TMENT o•TATE 
-0-1-RE_C_T_O_R_O_F_ INTELLIGENCE ANQ RESEAR~~c~\ ~n 
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March 1', 1966 
E gECLASSJFIE To : '!be Seaetaey NLj 129~8, Sec. 3.6 5 
'lbrough: 
S/S ..MJ B;11 •· --A.I ' -7 7-1.s-7 
Fran INR -'1hanas L. Hughes "'I"' J ~ N ­
--' ARA Date--_ F.rosicn of SOViet Influence in Czechoslovakia .LP :tt:Jp
Sd:>ject: 
'!he Prague i:eqine has gradually been assuning a nore indepEndent stand in its relat.ioos with the Soviet tbicn, giving greater heed tt> Czechoslovak natiooal interests cnoe totally su1:neJ:ged by subsei:vienoe to M:lsc:CM. A major inpetus for this change has cate franeoonanic and political difficul­ties in the past few years which have generated a critical re-evaluatioo of virtually all aspects of Czechoslovak society. 'lhis process received further llDIBltum foll.OLdng the fall of I<hrushchev in October 1964, when the czech>slcwak i:eqine shae:i a new detenninaticm to take the initiative·in solvinq its am problemS rather than foll.a.d.ng blindly the Soviet nalel. 
MXe moently the tale, volune, mil cxntent of Cf.eeh:>slovak propaganda · · en Soriet devel.qm:nts has changed : the syOOJ;ilancy of the Czechosl.oVak leadership towam. the KJ:anl.in, the 1.i>i.quity of p:ro-Sov:i.et propaganda, aril iefemnoes to the "sq>eriority" of the Soviet Wirf of life no lmger cbtain-. Popular criticism of the Sari et t.him and of Q:mlulist adlievements in a.d.1oalot'akia has also been expxessed ncre q>e nly. 
them am ind:Icati.cms that the Czechoslcwak leade%Sh:P has xecently ~fiedwith Sov.iet unwillingness or inability to neat OUtstandin<J ecxncmLc pxd>len& may be political..f.daOl.Ogical in nature. 
• 

Given the cxmservatism and cautim of the irl::urrbent leadership and 
and defense matters, the Prague regirre would be reluctant to take any initiatives which might provtke Soviet reprisals. While there m.v be no clranatic or fmdanental change in Czechoslovak-Soviet relations in the near future, the Prague leadership seerrs likely to oontinre its present gradual neasures of giving nore heed to national interests which to sare extent may also involve increased pressure for econani.c, rultural, and other ties with the West. 
(Note: The sd:>ject of th is Intelligen:e Note is discussed in detail in a forthcxming Research M:!morandum, R> B-30.)