

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

24

83

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Action

Control: 15561

Rec'd: October 19, 1964
2:39 p.m.

EUR

Info

FROM: Belgrade

ACTION: Secstate 776, Priority

INFO: Moscow 47, Priority

Paris 34, Priority

Hong Kong 5

Warsaw Unnumbered

Bucharest Unnumbered

Prague Unnumbered

Budapest Unnumbered

Sofia Unnumbered

Zagreb Unnumbered

DATE: October 19, 6 p.m. (SECTION I OF II)

PARIS FOR USRO

EMBTTEL 766 (not repeated addressees)

I called on Under Secretary Nikezic October 19 to exchange views on change in Soviet leadership, basing my comments on analyses contained in Department circular telegrams 664 and 679. I gave him copy of President's October 18 report to nation.

Principal points made by Nikezic were:

1. In absence of Ambassador, Soviet Charge had called on GOY to convey assurances that Soviet Government envisages continuation of good relations between two governments and parties.

2. GOY had no information to indicate that any additional major changes had taken place in party leadership. Initially, there had been some rumors of changes within MLT leadership

but these

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

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-2- 776, October 19, 6 p.m. (SECTION I OF II) from Belgrade

but these rumors remain unconfirmed.

3. Present hope and expectation of GOY is that new leadership will continue to pursue realistic and reasonable policies followed by Khrushchev, above also policy of peaceful coexistence. He added that Khrushchev's peaceful foreign policy intimately connected with realization of internal Soviet policies designed to relax internal tensions and to improve methods of government in USSR.

4. Although cause for Khrushchev's removal is basically an internal affair, outside world could not help, in world of nuclear dangers, but have common interest in methods and tactics used by new leadership in international life.

5. Nikezic dwelt on theme that new leadership would be strongly limited in policies which it could pursue since it would have to take account of realities of present-day world. These realities included posture of US and NATO, attitudes within Socialist world, good Soviet relations with non-aligned countries, and interests and expressed wishes of Soviet people themselves. In this connection, Nikezic directed attention to reaction of Italian, Polish, and Hungarian Communist Parties which all expressed hope that USSR would follow Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line. These parties made no effort to apologize for their relations with Khrushchev (and neither is Yugo CP, judging by Nikezic's remarks). New leadership would have to take this into consideration. Fact that new leadership made approaches to many governments and to Communist Parties represented tacit recognition that new regime recognized its area of maneuverability limited. Nikezic conjectured that if new regime followed hard line this would only be temporary tactic and would be used just as Khrushchev had used it, backing off when it was prudent to do so.

ELBRICK

TRT/18

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FROM: Belg
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TELEGRAM Department of State

83

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Control: 15565
Rec'd: October 19, 1964
2:42 p.m.

Action

EUR

FROM: Belgrade

Info

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G

SP

INFO: Moscow 47, Priority

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Paris 34, Priority

H

Hong Kong 5

SAL

Warsaw Unnumbered

FE

Bucharest Unnumbered

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Prague Unnumbered

USIA

Budapest Unnumbered

NSC

Sofia Unnumbered

INR

Zagreb Unnumbered

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DATE: October 19, 6 p.m. (SECTION II OF II)

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PARIS FOR USRO

RMR

GOY as yet has no clues re new regime's attitude toward differences with CHICOMs. This important question, which may have been intimately connected with Khrushchev's removal. Regardless of reason for dismissal, however, new Soviet regime may use removal as departure point for improving relations with Communist China. But even here possibilities of change in policy limited. CHICOMs have gone far with respect to territorial claims, development of nuclear weapons, demands for changes in Soviet foreign and economic aid policies. Soviets would have to make substantial concession to meet CHICOM demands and it should be remembered that USSR not weaker partner in this dispute. Nevertheless, if Soviets manage to improve relations with CHICOMs without endangering Khrushchev policies of realism, compromise, and negotiations, GOY would approve rapprochement.

7. GOY had no information re Suslov speech but Nikezic expressed hope Yugos would be able reconstruct basic

reasons

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reasons for dismissal on basis of information made available to Soviet public. Other clues would also appear in form of changes in emphasis in internal and external policies.

8. Collective leadership at this stage seems unavoidable. Little purpose served in speculating how long possible struggle for power would last. Obvious, however, that when man of Khrushchev's ability leaves scene, time required for possible replacement to assert his influence and leadership. At moment, GOY assumes Brezhnev and Kosygin pretty equal with other Presidium members.

Comment: Nikezic admitted candidly that GOY had no advance notice of developments; and that GOY is naturally concerned over possible change in direction of Soviet policies, especially toward CHICOMs since this could directly affect GOY-USSR State and Party relations. While GOY is hopeful that there will be no change in Soviet policy toward Yugo, we can assume it will be generally cautious on all issues in weeks ahead pending clarification of Soviet attitude on issues in which GOY concerned. However already evident from GOY critical attitude toward CHICOM nuclear test and alleged CHICOM attempts "split" Cairo conference that GOY not hedging its hostility toward CHICOMs.

GP-3.

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