Browsing by Subject "Conditional cash transfers"

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The domestic politics of policy diffusion
(2024-05) Domanico Vega, Diego Luis ; Weyland, Kurt Gerhard; Madrid, Raul; Weaver, Catherine; Elkins, Zachary; Hunter, Wendy
Why do some policies diffuse faster and to more countries than others? My dissertation provides a novel theory of policy diffusion. My research design, comparing the different diffusion patterns of three policies in Latin America, overcomes a long-lasting deficiency in the policy diffusion literature. Studies have focused almost exclusively on cases that diffused fast to many countries. This collective selection bias generated a theoretical oversight. Studies mistakenly consider the spread of information about a policy as a sufficient explanation for fast and widespread diffusion. My work focuses on the necessary domestic step, in which policymakers decide whether to enact and implement the idea. The speed and breadth of policies’ diffusion patterns depend on those decisions in multiple countries. With a focus on Latin America, I argue that presidents are the most influential policymakers. They apply institutional powers to fast-track the adoption of some models and to block the adoption of others. The expectation about the policy’s political effects on their popularity and electoral prospects determines presidents’ behavior. In short, policies that generate immediate political gains for the executive will be fast-tracked in multiple countries, resulting in a fast and wide diffusion. Policy models that reduce presidents’ electoral chances will be repeatedly blocked or delayed, failing to diffuse. In between, policies without a clear electoral effect will be adopted through normal policymaking and are likely to diffuse slowly to multiple countries. I apply a comparative process-tracing analysis of three policies: conditional cash transfers (CCTs) diffused quickly to most countries in the region; public-private partnerships (PPPs) diffused widely but slowly; and electronic voting machines (EVMs) diffused to only a couple of countries. Official documents and secondary data from eighteen countries reveal that presidents used their powers to accelerate the adoption of CCTs because the policy could increase their popular support among beneficiaries. In turn, they withheld investments in EVMs, which could alter voters’ behavior and jeopardize presidents’ expected electoral support. And these same chief executives initiated PPPs’ adoption but refrained from interfering in Congressional debates and implementation because the policy has limited effects on popularity. In-depth interviews from Colombia and Argentina confirm the political rationale that motivated presidents’ behavior.