Browsing by Subject "Deterrence"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3

Cooperation between Adversaries: The US and Russia’s Joint Effort against the Islamic State in Syria
(2018-05) Griffin, Abigail E.
The Syrian civil war has generated international media attention and interest since it broke out in 2011 as an Arab Spring uprising. The local conflict quickly became internationalized with two major coalitions at odds with each other—one supported by the United States and the other by Russia. The Russian coalition has included and backed the Assad regime in Syria, while the American coalition has supported several opposition groups and conducted air strikes against the Syrian government. However, the United States and Russia have managed to work together against a common enemy—the Islamic State. Cooperation is difficult to achieve, even between allies; oftentimes individuals defect in favor of their self-interests instead. Then how have the US and Russia managed to overcome their differences and incentives to defect and cooperate (avoiding war with each other) against the Islamic State? The answer rests in a thorough understanding of game theory and the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the two coalitions find themselves trapped.
Peace with strength : developing the conditions of coercive diplomacy
(2023-05-03) Ferguson, Daniel Max; Inboden, William, 1972-; Suri, Jeremi; Greitens, Sheena C; Lawrence, Mark A; Biddle, Tami
United States policymakers need viable crisis response options – other than war – when deterrence is not able to prevent aggression. This study examines one policy option in the space between deterrence and war: coercive diplomacy. Applied successfully, coercive diplomacy defuses emerging conflicts by persuading an aggressor to change or reverse their behavior. However, attempts at coercive diplomacy fail more often than they succeed, even when applied by global powers like the United States. I build on the work of scholars who have examined policy traits found within effective coercive diplomacy attempts. Alexander George first developed a set of conditions for coercive diplomacy – also described as ingredients or prerequisites – that, when present, increase the policy’s likelihood of success. A critical gap in the literature is a study that helps understand what leads to creating the conditions for coercive diplomacy – or what stands in the way of establishing those conditions. The central research question for this study is what facilitates or inhibits U.S. policymakers from developing favorable conditions for coercive diplomacy? I examine historical cases from the Johnson, Reagan, and Clinton administrations where the United States attempted coercive diplomacy to reveal the messy realities of policymaking. I uncover the complicated relationships, impediments to action, and what subtle factors helped U.S. decision-makers develop policies to compel opponents to change behavior. This research helps establish how policymakers achieve the conditions of coercive diplomacy or what factors prevent them from attaining these benchmarks. The conclusion of this dissertation provides original insights about the eight conditions, both individually and how they interact with one another. Learning how the conditions interact is one of the novel and important contributions of my dissertation to the field of coercion. Understanding how the conditions interact also helps policymakers anticipate the dynamics or tensions between the different conditions. I share seven policy implications that this study reveals about future applications of coercive diplomacy. Lastly, I offer a series of initial questions that policymakers should ask before exercising coercive diplomacy.
The shield of Asia : how deterrence and domestic politics shaped U.S. China policy, 1949-1969
(2017-05) Battjes, Mark E.; Lawrence, Mark Atwood; Inboden, William; Brands, Henry W; Marston, Daniel; Suri, Jeremi
“The Shield of Asia” explains the continuity of U.S. foreign policy towards China and the Asia-Pacific region from 1949 to 1969. It considers how domestic politics, ideas about deterrence, and more traditional geostrategic, military, and economic concerns influenced the formation of U.S. foreign policy. Despite the many changes in the strategic landscape, which included the Sino-Soviet split, China’s explosion of a nuclear device, the 1965 coup in Indonesia, and the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet wars, America’s foreign policy remained focused on the military containment and political and economic isolation of the People’s Republic of China. As allies, members of Congress, and the American public began to question U.S. foreign policy in the broad and diverse Asia-Pacific region, and particularly its policy toward China and South Vietnam, the Johnson administration deployed what I call the “shield thesis.” A companion to the domino theory, the shield thesis argued that the U.S. military deterrent in the region, directed at the People’s Republic of China, allowed the non-communist countries to develop politically, economically, and socially along Western lines. The domino theory told the American people why China had to be contained; the shield thesis explained how. The Johnson administration did not create the shield thesis. Rather, the shield thesis evolved during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to explain American foreign policy. The Johnson administration capitalized on the thesis’ development and used it to justify continuing American involvement in the Vietnam War. The coming shift in American foreign policy towards China and the Asia-Pacific announced by Nixon in the Guam Doctrine represented not the end of the shield thesis but an expression of confidence in its success. The assumptions that underpinned the shield thesis and provided it validity for American policymakers during the Cold War continue to inform U.S. decision making in the region, and around the world, today.