

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

SS

Info

NNNNVVV FHE556CA328
PP RUEHCR
DE RUFHJA 089 16/1725Z
P 161700Z ZEA
FM USBER BERLIN

0115091

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 1739 PRIORITY
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1568 PRIORITY
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 661 PRIORITY
RUFHPA/AMEMBASSY PARIS 726 PRIORITY
RUDLSK/USNMR SHAPE FOR BURNS UNN PRIORITY
RUFLC/USCINCEUR FOR POLAD UNN PRIORITY
RUFLUE/USELMLO UNN PRIORITY
RUFPA/USAREUR FOR POLAD UNN PRIORITY
RUFPAW/USAFE UNN PRIORITY
ZEN/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 654 PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

15 JUN 16 PM 3 00

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PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

SUBJ: EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER FLIGHTS

REFS: (A) BONNTEL 4859 TO DEPT (B) BERLINTEL 1721 TO DEPT 1554 TO
BONN

L I M D I S

FROM AMBASSADOR MCGHEE

1. AMB. SEYDOUX, IN HIS MEETING YESTERDAY WITH AMB. ABRASIMOV,
DID NOT RECEIVE ANY SATISFACTORY REPLY CONCERNING THE FLIGHTS OF
EAST GERMAN HELICOPTERS IN THE BCZ. ABRASIMOV MERELY NOTED SEYDOUX'S

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EXPOSE AND SAID HE WOULD INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE
LATTER'S REPLY TO THE TRIPARTITE NOTE OF MAY 6. I THEREFORE BE-
LIEVE THAT WE MUST MOVE URGENTLY TO MORE POSITIVE MEASURES TO DIS-
COURAGE A CONTINUATION OF THESE FLIGHTS. I AM CONCERNED THAT OUR
FAILURE TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES NOW WILL LEAD THE EAST GERMANS AND THE
SOVS TO CONCLUDE THAT WE DO NOT STRONGLY OPPOSE THEM. THIS WILL
MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT AND RISKY TO INDUCE THEM TO ABANDON
THE PRACTICE LATER, OR AT LEAST THOSE ASPECTS OF IT WHICH WE FIND
MOST OBJECTIONABLE.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By cb NARA, Date 7-6-00

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-2- 161700Z JUNE, FROM USBER BERLIN

2. SPECIFICALLY, I RECOMMEND THAT USCOB BE AUTHORIZED TO SEND US HELICOPTERS OVER EAST BERLIN OR THE SOV ZONE UNDER THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES (IT IS ASSUMED THAT A US HELICOPTER WILL BE SENT ALOFT TO FOLLOW, IN THE WESTERN SECTORS, ANY EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER THAT IS OBSERVED TO BE FLYING IN PROXIMITY TO THE BORDER - READY TO CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING):

(A) WHEN AN EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER OVERFLIES WEST BERLIN. IN THIS CASE THE US HELICOPTER WOULD, IF IT CAN GET THERE IN TIME, ENCOUNTER THE EAST GERMAN AIRCRAFT WHILE STILL OVER WEST BERLIN. IT WOULD ATTEMPT BY CLOSE BUT NOT DANGEROUS APPROACHES TO MANEUVER IT OUT OF WEST BERLIN, FOLLOWING IT FOR A SHORT DISTANCE (300-500 METERS) INTO EAST BERLIN OR THE SOVIET ZONE (WITHIN

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THE BCZ).

(B) WHEN AN EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER FLIES IN THE BCZ OUTSIDE WEST BERLIN BUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CONSTITUTE A HAZARD TO SAFETY OF NORMAL AIR TRAFFIC LEAVING AND DEPARTING WEST BERLIN AIRFIELDS. TO THE EXTENT COMPATIBLE WITH AIR SAFETY, THE US HELICOPTER WOULD ATTEMPT BY CLOSE BUT NOT DANGEROUS APPROACHES TO MANEUVER IT OUT OF THE AREA WHEREIN IT CONSTITUTES A HAZARD.

(C) WHEN AN EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER FLIES IN A PARTICULARLY PROVOCATIVE WAY NEAR TO WEST BERLIN, EVEN THOUGH NOT OVER IT. A PERSISTENT FLIGHT ALONG THE WEST BERLIN BOUNDARY WOULD BE SUCH AN OCCASION, AS WOULD A FLIGHT UP TO THE BORDER AT CHECKPOINT CHARLIE OR OTHER PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE POINT (OVER STEINSTUECKEN, FOR ANOTHER EXAMPLE). IN SUCH CASES THE US HELICOPTER WOULD CROSS THE WEST BERLIN BOUNDARY AND APPROACH THE OTHER AIRCRAFT. IT WOULD FOLLOW IT OR FLY ALONGSIDE IT, NOT NECESSARILY ATTEMPTING TO CHASE IT AWAY.

(D) IN ANY OF THE ABOVE CASES IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE US HELICOPTER WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LOCATE THE EAST GERMAN ON ARRIVAL AT THE POINT OF THE SIGHTING. IN SUCH A CASE, THE US AIRCRAFT WOULD CROSS THE BORDER AND FLY FOR TEN MINUTES OR SO IN SEARCH OF THE OTHER, THEN RETURN.

(E) IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE TYPES (A THROUGH C) OF FOLLOWING OR ACCOMPANYING US FLIGHTS RELATED TO SPECIFIC EAST GERMAN FLIGHTS

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WE SHOULD CONDUCT A SEPARATE BRIEF DEMONSTRATIVE FLIGHT OVER EAST BERLIN OR PLACES AT OUR OWN CHOOSING, BUT NOT OVER INTELLIGENCE TARGETS, -- SAY FOR 5 TO 10 MINUTES -- JUST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER EACH EAST GERMAN INCIDENT.

3. I FULLY AGREE WITH USBER AND GENERAL FRANKLIN (REF B PARA 5) THAT IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO SEND UNARMED AMERICAN HELICOPTERS BEYOND THE BORDERS OF WEST BERLIN TO DEAL WITH EAST GERMAN HELICOPTERS THAT ARE VERY LIKELY TO BE ARMED. I BELIEVE ARMED HU-1B HELICOPTERS SHOULD BE FURNISHED TO USCIB FOR THIS PURPOSE ONCE AUTHORIZATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO CONDUCT FLIGHTS OUTSIDE WEST BERLIN. I UNDERSTAND IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE TO INSTALL ARMAMENT ON HELICOPTERS NOW BASED IN BERLIN. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE ARMED AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE BROUGHT HERE UNTIL WE ARE DECIDED TO USE THEM, HOWEVER. THE ARMAMENT IS CONSPICUOUS AND WOULD COME QUICKLY TO PUBLIC ATTENTION. IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO BRING THEM IN AND THEN NOT PROCEED QUICKLY TO USE THEM MEANWHILE, FOR ANY FLIGHTS OUTSIDE WEST BERLIN PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF ARMED HELICOPTERS, GENERAL FRANKLIN INTENDS TO STATION IN THE US HELICOPTER A SOLDIER PASSENGER CARRYING AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON OUT OF VIEW. I CONCUR IN HIS INTENTION. IN FACT, I BELIEVE THIS WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE FOR DEALING WITH EAST GERMAN HELICOPTERS WITHIN WEST BERLIN.

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4. IN CONNECTION WITH THESE RECOMMENDATIONS IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE THAT LAST EVENING, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH MINISTER CALHOUN, BOTH GOVMAYOR BRANDT AND CDU OPPOSITION LEADER AMREHN SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF BERLIN PUBLIC OPINION THAT THERE BE FURTHER US HELICOPTER OVERFLIGHTS OF EAST BERLIN IN RESPONSE TO THESE EAST GERMAN PROVOCATIONS. AMREHN STRESSED THAT HE AND OTHER BERLINERS HAD NOTED WITH CONCERN THAT PERIODIC US OVERFLIGHTS HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE FOR MANY MONTHS IN CONTRAST TO THE EARLIER REGULAR PATTERN OF SUCH FLIGHTS. HE URGED THAT THESE FLIGHTS BE RESUMED IMMEDIATELY. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT RECOMMEND A RESUMPTION OF THE PATTERN OF OUR FLIGHTS PRIOR TO DECEMBER 23, 1964, THIS CONCERN OF THE WEST BERLIN ATTITUDE REINFORCES MY BELIEF THAT URGENT STEPS ALONG THE LINES NOW RECOMMENDED ARE NOW NECESSARY TO BRING THE NEW EAST GERMAN PRACTICE UNDER CONTROL. MY RATIONALE IN THIS REGARD IS DICTATED BY THE JUDGMENT THAT THE RESUMPTION OF REGULAR FLIGHTS ON OUR OLD PATTERN WOULD SERVE TO ESCALATE EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER ACTIVITY IN THE BERLIN AREA BY INVITING FLIGHTS ON THE PART OF THE EAST GERMANS IN REPRISAL. THE LIMITATION OF OUR FLIGHTS TO FOLLOWING EAST GERMAN FLIGHTS AND TO DEMONSTRATIVE ACTION IN OBVIOUS DIRECT RETALIATION AGAINST EAST GERMAN FLIGHTS WILL, I BELIEVE, HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT OF DISCOURAGING FURTHER EAST GERMAN FLIGHTS. GP-4 CALHOUN
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