Browsing by Subject "Happiness"

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Aristotle on luck : the role of coincidence in happiness and virtue
(2023-08) Wei, Yixin, Ph. D.; White, Stephen A. (Stephen Augustus); Hankinson, Robert J; Woodruff, Paul B; Driver, Julia; Evans, Matthew; Dean-Jones, Lesley A
This dissertation investigates Aristotle’s view on the place and significance of luck (τύχη) in happiness and virtue. According to the prevalent interpretation, Aristotle maintains that happiness and virtue are largely dependent on luck, for he believes that they are susceptible to the influence of factors beyond our control. I argue against the prevalent reading and offer a different interpretation: Aristotle claims that luck does not have a significant impact on happiness or virtue. A major assumption of the prevalent interpretation is that Aristotle defines “luck” as factors beyond our control. My dissertation shows that this assumption is mistaken. Instead, I argue that Aristotle’s discussions of luck in the ethical treatises depend on his own theory of luck developed in Phys. II.4-6: luck is a coincidental cause in the sphere of human actions that involve choice (Chapter 1). Aristotle argues that luck is unable to bring about happiness on the grounds that happiness cannot be determined by coincidences, which are irregular, unstable, and unforeseeable (Chapter 2). More specifically, Aristotle defines happiness as activity of soul in accordance with virtue, with a moderate amount of external goods in addition. Though external goods may be acquired or possessed by luck, Aristotle claims that virtuous dispositions and activities, which are the main components of happiness, are largely invulnerable to luck. Dispositions are invulnerable to luck because both natural dispositions and habits are regular and stable, such that they cannot be dominated by coincidences (Chapter 3). Virtuous activities are invulnerable to luck because even if the results of our actions are coincidentally caused, we can still act virtuously (Chapter 4). Furthermore, Aristotle’s theory of voluntariness commits him to a denial of what contemporary philosophers call “moral luck”, for he claims that factors beyond our control do not affect our praiseworthiness or blameworthiness (Chapter 5). Overall, according to the interpretation defended in this dissertation, because Aristotle consistently conceives of luck as a coincidental cause, and coincidences are irregular, unstable, and unforeseeable, he believes that luck plays no significant role in happiness and virtue.
Family support, family income, and happiness : a 10-year perspective
(2007-08) North, Rebecca Jeanne; Holahan, Charles J.
This study with 274 married adults examined the relative contributions of family income and family support to happiness across a 10-year period. Family income showed a small, positive association with concurrent happiness, whereas family support showed a substantial, positive association with concurrent happiness. The positive association between income and happiness grew weaker as income increased. Furthermore, family income moderated the association between family support and concurrent happiness; family support was more strongly associated with happiness when family income was low than when family income was high. In addition, change in family support was positively related to change in happiness, while change in family income was unrelated to change in happiness. These findings suggest that happiness can change and underscore the importance of exploring more deeply the role that family relationships play in facilitating such change.
From failure to flourishing: a cognitive, emotional, and behavioral model
(2010-05) North, Rebecca Jeanne; Holahan, Charles J.; Carlson, Caryn L.; Pennebaker, James W.; Swann, William B.; Wong, Patrick P.
Two studies were conducted to examine if and how failure can lead to subsequent psychological flourishing. Both studies used the context of individuals’ biggest job-related failure or most significant challenge to test a proposed model of adaptive response to failure. Specifically, it was proposed that, at a cognitive/emotional level, an adaptive response to failure is characterized by acceptance of negative emotions and self-acceptance. Further, it was proposed that at a behavioral level, an adaptive response to failure involves goal disengagement coupled with goal reengagement, including reengaging with new goals that are intrinsically meaningful. These complementary studies both examined the relationship between individuals’ response to failure and psychological flourishing. Studies were conducted with different participant samples and used complementary designs to provide converging evidence for the proposed model. Using a random sampling process to recruit participants, Study 1 (N = 50) consisted of semi-structured interviews with individuals from the Austin community. Study 2 (N = 101) was an online study and consisted of a series of questionnaires and a writing task. Analyses were conducted on interviews, questionnaires, and writings to examine the relationships between response to failure, including acceptance of negative emotions, self-acceptance, goal disengagement, and goal reengagement, and psychological flourishing. Overall, findings underscored the significance of acceptance and goal reengagement in predicting psychological flourishing after failure. Goal reengagement, in particular, consistently predicted subsequent flourishing. Results also indicated that in response to failure, both persistence toward meeting established goals and moving beyond established goals can lead to subsequent flourishing. These findings imply that flexibility, rather than adherence to a singular response, may be adaptive in responding at a behavioral level to failure. Furthermore, results showed that failures characterized by higher emotional distress can lead to greater subsequent psychological flourishing than failures characterized by low levels of emotional distress. Overall, both studies demonstrate that failure, when responded to in an adaptive way, can lead to a broad range of positive psychological outcomes.
Pleasure and political philosophy in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
(2022-05-05) Jiang, Jonathan; Stauffer, Devin, 1970-; Pangle, Lorraine Smith
This thesis analyzes Aristotle’s treatment of pleasure in book seven of the Nicomachean Ethics. The thesis argues that Aristotle’s identification of contemplative activity with a certain kind of pleasure fulfills a key part of his project to articulate a vision of happiness that is unified and harmonious and, accordingly, that Aristotle’s reflections on pleasure help illuminate his claim that the philosopher is the architect of the end of human life. The thesis suggests further that Aristotle implicitly qualifies this vision of happiness by indicating the internal tensions of the philosophic life.
Protected area effectiveness : wildlife conservation and human well-being in Kirindy Mitea National Park, Madagascar
(2024-05) Romanello, Domenic Michael ; Lewis, Rebecca J., 1972-; Dr. Denné Reed; Dr. Aaron Sandel; Dr. Patricia Wright; Dr. Jason Cons
Effective wildlife conservation is inextricably linked to the well-being of people living in and around conservation areas. Historically, conservationists have focused on a narrow range of externally defined socio-economic proxies for human well-being, failing to provide the affected population with the opportunity to assess their own life and connection to local conservation interventions. If conservation area assessments do not faithfully detect the complex and multidimensional nature of human well-being, conservation policies and practices may be misaligned with the core objectives of conservation and detrimental to the rights and livelihoods of local communities. To address this concern, a thorough exploration of human and wildlife well-being was conducted in and around Kirindy Mitea National Park (KMNP), Madagascar, as a case study to illuminate broader issues in the global protected area system. Despite the alarming incidence and intensity of poverty around KMNP, the link between poverty and human well-being was not as strong as anticipated, indicating the impact of non-socio-economic determinants of human well-being. Notably, local people did not attribute their low socio-economic standing or diminished well-being to KMNP. However, local people did emphasize the substantial costs borne by their communities as a result of eviction and the loss of access to land and resources under stringent environmental protections. While these protections rendered KMNP more effective than nearby unprotected areas, the well-being of wildlife in KMNP was compromised by severe and unsustainable habitat loss and species overexploitation, leading to population non-sustainability among several conservation target species. Enhancing the effectiveness of KMNP and the broader global protected area system is essential. Embracing a community-based participatory approach that actively involves local communities in the research process and incorporates their perspectives, experiences, and aspirations, yields a more holistic understanding of the situation locally, and ensures alignment with the vision of people around the conservation area so that the goals of wildlife conservationists are met without compromising the well-being of the people involved.
Rigorous honesty : an ongoing wrestling match with happiness and fear
(2015-05) Kettler, Brian Klein; Dietz, Steven; Lynn, Kirk; Engelman, Liz
In my thesis, Rigorous Honesty: An Ongoing Wrestling Match with Happiness and Fear, I will examine the role of fear and ego in my artistic practice and collaborations with other artists. My investigation is based around the concept of The Process vs. The Ticket mentality. At UT, I've committed fully to the process of creating and mounting new work. This has helped to combat the "Ticket" mentality or, thinking of each project as a ticket to widespread success, acclaim of financial gain. Additionally, I have craved and sought out close scrutiny and critique from my colleagues and professors. This commitment to the "process" of UT has helped me find moments of joy, connection and artistic breakthrough. While I still struggle with fear, jealousy and ego, I’ve been able to adopt concrete strategies to keep the focus on my work and my own personal version of success.
Social forces and hedonic adaptation
(2013-05) Chugani, Sunaina Kumar; Irwin, Julie R.
Consumers acquire products to enhance their lives, but the happiness from these acquisitions generally decreases with the passage of time. This process of hedonic adaptation plays an integral role in post-acquisition consumer satisfaction, product disposal and replacement behavior, and the "hedonic treadmill" that partially drives the relationship between consumption and happiness. Humans are social animals, however, and we know little about the relationship between the social environment and hedonic adaptation. My dissertation addresses this gap by exploring the moderating role of social presence (Essay 1) and self-concepts (Essay 2) on hedonic adaptation to products. Essay 1 explores how social presence affects hedonic adaptation to products. Research on general happiness has shown that significantly positive life events tend to maintain their positivity for longer periods of time when they involve active social interactions. I examine a more common situation in the domain of product consumption, i.e., the presence of others during consumption, and test whether hedonic adaptation to products is moderated by public contexts. By tracking happiness with products over time, I show that a "social audience" (i.e., the presence of others and the perception that those others notice the consumer) moderates hedonic adaptation through a consumer's inference of the social audience perspective. Inferring that the social audience is admiring one's product slows down adaptation, and inferring that the social audience is negatively viewing one's product accelerates adaptation. Essay 2 explores the role the identity-relevance of a product plays in hedonic adaptation. Extant research illustrates that consumers avoid consuming identity-inconsistent products in order to avoid dissonance arising from product choices conflicting with important self-concepts. I show that dissonance can also arise from consuming identity-consistent products because of the force of hedonic adaptation. I provide evidence that consumers feel uncomfortable experiencing declining happiness with identity-consistent products and thus resist hedonic adaptation to such products in order to resolve the dissonance.
The value of Socratic inquiry
(2023-12) Matherne, Matthew Todd; Evans, Matthew Lyall, 1970-; Barney, Rachel; Drucker, Daniel; White, Stephen A
In Plato’s Apology, Socrates claims his practice of Socratic inquiry is the “greatest good for a human” (38a2-5) and that practicing it in the afterlife would be “inconceivable happiness”(41c3-4). What makes Socratic inquiry (SI) valuable? This question, call it the Value Question, gives shape to this project. Since this question concerns the value of an epistemic activity, I first analyze Socratic value theory and the nature of the activity before considering how Socrates’ claims about the value of SI might be accounted for within Socrates’ theory of value. Yet as I began to wonder about the Value Question, I encountered a related interpretive tangle concerning Socratic happiness. On the one hand, Socrates seems committed to the view that he is happy because he thinks his characteristic practice (SI) is the greatest good and is happiness. On the other, Socrates seems committed to the view that he is unhappy because wisdom is necessary for happiness yet Socrates is ignorant. I term this the Socratic Happiness Paradox. As an initial step toward unravelling this textual knot, I first survey the literature relevant to the Socratic Happiness Paradox and reduce the paradox to a dilemma: either one must reject the necessity thesis or one must reject that practicing SI is the greatest human good and is happiness. Then I argue, via a close reading of Euthydemus 278-82 along with relevant passages in the Gorgias, Meno and Apology, that Socrates is not committed to the view that wisdom is necessary for happiness and that this coheres with the value theory presented in the aforementioned dialogues. The second half of the project develops a novel answer to the Value Question. Instrumentalism, the view that SI is merely instrumentally valuable, has been a common explicit or implicit assumption of many recent interpreters. After surveying two puzzles that arise for instrumentalists, I argue that the best solution to these puzzles is to deny instrumentalism. Finally, I argue for a source of the non-instrumental value of SI before considering how this answer coheres with the theory of value developed in the first half of the project.
What’s happiness got to do with it? Wellbeing and sustainable development policy in Greater Victoria, British Columbia, Canada
(2013-08) Teschauer, Mark Daniel; Oden, Michael
Planners often invoke wellbeing, sustainability, and related concepts when discussing planning initiatives, all of which are contested within their own separate literatures. Some of these planners, however, have begun drawing connections between the disciplines, a connection that very few in the planning academic literature are recognizing and studying. Using the Greater Victoria Happiness Index Partnership (HIP) in British Columbia as its primary case study, this thesis draws upon HIP’s experience in creating regional wellbeing indicators to better understand this relationship. It will investigate the efficacy of their efforts in affecting regional policy, explore their as well as the academic understandings of the wellbeing/sustainable development relationship, and draw recommendations that ultimately suggest a new means of applying this relationship in planning and other realms of public policy.