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dc.creatorSmith, James William, 1979-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-26T21:18:13Z
dc.date.available2012-09-26T21:18:13Z
dc.date.created2012-08
dc.date.issued2012-09-26
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/18036
dc.descriptiontext
dc.description.abstractManagerial communications often contain biased information because of managerial incentives and other influences. A common assumption in the accounting literature is that if investors are aware of managerial biases, they will be able to fully adjust for those known biases when reacting to managerial communications. Drawing on insights from psychology, I experimentally document that investors are not able to fully adjust for known biases in managerial communications--even when investors know the quantitative amount of the manager's bias. Indeed, investors behave contrary to economic theory as they are unable to fully unravel the effects of known biases when rendering judgments about the firm. My study has implications for researchers, regulators, and investors.en_US
dc.format.mediumelectronic
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works.
dc.subjectFinancial accountingen_US
dc.subjectManagerial biasen_US
dc.subjectBelief biasen_US
dc.titleCan investors fully adjust for known biases in manager communications?en_US
dc.description.departmentAccountingen_US
thesis.degree.departmentAccountingen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen_US
thesis.degree.grantorThe University of Texas at Austin
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US


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