



# Department of State

5 *James*  
**TELEGRAM**  
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ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,  
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, IO 13, NEA 13, SA 01, SAL 01, SAH 02,  
SR 01, SCI 05, E 15, ACDA 16, NIC 01, CCO 00, SSO 00, RSR 01, /159 W  
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P R 271858Z AUG 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5492  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
USMISSION NATO  
USUN NEW YORK 1261

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SUBJ: QUAI VIEWS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. QUAI DEP DIR FOR SOVIET/EE AFFAIRS (ANDREANI) PROVIDED FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY VIES ON CZECH SITUATION AFTER MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE:

(A) ACCORDING TO WHAT WAS MADE PUBLIC, CZECHS CAME OUT SURPRISINGLY WELL FROM THEIR ORDEAL, IF ONE COULD ASSUME WORST WAS OVER. FOR SOVIETS, OBVIOUS IMPORTANT GAIN WAS CONTINUED OF PRESENCE OF TROOPS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR CERTAIN PERIOD, WITH LEGITIMACY GIVEN BY CZECH AGREEMENT AND INSTRUCTIONS TO CZECH MILITARY TO TO COOPERATE.

(B) PRICE PAID BY CZECHS WAS NOT VERY HEAVY JUDGING BY APPEARANCES, ALTHOUGH BIG QUESTIONS REMAINED, ESPECIALLY (1) WHAT WOULD BE POSITION OF CERTAIN LEADERS (DUBCEK AND HIS ASSOCIATES; LEADERS ABROAD LIKE STK AND HAJEK; "NEW LIBERALS" ELECTED BY PARTY DURING OCCUPATION); (2) WHAT WOULD BE FATE OF SCHEDULED PARTY CONGRESS; (3) MOST IMPORTANT, COULD LEADERS KEEP CONFIDENCE OF PEOPLE WHILE SOVIET TROOPS SQUATTED IN THEIR COUNTRY. ANDREANI THOUGHT PRINCIPAL SOVIET AIM ALL ALONG WAS TO DIVORCE DUBCEK FROM THE REAL LIBERALS--COULD THEY DO THIS NOW WITHOUT

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *sl/abm* NARA, Date *4-18-06*





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AROUSING CZECH RESISTANCE? PUT ANOTHER WAY, ONCE LIBERALIZATION WAS STARTED COULD IT BE CONTAINED--WITH OR WITHOUT SOVIET TROOPS?

(C) IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT SOVIETS HAD ACHIEVED WHAT THEY SET OUT TO DO WHEN THEY SENT TROOPS IN, IF COMMUNIQUE WAS GOOD EVIDENCE--ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING SEVERE LOSSES SOVIETS TOOK POLITICALLY. THEREFORE IT SEEMED PLAUSIBLE THAT ONCE AGAIN SOVIETS MISJUDGED THEIR CAPACITY TO RUN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND IN THIS SENSE/ (AMONG OTHERS) MILITARY INTERVENTION HAD TO BE CONSIDERED MAJOR SOVIET ERROR.

(D) ANDREANI VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT WENT ON IN SOVIET POLIT-BUREAU DURING CZECH CRISIS AND SAID FOR LONG-RANGE PLANNING, GOF WANTED KNOW ALL IT COULD ABOUT WHICH LEADERS FAVORED HARD-LINE POLICY AND WHO WAS ON TOP NOW. HE REMARKED ON RUMORED ABSENCE OF MUCH OF LEADERSHIP DURING WEEK BEFORE INTERVENTION, NOTING THAT KOSYGIN HAD BEEN OUT OF TOWN OFTEN LATELY BEFORE IMPORTANT DECISIONS. HE ALSO ASKED US VIEWS, CITING PRESS STORIES PURPORTEDLY FROM US SOURCES ABOUT SPLIT IN LEADERSHIP; EMBOFF CITED PARA 6 OF STATE 227898 AND PROMISED PROVIDE URTHUR INFO IF AVAILABLE. ANDREANI SAID LOGICAL SUPPOSITION WOULD BE THAT HARD-LINERS MIGHT HAVE TEMPORARY SETBACK, BUT HARD TO JUDGE NOW. (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC FUNCTION PHILIPPE MALAUD ALSO BROUGHT UP KREMLIHOLGY WITH POLCOUNS AUG 27, SAYING GOF VERY INTERESTED IN EFFECT OF CRISIS UPON SOVIET LEADERSHIP FOR PLANNING FUTURE RELATIONS. ANDREANI MAY BE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW THIS PARTICULARLY CLOSELY NOW.)

2. IN SUM, ANDREANI'S INITIAL VIEW AFTER COMMUNIQUE WAS THAT WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED MUCH WORSE, AND THAT IF CZECH LEADERS COULD KEEP SUPPORT OF PEOPLE THERE WAS REASON FOR OPTIMISM THAT SITUATION WOULD START WORKING OUT. HE ADDED THAT, OF COURSE, WITH SOVIET TROOPS THERE, WE MUST EXPECT MORE CAUTIOUS POLICY IN PRAGUE, ESPECIALLY AS CONCERNS FOREIGN AFFAIRS.  
GP-3 SHRIVER

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