The Dissertation Committee for Alvin Augustus Dolan-Henderson Certifies
that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

SHAME, GUILT, AND ETHICAL ORIENTATION

Committee:

Frank C. Richardson, Supervisor

Frank Wicker

Guy Manaster

Kristin Neff

Steven Tipton

SHAME, GUILT, AND ETHICAL ORIENTATION

by

Alvin Augustus Dolan-Henderson, BA.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2003

Dedication

This is dedicated with love to my wife, the Reverend Doctor Susan Dolan-Henderson, my son Liam Dolan-Henderson and my mother and father, Winifred and Alvin Henderson.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank this dissertation's director, Frank Richardson, and the committee, Frank Wicker, Guy Manaster, Kristin Neff, and Steven Tipton. Thank you all especially for your patience and forbearance in the face of my many eccentricities. Many thanks are also due to John Gould, Ph.D., a good man, and a great supervisor. I would also like to strenuously acknowledge the many people with whom I discussed this project and the critique and support received from them, in particular the members of St. Mark's Episcopal Church in Austin, Texas.

SHAME, GUILT, AND ETHICAL ORIENTATION

Publication No._____

Alvin Augustus Dolan-Henderson, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2003

Supervisor: Frank C. Richardson

Traditional views of negative, self-referent emotions such as shame and guilt never questioned the utility or necessity of these painful feelings. In fact, both shame and guilt were seen as crucial to maintaining appropriate modes of conduct, propriety, and keeping in check selfish strivings or self-aggrandizement. Modern psychology has long treated both shame and guilt as pathological and, given its emancipatory, individualistic focus, has sought to rid persons of both of these self-conscious emotions without considering the possible negative consequences of such a project. A key component of the pathologization of negative emotions is the increasing emphasis placed on the individual, as both the primary psychological and political unit in American society. Mainstream psychology has placed the self in the center, both reflecting and reifying the

dominant social ethic and political philosophy, liberal individualism. Psychology, with its emphasis on the individual, has had the effect of inculcating an often hypertrophied self-awareness, as well as expanding individual freedoms and potentials. This self-awareness, with its inevitable self-comparison, vulnerabilities, and clamor for validation, is the fountainhead of shame (and shamelessness) for modern persons. The relationships between shame and guilt, depression, individualism and communitarianism, empty narcissism and Meaningful Connectedness, and responses to anger provoking scenarios were investigated in a sample of 150 upper division undergraduates using measures of the dimensions of interest. In general, shame-proneness was significantly related to externalization, depression, and malevolent anger. Guilt-proneness was significantly related to constructive anger and Meaningful Connectedness. When grouped according to level of individualistic ethical beliefs, highly individualistic participants were significantly more shame-prone and more likely to endorse an empty, selfish and disconnected approach to life. The highly individualistic group was significantly less likely than either the moderate or low groups to experience a sense of meaningful connection to others or a community, which may exacerbate feelings of alienation and shame. A communitarian ethical orientation was significantly related to a sense of Meaningful Connectedness. There were no significant relationships between individualism and malevolent, destructive anger.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter One

Overview

Traditional views of shame, guilt, and the other so-called "self-conscious" emotions regarded these experiences as the natural personal consequences of an individual's or group's thoughts and actions in the social, personal, and spiritual realms. In the traditional sense, shame was the consequence of an immoral act attributable to character logical weakness, or of a socially proscribed manner of living. In more archaic definitions, shame is simultaneously an emotion, a personal quality, and a status. In this manner, a "sense of shame," an understanding and respect for the boundaries of acceptable deportment, was once seen as essential to dwelling in community with others. Guilt, less global in its implications, attended the outright violation of codes of interpersonal conduct and was resolved by amendment or reparation. These emotions were normally regarded as helpful, guiding people back onto a path of right belief, thought, and action; or as a well deserved form of emotional autocorrection. In fact, failure to experience shame or guilt in appropriate contexts has traditionally been treated as either a moral failure or as a character defect, i.e. "moral insanity" or sociopathy. To lack a "sense of shame," or to behave shamelessly are character judgments usually reserved for unsocialized children, outlaws, or renegades of selfishness.

This once was true of American and Western cultures in general, and continues to be the case in many cultures characterized by more relational notions of self and identity.

Current views of negative emotions, grossly influenced by over a century of psychological theory and changes in the self and interpersonal connectedness, generally problematize and seek to overcome or dispense with them. The proliferation of self-help books, programs, workshops, not to mention psychiatric medications all address a fundamental dissatisfaction with our emotional lives. Why have guilt, shame, pride, and other self-referent emotions come to be treated differently in American mass culture? Guilt and shame, and getting rid of them, have become a big business for a diverse group of experts, from self-anointed, self-help speakers, to "aesthetic surgeons," to empirical psychology researchers. It is difficult to see why these negative self-reflexive emotions traditionally regarded as painful but natural and vital, have come to be experienced in such a problematic, and often debilitating manner by modern persons.

A central premise of this dissertation is that changes in what Charles Taylor (1989, 1991) refers to as *frameworks of meaning*, and concomitant mutations in the entity we refer to as "the self," are the most salient factors in the increasingly noxious power and attendant pathologization of negative emotional experiences. Frameworks of meaning, derived from lived experience, pre-existing the individual, and within which facts become meaningful to persons, are

2

"intricate webs of belief by which individuals shape their lives and against which these lives make some sense." (Taylor, 1991) Similarly, the political philosopher Alasdair McIntyre (1988) identifies these frameworks, or *tradition* as not so much a system of beliefs, and as such open to substantiation or delegitimation by argument. Instead, "the language in which we must frame questions and answers for ourselves," (Lovin, pg. 2 1991) and that we do not so much assert them as we are shaped by them.

Among the changes in frameworks of meaning, the emphasis on the individual self as the base unit of life has had dramatic effects across the lived world and studies of it. Taylor (1989) argues that selves were once more connected or embedded in a web of relationships, roles, and invariable continuities of experience. While he does not contend that in the past, recent or archaic, that there was no such thing as the self. He does make a powerful argument that beginning with the Enlightenment and the expansion of scientific inquiry and increasing skepticism towards cosmological understandings of life and the world, people once experienced themselves in a radically different manner (Taylor, 1989, 1991b). This supposition is given credence by encounters with persons from less individuated and industrialized contemporary cultures such as Japan, China, or India (Ho, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1996; Taylor, 1992).

We can hardly imagine our selves as being any other than as they are. Yet, a key component of the pathologization of negative emotions is the

increasing emphasis placed on the individual, as both the primary psychological and political unit in American society. Scientific psychology has placed the self in the center, both reflecting and reifying the dominant social ethic and political philosophy, liberal individualism. Psychology, and to be fair, the majority of the other academic disciplines have promoted the "turn inward" (Cushman, 1990; Sass, 1994) and this emphasis on the individual has had the effect of inculcating an often hypertrophied self-awareness, as well as expanding individual freedoms and potentials. An argument will be made in the course of this project that these changes in the self initiated and imposed by modern frameworks of meaning have allowed current persons of both genders and many ethnic groups the greatest degree of individual freedom and personal fulfillment in recorded history, while concomitantly alienating from self and community and increasing the debilitating qualities of negative self-conscious emotions, especially shame.

Quite a few theorists have proposed that shame and guilt are affective concomitants or even affective signals to threat perceptions to social bonds (H. Block Lewis, 1971, 1976, 1980; Manaster & Corsini, 1993; Morrison, 1989; Scheff, 1990, 2000; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991). In a recent retrospective study, Thomas Scheff (2001) identified the primary contributors to depression in a group of elderly men as lack of secure bonds. Insecure bonds he typified as relationships with a history lacking moments of mutual understanding (both cognitive and emotional) and devoid of even a vague level of equality. In Scheff's analysis, the

4

depressive disorders of the elderly men in his sample were attributable to "another primary emotion, shame," (2001) rather than grief. During interviews, the men "positively radiated shame," identified in their "overly soft speech, lack of eye contact, slowness, fluster, and self-blame," all of which (Block Lewis, 1976, 1981; Kaufman, 1989; M. Lewis, 1991, 1996, 2000; Retzinger 1991, 1995) are regularly identified as behavioral shame indicators. The late empirical researcher and clinician Helen Block Lewis (1976, 1981) proposed a type of depression that is attributable, primarily to unacknowledged shame.

Block Lewis (1976) defined the term shame in a special sense, referring to a concept much broader than implied in everyday usage or current empirical psychology. She considered shame to describe a family of emotions that includes embarrassment, modesty, and shyness, as well as more problematic manifestations like humiliation. The common element to this range of emotions, Block Lewis believed, was that they are all reactions to threats to social bonds. In this light, Block Lewis acknowledged the positive, as well as the negative aspects of shame. In her usage, shame also referred to a variety of colloquial terms indicating a lack of self-respect, low self-esteem, lack of self-confidence, heightened self-consciousness, and unfavorable social self-comparison. Similarly, she also implicated shame in resentment and envy, which in turn, are ineluctably relational phenomena concerned with the state of social bonds.

5

Block Lewis spent well over two decades researching and writing about shame and guilt, but still managed to regard both of these emotions as natural and necessary. She addressed shame, in particular as having healthy, relationship-affirming qualities as well as pathological, alienating manifestations. Subsequent psychological theorists seem to have taken only the pathological aspects to define the entirety of shame (Kaufman, 1989; M. Lewis, 1991, 2000; Morrison, 1989; Nathanson, 1991; Tangney, et.al 1991, 1992, 1996). Theoretical and empirical relationships between shame and many forms of deviant and pathological behavior have been examined. Significant empirical correlations were demonstrated between a pathological degree of shame and narcissistic personality disturbance (Gramzow & Tangney, 1996; Hibbard, 1993), somatization and depression (Tangney, et. al, 1991, 1992), destructive responses to anger (Tangney, 1996), Dissociative Identity Disorder (Alessandri & Lewis, 1996; Lewis, 1992, 2000) and domestic violence (Scheff & Retzinger, 1995). Clinician-theorists have written at length on the relationship of shame to Narcissism (Broucek, 1991; Capps, 1992; Fowler, 1996; Goldberg, 1995; Kohut, 1971, 1976; Morrison, 1989, 1991), Histrionic personality (Broucek, 1991; Kernberg, 1975), and alienation (Kaufman, 1989; Schneider, 1992).

Mainstream psychological researchers basically ignore the idea of shamelessness, perhaps because of its reference to moral judgment[1]. Shamelessness can be defined as a denial of modesty, self-promotion, instrumental use or display of one's body or self, self-objectification, and imagined transcendence of the shared meanings and values of one's world of life (Broucek, 1991; Fowler, 1996). Shamelessness is also characterized by a lack of empathy, or an initial empathic sentiment that regresses into an inward focus on the injustices done to, and the sufferings of the self, or "egoistic drift" (Hoffman, 1984).

Shamelessness is a form of self-objectification, or "embracing objecthood" (Broucek 1988, 1991). He suggests that turning oneself into an object for the visual appropriation of others is a common symptom of narcissistic and histrionic personalities. In this case, aesthetic considerations predominate over moral considerations. According to Broucek (1991), the aestheticism of hysteria is concerned with many variations on two basic themes: "Am I pretty, or manly?" and "Am I bright?" Combined, these two themes produce the questions "Am I interesting?" and "Do you like me?"

Shame in its many manifestations is intimately connected with connection, that is, it seems to signal danger to or detachment from social bonds. In its more

---

[1] Much has been written as to the allegedly "value-free" or objective nature of psychology that reveals, in fact, the discipline operates under several disguised or unacknowledged moral

pathological manifestations, shame makes re-affiliation difficult or extremely problematic due to its stimuli to the shamed to hide, cover, or disappear. Given the modern, Western framework of individualism, with its attendant amplified sense of separation, boundedness, and self-generation, it is not surprising that shame has become so debilitating. Nowhere is this more apparent than in some modern theories of psychological development, with the emphasis on "separation-individuation" (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). On the advice of experts, parents have, for at least a generation, practiced pushing their children away (Michael Lewis, 1991, 2000) allegedly fostering "self-sufficiency." It is possible that this has had the effect of weakening social bonds and increasing the pathological, alienating experience of shame.

An individuated self is after all a self on display, separate from the protective figure-ground of family, group, or community. Through the media, we are constantly bombarded with images of impossible beauty, strength, wealth, and achievement. Thus the new ideals of acceptability, of worth, of having any value as a being, are disseminated and demanded. How could we fail to experience the emotions of self-deficit, including shame when compared to images of eternally youthful, perpetually pumped, and immaculately dressed models? Especially when the same images encode commands for self-comparison and resultant shortfall. An image is infinitely manipulable while a person is not. It would seem

assumptive bases or ideologies.

8

that many of the well-documented psychological disorders of modernity are adaptational or defensive formations in the face of exposure, separation, and commercially mandated self-deficit.

There are many admirable qualities and values embedded within the frameworks of segments of American society that are outside of the dominant discourse. Many of these same qualities and values were once a part of Western frameworks of meaning, but have weakened or been lost in the spiraling of individualism-consumerism-imagism that has contributed to the breakup the modern self, families, and communities. In particular, social identity derived from webs of relationships and interdependencies combined with valuation and respect, rather than slavish obeisance, to tradition and of those with greater experience, i.e. the elders in our lives, holds more promise than threat.

This brings the line of inquiry to a point that would not be possible without considerable diminution of the formerly "imperious frameworks of meaning" (Taylor, 1989). Namely that we, as (post) modern persons are able, at least in part, to discern and describe these very frameworks. By so doing, we possibly choose from among the best of the freedoms, responsibilities, values, and qualities of both relational and individualist ethical orientations without violating the foundational beliefs that constitute who we are, as individuals or members of various groups. If this is indeed possible, what drives or undergirds our notions of the good, the true, and the beautiful? What makes our choices worth choosing?

Although thinkers such as Taylor, Lasch, and others recognize the frameworks wherein lives are navigated and lived out, these "horizons"[2] are never totally perceptible or knowable. Fortunately, many thinkers have addressed these very issues and some have offered a "third way," or at least an alternative to alienated, self-interested individualism or oppressive, self-negating collectivism.

Communitarianism differs from both individualism and collectivism not only on basic ethics of identity and on the world of life, but it is not received, or a culturally inculcated position; people are not born into communitarian cultures (Glendon, 1991). Rather, Communitarianism requires a conscious and intentional engagement with the various frameworks such as individualism and collectivism, their benefits, and dangers. This often requires a struggle within the self and in communities to think, feel, and interact from a stance that acknowledges the inherently dialogical nature of the self. This being an identity and a commitment to the common good, to responsibilities, as well as preserving individual liberties within the limits of the potential deleterious effects their exercise may hold for others.

From communitarian perspectives, liberal individualism misrepresents life. Humans cannot be self-contained, strangers to one another when each is born with parents, and when these parents have friends, relatives, neighbors, work associates, co-religionists, and fellow citizens (Walzer, 1988). The language of

---

[2] Heidegger's (1964) use of this term is similar to Taylor's sense of frameworks of meaning

liberal individualism takes away the sense of connectedness, and leads to an over-dependence on the rights of the individual, as protected by the courts and the state rather than by close connections. In this way of thinking, the self is not a pre-social configuration, but is capable of "reflecting critically on the values that have governed its constitution" (S. Dolan-Henderson, 1994).

In this sense, communitarian thought is a dialogue between two broad positions, one that gives primacy to liberty--individual rights and freedom, and the other that gives highest priority to order--the good of the collectivity. Amatai Etzioni (1996) characterizes his particular take on communitarianism as having the goal of a "good society that nourishes both social virtues and individual rights… and requires a carefully maintained equilibrium of order and autonomy, rather than a maximization of either." A good society requires an order that is aligned with the core moral commitments of its members. If the philosophy(s) of Communitarianism does neglect individual, group, or community in any way, its bases in life as a dialogue, an ongoing conversation among voices within and without makes likely that these shortcomings will be addressed in interlocution.

<center>**Chapter Two**</center>

<center>**Literature Review**</center>

The Study of Self-conscious Emotions

There seems to be no universally accepted definition of what an emotion is or what characteristics a phenomenon must have to qualify as one. The affect psychologist Robert Plutchik summarizes:

> Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, mediated by neural/hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to affective experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals, labeling processes; (c) activate widespread physiological adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not always, expressive, goal-directed, and adaptive. (Plutchik, p.32 1994)

Philosopher Robert Solomon emphasized the cognitive, evaluative aspect of emotion and de-emphasizes the physiological processes, "emotions are judgments, not blind or irrational forces that victimize us. Emotions are the life force of the soul, the source of most of our values, and the basis of most other

<center>12</center>

passions." (Solomon, p. 21 1993) For many philosophers, emotions are part and parcel of human beings as ethical, aesthetic, and relational creatures. Emotions, as distinct from feelings or mood, are *about, at, or for something*. They involve evaluation, whether conscious or otherwise. In practical terms, emotions may be seen as involving affect or feelings concomitant with physiological events. As such, involving cognition, however ephemeral, in the form of evaluation and memory; emotions express "inner" feelings; emotions can be a form of intra- and interpersonal communication; and emotions can be extremely powerful, at times to the point of overwhelming one (Pattison, 2000). Moods can be said to be more general, in the sense that Heidegger believed as "being tuned into" or "turned off to" the world (Solomon, 1993). Feelings, emotions, and moods, as categories, are difficult to separate, one from the other, and are obviously profoundly interrelated and interactive.

Social constructionists such as Kenneth Gergen (1994) argue that emotions are not biologically based, physiological phenomenon resident in individual agents. In this way of thinking, emotions have no objective existence, they are not, in other words, "natural," but rather are "performances within relationships that conform to a socially intelligible script." (Gergen, 1991) Without aligning to either a radically scientist or relativistic position, it is salient that emotions, like human existence itself, involve both physiology and psychological, social, and cultural factors.

The emotions, as a subject of inquiry have an extensive history. However, the term "self-conscious affects" was not coined until 1988, when Michael Lewis employed it in reference to guilt, shame, pride, hubris *pridefulness*, and their many possible permutations. As the term indicates, these emotions require a reflexive awareness of one's location in a performative space, the referencing of oneself in regards to some rule, condition, goal, or relationship. Thus, as M. Lewis (1989) makes clear, self-conscious emotions involve evaluation of oneself, and by extension, one's actions, choices, and decisions in regard to some contextual or global standards or requirements.

Many theorists have made the distinction between *primary* and *secondary* emotions (Lewis, H.B., 1971; Nathanson, 1994; Tomkins, 1963). The quantity of emotions, which humans experience and with which they make sense of their lives, is extensive. The idea of a basic set of emotions, pre-wired or genetically endowed, is logically restricted to a small set from which others, through combination or elaboration, are formed. There are multitudes of decision, rules, and ideas that various theorists have insisted must be passed in order for an emotion to be considered basic (Tomkins, 1963; Plutchik, 1962; Izard, 1977; Lewis, 1998). One decision rule common to most schemas insists that primary emotions are not dependent on introspection (Plutchik, 1962 in Lewis, 1992). This is borne out in studies of the development of emotions in infants and children. If we accept the supposition that infants are not born with a fully developed capacity

for self-awareness, then logically the emotions present when neonates are thrown into the world, as well as those that emerge early on in life, might be described as primary, or as comprising a more basic set of human emotions (Lewis, 1999).

If, for the primary set of emotions, self-consciousness is not required (Lewis, 2000, 1992), then evocation of disgust, sadness, anger, surprise, joy, interest or fear does not require introspection or reference to the self. A second set of emotions including jealousy; empathy, envy, embarrassment, shame, pride, and guilt seem to require the faculty of self-reference and involve the application of the self to a thought, situation, or evaluation. The first set is in evidence before the development of self-awareness and the second form with the capacity for self-reference, or as the self emerges. M. Lewis (1990) uses the category "self-conscious affects" to describe these changes in the emotional repertoire.

Lewis (1990) subdivides the secondary, self-conscious affects into one set that involves self-evaluation and another that does not. The non-evaluative set consists of emotional states that involve social exposure and include empathy and envy. The evaluative set involves reflexive evaluation of the self according to standards, rules, and goals that a person has tacitly interiorized and synthesized through socialization and relationships to others. This evaluative set includes guilt, shame, hubris, and pride.

Lewis (1990) conceptualizes emotions as "emotional states, emotional expressions, and emotional experiences." In this way of thinking, emotional

states are non-cognitive, that is they do not require a set of thoughts, perceptions or interpretations to precede them. Bodily sensations such as hunger, thirst, pain, and fatigue are such states. Lewis refers to these as *affects*. Certain affects, however embodied they may be, are more than physiological cues for survival. These are referred to as *emotions* and they consist of states that many people undergo on a daily basis that occur within and serve to constitute and color both social and internal experiences. The list of primary emotion-states includes simple conditions such as joy, sadness, fear, disgust, interest, and anger. For Lewis, the secondary emotions include more complex states, including empathy, sympathy, envy, guilt, shame, pride, and regret. These latter emotions require self-reference and are distinguished from the primary emotions on this basis.

Lewis (1992) describes *feeling* in two senses. The first sense of the term implies a felt physiological internal state, supposedly independent of cognition, which has a unique connection in a one-to-one manner with some discrete emotions such as fear or anger. A great deal of research and experimentation has attempted precisely to observe, measure, and quantify these "biological emotions" (Ax, 1953; Bowlby, 1969; Campos & Barnett, 1984; Damasio, 1994; Eckman, 1992; Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991; LeDoux, 1995, 2001), with generally equivocal results.

The second meaning of the word *feeling* has more to do with the self (Lewis, 1998). In this sense, feeling falls under the heading of emotional

experience. It is an awareness of being in a particular emotional state. For example, "I am aware of feeling angry," is a knowing about feeling. This requires an *objective self-awareness* of one's feeling state not necessary for the physiological state itself to happen. Emotional experience relates to introspection and the self and Lewis defines as "a person's evaluation and interpretation of her own perceived emotional state, through observation of physiological changes, such as increased heart and breathing rate, facial flushing or blushing, sweating, etc., or through evaluation of facial neuromuscular activity like smiling." (1992). Emotional experience is influenced by contextual factors that aid in the labeling of physiological states as discrete emotions. Emotional experience requires simultaneous attention to the emotional state or *subjective* level of awareness, and a social/contextual factors requiring objective self-awareness. Subjective experience is "the body attending to itself" (Lewis, 1997). This includes homeostatic mechanisms and adjustments, as well as unattended to cognitions and emotional states.

The second level of experience or *objective experience* is based on the notion that people, as selves and social interlocutors, consciously reflect on themselves. This may take the form of evaluating how one is meeting, or failing to meet, operative standards, rules, or goals, or whether these criteria make sense in a given situation. People are not always experiencing at the objective level. Often other things draw attention away from the self. An example of this is the

loss of self-awareness that professional athletes describe during optimal levels of performance, "in a zone." The player, in such a situation, becomes a part of the game and does not attend to her internal state. The player may not attend to her feelings until a break in the action or after the game. At such a time, the player may use contextual factors, such as winning or losing, to shape their emotional experience.

Emotional experience requires people to attend to a restricted set of stimuli (Lewis, 1997; Roberts & Pennebaker, 1995). Even though an individual may be in a certain emotional state, without attention to contextual factors or impressions, objective emotional experience may not occur. Emotional states and expressions may occur outside of conscious awareness; they may influence perception, interpretation, thoughts, and interactions with others and incite an actor to a certain course of action (Tangney, 1996). For example, a person is criticized by a supervisor at work, but then runs in to an old friend on the way home and is distracted by the encounter. Nevertheless, after arriving home, his partner comments that he seems touchy and short-tempered. This draws the person's attention to his emotional state, for which he has difficulty accounting.

Emotional experience ensues subsequent to the interpretation and evaluation of states and expressions and is thus reliant upon cognitive processes requiring perception, memory, and elaboration (Lewis, 1992; Roseman, 1984). Changes in physiological activity must be monitored, perceived, and compared

with previous experience before being labeled as a certain emotion. Socialization, enculturation, and individual experience provide persons with contexts and a vocabulary for deciding which emotion one is experiencing (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1988; Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). For a person to be aware that they are feeling a certain feeling requires the imposition of learning and enculturation that a certain feeling state is a certain feeling and thus has certain meanings specific to that individual, their family, local groups and culture. Lewis's second sense of the word feeling may account for situational, individual, local and cultural differences in emotions. In this sense, feeling falls under the heading of emotional experience.

Emotional expressions rarely have a direct correspondence to internal states (Damasio, 1996; Lewis, 1992, 2000). As many researchers have found, the physiological activities observed during divergent emotional states are quite similar. For example, similar autonomic signs are measured for both anger and happy excitement. There have been investigations linking local brain activity and neurotransmitter proliferation with emotional states (LeDoux, 1991, 1995), but these are beyond the scope of this project.

There are three modes for the expression of emotions, the face, the voice and the body. Again, there is no straight association between internal states and facial, vocal, and bodily expressions other than primary emotions in infants and children (Lewis, 1990, 1992). Researchers have totaled at least 33,000 different facial expressions available to most people given the musculature of the human

face (Ekman & Freisen, 1977; Izard, 1988). Facial expression is certainly amenable to conscious control. Given the many social situations that require concealing one's real feelings from others, it is safe to say that there is no direct relationship between emotional state and expression and in fact persons who cannot control or inhibit their emotional expressions generally have great difficulties socially.

Since there seems to be only a partial association between emotional states and expressions, any account of shame by way of observing behavior is bound to have limitations. Many theorists including Darwin (Bowlby, 1990; Cornelius, 1996), Sylvan Tomkins (1963), Carroll Izard (1986), and Carolyn Zahn-Waxler (1987) have attempted to identify shame and guilt experimentally by observing research participants' behaviors. Shame has characterized behaviorally by gaze avert (breaking eye contact), down-oriented facial positioning, collapse of the upper body into itself, blushing, and a cessation in the flow of behavior. Given human ability and the social necessity of controlling displays of emotions, experimental evocation and observation does not seem to be a valid method for identifying self-conscious emotions. Another crucial confound to accepting behavioral signs as shame or guilt manifestations is that many researchers have not distinguished between shame, guilt, shyness, or embarrassment (Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1992).

Charles Darwin (Bowlby, 1990; Cornelius, 1996; Lewis, 1992) focused on the function of emotions and their social expression in the context of evolution by natural selection. Emotional expression, for Darwin, did not serve the purpose of communicating emotions, but rather were the result of underlying action patterns that promoted the survival of the individual and the species in general. For example, the patterns of muscular activation of a male who perceives competition (erect posture, chest thrown out, arms held tensely at sides, in effect making the male appear larger), in Darwin's way of thinking, are the result of the male preparing to defend or attack. Given the close genetic relationship of humans and other primates, their emotions and their expression should be similar and have comparable functions.

Darwin observed that one of the basic distinctions between humans and other primates is that human's blush, while other primates do not (Bowlby, 1990). He attributed this difference to "mind" or consciousness. He associated shame with a strong desire for concealment resulting from exposure to the gaze of another plus the commission of a negative action. He characterized embarrassment as exposure plus a positive action. This is the only distinction Darwin makes between shame and embarrassment. He also did not distinguish shame from guilt, shyness or modesty.

Sylvan Tomkins (1963), psychoanalytically trained, adopted a Darwinian perspective in his study of emotions. He, like Darwin, did not differentiate

between shame, guilt or shyness and believed these emotions to be of the same class (Nathanson, 1994). For Tomkins, all of the self-conscious emotions are in reality a single class of emotional status that has the purpose of inhibiting or increasing interest and enjoyment (Nathanson, 1994; Tomkins, 1963). In Tomkins view, emotions are differentiated at the level of conscious awareness. Shame is activated by an "incomplete reduction of interest and joy," presumably in the service of survival (1963). Tomkins identified shame behaviorally by a dropping away of the head and upper body, closing and fluttering of the eyelids, turning away, and blushing, which are all intended to reduce facial communication. For Carroll Izard, another neo-Darwinian (1977, 1986), emotional expressions are universal and do not vary much cross-culturally. In the course of his work on emotional expressions, Izard has developed a coding system for facial expressions as a tool in the study of emotional development. This facial coding system has failed to differentiate any of these affects consistently (Nathanson, 1994; Lewis, 1992).

Carolyn Zahn-Waxler (1987, 1990) also developed a coding system for measuring the self-conscious emotions, relying on all three modes of emotional expression. By observing children's responses to playing with toys that were designed to fall apart, Zahn-Waxler and her colleagues have claimed to differentiate shame from guilt. If a child responds to her/his toy breaking by averting their gaze, "freezing," acting confused or befuddled, they are identified

as exhibiting a shame response. If, however, they respond to the toy breaking by showing a tense facial expression and momentary gaze avert, and attempt to fix their toy, this is suggestive of guilt. The "guilty" children do not attempt to disappear and their attempts at reparation indicate that the focus is not on them, but on the toy, the external object. In Zahn-Waxler's thinking, the focus subsequent to some failure is perhaps the most helpful behavioral difference between shame and guilt. With shame, the focus is on the self, however with guilt the focus appears to be external and subsequently on remediating the failure. Zahn-Waxler's studies do not differentiate between embarrassment and shame, nor do they discriminate between guilt and coping or problem-solving behaviors. Despite over a century of research, there is no single behavioral measure that bears a strong relationship with the experience of shame (Lewis, 2000).

Self-Conscious Emotions: Phenomenology, The Self And Culture

Taking a position that emotional experiences require objective self-awareness (Broucek, 1991; Lewis, 1990, 1992, 2000), it is possible to be in an emotional state and not experience that state, whether it is a primary or a self-conscious one. Self-conscious emotional states differ from primary emotional ones in that they require self-construal. All emotional states require an organism to produce the emotion, but self-conscious states require a self both to produce and to experience it. To be in a state of shame, an individual must compare their

23

self, their actions or thoughts against some standard, rule, or goal and evaluate failure. In order to experience the emotion people must focus their attention on the state. This requires objective self-awareness. Shame may become a propensity for some individuals and be evoked in an almost automatic manner.

Some psychoanalytic theorists have suggested that all shame is produced unconsciously, out of objective awareness. For example, classical psychoanalytic theories have advocated that there are prototypical shame-inducing situations such as toileting accidents in potty-trained children. In this way of thinking, there is a direct correspondence between bowel movements and shame. However, this might also be explained by a child's thoughts about their failure concerning the standards of what big kids do not do and what little kids in fact do. Rather than automatic processes incited by specific events, the logic of prototypicality should rest on the assumption that certain stimuli lead to shame states because they are more likely than others to lead to negative self-evaluation and shame producing thoughts. However, many theorists from Darwin to the present continue to insist on a causal link between prototypical shame-eliciting events and the production of shame states (H.B. Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1995). In Tomkins' mechanistic view of affective life, most shame is induced automatically, out of conscious awareness by prototypical events that stimulate the organism to reduce interest/enjoyment (Nathanson, 1994). From this perspective, shame is the result of incomplete reduction of interest/enjoyment. Michael Lewis (1992) counters Tomkins by

suggesting a transposition of the elements in this formula. In Lewis's formulation, shame interrupts interest/enjoyment.

Carroll Izard (1992) includes both automatic elicitors and a more phenomenological view. In this way of thinking, shame can be elicited by an unconscious reduction in interest/enjoyment, ala` Tomkins, but also is a form of self-perception, a keen consciousness of the self. Izard believes that prototypical events can be internal, in the manner of beliefs or thoughts about the self, as well as external. He defines shame as "a heightened degree of self-consciousness or self-attention: our consciousness is filled with self and we are aware of some aspect of the self we consider innocuous or inadequate." (Izard, 1977) The trigger is a quality of the self that a person considered innocuous or inadequate. From this perspective, shame can be an affective regulatory mechanism, a series of thoughts and feelings about the self, and a painful emotional experience.

Helen Block Lewis's (1971, 1977) beliefs about the prototypicality of shame center on the notion that it is a state of self-devaluation that can be externally provoked, but an external event is not necessary or sufficient. In her view, shame involves self-consciousness and self-imagery. Self-imagery is present in the form of mental pictures or images of the self as disgusting, weak, or damaged, dread fantasies of another's judgmental perceptions and feelings in regards to the self. Block Lewis distinguishes shame from guilt in terms of the object of the emotion. With shame, the object of the feeling is the self. Guilt takes

as its object a wronged other or a transgressive action by the self. HB Lewis believed, like Adler, that shame and guilt had the same function that of correcting lost relational bonds (Helen Block Lewis, 1971). Perhaps her major contribution to the study of self-conscious emotions may be the emphasis she placed on the mind as the elicitor of shame and guilt (M Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1992; 1995). The disapproval of a significant other may provoke thoughts about self-degradation, which then lead to the experience of shame. In this manner shame is not the automatic product of a specific action. Rather shame-elicitors reside in the self's legitimation of the negative evaluation of the self by others, and it would seem, can be anticipatory or elicited in response to a projection or imagination of the self in a situation that provokes shaming thoughts. The specific causes of negative evaluations are varied. It may be failure to adhere to standards, the violation of rules, and the failure to meet goals, or threat to, or loss of a relationship. In all cases, it is the self's focus on the self's failure, and an evaluation of the failure that evokes a shame experience.

Guilt may be somewhat easier to reconcile with the notion of prototypical elicitors, although its manifestations vary as widely as do shame's. Given the current emphasis on guilt as a protector of relationships, the prototypical guilt situation may be characterized as any event that is interpreted by an actor or actors as in some way threatening to de-stabilize relational bonds (HB Lewis, 1971; 1977; Tangney, et al., 1992). Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1995)

26

have proposed several interpersonal functions for guilt: (1) guilt contributes directly to good relationships by promoting behaviors that benefit relationships and by serving as an affective affirmation of the importance of relationships; (2) guilt functions as an influence technique. Persons in relationships often will employ guilt as a leverage mechanism, particularly if there is a power differential in the relationship. As such, guilt can serve to equalize the balance of power; (3) guilt acts to re-distribute emotional distress. Behaviors by a party in a relationship that compromise the bond in favor of self-gratification may initially feel good to the transgressor and bad to the injured party. Guilt acts as an emotional equalizer when evoked in the transgressor, dampening their selfish enjoyment and possibly heartening the wounded person through their partner's show of remorse (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1995).

Until recently, guilt has received a majority of the attention of both clinicians and affect researchers. The psychoanalytic position(s) on guilt are well known. In the case of Freud, the superego, the mechanism by which the standards of parents are incorporated into the self, (specifically through the child's fear that the parents will respond to transgression by withdrawal of love or punishment) is the initial source of guilt. Guilt, in relation to the superego, is similar to its relationship with instinctual drives and their expressions. Anxiety or fear is directly transmutable into guilt. From Freud, two stages in the development of

superego-guilt are notable: (1) the fear of authority, and (2) the fear of the superego itself (Lewis, 2000).

In a well-developed superego guilt is always operative, not only when an actual transgression has occurred. Freud's notion of guilt did not involve the global self, as in the case of existential guilt, but rather was related to one's action, including thoughts and instinctual urges. In the Freudian sense, guilt is a specific and focused response to a transgression that can be repaired through abstinence and penance. Pathological guilt arises from the combination of a hypertrophied sense of guilt resulting from an overdeveloped ego. Normally, the superego constantly condemns the ego; this in turn gives rise to normal guilt (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).

Phenomenology of Shame and Guilt

While it may be difficult to enumerate specific behaviors or prototypical eliciting events for shame, a combination of behaviors and situations can be helpful in the definition, observation, and study of shame and guilt (Lewis, 2000). People's responses to events can vary widely as a function of individual differences in life experiences, expectations, desires and needs. However much the content of thoughts about the self may vary individually, the phenomenology of these two self-referent emotions does not change much across descriptions and cultures.

Lewis (1998) describes four useful ideas about shame phenomenology. First, writers from the Old Testament to the contemporary describe an overwhelming desire to hide or disappear. A second feature of shame is acute, painful self-consciousness. This intense pain, discomfort, and anger distinguish shame from embarrassment and shyness. A third feature of shame is the feeling that one is worthless, inadequate, broken or contemptible. These thoughts represent a global judgment of the self by the self. A fourth feature is the fusion of subject and object. When experiencing shame, an individual is the subject, the experiencer, as well as the object of evaluation. Shame disrupts ongoing activity as the self focuses intently on itself (Helen Block Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1995). The results are confusion, the inability to think clearly, to talk or to act. A self is ensnared in a predicament in which the capacity to act becomes compromised. The fusion of subject and object distinguishes shame from guilt. In guilt, the self is the subject but not the object of the emotion. The object is external to the self and may include a focus on harm done to another, to a relationship, or to some other perceived collapse according to a set of standards or rules.

Many theorists in the analytical tradition insist that shame is triggered by the prototypical incontinence scenario and an assortment of other, primarily intrapsychic sources. These include unacceptable aggressive and libidinal impulses and specific developmental challenges such as muscle and motor

control. HB Lewis (1971), herself analytically oriented, links shame with "soft self-boundaries." This consists in part as a preoccupation with what others are thinking about the self, and in particular, the imagery that accompanies this ideation. In shame, there is a literal feeling of looking and being seen. Francis Broucek (1991), a proponent of a more relational form of self-psychology, believes that shame signals a disruption in intentionality and shared consciousness (an empathic mutualism) and thus in the sense of self. In this logic, there is no need for a distinct structure of conscience or superego. Relational and moral responsibilities to others and they to the self are a part of a constitutional conversation and form the lifelong core of the self. Shame might result from the failure of the self to abide by its obligations and responsibilities in regards to others, as well as from consistent failure, rejection, or objectification by important others.

Self-referent Thoughts and Self-conscious Emotions

A common thread that runs through the various theories under consideration in this project supports the notion that whether an individual experiences shame or guilt in certain situations seems dependent on how they identify the self in that event (Broucek, 1991; Kohut, 1977; Lewis, 1992; 1998; 2000). What is common with both emotions is a self-evaluation and attribution in regards to failure to act according to standards, rules, and goals. The self-

attribution one makes determines the nature of the resultant emotion. M Lewis's cognitive-attributional model of shame and guilt (1992) does not specify what constitutes success, failure, or the idiosyncratic processes that one employs in a self-evaluation. This model does not specify any particular standards, rules or goals that evoke shame or guilt across a population; these specific attributions are a social product.

Michael Lewis's Cognitive-Attributional theory of Self-conscious Emotions (1992, 2000) is represented in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Lewis's Attributional Model of Self-Conscious Affects

    A. Standards, Rules, and Goals

    B. Evaluation

    C. Attribution of Self

Success	*Failure*	
		Focus
HUBRIS	SHAME	*Global*
PRIDE	GUILT	*Specific*

The first feature of the model concerns standards, rules, and goals that form and structure human behavior. All people have an ethical orientation

31

consisting of beliefs, interiorized from their culture, education, family, and individual life experiences, which may include reason. Standards differ across different cultures, across groups within a culture, across individuals within groups, across eras, and between persons of different genders and ages within the same groups (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). To become a member of a group requires that a person learn, emote and act according to its standards. These standards are associated with human behavior, including thinking, feeling and acting. Merely thinking about certain things may constitute a violation of some groups' standards. For example, a person who has sexual thoughts about a friend's partner may be violating the standards not only of the friendship, but also of his family, faith, and culture. Lewis (1995) proposes that how people think, what they think, and how they feel are modulated by standards. For the philosopher Charles Taylor (1991), how people think about their standards and their position in regards to them constitutes *strong evaluation*, or evaluation of one's position in regards to the good, the true, and the just.

Certain feeling states are appropriate and inappropriate, generally and contextually. Sexual feelings about one's mother are inappropriate in most all cultures, while sexual feelings towards one's partner are generally acceptable, although varyingly private. In the inappropriate case, these feelings may produce guilt or shame or may be defended against and surface as anxiety or a vague sense of shame or guilt. Prescribed actions, standards, and the meanings associated with

culture, gender, and ethnicity partially constitute the self from an early age through a caregiver's interactions, expectations, and relationship to a child. By the age of one, children are beginning to learn the appropriate action patterns reflecting the standards of their culture (Lewis, 2000). Standards are distributed differentially to members of cultures and groups over time, gender, ethnicity, and status, but the transmission to children begins at a very early age (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1988).

The evaluation of actions, thoughts, and feelings in terms of standards is the second feature of the attributional model of self-conscious emotions. There are two major aspects of the process. The first concerns the internal and external aspects of evaluation. People violate standards but do not often attribute their failures to themselves. Frequently failure is attributed to the situation or other person. Internal and external attributions are both situationally influenced and may be characteristic of certain individuals. Some people are likely to blame or credit themselves no matter what happens. Dweck and Leggett (1988) found that many children blamed their success or failure on external factors, although a significant number attributed their performance to their own actions or selves. In this and other studies, strong gender differences are noted. In academic achievement, boys generally attribute success to their actions and failure to external factors (Beneffectance), while girls did just the opposite (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).

The second aspect has to do with how individuals determine success or failure in regards to any specific standard. Interpretation and evaluation of actions, thoughts and feelings in terms of standards is an important feature of human behavior. All systems have some evaluative component, from biological feedback mechanisms to whole societies. Children as young as three years old can be described as having their own sets of standards, rules, and goals and show distress when they violate them (Lewis, 1992; Stipek, 1983). Some standards are more valuable than others, although what constitutes importance varies between different groups. An example is found in Carol Gilligan's (1982) critique of Kohlberg's theory of moral development. In her work on the moral development of children, she found that there are differences between girls and boys as to what receives priority. For boys, notions of fairness and procedural justice prevail, while with girls, priority is accorded to relationships. Subsequent thinkers (Dolan-Henderson, 1994) have criticized Gilligan's position as itself essentialist, although it is possible to observe differential notions of what constitutes value between these groups. Other writers within psychology have cited the lack of empirical support and faulty methodology of Gilligan's findings.

Criteria for and evaluation of success or failure are not the same for everyone. Individual, familial, relational and contextual factors all can influence the outcome of a self-evaluation. Obviously many factors influence the production of unique or inaccurate evaluations of success or failure. These include

early failures in the self-development leading to characterological problems (Broucek, 1991; Kohut, 1971; Morrison, 1991), harsh socialization experiences, and high levels of reward for success or punishment for failure (Lewis, 1992; 2000).

Another feature of attribution has to do with global or specific self-attribution. Global attribution refers to the propensity to focus on the total self. Some individuals, at least some of the time, and in some situations, tend to focus responsibility for success or failure on the total self. The propensity for global self-evaluation may be transitory (behavioral self-blame), or it may be a habit (characterological self-blame). On the occasions of some failure in regards to standards, rules, and goals, the focus is on the self, as both subject (actor) and object (evaluated). This happens because the evaluation of the self by the self is complete. The focus of the self is not only on his/her behavior, but upon their worth, or lack of, as a human being. The result may be shame or a paradoxical narcissistic defensiveness (Broucek, 1991; Kohut, 1971; Morrison, 1989; 1991).

Specific self-attribution refers to the propensity for some persons, some of the time, and in some situations to focus on the specific actions of the self in regards to standards, rules, and goals. The total self is not implicated, but specific behaviors or effects on others may be. For example, if there is a failure to remember a friend's birthday, the focus is on the individual's forgetting, the

possibility that the friend's feelings may have been hurt, and on repairing the injury by calling, apologizing, or sending a belated card. The self's focus is on its behavior in interaction with objects or persons (Tangney, 1992; 1995).

Global versus specific self-focus may be a personality style or habit (HB Lewis, 1977; M Lewis, 1992; Weiner, 1988). When positive or negative events are taken into consideration, relatively consistent attributional patterns can be detected in individuals. This is referred to as an "attributional style." Some persons are likely to exhibit stability in their global and specific evaluations as a matter of course. In addition to dispositional issues relating to global or specific attributions, there are likely to be contextual factors. It seems likely that specific types or situations, especially those involving gender or status role, may be more likely than others to elicit a particular attributional focus, but these prototypic elicitors remain largely unexplored (Lewis, 1992).

Given the view that persons, through shared consciousness, experience, or socialization, establish standards, rules and goals; evaluate success or failure. Based on these standards, rules and goals; and that people self-evaluate in terms of internal/external, global/specific, and stabile/transitory; the relationship between these processes and self-conscious emotions becomes clearer. This model focuses on four emotions (and more subtle variants). Shame is a consequence of a failure appraisal relative to standards, rules, and goals when the person makes a global evaluation. Guilt, too, is the consequence of an assessment

of failure, however, the focus is the self's specific action. There are parallel processes when an appraisal of success is made. When success is evaluated and an internal, global, stable attribution is made, hubris or *pridefulness* is the result. When success is assessed and a person makes a specific attribution, pride is the resulting emotion (Lewis, 2000).

Shame

The term shame has been used to describe a broad range of related feelings and social positions. One can feel shame when failure occurs in both the public and private sphere, one can be "the shame" of one's family, the term can be used to express a loss, as in "it's a shame you didn't ----," or to describe a deplorable act or situation, "America's shame is the death penalty." Although generally unexplored in the psychological research, modesty, humility, reticence and other desirable qualities are also closely related to shame (Augsburger, 19--; Block Lewis, 1976, 1981; Schneider, 199-).

Michael Lewis (1990; 1992; 2000) proposes that shame is the product of a complex series of cognitive activities: individual's evaluations of their actions in regard to standards, rules, and goals and their global evaluation of the self. While the mechanisms and precipitants of shame differ considerably between theoretical positions, its phenomenology is generally accepted by most. The experience is described as the wish to hide, disappear, or die (Kaufman, 1989; HB Lewis, 1971;

M Lewis, 1992; Lindisfarne, 1998). It is extremely distressing and painful and many writers propose it results in the disruption of ongoing behavior, confusion, and inarticulateness (Broucek, 1991; Lynd, 1958; Morrison, 1989; Wurmser, 1981 :). The behavioral manifestations of shame are a drawing in and shrinking of the body, as though to withdraw from interaction, covering the face and gaze avert (Izard, 1989). Because of the intensity of shame and the global implication of the self, the only immediate escape seems to be ridding oneself of it. Since it is a global attack on the self (by the self), it may be extremely difficult to dissipate (Kaufman, 1989). Paradoxically, shame is described as resulting in both being dumbstruck and in empty verbosity (Scheff & Retzinger, 199-). There are many actions people utilize when shamed in order to undo the state. These actions range from the rational to the pathological, from reinterpretation, acceptance, and confession to grandiosity, rage, dissociation and repression.

Contrary to earlier formulations, shame is not related to whether an event is public or private[3]. Shame can result from a public failure or transgression, but exposure is not necessary or sufficient for its evocation (HB Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1992, 1995). Failure, attributed globally to the self, can be either public or private. It can be provoked just as easily by unacceptable thoughts or negative self-comparisons as it is by some public failure. Ruminating on perceived failures,

---

[3] As proposed by writers from Charles Darwin to the contemporary psychiatrist Nathanson and many others have insisted.

social faux pas, and the like probably evokes a lot of shame. Shame can center on moral action as well. From a philosophical perspective, standards, rules, and goals are moral, they guide, shape and monitor the lives of humans, as beings for who things matter (Taylor, 1991).

Block Lewis (1971; 1977)) and Tangney (1992) have proposed that some individuals are *shame-prone,* or likely to experience shame in situations where there are several affective possibilities. This is understood as a trait-like interpretive bias that results in the implication of the global self in situations of perceived failure or moral transgression (M. Lewis, 1992). *Shame proneness* is a negative evaluative belief about the global self that is stable over time and situations (A global, internal, and stable attribution). Shame is a painful affect that stimulates intense self-focused personal distress, emotional substitution, and subsequent efforts to reduce this distress often by projection and externalization (Tangney, 1992). Where guilt is regret for what one has done; shame is a regret for who one is. Guilt has been defined as re-integrative, while shame is generally treated as alienating and stigmatizing. Shame, with its attendant intense self-focus is proposed by many to pre-empt the capacity for empathy and shared consciousness, or intersubjectivity (Broucek, 1991; Tangney, et al., 1992).

Shame prone individuals were experimentally observed to resort to destructive responses when angered. Tangney and colleagues (1996) found strong positive correlations between shame-proneness and more intense anger arousal,

destructive responses, distorted cognitions, and pessimism as measured by the Anger Response Inventory (Tangney, et al., 1996). These responses include such interpersonally maladaptive behaviors as withdrawal and avoidance, irritability, self-aggression, direct and indirect hostility and aggression. Shame-proneness, with its attendant self focus on the defective global self and disabled empathic potential, can be an affective disposition to alienation and disconnectedness (Capps, 1993; HB Lewis, 1977; Tangney, 1993). If the personal ambience of social interaction is an exquisite sensitivity, and the responsibility for pain is the defective self, then shame-prone individuals may self protectively be disposed towards individualistic value positions. Thus, shame-proneness may be related to an individualistic ethical orientation.

Shame, Guilt, and Psychopathology

Helen Block Lewis believed that shame and guilt were related to unique symptom clusters (1971). A 1992 study by JP Tangney, Patricia Wagner, and Richard Gramzow failed to support this particular idea. Several studies (Tangney, et al., 1992, 1996; Keltner & Buswell, 1996) have found empirical support for distinctions between these two self-conscious emotions. Drawing on Helen Block Lewis's notion that certain individuals are prone to shame, while others are more prone to experience guilt, Tangney and her colleagues found significant

correlations between shame-proneness and general psychosocial maladjustment and several specific dimensions of psychopathology (1992). Significant correlations from this study establish relationships between shame and somatization, obsessive-compulsive traits, paranoid and idiosyncratic ideational styles, proneness to hostility and anger, interpersonal sensitivity, both trait and state anxiety, and depression. Guilt-proneness was inversely related to hostility and anger, phobic anxiety, and depression.

Block Lewis (1971) referred to shame as both a product and a catalyst of alienation. [4] Tangney and her associates have also demonstrated associations between *shame-proneness* and: anger arousal and self reported aggression (1992); lack of empathy (1991); proneness to narcissistic personality disturbance (1992); and destructive responses to anger (1996). Other theorists and researchers have either demonstrated or proposed correlations between shame and various forms of psychopathology including Narcissistic and Borderline personality disorders (Broucek, 1991; Hibbard, 1993 HB Lewis, 1977; Morrison, 1989; Wurmser,

---

[4] Shame has been compared a form of intrapsychic communication, relating the simultaneous fear of interpersonal failure combined with an overwhelming desire for acceptance and belonging (Retzinger & Scheff, 1991). Individual psychologists such as Alfred Adler and Ansbacher and Ansbacher (1959) have inferred that shame is an affective cry for belonging. Given that many standards, rules, and goals have to do with relationships, this does not seem unlikely.

41

1981), and Posttraumatic Stress and Multiple Personality Disorders (Lewis, 1992). Another study established significant associations between early trauma, including sexual, emotional, and physical abuse and shame (Alessandri & Lewis, 1996). Because all humans must make sense of the events in their lives in some manner, it is reasonable to assume that grossly mistreated individuals would establish a causal link between their selves and the abuse to which they are, or have been subjected. Even if the abuse stops, one who has been subjected to sustained mistreatment is likely to believe that in some way they brought it on their self (Lewis, 2000). In this sense, a "ruined" self is part of the evaluation and attribution process resulting in shame.

One particularly noticeable confound for most empirical studies of shame and guilt is that the shame considered in the majority of these studies is of an extreme, debilitating form. Many of these recent articles on shame focus only on its psychopathological manifestations and neglect possible positive or affiliative instances. Many of these researchers, including Tangney make the error of equating all shame as pathological and propose that it must be gotten rid of altogether. Tangney actually valorizes "shame-free guilt" as an optimal human emotional experience.

Problems in living originating from disturbances in the self have become more prominent in the preceding twenty-five years (Broucek, 1991; Kohut, 1971; Lasch, 1979; Lewis, 1992; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). Many writers

and theorists have implicated cultural and economic changes in the transformation from a society predominated by neuroses and anxiety, to one where characterological problems seem to be flourishing. Narcissistic disorders, in particular seem to have received a great deal of attention since the 1970's. There are significant differences between narcissism as a behavioral descriptor and as a disorder of character. Christopher Lasch (1979) suggested that the concept of narcissism has been "watered down" to refer to any thought or action that seems remotely selfish; however, he applied the term as a descriptor of the general development of American society over the past forty or more years. As American culture as become increasingly psychologized terms, which were once used in clinical and theoretical literature have become a sort of Lingua Franca, particularly among the educated. The common usage of clinical terminology in reference to non-clinical situations or phenomena is another facet of the medicalization of the world of life.

Freud distinguished between two forms of narcissism: primary narcissism involved an infant's focus of her libidinal energies on her as yet undifferentiated ego, while secondary narcissism referred to a withdrawal of psychic energies from objects (people or pursuits) back to the ego, generally as a defense against instinctual impulses. Freud regarded primary narcissism as more or less normal. Heinz Kohut (1971, 1977) elaborated on the concept and argued that all narcissism is not necessarily pathological, but rather, may lead to love for others

early in life. In Kohut's way of thinking, narcissism in its mature form is responsible for creativity, empathy, and humor (Lewis, 1992). In this sense, this form of narcissism is not pathological, but may be thought of as the will to power, assertiveness, and self-esteem.

Diagnostically, pathological narcissism is described by *DSM-IV* (1994) as a affected show of self-importance, an obsession with fantasies of endless success, power, beauty, or ideal love; indifference or rage, subservience, shame, and emptiness; exhibitionism; entitlement; manipulation in interpersonal relationships, overidealization or devaluation; and a lack of compassion. Many theorists (Broucek, 1991; Morrison, 1989; Lewis, 1992) argue that an inability to cope with shame and humiliation underlies pathological narcissism.

The pastoral theologian Donald Capps (1993) refers to several types of narcissistic personality in which shame is prominent, either by its proliferation or absence. He delineates these types as, the "craving self," which is "emotionally undernourished" and characterized by chronic emptiness, demands for attention, and pouting and whining. When their demands are not met (and they never really are); the paranoid self, characterized by hypersensitivity, rigidity, unwarranted suspicions, jealousy, self-importance; and tendencies towards externalization and attribution of evil motives to others. The manipulative self is characterized by lying, lack of guilt, transient and superficial relationships, and extreme contempt for others; the phallic self is characterized by exhibitionism, recklessness, and

44

manipulative tendencies. The phallic type is generally thought of when the term narcissism is employed. Capps refers to all of these types as empty and deficient in empathy and the ability to connect with others in meaningful ways.

HB Lewis's (1971) notion of *shame-proneness*, as elaborated by June Price Tangney (1992) is helpful in thinking about narcissism and shame. Narcissistic people are readily shame-prone and actively try to avoid experiencing shame. This is attempted either by utilizing a set of cognitions designed to avoid shame, or when this fails, by engaging in emotional behavior that masks shame (Broucek, 1991; Morrison, 1989; Schneider, 1992; Wurmser, 1981). Using the cognitive attributional model for this analysis, some people are disposed to making global self-attributions, particularly in regards to negative events. The propensity underlying narcissism is the consistent focus on the global self when evaluating success or failure. Because of this focus, failure is likely to produce shame and success is likely to result in hubris. The tendency to make global evaluations affects both their standards and the evaluative process of failure in regards to these standards. A person can avoid shame by never experiencing failure; she can avoid failure by setting her standards low so as never to risk the possibility of failure to meet them. Low standards, because they're easily met, create a feeling of hubris. Persons who are prone to making global attributions also set unrealistically high standards, which are difficult if not impossible to meet, and thus create more shame for their selves.

People employ many ideational defenses related to evaluation. Some claim success unrealistically; others with higher standards and the same behaviors would be likely to rate their behavior as a failure. This unrealistic evaluation of success is characteristic of grandiosity. Unrealistic evaluation of this sort is designed to increase hubris and to avoid shame. A narcissist evaluates a behavior that others would interpret as failure as a success. Unrealistic evaluation is characteristic of the self-aggrandizement of narcissism.

Kohut (1971, 1977) described several characteristics of narcissism: the prevalence of intense self-consciousness and particularly shame or hubristic affect; an inability to empathize or consider the interests of others beyond their usefulness to the self; and obsessive impression management (Goffman, 1963). These related to intense awareness of themselves as a social object, as well as unconscious fears of fragmentation. Kohut also believed that persons with narcissistic personalities are deeply conscious of themselves as defective in some elemental way. Narcissists must defend their fragile selves by seeking affirmation for their grandiosity.

Kohut's conceptualization of narcissism is closer to Rathvon and Holmstrom's (1996) "depleted narcissism" and Wink's (1991) "covert narcissism." The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Narcissism subscale, when subjected to a principal components analysis, yielded two independent factors, one suggesting Vulnerability-Sensitivity and the other

Grandiosity-Exhibitionism (Wink, 1991). Wink found that there were common associations between the two factors in the dimensions of conceit, self-indulgence, and disregard of others (lack of empathy). Vulnerability-Sensitivity is characterized by introversion, defensiveness, anxiety, and low stress tolerance. Grandiosity-Exhibitionism was related to extraversion, self-assurance, exhibitionism, and aggression.[5] Many theorists, primarily psychodynamically oriented, have echoed this bipolar distinction. Kohut (1971), Broucek (1991), and Kernberg (1975) have suggested differences between "a more phallic, aggressive, and externalized form; and a more hypersensitive, dependent, and internalized form" (Hibbard, 1993). There are many popular scales purporting to tap narcissism, however they often measure seemingly antipodal aspects.

For obvious reasons, most research and clinical literature seems to refer to the covert or depleted type of narcissism and it is with this type that most psychopathological signs are positively associated. The more externalized form is more often related to shamelessness, a topic not often addressed, but covered at length in texts from other disciplines. Aside from studies by JPT and Richard Gramzow (1992), other researchers have found support for associations between

---

[5] Freud distinguished between two forms of narcissism: primary narcissism involved an infant's focus of her libidinal energies on her as yet undifferentiated ego, while secondary narcissism referred to a withdrawal of psychic energies from objects (people or pursuits) back to the ego, generally as a defense against instinctual impulses. Freud regarded primary narcissism as more or less normal. Heinz Kohut (1971, 1977) elaborated on the concept and argued that all narcissism is not necessarily pathological, but rather, may lead to love for others early in life.

shame and the depleted form of narcissism. Stephen Hibbard, studying the relationship between parental alcoholism and both forms of narcissistic presentation, found significant positive correlations between participants' endorsements on a shame measure and two measures of the covert, hypersensitive form of narcissism (1993). He also found significant relationships between a lack of shame affect and the exhibitionistic, aggressive form of narcissism, suggesting an additional link of this form with psychopathy (Gacono & Bannatyne 2002).

Both Helen Block Lewis and Michael Lewis explore several different shame experiences including the *felt* experience of shame and a *bypassed* or generally unacknowledged type. Much of the effect of shame on human life occurs because of bypassed shame (HB Lewis, 1977; M Lewis, 1992). Felt and bypassed shame affect an individual in different ways.

Unacknowledged shame remains out of awareness because of defensive inattention, repression, denial, or engagement of objective self-awareness onto some more acceptable stimuli (Lewis, 1992). It exerts a detrimental force, intrapsychically, in two ways: (1) unacknowledged shame can influence behavior and make it difficult to account for. It may contribute to actions that have troublesome effects, which, due to bypassed shame's unacknowledged character, an individual, may have trouble making sense of; (2) bypassed or repressed shame may lead to the formation of psychopathology, as many psychodynamic theorists believe.

Individuals who are unwilling to experience shame may deny it through the mechanism of focusing on their action rather than on the global self, although at an unattended level of awareness they may be truly focused on their sense of worthlessness (HB Lewis, 1971). People also employ other forms of ideation, which allow them to shift into the position of a detached observer and thus distance from the self as the experiencer of shame. HB Lewis also saw the loss of self as a possible consequence of bypassed shame, not in the sense of psychosis, but as a loss of memory. M Lewis writes of how shame can contribute to loss of memory. Loss of memory, particularly memories so crucial to self-experience, may be thought of a loss of self.

Most studies of consciousness accept that much thought and affect (emotional states) are not always active in conscious awareness. The earlier review of awareness in the work of Michael Lewis establishes an acceptable foundation for this concept. Bypassed shame may also be attributable to other processes such as that offered by Thomas Scheff and Suzanne Retzinger (1995). They suggest that unfelt shame involves excessive thought, but with very little feeling. Conversely, they characterize felt shame as excessive feeling, but with very little thought. In these writers' opinion, bypassed shame is experienced as "a moment of painful feeling, followed by a lengthy episode of obsessive thought or speech" (Scheff & Retzinger, 1995).

Michael Lewis (1992) explains what becomes of the initial painful wince or jolt by proposing a "focus of attention hypothesis" which entails a de-focusing on the jolt of shame and attending elsewhere to avoid experiencing the painful emotion. One may be in a state of shame, but choose not to attend further to the state. The self is removed from attention to the state, but the state itself remains. Felt shame indicates that one has not removed their attention from the shame state, and may in fact be employing other methods to deal with the shame such as distancing oneself from it. Attention may also be withdrawn from focus more gradually by forgetting (M Lewis, 1992).

The problems that have become associated with unacknowledged shame have to do with the difficulties produced when people are in a state but do not pay attention to it. There are three areas of difficulty when shame is bypassed: (1) physical actions (2) defensive substitution of other emotions and (3) disrupted interpersonal exchanges (M Lewis, 2000). Unacknowledged shame has some physical consequences. People in a state of shame may blush, change body posture by collapsing inwards and averting their gaze, they have difficulty thinking, and feel uncomfortable and distressed. These physical actions can occur without acknowledgement of the shame state.

If a shame state remains unacknowledged, a person may focus on another emotional state. Emotional substitution is common with other emotions as well as shame. One may focus on feeling washed out or depleted, or on vague somatic

pains rather than on the shame itself. Often embarrassment is substituted for shame, and is used to deny it as well. By focusing on a feature of shame, of which embarrassment may be a milder form, one can avoid the intensity of its full emotional force (HB Lewis, 1977). One may also focus on the mental confusion and impaired thinking that is characteristic of shame. Instead of experiencing the full array of shame phenomenology, one may be unable to understand what has happened. By focusing on a single feature of the emotional state, one can avoid dealing with the whole experience. This shame is unacknowledged and as a result, the meaning and understanding one gathers from a shame situation is inconsistent with what is really happening. The result is intrapsychic conflict.

Felt shame can also be avoided by substituting an entirely new feeling. One defensive substitution for shame seems to entail a kind of mania, characterized by compulsive verbalization (Scheff & Retzinger, 1995). Often, sadness or anger is substituted for shame, one is the focus on the self and the other externalizes the focus onto a transgressor, real or imagined (M Lewis, 1992). In this sense, it would seem that shame-proneness and depression would have a significant relationship as has been indicated by Tangney (1992).

Sadness as a shame substitute occurs for a number of reasons. They both have similar general emotional tones, they are both negative and aversive, and they share an internal focus. Attributions for sadness are very similar to those for shame, internal and global. Substitution of sadness for shame may also be

51

facilitated by their social natures. Sadness is often the result of some negative relational outcome or a transgression by another. Sadness may be substituted for shame by focusing on the wrong done to the self by another, rather than on the behavior or social disposition of the self. Sadness, at least in its less extreme forms, is more comfortable to experience than shame and for this reason may make a desirable substitution.

Anger substituted for shame may have several bases. To feel shame implies a cause and anger is generally an adaptive emotion to confront a painful source. Anger also feels powerful and can help a wounded, vulnerable self feel strong. Anger substitution of shame is more prevalent among men (HB Lewis, 1971; M Lewis, 1992, 2000; Scheff and Retzinger, 1995; Tangney, 1996) and may contribute to the male propensity for violence. Instead of externalizing anger, others may become angry with themselves for their inadequacies, reactivity, or poor choices. Even though the cause, in this case, may be the self, anger at oneself still feels more powerful than shame.

The causes of shame and subsequent substitution with anger can be directed at specific others. This is a type of scapegoatism, which allows externalization of blame, thereby reducing one's own part in the experience. This use of anger does not provide for rectification of mistakes, but rather merely dissociates an individual from blame (M Lewis, 1992). Externalization is a

52

prominent feature of overt, aggressive narcissism and may account, at least in part, for the relational difficulties of narcissistic persons.

Bypassed shame affects social interactions not only by the defenses of substitution and externalization. As M Lewis (1992) has indicated, a state exists whether or not it is in conscious awareness. Unacknowledged emotions may be communicated socially through the body, voice, and verbal content. If one is shame-prone, others may take their reticence, gaze avert, or empty, rapid verbal style as negative indicators for a relationship. Mental confusion may be interpreted as unfriendliness. If one is prone to shame-inducing self-attributions, he may not have the confidence, desire, or motivation to engage in social interactions, friendships, or community. The intense self-focus attributed to the shame-prone (Tangney, et al., 1992) probably impedes connection with others as does characterological externalization of blame.

Shamelessness

The theologian Carl Schneider (1992) writes of shame, and a sense of shame. The absence of a sense of shame and a lack of appropriate respect before the world of life is an important theme in modern philosophy (Nietzsche, 1964). Schneider refers to shamelessness as "the most destructive form of shame." James Fowler (1996) has placed shame experiences on a continuum: healthy shame (protector of membership in valued communities and the custodian of

personal worthiness), perfectionist shame, ascribed shame due to minority status (internalized shame based on social discrimination), toxic shame (the result of persistent abuse or objectification), and shamelessness (in its extreme forms—narcissism and sociopathy).

Shamelessness is partially constituted by a denial of modesty, self-promotion, instrumental use or display of one's body or self, self-objectification, and imagined transcendence of the shared meanings and values of one's world of life. Shamelessness may be characterized by a lack of empathy, or an initial empathic sentiment that regresses into an inward focus on the injustices done to, and the sufferings of the self, or "egoistic drift" (Hoffman, 1984).

Broucek echoes Fowler's idea that shamelessness is a form of self-objectification, or "embracing objecthood" (1988; 1991). He notes the cultural pressures on women to regard themselves as objects is greater than any other similar pressure on males, although the objectification of the male body in the media has increased exponentially in the nine years since the publication of Broucek's book. He suggests that turning oneself into an object for the visual appropriation of others is a common symptom of narcissistic and histrionic personalities. In this case, aesthetic considerations predominate over moral considerations. According to Broucek (1991), the aestheticism of hysteria is concerned with many variations on two basic themes: "Am I pretty, or manly?"

and "Am I bright?" Combined, these two themes produce the questions "Am I interesting?" and "Do you like me?"

For Broucek (1991), individual manifestations of shamelessness are a defense against shame. He believes that shame is triggered by the experience of being objectified when wanting to be related to dialogically. The painful discrepancy of these experiences can be removed by "embracing objecthood" and renouncing one's claims as a subject. This solution replaces the self with an artificially constructed persona and replaces spontaneous responsiveness with a rehearsed performance. Two different forms of being undressed may illustrate this. There is nakedness, which is "unself"conscious, and there is nudity, which is the presentation of the self as an object.

For Broucek, the "average person" as portrayed in the media, is a corporate product. The goal is to make the objectified self a desirable object and to persuade others that their only hope of happiness lies in their acquiescence to the image of desirability and success promoted by the media. Shamelessness makes the acceptance and promotion of object idolatry easier to swallow. Erich Fromm (1948) offered the same analysis fifty years ago with the concept of the "personality market" and a perspective towards the world of life he referred to as "the marketing orientation."

Broucek (1991) notes, "witness the general shamelessness and corruption of our public officials and the leaders in the corporate and financial worlds as well

as the ever-increasing tawdriness, vulgarity, and tastelessness of the entertainment products offered to us." The pop culture heroes offered to the young, in particular, are noted for their pride in their aggressiveness, crudity, narcissism, and disrespect for others. These traits are cause for shame in other cultures and in the recent American past. Eric Hoffer (1974) refers to this as a "moral inversion," and proposes that most of the acts that provoke shame are not punishable by law, and that the everyday world of life depends on the observance of "unenforceable rules." Broucek may overstate it, "The whole structure of civilized society is thus a house of cards precariously balanced on shame as a defense" against narcissism, exhibitionism and voyeurism, and the objectification of self and of others. He believes that exhibitionism and voyeurism are rampant, and that this is attributable to a general breakdown of restrictions against objectification of self and others.

Broucek adds, "Capitalism has always been based on objectification of workers and consumers." The marketing orientation (Fromm, 1948) has conjoined objectification, greed, and sexuality as the prime movers of the current economic system. American society has failed to acknowledge the economic reasons for its current valorization of shamelessness and pretends that it is a patriotic respect for the constitutional right of free speech and aversion to censorship that promotes tolerance of objectification. A hermeneutic analysis of current contents and ideologies of mass culture would explore the utilitarian individualism inherent in

56

these phenomena. It would take the moral position that promoting any and every type of "free speech" has resulted in the "colonization of the lifeworld" (Habermas, 1987) by new possibilities that champion the objectification of self and other, under the disguised ideology of rapacious capitalism.

Guilt

Guilt is produced when individuals evaluate their behavior as failure, but focus on the specific actions that led to the failure (Lewis, 2000; Tangney, 1994). Another feature of guilt is the possible ameliorative actions that are likely to repair the failure (whether or not they are carried out). Phenomenologically, persons are distressed by their failure, but the pain is directed at the cause of the failure or the object of harm done, generally another person. The attribution process converges on the action of the self rather than on the self as a whole. This is why guilt experiences are not as painful or immobilizing as shame. There is generally no concomitant confusion or inarticulacy.

Guilt is usually associated with thoughts or intentions of corrective action that the transgressor can enact to repair the failure (Helen Block Lewis, 1971; M Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1992). Amelioration can be proactive or guilt may serve as a learning experience that one will hesitate before repeating. With guilt, the body does not collapse in on itself as with shame, rather researchers have noted

57

that participants in guilt-eliciting experiments seem to increase motor activity, as if trying to undo or repair the potential damage (Baumeister, Atwell & Heatherton, 1995; Zahn-Waxler, 1987).

Ridding oneself of the distressing affect in guilt is easier because the attribution is specific and situational rather than global. Coping generally consists of reparative actions directed towards the self as well as the other or the object. Even though there may not be an easily enacted reparative action convenient at the time guilt is experienced, research participants have been observed enacting other, sometimes unrelated "good" or conciliatory behaviors (Tangney & Niedenthal, 1995). There are levels of guilt seemingly associated with the availability of corrective action, the scarcer the likelihood of reparative action, the greater the intensity of guilt. When no corrective action is available or effective, a person may lapse into shame (HB Lewis, 1971). A person can be ashamed over a guilty action (or inaction), but cannot be guilty over being ashamed (Lewis, 1992a). Guilt lacks the painful intensity of shame. It is not "self-destroying," which seems to make guilt an all around more useful and pro-social emotion (Tangney, et al., 199-). However, because guilt is not as intense as shame, it may not goad a habitual transgressor into changing established moral, interpersonal, or characterological patterns.

HB Lewis (1971) and Tangney (1988) have proposed that individuals may be *guilt-prone* and have correlated this dimension with absence or minimal levels

of psychopathology (JPT, 1992), lower levels of anger arousal, resentment, and tendencies to blame others for negative events (JPT, 1996), and for constructive responses to anger inducing situations. *Guilt proneness* has been strongly correlated with empathy and a sense of interpersonal connection. Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1995) propose that guilt is most frequently experienced in close interpersonal relationships. This suggestion makes sense in light of the signal importance of intimate relationships to most people.

Additionally, guilt may help to solidify a developing relationship by modifying the actions of the partners to conform to the expectations and desires of the other. Guilt plays a powerful role when thought of as the ability to put oneself in the place of the injured party and to experience identification with their suffering or vicariously experience their distress. This, and the importance of relationships in human life, often motivates reparative action. This may be enacted by apology, correction, or compensation. Guilt has been valorized as a *re-integrative* emotion, communicating to the self the necessity of attending to the social bond with the wronged party and instantiating action to repair or maintain it (Scheff & Retzinger, 1991). Although guilt was once the *bete noir* of psychopathology, most recent explorations insist that it is an overwhelmingly positive emotion. When guilt does appear to be excessive or debilitating, writers such as Tangney and Scheff & Retzinger insist that it is really shame masquerading as guilt.

In Demotic Greek, the term *Hubris* refers to a tragic pridefulness that ultimately brings down the prideful. Unfortunately, in Greek drama, this often entailed the ruin and suffering of many others as well. Michael Lewis defined hubris as "an exaggerated pride or self-confidence often resulting in retribution by others" (1992). The antiquated term "pridefulness" refers to an individual who is haughty and so taken with himself as to be as to be repugnant. As one of the Seven Deadly Sins, it has a long history. Hubris is a consequence of an evaluation of success in regards to one's standards, rules, and goals where the focus is on the global self. In hubris, the person focuses on the total self as successful, and thus there is there is a fusion of subject and object such as is characteristic of shame. Mueller and Dweck (1998) have observed associations between too much praise of children and negative performance. It is possible that too much praise enhances hubristic tendencies, resulting in a lowering of standards, rules, and goals to avoid possible disconfirmation by failure.

Because of the global nature of hubris, it is likely to require frequent "fixes" to maintain. The individual must alter standards or re-evaluate what constitutes success. Unlike shame, hubris is highly positive and emotionally rewarding, the experiencer feels good about himself. Hubris is difficult to sustain, since no specific action precipitates it. Lewis (2000) refers to hubris as "addictive." Because of the "addictive" nature of this positive self-attribution, those prone to hubris derive little satisfaction from the feeling. Consequently, they

must seek out or invent situations likely to produce this emotional state. This can be accomplished either by altering their standards, rules, and goals or by re-evaluating what constitutes success in their actions, thoughts or feelings, as well as denigrating witnesses to their perceived failures.

Others generally describe individuals with hubristic tendencies with disdain (Capps, 1993; Kohut, 1971; Wink, 1991). Hubristic people have difficulty with interpersonal relationships since their self-absorption is likely to interfere with the wishes, desires, and needs of others. Given the contemptuousness associated with hubris, other people are likely to feel shamed by the actions of a hubristic individual (Rathvon & Holmstrom, 1991; Wink, 1991). Lewis (2000) notes three problems associated with hubris: (1) it is a transient but addictive emotion; (2) it is not related to a specific action, and thus requires altering patterns of goal setting or evaluation; and (3) it interferes with interpersonal relationships due to its self-centered, insolent, and contemptuous nature.

Pride is the consequence of a successful evaluation of a specific action. Phenomenologically, pride is experienced as joy over an action, thought, or feeling well done. The focus of pleasure is specific and related to a particular behavior. In pride, the self and the object are separated, as with guilt. Pride focuses a person on her action; she is engrossed in the specific action that gives her pride. Pride, in this definition, has been compared to achievement motivation (Stipek, et al, 1992; Lewis, 2000). Because pride is linked to a specific action, it

can be replicated. Unlike in hubris, pride's specificity allows for action. Other studies have associated pride of this sort with a "mastery" learning orientation (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).

The Positive Qualities of Shame

M. Lewis (1998, in Gilbert & Andrews) believes that shame and guilt function to interrupt any action that violates either internally or externally derived standards or rules. Although Lewis treats shame as a pathological, debilitating condition, it can serve in the capacity of protecting relationships, protecting the self, and for better or worse, preserving boundaries in social relationships and propriety. Thinkers in the field of evolutionary psychology such as Paul Gilbert and Michael McGuire (1998) suggest that the self-conscious affects are concerned primarily with integrating and forming action plans with social information. In this way of thinking, shame is primarily concerned with processing socially threatening information, especially in the areas of social rank, status, and social exclusions and rejections.

Shame provides feedback to an actor about success or failure of social strategies and may act as an "off switch" for competitive behaviors after a defeat (Gilbert & McGuire, 1998). The evolutionary psychology approach tends to see current human phenomenon as socially evolved remnants of a fantasized hunter-

gatherer period early in human history. This reasoning is almost spurious, given that there is no reliable history available about this distant period and recent studies of similar extant cultures reveal a broad array of social organizations, many without "traditional" social hierarchies. A questionable theoretical assumption aside, this view of the social utility of shame in structuring relationships holds some power.

Writers from other disciplines may offer a richer exploration of the functions of shame and guilt. Contemporary cultural anthropologists such as Benedicte Grima (1992) and Catherine Lutz (1988) have written that manifestation of emotions in particular cultures, and specifically in the women, reveal the differential power relations between genders. For example, women of the Paxtun, a Muslim group from Afghanistan, are permitted only two emotions, grief and shame (Grima, 1992). Grima takes this as an indicator of the constructed nature of emotions in the service of male domination. From her experience with the Paxtun, Grima arrived at the antiessentialist generalization that "Emotion is culture" (1992). In her work among the people of the Ifaluk atoll, Lutz found that women had a surprising measure of individual autonomy and wielded considerable power, although to overtly display it, particularly in the company of men, was a cause for shame.

Byron Good and Mary Jo Delvecchio-Good (1988) present a penetrating analysis of the interplay of the self, emotions, and political power in Iran. The

self, as it is perceived in Iran consists of several levels, or spheres. There are the external, or social spheres, variant upon contextual factors such as status and gender, the self in the family, and a "secret core," or private self that one shares at one's will and with only a few people (1988). For the Iranians, shame seems to serve as a protectant emotion that signals that one may be in danger of exposing a contextually inappropriate self, or that another may be acting in relationally inappropriate ways. Shame is also a concomitant of the sequestration of women, who pay a high price in shame for desiring to live beyond their ascribed status.

Obeyesekere (1990) has attempted to show that in certain local cultures in Africa that public shame, in the form of stigma, can actually be the impetus for meaningful spiritual or social growth. For example, persons with mental illness are generally stigmatized transculturally. In certain African groups, a journey through a psychotic disorder, or spirit possession, can actually valorize the sufferer and they may be seen as a sage or a prophet.

Theologians from Augustine to the present have offered various notions, often indirectly, about shame and guilt. Augustine of Hippo is known for, among many other things, the elaboration of the concept of original sin. In this way of thinking, the "fall" of humans from grace began with the curiosity, arrogance, and disobedience (hubris) of Adam and Eve, who through submitting to the temptation offered by Satan forever changed human nature. Augustine infers that the fall was a result of the deception of Satan, but also of hubris on the part of

Adam and Eve to be like God and independent of her/him. The first scene after they eat from the tree of life is of Adam and Eve being aware of their nakedness and attempting to hide from God as he/she comes to them in the garden. Adam offers "I was afraid because I was naked and ashamed, and hid myself." (Genesis 4, NRSV) Later, after casting the pair out of the garden, God makes them clothes of animal skin, caring for them even after their disobedience (Battenhouse, 1979).

The message, at least in part, is that humans alone are insufficient, incomplete, and given to error. Shame comes about when humans recognize their insufficiency and incompleteness in the course of selfish, sinful, or hubristic pursuits. Only in God can humans be whole. Shame, in this sense, seems to serve a powerful role in highlighting the futility of hubristic endeavor and re-directing people towards a wholeness and integrity in their relationship with their creator and harmony with her/his creation. The same is true on a human relational level. As many theorists have elucidated, shame, although it can occur in solitude, has an inherently relational character. In this way of thinking, shame is an inescapable part of human social and emotional bonds and is extinguished only at the peril of these.

The theologian Carl Schneider (1992) has "sought to call attention to a disvalued dimension of human experience—shame and the sense of shame." For Schneider, shame is closely tied to covering and uncovering, speech and silence, the literal and the inexpressible, concealment and disclosure, community and

alienation. He offers that the predominance of rationalism, science, and individualism have resulted in the rejection of many profound aspects of human experience. The contemporary rejection of shame is based on a faith-commitment to reason, science, and self-realization. It is an incarnation of the enlightenment ideals of reason and individual autonomy (Schneider, 1992). Some of the aspects of human existence devalued by scientism, like shame, are profoundly negative and yet, Schneider feels, play intimate roles in the meaningful human drama. A part of the damage done to meaningful human life by the growing hegemony of scientism is the valuation of the literal, the explicit, and the utilitarian and the devaluation of reticence, the unspoken, and the personal (Schneider, 1992).

Shame and a sense of shame can be likened to two different terms in the French, *honte* and *pudeur*, and two German words, *Scham* and *Schande*. Honte and Schande may be translated as being ashamed, as the experience of shame with its attendant pain, confusion, and desire to shrink or hide. Pudeur and Scham, in their closest English equivalents, refer to a sense of shame, modesty, and discretion and play a significant role as a positive restraining influence in human interaction (Lasch, 1978). Shame as discretion or modesty has been noted as a companion of virtue among philosophers and ethicists for thousands of years. Augustine felt that shame as discretion or modesty helped to maintain "the right order of values and actions" (Battenhouse, 1979). In this sense, shame sustains the personal and social ordering of the world, just and oppressive. What is right,

good, and just varies culturally, and according to predominating forms of social organization. However, shame, or the sense of shame is present in all extant societies no matter their character. Shame can be used as a depersonalizing, oppressive force, but may also function to maintain the integrity of self-responsible individuals. The theologian and sociologist Kurt Riezler (1951, p. 243) offers that

> Shame interferes in the relation between man and himself and is a
>
> powerful source of hate. A man puts another being to shame and he is
>
> confronted with his own meanness, his image of himself is broken, he
>
> despises himself and the one he has put to shame."

For reflective persons, shame may act to prevent shaming and thus damaging self and other.

In perhaps its best manifestation, the sense of shame also protects that which is private and vulnerable in an individual from public violation. Although most cultures vary as to what and how much may be revealed, most have some notion of privacy and of what should be kept private, not only to sustain social hierarchies, but also to protect the psychological individual. Privacy need not be equated with withdrawal from community or uninvolvement with one's neighbors. It is not a "fall from a primal condition of social communion or personal wholeness," (Schneider, 1992) or avoidance of social responsibilities. Privacy is not necessarily a selfish or individualistic dimension. Privacy is a

boundary between a self and various social contexts and actors, and as such helps protect it from inappropriate intrusions and makes possible relationships of different degrees of intimacy. In this way, privacy is crucial to familial bonds, love relationships, and friendships. The philosopher Hannah Arendt (1958) wrote, "Where privacy is prohibited, man can only imagine separateness as an act of stealth." The sociologist Irving Goffman (1969) observed that all social interactions involve risks to the self. In any interaction, both parties are made vulnerable. Human relationships require both protection and risk of this vulnerability through a relationship of bi-directional and measured self-disclosure (Goffman, 1969). The protection of self lies in the reciprocity of self-disclosure and shame may serve as a signal of inappropriate intimacy.

According to Arendt (1958), there are three different qualities and experiences that are protected and made possible by the private: (1) the private realm guarantees a depth of life. It contains many things that cannot survive the scrutiny of others. Arendt states, "a life spent entirely in public, in the presence of others, becomes …shallow, it is a life lived at high noon, devoid of darkening shadows." One possible interpretation of the recent proliferation of media-driven self-disclosure on talk shows and on the Internet is through the theoretical distanciation possible with electronic media, people feel an illusory freedom to project the private into the public sphere, debatably without cost. The actual effects of lurid publicization of the private are still a matter of argument and

research, but cynicism about human nature and a lowering of standards of human relational conduct may be the least deleterious outcome. Arendt continues (2) Privacy undergirds the public. There could not be a public realm without the establishment and maintenance of privacy. The private establishes boundaries, which in turn comprise, at least in part, identity. (3) Until recent times, the realm of the private has had the characteristic of the sacred. In the past, the private was surrounded by the mysterious. It belonged to the realm of creation, birth, illness, and death (Arendt, 1958).

Many things belong to the private because their meaning is altered, and the self de-stabilized, by public display. Shame acts, in its positive forms, to restrain the self from inappropriate exposure. Shame protects the self from alteration by public display, protects fragile qualities of the self, and may buffer the self from violations of its embodiment and emotional essence (Schneider, 1992). In Schneider's way of thinking, there are some parallels with Kohut's (1976) notion that shame protects the self by restraining displays of grandiose exhibitionism and resultant reactions. Given Schneider's and Arendt's ideas about shame and privacy, it is not difficult to connect the current predominance of shame with trends towards unfettered self-expression, individualism, and the current cultural obsession with exhibitionism/voyeurism in the form of excruciatingly personal web sites, television talk shows, and confessional writing.

M Lewis (1992) proposed that one way out of shame is confession. These current "technologies of the self" (Foucault, 1979) are probably not what he had in mind.

For Schneider (1992), shame as an emotional experience also contains a revelatory potential. In the painful self-awareness engendered by a shame experience, a part of the self is revealed to the self. The self, or self-aspect revealed in the shame experience is a reflexive apprehension of one's qualities, values, or ethics. Therefore, it realizes an intimate relation of the self to the self and reveals a possibly hidden aspect of one's being. Jean-Paul Sartre (1948) wrote, "Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the other sees me." Shame has a special capacity to disclose the self. The process that occurs in shame is not necessarily a constricted or unchangeable one. Through the shame experience, identity may be illumined, and also shaped, elaborated, and put into perspective (Schneider, 1992). The painful self-consciousness of shame is intimately linked with its revelatory potential. It makes self-confrontation difficult to avoid. If shame is not defensively transmuted into anger, self-hatred, or shamelessness, and is instead faced, it offers an instructive encounter with one's identity and the evaluations, values, and attributions that comprise it. In other words, shame may be a form of revelatory "strong evaluation" (Taylor, 1991).

Francis Broucek (1991) believes shame is innately linked not only with the self, but also with sexuality and protects adolescents, who are in "the delicate and necessarily private unfinished process of psychosexual maturation from

70

premature public exposure to the adult world of the already completed." In other words, shame serves to protect from precocious sexuality, enforce incest prohibitions, and is a protection from the public in all its forms.

Culture and Self-Conscious Emotions: Guilt and Shame

In recent decades, many social science researchers have challenged the idea of the universality of emotions. Their general claim is that there are radical differences in emotional experience and behavior across cultures (Geertz, 1973; Lutz, 1988; Russell, 1994). Universal notions about emotional expression like those of Ekman (1988) have been particularly challenged. Social Constructionists such as Kenneth Gergen (1985) and James Averill (1985) also promote the idea that emotions are socially constructed. This perspective, while challenging the universalism (and some might say imperialism) of mainstream social science, completely fails to consider the neurophysiological components of emotions, for embodied beings.

Cultures provide "horizons of meaning" (Taylor, 1991), or the "background of intelligibility" against which desires, preferences, and opinions make sense. A culture's focus on shared meanings and values is significantly related to emotional experiences within that particular culture (Taylor, 1989, 1991; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995). This is certainly true of the self-conscious emotions, which rely on the comparison of thought and behavior with standards,

rules, and goals. Wallbott and Scherer observed that the relationship between shame and identity, or ethical orientation is short lived in collectivist cultures compared to individualist cultures. These researchers also observed that differences associated with ethical orientation for guilt were not significant. The conclusion of this particular study was that shame experience seemed to vary across cultures.

Emotions can vary broadly in the degree that they connect or separate the self from interdependent relationships (Kitayama et al., 1995). Recent anthropological literature (Menon & Schweder, 1994) highlights the importance of emotion in social connectedness in primarily in non-western cultures. In one study, Menon and Schweder (1994) presented participants from India and the United States with three emotions: anger, shame, and happiness. The participants were then asked to choose the emotion that was different from the other two. The Indian participants chose anger and generally explained that anger disrupts interpersonal relationships and is related to disconnection from others (1994). The U.S. participants chose happiness because it is positive, while the others are negative. Thus, for the U.S. cohort, the evaluation of the aesthetic dimension of positive versus negative appeared to be the more salient feature than social connectedness.

Catherine Lutz (1988) has challenged the idea of universal emotions by claiming to have demonstrated that specific cultural systems and social

environments essentially organize emotional meanings. Her conclusion was that "emotion can be viewed as serving complex communicative, moral, and cultural purposes rather than as simply labels for internal states whose nature or essence is presumed to be universal" (Lutz, 1988). What may be universal is that emotions serve "complex communicative, moral, and cultural purposes," some of which vary culturally. Shaver, Wu, and Schwartz (1992) addressed the universality of emotions by examining similarities and differences in emotions across cultures. They observed that there are general conceptions about emotions that apply to most cultures and do not seem to vary widely between east and west. They warned that their findings do not indicate that everything about emotions is the same across the globe. However, people everywhere do seem to share many of the same motives, attribution capacities, emotional reactions, and need to control emotions.

The social nature of emotion is explicitly recognized in Japan (Doi, 1971; Lebra, 1985) and Korea (Ha, 1995). In both countries, there are extensive vocabularies that describe the often-subtle aspects of relationships. Many emotions arise from and strengthen cohesive communal relationships. The Japanese term "amae" characterizes the relationship between a mother and her children and may be defined as a "sense of indulgent dependence on the other" (Lebra, 1985). The Japanese term "haji" is shame that occurs when one fails to meet the expectations of the other and occurs in the presence of those about whom

one cares. Haji also highlights one's indebtedness and inferiority to the others and the significance of the others to oneself.

Francis Inki-Ha (1995) writes that Koreans are more aware of their shame experiences than Westerners, and links this with different values concerning relationships and involvement in relational bonds. The frequency with which Euro-Americans acknowledge feeling shame is significantly less than their Korean-American counterparts. Ha (1995) believes that this may be attributable to Euro-American cultural deficits in the identification of negative emotions. Euro-Americans also tend to use shame and guilt interchangeably and to provide trivial and impoverished accounts of their shame and guilt experiences. The avoidance of shame feelings among Euro-Americans may also have to do with the singular and detached self of modern America, wherein there is no collectivity in which to disperse one's shame.

The Euro-American cultural deficits in negative emotion recognition are probably a result of cultural beliefs and attitudes about the self, connectedness, and about shame and guilt. In Western cultures, shame may be the least socially acceptable emotion, as it is believed to be the mark of a weak or incompetent person (Goffman, 1979). Goffman observed that to appear ashamed in Western society is "considered evidence of weakness, inferiority, low status, defeat, and surrender" (1967).

Conversely, in Korean culture there is a cultural acceptance of shame (Ha, 1995). A popular Korean insult directed towards persons acting selfishly translates, as "you have no sense of shame." At certain times, Koreans feel that shame is virtuous, a form of modesty. In the Korean language, there is an elaborate vocabulary of words and phrases related to shame. Ha (1995) suggests that shame is "hypercognized" in Korean culture, which suggests its importance in the everyday world of life. This difference in the language and experience of shame between the U.S. and Korea is also attributable to different cultural beliefs and values about relationships, which are a component of ethical orientation (Liem, 1997).

In a study comparing Asian-American Protestants and Euro-American Protestants, Ratanasiripong (1996) investigated the relationships between self-construal, acculturation, grace, self-conscious emotions, and depression. The results suggest that shame experiences were more frequent among Asian Americans. An interdependent self-construal was significantly related to shame, while independence was inversely related to it. Shame and guilt both had significant correlations with depression and no relationship with acculturation.

In the United States, anger is often substituted for shame (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992; Lewis, 1992). This may suggest a connection with the dominant ethical orientation in American culture, individualism. The logic of this argument rests on the observed negative cultural

attitudes towards socially engaging emotions such as shame, which is depicted broadly in American culture as a sign of weakness, inferiority, and defeat. The findings of many of the studies in this review reflect the positive cultural value of shame in interdependent, or dividual cultures, and the aversion to any mention or display of shame, as well as the potential for interference with self-actualization, in the individualist United States. The positive necessity of shame seems left to theologians.

Psychological Perspectives on the Self

A distinguishing characteristic of being human is the capability for self-reflection. While a large proportion of organismic existence is out of the range and control of objective self-awareness, that which seems to most vividly signify human-ness involves an objective awareness that allows conscious processing of information and choice in paths of action and engagement. Many writers have emphasized this capacity for self-reflection. William James (1890) referred to this self-aspect as the "Empirical Self," or "the me." He referred to the unconscious, or subjective self as the "I," or the material self.

There are many ideas about the self and its development, Western, Eastern, and local. The most notable Western theories generally fall under the rubric of psychoanalytic, object relational, or self-psychological. There are many

other theories about the self, which both parallel and diverge from analytically oriented ideas. These include cognitive theories and those based on notions about interpersonal connectedness. In this section, three psychological genres of self theories will be considered, Self Psychology, Adlerian Individual Psychology, and Cognitive-Affective models of the self and its development. A fourth alternative found in the hermeneutic philosophical writings of Charles Taylor, Mikhail Bakhtin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon will be explored, as will theories about the self and its development from non-western traditions.

Sigmund Freud conceived of the self as involving conscious and unconscious processes. In his later writings he proposed the structural model of the tripartite self, consisting of Id, Superego, and Ego, as a means to understand the different levels of self and to define the psychological self. What is perhaps most important for present purposes is not an comprehensive explication of the three parts of the Freudian self, which are by now common knowledge, but rather that Freud pointed out that actions by persons are part of their selves and that there are parts of the self that operate outside of conscious awareness.

The Self Psychology of Heinz Kohut is simultaneously a powerful critique of psychoanalysis and a new theory of the self. Rather than the primacy of instinctual drives, Kohut emphasized the psychology of the self and object relations (Eagle, 1984). In Kohut's theories there are three main stages of normal

or healthy development: primary narcissism; the grandiose, exhibitionistic self; and healthy narcissism. In the autoerotic, primary stage, there are only a fragmented self and "ego nuclei." (Eagle, 1984) The primary narcissistic stage is characterized by the child's feelings of omnipotence and "absolute perfection" (Kohut, 1977). A sense of the self as cohesive and unitary begins to emerge at this point, but is disturbed by the unavoidable shortcomings of naturally imperfect parents to meet the child's demands and needs for perfect mirroring. In the subsequent stage, the "grandiose and exhibitionistic self," (Kohut, 1971) a sense of narcissistic equilibrium is maintained by the child through relinquishing the previous state of perfection to a loved, omnipotent "transitional self-object" in the form of an "idealized parent image" (Broucek, 1991; Eagle, 1984; Kohut, 1976; Morrison, 1989).

Early mirroring and the allowance of idealization by caregivers facilitate the transition to this state of normal exhibitionism and grandiosity. This allows the child to maintain her sense of power and efficacy in the face of the unavoidable demands and vicissitudes of reality. As the child develops, her unrealistic grandiosity and exhibitionism are tamed as she recognizes others as separate individuals. Maturity and autonomy are gained through "transmuting internalizations" (Kohut, 1971) that form stable structures for action in the world. Internalizations of the mirroring and idealized "parental imago" together with "twinship experiences" with close self-objects in childhood, establish a dimension

of social connectedness that provides continuing affirmation of the self. When there are consistent failures in mirroring and idealization at this stage, the self remains essentially stuck and does not progress into the final stage of healthy narcissism (Eagle, 1984).

Mature, healthy narcissism is characterized by a cohesive sense of self, adequate self-esteem regulation, tension reduction and development of ambitions, values and ideals. The mature self is a "bipolar structure" (Kohut, 1977). One pole consists of innate talents and ambitions of the primal "nuclear self" as they are shaped in earlier experience; the other pole consists of values and ideals derived from the idealized parental image (Richardson, Fowers & Guignon, 1999).

In Kohut's way of thinking, a child's basic biological and survival needs can be met by the parents, but his developing self can be damaged and fixated by their failure to supply "confirming and admiring responses of approval" and "maternal empathy." (Kohut, 1977) Kohut also discards the Freudian notion of aggressive drives, instead labeling destructiveness as a "disintegration product" of a fragmenting self. Kohut makes a claim for the primacy of self and object relations over biological drives, repudiating a major tenet of psychoanalytic dogma. Self-Psychology emphasizes the self almost to the exclusion of biological considerations.

Francis Broucek, a contemporary proponent of Self-Psychology and Object Relations suggests that early self-development grows out of a child's sense

of "efficacy, fulfilled intentionality, and the joy and excitement attendant on that experience." (Broucek, 1991) In this model, early experience of the sense of self is fundamentally sensori-motor. This initial sense of self is grounded at a bodily level in "kinesthetic flows" (1991) through which the intentional activities of the child are carried out. Intentionality, while not generally attributed to infants at this stage, is more likened to "willing." Willing, in this sense does not require objective self-awareness or knowledge of motives. Out of this early intentionality and its inherent reflexivity, its success and failure, and the attendant positive and negative affects, the sense of self begins to form.

A sense of efficacy or ineffectiveness is grounded in the responses a child receives from his parents. If a parent is sensitive, responsive, or "good enough," his sense of efficacy is maintained and enhanced. In the case of insensitive, inattentive, or neglectful responses, "the primitive sense of self will be damaged, and the capacity for initiative may be nipped in the bud, leading to a more or less robotic type of existence in which the child, as he grows older, attempts to establish a compensatory sense of self by the suppression or repression of his original action tendencies, based on an identification with the mother" (Broucek, 1991, p. 83). The sense of self is based on the interactions and communications, effective or not, with significant others. In the case of consistently ineffective experience with caregivers, a child's emerging sense of self is based on inhibitory activities in relation to itself. In other words, a child forms defenses against itself

and its ineffectiveness by inhibiting what it takes to be the source of inefficacy, itself. Broucek suggests that early experiences with failed intent or inefficacy, before the emergence of objective self-awareness, result in early shame experiences. With the emerging ability for self-reflexivity, these early experiences of unworthiness and powerlessness are elaborated into beliefs about the self and its relations to others.

Like Lewis (1992), Broucek believes that objective self-awareness is an innately human phenomenon and develops out of a young child's relations with others. These others "experience the self as an other, and as an other who makes a difference" (1991). Thus, the sense of self and the sense of other are inextricably intertwined. This intersubjectivity is a crucial element of a model of consciousness that consists of (1) intentionality, knowing what one is doing and why; (2) awareness of the here and now reality, knowing what is being sensed and what it means; and (3) shared consciousness, the sharing of knowledge and personal feelings, and an awareness of relational and moral responsibility to others, and of they to oneself (Broucek, 1991). Intentionality and shared consciousness are closely linked with the affect system. Until the development of language, intersubjectivity is based on shared affective experiences and meanings, and these continue to constitute the core of shared consciousness throughout life.

Through mirroring by others, a child begins to take himself as an object of reflection and, in a sense, objectify himself. The intercession of others is

necessary to the capacity to self-objectify. This capacity requires the ability to see things, including herself, as others see them. A child becomes aware that just as others are visible to her, she is visible to others. A part of the self has at least two exterior dimensions, one of which is visible to others and reflected back to the self and another, which will remain imperceptible to the self.

Developmentally, Broucek (1991) believes that the emergence of the faculty for self-objectification is signified by the child's ability to recognize her reflection in a mirror as her own. The consolidation of this capacity is indicated by increasingly accurate use of personal pronouns. The acquisition and correct usage of personal pronouns "indicates an awareness that he is capable of assuming different perspectives on a situation and knows that others may also" (Broucek, 1991). In this way of thinking, subjective self-awareness and self-objectification are incompatible as psychological experience and, on some level at least, this dissonance may in fact hasten the development of a more complex identity. Broucek suggests that part of this transition may precipitate a "tearing of the self from itself" and the subsequent development of a compensatory idealized self-image, similar to Kohut's grandiose, exhibitionistic stage. This is tempered by the emergent possibilities of self-reflexivity and increasing capacity for higher order shared consciousness.

After the emergence of objective self-awareness, a child may experience mirroring of their intentionality, excitement and interest, and sense of an

82

indwelling self, or may be disconfirmed in these experiences and treated as an object by insensitive, neglectful, or abusive caregivers. The former is akin to Kohut's notion of "healthy mirroring." The latter, however results in the experience of objectification by powerful, significant others. Objectification may come to dominate the consciousness of an individual and thwart the development of empathy, insight, and an indwelling sense of self (Broucek, 1991). The experience of shame is in some ways akin to the experience of being treated as an object, by others and defensively so by the self.

The development of objective self-awareness is the prerequisite for the emergence of other related capacities. Broucek lists: "(1) a heightened vulnerability to shame affect; (2) the division of experience into subjective and public modes; (3) the split of the self into the immediate "I" and the socially mediated "me"; (4) the loss of primary communion, the original I-Thou; (5) the beginning of 'object relations'; (6) the formation of an ideal self and an ideal other; (7) the beginnings of conscience; and (8) the birth of narcissism." This process is unavoidable, except in cases of failures in neurological development, illness, or injury. The affective undercurrent of self-development seems to be traumatic loss, even when parents are better than "good enough."

Alfred Adler was an early member of Freud's circle and served as the president of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Association. Freud and Adler eventually had a parting of the ways over divergences in their theories. Adler's childhood

was an important factor in his later ideas about the human world of life, a fact he embraced. He was born the second of six children and was "a sickly child" (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). Adler was greatly affected by the death of his younger brother when he was three years old. The ideas of illness, weakness, and belonging by status and beliefs are a major theme running throughout Adler's work.

Adler's metapsychology includes several concepts that have recently re-gained popularity in theoretical psychology. The first basic tenet is Holism, or the idea that humans are not collections of parts, or mechanistic assemblages of ego, id, and superego. Manaster and Corsini (1993) explain, "The individual in Individual Psychology does not mean the opposite of social or group," it refers to the unique individuality of each person. Holism also rejects the notion of determinism, embracing instead the idea of *creativity*. If everything is determined, there can be no responsibility or creativity. Works of art would be caused, not created, as would human beings.

Another idea of signal importance to Individual Psychology is its phenomenological, or "subjective, personal" emphasis (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). For everyday intents and purposes, reality is what people interpret it to be. For Individual Psychology, subjective reality refers to human impressions, views, perceptions, and conclusions, not to physical or scientific reality. Adlerian phenomenology has some important implications for the human world of life, it is

"… a psychology of use rather than of possession" (Manaster & Corsini, 1993), or a matter of what a person does with what they have, whether it be intelligence, motivation, athletic ability, or whatever, rather than what gifts or deficits a person may have been born with.: (Manaster and Corsini, 1993) In this way of thinking, happiness, success, or whatever it is that people want to achieve are a result of their perceptions, beliefs, and motivations rather than any innate giftedness. However, Adlerians do not believe that people can become whatever they want, objective, or cultural realities set limits on what is attainable. In this way, Individual Psychology seeks to avoid the dualism of determinism-indeterminism and may be generally characterized by the statement "Within the limits established by your biology and the environment, there is generally a lot that you can do" (Manaster & Corsini, 1993).

Individual Psychology sees people as *teleological* beings, purposive, moving towards goals. Individuals are viewed in terms of constantly striving. In this way of thinking, people are best understood by asking questions such as "What is she after?" or "What is her goal?" Teleology is another challenge to both objectifying and existential interpretations of the human. It challenges the notion that people are determined by their pasts, are "trained or conditioned," as well as the idea that humans live totally in the present, making radically free choices. In Individual Psychology, people are best understood in terms of where they are going. Individual Psychology acknowledges that there is some truth in

deterministic and existential views of the person. People are seen as making choices and pursuing goals based on "what happened to us in the past, what the situation is now, and what we are after" (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). There is a dynamic interplay among the past, the present, and the future.

Individual Psychology is anti-dualistic and anti-reductionistic. The individual is embedded in her/his culture and cannot be studied in isolation. No sense can be made of humans by a dissection or reduction of the self into its alleged elements. The individual is seen as a totality that cannot be reduced to parts. Individual Psychology is a *relational* psychology in which people are always seen as embedded in a social field. Although one is a unique individual, they are not apart from others. Adler saw people as always in motion, directed towards personal and social goals in a social matrix.

Social Orientation is perhaps the most crucial idea of Individual Psychology. It is ultimately concerned with morality, with ideas of good and bad. The good comes from social integration and social concern (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). Adler was primarily concerned with using knowledge for the general human good, allowing people to grow and develop. Human science for its own sake is fine, but the use of knowledge is more important. The human scientist should always be aware of the social and moral implications and its possible effects on the world of life. In this way of thinking, the psychologist must rely on his or her own experience of living and offer, "Messages, should give

instructions" rather than just publish information in academic journals (Manaster & Corsini, (1993). In the Adlerian way of thinking, to be happy and successful, one has to be good, in a socially connected way.

Individual Psychology sees each individual as different, and yet very much alike. Each person has a different personality called a "style of life" (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956). As humans develop, they each accumulate a set of conclusions about life, about right and wrong, how to obtain what is desired and avoid what is not, what others are like, and what he/she is like. This set of personal concepts is known as "private logic" and represents a personal philosophy of life (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). In any situation, people tend to act in terms of their private logic, which may be unacknowledged or unknown by the actor. Even though one's personal philosophy may be cognitively articulated, she still has a large measure of freedom in making decisions and acting. The choices may be influenced or "contaminated" by past experiences, but they are still free choices for which one is responsible. People are often able to rise above their pasts and make unexpected choices.

Adler believed that mental health or personal success was a function of a person's *social interest*. Social interest means "identification with humanity, a feeling of community, or a belonging to life" (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956). Manaster and Corsini offer (1993), "The best antonym for social interest might be selfishness, although anomie also conveys the opposite of social interest." In this

way of thinking, all important problems in life are social problems. How an individual perceives of and operates in the world always affects others, whether on the job, within the family, or within the larger society. Adler believed that it was a lack of social interest that pushed "children to "become the criminal, the problem children, neurotics and suicides" (Manaster and Corsini, 1993). Those who are lacking in social interest, concomitantly lack courage and self-confidence.

Adler believed that each person strove for self-improvement and has an in-born desire to become better, to move forward. This is referred to as the "growth force" and is common to many theories of personality (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). "Striving for perfection" is movement directed at self-improvement and greater competency. This has been frequently interpreted as a will to power or domination over others, which is not the case. Children are born helpless and rely on others to care for and nurture them. An individual's style of life cannot be understood without understanding their understanding of the people who look after him and compensate for his *inferiority*. Inferiority is a basic concept of Individual Psychology. This term is not wholly employed in the pejorative by Adlerians; rather it describes the condition into which every one is born. Much of subsequent life is a reaction to or compensation for this basic inferiority. Inferiority is a basis for the socially embedded nature of humans. Behavior is affected by inferiority feelings. Awareness of one's deficiencies may generate

feelings of distress and ideas as to compensate for or overcome one's self-perceptions of inferiority. Individual Psychology sees feelings of inferiority as normal and widespread. They may serve to motivate a person to movement, but the direction taken because of suffering from inferiority feelings influences whether the strategy is useful or useless.

To summarize Individual Psychology: People are seen as unique, organized, socially embedded, indivisible units. People react according to their phenomenology, their perceptions, memories, ideas, and values—their private logic. For heuristic purposes, the mind can be arbitrarily separated into cognition and affection. Cognition predominates and emotions serve the purposes of the intellect. Emotions are the result of the interpretation of both internal thoughts and external events. There are no deterministic emotional elicitors in the external world. Behavior is an extension of the teleolgies of individuals, many of which are unknown to the actors. The individual is meaningless except in social terms, and people are embedded in a social world. The normal, healthy, and successful individual see herself as a part of a family, local groups, a profession, and humanity, in others words, she has social interest.

Briefly, Adler's ideas on personality development hinge on the importance of others in self- formation. Although Adler himself did not organize his thoughts about the self along developmental lines, he did concern himself with how people become the way they are. For Adler, the main issue for all people

was "how to belong, to fit in" (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). The family is the main social milieu and socialization agent for a growing child. Children with an in-born potential for social interest want to belong to the family and must figure out just how they fit in. A family is composed of people who live together with a hierarchical structure, directionality, and some overall common goals. The hierarchical structure consists of the adults, one of whom may or may not claim the main authority, siblings, and perhaps others.

The birth order of children in a family is very influential in influencing how children solve the problem of finding their place. Siblings affect each other's personalities. Within any family, there are differential expectations of the children according to gender and birth order. Birth order refers to the sequential chronological position of individuals in a sibship and to the psychological position of a child (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). Adler noticed some general trends in self-formation that were influenced by birth order, with each successive sibling affecting the thoughts, feelings, and perceptions of position in the family hierarchy of those already born. Firstborns generally achieve more than do those born later; firstborns show a greater need for affiliation; those born later seem to have a better developed capacity for empathy; and firstborns seem to adhere to authority and respect traditions more than those born later. Sibling rivalries and strivings to find their place in a family greatly influence the development of personality.

Once an individual's "style of life" is developed, they maintain it through adaptation, self-reinforcement, and by achieving success as they see it. One seeks out social and occupational situations that allow him to fit in, given his style of life. People are motivated by their teleolgies and the human need for affiliation. As people mature, they develop strategies for reaching their goals and justifying their actions, to themselves and others.

Individual Psychology views emotions as human motivators. They serve to goad people into action and are a part of a person's style of life. Emotions are not elicited by events, but are the results of interpretations of events, including thoughts, by an actor according to her private logic. Emotions are controlled by goals, by ideas, and by intentions (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). Adler described emotions as "conjunctive," or socially oriented, and "disjunctive," socially aggressive or alienating. In this way of thinking, guilt is a conjunctive emotion, while shame is a disjunctive one, at least in its current manifestations. Some emotions like irritability, frustration, and ambivalence serve to "keep one equidistant from others" (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). They may essentially be a "cover-up" for one's real purposes and a mechanism by which people make themselves seem complex or superior. Adler viewed emotions as helpful and as facilitating movement in accordance with one's goals. People are seen as responsible for their emotions and a flare of temper cannot be attributed to biology or temperament.

The capacity for objective self-awareness empowers humans to deal with information and choose a best course of action. This intentionality is a quality of the objective self. Objective self-awareness allows humans to step outside of their processing and generate novel explanations and solutions. This facet of consciousness has been variously referred to as the "me," the objective self, and the "I," or subjective self (James, 1890). The self, for present purposes, will be what Lewis (1992, 1999) refers to as the "reflecting self." Different levels of the self involve different ways of knowing and different modes of consciousness. The notion of a multifaceted self is not new. Psychoanalytic theories including Freudian, Object Relations, and Self Psychology have all proposed that the subject is comprised of differing psychological components, even if the optimal product was a unitary, close-ended self.

The conceptual differences of emotional states and emotional experiences may be helpful in framing the problems of the complex self. Emotional states operate at the level of subjective, that is, non-reflective self –awareness. However unarticulated these states may be, they have goals, they learn and profit from experience. Emotional states influence conscious thought and behavior and react to external events and people. Emotional experience of states is the equivalent of objective self-awareness.

Epistemologically, humans have knowledge of many things, and yet what seems to separate people from most animals is the capacity to have knowledge

about knowledge and about themselves. The human self has knowledge and can function more or less efficiently in the world, but also has the capacity to reflect on itself. Some of the most interesting research on the development of objective self-awareness began with observing toddlers of various ages reacting or not reacting to their reflection in mirrors and video images of themselves or another toddler (Broucek, 1991; Lewis, M. & Brooks-Gunn, J., 1979; Lewis, M. & Michaelson, L., 1989). The age at which children begin to recognize themselves in reflective surfaces and on videotape without any prompting occurs generally during the second half of the second year of life (Lewis, 2000).

Consistently correct usage of personal pronouns normally occurs at more or less the same time (Lewis, 1990). This may indicate the emergence of the ability to linguistically represent the self. Although children are referred to my others as "you," "he-she," and never as "I or me," they nonetheless develop the capacity to employ self-referential pronouns correctly rather rapidly. This suggests a maturational sequence of self-recognition, which may be used as an indicator of the development of objective self-awareness. The result of development, barring any trauma, is the existence of all modes of self-awareness in the adult, with the earlier modes preserved. As a child develops and articulates different modes of self, earlier modes continue to exist and are not replaced by later ones. Lewis (1992) points out that all modes are likely to become more elaborate over the span of a life.

Adult modes of self may be delimited according to three categories: (1) Sensorimotor affective ways of knowing; (2) representational knowledge; and (3) abstract knowledge (Lewis, 1995). Each continues to be elaborated as a person matures, in part due to ontogenetic factors, but also in response to environmental transactions. The period from birth to eight months is dominated by sensorimotor affective knowledge of the self. The earlier part of this period is characterized by reflexes that more or less determine a child's environmental transactions (Bowlby, 1969). They allow a child to survive from the moment of birth and include sucking, startle, and crying, blinking, and clinging reflexes.

The latter half of the sensorimotor affective period involves reflexes, but behavior patterns learned from interactions with caregivers and the environment also begin to emerge. An example is the "reaching action pattern" (Lewis, 1992). Children of this age seem to know, in some sense, their place in space and are able to reach for and grasp objects in space. They also seem to have a grasp of distance and the reaching response seems to be affected by whether an object is far or near. Representational self-knowledge begins to emerge at approximately none months of age and is a component of implicit spatial positioning in the reaching response. It may also be a factor in the emerging capacity to recognize others, as opposed to self (Lewis, 1991).

Representational knowledge is possible with the development of an active memory and is a major cognitive milestone. Memory allows children to develop

different aspects of self-knowledge and releases them from dependence on the here and now, characteristic of sensorimotor knowledge. At this point, memory may be limited to actual representations of people and objects and does not include abstract representations. Self-knowledge is enhanced, given memory, and a child can remember actions that provoked certain consequences. This is true of the social world as well as the world of objects. The child develops the capacity to repeat successful actions, but because this connection remains somewhat vague and abstract, a child initially is unable to integrate both good and bad aspects of caregivers or events. This means that children may split representations of a parent into a good and a bad mom or dad. Failure to integrate in the course of development leads to later difficulties explored prolifically in the literature of psychopathology (Kernberg, 1975; Broucek, 1991).

Memory allows a child to accumulate permanent self-representations, those of significant others and of interactions. Children are observed to demonstrate very complex, sophisticated social patterning during the second year of life, despite lack of facility with language. Children of age eight to fifteen months know that there are action-consequence tendencies, know what it is like to interact with others, and are familiar with failure.

The child has an elaborate representational knowledge of her own actions, those of others, the ability to differentiate between self and other, and knowledge about interaction in general (Lewis, 1992b). Several things are evident in the

behavior of children of this age: (1) She knows of events that her as the center (self in time/space); (2) she is differentiated from others (self/other); she has enduring patterns (permanence); and (4) in certain transactions she knows which of her actions coincide with those of others (Lewis, 1992a). This self-knowledge is representational, and as such, is subjective.

The objective self emerges only with abstract knowledge from about the second half of the second year on. Children develop the ability to abstract and their representations are no longer limited to the realistic. It is now possible for the child to create representations of representations, memories of memories. This allows the child to categorize objects and people, and to think about both past and future events. Memory is expanded to longer periods and the memory system itself has become abstract. This allows for the learning of language and with it the further abstraction of cognitive abilities.

Lewis echoed Kohut and Broucek in emphasizing mirroring by caregivers in the development of the self-concept, but diverged in arguing that it is not sufficient for the emergence of objective self-awareness (2000). He argues that the meaning system attributed to the child by his parents is the change agent in development. Drawing on the work of Kenneth Kaye (1982), Lewis theorizes that the adult's meaning system, as expressed in treatment of the child, produces that which the parent thought that the child already possessed. The fact that parents believe that their child possesses self-awareness serve as the mechanism by which

the child becomes self-aware. Echoing the sentiments of hermeneutic philosophy, Lewis suggests that meaning is not found within the individual, but results from collective agreement as to meaning. The achievement of objective self-awareness is no different from any other meaning, since self-awareness is an idea that people have about themselves (Lewis, 1995). The acquisition of self-knowledge and its various levels is embedded in social contexts. In tandem with biological maturation, it seems reasonable that social-contextual factors hugely influence the development of self.

To summarize Lewis's theory of self-development: by the end of the second year a child has developed an elaborate self system (2000; 1999; 1992a; 1990). The fundamental aspects of a fully functioning self-system are in place, although it will undergo important changes over the span of life. This is inclusive of the three modes of self-knowledge, objective self-awareness emerging last. Normal individuals over three years old employ all modes, but it is objective self-awareness that is associated with the emotions of shame, guilt, pride, and hubris.

Interpretive Social Science and the Self

Heidegger wrote of the self as being, and as constituted by the world in which beings find themselves (Richardson, Fowers & Guignon, 1999). A self is most fully realized by taking on the roles made available to it by the familiar contexts of the world in which it acts. These familiar contexts are themselves

given their content by the wider context of practices and customs of historical culture. People are initiated into the practices and forms of the shared world of being; they gain partial mastery of some of the norms and standards that mediate interpretation and actions in context. People come to be selves, sons and daughters, Euro-American or African-American, through their inclusion in the conversation of the world of life.

The idea that children develop certain capacities because adults treat them as if they are capable of such (Lewis, 1992) is consistent with the general hermeneutic notion of being constituted in dialogue. Children "show up" in a world always already saturated with shared meanings that are part of the historical nature of the "event" of culture, family, and selfhood. A part of this endowment is the possibility for reflection on experience and reasoning somewhat beyond enculturation, although interpretation limits the possible options of choice to the available contents of the world of life. Humans are essentially social agents who's most basic way of being is to be a part of a "we" (Richardson, Fowers & Guignon, 1999).

To be a self is to be in ongoing dialogue with notions of the good, the true, and what is worth doing (Taylor, 1989). It is to be in ongoing dialogue with the "we," and with the world of life. Joseph Dunne (1996) and others think of the self as "storied" or as constituted by, and participating in many narratives that comprise understanding for individuals, families, genders, ethnicities, and whole

cultures.   Dunne writes that the young child is highly dependent and impressionable, but confronts others and the world "in an active mode" and with an "open and interrogative stance." The child is drawn into language and practices that shape its experiences and self-understandings from the start (Richardson, et al., 1999). A sense of self emerges, not from a separation-individuation process, but through assimilating and participating in current cultural practices and conversations.

The mature self is not a center of monological consciousness, an inner space or a mind full of representations of the external world and its own inner contents, but rather the self is a nexus of dialogue (Richardson, et al., 1999). A mature self is essentially an interplay or conversation of various "voices," commitments, identifications, or points of view (Richardson, et al., 1999). Mikhail Bakhtin (Holquist, 1989; Morson & Emerson, 1990) imagined the self as a conversation or struggle among multiple voices, speaking from different positions and invested with different kinds and degrees of authority. Becoming a self means interiorizing the dialogue from the world of life. Bakhtin (Morson & Emerson, 1990) calls some of these voices "authoritative," these are not in dialogue with other voices, generally go unquestioned, and are accepted whole cloth or rejected outright. Other voices are "innerly persuasive," they have been evaluated, assimilated, and retold in the self's own voice. This kind of dialogue

between and within selves always involves evaluations (Taylor, 1985) that concern the moral quality of one's motivations and actions

According to Taylor (1985), A fully competent human agent always has some understanding (or misunderstanding) of herself and is partly constituted by this understanding. Self-understanding incorporates agents seeing themselves against a background of "strong evaluation," or of distinctions between things that are acknowledged as of higher importance or worth and things that are of lesser value (Taylor, 1985). To be a self is to exist in a space defined by distinctions of worth. A self is a being in a space where things are "in question," and for whom at least some of these questions have been partially answered. These answers have often been given authoritatively by the culture, as well as elaborated through the experience and evaluations of the individual.

Taylor (1988) has argued that the notion of the self is inextricably intertwined with human understandings of their moral predicament and moral agency. Self-descriptions of being are inseparable from existence in a space of moral struggle and evaluation. For Taylor (1991), being a self is not like having "biologically given organs, say eyes, or faculty like vision," but existing in a world of issues, of how one ought to be and how one measures up against what is good, right, and what is worth doing. A part of being a self is finding one's standpoint in moral space and acting according to this perspective. The self exists in essentially moral space and the most basic languages of the self incorporate

spatial terms: within/without, above/below, inner/outer, deep/superficial. Taylor (1988) refers to this as "the moral topography of the self."

There is no true or genuine self that is despoiled by the world. Embeddedness in a wider shared culture cannot be thought of as a burden that constricts self-actualization. Participation in the "they" or "we" is what enables the self to become a self, in the sense of having some meaningful identity. Authenticity consists not in transcending the public but in realizing its possibilities in a coherent, focused, and creative way. Heidegger proposed that human being is an ongoing "happening or event" (Richardson, et al., 1999). Humans are self-interpreting beings and care about their own lives, about who and what they are, and about what is as at stake or in question for them. Because people care about their lives, they always take some stand on their existence by the adoption of roles, lifestyles, and personality traits made accessible by the world of life. In taking these stands, people understand what it is to be.

In the dialogical view, different aspects of a person's own experience converse with one another and struggle towards some kind of agreement, or disagreement. An individual's identity is always an attitudinal stance towards different meanings or perspectives, not a single standpoint. In this way of thinking, human agency is "interpretation dependent" (Taylor, 1988). Human agency consists of, in the greater part, the meanings and interpretive structures into which one is "thrown" and of which the particular self is a part. Being a self

has varied radically over time and culture. Persons in different cultures can have broadly diverse notions of self and identity, in keeping with their different self-understandings (Taylor, 1989).

Ethical Orientation

Given the hermeneutic notion that embeddedness in cultures, occupations, local groups, and families largely comprises identity, the complex interactions between these modes of life largely influence how groups and individuals perceive themselves and set certain priorities for thought, emotion, and behavior. The work of culture is a moral endeavor. Taking a broader definition of ethics and morality like that of Taylor (1985a), most human thought, emotion, or action can be characterized as involving evaluation of such against some standard, rule, goal, or ideal. This does not mean that all human phenomena are of the same equivalence in terms of their ethical character or import. The concept of strong evaluation rests on notions of the good, the true, and the just that give differing values to actions. Taylor (1995) argues that there are criteria besides what people think or feel about a phenomenon that determine, or influence what is ultimately good.

Taylor (1991) has described humans as "beings for who things matter," and identity or selfhood as existing in an "ethical space" wherein having a

coherent sense of self is knowing "where you are coming from when it comes to questions of value, or issues of importance." It might be said that people, whatever their cultural embeddedness, "always have a sense of self, in this sense, that they situate themselves somewhere in ethical space." (Taylor, 1991) This ethical space, and indeed self and identity, makes sense only within what Taylor has referred to as "frameworks of meaning," which, simplistically put, are the total background, including culture, in which persons thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and actions make sense of some sort.

People are generally aware of where they stand relative to standards, rules, goals, and ideals or how their thoughts, beliefs and actions compare to them. People's reactions when they compare their own beliefs, thoughts, and particularly behaviors against ethical criteria consist of and are mediated by memory, cognition, and emotional responses. The emotions that precede, or accompany an ethical operation are, in part, a language or thoughts about the self in regards to one's being in moral space. Michael Lewis (1992) defines shame and guilt as "the consequences of the self's failure in regard to a standard, goal, or rule," and differentiates guilt as generated by "a specific self-failure," while shame attends "a total self-failure vis-à-vis a standard." (1995). Persons are bound to have feelings or emotional concomitants that result from existence in an "ethical space," and which are, in fact, an inescapable dimension of this existence.

"Moral emotions" are an integral component of human being. It is the contention of this project, based on Taylor's portrayal of selfhood and identity as inescapably ethical, that the "self-conscious" or moral affects, shame, guilt, pride, and hubris are an integral part of the horizon of meaning for "beings for who things matter," regardless of framework or culture. These emotions, it will be offered, have somewhat different or contrasting manifestations, seemingly dependent on the frameworks, the ethics of selfhood and identity of the culture, sub-group, and family from which a self emerges.

Individualism and Collectivism

Individualism and collectivism are ethical orientations that vary cross-culturally, within a culture, between genders and socioeconomic statuses (Matsumoto, 1994; Mead, 1967). Hofstede (1984) identified four main cultural dimensions that can be related to basic human science issues: (1) Individualism-Collectivism, (2) power distance, (3) uncertainty avoidance, and (4) masculinity-femininity. Hofstede (1984) argued that these four dimensions provide an approach for understanding the dominant value systems in different cultures that influence institutions, social organizations, thought, and feelings. In this way of thinking, individualism-collectivism is a dimension that can be used to explain the relationship between individuals and the various collectivities that comprise a

culture. For example, in some cultures individualism is seen as a blessing and a source of well-being. In other cultures, individualism is seen as alienating.

As is obvious from the previous explication of a hermeneutic-dialogical self, these ethics of the self and identity are more than mere characterizations of being. They are inextricably implicated in the total psychological, social, political, and economic dynamics of persons, groups and cultures. The ethics of self and identity are an integral part and result of the larger ethico-religious systems dominant in various societies at various times. Notions of identity as individualistic and "dividualistic" (Ho, 1995) differ broadly in terms of these frameworks, what comprises ethical space, and how one goes about locating oneself within it. David Ho (1995) characterizes the self or a range of ideas on the concept of identity and personhood in Asian cultures (in general) as "dividual," embedded, relational, or connected. It is simplistic and inappropriate to describe all "eastern" cultures as having the same sense of personal identity and relational ethics. Ho has described four different philosophical traditions in which identity and constitutional frameworks vary. Inki Ha (199-) has explored different ways of being a self in Korea, and in how Koreans experience and discuss shame that also vary from the generalized

Hofstede (1984) characterized the I-C dimension as placing cultures on a bipolar continuum, where individualism and collectivism are the opposite ends of the same dimension. Other theorists (Gelfland, Triandis, & Chan, 1996;

Kagitcibasi & Berry, 1989) have disagreed with this dichotomous position and have defined I-C as independent constructs and proposed two separate dimensions, individualism and collectivism. This allows for occasions in which a person could be simultaneously high on both dimensions. In this way of thinking, being low on individualism does not infer that a person is necessarily high on collectivism.

The basic features of collectivism include: (1) Concern with the in-group's outcomes and as prioritizing the in-group's goals over individual goals; (2) maintaining harmony, interdependence, security, and cooperation; (3) avoiding open conflict within the in-group with more attention paid to maintaining the approval of others in the in-group and an emphasis on helping others save face; (4) defining social norms and duty in accordance with the in-group; (5) reciprocity among group members who are bound by interlocking responsibilities and obligations (6) self-definition based on intense emotional attachment to the in-group; and (7) sharp distinctions between in-groups and out-groups (Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Triandis, 1994; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990).

Theorists from a multicultural perspective (Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Triandis, 1994) have identified the basic features of individualism as: (1) a greater concern for personal rather than in-group outcomes and prioritizing personal goals over in-group goals; (2) motivation by personal preference, needs, rights, and the social-contractual relationship established with others; (3) the importance of

autonomy and emotional detachment from the in-group; (4) emphasis on rational assessment of associating with others; (5) accepting confrontations within in-groups as inevitable; and (6) independent self-definition.

Extensive research on individualism and collectivism has been performed in recent years. Schwarz (1994) executed a study utilizing participants from more than 40 countries and identified elements of individualism and collectivism in every country. The study supported the notion that collectivist values include family security, social order, and respect for tradition, honoring elders, security and politeness. Individualist values included curiosity, open-mindedness, creativity, and an exciting life full of pleasurable experiences. In a study of American and Japanese workers, Engel (1988) found that each group emphasized different values in the workplace. American workers valued individualism, independence, and self-sufficiency. The Japanese workers in this study valued group involvement and loyalty to the employer.

Individual perception is impacted greatly by individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1995). For collectivists, social perception is made up of a series of relationships that revolve around an individual. For individualists, the focus is on an individual who has relationships. In interviews with both Japanese and American women, Lebra (1984) found large differences. The Japanese talked at great length about their relationships, and said almost nothing about themselves. The American women hardly talked at all about their relationships

107

and extensively about themselves. In a study comparing the association of ethical orientation to social interaction between college students from Hong Kong and their American counterparts, Wheeler, Reis, and Bond (1989) observed that the Hong Kong students had significantly longer interactions and with fewer people compared with the American students.

Individualists have been noted to attribute events to internal individual causes more often than collectivists, who tend to attribute them to external circumstances (Newman, 1993). Newman also found that individualists pay attention to internal processes such as principles, while collectivists pay attention to the social contexts and saving face. Collectivists also have a hard time when they have to communicate an unpleasant message. Although they may value honesty, they value keeping harmony in relationships even more and would rather tell a white lie than risk damage to a relationship. Individualists may see this as dishonest because it is inconsistent with the Western value of truth and authenticity. The emotions of collectivists tend to focus on others and are short duration (situational), while the emotions of individualists are ego-focused (shame, anger) and of longer duration (do not change with the situation) (Smith & Bond, 1994). In East Asian collectivist cultures, people try to display only positive emotions towards acquaintances and tend to control negative emotions (Gudykunst, 1993).

Bettancourt and Dorr (1997) conducted two studies in the U.S. and observed, perhaps surprisingly, that in individualistic cultures, the importance of in-groups appears to play an integral role in the experience of positive subjective well being. Results also suggested that those people concerned about their in-groups were likely to evaluate them in more positive ways, which enhanced perceptions of happiness and well being. They also found that within an individualistic culture, both individuals' evaluations of themselves (subjective self-esteem) and evaluations in their in-groups (Collective self-esteem) play mutual roles in happiness and well-being. However, when one's in-group was considered outré', or failed to support individuals in their personal goals, blame was externalized and a substantial portion of the participants indicated they tend to move away from their in-groups.

The philosophical and religious traditions of various parts of the world have greatly influenced the development of ethical orientation and identity. Most people in the past were probably not individual selves in the modern Western sense (Truett-Anderson, 1997). In "Sources of the Self" (1989), Charles Taylor observed "we can probably be confident that at one level human beings of all times and places have shared a very similar sense of 'me and mine'." Julian Jaynes (1976) has proposed that before a certain point in history, roughly equivalent to the age of the Homeric Iliad, people did not possess a unitary consciousness like that of most moderns (regardless of culture). He argued that

the style of thinking that is now referred to as consciousness is not an innate human characteristic, but is a learned process, which is the result of a social invention that formed sometime after the Trojan war. Jaynes (1976) came to this conclusion from studying the literature of the ancient Greeks, in particular the Iliad, a conflation of legend, poetry, and history. In this literature, people frequently heard voices of the sort that would today be considered auditory hallucinations, but at that time were considered to be communications from the gods. These messages were generally obeyed, or disobeyed at peril. Jaynes believed there was probably no such thing as introspection at this point, the characters in the Iliad do not sit down and think out what to do (1976). Whether or not Jayne's assumptions are correct, ancient texts may be read as statements of how people felt, thought, and understood their worlds.

Writings from later Hellenic culture, including the Odyssey and the works of Heraclitus, portray a self that is radically unstable, devoid of certainty and permanence, not bounded or unique as in modernity. At about the same time as Heraclitus (500 B.C.), but half a world away, Gautama Buddha proclaimed a very similar notion of the unstable and illusory notion of the self (Truett-Anderson, 1997). The Dialogues of Plato, written more than a century after Heraclitus' time, reveal a self that may be the forerunner of the modern Western self. For Plato, the self was the earthly manifestation of the immortal soul, which exists in the world of eternal Ideas or Forms. All things on earth were merely reflections, or shadows

of the supernatural. In Socratic-Platonic dialogues, the human self had its own moral life and experienced conflict between the baser desires of the body and the transcendent aspirations of reasoning intelligence, which was characterized by Socrates as a personal, inner struggle (Truett-Anderson, 1997). In this way of thinking, the soul is the self and had an immortal identity.

The multicultural psychologist Triandis (1995) traces these important sources of modern individualism to the Greek Sophists. The Sophists taught their students to aspire to excellence in law, in debate, and in politics. Individual success was considered a sign of virtue. According to the Sophists, the ends of success justify any means used to attain them. Socrates and Plato thought that this idea was immoral and valorized the pursuit of truth, even if it meant not succeeding. These two currents in ancient Greek philosophy, individual success and truth, have been enormously essential parts of modern individualism.

Theorists from outside the discipline of cross-cultural psychology such as Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton (1985), Christopher Lasch (1979), as well as writers within the psychological tradition (Cushman, 1990; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999) have explored individualism in its many forms. In "Habits of the Heart" (Bellah et al., 1985), the authors propose that individualism lies at the heart of American culture. It is the modern framework of meaning (Taylor, 1989) that influences and guides almost every institution, group, and individual in the culture. Bellah, ET al.

explore four different strands of individualism: biblical, civic, utilitarian, and expressive. The differing types of individualism have many commonalities including the belief in the dignity, "and indeed, the sacredness of the individual" (Bellah, et al., 1985).

This innate dignity is protected by the notion of rights, which are sacrilized by connecting them to God in the US constitution and explicitly in churches, schools, social organizations, the military, and the like (MacIntyre, 1988). Anything that may violate the rights of the individual to think for himself, decide for himself, and to live his life as he sees fit are regarded as morally wrong, if not sacrilegious. Daily lives, as well as Americans' highest aspirations for self, others, society, and the world are informed by individualism. However noble this may seem, many of the direst dilemmas of modernity, for individuals and society, can be closely linked to individualism (Bellah, et al., 1985). Many forms of mental illness, social pathology, civic decay, and breakdown in ethics and morality can be associated with a hypertrophied form of individualism labeled variously as modern individualism (Bellah, et al., 1985) or liberal individualism (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999), or as "The Culture of Narcissism" (Lasch, 1979). The self has become "the main form of reality" (Coles, 1980, in Bellah, et al., 1985).

Liberal individualism is the ideological and moral perspective that undergirds much of modern social science (Richardson, et al., 1999). It consists of

two often-oppositional strains, utilitarian and expressive. Utilitarian individualism takes as a certain particular human appetites, fears, and dispositions and "sees human life as an effort by individuals to maximize their self-interest relative to these given ends" (Bellah, et al., 1985). This view of life has been criticized as promoting a way of life that is detached, calculating, emotionally isolating, and overly preoccupied with instrumental control over events to the neglect of other important concerns and purposes in living (Richardson, et al., 1999).

Expressive individualism is an outgrowth of the Romantic reaction to what was perceived of as the growing hegemony of the rational-empirical utilitarianism of the Enlightenment. It holds that "each person has a unique core of feeling and intuition that should unfold or be expressed if individuality is to be realized" (Bellah, et al., 1985). Unlike utilitarian individualism, the romantic notion of the individual allowed for the importance of and merger with others under certain conditions. Expressive individualism emphasizes an inner, true self independent of the influence of others.

Liberal individualism is a predisposition to thought, feeling, and a way of life that imbues modern consciousness (Taylor, 1991). Moral reasoning is theoretically limited to evaluation of means-ends relations. The focus on procedural or means-ends rationality is aimed at expanding human instrumental prowess and protecting individual freedom from dogma or authoritarian control (Richardson, et al., 1999). The romantic and postmodern reaction to this is the

valuation of aesthetics over morality (Gergen, 1988). In this way of thinking, the good is comprised of what is most compelling, entertaining, or pleasing. If reasoning about worthy ends is left to a narrowly procedural and utilitarian rationality, or to personal aesthetics, then no one is entitled to impose their values or way of life on others. What supposedly prevents this from always degenerating into an amoral struggle is the view of individuals as possessing natural rights and as invested with dignity and worth. Liberal individualism portrays a one dimensional, self-centered picture of human thought and action.

Taylor (1991) proposes that the passing away of unquestionable frameworks of meaning, wherein everyone had a place in a cosmic order, has left people with a dizzying and often terrifying array of options, or perhaps no consistently identifiable framework at all. Taylor (1989) writes of an agent without a framework as "pathological," and as "a person in the grip of an appalling identity crisis." A person without a framework exists outside the space of engagement, outside of orientation in a shared ethical space. It is precisely this agent that scientific psychology promotes as the ideal of the detached and self-contained individual.

At about the same time as Heraclitus and Gautama Buddha, roughly 500 B.C., Confucius emphasized the importance of virtue (Ho, 1995; Triandis, 1995). This was also seen in other Asian religious-philosophical traditions such as Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Shinto. Ho (1995) writes of these different

ethico-philosophical traditions, which have long guided thought, belief and action in different Asian societies and how they have influenced, and in turn been influenced by notions of the self and identity. Just as various strains of ancient Greek thought, particularly as it was incorporated into Christianity by Augustine and other Platonic and Aristotelian theologians of the early church, utilitarianism, Romanticism, and scientific instrumentalism have formed and been formed by a general western notion of the self. So too has the self shaped and been shaped by the systems of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Vedanta (not to mention various local, isolate ethical systems).

Considering Eastern conceptions of identity and selfhood requires that several caveats be taken: many theorists have written of Asia in inclusive terms, as basically a monoculture. There are significant differences in Asian cultures, identities, and their various philosophical worldviews. Another observation that deserves close attention is that, unlike many western philosophies, most eastern systems are not concerned with theory, nomenclature, or attitudes, but rather they "are concerned with a transformation of experience itself." (Ho, 1995)

Eastern ways of life are typified more by "juxtaposition and identity" than by western notions of "unit in diversity" (Haas, 1956). Asian ideas about personality concentrate on communal "goods," lived experience, insight, religious and philosophical approaches to life, and the value of taking a more oblique path in interpersonal relationships (Ho, 1995). Differences between the four eastern

religious-philosophical traditions and western models can be analyzed in three dimensions (Ho, 1995): subject-object distinctions; boundaries between self and other, including individual personhood; and the centrality and de-centeredness of the self.

The nature of the self-nonself boundary is a basic dimension along which cultural conceptions of identity may be differentiated (Sampson, 1988). In the West, identity is predicated upon the development and maintenance of clear self-other boundaries. A common thread in Western developmental psychology insists that a basic task of maturation is the unfolding of a distinct sense of self through the processes of separation and individuation (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 19--). A failure in this crucial task supposedly results in a loss of identity and subsequent psychopathology.

Markus and Kitayama (1991) believe that most Asian cultures have conceptions of identity that are predicated on the fundamental relatedness of individuals to one another. The self is construed as interdependent, not independent. The relational sense of identity found in Confucian societies, does not support a clear demarcation between self and nonself (Ho, 1993). Interpersonal relations are of crucial importance historically in the formation of character and contemporaneously in defining what it means to be human across the lifespan. The life of an individual is incomplete; it derives meaning only from its relationship to others. Confucianism does not require the dissolution of the

116

self-nonself boundary; it demands that selfhood be moral and reciprocal. The self is malleable through education, but it is not changeable in its essence, hence its rigidly hierarchical nature. In other Eastern philosophical traditions, the self-other boundary is negated. The Taoist self is a part of and in harmony with the cosmos. The selfless person thinks of others as I (Ho, 1995). In Hinduism, the idea of individual selfhood is an illusion. The Buddhist doctrine of 'no self" denies the very existence of an individual self.

Communitarianism

Taylor (1991b) believes the idea that modern societies can be run on a single principle, such as an abstract notion of the "general will" of the people, or that of free market allocations, is untenable if any sort of despotism is to be avoided. A better approach, one that in many ways echoes a hermeneutic-dialogical stance, is one that brings into open dialogue multiple positions as to how things are, or should be.

Mary Ann Glendon (1991) refers to the United States as "the land of rights and the missing language of responsibility," reflecting a major tenet of a broad and diverse group of notions generally referred to as "Communitarian." Communitarianism differs from both individualism and collectivism not only on basic ethics of identity and on the world of life, but it is not received, or a culturally inculcated position, people are not born into communitarian cultures.

117

Rather, Communitarianism requires a conscious and intentional engagement with the various frameworks such as individualism and collectivism, their benefits and dangers. This often requires a struggle within the self and in communities to think, feel, and interact from a stance that acknowledges the inherently dialogical nature of the self. Also there is an identity and a commitment to the common good, to responsibilities, as well as preserving individual liberties within the limits of the potential deleterious effects their exercise may hold for others.

The political and social philosopher Michael Walzer (1983) sees any measure of individual autonomy as contingent upon membership and participation in the community. Walzer distinguishes between self-esteem and self-respect. Self-esteem, he offers, "is a relational concept, dependent on a social hierarchy, it has to do with a favorable opinion of oneself as measured against others" (Walzer, 1983). He sees self-respect as having to do with living up to a standard, of having dignity and integrity for oneself and position. Unlike self-esteem, self-respect is non-competitive, is free from rank, available to anyone who understands her proper dignity and can act on it (S. Dolan-Henderson, 1994). Community circumstances are central to self-respect. It is crucial, for Walzer, that people be allowed to, and actually participate in society's many institutions.

Walzer works out a place for autonomy. It begins with conscience, with is also a key component of self-respect. In Walzer theory, conscience is shared knowledge, "an internalized acceptance of communal standards" (Walzer, 1983).

118

Self-respect, echoing but diverging from individualism, is "self-possession," the ownership not of one's body, but of one's character, qualities, and actions. It also means being accountable. The autonomous individual, in Walzer's (1983) words, "knows his place; he reigns in his own company, not elsewhere; he does not desire power over the whole world. He is the very opposite of a tyrant, who uses his noble birth, or his wealth or his office, or even his celebrity, to claim other goods that he has not earned, to which he has no right." One can only be autonomous in the context of membership and participation in the community.

For Walzer (1983), liberal individualism misrepresents life. Humans cannot be self-contained, strangers to one another when each is born with parents, and when these parents have friends, relatives, neighbors, work associates, co-religionists, and fellow citizens. The language of liberal individualism takes away the sense of connectedness, and leads to an over-dependence on the rights of the individual, as protected by the courts and the state. In this way of thinking, the self is not a pre-social configuration, but is capable of "reflecting critically on the values that have governed its constitution" (S. Dolan-Henderson, 1994). This requires the faculty that M. Lewis (1992) and Broucek (1991) refer to as "objective self-awareness."

In this sense, communitarian thought is a dialogue between two broad positions, one that gives primacy to liberty--individual rights and freedom, and the other that gives highest priority to order--the good of the collectivity. Amatai

119

Etzioni (1996) characterizes his particular take on Communitarianism as having the goal of a "good society that nourishes both social virtues and individual rights… and requires a carefully maintained equilibrium of order and autonomy, rather than a maximization of either." A good society requires an order that is aligned with the core moral commitments of its members.

Bellah, et al. (1985) define community as "a group of people who are socially interdependent, who participate together in discussion and decision making, and who share certain practices that both define the community and are nurtured by it." A community usually has a history and is defined in part by its past and its memory of the past. In the course of this project, the United States has generally been targeted as a bastion of self-contained individualism. The United States has also been identified as "a nation of joiners" (Bellah, et al., 1985). In many spheres of life, people are expected to get involved, to choose themselves to join social groups. Most people say they get involved in social institutions to achieve their self-interests or because they feel an affinity with others.

These groups usually result in what Bellah, et al. (1985) refer to as "lifestyle enclaves." People who share some features of private life form a lifestyle enclave. They express their identity through shared patterns of appearance, consumption, and leisure activities, which often serve to differentiate them from those with other lifestyles. A lifestyle enclave is not interdependent, do not act together politically, and do not share a history. However, if any of these

things begin to appear, a lifestyle enclave may evolve into a community. Many of what are referred to in the United States as communities, are actually lifestyle enclaves, or mixtures of the two.

A Communitarian-Hermeneutic Social Science Inquiry

Hermeneutic theorists such as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jurgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor may offer some new ways of thinking about the human situation (Richardson, et al., 1999). The word hermeneutic comes from the Greek word for interpretation and may be characterized as range of theories about "understanding understanding." Briefly, contemporary hermeneutics de-emphasizes the role of the human subject as an "epistemological being" (Richardson, et al., 1999) and finds the methods of natural science unsuitable for studying humans. Scientific ideology and methodology is explanatory, which it accomplishes by subsuming events under general laws. It treats the world as a collection of de-contextualized objects that may appear in certain causal interactions. Such an objectifying stance towards things presupposes a capacity for abstraction, in which all meanings and values are removed from experience so that things that are investigated as inherently meaningless objects in time and space, obedient to general, or natural laws (Gadamer, 1964). The ideology and methodology of science excludes the human

121

subject and promotes the belief that a true scientific detachment and objectivity can, and must me attained.

The primary goal of the human sciences is to understand what humans do by grasping the aims and interpretations of agents in the meaningful situations in which they find themselves. This understanding requires that the investigator put into play the "full totality of life" within herself, including her insights into what is crucial in life and the experience and skills that she has picked up herself as a feeling, thinking, desiring human subject within a framework of shared meanings.

Although some hermeneutic thinkers eschew the possibility and necessity of a method for a human science such as the "methodological dualism" proposed by Dilthey (1962), contemporary hermeneutics retains Dilthey's basic goal of understanding as a major element of this philosophy. There are three basic ideas which are common to most hermeneutic thought: The first commonality is that the conception of the human situation as knowers that is inherited from mainstream natural science gives a distorted view of things when used to make sense of human events. The idea of the detached, neutral researcher makes no sense in the human sciences, because people are always contextualized in a public life-world, caught up in a web of practices and linguistic conventions that can never be fully articulated or controlled. That is why researchers must draw on their preunderstanding of what things are all about and apply it to the understanding of others. The initial preunderstanding must be open to revision in the course of

interpretation, giving the human sciences an inescapable circular structure that moves from part to whole to part to whole, ad infinitum.

Secondly, humans are self-interpreting beings whose defining traits are shaped by the stands that they take in participating in a way of life that includes others. Possible self-interpretations and self-assessments circulating in the culture make possible the intentions, desires, and beliefs from which one makes a stand. To understand another involves seeing where they stand in relation to the public meanings and practices of their community. From this comes the understanding of selfhood and identity as composed of stories in a shared context of meaning (Dunne, 1996), what Richardson, et al. (1999) refer to as a "historical-dialogical conception of the self." This is a way of thinking of humans as unfolding narratives whose being is shaped by an ongoing dialogue with others in a communal context (Taylor, 1989).

Lastly, because humans are what they interpret themselves as being within their social contexts, it follows that social theory cannot be thought of as a neutral process of data collection and analysis. Social science pronouncements find their way into the culture and so define and alter the reality that they describe. Hermeneutics recognizes that the practice of interpretation, particularly of humans, has wide-ranging ethical and political implications. Given the impact of human science on ways of life and understanding, hermeneutics requires a

capacity for moral and political awareness that is excluded by empirical approaches to human phenomena (Richardson, et al., 1999).

Inescapable Ethics

The ethical turn in the human sciences rigorously questions the "value-free" rationality of mainstream social science and the "destructive social effects that follow from it" (Aldin, 1996). Hermeneutical ethics attempts to delineate a type of inquiry that is historically situated and practical, involving choice, deliberation, and judgment. Hermeneutics is generally anti-epistemological and advocates a cultural change from notions of truth to notions of meaning and value. This is a knowledge-model based on "conversation" rather than scientific experiment (Aldin, 1996). The idea of culture as a conversation rather than a structure standing on foundations fits well with the hermeneutical notions of knowledge (Rorty, 1980). Therefore, getting into conversations with others, including strangers may be analogous to acquiring a new virtue or skill by way of the interaction. In this sense, hermeneutics is a model based on ethical self-education, in some ways akin to the Aristotelian notion of *phronesis* (Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6).

Another person or an entire culture cannot be understood by examining its parts. Understanding is best achieved by finding out how a whole (individual or larger social unit) hangs together, and yet holistic understanding is necessarily

incomplete without consideration of its constituent parts. Coming to understand is more akin to getting to know a person than closely following some methodology. There is a constant interplay between the parts of a conversation and the point of the whole thing. Interlocutors play back and forth between self and other, present and past.

Hermeneutical ethics is based on the ideas of "dialogue," back and forth play between self and other, part and whole. It includes notions about the cultivation of wisdom, in the Aristotelian sense, which depends on dialogue, friendship, and the impossibility of understanding another by detaching, withholding judgment and feigning impartiality. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1979) substitutes the notion of "bildung," or education and self-formation, for that of knowledge as the goal of thinking. This character formation makes possible "an openness to the other, to the past or the alien" (1979). In this way of thinking, one always goes into a new situation with some pre-formed opinions or "prejudices," requiring that she always be aware of her own biases so as to encounter the new, or alien in such a way as to allow for its own truth.

In spite of the emphasis on historicity and tradition, the crucial notions of openness to the truth of the other and dialogue hopefully make hermeneutical ethics essentially anti-ethnocentric. Charles Taylor (1992), in particular has offered his own interpretive ethics based on respect for alterity, or difference. The increasing pluralism of cultural institutions has provoked some thinkers to an

125

acrimonious skepticism about the defensibility of any moral principles or perspectives (Guttman, 1992). Public institutions, including government, schools, and universities have come under heavy criticism for failing to *recognize* or respect the cultural identities of citizens.

In earlier societies, identity was largely fixed by social position (Taylor, 1991; Triandis, 1996; Truett-Anderson, 1998). The frameworks of meaning that explained what individuals recognized as important was largely determined by their place in society, and the roles and activities attached to their positions. While these frameworks have not totally receded and many people still define themselves by their social roles, Taylor (1992) offers that what decisively undermines socially derived identity in the modern West is the individualist notion of authenticity. In this sense, authenticity is being true to an inner nature that is in danger of being lost through external pressures to conform, and in taking an instrumental stance towards the self. Authenticity is the notion that each person has his or her own individual way of being human and should measure themselves by their own internal standards, rules, and goals. In this sense, authenticity cannot be socially derived, but must be inwardly generated. This authenticity is a monological "song of myself."

Given that there is no such thing as interior generation understood in this monological fashion, in order to understand the close connection between identity and what Taylor (1992) refers to as "recognition," the dialogical character of the

human world of life must be considered. Humans become realized agents capable of self-understanding and of defining an identity by way of their "acquisition of rich human languages of expression" (Ibid). In this sense, language is not restricted to the verbal, but is expanded to encompass other modes by which humans define themselves. This particular conception may include the languages of art, of gesture, of love, or of disconnection and alienation. The languages required for self-definition are not acquired by a detached knower, collecting facts and data, but rather by interaction with others who matter. In this way of thinking, the origin of the human mind is in dialogue. As people grow, they expand and elaborate on their original languages and develop opinions and stances of their own. Nevertheless, identity is defined always in dialogue with, toward, or against the things that significant others ascribe to a person. The languages learned in early "constitutional conversations" and in fact much of the conversation itself remains with a person as long as they live. Gergen and Gergen's (1988) essay on grief and mourning in the Victorian era may illustrate this point. Before the rise of modernity and the de-sacrilization of the world of life, the dead, even in American culture, were an integral part of everyday life. They remained alive in the memories, conversations, and manner of living that the survivors lived out (not to mention mortuary daguerreotypes). In the dialogical view, the influences of significant others, even if acquired in childhood, continues indefinitely.

This may seem to replicate the developmental determinism of most mainstream psychologies, but the languages obtained early in development can and do join in dialogue with those learned from interactions with significant others encountered later in life, as well as dialogue among the multiple voices of the self. One's notions about some "goods" can be transformed by enjoying them in common with mentors, partners, husbands, wives, and friends. Some goods only become accessible through common bonds. Unfortunately, liberal, or modern individualism tends to portray relationships as contractual, as an exchange of goods and services rather than as constituting one's identity.

The idea of authenticity, that people must inwardly generate their true identity and live according to their own genuine nature and self-derived goals can be said to be an essential component of expressive individualism (Bellah, et al., 1985; Richardson, et al., 1999). In earlier times, there was no pressing need for a "special" form of recognition as one's identity was based on social categories that everyone took for granted. The inwardly generated "authentic" identity of modernity is not automatically given recognition, it has to be earned through exchange, and the attempt can often fail. Taylor (1992) notes, "What has come about with the modern age is not the need for recognition but the conditions in which the attempt to be recognized can fail." That may be why the clamor for recognition has recently become so intense. In earlier times, people did not think

of themselves as having identities, not because they did not have them, but because identity was tightly interwoven into the fabric of life.

Authenticity, in the expressive individualist sense of the term, is at least in part a repudiation of an identity constituted in dialogue. As hierarchical frameworks of meaning have de-stabilized and been at least partially replaced by individualist ideologies, recognition has come to play an essential role in the culture that has arisen around this ideal. An original identity is vulnerable to recognition given or withheld, in both intimate and public spheres. In the culture of authenticity, relationships are seen as the crucible of self-discovery and self-affirmation for the inwardly generated identity (Taylor, 1992). In the public sphere, identities formed by dialogue and less shaped by predefined social scripts have made equal recognition a central issue. Equal recognition is the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society and its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it (Sandel, 1982). The ascription of a demeaning or inferior image to another can distort and oppress to the degree that it is internalized.

Returning to the notion of self-conscious affects, it is easier to see one reason why shame has become so debilitating in modern, individualist culture. The self, while still constituted in dialogue, is vulnerable to failures and the rebuffs of others, real or imagined, as never before. Recognition, particularly for the white male individualist, has been rephrased as unquestioned privilege, achievement and self-esteem. Some degree of the so-called "white male backlash"

against women and groups outside the dominant discourse may be attributable to not only the insecurities wrought by challenges to patriarchal authority, but also by a general feeling of misrecognition, of de-legitimation of white male identity. This is not necessarily regrettable, but requires a period of adjustment like any psychological or social change.

The need for recognition, in the sense of a validation of the basic truth of an individual or group in the public sphere, may energize people to engage in the politics of the world of life. It may serve as a new goad to commitment and investment in the communities of which people are, or desire to be active members. While some individuals or groups may have hidden agendas or base their efforts on a kind of victimology, at least these motivating factors may be brought into public dialogue. Writing almost two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville (1969) discussed the danger of Americans ending up as the kind of individuals who are "enclosed in their own hearts." Individuals may then be subject to a new form of despotism, whereby overweening self-concern and apathy about things beyond the personal sphere result in a nation where few desire to participate actively in self-government. Taylor (1991b) writes, "They will prefer to stay at home and enjoy the satisfactions of private life, as long as the government of the day produces the means to these satisfactions and distributes them widely." In such a case, the danger of "soft despotism" (Tocqueville, 1969) is immanent. It will not be a regime of oppression and terror, but in fact

everything will be run by an "immense tutelary power" (1969) over which people will have little control. The only defense against this, Tocqueville thinks, is a vigorous political culture in which participation is valued, in the local as well as higher spheres. Unfortunately, the encroaching solipsism of the self-contained individual undermines this engagement.

Chapter Three

Statement Of The Problem

Interpretive Social Science

This dissertation takes a broadly interpretive social science or hermeneutic approach to studying human action or social life. This interpretive approach is "postmodern" in the sense that it insists that all human understanding, including in the natural sciences, is thoroughly creative and interpretive rather than simply obedient to an objective order of fact. However, the interpretive or hermeneutic view rejects the conclusion of many postmodern thinkers that all human understanding is ultimately arbitrary or merely contingent. A key to this interpretive view is its contention that while both natural and human science inquiry are thoroughly interpretive or judgmental and do not admit of final or certain conclusions about their subject matter, still there are important differences between them. As Richardson and Fowers (1998) put it:

> Perhaps the main point of contrast is the central place occupied in the
> natural sciences by the exercise of a special capacity for abstraction that
> we might call "objectification." To adopt an objectifying stance toward
> things is to ignore or abstract away from "subject-related qualities"
> (Taylor, 1980, p. 31). Such qualities are most of the meanings of and

relationships among things that show up within our ordinary experience, concerned with our shifting desires, values, and aims. Thus, to take an objectifying stance means to "regard the world as it is independently of the meanings it might have for human subjects, or of how it figures in their experience (ibid.). Obviously this approach has proved its mettle in modern science and its applications. (p. 487)

These authors go on to argue that in spite of the evident successes of the natural sciences in modern times, there is no good reason to deny the validity of other kinds of interpretations of our experience and human action, ones reflecting different ways of being involved with the world, especially the world of human events and activities. Thus, in their opinion, "It no longer seems proper to many of us to insist that reality must be only that which is formulated through the approach of abstraction and objectification" (p. 488). Indeed, many of us have learned to question the detached, somewhat depersonalizing, "spectator" view of knowing and relating to the world this approach entails. In fact, this approach, in the opinion of many has yielded very little in terms of its own goal of empirical theory permitting extensive prediction and control of the everyday human realm, settling often for fragmented islands of inquiry and findings that often seem merely commonsensical or of questionable significance. Slife and Williams (1995, p. 195) point out that many critics feel that "the language of science" is a

"relatively impoverished language" for characterizing human activity because "we force ourselves to study human beings at a distance." (ibid)

Therefore, the basic view of social inquiry I have adopted in this dissertation holds that much of it consists neither in finding universal laws of human behavior nor in throwing up our hands in despair with the relatively sophomoric cry that "everything is relative." Rather, in this view, we patiently and painstakingly seek to make sense of the meanings that imbue and shape social and personal life or, as hermeneutic thinkers often put it, "interpret the interpretations" that serve as the goals and guidelines of meaningful human activity. According to an interpretive social science perspective, all sorts of quantitative, qualitative, theoretical, and interpretive modes of inquiry and the data they unearth can contribute to insightful and/or useful accounts of human action. But these accounts are likely to be much less revealing, or even be quite trivial, unless they are framed with the understanding that their constructs and explanations represent interpretations of meaningful, partly moral events in the social world. For example, in an interpretive approach, quantitative data may be sought and found that detect correlations among events or patterns in human affairs that, when insightfully interpreted, shed light on meaningful human dynamics and striving.

Given this interpretive perspective, what I propose to do in this study is to examine the relationships between (1) proneness to certain self-conscious emotions that are basic to human life (guilt and shame), (2) two kinds of ethical or political orientation that many people feel is morally and emotionally significant in today's world, (individualist vs. communitarian), and (3) two types of attitudes toward ones social world that might be thought to reflect whether or not has succumbed to a "culture of narcissism" (narcissistic emptiness vs. Meaningful Connectedness).

In the literature review I examined the empirical and theoretical works of both Michael Lewis and June Price Tangney and her collaborators. An admirable feature of these authors' work is the way in which they go beyond narrowly empiricist approaches and concern themselves with the actual experience and felt meanings of people in everyday life contexts. Also, they do not pretend to an impossible and sterile "value neutrality." Rather, they are concerned to rehabilitate the notion of a certain kind of healthy guilt and sense of responsibility without which we would not be, in the best sense, human beings at all. An interesting feature of Lewis' point of view is the way in which he appropriates the Kierkegaardian notion of commitment. Soren Kierkegaard (Lewis, 1992) wrote 150 years ago that the loss of commitment leads to the loss of identity and that relationships, a source of identity, are maintained only through commitment.

While both Lewis and Tangney stress the importance of moderate, healthy guilt in human life, they also, in line with much current psychology and popular opinion, insist that emotions and attitudes associated with shame are always harmful or pathological, and have little place in a healthy or fulfilled life. Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that this view of shame is limited and incorrect, and ultimately quite harmful in its own right. I have suggested that there is healthy and unhealthy shame as well as healthy and unhealthy guilt, and that the right kind of shame may be one of the most human and essential features of the moral life. In the research study conducted as part of this dissertation, I have utilized two new, experimental scales (which have garnered some empirical support for their reliability and validity, however) to try to obtain some support for this more affirmative view of shame.

Guilt and Shame

A number of contemporary theorists and researchers, like Lewis and Tangney [affect researchers—take out phrase] have rehabilitated guilt while continuing to treat shame as only pathological. Shame is identified as a major culprit in many different types of individual psychological difficulties including depression, social anxiety, addictions and eating disorders, personality disorders, and sexual dysfunction (Gramzow & Tangney, 1994; Hibbard, 1992; Kaufman,

1991; Lewis, 1992, 1996, 2000; Morrison, 1991; Tangney & Gramzow, 1991).

Perhaps more importantly, some researchers have identified shame as the primary source of disconnection and moral disorientation in modern persons. What all of the current research has in common is: 1) its narrow definition of shame as only pathological, and 2) a precipitant temporal order wherein shame precedes and then reinforces estrangement and self-centeredness.

If the emotion of shame is treated dimensionally, as distinct from guilt and embarrassment (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994), and given its status as a complex human emotion, I believe that with few exceptions these contemporary investigations of shame neglect or fail to recognize its multiplicity of its degree and form. Every other human emotion has many degrees and types of occurrence, for example, happiness runs the gamut from mildly amused to euphoric. Euphoria, except when it occurs in certain contexts, is generally treated as bizarre, if not pathognomonic. June Price Tangney and her various collaborators deal with this inconsistency by conceptualizing shame and guilt proneness as a trait, or as an attributional style that causes differential experience of shame, guilt, or some combination of both in by persons in response to the same scenarios. The TOSCA (Tangney & Gramzow, 1991) is a measure of pathological shame and healthy guilt, reflecting the current biases of empirical psychology and individualism.

Why then do cross-cultural psychological studies continue to insist that shame is functional and constructive in those cultural contexts? A review of the PsychINFO and other social science databases yielded not one citation in which a measure of healthy, protective, or constructive shame was reported. Cross-cultural studies involving shame as a variable use discourse analysis (Ha, 1996), narrative self-report (Markus & Kitayama, 1994), or extant instruments such as the TOSCA or the Harder Personal Feelings Questionnaire (Harder, 1990, 1995) that measure what I believe to be pathological shame. In these studies, participants from cultures with a more connected sense of identity may score high on the shame-proneness scale of the TOSCA, but otherwise appear to function successfully (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, Norasakkunkit, 1995; Ratanisiripong, 1996).

Cross-cultural results are generally read through a practical hermeneutic of the function and manifestation of shame as it relates to study participants from a particular culture. These studies seem to have a much broader definition of shame as involving "face," modesty, humility, and privacy. In all fairness, shame also seems to function in collectivistic cultures as an enforcer of social hierarchies and classism, which is generally abhorrent to Americans. What I believe to be the distinctive factors in the differential manifestations of shame between American and primarily Asian cultures are the differences in ethical orientations and the divergence in the nature of identity that fall along the lines of autonomy and connectedness, or Individualism and Collectivism.

138

Francis Ha (1996) observes in his study that shame is not avoided in Korean conversation because identity is construed by relationality and relationships are given more importance than in individualistic American contexts. Shame may hurt less for Koreans because it is diffused among group members through its frequent confession and sharing. Ha briefly explores the importance of modesty and humility in Korean relationships in a way that puts them squarely within the shame continuum. June Price Tangney's most current writings have addressed humility as a desirable personal quality for Americans (2000, 2002).

Individualism and Ethical Orientation

In the literature review, several models of the self were examined including self psychology, cognitive-affective viewpoints, individual psychology (Adlerian psychology), and ideas about selfhood from an interpretive social science perspective. While there are many admirable and practical qualities to the Self psychological and cognitive-affective models, they both are thoroughly imbued with the individualistic ideals of modern American culture.

Self psychology, with its notion of development proceeding from primary narcissism to mature, healthy narcissism, is a salient exemplar of the largely unexamined individualistic assumptions of psychology. In the theories of Heinz

Kohut and his followers, the primary unit of importance is the individual, and others including parents, siblings, teachers, and partners are to a great extent reduced to "self-objects" for the fulfillment or impediment of the developing self. The Kohutian teleology of self is the expansion of the individual's creativity and talents, and it seems as if the main purpose morality and ethics perform is instrumentally in the service of the self, to keep it from dissipating or losing its boundaries and returning to an earlier stage of narcissism. It is not much of a stretch to regard the implicit moral vision of Self Psychology and many other modern therapy theories as straightforward, if uncritical, expressions of a modern individualistic ethical orientation. They assume that a mature person's outlook on the good life and moral or social obligation are centered upon and largely limited to what is commonly termed "liberal individualism," with its focus on the maximization of individual fulfillment, human rights, and a contractual, instrumentalist view of human relationships.

According to many historians and critics American culture was once significantly more socially connected and community oriented than it has become in the last half century, partly as a result of the enormous expansion of personal mobility and freedoms in our society (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler & Tipton, 1985; Bellah, 1991; Bell, 1995; Glendon, 1991; Guttman, 1992; Lasch, 1978; Sandel, 1996). This well documented loss of a sense and the practices of

community seems to develop apace the expansion of the self and the individualist ethical orientation.

Somewhat paradoxically, as a result of these developments, shame has come to predominate in what was once primarily a culture of guilt (Benedict, 1946; Broucek, 1991; Karen, 1992; Lewis, 1992, 2000; Morrison, 1989). Shame can be a healthy reaction to falling out of step with or being at odds with the best values and practices of ones family, community, or society. In the absence of shared practices and values—which may have to criticized and reworked in the social or interpersonal process, rather than blindly adhered to—the individual's sense of being morally or socially out of joint lacks an appropriate remedy. To make matters worse, in our current society, with its exaggerated stress on "doing one's own thing" and "being one's own person," all sorts of normal human feelings of and needs for connectedness with others are interpreted as personal failings or immature dependencies—leading to intense feelings of shame! To a great extent, our culture is limited to offering as a cure for shame a kind of defensive self-esteem (Watson, Hickman & Morris, 1996) and the elusive promise of more, better, different commodities with which to temporarily sooth the self that can not tolerate itself (Fromm, 1948). Self-esteem divorced from accomplishment, self-respect, and humility is ultimately empty, selfish, and self-defeating (Lewis, 1992; Broucek, 1991). As a possible way out of these dilemmas, I have explored in this dissertation the possibility of cultivating,

141

instead of a singular, bounded self, a historical-dialogical conception of the self (Dunne, 1996; Richardson, Fowers & Guignon, 1999), a way of thinking of persons as unfolding narratives whose being is shaped by an ongoing dialogue with others in a communal context.

A "communitarian" moral outlook differs from both individualism and collectivism on several dimensions. There is a deep appreciation of but not a slavish obedience to, nor rejection of traditions and respected cultural and moral authorities. A communitarian ethic emphasizes the equal importance of responsibilities as well as rights and recognizes the great extent to which our very identities as persons are shaped by history and culture, giving us built-in obligations and meaningful moral ties to others from the outset. The communitarian view places a high value on both individual initiative and creativity and on community and the common good. The former is necessary for achieving the latter and the latter gives a sense of purpose and direction to the former. Human life is seen as a rich, ongoing kind of cooperation and conversation between the individual and community dimensions of human existence. In the dissertation, I have suggested a number of reasons why a balanced communitarian more than a one-sided individualistic moral outlook might be associated with a number of different positive and fulfilling outcomes in living. A new scale, The Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI), that assesses the degree to

which individuals adhere more to an individualistic or to a broadly communitarian moral or social outlook was employed to investigate these relationships.

Narcissistic Emptiness Vs. Meaningful Connectedness

Contemporary psychology and psychotherapy view narcissism and feelings of emptiness as a species of individual, or at most family, pathology. But many of the social theorists discussed in this dissertation argue that many narcissistic phenomena result from our way of life, from a one-sided individualism that is too "thin" to support its own best values and tends to cultivate individuals who can no longer fend off painful feelings of emptiness and emotional isolation but only defend themselves against such feelings in an ultimately self-defeating manner. So, these are moral and social problems at their root, not just or mainly psychological maladies. Richardson et al. (1999, pp. 14-15) remind us that an appreciation of this situation is not really new in psychology. It has often been noticed by important theorists over the years, even if the mainstream of the field chooses to ignore it. For example, they note that in the 1930's and 1940's Erich Fromm, Karen Horney and others argued persuasively that our rather shallow and overly-competitive way of life, oriented so much toward individual popularity and success, was in fact the source of many modern emotional problems in living. These noted thinkers may not have described an

alternative approach, beyond individual therapy, for getting at the root of such deep-seated cultural deficiencies, and it is probably unfair to expect them to have done so. Solutions in this arena come slowly at best, and are more a matter of calling for cultural evolution than any sort of quick fix that psychology or psychologists might devise.

In the dissertation, in order to begin to investigate these social and psychological dynamics in an empirical fashion, I have employed another new scale, the Common Feelings Inventory (CFI), that assesses the degree to which individuals see their everyday lives more in line with the attitudes of life in a "culture of narcissism" or more in terms of the opportunities and challenges of Meaningful Connectedness of a broadly communitarian sort.

Research Questions

I believe that the hypotheses investigated in the research portion of this dissertation follow directly from the theoretical and ethical framework I have tried to articulate and defend. These hypotheses predict clusters of relationships between pathological shame, externalization, depression, malevolent anger, individualism and Empty Selfishness, on one side, and healthy guilt, constructive anger, communitarianism, and a sense of Meaningful Connectedness, on the other. The first hypothesis holds that the study will replicate the findings of

Tangney and Gramzow's (1991, 1992), who found significant partial correlations between the variables of shame-proneness, externalization, depression, and malevolent anger. They also found a significant association among guilt-proneness, absence of substantial depressive symptoms, and constructive anger.

The second hypothesis consists of two parts, the first tests for differences in shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, externalization, depression, anger, Empty Selfishness, and Meaningful Connectedness between groups categorized according to levels of individualist ethical orientation. The groups will be formed by dividing the sample into thirds according to scores on the Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI). Tests of mean differences (ANOVA) will discern whether there are significant distinctions between the groups. The second part of this hypothesis will test for differences on the same variables between groups categorized by level of communitarian ethical orientation (BBI). Again, tests of mean difference will assess whether the groups are distinct.

Given the theoretical orientation of this study, it is expected that there will be significant differences on part one of the second hypothesis between the group scoring high versus the groups scoring lower on individualistic attitudes. The high group will be significantly more shame-prone, externalizing, depressed, malevolently angry, and higher in Empty Selfishness than the other two groups. Also, the high individualism group will show less guilt-proneness, constructive anger, and Meaningful Connectedness. These findings will lend support to the

145

theoretical assumptions of this project that pathological shame is related to one-sided individualism, psychopathology, and an empty or culturally narcissistic way of life,

The test of the second part of the hypothesis, with the sample categorized according to level of communitarianism will, I predict, yield significant differences between the groups in guilt-proneness, constructive anger, and Meaningful Connectedness, with the high communitarian group, as compared with the other groups, being significantly more guilt-prone, constructively angry, and endorsing an approach to life suggesting that well-being comes from having meaningful connections and commitments to others. In order to gain additional insight into the interaction of individualism and pathological shame, a multiple regression analysis will be run with shame as the dependent variable and individualist ethical orientation, depression, malevolent anger, and Empty Selfishness as the potential predictors. I anticipate that individualism will have the greatest weight in the equation.

The third hypothesis concerns relationships between variables of the Basic Beliefs Inventory (individualism and communitarianism), the Test of Self-Conscious Affects (shame and guilt-proneness), and the Common Feelings Inventory (emptiness and meaningful Connectedness). Significant positive correlations are expected between an individualist ethical orientation as measured by the BBI, emptiness measured by the CFI, and shame-proneness (TOSCA).

This result might be interpreted to mean that the absence of broadly communitarian beliefs and values are an important source of the kind of emptiness and disconnection that are theoretically linked to many negative shame-related experiences and problems in living in today's world. In the same vein, significant positive correlations are also expected between a communitarian ethical orientation (BBI), guilt-proneness (TOSCA), and Meaningful Connectedness (CFI).

I hope that these results will encourage future research—quantitative, qualitative, or interpretive, whatever seems most appropriate or potentially revealing—concerning the dynamics and influence of a different, positive conception of shame, one that appears to form an essential part of the kind of meaningful social connectedness and commitment involved in the best sort of human life.

Chapter Four

Methodology

Overview of the Dissertation Study

In the previous chapter, Statement of the Problem and Research Design, the basis and rationale for the dissertation study was established. In general, the study looks at the relationships among ethical orientations of two types (Individualism and Communitarianism), self-conscious emotions (guilt and shame-proneness), as well as depression, anger (malevolent and constructive), and dimensions of common commitments characterized by Meaningful Connectedness or Empty Selfishness.

The first hypothesis is a replicatory analysis of Tangney and Gramzow's (1991, 1992) studies connecting shame-proneness with depression and malevolent anger, and guilt-proneness with constructive anger. The second hypothesis tests the differences between groups of participants categorized by the Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI). Three groups, categorized as high, moderate, and low Individualist by the Basic Beliefs Inventory are contrasted on measures of shame- and guilt-proneness, externalization, depression (BDI), malevolent or constructive anger (ARIA-A), Empty Selfishness and Meaningful Connectedness assessed by the Common Feelings Inventory (CFI). Additional tests of difference are

148

performed between groups categorized by the BBI as high, moderate and low Communitarian on the same study variables. The third hypothesis concerns the relationships between ethical orientation, self-conscious emotions, Empty Selfishness and Meaningful Connectedness.

Instruments

Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II) (Beck, 1990).

The Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition is the most popular self-report measure of depression in both clinical and academic settings. The items on the BDI-II are designed to assess criterion symptoms of depression coinciding with the DSM-IV. Its psychometric properties are well-established. The respondent is asked to endorse the statements most characteristic of their experience of a range of depressive symptoms occurring in the two weeks prior to the administration of the test. Values on each symptom vary from 0- Not at all, to 3- Severe. Scores are derived by summing the ratings for the 21 items. Scores are interpreted by comparing the sums to optimal cut scores derived from the use of receiver operating curves. Scores are then classified as: minimal; mild; moderate; or severe.

***Test of Self Conscious Affect- Adult* (TOSCA-A)** (Tangney & Gramzow, 1991).

The TOSCA-A is a paper and pencil measure designed to assess individual differences in proneness to shame, proneness to guilt, externalization of blame, detachment/unconcern, pride in self (alpha-pride), pride in behavior (beta-pride). The TOSCA is comprised of 15 brief scenarios (10 negative, 5 positive in valence) that respondents would be likely to encounter in day-to-day life. Each scenario is followed by a number of associated responses, two of which capture phenomenological aspects of shame and guilt as described in the literature (Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1989). Respondents are asked to rate on a 5-point Likert type scale their likelihood of reacting in each manner indicated. This allows for the possibility that some respondents may experience both shame and guilt in connection with a given situation (Tangney, et al., 1996). The scenarios were derived from written accounts of personal shame, guilt, and pride experiences provided by a sample of several hundred college students and non-college aged adults. The response options were derived from a pool of affective, cognitive and behavioral responses provided by second sample of non-college aged adults. The TOSCA purports to measure shame, guilt and pride at the level of traits (Tangney, 1996) or "affective dispositions."

The fundamental idea behind the measurement of affective traits being that most people experience most emotions at some point in their lives, but that there are individual differences in the degree to which people are prone to

150

experience certain affects across a variety of situations provoking self-evaluation. A number of measures tap one affective dimension only, such as guilt, shame or pride (self-esteem). These measures employ a range of instrumentation from adjective checklists, ratings of descriptive statements, forced-choice formats, attitude ratings and qualitative analysis of narrative responses to given situations (Tangney, 1996). Examples of one-dimensional affective trait measures include: the Guilt scale of the Buss-Durkee Hostility-Guilt Inventory (Buss & Durkee, 1957); the Guilt Inventory (Kugler & Jones, 1992); the Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory (Mosher, 1996); the Situational Guilt Scale (Klass, 1987); the G-Trait Scale (Otterbacher & Munz, 1973). Across these various instruments, guilt and shame are frequently employed interchangeably with little attempt to differentiate between these two similar, but phenomenologically distinct emotional states. The importance of discriminating between guilt and shame is supported exhaustively in the literature (Lewis, HB. 1971; Lewis, M. 1989, 1992, 1996, 2000; Tangney, Wagner and Gramzow, 1992). Numerous empirical studies have strongly supported these two states as distinct, phenomenologically and in their correlations to other psychological and psychopathological phenomenon. When shame and guilt are measured distinctly, they each show different and divergent relationships to adjustment and maladjustment and social behavior.

As was explored in the literature review, both bear some strong associations with psychological states, symptoms and dispositions such as

151

narcissism (Hibbard, 1993; Broucek, 1991; Morrison, 1989; Kohut, 1971) sociopathy (Brodie, 1995), anger arousal and response (Tangney, et al., 1996), obsessiveness, depression (Tangney, et al., 1992, 1996) and empathy (Tangney, 1991). What psychometrically differentiates shame and guilt in their correlations to other psychological dimensions is the direction of the relationships. With shame, the correlations with psychopathological phenomena are almost overwhelmingly positive. The inverse is true of guilt, which tends to exhibit either negative or insignificant correlations with various psychopathologies. Guilt-proneness, as measured by the TOSCA, evidences a strong positive relationship with empathy as measured by the Empathy Scale for Adults (Feshbach & Lipian, 1987). Shame, as measured by the TOSCA, also has a positive relationship to empathy, although it is not significant. Tangney found significant inverse relationships between shame and empathy when controlling for guilt using the Self Conscious Affects and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI) (1991).

The TOSCA and other measures are based on theoretical differences between shame and guilt. These measures vary as to the format employed to assess shame and guilt, as well as how these emotions were operationalized and defined. The TOSCA and the Beall Shame-Guilt Test (1972) are both scenario-based instruments, but differ as to definitions of shame and guilt and in how they ask respondents to answer (Tangney, 1996). Beall's instrument asks respondents to rate how "upset" they would become if exposed to various scenarios in which

shame or guilt might be the affective outcome. The idea behind the Beall rests on prototypicality, that certain situations evoke shame or guilt in almost everyone, and that these two affects are defined by the situation in which they are experienced. Shame allegedly occurs in situations involving moral failures and guilt in situations involving behavioral transgressions. The situations themselves are labeled "guilt-inducing" and "shame-inducing" and thus are not consistent with Lewis's notion of shame and guilt as originating in the agent rather than the context.

Another approach to assessing shame and guilt involves the use of global adjective checklists. Adjective checklists require the respondent to endorse whether or not a word or phrase describes them. The Revised Shame-Guilt Scale (Holblitzelle, 1987) is an example of an adjective checklist consisting of 16 supposed shame adjectives (mortified, humiliated, embarrassed) and 20 alleged guilt adjectives (unethical, culpable, liable). Respondents are asked to rate the extent to which each adjective describes them. The Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2 (Harder, Cutler & Rockhart, 1992) presents the respondent with a list of shame and guilt related emotional descriptors ("intense guilt," "regret," or for shame "feeling ridiculous," "feeling disgusting to others.") and asks them to rate the frequency with which they experience each descriptor. The PFQ-2 consists of 10 shame and 6 guilt items. Drawbacks to the adjective checklist format include: (1) asking respondents differentiate between shame and guilt

153

feelings in an abstract context, while, in fact, shame and guilt frequently co-occur; (2) requirement of advanced verbal skills; (3) adjective checklists may actually assess diffuse, negative self-directed affect rather than specifically shame, guilt or any of their variants. (4) The most potentially compromising aspect of adjective checklists involves their face validity, which, according to almost every theory of shame, may provoke a defensive, self-preservative response set involving denial, repression, and avoidance.

Advantages of using an instrument such as the TOSCA are many. The scenarios used in the TOSCA were derived from a non-clinical sample of respondents, rather than from an abstract research perspective. For each scenario, the respondents endorse to what degree they would think, feel or behave on several dimensions tapping shame, guilt, externalization, detachment, alpha-pride (or hubris) and beta-pride (or positive feelings about an achievement). This allows that some respondents, for example, may simultaneously experience guilt and shame and may deal with it by blaming others or the situation. The TOSCA is very clear in its basis on a well-defined differentiation of shame and guilt. The authors (Tangney & Gramzow, 1991) have very explicitly defined what they take to be shame and guilt based on the work of Helen Block Lewis (1971) and Michael Lewis's Cognitive-Attribution theory of self-conscious affects (1989, 1992). Other strengths of the TOSCA are that it does not require the respondents to discern between shame and guilt in the abstract, its face validity is low and thus

it probably elicits a less defensive response set from the respondents than instruments such as the PFQ-2, and it is easily adaptable for use with younger age groups (There are also adolescent and child versions of the TOSCA). The psychometric properties of the TOSCA are generally high with reliabilities ranging across populations for the subscales: Shame .80; Guilt .83; Externalization .76; Detachment .71; A-Pride .66; B-Pride .58.

Anger Response Inventory-Adult (ARI-A) (Tangney & Gramzow, 1991).

The Anger Response Inventories (Tangney, Wagner, Marschall & Gramzow, 1991) are a series of paper and pencil measures intended to assess a variety of anger related dimensions in adults, adolescents and children. The adult version of the ARI purportedly assesses (1) proneness to anger, (2) typical responses to anger, and (3) respondents perceptions of the possible consequences of anger episodes. The ARI is a scenario-based measure, similar to its author's Test of Self-Conscious Affects (TOSCA). Respondents are presented with a series of common experiences that are likely to invoke anger. They are asked to imagine themselves in each scenario and then indicate, on a 5-point scale, (1) how angry they would be (arousal); (2) their intentions—what they would feel like doing, not necessarily what they would actually do (intentions—constructive, fractious, malicious); (3) their likely behaviors, including a variety of aggressive and non-aggressive responses; (4) their use of cognitive reappraisals of the self, the target,

and the situation; and (5) their beliefs about the long-term consequences for the self, the target and the relationship.

The ARI was constructed based on the cognitive appraisal theories of James Averill (1982) and Hoshmand and Austin (1987). Lists of anger-provoking situations were drawn up, a team of graduate students generated a pool of context-specific cognitive and behavioral responses to anger, and "best exemplars" of each of the five categories were selected. The potential items were then administered in an interview format with 20 adults. A working version of the ARI was administered to 199 undergraduates at a large state university in the eastern United States, along with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Distributions of all items were analyzed for restriction of range and violations of normality. Item–total correlations were examined, as were correlations with items of the social desirability scale. Based on the results, 23 scenarios were selected for inclusion in the final version of the ARI-A. The current study utilizes only two of the subscales concerning two types of anger in response to the scenarios: Constructive and Malevolent.

Internal consistencies of the ARI are generally high across the two subscales. Cronbach's alphas for the Constructive and the Malevolent anger subscales are in the 90's. The validity for the ARI tends to be high and the intercorrelations were consistent with psychometric theory for scenario-based measures (Tangney, Marschall, Wagener & Gramzow, 1991). For example,

156

malevolent anger was strongly correlated with a range of aggressive responses—direct aggression, indirect, and displaced aggression, as well as with pessimistic projections of consequences for the self, the target and the relationship. Constructive anger and actions were strongly correlated with beneficial long-term consequences. Given the already complex design of the current project, only the Malevolent and Constructive Anger subscales of the ARI will be examined. A correlation matrix with the excluded subscales and other study variables is presented in Appendix A.

Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI) (Richardson & Wicker, 1995)

The Basic Beliefs Inventory is designed to measure two fundamental value orientations widely held by members of American society. The first orientation is labeled "liberal individualism." It stresses personal autonomy and healthy self-interest on the part of separate, self-responsible individuals. It views the social realm as a neutral milieu in which people pursue their self-realization and enjoy mainly contractual relationships with others based on the exchange of goods, services, or mutual satisfaction. This orientation stresses the rights of individuals, including the rights to pursue their own goals and development without the interference of the state or social obligations, providing that the similar rights of others are respected. Most moral or spiritual values are viewed as personal or subjective. One overarching value is acknowledged by this orientation, namely a

157

formal or procedural justice sometimes referred to as "fairness" or the "rule of law." This orientation shapes many Americans sense of having rights, a sense of justice, and a sense of privacy or personal space. In other times and cultures, the overarching ethic of the purpose of life revolve around honor, "face," right thought/action/livelihood or achieving spiritual salvation. In modern American culture, the overarching ethic seems to consist of unencumbered individual freedom.

The second dimension assessed by the BBI is labeled "Communitarian." Within this perspective, people are viewed as less separate and self-interested than individualistic perspectives. It stresses the importance of a feeling of community, shared meaning and purposes, and lasting social ties with others. Communitarianism emphasizes personal responsibility and the common good, as well as a healthy sense of personal limits, discipline, and character development as opposed to self-actualization. Spiritual values are viewed not as a purely subjective or private matter, but as defining the broad outline and purpose of virtuous human life. The communitarian perspective, its proponents and theoretical antecedents criticize individualism for its suppression of social and historical context and its valorization of self-interested pursuit of fulfillment and as breeding emptiness, undermining lasting social ties, and resulting in social and psychological fragmentation and isolation. This perspective shares the liberal individualist emphasis of protecting and advancing personal autonomy, and

respect for, and protection of differences across gender, race and ethnicity and sexual orientation. Liberal individualists criticize communitarian ideas as authoritarian, antiquarian and as limiting individual freedom.

The BBI was developed to assess where respondents' broad moral-political values fall on a continuum from extreme individualism to a fully communitarian ethical orientation. The BBI may help describe the value orientations of contemporary individuals and groups. It may facilitate investigation of the interrelationship of these orientations with various other attitudes, values, aspects of personality, and even psychopathology. It may be helpful in identifying bias in measures or research that many critics have targeted as unreflectively grounded on naïve or dogmatic modern individualistic values. The BBI may also be helpful in exploring the consequences of individualistic or communitarian value orientations for different social and personal outcomes such as individual and relational adjustment, personal well-being or distress, moral reasoning, conflict resolution styles, and many others.

The BBI consists of 33 statements to which respondents are asked to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement. The Likert-type scale ranges from 1-Strongly Agree to 7-Strongly Disagree, with some items requiring reverse coding before data analysis. The psychometric properties of the BBI are generally high with reliabilities ranging across populations for the subscales: The individualism subscale's internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) estimate of

159

reliability from the present study is .78 and the communitarianism subscale's reliability is .87.

Common Feelings Inventory (CFI)

The CFI asks respondents to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with a series of statements on a 7-point, Likert-type scale. It consists of 33 statements tapping the degree to which respondents experience a sense of psychological well-being consisting of connectedness to others and an engagement in a life marked by shared meanings and purpose, and a type of self-interested, self-contained narcissism, empty of a sense of belonging to a community of shared meaning and purpose.   The statements on the CFI are drawn from the same theoretical orientation as the BBI and it is expected that they will evidence strong correlations, positive and negative along a continuum from empty narcissism to psychological well-being. Internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) reliability estimates for the two subscales were derived using the study data and yielded the following: Empty Selfishness .89 and Meaningful Connectedness .84.

Procedure

      The data was collected over five sessions, with participation limited to 50 participants per session. Session registration was accomplished at the beginning of a class period, and via electronic mail for those who may have been absent during the initial sign-up. The fifth session was a "make-up" session, and allowed those who missed the initial sessions to complete the study and receive credit. Each participant received a packet upon arrival consisting of: an Informed Consent form; a form describing the study in very general terms and including a list of contacts should their participation invoke undue emotional distress, as well as notification that each protocol will be checked for random answer patterns; a demographic data form asking the participant to indicate their age, gender, race/ethnicity, religious affiliation, and primary language; and the test instruments, sequenced randomly. Participants received a participation credit form from the primary researcher outside of the testing room after they turned in their completed packet and the protocols were reviewed for random response sets. Exclusionary criteria for use of each protocol in the study include: Incomplete Informed Consent form; incomplete demographic data form; incomplete instruments; randomly answered instruments. In all, thirty-two cases were excluded from the final analysis. All participants were treated in accordance with the ethical standards of the American Psychological Association as well as the

161

University of Texas "Policies and Procedures Governing Research with Human Subjects." The study was approved by the UT Institutional Review Board.

Hypotheses

In general, this study purports to examine several dimensions that have been connected, at least theoretically, in the review of the literature. Configurations of ethical orientation of at least two general types are investigated: (1) Individualism and (2) Communitarian ethical orientation. These variables are investigated in terms of whether they associate significantly with two clusters of variables differing generally along affective lines. These two clusters of variables include: (1) shame, externalization (blaming), malevolent anger, as well as depression and Empty Selfishness; (2) guilt, constructive anger, and Meaningful Connectedness. The following hypotheses are based on a critical synthesis of the literatures of empirical and clinical psychology, pastoral psychology, anthropology, and interpretive social science on the topics of self-conscious emotions, identity, and ethical orientations.

Hypothesis #1: The results will confirm previous findings of significant positive partial correlations between shame-proneness malevolent anger, and depression, when controlling for guilt. Significant positive relationships between guilt-proneness and constructive anger are also expected, when shame is factored

162

out. The first hypothesis test is a replicatory analysis of Tangney and Gramzow's (1991, 1992) studies that found significant part correlations between shame-proneness, externalization, depression, and malevolent anger; guilt-proneness, absence of substantial depressive symptoms, and constructive anger.

Hypothesis #2: There will be significant differences in shame proneness, guilt proneness, externalization, depression types of anger, Empty Selfishness, and Meaningful Connectedness between groups classified by 1) level of Individualist ethical orientation; and between groups categorized on 2) level of Communitarian ethical orientation. The second hypothesis consists of two parts, the first tests for differences in the dependent variables between groups categorized according to level of individualist ethical orientation. The groups will be formed by dividing the sample into thirds according to scores on the Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI) Individualism subscale. Tests of mean difference will discern whether there are significant distinctions between the groups. The second part of this hypothesis will test for differences (ANOVA) on the same variables between groups categorized by level of communitarian ethical orientation (BBI). Again, tests of mean difference will assess whether the groups are distinct.

Given the theoretical orientation of this study, it is expected that there will be significant differences on part one of the hypothesis tests between the individualism groups in that the high group will be significantly more shame-

163

prone, externalizing, depressed, malevolently angry, and higher in Empty Selfishness than the other two groups. The high individualism group will be significantly different in the inverse for guilt-proneness, constructive anger, and Meaningful Connectedness. These findings will lend support to the theoretical assumptions of this project that individualism is related to pathological shame, psychopathology, and an empty, selfish approach to life.

The second part of the hypothesis, with the sample categorized according to level of communitarianism, will hopefully yield significant differences between the groups in guilt-proneness, constructive anger, and Meaningful Connectedness, with the high communitarian group being significantly more guilt-prone, constructively angry, and endorsing an approach to life suggesting that well-being comes from having meaningful connections and commitments to others. In order to gain insight into the interaction of individualism and pathological shame, a multiple regression analysis will be run with shame as the dependent variable and individualist ethical orientation, depression, malevolent anger, and Empty Selfishness as the potential predictors. I anticipate that individualism will have the greatest weight in the equation.

Hypothesis #3: The third hypothesis concerns expected correlational relationships between variables of the Basic Beliefs Inventory (Individualism and Communitarianism), the Test of Self-Conscious Affects (Shame and Guilt-

proneness), and the Common Feelings Inventory (Empty Selfishness and Meaningful Connectedness). Given the close relationships of the two types of ethical orientation, investigation of the relationships among the variables will be performed utilizing partial correlational tests, controlling, in turn, for Individualism and Communitarianism.

Significant positive partial correlations are expected between an Individualist ethical orientation as measured by the BBI, Empty selfishness measured by the CFI, and Shame-proneness, with Communitarianism held constant, suggesting that the absence of broadly communitarian beliefs and values are a source of the kind of emptiness and disconnection that are theoretically linked to many negative shame related experiences and problems in living. Significant partial correlations are also expected between a Communitarian ethical orientation (BBI), Guilt-proneness (TOSCA), and Meaningful connectedness (CFI), when Individualism is held constant.

Chapter Five

Results

This dissertation study was designed to explore the relationships between some factors of particular interest for both psychology and the study of culture and persons. The project, is in part an attempt to elucidate changes in both the experience and treatment of negative self-evaluation and its attendant emotions, and to explore some possible reasons why shame, in particular is such a signal affect in contemporary contexts. Through the data analysis, relationships between negative self-referent emotions, ethical orientation, and attitudinal approaches to life will be examined and will provide insight into the interplay of these factors. Although both clinicians and empirical researchers have implicated shame in many of the emotional and relational disorders of modern times, scant psychological research before this project has attempted to frame emotional functioning and dysfunction in terms of larger ethical and cultural dynamics.

The results are presented in two major sections. The first section focuses on the descriptive aspects of the sample and includes the means, standard deviations, and/or frequency distributions of age, gender, ethnicity, and self-reported religious affiliation (Tables 1, 2, 3).

The second major section consists of three subsections. The first subsection presents the results and discussion of Hypothesis 1, which attempted to replicate the earlier work of June Tangney and Richard Gramzow (1991, 1992) linking shame-proneness with depression and malevolent anger, through partial correlational analyses controlling for guilt; and guilt-proneness with constructive anger when shame is factored out. The second subsection presents the results and discussion of Hypothesis 2, which proposed significant mean differences in shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and externalization, as measured by the TOSCA, as well as Empty Selfishness and Meaningful Connectedness as assessed by the CFI, between groups categorized according to levels of 1) Individualism and 2) Communitarianism respectively. The analyses necessitated the categorization of groups of scores on levels of Individualism (Low, Moderate, and High) and levels of Communitarianism (Low, Moderate, High), from these subscales of the Basic Beliefs Inventory.

The third major subsection presents the results for Hypothesis 3. This examines the associations between ethical orientation (Basic Beliefs Inventory), shame-proneness and guilt-proneness, (Test of Self Conscious Affects), empty self-centeredness and Meaningful Connectedness (Common Feelings Inventory). Given the considerable relationship of the Individualism and Communitarianism subscales of the BBI ($r = .34$, $p = <.000$), two partial correlational analyses were performed, first controlling for Communitarianism, and then for Individualism.

167

Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

Participants were 160 undergraduates (62% female, 38% male) attending the University of Texas-Austin who received credit towards an upper division undergraduate course requirement in return for their participation. As reported in the Methodology chapter, several cases were excluded for neglecting to complete demographic sheets and waivers, for turning in incomplete instruments, and for turning in instruments with obvious response sets (All extreme, all minimal, and random). Cases with partially completed demographic sheets were included if the waiver was complete. Approximately 10 participants only partially completed the demographic sheet. The students ranged in age from 19 to 42 years old (M= 22.7, SD= 3.74). The sample was representative of the general university student population and was majority Euro-American 60.2%, followed by Latino/a 14.8%, East Asian 8.6 %, African-American 5.5 %, South Asian 3.9%, "Asian-American" 2.3%, and Native American .8% (Table 2). Primary religious affiliation was reported as Protestant 46%, Catholic 16.4%, Jewish 9.4%, Hindu 5.8%, Buddhist 2.3%, and Atheist/Agnostic 14.8% (Table 3). Only one analysis based on demographic difference was significant. There was a significant mean difference between males and females on shame-proneness F= 6.03, p= .01. This finding is similar to Tangney and Gramzow's observations (1989, 1991). No other

168

analyses utilizing demographic variables were feasible given uneven and inadequate group sizes. Descriptive statistics for all study variables are presented in Table 4.

Table 1: Frequency Distribution of the Sample by Age

Age	Frequency	Percent
19	1	.8
20	23	18
21	34	26.6
22	32	25
23	6	4.7
24	5	3.9
25	2	1.6
26	7	5.5
28	4	3.1
29	1	.8
31	2	1.6
32	1	.8
33	1	.8
35	1	.8
40	1	.8
42	1	.8
Total	122	95.3
Missing	6	4.7

Table 2: Frequency Distribution of the Sample by Ethnicity

	Frequency	Percent
Native American	1	.8
Asian-American	3	2.3
South Asian	5	3.9
African-American	7	5.5
East Asian	11	8.9
Latino/a		19 14.8
Euro-American	77	60.2
	Total	123 96.1
	Missing	5 3.9

Table 3: Frequencies and Percentages of the Sample by Self-Reported Religious Affiliation

	Frequency	Percent
Buddhist	3	2.3
Hindu	5	5.8
Jewish	12	9.4
Atheist/Agnostic	19	14.8
Catholic	21	16.4
Protestant	61	46
Total	121	94.5
Missing	7	5.5

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for All Study Variables

Variable	Mean	SD	Cases
GUILT	57.63	5.65	127
SHAME	45.95	10.68	127
EXTERNAL	38.56	8.47	127
BDI	7.44	6.52	127
INDIV	81.87	9.41	127
COMM	59.89	18.56	127
EMPTY	66.48	17.19	127
CONNECT	47.04	11.02	127
CONAnger	89.01	12.41	127
MALAnger	64.79	17.30	127

Note:
Variable Abbreviations
Guilt   Guilt-Proneness
Shame   Shame-Proneness
EXTERNAL   Externalization
BDI   Depression
INDIV   Individualism
COMM   Communitarianism
EMPTY   Empty Selfishness
CONNECT Meaningful Connectedness
CONAnger Constructive Anger
MALAnger Malevolent Anger

Self-conscious Affects, Anger and Depression

Hypothesis #1: Two partial correlation analyses were performed to test hypothesis 1. The results of the first analysis confirm the previous findings of Tangney and Gramzow (1992) reporting significant positive partial correlations between shame-proneness, externalization, malevolent anger, and depression, controlling for guilt (See Table 5). When guilt was held constant, shame-proneness was found to bear significant positive relationships with externalization, or tendency to blame or make external re-attributions, depression as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory-II, and malevolent intentions when faced with anger-provoking situations (Table 5). A significant relationship between malevolent anger and depression, as well as malevolent anger and externalization were also observed when guilt was held constant. Part two of the hypothesis test replicated Tangney & Gramzow's finding of a significant, though weak association between guilt-proneness and depression, holding shame constant (Table 6). However, the test of the present data failed to substantiate significant positive relationships between guilt-proneness and constructive anger, controlling for shame (Table 6).

173

Table 5: Partial Correlations between Shame-Proneness, Depression, Externalization and Malevolent Anger, (Guilt Held Constant)

	SHAME	BDI	EXTERNAL	MALAnger
SHAME	---	.25**	.23**	.23**
BDI	.25**	---	.14	.21*
EXTERNAL	.23**	.14	---	.30**
MALAnger	.23**	.21*	.30**	---

* Significance .05   **Significance .01   (2-tailed)
Note:
Variable Abbreviations
SHAME   Shame-Proneness
EXTERNAL   Externalization
BDI   Depression
MALAnger   Malevolent Anger

Table 6:   Partial Correlations between Guilt-Proneness Depression, and Constructive Anger (Shame Held Constant).

	PGUILT	BDI	CONAnger
PGUILT	---	.18*	-.03
BDI	.18*	---	.01
CONAnger	-.04	.01	---

*Significance .05 **Significance .01 (Two-tailed)
Note:
Variable Abbreviations
Guilt   Guilt-Proneness
BDI   Depression
CONAnger   Constructive Anger

Interaction of Levels of Ethical Orientation and Other Study Variables

Hypothesis #2:

To test Hypothesis 2, the sample was first grouped according to scores on the Individualism subscale of the Basic Beliefs Inventory. In order to maintain group sizes sufficient for the analysis, the sample was divided into three groups, 1) the low group made up of 43 subjects, 2) the moderate group with 42, and 3) the high group with 43 participants. The three groups were significantly different on the criterion, level of Individualism, at $\underline{F} = 26.4$, p= <.000.

An Analysis of Variance was conducted to evaluate the relationship between Individualism, as measured by the BBI, and shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and externalization (tendency to blame or make external re-attributions) measured by the TOSCA, malevolent and constructive anger assessed by the ARI, and Empty Selfishness and Meaningful Connectedness measured by the CFI. The independent variable was the Individualism factor; the dependent variables consist of those taken from the TOSCA, ARI, and the CFI. The ANOVA was significant for relating Individualism to Guilt-proneness F= 6.85, p= <.00; Shame-proneness $\underline{F}$ = 10.33, p= <.00; Externalization $\underline{F}$= 2.10, p= .03; and Empty selfishness $\underline{F}$= 2.20, p= .01. The results of the ANOVA are

176

presented in Table 7. The means table for all variables by levels of Individualism are presented in Table 8.

Planned post hoc analyses using the Tukey's procedure offered a more detailed view of the differences on the dependent variables between the low, moderate, and high individualism groups. The high Individualism group was significantly less guilt prone (F= -3.28, p= .05), more shame-prone (F= 7.23, p= <.00), more externalizing (F= 2.26, p= .05), and more likely to endorse an empty selfish approach to life (F= 6.3, p= .05) than the moderate group. The high Individualism group was significantly greater on the Empty Selfishness variable than the low group (F= 6.1, p= .05).

The moderate Individualism group was significantly more guilt-prone than either the low (F=3.3, p= .01) or high groups (F= 3.97, p= <.00). The moderate group was less empty than the high Individualism group (F= -6.3, p= .05) and less shame-prone than either the high (F= -7.23, p= <.00) or the low Individualism groups (F= -4.12, .01). There were no other significant mean differences between the Individualism groups on the connectedness, malevolent or constructive anger variables. Curvilinear relationships were observed between the Individualism groups on both the guilt-proneness (Figure 2) and shame-proneness variables (Figure 3). On the shame-proneness comparison, the low group mean was 46.33, the moderate group lesser at 42.20, and the high Individualism group evidenced the greatest mean at 49.43.

177

The second set of analyses for Hypothesis 2 required grouping the sample according to high, moderate, and low levels of Communitarianism taken from this subscale of the BBI. Results of the ANOVA are presented in Table 9. A one-way ANOVA was performed and found that the groups were significantly different on levels of Individualism, $F= 56.41$, $p= <.00$. The test of means difference on the dependent variables was significant for Communitarianism and guilt $F= 5.41$, $p= .006$, and Meaningful Connectedness $F= 16.48$, $p= <.00$, and significant in the negative direction for Empty Selfishness $F= -21.21$, $p= <.00$. There was no significance for Communitarianism and shame, externalization, and malevolent or constructive anger. Means of all variables grouped by Communitarianism are presented in Table 10.

Planned comparison analyses using the Tukey's procedure helped to illuminate the specific differences on the dependent variables between levels of Communitarian ethical orientation. The group endorsing a high level of Communitarianism was significantly more guilt-prone than the moderate group $F= 2.62$, $p= .05$, and the low group $F= 3.74$, $p= .05$. The high group was significantly less likely to endorse an empty selfish approach to life than either the low group $F= -19.51$, $p= <.00$, or the moderate group $F= -11.96$, $p= <.00$. The moderate group was significantly different from the low group on the Empty Selfishness variable $F= -7.54$, $p= <.00$. The high Communitarian group was

178

significantly more likely to endorse a meaningful connected approach to life than the low group $\underline{F}$= 12.05, p= <.00, as was the moderate group $\underline{F}$= 12.85, p= <.00.

A multiple regression equation was constructed to explore the relative power of contributing factors to pathological shame scores. Shame was utilized as the dependent variable, with Individualism, Communitarianism, Empty Selfishness, malevolent anger, and externalization entered as predictor variables. The regression analysis was significant overall and yielded R=.39, R^2 = .15, $\underline{F}$ Change = 6.52, p= <.000. The variables accounting for the power in the regression are, in descending order, Individualism (β= .24). Externalization (β= .23), and malevolent anger (β= .20). Communitarianism (β= -.27) provided negative predictive power. A summary of the regression is presented in Table 11.

Table 7: Analysis of Variance for Levels of Individualism

Source	F	p
GUILT	6.85	.00**
SHAME	10.38	.00**
EXTERNAL	2.10	.03*
EMPTY	2.20	.01**
CONNECT	1.22	.29
MALAnger	.68	.31
CONAnger	.77	.53

*Significance .05   **Significance .01   Note: df= 2, 128
Note:
Variable Abbreviations
Guilt   Guilt-Proneness
Shame   Shame-Proneness
EXTERNAL   Externalization
EMPTY   Empty selfishness
CONNECT   Meaningful connectedness
CONAnger   Constructive Anger
MALAnger   Malevolent Anger

Table 8: Means for all Variables by Levels of Individualism

Variable	N		Mean	SD
Guilt	1	40	60.90	6.36
	2	44	62.18	4.70
	3	44	58.20	4.97
	Total	**128**	**60.42**	**5.34**
Shame	1	40	46.33	8.12
	2	44	42.20	7.55
	3	44	49.43	7.05
	Total	**128**	**45.98**	**7.57**
External	1	40	40.75	7.87
	2	44	38.75	6.98
	3	44	42.38	7.83
	Total	**128**	**40.62**	**7.56**
Empty	1	40	63.10	13.68
	2	44	59.95	14.55
	3	44	69.31	18.86
	Total	**128**	**64.12**	**15.69**
Connect	1	40	50.35	11.38
	2	44	54.47	11.23
	3	44	51.18	15.52
	Total	**128**	**52.00**	**12.71**
MALAnger	1	40	66.30	17.01
	2	44	65.86	15.56
	3	44	62.34	18.87
	Total	**128**	**64.83**	**17.14**
CONAnger	1	40	88.37	10.83
	2	44	89.27	12.64
	3	44	89.34	13.71
	Total	**128**	**88.99**	**12.39**

Note: 1=Low group; 2=Moderate group; 3=High group

Table 9: Analysis of Variance for Levels of Communitarianism

Source	$\underline{F}$	p
GUILT	5.41	.00**
SHAME	1.16	.31
EXTERNAL	.511	.60
EMPTY	-21.21	.00**
CONNECT	16.48	.00**
MALAnger	.960	.38
CONAnger	.51	.60

*Significance .05 **Significance .01 df= 2, 128

Note:
Guilt   Guilt-Proneness
Shame   Shame-Proneness
EXTERNAL Externalization
EMPTY   Empty Selfishness
CONNECT Meaningful Connectedness
MALAnger Malevolent Anger
CONAnger Constructive Anger

Table 10: Means for all Variables by Levels of Communitarianism

Variable	N		Mean	SD
Guilt	1	43	58.16	5.09
	2	42	59.28	6.47
	3	43	62.90	4.52
	Total	**128**	**60.11**	**5.36**
Shame	1	43	47.46	7.92
	2	42	44.90	9.41
	3	43	45.53	6.71
	Total	**128**	**45.96**	**8.01**
External	1	43	37.97	7.83
	2	42	39.59	7.82
	3	43	39.16	7.31
	Total	**128**	**38.90**	**7.65**
Empty	1	43	73.09	16.22
	2	42	65.54	14.03
	3	43	53.58	11.32
	Total	**128**	**64.06**	**16.08**
Connect	1	43	43.79	7.02
	2	42	56.64	10.42
	3	43	55.83	15.65
	Total	**128**	**52.05**	**12.93**
MALAnger	1	43	62.53	18.01
	2	42	67.86	13.56
	3	43	64.34	19.26
	Total	**128**	**64.78**	**17.16**
CONAnger	1	43	90.37	11.73
	2	42	88.27	12.24
	3	43	89.02	13.64
	Total	**128**	**89.01**	**12.40**

Note: 1=Low group; 2=Moderate group; 3=High group

Figure 2: Curvilinear Relationship of Levels of Individualism and Guilt-Proneness

Guilt

Levels of Individualism

Figure 3: Curvilinear Relationship of Levels of Individualism and Shame-Proneness

Shame

Levels of Individualism

Table 11: Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Shame-Proneness

Model	Unstandardized B	Standardized b	Sig.
(Constant)	23.44		
Individualism	.211	.244	.01**
Communitarian	-.118	-.271	.01**
Empty	-4.88	-.097	.34
MALAnger	9.38	.199	.025*
External	.242	.228	.01**

* Significant at .05   ** Significant at .01

Note: $\underline{F}$ Change = 6.52, p= <.000

Shame and Guilt, Ethical Orientation, and Approach to Life

Hypothesis #3:

The third hypothesis, namely that there are significant partial correlations between ethical orientation, affect proneness, and approach to life, was tested by a two partial correlation analyses. A preliminary correlational analysis was performed to illuminate possible overlap between the two subscales of the BBI, Individualism and Communitarianism. They were significantly related at .34, p=<.000. With this in mind, partial correlational analyses were performed between the variables of the TOSCA, BBI and CFI, namely Guilt- and Shame-proneness, Individualism, Communitarianism, Meaningful Connectedness, and Empty Selfishness. The first partial correlational test was performed between Individualism and Shame, Guilt, Meaningful Connectedness, and Empty Selfishness, while Communitarianism was held constant. For this analysis, the only significant positive relationship found was between Individualism and Empty Selfishness r= .25, p= <.000. No other significant relationships were found when controlling for a communitarian ethical orientation.

A second set of partial correlational tests was performed between Communitarianism and guilt- and shame-proneness, Meaningful Connectedness, and Empty Selfishness, while holding constant Individualism. Significant relationships were found between Communitarianism, guilt- and shame-

187

proneness, Meaningful Connectedness, and Empty Selfishness. Most notably, a communitarian ethical orientation was significantly related to guilt-proneness and Meaningful Connectedness, and related in a negative manner to shame-proneness and Empty Selfishness, when Individualism was held constant. Meaningful connectedness also bore significant associations in the negative direction with shame-proneness and Empty Selfishness under this same condition. The results for this analysis are presented in Table 12.

Table 12: Partial Correlations between Communitarianism, Guilt, Shame, Meaningful Connectedness, and Empty Selfishness, with Individualism Held Constant.

	Guilt	Shame	Empty	Connect	Comm
Guilt	---	.01	-.22**	.02	.30**
Shame	.01	---	.02	-17*	-.15*
Empty	-22**	.02	---	-.25**	-.54**
Connect	.02	-.17*	-.25**	---	.42**
Comm	.30**	-.15*	-.54**	.42**	---

*Significant at .05 (2-tailed)   **Significant at .01 or below (2-tailed)

Variable Abbreviations
Guilt   Guilt-Proneness
Shame   Shame-Proneness
Comm   Communitarianism
Connect   Meaningful Connectedness
Empty   Empty Selfishness

Chapter Six

Discussion

The integrative review of the literature, the theoretical synthesis, and the findings of the statistical analyses tend, overall to support the original hypotheses and thus the general contention of this project. A part of this assertion is that changes in our frameworks of meaning have wrought transformations in self-experience and perception that have made modern persons much more vulnerable to negative emotions. These changes in the world of life have brought great good to a great many, but have affected communities and individuals in deeply detrimental ways as well. Mainstream psychology explains these difficulties in terms of individual psychopathology.

It has also been the contention of this project from its inception that the systematic attempts to understand and "heal" human beings, often called psychology or psychotherapy, have in fact often increased the rate of disconnection and the painful experience of negative emotions by promoting the ideal of the singular person, self-motivated, achievement-driven, and self-contained as the crucial unit of being, study, and intervention. Psychology's answer to the increasing power of sadness, grief, shame, guilt, anxiety, and the plethora of other distressing emotional states is to problematize and seek to do

away with them, as if these vital parts of human life were in actuality the dilemma. This is particularly true of psychiatry and the psychopharmacology industry. Powerful shame hurts powerfully; abandonment by a loved one can bring on exquisite and enduring pain, but are these not common to all humans across history? Our reactions and responses to unavoidable personal emotional pain and suffering are what seem to really matter. Dealing with the vicissitudes of living is, for most of us, best achieved in the company and with the mutuality of others. Working through the inevitable pain of living, often with the help of a compatriot or a community, is a source of growth, both of the sufferer and the people.

Shame, Guilt, Anger, and Depression

Two partial correlation analyses were performed to test hypothesis 1. Shame-proneness was found to bear significant positive relationships with externalization (the tendency to blame), depression, and malevolent anger when guilt-proneness was controlled. The second partial correlational analysis found a weak, though significant relationship between guilt-proneness and depression. This finding replicated Tangney & Gramzow's (1992) earlier observations that guilt is a negative emotion and therefore likely to associate with another negative affect, depression. This is in spite of controlling for shame in the analysis. The

second analysis failed to match previous findings of significant relationships between guilt-proneness and constructive anger.

By way of explaining the current study's failure to replicate the prior association of guilt-proneness and constructive anger, demographic variables between the original study and the current one were compared. The sample for the current study is more diverse in terms of race and ethnicity, especially in its inclusion of Latino/a and Asian-American participants and this could account for differences in the results.

Sample Grouped by Levels of Ethical Orientation: Comparison on Other Variables of Interest

Levels of Individualism

The second hypothesis speculated that there would be significant differences on the study variables when the sample was grouped according to level of ethical orientation. The test of this hypothesis involved separating the sample based on their scores on the two subscales of the Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI). For the first analysis, the sample was divided into three groups according to scores on the Individualism subscale and classified as high, moderate or low. An ANOVA found that the three groups were indeed different from each other on the criterion variable. These three groups were then compared for differences

across the dependent variables of the study, namely shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, externalization, Empty Selfishness, and Meaningful Connectedness.

The overall differences revealed by the experimental ANOVA indicated the Individualism groups were different on several of the dependent variables, including guilt- and shame-proneness, externalization, and Empty Selfishness. Planned post hoc analysis utilizing the Tukey's procedure indicated that the high Individualism group was significantly less guilt-prone, more shame-prone, more prone to externalizing (blaming), and more endorsing of an empty selfish approach to life than the moderate group. The high group was also more likely to endorse Empty Selfishness than the low group. The moderately individualistic group was more prone to guilt than the low or high groups and less prone to shame than either one. The moderate group was less empty than the high group. The moderate and low groups were significantly more endorsing of an approach to life marked by meaningful connection to others than was the high group.

The analysis suggests that persons who endorse a highly individualistic ethical orientation may be more prone to shame and to an empty, selfish approach to life devoid of meaningful connections to others, more so than those who only moderately or barely endorse individualism. The high group was also significantly different from the moderate or low groups on the externalization variable, suggesting that individualists are more prone to blame others whether in the attempt to reattribute culpability and avoid shame, or to discharge their own

193

negative affect, which may primarily consist of shame. In a sense, this is what Broucek (1991), H. Block Lewis (1976), Michael Lewis (1992, 2000), and Schneider (1991) propose as the alienating experience of shame-proneness. For a significant portion of the sample in this study, Individualism and its attendant selfishness and moral relativism are a cognitive and philosophical defense mechanism against the painful separateness of living with an identity or self-concept inadequate to meet the unreal demands of modern selfhood. This finding lends credence to my belief that the current working models and measures of shame are one-dimensional and account for only pathological shame.

One finding of particular interest in the post hoc analysis concerns the moderate Individualism group. This particular group of cases was more guilt-prone than the high or low groups, less shame-prone than high or low groups, and less endorsing of an empty selfish approach to life than the high group. The oscillation of mean shame scores between the three groups reveals a curvilinear relationship between Individualism and Guilt-Proneness, as well as Shame-Proneness.

Levels of Communitarianism

A second analysis was performed to examine interactions between levels of communitarian ethical orientation and the other variables. The analysis of variance indicated significant differences for levels of communitarianism and

guilt-proneness, Meaningful Connectedness, for Empty Selfishness. The planned post hoc procedure indicated the high communitarianism group was significantly more guilt-prone than either the moderate or low groups; the high group takes an approach to life that is more concerned with meaningful connection to others in a community of shared values than the low group. The low communitarian group was most likely to endorse an empty narcissistic approach to life.

The high communitarian group is significantly different from the moderate and low groups; more guilt-prone and more concerned with an approach to life marked by Meaningful Connectedness. This finding would seem to substantiate the "good guilt" hypothesis, in that this group endorses an ethical orientation concerned with life and values in common with others and is more prone to good, prosocial guilt (Michael Lewis 1992, 2000; Tangney & Gramzow 1989, 1991, 1992). The Test of Self-Conscious Affects is, I contend, a measure of "good guilt," and this finding lends support to my contention.

Overall, these findings tend to support the overarching proposals of this dissertation, namely that liberal individualism permeates mass culture and individual lives and while it has undeniable benefits, its costs include emotional suffering and isolation, and estrangement from communities in which the suffering might be diffused and self-respect generated from contribution to a greater good. The findings indicate that those who endorsed a high level of communitarian values were more prone to good guilt and take an approach to life

that values meaningful connection to communities of shared values. This communitarian group also seemed less prone to the call and effects of the "Culture of Narcissism."

Ethical Orientation, Self-Conscious Emotions and Approach to Life

According to the third hypothesis, the dimensions tapped by the TOSCA, BBI and CFI would bear significant relationship in the intuitive manner, namely that Individualism would correlate significantly with Shame-proneness, and Empty selfishness, when Communitarianism was controlled; while Communitarianism would correlate significantly with Guilt-proneness and Meaningful Connectedness when Individualism was held constant. Because Individualism and Communitarianism were significantly related, partial correlations were performed to examine the relationships between each ethical orientation variable and the other study variables while controlling, in turn for each. Given that Communitarianism is not the opposite of Individualism, but rather a more connected and responsible variant of ethical orientation, the two dimensions are apt to overlap somewhat. Significant correlations between subscales are not an uncommon finding on tests that contain two or more subscales (Hamilton, 1992: Stevens, 1990). For these reasons, partial correlational

analyses were performed; the first between Individualism, controlling for Communitarianism, and shame, guilt, Empty Selfishness and Meaningful Connectedness. In this analysis, Individualism was related to Empty Selfishness, but not to guilt- or shame-proneness. It was anticipated that this partial correlation analysis would have found a significant association between Individualism and shame-proneness, but this was not the case.

A second set of partial correlational analyses was performed between Communitarianism and guilt- and shame-proneness, Meaningful Connectedness, and Empty Selfishness, holding Individualism constant. Significant relationships were found between Communitarianism, guilt- and shame-proneness, Meaningful Connectedness, and Empty Selfishness. Most notably, a communitarian ethical orientation was significantly related to guilt-proneness and Meaningful Connectedness, and related in an inverse manner to shame-proneness and Empty Selfishness, when Individualism was factored out. Meaningful connectedness also bore significant associations in the negative direction with shame-proneness and Empty Selfishness. In terms of this sample, persons with a Communitarian ethical orientation are more prone to healthy guilt and to an approach to life that values and finds meaning and purpose in connection to others and to the community. This may suggest, in a most Adlerian turn that social interest, finding one's place in relationships and in the world is a source of well-being not offered by the current ethos.

Shortcomings of the Study

The major shortcomings of the study are evident in the experimental design of the project. Ideally, the study should have included multiple measures of ethical orientation and approaches to life. A comprehensive literature review of several online databases yielded no comparable measures of ethical orientation of the types measured by the BBI. The instrument closest in spirit to the BBI could be the Rokeach Values Survey (Rokeach, 1982); however it does not address categories of ethical orientation like those identified by the Basic Beliefs Inventory. No other measure of individualism/communitarianism was identified at the time of this writing.

The Common Feelings Inventory purports to tap two common approaches or attitudinal sets in regards to life and living. The first is marked by a sense of connectedness to others and appreciation of values and meanings held in common with a community of others. The second approach to living is marked by instrumental self-centeredness and a lack emphasis on the importance of connection to others. This approach basically treats life as a struggle to maximize self-interest and avoid exploitation by others. There seems to be a raw utilitarian ethic underlying this approach to life and relationships are generally treated as contractual, as an exchange of goods and services rather than intrinsic in and of

themselves. There are several other measures that appear to tap similar sets of values as those measured by the Common Feelings Inventory, including Carol Ryff's measure of psychological well-being (1989), the Social Interest Scale (Crandall, 1975), the Tavis Measure of Social Interest (Tavis, 1990), and the Individualism-Collectivism Scale (Hui & Triandis, 1984).

Given the obvious existence of these other similar scales, the present study's omission of corroborative measures for the CFI seems glaring. The failure to do this lies with the author of this dissertation, who was not aware of these other measures when the data collection and experimental design was in the planning stages. So a lack of thoroughness seems to be a major shortcoming of this study.

Another rather obvious drawback concerns the relatively weak, although significant results from many of the hypotheses tests. Although Tangney and Gramzow (1989, 1991, 1996) found partial correlations in their various studies that were generally in the .20 to .40 range, stronger Pearson correlations were expected from the data analysis of the current study. Most relationships in this study were in the .20's, with notable exceptions observed in the relationships between communitarianism (controlling for individualism) and Meaningful Connectedness (.42, p= .0), and the inverse relationship between communitarianism and Empty Selfishness (-.54, p= .0).

Disappointing results were also observed in the lack of significant relationships between the anger variables of the Anger Response Inventory and other study variables. Although approximately twenty-five participants' data was excluded from the study for overt random responding on this instrument, it is likely that many other participants answered the ARI in a random or cursory manner due to its length and attendant subject fatigue. The data collection procedure was, in hindsight, less than conducive in facilitating participants' full attention and truthful responding. The participants were required to complete all of the instruments in one session and the total number of items for each case was greater than five-hundred, possibly inducing participant fatigue and dwindling interest and motivation as the session progressed.

Further Considerations

In this dissertation I have tried to present the notions of "frameworks of meaning" and their constitution of who we are, how we see ourselves, and how we make sensible the social and psychological worlds. I have presented several modern psychological theories of the emotions, the "self," and the interaction and of these phenomena into what we generally, and without question consider being experience, a sense of reality. I have tried to convey the sense that the so-called "objective" and "scientific" ideologies of the social sciences have not only added

to the "malaise of modernity," but are in fact reflections of the breakdowns of older frameworks of meaning. These frameworks valued emotional experience of whatever sort, promoted a set of values wherein the community or social worlds were given much more importance, and the focus was much less on the interior life of the individual

One implication of my study is that painful, "alienating" emotions do not exist in a vacuum and that there are crucial places for these in our emotional repertoires. There are good and not so good reasons that persons experience the debilitating effects of depression, shame, shyness, or other negative emotions. One thread I have explored in the course of this dissertation has to do with selfhood, particularly in how it has changed under the inward focused, achievement-oriented, and imagistic demands of our current times. As Charles Taylor so perspicaciously wrote "Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes" (1989, p. 3). So, again not all negative, painful emotional experiences are pathological as such, but are enmeshed with our identities and our being in the world.

The results of this study have established relationships between high levels of Individualism and pathological shame, the tendency to blame others, malevolent anger, as well as Empty Selfishness. What does that say, given the limited power of this particular analysis? I believe it describes a small part of the spectrum of what Charles Taylor has called the "malaise of modernity." This

predicament of the self and self-experience seems very similar to Rathvon &
Holmstrom's (1991) "depleted narcissism," and what Christopher Lasch (1978)
referred to as a "culture of narcissism." The culture of Individualism creates the
self and the conditions under which the self finds it difficult to measure up. The
same ethos offers empty solutions such as the commodification of sex and
identity, vacuous consumerism, and empty, groundless self-esteem.

If, as the many affect researchers reviewed in the course of this project
propose, emotions are inherently evaluative and as Taylor has made an excellent
case for our "self-interpreting being", just what is the message that shame trying
to tell its sufferers? There are a plethora of possibilities: "I have acted childishly;"
"I have acted in such a way as to draw undue attention to myself;" "I do not
belong here;" "I shouldn't have tried to seduce my friend's wife." Shame is
ineluctably affiliative as well as alienating. But what about the pathological
shame of mainstream psychology? What about the ruined identities, the self-
disgusted selves? While Lewis offers a promising, if somewhat vague solution to
the incapacitating effects of pathological shame in his exploration of
Kierkegaard's notion of commitment, it seems that something larger is in order.
Perhaps a change in the ways we perceive and act.

I believe that the Communitarian cluster of relationships found in the study
offers some direction not only in attenuating the devastating subjective power of
shame, but of social fragmentation as well. In the tests of the second hypothesis,

significant differences were found between cases categorized by level of Communitarian ethical orientation. The highest scoring group was more guilt-prone and took an approach to life that valued connection to others and to communities of shared meanings and purposes. Is it possible that one could change values and begin to think and act in ways that reflect and nurture more communal ways of living? The answer is obviously, yes. Psychology could play an important role in helping persons to examine and change their values in this direction, which would be a reversal of its first one-hundred years.

Many powerful intellects have written of the necessity of shame for human existence. The religious sociologist Kurt Reizler (1958, p. 453) writes in detail of the intimate connection of two equivalent forms of shame, *aischyne* is the equivalence of disgrace or dishonor, while *aidos* means awe, respect, or reverence. Reizler writes, "You feel aidos when confronted with things nature tells you to revere and not violate. Shame in sexual matters is aidos, not aischyne." (1958, p. 463). So in this way, sex retains some of the awe, the power and sacredness of transcendence rather than the commodity it has become. I believe that Hannah Arendt would agree, given her strong notions of the private, the sacredness that sometimes accompanies solitude.

With the progressive decay of cosmological understandings of things, with the "death of God," as it has been proposed, what becomes of shame, as in the sense of awe? What are its meanings? Shame has not gone away, as many

psychologists would like, it has increased. In the company of this increase in shame affect there is an attending loss in the institutions that made it bearable and solvable, that gave shame its meaning and power as a force for constructive change. While not impossible, it has become more difficult to belong to a community, to be a member of a social body in which sin is expected as the natural course of human behavior, and which has in place mechanisms, rituals, or rites for redemption. Members of communities and families and societies are expected to fail, to err, to succumb to temptation. This is an admission of our humanness and it goes against the psychological ideal of the bounded, masterful self.

Liberal Individualism promotes violation of the rules of the family, the neighborhood, or congregation and rejects the need for redemption and reintegration in the name of the sovereign self. Witness the rate at which modern persons change churches, denominations, even religions. More often people speak of "spirituality, not religion," which is often a codeword for making up one's own form of transcendence which ultimately consists of self-serving illusions. Faith has become more of a treatment for the self than a relationship with a higher reality. I believe that the egoism and imagism inherent in individualism has promoted a notion of freedom from shared belief and tradition that is an empty, ersatz version of a genuine relationship with a higher power.

Modern psychology and psychotherapy are emancipatory endeavors (Richardson & Fowers, 1998). Within their ideologies, tradition, families, all of the institutions of development are vilified for their constraint of the burgeoning self. Freedom from tradition is liberation. But with freedom from tradition people are given a new set of conditions for failure. Charles Taylor (1992, p.34), offered "What has come about with the modern age is not so much the need for recognition but the increasing conditions in which the attempt to be recognized can fail." This form of authenticity, "self-generated imagism," driven by consumerism, and ultimately the dominant paradigm of global capitalism, has made the clamor for recognition intense.

It helps explain the debilitating, crippling rejection and pathological shame we as psychologists encounter so frequently in our clients (and in ourselves, truth be told). The emancipatory framework of modern psychology, or mass-media wisdom (think Oprah) negates the need, the desire, and the absolute necessity of the sacred rituals of redemption, unless is it a false "redemption" of public humiliation as on television "reality shows." In modern psychotherapy, redemption is a form of increasing self-esteem, or "getting the love you want." Psychologists, it can be argued, are prevented by our code of ethics of pointing out our clients' transgression, working with them to stop, and assisting them in seeking real forgiveness and redemption.

Real redemption, whether it comes from a public act of confession and contrition or a heartfelt apology and amendment of behavior is a nonetheless dialogical act. There is no monological redemption. It is an affirmation of the constitution of oneself by the groups we belong to and a plea to continue this belonging, of membership, of co-constitution by that body of the self. Confession and redemption in this sense is not just another "technology of the self", in the sense used by Foucault (as in a further interioratization of power/knowledge, 1971, p. 134). Confession, redemption, and reintegration are ineluctably dialogical elements of humanness.

Appendix A

Consent Form

Emotions and Identity

You are invited to participate in a study of emotions and identity. I am a doctoral candidate in Educational Psychology at the University of Texas at Austin conducting research for my dissertation. My purpose is to explore peoples' beliefs about life and their emotional experience. You have been asked to participate because you are a part of the subject pool and can receive partial credit towards a class if you choose to do so. You will in no way be penalized if you chose not to participate. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to respond to several psychological instruments. The entire process should take between one and two hours. The information obtained will be confidential. The information acquired from you will be assigned a code number. To insure confidentiality, your responses will be connected only to your code number. You will not be personally identified.

If you have any questions, please ask me. If you have any additional questions later, please contact August Dolan-Henderson (512 322-9607) or Frank Richardson (471-4155).

You are making a decision whether or not to participate. Your signature indicates that you have read the information provided above and have decided to participate. You may withdraw at any time, if you so choose.

_____   _____

Signature of Participant   Date

_____   _____

Signature of Investigator   Date

Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI)

The following statements express everyday feelings or experiences. These feelings or experiences are all normal, and normal people vary a great deal in how much they experience them at different times in their lives. Please indicate how strongly you agree with each statement. It is best not to dwell too long on an item. Just give your honest first impression as to how much you agree or disagree with the statement.

At the top of each page you will find a scale like this one:

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
Strongly   Neutral   Strongly
Agree   Disagree

Please use this scale to indicate how you feel about each statement. Just write the appropriate number from one to seven in the space provided to the right of each item.

$$1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7$$

| Strongly Agree | | | Neutral | | | Strongly Disagree |

1. You can achieve almost any goal if you put your mind to it. _____

2. Self-sacrifice is an essential part of any long-term intimate relationships. _____

3. The feeling of being a part of a community of people with shared purposes is very important to me. _____

4. To accept things on faith is to relinquish personal responsibility. _____

5. Our deepest feelings cannot be shared with others. _____

6. Religious or spiritual beliefs are essential to a fulfilling life. _____

7. The "common good" is best achieved when everyone is free to pursue their own ends. _____

8. I deeply appreciate the wisdom of past generations. _____

9. Economic success is a very high priority in my life. _____

10. All "truth" is relative; it depends on one's personal point of view. _____

11. Personal humility is an essential virtue. _____

12. One's first responsibility is to oneself rather than to others. _____

13. We should be at least as concerned for the common good as for our own happiness. _____

14. The first step toward "finding oneself" is to move away from past beliefs and other people's values _____

15. The best advice you can give someone you care about is to first look out for him or herself. _____

$$1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7$$

| Strongly | Neutral | Strongly |
| Agree | | Disagree |

16. Personal growth is more important than one's ties to others. _____

17. Efforts to control the future are the source of many personal and _____
social ills in the modern world.

18. I am worried that I will never be able to achieve everything I want. _____

19. Fulfillment in life has nothing to do with recognition, wealth, or _____
power.

20. In the final analysis we are all alone. _____

21. It is important to accept things the way they are. _____

22. Good friendship is essentially an exchange of benefits and _____
pleasurable experiences.

23. It is wiser to focus on practical concerns than on moral or spiritual _____
purpose.

24. There are no fixed standards of right or wrong; right and wrong vary _____
according to a particular situation.

25. I have become who I am largely as a result of my own efforts. _____

26. Everyone needs some kind of moral standard or structure beyond him _____
or herself.

27. Nature is there to be exploited as fully as possible for the good of _____
humankind.

28. Healthy self-interest is the best guide to a good life. _____

29. I am deeply moved when I see someone give unselfishly to others. _____

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7

Strongly   Neutral   Strongly
Agree   Disagree

30. I judge my values by how much they fulfill my personal needs   _____
and desires.

31. A sense of unity with nature is important to me.   _____

32. An important virtue of democracy is that no one is asked to sacrifice   _____
themselves for the common good.

33. I would not be happy unless my work was of service to others.   _____

Appendix C

Common Feelings Inventory (CFI)

The following statements express everyday feelings or experiences. These feelings or experiences are all normal, and normal people vary a great deal in how much they experience them at different times in their lives. Please indicate how strongly you agree with each statement. It is best not to dwell too long on an item. Just give your honest first impression as to how much you agree or disagree with the statement.

At the top of each page you will find a scale like this one:

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
Strongly   Neutral   Strongly
Agree   Disagree

Please use this scale to indicate how you feel about each statement. Just write the appropriate number from one to seven in the space provided to the right of each item.

$$1 \text{ ----- } 2 \text{ ----- } 3 \text{ ----- } 4 \text{ ----- } 5 \text{ ----- } 6 \text{ ----- } 7$$

Strongly Agree	Neutral	Strongly Disagree

1. Most of the time I feel a sense of purpose in my everyday life. _____

2. I am much happier when I get a lot of attention and admiration from others. _____

3. I am usually quite interested in what is going on in the lives of people around me _____

4. I am easily humiliated by criticisms and putdowns. _____

5. I feel a sense of connection with people in history and societies of the past. _____

6. I enjoy friendly competition with others. _____

7. I am often bored in my day-to-day life. _____

8. It is rewarding to discover how much people are alike in their problems. _____

9. It is important to me to be special or unique. _____

10. I get a great deal of satisfaction from the ordinary pleasures of life. _____

11. It is possible to feel connected to someone you do not see very often. _____

12. I am very sensitive to evaluation or criticism by others. _____

13. I often have to struggle to sympathize with how others feel. _____

14. I have a sense of emptiness much of the time. _____

15. I would like to be recognized as an important or remarkable person. _____

16. People just don't understand my struggles. _____

$$1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7$$

| Strongly Agree | | Neutral | | | Strongly Disagree |

17. I feel a sense of solidarity with people in other societies and parts of the world.   _____

18. I am worried that I will never be able to achieve everything I want.   _____

19. Other people's criticism is often helpful.   _____

20. I do not feel as appreciated by others as I feel I deserve to be.   _____

21. I feel that the story of my life is part of a larger story.   _____

22. I like it when I feel superior to other people.   _____

23. I resent it when I am slighted or not given my due in a situation.   _____

24. I can find meaning in simple things.   _____

25. I usually find it difficult to work out differences with others.   _____

26. I generally feel a sense of purpose in my life.   _____

27. I often feel entitled to more than I get in life.   _____

28. I can easily feel the pain of others.   _____

29. I daydream a lot about being very successful or famous.   _____

30. I do not feel my problems or struggles are particularly unique.   _____

31. I do not get jealous when hearing about the success or happiness of others.   _____

32. I am very sensitive to evaluation or criticism by others.   _____

33. It is important to me to be modest or humble without being meek or unassertive.   _____

Appendix D

Beck Depression Inventory-II

Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the way you have been feeling during the past two weeks, including today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than one statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite).

1. Sadness

0 I do not feel sad.

1 I feel sad much of the time.

2 I am sad all the time.

3 1 am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.

2. Pessimism

0 I am not discouraged about my future.

1 I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be.

2 I do not expect things to work out for me.

3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse.

3. Past Failure

0 I do not feel like a failure.

1 I have failed more than I should have.

2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures.

3 I feel I am a total failure as a person.

4. Loss of Pleasure

0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy.

1 I don't enjoy things as much as I used to.

2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy.

3 I can't get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy.

5. Guilty Feelings

0   I don't feel particularly guilty.

1   I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done.

2   I feel quite guilty most of the time.

3   I feel guilty all of the time.

6. Punishment Feelings

0   I don't feel I am being punished.

1   I feel I may be punished.

2   I expect to be punished.

3   I feel I am being punished.

7. Self-Dislike

0   I feel the same about myself as ever.

1   I have lost confidence in myself.

2   I am disappointed in myself.

3   I dislike myself.

8. Self-Criticalness

0   I don't criticize or blame myself more than usual.

1   I am more critical of myself than I used to be.

2   1 criticize myself for all of my faults.

3   I blame myself for everything bad that happens.

9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes

0   I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.

1   I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out.

2   I would like to kill myself.

3   I would kill myself if I had the chance.

10. Crying

0   I don't cry anymore than I used to.

1   I cry more than I used to.

2   I cry over every little thing.

3   I feel like crying, but I can't.

11. Agitation

0   I am no more restless or wound up than usual.

1   I feel more restless or wound up than usual.

2   I am so restless or agitated that it's hard to stay still.

3   I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing something.

12. Loss of Interest

0   I have not lost interest in other people or activities.

1   I am less interested in other people or things than before.

2   I have lost most of my interest in other people or things.

3   It's hard to get interested in anything.

13. Indecisiveness

0   I make decisions about as well as ever.

1   I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual.

2   I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to.

3   I have trouble making any decisions.

14. Worthlessness

0   I do not feel I am worthless.

1   I don't consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to.

2   I feel more worthless as compared to other people.

3   I feel utterly worthless.

15. Loss of Energy

0   I have as much energy as ever.

1   I have less energy than I used to have.

2   1 don't have enough energy to do very much.

3   1 don't have enough energy to do anything.

16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern

0   I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern.

la   I sleep somewhat more than usual.

1b   I sleep somewhat less than usual.

2a   I sleep a lot more than usual.

2b   I sleep a lot less than usual.

3a   I sleep most of the day

3b   I wake up 1-2 hours early and cannot get back to sleep.

17. Irritability

0   I am no more irritable than usual.

1   I am more irritable than usual.

2   I am much more irritable than usual.

3   I am irritable all the time.

18. Changes in Appetite

0   I have not experienced any change in my appetite.

la   My appetite is somewhat less than usual.

lb   My appetite is somewhat greater than usual.

2a   My appetite is much less than before.

2b   My appetite is much greater than usual.

3a   I have no appetite at all.

3b   I crave food all the time.

19. Concentration Difficulty

0   I can concentrate as well as ever.

1   I can't concentrate as well as usual.

2   It's hard to keep my mind on anything for very long.

3   I find I can't concentrate on anything.

20. Tiredness or Fatigue

0   I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.

1   I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual.

2   I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do.

3   I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do.

21. Loss of Interest in Sex

0   I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.

1   I am less interested in sex than I used to be.

2   I am much less interested in sex now.

3   I have lost interest in sex completely.

Appendix E

Anger Response Inventory (ARI)

Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by several common reactions to those situations.

As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate fill responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times.

Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day—to—day life, followed by several common reactions to those situations.

As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times. Rate them on a scale of 1 to 5 according to the figure below:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

For example:

A. You wake early one Saturday morning It is cold and rainy outside

a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news. __1__

b) You would take the extra time to read the paper. __5__

c) You would feel disappointed that its raining. __3__

d) You would wonder why you woke up so early. __4__

In the above example, I've rated of the answers by writing a number "1" for answer (a) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday morning —— so it's not at all likely that I would do that. I wrote a "5" for answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I wrote a "3" for answer (C) because for me it's about half and half. Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't ——

it would depend on what I had planned. And I wrote a "4" for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.

<div align="center">

1---2---3---4---5

Not very much   Very much

</div>

Please do not skip any items - - rate all responses.

1. You are waiting to be served at a restaurant. Fifteen minutes have gone by, and you still haven't even received a menu.

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at the waitress or   _____
restaurant?

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

<div align="center">

l---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

</div>

e) I wouldn't leave a tip.   _____

f) I'd go get a menu myself.   _____

g) I'd just sit there and wait.   _____

h) The longer I sat there, the more I would think about how angry I was.   _____

i) I'd pound a knife on the table as the waitress walked by.   _____

j) I'd think the waitress must be new.   _____

k) I'd snap at the person sitting with me.   _____

The next question is about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial?   _____

2. You get pulled over for speeding when you were driving at the speed limit.

1---2---3---4---5

Not very much   Very much

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel, not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at the policeman?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 6 questions are about what you would actually do

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

e) I'd wonder if I was going faster than I thought.   _____

f) I'd go to court.   _____

g) Afterwards. I'd turn on the radio to take my mind off it.   _____

h) I'd take down the policeman's badge number and report him.   _____

i) I'd tell the policeman off.   _____

j) I'd pay the ticket, but I would steam over it for days.   _____

The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

k) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally?   _____

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the, policeman personally?   _____

3. You are trying to rest or read, but there are children nearby who are making a lot of noise while playing.

1---2---3---4---5

Not very much   Very much

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at the children?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do

e) I'd watch TV until I calmed down.   _____

f) I'd be angry with myself for not being able to ignore it.   _____

g) I'd think, "They're only children. They don't know better."   _____

h) I'd yell at them to shut up.   _____

i) I'd take their toys away.   _____

j) I'd snap at someone else in the house.   _____

k) I'd move to a quieter room.   _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for y personally?   _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the children,   _____
personally?

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your   _____
relationship with the children?

4. Your boss implies that you're lying when you are really telling the truth.

1---2---3---4---5

Not very much   Very much

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do.

b) How much would you feel like getting back at the boss?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

e) I'd slam something on the boss's desk.   _____

f) For the next several days, I wouldn't do any more work   _____
than I had to.

g) I'd think the boss probably just misunderstood.   _____

h) I'd get into a fist-fight with another co-worker.   _____

i) I'd think maybe I should have been clearer.   _____

j) I'd calmly explain to my boss that I was telling the truth.   _____

k) I'd walk away before I lost my temper.   _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for personally?   _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your boss,   _____
personally?

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your   _____
relationship with your boss?

5. During an argument, a friend calls you "stupid".

1---2---3---4---5

Not very much   Very much

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do.

b) How much would you feel like getting back at the friend? _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

e) I'd be so angry I would just walk away. _____

f) I'd explain that I don't like being called "stupid". _____

g) I wouldn't speak to the friend for at least a week. _____

h) I'd think it wasn't worth worrying about. _____

i) I'd shove the friend against the wall. _____

j) I'd think that the friend was having a bad day. _____

k) I'd shove the next person that got in my way. _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the friend, personally? _____

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your relationship with the friend? _____

6. Your brother borrows you car and leaves you with an empty gas tank.

1---2---3---4---5

Not very much   Very much

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel, not necessarily what you would do.

b) How much would you feel like getting back at your brother?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

e) I'd just forget about it.   _____

f) I'd borrow his car and return it with no gas.   _____

g) I wouldn't say anything, but I'd get angrier every time I thought   _____
about it

h) I'd hit him.   _____

i) I'd calmly ask him to put more gas in the car.   _____

j) I'd think it's no problem. I can just get gas next time I go out.   _____

k) When I saw the gas gauge, I'd slam my fist on the dashboard.   _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for personally?   _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your   _____
brother, personally?

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your   _____

relationship with your brother?

7. You're struggling to carry four cups of coffee to your table at a cafeteria. Someone bumps into you, spilling the coffee.

1---2---3---4---5

Not very much   Very much

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do.

b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 8 questions are about what you would actually do:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

e) I'd get some more coffee.   _____

f) I'd be angry with myself for trying to carry so many cups of coffee   _____

g) I'd kick a chair.   _____

h) I'd think I should have watched where I was going.   _____

i) I'd spill something on that person's coat on the way out.   _____

j) I'd think it must have been an accident. I'm sure the person didn't   _____

mean it.

k) I'd bump the person back and make sure he or she spilled something.   _____

l) I'd forget about it and go about my business.   _____

The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

228

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the other person? _____

8.   You see a friend being bullied by another person.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   Very Much

a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel, not necessarily what you would do

b) How much would you feel like getting back at that other person? _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____

The next 6 questions are about what you would actually do.

l---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

e) I'd snap at a bystander to do something. _____

f) I'd walk away and keep my cool. _____

g) I'd kick myself for doing nothing. _____

h) I'd make a threatening gesture. _____

i) I'd think maybe I was overreacting. _____

j) I'd take the friend's arm and get him to walk away. _____

229

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

<div align="center">

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

</div>

k) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for personally?   _____

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the other person?   _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your relationship?   _____

9. Your friend makes plans to meet you for lunch, but doesn't show up.

<div align="center">

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   **Very Much**

</div>

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do.

b) How much would you feel like getting back at the friend?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

<div align="center">

l---2---3---4---5

Not likely   **Very likely**

</div>

e) I'd wonder if I'd made a mistake about the time or the place.   _____

t) I'd think that something serious must have come up to make the friend miss lunch. _____

g) I'd stop speaking to that friend. _____

h) I'd be angry with myself for waiting around. _____

i) I'd just forget about it. _____

j) I'd snarl at the waiter. _____

k) I'd call the friend to yell at him or her for being so thoughtless. _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally?_____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the friend, personally? _____

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your relationship? _____

10. You are driving to the airport to pick up a friend and get stuck in traffic.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   **Very Much**

a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at someone or something? _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____

The next 5 questions are about what you would actually do.

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   **Very likely**

e) I'd turn on my favorite radio station to relax.   _____

f) I'd honk my horn repeatedly.   _____

g) I'd think the plane will probably be late anyway.   _____

h) I'd shove people out of my way once I got to the airport.   _____

i) I'd be angry with myself for not having left earlier.   _____

The next question is about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

j) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial?   _____

11. You are driving along at the speed limit and the person behind you is right on your bumper.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   **Very Much**

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do.

b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do.

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

e) I'd be angry at myself for letting it bother me. _____

f) I'd wonder if l was going slower than I thought. _____

g) I'd make some nasty gesture at that driver. _____

h) I'd change lanes and let the car go by. _____

i) I'd just keep going the speed limit and I'd ignore it. _____

j) I'd pound the dashboard. _____

k) I'd take down the driver's license plate number and report it to the _____

police.

The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for _____
personally?

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the _____
driver personally?

12. While arguing with your brother, he pushes you.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   Very Much

a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do.

b) How much would you feel like getting back at your brother? _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

l---2---3---4---5

Not likely   **Very likely**

e) I'd hit him as hard as I could. _____

f) I'd be angry with myself for getting into it. I should know better than to argue with him. _____

g) I'd tell my brother he'd hurt me, and ask if we could talkabout what was bothering him. _____

h) I'd walk away. _____

i) I'd hit my younger brother or sister later. _____

j) I'd think my brother was having a bad day. _____

k) I'd destroy something important to him. _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for personally? _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your brother personally? _____

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your relationship with your brother? _____

13. A co-worker makes a mistake and blames it on you.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   Very Much

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at the co-worker?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

e) I'd shove the next person that spoke to me.   _____

1) I'd corner the co-worker and yell at him or her for being such a liar.   _____

g) I'd start a rumor that would ruin that co-worker's reputation.   _____

h) I'd talk it over with the co-worker to try to clear things up.   _____

i) I'd go home early.   _____

j) I'd think about the co-worker over and over and really come to hate.   _____
the person

k) I'd wonder if maybe I d1 have something to do with it.   _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____

235

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the co-worker, _____ personally?

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your relationship with the co-worker? _____

14. You are arguing with your spouse or partner and a friend tries to interfere.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   **Very Much**

a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at the friend? _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   **Very likely**

e) I'd yell at the friend to mind their own business. _____

f) The more I'd think about the friend's interruption, the angrier I'd get. _____

g) I'd stop speaking to the friend. _____

h) I'd leave the room to calm myself down. _____

i) I'd go into the kitchen and break something. _____

j) I'd tell the friend I appreciate the concern, but I'd like to keep this between me and my partner. _____

k) I'd decide it's OK if the friend wants to put in a word or two. _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the friend,   _____
personally?

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your   _____
relationship with the friend?

**15. You are walking along on a rainy day, and a car speeds past, splashing
you with muddy water.**

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   **Very Much**

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do

b) How much would you feel like getting back at the driver?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   **Very likely**

e) I'd take down the license plate number and report the driver for   _____

reckless driving.

f) I'd figure it was just an accident. The driver didn't see me.   _____

g) I'd go home. wash up, and change clothes.   _____

h) I'd just shrug it off. Worse things happen.   _____

i) I'd make a joke about it being "just one of those days".   _____

j) I'd throw down my umbrella.   _____

237

k) I'd be furious with myself for walking so close to the road.   _____

The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you, personally?   _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the driver personally?   _____

16. You find out a "friend" was talking about you behind your back.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   **Very Much**

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would thy:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her?   _____

c) How much would you feel. like fixing the situation?   _____

 d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   **Very likely**

e) I'd slam the door in the friend's face next time he or she came by.   _____

f) I'd do something I enjoy to get my mind off of it.   _____

g) I'd tell all our friends this person can't be trusted.   _____

h) I'd think maybe the friend just slipped, and the whole thing was blown _____
out of proportion.

i) I wouldn't really care what he or she thinks. It wasn't a good friend _____
anyway

j) I'd ask the friend why we couldn't talk to each other about things that _____

are bothering us.

k) I'd take it out on another friend by being short-tempered. _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the friend, _____
personally?

n)Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you _____
relationship?

**17. You find out from your boss that a fellow co-worker has complained
about your work.**

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   **Very Much**

a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at the co-worker? _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

e) I'd try to look calm, but inside I'd be furious for a long time. _____

f) I'd think that the co-worker didn't mean to cause trouble. _____

g) I'd make a point to tell other co-workers about what he or she had done. _____

h) I'd shove the co-worker up against a wall. _____

i) Once alone, I'd throw something across the room. _____

j) I'd calmly discuss the situation with the co-worker and ask him/her to speak with me first when there are complaints. _____

k) I'd just ignore the situation and go about work as usual. _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or be for the co-worker personally? _____

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your relationship? _____

18. You are waiting in line for a movie and someone cuts in front of you.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   Very Much

a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her? _____

240

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   **Very likely**

e) I'd ask the manager to speak to the person.   _____

f) I'd tell the other people in the line how rude the person was.   _____

g) I'd just ignore it.   _____

h) I'd snap at the ticket clerk.   _____

i) I'd remind myself that it's no big deal. There will be plenty of seats.   _____

j) I wouldn't say anything, but I'd be so angry I couldn't enjoy the movie. _____

k) I'd shove the person back out of line.   _____

The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally?   _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for that person?   _____

19. Someone you have just met treats you like you are not good enough.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   **Very Much**

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at that person?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   **Very likely**

e) I'd make a nasty gesture in the person's face. _____

f) I'd tell everyone what a snob that person is. _____

g) I'd calmly explain that I didn't appreciate how he or she was treating me. _____

h) I'd excuse myself from the conversation. _____

i) I'd think the person doesn't realize how he or she is coming across. _____

j) I'd hit the next person I saw. _____

k) I'd wonder if I was being too sensitive. _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for that person? _____

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the relationship? _____

20. A person who has kept you waiting before is late again for an appointment.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   **Very Much**

a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

l---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

e) I'd ask the person to call next time he or she is going to be late.   _____

f) I wouldn't show up for our next appointment.   _____

g) I'd be furious with myself for waiting.   _____

h) I'd kick something near by.   _____

i) I'd read something to calm down.   _____

j) I'd wonder if I'd made a mistake about the time of our   _____

appointment.

k) I'd yell at the person for being so inconsiderate.   _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you   _____
personally?

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for that person?   _____

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the   _____
relationship?

21. You see an older person pushed aside by someone in a hurry.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   Very Much

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at that person?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

l---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

e) I'd talk loudly about how I hate people who push and shove.   _____

f) I'd yell at the person and call him or her names.   _____

g) I'd think it was just a little bump.   _____

h) I'd make sure the older person was all right.   _____

i) I'd trip the next person that ran by in a hurry.   _____

j) I'd be steamed all day about the incident.   _____

k) I'd just ignore it.   _____

The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   Beneficial

l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for that person?   _____

22. A neighbor's dog barks all night while you are trying to sleep.

1---2---3---4---5

Not Very Much   **Very Much**

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at someone or something? _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

l---2---3---4---5

Not likely   **Very likely**

e) I'd go to work the next day and be grumpy with my fellow workers.   _____

f) I'd just lay there until I fell asleep.   _____

g) I'd think I'm just a light sleeper.   _____

h) I'd complain to the other neighbors about the problem with the dog.   _____

i) The more the dog barked, the more it would get on my nerves and the   _____
angrier I would get.

j) I'd ask the neighbor to try to keep the dog quiet during the night.   _____

k) I'd call the neighbor and yell at him to shut his dog up.   _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you   _____
personally?

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the neighbor   _____
personally?

245

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the relationship?   _____

23. You tell a friend about a problem and your friend doesn't take it seriously.

<div align="center">

1---2---3---4---5

</div>

Not Very Much		**Very Much**

a) How angry would you be in this situation?   _____

The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you would do:

b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her?   _____

c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation?   _____

d) How much would you feel like letting off steam?   _____

The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:

<div align="center">

l---2---3---4---5

</div>

Not likely	**Very likely**

e) I'd be nice to the friend but my anger would build inside.   _____

f) I'd pound on the wall.   _____

g) I'd never speak to the friend again.   _____

h) I'd grab the friend and force him or her out the door.   _____

 i) I'd think maybe the friend is making light of this problem to cheer me up.   _____

j) I'd make a joke to lighten up the conversation.   _____

k) I'd tell my problem to someone else who would take it seriously.   _____

The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think things would turn out in the long-run?

1---2---3---4---5

Harmful   **Beneficial**

l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for personally?   _____

m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the friend,   _____
personally?

n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your   _____
relationship with the friend?

Appendix F

Test of Self-Conscious Acts (TOSCA)

Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day—to—day life, followed by several common reactions to those situations.

As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times. Rate them on a scale of 1 to 5 according to the figure below:

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

For example:

A. You wake early one Saturday morning It is cold and rainy outside

a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news.	1
b) You would take the extra time to read the paper.	5
c) You would feel disappointed that it's raining.	3
d) You would wonder why you woke up so early.	4

In the above example, I've rated of the answers by writing a number "1" for answer (a) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday morning —— so it's not at all likely that I would do that. I wrote a "5" for answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I wrote a "3" for answer (C) because for me it's about half and half. Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't —— it would depend on what I had planned. And I wrote a "4" for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.

Please do not skip any items —— rate all responses.

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch At 5 o'clock, you realize they've stood you up:

a) You would think: "I'm inconsiderate."   _____

b) You would think: "Well, they'll understand."   _____

C)You would try to make it up to him as soon as   _____

possible.

d) You would think: "My boss distracted me just   _____

before lunch."

2. You break something at work and then hide it.

a) You would think: "This is making me anxious. I   _____

need to either fix it or get someone else to."

b) You would think about quitting.   _____

c) You would think: "A lot of things aren't made very   _____

well these days."

d) You would think: "It was only an accident."   _____

3. You are out with friends one evening and you're feeling especially witty and attractive. Your best friend's spouse seems to particularly en-joy your company

a) You would think: "I should have been aware of what

my best friend is feeling."   _____

b) You would feel happy with your appearance and personality,   _____

c) You would feel pleased to have made such a good impression. _____

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   **Very likely**

d) You would think your best friend should pay attention to his/her   _____

spouse.

e) You would probably avoid eye-contact for a long time.   _____

4. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project and it turns out badly

a) You would feel incompetent.   _____

b) You would think: "There are never enough hours in the day."   _____

c) You would feel: "I deserve to be reprimanded."   _____

d) You would think: "What's done is done."   _____

5. You make a mistake at work and find out a co—worker is blamed for the error

a) You would think the company did not like the co—worker.   _____

b) You would think: "Life is not fair."   _____

c) You would keep quiet and avoid the co—worker.   _____

d) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation.   _____

6. For several days put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you
make the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well.

a) You would think: "1 guess I'm more persuasive than I thought."   _____

b) You would regret that you put it off.   _____

c) You would feel like a coward.   _____

d) You would think: "I did a good job."   _____

e) You would think you shouldn't have to make calls you feel

pressured into.   _____

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

7. You make a commitment to diet but when you pass the bakery a dozen donuts

a) Next meal, you would eat celery to make up for it.   _____

b) You would think: "They looked too good to pass by."   _____

c) You would feel disgusted with your lack of will power and

self-control.   _____

d) You would think: "Once wont matter."   _____

8. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face:

a) You would feel inadequate that you can't even throw a ball.   _____

b) You would think maybe your friend needs more practice at catching.   _____

c) You would think: "It was just an accident."   _____

d) You would apologize and make sure your friend was okay.   _____

9. You have recently moved away from your family and everyone has been very helpful A few times needed to borrow money but you paid back as soon as you could

a) You would feel immature.   _____

b) You would think: "I sure ran into some bad luck."   _____

c) You would return the favor as quickly as you could.   _____

d) You would think: "I am a trustworthy person."   _____

e) You would be proud that you repaid your debts.   _____

10. You are driving down the road and you hit a small animal

a) You would think the animal shouldn't have been on the road.   _____

b) You would think: "I'm terrible."   _____

c) You would feel: "Well, it was an accident." _____

d) You would probably think it over several times wondering if you could have

avoided it. _____

1---2---3---4---5
Not likely   Very likely

11. You walk out of an exam thinking did extremely well did poorly

a) You would think: "Well, it's just a test." _____

b) You would think: "The instructor doesn't like me." _____

c) You would think: "1 should have studied harder." _____

d) You would feel stupid. _____

12. You and a group of co-workers worked very hard on a project out for a bonus
because the project was such a success

a) You would feel the boss is rather short-sighted. _____

b) You would feel alone and apart from your colleagues. _____

c) You would feel your hard work had paid off. _____

d) You would feel competent and proud of yourself. _____

e) You would feel you should not accept it. _____

13. While out with a group of friends make fun of a friend who's not there

a) You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless." _____

b) You would feel small, "like a rat." _____

c) You would think that perhaps that friend should _____

have been there to defend himself/herself. _____

d) You would apologize and talk about that person's good points, _____

14. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on you and your boss criticizes

a) You would think your boss should have been clearer about what

was expected of you.   _____

1---2---3---4---5

Not likely   Very likely

b) You would feel like you wanted to hide.   _____

C) You would think: "I should have recognized the problem and done

a better job."   _____

d) You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect."   _____

15. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children It turns out to be frustrating and time—consuming work You think seriously about quitting but then y see how happy the kids are.

a) You would feel selfish and you'd think you are basically lazy.   _____

b) You would feel you were forced into doing something you did

not want to do.   _____

c) You would think: "I should be more concerned about people who

are less fortunate."   _____

d) You would feel great that you had helped others.   _____

e) You would feel very satisfied with yourself.   _____

Appendix G

Demographics Form

Number _____

Demographic Information

GENDER   Male   Female

AGE _____

ETHNICITY _____

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION _____

Appendix H

Descriptive Statistics of Variables Excluded from the Study

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
TOSCA			
Detachment	31.56	5.39	128
Pride in Self	20.99	2.54	128
Pride in Actions	21.18	5.76	128
ARI			
Anger Level	85.39	9.54	128
Physical Aggress	66.42	11.22	128
Verbal Aggress	71.51	6.32	128
Reappraisal	66.64	11.35	128
Projected Outcomes			
For Self	66.67	11.43	128
For Other	64.56	10.99	128
For Relationship	43.94	8.85	128

Bibliography

Abu-Lughod, L., & Lutz, C. (1990) Introduction: Emotion, discourse, and the politics of

    Everyday life. In Abu-Lughod, L, & Lutz, C. (Ed.s) *Language and the politics of*

    emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Albers, R.H. (1995) *Shame: A faith perspective*. New York: Haworth Pastoral Press.

Aldin, A.K. (1996). Human responsibility in, to, and for nature. *Contemporary*

    Philosophy, XI, 232-238

Allan, S., Gilbert, P., & Goss, K. (1994). An exploration of shame measures. *Personality*

    and Individual Differences, 17 (5), 719-722.

Ansbacher, H.L, & Ansbacher, R.R (1956). *The individual psychology of Alfred Adler*.

    New York: Harper & Row

Arendt, Hannah (1959). *The human condition*. New York: Anchor Books.

Augsburger, David (1986). *Pastoral counseling across cultures*. Louisville, KY:

    Westminster John Knox Press.

Averill, J.R. (1980). Emotion and anxiety: Sociocultural, biological, and psychological

    determinants. In A.O. Rorty (ed.) *Explaining emotions*. Berkeley, CA: University

    of California Press.

Averill, J. R. (1985). The social construction of emotion: With special reference to love.

    In Gergen, K.J., & Davis, K.E. (Ed.s), *The social construction of the Person*. New

    York: Springer-Verlag.

Averill, J.R. & More, Thomas A. (2000). Happiness. In Lewis, M., & Havilland-Jones, Jeannette (Ed.s*) Handbook of Emotions, 2ⁿᵈ Edition*. New York, Guilford Press.

Ax, A.F. (1953) The physiological differentiation between fear and anger in humans. Psychosomatic Medicine, 15. In Cornelius, R.C., *The Science of Emotion*. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Battenhouse, R. (1979). *A companion to the study of St. Augustine*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Press.

Baumeister, Roy F. (1991). *Escaping the self: Alcoholism, spirituality, masochism, and other flights from the burden of selfhood.* New York, Basic Books.

Baumeister, R.F., Stillwell, A.M., & Heatherton, T.F. (1995) Interpersonal Aspects of Guilt: Evidence from narrative studies. In J.P. Tangney & K.W. Fischer (Eds.) *Self conscious emotions: shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*. (Pp. 255-273) New York: Guilford Press

Bellah, Robert, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, Ann, & Tipton, Steven (1985). *Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life*. New York: Perennial Books.

Bellah, Robert N. (1991). *The good society*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Bellah, Robert N. (1987) The Quest for the self: Individualism, morality, politics. In *Interpretive social science: A second look*. Rabinow, P & Sullivan W. (Eds.) Berkeley CA: University of California Press

Bell, Daniel. (1995). A communitarian critique of authoritarianism. *Society, 32*, 39-43.

Benedict, R. (1946). *The chrysanthemum and the sword: Patterns of Japanese culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Berecz, John and Helm, Herbert (1998) Shame: The underside of Christianity, *Journal of Psychology and Christianity*. 17 (1),

Bettencourt, A.B., & Dorr, N. (1997). Collective self-esteem as a mediator of the relationship between allocentrism and subjective well-being. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23*

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. (1955) *Ethics*. London: SCM Press.

Bowlby, John. (1969). *Attachment and Loss, Vol. 1: Attachment*. New York: Basic Books

Bowlby, John. (1990). *Charles Darwin: A new life*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Braithwaite, J. (1993). Shame and modernity, *British Journal of Christianity, 33 (1)*,

Bronheim, H.E. (1998). *Body and soul: The role of object relations in faith, shame, and healing*. Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson, Inc.

Broucek, Francis. (1991). Shame *and the self*. New York: Guilford Press.

Broucek, Francis. (1982). Shame and its relationship to early narcissistic developments, *International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 60,* 311-316

Campos, J.J., & Barnett, K.C. (1984) Toward a new understanding of emotions and development. In Izard, C.E., Kagan, J., & Zajonc, R. (Ed.s), *Emotions, cognition, and behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Capps, Donald. (1992). The depleted self: Sin and narcissism. Princeton: Princeton University Press

258

Cole, M., & Wertsch, J.V. (1999). Beyond the individual-social antimony in discussions of Piaget and Vygotsky. In J.V. Wertsch (Ed.), *Voices of the mind: A sociocultural approach to mediated action*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

Cornelius, Randolph R. (1996) *The science of emotion*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Cosmides, Leda & Tooby, John. (2000). Evolutionary psychology and the emotions. In M. Lewis & Haviland-Jones, J (Ed.s) *Handbook of Emotions, 2nd Edition*. New York: Guilford Press.

Cushman, Phillip. (1990). Why the self is empty: *American Psychologist*

Crandall, J.E. (1975). A scale for social interest. *Journal of Individual Psychology, 31,* 187-195.

Damasio, A.R. (1994) *Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain*. New York: Grosset/Putnam.

Doi, T. (1962). Amae: A key concept for understanding Japanese personality structure. In R.J. Smith and R.K. Beardsley (Ed.s), *Japanese Culture: Its development and characteristics*. Chicago: Aldine Press.

Doi, T. (1986). *The anatomy of the self*. Tokyo: Kodansha International.

Dolan-Henderson, Susan (1994) *Morality, autonomy, and community: The moral self*. Doctoral Dissertation in Religion. Atlanta, GA: Emory University, UMI Press.

Dunne, Joseph. (1995). Beyond sovereignty and deconstruction; the storied self. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*. 21:5/6

Ekman, P. (1992). Are there basic emotions? *Psychological Review, 99*.

Ekman, P. (1986). A new pan-cultural facial expression of emotion. *Motivation and Emotion, 10*.

Etzioni, A. (1996). *The new golden rule: Community and morality in a democratic society*. New York: Basic Books.

Flavell, John H., Miller, Patricia, & Miller, Scott (1993). *Cognitive Development, 3rd Edition*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Fridja, N.H. (1988). The laws of emotion. *American Psychologist, 43*.

Gaines, S.O., Barajas, L., Hicks, D., Lyde, M., Takahishi, Y., Yum, N., Garcia, B.F., Marelich, W.D., Bledsoe, K.L., Steers, W.N., Henderson, M.C., Granrose, C.S., Rios, D.I., Farris, K.R., & Page, M.S. (1997) Links between race/ethnicity and cultural values as mediated by racial/ethnic identity and moderated by gender. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72*

Gay, P. (1987). *A godless Jew: Freud, atheism, and the making of psychoanalysis*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Gelfland, M.J., Triandis, H.C., and Chan, D. K.S. (1996).Individualism versus collectivism or versus authoritarianism? *European Journal of Social Psychology, 26*, s

Gergen, Kenneth. (1991). *The saturated self*: *Dilemmas of identity in contemporary life*.

New York: Basic Books.

Gilbert, P., & Andrews, B. (1998). *Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Glendon, M.A. (1991). *Rights talk: The impoverishment of political discourse*. New York: Free Press.

Goffman, Erving (1970) *Relations in public*. New York: Harper Colophon   (1967) *Interaction ritual*. New York: Anchor Books (1963) *Stigma*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall

Goldberg, Carl. (1996). *Speaking with the devil: A dialogue with evil*. New York: Viking Press.

Golomb, Elan. (1992). *Trapped in the mirror: Adult children of narcissists in their struggle for self*. New York: Quill Press, an Imprint of William Morrow & Co.

Good, B., & Delvecchio-Good, M. (1997). *Medicine, rationality, and experience: An anthropological prospective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Good, J.A. (1999) *Shame, images of god and the cycle of violence*. New York: University Press of America.

Goode, Erica (2000). How culture molds habits of thought. *The New York Times; Tuesday, August 8, 2000.*

Gramzow, R. & Tangney, J.P. (1992). Proneness to shame and the narcissistic

personality. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18,* pp. 369-376.

Grant, G.P. (1985). *English speaking justice*. Notre Dame, IN.: Notre Dame University

Press.

Gudykunst, W.B. (Ed.) (1993). *Communication in Japan and the United States*. Albany:

State University of New York Press.

Guttman, A. (1992). Introduction and commentary. In C. Taylor, *Multiculturalism and

the politics of recognition*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ha, F. (1995). Shame in asian and western cultures. *American Behavioral Scientist, 38,*

Haas, W.S. (1956). *The destiny of the mind: East and West*. New York: Macmillan.

Habermas, J. (1990). *Moral consciousness and communicative action*. Trans. By

Christian Lenhardt & Sherry Weber Nicholson. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1984). *The theory of communicative action*. Trans. by Thomas McCarthy.

Boston: Beacon Press.

Harder, D.W. (1990). Additional construct validity evidence for the Harder personal

feelings questionnaire measure of shame and guilt proneness. *Psychological

Reports, 67,* 26-35 (1995) Shame and guilt assessment and relationships of

shame-and guilt-proneness to psychopathology. In J.P Tangney (Ed.), *Self-

conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride*

(pp. 368-392). New York, New York: Guilford Press

Harre, Rom (1997)   Are Emotions Significant in Psychology only as Motives? *Journal*

> *for the Theory of Social Behavior* 27:4 1996) (*The social construction of*

> *emotions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heidegger, M. (1977). *Basic writings: nine key essays plus the introduction to Being and*

> *Time*. (Ed.) Krell, D.F. New York: Harper & Row.

Hibbard, Stephen (1993) Adult Children of Alcoholics: Narcissism, shame, and the

> differential effects of paternal and maternal alcoholism. *Psychiatry*. 56,

Hibbard, S. (1992). Narcissism, shame, masochism, and object relations: An exploratory

> correlational study. *Psychoanalytic Psychology, 9*. (4) 489-508.

Ho, David Y.F. (1995). Selfhood and identity in Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and

> Hinduism: Contrasts with the west. *Journal for the theory of social behavior, 25*

> (2).

Ho, David Y.F (1994), Filial Piety, authoritarian moralism, and cognitive conservatism.

> *Genetic, Social, and General Psychology,*

Ho, David Y.F. (1993). Relational orientation in Asian social psychology. In Kim, U., &

> Berry, J. (Ed.s), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural*

> *context*. Newberry Park, CA: Sage Publishing.

Hoffman, M.L. (1982) Development of Prosocial Motivation: Empathy and Guilt. In N.

> Eisenberg-Berg (Ed.) *Development of Prosocial Behavior* (pp. 281-313) New

> York: Academic Press.

263

Hofstede, G., & Bond, M.H. (1984) Hofstede's culture dimensions: An independent

validation using Rokeach's value survey. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,*

15 (4)

Husserl, Edmund (1962) *Ideas: A general introduction to phenomenology*. New York:

Collier Books.

Izard, C. E. (1977) *Human emotions*. New York: Plenum.

Izard, E. E. (1992). Basic emotions, relations among emotions, and emotion-cognition

relations. *Psychological Review, 99*.

Kagitcibasi, C., & Berry, J.W. (1989) Cross-cultural psychology: Current research and

trends. *Annual Review of Psychology, 40,*

Karen, Robert (1992) Shame. *The Atlantic Monthly*. February 1992,

Kaufman, G. (1996). *The psychology of shame: 2ⁿᵈ Edition*. New York: Springer.

Keltner, D., & Buswell, B.N. (1996). Evidence for the distinctness of embarrassment,

shame and guilt: A study of recalled antecedents and facial expressions of

emotion. *Cognition and Emotion, 10* (2).

Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi and Yoon (1994) *Individualism and Collectivism:*

Theory, Method, and Applications. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications.

Kitayama, S., Markus, H.R., Matsumoto, H., & Norasakkunkit, V. (1995). Culture, self,

and emotions: A cultural perspective on "self-conscious" emotions. In J.P.

Tangney & K.W. Fischer (Ed.s), *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of*

shame, guilt, embarrassment a*nd pride*. New York: Guilford Press.

Kohut, Heinz. (1984) *How does analysis cure?* Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press.

Kohut, Heinz. (1977). *The restoration of the self*. New York: International Universities
Press.

Kohut, Heinz. (1971). *The analysis of the self.* New York: International Universities
Press.

Lasch, C. (1978). *The culture of narcissism*. New York: Norton.

Lasch, C. (1984). *The minimal self*. New York: Norton.

Lazarus, R.S. (1991) *Emotion and adaptation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lazarus, R.S. & Lazarus, B.N. (1994). *Passion and reason: Making sense of our
emotions*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Lebra, T.S. (1976). *Japanese patterns of behavior*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press

Lebra, T.S. (1984) *Japanese women: Constraint and fulfillment*. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press.

LeDoux, J.E. (1995). In search of an emotional system in the brain: Leaping from fear to
emotion to consciousness. In Gazzanige, M.S. (Ed.), *The cognitive neurosciences*.
Cambridge MA: MIT Press

Lewis, H.B. (1988) .The role of shame in symptom formation In M. Clynes & J.
Panskepp (Eds.), *Emotions and Psychopathology*. New York: Plenum Press

Lewis, H.B. (1987). *The role of shame in symptom formation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
Press.

Lewis, H.B. (1971). *Shame and guilt in neurosis*. New York: International Universities Press.

Lewis, Michael (2000). Self-Conscious emotions: Embarrassment, pride, shame, and guilt. In Lewis, M., & Haviland-Jones, J. (Ed.s), *Handbook of emotions, Second Edition*. New York: Guilford Press.

Lewis, Michael (1999).On the development of personality. In Pervin, L., & Oliver, P. (Ed.s), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research, 2nd Edition*. New York: Guilford.

Lewis, Michael (1999). The role of the self in cognition and emotion. In Dalgleish, T. & Power, M. (Ed.s), *Handbook of cognition and emotion*. Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons.

Lewis, Michael (1998) Altering fate; Why the past does not predict the future. *Psychological Inquiry, 9*.

Lewis, Michael (1997) The self in self-conscious emotions. In Snodgrass, J., & Thompson, R., (Ed.s), *The self across psychology: Self-Recognition, self-awareness, and the self concept*. New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Science.

Lewis, Michael (1992). *Shame: The exposed self*. New York: Free Press.

Lewis, Michael (1992b) Self-conscious emotions and the development of self. In Shapiro, T., & Emde, R. (Ed.s) Affect*: Psychoanalytic perspectives*. Madison, CT: International Universities Press.

266

Lewis, Michael (1991) Ways of knowing: Objective self-awareness or consciousness. *Developmental Review, 11*

Lewis, Michael (1990) The development of intentionality and the role of consciousness. *Psychological Inquiry, 1*.

Liem, R. (1997). Shame and guilt among first- and second-generation Asian Americans and European Americans. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 28* (4),

Lutwak, N., & Ferrari, J.R. (1996). Moral affect and cognitive processes: Differentiating shame from guilt among men and women. *Personality and Individual Differences, 21* (6), 891-896.

Lynd, H. (1958). *On shame and the search for identity*. New York: Harcourt Brace & Janovovich.

Mahler, M.S., Pine, F. & Bergman, A. (1975). *The psychological birth of the human infant*. New York: Basic Books.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. (1981). *After virtue*. London: Duckworth.

Manaster, G.J., & Corsini, R.J. (1995). *Individual psychology*. Chicago: Adler School of Professional Psychology.

Manaster, G.J., Painter, Genevieve, Deutsch, D., & Overholt, B.J. (1977) *Alfred Adler: As We Remember Him*. (Ed.s). Chicago: North American Society of Adlerian Psychology

Markus, H.R., and Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and self. *Psychological Review 98*.

Markus, H.R., and Kitayama, S. (1994). The cultural construction of self and emotion: Implications for social behavior. In S. Kitayama, & H.R. Markus (Ed.s) *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence*. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.

Marinoff, L. (1999). *Plato not Prozac: Applying philosophy to everyday problems*. New York: HarperCollins.

Matsumoto, D. (1994). Culture and Emotion. In L.L. Adler, & U.P. Gielen (Ed.s) *Cross cultural topics in psychology*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Maslow, Abraham (1973). *Dominance, self esteem, self-actualization: Germinal papers of Abraham Maslow*. R.J. Lowry (Ed.) Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.

May, H.G., and Metzger, B.M. (1977). *The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mead, M. (1967). *Cooperation and competition among primitive peoples*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Menon, U., & Schweder, R.A., (1994). Kali's tongue: Cultural psychology and the power of shame in Orissa, India. In S. Kitayama, & H.R. Markus (Ed.s) *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence*. Washington, D.C.: American psychological Association.

Miller, P. (1993). *Theories off developmental psychology*. New York: W.H. Freeman.

Miller, Susan Beth. (1996). *Shame in context*. Hillsdale, N.J.; Analytic Press.

Miller, Susan Beth (1985). *The shame experience*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press.

Morris, C. (1987). *The discovery of the individual: 1050-1200*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Morrison, Andrew (1996) *The culture of shame*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Morrison, Andrew (1989). *Shame: The underside of narcissism*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Morson, G.S & Emerson C. (1990)   Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics

Nathanson, D. (1992). *Shame and pride: Affect, sex, and the birth of the self*. New York: W.W. Norton & Sons.

Niedenthal, P., Tangney, J.P., & Gavanski, I. (1994). "If Only I weren't" Versus "If Only I Hadn't": Distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67*, 585-595.

Paranjpe, A.C. (1988). A personality theory according to Vedanta. In A.C. Paranjpe, D.Y.F. Ho, & R.W. Reiber (Ed.s), *Asian contributions to psychology*. New York: Praeger.

Pattison, Neil (2000). *Shame: Theology, psychology and therapy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pennebaker, J.W. (1995). Emotion, Disclosure, and Health: An Overview. In Pennebaker, J.W. (Ed.) *Emotions, disclosure & health*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press.

Pembroke, Neil E. (1998). Toward a Shame-Based Theology of Evangelism. *Journal Of Psychology and Christianity. 17*(1),

Plutchik, R. (1984). Emotions: A general psychoevolutionary approach. In Scherer, K.R.,

    & Ekman, *Approaches to emotion*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Press.

Ratanaspiripong, P.P. (1996). *Effect of culture and religious beliefs on self-conscious*

    emotions *and depression: Acculturation, self-construal, belief in grace, shame,*

    guilt, and depression among Asian-American and European American

    Protestants. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Berkeley CA: Wright Institute

Rathvon, N. & Holmstrom, R.W. (1996). An MMPI-2 portrait of narcissism. *Journal of*

    Personality Assessment, 66 (1) 1-19.

Reizler, K. (1943). Comment on the social psychology of shame." *American Journal of*

    Sociaology, 48, 457-465

Retzinger, S.M. (1989). Marital Conflict: The role of emotion. *Journal of Family*

    Violence, 6 (1)

Retzinger, S.M. (1995). Identifying shame and anger in discourse. *American Behavioral*

    Scientist, 38, 1104-1113.

Rosaldo, R. (1989). *Culture and truth: The remaking of social analysis*. Boston: Beacon.

Reddy, W.M. (1999). Emotional Liberty: Politics and History in the Anthropology of

    Emotions. *Cultural Anthropology*. 14 (2),

Richardson, Fowers and Guignon. (1999). Re-Envisioning psychology: Moral

    dimensions of theory and practice. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers

Richardson, F.C. (1989). Freedom and commitment in modern psychotherapy. *Journal of*

    Integrative and Eclectic Psychotherapy, 8 (4),

Richardson, F.C. (1994). Social theory and values: A hermeneutic perspective. *Theory and Psychology, 4* (2),

Richardson, F.C. (1997). *Overcoming fragmentation in psychology: A hermeneutic approach*. Unpublished manuscript.

Roberts, T.A., & Pennebaker, J.W. (1995) Gender differences in perceiving internal state. In Zanna, M. (Eds.) *Advances in experimental social psychology,* 27. Academic Press: Orlando Florida.

Roseman, I.J. (1984). Cognitive determinants of emotion: A structural theory. In P. Shaver (Ed.) *Review of Personality and Social Psychology* (Vol. 5). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Roseman, I.J. (1991). Appraisal determinants of discrete emotions. *Cognition and Emotion, 5*.

Ryff, C.D. (1989). Happiness is everything or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57,* 1069-1081.

Sampson, E. (1988). The debate on individualism   *American Psychologist, 43.*

Sandel, Michael (1982). *Liberalism and the limits of justice*. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sandel, Michael (1984). Justice and the good. In Michael Sandel (Ed.) *Liberalism and its critics*. New York: New York University Press.

Sandel, Michael (1996). *Democracy's discontent: America in search of a public philosophy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sanftner, J.L., Barlow, D.H., Marschall, D.E., & Tangney, J.P. (1997) The relation of shame and guilt to eating disorders symptomology. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology.*

Sarbin, T.R. (1986). *Narrative Psychology: The storied nature of human conduct.* New York: Praeger.

Sardello, R. (1974). A phenomenological approach to development: The contributions of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. *Human Development, 17,* 401-423.

Sartre, J-P. (1956). *Being and nothingness*. New York: Washington Square Press.

Sartre, J-P. (1975). *The emotions: Outline of a theory*. Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press.

Scheff, T.J. (1987). The shame-rage spiral: A case study in an interminable quarrel. In H.B. Lewis *The role of shame in symptom formation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawerence Earlbaum Press.

Scheff, T.J. (1991). *Emotions and violence: Shame and rage in destructive conflicts*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Scheff, T.J. (1995) Shame and related emotions: An overview. *American Behavioral Scientist, 38* 1053-1059.

Scherer, K.R., & Wallbott, H.G. (1994). Evidence for universality and cultural variation of differential emotion response patterning. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66.*

Schwarz, S.H. (1994). Beyond individualism and collectivism: New cultural dimensions of values. In Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi and Yoon.

Schwarz, S.H. (1994) *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications*. Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage Publications.

Schweder, R.A., & LeVine, R.A. (1984) *Culture theory: Essays on mind, self, and emotion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shand, J.S. (1993). *Philosophy and philosophers: An introduction to Western philosophy*. New York: Penguin USA.

Shaver, P.R., Wu, S., & Schwartz, J.C. (1992). Cross-cultural similarities and differences in emotion and its representation: A prototype approach. In M.S. Clark (Ed.), *Review of personality and social psychology* (Vol. 13). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publishing.

Solomon, R.C. (1997)   Beyond Ontology: Ideation, Phenomenology and the Cross Cultural Study of Emotion. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*. 27 (2/3),

Solomon, R.C. (1993) *The passions: Emotions and the meaning of life*. Indianapolis IN: Hackett Publishing Co.

Schneider, Carl (1992). Shame*, Exposure and Privacy*. New York: W.W. Norton & Sons.

Smith, P.B., & Bond, M.H. (1994). *Social psychology across cultures*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Stipek, D. (1998). Differences between Americans and Chinese in the Circumstances

Evoking pride, shame, and guilt. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29* (5),

617-629.

Tangney, J.P., & Fischer, K.W. (1995). *Self conscious emotions: The psychology of

shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*. New York: Guilford Press.

Tangney, J.P. (1990). Assessing individual differences in proneness to shame and guilt:

Development of the self conscious affect and attribution inventory. *Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 59,* 102-111.

Tangney, J.P. (1991) Moral affect: The good, the bad, and the ugly. *Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 61,* 598-607.

Tangney, J.P., Wagner, P.E., Fletcher, C., & Gramzow, R. (1992a). *The Test of Self-

Conscious Affect*. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press

Tangney, J.P., Wagner, P., & Gramzow, R. (1992b) Proneness to shame, proneness to

guilt, and psychopathology. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103,* 469-478.

Tangney, J.P. (1992c). Situational determinants of shame and guilt in young adulthood.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18 (issue),

Tangney, J.P. (1995). Recent advances in the empirical study of shame and guilt.

American Behavioral Scientist, 38, 1132-1154

Tangney, J.P. (1995) Shame and guilt in interpersonal relationships. In J.P. Tangney &

K.W. Fischer (Eds.) *Self Conscious Emotions: Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and

Pride*. (pp.114-139) New York: Guilford Press.

Tangney, J.P., Burggraf, S.A., & Wagner, P.E. (1995). Shame proneness, guilt proneness

and psychological symptoms. In J.P. Tangney & K.W. Fischer (Eds.) *Self*

conscious emotions: Shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride. (pp. 343-367). New

York: Guilford Press.

Tangney, J.P., Miller, R.S., Flicker, L., & Barlow, D.H. (1996) Are shame, guilt and

embarrassment distinct emotions? An analysis of participant ratings. *Journal of*

Personality and Social Psychology

Tangney, J.P., Wagner, P.E., Barlow, D.H., Marschall, D.E., & Gramzow, R. (1996) The

relation of shame and guilt to anger and self reported aggression. *Journal of*

Personality and Social Psychology

Tavis, T.M. (1990) *Social interest: A critique of current models*. Unpublished doctoral

dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin.

Taylor, C. (1995). *Philosophical arguments*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Taylor, C. (1992). *Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition*. Princeton: Princeton

University Press.

Taylor, C. (1991). *The ethics of authenticity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Taylor, C. (1991) The Dialogical self. *The interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science,*

Culture. Hiley, Bohman and Shusterman, (Ed.s) Ithaca: Cornell University Press

Taylor, C. (1989) *Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity*. Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press.

Taylor, C. (1988) The Moral Topography of the Self. *Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory: Interpretive Perspectives on Personality, Psychotherapy, and Psychopathology*. Messer, Sass and Woolfolk, (Ed.s)

Taylor, C. (1987). Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, In *Interpretive social science: A second look*. Rabinow, P. & Sullivan W. (Eds.)

Taylor, C. (1985). *Human agency and language: Philosophical papers 1*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, C. (1985). *Philosophy and the human sciences: Philosophical papers 2*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tocqueville, Alexis de (1969). *Democracy in America*. New York: Anchor Press.

Tomkins, S. (1963) *Affect, imagery, and consciousness, Vol. 2. The negative affects*. New York: Springer Publishing.

Trafimow, D., Triandis, HC., & Got, S.G. (1991). Some tests of distinction between the private and the collectivistic self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60*

Triandis, H.C., Chen, X. P., & Chan, D.K.S. (1998). Scenarios for the measurement of individualism and collectivism. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29* (2).

Triandis, H.C., Chen, X. P., & Chan, D.K.S. (1994). Major cultural syndromes and emotion. In S. Kitayama & H.R. Markus (Ed.s), *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence*. (pp. 285-306) Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.

Triandis, H.C. (1995). *Individualism and collectivism*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Triandis, H.C., McCusker, C., & Hui, C.H. (1990). Multimethod probes of individualism and collectivism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59*

Truett-Anderson, W. (1997). *The future of the self: Inventing the postmodern person*. New York: Jeremy Tarcher/Putnam.

Tu, W.M. (1985*) Confucian thought: Selfhood as creative transformation*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Wallbott, H.G., & Scherer, K.R. (1995). How universal and specific is emotional experience: Evidence from 27 countries and 5 continents. In K.R. Scherer, (Ed.), *Faces of emotion: Recent research*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Assoc.

Walzer, Michael (1983). *Spheres of justice: A defense of pluralism and equality*. New York: Basic Books.

Watson, P.J., Hickman, E. & Morris, R.J. (1996). Self reported narcissism and shame: Testing the defensive self-esteem and continuum hypotheses. *Personality and Individual Differences, 21(2)...*

Weiner, B. (1986). *An attributional theory of motivation and emotion*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Wicker, F.W., Payne, G.C., & Morgan, R.D. (1983) Participants descriptions of guilt and shame. *Motivation and Emotion, 7*. 25-39

Wheeler, L., Reis, H.T., & Bond, M.H. (1989). Collectivism-individualism in everyday

social life: The Middle Kingdom and the melting pot. *Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 57*...

Wink, P. & Gough, H.G. (1991). Two faces of narcissism. *Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 61*. 590-597.

Wurmser, Leon. (1995). *The Mask of Shame*. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.

Zahn-Waxler, C., & Kochanska, G. (1990). The origins of guilt. In R.A. Thompson (Ed.),

The Nebraska symposium on motivation 1988: Socioemotional development (Vol.

36, pp. 182-258). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Vita

Alvin Augustus Dolan-Henderson was born May 31, 1958 in Greenville, South Carolina. His parents were Alvin Augustus Henderson II and Winifred Usher Henderson. He attended Warner Robins Elementary School, in Warner Robins, Georgia until 5th grade, when his family moved to Wethersfield, Essex, England, where he attended the Finchingfield School. The family again relocated when he was 12-years-old, this time to Madrid, Spain. There, Mr. Dolan-Henderson attended the American School of Madrid. He attended the State University of West Georgia and graduated with a BA in the History of Ideas in 1981. He then completed four semesters of graduate work in the department of Sociology and was a graduate teaching assistant for three of those semesters. Mr. Dolan-Henderson was admitted to the doctoral program in Counseling Psychology at the University of Texas-Austin in April, 1995 and began coursework in August, 1995.

Mr. Dolan-Henderson began working as a mental health assistant at the Georgia Mental Health Institute in Atlanta, Georgia in 1986, eventually becoming a Behavior Therapist at the Adolescent Forensic Unit. He worked for three years as a neuropsychometric technician at the Georgia Traumatic Brain Injury Rehabilitation Center in College Park, Georgia. During this time, he also volunteered with the Georgia Head Injury Association and helped set up family facilitated support groups throughout the state. In 1990, Mr. Dolan-Henderson

married the Reverend Doctor Susan Dolan and moved to Austin, Texas in 1991. Dr. and Mr. Dolan have one son, Liam Dolan-Henderson, born June 30th, 1995.

Beginning in October, 1991 he worked as a Rehabilitation Therapy Supervisor on the Social Learning Program at the Austin State Hospital until he began doctoral training at UT-Austin. He has worked as a Psychometrician for John R. Gould, Ph.D. for the past four years, assessing primarily adolescents and adults. He completed the predoctoral internship program at the Austin State Hospital in August 2002, with primary rotations in Neuropsychology and Geriatric Psychology.

Alvin Augustus Dolan-Henderson resides permanently at

3104 Harris Park Avenue

Austin, Texas 78705-3124

This dissertation was typed by the author, Alvin Augustus Dolan-Henderson