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**Vote Choice in the Presence of Targeted Benefit Transfers: Unpacking
the Voter's Decision-Making Process**

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this to my wife Butet, and daughters Kirana and Bintari. Without their patience and sacrifice, this dissertation would not have been completed. For that and more, I thank them.

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Vote Choice in the Presence of Targeted Benefit Transfers: Unpacking the Voter's Decision-Making Process

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Abstract: In many developing democracies, political campaigns distribute cash and other goods to voters prior to elections in order to mobilize support. This study examines how receiving targeted benefits from political campaigns impacts three steps in the decision-making process. Each empirical chapter in this dissertation focuses on a different step in the process and tests hypotheses with original data from the Indonesian context. The first step is *acceptance*: voters must overcome obstacles just to receive campaign transfers. Accordingly, Chapter Two examines the economic hurdles to obtaining targeted benefits and how these hurdles affect patterns of distribution among the voting population. It outlines a micro-economic theory that explains who accepts transfers by leveraging differences in the costs of accepting cash versus accepting in-kind transfers. Next, Chapter Three examines how targeted transfers affect voter *participation* in the form of turning out to vote, by those voters who do accept targeted transfers. It finds that while there is heterogeneity in how political parties mobilize voters to the polls, each strategy does increase turnout as there is no evidence of encouraging abstention among those who receive transfers. Finally, Chapter Four examines *vote choice* among those individuals who accepted transfers from campaigns. To test the propositions outlined in the dissertation, micro-level survey data from two typical Regency-Level elections in Indonesia are used.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation examines the decision-making process undergone by voters in young democracies when they cast their votes for public office. In these settings, a key issue weighing on many voters' minds is the value they place on private transfers distributed prior to elections and whether those transfers alter their voting behavior. These targeted benefit transfers are provided to voters by campaigns in exchange for their vote (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, Hicken, 2011). Although various forms of contingent exchange have been studied for decades by political scientists (Scott 1969, Lemarchand and Legg, 1972), this dissertation uses more recent work on formal decision making models as a departure point to examine aspects of individual voting behavior (Stokes 2005, Nichter 2008, Stokes et al. 2013, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014).

Studies of formal decision making are a useful starting point for this project because they bring into focus various steps in the decision-making process and highlight key variables weighed by voters during this process. There are separate acts that take place sequentially before one ultimately decides whom to vote for, if they vote at all. In these pages, voter choice decisions will be broken down into three sequential steps. First, voters decide to accept or reject targeted benefits, if offered. Second, voters (whether or not they received benefits) decide whether to vote. And third, voters decide upon a candidate, whether from the campaign that provided them with the benefit or one that did not.

Campaigns provide targeted benefits to influence who turns out and whom they vote for, but they cannot overlook the importance of providing something of value to voters so that they accept these transfers initially. Any deviation from these three steps results in wasted resources and reduce the effectiveness of this political mobilization strategy.

This dissertation is not the first study to highlight the importance of a multi-step process. Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2014) argue that targeted transfers are an attempt to establish contingent relationships between political parties and voters. However, they point out that the success of such a strategy is conditioned by two variables. First, it is conditioned by each voter's preference toward or against the party providing the transfer, and second it is conditional upon that voter's likelihood to vote. From this insight, the authors generate a two-by-two typology of political mobilization in which one axis describes an individual voter's likelihood to vote and the other describes how likely that voter is to choose the political party that provided a targeted benefit. The typology suggests that scholars are already moving in the direction of conceptualizing the use of targeted benefits during campaigns as a multi-step process. Some individuals are likely to vote, while others are not. For these individuals a transfer may simply encourage turnout, but would not impact their choice. For individuals who are detached from politics, the transfer may both encourage turnout and influence their choice of candidate. While there are still others who may be likely to turnout but have not decided whom to vote for yet. For this last group, the transfer impacts that final stage of the process.

Given this sequence, the substantive chapters in this dissertation examine three corresponding dependent variables: whether a voter accepts a good, whether they turn out to vote, and for whom they vote. Each of the chapters uses survey data from two mayoral elections in Indonesia to explain variation in each of these outcomes.

Substantive chapters in this dissertation begin with Chapter Two. This chapter explores the kinds of voters that accept private benefit transfers from campaigns prior to elections. In other words, it examines which voters are targeted successfully by campaigns. The literature on this question generally assumes that the poorest voters are most likely to enter into such contingent relationships (Hicken 2011). However, the findings in this

dissertation are somewhat inconsistent with this idea. The survey data indicate a generally negative relationship between income and targeting across the entire distribution, but they also show that the poorest individuals were less likely to receive transfers from campaigns than were their working class neighbors. In other words, there is a short uptick in the probability of accepting a transfer before the negative relationship is found. Although working class individuals in this context are also objectively poor, this finding highlights that the likelihood receiving targeted transfers does not strictly decrease as income increases. Thus, the relationship between income and the probability of accepting a targeted transfer from a campaign is concave, rather than strictly decreasing. Surprisingly, there is interesting variation at the lowest part of the income distribution, which in turn, highlights other individual-level factors play a role in one's decision to accept targeted benefits from a campaign. Finally, Chapter Two provides micro-foundations for the downward slope of the relationship. It outlines how the law of diminishing marginal utility is relevant to in-kind transfers – but not cash transfers - and that it is this mechanism responsible for the negative relationship found in the data.

While there are potentially numerous factors on which to focus, Chapter Two uses the formal spatial models in the vote buying and clientelism literature as a starting point (Stokes 2005, Nichter 2008, Stokes et al. 2013). All of these models use a similar formulation, which generally begin with the form: $u_i = -\frac{1}{2} (X_i - V_i)^2 + b_i - c_i$, where u_i is the utility of person i , X_i is the ideological position on the political spectrum for candidate i , V_i is the position on the ideological spectrum for voter i , b_i is the benefit given to voter i for their support, and c_i is the cost of voting. Much of the analysis in this literature then focuses on variation in voting behavior driven from the ideological portion of the model, while holding the benefit transfers constant. Chapter Two however, expands on this literature by theorizing and testing the underlying microeconomic logic of b_i , the term

representing private goods in the model. Since accepting targeted benefits does not strictly decrease with voter incomes, the paper examines whether the type of benefits transferred affects the first step in the vote buying process – accepting a benefit from a campaign - in any way.

In a sense, Chapter Two outlines an underlying function that impacts b_i – the private transfer from the campaign to the voter – by providing a more complete model of the decision making process involved in the first decision made by the voter, whether the transfer even has enough value to them to seek it out. Microeconomic theory suggests that benefits provided by governments can target different sets of individuals depending on how those benefits are distributed, often whether they are distributed as in-kind transfers or as cash. When economic costs are applied to a broad group of eligible people, only those individuals willing to pay the cost opt into receiving that benefit (Currie and Ghavari 2008). In Chapter Two, this logic is transferred to the electoral area and applied to the distribution of targeted benefits prior to elections because like public welfare transfers, campaigns can impose costs on those accepting transfers by providing different types of benefits to potential voters. This explanation contributes to the literature because it provides a microeconomic explanation, rather than a cultural explanation where the in-kind transfer activates a sense of belonging to a particular identity, for the use of in-kind benefit transfers during campaigns. Chapter Two also explores how various occupational obstacles faced by the poorest limit their exposure to political campaigns, relative to their working class neighbors. The chapter adds to our understanding of structural factors in the local economy that also impact the relationship between accepting targeted benefits and income.

Chapter Three focuses on voter participation, the second stage in the decision making process. Specifically, it examines the determinants of turnout. Although the literature on voter participation dates back decades, few studies focus on developing

countries (Fornos et al. 2004; Blais 2006). This chapter tests empirically whether accepting transfers is, in fact, positively associated with voter participation in elections, independent of other possible determinants of turnout.

It is important to establish this fact because there remain a number of possible explanations for any relationship – if found - between these two variables. For example, parties may reward campaign event attendees. Therefore, what appears to be campaigns using targeted benefits to increase turnout may simply be campaigns rewarding party loyalists. In this case, targeted transfers are really a proxy for party identification rather than an independent factor unto itself. These voters were going to participate in the election anyway, leaving these transfers with no independent impact of their own. Alternatively, particularistic benefits might also be given to encourage abstention from opposition voters (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014). Cox and Kousser (1981) showed that paying potential voters to stay home one Election Day – i.e. abstention buying - increased with the spread of the secret ballot because it could be monitored. If this is occurring in Indonesia, one might expect a negative relationship. However, since it is unlikely campaigns would exclusively use this strategy, one might not see a simple correlation between having received a transfer and turnout if campaign both attempt to buy both turnout and abstention. In this scenario, the two impacts could cancel each other out.

The analysis in Chapter Three shows that party identification and receiving transfers each have their own independent impacts on turnout, but that the impacts for party identification are heterogeneous. Party identification for some parties is positively associated with turnout while others either have no association or have a weak positive association. Moreover, age and political knowledge are identified as variables that also impact voter turnout. This fact highlights that researchers in comparative politics who

study behavior in poor countries would be wise to better incorporate variables from the American politics literature into our understanding of voting behavior.

Chapter Four assesses the third step in the decision-making process: vote choice. It builds directly on literature featuring formal spatial models of politics with targeted transfers (Stokes 2005, Nichter 2008, Stokes et al. 2013). Specifically, this chapter questions whether political scientists should assume that all political parties in developing countries are easily placed along an ideological spectrum. Then, it reparametrizes the placement assumption for one political party using a probability distribution, rather than a point estimate, to model placement uncertainty.

The formal model suggests that an equilibrium exists where non-ideological parties compete rationally to mobilize votes. Specifically, non-ideological parties attempt to buy votes from all potential voters within twice the distance of the placement of the ideological party from the median voter. In practice, this means that the non-ideological party will try to buy votes from all voters, except those who strongly identify with the other party competing in the election.

The empirical results generally support the model's prediction and show that receiving transfers from campaigns is a stronger driver of vote choice than party identification. However, when receiving transfers is conditioned by identification with one of the Islamic Organizations affiliated with a major political party, the impacts of transfers on vote choice are muted. In other words, targeted transfers are a strong driver of vote choice for voters who don't identify with one of Indonesia's large Islamic organizations, which are arguably more ideologically coherent than are their secular counterparts.

Each of these papers examines how targeted transfers impact each step in the decision-making process, when targeted benefits exchange hands between political campaigns and voters. The next section looks at the types of distributive politics more

broadly so the reader can place the type of targeted transfers observed in Indonesia within the broader political science literature.

CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING CONTINGENT RELATIONSHIPS

Studies in developing countries dating back at least to the 1960s have observed the presence of relationships between voters and political parties - or machines - where a voter's political support for a candidate is contingent upon the exchange of money or other targeted benefits (for example Scott 1969). These older studies have often been categorized under the heading of clientelism and share a number of common traits. Scholars generally agree that clientelistic relationships are dyadic, hierarchical, and iterative over time, and that the exchange of benefits is contingent on political support (Hicken 2011). These older studies uncovered clientelistic politics using qualitative fieldwork. Scholars would visit locations in the developing world and observe how political parties or machines interacted with voters over time. They would observe exchanges that occurred between the client and patron before, during, and after campaign season. More recently, however, scholars have noted in their work that other forms of contingent exchange exist. The most studied type of alternative exchange is classified as 'vote buying.' Compared to clientelism, vote buying has fewer identifiable traits and as a result is more broadly defined than clientelism. Schaffer and Schedler (2007, p.1) simply define vote buying as "the exchange of money, goods, or services for votes."

There are a number of key differences between the two concepts. First, political support in a clientelistic setting can include political activities other than voting. For example, Auyero's (2000) study of clientelism in Argentina provides examples of citizens

attending political rallies to show support for their patrons. In exchange, they hope to get a future job in the local government when one becomes available. In this example, there is a longer time horizon for payback by the political patron. The rally is attended at present and the payback occurs in the future at some unspecified date. The promise is considered credible because of repeated contact between the voter and party representative over time. Moreover, in contrast to vote buying, political support is provided in the form of attendance to a rally, not at a polling station. The political party is willing to pay for this, however, as it signals their popularity and importance to the population more generally. Vote buying, by contrast, requires that political support take the form of votes and the connection between the voting and the benefit is more direct.

Recently scholars have begun to broaden how vote buying and clientelism are classified. One prominent paper usefully distinguishes these contingent relationships by the various strategies behind their usage (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014). These scholars recognized that attempts to establish contingent relationships between political parties and voters is conditional upon (1) each voter's preference toward (or against) the party attempting to secure their vote and (2) that voter's likelihood to vote. Some voters need to be convinced to support a candidate while others just need an incentive to participate in an election. Even others need to be convinced to abstain from voting.

Gans-Morse et al. describe a two by two conceptualization of politics in which targeted transfers are provided by campaigns: the first axis describes an individual voter's likelihood to vote and the second axis describes the likelihood that a voter would choose the political party that provides a targeted benefit (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014). Immediately, the reader should see that the first axis describes turnout, while the second axis describes a voter's behavior once they have reached the voting booth. These

classifications are based upon two separate actions at two separate time periods, and they map onto the final two stages in the decision making process outlined in this dissertation.

In this typology, these scholars identify four possible types of relationships. The first type they call double persuasion, in which a voter is both *unlikely to vote* and *indifferent or weakly opposed* to the party providing the transfer. For this person the transfer has two purposes. It first encourages the voter to turnout, then it persuades the voter to choose the party that provided the transfer. The second type is called turnout buying, which is where the voter is *unlikely to vote*, but generally supports the party that provided the voter with the transfer. For this type, the transfer has one purpose: it simply encourages the voter to make it to the polling station on Election Day. Convincing the voter to vote for the party is not necessary because they already support that party. The third type has two sub-categories, vote buying and abstention buying. These individuals are both likely to vote, but the former is *indifferent* to the party while the other *strongly opposes* the party. This typology recognizes that it would be almost impossible to change the mind of a strong rival so the best course of action is to encourage them not to vote. Abstention buying however, generally requires some institutional mechanism that allows for the party to ensure they stay home on Election Day, such as voter identification cards that can be turned over the party until after the election. These scholars call the final category of providing targeted transfers as ‘rewarding loyalists’ because these transfers are provided to voters who are both likely to vote and choose the party once in the polling booth. These are the voters that have iterative relationships with political parties over time and dominate much of the qualitative clientelism literature (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014).

While this typology is useful conceptually, breaking it down by each stage in the voting process outlined in this dissertation highlights some inherent empirical issues. In

the turnout stage, each of the typologies in the framework –except voter abstention - predicts that receiving a transfer should increase turnout. If one controls for party preferences, however, the analysis does gain some traction and may be able to distinguish between some of these typologies. For example, if an election is dominated by parties targeting loyalists with transfers, party identification and having received a transfer would be highly correlated. In a regression framework, this might lead to statistically insignificant findings on both variables due to collinearity, or to a significant coefficient on the party identification indicator only if the campaign only rewards a sub-set of this group. Alternatively, if the political parties focus their resources on buying turnout, one might find transfers to be a more consistent predictor than party identification as those who identify with the party but do not receive a transfer sit at home. But empirically distinguishing between these typologies becomes impossible if scholars believe political parties use mixed strategies, which many do (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014).

Despite this, the framework remains useful conceptually because it highlights the multiple stages involved when campaigns use targeted benefits to mobilize electoral support. To understand the underlying mechanics, one has to examine each step of the process beginning with who receives targeted goods until votes are cast. Note, this approach differs substantially from much of the previous work on clientelism. Ethnographic researchers have studied these political relationships extensively, and they generally focus on the unequal power relationships involved and the iterative process that can be observed over time (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972). Auyero argues that to understand clientelism, one must conduct research over extended periods of time in the communities themselves, otherwise one will miss how these relationships build up (Auyero 1999). He says that:

“It is not in the boisterous - and often pathetic - distribution of food packages before a political rally or election, but in the abiding ties, in the enduring webs of relations that politicians establish with their "clients" and in the – sometimes shared (although not cooperatively constructed) - array of cultural representation” (Auyero, 1999, p. 327).

The reader should note that this quotation focuses on loyalists described in the typology. When ethnographic researchers embed themselves in local social and political networks overtime, they by definition study those local actors who are politically engaged between elections due to the length of time these researchers spend in the field conducting their work. They identify those citizens who are in constant contact with party members, whether political activities are ongoing or not, and thus limit their research to “loyal supporters” in the above typology.

More recent studies use survey data to study vote buying, which has its own strengths and weaknesses. First, survey research allows cross-country comparisons to be made. One prominent source of survey data is Afrobarometer, which asks:

“And during the [20xx] election, how often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift, in return for your vote?” (Jensen and Justesen 2014, p. 224).

The response categories are ordinal categories that include ‘Never’, ‘No experience with this in the past year’, ‘Once or twice’, ‘A few times’, or ‘Often’ (Jensen and Justesen 2014, p. 224). This survey question –and others like it - clearly attempt to measure vote buying, but it should be noted that each of the voter types outlined by Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter (2014) could theoretically respond ‘yes’ to this question, except those

whose abstention is being bought or possibly loyalists, if one believes they will read such a question and respond that the gift and their vote are not connected.

While both of these approaches to studying the role of transfers and how they impact voting behavior are useful, each has its drawbacks. Ideally, researchers would generate panel survey data so they could distinguish between voters who fit into these categories empirically because these categories are quite useful theoretically. A survey that repeatedly asks respondents which parties they favored at regular intervals over time would allow researchers to better identify voters in the data who had stable party ideologies and those who did not, which would make identifying loyalists, weak supporters, and opposition voters *prior to any transfer* being made from the campaign to the voter. However, the two most common approaches – survey and ethnographic research - are feasible for most researchers.

This dissertation measures transfers from campaigns to voters using surveys of registered voters in the two regencies studied. Therefore it is difficult to determine which type of contingent relationship a transfer represents; it suffers from many of the same measurement issues the Afrobarometer measure discussed above does. However, this survey does improve on previous survey measures by providing more detailed responses in two ways. First, rather than asking voters whether they received “food or a gift” from a campaign, the survey specifically asks whether the respondent received cash and whether they received in-kind goods as two separate questions. Rather than lumping all transfers together, the survey here separates out transfers into categories, which is what allows for the analysis in Chapter Two to be conducted.

Second, the survey asks about targeted transfers from each campaign. Therefore, rather than simply identifying who may have accepted something from a campaign and

lumping them all together, the measures here allow one to identify voters who may have received transfers from more than one campaign. With multiple parties competing for votes, the same voter might receive a transfer from a campaign attempting to buy their vote that they weakly oppose, while a different party they weakly support might be simply attempting to buy their participation in the election. Although the statistical power of this study is too small to conduct this hypothetical analysis, this approach to measurement would be useful for future work and this dissertation hopefully demonstrates that. In summary, the dissertation here uses cross-sectional survey data even with its limitations, however, it improves on previous survey measures by incorporating more detail into how the data is generated.

INDONESIAN CONTEXT

Each of the steps in the process of voter buying is examined in the context of mayoral elections in Indonesia. In this setting, clientelistic relationships are less consolidated due to institutional legacies of Indonesia's authoritarian past where local officials were regularly moved to new provinces (Sidel 2004). However, despite the absence of long-term clientelistic relationships, money and gifts do change hands prior to elections. Scott (1969) identified three requirements for political machines, and thus the distribution of targeted benefits to mobilize votes during elections, to flourish. His requirements were that (1) the country must elect their leaders, (2) there must be (close to) universal suffrage, and (2) elections must be relatively competitive, meaning that power must change hands frequently (p. 1143). Indonesia meets all three requirements.

The Indonesian state has five tiers of government, namely (1) the national government, (2) the provincial governments, (3) the regency governments, (4) the sub-district governments, and finally (5) the village level-governments (Buehler, 2009). This dissertation focuses on elections for regency-level governments, which have grown in importance. In the early 2000's, Indonesia began a process of decentralization that shifted political power and financial resources to the hundreds of these regency-level governments (Sulistiyanto and Erb, 2009). Indonesia delegated eleven policy areas to regency governments in 2001 including public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, transportation, trade and industry, investment, the environment, land affairs, cooperatives and labor. The central government retained power over national defense and security, foreign policy, monetary policy, and religious affairs (Buehler, 2009). As a result, the regency head, or mayor, became an incredibly powerful player in government who had the power to shape numerous policy areas in Indonesia. Local political competition became fierce following this delegation of responsibilities because the infusion of resources, and broad policy responsibilities, gave local government massive power over their jurisdictions. More than 25 percent of all public revenues were transferred to these regency-level governments through the General Allocation Fund to carry out their responsibilities (Rasyid, 2003, p.67-8).¹

Administrative decentralization in Indonesia was followed by political decentralization. A new electoral regime was put into place from Law No. 32 of 2004 on Local Government, which instituted direct elections for regency heads and mayors (from 2001-2004 regency heads were appointed by an elected regency-level council). Moreover,

¹ Note, 25% are transferred through the general allocation fund, while additional transfers are made through other mechanisms. Therefore, 25% is the lowest possible estimate of the share of public expenditures made by district-level governments. When other public funds are included, local governments are responsible for managing over 30% of the total share of public expenditures made by any public entity in Indonesia.

Law No. 32 of 2004 implemented two important electoral rules relevant for this project. First, as mentioned, direct elections for regency heads and mayors were to occur and they would be won by a plurality (Sulistiyanto and Erb, 2009). Regency head and mayor both manage the same level of government, the principal difference is that regency heads oversee rural areas while mayors oversee urban areas. And second, to prevent too many candidates from running in any one election, this law required candidates to run under the banner of a political party - or coalition of political parties - that received at least 15% of the vote from the most recent national election cycle for that area's legislator (Pratikno 2009, Choi 2009).² This law effectively caps the number of possible candidates at six. These new elections became known as *Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada)*, meaning "election for area head." For rural regencies, the area head is known as the *Bupati*, and for urban areas, the area head is known as the *Walikota*. However, as noted above, these two individuals sit at equal levels of government; below the provincial government, but above the sub district government.

Area studies experts who focus on Indonesia began to study *Pilkada* elections (e.g. Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009; Buehler and Tan, 2007; Vel, 2005; Hadiz, 2011; Holtzappel, 2009; Pratikno, 2009). The reason behind this shift from political research that focused on Jakarta toward examining local elections was obvious. If local governments have their citizens' best interests in mind, this new electoral structure would lead to improvements in the delivery of public services, improvements in governance, and improvements in the socioeconomic status of Indonesia's many impoverished residents. However, if citizen oversight was limited in practice, service delivery could vary widely, even deteriorating in some localities, and the quality of overall governance could suffer, stalling Indonesia's

² Alternatively, a political party or coalition of parties can back a candidate if they hold more than 15 percent of the seats in the local council.

development. The use of targeted transfers, known as “money politics” in the Indonesian literature, was of particular concern as it had the potential to undercut the electoral accountability mechanism put in place by this new law (Hadiz, 2011), a common finding in the clientelism and vote buying literature more broadly (Keefer 2007).

The literature on *Pilkadas* is filled with rich descriptive case studies from locations across the archipelago. Vel’s (2005) analysis of *Pilkada* elections in Sumba, an island in Eastern Indonesia, stresses that networks rooted in churches, traditional hierarchies of Sumbanese nobility, and business alliances are utilized by politicians and political parties to organize political support. She states that candidates lean upon local norms and societal rules to mobilize support and to get voters to the polls. In practice, this was done through meetings where citizens within churches and traditional hierarchies were provided with food, money, and livestock in exchange for their time and ultimately for their political support. A key implication of her work is that candidates who are unable to navigate local customs are unable to leverage local networks to distribute gifts to voters to generate the expectation of reciprocity. In other words, without access to these network channels, it is difficult for campaigns in Sumba to enter into the contingent relationships studied in this dissertation.

Choi (2009) examines a mayoral election in Batam Regency, a small resource rich area in Western Indonesia, where local public officials dominated the electoral arena; as opposed to candidates in Sumba where candidates were often from families with ties to local nobility. She argues that campaigns are largely based on personality. While she did note there seemed to be a weak connection between party identification and vote choice, this didn’t imply that voters chose candidates because of the party platforms or ideology. She stresses that the issues discussed during the campaign were peripheral, inconsistent, and included vague promises of development. She argues that political parties, rather than

using *Pilkada* elections to control government, used these elections to extract rents for their central operations. They do this by limiting access to the ticket to those candidates who can pay the party up front. During the campaign, the parties themselves sit on the sidelines while the candidates, who've already paid the parties for access to the ballot, fund their own campaigns, utilize their own locally-based social and business networks to turn out votes. This system, the author argues, encourages 'money politics' in mayoral elections, because the candidates have to "earn" their investment back, which is what this scholar witnessed.

Buehler and Tan's (2007) study on political party institutionalization in local elections also provided an interesting perspective. Their case study of a *Pilkada* in Gowa, South Sulawesi included four candidates, three of which were current or former *Golkar* Party members. Although the winning candidate in this election was backed by *Golkar*, they argue that candidate the won the election because he was backed by a powerful local business group headed by members of the winning candidate's family, not because that candidate had the support of *Golkar*. Rather than the party choosing the best candidate to represent them in the election, the candidate with the widest network and deepest pockets to fund their own campaign, in essence, hired a political party to service their campaign operations. Buehler (2009) returned to South Sulawesi later to examine two additional *Pilkada* elections and also found that those candidates who had stronger local networks were also able to use 'money politics' to mobilize votes to win their respective elections.

This literature on *Pilkadas* has two constants. First, there is uniform recognition that the distribution of targeted benefits is an important factor during campaigns to encourage voters to generate support. And second, candidates tend to rely on local groups and personal networks, rather than political parties, for campaign operations. As a result, neither parties nor candidates are particularly ideological and as a consequence, it is

difficult to place many of them accurately along an ideological continuum (Buehler, 2009). It is in this context that this dissertation examines how the distribution of particularistic benefits impacts political mobilization and ultimately the outcome of elections.

In these studies, researchers either observed campaigns as they played out leading up to an election to generate insights for their work, or interviewed campaign operatives to get a better understanding of their campaign strategies. None of the studies on *Pilkadas* attempted to distinguish between types of voters who may have accepted particularistic benefits and none of them examined the microeconomic influences affecting the voter's decision-making process. Finally, each of these studies used qualitative interviews with citizens and campaigns to generate their findings. These studies provided useful, rich accounts with interesting insights of *Pilkada* elections but do not provide the type of data necessary to explore the questions examined here. Specifically, were particularistic transfers merely symbolic of a shared identity as Vel's (2005) account would suggest? If so, why do political candidates provide cash to voters as well? Surely there is also an economic component to these transfers as well.

Moreover, these studies are not able to provide much insight on how these transfers impact turnout for marginal voters. It is quite different to interview a voter who is active with the local party or candidate than it is to identify those loosely connected with a party for follow up interviews. It is even more difficult to do for voters who are not connected to a party in any way, yet vote during the election. As a result, systematically examining the impact of receiving particularistic benefits on turnout is difficult, if not impossible.

Finally, these studies have difficulty of directly tying the acceptance of benefits to actual vote choice. They can observe the distribution of benefits from a campaign, maybe even get information from those same campaigns to show that the campaign that spent the most money won, but without survey data these studies cannot directly tie the accepting of

a benefit from a campaign to one's vote choice. It remains possible that voters accept what is offered, then vote their conscience, or is possible that certain voters accept numerous transfers from multiple campaigns, then either do not vote or vote their conscience as well. For these reasons, this dissertation contributes to our understanding – as Indonesianists - of *Pilkada* elections.

More broadly, this dissertation provides a number of contributions to the larger literature on the politics of mobilization using targeted transfers. First, it has long been assumed in the literature that the acceptance of transfers from campaigns and income are strictly negatively correlated. In Chapter Two, the reader will see that this is not always the case. Microeconomic factors impact whether voters place enough value on transfers to even accept them, especially when those transfers are in-kind rather than in cash. Symbolic explanations where voters chose the candidate that best aligns with their personal or cultural identity are insufficient to explain the variation found in the data because they fail to explain the use of cash and because they fail to explain why the acceptance of in-kind transfers is conditioned by one's income. This is not to say that culture is irrelevant, only that to completely understand how transfers are distributed, one must also incorporate microeconomic considerations as well.

Chapter Three adds a small piece to the literature. Recently, scholars have begun to take seriously the idea that transfers have heterogenous impacts that are conditioned by a voter's preference toward the candidate providing the transfer (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014). Their behavior is further dependent upon that voter's inherent likelihood to vote, yet the literature has yet to produce an empirical study solely focusing on political participation in elections. Chapter Three empirically tests and finds that transfers impact turnout, independent of one's party preference. This finding provides

evidence that while transfers may also ultimately impact voter choice, they also impact the intermediate step of increasing political participation on Election Day.

Chapter Four analyzes vote choice. It contributes to the broader literature by expanding the base spatial model in this literature. Specifically, this chapter explores how a political party with a vague ideological placement might change our understanding of how transfers impacts one's voting calculus. While placement uncertainty has been examined in spatial models of American political behavior (Shepsle 1979, Enelow and Hinich 1981), these insights have yet to be incorporated into models of vote buying. The model finds that there is an equilibrium where non-ideological parties do distribute transfers in exchange for votes and that these parties target voters within twice the distance of the opposition party's distance from the median voter, which in many cases will cover the vast majority of voters. For these political parties, then, they distribute transfers to most voters not strongly affiliated with the opposition.

This chapter also makes one smaller contribution. Surprisingly, there are few studies that explore the impact of transfers from campaigns on vote choice using voter-level data. While Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2004) is a notable exception to this, they do not incorporate transfers from both parties in their regression models, only those from the *Peronist* candidate's campaign (p.71).³ Chapter Four in this dissertation estimates a model that includes all transfers from all campaigns to all voters. To do this, however, it models the discrete choice as a dyadic data set linking all possible outcome dyads to transfers within all voters. The findings show that transfers have a larger impact on vote choice than the voter's party identification. The following three chapters provide more detail on the contributions outlined in this introductions.

³ They do note that the variable is weaker for the opposition's transfer indicator, but it is notable that a full model of both sets of transfers is not presented in this paper

Chapter 2: Targeting Voters

In the lead up to two mayoral elections in Indonesia, candidates from multiple parties distributed rice, eggs, cooking oil, headscarves, and prayer mats to prospective voters. That vote buying existed here was unsurprising. However, two things stood out at the time. First, the people who accepted these items were poor by any reasonable measure, but they weren't the poorest people in the area. Street vendors and stall owners were present, not seasonal workers from the fields (Scott 1969, 1148)⁴. Why were the poorest citizens missing? Second, the costs involved for both the campaigns and the citizens were not trivial. Campaigns had to procure and distribute items across villages, even up into the mountainous regions of Java. Once goods were accepted citizens had to transport them home, which can be costly for those who don't have their own private transport. Given this, why didn't they just distribute cash?

The extant literature on campaign targeting doesn't explain this. It assumes the cheapest votes to buy are from the poorest citizens, who are targeted as a result. For example, explanations rooted in clientelism focus on the iterated contact between patrons and clients over time (Hicken, 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Auyero 2000). In this framework, the patron learns who to target because they slowly gain knowledge about each client over time, presumably including their financial situation and their preferences for different types of transfers (cash or in-kind). However, in Indonesia, the traditional political structures that might sustain these relationships long enough to obtain individualized information about voters are eroding (Buehler, 2009).

⁴ Scott (1969) describes these individuals as peasants and tenant farmers.

Studies rooted in political economy explain who gets targeted by the ideological positions of voters relative to parties (for example, see Stokes et al., 2013; Nichter, 2008). However in Indonesia, political parties are not easily differentiated along an ideological spectrum *nor* is attachment to political parties particularly strong (Pratikno, 2009; Mujani and Liddle, 2010). Moreover, these models do not attempt to differentiate between transfer types; they simply assume all transfers are perfect substitutes. How then, does one explain targeting patterns in countries like Indonesia, where many parties are not ideologically distinct and where traditional political networks are eroding? This paper argues that there are two forces at play that explain who gets targeted; together they produce to a curvilinear relationship between a person's income and whether they are targeted, rather than the strictly negative correlation commonly described in the literature.

The first force at play originates from campaigns wanting to reduce the costs of distributing items to voters. In practice this means they distribute items in areas, such as traditional markets, where they can reach a lot of people at once, which minimizes the distribution cost for each transfer made. Street vendors are well positioned to accept transfers from campaigns as they are likely to be working in the market on any given day, but seasonal workers in the fields, maids working in homes, and those whose work is done away from concentrated population areas can be missed if they aren't shopping at that moment. As a result, the campaigns desire to reduce the cost of distributing goods creates an entry barrier to receiving transfers from a campaign, which suppresses vote buying at the extreme low end of the income distribution. This force operates at the campaign level.

The second force at play affects targeting patterns at the individual voter level. Specifically, in-kind transfers improve the ability for campaigns to target low-income voters because they impose a small cost on the recipient, which reduces the net value of the transfer to the voter because the transfer is subject to the law of diminishing marginal

utility. By placing a small cost on potential voters, higher income voters screen themselves out of accepting in-kind but not cash transfers.

Put together, this paper shows that the relationship between incomes and accepting transfers from campaigns is curvilinear, increasing initially as work-related barriers are removed and costs associated with accepting transfers are reduced. The relationship then decreases as the value each voter places on transfers decreases, even as costs also reduce. This contrasts with the vote buying literature, which generally finds a strictly decreasing relationship between income and vote buying (for example, see Jensen and Justesen, 2014).

The empirical part of this paper utilizes original survey data collected from two mayoral elections in Central Java by the author. Indonesia is an advantageous place to survey the presence of vote buying because Southeast Asian democracies tend to report its occurrence in higher numbers than other countries (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007). Specifically, one rural and one semi-urban regency were surveyed in Java that held elections simultaneously and were geographically proximate. Javan regencies were chosen because the island contains almost 60 percent of Indonesia's population (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2014).

Regency elections were chosen for a number of reasons. First, this level of government is of interest because more than 25% of all public revenues are transferred to and spent by them (Rasyid, 2003, p.67-8).⁵ Moreover, regencies have a substantial amount of autonomy from the central and provincial governments on how to spend these funds. Also, regency-level elections are generally non-ideological (Pratikno, 2009; Buehler, 2009; Buehler and Tan, 2007). Finally, the population in this part of Java is

⁵ Note, 25% are transferred through the general allocation fund, while additional transfers are made through other mechanisms. Therefore, 25% is the lowest possible estimate of the share of public expenditures made by regency-level governments. When other public funds are included, regency-level governments are responsible for managing over 30% of the total share of public expenditures made by any public entity in Indonesia.

relatively homogenous, allowing the study to focus on individual voters, rather than groups of voters separated by visible cleavages, a common factor in vote choice (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Note, within the Indonesian government, regencies are the level of government that sit below the central and provincial governments, but above the sub-district and village governments.⁶ The closest comparison in the United States would be to counties and cities, with the caveat that cities are geographically separate from counties -- i.e. cities did not sit inside counties but next to them.

This paper uses a survey because it provides the means to collect disaggregated data, which allows the researcher to examine the theory proposed in this paper, alternative theories, and assess the validity of key variables in the analysis. The results outlined in the following sections should be of interest to political scientists studying vote buying and clientelism because they suggest microeconomic considerations are included in the mental calculus of individuals voters when decide whether to engage in vote buying. For the spatial models found in this literature, the results suggest that a fuller understanding of various parameters often held constant in formal models have interesting variation of their own (Nichter 2008, Stokes et al. 2013).

The remainder of the paper will unfold as follows. First, previous studies of voter targeting in the literature will be discussed, followed by a short discussion of the use of in-kind versus cash transfers in the economics literature. Second, the theory will be laid out, possible alternative explanations will be considered, and empirical implications identified. Third, the case selection and survey will be outlined in detail and its results analyzed. Finally, the paper concludes with a summary of the study's theory and main findings, and it identifies some unanswered questions for future research.

⁶The Indonesian words are *Kabupaten* for rural areas and *Kota* for urban areas. Despite the urban-rural distinction, both executives have the same authority.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The research questions presented here deal with two separate, but related topics: who campaigns target and what benefits they distribute. The canonical targeting studies in the distributive politics literature often approach the topic from the perspective of the party or candidate. The original debate was concerned with which blocks of voters were targeted by campaigns for redistribution: blocks of core constituents or blocks of swing voters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). Other work analyzed targeting by geographic areas, rather than typologies of voters, but also aggregated individual voters to their geographic characteristics for analysis (Calvo and Murillo, 2004). In all of these studies the theoretical focus is on targeting *blocks* of voters with resources in exchange for electoral support, not individuals *within* those blocks.

More recent work shifts the focus from targeting groups to individual voters. These papers come in two varieties. One set draws on the classical spatial voting framework to explain vote buying dynamics (Stokes et al. 2013; Nichter 2008; Stokes, 2005). The other draws on studies in the behavioral sciences of how reciprocity effects decision-making (Sobel, 2005; Finan and Schechter, 2012). Behavioral theories argue that local political brokers target those voters who get satisfaction from acts of reciprocity. While reciprocity may be at play in Indonesia to some extent, it fails to explain the microeconomic variation described in this paper. And while the theories rooted in spatial voting partially explain the socioeconomic variation, they also identify targeted voters based on their ideological placement, making them incomplete descriptions of targeting patterns. As the reader will see below, however, spatial models do provide a useful foundation from which to build a more complete theory of vote buying.

Political campaigns distribute various types of benefits to voters. To understand distributive politics in its entirety, one has to place individual benefits transfers within this broader context (Kramon and Posner, 2013). Benefits distributed by campaigns can take the shape of public employment (Calvo and Murillo 2004), individualized access to state resources (Auyero 2000), direct cash transfers (Kramon 2016), or tangible goods distributed from campaigns to individuals or groups (Vel 2005). The one characteristic uniting these benefit transfers is that campaigns can discriminate or exclude – at least some - individuals from consuming them. In economic terms, these benefits must be either private or club goods, not public goods (Kitschelt and Wilkerson, 2007).

This project focuses on a form of distributive politics immediately preceding an election. During this time, political campaigns visit busy public places, neighborhoods to solicit support from potential voters, and distribute targeted benefits to individual voters at each stop. The benefits distributed are private goods and can be either in-kind or cash. This is important because the economics literature suggests that while providing cash is more efficient to distribute and should produce more satisfaction to those voters who receive cash, transferring in-kind goods allows for what economics call “self-targeting”: a mechanism where costs are applied to a broad group of people so only those individuals willing to pay a cost opt into receiving that benefit (Currie and Ghavari 2008). Since one’s neighbors may have difficulty estimating one’s income or consumption (Alatas et al 2012), a political campaign strategy that utilized self-targeting would theoretically put campaign transfers in the hands of those individuals who value the targeted benefit the most.

A THEORY OF MICROECONOMIC TARGETING

Calvo and Murillo (2004) show that when benefits are set across locations, economic inefficiencies will be present because there will be people who are willing to support the candidate for less than the value of the transfer they are offered. While their study focuses on the distribution of public jobs, the logic also applies in Indonesia because in the elections studied in this paper, voters who lived on the same block or attended the same event might all have been given set benefits, for example approximately three dollars in cash or they might have all been given 2.5 kilograms of rice and ten eggs. Generally, one didn't see much variation in the benefit given when they attended the same political event or lived on the same street. As with setting a flat public wage, the distribution of resources using a set benefit for a given location will lead to microeconomic inefficiencies. These inefficiencies, in turn, could generate variation in whether benefits are accepted by individual voters so campaigns are likely overpaying at least some voters for their votes. If this is true, how might a campaign further differentiate the price of votes below the neighborhood or street level? In other words, how might a campaign distribute goods to reach those who value them the most?

Recall that spatial models in the literature only include one term to represent private transfers. This term can represent the transfer of a private good or simply cash. However, economic theory tells us that cash will be more efficient than in-kind transfers because it is fungible. People can get whatever they want with cash. Therefore absent perfect information about voters' individual preferences across different benefits, a set transfer of cash to a group of people will be more efficient in raising their wellbeing because they can use that money for their most desired purpose. There will be individuals who highly prize whatever good is being distributed -- including eggs, rice, oil, and prayer mats -- but there will also be people who are offered goods that would prefer cash making the private

distribution of goods by campaigns to these individual voters inefficient. Given this logic, why would a campaign ever target voters with in-kind goods?

There are a number of possible answers to this question. First, they may get a bulk rate on staple goods or they may procure them from leakage in government programs. If this is the case, however distributing these goods still leads to the microeconomic inefficiencies described above. Put differently, this explanation only addresses why a campaign might *supply* in-kind goods, not whether an individual voter would be more willing to accept them from a campaign. If there is empirical variation at the individual voter level, this explanation remains incomplete. If the type of transfer used by campaigns were strictly a supply-side story, campaigns should overwhelmingly distribute in-kind goods because each in-kind transfer would cost the campaign less than the value placed on the transfer by the voter. Yet they do not; approximately 39% of respondents accepted cash in our survey, while 35% accepted in-kind goods in the survey data used here (see Appendix A, Table A.2).⁷ This suggests that campaigns do take voter preferences into account. Successful targeting strategies require active participation by those being targeted.

A second explanation is that transferring cash might be seen as a violation of social protocol or undermine norms of reciprocity between voters and the campaign. The logic here is that providing cash to someone in exchange for electoral support has a very formal, transactional feel to it and undermines trust between campaigns and voters. Instead, to maintain the perception that a personal relationship exists between both actors, campaigns provide goods that could be interpreted as a gift. This gift could even generate feelings of reciprocity (Finan and Schechter, 2012). However, if this perspective were pervasive in

⁷ Survey will be described in more detail below.

the elections studied here, then one would expect to see more in-kind goods changing hands than cash, but again, more respondents accepted cash than in-kind goods in these elections. A t-test assuming the difference between these two averages is zero generates a p-value of 0.09 (not shown). While this isn't strong evidence these two means are different, the direction of the difference contradicts this explanation as cash transfers outnumber in-kind transfers. If providing cash to voters violated local norms, one would expect the percentage of citizens who accepted cash to be much lower than those who accepted in-kind goods.

Given this evidence, it appears that campaigns do incorporate voter preferences into targeting strategies. They attempt to distribute what voters themselves prefer, and that these preferences are economic, not just normative, in nature. Given this, how can campaigns leverage the type of goods given out before elections to better target voters?

The overwhelming majority of houses in Indonesia use rice, oil, and eggs on a daily basis so one might assume these items are close to interchangeable with cash transfers. However, there is a cost born by the person accepting these goods, including the cost of transporting the goods home, possible spoilage or breakage, differences in preferences between that good and cash, among other things. Even if in-kind goods are perfect replacements for cash, which is only true if that individual was going to buy that good with their next purchase, there remain costs associated with accepting them. While this cost may be small, the benefits involved in vote buying operations are also small in absolute terms -- the cost doesn't need to be high for it to be a large enough proportion of the overall benefit to impact an individual's decision to accept the in-kind good or not. The reader should note that buying votes with cash imposes no such costs on the voters accepting it; cash can be transported in one's pocket, it won't spoil, and allows the voter to buy whichever good they want with it.

Applying this logic to understand who accepts transfers from campaigns, and thus who can be targeted, requires one more step. If one assumes poorer voters value transfers at higher rates, and that their marginal benefit of those transfers is higher than relatively wealthier voters, then the costs associated with in-kind transfers from campaigns to voters should screen out those relatively wealthy voters when in-kind goods are offered to them, but not when cash is offered. Due to differences in cost between accepting in-kind and cash transfers, the following theory focuses on the microeconomic calculus of accepting in-kind goods.

Figure 2.1: Marginal Utilities: Accepting In-Kind Transfers with Fixed Costs





Figure 1 outlines this logic in simple economic terms using a stylized example of two individuals at different points along a marginal utility graph. The y-axis represents the total utility someone gets from a given transfer, while the x-axis represents the value of that transfer in dollars. Following basic microeconomic theory, the function is decreasing for each additional unit in net value.

The vertical line labeled V_P and V_R represent the value of a *cash transfer* from a campaign to a *poor* and *rich* individual respectively. Consistent with diminishing marginal utility, $V_P > V_R$ because the transfer is more valuable to the poorer individual. This value is costless in the sense that it requires no additional effort to accept or has no chance of diminishing in value (e.g. unlike food spoilage). However, after adding a constant cost C , one sees that the net utility for the *rich* person is negative because $C > V_R$, but remains slightly positive for the poor person as $C < V_P$. The decision to accept or reject the good depends on whether the total utility remains positive after incorporating the cost. This visualization exercise highlights that small costs can produce negative overall utilities for richer voters to accept goods but not necessarily for poorer voters. This remains true even though the absolute loss in utility is much greater for the poorer individual.

Although the example laid out in Figure 1 holds the costs associated with accepting goods constant, the example can be extended to incorporate different types of voters with varying costs. Voters with higher incomes likely have lower costs for transport and have less food spoil given their access to motorbikes, cars, refrigeration, and other amenities. Figure 2 builds on the previous example by adding a middle class voter whose value placed on the transfer is V_M . It also replaces cost C with two different cost terms, C_W and C_M , which represent the costs associated with accepting an in-kind good when the person has to walk and when they own a motorbike, respectively. C_W is the thin horizontal line and

C_M is the thick horizontal line. Note that C_M is drawn over C_W so C_W is approximately twice the length of C_M .⁸

Figure 2.2: Marginal Utilities: Accepting In-Kind Transfers with Varying Costs



Recall, the purpose of this exercise is to illustrate when a prospective voter decides to accept an in-kind transfers from a campaign. They do this when the costs associated with accepting said transfers are less than the marginal utility (or value) of accepting the good. For the middle class voter without a motorbike, they accept when $V_M > C_W$.

⁸ The length of each is theoretically arbitrary, C_W could be one-third or one-fourth the size of C_M in reality. The logic presented here still holds as long as $C_W > C_M$, however, these sized lines make the figure legible and for this reason were chosen.

Similarly, they reject the in-kind transfer when $V_M < C_W$. In Figure 2, the middle class voter who walks for transportation clearly rejects the good, however, it is not clear whether the middle class voter with the motorcycle accepts or rejects the in-kind transfer. This is because Figure 2 was drawn so $V_M = C_M$, which means that $V_M > C_M$ for all voters to the left of the middle class voter's location, while $V_M < C_M$ for all voters to the right of the same location. Any voter to the right of V_M with a motorbike, no matter how close to that point they are located, will reject the transfer. The opposite is true for any voter to the left of this point. Moreover, the rich voter represented on the right by V_R clearly rejects the in-kind transfer because $V_R < C_M$, despite owning a motorcycle.

Now, given how far to the right the rich voter is, the obvious question becomes what is the cost of accepting in-kind transfers if one has a car? Surely it is less than those voters who have motorbikes. For the voter with the car, the same logic applies, but the indifference point moves further right along the marginal utility curve. Theoretically there is still a smaller cost C_C (the cost for a voter with a car) for which a new V_R would be equal as well. At this indifference point, those voters to the left of it accept the transfer while those to the right reject it. However, this question misses an important point that is implicit in the marginal utility curve itself. As one moves further to the right along the curve, the additional value received from accepting any good approaches zero. If $V_R \approx 0$, then any cost will lead the rich voter to reject the good, even rich individuals with a car.

These stylized examples are simply meant to demonstrate the underlying dynamic at play when voters either choose to accept or reject transfers from campaigns. The reader should notice these predictions are probabilistic. It is still possible for a rich person to accept an in-kind transfer and for a poor person to reject a similar transfer, but on average the relationship with income should be negative because richer voters will be screened out in this framework; even when their costs of accepting goods is lower than their poorer

counterparts. It also demonstrates that the spatial models in the current literature to explain vote buying, *rather than being discarded*, can be further revised to incorporate this channel for targeting. The point of this analysis isn't that each individual voter calculates their individual marginal utilities in their head and decides whether they should accept the transfer or not. It is more subtle than that. When someone is offered cash they can simply accept it, put it into their pocket, and convert into whatever that individual chooses at a later date. However, when someone is offered an in-kind good, such as five kilograms of rice or a prayer mat, the higher income person is more likely to question whether they need more rice at this very moment or whether they need an additional prayer mat to go with the others they have at home. It also leads to one very simple prediction: in-kind transfers should better target poorer individuals because richer voters will screen themselves out.

The reader will note that this prediction is consistent with the findings of the current literature. It simply provides micro-foundations to explain why in-kind goods, rather than cash, should drive the association between vote buying and poverty. It also explains the negative slope of the curvilinear relationship between income and vote buying proposed in the opening paragraphs. However, it doesn't completely explain the initial uptick.

Recall that missing from campaign stops were day laborers, seasonal rice field workers, and other citizens at the very bottom of the income distribution. When a campaign stops at a market or some other place with a concentrated population, vendors, rickshaw drivers, and others one would rightfully describe as poor, have the opportunity to interact with a campaign and receive gifts or cash. These people are there every day so they have a high chance of being present when the campaign stops by. In other words, one can think of having one's vote bought as a some probability function of being present when votes are being bought, with day laborers, fieldworkers and maids the least likely to be present one any given day due to the nature of where their work occurs. This is tied to income

because on average, those who work as laborers or seasonal field workers may take home similarly small amounts per day, but they may work fewer days on average than those vendors who own stalls in the local market.

It is important to recognize that this does not mean that agricultural workers or maids will never interact with campaigns or be present when goods are distributed. The argument for this upward swing also relies on a probabilistic logic. For example, maids often visit markets where a number of campaign events took place. They may even visit the market every day if they have to buy food and other ingredients to cook for their employer.⁹ If a campaign distributed goods in the morning during their trip to the market, they may be present to accept something from the campaign and do so. At some point, however, they have to return to their employer's house to cook. If that campaign decided to visit the market in the afternoon, however, after the maid returned to cook at their employer's house, they would not have been present to accept a transfer from the campaign.¹⁰

Compare this maid's probability of being present at the market to accept a transfer to a small vendor's probability of accepting a good at the market. That vendor is likely there most –if not all - of the time the market is open. They may go home if their product sells out, but they will generally be present from the time the market opens until it closes to increase their income by selling as much of their inventory as possible. Given this, the probability they will be present when campaigns stop by will be much greater than the maid who only spent an hour at the market. One can even extend this probabilistic logic

⁹ Maids in more densely populated areas might visit the market less than one might think, however, as many Indonesian neighborhoods have someone who pushes a vegetable and meat cart each morning selling small quantities of vegetables for that day. Employers who do not wish to trust their maids with money may buy food and other ingredients directly from this person each morning in front of their houses.

to variation across different vendors. Since inventory costs money, those vendors with larger inventories will take longer to sell their goods – and thus be less likely to close up shop and go home – than those vendors with smaller stalls selling fewer goods or food. Vendors with more inventory also likely have higher earnings since they can sell more volume so the probability of being present to accept transfers from the campaigns is higher for vendors with higher incomes.

There is one last thing to note about this hypothetical maid. Figure 2 explored how a voter's costs can decrease as one has more income, but there are additional implications for a maid who returns to cook for her employers. First, she has to bring back the ingredients needed to cook for that employer. Her job depends on this. Even if she is present during a campaign's trip to the market, she has to bring any goods she accepts from the campaign back to her employer's residence while simultaneously carrying the ingredients for her employer's meal. Then she has to carry her campaign goods home at the end of her work day. Therefore, even if she is present, the cost of accepting the goods may be too much at that moment to accept in-kind goods from the campaign. In this scenario, one could imagine increasing the cost C_w in Figure 2 for this particular maid at this particular time. However, one could also imagine this same exact maid visiting the market in the afternoon, after she is done with her work, buying something for her own house and accepting an in-kind good from the campaign because she only has to carry the good home and she can choose to buy less at the market for herself if she wishes. An option she doesn't have when shopping for her employer. Therefore, even if she is present, she may still reject the campaign goods while she is working, but not while she is shopping for herself on her own time.

To see whether these stories are plausible, the following sections discuss the case selection and context of the elections studied, then analyze and discuss original survey data from two elections in Indonesia where vote buying is prevalent.

INDONESIAN CONTEXT

Java Island contains Indonesia's capital and almost 60 percent of Indonesia's 240 million citizens. Central Java, where this research was done, is the third most populous province in Indonesia with approximately 32 million residents in 2013; the only two provinces with larger populations are West and East Java (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2014). Moreover, Jakarta and Surabaya are Indonesia's two largest cities, located on Java, and important generators of economic activity in Indonesia. As a result, Java drives much of Indonesia's political and economic life.

This study chose to select elections in Central Java because it had the highest province-wide poverty rate on the island at approximately 15 percent in 2013, despite being slightly smaller than West or East Java (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2016).¹¹ In 2010, the poverty rate for all of Indonesia was slightly lower at 13.3 percent, so Central Java was close to the national average (Suryahadi et al., 2011, p.70). Since poverty remains the most important factor for politics of this type, selecting elections in high poverty regencies ensured sufficient variation across survey respondents' behavior (Scott 1969; Hicken 2011; Jensen and Justesen, 2014). Moreover, Central Java has education levels near the Indonesian average. Its secondary school enrolment ratio of approximately 65 percent is

¹¹ Note, Yogyakarta (officially Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta – or Yogyakarta Special Region) has a slightly higher poverty rate, but they have a unique political system that still incorporates a Sultan as governor. This city is unique in a number of interesting ways, but does not provide a useful context from which to study local elections in Indonesia generally.

relatively close to the national average of 62 percent (Miranti, 2011, p. 101).¹² In short, Central Java was identified as a prospective location for this research because it is located on Java and has typical education and poverty indicators for an Indonesian province.

Tegal was selected for more practical reasons. Specifically, there were two elections occurring simultaneously in neighboring regencies during the research period, one semi-urban and one rural regency. Tegal was chosen over Magelang Regency, which also had an election during the research period, because it is the home of one of the world's largest Buddhist stupas –Borobudur Temple – making it an outlier as its tourism based economy is distinct from most regencies in Indonesia except Bali and possibly the western part of Flores Island, where visitors to Komodo National Park stay. In general, Magelang is wealthier than the average regency in Central Java.

Tegal is a small city on the north coast of Java, located along the Highway 1 between Jakarta and Semarang, the capital city of Central Java and a major port. A second highway branches off at Tegal that leads over one of Java's mountain passes to the southern coast of Java, which connects with another major highway. Due to its location, Tegal has a large number of trucks and other travelers pass through on a regular basis and a number of small factories along Highway 1. Most of the population of Tegal, however, is inland in the rural regency and consists of rice paddies and vegetable farming in the higher elevations where the temperatures are cooler. Approximately 47 percent of the rural regency's landmass is rice paddies (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Tegal, 2013) while 22 percent of the urban regency's landmass is used for agriculture (Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Tegal, 2013).¹³

¹² Enrollment rates varied from 39 percent to 83 percent at the time (Miranti, 2011, p. 101)

¹³ There are two Tegal Regencies, one urban and one rural. In Indonesia, urban regencies are called *Kotas* and rural regencies are called *Kabupatens*.

This paper begins with the premise that the current models for vote buying are insufficient to explain targeting in Indonesian elections. This rests on three pieces of evidence. First, in local Indonesian elections there are no major cleavages within localities for parties to form around. While many cleavages exist in Indonesia more broadly, they rarely exist in the small, homogenous jurisdictions where regency elections take place. The elections studied here in *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* fit this profile.

One common cleavage in Indonesia is religion, however these two elections were conducted in areas where the overwhelming majority of the population was both Muslim and ethnically Javanese. This is supported by the survey used in the paper, which shows about 99% of respondents in the sample are Muslim (see Appendix A). However, while the Islamic community in Indonesia is diverse in its own right, there are generally two groups recognized as the largest strains of Islam, often referred to as *modernist* and *traditionalist* Muslims (Burhani, 2013). A political cleavage within Islam remains possible because these two groups are affiliated with two separate political parties. To address this, a question on the survey used in this study asked all respondents who identified themselves as Muslim whether they identified with either of these groups. The overwhelming majority of respondents in the survey, approximately 85 percent, who identified as Muslim said they identified with the *traditionalist* group, *Nahdlatul Ulama*, while only 9.5 percent they identified with the *modernist* group *Muhammadiyah*. The remaining respondents indicated they didn't identify with either.

Second, party ideologies are generally uninformative in Indonesia, especially for local elections. Area studies scholars argue that the relationship between parties and candidates in local elections is mostly pragmatic. The candidate's decision to run under the banner of a given party is based on convenience and meeting minimum threshold requirements for parties to field a candidate, rather than the candidate's political ideology.

Specifically, a political party must hold at least 15 percent of the seats in the regency-level legislature or have received at least 15 percent of the votes in the last election to field a candidate. When the party does not meet this requirement by themselves, they can form coalitions so that the combined number of seats or votes surpasses 15 percent (Buehler, 2009; Buehler and Tan, 2007). A voter cannot simply look at the party name next to the candidate's name and know which policies the candidate is likely to implement once in office. Even in national elections where party politics are thought to be stronger, survey data indicate that party identification is becoming weaker over time (Mujani and Liddle, 2010).

Third, in regency-level elections, Pratikno (2009) finds that the rules for fielding a candidate led to approximately 70 percent of the first 192 elections to be supported by a coalition of parties, rather than a single party. He lays out a two-by-two typology of party ideology - with Islam-Secularism on one axis and Elite – Populist along the other axis – and finds that those coalitions did not follow any inherent logic. He concludes that party coalitions are based meeting the minimum requirements for fielding a candidate, rather than any ideological beliefs shared by coalition parties.

To reiterate, these pieces of evidence are important contextual factors because the distributive politics targeting literature utilizes a spatial framework to explain behavior, which assumes that voters can place themselves along an ideological spectrum and identify the distance between themselves and the candidates.¹⁴ However, in the Indonesian context described above, the ideological component effectively disappears, or is too noisy to

¹⁴Both Stokes et al (2013) and Nichter (2008) use a similar formulation for their base model. The model in Nichter (2008) is as follows: $u_i = -\frac{1}{2} (X_i - V_i)^2 + b_i - c_i$, where u_i is the utility of person I, X_i is the ideological position on the political spectrum for candidate I, V_i is the position on the ideological spectrum for voter I, b_i is the benefit given to voter i for their support, and c_i is the cost of voting. However, in the Indonesian context, the model reduces to $u_i = b_i - c_i$ because $-\frac{1}{2} (X_i - V_i)^2$ is undefined.

transmit much information. If a voter cannot identify where the candidate's beliefs sit along some ideological dimension, they cannot assess the distance between their own beliefs and the candidates' beliefs to decide which candidate best represents them, a key factor in identifying who gets targeted in these models.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY, SOCIAL DESIRABILITY, AND LIST EXPERIMENT

This paper uses data from an original survey conducted in two regencies in Indonesia, *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal*, which are both located in the province of Central Java. Respondents were randomly selected from voter lists compiled by Indonesia's General Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum*). In each regency, the election commission conducts a door-to-door census in the months prior to an election that captures all of the Indonesian citizens over seventeen years of age whose official residence is that address. Those names are added to the official voter rolls, which are kept by poll workers at each polling station on Election Day. This census is a list of all possible voters in each of the elections studied so a random sample drawn from these lists produces a representative sample of the electorate for that election, which is exactly what was done to generate the sample for this survey. Note that while a similar number of respondents were drawn from each regency, the two regencies have different populations. Therefore, inverse probability weights were constructed and applied to the analysis (See Appendix A for more details on the survey methodology).

Although common in Indonesia, vote buying is an illegal activity, so direct survey questions on vote buying may not be valid measures of the phenomenon. In their research in Nicaragua, Gonzales Ocantos et al. (2012) showed that social desirability bias can impact analysis of this kind. Social desirability bias is the phenomenon whereby survey

respondents provide answers reflecting how one should act according to social norms, not how they actually acted. If one knows that social norms frown upon accepting transfers from a campaign – especially if it is illegal – they may lie to the survey enumerator to hide their behavior. Gonzales Ocantos et al (2012) find that less than 5% of respondents responded *yes* to having received gifts from a campaign in their study, however, a list experiment revealed that approximately one in four respondents had done so. Given this result, they warn that direct measures of vote buying could be misleading, but is this specific to Latin America?

To assess whether social desirability bias is an issue in this data, a list experiment was also conducted to gauge whether under-reporting was a serious issue here, and if so, what its magnitude was. Respondents were randomly allocated into two groups. The first group was asked to count and report the number of individuals who got involved in politics, whether they discussed with a friend who they planned on voting for, and whether they donated money to a candidate or worked for that candidate without compensation. The treatment group was asked to count and report on these three options plus whether they got money or in-kind goods from a campaign.¹⁵ By randomly allocating respondents to control and treatment groups, the list experiment allows one to estimate the percentage of people who responded in the affirmative to the omitted option in the control group by taking the difference between the two group means. In this case, the omitted response in the control group was whether the respondent got money or in-kind goods from a campaign (see Appendix A for more details on the list experiment methodology).

The results from the list experiment can be seen in Table 1. The difference in means between the control and treatment groups is 0.51 and significant (t-statistic is -5.3, $p < 0.1$).

¹⁵ They were asked if they were given *Sembako*, which is a short for *Sembilan Bahan Pokok*. This translates loosely into “the nine staples.” Specifically, *sembako* includes rice, oil, sugar, salt, meat, eggs, corn, milk, and kerosene.

Since the other three counts are statically equal across both groups, the experiment estimates that approximately 51 percent of survey respondents accepted either cash or some other good from a campaign before the election, compared to 47 percent of respondents who said so through direct questioning. This comparison shows that receiving cash or goods was underreported, as the literature predicts, however, the level of underreporting in this data is only about 4 percent. This result is consistent with the literature that says Southeast Asian democracies tend to report vote buying in higher numbers than other regions (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007). To the extent that social desirability bias exists in Indonesia, it is less of an obstacle when studying vote buying than in other regions.

Table 2.1 – Percent of Respondents that Accepted Transfers

<u>List Experiment: Comparison of Means</u>				
	Treatment	Control		Difference
Mean	0.82	0.31		0.51
SE	0.09	0.04		
			T	-5.32
			p-value	0.000
			N	302
<u>Direct Survey Question: Frequency</u>				
	Count	Percent		
Yes	151	47.5		
No	167	52.5		
Total	318	100		

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Now that minimal measurement error has been found in the dependent variable, the two principal hypotheses can be tested. There are two dependent variables in this analysis, whether someone accepted money and whether someone accepted in-kind goods from a campaign before the election. The survey was designed to record all types of transfers from each campaign to each respondent. It asked the respondent whether they had any contact with someone from each of the campaigns. Then, if the person said *yes*, they were asked a series of additional questions including whether they accepted cash, and how much, or any in-kind goods from the campaign, and what they were. The dependent variable was then coded twice, once for accepting cash transfers and once for accepting in-kind transfers. In both instances, the variable was coded one when the respondents accepted the transfer and zero if they did not.

The theory presented here makes a few key assumptions that need to be considered in the analysis. First, as one's income goes up, the likelihood of accepting a gift from a campaign increases due to barriers to entering the market for vote buying. Therefore one would expect to see a positive coefficient on the variable recording the individual's income. However, the theory also rests on the assumption that both these barriers decrease – due to one's occupation and to lower costs from improved transportation or other amenities - and that there are diminishing marginal returns to private consumption as individuals move up the income ladder. Given this, the theory would also predict that including a squared income variable in the model would better fit the data and that this squared income variable should be negative. Moreover, one should expect to see this relationship between income and the outcome for in-kind transfers, but not for cash transfers. This would suggest that

different types of transfers serve an economic, rather than social, function when campaigns distribute goods prior to elections.

One additional variable is included as a control. Hicken (2011: p. 299) suggests that formal employment, which is likely correlated with income, could incentivize voters to pay closer attention to, and base their votes upon, policies rather than direct transfers. This is because those voters have a larger stake in public policy outcomes, for example, tax policy, since those voters will pay a larger share into public revenues. Since individuals in formal employment are likely to earn more, the relationship between income and vote buying could be the result of this correlation. Including this control allows one to ensure that a negative relationships between income and having accepted any transfers from a campaign, isn't the result of having omitted this variable. Finally, a battery of other individual traits are included as controls to check the robustness of the relationship.

In Table 2 below, the models shows the expected sign for the coefficients on both the income and income squared variables. The income variable has a positive coefficient for in-kind outcomes while the income squared variable has a negative coefficient. This implies that predicted probabilities increase at the lowest incomes before peaking, and then decreasing, as the theory outlined here suggests. The relationship between having accepted cash from a campaign and income remains insignificant however, just at the theory predicts.

The second set of models include a dummy variable for those respondents who were employed in a formal sector, which mainly consists of government workers, private factory workers, or someone employed at one of the local malls or chains. They show that formal employment is not driving the relationship between income and having accepted in-kind goods. The coefficients barely change and remain significant for all in-kind outcomes, but insignificant for the cash outcome. Finally, the last two models include a

number of control variables to see whether the relationship is dependent on a number of other factors, such as age, education levels, gender, attendance at religious services, number of children respondent has, and the amount of savings they have. The relationship holds despite including all these controls.

Table 2.2: Weighted Probit Regressions


	Cash	In-Kind	Cash	In-Kind	Cash	In-Kind
Income	0.05	0.24** *	0.03	0.21**	0.10	0.28***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Income^2	-0.00	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.00	-0.01†
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Employed			0.04	0.30	0.2	0.3
			(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Female					-0.16	0.12
					(0.2)	(0.2)
Savings					-0.00	-0.00
					(0.00)	(0.00)
Age					-0.01	0.00
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Education					-0.06	0.07
					(0.04)	(0.04)
# Kids					0.05	-0.05
					(0.08)	(0.08)
Mosque					-0.01	-0.00
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-0.4***	-0.6***	-0.3***	-0.6***	0.5	-1.4*
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.7)	(0.7)
<i>N</i>	266	266	232	232	211	211

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Note: The base outcome for these regressions is those voters who didn't accept cash or in-kind goods from any campaign. Employed indicates those respondents formally employed, Savings is measured in thousands of Rupiah, Age and Education are measured in years, and Mosque measures the number of times per week the respondent goes to the mosque.

To more clearly see the relationship between income and targeting using in-kind goods, one can plot the predicted probabilities of accepting in-kind transfers by income. This is done to explore at which income-level the predicted probability peaks. Figure 2 shows that it does somewhere around nine million Rupiah per month, well above the sample mean and an income level that would put that resident in the upper quartile of Tegal's income distribution.

Figure 2.3: Weighted Predicted Probabilities across Income Levels



Note: Predicted Probabilities Generated from Column 2 in Table 2. At the time of this survey, the exchange rate was approximately Rp 13,000 for every USD. Therefore, a value of 10 on the x-axis is approximately \$770 per month. Density bars measure every Rp 2 million.

Individuals at the very bottom of the income distribution, whom are assumed to be the most likely to sell their votes in the literature, do not accept transfers at as high of rates as those individuals who had moderate to high incomes. One concern about these results is that they do not account for geographic effects, another is that they are being driven by outliers, especially if one looks at the density of income across the bottom of Figure 2. Each concern will be addressed in turn. If socioeconomic status and the type of benefits distributed cluster in locations, which supply-side explanations discussed earlier would suggest, then income may act as a proxy for geographic location. Recall that the comparative politics literature stress the importance of macro-level targeting to low-income areas (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Calvo and Murillo, 2004). Campaigns therefore might be targeting areas that are generally poor, but missing the poorest residents because of geographic obstacles, such as the poor living in remote areas, rather than those outlined in the theory presented here. In the area studied here, this is generally the case with those living higher up Java's mountainous slopes, being poorer and more difficult to reach due to crumbling infrastructure. The sub-districts themselves are quite diverse with concentrated urban areas, coastal fishing areas, agricultural areas with rice paddies, a military base, tea and other industrial factories, as well as high altitude mountainous area. To address this, area dummy variables were included for each of the sub-districts, three of which cover the higher altitudes and two of which cover the coastal fishing areas, in these two regencies. Next, to check whether these results are driven by outliers, the probit procedure is bootstrapped using fifty replications. Table 3 provides the results of two models that include area fixed-effects and two which bootstrap the probit procedure.

Table 2.3: Robustness Checks

	Sub-District Fixed Effects		Bootstrapped	
	In-Kind	Cash	In-Kind	Cash
Income	0.22** (0.09)	0.01 (0.08)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)
Income Squared	-0.01** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.007)
Constant	-0.47** (0.19)	-0.29 (0.18)	-0.6*** (0.1)	-0.4t (0.10)
<i>N</i>	266	266	266	266

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Probit regressions with dummy variables for each sub-district. In-kind dependent variable coded 0 for all respondents who accepted in-kind goods and zero otherwise. Cash dependent variable also coded one for all respondents who accepted cash and zero otherwise. Sub-district dummy coefficients not shown for fixed effects models.

Table 3 shows that all coefficients on income and income squared remain significant for the in-kind probit regression, yet none are significant for the cash regression, suggesting the original models are robust to area fixed-effects. In short, the geographic clustering of the poorest in remote areas is not what is driving the principal results in Table 2. When the procedure is bootstrapped, the income squared variable is marginally insignificant, indicating the downward slope of the curvilinear relationship is sensitive to high income outliers.¹⁶ However, the initial upward slope is robust to this procedure. The

¹⁶ Note, the coefficient for income squared presented in the bootstrapped column for the in-kind outcome has a p-value of 0.12. The procedure was run multiple times during analysis and generated p-values ranging from 0.02 to 0.22, however, the most common p-values from these multiple runs were between 0.10 and 0.15.

reader should note that the cash acceptance coefficients for income in this regression are insignificant, as with all results presented here.

The results are also robust to multinomial regression models where the dependent variable is separated into those who did not receive a transfer, those who only received cash, those who only received in-kind good, and those who received both (Table A.2, Appendix A). The final category – respondents who received both cash and in-kind goods - mimics the results for in-kind goods only.

Note, to this point the dependent variable has included both individuals who did and did not have contact with a campaign in the dependent variables. This could accentuate the curvilinear relationship found between income and having accepted a good. This might be especially problematic if the vast majority of those individuals who did not have contact with the campaign were also at the low end of the income distribution. A simple bivariate probit regression (not shown) predicting campaign contact with income produces a positive and significant coefficient on income suggesting higher income voters were contacted more often ($\beta = 0.53$, $z=2.63$). Given this, the analysis is redone using a sample that includes only respondents who had contact with a campaign (see Appendix A). If the theory is literally true, one would expect a strictly negative relationship between income and accepting goods. What is found however, is that the coefficient moves in this direction – the coefficient is cut in half – but the sign does not completely flip as one might expect in a complete model. Note, restricting the sample to those with contact in the campaign reduces it by about a third so including more independent variables further degrades the sample due to item missingness for individual independent variables. This result suggests that contact is both related to one's income and that the relationship shifts in the predicted direction once one restricts the sample in this way. The fact that it does not do so completely suggests the presence of an omitted variable (owning a motorbike, for example)

and the continued presence of high costs facing low income individuals as highlighted by the example above regarding the maid who accepts a campaign gift while shopping for herself, but not while shopping for her employer.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

This paper argues that the poorest individuals did not receive cash or goods prior to the elections and that this was due to the nature of their work. Specifically, their work decreases the probability of being present when goods are distributed by campaigns so they are less likely to receive transfers than better off citizens. A number of alternative explanations have been discussed, but other possible explanations remain. For example, farm laborers and other low wage workers may not have been targeted because they are often from other regencies or it may be that laborers make up a small part of the electorate. If either of these are true, it may simply be inefficient for campaigns to target these workers. Fortunately, there are a number of questions asked in the survey that will help one assess whether either of these explanations seem likely.

Tegal, like many rural areas across the developing world, exports much of its indigenous labor. This is important point because campaigns might chose not to distribute transfers to the lowest end of the income distribution if many of those laborers are unable to vote, not because of the logic outlined in the theory here. Targeting these workers would waste campaign resources on non-voters. If one looks in the survey methodology appendix (Appendix A), however, they will see that survey response rates were adjusted because interviews with local civil servants in Tegal indicated that many of its permanent residents went to major cities for work and this might push survey response rates downward. To assess whether the survey was getting an accurate representative sample, qualitative

information was collected to understand why individual surveys were not completed. Each time an enumerator was unable to complete a survey, they were instructed to write in the comments section at the end why that survey wasn't completed. The responses were grouped into three refusal categories:

(1) Respondents who lived at the residence but whom the enumerators were unable to find at home.

(2) Respondents who worked/lived elsewhere but whose government paperwork – including their voter registration information - remained at the address in Tegal of their family.

(3) Respondents who were present but simply refused to conduct the survey.

Of the 248 respondents where the enumerators were unable to complete surveys, 157 (63 percent) of them fit into Category 2. While it is likely that Tegal receives some workers from outside the regency (there's obviously no way to prevent this), it does suggest that Tegal is a net exporter of its surplus labor into Indonesian cities rather than a large scale-importer of labor that might scare away campaigns from targeting laborers.

This evidence however, does not address whether there is a sufficient pool of voters to target in the fields or other localities where low skilled labor might be present. The survey also has a question that asks the respondent to list their principal source(s) of income. A substantial minority of respondents, 18.4 percent, marked either farm laborer or day laborer.¹⁷ Recall that the sample for the survey was generated from the actual voter lists used at polling stations to verify citizens could vote in the election. This means that approximately one-fifth of the electorate worked as day or field laborers. While some

¹⁷ In the actual data, 47/255 of respondents that answered this question by marking “tenaga kerja pertanian” and “kerja harian,” respectively.

campaigns may chose not to target this group of voters for various reasons, it seems improbable that such a large group would be overlooked by every single campaign, especially when the winning candidates won with pluralities of between thirty and forty percent of the vote.

The survey also recorded those individuals who were not in the labor market. If one focuses on just the males in the sample, as many women were likely housewives or did not work for other reasons, one sees that over 10 percent of working aged males were unemployed. Although it is likely there were workers from neighboring regencies in Tegal prior to the election, either working in the fields or as laborers elsewhere, the labor market for actual residents still had substantial slack lessening the need to find workers from other regencies.

It is also important to note how paddy fields are planted in Tegal. Generally, there are two times when labor is needed, during the planting season and during harvest. The election in Tegal was in late October, just before the rainy season in Java, which lasts from November or December until February. Therefore, the time leading up to the election was when farmers plant their crops. This is notable because planting rice in Java requires less labor than harvesting. If you visit a single sub-village during planting season, you are likely to see one to two pieces of land plowed and planted over the course of a few days. The rice seedlings are often planted in a small corner of a paddy field, then spread out across the rest of the field by a handful of people. This process plays out over a few weeks until the entire sub-village is planted. Harvesting is much different and much more labor intensive. A group of people will work one field over the course of one day. The volume of work is much larger, which makes sense as the seedlings planted grew while in the ground and the rice must also be processed in addition to being cut. It is during this time, that workers are in the fields in large numbers.

Details like this suggest that the lessons one can learn from this election are idiosyncratic, however, the current schedule for mayoral elections in Indonesia show that every election during this year's cycle was scheduled from October through February. In other words, the general election commission has scheduled elections before the conclusion of the rainy season, before the spike in demand for labor occurs, for every jurisdiction, not just Tegal.¹⁸ While none of these pieces of evidence prove directly that all the laborers working in Tegal were from Tegal during the campaign season, they are suggestive that this issue is minimal. In summary, approximately 20 percent of registered voters in Tegal are laborers, Tegal sends a large number of workers elsewhere to earn a living rather than importing labor, and the election did not occur during a time of peak demand for labor.

Another possible objection to the theory presented here may be that the poor are often concentrated in low socio-economic areas. And since they do not have money for transportation, they do not travel far for work. Much of the work done by these laborers, however, is agricultural in nature. This is important to note because agricultural land itself is spread out across space. Therefore, either the areas the poor live in are spread out, or they must walk long distances to reach the fields they work in. Both cannot be true. This may be unique to rural areas on Indonesia as poverty is certainly concentrated in Jakarta and other large cities. When workers from places like Tegal move to large cities, they are forced to settle in low-income areas, which results in concentrated poverty. In large cities, it can be true that both the poor live in concentrated pockets of poverty and that they do not travel far for work. Urban laborers do not necessarily work on different pieces of land from one day to the next, at least to the same extent, as their rural counterparts.

¹⁸ To see the schedule for the 2017 mayoral election cycle, visit: <https://pilkada2017.kpu.go.id/>

A final objection to the theory presented here may be that distributing in-kind goods does serve as a screening mechanism, but that mechanism is one where inferior goods are provided so that only the poor accept them. The survey itself did not collect information on the quality of goods received, so there is no way to test this theory directly with the survey data. However, the theory here focuses on costs for a number of reasons. First, the most common goods provided were known locally as *Sembako*, which is an acronym in Bahasa Indonesia for the nine staples. The most common goods were rice, oil, eggs, and dry noodles. All Indonesian families, regardless of their socioeconomic standing, have these goods in their kitchens and eat them regularly. The reason this paper focuses on the costs associated with accepting in-kind goods rather than the quality of those goods is because the cooking oil and dry noodles were common brands – all with yellow packaging - found in both traditional and upscale modern markets across Indonesia. If these two goods were inferior, it would have been for only the highest income individuals in Indonesia, few if any, of whom lived in Tegal.

Rice is different however. There is a wide range of qualities and many are inferior (and thus cheap). The reason this paper does not make the argument that the screening mechanism found here is due to inferior goods though is because when the voter accepts the plastic bag, they grab all of the goods at once before they can open the portion of dry rice and examine it. When they see the packages or noodles and cooking oil in the plastic bags being passed out, they can immediately see the brands they know and accept the goods without thinking the bag is filled with inferior goods. However, it isn't until they have already accepted the bag and opened the portion of rice that they can tell whether the rice is of low or high quality. Some voters may in fact accept the bags and upon inspecting the rice, throw it away, but this is after they have already been screened into accepting the goods. This sequence of events does highlight an interesting question for future work.

Specifically, what do voters do once they have accepted the goods? Do they consume them and vote for the party that gave them the goods? Or is it conditional upon the quality of the good – and thus the utility the voter receives from its consumption – as to whether the transfer is sufficient to successfully buy one’s vote? These questions are left to another research paper.

This paper provides two contributions to the distributive politics literature. First, much of the previous literature considered private transfers as interchangeable, overlooking microeconomic mechanisms used to targeting voters. But the empirical results presented here show that different types of transfers and their associated characteristics do play a role in how voters are targeted during campaigns. The paper then presents a plausible mechanism underlying these results. This finding is directly applicable to the literature on spatial models of vote buying as it highlights the presence of additional variation in the transfer term, which is often fixed. Loosening this parameter could give researchers a more realistic approximation of the decision making calculus internalized by voters.

While this is a small study with limited geographic coverage, it selected a fairly “typical” location in Indonesia for which to collect data. Tegal is a small city in one of Indonesia’s largest provinces. Central Java has a poverty rate near the national average and citizens with secondary school enrollment rates near the national average. Moreover, the local nature of the survey allows one to design survey questions specifically to compare different types of transfers. Currently, large cross-national surveys such as Afrobarometer lump all transfers during campaigns into one question, which allows scholars to test broad theories of vote buying cross-nationally, but prevents them from examining micro-theories based on individual preferences, such as the one outlined in these pages (for example, see Jensen and Justensen, 2014, p.222).

Second, it samples a disproportionate number of poor people due to the socioeconomic characteristics of Tegal, which in turn allows the analysis to explore variation *within* the low end of the income distribution, typically the population most often targeted by campaigns. Ironically, the narrow geographic focus is actually what allows the analysis to discern that there are barriers to the poorest voters to being targeted. A much wider area of study, say a national study of Indonesia, would have simply picked up high levels of *vote buying* by the *poor* in Tegal, since both are present there in abundance, but would have missed that the poorest individuals did not receive goods prior to the elections.

On one hand, this explanation is context specific as it requires a local economy where the poorest workers are disbursed relative to slightly wealthier voters. However, this describes many small towns and rural areas across many developing countries. As such, there are some important characteristics present in Tegal that exist elsewhere. Recall, the distribution of income was mostly on the low end and it was relatively flat. This characteristic is particularly important because although poor, in a sense, Tegal was a relatively equal (i.e. it has low income inequality), which makes identifying the poorest difficult for campaigns. A wider local income distribution might have generated the result commonly found in the literature, that is, the likelihood of selling one's vote strictly decreases as their income increases. This tells us, potentially, these conditions aren't necessarily just interesting caveats, but could have broader implications. For example, is the width of the income distribution related to the effectiveness of campaign targeting? In other words, is poverty the factor that drives the effectiveness of vote buying or is the heterogeneity of the economy more important? The current literature tells us that vote buying should decrease as places develop and vote buying becomes too expensive, but could a wider income distribution mitigate these forces – even temporarily - if it makes

targeting the low end of the distribution more efficient? While these questions are left for a future research paper, they are rooted in the two elections studied in this paper.

CONCLUSION

In contrast with vote buying literature, this paper shows that the relationship between income and accepting transfers from campaigns is curvilinear. It presented a theory that in-kind goods impose a small cost on the individual accepting the transfer, which acts as a screening mechanism. When high income voters value these transfers less than low income voters, in-kind transfers do find their way into the hands of lower income people at higher rates. This is because high income voters choose not to accept in-kind transfers, even while still accepting cash. The data largely support this idea, conditional on occupational and other cost factors, and found that income was associated with accepting in-kind transfers, but not cash. One lesson from this paper then, is that spatial models of vote buying should loosen the assumption that all transfers are substitutes by allowing for variation in how individual voters prefer different types of transfers.

Chapter 3: Turnout Buying

An influential theory in the vote buying literature argues that the true impact of distributing particularistic benefits during election campaigns is via turning out political supporters to the polls, not by persuading uncommitted voters (Nichter 2008). This theory builds upon insights from the Downsian logic of voting, that there are costs to voting and these costs prevent potential voters from getting to the polls on Election Day (Downs 1957). The Nichter study, however, never models turnout directly. Despite its conclusions it focuses on the types of voters that receive rewards from campaigns, a key intermediate step in the theory, and leaves the job of examining turnout to others (see Nichter 2008, p. 26). While the immediate focus of Nichter's study was to examine which voters receive transfers from campaigns, it leaves one questioning whether those potential voters eventually materialize into actual voters. Moreover, additional work on this topic by the same author highlights the possibility of paying voters to stay home when there is a secret ballot (Gans-Morse, Gazzuca and Nichter, 2014). Although these studies aim to explain, at least partially, how private transfers from campaigns to voters shape patterns of political participation, neither directly estimates this relationship empirically. This constitutes a significant gap in the literature. Does receiving direct transfers from campaigns lead to increased turnout, independent of other known determinants of turnout? Does abstention buying nullify its effects?

Assuming such an empirical relationship exists between the act of voting and receiving gifts or cash from campaigns, there remain a number of possible explanations for such a relationship. Parties might simply reward individuals at campaign events and through their social networks, making the relationship spurious. In this case, parties reward

loyalists simply because loyalists are present when cash and other gifts are handed out or they distribute gifts via informal networks of party workers, who distribute the transfers, and who tend to be party supporters as well. In this scenario, then accepting cash or other gifts might merely be a proxy for party identification. Alternatively, private transfers to potential voters might be done with two objectives in mind: to buy turnout from loyalists and abstention from opposition voters (Gans-Morse, Gazzuca and Nichter, 2014). Therefore, one might not see a simple correlation between having received a transfer and turnout due to these two forces working in opposition.

More empirical work is needed to answer these simple questions. Specifically, does receiving cash or other goods from a political campaign increase the likelihood of turning out to vote? And more importantly, does this relationship remain after controlling for other known determinants of turnout, especially for party identification? Surprisingly, there are few studies examining how receiving direct benefits from a campaign impacts one's likelihood to vote. This is at least partially due to relatively few studies of turnout conducted in developing countries at all (Fornos et al. 2004; Blais 2006). And the studies that do exist don't necessarily measure private transfers. Often the act of receiving a good from a campaign is substituted with "exposure" to vote buying - or some other measure - because it provides the survey respondent with sufficient plausible deniability in the hopes of increasing the likelihood of an honest response concerning an illegal behavior (for example, Carreras and Irepoglu 2013). This paper aims to provide one piece of evidence toward filling this empirical gap. Using data from two mayoral elections in Indonesia, this paper seeks to answer the two questions noted above. Does receiving transfers from campaigns increase the likelihood of voting? And, are these effects independent of other confounding factors?

This paper is divided into five sections. First, it will examine the literature on voter turnout across political science. The purpose of focusing on turnout rather than the vote buying literature is that it is the dependent variable in this paper is turnout and because other potential confounding variables must be identified for inclusion into any statistical models presented here. Second, the survey and data will be described. This Indonesian survey data is useful because it took place in a country where campaigns distribute cash and goods to potential voters regularly during elections and it includes a direct measure of vote buying. It also includes other variables common in the turnout literature. Third, the paper will identify and describe key variables in the data set. Fourth, the paper will conduct descriptive and multivariate analysis. And fifth, it will conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications for future work.

THEORY AND EVIDENCE OF TURNOUT

The comparative literature on the determinants of voter turnout dates back three decades (Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Jackman 1987). This literature can be divided into two broad types of research, one assessing how institutional variables at the country- or state-level, impact turnout across jurisdictions, and the other assessing personal characteristics that impact turnout.

Early in this literature, institutional variables dominated the discourse and the principal cases were advanced industrialized democracies. These variables included voter registration rules, single member districts, and the presence of decentralized political parties with linkages to civil society organizations (Powell, 1986). Later, the competitiveness of elections, multipartyism, mandatory voting, electoral disproportionality and unicameralism all were examined to see how they impacted turnout (Jackman, 1987).

Even more recently, studies found that proportional representation systems increase turnout (Blais and Carty, 1990) as well as same day registration, especially for low educated citizens (Brians and Grofman, 2001). Each of these studies used data that included variation either across states or countries, thus allowing researchers to tease out institutional traits that either hamper or encourage voting by the public.

Recall that the vote buying literature, however, is attempting to understand whether individual transfers from a campaign to a potential voter impacts political participation at the voter level. Therefore, institutional level variables – while they may interact with vote buying – can’t explain these behaviors at such a granular level. Individual level traits are more useful for this paper.

A parallel set of studies examined which individual level traits were associated with voting in advanced industrialized democracies. These studies examined common demographic variables such as age, sex, race, income, education, length of residence, and how each impacted turnout (Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). In a separate and impactful study, variables such as education, age were confirmed to impact turnout but identifying with a political party and being interested in politics were added to the stable of variables that impacted voter turnout (Powell, 1986). As the literature advanced, so did the sophistication of the variables both theorized and measured in the literature. Most prominently, individual citizens’ cognitive resources, as measured by political knowledge, were found to be associated with voting (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Also, face-to-face canvassing substantially increased turnout (Gerber and Green, 2000). And finally, scholars returned to one’s age as a primary driver of turnout arguing that voting is an individualized, habit-forming behavior (Plutzer, 2002). The logic for this perspective was that young people don’t vote at high levels, but over time as more of them

enter the electorate, they remain part of the electorate. Turnout rates for any cohort increase over time due to inertia.

These studies only describe behavior and institutions in advanced industrialized democracies, however, and scholars argue the voter turnout literature lacks studies from the developing world (Fornos et al., 2004; Blais, 2008). Yet there are a few exceptions. One prominent study in this space examined voter turnout using a wide array of country-level variables for 17 Latin American countries. It found that three variables – compulsory voting, party competition, and effective registration processes – explain over 50 percent of the variation in turnout across these Latin American democracies (Perez-Linan 2001). A second Latin American study examined elections from 1980 to 2000 and also found that institutions such as unicameralism, compulsory voting, and concurrent legislative and elections all impacted turnout. They also found that country-level variables measuring political freedoms are associated with turnout, but aggregate socioeconomic variables are not (Fornos, et al 2004). Another study looked at presidential elections in a sample of 52 countries, including many developing countries. It found that the level of development, the number of candidates running, whether an incumbent is running, compulsory voting, and the length of time the country has been a democracy all impact turnout in different ways (Dettrey and Schwindtbayer, 2009).

The reader should pause here to note again that these studies track the previous literature on turnout as they focus on country-level variables and socioeconomic aggregates, they do not explain individual level traits impacting voter turnout, the level of analysis focused on in turnout buying theories. A single country study on turnout in Mexico that used individual-level data and found that trust in elections by individual voters was negatively correlated with turnout. Specifically, when opposition voters doubted the integrity of the electoral process, turnout decreased (McCann and Dominguez, 1998). A

second study on turnout in Latin America combined country- and individual-level variables for their analysis. Using a hierarchical model, they found that both trust in electoral integrity and being exposed to vote buying increased turnout, but the effects of trust in electoral institutions were – not surprisingly - largest in countries without mandatory voting (Carreras and Irepoglu, 2013). Finally, studies of voter turnout in the Downsian tradition argue that vote buying increases turnout for supporters of political parties and uses data from Argentina to provide evidence for this perspective (Nichter, 2008). However, as has been mentioned already, the empirical test in this study does not model turnout directly.

Despite the studies mentioned here, there remain too few studies of individual level traits in the developing world. The studies that exist, however, do identify traits that can be used as a starting point for future studies, including this one. Studies in developing countries have identified three individual-level variables that increased turnout: trust in electoral institutions, vote buying, and identifying with a political party (McCann and Dominguez, 1998; Carreras and Irepoglu, 2013; Nichter, 2008). Moreover, studies in advanced democracies can contribute in this same way. In these contexts, researchers have identified age, sex, race, income, and education (Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), political knowledge (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995), face-to-face canvassing (Gerber and Green, 2000), and identifying with a political party all increased turnout (Powell, 1986).

SURVEY AND DATA

Given the literature's focus on country- or state-level determinants for turnout, this paper seeks to fill a void by focusing on individual voters. It uses data from

two sub-national elections with identical electoral institutions and rules. Specifically, it uses data from an original survey conducted in two regencies in Central Java, Indonesia: *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal*. Examining voting behavior in this setting provides the opportunity to hold the institutional variables constant so one can focus on traits of individual voters who actually turn out to vote. This focus does not imply that institutional factors are unimportant. Changes to the electoral process or structural factors within Indonesia would push the overall rates of turnout upwards or downwards. However, individual factors likely also matter and the theories of vote buying that motivated this paper rely on models of personal decision-making. As such, analysis at the individual voter level can test the plausibility of these theories directly.

The survey itself is from a random sample of registered voters in these two regencies. Respondents were randomly selected from voter lists compiled by the General Elections Commission, which has an office for each regency. One of the commission's tasks at each regency's local office is to keep updated lists of registered voters, which they generate from a door-to-door census. This census includes all Indonesian citizens seventeen years old and over who reside at that address. This list is used by poll workers at each polling station on Election Day to verify each voter's eligibility to vote at that location so it contains the universe of all possible voters in these elections. Given this, the random sample for this survey represents all registered voters for these two elections.

To collect the data, the author trained nine students from a local university in the administration of the survey. The training involved three steps. First, the author held a workshop with these students where each question in the survey was explained to the surveyors by the author. Then each surveyor conducted a few mock interviews with a different surveyor to get comfortable with the content in the survey. Third, each surveyor was given a list of fifteen registered voters not included in the study sample so they could

attempt to find residences and pilot the survey with respondents comparable to those in the actual sample. Finally, the author sat in on a number of interviews during the pilot phase and in the opening days with each enumerator to ensure they were following directions and to provide feedback.

This survey generated 318 completed surveys, 157 in *Kota Tegal* and 161 in *Kabupaten Tegal*. Response rates for *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* were 57 percent and 55 percent respectively. Local election officials indicated that a large percentage of individuals who did not vote in these elections were citizens whose permanent address was in *Tegal*, but who worked abroad or in another part of Indonesia.¹⁹ Since their permanent address remained in their home village with their families, they were registered to vote there. However, they generally only return home for the end of Ramadan celebrations so they don't vote in mayoral elections.

This is important contextual information because if citizens keep all of their government papers - including their voter registration - at their village address but do not live there, then the actual number of potential voters in local elections is smaller than the voter rolls would suggest. Note that rural Indonesia does not experience an influx of voters from neighboring districts as can be found in other developing countries (e.g. Hidalgo and Nichter, 2015). This has two sample design implications: first, response rates for the survey should resemble voter turnout rates. Those individuals, who spend their time outside their home village, should not be present for the campaign, the election, or when enumerators visit their houses to administer a survey. Second, when estimating the effective number of completed surveys, one would need to draw larger samples in areas where turnout was lower.

¹⁹ Interview with election officials from the *KPU* in *Kabupaten Tegal*.

Table B.1 in Appendix B shows that turnout rates from the election commission are 56 percent and 58 percent for *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal*, respectively. These numbers are close to the survey's response rates. Also in the table, one can see an adjusted response rate. When a survey respondent refused or was unable to complete a survey, the reason for refusal was recorded. These reasons were coded into three separate categories: one category was that the potential respondent simply refused to be interviewed, a second response category included respondents who lived there but enumerators never found at home, and the final category included those individuals who lived and worked in Jakarta (or some other large city) but kept their paperwork at their family address in the village. The final category also included those who passed away since the last voter registration census and young women who moved away to live with their husband's family in a different part of Indonesia. This final category was then dropped from the denominator to calculate an adjusted response rate, which decreased the potential sample to 406. With this adjustment, the overall response rate became 78 percent. This exercise was done to demonstrate that while not every potential voter agreed to take part in the survey, the majority of them did.

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

The literature review highlighted a number of individual level variables that have been found to predict turnout, including age, sex, race, income, education, political knowledge, face-to-face contact between voters and campaigns, identifying with a political party, being exposed to vote buying, and trusting in the electoral institutions (Ashenfelter

and Kelley 1975; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Gerber and Green 2000; Powell 1986; McCann and Dominguez 1998; Carreras and Irepoglu 2013).

As a starting point, one should recognize that these variables are generated from two different contexts. Studies from advanced democracies have identified one set of determinants, while studies from developing countries have identified a different, although partially overlapping, set of determinants. Since Indonesia is still a young democracy, vote buying and party identification will be examined first. Note that the survey used here includes questions for the first two variables, but not the level of trust in electoral institutions. However, recent research from Indonesia indicates high levels of trust in electoral institutions so while the analysis will not be able to estimate its potential influence directly, it is likely to increase turnout overall (IFES, 2014).

The survey here does include variables measuring vote buying and party identification. While party identification is relatively straightforward to measure, the fact that vote buying is illegal in Indonesia may make it difficult to measure accurately. Respondents might be less willing to admit having accepted something from a campaign to an enumerator because it is technically illegal, which would introduce measurement error into a key variable. This idea has empirical support in studies from other regions. Research from Nicaragua, for example, showed that social desirability bias can impact measures of vote buying. Specifically, less than 5% of respondents in Nicaragua responded *yes* to having received gifts from a campaign in this study, while a list experiment indicated approximately one in four respondents had in fact done so (Gonzales Ocantos et al. 2012). A discrepancy this large could undermine any analysis, which is why some surveys ask whether a person has been exposed to vote buying as a proxy variable, rather than asking them if they accepted money or goods from campaigns directly (e.g. Carreras and Irepoglu 2013). However, there is reason to believe that these issues vary across regions and that

Southeast Asia in particular is a region where this phenomenon is muted (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007)

To assess whether social desirability bias is an issue in this data, a list experiment was also conducted to gauge the level of under-reporting for this variable. For the list experiment, respondents were randomly allocated into two groups. The control group was asked to count and report the number of individuals who (1) got involved in politics, (2) whether they discussed with a friend who they planned on voting for, and (3) whether they donated money to a candidate or worked for that candidate free. The treatment group was asked to count and report on these three options plus whether they (4) got money or in-kind goods from a campaign.²⁰

The results from the list experiment can be seen Table B.2 in the appendix. The difference in means between the control and treatment groups is 0.51 and significant [t value is -5.3, $p < 0.1$]. Since the other three counts are statically equal across both groups, the list experiment estimates that approximately 51 percent of survey respondents accepted either cash or some other good from a campaign before the election compared to 47 percent of respondents who said so through direct questioning. This comparison shows that receiving cash or goods was underreported as the literature suggests, however, the level of underreporting here is only about 4 percent. This result is consistent with the literature that says Southeast Asian democracies tend to report vote-buying in higher numbers than other regions (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007). To the extent that it exists in the region, underreporting is less of an issue in Indonesia than elsewhere.

The survey included an open ended question that asked which political party the respondent preferred. Respondents identified with nine separate political parties including

²⁰ They were asked if they were given *Sembako*, which is a short for *Sembilan Bahan Pokok*. This translates loosely into “the nine staples.” Specifically, *sembako* includes rice, oil, sugar, salt, meat, eggs, corn, milk, and kerosene.

PDIP, PKB, Golkar, PAN, Gerindra, PPP, Partai Demokrat, Hanura, and PKS. Moreover, approximately 21 percent of respondents indicated they didn't prefer a political party. Of these ten responses, the four most common responses were PDIP, PKB, and Golkar. The fewest respondents identified with Partai Demokrat, Hanura, and PKS.

Table 3.1: Proportion with Each Political Party ID

Political Party ID	Proportion w/ PID
No PID	0.21
PDIP	0.28
PKB	0.27
Golkar	0.12
PAN	0.04
Gerindra	0.03
PPP	0.03
Demokrat	0.01
Hanura	0.01
PKS	0.01
Sum	1.0

The three most common parties listed here have long histories in Indonesia. PDIP, which stands for *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, is the successor party to the Indonesian Democratic Party, which was one of three political parties allowed during Indonesia's authoritarian years. The party is associated with Indonesia's first President Sukarno and is headed by his daughter and a former president in her own right, Megawati Sukarnoputri. The second largest party respondents identified with was PKB, or *Partai*

Kebangkitan Bangsa. This is a traditionalist Muslim party affiliated with Indonesia's largest Muslim group, *Nahdlatul Ulama*. The third party respondents identify with is Golkar, or *Partai Golongan Karya*. This was the principal electoral mobilization machine for the authoritarian regime and remains an important party in Indonesia. The other two political parties with relatively long existences in Indonesia are PAN – the modernist Islamic party affiliated with Indonesia's second largest Muslim group *Muhammadiyah* – and PPP, which was the religious party allowed during the authoritarian period, and from which PAN and PKB broke off from following the legalization of new political parties. The remaining political parties here are either vehicles for a particular politician (Gernindra, Demokrat, Hanura) or one that follows a radical Islamic ideology (PKS). Not surprisingly, the parties with the longest histories are identified with by more respondents than are the newer parties.

In addition to these vote buying and party identification, studies from advanced democracies on voter turnout identified age, sex, race, income, education, political knowledge, and face-to-face contact between voters and a campaign worker as being associated with turnout – at least in some contexts. Each of these variables are self-explanatory, except political knowledge. For this variable, the survey asked respondents to answer questions about politics and government in Indonesia. Specifically, an additive scale was created from four open ended questions posed to each respondent. The four questions were:²¹

²¹ Note, a 5th question was asked as well asking who was the current Mayor in the regency, however, the previous mayor of Kabupaten Tegal was in jail for corruption charges and his replacement – the vice-mayor - died of natural causes due to his age in the months prior to the election. As a result, a civil servant was running the local government until the election. No one in the survey knew that civil servants name in Kabupaten Tegal. Conversely, about 94 percent of the respondents in Kota Tegal their mayor's name. As a conservative test to determine whether this question was measuring the same aspect of political knowledge, responses indicating that there was no mayor were coded as correct. With this assumption then, just under five percent of the respondents in Kabupaten Tegal got the question correct. A t-test measuring the difference in proportions for the question between the two regencies had an absolute value

- Who is the current vice-president of Indonesia?
- Who is the current governor of the province?
- Which Political Party was SBY (the president of Indonesia) a member of?
- Which level of government was responsible for funding schools in your area?

Each question was coded as a one if the respondent was correct and a zero if they were incorrect or if they responded that they didn't know. Then an additive scale was created by summing all of the correct answers. Therefore, someone who got all of the questions correct would be scored a four and someone who got all of them incorrect were scored a zero. The distribution of the variables can be seen in the following table.

Table 3.2: Mean Values for Each Political Knowledge Variable

Variable Names	Vice-President	Governor	SBY's Party	Education Funding	Additive Scale (0-4)
Mean Value	0.68	0.54	0.82	0.03	2.1
SD	0.47	0.50	0.38	0.18	1.1

Looking at the values, one sees that there is variation across the four individual questions and the additive measure. Of all the questions, the highest proportion of survey respondents know the political party of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono with approximately 82 percent of respondents answering it correctly. Second, 68 percent of respondents knew that Boediono was the Vice President, and 54 percent Ganjar Pranowo (or simply Ganjar) was the governor of Central Java. The final question was included to help identify those individuals who were highly knowledgeable about

over 37 (!) indicating this variable wasn't comparable across the two regencies and so the variable was dropped.

government in Indonesia, while the survey was looking for respondents to identify the Regency-level Office of the Education Ministry, answers that either identified the local government or the education ministry were accepted as correct since only three respondents correctly identified the agency. The overall distribution of the scale can be seen in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Frequency Distribution for Knowledge Scale Variable

Number Correct	Frequency	Percent of Total
0	45	14
1	40	13
2	86	27
3	138	44
4	8	3

Other variables from the voter turnout literature can be found in Table B.3 in Appendix B, with one caveat. The American politics literature identifies race as being correlated with turnout, but since race has little meaning in Tegal, where all residents are Asian, ethnicity is used instead. But the reader can also see in the table that 94 percent of the respondents are Javanese, highlighting how homogenous these two regencies are. The other six percent of respondents identified themselves as mixed ethnicity of Javanese plus Sundanese (the indigenous group from neighboring West Java), Bugis (a seafaring group from Sulawesi spread out across most of the coastal areas of Indonesia), or Arab. There were also households claiming individual ethnicities of Betawi (from Jakarta), Sasak (from Lombok), and Sundanese.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The analysis here will be done in four steps. First, a descriptive analysis of party identification and receiving transfers will be done. These two variables were important in the developing country literature assessing the determinants of turnout (e.g. Nichter 2008; Carreras and Irepoglu 2013, Gans-Morse, Gazzuca and Nichter, 2014). The initial analysis will establish whether voters who receive transfers are distinct from those who claim a party identification and it will assess whether receiving transfers has its own effects on turnout, independent of party identification. Second, multivariate analysis will be conducted to see whether this relationship is robust once all known factors from the broader literature are included in the statistical model. Finally, further analysis of variables from the broader literature is done to explore pathways for future research.

When trying to understand turnout in elections with rampant vote buying, a major concern is *whose* votes are bought. Are individuals who already support a political party given transfers to ensure turnout, as some scholars argue, or are transfers given to potential voters to sway their votes? Although this debate centers around which voters get targeted, it is relevant here because the former perspective implies that party identification and having received transfers should be highly correlated (Nichter 2008). If this is true, then multivariate models - absent a high powered data set - might be unable to distinguish between the independent impacts of each variable in a model assessing voter turnout. As this dataset has just over 300 respondents, it may struggle to detect such small impacts.

To explore whether parties in this election only targeted their own supporters, Table 3.4 provides a set of descriptive statistics. Specifically, it provides proportions for respondents claiming the party identification listed in the left column. It then provides the proportion of respondents with that party identification who received a transfer from any

party (includes transfers from the party they identify with as well as parties they do not identify with). Finally, the table lists the proportion of respondents with that party identification that received a transfer (simply the ratio of the first proportion over the second proportion). If the final column equals (or is close to equaling) one, then that indicates that every single respondent who claimed that party identification also received a transfer from that campaign. If turnout buying were the only explanation for private transfers during campaigns, one might expect this outcome.²² In Table 4, the reader should focus on the top four categories as they have the largest number of people identifying with these parties. Both PDIP and Golkar have over 50 percent of their supporters receiving benefits of some kind from one of the campaigns. PKB, notably, has only about a third of their identifiers receiving transfers, which is about the same as those people who do not identify with a party. Note, for the turnout hypothesis to be strictly true, then those without a party identification should not receive transfers in such high numbers.²³

²² Note, the authors of this perspective don't claim anything this extreme (see Gans-Morse, Gazzuca and Nichter, 2014), this example is used to simply clarify what a world with only turnout buying would look like.

²³ The other parties are listed simply for the readers information, the sample sizes are too small for even a descriptive analysis, but may be interesting for those with knowledge of Indonesian politics.

Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Party Identification and Proportion of PID who Receive Transfers from Campaigns

Political Party ID	Proportion w/ PID	PID and Received Transfer	Proportion of PID who Received Transfer
No PID	0.21	0.08	0.37
PDIP	0.28	0.15	0.55
PKB	0.27	0.10	0.36
Golkar	0.12	0.08	0.65
PAN	0.04	0.02	0.58
Gerindra	0.03	0.01	0.30
PPP	0.03	0.01	0.51
Demokrat	0.01	0.01	0.73
Hanura	0.01	0.01	0.63
PKS	0.01	0.01	0.73
	Sum: 100	N = 315	

This table does not however, tell us whether those receiving transfers were getting those transfers from the party they claimed to identify with. It could be that all transfers were given by the party each respondent identifies with and these transfers were strictly to ensure each party identifier turns out for the election. Alternatively, it could be that each respondent was provided transfers from parties they do not identify with in an attempt to literally buy their vote. In this scenario, none of the transfers was from the person's identified party (the other extreme of the turnout scenario described above). Neither of these outcomes is likely to be completely true. The fact that 37 percent of those individuals who don't identify with a party suggests a middle ground because a strict turnout strategy would overlook this group, while a strict vote buying strategy would target this group in higher numbers.

Table 5 presents the data differently. Rather than focusing on an individual voter's party identification and whether they received anything from a campaign, it looks at the data from the political party's perspective. Specifically, Table 5 shows the party identification of the voters that each political party provided transfers to. The first column is the proportion of those whose party identification matches the political party that they received a transfer from. The second column is the proportion of respondents who identify with a different political party, received transfers from the political party listed in the left column. Finally, the third column is the proportion of respondents who did not identify with any party that received transfers from the political party for each row. Note that the three parties with the smallest number of identifies in the survey have been dropped due to their small sample size.

Table 3.5: Transfers Received by Party

Political Party	Proportion w/ this PID who Received Transfer from Party	Proportion w/ this PID who received Transfer from different Party	Proportion w/ No PID Receiving transfer from Party
PDIP	0.23	0.11	0.12
PKB	0.21	0.00	0.10
Golkar	0.55	0.25	0.20
PPP	0.50	0.30	0.33
Gerindra	0.00	0.04	0.04
Pan	0.25	0.18	0.09

Here one can see the turnout model seems to hold for PKB as they did not target any respondents who identified with any of the other political parties. However, many

non-identifiers also received transfers from PKB suggesting they either identify voters who lean toward PKB or take part in both turnout as well as vote buying. For Golkar, they seem to heavily target their own supporters, with over half getting something from the party, while also targeting those with other party identifications and no party identifications relatively equally. Golkar takes care of their own first, then reaches out to everyone indiscriminately. PDIP follows a similar pattern as Golkar, just with less efficiency as voters who identify with PDIP are targeted by their own party less than half the time (although note, the ratio of party to non-party to no id is about 2:1:1 for both parties). Recall, an important reason this descriptive analysis was done was to assess whether party identification and having received a transfer are perfectly collinear. While this descriptive evidence suggests a correlation between each of these parties and who they provide with transfers, the relationship should allow for multivariate modeling to estimate separate impacts.

Next, one can turn their attention to the relationship between these two variables and whether one turned out to vote in the election. The dependent variable – turnout - takes on a value of one when that respondent voted and a zero when they did not vote in the election. Given the dependent variable follows a Bernoulli distribution, all multivariate models use a probit regression to estimate the relationships between turnout and the various independent variables. For the first set of models, party indicators and having received a transfer from a party are included. Each of the political party indicators is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the respondent identifies with that political party and a zero otherwise. Recall from Table 4 that three political parties – Hanura, Demokrat, and PKS - each had less than 1 percent of respondents who said they identified with them

– so these dummy variables are excluded from the analysis.²⁴ Moreover, dummy variables for those respondents who did not report a party identification is omitted from the analysis serving as the base category so all party indicator coefficients reported in the table represent a comparison between having no party identification and the party identification measured by each party indicator. Recall, the variable for having received a transfer is coded one for all respondents who were provided either cash or an in-kind good from any campaign.

Table 3.6: Probit Regression Models Predicting Turnout

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Gerindra	-0.38 (0.45)		-0.26 (0.47)
Golkar	1.04** (0.46)		0.98** (0.49)
PAN	0.48 (0.55)		0.45 (0.58)
PDIP	0.36 (0.25)		0.35 (0.26)
PKB	0.90*** (0.31)		1.04*** (0.32)
PPP	0.25 (0.59)		0.13 (0.58)
Received Transfer		0.74*** (0.22)	0.81*** (0.24)
Constant	0.90*** (0.17)	1.01*** (0.12)	0.61*** (0.19)
Pseudo R ²	0.08	0.06	0.14
N	315	316	315

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

²⁴ In effect this collapses them into the excluded category. Also note that this analysis was done using STATA, which automatically drops two of them as they perfectly predict turnout due to so few non-zero values. The inclusion/exclusion has no substantive impact on the results (not shown).

Table 3.6 provides results from these probit regressions. From the descriptive analysis, Golkar and PKB were the most likely parties to target their own identifiers, yet they are the two parties with significant and positive coefficients. This is interesting because the coefficients on the indicators for these two parties suggests that identifiers for each of these parties – or at least a significant sub-section of them - would turnout independent of receiving a transfer. PDIP, on the other hand, has a positive but insignificant coefficient. PDIP supporters may either not feel motivated enough from the identification to turnout, or more likely, they have a weaker attachment to their party on average so any positive impacts require a larger sample to detect. The variables for the other three parties are underpowered making their coefficients difficult to interpret, but one should note all but one are positive.

Having received a transfer from a political campaign is positive and significant in both models where it's included. This is notable as if both turnout and abstention buying were present for these elections, one would expect these opposing forces to cancel out, leading to an insignificant result as the coefficient on this variable is pushed toward zero. If abstention buying does exist, it is modest in comparison to turnout buying. Table B.5 in Appendix B shows the proportions for respondents in the survey who claim a party identification but received a transfer from a different party. While the overall proportion ranges from a low of zero for PKB to a high of 19 percent for Golkar, indicating some political parties could buy voter abstention, when the sample is restricted to only those voters who did not turn out; half of the parties register a zero while the highest proportion of abstainers is Golkar with 6 percent. If political parties are attempting to buy abstention, they are quite unsuccessful at it.

These results are consistent with the hypothesis of turnout buying, but they remain preliminary. It remains conceivable that campaigns target certain demographic groups who are likely to turn out. In this scenario, campaigns target those individuals who are likely to turnout, not to get them to the polls, but to convince those people already going to the polls to vote for them. Despite these results, omitted variables could still be driving the relationship found in Table 3.6.

These base models are simply included to demonstrate that the data are consistent with previous findings in the turnout literature from developing countries. A more complete model, however, should include the variables highlighted in the literature review from a broader range of countries. These additional variables include age, gender, income, whether they had contact with the campaign, years of education, political knowledge, and an indicator for whether they were ethnically Javanese. Table B.3 in Appendix B indicates that income, age, education, gender, and ethnicity all have individual responses on individual surveys that are missing (i.e. there is item missingness in the data), which can decrease the analysis sample significantly when all are included at once. Therefore, the analysis will replicate the regressions presented in the previous table while controlling for one additional variable at a time to reduce the number of observations lost testing each additional variable. As each model loses observations due to this item missingness, this strategy allows the reader to observe how coefficients change on party identification and having received a transfer while limiting the number of observations lost with the addition of each new variable. Note the final column includes the complete model for comparison. Table 3.7 shows the results.

Table 3.7: Probit Regression Models with Full Set of Independent Variables

Variables	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
Received Transfer	1.08*** (0.29)	0.77*** (0.24)	0.81*** (0.24)	0.50 (0.31)	0.82*** (0.24)	0.80*** (0.24)	0.84*** (0.24)	0.82** (0.39)
Gerindra	-0.37 (0.53)	-0.20 (0.47)	-0.28 (0.47)	-0.27 (0.48)	-0.22 (0.47)	-0.25 (0.47)	-0.40 (0.48)	-0.59 (0.58)
Golkar	0.46 (0.55)	0.95* (0.5)	0.99** (0.49)	0.82* (0.49)	0.98** (0.49)	1.00** (0.50)	0.95* (0.50)	0.08 (0.64)
PAN	0.16 (0.62)	0.40 (0.57)	0.47 (0.59)	0.39 (0.60)	0.46 (0.58)	0.46 (0.59)	0.46 (0.60)	-0.05 (0.67)
PDIP	-0.04 (0.30)	0.35 (0.27)	0.35 (0.26)	0.33 (0.26)	0.36 (0.26)	0.37 (0.27)	0.36 (0.26)	-0.01 (0.35)
PKB	0.73** (0.36)	1.02*** (0.33)	1.03*** (0.32)	1.0*** (0.32)	1.04*** (0.32)	1.06*** (0.33)	1.02*** (0.32)	0.56 (0.41)
PPP	-0.43 (0.62)	-0.08 (0.62)	0.14 (0.58)	0.07 (0.58)	0.17 (0.58)	0.15 (0.58)	0.12 (0.58)	-0.90 (0.73)
Income	-0.04 (0.03)							-0.04 (0.03)
Age (years)		0.01* (0.01)						0.03*** (0.01)
Education (years)			0.01 (0.03)					0.04 (0.05)
Contact w/ Campaign				0.44 (0.28)				0.45 (0.34)
Female					0.09 (0.21)			0.13 (0.27)
Javanese						-0.15 (0.44)		0.21 (0.50)
Knowledge							0.13 (0.09)	0.25* (0.14)
Constant	0.9*** (0.2)	0.1 (0.3)	0.55* (0.31)	0.50** (0.20)	0.54** (0.22)	0.74* (0.43)	0.36 (0.26)	-1.58 (0.96)
<i>N</i>	266	305	314	315	313	315	315	259

The first thing one should notice is that having received a transfer is statistically significant and positive for each regression, except the one where campaign contact is controlled for. The coefficient remains positive, but smaller and its p-value reduces to 0.11. Having contact with a campaign and having received a transfer from a campaign are – not surprisingly – highly correlated at 0.77 suggesting that this result is possibly due to collinearity between the two independent variables. It also suggests that the other models may overstate the impact of receiving transfers because there are two separate mechanism at play – receiving a transfer and making contact with a campaign - both of which increase the likelihood of turnout. The fact that having received a transfer is statistically significant and positive in the full model and that the p-value for Model 7 is barely insignificant further suggests this explanation is likely.

The second thing one should notice is that there remains variation in statistical significance across the political party indicators. The traditionalist Islamic political party PKB, remains significant and positive for all but one of the regressions. Golkar, the political machine for Suharto during his reign, is more mixed. It passes a 90 percent significance test in all but two regressions, but only passes a 95 percent hypothesis test three times. The coefficients on each Golkar indicator is always less than the coefficient on the PKB indicator (although it gets close to the same magnitude at times) suggesting that the effects of party identification are conditional and possibly weaker than PKB. The PDIP indicator is never statistically significant in any of the models, but as before remains positive in all but one model, where the coefficient is basically zero.

In practical terms, this suggests that party identification is a motivating factor for people who identify with certain parties but that there are heterogeneous effects of party identification on turnout. Identification with some parties such as PKB, which recall is a religious party, is a strong enough force to get people to turn out. Identification with

Golkar, a secular party from the authoritarian era, also seems to increase turn out, but the effects are weaker. And for PDIP, the effects are weaker still, if they exist at all. Since individuals self-select their party identification, some underlying traits associated with how individuals sort themselves by party realistically still drives turnout, rather than having a party identification itself, but even after controlling for known covariates in the literature this relationship holds suggesting this remains a useful proxy variable for researchers moving forward. This also highlights the need to further investigate how individuals select party identification in young democracies, such as Indonesia.

Before moving on, trust in electoral institutions needs to be addressed. A study from Latin America showed that trust in the fairness of electoral institutions is an important determinant of voter turnout, especially for opposition voters who stay home if the government cannot be trusted to run a fair election process (Carreras and Irepoglu 2013). Recall that Indonesians are generally positive toward the quality of their electoral institutions (IFES, 2014). On average then, if trust is correlated with one's party identification or with having received a transfer, then the correlation between these variables and trust will provide information about which direction the bias might be. Specifically, since trust is positively correlated with turnout, any independent variable it positively correlates with will push the coefficient of that independent variable upwards. On the other hand, any independent variable it negatively correlates with will push the coefficient in a negative direction. For party identification, trust could be a sorting mechanism with less trustful citizens identifying with one party, while more trustful citizens identifying with another party. In this case, the coefficients of certain parties could be pushed toward zero and as a result become statically insignificant. It is possible that this is what is happening with the PDIP indicator, however, it is not likely. Recall that trust in Indonesia is high overall. If trust is affecting the analysis here, it likely pushing

coefficients on party identification upward, indicating the results might be overestimating the impact of party identification on turn out. Since this paper is exploring whether receiving a transfer increases turnout, independent of party identification, this result supports the turn out hypothesis.

The second variable – receiving a transfer from a campaign – could be more problematic. Vote buying could depress trust in electoral institutions for those individuals exposed to or taking part in vote buying. Since having received a transfer is positively correlated with turnout though, this means that a negative correlation between trust and receiving a transfer from a campaign would actually push the coefficient on the received transfer variable toward zero. Yet this variable is positive and significant in almost all of the model specifications. For those who think that omitting trust from the model is biasing this result, it means they think the coefficient should be even larger. Given this, the results would not likely change substantively had the survey included a variable on trust in electoral institutions. The coefficients might have changed somewhat, but the contrast between the impacts of party identification and receiving a transfer would have been even larger, as the former coefficient would have been pushed toward zero and the latter coefficient would have had a larger magnitude. In summary, omitting a measure for trust in these models should not affect the results found in the regression models.

There are two variables from the literature on advanced democracies that are statistically significant in some of the regression models, and that should be discussed well. First, as a person's age increases, so does their likelihood for turning out to vote. Researchers in American politics argue that voting has an element of inertia so first time voters each election move from habitual non-voters to habitual voters (Plutzer, 2002). This argument seems plausible because, although Indonesia is a relatively new democracy, the Suharto regime did hold elections regularly and these elections had extremely high turnout

rates – even in the years just preceding the regime’s collapse (Schiller, 1999). Ironically, applying this argument from the American politics literature to Indonesia implies that authoritarian regimes can create the conditions for – at least some - democratic behaviors.

A simple t-test dividing those respondents who could vote in the last election under authoritarian leadership in 1997 versus those were too young to vote at the time supports this idea. The test produces an absolute t-value over 3 when comparing the group means of 94 percent and 84 percent for those individuals old enough to vote prior to democracy in Indonesia and for those respondents who were too young to vote in 1997. While this is by no means conclusive, it is an interesting fact from the data and a plausible explanation for why age is statistically significant in each of the probit regressions presented in this paper.

Political knowledge is the other variable from the American politics literature that seems to play a role in increasing turnout. The full model produces a marginally significant and positive coefficient. Normally, one might overlook this result because it did not appear to be significant in the other model that included it and assume it is a weak predictor of turnout. However, there are possible measurement issues with this variable that suggest further analysis would be useful. First, while the survey sample here is large enough to identify substantive relationships in the data (statistically speaking), this variable attempts to measure an abstract concept increasing the likelihood for measurement error. Recall from the discussion of the independent variables that this variable was constructed using an additive scale from five open-ended questions. Also recall that two of the questions had possible issues, leading one to be dropped from the analysis altogether. Specifically, one political knowledge question asked about education funding for local public schools, which very few people answered correctly, even when the criteria for a correct answer was expanded by the author. The other question asked about who the current Mayor was, but

in Kabupaten Tegal the previous mayor was in prison for corruption charges and his vice Mayor was deceased due to old age. Therefore, at the time of the survey it wasn't clear who the actual mayor was to most residents of Kabupaten Tegal (it was a civil servant who was running the local government until the newly elected mayor took over). The question in Kota Tegal was measuring the question's intent, which was who is the Mayor, which respondents in the survey from Kota Tegal named correctly over 90 percent of the time. However, knowing the current mayor in Kota Tegal was the simple question it was intended to be. In Kabupaten Tegal however, one would need to know the intricacies of the local government's line of succession, which is obviously not the simple knowledge question it was intended to be. As a result, this variable was dropped from the additive scale in the above analysis.

To explore whether these two issues impacted the validity or reliability of the scale, however, two additional analyses can be done to check the robustness of the result. Specifically, two additional political knowledge variables can be constructed. The first – called Knowledge 2 in the Table B.4 in Appendix B – is constructed using just the three political knowledge questions answered correctly and consistently by many respondents. This will reduce the variation of the knowledge variable making it more difficult to measure relationships between it and turnout, but this truncate measure should be more reliable and valid. And the second – called Knowledge 3 in Table B.4 in Appendix B – can be constructed using all five questions, but restricting the analysis to the Kota Tegal sample. This scale could improve validity by helping to identify those low information voters who cannot name the current mayor of Kota Tegal, which had the highest percentage of correct answers. If there is any question as to whether the additive scale's two poles really represent high knowledge versus low knowledge voters, especially given the tiny percentage of individual getting the education funding question correct, the addition of this

question to the scale should increase the validity at the end of the measure representing low information voters.

Table B.4 in Appendix B includes the results of these additional regressions. Columns 1 and 3 include the political knowledge variable constructed from three questions and the results show a weak positive correlation in one model and no result in the other (although the coefficient remains positive). Columns 2 and 4 show the expanded scale applied to a smaller sample. The first regression finds a positive and statistically significant relationship and the second produces a similar sized coefficient but the p-value drops to 0.13. Note that the regression in the fourth column, however, has approximately a 20 percent smaller sample so this lack of statistical significance is more likely due to this rather than the variable having no impact.

CONCLUSION

This paper tested the theory that vote buying operations increase turnout for those individuals who actually receive cash or other benefits from campaigns prior to elections. It finds evidence that while party supporters do tend to receive the highest rate of transfers from the party they identify with, voters that identify with other parties and voters who don't identify with any political parties also receive transfers. This pattern in the data left open the possibility that political parties also attempt to pay the supporters of political opponents to stay home on Election Day. However, multivariate analysis showed that receiving transfers was positively correlated with turnout across multiple model specifications, suggesting abstention buying was minimal if it existed at all. A descriptive analysis (Table B.5 in Appendix B) further showed that very few respondents who claim

one party but receive transfers from a different party actually sit out the election, something one would expect to see if abstention buying was pervasive during these elections.

This analysis did not rule out the possibility that transfers provided to voters who don't identify with political parties was also an example of vote buying; however, only that those who received transfers were more likely to turnout regardless of their party identification and regardless of which party provided the transfer to them. This leaves open the possibility of two separate purposes for the transfers depending on one's party identification. For supporters, the transfer simply ensures turnout. A person who receives a transfer from the party they identify with likely has no decision to make unless another party is attempting to buy one's vote and the transfer is made to ensure that voter remains loyal to the party they usually identify with. Table B.6 in Appendix B, however, shows that only 6 percent of respondents received transfers from more than one campaign, making this a possibility for only a small number of voters, if at all.

For those individuals who do not claim to identify with a party, there are two steps in the participation process that could be impacted by a transfer. First, it could encourage the person to turn out by reducing the costs associated with voting, much like it does for party supporters who receive transfers from campaigns. The evidence here broadly suggests that this is the case. However, a transfer from a campaign could also enter in to that voter's individual decision making process, leading the voter to vote for the party that gave them the transfer or vote against that party if they view vote buying negatively. Unfortunately, this survey data is too small to distinguish between these two possibilities. A much larger survey would be needed to disentangle and identify whether there are smaller, independent impacts on each of these steps in the process.

Finally, for those individuals who receive transfers from parties that are not their own, the evidence here suggests that this does increase their likelihood of turning out to

vote. However, there remain two possibilities. First, this could be an attempt by campaigns to buy weak supporters of their political opponents or it could be that political parties are inefficient at identifying their own likely supporters. In the latter scenario, it is possible that campaigns target particular neighborhoods and that those people who receive transfers from parties they do not support are simply political minorities in their respective neighborhoods. In other words, their receiving goods is simply spillage, which would in fact support the turnout hypothesis since the parties themselves are targeting supporters, even if ineffectively. Again, a larger data set from future research would allow one to separate these two possibilities.

In conclusion, the data suggest that receiving a private transfer from a political party does increase one's likelihood to vote. This result is robust to various model specifications that incorporate known determinants of voter turnout in the literature. However, research questions remain for future projects. Specifically, larger and more detailed datasets would allow researchers to more closely examine how some voters receive transfers from parties they do not support and whether this impacts their behavior at the polls beyond encouraging them to show up on Election Day.

Chapter 4: Vote Choice

In many young democracies, citizens accept gifts or money in exchange for their votes during election time. Indonesia is no different. But a budding literature on the effectiveness of vote buying, while still thin, suggests that distributive politics may not always work as intended (Wang and Kurtzman, 2007). For example, a study in Mexico found that only 37 percent of those individuals who received a gift from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) voted for their presidential candidate in the 2000 election (Cornelius 2004, p.57). They either did not vote or voted for a different candidate. In Argentina, a different study estimated that only about 16 percent of voters who received something had their voting decision influenced by that handout, this was equal to 1.5 percent of the voting population (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004, p.70). In a Philippine study, researchers estimated that only 30 percent of voters in a local election who accepted money were influenced by that gift (Schaffer 2007, p.173). Yet distributive politics persists across the globe. Political parties and candidates continue to spend resources on direct transfers to voters without knowing whether those voters will in fact vote for them. Some scholars argue that the presence of local brokers increases the efficacy of direct transfers (Stokes et al. 2013), but the presence of brokers doesn't guarantee resources are always spent wisely (Wang and Kurtzman, 2007). These findings highlight the need for scholars to understand when distributive politics are effective and when they are not. Moreover, these findings underscore that political parties might not always target voters with private transfers efficiently.

While theories of vote-buying are diverse, many build upon spatial voting models (Stokes 2005, Nichter 2008, Stokes et al. 2013). Spatial models are relatively new to this

literature, but date back more than half a century in the American politics literature (Downs, 1957, Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Spatial models start with the premise that some ideological distribution or policy mix exists for each candidate and that voters can place both political parties and themselves along this distribution. Then, voters simply see which party is closest to them and vote for that party accordingly. Models of distributive politics add a wrinkle to this set-up by allowing voters to weigh direct transfers to voters as well, whether money or some other good, into their decision making calculus (Stokes et al. 2013; Nichter 2008). This is an extension of spatial models and provides a more accurate representation of politics in many democracies with vote buying.

In many of these democracies, however, political parties are often not easily differentiated along an ideological spectrum, *nor* is attachment to political parties particularly strong. Indonesia, where research for this study takes place, is one such democracy (Pratikno, 2009; Mujani and Liddle, 2010). In this context, how does one explain vote choice? How do political parties decide whom to target with transfers during campaigns? This paper extends the standard model of distributive politics in the literature to explore these questions by directly incorporating ambiguity into the placement of political parties. To incorporate this uncertainty, it replaces one party's point estimate of their ideological placement with a probability distribution. This allows for the party to take on a range of values, each with an assigned probability, and compare its predictions to parties more precisely placed ideologically. With this setup, one can then answer some interesting questions, namely, do ideologically identifiable parties need to campaign using distributive politics? Which voters do they target during campaigns? And are they more or less effective when they do?

Indonesia is an excellent place to investigate these questions, but is it unique? Do other countries have also have weak, unstable, or fractured parties? The comparative

politics literature is littered with examples of parties that have ambiguous policy positions. One classic study categorized, then identified, the types of electoral systems that disincentivize politicians to campaign behind party labels, and opt instead for more personalized campaign strategies (Carey and Shugart 1995). Its primary result was that certain electoral institutions either increase or decrease the importance of party labels and that in many contexts politicians are incentivized to run personalized, rather than party centric, campaigns. In Brazil, the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT) is well known to voters from years of outreach so voters have formed attachments with that party. As a result, individual politicians may benefit from associating themselves with PT over time; however, other political parties in Brazil are less well known and more difficult to place ideologically. One indicator of this is that on average one-third of sitting Brazilian legislators switch parties during their terms (Samuels 2006). The Brazilian case highlights an important point, which is true in Indonesia as well. Within a given country, there may be both ideological and non-ideological parties operating in the same space (or more precisely, parties that are less clear ideologically). This is also true in Indonesia, as will be outlined below.

This paper is split into five sections. First, it covers relevant literature, outlines the model, and generates its theoretical implications. Second, it provides background information on Indonesia and the elections studied here. Third, it describes the survey data used to test the formal model and addressed empirical issues when measuring vote buying. Fourth, it justifies the dyadic analysis plan and executes said plan. Finally, it discusses the results and conclusions from the model and empirical data.

SPATIAL VOTING MODELS

The literature on spatial voting models with vote buying is best summarized by two perspectives. The key puzzle in this debate is how vote buying persists despite the temptation for voters to take the money or goods and vote their conscience. One perspective argues that political parties use private transfers to attract swing voters (Stokes 2005), while the other perspective argues that political parties use private transfers to ensure the turnout of the party faithful (Nichter 2008). Stokes et al. (2013) then shows that many of the party faithful do receive transfers, but this is the result of a principal-agent problem whereby local brokers - who actually distribute the transfers – target party faithful despite instructions to target swing voters. None of these papers, however, loosen the placement assumption within their spatial models and thus assume swing and core voters are identifiable, either by the parties themselves or by local brokers.

Uncertainty in party placement exists, however. The American politics literature grappled with this issue in the 1970s and 1980s. At the time, scholars identified two possible sources of uncertainty: political parties strategically putting forward vague policy proposals and voters' tendency to collapse numerous policy positions into a simplified, unidimensional ideological scale.

Strategic ambiguous placement is best seen via the following quote from William Henry Harrison's – the ninth president of the United States - campaign manager:

“Let him say not one single word about his principles, his creed – let him say nothing – promise nothing. Let no Committee, no convention – no town meeting ever extract from him a single word, about what he thinks now, or what he will do

hereafter. Let the use of the pen and ink be wholly forbidden as if he were a mad poet in Bedlam” (Shepsle 1972, p. 555)

Scholars of American politics realized that at least some candidates had an incentive to campaign, not with clear policy prescriptions, but with the vaguest possible campaign promises. Shepsle (1972) introduced the concept of ambiguous party placement into the spatial modelling literature decades ago. He substituted the point estimate of a party’s ideal point with a random probability distribution and showed that candidates making vague policy statements do attract a certain type of voter. Specifically, they attract risk acceptant voters whom he defines as voters that willingly accept the possibility of a less desirable policy mix for the chance of seeing their ideal policy mix implemented after the election. His paper also showed that candidates with ambiguous policy positions repel risk averse voters. Left unsaid in this paper, however, is how one identifies risk averse and risk acceptant voters ex-ante and what the distribution of these individuals might be across any given electorate.

The second source of uncertainty is a result of a voter’s ability (or lack thereof) to process various pieces of information from political campaigns and place them – accurately - along a simplified, unidimensional ideological spectrum (Enelow and Hinich, 1981). In this set-up, voters are the source of uncertainty and interestingly shift their own ideal points away from the median when the center of the ideological spectrum is the area of greatest uncertainty. Ambiguity is introduced in this model through a random variable on party placement specific to each individual voter. This variable has an expected value of the “correct” party placement but each voter’s perception of that placement is the expected value plus some residual. A key finding in this paper, however, is that this source of uncertainty helps to explain why political parties in the United States never fully converge

on the median voter. It outlines a mechanism for how polarization remains stable. In other words, it outlines how the Republican Party is able to remain a right-of-center party and the Democratic Party remains a left-of-center party, with neither converging on the median voter.

This paper builds on the models in Nichter (2008, p. 22-23) and Stokes (2005, p. 319-21). Both of these models assume voters choose candidates along a single dimensional policy space and preferences are exogenous, meaning that transfers do not impact a voter's desired set of policies. These models also assume two parties are present and the choice faced by the voter is between a machine party and an opposition party. However, in this paper, the vote choice is between a non-ideological and ideological party, respectively, as Indonesia has no true machine parties. This paper keeps each of these assumptions in place. Moreover, this paper assumes that the source of uncertainty is the political parties themselves, not individual voter's inability to accurately process information from candidates during the campaigns. While voter level uncertainty may also be present, scholars studying similar elections in Indonesia stressed that the issues discussed during campaigns were inconsistent and included vague policy promises (Choi 2009). If these elections took place in an information rich environment where media provided daily updates of election issues, then uncertainty may be from individual voter's inability to process that information, however, this does not describe the area in Java where Tegal is located.

Since the driving force behind this paper is that parties can be difficult to place along a spectrum, the model here presents the voter's choice as between two parties, but assumes the machine party is difficult to place ideologically while the opposition party has a coherent ideology. The base model then, which is the utility function representing a vote for the opposition party, is written as follows:

$$u_i = -(X_i - V_i)^2 + b_i - c_i \quad (1)$$

In this model, u_i is the utility of voter i , X_i is the ideological position on the political spectrum for candidate i , V_i is the position on the ideological spectrum for voter i , b_i is the targeted benefit given to voter i for their support so $b_i \in \{0, b\}$, and c_i is the cost of voting and restricted to $c_i \in \{0, c\}$. A vote is represented by $V_i \in \{X_1, X_2\}$. The model assumes the median voter is located at zero along the ideological spectrum, with left of center parties placing themselves at negative values and right or center parties placing themselves at positive values. The reader will see below that this assumption vastly simplifies the model when solving for constraints the machines party faces.

Uncertainty is incorporated into the party placement by assuming that party chooses strategic ambiguity. Following Shepsle (1972), the non-ideological party's placement is modeled using a uniform probability distribution. In practical terms, this means that X_i takes on a range of values and the difference $X_i - V_i$ is weighted equally by the probability of a given placement of the party's location across their possible policy space. The uniform probability distribution is used because it is ideal for comparing predictions for parties with uncertain placement – i.e. non-ideological parties - to ideological parties that can be placed because it does not change the shape of the utility loss function, only its slope. To do this, one simply multiplies the uniform distribution by X_i for the non-ideological party. Formally, $X_i \in \{a, z\}$ and assume that $z > a$ where a and z represent two points along the ideological spectrum for each candidate between which the true value of X_i lies. Moreover assume $z-a \geq 1$ so that if the ideological party chooses to pick a clear policy platform, their side of the equation simplifies to the base model, i.e. the utility loss

function of the ideological party. The uniform probability distribution is $\frac{1}{z-a}$ so the updated utility function for the non-ideological party is:

$$u_i = -\int_a^z \left(\frac{X_i}{z-a} - V_i\right)^2 dx + b_i - c_i \quad (2)$$

Thus, if neither party provides targeted transfers and the cost of voting is constant to cast a vote, then the voter votes for the non-ideological party when $-\int_a^z \left(\frac{X_i}{z-a} - X_1\right)^2 dx > -(X_i - X_2)^2$ and they vote for the ideological party when $-\int_a^z \left(\frac{X_i}{z-a} - X_1\right)^2 dx < -(X_i - X_2)^2$. They do this as long as $-\int_a^z \left(\frac{X_i}{z-a} - X_1\right)^2 dx > -c_i$ or $-(X_i - X_2)^2 > -c_i$.

If the non-ideological party provides a transfer b_i for one's vote, then the voter chooses the non-ideological party when $-\int_a^z \left(\frac{X_i}{z-a} - X_1\right)^2 dx + b_i > -(X_i - X_2)^2$ as long as $-\int_a^z \left(\frac{X_i}{z-a} - X_1\right)^2 dx + b_i > -c_i$. Using similar logic, they vote for the ideological party when $-\int_a^z \left(\frac{X_i}{z-a} - X_1\right)^2 dx + b_i < -(X_i - X_2)^2$ as long as $-(X_i - X_2)^2 > -c_i$.

If the ideological party also provides transfer b_i to offset the incentive from the non-ideological party, the voter chooses the non-ideological party when $-\int_a^z \left(\frac{X_i}{z-a} - X_1\right)^2 dx + b_i > -(X_i - X_2)^2 + b_i$ as long as $-\int_a^z \left(\frac{X_i}{z-a} - X_1\right)^2 dx + b_i > -c_i$. And to state the final constraint, they vote for the ideological party when $-\int_a^z \left(\frac{X_i}{z-a} - X_1\right)^2 dx + b_i < -(X_i - X_2)^2 + b_i$ as long as $-(X_i - X_2)^2 + b_i > -c_i$. These equations simply describe the expected utilities and outcomes for each possible scenario, but provide little insight as to how the presence of a non-ideological party changes the electoral dynamics.

Recall, we've developed this model to understand whether the ambiguous placement by the non-ideological party impacted which voters were targeted by campaigns.

To see this, we need to first know whether there are any equilibria where the median voter prefers the ambiguous party over the ideological party, and second, what constraints the ambiguous party faces. For example, can a candidate simply say they have no policies or must they at least make vague policy statements? Formally, we need to determine within what limits, if any, they must set the bounds of z and a . Next, we transform the above expression into something more tractable where one can solve for z and a . To do this, we solve the definite integral from a to z . Note, at this point we add a constant of -3 to both utility functions to simplify the math when the integral is taken:

$$u_i = -3(a - z)\left(\frac{X_i}{a - z} - X_1\right)^3 \Big|_a^z + b_i - c_i \quad (3)$$

Expand:

$$u_i = -3(a - z)\left(\frac{a}{a - z} - X_1\right)^3 - 3(a - z)\left(\frac{z}{a - z} - X_1\right)^3 + b_i - c_i \quad (4)$$

Solve and simplify with algebra:

$$u_i = \frac{(X_1(z - a) - z)^3 + (X_1(a - z) + a)^3}{(a - z)^2} + b_i - c_i \quad (5)$$

Equation 5 is the utility of each voter if they chose to vote for the non-ideological party. In other words, this is the expected utility under party placement uncertainty. There are a few things to note. First, while the numerator is a bit messy, it will always be negative because $z > a$. To see this, note that X_1 in the left side will always be negative then subtracted by the larger z , and X_1 on the right side will always be positive then added by

the smaller a , thus the sum of these two terms will always be negative as both retain their signs when they are cubed.

What is interesting to note here, however, is that as a and z grow further apart, the overall loss of the ideological expression goes toward infinity so the machine party does face constraints. It cannot simply state to the electorate that it has no policy positions. One way to think about this is that a political party or candidate cannot simply say they have no policy positions at all in a debate or newspaper interview; they have to at least provide some vague promises to remain within some accepted bounds of candidate behavior. Mathematically, since the numerator will become larger than the denominator in absolute terms as the distance between a and z grow further apart due to the different exponents, the candidate who declares they have no policy positions will generate an infinite loss of utility to those voters who choose them.

If the party can be easily placed along an ideological spectrum, however, then $(a - z)^2$ is small and the utility loss from the ideological portion of the model is weighted up. As a result, parties that are easily placed along the ideological spectrum pay a price for clear policy platforms because those utility losses are fully realized. One can see this when they solve for the benefit transfer required by the non-ideological party and the ideological party. The indifference point for b_1 and b_2 is:

$$\frac{(X_1 - z)^3 + (-X_1 + a)^3}{(a - z)^2} - c > -b_1$$

And


$$-3(X_i - X_2)^2 - c > -b_2$$

For the time being, we assume that $b_1 = b_2$ and c is constant because a trip to the polling station is the same regardless of which candidate the voter chooses. That tells us that the machine party is chosen when:

$$\frac{(X_1(z-a)-z)^3 + (X_1(a-z)+a)^3}{(a-z)^2} > -3(X_i - X_2)^2$$

This remains a messy expression, but the following figures and tables provide the model's intuition. In Figure 4.1, the median voter is at 0, the center of the voting space and equidistant from both parties. Their utility loss function touches the line at zero. Any vote cast by the voter will result in some loss of utility if the party they vote for is not located at zero and *only at zero*.

Figure 4.1: Expected Utilities for Both Parties: NIP=3 and IP=3



Note: Non-ideological party = NIP and Ideological party = IP

Let the non-ideological party be placed at -3 and the ideological party be placed at 3. In the base model, the voter would be indifferent to their party choice as a vote for either party would result in a loss of 27. In that circumstance, the voter would choose whichever party gave them the largest transfer assuming that transfer was enough to set off the loss in utility and the cost of voting. In the framework proposed here however, we can set a and z to different values and calculate the utility lost with in each scenario. Table 4.1 provides the expected utilities for a variety of scenarios assuming the midpoint of the non-ideological party and ideological party remain at -3 and 3 respectively.

Table 4.1: Expected Utilities for Each Party: NIP=3 and IP=3

A	Z	Machine	Opposition
-4	-2	-558	-27
-5	-1	-1561	-27
-6	0	-114	-27
-7	1	0	-27
-8	2	-1/10	-27
-9	3	-275.25	-27


Note: Non-ideological party = NIP and Ideological party = IP

The reader can see that there is a small range where a voter for the non-ideological party, rather than the ideological party, provides less negative utility to the median voter. From this table, one can also see that the range where the expected utility for a vote for the non-ideological party is less negative than for the opposition is actually quite small along the spectrum. This is because as the range increases, the losses due to the exponential shape of the function quickly starts to outweigh the smaller losses closer to their ideal point. This highlights an important point, the non-ideological party would prefer to place itself as

close to the median voter as possible. The range of the utility function where the cubed term on the numerator will be smaller than the squared denominator is where the distance from the median to a and z is relatively close. Specifically, when $(X_1(a - z) + a)^3 < 1$ and $(X_1(z - a) - z)^3 < 1$ because cubing fractions generates smaller numbers.

This makes sense because if a party's strategy was to make broad, non-ideological appeals, they are flexible ideologically, so there are few constraints on the midpoint of their placement. Given this, they would likely place the midpoint of their possible policy positions as close to the center of the ideological distribution as possible. The next example takes this insight into account and places the midpoint of the non-ideological party at the center of the distribution, while leaving the opposition party at 3. As seen in Figure 4.2:

Figure 4.2: Expected Utilities for Both Parties: NIP=0 and IP=3



Note: Non-ideological party = NIP and Ideological party = IP

In this example, the non-ideological party moves the midpoint of its probability distribution to the median voter while the ideological party remains at 3. This placement generates the expected utilities in Table 4.2:

Table 4.2: Expected Utilities for Each Party: NIP=0 and IP=3


A	Z	Machine	Opposition
-1	1	-1/2	-27
-2	2	-1	-27
-3	3	-1.5	-27
-4	4	-2	-27
-5	5	-2.5	-27
-6	6	-3	-27
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
-54	54	-27	-27
-55	55	-27.5	-27.5

Note: Non-ideological party = NIP and Ideological party = IP

The expected utilities here show how a party sending vague ideological placement signals reduces the losses associated with voting for that party when they situate themselves near the center of the distribution. In fact, the losses for the non-ideological party do not equal that of the ideological party until the spread is six times larger than the distance of the ideological party from the median voter. This means that choosing ambiguous policy platforms can be a rational strategy for political parties to garner votes in this situation. The question arises however, will the ideological party respond by also moving to the median voter? Next, we look at this alternative scenario, where the ideological party places

itself at the center of the distribution to counteract the non-ideological party's attempt to monopolize the center of the distribution.

Figure 4.3: Expected Utilities for Both Parties: $NIP=0$ and $IP=0$



Note: Non-ideological party = NIP and Ideological party = IP

Putting aside the credibility of such a move for a moment, one can see that the median voter would in fact generate expected utilities of zero for choosing the ideological party regardless of the distance between Z and A chosen by the non-ideological party in such a situation. However, the shape of the loss function quickly becomes more negative for those voters near, but not at the center of the ideological distribution. Voters greater than one unit away from the center, however, end up with a smaller utility loss if they choose the non-ideological party – with its vague platform – over the ideological party's clearly centrist platform because those losses grow at a constant rate (see the non-ideological party's expected utilities in Table 4.2) while the ideological party's utility losses that grow at an exponential rate. As a result, the machine party maintains its advantage electorally as long as the overall ideological distribution of voters isn't tightly clustered

around the median voter. Risk acceptant voters from both the right and left side of the ideological spectrum will choose the machine as long as those voters are more than one unit away from the median voter. In short, this isn't a tenable position for the ideological party, they will either have to loosen their ideological clarity to match the non-ideological party's – leading to both parties simply competing for votes using targeted private transfers – or remain at their true ideological position and rally their supporters.

Table 4.3: Expected Utilities for Both Parties: NIP=0 and IP=0

A	Z	Machine	Opposition
-1	1	-1/2	0
-2	2	-1	0
-3	3	-1.5	0
-4	4	-2	0
-5	5	-2.5	0
-6	6	-3	0

Note: Non-ideological party = NIP and Ideological party = IP

These simple examples show that non-ideological parties who choose an ambiguous placement strategy will tend toward the middle of the distribution and provide vague platforms that are difficult for voters to clearly identify. These parties will set the distance between z and a to some non-zero number discouraging ideologically clear parties from moving toward the center. Moreover, ideological parties with clear platforms will remain near their ideal point when competing in elections or be forced to mimic the non-ideological party and simply compete by buying votes.

The American politics literature on spatial models includes a debate about why parties choose policy positions in the first place. One perspective argues that policy positions are chosen by political parties simply to garner enough votes to gain power (Chappell and Keech 1986). The other perspective argues that political parties do have a set of preferred policies. While they may go after voters in the center to win elections, this is done with the intention of gaining power to implement their preferred policies (Wittman 1973; Wittman 1983). The former perspective sees power as an end goal in and of itself, while the latter perspective sees power as a means to their policy ends. In this paper, the model effectively assumes the non-ideological party is focused on power while the ideological party has actual policy preferences.

This leaves us with an important question: how ambiguous will the non-ideological party be during the campaign with regards to their platform? For our purposes, how far apart will the non-ideological Party set a and z from each other? Given the right-sided placement of the non-ideological party in the model here, the model should provide an answer as to where z should be set. Should it encompass the location of the non-ideological party? Should it stop short and be set between the median voter and the non-ideological party? Recall we defined the median voter's location at zero along the spectrum. This was done because it ensures that a and z will have opposite signs, but also the same magnitude, which allows one to simplify the expected utility function for voters choosing non-ideological parties as $X_1 = 0$. The simplified utilities are now:

$$\frac{(-z)^3 + (a)^3}{(a-z)^2} - c + b_1 > -3(X_i - X_2)^2 - c + b_2$$

One can also then substitute $-z$ for a because the uniform distribution is symmetrical. Given the midpoint here is zero, we know that $a = -z$ so via substitution the left side of the inequality is:

$$\frac{(-z)^3 + (-z)^3}{(-z - z)^2} - c + b_1 > -3(X_i - X_2)^2 - c + b_2$$

Which simplifies to:

$$-\frac{z}{2} - c + b_1 > -3(X_i - X_2)^2 - c + b_2$$

Or if one focuses on the ideological portion:

$$-z > -6(X_i - X_2)^2$$

This tells us that z can be set six times the distance that separates the ideological party from the median voter (recall, to simplify the math both sides were multiplied by three, therefore one can think of this result as setting z twice the distance from the media to the location of the ideological party). This has some interesting implications.

First, the non-ideological party can target any voter not strongly affiliated with the opposition party that is within six times the distance of the difference between the median and the ideological party from the median voter. In most settings, this technically means the non-ideological party can target most voters along the spectrum plus or minus $6(X_i - X_2)^2$ from the median voter. This makes vote buying an attractive option because targeted transfers offsets the cost of voting as well as the ideological loss from the vote itself. For the ideological party, the range of possible values taken by the non-ideological

party forces them to target those voters who are reasonably close to their political position. In other words, loyalists. Second, if the ideological party moves toward the center, the non-ideological party's response is to clarify their positions somewhat, but not completely. Formally, the distance between a and z shrinks, which in a sense defends against a move to the center by the ideological party.

This result may partially explain disagreements in the vote buying literature about who campaigns target, where some scholars argue parties focus on core supporters and other scholars argue parties target swing voters. This model says whether a party targets swing or core voters depends on how clearly ideological the party is. When the party has a strong and consistent ideology, then the party targets core supporters. When the party simply makes vague ideological pronouncements, then the party "targets" all voters not identified with the ideological party.

One additional step in logic also potentially explains variation in vote buying's effectiveness. Since the ideological party targets known supporters, they should be relatively effective with their vote buying operations. However, the ambiguous strategy pursued by the non-ideological party should lead to more wasted resources, since they "target" more broadly.

Under these conditions, the targeted transfer from the non-ideological party (b_1) acts as an inducement to get voters to vote for the them – i.e. to buy votes – while the targeted transfer from the ideological party (b_2) acts as an inducement to get supporters of the ideological party to the polling station on Election Day. Or in situations when ideological party supporters were also provided with transfers from the non-ideological party (b_1), it might prevent them from defecting to the non-ideological party, especially if that voter is a weak supporter. This leads to two predictions concerning vote buying. First, the non-ideological party will distribute transfers to a wide variety of potential voters, only

exempting those individuals who are closely aligned with the opposition party. Second, the ideological party will target its own voters to ensure they turnout and to prevent weak supporters from defecting to the non-ideological party in the event that they are given a transfer (b_1) during the non-ideological party's broader, loosely targeted vote buying campaign.

These predictions speak directly to the vote buying literature. A key issue in the literature was how to explain the presence of vote buying when there was a secret ballot. Nichter (2008) argued that targeting supporters made this point irrelevant because who voted could be monitored, while Stokes et al (2013) argued local brokers overcame this information hurdle and provide an alternative explanation to how parties

INDONESIAN CONTEXT

Testing the predictions from this model requires a context with both ideological and ambiguous parties competing in the same election. In the following section, it will be demonstrated that Indonesia is one such context and that mayoral elections are particularly useful for testing this model given their predisposition toward non-ideological candidates.

Post-independence Indonesia initially had multiple parties representing distinct cleavages in Indonesian society, reflecting common theories of party formation (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). However, once Suharto took power of Indonesia in the 1960s he consolidated the electoral landscape into three political parties. These three political parties remained the only three legal political parties until the fall of his regime in the late 1990s (Vickers 2005). There was an Islamic party, a Pancasila-based party, and Suharto's

own party *Golkar* (short for *Golongan Karya*), whose base was public bureaucrats and supposedly represented a balance between secularism and religiosity. As a result, the historic ideological spectrum in Indonesia is one with religiosity on one end of the spectrum and secularism on the other end. It wasn't clear at the time whether Indonesia would be able to hold all of its diverse islands together as one nation at the time, so Suharto injected a dose of nationalism by appealing to an ideology called Pancasila.

Pancasila is a term that describes five principals laid out by Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, in the country's early years. It also reflects an attempt to bridge one of Indonesia's longstanding internal political cleavages. In an effort to push back against those who wanted an Islamic State in 1945, Sukarno attempted to create a broad ideology that all Indonesians, including minority populations from other religions, could follow. At the time, he was worried that many of the eastern islands might leave to form their own small countries, given their cultural and religious differences with Muslim majority Java. (Majumdar 2004). Suharto's solution was Pancasila, which is a statement of belief in five principals, which all Indonesian's could theoretically abide by. These principals are:

- (1) One and only one God,
- (2) A just and civilized humanity,
- (3) The unity of Indonesia,
- (4) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom evident in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives,
- (5) And social justice (Majumdar 2004, p. 81).

Although the first principal is a belief in God, this language was used to recognize that Indonesia did in fact include a large number of religious people – as a means to mollify

those pushing for an Islamic State - yet it was written in a way as to not to tie the ideology to any one particular faith (Majumdar 2004).

This discussion of Pancasila is relevant here because it identifies two broad camps in Indonesian politics, the first represented by self-identified Islamic parties pushing for a more religious government and everyone else, who in a sense subscribe to an ideology based on compromise between many of cultures. It is important to note that since 1965, Indonesia's communist party – the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI) - has been banned. Members of the PKI were killed on a massive scale throughout the archipelago in the 1960s, effectively ending the debate over economic models for decades (Vickers 2005, pp. 156-160). As a result, the principal ideological divide remains those who prefer Indonesia to become an Islamic State and those who do not, just as it was at Indonesia's independence. One question remains, however: are there cleavages within Islam? And if so, do they align with political parties?

Burhani (2013) outlines the two principal typologies of Islam in Indonesia: *modernist* and *traditionalist* schools of thought. The *traditionalist* version of Islam is summarized as one that incorporates numerous aspects of local Indonesian culture into one's practice of Islam, while the *modernist* version is more willing to disregard native traditions so one can better follow the tenets of Islam. There is an extensive literature on these two approaches (beginning with Geertz 1960), and these terms themselves are contested. For example, Ufen (2008) uses the terms *santrian* and *abangan* to describe the *modernist* and *traditionalist* strains, respectively. Baswedan (2004) divides Indonesian Muslims into non-practicing, which he calls *syncretists*, and devout, which he further divides into *traditionalists* and *modernists*.²⁵ However, there is little dispute that the two

²⁵ Baswedan (2004) argues that this typology, taken from Geertz (1960), still remains relevant in Indonesian Politics even as the distinction has become blurry in Muslims' everyday lives.

principal non-governmental Islamic organizations in Indonesia, *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU), are outgrowths of these separate strains of Islam and that each is affiliated with individual political parties. The *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB) is directly connected to the traditionalist Islamic *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU), which officially has around 40 million members, and the *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN) has strong links to the modernist Islamic organization *Muhammadiyah*, which claims a membership of some 35 million (Ufen, 2006). The PKB was founded by NU leadership following the fall of Suharto in 1998. Abdurrahman Wahid, the Indonesian president from 1999-2001 and the head of NU from 1984-1999, was instrumental in linking the mass organization NU with the PKB. PAN was also founded in 1998. It was created by Amien Rais, the chairman of Muhammadiyah from 1995-1998 (Baswedan, 2004).

In the post-Suharto era, a number of new political parties have sprung up. Islamic parties broke off from the pan-Islamic party under Suharto, where sub-groups who maintained different theological perspectives were forced into one party. This includes the aforementioned PAN and PKB. On the other hand, many non-Islamic parties were created out of whole cloth as political vehicles for individual politicians, such as former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's *Partai Demokrat*. Moreover, there have been splits within major parties, such as Suharto's Golkar party, where well known politicians from Golkar have joined electoral tickets outside their party's electoral coalitions (often while remaining part of the party). This happened in the most recent presidential election where the vice-presidential candidate Jusuf Kalla ran on the PDIP ticket with Joko Widodo against his own party (Kapoor 2014). In short, at this point in its democratic development, many Indonesian political parties –outside the Islamic parties - are unstable, with unclear platforms, making it difficult for voters to place them along a policy space.

Local elections in Indonesia are consequential to public policy. This is because sub-national governments oversee the distribution of a large proportion of public resources. The increase in public funds accessible to local governments has occurred while autonomy for local executives from higher levels of government has increased. In short, mayors have more money and more power than they did prior to 2004 making the position attractive to many. Moreover, political parties are weakest at the lowest level of government. Although party sponsorship is required to qualify for the ballot, mayoral elections are funded, and dominated, by candidate's personal networks rather than the political parties (Vel, 2005; Buehler and Tan, 2007; Choi, 2004; Buehler 2009, Hadiz, 2011). As a result, mayoral elections, locally known as *Pilihan Kepala Daerah* - or *Pilkadas* for short - provide an ideal context to examine the spatial model outlined here.

In the first large study of *Pilkadas* following the 2004 electoral reform on local election, Pratikno (2009) surveyed these elections following their initial implementation and found that the rules for fielding a candidate led to approximately 70% of the first 192 elections to be backed by party coalitions, rather than a single party. He conceptualizes a two-by-two typology of party ideology - with Islam-Secularism on one axis and Elite – Populist along the other axis – and finds that *Pilkada* coalitions do not follow any inherent ideological logic. He concludes that party-coalitions are based on pragmatism, rather than ideology or agreement over policy preferences. Specifically, this pragmatism manifests itself via the fact that one must meet minimum vote share requirements from the previous legislative election to field a mayoral candidate. When political parties, even those with national reach fail to meet this criteria, they can either sit the election out or join an ideologically incoherent coalition. He finds that political parties generally choose the latter. Therefore, many candidates in *Pilkada* elections could be described as ideologically ambiguous as described by the spatial model outlined in these pages.

The literature on *Pilkadas* is also filled with rich descriptive case studies from locations across the archipelago. In her analysis of *Pilkada* elections in Sumba, an island in Eastern Indonesia, Vel (2005) stresses that networks rooted in churches, traditional hierarchies of Sumbanese nobility, and business alliances are utilized by politicians and political parties to organize political support and implement distributive politics. She argues that candidates make appeals to voters based upon shared identity, rather than policy positions. General calls from the development of Sumba are made, but few details are given.

Choi (2009) examines a mayoral election in Batam Regency, a small resource rich area in Western Indonesia, where local public officials dominate the electoral arena and also argues that campaigns are largely based on candidates' personalities. While this study did note there seemed to be a weak connection between party identification and vote choice, it was secondary to personal traits. Choi (2009) stressed that the issues discussed during the campaign were inconsistent and included vague promises of development. The study concluded that political parties, rather than using *Pilkada* elections to control government and implement policy platforms, political parties primarily used these elections to extract rents for their central operations in Jakarta.²⁶ In practice, parties do this by limiting access to the ticket to those candidates who can pay the party up front. During the campaign, the political parties themselves sit on the sidelines while the candidates, who've already paid the parties for access to the ballot, fund their own campaigns, using their own local social and business networks to turn out votes. As in

²⁶ Recall the debate in the American politics spatial voting literature above between scholars who argued that policy positions were a means to attracting voters and thus obtaining power, while other scholars argued parties themselves actually have policy preferences and that power was a means to implementing their preference policy choices. The research on *Pilkada* elections tends to place candidate motivations with the former camp.

Sumba, her study describes an electoral process where political parties made ambiguous policy promises, yet engaged in the distribution of targeted transfers to mobilize votes.

Buehler and Tan's (2007) study on political party institutionalization in local elections also provided an interesting perspective. Their case study of a *Pilkada* in Gowa, South Sulawesi included four candidates, three of which were current or former *Golkar* Party members. Although the winning candidate in the election was backed by *Golkar*, they argue that candidate won the election because they were supported by a powerful local business network, headed by members of the winning candidate's family, not because that candidate ran on *Golkar's* ticket. Rather than the best candidate being chosen by the party to represent them in the election, the candidate with the widest network and deepest pockets to fund their own campaign, in essence, hired the most visible political party to back their campaign. Buehler (2009) returned to South Sulawesi later to examine two additional *Pilkada* elections and also found that candidates with stronger local networks were also able to win their respective elections. In summary, the literature identifies personal networks and candidate characteristics as central more to success in *Pilkada* elections than policy platforms. When policy platforms are mentioned as explanations for vote choice, it is as a secondary explanation.

Since platforms in *Pilkada* elections provide little differentiation, especially when candidates are backed by coalitions, party loyalties have waned and are often based on emotional or cultural identification rather than differing governing philosophies (Ufen, 2008). An Asia Foundation Survey showed that approximately two-thirds of respondents said that there were no differences between the parties, or that they could not identify a difference between political parties (Asia Foundation, 2003, p.100). Ufen (2006) argues that these citizens are not necessarily ill-informed, as the platforms of *Golkar* and *PDIP*, two of Indonesia's largest political parties, pursue very similar policy goals. It is not

surprising then, that parties in Indonesia serve as vehicles for individual politicians to take office rather than vehicles to advance policy proposals. Moreover, the source of ambiguity derives from the political parties themselves, not from the voter's inability to properly process political information.²⁷

There are exceptions, however. As discussed, the Islamic political parties PAN and PKB are associated with the two dominant Islamic schools of thought in Indonesia. These two political parties grew from two longstanding civil society organizations with ideological goals known widely across Indonesia. Each lobbies for educational and religious issues from their own theological perspectives, whether they hold office or not, providing some idea of their ideological perspective to Indonesians. These two parties do have an ideological perspective. Therefore, not all political parties in *Pilkada* elections field solely non-ideological candidates. It is also important to note that PAN and PKB are most active on Java, while many of the *Pilkada* studies in the literature were conducted outside Java. Generally speaking, PAN is active in more urban areas while PKB is more active in rural areas. In Tegal, PKB was very active and played an important role in the elections; its candidate winning the rural regency. Therefore, the Tegal elections included both types of political parties described in the theoretical model: an ideological party (PKB) and non-ideological parties (PDIP and Golkar).

²⁷ Recall the Shepsle (1972) versus Enelow and Hinich (1981) debate in the section on spatial models in this paper. The *Pilkada* literature suggests the uncertainty described in Shepsle (1972) more closely resembles the uncertainty in local Indonesian elections.

SURVEY AND DATA DESCRIPTION

This paper uses data from an original survey conducted in two regencies in Central Java: *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal*. Respondents were randomly selected from voter lists compiled by Indonesia's *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (General Elections Commission). These voter lists are generated from a door-to-door census, which is designed to include all Indonesian citizens seventeen years old and over who reside at that address. This list is what poll workers have at each polling station on Election Day to verify each voter's eligibility to vote at that location. Since this is a census, a random sample can be drawn to generate a representative sample of the electorate for that election. This is exactly what was done.

This survey generated 318 completed surveys, 157 in *Kota Tegal* and 161 in *Kabupaten Tegal*. Response rates for *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* were 57 percent and 55 percent respectively. Local election officials indicated that a large percentage of individuals who did not vote in these elections were citizens whose permanent address was in *Tegal*, but who worked abroad or in another part of Indonesia.²⁸ Since their permanent address remained in their home village with their families, they were registered to vote there, however, they generally only return home for the end of Ramadan celebrations so they don't vote in mayoral elections.

For this study's purpose, this is important information because if citizens keep all their government papers, including their voter registration, at their village address but do not live there, then the actual number of potential voters in local elections is smaller than the voter rolls would suggest. This has two sample design implications: first, response rates for the survey should resemble voter turnout rates. Those individuals who spend their

²⁸ Interview with election officials from the *KPU* in *Kabupaten Tegal*.

time outside their home village should not be present for the campaign, the election, or when enumerators visit their houses to administer a survey. Second, when estimating the effective number of completed surveys, one would need to draw larger samples in areas where turnout was lower.

Table C.1 in Appendix C shows that turnout rates from the *KPU* are 56 percent and 58 percent for *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* respectively. These numbers are close to the survey's response rates. Also in that table, one can see an adjusted response rate. When a survey respondent refused or was unable to complete a survey, the reason for refusal was recorded. The adjusted response rate subtracts those individuals whose family indicated they work or study in a different location, individuals who passed away after the *KPU* census, and those persons who moved in with their in-laws after marriage. This decreased the potential sample to 406 and the overall adjusted response rate to 78 percent overall.

Gonzales Ocantos et al. (2012) show that direct responses to survey questions on vote buying may not be valid measures of the phenomenon. Their research in Nicaragua showed that social desirability bias can impact analysis of this kind. Specifically, their work shows that less than 5% of respondents responded *yes* to having received gifts from the campaign they studies, while a list experiment indicated approximately one in four respondents had in fact done so. A discrepancy this large could undermine one's analysis.

To assess whether social desirability bias is an issue in this data, a list experiment was also conducted to gauge whether under-reporting was a serious issue here, and if so, what its magnitude was. Respondents were randomly allocated into two groups. The first group was asked to count and report the number of individuals who got involved in politics, whether they discussed with a friend who they planned on voting for, and whether they donated money to a candidate or worked for that candidate free. The treatment group was

asked to count and report on these three options plus whether they got money or in-kind goods from a campaign.²⁹

The results from the list experiment can be seen Table 4. The difference in means between the control and treatment groups is 0.51 and significant [t value is -5.3, $p < 0.1$]. Since the other three counts are statically equal across both groups, the list experiment estimates that approximately 51 percent of survey respondents accepted either cash or some other good from a campaign before the election compared to 47 percent of respondents who said so through direct questioning. This comparison shows that receiving cash or goods was underreported as the literature suggests, however, the level of underreporting here is only about 4 percent. This result is consistent with the literature that says Southeast Asian democracies tend to report vote-buying in higher numbers than other regions (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007). To the extent that it exists in the region, social desirability bias is less of an obstacle when studying vote-buying than in other regions.

²⁹ They were asked if they were given *Sembako*, which is a short for *Sembilan Bahan Pokok*. This translates loosely into “the nine staples.” Specifically, *sembako* includes rice, oil, sugar, salt, meat, eggs, corn, milk, and kerosene.

Table 4.4: List Experiment: T-Test by Treatment Group

	Treatment	Control	Difference
Mean	0.82	0.31	0.51
SE	0.09	0.04	
		T	-5.32
		p value	0.000
		N	302
Collapsed DV: Received Cash or Good from Campaign			
	Count	Percent	
Yes	151	47.5	
No	167	52.5	
Total	318	100	

UNIT OF ANALYSIS

The hypothesis here attempts to compare different variables that are associated with a person selling one's vote to a campaign. This means that each respondent in the data has as many options on the dependent variable as there are candidates running in the election. Moreover, they have the possibility of accepting transfers from each of the candidates or accepting transfers from none of the campaigns. Table 4.5 shows that 6.31 percent of respondents have accepted transfers from more than one candidate during the campaign and just over 50 percent did not accept any transfers.

Table 4.5: Number of Campaigns Providing Cash/Goods to Each Respondent

Number of Campaigns	Frequency	Percent of Total
0	166	52.37
1	131	41.32
2	17	5.36
3	3	0.95

The structure of this data suggests the use of an alternative specific choice set model to test the primary hypothesis in this paper, however, there is an important caveat. Common models in this class, such as the alternative specific logistic regression model, may not be identifiable using maximum likelihood estimation if the alternative specific independent variables for some of the respondents do not vary, which is the case with this data. In layman's terms, this class of model assumes that each respondent is given a set of choices and makes one choice - which is the case here - but it also assumes that the alternate specific independent variable – the transfer from the campaign here – always varies. In the data here, approximately half of the respondents' independent variable values are all zero because about half of the respondents did not receive any cash or goods from any of the campaigns.

With this in mind, one has to find an alternative model for analysis. This paper borrows a common analytical approach from the International Relations literature that allows one to compute coefficients, and compare those coefficients to each other, when an alternative specific independent variable exists, but there are some respondents with no within respondent variation along the independent variable of interest. This approach is to model the election data here using a dyadic design, with clustered standard errors to account for dependence across individuals.

Much of empirical research on bilateral treaties and conflict, uses a unit of analysis where a pair of two political actors is represented by one observation. Each individual observation in the data represents an interaction or a relation between the two countries. Dyadic data can be classified into two types: directed and undirected. The former describes an interaction whereby there is one actor is a source and one a target. For example, in foreign investment there is an investor and a host country, or in trade there is an importer and an exporter. The latter type of data simply describes a situation where there the relationship between two actors in a dyad is unclear or there is no theoretical justification to order the pairs (Neumayer and Plümper, 2010). Since this is an electoral context where campaigns target individual voters with transfers to get their vote, the relationship where the candidate is the source and the voter the target.

This paper restructures the dataset so that each observation consists of a dyad linking an individual voter and a campaign. Therefore, in the urban area where there were four candidates, each respondent has four candidate-respondent dyads. The dependent variable is then coded as a one for the campaign that received that individual's vote and a zero otherwise. Note, those individuals who did not cast a ballot for a candidate are kept in the data and coded as zeros for all candidate-voter dyads because it is possible for them to receive a transfer from a campaign, yet not cast a vote, which is important so that the effectiveness of transfers from campaigns is not overestimated.

This dyadic structure also allows for the independent variable measuring transfers to vary for a given respondent. Individuals who accepted transfers from the campaign within that dyad are coded one when they accepted a transfer and zero otherwise, whether they voted for that campaign or not. Unlike the class alternative specific logit models mentioned above, this structure also allows for individuals who did not accept transfers from any campaign to remain in the analysis. However, like the alternative specific

models, it allows for each potential choice and all candidate-voter interactions to be included in the model.

All other independent variables in the analysis are coded as binary variables following the same structure as the transfer variable. Party Identification (PID) is coded one when the candidate within that dyad was sponsored by that party or was included in their coalition and zero otherwise. This allows the analysis to stack all the disparate political parties into one variable to compare PID in the abstract sense directly with accepting transfers, rather than comparing individual parties, some of which are more involved in vote buying than others. Moreover, the independent variable for *Muhammadiyah* is coded one when the respondent said they were more sympathetic to modernist versions of Islam within the candidate dyad who was backed by PAN and similarly, those respondents who indicated they preferred traditionalist Islam were coded as a one within the dyad containing the candidate backed by PKB. The combined *Islamic Organization* variable simply combines these two variables so that the belonging to one of these organizations could be compared to the effectiveness of political parties more generally. Finally, all standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

The formal model outlined in this paper makes a number of predictions. First, it assumes that transfers from campaigns will strongly predict vote choice and that the coefficient will be positive. Second, it assumes that PID should also positively predict vote choice, but that this relationship should be stronger for those attached to Islamic parties (i.e. PKB and PAN) than the non-ideological political parties. Rather than separate out the indicator for Islamic parties however, we can look at the core supporters by adding binary indicators for those individuals who identify with *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU) as there may be a number of people who claim they identify with one of the Islamic political parties politically, but not necessarily their ideologies. The indicators for the

Islamic parties then might include both core supporters and weak supporters. This seems to be true as the correlations between those who identify with each Islamic organization and their respective parties is only 0.33 and 0.20 respectively, which are positive but moderate. As a result, we include indicators for respondents who identify with these organizations in Models 2 and 3.

Table 4.6: Dyadic Logistic Regression Results. Dependent Variable: Vote Choice

DV: Vote Choice	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Accepted Transfer	2.85*** (0.22)	3.18*** (0.23)	3.39*** (0.30)	3.26*** (0.23)
PID	2.51*** (0.21)	2.27*** (0.22)	2.10*** (0.27)	2.29*** (0.22)
Muslim Organization		2.11*** (0.25)		2.18*** (0.24)
Muhammidiya			0.69 (0.89)	
NU			2.80*** (0.27)	
Transfer*Muslim				-1.74** (0.75)
Constant	-2.56*** (0.10)	-2.94*** (0.13)	-3.33*** (0.17)	-2.97*** (0.12)
R^2	0.32	0.38	0.42	0.38
N	1,417	1,417	1,417	1,417

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standard Errors Clustered by Survey Respondent

The results in Table 4.6 are largely as expected. All models have positive coefficients for the transfer and PID variables, but the transfer coefficient is always larger indicating its estimated impact is larger. In Model 1, the PID coefficient is almost as large

as the transfer variable, but once the Muslim organization variables are included, the spread in the PID and transfer coefficients becomes larger. This is due to the coefficient on transfer variable increasing while the PID coefficient is muted somewhat. When we break apart *NU* and *Muhammadiyah*, we see that this is being driven mainly by those affiliated with *NU*. When one looks at the *NU* and *Muhammadiyah* variables, they see that only about 9.5 percent of the sample identifies with *Muhammadiyah* while over 80 percent identify with *NU*. Note, only 26 percent of the sample identifies with PKB, the political party affiliated with *NU*.

Finally, the interaction between Muslim Organization identification and having received a transfer from the party affiliated with that organization is negative and pushes the conditional impact toward zero. In other words, those individuals who both claim the party's Islamic identity and received money or goods from the campaign were less likely to vote for that party than those individuals who just claim the identity. These people are weak supporters. These voters are targeted by PKB to minimize the chance of defection during the election, just as the spatial model outlined here predicted.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results broadly align with the model's predictions. The model outlined in these pages simplified an election into two types of political parties. A non-ideological party whose policy prescriptions were vague and a more traditional ideological party with a clear policy platform. The model then analyzes how one would expect political competition to play out in such a scenario, concluding that the non-ideological party will widely distribute patronage to all but core supporters of the ideological as their best strategy

to winning elections. The ideological party, on the other hand, would focus on getting its core supporters to the polling stations on Election Day and on distributing patronage to weak supporters to ensure that they don't defect.

The results from the survey generally support these predictions. First, the primary force driving vote choice in the mayoral elections studied here is targeted transfers. In every model, this coefficient was the largest in magnitude. Second, party identification did have positive coefficients, but they were always smaller in magnitude than both receiving a transfer from a campaign and identifying with an Islamic organization affiliated with political party. In Tegal, this effect was driven primarily by *NU*. Third, the coefficient on the interaction between identifying with an Islamic organization and having received a transfer was negative indicating that rather than getting core supporters to turn out, the Islamic parties were targeting weak identifiers with their transfers. These results suggest that comparativists using spatial models of voting need to think hard about how much information is transmitted to voters via party labels and how variance in information across policy platforms might impact voter choice: both theoretically and empirically.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This dissertation has examined how the use of targeted transfers by political parties to mobilize voters prior to elections affects three separate steps in the voters' decision-making process on who to ultimately vote for. This dissertation used data from *Pilkada* elections in Indonesia, where locals vote for their regency head. These elections were examined because - as was discussed in the introduction - decentralization reforms increased the importance of this position within the government. Regency heads were given resources to enact policies but had to face voters for the first time. Also, as was discussed in Chapter Three, Indonesian citizens tend to know the name of their regency head in higher numbers than many other government officials, including their own vice-president (recall, over 90 percent of respondents could identify their regency head in *Kota Tegal*). The importance of the regency head, in combination with its public visibility, makes it a useful electoral arena to study political behavior.

A key point I hope readers internalize from this dissertation is that targeted transfers impact different voters in different ways. It uses Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter's (2014) typology to tie the chapters together, not because this typology is the final word on the different types of voters that could potentially be impacted by transfers, but because it usefully highlights the possibility that targeted transfers do have heterogeneous impacts across voter types. Clientelism and vote buying are not the only two forms such transfers take. That paper, however, is solely theoretical and provides no new empirical corroboration for its typology. Moreover, as was discussed in Chapter Three, this typology fails to provide sufficient differentiation along its turnout axis (i.e whether an individual is likely or unlikely to vote in the election) to distinguish between some of the types outlined

in its cells. Never-the-less, Gans-Morse, Mazzucca, and Nichter (2014) move comparative political scientists in the right direction by attempting to delineate types of voters that accept particularistic benefits prior to elections. This dissertation is a small contribution toward their goal.

The results presented in each chapter begin to identify which types of transfers might have been used to mobilize voters in these two Indonesian elections. For example, the traditionalist Islamic party PKB only targeted their own supporters and those who didn't identify with a political party. PKB's political party indicator was highly predictive of turnout, whether than individual received a transfer or not so they were likely using transfers to reward their loyalists. This result makes sense given what is known about its non-governmental arm *NU*, which runs religious schools and provides healthcare across rural Java, where Tegal is located. It is one of the few political parties in Indonesia whose institutional – although not necessarily party - structure predates the transition to democracy, if one views PKB and *NU* as closely linked. Therefore it is possible that PKB has long-term loyalists, even if their allegiance is to its non-governmental arm rather than the political party itself.

Meanwhile, PDIP used transfers to mobilize votes via a separate mechanism. While it was possible that PDIP had long term supporters given its historical roots, which trace back to Sukarno - Indonesia's first president - the data collected in these elections does not support that conclusion. The party indicator for PDIP was not positively related with turnout in any model specification suggesting no independent impact of political identity on participation. PDIP candidates in both elections were competitive, however, taking second place in both contests. PDIP candidates factored into these elections by providing transfers to their own identifiers, non-identifiers, and those who identified with other political parties. They spread goods and cash to voters with minimal discrimination.

Since there was no evidence of abstention buying, PDIP appears to have used targeted transfers to buy turnout from their own supporters – given their party indicator had no explanatory power - and to buy votes from indifferent and weakly opposed voters.

Golkar fit somewhere between these two. Golkar's party indicator did positively predict turnout, but its coefficients were small when compared to PKB. Interestingly, their pattern of distributing transfers more closely followed PDIP's pattern as they spent resources on supporters, non-identifiers, and voters claiming allegiance to a different party. Their strategy appears to be the most diverse, including three types: vote buying, turnout buying, and rewarding loyalists. As was outlined in Chapter Four, Golkar was the political mobilization machine for the authoritarian regime pre-democratization. For decades, to become a civil servant in Indonesia, one had to join Golkar so these individuals likely still make up a large percentage of Golkar's political base. Golkar likely has a cohort of loyalists it can and does reward and one sees this in the data presented in Chapter Three. However, in rural regions where agriculture makes up such a large proportion of the electorate, this base may be too small to win a plurality of votes. As a result, Golkar engages in more vote and turnout buying than PKB and thus follows a strategy laid out by PDIP a bit more closely.

Of course these categorizations remain somewhat speculative. The data used in this dissertation was cross-sectional, making it impossible to identify each type with a high degree of accuracy. Moreover, these typologies are likely somewhat simplified as well. Kramon's (2016) recent work provides evidence that voter's perceptions of candidates change when they know that their campaign provided cash to supporters at rallies. Candidates that provide cash actually improve their image with the electorate, at least among the poor in Africa. Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter's (2014) typology, however, assumes static preferences influence voting behavior; specifically, one's preference,

indifference, or antipathy toward a given political party and that person's innate likelihood to vote. If candidate evaluations change for supporters, opponents, or the non-aligned based on exposure to the presence of targeted transfers, then the typology is unable to distinguish individual preferences *ex-ante*. Alternatively, if one begins the campaign as a supporter, does their evaluation change if they do not receive something? Kramon's (2016) work focuses on cash transfers, but given cultural or identity-based arguments for the distribution of in-kind goods versus cash, does these different types of goods have heterogeneous impacts for different types of voters? Unfortunately, this dissertation is unable to address these questions. Although Kramon's work raises important issues relevant here, it was published after the data was collected for this project and will be incorporated into future work.

A FULLER SPATIAL MODEL

Spatial models of politics on the distribution of targeted transfers during campaigns has provided a useful foundation for scholars to distill the voter's decision-making process into a small number of variables. Namely, political preferences or ideology, costs of voting, and the value of the transfer itself. The decision to vote and whom to vote for, however, surely requires the considerations of more than three variables, which may operate across contexts differently. Chapters Two and Four push the literature in this direction.

Chapter Two focuses on the transfer itself and provides a microeconomic mechanism that partially explains who accepts targeted transfers from campaigns. When campaigns offer in-kind transfers to voters, the costs associated with accepting transfers

screens out higher income voters; the voters deemed to be more difficult to buy in the literature (Stokes et al, 2013). While others have examined how in-kind transfers often provide symbolic meaning to voters, this chapter demonstrates that these transactions also follow an economic logic. Specifically, the use of in-kind transfers acts as a self-targeting mechanism to encourage those individuals who value transfers the most to pay the cost of accepting them; weeding out potential voters who value them less. Broadly speaking, this result suggests that the fixed term in spatial models of this type of distributive politics actually has its own interesting variation. Mathematically, this term – which is always fixed in the literature – has its own underlying multivariate probability function. Although this chapter focuses on the microeconomic logic, the full function also likely includes symbolic factors as well. For example, PKB – the Islamic party competing in elections here – often provided gifts with religious significance in addition to cash and other in-kind transfers. A religious gift – such as a prayer mat - could have also activated a sense of identity, also impacting the voter in addition to the issue discussed in Chapter Two. Rarely, if ever, did PDIP or Golkar provide headscarves or prayer mats to potential voters. Therefore a full model would incorporate both factors.

Chapter Four moves the literature on the use of distributive politics forward by examining whether the ideological term in spatial models varies in its operationalization across political parties. It does this by looking to past research in the American politics literature. Seminal papers by Shepsle (1972) and Enelow and Hinich (1981) realized that a lack of information could impact the placement assumption, critical to the Downsian framework. At the time, scholars knew there were issues with voters' level of information about politics that could impact these models. These scholars, however, debated the source of uncertainty and how it impacted behavior. During this scholarly debate, two sources of uncertainty were identified: the political parties and the individual voters themselves.

Shepsle (1972) argued that politicians were intentionally vague, making it difficult for voters to know their policy proposals, while Enelow and Hinich (1981) argued that each voter's inability to perfectly process and compress the information they are exposed to create a gap in information regarding policy. In a sense, a voter's inability to process all the information they are exposed to perfectly causes measurement error in the placement assumption.

Chapter Four focuses on the former source of uncertainty. A new model of spatial politics was built to include both political parties with vague platitudes and the presence of targeted transfers to explore how the presence of difficult to place parties might impact the distribution of transfers. This decision was based on previous research from elections in Indonesia (for example, Pratikno 2009), which indicated that party heuristics were meaningless in such elections. Chapter Four then showed that political parties that choose to propose vague policy positions are free to attempt to buy votes from individuals across the political spectrum, much like PDIP did in the elections studied here.

This does not mean individual information processing cannot be a source of uncertainty in the minds of Indonesian voters, only that at this point in Indonesia's political development, there is not an overabundance of political information for citizens to consume, especially for local elections in rural areas. Enelow and Hinich's (1981) mechanism requires citizens to have access to more information than one can process efficiently, which may come into play in future elections - as local media expand - or in presidential elections - where Jakarta's more institutionalized media companies dominate. The reader should note that Shepsle wrote his piece on uncertainty in American politics in the early 1970s, in the aftermath of America's last political realignment following the civil rights era. At that time, politicians were leaving the Democratic Party in the south making party labels less informative. By the time Enelow and Hinich wrote their piece in the early

1980s, politicians had resettled into their respective camps clarifying the meaning of party labels in the United States. Indonesian parties can be thought of as being at a similar point of development as the America Sheplse was observing. Specifically, Indonesian political party labels may not have much meaning, currently, but over time politicians may sort themselves out into more definitive camps. At that point, the modelling strategy used here may not be appropriate, but the strategy implemented by Enelow and Hinich (1981) may be.

FUTURE RESEARCH

To build on this work, future research should both expand the amount of data collected and collect more detailed variables. First, future projects should collect data across multiple waves for an entire election cycle. To this author's knowledge, there remain no panel surveys of individual-level voter behavior leading up to elections where targeted transfers are provided by campaigns to voters. A study using this design would be able to utilize strengths from the qualitative clientelism literature –where political party contacts can be observed over time - and the quantitative vote buying literature –where a broader range of voters who accept targeted transfers from campaigns can be observed.

With panel data, researchers can track party preferences over time so one could assess how stable party identification is for voters in a context such as this. Moreover, scholars must see whether one's party identification changes once that voter accepts a transfer from a political party. The cross-sectional data found used here is problematic because there remains the possibility of endogenous relationship between these two independent variables. For example, does a non-identifier three months prior to an election

then identify with the political party they received a transfer from and for how long do they identify with that party? Simply asking respondents for their party preference after an election is unable to address this issue.

A panel study would also allow researchers to track a respondent's interactions with political parties between elections. With this information, researchers could evaluate the impacts of transfers for those who are in constant contact with parties and those who only interact with politics leading up to the election. These voters likely react differently to targeted transfers, the latter possibly less attached to a political party and more willing to sell their vote. With this information, scholars might be able to better identify voter types and ultimately traits associated with each type.

Researchers could examine how income conditions individual's reactions to targeted transfers. While the survey here asked for an average income across a fixed time period, a better measure of how income might impact the value one places on transfers might be the volatility. A poor individual who gets all of their income in one lump sum from a harvest in rural Indonesia might value that transfer more than their neighbor who gets a monthly salary for working as a maid in someone's house, depending on where in their income cycle they are (even if their average incomes are equal). If the election takes place right before harvest, then the poor person who earns their money as a lump sum might have no resources in their household at that moment and be desperate for any transfer provided by a campaign. Alternatively, if the election is after harvest, that same person might place a low value on transfers because they are currently flush with household resources (relatively speaking). In contrast, the person working as a maid is never quite as "rich" or as "poor" as the agricultural worker and thus places a constant value—somewhere between these two extremes - on transfers during campaigns. These two individuals get lumped together in when income is measure over a fixed time period, but can be identified

and examined separately when multiple measures of income are present over time (for example, see Mills and Amick, 2010).

Future studies should also collect more detailed data of behavior. Chapter Four suggests that political knowledge could be an important variable as it increased turnout, despite limitations in its measurement here. That political knowledge plays a role in how - or whether - targeted transfers impact political behavior does have face validity. It is highly plausible that low knowledge individuals are more susceptible to selling their votes when compared to their more knowledgeable neighbors. Knowledge may be related to party identification and serve as a sorting mechanism for political party supporters, with political parties pushing vague platforms attracting low knowledge voters, while high knowledge voters are attracted to political parties with clearer policy proposals. Although this remains speculative at this point, future research should collect more extensive information on knowledge levels, incorporating more than the five questions outlined asked in this survey.

Future iterations of the survey should also attempt to collect data of the price of in-kind goods distributed by campaigns. A major shortcoming in the analysis in this dissertation is that the value of in-kind goods was not estimated. The survey did ask what how much money was provided by a campaign when cash exchanged hands, but only collected lists of goods when the respondent indicated they accepted in-kind transfers. This limited the types of analysis and the types of statistical models that could be run as most variables were ultimately coded as binary variables. Future iterations of the survey should ask the respondents how much they would pay for the in-kind goods they received if they bought them by themselves. Although this may not produce a perfect measure of the real price of those goods, it has the advantage of providing information on the respondent's perception of that basket of goods, which is arguable more important than their true value.

Having said this, the goods distributed by campaigns were common items in Indonesian households so measurement error could be quite small. Moreover, if one can estimate the monetary value of the goods provided by campaigns, then researchers could begin to explore how to separate the economic versus symbolic factors associated with the distribution of goods versus cash.

In Chapter Three, a study on how trust in political institutions impacted turnout highlighted an important omitted variable from the survey used here. Although the context of that discussion centered on how its absence might bias other independent models, its relationship with turnout also ties it directly to Gans-Morse, Mazzucca, and Nicther's (2014) typology discussed throughout these pages. Since it is positively correlated with turnout, scholars should think about how it conditions one's perception of transfers from campaigns. For example, how does a voter with low trust in the electoral process perceive a transfers from their preferred campaign versus a campaign they oppose? Unfortunately, these fundamental questions cannot be addressed until future work includes measures of trust in their surveys.

Finally, while tangential to the overall points discussed in this dissertation, Chapter Three highlights the need for scholars to begin to identify variables associated with the presence of abstention buying. In these elections, voters were enrolled by the General Election Commission via a census and only had to prove their identification to the poll worker to vote. Since more than one form of identification could be used (although one's KTP – *Kartu Tanda Penduduk* - was the most common form of identification provided), it made it difficult to enforce abstention in this context. If a voter takes money and provides them with a KTP, then they can use a different form to vote undermining the abstention buying scheme. As a result, the data in Indonesia did not show the presence of abstention buying. This does not mean, however, that there is not additional research that could be

done, especially to identify the conditions under which abstention buying is most likely. Large cross-country analysis of abstention buying could identify policy-relevant institutional factors that increase or decrease its presence. Future research on this could also bear fruit.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation provides a number of contributions to the current literature on the use of targeted transfers in political campaigns. First, in the broadest sense, this dissertation shows that microeconomic forces impact who receives transfers from political campaigns. While symbolic explanations are common throughout the literature on clientelism and other forms of contingent exchange during elections, none have laid out the underlying microeconomic mechanisms as has been done here. Second, this dissertation incorporates decades-old insights into current models of spatial voting, which have yet to be merged into this literature. Specifically, Chapter Four analyzes a scenario where parties are intentionally vague with their policy platforms so that they can effectively buy votes from citizens. The amount of information available in a campaign ultimately impacts political behavior, something researchers in comparative politics should be cognizant of in future work.

This project also makes a number of smaller empirical contributions. First, it provides further evidence that the Southeast Asia is a particularly productive area for the study of targeted transfers. The list experiment done here confirms that social desirability bias is minimal in this region allowing researchers to get relatively accurate measures of this often illegal, yet impactful, activity. Second, this project measures the types of

transfers provided by campaigns quantitatively. Many studies ask questions that allow for respondents to deny their involvement in accepting targeted transfers. They will measure transfers as “cash or other goods,” which effectively diminishes the variety of micro theories of behavior one can examine. Third, this project confirms that there is empirical variation across parties within a given context for the individuals who receive transfers. For example, PKB only targeted their own supporters while other parties cast a wider net. Although a number of theoretical pieces exist in the comparative politics literature suggesting this is the case, fewer empirical studies confirming it exist.

Finally, I hope this project shows other researchers that diversifying our data can lead to interesting insights. This project is unusual because it uses quantitative data to study a local election in detail. Often political scientists commission surveys to maximize external validity, while qualitative researchers focus on localized areas to uncover detailed mechanisms driving political outcomes. The former projects then produce data that miss important localized relationships – such as the ‘true’ relationship between income and accepting transfers from campaigns – because they only generate a small number of data points from each area. There is interesting variation across small areas that researchers miss in such circumstances.

The latter research projects, however, can also miss important patterns because their research is often not generated from a random sample. Researchers then tend to focus on one type of contingent relationship – as long-term, iterative relationships have been in the clientelism literature – at the expense of other related relationships. By definition the individuals studied by many qualitative researchers tend to be those people who interact with party representatives between elections. These are a non-representative subset and too small a group to win a plurality in most competitive elections. In the conclusion, this dissertation has suggested that future researchers attempt a quantitative panel study over

an entire electoral term in office. This is one possibility that could produce interesting research, however, there are likely others as well.

Appendices

APPENDIX A

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Survey Data

Variable	Mean	Sd	N
Female	0.517	0.5	315
Years of Education	9.3	4.0	316
Monthly Income (Millions of Rp)	1.6	4.2	267
Muslim	0.997	0.06	317
Trips to Mosque per week	9.5	9.9	312
People per HH	5.1	1.8	315
Children under 18	1.5	1.4	312
Age of Respondent	41	16	306
Turnout	0.899	0.30	317

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of Political Variables

Variable	Mean	Sd	N
Turnout	0.899	0.30	317
Paid Cash	0.39	0.49	318
Paid In-Kind	0.35	0.48	318
Paid Both	0.26	0.44	317
Paid Cash and Voted for that Candidate	0.84	0.36	118
Paid In Kind Good(s) and Voted for that Candidate	0.85	0.37	105

Survey Details and Methodology

The overall response rate for this survey was 56 percent, which totaled 318 completed surveys. Response rates for *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* are 57 percent and 55 percent respectively. Local election officials indicated that a large percentage of individuals who did not vote in these elections were citizens from these areas that worked abroad or in another part of Indonesia.³⁰ Their permanent address remained in their home village with their families, however, they generally return home for the end of Ramadan celebrations and spend most of their time elsewhere. If citizens keep all their government papers, including their voter registration, at their village address the actual number of potential voters in local elections is smaller than the voter rolls would suggest. This has two sample design implications: first, response rates for the survey should resemble voter turnout rates. Those individuals, who spend their time outside their home village, should not be present for the campaign, the election, or when enumerators visit their houses to administer a survey. Second, when estimating the effective number of completed surveys, one would need to draw larger samples in areas where turnout was lower.

In Table 1 of this appendix, one can see that turnout rates from the *KPU* are 56 percent and 58 percent for *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* respectively. These numbers are close to the survey's response rates. Also in that table, one can see an adjusted response rate. When a survey respondent refused or was unable to complete a survey, the reason for refusal was recorded. The adjusted response rate subtracts those individuals whose family indicated they work or study in a different location, individuals who passed away after the *KPU* census, and those persons who moved in with their in-laws after

³⁰ Interview with election officials from the *KPU* in *Kabupaten Tegal*.

marriage. This decreased the potential sample to 406 and the overall adjusted response rate to 78 percent.

Table A.3: Turnout Rates and Survey Response Rates

Voter Turnout			
	Kota Tegal	Kab.Tegal	Overall
Registered Voters	196,339	1,183,537	1,379,876
Ballots	110,893	685,280	796,173
Turnout Rate	0.56	0.58	0.58
Survey Responses			
	Kota Tegal	Kab. Tegal	Overall
Surveys Complete	157	161	318
Respondents Drawn	274	291	565
Overall RR	0.57	0.55	0.56
Adjusted Response Rates			
	Kota Tegal	Kab. Tegal	Overall
Voters Outside Area	73	83	156
Adjusted Denominator	201	208	409
Turnout Rate	0.78	0.77	0.78

Note: Voter Turnout Data was obtained from the General Election Commission

Table A.3 also shows that the number of respondents drawn were not random across the entire list, but drawn within each regency. This was done to leave open the possibility of comparative analysis across regencies because a true random sample would have produced too few respondents from *Kota Tegal* as it is about one-fifth the population of *Kabupaten Tegal*. Therefore simple inverse probability weights were constructed and used in the analysis unless stated otherwise. These are calculate by simply taking the inverse of the likelihood that a given respondent was chosen. Since the sample was drawn from the

complete voter list, this means the number of people on the voter list, divided by the number of people sampled for each regency.

The survey itself was conducted using nine enumerators recruited by the researcher at the small university located in Tegal. Each was in the undergraduate in the Social and Political Science department and from one of the two regencies. Tegal uses a distinct Javanese dialect that incorporates a number of Sundanese words given its proximity to the West Java border. This ensured that older respondents, who may be less fluent in Indonesian, could converse with the enumerator. Each enumerator was trained with the survey for two days by the researcher, then sent out for one week to pilot the survey. It was stressed that the enumerators find a relatively private place at the respondent's house to ensure free responses.

The researcher created a separate voter list for the pilot. For five days the enumerators went out and attempted to find three respondents on their list to conduct interviews. If they found that person, they completed an interview. If they could not, they marked why they could not find that person. Then each evening the enumerators met with the researcher to go over issues from each day, turn in their surveys so they could be reviewed, and trade ideas about how best to locate addresses with the information provided by the voter lists. After five days of piloting, the enumerators switched to the randomly sampled list and the survey began.

Probit Regressions with Full Controls

The in-text regressions focus on economic variables because the theory outlined in this paper is directly related to each voter's economic preferences. However, the below models use a much larger set of voter-level controls and find the same relationship between income and transfer-type.

Table A.4: Regressions with Full Controls

	Cash	In-Kind
Income	0.09 (0.09)	0.29 ‡ (0.11)
Income Squared	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02† (0.01)
Female	-0.23 (0.22)	0.10 (0.22)
Formal Employment	0.13 (0.3)	0.22 (0.3)
Savings	-0.00† (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Age (years)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Education (years)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Muslim Party	-0.71 ‡ (0.25)	-0.23 (0.24)
Kids (# in HH)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
Attend Mosque (#/week)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Rooms (# in House)	0.13 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)
Constant	-0.03 (0.8)	-1.78† (0.88)
R ²	0.09	0.09
N	210	210

* $p < 0.1$; † $p < 0.05$; ‡ $p < 0.01$

Table A.5: Weighted Multinomial Probit Regressions

Outcome		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Cash	Income	-0.039 (0.065)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
	Income^2		-0.0 (0.002)	0.00 (0.00)
	Formal Employment			-0.41 (0.52)
	Constant	-1.2 *** (0.19)	-1.3 *** (0.19)	-1.0 *** (0.22)
In-Kind	Income	0.07 (0.043)	0.41 *** (0.14)	0.34** (0.14)
	Income^2		-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
	Formal Employment			0.28 (0.48)
	Constant	-1.42 † (0.18)	-1.71 *** (0.24)	-1.66 *** (0.29)
Both	Income	0.03 (0.04)	0.25** (0.12)	0.21* (0.12)
	Income^2		-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
	Formal Employment			0.3 (0.4)
	Constant	-0.62*** (0.15)	-0.78*** (0.18)	-0.75*** (0.21)
<i>N</i>		267	267	233

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Note: The base outcome for these regressions is those voters who didn't accept cash or in-kind goods from any campaign.

The dependent variable here is zero for individuals who did not receive anything from any campaign, one for individuals who accepted cash only, two for individuals who accepted in-kinds goods only, and three for individuals who accepted both.

List Experiment

The list experiment included three options in the control group and four options in the treatment group. The treatment question was written as follows:

How many of these things did you do during the campaign?

- Involve themselves in the political arena
- Discuss with a friend who you will vote for
- Work for a candidate for free or give money to a candidate
- Receive money or Sembako from a candidate

Write Total []

The control group was given the first three options only. The reader should note that the final two options somewhat contradict each other as one indicates the respondent donated time or money to the candidate, while the last one indicates they received something from the candidate. While it is possible a respondent could respond yes to both, these two options were included to mitigate the number of respondents who would answer four and thus undermine the anonymity of the treatment. Note, eight respondents (or 5.4 percent of the 148 treatment surveys) did write in 4 as their response.

Sample Restriction: Respondents with Campaign Contact

One concern with the analysis here might be that the dependent variable records zeros both for voters who were not in contact with a campaign and therefore did not accept a transfer and voters who were in contact with a campaign, but did not accept a transfer. This appendix reran the regressions that produced the Figure 2 in the text, which showed the inverted-U shape for predicted probabilities of accepting a good, and reproduced the graph. Note, this is the same procedure used in the text, the only different is the sample has been limited to the 180 individuals who were in contact with any campaign at any point leading up to the election. The coefficients on the income variable stays the same at 0.42 for both models and the coefficients on the income squared variable similarly stay the same at -0.033. All of these coefficients produce a z-score above an absolute value of 2 so they maintain their significance. Moreover, the intercept shifts upwards from -0.59 to -0.17.

Table A.6: Weighted Probit Regressions: Restricted Sample by Campaign Contact

	Cash	In-Kind	Cash	In-Kind
Income	-0.05 (0.09)	0.23** (0.10)	-0.09 (0.10)	0.19* (0.10)
Income^2	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Employed			-0.06 (0.30)	0.27 (0.30)
Constant	0.15 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.14)	0.26 (0.18)	-0.15 (0.17)
N	180	180	160	160

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

APPENDIX B

Table B.1: Turnout Rates and Survey Response Rates

Voter Turnout			
	Kota Tegal	Kab.Tegal	Overall
Registered Voters	196,339	1,183,537	1,379,876
Ballots	110,893	685,280	796,173
Turnout Rate	0.56	0.58	0.58
Survey Responses			
	Kota Tegal	Kab. Tegal	Overall
Surveys Complete	157	161	318
Respondents Drawn	274	291	565
Overall RR	0.57	0.55	0.56
Adjusted Response Rates			
	Kota Tegal	Kab. Tegal	Overall
Voters Outside Area	73	83	156
Adjusted Denominator	201	208	409
Turnout Rate	0.78	0.77	0.78

Note: Voter Turnout Data was obtained from the General Election Commission

Table B.2: List Experiment: T-Test by Treatment Group

	Treatment	Control	Difference
Mean	0.82	0.31	0.51
SE	0.09	0.04	
		T	-5.32
		p value	0.000
		N	302
Collapsed DV: Received Cash or Good from Campaign			
	Count	Percent	
Yes	151	47.5	
No	167	52.5	
Total	318	100	

Table B.3: Descriptive Statistics of Survey variables

Variable	Observations	Mean	s.d.
Age	305	41	16
Female	314	0.52	0.5
Income (Million Rp)	266	1.67	4.2
Education	315	9.2	3.8
Contact w/ Campaign	317	0.67	0.47
Ethnically Javanese	316	0.94	0.23

Table B.4: Probit Regressions predicting Turnout Using Alternative Knowledge Scales

	Turnout	Turnout	Turnout	Turnout
Received Transfer	0.84*** (0.24)	1.17*** (0.35)	1.13*** (0.32)	1.36*** (0.50)
Gerindra	-0.38 (0.48)	-0.23 (0.59)	-0.52 (0.57)	-0.67 (0.74)
Golkar	0.95* (0.50)	0.80 (0.58)	0.34 (0.62)	0.20 (0.79)
PAN	0.46 (0.60)	0.42 (0.69)	0.02 (0.65)	-0.07 (0.82)
PDIP	0.36 (0.26)	0.39 (0.35)	0.03 (0.35)	-0.05 (0.48)
PKB	1.03*** (0.32)	1.12** (0.56)	0.65 (0.40)	0.64 (0.67)
PPP	0.12 (0.58)		-0.83 (0.73)	
Knowledge 2	0.13 (0.10)		0.24* (0.14)	
Knowledge 3		0.22** (0.11)		0.26 (0.18)
Income			-0.04* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Age			0.03*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)
Education			0.04 (0.05)	0.09 (0.07)
Female			0.17 (0.26)	-0.07 (0.37)
Javanese			0.14 (0.49)	0.06 (0.73)
Constant	0.35 (0.26)	-0.28 (0.41)	-1.39 (0.95)	-2.15 (1.40)
<i>N</i>	315	155	259	122

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.5: Proportion of Transfers to Respondents of Different Parties

Paid Respondents from Other PID	Mean of Entire Sample	Mean for Sample that Did Not Turnout
PDIP	0.05	0
Golkar	0.19	0.06
PKB	0	0
N	317	28

Note: Variables calculated by identifying respondents in survey who claimed to identify with one political party, but received a transfer from the party in column one.

Table B.6: Campaigns Providing Cash/Goods to Each Respondent

Number of Campaigns	Frequency	Percent of Total
0	166	52.37
1	131	41.32
2	17	5.36
3	3	0.95

APPENDIX C

Table C.1: Turnout Rates and Survey Response Rates

Voter Turnout			
	Kota Tegal	Kab. Tegal	Overall
Registered Voters	196,339	1,183,537	1,379,876
Ballots	110,893	685,280	796,173
Turnout Rate	0.56	0.58	0.58
Survey Responses			
	Kota Tegal	Kab. Tegal	Overall
Surveys Complete	157	161	318
Respondents Drawn	274	291	565
Overall RR	0.57	0.55	0.56
Adjusted Response Rates			
	Kota Tegal	Kab. Tegal	Overall
Voters Outside Area	73	83	156
Adjusted Denominator	201	208	409
Turnout Rate	0.78	0.77	0.78

Note: Voter Turnout Data was obtained from the General Election Commission

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