

Copyright
by
Rodolfo Disi Pavlic
2017

**The Dissertation Committee for Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Certifies that this is the
approved version of the following dissertation:**

**Policies, Politics, and Protests: Explaining Student Mobilization in Latin
America**

Committee:

Raúl Madrid, Supervisor

Daniel Brinks

Henry Dietz

Nicolás Somma

Michael Young

**Policies, Politics, and Protests: Explaining Student Mobilization in Latin
America**

by

Rodolfo Disi Pavlic, B.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

May, 2017

Dedication

Para mis padres, Vilma y Julio, por siempre confiar en mí. Para mis hermanos Lino, Giorgio, Stefano, Agustina y Julio, por el cariño incondicional. Para Belén, por la compañía en el camino.

Acknowledgements

I have incurred several intellectual, professional, and personal debts while writing this dissertation. I cannot thank Raúl Madrid enough for his guidance and encouragement as my advisor. Raúl read scores of papers, proposals, and manuscripts that eventually led to this dissertation. Throughout the years, he never failed to give me prompt, thoughtful, and detailed feedback. The quality of his comments is imprinted throughout this work. We met countless times to discuss my project, and he was always very generous with his time. I hope I will one day be able to advise in a similarly kind, fair, and patient way.

I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee. Dan Brinks, Henry Dietz, Nicolás Somma, and Michael Young also contributed to the completion of this project. I was lucky enough to be Henry's teaching assistant in my first semester of doctoral studies, and I greatly benefited from our brown-bag meetings throughout the years. Dan was my advisor when I entered the Ph.D. program, and he gave me precious feedback throughout this process. I learned very much during Michael's seminar on social movements, which gave valuable insights on social movement theory. Nico, who was once my teaching assistant at the University of Notre Dame, went above and beyond the call duty with his guidance, particularly during the Chilean part of my fieldwork.

I am also indebted to other persons in the Government Department of the University of Texas at Austin. I wrote the original proposal of this project in Kurt Weyland's Comparative Politics seminar, and he gave me valuable comments on many

occasions. I also benefited from taking Wendy Hunter's Latin American Politics and Supervised Teaching seminars. Annette Park, our Graduate Program Administrator, deserves a special mention: she always provided prompt and helpful responses to my multiple questions, and her help was critical during my last year in the Department, when I was away from Austin. Participating in the Department's Comparative Politics Graduate Student Workshops, both as a discussant and presenter, was very rewarding. In more general terms, this dissertation was greatly assisted by a scholarship from the Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, which allowed me to carry out preliminary fieldwork in Mexico City.

I must also thank another institution: the National Commission for Technological and Scientific Research (CONICYT) which, through the *Becas Chile* program, was critical in funding my doctoral studies and research.

My peers and friends greatly enriched my years as a doctoral student. Special thanks go to Calla Hummel, a great friend and excellent colleague, with whom I spent countless days and nights working, reading each other's papers, and sharing meals and drinks. I would like to thank other peers with whom I had to chance to share in seminars, reading groups and social occasions like Roberto Armijo, Kimberly Guiler, Katie Putnam, Dana El-Kurd, Andy Stravers, Henry Pascoe, Omar Awapara, Jake Dizard, Giorleny Altamirano, Ayca Arkilic, Joe Amick, Nadine Gibson, Ken Miller, Josiah Marineau, and Mike Denly. Joe Tafoya and Luke Perez, two generous friends with whom I lived during my first years in Austin, deserve a special mention. Other friends, like Ruy Manrique, Ariadna Reyes, Mariana Morante, Darcia Datshkovsky, Katie Casstevens,

Delfina Rossi, José Guzmán, Luciana Molina, and Amruta Ponkshe made me feel part of a larger Latin American and international community in Texas. Finally, other friends like Tania Bahamondez, Sebastián Astroza, Daniel Moraga, Pedro Pablo Cuevas, María Angélica Arce, Sebastián Souyris, Magdaleña Saldaña, Pedro León, and Luciano Correa brought a little bit of Chile to Austin for me. I will dearly miss seeing all of these friends.

I am very grateful to all the individuals and institutions that facilitated the fieldwork and research for this dissertation. In Chile, the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES) and the Institute of Sociology of Pontifical Catholic University of Chile offered me institutional backing, which opened many doors. COES also gave me funding to carry out my research, which made the timely completion of the Latin American Student Protest Dataset possible. I am grateful to Joaquín Ugalde and Gustavo Díaz for their assistance in coding this dataset. In Peru, I cannot thank Roxana Franco enough for receiving me in her home during my time in Lima. The institutional backing of the Institute of Peruvian Studies made my Peruvian sojourn much more fruitful. Paula Muñoz, Eduardo Dargent, Ricardo Cuenca, and Noelia Chávez were kind enough to introduce this newcomer to Peruvian politics to many potential interviewees.

I must also thank several people and organizations for their contributions during the home stretch of this project. The Political Science Institute of The Pontifical Catholic University of Chile was extremely gracious by allowing me teach my own course on Student Politics in the second semester of 2016. In particular, would like to thank José Marín and the students who took the course: the experience from teaching it and their feedback definitely found their way to this dissertation. I would also like to thank the

anonymous reviewers of my upcoming article on *Latin American Research Review* for their detailed feedback, which I have incorporated into this work.

Last but not least, I am indebted to my whole family for their emotional support throughout these years. My mother, Vilma Pavlic, has trusted in me since I can remember, and has always been enthusiastic about my endeavors. My grandparents, Elena Véliz and Rafael Pavlic, have been unwaveringly interested in and proud of my work. I am particularly grateful to my mother and grandmother, both of whom are teachers, for instilling in me the value of education. My father, Julio Disi, has constantly encouraged me to pursue my dreams and sought ways to support them. My siblings Lino, Giorgio, Stefano, Agustina, and Julio have provided much-needed doses of humor, encouragement, and affection. Finally, I would like to thank my *polola*, Belén Cumsille. She has been an amazing partner, travel companion, colleague and friend throughout this demanding process. Belén has been both my staunchest supporter and my most relentless critic, and has shaped this dissertation to such an extent that it would have been impossible without her.

Policies, Politics, and Protests: Explaining Student Mobilization in Latin America

Rodolfo Disi Pavlic, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2017

Supervisor: Raúl Madrid

Latin American college student protesters have been historically a force to reckon with. Scholars have argued, however, that the introduction of neoliberal policies in the late twentieth century would discourage mobilization. Yet, some of the most liberalized higher education systems in the region have witnessed relatively frequent and massive mobilizations in recent years. What explains variation in the frequency and size of student mobilizations in Latin America?

To answer this question, I propose a theory of student mobilization that considers explanations based on both social grievances and political opportunities. I argue that, in order to understand the effect of these explanations on protests, mobilization must be disaggregated into two of its main dimensions: the frequency of mobilizations, and the size of protests. The reasons that explain the frequency of protests may not adequately explain the size of individual mobilizations, and vice versa. I claim that social grievances, caused by neoliberal policies, have a positive effect on mobilization. More specifically, the expansion of higher education to include working class students, and the increase in private expenditures, increase both the frequency and size of protests. Meanwhile, political opportunities have an effect on mobilization through student-party linkages – the level of organizational, programmatic, and personalistic connections between political

parties and students. I argue that stronger organizational linkages with ruling parties have a demobilizing effect on frequency, but that stronger linkages with the opposition can increase protest size.

I use a mixed-methods, multilevel research design to test the theory. At the regional level, I use an original dataset of more than 4,700 protest events to carry out quantitative analyses of student protest frequency and size in Latin America. At the country level, I draw evidence from comparative case studies of student mobilization, higher education policies, and student-party linkages in Chile and Peru. Finally, I carry out a quantitative analysis of a 2012 Chilean survey to test the theory at the individual level. This quantitative and qualitative evidence drawn from different levels of analysis supports the theory's expectations.

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|------|
| List of Tables | xv |
| List of Figures | xvii |
| Chapter One: A Theory Of Student Mobilization..... | 1 |
| Protest Frequency versus Protest Size | 4 |
| Incomplete Accounts of Student Mobilization in Latin America | 6 |
| Reconciling Grievances and Opportunities | 10 |
| Alternative Explanations..... | 29 |
| Leftist Parties and Social Mobilization..... | 29 |
| Differences in Higher Education Institutions | 31 |
| Technology, Social Media, and Protests..... | 34 |
| Research Design..... | 36 |
| Conclusion | 40 |
| Plan of the Dissertation | 42 |
| Chapter Two: Quantitative Analyses Of Student Mobilization In Latin America | 46 |
| The Latin American Student Protest Dataset..... | 48 |
| The Student-Party Linkages Expert Survey..... | 66 |
| Analyzing the Frequency of Student Mobilization | 76 |
| Data and hypotheses | 76 |
| Variables | 78 |
| Results..... | 83 |
| Postestimation | 88 |
| Analyzing the Size of Student Mobilization | 91 |
| Data and hypotheses | 91 |
| Variables | 94 |
| Results..... | 99 |
| Robustness | 103 |
| Postestimation | 105 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Analyzing the Number of Student Participants: An Alternative Approach | 110 |
| Data and hypotheses | 110 |
| Variables | 111 |
| Results and robustness | 113 |
| Postestimation | 116 |
| Conclusion | 121 |
| Chapter Three: Student Mobilization In Chile..... | 126 |
| Student Mobilization in Chile: A Case Study | 128 |
| Aggrieved Students Enter the System..... | 133 |
| Party Linkages: Erosion under the Left, Absence under the Right..... | 140 |
| A Quantitative Test of Student Mobilization in Chile | 148 |
| Dependent variable: protest participation | 150 |
| Socioeconomic Sector..... | 152 |
| Higher Education Funding | 152 |
| Party Linkages | 153 |
| Control Variables | 154 |
| Results and Robustness..... | 155 |
| Postestimation | 162 |
| Conclusion | 165 |
| Chapter Four: Student Mobilization In Peru..... | 168 |
| Student participation in Peru before and after the Fujimori regime .. | 170 |
| Policies, politics, and protests under Fujimori..... | 175 |
| The higher education system in Peru: incomplete inclusion | 177 |
| The absence of financial grievances in a neoliberal system | 181 |
| Student-party linkages without a party system | 186 |
| Additional explanations for smaller and more infrequent mobilizations in Peru | 196 |
| The student tercio..... | 196 |
| The legacy of repression on student organization in Peru | 199 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Conclusion | 201 |
| Chapter Five: Conclusion | 205 |
| The Argument | 206 |
| Empirical Findings..... | 211 |
| Theoretical Implications | 216 |
| Policy implications..... | 219 |
| Directions for Future Research | 221 |
| Appendices..... | 226 |
| Appendix A: Interviewees | 226 |
| Appendix B: Guideline for Coding Protest Events..... | 232 |
| Appendix C: Missing Months Per Country in OSAL Conflict Briefs | 238 |
| Appendix D: Expert Survey Forms per Country | 239 |
| Argentina..... | 239 |
| Bolivia..... | 242 |
| Brazil | 245 |
| Chile..... | 248 |
| Colombia..... | 251 |
| Costa Rica | 254 |
| Dominican Republic | 257 |
| Ecuador | 260 |
| El Salvador..... | 263 |
| Guatemala | 266 |
| Honduras | 269 |
| Mexico | 272 |
| Nicaragua | 275 |
| Panama..... | 278 |
| Paraguay..... | 281 |
| Peru | 284 |
| Uruguay..... | 287 |
| Venezuela..... | 290 |

| | |
|------------------|-----|
| References | 293 |
|------------------|-----|

List of Tables

| | |
|---|-----|
| Table 1.1 Effects of main explanatory variables on protest frequency and size.... | 29 |
| Table 2.1: Protest Events with College Student Participants, 2000 - 2012 by country | 54 |
| Table 2.2: Protest Events with College Student Participants, 2000-2012 by Country (Divided by student population size in hundreds of thousands) | 56 |
| Table 2.3. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Country | 58 |
| Table 2.4. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Types of Student | 60 |
| Table 2.5. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Target | 61 |
| Table 2.6. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Participating Actors | 62 |
| Table 2.7. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Demands | 63 |
| Table 2.8. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Location | 64 |
| Table 2.9. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Tactics | 65 |
| Table 2.10. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Incident Types | 65 |
| Table 2.11. Organizational Linkages Between Students and Political Parties in Latin America (includes all administrations in power between 1999 and 2015) | 68 |
| Table 2.12 Regression Models Predicting the Frequency of Student Protest Events | 85 |
| Table 2.13. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Events by Number of Protest Participants | 94 |
| Table 2.14. Countries, Events, and Missing Values for Protest Size by Coder | 99 |
| Table 2.15. Ordered logistic regressions predicting size of student protests | 101 |
| Table 2.16. Robustness models predicting the size of student protests | 104 |
| Table 2.17. Models Predicting Total Number of Participants per Country-Year | 114 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Table 3.1. Organizational Linkages Between Students and Political Parties in Chile, 1994-2015 (approximately) | 142 |
| Table 3.2. Ordered Logistic Regressions Predicting Protest Behavior..... | 157 |
| Table 3.3. Logistic Regressions Predicting Protest Behavior by Protest Type ... | 161 |
| Table 4.1. Organizational Linkages Between Students and Political Parties in Peru 1994-2016 (approximately) | 187 |
| Table A1. List of Fieldwork Interviewees | 226 |
| Table C1. Missing Months in OSAL Conflict Briefs | 238 |

List of Figures

| | |
|--|-----|
| Figure 2.1. Distribution of Protest Count Dependent Variable | 79 |
| Figure 2.2 Predicted Protest Frequency by Funding Type, with 95% CIs | 89 |
| Figure 2.3 Predicted Protest Frequency by Linkages with Ruling Parties Score, with 95% CIs..... | 90 |
| Figure 2.4. Predicted Protest Frequency by Enrollment, with 95% CIs | 91 |
| Figure 2.5 Adjusted Predictions of Protest Size Depending on Whether Financial Aid Demands Were Made, with 95% CIs..... | 107 |
| Figure 2.6 Adjusted Predictions of Protest Size Depending on Whether Education Costs Demands Were Made, with 95% CIs..... | 108 |
| Figure 2.7 Adjusted Predictions of Protest Size When Party Member Participate, Depending on Whether the Government is Targeted, with 95% CIs..... | 110 |
| Figure 2.8. Distribution of the Number of Protest Participants per Country-Year | 112 |
| Figure 2.9 Predicted Number of Protest Participants by Funding Type, with 95% CIs | 117 |
| Figure 2.10 Predicted Protest Frequency with Varying Levels of Linkages with Ruling Parties, with 95% CIs..... | 118 |
| Figure 2.11 Predicted Number of Protest Participants at Varying Net Enrollment Ratios, with 95% CIs | 119 |
| Figure 2.12. Number of Protest Participants by Number of Protest Events in the LASPD | 121 |
| Figure 3.1. Number of Protest Events with College Student Participants in Chile, 2000-2011 | 131 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Figure 3.2. Net Enrollment in Higher Education by Income Decile in Chile, 1990 and 2011..... | 136 |
| Figure 3.3. Public Expenditure per Student and Gross Enrollment Ratio, Chile 1987-2009..... | 138 |
| Figure 3.4. Distribution of Protest Participation Index..... | 151 |
| Figure 3.5 Predicted Probabilities of Protest Participation by Socioeconomic Sector, with 95% CIs..... | 163 |
| Figure 3.6 Predicted Probabilities of Protest Participation by Loan Use, with 95% CIs | 164 |
| Figure 3.7 Predicted Probabilities of Protest Participation by Political Sector Identification, with 95% CIs | 165 |
| Figure 4.1. Number of Protest Events with College Student Participants in Peru, 2000, 2011..... | 171 |
| Figure 4.2. Net Enrollment by Income Quintile in Peru, 2000 and 2011 | 179 |
| Figure D1 Argentina Expert Survey | 239 |
| Figure D2 Bolivia Expert Survey | 242 |
| Figure D3 Brazil Expert Survey | 245 |
| Figure D4 Chile Expert Survey..... | 248 |
| Figure D5 Colombia Expert Survey | 251 |
| Figure D6 Costa Rica Expert Survey..... | 254 |
| Figure D7 Dominican Republic Expert Survey | 257 |
| Figure D8 Ecuador Expert Survey | 260 |
| Figure D8 Ecuador Expert Survey, cont..... | 262 |
| Figure D9 El Salvador Expert Survey | 263 |
| Figure D10 Guatemala Expert Survey | 266 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Figure D11 Honduras Expert Survey..... | 269 |
| Figure D12 Mexico Expert Survey | 272 |
| Figure D13 Nicaragua Expert Survey | 275 |
| Figure D14 Panama Expert Survey..... | 278 |
| Figure D15 Paraguay Expert Survey | 281 |
| Figure D16 Peru Expert Survey | 284 |
| Figure D17 Uruguay Expert Survey | 287 |
| Figure D18 Venezuela Expert Survey | 290 |

Chapter One: A Theory Of Student Mobilization¹

The beginning of the 1990s portended a decline in college student activism in Latin America. College students in the region were a social force to be reckoned with since at least the 1920s, but the authoritarian turn of the 1970s and 1980s in the region had decreased their influence due to repression. Two more recent factors were supposed to deliver the coup de grâce to student movements, however. First, the third wave of democracy had taken away students' most important reason to protest at the time: the ousting of dictatorships and the return to competitive politics. Second, in the aftermath of the crisis of the state-directed and -induced industrialization model, many countries in the region adopted market-based policies in higher education. These reforms promoted less public funding and increased the private sector's involvement in higher education, which eroded the unity of students as a social actor. Experts declared, therefore, that the Latin American student movement "has died" (Brunner, 1986), and that student activists "have lost" (Levy, 1991, p. 151).

Two decades later, the outlook is very different. Major student mobilizations have broken out in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. Some of these movements "widely exceed sectorial (and even generational) interests to become processes that invigorate wider social struggles, making claims against the dominant system that go

¹ A modified version of this chapter has been accepted for publication as Disi Pavlic, R. (2018). Sentenced to Debt: Explaining Student Mobilization in Chile. *Latin American Research Review*, 53(3).

beyond the educational system” (Vommaro, 2013, p. 130).² Some of the most massive student movements have occurred in the countries that have gone the furthest in advancing these same neoliberal reforms; indeed, the movements have arisen to protest these policies, demanding an increased role of the state in higher education. Why have student protests swept through some countries, but not others? And what explains the dramatic variation in the size of these protests?

Theoretically grounded, comparative explanations of student mobilization in the region are mostly out of date (Vommaro, 2013, p. 130). The most recent (Brunner, 1986; Levy, 1989a, 1991; Silva Michelena, 1986) of these theories were elaborated during a time of authoritarian governments when market policies were being implemented. The current context in the region, with democratic regimes and implemented economic liberalism, rather than liberalization (Gans-Morse & Nichter, 2007), warrants new explanations for student mobilization.

More recent accounts usually cover one country or case of high mobilization, foregoing the opportunity to explain variation in student mobilization. The literature has presented several competing explanations of student mobilization, and two sets of explanations have become prominent. Some studies have centered on the effect of higher education finance on mobilization (Bellei, Cabalin, & Orellana, 2014a; Kubal & Fisher, 2016; Sukarieh & Tannock, 2014). Other works have emphasized the role that institutional politics have played in the emergence of student protest (Palacios-

² Author’s translation. All translations from Spanish and Portuguese primary and secondary sources are my own.

Valladares, 2016; Somma & Medel, 2017; von Bülow & Bidegain Ponte, 2015). Since most works are qualitative, they do not control for the effect of competing explanations. An additional issue is that virtually every work³ on the subject has equated higher levels of mobilization with higher frequency of mobilization. As I argue below, both frequency and size are important dimensions of protests, and accounts that explain one may not help to explain the other.

This chapter presents a novel theory of student mobilization, highlighting the role that higher education enrollment, college funding, and linkages with parties in power and in the opposition play in explaining variation in both the frequency and size of student mobilizations. Higher education policies have similar effects on both protest frequency and size but party linkages have differing effects on size and frequency.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the distinction between protest size and protest frequency, and why explanations of one may not be suitable to explain the other. Then, it gives an overview on the literature on student mobilization in Latin America. It focuses on more recent works, analyzing some of their gaps and deficiencies. Next, I present my own theory of student mobilization, laying out several hypotheses. Then, the research design of this study is presented, showing how the theory is tested at the regional, national, and individual levels. The last two sections conclude the chapter and lay out the plan of the dissertation.

³ Cummings (2015) does briefly discuss the size of student protests in Chile using data from the dataset by Medel & Somma (2016).

Protest Frequency versus Protest Size

Before answering the questions above, it is necessary to define what is meant by more or less mobilization. Gill & DeFronzo (2009, p. 208) define a student movement as

[A] relatively organized effort on the part of a large number of students to either bring about or prevent change...involving either institutionalized or non-institutionalized collective actions or both simultaneously.

This conceptually rich definition poses several questions about the causes of student mobilization. What causes some movements to be large and widespread, and others to be small and contained? What provokes the occurrence of more or fewer episodes of collective actions during a student movement?

Indeed, two related yet distinct ways to understand the scope of social mobilization are its frequency – the number of protest events in a given time period – and size – the number of participants involved in each event.⁴ Protest frequency can be highly associated with the aggregated number of participants in protest. This is the case when many small sized events – hunger strikes or suicides attacks – are recorded over time in a certain place. However, as Biggs (2016, p. 19) demonstrates, “there is no justification to assume a high correlation over time or across spatial unit” between protest frequency and aggregate. This is because, in many cases, adding to an analysis a few events – marches, sit-in, strikes – will add little to the total frequency but much to the aggregate size of the events in a given time period or location. I extrapolate Biggs’ insight about the *aggregate*

⁴ Another way to measure the scope of mobilization is by its duration. For example, some studies use number-days – the number of days each participant is involved in a protest – to measure, for example, how many working-days a firm loses in a strike (Rule & Tilly, 1965; Spielmans, 1944). Also important is the severity of a protest, as measured by the number of dead, injured and property damaged (Biggs, 2016, p. 7; Carter, 1986).

number of participants across different protests to the number of participants in *individual* protest events to argue that conventional explanations of protest frequency are inappropriate to explain variation in the size of single protests.

Most explanations of variation in mobilization focus on protest frequency. Starting in the 1960s, political scientists and sociologists began compiling catalogs of protest events (Hibbs, 1973; Rummel, 1966; Tilly, 1978). Experts analyzing Latin American movements have also created their own catalogs of protests (Almeida, 2007, 2012; Inclán, 2008; Trejo, 2009). Although many studies have covered other dimensions of social protests, examining the frequency of protest events has become the standard procedure to analyze variation in mobilization (Biggs, 2016, p. 2). Usually, studies measure frequency based on the number of protest events in geographic (country, district, city) and/or time units (year, semester).

Nevertheless, it is important to analyze the size of individual protests as well. Experts have argued that protest size is one of the main factors that cause movements to be successful and bring about change. Large numbers are key for obtaining demands through collective action in general (Olson, 2009) and social movements in particular (Oberschall, 1994, p. 80; Opp, 2009). Indeed, activists typically prioritize maximizing the number of participants over maximizing the number of protests (Popovic & Miller, 2015, p. 52; Tilly, 2015, p. 370) as a strategy to show their adversaries how much support they enjoy (DeNardo, 1985, p. 6). Additionally, the overwhelming majority of studies focus on the frequency of protests, rather than on their size. In an overview of 41 articles published between 2000 and 2014 in seven leading journals, Biggs (2016, pp. 5–6) finds

that 83% of them focus on protest frequency, and that two thirds only use that measure. The issue of individual protest size merits more scholarly attention because, as Biggs argues, conclusions drawn from analyses of protest frequency are not informative about the determinants of protest participation.

Incomplete Accounts of Student Mobilization in Latin America

The causes of current student mobilizations in Latin America are undertheorized. Worldwide student demonstrations in the 1960s triggered an unprecedented number of studies about student politics and movements but academic interest waned when the demonstrations declined or were suppressed (Altbach, 2006). Although some of these early studies offer theoretically grounded explanations for student mobilization in developed (Lipset, 1993; Tarrow, 1989, pp. 143–167) and developing (Lipset, 1967; Spencer, 1965a) contexts, they are outdated because they focus on the smaller, more exclusive student bodies of the time.

In the case of Latin America and other developing regions, these studies analyzed what Trow (1973) calls “elite” higher education: systems where a reduced share of the college-age population is enrolled, access is understood more as a privilege than as a right, and most students come from the ruling classes. Lipset (1967, p. 5), for example, argues that as members of the elite, students in the developing world “do not just prepare themselves for future roles in public life; they play a significant part in political life of their countries even during their student period.” Importantly, higher education in the region at the time was free or had a nominal cost: one of the core demands in Liminar

Manifest of the 1918 Cordoba Reform Movement (the first major student movement in Latin America)⁵ was free education (Liebman, Walker, & Glazer, 1972, p. 10). By contrast, Latin America currently tends towards general and even universal systems that are not only for the traditional elites. Higher education in the region is not uniformly free anymore, and privately owned universities and higher education institutes have made great advances in many countries. Moreover, the connection between student and party politics has eroded since its zenith in the 1960s and 1970s, after the Cuban Revolution (Spencer, 1965b, p. 95) in many countries in the region. As Vommaro, 2013, p. 129) states, young people's political participation in those times was associated with "political affiliation, generally in political parties, and also in armed groups or guerrillas." Now, however, student movements are often detached from political parties and broader political demands.

Researchers have paid less attention to student movements in Latin America than in the recent past (Vommaro, 2013, pp. 129–130). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the consensus was that market policies and authoritarian regimes were causing a decline in student activism (Levy, 1989, 1991; Silva Michelena, 1986). Brunner (1986) eloquently claimed that the "Student Movement" – college students as a cohesive and relevant political actor – had died, giving way to a myriad of (lower case) "student movements," fragmented and with particularistic demands. However, the emergence of student

⁵ Eventually at least some of the demands of the Cordoba Movement were passed in law in eighteen Latin American countries (Liebman, Walker, & Glazer, 1972, p. 9)

movements protesting against these same market reforms in several democratic regimes suggests that new explanations are in order.

Some important exceptions to this lack of interest focus on a single case like Chile (Aguilera, 2012; Bellei & Cabalin, 2013; Bellei, Cabalin, & Orellana, 2014b; Cummings, 2015; Guzman-Concha, 2012; Kubal & Fisher, 2016; Salinas & Fraser, 2012; Somma, 2012; Somma & Medel, 2017; von Bülow & Bidegain Ponte, 2015).⁶ Most of these works attribute the high frequency of student mobilization in recent years in Chile to financial causes – the present work extends this claim to the whole region, while also extrapolating it to protest size, and bringing in other factors. Indeed, I argue that it is not only financial grievances but also the discontent caused by the incorporation of new students into higher education that explain variation in student mobilization in Chile and elsewhere in the region.

There are some edited works studying several countries in the region (González Marín & Sánchez Sáenz, 2011; Marsiske, 2006; Marsiske & Alvarado, 1999). These studies make important empirical contributions to our understanding of the cases they examine but they tend to limit themselves to exploring the applicability of the existing social movement theories rather than presenting novel theoretical contributions. By contrast, some case studies develop novel theoretical arguments, but they do not test their claims empirically beyond that case. I am aware of only one study using a comparative lens (comparing student mobilization in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) to explain student mobilization (Palacios-Valladares, 2016).

⁶ For other exceptions, see Vommaro (2013, p. 130, f.n. 3).

Another issue is methodological homogeneity. With few notable exceptions (Medel & Somma, 2016; Scherman, Arriagada, & Valenzuela, 2015; Somma & Medel, 2017), most works are qualitative, therefore missing the opportunity to test their hypotheses and control for the effect of other variables. The studies that do take quantitative approaches test their hypotheses at the individual level or use data from one country and, therefore, do not offer comparative explanations. Even beyond Latin America, there is a general absence of comparative, cross-national studies on student mobilization in the literature (Gill & DeFronzo, 2009, p. 204).

In terms of protest size, this study is an effort to fill an important gap in social movement literature. Studies have demonstrated that protest size is a major predictor of, for example, media coverage of protests (Barranco & Wisler, 1999; Hocke, 1999; McCarthy, McPhail, & Smith, 1996; Snyder & Kelly, 1977). Other scholars have used changes in the number of protest participants to explain declining union memberships (Checchi & Visser, 2005), and to evaluate the claim that Western countries are turning into movement societies (Soule & Earl, 2005). Saunders (2014), however, is to the best of my knowledge the only study that analyzes protest size as the explanandum.

There is a growing body of literature addressing mobilizations against neoliberal reforms in Latin America (Almeida, 2007; Silva, 2009; Yashar, 2005). This literature has nevertheless largely excluded student movements from their analyses. One exception is Almeida (2007, p. 129) who finds that students were involved in 17.5% of all anti-neoliberal protest campaigns between 1995 and 2001 in the region. More research on student involvement seems justified since, according to Almeida (2007, p. 129), other

well-studied groups, such as indigenous and women's movements, participated in fewer episodes of protest. There is, therefore, a lack of theoretical and comparative perspectives that consider the current Latin American political and higher education context in explaining the frequency and size of student protests. This study aims to fill the gaps in the literature by offering a theoretically informed, regionwide and multi-method analysis of college student mobilization, in terms of both protest frequency and size.

Reconciling Grievances and Opportunities

The most fruitful way to understand the emergence of student movements is as an example of mass mobilization against neoliberal reforms caused by grievances associated with neoliberalism. There is a long tradition in social movement theory identifying strain, grievances, and discontent as driving forces of protest (Buechler, 2007). Indeed, scholars have long argued that subjecting social services to market logic results in social dislocation, which can generate popular resistance (Polanyi, 1944), and Latin America has been no exception (Silva, 2009).

Grievances are theorized to promote mobilization by turning protest into a plausible or desirable tool to find solutions for structural strains and personal discontent. In some accounts, grievances are driven by individual-level characteristics. For example, studies using nationally representative survey data that have found that dissatisfied individuals are more likely to engage in protest than their more content counterparts (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Dalton, Van Sickle, & Weldon, 2009). Other grievance theorists look at the structural level for the causes of discontent. For instance, McVeigh

(2006) shows that structural conditions that cause discontent (such as ethnic and religious heterogeneity, income inequality, educational inequality, and population density) are associated with higher levels of social mobilization.

Other scholars of mobilization have suggested, however, that the level of grievances is always high among some groups, and therefore cannot explain variation in levels of contention over time (Goodwin, 2001). A related problem is that grievances can sometimes only be observed ex post by the emergence of a social movement. According to McAdam (1982, p. 11), collective behavior theorists, therefore, “would appear to overstate the extent to which the social world is normally free of strain” I argue, by contrast, that the level of grievances for students in the region varies by country and over time, and can therefore explain variation in student protest over time and across states. I also argue that these grievances, which are associated with costs and enrollment, can be observed separately from the emergence of student protest.

Latin American higher education has gone from being limited, public and free to becoming massive, increasingly private, and paid for by students (Bernasconi, 2008). Under the auspices of the World Bank, many Latin American countries adopted market-oriented higher education regulations in the 1980s and 1990s (Mollis, 2006, p. 504). Only a few of them enacted the policies recommended by the 1998 UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education (López Segrera, 2011, p. 212), which, in its Final Report, declared the role of the State in higher education funding to be “essential” worldwide, and “unavoidable” in Latin America (WCHE, 1998, pp. 2, 79).

Neoliberal education reforms cut funds to public institutions, which have

transferred part of their costs to students by establishing or increasing tuition. Some public institutions also began to finance themselves through the sale of services – consultancies, laboratory test services, fielding opinion surveys and focus groups, among others. Neoliberal reforms also led to the proliferation of private institutions, which funded themselves almost exclusively through tuition (Castro & Levy, 2000, p. 102; Holm-Nielsen, Thorn, Brunner, & Balán, 2005, p. 44). For example, just between 1995 and 2002, the number of higher education institutions in the region increased from 5,438 (about 54% of them private) to 7,514 (65% of them private) (García Guadilla, 2006, p. 261); by 2011, 69% of all higher education institutions in the region were privately owned (Brunner & Villalobos, 2014, p. 31). Meanwhile, between 1995 and 2002 the number of students increased from almost 7.5 million (about 38% in private institutions) to more than 12 million (about 48% attending private colleges) (García Guadilla, 2006, p. 261). Indeed, Latin America is the world region with the largest share of private enrollment (Brunner & Villalobos, 2014, p. 28).

Some countries (like Argentina and Uruguay) have preserved the public and free character of higher education more than others (like Colombia and Peru), but the general trend since the advent of the Washington Consensus has been towards increased costs for students.⁷ Indeed, in 2010, five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru) exceeded the OECD country average in terms of the proportion of expenditures in higher education that were private (Brunner & Villalobos, 2014, p. 37).

⁷ Indeed, the only two regions of the world where private higher education has not made great strides are Western Europe and Africa (López Segrera, 2011, p. 208).

As a result, students in Latin America have experienced a new grievance: the high cost of education.

At the same time, enrollment in higher education has also expanded dramatically in the region. Part of this expansion can be attributed to increased primary and secondary school attendance: between 1997 and 2013, the proportion of the 20 to 24 year-old population that had completed high school increased from 37% to 58% (CEPAL, 2016, p. 30). The most important improvements in secondary education completion rates were made in the lower income segments. For example, between 1997 and 2013, the first (lowest) income quintile increased its high school completion rate from 14% to 34%, and the second income quintile improved its graduation rate from 20% to 44%.

Neoliberal reforms, however, also contributed to the increased enrollments, making higher education more accessible to the middle and working classes than ever before. According to Brunner & Villalobos (2014, p. 29), Latin American higher education policy has “promoted, stimulated, or tolerated a strong horizontal and vertical differentiation of the national systems,” which resulted in the diversification of the ownership, administration and social composition of higher education. Many working and middle class students, however, cannot easily afford tuition increases and thus they have resisted efforts to saddle them with the growing costs of higher education. Rising educational costs combined with increased access to education have thus promoted mobilization.

The consequences of these national policy changes are evident for students. Today in Latin America, although more people have access to higher education, students

and their families have more trouble paying for their studies than in the past. The chronic shortage of grants and scholarships (Holm-Nielsen et al., 2005, p. 53) in the region makes the situation of the poorest students even more precarious. The retreat of public support is a problem not only for the working class, however. Many middle class students must also take out loans to pay for their education and as a result, they too have incentives to protest the high cost of education. As Sukarieh & Tannock (2014, pp. 113–114) argue,

[Student] protests are a response to growing structural contradictions in the relationship that post-secondary education has with society and the economy at large. For decades now, post-secondary education been promoted by governments around the world as the most important (and increasingly, the only) vehicle for individual social mobility [...] Yet, at the same time...many students found that their access to high quality further and higher education is restricted (for example, by their inability to pay)

Students, therefore, experience grievances directly associated with higher education policy – the incapacity to pay for their studies, or the prospect of years of indebtedness. Rather than just retreating to the private sphere or engaging in merely sporadic outbursts of frustration, students have organized to collectively voice their discontent, leading to mobilizations. My first hypothesis about protest frequency, therefore, is:

Hypothesis 1. Increased private spending on higher education will increase the frequency of protests.

My second hypothesis, concerning funding and the size of student protests, is similar to the first:

Hypothesis 2. Student protest events that make education finance demands will tend to be larger than those that do not make education demands.

There are also grievances that are specific to working class, first-generation

students – the ultimate beneficiaries of the policies aimed at increasing access. Increases in the cost of attendance when the enrollment ratios are high do not affect all students equally. Wealthier students will usually be able to cope with these changes with their own (and their families’) resources, but students from lower income families will typically see their studies threatened or cut short. The contrast may cause poorer students to feel a sense of “relative deprivation” (Gurr, 1970), leading them to mobilize. Thus, although reaching higher education is still not feasible for most young people in Latin America (López Segrera, 2011, p. 215),⁸ those who manage to enroll in college often experience new grievances related to the expansion of higher education thanks to market reforms.

In recent decades, higher education policies have not addressed the issue of lower-income students’ success and retention in college. In many instances, the services provided by higher education institutions have not kept up with the enlargement and diversification of their student bodies (González Fiegehen, 2006, p. 162). Housing, meals, libraries, and facilities are often still designed to cater to people who do not have to work, and who have adequate access to books and study places in their homes. More importantly, higher education institutions in Latin America seldom provide resources, such as tutoring and remedial courses, that promote the success of economically disadvantaged students (Sverdlick, Ferrari, & Jaimovich, 2005, pp. 107–108). These institutional deficiencies tend to be particularly widespread among the new, low quality

⁸ This resulted in 2006 in more than half of public spending in the region going to the richest income quintile, with less than 2 percent going to the poorest one (Puryear & Goodspeed, 2011, p. 126)

private institutions, which have also absorbed the lion's share of increases in enrollment. These are the so-called "demand-absorbing institutions" (López Segrera, 2011, pp. 209–210), many of them for-profit, low quality colleges,⁹ which cater to the students who do not meet the criteria to attend elite private or public institutions.

Retention is particularly problematic for lower income students in Latin America. For example, in Argentina, which has reached "universal"¹⁰ levels of college enrollment, more than two out of five high school graduates from the poorest income quintile drop out of college, compared to about 14% of high school graduates in the richest income quintile (García de Fanelli, 2005, p. 4). Similarly, according to Puryear & Goodspeed (2011, p. 115),

[o]nly a third of those admitted in Chile and half of those admitted in Colombia graduate. The situation is similar in Mexico, where only 30 percent of those that enter in any given year graduate. This has serious implication for education finance.

According to González Fiegehen (2006, p. 162), repeating courses and dropping out of school in the region are caused by,

the socioeconomic conditions of students and families (place of residence; parents' educational level; family environment; the need to work to support themselves and their families). This situation affects the lower income quintiles more strongly. Thus, financial issues and efficient expenditure become more critical.

These class-specific grievances and unmet needs are particularly likely to lead working-class students to mobilize. Hence, my third hypothesis, concerning protest

⁹ Most states have a low capacity to assess the quality of the education being taught in colleges: "Accreditation systems are weak, not widespread, and have had limited impact" (Puryear & Goodspeed, 2011, p. 118).

¹⁰ According to Trow (1973, 2006), universal higher education corresponds to systems where 50% or more of the college-age population attends college.

frequency:

Hypothesis 3. Greater access to college increases the frequency of student protests.

A similar effect is expected in term of size:

Hypothesis 4. Greater access to college increases the size of student protests.

Although grievances may be the immediate cause for mobilization (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001), some have existed for a while and thus cannot independently explain why social actors mobilize under certain circumstances but fail to do so in others. Political opportunities (McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 1978) – or the lack thereof – may help to explain the emergence and timing of protests. This study agrees with authors who consider social mobilization to be intimately linked to institutional politics, and that there is a porous limit between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics (Goldstone, 2003, p. 2).

A vast array of different political factors may open up the political system for mobilization. Some factors, like state capacity, the electoral system, and the degree of centralization are quite static and, therefore, tell us little about changes in mobilization over time. Indeed, the political opportunity structure approach – the argument that the political context affects mobilization – is conceptually too vague and hard to falsify to be readily applicable.¹¹ This study emphasizes the role of linkages between students and political parties, a dynamic political factor that fluctuates across both time and space. It is essential to take into account the relationship between political parties and social

¹¹ Goodwin & Jasper (1999, p. 28) take this criticism further and claim that Political Process Theory in general is “tautological, trivial, inadequate, or just plain wrong.”

movements to understand the frequency and scale of social mobilization:

[P]arty structure is probably the single most important variable for understanding the patterning of social movements. Movements can be understood as one part of a range of options that also includes political parties. Parties spin off movements, either deliberately or in the process of factionalizing. Movements appear within parties. Both are organizational forms for pursuing political ends, so it is not surprising that they are so closely intertwined (Garner & Zald, 1987, p. 312)

By analyzing the effect of strong linkages to parties in power and in the opposition, this study aims to shed light on the debate between Tilly (1978), who argues that social mobilization is more likely to occur in very closed or very open political systems (U-shaped curve) and Eisinger (1973) who claims that the likelihood of protests increase when the political system is neither closed or open (inverse U-shaped curve).

Party linkages are understood as the connections between political parties and societies. Strong party roots in society are an essential component of party system institutionalization, together with electoral stability, legitimacy, and independent status and value (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005, pp. 4–5). As Kitschelt argues, linkages between citizens and parties may take a variety of forms, including programmatic, personalistic, and organizational linkages (Kitschelt, 2000). Kitschelt's concept of party linkages (in its three forms) has been used to argue that there is an association between clientelistic linkages and economic development (Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes, 2004, p. 78; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 732), and to show how conservative parties using different linkage strategies can attract diverse socioeconomic constituencies (Luna, 2010). This study extends the use of party linkages to social mobilization to explain variation in mobilization based on different levels of student

linkages with political parties in government and in the opposition.

Organizational linkages refer to the degree political parties as organizations and certain social groups overlap. Linkages are strong when, for example, political parties have a presence in college campuses through youth outreach arms. Student membership in political parties – including participation in leadership positions – also denotes strong linkages between parties and students. Alliances for, say, electoral purposes may strengthen linkages (albeit temporarily) between students and parties. For example, in Peru the Alliance for Progress party offers scholarships and other benefits to college students in the party's founder's universities in exchange for their participation in electoral campaigns (Barrenechea, 2014). Similarly, organizational linkages are also established when party members pursue policies that are against student preferences but when they still obtain student leader's support through side payments. These payments can take several forms: positions within the party organization, candidacies for political office, support in student government elections, among others.

Programmatic linkages refer to the extent to which a political party's program or platform is aligned with a certain social sector's policy preferences. Programmatic linkages are created when "[p]olitical parties offer packages (programs) of policies that they promise to pursue if elected into office" (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 850). These linkages can be particularly salient in the case of programmatic political parties, which establish both programmatic and organizational linkages with students. This is the case, for example, with many leftist parties, which have historically had strong ideological connections to mobilized students in the region (Liebman et al., 1972, p. 27). Indeed,

student activism in Latin America has been characterized as primarily leftist (González Marín & Sánchez Sáenz, 2011; Marsiske, 2006).¹² Latin American college students have historically mobilized in favor of labor, public education, and against military interventions and imperialism, often adopting Marxist and Socialist slogans and terms. Whether leftist parties are in power or (more usually) in the opposition can have, therefore, an important influence on student mobilization. With the exception of some countries like Chile and Uruguay (Luna & Altman, 2011), ideology is nevertheless relatively weakly associated with party identification in most Latin American countries (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005). Indeed, in some developing contexts, personalistic and clientelistic relationships tend to be more important.

Finally, in charismatic parties, students establish a direct relationship with the party's charismatic leader. This type of linkages refers to connections based on "an individual's unique personal skills and powers of persuasion that instill followers with faith in the leader's ability to end suffering and create a better future" (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 849). Some notoriously charismatic leaders like Juan Domingo Perón have had weak linkages to students: Argentine college students sympathized with the opposition during his first presidential term and protested against him (Liebman et al., 1972, p. 26). Meanwhile, President Hugo Chávez established new higher education institutions staffed and attended by Bolivarian supporters (Ivancheva, 2016). Thus, student-party linkages can take a variety of forms.

¹² Other organizations such as Christian Democratic parties and even some right-wing ones have also attracted politically active students, however (Liebman et al., 1972, p. 72).

Student-party linkages are an important issue given the considerable variance in party-society linkages in the region and, as Roberts (2008, p. 342) puts it,

[T]here is little systematic comparative research to explain such variation in party-society linkages. At a time when both the partisan Left and social movements are gaining access to the commanding heights of state institutions, it is imperative to explore the institutional expressions of popular power.

This study contributes to our knowledge of party-society linkages by explaining how their variation in the case of linkages with college students explains variation in student mobilization.

The presence of organizational party linkages is particularly important in the case of students. Indeed, student politics are a prime hotbed for party leadership. Many party leaders – if not all – cut their teeth and acquire their political skills and networks during their time as college students. Moreover, sometimes parties expect their members who hope to run for office to have played an important role in student politics (Washington, 1959, p. 473). Joignant identifies “university capital” as one of the sources of political power: “[a]lthough it is a resource of variable importance depending on the country, it is within the boundaries of student political organizations...where the first forms of political leadership are acquired or developed” (Joignant, 2012, p. 608). Students’ simultaneous participation in student and party politics may result in a “double militancy” (Franceschet, 2004) and “institutional activism” (Santoro & McGuire, 1997), which can promote the growth of movements through party support and increase their likelihood of policy success by bureaucratic means. Thanks to this more formal type of participation, students can act as intermediaries between student and party organizations, facilitating

the transmission of information between the two. The significance of party linkages in the case of students cannot, therefore, be underestimated.

The location of political parties in the polity determines whether linkages with students will promote or discourage protests. Van Dyke (2003, p. 243), for example, argues that the location (specifically, the level of government in federal systems) of elite allies determines their effect on student mobilization. I build on this insight to argue that another location of parties with strong linkages – in government or in the opposition –has a major differential effect on protests.

Scholars have previously argued that linkages between social movements and opposition parties can promote mobilization and the achievement of policy outcomes (Almeida, 2010; Stearns & Almeida, 2004; Su, 2015). A strong opposition, for example, can promote mobilization to destabilize the government (Morgenstern, Negri, & Pérez-Liñán, 2008, p. 183). Almeida (2010), drawing on evidence from five Latin American countries, argues that alliances between social actors and opposition political parties with at least moderate electoral success foster mobilization against market reforms. Similarly, Su (2015) finds that for 107 countries between 1990 and 2004, the larger and more united the opposition, the greater the number of anti-government protests. As Somma & Medel explain,

When movements get close to polity members, they may be aware that they have powerful allies they can rely on. They become less vulnerable to stigmatization by the media and to harsh and arbitrary repression by police forces. Movement leaders and constituencies feel more optimistic and empowered. Hence they mobilize more (2017, p. 33)

The resources and policymaking influence of opposition parties vary considerably, however. Some may have a powerful organization and control numerous municipal and congressional posts, while others may hold no offices and have very few resources. Indeed, strong ties to some minor or marginal parties can actually result in the stigmatization of their student allies, rendering them likely targets of state repression, and decreasing their capacity to mobilize. For example, students with ties to the African National Congress (ANC) and other anti-apartheid parties tended to refrain from protesting due to heightened repression against these parties in the 1960s (Cele & Koen, 2003). It is impossible, therefore, to theorize whether linkages with opposition parties in general will promote or discourage student mobilization. The effect of opposition linkages on student protest frequency may be, on average, null.

By contrast, ruling parties wield much greater influence than opposition parties, and connections between them and social movements will typically decrease mobilization. Ruling parties may want to discourage their supporters from mobilizing to facilitate governance. Likewise, government supporters in the movement may want to dampen protest to avoid calling the regime's legitimacy into question. For example, in 1962, the Brazilian National Union of Students staged a strike that was ended "by student political leaders apparently at the request of the government which feared the military might use it as a pretext to launch a coup" (Liebman et al., 1972, p. 28). Van Dyke (2003, pp. 240–243) finds that the presence of governors and presidents from the Democratic Party (which has stronger ties to leftist college students) decreased the likelihood of leftist student protests in the United States. By contrast, the 1968 Italian student

movement only emerged after students escaped “the narrow logic of party control” (Tarrow, 1989, p. 156). In the case of unions, experts have found that connections with ruling parties reduced their ability to mobilize and to resist market reforms (Madrid, 2003; Murillo, 2001). In Latin America, ties between social movements and ruling elites in the post-transition period resulted in the subjugation of the logic “directed toward securing concrete claims” to the political logic of democratic consolidation (Garretón, 2003, p. 85). Indeed, the goal of elite participation in mobilization may be to eventually curb it (McAdam, 1982, p. 62).

It is at this point that it is essential to define what we meant by greater mobilization. If we mean *more frequent* mobilization, then linkages with parties in the opposition may or may not assist student protests. Several studies have found an association between opposition party strength (measured in terms of their presence in Congress and the electorate) and the frequency of protests (Almeida, 2010; Arce, 2010; Su, 2015). There are two issues with this finding. First, most protest event datasets based on media analysis are biased in favor of larger events (Biggs, 2016). Thus, what these studies actually find is that strong oppositions are associated with more frequent *massive* protests. Second, and more important, they usually restrict their analyses of the opposition to parties with congressional representation, thus overestimating the effect that opposition parties in general have on protest frequency. Indeed, some powerful parties in the opposition may have the leverage, resources, and manpower to contribute significantly to student causes, increasing the number of student protests. Other minor parties are too weak to provide the means to initiate mobilizations. Indeed, their fringe

status may actually deter student mobilization.

Linkages with ruling parties, by contrast, will most certainly deter mobilization. These linkages may prevent the emergence of student mobilization in at least two ways. First, if the government opposes students' demands and mobilization, it can co-opt students by offering side benefits. For example, it can offer student leaders, who act as brokers between the government and students, positions in the public sector, or possibilities to move up from the rank and file to leadership positions within the party. Second, if ruling parties respond to student grievances, the government can credibly channel them institutionally, rendering mobilization unnecessary. For example, Santoro & McGuire (1997, p. 505) argue that Democratic legislators grant civil rights activists "significant access to their offices' resources, such as information, data collection, expert personnel/staff, and access to other decision-makers" to advance their policy goals through formal channels. As McCarthy & Zald argue in the case of student mobilization in the 1960s United States:

The effects of established institutions' involvement in the backing of professional social movement organizations should have the broader implication of directing organized dissent into legitimate channels. That student energies can be diverted into legitimate channels by flourishing professional social movement organizations remains a distinctive possibility. By applying large amount of resources, then, in ameliorative directions, elites may have the effect of diffusing the radical possibilities of dissent in general [...] Such an argument does not hinge upon the motives of the elite groups. Whether their motives are sincere concern or social control, their actions are likely to have the same general effects (1973, p. 26)

Following the terminology of McAdam et al (2001, p. 12), linkages to government parties put students closer to becoming "polity members" with routine access to policymaking;

conversely, when linkages with parties in government are weak they are more likely to become “challengers.”

Another way to understand the effect of strong linkages with ruling parties is through Hanagan's (1998, pp. 4–5) concepts of “articulation” and “permeation.” When movements articulate parties’ positions, “movement activists are expected to follow party guidelines and instructions” (Hanagan, 1998, p. 5); when parties permeate movements to recruit them for their causes, “movement activists expect to receive a fair-minded hearing for their cause and, employing routine channels for exerting influence, to have a reasonable chance of winning the party to their point of view” (Hanagan, 1998, p. 5). Articulation with and permeation by ruling parties should discourage mobilization. Conversely, when parties in government are unable to permeate student movements or to articulate their demands, student protests become more likely. Thus, my fifth hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 5. *Stronger student linkages to parties in power decrease the frequency of student protests.*

If by greater mobilization we mean *larger* protests, the most important actors influencing the scope of social mobilization are, arguably, political parties in the opposition. While weak societal connections to ruling parties may increase political instability and the frequency of protests (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995), strong connections with certain opposition parties may also boost mobilization.

Indeed, both parties and students may benefit from these alliances. Students can take advantage of the party’s organization and other resources to extend the reach and

visibility of their mobilizations (Rochon, 2016). Parties, in turn, can convert students into electoral constituencies (Goldstone, 2003), use protests to advance their policies and agendas outside of formal institutions, and weaken competing elites (Eckstein, 2001, p. 40). In his description of student politics in Venezuela in the 1950s, Washington (1959, p. 465) recounts: “The proclivities of the students are fully exploited by the political parties. It is an old practice of opposition leaders to place students in the forefront of demonstrations that might provoke violence on the part of the powers-that-be.” In its demonstrations against the Vietnam War, the goal of the Italian Communist Party was to

capture the new militance stirring among young people, while embarrassing the Socialists and attacking the government's support of the American war. In fact, the new levy of young Communists in 1966 was officially called 'the Vietnam levy' by party leaders (Tarrow, 1989, p. 161).

To paraphrase Tarrow (2011), opposition party participation opens up the political opportunity structure for larger student demonstrations.

I argue that variation in the level of linkages with ruling parties, by contrast, should have no effect on the size of student mobilizations. Governments, as explained above, are generally against mobilization and hence discourage the emergence of protests. Once protests are a done deal, however, ruling party linkages should be irrelevant for the size of student mobilizations. If linkages were weak, ruling party members would not participate in student demonstrations because of the tenuous relationship between the government and students; if linkages were strong, ruling parties would still not contribute to student protests out of concerns about regime stability and legitimacy. I argue, therefore, that variation in the size of student protests is not majorly affected by variation

in linkages with parties in government.

I claim, therefore, that stronger connections to parties in the opposition will increase the size of student protests. Because opposition parties have the resources (manpower, logistics, monetary resources) and reasons (destabilize the government, gain student supporters) to contribute to the number of participants in protests, protests with opposition party involvement will tend to be larger. Meanwhile, when linkages with opposition parties are weak, coordination between parties and students becomes is less likely, causing protests to be relatively smaller. I derive, therefore, the following hypothesis about the effect of opposition parties' involvement in student protests:

Hypothesis 6. *Stronger student linkages to parties in the opposition increase the size of student protests.*

Student protests, therefore, will occur more often when the costs of higher education rise for students, when enrollments increase, and when the student movements have weaker ties to the ruling parties. Moreover, once they break out, student demonstrations will be larger when students bear more of the cost of education, when they involve lower income students, and when student organizations that stage them have stronger ties to opposition parties.

Table 1.1 summarizes the effect of the variables discussed on protest frequency and size. The higher education policy variables – finance and enrollment – have similar effects on both dimensions of student mobilizations. In other words, increases in the share of private funding of higher education and in enrollment boost student mobilization broadly understood. Party linkages, by contrast, have different effects on the size and

frequency of protests. On the one hand, strong linkages with ruling parties are associated with less frequent student mobilization; on the other hand, stronger linkages with the opposition are associated with larger student protests.

Table 1.1 Effects of main explanatory variables on protest frequency and size

| <i>Explanatory Variable</i> | | <i>Effect on</i> | |
|---|--------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| | | Protest Frequency | Protest Size |
| Higher Education Policy | | | |
| Finance | More Private | More Frequent | Larger |
| Enrollment | Higher | More Frequent | Larger |
| Student Linkages with Political Parties | | | |
| In Government | Stronger | Less Frequent | No effect |
| In the Opposition | Stronger | Null effect | Larger |

Alternative Explanations

Leftist Parties and Social Mobilization

An alternative explanation would be that more social mobilization is associated with stronger leftist parties. As mentioned above, Latin American students have historically a strong connection to parties on the Left. Indeed, the political Left also tried to establish strong ties to civil society after the third wave of democratization:

[T]he idea of deepening democracy provided rationale for the construction of new alliances between parties in the Left that were in search of social subjects and popular organizations that needed institutional representation in formal policymaking arenas (Roberts, 1998, p. 3).

It would be understandable, therefore, that, as leftist parties become stronger, so would their activist allies, leading to mobilization. In other words, when leftist parties gain more presence among voters, in Congress, and in the executive, this would open up the political opportunity structure for more mobilization by their allies. This argument goes in line with the claim made by political process theorists that the presence of elite allies increases the likelihood of protest, as the perception of policy success increases (McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 2011).

Several studies lend support to this claim. Van Dyke (2003b pp. 240–243), for example, finds that the presence of more Democratic congresspersons in state legislatures (whom she claims are allied with leftist college students) increases the likelihood of leftist student protests in several college campuses in the United States between 1930 and 1990. Similarly, Minkoff, 1997 (p. 795) finds that “[t]he recruitment of [Progressive] political allies and the expectation of elite responsiveness encourage protest by a range of groups and initiate the onset of a protest cycle.” At the individual level, identifying with leftist ideology is a strong indicator of participating in protests (Dalton, Van Sickle, & Weldon, 2009, p. 60). To the extent, therefore, that leftist parties become stronger by recruiting sympathizers and members, protest activity should also increase.

The claim that stronger leftist parties may increase student mobilization in Latin America is problematic for several reasons. First, the experience of many Latin American countries suggests that leftist ideology does not necessarily lead to strong linkages with college students. Indeed, in many countries of the region, students have protested *against* leftist governments, such as those of Presidents Hugo Morales and Nicolás Maduro in

Venezuela (Ivancheva, 2016), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (El Universo, 2015), and Evo Morales in Bolivia (La Nación, 2007). As mentioned above, the relationship between ideology and party identification is weak in most of the region, and there may be other reasons for students to establish strong or weak linkages with political parties besides ideological affinity.

Second, assuming student-leftist parties linkages are strong, more important than the strength of leftist parties is whether or not they are in government. When holding the presidency, even leftist parties and their supporters feel compelled to promote stability and the regime's legitimacy, and hence become more averse to experiencing social protests. When in power, the Latin American Left has often chosen to "contain popular demands and compromise with competing interests to ensure democratic stability, even if the result is an elitist form of democracy that discourages popular participation" (Roberts, 1998, pp. 6–7). For example, under the rule of certain leftist governments with strong ties to them, like in Brazil under the Worker's Party, Uruguay under the Frente Amplio, and Chile under the Concertación, the scale of student mobilization has actually diminished. Conversely, when in the opposition, the Left may use its influence and ties to the social sector to boost the scale of mobilizations. More important than the strength of leftist parties is, therefore, whether they actually have strong linkages with students, and whether they are in the government or in the opposition.

Differences in Higher Education Institutions

Another explanation applies resource mobilization theory to explain differences in

mobilization between different higher education institutions. In a nutshell, resource mobilization theory argues that the potential for mobilization increases as the resources and strategies available to groups grow (Edwards & McCarthy, 2007; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, & Brady, 1995). A minimum level of preexisting networks and organization is essential for the mobilization of even the most disadvantaged segments of a population (McAdam, 1982, pp. 43–44).

In the context of higher education, different types of institutions coincide with different levels of resources. One key difference is between university and non-university institutions. The university setting, which offers time and room for extracurricular activities, and has a tradition of student organization and politics, can be a fertile ground for collective action (Altbach 2006). By contrast, non-university technical and vocational institutions lack the resources that promote mobilization. These institutions are for the most part much more recent than universities (Bernasconi, 2008, p. 28), and thus students cannot draw from a tradition of mobilization the way their universities counterparts do. More importantly, these institutions' administrations are less tolerant of student politics. More so today than in the past, students "find themselves at institutions, such as technical institutes, with no tradition, interest or tolerance for student activism" (Levy, 1991, p. 150).

A further distinction can be made between the public, generally older universities, and the majority of universities founded since the 1980s, most of them private. These two types of universities often have opposing views of the role students should play in the institutions and in society, and therefore offer differing levels of resources for

mobilization. As Fleet & Guzmán-Concha (2016, p. 5) argue, students may be less likely to participate in mobilizations, “in universities where intellectual labour is more materially constrained and subjected to exploitation (i.e. the most massified and marketised universities)”. Thus, based on the availability of resources, students from public universities are generally more likely to mobilize than those from private ones, who are in turn more likely to mobilize than students attending other higher education institutions. At the national level, it would be expected that countries with higher percentages of students enrolled in private and non-university institutions, would have lower levels of student mobilization. At the individual level, we would expect to see students attending public colleges to protest more frequently than their colleagues in private and non-university institutions.

I am skeptical of explanations based on institutional differences in resource availability for two reasons. First, the claim that the expansion of certain types of higher education institutions is associated with decreased mobilization does not seem to hold against the empirical record. The number of private and non-university institutions (as well as the share of the college population enrolled in these institutions) has consistently increased across the region (Holm-Nielsen et al., 2005), yet student mobilization has fluctuated over time and across countries. For example, as will be argued below, Chile in 2011 experienced the highest frequency of student protests, although in that year, 84% of the student population was enrolled in private institutions,¹³ which was the highest rate in the region (Brunner & Villalobos, 2014, p. 28).

¹³ In Chile all non-university institutions are privately owned.

Second, when the distinction between protest frequency and size is considered, institutional differences lose explanatory power. Differences between private and public institutions may explain variation in the frequency of the subset of protests occurring within educational institutions (strikes and sit-ins, for example): mobilizations taking place inside colleges (whether or not they have administrative approval) may happen more frequently in public institutions. However, public/private institutional variation should be less important when explaining the size of all events, including the largest events (demonstrations, marches), which happen in public spaces outside of the students' institutions' purview and make it possible for students from all institutions to attend. Thus, I argue that the privatization of *costs* is more important than the privatization of *enrollment* to explain increases in student mobilization.

Technology, Social Media, and Protests

Another alternative explanation would attribute protest to the growing use of communication technologies in social protest. According to their proponents, new media platforms facilitate collective action by decreasing the costs of communication and coordination among potential participants (Rheingold, 1985). Social media use appears to be associated with higher “offline” political participation (Baym, 2015, pp. 106–107); the evidence also suggests that social media mobilizes individuals who would not participate otherwise (Enjolras, Steen-Johnsen, & Wollebaek, 2013). When it comes to protest participation, Lin & Su (2015) find that higher levels of cellphone usage at the country level, and of individual-level cellphone and internet usage in Taiwan, are associated with

higher frequencies of protests. Several studies argue that social media use has played an important role in several instances of student protest (Lin & Su, 2015; Maireder & Schwarzenegger, 2012; Scherman et al., 2015; Valenzuela, Arriagada, & Scherman, 2012). At the country level, it might be expected, therefore, that increased online access would be associated with more frequent and massive student protests. At the individual level, in turn, more frequent use of social media like Facebook and Twitter would also be correlated with more participation in student protests.

I am also skeptical about the effect of social media use for two reasons. First, from a theoretical standpoint, there is still an ongoing debate on whether the effect of social media use on protest is positive, negative, or epiphenomenal. The so-called “cyberpessimists” argue that using social media actually drives people away from any sort of public engagement, or that online activism drives people away from offline political participation (Christensen, 2011; Nie, 2001). Social media can

provide a form of emotional release that simultaneously invigorates and exhausts tension...Depending on context, these affective attachments create feelings of community that may either reflexively drive a movement, and/or capture users in a state of engaged passivity” (Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2012, p. 2008).

Even in studies where the association with protest is confirmed to be positive, the effect of social media may be due to preexisting personal characteristics. For example, Leung & Lee (2014) find that the effect of alternative internet media usage on protest participation is partly driven by preexisting political attitudes and beliefs toward mainstream media; among students in Hong Kong, Tang & Lee (2013) find that exposure to political information and connections with political actors mediate the effect of

Facebook usage on protest participation.

Second, theories of social media have little to say about the effect of social media use on protest frequency. The most compelling evidence for the importance of social media usage is found at the individual level using survey data.¹⁴ Thus, these studies tend to explain individual-level variation in protest participation. This data may explain indirectly why some protests are larger than others – social media use may add additional participants to protests. Indeed, the use of online platforms may decrease the costs of mobilization for cyber-activists who would otherwise not participate (Marín Álvarez, 2016). Since more participants do not necessarily translate into more protests, social media use has little to say about protest frequency, and why they occur in the first place.

Research Design

This dissertation takes a comparative and multilevel perspective to explain variation in college student mobilization in Latin America. It also responds to recent calls in comparative politics for “mixed” research designs (Lieberman, 2005), which use both quantitative and qualitative methods. Specifically, this study uses a “nested” analysis, which “combines the statistical analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more cases within the sample” (Lieberman, 2005, pp. 435–436). These designs take advantage of the distinct assets of both quantitative and qualitative methods, using quantitative methods to establish the associations between the main independent variables and the dependent while controlling for other covariates, and

¹⁴ An exception is Pierskalla & Hollenbach's (2013), who show that increased local availability of cellphone technology increases the probability of violent collective action in Africa.

qualitative approaches to find the causal mechanisms linking these factors.

This study also tests my arguments at three different levels of analysis. First, I test the hypotheses about the effect of higher education finance, enrollment, and government and opposition party linkages on protest frequency and size using a novel dataset of protest events with college student participants in Latin America. This dataset, the Latin American Student Protest Dataset (LASPD), includes more than 4,700 different protest events in eighteen Latin American countries between 2000 and 2012. The LASPD also contains information about each event's characteristics, such as the actors involved, their tactics, their targets, the number of participants, and the locations of the events. I drew from data aggregated at the national level and from studies of higher education policy in Latin America to obtain the education policy variables, and carried out an expert survey of more than seventy scholars to gauge the level of linkages between student movements and ruling as well as opposition parties. This data is analyzed descriptively and through regression analysis. As noted, the two dependent variables are protest frequency as measured by number of protest events in each country-year, and protest size, as measured by the number of participants in each protest event. Mixed-effects negative binomial and logistic models, and ordered logistic, conditional logistic and multilevel ordered logistic models are used to analyze the dependent variables.

Second, I conducted comparative case studies of higher education policies, student-party linkages, and student protest frequency and size in Chile and Peru. This section of the dissertation explores the causal mechanisms through which grievances associated with market-friendly policies and student party linkages have affected the

frequency and size of student mobilizations. The period covered begins with each country's return to democracy (1990 in Chile, 2000 in Peru), and ends in 2011 Chile and 2014 in Peru. The differences in levels of student mobilization are striking: Chile has experienced major episodes of frequent and massive student demonstrations (most notably in 2006 and 2011), while students in Peru have protested less frequently and in smaller numbers since the return to democracy. In terms of higher education policies, both countries have adopted neoliberal policies, promoting the growth of the private sector, reducing the relative weight of public spending, and promoting enrollment. On the political side, the two countries are similar in that student linkages with governing parties have traditionally been weak or have weakened over time while the strength of linkages with the opposition has fluctuated. A key difference, however, can be found in the substantially different levels of costs students face, derived from the different policies enacted to fund higher education and promote enrollment. These two countries have, therefore, key similarities, which are controlled for, and a few major differences that lend themselves for fruitful comparison. Thus, comparing student mobilization in Chile and Peru constitutes an example of a "most similar" case selection and analysis strategy (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, pp. 304–306).

Data for the case studies were collected through fieldwork in the United States (Washington, D.C.), Chile (Santiago and Valparaiso) and Peru (Lima). Fieldwork was conducted between July of 2014 and May of 2015. The data includes primary and secondary written sources, as well as more than seventy semi-structured interviews carried out by the author with current and former student leaders, politicians, and

government and university officials.¹⁵ Interviewees in both countries include former Education Ministers and other government officials, heads of the national college student federations (CONFECH in Chile and FEP in Peru), members of political parties and student unions, and student leaders in public and private universities.

Finally, I test the observable implications of my hypotheses at the individual level. The microdata used for the individual-level analysis come from the Chilean Instituto Nacional de la Juventud (National Youth Institute, INJUV) 2012 *Encuesta Nacional de la Juventud* (National Youth Survey, ENJ). This survey, which is representative of the 15-29 year-old population of the country, asked respondents about their participation in several types of protest tactics, as well as their use of education funding sources and various demographic characteristics, including socioeconomic status. Ordered logistic and logistic regression models are used in this analysis. Testing the theory at the individual level is important to ensure that “the research has microfoundations, that is, it pays attention to the constraints on and the strategic interactions among the actors whose aggregated choices produces the outcome of interest” (Levi, 2009, p. 120). Indeed, individual participation is the basis of both frequent and massive protests.

Putting it in terms of country-years, the quantitative analysis at the regional levels explores to determinants of student protest frequency and size in more than two hundred country-years; the comparative case studies analyze the ways higher education policies and party politics have affected student mobilization in Chile and Peru in about 35

¹⁵ See Appendix A for a list of all interviewees.

country-years; finally, the survey analysis examines the responses of thousands of college students in one country-year (Chile between 2011 and 2012).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that, in order to understand college student mobilization in Latin America, both politics and public policy have to be considered. Additionally, I have argued that the frequency and size of protest are distinct dimensions of mobilization and they, therefore, merit separate explanations. Indeed, I have presented a theory of student mobilization arguing that, while social grievances have similar consequences for frequency and size, the effects of party linkages have differential effects on these two aspects of mobilization: grievances associated with increased enrollment and decreased funding have a positive effect on student protest frequency and size; meanwhile, the effects of party linkages these two dimensions of mobilization depend on the parties' location in government or in the opposition. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only study explaining two dimensions of social mobilization, and arguing that the factors influencing them have differential effects.

In my theory I have argued that social grievances associated with neoliberal reforms in higher education and linkages between students and ruling and opposition political parties have major effects on student mobilization. Neoliberal reforms, enacted since the 1980s in the region, have resulted in a simultaneous increase in college enrollments and in the share of education costs paid for by students. These reforms have caused grievances related to the incorporation of lower income students, and to financing

higher education. Intensifications of these grievances increase both the frequency and the size of student mobilizations.

Party linkages refer to the programmatic, charismatic, and organizational connections between students and political parties. Their effect depends on whether the parties are in the government or the opposition. In terms of frequency, stronger linkages with ruling parties deter mobilization, while connections with the opposition are not expected to have an independent effect. Meanwhile, stronger linkages with opposition parties will result in more massive student mobilizations, while connections with the government should not make a contribution to student protest size.

This study has several theoretical implications for the study of social movements. First, the distinction made between protest size and frequency underscores the importance of having a well-defined dependent variable. Most studies have focused on protest frequency (Biggs, 2016) even though “the logic of numbers” (Della Porta & Diani, 2006) plays a vital role in the outcomes of mobilization. The argument presented in this chapter suggests that explanations of protest frequency may not explain variation in protest size.

Second, in terms of grievances, the theory suggests that grievances associated with neoliberal policies have a mobilizing effect in the long run. Previous studies argued that market reforms have “generally been met by most Latin American societies not with a bang but with a relative whimper” (Kurtz, 2004, p. 264), and that once implemented they “undermine the mobilizational capacity of social groups” (Gans-Morse & Nichter, 2007, p. 1404). By contrast, I argue that these reforms can become a major motive for mobilizing college students even years after their implementation. This is particularly

true of policies, like increased enrollment and private funding, that affect both the acuteness and the scope of grievances. Experts should consider both types of causal mechanisms when assessing the effect on mobilization of the much-maligned explanations based on social grievances.

Finally, scholars have emphasized the role that party system institutionalization in general and party rootedness in society in particular play in political stability and governance (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). Drawing on the concept of society-party linkages (Kitschelt, 2000), this study argues that stronger linkages between students and parties have an independent effect on the frequency and size of student protests, and that this effect depends on whether parties are in government or in the opposition. Indeed, while many studies have underscored the importance of ties with opposition parties for increased mobilization (Almeida, 2010; Arce, 2010; Su, 2015), I argue that in terms of frequency the most important factor is ties to ruling parties, and that when these ties are stronger, protest becomes more sporadic. I theorize, however, that stronger linkages with the opposition do have a positive effect on the size of student demonstrations. Political opportunities in the form of party linkages, therefore, have contradictory effects on social mobilization, depending on the dimension of mobilization being analyzed.

Plan of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter Two contains the regional level analysis of student protest frequency and size. The chapter discusses how the LASPD dataset was created, its main characteristics, and it uses the dataset to describe

the frequency and size of Latin American student mobilizations. The chapter also discusses the design, implementation, and results of an expert survey on organizational student-party linkages. Finally, the chapter presents regression models using protest frequency, size, and the aggregate number of participants as response variables. Mixed-effects negative binomial and logistic models are used to analyze the causes of protest frequency per country-year; ordered logistic, conditional logistic, and multilevel logistic models are used on the categorical protest size variable; and, negative binomial and logistic models are used to analyze the number of protest participants per country-year. Chapter Two also includes a detailed account of the independent variables and the way they were measured.

The next two chapters contain the comparative case studies of student mobilization in Chile and Peru. Chapter Three explores the ways higher education policy and party linkages affected college student mobilization in Chile between 1990 and 2011. Students in Chile have constantly demonstrated since the return to democracy, but the frequency and massiveness of protests clearly peaks in 2011. It shows how a funding system enacted in the 1980s based on private spending and major, debt-financed increases in enrollment in the 2000s resulted in widespread and acute social grievances. The chapter also demonstrates that strong linkages with ruling parties during the Concertación government coalition years (1990-2010) initially deterred mobilization but subsequently waned. The weak linkages with the Center-Right government of President Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014) help to explain the timing of major mobilizations in 2011. The chapter also explains how linkages with opposition parties (which included the

Concertación parties after 2010), explain variation in the size of student protests. Chapter Three also includes a statistical analysis of the ENJ survey, employing a subsample of Chilean college students. Using ordered logistic and logistic models, the analysis shows that students who use loans, belong to the working class, and have weak programmatic linkages to the governing parties have a higher likelihood of participating in protests.

Chapter Four explores the effect of higher education policies and party linkages on student mobilization in Peru from 2000 to 2014. In Peru, the frequency and size of student protests has fluctuated but have never reached the levels recorded in 2000, when students helped to oust President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). The chapter discusses how the Fujimori regime, like the authoritarian regime in Chile, followed a neoliberal approach in higher education, decreasing public expenditures and promoting the growth of the private sector, increasing working class participation and private expenditures in higher education. As in Chile, the first democratic governments had very strong linkages with students, which subsequently eroded. However, Chapter Four shows how incorporation of working class students has not been as thorough as in Chile, and the cost of education is relatively lower thanks to free tuition in public institutions and income-based rates in private colleges, resulting in lower levels of grievances. Chapter Four also discusses how the weakness of political parties in Peru, and particularly of those in the opposition, explains their minor contributions to the size of student mobilizations in the country.

The Conclusion summarizes the theoretical arguments and empirical findings, and out the dissertation's main theoretical and policy implications. This section also offers

suggestions for future research on student mobilization, higher education policy, and party-society linkages.

Chapter Two: Quantitative Analyses Of Student Mobilization In Latin America

2011 was an eventful year for Latin American student activists. According to the Latin American Student Protest Dataset (LASPD), the national and local media of eighteen countries in the region recorded more than 570 protest events with higher education student participants. The frequency of student protests was spread unequally among the countries, however. In Uruguay, for example, the media recorded a single event commemorating the deaths of two demonstrators in 1994, while Chile experienced 143. The size of these protests also varied widely. For example, on April 29, five students at the Industrial University of Santander in Bucaramanga, Colombia began a hunger strike against the expulsion of a fellow student for participating in a previous demonstration against the institution (Martínez, 2011). By contrast, on August 21, the Chilean Confederation of Students organized the “Family March for Education” seeking free, public, and high quality education, gathering between 100,000 and 1,000,000 attendees in downtown Santiago, according to different estimates (Bellei, Cabalin, & Orellana, 2014, p. 431; EMOL, 2011). What explains this conspicuous variation in the frequency and size of student protests?

College students in Latin America have been recognized for decades as influential political actors. Their efforts at shaping politics and policies through protests have had great consequences. Some studies have employed a comparative lens to analyze and explain student mobilization (Muñoz Tamayo, 2011; Palacios-Valladares, 2016), drawing on the various experiences of student movements. However, there is a dearth of

quantitative analyses at the regional level, which can systematically analyze mobilization while testing competing explanations.

This chapter analyses two aspects of college student mobilization: the frequency and the size of student protests. It makes use of the Latin American Student Protest Dataset (LASPD) mentioned in the previous chapter. The first part of the chapter presents and discusses the LASPD. The second part discusses the results of an Expert Survey of organizational party linkages between college students and political parties in Latin America. The third part analyses the frequency of protests, understood as the number of student protest events in every country-year included in the LASPD. This dependent variable is regressed using mixed-effects negative binomial and logistics models. The fourth part analyzes the size of each protest in the LASPD, measuring size as a categorical variable. Ordered logistic, conditional logistic, and multilevel logistic regressions are applied in this section. The fifth section takes an alternative approach by transforming the frequency variable into a count of the total number of protest participants per country-year. Similar to the frequency analysis, the number of participants per country-year is analyzed using mixed-effects negative binomial and logistics models. The chapter concludes that different funding policies, levels of enrollment, and party linkages have important consequences for the frequency, individual protest size, and aggregate size of student mobilizations.

The Latin American Student Protest Dataset

This section discusses a dataset of 4,717 student protest events in eighteen Latin American countries between the years 2000 and 2012 that I created using the monthly Chronologies of Social Conflict of the Latin American Social Observatory (Observatorio Social de América Latina, OSAL, 2012), which belongs to the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO). These Chronologies contain summaries of social conflicts (including press conferences, meetings between government authorities and social actors, and protests) based on media reports from each country, with each summary typically being one or two paragraphs long. The media analyzed include national and local newspapers, news websites, and radio stations. OSAL analyzed at least three media in any given period.

This dataset was created applying the method of Protest Event Analysis (PEA). According to Koopmans & Rucht (2002, p. 231), PEA

[has] been developed to systematically map, analyze, and interpret the occurrence and properties of large numbers of protests by means of content analysis,¹⁶ using sources such as newspapers reports and police records. These protest data, in turn, can be linked to other kinds of data in order to study the causes and consequences of protests

Important examples of the use of PEA include Shorter & Tilly's study of more than a century of strike activity in France (1974), Tarrow's (1989a) research on the 1965-1975 Italian protest cycle, including the role of college students in its onset, and Koopmans & Statham's (1999) study of "political claims-making" related to migration and ethnic

¹⁶ Content analysis refers to "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use" (Krippendorff, 2012, p. 24).

relations in Germany and Great Britain. PEA studies have gone from being descriptive exercises that were relatively naïve about their source's biases to statistically sophisticated analyses that are more careful about the shortcomings of their sources (Hutter, 2014, pp. 3–5).

Examples of studies that have taken advantage of PEA to analyze and explain social mobilization in Latin America are relatively scarce, but there are notable exceptions at the regional (Almeida, 2007; Arce, 2010; Bellinger & Arce, 2011), national (Almeida, 2008, 2012; Arce, 2014; Medel & Somma, 2016), and subnational (Inclán, 2008; Trejo, 2009) levels.¹⁷ An example of PEA used to explain student mobilization is Nella Van Dyke's dataset of leftist student protest events in select colleges in the United States (1930-1990), which analyzed college newspapers to obtain the data (Van Dyke, 2003a, 2003b). While surveys and case studies are appropriate to analyze student protest behavior and the causal mechanisms behind student mobilization, PEA is a more effective tool for analyzing student mobilization across large geographic distances and time periods.

The methods used to systematize this dataset follow Medel and Somma (2016), who also used the OSAL Chronologies to analyze protest events by all social actors in Chile between 2000 and 2012. The word roots “estud,” “alumn,” “alun,” and “univers” were searched for in the Chronologies (as electronic files) to find the relevant events.¹⁸ Searching for these roots revealed a multitude of related terms in Spanish and Portuguese,

¹⁷ All of these studies analyze protest frequency, not size, however.

¹⁸ The author carried out the search for protest events with college student participants in the OSAL Chronologies.

such as *estudiante* and *estudante* (the noun “student” in the two languages), *estudiantil* and *estudentil* (adjectives meaning “pertaining to students”), *alumnado* and *alunato* (“student body”), and *universitariola* and *universitário/a* (“college student”), among many other words. Each protest was then individually analyzed to see whether there were actually college students involved– in many cases there were, for example, only secondary students involved, or only college professors. Finally, each event was coded according to several characteristics: location, date, type of student participants, other social sectors that participated in the event, estimated number of protesters, targets, demands, whether the demands are for or against change, tactics, and the presence of police repression, injured and dead.¹⁹ The events were coded using a survey-style online form on Google Forms.

Admittedly, PEA is only an approximate way to quantify student mobilization, and using the OSAL data to create the LASPD has shortcomings. As Hutter (2014, p. 17), points out, “[a]ny scholar who works with PEA data needs to address the selection bias question...[N]o researcher would claim that these events are a representative sample of all protest events that take place. The coverage is selective.” Two main types of factors are associated with selection bias, and make a student protest event more or less likely to be covered: event characteristics and news agency characteristics (Earl, Martin, McCarthy,

¹⁹ The author, along with two assistants coded the events. The author coded four countries (Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay), one assistant (who speaks Portuguese) coded one country (Brazil), and the other assistant coded the rest (Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela). All three followed the same coding guideline, and the author trained the assistants before the coding process began. The coding guideline can be found in Appendix B.

& Soule, 2004).²⁰ These media biases tend to be consistent over time (McCarthy, Titarenko, McPhail, Rafail, & Augustyn, 2008).

Regarding the events themselves, there is a tendency to record more of the most massive and disruptive events, and fewer of the smaller and peaceful ones. These two causes of media bias reflect Della Porta & Diani's (2006, pp. 171–176) “logic of numbers” and the “logic of damages” in social movements, which also affect a movement’s chance of success. The presence of security personnel also has an independent effect on media coverage (Myers & Caniglia, 2004). Thus, a small demonstration on campus may go unnoticed, compared to a massive student march along a main street. Similarly, a small sit-in may only be covered if the police intervene, evicting and arresting students.

In terms of news agency characteristics, each medium included in the OSAL Chronologies has its own degree of bias. The bias may be related to the mediums’ national or local scope, with local media being less selective in its coverage (Hocke, 1999), its geographic location – events in more isolated places are less likely to be reported (Danzger, 1975) – and its ideological bias: very liberal newspapers, for example, are generally more likely to cover protest events than conservative ones (Oliver & Myers, 1999).

The LASPD was created addressing, at least partly, all of these sources of bias.

²⁰ The authors also identify a third source of bias: issue characteristics, meaning that some issues may be in or out the media attention cycle. However, the effect of issues characteristics on media bias is less clear than in the case of event and media characteristics (Ortiz, Myers, Walls, & Diaz, 2005, p. 401), and even the experts who claim that issues matter for reporting say that protest size “dwarfs” their effect (McCarthy, McPhail, & Smith, 1996, p. 492).

Applying PEA to process the OSAL chronologies partly overcomes media bias by using multiple media in every country. Using the same source of data (OSAL) for their analysis of protest tactics in Chile, Medel & Somma (2016, p. 176) argue that

[O]ne of the strengths of the OSAL records relative to most existing PEA for other countries, is the use of a multitude of written, radio, and online media. This allows for the triangulation of information and substantially (although not completely) reduces selection bias.

The subject matter of the LASPD – Latin American college students – also has certain advantages. The vast majority of college students (with the notable exception of students in rural normal schools) resides and acts in urban areas, and national and state capital cities house a relatively large number of higher education institutions. This means that college student protests are more likely to be picked up by the media, compared to demonstrations staged by indigenous peoples or peasants, for example. Their location can also make student protests more disruptive for a larger segment of the population. Also, unlike the United States, most Latin American countries have unitary states, and even those that are organized into federations (like Mexico and Brazil) have higher education systems and universities that depend directly on the federal government. College students in the region are, therefore, relatively likely to target the central government, go to capital cities and demonstrate near or at presidential palaces and national congresses, drawing the attention of national media. The LASPD, therefore, offers a unique opportunity to study student mobilization in the region in a comparative and systematic manner.

It is also worth noting that the LASPD is unique in terms of the breadth (use of local sources) and scope (number of countries and years covered). Other studies at the

Latin American level of analysis have relied on national and/or international press, and are therefore less likely to list events that did not make national or worldwide headlines. Almeida (2007), for example, created a dataset using nationwide and international newspapers and identified approximately 140 protest events per year for *all* social actors. This dataset, by contrast, relies on multiple local and national media sources through the OSAL chronologies, and identifies more than 360 protest events per year *just* for events with college student participants. Compared to the other studies using national media, the LASPD also covers a large number of country-years. For example, Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni (1995) includes events in four Western European countries between 1975 and 1989 (60 country-years); the “Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres” (EUROPUB) project (Koopmans & Statham, 2002) covers data for seven countries in Western Europe between 1990 and 2003 (98 country-years). By contrast, the LASPD covers 231 country-years.

Table 2.1 summarizes the amount of student protest events for every country-year in the dataset.²¹ In terms of number of protest events, Brazil has the highest protest frequency with 549 and Costa Rica has the least with 97. Both Bolivia and Costa Rica have years with no recorded events (2001 and 2000, and, 2000, respectively) while Chile (2011) has the largest number of events in a single year (143 protests). Overall, protests are not spread evenly and do not to increase by year.

²¹ Some monthly Chronologies were unavailable from the OSAL website and were hence not included in the LASPD. See Appendix C for the list of missing months per country.

Table 2.1: Protest Events with College Student Participants, 2000 - 2012 by country

| Country-Year | 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 | Total country |
|--|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|
| Argentina | 7 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 9 | 18 | 86 | 51 | 55 | 67 | 80 | 12 | 28 | 446 |
| Bolivia | 22 | 0 | 25 | 22 | 17 | 23 | 57 | 84 | 61 | 17 | 27 | 20 | 14 | 389 |
| Brazil | 6 | 10 | 3 | 1 | 9 | 28 | 44 | 112 | 89 | 99 | 71 | 78 | 33 | 583 |
| Chile | 43 | 21 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 17 | 41 | 47 | 39 | 18 | 20 | 143 | 48 | 461 |
| Colombia | 4 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 18 | 17 | 32 | 54 | 6 | 14 | 25 | 67 | 31 | 286 |
| Costa Rica | 0 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 11 | 14 | 18 | 1 | 11 | 27 | 4 | 9 | 106 |
| Dominican Republic | 2 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 53 | 15 | 40 | 14 | 144 |
| Ecuador | 8 | 5 | 10 | 7 | 12 | 8 | 22 | 26 | 45 | 6 | 23 | 18 | 14 | 251 |
| El Salvador | 1 | 4 | 6 | 10 | 12 | 7 | 13 | 13 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 10 | 1 | 86 |
| Guatemala | 9 | 10 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 13 | 8 | 3 | 23 | 10 | 8 | 13 | 97 |
| Honduras | 6 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 12 | 42 | 13 | 56 | 12 | 13 | 8 | 148 |
| Mexico | 28 | 4 | 14 | 13 | 3 | 6 | 77 | 62 | 90 | 10 | 72 | 67 | 35 | 527 |
| Nicaragua | 6 | 5 | 6 | 18 | 15 | 13 | 25 | 12 | 5 | 14 | 7 | 15 | 6 | 143 |
| Panama | 4 | 19 | 11 | 22 | 9 | 19 | 14 | 28 | 11 | 12 | 21 | 19 | 13 | 204 |
| Paraguay | 3 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 17 | 12 | 29 | 22 | 11 | 36 | 14 | 151 |
| Peru | 26 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 12 | 10 | 45 | 19 | 26 | 20 | nd | 192 |
| Uruguay | 9 | 2 | 20 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 16 | 12 | 16 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 103 |
| Venezuela | 7 | 12 | 4 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 89 | 78 | 74 | 87 | 20 | nd | nd | 400 |
| Total year | 191 | 123 | 152 | 164 | 145 | 194 | 590 | 687 | 591 | 548 | 479 | 571 | 282 | 4,717 |
| Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset. Note: All cells in gray denote missing data for at list one month of that country-year | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Using the absolute number of protests per country-year to make assessments about the causes of student mobilization can be problematic because the number of students varies by country, and countries with more students will, unsurprisingly, have more protests. Dividing the number of protests by the college student population size (expressed in hundreds of thousands) reveals a very different picture. Table 2.2 shows the

results of weighing the number of protest events by student population size per year. Using this approach reveals that Brazil has the least mobilized student population: in most years, the country had less than one event per 100,000 students. On the other side of the spectrum is Bolivia, with almost twenty-four events per 100,000 college students in 2006.²² The two other countries that exceed ten events per 100,000 students are Chile (13.5 in 2011) and Costa Rica (10.5, 12.4, and 14.8 in 2006, 2007 and 2010 respectively).²³ These results confirm recent scholarship on the exceptional extent of student mobilization in Chile in 2011 (Cummings, 2015; Palacios-Valladares, 2016).

²² Most of these events were against the policies debated in the Constituent Assembly and against the MAS, the ruling party.

²³ Most of the events in Costa Rica were against to the Free Trade Agreement between Costa Rica and the United States.

Table 2.2: Protest Events with College Student Participants, 2000-2012 by Country
(Divided by student population size in hundreds of thousands)

| Country/ Year | 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Argentina | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 0.3 | 0.6 |
| Bolivia | 0.5 | 0 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Brazil | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 0.7 |
| Chile | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 3.1 | 1 |
| Colombia | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 0.7 |
| Costa Rica | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| Dominican Republic | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 0.3 |
| Ecuador | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| El Salvador | 0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.2 | 0 |
| Guatemala | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Honduras | 0.1 | 0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Mexico | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 2 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 0.8 |
| Nicaragua | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Panama | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Paraguay | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.3 |
| Peru | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.4 | nd |
| Uruguay | 0.2 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 |
| Venezuela | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 0.4 | nd | nd |
| Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset. Note: All cells in gray denote missing data for at list one month of that country/year | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

There is also high variation in terms of protest size across countries. Table 2.3 shows the distribution of the protest size categories for each country included in the LASPD. As the table indicates, unfortunately, more than one third of the protest events in the LASPD did not have enough information to assess their size. There is much cross-country variation in the number of events with missing information about the number of participants, however. For example, every event in Uruguay had data on its size, while

almost 60% of the events in the Dominican Republic are lacking data on this variable.²⁴ Those events that did have the information about their size tended to be quite large. For example, about one quarter had more than one thousand or more participants. Small events, (49 or less participants) were most prevalent in Chile (about 19% of the events in the country), while the presence of one thousand or more protestors was very frequent in Uruguay (about 45%). The year when the frequency of very large protests was highest in Uruguay (13 in 2002) coincides with a moment of strong student ties to the broad front,²⁵ when this party coalition was in the opposition.

²⁴ The number of missing values varied greatly depending on who coded the event. This is further explicated below in this chapter in the section analyzing protest size through regressions.

²⁵ Both the Student-Party Linkages Expert Survey (discussed below) and Palacios-Valladares (2016) confirm the strong organizational linkages between college student and the Broad Front at the time.

Table 2.3. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Country

| Country | | ≤49 | 50-100 | 101-999 | ≥1,000 | Missing information |
|---|----------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Argentina | N | 28 | 25 | 90 | 129 | 174 |
| | % | 6.28 | 5.61 | 20.18 | 28.92 | 39.01 |
| Bolivia | N | 59 | 17 | 43 | 72 | 198 |
| | % | 15.17 | 4.37 | 11.05 | 18.51 | 50.9 |
| Brazil | N | 34 | 43 | 148 | 97 | 261 |
| | % | 5.83 | 7.38 | 25.39 | 16.64 | 44.77 |
| Chile | N | 89 | 85 | 120 | 161 | 6 |
| | % | 19.31 | 18.44 | 26.03 | 34.92 | 1.3 |
| Colombia | N | 18 | 30 | 110 | 121 | 7 |
| | % | 6.29 | 10.49 | 38.46 | 42.31 | 2.45 |
| Costa Rica | N | 13 | 5 | 11 | 30 | 47 |
| | % | 12.26 | 4.72 | 10.38 | 28.3 | 44.34 |
| Dominican Republic | N | 11 | 10 | 19 | 20 | 84 |
| | % | 7.64 | 6.94 | 13.19 | 13.89 | 58.33 |
| Ecuador | N | 22 | 10 | 34 | 61 | 124 |
| | % | 8.76 | 3.98 | 13.55 | 24.3 | 49.4 |
| El Salvador | N | 11 | 4 | 16 | 19 | 36 |
| | % | 12.79 | 4.65 | 18.6 | 22.09 | 41.86 |
| Guatemala | N | 6 | 1 | 10 | 40 | 40 |
| | % | 6.19 | 1.03 | 10.31 | 41.24 | 41.24 |
| Honduras | N | 18 | 6 | 22 | 25 | 77 |
| | % | 12.16 | 4.05 | 14.86 | 16.89 | 52.03 |
| Mexico | N | 30 | 22 | 115 | 168 | 192 |
| | % | 5.69 | 4.17 | 21.82 | 31.88 | 36.43 |
| Nicaragua | N | 8 | 5 | 34 | 30 | 66 |
| | % | 5.59 | 3.5 | 23.78 | 20.98 | 46.15 |
| Panama | N | 17 | 7 | 35 | 37 | 108 |
| | % | 8.33 | 3.43 | 17.16 | 18.14 | 52.94 |
| Paraguay | N | 13 | 10 | 33 | 29 | 66 |
| | % | 8.61 | 6.62 | 21.85 | 19.21 | 43.71 |
| Peru | N | 18 | 38 | 57 | 67 | 12 |
| | % | 9.38 | 19.79 | 29.69 | 34.9 | 6.25 |
| Uruguay | N | 17 | 10 | 30 | 46 | 0 |
| | % | 16.5 | 9.71 | 29.13 | 44.66 | 0 |
| Venezuela | N | 47 | 19 | 42 | 58 | 234 |
| | % | 11.75 | 4.75 | 10.5 | 14.5 | 58.5 |
| Total | N | 459 | 347 | 969 | 1,210 | 1,732 |
| | % | 9.73 | 7.36 | 20.54 | 25.65 | 36.72 |
| Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset. N=4,717 | | | | | | |

Although most news did not describe student protesters in detail, some specific types of higher education students were prominent participants in the events captured by the LASPD. Table 2.4 shows the frequencies of participation by selected types of students. In terms of overall participation, education, pedagogy and normal school students participated in 6% of all events in the dataset. They were particularly important actors in Mexico, where they took part in 139 protest events (about 26% of all events in that country). Social science (including sociology, political science, and psychology) students were also recurrent actors in protest events, confirming the historical role they have played in student movements in Latin America (levy, 1991, p. 150) and elsewhere (lipset & altbach, 1967). In terms of protest size, education and non-university (technical and vocational college students, among others) participated often in massive events, while indigenous and afro-descendant students were more likely to participate in very small events.

Table 2.4. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Types of Student

| Type of Student | | ≤49 | 50-100 | 101-999 | ≥1,000s | Missing Information | Total (%) |
|----------------------------------|----------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Social Sciences and Humanities | N | 22 | 13 | 29 | 17 | 78 | 165 |
| | % | 13.33 | 7.88 | 17.58 | 10.3 | 47.27 | 100 (3.5%) |
| Law | N | 14 | 7 | 14 | 4 | 38 | 78 |
| | % | 17.95 | 8.97 | 17.95 | 5.13 | 48.72 | 100 (1.65%) |
| Education and <i>Normalistas</i> | N | 22 | 24 | 75 | 49 | 98 | 283 |
| | % | 7.77 | 8.48 | 26.5 | 17.31 | 34.63 | 100 (6%) |
| Non-university | N | 14 | 10 | 34 | 30 | 60 | 166 |
| | % | 8.43 | 6.02 | 20.48 | 18.07 | 36.14 | 100 (3.52%) |
| Graduate | N | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 8 |
| | % | 0 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 100 (0.17%) |
| Indigenous and Afrodescendent | N | 13 | 8 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 28 |
| | % | 46.43 | 28.57 | 17.86 | 3.57 | 3.57 | 100 (0.59%) |
| Total | N | 459 | 347 | 969 | 1,210 | 1,732 | 4717 |
| | % | 9.73 | 7.36 | 20.54 | 25.65 | 36.72 | 100 |

Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset.

Table 2.5 shows the frequency and percentages of the targets of student protests in the LASPD. Overall, national governments were by far the most common target of student protests, with more than 56% of all events targeting them. Perhaps unsurprisingly, educational institutions were also a common target of student protests (more than 25% of all events). Student protests seldom targeted public and private companies, which may be more regular targets of labor mobilizations and strike. Analyzing the size of protests by their targets reveals interesting associations, however. For example, national governments were also the most frequent target of the largest category of protests (about 36%) while educational institutions were the most recurrent target of the smallest category of protests (about 17% of these events targeted these institutions).

Table 2.5. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Target

| Target | | ≤49 | 50-100 | 101-999 | ≥1,000s | Missing Information | Total (%) |
|---|----------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| National Government | N | 184 | 155 | 518 | 958 | 832 | 2,647 |
| | % | 6.95 | 5.86 | 19.57 | 36.19 | 31.43 | 100 (56.12%) |
| Local Governments | N | 52 | 65 | 204 | 230 | 322 | 873 |
| | % | 5.96 | 7.45 | 23.37 | 26.35 | 36.88 | 100 (18.51%) |
| Police | N | 26 | 14 | 78 | 104 | 135 | 357 |
| | % | 7.28 | 3.92 | 21.85 | 29.13 | 37.82 | 100 (7.57%) |
| Educational Institutions | N | 203 | 121 | 250 | 89 | 548 | 1,211 |
| | % | 16.76 | 9.99 | 20.64 | 7.35 | 45.25 | 100 (25.67%) |
| Private Companies | N | 14 | 18 | 47 | 50 | 69 | 198 |
| | % | 7.07 | 9.09 | 23.74 | 25.25 | 34.85 | 100 (4.2%) |
| Public Companies | N | 3 | 8 | 15 | 14 | 21 | 61 |
| | % | 4.92 | 13.11 | 24.59 | 22.95 | 34.43 | 100 (1.29%) |
| Other Social Actors | N | 25 | 10 | 42 | 57 | 63 | 197 |
| | % | 12.69 | 5.08 | 21.32 | 28.93 | 31.98 | 100 (4.18%) |
| Foreign Governments | N | 8 | 18 | 49 | 108 | 85 | 268 |
| | % | 2.99 | 6.72 | 18.28 | 40.3 | 31.72 | 100 (5.68%) |
| Total | N | 459 | 347 | 969 | 1,210 | 1,732 | 4717 |
| | % | 9.73 | 7.36 | 20.54 | 25.65 | 36.72 | 100 |
| Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset. | | | | | | | |

Other actors often took part in protest events with student participation. Indeed, students regularly participated in many events that were led by and advanced the demands of other social actors. Table 2.6 shows the frequency of other actors' participation in the LASPD events. The most common group that acted alongside students was workers (almost 29%) of all events. In fact, the LASPD includes several events that were actually worker's demonstrations (like international worker's day parades and demonstrations on may 1) where students played a supporting or auxiliary role. The second most common actors were political parties, which were involved in

about 17% of all events. On the other side of the spectrum are indigenous and afro-descendant peoples, who participated alongside students in less than 4% of the events. College students acted alone in more than 45% of all protests. Regarding protest size, “one thousand or more” was the most frequent size category for all actors, and was the least frequent one when college students protested by themselves.

Table 2.6. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Participating Actors

| Other Actors | | ≤49 | 50-100 | 101-999 | ≥1,000 | Missing Information | Total (%) |
|---------------------------------------|---|-------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------|
| Secondary Students | N | 13 | 16 | 60 | 153 | 72 | 314 |
| | % | 4.14 | 5.1 | 19.11 | 48.73 | 22.93 | 100 (6.66%) |
| College Faculty | N | 16 | 23 | 118 | 247 | 251 | 655 |
| | % | 2.44 | 3.51 | 18.02 | 37.71 | 38.32 | 100 (13.89%) |
| Schoolteachers | N | 10 | 6 | 47 | 235 | 90 | 388 |
| | % | 2.58 | 1.55 | 12.11 | 60.57 | 23.2 | 100 (8.23%) |
| Workers | N | 28 | 50 | 264 | 644 | 381 | 1,367 |
| | % | 2.05 | 3.66 | 19.31 | 47.11 | 27.87 | 100 (28.98%) |
| Peasants | N | 6 | 6 | 63 | 180 | 84 | 339 |
| | % | 1.77 | 1.77 | 18.58 | 53.1 | 24.78 | 100 (7.19%) |
| Indigenous and Afrodescendant Peoples | N | 8 | 8 | 40 | 104 | 34 | 194 |
| | % | 4.12 | 4.12 | 20.62 | 53.61 | 17.53 | 100 (4.11%) |
| Political Parties | N | 16 | 30 | 135 | 388 | 243 | 812 |
| | % | 1.97 | 3.69 | 16.63 | 47.78 | 29.93 | 100 (17.21%) |
| Only College Students | N | 369 | 223 | 448 | 216 | 897 | 2,153 |
| | % | 17.14 | 10.36 | 20.81 | 10.03 | 41.66 | 100 (45.64%) |
| Total | N | 459 | 347 | 969 | 1,210 | 1,732 | 4717 |
| | % | 9.73 | 7.36 | 20.54 | 25.65 | 36.72 | 100 |

Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset.

Student protests advanced a variety of demands. Table 2.7 shows the overall frequency of demands and by protests size. The most common demand was political claims (constitutional reforms, freedom of speech, democracy, among others), with about 16% of all events advancing this type of demands. Education-specific demands were also widespread: demands related to education costs, support, and university autonomy and governance were raised in approximately 14%, 6%, and 6% of all protests, respectively.

In terms of the number of participants, ethnic demands were distinct in that they were often made in very small events (18% of all events that had ethnic demands were small). When events made demands related to labor, the protests tended to be larger: the largest protest size group ($\geq 1,000$ participants) was the most frequent category (almost 50%).

Table 2.7. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Demands

| Demands | | ≤ 49 | 50-100 | 101-999 | $\geq 1,000$ | Missing Information | Total (%) |
|------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|---------------|----------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|
| Labor | N | 12 | 16 | 72 | 238 | 146 | 484 |
| | % | 2.48 | 3.31 | 14.88 | 49.17 | 30.17 | 100 (10.26%) |
| Peasant | N | 4 | 1 | 28 | 40 | 39 | 112 |
| | % | 3.57 | 0.89 | 25 | 35.71 | 34.82 | 100 (2.37%) |
| Health | N | 15 | 9 | 42 | 54 | 44 | 164 |
| | % | 9.15 | 5.49 | 25.61 | 32.93 | 26.83 | 100 (3.48%) |
| Human Rights and Dictatorships | N | 8 | 12 | 31 | 51 | 53 | 155 |
| | % | 5.16 | 7.74 | 20 | 32.9 | 34.19 | 100 (3.29%) |
| Ethnic | N | 21 | 12 | 30 | 31 | 20 | 114 |
| | % | 18.42 | 10.53 | 26.32 | 27.19 | 17.54 | 100 (2.42%) |
| International | N | 11 | 22 | 57 | 144 | 90 | 324 |
| | % | 3.4 | 6.79 | 17.59 | 44.44 | 27.78 | 100 (6.87%) |
| Political | N | 59 | 40 | 120 | 281 | 245 | 745 |
| | % | 7.92 | 5.37 | 16.11 | 37.72 | 32.89 | 100 (15.79%) |
| Postmaterialist | N | 12 | 15 | 48 | 72 | 91 | 238 |
| | % | 5.04 | 6.3 | 20.17 | 30.25 | 38.24 | 100 (5.05%) |
| Education Costs | N | 58 | 52 | 146 | 218 | 179 | 653 |
| | % | 8.88 | 7.96 | 22.36 | 33.38 | 27.41 | 100 (13.84%) |
| Education Support | N | 30 | 37 | 70 | 58 | 98 | 293 |
| | % | 10.24 | 12.63 | 23.89 | 19.8 | 33.45 | 100 (6.21%) |
| University Autonomy and Governance | N | 31 | 23 | 58 | 42 | 144 | 298 |
| | % | 10.4 | 7.72 | 19.46 | 14.09 | 48.32 | 100 (6.32%) |
| Total | N | 459 | 347 | 969 | 1,210 | 1,732 | 4717 |
| | % | 9.73 | 7.36 | 20.54 | 25.65 | 36.72 | 100 |

Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset.

The dataset also recorded the cities (or nearest cities) where the events took place.²⁶ Table 2.8 shows the overall frequency of events by size occurring in the capital cities of the countries included in the LASPD. Approximately 46% of all events took

²⁶ Events could occur in more than one place at the same time.

place in capital cities. In terms of mobilization size, the distribution of protest events occurring in capital cities does not differ greatly from the overall distribution of events (see table 2.3). Thus, there does not seem to be an evident reporting bias based on the location of news agencies in capital cities.

Table 2.8. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Location

| Location | | ≤49 | 50-100 | 101-999 | ≥1,000 | Missing Information | Total (%) |
|--------------|---|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Capital City | N | 217 | 160 | 411 | 605 | 768 | 2,161 |
| | % | 10.04 | 7.4 | 19.02 | 28 | 35.54 | 100 (45.81%) |
| Total | N | 459 | 347 | 969 | 1,210 | 1,732 | 4717 |
| | % | 9.73 | 7.36 | 20.54 | 25.65 | 36.72 | 100 |

Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset.

The LASPD recorded dozens of different tactics used in the protest events. Table 2.9 shows the frequency of tactics aggregated into three categories: peaceful,²⁷ disruptive,²⁸ and violent²⁹ tactics. Each event could contain tactics in more than one – and sometimes all –categories. Peaceful tactics were by far the most common type of tactic in the LASPD (about 72% of the total).

²⁷ Marches; static demonstrations; press conferences or public declarations; assemblies, public debates or other deliberative acts; symbolic, artistic, and/or cultural acts; deliveries of letters or lists of demands; commemorations of dates or people.

²⁸ Strikes; sit-ins at students' own institutions; sit-ins in other places; blockades (of streets, bridges, etc.); *funas* or *escraches* (types of public shaming, especially against human rights violators, which involve approaching targets at their current place of work or residence).

²⁹ Hunger strikes and other self-destructive actions; attacks on and destruction of public property; attacks on and destruction of private property; uses of weapons; attack against security forces; attacks against noninvolved third parties; attack against other demonstrators or counterdemonstrators.

Table 2.9. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Tactics

| Tactics | | ≤49 | 50-100 | 101-999 | ≥1,000 | Missing Information | Total (%) |
|----------------|---|-------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------|
| Peaceful | N | 192 | 211 | 720 | 1,112 | 1,157 | 3,392 |
| | % | 5.66 | 6.22 | 21.23 | 32.78 | 34.11 | 100 (71.91%) |
| Disruptive | N | 190 | 173 | 365 | 348 | 673 | 1,749 |
| | % | 10.86 | 9.89 | 20.87 | 19.9 | 38.48 | 100 (37.08%) |
| Violent | N | 117 | 24 | 89 | 133 | 165 | 528 |
| | % | 22.16 | 4.55 | 16.86 | 25.19 | 31.25 | 100 (11.19%) |
| Total | N | 459 | 347 | 969 | 1,210 | 1,732 | 4717 |
| | % | 9.73 | 7.36 | 20.54 | 25.65 | 36.72 | 100 |

Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset.

Finally, the LASPD also recorded some types of incidents occurring during demonstrations. Table 2.10 shows the incidence of clashes with police forces, arrests during demonstrations, and injuries and/or deaths during student protest events. Overall, clashes with the police occurred more often than the other two incidents. Clashes and arrests were most often reported in Chile (in 184 and 168 protest events, respectively), while the percentage of events with injuries and/or deaths (the former being much more common) was highest in Bolivia (about 17%). For all three types of incidents, the most common protest size category was one thousand or more participants.

Table 2.10. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Size by Incident Types

| Incidents | | ≤49 | 50-100 | 101-999 | ≥1,000 | Missing Information | Total (%) |
|---------------------|---|-------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------|
| Clashes with Police | N | 40 | 63 | 183 | 297 | 197 | 780 |
| | % | 5.13 | 8.08 | 23.46 | 38.08 | 25.26 | 100 (16.54%) |
| Arrests | N | 33 | 39 | 102 | 195 | 79 | 447 |
| | % | 7.38 | 8.72 | 22.82 | 43.62 | 17.67 | 100 (9.48%) |
| Injured and/or Dead | N | 22 | 27 | 81 | 146 | 126 | 402 |
| | % | 5.47 | 6.72 | 20.15 | 36.32 | 31.34 | 100 (8.52%) |
| Total | N | 459 | 347 | 969 | 1,210 | 1,732 | 4717 |
| | % | 9.73 | 7.36 | 20.54 | 25.65 | 36.72 | 100 |

Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset.

The Student-Party Linkages Expert Survey

There is no existing data source on organizational linkages (Kitschelt, 2000) between students and political parties over time and across countries. Data on these linkages were obtained, therefore, from an original survey I conducted of experts in student movements and politics. Experts surveys have been used in quantitative analyses in political science, for example, to assess the worldviews of elites and their constituents in seven European states over two centuries (Braumoeller, 2012, pp. 86–90) but this is, to the best of my knowledge, the first time it is applied in conjunction with PEA to explain social mobilization. The experts were contacted based on three main criteria: edited publications related to student movements (González Marín & Sánchez Sáenz, 2011; Marsiske, 2006; Modonesi, 2012), participation in the 2014-2016 Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Congresses on panels related to student and party politics and social movements; and referrals by other experts. A total of 112 persons were contacted, of whom 75 completed the survey.³⁰ Scholars with expertise in every Latin American country except Nicaragua and Panama answered the survey.³¹ The survey was carried out online between April 21 and June 20, 2015.

The experts were asked to gauge the level of organizational linkages between college students and political parties in power and in the opposition. They could rate the level of linkages from 1 (minimal) to 10 (very high) the level of linkages during each

³⁰ Respondents were promised that data would remain anonymous and available only at the aggregate level. One potential respondent declined to participate, fearing the survey would be used for policing or political purposes.

³¹ These two countries are therefore excluded from the regression analyses below.

presidential administration in the region between 1999 and 2015. They were also asked to answer an open-ended question about examples of strong party linkages in their country of expertise. Organizational student-party linkages were defined in the survey as the presence of parties in college campuses through, for example, outreach arms. According to the survey, college student membership in parties, including participation in party leadership positions, also denoted strong linkages. Experts were also told that linkages could be formal or informal, ideological or material.³² Table 2.11 shows the mean of each country's scores on government and opposition party linkages during each presidential administration between 1999 (or before) and 2015 (or later, depending on the presidency).³³

³² See Appendix D for the survey forms for each country.

³³ Since the survey was carried during the first semester of 2015, experts' assessments do not reflect changes in student-party linkages in the latter part of that year.

Table 2.11. Organizational Linkages Between Students and Political Parties in Latin America (includes all administrations in power between 1999 and 2015)

| Country | Presidency | Starting Date | Ending Date | Linkages with Parties in Power Score (Mean) | Linkages with Parties in the Opposition Score (Mean) |
|---|--------------------------------|---------------|-------------|---|--|
| Argentina | Carlos Menem | 7/8/89 | 12/10/99 | 4 | 8 |
| | Fernando de la Rúa | 12/10/99 | 12/21/01 | 6.8 | 8 |
| | Adolfo Rodríguez-Saá | 12/23/01 | 12/30/01 | 3.8 | 8 |
| | Eduardo Duhalde | 1/2/02 | 5/25/03 | 4.3 | 8 |
| | Néstor Kirchner | 5/25/03 | 12/10/07 | 5.3 | 7.3 |
| | Cristina Fernández de Kirchner | 12/10/07 | 12/10/15 | 6.5 | 7.8 |
| | Mauricio Macri | 12/10/15 | Incumbent | 4.5 | 7.5 |
| | Country mean | | | 5 | 7.8 |
| Bolivia | Hugo Bánzer | 8/6/97 | 8/7/01 | 1 | 5 |
| | Jorge Quiroga | 8/7/01 | 8/6/02 | 1 | 5 |
| | Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada | 8/6/02 | 8/17/03 | 1 | 5 |
| | Carlos Mesa | 10/17/03 | 6/6/05 | 2 | 5 |
| | Eduardo Rodríguez | 6/9/05 | 1/22/06 | 2 | 5 |
| | Evo Morales | 1/22/06 | Incumbent | 5 | 3 |
| | Country mean | | | 2 | 4.7 |
| Brazil | Fernando Henrique Cardoso | 1/1/95 | 12/31/02 | 3 | 8.3 |
| | Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva | 1/1/03 | 12/31/10 | 7.3 | 3.3 |
| | Dilma Rousseff | 1/1/11 | 8/31/16 | 6 | 4.8 |
| | Country mean | | | 5.4 | 5.4 |
| Source: Author's elaboration based on Expert Survey. Total number of respondents: 75. Linkages Scores Scale: 1 (weak linkages) to 10 (strong linkages). | | | | | |

Table 2.11. Organizational Linkages Between Students and Political Parties in Latin America (includes all administrations in power between 1999 and 2015), cont.

| Country | Presidency | Starting Date | Ending Date | Linkages with Parties in Power Score (Mean) | Linkages with Parties in the Opposition Score (Mean) |
|---|---------------------------------|---------------|-------------|---|--|
| Chile | Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle | 3/11/94 | 3/11/00 | 3.9 | 3 |
| | Ricardo Lagos Escobar | 3/11/00 | 3/11/06 | 3.7 | 3.1 |
| | Michelle Bachelet Jeria | 3/11/06 | 3/11/10 | 3.6 | 2.6 |
| | Sebastián Piñera Echeñique | 3/11/10 | 3/11/14 | 1.3 | 4.9 |
| | Michelle Bachelet Jeria | 3/11/14 | Incumbent | 2.9 | 2.7 |
| | Country mean | | | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| Colombia | Andrés Pastrana Arango | 8/7/98 | 8/7/02 | 2.7 | 7.7 |
| | Álvaro Uribe Vélez | 8/7/02 | 8/7/10 | 3.7 | 7.3 |
| | Juan Manuel Santos Calderón | 8/7/10 | Incumbent | 3.7 | 7 |
| | Country mean | | | 3.3 | 7.3 |
| Costa Rica | Miguel Rodríguez Echeverría | 5/8/98 | 5/8/02 | 2.7 | 5 |
| | Abel Pacheco de la Espriella | 5/8/02 | 5/8/06 | 1.7 | 5 |
| | Óscar Arias Sánchez | 5/8/06 | 5/8/10 | 4.3 | 6.3 |
| | Laura Chinchilla Miranda | 5/8/10 | 5/8/14 | 3.7 | 7 |
| | Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera | 5/8/14 | Incumbent | 5 | 5.5 |
| | Country mean | | | 3.5 | 5.8 |
| Dominican Republic | Leonel Antonio Fernández Reyna | 8/16/96 | 8/16/00 | 8 | 8 |
| | Rafael Hipólito Mejía Domínguez | 8/16/00 | 8/16/04 | 9 | 7 |
| | Leonel Antonio Fernández Reyna | 8/16/04 | 8/12/12 | 9 | 8 |
| | Danilo Medina Sánchez | 8/16/12 | Incumbent | 8 | 7 |
| | Country mean | | | 8.5 | 7.5 |
| Source: Author's elaboration based on Expert Survey. Total number of respondents: 75. Linkages Scores Scale: 1 (weak linkages) to 10 (strong linkages). | | | | | |

Table 2.11. Organizational Linkages Between Students and Political Parties in Latin America (includes all administrations in power between 1999 and 2015), cont.

| Country | Presidency | Starting Date | Ending Date | Linkages with Parties in Power Score (Mean) | Linkages with Parties in the Opposition Score (Mean) |
|---|-----------------------------|---------------|-------------|---|--|
| Ecuador | Jamil Mahuad Witt | 8/10/98 | 1/21/00 | 2 | 7 |
| | Gustavo Noboa Bejarano | 1/22/00 | 1/15/03 | 1 | 5 |
| | Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa | 1/15/03 | 4/20/05 | 1 | 7 |
| | Alfredo Palacio González | 4/20/05 | 1/15/07 | 1 | 5 |
| | Rafael Correa Delgado | 1/15/07 | Incumbent | 6 | 5 |
| | Country mean | | | 2.2 | 5.8 |
| El Salvador | Armando Calderón Sol | 6/1/94 | 6/1/99 | 4 | 7 |
| | Francisco Flores Pérez | 6/1/99 | 6/1/04 | 3 | 7 |
| | Elías Antonio Saca González | 6/1/04 | 6/1/09 | 4 | 6 |
| | Mauricio Funes Cartagena | 6/1/09 | 6/1/14 | 6.5 | 6 |
| | Salvador Sánchez Cerén | 6/1/14 | Incumbent | 5.5 | 6 |
| | Country mean | | | 4.6 | 6.4 |
| Guatemala | Álvaro Arzú Yrigoyen | 1/14/96 | 1/14/00 | 1.5 | 5.5 |
| | Alfonso Portillo Cabrera | 1/14/00 | 1/14/04 | 1.5 | 5 |
| | Óscar Berger Perdomo | 1/14/04 | 1/14/08 | 1.5 | 4.5 |
| | Álvaro Colom Caballeros | 1/14/08 | 1/14/12 | 1.5 | 3.5 |
| | Otto Pérez Molina | 1/14/12 | 9/3/15 | 1.5 | 3.5 |
| | Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre | 9/3/15 | 1/14/16 | 1 | 5 |
| | Country mean | | | 1.4 | 4.5 |
| Source: Author's elaboration based on Expert Survey. Total number of respondents: 75. Linkages Scores Scale: 1 (weak linkages) to 10 (strong linkages). | | | | | |

Table 2.11. Organizational Linkages Between Students and Political Parties in Latin America (includes all administrations in power between 1999 and 2015), cont.

| Country | Presidency | Starting Date | Ending Date | Linkages with Parties in Power Score (Mean) | Linkages with Parties in the Opposition Score (Mean) |
|---|---|---------------|-------------|---|--|
| Honduras | Carlos Roberto Flores | 1/27/98 | 1/27/02 | 8 | 10 |
| | Ricardo Maduro Joest | 1/27/02 | 1/27/06 | 9 | 5 |
| | José Manuel Zelaya Rosales | 1/27/06 | 6/28/09 | 7 | 4 |
| | Roberto Micheletti Bain (<i>de facto</i>) | 6/28/09 | 1/27/10 | 2 | 9 |
| | Porfirio Lobo Sosa | 1/27/10 | 1/27/14 | 5 | 8 |
| | Juan Orlando Hernández | 1/27/14 | Incumbent | 4 | 8 |
| | Country mean | | | 5.8 | 7.3 |
| Mexico | Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León | 12/1/94 | 11/30/00 | 4.2 | 6.1 |
| | Vicente Fox Quesada | 12/1/00 | 11/30/06 | 4.6 | 5.7 |
| | Felipe Calderón Hinojosa | 12/1/06 | 11/30/12 | 3.2 | 6 |
| | Enrique Peña Nieto | 12/1/12 | Incumbent | 3.6 | 5.5 |
| | Country mean | | | 3.9 | 5.8 |
| Paraguay | Raúl Cubas Grau | 8/15/98 | 3/29/99 | 8 | 1 |
| | Luis González Macchi | 3/29/99 | 8/15/03 | 6 | 1 |
| | Nicanor Duarte Frutos | 8/15/03 | 8/14/08 | 10 | 1 |
| | Fernando Lugo Méndez | 8/15/08 | 6/22/12 | 10 | 7 |
| | Federico Franco Gómez | 6/22/12 | 8/15/13 | 6 | 7 |
| | Horacio Cartes Jara | 8/15/13 | Incumbent | 10 | 3 |
| | Country mean | | | 8.3 | 3.3 |
| Source: Author's elaboration based on Expert Survey. Total number of respondents: 75. Linkages Scores Scale: 1 (weak linkages) to 10 (strong linkages). | | | | | |

Table 2.11. Organizational Linkages Between Students and Political Parties in Latin America (includes all administrations in power between 1999 and 2015), cont.

| Country | Presidency | Starting Date | Ending Date | Linkages with Parties in Power Score (Mean) | Linkages with Parties in the Opposition Score (Mean) |
|---|-------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|---|--|
| Peru | Alberto Fujimori Fujimori | 7/28/90 | 11/22/00 | 1 | 5.5 |
| | Valentín Paniagua Corazao (interim) | 11/22/00 | 7/28/01 | 4.8 | 3 |
| | Alejandro Toledo Manrique | 7/28/01 | 7/28/06 | 4.3 | 3 |
| | Alan García Pérez | 7/28/06 | 7/28/11 | 3.3 | 3.8 |
| | Ollanta Humala Tasso | 7/28/11 | 7/28/16 | 3.5 | 4.5 |
| | Country mean | | | 3.4 | 4 |
| Uruguay | Julio María Sanguinetti Coirolo | 3/1/95 | 3/1/00 | 3.7 | 6.7 |
| | Jorge Batlle Ibáñez | 3/1/00 | 3/1/05 | 3.3 | 7 |
| | Tabaré Vázquez Rosas | 3/1/05 | 3/1/10 | 6.7 | 3.7 |
| | José Mujica Cordano | 3/1/10 | 3/1/15 | 7.7 | 4 |
| | Tabaré Vázquez Rosas | 3/1/15 | Incumbent | 6 | 4 |
| | Country mean | | | 5.5 | 5.1 |
| Venezuela | Rafael Caldera | 2/2/94 | 2/2/99 | 5.7 | 4.3 |
| | Hugo Chávez Frías | 2/2/99 | 4/12/02 | 3.7 | 4 |
| | Pedro Carmona (de facto) | 4/12/02 | 4/13/02 | 2.3 | 5 |
| | Diosdado Cabello (interim) | 4/13/02 | 4/14/02 | 3.5 | 1.5 |
| | Hugo Chávez Frías | 4/14/02 | 3/5/13 | 6.3 | 7.3 |
| | Nicolás Maduro Moros | 3/5/13 | Incumbent | 5.7 | 8 |
| | Country mean | | | 4.5 | 5 |
| All countries | | | | 4.5 | 5.3 |
| Source: Author's elaboration based on Expert Survey. Total number of respondents: 75. Linkages Scores Scale: 1 (weak linkages) to 10 (strong linkages). | | | | | |

The results of the expert Student-Party Linkages Expert Survey offer several insights about the organizational connections between students and parties in contemporary Latin America. First, the total mean scores for parties in government (4.5) and in the opposition (5.3) show that, in general, students have stronger linkages with the latter. Although there are some notable exceptions (like the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Uruguay) most countries in the region follow this trend quite consistently. The widespread connections with political parties in the Left (some of them quite marginal or minor) may explain this difference. For example, an expert on Bolivia said that students in the country “tended to connect with mainly leftist organizations until Evo Morales.” In the case of Mexico, college students have had strong ties to the leftist politician Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO)³⁴ and the parties he has been a part of. “The PRD, through youth groups, and its own factions in [the country’s] the interior, was an important bastion between 1990 and 2000. Since then, due to differences between party factions, the AMLO movement and later MORENA have become prominent,” explained a Mexican expert. In Argentina, students have had strong ties to “parties of Peronist stock and parties in the Left in its different forms.” An Ecuador expert stated that the Marxist-Leninist Democratic People’s Movement (currently called Popular Unity Movement), which opposes Rafael Correa’s government, has had “sustained ideological-political linkages” with many student organizations, and that these connections are aimed at the “formation of the groups that give this party political continuity.” In the case of

³⁴ AMLO is a former PRI and PRD politician who founded MORENA in 2014. PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) is a Center-Left party that split from the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 1989.

Colombian college students, “linkages are with leftist positions and with the political opposition to government parties.”

The results of the expert survey nevertheless suggest that the relationship between leftist parties and students is not always strong, and that students can also form close ties with other parties. This may be especially true when leftist parties rise to power and do not meet the expectations of their student allies. In Bolivia, for example, “[u]nder the Morales government, [the strong relationship between leftist parties and students] becomes less important.” In the case of Venezuela under the Bolivarian Revolution, an expert related the following,

Initially Hugo Chávez did not have significant support among student movements (but it did within the professors’ union) [...] Only later did *Chavismo* build a movement within universities but it was never in the majority, mainly because of its violent tactics, which included institutional sit-ins and physical attacks against other student groups on campus [...] Opposition parties were devastated after the 1998 elections, and something similar happened in the college context. The relationship with parties was recomposed only after the resurgence of the student movement in 2007 [...] Nowadays, several congresspersons and first-class leaders of [center-right Project Venezuela], [centrist Justice First], and [center-left A New Era] come from the student movement.

Thus, strong student-party connections do not depend on a shared leftist ideology. In Honduras, for instance, right-wing parties have used organizational linkages forged on campus as springboards for national politics:

presidential candidate Oswaldo Ramos Soto in the 1993 elections [a member of the conservative National Party of Honduras] was a rector of the [National University of Honduras (UNAH)] through the United Democratic University Front (FUUD). The current [Nationalist] President, lawyer Juan Orlando Hernández, was also president of the UNAH Law School Student Association.

The Honduran Liberal Party has also had strong ties to students, as “former President Carlos Alberto Reina (1994-1998) and his presidential precandidate brother, Jorge Arturo Reina, were the founders of the University Reform Front (FRU),” a student organization which still has an important presence at UNAH.

Another conclusion drawn from the survey is that the level of organizational linkages with the government and opposition often flips when the executive shifts hands from one party or party coalition to another. For instance, the mean scores of government and opposition linkages in Brazil were the same during the 1995-2016 period (5.4). However, when the period is broken down into government coalitions, differences between government and opposition linkages become evident. During the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso,³⁵ the ruling coalition was composed of a heterogeneous mix of right-wing, leftist and centrist parties; student linkages with this coalition were weaker than with the opposition, as the linkages scores suggest (3 and 8.3, respectively). Then, when the Workers’ Party (PT) gained the presidency, the government had stronger ties with students than did the opposition (the mean linkage scores were 6.7 with the government and 4.1 with the opposition during the two presidencies, respectively), although government linkages were stronger under President Lula Da Silva than under President Dilma Rousseff. Indeed, a Brazil scholar argues that the

PT, the United Socialist Worker’s Party, the Socialism and Liberty Party have had youth arms and collectives with a strong presence in the student movement in the last fifteen years. The Democrats, PSDB and other parties also have organized party youths, but they have a smaller presence in the student movement.

³⁵ Cardoso is a member of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB).

A similar phenomenon occurs in Uruguay, where the government has had stronger organizational ties with students during the Broad Front (FA) governments (means of about 6.6 with government parties and 3.9 with the opposition), which have been in power since 2005, than during the previous (1995-2005) Colorado Party administrations (means of about 3.5 with ruling parties and 6.9 with the opposition). Nevertheless, linkages with the FA did suffer somewhat after the party rose to power, as the mean scores and expert assessments suggest:

The FA has had a strong connection with social organizations in general and student organizations in particular. Until its ascent to power, it consisted of a well-aligned leftist platform; for example, affiliation of student leadership structures in some of its factions used to be prominent. With the rise of the FA to government, the dialogue [with students] continues although the student movement has lost relevance. Leftist positions outside of the FA within the [Federation of University Students of Uruguay] have gained ground, although they have not reached a majority.

Which parties are in power, therefore, matters for students' level of organizational connections to the government, and determines students' status either as "polity members" or "challengers" (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, p. 12). This status, in turn, has important consequences for student mobilization.

Analyzing the Frequency of Student Mobilization

Data and hypotheses

In this section, I use data from the LASPD to analyze the frequency of student protests. For the purposes of this analysis, the protest events have been aggregated by country-year, which is the unit of analysis (for example, El Salvador-2002, Uruguay-

2008, etc.) Although in theory a more fine-grained measure could be used for the dependent variable (for example, country-month or city-year) to generate more observations, this is not feasible because all the data for the independent variables are available at the country-year level only. It is important to note that these events include not only events with education demands but also every protest with college participants.

I adapted the hypotheses presented in Chapter One to fit the population of observations (Latin American countries between 2000 and 2012), and the unit of observation (country-years). The hypotheses about the effect of educational access and financial discontent on the frequency of student are as follows:

Hypothesis 7. Higher levels of private spending in higher education increase the frequency of student protests in a given country-year.

Hypothesis 8. Higher enrollment rates increase the frequency of student protest events in a given country-year.

Concerning the effect on protest frequency of student linkages with ruling and opposition parties, the hypotheses are:


Hypothesis 9. Stronger linkages with parties in power decrease the frequency of protests in a given country-year.

Hypothesis 10. Stronger linkages with parties in the opposition have no effect on the frequency of student protests in a given country year.

Variables

To gauge the frequency of student mobilization, the response variable used the **count of protest events** per country-year. The count ranges from 0 to 143, although the most frequent numbers of events are six (15 times), twelve, (13 occurrences), and two, four, nine, and fourteen (10 times each). The histogram in Figure 2.1 shows that most country-years have relatively few protests events, with the frequency of the number of events generally decreasing as the number of protest events increase. This variable, therefore, seems to follow a classic Poisson distribution.

Figure 2.1. Distribution of Protest Count Dependent Variable



There are five main independent variables of interest. The first one categorizes the sources of **funding** for higher education. This measure, taken from Brunner & Villalobos (2014, p. 62), categorizes the higher education systems as being predominantly **public**, **shared** or **private**.³⁶ Brunner & Villalobos code all countries in the student protest dataset with the exception of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. I coded for these countries using the 2007 and 2011 CINDA (Interuniversity Center for Development) country reports, which Brunner also coordinated (de Escobar, 2006, 2011,

³⁶ Generally, private expenditures come primarily from households. For example, the percentages of household and other private sources as a proportion of the total expenditures in tertiary educations were respectively in 2012, 54.8% and 10.7% in Chile, 30% and 0.3% in Mexico, and 57.4% and 0% in Colombia (OECD, 2015, p. 248).

Duriez González & Coca Palacios, 2011a, 2011b; Duriez González & Sándigo Martínez, 2011; Duriez González & Zamora Arrechavala, 2011). These reports describe each country's higher education system's finances. This is a time-invariant covariate – each country has the same value throughout the analyzed period. The only “Private System” is Chile; the “Shared System” countries are Colombia, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. In the rest of the countries, the main source of college funding is public.

Second, a measure of each country-years' higher education net enrollment ratio (**NER**) is included. This variable was gathered from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank, 2015), which compiles household survey data from Latin American countries. The NER is the number of college-age people attending higher education institutions, divided by the total number of college-age people. Most countries do not conduct yearly household surveys, so values for this variable were interpolated and extrapolated for the country-years with no data. NERs were also averaged in the case of country-years where more than two surveys were carried out. Each country's NER tends to increase over time.

Finally, two variables, measuring the level of organizational linkages between students and parties, were added. The two variables are **linkages with parties in government** and **linkages with parties in the opposition**. For this analysis, the mean score of all experts in each presidential administration is used.³⁷ The mean scores of student linkages with parties in power and in the opposition for all administrations were

³⁷ When there is more than one presidential administration in a country-year, that year is assigned to the administration that covered most of the days in that year. This data was drawn from the Varieties of Democracy Project country-year dataset (Coppedge et al., 2016).

4.9 and 5.45, respectively. Because experts gave one score to the government and another to the opposition during each presidency,³⁸ these variables are useful to compare differences between different administrations, but do not capture yearly changes in the level of student-party linkages or within each presidential term.

Six control variables based on the literature are also included. **Regime type** is measured using the PolityIV Project dataset (Marshall & Marshall, 2016), which assigns continuous scores ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). Some authors have argued that closed political systems cannot contain grievances, leading to more protests (Gurr, 1970); others argue that democratic regimes give protestors more chances to demonstrate (Eisinger, 1973); a third group argues that intermediate regimes have neither the repressive power of autocracies nor the accommodating capacity of democracies to thwart conflict, so there should be more protests in countries that fall in the middle (Hegre, 2001). In the specific case of Latin America student activism, Levy (1986, 1991) has argued that both authoritarian regimes and democratization have had a negative effect on student mobilization in the region. To test this third argument, I transformed regime type variable to a 0 to 20 range, and added a **squared version of regime type** variable. **GDP per capita (logged)** and **GDP growth** (World Bank, 2016a) are used to account for the effect on mobilizations of the countries' level of development and short-term economic shocks. Recent studies have found that the use of new technologies (like cellphones and the Internet) has a positive effect on the

³⁸ The only exception is the presidency of Hugo Chávez, which was briefly interrupted in by a coup in 2002. Therefore, the analysis includes two sets of measures for the Hugo Chávez presidency in Venezuela: before and after 2002.

frequency of mobilizations at the country level (Lin & Su, 2015; Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013). A measure of **Internet users per 100 inhabitants** (World Bank, 2016b) is, therefore, added. Finally, experts have argued that college diversification has decreased student mobilization not only in terms of increased socioeconomic diversity, but also through the expansion of private institutions (Brunner, 1986; Levy, 1991). A variable measuring **enrollment by type of institution** (public or private) is therefore included. No single source had data for all the country-years included, so the variable was created based on four different sources (Brunner & Villalobos, 2014, p. 28; CEDLAS and World Bank, 2015; IESALC, 2006, p. 258; UNESCO, 2016). Since the exact percentage of private enrollment from one source did not match exactly the information from another, the variable was dichotomized (50% or more enrolled in private institutions versus less than 50%).

Other control variables are added not so much because of their theoretical importance but to accurately control for characteristics of the data being used. In some country-years, the OSAL Chronologies were unavailable for most – but not all – months, so a variable containing the number of **missing months** is included to control for the effect of missing data. About 83.5% of the 231 country-years in the LASPD had no missing months. A one-year **lagged count of protests** is also added to control for the potential effect of cycles of protest. Inclán's (2008) study of mobilization in Chiapas finds, for example, that the number of events in one year has a positive effect on the number of protests in the next year. To assess the effect of specific years on the number of protests, a categorical **year** variable is added. Finally, the **college student population**

size (CEDLAS and World Bank, 2015) of each country-year is also included. This variable is meant to account for the large differences in the size of student populations over time and especially across countries. For example, 50 protest events in one year in Costa Rica denote a much larger level of student mobilization than 50 protest events in the same year in Brazil, where the student population is much larger. Likewise, 30 protests events in Argentina-2000 would imply a larger level of mobilization than 30 protest events in Argentina-2011, simply because the size of the student population in that country has increased in twelve years.³⁹

Results

The data described above is regressed using several model specifications. Table 2.12 describes the results of these three different models. Since the dependent variable is a count, negative binomial regressions are applied in Models I, and II. The count variable is converted into a binary measure ($0 \leq$ six protest events; 1 otherwise)⁴⁰ for the logistic regression model (III). More specifically, mixed-effects negative binomial and logistics regressions are used. In these models, each country-year is nested within the corresponding country. Because the values of the funding variable (private, shared public) are country-specific and time-invariant, they would be correlated with country fixed-effects, so it cannot be added to the model at the same time as country dummies

³⁹ Student population size is not a completely valid exposure variable, however. To be an exposure variable, the event count would only have to be restricted to student-only events. Students, however, participate in other social actors' events, and other actors participate in student-initiated protests, so there may be more events with student participants than the student population size would suggest. Thus, although student population size should be included in the model, larger student population sizes do not quite define the opportunity for more protests.

⁴⁰ Six protest events per country-year is both the mode and 25th percentile of the protest count measure.

without losing observations. Thus, mixed-effects models are used because they allow for the inclusion of both country-specific random effects and time-invariant covariates.

Table 2.12 Regression Models Predicting the Frequency of Student Protest Events

| | I (Mixed-Effects Negative Binomial) | II (Mixed-Effects Negative Binomial) | III (Mixed-Effects Logit) |
|--|--|---|------------------------------|
| <i>Enrollment</i> | | | |
| NER | 1.100*** | 1.037*** | 1.173*** |
| | (0.0179) | (0.00990) | (0.0631) |
| <i>Funding (Reference: Private)</i> | | | |
| Public | 1.196 | 0.411*** | 0.243 |
| | (0.495) | (0.0885) | (0.226) |
| Shared | 0.924 | 0.411*** | 0.112** |
| | (0.440) | (0.0927) | (0.106) |
| <i>Student-Party Linkages</i> | | | |
| Government | 1.022 | 0.963** | 0.809** |
| | (0.0523) | (0.0176) | (0.0712) |
| Opposition | 0.982 | 1.044 | 1.115 |
| | (0.0661) | (0.0371) | (0.107) |
| <i>Controls</i> | | | |
| Regime Type Score | | 1.366 | 0.377 |
| | | (0.330) | (2.984) |
| Regime Type Score^2 | | 0.993 | 1.010 |
| | | (0.00509) | (0.146) |
| GDP (log) | | 0.698* | 0.431** |
| | | (0.134) | (0.185) |
| GDP growth (%) | | 1.002 | 1.067 |
| | | (0.0160) | (0.0642) |
| Internet Users (per 1,000 people) | | 1.005 | 1.019 |
| | | (0.0128) | (0.0681) |
| Enrollment by Institutions (Reference: mostly in private institutions) | | 1.242* | 1.237 |
| | | (0.141) | (0.601) |
| Number of missing months | | 0.896*** | 1.000 |
| | | (0.0374) | (0.231) |
| Student Population Size (100,000s) | | 1.030*** | 1.047*** |
| | | (0.00466) | (0.0184) |
| 1-year Lagged Dependent Variable | | 1.006*** | 1.331 |
| | | (0.00217) | (0.686) |
| Observations | 205 | 203 | 190 |
| Number of Countries | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Years | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| Incidence Rate Ratios reported in Models I and II; Odds Ratios in Model III. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. Results for year variable not shown. | | | |
| *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | |

Model I includes the independent variables only. In this case, only the NER regression variable is statistically significant: with every one-percentage point increase in the NER, the number of protest events increase by 10%. Models II and III are full models with the control variables added. The results of these two models demonstrate that several variables of interest become statistically significant *after* the addition of the controls, and that these results are robust across different model specifications. The following paragraphs focuses on Model II because its count variable has more variation – and information – than the dichotomous variable in Model III, which was included to assess the robustness of Model II’s results.

The results support Hypothesis 2 about the positive effect of increased enrollment on the number of protests. Every percentage point increase in the net enrollment ratio results in the number of protests increasing by 3.7%. Hypothesis 1 about the positive effect of primarily private spending on education on the number of student mobilizations is also supported. Compared to private funding, public funding is associated with a decrease in the number of protests of almost 59%. Meanwhile, compared to private funding, shared (mixed public and private) spending also results in a decrease in the number of protests of about 59%. When the baseline category is public spending instead of “private” (not shown), the effect of “shared” finance systems is not statistically significant but the effect of private funding is: compared to primarily public funding, private funding is associated with a 143% increase in the number of protest events. This suggests that the main difference in the effect of funding on student protest frequency is

between private spending, on the one hand, and the other two types of funding, on the other.

The results also support the theorized negative relationship between strong student linkages with parties in government and mobilization (Hypothesis 3). *Ceteris paribus*, with every one-point increase in the ruling parties linkage score, the number of student protests decreases by approximately 3.7%. Meanwhile, the correlation between linkages with opposition parties and the protest count is not statistically significant in any model specification (although it is small and positive in the two fully specified models), which supports Hypothesis 4.

The regressions also underscore the importance of several control variables. The result offers partial support for the theorized effect of the economy on the number of student protests. Indeed, the size of the economy has a negative effect in the two fully specified models: in the case of the Model II, higher levels of development (as denoted in a unit increase in the logged GDP per capita variable) are associated with a 30% decrease in the count of protest events. Perhaps unsurprisingly, larger student populations are associated with more frequent student mobilizations, and missing months in the dataset are associated with less frequent protests. The analysis also confirms that the number of protests in the past influences the number of protests in the present: an additional protest event in one year results in a 0.6% increase in the number of student protests in the subsequent year. The results also suggests that, as scholars have argued (Brunner, 1986; Levy, 1991, p. 199), privatization reduces student mobilization: compared to systems where the absolute majority of students are enrolled in private institutions, primarily

public enrollment is associated with a 24% increase in the frequency of protest events. The effect on protest frequency of other control variables, like Internet usage and regime type, does not achieve statistical significance. The direction of the effects are positive as expected, however, and do not preclude these variables from having a significant effect social mobilization in general, mobilization by other social groups (like labor, ethnic minorities, and others), or other specific types of collective action like political violence (Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013).


Postestimation

Using Model II in Table 2.11, the predicted counts of the dependent variable can also be estimated at specific values of the independent variables.⁴¹ Figure 2.2 shows the predicted counts at three categories of funding: public, shared, and private funding. Holding all other variables at their mean values, the predicted counts of public and shared funding systems are virtually undistinguishable: 13.69 and 13.72 events, respectively. Private funding, by contrast, is associated with a much higher count of 33.4 protest events. Thus, the main distinction seems to be between higher education funding based primarily on private spending, compared to other systems. The similar predicted counts of public and shared systems may be caused by the socioeconomic segmentation of enrollment in shared systems: in the countries where both the public and the private sector make significant expenditures in higher education, the poorest students may only

⁴¹ Due to software limitations, only the fixed portion of the model can be used to calculate predicted protest frequencies. This means that the country-specific random effects are not included in the protest frequency predictions.


access low-quality private institutions (which discourage mobilization), while their middle income peers attend public colleges (so they experience fewer grievances).

Figure 2.2 Predicted Protest Frequency by Funding Type, with 95% CIs




Meanwhile, Figure 2.3 shows the predicted counts at every level of the organizational student linkages with government score. In few words, as the score increases – denoting stronger connections between students and political parties in power – the number of protest events decreases. For example, holding all other variables at the mean values, when the score is lowest at 1, the number of protest events is 25. By contrast, when linkages are highest (score of 10), the number of events decreases to 17.8.

Figure 2.3 Predicted Protest Frequency by Linkages with Ruling Parties Score, with 95% CIs



Finally, Figure 2.4 shows the predicted counts for select net enrollment ratios (NER). Values starting at 7 and increasing by 10 percentage points are used to illustrate the relationship between enrollment and the number of protests. The figure shows that increased enrollment is associated with important increases in the number of protest events. Holding the rest of their variables at their mean values, a low enrollment ratio (i.e., that 7% of the college-age population attends college) leads to a predicted count of 12.5 protest events; meanwhile a relatively very high NER (i.e., that 47% of college-age youths attend college) increases the predicted count of protests to 54.

Figure 2.4. Predicted Protest Frequency by Enrollment, with 95% CIs



Analyzing the Size of Student Mobilization

Data and hypotheses

This section also analyzes the determinants of the size of college student protests using the LASPD. The unit of analysis is each protest event using the reported size as the dependent variable and other protest characteristics as the covariates. The LASPD contains characteristics of student protest events, including the types of demands that the protesters made, which can directly capture the effect of financial and working-class grievances on student protest size. In the case of party linkages, two assumptions about the data are made. First, it is assumed that the presence of political party members in a

student protest denotes strong linkages between that party and college students. Second, when parties are present in protests, it is assumed that whether or not the mobilizations target the government indicates whether the parties belong to the ruling coalition or the opposition: when the protest targets the government, it is assumed that they are opposition parties; when they do not target the government, it is assumed that those parties belong to the opposition.⁴² This is not a perfect indicator of the opposition or government status of parties involved, but most events in the LASPD did not specify the names or types of parties involved in the events.

In this section the hypotheses about protest size presented in Chapter One are adapted to fit the characteristics of the LASPD and the unit of observation (individual protest events). As the previous chapter argues, the incorporation of working class students into higher education systems and increased costs for students in these systems generate grievances, which increase the size of student mobilizations. Thus, at the level of individual protest events, I would expect mobilizations to be larger where students make demands about educational costs. Specifically, I argue that protests that make educational cost demands will attract more students because many students are concerned about educational costs. The hypothesis about the effect on protest size of financial grievances is adapted to this analysis in the following way:

⁴² This assumption is of course not realistic in all cases. Sometimes, members of the ruling parties present in the mobilizations may represent a certain subnational unit, while the protests target the federal or national government. Party members involved in a student protest may also represent a faction of the party that may not control the organization, participating in the protests as a way to pressure the ruling factions. Opposition parties may sometimes also support student mobilizations even when they do not target their rivals in power.

Hypothesis 11. Where demands about the costs of education are made, student protests will be larger.

Financial aid claims refer to demands related to scholarships, student fares in public transportation, student housing and meals, and other programs that facilitate attendance, and that especially affect lower income students. I argue that protests that make financial aid demands will attract more students because many students are concerned about financial aid (or lack thereof). The hypothesis about the effect on protest size of working class grievances is adapted to this analysis in the following way:

Hypothesis 12. Where demands about financial aid are made, student protests will be larger.

Other things being equal, protests will be larger where parties participate in them. This depends, however, on whether the event targets the government or not: when the protests target the government, opposition parties are more likely to participate and add their ranks; meanwhile, when protests do not target the government, opposition parties may not participate, making the event smaller. Regarding the effect on protest frequency of linkages between students and government and opposition parties, the hypotheses are thus the following:

Hypothesis 13. The presence of party member participants in protests that do not target the government (denoting strong linkages with ruling parties) has no effect on the size of student protests.

Hypothesis 14. The presence of party member participants in protests that target the government (denoting strong linkages with opposition parties) increases the size of student protests.

Variables

The dependent variable for this analysis is the **number of protest participants** per protest event. Table 2.13 shows the distribution of the categories used in this analysis. News stories rarely report the exact number of participants in a protest, so the number of participants is classified into four categories for this analysis: a small group (10-49 people or less, 9.7%), a medium-sized group (50-100 people, 7.4%), hundreds (20.5%), thousands or more (25.7%), and not enough information (36.7%). Given that these categories are ordinal, an ordered logistic regression will be used.

Table 2.13. Frequency and Percentages of Protest Events by Number of Protest Participants

| Protest Size | ≤49 | 50-100 | 101-999 | ≥1,000 | Missing Information | Total |
|--|------|--------|---------|--------|---------------------|-------|
| N | 459 | 347 | 969 | 1,210 | 1,732 | 4,717 |
| % | 9.73 | 7.36 | 20.54 | 25.65 | 36.72 | 100 |
| Source: Latin American Student Protest Dataset | | | | | | |

Four independent variables are used to analyze the effect of higher education policy grievances and party linkages on protest size.⁴³ First, the presence of demands about the **education costs** is included. This category includes demands related to claims against student debt, costs, and in favor of public and free education. Second, to assess

⁴³ The variables described below are not mutually exclusive, except the presence of political party members, and the absence of any social actor.

the effect of increased access on protest size, the effect of **financial aid** demands is analyzed. The two variables used to assess the effect of party linkages are interaction effects of two other variables: whether or not the government was the target of the protest; and the presence of members of political parties in the protests. The government target variable includes both national and local governments, and includes protests targeting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at both national and local levels. As noted above, the **presence of party members-government target** interaction term is meant to assess the effect of strong linkages with the opposition; the **presence of party members-government not targeted** is used to analyze the effect of stronger linkages with the opposition. Where parties are present in the protest and the government is targeted by the protests, the student protesters are assumed to have strong linkages with the opposition. Where party members are present and the government is not targeted, the student protesters are assumed to have strong links to ruling parties.

Several theoretically relevant control variables are also added. In terms of targets, there are two main foci of student mobilization: the **government** and **educational institutions**. Protests that target the government (even without the presence of political party members) are interesting in their own right because the state is the target of social mobilization par excellence, according to political process theory (McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly, 1978, 1995). There are at least two reasons why protests that target the state may be larger. First, student protests may consider the state to be responsible for a wide variety of issues, and they may target it to compel it change the laws or policies involved in the situation. Second, students at one institution or from one organization may also try to

reach out to other students for a common cause. They may also try, for example, to make alliances with other social groups to increase their numbers, uniting their causes to pose a larger challenge to the state. In other words, they will attempt to increase participation by framing their demands in such a way that they resonate with more social actors (Benford & Snow, 2000). For mobilizations to become massive, “the movement’s grievances and demands must resonate with the population’s larger needs in order to attract sympathizers, supporters, and members” (Inclán, 2008, p. 1331). It is easier to achieve this with the state as a target than with any other target.

Educational institutions are the target of frequent yet smaller protests. This is because they are relatively weaker institutions. Few social actors can be considered to be legitimate challengers of educational institutions (Walker, Martin, & McCarthy, 2008, p. 40), and it is, therefore, more difficult for students from one institution to gain student allies from other schools, let alone other social actors – their frame will not go beyond the limits of the actors involved in the school. Similarly, compared to large corporations or the state, higher education institutions may require less pressure – and fewer protestors – to acquiesce to student demands or at least to be willing to negotiate

Four variables based on demands are also included. First is the presence of demands for **university autonomy** and student participation in university governance. The issue of student participation in governing their colleges was the first major catalyst for student mobilization in the region (Portantiero, 1978), and has been an ongoing issue in some Latin American countries (Ivancheva, 2016). A dichotomous variable identifying protest events with **political** demands is included. This variable includes demands related

to freedom of speech, constitutional reforms, and regime change, among other political issues. The purpose of analyzing the effect of political demands is to test whether the decades-old association between student protest participation and interest in national politics (Brunner, 1986; Levy, 1989, p. 325; Liebman, Walker, & Glazer, 1972) still holds in contemporary Latin America. Lastly, a dichotomous variable capturing the presence of **postmaterialist** demands (5.1%) is also included. This variable is a combination of sexual, moral, feminist, environmentalist, and animal-rights demands. Scholars have proposed that economic development and modernization cause a shift in values towards individual expression, human rights, and other non-materialist concerns. This shift in values, in turn, causes a change in political attitudes and social mobilization (Inglehart, 1990; Opp, 1990). This effect is particularly stronger in younger generations and it should be, therefore, among college students. I expect, therefore, that the presence of these demands will be associated with larger protest events.

Several other control variables are used in the study. First, whether the protest event occurred in any of the countries' **capital cities** (45.8%) is incorporated as a dichotomous variable. This is important because, in addition to large student populations, capitals as stages for protest provide students with many symbolic resources and strategies, such as marching in the city's main avenue (Marín Naritelli, 2014). The presence of these resources may be associated with higher levels of mobilization and participation. The dataset includes protest events in eighteen different countries over thirteen years so country and year dummy variables are also added to the study. These are meant to control for **country**- and **year**- specific effects on the level of participation – to

see if, for example, there is a timeless “Chileanness” or “Mexicanness” or a cross-sectional effect of the year 2005 that has an effect on the number of protesters in Chile, Mexico, and 2005, respectively. To control for the baseline level of the presence of other actors, a variable denoting the presence of **student participants only** is also included.

Finally, a **coder** variable is also added to one regression model to control for the effect of coders on the number of missing cases. Table 2.14 shows that, of the three coders that collaborated in creating the dataset, two (coders 1 and 2) have very similar percentages of cases with insufficient information to enter values in the protest size variable (44.8% and 46.8%, respectively), while the third one had a markedly lower level of missing values (2.4%). This suggests that the missing values for the dependent variable are not missing completely at random (MCAR) but missing at random (MAR), conditional on who coded the values. A “Coder 3” variable is thus added to one of the models so that the probability of missing values in the protest size variable does not depend on its own values. This variable is not used in all models because any coder variable would have multicollinearity issues: since the coders processed events in specific countries, “coder” is highly correlated with the country variable. Therefore, this variable is only added to one of the mixed-effects ordered logistic model, which has country specific random effects instead of fixed effects.

Table 2.14. Countries, Events, and Missing Values for Protest Size by Coder

| | Coder 1 | Coder 2 | Coder 3 | Total Coded |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|
| Countries | 1 | 12 | 4 | 4,717 |
| Events (N) | 585 | 3,090 | 1,042 | 4380 |
| Events (%) | 12.4 | 65.51 | 22.09 | 100 |
| "Missing information" on Protest Size (N) | 262 | 1445 | 25 | 1732 |
| "Missing information" on Protest Size (%) | 44.79 | 46.76 | 2.4 | 36.72 |
| Source: Latin American Student Dataset | | | | |

Results

Table 2.15 presents the results of the ordinal logistic models with the independent variables (I), with the independent and control variables (I), and with the added interaction effects between government target and party member participants (III), all with robust standard errors. In Model I, the financial aid explanatory variable is statistically significant but negative (against expectations). The direction of the effect is reversed, however, after adding the controls in model II. The addition of the educational institution variable may explain this change as many (but not all) claims for increased or sustain financial aid target specific colleges. Meanwhile, the significance level and direction of the effect of the explanatory variables in model II remain unchanged after adding the interactions in model III, save for the fact that the effect of party member participation (when not targeting the government) on protest size becomes statistically insignificant after adding the interaction with targeting the government. This suggests that, while political party participation in protests has an important effect on the size of student mobilizations, this effect is only important when the protests target the

government because parties are more interested in contributing to student mobilizations targeting their political rivals in power. As theorized, it may be that the parties attending the protests are in the opposition. The rest of this discussion focuses on model III (the full model with government target-party member participation interaction effect).

Table 2.15. Ordered logistic regressions predicting size of student protests

| | I | II | III |
|--|----------|----------|----------|
| Actors | | | |
| Party member participants | 4.587*** | 1.996*** | 1.418 |
| | (0.440) | (0.231) | (0.329) |
| Government*Party member participants | | | 4.206*** |
| | | | (0.698) |
| Only Students | | 0.217*** | 0.215*** |
| | | (0.0198) | (0.0197) |
| Demands | | | |
| Education costs | 1.635*** | 1.647*** | 1.659*** |
| | (0.160) | (0.186) | (0.188) |
| Financial aid | 0.806* | 1.306* | 1.312* |
| | (0.102) | (0.189) | (0.190) |
| Political | | 1.099 | 1.084 |
| | | (0.129) | (0.128) |
| Autonomy | | 1.174 | 1.166 |
| | | (0.196) | (0.194) |
| Postmaterialist | | 0.879 | 0.875 |
| | | (0.153) | (0.152) |
| Targets | | | |
| Educational Institutions | | 0.668*** | 0.638*** |
| | | (0.0763) | (0.0742) |
| Government | | 2.103*** | 1.947*** |
| | | (0.224) | (0.225) |
| Capital City | | 0.914 | 0.909 |
| | | (0.0757) | (0.0755) |
| Number of years | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| Number of countries | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| N | 2,985 | 2,985 | 2,985 |
| Reporting odds ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and year effects not reported. | | | |
| *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | |

It was theorized that political party involvement would have no effect on the number of participants in student protests (Hypothesis 7) if the protests did not target the government. The results of Model III support this hypothesis. Meanwhile, events that both target the government and have party member participants have about 4.2 times

higher odds of being larger than those where either the government was not targeted or party members did not participate. This result, which has the largest effect of all independent variables, is highly significant, and supports Hypothesis 8.

In terms of demands, the results also support the theory. The presence of education costs and support demands in a protest is in the expected direction and it is statistically significant in both cases, supporting Hypotheses 5 and 6: the presence of demands about the cost of education is associated with almost 66% higher odds of having more participants than events without demands about costs; meanwhile, events where demands related to financial aid were made had about 31% higher odds of being larger than events where this type of demands was absent.

Some control variables derived from the literature had a discernable effect on the size of protests. As expected, protests that target educational institutions have about 26% lower odds of having a high turnout, compared to those that do not target colleges. Against expectations, the effects of university autonomy, political, and post-materialist demands were positive (except for post-materialist demands) but did not achieve statistical significance. By contrast, and against expectations, staging a protest in a capital city did not have a positive or statistically significant effect on protest size. It may be that student protests in capital cities require less participants to be picked up by the news, and these protests may require less people to have the desired impact. Unsurprisingly, the absence of any allies in these protests reduces the odds of events being larger by almost 79% (compared to the presence of at least one other social actor).

Robustness

Additional models are also used to assess the robustness of the results above. Although each category of the dependent variable has a large number of observations, fitting a fixed-effect ordered logistic model with dummy variables is problematic. This is important because there is unfortunately no clear consensus about the best estimator for fixed-effects ordered logistic regressions (Allison, 2009; Baetschmann, Staub, & Winkelmann, 2011; Riedl & Geishecker, 2014). The proposed solutions are two. The first one is dichotomizing the ordinal categorical variable, and running a conditional logistic regression (Campbell, 1980). The two new categories of number of participants are “less than one thousand,” and “one thousand or more.” This is a “meaningful threshold” (Riedl & Geishecker, 2014, p. 4) because PEA tends to be biased in favor of larger and more visible protest events since the media tends report them more. The second solution is using a multilevel ordered logistic regression, where protest events are nested within country-years, which are in turn nested within countries.

Table 2.16 shows the results of three new regression models (one conditional logistic regression, and two mixed-effects ordered logistic regressions) adopting these solutions. Two models are similar to model III above, while the second mixed-effects model adds the abovementioned “Coder 3” variable to control for the effect of individual coders on the number of cases with missing information in the protest size variable. All models report robust standard errors. Table 2.16 shows the results of these three regressions.

Table 2.16. Robustness models predicting the size of student protests

| | Conditional Logistic Regression | Multilevel Ordered Logistic Regression | Multilevel Ordered Logistic Regression (with coder variable) |
|---|---------------------------------|--|--|
| Actors | | | |
| Party member participants | 2.596*** (0.630) | 2.457*** (0.613) | 2.466*** (0.606) |
| Government*Party members | 5.571*** (1.173) | 4.695*** (0.921) | 4.707*** (0.918) |
| Workers | 2.089*** (0.278) | 2.428*** (0.360) | 2.427*** (0.362) |
| Secondary Students | 1.908*** (0.236) | 1.954*** (0.279) | 1.955*** (0.280) |
| Teachers | 2.651*** (0.602) | 2.725*** (0.523) | 2.730*** (0.520) |
| College Faculty | 1.819*** (0.267) | 1.681*** (0.267) | 1.682*** (0.267) |
| Only Students | 0.598*** (0.0519) | 0.559*** (0.0713) | 0.559*** (0.0712) |
| Demands | | | |
| Education costs | 1.719** (0.435) | 1.595*** (0.286) | 1.588** (0.294) |
| Financial aid | 1.325 (0.270) | 1.260* (0.173) | 1.257* (0.171) |
| Political | 1.159 (0.149) | 1.055 (0.156) | 1.057 (0.157) |
| Autonomy | 1.192 (0.256) | 1.225 (0.220) | 1.226 (0.220) |
| Postmaterialist | 1.112 (0.193) | 0.946 (0.185) | 0.946 (0.185) |
| Targets | | | |
| Educational Institutions | 0.579*** (0.105) | 0.765 (0.145) | 0.765 (0.145) |
| Government | 2.335*** (0.392) | 1.909*** (0.273) | 1.909*** (0.274) |
| Tactics | | | |
| Peaceful | 4.657*** (1.110) | 5.236*** (1.033) | 5.237*** (1.032) |
| Disruptive | 1.706*** (0.274) | 2.278*** (0.372) | 2.274*** (0.371) |
| Violent | 1.569* (0.393) | 1.042 (0.219) | 1.042 (0.219) |
| Capital City | 0.836 (0.134) | 0.853 (0.107) | 0.852 (0.107) |
| Coder 3 | | | 1.112 (0.254) |
| Number of years | 13 | | |
| Number of countries | 18 | | |
| Number of country-years | | 216 | 216 |
| N | 2,985 | 2,985 | 2,985 |
| Reporting odds ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and year effects not reported in first model. | | | |
| *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | |

Overall, the size, direction and significance level of all the variables of interest remain the same in all three models. One important difference with model III in Table 2.15 is that the party participation variable (when not targeting the government) achieves statistical significance, although the size of its effect on protest size is still smaller than the government*party member interaction. Two other differences are that the effect of financial aid demands is not statistically significant in the conditional logistic model, and the effect of targeting educational institutions is not significant in the mixed-effects models. The third model also shows that the effect of the “Coder 3” variable is not statistically significant. This result suggests that, although this coder was much less likely to report missing information in the size variable, an event was not more likely to be larger or smaller because this person coded the event.


Postestimation

The following section reports the predicted probabilities of the protest size variable at selected values of the independent variables. These statistics are calculated from predictions of model III in Table 2.15 above. All other variables are held at their mean values. These postestimation values are used to illustrate the effect of the independent variables on the size of student protests. All of the following results are statistically significant,

Figure 2.5 shows the predicted probability of each category of protest size when financial aid demands (demands related to scholarships, student fares, and other measures that promote attendance by lower-income students) are advanced and when they are not.

The predicted probabilities of all but one of the protest size categories are higher when financial aid demands are not made. The exception is the predicted probability of the largest size category ($\geq 1,000$), which is higher when this type of claims are made. Thus, the predicted probability that an event that has the smallest number of participants (less than 49) is 10% when financial aid demands are not advanced, and less than 8% when they are; meanwhile, the predicted probability of the largest category (protests with at least 1,000 participants) is about 36% when financial aid demands are not advanced, and approximately 43% when these claims are made. These results suggest that the demands typical of lower-income students have a significant ability to convene large number of participants.

Figure 2.5 Adjusted Predictions of Protest Size Depending on Whether Financial Aid Demands Were Made, with 95% CIs.



Something similar occurs when assessing the predicted probability of event sizes that advance demands about education costs (Figure 2.6). The predicted probability of largest size category (one thousand or more participants) is higher when costs demands are advanced, while predicted probabilities of the rest of the categories are higher when these demands are not made. For example, the predicted probability of the small size category (≤ 49) is about 11% when costs demands are not advanced, and less than 7% when students advance these demands. By contrast, the predicted probability of the largest size category is about 35% when education costs claims are not made, and almost

47% when they are. This suggests that promoting or defending public and free education have a very important effect on the size of student mobilizations in the region.

Figure 2.6 Adjusted Predictions of Protest Size Depending on Whether Education Costs Demands Were Made, with 95% CIs.





Figure 2.7 shows the predicted probabilities of protest size when party members participate, and when the government is targeted and when it is not. The relationship between protest size and political party participation in student protests against the government is very clear: the expected probability of having a protest with at least 1,000 participants is much larger when parties participate and the event targets the government, while the expected probabilities of the other, smaller, categories are higher when parties are involved but protests do not target the government. Thus, when parties participate in

student protest events, the expected probability of the smallest category is almost 13% when the government is targeted, and about 5% when it is not; meanwhile, the predicted probability of the largest category is less than 31% when the government is not targeted by the protest, and approximately 57% when students target the government. This result gives indirect support to the claim that strong linkages with opposition parties have a positive effect on the size of student mobilizations.

Figure 2.7 Adjusted Predictions of Protest Size When Party Member Participate, Depending on Whether the Government is Targeted, with 95% CIs.



Analyzing the Number of Student Participants: An Alternative Approach

Data and hypotheses

An alternative way to analyze the effect of grievances and party linkages on student mobilization is aggregating the total number of protest participants per country year, as suggested by Biggs (2016). The hypotheses about the frequency of protests can be adapted to explain variation in the number of participants per country-year.

Hypothesis 1. Higher levels of private spending on higher education increase the number of protest participants in a given country-year.

Hypothesis 2. Higher enrollment rates increase the number of protest participants in a given country-year.

Hypothesis 3. Stronger linkages with parties in power have a negative effect on the number of protest participants in a given country-year.

Hypothesis 4. Stronger linkages with parties in the opposition have no effect on the number of protest participants in a given country-year.


Variables

In the LASPD, the protest size variable is categorical, so in order to have a continuous variable, each category is assigned a specific number. To ensure variance, the original categories in the LASPD size variable are assigned the lowest⁴⁴ corresponding estimates: events in the “handful (1-9)” category were assigned one protester; “small group (10-49)” events were assigned ten protesters; the “medium-sized group (50-99)” protests were assumed to have fifty protesters; protests with 100-999 participants were given one hundred protesters; protests with a thousand or more demonstrators were assigned one thousand protesters; and protests in the “tens of thousands” category were attributed ten thousand protesters. The number of participants in every event within the same country-year was summed to create the **total number of protest participants per country-year** variable. This variable, which ranges from zero (several country-years) to 377,115 (Chile-2011), does not, therefore, reflect the exact amount of protest participants but provides a conservative estimate thereof. Figure 1 shows the distribution of this new

⁴⁴ The lowest corresponding estimates of each category are used because the largest one (tens of thousands or more) does not have an upper limit.

variable. The mean number of participants per country-year is about 22,386 protestors but most country-years have far less; the median is 11,530 participants, and the mode is zero participants (fifteen country-years).⁴⁵

Figure 2.8. Distribution of the Number of Protest Participants per Country-Year



Two other new variables are added to analyze protest size. First, the **number of events with missing data per country-year** is included because each event that is missing data should have a negative effect on the aggregate number of participants. Second, a one-year **lagged number of protest participants** variable is also added to

⁴⁵ In most country-years with no recorded participants, there was one or more events registered but with missing information for the protest size variable. The second most common value (six country-years) is 1,000.

control for the effect of protest cycles. The rest of the variables are the same as the ones used above in the protest frequency analysis.

Results and robustness

The number of protest participants is regressed using three model specifications. Table 1 describes the results of these models. As with the protest frequency analysis, negative binomial regressions are used in Models I, and II. The count variable is converted into a dichotomous measure ($0 \leq 11,530$ protest participants; 1 otherwise)⁴⁶ for the logistic regression model (III). As explained in the protest frequency analysis, mixed-effects models are used because they allow for the inclusion of both country-specific random effects and time-invariant variables like funding.

Model I only includes the independent variables of interest. In this case, only the NER and government linkages variables are statistically significant. With every one-percentage point increase in the NER, the number of protestors increases by 7.7%. With every one-point increase in the government linkages score, the number of protesters decreases by 11.9%. (The opposition linkages variables does not have a significant effect on the number of demonstrators.) Models II and III are full models with the control variables added. The similar results of these two models demonstrate that several variables of interest become statistically significant only *after* the addition of the controls, and that these results are consistent across different model specifications, with the important exception of the NER. The following paragraphs discuss Model II.

⁴⁶ 11,530 participants per country-year is the median (50th percentile) of the protest count measure.

Table 2.17. Models Predicting Total Number of Participants per Country-Year

| | I (Mixed-Effects Negative Binomial) | II (Mixed-Effects Negative Binomial) | III (Mixed-Effects Logit) |
|---|--|---|------------------------------|
| <i>Enrollment</i> | | | |
| NER | 1.077*** | 1.032*** | 1.027 |
| | (0.0214) | (0.00998) | (0.0391) |
| <i>Funding (Reference: Private)</i> | | | |
| Public | 0.955 | 0.211*** | 0.202*** |
| | (0.326) | (0.0780) | (0.0924) |
| Shared | 0.877 | 0.265*** | 0.224** |
| | (0.603) | (0.131) | (0.132) |
| <i>Student-Party Linkages</i> | | | |
| Government | 0.881*** | 0.881*** | 0.866** |
| | (0.0381) | (0.0228) | (0.0586) |
| Opposition | 0.921 | 0.986 | 1.004 |
| | (0.0828) | (0.0759) | (0.142) |
| <i>Controls</i> | | | |
| Regime Type Score | | 1.241 | 3.721 |
| | | (0.730) | (3.230) |
| Regime Type Score² | | 0.995 | 0.977 |
| | | (0.0127) | (0.0174) |
| GDP (log) | | 0.853 | 0.590 |
| | | (0.277) | (0.304) |
| GDP growth (%) | | 1.006 | 1.037 |
| | | (0.0332) | (0.0416) |
| Internet Users (per 1,000 people) | | 1.016 | 1.048 |
| | | (0.0147) | (0.0430) |
| Enrollment by Institutions (Reference: majority in private institutions) | | 2.329*** | 3.419*** |
| | | (0.671) | (1.269) |
| Number of missing events | | 1.010 | 1.063*** |
| | | (0.00730) | (0.0237) |
| Student Population Size (100,000s) | | 1.032*** | 1.044*** |
| | | (0.0118) | (0.0143) |
| 1-year Lagged Dependent Variable | | 1.000 | 1.405 |
| | | (0.00000125) | (0.429) |
| Observations | 205 | 203 | 204 |
| Number of Countries | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Years | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| Incidence Rate Ratios reported in Models I and II; Odds Ratios in Model III. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. Results for year variable not shown. | | | |
| *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | |

The results support the theorized positive relationship between increased education costs for students and the number of participants in protests (Hypothesis 1). Compared to privately funded higher education systems, public funding reduces by almost 79% the number of protests participants. Shared funding, on the other hand, reduces by 74% the number of protestors, compared to private funding. When public funding replaces private funding as the reference category (not shown), the effect of shared funding is positive but not statistically significant. By contrast, private funding increases the number of protestors by about 374% relative to public funding. These results suggest that, in terms of the aggregate number of protest participants, the main difference is between private funding, on the one hand, and shared and public funding, on the other.

The results also support Hypothesis 2 with regard to the positive effect of increased enrollment on the number of protest participants. With every one percentage point increase in the NER, the number of protest participants increases by 3.2%. The null effect in Model III, however, suggests that enrollment does not have a significant effect when comparing moderately large and small protest participant numbers. It may be that variation in enrollment variable only explains extreme variation in aggregate protest size.

The results also support the expected relationships between party linkages and the number of protestors. As expected (Hypothesis 3), a one-point increase in the government linkages score reduces the number of protest participants by approximately 12%. Meanwhile, changes in the opposition linkages score do not have a statistically significant effect on the number of protestors (Hypothesis 4).

Postestimation

Using Model II in Table 2.17, the predicted number of protest participants per country-year can be estimated based on selected values of the independent variables.⁴⁷ All of the results described below are statistically significant, and all the values (except for the values of interest) are held at their mean values. Figure 2.9 shows the predicted number of participants at the three categories of funding: public, shared, and private funding. The predicted numbers of demonstrators in public and shared funding systems are somewhat similar: about 14,231 and 17,898 protesters each. By contrast, the predicted number of protest participants in the case of private funding is much higher: about 67,495. Thus, private funding has a much greater effect on the number of participants than does shared or public funding

⁴⁷ These postestimations have the same issues as in the protest frequency analysis – due to software limitations, only the fixed portion of the model were used to calculate predicted number of participants.

Figure 2.9 Predicted Number of Protest Participants by Funding Type, with 95% CIs






Figure 2.10 shows the predicted number of demonstrators by each value of the organizational linkages with government score. In short, the higher the linkage scores – indicating stronger connections between students and political parties in power – the lower the number of protest participants. For example, when the score is lowest at 1, the predicted number of protest participants is about 38,616. Conversely, when linkages between students and ruling parties are strongest (score of 10), the predicted number of demonstrators is much lower: approximately 12,380 participants.

Figure 2.10 Predicted Protest Frequency with Varying Levels of Linkages with Ruling Parties, with 95% CIs



Finally, Figure 2.11 shows the predicted number of protest participants at varying net enrollment ratios (NER). Similar to the analysis of protest frequency above, values starting at 7 and increasing steadily by 10 percentage points are used to illustrate the relationship between enrollment and the number of protest participants. The figure illustrates the positive relationship between enrollment and the number of protest participants. For example, a very low enrollment ratio (in which only 7% of the college-age population attends college) is associated with a predicted number of 15,071 protest participants; by contrast, a relatively high NER (in which 47% of college-age youths attend college) is associated with a predicted number of approximately 53,540 protesters.

Figure 2.11 Predicted Number of Protest Participants at Varying Net Enrollment Ratios, with 95% CIs



The similar results of the two sets of analyses may be explained by the similarities between the number of protest events per country-year and the number of participants per country-years variables. Indeed, the effect of the independent covariates on both variables is virtually identical. This finding is in sharp contrast with the argument that “counting events and counting participants will yield very different conclusions” (Biggs 2016, p. 3). Figure 2 shows that the number of protest events and the number of participants in the LASPD are, in fact, relatively highly correlated ($r=.68$). Biggs (2016, p. 23), however, states the following about the relationship between protest size and frequency:


Aggregated over time intervals or across geographical units, there is no high correlation between event frequency and total participation. Four time series yield

correlation coefficients from .10 to .43; with city as the unit of observation, the coefficient does not exceed .64. Perhaps other data sets will reveal higher correlations, but this will need to be demonstrated. As it stands, the frequency of events and the total number of participants diverge so much that findings for one are unlikely to apply to the other.

The fact that in the LASPD, a dataset spanning eighteen countries over thirteen years, total participation and event frequency are more correlated than in other datasets undermines Biggs' findings. The similarities between the results of the protest frequency analysis and the analysis of protest participants may be due in large part to the way the protest participant variable was created, by assigning the lowest possible estimates for each value of the original protest size category. The high correlation between the number of participants and protest, however, may also mean that the LASPD was better able to capture smaller events than the typical protest event dataset by using multiple national and local sources per country that were drawn from the OSAL Chronologies. At any rate, the high correlation means that, in this case, the insights from analyzing protest frequency are very similar to those generated by analyzing protest participation.

At the same time, this correlation also points to the usefulness of analyzing the size of individual protest events separately, especially in the case of the LASPD. This way, the insights derived from analyzing different event sizes are not clouded by aggregation, which increases the influence of larger events.

Figure 2.12. Number of Protest Participants by Number of Protest Events in the LASPD



Conclusion

This chapter tested the hypotheses outlined in Chapter One at the regional level. The first section of the chapter discussed the elaboration and results of the Latin America Student Dataset (LASPD), showing that the frequency and size of student protests are associated with key characteristics of protest events, such as specific types of college students, targets, actors, demands, locations, tactics and types of incidents. The second section discussed an Expert Survey of Student-Party Linkages in Latin America. The results of the survey suggest, among other things, that the level of organizational linkages with parties in power vary by presidential administration and government coalition, and that students often have close relationships with leftist parties, although this is not always the case.

The subsequent sections used the data from the LASPD and the Expert Survey, along with other variables, to carry out statistical analyses of student protest size and frequency. Using the frequency of protests per country-year, the third section analyzed the determinants of protest frequency. In terms of the determinants of protest frequency, four hypotheses were presented. First, higher enrollment rates were expected to increase the frequency of student protests. Second, higher education systems that rely on private funding in higher education, where students and families assume the cost of education, were predicted to lead to more protests. Third, stronger linkages with parties in power were expected to decrease the frequency of protests. Conversely, stronger linkages with opposition parties were predicted to have no effect on student mobilizations.

The findings of the statistical analyses are in line with these hypotheses. Table 2.12, and Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 show that enrollment, funding, and party linkages have statistically significant effects in the number of protest events in the LASPD. Increases in net enrollment ratios are associated with higher counts of student events. Compared to private funding, the presence of both public and shared systems is associated with fewer protests. Finally, stronger linkages between college students and parties in power, as measured through an expert survey, are associated with less frequent protests. The relationship between linkages with parties in the opposition and the number of protests is not statistically significant, however.

The second part of this chapter was dedicated to analyzing the determinants of the size of student protests. It was hypothesized that the presence of political party members increases the size student protests. It was also predicted, however, that there would be an

interaction effect between targeting the government and the presence of party members at protests: student protest events that both target the government and have party member participants are likely to be larger than those that do not have party members or that do not target the government. Conversely, it was predicted that the presence of party member participants in protests that do not target the government would have no effect on the size of student mobilization. Finally, protests that advance demands related to education costs and financial aid were expected to increase the size of student mobilizations.

The findings strongly support these hypotheses. Tables 2.15 and 2.16, and figures 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 show that party member participation in protests that target the government, and the advance of education demands related to costs and financial aid are all associated with larger student protests. By itself, the political party member variable does not have an effect on the size of student protest events in the main model. More important, however, is the fact that once the government-party member interaction is added, the effect is much larger. In other words, party members are particularly likely to swell the ranks of student protests when protests are aimed at the government. This suggests that many of the party members participating in protests may belong to the opposition. Finally, education costs and financial aid demands were the only types of demands analyzed that have a statistically significant and positive effect on the size of student mobilizations.

Finally, the fourth section used the protest frequency per country-year and the protest size variables to create an estimate of the total number of protest participants.

Four hypotheses were presented, based on the predictions for protest frequency. First, higher enrollment rates were expected to increase the number of protestors. Second, higher education systems that rely on private funding were predicted to increase the size of demonstrators. Third, stronger linkages with parties in power were expected to decrease the number of participants. Conversely, stronger linkages with opposition parties were predicted to have no effect on the number of participants in student mobilizations.

The analysis of the number of protests participants strongly support these hypotheses. Table 2.17, and Figures 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 show that increased enrollment, private funding, and government linkages have statistically significant effects on the number of protest participants. These results are virtually identical to those of the protest frequency analysis, which contradicts the argument that analyzing frequency and protest participation yields different results (Biggs, 2016).

Of course, the results of this chapter have several qualifications. In addition to the abovementioned issues of media bias that all protest event analysis (PEA) efforts suffer from, the statistical analysis sections also have other issues that may be resolved in the future with more and finer-grained data. In the section analyzing protest frequency, the weakest finding is the one to do with the effect of funding type, since only one country is in the “private category” and the variable does not change over time. Similarly, using data for gauging longitudinal changes in linkages (instead of differences during administrations) would strengthen the argument for the effect of linkages on protest frequency. Concerning the protest size regressions, the presence of parties in student

protests (targeting or not targeting the government) is an imperfect indicator of linkages with the government or the opposition. Likewise, recoding or imputing the protest size variable would also provide stronger evidence for the effect of grievances and party linkages on protest size. Finally, since the LASPD only includes events with college student participants, the results obtained from analyzing this data do not directly account for the “spillover effects” (Meyer & Whittier, 1994) of general levels of mobilization or among other social sectors.

This chapter underscores the importance of higher education policy in shaping the frequency and size of student mobilizations. Different policy decisions in terms of enrollment and funding – like promoting enrollment through the entrance of new, tuition-based institutions in higher education – are translated into student grievances leading to mobilization. The results suggest nevertheless that holding other factors constant, increased enrollment may result in more and larger student mobilizations. The chapter also highlights the complicated relationship between party politics and social mobilizations. On the one hand, connections to ruling parties discourage mobilization. On the other hand, once protests occur, party member participation in student protests has a major effect on their size, especially when governments are targeted.

Chapter Three: Student Mobilization In Chile⁴⁸

In 2011, Chilean university students began to mobilize massively against the country's neoliberal education system. Students occupied schools, colleges and universities for months in the country's most important protests in decades. The movement led to the impeachment of one of President Sebastián Piñera's education ministers, and the resignation of two others. It also caused the government to unexpectedly pursue more statist education policies than its progressive predecessors in terms of government oversight, funding, and governance of higher education (Kubal & Fisher, 2016, p. 231). President Michelle Bachelet initiated a comprehensive reform of the country's education system, the scope and direction of which would be impossible to imagine without the mobilizations. Moreover, four former student leaders were elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 2013 thanks to the protests.

This chapter seeks to explain why students have protested in Chile, a country that in recent decades has experienced the reintroduction of competitive party politics and the adoption of market policies in the social sector. Analyzing the Chilean case shows that liberalization of higher education does not eliminate protest, but rather creates increased financial grievances among students by expanding the number of students attending college while also increasing educational costs. The evolution of student mobilization in Chile also demonstrates that when students and their families are unable to bear the financial burden of college on their own, they are more likely to mobilize. Students from

⁴⁸ A modified version of this chapter has been accepted for publication as Disi Pavlic, R. (2018). Sentenced to Debt: Explaining Student Mobilization in Chile. *Latin American Research Review*, 53(3).

disadvantaged backgrounds are particularly likely to mobilize for their education than their more privileged peers. However, this chapter argues that close linkages between students and ruling parties make students less likely to mobilize, both because they trust the government to advance their demands institutionally, and because the government can use these connections to coopt students and nip mobilization in the bud.

This chapter uses a mixed-methods research design. It first presents a case study of the evolution of higher education policy, organizational student-party linkages, and student protests in Chile from 1990 to 2011. This section draws evidence from primary and secondary sources, including more than forty semi-structured elite interviews carried out by the author between June of 2014 and March of 2015 in Washington, D.C., Santiago, and Valparaíso. The interviewees include student leaders (from traditional and private universities), government and party officials (ranging from the far Left to the Right), residents of Santiago and Valparaíso, and people whose careers were related to student mobilization between 1990 and 2014. The second section of the chapter adapts the hypotheses presented in Chapter One to the Chilean context and the individual level, and then tests these hypotheses statistically using a sample of college students from a 2012 Chilean survey.

Chile is a useful case to analyze in part because it has had variation on the dependent as well as the independent variables of this study. In recent years, Chile has experienced varying levels of student protests, including major mobilizations in 2006 and 2011. Indeed, the country experienced the highest recorded number of protests in one year in 2011 (both in absolute terms and weighted by student population size) in the

LASPD. During the 1980s, the country adopted a neoliberal higher education system that increased enrollment as well as educational costs for students (Brunner, 2009), which subsequent governments managed to modify only slightly (Pribble & Huber, 2010, p. 10). In a context of generalized decay of linkages with political parties (Morgan & Meléndez, 2016), Chilean students' closeness to government and opposition political parties has also changed over time (von Bülow & Bidegain Ponte, 2015), with government linkages being stronger with the Center-Left Concertación than with the Center-Right Alianza. Finally, the Chilean case is important because, as the region has tended to follow the Chilean example of increasing enrollment through neoliberal policies (López Segrera, 2011, pp. 212–218), many countries may experience similar mobilizations.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section explores, using a case study, the causal mechanisms through which higher education policy and student-party linkages affect student mobilization in Chile. The second section tests the hypotheses presented in Chapter 1 at the individual level through a statistical analysis of a 2012 survey of Chilean college students. The last section concludes that, while financial grievances may exist for a long time, it is not until previously excluded sectors enter college, and the linkages with parties in government grow weak and those with the opposition become strong that grievances translate into frequent and large mobilizations.

Student Mobilization in Chile: A Case Study

Higher education in Chile was free and funded by the state until the reforms enacted in 1981 by the military regime. The 1981 law created new independent institutions out of existing universities' regional branches, progressively eliminated direct funding, and permitted the creation of new private institutions. Indirect public funding took the form of state-backed loans, which were only available to students attending pre-reform universities and their offshoots (called "traditional" universities).

Increased enrollment after the return to democracy in 1990 enlarged the mass of students from lower-income families who were the most vulnerable to neoliberal policies (Brunner, 2009, pp. 318–319). Linkages between student organizations and political parties also played an important role in the transformation of the grievances into mobilization. Ties to the Concertación governments were initially strong but began to deteriorate in the mid-1990s. Then, when the center-right government of Piñera was elected to the presidency, linkages with the parties in power became too weak to prevent mobilization. Massive student protests broke out. These mobilizations had ambitious goals, which were geared towards changing the whole educational system.⁴⁹ Although the students ended up embracing a broad array of demands, like the nationalization of the copper mining industry and constitutional reform in 2011, the protests began with, and had at their core, discontent about education finance (Somma, 2012, p. 300).

⁴⁹ Interview with Sergio Bitar, Minister of Education (2003–2005), June 16, 2014; Interview with Ernesto Schiefelbein, Minister of Education (1994), November 4, 2015; Interview with Mariana Aylwin, Minister of Education (2000–2003), November 27, 2014; Interview with José Pablo Arellano, Minister of Education (1996–2000), March 19, 2015; Interview with Jonathan Serracino, President, Universidad Alberto Hurtado Student Federation (2006, 2009), October 9, 2014.

The 1990s, by contrast, experienced low levels of student mobilization (Cummings, 2015, p. 54). Once student federations achieved their main goal – the return to democracy – they lost their mobilizing capacity.⁵⁰ As a former Education Minister states,

there was a period of a certain stupor [*aturdimiento*] that stands out. I remember being in the Senate and we often wondered what had happened to student mobilizations, which are always part of a democratic process. That did not happen in the 1990s, or it happened very slightly.⁵¹

In the second half of the decade, protests were small and usually restricted to public institutions. Students mobilized – unsuccessfully – for family income-based tuition rates (*arancel diferenciado*),⁵² and the reestablishment of student participation in higher education governance (Muñoz Tamayo, 2011, p. 125).

In the 2000s, college students followed the lead of secondary school students twice: in the 2001 *Mochilazo*⁵³ protest to reduce student fares in public transportation, and in the 2006 *Revolución Pingüina* (Donoso, 2013). Before 2011, the most important college student-led mobilization happened in 2005, when traditional university students mobilized against the imposition of a state-endorsed private loan program, which was nevertheless applied to students attending other institutions.⁵⁴ Figure 3.1, using data for Chile from the LASPD, shows that Chilean college students' involvement in protests

⁵⁰ Interview with Julio Sarmiento. Member, Communist Party; President, University of Chile Student Federation (FECH, 2010), October 14, 2014.

⁵¹ Interview with Sergio Bitar.

⁵² Interview with Álvaro Cabrera; Interview with Julio Sarmiento.

⁵³ Interview with Mariana Aylwin.


⁵⁴ Interview with Nicolás Grau, President, FECH (2006), October 27, 2014. Interview with Felipe Melo, President, FECH (2005), November 10, 2014.

clearly peaks in 2011, both in terms of the total number of protests as well as the frequency of very large events. As a former student leader notes,

Evidently, what happens in 2011 in terms of massiveness...breaks with what had been previously observed. When in 1997 or 1998 we took 15,000 students to the streets, it was a huge success; it was a gigantic demonstration here in Santiago. There is no comparison between that and the 100,000 or 150,000 who effectively participated in 2011 in some of the demonstrations⁵⁵

As will be argued below, protests became both frequent and massive when enrollment increased, debt grew, government linkages weakened, and ties to the opposition strengthened.

Figure 3.1. Number of Protest Events with College Student Participants in Chile, 2000-2011



⁵⁵ Interview with Álvaro Cabrera, Secretary General (1998), President (1999), FECH, November 5, 2014.

The protests responded in large part to neoliberal education policies. The return to democracy under the Concertación coalition governments (1990-2010) did not reverse but rather built on the neoliberal legacy in higher education. Although some important reforms were carried out, none of them addressed the finance issues. The new democratic regime established stricter monitoring and rules for the creation of new private institutions, emphasized access and the quality of academic programs, and improved the information available to current and prospective students.⁵⁶ However, the Concertación upheld the private sector's ability to establish new schools, the administrative autonomy of colleges, the market's self regulation and, most importantly, students' responsibility for financing their education (Brunner, 2009, p. 294).

Public expenditures did not keep up with the expanded coverage. In 2003, for example, public and private (mostly family) sources both spent an average of about \$1,415 per student at public universities. By contrast, in private universities, the Chilean state spent slightly more than \$62 while private sources spent more than \$2,174 per student on average (Marcel & Tokman, 2005, p. 40).⁵⁷ Household expenditures represented 83% of the country's total expenditures in higher education in 2004 (Brunner, 2009, p. 381). Moreover, by 2007, tuition in public universities accounted for 28% of the gross national income per capita – higher than in any OECD country – while tuition in private universities represented 32% (OECD & World Bank, 2009, p. 247).

⁵⁶ Interview with María José Lemaitre, Secretary, National Council of Higher Education (1990-1998). November 20, 2014.

⁵⁷ As a reference, the legally minimum monthly wage in Chile in 2003 was approximately \$170.

By the time protests erupted under Piñera in 2011, the OECD (2011, p. 232) found that 85% of spending on higher education in the country came from households, as opposed to the OECD average of 69%. For this reason, politicians, activists, and the media dubbed the country's higher education system "the most expensive in the world" (The Economist, 2011). Indeed, in an early-2011 report commissioned by the Chilean government, the World Bank warned about the default rates of early CAE borrowers,

As a young program, to date CAE has only a few thousand borrowers who have entered repayment. Nonetheless, 36% of these have already defaulted. Ultimately, half of all borrowers from this cohort will probably default. Fifty percent default is high by international standards, and CAE can do much better (Education Sector, Latin American & Caribbean Region, The World Bank, 2011, p. 9)

As one interviewee explained, the cost of education had an important effect on protests: "The issue of expectations [of attending college] created a synergy with the issue of the economic burden of higher education for families, and those two factors explain to a great extent the mobilizations."⁵⁸

Aggrieved Students Enter the System

Why did it take two decades for students to mobilize massively for financial reasons? In some cases, the implementation of the new financial system generated an immediate yet short-lived backlash. For example, in 1990, when the collection of tuition was handed over to a private bank, students at the Metropolitan University of Education

⁵⁸ Interview with Horacio Walker, Dean, School of Education, Diego Portales University. November 14, 2014.

Sciences protested by burning payment stubs in front of the rector's office.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, major protests did not break out until much later.

The main reason is that it took years for a sizable mass of students to be affected by the high cost of education. Chile went from having a predominantly urban, elite, young, and male student population to one with increasing gender, age, regional and socioeconomic diversity (Orellana, 2011, p. 87). Two factors made the increasingly diverse student population possible: growth in the number of institutions, and increased access to credit. Successive governments deregulated the education system and permitted it to expand rapidly. The number of recognized higher education institutions went from just 8 in 1980 to a peak of 302 in 1990, and then declined to 229 in 2003, and 165 in 2014 (CNED, 2014).

Increasing access to credit also played a vital role in the massification of higher education, especially in the second half of the 2000s. Basically, state-endorsed student loans have subsidized the demand for higher education. In 2005, President Ricardo Lagos' administration created the State-Endorsed Loan (CAE). A majority of the students who benefited from the CAE in 2010 belonged to the lowest income brackets, and most attended non-university institutions and the less selective post-reform universities (Durán, Jorquera, Pey, Riesco, & Mendoza, 2011, pp. 46–47). These students had difficulty adapting to the costs (tuition, transportation, and meals) associated with higher education.

⁵⁹ Interview with Alejandro Ormeño. Rector, Metropolitan University of Educational Sciences (1990–1994). October 30, 2014.

As Jonathan Serracino notes in the case of Alberto Hurtado University (a private university founded in 1997),

[i]f you diversify the student body [...] they become more first-generation and some demands begin to appear [...] that make sense because they affect students' daily lives [...] The University didn't have meal plan scholarships and was accepting people who didn't have money to buy food.⁶⁰


The result of these market-based, government-subsidized policies was that coverage increased steadily. Initially, the policies promoting access primarily benefited the segments of the upper and upper-middle classes that still had not entered the system. Then, in the late 1990s, these upper classes reached a saturation point at about 55% of the college-age population, and more students from middle and lower-middle class backgrounds began to attend college for the first time. Finally, in the mid-2000s, when the percentage of middle class college students reached 25% to 35% of the college-age population, the share of working class students also began to increase substantially (Orellana, 2011, p. 89).

Household survey data (Centro de Estudios MINEDUC, 2012, p. 16) illustrate the changes in the higher education net enrollment ratio (NER) between 1990 and 2011 by income decile in Chile (Figure 3.2). The richest decile increased its NER from 40.3 in 1990 to 62.9 in 2011. However, the most dramatic changes are found in the NER of the two poorest deciles. Indeed, college-age youths in these groups increased their participation in higher education by a factor of six and seven between 1990 and 2011, respectively. As a result, the poorest decile had a NER of 21.8 by 2011, the same as the

⁶⁰ Interview with Jonathan Serracino.

third richest decile in 1990. In terms of overall participation by decile, the poorest two deciles comprised 3% and 2% of higher education students in 1990, but by 2011 their share had increased to 5% and 7%, respectively. By contrast, the share of the college student population accounted for by the two highest income deciles decreased from 17% and 23% in 1990 to 14% each in 2011 (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2015a, 2015b).

Figure 3.2. Net Enrollment in Higher Education by Income Decile in Chile, 1990 and 2011



The meager public support offered for higher education was not enough to keep up with the dizzying pace of enrollment of poorer students. Reports find that, both nationwide (Durán et al., 2011) and in the Santiago Metropolitan region (Olavarria Gambi, Allende González, Oyandedel Sepúlveda, & Fernández Albornoz, 2010), lower income students are less afraid of incurring debt, and are more likely to take loans to pay


for college. Increased availability of credit, therefore, has had a direct effect on college enrollment.

Figure 3.3 shows the decline in mean public expenditure per college student between 1987 and 2009 (Arellano, 2011, p. 24), a period in which enrollment increased considerably. While the lowest amount was in 2007 (424,000 Chilean pesos), the amount spent per student in 2009 (437,000 pesos) when the gross enrollment ratio (GER)⁶¹ reached 59%, was less than half the amount spent in 1987 (897,000 pesos), when the GER reached about 18%. Thus, it was not until the mid-2000s that financial grievances affected a large segment of the college population. A former Communist Youth member, Iván Mlynarz, recounts that, in the mid-1990s, when he proposed free education, a University of Chile student replied,

[T]he free education that you're proposing would be financed by the state, and those resources are given by all Chileans, and that would mean that there would be a transfer of resources from the poorest to high-income people, who are the majority of those who study here (Muñoz Tamayo, 2011, p. 125)

⁶¹ The number of people of any age attending college as a proportion of the college-age population.

Figure 3.3. Public Expenditure per Student and Gross Enrollment Ratio, Chile 1987-2009



The situation had drastically changed fifteen years later. As one student leader puts it, students from less selective institutions became “proletarianized” as their socioeconomic background diversified, and began demanding system-wide changes to get more public support.⁶² As Deputy Giorgio Jackson explains, the neoliberal policies carried out in the country “generated an illusion” that “exploded” in 2011, leading to widespread protests by working and middle class students.⁶³ Similarly, Valparaíso Mayor Jorge Sharp argued:

The 2011 movement can’t be explained solely as a mobilization that was organized, carried out, and attended by people from the traditional universities. I participated in many demonstrations since I entered college, and in the

⁶² Interview with Julio Sarmiento.

⁶³ Interview with Giorgio Jackson, President, Pontifical Catholic University Student Federation (FEUC, 2010), Deputy (*Revolución Democrática*, 2014-), October 24, 2014.

demonstrations in 2005 related to funding, at the time about the CAE and about institutional accreditation, there were fewer people than nowadays. I believe that the social character of the conflict became broader, and that attitude came from the world of private universities [...] Without a doubt, I think that the role that that sector of the population played, when it entered college, was fundamental in terms of amplifying the mobilization⁶⁴

At the CONFECH, ⁶⁵ students from the regional public universities, which are less selective than their counterparts in Santiago and house a larger proportion of lower-income students, were also more vocal and radical in their positions (Fleet & Guzmán-Concha, 2016, p. 15).

By contrast, upper-class students – who had already accessed higher education and attended selective universities – did not have to take out loans to pay for their studies. They did not experience a financial grievance and, therefore, mobilized much less.⁶⁶ This resonates with the findings of other studies that students attending elite universities with upper-class student bodies did not protest and preferred to organize social events such as snowboarding contests (Fleet & Guzmán-Concha, 2016, p. 11) while their public and non-elite counterparts organized in the CONFECH were demonstrating.

Former Education Minister Sergio Bitar's description of the Concertación's reaction to the student movement in 2011 illustrates the relationship between loans-based enrollment and protest:

⁶⁴ Interview with Jorge Sharp, President, Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso Student Federation (FEPUCV, 2010), Mayor of Valparaíso (Movimiento Autonomista, 2016-). October 16, 2014.

⁶⁵ CONFECH is the Chilean national association of university student federations.

⁶⁶ Interview with Eugenio Guzmán, Dean, School of Government, Universidad del Desarrollo, September 11, 2014.

It generated a tremendous discussion. What did we do wrong? Why did it take us so long to take measures? On the other hand, the discussion was also that this was happening because of what we did, we allowed for the expansion of democracy and higher education. Had we not expanded higher education the way we did it, then the problem would not exist, so [the protests] were also caused by the social and democratic expansion of Chile in previous years.⁶⁷

Thus, although protests had been common for years, they only became very frequent and massive in 2011, when college became highly accessible yet financially onerous for students.

Party Linkages: Erosion under the Left, Absence under the Right

The relationship between ruling parties and college student organizations helps explain the timing of mobilizations. The ruling parties' linkages with students were strong in the first years of the Concertación governments, but they subsequently eroded (Garretón, 2005, p. 393). The rightwing Alianza coalition has always had a weaker presence in student politics, which explains why students mobilized in 2011 after the election of a president belonging to this coalition.

Figure 3.1, based on the Expert Survey discussed in Chapter Two, shows the evolution of organizational linkages in Chile between the presidencies of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle and the second administration of Michelle Bachelet. The results of the survey suggest that, while the Concertación was in power, college students' linkages were stronger with the parties in power than with those in the opposition. The Communist Party (PC) was for years part of the extra-parliamentary opposition and had strong ties to

⁶⁷ Interview with Sergio Bitar.

students,⁶⁸ but parties on the Center-Right and Right,⁶⁹ with weaker overall connections, were also in the opposition at the time. With each successive administration, however, the level of linkages between student organizations and ruling parties became weaker. One scholar who responded to the survey described the erosion of the relationship between the Concertación parties and organized students:

In the early 1990s, [the Concertación had] a stronger connection with student organizations (including party members in student leadership positions). As time passed, they have lost positions within the student movement until becoming currently quite relegated (compared to the hegemonic position they had during the transition).

Indeed, according to another expert, in this period “student mobilization becomes progressively disconnected from party membership.”

⁶⁸ As one expert explains, the Communist Party is the political party with the largest presence in student organizations, to the extent that it played an unstudied role in articulating the 2011 movement, and in incorporating private universities into a protest cycle for the first time, alongside traditional public universities.

According to another scholar, PC members “train student leaders, helped in making decisions, connect them with social struggles in other parts of the country, and with other social struggles outside of the educational realm.” Other experts also underscore the strong presence of the PC in colleges outside of Santiago, and in high school student organizations.

⁶⁹ One prominent exception, according to experts in the survey is UDI through its strong connections to the *gremialista* student organization at the Catholic University of Chile.

Table 3.1. Organizational Linkages Between Students and Political Parties in Chile, 1994-2015 (approximately)

| Presidency | Starting Date | Ending Date | Governing Coalition | Major Parties in Power | Linkages with Ruling Parties Score (Mean) | Linkages with Opposition Parties Score (Mean) |
|---|---------------|-------------|---------------------|------------------------|---|---|
| Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle | 3/11/94 | 3/11/00 | Concertación | DC, PS, PRSD, PPD | 3.9 | 3.0 |
| Ricardo Lagos | 3/11/00 | 3/11/06 | Concertación | DC, PS, PRSD, PPD | 3.7 | 3.1 |
| Michelle Bachelet | 3/11/06 | 3/11/10 | Concertación | DC, PS, PRSD, PPD | 3.6 | 2.6 |
| Sebastián Piñera | 3/11/10 | 3/11/14 | Alianza/Coalición | RN, UDI | 1.3 | 4.9 |
| Michelle Bachelet | 3/11/14 | Incumbent | Nueva Mayoría | Concertación, PC | 2.9 | 2.7 |
| <i>Country mean</i> | | | | | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| Source: Author's elaboration based on Expert Survey. DC: Christian Democratic Party; PS: Socialist Party; PRSD: Social Democrat Radical Party; PPD: Party for Democracy; RN: National Renewal; UDI: Independent Democratic Union; PC: Communist Party | | | | | | |

The situation changed drastically when the Center-Right Alianza coalition gained the presidency in 2010. During the Piñera administration, linkages with the government coalition reached its lowest point (score of 1.3), and linkages with the opposition became stronger than ever during the period analyzed (score of 4.9). According to the LASPD, this period of strong linkages with the opposition and weak linkages with the government coincides with the highest overall number of protest events, and of the largest protests, in Chile (see Figure 3.1). Then, when the Nueva Mayoría coalition (the old Concertación with the addition of the PC) rose to power in 2014, the linkage scores returned to the trends observed under the Concertación governments. As one expert relates, since the

2006 and 2011 mobilizations students “begin to express their connection with politics beyond conventional party membership.”

The Concertación began its rule with strong ties to students who participated in the mobilizations against the Pinochet regime. Beginning in 1990, the factions that competed in student politics tended to represent the national-level political parties.⁷⁰

Indeed, as one student leader of the 2011 movement notes,

I can’t deny the contribution that the political parties’ youth arms played in the process of recovering democracy. The first student federation that recovered its democratic character [during the dictatorship] was from the Catholic University of Valparaíso, and its first president was a Christian Democrat. And there was a very broad alliance, ranging from the Christian Democrats to the Revolutionary Left Movement [MIR]...and generally those who took leadership positions are now professional politicians, but at the time they were student leaders from the Concertación parties [...] The problem was that after 1990 they became too comfortable [*se acharcharon*]. This was the generation that some refer to as the “briefcase generation” because they were the ones chasing after important politicians holding their suitcases to see if they could get something⁷¹

In the early years after the return to democracy, the Concertación “downplayed mass mobilization in favor of elite-negotiated social and political pacts to mitigate the fears of conservative sectors” (Roberts, 1998, p. 141). This meant that student organizations linked to the Concertación were discouraged from pressing financial demands, which put their student supporters in an awkward situation between their classmates’ demands and their parties’ directives.⁷² In 1993,

⁷⁰ Interview with Claudio Orrego, President, FEUC (1990), December 4, 2014.

⁷¹ Interview with Jorge Sharp.

⁷² As one interviewee notes, one of the reasons the Concertación downplayed mobilization and did not support students’ financial demands in the 1990, , was that “the-powers-that-be [*poderes fácticos*] were really present, perhaps more publicly so than today. They were the military and Pinochet and the extortionist Right, there is no doubt about that, but there was also a way of doing politics, with the Concertación, that implemented changes only to the extent possible.” Interview with Jorge Sharp.

all student federations went through a crisis, caused by the mismanagement of the Concertación political youths. Student support for leaders, as represented in elections, reached unprecedented low levels, and throughout Chile only two student federations were left” (Moraga Valle, 2006, p. 197).

As one student leader observed,

Working as a Concertación leader was very unpleasant because you really had a conviction as a student leader about the state of education in Chile, so you were in the middle because you had to respond to your bases, to other leaders who were critical of the government...but you couldn't push too far in the opposite direction...you couldn't push too far because in a way it was also your government. If I demonstrate all week long I will harm the government.⁷³

Special envoys from the parties, who were typically former student leaders themselves, also impeded student efforts to organize mobilizations. A student leader from an independent political group describes the relationship between the Concertación and its student leaders in the following way:

They responded much more to pressures from the parties than from their own bases, and there was this logic, the same way the Right has these connections between companies and politics, where [leaders] go from one to the other. The Concertación federations were the same: they had [student federation] presidents one year and in one or two years these presidents became advisors to the Ministry of Education. They worked there and their task was to contact the federations as a kind of conflict managers. Strikebreakers, that was their role.⁷⁴

Some interviewees described how the presence of these brokers – who might linger outside of the meeting rooms where the CONFECH convened – influenced the decisions

⁷³ Interview with Carlos Rivera. President, University of Talca Student Federation (2000-2001). Department of Student Affairs Representative, Ministry of Education Higher Education Division (2003-2008). October 30, 2014.

⁷⁴ Interview with Nicolás Grau.

made by the Concertación-controlled student unions.⁷⁵ For example, in the unsuccessful 1999 student mobilizations to change the financial system,

the strategy of the leaders connected to the Concertación was an attempt to cause a break in the natural organization of students when they created CONFESUR by seceding from CONFECH to delegitimize it [because it was] dominated by the [extra-parliamentary] left. The acceptance by CONFESUR of the funds the government offered instead of the [CONFECH] proposal caused a serious problem (Moraga Valle, 2006, p. 230)

Another prominent example of parties demobilizing protests occurred during the 2006 *Revolución Pingüina*. The government was unable to thwart its emergence because the leaders of the high school student organizations that spearheaded the protests represented far-left and center-right opposition parties as well as the ruling Concertación (Donoso, 2013, p. 9). In other words, weaker (high school) student ties to the ruling Concertación facilitated the upsurge in mobilization. During the protests, however, the ruling Socialist and Radical parties managed to get their members elected to the presidencies of several student federations.⁷⁶ This helped bring an end to the demonstrations after the creation of a Presidential Advisory Council, which incorporated students and other social actors.

As time passed, linkages between the ruling Concertación and the students began to erode. As a former Concertación Education Minister explains, compared to the time of his tenure in the 1990s “now the renewal of party leaderships has disappeared, I think

⁷⁵ Interview with Marcos Lozano, President, Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María Student Federation (Santiago Campus, 2007-2009), November 24, 2015; Interview with Jaime Bellolio, President, FEUC (2005), Deputy (UDI, 2014-), March 3, 2015.

⁷⁶ Interview with Jonathan Serracino.

there is less party membership, and young people are more independent.”⁷⁷ In the 2000s, the ruling parties had a weak presence in the universities. Another Minister describes the diminished position of party-affiliated student leaders during the 2001 Mochilazo:

At the time there were student leaders, both in high schools and higher education, from the Concertación parties within the student movement. They were the main leaders and we reached agreements with them but they couldn’t handle their assemblies because they had to take the agreements and the whole assembly had to accept them. [The bases] did not accept representation by their leaders.⁷⁸

This does not mean, however, that students became depoliticized: the PC, for example, maintained strong linkages. Student organizations that were hostile to or had no connections with the government gained influence. It was students from the PC and new organizations such as *SurDa*, New University Left, and Autonomous Left, who provided resources and organized many of the mobilizations in the 2000s.⁷⁹ Indeed, several interviewees noted the gradual disappearance of the Concertación from the college scene and the subsequent political activation of students, this time without party affiliations.⁸⁰

Finally, when Sebastián Piñera was elected, the government lost virtually all connections to the major student organizations. As one interviewee described:

[T]he problem changes in 2011 because the government changes, and even if the government had deployed teams all over Chile the margin of political attention was much lower because anyone who represented the Center-Right vis-à-vis the student world would have had limited leeway. You could imagine how much they distrusted the Center-Right if they couldn’t even trust student leaders from the Concertación.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Interview with Ernesto Scheifelbein.

⁷⁸ Interview with Mariana Aylwin.

⁷⁹ Interview with Julio Lira, President, FECH (2002-2003). October 22, 2014.

⁸⁰ Interview with Sergio Bitar; interview with Claudio Orrego.

⁸¹ Interview with Carlos Rivera.

As a student leader of the conservative *gremialista* movement explained, the administration lacked the usual ties to students that could have prevented or curtailed protests.⁸² The groups still linked to the Concertación, now in the opposition, also had the opportunity to coalesce and in some cases lead the mobilizations against the government. Such was the case in the traditional Catholic University of Chile, where New University Action, a center-left organization, led the student federation and played a key role in the 2011 mobilizations. However, the people who turned the 2011 protests into a massive, unprecedented phenomenon were the recently incorporated, non-elite and unaffiliated students.⁸³ Although for the most part they did not stage protests within their own campuses due to institutional constraints (Bellei, Cabalin, & Orellana, 2014, pp. 429–430, 433; Fleet & Guzmán-Concha, 2016, pp. 12–13), they were responsible for swelling the ranks of the protestors in the marches and demonstrations occurring on the country’s main avenues and squares.⁸⁴

Weak linkages with the ruling parties thus help explain the outbreak of student protests in 2011. The majority of students were politically distant from Piñera. According to rightwing congressman Jaime Bellolio, the government tried to identify “the people who needed to be convinced and talked to in order to seek a legislative or policy exit” to student demands.⁸⁵ However, as longtime Concertación leader Sergio Bitar explains,

⁸² Interview with Diego Gómez. Student leader, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (2009-2011, *Gremialismo*). October 28, 2014.

⁸³ Interview with Andrés Fielbaum.

⁸⁴ Interview with Andrés Fielbaum.

⁸⁵ Interview with Jaime Bellolio.

We've always had people coming from the social movements; party leaders are connected to social leaders; by contrast, the Right doesn't have any capacity to dialogue...Therefore, [grievances] exacerbate with the Right, and then a conflict emerges.⁸⁶

Unlike more isolated episodes in the past, the student movement in 2011 had widespread support both in the traditional and newer universities. The latter have a higher proportion of students who come from lower-income families and have fewer connections to political parties (Palacios-Valladares, 2016, p. 16). In light of these factors, it is easy to understand why the 2011 movement began with a strike at Central University,⁸⁷ a private, post-reform institution whose students are mostly first generation (Fleet & Guzmán-Concha, 2016, p. 13; Kubal & Fisher, 2016, p. 230).

A Quantitative Test of Student Mobilization in Chile

In this section, I use data from the 2012 National Youth Survey (ENJ) by the Chilean National Youth Institute (INJUV, 2015). INJUV is the public organization in charge of youth policy, and it has conducted a nationwide survey of youths every three years since 1994. The 2012 ENJ provides a snapshot of a time when there were relatively high levels of student mobilization. It was conducted between May and August 2012, the target population being 15 to 29 year-olds. The sample was obtained through a multistage, probabilistic procedure.

The hypotheses about student mobilization presented in Chapter One are adapted here to fit the characteristics of the data used: individual college students in 2012 Chile.

⁸⁶ Interview with Sergio Bitar.

⁸⁷ Interview with Pablo Zenteno, President, Central University Student Federation (2008-2009). October 21, 2014.

This analysis follows an established agenda in social movement studies of identifying the determinants of mobilization using microdata. McAdam & Paulsen's (1993) study, for example, emphasizes the importance of preexisting social ties among college students to explain their participation in the 1964 Freedom Summer Project. More recent contributions emphasize the effect of interpersonal networks (Schussman & Soule, 2005) and economic and political development (Dalton, Van Sickle, & Weldon, 2009) on protest behavior using nationally representative survey data.

Because this section analyses individual protest participation, it does not make a distinction between protest size and frequency. Testing the hypothesis using microdata is important, however, because individual participation in protests is essential for both the frequency and size of protests. In other words, more individual participation leads to more frequent and larger mobilizations. Based on the particular features of the Chilean higher education system and the individual-level nature of the data used, the hypotheses about the effect on mobilization of financial and working-class grievances are adapted in this analysis in the following way:

Hypothesis 1. Students who incur debt are more likely to mobilize than those who do not.

Hypothesis 2. Working class students are more likely to mobilize than their middle- and upper class counterparts.

Hypothesis 3. Students with stronger ties to ruling parties are less likely to mobilize.

*Hypothesis 4. Students with stronger ties to opposition parties are more likely to mobilize.*⁸⁸

This analysis selected the college student respondents from the INJUV sample of Chilean youths. Three items in the survey – enrollment in higher education (23.22%), enrollment in specific types of higher education institutions (22.65%), and the respondent’s level of education – were used to define this subset. Unfortunately, not all respondents answered consistently across these questions. My solution was classifying respondents as students if they responded simultaneously that they were enrolled in higher education; attended university, vocational or technical college; and that their current level of education was incomplete college. This was done to exclude respondents who had already completed a college degree. The size of this subsample is 1,501 students. The surveys’ sampling weights make the sample representative of the entire Chilean 15-29 year old population so they are not appropriate for the subsample, and are not used.


Dependent variable: protest participation

Participation in protests was measured in the ENJ by asking about participation in three types of mobilizations in the past twelve months: participation in demonstrations (38.8% of positive responses), strikes (31.5%), and sit-ins (17.8%). All “yes” answers were summed to create an index ranging from a value of zero (no participation) to three (participation in all types of protests). The index has Cronbach’s alpha of 0.77,

⁸⁸ However, as discussed below, the way the ENJ asked about connections with political parties only allows for the creation of a proxy variable for party linkages, based on ideology.

suggesting that the protest participation index has an acceptable level of internal consistency. The subsample size decreases by only ten respondents once those who did not answer any of the protest participation questions are excluded. Figure 3.4 shows that 805 respondents reported not participating in any type of protest; 280 participated in one type; 189 in two types; and 218 said they participated in all three types of protests. Although the ENJ did not ask specifically about protest participation for education causes, it asked about protesting during a time of high education-related mobilization, which reduces the potential bias caused by participation in other causes.

Figure 3.4. Distribution of Protest Participation Index



Socioeconomic Sector

The ENJ asked respondents to identify their household income bracket but almost 35% declined to answer or said they did not know. However, the ENJ includes a measure of the respondent's socioeconomic sector (SES). This measure, which is widely used in Chile, classifies respondents based on their head of household's education and employment status (ADIMARK, 2000). For example, having a graduate degree and a managerial position denotes higher incomes and, therefore, a higher SES. The SES categories are ABC1 (highest), C2, C3, D, and E (lowest). In the case of students whose head of household was unemployed or retired, the ENJ asked them about their households' ownership of a series of consumer products to determine their SES.

Higher Education Funding

The survey asked students about their sources of funding for college. The options were partial or full scholarships, four types of loans, family funds, own funds, and other sources. These options were grouped into four different, non-mutually exclusive variables: scholarships, loans, self-funding, and other sources. Each of these four variables can take three values ("Yes," "No," "Doesn't know"). The "Loans" variable directly tests H1, while the other survey items are included to control for the effect of using other sources of funding.

Party Linkages

The ENJ does not include a variable that captures party linkages directly.⁸⁹ The alternative used in the regressions is identification with what the survey calls “political sectors.” The survey’s item categories are “Right,” “Center-Right,” “Center,” “Center-Left,” “Left,” “None,” and “Doesn’t know.” Ideology is a relatively strong determinant of party identification in Chile (Luna & Altman, 2011, p. 11) so it is a reasonable, albeit incomplete, indicator of closeness to or distance from parties. For example, students who identify with the Center, Center-Left, Left or no political sector when Piñera was president should have weaker government linkages than those who identified with the right or center-right. I associate both the Center-right and the Right with the Piñera administration because his government included both center-right politicians (such as Piñera and other RN members) and right-wing politicians: members of the right-wing UDI filled several key cabinet positions, including Education Minister. Studies, however, have shown that leftist ideology is an important predictor of protest participation (Dalton et al., 2009, p. 60). Nevertheless I would expect the main distinction not to be between leftist students and everyone else, but rather to be between government and opposition supporters. The identification variable used has, therefore, the following four values:

⁸⁹ Membership in political parties, a relatively stringent measure of student-party linkages, is rare among college students: according to the ENJ, less than 1.9% (28 respondents, 11 of whom said they had leadership positions within their parties) reported being a member of a political party. Categorizing students by party membership and political identification (not shown) suggests that student membership in the opposition sector (Center, Center-Left, and Left, 17 respondents) is the only party membership category that has a statistically significant (and positive) effect on the protest participation index. Membership in government sector political parties (Right and Center-Right, 3 respondents) does not have a significant effect on student mobilization. However, the significance and relative magnitude of the rest of the independent variables – including political sector identification – remain unchanged. Given the very small number of affirmative answers to this question, the political identification variable is used instead below.

Government (Right, Center-Right), Opposition (Center, Center-Left, Left), Identification with No Sector, and Don't Know.

It is nonetheless difficult to know whether this variable is measuring the impact of mere ideology or party linkages or both. Variance in the ideology of the executive would be necessary to properly disentangle the effect of ideology from party linkages, but unfortunately this survey was only carried out during the Piñera administration. Additionally, the ENJ does not measure the student's organizational resources or capture the organizational aspects of mobilization.⁹⁰ These are important limitations of this study that future research may be able to resolve.

Control Variables

Educational affiliation should also shape participation. The type of higher education institutions that students attend is important because of the role resources play in mobilization (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, & Brady, 1995). Arguably, the starkest differences are between university and non-university (Professional Institute and Technical School) students.⁹¹ The former have, in many cases, well-organized unions, which provide resources and networks that facilitate mobilization; the latter, by contrast, are less organized because their institutions often discourage and even persecute their efforts to organize (Levy, 1991, p. 150). A university/non-university variable is used to assess this effect.

⁹⁰ For an overview of the evolution of students' organizational resources see Palacios-Valladares (2016).

⁹¹ Interview with Felipe Ramírez. Secretary General, FECH (2012). November 11, 2014.

Participation in social organizations is also assessed because these groups provide students with resources to mobilize. The survey asked about participation in twelve types of groups or associations. A participation/no participation variable is added. The availability of symbolic resources and strategies in the capital, Santiago, has also been emphasized in the literature (Marín Naritelli, 2014) so a Metropolitan Region dummy is also included.

Recent studies have argued that social media use has an independent effect on mobilization (Enjolras, Steen-Johnsen, & Wollebaek, 2013; Lin & Su, 2015). To evaluate this effect, an ordinal variable was created based on a question about frequency of Facebook and Twitter use. The categories are “never,” “almost never,” “at least once a month,” “at least once a week,” “every day,” and “doesn’t know.” Finally, gender and age are also included as controls.

Results and Robustness

The dependent variable is assumed to be an ordinal scale so the hypotheses were tested using ordinal logistic regression models. The ordinal logistic model provides a better fit for the data when its distribution is limited and takes few values (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013, p. 99).⁹² Table 3.2 presents two ordinal logistic models: model I includes only the variables of interest, and model II adds the control variables. The significance level and direction of the effect of most of the explanatory variables in Model I remain

⁹² Indeed, compared to the equivalent negative binomial model, Model II in Table 3.2 has much smaller Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC), suggesting that it has a better goodness-of-fit. Brant tests also show that Model II does not violate the parallel regression assumptions and hence is appropriate

unchanged after adding the controls in Model II. Important exceptions are all but one of the socioeconomic group categories (compared to group E), which become statistically significant *after* adding the control variables. The rest of this discussion focuses on Model II.

Table 3.2. Ordered Logistic Regressions Predicting Protest Behavior

| | Model I | | Model II | |
|--|------------|---------|------------|----------|
| | Odds Ratio | (SE) | Odds Ratio | (SE) |
| Socioeconomic Group | | | | |
| ABC1 | 0.637 | (0.317) | 0.366** | (0.187) |
| C2 | 0.783 | (0.374) | 0.503 | (0.245) |
| C3 | 0.558 | (0.266) | 0.401* | (0.195) |
| D | 0.500 | (0.240) | 0.403* | (0.196) |
| Funding Source | | | | |
| Self | 0.982 | (0.131) | 0.973 | (0.133) |
| Don't know | 0.669 | (0.323) | 0.668 | (0.325) |
| Scholarships | 1.540*** | (0.191) | 1.466*** | (0.188) |
| Don't know | 3.709** | (2.052) | 3.571** | (1.989) |
| Loans | 1.803*** | (0.223) | 1.520*** | (0.193) |
| Don't know | 0.716 | (0.424) | 0.638 | (0.381) |
| Other Sources | 2.227*** | (0.679) | 2.512*** | (0.779) |
| Don't know | 1.349 | (0.282) | 1.356 | (0.292) |
| Identification with Political Sectors | | | | |
| Opposition | 3.655*** | (0.667) | 3.939*** | (0.730) |
| No Sector | 1.596*** | (0.276) | 1.828*** | (0.323) |
| Don't know | 1.120 | (0.305) | 1.537 | (0.434) |
| Resources | | | | |
| University Student | | | 2.083*** | (0.262) |
| Participation in Social Groups | | | 1.612*** | (0.173) |
| Female | | | 0.803** | (0.0851) |
| Age | | | 0.949** | (0.0196) |
| Metropolitan Region | | | 0.704** | (0.101) |
| Facebook and Twitter Use | | | | |
| Never | | | 1.561 | (1.445) |
| Almost never | | | 1.421 | (0.514) |
| At least once a month | | | 2.149 | (1.283) |
| At least once a week | | | 0.766* | (0.121) |
| Don't know | | | 0.751 | (0.177) |
| Observations | 1,491 | | 1,491 | |
| Standard errors in parentheses | | | | |
| *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | | |

As expected (Hypothesis 2), there is an important association between protest participation and SES. Compared to group E (the poorest group), all other groups, except C2, are significantly less likely to mobilize. For example, compared to the poorest group,

students in the richest segment (ABC1) have about 63% lower odds of protesting. Comparisons between other socio-economic groups (e.g., between C1 and C2) do not achieve statistical significance in most cases, nor do comparisons between groups achieve significance when SES is dichotomized or trichotomized (not shown). This suggests that the most important class distinction is between poor students, who are more likely to protest, and everyone else.

It was also hypothesized that students who cannot pay for their education out of their pockets are more likely to mobilize than those who can (Hypothesis 1). Indeed, having loans increases the odds of mobilizing by 52%. Interestingly, having scholarships also increases the odds of protesting by almost 47%, and declining to respond to this item increases it by more than 257%. It may be that many respondents who refused to answer the question actually had scholarships but preferred not to mention it due to social desirability bias. Students with scholarships may be more likely to protest because they are more likely to be poor,⁹³ and they may be more aware of the high cost of the education, even though they do not incur debt. Additionally, students with scholarships may also be more likely to protest because they fear that neoliberal education reforms might eliminate their scholarships. Using other sources of funding is also positively associated with participating in protests. This was an open-ended question, which in most cases included other types of loans and scholarships not listed in the survey.

⁹³ According to the ENJ, more than 43% of students in the lowest SES had scholarships, while in the case of the highest SES students, less than 13% did.

The hypotheses about the effect of linkages are also supported. Compared to identifying with government sectors (Right and Center-Right), students who identify with opposition sectors (Center, Center-Left, and Left) have almost 294% higher odds of participating in protests. Even those who said they do not identify with any political sector have approximately 82% higher odds of protesting, compared to students identifying with the government. Disaggregating the Opposition category (not shown) demonstrates that, compared to students who identify with the government, even students identifying with the political Center have about 94% higher odds of mobilizing. These results, therefore, support the hypothesized negative effect of stronger linkages with ruling parties on student mobilization (Hypothesis 3). On the other hand, when using Opposition as the reference category (not shown) all the other categories are significantly less likely to mobilize. For example, compared to identifying with the opposition, government identification is associated with almost 75% lower odds of protesting; students identifying with no sector also have about 54% lower odds of mobilizing. These results confirm the expected mobilizing effect of stronger linkages with the opposition (Hypothesis 4).

Some control variables were also statistically significant. University students, compared to those attending other higher education institutions, had about 108% higher odds of participating in protests. This finding supports the argument, made by scholars in the 1980s and 1990s, that institutional diversification deters mobilization (Brunner, 1986; Levy, 1991). Participating in social organizations is positively associated with protesting. By contrast, being female and being older are negatively associated with mobilization.

Against expectations, living in the Metropolitan Region is negatively associated with protest participation.

Contrary to other studies of social media and student protest in Chile (Scherman, Arriagada, & Valenzuela, 2015; Valenzuela, Arriagada, & Scherman, 2012), the analysis finds only partial support for the claim that Facebook and Twitter use has a significant positive association with participating in protests. Indeed, the only statistically significant result is that, compared to everyday use, using social media at least once a week is associated with approximately 23% lower odds of mobilizing. Dichotomizing social media use (everyday use versus less than everyday use, not shown) does not make its effect on mobilization statistically significant.

The robustness of the results of the ordered logistic regressions is assessed by disaggregating the protest participation index. In Table 3.3, I use logistic regressions to examine how the same variables affect participation in the three protest categories: strikes, demonstrations, and sit-ins. For the most part, the size, direction and significance level of the effects of the independent variables are similar. Important exceptions are the SES variables, which are statistically significant for participating in demonstrations and sit-ins but not in strikes; also, using loans is significantly and positively correlated with participating in strikes and demonstrations but not with participating in sit-ins. The results of the logistic models hence support the hypotheses that socioeconomic sector, indebtedness, and party linkages shape protest participation but that their effects vary by tactic.

Table 3.3. Logistic Regressions Predicting Protest Behavior by Protest Type

| | Strike | | Demonstration | | Sit In | |
|--|------------|----------|---------------|----------|------------|----------|
| | Odds Ratio | (SE) | Odds Ratio | (SE) | Odds Ratio | (SE) |
| Socioeconomic Group | | | | | | |
| ABC1 | 0.580 | (0.360) | 0.327* | (0.188) | 0.222** | (0.146) |
| C2 | 0.852 | (0.504) | 0.436 | (0.240) | 0.345* | (0.211) |
| C3 | 0.784 | (0.463) | 0.288** | (0.158) | 0.290** | (0.178) |
| D | 0.893 | (0.526) | 0.304** | (0.167) | 0.282** | (0.173) |
| Funding Source | | | | | | |
| Self | 0.864 | (0.135) | 1.183 | (0.181) | 0.972 | (0.183) |
| Don't know | 0.559 | (0.304) | 1.329 | (0.722) | 0.430 | (0.254) |
| Scholarships | 1.485*** | (0.220) | 1.476*** | (0.211) | 1.397* | (0.251) |
| Don't know | 3.030* | (1.867) | 2.912* | (1.791) | 3.151* | (2.102) |
| Loans | 1.527*** | (0.223) | 1.608*** | (0.227) | 1.277 | (0.226) |
| Don't know | 0.713 | (0.475) | 0.458 | (0.308) | 1.293 | (0.929) |
| Other Sources | 2.360** | (0.870) | 3.046*** | (1.139) | 1.701 | (0.728) |
| Don't know | 1.651** | (0.390) | 1.080 | (0.254) | 1.551 | (0.416) |
| Identification with Political Sectors | | | | | | |
| Opposition | 3.563*** | (0.778) | 3.935*** | (0.806) | 4.188*** | (1.197) |
| No Sector | 1.717** | (0.362) | 1.847*** | (0.359) | 1.961** | (0.557) |
| Don't know | 1.547 | (0.509) | 2.037** | (0.611) | 0.938 | (0.458) |
| University Student | 2.305*** | (0.346) | 1.695*** | (0.232) | 2.988*** | (0.611) |
| Participation in Social Groups | 1.565*** | (0.194) | 1.570*** | (0.184) | 1.394** | (0.211) |
| Female | 0.930 | (0.114) | 0.759** | (0.0887) | 0.748** | (0.111) |
| Age | 0.967 | (0.0227) | 0.951** | (0.0212) | 0.941** | (0.0276) |
| Metropolitan Region | 0.876 | (0.144) | 0.686** | (0.108) | 0.738 | (0.155) |
| Facebook and Twitter Use | | | | | | |
| Never | 2.954 | (2.828) | 0.818 | (0.940) | 3.089 | (3.680) |
| Almost never | 2.093* | (0.874) | 1.834 | (0.744) | 0.411 | (0.310) |
| At least once a month | 1.201 | (0.833) | 3.285* | (2.116) | 3.031 | (2.143) |
| At least once a week | 0.785 | (0.143) | 0.675** | (0.118) | 0.848 | (0.192) |
| Don't know | 0.707 | (0.188) | 0.778 | (0.193) | 1.241 | (0.359) |
| Observations | 1,496 | | 1,499 | | 1,493 | |
| Standard errors in parentheses | | | | | | |
| *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | | | | |

The different levels of personal costs required to participate in each protest type may explain differences in the effects by tactic. For example, participating in a college strike has relatively few personal repercussions, which could explain why social class has no statistically significant effect on it; by contrast, participating in a sit-in, which involves

living inside the school for an extended period under threat of eviction is rare except among the most ideologically driven student activists.

Postestimation

Fitting Model II on Table 3.2 (full model with ordered logistic regression), I estimate the predicted probabilities of the different categories of protest participation.⁹⁴ Figure 3.5 shows the predicted probabilities of the different levels of protest participation by each of the five SES categories. For example, the probability of participating in no protest activities is about 58% for students who belong to the richest SES category, and 14% for student belonging to the poorest SES category. Conversely, the predicted probabilities of participating in all three types of protests are lowest (10%) in the richest SES category and highest (24%) in the poorest SES category. This further confirms the important positive effect that working class status has on student mobilization.

⁹⁴ The rest of the variables are used at their means. All the results are statistically significant.

Figure 3.5 Predicted Probabilities of Protest Participation by Socioeconomic Sector, with 95% CIs.





Figure 3.6 shows the predicted probability the protest participation categories by loan use. It is important to note that the predicted probability of participating is higher for students who have loans for all the participation categories (participating in one, two and all types of protests). For example, the predicted probability of participating in all three types of protests is about 15% when using loans, and 11% when not taking out one. By contrast, the predicted probability of participating in no events is higher (about 58%) for those students not using loans than for those incurring debt (approximately 47%). These

results corroborate the positive effect that financial grievances in the form of loan use have on participating in protests.⁹⁵

Figure 3.6 Predicted Probabilities of Protest Participation by Loan Use, with 95% CIs




Finally, Figure 3.7 shows the predicted probabilities of each level of participation in protests by political sector identification. Overall, the predicted probability of not participating in any protests is much lower for those who identify with the opposition (about 39%) than for those identifying with government sectors (close to 71%). The opposite is true when they participate in at least one protest: for example, the predicted probability the predicted probability of participating in one type of protest is 15% for

⁹⁵ The results also suggest that people who declined to answer the question behaved similarly to those who do not take loans.

students who identify with government sectors, but is close to 23% for those students identifying with the opposition. Thus, these predicted probabilities demonstrate the negative effect on protesting of having strong (ideological) connections to parties in power, and the mobilizing effect of having stronger linkages with opposition parties.

Figure 3.7 Predicted Probabilities of Protest Participation by Political Sector Identification, with 95% CIs



Conclusion

This chapter shows how differences in social class, funding, and linkages to governing parties lead to different levels of protest participation among college students in Chile. The quantitative analyses demonstrate that working class students, students who

take out education loans, and those who have weak programmatic connections to governing parties are more likely to protest. While previous studies using survey data have shown education is a key factor in protest participation (Dalton et al., 2009; Schussman & Soule, 2005), this article contributes to this line of research by showing *how* education shapes mobilization.

Qualitative evidence sheds light on the ways these factors lead to more frequent and larger student mobilization. Over time, neoliberal reforms caused significant cost increases while also expanding the number of working class students who could not afford the rising fees. Moreover, in 2011 a right-wing coalition with weak organizational student linkages came to power, and this government, unlike its predecessors, could not coopt them or credibly channel their demands. Thus, following Hanagan's (1998) typology of movement-party relationships, student organizations and political parties in Chile have tended to go from close articulation and permeation, to ad-hoc alliances, and more recently to independence and competition. Neoliberal higher education policies were, therefore, responsible for both creating a grievance and increasing the population affected by it, while weak government and strong opposition linkages were behind the timing of the large and frequent mobilizations that occurred during this period. In other words, changes in grievances and party linkages explain why, as Mayol & Azócar (2011) note, social discontent increased in Chile since 1990 but it only ceased to be tolerated in 2011.

Although it is not the main focus of this chapter, the explanations used to explain the rise of student mobilization in Chile also explain its subsequent decline. One report

found that in 2015, college students participated in 42 events, a sharp drop from the peak of 143 in 2011 (Observatorio de Medios y Movimientos Sociales Universidad de La Frontera, 2015, p. 22). Since Bachelet's reelection in 2014, the government has used its ties to students to prevent mobilization (Segovia, 2014), leading to a "crisis" in the movement (Danton, Guzmán, & Hillman, 2016). According to one scholar who responded to the expert survey, her second term can be described "as a period of cooptation of the student leadership, particularly through the incorporation of the Communist Party in the government and the hiring of student leaders." Regarding the effect of financial grievances, in 2011, the student movement was characterized by its ability to convene working class and private college students, who were particularly distressed by the neoliberal system in place. In 2016, lower income students obtained government-sponsored free funding at accredited institutions, so now they may be wary of foregoing public funding to mobilize and interrupt the academic terms. Recent student mobilization has, therefore, had problems because of its past achievements (Disi Pavlic, 2016). Thus, under the current administration, without the common motivation of financial grievances, only the most driven students participate in protests, under threat of cooptation by the government, and with little opposition support.

Chapter Four: Student Mobilization In Peru

Peruvian college students played a major role in the successful mobilizations against the Fujimori dictatorship in the late 1990s. They coordinated with other civil society actors and even spearheaded the multitudinous protests that resulted in Fujimori's resignation after his fraudulent reelection in 2000. Since then, however, students in Peru have not recovered their former prominence in the country's contentious politics, which have involved conflicts between local communities and mining companies. What explains variation in the size and frequency of student mobilizations in Peru?

The question becomes even more puzzling when the Peruvian and Chilean cases are contrasted. The authoritarian governments in Chile and Peru enacted market-friendly policies in higher education, which their democratic successors have maintained. In both countries, organized students have progressively become estranged from the major traditional parties, and even more so in Peru. However, mass reactions by students to these policies have taken years to emerge, and have been more pronounced in Chile than in Peru. Analyzing the Peruvian case also breaks with a general tendency in the literature on student protests to focus on cases of high mobilization like Chile (Cummings, 2015; Fleet & Guzmán-Concha, 2016; Kubal & Fisher, 2016; Palacios-Valladares, 2016; Palacios-Valladares, 2016; Somma, 2012; Vommaro, 2013), Colombia (M. C. García, 2012; Vommaro, 2013), Argentina (Palacios-Valladares, 2016; Vommaro, 2013), Mexico (Alonso, 2013; Galindo & González, 2013; Vommaro, 2013), and Uruguay (Palacios-Valladares, 2016). With few exceptions (Barrenechea, 2014; Chávez Granadino, 1999; Chávez, 2015a; L. García & Vela, 2015), few works have analyzed Peruvian student

politics and protests. Furthermore, analyzing the Peruvian case allows the dissertation to avoid selecting cases on the dependent variable (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994)

In this chapter, I argue that the differences in mobilization between Chile and Peru can be attributed to a great extent to the relative absence of financial grievances among Peruvian college students. To support this argument, the chapter explores the ways changes in higher education policy and student-party linkages explain student mobilization in Peru since the country's return to democracy in 2000. The case study draws evidence from primary and secondary sources, and from more than twenty-five semi-structured elite interviews carried out in Lima between February and May of 2015. Interviewees include student leaders from public and private universities, government and party officials, and residents of Lima and as well as other parts of Peru.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section discusses student politics and the general political situation during the Fujimori regime (1990-2000) in order to contextualize the subsequent democratic period. The second section discusses the still incomplete incorporation of working class students in the country since 1990. The third section explains the relative absence of financial grievances caused by the low cost of higher education and the presence of payment scales in most institutions. The fourth section discusses student-party linkages in Peru since 1990, describing their relative decline and the overall weakness of party organizations in the country. The fifth section presents two additional factors, which are present in Peru but absent in Chile, that may also explain the low frequency of student protests although these factors play a lesser role than financial grievances. The final section concludes.

Student participation in Peru before and after the Fujimori regime

Peruvian university students were important actors in the mobilizations for democracy in the 1990s during the dictatorship of President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). Student organizations at public universities were suppressed by the regime but they had close ties to and supported working class actors and organizations in working class neighborhoods that protested against Fujimori.⁹⁶ Meanwhile, students from some private universities had a leading role in the demonstrations against Fujimori, given the dictatorship's crackdowns on "subversives" that affected their public university counterparts. Indeed, the 1997 demonstrations against the regime's removal of judges from the Constitutional Court, the first large protest against Fujimori, was essentially "a student march" (Chávez Granadino, 1999; Panfichi & Coronel, 2014).⁹⁷ Student federations, along with other sectors of civil society and some political parties, also led and participated in large numbers at the *Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos*, which gathered 300,000 demonstrators in Lima against Fujimori's reelection in 2000 (Panfichi & Coronel, 2014).

Student mobilization, however, decreased after the return to democracy in 2000. According to Garay & Tanaka (2009:80),⁹⁸ students participated in almost twelve percent of all social protests in Peru between 1995 and 2000 (361 protests); by contrast, between 2001 and 2006 they were involved in only 5 percent of all events (225 protests). Their

⁹⁶ Interview with Marité Bustamante, President, National University of San Marcos Law Student Center (2010); City of Lima councilmember (2011-2015). May 5, 2015.

⁹⁷ Interview with Alejandra Alayza, President Pontifical Catholic University of Peru Student Federation (FEPUC, 1999). May 11, 2015.

⁹⁸ These figures include both higher education and secondary students.

study also suggests that the high levels of student participation during the dictatorship were related to demands for democracy. Indeed, as Muller, Dietz, & Finkel, (1991 p. 1279) note, in the 1980s and early 1990s, “[a]mong university students in Peru, alienation from the political system is by far the most relevant” kind of grievance. As political demands were made in almost three quarters of the events with student participants and was the most common type of demand; after 2000, political demands became the second most common type after administrative demands, and were made in less than one quarter of the events with student participants.

Figure 4.1. Number of Protest Events with College Student Participants in Peru, 2000, 2011




Figure 4.1, using LASPD data for Peru, shows that student mobilizations have been less frequent and smaller than in Chile. In terms of the total number of protest events, the frequency began to increase in 2008, although college students also protested

relatively frequently in 2000, when linkages with the government were very weak under Fujimori. Regarding large protests, their number never exceeds that of 2000 (15 protests), and become relatively rare afterwards. Three factors explain in part the increase in the number of protest events after 2007: first, attempts to change regulations concerning college faculty in 2008 caused an unusual increase in the number of events supporting professors' demands;⁹⁹ second, government efforts to decrease support for students (for example, by increasing student bus fares) after 2008 resulted in backlashes across the country;¹⁰⁰ finally, as discussed below, linkages with ruling parties were also relatively weak during the administrations of Presidents Alan García and Ollanta Humala.

The relatively minor role of Peruvian students in contentious politics becomes more evident when their participation is contrasted with that of their Chilean counterparts. Between 2000 and 2011 college students took part in an average of 16 mobilizations in Peru; meanwhile students in Chile participated in 38.4 protest events per year. In terms of large protests, Peruvian students participated in approximately 5.6 events with more than 1,000 participants while Chilean pupils were involved in about 13.4 events yearly.¹⁰¹

Since the return to democracy, higher education students have played a minor role in social protests in Peru. Most social movements in Peru since 2000 have been limited, local and short-lived (Panfichi & Coronel, 2014: 51-56; Remy, 2010). The majority of the

⁹⁹ According to the LASPD, 26% of all events making college faculty demands in Peru occurred in 2008.

¹⁰⁰ 89% of the events in Peru making support demands occurred after 2007, and 54% took place just in 2008.

¹⁰¹ See Figures 2.1 and 2.3 in Chapter Two.

protests have been against the policies of local or regional governments and the implementation of mining projects (Arce, 2014). The demands have been mostly locally and environmentally-centered, and the participating actors local communities and indigenous groups.

When they have mobilized, students have often participated in events for causes other than their own. Their participation in mobilizations also tends to be sporadic and in reaction to specific events or policies.¹⁰² For example, during the *Baguazo* in 2009, when Amazonian indigenous groups' protests against oil drilling in their lands resulted in the deaths of dozens of policemen and protestors, thousands of people in the main march spontaneously against the violence, including some student collectives.¹⁰³ Protests about institution-specific issues (including corruption among university authorities, delays in construction projects, and problems with examinations) were also prominent.¹⁰⁴ According to the LASPD, this type of demand was observed in 27% of all Peruvian protest events, a higher prevalence than in Chile (12% of all events).¹⁰⁵

Higher education students have played a role in some of the other relevant protest events since 2000. These mobilizations includes the protests against Keiko Fujimori's presidential 2011 campaign, the "*No a Keiko*" movement; the 2012 mobilizations against

¹⁰² Interview with Ricardo Cuenca, Director, Institute for Peruvian Studies (IEP); Peruvian Ministry of Education (MINEDU) National Council of Education (CNE) member. February 25, 2015; interview with Marité Bustamante.

¹⁰³ Interview with Lilia Ramírez, student leader, PUCP; lawyer, Legal Defense Institute (IDL). March 3, 2015.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Julio Cáceda, student leader, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (PUCP). February 26, 2015.

¹⁰⁵ When all countries in the LASPD are considered, demands related to institution-specific problems were made in 29% of all events.

the Conga mining project in Cajamarca; the rallies against the *Repartija* (“Carve-up”) in 2013, when it was discovered that a group of congresspersons had negotiated behind closed doors the appointment of several important government positions; the mid-2014 protests against compulsory membership in private pension funds;¹⁰⁶ and the marches in Lima between December of 2014 and January of 2015 against the “*Ley Pulpín*,”¹⁰⁷ which reduced the job benefits of young adults (Chávez, 2015b; L. García & Vela, 2015).

What all of these cases of protest have in common is that, although students played a significant role in them, all of them were essentially reactive and defensive mobilizations – student protesters lacked a mid- or long term agenda.¹⁰⁸ In the words of an interviewee, “students mobilize by negation, not by action.”¹⁰⁹ Also, the demands they advanced usually belonged to or benefited other groups, and were not directly related to students as a social group. They acted in support of and in conjunction with other social groups and political parties. In addition, most student participants and leaders came from middle and upper middle-class backgrounds, and belonged to elite private schools and the public universities, which have a tradition of student politics and mobilization. Therefore, although student mobilization has slightly increased since 2000,¹¹⁰ at the national level

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Álvaro Vidal, student leader, PUCP and National University of San Marcos (UNSM). May 13, 2015.

¹⁰⁷ “Pulpín” comes from a brand of fruit juice named “Pulp,” which is aimed at children and comes in a colorful, odd-shaped container. The word “chibolo” (boy, youngster) was added to create the expression “chibolo pulpín,” which refers to inexperienced, wholesome, naïve young people (“Conoce de dónde proviene el término ‘chibolo pulpín’,” 2014).

¹⁰⁸ Interview with César Ames, President, UNMSM Social Sciences Student Union (2014). March 12, 2015.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Luis Esparza, student leader, PUCP and UNMSM. May 5, 2015.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Michael Ortiz, President, Federation of Peruvian Students (FEP, 2012-2015). March 3, 2015.

“the student movement is practically nonexistent. Education demands have not been raised since the mid-twentieth century, and the largest mobilizations manage to gather with much effort ten or fifteen thousand people around current national issues” (Chávez, 2015a: 1-2).

Policies, politics, and protests under Fujimori

A brief analysis of the previous period, the dictatorship of Alberto Fujimori – the so-called “*Fujimorato*” – is necessary because the actions carried out by this regime had a lasting effect on Peru. Fujimori’s regime began in 1990 when he was democratically elected but became authoritarian in 1992 when he staged a self-coup, and ended in 2000 when he fled to Japan amid accusations of corruption and human rights violations. The Fujimorato had a major impact on the Peruvian higher education system, the party system, and on students’ organizational resources.

Under Fujimori, the Peruvian higher education system became larger and more private, as the number of private institutions outgrew the number of public ones. The austerity and neoliberal reforms carried out in this period, known as the “Fuji Shock” (Brooke, 1990), aimed at liberalizing the economy in general (Murakami, 2007), including the higher education system (Cuenca, 2014: 483-483). In 1996, Fujimori passed legislative decree 882, which instituted the right of individuals to create new institutions, and specified that these could be for profit, and that the role of the state through the Ministry of Education was only to supervise the quality of private institutions. These reforms paved the way for the relatively passive role the state played in higher education

and for more household spending in higher education, as increases in enrollment have occurred through the expansion of the private sector.

The Peruvian party system, which was discredited after the economic crisis and the political violence of the 1980s, collapsed indefinitely during the Fujimori regime. Although parties legally existed, the dictatorship used clientelism, cooptation and repression to suppress the opposition (Panfichi & Coronel, 2014: 37, 39-40). Whereas in the 1980s a handful of parties attracted the great majority of votes election after election, beginning in the 1990s these parties lost most of their electoral support. They were replaced in most regions by local movements that were set up in an ad-hoc fashion before every election (Levitsky, 1999: 86-87). This was mirrored at the level of student politics with the disappearance of the university wings of political parties, which were common until the 1980s and 1990s.¹¹¹

Violence against members of student unions (where extremist groups were supposed to have supporters), and the military occupation of several campuses undermined the ability of students of the most important universities to organize. Thus, the policies and actions carried out during the “*Fujimorato*” set the basis for low levels of student mobilization in the future. For example, the military intervened in the National University of San Marcos and disbanded its student federation –students organized themselves by department or major but the university-wide federation did not reemerge until 2015 (twenty-five years after its dissolution).

¹¹¹ Interview with José Távara, Economics Department Academic Director, PUCP. February 25, 2015.

The higher education system in Peru: incomplete inclusion

The higher education policies enacted during the Fujimori regime gave the private sector the responsibility of increasing access to higher education. The main result of this policy has been that private sector institutions have grown faster than public ones, and now most of the student population attends private universities. These policies were only slightly changed after Fujimori, resulting in the “inexistence of a higher education system and the inexistence of [public] policies for this sector, which generates an explosive and disorderly growth” (Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2011: 113). Although enrollment has increased across society, there is still an important gap between the rich and the poor in terms of access to college, with the latter being only partially included in the higher education system.

The enactment of neoliberal policies in the 1990s ended the era of state-centered policies that had begun during the leftist authoritarian regime of General Juan Velasco. The effect on higher education was that the state virtually relinquished the role it had played in the creation and oversight of higher education institutions. As the National Council of Education (2011: 13) describes,

In 1968 there were 30 universities, three of which were private. From 1968 to 1980 (military dictatorship) five more public universities were created. Between 1981 and 1990, another 17 universities (3 public) were added. From 1990 to 2000, 24 private and one public university were created (six of them were later suppressed). After this period, 10 more universities were created (four public ones and one from the reconversion of the *Escuela Superior de Administración de Negocios*, ESAN).¹¹² Now, sixty universities have a president and twenty are still

¹¹² According to Nicolás Lynch (Minister of Education [2001-2002]), many of these new public universities are the result of pork barrel policies and lack adequate personnel and infrastructure. Interview with the author. May 6, 2015.


in the institutionalization process (with and Organizing Committee), 5 of which are public. One of these – the *Universidad Nacional Tecnológica del Cono Sur de Lima* – is still not operating.

The private sector has, therefore, eclipsed the role of public institutions in higher education (Cuenca, 2014; 484). In recent years, several private universities have also begun building regional campuses all over Peru,¹¹³ which has further increased the presence of private institutions across the country. Meanwhile, the supply of non-university higher education has decreased, partly due to the government-imposed shutdown of and restrictions on low quality institutions, and because more and more students prefer to apply to universities (Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2011: 111-112).

This increase has resulted in the incorporation of larger segments of the population into the higher education system. From 1996 to 2012, the number of university students in Peru increased from 389,316 to 864,232 (Asociación Nacional de Rectores, 2012). Figure 4.2 shows the way access has increased in Peru for each income quintile between 2000 and 2011. All income groups increased their access to higher education but the most important changes have happened among the lower income quintiles: the largest increase occurred in the second income quintile, which went from an enrollment ratio of almost seven percent in 2000 to about twenty-six percent in 2011 – an increase of approximately nineteen percentage points.

¹¹³ Interview with Jorge Mori, student leader, UNMSM, Advisor to Congressman Daniel Mora. February 27, 2015.

Figure 4.2. Net Enrollment by Income Quintile in Peru, 2000 and 2011



There are important differences in net enrollment in Chile and Peru, however. In both countries, the largest increases have been among the lower income students, but Chile has incorporated more of them since its return to democracy in 1990. The net enrollment of the poorest (first quintile) students in Chile increased to 21% in 2013, while Peru's increased to about 12% (CEDLAS and World Bank, 2015). These differences in incorporation partly explain why protests in Peru have been less frequent and smaller than in Chile.

The private sector has gobbled up most of this increase in enrollment. Newer, less selective institutions have accepted most of the first-generation students while the

socioeconomic makeup of some private universities changed as access become more widespread. For example, institutions like San Ignacio de Loyola University, which had a majority of middle- and upper class students in the 1990s, began to tilt towards a low-income student population in the mid-2000s.¹¹⁴ More generally, the share of the lowest income quintile students who attend public institutions decreased from about 72% in 2004, to 58% in 2012 (Cuenca, 2013). Increased private investment has been essential to expanding access to higher education but has also resulted in institutional segmentation by quality (for example, in terms of instruction and infrastructure).¹¹⁵

Increased access to higher education has been widespread but unequal. Traditionally excluded ethnic groups, for example, have benefited less from this increase than white and mestizo Peruvians (Cuenca, 2014: 488-490). The same is true for socioeconomic groups. Although social origin is no longer relevant when it comes to access to primary and secondary education, in the case of higher education “[p]arents’ social background and origins end up being more important to determine educational achievement” (Benavides & Etesse, 2012, p. 77). According to Ricardo Cuenca, the higher income groups still experience by far the highest access so enrollment is still not democratized.¹¹⁶ As the National Council of Education states, “[g]rowth in the supply has generated an illusion of more access to higher education since it is strongly privatized and far from being able to guarantee jobs” (Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2011, p. 113).

¹¹⁴ Interview with Emilio Salcedo, Peruvian University of Applied Sciences (UPC) and PUCP. May 5, 2015.

¹¹⁵ Interview with José Távara.

¹¹⁶ Interview with the author.

Increased access has caused an oversupply of college graduates from low quality institutions, who are less likely find employment commensurate with their level of education.

The absence of financial grievances in a neoliberal system

The Peruvian higher education system, with its sizable private, for-profit sector and relatively weak government oversight, has been very market-friendly since the reforms of the Fujimori regime. Most of the significant growth in enrollment since 2000 has occurred in these institutions, which attract predominantly low-income students. Moreover, according to several sources, the quality at many of these institutions is doubtful at best, and their graduates have a harder time finding jobs than their counterparts in public and elite, not-for profit universities (Yamada & Castro, 2013). The puzzle then is why the majority of students have not protested against a system that has been called a scam by many Peruvians, including the president of the congressional committee on education (Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2014).¹¹⁷ Scholars agree that, in general, social movements in Peru are weak and geographically fragmented (Garay & Tanaka, 2009; Remy, 2010) since the vibrant social fabric necessary for social mobilization was torn apart during the Fujimori years.¹¹⁸ One explanation, therefore, for the low level of social mobilization among college students would be that repression

¹¹⁷ Interview with Zenón Depaz, philosophy professor, UNMSM; MINEDU National Superintendency of University Education (SUNEDU) councilmember, May 14, 2015; interview with Nicolás Lynch.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Nicolás Lynch.

during the dictatorship caused the demise of the social networks and resources that are necessary for movements to emerge.

I argue, by contrast, that the main explanation behind the relative absence of student mobilization in Peru can be found in the way the Peruvian higher education system distributes the costs of education. Roughly speaking, there are three types of higher education institutions: elite, private, non-profit universities; public institutions that do not charge tuition; and for-profit, private colleges. As Nelson Manrique puts it, “socioeconomic diversification is a system-level phenomenon, it doesn’t occur at every institution.”¹¹⁹ The way socioeconomic groups are segmented by type of institution explains why mobilization is weak in Peru.

The majority of upper- and upper-middle class students attend the most selective private universities. All of these institutions are old, established, non-profit universities, and they charge students large sums for tuition. Although students from these universities are the most organized,¹²⁰ most of them do not engage in student protests, and when they do, the causes are related to university-specific issues. Another financial factor that thwarts mobilization at these colleges is that (unlike their counterparts in Chile¹²¹) they apply an “*escala de pagos*,” a payment scale based on socioeconomic status that determines the amount that each student has to pay for tuition. Some colleges have up to

¹¹⁹ Sociology professor. Interview with the author, May 12, 2015.

¹²⁰ Interview with Ricardo Cuenca.

¹²¹ This payment system is called *arancel diferenciado* (differentiated tuition) in Chile. Chilean students protested since the 1990s to achieve it without success.

eighteen different *escalas* while others have only three.¹²² For example in 2013, the total tuition for a 10-semester undergraduate degree at two of these elite institutions, the University of the Pacific and the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, ranged from roughly \$28,500 to \$63,653 USD, and from \$18,500 to \$57,900, respectively (Zaragoza, 2013).¹²³ Most students at these elite schools, therefore, do not experience acute financial grievances because they tend to come from upper income families, and pay according to their socioeconomic status.

Many middle- and lower-middle class students go to public universities. These institutions, which made up the majority of universities until the 1990s, have free tuition and offer students other free and discounted services, like meals and housing. Mobilizations by students from these universities are relatively scarce and rarely extend beyond a single institution. Although increases in the cost of education (in the form of increases in the cost of fees or the elimination of free services) can sometimes cause mobilizations, these protests tend to be institution-specific. Because tuition is free at these institutions, there are no widespread financial grievances among their students.

Finally, poorer students have generally not mobilized en masse against the system. There are three main reasons for this. First, some lower-middle and most working class students attend private, for-profit institutions and technical schools. Private, for-profit universities are the most common kind of institution and have absorbed most of the country's increase in access to higher education. Peruvians call these schools

¹²² Interview with Luis Esparza.

¹²³ As of December 31, 2013 the exchange rate was 1 USD = 2.8 PEN.

“universidades empresa” (“enterprise universities”), and more pejoratively *“universidades garage”* (because some were allegedly set up inside garages) or *“universidades bamba”* (“imitation universities”). Technical schools, by contrast, have decreased their enrollment and the number of these types of institutions has shrunk as poorer students have migrated to private universities for aspirational reasons and due to their low (Cuenca, 2014: 502-503). Although these for-profit schools charge tuition, the cost tends to be so low that many students and their families can afford them. For example, the total tuition in 2013 for a 10-semester undergraduate degree at two of these institutions, Universidad Alas Peruanas and César Vallejo University, ranged from \$5,700 to \$26,800 USD in the former, and was \$8,000 in the latter (Zaragoza, 2013).

The lack of financial options in Peru also explains the relatively low level of mobilization. According to Ricardo Cuenca, only three banks offer student loans because tuition is relatively cheap.¹²⁴ Nelson Manrique and former Education Minister Nicolás Lynch add that college loans play a marginal role, and are not an important part of higher education finance.¹²⁵ This is in sharp contrast with the situation in Chile, where access to state-backed-credit has made it possible for a much larger segment of the working class to attend college, regardless of family income. In Chile, the most important hurdle for access to college is the college admissions test, while in Peru financial constraints are still a significant obstacle for the lower-income population.

¹²⁴ Interview with Ricardo Cuenca.

¹²⁵ Interviews with Nelson Manrique. Interview with Nicolás Lynch.

Second, many students at these schools have part-time jobs, which decrease the amount of time and energy they can devote to organizing and mobilizing.¹²⁶ In the cases where education is too onerous for the family budget, students often take part-time jobs that allow them to pay for their education without taking on debt,¹²⁷ which also has a negative effect on their ability to participate in student politics and mobilizations.

Finally, in recent years the Peruvian government has enacted a scholarship program for some low-income university students, potentially relieving some grievances. In 2011, President Humala enacted the legislation creating the *Beca 18* scholarship program. The program funds undergraduate education in selected public and private universities, and technical schools, and assigns recipients to a tutor. The program targets low-income students as well as other vulnerable populations (Cuenca, 2014: 499). The only requirement is that students must choose a major related to science and technology. The number of recipients has tripled since its inception, and in 2013 almost 11,000 scholarships were awarded. These initiatives help to relieve students and families from the financial burden of higher education, diminishing these students' incentives to mobilize against the education systems. In Chile, by contrast, there was no large-scale, income-based public tuition scholarship for technical and vocational college until 2009

¹²⁶ Interview with Alejandra Alayza; interview with Michael Ortiz. This is more similar to the kind of higher education that would deter mobilization, according to group of scholars who were the last to address this issue (Brunner, 1986; Levy, 1991).

¹²⁷ Interview with Emilio Salcedo; interview with Michael Ortiz.

(with the establishment of the Beca Nuevo Milenio), and no public scheme to fund tuition for university students until 2016.¹²⁸

Student-party linkages without a party system

The evolution of student linkages with the government in Peru is similar to the Chilean experience. Student linkages with ruling parties were strong immediately after the return to democracy because college students played an important role in the movement against Fujimori. Government linkages became weaker subsequently, however. Linkages with the opposition, although always present, have also become weaker because the Left has atomized, and students have begun forming their own autonomous organizations. The evolution of party linkages partly explains, therefore, the small size and low frequency of student protests in Peru: weak linkages with parties in the opposition did not contribute to the size of student mobilizations; the weak linkages with ruling parties, meanwhile, allowed protests but did not generate them in the absence of widespread student grievances.

The Peruvian party system has been defined as an “inchoate” party system since the 1990s (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995), and the country is considered to be a “democracy without parties” (Crabtree, 2010; Levitsky, 1999; Tanaka, 2005). National parties, with the exception of PAP,¹²⁹ have over time disappeared from the national stage. In their place, a range of local and regional “movements” have emerged around specific

¹²⁸ All other government tuition scholarships for lower income students have an academic performance requirement (MINEDUC, 2017), which limit their reach.

¹²⁹ The Peruvian Aprista Party, which is also informally known as APRA or the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance.

politicians. These candidate-centric parties come and go, so the party system is to a certain extent created all over again after each election (Levitsky, 1999: 87). With the exception of those in power, these parties are organizationally weak so they cannot offer many resources for mobilization, and their student allies are less able to rely on them for protection from unfavorable media coverage and police repression, discouraging protest. In general, the linkages between these ephemeral parties and organized society are weak; where they are stronger, the linkage is usually with local and institutional organizations rather than with sectors with a national presence. Over time, the connection between parties in power and student organizations has also eroded.

Table 4.1. Organizational Linkages Between Students and Political Parties in Peru 1994-2016 (approximately)

| Presidency | Starting Date | Ending Date | Governing Coalition | Major Parties in Power | Linkages with Ruling Parties Score (Mean) | Linkages with Opposition Parties Score (Mean) |
|---|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|--|--|
| Alberto Fujimori | 7/28/90 | 11/22/00 | Peru 2000 (1999-2000) | C90, NM, VV | 1.0 | 5.5 |
| Valentín Paniagua (interim) | 11/22/00 | 7/28/01 | | AP | 4.8 | 3.0 |
| Alejandro Toledo | 7/28/01 | 7/28/06 | | PP, FIM | 4.3 | 3.0 |
| Alan García | 7/28/06 | 7/28/11 | | PAP | 3.3 | 3.8 |
| Ollanta Humala | 7/28/11 | 7/28/16 | Gana Perú | PNP, PSP, PCP, PSR | 3.5 | 4.5 |
| <i>Country mean</i> | | | | | <i>3.4</i> | <i>4.0</i> |
| Source: Author's elaboration based on Expert Survey. C90: Cambio 90; NM: Nueva Mayoría; VV: Vamos Vecino; AP: Acción Popular; PP: Perú Posible; FIM: Frente Independiente Moralizador; PAP, Peruvian Aprista Party; PNP: Peruvian Nationalist Party; PSP: Peruvian Socialist Party; Peruvian Communist Party; PSR: Revolutionary Socialist Party. | | | | | | |

Table 4.1 shows the results of the Expert Survey presented in Chapter 2 for Peru. Overall (and as observed in most other Latin American countries) college students tend to have stronger linkages with the opposition than with ruling parties. Crucially, the lowest recorded level of linkages with parties in power and the highest level of linkages with the opposition (during the regime of Alberto Fujimori) coincide with the highest level of very large mobilization and the second highest count of total mobilizations recorded in the LASPD for Peru (see Figure 4.1). Indeed, all the Peru scholars who answered the Expert Survey gave the Fujimori regime a score of one in student linkages, the lowest possible rating. The situation was reversed during the presidencies of Valentín Paniagua and Alejandro Toledo, when the government had stronger connections to students than the opposition. According to an expert,

Student organizations had an important role in the anti-Fujimori movement; they became closely connected to political groups in the opposition and civil society. When he assumed the government, Toledo announced the creation of a public entity dealing with youths at the cabinet level, to recognize the important role that youths played in recovering democracy.¹³⁰

During the second government of Alan García, student-opposition linkages became stronger again. Although the ruling PAP itself emerged from student mobilizations in the 1920s (Mariátegui, 1928; Portantiero, 1978), its connections to colleges had weakened when it returned to power. As an expert relates, the PAP only has a presence “in the universities it has administrative control over (Villarreal, Garcilaso, San Martín),” while another expert mentions that PAP has a presence in other public colleges. The government also had weak organizational ties to students when President

¹³⁰ National Youth Council, currently called National Youth Service.

Humala was in power. An expert described how linkages with the Humala government declined after some leftist groups split from the government coalition:

Initially, there were connections with student groups, but then the government becomes fragmented. The PSPS, Land and Liberty, Verónica Mendoza or Sergio Tejada,¹³¹ they all had followers in the universities [but] they leave the government party and also become part of the opposition.

The experts also mentioned that, overall, many student organizations are linked to minor or fringe parties on the Left, or that the organizations identify themselves as leftists but do not have connections to parties. One Peru expert described the evolution of these groups,

Both [PAP] and the Left (which later became fragmented) maintain university bases, generally through grass-roots organizations, precisely because they are mass parties. This involves creating student organizations as part of a political party. In other words, they build an organic relationship with the party, they are formed through the party, and they have an ideology based on the party's ideology. That was transformed with time, after the fragmentation of the Left. With further fragmentations, what happens now is that there are several leftists groups in colleges that are not necessarily linked to leftist parties.

Other experts mentioned that the Communist Party of Peru – Red Fatherland (PCP-PT) also has important student bases. Indeed, members of the PCP-PT were at the helm of the National Student Federation of Peru (FEP) since the 1970s (Navarro, 2010) until 2015. Another common theme is the weak relationship between students and many short-lived parties in Peru. As an expert observes, these fleeting parties

often use students as administrative capital for their political campaigns, in a pragmatic or clientelistic linkage. These youth groups are not party bases but are formed independently from parties for electoral purposes.

¹³¹ They resigned from the PNP, the ruling party, in 2012 and 2015, respectively.

In many cases, student organizations with close ties to political parties in Peru are considered to favor party interests rather than students' interests. In his study about university student attitudes towards politics in Peru, Chávez Granadino (1999) classifies university students into three groups: students who are not interested in politics; students with traditional, partisan views of politics; and those emphasizing student issues. He classifies them based on two factors: first, students' attitudes towards university politics; and second, the policies and demands that motivate them to participate. The first group consists of students who are not interested in active participation. This group is widespread in both public and private universities (pp. 93-94), and it comprises the majority of the student body at any given time. These students are the least likely to mobilize.

The second group is students who have "traditional" attitudes towards politics. According to Chávez, these students, usually called "*politiqueros*" (politickers), are commonly found in public universities, are highly politicized and are often more connected to political groups that have had a direct influence on universities for decades than they are to the interests of the student body,

The knowledge they possess about the mechanisms of politics (conducting debates, managing public opinion, the relationship with some groups of professors and authorities, among others), makes the rest of students fearful that they will be used for their particular ends (Chávez Granadino, 1999, pp. 94–95, author's translation).

The last group comprises students who are interested in politics but also in the defense of student interests. These students are usually critical of traditional political participation practices (associated with political parties); they are often leaders of

independent student organizations, and mobilize for causes related to students' needs and rights (Chávez Granadino, 1999, p. 95).

Since the return to democracy in 2000, the relationship between student organizations and political parties (both in presidency and in the opposition) has eroded progressively. In the 1980s, political parties – especially those in the Left – had a strong presence at the university level through the participation of their members and sympathizers in student politics. Most students, however, began to distance themselves from the leaders of the student federations, whose highly ideological and in some cases violent tone became increasingly unappealing. This distance resulted in a lack of representativeness and legitimacy, where “many times elections within universities became a mere formality due to the lack of identification of the majority of students with the conventional leading groups” (Chávez Granadino, 1999: 54).

Political repression and the resulting collapse of the party system contributed to this distancing. First, the belligerent discourse and actions of student leaders with party connections and the political repression carried out by the state in the 1990s caused the majority of students to become depoliticized; they became weary of political participation in general and within their institutions. Then, over time, many autonomous student organizations emerged, embracing the demands of students as members of the university community and as distinct social actors.¹³² Student-party linkages became rare (“*anecdóticas*”).¹³³

¹³² Interview with Álvaro Vidal.

¹³³ Interview with Marité Bustamante.

The highly fragmented and unstable nature of the party system in Peru means that nowadays virtually no party has a deep connection with student organizations at the national level. Most parties that do have strong linkages with students are limited to bastions at a couple of institutions, mostly outside of Lima,¹³⁴ like Patria Roja at the National University of Cajamarca,¹³⁵ which even finances the local student federation.¹³⁶ Indeed, the Lima headquarters of the FEP, whose leadership hailed for years from the Cajamarca student federation, were located inside the headquarters of the SUTEP, the largest teacher's union in Peru, which also had close ties to Patria Roja while the party was in control of FEP.

Some political parties and leaders are involved in the administration and ownership of some institutions, using them as places to weather the period in between political appointments, and even using their monetary and organizational resources for political campaigns (Barrenechea, 2014). An interviewee mentioned that some institutions work as “*universidades cajas*” (“cash register universities”) of political parties. Examples of this relationship between universities and parties include those of the Universidad San Martín de Porres with the PAP;¹³⁷ Universidad César Vallejo with César Acuña, the founder of the university, mayor of Trujillo, and leader of the Alliance for Progress Party (Barrenechea, 2014); Universidad Privada Telesup, owned by

¹³⁴ Interview with Rolando Ames, political science professor, PUCP; Senator for United Leftist Front (FIU, 1985-1990). May 5, 2015.

¹³⁵ Interview with Noelia Chávez, student leader, PUCP. February 18, 2015. Interview with Julio Cáceda.

¹³⁶ Interview with Jorge Mori.

¹³⁷ Interview with Jorge Mori.

congressman José Luna of the National Solidarity Party (Vásquez, 2013); and Alas Peruanas University, which has close ties to *Fujimorismo*.

Parties in the opposition that have stronger connections to student organizations are often accused of *aparateo*, that is, capturing the leadership positions of student organizations in order to use them for their own political purposes instead serving the interests of students.¹³⁸ In the experience of Johanna Rodríguez, for example, party youth members acted more like speakers of their parties, and their superiors within the party made the decisions they advanced at the student federations.¹³⁹ Overall, leftist parties have stronger connections with student organizations in public universities through their university wings, while center and right wing parties have connections to students through their ownership of some private colleges. In the latter case, the parties coopt members of the student *tercio* and organizations to thwart mobilization.¹⁴⁰

Variation in connections to parties explains the minor role students had in the relatively marginal mobilizations for and against the University Reform Law of 2013. Institution-specific ties to some parties caused a division among student organizations.¹⁴¹ Ideological differences and competition for membership between Patria Roja, which controlled the FEP, and MOVAREDEF (the political arm of Sendero Luminoso),¹⁴² which has a presence in several public universities, limited the actions of their student members

¹³⁸ Interview with Julio Cáceda; interview with Omar Cavero, student leader, PUCP; researcher, MINEDU. May 7, 2015.

¹³⁹ Interview with Johanna Rodríguez, President, FEPUC (2003). May 5, 2015.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Jorge Mori.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Luis Esparza.

¹⁴² Interview with Sigrid Bazán, President, FEPUC (2012). April 29, 2015.

against the reform. In addition, members of the ruling PNP managed to get elected to leadership positions in several student federations, which they used to mobilize to promote the law. Their influence decreased, however, when purges within the party carried out by the faction led by President Humala diverted their attention.¹⁴³

The latest example of the difficult relationship between students and parties is the mobilization against the so-called “*Ley Pulpín*,” a law passed in December 11, 2014 that reduced the mandatory job benefits of 18 to 24 year olds in order to reduce that segment’s unemployment and informal employment rates. Young people in Lima, including students, organized a series of mass marches against it, which were unusual due to their large size, the amount of first-time and low-income participants (Cavero, 2015), and the use of social media to convene the events.¹⁴⁴ The protests and public support for them forced Congress to repeal the law on January 26, 2015.

Political parties, which had a strong presence and leadership in the early stages of the mobilization through the D18 group, attempted to coopt the movement, but other leaders were able to organize the mobilization in such a way that the parties could not capture it. Participants in the movement accused political parties like *Patria Roja* and APRA of trying to corrupt the movement for their own purposes, and in particular to take advantage of the movement’s popularity in preparation for the presidential and congressional elections of 2016 (Chávez, 2015b).¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Interview with Luis Esparza.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with César Ames.

¹⁴⁵ Interview with Álvaro Vidal.

Members of the PAP attempted to increase their influence – and prevent other parties from doing so – by proposing after the second march to organize the movement into *zonas*.¹⁴⁶ *Zonas* would geographically disaggregate the movement participants into groups of residents from contiguous municipalities. The initiative backfired when the rest of the movement, including several university organizations, which had a strong anti-party stance,¹⁴⁷ decided to organize so that no single participating organization could capture the *zonas* (L. García & Vela, 2015). Another objective was to weed out infiltrators, who were accused of having connections to the police and causing public disorder during the demonstrations.¹⁴⁸ *Zonas* were devised to work in a horizontal, nonhierarchical way, with all decisions made in open assemblies. All members were encouraged (and sometimes compelled if they had been quiet for too long) to voice their opinions. The leaders acted only as spokespersons, and had to rotate periodically.

Political party members, therefore, were forced to participate in their roles as *zona* members, and the connection between the movement and parties was weak. Several sources attribute the movement's legitimacy and acceptance, its ability to summon large crowds, and its ultimate success in repealing the *Ley Pulpín* to the distance the organization took from formal politics and parties.¹⁴⁹ Parties and party members, therefore, participated in the mobilizations against the *Ley Pulpín* but had to accept a secondary role in order to avoid being left out.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with César Ames.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Lilia Ramírez.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with César Ames.

¹⁴⁹ Others, however, believe that the movement will not survive if it rejects traditional organization, hierarchy, and cooperation with parties (Cavero, 2015).

Additional explanations for smaller and more infrequent mobilizations in Peru

Fieldwork and interviews in Peru suggest that there are two additional factors that may explain why student mobilizations are relatively smaller and less frequent. The first factor is the institutionalized student participation in decision-making in many universities – the student *tercio* –, which diverts students' attention and energy from other affairs and adds an additional opportunities for cooptation by university authorities. The second factor is the legacy of repression in the 1980s and 1990s on student organizations, from which they are only recently recovering. These two factors are better understood as contextual variables, however. They are practically time-invariant in the Peruvian case, and cannot explain longitudinal changes in the size and frequency of student mobilizations.

The student tercio

Student participation in university government is through the *tercio estudiantil*, which means that one third of representatives in the university decision-making bodies must be students. The *tercio* system, however is only present in public institutions (by law) and in the few private universities that are organized like their public counterparts. The institutions that have a *tercio estudiantil* may be the minority but they include the oldest, some of the most prestigious, and virtually all of the colleges that have a tradition of student politics and organization.¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Ricardo Cuenca.

Although having a *tercio* may result in at least a modicum of student organization, which is necessary for mobilization, there are at least four ways in which this system works against the translation of grievances into protests. First, and more positively, the *tercio* is a channel through which students can advance their sectorial demands at the level of each individual institution. The fact that students have a built-in weight in the university's decision-making bodies makes pursuing positions in the *tercio* desirable.¹⁵¹ Thus, the *tercio* can turn students into “insiders” within their universities, making the advancement of their demands through protest less necessary and attractive.

Second, participating in institutional decision-making consumes time and energy. As one interviewee suggested,¹⁵² involvement in administrative and academic activities like participating in faculty search committees takes away time and manpower from other issues that may be more important but less pressing to students. Students who participate in the *tercio*, therefore, have fewer resources to commit to mobilization.

Third, the presence of two student-elected groups, the student federations and the *tercio* representatives, may cause internal conflicts in the student body. Sometimes, one student group may control the student federation while another controls the majority of *tercio* representative positions. It is common for the federation to be controlled by members of political parties, their sympathizers or autonomous student groups while students closer to the faculty faction or the university administration control the *tercio*.

¹⁵¹ Interview with Julio Cáceda.

¹⁵² Interview with Marité Bustamante.

Depending on how much these student factions disagree on a certain issue, this “double representation” can cause a deadlock in efforts to mobilize.¹⁵³

Finally, and related to the previous point, professors and administrators have an interest in who gets elected to the *tercio*. As some interviewees noted, professors sometimes coopt students in order to control a majority of the student representatives for their own sectorial or personal interests,¹⁵⁴ causing the purpose of the *tercio* to become “distorted” and turning students in the *tercio* into “mercenaries” of other groups within the college.¹⁵⁵ Indeed, there are many cases of student tickets sponsored by professors or the administration running against autonomous student groups.¹⁵⁶

These connections between the administration and the student *tercio* explain, for example, why some students mobilized and spoke out against the University Reform Law of 2013. The law eliminated the *Asamblea Nacional de Rectores* (National Assembly of University Presidents, ANR), which until that point was in charge of overseeing the accreditation of universities, and replaced it with the Superintendencia Nacional de Educación Universitaria (National Superintendency of University Education, SUNEDU). According the one interviewee, the university presidents used their influence in the student *tercios* to gather supporters against the reform.¹⁵⁷

Although important in some cases, the student *tercio* only plays a contextual role in student mobilization. In addition to being time-invariant, the *tercio* as an institution is

¹⁵³ Interview with Michael Ortiz.

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Michael Ortiz; interview with Zenón Depaz.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Nelson Manrique.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Julio Cáceda.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Jorge Mori.

present only in a fraction of the Peruvian universities. Additionally, given its institution-specific nature, the presence of the *tercio* should only have an effect within each college, and not at the more aggregate (city, regional, or national) levels. Student participation in university governance, therefore, may slightly (but not completely) explain the overall differences in student mobilization between Chile and Peru.

The legacy of repression on student organization in Peru

Student organization, both at the national and the institutional level, is comparatively weak in Peru. In general, organizational resources are higher (but still low) at the elite private and public universities, and lower in most “*universidades empresa*” due to the legal control their owners have on university affairs.

Most of the elite private universities, whether they participate in mobilizations or not, have student organizations or unions. This is explained, in part, by the relative lack of state intervention and repression these institutions suffered during the Fujimori regime. Students from these universities were usually not perceived as threat to internal security because they were deemed to be socioeconomically and even ethnically different from the students involved in armed groups at other colleges.¹⁵⁸ According to Alejandra Alayza, the fact that organizations at these institutions did not suffer the repression that their public counterparts experienced, explains why universities like the Catholic University of Peru and others were able to play such an important role in the first peaceful mobilizations against Fujimori in 1997. Most student mobilizations in the early

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Alejandra Alayza.

2000s were also spearheaded by these universities, where the lack of intervention meant that “critical thought was preserved.”¹⁵⁹ Since the return to democracy, however, many of the student organizations at these universities have assumed more social, event-planning roles. For example, students at San Marcos reestablished the university-wide student federation (FUSM) in July 2015, after the Patria Roja-controlled FUSM was disbanded in 1989.

As mentioned above, political repression against students due to their alleged connections to *Sendero Luminoso* and the *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru* had a lasting effect on students’ organizational resources at public universities. Until the 1990s, public university students had organizations akin to workers’ unions, both at the institution and national level.¹⁶⁰ After 1990, several universities like San Marcos and La Cantuta were placed under military control, their students and faculty were persecuted and even forcibly disappeared, and their federations disbanded. Some groups of students still feel reluctant to create organizations for fear that they will be accused of being terrorists by university and public authorities and stigmatized by public opinion.¹⁶¹ For example, during one of the demonstrations against the “*Ley Pulpín*” in January of 2015, as the march went through the upscale neighborhood of Miraflores, antagonistic residents and passers-by yelled at students, calling them “*terrucos*” (slang for “terrorists”).¹⁶² Organizations and federations at these universities have slowly reappeared although

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Zenón Depaz.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Zenón Depaz.

¹⁶¹ Interview with Johanna Rodríguez; interview with Nicolás Lynch.

¹⁶² Interview with Ricardo Cuenca.

students at some emblematic universities still have not recovered their federations. For example, the San Marcos Student Federation (FUSM) was reestablished in July 2015.

The legacy of repression is only a contextual variable, however. Besides being virtually a constant during the period analyzed, the experience of Peruvian students does not differ that much from that of their Chilean counterparts. The Pinochet dictatorship also intervened in colleges, and used repression and violence against student organizations under the pretense of quelling armed resistance to the regime, both in private and public institutions (Salazar Vergara & Toro, 2002). Thus, the legacy of repression on student organization does not explain by itself the different trajectories of student mobilization in the two countries.

Conclusion

Peru has experienced some episodes of student mobilization since 2000. These protests, however, pale in comparison to the demonstrations against President Fujimori in the 1990s that students led and participated in. Mobilization during the dictatorship was both massive and nationally coordinated – there was a national student movement. By contrast, since the country's return to democracy, students have lost their prominence as social actors. Their mobilizations have become smaller, with more institution-specific demands, and circumscribed to a decreasing share of universities as the creation of private institutions has relegated public education to a secondary role.

The frequency of student mobilizations is low despite the tenuous connection between student organizations and political parties in government. These linkages have

suffered due to the legacies of political violence and repression in the country. Linkages with opposition parties have not contributed to the size of student mobilizations due to the relative weakness of parties. Since the 1990s, Peru has been a “democracy without parties,” with candidate-centered electoral vehicles that have few societal allies or connections to organized society beyond their leader’s regional fiefdoms. Students’ weak connections to ruling parties hinder the cooptation of leaders and the channeling of demands; weak connections to opposition parties – and the parties’ own organizational weakness – prevents them from increasing the mass of student protests.

The main reasons for the relative lack of mobilization, however, can be found in the way neoliberal higher education policy has shaped access and funding. In Peru, the neoliberal policies adopted since the 1990s have given the private sector a predominant role in increasing access to higher education to the point that most universities in Peru are private, for-profit institutions. Access is still not completely generalized, however, the incorporation of poorer students being a product of improvements in secondary education outcomes rather than of policies conceived to increase opportunities in higher education.

Ultimately, the way social origin and higher education finance intersect explains the low levels of mobilization. The Peruvian higher education system is highly segmented by socioeconomic origin: the more well off students attend selective, mostly not-for profit institutions while their middle- and working class counterparts attend public and for-profit institutions. The wealthy students who attend selective universities can afford to pay for their education even though tuition is high; most poor and middle class students can also afford the price of going to the mostly free public institutions and the

low cost, for-profit colleges. Finally, unlike Chile, there is no generalized, government-sponsored access to credit that would allow the majority of the poorest students to attend college. There are no widespread financial grievances, therefore, that could lead to mass mobilization.

Two other factors are linked to the low levels of student mobilization in Peru. First, student participation in the university governing bodies of all public and some private universities also diminishes the incentives and opportunities for mobilization. This involvement gives students institutionalized bargaining power, takes time and energy away from mobilization, leads to divided student leadership, and may give other groups within the university incentives to coopt students. Second, students in Peru are organizationally weak. Besides having a weak national-level organization (FEP), many public universities have not yet fully recovered the level of student organization they had before the state repression in the Fujimori years. These two factors, however, are best understood as time-invariant, contextual variables, and do not play a major role in explaining variation in student mobilization in the country over time.

Comparing Chile and Peru in terms of student mobilization emphasizes the importance of financial grievances to mobilize students in Latin America. Experts on the Chilean case have argued that social stratification, incorporated into higher education through the creation of elite and non-selective institutions with differing outcomes in term of employment and social mobility, explains differences in mobilization (Fleet & Guzmán-Concha, 2016). Comparing the experiences of Chilean and Peruvian students shows that stratification does not play such a large role in protest. Both higher education

systems are highly stratified, with upper-, middle-, and lower-income students attending different institutions, yet mobilization is higher and larger in Chile. The main difference seems to be funding, with Chilean students carrying a heavier financial burden than their Peruvian counterparts.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

In recent years, college students in Latin America have mobilized massively and frequently. They often protested against neoliberal policies in higher education and did so autonomously from political parties (Palacios-Valladares, 2016; Vommaro, 2013). In cases like Chile, the student movement was successful in triggering the reform of neoliberal higher education policies; in others, like Colombia, it has been able to thwart the implementation of market-based reforms. Political scientists and sociologists, among others, have offered several explanations for the high levels of student mobilization in some countries. These explanations remain partial at best, since scholars have tended to focus on cases with high levels of mobilization, and have not made a distinction between student protest frequency and size.

This dissertation has sought to explain what shapes variation in two different dimensions of college student mobilization: how frequently they occur, and how large they become. With these two distinct dimensions in mind, I elaborated a theory of how two main factors – grievances and political opportunities – are associated with different mobilization outcomes. I argued that variation in levels of grievances associated with neoliberal higher education policies that transfer the cost of education to students and expand the number of working class students in the system, and variation in the strength of linkages with parties in power and in the opposition shape the frequency and size of student mobilizations. The dissertation offered evidence in the form of case studies of

student mobilization Chile and Peru, as well as quantitative analyses at the regional and individual levels, which support the hypotheses derived from the theory.

This chapter begins by reiterating the questions the dissertation aimed to answer, its main arguments, and the specific hypotheses extrapolated from the theoretical discussion. Next, the main findings from the large-N regional analyses, the case studies, and the survey analysis are discussed. Finally, it elaborates on the broader theoretical and policy implications of the findings, presenting suggestions for future research.

The Argument

This study's driving question is what explains variation in student mobilization in Latin America. In order to tackle this question, I distinguished between two major dimensions of social mobilization: how often they occur (frequency) and how small or large individual protests are (size). I argue that grievances associated with neoliberal higher education policies, and linkages with political parties shape the frequency and size of student mobilizations. I also argue that, while the presence of grievances has a positive effect on both frequency and size, the effect of linkages depends on whether parties are in government or in the opposition.

In order to understand the causes of social mobilization, this concept has to be disaggregated into at least two dimensions: protest size and frequency. Many studies of social movements tend to use both dimensions interchangeably, or fail to make this distinction at all. The overwhelming majority of the studies that have a well-defined outcome variable have focused on protest frequency. Since at the aggregate level there is

a weak association between the total number of protests and the total number of participants, the conclusions drawn from studying one dimension of protests may not apply to the other (Biggs, 2016). In other words, the causes that explain variation in student protest size may not explain variation in protest frequency, and vice versa.

With these two distinct outcome variables in mind, I identify two sets of explanatory factors that have independent – and sometimes differential – effects on student mobilization in Latin America. Unlike some social movement experts who have downplayed the role of discontent in mobilization (Goodwin, 2001; McAdam, 1982), I argue that social grievances have a major effect on student protest. These grievances are typically related to neoliberal higher education policies that promote private sector participation and decrease the role of the state in the provision and funding of higher education. Since the 1980s and 1990s, many countries in the region have adopted these policies.

The role of the private sector in higher education grew in many states through privatization and the enactment of more flexible laws for the establishment of new institutions. For-profit higher education was also legalized in some countries to promote private sector growth. Enrollment in private institutions and the number of private colleges have, therefore, increased, and the public sector has experienced a relative decline. The overall effect, however, was that college became more accessible than ever in Latin America. Although in many countries the public sector is still predominant, many working class students, who were previously excluded from higher education, began to attend these new, privately owned institutions. The result is that fewer higher

education systems in the region are considered to be elite (Trow, 1973), and more have attained general and even universal levels of enrollment.

The second phenomenon is the transfer of the costs of higher education from the public to the private sector in general, and to students in particular. In some countries, public institutions, which used to be free, began to implement cost recovery measures (Castro & Levy, 2000) such as charging fees, selling services to the marketplace, and requiring tuition. In addition, almost without exception, private universities have funded themselves through tuition. Thus, although more students than ever now attain higher education in the region, attending college has also become overall expensive for many of them.

These changes in the patterns of college enrollment and funding have created grievances. Decreased public support for education and higher costs have caused discontent among middle- and working class students. These students feel that their hopes of social mobility and personal growth through higher education have been jeopardized by their inability to afford college or to pay their studies without incurring debt. This financial discontent breeds student mobilization.

The incorporation of working class students into higher education is also associated with social grievances. In many cases, the incorporation of these vast segments of the population has been steady but not necessarily of high quality. Many of the new, private institutions that have admitted working class students have dubious credentials (López Segrera, 2011), and there are few attempts aimed at promoting the success and advancement of first-generation and working class students (González Fiegehen, 2006;

Sverdlick, Ferrari, & Jaimovich, 2005). Thus, working class students have specific grievances associated with the way they have been included in higher education, especially compared to their higher income peers.

The second set of factors explaining variation in student mobilization is political. I extrapolate the insights from political science about party-society linkages (Kitschelt, 2000) to explain variation in protest frequency and size. Student party linkages are defined as the connections between college students and political parties, and may take programmatic, organizational, and personalistic forms. Students have historically had strong connections to political parties in Latin America, as colleges have been hotbeds for party membership and leadership (Joignant, 2012; Liebman, Walker, & Glazer, 1972). Students and parties sometimes share a common ideology, and some parties have official student branches on campus.

The strength of linkages alone cannot explain the relationship between party linkages and student mobilization. The location of political parties in the polity – how close they are to power – is also important. Parties in power may want to discourage their student allies from mobilizing to avoid undermining the government's legitimacy. Likewise, students with stronger connections to the government may prefer to use institutional channels to voice their demands rather than mobilizing. By contrast, opposition parties may want to promote student protest to challenge their rivals in government, and students may use their connections to the opposition to join forces for their own purposes.

I theorized that these four factors – higher education funding and enrollment, and party linkages with the government and opposition – have important effects on student protest frequency and size. The effects of the first two are similar for both dimensions of student mobilization: higher enrollments of working class students, and a higher share of education costs assumed by students are both expected to cause more frequent and larger student mobilizations.

The effects of the other two political factors, on the other hand, depend on the dimension of mobilization being analyzed. Stronger linkages with ruling parties have a negative effect on the frequency of protests: ruling parties have the motivation to reduce unrest, and they can use state resources and institutions to coopt students or channel their demands. Linkages with the opposition, by contrast, should have no independent effect on protest frequency, as many opposition parties are too weak to contribute to the emergence of mobilizations. Once mobilizations have been organized and are a fait accompli, party linkages may have an important effect on protest size. Stronger linkages with parties in power are expected to have little effect on their size, as ruling parties were opposed to them in the first place. Stronger connections with opposition parties, by contrast, may lead the opposition to support students with resources (and at a minimum, with their ranks), and are hypothesized to positively contribute to the size of student mobilizations.

Empirical Findings

This dissertation tested the abovementioned hypotheses and assessed its causal mechanisms using a mixed methods and multilevel strategy, combining regression analyses of regional and microdata with country-level comparative case studies. In Chapter Two, I presented and discussed the Latin American Protest Dataset, LASPD, and the results of an online Expert Survey on student politics and mobilization. A descriptive analysis of the LASPD showed that there is a high degree of variation in protest in student mobilization. The frequency of student protest events varies greatly by country, and both protest size and frequency are associated with variation in key protest features such as demands, strategies, types of students, other actors involved, and incidents. The results of the Expert Survey, in terms of both the open-ended items and the linkage scoring questions show that students tend to have stronger organizational linkages with the opposition, that they have usually stronger linkages with leftist parties, and that their ties with ruling parties tend to weaken as governing coalitions get reelected.

I used data from these original sources, along with other country-level information, to carry out regression analyses of student protest frequency, size, and the total number of protest participants in eighteen Latin American countries between the years 2000 and 2012. Using country-years as the unit of analysis, and mixed-effects negative binomial models, I analyzed this data to assess the determinants of student protest frequency in the region. The results of these models are in line with the hypotheses presented in Chapter One. Compared to higher education systems with mixed or public funding, having a primarily private funding system is associated with higher

protest frequencies. Similarly, the larger the share of the college-age population attending higher education, the higher the odds of more frequent student protests. Meanwhile, stronger organizational linkages with ruling parties are associated with lower counts of student protests. As expected, the level of linkages with political parties in the opposition does not have a statistically significant effect on the frequency of mobilizations.

The data was also analyzed at the level of each individual protest event in the LASPD to analyze the covariates of student protest size. The main models used to regress the categorical protest size variable were logistics ordinal models. The findings of these analyses support the hypotheses about protest size. The presence of educational cost demands (i.e., demands about tuition costs, debt, and support for public education) is associated with larger student mobilizations. Similarly, financial aid claims (i.e., demands about scholarships, student bus fares and housing, among others), which primarily concern lower income students, are also correlated with larger events. In terms of party linkages, the presence of party members in protests targeting the state, denoting strong connections with opposition parties, are associated with very high odds of larger student protests. However, the results show that when the mobilization does not target the government, denoting stronger linkages with ruling parties, party member participation not have a statistically significant effect on protest size.

Finally, the protest frequency and size variables were used to estimate the total number of protest participants per country-year. Similar to the protest frequency analysis, I used mixed-effects negative binomial models to regress the protest participation variable. The findings are virtually identical to those of the protest frequency analysis,

and cast doubt on the claims that the conclusions drawn from analyzing the frequency of protests cannot be applied to protest participation (Biggs, 2016). The results of these models demonstrate, however, that protest size is a distinct dimension of mobilization.

In Chapters Three and Four, I employed a qualitative approach to assess the causal mechanisms by which differences in higher education grievances and party linkages explain variation in student mobilization. More specifically, I carried out comparative case studies of higher education funding and enrollment policies, party linkages with the government and the opposition, and college student mobilization in Chile and Peru after their return to democracy. These two countries provide a useful comparison because they both experienced the imposition during the authoritarian period of neoliberal higher education policies (which their successors maintained), and the overall weakening of student-party linkages, especially of those with ruling coalitions. Crucially, however, governments in Chile have implemented funding schemes which, compared to their northern neighbor, have made college both widely available but also extremely financially onerous for students. As a result, Chilean students have protested more frequently and massively than their Peruvian counterparts.

As I discussed in Chapter Three, college students in Chile have consistently mobilized to change the country's higher education system since the return to democracy in 1990. Until recently, their levels of mobilization, however, paled in comparison with the previous authoritarian period. Protests only became very frequent and massive in 2011. These latter protests virtually paralyzed the country, had widespread popular support, and resulted in a major overhaul of the education system. The Chilean higher

education system is relatively unique in the region in that students have borne the majority of the costs of education, regardless of their socioeconomic origin or the type of institution they attended. The number of private institutions and the percentage of students enrolled in them have also increased steadily. While private institutions have been widespread since the 1980s, the issue of costs became a major mobilizing cause after 2005, when the Chilean government created a state-endorsed loan program (CAE), which eventually allowed thousands of previously excluded youths to attend college. Thus, by 2011, there was a large mass of students who were aggrieved for financial reasons, and thus were willing to take to the streets in protests.

Owing to their alliance against the Pinochet dictatorship, student organizations had a very close relationship with the Center-Left Concertación party coalition, which held the Chilean Presidency between 1990 and 2010. The Concertación used these connections to quell student mobilization and promote stability and implement gradual reforms. Over time, student ties to the coalition weakened; students began to form stronger connections with the opposition Communist Party (PC), and they also began to form their own autonomous political organizations. Then, when the Center-Right Alianza coalition took power in 2010, the government lost virtually all of its connections to organized students. Opposition party linkages were very weak during the 1990s, as the Center-Right opposition had little presence in colleges, and the PC itself was weakened after the democratic transition. In the 2000s, however, the PC began to gain influence among college students, and in 2010 the Concertación joined the opposition, contributing to the size of the 2011 student movement.

In Chapter Four I discussed how student mobilization in Peru has been relatively less prominent. College students were major actors in the protests that brought about the end of the Fujimori regime, but since then student mobilizations have been less frequent and smaller, particularly compared to Chile. Students have protested, but their mobilizations have tended to be circumscribed to specific colleges, and have advanced institution-specific demands. The Fujimori regime liberalized the higher education system, reducing public expenditures, promoting the growth of the private sector, and legalizing profitmaking at private institutions. Public universities, however, remain tuition-free, and private ones have income-based tuition rates, reducing financial grievances. Importantly, education loans are rare, so the incorporation of working class students is less thorough than in Chile, and is not based on debt.

Regarding party linkages, government-student connections were initially very strong during the Paniagua and Toledo administrations, thanks to the role that students and opposition parties played in ousting Fujimori. During the second term of President Alan García, student linkages were weak, and they became frailer during leftist President Humala's administration, as many leftist organizations abandoned the government over the course of his term. Linkages with the opposition have also been weak, as most parties in Peru are fragile themselves. Although the Left has always had a presence among college students, students have also begun to organize themselves independently. The Peruvian case suggests that, without a widespread grievance fueling mobilization, party linkages have little effect on the frequency and size of student mobilizations.

Finally, Chapter Three also tested the hypotheses using microdata from a 2012 Chilean survey. An analysis of the individual determinants of student participation in protests using negative binomial and logistic regressions lends support to the hypotheses. In terms of grievances, students who incur in debt are more likely to participate in protests, as are those who come from working class families. Additionally, students with weak programmatic (ideological) linkages to the Center-Right government of President Sebastián Piñera were more likely to participate in protests than those with stronger connections. Conversely, students with stronger programmatic linkages with the opposition (identifying with the Center, Center-Left, and Left political sectors) were more likely to participate in protests than other students, including those who identified with no sector. Assessing the theory at the individual level is important because it is the basis for both the frequency and size of protests.

Theoretical Implications

This study seeks to contribute to the study of student protests and social mobilization in several ways. First, this dissertation has sought to problematize what is meant by “mobilization.” In general, studies have focused overwhelmingly on protest frequency (Biggs, 2016), or have used evidence of high protest frequency and size interchangeably to refer to high levels of mobilization (Cummings, 2015). When studies do focus on protest size, they apply it as an independent variable to explain other outcomes (Barranco & Wisler, 1999; Biggs, 2016, pp. 5–6; Checchi & Visser, 2005; Hocke, 1999; Snyder & Kelly, 1977; Soule & Earl, 2005). To the best of my knowledge,

this dissertation is virtually the only attempt (with the exception of Saunders, 2014) to assess the determinants of protest size. As the differential effects of ruling and opposition party linkages on student protest and size suggest, the explanatory factors that explain one dimension may not explain the other.

Second, this study emphasizes the role that discontent in general and economic grievances in particular play in social mobilization. More specifically, they suggest that neoliberal policies do not necessarily decrease social mobilization in the long run, as some scholars have suggested (Gans-Morse & Nichter, 2007; Kurtz, 2004; Weyland, 2004). Rather, as Silva (2009, p. 3) has argued, neoliberal policies may actually provide “the motive for mobilization.” Silva claims that neoliberalism generated protest by creating “significant economic and political exclusion among urban and rural labor and even middle classes as they dismantled the old national-populist order” (Silva, 2009, p. 4).

In the case of the student population, neoliberal policies create grievances by cutting state subsidies to higher education. Moreover, by expanding access to higher education, neoliberal policies increase the size of the population sharing these grievances. The theory, therefore, suggests that neoliberal policies can affect both the acuteness of grievances and the size of the populations affected by them, thus increasing both the size and frequency of protest. For example, the *piquetero* movement in Argentina in the 1990s was the product of both widespread unemployment caused by neoliberal reforms, and the weakening of workers’ ties to parties in government and their associated unions (Oviedo, 2002). Similarly, the Bolivian *cocalero* movement emerged due to neoliberal

policies that both pushed former miners to coca-growing regions and aimed at eradicating coca plantations (Anria, 2013: 26). Explanations of changes in mobilization would benefit from studying both of these causal channels.

At the same time, however, the findings of this study suggest that not all of the consequences of neoliberalism are associated with increased mobilization. More specifically, the privatization of higher education at the institutional level seems to have a demobilizing effect. For example, at the regional level, the quantitative analyses found that country-years with a higher percentage of attendance in private institutions experienced fewer episodes of student protests than country-years with predominantly public enrollment; at the individual level, Chilean students enrolled in non-university institutions, all of which are private, were less likely to participate in protests than their peers attending universities. In many cases, private institutions are not legally required to have student organizations, and they actually often persecute students' effort to organize, which makes mobilization less likely. This lends some credence to the claims made by scholars when higher education systems in the region were beginning to change that this transformation would have a demobilizing effect (Brunner, 1986; Levy, 1991). Thus, while the privatization of costs caused by neoliberal reform has a mobilizing effect, the privatization of enrollment appears to have the opposite effect.

Scholars of political party systems have argued that the relationship between parties and society has an important effect on political stability and democratic governance (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). This study describes the contradictory relationship between political parties and social movements, emphasizing that linkages to

ruling parties have an important effect on mobilization frequency, while linkages to the opposition have a strong impact on mobilization size. Although the current literature has emphasized the mobilizing effect of strong linkages to the opposition (Almeida, 2010; Arce, 2010; Maguire, 1995; Su, 2015), this paper argues that linkages to parties in power may also have a key impact. In a similar vein, the literature has emphasized the presence of elite allies as a factor promoting the policy success of social movements (J. D. McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Van Dyke, 2003b). The results from this dissertation suggest, therefore, that there may be a trade-off between having a larger policy impact through party connections, and convening more frequent and larger demonstrations.

Policy implications

The results from this dissertation also have policy implications. Student protests are an important issue for policymakers because they can disrupt the whole education system: in 2011 in Chile, for example, dozens of colleges had to extend the academic year from December to February of 2012, and about 50,000 high school students lost that school year (BBC Mundo, 2011; La Nación, 2011). The insights of this study are relevant for policymakers in least three respects.

First, policymakers should expect increased student mobilization as college enrollments increase. Mobilization should be particularly acute when growth is fueled by deregulation and private sector growth, and when the system grows thanks to the incorporation of working class students. To address these class-based grievances, governments should implement system-wide programs to promote the retention and

success of the most vulnerable students. For example, Colombia implemented in 2006 the *Sistema de Prevención de la Deserción en Educación Superior* (SPADIES) information system. According to Fiszbein, Cosentino, & Cumsille (2016, p. 41), SPADIES is used to monitor and track students' socioeconomic status, institutional affiliation, academic progress, and dropout rates in the higher education system in order to improve retention. The government has provided incentives (accreditation and access to funds) to institutions addressing retention issues, which has resulted in a decrease in national dropout rates from 33 percent in 1999 to 13 percent in 2014. Addressing retention and promoting academic success through measures like remedial courses and scholarships should at least in part deal with the grievances associated with increased enrollment in higher education.

Second, policymakers should also consider changes to the higher education system funding structure to address mobilizing grievances. In Peru, the presence of free tuition in public universities and income-based tuition rates in private institutions is associated with relatively low levels of student mobilization; in Chile, the recent decline in student mobilization is associated with the implementation in 2016 of free tuition for the student population at state-accredited colleges who are in the bottom half of the income distribution. Thus, policymakers can provide public funding for at least some of the population or institute tuition rates based on family income to address financial grievances associated with mobilization.

Finally, based on the discussion of the role of party linkages in mobilization, policymakers should also find ways to channel and represent student interests to avoid

the escalation of conflicts. This is especially important in the case of political parties in government, since this study has demonstrated that closer connections between them and students can reduce the frequency of student protests. In a general context of weaker party-society linkages in Latin America (Roberts, 2002) establishing permanent and official channels of communication with student organizations, instead of ad-hoc committees and roundtables once protests are underway, may prevent the eruption of some episodes. Additionally, political parties should redouble their efforts to have a presence in the college scene. Many political parties in the region suffer from oligarchization and low levels of internal democracy due to their low rates of party leadership renewal (Freidenberg, 2006, pp. 102, 120, 129). The establishment (and in some cases reestablishment) of college branches and of student representatives in the parties' leadership positions may promote closer relations between students and parties, and cause colleges to once again become hotbeds for party leadership. The creation of new linkages is particularly pressing in newer, private institutions, and among newly incorporated students, where parties have a lesser presence.

Directions for Future Research

The theory and findings of this dissertation point to several avenues for future work in sociology and political science. In general, the arguments and insights from this study of college student mobilization should be applicable to the study of high school student mobilization in Latin America. Higher levels of high school enrollment are a precondition for increased college attendance, and although public expenditures in

secondary education have overall increased in recent years, there is much intraregional variation (UNESCO, 2014). High school students, according to the LASPD, were present in almost 7% of the college student protests in the region, and have been major actors in countries like Chile (Donoso, 2013; Kubal & Fisher, 2016). It would be worthwhile, therefore, to carry out a similar analysis of high school student mobilization and assess the effect of the same variables presented in this dissertation.

Future research may also benefit from analyzing party linkages to explain variation in mobilization among other social groups. Indeed, variation in party linkages with the government and opposition may also help explain variation in labor activism (Levitsky & Way, 1998; Madrid, 2003; Murillo, 2001) and the rise of ethnic movements (Anria, 2013; Madrid, 2003; Rice, 2012; Van Cott, 2005) in Latin America. As this study suggests, party ties may be important to explain both the frequency and size of labor and ethnic mobilizations.

In terms of student movements, this dissertation has emphasized the role linkages with ruling parties have on the frequency and size of mobilizations. This factor may also explain variation in other key dimensions of protest, like the duration of events, the use of certain protest strategies, and the presence of violence (Carter, 1986), and state repression. Indeed, there is an incipient literature on the determinants of state repression against political dissent to which the variables emphasized in this study might contribute (Ritter, 2014; Ritter & Conrad, 2016). Since the government decides how the state apparatus responds to mobilization, differences in society-party linkages may explain different levels of state repression, both over time and across different social actors. For

example, Medel (2016) suggests that mobilized students in Chile experienced less repression than the indigenous Mapuche but more than organized labor due to each sector's different level of ties to the ruling Concertación, with closer connections being associated with less repression.

The implications of the theory presented in this dissertation are also applicable beyond Latin America. For example, like many Latin American countries, the United Kingdom experienced unusually high levels of student protests in 2010 and 2014 because the population affected by tuition increases was quite large (Brown, Dowling, Harvie, & Milburn, 2013, p. 81; Cammaerts, 2013, p. 531; Taylor, 2014) Other student protests occurred for similar reasons in Canada and the Netherlands (Ratcliffe, 2015). Indeed, protests connected to the rising cost of education are a worldwide occurrence:

[U]niversities and higher education systems have been subject to a wave of student occupations, demonstrations, and strikes. The most high profile of these have occurred in California in the fall of 2009, the United Kingdom in late 2010, Chile for a period of two years that began in the spring of 2011, and Quebec, Canada, in the spring of 2012. But no part of the world has been left untouched (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2014, p. 113).

The higher education system of the United States has experienced some of the same trends as these countries. The country's sizable student population has accumulated massive levels of loan debt so it seems plausible that it might experience comparable mobilizations. Indeed, student financial grievances were expressed during the Occupy Wall Street movement, when hundreds of local protests were organized against tuition hikes, student debt, and for public education (McCarthy, 2012). Whether these same issues will result in sizable, recurrent national protest campaigns is an open question.

This study has also underscored the role that increased enrollment and the incorporation of working class students has on student mobilization. In recent decades, college enrollment in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia has increased substantially but from a very low baseline (Bruneforth, 2010; UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2014). Like in Latin America, this process has been fast but not necessarily well regulated. To the extent that lower income youths begin to attend college en masse, countries in these regions may begin to experience new levels of student mobilization.

The arguments presented in this study about the role of party linkages also travels well to other political contexts. For example, students protesting against tuition hikes in the United Kingdom in 2010 had weak ties to the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition government (Ibrahim, 2011). In the United States, the government of President Donald Trump may experience more and larger student protests than a government led by Hillary Clinton because Democrats in the opposition have close ties to college students (Van Dyke, 2003a, 2003b).

In conclusion, this dissertation explains to a great extent variation in college student mobilization in Latin America, in terms of both size and frequency. The theory advanced here can be applied to other social actors in Latin America and beyond, and can be used to explain other dimensions of social mobilization like state repression of mobilization. My research shows that students in the region mobilize en masse when college is both highly accessible and costly for students, and they mobilize more frequently when they have weaker linkages to the government, and more massively when they have stronger connections to the opposition.

Access to education is a human right, and higher education can become an agent of social change. As the United Nations states, education “promotes individual freedom and empowerment and yields important development benefits. Yet millions of children and adults remain deprived of educational opportunities, many as a result of poverty” (UNESCO, 2016). Explaining the ways education access and finance cause students to mobilize is, therefore, not only academically interesting but also normatively compelling. I hope I have contributed through this dissertation to understanding why students fight for their right to education.

Appendices

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWEES

Table A1. List of Fieldwork Interviewees

| Name | Title(s) (duration) | Organization(s) | Interview Location | Date |
|------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|
| Sergio Bitar | Minister of Education (2003-2005) | PPD | Washington, DC | 6/16/14 |
| Francisco Marmolejo | Tertiary Education Coordinator | World Bank | Washington, DC | 7/25/14 |
| Javier Botero | Senior Education Specialist | World Bank | Washington, DC | 8/6/14 |
| Michael Crawford | Lead Education Specialist | World Bank | | 8/14/14 |
| Maria Paulina Mogollón | Financial & Private Sector Development Specialist | World Bank | Santiago (telephone interview) | 8/19/14 |
| Elena Arias | Education Senior Associate | Inter-American Development Bank | Washington, DC | 8/15/14 |
| Patti McGill Peterson | Presidential Advisor for Global Initiatives | American Council on Education | Washington, DC | 8/15/14 |
| Andrés Fielbaum | President (2012-2013) | FECH, IA | Santiago | 8/28/14 |
| Eugenio Guzmán | Dean, School of Government | Universidad del Desarrollo | Santiago | 9/11/14 |
| María José Elizalde | Councilmember (2010) | FECH, PS | Santiago | 10/8/14 |
| Felipe Garrido | Executive Secretary | FEUV, ON | Valparaiso | 10/16/14 |

Note: PPD: Party for Democracy; FECH: University of Chile Student Federation; IA: Autonomous Left; PS: Socialist Party of Chile; FEUV: University of Valparaiso Student Federation; ON: Oveja Negra Collective; FEUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; NAU: New University Action; FEPUCV: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; MA: Autonomist Movement; PC: Communist Party of Chile; FEUAH: Alberto Hurtado University Student Federation; NIU: New University Left; FEUCENTRAL: Central University Student Federation; PUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile; MG: Gremialista Movement; Libertarian Students Front; FEUTAL: University of Talca Student Federation; MINEDUC: Chilean Ministry of Education; UMCE: Metropolitan University of Education Sciences; FEUTM: Federico Santa Maria University Student Federation; FEUSACH: Santiago de Chile University Student Federation; PUCP: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru; CNE: National Education Commission, Peruvian Ministry of Education; UDI: Democratic Independent Union; FEPUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru Student Federation; UNMSM: National University of San Marcos; FIU: United Leftist Front; PCP-PT: Communist Party of Peru - Red Fatherland; TL: Land and Liberty; MINEDU: Peruvian Ministry of Education; SUNEDU: MINEDU National Superintendency of University Education.

Table A1. List of Fieldwork Interviewees, cont.

| Name | Title(s) (duration) | Organization(s) | Interview Location | Date |
|---|---|------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| Maria Ignacia Pinto | Executive Secretary | FEUC, NAU | Santiago | 10/7/14 |
| Jorge Sharp | President (2009); Mayor of Valparaíso | FEPUCV, IA; MA | Valparaíso | 10/16/14 |
| Julio Sarmiento | President (2009-2010) | FECH, PC | Santiago | 10/14/14 |
| Jonathan Serracino | President (2006, 2009) | FEUAH, NIU | Santiago (Skype interview) | 10/13/14 |
| Pablo Zenteno | President (2009) | FEUCENTRAL, PC | Santiago | 10/14/14 |
| Julio Lira | President (2002-2003) | FECH, PC | Santiago | 10/22/14 |
| Felipe Melo | President (2003-2004) | FECH, PC | Santiago | 10/10/14 |
| Nicolás del Canto | Student leader | PUC, NAU | Santiago | 10/29/14 |
| Giorgio Jackson | President (2011); Deputy, Congressional District 22 | FEUC, NAU; RD | Santiago | 10/24/14 |
| Nicolás Grau | President (2005-2006) | FECH, NIU | Santiago | 10/27/14 |
| Diego Gómez | Student leader | PUC, MG | Santiago | 10/28/14 |
| <p>Note: PPD: Party for Democracy; FECH: University of Chile Student Federation; IA: Autonomous Left; PS: Socialist Party of Chile; FEUV: University of Valparaíso Student Federation; ON: Oveja Negra Collective; FEUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; NAU: New University Action; FEPUCV: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; MA: Autonomist Movement; PC: Communist Party of Chile; FEUAH: Alberto Hurtado University Student Federation; NIU: New University Left; FEUCENTRAL: Central University Student Federation; PUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile; MG: Gremialista Movement; Libertarian Students Front; FEUTAL: University of Talca Student Federation; MINEDUC: Chilean Ministry of Education; UMCE: Metropolitan University of Education Sciences; FEUTM: Federico Santa Maria University Student Federation; FEUSACH: Santiago de Chile University Student Federation; PUCP: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru; CNE: National Education Commission, Peruvian Ministry of Education; UDI: Democratic Independent Union; FEPUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru Student Federation; UNMSM: National University of San Marcos; FIU: United Leftist Front; PCP-PT: Communist Party of Peru - Red Fatherland; TL: Land and Liberty; MINEDU: Peruvian Ministry of Education; SUNEDU: MINEDU National Superintendency of University Education.</p> | | | | |

Table A1. List of Fieldwork Interviewees, cont.

| Name | Title(s) (duration) | Organization(s) | Interview Location | Date |
|----------------------|---|-------------------------|--------------------|----------|
| Luis Thielemann | Student leader | University of Chile, IA | Santiago | 11/6/15 |
| Nicolás Valenzuela | Secretary General (2009) | FEUC, NAU | Santiago | 11/7/14 |
| Felipe Ramírez | Felipe Ramírez (2011) | FECH, FEL | Santiago | 11/11/14 |
| Víctor Orellana | Student leader | University of Chile, IA | Santiago | 11/13/14 |
| Mabel Araya | Student leader | PUC, FEL | Santiago | 11/20/14 |
| Simón Ramírez | Student leader | PUC, FEL | Santiago | 11/20/14 |
| Carlos Rivera | President (2000-2001); Department of Student Affairs Representative (2003-2008) | FEUTAL; MINEDUC, PS | Santiago | 10/30/04 |
| Alejandro Ormeño | Rector (1990-1994) | UMCE, DC | Santiago | 10/30/04 |
| Pilar Armanet | Chief, Higher Education Division (2000-2006) | MINEDUC, DC | Santiago | 11/4/16 |
| Ernesto Schiefelbein | Minister of Education (1994) | DC | Santiago | 11/4/16 |
| Víctor Muñoz | Sociology Professor | University of Chile | Santiago | 11/5/14 |

Note: PPD: Party for Democracy; FECH: University of Chile Student Federation; IA: Autonomous Left; PS: Socialist Party of Chile; FEUV: University of Valparaiso Student Federation; ON: Oveja Negra Collective; FEUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; NAU: New University Action; FEPUCV: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; MA: Autonomist Movement; PC: Communist Party of Chile; FEUAH: Alberto Hurtado University Student Federation; NIU: New University Left; FEUCENTRAL: Central University Student Federation; PUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile; MG: Gremialista Movement; Libertarian Students Front; FEUTAL: University of Talca Student Federation; MINEDUC: Chilean Ministry of Education; UMCE: Metropolitan University of Education Sciences; FEUTM: Federico Santa Maria University Student Federation; FEUSACH: Santiago de Chile University Student Federation; PUCP: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru; CNE: National Education Commission, Peruvian Ministry of Education; UDI: Democratic Independent Union; FEPUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru Student Federation; UNMSM: National University of San Marcos; FIU: United Leftist Front; PCP-PT: Communist Party of Peru - Red Fatherland; TL: Land and Liberty; MINEDU: Peruvian Ministry of Education; SUNEDU: MINEDU National Superintendency of University Education.

Table A1. List of Fieldwork Interviewees, cont.

| Name | Title(s) (duration) | Organization(s) | Interview Location | Date |
|----------------------|--|---|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Carlos Meléndez | Political Science Professor | PUC | Santiago | 11/13/14 |
| Horacio Walker | Dean, School of Education | Diego Portales University | Santiago | 11/14/14 |
| María José Lemaitre | Technical Secretary (1990-2007); Executive Director | National Undergraduate Accreditation Commission, MINEDUC; Inter-University Development Center | Santiago | 11/20/14 |
| Mariana Aylwin | Minister of Education (2000-2003) | DC | Santiago | 11/27/14 |
| Álvaro Cabrera | President (1999) | FECH, PC | Santiago | 11/5/14 |
| Juan Carraha | Student leader | PUC, NAU | Santiago | 11/27/14 |
| Marcos Lozano | President (2007-2009) | FEUTM | Santiago | 11/24/14 |
| Joaquín Walker | President (2010) | FEUC, NAU | Santiago | 11/24/14 |
| Alberto Millán | Student leader | PUC, NAU | Santiago | 11/24/14 |
| José Joaquín Brunner | Minister General Secretary of Government (1994-1998); Director, Higher Education Program | Chile; Diego Portales University | Santiago | 11/25/14 |
| Francisco Arellano | Student leader | University of Chile, IA | Santiago | 12/4/14 |

Note: PPD: Party for Democracy; FECH: University of Chile Student Federation; IA: Autonomous Left; PS: Socialist Party of Chile; FEUV: University of Valparaíso Student Federation; ON: Oveja Negra Collective; FEUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; NAU: New University Action; FEPUCV: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; MA: Autonomist Movement; PC: Communist Party of Chile; FEUAH: Alberto Hurtado University Student Federation; NIU: New University Left; FEUCENTRAL: Central University Student Federation; PUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile; MG: Gremialista Movement; Libertarian Students Front; FEUTAL: University of Talca Student Federation; MINEDUC: Chilean Ministry of Education; UMCE: Metropolitan University of Education Sciences; FEUTM: Federico Santa María University Student Federation; FEUSACH: Santiago de Chile University Student Federation; PUCP: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru; CNE: National Education Commission, Peruvian Ministry of Education; UDI: Democratic Independent Union; FEPUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru Student Federation; UNMSM: National University of San Marcos; FIU: United Leftist Front; PCP-PT: Communist Party of Peru - Red Fatherland; TL: Land and Liberty; MINEDU: Peruvian Ministry of Education; SUNEDU: MINEDU National Superintendency of University Education.

Table A1. List of Fieldwork Interviewees, cont.

| Name | Title(s) (duration) | Organization(s) | Interview Location | Date |
|--------------------|--|--|--------------------|---------|
| Renato Calderón | Student leader | PUC, NAU | Santiago | 12/4/14 |
| Claudio Orrego | President; Intendent | FEUC, DC; Santiago Metropolitan Region | Santiago | 12/4/14 |
| Gonzalo Zapata | Education Professor | PUC | Santiago | 12/5/14 |
| Camilo Ballesteros | President (2010-2011); Director, Social Organizations Division | FEUSACH, PC; Ministry of Interior | Santiago | 12/9/14 |
| Rossan Castiglioni | Political Science Professor | Diego Portales University | Santiago | 1/27/15 |
| Noelia Chávez | Student leader | PUCP | Lima | 2/18/15 |
| José Távara | Academic Director, Economics Department | PUCP | Lima | 2/25/15 |
| Ricardo Cuenca | Director; Councilmember | Institute of Peruvian Studies; CNE | Lima | 2/25/15 |
| Julio Cáceda | Student leader | PUCP | Lima | 2/26/15 |
| Julio Mori | Student leader; Advisor to Congressman Daniel Mora | UNMSM | Lima | 2/27/15 |
| Michael Ortiz | President (2012-2015) | FEP, PCP-PT | Lima | 3/4/15 |

Note: PPD: Party for Democracy; FECH: University of Chile Student Federation; IA: Autonomous Left; PS: Socialist Party of Chile; FEUV: University of Valparaíso Student Federation; ON: Oveja Negra Collective; FEUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; NAU: New University Action; FEPUCV: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; MA: Autonomist Movement; PC: Communist Party of Chile; FEUAH: Alberto Hurtado University Student Federation; NIU: New University Left; FEUCENTRAL: Central University Student Federation; PUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile; MG: Gremialista Movement; Libertarian Students Front; FEUTAL: University of Talca Student Federation; MINEDUC: Chilean Ministry of Education; UMCE: Metropolitan University of Education Sciences; FEUTM: Federico Santa María University Student Federation; FEUSACH: Santiago de Chile University Student Federation; PUCP: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru; CNE: National Education Commission, Peruvian Ministry of Education; UDI: Democratic Independent Union; FEPUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru Student Federation; UNMSM: National University of San Marcos; FIU: United Leftist Front; PCP-PT: Communist Party of Peru - Red Fatherland; TL: Land and Liberty; MINEDU: Peruvian Ministry of Education; SUNEDU: MINEDU National Superintendency of University Education.

Table A1. List of Fieldwork Interviewees, cont.

| Name | Title(s) (duration) | Organization(s) | Interview Location | Date |
|-------------------|--|---|--------------------|---------|
| Rolando Ames | Political Science Professor; Senator (1985-1990) | PUCP; FIU | Lima | 5/5/15 |
| Emilio Salcedo | Student leader | Peruvian University of Applied Sciences, PUCP | Lima | 5/6/15 |
| Nicolás Lynch | Minister of Education (2001-2002) | | Lima | 5/6/15 |
| Marité Bustamante | President (2010); City of Lima Councilmember (2011-2015) | UNMSM Law Student Center, PCP-PT; TL | Lima | 5/6/15 |
| Omar Cavero | Student leader; researcher | PUCP, MINEDU | Lima | 5/7/15 |
| Alejandra Alayza | President (1999) | FEPUC | Lima | 5/11/15 |
| César Ames | President (2014) | UNMSM Social Sciences Student Union | Lima | 5/12/15 |
| Nelson Manrique | Sociology Professor | PUCP | Lima | 5/12/15 |
| Álvaro Vidal | Student leader | PUCP, UNMSM | Lima | 5/13/15 |
| Zenón Depaz | Philosophy Professor; Councilmember | UNMSM; SUNEDU | Lima | 5/14/15 |
| Johanna Rodríguez | President (2003) | FEPUC | Lima | 5/14/15 |

Note: PPD: Party for Democracy; FECH: University of Chile Student Federation; IA: Autonomous Left; PS: Socialist Party of Chile; FEUV: University of Valparaíso Student Federation; ON: Oveja Negra Collective; FEUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; NAU: New University Action; FEPUCV: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Student Federation; MA: Autonomist Movement; PC: Communist Party of Chile; FEUAH: Alberto Hurtado University Student Federation; NIU: New University Left; FEUCENTRAL: Central University Student Federation; PUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile; MG: Gremialista Movement; Libertarian Students Front; FEUTAL: University of Talca Student Federation; MINEDUC: Chilean Ministry of Education; UMCE: Metropolitan University of Education Sciences; FEUTM: Federico Santa María University Student Federation; FEUSACH: Santiago de Chile University Student Federation; PUCP: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru; CNE: National Education Commission, Peruvian Ministry of Education; UDI: Democratic Independent Union; FEPUC: Pontifical Catholic University of Peru Student Federation; UNMSM: National University of San Marcos; FIU: United Leftist Front; PCP-PT: Communist Party of Peru - Red Fatherland; TL: Land and Liberty; MINEDU: Peruvian Ministry of Education; SUNEDU: MINEDU National Superintendency of University Education.

APPENDIX B: GUIDELINE FOR CODING PROTEST EVENTS

Guía para codificación de eventos de protesta estudiantil

Adaptado del Instructivo del Proyecto Fondecyt iniciación 11121147, Nicolás Somma

Rodolfo Disi

Notas:

- Leer el instructivo antes de codificar.
- Antes cualquier pregunta contactar en rdisip@gmail.com (preguntas complejos), +569 4217 7987 (preguntas urgentes), o por whatsapp (preguntas simples).
- Se puede modificar a posteriori datos de un evento codificado.
 - Esto es particularmente importante en el caso que un evento sea realmente la continuación o conclusión de un evento anterior. Por ejemplo, un evento sobre choques entre estudiantes y policías cuando los últimos ingresan a universidad para quebrar una toma es, en definitiva, la continuación del evento de toma de universidad. En este caso, si ya se codificó el evento de toma, este se debe modificar en vez de codificar un evento nuevo.

1.

- Elegir codificador.

2.

- Anotar número de evento que aparece al costado izquierdo del evento en rojo.

3.

- Anotar número de página del documento .pdf. Este número NO es es que aparece anotado en cada página específica.

Ubicación y Fecha

4.

- Elegir país

5

- Ingresar la ciudad donde ocurrió el evento o la ciudad más cercana a donde ocurrió. Si no hay información sobre alguno de estos campos dejarlo en blanco.
- Si en un mismo evento se mencionan acciones en más de un lugar (ej. Lima y Tacna), reportarlos en orden de aparición (hasta 5).

6

- Seleccionar mes, día, y año en que ocurre el evento. La fecha aparece en cada página donde empieza un evento.

- Importante: si se ingresa a mano, ingresar fecha del modo anglosajón (Mes/Día/Año).
- Puede ocurrir que se mencione que el evento ocurrió en el pasado (p. ej. “ayer”, “la semana pasada”, “durante el mes de junio”, etc.). Si es así, anotar la fecha aproximada más cercana (ej.: “ayer”, restar un día; “la semana pasada”, restar 7 días; “el mes pasado”, anotar el día reportado pero del mes anterior).

Manifestantes

7.

- Seleccionar hasta cuatro tipos de estudiantes que participen en la protesta. Si se reportan más de cuatro, seleccionar los cuatro más importantes en términos de participación.
- Si no se menciona ningún tipo específico de estudiante seleccionar “No se especifica”
- No hay inconveniente si se superponen dos o más tipos (ej. “indígenas” y “estudiantes de pedagogía”).
- Si se reporta algún tipo que no aparece en las opciones predefinidas seleccionar “Otro” y escribirlo.

8.

- Escribir el nombre de cada institución de educación superior cuyos estudiantes participen en la protesta.
- Escribir de preferencia las siglas de la institución (UBA, USP, UNAB, etc.) separadas por una coma. Saltar si no se menciona ninguna.

9.

- Seleccionar hasta cuatro grupos sociales que participen en la protesta con los estudiantes. Si se reportan más de cuatro, seleccionar los cuatro más importantes por participación.
- No hay inconveniente si se superponen dos o más grupos (ej. “indígenas” y “campesinos”).
- Si se reporta algún grupo que no aparece en las opciones predefinidas seleccionar “Otro” y escribirlo.
- Ejemplos de los grupos sociales:
 1. Estudiantes secundarios: estudiantes de liceos, colegios, etc.
 2. Profesores universitarios: docentes, instructores de instituciones de educación superior
 3. Trabajadores: del sector público, privado, independientes, miembros de sindicatos, etc.
 4. Campesinos y agricultores: granjeros, jornaleros, etc.

5. Militantes de partidos y otras organizaciones políticas: militantes del PRI (México), del FPMR (Chile), etc.
 6. Grupos étnicos (indígenas, afrodescendientes): Mapuches, aimaras, negros, etc.
 7. Grupos animalistas y/o ambientalistas: miembros de Patagonias sin Represas, PETA, etc.
 8. Minorías sexuales: Gays, lesbianas, transexuales, etc.
 9. Grupos de Derecho Humanos: Agrupación de familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos, Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo, etc.
 10. Habitantes de una localidad: vecinos de un barrio, residentes de una ciudad, habitantes de una región, etc.
- 10.
- Si se reporta información de dos o más fuentes (p. ej. carabineros y manifestantes) anotar el promedio.
 - Elegir la estimación que parezca más razonable en función del resto de la información sobre el evento. Por ejemplo:
 - Si se reporta que los manifestantes llenaron la principal avenida de una gran ciudad, elegir “miles” o “decenas de miles” (según el tamaño de la ciudad).
 - Si se reporta que los estudiantes de una universidad grande iniciaron una huelga elegir “cientos” o “miles”.
 - Si se reporta que los activistas llegaron al lugar en un sólo camión, elegir “grupo chico”.
 - Si no existe información para realizar una estimación, elegir “No hay suficiente información”.

Blancos y Demandas

- 11,
- Seleccionar la entidad a la que va dirigida la protesta.
 - Si la protesta está dirigida a una persona con nombre y apellido, marcar la opción que indique la procedencia institucional de la misma. Por ejemplo, si la protesta es contra el Presidente, marcar “gobierno nacional”. Si es hacia el decano de una facultad, marcar “instituciones educacionales”. Si la persona no pertenece a ninguna institución marcar “Otro” y escribir el nombre y apellido de la persona.
 - La opción “Otros grupos sociales” comprende protestas contra grupos sociales. Un ejemplo sería una marcha de estudiantes en contra de las demandas por mejoras salariales hechas por profesores universitarios.
 - Si se selecciona la opción “Otro”, escribir el grupo o persona particular referidos (hasta tres, por orden de importancia).

12.

- Luego identificar la demanda en el listado específico del menú y seleccionarla.
 - Si pertenece a cierta “Educación” pero no es específica, seleccionar alguna de las “Educación: general”
 - Si es una demanda específica de educación o de otro tema no que no está contemplado en la lista, seleccionar el “Otro” y escribir.
- Basarse en el texto - no atribuir demandas en base al conocimiento previo del movimiento.

13

- Identificar si las demandas son principalmente para promover a oponerse a un cambio. Ejemplos:
 - Promover: demandas para que una universidad aumente el número de becas.
 - Oponerse: demandas para que no se apruebe una ley que reduce los recursos destinados a investigación.

14.

- Identificar la táctica en el listado específico del menú y seleccionarla. A continuación aparece el listado de tácticas específicas, con algo más de detalle y ejemplos que en el formulario web. Consultarlo hasta familiarizarse con el mismo.
- Seleccionar hasta cuatro tácticas en total – si se mencionan más de cuatro seleccionar los cuatro más importantes, privilegiando las que usan los estudiantes por los que usan solamente otros grupos sociales involucrados.
- Si no aparece la táctica en el listado, seleccionar “Otro” y anotarla. Anotar hasta cuatro tácticas en total no especificadas en el listado; si hay más de cuatro anotar las más importantes.
- Si se hace referencia a una táctica ligada al evento, pero que no está teniendo lugar ahí mismo, **no anotarla** (p. ej., si el evento reporta una manifestación frente a la CONADI por maltrato a mapuches en huelga de hambre, no seleccionar el código correspondiente a “huelga de hambre”, pero sí seleccionar “102. Manifestación o movilización”).

Tácticas pacíficas I (códigos 101-107)

101. Marcha. Desplazamiento colectivo por calles, parques, plazas u otros espacios públicos. Habitualmente aparece el término “marcha”. Si aparecen otros términos (como “manifestación” o “movilización”) pero hay evidencia de desplazamiento colectivo, codificar como “marcha”.

102. “Manifestación” o “movilización”. Reunión de personas que protestan en espacios públicos que, a diferencia de la marcha, no supone desplazamiento colectivo.
103. Acto con oradores, posiblemente con equipos de amplificación y plataformas o escenarios (p. ej. actos del 1 de mayo).
104. Conferencia de prensa o declaración pública.
105. Asamblea, debate público, u otro evento deliberativo y de debate entre los participantes.
106. Acto artístico, simbólico o cultural. Puede ser musical, teatral, danza, uso de muñecos o marionetas, exposición de imágenes o videos, etc. . Puede ser que no lo hagan los propios manifestantes sino que se menciona la existencia de un grupo artístico. También puede ser actividades simbólicas no estrictamente artísticas que exigen coordinación previa entre varios participantes. En ocasiones son transgresoras. Aquí entran los caceroleos, besatones, corridas alrededor de la Moneda, bicicletadas, marchas en ropa interior, desnudos en público y similares
107. Entregar de petitorio. Presentación de carta o documento con demandas a autoridades universitarias o políticas.
108. Conmemoración u homenaje a fechas, eventos, grupos o individuos (posiblemente mártires o líderes sociales)

Tácticas disruptivas no violentas (códigos 201-206)

201. Huelga o paro de actividades (Ojo: huelgas de hambre llevan el código 301).
202. Toma u ocupación de instalaciones de la institución educacional a la que pertenecen los estudiantes.
203. Toma u ocupación de otros lugares (edificios públicos, fábricas, etc.)
204. Cortes o tomas de rutas, calles, caminos, puertos, puentes o accesos.
205. Interrupción de actividades de autoridades políticas u otras élites (por ejemplo ingreso en comisión de parlamento, etc.)
206. Funas, escraches. Protesta contra individuos, grupos u organizaciones, generalmente congregándose en el lugar de trabajo, domicilio, o sede. La Comisión Funa organiza buena parte de las mismas en Chile.

Tácticas violentas y autodestructivas (códigos 301-307)

301. Huelga de hambre y otros actos autodestructivos. Aunque la realice sólo una persona, por lo general hay un grupo que la apoya por lo que puede considerarse como una protesta colectiva. También incluye actos peligrosos o autodestructivos como forma de llamar la atención. Por ejemplo, cadena humana a través del Mapocho, quema a lo bonzo, o cualquier tipo de autoinmolación de los participantes. Huelga de hambre se codifica como una actividad distinta.
302. Ataques y destrucción de propiedad pública (señaléticas, semáforos, estatuas, etc.)
303. Ataques y destrucción de propiedad privada (autos, quioscos, negocios, etc.)
304. Uso de armas (blanca, incendiarias, de fuego, etc.) de parte de los manifestantes.
305. Ataque a policías, guardias de seguridad o fuerzas armadas.

306. Ataques a terceros no involucrados (ej. Transeúntes, conductores de micro, comerciantes, etc.).
307. Ataques a otros manifestantes o contramanifestantes. Por ejemplo, ataques por parte de estudiantes a profesores universitarios manifestándose demandando mejoras salariales.

15.

- Seleccionar “Sí” si se menciona que la policía u otras fuerzas de orden u seguridad “eprimen a los manifestantes usando fuerza física, bombas lacrimógenas, carros lanzaaguas, etc.

16.

- Seleccionar “Sí” si se menciona que las fuerzas de orden y seguridad arrestan a manifestantes.

17.

- Seleccionar “Sí” si se menciona que hay heridos y/o muertos, tanto entre los manifestantes, policía o terceros no involucrados.

P18

- Anotar cualquier comentario sobre el evento que crea que el equipo de investigación debe tener en cuenta.

APPENDIX C: MISSING MONTHS PER COUNTRY IN OSAL CONFLICT BRIEFS

Table C1. Missing Months in OSAL Conflict Briefs

| Country | Months | Number of Missing months | Percentage of missing months (157 months per country-year) |
|--|---|--------------------------|--|
| Argentina | None | 0 | 0 |
| Bolivia | Sept to Dec 2012 | 4 | 2.56 |
| Brazil | July to Dec 2012 | 6 | 3.85 |
| Chile | Sept to Dec 2012 | 4 | 2.56 |
| Colombia | Aug to Dec 2012 | 5 | 3.21 |
| Costa Rica | Feb 2008, Nov 2009, Nov-Dec 2012 | 4 | 2.56 |
| Dominican Republic | Jan-Apr 2000, Jan-Apr 2004, Jun-Dec 2012 | 15 | 9.62 |
| Ecuador | Jan 2012, Jun-Dec 2012 | 8 | 5.13 |
| El Salvador | Jan-Apr 2000, Jan-Feb 2008, May 2008, Oct-Dec 2012 | 10 | 6.41 |
| Guatemala | Sept-Dec 2012 | 4 | 2.56 |
| Honduras | Jan-Apr 2000, Feb-March 2008, Oct-Dec 2012 | 9 | 5.77 |
| Mexico | Aug 2009, May-Dec 2012 | 9 | 5.77 |
| Nicaragua | Jan-Apr 2000, Jul-Dec 2012 | 10 | 6.41 |
| Panama | Jan-Apr 2000, Jan-Feb 2008, Aug-Dec 2012 | 12 | 7.69 |
| Paraguay | May-Aug 2005, Dec 2007, Jul-Dec 2012 | 11 | 7.05 |
| Peru | Oct 2008, Dec 2008, Oct-Dec 2009, Year 2012 | 5 | 3.47 |
| Uruguay | Jan-Apr 2000, Nov 2007, May 2008, Feb 2012, Oct-Dec 2012 | 10 | 6.41 |
| Venezuela | Jan-Apr 2000, Dec 2007, Jan 2009, Nov 2009, Jan-Feb 2010, July-Dec 2010, Year 2011, Year 2012 | 15 | 11.36 |
| Total | | 141 | 5.09 |
| Source: Author's elaboration based on LASPD | | | |
| Note: Number of months Peru: 144 (2012 excluded); 132 in Venezuela (2011 and 2012 excluded); Total: 2772 (12 months × 231 years) | | | |

APPENDIX D: EXPERT SURVEY FORMS PER COUNTRY

Argentina

Figure D1 Argentina Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Argentina. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Argentina entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Argentina en el período 1999-2015. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Carlos Menem (~1999) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Fernando de la Rúa | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Adolfo Rodríguez Saá | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Eduardo Duhalde | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Néstor Kirchner | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Cristina Fernández de Kirchner | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Mauricio Macri (2015-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D1 Argentina Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview> 2/3

Figure D1 Argentina Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Bolivia

Figure D2 Bolivia Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Bolivia. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Bolivia entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Bolivia en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|---------------------------|---|--|
| Hugo Bánzer (~2001) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Jorge Quiroga | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Carlos Mesa | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Eduardo Rodríguez | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Evo Morales (2006-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D2 Bolivia Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D2 Bolivia Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Brazil

Figure D3 Brazil Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimado/a senhor/a:

Bemvindo a este levantamento para especialistas em partidos políticos e atores sociais no Brasil. Esta pesquisa é parte do meu projeto de pesquisa de doutorado, o qual ajuda completar o grau do Doutor em Governo. Meu orientador é Dr. Raúl Madrid da Universidade de Texas em Austin. O/a senhor/a foi eleito/a como possível participante na pesquisa porque, dada a sua carreira e experiência, considero que suas respostas podem ser uma fonte importante para meu projeto. Agradeço sua participação nesta pesquisa sobre a conexão entre partidos políticos y estudantes do ensino superior.

Lhe solicito pensar no degrau de **conexão entre partidos políticos e estudantes do ensino superior** no Brasil entre 1999 e 2015 a nível nacional. A conexão entre partidos y estudantes consiste principalmente em duas coisas: por um lado, na presença dos partidos nos campus universitários através de, por exemplo, asas universitárias; por outra parte, na militância de estudantes do ensino superior nos partidos, incluindo nas posições de liderança e nas diretorias. Estas conexões podem ser tanto formais como informais, ideológicas como clientelista.

Muito obrigado por adiante por compartilhar a seu conhecimento do assunto!

As seguintes perguntas lhe dão a opção de registrar informação para o Brasil no período 1999-2015 a nível nacional. Por favor registre dados dos partidos e anos para os quais o/a senhor/a sente que seu nível de experiência lhe permite fazer uma avaliação informada.

Numa escala de 1 a 10, onde 1 é "mínima conexão" e 10 é "nível muito alto de conexão," como o/a senhor/a descreveria o nível de **conexão entre as organizações estudiantes do ensino superior e os partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nível nacional?

| | Partidos na aliança governante | Partidos da oposição (se houve) |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| Fernando Henrique Cardoso (-2003) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Dilma Rousseff (2011-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Você tem comentários sobre o acima? Se não eles, deixe seção em branco.

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

1/3

Figure D3 Brazil Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor dá exemplos de partidos que já tiveram conexões fortes com organizações estudantis e descreve a natureza destas conexões.

Muito obrigado por contribuir seu conhecimento a esta pesquisa!

Ter um amplo conjunto de especialistas que contribuíam informação para os distintos países seria muito benéfico para esta pesquisa. Para finalizar, lhe agradecería se poder sugerir mais especialistas que puderam contribuir a esta pesquisa. Deixe esta seção em branco se você não quiser sugerir especialistas.

| | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nome | <input type="text"/> |
| Especialista em país | <input type="text"/> |
| Instituição | <input type="text"/> |
| Endereço de correio eletrônico | <input type="text"/> |

Outro especialista. Caso você nao tenha outras sugestões, deixe esta seção em branco.

| | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| Especialista em país | <input type="text"/> |
| Instituição | <input type="text"/> |
| Endereço de correio eletrônico | <input type="text"/> |

Outro especialista. Caso você nao tenha outras sugestões, deixe esta seção em branco.

| | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| Especialista em país | <input type="text"/> |
| Instituição | <input type="text"/> |
| Endereço de correio eletrônico | <input type="text"/> |

Figure D3 Brazil Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Outro especialista. Caso você não tenha outras sugestões, deixe esta seção em branco.

| | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nome | <input type="text"/> |
| Especialista em país | <input type="text"/> |
| Instituição | <input type="text"/> |
| Endereço de correio eletrônico | <input type="text"/> |

Você chegou ao final da esta pesquisa de especialistas. Obrigado por contribuir para este estudo!

Chile

Figure D4 Chile Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Chile. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Chile entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Chile en el período 1999-2015. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (-2000) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Ricardo Lagos | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Sebastián Piñera | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Michelle Bachelet (2014-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D4 Chile Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D4 Chile Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Colombia

Figure D5 Colombia Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Colombia. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Colombia entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Colombia en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| Andrés Pastrana (~2002) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Álvaro Uribe | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Juan Manuel Santos (2010-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

1/3

Figure D5 Colombia Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D5 Colombia Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Costa Rica

Figure D6 Costa Rica Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Costa Rica. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Costa Rica entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Costa Rica en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|
| Miguel Rodríguez Echeverría (~2002) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Abel Pacheco de la Espriella | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Óscar Arias | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Laura Chinchilla | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Luis Guillermo Solís (2014-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D6 Costa Rica Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D6 Costa Rica Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Dominican Republic

Figure D7 Dominican Republic Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en la República Dominicana. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en la República Dominicana entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para la República Dominicana en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|--|---|--|
| Leonel Antonio Fernández Reyna (-2000) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Rafael Hipólito Mejía Domínguez | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Leonel Antonio Fernández Reyna (2004-2012) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Danilo Medina Sánchez (2012-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D7 Dominican Republic Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D7 Dominican Republic Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Ecuador

Figure D8 Ecuador Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Ecuador. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Ecuador entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Ecuador en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|-----------------------|---|--|
| Jamil Mahuad (-2000) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Gustavo Noboa | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Lucio Gutiérrez | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Alfredo Palacio | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Rafael Correa (2007-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D8 Ecuador Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D8 Ecuador Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

El Salvador

Figure D9 El Salvador Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en El Salvador. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en El Salvador entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para El Salvador en el período 1999-2015. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| Armando Calderón Sol (-1999) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Francisco Flores | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Elias Antonio Saca | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Mauricio Funes | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Salvador Sánchez Cerén (2014-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D9 El Salvador Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D9 El Salvador Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Guatemala

Figure D10 Guatemala Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Guatemala. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Guatemala entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Guatemala en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| Álvaro Arzú (~2000) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Alfonso Portillo | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Óscar Berger | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Álvaro Colom | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Otto Pérez Molina | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

1/3

Figure D10 Guatemala Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D10 Guatemala Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Honduras

Figure D11 Honduras Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Honduras. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Honduras entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Honduras en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|------------------------------------|---|--|
| Carlos Roberto Flores (-2002) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Ricardo Maduro Joest | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| José Manuel Zelaya Rosales | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Roberto Micheletti Bain (interino) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Porfirio Lobo Sosa | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Juan Orlando Hernández (2014-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D11 Honduras Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D11 Honduras Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Mexico

Figure D12 Mexico Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en México. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en México entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para México en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| Ernesto Zedillo (~2000) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Vicente Fox | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Felipe Calderón | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D12 Mexico Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D12 Mexico Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Nicaragua

Figure D13 Nicaragua Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Nicaragua. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Nicaragua entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Nicaragua en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|------------------------|---|--|
| Arnoldo Alemán (~2002) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Enrique Bolaños | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Daniel Ortega (2007-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

1/3

Figure D13 Nicaragua Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D13 Nicaragua Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Panamá

Figure D14 Panama Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Panamá. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Panamá entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Panamá en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|---|---|--|
| Ernesto Pérez Balladares González Revilla (-1999) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Mireya Elisa Moscoso Rodríguez | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Martín Erasto Torrijos Espino | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Ricardo Alberto Martinelli Berrocal | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Juan Carlos Varela (2014-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D14 Panama Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

Institución

Dirección de correo electrónico

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

Nombre

País de Experticia

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D14 Panama Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Paraguay

Figure D15 Paraguay Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Paraguay. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Paraguay entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Paraguay en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| Raúl Cubas Grau (-1999) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Luis González Macchi | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Nicanor Duarte Frutos | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Fernando Lugo | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Federico Franco | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Horacio Cartes (2013-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

1/3

Figure D15 Paraguay Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D15 Paraguay Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Peru

Figure D16 Peru Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en el Perú. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en el Perú entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para el Perú en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| Alberto Fujimori (~2000) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Valentín Paniagua (transitorio) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Alejandro Toledo | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Alan García | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Ollanta Humala (2011-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D16 Peru Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D16 Peru Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Uruguay

Figure D17 Uruguay Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Uruguay. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Uruguay entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Uruguay en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| Julio María Sanguinetti (-2000) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Jorge Batlle | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| José Mujica | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Tabaré Vázquez (2015-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D17 Uruguay Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D17 Uruguay Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

Venezuela

Figure D18 Venezuela Expert Survey

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Estimada/o:

Bienvenido a esta encuesta para expertos en partidos políticos y actores sociales en Venezuela. Este estudio es parte de mi proyecto de investigación de disertación conducente al grado de Doctor en Gobierno. Mi profesor guía es el Dr. Raúl Madrid de la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Usted ha sido elegida/o como posible participante en mi estudio porque, dadas su carrera y experiencia, considero que sus respuestas pueden ser una fuente importante para mi proyecto. Agradezco su participación en esta investigación sobre la conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios.

Le solicito pensar en el nivel de **conexión entre partidos políticos y estudiantes terciarios** en Venezuela entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional. La conexión entre partidos y estudiantes consiste principalmente de dos cosas: por un lado, en la presencia de los partidos en los campus universitarios a través de, por ejemplo, alas universitarias; por otra parte, en la militancia de estudiantes terciarios en los partidos, incluyendo en posiciones de liderazgo y en las directivas. Esta conexiones pueden ser tanto formales como informales, ideológicas como clientelares.

¡Muchas gracias por adelantado por compartir su experticia!

Las siguientes dos preguntas le darán la opción de ingresar información para Venezuela en el período 1999-2015 a nivel nacional. Por favor ingrese datos de los partidos y años para los cuales sienta que su nivel de experticia le permite hacer una evaluación informada.

En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es "mínima conexión" y 10 es "nivel muy alto de conexión," ¿cómo describiría usted el nivel de **conexión entre las organizaciones estudiantiles terciarias y los partidos políticos** entre 1999 y 2015 a nivel nacional?

| | Partidos en la coalición de gobierno | Partidos de oposición (si los hubiere) |
|--------------------------|---|--|
| Rafael Caldera (~1999) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Hugo Chávez (1999-2002) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Pedro Carmona (de facto) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Diosdado Cabello | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Hugo Chávez (2002-2013) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |
| Nicolás Maduro (2013-) | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

¿Tienes comentarios respecto a la pregunta anterior? En caso de no tenerlos, dejar sección en blanco.

Figure D18 Venezuela Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016

Qualtrics Survey Software

Por favor de ejemplos de partidos que han tenido conexiones fuertes con organizaciones estudiantiles y describa la naturaleza de estas conexiones.

¡Muchas gracias por aportar con su experticia a este estudio!

Tener un amplio rango de expertos que aporten con información para los distintos países sería muy beneficioso para este estudio. Para finalizar, le agradecería si pudiera sugerir más expertos que puedan contribuir a esta investigación. En caso de no sugerir otros expertos, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |

<https://utexas.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview>

2/3

Figure D18 Venezuela Expert Survey, cont.

2/18/2016 Qualtrics Survey Software

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Otro experto. En caso de no tener otra sugerencia, deje esta sección en blanco.

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Nombre | <input type="text"/> |
| País de Experticia | <input type="text"/> |
| Institución | <input type="text"/> |
| Dirección de correo electrónico | <input type="text"/> |

Ha llegado al fin de la encuesta de expertos ¡Muchas gracias por aportar a este estudio!

References

- ADIMARK. (2000). *El Nivel Económico ESOMAR*. Santiago, Chile. Retrieved from <http://www.microweb.cl/idm/documentos/ESOMAR.pdf>
- Aguilera, O. (2012). *Repertorios y ciclos de movilización juvenil en Chile (2000-2012)*. *Utopía Y Praxis Latinoamericana*, 17(57).
- Allison, P. D. (2009). *Fixed effects regression models*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Almeida, P. (2007). Defensive Mobilization: Popular Movements against Economic Adjustment Policies in Latin America. *Latin American Perspectives*, 34(3), 123–139. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X07300942>
- Almeida, P. (2008). *Waves of protest: popular struggle in El Salvador, 1925-2005*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Almeida, P. (2010). Social Movement Partyism: Collective Action and Political Parties. In N. Van Dyke & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), *Strategic alliances: coalition building and social movements* (Vol. 34). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Almeida, P. (2012). Subnational Opposition to Globalization. *Social Forces*, 90(4), 1051–1072. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sor044>
- Alonso, J. (2013). Cómo escapar de la cárcel de lo electoral: el Movimiento# YoSoy132. *Desacatos*, (42), 17–40.
- Altbach, P. G. (2006). Student Politics: Activism and Culture. In J. J. F. Forest & P. G. Altbach (Eds.), *International handbook of higher education* (pp. 329–345). Dordrecht: Springer.

- Anria, S. (2013). Social Movements, Party Organization, and Populism: Insights from the Bolivian MAS. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 55(3), 19–46.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2013.00201.x>
- Arce, M. (2010). Parties and Social Protest in Latin America's Neoliberal Era. *Party Politics*, 16(5), 669–686. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068809346005>
- Arce, M. (2014). *Resource extraction and protest in Peru*. Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Arellano, J. P. (2011). *Equity and sustainable growth: Twenty years of social policies, Chile 1990–2009* (The World Bank). Washington, D.C.
- Asociación Nacional de Rectores. (2012). *Estadísticas Universitarias*. Lima: Asociación Nacional de Rectores.
- Baetschmann, G., Staub, K. E., & Winkelmann, R. (2011). *Consistent Estimation of the Fixed Effects Ordered Logit Model* (Discussion Paper Series No. 5443). Institute for the Study of Labor. Retrieved from <http://ftp.iza.org/dp5443.pdf>
- Barranco, J., & Wisler, D. (1999). Validity and systematicity of newspaper data in event analysis. *European Sociological Review*, 15(3), 301–322.
- Barrenechea, R. (2014). *Becas, bases y votos: alianza para el progreso y la política subnacional en el Perú* (1. ed). Lima: IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Baym, N. K. (2015). *Personal connections in the digital age*. John Wiley & Sons.
- BBC Mundo, E. (2011, October 6). Chile: ¿perderán los estudiantes el año escolar? *El Mostrador*. Retrieved from

<http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/10/06/chile-%c2%bfperderan-los-estudiantes-el-ano-escolar/>

- Bellei, C., & Cabalin, C. (2013). Chilean Student Movements: Sustained Struggle to Transform a Market-oriented Educational System. *Current Issues in Comparative Education*, 15(2), 108–123.
- Bellei, C., Cabalin, C., & Orellana, V. (2014a). The 2011 Chilean student movement against neoliberal educational policies. *Studies in Higher Education*, 1–15.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2014.896179>
- Bellei, C., Cabalin, C., & Orellana, V. (2014b). The 2011 Chilean student movement against neoliberal educational policies. *Studies in Higher Education*, 39(3), 426–440. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2014.896179>
- Bellinger, P. T., & Arce, M. (2011). Protest and Democracy in Latin America's Market Era. *Political Research Quarterly*, 64(3), 688–704.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912910373557>
- Benavides, M., & Etesse, M. (2012). Movilidad educativa intergeneracional, educación superior y movilidad social en el Perú: Evidencias recientes a partir de encuestas a hogares. In R. Cuenca (Ed.), *Educación superior, movilidad social e identidad* (Primera edición, pp. 51–92). Lima, Perú: IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26(1), 611–639.
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611>

- Bernasconi, A. (2008). Is There a Latin American Model of the University? *Comparative Education Review*, 52(1), 27–52. <https://doi.org/10.1086/524305>
- Biggs, M. (2016). Size Matters: Quantifying Protest by Counting Participants. *Sociological Methods & Research*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124116629166>
- Booth, J. A., & Seligson, M. A. (2009). *The legitimacy puzzle in Latin America: political support and democracy in eight nations*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Braumoeller, B. F. (2012). *The great powers and the international system: systemic theory in empirical perspective*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brooke, J. (1990, August 12). Peru's Poor Feel Hardship of "Fuji Shock" Austerity. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/12/world/peru-s-poor-feel-hardship-of-fuji-shock-austerity.html>
- Brown, G., Dowling, E., Harvie, D., & Milburn, K. (2013). Careless Talk: Social Reproduction and Fault Lines of the Crisis in the United Kingdom. *Social Justice*, 39(1 (127)), 78–98.
- Bruneforth, M. (2010). Higher education in sub-Saharan Africa – A statistical portrait. Presented at the UIS Workshop on Education Statistics, Windhoek: Unesco Institute for Statistics. Retrieved from <http://www.uis.unesco.org/StatisticalCapacityBuilding/Workshop%20Documents/Education%20workshop%20dox/2010%20Windhoek%20->

- Regional%20Workshop%20on%20Education%20Statistics%20for%20South%20and%20Eastern%20Africa/Higher%20Ed_GED_SSA.pdf
- Brunner, J. J. (1986). El movimiento estudiantil ha muerto. Nacen los movimientos estudiantiles. In J. C. Tedesco, H. R. Blumenthal, & O. Albornoz (Eds.), *La Juventud universitaria en América Latina*. Caracas: CRESALC/UNESCO.
- Brunner, J. J. (2009). *Educación superior en Chile: instituciones, mercados y políticas gubernamentales (1967-2007)*. Santiago, Chile: Ediciones UDP.
- Brunner, J. J., & Villalobos, C. (2014). *Políticas de Educación Superior en Iberoamérica, 2009-2013*. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones UDP.
- Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., & Stokes, S. C. (2004). Vote Buying in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review*, 39(2), 66–88. <https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2004.0022>
- Buechler, S. M. (2007). The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown Theories of Collective Action. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements* (pp. 47–65). Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
- Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2013). *Regression analysis of count data*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cammaerts, B. (2013). The Mediation of Insurrectionary Symbolic Damage: The 2010 U.K. Student Protests. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 18(4), 525–548. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161213496283>
- Campbell, G. (1980). Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data. *Review of Economic Studies*, 1980(XLVII), 225–238.

- Carter, G. L. (1986). The 1960s black riots revisited: city level explanations of their severity. *Sociological Inquiry*, 56(2), 210–228.
- Castro, C., & Levy, D. C. (2000). *Myth, reality, and reform: higher education policy in Latin America*. Washington, D.C. : Baltimore: Inter-American Development Bank.
- Cavero, O. (2015, March). Presented at the Movilizaciones en contra del régimen laboral juvenil: ¿Nueva Cultura política juvenil?, Lima, Perú.
- CEDLAS and World Bank. (2015). *Statistics*. Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from <http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/statistics.php>
- Cele, G., & Koen, C. (2003). Student politics in South Africa. An overview of key developments. *Cahiers de La Recherche Sur L'éducation et Les Savoirs*, (2), 201–223.
- Centro de Estudios MINEDUC. (2012). *Encuesta CASEN 2011 : Análisis Módulo Educación*. Ministerio de Educación. Retrieved from http://static1.mineduc.cl/doc_mailing/20121026%20analisis%20casen%20final.pdf
- CEPAL. (2016). *Panorama Social de América Latina, 2015*. Santiago de Chile: Comisión Económica de América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
- Chávez Granadino, J. (1999). *¿Jóvenes a las Obras? Juventud y participación política*. Lima: Agenda: Perú.

- Chávez, N. (2015a). Los circuitos políticos: cambios institucionales y nuevos movilizadores de la organización política estudiantil en el Perú. Presented at the LASA Congress, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
- Chávez, N. (2015b, March). Presented at the Movilizaciones en contra del régimen laboral juvenil: ¿Nueva Cultura política juvenil?, Lima, Perú.
- Checchi, D., & Visser, J. (2005). Pattern Persistence in European Trade Union Density A longitudinal analysis 1950–1996. *European Sociological Review*, 21(1), 1–21.
- Christensen, H. S. (2011). Political activities on the Internet: Slacktivism or political participation by other means? *First Monday*, 16(2).
- CNED. (2014). CNED - INDICES Estadísticas. Retrieved May 8, 2014, from http://www.cned.cl/public/Secciones/SeccionIndicesEstadisticas/indices_estadisticas_instituciones.aspx?opcBusquedaCSE=9_3_2
- Conoce de dónde proviene el término ‘chibolo pulpín’. (2014, December 18). *RPP Noticias*. Retrieved from http://www.rpp.com.pe/2014-12-18-conoce-de-donde-proviene-el-termino-chibolo-pulpin-noticia_752140.html
- Consejo Nacional de Educación. (2011). *Proyecto Educativo Nacional al 2021: La Educación que Queremos para el Perú*. Lima: Ministerio de Educación.
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., ... Zimmerman, B. (2016). V-Dem [Country-Year/Country/Date] Dataset v6.2 (Version 6). University of Gothenburg VDem Institute, University of Notre Dame Kellogg Center. Retrieved from <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-6-2/>

- Crabtree, J. (2010). Democracy without Parties? Some Lessons from Peru. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 42(2), 357–382.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X10000477>
- Cuenca, R. (2013, October). *Consideraciones para una reforma de la educación en el Perú*. Lima, Perú. Retrieved from http://www.slideshare.net/SINEACE/reforma-de-la-educacin-superior-en-el-per?from_action=save
- Cuenca, R. (2014). La Educación Superior en el Perú: Expansión, calidad, e inclusión. In J. J. Brunner & C. Villalobos Dintrans (Eds.), *Políticas de educación superior en Iberoamérica, 2009-2013* (1. ed, pp. 431–480). Santiago de Chile: Ediciones UDP.
- Cummings, P. (2015). Democracy and Student Discontent: Chilean Student Protest in the Post Pinochet Era. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 7(3), 49–84.
- Dalton, R., Van Sickle, A., & Weldon, S. (2009). The Individual–Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour. *British Journal of Political Science*, 40(1), 51.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712340999038X>
- Danton, P., Guzmán, F., & Hillman, K. (2016, September 4). Baja asistencia a marcha abre debate sobre crisis del movimiento estudiantil. *La Tercera*. Retrieved from <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/baja-asistencia-a-marcha-abre-debate-sobre-crisis-del-movimiento-estudiantil/>
- Danzger, M. H. (1975). Validating conflict data. *American Sociological Review*, 570–584.

- de Escobar, V. (2006). *La Educación Superior en Panamá 2006* (La Educación Superior en Iberoamérica 2006). CINDA - Universia.
- de Escobar, V. (2011). *La Educación Superior en Panamá 2005-2009* (La Educación Superior en Iberoamérica 2011). CINDA.
- Della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2006). *Social movements: an introduction* (2nd ed). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- DeNardo, J. (1985). *Power in numbers: The political strategy of protest and rebellion*. Princeton University Press.
- Disi Pavlic, R. (2016, September 29). Whither the Student Movement? Reform and Demobilization in Chile. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from <https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2016/09/29/whither-the-student-movement-reform-and-demobilization-in-chile/>
- Disi Pavlic, R. (2018). Sentenced to Debt: Explaining Student Mobilization in Chile. *Latin American Research Review*, 53(3).
- Donoso, S. (2013). Dynamics of Change in Chile: Explaining the Emergence of the 2006 Pingüino Movement. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 45(1), 1–29. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X12001228>
- Durán, F., Jorquera, P., Pey, R., Riesco, M., & Mendoza, P. (2011). *Financiamiento de la educación superior en Chile: problemas y propuestas* (p. 78). Santiago: CENDA.
- Duriez González, M., & Coca Palacios, L. (2011a). *La Educación Superior en El Salvador 2005-2009* (La Educación Superior en Iberoamérica 2011). CINDA.

- Duriez González, M., & Coca Palacios, L. (2011b). *La Educación Superior en Guatemala 2005-2009* (La Educación Superior en Iberoamérica 2011). CINDA.
- Duriez González, M., & Sándigo Martínez, C. (2011). *La Educación Superior en Honduras 2005-2009* (La Educación Superior en Iberoamérica 2011). CINDA.
- Duriez González, M., & Zamora Arrechavala, B. (2011). *La Educación Superior en Nicaragua 2005-2009* (La Educación Superior en Iberoamérica 2011). CINDA.
- Earl, J., Martin, A., McCarthy, J. D., & Soule, S. A. (2004). The use of newspaper data in the study of collective action. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 65–80.
- Eckstein, S. (2001). Power and Popular Protest in Latin America. In S. Eckstein & M. A. Garretón (Eds.), *Power and popular protest: Latin American social movements* (Updated and expanded ed, pp. 1–60). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Education Sector, Latin American & Caribbean Region, The World Bank. (2011). *Chile's State Guaranteed Student Loan Program (CAE)* (Analysis and Evaluation).
- Edwards, B., & McCarthy, J. D. (2007). Resources and Social Mobilization. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
- Eisinger, P. K. (1973). The conditions of protest behavior in American cities. *American Political Science Review*, 67(1), 11–28.
- El Universo. (2015). Protestas estudiantiles en rechazo al Gobierno continuaron en Quito. *El Universo*. Retrieved from <http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2015/06/16/nota/4967515/protestas-estudiantiles-rechazo-gobierno>

- EMOL. (2011, August 21). Miles de personas se congregan en Parque O'Higgins por marcha familiar por la educación. *El Mercurio*. Retrieved from <http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/08/21/499013/miles-de-personas-se-congregan-en-parque-ohiggins-por-marcha-familiar-por-la-educacion.html>
- Enjolras, B., Steen-Johnsen, K., & Wollebaek, D. (2013). Social media and mobilization to offline demonstrations: Transcending participatory divides? *New Media & Society*, 15(6), 890–908. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444812462844>
- Fiszbein, A., Cosentino, C., & Cumsille, B. (2016). *The Skills Development Challenge in Latin America: Diagnosing the Problems and Identifying Public Policy Solutions*. Inter-American Dialogue Mathematica Policy Research.
- Fleet, N., & Guzmán-Concha, C. (2016). Mass Higher Education and the 2011 Student Movement in Chile: Material and Ideological Implications. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12471>
- Franceschet, S. (2004). Explaining Social Movement Outcomes: Collective Action Frames and Strategic Choices in First- and Second-Wave Feminism in Chile. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(5), 499–530. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414004263662>
- Freidenberg, F. (2006). La democratización de los partidos políticos: entre la ilusión y el desencanto. In J. Thompson & F. Sánchez (Eds.), *Fortalecimiento de los partidos políticos en América Latina: institucionalización, democratización y transparencia*. Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos - Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electora.

- Galindo, J., & González, J. (2013). Yo soy 132, la primera erupción visible. *México: Glabal Talent*.
- Gans-Morse, J., & Nichter, S. (2007). Economic Reforms and Democracy: Evidence of a J-Curve in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(10), 1398–1426.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007305811>
- Garay, C., & Tanaka, M. (2009). Las protestas en el Perú entre 1995 y el 2006. In R. Grompone & M. Tanaka (Eds.), *Entre el crecimiento económico y la insatisfacción social: las protestas sociales en el Perú actual* (1. ed, pp. 59–124). Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- García de Fanelli, A. M. (2005). *Acceso, abandono y graduación en la educación superior argentina*. Buenos Aires: SITEAL.
- García Guadilla, C. (2006). *Financiamiento de la educación superior en América Latina* (No. II.7). Barcelona: Mundiprensa.
- García, L., & Vela, J. (2015). Las “zonas” o la inesperada virtud de la anarquía. *Argumentos*, 9(1). Retrieved from
<http://revistaargumentos.iep.org.pe/articulos/las-zonas-o-la-inesperada-virtud-de-la-anarquia/>
- García, M. C. (2012). Movilización estudiantil por la defensa de la educación superior en Colombia. *Anuari Del Conflict Social*, 449–466.
- Garner, R. A., & Zald, M. N. (1987). The political economy of social movement sectors. *Social Movement in an Organizational Society. Collected Essays, New Brunswick, Transaction Book*, 293–318.

- Garretón, M. A. (2003). *Incomplete democracy: political democratization in Chile and Latin America*. Chapel Hill: UNC Press.
- Garretón, M. A. (2005). Social sciences and society in Chile: institutionalization, breakdown and rebirth. *Social Science Information*, 44(2–3), 359–409.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018405053292>
- Gill, J., & DeFronzo, J. (2009). A comparative framework for the analysis of international student movements. *Social Movement Studies*, 8(3), 203–224.
- Goldstone, J. (2003). Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics. In J. Goldstone (Ed.), *States, parties, and social movements* (pp. 1–24). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- González Fiegehen, L. E. (2006). *Informe sobre la Educación Superior en América Latina y el Caribe 2000-2005: La Metamorfosis de la Educación Superior*. Caracas: IESALC.
- González Marín, S., & Sánchez Sáenz, A. M. (Eds.). (2011). *154 años de movimientos estudiantiles en Iberoamérica*. México: UNAM.
- Goodwin, J. (2001). *No other way out: states and revolutionary movements, 1945-1991*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. M. (1999). Caught in a winding, snarling vine: The structural bias of political process theory. *Sociological Forum*, 14(1), 27–54.
- Gurr, T. R. (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton, N.J: Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University [by] Princeton University Press.

- Guzman-Concha, C. (2012). The Students' Rebellion in Chile: Occupy Protest or Classic Social Movement? *Social Movement Studies*, 11(3–4), 408–415.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2012.710748>
- Hanagan, M. (1998). Incorporation, Disengagement, and Opportunities - a Long View. In M. G. Giugni, D. McAdam, & C. Tilly (Eds.), *From contention to democracy* (pp. 3–30). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hegre, H. (2001). Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816–1992. *American Political Science Association*, 95(1), 33–48.
- Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(4), 725–740.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704040472>
- Hibbs, D. A. (1973). *Mass political violence: A cross-national causal analysis* (Vol. 253). Wiley New York.
- Hocke, P. (1999). Determining the selection bias in local and national newspaper reports on protest events. In D. Rucht, R. Koopmans, & F. Neidhardt (Eds.), *Acts of dissent: new developments in the study of protest* (pp. 131–163). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Holm-Nielsen, L. B., Thorn, K., Brunner, J. J., & Balán, J. (2005). Regional and International Challenges to Higher Education in Latin America. In H. de Wit, I. C. Jaramillo, J. Gacel-Ávila, & J. Knight (Eds.), *Higher education in Latin America: the international dimension* (pp. 39–70). Washington, D.C: World Bank.

- Hutter, S. (2014). Protest Event Analysis and Its Offspring. In D. della Porta (Ed.), *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research* (pp. 335–367). Oxford University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719571.001.0001/acprof-9780198719571-chapter-14>
- Ibrahim, J. (2011). The New Toll on Higher Education and the UK Student Revolts of 2010–2011. *Social Movement Studies*, 10(4), 415–421. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2011.614110>
- IESALC. (2006). *Informe sobre la Educación Superior en América Latina y el Caribe 2000-2005: La Metamorfosis de la Educación Superior*. Caracas: IESALC.
- Inclán, M. de la L. (2008). From the ¡Ya Basta! to the Caracoles: Zapatista Mobilization under Transitional Conditions. *American Journal of Sociology*, 113(5), 1316–1350. <https://doi.org/10.1086/525508>
- Inglehart, R. (1990). Values, Ideology and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social Movements. In R. J. Dalton & M. Kuechler (Eds.), *Challenging the political order: new social and political movements in western democracies* (pp. 43–66). New York: Oxford University Press.
- INJUV. (2015). *Encuestas de Juventud*. Retrieved from <http://www.injuv.gob.cl/portal/categoria/publicaciones/encuestas-de-juventud/>
- Ivancheva, M. P. (2016). The Discreet Charm of University Autonomy: Conflicting Legacies in the Venezuelan Student Movements. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12472>

- Joignant, A. (2012). Habitus, campo y capital: Elementos para una teoría general del capital político. *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 74(4), 587–618.
- King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). *Designing social inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. (2000). Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities. *Comparative Political Studies*, 33(6–7), 845–879.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/001041400003300607>
- Koopmans, R., & Rucht, D. (2002). Protest Event Analysis. In B. Klandermans & S. Staggenborg (Eds.), *Methods of social movement research* (pp. 231–259). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (1999). Political claims analysis: integrating protest event and political discourse approaches. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 4(2), 203–221.
- Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (2002). The transformation of political mobilisation and communication in European public spheres: A research outline. *Online: Http://Europub. Wz-Berlin. de*.
- Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Giugni, M. G. (1995). *New social movements in Western Europe: a comparative analysis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Krippendorff, K. (2012). *Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology* (3rd ed). Los Angeles ; London: SAGE.

- Kubal, M. R., & Fisher, E. (2016). The Politics of Student Protest and Education Reform in Chile: Challenging the Neoliberal State. *The Latin Americanist*, 60(2), 217–242. <https://doi.org/10.1111/tla.12075>
- Kurtz, M. J. (2004). The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons from Latin America. *World Politics*, 56(2), 262–302. <https://doi.org/10.2307/25054257>
- La Nación. (2007, September 7). Protestas frenan reapertura de Constituyente en Bolivia. *La Nación*.
- La Nación. (2011, December 27). Movilización estudiantil: El gran hito que marcó 2011. *La Nación*. Retrieved from <http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educacion/movilizacion-estudiantil-el-gran-hito-que-marco-2011/2011-12-22/151743.html>
- Leung, D. K. K., & Lee, F. L. F. (2014). Cultivating an Active Online Counterpublic: Examining Usage and Political Impact of Internet Alternative Media. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 19(3), 340–359. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161214530787>
- Levi, M. (2009). Reconsiderations of Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis. In M. I. Lichbach & A. S. Zuckerman (Eds.), *Comparative politics: rationality, culture, and structure* (2nd ed). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Levitsky, S. (1999). Fujimori and post-party politics in Peru. *Journal of Democracy*, 10(3), 78–92.

- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (1998). Between a Shock and a Hard Place: The Dynamics of Labor-Backed Adjustment in Poland and Argentina. *Comparative Politics*, 30(2), 171. <https://doi.org/10.2307/422286>
- Levy, D. C. (1986). *Higher education and the state in Latin America: private challenges to public dominance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Levy, D. C. (1989a). Latin American Student Politics: Beyond the 1960s. In P. G. Altbach (Ed.), *Student political activism: an international reference handbook* (pp. 315–337). New York: Greenwood Press.
- Levy, D. C. (1989b). Latin American Student Politics: Beyond the 1960s. In P. G. Altbach (Ed.), *Student political activism: an international reference handbook* (pp. 315–337). New York: Greenwood Press.
- Levy, D. C. (1991). The Decline of Latin American Student Activism. *Higher Education*, 22(2), 145–155. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3447249>
- Lieberman, E. S. (2005). Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3). <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051762>
- Liebman, A., Walker, K., & Glazer, M. (1972). Universities, University Reform, and Student Politics in Latin America: a Historical Overview. In *Latin American University Students: A Six Nation Study* (pp. 1–34). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Lin, T., & Su, Y.-P. (2015). Flash-Mob Politics in Taiwan: New Media, Political Parties, and Social Movements. *Taiwan Democracy Quarterly*, 12(2), 123–159.

- Lipset, S. M. (1967). University Students and Politics in Underdeveloped Countries. In S. M. Lipset (Ed.), *Student Politics* (pp. 3–53). New York: Basic Books.
- Lipset, S. M. (1993). *Rebellion in the university*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Lipset, S. M., & Altbach, P. G. (1967). Student Politics and Higher Education in the United States. In S. M. Lipset (Ed.), *Student Politics* (pp. 199–252). New York: Basic Books.
- López Segre, F. (2011). La educación superior en el mundo y en América Latina y el Caribe: principales tendencias. In T. Dos Santos (Ed.), *América Latina y el Caribe: Escenarios posibles y políticas sociales* (Vol. 3). Montevideo: UNESCO.
- Luna, J. P. (2010). Segmented Party–Voter Linkages in Latin America: The Case of the UDI. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 42(2), 325–356.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X10000465>
- Luna, J. P., & Altman, D. (2011). Uprooted but Stable: Chilean Parties and the Concept of Party System Institutionalization. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 53(2), 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00115.x>
- Madrid, R. L. (2003). Labouring against Neoliberalism: Unions and Patterns of Reform in Latin America. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 35(1), 53–88.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0200665X>
- Maguire, D. (1995). Opposition movements and opposition parties: equal partners or dependent relations in the struggle for power and reform? In J. C. Jenkins & B.

- Klandermans (Eds.), *The politics of social protest: Comparative perspectives on states and social movements* (pp. 199–228).
- Mainwaring, S., & Scully, T. (1995). Party Systems in Latin America. In S. Mainwaring & T. Scully (Eds.), *Building democratic institutions: party systems in Latin America*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Mainwaring, S., & Torcal, M. (2005). *Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory After the Third Wave of Democratization* (No. 319). Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute for International Studies.
- Maireder, A., & Schwarzenegger, C. (2012). A movement of connected individuals: Social media in the Austrian student protests 2009. *Information, Communication & Society*, 15(2), 171–195.
- Marcel, M., & Tokman, C. (2005). *¿Cómo se Financia la Educación en Chile?* (Estudios de Finanzas Públicas). Santiago de Chile: Ministerio de Hacienda.
- Mariátegui, J. C. (1928). *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana*. Lima: Minerva.
- Marín Álvarez, J. (2016). *Los usos y estrategias de Facebook en el movimiento social por la educación en Chile durante el 2011*. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago.
- Marín Naritelli, F. (2014). *Las batallas por la Alameda; Arteria del Chile demoliberal*. Santiago: Ceibo.

- Marshall, M. G., & Marshall, T. R. (2016). Coup D'État Events, 1946-2015 (Version version 2015 <p4v2015 and p4v2015d>). College Park: Center for Systemic Peace.
- Marsiske, R. (Ed.). (2006). *Movimientos estudiantiles en la historia de América Latina III* (1. ed). México: Centro de Estudios sobre la Universidad, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México : Plaza y Valdés Editores.
- Marsiske, R., & Alvarado, L. (Eds.). (1999). *Movimientos estudiantiles en la historia de América Latina* (1. ed). México: Centro de Estudios sobre la Universidad, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México : Plaza y Valdés Editores.
- Martínez, E. J. (2011, May 4). Cinco días en huelga de hambre completan estudiantes de la UIS. *Vanguardia Liberal*. Retrieved from <http://www.vanguardia.com/historico/103208-cinco-dias-en-huelga-de-hambre-completan-estudiantes-de-la-uis>
- Mayol, A., & Azócar, C. (2011). Politización del malestar, movilización social y transformación ideológica: el caso “Chile 2011.” *Polis (Santiago)*, 10, 163–184.
- McAdam, D. (1982). The Political Process Model. In *Political process and the development of Black insurgency, 1930-1970* (pp. 36–59). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McAdam, D. (1996). Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, 23–40.

- McAdam, D., & Paulsen, R. (1993). Specifying the relationship between social ties and activism. *American Journal of Sociology*, 640–667.
- McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. G., & Tilly, C. (2001). *Dynamics of contention*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McCarthy, J. D., McPhail, C., & Smith, J. (1996). Images of protest: Dimensions of selection bias in media coverage of Washington demonstrations, 1982 and 1991. *American Sociological Review*, 478–499.
- McCarthy, J. D., Titarenko, L., McPhail, C., Rafail, P., & Augustyn, B. (2008). Assessing Stability in the Patterns of Selection Bias in Newspaper Coverage of Protest During the Transition from Communism in Belarus*. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 13(2), 127–146.
- McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1973). *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
- McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(6), 1212–1241.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2777934>
- McCarthy, M. A. (2012). Occupying Higher Education: The Revival of the Student Movement. *New Labor Forum*, 21(2), 50–55.
<https://doi.org/10.4179/NLF.212.0000008>

- McVeigh, R. (2006). Structural Influences on Activism and Crime: Identifying the Social Structure of Discontent. *American Journal of Sociology*, 112(2), 510–566.
<https://doi.org/10.1086/506414>
- Medel, R. (2016). Las lógicas de la represión estatal en el Chile post autoritario. Presented at the XI Congreso Chileno de Ciencia Política, Pucón, Chile.
- Medel, R., & Somma, N. (2016). ¿ Marchas, ocupaciones o barricadas? Explorando los determinantes de las tácticas de la protesta en Chile. *Política Y Gobierno*, 23(1), 163–199.
- Meyer, D. S., & Whittier, N. (1994). Social Movement Spillover. *Social Problems*, 41(2), 277–298. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3096934>
- MINEDUC. (2017). Beneficios Estudiantiles Educación Superior. Retrieved March 5, 2017, from http://portal.becasycreditos.cl/index2.php?id_contenido=29694&id_portal=74&id_seccion=4751
- Ministerio de Desarrollo Social. (2015a). *Encuesta Casen Interactiva 1990*. Santiago, Chile: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social. Retrieved from <http://www.redatam.org/redchl/mds/casen/casen1990/Index.html>
- Ministerio de Desarrollo Social. (2015b). *Encuesta Casen Interactiva 2011*. Santiago, Chile: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social. Retrieved from <http://www.redatam.org/redchl/mds/casen/casen2011/Index.html>
- Minkoff, D. C. (1997). The sequencing of social movements. *American Sociological Review*, 779–799.

- Modonesi, M. (Ed.). (2012). Movimientos Estudiantiles [Special Edition]. *OSAL*, XIII(31).
- Mollis, M. (2006). Latin American University Transformation in the 1990s: Altered Identities? In J. J. F. Forest & P. G. Altbach (Eds.), *International handbook of higher education* (Vol. 18, pp. 503–515). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Moraga Valle, F. (2006). Crisis y recomposición del movimiento estudiantil chileno (1990-2001). In R. Marsiske & L. Alvarado (Eds.), *Movimientos estudiantiles en la historia de América Latina* (1. ed, p. 179). México: Centro de Estudios sobre la Universidad, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México : Plaza y Valdés Editores.
- Morgan, J., & Meléndez, C. (2016). Parties under Stress: Using a Linkage Decay Framework to Analyze the Chilean Party System. *Journal of Politics in Latin America; Vol 8, No 3 (2016): Political Representation in Contemporary Chile*. Retrieved from <https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/1003/1010>
- Morgenstern, S., Negri, J. J., & Pérez-Liñán, A. (2008). Parliamentary Opposition in Non-Parliamentary Regimes: Latin America. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 14(1–2), 160–189. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572330801921166>
- Muller, E. N., Dietz, H. A., & Finkel, S. E. (1991). Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion: The Case of Peru. *The American Political Science Review*, 85(4), 1261. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1963945>

- Muñoz Tamayo, V. (2011). *Generaciones: juventud universitaria e izquierdas políticas en Chile y México: Universidad de Chile, UNAM, 1984-2006*. Santiago: LOM.
- Murakami, Y. (2007). *Perú en la era del Chino: la política no institucionalizada y el pueblo en busca de un salvador* (Vol. 27). Instituto de Estudios peruanos.
- Murillo, V. (2001). *Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Myers, D. J., & Caniglia, B. S. (2004). All the rioting that's fit to print: Selection effects in national newspaper coverage of civil disorders, 1968-1969. *American Sociological Review*, 69(4), 519–543.
- Navarro, P. (2010). A Maoist Counterpoint: Peruvian Maoism Beyond Sendero Luminoso. *Latin American Perspectives*, 37(1), 153–171.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X09351716>
- Nie, N. H. (2001). Sociability, interpersonal relations, and the internet reconciling conflicting findings. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 45(3), 420–435.
- Oberschall, A. R. (1994). Rational choice in collective protests. *Rationality and Society*, 6(1), 79–100.
- Observatorio de Medios y Movimientos Sociales. (2015). *Medios de Comunicación y Movimientos Sociales en la Prensa Escrita Chilena*. Observatorio de Medios y Movimientos Sociales Universidad de La Frontera. Retrieved from <http://www.mediosymovimientossociales.cl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Informe-de-Seguimiento-y-An%C3%A1lisis-de-la-Conflictividad-en-Chile.pdf>

- OECD. (2011). *Education at a glance, 2011 OECD indicators*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD. (2015). *Education at a glance 2015: OECD indicators*.
- OECD, & World Bank. (2009). *Revisión de políticas nacionales de educación: la educación superior en Chile*. Santiago: Ministerio de Educación.
- Olavarria Gambi, M., Allende González, C., Oyandedel Sepúlveda, J. C., & Fernández Albornoz, R. (2010). “¿Es el temor al endeudamiento una limitante en el acceso a la Educación Superior? (p. 58). FONIDE, MINEDUC.
- Oliver, P. E., & Myers, D. J. (1999). How Events Enter the Public Sphere: Conflict, Location, and Sponsorship in Local Newspaper Coverage of Public Events 1. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105(1), 38–87.
- Olson, M. (2009). *The logic of collective action* (Vol. 124). Harvard University Press.
- Opp, K.-D. (1990). Postmaterialism, Collective Action, and Political Protest. *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(1), 212. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111516>
- Opp, K.-D. (2009). *Theories of political protest and social movements: a multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Orellana, V. (2011). Nuevos Estudiantes y Tendencias Emergentes En La Educación Superior. In M. Jiménez de la Jara & F. Lagos Rojas (Eds.), *Nueva geografía de la educación superior y de los estudiantes* (pp. 79–134). Santiago: Aequalis.
- Ortiz, D., Myers, D., Walls, E., & Diaz, M.-E. (2005). Where do we stand with newspaper data? *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 10(3), 397–419.

- OSAL. (2012). *Cronologías del Conflicto Social*. Observatorio Social de América Latina, Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales. Retrieved from <http://www.clacso.org.ar/institucional/1h.php?idiom>.
- Oviedo, L. (2002). Una historia del movimiento piquetero. *Razón Y Revolución*, (9).
- Palacios-Valladares, I. (2016). Internal Movement Transformation and the Diffusion of Student Protest in Chile. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 1–29. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X16001905>
- Palacios-Valladares, I. (2016). With or Without Them: Contemporary Student Movements and Parties in the Southern Cone. *The Latin Americanist*, 60(2), 243–268.
- Panfichi, A., & Coronel, O. (2014). Régimen político y conflicto social en el Perú: 1968–2011. In N. Henríquez Ayin (Ed.), *Conflicto social en los Andes: protestas en el Perú y Bolivia* (pp. 13–64).
- Papacharissi, Z., & de Fatima Oliveira, M. (2012). Affective News and Networked Publics: The Rhythms of News Storytelling on #Egypt. *Journal of Communication*, 62(2), 266–282. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01630.x>
- Pierskalla, J. H., & Hollenbach, F. M. (2013). Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa. *American Political Science Review*, 107(2), 207–224. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000075>
- Polanyi, K. (1944). *The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time*. Boston: Beacon Press.

- Popovic, S., & Miller, M. (2015). *Blueprint for Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other Nonviolent Techniques to Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, Or Simply Change the World*. Spiegel & Grau.
- Portantiero, J. C. (1978). *Estudiantes y política en América Latina: el proceso de la reforma universitaria (1918-1938)*. México: Siglo Veintiuno.
- Pribble, J., & Huber, E. (2010). *Social Policy and Redistribution under Left Governments in Chile and Uruguay* (Collegio Carlo Alberto Notebooks No. 177). Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Puryear, J., & Goodspeed, T. O. (2011). How Can Education Help Latin America Develop? *Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies*, 3(1), 111–134.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/097491011000300104>
- Ratcliffe, R. (2015). University protests around the world: a fight against commercialisation. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from
<http://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2015/mar/25/university-protests-around-the-world-a-fight-against-commercialisation>
- Remy, M. I. (2010). A Siege from the Sidelines: Between the Many Local Conflicts and the Slow Build Up of New Social Movement in Peru. In M. Tanaka & F. Jácome (Eds.), J. Guppy & G. Hart (Trans.), *Challenges in Democratic Governance: Political and Institutional Reforms and Social Movements in the Andean Region* (pp. 239–268). Lima, Caracas, Ottawa: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP), Instituto Venezolano de Estudios Sociales y Políticos (INVESP), International Development Research Centre (IDRC) – Canada.

- Rheingold, H. (1985). *Tools for thought: The history and future of mind-expanding technology*. MIT Press.
- Rice, R. (2012). *The new politics of protest: indigenous mobilization in Latin America's neoliberal era*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Riedl, M., & Geishecker, I. (2014). Keep it simple: estimation strategies for ordered response models with fixed effects. *Journal of Applied Statistics*, 41(11), 2358–2374. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02664763.2014.909969>
- Ritter, E. (2014). Policy Disputes, Political Survival, and the Onset and Severity of State Repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58(1), 143–168. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712468724>
- Ritter, E., & Conrad, C. (2016). Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1), 85–99. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000623>
- Roberts, K. M. (1998). *Deepening democracy?: the modern left and social movements in Chile and Peru*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Roberts, K. M. (2002). Party-society linkages and democratic representation in Latin America. *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 27(53), 9–34.
- Roberts, K. M. (2008). The Mobilization of Opposition to Economic Liberalization. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11(1), 327–349. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053006.183457>

- Rochon, T. (2016). *Mobilizing for peace: the antinuclear movements in western europe*. [S.l.]: Princeton Univ Press.
- Rule, J., & Tilly, C. (1965). Measuring political upheaval. *Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University*.
- Rummel, R. J. (1966). Dimensions of conflict behavior within nations, 1946-59. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 65–73.
- Salazar Vergara, G., & Toro, M. S. (2002). *Niñez y juventud: (construcción cultural de actores emergentes)* (1. ed, Vol. 5). Santiago de Chile: LOM Editores.
- Salinas, D., & Fraser, P. (2012). Educational opportunity and contentious politics: The 2011 chilean student movement. *Berkeley Review of Education*, 3(1).
- Santoro, W. A., & McGuire, G. M. (1997). Social Movement Insiders: The Impact of Institutional Activists on Affirmative Action and Comparable Worth Policies. *Social Problems*, 44(4), 503–519. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3097220>
- Saunders, C. (2014). Factors determining the size of protests: The configuration of the state, protest organisations and individual protesters. In *ECPR Joint Sessions*. Salamanca.
- Scherman, A., Arriagada, A., & Valenzuela, S. (2015). Student and Environmental Protests in Chile: The Role of Social Media: Social Media and Protests in Chile. *Politics*, 35(2), 151–171. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12072>
- Schussman, A., & Soule, S. A. (2005). Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation. *Social Forces*, 84(2), 1083–1108.

- Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 294–308. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077>
- Segovia, M. (2014, October 13). El año perdido del movimiento estudiantil. *El Mostrador*. Retrieved from <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2014/10/13/el-ano-perdido-del-movimiento-estudiantil/>
- Shorter, E., & Tilly, C. (1974). *Strikes in France 1830-1968*. Cambridge University Press.
- Silva, E. (2009). *Challenging neoliberalism in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Silva Michelena, J. A. (1986). La participación estudiantil en las actividades políticas. In H. R. Blumenthal, J. C. Tedesco, & O. Albornoz (Eds.), *La juventud Universitaria en América Latina*. Caracas, Venezuela: CRESALC/UNESCO.
- Snyder, D., & Kelly, W. R. (1977). Conflict intensity, media sensitivity and the validity of newspaper data. *American Sociological Review*, 105–123.
- Somma, N. (2012). The Chilean student movement of 2011-2012: challenging the marketization of education. *Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements*, 4(2), 296–209.
- Somma, N., & Medel, R. (2017). Social movements and institutional politics in contemporary Chile. In S. Donoso & M. von Bülow (Eds.), *Social Movements in*

- Chile Organization, Trajectories, and Political Consequences*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Soule, S., & Earl, J. (2005). A movement society evaluated: Collective protest in the United States, 1960-1986. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 10(3), 345–364.
- Spencer, D. (1965a). *Student Politics in Latin America*. Philadelphia: United States National Student Association.
- Spencer, D. (1965b). The impact of the Cuban Revolution on Latin American student politics. In D. Spencer (Ed.), *Student Politics in Latin America* (pp. 91–95). Philadelphia: United States National Student Association.
- Spielmans, J. V. (1944). Strike profiles. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 319–339.
- Stearns, L. B., & Almeida, P. D. (2004). The Formation of State Actor-Social Movement Coalitions and Favorable Policy Outcomes. *Social Problems*, 51(4), 478–504.
<https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2004.51.4.478>
- Su, Y.-P. (2015). Anti-Government Protests in Democracies: A Test of Institutional Explanations. *Comparative Politics*, 47(2), 149–167.
<https://doi.org/10.5129/001041515814224444>
- Sukarieh, M., & Tannock, S. (2014). *Youth Rising?: The Politics of Youth in the Global Economy*. Routledge.
- Sverdlick, I., Ferrari, P., & Jaimovich, A. (2005). *Desigualdad e inclusión en la educación superior: Un estudio comparado en cinco países de América Latina* (No. 9) (p. 110). Buenos Aires: OLPED.

- Tanaka, M. (2005). *Democracia sin partidos, Perú, 2000-2005: los problemas de representación y las propuestas de reforma política* (1. ed). Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Tang, G., & Lee, F. L. F. (2013). Facebook Use and Political Participation: The Impact of Exposure to Shared Political Information, Connections With Public Political Actors, and Network Structural Heterogeneity. *Social Science Computer Review*, 31(6), 763–773. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439313490625>
- Tarrow, S. G. (1989a). *Democracy and disorder: protest and politics in Italy, 1965-1975*. Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press.
- Tarrow, S. G. (1989b). Early Risers: The Student Movement. In *Democracy and disorder: protest and politics in Italy, 1965-1975* (pp. 143–167). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tarrow, S. G. (2011). Contentious Politics and Social Movements. In *Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics* (pp. 16–36). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, M. (2014, November 19). Student protest over tuition fees ends in scuffles with police. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/nov/19/student-protest-tuition-fees-scuffles-police>
- The Economist. (2011, October 29). The fraught politics of the classroom. *The Economist*. Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/node/21534785>
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From mobilization to revolution*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

- Tilly, C. (1995). "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834. In M. Traugott (Ed.), *Repertoires and cycles of collective action* (pp. 15–42). Durham: Duke University Press.
- Tilly, C. (2015). *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834*. Routledge.
- Trejo, G. (2009). Religious Competition and Ethnic Mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico. *American Political Science Review*, 103(3), 323.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990025>
- Trow, M. (1973). *Problems in the transition from elite to mass higher education*. (p. 57). Berkeley: Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.
- Trow, M. (2006). Reflections on the Transition from Elite to Mass to Universal Access: Forms and Phases of Higher Education in Modern Societies since WWII. In J. J. F. Forest & P. G. Altbach (Eds.), *International handbook of higher education* (pp. 243–280). Dordrecht: Springer.
- UNESCO. (2014). *Regional Report about Education for All: in Latin America and the Caribbean: Global Education for All Meeting. Muscat, Oman, May 12th and 14th of 2014*. Santiago de Chile: UNESCO.
- UNESCO. (2016a). The Right to Education | Education | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Retrieved March 6, 2017, from <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/right-to-education/>

- UNESCO. (2016b). UIS Statistics. Retrieved January 12, 2017, from <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>
- UNESCO Institute for Statistics. (2014). *Higher education in Asia: expanding out, expanding up : the rise of graduate education and university research*.
- Valenzuela, S., Arriagada, A., & Scherman, A. (2012). The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior: The Case of Chile. *Journal of Communication*, 62(2), 299–314. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01635.x>
- Van Cott, D. L. (2005). *From movements to parties in Latin America: the evolution of ethnic politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Van Dyke, N. (2003a). Crossing Movement Boundaries: Factors that Facilitate Coalition Protest by American College Students, 1930–1990. *Social Problems*, 50(2), 226–250. <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2003.50.2.226>
- Van Dyke, N. (2003b). Protest cycles and party politics: The effects of elite allies and antagonists on student protest in the United States, 1930-1990. In J. Goldstone (Ed.), *States, parties, and social movements* (pp. 226–245).
- Vásquez, M. (2013, March 16). Universidad Telesup, del congresista José Luna, viola Código del Consumidor y Ley Universitaria. *Diario16.pe*. Retrieved from <http://diario16.pe/noticia/23298-universidad-telesup-del-congresista-josae-luna-viola-caodigo-del-consumidor-y-ley-universitaria>
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., Brady, H. E., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics* (Vol. 4). Cambridge University Press.

- Vommaro, P. (2013). Las relaciones entre juventudes y políticas en la América Latina contemporánea: una aproximación desde los movimientos estudiantiles. *Revista Sociedad*, 32, 127–143.
- von Bülow, M., & Bidegain Ponte, G. (2015). It Takes Two to Tango: Students, Political Parties, and Protest in Chile (2005–2013). In *Handbook of Social Movements across Latin America* (pp. 179–194). Springer.
- Walker, E. T., Martin, A. W., & McCarthy, J. D. (2008). Confronting the State, the Corporation, and the Academy: The Influence of Institutional Targets on Social Movement Repertoires. *American Journal of Sociology*, 114(1), 35–76.
<https://doi.org/10.1086/588737>
- Washington, S. W. (1959). Student Politics in Latin America. *Foreign Affairs*, April.
Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-america-caribbean/1959-04-01/student-politics-latin-america>
- WCHE. (1998). *Final Report*. October Paris: UNESCO.
- Weyland, K. (2004). Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A Mixed Record. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 46(1), 135–157.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2004.tb00268.x>
- World Bank. (2016a). *World Development Indicators* | *World DataBank*. Retrieved from <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.CD&country=#>

World Bank. (2016b). *World Development Indicators*| *World DataBank*. Retrieved from <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=IT.NET.USER.P2&country=>

Yamada, G., & Castro, J. F. (Eds.). (2013). Evolución reciente de la calidad de la educación superior en el Perú: no son buenas noticias. In *Calidad y acreditación de la educación superior: retos urgentes para el Perú* (1a edición). Lima: Universidad del Pacífico : Consejo de Evaluación, Acreditación y Certificación de la Calidad de la Educación Superior Universitaria.

Yashar, D. J. (2005). *Contesting citizenship in Latin America: the rise of indigenous movements and the postliberal challenge*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zaragoza, J. (2013, November 8). ¿Cuánto cuestan los estudios universitarios en el Perú? Retrieved November 21, 2015, from <http://educacionalfuturo.com/vocacional/hurgando-en-el-criterio-de-clasificacion-cuanto-cuestan-los-estudios-universitarios/>