

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WPC - wecker

27b

MEMORANDUM

September 23, 1966

SUBJECT: Vietnam Resolution at the Pugwash Conference

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

In order to understand the following recital it is important to remember that the overwhelming majority of the Conference opposed the U.S. policy on Vietnam and that a substantial majority of the American group shared this view.

(1) On September 13th there was a plenary session devoted entirely to Vietnam. In intemperate, highly emotional language, the Soviet delegation demanded an across-the-board condemnation of the U.S. The Soviet harangues took well over an hour. They were supported with much less intensity by the East Europeans. On the American side there were only three speakers: Steve Muller called for negotiations. Betty Lall asked the Soviets to act as mediators and for her pains was viciously attacked by Emilyanov. I spoke about factual inaccuracies in the Soviet presentation and said that if this was indeed the mood in Moscow peace was impossible. I also said that the emotional character of the Soviet presentation was inappropriate for a scientific conference. Just before adjournment Bentley Glass supported my position.

(2) On September 14th, Nemeo, the Secretary of the Czech Pugwash Committee and convener (i.e. drafter) of the Working Group preparing the Vietnam resolution, asked my view about a recommendation that a study group of neutral scientists

PRESERVATION COPY



visit Saigon and Hanoi. I said I would support this provided the rest of the resolution did not load the dice against the U.S. After consultation with Shulman and Mrs. Lall--the American members of the Working Group--it was decided to include the criticisms of U.S. policy as the view of "some" while also listing counterarguments as the view of "others". Nemec kept his side of the bargain loyally throughout.

(3) At the plenary session on September 15th the report of the Working Group in addition to the preamble described under (2) contained recommendations that foreign troops be withdrawn and the "people of Vietnam be free to determine their own fate." At my suggestion, Shep Stone moved to amend foreign to "troops from outside South Vietnam" and to add the phrase "both North and South" to the plea for self-determination. This was strenuously resisted by the Soviets. Millionshikov, who chaired the session, urged the Working Group to add more emotion to their report and to condemn the U.S. I intervened to challenge the appropriations of the chairman instructing Working Groups and of a group of scientists being asked to be emotional.

(4) At the plenary session on September 16th, the Working Group report did not contain the Stone amendment. I made an issue of it. The Soviets resisted. There was so much uncertainty, however, that it was decided to report that the Conference could agree "neither on the causes of the war in Vietnam nor on the means to deal with it."

PRESERVATION COPY