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dc.creatorShepard, Danielen
dc.creatorHumphreys, Todden
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-22T17:11:56Zen
dc.date.available2012-08-22T17:11:56Zen
dc.date.created2011-10en
dc.date.issued2012-08-22en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/17605en
dc.descriptionPreprint of the 2011 ION GNSS Conference Portland, OR, September 19-23, 2011en
dc.description.abstractTest procedures are developed for characterizing the response of civil GPS receivers to spoofing attacks. Two response characteristics are analyzed in detail for four representative GPS receivers: (1) the spoofer power advantage over the authentic signals required for successful receiver capture, and (2) the aggressiveness with which a spoofer can manipulate the victim receiver’s time and position solution. Two of the tested receivers are commonly used in critical infrastructure applications, one in smart power grid regulation and one in telecommunications networks. The implications of the test results for these critical infrastructure applications are discussed.en
dc.publisherThe Institute of Navigationen
dc.subjectGPS Spoofingen
dc.titleCharacterization of Receiver Response to Spoofing Attacksen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.description.departmentAerospace Engineeringen


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