WHEELER 

1. 
PURPOSE: THE PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEFING IS A BRIEF RESUME OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN VIETNAM. 

2. 
W~T 	IS THE SITUATION ALONG THE DMZ? 


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-,TOTAL 	INDICATIONS OF ENEMY IN THE DMZ SINCE 1 NOV: 230 
11 ATTACKS BY FIRE 	FROM THE DMZ ON FRIENDLY POSITIONS. 
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-.,-, 34 FIRINGS ON OUR PAC/OBSERVER AIRCRAFT FROM DMZ. 95· SIGHTINGS OF ENEMY PERSONNEL IN DMZ (11 N OF PMDL) •. 81 OTHER SIGHTINGS OF LIGHTS, VEHICLES, BUNKDE.RS, 
TRAILS~ 	ETC. 
' 	. 
66 US/ARVN RESPONSES HAVE BEEN MADE INTO DMZ WITH ~ARTILLERY, AIR STRIKES & NAVAL GUNFIRE. DATES: NOV 1-3, 4-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-24 INDICATIONS: o, 8, 23, 84, 45 FRIENDLY FIRINGS: O, 7, 18, 34, 13 
3. HAVE WE BEEN ABLE· TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY ENEMY IN THE DMZ AS NVA? 

NO. 
-ON 20 NOV HIGHEST AUTHORITY AUTHORIZED SQUAD-SIZE PATROLS INTO THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ OVER PERIOD 24 NOV -3 DEC 68 TO CAPTURE SOME PRISONERS TO PRQVE POSITIVELY THAT IT IS THE NVA 
(OR VC) ~mo ARE VIOLATING THE DMZ. (FOR USE IN PARIS). PLATOONS SOUTH OF DMZ BACK UP THE "SNATCH" PATROLS. 
-USMC "SNATCH" PATROLS MADE NO CONTACTS IN .DMZ ON 24 NOV. 
4. 	/HOW MANY ATTACKS ON POPULATION CENTERS SINCE 1 NOVEMBER? -TOTAL ATTACKS: 60 -LAST 48 HOURS: 9 

I CTZ 15 MINOR 4 MAJOR ·~3/3 * 	U.5 /'5}
~Vtl 	j'f2 t/f'1 
/2 { 6 II CTZ 7 MINOR 0 MAJOR 2/0 
f#F 1 
III CTZ 8 MINOR 0 MAJOR 0/0 IV CTZ 24 MINOR 2 MAJOR 1/0 ~ MAJOR ATTACKS WERE GROUND/FIRE ATTACKS ON TWO REFUGEE CAMPS ANO ONE HAMLET NEAR QUANG NGl\I . -TO PROVIDE AN EVALUATION OF TRENDS, FOLLOWING IS A COMPARISON MADE OF ATTACKS ON POPULATION CENTERS BY (1) GROUND ATTACK AND/OR 
(2) 	ATTACK BY FIRE OF MORE THAN 20 ROUNDS: TET MAY 3D OFF OCT 68 1-24 NOV ATTACKS PER WEEK: 47/WK 35/WK 16,/WK 9/WK ll. 5/WK 
-IN OTHER WORDS, THERE IS NOTHING SHARPLY OUT OF LINE HERE, SO FAR, ALTHOUGH SOME INCREASE IS NOTED. 
5. WHAT IIAS BEEN THE ENEMY'S REACTION TO OUR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER NORTH VIETNAM SINCE 1 NOVEMBER 1968? -TOTAL RECON FLIGHTS OVER NVN: 229 -LAST 72 HOURS: 23 (...J..2..5 TAC RECON FLIGHTS, -2_ SR-71, 29 DRONES). 
-	TOTAL HOSTILE REACTIONS: 80 
3 DRONES SHOT DOWN EARLY THIS MONTH. 


-(...-;"' -:--r-., f 
,, . 
-1 RF-4 DOWNED BY AAA NW DONG HOI 23 NOV. 
(AT LEAST ONE SURVIVOR: SURROUNDED, BELIEVED CAPTURED) • 
--WAS ESCORTED BY A SECOND RF-4; NO FIRE SUPPRESSION. 
AFTER MR. VANCE NOTIFIED NVN OF OUR INTENTIONS ON ' 2 4 NOV, WE RESUMED MANNED RECON FLIGHTS WITH ARMED ESCOR TO SUPPRESS ENEMY FIRE AGAINST RECON AIRCRAFT (241901E NOV). 
-1 RA-SC DOWNED ~y SAM NORTH OF VINH. (242239E NOV). 
-1 F-4D ESCOR~ DOWNED DY AAA NW DONG HOI (250045E NOV). SAR \\TITH ARMED SUPPRESSION CARRIED OUT. 
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6. WHAT IS THE CURRENT SCALE OF RECON FLIGHTS AUTHORIZED OVER NORTH VIETNAM? 
-90 MISSIONS PER WEEK (UP TO 25/DAY) WITH AUTHORITY TO REQUEST MORE IF .REQUIRED. 
-ARMED ESCORT TO SUPPRESS HOSTILE AIRCRAFT AND GROUND FIRE IS AUTHORIZED AND BEING FURNISHED. 
7. WHAT HAVE OUR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER NVN AND LAOS DISCOVERED1* 
-ENEMY IS MOVING MILITARY SUPPLIES, POL AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS INTO RP-I AND LAOS WITH IMPRESSIVE SPEED. 
-ALL MAJOR ROADS AND BRIDGES IN RP-I LEADING TO DMZ, BAN KARA! PASS AND MU GIA PASS ARE OPEN. 
-TRUCK TRAFFIC 
5000 TRUCKS PHOTOGRAPHED IN RP-I, II, III BEFORE 20 NOV; e MOST MOVING IN CONVOYS OF 50-100. 
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--POL, AMMO, AAA, SAM EQUIPMENT AND FIELD ARTILLERY MOVING SOUTH. 
--OVER 2000 TRUCKS DETECTED BY SENSORS IN LAOS 1-16 NOV; SOU~H OF MU GIA, 250 TRUCKS PER DAY. 
-RAIL TRAFFIC 
--HANOI-VINH RAIL LINE OPEN; RR 7 OPEN DOWN INTO RP-I, RAIL QUOTA OF 11 400 TON/DAY" SET (SIGINT}. 
-POL · 
MORE PHOTOGRAPHED IN RP-I SINCE 4 NOV THAN IN PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS. 
-WATER-BORNE LOGISTICS CRAFT 
--HEAVY TRAFFIC ON RP-I WATERWAYS; COASTAL CONVOYS ENROUTE FROM HAIPHONG-DONG HOI. 
--ACTIVITY AT LEAST AS GREAT AS DURING HOLIDAY TRUCES OF LAST TWO YEARS,
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-IN SUMMARY: ENEMY IS EXPLOITING THE BOMBING HALT TO SHIFT 
HIS LOGISTIC COMPLEX SOUTHWARD FROM NORTH OF l9TH PARALLEL TO RP-I, 
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NEAR DMZ. 
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-EXPECT ENEMY TO PUSH SUPPLIES THRU LAOS (NOW DRYING OUT} TO SUPPORT ENEMY IN I & II CTZ. 
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-NO CONFIRMED EFFECTS SO FAR ON ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AND THROUGH THE DMZ. tvE ARE WATCHING THIS CLOSELY. 
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* White House, State, OSD, and Paris have information in this para. 

8. WHAT IS THE SCALE OF OUR AIR EFFORT IN LAOS TO STOP THE TRUCKS? 
-380 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES PER DAY. 
20 ARC LIGHT SORTIES PER DAY. 

9. 	WHAT IS THE CURRENT TACTICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM? -DURING 1968, THE ENEMY HAS CONCENTRATED GENERALLY ON OFFENSIVE EFFORTS BY MAIN FORCE NVA/VC UNITS. -AS RESULT, CASUALTIES AND SUPPLY SHORTAGES HAVE IMPACTED MOST DRAMATICALLY ON NVA/VC REGIMENTS. -OF 59 NVA/VC REGIMENTS IN SVN, 23 WITHDREW IN AUG/SEP TO NVN, LAOS AND BORDER SANCTUARIES. THEREFORE, WE HAVE INCREASED THE EMPHASIS ON ELIMINATING VC LOCAL FORCES AND VC INFRASTRUCTURE. (3 NVA REGTS MOVED BACK INTO III CTZ; NO SIGNIFICANT THREAT INCREASE}. 
RES'ULTS 	INCLUDE: 
HIGHER ATTRITION ON VC LOCAL FORCE UNITS, 
IMPROVED CHIEU HOI RATE, 

INCREASED EFFECTS ON ·· VC INFRASTRUCTURE. 
-GVN HAS INCREASED EMPHASIS ON TERRITORIAL SECURITY. 

/ 
R/F COMPANIES DEC 67 -931; NOW -1,092. 
P/F PLATOONS DEC 67 -4,237; NOW-4,615. 
BOTH RECEIVING MODERN ARMS AND RADIOS RAPIDLY. 
SELF-DEFENSE FORCES: 815,000 MEMBERS, 330,000 TRAINED, 

8 6 I 0 0 0 ARMED . -US/ARVN FORCES ARE OUT IN THE JUNGLES AND TRAILS AFTER THE VC LbCAL FORCE UNITS. -ENEMY ACTIVITY IN NOVEMBER HAS BEEN GENERALLY LIGHTa --RECENT ACTIVITY MAINLY CENTERED IN SOUTHERN I CTZ, WHERE US OPERATIONS SEEKING OUT VC/NVA UNITS WHICH HAVE INITIATED RECENT ATTACKS ON HAMLETS, REFUGEE CAMPS, AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. 
10. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT? 
-THERE IS A VIGOROUS ENEMY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH "LIBERATION" AND . "REVOLUTIONARY" COMMITTEES TO GOVERN THE . RURAL PEOPLE PLUS AN URBAN "ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC PEACE FORCES." 
-1 HOWEVER, THE PACIFICATION EFFORT SHOW~: 
--POPULATION CONTROL GAIN OF 3% IN OCT 68, (DOUBLE PREVIOUS RATE IN '~8), WITH 69.8% GVN CONTROLLED, 14.9% CONTESTED, 15.3% VC CONTROLLED. 
--CHIEU HOI RATE SHOWED SHARP INCREASE IN SEP 68 (2,381 vs 1,130 AVERAGE DURING FIRST NINE MONTHS OF '68). 14,000 FOR YEAR. 
--VC INFRASTRUCTURE. SEP 68 BEST MONTH IN 1968 ~EXCEPT TET & MAY PEAKS). ll,000 ELIMINATED THIS YEAR. 
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-ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN BEGAN 1 NOV 68, AIMS TO BRING 1000 CONTESTED HAMLETS UNDER GVN CONTROL BY TET 1969. 
--, SECURITY ~ORCES NOW IN 700 OF THE 1000 HAMLETS. 
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11. 	WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM? -ENEMY HAS MADE A DECISION TO SHIFT MAJOR EMPHASIS FROM MILITA.RY TO POLITICAL OBJECTIVES TO ATTAIN HIS GOAL OF DOMINATING SOUTH VIETNAM. --A COMBINATION OF POLITICAL,PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS IS ENVISIONED. 
-HE SEES OUR STRATEGY (CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) AS: CLEAR AND HOLD. REPLACE US UNITS WITH STRONG RVNAF. ATTACK OF VC INFRASTRUCTURE. 
_, -HE HAS SET FORTH THREE MEANS TO COUNTER OUR STRATEGY: DESTROY OUR OUTPOSTS AND UNITS. DESTROY WAR FACILITIES TO WEAKEN RVNAF. MAINTAIN AND EXPAND HIS CONTROL OVER POPULATION. -THE ENEMY IS INTENSIFYING ACTIVITY, BUT MINIMIZING CASUALTIES. --HITTING OUR OUTPOSTS, WHICH IMPEDE HIS RURAL OPERATIONS. -HOWEVER; PRINCIPAL TARGETS HAVE BEEN: 
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VILLAGES AND HAMLETS. 
PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CAPITALS. 
WEIGHT OF EFFORT SINCE 1 NOV AIMED AT POPULATION CONTROL; GP~AT MAJORITY OF TARGETS ARE CONTESTED HAMLETS (OF 35 ATTACKED, ALL WERE CATEGORY B, C, ORD). 
--MANY OF THOSE ATTACKED ARE TARGETS OF OUR VC INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATIONS. 
--69% OF ATTACKS ON HAMLETS THIS MONTH BY THE VC LOCAL FORCE UNITSu 
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-SUMMARY: 
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--THE ENEMY PERCEIVES OUR PACIFICATION OBJECTIVES. 
--HE MAY WISH TO INDICATE AN NVA WITHDRAWAL AND SHIFT OF RESPONSIBILITY TO VC FOR MILITARY/POLITICAL. OPERATIONS IN SVN. 
--WE CAN EXPECT THE ENEMY TO FIGHT US HARD TO DENY THE GVN CONTROL OF THE POPULATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 
--CONSEQUENTLY, SUCCESSES IN THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, WHICH IS CRUCIAL TO THE FUTURE OF THE GVN, WILL BE HARD-WON :N THE COMING MONTHS. 
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SENSITIVE