



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Noway 140
28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 994

PAGE 01 OSLO 06169 221429Z

45
ACTION EUR 20

INFO SS 25, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, USIA 12, IO 13, NIC 01, ACDA 16, SAH 02, RSR 01,
/123 W

P 221145Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1900
INFO USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 89
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OSLO 6169

SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

REF: OSLO 6156

1. BEFORE TAKING OFF FOR HELSINKI AMB KENNAN ASKED ME TO PASS ALONG FOLLOWING SUGGESTION WHICH HE THOUGHT COULD BE OF USE AT UN AND ELSEWHERE. HE SAID THAT AFTER EXAMINING PRESS REPORTS AND FOLLOWING SITUATION IT APPEARED THAT AMONG SOVIET PARTNERS ONLY FORMAL STATEMENT RE CZECH APPEAL FOR MILITARY HELP HAD COME FROM EAST GERMANS. THIS GAP PLUS SUDDENNESS OF TROOP MOVEMENTS STRONGLY SUGGESTS MINIMAL OR NO CONSULTATION (PERHAPS SOME THIN INTER-PARTY DISCUSSION) AMONG USSR AND ITS ALLIES PRIOR TO MOVING TROOPS. IF THIS HYPOTHESIS IS TENABLE AMB KENNAN BELIEVES IT CAN BE EXPLOITED AS WEAK POINT AMONG SOVIET AND PARTNERS AND PARTICULARLY IN UN, WHERE WE CAN BADGER AND EMBARRASS HUNGARIANS VIS A VIS SOVIETS AND OTHERS WITH QUESTIONS AS TO WHO ASKED THEM TO ACT, WHO REQUESTED THEIR HELP, WHEN WERE THEY CONSULTED BY ALLIES, ETC.

2. AMB KENNAN ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY STRENGTH OF CEAUSESCU CONDEMNATION OF ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE BELIEVES RUMANIAN ROLE WILL BE CRUCIAL AS CRISIS UNFOLDS AND SHOULD BE CLOSELY WATCHED.

3. AMB KENNAN HAS ALSO MADE MOST HELPFUL STATEMENT TO PRESS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By sj/cbm NARA, Date 4-18-06



Department of State

TELEGRAM

21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 OSLO 06169 221429Z

HERE RE CRISIS WHICH REPORTED SEPTEL. THIS PLUS HIS CONVER-
SATION YESTERDAY WITH UNDERSECRETARY JACOBSEN (OSLO 6163)
HAS BEEN REAL PLUS FOR US HERE.

4. DEPT PLEASE PASS ABOVE TO AMB BOHLEN. HELSINKI PASS
AMB KENNAN. GP-1. BOVEY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~