

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Info

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MTO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1802 1965 JUN 28 PM 4 31

INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 6123

RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 690

RUFHPA/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 756

ZEN/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 686

RUDLSK/USNMR SHAPE FOR BURNS PRIORITY

RUFPA/USAREUR FOR POLAD PRIORITY

RUFLE/USCINCEUR FOR POLD PRIORITY

RUFLE/USELMLO PRIORITY

RUFPAW/USAFE PRIORITY

STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~ JUNE 28

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

SUBJECT: WINZER'S SED PLENUM SPEECH ON AIR MATTERS

REF: (1) BERLINTEL 1795 TO DEPT, 1616 TO BONN.

(2) BERLINTEL 1765 TO DEPT, 1592 TO BONN

GDR FOREIGN MINISTER WINZER'S SPEECH AT THE 10TH SED PLENUM CLEARLY RAISES A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT EASTERN INTENTIONS ON BERLIN AIR MATTERS.

THE MAIN THRUSH OF THE SPEECH WAS TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLE GDR AIR SOVEREIGNTY OVER EAST BERLIN, TO

PAGE TWO RUFHOL 158 ~~SECRET~~

ESTABLISH THE SECTOR-SECTOR BORDER AS AN AIR BOUNDARY ALSO, AND TO CONVEY THAT THE BERLIN CONTROL ZONE NO LONGER EXISTS. THUS HE SAID THAT THE WESTERN POWERS MUST OBTAIN THE GDR'S PERMISSION FOR LOCAL FLIGHTS OVER EAST BERLIN. THUS ALSO HE SAID THAT BASC HAS NO AUTHORITY FOR THE EAST BERLIN AIRSPACE.

WINZER'S PROPOSAL THAT THE FOUR POWERS AUTHORIZE BASC TO REACH FLIGHT SAFETY AGREEMENTS WITH THE GDR TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY WAS MADE IN TERMS WHICH SUGGEST THAT A FORMAL GDR INITIATIVE TO THE FOUR POWERS MAY BE FORTHCOMING. SUCH AN INITIATIVE WOULD BE TURNED DOWN BY THE WEST BUT PRESUMABLY

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By cb NARA, Date 7-6-00

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-2- 1802, JUNE 28, FROM: BERLIN

ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS. THE LATTER MIGHT THEN ANNOUNCE THEIR INTENTION TO LEAVE BASC AND TURN OVER THEIR ROLE TO THE VOLA\*

ALTERNATIVELY -- AND, WE WOULD IMAGINE, MORE PROBABLY -- THE SOVIETS MIGHT ANNOUNCE THAT THEY WOULD IN FUTURE EXERCISE THEIR FUNCTIONS THERE THROUGH AGREEMENT WITH THE GDR, NOT ON THE BASIS OF QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES COULD ARISE FROM THIS HALF-WAY MEASURE. THE SOVIETS MIGHT ASK FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES IN BASC NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES, SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INSTITUTION OF TELEPRINTER SERVICE, AND MAKING THE EAST GERMANS (AT SCHOENEFELD AIRPORT) INFORMATION

PAGE THREE RUFHLA 158 ~~SECRET~~

ADDRESSEES ON FLIGHT CLEARANCES. THE APPLICATION OF THE REVERSE AGENCY PRINCIPLE WOULD GRADUALLY ENLARGE THE GDR ROLE IN ASC TO THE POINT WHERE THE SOVIETS, HAVING WORKED THE EAST GERMANS INTO THE SYSTEM OVER A LONGER PERIOD, MIGHT AT SOME FUTURE STAGE ABANDON BASC ENTIRELY.

ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIETS TO ANNOUNCE FORMALLY AT SOME POINT THAT THEY NO LONGER CONSIDER THE BERLIN CONTROL ZONE AS BEING IN EXISTENCE. SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT NEED NOT HAVE IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES. WESTERN FLIGHTS TO AND FROM BERLIN COULD CONTINUE AS BEFORE, USING THE SAME FLIGHT PATHS. THE EAST GERMANS MIGHT ANNOUNCE THAT THEY WERE MAKING THE FLIGHT PATHS AVAILABLE "TEMPORARILY" PENDING THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE WESTERN POWERS. THE MAIN EASTERN PURPOSE WOULD BE TO FURTHER ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF GDR AIR SOVEREIGNTY OVER EAST BERLIN AND GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE VIEW THAT THE BERLIN CONTROL ZONE HAS BEEN DONE AWAY WITH. GP-3. CALHOUN

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\*AS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

Note: Believe reftel # 2 is Berlin's 1769 to the Dept.

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