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Vietnamese morale and to perpetuate the conflict without risking excessive US response. To the Chinese, both the Korean War and the very measured character of US escalation against North Vietnam provide psychological assurance that the likely US response to initially limited Chinese involvement would be measured and tem­
peredo 
II. The Soviet Attitude towards the Vietnamese War 
lo At first, the Soviet leaders were concerned that the war may complicate the US-Soviet relationship or prompt unacceptable risks. This fear is probably much less today than a year or so ago. 
2. As the war went on, the Soviet leaders began 
to see some major benefits themselves from the US 
involvement. In their thinking: 

a. 
The war weakened US posture in Europe and created new openings for Soviet diplomacy; · 

b. 
it reduced the effectiveness of US bridge­building to East Europe; 

c. 
it intensified domestic strains in the 
United States while consuming major US resources; 



\ d. it diverted Chinese hostility from the Soviet Union and reduced the likelihood of a US-Chinese rapprochement. 
3o Without a doubt the war also has created liabilities fer the Soviet Union. The Soviets have been embarrassed by their inability to deter the US from bombing a Corrununist state. The war did reduce the possibility of incre'ased US-Soviet trade, which at least some Soviet leaders desired. Nonetheless, the assumed political benefits of the war certainly must outweigh in the minds of most Soviet leaders the loss of somewhat marginal and essentially only potential economic benefitso 
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4. It would appear that today the Soviet leaders are primarily concerned with containing the risks of the war; not with the war itself. Furthermore, if one bears in mind the over-all Soviet view of their relation­ship with the United States --including the allegedly more "aggressive" US policy --it is difficult to see why the Soviet leaders should not view the war as, on balance, convenient, though posing certain obvious risks o A prolonged and painful continuation is preferable either to a US victory or even to a compromise settlement, which would simply free the United States to pursue .more effec­tively its policies in Asia or Europe. Prolonging the war but minimizing its risks --that jn essence appears to be the Soviet posture in regard to the Vietnamese conflicto 
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