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dc.contributor.advisorKoonce, Lisa Lynn, 1959-en
dc.creatorSmith, James William, 1979-en
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-26T21:18:13Zen
dc.date.available2012-09-26T21:18:13Zen
dc.date.issued2012-08en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/18036en
dc.descriptiontexten
dc.description.abstractManagerial communications often contain biased information because of managerial incentives and other influences. A common assumption in the accounting literature is that if investors are aware of managerial biases, they will be able to fully adjust for those known biases when reacting to managerial communications. Drawing on insights from psychology, I experimentally document that investors are not able to fully adjust for known biases in managerial communications--even when investors know the quantitative amount of the manager's bias. Indeed, investors behave contrary to economic theory as they are unable to fully unravel the effects of known biases when rendering judgments about the firm. My study has implications for researchers, regulators, and investors.en
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works.en
dc.subjectFinancial accountingen
dc.subjectManagerial biasen
dc.subjectBelief biasen
dc.titleCan investors fully adjust for known biases in manager communications?en
dc.description.departmentAccountingen
thesis.degree.departmentAccountingen
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen
thesis.degree.grantorThe University of Texas at Austinen
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen


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