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**Stratification, Religion, and Migration in the Western Highlands of**

**Guatemala:**

**A Demographic and Sociological Analysis of two Indigenous**

**Populations**

**and Perceptions of Social Issues**

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**Stratification, Religion, and Migration in the Western Highlands of Guatemala:**

**A Demographic and Sociological Analysis of two Indigenous Populations**

**and Perceptions of Social Issues**

**by**

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**Dissertation**

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## **Dedication**

For my Missionary Benedictine Order of St. Ottilien,  
and my parents, James J. and Joy B. Kasun  
and Rev. Paschal Thomas, OSB

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**Stratification, Religion, and Migration in the Western Highlands of Guatemala:  
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and Perceptions of Social Issues**

Stanley Louis Kasun, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2015

Supervisor: Nestor Rodríguez

The anthropologist Velásquez Nimatuj undertook her study of the K'iche' of the Western Highlands of Guatemala as both a personal and scientific mission to better understand the interweaving layers of systematic oppression, which include race, class, and gender (2002:35–6). Her work described these layers of oppression from outside the indigenous community as well as within the community. My dissertation complements her work by examining the social position and attitudes of two indigenous K'iche' communities in the Highlands. I examine stratification, religion, and migration in three separate chapters, describing the demographic context of the K'iche' communities and how they fit into the wider local, national, and global context. My case study is unique, in the sense that it controls for race-ethnicity, but the towns have different socio-economic structures. The second part of each chapter examines differences in attitudes toward stratification, politics, the economy, and migration issues, both local and international.

My hypotheses in each chapter states that the influence of the socio-economic organization of the town in which the respondents live will influence their attitudes toward social issues more than their religious denomination, sense of God's presence, or whether the respondent belongs to a migrant household.

Liberation theologians synthesized the lives and struggles of Latin America's poor with both religion and science. Their goal was to give inspiration to the multitudes of Latin Americans who lived in extreme poverty, and to give space in society for changes in socio-economic structures of oppression and exploitation. In my chapters, I focus on how private property has been used to create the social structures now in existence. My research is based on a sample survey of 224 respondents, divided between San Cristóbal and Zunil. This study uses quantitative analysis, but it borrows from qualitative research and comparative historical sociology to establish the social context of the two towns and the social position of the respondents. The dissertation reviews relevant social research on stratification, religion, and migration, which provides the sociological context for each chapter.

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## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

### **1.1 Statement of Research Problem**

The anthropologist Velásquez Nimatuj undertook her study of the K'iche' of the Western Highlands of Guatemala as both a personal and scientific mission to better understand the interweaving layers of systematic oppression, which include race, class, and gender (2002:35–6). Her work described these layers of oppression from outside the indigenous community as well as within the community. My dissertation complements her work by examining the social position and attitudes of two indigenous K'iche' communities in the Highlands. I examine stratification, religion, and migration in three separate chapters, describing the demographic context of the K'iche' communities and how they fit into the wider local, national, and global context. My case study is unique, in the sense that it controls for race-ethnicity, but the towns have different socio-economic structures. The second part of each chapter examines differences in attitudes toward stratification, politics, the economy, and migration issues, both local and international.

My hypotheses in each chapter states that the influence of the socio-economic organization of the town in which the respondents live will influence their attitudes toward social issues more than their religious denomination, sense of God's presence, or whether the respondent belongs to a migrant household. My motivation for sociology comes from two personal motivations, namely my appreciation for politics and religion. Having arisen from an early sense of nationalistic pride, yet a desire for humanistic values, the unity of these issues took shape in the 1980s with a seminary professor in sociology. I was lead to appreciate the work of Gustavo Gutierrez (1973, 1984, 1993),

Jon Sobrino (1993; 1985), Enrique Dussel (1976, 2013; 1998), and Leonardo Boff (1984, 1986, 1988, 1997; 1990), among others. All of them are Latin American theologians who engaged the church and the continent with liberation theology. Social science gave me the opportunity to examine the issues of poverty and wealth that liberation theology borrowed from world-system theory (Gutiérrez 1973).

Liberation theologians synthesized the lives and struggles of Latin America's poor with both religion and science. Their goal was to give inspiration to the multitudes of Latin Americans who lived in extreme poverty, and to give space in society for changes in socio-economic structures of oppression and exploitation. From this general analysis, I focus on how private property has been used to create the social structures now in existence. My research is based on a sample survey of 224 respondents, divided between San Cristóbal and Zunil. This study uses quantitative analysis, but it borrows from qualitative research and comparative historical sociology to establish the social context of the two towns and the social position of the respondents. I continue the introduction with a review of relevant social research on stratification, religion, and migration, which provides the sociological context of my chapters, but I attempt not to restate information here, that I provide in each of the chapters. I then describe my field research and methods, ending with my specific hypotheses for each chapter.

## **1.2 Literature Review**

The interest in Guatemala by anthropologists is quite extensive (Adams 1970; Camus 2008; Carmack 1988a; Falla 1994; Hale 2006b; Lovell 2010; Velásquez Nimatuj 2002), as well as by others like historians (Garrard-Burnett 1998; Jonas 1991; Klaiber 1998), activists and reporters (Harbury 1997; Lernoux 1980; Ortiz and Zamora 2010),

economists, geographers, and sociologists (Cárdenas, Ocampo, and Thorp 2000b; Figueroa Ibarra 2011; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014; Rodríguez 1987). My dissertation examines the work of many scholars dedicated to knowing more about Guatemala and how it fits into the regional and global context. These authors, from many continents, include Ricardo Falla (1988, 1994, 2001), Robert Carmack (1973, 1988a, 2001), Beatrice Manz (1988b, 2004), Lina Barrios (1998), Richard Adams (1970), Charles Hale (2006b), Nestor Rodriguez (2010; 2014; 1987), Beatrice Manz (1988b), Bryan Roberts (1968a, 1990), Susanne Jonas (1991; 2014), George Lovell (2010), Sterner Ekern (2010), Timothy Steigenga (2001, 2007), Richard Immerman (1982), Victoria Sanford (2003, 2008), Amy Sherman (1997), Figueroa-Ibarra (2011), etc. I have also examined significant reports. The United Nations produced a twelve volume report detailing the armed conflict in Guatemala from the 1960s to the 1990s (CEH 1999a). Complementing this report was the Catholic Church's report, examining the specific cases of assassination, torture, or massacres (Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala 1998).

### *Review of Stratification Research*

Sakamoto and Kim (2014) give a brief overview of inequality research, beginning with Marx's Capital, which built its theory of inequality and societal change around the concept of the "mode of production" and class conflict. Max Weber examined social stratification through an emphasis on "market situation" and differential "life chances." Many do not regard Durkheim as theorizing about social stratification, yet his emphasis on how a society functions becomes relevant if inequality is shown to create instability (Sakamoto and Kim 2014). Davis and Moore (1945) analyzed the difference between

skilled and unskilled workers, which created a necessary inequality for continued progress. Lenski (1966) argued that inequality increases as societies became more productive. His argument stated that inequality reached its height during the last stage of agrarian development, before industrialization. With the emergence of industrialization, the elites necessarily depended upon skilled workers, technical experts, knowledge-based employees, etc., and the trend in inequality would be reversed (1966:308).

Critical race research has associated inequality with ethnicity-race within the system of capitalism (Feagin 2013; Massey and Denton 1993; Mills 1997; Omi and Winant 2014). This perspective lends support to research in Guatemala in describing the various levels of poverty among the indigenous people (Camus 2008; Hale 2008). There also has been some social science research on Guatemalans in the U.S., including how they have assimilated in the U.S. (Burns 1993; Hagan 2004, 2008; Menjivar 2006; Rodriguez 1987). There also has been some research on political and economic attitudes of indigenous Guatemalans in Guatemala focusing on political affiliation and related questions (Steigenga 2001).

The framework of many social scientists, who worked in Guatemala, was informed by world-systems theory (Wallerstein 1974). It provided an understanding of social inequality (Camus 2008; Figueroa Ibarra 2011; Manz 2004; Velásquez Nimatuj 2002). Velásquez Nimatuj orients her work through world-systems theory and through subaltern or sub-culture theories based on Antonio Gramsci (2002, 2008). Moreover, both social scientists and liberation theologians have benefited from the early work of researchers on the theories of colonization and the influence of colonialism on culture and social conditions (Amin 1974; González Casanova 1965; Stavenhagen 1968). Other

researchers support some form of integration into the current global system as a way to achieve social mobility (Sherman 1997; Steigenga 2007; Stoll 2013). Integration into global capitalism is supported by some economic researchers, including business and government leaders, along the lines of neo-liberalism or the Washington-Consensus (Coatsworth 2005; Prud'homme 1995).

### *Review of Religious Research*

Sociologists of religion in the U.S. and Latin America have had varied interests in the demography of religion and attitudes of religious members, often combining the two. At the turn of the century, researchers wrote about the benefits of studying religion, including research that linked better health and well being to religious communities based on social integration and support, psychological support, and coping (Ellison and Levin 1998; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). This developed into other studies linking religion and health, physical and mental (Ellison and Burdette 2012; Ellison and Hummer 2010; Hill et al. 2007). Studies also found evidence showing how more frequent religious attendance and belief in the afterlife mitigated the effects of financial hardship (Bradshaw and Ellison 2010). Other studies found greater psychological distress for those suffering from religious doubts or a troubled relationship with God (Ellison and Lee 2009).

Some research focuses on political and religious attitudes, relating its finding to policies (Ellison, Echevarría, and Smith 2005; Emerson 2000; Porter and Emerson 2013). The “Divided by Faith” narrative of Emerson and Smith (2000) associates racial inequality in America by conservative, individualist theology of Protestant Evangelicals, and researchers find that it still matters today, where “a unique white evangelical cultural toolkit that emphasizes personal accountability and freewill individualism drives



evangelicals' views about racial inequality (Cobb 2014:136).” In another study Guatemalans have been mentioned in passing as belonging to evangelical groups more than other Latinos, but that we know little about their relationship between political and religious beliefs (Ellison et al. 2005). Other studies have shown that variations in the social networks of individuals based on the make-up of the community and the religious denomination may be explained by sub-culture identity theories (Smith 1998) or social structures (Blau 1977).

Latin American scholars provide the theological framework that I use to synthesize with the sociological frameworks. They link religion, politics and economics (Gutiérrez 1973). After this initial book on liberation theology, other religious and philosophy scholars began writing extensively on linking theology with socio-economic structures (Berryman 1984; Boff 1987; Brown 1978; Dussel 1979, 2013; Sobrino 1985). Anthropologists and sociologists also became interested to analyze liberation theology as part of their social science research (Camus 2008; Falla 2001; Smith 1991; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008). Guatemalan scholars like Ricardo Falla (1994) wrote about how particular religious leaders implemented projects that experimented with social relationships modeled after Biblical communities as understood through liberation theology. During the period of the civil war, Catholicism declined and Evangelical Protestantism grew in the Western Highlands (Garrard-Burnett 1998:135–57). Other scholars brought out the relationship between evangelicals and Catholics, with Pentecostalism being associated with the general population and neo-Pentecostalism being associated with the elites, though the Catholic Church continued to have considerable influence among the elites (Freston 2001:263–80). Steigenga (2007)

conducted research among various denominations in Guatemala about religious, socio-economic and political beliefs, finding similarities in beliefs among Pentecostals and charismatic Catholics. There are also stories showing the associations between the inspirations that one receives from religion and the decisions made to choose guerrilla warfare as a means to change political policies (Ortiz and Zamora 2010).

### *Review of Migration Research*

Few Mayan Guatemalans migrated to Mexico or the U.S. prior to 1980 (Aguayo 1998:5, 27). Since then, migration from Guatemala to the U.S. has been documented in a new way, classified into five phases, showing how Guatemalan migration to the U.S. continues to increase with every phase (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014). The theory of cumulative causation may explain how a series of events led the Mayans to migrate to the U.S., as the changing social contexts gave rise to new possibilities (Castles and Miller 2009:29; Manz 1988b). In part, the elites intentionally dispossessed the indigenous people in Guatemala during the 1980s, setting the context for migration (CEH 1999a:159–60; Ortiz and Zamora 2010). There are many other similar reasons for Mayan migration, tracing them to socio-economic strategies to increase productivity across agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Cohen 2000, 2005), violent repression of worker movements and guerrilla warfare (Aguayo 1985:28; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014:65), and the desire of the Mayans for social mobility (Carmack 1988a; Hagan 1994; Orozco 2002a). Many Mayans migrated to the United States, settling in places like Houston (Rodriguez 1987; Rodriguez and Hagan 2000), Florida (Burns 1993), and California (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014; Menjivar 2006).

Relationships between Guatemalans in the U.S. and the Western Highlands continues to be strong, and they are a part of the transnational migration networks established over time (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014; Steigenga 2007). Remittances have become the single important source for increased economic status (Camus 2008; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014; Kay 2008). A master's thesis examining the affects of remittances on Zunil through ethnographic research found that people spent money to improve individual, family and community life, including infrastructure and education, and that the benefits of migration outweighed the risks (Martinez 2006). Attitudes toward migration issues have been investigated in terms of the migrant's experience of migration, which includes their felt need to travel as a means of social mobility or improvement (Hagan 2008; Hagan, Rodriguez, and Castro 2011).

### **1.3 Field Data and Research Methods**

#### *Geography*

Located in the Western Highlands, Totonicapán and Quetzaltenango make up two of twenty-two departments of Guatemala,. The Highlands border Mexico to the west and north, and they are known as the “altiplano.” Guatemala is a constitutional democratic republic, with centralized control from its capital, Guatemala City (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). There are 333 municipalities in Guatemala, with eight in Totonicapán and twenty-four in Quetzaltenango. Each municipality is divided into subsections, including towns and *cantons* (hamlets). According to the 2002 INE (National Statistics Institute) census, the municipality of San Cristóbal has seven towns and six cantons. The towns are: Nueva Candelaria, Pacanac, Patachaj, Xecanchavox, Xesuc, and San Ramon. The cantons are Cienaga, Chirijcaja, Chuicoton, Xetacabaj, Coxliquel, El Molino and

Paxcaquinil. The municipality of Zunil has two towns, seven hamlets, one place, and dispersed population. The towns are La Estancia de la Cruz and Santa Maria de Jesus. The cantons are Chuitinimit, La Calera, Chimucubal, Tzuitinimitz, La Muralla, La Planta and Xolcaja. The place is Balneario Aguas Amargas (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2003). K'iche ethnicity dominates in both Departments, though southern Quetzaltenango is dominated by Mam speaking indigenous.

San Cristóbal is situated 2,330 meters above sea level, while Zunil is slightly lower, 2,076 meters above sea level. The major inter-American highway runs through San Cristóbal, Totonicapán, located near the intersection of “Cuatro Caminos,” where two highways intersect that take people and goods north to Huehuetenango, south to Quetzaltenango, east to Guatemala City, and west to San Marcos. The size of the municipality of San Cristóbal is 36 square kilometers and the size of the municipality of Zunil is 92 square kilometers (Sistema Nacional de Planificación 2010a, 2010b). The Department of Quetzaltenango is about twice the size of Totonicapán, 1,951 versus 1,061 square kilometers (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2003).

Totonicapán is located entirely within the mountainous region, with various rivers forming in the west and flowing north, eventually becoming a part of the large river Rio Chixoy o Negro, then flowing east. Quetzaltenango is mountainous in the northern half, beginning at about the same latitude as Totonicapán. Small rivers in the north flow into “Rio Cuilco,” which forms part of the western and northern border with Huehuetenango and San Marcos. Four large volcanoes demarcate northern from southern Quetzaltenango, where small rivers begin and flow to the south. Some rivers move to the west, making up “Rio Naranjo”, filling out the rest of the western border with San

Marcos going south. Low lying tropical land make up southern Quetzaltenango. Quetzaltenango's eastern border in the north makes up Totonicapán's western border. Sololá is directly to the south of Totonicapán, and east of Quetzaltenango's middle. The famous lake Atitlán is located in Sololá. East of Totonicapán is the department of Quiché.

The Ladino and indigenous population in my study is the portion of Guatemala's population at the lower income and wealth distribution. Guatemala is made up of various ethnicities, with 25 different groups identified on the 2002 census form (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2003). Twenty-two of the ethnicities pertain to Mayan indigenous. Those making up my survey are from the largest ethnic Mayan group, K'iche, which account for 9.1% of the country's Mayan population (Central Intelligence Agency 2014).

#### *Choosing the Research Site*

San Cristóbal Totonicapán has been a research site of Dr. Nestor Rodriguez for the past thirty years, where he developed and maintained informants. In the course of his research, he traveled some 20 miles to Zunil and noted the differences between Zunil and San Cristóbal, noting that it would make for a good sociological comparison, controlling for indigenous populations. In 2010, I accompanied Dr. Rodriguez to Guatemala, and he presented the idea of comparing the two towns for a dissertation project. Dr. Rodriguez explained that the two towns provide a heterogeneous cross sample to compare the kinds of indigenous communities that exist in the Highlands. For example, San Cristóbal's economy is service and handicraft based, while Zunil's economy is agricultural based. Zunil is more isolated in the mountain regions of Quetzaltenango, while San Cristóbal is

on the busy Pan American highway near Guatemala's second largest city. Nearly all the women in Zunil wear the traditional dress, and there are artisan workshops in homes dedicated to making parts or all of the dresses. In contrast, indigenous women in San Cristóbal wear the traditional dress less often, and may reserve it for special occasions. More than 90% of the people in Zunil are affiliated with Catholicism, while in San Cristóbal this affiliation is 75%. Economically, people use the commercial banks located in Zunil, while there are none in San Cristóbal. Four days of the week farmers in Zunil offer their agricultural produce for wholesale, and San Cristóbal has a small farmers market for daily consumption near the city center. Both towns have experienced widespread migration, demonstrated in the constructing of new infrastructure and housing.

#### *Preparations for Survey Research*

In 2011, I made another visit to Guatemala, reconnecting with informants and making new ones. A year later, in 2012, I assisted Dr. Rodriguez and Dr. Roberts on their "Return Migration Project", conducting one-hour interviews of Guatemalan migrants, who had returned after an extended stay in the United States. For the months leading up to my 2012 field research, I constructed the "Western Highlands 2012" survey. Taking advantage of the time in 2012 when I conducted interviews for the Return Migration Project, I conducted survey research for my dissertation. I completed 232 interviews with the assistance of a trained, local team.

I lived in the city of Quetzaltenango, the capital of the department of Quetzaltenango, having a population of about 200,000. San Cristóbal lies to the north of Quetzaltenango and Zunil to the south. In Quetzaltenango, a Benedictine Monastery, St. Joseph, became my base of operations. I lived there and my research assistant, Vicky

Hernandez, lived in the guest house. I recruited her in Mexico to assist me, as I had known her since 1992. She had a career as a clerical administrator in Mexico's public educational institution. Though she volunteered her time and energy for my research, most of her expenses were paid, including airfare, room and board.

Upon arrival in Quetzaltenango, I recruited interviewers. I had three interviewers in San Cristóbal. The key informant, Nazario Monzón, helped me recruit them. They were three indigenous women, who were related to him or worked for him at his law office in San Cristóbal. I had one interviewer for Zunil, who lived in Quetzaltenango. He was recommended by a monk at the monastery where I stayed. He worked extensively in the past with NGOs in the rural areas, which gave him unique qualifications to conduct the surveys.

After recruiting them, I trained them in the method of conducting an interview in a one-day workshop. The workshop included developing their personal style to administer the survey in a friendly, non-judgmental manner. Because the survey measured both demographic characteristics and perceptions, I focused on each person's tone and delivery, so as not to prejudice an answer one way or the other. I gave a thorough explanation of the University's IRB rules and consent form. The training involved the interviewer being administered the survey, as a means to give them an example about how to do it. During the training sessions, some of the questions needed adjustments, like the word "indigenous ethnicity" rather than "Mayan ethnicity" as people identified more with the term "indigenous ethnicity." Subsequently, the team and I met every day for about the first three days, after which we met once or twice a week, discussing issues and evaluating how things were going. They shared their experiences,

and we refined our approach. As an incentive, each interviewer was paid forty quetzals (about five dollars) for each interview completed. In San Cristóbal, the interviewer offered a food gift (juice, porridge, etc.) to the interviewee, if it seemed appropriate. We did not offer a gift to the interviewee in Zunil, but the opportunity to participate in research. I collected the interviews at our periodic meetings, and I paid the interviewer for the surveys conducted.

During our training session, we discussed various ways to recruit survey participants. I took into consideration that none of the interviewers had prior experience conducting interviews. However, each one showed exceptional enthusiasm and talent to conduct the interviews. I trained the interviewers to recruit by judgment or convenience sampling. This is a non-random sample based on knowledge of the town. In San Cristóbal, we targeted various sections of the municipality, attempting to get some variability, with equal numbers of men and women and various age groups. We also attempted to locate Ladinos (non-Maya), who offered a contrast with the indigenous. In the beginning, I asked the interviewers to recruit family members and friends who lived in different households, with the goal of building up their confidence to conduct the interviews with a more diverse population. After a few days, the interviewers began asking people associated with their churches, then expanded to unknown people in various sections of the municipality. The interviewers coordinated the geographical areas of the population with each other, obtaining the sample I have for this dissertation.

The interviewer for Zunil worked for several years as an employee of NGOs, principally in rural development projects in Quetzaltenango and nearby Departments. He maintained contacts with directors of the NGOs, and he called them to recruit our first



survey participants. His contacts knew supervisors of factories. The supervisors gave him permission to interview workers. The workers also assisted him in recruitment by introducing friends, other workers and family members. The interviewer also contacted people within the educational system, interviewing local teachers and those associated with the educational institutions. He knew none of the respondents, yet maintained confidence in his work.

### *Survey Design*

Under the direction of Dr. Nestor Rodriguez, I constructed a seventy-four question survey in Spanish. In part, my work with U.S. based surveys, namely the American National Election Survey (American National Election Studies, The 2015) guided me to the kinds of questions that I asked with this survey. The survey collected demographic information, including age, sex, place of birth, marital status, ethnicity, first language spoken, education, work career, household income, remittances, religious affiliation, frequency of church attendance, and whether anyone in the household had migrated. The attitudinal part of the survey asked about opinions regarding education, role of government, economic policies, race-ethnicity, gender roles, conceptions of God, religious doubt, and issues relating to local and international migration. Perceptions were measured on a 1 to 7 Likert scale, with “1” representing strongly disagree, “2” disagree, “3” tendency to disagree, “4” neutral or no opinion, “5” tendency to agree, “6” agree, and “7” “strongly agree.” The interviewer then checked the value indicated by the respondent. As I explain in subsequent chapters, there were some variations of this Likert scale to some questions. To my knowledge, this is the first kind of quantitative survey

combining demographic information and perceptions of social issues to be conducted in the Highlands.

The survey began at the end of July and was completed by the end of August 2012. In total, 232 surveys were completed, 101 in Zunil and 131 in San Cristóbal. Eight observations were deleted because of measurement problems, including duplicate household members and missing information, leaving a total sample of 224 observations. The survey took about 1 to 1.5 hours in San Cristóbal and about 45 minutes in Zunil.

#### **1.4 Research Hypotheses**

Chapter two describes the differences in stratification between the respondents in San Cristóbal and Zunil. Where possible, I compare my survey data with the stratification information available in the 2002 Guatemalan census. I hypothesize that there is a difference in attitudes toward stratification issues between individuals who live in two economically distinct areas. I examine the hypothesis with nine models that include attitudes toward government policies, gender roles, economic policies, and causes of poverty and wealth, controlling for race-ethnicity, which is the same in each locality.

Chapter three describes the differences in religious issues between the respondents in San Cristóbal and Zunil. The 2002 Guatemalan census did not collect information about religion or religious denominations, so I use other sources to make some comparisons. I hypothesize that attitudes toward politics and the economy will be associated between individuals who live in two economically distinct areas rather than their religious denomination or sense of God's presence. I examine the hypothesis with six models that include attitudes toward economic development, U.S. policies toward immigrants, and causes of poverty and wealth.

Chapter four describes the differences between respondents from migrant and non-migrant households in San Cristóbal and Zunil. When possible, I compare my survey data with the migrant data available in the 2002 Guatemalan census. I hypothesize that the attitudes of respondents toward migration issues or policies are associated with the town in which they live, being organized differently by socio-economics and culturally distinct, rather than with whether one belongs to a migrant or non-migrant household. I examine the hypothesis with seven statements about remittances, perceptions of North Americans toward Guatemalans, and perceptions of local migrants.

## **Chapter 2: Inequality and Poverty: The Experience of Indigenous and Ladino Guatemalans**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Martin Luther King summed up the struggle for freedom by the oppressed as follows, “We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed (King 1968).” The demand for liberation from oppression has not been answered in America with its high poverty rates in majority black inner cities, majority immigrant neighborhoods, or on indigenous reservations (Grusky and Szelényi 2007). Similar problems of stratification exist in Latin America (Cárdenas, Ocampo, and Thorp 2000a; Gutiérrez 1973; Lernoux 1984; Thorp 2000). Karl Marx wrote that people’s ideas are shaped by the material conditions in which they live (Marx 1845). Max Weber wrote that a person’s chances at success in life is conditioned by their social position (Weber 1930). This study looks at populations in Guatemala as a case study to understand perspectives of poverty and social mobility. It examines perspectives of individuals in the lower socio-economic classes.

In this chapter, I compare perceptions of social issues related to inequality in San Cristóbal, Totonicapán and Zunil, Quetzaltenango. As mentioned in the introduction, they are populated primarily by K’iche’ Mayans. In San Cristóbal, employment is based on informal wage work, while in Zunil the employment is based on small agricultural enterprises. I hypothesize that there is a difference in attitudes toward stratification issues between individuals who live in two economically distinct areas. I examine the hypothesis with nine models that include attitudes toward government policies, gender

roles, economic policies, and causes of poverty and wealth, controlling for race-ethnicity, which is the same in each locality.

Guatemala is a case study into some aspects of Latin American development. Throughout the region, peasant populations have been transformed into labor forces for capitalist agriculture, primary commodity development, and low-wage, informal factory work (de Janvry 1981). Guatemala's experience is also unique, where the elites have had unusual control of the country's resources, labor, and services industry. The country remains tumultuous compared to other Latin American countries, though less so since the Peace Accords of 1996. In my analysis, I situate the populations of San Cristóbal and Zunil within local, national, and global socio-economic contexts. The two towns offer a unique opportunity to test differences in perceptions of socio-economic development, while controlling for race-ethnicity. By highlighting the current struggle, we may gain a greater understanding of the work for just societies of the indigenous people and other non-indigenous people, in addition to gaining insights into their perceptions that lead to understanding how policies can be developed to overcome oppression.

## **2.2 Literature Review**

### *Private Property as Instrument of Inequality*

Inequality has been a persistent concern for many research scientists studying Latin America and Guatemala (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014; Velásquez Nimatuj 2002; Falla 1994; Jonas 1991). The roots of Guatemala's current social structures may be traced to the arrival of Pedro Alvarado in 1524 CE, under the command of Hernán Cortés, representing the Spanish crown. Alvarado masterminded the subjugation of Tenochtitlán in Mexico, and Cortés entrusted him to subjugate the Mayans, dispossessing

them of their property (Figuerola Ibarra 2011:92; Foster 2000). By 1530 the Mayans were subjugated militarily and the period of Spanish rule lasted until 1821 (Carmack 2001:40–49; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008).

A new constitution abolishing communal ownership of property was promulgated under President Rufino Barrios in 1879, which gave impetus to capitalist agricultural production, expropriating 26,863 pieces of land (each piece about 42 hectars) from the Catholic Church and indigenous communities (Bulmer-Thomas 2000; Figuerola Ibarra 2011:101–104). By 1900, coffee and bananas dominated agricultural exports to the United States and Europe (Cullather 1999:9; Pérez Brignoli 2000). The elites grew as private property became a source of their wealth, and in response workers founded the Communist Party in 1922, just five years after the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (Figuerola Ibarra 2011:105–109). The elites responded by executing members of the Communist Party in the 1930s, which indicated the type of control the elites had within Guatemalan society (Figuerola Ibarra 2011:107, 112–114). Throughout this period, U.S. and European businesses operated in Guatemala, helping establish successful business in primary commodities like bananas and coffee (Cohen 2000; Cullather 1999:9–10).

A liberal democracy took power in 1944 until 1954, gaining power through workers and teachers strikes (Cullather 1999:11). The new President, Juan José Arévalo, aimed to develop greater independence for Guatemala's elites from transnational companies, which required a shift in policy to develop a middle class, alleviate harsh poverty of the indigenous, and provide more education, health care and better working conditions for workers (Figuerola Ibarra 2011:110–114; Immerman 1982:48–57). The

largest landowner in Guatemala, the United Fruit Company, monopolized banana production and through its subsidiary, International Railways of Central America (IRCA), monopolized transport facilities. The company, Electric Bond and Share, controlled the country's electrical network (Jonas 1991:19). The Arbenz administration (1951-1954) began moderate reforms, which expropriated some property to create small farms that helped mostly indigenous families (Jonas 1991:25-7). Guatemalan landed elites and the foreign companies greatly opposed Arbenz. The companies in tandem with the U.S. embassy and Eisenhower administration, planned a coup, which succeeded in 1954 (Cullather 1999:38-40; Figueroa Ibarra 2011; Harbury 1995; Immerman 1982:82-100; Lovell 2010). The new President, Carlos Castillo Armas, gave back to the United Fruit Company 99% of its expropriated land and associated dissent as "communist," gaining greater social control (Figueroa Ibarra 2011:116-7; Immerman 1982:180-2, 187-201; Jonas 1991:28-34).

#### *Global Capital Networks and Violence as an Instrument of Private Property*

By 1968, foreigners, led by the United States, controlled 62% of Guatemala's major manufacturing plants (Jonas 1991:48, 51). From 1950 to 1975, the average indigenous farm decreased from 3.2 acres per person to 2 (Carmack 1988a:15). In the early 1970s, 50% of Guatemala's salaried workforce were a part of the social security system, and 43% of them earned on average 66 cents (.66 quetzals) a day, or 65% received 1.34 quetzals, when the minimum needed to survive was Q 8.16 for urbanites and Q 4.66 for rural people (Figueroa Ibarra 2011:123). Massive strikes began to crisscross Guatemala beginning with teachers in 1973 (Figueroa Ibarra 2011:127). By 1975, the elites responded with Guatemala's largest arms build up in history (see Figure

2.1). Union leaders, teachers, activists, priests, catechists, etc. were assassinated by the Lucas Garcia Administration (1978-82) (Carmack 1988a:53–55, Davis 1988a; Ortiz and Zamora 2010; Velásquez Nimatuj 2002). The U.S.’ Ronald Reagan Administration (1981-89) no longer considered Guatemala a human rights violator, which signaled to the elites to increase their violence as a means to maintain their property relations (Guerrilla Army of the Poor, The 1981). This meant war with Guatemala’s revolutionary groups, which included the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), FAR (Rebel Armed Forces), ORPA (Organization of People in Arms), and the PGT (Guatemalan Labor Party), which desired to socialize property relations (Guerrilla Army of the Poor, The 1981).

**Figure 2.1: Arms Imports for Guatemalan government by year**



President José Efraín Ríos Montt (1982-84), who was praised by the Reagan administration as a defender of human rights, moved from targeted individual assassinations to targeted collective assassinations, known as the “scorched earth” policy (Harbury 1995; Immerman 1982:105–9, 122–6, 2014:124–37; Sanford 2003). The guerrilla army was not defeated strategically, but the military destroyed their social base, advancing their objective to re-organize the Highlands (Jonas 1991:149–50). The




scorched earth policy ended by January of 1986, but the strategy of selective assassinations continued (Díaz López 2008; Ortiz and Zamora 2010:14).


### *Consolidation of Private Property in the 1980s to 2000s*

The destruction of the revolutionary movement in Guatemala set the stage for massive profits and investments for the elites. They consolidated agricultural production and moved many indigenous workers into informal wage work (Portes and Hoffman 2003; Schäfer 1992:131–3). Three graphs show how the workforce changed over time. Figure 2.2 shows an increasing gap between the total Guatemalan workforce and workers who participate in the workforce from 1990 to 2011. Figure 2.3 shows how the majority of workers went from working in agriculture prior to 1990 to about 32% in 2011. More workers are employed in the service industry, following consumer interests of the elites (Cohen 2000).

**Figure 2.2: The gap between those able to work and those actually working**




**Figure 2.3: The rise of service jobs and the fall in agricultural jobs over time**



Additional evidence of elite domination over property and labor is revealed by the reduced role of agriculture in the overall wealth in Guatemala from 1965 to 2012. Figure 2.4 shows the value added to the GDP by four economic sectors, with agriculture going from second place to last from 2000 to the present (the right half of the graph). The indigenous people continue to rely on less lucrative areas of agriculture for subsistence, while the elites moved into the more lucrative areas of agriculture (Fischer and Victor 2014). Similar to other Latin American Countries, Guatemala's elites have continued neo-liberal reforms, increasing and impoverishing the informal workforce (Dougherty 2011; Portes and Hoffman 2003; Roberts 1990). The Gini coefficient, a measure of the extremes of wealth within a country, is high in Guatemala, describing one of the worst inequality gaps in Latin America (World Bank 2011, 2013).

**Figure 2.4: Dollar amount of added value to GDP by economic sector**




### *Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as Instrument for Private Property in Manufacturing*

The research on FDI shows that it is a neo-liberal policy that benefits private property. Higher FDI is associated with privatizing pensions (Reece and Sam 2012), but greater regional integration, economic growth, and political stability (Pereira, Jalles, and Andresen 2012). It is associated with countries who have developed domestic markets with stronger states (Davis 2011). Lower FDI investment is associated with populist governments (Morrissey and Udomkermongkol 2012), dependence on primary exports (Herzer 2012), and underdeveloped countries compared to developed ones (Lankauskienė and Tvaronavičienė 2011). It is associated with capitalist property rights, protected within a stable political system, with particular significance in the services and manufacturing industries (Ali, Fiess, and MacDonald 2010; Willmore 1976).

Most FDI in Guatemala is associated with investments in manufacturing, including limited investment in the garment industry in the Western Highlands (Goldín 2005). Since 1996, both Guatemala's FDI and GDP (Gross Domestic Product) have grown considerably. In 2011 and 2012, FDI has contributed over one billion dollars to

Guatemala's economy, which represents a little more than 3% of its GDP. See Figure 2.5. GDP was 35 billion dollars in 2013.

**Figure 2.5: Yearly foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows for Guatemala**



### *Peace Accords and Property Rights*

The signing of the peace accords on December 29, 1996, required a commitment by its participants to capitalist property rights (CEH 1999a:1:212–27). The elites, in conjunction with the government, had previously agreed to this commitment in 1987 (CEH 1999a:1:213). This contrasted with farmers and workers' demands for some forms of socialist property rights (CEH 1999a:1:218; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:215–21). Since 1996 the Guatemalan government has made the state an instrument to increase the privatization of goods and services (Camus 2008; Copeland 2007:314–23; Figueroa Ibarra 2011; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014; Palma 2011; Schirmer 1999; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008). The shift “involved reducing the economic power of the State by privatizing state enterprises and downsizing public employees, dismantling protective tariff barriers, opening the economy to the world market as well as to foreign capital and, last but not least, a shift to exports to pay for the debt (Kay 2008).”

### **2.3 Case Study: Western Highland Towns of San Cristóbal and Zunil**

San Cristóbal, primarily an informal wage working town, and Zunil, primarily an agricultural town, are my towns to examine the indigenous perspectives of the role of business and race in wealth and poverty. I examine the work of social researchers in the Western Highlands, which will help me interpret the findings that I test between San Cristóbal and Zunil.

People in Guatemala desire social mobility. Anthropologists describe how Mayans enter the coffee or vegetable commodity market, working small plots of land, to achieve something more, “to educate their children, to invest in land or a vehicle, to expand their house (Fischer and Victor 2014:174).” However, they do not see it as a major source of living like the ladino plantation owners. Nevertheless, Guatemalans at home or abroad desire to improve their socio-economic position (Burns 1993; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014).

#### *Adapting to Capitalist Property Rights and the Role of Race-Ethnicity*

The socio-economic structure plays an important role to shape individual and community perceptions of social issues, but also the traditions of the indigenous people. Guatemala’s economy is oriented toward primary commodity export production, which has affected the relationships of indigenous communities to the state and the global economy (Kay 2008; O’Neill and Thomas 2011; Thomas 2014). In recent years, garment factories have opened in the Highlands, where 95% of the product is exported to the U.S. (Goldín 2005). While a majority of Western Highlanders work in agriculture, the area has been targeted for mining and cheap labor in the textile industry (Dougherty 2011; MacNeill 2014). Ethnographic studies of indigenous garment workers, for example,

show the conflict in values their current situation is causing: “Tecpanecos [a Mayan ethnicity] sometimes respond to the competitive market situation in which they find themselves by drawing on moral discourses that help to make sense of the promises of entrepreneurial success, on the one hand, and the difficult realities of postwar social life and economic struggle, on the other (K. Thomas 2012:801).”

The new economic activities have influenced the indigenous sense of communal ownership and redistribution of goods among neighbors, i.e. the *cofradía* system. The communal system is being replaced by a sense of individualism, which is correlated with privatization of communal lands, the opening of agricultural markets to foreign imports, the loss of agricultural jobs, rural dislocation, transnational migration, and informal incorporation into the global economy (Copeland 2007; Thomas 2014).

According to the World Bank, 50% of household income inequality is explained by differences of race-ethnicity, i.e. between *ladinos* and the indigenous people (Ocampo 2009). A casual reading of Guatemalan history makes this statement understandable, since indigenous people have been at the bottom of the socio-economic scale (Arzú 2000; Hale 2006b; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014; Lovell 2010; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008). Linking racism as part of the socio-economic structures of global capitalism has been the interest of many social researchers (Bonilla-Silva 2004; Hale 2002; Omi 2014; Telles and Garcia 2013; Wilson 2012).

Bonilla-Silva (1997) outlined a theory of racism called “racialized social systems.” His research countered prevailing theories of racism that did not account for “racial phenomena.” He contends that as society becomes racialized, “racialization develops a life of its own” (1997). New racism attempts to maintain and perpetuate white

supremacy through “(1) the notion of cultural rather than biological difference, (2) the abstract and decontextualized use of the discourse of liberalism and individualism to rationalize racial inequality, and (3) a celebration of nationalism that at times acquires an ethno national character (Bonilla-Silva 2000:188).” Similarly, Hale (2002) goes into detail about the current racial divisions in Guatemala’s Western Highlands. Hale describes multi-culturalism as an opening for the indigenous people to participate more widely in civil society, though there are limitations. One problem he addresses is neo-liberal emphasis on individual rights in the context of collective demands (Hale 2002). He writes that neoliberalism captures the individualist essence by strengthening ties with non-state entities like NGOs, churches, and voluntary organizations. In a later article, Hale wrote how these organizations limit the spaces of indigenous empowerment within a neo-liberal state nestled within a system of global capitalism (Hale 2004).

Relating back to my hypothesis that attitudes are shaped by the socio-economic context, I examine Bonilla-Silva’s theory of new racism. It is uncertain how deep the neo-liberal mindset of individualism has penetrated San Cristóbal or Zunil, and if there is an observable difference between the indigenous people living in two different socio-economic environments. By examining perceptions of the indigenous people toward themselves, new information may help articulate better policies that are based on how poorer communities construct racial-ethnic attitudes and perceive solutions to alleviate inequality. This helps further the project of “rearticulation” of the indigenous community outlined by social researchers (Hale 2004).

### *The Role of Gender in the Accumulation of Property*

Social scientists describe how women have been subordinated to men in the indigenous community by varying degrees: arranged marriages, the exclusion of women to participate in community decisions, inheritance customs through masculine familial lines, and influences from the wider society (Camus 2008:237–8; Chiappari 2001; Velásquez Nimatuj 2000). Beyond the indigenous communities, gender differences have been affected by Guatemala's social structures. For example, differences exist within the workforce. Guatemala's export industries have seen increases in informal workers among both women and men (Hite and Viterna 2005). Capitalist investment and development hired more women in the textile industry and paid them less. Of 18 Latin American countries, Guatemala has the lowest ratio of pay for women compared to men, at 55% of men's wages on a national average (Hite and Viterna 2005). From 2000 to 2010, more than five-thousand women were killed in Guatemala, which has been named "femicide" (Carey Jr and Torres 2010). Gender violence became culturally accepted in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and afterwards gendered violence became a tool of the state power and the military as patriarch (Carey Jr and Torres 2010).

### *Limits of Education in a Private Property System*

The increase in educational levels is not an indication that it is an assured route to full integration into Guatemalan society, since the overall negative view of the indigenous people in Guatemalan society has created a glass ceiling for all social classes within the indigenous population (Hale 2006a; Velásquez Nimatuj 2002). However, studies linked education with social mobility, and how a group perceives the value of education, may indicate how much they invest in it as a community (Camus 2008;



Kingston et al. 2003). In the developed countries, researchers linked social mobility with education, showing how higher education is associated with better health, more political involvement, greater wealth, etc. (Kingston et al. 2003). The World Bank studied educational levels in Central America, and Guatemala had the slowest rise in mean years of education for the population from 1950 to 2010, lagging behind all countries (Bashir and Luque 2012). They estimated Guatemala's median educational level in 2001 to be 2.0 years and the average to be 3.7 years. In 2009 the average increased to 4.4 years and the median increased to 3.0 years. Educational achievement in Totonicapán has been linked with the success of social programs with CDRO (Cooperación para el Desarrollo del Occidente), which found that communities that worked with CDRO (or other NGOs) had higher educational levels, which changed people's perception of education positively (Ekern 2010:205–10; Ruiz Lagier 2007:166).

*Government Policies: Designed to Support Private Property*

The history of indigenous subjugation dates to the arrival of the Spanish, but the indigenous people have participated in municipal governments to different degrees in time and space, such as in the form of an independent government, integrated government or parallel government (Barrios E. 1998). Since 1986, the push in Guatemala has been to integrate the indigenous self-governing bodies with the Ladino municipalities. This has been less successful in places with stronger indigenous organizations. For example, in Totonicapán the indigenous mayors continue to function, without the support of Guatemalan laws, but the mayors preserve indigenous culture through various cultural activities, administration of forests, etc. (Barrios E. 1998:141–7; Ekern 2010).

Ekern's in-depth ethnographic research in Totonicapán proposed the concept of the "I-Collective" to understand how the indigenous leadership in the municipalities of Totonicapán governed their own communities (Ekern 2010:91, 125). He uses this concept to explain the differences between the 48 cantons of the municipality of Totonicapán, providing a framework to distinguish liberal, moderate, and conservative leaders. Liberal leaders are more open to the capitalist socio-economic structures of Guatemala and the conservatives are less open to them. Moderates are between these positions (Ekern 2010; Velásquez Nimatuj 2002). Analyzing the cantons, (areas outside the main urban municipality), Ekern found that strong leadership helped people move to different political and social positions. For example, he described how some cantons saw the value of taxes, because people had been taught that being connected to the wider state would help them obtain better security, opportunities for well-being, and greater social integration (Ekern 2010:220).

## **2.4 Field Data and Research Methods**

This paragraph summarizes my field data and research methods. I compare survey research between San Cristóbal, a wage-working based town, and Zunil, an agriculturally based town. More details are in chapter one. I constructed a seventy-four question survey in Spanish. In part, my work with U.S. based surveys guided me to the kinds of questions that I asked with this survey. The survey collected demographic information, including age, sex, ethnicity, education, marital status, number of children, and household income. The attitudinal part of the survey asked about opinions regarding economic policies, perceptions about the role of race-ethnicity in wealth and poverty, the role of gender, and the role of government in society. Perceptions were measured on a 1

to 7 Likert scale, with “1” representing strongly disagree, “2” disagree, “3” tendency to disagree, “4” neutral or no opinion, “5” tendency to agree, “6” agree, and “7” “strongly agree.” The interviewer then checked the value indicated by the respondent on the survey. The survey took about 1 to 1.5 hours in San Cristóbal and about 45 minutes in Zunil. I will explain the models in the analysis section below.

The survey began at the end of July and was completed by the end of August 2012. In total, 232 surveys were completed, 101 in Zunil and 131 in San Cristóbal. Eight observations were deleted because of measurement problems, including duplicate household members and missing information, leaving a total sample of 224 observations.

#### *Descriptive Characteristics of San Cristóbal and Zunil*

As mentioned in the introduction, the last census taken in Guatemala was in 2002. It is unfortunate that the data are not more current, but it does provide a comparison to my survey, even though it is not representative. Aware of this limitation, I highlight the characteristics between my survey and the census. From census data, I selected demographic characteristics for the rural and urban areas of the municipalities of San Cristóbal and Zunil, as defined by the census, and totals for each Department (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2003). Table 2.1 describes data from the 2002 census and Table 2.2 describes data from the 2012 Western Highlands Survey. I also compare data from the National Planning Department, which operates in conjunction with the Guatemalan government’s executive branch, with census data (Sistema Nacional de Planificación 2010a, 2010b). They collected local, sample representative data of the populations and presented the results in 2010 reports.

The National Planning Department's 2010 data describes San Cristóbal's total municipal population growing by 6,000 residents since 2002, while Zunil grew by about 1,200 (Sistema Nacional de Planificación 2010a, 2010b). This suggests that more people migrated into San Cristóbal compared to Zunil, though I do not have statistics on migration or fertility.

The ratio of men and women in the census shows more women than men in both San Cristóbal and Zunil. The lowest ratio is in Zunil with 4.3% more women. My sample is skewed to 67% men and 33% women in Zunil, but in San Cristóbal the ratio is 44% men to 56% women. This may be an artifact of my interviewers, as in Zunil I had one male interviewer and in San Cristóbal I had four female interviewers; or it could be the result of more male-outmigration. This may have implications for other demographics like education, since Mayan women often have less education than men, but some interesting patterns emerge with these cautions in mind. I control for gender in my models when I test whether there are differences in attitudes between the two research sites.

In the 2002 census, 60% or more of the population in each category is under 30 years of age. Around 15% of the population was aged 30-44. About 10% of the population was aged 45 to 64 and about 7% or less of the population was 65 or over. The data shows fairly equal distributions across San Cristóbal and Zunil. While my data is not representative and needs to be interpreted with caution, it shows a slightly older population, with 53% below 30 years in Zunil and 45% in San Cristóbal. In both places, about 27% of the population is aged 30-44 and 20% from 45-64. No one in my sample is over 65 in San Cristóbal, but 4% are over 65 in Zunil.

The educational levels in the 2002 census and my survey reveal a striking consistency of increased educational attainment. Looking at the urban data from 2002, 14% have no education in San Cristóbal while 41% have none in Zunil. In the 2012 survey, that drops to 6% and 8% respectively. The numbers for Zunil may be more optimistic because of the skewed sex ratio, as girls have traditionally been kept out of school compared to boys. For example, in the total number of people reporting no education in Zunil in 2002, 64% were women and 36% were men. For both San Cristóbal and Zunil in the 2012 survey, 38% of the men and 62% of the women had no education. Higher education went up dramatically from levels in 2002, from 0.5% to 5.6% to about 18% in 2012. The urban area of San Cristóbal in 2002 compared to 2012 survey shows a 20% increase in secondary education. Zunil had about a 12% increase. The urban area of Zunil in 2002 compared to the 2012 survey shows about 15% increase in primary education. Both towns show increasing educational levels, with San Cristóbal having higher secondary rates and Zunil having higher primary rates overall.

Racial-ethnic diversity has remained constant. In the 2002 census, urban San Cristóbal was 77% K'iche' and urban Zunil was 99%. This population sample is reversed for the rural areas. Rural San Cristóbal is 97% K'iche' and rural Zunil is 76%. The ladino population makes up most of the remaining population, being 22% in urban San Cristóbal and 23% in rural Zunil. My 2012 survey shows similar ratios that mirror the 2002 census of the urban areas, being 75% K'iche' in San Cristóbal and 96% in Zunil.

The reported mother language of the population in urban San Cristóbal is K'iche' at about 12% in the 2002 census, which is similar to the 11% in my 2012 survey. In the

census and survey, 87% of the population reported Spanish as their mother language. For Zunil in 2002, 99% reported K'iche' as their mother language and in 2012 it was 87%. Less than 1% reported Spanish as their mother language in urban Zunil in 2002, and that increased to 12% in 2012. The limitation of this information, however, is in the 2012 unrepresentative population sample. Without other surveys, on the other hand, my survey is instructive as well as useful for further research.

**Table 2.1: Demographic Results for San Cristóbal and Zunil by Urban and Rural Regions from the 2002 Census. Includes Department Totals**

<b>2002 INE Census</b>	<b>San Cristóbal Rural</b>	<b>San Cristóbal Urban</b>	<b>San Cristóbal Total</b>	<b>Zunil Rural<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Zunil Urban</b>	<b>Zunil Total</b>	<b>Depart. of Totonicapán</b>	<b>Dept. of Quetzaltenango</b>
<b>Population (N)</b>	26,375	4,233	30,608	4,556	6,718	11,274	339,254	623,848
<b>Ratios</b>	86.2%	13.8%	100.0%	22.3%	77.7%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Men</b>	12,441 (47.2%)	1,950 (46.1%)	14,391 (47.0%)	2,266 (49.7%)	3,079 (45.7%)	5,345 (47.41%)	159,979 (47.2%)	299,497 (48.0%)
<b>Women</b>	13,934 (52.8%)	2,283 (53.9%)	16,217 (53%)	2,290 (50.3%)	3,639 (54.2%)	5,929 (52.6%)	179,275 (52.8%)	324,351 (52.0%)
<b>Age: under 30</b>	18,470 (70.0%)	2,568 (60.7%)	21,038 (68.73%)	3,240 (71.1%)	4,538 (67.5%)	7,778 (68.99%)	240,444 (70.9%)	426,343 (68.3%)
<b>30-44</b>	3,926 (14.9%)	681 (16.1%)	4,607 (15.05%)	713 (15.6%)	1,181 (17.6%)	1,894 (16.8%)	49,315 (14.5%)	96,505 (15.5%)
<b>45-64</b>	2,788 (10.6%)	682 (16.1%)	3,470 (11.34%)	440 (9.7%)	768 (11.4%)	1,208 (10.7%)	35,024 (10.3%)	71,193 (11.4%)
<b>65+</b>	1,191 (4.5%)	302 (7.1%)	1,493 (4.9%)	163 (3.6%)	231 (3.4%)	394 (3.49%)	14,471 (4.3%)	29,807 (4.8%)
<b>Education: none</b>	8,582 (32.5%)	594 (14.0%)	9,176 (30.0%)	1,278 (28.0%)	2,758 (41.1%)	4,036 (35.8%)	101,611 (30.0%)	125,157 (20.0%)
<b>Primary</b>	10,938 (41.6%)	1,717 (40.6%)	12,700 (41.5%)	1,967 (43.2%)	2,662 (39.6%)	4,629 (41.1%)	140,901 (41.5%)	268,801 (43.1%)
<b>Secondary</b>	1,364 (5.2%)	1,148 (27.1%)	2,512 (8.2%)	331 (7.3%)	280 (4.2%)	611 (5.4%)	21,775 (6.4%)	85,991 (13.8%)
<b>Higher</b>	143 (0.7%)	206 (5.6%)	349 (1.4%)	18 (0.5%)	28 (0.5%)	46 (0.5%)	2,407 (0.9%)	19,801 (4.0%)
<b>Ethnicity: K'iche</b>	25,674 (97.3%)	3,262 (77.1%)	28,936 (94.5%)	3,465 (76.1%)	6,660 (99.1%)	10,125 (89.8%)	322,076 (97.9%)	182,246 (29.2%)
<b>Mam</b>	53 (0.2%)	15 (0.4%)	68 (0.2%)	9 (0.2%)	10 (0.2%)	19 (0.2%)	468 (0.1%)	138,534 (22.2%)

Table 2.1, continued

2002 INE Census	San Cristobal Rural	San Cristobal Urban	San Cristobal Total	Zunil Rural <sup>1</sup>	Zunil Urban	Zunil Total	Depart. of Totonicapán	Depart. of Quetzaltenango
Other Ind	75 (0.3%)	8 (0.2%)	49 (0.2%)	28 (0.6%)	1 (0.01%)	24 (0.2%)	954 (0.3%)	4,973 (0.8%)
Ladino <sup>2</sup>	572 (2.2%)	948 (22.4%)	1,520 (5.0%)	1,054 (23.1%)	47 (0.7%)	1,101 (9.8%)	5,640 (1.7%)	297,560 (47.7%)
Are You Indigenous?	25,775 (97.7%)	3,293 (77.8%)	29,068 (95.0%)	3,508 (77.0%)	6,680 (99.4%)	10,188 (90.4%)	333,481 (98.3%)	337,666 (54.1%)
Mother Language								
Population (N)	24,432	3,994	28,426	4,168	6,411	10,579	311,081	574,442
K'iche	16,415 (67.2%)	495 (12.4%)	16,910 (59.5%)	2,245 (53.9%)	6,357 (99.2%)	8,602 (81.3%)	254,169 (81.7%)	73,677 (12.8%)
Spanish	7,950 (32.5%)	3,475 (87.0%)	11,425 (40.2%)	1,905 (45.7%)	45 (0.7%)	1,950 (18.4%)	55,710 (17.9%)	392,079 (68.25%)
Data Source: Guatemalan 2002 Census, National Statistics Institute (INE)								
<sup>1</sup> Figure includes town of Santa María de Jesus, marked as urban in census.								
<sup>2</sup> 651 people, or 0.1% of population were not Indigenous or Ladino in both Departments.								



**Table 2.2: Demographic Results in San Cristóbal and Zunil with Actual Numbers and Percentages**

August 2012 Survey Western Highlands	San Cristóbal	Zunil		San Cristóbal	Zunil
Population: (Planning Report 2010) Municipality: This Row Only	36,675	12,356			
Men	55 (43.65%)	66 (67.35%)	Monthly HH Income, in Quetzals mean	2,059	2,404
Women	71 (56.35%)	32 (32.65%)	Bottom 1%	250	250
Age: under 30	57 (45.24%)	52 (53.06%)	Bottom 5%	250	250
30-44	35 (27.78%)	27 (27.55%)	Bottom 25%	1,100	1,100
45-64	29 (23.02%)	19 (19.39%)	Median	1,500	2,100
65+	0 (0.0%)	5 (3.97%)	Top 25%	2,300	2,500
Education: none	8 (6.45%)	8 (8.16%)	Top 5%	7,500	7,500
Primary	37 (29.84%)	55 (56.12%)	Top 1%	7,500	12,500
Secondary	56 (45.16%)	17 (17.35%)	Wealth Indicators		
Higher	23 (18.55%)	18 (18.37%)	Own House	65.87%	89.80%
Ethnicity: K'iche	95 (75.40%)	94 (95.92%)	Own Car	26.98%	27.55%
Mam	0	0	Property	10.32%	65.31%
Other Ind	0	0	Plot of Land/Milpa	12.70%	31.63%
Ladino	31 (24.6%)	4 (4.08%)	Registered Business	14.29%	15.31%
Mother Language: K'iche	14 (11.11%)	85 (86.73%)	Other Small Business	0.00%	9.18%
Spanish	110 (87.30%)	12 (12.24%)			
Both	2 (1.59%)	1 (1.02%)			
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012					

### *Income and Wealth Levels*

The right side of Table 2.2 describes income levels and wealth in the 2012 survey. Table 2.3 measures the available wealth variables in the 2002 census, and it describes various characteristics of respondents' homes in the two towns. In the municipality of San Cristóbal, the wage working town, 24% of the walls are made of cinder block, while in Zunil, the agricultural town, it is 79%. Walls are 74% adobe in San Cristóbal and 13% in Zunil. The ceiling and roof material is 67% tile in San Cristóbal, and 79% lamina in Zunil. Interestingly, 52% of the respondents in San Cristóbal reported having a dirt floor, while only 8% in Zunil report having a dirt floor. In San Cristóbal, 51% had a water faucet in the home, and 88% in Zunil. Nearly everyone in both municipalities had electricity and a kitchen. San Cristóbal, however, shows greater stratification in the number of rooms in the home compared to Zunil. Not including the kitchen or bath, there is an average of 2.75 rooms in San Cristóbal and 2.31 in Zunil. The median is 2 for both, but at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile, homes in the top 10% have 5 in San Cristóbal and 4 in Zunil.

In my 2012 survey, stratification appears to be greater in San Cristóbal. The average income in San Cristóbal is 2,059 Quetzals a month and 2,404 in Zunil<sup>1</sup>. The median is 1,500 Quetzals in San Cristóbal and 2,100 Quetzals in Zunil, with the top 5% at 7,500 Quetzals a month in both towns. On all wealth indicators, Zunil is higher than San Cristóbal. It is especially pronounced in three areas: 24% more households own their homes; 55% more households own property; and about 20% more have a plot of land or field in Zunil than San Cristóbal.

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<sup>1</sup> The Quetzal/Dollar exchange rate in 2012 is about .126 dollars per one quetzal or about 7.8 Quetzals per Dollar.

**Table 2.3: Wealth Indicators in the 2002 Guatemalan Census**

Guatemalan 2002 Census	Municipality	
Wealth Indicators	San Cristóbal	Zunil
Wall Material		
Brick	0%	1%
Block	24%	79%
Concrete	0%	1%
Adobe	74%	13%
Wood	0%	1%
Ceiling/Roof Material		
Concrete	8%	18%
Lamina	22%	79%
Asbestos	3%	0%
Tile	67%	3%
Dirt Floor	52%	8%
Water Faucet in House	51%	88%
Bathroom Available	85%	95%
Bathroom in House	81%	86%
Electricity in House	92%	96%
Kitchen in House	97%	96%
Rooms in the House		
Except bath & kitchen, Avg	2.75	2.31
Median	2.00	2.00
90th Percentile	5.00	4.00
Bedroom in the House		
Average	1.94	1.85
Median	2.00	2.00
90th Percentile	3.00	3.00
Data Source: Guatemalan 2002 Census, National Statistics Institute (INE)		

### *Economic Activity*

Table 2.4 is constructed from occupational data that was asked of each of the respondents in the 2012 survey. The 2012 survey asked respondents about their own work and the work of his or her spouse, or other relative in the home. The respondent checked all of the occupations in which he or she engaged. The possible occupations were: day laborer; self-employed, but not in agriculture; self-employed, but within agriculture; self-employed in handicrafts; self-employed by selling agricultural products; self-employed by selling animals; self-employed through commissions or contracts; earnings by remittances; factory work; and other kinds of work. In 102 of 224 cases the “other” box was checked and the actual occupation was recorded. For all cases, I created six occupational categories.

According to the census in 2002, the top three economic activities in San Cristóbal were 38% manufacturing textiles and food, 24% agriculture, and about 17% for wholesale and retail. For Zunil it was agriculture at 62%, wholesale and retail at 16%, and manufacturing textiles and food at 9%. Table 2.5 describes the economic activities in the 2002 census. In the 2012 survey, in San Cristóbal 28% were economically inactive, 26% were self-employed or professional (i.e. teacher or doctor), 21% in blue-collar work and 20% in white-collar work (i.e. clerical). Only 2% were in agriculture. For Zunil, 66% were employed in agriculture, 19% were day laborers, and 11% were self-employed or professional (i.e. teacher). The economic activity in Zunil remains similar in 2002 and 2012. The 2012 survey describes much less agricultural activity in San Cristóbal than 2002, and the rest of the workforce is distributed across various sectors. The largest number of individuals reported that they were economically inactive, which may reflect

the larger sampling of women. The drop in household wage work, 17% from 2002 to 2012, may be an artifact of the survey and not represent the actual economic activity in the San Cristóbal households. For example, anthropological research shows that in San Cristóbal and the Highlands, households have been used as “mini” factories, where workers, mostly women, are contracted for textile piecework (Copeland 2007:231). Both towns have had some influence by one of Guatemala’s largest textile factories about one mile north east of Zunil in the town of Cantel (Nash 1967).

**Table 2.4: Occupational Data Described in Six Categories from San Cristóbal and Zunil**


<b>Occupational Categories</b>	<b>San Cristóbal</b>	<b>Percent Engaged</b>	<b>Zunil</b>	<b>Percent Engaged</b>	<b>Row Total</b>	<b>Row Percent</b>
<b>1. Self-Employed (in Agriculture)</b>	3	2%	65	66%	68	30%
<b>2. Self-Employed / Professional (not in Agriculture)</b>	33	26%	11	11%	44	20%
<b>3. White-Collar (not professional)</b>	25	20%	0	0%	25	11%
<b>4. Blue-Collar (wage or piece work)</b>	27	21%	2	2%	29	13%
<b>5. Economically Inactive, (housewives, students, retired)</b>	35	28%	1	1%	36	16%
<b>6. Day Laborer (only option marked)</b>	3	2%	19	19%	22	10%
<b>Total (N): 224</b>					224	100%
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012						

**Table 2.5: Economic Activity in San Cristóbal and Zunil from the 2002 Guatemalan Census**

Economic Activity	San Cristóbal	Percent Engaged	Zunil	Percent Engaged
<b>Population Total:</b>	9,396		3,660	
<b>Agriculture, Hunting, Forest, Fish</b>	2,514	24.10%	2,260	61.70%
<b>Manufacturing Textiles and Food</b>	3,557	37.90%	329	8.99%
<b>Utilities (Elect, Gas, Water)</b>	39	0.42%	62	1.69%
<b>Construction</b>	463	4.93%	189	5.16%
<b>Whole-Sale and Retail, Restaurants and Hotels</b>	1,550	16.50%	599	16.37%
<b>Transportation, Storage and Communications</b>	190	2.02%	89	2.43%
<b>Financial, insurance, and real estate services</b>	105	1.12%	17	0.46%
<b>Public Administration and Defense</b>	64	0.68%	38	1.04%
<b>Teaching</b>	244	2.60%	18	0.49%
<b>Community, Social, and Personal Services</b>	607	6.46%	38	1.04%
Data Source: Guatemalan 2002 Census, National Statistics Institute (INE)				

Figure 2.6 graphs the five occupations described in Table 2.4 by household income. When looking at the graph, I draw your attention to number 3, where there are no white-collar workers in Zunil.

**Figure 2.6: Occupations compared by Mean Monthly Household Income**



### *Marital Status and Number of Children*

Table 2.6 describes and compares the marital status of respondents and number of children in the 2012 Western Highlands survey and the 2002 census. The 2002 census describes similar quantities of people across all statuses and number of children for both towns. About 25% of the population is single, 60% married, and 10% living in a free union. About 40% of the people have no children and about 35% have four or more children. The 2012 survey for San Cristóbal is similar to the 2002 data, with slight variation in free unions. For Zunil, the 2012 survey reports more single status respondents. A majority of respondents in both surveys report having no children, but there is a huge drop in families reporting to have 4 or more children: 30% for San Cristóbal and 15% for Zunil. Both towns report higher percentages of respondents having 1 or 2 children. For 3 children, it stays at about 10% in Zunil for both periods, but for San Cristóbal it increases 11%. Because my 2012 sample is not representative, the samples are not directly comparable and further research is needed to obtain better demographic statistics.

**Table 2.6: Marital Status and Children in the 2012 Western Highlands Survey and 2002 Guatemalan Census**

2012 Western Highlands Survey	San Cristobal	Zunil	2002 INE Census (=>18)	San Cristobal (Municipality)	Zunil (Municipality)
Marital Status: Single	37 (29%)	42 (43%)	Single	3,814 (25%)	1,382 (24%)
Married	75 (60%)	51 (52%)	Married	8,808 (58%)	3,292 (58%)
Free Union	6 (5%)	3 (3%)	Free Union	1,540 (10%)	675 (12%)
Divorced/Separated	4 (3%)	0 (0%)	Div/Sep	213 (1%)	72 (1%)
Widowed	4 (3%)	2 (2%)	Widowed	889 (6%)	258 (5%)
Number of Children: 0	36 (29%)	44 (45%)	Children: 0	3,066 (40%)	1,485 (40%)
1	24 (19%)	14 (14%)	1	821 (9%)	323 (9%)
2	28 (22%)	13 (13%)	2	922 (10%)	325 (9%)
3	27 (21%)	9 (9%)	3	908 (10%)	369 (10%)
4 or more	11 (9%)	18 (18%)	4 or more	3,529 (39%)	1,251 (33%)
N = 224				N=9,309	N=3,753
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012					
Data Source: Guatemalan 2002 Census, National Statistics Institute (INE)					

### *Models: Examining Attitudes toward Nine Stratification Issues*

In this chapter, I hypothesized that there are differences between attitudes of individuals toward stratification issues in San Cristóbal and Zunil. I examine the hypothesis with nine statements, which I use as dependent variables to form nine models. As summarized in the methods section above and described in detail in chapter one, respondents checked one of seven options from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). I graphed the nine statements below by location. For the variables related to gender, I graphed them by location and gender. This helps with seeing how respondents answered the questions and to contrast the answers with the regression analysis.

Because there are seven levels in the scale, I examined the statements using OLS regression. At the same time, because of the relative few cases that I have, I also examined the data by creating binary variables from the seven statements. I recoded the answers (5), (6), and (7) to “agree” and (1), (2), (3), and (4) to “do not agree.” Because (4) is “neutral,” I present the data using “agree” and “do not agree.” Comparing OLS and




logistic regression results, the significant variables were nearly the same, with similar significances. I chose to present logistic regression, which enables me to explain the results in odds ratios. It is helpful in this analysis to see how big the differences are between San Cristóbal and Zunil. In each of the nine models, I have the same independent variables. Table 2.9 describes the results of the logistic regression analysis.

### *Dependent Variables*

Because of the different levels of responses, at times very high, percentages on the y-axis, i.e. “the percentage of respondents in each category,” is adjusted accordingly for each graph. The right side of the graphs is respondents from San Cristóbal and the left side from Zunil. At the bottom of each graph, the results of a two tailed, t-test is displayed between respondents in San Cristóbal and Zunil.


Model 1 examines the following attitude, “It is important for the government to help create jobs.” Figure 2.7 describes the responses grouped by town.

**Figure 2.7: Attitudes toward importance of Government to create jobs**



The second statement, Model 2, examines the following attitude, “Foreign investment is important to help give people jobs.” Figure 2.8 describes the responses grouped by town.

**Figure 2.8: Attitudes toward job creation through foreign investment**



The third statement, Model 3, examines the attitude of respondents toward individual causes of poverty and wealth in relation to race-ethnicity. The fourth statement, Model 4, examines the attitude of respondents toward structural causes of

poverty and wealth in relation to race-ethnicity. Models 3 and 4 in Table 2.9 are constructed from two statements each on the survey. When I designed the statements, I modeled them after similar statements in surveys asked in the United States like the American National Election Studies (ANES) (2015). While the ANES asked respondents to rate statements about black Americans, I changed the race-ethnicity to the indigenous Mayans.

Additionally, the statements helped sort out the conceptualization of the respondent's view toward individualism, which Bonilla-Silva (2000) described as rationalizing racial inequality, and perceptions of the structural causes of poverty. Two questions focused on individual causes and two focused on structural causes. I used factor analysis to examine the differences. See Table 2.7.


**Table 2.7: Factor Analysis of Four Statements on the Role of Ethnicity in Wealth and Poverty**

<b><i>Factor Analysis:</i></b> <b>Statement</b>	<b>Eigenvalue</b>	<b>Loading</b>	<b>Latent Variable</b>
1A) <i>Many people in Guatemala have worked their way up out of poverty. The Maya should do the same without any special favors.</i> 1B) <i>It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if the Maya would only try harder they could be just as well off as other Guatemalans.</i>	1.30	.8061	Individual causes of wealth and poverty.
2A) <i>Because of the past history, the Maya have it more difficult than other people in Guatemala.</i> 2B) <i>Over the past few years, the Maya have gotten less than they deserve.</i>	1.36	.8255	Socially structured causes of wealth and poverty.
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012			


Factor analysis indicated two factors with the four statements. I used principle component factor analysis. This indicated to me that two different types of conceptions about the causes of wealth and poverty were being measured. Since each factor contained no more than two variables, I decided not to use the results in my regression model. However, in line with data reduction (parsimony) as a goal, I added the two variables that associated with each other and then divided the total by two, getting a unique score for the respondents. The scores were rounded up to the next higher integral, enabling me to replicate the 1-7 Likert scale. These two variables I used in the regression model. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 graph the new latent variables.

I also examined the correlations between the four statements, and between the two statements that made up the present variable. The scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) for the four statements was .43. For the individual causes of poverty and wealth it was .46. For the social causes of poverty and wealth it was .53. A stronger alpha is desirable. I ran an OLS regression with the factored scores, which gave me the same results on the main independent variable, town. However, the OLS results gave me more explanatory power for structured causes of poverty and wealth (about 5.6%), but less (about 1.5%) for individual causes of wealth and poverty. The logistic regression that I used maintains the overall associations that I examine in this chapter, though it must be noted that some variation has been lost. For example, some respondents agreed with statement 1A, but disagreed with 1B, or vice versa.

**Figure 2.9: Attitudes toward individual causes of poverty and wealth**



**Figure 2.10: Attitudes toward structured causes of poverty and wealth**



The fifth statement, Model 5, examines the attitude of respondents toward gender roles in the family. The sixth statement, Model 6, examines the attitude of respondents toward gender roles in the community. The seventh statement, Model 7, examines the attitude of respondents toward gender roles in society. Models 5, 6, and 7 in Table 2.9 are constructed from two statements each on the survey.

To examine the attitudes of the respondents toward gender roles in the family, community, and society, a series of six statements were presented to the respondents, who rated them according to the Likert scale described earlier from strongly disagree (1), to strongly agree (7). To analyze whether the statements picked up these differences, I performed factor analysis. Factor analysis indicated three factors, using principle component factor analysis. The three factors picked up attitudes that I had desired to measure in the family, community, and society. I then ran the procedure for each set of statements. Table 2.8 shows the results of the factor analysis that I ran on each set.

Since each factor contained no more than two variables, I decided not to use the results, i.e. the latent variable, in my regression model. However, in line with data reduction (parsimony) as a goal, I added the two variables that associated with each other and divided the total by two, getting a unique score for each respondent. The scores were rounded up to the next higher integral. The three new variables are graphed in Figures 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13. Higher agreement in Figures 2.11 and 2.13 describe stronger support for gender equity. Lower agreement, i.e. greater disagreement, in Figure 2.12 describes stronger support for gender equity.


I also examined the correlations between the six statements, and between the two statements that made up the present variable. The scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) for the six statements was .44. For gender roles in the family it was .51. For gender roles in the community it was .45. For gender roles in society it was .11. A stronger alpha is desirable, and the last alpha coefficient shows that the variable does not correlate well. I ran an OLS regression with the factored scores for each model, which gave me similar results. See more explanation of the results below. The logistic

regression that I used maintains the overall associations that I examine in this chapter, though it must be noted that some variation has been lost.


**Table 2.8: Factor Analysis of Six Statements on Gender Roles in the Family, Community, and Society**

<b>Factor Analysis:</b> Statement	Eigenvalue	Loading	Latent Variable
1A) Men and women should share the household work. 1B) Raising children is a responsibility of both the woman and the man.	1.34	.8199	Gender roles in the family
2A) It is better for women to stay at home than to work outside the home. 2B) A woman does not need to know how much a man earns.	1.29	.8036	Gender roles in the community
3A) Women should be paid the same as a man for the same kind of work. 3B) This will always be a man's society. Women will never be paid equal to men. (This original statement was <b>Reverse Coded</b> for graphing.)	1.06	.7279	Gender roles in society
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012			


**Figure 2.11: Attitudes Toward Gender Roles in the Family**  
(Agree means support for Gender Equality)



**Figure 2.12: Attitudes Toward Gender Roles in the Community**  
(Disagree means support for Gender Equality)



**Figure 2.13: Attitudes Toward Gender Roles in Society**  
(Agree means support for Gender Equality)




Because of the lower loading factor, low alpha coefficient, and graphing results in Figure 2.13 for the variable on gender roles in society, I examined the responses in greater detail. Graphs of the two original statements describe the differences. Figure 2.14 describes strong support among respondents for equal pay for equal work. Figure 2.15, however, describes heterogeneous support among respondents that society will




always be male dominated and therefore women will always make less for equal work.

This needs to be kept in mind when interpreting Figure 2.13.

**Figure 2.14: Societal Attitudes: Equal pay for women and men**




**Figure 2.15: Societal Attitudes (Reverse Coded):  
Our society will never pay women and men equally**




The eighth statement, Model 8, examines the following attitude, “The government should provide health care for everyone.” Figure 2.16 describes the responses grouped by town.

**Figure 2.16: Attitudes toward universal health care**



The ninth statement, Model 9, examines the following attitude, “The government and other countries should work together in order to help Guatemala develop.” Figure 2.17 describes the responses grouped by town.

**Figure 2.17: Attitudes toward other countries helping Guatemala develop**



### *Independent Variables*

The main independent variable is San Cristóbal (1) and Zunil (0). The control variables are gender, male (1) and female (0); highest level of education, continuous

variable (0) to (22); race-ethnicity, Mayan (1) and Ladino (0); monthly household income, continuous variable that I divided by 1,000 to avoid “0” coefficients in the table; age of respondent, continuous variable; marital status, married (1) and single (0); and number of children, continuous variable. Because of missing values, the total number of observations in each of the models is  $N = 214$ , except for Model 5, explained below. Pseudo  $R^2$  is shown at the bottom of the table.

## 2.5 Results

Table 2.9 describes the results of the logistic regression for the nine variables presented above. The evidence for my hypothesis that socio-economic context affects attitudes toward stratification is mixed. Only two of the nine models support the thesis, Models 4 and 6. In the cell, the top number is the coefficient and the middle number in parenthesis is the standard error. The bottom number is the odds ratio. The first row above the double line describes the direct effects of the main independent variable on the dependent variables. Below the double line are the full models. Overall for each model, the explanatory power is moderate, from a low of 2.9% pseudo  $R^2$  in model 3, to a high of 16.4% in model 5.

In model 1, age is the only significant variable, and it is marginally significant. With every year increase in age, there is an 8.9% greater odds that a respondent agrees that it is important that the government help create jobs. There is wide support in both towns for this attitude, and my hypothesis is not supported.

In model 2, race-ethnicity is marginally significant and the number of children is significant. Mayans are 148% more likely than Ladinos to agree that FDI is important to help people obtain jobs, however it is marginally significant. For each unit increase in

the number of children of a respondent, there is about a 33% decrease in odds that they agree with the statement, and it is significant. Generally, there is wide support among respondents for FDI, and my hypothesis is not supported.

In model 3, there is one variable that is significant, marital status, though marginally significant. Married respondents have about 128% greater odds than single respondents to agree that individual efforts are needed to overcome poverty and increase wealth. As with all marginally significant variables, caution must be exercised that this result is simply by chance and not representative of the sample.

In model 4, there are two significant variables, which are town and race-ethnicity. In the direct effect model, San Cristóbal respondents are about 172% more likely to agree with structured causes of poverty and wealth than Zunil respondents. In the full model this increases to about 331% more likely and it is highly significant. The other significant variable is race-ethnicity, with Mayans supporting this attitude by 264% greater odds than Ladinos. These results support my hypothesis. About 10% of the variation in y is explained.

In model 5, there is one variable that is significant, though marginally, and it is gender. Men are about 86% less likely to agree in equitable gender roles in the family than women. In this model only, the number of observations dropped to 181 because of the race-ethnicity variable. Ladino cannot be estimated because they did not vary on this statement, all marking “agree” on the survey.

In model 6, there is one variable that is highly significant, and it is the place of residence. In the direct effects model, respondents in San Cristóbal are about 70% less likely to agree to gender inequity than respondents from Zunil. In the full model, this

increases to about 75% less likelihood, supporting my hypothesis. About 10% of the variation in y is explained.

In model 7, there are no variables that are significant, and my hypothesis is not supported. As mentioned above, this is my least fit model. Further analysis described some differences. When I ran the OLS regression on the factored scores, there was one marginally significant difference in the gender variable, with women agreeing with equitable gender roles in society more than men. When I ran an OLS regression model with each of the two variables as dependent ones, further results were found. First, with every unit increase of education, there was greater support for equal pay for men and women. In the second variable there were three marginally significant associations. Men are less likely to agree than women with the attitude that women will obtain equal pay for equal work in society with men. Each unit increase in education is positively associated with equity, and so is each unit increase of household income.

In model 8, there are two marginally significant variables. For each unit increase of education, there is a 14% decrease in the likelihood that the respondent agrees that the government ought to provide universal health care. This is reversed for household income, where there is about an 86% increase in the likelihood of support for universal health care for each unit increase in household income. This does not support my hypothesis. Generally, there is wide support for universal health care in both towns.

Finally, in model 9 there is one significant variable, and it is household income. For every unit increase in household income, there are about 58% greater odds that a respondent agrees with the attitude that other countries ought to help Guatemala develop.

Generally, there is high agreement among respondents to this question, and my hypothesis is not supported.

Table 2.9: Examining Differences in Attitudes Between Respondents by Town on Nine Stratification Issues

## Logistic Regression: Attitudes between San Cristóbal and Zunil toward Stratification Issues

<i>Dependent Variables</i>	It is important that the government helps create jobs	Foreign investment: important in order to help people find jobs	Individual Causes: Poverty and Wealth	Structured Causes: Poverty and Wealth	Attitudes Toward Gender Roles in Family	Attitudes Toward Gender Roles in Community	Attitudes Toward Gender Roles in Society	The government ought to provide health insurance for everyone	Other countries ought to work together to develop Guatemala
<i>Binary Variables: Agree (1) Do Not Agree (0)</i>	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>
	coefficient (se) odds ratio	coefficient (se) odds ratio	coefficient (se) odds ratio	coefficient (se) odds ratio	coefficient (se) odds ratio	coefficient (se) odds ratio	coefficient (se) odds ratio	coefficient (se) odds ratio	coefficient (se) odds ratio
San Cristóbal (1) and Zunil (0) (by itself & DV)	-0.592 (-0.960) .553	0.310 (0.904) 1.364	-0.592 (-0.960) .678	0.999*** (3.215) 2.716	-1.038 (-1.276) .354	-1.231*** (-3.511) .292	-0.214 (-0.765) .808	-0.810 (-1.349) .445	-0.140 (-0.336) .869
<i>San Cristóbal (1) and Zunil (0)</i>	-0.761 (-1.042) .467	0.331 (0.770) 1.392	-0.362 (-0.938) .695	1.462*** (3.586) 4.314	-1.494 (-1.556) .225	-1.380** (-3.175) .251	-0.328 (-0.986) .721	0.043 (0.057) 1.044	0.242 (0.487) 1.273
Gender: Male (1) Female (0)	-0.453 (-0.693) .635	-0.112 (-0.278) .894	-0.044 (-0.122) .957	0.509 (1.380) 1.664	-2.020+ (-1.733) .133	0.323 (0.803) 1.382	0.056 (0.177) 1.058	-0.020 (-0.029) .980	0.466 (1.003) 1.593
Level of education continuous (0) to (22)	0.007 (0.085) 1.007	-0.006 (-0.116) .994	-0.018 (-0.435) .982	0.058 (1.321) 1.060	0.054 (0.592) 1.055	-0.066 (-1.371) .936	0.044 (1.191) 1.046	-0.154+ (-1.903) .858	-0.078 (-1.392) .925
Race-Ethnicity: Mayan (1), Ladino (0)	1.071 (1.440) 2.918	0.908+ (1.738) 2.480	-0.204 (-0.399) .815	1.292* (2.556) 3.640	dropped	-0.716 (-1.248) .489	-0.207 (-0.467) .813	0.269 (0.344) 1.309	0.222 (0.371) 1.249
Monthly HH income in Quetzals (÷1,000)	-0.040 (-0.260) .961	0.220 (1.586) 1.246	0.039 (0.417) 1.040	0.008 (0.098) 1.009	-0.016 (-0.076) .983	-0.136 (-1.179) .873	0.074 (0.868) 1.077	0.622+ (1.794) 1.863	0.456* (2.037) 1.578

**Table 2.9, continued**

Age of Respondent in the year of the survey	0.085+ (1.865) 1.089	0.021 (0.933) 1.021	-0.014 (-0.769) .986	0.009 (0.469) 1.009	-0.042 (-1.141) .959	0.007 (0.311) 1.007	-0.000 (-0.019) 1.000	0.024 (0.598) 1.025	-0.003 (-0.139) .997
Marital Status: Married (1) Single (0)	-0.001 (-0.002) .999	0.795 (1.635) 2.215	0.822+ (1.934) 2.275	-0.156 (-0.359) .855	-0.186 (-0.183) .831	0.203 (0.433) 1.226	-0.328 (-0.889) .720	-1.138 (-1.238) .320	0.180 (0.334) 1.198
Children (continuous)	-0.460 (-1.439) .631	-0.401* (-2.306) .669	-0.142 (-0.943) .867	-0.094 (-0.625) .910	0.124 (0.362) 1.132	-0.217 (-1.273) .805	-0.018 (-0.136) .982	-0.215 (-0.713) .807	0.039 (0.187) 1.040
Constant	0.702 (0.438)	-0.217 (-0.227)	1.950* (2.218)	-1.572+ (-1.765)	6.564*** (3.592)	0.493 (0.520)	0.523 (0.687)	3.300* (1.975)	1.222 (1.141)
Number of observations	214	214	214	214	181	214	214	214	214
Pseudo R2	0.075	0.069	0.029	0.097	0.164	0.104	0.029	0.118	0.059

note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012.



## **2.6 Discussion and Conclusion**

People living in the greatest poverty in Latin America are the indigenous population. There is stratification within the indigenous population, however all indigenous people live in a society that is socially constructed that prevents them from joining or integrating with classes above them (Velásquez Nimatuj 2002). Weber associated a person's life chances with their social position, which theoretically does not give the indigenous people very much hope for social mobility or overcoming poverty. Marx theorized that as workers become more numerous, their socio-economic context changes their level of consciousness, which in turn shifts power from the elites to the workers. Part of the process of creating policies that reduce poverty and inequality includes examining these theories. Some researchers advocate working within current structures, finding the right balance between national investment and growth policies that will help people on the margins of the global economy (Salazar-Xirinachs 2008). This includes greater access to finance, higher levels of human capital (i.e. education), property rights stability, identifying investment opportunities, and protecting workers with social benefits (Powell 2013; Salazar-Xirinachs 2008). The revolutionary movements in Guatemala, and elsewhere in Latin America, aimed to change the political structure in order to change how property was owned so that it would be more widely distributed (Guerrilla Army of the Poor, The 1981; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014; Moller 2004).

This research examined whether two towns that are organized differently within Guatemala's socio-economic system, but have similar ethnicity, perceive stratification issues differently. Using convenience sampling from 224 respondents, I found some

support for my hypothesis. Respondents in the wage-working town of San Cristóbal were more likely to agree that there are structural causes to poverty and wealth compared to Zunil respondents. Additionally, respondents in San Cristóbal were more likely to agree with equity in gender roles in the community compared to Zunil respondents. Zunil respondents were more likely to have the attitude that women should stay at home rather than work and they did not need to know how much a man earned. Overall, there were more similarities between the population groups on issues of stratification. Both groups agreed on a number of issues, including the role of government and FDI to create jobs, greater individual effort to overcome the causes of poverty, equity in family and societal gender roles, universal health care, and support for international policies to help Guatemala develop. Examining these results within the wider socio-economic and cultural milieu, there are four general themes for discussion.

First, the current struggle of the indigenous people is limited by their socio-economic and cultural context, particularly control over the wholesale and retail sale of their products or labor. On the one hand, there is more control over this in the agricultural town of Zunil, where there is greater self-employment, home ownership, and farming families that own their land. On the other hand, in San Cristóbal, the people report less home ownership, less agricultural work, but more work in household textiles and the services industry. There are also similarities in low-income status and their K'iche' identity. There differences in attitudes toward job creation are marginal, and there is high agreement in both towns for job creation by the government or private industry. In both towns, people expressed that there is a serious lack of work or opportunities for work. The indigenous have little control over the vast resources in

Guatemala, which the elites overwhelmingly control, but the government is one entity with which they have regular contact. For example, residents have contact with the government through the municipality or educational system. This similarity of experience helps explain the strong support for the role of government in the creation of jobs. While the national government is currently controlled by the elites, if greater attention is paid to ways how to transform the control of labor and the commodities that it produces to workers, the government may be friendlier to job producing policies.

On the lack of difference between the population groups in their overall strong support for universal health care and stronger international ties, this may suggest class based social issues. Neither town has a hospital in it. Health insurance is limited to jobs that the indigenous people and many Ladinos do not have, as most of them are in the informal work force. Few have the resources to pay for regular medical visits, and even less for serious medical emergencies. This is not a concern for the elites or upper classes and it is uncertain whether the upper classes are concerned about this problem among the lower classes. While I did not measure class conflict, it would be in the interests of all Guatemalans to avoid conflict by using the tool of the government to implement policies like national health care. Classes have different financial and cultural interests, and there is the further complexity among the Mayans with traditional health care and influences of Western medicine (Adams and Hawkins 2007).

Second, there is considerable research about the communal values of the indigenous people being challenged by the neo-liberal influences of individualism, yet it is not clear how this may play out in the long term (Ekern 2010:52; Goldín 2005). My survey reported no differences between respondents, who widely agreed that poverty is

caused by the lack of individual efforts of the indigenous people. In the homogeneous, cultural context of the two towns, respondents may be reflecting on the fact that they see a number of unemployed people. Or, it may reflect an observation that they observe a number of individuals who could participate in communal decisions, but do not, and therefore associate their lack of participation with the need for greater individual efforts to overcome poverty.

Additionally, my survey found that people in San Cristóbal were more likely to agree in structural causes to poverty than people in Zunil. This may be explained by the socio-historical context of Zunil's isolation as a community compared to San Cristóbal, whose people have greater exposure to observe how social structures influence wealth and poverty through their work. In one of my conversations with a Jesuit priest from Mexico who has worked in Guatemala for 36 years, and 25 years with the indigenous communities, including San Cristóbal and Zunil, he stated that many Zunil farmers sell their produce to merchants that come to Zunil (Castillo González 2013). While this limits their exposure to other communities, it also preserves their cooperation and sense of community. He believed that this kind of cooperation needed to be preserved in towns like Zunil. He talked about living in a community that "put its resources together" for the benefit of the whole community (Castillo González 2013).

Third, attitudes of respondents, men and women, strongly support modern notions of gender role equity in the family like caring for children and household chores. There are no differences between individuals in San Cristóbal or Zunil and the differences between women and men are marginal. Social researchers described Guatemala's indigenous immigrants in the U.S. to be more favorable towards women issues than

Ladinos or other Central Americans (Menjívar 1999). Stories of guerrilla fighters included new and changing notions of greater equality between genders in the Western Highlands (Ortiz and Zamora 2010). However, this may not explain entirely why respondents answered in this way. It would be useful, for example, in further studies to explore the meaning behind the answers. When men answered that both women and men need to care for their children equally, did they think of their role of “caring for children” in the same way that women thought of their role as “caring for children”?

My survey shows a highly significant difference in perception of gender equity for issues related to the community. Individuals from San Cristóbal are more likely to disagree with inequity for gender roles in the community compared to those in Zunil. This is not surprising, given the more traditional socio-economic organization of Zunil. Agricultural communities like Zunil depend upon the unpaid work of women in the household, where many of the respondents indicated working as subsistence farmers in a corporate community or as day laborers (de Janvry 1981:113). Nevertheless, both communities continue to show differences that suggest that dialogue in the future will benefit men and women. A welcomed suggestion from the anthropologist Velásquez-Nimatuj is that the liberation of K’iche’ women is based, in part, on their ability to construct a feminism that is based on their culture, vision, ethnicity, and social situation (2002:212).

Fourth, the attitudinal statements in my survey were designed to obtain opinions about complex matters, no matter the level of education of the respondent. They are unique to survey research in Guatemala. Each of my main independent variables, for example, is connected to specific social science research, which desired to see how aware

the respondents were of structural injustices and its relationship with neo-liberal ideas about individualism. For example, the theory of new racism by Bonilla-Silva (2000) explained how white supremacy continues to be perpetuated through ideological control of global capitalism. However, it is not clear how deeply the connections are made in the minds of the respondents about the way Bonilla-Silva conceives of racism and the way that my respondents conceive of racism. The indigenous people appear to be aware of the wider forces of racism and inequality, and their general relationship with the outside world, but their social position is so weak that it is hard for them to successfully challenge the national and international elites. Various social scientists have commented on an aspect of this problem, like “indio permitido” (Hale 2004; MacNeill 2014).

Addressing the problems facing the indigenous people and poor Ladinos may get a boost if academics, demographers, religious leaders, politicians, economists, and others continue to work on ways that enable workers to gain greater control over their labor and the commodities that their labor produces. This kind of research applies to Latin America and the wider developing world as much as it does to Guatemala. Each country has its particular difficulties to overcome social problems, and the pain and suffering of Guatemala’s past and present, including the tight control of the elites over the country’s resources, makes Guatemala an especially appealing place to do research and discover creative ideas to build social movements that would have success. The difficulties are numerous, but not insurmountable. Some indigenous communities struggle with individualistic competition against communal cooperation when capitalist investments begin to change the working patterns and thus behavior and thinking of people who work in factories (Goldín 2005). While capitalist development has brought different degrees of

success and poverty in the Highlands, future research could advance our understanding of capitalism such that the communal cooperation, which the indigenous people currently live out, may help them build their own capital to create new cultural and socio-economic structures. It is uncertain, however, if the elites of Guatemala may be persuaded to see this project in terms of a moral exigency that must be done, or perceive it as a threat to their existence that must be opposed.

## **Chapter 3: Religion and Politics: Ideological Influences in the Western Highlands**

### **3.1 Introduction**

Gustavo Gutierrez summed up the struggle for liberation in Latin America, “Only a radical break from the status quo, that is a profound transformation of the private property system, access to power of the exploited class, and a social revolution that ...would allow for the change to a new society, a socialist society – or at least allow that such a society might be possible (1973:26–27)” Latin American countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have adopted policies to mitigate oppression by adopting socialist ideas and practices (Cameron and Hershberg 2010). Guatemala has influences of socialism, especially in its mid-20<sup>th</sup> century with the Arbenz government, and its experiences with guerrilla movements. Karl Marx viewed religion as part of the historical material conditions of society, associating it with class oppression and domination (Marx 1845). Theologians and social scientists, however, have written about religion as a means to liberate the poor from class oppression (Boff 1987; Brown 1978; Dussel 1973). This chapter looks at populations in Guatemala as a case study to understand perspectives related to religion, religious beliefs, and political solutions to socio-economic problems. It examines perspectives of individuals between two towns that are organized to support distinct aspects of Guatemala’s socio-economic system.

Using original research that I introduced in previous chapters, I compare individuals in the wage-working town of San Cristóbal, Totonicapán and the agricultural town of Zunil, Quetzaltenango. I hypothesize that attitudes toward politics and the



economy will be associated between individuals who live in two economically distinct areas rather than their religious denomination or sense of God's presence. I examine the hypothesis with six models that include attitudes toward economic development, U.S. policies toward immigrants, and causes of poverty and wealth.

Guatemala is a case study to examine the wider political and religious struggles that Latin American people face on a daily basis in the lower-economic classes. The Catholic Church is the largest denomination in Guatemala and Latin America, yet its influence has been mixed since its members reside in all classes of society (Lernoux 1989). Today, the greatest percentage of Catholics in Guatemala is among the elites at 62% (Prensa Libre 2011). From the 1960s onward, some religious leaders in Guatemala developed programs inspired by liberation themes, which became associated with liberation theology. By the mid-1970s, Guatemala's elite and U.S. administrations associated guerrilla movements with liberation theology and they aimed to destroy both (Lernoux 1989:89–92). In my analysis, I situate the populations of San Cristóbal and Zunil within local, national, and global ideological contexts, showing how religion and politics work together to maintain and perpetuate current socio-economic structures. By highlighting the ideological context that supports the current system based on private property, we may gain greater understanding about the meaning of what is said, as a means to be more conscious about how ideology is related to policies that do not benefit or empower the indigenous people.

### 3.2 Literature Review

#### *Ideology Associated with Private Property as an Instrument of Subjugation*

In 1493 Pope Alexander VI gave the Spanish King the right to dominate and control the resources and riches of a large part of the Americas, which included the Western Highlands. At the time, this was unbeknown to its inhabitants. In early 1524, Pedro de Alvarado arrived in the Western Highlands and in a few months he conquered the most powerful Mayans, the K'iche', and ruled the region as governor for the next 17 years (Foster 2000:52–8). In the next years, large numbers of the indigenous population in Central America were enslaved and various conquistadores bought and sold them, which was prohibited in 1530 (Foster 2000:74; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:52–3). The Spanish crown enticed the conquistadores as permanent settlers by instituting the “encomienda” system, a grant of land and people (Foster 2000:71–4). One anthropologist described slavery and the encomienda system for what it was: “to exploit them physically, culturally, and emotionally until death (Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:53).” At most, the Church defended the Mayans against the most flagrant abuses of the Spanish colonizers, however both colonizers and Church leaders promulgated beliefs of indigenous inferiority (Jonas 1991:15; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008).

The 1600 and 1700s saw the growth of huge plantations, called “latifundias,” and colonizers and the Catholic Church established firm control of the Highlands by becoming owners of large estates (Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:53–4). After the end to Spanish rule with the Act of Independence on September 15, 1821, the Mayans continued to be conceptualized as less than human (Foster 2000; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:54–5). The conservative elite of Guatemala, including clergy, religious institutes, and Creoles

maintained a close link with the indigenous people, creating a political base against the liberal elites who desired to expand capitalist agriculture, which would have dispossessed large numbers of them from their land (Jonas 1991:17). Keeping the liberals out of power, the dictatorship of Rafael Carrera (1840-1865) gave land titles to some of the indigenous people (Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:55).

Eighteenth century industrialization created new elites with Enlightenment ideology, which influenced Guatemalan liberal elites, who gained power on June 30, 1871 with the presidency of Justo Rufino Barrios (Foster 2000). From 1871 to 1944, the new elites changed Guatemala's social structures. They expropriated the estates of the Catholic Church, gave away government land and property, and took vast amounts of communal lands that Mayans possessed (Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:56). The liberal elite grew powerful by establishing coffee plantations, agro-exporting the coffee, and organizing the dispossessed Mayans as workers in serf-like conditions. The new class was comprised of Germans, creoles, and Ladinos, which comprised about 2,000 families who established control of 90% of the coffee exports in the early 1900s (Aylwin Oyarzún 2002:80). Barrios changed laws that enabled the new class to take root. For example, he issued a "Freedom of Worship" decree in 1873 that abolished Catholicism as a state religion and invited German Lutherans and American Presbyterians to Guatemala (Garrard-Burnett 1998:11). The Catholic Church was considerably weakened, such that by 1912 the whole country had about 119 priests (Klaiber 1998:222). The new elites saw themselves as superior to other classes. During this time, the Church promoted bishops in Guatemala and elsewhere that held similar viewpoints, i.e. classless society was unnatural (Lernoux 1989:19–22).

Barrios also reduced the power of the old order by encouraging industrial development. One of the first textile factories in Guatemala opened four miles northeast of Zunil and eleven miles south of San Cristóbal in the town of Cantel in 1876, which continues to operate today (Garrard-Burnett 1998:60). This transformation of agricultural work into industrial work made possible the success of Protestantism in Cantel, i.e. the Presbyterians built a church community, which was viable by 1919 (Garrard-Burnett 1998:60). The banana plantations economically restructured parts of Guatemala's Caribbean and Pacific coasts, creating a lower wage working class. Pentecostal groups were particularly successful among this group of workers, who were uprooted from their former way of life in agriculture. This also uprooted their "symbolic" religious system, making Pentecostalism a possibility in their new social situation, and it was this group in which Pentecostalism made rapid advances (Schäfer 1992:117–22).

*Religious and Political Ideology in the Maintenance of Class and Private Property*

The governments of Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Árbenz (1944-1954) began to change class relations in Guatemala, with goals to transform Guatemala into a modern capitalist economy (Jonas 1991:26). This included ameliorating the conditions of the Mayans, in part, by dividing unused land on farms larger than 224 acres among 138,000 indigenous families (Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:57). The Mayans developed a sense for the need for liberation, as they no longer saw themselves as an inferior ethnicity (Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:33–89). However, capitalist modernization and land reform were opposed by foreign monopolies, especially the United Fruit Company, and the landed oligarchy (Brockett 2010; Jonas 1991:26). Churches were involved also in the

controversies. In the 1950s under the Árbenz administration, foreign Protestant missionaries opposed “ambitious” government programs, but most of their parishioners were strong supporters of them (Garrard-Burnett 1998:92). The fact of being a Protestant Guatemalan, meant that they deviated from the accepted social norm, and therefore were more open to change than their Catholic counterparts (Garrard-Burnett 1998:93).

The Catholic hierarchy strongly opposed the social reforms during this period. Various leaders and writers associated Catholicism with the protection of private property and the defeat of communism (Garrard-Burnett 1998:88). Moreover, the Catholic Church promoted lay Catholic groups, which associated Protestant Missionaries with communism in an attempt to stem the growth of Protestantism (Garrard-Burnett 1998:88). This also gave ideological support to the elites in Guatemalan society that opposed the changes underway in Guatemala. The Archbishop of Guatemala City, Mariano Rossell y Arellano, worked to overthrow the Árbenz government and he expressed the political interests of powerful ultraconservative Catholic lay factions in Guatemala (Garrard-Burnett 1998:101–2; Steigenga 2001:68–9).

The efforts to modernize capitalism in Guatemala ended with the U.S.-sponsored coup in 1954, bringing Carlos Castillo Armas to power (Cullather 1999). Eyewitnesses described it as a reign of terror that came from the military and state against the indigenous population (Ortiz and Zamora 2010:85). However, the goal of the Castillo Armas administration (1954-1957) and the U.S. government was to find and remove all “communists” and communist supporters (Brockett 2010). Two months following the revolution, union organizers at the United Fruit Company and leaders in indigenous villages were targeted, with the United States embassy providing the lists (Harbury

1995:15). Upwards of 8,000 peasants were killed (Harbury 1995:15). The Catholic Church benefited from supporting the counter-revolution. It was given new property rights, the right to establish new convents, and the right to teach in public schools on a national scale, which was ratified in the 1955 Constitution (Garrard-Burnett 1998:101).

*Shifts in Religious and Political Ideology within and between Classes and Races-Ethnicities*

The goal of the U.S. government after the successful counter-revolution was to build a model democratic state (Brockett 2010). The U.S. and Guatemala governments worked together, with the U.S. desiring that labor leaders focus their efforts on negotiations with management, avoiding larger socio-economic issues (Brockett 2010). U.S. policy worked with labor leaders to build “free democratic trade unions,” yet Guatemala’s elites associated unions of any kind with communism. Castillo-Armas talked about this problem with U.S. government officials, since he understood that the socio-economic elites had trouble with U.S. policies from the beginning and looked back to the days of the Ubico dictatorship (1931-1944) (Brockett 2010). Nevertheless, changes continued in Guatemala. The discovery of more mineral deposits, foreign direct investment, and the resumption of the enlargement of Ladino agricultural land lead more Guatemalans to sell their labor to work the large farms and the growing, but small manufacturing industry (Dougherty 2011; Willmore 1976). In the 1950s and 1960s, Protestant groups, particularly the Pentecostals, grew in the rural areas (Garrard-Burnett 1998; Schäfer 1992). In the 1960s as rural residents migrated to Guatemala City, there was no industrial base to employ them (Roberts 1968a). Heinrich Schäfer (1992) theorized about this growth using the sociology of Bourdieu (1977). As Guatemalans were uprooted from their traditional way of life and orientation toward the world, their

new situations demanded new orientations, including new religious orientations, which Protestantism was able to provide (Schäfer 1992). The Catholic Church was absent among some of the uprooted groups, and Pentecostalism was the preferred denomination among them (Green 1993; Roberts 1968b).

Schäfer's analysis of Protestant growth from the 1960s to the 1980s described Pentecostal and Evangelical Churches having the strongest growth among the lower classes in both urban and rural areas. Some mainline Protestant churches also have adherents in the lower classes. These classes suffered extreme and violent social changes, which these religious denominations helped provide orientation (Schäfer 1992:164–5). Because the Catholic Church began to be influenced by base communities and liberation theology, sectors of the elites and the upper classes with similar interests labeled the Church communist and joined the neo-Pentecostal churches, mostly in the capital (Schäfer 1992:147). There are old and new middle classes in both the urban and rural areas, including the petty bourgeoisie of the indigenous and ladinos. The old middle class made a living with an orientation toward internal markets and the new middle class made a living with increased industrialization and bureaucratization from the 1960s onward (Schäfer 1992:148–9). The old middle classes largely remained conservative Catholics and those that are Protestant in this class come from second or third generations, joining mainline or evangelical Protestants. Those in the new middle classes tend to be charismatic Catholics or neo-Pentecostals (Schäfer 1992:150). Schäfer describes two social forces that affect the indigenous people, one internal, and the other external, relating to the wider Guatemalan society, i.e. in terms of production. Internally, they are oriented toward religious-political social status, and externally toward their

economic social position (Schäfer 1992:153). At the same time, the indigenous people do not have access to the elite classes, but their socio-economic system had extreme changes, i.e. violence of the 1980s, which disrupted their religious-political orientation. Together with strong social forces to adapt to Ladino culture, conditions were created for Protestant growth in the Highlands (Schäfer 1992:153). Indigenous populations that have joined Protestant groups coincide with areas of Guatemala with their integration into capitalist agricultural production that subordinates them directly or indirectly (Schäfer 1992:157). On the one hand, Schäfer associates the group of indigenous people who sell their labor with an inability to invest in indigenous rituals, and because there is a religious-spiritual void, they turn to Protestantism. On the other hand, there are other indigenous groups who have become socially mobile, and Protestantism becomes a way to ratify their new orientation, i.e. away from community religious celebrations (Schäfer 1992:159–60).

Guatemalans, including past supporters of the Árbenz administration and disaffected military officers, formed a guerrilla movement in 1961 to counter the counter-revolution of Castillo Armas (Garrard-Burnett 1998:111; Jonas 1991:67–8). Simultaneously, reformist minded Catholic clergy, and on a smaller scale Protestant clergy, organized migrants and dispossessed peasants into cooperatives and base communities (Camus 2008:106–14; Garrard-Burnett 1998:111–2). Guatemala's ruling classes took notice, and as early as 1967 Maryknoll priests were expelled, accused of collaborating with the guerrillas in Zacapa (Garrard-Burnett 1998:128–9). However, the Catholic Church was split. The Catholic hierarchy solidly supported the defeat of the guerilla insurgency in eastern Guatemala, which the government destroyed in 1967 by



employing a scorched earth policy (Garrard-Burnett 1998:111; Jonas 1991:127). The elite classes legitimized its actions, working with the U.S. military to train and focus the Guatemalan army on the U.S. “doctrine of national security” in order to shape the army’s worldview, which became the pillar of their new ideology as early as 1960 (CEH 1999b; Jonas 1991:69–71). Cooperation between the two militaries of these two countries have continued until today (Hochmüller 2014).

At the same time, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church saw its power and legitimacy coming from the government and elites, desiring good relations with both (Adams 1970:279). In the period after Vatican II (1962-1965), the lay Catholic leadership grew even more. For example, Catholic Action, grew from 27,000 members in 1967 to 132,000 in 1976 (Carmack 1988c:16; Jonas 1991:127–30). Guatemala’s bishops were lead by Guatemala’s City’s Archbishop Casariego, a conservative who prevented liberal voices, which only emerged as a national voice after his death in 1983 (Klaiber 1998:228). Notwithstanding these challenges, the Church grew in personnel, such that by 1991 it had 21 bishops, 218 diocesan priests, 512 religious priests and 1,539 women religious (Klaiber 1998:223).

More than a decade after the counter-revolution, Guatemala’s social structures increased poverty among the Mayans, who earned about \$0.25 a day (Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:58–61). To avoid a revolution in Central American countries like the one in Cuba, the Kennedy Administration instituted its program, Alliance for Progress, to pour billions into poverty stricken areas in Latin America (Jonas 1991:49–50). These funds helped cooperatives in the Highlands, yet promoted anti-communist ideology (Carmack 1988c:49–50). Other U.S. organizations worked similarly like the American Institute for

Free Labor Development (AIFLD) (Lernoux 1989:293). Additionally, religious groups had renewed interest in Guatemala from an ideological point of view, when conservative evangelical groups saw evangelical Christianity as an alternative to communism, promoting the idea that the U.S. was a model for spiritual, social, and political values for Guatemalans (Garrard-Burnett 1998:107–8). Catholics and mainline Protestant Churches lost members while Pentecostal Churches grew, such that by 1970, “60 percent of the entire evangelical population of the country was Pentecostal. By 1980, this figure exceeded 80 percent (Garrard-Burnett 1998:119).”

#### *Consolidation of Capitalism's Gains through Violence and Ideology*

The Latin American Bishops Conference (CELAM) was lead by bishops from 1968 to 1972 in favor of liberation theology, which was later lead by bishops against it (Smith 1991:168; Vallely 2013:41–4). Gutierrez' book on liberation theology, which came out in Spanish in 1971, represented a synthesis between Christianity and communism (Gutiérrez 1973). Many Latin American bishops denounced social sins and encouraged the building-up of base communities (Lernoux 1989:25–6). In Guatemala, foremost among these bishops was Monsignor Juan Gerardi, bishop of the diocese of K'iche and assassinated in 1998 (Martinez C. 1999). Shortly after Gutierrez' publication, the Catholic Church began criticizing liberation theology to such an extent that liberation theologians became defensive and distanced themselves from Marxist interpretations of liberation theology (Smith 1991:230–3). Pope Paul VI (1963-1978) reinforced this separation by rejecting Catholic identification with political ideology, stating that there were no direct ties between political options and the Gospel (Lernoux 1989:24).

Despite the overwhelming force used by Guatemala's elites to defeat the first insurgency, a small band fled to live in the forests of Mexico, making contact in remote areas of K'iche, where they began their first actions in mid-1975 (Lernoux 1989:62; Schäfer 1992:138–9). Guatemalan workers continued to organize. For example, religious leaders formed cooperatives, student leaders learned about poverty and organization, and workers strengthened labor unions (Berryman 1984). There was an apparent political opening when union leaders met with Guatemalan President Laugerud García (1974-1978) in 1976 when workers went on strike at Coca Cola (Berryman 1984:25). This later expanded to involve food processing, textile, transportation, and banking sectors, and urban to rural areas (Berryman 1984:26; Carmack 1988c:17). Guatemala's indigenous community formed and lead their first union, the Comité de Unidad Campesino (CUC) (Committee for Peasant Unity) (Carmack 1988b:20). It made its first public appearance in 1978. They united the indigenous workers with poor ladino farm workers and urban factory workers (Berryman 1984:35; Carmack 1988b:20; Lernoux 1989:62; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008).

The emergence and popularity of these groups were seen as a serious threat by the Guatemalan military and elites (Steigenga 2001:71). The elites prepared for war, as signified by the most massive arms build-up in its history in 1975, under President Laugerud. Moreover, the armed forces increased training with the U.S. military in Panama and the U.S., creating a special military force called *Kaibiles*. They were trained by U.S. Army Rangers to establish psychological operations and militarize vast parts of Guatemala. They established new military bases in the Highlands and the Capital, using Vietnam's experience as a model for Guatemala's military (CEH 1999b:41–63).

While the U.S. had slowed down military aid to Guatemala in 1977 under the Carter Administration, Guatemalan officials initiated contacts in 1974 with U.S. allies, Israel and Taiwan (Díaz López 2008:109; Hunter 1987). From 1975 to 1982, Israel provided various types of military hardware, electronic and surveillance equipment, and built factories for munitions (CEH 1999c:184–7; Jonas 1991:147). Though the Carter administration talked about human rights, they did little for them in Guatemala (Berryman 1984:41). Guatemala's next President, Lucas Garcia (1978-1982) tapped evangelicals to provide an alternative religious orientation, i.e. literal interpretation of the Bible and submission to authority, from the rural areas for political support (Garrard-Burnett 1998:132). He established a wide spy network (Carmack 1988b:149; Garrard-Burnett 1998:132–3). Garcia used this intelligence to intensify the war against all groups that would be sympathetic to the goals of the guerrillas by killing them, including religious leaders, catechists, labor leaders, student leaders, cooperative leaders, etc. (Bermúdez 1986; Berryman 1984; Camus 2008; Manz 1988b; Ortiz and Zamora 2010:66; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008).

With the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency of the U.S. in 1980, his administration began planning strategies for Latin America. Reagan's advisors wrote a policy titled, *A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties*. One of its adopted proposals was to attack liberation theology, as it saw it as an outgrowth of the Catholic Church's criticism of "productive capitalism" (Lernoux 1989:89–90). His election signaled to Guatemala's elites and other Central American elites that the U.S. would support their violent efforts to destroy the guerrilla movement, demonstrated by the tens of thousands killed (Falla 1994; Lernoux 1989:264). A campaign of violence and ideology, known as

“Guns and Beans”, became the centerpiece of how Guatemala’s next President, Rios Montt (1982-1984), definitively turned the balance of war in favor of the military, government, and elites (Carmack 1988b:7; CEH 1999b:45–6).

His counterinsurgency strategy classified the indigenous communities as “green” (watched but left alone), “red” (no distinction between Mayans and guerrillas, authorizing the death of everyone), and “yellow” and “pink” (selective violence as their support of guerrillas was ambiguous) (Carmack 1988b:xv–xvi). Started in 1982, by 1983 it was clear that the army had militarily defeated the guerrillas (Garrard-Burnett 1998:148; Manz 1988b:20–1). The offensive destroyed the guerrilla’s social base in the southern Coast, the Capital, the central Highlands, and Alta Verapaz, with a remnant remaining in the northwest (CEH 1999b:285–7).

Refugees were forced into government created “poles” or model villages. Men were forced to participate in civil patrols (Carmack 1988b:7, 32). They were indoctrinated against unions and cooperatives, instructed to be obedient and submissive, lied to that the guerrillas destroyed their towns, forced into “model” villages to meet the conditions for approval of NGOs and foreign governments, and forbidden to speak Mayan languages, since they associated Mayans with being communists (Harbury 1995:143–5; 189–97). The dominant culture in Guatemala wanted the indigenous people to adopt the Ladino culture, including areas less affected by the civil patrols like Totonicapán (CEH 1999b:45–6; Davis 1988; Smith 1988).

Religious ideology became one of the tools of subjugation, as Rios Montt’s conversion to Neo-Pentecostalism demonstrated (Steigenga 2007). His membership in this group, gained him access to his church’s leader, Jim Durkin of Eureka, California

and his inside connections with the Reagan Whitehouse (Figueroa Ibarra 2011:266; Freston 2001:266–72). Through these connections, Montt was able to harness the ideological messages of the Pentecostals as a means to counter the social messages of liberation theology and the guerrilla organizations (Figueroa Ibarra 2011:267–71). The ideological messages were simple: poverty existed because of the rottenness of humanity, promoted by communism, which was the new Antichrist, and indigenous backwardness (Díaz López 2008:19, 56–7, 143–6; Garrard-Burnett 1998:148). Televangelists like Jimmy Swaggart and Pat Robertson became allies of Guatemala’s government, among others, and “preached a God-is-an-American religion in which any challenge to U.S. hegemony was dismissed as the work of the devil,” and liberation theology needed to be defeated (Lernoux 1989:157–60, 164; Stoll 1988).

This was not the ideological message of the guerrillas, religious leaders, and others that saw the struggle of poverty as a struggle against capitalism and for socialism (Bermúdez 1986; Berryman 1984; Harbury 1997; Ortiz and Zamora 2010). The indigenous groups like the CUC and the guerrilla movement worked together, seeing no other option out of poverty except militarily and they issued their goals in 1982. They agreed, 1) to end of repression, guaranteeing life and peace; 2) to establish networks to resolve poverty, in part by ending the economic and political domination of the elites and their foreign counterparts; 3) to guarantee the equality between indigenous and Ladino people; 4) to establish a new social order with all sectors of society; 5) and to establish working relationships with poor countries to help them develop (CEH 1999b:237–8). By this time, however, the elites were ready for their decisive military offensive, the second scorched earth policy (Carmack 1988b; Falla 1994).

*Religious Leaders Identify with the Elites from 1983 to the Peace Accords*

The government consolidated its ideological message and military control from 1983 to the Peace Accords (1996). During this period the Pentecostals stressed obedience to political authorities and saw change coming through their ability to vote, which did not threaten the elite control of society (Cantón Delgado 1998; Steigenga 2007:270). The Catholic Church hierarchy showed its approval of Guatemala's elites with the March 1983 visit of Pope John Paul II to Guatemala. Before his arrival, he visited Nicaragua and set the tone by publically humiliating Nicaragua's Minister of Culture, Ernesto Cardenal, a Catholic priest that supported the Sandinista revolution (Lernoux 1989:58–61). When John Paul II arrived in Guatemala, he hinted at the excesses of the Montt administration by requesting that two captured guerrillas not be executed, but was ignored (Díaz López 2008:205). Archbishop Casariego (Guatemala City) died on June 15, 1983. This gave the Guatemalan bishops an opportunity to shift their concern to the indigenous people, but they were weak (Klaiber 1998:228–9). Under the guidance of the new Archbishop, Próspero Penados del Barrios, the bishops wrote a letter opposing the civil patrols and encouraging the writing of a new constitution in June of 1984 with their letter titled, *"To Build a Peace"* (Carmack 1988b:31). They lamented the fact that the "entire Guatemalan socioeconomic structure has rested upon the foundation of a subjugated and impoverished Indian people (Davis 1988:3)."

The Catholic Church's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in Rome published a document rejecting liberation theology's association with Marxism (Ratzinger 1984). With this document, John Paul II revealed his support for anti-communist and pro-capitalist governments, and worked to disassociate bishops who

supported liberation theology with leadership positions in the Church (Lernoux 1989:66–7). In 1988 Guatemala’s bishops wrote, “*The Cry for Land*” (Klaiber 1998:228–9). They pointed out that 2.25 percent of the population owned 64.52 percent of the land in 1986, and they demanded agrarian reform. With all of Guatemala’s bishops signing the letter, they unified to pursue democracy and peace, pressuring President Vinicio Cerezo (1986-1991) to earnestly begin the peace process (Klaiber 1998:229–36). The final peace settlement was signed in the National Palace on December 29, 1996, under President Alvaro Arzú (1996-2000). As mentioned in chapter two, property as a private right was a basic principle in the Peace Accords, thereby assuring elite dominance in Guatemalan society (CEH 1999a:212–27). Some of the ruling elite realized that they needed to do something for those living in poverty, and supported local government development programs to meet some of the basic needs of the population. In part, they were motivated to counter social conditions that might revive the revolutionary movement (Jonas 1991:229). Nevertheless, this represented a small part of the Guatemalan elite, who generally opposed all reforms of the social structures (Gleijeses 1999:xxi).

Evangelical pastors in the Highlands advocated “participation in the new community of ‘brothers and sisters’ to work towards the common goal of self-betterment” and to promote a “new ideology [that] emphasizes individualism, competition, personal improvement, and social and economic progress” as positive values (Goldín and Metz 1991:334).

After 1996, having consolidated both the military power and ideological message in Guatemala, the elites permitted the existence of two truth commissions, Proyecto



Interdiocesano para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica<sup>2</sup> (REMHI) and Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico<sup>3</sup> (CEH). The former was sponsored by the Catholic Church (1995-1998) and the latter by the United Nations (1994-1999). REMHI documented individual cases and the CEH documented the dynamics of the armed conflicts, focusing on the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The investigations complemented each other (Díaz López 2008:322–3; Hatcher 2009; Martinez C. 1999:179–81). Some evangelicals viewed the truth commissions with suspicion, preaching forgiveness for war crimes rather than bringing the perpetrators to justice, using the individualism of the “born again” doctrine to preach forgiveness and to leave it up to God to punish those like former President Montt (Philpot-Munson 2009). Others classified the international human rights movement as ideologically leftist, and they labeled the CEH and REMHI reports as ‘communist’ documents (Philpot-Munson 2009).

The two reports wrote that both sides were responsible for the massacres -- with 93% of the assassinations committed by the military, 4% committed by obscure forces, and 3% committed by the guerrillas (CEH 1999d:29–33). The absolute totals that these percentages represent are about 200,000 Guatemalans, killed from the 1960s into the 1990s with most of them tortured (CEH 1999b:15; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008). The reports’ language associating equal responsibility for the massacres, however, obscures the class nature of the civil war and it obscures the struggle that the indigenous people continue to experience today.

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<sup>2</sup> The Inter-Diocesan Project for the Recuperation of Historical Memory

<sup>3</sup> Commission for Historical Clarity

*Case Studies in Work and Religious Ideology in the Highlands of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*

Low unionization and social stability are attractive for capitalist investment, suggesting sources of cheap labor that will last for an indefinite period of time (Goldín 2005). Since the 1980s, there has been increasing interest in assembly production in Guatemala, with about 225 textile factories and 108,000 workers in 2004 (Goldín 2005). About 50% of the industrial capital comes from South Korea. Guatemala exports 95% of the assembled products to the U.S. (Goldín 2005). This work is one of few options, at \$6 a day, for rural people. Goldín's research described three general perceptions toward unionization. First, workers do not see themselves as a proletarian class in large part because they depend upon their families in agricultural production to supplement their basic needs due to low wages. Second, workers are compliant to workplace injustices, either because of the feeling of freedom for having their own wage, or the fear of violent repression if the status quo is challenged. Third, workers blame each other for the lack of better conditions and sympathize with company supervisors, rather than organizing to work as a group for better conditions (Goldín 2005:73–4). Earlier studies among textile workers in other parts of the Highlands describe a shift away from community solidarity toward individual competition (Goldín and Metz 1991:334).

Related studies described the difficulties of political organization among the indigenous people in Sololá, concluding that the framing of social issues through the racial-ethnic lens turned to framing of issues through class, gender, personal interests, and party politics (Smith 2009:29). Another study examined religious orientation among the indigenous Q'eqchi'es (Kekchi) in northern Guatemala, who are mostly peasant

farmers, and how Catholic, Evangelical and traditional religious congregations have similar worldviews (Siebers 1999).

*Theories of Conceptualizing and not Conceptualizing God*

Karl Marx traced the influence of his historical materialism to Ludwig Feuerbach, viewing religion and the idea of God as a product of the human imagination (Marx 1845). Later biographers traced his atheism and his historical material conception of the world to Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* (1989), which described Christianity as a product of humanity (Brazill 1970:146). Durkheim saw religion as one way to provide for a stable and functioning society, avoiding the debate on whether God existed (Durkheim 1915). Weber wrote that religion may become irrelevant as society developed, yet it is associated with the most developed civilizations (Weber 1930). In recent decades, sociologists of religion use the tools of sociology to gain greater understanding of people who believe in God and practice religion, especially since religion continues to be important for people (Wuthnow 2014).

What about understanding how individuals perceive the world, who believe in God? Schäfer borrowed from Bourdieu (1977) to develop a theory of understanding about how people in the predominately Catholic countries of Latin America began to switch in large numbers to Protestantism (Schäfer 1992:115). Taking the idea that human beings develop a world view based on their actual living situation in the wider social structure, he examined the relationship between social practice in its corresponding context, including a symbolic system (i.e. religion) that gave the individual an orientation toward the world (Schäfer 1992:115–6). He then associated the new religious offerings with the new social structures being created in Central America.

Early social research by anthropologists fit this theoretical view. For example, Carmack revealed how the Mayans maintained their cosmogony and concepts of God by understanding the world through a synthesis between various elements of the Mayan and Catholic faith (Carmack 2001:407–12). The historian Garrard-Burnett documented how Evangelicalism continued to succeed in many indigenous areas and over time the Mayans who switched to Evangelicalism shaped it to fit their identity and culture (Garrard-Burnett 1998:162–71). An anthropologist noted that some people negotiated their faith between the old and the new, noting that the grandmother of one informant had a Catholic altar in her house in downtown Quetzaltenango, yet visited the Mayan altars in Zunil and Cantel (Velásquez Nimatuj 2002:154). An anthropological study in Totonicapán linked the advancement of society to education, which was linked to making religion relevant to the present, which re-shaped values of equality to overcome material and ideological divisions (Ekern 2010:135–203, 215).

Non-social scientists discovered ways to link current religious beliefs to the maintenance of those beliefs while advancing socio-economic development in the targeted population. Carmack's social research documented how Spanish Jesuit priests, after many years of work with indigenous communities with little developmental successes, realized that their self and collective awareness centered their social organizations on religion. Reflecting on how to engage the indigenous people, the Jesuits began making greater progress when the chapel became the center of decision making (Carmack 1988c:49). This integrated the secular and religious decisions of the indigenous people, and the priests had success in developing cooperatives in the 1960s and 70s (Carmack 1988c:49–50).

In an interview with Rev. Antonio Suleta in Guatemala City, who has worked extensively with Mayans and Ladinos, he commented about how his experience and education has led him to propose how Guatemalans think of God. He contended that people do not perceive that various groups have different conceptions about God. Rather, they see the same God everywhere. Thus, the Evangelicals, Presbyterians, and Catholics perceive God in a similar way. What matters to the people, according to Suleta, is how God is manifested with the people, i.e. experience of God (Suleta 2013). Thus, my hypothesis states that attitudes toward economic development, U.S. policies toward immigrants, and causes of poverty and wealth will be associated between individuals who live in two economically distinct areas rather than their religious denomination or sense of God's presence.

### **3.3 Field Data and Research Methods**

This paragraph briefly summarizes my field data and research methods that I explained in chapter one. I compare survey research between San Cristóbal, a wage-working based town, and Zunil, an agriculturally based town. In addition to the demographic information in chapter two, my survey collected information about respondents' religion, which the Guatemalan 2002 census did not collect. The attitudinal part of my survey asked opinions regarding economic development, U.S. policies toward immigrants, and causes of poverty and wealth in relation to race-ethnicity. Perceptions were measured on a 1 to 7 Likert scale, with "1" representing strongly disagree, "2" disagree, "3" tendency to disagree, "4" neutral or no opinion, "5" tendency to agree, "6" agree, and "7" "strongly agree." The interviewer then checked the value indicated by the respondent on the survey. I will explain the models in the analysis section below.

### *Religious Characteristics of Guatemala*

Two sources have data on the religious affiliations of Guatemalans. One is “Corporación Latinobarómetro,” a non-profit organization in Santiago de Chile, which conducts almost yearly surveys of various Latin American countries. Since 1995, almost every year Latinobarómetro has conducted 1,000 person to person surveys, randomly sampled, in Guatemala. The survey includes religious questions (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2014). These data show some fluctuation, but the gap between the number of Catholics and Evangelicals is closing. In 1996 there were 54% that identified as Catholic and 25% as Evangelical, while in 2013, 47% identified as Catholic and 40% as Evangelical. In 2013, 9% of the respondents identified with other denominations and 3% as atheists.

The second source was funded by Guatemala’s national newspaper, *Prensa Libre*, which contracted with a marketing and investigative firm, ProDatos, S.A. They conducted a national survey on various social issues from May 15 to 22, 2011, including religion, creating a report (Prensa Libre 2011).<sup>4</sup> Because this is a newspaper source, some caution is needed when interpreting their results. They conducted 1,200 interviews and the survey has a 95% confidence level for representing the national population, with a margin of error of 2.8%. The population was divided into three regions: Metropolitan Guatemala City, Urban Interior (3,000 or more habitants) and Rural (less than 3,000 habitants). Table 3.1 is taken from their survey. It gives a description of the affiliations of the respondents by urban or rural living and socio-economic status. In terms of gender, 48% of the male and female population was Catholic; 36% of the male

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<sup>4</sup> “So here we are the Guatemalans: survey reveals attitudes and individual perceptions of our society 2011.”

population was Evangelical and 42% for women. The breakdown of religion according to Department or municipality is not given.

**Table 3.1: Religious Characteristics of a National Sample of Guatemalans**

<b>Guatemalans</b>	<b>Catholic</b>	<b>Evangelical</b>	<b>Religion is Very Important</b>
<b>Variable:</b>			
Women	48%	42%	87%
Men	48%	36%	80%
Metropolitan Guatemala City	57%	30%	77%
Urban areas 3,000 or more	48%	40%	87%
Rural areas less than 3,000	44%	43%	85%
SEC: High (2% of sample)	62%	24%	67%
SEC: Med (13% of sample)	54%	38%	82%
SEC: Low (85% of sample)	47%	40%	84%
Data Source: Prensa Libre: ProDatos, 2011			

### *Characteristics of the Western Highlands Survey*

Using my 2012 Western Highlands survey, I created two tables that show the differences between Catholics and Evangelicals in San Cristóbal and Zunil by demographic characteristics. Table 3.2 describes various demographic and religious characteristics, and Table 3.3 describes income and wealth characteristics. The sub-samples are small, and the unrepresentative nature of the sample needs to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, this research helps us understand certain characteristics of the population that might otherwise not be accesible.

In San Cristóbal, there are about 10% more women than men belonging to either denomination. In Zunil, my sample of 71 Catholics is 72% men and 28% women and of the 26 Evangelicals, about 10% more are men. In terms of age, in both towns about half the sample is under 30. About 30% of the sample across denominations in both towns is 30-44 years of age. There is greater variation in the 45-64 age groups, with a high of

30% Catholics in San Cristóbal and a low of 8% in Zunil that are Evangelical. There are no respondents in the 65 and older group from Zunil, and there is single digit representation in San Cristóbal. Catholic and Evangelical respondents in San Cristóbal and Zunil are similar in two educational categories: 6 to 8% have no education, and 12 to 23% have higher education. This contrasts with about half the sample in both denominations in San Cristóbal having a secondary education, and about half the sample in both denominations in Zunil having a primary education. In both denominations in San Cristóbal, 30% have a primary education. In Zunil, 15 to 18% of respondents have a secondary education.

In San Cristóbal, 84% of Catholic respondents are Mayans and 16% are Ladino, but in Zunil all the Catholics are Mayans. Evangelical respondents are 71% Mayan in San Cristóbal and 29% Ladino, but 85% Mayan and 15% Ladino in Zunil. More Evangelical than Catholic respondents report being married rather than single with 71% in San Cristóbal and 65% in Zunil. About 59% of Catholic respondents are married in San Cristobal and 51% in Zunil. About 23% of Catholic respondents in San Cristóbal report K'iche as their mother tongue, and 7% of the Evangelicals. Zunil is very different, with 99% of the Catholics learning K'iche rather than Spanish as their first language and 58% of the Evangelicals. Evangelicals report greater intensity of prayer, with 57% praying more than three times a day in San Cristóbal and 50% in Zunil. Catholics report less intensity of prayer, with 68% praying once a day or less in San Cristóbal and 66% in Zunil. Weekly Church attendance is high at more than 60% for Catholic respondents in both towns and 79% for Evangelicals in San Cristóbal. Evangelical respondents in Zunil, however, report the highest attendance at 65% going more than once a week.



Table 3.3 describes slight variation in wealth between Catholic and Evangelical respondents in San Cristóbal and Zunil. In San Cristóbal there is less variation between denominations, with monthly average incomes at 1,500 quetzals for both and the highest and lowest incomes at 7,500 and 250 quetzals respectively. In Zunil, Evangelical respondents report an average of 2,100 quetzals a month and 1,900 for Catholics, a difference of about \$25.

**Table 3.2: Demographic and Religious Characteristics by Religious Denomination**

August 2012 Survey Western Highlands	San Cristóbal		Zunil	
	Catholic	Evangelical	Catholic	Evangelical
<b>Population Sample</b>	44 (34.92%)	82 (65.08%)	71 (73.20%)	26 (26.80%)
<b>Men</b>	45%	43%	72%	54%
<b>Women</b>	55%	57%	28%	46%
<b>Age: under 30</b>	48%	44%	49%	65%
<b>30-44</b>	20%	32%	27%	27%
<b>45-64</b>	30%	19%	24%	8%
<b>65+</b>	2%	5%	0%	0%
<b>Education: none</b>	7%	6%	8%	8%
<b>Primary</b>	30%	30%	56%	54%
<b>Secondary</b>	51%	42%	18%	15%
<b>Higher</b>	12%	22%	17%	23%
<b>Ethnicity: Indigenous</b>	84%	71%	100%	85%
<b>Ladino</b>	16%	29%	0%	15%
<b>Marital Status: Married</b>	59%	71%	51%	65%
<b>Single</b>	41%	29%	49%	35%
<b>Mother Language: K'iche</b>	23%	7%	99%	58%
<b>Spanish</b>	77%	93%	1%	42%
<b>Prayer: &gt; 3x Daily</b>	32%	57%	34%	50%
<b>1x Daily or less</b>	68%	43%	66%	50%
<b>Church Attendance: Every Week</b>	64%	79%	61%	35%
<b>&lt; once a Week</b>	36%	21%	39%	65%
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012				

However, the top 1% of Catholic respondents report 12,500 quetzals per month and it is 7,500 for Evangelicals. Wealth indicators have some variation as well. About 66% of respondents in both denominations in San Cristóbal own a house, but that rises to about 90% for those in Zunil. About 10% of respondents in both denominations in San Cristóbal report owning property and about 14% report owning a plot of land, but they are significantly higher in Zunil. Catholic respondents in Zunil report 75% property ownership and 32% own a plot of land, while that figure drops to 38% and 27% respectively for Evangelicals, but they have similar percentages of home ownership. Interestingly, respondents in San Cristóbal rather than Zunil are higher educated across denominations, but they have lower average incomes and own less property.

**Table 3.3: Wealth Characteristics by Religious Denomination**

August 2012 Survey Western Highlands	San Cristóbal		Zunil	
	Catholic	Evangelical	Catholic	Evangelical
Population Sample	44 (34.92%)	82 (65.08%)	71 (73.20%)	26 (26.80%)
Monthly HH Income, in Quetzals (2012), mean	2,058	2,060	2,378	2,558
Bottom 1%	250	250	250	250
Bottom 5%	425	250	250	250
Bottom 25%	1,100	1,100	1,100	1,100
Median	1,500	1,500	1,900	2,100
Top 25%	2,400	2,300	2,500	3,100
Top 5%	7,500	7,500	7,500	7,500
Top 1%	7,500	7,500	12,500	7,500
Wealth Indicators				
Own House	66%	66%	90%	88%
Own Car	32%	24%	20%	50%
Property	9%	11%	75%	38%
Plot of Land/Milpa	14%	12%	32%	27%
Registered Business	14%	14%	14%	19%
Other Small Business	0%	0%	7%	15%
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012				

*Models: Examining Attitudes toward Politics and the Economy*

In this chapter, I hypothesize that attitudes toward the economy, politics, and poverty will be associated between individuals who live in two areas that are organized differently by socio-economic activity rather than their religious denomination or sense of God's presence. I examine the hypothesis with six statements, which I use as dependent variables to form six models. As summarized in the methods section above and described in detail in chapter one, respondents checked one of seven options from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). I graphed four statements below by location and religious denomination. This helps with seeing how respondents answered the questions and it contrasts the answers with the regression analysis. The two dependent variables that measure causes of poverty and wealth in relation to race-ethnicity were described in chapter two, and so I do not graph them in this chapter.


Because there are seven levels in the scale, I examined the statements using OLS regression. At the same time, because of the relative few cases that I have, I also examined the data by creating binary variables from the seven statements. I recoded the answers (5), (6), and (7) to "agree" and (1), (2), (3), and (4) to "do not agree." Because (4) is "neutral," I present the data using "agree" and "do not agree." Comparing OLS and logistic regression results, the significant variables were nearly the same, with similar significances. I chose to present logistic regression, which enables me to explain the results in odds ratios. It is helpful in this analysis to see how big the differences are between San Cristóbal and Zunil. In each of the six models, I have the same independent variables. Table 3.5 describes the results of the logistic regression analysis.

### Dependent Variables

Because of the different levels of responses, at times very high percentages on the y-axis, i.e. “the percentage of respondents in each category” is adjusted accordingly for each graph. The right side of the graphs is respondents from San Cristóbal and the left side from Zunil.


Model 1 examines the following attitude, “Guatemala needs a better system that is distinct from capitalism, because few people control politics.” Figure 3.1 describes the responses grouped by town and religious denomination.

**Figure 3.1: Attitudes toward the need for a better system other than capitalism**



Model 2 examines the following attitude, “Unions help the development of Guatemala.” Figure 3.2 describes the responses grouped by town and religious denomination.


**Figure 3.2: Attitudes toward whether unions help develop Guatemala**



Model 3 examines the following attitude, “The United States has a right to organize its people and technology to stop anyone from entering their country illegally.”


Figure 3.3 describes the responses grouped by town and religious denomination.

**Figure 3.3: Attitudes toward the U.S.’s right to stop unauthorized entries**



Model 4 examines the following attitude, “The United States should make it easier for Guatemalans to work there.” Figure 3.4 describes the responses grouped by town and religious denomination.

**Figure 3.4: Attitudes toward the U.S. facilitating Guatemalans to work there**



Model 5 examines the following attitude, which is a latent variable, “Individual causes of wealth and poverty.” For this model, I created a binary variable from the latent variable described in chapter two. Please see Figure 2.9 in chapter two.

Model 6 examines the following attitude, which is a latent variable, “Socially structured causes of wealth and poverty.” For this model, I created a binary variable from the latent variable described in chapter two. Please see Figure 2.10 in chapter two.

### *Three Main Independent Variables*

The first main independent variable is a latent variable, called the “omnipresence” of God. It is composed of three variables. I initially had thought that I could explore variations in the respondents’ concepts about God, distinguishing between those conscious of God operating in history as a liberator of the poor and those who did not. I did not find distinctions. Instead, I found strong similarity among the respondents for each statement about God. Factor analysis indicated that the variables went together. Table 3.4 describes the questions and results of the factor analysis. The eigenvalue and loadings were large enough to propose the latent variable, omnipresence of God. I also

examined correlations of the variables, and the internal consistency reliability was moderate at  $\alpha = .68$ .

**Table 3.4: Factor Analysis of Three Statements about Repondents' View of God**

<b>Factor Analysis: Statement</b>	<b>Eigenvalue</b>	<b>Loading</b>	<b>Latent Variable</b>
1) <i>The world is not going to change, but God has given me something to eat every day and I am grateful.</i> 2) <i>God gives me challenges every day, but God changes the hearts of the rich in order that they may be more generous and then everything will be normal.</i> 3) <i>We live in a society that excludes the poor. God is on the side of the poor, and he is going to change society to be equitable.</i>	1.83	1) .72  2) .80  3) .82	Omnipresence of God

The second main independent variable is San Cristóbal (1) and Zunil (0). The third main independent variable is the respondent's religious denomination, Catholic (1) and Evangelical (0). It was determined by asking a series of questions. If the respondent indicated that he or she was Protestant, a further question asked about the specific denomination: Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, Mormon, Pentecostal, Assembly of God, or Other. My four interviewers discussed with me that Evangelicals and Pentecostals are similar expressions of faith in their particular municipalities, and therefore individuals may be identified as either Evangelical or Pentecostal. While some social scientists have made distinctions between these Protestant denominations (Schäfer 1992), other social scientists have made similar observations as my interviewers (Steigenga 2001:10). Possibly, the difference between the observations is the breadth of communities that were studied. The Protestants appear to be more homogenous in my research sites. Eight

respondents did not mark a denomination. Five recorded their parents as being Protestant and appeared to be otherwise active, so they were coded as Evangelicals. A sixth respondent had Catholic parents, who indicated having been part of the same faith tradition, so the respondent was coded as Catholic. Two respondents marked “none” for all the questions on denomination, but answered all the questions on faith practice. These were coded as “Evangelical.”

#### *Demographic Control Variables*

The control variables are gender, male (1) and female (0); highest level of education, continuous variable (0) to (22); race-ethnicity, Mayan (1) and Ladino (0); monthly household income, which is continuous variable that I divided by 1,000 to avoid “0” coefficients in the table; age of respondent, continuous variable; marital status married (1) and single (0), and single status includes widowed and divorced since there are very few in these categories; and children, continuous variable.

#### *Religious Control Variables*

I include two variables to control for religious effects. One question asked, “With what frequency do you attend religious services at your congregation?” There were eight options: 1) never, 2) less than once a year, 3) about once or twice a year, 4) several times a year, 5) about once a month, 6) two-three times a month, 7) nearly every week, and 8) every week. Most respondents coded 8, so I made this variable binary with those attending every week (1) and those less than every week (0).

The second religious control variable measured intensity of prayer life. The question asked, “There are different ways that people practice their religion. Outside of religious services, do you pray, 1) several times a day, 2) once a day, 3) a few times a



week, 4) once a week or less, or 5) never. Since most respondents checked the box that they prayed several times a day, I created a binary variable with those praying several times a day as (1) and those who prayed once a day or less with (0). Because of missing values, the total number of observations in each of the models is  $N = 211$ . Pseudo  $R^2$  is shown at the bottom of Table 3.5.

Table 3.5: Logistic Regression Examining Differences in Attitudes Between Respondents in San Cristóbal and Zunil

<b>Attitudes toward Politics and the Economy Examined by Omnipresence of God, Town, and Religion</b>						
Dependent Variables	Guatemala needs a better system that is distinct from capitalism	Unions help Guatemala Develop	U.S. has a right to organize to stop Unauthorized Entries	U.S. should make it easier for Guatemalans to work there	Individual Causes: Poverty and Wealth (latent)	Structured Causes: Poverty and Wealth (latent)
Binary Variables: Agree (1) Do Not Agree (0)	Model 1 coefficient (se) odds ratio	Model 2 coefficient (se) odds ratio	Model 3 coefficient (se) odds ratio	Model 4 coefficient (se) odds ratio	Model 5 coefficient (se) odds ratio	Model 6 coefficient (se) odds ratio
God's Omnipresence (continuous, latent) <i>(by itself &amp; DV)</i>	-0.132 (-0.745) .875	-0.009 (-0.061) .992	0.068 (0.464) 1.071	0.461*** (2.943) 1.586	0.622*** (3.849) 1.862	0.013 (0.088) 1.013
San Cristóbal (1) and Zunil (0) <i>(by itself &amp; DV)</i>	0.165 (0.509) 1.179	0.312 (1.121) 1.367	1.170*** (3.745) 3.221	-0.008 (-0.022) .992	-0.389 (-1.193) .678	0.999*** (3.215) 2.716
Denomination: Cath (1) Evang (0) <i>(by itself &amp; DV)</i>	0.400 (1.220) .490	0.161 (0.586) 1.175	-0.584* (-2.028) .558	-0.051 (-0.144) .95	-0.071 (-0.223) .931	-0.146 (-0.478) .865
God's Omnipresence (continuous, latent)	0.095 (0.420) 1.100	-0.046 (-0.274) .955	0.210 (1.142) 1.234	0.851** (3.846) 2.341	0.704*** (3.495) 2.023	0.285 (1.417) 1.329
San Cristóbal (1) and Zunil (0)	0.397 (0.823) 1.488	0.609+ (1.659) 1.839	1.116** (2.801) 3.053	0.865+ (1.682) 2.375	-0.398 (-0.918) .671	1.537*** (3.447) 4.653
Denomination: Cath (1) Evang (0)	0.665 (1.463) 1.944	0.686* (1.995) 1.987	-0.260 (-0.722) .771	-0.266 (-0.555) .767	-0.136 (-0.334) .873	-0.113 (-0.284) .893
Gender: Male (1) Female (0)	-0.385 (-0.889) .681	-0.035 (-0.105) .966	0.602+ (1.680) 1.825	0.819+ (1.766) 2.268	0.037 (0.093) 1.038	0.683+ (1.753) 1.980
Last year of education, continuous from (0) to (22)	0.082 (1.479) 1.085	-0.021 (-0.528) .979	0.000 (0.009) 1.000	-0.003 (-0.059) .997	0.054 (1.089) 1.056	0.087+ (1.826) 1.091
Race-Ethnicity: Mayan (1), Ladino (0)	-0.001 (-0.001) .999	-0.237 (-0.520) .789	-0.619 (-1.318) .538	0.741 (1.212) 2.098	-0.031 (-0.055) .969	1.646** (3.022) 5.189
Monthly HH income in Quetzals (÷1,000)	0.585* (2.501) 1.795	0.054 (0.688) 1.055	-0.007 (-0.083) .993	0.450* (2.085) 1.568	-0.019 (-0.191) .981	-0.030 (-0.344) .970

**Table 3.5, continued**

Age of Respondent in the year of the survey	-0.002 (-0.123) .997	-0.004 (-0.218) .996	0.000 (0.011) 1.000	-0.019 (-0.894) .981	-0.008 (-0.415) .992	0.013 (0.623) 1.012
Marital Status: Married (1) Single (0)	-0.404 (-0.795) .668	0.600 (1.498) 1.822	-0.137 (-0.320) .872	-0.868+ (-1.669) .420	0.501 (1.055) 1.650	-0.418 (-0.894) .658
Children (continuous)	0.019 (0.115) 1.019	-0.091 (-0.630) .913	-0.042 (-0.258) .959	0.376+ (1.960) 1.457	-0.008 (-0.051) .992	-0.049 (-0.313) .952
Church Attend: Weekly (1); Less than Weekly (0)	-0.174 (-0.400) .841	-0.483 (-1.449) .617	0.524 (1.418) 1.688	-0.480 (-1.044) .619	0.274 (0.685) 1.316	-0.332 (-0.882) .717
Prayer: More than 3x Daily (1) Daily or less (0)	-0.813* (-2.084) .443	0.550+ (1.697) 1.734	-0.242 (-0.690) .785	0.581 (1.251) 1.788	-0.192 (-0.491) .825	0.561 (1.487) 1.753
Constant	0.245 (0.238)	-0.907 (-1.093)	-1.156 (-1.313)	0.281 (0.264)	1.120 (1.119)	-2.145* (-2.207)
Number of observations	211	211	211	211	211	211
Pseudo R2	0.161	0.045	0.094	0.156	0.104	0.113
note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1						
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012						

### 3.4 Results

The results of the logistic regression are described in Table 3.5, examining the hypothesis that attitudes toward politics and the economy will be associated between individuals who live in two economically distinct areas rather than their religious denomination or sense of God's presence. The evidence is mixed. Two models, 3 and 6, support the hypothesis with high significance and two models, 2 and 4, support the model with marginal significance. Models 1 and 5 do not support my hypothesis. In the first line of the cell are the coefficients and standard errors. The second line, or bottom number, is the odds ratio. The three rows above the double line describe the direct effects of the main independent variables on the dependent variables. Below the double line are the full models. Overall for each model, the explanatory power is moderate, from a low of 4.5% pseudo  $R^2$  in model 2, to a high of 16.1% in model 1.

In model 1, monthly household income and intensity of prayer are the two significant variables. For each unit increase of household income, there is a 79.5% greater odds that the respondent agrees that Guatemala needs a better system distinct from capitalism. For respondents that pray more often compared to those that pray less often, there is about a 55% decrease in odds that they agree with the statement. My hypothesis is not supported.

In model 2, there are three significant variables, town, denomination, and intensity of prayer. In the direct effect models, none of the three main independent variables are significant. In the full model, respondents from San Cristóbal are about 84% more likely to agree that unions help develop Guatemala compared to those in Zunil, but it is marginally significant. This gives some support to my hypothesis. For

religious denomination, Catholics have about 99% greater odds of supporting this statement than Evangelicals, which is significant and does not support my hypothesis, showing mixed results. Those who pray more often are about 73% more likely to support this statement, though the effect is marginally significant.

In model 3, there are two significant variables, which are town and gender. In the direct effects models, town and denomination are significant. Respondents in San Cristóbal compared to Zunil are about 222% more likely to agree with the statement that the U.S. has a right to stop unauthorized migrant entries. In the full model, this remains highly significant, with about 205% more likely to agree in San Cristóbal with the statement. In the direct effects model for denomination, Catholics are less likely to agree with the statement by about 44% compared to Evangelicals. However, in the full model it is no longer significant. Men are more likely to agree with the statement by about 82% compared to women, however the variable is marginally significant. This model supports my hypothesis.

In model 4, there are six significant variables, however four are marginally significant. In the direct effects model, only omnipresence of God is significant. For each level increase in a respondent's sense of God's presence, he or she is about 59% more likely to agree with the statement that the U.S. should make it easier for Guatemalans to work there. In the full model, this increases to 134% more likelihood for each level increase. While this does not support my hypothesis, there is some support for my hypothesis in this model. Respondents in San Cristóbal are about 138% more likely to support this statement than those in Zunil, though the coefficient is marginally significant. There are three other marginally significant variables, including gender that

shows men supporting the statement more than women with an odds ratio of about 127%. Married respondents have about 58% less odds of supporting the statement than single respondents, and with each increase of the number of children, respondents are about 46% more likely to support the statement. For household income, each unit increase is associated with about 57% greater odds of supporting the statement, and the coefficient is significant.

In model 5, one variable is significant and it is omnipresence of God. In the direct effects model, for each increase in a respondent's sense of God's presence, there is about 86% greater odds that they will agree with the statement that poverty and wealth have individual causes. In the full model, this increases to 102%, and the coefficient is highly significant. This does not support my hypothesis.

Finally, in model 6 there are four significant variables, but two are marginally significant. In the direct effects model, San Cristóbal respondents are about 172% more likely to agree with the statement that poverty and wealth have structured causes. This is highly significant and remains so in the full model, and the effect increases, with 365% greater odds to agree with the statement than the respondents in Zunil. This supports my hypothesis. The other highly significant variable is race-ethnicity, with Mayans agreeing with the statement by about 419% greater odds than Ladinos. Men are about 98% more likely to support it than women, though the effect is marginally significant. Also marginally significant, for each unit increase in education, a respondent is about 9% more likely to support the statement.

### 3.5 Discussion and Conclusion

A religious leader summed up the struggle in Latin America in 1985 that fits today's challenges: "Reports published by *campesino* and worker organizations in Guatemala are full of evidence that all peaceful means for bringing about structural change have been exhausted. This is the situation that has obliged the Guatemalan people to organize for their defense (Bermúdez 1986:21)." Latin America has advanced considerably from the years of dictatorship that characterized many countries in the mid to late 20<sup>th</sup> century. Liberation theologians have inspired leaders throughout Latin American, including heads of State like Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Marx wrote of an elite attitude when he described religion as a tool of the elites to keep power (Marx 1845). Religion, however, has become a tool by the lower classes to overcome oppression, which Marx did not envision. Nevertheless, class conflict continues in Latin America. The Catholic Church has attempted to mediate the conflict by labeling liberation theology as ideological, so as to move liberation theologians away from its synthesis with Marxism, i.e. world -systems theory (Smith 1991). However, this approach maintains rights of individual owners of goods and services, which is the capitalist system of private property. Similarly, Pentecostal churches in Latin America represent an ideological trend that helps people become orientated in a society being uprooted by socio-economic changes, emphasizing individual characteristics (Steigenga 2001:86, 2007:265).

Guatemala is a case study to gain some understanding into the current dynamics of religion and politics. My study focused on the indigenous people and their perspectives toward politics and the economy and whether they varied by socio-economic

organization, religious denomination, or perceptions of God. While my evidence has not supported the hypothesis in all models, there have been some interesting results.

Generally, the indigenous people and Ladinos do not vary in their agreement or disagreement with the examined issues, except for structured causes of poverty and wealth. Interestingly, this is the largest effect in all of my models, suggesting that the Mayans are quite conscious of their oppressed position within Guatemalan society. It is troubling that the Ladinos are far from the Mayans on this issue, and more research may help us see how to better understand this gap with the aim to change policies that create conditions to change exploitative social structures.

In the same model, the results supported my hypothesis, describing respondents from San Cristóbal much more likely to perceive structured causes of poverty and wealth than those from Zunil. This is the second strongest effect in the models. The wage-working community of San Cristóbal experiences the working conditions of household textile work and they live at an important crossroads connecting Guatemala east and west and north and south. The agricultural employment in Zunil lends to a tighter community and they run their own businesses, as indicated by their higher rates of property, land, and home ownership. This indicates that they have less contact with the exploitation practices against Mayans. However, the race-ethnic effect suggests that the K'iche' of Zunil are aware of structured causes of poverty and wealth, though greater investigation may help us see the meaning of these distinctions.

The only variable in model 5 that described a difference in individual causes for poverty and wealth was God's omnipresence, with respondents who perceived higher levels of God's omnipresence agreeing with individual causes for poverty and wealth.



Though this did not support my hypothesis, it is reasonable to see an association between a strong, personal sense of God's presence and a belief that poverty can be overcome through personal, individual efforts. This lends support to the work of anthropologists and insights of religious leaders that see the influences of religion across denominations, for example concepts of being responsible for one's own salvation may influence concepts about how to overcome poverty. Further investigation may help clarify these kinds of associations. Furthermore, model 4 describes that a greater sense of God's omnipresence is associated with Americans making it easier to work there, which suggests that it would be done legally, and a sense of upholding the law. This also is a concern for residents in San Cristóbal, whose working conditions may need to be more disciplined than those in Zunil, suggesting a desire to find a way to work in the U.S. legally, i.e. upholding the law. The marginal effect may be a problem of low statistical power. Nevertheless, this "legal" mindset comes out in model 3, though negatively, where respondents in San Cristóbal agree more widely with the attitude that the U.S. has a right to stop unauthorized migration.

Not surprisingly, respondents in San Cristóbal compared to Zunil are more likely to see the value of unions, being more closely associated with a wage-working environment. However, Catholics also are more likely to see the value of unions compared to Evangelicals. This is the only model that showed variation between the two denominations, suggesting that while there are many issues of agreement, there may be something to the literature that associates Evangelicals with greater social stability within the current social structures. This assumes that union organizing is a route outside the range of possibilities of change within society that Evangelicals perceive. Interestingly,

the majority of respondents described in Figure 3.1, agree that a system other than capitalism is needed, and this lends support to the similarity of the respondents on issues of change. However, it reveals a need to better understand the differences from the perspective of social science. For example, if respondents perceive a new system is needed, what is the vehicle for change that they would agree on? Based on the pattern of these results, there are four general themes for discussion.

First, the concept of private property has been established by the elites to claim a right to control the goods and services of workers. This allows them to have enormous control over ideological messages, political and religious, that maintains a class system where the indigenous people remain among the poorest. While my findings reveal strong support for liberal political and economic policies in general among respondents, the interpretation of the findings is limited, especially because of its cross-sectional nature and being an unrepresentative sample. Nevertheless, it tells the story about some groups and lends support to the work of anthropologists about the cultural aspects of people's perceptions. I illustrate this conclusion with an example of someone who is working to change the social structures.

José (not his real name), is a Mayan return migrant from the U.S. to Guatemala that participated in the Return Migration Project organized by sociologists at the University of Texas at Austin. In the 1980s, José was a guerrilla fighter, later a social worker, and then a migrant. He left Guatemala to the U.S. in 1996 with a visa. José married, became a legal permanent resident, had a son, and worked as a gourmet chef. Throughout his stay in the U.S., he saw the differences between him and other Guatemalan immigrants, who suffered with insecurity over their illegal status, cleaning

hotels, restaurants, etc. He achieved the “American Dream,” but he felt the need to serve struggling Guatemalans. He believed the causes of poverty were rooted in the neo-liberal economic system. Throwing his permanent residency card in the trash, he returned to Guatemala determined to help people obtain the “Guatemalan Dream.” His experience in the U.S. transformed his vision to see furniture when he sees a tree, or cars when he sees iron ore, or T-bone steaks when he sees cows. He laments the reality that most Guatemalans do not have a vision for development (Kasun 2012).

Second, religion orientates people within their micro and macro social context, and when people become uprooted socio-economically, new orientations within the religious field has helped the disorientated to become orientated to fit their new socio-economic circumstances (Schäfer 2002). The majority of respondents in San Cristóbal is Evangelical, and largely is not associated with agricultural work. The majority in Zunil is Catholic and largely associated with agricultural work. Future studies may examine the meaning of the “omnipresence” of God that crosses religious denominations, which is a religious dimension that is present during times of transition. What are the different kinds of struggles or strategies that people use to maintain their belief and concept of God in times of disorientation? Both Zunil and San Cristóbal were not targeted by the military in the 1980s in the same way that other Guatemalan towns were targeted. This may have had an affect on the respondents to look for ways to fit in and cooperate with the wider society.

Two interviews highlight these results. One is with an Evangelical pastor, Jorge (not his real name), in San Cristóbal, and the other is a Catholic pastor, Angel Vicente, in Zunil. Both are Mayans. Jorge reflected on the problems of poverty among the Mayans.

He stated that there is unity among all indigenous people, no matter the faith. While emphasizing that all people are created equally in the image of God, the poor and the rich must live along side each other and understand that each person in authority is placed there by God. Charity and individual opportunities by those who have more, given to those who have less, alleviate social problems (Pastor 2013).

Angel Vicente also explained that individuals are created equally in the image of God. He stressed tolerance for individuals to follow their religion of choice. While all people believe in God, he stated that people are not motivated by faith, but rather the ultimate necessities of life, which reflects his doctoral work in anthropology. In terms of the influence of religion in Guatemala and Latin America, he sees the rise of Pentecostalism, and its counterpart in the charismatic movement of the Catholic Church, as an attempt to eradicate liberation theology. Moreover, he sees the Catholic Church's fostering of the charismatic movement as a mistake, stating that its members challenge the sacramental and hierarchical structures of the Church. It opens up a flow of Catholics into Pentecostalism. Liberation theology helped grow base communities, which in turn developed a communitarian spirit, which in turn encouraged the faithful to support the structures of the Catholic Church (Díaz 2013).

Third, social scientists, activists, and religious leaders have offered solutions into the challenges and difficulties faced by the people in the Western Highlands addressed in this chapter. First, there is Penny Lernoux, a long time reporter in Latin America. She suggested that the Church could help end "poverty and injustice" "by encouraging the growth of popular movements through the democratic example of base communities," which sow the seeds of change, i.e. Brazil (Lernoux 1989:152). Her insight is mirrored

more than 20 years later by the pastor in Zunil that sees the value of base communities for Catholicism. Second, Jennifer Harbury has lived and written extensively on Guatemala. She married an indigenous man fighting with the guerrillas, who was tortured and killed by the military (Harbury 1997). She wrote that to change the social conditions of the indigenous people, outside countries must employ economic sanctions as a means to force the elites to be more democratic (Harbury 1995:252–3). Third, Timothy J. Smith, doing anthropological research in the Highland town of Sololá, suggested that indigenous groups could tap into the people's desire for a community vision that tied local and national interests, if they found a way to overcome internal conflicts (Smith 2009). Fourth, the work of Sterner Ekern (2010) in the municipality of Totonicapán suggested that the forces of traditionalism and reformism in the 48 cantons (villages) find common ground when they integrate individual and communal interests into a common vision. Moreover, the vision that integrates local and national interests will be the vision that leads its citizens to material development, compared to those that do not integrate their interests (Ekern 2010:195–264). Obstacles to indigenous advancement within Totonicapán and Guatemala in general was their lack of organization across different indigenous groups, complicated by 21 different Mayan languages and cultures, as well as the presence of elites (Ekern 2010:193–203, 259, 263).

Fifth, Irma Velásquez Nimatuj, an indigenous anthropologist, envisioned a multi-faceted approach. Mayan unity needs unity in organization, so all Mayans act together to end their poverty and discrimination (Velásquez Nimatuj 2002:137). Racism needs to be fought against by people throughout the world (Velásquez Nimatuj 2002:136). Strategies to end the internal subordination of women need to be strengthened (Velásquez Nimatuj

2002:50–1). She conceptualizes the subaltern theories of Antonio Gramsci as a means for accomplishing the goals of liberation through the strategies of accommodation and resistance (Velásquez Nimatuj 2002:166). She links racism, class, and gender subordinations on a global scale to these same problems on a local scale in Guatemala (Velásquez Nimatuj 2008). And finally, ethnographic research by Tim MacNeill (2014) studied a Mayan organization in the Highlands as a case study to show how Mayan activists engaged the community to oppose the exploitation of an international mining company. Their experiences increased their social capital, so they could engage in other activist opportunities, which aimed to inform public policy more widely from the view of the subaltern and consensus building (MacNeill 2014).

Fourth, the Catholic Church's response to liberation theology took away a scientific tool from liberation theology as a community based social movement to challenge the elite's role in exploitation and oppression. Religious leaders made a synthesis in both theory and practice in the 1960s and 70s of liberation theology (Carmack 1988a:49; Gutiérrez 1973). By forcing liberation theologians to back track from world systems theory and its association with Karl Marx, religious leaders took the side of the elites. This enabled the elites to promulgate political and religious ideology to support private property and the global capitalist system. The success of base communities in the 1960s and early 1970s made an easy ideological transition of its Catholic members, since it fit with social interpretations of property (Bermúdez 1986:70). The success of base communities put its participants in conflict with the elites, who did not want to be uprooted from their orientation in the world that included the individual control of private property and religion.

This case study, examining the differences within two different economically organized towns, aimed to describe similarities and differences within the indigenous population in terms of religious and political ideology. My study supports class analysis with aspects of ethnic-race analysis in terms of subaltern culture, locating the control of goods and services as the form of private property that enables inequality and poverty. My study has a number of limitations. Future studies would be valuable to analyze how the control of goods and services by workers would produce a new ideology of religion and politics. This assumes that workers would gain the control of the State apparatus, which means they would control the instruments of force. Questions that my research does not answer are how a new social order would transition from socio-economic structures organized around individual capitalists to structures organized around workers. These questions continue to be the subject of research. On the ground, many indigenous people have found a temporary solution to their poverty through migration to the U.S. My next chapter examines the differences between migrant and non-migrant households, which have been a solution acceptable to elites and non-elites in Guatemala to the needs and desires of people living in poverty.

## **Chapter 4: The Influence of Migration on Guatemalan Sending Communities**

### **4.1 Introduction**

Frederick Douglass, an American who escaped slavery and worked to end it in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, stated, “Perhaps no class of our fellow-citizens has carried this prejudice against color to a point more extreme and dangerous than have our Catholic Irish fellow-citizens, and yet no people on the face of the earth have been more relentlessly persecuted and oppressed on account of race and religion than have this same Irish people (2008:546).” His insight about the relationship between color, migration, and religion is a powerful expression of the struggle that faced Americans in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which continues in different ways today. Mayans from Mexico and Guatemala began migrating to the U.S. in large numbers after the intense political violence in Guatemala in the early 1980s. However, they have migrated for hundreds of years within the regions of Mexico and Central America (Carmack 1981; Falla 2008; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014:28). Why do people migrate? Oppression and political violence have been major catalysts for the movement of peoples, as well as the desire for social mobility. I use Guatemala as a case study for studying this phenomenon.

Building on my original research between a sample of people from San Cristóbal and Zunil, I examine differences between respondents in migrant households and non-migrant households across the towns. I hypothesize that the attitudes of respondents toward migration issues or policies are associated with the town in which they live, being organized differently by socio-economics and culturally distinct, rather than with whether



one belongs to a migrant or non-migrant household. I examine the hypothesis with seven statements about remittances, perceptions of North Americans toward Guatemalans, and perceptions of local migrants. I focus on both demographic characteristics and attitudes, focusing on issues related to migration and social mobility. One of the questions driving my interest is to understand the influences of respondents' attitudes toward migration.

Does it belong more to a household that has a migrant member or the town in which they live? Additionally, I aim to expand our understanding of the influences that migrants to the U.S. have among family members or among the wider community. I argue that the cumulative effects of migration are generated by and benefit sending and receiving communities, similar to other arguments (Rodríguez 1996b). In other words, both American and Guatemalan societies became agents of migration as a solution to economic, political, or social problems felt in both countries. This association is indicative of how people throughout the world conceive and achieve social mobility or greater status, or in the case of political violence, find a safe place to preserve their lives.

There are implications for Marxist and Weberian theory. Marx emphasized the homogenous ideology within each socio-economic class, while Weber emphasized life's chances based on one's social position (Marx 2002; Weber 1930). Along with migration theory, these theories guide my analysis. I examine if there are differences among respondents that live in different social contexts, controlling for ethnicity, yet are part of the same "subaltern" culture (Velásquez Nimatuj 2002). I provide descriptive characteristics, comparing the 2002 Guatemalan census with my Western Highlands 2012 survey, dividing the data into migrant and non-migrant households. I report the unique findings from my 2012 survey, including demographic characteristics, motivations to

migrate, and difficulties migrants encountered. The literature review examines social research pertinent to my analysis, including theories of migration, capitalists' role in migration, phases of migration, remittances as cheap labor or poverty reduction, and influences of migrants on Guatemalan attitudes toward social issues. As in my previous chapters, I refer to aspects of private property that influence migration, which becomes part of my discussion.

## **4.2 Literature Review**

### *Migration Theory briefly Reviewed*

General socio-economic trends have shaped the migratory lives of individuals and communities, according to migration scholars. For example, researchers have documented how Guatemalan individuals and households organized into migrant streams in response to the demand for workers in the U.S. (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014). While broad social forces have influenced migratory patterns in different ways across time and space, our current understanding grows as our understanding of the complexity of society grows (Massey and International Union for the Scientific Study of Population 1998). This complexity has been described from various perspectives that enhance our understanding of migration in both the local and global context. In the last decades, researchers focused on socio-economic features of migration between sending and receiving countries, which include world systems theory (Wallerstein 1983), microeconomic theory (Borjas 1995), human capital theory (Massey et al. 1993), new economic theory (Massey 1999), transnational theory (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002; Levitt 2001; Massey and International Union for the Scientific Study of Population 1998; Waldinger 1996), network theory (Massey et al. 1993; Sassen 1995), political economy

theory (Hollifield 1992), and cumulative causation theory (Fussell and Massey 2004; Massey 1990) among others.

As described in the introduction, many sociologists have studied individuals and local communities involved in migration (Burns 1993; Hagan 1994, 2008; Menjivar 2006; Rodriguez and Hagan 2000). Other sociologists have written about how sending communities decided whom to send as migrants within the household or community, which managed risk and overcame market failures (Massey et al. 1993). More recently, research has focused on the decisions made by sending communities that make appeals to their loved ones to return home, which is often based on family maintenance and creation (Piacenti 2009). Researchers have summarized their findings and theories in various publications (Brown and Bean 2005; Massey 1999). One theme that I gleam from this research is that efforts to keep migrant paths open are an effort of sending and receiving communities, despite anti-immigrant proposals to stop migration.

#### *Capitalist Social Relations and its Influence on Migration*

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and before 1945, the rise of industrialization capitalism is associated with migration from rural areas to urban areas and to countries with higher rates of industrialization (Castles and Miller 2009:79–95). From the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s, many Latin American countries followed the socio-economic plan of import substitution industrialization (ISI) (Cohen 2000; Palma 2007). Neo-liberalism replaced ISI, being promoted by the Washington consensus, which was motivated by the debt crisis that began in 1982 (Palma 2009). These neo-liberal reforms changed how the state acted, subjecting itself to the interests of the market rather than the state subjecting the market to its interests (Palma 2009:865). In general, the rural

economies of Latin America have had four basic socio-economic trends since then until today. There has been 1) a shift to rural non-farm activities, 2) an increase in the flexibilization and feminization of rural work, 3) an increase in rural-urban interactions, and 4) a rising importance of international migration and remittances (Kay 2008).

The neo-liberal reforms being promulgated by the U.S. in the 1980s were accompanied by anti-immigration policies toward Guatemalans by the Ronald Reagan Administration (1981-1989). For example, Guatemalan asylum seekers were treated differently than asylum seekers from other countries. In the early to mid-1980s one to two percent of Guatemalan asylum applications were approved (Aguayo and Fagen 1988). This contrasts with an overall approval rate of nearly 25% out of a total of almost 200,000 applications from 1981 to 1990 (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997). By 1996 Guatemala was second to El Salvador, which had its highest year for pending asylum applications at 126,001 (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997).

Not drawing a connection to the refugee crisis, the Reagan administration concentrated on its war policies in Guatemala by promulgating the idea that if the Guatemalan government did not defeat the leftist guerillas, then Guatemalans would flee to the United States in great numbers (Aguayo and Fagen 1988:34). At the same time, the elites in Guatemala promoted negative views of the Mayans who fled the massacres, tainting them as guerrilla sympathizers, in order to keep them out of Guatemala (Aguayo and Fagen 1988:71–2). These events support Alain de Janvry's description of the Junker road of agricultural development, which is a massive dispossession of the peasants and integration into the needs of global agri-business, accompanied by strong political control

(1981:4, 106–9, 179–81). While these events have a particular expression in Guatemala, as described in the two previous chapters, some accounts describe Guatemalans taking up arms because there was no other option to fight the oppression they lived as poor people in Guatemalan society (Bermúdez 1986:21; de Janvry 1981:190–1). The elites responded with even greater violence and ideological re-indoctrination, which reconstituted social relations (Falla 1994).

The violence became the initial impetus for Guatemalan migration to the U.S., but continued to increase well after Guatemala’s scorched earth policy of the 1980s (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014). For example, many U.S. industries were being restructured, including the meat packing industry, which provided immigrants with stable, long-term work (Artz, Jackson, and Orazem 2010). With the new social order being stabilized in Guatemala through defeat of the guerrillas and eventually the 1996 Peace Accords and rule of law protecting private property, the Guatemalan rural and urban capitalists cooperated to maintain the social order through increased militarization of the country, which has become increasingly sophisticated still today (Hochmüller 2014; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014:55).

#### *The Phases of Guatemalan Migration and General Economic Outline*

The demographic structure for Guatemalan migration to the U.S. has been outlined by Jonas and Rodriguez (2014) in terms of five phases. In the first half of phase one about 5,000 Guatemalans migrated annually beginning in 1970. It jumped to more than 10,000 migrants annually in 1977. The second phase began in 1986 when more than 20,000 people began migrating annually. By 1988, 100 to 200 thousand Guatemalans resided in the United States, but before 1981 there were less than 30,000, and most of


them were Ladinos (Aguayo and Fagen 1988:29). The third phase began in 1989 and ended in 1991. This period reported a surge in Guatemalan legal permanent residents from 1989 to 1991, totaling 76,879 admissions (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014:29). Phase four began in 1992 and lasted until 2003, showing a fairly steady increase of total migrants, reaching over 35,000 annually. In phase five Guatemalans continued to immigrate in greater numbers from 2004 to the present. Total migration peaked in 2005 with 63,837 people, but annually it has been above 50,000 (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014:26–69). More men than women migrated from the Western Highlands (Camus 2008:203–6; Rodriguez 1987).

Information compiled by the Pew Hispanic Center using the American Community Survey of 2009, describes that Guatemalans make up 1.1 million of the 48.4 million Hispanics in the United States (Dockterman 2011). Of this number, 68% are foreign born and 73% arrived in the U.S. in 1990 or later. About one quarter of them are USCs (U.S. Citizens). The median age is 27, while it is 36 for the U.S. population, and 44% of them are married. About one-third of the Guatemalans live in California, and another third lives in the South, and the last third lives in the rest of the U.S. About 55% of those 25 years or older have not obtained at least a high school diploma. The median annual personal income for Guatemalans, 16 years and older, is \$17,000, below the median of \$20,000 for all Hispanics and \$28,900 for all Americans. Their poverty rate is 26%, higher than the 14% rate of the U.S. population and 23% for all Hispanics (Dockterman 2011).


The population in Guatemala has steadily increased. In 1960, more people lived in the rural area than in cities, but today it is evenly split, as shown in Figure 4.1. The

gap began closing in the later 1980s, giving evidence to the changing relationships between farmers, workers, and capitalists. This demographic shift is associated also with an overall increase in wealth, as described in chapter two. In the agricultural sector, the value added per worker hit a nadir in the last year of the scorched earth policy, then began rising to reach its pre-scorched earth policy value within seven years (see Figure 4.2). It then increased significantly to remain at the higher end of the scale today.

**Figure 4.1: Guatemalan Total Population, with Urban and Rural Groups**



**Figure 4.2: Annual Value added per worker in Agriculture by Year**




The development path chosen by Guatemalan rural and urban capitalists benefited capitalists and left few options for upward social mobility for the non-elites in the Western Highlands (Camus 2008:56–7, 281; Copeland 2007). As mentioned in the previous two chapters, property as a private right was a basic principle in the Peace Accords, eliminating the socialization of property, which was the mechanism for advancing the interests of the poor of Guatemalan society (CEH 1999a:212–27). In chapter two I showed the graph for permanent land and arable land, which makes up about 25% of the total land of Guatemala. Below, Figure 4.3 contrasts this difference with the total agricultural land, which is “the share of land area that is arable, under permanent crops, and under permanent pastures (World Bank 2013).” (It also shows deforestation as forested land has decreased over time.) Arable crops are planted annually from seed after each harvest, like cabbage, turnips, tomatoes, etc. and permanent crops endure a minimum of five years like coffee, bananas, cocoa, etc. The red lines at 1984 and 1988 indicate a substantial increase in total available land for agriculture, correlating with the scorched earth policy of the elites (Manz 1988b).

Agricultural workers in San Cristóbal and Zunil work on arable land. Though arable land represents a greater percentage of land cultivated than permanent land, all the top export related crops come from permanent land. Figure 4.4 shows the value of Guatemala’s main exports from 1980 to 2013, all coming from permanent agricultural land: coffee, sugar, banana, and cardamom. As mentioned in previous chapters, Guatemala continues to rely on primary materials for export, with the service industry making up the largest part of Guatemala’s economy as a percentage of GDP. The




indigenous people are integrated into Guatemala's economy, but receive the smallest share of its wealth.

**Figure 4.3: Total Agricultural Land, with Arable and Permanent Land by Year**



**Figure 4.4: Guatemala's Four Principal Primary Commodities by Year**



### *Remittances as Contributor to Cheap Labor and Poverty Reduction*

If Guatemala's violent period is part of its transition to capitalist agricultural development, the role of remittances helps maintain a seasonal workforce and increases consumption and social mobility. De Janvry wrote about "functional dualism," when the


peasant and commercial farmers cease to compete with each other, and often the peasant buying the commodity of the commercial farmer. The commercial farmer needs the labor power of the peasant farmer, and so policies develop to maintain the peasant livelihood (de Janvry 1981:98–9, 194–5). Additionally, in some areas of the Highlands, households with remittances also participate in household textile production. In Latin America, the peasant farmer receives more remittances than any region in the world, \$52 billion in 2006 (Fajnzylber, Lopez, and World Bank 2008). Between 5 and 10 percent of Guatemala's households received remittances in 2001 (Fajnzylber et al. 2008). Households in the lowest quintile of non-remittance income in Guatemala receive a little more than 30% of the remittances. Or, the poorest 60% receive 41% of all remittances, but only 29% of non-remittance income (Fajnzylber et al. 2008). Taking these ratios as a general distribution guideline, 861 million dollars in remittances went to poorer households in 2003, and by 2013 this rose to 2.2 billion dollars. The bulk of remittances, however, went to wealthier Guatemalans.

Moderate and extreme poverty is reduced in Central America between 0.37 percent and 0.29 percent for every one percent of GDP from remittances. (Acosta et al. 2008; Fajnzylber et al. 2008). Remittances have a larger, disproportionate role for smaller countries like Haiti and Guatemala, and the funds are largely spent on consumer commodities (Orozco 2002b; Palma 2009). Overall, Guatemalans tend to use remittances for durable goods, housing, education, health, small land purchases, and consumer items (Camus 2008:142, 157–63, 183–7, 229; Fajnzylber et al. 2008; Kay 2008). Likewise, in a study comparing San Cristóbal, Totonicapán to Guatemala's eastern Ladino town of Gualán, more people in San Cristóbal used the remittances to support needs of household

members while more people in Gualán used them for small business investment (Moran-Taylor 2008). A student paper on Zunil observed that migration to the U.S. was difficult for people, especially in the beginning. However, the remittances made significant improvements in all areas of life, outweighing the negative factors (Martinez 2006).


Figure 4.5 compares the remittances for Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti from 1980 to 2013. By 2005 Guatemala began sending more remittances back home than other Central American countries, reaching close to six billion dollars in 2013. Guatemala's economy has been growing faster than remittances, which made up 12.5% of the GDP in 2007 and in 2013 remittances made up about 10% of the GDP. Examining remittances as a percentage of GDP, Guatemala was ranked 19<sup>th</sup> of all countries in 2013. In that same year, Kyrgyz Republic had the highest ratio of remittances to GDP at nearly 32%, then Nepal at 29%. Haiti was the 4<sup>th</sup> highest at 21%, Honduras the 10<sup>th</sup> highest at 17%, and El Salvador the 11<sup>th</sup> highest at 16%. Mexico was 67<sup>th</sup> at 1.8%. Wealthier countries, like Germany, received 15.8 billion dollars in remittances, the fifth highest, but only 0.42% of GDP, ranking 101<sup>st</sup>. This describes the relative impact of remittances on poorer countries versus wealthier countries, with smaller amounts of remittances having wider social value for poorer economic sectors (Sánchez Barricarte 2010:197).

**Figure 4.5: Central American Countries Receiving Remittances by Year**



The end of phase four (1992 to 2003) of Guatemalan migration is associated with a dramatic increase in remittances to Guatemala (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014). At the same time wealthier Guatemalans used remittances to increase their consumption, i.e. socio-economic status. This is also associated with a dramatic increase for imported consumer goods, as shown in Figure 4.6. During this time, however, imported construction materials remained flat. Velásquez Nimatuj observed in her communities of study that the fall in coffee prices in the early 2000s was offset with the rise in remittances, but work opportunities did not increase (2008:72). This lends support to the role of remittances as maintaining a reserve workforce or creating low-wage work opportunities. Forty years earlier, Adams noted a similar pattern that as overall wealth increases, distribution of wealth to the different classes remained the same (1970:10).

**Figure 4.6: Guatemala's Main Imported Goods and Materials by Year**



*Influences of Migrants on Guatemalan Attitudes toward Social Issues:  
Attitudes of Migrants Begin on the Journey*

In this section, I examine the literature about individual Guatemalan attitudes toward migration policies. While attitudinal research is complex, researchers find that there is a general correlation between attitudes marked on a survey and actual behavior, which is better understood by in-depth interviews and observational studies (Campbell and Herman 2010; Krysan 2000). The attitudes of migrants in the U.S. begin their formation by the ease or difficulty of their journey. The results of Jacqueline Hagan's in-depth interviews of Guatemalan migrants concluded that religion was a mediator to the journey's hardship. Churches, shelters, and religious workers performed network functions, adding to the migrants existing networks for the journey (2008:162). Whereas social capital and social networks are necessary, they are insufficient to reduce the physical and psychological costs associated with undocumented migration (Hagan 2008:158). Other research examined the importance of networks that international Catholic religious orders and lay groups set up, including migrant houses from

Guatemala to the United States. They cared for their physical and spiritual needs, and they strongly defended their human rights in each country (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014:97–9). The Catholic Church encouraged migrant supporters by its vision outlined in *The Love of Christ towards Migrants* (2004). Its vision encouraged migration, seeing the movement from a poor country to a wealthy country as a human right. It recognizes that migrants are often oppressed and the solution to migration is a new international economic order and national structures in host countries to help migrants integrate into their new, local communities (Pérez-Madrid 2005; Viana 2005).

#### *American Attitudes toward Migrants*

Social scientists have made strides into understanding attitudes toward migrants in the U.S. and Europe. For example, an assimilationist threat measure was developed as a tool to help social researchers to explore the causes and consequences of American anti-immigration sentiment (Paxton and Mughan 2006; Wright and Citrin 2011). Politically liberal Americans, often portrayed as being pro-immigrant, have been described as concealing their support for immigration restrictions (Janus 2010). Other studies show the importance that Americans place on assimilation by Latinos in the wider American society. U.S.-born Latinos acculturate more deeply into the wider American culture, expressing less favorable views toward immigration issues, which are similar to the variations among whites (Branton 2007). Taking an intersectional approach toward migration attitudes, Berg (2010) describes the moderating effects of education, race, class, gender, and region toward migration policies. For example, the moderating effect of education on race-ethnicity shows that people within the same racial-ethnic composition, i.e. blacks facing greater economic competition, will be less favorable

toward migrant policies than those with less competition in jobs where blacks have higher education. Or, women who live in areas where there are more foreign born residents, develop more positive attitudes toward migrants than men (Berg 2010).

Some research has examined how racial contexts affect the attitudes of Americans' toward immigration policies, suggesting that racial-ethnic integration alleviates interethnic tension (Ha 2010). Along similar lines, Latinos with weak attachment to Latino culture, and who have assimilated American societal norms, hold less positive views toward migrants than those with stronger attachments to Latino culture (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand 2010). Interestingly, among the Latinos in the U.S., Mexicans, along with Central Americans, drive support for legalization programs for illegal migrants (Rouse et al. 2010). Other research described American opposition to pro-immigrant policies being explained primarily from implicit and explicit nativism, racism, and principled political conservatism (Knoll 2013).

#### *Host Countries Shape Migrant Attitudes and Migrants Shape Attitudes in Host Country*

This conflictive social context that Guatemalans face when they migrate to the U.S. is not easy to navigate. Soon they experience negative social situations, which is attributed to racism, which is an experience familiar to them in Guatemala (Fox 2006; Hale 2006b; Odem 2007). Various social scientists document American attitudes of hostility toward migrants (Chiricos et al. 2014; Knoll 2013; Reyna, Dobria, and Wetherell 2013). In turn, it should not be surprising that Latinos, especially Guatemalan indigenous migrants, often choose to live in enclaves that support their cultural values (Rodríguez 2012).

Migrants also impact perceptions of natives in their host countries. One of the first sociological studies about Mayan migrants in the U.S. was written by Nestor Rodriguez about their contact and growth in Houston (1987). The Mayans brought new cultural expressions to Houston, like traditional foods and clothing, which contrasted with previously established cultures of immigrants from other Central American countries and Mexico. Following Rodriguez' work, Hagan wrote an in-depth book on the Mayan Guatemalans in Houston (1994). She found that the Mayans reproduced their traditional cultural conditions, which included religious practices, gender roles, and authority structures. Other social researchers studied Mayan communities in Florida, describing how the communities found individual leaders that intersected with the dominant culture as a means to find space for work and daily living (Burns 1993).

Some Protestant and Catholic Churches provided a means for leadership building and social mobility for migrants (Foley and Hoge 2007). Negative experiences for migrants markedly increased after September 11, 2001 (Camus 2008). For example, when American elites framed migration as a security issue, negative images of migrants with such concepts as "illegals" or "invaders" began to create a hostile climate that associated them with terrorists (Camus 2008:31–3). Migrants, who did not perceive themselves as dangerous people, expressed feelings of hurt, depression, and low self-esteem, which decreased their ability to deal with problems in their families back home (Camus 2008).

#### *Transnational Migration Network and its Challenges*

Besides monetary remittances, there are also "social remittances" (Levitt 1998). Levitt described how social and political life is changed by the influence of migrants



between the U.S. and the Dominican Republic. She found that the impact of migrants on the sending country varies, depending upon the kind and intensity of contact, including 1) normative structures (ideas, values, and beliefs); 2) systems of practices (actions that shape norms); and 3) social capital (Levitt 1998, 2001). Generally, migrants maintained and increased their interactions with people at home (Brown and Bean 2005; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014).

Other social researchers conducted in-depth interviews among sending communities in Mexico, including Mexican Mayans, describing collective identities between household members in the U.S. and Mexico (Fox 2006). Negative experiences included racial-ethnic discriminatory attitudes from both Americans and Mexicans (Fox 2006). Other studies confirm the racism experienced by Mayan migrants living in other cultures (Odem 2007). Another study found that Mayans in Mexico had positive experiences of migration, but they desired greater flexibility to travel between the U.S. and Mexico as they often crossed the border without documentation (Piacenti 2009).

The transnational links may become complicated. An analysis between a sending Mayan town in Huehuetenango and the receiving town in the U.S. state of Georgia revealed a dynamic of conflict and cooperation (Odem 2007). In the U.S., migrants maintained their identity through their religion, Catholic identification in a wider Protestant culture. They helped support major projects back home, including the annual “fiesta,” medical clinics, construction projects, and educational needs. At the same time, Mayan leaders in Guatemala began to identify Catholicism with colonialism and Ladino racism, turning away from Catholicism, which created some conflict (Odem 2007). Other researchers describe the emergence of social problems among Mayan migrants,

such as drug trafficking, kidnappings, and delinquency (Camus 2008:304). Conflicts due to policy considerations included proposals to control or tax migrant earnings, (Camus 2008; Orozco 2002b).

Evidence of migrant influence is most notable in housing. In San Cristóbal, American style houses have been and are being built with large windows and doors, or some with burglar bars. Rather than building traditional houses that face inward with large open middles, they face the street like houses in the U.S. (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014:148). My interview with a Jesuit priest, who trains indigenous leaders and stays with a family in Zunil on most weekends, stated that home construction has changed dramatically, but it is more appearance than actual change in thinking (Castillo González 2013). While houses have grown from one floor to three or more, the house is organized the same as if it were one floor, simply with different families occupying other floors. Two to six people may be in one bedroom, with a shower, but only guests use the shower, because people prefer to bathe like always in the outdoor thermal baths (Castillo González 2013).

### *Shaping Perceptions in Communities of Origin*

A study compared a ladino community in eastern Guatemala, Gualán, with my research site, San Cristóbal. The author concluded that community members held positive, negative, or ambivalent attitudes toward their migrant members and migrant issues (Moran-Taylor 2008). For example, the younger return migrants in Gualán were perceived as identifying with negative Mexican American customs rather than positive ones. Older returnees adopted Mexican American cultural aspects like slang, which many non-migrants disapproved (Moran-Taylor 2008). However, others were positive,

because educational levels increased and many saw return migrants with better demeanor and greater community investment. Those who saw positive and negative affects from remittances, for example, were “ambivalent” toward migration issues. In San Cristóbal, attitudes were positive, associating remittances with improved quality of living like houses built with block, kitchen appliances, better health and nutrition, and access to technology like cameras and computers. Some migrants invested in small businesses, seeing a desire to help their families and communities, while other residents reported arrogant attitudes in return migrants (Moran-Taylor 2008). Other researchers reported similar attitudes. Migrants, who come home for major celebrations about twice a year, lead some residents to conclude that the returnees belonged more in the U.S. than in Guatemala (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014:148–9). Or, the local indigenous community associated return migrants with the prejudicial attitudes they experienced from non-migrant Ladinos, attributing their superiority to having bigger and newer houses, or more land (Camus 2008:324).

Return migrants are not the only sources for how non-migrant Guatemalans form their opinions about migration issues. Development and socio-economic reorganization affects social relations and ideas about social position (de Janvry 1981; Marx 1845). Political campaigns have been tools for ideological indoctrination (Camus 2008:50). The rise of NGOs has influenced activities and perceptions. After the Peace Accords in 1996, many state initiatives like rural financial supports or access to markets were replaced by a patchwork of NGOs, which accumulated influence over time (Copeland 2014). While some NGOs helped give expression to anti-imperialist sentiments, gaining sympathy in the Highlands, they also advanced an ideology against the state, fracturing the political

cohesion of the Highlands (Camus 2008:133). These tensions lead the people in the Highlands to adopt varying ideas about social problems (Copeland 2014), helping the elites to gain support for ideas that maintain property as privatized rather than socialized (Goldín 1992; Ybarra 2009).

### **4.3 Field Data and Research Methods**

Chapter one described my data and methods to create, administer, and prepare the survey for analysis. In the next section, I describe demographic characteristics of San Cristóbal and Zunil, comparing the 2002 Guatemalan Census with my 2012 Western Highlands Survey. I examine the data by grouping the characteristics by migrant and non-migrant households. I also describe other characteristics that are unique to the 2012 survey, which include remittances, income, religious denomination, economic feeling measure, motivations to migrate, and difficulties encountered in the migration journey.

Following the section describing demographic characteristics, I examine the hypothesis described in the introduction that attitudes are associated more by the social context of the respondent, measured by the town in which he or she lives, rather than if the respondent lives in a migrant or non-migrant household. Each of the seven statements become dependent variables (DV) with two main independent variables (IV) and control variables. The first main IV is San Cristóbal (1) and Zunil (0). The second is migration household (1) and non-migrant household (0). After the next section, I explain each statement and graph its distribution by town and migrant household. These are the seven models. Summarizing some of the details from chapter one, the survey collected demographic information, including age, sex, ethnicity, education, household income, marital status, and number of children. Attitudes were measured on a 1 to 7 Likert scale,

with “1” representing strongly disagree, “2” disagree, “3” tendency to disagree, “4” neutral or no opinion, “5” tendency to agree, “6” agree, and “7” “strongly agree.” I will explain the models in the analysis section below.

The survey began at the end of July and was completed by the end of August 2012. In total, 232 surveys were completed, 101 in Zunil and 131 in San Cristóbal. Eight observations were deleted because of measurement problems, including duplicate household members and missing information, leaving a total sample of 224 observations.

*Descriptive Characteristics of San Cristóbal and Zunil  
2002 Census: Migrant and non-Migrant Households by Urban or Rural Area*

Guatemala’s 2002 census asked each respondent whether someone from the household migrated permanently outside the country in the last ten years. The survey asked two follow-up questions, namely how many men and then how many women migrated that belong to the household. These questions helped me divide the 2002 census into “migrant” and “non-migrant” households. Table 4.1 describes the main characteristics. The question placed migrant household members having left Guatemala from 1992 to 2002, corresponding to phase four of migration to the U.S. (1992-2003) (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014:29). The top line in Table 4.1 describes total migrant and migrant households, reporting significant numbers of Guatemalans migrating from the rural part of the municipality of San Cristóbal (15%) and the urban area of Zunil (15%) in phase four. The urban area in San Cristóbal reported 9% and the rural area for Zunil reported 8%. A disproportionate population of women in the census may be explained partially in Table 4.2, which describes a disproportionate number of men that migrated. An exception to this observation is rural households in Zunil, which has low migration and almost equal number of men and women.

Ethnically, what stands out is that nearly all households in rural San Cristóbal are indigenous ones. About 25% of the population is Ladino in urban migrant and non-migrant households. This is almost reversed for the municipality of Zunil, with 100% of the urban migrant households belonging to indigenous people. In rural Zunil, more Ladino households have a migrant member at 25% of the sample. Urban San Cristóbal respondents reported on average 2.34 migrants per household, the highest, and rural Zunil respondents reported the lowest on average at 1.44. The median for all households was one migrant. Rural migrant households in San Cristóbal were associated with higher levels of no education than urban households. This was reversed for Zunil, though levels of no education remained high and Ladinos comprised 25% of the non-migrant rural households. Post-secondary or higher education was below 1%, except for urban households in San Cristóbal. Interestingly, no indigenous or Ladino respondents in rural migrant households from Zunil reported education higher than the secondary level.

Table 4.2 describes the total number of migrants that respondents reported that had originated from their households. A wide majority of migrants are men, except for urban migrants from San Cristóbal, where more migrants are women.

**Table 4.1: Guatemalan 2002 Census: Characteristics by Migrant and non-Migrant Households divided by Urban or Rural in San Cristóbal and Zunil**

Migration Phase 4: (1992-2003)*	Municipality of San Cristóbal					Municipality of Zunil				
	Total Pop.	Rural Migrant	Rural No Migrant	Urban Migrant	Urban No Migrant	Total Pop.	Rural Migrant	Rural No Migrant	Urban Migrant	Urban No Migrant
Households: Migrant and non-Migrant	30,605	4,015 (15%)	22,359 (85%)	393 (9%)	3,838 (91%)	11,274	367 (8%)	4,189 (92%)	1,038 (15%)	5,680 (85%)
Gender of the Respondent: Men	14,389 (47%)	1,769 (44%)	10,671 (48%)	175 (46%)	1,774 (46%)	5,345 (47%)	151 (41%)	2,115 (50%)	455 (44%)	2,624 (46%)
Gender of the Respondent: Women	16,216 (53%)	2,246 (56%)	11,688 (52%)	218 (54%)	2,064 (54%)	5,929 (53%)	216 (59%)	2,074 (50%)	583 (56%)	3,056 (54%)
Ethnicity: Indigenous		99%	98%	76%	78%		94%	75%	100%	99%
Ladino		1%	2%	24%	22%		7%	25%	0%	1%
Migrants per Family										
Mean		1.85	----	2.34	----		1.44	----	1.68	----
Median		1	----	1	----		1	----	1	----
Education of Individual		(N=3,265)	(N=17,806)	(N=351)	(N=3,312)		(N=289)	(N=3,305)	(N=905)	(N=4,823)
None		37%	41%	13%	16%		43.6%	34.9%	44.3%	48.9%
Primary		55%	52%	44%	47%		50.5%	55.1%	50.6%	45.7%
Secondary		7%	6%	38%	31%		5.9%	9.5%	4.6%	4.9%
Higher		0.9%	0.6%	5%	6%		0.0%	0.5%	0.4%	0.5%
Data Source: Guatemalan 2002 Census, National Statistics Institute (INE)										
*The question asked if there were permanently settled members of the family outside Guatemala in the last 10 years (1992-2002).										

**Table 4.2: Guatemalan 2002 Census: Total Number of Migrants from all the Households by Gender**

<b>Migration Phase 4: (1992-2003)*</b>	<b>Municipality of San Cristóbal</b>			<b>Municipality of Zunil</b>		
	Total Population	Rural Migrants	Urban Migrants	Total Population	Rural Migrants	Urban Migrants
<b>Total Number of Migrants</b>	8,362 (100%)	7,442 (89%)	920 (11%)	2,276 (100%)	527 (23%)	1,749 (77%)
<b>Men</b>	6,017 (72%)	5,595 (75%)	422 (46%)	1,879 (83%)	454 (86%)	1,425 (81%)
<b>Women</b>	2,345 (28%)	1,847 (25%)	498 (54%)	397 (17%)	73 (14%)	324 (19%)
Data Source: Guatemalan 2002 Census, National Statistics Institute (INE)						

*2012 Western Highlands Survey: Migrant and non-Migrant Households*

Table 4.3 describes the differences between migrant and non-migrant households. There were no efforts to distinguish between rural or urban respondents, as respondents were targeted that lived in the urban areas. About 39% of the households in San Cristóbal have a migrant member and it is about 64% for Zunil, which is a majority of households. Because of the convenience sampling, there may be a sampling error. More female respondents make up San Cristóbal households and more males for Zunil, which is a bias in sampling. Applying the theory of phases created by Jonas and Rodriguez (2014), 51% of San Cristóbal's migrants left in phase 5 and 40% in phase four. For Zunil 44% left in phase five and 54% in phase four. In San Cristóbal there is an average of 1.65 migrants per migrant household and Zunil has an average of 2.44 per migrant household. In San Cristóbal, 78% of the migrant households were indigenous ones and 97% were in Zunil. Non-migrant households in San Cristobal were 74% indigenous ones and 26% Ladino, and in Zunil 94% were indigenous households and 6% Ladino.

Educational levels of respondents from both towns describe low levels of no education, 10% or less. Combined levels of primary and secondary education were high with 66% for migrant households and 80% for non-migrant households. Respondents



from migrant households reported 23% with higher education, compared to 16% for non-migrant households. Respondents from Zunil had similar levels of combined primary and secondary education, though higher levels of primary education than secondary. Respondents from migrant households reported 26% with higher education, compared to 6% for non-migrant households.

Non-remittance monthly income is described with three categories of low, middle, and high. About 43% of the respondents in migrant households in San Cristóbal reported being in the low category (Q1,100 (\$141) or less)<sup>5</sup>. For Zunil it was 27%. About 30% of respondents in San Cristóbal reported being in the middle income category (Q1,100 to Q2,500 (\$321)). It was about 44% for Zunil. About 23% of the respondents from migrant households in San Cristóbal reported being in the highest income category, (Q2,500 (\$321) or more). It was 26% for Zunil. Respondents in non-migrant households from San Cristóbal are nearly similar as the non-migrant households, except there are less in the low income group and more in the middle income group. For Zunil, respondents in non-migrant households are divided about equally in all three categories.

Not all families with migrant members receive remittances. It is less than half the sample, with 47% receiving remittances in San Cristóbal and 32% in Zunil. Out of those who receive remittances, the average monthly amount is Q1,023 (\$132) in San Cristóbal and Q2,588 (\$332) a month in Zunil, more than double the amount in San Cristóbal. In San Cristóbal, the median is Q750 (\$96) and Q1,750 (\$224) for Zunil. For those who receive remittances, about 81% of the remitters from San Cristóbal began sending the remittances within one year or less. It was about 76% for those in Zunil.

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<sup>5</sup> The average exchange rate at the time until today has been relatively stable. I used Q7.8 equals U.S. \$1.

I also examined the religious denomination of the respondents by migrant and non-migrant households. In San Cristóbal, about 35% of the respondents were Catholic in both migrant or non-migrant households, and 65% in Protestant households. In Zunil, about 74% of respondents in migrant households were Catholic and about 71% for non-migrant households. Respectively, about 26% and 29% of Protestant respondents were in migrant and non-migrant households.

A “feeling” measure of economic well-being asked respondents, “Would you say that you are better off this year, worse off this year, or about the same as last year?” In San Cristóbal, 17% of respondents in migrant households said they were worse off compared to 22% in non-migrant households. In Zunil, 24% of the respondents from migrant households reported they were worse off and 37% from non-migrant households. Those reporting that they are better off in migrant households from San Cristóbal were 29% and 27% for non-migrant households. These figures were 19% and 9% in Zunil, respectively, for migrant and non-migrant households. A majority of respondents in San Cristóbal and Zunil in both household categories reported about the same economic well-being, from 51% to 56%.


**Table 4.3: Migrant and non-Migrant Households in San Cristóbal and Zunil**

	San Cristóbal		Zunil	
	Migrant Member	No Migrant Member	Migrant Member	No Migrant Member
<b>Total Population*</b>	126		97	
<b>Households: Migrant and non-Migrant</b>	49 (39%)	77 (61%)	62 (64%)	35 (36%)
<b>Male Respondents</b>	18 (37%)	37 (48%)	45 (73%)	23 (66%)
<b>Female Respondents</b>	31 (63%)	40 (52%)	20 (27%)	12 (34%)
<b>Phase Migrant Left **</b>	(N = 78)		(N = 121)	
Phase 1 (1977-85)	4 (5%)	----	1 (1%)	----
Phase 2 (1986-88)	0 (0%)	----	0 (0%)	----
Phase 3 (1989-91)	3 (4%)	----	2 (2%)	----
Phase 4 (1992-2003)	31 (40%)	----	65 (54%)	----
Phase 5 (2004-today)	40 (51%)	----	53 (44%)	----
	(N = 49)	(N = 77)	(N = 62)	(N = 35)
<b>Ethnicity: Indigenous</b>	38 (78%)	57 (74%)	60 (97%)	33 (94%)
Ladino	11 (22%)	20 (26%)	2 (3%)	2 (6%)
<b>Migrants per Family</b>				
Mean	1.65	----	2.44	----
Median	1	----	2	----
<b>Education of Individual</b>	(N = 48)	(N = 76)	(N = 62)	(N = 35)
None	5 (10%)	3 (4%)	5 (8%)	3 (9%)
Primary	17 (35%)	20 (26%)	34 (55%)	20 (57%)
Secondary	15 (31%)	41 (54%)	7 (11%)	10 (29%)
Higher	11 (23%)	12 (16%)	16 (26%)	2 (6%)
<b>Income, monthly, of HH</b>	(N = 46)	(N = 72)	(N = 62)	(N = 34)
Q 1,100 or less	20 (43%)	24 (33%)	17 (27%)	12 (35%)
Q 1,100 to Q 2,500	14 (30%)	32 (44%)	27 (44%)	11 (32%)
Q 2,500 or more	12 (26%)	16 (22%)	18 (29%)	11 (32%)
<b>Families with Remits.</b>	22 of 47 (47%)	0 of 77 (0%)	20 of 62 (32%)	2 of 35 (6%)
<b>Monthly Remittances</b>				
Mean	Q 1,023	----	Q 2,588	Q 750
Median	Q 750	----	Q 1,750	Q 750
<b>First Remittances Rcvd:</b>	(N = 21)		(N = 23)	
6 Months or Less	10 (48%)	----	9 (43%)	0
6 Months to 1 Year	7 (33%)	----	7 (33%)	1 (50%)
2 Years or More	4 (19%)	----	5 (24%)	1 (50%)
	(N = 49)	(N = 77)	(N = 62)	(N = 35)
<b>Religion: Catholic</b>	17 (35%)	27 (35%)	46 (74%)	25 (71%)
Protestant	32 (65%)	50 (65%)	16 (26%)	10 (29%)
<b>Economical Feeling:</b>	(N = 48)	(N = 77)	(N = 62)	(N = 35)
Worse:	8 (17%)	17 (22%)	15 (24%)	13 (37%)
About the Same:	26 (54%)	39 (51%)	35 (56%)	19 (54%)
Better:	14 (29%)	21 (27%)	12 (19%)	3 (9%)
*Because of missing values, some variables have less N than the total sample, as noted in the Table.				
**The N is higher because this includes all migrants from each household				
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012				

### *Graphing Remittances by Mean Monthly Income*

A total of 44 households receive remittances. How does this compare to the income level of the households that do not receive remittances in the sample? I created a three-way graph (see Figure 4.7). The y-axis is average monthly non-remittance income and the x-axis is the actual monthly remittance received. The lighter bar represents San Cristóbal and the darker bar represents Zunil. The two bars at “0” represent the average income of respondents who do not receive remittances. For San Cristóbal it is Q2,186 (\$280) and it is Q2,514 (\$322) in Zunil. Thirty-three households receive between Q250 (\$32) and Q1,750 (\$224) and five households in Zunil receive Q5,100 (\$654). Only two bars reach an average household income that is higher than households not receiving remittances. The bar for San Cristóbal at Q1,250 (\$160) represents two households, with incomes of Q1,300 (\$167) and Q4,600 (\$590). The bar at Q5,100 (\$654) for Zunil represents five households, with two incomes at Q7,500 (\$962). Otherwise, households that receive remittances on average have lower non-remittance income than those who do not receive remittances. Of these 44 households, only five receive more than Q2,500 (\$321) in monthly income. Nevertheless, averages hide inequality, since only 16 households in Zunil and 21 households in San Cristóbal, which do not receive remittances (i.e. out of a total of 172 households), earn more than Q2,500 (\$321) a month.

**Figure 4.7: San Cristóbal and Zunil: Monthly Remittances by Mean Income**



### *Motivations to Migrate*

Main reasons that drive migration are violence and socio-economic conditions (Castles and Miller 2009; Jonas and Rodríguez 2014). Migrants often receive moral support from various organizations like the Catholic Church, which supports the rights of people to migrate as a means to survive (Hagan 2008; Hamao 2004). My 2012 survey asked the respondent “why” their relative migrated, giving the interviewer space to write in one or two reasons. The survey did not prompt any response. Notably absent in their responses is that political violence was not a reason given from the 151 responses received, as shown in Table 4.4. The top two motivations given by respondents in both towns were economic problems (1) and no work (4) for the first respondent. The combined percentage is about 63% for Zunil and 57% for San Cristóbal. Many respondents put down a second migrant, giving a different reason for their motivation to migrate. This illustrated other reasons why their family member migrated, including family unity (9) and debt (10). The main answers for migration, however, were similar to the previous migrant, with economic problems (1), poverty (2), and no work (4) being top

reasons. These reasons appear to be similar, though I decided to group the answers in these categories because the words “economic problems”, “poverty”, “no work”, etc. were specifically mentioned in the answer.

**Table 4.4: Ten Reasons that Motivated Relatives to Migrate, according to Respondents**

<b>Reason To Migrate</b>				
	<b>First Migrant Left Because...</b>		<b>Second Migrant Left Because...</b>	
	San Cristóbal	Zunil*	San Cristóbal	Zunil
1. Economic problems	30%	42%	25%	49%
2. Poverty	15%	18%	25%	20%
3. Social mobility	19%	17%	12.5%	17%
4. No work	28%	22%	25%	11%
5. Study	0%	2%	0%	0%
6. Love	2%	0%	0%	0%
7. Not-sure	4%	0%	0%	0%
8. Family violence	2%	0%	0%	0%
9. Family unity	0%	0%	12.5%	0%
10. Debt	0%	0%	0%	3%
	N = 47	N = 60	N = 16	N = 35
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012 *Figures rounded up				

### *Difficulties Reported for Migrants*


My survey asked respondents who had relatives that migrated, “Could you name two of the difficulties experienced by your migrant household member?” In part, the question was motivated by the work of Hagan (2008), who described the migrant journey from Guatemala to the U.S., which included the various difficulties that they experienced. I was also motivated by the work of activists in the U.S. that work with migrants to overcome legal obstacles related to their migration status, employment, health, and other issues (Flynn 2013; Wheeler 2010).

The interviewer had space to write in two reasons. The survey did not prompt any response, and I placed each response into one of seven categories. I graphed the


difficulties that respondents reported by whether the household currently received remittances. Figure 4.8 describes the answers of respondents in households that receive remittances, and Figure 4.9 describes the answers of respondents in households that do not receive remittances. The bar represents average non-remittance income (y-axis). The x-axis represents the difficulty encountered. The number of the bar and the average monthly income are vertically placed above the bar to facilitate identification with the seven categories in the legend. The number of respondents contributing to each answer is written in the inside bottom of the bar. Respondents from Zunil are graphed on the left and those from San Cristóbal are graphed on the right.

For respondents receiving remittances in Zunil (Figure 4.8), those in the highest income bracket (above Q2,500 (\$321)) reported finding a job (3) as the greatest difficulty. There are no high income bracket people in San Cristóbal in this category. However, for those in the middle income bracket (Q1,100 (\$141) to Q2,500 (\$321)) most respondents in San Cristóbal stated three main difficulties: the journey (2), finding a job (3), and fear of removal (4). Respondents in Zunil reported two: the journey (2) and fear of removal (4). In both towns, respondents in the lowest income bracket reported exploitation (1) and leaving home (6) were the main difficulties.

**Figure 4.8: Reported Difficulties for Migrants that send Remittances**



**Figure 4.9: Reported Difficulties for Migrants that do not send Remittances**



Respondents who receive no remittances from their relatives (Figure 4.9) report some variation on the difficulties of their migrant relatives. For example, more respondents reported exploitation as the greatest difficulty in both towns. However, by far the greatest difficulty reported by respondents in Zunil was suffering on the journey (2). When I examined the income levels of the 22 respondents in this category, they spanned all incomes, including three respondents in the highest and lowest levels. Only



one respondent in San Cristóbal reported suffering on the journey (2). However, it was the highest reported category for San Cristóbal respondents in Figure 4.8 (households that receive remittances). Household income was Q2,500 (\$321) or less for those reporting that the journey was the greatest difficulty (2). Because my sample is not representative, these figures may not represent the general population. However, the findings from Zunil and San Cristóbal offer a contrast that would require greater investigation, since the work of Hagan (2008) found that the quality or difficulty of the journey influenced the later success of the migrants. Was there a difference in the difficulty or in the preparation of the journey for migrants from Zunil and San Cristóbal, or is there a difference in the perception of the difficulty that may be different than the actual experience?

#### *Models: Examining Attitudes toward Seven Social Issues*

In the introduction, I hypothesized that the attitudes of respondents toward migration policies will be associated with the town in which they live, being organized differently by socio-economics and culturally distinct, rather than with whether one belongs to a migrant or non-migrant household. I examine the hypothesis with seven statements, which I use as dependent variables to form seven models. As summarized in the methods section above and described in detail in chapter one, respondents checked one of seven options from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). I graphed the seven statements below by location and whether they belonged to a migrant household. This helps with seeing how respondents answered the questions and to contrast the answers with the regression analysis.

Because there are seven levels in the scale, I examined the statements using OLS regression. At the same time, because of the relative few cases that I have, I also

examined the data by creating binary variables from the seven statements. I recoded the answers (5), (6), and (7) to “agree” and (1), (2), (3), and (4) to “do not agree.” Because (4) is “neutral,” I present the data using “agree” and “do not agree.” Comparing OLS and logistic regression results, the significant variables were nearly the same, with similar significances. I chose to present logistic regression, which enables me to explain the results in odds ratios. It is helpful in this analysis to see how big the differences are between San Cristóbal and Zunil and between migrant and non-migrant households. In each of the seven models, I have the same independent variables. Table 4.5 describes the results of the logistic regression analysis.


#### *Independent Variables*

The first main independent variable is San Cristóbal (1) and Zunil (0). The second is migrant household (1) and non-migrant household (0). The control variables are gender, male (1) and female (0); highest level of education, continuous variable (0) to (22); race-ethnicity, Mayan (1) and Ladino (0); monthly household income, continuous variable that I divided by 1,000 to avoid “0” coefficients in the table; age of respondent, continuous variable; marital status, married (1) and single (0); and number of children, continuous variable. Because of missing values, the total number of observations in each of the models is  $N = 213$ . Pseudo  $R^2$  is shown at the bottom of the table.

#### *Dependent Variables*


The first statement, Model 1, examines the following attitude, “In the next ten years, Guatemala will not need remittances from family members in the United States.” Figure 4.10 describes the responses grouped by town and migrant household.

**Figure 4.10: Attitudes toward the Future of Remittances sent by Family**




The second statement, Model 2, examines the following attitude, “North Americans appreciate the work of Guatemalans in the United States.” Figure 4.11 describes the responses grouped by town and migrant household.

**Figure 4.11: Attitudes toward how well Guatemalans are treated in the U.S.**




The third statement, Model 3, examines the following attitude, “Americans are friends to Guatemalans and will help Guatemala advance its economic future.” Figure 4.12 describes the responses grouped by town and migrant household.

**Figure 4.12: Attitudes toward the help North Americans will give Guatemala**




The fourth statement, Model 4, examines the following attitude, “If Guatemala was more like the United States, it would be a better place to live.” Figure 4.13 describes the responses grouped by town and migrant household.

**Figure 4.13: Attitudes toward Guatemala changing to be more like the U.S.**




The fifth statement, Model 5, examines the following attitude, “Immigrants send plenty of money back to Guatemala. I only wish they invested it better.” Figure 4.14 describes the responses grouped by town and migrant household.

**Figure 4.14: Attitudes toward the Investments of Migrants**



The sixth statement, Model 6, examines the following attitude, “Immigrants exaggerate their importance when they come back to the community.” Figure 4.15 describes the responses grouped by town and migrant household.

**Figure 4.15: Attitudes toward Migrants when the return back home**



The seventh statement, Model 7, examines the following attitude, “Immigrants really help the community. If it were not for them, we would be worse off.” Figure 4.16 describes the responses grouped by town and migrant household.

**Figure 4.16: Attitudes toward the help that Migrants give their communities**




Table 4.5: Logistic Regression Between Respondents in San Cristóbal and Zunil and Migrant and Non-migrant Households

<b>Attitudes toward Migration and Related Policies, Examined by Town and Migrant Household</b>							
<i>Dependent Variables</i>	In Next Ten Years Guatemala will not need remittances	North Americans appreciate the work of Guatemalans in USA	North Americans are our friends and they will help Guatemala	If Guatemala was equal to USA, it would be a better place to live	Migrants Send enough Money, but I wish they invested it Better	Migrants exaggerate when they return home	Migrants help community. If it were not for them, we would be worse off
<i>Binary Variables:</i>							
<i>Agree (1)</i>							
<i>Do Not Agree (0)</i>							
	coef/(se) odds ratio	coef/(se) odds ratio	coef/(se) odds ratio	coef/(se) odds ratio	coef/(se) odds ratio	coef/(se) odds ratio	coef/(se) odds ratio
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
San Cristóbal (1) and Zunil (0) (by itself & DV)	<b>-0.58*</b> (-1.98) .561	<b>0.96***</b> (3.42) 2.616	<b>0.45+</b> (1.67) 1.570	<b>-1.13**</b> (-2.77) .324	<b>1.08***</b> (3.75) 2.938	<b>1.15***</b> (3.64) 3.167	0.04 (0.11) 1.036
Migrant Household (1) and Non-Migrant HH (0) (by itself & DV)	0.14 (0.48) 1.149	0.23 (0.87) 1.264	0.20 (0.74) 1.22	<b>1.06**</b> (2.74) 2.888	-0.01 (-0.05) .986	<b>-0.58+</b> (-1.86) .561	0.56 (1.64) 1.756
<i>San Cristóbal (1) and Zunil (0)</i>	<b>-0.70+</b> (-1.93) .495	<b>1.08**</b> (3.10) 2.950	<b>0.56+</b> (1.69) 1.753	-0.78 (-1.59) .460	<b>1.25***</b> (3.40) 3.495	<b>0.95*</b> (2.41) 2.594	0.37 (0.89) 1.454
Migrant Household (1) and Non-Migrant HH (0)	-0.07 (-0.211) .935	<b>0.55+</b> (1.81) 1.736	0.30 (1.02) 1.347	<b>1.03*</b> (2.41) 2.806	0.19 (0.59) 1.209	-0.34 (-0.97) .7142885	<b>0.67+</b> (1.79) 1.946
Gender: Male (1) Female (0)	-0.41 (-1.201) .665	0.31 (0.97) 1.365	0.003 (0.01) 1.003	-0.37 (-0.87) .689	-0.20 (-0.59) .819	-0.40 (-1.07) .672	0.49 (1.25) 1.627
Last year of education, continuous variable from 0 to 22	<b>-0.09*</b> (-2.10) .918	-0.03 (-0.83) .970	-0.05 (-1.48) .948	<b>-0.11*</b> (-2.23) .894	<b>-0.10*</b> (-2.54) .904	0.05 (1.08) 1.047	<b>-0.09+</b> (-1.89) .915
Race-Ethnicity: Mayan (1), Ladino (0)	-0.70 (-1.50) .496	-0.61 (-1.39) .546	-0.22 (-0.51) .805	0.03 (0.06) 1.033	-0.55 (-1.13) .576	0.18 (0.32) 1.195	-0.11 (-0.21) .898
Monthly HH income in Quetzals (≠1,000)	0.02 (0.26) 1.022	-0.02 (-0.28) .979	0.06 (0.79) 1.061	0.08 (0.65) 1.082	<b>0.18*</b> (2.06) 1.201	-0.02 (-0.30) .976	0.13 (1.14) 1.142

**Table 4.5, continued**

Age of Respondent in the year of the survey	-0.005 (-0.31) .995	-0.001 (-0.04) .999	0.009 (0.55) 1.009	-0.022 (-1.09) .978	<b>-0.03+ (-1.81)</b> <b>.969</b>	-0.016 (-0.88) .984	0.032 (1.40) 1.032
Marital Status: Married (1) Single (0)	0.13 (0.32) 1.136	0.22 (0.59) 1.242	0.04 (0.10) 1.037	0.10 (0.20) 1.104	<b>0.83* (2.15)</b> <b>2.297</b>	<b>0.88* (2.004)</b> <b>2.420</b>	-0.17 (-0.37) .843
Children (continuous)	-0.01 (-0.07) .990	-0.01 (-0.09) .988	-0.06 (-0.42) .945	-0.003 (-0.02) .997	0.11 (0.76) 1.116	-0.18 (-1.140) .838	<b>-0.32+ (-1.90)</b> <b>.725</b>
Constant	1.19 (1.42)	-0.56 (-0.72)	-0.08 (-0.11)	<b>3.45*** (3.34)</b>	1.26 (1.52)	0.87 (0.96)	0.79 (0.81)
Number of observations	213	213	213	213	213	213	213
Pseudo R2	0.050	0.061	0.022	0.126	0.113	0.103	0.061
note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1							
Data Source: Western Highlands Survey 2012							



#### 4.4 Results

Table 4.5 describes the results of the logistic regression for the seven variables presented above, which are the dependent variables. In the cell, the first number is the coefficient and the number in parenthesis next to it is the standard error. The number in the second row of the cell is the odds ratio. The first two rows, above the double line, describe the direct effects of the main independent variables on the dependent variables. Below the double line are the full models. The main independent variables are shown first, and then the control variables. One notable variable that I did not include in the models was religious denomination. The variable was insignificant in all the models, describing no differences between Catholic or Protestant respondents, so it was omitted. Overall for each model, the explanatory power is fair, from a low of 2.2% pseudo  $R^2$  in model 3, to a high of 12.6% in model 4.

One direct effect in model 1 is significant, i.e. location. Respondents in San Cristóbal are about 44% more unlikely not to agree with the statement, meaning that they are more likely to report that Guatemalans will need remittances in the next ten years. There are no differences between respondents in migrant or non-migrant households. In the full model, the effect is only marginally significant, but the effect is slightly stronger at 50.5% more unlikely to agree with the statement. This supports my hypothesis that the town of the respondent would predict the outcome of an attitude toward migration perceptions or policies rather than whether the respondent comes from a migrant household. Among the control variables, the education variable is significant. As each year of education increases, it is 8.2% less likely that the respondent will agree with the statement.

One direct effect in model 2 is significant, i.e. location. Respondents in San Cristóbal are about 162% more likely to agree with the statement, meaning that they are more likely to say that North Americans appreciate the work of Guatemalans compared to those in Zunil. When the controls are added into the model, the significant effect increases to 195% more likely to agree with the statement compared to respondents in Zunil. However, because of the marginal significance of migrant household, my hypothesis is not fully supported. It is about 74% more likely that a migrant household agrees with this statement compared to a non-migrant household. It is not significant as a direct effect, however.

One direct effect in model 3 is marginally significant, i.e. location. Respondents in San Cristóbal are 57% more like to agree with the statement, meaning that they are more likely to report that North Americans are friends of Guatemalans and therefore will help Guatemala, compared to respondents in Zunil. In the full model, this effect gets stronger, though remains marginally significant, which shows that the respondents from San Cristóbal are about 75% more likely to agree with the statement than those from Zunil. This supports my hypothesis, and there are no other significant variables in the model.

The direct effects in model 4 are significant for both location and migrant household, which are mixed results for my hypothesis. First, respondents in San Cristóbal are about 68% less likely to agree with the statement, meaning that they are less likely to say that Guatemala would be a better place to live if it were more like the U.S. compared to respondents in Zunil. Second, respondents from migrant households are about 189% more likely to agree with this statement compared to non-migrant

households, which does not support my hypothesis. In the full model, my hypothesis is not supported. Location is not significant, but migrant households remain significant, and a similar likelihood to support the statement at about 181%. The other significant variable is education. For every year increase of education, there is about 10% likelihood that the respondent does not support this statement.

One direct effect in model 5 is significant, i.e. location, supporting my hypothesis. Respondents in San Cristóbal are about 194% more likely to support the statement than respondents from Zunil, meaning that they are more likely to report the perception of wishing that migrants invested their money better. In the full model, the effect remains significant and it is stronger, which shows that respondents from San Cristóbal are about 250% more likely to agree with this statement than those from Zunil. Four control variables are significant. For education, with every year increase, respondents are about 10% more likely not to agree with this statement. For every unit increase in monthly household income, respondents are 20% more likely to agree with this statement. Age is marginally significant. For every year increase in age, respondents are 3.1% less likely to support this statement. Marital status is significant. Respondents who are married are about 130% more likely to agree with this statement than those who are single.

The direct effects are significant in model 6. Respondents in San Cristóbal about 217% are more likely than those in Zunil to support the statement that migrants exaggerate their importance when they return home. It is marginally significant for migrant households. About 44% of respondents from migrant households are less likely to support this statement than respondents from non-migrant households. In the full model, the migrant household effect is no longer significant. The location variable

maintains significance, though the odds ratio is less. Respondents in San Cristóbal are about 159% more likely to support this statement than those in Zunil. One other control variable is significant, marital status. Married respondents are 142% more likely to support this statement than single ones.

The direct effects in model 7 are not significant. However, in the full model, respondents in migrant and non-migrant households are marginally significant. Respondents in migrant households are about 95% more likely to agree with the statement that migrants help the community, because otherwise they would be worse off. This does not support my hypothesis. Two control variables are significant. For every year increase of a respondent's education, he or she is 8.5% less likely to agree with this statement. Second, for each increase in the number of children, respondents are 27.5% less likely to agree with this statement.

#### **4.5 Discussion and Conclusion**

Social researchers have been interested in indigenous populations for many decades, (Adams 1970; Adams and International Congress of Americanists 1966; Rodriguez 1987). Today indigenous social scientists have built upon previous work, describing the various difficulties that indigenous populations have to advance economically and socially (Velásquez Nimatuj 2002). Guatemala is a unique case study to understand the struggles of the indigenous population for a number of reasons. The Mayan population had been one of the most advanced societies in the Americas in the first millennium (Carmack 2001). It was one of the first Catholic countries to legitimize non-Catholic groups to live, work, and worship in Guatemala (Garrard-Burnett 1998). Today Guatemala has a greater percentage of indigenous population than any other Latin

American country and at the same time the largest percentage of Protestants out of any country. Guatemala also suffered more massacres and violence against workers, families, and communities from the 1960s to the present than other countries, though this does not diminish the suffering that other countries experienced. The 1944 to 1954 liberal government of Guatemala became a learning experience for Cuban revolutionaries to avoid the mistakes that lead to a coup that ended its experiments in liberal reforms. At the same time, the Western Highlands remain one of the poorest regions in Latin America. These complex social conditions have been accompanied by waves of migration to the U.S. since the 1980s (Jonas and Rodríguez 2014). This fascinating history and experience of Guatemala, and the indigenous people in particular, motivated me to do survey research in the Highlands as a case study to understand the wider phenomena of migration, inequality, and religion.

In this chapter I examined the differences and similarities between respondents in the type of town in which they lived, or the type of migrant and non-migrant household in which they belonged. I looked at demographic details as well as attitudes toward issues related to migration. We can see the differences demographically. For example, as described earlier, Jonas and Rodriguez (2014) organized Guatemalan migration to the U.S. in five phases, and the Guatemalan 2002 census gives us migration figures for phase four. A majority of migrants (54%) migrated from Zunil during this period in my 2012 survey, with a strong minority (40%) migrating from San Cristóbal in phase four. The current phase, 2004 to the present, my survey reports continued high levels of migration (Table 4.3). Comparing my unrepresentative sample with the census has its limitations, but it indicates possible, important trends and influences from migrants in terms of

consumption, i.e. sending remittances, or other activities. Educational levels are considerably higher for both migrant and non-migrant households in both towns, with the highest level of education being reported in migrant households. Migrant respondents have higher levels of economic satisfaction than non-migrant respondents, though non-migrant respondents also have high levels. The propensity of migrants to migrate, according to various answers in the survey, comes from reasons of poverty or a desire to improve one's family economic well-being. Generally low income levels combined with the kinds of reasons given for migration, the Western Highlands continues to be fertile ground for migratory activity. My particular case study does not show other reasons for migration, like political violence or the infiltration of the drug cartel. In terms of the difficulties migrants faced, many respondents reported that their migrant relatives suffered during the journey, 40 of them. However, 17 send remittances and 23 did not. Greater investigation into their experiences may support the findings of Hagan (2008) about the importance of religion, and expand our understanding about successful and less successful migration strategies by comparing the two groups.

The evidence for supporting my hypothesis toward migrant attitudes is mixed. Supporting my hypothesis, the town where the respondent comes from is strongly significant in three full models (2, 3, and 4, with model 2 partially supporting it), and marginally significant in two (1 and 3). Model 4 is the model with a strongly significant coefficient that does not support my hypothesis, and models 2 and 7 are marginally significant. This pattern of results brings up three themes for discussion.

First, the evidence suggests that the social context or organization of the town is an important consideration when examining the attitudes of people, though migrants have

a role in how family members in the home country perceive issues related to migration. This makes greater sense in terms of migration theory, like cumulative causation and transnational network theory, complementing the classical theories like Marx and Weber. According to the 2002 census, both towns had similar percentages of migrant outflows, though respondents from San Cristóbal are more likely to see the need for remittances in the next decade. While some of the variation may be explained by the stability of an agricultural community like Zunil and the more precarious job situations in San Cristóbal, my study is limited to offer more detailed answers. Moreover, the difference is marginal, meaning it could be a problem of low sample numbers. San Cristóbal residents are more likely to perceive that Americans appreciate Guatemalan workers compared to those from Zunil, independent of other variables. This suggests that the transnational social networks developed by the migrants from San Cristóbal differ from those from Zunil, with better experiences transmitted by the migrants from San Cristóbal to their home communities. This supports the work of Rodriguez (1987), who found that stronger social networks among the indigenous people of Totonicapán in Houston and their relatives back home gave them an advantage to survive in the larger community. It also supports some evidence in my conversations with migrants from Zunil in the U.S., and a priest that I interviewed who lives part time in Zunil that works with the indigenous in the Highlands, that express moving from one job to another in search for better working conditions and for less conflicts in the workplace (Castillo González 2013).

Not surprisingly, there is no difference between respondents about whether migrants help the community, which figure 4.16 shows high agreement in both towns. However, respondents in San Cristóbal are much more likely to express greater demands

on migrants than respondents in Zunil, in terms of migrants investing their money and feeling their importance when they return home. It may be possible that in a closely-knit community like Zunil, there is greater transparency about financial matters than a more urbanized situation like San Cristóbal, where there are no local banks, large migrant homes that are not always occupied, and greater religious heterogeneity. My study does not examine these details, but suggest areas for further study, and whether it is associated with more capitalist development along the lines of cottage and wage work.

Respondents from migrants households are much more likely to have the attitude that the more Guatemala becomes like the U.S., it would be a better place to live, model 4. Along with the marginal significance in models 2 and 7, this is evidence that transnational family social networks have influences that non-migrant households do not have on members, net of all control variables. Interestingly, the influence favors the U.S., and suggests that a migrant's success in the U.S. is associated with conscious or unconscious beliefs that the U.S. has better social structures than Guatemala. However, more investigation is needed. It could be that the respondent's perception of American social structures is more favorable because wider socialization like film, TV, or social media. However, the latter reasons would not explain the difference between migrant and non-migrant households, unless one's migrant relative influences one's understanding of these messages.

Second, migration is part of a complex socio-economic, political, and cultural phenomena, which is as much local as it is global. Rodríguez (1996a) compared the global movement of capital with the global movement of workers and families and proposed "autonomous international migration" as a way to understand the institutions



that individuals, families, and communities built up over time. This was done without state involvement, and the migrant benefited by working and receiving a wage and the employer benefited by making a viable business (Rodríguez 1996a). However, as noted by Rodríguez in the article, political actors get involved in other ways by criminalizing workers without proper documentation, by making it tougher to cross international borders, and by offering occasional forms of relief, i.e. legalization (Rodríguez 1996a:31). Another aspect in the struggle indigenous people have is the battle against their position in society in terms of class and race. Velásquez Nimatuj wrote that her experience taught her that the struggle against racism is part of the struggle against injustice and the ability to have access to land, encouraging the use of legal and political channels for change (2008:282). De Janvry wrote that the various social positions that peasants face as a class with the capitalist class means that social change will resolve the contradictions, which he referred to as class struggle (1981:265). These kinds of solutions would involve changes in laws about the use of private property, which individuals maintain primary control under the current constitution. If my two research sites in Guatemala are a case study in class conflict, it describes that social change has occurred through migration, which affects the whole community to different degrees, which respondents reported as mostly positive. It has also been an accepted means of social change in Guatemala and the U.S., albeit less than the change envisioned by workers from the 1970s to the 1990s (Guerrilla Army of the Poor, *The* 1981).

Third, current motivations for migration from Guatemala may vary for different parts of the country. In the 1980s and 1990s, migrants from Totonicapán and vast areas of the Highlands cited political violence as their reason to leave Guatemala, though other

reasons like economic hardship was also mentioned (Manz 1988b; Rodriguez 1987). In my study, no one mentioned political violence as a motivation. Most people left for economic reasons or reasons based on poverty. However, we are aware that drug cartels and political violence are on the rise in other parts of Guatemala, and thus indicative of political violence as a reason to migrate (Hochmüller 2014; Ybarra 2012). Nineteenth century migration from Europe to the U.S., e.g. from Ireland or Germany, was motivated by a variety of reasons, notwithstanding poverty and political violence (Castles and Miller 2009). One difference between European and indigenous migrants is race. Insofar as Velásquez Nimatuj's insight into the association between class and race is correct, the harder it will be for more indigenous migrants to integrate into American communities. The wider question of justice might be whether social change can occur without violence. In a few places, social scientists wrote that the elites were not disposed to give up their privileges or cooperate with the indigenous people in politics or economics on an equal basis, leaving only one option for the indigenous people to follow, namely armed opposition (Aguayo 1985:65; Davis 1988:20).

Today there is no organized armed opposition in Guatemala to take political control and institute a government dedicated to socialism. However, some indigenous individuals and groups gained wider leadership experience during the civil war by directing the CUC (National Peasant Union) (Velásquez Nimatuj 2008:91–135). This broke the ideological domination and sense of inferiority of many Mayan people (Manz 1988a:89). Moreover, a collection of personal stories by indigenous and non-indigenous guerrillas tells of the pride and motivations of the individuals who were involved in the social, armed movement to change Guatemala's social structures (Ortiz and Zamora

2010). In the U.S., the indigenous population is a few percentage points of the total population, but in Guatemala it comprises more than half the population. No other country in Latin America has as high of a percentage of the population, which indicates the unique case study of Guatemala. Throughout Latin America the indigenous population is the poorest, and the struggle to understand their social position in relationship to others in society will go a long way to transforming societies, with the aim to reduce conflicts and resolve contradictions.

## Chapter 5: Conclusions

Writing my dissertation has been a rewarding and meaningful experience that has refined many of my ideas about politics, economics, race-ethnicity, and the role of religion in society. My first exposure to sociology was in college in the fall of 1985. Our professor linked capitalism, racism, and imperialism with oppression, exploitation, and injustice. Being in my early 20s, I was open to new explanations about events in the world, since the explanations put forward by the major U.S. political parties about issues like inequality and racism were not satisfactory. Our professor stated that Christianity has not yet assimilated nineteenth Century critical thinking, better formulated by the German philosopher and economist Karl Marx. His historical critical analysis of the capitalist economic system and his criticism of religion continue to be relevant in today's world society, as the European political theology and the Latin American liberation theology point out.

In the next decade, I obtained my Master of Arts degree in Church history, examining the viability of Boys Town, a place that helped troubled youth to find their talents and place in society. At the same time, I maintained my interest in liberation theology, reading various authors. I found the work of Enrique Dussel to be one of the more profound syntheses between Christianity and Marxism. Like my professor of sociology in the 1980s, Dussel concluded that there was no contradiction between Christian ethics and Marxist ethics. At the 2015 conference led by a group of founders of CEHILA, the Commission Studies for Latin America Church History in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, he stated that liberation theologians will find unity across denominations when they begin to incorporate the ethics of Marx as found in his major work, *Capital*. In other

words, his analysis leads him to conclude that each religious denomination would have to come to terms with Marxian ethics to fit their particular interpretation of Christianity, i.e. if Christianity desired to be consistent with their ethical foundations.

The general agreement of liberation theologians with Dussel's vision about the future of Christianity is strikingly different from the point of view of sociologists of religion in the U.S. represented by Christian Smith (1991). Smith surveyed liberation theology and concluded that liberation theologians moved away from using the sociological analysis of Marx to understand the social reality of wealth and poverty. Whereas Smith argued that this was a sign of liberation theology's diminished and diminishing influence, Dussel argued that this was an event that must be reversed in order to "save" Christianity as a religion for the future. My dissertation is a response to both of these positions. I highlight the similarities and differences between Zunil and San Cristóbal, discussing how this might impact our understanding of liberation theology, and ending with an analysis of the relevance of religion in Guatemala in its regional and world-wide context.

## **5.1 Review of Findings**

The three main chapters of my dissertation describe the survey research that I conducted in San Cristóbal and Zunil, examining the social context and perception of the majority indigenous people in my survey in regards to inequality, religion, and migration. Generally, I theorized that the respondents' perceptions of various social issues would be conditioned by the town where they lived more than their social stratification, religious denomination, sense of God's presence, or migrant household. By choosing San Cristóbal and Zunil, I controlled for ethnicity. The second chapter described a population

experiencing wide poverty and lack of job opportunities, though respondents reported working in various occupations. Zunil developed an economy based on agricultural primary commodities. San Cristóbal tended toward wage work. Both economies are part of the informal economy (Roberts 1990). Making a general, though cautious comparison with the 2002 Guatemalan census, the Western Highlands 2012 survey indicates some status mobility by increased levels of education and some higher wealth indicators. Remittances have transformed both towns. It appears remittance income may have a wider affect in the towns than just with families that receive remittances, since more children are going to school and construction in housing, roads, and small businesses involve non-migrant families. Respondents saw the need for individual and social efforts to overcome poverty, though respondents with a stronger sense of God's presence were associated with greater odds of agreeing with individual efforts, suggesting the influence of a personal theology of salvation. Mayan respondents more likely than Ladinos, and those from San Cristóbal more likely than Zunil, agreed with structural causes of poverty and wealth. It is uncertain to what extent respondents articulate the racism they experience in structural terms i.e. through cultural differences, individualism as a rationalization for racial inequality, and nationalism that identifies with white ethnicity (Bonilla-Silva 2000).

## **5.2 Discussion of Similarities and Differences**

Near the entrance of San Cristóbal is the main intersection known as “cuatro caminos.” The shoulders of the two highways are lined up with buses and trucks to go east to Guatemala City or Totonicapán, west to San Marcos or Mexico, north to Huehuetenango, and south to Quetzaltenango. Going south by car from Quetzaltenango a

sign on the highway welcomes you to Zunil. The highway, the most direct from Quetzaltenango, cuts through a valley with mountains on the left and right. The majority of the population lives to the east of the highway, though people also live to the west. Several taxis and buses wait for customers or tourists along the shoulders and entrances to Zunil. Four days a week the entrances and shoulders of the highway are packed with pallets of fruits and vegetables. Trucks and buses line both sides of the highway and merchants from the region bargain with the people of Zunil to sell their agricultural merchandize. This highway through Zunil is otherwise quiet, contrasting with the 24 hour activity at cuatro caminos.

### *Economy*

The economic activity in San Cristóbal is diversified. There is the hustle and bustle of cuatro caminos, and this activity contrasts with the quiet city center of San Cristóbal, except for the weekly market day that sells all kinds of merchandize. The city center's buildings are the Catholic Church, the municipality, and various small businesses. Several blocks off the city center, however, a small farmer's market sells fruit and vegetables on a daily basis. Radiating from the city center, San Cristóbal has various streets with stores, shopping, and Evangelical churches. People in San Cristóbal travel about three miles north to San Francisco El Alto for clothes, since it is a hub for family owned and operated textile industry and central distribution point. The home as a domestic textile factory also characterizes San Cristóbal. About 26% of the population engages in agricultural work, either as a day laborer or self-employed farmer. Many people work in small businesses or professional work in Quetzaltenango, which has good roads and public transportation options to and from San Cristóbal. Small businesses also

supplement people's income, including bakery shops, convenience stores, electronic stores, internet shops, and restaurants, often being located in or next to their homes. San Cristóbal does not have any banks, and the closest bank is located in Salcajá, a town half way the distance from San Cristóbal to Quetzaltenango.

The economic activity in Zunil is less diverse, more homogenous. About 62% of the population is involved in agricultural work as day laborers or small business owners. Many families work together, forming cooperatives to sell their vegetables and fruits. While I did not thoroughly analyze this activity, it appears to function more like a gathering of small business owners rather than a union that competes with the managers and owners of a company. Moreover, people are advancing their knowledge of crop production as demonstrated by the growing number of greenhouses that provide better quality products for the vegetable and fruit markets. The agricultural setting provides greater contact with the family members as immediate and extended family members work in the fields. Residents by and large maintain gendered roles, with women cooking the meals and taking care of the home. The men come home to eat either at midday or towards the evening. Some people are tenant farmers near Almolonga, a town north and west of Zunil. Various families showed me their investments in the textile industry, focusing on making traditional women's clothing. A large room within their homes, for example, would be set up like a small domestic factory for making the garments. People in Zunil also work in the textile factories of Cantel, a town north and east of Zunil about one mile (Nash 1967). Zunil's city center is located half way up the hill on which it is constructed, on a wide open plateau. The buildings on the plaza include the Catholic Church, the municipality, and various stores and restaurants. Buses line part of the plaza,



taking people to various parts of the municipality. There is also tourism concentrated on the thermal baths and volcanic water, for example Fuentes Georginas. This generates some taxi and restaurant business. Zunil has banking services, a large indoor market, and outdoor market in the city center a couple of times a week. Public transportation to Quetzaltenango is limited and the highways are two-lanes and less maintained than those out of San Cristóbal.

The most obvious difference between San Cristóbal and Zunil is the kind of activity associated with its geographical location – one being a bustling transportation hub and the other being a quiet agricultural center with bursts of activity. Both towns have similar city centers, but there is more activity in Zunil's city center than that of San Cristóbal's. San Cristóbal's economic activity is more diversified than the economic activity Zunil. In Zunil agricultural activity is part of the understanding of economic stability, while in San Cristóbal the economic diversification means that people have several kinds of economic activity that contributes to their understanding of economic stability. It also means that there are less common experiences in San Cristóbal based on type of economic activity, which might contribute to the divisions and mistrust between groups, rather than within groups. For example, water is a precious commodity and a cooperative of about 200 households work together to maintain a supply of water from a nearby well. Families work together to help each other financially. I attended a meeting of the cooperative and I saw how men and women took on leadership roles to talk about the various issues related to the cooperative, showing me strong in-group solidarity.

## *Racism*

One of the other intractable problems related to the economy is racism.

Velásquez Nimatuj (2002) described racism that all classes of the K'iche' experience in Guatemala. The highest class within the K'iche' is the petty bourgeois class. There are no K'iche' among the elites. Because I controlled for race-ethnicity by choosing two K'iche' towns, I wanted to know how Mayans thought about themselves. In part, I desired to analyze whether their understanding of poverty correlated with the understanding of poverty among sociologists, economists, or liberation theologians. I operated on the beliefs of the theories of critical race theory and colonialism (González Casanova 1965; Stavenhagen 1968). The way that whites construct racial categories antagonizes people of different races to different degrees with the goal to maintain and perpetuate economic hegemony. Therefore, the motivation for my questions about how the Mayans think of the role of race in the creation of wealth and poverty, i.e. individual and social structures of poverty, comes from my desire to contribute to the work of academics and activists for an accurate understanding about how oppression is maintained and perpetuated. In part, I hope to contribute to the on-going work of scholars, activists, and the oppressed themselves to find unity in thought and action. This will increase our ability to work towards common goals that reduce racism, capitalism, and imperialism and replace it with humanism that is a synthesis between Christianity (each particular denomination) and communism. This does not destroy the advances that capitalism has made to world socio-economic development, but advances how capital can be used on a global scale that is controlled socially rather than individually, i.e. workers rather than individual capitalists. The indigenous and poorer Ladinos conceptualize

individual causes of wealth and poverty based on race more strongly than structural causes of wealth and poverty based on race. This means that there might be opportunities for education. For example, we know through ethnography that the indigenous people face a glass ceiling for advancement. We also know that even if the glass ceiling did not exist for some individuals, the whole class of indigenous people would continue to live in poverty. How can we teach individual motivation to overcome poverty while at the same time work to change policies that likewise change social structures that fundamentally change the control of the goods and services that workers produce? This is a complex idea that requires the work of many social researchers, liberation theologians, and activists.

Reflecting on the work of Irma Vásquez Nimatuj, Manuela Camus, or Beatriz Manz, the indigenous people were proud to have their own national leaders, e.g. of a union, “Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC). As the guerrilla movement strengthened in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is logical to suggest that the indigenous people were inspired by the Ladino successes as guerrilla leaders and union organizers. This inspiration would lead them to develop their own organizations beyond the work of indigenous mayors, which began under Spanish colonialism. Unbeknownst to either the Ladinos or indigenous people fighting for a just society, the elites had planned way back in the mid-1970s to use all possible violence and ideological campaigns to defeat them. However, the indigenous people developed leadership and social networking skills on a national scale through leading organizations like the CUC. In retrospect, they built upon these experiences by sending family members to work in the U.S. They developed transnational social networks, and, more importantly, avoided the catastrophic

consequences of losing the civil war. The benefits of migration have spread throughout the Western Highlands and Guatemala as a whole.

### *Religion*

Another reason I chose to study San Cristóbal and Zunil was their differences in religious affiliation. San Cristóbal has a majority of Catholics, though my sample from San Cristóbal has a majority of Evangelicals. The Catholic Church building is the third wonder of Guatemala, though it is not the center of activity as it once was. The town has large Evangelical churches that fit upwards of 300 people. People are serious about home Bible studies and coming to church during the week as well as on Sunday. The different Evangelical churches are not affiliated with each other, with some of them being break-away churches from the larger churches. There is no single church that is the hub of activity for the town, with the possible exception of its patronal feast day in July. San Cristóbal appears to have several groups that vie for attention, thus making unity between the groups more difficult. There is also the contrast between Catholics whose worship style is formal and sacramental, and the evangelical style which is testimonial based and more democratic. It also emphasizes a personal relationship with God without the need for priests as intermediaries. People are respectful of each other, but this does not mean that they trust each other or aim to create some kind of social cohesion. The extensive activity at cuatro caminos may add to the insecurity that the people of San Cristóbal feel, as demonstrated by occasional strikes, road blockages, and confrontations with the military police.

In Zunil, nearly all the population is Catholic and a group of lay people operate a local radio station with studios at the church. They broadcast in K'iche, occasionally in

Spanish, with the goal of providing local information to its residents and greetings from relatives living in the U.S. Apart from the Catholic Church, there is devotion to “San Simón.” There are various stories about its origin. It appears that decades ago disaffected Catholics, devoted to San Simón, objected to the priest trying to abolish the devotion, so they separated from the church. The figure of San Simón goes from household to household on an annual basis. People go to the house and ask the priests and priestesses to ask help for them from San Simón, usually for a personal or social problem. They pay a fee. People willingly guided me to San Simón. Otherwise, Evangelical churches are small and hard to locate. I found the pastor of a Jehovah Witnesses’ congregation. He used his yard as a make shift worship space for about 20 people.

Catholicism orientates the lives of the people in Zunil every day, whether it is in the home, understanding personal relationships, or seeing the fruits of their agricultural labor as coming from God. Life and death, sin and holiness are understood “sacramentally.” In part, a sacramental understanding means that God is manifested through things and events like baptism, communion, confirmation, and marriage. Social organizations are centered on the Church, such that most evenings the Church is bustling with activity. In Zunil, people fill the chapel daily for Mass and worship of the Eucharist, which is separate from the main Church. When speaking with the mayor of Zunil, he occasionally referred me to the pastor of the Catholic Church to answer more technical questions about the community. This was different than my encounter with the mayor of San Cristóbal. Once he explained how he used grant money to help both Evangelical and

Catholic Churches, because he desired to be of service to the whole population of San Cristóbal.

I spoke extensively with Fr. Victoriano (2013), an anthropologist originally from Mexico. He served many Catholic communities in the Highlands, including Zunil and San Cristóbal as pastor. I asked him about how he saw the differences between Zunil and San Cristóbal. He believed that the culture of the K'iche' was more pure in Zunil than San Cristóbal, meaning that the people in Zunil maintained their beliefs and values more vigorously than the people in San Cristóbal, Catholic or Protestant. Victoriano made distinctions along how well people lived out trust and solidarity, creating greater social cohesion. I talked with Victoriano at a retreat center, where he was teaching young Mayans how to develop their leadership skills within Mayan traditions. He was pessimistic about how development was affecting Zunil, as he saw people making decisions that benefited themselves personally more than communally.

### **5.3 Liberation Theology in Solidarity with the Poor**

Liberation theology motivated me to imagine that the people in San Cristóbal and Zunil might be at different levels of understanding their own poverty in terms of religious consciousness. For example, my questions about the respondents' conception of God attempted to isolate various levels of understanding of liberation theology among the indigenous people and lower class Ladinos. I anticipated finding distinctions between whether God was a passive actor in people lives, an actor in the lives of the rich to help the poor, or an actor in the lives of the poor to oppose the rich. What I found was little distinction between people's ideas on all three measures, i.e. people thought God worked in all those ways. It was not until a conversation with the liberation theologian, Miguel

Picado (2009, 2011), that I realized that liberation theology was developed by middle and upper class people to understand how workers and the masses of people experienced oppression, exploitation, and injustice. This helped me understand why my measures for “concepts of God” described almost no differences between the respondents about the agency of God in liberating the poor. Rather than talking about God as an agent of liberation, I developed a latent measure called “omnipresence of God.” In other words, the experience and mental conceptualizations about the agency of God in the lives of my sample population were different than the experiences and mental conceptualizations of liberation theologians about the agency of God in the lives of the poor. Moreover, this dynamic is seen in the work of social scientists (Ekern 2010). This is one of the significant contributions of sociology to social science research in Guatemala. In no way does this take away the hard work of liberation theologians, but it aids our understanding about how sociology will continue to complement liberation theology.

A broader array of research studies have talked about colonialism in Mesoamerica, Latin American, and Africa (Amin 1974; González Casanova 1965; Stavenhagen 1968). The Mayans developed strategies of survival in a colonial culture that taught them subservience and inferiority. If the goal is to develop a culture that has eliminated the vestiges of colonialism, my research describes that there are areas for continued improvement. For example, respondents in general agreed that there are structural causes of poverty based on race, meaning that in their everyday activities they are treated inferiorly compared to non-indigenous Guatemalans. Also, while educational opportunities increased and economic advancement, this has come about with the Mayans

own efforts through migration and receiving remittances rather than an equality or parity of education with Ladinos or Creoles.

This dissertation was designed to find new ways to think about the problems facing Latin America. I worked in the Hispanic community in central and eastern Nebraska as a Catholic priest from 1994 to the present, which included helping thousands of Mexicans and Central Americans to obtain legal status in the U.S. as an immigration advocate. I saw a gap in the thinking of migrants, who perceived white Americans more positively than white Americans perceived them. I desired to capture this contradiction by focusing on attitudes that I did not see in ethnographic research or liberation theology. However, ethnographic research became essential for helping me contextualize my survey results. I hoped to capture some of the beliefs and attitudes toward social issues that were not captured in previous research or theology.

#### **5.4 The Relevance of Religion in Guatemala Today**

What is the relevance of religion today in Guatemala and where can the churches go? As discussed above, all religions, not only Christianity, will have to find a way to synthesize with a new social order. I cannot envision a world where individual capitalists can develop a system that leads to the solutions of wealth and poverty, or war and peace. Insofar as religions and religious leaders identify with individual capitalists, they side against the poor.

Guatemala appears to be a unique case in Latin America, but not so unique that it does not provide a lesson for Latin America or even other countries struggling with the problem of wealth and poverty. The suffering of Guatemala may be compared to the suffering of Poland before the outbreak of World War II. In order to control the



population of Poland so that they would not oppose the “final solution” proposed by the Nazis, the Germans sent in special operation forces before the War to kill priests, sisters, and other Polish intellectuals. The goal was to pre-empt any opposition that might successfully defeat the Germans in Poland. Upwards of 300,000 people were killed in these operations (G. Thomas 2012). Similarly in Guatemala, priests were expelled and banned from coming into Guatemala for decades. During the height of the civil war, whole dioceses in Guatemala were abandoned by their bishops and priests, and many were killed (Martinez C. 1999). Why did more indigenous people die in Guatemala than any other Latin American country that went through their own periods of dictatorships? Perhaps Guatemala’s large indigenous population correlated with the mechanisms of racism, and the capitalist system in Guatemala realized that it was strong enough to change the socio-economic organization of Guatemala through violence.

Social research complements the work of liberation theologians with the aim to strengthen the civil and democratic institutions, the social movements, and organizations, towards building, in solidarity, a new social order. Cracks in solidarity, will certainly be exploited by individual capitalists to maintain and perpetuate our current system characterized by oppression, exploitation, and injustice, even increasing the probability of war. For Guatemalans, it is a delicate balance because of the lack of power and resources among the indigenous people and the commitment of the elites to global capitalism, presently led by the U.S., which has enormous resources. At the least, I hope to open up new avenues of thinking about the problems of wealth and poverty, so that continued research may contribute towards developing a sense of the “common good” more appropriate for our times, modeled probably after the “Sumak Kawsay”, the “good

living” or “buen vivir” of the Latin American ancient peoples to forge a new society that can find the justice, peace and joy that all human beings desire, and in harmony with nature. (Llasag Fernández 2009) Practically speaking, this means that the Church will have to be committed in solidarity with the poor, in the construction of a world based on humanitarian values in all areas of life, including socio-economic development.

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