A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF IBN KHALDUN'S THEORY

A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

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A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF IBN KHALDUN'S THEORY

A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

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PREFACE

Ibn Khaldun is a great Moslem thinker of the fourteenth century (b. 1332, d. 1406 A. D.). Modern writers are inclined to consider him as a pioneer or a precursor in the science of society and the philosophy of history. Some of them consider him as the first sociologist in the history of mankind and even the founder of modern sociology.[1] His Prolegomena, which is the primary subject of study in the present work, is regarded by one authority as one of the six important monographic works in general sociology.[2]

The aim of this dissertation is not to study either Ibn Khaldun or his theory in minute detail. In fact, other modern students have successfully achieved that task. The aim of this work is, rather, a different one. Our aim here is to see Ibn Khaldun in a different light, or, to use Mannheim's term, through a perspective which is greatly different from the customary one. Ibn Khaldun lived in a culture quite different from our present culture, and was accustomed to view the world within a frame of

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[1]See M. Enan, Ibn Khaldun, p. 159; S. Hasri, Dirasat, p. 198; M. Fahmi, Ilm Al-Iitima, p. 13.

[2]The other five are: Positive Philosophy and System of Positive Polity of Comte, Philosophy of History of Hegel, Principles of Sociology of Spencer, Principles of New Science of Vico. See P. Sorokin, Society, Culture, and Personality, p. 31.

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reference with which we are perhaps completely unfamiliar. The
first duty that lies, therefore, before us, in order to be able
to understand Ibn Khaldun, is to reconstruct his perspective or
his frame of reference anew, and to try to look at the social
phenomena through it.

In this work, the space which is devoted to the discus-
sion of Ibn Khaldun's theory per se is small in comparison to
that devoted to the reconstruction of the perspective and the
categories of thought according to which Ibn Khaldun and his
fellow writers viewed their world. This work is, as its sub-
title shows, a study in the sociology of knolwedge. Ibn Khaldun
is then taken as a point in case. He is studied primarily to show
how his theory and the theories produced in his culture can fit
into the general scheme of the sociology of knowledge as recently
developed by modern sociologists.

The sociology of knowledge is, to remind the reader, a
very new discipline. It has been developed and become recognized
as such only in the last decade or so. According to its funda-
mental premises, the human mind is to be regarded, not as an
infallible mirror of the absolute truth, but rather as a tool
placed in the hand of man in order to assist him in his struggle
for existence. Man sees things, not as they are in reality, but
as they one-sidedly appear to him while he is standing in his

cultural and social situation, and involved in his particular
psychic condition.

Man seems to be mainly influenced in his world-view,
as Burgess points out, by three factors: (1) cultural outlook
(2) social position (3) personal inclination.[3] Man is at first
influenced in his thinking by the system of preconceptions and
values which is implanted in his mind since his early infancy
by his social environment. These preconceptions and values are
unconsciously hidden in the depth of man's mind. They seldom
rise to the surface. They may cause trouble, as Professor Wirth
points out, if they become consciously recognized. Wirth says:

> . . . the things we take for granted determine
> what are the non-controversial elements in our
> existence. These are the elements upon which there
> is such consensus that they do not even rise to the
> level of consciousness. If they are brought to the
> level of consciousness, they make trouble. Further,
> we never predict these elements in other civilizations.
> To find these things out about other people, we have
> to enter into their life, for they will not just tell
> us these sacred things, (generally they do not know
> them themselves). People do not wear such things on
> their sleeves; we can get to know them only through
> long, intimate, penetrating contact, or we can see them
> reflected in various symbols of different kinds which
> these people cannot explain to us, because they are
> shrouded in mystery.[4]

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[3]See E. W. Burgess, "Research Methods in Sociology," in
Gurvitch and Moore, Twentieth Century Sociology, pp. 24, 27.

[4]Professor Louis Wirth's lectures on the Sociology of
Knowledge in the University of Chicago.

Man usually imposes them on the object he sees and often regards them as the foundations of nature at large. When he sees, in other cultures, certain values that deviate from those to which he has been accustomed in his own culture, he becomes amazed, and sometimes indignant. He tends, in general, to consider these deviant values as perverted, unnatural and even criminal.

Furthermore, man's mind is usually influenced by his class affiliation and social position. Opposed classes have usually opposed value systems. What is good to one may be bad to the other.[5] While the upper classes, for example, look upon revolution or any sort of social movement as a crime punished by death on the ground that it endangers public peace or disturbs a social order which is, to them, a sacred thing; the lower classes, on the other hand, may see in revolution a blessed phenomenon or a divine act for the reviving of the "old" social justice.

Finally, man's mind is influenced by his personal attitudinal and emotional complexes. Nobody seems able to entirely escape the effect of his emotions upon his judging power. Even Aristotle, who had an extreme confidence in his absolutistic logic, recognized the influence of emotion on man's thinking.

It seems that man's mind is placed inside three circles

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[5]See G. de Gré, Society and Ideology, p. 2 et seq.

of fetterment which are, in turn, inside each other. If man
can supposedly free himself from his private circle of attitudes,
he will fall into the second circle, that is, of his class
attitudes; and then, into the third which belongs to his culture
and which is mostly unconscious and almost unescapable. Complete
objectivity of thinking is, therefore, very difficult, if not
impossible.

However, a new level of objectivity can be attained, as
Mannheim points out.

> In the case of situationally conditioned thought,
> objectivity comes to mean something quite new and dif-
> ferent: (a) there is first of all the fact that in so
> far as different observers are immersed in the same
> system, they will, on the basis of the identity of their
> conceptual and categorical apparatus and through the com-
> mon universe of discourse thereby created, arrive at
> similar results, and be in a position to eradicate as an
> error everything that deviates from this unanimity;
> (b) and recently there is a recognition of the fact that
> when observers have different perspectives, "objectivity"
> is attainable only in a more roundabout fashion. In such
> a case, what has been correctly but differently perceived
> by the two perspectives must be understood in the light
> of the differences in structure of these varied modes of
> perception. An effort must be made to find a formula for
> translating the results of one into those of the other
> and to discover a common denominator for these varying
> perspectivistic insights. Once such a common denominator
> has been found, it is possible to separate the necessary
> differences of the two views from the arbitrarily con-
> ceived and mistaken elements, which here too should be
> considered as errors.[6]

With this sort of objectivity as our criteria, we proceed

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[6]K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 270.

to study Ibn Khaldun, who was himself, according to the classical rules of objectivity, completely biased. One can recognize in his writings the strong influence of his class position and personal attitudes on his thinking. Following the principle of absolutistic objectivity, we are forced to deprive his theory of any scientific value. Nevertheless, Ibn Khaldun produced, as Howard Becker says, "the most strangely modern-sounding theories that one could imagine."[7]

Ibn Khaldun's strong bias seems to be one of the main-springs of his scientific creativity. Through this bias, he could see what others were unable to see. As we shall see later, his contemporaries were handicapped in their study of social phenomena by their "idealistic" preconceptions and classical rules of think-ing. He, on the other hand, was carried beyond these limitations by his peculiar class position and stormy political career to the other side of the hill where he could establish for himself an individual perspective.

Thus, the plan of the present work calls for a somewhat indirect attack on the sociological theories of Ibn Khaldun. A large part of the discussion will be devoted to a study of the con-flicting perspectives and value systems that characterized his time and place. It has been found that, without doing this, Ibn

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[7]See Barnes, Becker and Becker, Contemporary Social Theory, p. 496.

Khaldun's theory cannot be fully understood. By generally discussing the main feature of the various ideologies and thought-styles which preceded the appearance of Ibn Khaldun's work, much light can be shed on his own theories.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

It is rather difficult to mention the names of all those who helped me in making this study. It is really the fruit of cooperation on the part of many persons rather than an individual effort. I wish, however, to single out a few of those who have had distinct contributions to make to this work and who tendered great assistance to me.

I should like especially to mention Professor Harry Moore of the Sociology Department, The University of Texas, whose inspiration, guidance, and constructive criticism have been necessary for the achievement of the present work. Grateful mention should be made of Professor Warner Gettys, the Chairman of the Sociology Department, whose personal encouragement and directive thought did much to influence my thinking. Also, to Professor Carl Rosenquist I am indebted for the great inspiration and advice he has rendered in directing my study. To Professor Walter Firey, I am grateful for his friendly help and patient guidance.

Ali Wardi
The University of Texas
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Ibn Khaldun is considered vague and difficult to understand. His critics never agree as to the real meaning of his writings. Some of them ascribe to him certain intentions which he may never have thought of. While one writer speaks of him as a highly pious person,[1] another considers him impious and extremely worldly.[2] One regards him a devoted Arab,[3] another considers him a Berber who was bitterly hostile to the Arabs.[4] An Arab writer recently takes Ibn Khaldun's Prolegomena as the Bible for the rising new generation of the Arab world of today, as a symbol of their ancestors' greatness and an indication of their creative intelligence.[5] Another Arab writer advocates, on the other hand, burning all of Ibn Khaldun's books and unearthing his bones, too, on the ground that he was a professed enemy of the Arab nation.[6]

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[1] R. Flint, cited by T. Hussain, Falsafat Ibn Khaldun, Al-Ijtimaiya, p. 25.

[2] Ibid., pp. 13, 16, 23, 25.

[3] Von Wesendonk, Ibn Khaldun, p. 176.

[4] M. Anan, Ibn Khaldun, p. 114.

[5] S. Hasri, Dirasat, passim.

[6] Cited by S. Hasri, op. cit., p. 107.

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Ibn Khaldun's _Prolegomena_ seems to be like the _Bible_ or the _Koran_ in which each of the conflicting parties can find something that supports their contradictory views. This may be the problem of every work that is viewed through a perspective different from that of the author, that is, from an angle with which the author is not familiar.

The time has gone when truth was taken as an objective datum existing "there," and anyone capable of correct sight could, therefore, grasp its whole reality. This is no longer considered a valid idea. Truth is now regarded as a highly complicated phenomenon which it is impossible to view entirely from a single perspective.[7] Truth may be likened to a multi-phased pyramid.[8] No one is able to see all of its phases at the same time while standing in one place. The truth can be grasped, as Mannhein has pointed out, only through a roundabout fashion, through a generalised view which synthesises all the various particular views.[9]

The fault of the critics of Ibn Khaldun is that they try to impose their own categories and principles of thought, i.e., their own perspective, on Ibn Khaldun. The result has been that each of them has come out of his investigation with a somewhat different interpretation.

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[7] See K. Mannhein, _op. cit._, Chap. V passim.

[8] G. de Gré, _Society and Ideology_, p. 98.

[9] K. Mannhein, _op. cit._, p. 270.

Taha Hussein, the well-known Arab writer, and De Slane, the French translator of Ibn Khaldun's works, complain of the vagueness and the contradictions of Ibn Khaldun's writings.[10] As a matter of fact, Ibn Khaldun is far from their estimate. His writing is very clear in comparison to the other writers of his time and culture.[11] The vagueness of Ibn Khaldun of which De Slane complains may be due to the fact that De Slane studies Ibn Khaldun from the "static" point of view, whereas Ibn Khaldun is looking at the social phenomena from the "dynamic" point of view.

The same thing can be, in the opinion of Ibn Khaldun, good and bad, useful and harmful. This is a shockingly contradictory statement to those who view things through the Aristotelian logic. De Slane and most of the critics of Ibn Khaldun, particularly the Arab writers of the modern times, cannot understand how Ibn Khaldun favors the Arabs and declares at the same time that they are the most savage people on earth.[12] Living under the influence of modern civilization, the writers cannot refrain from the conclusion that "savageness" is one of the most degrading and

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[10]Taha Hussein, op. cit., p. 28; M. Enan, Ibn Khaldun, p. 179.

[11]See M. Enan, op. cit., pp. 8, 136-137.

[12]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddima, Sec. II, Chap. 26 et passim.

shameful traits any nation can be labeled with. Looking through
the perspective of Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, we may see
that "savageness" is not so degrading as those critics think.
Following the argument of Ibn Khaldun, one may see that the word
"savageness" means the same as the words, "manliness," "bravery,"
"liberty," "pride," and the like. Civilisation may mean in Ibn
Khaldun's terminology "softness," "womanliness," "cowardliness,"
"humiliation," etc. And these are considered by Ibn Khaldun as
indications of defectiveness in man.[13]

Many of the disagreements and the heated controversies
raging now and then between conflicting parties, schools, sects
and the like can be explained as a conflict between different
perspectives—a disagreement about the angle from which the truth
should be viewed. A party may have, consciously or unconsciously,
certain categories and preconceptions which are just the contrary
to those of the opposite party. Each tries to convince the other,
with no avail whatsoever, that the truth is on his own side. The
uselessness of the debate is almost always due to the failure of
each party to comprehend the concealed preconceptions which under-
lie the thought of the others. The first step which is necessary
to really understand what others say or claim is to try to reach

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[13]Ibid., pp. 138, 148, 151, 374 et passim.

the depth of their minds, to grasp the "first principles" of their thought; in other words, to look through their own per-spective.[14]

Professor Talcott Parsons says as regards this point:

It is perhaps one of the most important canons of critical work, that the critic should attempt so far as possible to see the work of an author in the per-spective of the intellectual situation and tradition out of which it has developed. This is one of the best protections against the common fallacy of allowing super-ficial interpretation of verbal formulae to mislead one into unfair interpretations of ideas and inadequate formulations of problems.[15]

Most of those who have studied Ibn Khaldun have been satisfied with accepting his theory at its face-value. Thus, they fail to grasp its real meaning.

Ibn Khaldun lived in culture which was completely different from ours. He attacked, it is true, most of the intellectual tendencies and attitudinal complexes of his time. But we are nevertheless unable to understand his point of view unless we study at first those tendencies and values which he attacked. It is necessary, in order to grasp the actual meaning of Ibn Khaldun, to put ourselves in his shoes and view the world through his eyes.

N. Schmidt considers Ibn Khaldun as "a solitary figure,

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[14]Cf. J. Dewey, How We Think, p. 214.

[15]T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, p. 72.

towering above his age."[16] Almost all of the modern critics of
Ibn Khaldun seem to agree. They even go to the extreme and
regard his work as an intellectual miracle, an inexplicable
stroke of genius, arising out of an atmosphere of darkness where
he has no predecessor as well as no successor.[17] Toynbee says:

> In his chosen field of intellectual activity he
> appears to have been inspired by no predecessors and
> to have found no kindred souls among his contemporaries
> and to have kindled no answering spark of inspiration
> in any successors; and yet, in the Prolegomena
> (Muqaddamat) to his Universal History he has conceived
> and formulated a philosophy of history which is un-
> doubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever
> yet been created by any mind in any time and place.[18]

One of the main purposes of this thesis is to refute this
idea; which is here regarded as void of any scientific basis.
Just like any other thinker, Ibn Khaldun is a child of his time.[19]
His social theory is, in spite of its highly innovational appear-
ance, an end-product of a long series of the Islamic movements
of thought. It may be no exaggeration to say that his theory was
a sort of synthesis of the conflicting ideologies and the sectarian
beliefs of Islam. It is in fact not strange to find such a theory

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[16] N. Schmidt, Ibn Khaldun, p. 45.

[17] T. J. De Boer, Tarikh Al-Falsafa Fil-Islam, p. 280.

[18] A. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. III, p. 322.

[19] H. Barnes, H. Becker and F. Becker, Contemporary Social
Theory, Vol. I, p. 496.

arising in Islamic society. It is rather strange to find it
arising so late.

Islam is, as we shall see later, a politico-religious
system.[20] It differs from most of the great religions of the
world in the fact that its founder was secular ruler as well as
a religious leader. This combination of religion and politics,
of ideality and actuality, was quite easy and natural at the time
of Mohammed. The society of Medina, where Mohammed founded his
politico-religious system, was constituted of what Professor
Cooley calls "primary groups." In such a society, politics and
religion normally go hand in hand. They are two phases of one
integrated whole. Anthropologists have noticed, as we shall see
later, that there is no discrepancy between the "ideal" and the
"real" among the primitives who live in societies of a primary
type.

Ahmad Amin, the professor of Arabic literature in the
Egyptian University, has said that the nomadic tribesmen of Arabia
are so proud of their culture and so content with their life, that
they cannot imagine a better one. They do not know, he says, the
"ideal" because of their limited imagination and so they do not

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[20]See R. Strothmann, "Shia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol.
IV, p. 350; M. Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam, p. 3.

have any word for it in their language.[21] The Arabian nomads,
it is true, have no word for the "ideal," but this is due not
to their limited imagination, as Amin says. It is due rather to
the fact that, unlike civilised man, they do not recognise an
"ideal" separate from their own "real." The primary groups, as
Cooley points out, ". . . do not formulate any such ideal, but
they have it nevertheless."[22]

Thus, it was easy and practical, on the part of Mohammed,
to combine in his religion the "ideal" and the "real." But,
after Mohammed's death as Islamic society moved from a primary
type to a secondary one, or to use Tönnies' terms, from a
"Gemeinschaft" to a "Gesellschaft," difficulty arose. The secu-
larised "real" of the Islamic Empire could not continue to be in
good terms with the lofty "ideal" of Mohammed.[23] Moreover, in the
Moslem world there had grown up, as Lammens points out, the well-
established "sciences" which have the Prophet's traditions as their
objects.[24] The traditional "ideals" of Mohammed were well-preserved

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[21]Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, p. 37.

[22]C. Cooley, R. Angell, and L. Carr, Introductory
Sociology, p. 61.

[23]J. Schacht, "Sharia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV,
p. 323.

[24]H. Lammens, Islam, Its Beliefs and Institutions, cited
by H. Barnes and H. Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science,
Vol. I, p. 267.

and became gradually well-memorized, while political affairs,
ran their inevitable course, following the dictum of expediency
and compromise as against the principles of the Prophet.[25] The
men of knowledge and ideation came then face to face against the
men of practice and politics.

The conflict was at first very severe and bloody. A truce
was finally established between the two parties. It seems as if
they had recognized the futility of the fight. No party could
listen to the good reason of the other. Each would go its own
way as if it were driven by an inescapable force.[26] Both might
have found it useful to come to terms of some sort.

The reconciliation was a peculiar one indeed. Each party
seemed to concede to the other a complete freedom within its own
field on condition that it would, in turn, not interfere with the
other's field. The rulers began, therefore, to indulge in
ceremonial and institutional performances, to pay an extreme
attention to what the "men of knowledge" would say as regards these
performances, and to be permitted afterwards to go their own ways
in their secular activities unmolested and unwatched. The "men
of knowledge," in their turn, recommended a complete submission
to the rulers. He who rebels against his ruler, they would say,

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25See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. II, p. 162.

26Cf. J. Schacht, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 323.

rebels against Allah.[27] They approached, to some extent, as Goldzeher points out, the Christian principle of giving to Caesar what was Caesar's and to God what was God's.[28]

A "compartmentalized," or what Kimbal Young calls "schizoid," mentality developed as a result of this reconciliation of the "ideal" and the "real." There had grown up two separate realms of thinking. One was allotted to the religious and the formal activities; the other was allotted to the normal daily life. Men were permitted in some sense to do almost anything within their secular activities, but as soon as they came to talk to others in a formal meeting, they returned to the traditional "ideals," shouting enthusiastically in the preaching for them. Thinkers and writers of every sort developed an extreme logic-tight "compartmentalization" of thought. They were accustomed to drift along with the social currents of their time, but when they came to write a book they put on their godly countenances and became furious about the decline of the Prophet's "ideals" among their fellowmen.

Ibn Khaldun was born in this mental atmosphere. He was

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[27]R. Stethmann, "Shia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 350.

[28]Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 359.

brought up and educated strictly along these lines.[30] Fortunately or unfortunately, he was driven afterwards toward politics in a society which was enormously disorganized.[31] He was brought up as a "man of knowledge" and finally came to be an opportunistic politician and a fickle diplomat. The dilemma of the "ideal" versus the "real," which highly characterized the Islamic society, most probably reached a high pitch in Ibn Khaldun's psyche. He was perhaps bitterly criticized by his "idealistic" fellow-men on the ground of his "secular" inclination.[32] His bitter attack against the proud and uncompromising nature of the theologians and "jurists" of his time might indicate a reciprocity of dislike.[33]

After fruitless strife and a stormy career in the political field, Ibn Khaldun fled to a nomadic tribe where he intended to have some mental rest and to write a general history of Islam. He may be likened in this respect to Thucydides, the greatest of ancient historians,[34] who wrote an excellent account of the

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[30]Cf. A. Toynbee, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 322.

[31]Taha Hussein, op. cit., p. 24.

[32]Cf. K. Enan, op. cit., p. 94.

[33]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, pp. 460-61, 542, 224.

[34]"His /Thucydides'/ search for purely natural causes, strict impartiality, and rigid criticism of sources made him the greatest of ancient historians." N. Schmidt, Ibn Khaldun, p. 17.

Peloponnesian War, after he was forced into a position which
enabled him to study the two sides of the conflict. Both Ibn
Khaldun and Thucydides can be said to have been driven by some
personal misfortune toward the "other side of the hill" and so
they achieved a view into the world more comprehensive than that
of their contemporaries. Thucydides writes, in the preface to
the second part of his famous work,

> It was my fate to be exiled from my country for
> twenty years after my command at Amphipolis; and in
> this situation I was enabled to see something of both
> sides—the Peloponnesian as well as the Athenian—
> and to make a special study of the war at my leisure.[35]

Seeing the two sides of the picture, and being familiar with the
underlying factors of the two conflicting parties of Islam, Ibn
Khaldun might have seen elements of truth in each. In prepara-
tion to his history-writing, he read, in his nomadic resort, the
works of most of the historians of Islam up to his time. It was
quite possible that he was amazed and perhaps shocked to see that
Moslem historians were all fully oriented toward "idealism" with
no tendency whatsoever in favor of a "realistic" explanation and
understanding.

As he spoke of himself, a stroke of inspiration suddenly

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[35]Cited by A. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. III,
p. 292.

hit his mind as a result of his wide reading.[36] He thought that

it was necessary, before writing a history, to write an intro-

duction in which he might be able to orient the minds of the

prospective readers in favor of some "realistic" understanding.

With this aim set before his eyes, he sat down and started to

write his famed Prolegomena. Howard Becker says in this reagrd,

> It has been noted that his methodology was oriented
> toward the problems of historical documentary criticism.
> This led to his larger formulation of the laws of society
> and social change, which should act as points of critical
> reference in determining the validity of documentary or
> traditional evidence. The logico-observational character
> of his work is striking throughout.[37]

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The present dissertation deals with four subjects which

are supposed to be the most important axes around which Ibn

Khaldun's thought revolved. These subjects are to be presented

in terms of dichotomies—one point versus the other. Weber's

concept of the "ideal-type" will be used extensively in discussing

these dichotomies.

Since the present work deals mainly with thought in the

light of sociology of knowledge, the concept of "ideal-type," or

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[36]See S. Hasri, op. cit., pp. 69-71; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab
Al-Ibar, Vol.VII, p. 445.

[37]H. Barnes and H. Becker, Social Thought from Lore to
Science, Vol. I, p. 269.

what Becker calls "constructive typology," seems to be a neces-
sary tool of study. The human mind, in general, seems to be
inclined to think in terms of typological dichotomies. As we
shall see later, thinking is a social product. It is, as Mills
points out, a silent conversation with an imaginary adversary.[38]
Thus, any point raised for discussion or reflection normally
takes the form of "pro" and "con." Most of the historical phi-
losophies and theories of the human race can be said to be products
of vehement controversies. No thinker is able to produce a theory
without being at first well-informed about certain controversies
which have been already discussed and in at least some respect
left unsettled. The human mind seems to grow up and thrive on
subjects in which two sides are extremely opposed to each other.
As soon as a certain value is contemplated, its opposite arises
in the mind, and so, a heated conversation, whether silent within
the "self" or aloud between conversing men, takes place.

It is easily observed that the controversy is usually
held in terms of opposing "ideal-types": one against another.
An ideal-typical phenomenon is seldom found in actual life.
Social events usually take place in less definite forms. But,
human mind nevertheless is accustomed to take sides in looking

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[38]C. Wright Mills, "Language, Logic and Culture," American
Sociological Review, Vol. IV, No. 5, Oct. 1939, p. 673-74.

at social events. It is often oriented toward one extreme or
the other. It is often enchanted by the dichotomies of absolute
good versus absolute evil, absolute right versus absolute wrong,
absolute beauty versus absolute ugliness, etc. There is nothing
absolute in actuality, as we shall see later. However, typo-
logical controversies seem to be useful tools of discussion with-
out which the human mind seems incapable of any productive work.

The four subjects in which Ibn Khaldun appears to be most
interested have caused, throughout the whole history of Islam,
exciting controversies. They are as follows:

     1. idealism vs. realism

     2. right vs. might

     3. reason vs. religion

     4. Islam vs. nomadism

The present work is therefore divided into four parts; each part
deals with one of these four dichotomies.

It should be made clear at this point that the terms used
in this work are defined from the sociological point of view
rather than the philosophical one. Terms, such as ideal, real,
right, might, reason, religion, and the like, have no clear and
definite meanings in philosophy. Philosophers are usually inclined
to deal with things in terms of metaphysics which are supposed
to lie beyond this phenomanal world. Sociologists, on the other

hand, tend to understand things as they are in actuality. They
do not care, for example, to know what is "right" in its meta-
physical, absolutistic realm. They may doubt the existence of
such an absolutistic realm. What is "right" to them is what
men in their social considerations take as right. "Might" is
also what people consider as might.

The concept of social classes, which is closely connected
with the subject of "right" versus "might," is taken here in its
sociological definition. Several theorists have tried to define
social classes objectively, that is, on the basis of income,
occupation and the like.[39] Sociologically speaking, social classes
are more or less spontaneous formations expressive of social
attitudes.[40] In the words of MacIver,

> Whenever social intercourse is limited by con-
> siderations of status, by distinctions between "higher"
> and "lower," then social class exists. A social class,
> then, is any portion of a community marked off from
> the rest by social status.[41]

The terms "idealism" and "realism" are also taken into
consideration along sociological lines rather than philosophical
ones. These terms are popularly used in differentiating between

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[39]See M. Gordon, "Social Classes in American Sociology,"
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LV, No. 3, Nov. 1949, pp. 266-68.

[40]R. MacIver and C. Page, Society, p. 348.

[41]Loc. cit.

two kinds of attitudinal complexes toward social life. In
the popular mind, there are two opposite types of men: "idealists"
who accept and live by lofty moral, aesthetic or religious stand-
ards,[42] on the one hand, and "realists" who devote themselves to
the facts and details of actual life as opposed to the imaginary
ideals,[43] on the other hand. Philosophers, however, mean by
"idealism" and "realism" quite different things. Their main
intention in this respect is to discover whether the ultimate
reality of the world consists of "idea" or "matter," of "purpose-
ful mind" or "blind nature."

As regards the term "religion," there also can be; seen
some discrepency between philosophical and sociological inter-
pretation. The philosophically minded person often attempts to
discover the ultimate truth behind the religious phenomena. He
may be inclined sometimes to seek some rule with which he can
distinguish the true from the false religion. In sociology, on
the other hand, religion is treated as a part of a well-integrated
society. Whether a religion is false or true is not important
in this regard. As far as a religion is adopted by a society or
a class in a society, it becomes a social phenomena worthy of
study and investigation. In the words of Durkheim, "There are

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[42]See H. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy, p. 236.

[43]Ibid., p. 268.

no religions which are false. All are true in their own fashion;
all answer, though in different ways, to the given conditions
of human existence."[44]

The philosopher, who takes "reason" as his guide, may
find certain religious beliefs irrational or illogical. Is there
any real basis for the well-known antagonism between rationalism
and religion? The factor behind this antagonism is perhaps due
to the philosophical belief that the laws of "reason" and logic
are absolute. From the sociological point of view, logic is
relative; and the laws of thought are social derivatives just like
any norms of social behavior. Both thought and behavior develop
and become standardized under the impression of social norms.
Mills says:

> No individual can be logical unless there be agree-
> ment among the members of his universe of discourse as
> to the validity of some general conception of good
> reasoning. . . . The 'laws of logic' impose restrictions
> upon assertions and argument. They are the rules we
> must follow if we would socialize our thought. They are
> not arrived at intuitively, nor are they given, 'innate
> within the mind.'[45]

In this way, "reason" can be regarded as a weapon in the hands
of man. Man can use it to fit or to fight any system. Religious

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[44]E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious
Life, p. 3.

[45]C. Wright Mills, op. cit., p. 674.

man may sometimes fear "reason." They fear it not because of
any intrinsic quality in it which is opposed to religion. They
fear it in fact as they fear any weapon used against them, while
they like at the same time to use it, if they can, against their
enemies. "Reason" is, as William James points out, a tool put
in the hands of man to help him in the struggle for existence.

IDEALISM VERSUS REALISM

In this part the dichotomy of idealism versus
realism is treated. We are going to see here, from
whence the "ideal" and the "real" have come, why they
are often opposed to each other, how they become some-
times reconciled, etc. At the end, the opinion of Ibn
Khaldun on these controversial points is discussed.

CHAPTER II

THOUGHT-STYLE

Before discussing idealism and realism, it may be neces-
sary to study the nature of human thought. Many of the writers
who deal with the subject fail to realize the fact that idealism
and realism are patterns of thought, or to use Mannheim's termin-
ology, "thought-styles." It is not enough, therefore, to classify
men into idealists and realists without going further into men's
minds and studying how these two mental orientations have risen.

The concept of "thought-style"[1] is most probably in-
comprehensible to those who think according to the classic way
of thinking. In their opinion, the thinking process is absolute

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[1]"Thought-style" is a literal translation of Mannheim's
term "Denkstil." It means, according to Mannheim, "the model
that is implicitly in the mind of a person when he proceeds to
reflect about an object." Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia,
p. 247. It may also mean, as Mandelbaum puts it, a "system of
categories with which a person or an age . . . seeks to grasp
the nature of the world." M. Mandelbaum, The Problem of His-
torical Knowledge, p. 74. It should be mentioned here that the
English translators of Mannheim's book, Ideology and Utopia,
have translated the German term "Denkstil" into "thought-model."
It seems, however, meaningless to prefer one translation to the
other. Both denote the same meaning indeed, that is, the
implicit preconceptions or categories which form the frame of
reference or the perspective through which a thinker views the
world around him. It is needless to say that this runs contrary
to the spirit of the Aristotelian logic which considers pre-
conceptions and categories of thought as "innate" notions of
human mind which in turn correspond to the eternal qualities of
nature.

and universal. It is the same wherever man can think. To
them, truth is something that exists distinctly "there," ready
to be picked up. The thinker has only to look out and see it.
All thinkers are able, as long as they are capable of correct
thinking, to see it as it is, without any alteration or dis-
tortion whatsoever.

However, this view is no longer held to be valid. Thought
is, as John Dewey points out, a sort of human act.[2] It tends ,
like any other act,to follow the rules set by society. Logic can
be taken to be as relative as any system of social values.[3] C. W.
Mills says:

> . . . What we call illogicality is similar to
> immorality in that both are deviations from norms.
> We know that such thought-ways change. Arguments,
> which in the discourse of one group or epoch are
> accepted as valid, in other times and conversations
> are not so received. That which was long meditated
> upon is now brushed aside as illogical. Problems set
> by one logic are, with a change in interests, out-
> grown, not solved. . . .[4]

This opinion may be extremely shocking to the classical
thinkers. The idea of relativity of logic may have the same effect

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[2] J. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, Pt. 3, passim.

[3] Cf. L. Rougier, "The Relativity of Logic," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, Dec. 1941, Vol. II, No. 2, passim.

[4] C. W. Mills, "Language, Logic and Culture," American
Sociological Review, Vol. IV, No. 5, Oct. 1929, p. 674.

on them as that of the relativity of morals has on the primitives.
It can be safely said that both the belief in the absoluteness of
rules of logic and that of values spring from the same source—
i.e., human society.

It is now considered that thought follows the pattern of
conversation.[5] It is in a sense a silent conversation with the
"self." When one feels that ideas are illogical, it may mean
that the "self" has not approved of them. Reasoning, says Pierce,
involves approval of one's reasoning.[6]

G. H. Mead attributes the rise of "mind," and consequently
of thought, to the process of "taking the role of the other."[7]
When man thinks, therefore he merely converses with that "other."[8]
It is observed in everyday life that people sometimes talk with
themselves when they think, as if they were talking to some
imaginary adversary. This adversary we may call, as Mills does,
"the generalized other."[9] Most of the time, we think silently.
Our thought is, then, a silent conversation. "It is," Mills says,

[5] Loc. cit.

[6] Ibid., p. 673.

[7] G. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Part II, passim.

[8] C. Mills, op. cit., p. 672 et seq.

[9] Loc. cit.

"from this socially constituted viewpoint that one approves or disapproves of given arguments as logical or illogical, valid or invalid."[10]

From this, we can conclude that rules of logic are not absolute or "innate within the mind" as Aristotle thought. They are products of debate and discussion. In a sense, they are social regulations to check conversation when it goes beyond the limits set by the group in which the thinker happens to live. When a person begins to doubt the logic of his own idea, it is an indication that the imaginary adversary of the conversation or "the generalised other," to use Mead's term, has registered a valid objection to it.

An idea received, unaccompanied by explicit or implicit argument, is an item to be memorized rather than evaluated. No idea becomes a datum for thought unless it can be utilized as a point of discussion, a subject with pros and cons, a matter for lively conversation. This shows how the modern method of education encourages thoughtfulness and mental creativity by means of its encouragement of curiosity and discussion among students. The old method, on the other hand, suffocates creative thought because of its emphasis upon memorizing rather than upon controversial thinking.

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[10]_Loc. cit._

It is indeed interesting in this connection to notice that the rise of highly complicated systems of philosophy in the Ancient Greek, for the first time in the history of mankind, was actually correlated with freedom of speech and a certain sort of democratic government which permitted men to express their ideas without much fear of punishment—a situation which could seldom be found in any other part of the ancient world. At that time, the Sophists appeared on the stage of Greek history—a strange class of professional teachers whose main business was to teach the Greek youths how to win an argument in a political or judicial meeting.[11]

> The Sophists furthered the transition from dialectic to logic in two ways. In the first place they made it possible. Incessant questioning leads to answers. Hair-splitting, even where mischievous in intent, leads to distinctions of value. Paradoxical insistence on the accidents of speech-forms and thought-forms leads in the end to perception of the essentials. Secondly, they made it necessary. The spirit of debate run riot evokes a counter-spirit to order it and control it. The result is a self-limiting dialectic. This higher dialectic is a logic.[12]

As a result of the intellectual tumult caused by the appearance of the Sophists, thinkers began to feel the need for rules to

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[11]See Henry Jackson, "Sophists," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 20, pp. 999-1000.

[12]H. Blunt and A. Wolf, "History of Logic," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 14, p. 137.

regulate the debate. Aristotle happened to be the legislator
of those rules which he called "the rules of logic."[13] It is
not strange, therefore, that the word "logic" means, in Greek,
speaking.[14] This may be similar to the enactment of law in
modern times. The legislators, in their attempt to settle the
conflict of the various interests, enact rules according to which
the various sections of the society are supposed to proceed in
their activities.[15] Any act which violates these rules is then
considered illegal. In the same way, any act of thinking which
violates the Aristotelian rules of logic is considered illogical.

As we have observed before, thought is a form of human
action. Dewey has rightly pointed out that all forms of human
action result from disequilibrium. It is absurd to ask what
induces man to action. He is an active being, says Dewey. You
begin with human beings who are alive, active and part of a
sequence or in some kind of context. There is some degree of
disequilibrium present at all times. This disequilibrium calls

[13]See loc. cit.

[14]It is interesting to note here that the Moslems called
one of their sciences--the science with which they tried to
reconcile religion and reason--"the science of Kalam," that is,
the science of speaking and argument. See T. De Boer, Tarikh Al-
Falsafa, Eil-Islam, p. 50.

[15]See W. Seagle, "Sociological Trend in Modern Juris-
prudence," in H. Barnes, H. Becker and F. Becker, Contemporary
Social Theory, passim.

forth tendencies to act.[16] In infants or animals, the tendency
or the impulse to act is not limited by any social norm. When
the beast of prey, for instance, sees his prey, he jumps on it,
struggles with it, overcomes it and finally eats it. There is no
place for thought in this operation. The animal feels, under the
pressure of hunger, some sort of disequilibrium, some sort of a
biological impulse or a tendency to act. He has no "self" which
might converse with him or inhibit his action. He has, therefore,
no "conscience" as well as no thought.

Man, on the other hand, has "self." He lives with other
men and so he is accustomed, as Mead points out, to take the roles
of other human beings. Thus, when he feels a tendency to act,
under the pressure of certain biological impulses, he finds his
"self," or the "generalized other," watching him and, in many cases,
inhibiting him. He is then obliged to converse with his "self."
He starts thinking about how to overcome this social obstacle.
When he is hungry and sees delicious food in the hands of other
fellows, his natural tendency is to take the food, by force if
necessary, and immediately eat it; but his "self" would say "No,
this is not the way to earn your food. People will laugh at you,
will condemn you, will punish you!" The silent conversation will

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[16]J. Dewey, op. cit., passim; Mary Follett almost hits
the same point, ". . . we can see in our own lives that urge is
always the lack." See M. Follett, Creative Experience, p. 81.

then continue until he reaches a solution of how he can get food
in a way which his "self," or his group would approve.

Here one may notice some sort of resemblence between thought
and "conscience." Freud almost hits the same point when he calls
conscience "the superego," or in other words, the "super-self."
Using Mead's terminology, it may be right to say that when you think
you mentally talk with the group of which you take the role. And
when you feel the pangs of conscience, you merely feel, as Professor
Harry Moore points out, that the group of which you take the role is
peeping at you.[17] One of this writer's friends in Bagdad related
one day the following episode as he remembered it from the early
days of his childhood:

> When I was still a child, my father used to buy for
> the family dinner more meat than was needed. He seemed
> to feel very ashamed to buy from the butcher a small
> quantity of meat. I discovered later that the main reason
> behind it was that my father's shop was located near a
> sharp-tongued butcher. My father used, therefore, to
> hear a lot of bitter criticism and dispraise from that
> saucy butcher everytime a customer bought a small quantity
> of meat. Thus, my father, unconsciously developed some
> sort of contempt for those who used to buy little meat for
> their homes. He called them misers and even rascals.
> When he went to any butcher shop to buy meat, he seemed
> to take the role of that censorious butcher and to think
> through his perspective.

It should be mentioned at this point that this example of the friend's

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[17] From Professor Harry Moore's lectures on Social Theory in
The University of Texas.

father is by no means rare. Almost all men fall more or less
under the same pattern. Nobody seems to escape taking the role
of a certain individual or group when he thinks. Even the
scientific author, who is usually supposed to be absolutely objec-
tive in his thinking, takes, when he starts writing, the role of
some of his students, colleagues, friends, critics or some other
persons, and begins to judge the logic of his writing through
their own perspectives.

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In the light of the preceding discussion, one may under-
stand the nature of thought-style and the main factors behind its
development in man's mind. Man is, then, not free to become
completely objective and impartial in his observations.[18] The dice
are, as M. Moore says, always loaded in favor of some preference.[19]
One can rightly come to the conclusion here that as far as man
may have several "consciences" to cover the different value-systems
of the various groups to which he belongs,[20] he may have several
thought-styles too. It can be easily observed that man thinks and
behaves differently as soon as he moves from one group to another.

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[18]See K. Mannheim, op. cit., p. 240.

[19]Merrit Moore, "Introduction," in G. H. Mead, Movements
of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, p. xxix.

[20]See J. Roucek, Social Control, p. 40.

The system of categories and preconceptions, which implicitly underlies his thought, changes along with his moving from one social environment to another. At one time you may see him sober, critical and wisdom-seeking; at another, careless and childish. At one time, he may pedantically blame you for some formal mistake you have made; at another, he may joyfully commit the same mistake and advise you to do so, too. This, it is true, can be attributed sometimes to a psychic or emotional factor. But the social factor is nevertheless quite observable on various occasions. An oriental proverb says, "There is a special kind of speech for every kind of situation." William James says that man has as many different social "selves" as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinions he cares; he generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups.[21] This great insight of William James is quite instructive. Since man has as many "selves" as necessary to cover the various groups around him, he can equally have many thought-styles.

It seems as if self, conscience, and thought-style are different phases of one single reality—the social self. Man is said to be a "social animal." As a result of living in society, the human animal develops self, conscience, and thought-style, and consequently distinguishes himself from other animals.

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[21] W. James, Psychology, p. 179, cited by E. V. Stonequist, The Marginal Man, p. 4.

CHAPTER III

THE TYPES OF THOUGHT-STYLE

As we have noticed in the last chapter, man thinks dif-
ferently as he moves from one group to another. This can be
taken as an indication of an unlimited variety of thought-style
due to the fact that there is no limit to the number of groups
in which man may become involved at one time or another. In the
present chapter, however, an attempt is made to construct some
ideal-types of thought-style in which the minor differences of
individual thinking are overlooked, while the fundamental features
of group thought are duly emphasised.

In modern civilisation, man has membership in various
groups and associations at the same time. As Pigors points out,
he does not share in the activity of each group with all his
personality.[1] However, it should be remembered here that this
is not the case with the so-called primitive people. The primi-
tive man enters his group with all his personality. Nothing is
left to be acted upon in another grouping. The primitive group
is usually small in number. All its activities are done in a
face-to-face pattern.[2] When the primitive man thinks he always

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[1]P. Pigors, Leadership and Domination, p. 50 et seq.

[2]Cooley, Angell and Carr, Introductory Sociology, p. 55
et seq.

takes the role of his small group. His "generalized other" is, therefore, one at all times. In such primary grouping,[3] things are the same for a comparatively long period of time. In other words, the morés and the social values of the group are fixed and considered sacred. A certain spiritual element is supporting them, ready to punish anyone who violates them. This spiritual element is called by various names, such as "mana," "totem," "gods," "charisma," but it has in any case the same effect of value-fixation.[4] In such environment, man tends, therefore, to think along a conservative line. He takes the role of one unchangeable group all the time.[5] There is no place in his thought-style for a relativistic or temporalistic point of view. This is no doubt contrary to the thought-style of a man who lives in a

[3] Professor Cooley gives the face-to-face association the classical term of "primary grouping." He includes in it, in addition to the primitive societies, the family, the agricultural village, the play-group, the neighborhood, etc. The characteristics of the primary group according to Cooley are: (1) face-to-face association (2) the unspecialized character of that association (3) the relative permanence (4) the small number of persons involved (5) the relative intimacy among the participants. See Ibid., p. 55, Chap. IV, passim.

[4] Cf. R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 30.

[5] "The folkways," says Murdock, "are further regarded as natural and right, and any deviation from them as unnatural and wrong . . . members of other groups, who follow other codes, are perverse, immoral, savage or heathen." G. Murdock, "Ethnocentrism," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. V, p. 613.

"secondary" group, where he participates in various groups, shifting from one to another as time marches on. To quote Karl Mannheim,

> For the son of a peasant who has grown up within the narrow confines of his village and spends his whole life in the place of his birth, the mode of thinking and speaking characteristic of that village is something that he takes entirely for granted. But for the country lad who goes to the city and adapts himself gradually to city life, the rural mode of living and thinking ceases to be something to be taken for granted. He has won a certain detachment from it. And distinguishes now, perhaps quite consciously, between "rural" and "urban" mode of thought and ideas.[6]

From the above discussion we may construct two ideal-types of thought-style in correspondence with the two ideal-types of grouping—the primary and the secondary.[7]

It is customary to attribute to the "sacred" thought-style the characteristics of being "absolutistic," "eternalistic," and "spiritualistic."[8] In the same way, we can say that the

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[6]K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 252-53.

[7]It is in vogue among modern sociologists to classify human societies into two main types, similar to those of Professor Cooley. For example, Becker classifies them into Sacred and Secular; MacIver, Community and Society; Durkheim, Mechanical and Organic; Tonnies, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft; Sorokin, Unibonded and Multibonded; Ogburn, Stationary and Changing; etc. For certain considerations, linguistic and otherwise, Becker's terms will be used throughout the present work.

[8]The term "spiritualism" is used here to indicate both the philosophical term, "idealism" and the ethnological terms "animism," "animatism," "Totemism," and the like. In the opinion of this writer, both the philosophical "idealism" and the primitive belief in "mana," "spirits," and "gods" springs from the same reason. Cf. P. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, Vol. II, p. 183.

"secular" thought-style is, on the contrary, "relativistic,"
"temporalistic," and "materialistic."[9]

It seems that these three characteristics of the "sacred"
thought-style are highly suitable to each other. They can be
said to form a well-integrated whole, or a "Gestalt," to use the
modern term of psychology. Howard Becker defines the "sacred"
societies as "communities in which a sort of emotional halo en-
circles the ways of fathers and thereby prevents their profana-
tion by change."[10] This may mean that the member of a "sacred"
society cannot escape viewing the world through a "static" perspec-
tive in which the truth is considered absolute, eternal and
sacred. It seems difficult for him to think of the truth as a
changeable or relative phenomenon.

Generally speaking, man derives, as Durkheim and Scheler
point out, the categories of his thought from the structure and
norms of his group. To quote Scheler in this regard,

> Since explaining means relating the relatively new
> to what is already known, and since society is always
> 'more known' than anything else, the arrangement and
> classification of groups which compose society, determine
> the subjective forms of thinking and perception as well as
> the classificatory arrangement of the world in categories.[11]

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[9]Cf. H. O. Dahlke, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in H.
Barnes, H. Becker and F. Becker, Contemporary Social Theory,
pp. 75-6; P. Sorokin, op. cit., Vol. II passim.

[10]H. Barnes and H. Becker, Social Thought from Lore to
Science, Vol. I, p. 10.

[11]Cited by H. O. Dahlke, op. cit., p. 76.

Accordingly, it is possible to infer that, in the sacred society which is normally built on a "permanent" and holy basis, thought-style should be eternalistic, absolutistic and spiritualistic. In such mental atmosphere, values seem to be sacred because they are unchangeable, and also, they are unchangeable because they are sacred. Each quality appears to be the cause and the effect of the other at the same time.[12] In other words, they are parts of one Gestaltic whole.

Anthropologists agree that the so-called primitive people[13] believe, in one form or another, that the world is inhabited by spirits of various kinds. Every value or cultural trait has, in their eyes, a "mana" or "spirit"[14] behind it, ready to punish for violation and to reward for conforming.[15]

Several anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists have attempted to explain the universal tendency of "spiritualism" along the primitive peoples. The question is always raised as to

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[12]This becomes quite understandable in the light of the so-called "circular response" theory. See for detail, Mary Follet, Creative Experience, Chap. III, et passim.

[13]It is important to note at this point that the primitive society is discussed here as a representative par excellence of the sacred society. By studying the primitive thought-style, much light can be shed on that of the civilized man.

[14]Morat and Davey, From Tribe to Empire, p. 47.

[15]Hans Kelsen, Society and Nature, pp. 13-15, 55-58, et passim.

why are religion and the belief in spirits found everywhere among primitive peoples? It is strange indeed that these theorists always raise the question about the origin of "spiritualism" among primitive peoples, without turning back to themselves and asking why are the civilized peoples "materialistic" in their thinking. It seems that these theorists, whose minds are impressed by the "materialistic" orientation of their civilization, consider "materialistic" thinking merely natural, whereas "spiritualism" needs to be explained. They overlook the fact that a man living in the "sacred" society has an equal right to consider "spiritualism" as the natural tendency, while "materialistic" thinking needs explanation. The problem lies in the fact that modern thinkers tend to take the categories of their own thought as natural and absolute and so try to impose them on the thought of other cultures. As far as human nature is concerned, "spiritualism" may be more "natural" than our arrogant "materialism." As a matter of fact, causality, which is the core of "materialistic" thinking, is not a form of thought with which human consciousness is endowed by natural necessity. It is not, as Kant calls it, an "innate notion."[16] "Spiritualism," on the other hand, may be more suitable to the nature of human mind. It is not so strange for man to

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[16] H. Kelsen, op. cit., p. vii.

think in a "spiritualistic" mode. It is rather strange if he
thinks in terms of cause and effect.

In order to understand more clearly the preceding dis-
cussion, it is necessary to study the psychological process through
which human mind develops. As was said in the previous chapter,
human "mind" and "self" develop together through the same process,
i.e., through the process of taking the role of others.[17] Man
starts to think and to be conscious of his "self" at the same
time. He becomes conscious of his "self" because he begins to
look at himself as an object through the eyes of others.[18] And
he becomes able to think because he begins to take the role of
others and converses silently with them. It is quite natural,
therefore, that man tends, as soon as he feels the rise of "self,"
to project the same on everything around him. Thus, everything,
animate and inanimate, has a certain kind of "spirit" or "mana"
which makes it behave like a human being. Everything can, there-
fore, be said to have "self." This is often observed among children
of the civilized peoples. Children, as well as primitive people,

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[17]The behaveristic-pragmatistic theory of Mead which
emphasizes the importance of taking the role of others in the
rise of "mind" and "self," seems to be the accepted theory in
the field. Most of the modern psychologists and sociologists
seem to pay some tribute to it in one way or another.

[18]G. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Pt. III passim.

treat the inanimate things around them as if they were human beings like themselves.[19] To them, even social values have "mana" and behave like men according to the law of retribution.[20] In the eyes of the primitives, as Moret and Davy say,

> It is mana which makes the net catch, the house stand fast, the canoe be seaworthy. It is the fertility in the field and the healing or the deadly virtue in drugs. In the arrow it is mana that kills.[21]

This "spiritualistic" or "animatistic" world-view among the primitives can be said to be the projection of one's self or spirit on the cosmos.

As a matter of fact, there may be no difference in the primitives' eyes between self and spirit. This differentiation has been recently developed by modern philosophers who are accustomed to ask questions about everything coming under their cognition. The primitives, on the other hand, are not inclined to ask philosophical questions. They take everything around them for granted. They firmly believe in the dualism of body and spirit. They simply feel it in themselves, and clearly see it in the case of death or sleep. There is no obvious reason to doubt this dualism or ask questions about it as the wise-men of

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[19]H. Kelsen, op. cit., p. 6, et passim.

[20]Ibid., pp. 5, 7-8.

[21]Moret and Davy, From Tribe to Empire, p. 47.

civilization usually do. They actually feel the effect of the
"spirit" or the "self" or the "mana" as living within their bodies.
They consequently tend to attribute the same thing to the various
things of nature. There are spirits everywhere, and God may be
considered the chief spirit who lies behind the great universe.
His position relative to the other spirits may be parallel to that
of the leader of a tribe or the father of a family.[22]

It is interesting to notice, as Kelsen points out, the
complete difference in the world-view between the primitive and
the civilized man. Whereas the primitive man tries to interpret
nature in the terms of human society, the civilized people try,
just on the contrary, to interpret human society in the terms of
nature.[23] And consequently each accuse the other of superstition
and irrationality. The civilized man tends to deny every influence
of "spirits" on nature. To him, nature is entirely governed by
certain inescapable laws; and human society, as part of nature,
should be interpreted, therefore, in the terms of these natural
laws. The primitives, on the other hand, are so impressed by the
mould of the social environment that they see all nature likewise
impressed by it. They are then rather to be called "social" people

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[22]Cf. H. O. Dahlke, op. cit., p. 76; H. Barnes and H.
Becker, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 33-34.

[23]H. Kelsen, op. cit., pp. vii, 1 et passim.

than to be called "natural" people. Kelsen says,

> For these reasons the customary characterization of
> primitive man as a 'man in a state of nature' or a
> 'natural man' is inept. Nothing appears 'natural' to
> him because everything, as soon as he seeks to explain
> it, is 'artificial' or 'made,' not necessarily by him-
> self but by his fellow-men or even by super-human
> beings.[24]

As we have noticed, children of the civilized people are
usually inclined to think in a similar way. There is, indeed, a
profound insight in Jung's theory which says that the primitives
are the children of human race. It is right to note that the
primitives' mind ceases to develop beyond that of civilized
children. There is, it is true, nothing deficient in the biological
structure of the primitives' minds. Human mind ceases to develop,
generally speaking, on account of certain deficiencies in the
socio-cultural contact. Mind is in reality a product of contact
and communication.[25] In the "sacred" society, where the primitives
and all culturally-isolated peoples live, mind cannot develop
beyond certain limits. There, man does not find anything new or
different from what he has been used to since his early childhood.
Everything is permanent and sacred; what was yesterday is today,
and shall be tomorrow.[26] As we have noticed before, things do not

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[24]Ibid., p. 48.

[25]See G. Mead, op. cit., Pt. II, passim.

[26]See N. Miller, The Child in Primitive Society, p. 253.

change because they are sacred, and they are sacred because they do not change.

In the "secular" society, on the other hand, things are greatly different. They change from time to time, and from place to place. Their sacredness loses, therefore, its grip upon the human mind. Man begins in such environment to seek connection between cause and effect. There are no "spirits" behind the phenomena of nature. When things change rapidly man begins to search for the underlying laws which do not change. Man seems always looking for a permanent basis behind the changeable phenomena. In the "sacred" society, there is no need to look for such a basis, because nothing changes. Things are taken as they appear, being moved by spirits like man himself. In the "secular" society, on the other hand, man tends to become rationalistic, materialistic and philosophical. He asks questions about everything in an attempt to reach the solid foundation of the universe.

In ancient Greece, where society was highly secularized, philosophers tried to see, in the "atom," the "four elements" or the like, the answers to their perplexing questions. As a reaction against these secularizing and socially-disorganizing tendencies, there arose Socrates and Plato, the prophets of the ancient Greeks. Plato tried, with some success, to combine the "materialistic" tendency of the early philosophers with the "spiritualistic" tendency of the "sacred" society which he greatly

admired.[27] He consequently developed his well-known theory of
"the Ideas"[28] in which he found the permanent basis that lay
behind the changing and illusory phenomena of the world.

In conclusion, we may say that, in the "sacred" society,
the human mind is normally inclined to think according to the
spiritualistic-eternalistic-absolutistic thought-style, while the
secularized mind tends to think, on the contrary, according to the
materialistic-temporalistic-relativistic one. The controversy of
"idealism" versus "realism," can be safely regarded as an aspect
of the conflict which usually arises between these two contra-
dictory thought-styles. "Ideals" are, as Cooley would say, products
of the "sacred" thought-style. They are regarded in such a society
as eternal and absolute--as existing beyond this temporary and
changeable world. They are taken as spiritual too. Idealists
firmly believe in some spiritual power that supports the ideals
and guarantees their final victory. Idealism is, as Mathews points

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[27]H. Barnes and H. Becker, _op_. _cit_., Vol. I, p. 8.

[28]It is interesting indeed to find in the Platonic "Ideas"
a philosophical system that successfully solved, in the ancient
times, the secularization dilemma of rationalism versus religion,
realism versus idealism, secular thought-style versus sacred.
This may explain why Plato has won the admiration and reverence
of an unlimited number of thinkers throughout history. Neo-
Platonism which developed afterwards a strong religious inclina-
tion could be regarded as an inevitable evolution of the Platonic
"idealism."

out, closely akin to religious faith.[29]

Charles Cooley says, on this point,

Life in the primary group gives rise to social
ideals which, as they spring from similar experiences,
have much in common throughout the human race. These
naturally become the motive and test of social progress.
Under all systems men strive, however blindly, to
realize objects suggested by the familiar experience of
primary association. Hence, again, the gravity of the
increasing substitution of secondary for primary associa-
tion in modern life.[30]

29S. Mathews and G. Smith, A Dictionary of Religion and
Ethics, p. 216.

30Cooley, Angell and Carr, Introductory Sociology, p. 60.

COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF THOUGHT

It should be remembered that the classification of thought-style into "sacred" and "secular," as it has been discussed in the last chapter, is merely a constructive typology. It is an "ideal-typical" classification, which does not show things in their actual process of becoming. It is, in other words, a heuristic construction[1] made for the purpose of contrasting the two extreme points of a continuum along which the actual societies and the thought-styles can be arranged side by side.

Actual societies can neither be placed in the "sacred" type nor in the "secular." Each can be shown with some tendency toward one or the other extreme. However, one can find many societies and groups closely approaching the "sacred" type. But it is quite difficult, indeed, to find societies approaching the "secular." Most of the primitive and the nomadic tribes, many of the isolated villages and mountainous communities, etc., can be classified with a strong inclination toward the "sacred" type of society. The "secular" type, on the other hand, is actually approached by comparatively very few. This may be explained by the fact that

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[1] See for a good discussion of constructive typology in the social sciences, H. Barnes, H. Becker and F. Becker, *Contemporary Social Theory*, Pt. II, Chap. 2.

secularization of human society is a new phenomena in the history
of mankind. Man lived in "sacred" societies for hundreds of
thousands of years before the dawn of civilization, and the process
of secularization arose in history just a few thousand years ago.
Moreover, the effects of secularization have penetrated only a few
societies here and there which have happened to fall under one or
the other of the secularizing factors.[2] The remaining majority of
peoples have stayed in their sacredly isolated ways of life.

This may explain why "sacred" thought-style can be observed,
more or less, everywhere, and even in the midst of the most secu-
larized and materialistic section of modern civilization. Very
few men indeed can think today in a completely relativistic-
temporalistic-materialistic thought-style. The late rise of
sociology and the other social sciences may indicate the same point.
Social sciences, which are usually based on a relativistic-
temporalistic-materialistic foundation, found, and still find,

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[2]Sociologists widely differ in their opinion about the main
factor behind the secularizing of a sacred society. Durkheim con-
siders it to lie in the growth of population and the rise of divi-
sion of labor; Tönnies believes it to lie in trade and commerce;
Veblen, in the introduction of technology and scientific knowledge;
Gumplowicz, in conflict and war; Becker, in cultural contact and
communication; Sorokin, in the dialectical process of the socio-
cultural dynamics; etc. It is perhaps permissible to conclude that
a sacred society can be secularized by each one of these factors.
It is not rare to find two or more of these factors working together
in the process of social secularization. It can be rightly said
that, other conditions being equal, the more the secularizing
factors, the greater is the momentum of secularization.

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great difficulty in penetrating the human mind. The "sacred" thought-style usually persists, and "lags" behind, in almost every society which comes under the influence of the secularization process. This may be due to what Ogburn calls "cultural lag."[3] In a secularized society, man easily follows the dictation of expediency when he is earning his living or raising his position. Under the pressure of the rapidly changing situations, he may lead a "secular" career in his everyday life, but when he comes to think about the larger world around him, he tends to think according to the old "sacred" way of thinking. In the words of Louis Weber,

> It is said when man thinks about nature and its conditions, he thinks with the brain of another age, and, though possessing the technical knowledge of the adult, he philosophizes, nevertheless, as a child.[4]

It is indeed interesting to observe men leading a compartmentalized life, thinking in a contradictory way, without being aware of it. This can be observed in an intense form in societies which have newly fallen under the impact of civilization. When man is in the market-place or amidst his political activities, he

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[3]See for details and criticism of "cultural lag," W. F. Ogburn, Social Change, Chap. IV, V; R. M. MacIver and C. H. Page, Society, p. 574 et seq.; P. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, Vol. IV, Chap. IV.

[4]Louis Weber, Le Rythme du Progrès, cited by P. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, Vol. IV, p. 158.

forgets the absolute-eternal-spiritual truth. He merely seeks the best practical way leading him to his "secular" ends. As soon as he leaves the spot and goes to another place, such as a religious or intellectual meeting where the "sacred" truth hangs in the air, he forgets his other "self" and begins to preach and teach---to get enthusiastic about how man should strictly live up to his eternal principles. To quote Kimball Young:

> In our society, we have two moralities, one derived from Christianity and the Golden Rule, and the other from business enterprise, where sharp dealing and cutthroat competition are considered virtuous practices. Sometimes the strain induced in persons who are culturally indoctrinated in both codes results in schizoid, or split, personality.[5]

Following the theory of William James of the variety of men's "selves," we can conclude that in a "secularized" society man usually takes the roles mainly of two groups; the primary group in which he has been brought up, on the one hand, and the group of his economic and political interests, on the other hand.[6] He then has two "selves," the first tends to live up to the "sacred" values of the primary group, and the second self is motivated by the expediency of his "secular" life. To quote Young again,

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[5]K. Young, Social Psychology, p. 145.

[6]Cf. Reinold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, pp. 13-14.

In moral matters we may thoroughly accept the codes and practises of primary group controls but feel free to break these codes in dealing with competitors in business.[7]

This "compartmentalisation" of thought-style seems to be rife in a society, like the United States, where both religious sentiment and economic activities are strong. What Myrdal calls "the American Dilemma" may be well-represented in this realm. Strecker and Appel say,

A certain business man was the leader of the community in a town in the middle west. He was President of the Board of Trade, Superintendent of the Sunday School, and a generous contributor to the Boy Scouts. Yet he pressed a very close business deal, and several times ruthlessly ruined competitors. Religion may be love for fellowmen on Sunday, but in this instance, business was strictly business on the remaining six days of the week.

This is the motif of Ibsen's 'Pillars of Society'— those who lead double lives or practice secret vices may use this double type of thinking.[8]

Parallel to what is called in psychology the "schizoid" personality, we can develop in sociology the concept of "schizoid society." As a matter of fact, "compartmentalisation" of thought is sometimes more obvious in society than in the individual. Almost all of the societies that are somewhat raised above the level of primitives have, more or less, some sort of "compartmentalized"

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[7]K. Young, op. cit., p. 130.

[8]E. A. Strecker and K. E. Appel, Discovering Ourselves, p. 251.

thought-style.[9] Thinkers have always, since the classical time, talked about the conflict between the so-called "idealism" and "realism." Society is often pulled hard from two opposite sides. Men feel, on the one hand, obliged to follow the "ideals" inherited from the primary group, and tend, on the other hand, to drift along with social "currents" regardless of these sacred "ideals."

In order to solve this dilemma, society may resort to the distribution of the conflicting values among the various classes. To quote Professor Merton,

> Abstractly inconsistent values are often rendered compatable by their distribution among various statuses in the social structure so that they do not result in conflicting demands upon the same persons at the same time. Potential conflict of values may be obviated by their segregation in different universesof discourse and their incorporation in different social roles.[10]

In this way, people may allot, as it is often observed, the service of the "eternal truth" to certain classes, such as the priests, the monks, the wise-men, etc., whereas, the other classes go ahead in their secular activities unmolested. It may be, permitted for men to indulge in "sins," or in "secular activities."

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[9] It is a well-known saying that the "prinitive" is much less hypocritical than the "civilised" man. This may indicate the fact that "compartmentalisation" of thought-style does not exist among prinitives.

[10] R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 258.

But, they must go, as soon as possible, to the guardians of
the "eternal truth," so to speak, for the purpose of cleansing
themselves from these "sins." The only duty which is required
from the ordinary man as regards these guardians and functionaries
is to provide them with decent living, fulsome respect, and
certain lip-service once in a while.

In fact, it can be noticed, in every institutionalized
religion of the present civilization, some sort of "compartmental-
ized" thought-style and "schizoid" tendency. Durkheim seems to
consider this "compartmentalization" the essence of religion in
general. To Durkheim, the essence of religion is the division
of all things and phenomena into two kingdoms: the profane and
the sacred. Its teachings urge the members of a religion not
to mix these two kingdoms because mixing is a sin or a religious
sacrilege, and it teaches them to approach the kingdom of the
sacred or, when mixing does happen, in order that they may annul
its sinful results, it urges them to perform religious purifica-
tion, whatever its concrete form may be. These functions and
characteristics of religious phenomena are, according to Durkheim,
manifested in thousands of forms: in a special separation of the
place for religious services from the places of usual profane
activities; in a prohibition to use such places for everyday
affairs; and in separation of the time devoted to the sacred from

that devoted to the profane; hence, says Durkheim, arise holidays when it is forbidden to do profane things, as is specified in the fourth Commandment. The same essence of religion, is, in Durkheim's opinion, exhibited by religious ceremonies whose purpose is either to purify man from sin, as in the ease of confessions; or, like the Eucharist and baptism, to make a profane man a participant of the sacred; or, like a consecration, to give him an additional portion of the sacred.[11]

However, this religious phenomenon, which Durkheim claims to be the essence of religion in general, seems to characterise more obviously the civilised than the primitive society. The primitive life is too simple to suffer "compartmentalisation" in any of its various aspects. The separation of time, space, or class for religious devotion is not so important among the primitives as to make them behave or think in two different realms. There may be no exaggeration in saying that almost all of their activities are in some sense religious, that is to say, performed according to the "sacred" thought-style. "All in all," says Becker, "it may be said with considerable assurance that there is no phase of preliterate life

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[11]E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Chaps. II-III; See also P. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theory, pp. 473-74.

unaffected by supernatural or religious factors. . . ."[12]
There is no differentiation, to refer to MacIver's theory,
between value-as-end and value-as-means in the "primitive's"
eyes.[13] Everything is ruled by certain spirit or "mana," and
so, should be done according to the "eternal" and "absolute"
way which is inherited from their grandfathers and their great
grandfathers.[14] The "primitive" man acts in a certain fixed
way regardless of whether he is acting for sacred or secular
purposes. His behavior, as well as his thought, is done accord-
ing to the spiritualistic-eternalistic-absolutistic points of
view. In other words, there is no place in his life for the
materialistic-temporalistic-relativistic perspective.

As soon as civilization dawns upon the horizon of human
society, we find some segregation beginning to appear between the
"sacred" and the "secular," or, as MacIver puts it, between
value-as-end and value-as-means. The secularization process
will then draw certain things from their sacred places and throw

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[12]H. Barnes and H. Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, Vol. I, p. 36.

[13]See R. MacIver and C. Page, *Society*, p. 630 et seq.

[14]"As things," says Brown, "were in the days of long ago, so they are today, so they must remain. . . . Things remain; they don't pass away; they don't change . . . as the saying is 'the unconquerable things have been ever since the beginning.'" See N. Miller, *The Child in Primitive Society*, p. 253.

them into the rapidly changing current of life; while other
things remain in their old places comparatively unmolested.[15]
The politico-economic values, for example, may not be capable
of standing still in the midst of the tumultuous process of
civilization. A ruler, who follows the old rigid standards,
will be sooner or later overrun by his newly rising rivals. A
business man, too, will be destroyed by his competitors if he
"piously" sticks to the "sacred" rules of the primary group.
Men will be forced, therefore, by the pressure of time to adopt
the new ways of behavior and thought. The "secular" thought-style
will be, then, inevitable. The old "sacred" ways will be no
longer effective. To ease his conscience as regards the sacred
"ideals," man may resort to logic-tight "compartmentalization"
of thought and behavior. He will be permitted then to commit
"sins." But, in order to clean his soul from it, he quickly goes
to a "specialized" professional functionary and pays or performs
whatever he is ordered to do according to the circumstances.

Consequently, the schizoid type of personality becomes
rife. The drama of "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" may be played by
many persons, on the social stage. To quote Strecker and
Appel,

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[15]Cf. W. Ogburn, Social Change, p. 259, et seq.

Barriers, apparently, may prevent one side of the personality from observing what the other side is doing. Instead of thinking them out and reconciling them or adjusting them consciously, we follow one line of conduct and then another without ever bothering about inconsistencies. We develop a blindness to our contradictions which may be so patent to others that it becomes humorous—if it is not tragic.[16]

It is interesting indeed to see, as Max Lerner says, "that men, whether in politics, in business or in private life, do not act according to their professions of virtues."[17] Men, as Machiavelli rightly notices, thinks differently in the piazza and palazzo.[18] When one talks in a "salon," speaks in a meeting, addresses a crowd, writes a book, or the like, he preaches about the "ideals" as if he is a completely different person from his usual self. To use again Mead's terminology, he takes then the role of a primary group with its unchangeable ideals. But, as soon as he turns back to his usual life, he forgets the high "ideals" he was preaching. His thought-style goes in almost the opposite direction.

One of the senior governors of the Islamic Empire of the Medieval Ages once sent a long letter of advice to his son

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[16] R. Strecker and K. Appel, op. cit., p. 252.

[17] Max Lerner, "Introduction" in N. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. xiii.

[18] Cited by M. Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge, p. 69.

who was newly appointed to the office of governorship. It is really astonishing to find that the elaborately written advice of the governor runs just contrary to how he actually behaved in his own political career.[19] He diligently urges his son, for example, never to flatter an enemy, believe a spy, befriend a libertine, ally a non-believer, reward a flatterer, forgive a sinner because of his high position, etc.[20] In fact, it is unimaginable how a ruler in a "secular" society can strictly follow such advice without losing his job. It is difficult indeed to believe that the governor's purpose is really to want his son to follow literally his "idealistic" advice. He intended perhaps to perform, by sending such a pedantic letter, his formal duty as a ruler in a politico-religious state.

People are used, it seems, to forgive being "evil" in actual behavior. But they never forgive, on the other hand, believing in "evil" behavior. They may believe that actual behavior beongs to this changing world, while belief belongs to the eternal and absolute one. If you act "badly," it is a temporary phenomena, you may repent someday in the future and so you wash away everything you have done. But when you think

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[19] See the text of the letter in Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 303, et seq.

[20] Ibid., p. 307.

"badly," your eternal soul is polluted. You doubt the absolute
wisdom of God and side with His enemy, the Devil, and so He
will not forgive you. This appears to be derived from the
tribal spirit of the "sacred" society. You may be forgiven if
you act "badly" within your group as soon as you revert to believ-
ing in its "just" cause and siding with it against its enemies.
But when you cross the line and go to the side of the enemy,
only once, you are a "traitor." The only punishment for this
unforgivable act is death.

In this way, it is supposed, people are wont to differen-
tiate between thought and behavior. They allot to each a world
which is completely different from the other. Thinking belongs
to the realm of God, ideals, eternal values, the-other-world,
etc. Acting, on the other hand, belongs to this changing and
temporary world. So, the author of a book or orator should
forget his actual behavior and place before himself and his
audience the "eternal, absolute truth." Otherwise, he may be
considered a traitor, infidel or advocate of the Devil.

When Machiavelli wrote a book in which he tried to advise
his prince to push aside these "idealistic" penadtries and deal
with people in a truly "realistic" way, he became associated in
the popular mind with the Devil himself. "Old Nick" became an

epithet equally applicable to both.[21] It is right to say
that most of those who condemn Machiavelli actually behave in
the same manner as he advised them to. They condemn in fact
how he dares to exploit the realm of the eternal truth in the
explaining of such changeable phenomena as those of political
or military affairs. These phenomena which belong to this
illusary world should, they would say, be kept away from the
books of schools, the pulpits of churches, the platforms of
meetings, etc. In their opinion, people must be always taught
with these sacred means in terms of what ought to be rather than
what is.[22]

However, there are many thinkers who consider this
"compartmentalization" of thought quite advantageous to the
human society. They are of the opinion that "idealistic" think-
ing has, in spite of its contradiction to actual life, the
advantage of reminding man that there are certain "ideals" ahead
of him that should be sought and strived for. In this way,
society can move forward and release itself from the rigid
"cake-of-custom," in which it usually arrests itself. To quote
Von Wiese, the German sociologist,

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[21]See Barnes and Becker, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 301-02.

[22]Cf. Max Lerner, Introduction in M. Machiavelli, The
Prince, p. xliii.

> Utopia and Topia are always in deadly combat;
> ideal perfection continually clashes with real
> imperfection—perhaps imperfect because real. And,
> just as the Topia must always and everywhere be
> present if any ordered social life is to exist, so
> must the Utopia be similarly immortal, for one is
> the necessary complement of the other. Few of us
> are willing or able to dispense with the vision of
> a more perfect world; we gain courage to struggle in
> the here and now by envisaging the nowhere and never.
> Some of us look forward for that vision, some look
> back, but almost no one wishes to banish it from the
> view.[23]

According to some sociologists, "ideals" are necessary for human

society whatever it may be. The names or the forms of the

"ideals" may change, but there will never be a society without

them. In Durkheim's words: "Society can neither create nor

recreate itself without at the same time creating ideals."[24]

As far as society is now in a stage of transition from the

"sacred" type to the "secular" one, "ideals" seem to be inevitable

as well as necessary. Compartmentalization of thought-style is,

no doubt, harmful and indeed ridiculous. But, on the other hand,

to live along completely "realistic" lines in such a transitional

stage may be harmful also. It is, undoubtedly, a dilemma in

which both horns are sharp, but life in itself is a huge dilemma.

No aspect of human life seems to be free from such critical

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[23]Wiese-Becker, Systematic Sociology, p. 410.

[24]E. Durkheim, The Forms of Elementary Religions, cited
by G. Gurvitch, Twentieth Century Sociology, p. 276.

situations. In order to be alive and active man needs, as
Dewey points out, some goal toward which to strive. On arrival
at that goal, there should appear another to be attained. Lack
of striving and action may mean a lack of life.[25] There is,
therefore, always a dilemma between the one horn of attaining
the goal desired and the other of not attaining it because it
is the beginning of a new striving.

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A typical "secular" society, it is true, can be said to
lack "compartmentalization" of thought-style. Man may be able
there to think and act in the same way. A typical "secular"
society may be likened in its lack of "compartmentalization,"
to a typical "sacred" society, as we have noticed before.[26]
In primitive society which has been taken as "sacred" society
par excellence there is almost no conflict between the "actual"
and the "ideal." As Cooley says,

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[25]This is strongly reminiscent of Schopenhauer's
philosophy of life. See W. Durant, The Story of Philosophy,
p. 244, et seq.

[26]It should be remembered here again that a typical
society, whether sacred or secular, does not exist in actual
life. Every society in the world can be said to be in some
sort of transitional stage. "Shangri La" is nowhere on this
"sinful" globe. The dilemma is, more or less, present every-
where.

. . . /The primitives,7 do not formulate any
such ideals, but they have it nevertheless; they see
it: they see themselves and their fellows as an
indivisible, though various, "we," and they desire
this "we" to be harmonious, happy, and successful.[27]

In other words, the primitives are not aware of the "ideal"
because their "actual" does not differ from it. In brief, they
act and think in the same way. A typical "secular" society
will do the same, if it really arises somewhere in modern civiliza-
tion. Man will then think about the world around him in the
same manner as he acts upon it. He will no longer have "ideals"
that differ from his actual behavior. If the new "dynamic"
system of education prevails in the family and the school of
modern civilization, the child will no longer see the "ideal" as
a "static" idea loftily existing in the eternal-absolute-
spiritual world. There may be no such world to him. What ought

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[27]Cooley, Angell and Carr, Introductory Sociology, p. 61.

It is interesting indeed to notice at this point that the
goal of human ideals is, as Cooley here alludes to, to lose one's
self in the group, that is, to give up one's own interests for the
sake of the group's interests. Hence, we can consider the primi-
tive man highly "idealistic" because he usually identifies himself
with what Cooley calls the "we." This has wrongly led some
anthropologists to think that the primitive man has no ego-
consciousness, and no developed experience of his "self." It may
be more correct to say rather than he has no clear individuality.
To interpret this into Mead's terminology, we can say that he has
a weak "I" and a strong "me"; that is to say, he sees his "self"
as others see it; he feels that way very clearly, but he does not
feel it as an independent entity for itself. In brief, he has
social "self" but no individuality, just contrary to the civilized
man.

_to be_ will become what _is_. His logic will be then, as I. M.
Baldwin suggests, a "cinematographic" rather than a "photographic"
one.[28] The "ideal" for the typical "secular" man will be a
relative, temporal and rational one, which pragmatically changes
along with the change in time and space. Instead of the ancient
idea that history is a series of struggle between good people
and bad people, the new logic will teach that many of the bitterest
struggles are oppositions of one group's good and some other
group's good. It will be no longer good versus bad, but good
versus good and evil versus evil.[29]

It should be remembered that this is a typological des-
cription of some fictitious society which is expected to be
closely approached someday in the future if the process of social
"secularisation" continues along the same trend that has been
observed since the beginning of modern times. There are, however,
certain evidences that support this prophecy. Comparing the
modern situation where a writer like Machiavelli is welcome and
respected, to the past where there was a wide discrepency between
how people actually behaved and what they confessed, we may find

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[28]See H. Thomas, _The Living World of Philosophy_, p. 99, et seq.

[29]See W. A. Leys, _Ethics and Social Policies_, p. 257.

that we are really moving, fast or slowly, toward the afore-
mentioned goal.[30] The dilemma of idealism versus realism is
now losing much of its vigor in the mental atmosphere of the
cosmopolitan cities of today. There may appear here and there
numerous writers, like T. V. Smith,[31] who do not see any conflict
whatsoever between philosophical speculations, on the one hand,
and political activities, on the other. "Compromise," rather
than dogmatic attachment to certain absolute values, becomes
the shibboleth of the age.

T. V. Smith says as regards "compromise,"

> To demand the maximum of ideality—the highest
> demands of the private conscience—as the rule of
> collective action is to suffer the minimum ideality,
> for, since other consciences will not agree with the

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[30]It is interesting to notice that the thinkers in many
of the oriental countries of today still live in the same mental
climate of the past ages. The conflict, between what is and
what ought to be, is still going on in the same scale as that of
the time of Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun. In the East, it is
enormously hazardous, on the part of a writer, for example, to
write today a "realistic" article which violates some of the
favorite "ideals" of the public.

[31]T. V. Smith is a politician-philosopher. He may be
considered the secular version of the Platonic "king-philosopher."
Instead of dogmatically clinging to certain fixed ideas or ideals,
he believes in compromise. "In his recent publication," says
Leys, "Professor Smith has blessed the peacemakers (the politicians)
who mediate and wear down the demands of the rival pressure groups.
He has also suggested that conscientious citizen will be more
civilized if he loses some of his self-rightousness and shows more
readiness to go 'beyond conscience.'" W. A. Leys, op. cit.,
pp. 313-14.

highest vision of any conscience, this vision can
be put into action only by coercion, which in turn
outrages all other values and mutilates its own by
the form of implementation. To settle collectively,
on the other hand, for the minimum ideality is to
facilitate the realization of the maximum. This is
so because the minimum can be agreed upon; the agree-
ment establishes a domain of peace and permits each
conscience to go back to its groups of like-minded
people and then work out its highest promptings
directly for the subsequent indirect improvement of
the body politic.[32]

The above quotation is an example of a secular thought-
style. In it, one can clearly see a relativistic, temporalistic,
materialistic reasoning. It is undeniable that this sort of
reasoning is comparatively rife among modern thinkers. It seems
to be gradually spreading day after day. It is, therefore,
reasonable to conclude that the time when it becomes dominant
will come sooner or later, and then the pattern of behavior and
the style of thought will, for better or worse, coincide.

[32]T. V. Smith, "Compromise, Its Context and Limits,"
Ethics, Vol. LIII, No. 1, October 1942, pp. 7-8.

THE ISLAMIC THOUGHT-STYLE

The conflict between the "ideal" and the "real" and their final "compartmentalisation" within the social structure can be clearly observed in the early history of Islam. The Islamic society may be taken as an excellent example of what has been called the "schizoid society."

Mohammed founded Islam in a "sacred" society; and shortly after his death, the Moslems rapidly spread over a wide variety of cultures and civilisations, where they established one of the biggest empires in history. The transition from an extremely "sacred" society to an extremely "secular" one was enormous and very fast indeed. The well-conserved and well-memorised traditions of Mohammed, "Al-Hadith," stood face to face against the secularised and disorganised affairs of the Islamic Empire.

The external wars which successfully built the empire were immediately followed, as Toynbee points out, by the internal wars[1] which arose between the two camps of Islam: the "ideal-istic" and the "realistic." Some of the Moslems had drifted

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[1]"In this Arab act of brigandage," says Toynbee, "the twelve years of conquest were followed by twenty-four years of fratricidal strife." A Toynbee, A Study of History, (Abridged), p. 343.

along with the currents of the time and so adopted a relativistic,
temporalistic, materialistic attitude; while others remained
in the mental atmosphere of the old time in which secular life
was bitterly criticised and vehemently fought. The conflict
between the two camps was, as Professor Ahmad Amin notices,
severe and long.[2]

The Moslem historians are wont to classify the history
of the Islamic Empire into three clear-cut periods: (1) the
period of the "Rashidin" (orthodox) caliphs which immediately
succeeded the death of the Prophet and lasted for about thirty
years (2) the period of the Omayyad dynasty which succeeded the
first period and lasted for about a century (3) the period of the
Abbasid dynasty which succeeded the second period and lasted
until the invasion of the Mongols, who ransacked Bagdad (656,
A. H.—1358, A. D.) and marked the beginning of the Islamic
dark ages.[3]

This classical division of the Islamic history can be,
in spite of its dynastic basis, highly instructive in tracing
the successive stages through which the Islamic thought-style
has developed. We can safely say that these three periods

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[2]A. Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, p. 82.

[3]See D. Miqdadi, Tarikh Al-Ummat Al-Arabiyya, p. 330
et passim.

paying much attention to the Mohammedan traditions.[7] The "idealists" and the religious men, on the other hand, devoted themselves to the collecting and preserving of the sacred traditions of Mohammed and his "Rashidin" successors with no inclination whatsoever toward the understanding of actual development of life.[8] The gap between two camps gradually increased with the passing of time. One Omayyad Caliph, Omar II, seriously attempted to reconcile the two and revive the old "golden" time,[9] but without much success. The only reward he got for his pious attempt was being included, by the orthodox historians and theologians, among the "Rashidin Caliphs." His attempt was like "a blow in the ashes," as the oriental proverb would say.

An important event took place during the Omayyad regime, which eventually turned out to be a highly explosive mine put under the whole edifice of the Omayyad Caliphate. This event was the murder of Hussain, the son of Ali and the grandson of Mohammed through his well-known daughter, Fatima.[10] Hussain was,

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[7]See L. D. Vida, "Umayiad" Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 998; Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 374; Vol. II, p. 162.

[8]J. Schacht, "Sharia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 322.

[9]See Abu Yusof, Kitab Al-Kharaj, pp. 18-20.

[10]A. Aqqad, Abu Al-Shuhada, p. 140, et passim; Amir Ali, The Spirit of Islam, p. 464 et seq.

like his father, Ali, a man of idealism and extreme piety. He
revolted with some few followers against the drunkard Omayyad
Caliph, Yazid. A government army met him in a place in Iraq
called Karbala, and savagely murdered him along with his sons,
relatives and followers. Modern orientalists and students of
Islam are usually inclined in favor of the Omayyad Caliph
against Hussain. They tend to consider Hussain a mere rebel
against his legitimate government. The orthodox Moslems, on
the other hand, view the event quite differently.

> Mohammadan tradition, which with rare exceptions
> is uniformly hostile to the Umayyad dynasty, regards
> Husayn as a martyr and Yazid as his murderer; while
> modern historians, for the most part, agree with Sir
> W. Mair, who points out that Husayn, "having yielded
> himself to a treasonable, though impotent design upon
> the throne, was committing an offense that endangered
> society and demanded swift suppression." This was
> naturally the view of the party in power, and the
> reader must form his conclusion as to how far it
> justifies the action which they took. For Moslems the
> question is decided by the relation of the Umayyads to
> Islam. Violators of its laws and spurners of its
> ideals, they could never be anything but tyrants; and
> being tyrants, they had no right to slay believers who
> rose in arms against their usurped authority. The
> so-called verdict of history, when we come to examine
> it, is seen to be the verdict of religion, the judgment
> of theocratic Islam on Arabian Imperialism. On this
> ground the Umayyads are justly condemned, but it is
> well to remember that in the Moslem eyes the distinc-
> tion between Church and State does not exist. Yazid
> was a bad Churchman: therefore he was a wicked tyrant;
> the one thing involves the other.[11]

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[11]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 197. It is significant to
note here that the above quotation is one of the rare examples
in which orientalists study Islam through its own perspective
rather than through their own.

However, this historic tragedy of Hussain provided the
"idealistic" camp with a tool of propaganda that could never
be obtained otherwise. Many historians agree that the Abbasids
based their whole movement on the idea of "avenging the murder
of Hussain."[12]   As a matter of fact, the classical slogan "Oh,
revenge for Hussain!" was a motto around which many Moslems
rose in rage and sacrificed their lives.[13]

Finally, the Ommayyad Caliphate crashed, and the Abbasid
regime became firmly established. In the opinion of Amir Ali
and some other orientalists, the orthodox Islam is entirely
built on the self-interest of the Abbasids.[14] This opinion how-
ever, is not wholly free from exaggeration. The orthodox Islam,
it is true, took its final form at the time of the early Abbasid
Caliphs. Most of the Islamic "sciences," especially history and
"Hadith," were encouraged by them and became firmly established
under their supervision. The history of Islam began then to be
molded in its final form. Moreover, it began to be overloaded,
consciously or unconsciously, with undue praise for the Abbasids

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[12]Their war flags were black in color in order to indicate
their mourning for the death of Hussain and the other Alid martyrs.
See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mocaddima, p. 259.

[13]See G. Zaidan, Al-Tamaddun Al-Islami, Vol. IV, p. 114
et seq.

[14]Amir Ali, op. cit., p. 287, A. Guillaume, Traditions
of Islam, p. 60; R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 365.

and dispraises for the Omayyads.[15] The Aristotelian logic was
introduced at that time, and became a useful tool in the hands
of the historians and carriers of "Hadith" in their praising-
dispraising tendency. Philip Hitti says,

> At the time of its achievement the Abbasid victory
> was generally hailed as representing the substitution
> of the true conception of the caliphate, the idea of
> the theocratic state, for the purely secular state (Mulk)
> of the Umayyads. . . . the highly organized machinery
> for propaganda which helped to undermine public con-
> fidence in the Umayyad regime was now cleverly directed
> toward permanently entrenching the Abbasids in public
> favour.[16]

It was impossible, of course, on the Abbasids' part to
really combine the old "ideal" of Mohammed with the secularized
"real" of actual politics, and make them act together in the same
pattern as that of the early time. The "real" of the Islamic
Empire was at that time too secular to be basically reconciled
with the sacred "ideal." The Abbasids resorted, therefore, to
the trick of "compartmentalization" with which they could satisfy
both needs separately without bringing them face to face on a
common ground. To quote Professor Hitti again,

> As a matter of fact the religious change was more
> apparent than real; although unlike his Umayyad
> predecessor he assumed piety and feigned religiousity,

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[15]A. Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. II, pp. 26, 124; L. D.
Vida, "Umayiad," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 999.

[16]P. Hitti, op. cit., pp. 288-89.

> the Baghdad Caliph proved as worldly-minded as
> he of Damascus whom he had displaced.[17]

They devoted special times and places for prayer and "idealistic"
contemplation and discussion, while the remaining times and
places became free for secular activities. They appointed offi-
cial functionaries for each realm and ordered them to go ahead
with their fields of specialisation without paying any attention
to what the other specialists would say.

When the Abbasid caliphs found themselves in a situation
where the "ideal" and the "real" came into open conflict, they
did not hesitate to call the orthodox jurists and thinkers in
order to find some "legitimate tricks" with which they might be
able to evade the conflict.[18] It was not rare, for example, to
find a caliph legitimately releasing himself from an oath or a
promise through a religious or "idealistic" excuse that was
readily sanctioned by the orthodox jurists.[19]

The caliphs were accustomed to fill their luxurious
palaces with thousands of concubines and slaves, and hundreds of

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[17] Ibid., p. 289.

[18] A. Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. II, p. 33.

[19] See, for example, Ibn Khaldun, Kitab Al-Ibar, Vol. III,
pp. 208, 218.

specialized singers and dancers, and enjoy life to the utmost.[20]
But, as soon as the time of formal prayer came, everything would
be adjourned and the psychological atmosphere then became com-
pletely different.[21] One of the Abbasid Caliphs, Al-Mutawakkil,
was so unjust and ruthless in his secular life that he was
called the "Nero of the Orient."[22] He was nevertheless con-
sidered by the traditionists as one of the best caliphs in Islam
merely because he upheld the traditional orthodoxy and suppressed
sectarian tendencies with utmost severity. Ahmad Amin says
about him,

> In spite of the fact that he was one of the most
> unjust caliphs, the orthodox Moslems eulogized him,
> and pardoned him for his mischievous deeds. Many
> traditionists saw in their dreams that Allah had
> forgiven him.[23]

Ibn Khaldun relates a story about a certain caliph who
was widely known for his extremely vicious life which ran contrary
to the Islamic standards of piety and moral integrity. Con-
sequently, he was killed. However, some men finally discovered

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[20]See P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 302, et seq.

[21]See G. Zaidan, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 196-98.

[22]D. Miqdadi, op. cit., p. 320. "Al-Mutawakkil," says
Hitti, "according to a report, had 4,000 concubines, all of whom
shared his nuptial bed." P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 342.

[23]Ahmad Amin, Dhuhr Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 198.

that the caliph was not so bad as it had been judged. He was,
they realized, highly meticulous and careful as regards his
formal prayers and religious ceremonies. When the time of prayer
approached, he was accustomed to take off the clothes in which
he committed his vices, put on clean ones, perfectly perform
the rite of ablution, and then, perform the required prayer as
humbly as any other pious Moslem would do. His murderer, there-
fore, made a great mistake in killing such a "good" caliph.[24] In
their opinion, it seems, whether a caliph is good or bad, depends,
not upon his actual behavior but rather upon his lip-service
towards his God.

As we might have noticed in the preceding chapter, a
Moslem ruler was practically permitted to act within his political
field according to what the societal expediency or his personal
sentiment would dictate upon him; but, when he was to speak from
the pulpit of the mosque or to deliver formal advice, he should
act according to the strict "ideal" of the Prophet. The later
action had absolutely nothing to do with the former. Each had
its own independent field. When the Moslem governor mentioned
in the preceding chapter advised his son in his "idealistic"
letter to do in politics as he would do in the mosque, i.e., to
befriend pious men and repel men of this world, he did not really

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[24]See Ibn Khaldun, Kitab Al-Ibar, Vol. III, p. 106.

mean that his son should take his advice literally. In other
words, he did not mean to ruin his son's future as a successful
governor. Perhaps he meant to make him appear that way in his
public performances.

Gradually afterwards, the Islamic society developed what
may be called "vicarious religion." Successful men in politics
or business might hire, with money, some other men to perform
religious duties for them, such as prayer, pilgrimage, fasting
and the like. Many mosques, religious schools, monastery-like
institutions were erected by the upper and wealthy classes of
the society for the purpose of pleasing or appeasing Allah. It
appeared as if God became in their eyes a monarch-like person
who was to be propitiated by gifts, flattery and signs of personal
submission and obedience. One can easily notice that the number
of religious establishments usually ran proportional to the
injustice done to the society by the ruling class. A modern
writer in Egypt observes that the darkest age in the history of
Egypt, that is, the age of the Turkish Mamluks, was also the
greatest age in mosque building. Nizam Al-Mulk, the well-known
councilor of the Saljuqi Sultanate in Iraq, spent a great part
of the Sultan's money on building mosques and almhouses. When
the Sultan blamed him for that extravagance, he frankly answered
that all of them as well as their soldiers and officials indulged

in various sins and vices. Nothing, therefore, the councilor continued, could save them from Allah's punishment except to mobilize a huge army of pious worshippers who would spend their nights in worshipping, "crying" and praying for them.[25]

Religion became then extremely formal, with little attention paid by its followers to its original spirit and morality.[26] Secular life became completely separate from religious life. Each had its special attendants, functionaries and funds. A ruler would be popularly considered pious and good as far as he had "taken care of the shrines and provided for the maintenance of the regular offerings." His unjust deeds in his secular life might be taken as relatively insignificant. These deeds were temporary phenomena which would be soon forgotten. The religious institutions which he had established, on the

[25]G. Zaidan, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 202.

[26]This seems to be the final stage in the evolution of every religion arising in a secular society. As we shall see in the third part of this work, every religion tends to be moralistic in its beginning and formalistic at the end. What has happened in Islam is quite reminiscent of what had happened, for example, in the religion of ancient Babylon. As P. Smith points out, the Babylonian priests flatly ascribed the fall of Babylon to the fact that its king, Nabonidus, had not taken care of the shrines and provided for the maintenance of the regular offerings. See P. Smith, The Prophet and His Problems, p. 221. Judaism, which arose partly as a reaction against this formalistic religion, finally became itself formalistic. See J. Driscoll, "Pharisees," The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, p. 790.

other hand, were long lasting, and long eulogized.[27]

The ruling and the wealthy classes had a full right to immortalize their religious achievements by writing them down or hiring someone to write them down in a form of book. This was considered permissible and even good. By writing a book about religious achievements, other men, it was expected, might be encouraged to do the same. It was, on the other hand, deemed bad for a ruler to write down his secular activities as they actually happened without some sort of apology or rationalization. Book-writing was regarded at that time similar in effect to preaching from a mosque pulpit. A writer, at least while writing, was expected to be "idealistic." His books were intended for reading by many men and for future as well as present times. They were required to deal with the eternal truths instead of the ephemeral concerns of a particular group of men at a given time—with the "ideal" world instead of the "real" one.

There appeared only one writer in the whole history of Islam who once belonged to the ruling class of the society and who frankly wrote a book about his secular activities as truly as they happened. This was Ibn Khaldun. In addition to his

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[27]It is interesting to note here that all of the old mosques and religious establishments that remain until today carry on their walls the names of their builders surrounded by plentiful ceremonial phrases and Koranic verses. Nobody can imagine, therefore, that those great builders go to "Hell" after all.

famed _Prolegomena_ which is the main subject of the present dis-
sertation, he wrote a long autobiography[28] in which he flatly
told all the "badness" and "fickleness" of his secular life
with no tendency whatsoever to apologize or rationalize.[29] Ibn
Khaldun's autobiography was no doubt an astonishing and unexplain-
able phenomenon to his contemporary fellow-writers. Until the
present time nobody has been fully able to explain how and why
Ibn Khaldun dared to write such an extremely frank and "real-
istic" book about himself. It is possible, however, to consider
Ibn Khaldun's _Prolegomena_ as a sort of indirect or semi-conscious
rationalization of his "fickle" political career which he honestly
told in his autobiography. At any rate, Ibn Khaldun's whole
work was an exceptional phenomenon in view of the entirely
"idealistic" intellectual environment in which he appeared.

Just like their rulers, the Moslem writers did not raise
any serious objection against the extremely secular trends of
their society;[30] while they were, nevertheless, highly "idealistic"
in their literary and formal engagements. They persisted in
writing vehemently about the Mohammedan "ideals" in spite of the

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[28]Ibn Khaldun, _Kitel Al-Ibar_, Vol. VII passim.

[29]M. Enan, _Ibn Khaldun_, p. 28; Taba Hussein, _Falsfat Ibn Khaldun Al-Ijtimaiya_, p. 24.

[30]See T. Arnold and G. Gullaum, _The Legacy of Islam_, p. 302.

fact that no one would be influenced by them. They themselves
were not different from others in accepting secular trends,
despite their own writings.[31]

Several books had been published during this period,
and all of them were written, not to describe what is, but
rather to discuss what ought to be. The orthodox writers seemed
to indulge in some sort of Platonic Utopias where things were
supposed to be achieved exactly according to the old "ideals."
In the opinion of Schacht, they intended by writing their books
to show how things were going to be at the time of the "Mahdi,"
the future deliverer of Islam.[32] They appear to have been lost
between the past of the Prophet and the future of the "Mahadi."
They had paid so much attention to the past and the future that
they had missed the present.

In this light, many of the classic books of Islam which
deal with political affairs can be understood. They have been
written to preach rather than to describe, to dream rather than
to see objectively.

One of these books deserves a special mention in this

[31]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 224.

[32]J. Schacht, "Sharia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV,
p. 323.

connection. This book, The Virtuous City, was written by
Farabi, the great philosopher of Islam (d. 950, A. D.). It is
not different in its general outlook from any other book written
in Islam about social phenomena. Farabi was most probably
inspired in the writing of it by Plato's Republic.[33] He attempts
in his writing to describe an ideal state or what he calls a
"virtuous city." Nothing strange or new can be found in it as
far as he continues to describe his "virtuous city." But, great
sociological insights suddenly appear in the book when he comes
to describe what he calls "anti-virtuous cities." Here we find
him a man of great scientific ability and keen observation.[34]
In order to show how things become corrupted in actual life and
very low in comparison to those of the ideal city, he gives some
details of real cities. By these details which reflect, to a
large extent, the every day life of his time, Farabi provides
us with a sociological description of the first grade.[35]

It is interesting to imagine, while reading this excellent
work, how many great sociological works like this could have
been produced by the classic writers of the old time, if they

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[33]C. De Voux, "Farabi," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. II,
p. 54.

[34]C. De Vaux likens some of his theories in this regard
to those of Nietzsche. See M. A. Raziq, Fallasuf Al-Arab, pp.
91-92.

[35]See Al-Farabi, Al-Madinat Al-Fadhila, p. 90 et seq.

had not been so much preoccupied by their "idealistic" tenden-
cies. Some of those writers seem to be highly capable of
sociological study. The main reason, which has prevented them
from doing that, lies perhaps in the fact that they consider it
"bad" and "devilish" to study temporary phenomena that belong
to this corrupted world.[36] Farabi has devoted a small part of
his book to the description of actual life only for the purpose
of condemning it and laughing at its "absurdity." If he had
been free from such mental preoccupation, he might have produced
a much greater work.

When we come to study Ibn Khaldun, it seems necessary to
treat his sociological theory in the light of what has been just
discussed. Ibn Khaldun is, no doubt, a great thinker and original
writer. But, we should not over-emphasize this fact to the

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[36]The author of _Akhlaqi Jalali_ which is considered the
most esteemed ethical work of Islam divides men into four grades
according to the ability to understand the absolute truth; the
highest grade includes philosophers, while the lower grade
includes the idiots who do not penetrate in their world-view
beneath the surface of things into the absolute truth. In his
own words, "Next comes the class of those short sighted mortals
who cannot idealize at all beyond the order of things sensibly
manifest, and who stop short at remote ideas and images; and
those we term imbeciles." W. F. Thompson, _Practical Philosophy
of the Muhammedan People_, p. 369. In view of this classification
of men, no writer is encouraged to deal with the actual things
which are deemed superficial. Every writer likes, of course, to
be graded within the upper grade--with the philosophers who over-
look the temporary phenomena of the world for the sake of its
eternal and absolute reality.

extent that we neglect to go deeper into his mental preoccupa-
tion and preconception in order to understand the origin of his
theory. The key with which we may be able to appreciate fully
Ibn Khaldun's originality lies in the fact that he was the only
writer in the medieval Islam who became free in his political
and social writing from "idealistic" orientation. He differs
from Farabi, for instance, in the fact that he tends to describe
actual life, not to condemn it as Farabi has done, but to seriously
analyse it in order to understand it and adapt himself to it.

There are, of course, several factors behind this "real-
istic" orientation of Ibn Khaldun. Why he became "realistic" in
his thought-style in spite of his "idealistic" education, is a
complicated subject indeed. Several aspects of this subject are
to be studied in the following parts of this work. In the next
chapter, however, one single point is going to be discussed;
that is, the way in which Ibn Khaldun has tried to reconcile the
"ideal" and the "real" in his theory.

CHAPTER VI

IBN KHALDUN'S THOUGHT-STYLE

Ibn Khaldun can be rightly considered the Islamic ver-
sion of Machiavelli. Both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli have
distinguished themselves from their scholastic contemporaries
by treating social affairs within a highly "realistic" frame
of reference. There is, however, a big difference between the
two which should not be overlooked. Whereas Machiavelli rejects
"idealism" for "realism," or in the words of Max Lerner, what
ought to be for what is,[1] Ibn Khaldun acknowledges the validity
and importance of both. To Ibn Khaldun, what ought to be is as
valid as what is, but they should be completely separated, each
to be placed in its special realm without permitting it to inter-
fere with the other. He bitterly attacks orthodox thinkers in
several parts of his famed Prolegomena on the ground that they
are in the habit of mixing the two, that is, of having a
"schisoid" thought-style.

In certain places, he attacks the historians who are
accustomed to write history and to discuss its problems in the

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[1]Max Lerner, "Introduction" in N. Machiavelli, The Prince,
p. xlvi.

same spirit as that in which they treat the Hadith (i.e.,
traditional sayings) of the Prophet. Ibn Khaldun is of the
opinion that religious affairs should not be mixed with secular
affairs.[2] The Prophet's sayings normally deal with what ought
to be; the "traditionists" therefore have the right to busy them-
selves with the question of whether a certain "tradition" has
been really said by the Prophet or not. But they should not,
Ibn Khaldun says, use the same method in history. History deals
with what **is**, with the actual affairs of society, and so, in
order to study it you must study at first the social laws which
rule people in their everyday activities. The method of the
"traditionists," in investigating the integrity and truthfulness
of the men who bear the Prophet's saying, is no longer important
in history-writing. Most of the Moslem historians and social
theorists are, in the opinion of Ibn Khaldun, like preachers and
teachers telling what **ought to be**, while their real job is to tell
what actually happened in the past.[3]

At any rate, Ibn Khaldun does not belittle the significance
of the "ideal" and religious, as Machiavelli does. In fact, he
himself claims to be a very pious and religious person. The

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[2]See Ibn Khaldun, **Al-Moqaddima**, p. 37 and passim.

[3]**Ibid.**, pp. 37, 40 and passim.

thing he hates most in this respect is the interference of
religious "idealism" or utopianism in the affairs of actual
life.[4] In order to fulfil your duty as a religious man, he
says, you should retire from secular life and go worshiping
Allah in some isolated places which are particularly devoted
to such religious activities.[5] It is not practical or useful,
in his opinion, to disturb society with "idealistic" halucina-
tion or religious utopianism.[6] Instead of disturbing the social
order by dreaming reforms, Ibn Khaldun advises, one should
submit to the social necessity and expediency to which all men,
since the beginning of history, have submitted.

Ibn Khaldun attacks the "idealistic" thinkers for their

[4]It should be mentioned at this point that the orthodox
writers, in spite of their actual drifting with the expediency of
secular life encourage at times utopiamistic reforms and revolu-
tions. At the time of Ibn Khaldun, several revolutions arose
in North Africa as a result of their utopian writings. Much
blood was shed for the sake of some impracticable "ideals."

[5]See Taha Hussain, Falsafat Ibn Khaldun Al-Iitimaiya,
Vol. 25, p. 80.

[6]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 160 et passim. It is interest-
ing to notice that Gumplowicz, who is considered one of the great
admirers of Ibn Khaldun among modern sociologists, has come to a
conclusion quite similar to that of his admired master. "In fact,"
says Barnes, "Gumplowicz maintains that the chief practical value
of his sociology is that it will prevent the waste of human energy
in futile utopian schemes of social reform." H. Barnes, "The
Social Philosophy of Ludwig Gumplowicz" in H. Barnes, History of
Sociology, p. 201.

overlooking of the present and their concentrating on the past
of the Prophet along with the future of the "Mahdi." To him,
the Prophet's "ideal" was suitable to the time and the place
in which the Prophet happened to live.[7] It is quite useless and
even harmful sometimes to apply this old "ideal" to the present
which is quite different from the time of the Prophet. As to
the future, Ibn Khaldun flatly denies the coming of any "Mahdi."
Thus, Ibn Khaldun can be regarded as the first, and perhaps the
last, writer in Islam who dares to deny the "Mahdi." To him,
the future, as well as the past, runs on the same pattern, and
goes according to the same laws, that can be observed in the
present. The similarity between the past and the future, Ibn
Khaldun says, is more than that between two drops of water.[8]

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[7]In his own words, "Ages differ from each other . . . and
each must be specifically judged." Ibid., p. 211.

[8]Ibid., p. 10. One may notice here some sort of contra-
diction between this opinion of Ibn Khaldun and a former one which
says that ages differ from each other and each must be specially
judged. It is undeniable anyhow that Ibn Khaldun's work is not
free from inconsistencies. No creative mind, in fact, can escape
inconsistency of some sort. S. N. Patton says, "consistency is
the refuge of small minds." (Cited by J. M. Ferguson, Landmarks
of Economic Thought, p. 131.) At any rate, Ibn Khaldun's present
situation can be easily defended. He believes that ages differ in
their particular conditions, but all of them nevertheless are ruled
by the same social laws. According to his theory, the time of the
Prophet, for example, is different from our time on the ground of
differences in type of customs, cultural development, social
structure, etc., while the general rules which govern various kinds
of human society are the same in the past and the present.

Ibn Khaldun pays great attention to the historical con-
troversies of Ali versus Muawiya,[9] Hussain versus Yazid, and,
finally, the "sacred" Caliphate versus the "secular" kingship.
As we might have noticed, these controversies characterized the
conflict between the "ideal" and the "real" in the Omayyad period,
and eventually became rigidly institutionalized within the
Islamic orthodoxy in the Abbasid period. Ibn Khaldun faces,
therefore, a perplexing dilemma. Following his "realistic" tend-
ency, or in other words, his "secular" thought-style, he should
side with Muawiya against Ali, with Yazid against Hussain, and,
in general, with the Omayyads against the "idealistic" camp. But
this would surely bring trouble to Ibn Khaldun and to anyone who
dared to doubt the absolute validity of the orthodox dogma.

However, Ibn Khaldun was clever enough to come out un-
harmed from that critical situation. It was quite possible that
he might have come out, otherwise, with the same result as that

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[9] Muawya is the chief rival of Ali and the founder of the
Omayyad dynasty in Islam. The conflict between Ali and Muawiya
is considered the first event in the history of Islam in which the
"ideal" and the "real" came into clear-cut contrast. Muawiya is,
as Hitti points out, no favorite with several historians whose
works came down to us. They regarded him as the first "king" in
Islam. The historian's attitude is a reflection of that of the
"idealistic" puritan, who accused him of secularizing Islam and
changing the theocratic caliphate to a temporal kingship. (P.
Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 197.) Ibn Khaldun is one of the
very few historians who praise and admire Muawiya in Islam. This
is one aspect of Ibn Khaldun's "realistic" orientation.

of Machiavelli, i.e., cursed and eternally condemned, if he had not protected himself by some traditional sayings with which he superficially supported his theory. He got, it is true, a general neglect from the Moslem readers, as a result of his "realistic" outlook;[10] but no religious "curse" has ever fallen on him.

Ibn Khaldun cleverly defends Muawiya, criticizes Hussain and favorably discusses the secular tendencies of the Omayyads, without arousing any suspicion or indignation in orthodox Moslems. He theorizes in a completely secular thought-style, but he resorts to a "saying" of Mohammed or a "doing" of the "Rashidin" caliphs as soon as he finds himself in a "dangerous"

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[10]Several writers have tried to explain the reason behind the general neglect in which Ibn Khaldun's theory was treated in the Islamic world up to a very recent time. Most of the writers seem to agree that his theory was forgotten and neglected in Islam only because of the general decline in which the Islamic civilization had been completely immersed after Ibn Khaldun. This may be true but in a very indirect way. Many of the thinkers, who appeared about or after Ibn Khaldun's time, won long-lasting fame in spite of the so-called "decline of the Islamic civilization." In the opinion of this writer, Ibn Khaldun was forgotten by the Moslems mainly because of his "realistic" outlook which they did not understand, or rather, did not appreciate. They were perhaps amazed at the seriousness with which Ibn Khaldun had treated the affairs of this temporary world. For them, these affairs did not deserve to be written in a formal book; everybody knew them for everybody practiced them; there was, therefore, no advantage of wasting "pens and papers" on them, while ideas of eternal value waited to be contemplated upon and written instead.

situation. Most of the traditional "sayings" or "doings,"
which he has used, do not fit well the theory he propounds.[11]
Some of them may be, in reality, contradictory to the spirit
of his theory; but he seems to be satisfied with them as far as
they talismanically protect him from the "curse" of the "jurists"
and theologians.[12]

His writing in this connection is clearly "secular,"
that is to say, relativistic, temporalistic and materialistic.
In the fourth part of this work, the personal and the class factors,
which underlie his "secular" thought-style, will be duly dis-
cussed. It may be satisfactory here to discuss how he has applied
the relativistic, temporalistic and materialistic methods on the
aforementioned controversies.

Ibn Khaldun agrees with the orthodox writers that the
sacred caliphate came to an end when Muawiya, the founder of the
Omayyad dynasty, ascended to the throne.[13] Ibn Khaldun might be
unable to deny this because there was a well-known "saying,"
attributed to the Prophet, to the effect that the caliphate
would last only thirty years after the Prophet's death, and then

[11]Cf. T. Hussain, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

[12]Ibid., p. 128.

[13]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 206.

an unjust kingship would prevail.[14] Ibn Khaldun admits, how-
ever, that Muawiya was a "king" rather than a "caliph." But,
what is wrong with that? he seems to ask.[15] In his words,
"kingship is a relative thing."[16] It is, therefore, not bad in
itself. It is like any thing human—bad when used for bad
purposes, good otherwise.[17] In his opinion, the Prophet did not
dispraise or condemn kingship as such; he rather condemned its
usual by-products such as injustice, luxury and the like.[18]
When it is used, on the other hand, to help justice, defend
religion and encourage religious ceremonies, it becomes un-
doubtedly worthy of praise. Condemning kingship is, according
to Ibn Khaldun, just like condemning anger or sexual desire.
These instincts, he says, are not intrinsically bad; they are
causes of preserving the human race and protecting it against
agression. They become bad only when they are unjustly or
illegally used.[19]

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[14]This saying is said to be invented by the orthodox
carriers of Hadith as a protest against the worldly Omayyads.

[15]See Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 206.

[16]Ibid., p. 188.

[17]Ibid., p. 192-193.

[18]Ibid., p. 192.

[19]Ibid., pp. 202-203.

To Ibn Khaldun, Muawiya was a true Moslem and a good ruler. He adopted a pompous kingship merely because the conditions of the time obliged him to do so. He lived in an age which was greatly different from that of the Prophet and/or his "Rashidin" successors. Luxury and pompous appearances became in his time necessary in order to be a respectable ruler.[20] As to Muawiya's rebellion against the legitimate caliph, Ali, and his taking of the caliphate by force, Ibn Khaldun refers to the social pressure which obliged him to do so.[21] Further, Ibn Khaldun says, Muawiya did not show by his revolution a wrong aim. Muawiya fought Ali merely because he found himself better equipped for the caliphate than Ali. Muawiya's "asabiyya" (or party) was stronger than that of Ali, and so he was in a better position to enforce the divine law than Ali.[22] Ali had a weak

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[20]Ibid., p. 203.

[21]Ibid., pp. 205-206.

[22]Ibn Khaldun does not directly say that. But, in several places of his Prolegomena, he notes that one of the most important qualifications of a caliph is to have a strong party, or to use his terminology, a strong "asabiyya," for the purpose of supporting him in executing the divine law. (See Ibid., pp. 193, 195, 216, 224.) In his own words, "No one is ordered /by Allah/ to do something which he is unable to do." (Ibid., p. 196.) Generally speaking, Ibn Khaldun can be said to be of the opinion that it is for the welfare of the people to have a caliph from the strongest party in the nation, and the strongest party or tribe has full right to revolt against any ruler who belongs to a weaker party. This is, of course, an opinion that shocks "idealistic" thinkers. It is interesting to mention here that a certain Moslem thinker

"asabiyya" behind his back. He was, therefore, to be, sooner
or later, replaced by a more powerful leader. This leader
happened to be Muawiya. If Muawiya refused to lead the revolu-
tion against Ali some other leader of his tribe would eventually
lead it. Muawiya did, therefore, what was inevitable.[23]

Ibn Khaldun supports this extremely relativistic point
of view by a "saying" attributed to Ali himself. He stresses
the fact that those who died on both sides of the fight between
Ali and Muawiya were martyrs.[24] Ibn Khaldun approaches here the
same relativistic view as that of T. V. Smith; he comes to the
conclusion that the fight was not along the line of good versus
bad, but rather, of good versus good. As he puts it, "You will
excuse everyone, if you examine his case with the eye of justice
and neutrality."[25] Here he finds good support in the very
"Hadith" of the Prophet. The Prophet is known to have said that
any one who forms his own opinion by exerting his own reasoning
shall be favorably rewarded by Allah. To quote Macdonald, "For
thus applying himself he would, according to a tradition from the

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of the secondcentury A. H. suggested that the caliph should have
been selected from the weakest party, for it would be then much
easier to depose him in case of corruption or injustice--an
extremely "idealistic" opinion in comparison to that of Ibn
Khaldun. (See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al Islam, Vol. III, p. 77.)

[23]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mocaddima, pp. 205-206.

[24]Ibid., p. 215.

[25]Loc. cit.

Prophet, receive a reward even though his decision were wrong;
while if it was right he received a double reward.[26]   It is
greatly advantageous, Ibn Khaldun concludes, to see the Prophet's
companions disagree in their opinions about religious matters
and fight each other about them. This may be, he says, taken
by the Moslems as a guide in their actual life, so that everyone
can find, among the different opinions of the Prophet's companions,
one that fits his particular condition.[27]

        Ibn Khaldun treats the controversy of Hussain versus
Yazid in the same relativistic-temporalistic-materialistic frame
of reference as that in which he treats the controversy of Ali
versus Muawiya. Here, we find Ibn Khaldun condemning Hussain's
rebellion against Yazid. He admits with the orthodox historians
that Yazid was a vicious libertine; but that was not enough, in
his opinion for a rebellion against him. Ibn Khaldun defends
Muawiya's rebellion against Ali on the ground of "asabiyya." He
condemns Hussain's rebellion on the same ground.[28]   It appears as

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[26] D. B. Macdonald, "Idjtihad," _Encyclopedia of Islam_,
Vol. II, p. 448.

[27] Ibn Khaldun, _Al-Moqaddima_, p. 218.

[28] Ibn Khaldun's concept of "asabiyya" will be fully dis-
cussed in the following parts of this work. It may suffice here to
say that "asabiyya" in the nomadic culture can be paralleled to a
political party in civilization. "Asabiyya" is the loyalty of one
or more tribes to a certain leader. Ibn Khaldun condemns Hussain's
rebellion on the ground that his "asabiyya" was weaker than that of
Yazid; Hussain then had no right to revolt whatever the corrpution
of Yazid might be.

if Ibn Khaldun's standard of good and bad rebellion lies in
its final success. He seems to have this extremely pragmatic
point of view unconsciously concealed in the depth of his mind.
He might have been unable to openly express it to himself or to
his readers.

In fact, the "asabiyya" is too vague a factor to be so
much depended upon in political and social affairs. The history
of Islam shows that the same "asabiyya" may increase or decrease
in power according to the change in situation. Many leaders lost
their own "asabiyya" after they had suffered a defeat in one way
or another. Many others gained strong "asabiyyas" after some
accidental victory or suddenly rising fortune. The life of
Mohammed himself is a good example of that. He was at the begin-
ning powerlessly striving for his "idealistic" principles without
much avail.[29] When he at last won the battle of Badr, which
almost happened by mere chance, he gradually developed the
strongest "asabiyya" in Arabia at that time.[30]

Ibn Khaldun seems to over look the fact that politics is
a sort of gambling. It cannot submit itself to exact calculations
or measurements. He had most probably witnessed the gambling

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[29]A. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. III, p. 468.

[30]R. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, pp. 174-'75.

nature of politics within his own career. However, in criticis-
ing Hussain's rebellion, he seems interested primarily in belit-
tling "idealistic" movements in general. "Idealistic" inclina-
tions should be, in his opinion, expressed, not in the social
realm where everything is fixed according to an inevitable pattern,
but rather in their own specialized places where they will never
be interfered with by any secular considerations. Accordingly,
Muaiwya might be considered as a "realistic" leader who wanted
nothing but to reach the throne of the Caliphate, and then, to
maintain the status quo with no intention for change whatsoever;
while Hussain was, on the other hand, an extremely "idealistic"
man, who always strove to revive the sacred traditions of his
grandfather, the Prophet. Ibn Khaldun condemns Hussain's rebel-
lion perhaps along these lines. He dislikes any one who disturbs
the social order for some impractical "ideals." When Muawiya,
however, disturbed the social order, he merely tried to replace
Ali on the ground that he was more powerful than Ali in the main-
taining of the social order—he disturbed it a little only to
maintain it better. But Hussain disturbed the social order,
according to the theory of Ibn Khaldun, without having enough
"asabiyya" for maintaining it again. "Ideals" alone are not suf-
ficient, or to use Ibn Khaldun's words, "religion without
'asabiyya' is incomplete."[31]

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[31]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 159.

Ibn Khaldun's view of the social order can be, in some
sense, likened to that of the classic economists. He seems to
believe that human society is constructed and directed by a
benevolent invisible hand, the hand of Allah himself. For him,
Allah is the creator of both the good and the evil of the
world;[32] and the evil is a necessary by-product of the good.[33]
So, if you let society alone, says Ibn Khaldun, with no inter-
vention whatsoever, you will enable it to correct itself and to
turn back to its original and well-arranged equilibrium. Society,
it may be said, goes on along its inevitable lines which have
been wisely arranged by its omnipotent creator.[34] Things may
become bad sometimes and even get gradually worse day after day.
This by no means justifies revolt or protest against them.
Revolution may be harmful rather than useful to the society.
It is better, instead, to drift along with it. It will sooner
or later turn back to its original goodness.[35]

It can be observed in several places in Ibn Khaldun's

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[32]Ibid., p. 143.

[33]Ibid., p. 390.

[34]See Ibid., pp. 390-91. Ibn Khaldun once indirectly
declared that Allah was more just than to permit a bad caliph to
rule the people. (See Ibn Khaldun, Kitab Al-Ibar, Vol. III, p. 106.)

[35]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, Part II, Chaps. 15, 20
et passim.

works that he sees in the social dialectic an efficient tool
for reviving social justice when it periodically goes on a
decline. Modern writers are wrongly inclined to consider Ibn
Khaldun a pessimistic writer.[36] Just on the contrary, he can
be considered quite optimistic in his social theory. In order
to devaluate the "idealistic" tendency of his contemporaries,
it might have been necessary for him to propound an optimistic
philosophy of life. He appears to tell them that there was no
need for their "idealistic" efforts because society would
eventually and spontaneously get better as far as they would not
molest it with their impractical ideals.

Like the English Deists of the eighteenth century, Ibn
Khaldun seems to believe that Allah after creating the world
has left it to be run by its own laws without intervention of
any sort. Even the prophets, who are sent by Allah himself,
tend to achieve their sacred mission according to the social
laws. They conform, says Ibn Khaldun, to the dictation of
"asabiyya" like any other men. In other words, they do not
attempt to change the customary ways and morés of society. They
leave everything as it is, or rather as it has been arranged by

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[36]George Sarton, for example, regards Ibn Khaldun's
Prolegomena as a melancholic book and Ibn Khaldun himself as
a precursor of Spengler. See O. G. Sarton, History of Science,
Vol. III, p. 1770.

its wise creator.[37]

Ibn Khaldun frankly refers to the Prophet, Mohammed,
saying that he was sent for the purpose of teaching us religion
rather than the affairs of this world.[38] Ibn Khaldun appears
here as if he distinctly differentiates the religious from the
secular affairs. This of course runs contrary to the spirit of
Islam as defined by its orthodox followers. Islam is, as we
have noticed, a politico-religious system. The traditions of
Mohammed deal with secular as well as with religious affairs.[39]
The orthodox jurists and "Ahl Al-Hadith" (i.e., the carriers of
the Mohammedan traditions) are accustomed to view social phenomena
in the light of the Prophet's teachings. They tend, therefore,
to condemn any phenomenon or custom that differs from the
Mohammedan pattern regardless of the difference in time or place.
It can be safely said that the Moslems in general take the
Prophet's traditions as if they carry "mana"; they always
remember the fact that the Arabs were before Mohammed an humble

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[37]"Thus," says Ibn Khaldun, "the Prophets, peace be upon
them, resorted in their divine missions to the "asabiyya" and
the tribal support, while they could, if they wished, win victory
by the mere help of Allah. This is because Allah does things
according to the social customs." Ibn Khaldun Al-Moqaddima,
p. 159.

[38]Ibid., p. 494.

[39]See M. Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam,
p. 3.

and poverty-stricken people, and they became after him wealthy
and victorious over a great part of the world. They firmly
attribute that historical success to the sacred influence of
Mohammed and his teachings. This may partly explain the
vehemence and the extreme meticulousness with which the early
Moslems preserved the minute details of every saying or doing
of the Prophet.[40] They deal with these well-preserved traditions
of the Prophet in an absolutistic, eternalistic, spiritualistic
frame of reference. Everything the Prophet did should be taken
to fit all times and places, and to bring victory to everybody
who devotedly conforms to it.

At the time of Ibn Khaldun which was one of the darkest
times in the history of Islam, the Moslem "traditionists"
attributed the decline of the Islamic society mainly to its
deviation from the original "ideals" of Islam. Ibn Khaldun
bitterly attacked this sort of "idealistic" orientation, or
"sacred" thought-style. He tends to consider it a sort of
hypocrisy and double-faced arrogance. To him, the true pious

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[40]"In the Moslem world there had grown up the 'well-
established sciences which have traditions as their objects.'
The method consisted in a complicated system of checking and
cataloguing the isnads, or the bearers of tradition, so as to
know just who they were, from what sources their traditions
came, and the degree of confidence that could be assigned to
them." H. Barnes and H. Becker, Social Thought from Lore to
Science, Vol. I, p. 267.

men are those who retire from this world and sincerely worship
Allah in their devoted seclusion. These are, as he puts it,
the real "inheritors of the prophets."[41] The "jurists" and the
"traditionists," on the other hand, do nothing of the sort. They
teach people how to behave, while they do not do according to
what they have said. They are, says Ibn Khaldun, religious men
only in appearance and pretence.[42]

Ibn Khaldun views the traditions of the Prophet in a way
which distinguishes him from almost all other Moslem writers.
His method in dealing with these "sacred" traditions is completely
"secular," that is to say, in accordance with the relativistic,
temporalistic, materialistic thought-style. However, he does
not express his "secular" thought-style in an open and direct way.
He uses in this regard a highly clever method in order to pro-
tect himself from a public curse or perhaps from a "mob lynching."[43]

In his opinion, the Prophet was sent not to teach us how

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[41]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, pp. 223-24.

[42]Ibid., p. 224.

[43]It is relevant here to mention that one of his favorite
friends was savagely strangled, as he points out, on account of
some unorthodox ideas. (See Ibn Khaldun, Kitab Al-Ibar, Vol. VII,
pp. 341-42.(At the time of Ibn Khaldun, people seemed to be very
fanatic and intolerent against any ideas that slightly differed
from traditions. (See T. J. DeBoer, Tarikh Al-Falsafa Fil-Islam,
p. 238 et seq.)

to behave in our secular activities.[44] His sayings or doings
in this regard contain no "mana" or talisman for luck. Ibn
Khaldun explains, for example, the Arab victory after Mohammed
with an entirely sociological explanation. The Arabs, since
they are very nomadic and "savage" in their characters, can
conquer other peoples any time they are united by one cause.[45]
They failed to do that before Mohammed merely because they were
antagonistic toward each other due to their strong tribal
spirit.[46] As soon as they were brought together by Mohammed to
fight for one cause, that is, the cause of Allah, they conquered
the world. Moreover, they may be able to do that again if they
become reunited in some way or another.

Ibn Khaldun reviewed several of the Mohammedan tradi-
tions that deal with the secular affairs and then hit what
might be called, his greatest and most dangerous stroke. These
traditions should not, in his opinion, be treated as absolute
and eternal--above and beyond the effects of time and place.
Mohammed did not intend that they would be exactly followed with-
out looking at the reason behind them. Everything the Prophet

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44Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mogaddima, pp. 493-94.

45See Ibid., pp. 138, 145.

46Ibid., pp. 150, 151.

said or did as regards the affairs of this world should be
taken, according to Ibn Khaldun, within its temporal and
relative context. There will be no advantage in following it
as such. Unlike purely religious traditions, the secularly-
intended traditions fit only the time and the place in which
they were issued. The orthodox traditionists have, therefore,
no right to impose, for instance, what the Prophet did as
regards the politics of his time on the politics of our time.
In brief, the conception of time is very important in Ibn
Khaldun's thought-style, in contrast to that of his "idealistic"
contemporaries.[47]

Ibn Khaldun can be rightly considered as the first
thinker in Islam who put the sacred traditions of the Prophet
on the dissection-table of time and place. There appeared, it
is true, a Moslem writer called Al-Jahidh, several centuries
before Ibn Khaldun, who faintly tried to criticise the absolut-
istic, eternalistic attitude of the "traditionists" and to
examine the traditions in the light of time and place.[48] This

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[47]"From the extreme ideational position, no change, no
process, and no sensate time really exists; true reality is
eternal and unchangeable. However, even from this standpoint
the phenomena of change, though illusory, must be admitted in
the illusory world of senses." P. Sorokin, Social and Cultural
Dynamics, Vol. II, p. 153 (footnote).

[48]See Al-Jahidh, Haiwan, Vol. I, p. 148.

writer was, however, no match for Ibn Khaldun, in this respect.[49]
Al-Jahidh was extremely logical minded. He criticized the
traditions, in fact, à la Aristotle. Ibn Khaldun, on the other
hand, is free from any consideration of logic. As we shall see
later, he vehemently attacks the Aristotelian logic and its
application in actual life. He views the Prophet's traditions
within the context of social customs and norms, while Al-Jahidh
views them within the context of formal logic and static syllo-
gism. The gap between the two views is quite wide indeed.

One of the important Islamic subjects which was highly
controversial at the time of Ibn Khaldun was that of the Cali-
phate. The Prophet is known to have said that the caliph must
be from the tribe of Kuraish. At the time of Ibn Khaldun, there
was practically no Kuraishite caliph in the whole Islamic Empire.
The orthodox writers stayed in the "ivory tower," assenting
that the Caliph should have been Kuraishite, with no considera-
tion of the real conditions of their state. To Ibn Khaldun the
problem is very simple. Looking at the point through his
relativistic-temporalistic-materialistic perspective, he sees
that it is not necessary for the caliph to be Kuraishite in
all times and places. When the Prophet restricted the caliphate
to the tribe of Kuraish he did not mean that Kuraish had certain

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[49]It is interesting indeed to notice that Ibn Khaldun
was once accused by some orthodox writer of being an imitator
of Al-Jahidh. See M. Enan, Ibn Khaldun, p. 94.

spiritual characteristics which other tribes had not. The
reason behind the Prophet's saying lay, according to Ibn Khaldun,
in the fact that Kuraish was at the time of the Prophet the
strongest tribe in Arabia. Its "asabiyya," in other words, was
the most powerful. Consequently, a caliph from this strong
tribe would be an effective factor in subduing the whole of
Arabia to the sovereignty of Islam.[50] But now, Ibn Khaldun
avers, after Kuraish has lost its "asabiyya," any powerful tribe
that is able to support a caliph in his position, has the same
right as that of Kuraish in the past.[51]

Ibn Khaldun discussed another question as regards the
caliphate---the question of the popular election of the caliph.
Immediately after the death of the Prophet, popular election
was, Ibn Khaldun says, possible. The influence of the prophetic
miracles was still fresh. People were still impressed by the
historical events of the Prophet's life. But, later, things
became different. Secular considerations became more effective
than religious ones on the minds of the Arabs. The Caliph
should, therefore, have been a son or close relative to his
predecessor. In fact, he should have been appointed by his
predecessor, in view of the fact that the same "asabiyya" which

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[50]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 195.

[51]Ibid., p. 196.

had supported the predecessor would support his son after
his death.[52] Popular election is then ineffective in the secu-
lar society of Islam.

This may appear ridiculous in the eyes of the Moslem
thinkers who are accustomed to see things according to what
ought to be, rather than to what is. Until now the principle
of the popular election of the caliph is one of their favorite
subjects in spite of its impracticability in the actual politics
of their societies.[53]

Ibn Khaldun is opposed to the Moslem writers in another
point about the caliphate, due to the "realistic" orientation of
his thought-style. According to M. Khadduri, Ibn Khaldun is
the only writer in Islam who approves of more than one caliph
to rule the wide Islamic Empire, which is very difficult to be
ruled by only one.[54] In this point as in all other points, Ibn
Khaldun is sociologically minded. He tends to treat Mohammedan
traditions, not as ideas existing in a vacuum, but rather as
real phenomena existing in actual society.

It is interesting indeed to observe that Ibn Khaldun

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[52]This can be more clearly understood if we remember that
family relationship rules supreme in the Arabian society until now.

[53]See T. W. Arnold, "Khalifa," Encyclopædia of Islam,
Vol. II, p. 884.

[54]See M. Khadduri, op. cit., p. 43.

tries to explain on a sociological basis, not only the sacred
traditions of the Prophet but also all sorts of popular beliefs
and myths. He touches the questions of luck, intelligence,
public health, and the like, and attempts to explain their origin
along materialistic or sociological lines. For example, he dis-
cusses the problem of East and West and why Eastern people were
more intelligent and scientifically-minded than the Western
people (in his time, of course). He firmly declares that this
is not because of any difference in the original constitution
of mind as ignorant travelers tend to believe.[55] In his opinion,
all men, Western and Eastern, are almost the same in their mental
potentialities. The difference arises only as a result of dif-
ference in culture and social development.[56] The Western people,
he says, are mostly nomadic in culture. They are not familiar
with the things with which the civilized people of the East are
familiar. In his opinion, mind is largely a product of the
social environment. It increases or decreases in wisdom according

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[55]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mogaddima, p. 432.

[56]Ibid., p. 433. Some of the old writers even attribute
the difference in intelligence between the West and East to an
astrological factor. Ibn Khaldun, however, acknowledges some
geographical effect in this respect. Geography works perhaps
indirectly by facilating or handicapping civilization which is,
in his opinion, the main factor in developing human mind from its
potentiality to its actuality. Just contrary to what is popularly
ascribed to him, he does not lean heavily toward the geographical
interpretation of social phenomena.

to the contacts and training it receives from its surroundings.[57]
Some nomads, Ibn Khaldun resumes, are originally more intelli-
gent than many of the civilized men. It is the artificiality
of civilization that makes civilized men appear more sophisticated
than the nomads.[58]

In another place in his Prolegomena, Ibn Khaldun
observes that the more the population in a city or a country
the better is the public health.[59] However, Ibn Khaldun fails
here to place the horse before the carriage. He fails, in other
words, to realize that large population can be a result (rather
than an effect) of good health conditions. His methodology in
this point is, nevertheless, far better, from the sociological
point of view, than that of his contemporaries. One of his
fellow-writers attributed the bad health conditions of a certain
place in North Africa to a talismanic work.[60] Ibn Khaldun re-
acted against this superstitious explanation and put forth,
instead, his rational explanation. In his opinion, the reason
behind good health conditions in the cities of large populations

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[57]Loc. cit.

[58]Ibid., pp. 433-34.

[59]Ibid., p. 348.

[60]See details in Ibid., p. 347.

lies in the fact that the brisk movements of large populations cause the air of the city to move accordingly. This moving of the air consequently prevents the putrefaction of things and the spread of fevers.[61]

At the time of Ibn Khaldun, there was a popular belief to the effect that knowledge and luck were rarely found together in one person. Man gets knowledge at the expense of his means of living.[62] Ibn Khaldun attributes this phenomena to a sociological cause. The man of knowledge, he says, is normally proud of himself and his intelligence.[63] This is, according to Ibn Khaldun, one of the bad characteristics which handicap man's success and prosperity in this world. Material success needs, in his opinion, the use of flattery, humbleness, and readiness to submit one's self to those of higher social positions.[64] Many

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[61]Ibid., p. 348. Ibn Khaldun seems to be influenced in this explanation by a certain linguistical consideration. In Arabic, the same word is used for the motion of air as well as for the motion of crowds and population. When Ibn Khaldun thought of a large population he probably connected it unconsciously with the motion of air and then he put forth his strange theory about the good health in big cities.

[62]This belief is still held to be true by many in the Eastern countries of today. It can be explained by the fact that knowledge in these countries is still "idealistic" in its orientation. No wonder that it handicaps man in the getting along with his actual life!

[63]Ibid., p. 391.

[64]See Ibid., Part V, Chap. 6 passim.

ignorant and illiterate men have won great luck merely because
they are submissive and not proud in their character.[65]

Ibn Khaldun's sociological insight greatly shines when
he discusses another superstition of his time--the belief in
the connection between the planting of a certain fruitless tree
and the decline of the people's prosperity. There is no magical
or spiritual factor, Ibn Khaldun says, in this kind of tree that
brings about bad luck as ignorant men believe.[66] In his opinion,
the planting of fruitless trees of any kind is an indication of
extreme luxury. It then indicates the approaching decline of
the nation. Ibn Khaldun is highly firm in his conviction that
luxury always leads to the destruction of civilisation.[67] He
ridicules those people who abstain from planting fruitless trees
in their gardens.[68] For him, this abstention is meaningless and
useless. Luxury is an inevitable part of civilisation. It will
lead sooner or later to its destruction regardless of whether
people plant or abstain from planting this insignificant tree.

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[65]Ibid., p. 392.

[66]Ibid., p. 373.

[67]Ibn Khaldun's opinion as regards civilisation is quite
similar to that of K. Marx as regards the capitalistic system.
Ibn Khaldun believes that civilisation carries within itself its
own contradiction and the seed of its own destruction. In his
own words, "civilisation is the goal of society, the cause of its
decline, and the end of its life." Ibid., p. 371.

[68]Ibid., p. 373.

The tree is an indication, rather than a cause, of the civilisa-
tion death. It is important to note here that Ibn Khaldun
regards individual efforts completely useless in this respect.
Society, like any other living organism, eventually dies when
its reaches its old age, that is, civilisational stage of its
development. No one is able to prevent the social dialectic
from its cyclical evolution.[69]

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The reader can find other examples in Ibn Khaldun's
Prolegomena that indicate his "realistic" thinking. In some of
them, the reader may find, as Howard Becker says, "the most
strangely modern-sounding theories that one could imagine."
He even explains the phenomena of "prophethood," as Taha Hussain
points out, on a pycho-sociological basis.[70] He seems to regard
"prophethood" a normal phenomenon which any man may be able to
experience to some degree in his dream or mystic ecstasy.[71]
This, however, should not blind us to the fact that Ibn Khaldun
is not completely "secular" or "realistic" in his thought-style.
His "secular" thought-style is reserved only for secular affairs.

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[69]See Ibid., Part III, Chaps. 13 and 14 passim.

[70]See T. Hussain, op. cit., p. 81.

[71]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, Introduction VI passim.

Thus, he differs from the other Moslem writers who treat even
the secular affairs with "sacred" thought-style, as we have noticed
before. However, when he comes to discuss purely religious matters
he writes in a way that amazes the reader with the sudden change
of tone. Ibn Khaldun, then, jumps surprisingly from a materialistic
attitude to a spiritual one, from rationalism to mysticism.[72] In
this regard, he greatly differs from Machiavelli who entirely
rejects the "ideal" for the "real."

In conclusion, it can be said that Ibn Khaldun has adopted
the orthodox "compartmentalization" of thought and developed it to
its logical conclusion. He agrees with the orthodox thinkers that
there are two distinct realms, ideal and real, but the two should
be, in his opinion, completely separated from each other. According
to his theory, man should not molest the "real" world by some
impractical ideas derived from the "ideal" world; there is absolutely
no connection between the two worlds. Man can be, therefore,
idealistic and realistic at the same time; he can be both a religious
man as well as a secular man, without feeling any conflict inside
his soul. In contrast to the orthodox thinkers, Ibn Khaldun does
not like to play the drama of "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," in the field

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[72]See for example his discussion of pilgrimage ceremonies
of Mecca, Ibid., pp. 411-12. See also what he says about the
religious situation in his time, Ibid., p. 208.

of social activities. He hates those pedantic men who act in one
way and think in another, and who do not "really" behave according
to what they "idealistically" preach. Ibn Khaldun seems to believe
that "compartmentalization" should be complete, and the partition
between the religious realm and the secular one should be impervious
and idea-proof. Accordingly, man has no right to carry with him,
when he comes out from his religious devotion, an ideal or idea
that may disturb the on-going process of social life. Each realm
has to be completely independent from the other.

PART II

MIGHT VERSUS RIGHT

In this part, the classical conflict between "right" and "might," its origin and its importance from the standpoint of sociology of knowledge, are discussed in general terms. Then, a particular discussion as regards the role played by this conflict in the development of Islamic thought is presented. Finally, Ibn Khaldun's opinion about these points is carefully studied.

MIGHT AND RIGHT

The chronic controversy, which has engaged the philoso-
phical mind since the classic time, of "might" versus "right,"
politics versus religion, realism versus idealism is meaning-
less in a "sacred" society. In such a society there is no gap
between the so-called "might" and "right."[1] Among primitive
peoples men of power usually go, hand in hand, with the carriers
of traditions. Thus, it is hard to find there despotic or
unjust rulers. To use Pigors' term, the ruler in the "sacred"
society is a "leader" rather than a "dominator."[2] He usually
leads his people toward what they want. There is normally no
place for a ruler who leads his subjects toward what only he
himself wants. In short, there is no class exploitation or
social injustice in the "sacred" society. The leader in such

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[1]It should be remembered here that the terms "might" and
"right" are used in the social or relative sense. What is right
is no more than what is regarded so by the people. "Right" is
traditionally derived. People do not usually ask what is right
or wrong. They inherit it as such within their social heritage
or culture. Only philosophers of the extreme secular type ask
about these things and try to find metaphysical bases for them.
"Might" is also a relative term, socially defined. Criteria of
"might" or power change with the change in the value-system and
social heritage.

[2]See Pigors, Leadership and Domination, passim.

a society is usually the "father," the "sheikh," the "elder," or the like. He follows the same tradition, believes in the same "mana," fears the same "tabu," worships the same "god," as his followers. To use Mead's terminology, he takes the role of the same "generalized other," that of his subjects. He looks through their eyes, and feels the same as they feel.[3]

The dilemma of the ideal versus the actual, which the sociologists of religion are fond of discussing these days,[4] hardly exist in "sacred" societies. It, too, is most probably a product of civilization, that is, of the "secular" society. The historians of civilization almost all agree that the rise of civilization was accompanied by the rise of social injustice, the oppression of one class by another, the use of force for social control.[5] In Briffault's words, "The development of civilization is not, accordingly, a gradual transition out of lower forms of culture, but a revolution from a state of social equality to one of social inequality."[6] The appearance of the

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[3]See W. Durant, The Story of Civilization, pp. 23-25.

[4]See Wiese-Becker, Systematic Sociology, Chap. XLIV; J. M. Yinger, Religion in the Struggle for Power, Chap. II.

[5]See H. G. Wells, Outline of History, p. 228; R. Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 127.

[6]R. Briffault, Rational Evolution, p. 32.

first written code in history, that is, the "code of Hamurabi" in ancient Babylon is interpreted by sociologists as an indication of the weakening in the spontaneous social control of the primary grouping.[7]

The state, which is a fundamental element of every "secular" society or civilization, is viewed by many sociologists as to have been originally established and based upon oppression and social inequality. "The state," says Lester Ward, "as distinct from tribal organisation, begins with the conquest of one race by another."[8] "Everywhere," says Oppenheimer, "we find some warlike tribe breaking through the boundaries of some less warlike people, settling down as nobility, and founding its "state."[9] "Violence," says Ratzenhofer, "is the agent which has created the state."[10] "The state," says Gumplowics, "is the result of conquest, the establishment of the victors as a ruling caste over the vanquished.[11] "The state," says Sumner, "is the product

[7]H. Barnes and H. Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science, Vol. I, p. 87.

[8]Cited by W. Durant, op. cit., p. 23.

[9]F. Oppenheimer, The State, p. 16.

[10]Cited by E. A. Ross, Social Control, p. 50.

[11]Cited by W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, Science of Society, Vol. II, p. 704.

of force, and exists by force."[12] In brief, the "conflict"
theory, and consequently class oppression has gained, as Barnes
points out, such general acceptance among sociologists that
it may almost be considered as the sociological theory of the
origin of the state.[13]

To quote Durant about this point,

Every growing civilisation is a scene of multiply-
ing inequalities; the natural differences of human
endowment unite with differences of opportunity to
produce artificial difference of wealth and power, and
when no laws or despots suppress these artificial
inequalities they reach at last a bursting point where
the poor have nothing to lose by violence, and chaos
of revolution levels men again into a community of
destitution.

Hence the dream of communism lurks in every modern
society as a racial memory of simpler and more equal
life; and where inequality or insecurity rises beyond
sufference, men welcome a return to a condition which
they idealize by recalling its equality and forgetting
its poverty.[14]

The above-quoted argument of Durant is quite reminiscent
of Nietzsche's theory of the geneology of morals and the process
of transvaluation.[15] In the growing civilisation, the oppressed
classes tend to revolt or protest against the prevailing values
which usually support the upper classes in their oppression.

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[12]Ibid., p. 709.

[13]H. E. Barnes, History of Sociology, p. 195.

[14]W. Durant, op. cit., pp. 18-19 (footnote).

[15]See F. Nietzsche, Geneology of Morals, passim.

They may invent another system of values as a reaction against
the dominant one.[16] Thus, the gap between "might" and "right"
appears. Two separate systems of values then develop; one for
the man of "power" and "might," and the other, for the men of
"religion" and "right."[17]

Among the primitives and in "sacred" societies in general,
on the other hand, where oppression and unjust government seldom
exist, it is safe to say that there is no gap between "might"
and "right." Ethnologists give us many actual evidences to support

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[16]G. De Gré, Society and Ideology, p. 2.

[17]It is quite interesting indeed to notice that the period
around the sixth century (B. C.) strangely witnessed many religious
revolutions against the prevailing value-systems of the time.
Mahavira and Buddha rose in India, Lao-tse and Confucius in China,
some of the great Hebrew Prophets in Judea, Socrates and Plato in
Greece, Zarathustra in Persia, etc. Will Durant seems to attribute
the simultaneity of these religious risings to some sort of cul-
tural contact between the nations of the ancient world. (See W.
Durant, op. cit., p. 422, footnote). However, it seems that in
this period, the various civilizations of the world reached a
peculiar stage in their social development where social injustice
and class oppression were no longer bearable. Thus, the various
Prophets mentioned above appeared to lead the oppressed classes
in their transvaluation tendencies against the oppressors. It is
highly instructive in this regard to observe that the various
civilizations of the old world, from the Far East to the Near East,
appeared almost simultaneously on the face of the globe. Why?
Nobody seems to know exactly why. Anyhow, in that period of the
Prophets mentioned above, all the civilizations of the ancient
world seemed to have reached what Durant calls "the bursting
point." Hence, most of the great religions of the present world
started and so put human morals on the move.

the point.[18] To quote Jamali about the institutions of "sheikh-

hood" among the nomad tribes of Arabia:

> In order to be worthy of his post, a sheikh must
> possess a great capacity for leadership. In the desert,
> of course, this would be interpreted to mean physical
> strength, moral and physical courage, far sightedness
> and good judgment, personal magnetism, and a great con-
> sideration for the rights of the poor, of the refugee,
> and of the guest.
>
> Theoretically the sheikh power is absolute, but
> his actions and decisions are always guided by the public
> opinion of the tribe. . . . Thus this apparent absolut-
> ism is in reality only relative, since it is always
> checked and balanced by the opinion of the men of the
> tribe. Indeed, the sheikh usually consults members of
> the tribe whose good judgment he respects.[19]

Viewing "right" and "might" through the primitive or

"sacred"perspective, we can see that the two are looked upon as

one. The primitive man cannot imagine them as separate. If some

men in modern civilization begin to believe that "might" makes

"right," primitives can be said to believe in the reverse, that

is, "right" makes "might." The primitive man, in other words,

regards any kind of success as a result of the work of some

invisible or supernatural power. According to Morot and Davy,

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[18]Cf. R. M. MacIver and C. H. Page, Society, p. 594
et seq.

[19]M. Jamali, The New Iraq, p. 28. See, for a similar
opinion, E. Main, Iraq, p. 20.

It is mana which makes the net catch, the house stand fast, the canoe be seaworthy. It is the fertility in the field and the healing or the deadly virtue in drugs. In the arrow it is mana that kills.[20]

Thus a chief has not been able to reach his high position unless he has obtained in advance the right qualifications of chiefhood, he has become a chief because certain "mana" or "spirit" has supported him in his becoming so.[21] Speaking of "charisma," which is not much different in this respect from "mana," Max Weber says:

If proof of his charismatic qualification fails him for long, the leader endowed with charisma tends to think his god or his magical or heroic powers have deserted him. If he is for long unsuccessful, above all if his leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear. This is the genuine charismatic meaning of the "gift of grace."

Even the old Germanic kings were sometimes rejected with scorn. Similar phenomena are very common among so-called "primitive" peoples. In China the charismatic quality of the monarch, which was transmitted unchanged by heredity, was upheld so rigidly that any misfortune whatever, not only defeat in war, but drought, floods, or astronomical phenomena which were considered unlucky, forced him to do public penance and might even force his abdication. If such things occurred, it was a sign that he did not possess the requisite charismatic virtue, he was thus not a legitimate "Son of Heaven."[22]

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[20]Moret and Davy, From Tribe to Empire, p. 47.

[21]See H. Becker and A. Barnes, op. cit., p. 23.

[22]Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, p. 330.

The chief then is usually aware of the "mana" behind him.
When he fails in some of his enterprises, he is sure that he
has lost his "mana." He has no right, therefore, to persist
in claiming a high position in his group. The group merely
shifts its loyalty to another chief. It is, in this sense, as
objective in its selection of its leader as an engineer in his
search for a new machine or an invention.[23]

The nomad Arabs are known as fickle men, changing their
loyalty as soon as their chief loses his fight. "The first
among those who loot his tent," says Wihba, "are his friends.
"Since he has been defeated," they usually say, "we have more
right to take his property than his enemies."[24] This quality of
the nomad Arabs has been widely condemned by their critics.[25]
It is quite interesting to notice that the critics, who are
mostly Christians or devoted Moslems, impose their own categories

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[23]It should be remembered here, again, that we are talk-
ing about an ideal-type which does not exist in reality as such.
This is the tendency, rather than actual happening. No doubt
much oppression and social injustice can be observed among primi-
tive people and primary groups, but this can be taken as an
exception that proves the rule, as old thinkers would say.

[24]H. Wihba, Jazirat Al-Arab, p. 275.

[25]In the judgment of the Koran (9:98), "The desert
Arabians are most confirmed in unbelief and hypocrisy." (See
also P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 26.)

of values and thought on the nomad Arabs. They try to view
the Arabs in the light of Christ's or Mohammed's principles.

Viewing this characteristic of the nomad Arabs in the
light of the sacred thought-style, i.e., through the absolutistic-
eternalistic-spiritualistic perspective, we find them quite
rational and consistent within their own logic.[26] According
to the "sacred" thought-style, the failing chief is no longer
a chief. There is no use to cry over spilt milk, Since the
values of the "sacred" society are eternal and absolute, nobody
dares to violate them. The new chief is therefore not different
from the previous one in his value-system. He strictly follows
the prevailing system as did his predecessor. The only difference,
which favors of course the new against the old chief, is the
newly rising "mana." The new chief has more right to be followed
by the group because he is more successful in his leadership. He
has a victorious "mana." As soon as he fails, a newer leader is

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[26]As we have noticed before, logic and rationality are
relative. Thus, it is unjust to condemn other peoples through
our own logic. "True," says Weber, "a Hindu mystic suddenly
transplanted to a center of Catholicism would not be regarded
as in any way rational; value systems of the contrasting civili-
sations are too far apart. Still, it is clear that within any
given civilisation the scope of rationality is always implicitly
determined, and taken for granted in passing social judgment of
every description. We have, as it were, a sort of secret yard-
stick by which we measure conduct, sometimes without any clear
idea of what we are doing." (Cited in H. Barnes, H. Becker and
F. Becker, Contemporary Social Theory, p. 520.)

found whose "mana" is fresh and effective. In this way, the
nomads, and the primitive peoples in general, can maintain a
successful and good system of leadership, and so eliminate,
in one way or another, the gap between the ruler and the ruled.

Even the general respect with which primitives normally
treat their elders, can be explained along the same lines. It
may be right to say about this point, the more hazardous the
life is, the higher will be the power of old men. This can be
attributed to the fact that the mere survival of a man in a
dangerous environment, may indicate his possessing a strong
"mana." Among primitive peoples, an old man is respected not
merely because he is an old man per se. He is respected because
his "mana" has been so powerful that he could emerge safely
out of all various risks and battles of life, until he has reached
finally his old age. In some primitive cultures they kill their
old men and eat their flesh. This may indicate that they do
not respect the old man as an individual; they rather respect
his successful "mana." By eating his flesh they imagine that
they may acquire some of his capacities.[27] In the Near East,
until now, people consider that eating certain ceremonial food
prepared after the death of an old man, lengthens the age of

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[27]See H. Barnes and H. Becker, op. cit., p. 23.

the eater.[28]

Accordingly, the old men, who normally form the upper class in the "sacred" society, are looked upon as the carriers of traditions and the possessors of rightful spirits. The ordinary member of the society does not feel then any sort of oppression under their rules. He takes their rules as natural and right. As we shall see later, there seldom exists a feeling of resentment among the lower classes against their elders. To conclude, we may say that the members of the "sacred" society are in a sense grop-conscious rather than class-conscious.

When the first civilisation arose in the ancient East, this queer amalgamation of "right" and "might," began to weaken and finally was shattered to pieces. In the next chapter, we are going to discuss what this new phenomenon in the structure of the ancient society would lead to in the realm of thought.

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[28]Durant says, "everywhere among nature peoples' blood is regarded as a delicacy--never with horror; even primitive vegetarians take to it with gusto. Human blood is constantly drunk by tribes otherwise kindly and generous; sometimes as medicine, sometimes as a rite or covenant, often in the belief that it will add to the drinker the vital force of the victim." W. Durant, op. cit., p. 11.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MILLENNIAL HOPE

In the last chapter, we have seen how, in the "sacred"
society, the man of power is, at the same time, the upholder
of tradition, the symbol of religion and the owner of a strong
"mana."[1] As soon as civilization arose in the ancient times,
and with it the state, there appeared some discrepancy between
"might" and "right." H. G. Wells describes, with his lucid
pen, the new phenomenon when he discusses the Sumeric civiliza-
tion which is considered one of the first, if not the first,
civilizations in the world.

> The early rulers of Sumer we know were all priests,
> kings only because they were chief priests. And
> priestly government has its own weaknesses as well as
> its peculiar deep-rooted strength. The power of a
> priesthood is a power over their own people alone.
> It is a subjugation through mysterious fears and hopes.
> The priesthood can gather its people together for war,
> but its traditionalism and all its methods unfit it for
> military control. Against the enemy without, a priest-
> led people is feeble.
>
> Moreover, a priest is a man vowed, trained, and con-
> secrated, a man belonging to a special corps, and neces-
> sarily with an intense esprit de corps. He has given
> up his life to his temple and his god. This is a very

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[1] We should note at this point, that "mana" is no longer
recognised as such among the civilized peoples. It would take
the names of "Spirit," "Idea," "Charisma," "God," "Sakhina,"
"Divine Right," etc.

excellent thing for the internal vigor of his own priesthood, his own temple. But in the next town or village is another temple with another god. It is his constant preoccupation to keep his people from that god. Religious cults and priesthoods are sectarian by nature; they will convert, they will overcome, but they will never coalesce. . . .

. . . .

It was out of the two main weaknesses of all priest-hoods—namely, the incapacity for efficient military leadership and their inevitable jealousy of all other religious cults—that power of secular kingship arose. The foreign enemy either prevailed and set up a king over the people, or the priesthoods, who would not give way to each other, set up a common fighting captain, who retained more or less power in peace-time. The secular king developed a group of officials about him, and began, in relation to military organization, to take a share in the administration of the people's affairs. So, growing out of priestcraft and beside the priests, the king, the protagonist of the priest, appears upon the stage of human history, and a very large amount of the subsequent experiences of mankind is only to be understood as an elaboration, complication, and distortion of the struggle, unconscious or deliberate, between these two systems of human control, the temple and the palace.[2]

As a matter of fact, this conflict discussed by H. G. Wells, between the "temple" and the "palace," can be found in one form or another wherever a civilization, that is to say, a "secular" society, arises. The priest, who is the successor and the replica of the primitive leader, and who has been obliged to incarnate his "mana" into a "temple" in order to satisfy the new

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[2]H. G. Wells, Outline of History, pp. 215-16.

taste of the rising material civilisation, finds himself weak
in front of the "secular" king. As Mr. Wells has shown, the
priest is effective within the village around his temple. The
growing state, which is usually formed by the coalition of
several villages, needs another kind of ruler. The state needs
a secular ruler who does not rely on the face-to-face ways of
social control, but rather on force and sometimes on reign of
terror. The social control of the primary group, in which the
"priest" is quite effective, is no longer efficient. The state
needs a Hamurabi rather than a Patesi. It needs a written code
rather than a system of local folkways and morés. The secular
king with his disciplined army and obedient officials around him
becomes the core of the new state and the builder of the rising
civilisation.

MacIver has shown that one of the main differences
between what he calls "culture"[3] and "civilisation" lies in the
fact that in "culture" values are means and ends at the same time.

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[3]MacIver uses the term "culture" in a sense quite different
from that used by anthropologists. For the anthropologist, "cul-
ture" signifies the total social heritage. For MacIver, on the
other hand, "culture" is taken as the opposite of "civilisation."
In order to decide whether certain value is "cultural" or "civili-
sational," in MacIver's sense, we may ask ourselves: Do we want
it for itself or do we merely use it in order to attain some other
thing we want. The value-as-end is usually "cultural" whereas
the value-as-means is "civilisational."

In his opinion, there is no distinction in "culture" between
value-as-end and value-as-means. Things are done as means
for certain ends and as ends in themselves, at the same time.
In civilization, on the other hand, certain kinds of values
begin to be labeled as ends in themselves; the other kind, as
means for other ends. Thus, among "culture" peoples a tool is
not only a means handled for the purpose of achieving certain
material ends, but also as an end in itself. In other words,
the tool has a "mana" which wants to be particularly satisfied.
To quote MacIver,

> A factory, or a mechanism like the printing press
> or the ring spindle, does not count among the things
> that people enjoy or venerate or dance around or sing
> songs to or in any sense "live for." It is thought of
> solely as a productive mechanism. Its efficiency is
> its sole and sufficient justification. . . .

> Turn to a primitive society and the contrast becomes
> manifest. . . . Such people hunt and fish and dig and
> weave and trade, but these utilitarian processes are
> woven into the social life and are invested with cul-
> tural significance. They are surrounded with tradi-
> tion, with ceremony, with legend, with tribal lore.
> Scarcely anything is purely utilitarian, and conversely,
> there is scarcely anything that is purely cultural.[4]

Quoting MacIver again,

> Ritual is as important as craftsmanship in the making
> of a canoe or in the cultivation of the soil. Prayers
> are as important as arms in the conduct of war. Religion
> is compounded with magic and cannot be divorced from the
> business of living. . . . Everything in nature is

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[4]R. M. MacIver and C. H. Page, Society, pp. 630-31.

instinct with social meaning and enshrined in social ceremony. Culture, technique, authority, people and land are subjectively unified.[5]

This may explain why the "priest" loses his effectiveness as a ruler in the rising civilisation. He strictly follows the traditions inherited from his predecessors without being able to change them in order to fit them to the new social situation. The secular king, on the other hand, has a certain sort of mental elasticity through which he can distinguish between value-as-end and value-as-means. He is able to adapt his political and judicial decision to the changing situations. He does not care about what other peoples feel. His "self" is not the "looking glass," to use Cooley's term, of a certain village, like the "self" of the "priest." His aim is to win political and economic control of a certain area. The only role he takes is the role of the victorious fighters around him. He is happy only when he leads them to victory. He does not care about the various value-systems he is going to violate in the process of conquering the various peoples.

The conquered peoples begin to see clearly that might and right are completely separate. The man of power is no longer the upholder of their traditions or the carrier of the "sacred mana." How are they going to meet the situation? It is a great problem,

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[5]R. M. MacIver, "The Historical Pattern of Social Change," Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. II, No. 1, Oct. 1936, p. 47.

indeed. Their deep-rooted beliefs tell them that "might" and "right" cannot be separate, while in their actual life they see them just on the contrary. The only solution open to them in such a critical situation seems to lie in the so-called "millennial hope." In order to reconcile the old "ideal" with the present "real" they have no choice but to resort to the doctrine of future hope, or to what Sorel calls "social myth." Thus, they begin hoping that, although "might" and "right" are now separate, they shall someday in the future unite again. Eventually, as the Bible puts it, "The last shall be first."[6]

It is interesting, indeed, to find the "millennial hope," rife, in one form or another, everywhere in the various civilizations of the ancient times. Each civilization has its own conception of the cyclical fluctuation of the world according to which things are supposed to become bad and then good again. As a matter of fact, the Hegelian dialectic is not original with Hegel. It can be found in one form or another everywhere in the ancient times. It should be remembered, at this point, that both social dialectic and millennial hope denote one single fact, that is, the expectation of how "might" and "right" will be combined again after they have been separate.

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[6] See K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 22-23.

In ancient Babylon, for instance, the doctrine was represented in what was called annus magnus (or the world's year).[7] "Since each year had its days of youth and its declining season of old age, so the world was supposed to pass through a series of births and deaths as the successive world-years came and went."[8]

In ancient Egypt, this notion was specially prominent, as Case points out, in the popular Isis-Osiris cult which had a wide vogue not only in Egypt itself, but all about the Mediterranean in the ancient times. The myths of the cult tell of a fierce conflict between Osiris, the brother-husband of Isis, and a mighty foe who slays Osiris. But a restoration to life is accomplished by the effort of Isis, and the slayer of Osiris is finally conquered.[9] The slayer of Osiris is called Seth who is the prototype of Satan,[10] while the divine couple Osiris-Isis can be safely considered the symbol or the totem of the

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[7]See P. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, Vol. II, p. 362.

[8]S. J. Case, The Millennial Hope, p. 16. As we shall see later, this notion of annus magnus can be clearly seen in Ikhwan Al-Safa in Islam, from which Ibn Khaldun most probably took the nucleus of his theory of social dialectic.

[9]Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[10]H. Barnes and H. Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science, p. 98.

prehistoric clans of Egypt. The restoring of Osiris' life and the destroying of Seth may represent, in a sense, the hope of the ancient Egyptians in their future deliverence from the evils of social secularization and of civilization which disturbed the primitive pattern of their old tribal life.

In ancient Persia, the notion of bitter warfare between the power of light and the power of darkness lies at the very root of the popular beliefs and religion.[11] At an early date old nature-myths had been transformed into ideal moral struggles between the god of righteousness, on the one hand, and the forces of evil, on the other. The world began with the good god's creative act in producing beings worthy of himself. This was followed by the counter-activity of the evil spirit, who created many demons and fiends to assist him in his malicious designs. Thus, the world has become a great battleground when God, his angelic assistants, the beneficient powers of nature, and the righteous men are pitted against Satan, his demonic allies, malignant natural forces, and evil forces. However, the events connected with the final triumph of God were extensively elaborated by Persian fancy. Shortly before the end

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[11]Lassalle regards Zoroaster, the great Persian prophet, as a precurser of Hegel. See S. M. Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, p. 6.

the world will suffer great distress as the Satanic powers
make a last gigantic effort at self-assertion. The people
will be corrupted at that time through the worship of idols;
friends and relatives will become estranged from one another
and a large part of the nation will perish. Finally, these
terrible conditions will be relieved by the appearance of a
savior. . . .[12]

In ancient India, the millennial hope takes a similar
form through the fluctuation of "Krita" and "Kali" ages. At
the "Kali" age, the rulers will be,

> of churlish spirit, violent temper, and even
> addicted to falsehood and wickedness. They will
> inflict death on women, children, and cows; they will
> seize the property of their subjects; they will be
> of limited power and will rapidly rise and fall . . .
> their lives short; their desires insatiable, and they
> will display but little piety. . . . Then property
> alone will confer rank; wealth will be the only source
> of devotion; passion will be the sole bond of union
> between sexes; falsehood will be the only means of
> success in litigation; and women will be objects
> merely of sensual gratification. . . . Dishonesty will
> be the universal means of subsistence . . . menace and
> presumption will be substituted for learning . . .
> mutual assent will be marriage; fine clothes will be
> dignity. . . .[13]

Then, the age of purity (Krita) will dawn upon the world.

A Brahman with supernatural powers will destroy

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[12]See S. J. Case, op. cit., pp. 18-28.

[13]H. H. Wilson, The Vishnu Purāná, Vol. IV, p. 224 et
seq., cited by P. Sorokin, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 356.

. . . all thieves and all those whose minds are
devoted to inequity. He will then re-establish
righteousness upon earth.

Them purified and awakened men "shall give birth to a race
who shall follow the laws of the Krita age."[14]

In ancient China, the principle of "Yang" and "Yin"
represents a certain kind of millennial hope. It is a principle
akin, as Sorokin says, to the Hegelian "thesis-antithesis."[15]
Still, another kind of millenial hope can be noticed in the
Confucionist theory of the three stages. According to it,
mankind passes through three main stages in the course of time:
the disorderly stage, with its anarchy, continuous warfare, and
lack of efficient social control; the stage of small tranquillity,
characterized by the institutions of family, private property,
egotism, social instability; the stage of great similarity,
marked by social order, almost common property, mutual benevolence,
and reverence.[16]

After all, in ancient Judea, the millennial hope took
its final form which was destined to play later on a great role
in thought-development of mankind all over the world.

Professor Case is inclined to explain the "millenial

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[14]Cited by P. Sorokin, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 356.

[15]Ibid., p. 358.

[16]Cited by Ibid., p. 360.

hope" of the ancient civilizations on a geographical basis.
In his opinion, it is due primarily to the severity of the
climate and the like.[17] He says so, perhaps, under the in-
fluence of the geographical school which was greatly influential
among social scientists in the last century.[18] As a matter of
fact, the primitive peoples are more exposed to the influence
of geographical factors than the civilized.[19] Nevertheless,
it is difficult to find a clear formulation of the "millennial
hope" among them. Sociological explanation seems to be more
acceptable in this regard then the geographical one. Man is
usually more sensitive to the social injustice than to the
natural severity. An oriental proverb says: "A calamity shared
by all is quite bearable." The primitive peoples, generally
speaking, face natural hardships on a somewhat communistic basis.
To quote Durant,

>   It was usual among "savages" for the man who had
>   food to share it with the man who had none, for
>   travelers to be fed at any home they chose to stop at
>   on their way, and for communities harassed with drought

[17]S. Case, op. cit., passim.

[18]See P. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories,
pp. 99-101.

[19]"An important principle," says MacIver, "is revealed by
the relation of man to geographical conditions: As man's control
increases he becomes less directly and less completely dependent
upon and influenced by the immediate environment in which he is
situated." R. MacIver and C. Page, op. cit., p. 103.

to be maintained by their neighbors. If a man sat
down to his meal in the woods he was expected to call
loudly for someone to come and share it with him, before
he might justly eat alone. When Turner told a Samoan
about the poor in London, the "savage" asked in astonish-
ment; "How is it"? No food? No friends? No house to
live in? Where did he grow? Are there no houses
belonging to his friends? The hungry Indian had but to
ask to receive; no matter how small the supply was,
food was given him if he needed it; "No one can want
food while there is corn anywhere in the town." Among
the Hottentots it was the custom for one who had more
than others to share his surplus till all were equal.
White travelers in Africa before the advent of civilisa-
tion noted that a present of food or other valuables
to a "black man" was at once distributed; so that when
a suit of clothes was given to one of them the donor
soon found the recipient wearing the hat, a friend the
trousers, another friend the coat. . . .[20]

Therefore, there is very little place for "millennial

hope" among the primitive peoples because things are not "bad"

as far as social relationships are concerned.

Actually, however, one may find here and there among the

primitive peoples some sort of exploitation of one class by

another, or some gap between the leaders and the subjects. Never-

theless, one can hardly observe, as we have noticed in the pre-

ceding chapter, a feeling of resentment among the lower classes

that gives rise to any "millenial hope." Resentment does not

rise among lower classes, as Max Scheler rightly points out,

when they regard their status as being natural and right.[21]

Commenting on this, De Gré says:

[20]W. Durant, The Story of Civilisation, pp. 16-17.

[21]See G. De Gré, Society and Ideology, p. 12.

Long lasting oppression and inferiority of
status, therefore, does not guarantee the formation
of resentment; it must be coupled with strong feel-
ings of personal importance and self esteem.[22]

Thus, the prevalence of the doctrine of "mana" or
"charisma" in the primitive society makes resentment difficult
to arouse among the exploited subjects against their exploiting
leaders. The subjects may regard the exploitation-system, if
it exists. as natural or impersonal. They feel as if they are
submitting to, and slaving for, a sublime "spirit" that lies
behind the leader, not the leader himself. Simmel, the German
sociologist, thinks that, in general, depersonalisation of
authority relations make subordination more tolerable and less
humiliating.[23] It can be observed in some primitive societies
that the "father," the "sheikh," the "Brahman," the "Raja," and
the like, are sometimes in "dominating" positions over their
subjects. But, in the eyes of their subjects, they are merely
exercising the authority which is rightfully vested in them by
some "sacred" power. Might and right, therefore, are not deeply
separate.

The separation between "might" and "right" really appears
when the state arises and the palace, to use Wells' terms, is

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[22]Loc. cit.

[23]See R. Heberle, "The Sociology of George Simmel," in
H. Barnes, History of Sociology, p. 259.

erected beside the temple. Then, the men of the temple, as
the carriers of the sacred traditions, begin to open the eyes
of the lower classes to the unnaturalness of the oppression
committed against them by the men of the palace. The temple
consequently becomes the publishing house of the "millennial
hope." It arouses indignation against the palace and gives hope
that social injustice will eventually be overruled by diety
when "the last shall be first."

RIGHT VERSUS MIGHT IN ISLAM

Islam is, as Strothmann points out, a politico-religious phenomenon.[1] Its founder, Mohammed, was in his last years the "sacred" as well as the "secular" leader of the Moslem community. However, most of the Western historians and orientalists dispraise Mohammed on the ground of his secular career. To quote Reynold Nicholson who is considered an objective student of Islam,

> Mohammed in the early part of his career presents a spectacle of grandeur which cannot fail to win our sympathy and admiration. At Medina . . . he appears in a less favorable light: the days of pure religious enthusiasm have passed away forever and the Prophet is overshadowed by the Statesman.[2]

Many other writers attack Mohammed m re severely and in a less objective tone.[3]

It should be remembered that these Occidental writers view Mohammed through their own perspective; they impose the "categories" of their own culture on a man living in a quite

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[1] R. Strothmann, "Shia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 350.

[2] R. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, p. 169.

[3] See A. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. III, pp. 468–69; H. G. Wells, An Outline of History, pp. 607–608; J. Schacht, "Mohammed," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. X, p. 570.

different one. Most of them are Christians or living in a
Christian environment where the dictum, "Render unto Caesar
the things which are Caesar's and to God the things that are
God's," is considered logical and natural. They usually have
been taught since their early infancy that Christ refuses the
"crown" offered to him, and so they tend to regard Mohammed as
"a vulgar imposter" merely because he did accept the "crown."[4]

It seems that they overlook the big difference between
Christ's society and that of Mohammed. In fact, Christ lived
in a "secular" society, where the gap between "might" and "right"
was enormously wide, whereas, Mohammed, on the other hand, lived
generally speaking in a nomad society in which the "sacred"
tribal association was most prevalent. In discussing the dif-
ference between Christ's social environment and that of Mohammed,
Toynbee almost comes to the same conclusion. Toynbee says:

> Perhaps, the explanation is to be found in the
> nature of the social milieu into which Mohammed hap-
> pened to be born. If it is asked why he did not
> "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's,"
> the obvious answer is that, unlike Jesus, Mohammed
> did not happen to live under Caesar's jurisdiction.
> Whereas, Jesus was a member of the internal pro-
> letariat of the Roman Empire, and as such, was at the
> Roman government's mercy, Mohammed was a member of
> the external proletariat whose home was in the

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[4]"In quarters," says Toynbee, "hostile to Islam and to
its founder, this worldliness has been a popular object of denun-
ciation. . . ." (A Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. III, p. 468.)

no-man's-land outside the Roman frontiers and beyond
the reach of Caesar's arm. This extreme difference
of milieu explains, at least in part, the extreme dif-
ference between the earthly fortune of these two
prophets. . . ."[5]

In spite of his penetrating insight into the difference
between the social milieus of Jesus and Mohammed, Toynbee seems
to lack the more comprehensive explanation offered by sociology.[6]
The Roman rule, which has been emphasized by Toynbee as to be
the main difference between the two social milieus, is merely
an aspect indicating, rather than causing, the difference.
Jesus' society was a "secular" society in contrast to that of
Mohammed. Jesus could never be a successful secular ruler. The
gap between religion and politics, between what ought to be and
what is, was so wide that no man on earth could really reconcile
them. In the "no-man's-land" of Arabia, on the other hand, the
society was, and still is, typically "sacred." Its nucleus is
a well-integrated tribe[7] whose "sheikh" honestly serves its
public interests.[8] Actually, Mohammed tried to be a Christ-like

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[5]Ibid., p. 469.

[6]As a matter of fact, Toynbee is known by his general lack
of knowledge in the new sociological ideas which can be said to
have revolutionized the thought-style of the modern social scientists.
See H. Barnes and H. Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science,
Vol. I, p. 764.

[7]P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 26.

[8]Ibid., p. 28.

prophet for about thirteen years without much avail. To quote
Toynbee again,

> Down to the thirteenth year of the mission, when
> Mohammed finally withdrew from Mecca to Medina and
> abandoned the purely prophetic for the politico-
> religious career, Mohammed's preaching was manifestly
> from the worldly point of view, an utter failure. As
> a result of thirteen years of propaganda, he had won
> no more than a handful of converts most of whom had
> been compelled to fly the country. . . .[9]

Mohammed failed because the nomad Arabs could not under-
stand "right" without "might" behind it. As we noted in a pre-
vious chapter, "right" and "might," or in other words, religion
and politics, go hand in hand in "sacred" societies.

A very few followed him while he was preaching peacefully
and devotedly in Mecca. Most of the early converts were recruited
from the slaves and the lower classes of the town.[10]

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[9] Toynbee, op. cit., Vol. III, 468.

[10] S. Lane-Poole, The Speeches and Table-Talks of the
Prophet Mohammed, p. xxxiii; H. Masse, Islam, p. 37; R. Levy,
The Sociology of Islam, Vol. I, p. 77; R. Nicholson, op. cit.,
p. 154; P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 133.

It should be mentioned here that Mecca alone, in contrast
to all of its neighboring societies, fell under some sort of
"secularization" process due to its brisk commercial activities.
There appeared, therefore, certain individuals who felt the
oppression of the "secularization" process and so were attracted,
as Nicholson points out, by the leveling ideas of Islam (loc. cit.).
Except these few individuals who mostly belonged to the oppressed
class of Mecca, practically no one was attracted to Mohammed's
preaching for about thirteen years.

As soon as Mohammed changed, after the "Hijra," to a
secular ruler and a successful commander in war, the nomad
Arabs began to change their attitude toward him. They began
to regard him as a sacred prophet "really" sent by Allah. "The
victory itself," says Professor Hitti, "was interpreted as a
divine sanction of the new faith."[11] After the battle of Bedr
in which Mohammed was overwhelmingly victorious over his enemies,
the Koran says,

> Ye have had a sign in the two parties who met;
> one party fighting in the way of Allah, the other mis-
> believing; these saw twice the same number as them-
> selves to the eye-sight, for Allah aids with his help
> those whom He pleases. Verily, in that it is a lesson
> for those who have minds.[12]

Commenting upon the victory of Badr, Nicholson says:

> Here, at last, was the miracle which the Prophets'
> enemies demanded of him. . . . The victory of Badr
> turned all the eyes upon Muhammad. However little the
> Arabs cared for his religion, they could not but
> respect the man who had humbled the lords of Mecca.
> He was now a power in the land—"Muhammad, King of the
> Hijaz." In Medina his cause flourished mightily. The
> zealots were confirmed in their faith, the waverers
> convinced, the disaffected overawed.[13]

When Mohammed finally entered Mecca as a conqueror, his
chief opponent, Abu Sufian, declared his conversion to Islam,

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[11]P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 117.

[12]The Koren, Chap. III, Verse 11.

[13]R. Nicholson, op. cit., pp. 174-75.

saying, "Oh, Mohammed, if our idols were real gods, they should have protected us from you."[14]

H. G. Wells severely criticises Mohammed on the ground that he left his followers with no clear scheme according to which the election of his successors might be smoothly achieved.[15] Abdul-Raziq, a modern Moslem writer, advocates, perhaps under the influence of Wells' opinion, that Islam is a purely religious system. Political entanglement is, in his opinion, merely an incidental phenomena, not intended by the Prophet to be established upon a permanent basis. Thus Mohammed, says Abdul-Raziq, was completely right in neglecting the question of succession after his death. He was just a prophet, founding a religion, not a king.[16]

The difficulty with Wells, and Abdul-Raziq, probably lies in the fact that they forgot that Mohammed was living, as we have noticed before, in a "sacred" society in which the problem of

[14]This well-known saying attributed to the Arch-enemy of Mohammed at his conversion to the religion of Islam, clearly indicates the popular belief that "might" is necessarily associated with "right." (Cf. Al-Sahhar, Ahl Al-Bait, pp. 25, 27.)

[15]H. G. Wells, op. cit., p. 622.

[16]Ali Abdul-Raziq, Al-Islam Wa Usul Al-Hukm, pp. 93-95, et passim.

electing the leader did not practically exist.[17] Here again, the writers impose the "categories" of their own society on a different one. It was not imperative, in fact, for Mohammed to plan a scheme of succession or election for a society which was not yet born.[18] Mohammed can be considered, in this regard, a "sheikh" rather than a king. The "sheikh" of a tribe does not worry at all about who is going to succeed him after his death. The successor will be chosen eventually according to his own capacities[19] and his "mana." It is true, the successor is sometimes required to be from the family of his predecessor. This, however, can be interpreted as to indicate the possessing of "good" blood[20] which

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[17]There are some well-supported evidences which indicate that Mohammed had tried repeatedly to appoint Ali, his favorite cousin and son-in-law, as his successor. It seems that the objection against this appointment raised by some of his influential companions had finally caused him to drop it. (See Amir Ali, Spirit of Islam, p. 431; D. Donaldson, Aqidat Al-Shia, pp. 60, 22-27; Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 212, A. Aqqad, Abqariyat Al-Imam, pp. 165-167.)

[18]It is interesting indeed to notice here that Ibn Khaldun has a similar opinion as to the unimportance of appointing a successor at the time of the Prophet's death. (See Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 213.)

[19]E. Main, Iraq, p. 20.

[20]Until the present time, the nomad Arabs pay extraordinary attention to the "blood" and the blood relationship (See W. R. Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, pp. 26, 46). In fact, no other people in the world is so careful about the purity of its "blood" and its long pedigree as the Arabs (See P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 28). They even guard the "blood" purity of their horses. They keep the lineages of their horses as carefully as they keep their own.

ensures a powerful "mana." The tribe may prefer the son of the
old "sheikh" to be his successor believing that the "sheikh's"
capacities have been inherited by his son. Nevertheless, the
succeeding son will be deposed from his sheikhhood as soon as he
shows any kind of incapacity,[21] i.e., as soon as he loses his
"mana." In the words of Hitti, "His tenure of office lasts dur-
ing the good-will of his constituency."[22]

When Mohammed died, the Moslems immediately hurried to
elect his successor. They soon elected Abu Bekr, one of the
most celebrated disciples of the Prophet. There arose, it is
true, some disagreement and slight disturbances about the election,
but no serious conflict resulted from that. After the death of
Abu Bekr, almost all the Moslems quietly submitted to his suc-
cessor Omar I. There appeared no trouble as regards the succes-
sion merely because the Islamic society was still standing on
its old foundation, it had not yet come out from the "sacred" to
the "secular" pattern. The gap between the upper and lower
classes had not yet developed.

In spite of his great integrity and wisdom, the second
caliph, Omar, did something which, in the opinion of some thinkers,
facilated the rise of the gap. Omar began to distribute the

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[21]See Jamali, The New Iraq, pp. 27-28.

[22]P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 28.

spoils from the conquered countries, not equally as his predeces-
sor did, but inequally: to each according to his past record
of service and devotion to the cause of Islam.[23] This inequal
distribution can be rightly regarded as one of the factors that
led to the rise of an aristocratic class in Islam. Omar seemed
to become somewhat aware of the social consequences of the
pouring spoils of war. When the extraordinary spoils from the
Persian conquests came to Medina, Omar bitterly wept, saying to
one of his intimate friends: "But Allah does not give this
material treasure to a people without sowing at the same time the
seeds of hostility and hatred among them."[24] In fact, this
prophecy of Omar became true shortly after his death. A wide
difference in wealth and prestige arose among the Moslems. The
influence of social secularization began to gradually increase,
particularly when the Moslems came into contact with the con-
quered civilizations and tried to adopt some of their luxuries
and complicated life.[25]

Unfortunately, the third Caliph, Othman, was weak and in
the habit of favoring his relatives in the distribution of war

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[23]Abu Yusof, Kitab Al-Kharaj, p. 50 et seq.

[24]Ibid., p. 56.

[25]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, pp. 204-205.

spoils or the appointment of officials.[26] A significant fact should be mentioned at this point. Othman's relatives happened to be the same men who led the historical opposition of Mecca against Mhoammed and who did not adopt Islam except at the last hour when Mecca was conquered.[27] Othman practiced, or was obliged to practice, an extreme nepotism in favor of these men who were looked upon by the pious Moslems as "bad believers." In the words of Nicholson,

> They soon climbed into all the most lucrative and important offices and lived on the fat of the land, while too often their ungodly behaviour gave point to the question whether these converts of the eleventh hour were not still heathens at heart.[28]

Thus, two separate camps were formed. One was led by Ali and some other pious "companions" of the Prophet, and the other camp was led by the Omayyads, the relatives of the aging caliph, Othman. A man who belonged to the pious camp deserved here some special note. This person is Abu Thar who is considered by modern writers as the prophet of socialism in Islam.[29] Abu Thar

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[26]A. Gilman, The Saracens, p. 266.

[27]It is interesting to note that the same men led afterwards the opposition against Ali, the fourth caliph, and finally established their "realistic" dynasty, the Omayyad, during whose rule the conflict between the "ideal" and the "real" reached its climax in the history of Islam, as we have seen in the preceding part.

[28]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 190.

[29]See Al-Sahhar, Abu Thar Al-Ghifari; Q. Qalachi, Abu Thar Al-Ghifari; A. Al-Subaiti, Abu Thar Al-Ghifari.

vehemently protested against the big difference in wealth among the Moslems of his day.[30] He preached that the rich should have distributed their wealth among the poor and the needy.[31] After a long and severe strife, he helplessly died in exile.[32] However, the seed he sowed, rapidly grew after his death. His tragic episode associated with the continuous propaganda of the pious camp finally led to the murder of Othman by an indignant mob.[33]

The pious camp temporarily triumphed with the election of Ali to be Othman's successor in the caliphate. The "idealistic" rule of Ali was destined to last a very short time. The conscious lower classes who supported Ali in this election seemed to be too weak to prevent the "realistic" tide from rising. As we saw before, Muawiya led the opposition against Ali and eventually defeated him.

During the Omayyad dynasty which was founded by Muawiya, the contrast between what Wells calls the "Palace" and the

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[30]Abu Thar was the only nomadic person among the Prophet's companions. This may explain his extreme vehemence against the inequality in wealth which developed after the death of his beloved master, Mohammed.

[31]Al-Sahhar, op. cit., pp. 124-31.

[32]Q. Qalachi, op. cit., pp. 58-60.

[33]Ibid., pp. 61-70.

"Temple" was very clear. The name of Ali became at that time
the motto around which the camp of "right" gathered, while
the camp of "might" gathered around the triumphant Omayyads.[34]

It is interesting indeed to notice that the Arabs
mostly sided with the Omayyads.[35] While the non-Arabs, on the
other hand, sided against them in the "idealistic" camp.[36] Most
of the modern students of Islam tend to explain this phenomenon
according to the theory of racial determination. They usually
believe that the Arabs are different in their innate capacities
or tendencies from the non-Arabs.[37] There is perhaps no need
to say that racial determination, as well as the geographical
one, is no longer considered valid in the explanation of social
phenomena. There may be no exaggeration in saying that socio-
logical explanation is much more instructive and comprehensive
in this regard.

Looking at the controversy through the perspective
established in the present part, we may easily discover the
reason behind the siding of the Arabs with the Omayyads in

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[34]Cf. J. Schacht, "Usul," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV,
p. 1055.

[35]See Ahmad Ami, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 33.

[36]See Ibid., Vol. I, p. 32.

[37]Cf. R. Nicholson, op. cit., 214.

contrast to the non-Arabs. The reason, in fact, does not lie in the Arabs' hedonistic tendency or lack of religious sincerity, as modern students tend to think. It lies rather in the fact that the Arabs were at that time mostly nomadic in their culture and social values. They were, in other words, in the habit of looking at "might" and "right" through what has been referred to in this work as the "primitive" perspective. When the Omayyads defeated Ali and established their victorious dynasty, the Arabs saw in this a sign surely indicating that "right" was siding with the Omayyads. This will be more clearly understood if we remember the fact that the Omayyads respected the nomadic folkways and morés more than they respected those of Islam.[38] Moreover, they enlarged the area of the Islamic Empire to an astonishing extent. In fact, the greatest of the Islamic conquests took place under the Omayyad regime.[39] The armies, which helped to achieve such a "miraculous" victory

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[38] D. L. Vida, "Umaiyad," _Encyclopedia of Islam_, Vol. IV, pp. 998-99; "The Umayyad dynasty," says Macdonald, "we should remember, was in many ways a return to the pre-Muslim times and to an easy enjoyment of world things; it was a rejection of the yoke of Mohammed in all but form and name." (D. B. Macdonald, _The Development of Muslem Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory_, p. 130.)

[39] Al Miqdadi, _Tarikh Al-Ummat Al-Arabiyya_, pp. 233-37.

and enjoyed its booty, were mostly recruited from the Arabs themselves.[40]

Actually, the Arabs believed in the righteousness of the Omayyads as a result of their victory. Several evidences can be gathered, to support this point, from the incidental talks of the Arabs that happened to be preserved for one reason or another by the Moslem historians.[41] Mauwiya, the founder of the Omayyad dynasty, himself, declared once, from the pulpit of the mosque, that he was better in the sight of Allah than Ali. "The two," Muawiya said, "lay their case in front of Allah, and Allah settled it by judging in favor of Muawiya against Ali."[42] Muawiya considered his victory over Ali as an indubitable proof of his "rightfulness" in the sight of Allah. He might not actually believe in that, but to declare it from the pulpit of the mosque indicated the inclination of the audience to believe in it.

At any rate, the Arabs began under the leadership of the

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[40]It is necessary to note here that one of Ibn Khaldun's ancestors served as a general in the Omayyad army that conquered Spain. This is an important factor in the development of Ibn Khaldun's thought-style, especially if we remember that the Arabs tend to be loyal to the same party that has deserved the loyalty of their ancestors.

[41]See for example, Al-Sahhar, op. cit., pp. 227, 260, 324.

[42]Ibid., p. 260.

Omayyads to develop a deep contempt toward the non-Arab Moslems.
They began to consider the non-Arabs as mere slaves or booty
of war. Muawiya is reported to have once said,

> I notice that these reds /i.e., the non-Arab
> Moslems/ have increased in number . . . I imagine
> they will, someday, rebel against the Arabs and the
> government, and so I have an intention to kill part
> of them and leave the other part enslaved for the
> purpose of establishing markets and building
> roads. . . .[43]

As a reaction, deliberate or unconscious, against this
racial discrimination, the non-Arab Moslems resorted to the
collecting of the sacred traditions of Mohammed and his "Rashidin"
caliphs. The mosques became then schools for the learning of
the newly-rising "sciences" of Islam. Almost all the "scientists"
in Islam were, as Ibn Khaldun points out, non-Arabs.[44] Sayings
were spreading at that time to the effect that the non-Arabs, and
particularly the Persians, were, by nature, more scientific and
more religious than the Arabs. Even the Prophet was included
among those who believed in the scientific ability and honesty
of the Persians.[45]

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[43]Cited by Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, p. 90.

[44]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, pp. 543–45.

[45]See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, pp. 76–78.

Thus, the Moslems were divided, along racial lines, into two separate groups: soldiers and scientists, followers of "might" and followers of "right." Each race followed the way that was opened before them. The Arabs represented the conquerors who believed that the sword was the last judge in the world, whereas the non-Arabs represented the conquered who resorted to the realm of ideas and ideals, or what Nietzsche called "transvaluation," as a protest against the severe judgment of the sword. Consequently, the contrast of the "temple" as against the "palace," or in this case, the "mosque" as against the "qasr" became obvious.

MILLENNIAL HOPE IN ISLAM

Islam was, and still is, full of the millennial hope.
The hope usually goes in Islam under the name of "Mahdism." It
is natural, of course, on the part of the Moslems to wait always
for the expected "Mahdi," since they often feel a wide dis-
crepency between the ideal principles of Mohammed and the actual
conditions of their politico-religious life.[1]

The modern students of Islam think that Mohammed did not
himself expound the idea of "Mahdi." The idea rather, they say,
developed in Islam during the Omayyad period under the influence
of the Jewish and Christian Messianism; then, it was invented
and attributed to the "Hadith" of Mohammed.[2] Modern students,
it seems, consider that Mohammed was interested in no millennial
hope, due to the fact that he was a victorious prophet. They
seem to see little reason on the part of Mohammed to prophesy

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[1]See J. Schacht, "Sharia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV,
p. 323.

[2]See Cohn, "Messianism," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences,
Vol. X, p. 363; D. S. Margoliouth, "Mahdi," Encyclopedia of
Religion and Ethics, Vol. VIII, p. 636; D. M. Donaldson, Aqidat
Al-Shia, pp. 230-31.

about a "future savior," since he considered himself the
"future savior" of his people, and he, moreover, actually
achieved what was expected from him in this respect. Here again,
we notice that scholars impose their own presuppositions and
categories of thought on others. In fact, there was a great
reason on the part of Mohammed to be interested in the millennial
hope particularly in the first period of his prophetic mission
when he was helplessly and hopelessly striving against over-
whelming forces.[3] Mohammed was, as we have seen, not victorious
from the beginning of his mission. In the first period of his
mission, he was, in some sense, a prophet of the Biblical type.
At that time, he was greatly influenced by the Judaeo-Christian
attitudinal-complex.[4] It is natural, therefore, to find in
Mohammed the same interest in "Messianism" as that of the Jews
and the Christians before him. The difficulty with the modern
students is that they usually overlook the fact that Mohammed
was a great admirer of the Hebrew prophets and vehemently tried
to follow their footsteps as far as possible.[5]

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[3] A Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. III, p. 468 et seq.

[4] P. Hitti, History of the Arab, p. 113.

[5] Almost all the historical narratives of the Koran have
their biblical parallels. Many of the Hebrew Prophets are men-
tioned in the Koran with great reverence as if they were the only
prophets sent by Allah to mankind.

Studying the attitudinal-complex of Mohammed through this perspeetive, we may be able to see that the "Mahdi" is nothing but the Mohammedan version of the Hebrew "Messiah." It is interesting that modern students always wonder as to the source from which the word "Mahdi" came. This word, in fact, was unknown in Arabic before Mohammed. The students differ as to the root from which it was derived, and to the reason behind it.[6]

The problem seems to be very simple. It is most probable that Mohammed developed the word "Mahdi" just to be the Arabic equivalent of the Hebrew term of "Messiah." Both are "passive partieiples," grammatically speaking, and both indieate almost the same meaning. Whereas "Messial" means the anointed one, "Mahdi" means the divinely guided one.[7] The "Mahdi," like the "Messiah," is believed to appear in some future time to deliver the "believers" from the prevailing social injustiees. The fact that he will be "divinely guided," or "anointed" to use the

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[6]D. S. Margoliouth, "Mahdi," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VIII, pp. 336-37.

[7]This seems to be the most acceptable interpretation of the term "Mahdi" among orientialists. See Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 336.

Hebrew terminology,[8] denotes that in his person "might" and "right" will be combined together again, after they have been separated.

It is interesting at this point to observe that the Mohammedan traditions often mention the coming of Jesus along with the rise of the "Mahdi." The two "deliverers" will, according to the traditions, cooperate in the fight against the anti-Christ, or "Al Masih Al-Dajjal"[9] as the traditions call him. Macdonald says,

> But in this development /of the "Mahdi" tradition/ the roles assigned to Jesus and to the Mahdi came to be confusingly alike, and one party tried to cut the knot with a tradition from Muhammed. "There is no Mahdi save Isa B. Maryam."[10]

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[8] "The anointing of Kings represented the formal investiture with an office that was always regarded as sacred among the Hebrews. . . . That the act indicated, besides the purely formal investiture, that actual transfer of Divine Powers to the person anointed, may be concluded from the explicit statement in connection with the anointing ceremony that 'the spirit of Jehovah rested with the anointed one.' . . . (A Crowley, "Anointing," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. I, p. 556. It is interesting indeed to notice that anointing among the primitive Malenesians still indicates the imparting of "mana" by the medicine-man to the anointed one. See Ibid., pp. 550-51.)

[9] The "Masih Al-Dajjal" means in Arabic the "False Messiah." (See Wensink, "Masih," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. III, p. 391; B. C. De Vida, "Dodjdjal," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. I, p. 887; D. M. Donaldson, op. cit., pp. 242-43.)

[10] D. B. Macdonald, "Isa," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. II, p. 525. "Isa Ibn Maryam" means: Jesus, the son of Mary.

However, this tradition which declares that there is no Mahdi save Jesus has for long troubled the minds of the Moslem "traditionists."[11] What did the Prophet really mean by that? The traditionists widely differ in answering this perplexing question. It appears that Mohammed meant what he said. There is no "Mahdi" save Jesus. This will be clearly understood if we remember that Mohammed developed late in his life an intense dislike against the national pride and arrogance of the Jews.[12] We can find, moreover, some verses in the Koran which obviously indicate the siding of Mohammed with the Christians against the Jews.[13] Looking through this perspective, we may be able to see in the aforementioned tradition, which identifies the "Mahdi" with Jesus, an indirect challenge from Mohammed against the Jews.

At any rate, "Mahdism" seems to lose gradually its grip upon the minds of the Moslems after they became victorious and began to build their huge empire. The flowing hope of the early days began to die out as a result of the rising "might" of Islam.

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[11] Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, pp. 322, 325, 327.

[12] See Heinrich Speyer, "Yahud," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 1148.

[13] The Koran says, "You will meet no greater enemy of the believers than the Jews and the Heathens and more inclined to friendliness to believers than those tho say, 'We are Christians,' for there are priests and monks among them and they are not arrogant." Chap. V, Verse 85.

During the "Rashidin" period, "might" and "right" appeared to go hand in hand. The "Mahdi" was then not wanted. The idea of the future deliverer was saved at the depths of the Moslems' minds to some later days. Even when Muawiya defeated Ali and founded the "unorthodox" dynasty of the Omayyads on the throne of the caliphate, no "Mahdi" was in sight. The pious Moslems were then still believing that the right kind of government would be sooner or later restored to its previous position.

However, the first "Mahdi" in Islam, as history tells us,[14] appeared immediately after the murder of Hussain, the grandson of Mohammed, at the hands of an Omayyad army.[15] This "Mahdi" was Ibn Al-Hanafiyya, a half-brother of Hussain. It seems that Ibn Al-Hanafiyya did not actually want to be called so. Some Moslems were perhaps so depressed at the murdering of

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[14]See D. S. Margoliouth, "Mahdi," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VIII, p. 336; Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III, p. 236; D. M. Donaldson, op. cit., p. 231.

[15]Mohammed is known to have loved his grandchild, Hussain, a great deal. There are several traditional sayings attributed to Mohammed denoting the high position of Hussain in his eyes. When Hussain was brutally killed with his family and followers by the Omayyad army, the pious Moslems were enormously shocked. This may explain why the first "Mahdi" in Islam appeared after his murder. "The death of Hysayn," says Lane-Poole, "as idealized in after ages, fills up a want in Islam; it is the womanly against the masculine, the Christian as opposed to the Jewish element, that this story supplies to the work of Mohammed." (Cited by C. Sell, Studies in Islam, p. 53.)

Hussain that they could not refrain from reviving the long-forgotten tradition of the "Mahdi." When Ibn Al-Hanafiyya died, his followers believed he did not actually die. He was, they said, merely retiring from this "evil" world, living somewhere in the mountains outside the "Medina," waiting for the order of Allah to come out and deliver his people from the prevailing social injustice.[16]

During the Omayyad period, and the Abbasid period afterwards, many "Mahdis" arose. Almost all of them were Alids,[17] i.e., descendents of Ali. The name of Ali was, as we have seen before, a pregnant symbol of protest against the secularization of the Caliphate, that is, against the separation of "might" and "right." Hence, we find the adjectives "Alid" or "Fatimid"[18] often associated with the name "Mahdi." In fact, most of the traditions of the "Mahdi" which are usually attributed to the Prophet indicate this association.[19] This led Professor Amin of

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[16]Ahmad Amin, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 236-37.

[17]D. S. Margoliouth, "Mahdi," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VII, pp. 336-37.

[18]Fatimid means a descendent of Fatima the daughter of Mohammed and the wife of Ali. Hence, Fatimid and Alid are taken sometimes as synonyms.

[19]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mocaddima, Pt. III, Chap. 52 passim.

the Egyptian University to the conclusion that the idea of the
"Mahdi" is a Shiite[20] invention.[21] He attributes, moreover,
the spread of the idea among the orthodox Moslems to the work
of the Sufites who adopted it from the Shiites.[22] Professor
Amin overlooks the fact that "Mahdism" is a kind of millennial
hope, or messianism, that can be found, in one form or another,
in almost all societies in which "might" and "right" are thought
to be in conflict against each other. To quote Cohn,

> Messianism, moreover, is never mere theoretical
> speculation about things to come; it is always a
> living practical force. . . . There is always in
> messianism a non-acceptance of the present order and
> a sentiment of revolt against things which seem
> unbearable.[23]

The Shiites, it is true, were the first of the Islamic
group who seriously believed in the "Mahdi." They did so mainly
because they were the first group in Islam who felt the burden
of injustice under the Omayyad caliphate. Actually, the Omayyads
did not hesitate to use every means possible to suppress Shiism
and to blemish the name of Ali which was considered the seed

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[20]The Shiites are the partisans of Ali.

[21]Ahmad Amin, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 236 et seq.

[22]Ibid., 245-46.

[23]H. Cohn, "Messianism," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences,
Vol. X, p. 357.

of Shiism.[24]

Afterwards, "Mahdism" was adopted by the Sufites. Sufism
is a kind of mysticism developed in Islam as a protest against
the profanation of the caliphate, on the one hand, and against
the moral disintegration of the Islamic society on the other
hand.[25] Following Wiese's theory, we can regard Sufism as the
"cult," whereas Shiism is the "sect" of Islam. In the opinion
of Wiese, both of these two ideal-types, the "cult" and the
"sect," rise, generally speaking, in reaction against the secu-
larization of religion or the adulteration of its old ideals.[26]
No wonder, therefore, that the doctrine of the "Mahdi" appeared
first among the Shiites and the Sufites, and then spread to
the orthodox masses of Islam.

However, there is a big difference between the "Mahdi"
of the Shiites and that of the Sufites that penetrated finally

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[24]Abu Al-Hadid, Sharh Al-Nahj, Vol. I, p. 356, 358, 359
and Vol. III, p. 15, cited by M. H. Zain, Al-Shia Fil-Tarikh,
p. 24.

[25]See E. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, p. 416;
Ahmad Amin, Dhuhr Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 121.

[26]See Wiese-Becker, Systematic Sociology, Chap. VLIV,
passim. The only difference between the "cult" and the "sect"
in this respect lies in the fact that the former is an individual
reaction whereas the latter is a social one. "The sources of
emotional satisfaction," says Wiese, "for the cult behavior lies
wholly within himself; the injustices or good fortunes which
others may suffer affect him to be sure, but the center of his
cosmos is his "I." Ibid., p. 267.

into the whole body of Islam. The Shiites believe that the "Mahdi" is now living in a place of retirement beyond the reach of ordinary men. He is waiting the order of Allah in order to appear and "fill the earth with justice after it has been full of injustice." According to them, the "Mahdi" is a historical man who lived once in the past, and then disappeared and retired into his unreachable place. He did not die and will not die until he appears again to this world and fully fulfills his mission.[27] The Sufites, on the other hand, believe that the "Mahdi" is an ordinary man. He will be born some day in the future, just like any other man, and after he reaches the age of maturity, he will rise to achieve his mission of social delivery.

This difference in doctrine has led to a great difference in actuality. In fact, we seldom see a "Mahdi" rise among the Shiites. This may be due to the supernatural and the impossible qualities which they attribute to the life and past career of the "Mahdi." They do not easily respond to a claim of "Mahdism" rising in their midst. Any claimant of "Mahdism" should prove beyond doubt, in order to win the confidence of the Shiites, that he was not born in the present age, and that he has just come out from his hiding place in which he was

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[27]See D. M. Donaldson, Aqidat Al-Shia. Chap. XXI, passim.

living for ages. This is, of course, highly difficult, if not
impossible, to do on the part of any rising "Mahdi." This may
explain why there have appeared, comparatively speaking, very
few "Mahdis" among the Shiites during the dark ages of Islam.[28]

Among the orthodox groups of Islam, on the other hand,
the doctrine of "Mahdism" is a dynamic social factor. It pro-
duced, and still is producing, many uprisings, upheavals, and
social movements in the Islamic society. To the orthodox
masses, the "Mahdi" is an ordinary man, so any man with a pro-
phetic tendency may feel that he is the expected deliverer of
Islam. Thus, "Mahdism," became one of the few doctrines that
saved the Islamic society from a complete stagnation during its
dark ages.[29]

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[28] There appeared among the Shiites only one important
"Mahdi" in the recent times. This was Ali Mohammed, of Persia,
who is considered the founder of the Bahai religion. It is
interesting to notice that, in the beginning of his preaching,
he did not, at all, claim to be the "Mahdi" himself. He called
himself the "Bab," that is, the door or the introduction to the
coming of the "Mahdi." He met, nevertheless, an extraordinary
opposition from the Shiites of Persia. (See D. M. Donaldson,
op. cit., p. 352 et seq.)

[29] In the opinion of Ahmad Amin, "Mahdism" was, on the
contrary, a sort of opium to the masses. In his own words, "the
ruler becomes corrupt while the masses dream." Ahmad Amin,
Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III, p. 246. In another place, however,
Ahmad Amin ascribes many revolutions and social upheavals,
especially in the West, to the idea of "Mahdism," (Ibid., Vol.
III, p. 244.)

At any rate, the Sufites were the leading factor
behind this kind of social fermentation. Their mysticism and
esstatic tendency provided many of them with some sort of
prophetic inspiration, or "Mahdic" inclination.[30] It is
interesting to notice at this point, that the Sufites have somewhat
released the doctrine of "Mahdism" from its traditional con-
text and placed it, instead on a philosophical basis. They
consider "Mahdism" as a phase of the dialectical process which
rules society as well as nature. In the light of this dia-
lectical theory, they regard the appearing of the "Mahdi" as an
inevitable phenomenon since Allah has wisely arranged things to
be finally corrected after they become corrupted.[31]

The Sufites have not found much difficulty in attribut-
ing this dialectical doctrine to Mohammed himself. The Prophet
is said to have predicted the gradual decline of his religion,
after his death.[32] He has predicted also that Allah will send

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[30]"Here and there," says O'leary, "we find Sufi revivals;
indeed, Sufism is the only phase of Islam which kept free from
the rigid conservatism which has laid its iron hand of repression
upon Muslim life and thought generally." De Lacy O'leary,
Arabic Thought and Its Place in History, p. 224.

[31]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 324.

[32]J. Schacht, "Sharia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV,
p. 323.

in the beginning of every century a reformer in order to revive
the decaying body of Islam.[33] To the Sufites, the successive
reformers of Islam are ordinary men inspired only for the
purpose of keeping the body of Islam intact and safe for certain
periods of time. The final and the revolutionary revival of
the religion will be achieved by the "divinely guided" Mahdi.
And this will take place at the end of time.[34] According to
the Sufites, it is the law of the world that things run on a
circle, getting low and high again. Allah destines everything
to turn back to its old original pattern. The disparity between
"right" and "might" is therefore temporary. The pious Moslems
have the full right then to expect a savior. It is difficult
to imagine that Allah shall permit the world to run into its
final end before the appearance of the "Mahdi."[35]

Where did the Sufites get this dialectical theory? It
appears that they got it, directly or indirectly, from Babylonian
and Persian origins. As a matter of fact, the influence of the
Babylonian "annus magnus" can be clearly observed in the writings

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[33]Al-Ghazzali, Al-Monqidh Min Al-Dhalal, p. 132.

[34]D. B. Macdonald, "Mahdi," Encyclopedia of Islam,
Vol. III, p. 114.

[35]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, pp. 323-24.

of the Batinites long before the Sufites. Ikhwan Al-Safa,
the Batinite's most famous writers, say:

> Time is divided into two parts; a shining day and
> a dark night, a hot summer and cold winter; and the
> two parts always follow each other. . . . This is
> also observable in the history of dynasties, sometimes
> the state is in the hands of good people, and in other
> times, it falls into the hands of the bad. This is the
> law of nature as Allah says. . . . And today, we find
> that the power of the bad people in its prime; this
> indicates that they are about to go down because a
> decrease comes always after an increase.[36]

It is quite instructive indeed to note here that the Sufites
were greatly influenced, as O'Leary points out, by the philoso-
phical teaching of the Batinites and especially of "Ikhwan Al-
Safa," quoted above.[37] Moreover, many of the early Sufites were,
according to O'Leary, converts from Zoroastrianism, or the sons
of such converts.[38] Therefore, one can easily come to the con-
clusion that Zoroaster, who is considered the precursor of

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[36]Ikhwan Al-Safa, Rasail, pp. 111-12.

[37]See De L. O'Leary, op. cit., p. 167. Ikhwan Al-Safa
was, later on, introduced to Spain and the "West" and there
exerted an undeniable influence on the "Western" philosophers
and then on Ibn Khaldun as we shall see later. It is interesting
indeed to find in Ibn Khaldun's Prolegomena a clear allusion to
the similarity between social dialectic and the fluctuation of
day and night. (See, for example, Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima,
pp. 208-09.)

[38]De L. O'Leary, op. cit., p. 190.

Hegel,[39] can be also considered the teacher of the Sufites,
in his dialectical theory. In fact, the Sufites' writings are
full of dialectical concepts and interpretations.[40] The follow-
ing quotation, from O'Leary, may give the reader a general
view of the dialectical theory in Sufism.

> The Sufi doctrine of God as the only reality has a
> direct bearing not only on creation but also on the
> problem of good and evil. As a thing can only be
> known by its opposite, light by darkness, health by
> sickness, being by non-being, so God could only be made
> known to man as reality contrasted with non-reality,
> and the mingling of these two opposites produces the
> world of phenomena in which light is made known by a
> background of darkness, which darkness is itself only
> the absence of light; or, as being proceeds by succes-
> sive emanations from the First Cause, it becomes weaker
> or less real in each emanation as it recedes further
> from the great Reality, it incidentally becomes more
> perceptible as it becomes less real. Thus evil, which
> is merely the negation of the moral beauty of the
> Reality, appears in the latest emanation as the unreal
> background which is the inevitable result of a pro-
> jection of the emanation from the First Cause, who is
> entirely good, into a world of phenomena. Evil is,
> therefore, not real, it is merely the result, the
> inevitable result, of the mingling of reality with
> unreality. In fact, this is implied in the doctrine
> that all other than God is unreal.[41]

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[39] S. M. Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia,
p. 6.

[40] See C. Sell, Studies in Islam, pp. 5-7; Afifi, Ibn
Al-Arabi, p. 159; De L. O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

[41] De L. O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

IBN KHALDUN AND "MAHDISISM"

Ibn Khaldun was born in a time when the Islamic society was in its most critical situation. The Moslems had been encircled and attacked from three different fronts at almost the same time. The Mongols attacked them from the east, the Crusaders from the north and the Spaniards from the west.[1] The Moslems were helplessly defending their "holy" lands and perplexedly wondering what was the cause behind all these deadly troubles.

In this critical situation, Ibn Khaldun was born. History tells us that the Sufite influence was extraordinarily strong in North Africa at the time of Ibn Khaldun.[2] Every now and then there appeared a man who claimed to be the expected "Mahdi." Most of the "Mahdis" failed in their missions leaving behind them social unrest and widespread resentment.

Most of the students of Ibn Khaldun agree, more or less, that he was favorably influenced by the Sufite doctrine. M. Enan believes that Ibn Khaldun had a strong Sufite tendency.[3]

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[1]See A. Toynbee, Civilisation on Trial, Chap. 10 passim.

[2]T. Hussein, Falsafat Ibn Khaldun Al-Iitimairya, p. 75.

[3]M. Enan, Ibn Khaldun, p. 31.

According to Macdonald, Ibn Khaldun was a convinced Ghassal-
ian,[4] i.e., a follower of Gazzali, the great Sufite who made
Sufism an acceptable doctrine in Islam. Was Ibn Khaldun really
Sufite? This writer is of the opinion that he was Sufite as
far as religious affairs were concerned. When he wrote about
Allah and how man should behave toward Him, he appeared as a
pious believer and a devoted mystic. But he, nevertheless,
differed from the Sufites and all other religious groups, as we
have seen before, in regard to social affairs. Unlike the
Sufites, he believed that religion had nothing to do with society
or politics.

If we are permitted to liken the Sufites in their dia-
lectical theory to Hegel, Ibn Khaldun can be likened in this
sense to Karl Marx.[5] As we have seen in a preceding chapter,

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[4]See D. B. Macdonald, The Religious Attitude and Life in
Islam, p. 131.

[5]Marx says that he merely stands the Hegelian dialectic
on its feet. In the words of Loucks and Hoot, "It might be said
that Marx rejected Hegel's idealism and substituted for it realism.
The thesis and antithesis became to Marx actual opposing forces
existing in the universe, with a synthesis as the resulting objec-
tive phenomenon which, becoming in its turn thesis or antithesis,
played its part in the creation of a new synthetic phenomenon.
That this realism constituted a vital modification of the Hegelian
system is attested by the numerous clashes Marx had with the
followers of the more purely idealistic Hegel. Whereas, the latter
never departed from the realm of mental images, Marx set out to
study the operation of this (to him) universal truth in the every-
day events of the world of human affairs." (W. N. Loucks and J. W.
Hoot, Comparative Economic Systems, p. 181.)

Ibn Khaldun believes that society, as well as nature, is ruled
by the dialectical process. But he seems to see in the Sufite
dialectic too much of "spiritualism" or "idealism" to be rightly
applied to the actual process of society. Ibn Khaldun took the
Sufite dialectic, as Marx did long after him as regards Hegel,
and "stood it on its feet."

Ibn Khaldun's social theory is deeply penetrated by a
dialectical inclination showing society to move on a cyclical
pattern but he is not of the opinion that this cyclical movement
is run by a spirit or an idea. He firmly believes that the
social dialectic is run by certain factors springing up from
society itself. Thus, Ibn Khaldun has taken up the Sufite theory,
deprived it of its "spiritualistic" coloring and fixed it anew
upon a "materialistic," or "sociologistic," basis.

The prime mover behind the social dialectic is, according
to Ibn Khaldun, the "asabiyya."[6] The "asabiyya" to Ibn Khaldun

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[6]In the opinion of Hasri, the "asabiyya" forms the core
of the entire social theory of Ibn Khaldun (See S. Hasri, Dirasat,
p. 285). What Ibn Khaldun exactly means by the term "asabiyya,"
is difficult to decide. Whether it is the tribal spirit, esprit
de corps, or the social relationship in general, nobody knows. In
spite of his great reliance in his social explanation on the
"asabiyya," Ibn Khaldun does not give us a clear definition of it.
This may be ascribed to the fact that the term was quite usable
in his time, and so he did not feel any need for defining it. It
may be sufficient for the purpose at hand to define "asabiyya" as
the tribal loyalty or spirit which makes the individual give up

seems to play the same role as that of Allah's will to the
Sufites. This does not mean that Ibn Khaldun denies the effect
of Allah's will upon social process. In fact, he, as a true
Moslem, firmly believes that Allah's will is behind every
phenomenon in the world, natural or social. But Allah does not
usually do things, Ibn Khaldun says, in contradiction to the
laws which He Himself has created.[7] Particularly in social
phenomena, Allah does things, when He wants, in accordance with
the laws of society. Even the prophets, who were entitled to

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himself for the sake of his tribe and view the world through its
eyes. It is, as Hitti puts it, "the individualism of the member
of the clan magnified." (P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 27.)
This may express, as near as possible, what Ibn Khaldun meant
by "asabiyya." This is what can be observed in the nomadic
culture of which Ibn Khaldun was an admiring student. In the
nomadic society, as well as in all types of primary groups, as
we have seen before, man's individuality is weakened at the
expense of his strong "social self." At any rate, Ibn Khaldun
believes, as we shall see later, that the stronger the "asabiyya"
of a people, the greater will be its role in the social process.
When a people has a strong "asabiyya" they can easily conquer other
peoples, establish a state, and run society according to their
own interests. Then they will yield to luxury and soft life,
and so gradually lose their "asabiyya." Another people with a
freshly strong "asabiyya" will appear on the stage of society
and repeat the cycle—conquest, establishing the state, and then
luxury and decline. Nobody, according to Ibn Khaldun, is able
to prevent this cycle from its up-and-down movement.

[7]As we have noticed before, Ibn Khaldun can be likened in
this sense to the English Deists of the eighteenth century who
believed that God left the world, after He had created it, to
be run according to its own laws, without interference.

perform miracles against the law of causality, did, neverthe-
less, their reforms in the social field according to the dicta-
tion of the "asabiyya."[8] The "Mahdi" is therefore no exception
to the rule.[9] Anyone who wants to reform the human society
must follow its inevitable laws. The "divine guide" is not
enough for the "Mahdi." He should have, in addition, a strong
tribal power, or "asabiyya," to support him in his divine mission.

Ibn Khaldun is considered the first, and perhaps the
last, writer in Islam who flatly denies the coming of any
divinely guided "Mahdi." In reality, he is not against any kind
of "Mahdi," as he is supposed to be. He refutes only the idea
of the "Mahdi" who is supposed to come out of nothing as far as
power relationship is concerned and to achieve his mission by
some sort of miracle or divine assistance.

Ibn Khaldun is particularly against what he calls the
"Fatimid,"[10] that is, the "Mahdi" who is a descendent of Ali
and Fatima. He seems to have some deep, unconscious hatred
against the Alids,[11] in general, perhaps because of the extreme

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[8]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moeaddima, p. 159.

[9]Ibid., pp. 327-28.

[10]See Ibid., Part III, Chap. 52, passim.

[11]See Ibid., p. 446.

"idealistic" tendency, which characterized them for a long time in the early history of Islam. He is of the opinion that the Alids cannot produce any "Mahdi" in the future, because they have no strong "asabiyya" to support their "Mahdi" when he arises.[12]

Of all the "Mahdis" who appeared before his time, Ibn Khaldun admired only one. This one was that who successfully established Almohad dynasty in North Africa.[13] According to Ibn Khaldun's theory, a good "Mahdi" is that one who leads a growing "asabiyya" to its natural end--that one who helps the social dialectic in its cyclical movement. To Ibn Khaldun, as we have seen before, society does not need a reformer. It can correct itself by itself. In brief, there is a need for those who facilate the spontaneous correction of society, not for those who handicap it by their "idealistic" and impractical day-dreaming.

When Ibn Khaldun comes to the problem of evil, he studies it in a way quite reminiscent of the Sufite's view in this regard.

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[12]Ibid., pp. 327-28.

[13]It may be relevant to mention that Ibn Khaldun dedicated his Prolegomena and General History to the King of Tunisia, of his time, who was related, in a way, to Almohad dynasty. (See R. Brunschvig, "Tunisia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 851.) This may partly explain why Ibn Khaldun was favorably inclined toward the Almohads and their successful "Mahdi."

For him, evil is not a fundamental element in the social structure. Evil is merely a by-product of good. It is, moreover, very little in comparison to the good achieved in producing it.[14] In other words, evil and good are not, in his opinion, two separate things opposed to each other as orthodox writers are accustomed to think. They are rather two phases of one reality, the reality of existence. In this way, Ibn Khaldun has done away with the discrepancy between "might" and "right."

It is true, Ibn Khaldun admits, that "might," or what he calls "jah," may lead its owner to do some acts of injustice, but this is an inevitable by-product of the good resulting from the exercising of "jah." According to his theory, society without upper classes, is impossible. With an argument reminiscent of Hobbes' philosophy, he comes to the conclusion that a group of men living together, without some upper hand regulating their activities, may become beasts fighting each other, instead of social beings cooperating with each other.[15] In other words, "might" is necessary for establishing "right." The conflict that appears between the two is relatively insignificant, and should be considered a small cost for the maintaining of the

[14]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 390.

[15]Loc. cit.

highly advantageous social life.[16]

Here, Ibn Khaldun obviously shows a strong upper class orientation. The upper classes naturally believe, as Yinger points out, "that there is nothing basically evil about a society which has treated them so well."[17] It is usually the lower class which believes that society is full of injustice and that power is evil. We have usually two opposed ideologies or perspectives, each sees social conditions from its own side, entirely overlooking the other side. The upper classes tend to refer to themselves as the guardians of social order and the agents of God for that; whereas, the lower classes believe that society will do much better if the upper classes refrain from their unjust interference and exploitation. Niebuhr says,

> Privileged groups have other persistent methods of justifying their special interests in terms of general interest. The assumption that they possess unique intellectual gifts and moral excellencies which redound to the general good, is only one of them. Perhaps a more favorite method is to identify the particular organization of society, of which they are beneficiaries, with the peace and order of society in general and to appoint themselves the apostles of law and order. Since every society has an instinctive desire for harmony and avoidance of strife, this is a very potent instrument of maintaining the unjust status quo. No society has ever achieved peace without incorporating injustice into its harmony. Those who would eliminate the injustice are therefore always

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[16] See Ibid., Part 5, Chap. 6 passim.

[17] J. M. Yinger, Religion in the Struggle for Power, p. 26.

placed at the moral disadvantage of imperilling its
peace. The privileged groups will place them under
that moral disadvantage even if the efforts toward
justice are made in the most pacific terms. They
will claim that it is dangerous to disturb a pre-
carious equilibrium and will feign to fear anarchy
as the consequence of the effort. This passion for
peace need not always be consciously dishonest.
Since those who hold special privileges in society
are naturally inclined to regard their privileges
as their rights and to be unmindful of the effects of
inequality upon the underprivileged, they will have
a natural complacence toward injustice. Every effort
to disturb the peace, which incorporates the injustice,
will therefore seem to them to spring from unjustified
malcontent. They will furthermore be only partly con-
scious of the violence and coercion by which their
privileges are preserved and will therefore be particu-
larly censorious of the use of force or the threat of
violence by those who oppose them.[18]

Ibn Khaldun, therefore, is looking through the perspec-

tive of the upper, or what Neibuhr calls the privileged,

classes.[19] He does not see a fundamental discrepency or conflict

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[18]R. Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, pp. 129-30.

[19]It should be remembered at this point that Ibn Khaldun
actually belonged for some time to the upper classes of his
society. He served, under various rulers, as a diplomat, a
royal usher, a secretary and the like. But there is still a
great difference between him and a typical member of an upper
class. He started his life, more or less, as a member of a
lower class, and was educated by his ascetic-pious father to be
a man of religious devotion and "idealistic" learning. After
the death of his father, his strong ambition led him on the road
of political and secular activities. Thus, a great psychological
conflict might have raged within himself, and probably caused him
to theorize and rationalize. A typical upper class member, on
the other hand, does not have to theorize or rationalize about
his position. He takes everything for granted and goes ahead

between "might" and "right," just in contrast to the view of
the lower classes. He views the role of the "asabiyya" through
the same perspective too. The students of Ibn Khaldun's theory
usually misunderstood him about this point. They often judge
him by the same standard as that by which they judge other
writers of old times. Hence, they tend to condemn him and con-
sider his theory of the "asabiyya" as a flat worship of power
for its own sake. Ibn Khaldun, as a matter of fact, does not
worship power, or "asabiyya," for its own sake. When he requires
a strong "asabiyya" for the "Mahdi" or any other revolutionary
leader, he does not mean, as flatly as it appears, that "might"
makes "right."

It should be remembered at this point that "asabiyya"
is mostly a nomadic trait, and Ibn Khaldun is studying it in its
nomadic context. As we have seen before, the nomadic sheikh
who has a strong "asabiyya" is usually a good leader. In his
person "might" and "right" normally go hand in hand. Ibn Khaldun
does not mean, therefore, by "asabiyya" merely a social power.
It means in his opinion much more than that. Having a strong

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in his "realistic" life unmolested by any sort of ideas or ideals.
There is, in other words, no difficulty or psychological con-
flict arising inside the "self" of such a man. The difficulty
arises usually in a man, like Ibn Khaldun, who stands on the
margin, between the classes--a marginal man.

"asabiyya" indicates also having good character and high

qualifications of leadership. In his own words,

> If we look at the owners of the "asabiyya" and
> those who have won the victory over many countries
> and nations, we see them competing with each other
> in the characters of goodness, such as generosity,
> forgivingness, patience, hospitality, charity, endur-
> ance, fidelity, helpfulness; and spending money for
> the protection of honor, the glorification of religion,
> the respect and obedience of religious "scientists," the
> reverence of the pious men and the seeking of their
> blessing, modesty in front of the shiekhs and the
> big men, the submission to justice, the good-treatment
> of the oppressed, the humility toward the lower
> classes, the responding to the cry for help, the
> avoidence of cheating, treachery, or breaking of a
> promise, and the like. These are the qualifications
> which the leaders have obtained and so deserved to
> be the rulers over their subjects. In general, it is
> a boon given them by Allah proportionally to their
> asabiyya and victory. It is not given in vain or
> uselessly. Kingship is the most suitable reward for
> their asabiyya. Allah has permitted them to be kings
> and He led them to it. Things will be on the contrary,
> if Allah leads a people to its decline. . . .[21]

The above quotation clearly shows how Ibn Khaldun sees

no natural conflict between "might" and "right," and how in the

institution of the "asabiyya" the two can be successfully com-

bined.   However, this theory of Ibn Khaldun will be better

understood if we remember the fact that, like Pigors, he classi-

fies rulers into leaders and dominators.[22]   When he sees "might"

[21]Ibid., pp. 143-44.

[22]See Ibid., p. 139.

and "right" combined in the ruler, he most probably has in
mind leadership rather than domination. In fact, there is no
place for the "asabiyya" where domination prevails. He clearly
shows, in other places of his Prolegomena, that as soon as
domination begins to replace leadership in a dynasty, the
"asabiyya" gradually loses its vigor and its binding force and
eventually dies out.

In the nomadic culture, leadership always prevails.
According to Ibn Khaldun's theory, "might" and "right" remain
combined as long as the tribe remains in its nomadic stage. But
the point which he emphasizes in this regard is that no society
in the world, nomadic or civilized, can withstand the process
of time without suffering some change. The nomads are always
allured and attracted by the luxuries of the cities. The sheikh
tends to gather around him more and more "asabiyyas," and then
tends to attack some of the neighboring states and establish
there a royal dynasty. This process appears to Ibn Khaldun
unescapable as far as there is some contact between nomadic
tribes and cities.[23] As soon as the new dynasty is established,
the combination of "might" and "right" tends to be gradually
leosened. Luxurious life begins to strike a wedge between the

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[23] Ibid., Part II, Chap. 17, passim.

two. The sheikh who was a mere tribal leader, highly sensi-
tive to the public opinion of his followers, becomes now a
king, leading a luxurious life which can hardly be shared by
all of his tribe. A sort of jealousy and hostility may arise
between the king and his former followers. He may attempt to
suppress the pride and vanity which naturally arise in them
after the victory has been won by them.[24]

In order to play safe against his former tribe, he may
raise a mercenary army. The new army will not be as strong
as the old one which was based on the "asabiyya." A mercenary
army, anyhow, denotes the beginning of the decline in the
dynasty's life. It relies on money rather than on *esprit de
corps*. The bigger the payment is, the greater will be the
temporary vigor of the hired soldiers.

The king may be obliged later to levy heavy taxes for
the purpose of meeting the extraordinary expenses of the state.
The heavy taxes will lead, however, to the impoverishing of
the subjects and the discouraging of industry. The dynasty is
now therefore in its last stage of its life. Economic and
political affairs go, in the opinion of Ibn Khaldun, hand in

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[24] *Ibid.*, Part III, Chap. 10, passim.

hand[25] A new dynasty will be sooner or later established in order to begin a new cycle again. Thus, the social dialectic is always on the move. It is a guarantee that social injustice, when it appears, does not stay for long.

To Ibn Khaldun, the life cycle of a dynasty has the same stages as that of the individual. It has its birth, youth, old age, and death. No dynasty can escape it.[26] An average dynasty normally contains four successive kings.[27] The first one is usually good and just. He is the founder of the dynasty, and he has been able to found it mainly because he is good and just. He still has the good characters and the high qualifications of leadership which have made him a successful sheikh.

His son however may imitate his father in some of his good characters without knowing why. He is therefore somewhat less good than his father. An imitator, Ibn Khaldun says, can hardly equal the imitated. The following king, that is, the third, is still less good in his imitation than the second. The fourth is usually the last link of the chain. He finds himself

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[25]See Ibid., Part II, Chaps. 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, passim.

[26]Ibid., pp. 293-94.

[27]Ibid., Pt. II, Chap. 15.

in a very high position, and he ignorantly attributes it to
his honorable "blood" or his extraordinary pedigree. He is
accustomed since his early infancy to see men around him blindly
revering him and unhesitatingly obeying his whims. He does
not realize that this has been established by his grandfathers
with strong "asabiyya" and good characters. He naturally becomes
careless as regards the necessary qualifications of a good ruler.
To use Pigors's terminology, his rule became "domination"
instead of "leadership." This surely indicates the approaching
death of his dynasty.[28]

In general, it seems that Ibn Khaldun, like Pigors,
considers "leadership" to thrive particularly in the "sacred"
society, while "domination" to be found only in the "secular"
society.[29] To him, leadership" is the natural type. Originally,
human society does not easily submit to a bad ruler. To be a
leader normally means to be good.[30] The intruding factors, which
lead to a deviation from this rule, are due to the rise of
civilisation and to the luxurious and vicious life associated
with it. Civilisation usually leads to the weakening or neglecting

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[28]Ibid., pp. 140-41.

[29]Ibn Khaldun calls "domination" and "leadership,"
"kingship" and "headship" respectively. (See Ibid., p. 139.)

[30]Ibid., p. 143.

of the "asabiyya."[31] The crown of "kingship" in the cities is
often inherited, and so the election of the leader by the led
is no longer available. "Might" becomes, therefore, separated
from "right." But this is, Ibn Khaldun would say, a temporary
phenomenon. The deviation from good leadership is a warning
of the coming end of the ruler. The bad king will be, sooner
or later, replaced by a good one, and the "cycle" begins then
a new turn again.[32]

In this way, Ibn Khaldun adapts the "spiritualistic"
dialectic of the Sufites to his "secular" thought-style. There
is no need then for a divinely guided "Mahdi" in order to com-
bine "might" and "right" once more. Society has its own machinery
for the spontaneous correction of itself. Ibn Khaldun likes
those who move with, rather than those who resist, the social
dialectic.

He even dislikes the ruler whose intelligence is higher
than the average. A highly intelligent ruler, he says, may
see things in their final realities or according to their logical
consequences, and then impose his profound conclusions on his

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[31] Ibid., pp. 144, 168-69.

[32] Ibid., p. 298 et seq.

subjects who are naturally unable to understand them.[33] A good ruler should be, therefore, of an average intelligence in order to understand his subjects and make himself understood by them. As Ibn Khaldun puts it, "a high intelligence is a defectiveness in the ruler."[34] This may indicate Ibn Khaldun's strong inclination to let the social process move along by its own spontaneous force, without interference of any sort.

To sum up, Ibn Khaldun can be considered, in some sense, optimistic in his world-view. According to his theory, society may at times become corrupt, but there is a certain social force, or an invisible hand, to use Adam Smith's terminology, that tends to correct, sooner or later, what temporarily goes wrong in society. "Allah is more merciful than to let his subjects be wronged forever."

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[33]Ibid., p. 189.

[34]Loc. cit.

PART III

RELIGION VERSUS RATIONALISM

In the early history of Islam, a vehement controversy or conflict arose between those who advocated a blind submission to religious authority, on the one hand, and those who placed reason above revelation as the guide in matters of belief or conduct, on the other hand. In the present part, this controversy is discussed from the general as well as from the particular point of view.

This controversy had, as we shall see, an enormous influence on the mind of Ibn Khaldun. In fact, his social theory can be considered, in some sense, as an end-product of the successive thought-movements that evolved in Islam as a result of this controversy.

CHAPTER XII

RELIGION AND REASON

Since the beginning of recorded history, man has wit-
nessed, in one form or another, a certain sort of antagonism
between religious belief and free reasoning. It is often
maintained that it is highly difficult, or maybe impossible,
for man to be piously devoted to certain religious dogma, and
to be, at the same time, a free thinker or a rationalist.
Rationalism, says A. W. Benn, means hostile criticism of theo-
logical dogma, "the mental habit of using reason for the des-
truction of religious belief."[1]

Is there really any natural antagonism between religion
and reason as is often maintained? It seems quite useful,
before answering this question, to know what type of religion
one has in mind when he discusses its antagonism with reason.
In fact, religion is not of one type. One can distinguish
between at least two types of religions: between the religion
which thrives in the "sacred" society and that which is found
in the "secular" one. In the religions of the "secular" society,

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[1] A. W. Benn, History of English Rationalism in the Nine-
teenth Century, Vol. I, pp. viii, 4, 6. Cited by H. Wodehouse,
"Rationalism," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. X,
p. 580.

one can also distinguish, as sociologists have recently dis-
covered, between the "church" type and the "sect" type.[2]

The common mistake of many students of religion is
that they try to define, and to discover the essence of all
types of religion within one frame of reference. This may be
the main cause of their failure.[3] Durkheim, for example,
believes that in order to understand the profound reality of
religion in general one should study it in its simplest form,
which can be found, he thinks, in the simplest cultures.[4]

This writer is of the opinion that there is a funda-
mental difference between the religion of primitives and that
of the civilized peoples, or, to put it more definitely, between

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[2]The typological classification of religion into "church"
and "sect," has been originally developed by Troelsch, the
German philosopher and sociologist of religion. Now, it is
becoming in vogue among modern sociologists. See, for example,
J. Yinger, Religion in the Struggle for Power, Chap. II; Wiese-
Becker, Systematic Sociology, Chap. VLIV; J. Wach, Sociology of
Religion, pp. 297-98.

[3]Religion is one of the most disputable terms. Dozens of
definitions were tried; no agreement has yet been reached as
regards the essence of religion. It is quite interesting to
notice that Marx, for example, describes religion as "the opium
of the masses," while Nietzsche describes it, on the contrary,
as "the revolt of the slaves." It seems that each of the two
authors has in his mind a type of religion that is quite different
from that in the mind of the other.

[4]See E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious
Life, p. 1, et passim.

the religion of the "sacred" society and that of the "secular"
one. In the "sacred" society, religion and society are, in
some sense, synonymous. To use Professor Merton's words, the
membership of religion and that of society are "co-extensive."[5]
Durkheim shows that the source of religion is the society itself,
that religious conceptions are nothing but symbols of the
characteristics of the society, that the sacred, or God, is but
a personified society and that the substantial social function
of religion has consisted in the creation, reinforcement, and
maintenance of social solidarity.[6] Here, Durkheim's mind is no
doubt concentrated on the religion of the "sacred" society. He
overlooks the fact that the religion that rises in a "secular"
society may have a completely different function or meaning.

In a "secular" society, the membership of religion is
not necessarily co-extensive with that of society. Religion
becomes, then, colored, more or less, with some class ideology.
Religion, as Hogbin rightly points out, "reflects rather than
dictates social relationship."[7] It, therefore, reflects the
clash of classes among the civilized people, while it reflects

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[5] R. K. Merton, Social Theory & Social Structure, p. 32.

[6] Cited by Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories,
p. 474, E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,
passim.

[7] H. J. Hogbin, Law and Order in Polynesia, p. 80.

the whole society among the primitives. As we have seen before, class consciousness usually rises with the rise of "secular" society. It then tends to color religion accordingly.

Nietzsche, with his peculiarly poetic style, defines religion as the "revolt of the slaves." There are some historical evidences which indicate that Nietzsche's definition contains a certain element of truth.[8] As a matter of fact the history of many of the world religions which were first established in secular societies supports Nietzsche's theory. A religion often rises in a "secular" society to provide the lower, or oppressed, classes with a new system of values, for the purpose of protesting and perhaps struggling against the prevailing values of their oppressors.[9] De Gré says,

> The suppressed stratum, instead of making a direct frontal attack on their actual or supposed oppressors, turn their resentment against the system of values and world conception of the dominant stratum. It is this helpless hatred, impotent in that it cannot manifest itself in violence or a direct challenge to the existing power relationship because it lacks the strength, the courage, the historical preparation, or the ripe societal conditions to do so, which in its internalized negation of those values supported by the then dominant social class, achieve that transmutation and inversion of values which Nietzsche has so aptly termed "transvaluation."[10]

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[8] Cf. G. De Gré, Society and Ideology, p. 1, et seq.

[9] Cf. Briffault, Rational Evolution, pp. 206-207.

[10] G. De Gré, op. cit., p. 2.

This "transvaluation" normally takes the form of religion. In fact, no protest or revolt against an existing régime can be successfully achieved without being first sanctified by religion. Even the communistic revolt of the present time has, in spite of its apparent indignation against religion, some religious elements.[11] Religious belief, or what Sorel calls "social myth" is necessary for any movement that attempts to attack the status quo.[12]

In contrast to the religion of the "sacred" society, the religion of the "secular" society is, in the beginning at least, a "class" religion rather than a "group" religion. Whereas in the "sacred" society, religion is a great integrating and solidifying factor, in the "secular" society it may be a dividing or breaking factor.[13] Its rallying call is, "come along and become separate," while the religion of the "sacred society" cries: "Be one solid body against your enemy." Among the "sacred" societies, the struggle for existence usually places each society against the others. Esprit de corps, therefore, rules supreme;

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[11] J. E. Yinger, op. cit., pp. 8-10; R. Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics, p. 191.

[12] See L. P. Edwards, Natural History of Revolution, p. 90, et seq.

[13] See R. K. Merton, op. cit., p. 30, et seq.

and religion naturally reflects this sort of social solidarity.

In this type of religion, it can be easily observed
that there is no place for reason. As far as religion and
society are co-extensive, or in other words, well-integrated
parts of the solid pattern of culture, free play of reason or
rationalistic tendency may become dangerous to the social soli-
darity and may result in some disorganizing consequences. The
member of the "sacred" society tends to take any doubting in the
religious beliefs as a sign of betraying the cause of the group.
One should be firm beyond any doubt as regards religious dogma
in order to be considered an honest member of the "sacred"
society. Here, the social function of religion, as Durkheim
rightly shows, consists in the creation, reinforcement and main-
tenance of social solidarity.[14] Any question, therefore, raised
by a member, as to the rationale or the utilitarian reason
behind religious beliefs, is considered doubting the cause of
the group. Everything must be taken as natural and indubitable.

In this light, the theory of DeMaistre, the vehement
exporent of social stability and religious catholicism, can be
understood.

He asserted that discussion and argument are fatal
to stability, that a constitution or social order which

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[14]See E. Durkheim, op. cit., passim.

is rationally achieved and understood is by that very
fact incapable of winning the support and obedience
upon which social order and stability rest. Men obey
only what they venerate but cannot understand . . .
Society must be ruled by customs and institutions,
the origin of which are lost in the mist of history.
Laws must be the edicts of a king which are accepted
blindly, not on their merits, but as emanating from a
source of authority divinely ordained.[15]

It is quite interesting to notice, that, in the "sacred"

society, there is no difference between the person and his

opinion. This reflects, of course, the identity of the group

and its beliefs. It is not easy to say to a person, in such a

situation, "I do not agree with your opinion." Non-agreement

with somebody's opinion means the declaration of personal hostility

against him. Friendship includes, not only mutual liking and

helping, but also complete agreement of opinions. It requires

one's siding with his friends in any argument, right or wrong.[16]

Along these lines, one can understand the oft-maintained

antagonism between religion and rationalism. In the "sacred"

society, religion is not an individual concern which can be

[15]Barnes and Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science,
Vol. I, p. 491.

[16]This may explain why democracy fails in countries based
on a "sacred" pattern of socialization, such as those of South
America, West Indies, Balkan and the Near East. Free argument
and respect of different opinions, which are necessary to
democracy, hardly exist in such countries. Revolution, there-
fore, takes the place of peaceful election, bullets and used
instead of ballots.

based on personal taste or intellectual inclination. History tells that nomadic tribes, whether Arabs,[17] Berbers,[18] Turks[19] or even Germans,[20] were in the habit of entering a new religion, where they were converted to it, by group rather than individually. They in general can be said to be unable to understand individualistic conversion. All the members of the tribe enter a religion or leave it together. As soon as they see that certain religion brings power or luck, they adopt it as quickly as they leave it when they are disappointed with it. We seldom find a break or conflict within a "sacred" society as a result of a new religion, just contrary to what normally happens in the "secular" society.

This indicates, of course, the inclination of "sacred" societies to take religion as collective concern. It is up to the sheikh or the tribal council to decide whether the tribe shall adopt a certain religion or not. The sheikh may decide about this question just exactly as he decides about intertribal raids and the like. This does not mean that, by adopting a new religion, the tribe is going to change its traditional morés.

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[17]R. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, p. 178.

[18]G. Yver, "Berber," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. I, pp. 699-701.

[19]Ahmad Amin, Dhuhr Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 32.

[20]See Briffault, op. cit., p. 116.

With a new religion, the tribe changes only the "god" or the "mana," i.e., replaces the old by a new and a more powerful one. The value-system remains the same; only its sanctifier changes.

In contrast to this, the religion of the "secular" society is usually adopted for the purpose of changing the prevailing social values—for the purpose of transvaluation.

It is worth noting here that the religion that arises in a "secular" society, tends to view the world through a "sacred" thought-style. The lower classes, who resort to religion, as a protest against the upper classes, may find in the eternalistic, absolutistic, spiritualistic logic a powerful tool with which the secular tendencies of the upper classes can be severely criticized and condemned. Yinger, a student of modern religions, defines religion as "the attempt to bring the relative, the temporary, the disappointing, the painful things in life into relation with what is conceived to be permanent, absolute and cosmically optimistic."[21] This definition clearly shows, in spite of its generalized connotation, the tendency of religion in the "secular" society to view the

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[21] J. M. Yinger, _op. cit._, p. 5.

world along the lines of "sacred" thought-style.[22]

When a society becomes secularized, its rulers and upper classes tend to adopt a "secular" thought-style with its relativistic, temporalistic, materialistic logic. In fact, they have not been able to climb the social ladder without such "realistic" orientation, as we have seen before. What is right is to them what leads to power or success. They do not like to live in a world of ideals and ideas.[23] What *is* is right.[24] The lower classes, on the other hand, in order to compensate for their low status in the actual world, resort to a world of ideals and utopias. To quote Mannheim,

> The group oriented to the left intend to make something new out of the world as it is given, and therefore they divert their glance from things as they are, they become abstract and atomise the given situation into its component elements in order to recombine them anew.[25]

However, any religion that arises in the "secular" society inevitably comes, sooner or later, to be involved in what the

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[22]This definition, in fact, is implicitly meant to be applied to those religions which grow in the "secular" society. See _Ibid._, p. 23 et passim.

[23]"Advantageously," says Merton, "located classes ("conservatives") may be loath to theorize about their situation. . . ." R. K. Merton, _op. cit._, p. 257.

[24]Cf. T. Veblen, _Theory of the Leisure Class_, p. 207.

[25]K. Mannheim, _Ideology and Utopia_, p. 246.

modern sociologists of religion call "the dilemma of the church."
Its "idealistic" orientation, which has been just discussed,
cannot be maintained in its original purity for a long period
of time in face of the various entanglements in which the religion
has to be involved during the process of its development and
growth. There are, as Yinger points out, two opposed alterna-
tives lying before religion in this regard: "the demands of the
religious ideal and the claims of secular interests."[26]

Religion must compromise in order to grow and spread
among the various classes of the society. By refusing to compro-
mise, it places itself in an opposition against some of the most
powerful groups of the society. Thus, both horns of the dilemma
are sharp. Yinger says,

> Either it has to accept their legitimacy and there-
> fore to compromise its own demand when they are in con-
> flict with the prevailing secular claims, or it must be
> ready to accept a limited sphere of influence.[27]

No religion in the "secular" world, whatever might be its
original "idealistic" orientation, can refrain for long from
compromise or some sort of secularization and societal entangle-
ments. Hence, it will sooner or later become an institutional-
ized "church" whose goal then lies in the solidifying of society

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[26] Yinger, op. cit., p. 25.

[27] Ibid., p. 26.

on the basis of status quo, rather than the improving of the
social relations between the oppressor and the oppressed. It
is now no longer a "class" religion as it was in the beginning.
Both the upper and the lower classes will be equally included
within the institutionalised frame of the "church." The "church"
then becomes similar in a sense to the religion of the "sacred"
society where the group and religion are co-extensive. The
"churchman" is no longer interested in how the upper classes
treat the lower. He will leave that to the morés and folkways
of the society. His main interest lies in the increasing of the
membership of the "church" by every means he can lay hands on.
The religious group enters, as Max Weber points out, the arena
of the struggle for power like any other secular group.[28]

In protest against this secularisation of religion, the
"sect" arises, like a new "idealistic" religion, from among the
lower classes, and so the "dilemma of the church" is intensi-
fied. History of religion in the "secular" society shows a
strong tendency to run on a dialectical cycle. Every new religion,
which is at first oriented toward some lofty ideals, tends to
become, sooner or later, secularised and institutionalised, and
so gradually loses its original "idealism." The "sect," which

[28] See Ibid., p. 230.

rises to protest in favor of the old ideals, becomes in turn secularized too.[29] We can safely conclude here, that the upper classes are often the main cause behind the secularizing process of religion, whereas the lower classes are the main source from which a new religion or a "sect," springs.[30]

In the light of the above discussion, the antagonism between religion and reason can be said to be neither natural nor absolute. It may be regarded as a result of the secularization of the "church." It may be, in other words, one of the forms which the conflict between the "church" and the "sect" takes. The "churchmen," as well as the upper classes who support them, require from their followers only a blind submission to the institutionalized orders of the church. They do not favor any sort of philosophization or ideation. Any tendency of this sort will lead, they think, to undermine their position. They do not like, in other words, for the "church" members to become aware of the discrepancy between the old "ideals" of the "church" and its present situation.

Actually, ideals and ideas go together. The thinker who

[29]Cf. C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, An Introduction to Sociology, p. 689 et seq.; L. Edwards, Natural History of Revolution, p. 91.

[30]Cf. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 1 (e).

is inclined toward "ideals," tends at the same time to think
in terms of ideation and philosophy.[31] In fact, every new
social movement, which preaches for certain ideals, is inclined,
in one way or another, to use the rationalistic way of thinking.

In order to attract the masses to new "ideals" and make
them abandon their customary ways, it is necessary to use some
sort of reasoning and "idealistic" logic. It is, however, a
psychological fact that when a person is satisfied with his
position he just drifts along with his whims or emotions with no
tendency whatsoever to think rationally as to why he is doing
this or that act. As soon as his emotions are disturbed, he
begins to use his mind diligently in order to overcome the dis-
liked obstacle to his contentment. If his emotions are turned
against someone whom he is unable to overcome directly, he may
resort to some indirect method to prove "rationally" and "logi-
cally" that the hated person is a public enemy, a Devil's agent,
or the like.[32]

John Dewey's theory of the genesis of thought in general
is highly instructive in this respect. In Dewey's opinion,
reflection is an aspect of an interruption in some sort of

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[31]See G. De Ruggiero, "Idealism," Encyclopedia of Social
Sciences, Vol. VII, p. 568, et seq.

[32]Cf. G. De Gré, Society and Ideology, p. 2.

habitual, regular or on-going activity.[33] This interruption
can occur as a block, and in this case the resulting effect is
that of ambivalence, or the simultaneous occurrence of two
opposing tendencies to act. Even such ambivalence, Dewey says,
is associated with those qualities to which we refer as intel-
lectual. To Dewey, every tendency to act carries with it a
certain amount of energy and this energy must be expended either
by direct carrying out of the act toward which the energy is
oriented, or by some devious method such as sublimation and
rationalization where some element of imagination plays a role.
One tends then to substitute a thought-out, or concocted reason,
in place of the real reason. And so, Dewey continues, these con-
cocted reasons tend to develop in human beings as a repertoire
of apologies for action not acceptable in terms of conventional
standards.[34]

It is interesting indeed to see that the terms rationality
and rationalization are derived from the same root. It may be
no exaggeration to say that rationalism is, in some sense, a form
of the psychological process of rationalization. Man is said to

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[33]F. C. S. Schiller agrees with Dewey on this point. See
Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 195.

[34]J. Dewey, How We Think, passim; J. Ratner, Intelligence
in the Modern World, p. 851 et seq.

be rational merely because he can rationalize, that is, he can find some acceptable reason for actions that run contrary to conventions.

In this light, we, therefore, can clearly understand why the upper classes in the "secular" society are less inclined than the lower classes toward idea-ism and idealism.[35] When the upper classes think, they usually think in the relativistic-temporalistic-materialistic way. This is the only way with which they can maintain their position or promote their interests in their "secular" environment. They are, as Schiller points out, far from thinking in terms of the "idealistic" logic.[36] This logic handicaps, as Ibn Khaldun says, their secular activities rather than promotes them.[37] The lower classes, on the other hand, resort, when they develop an oppression psychosis, to logic and reason. This seems to be the only way in which they can fight their oppressors who are normally fortified by the institutions of the "church." Thus, the "churchmen" fear rationalism. In other words, rationalism becomes than an effective

[35]Cf. Greel, Sinism, p. 19.

[36]F. C. S. Schiller, Logic for Use, pp. 5-6.

[37]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mogaddima, p. 543.

weapon in the hands of the heretics. It is, therefore, dangerous.

To sum up, we can say that reason is not hostile to all types of religion. It does not fit, it is true, what may be called the "group religion," that is, the type of religion which symbolizes social solidarity, and moral integration. When religion represents a group, it is quite unsocial to question or doubt any of its dogmas or mythology. Here, the antagonism is not between reason and religion as such. It is, rather, between free reasoning and social integration. Values, which are the underlying bases of social integration, should be viewed as natural, indubitable and sacred. The function of religion, in this regard, is to provide the sanctifying element behind the social values. Consequently, a doubt in the religious beliefs or mythology may endanger the whole structure of society. A "class religion," on the other hand, is quite friendly to reason. The "revolting" classes, which normally resort to religion for support, often build their religious scheme on free reasoning. "Come along and be separate." "Leave the obsolete values of the grandfathers and adopt new and more valid ones." It is often found that free reasoning and heretic tendencies are associated with each other.

It can be said, then, that free reasoning does not

naturally lead to social disintegration, as De Maistre believes.
It may be just the reverse—that social disintegration leads
to the use of free reasoning. When society is well-integrated,
and all of its members are, consequently, content with its
traditional values, free reasoning is hardly used. Men are,
then, not inclined to think in rationalistic or logical terms,
even if they are deliberately taught to do so. They may not be
able to understand the deep meaning of such kind of thinking.
Levy-Bruhl and his school maintain that the primitive is not
rational in his world-view.[38] As a matter of fact, there is no
function for rational thinking in his extremely traditional life.
Rational thinking has a function, when the social structure
becomes disorganised, the classes antagonistic against each
other, and the prevailing traditions criticized.

The founder of a new religion, it is true, usually claims
that his primary purpose is to revive or restore the old tradi-
tions of a past "golden age," or to bring practices and doctrines
into coincidence with the "true spirit" of the prevailing religion.

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[38]See B. Malinowski, Magic, Science, and Religion, p. 9.
It should be mentioned here that Levy-Bruhl's theory is now
widely criticized. It is now believed that the primitive is not
entirely illogical in his thinking, he has his own logic which
differs from ours. In any case, the rationalistic, "idealistic"
logic which has been rife in our civilization is incomprehensible
to the primitive's mind.

But this does not indicate a truly traditional inclination in
the new movement. Consciously or unconsciously it may repre-
sent a mere cover for the revolutionary tendency of the new
movement. In order to criticise successfully the traditional
religion and, at the same time to allay fears of religious
change, the founder may find it necessary to speak in terms of
certain revered and well-established traditions of the past.
However, these older traditions are often re-interpreted and
given a new meaning which the members of the new cult may assert,
and truly believe, are the "real" or "true" meanings which have
been misunderstood or even corrupted during the course of time.

In conclusion, we may say that reason is merely a tool
that can be used to defend or attack any object. When a new
religion starts its preaching movement, or when it rises as
"a revolt of the slaves," as Nietzsche puts it, reason is usually
found to be an obedient servant in the hands of religious men.
But, when religion develops afterwards to be the "opium of the
masses," to use Marx's oft-quoted label, any stirring factor
becomes dangerous to it. Free reasoning and rationalism may
contain, then, some disorganizing and even demoralizing
influence.

Along these lines, the relations between Islam and
reason are going to be traced in the following chapters.

CHAPTER XIII

ISLAM AND REASON

As we have noticed before, Mohammed did not rise in a
typical nomadic society. In the "sacred" society of the nomadic
tribe, there is in fact no chance for a prophet. It is, as
Professor Margoliouth says, "the better the order of the com-
munity, the less chance has a prophet."[1] Mohammed appeared in
the city of Mecca which was at that time in a state of intense
secularisation. It was the center of commerce and usuary.[2]
Wensinck calls Mecca of that time "a merchants' Republic."
Lammens calls it "a clearing house" or "a banking town."[3] A
wide gap appeared between the upper and lower classes.[4] The
tribe of Kuraish which formed the aristocracy of the city was
also the guardian of the "Kaaba," the pilgrimage center of Arabia.

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[1]D. S. Margoliouth, Mohammedanism, pp. 51-52.

[2]Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, pp. 13-14.

[3]H. Lammens, "Mecca," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. III,
p. 440.

[4]It is interesting to notice that the ecological arrange-
ment of the Meccan classes of that time was just the reverse of
what is now observed in the typical city of America. The center
of Mecca was allotted to the aristocrats and the rich while the
outskirts were inhabited by the slaves and the lower classes.
See H. Lammens, "Kuraish," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. II,
p. 1123.

Many of the Arabian idols, 365 idols to be exact, were placed
in the "Kaaba" under the supervision and care of Kuraish.[5]
Kuraish encouraged, in every means, the pilgrimage of the Arabs
to the "Kaaba." The institution of pilgrimage was indeed highly
effective in increasing the prestige and wealth of Kuraish. It
can be rightly said that the economic and religious interests
of Kuraish were perfectly combined in the institution of the
pilgrimage.

　　We can safely conclude that Mohammed had been greatly
impressed by the misery and lowly conditions of the lower classes
of Mecca.[6] During the Meccan period, Mohammed was similar to
the Hebrew Prophets who vehemently preached for the nomadic
ideals of justice, equality, and brotherhood.[7] In order to
attract converts to his new religion, he resorted to "reason."
He began to attack the traditional way of thinking, and to
ridicule the customary saying, "We have found our fathers doing
that and we are following their footsteps."[8]

　　In the Koran, the praise of reason and free thinking

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[5]A. Gilman, The Saracens, p. 31.

[6]See P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 113.

[7]Cf. R. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, p. 154;
Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, pp. 359-60.

[8]This phrase can be found in several places of the Koran,
repeatedly stated in order to be condemned and ridiculed.

can be found in very many and diversified forms. It is not
possible, of course, to find a strict form of logical syllogism
in the Koran, but the way with which Mohammed attacked the tradi-
tions and conventions of Mecca is reminiscent of the two-
valued reasoning of the Aristotelian logic.

Von Noldeke, the famous German orientalist, is of the
opinion that Mohammed was not quite rationalistic in his preach-
ing argument. To quote him,

> Muhammad's single aim in the Meccan Súras, is to
> convert the people, by means of persuasion, from their
> false gods to the One God. To whatever point the dis-
> course is directed, this always remains the ground-
> thought; but instead of seeking to convince the reason
> of his hearers by logical proofs, he employs the arts
> of rhetoric to work upon their minds through the
> imagination. Thus he glorifies God, describes His
> working in Nature and History, and ridicules on the
> other hand the impotence of the idols. Especially
> important are the descriptions of the everlasting bliss
> of the pious and the torments of the wicked: these,
> particularly the latter, must be regarded as one of the
> mightiest factors in the propagation of Islam, through
> the impression which they make on the imagination of
> simple men who have not been hardened, from their youth
> up, by similar theological ideas.[9]

This is another example in which a writer imposed his own cate-
gories of thought on a different culture. Noldeke seems to
require from Mohammed the same rationalistic forms of thinking
that now prevail in the present civilization. Studying Mohammed
in the light of his own culture and social values, we can consider

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[9]Cited by R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 160.

him quite rationalistic in his thinking. He employed, it is
true, a certain sort of rhetoric and poetic argument to con-
vince his contemporaries. But this by no means indicates in
him an anti-rationalistic tendency. Rationalism is, as we have
noticed, relative. It is instructive here to quote Max Weber
about the relativity of rationalism,

> . . . True, a Hindu mystic suddenly transplanted
> to a center of catholicism would not be regarded as in
> any way rational; value-systems of the contrasting
> civilizations are too far apart. Still it is clear that
> within any given civilization the scope of rationality
> is always implicity determined, and taken for granted in
> passing social judgment of every description. We have,
> as it were, a sort of secret yardstick by which we
> measure conduct, sometimes without any clear idea of
> what we are doing.[10]

It should be remembered here that in the culture, in
which Mohammed lived, poetry and rhetoric were not considered
the same as we consider them now. A well-arranged line of poetry
or a terse statement with a musical rhythm were taken at that
time as sure indications of the truth stated in them. It was,
and still is, easier to convince an Arab by a short line of good
poetry than by a long syllogistuic argument. Poetry, as
Nicholson points out, rooted in the Arabs' life, insensibly
moulded their minds and fixed their characters.[11]

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[10]Cited in Barnes, Becker and Becker, Contemporary Social
Theory, p. 520.

[11]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 72.

Consequently, Mohammed was unable to make himself
understood without coloring his preaching arguments with some
poetic and rhetorical ornamentation. The Koran is full of
verses encouraging man to think and pointing out his responsi-
bility to use the capacity to reason which is given him by
Allah.[12] In one place we read,

> Verily, we created man from a mingled clot, to
> try him; and we gave him hearing and sight. Verily,
> we guided him in the way, whether he be grateful or
> ungrateful.[13]

We read in another place,

> Have we not made for him two eyes and a tongue,
> and two lips? And guided him in the two highways?
> but he will not attempt the steep![14]

We read in still another place,

> Verily, in the creation of the heavens and the
> earth, and in the succession of night and day, are
> signs to those possessed of minds; who remember Allah
> standing and sitting or lying on their sides, and
> reflect on the creation of the heavens and the earth,
> "O Lord! Thou hast not created this in vain. . . ."[15]

Speaking about the dwellers of Hell, the Koran quotes them say-
ing, "if we were able to hear and think, we would not be among

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[12]See Al-Maghribi, Al-Akhlaq Wel-Wajibat, pp. 49-50.

[13]The Koran, Chap. LXXVI, Verse 3.

[14]The Koran, Chap. XC, Verses 9-10.

[15]The Koran, Chap. III, Verse 189.

the Hell dwellers."[16]

These quotations indicate, in spite of their terse and musical tone,[17] some underlying rationalistic elements. This can be clearly understood if we compare them to the Arabic poetry that prevailed at the time of Mohammed. Arabic poetry was, and still is, overpowered by emotion rather than by reason. The severe struggle for existence that prevails among the hostile tribes seems to strengthen the role of emotion in the Arabs' lives at the expense of reason: the Arabs, in fact, are well-known by their quick anger and easily-provoked feelings of pride and honor.[18] An Arab is, as Hitti puts it, a bundle of nerves, bones, and sinews.[19] He represents what Nietzsche calls the "strong man."

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[16]Cited by Al-Maghribi, op. cit., p. 55.

[17]It should be remembered that the Koran is, in its original language, highly musical. Much of its original rhythm and eloquence disappear when translated to another language. "It was addressed to the ear, not to the critical eye; it was uttered by a living voice that impressed those who heard it with the power and enthusiasm of the speaker; it made a personal appeal." R. Nicholson, "Introduction," in E. H. Palmer, The Koran, p. xvi.

[18]Mohammed's emphatic condemnation of anger may indicate its prevalence along his contemporaries, see Al-Maghribi, op. cit., pp. 63-66.

[19]P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 24.

According to Nietzsche,

> In the strong man there is very little attempt
> to conceal desire under the cover of reason; their
> simple argument is, 'I will.' In the uncorrupted
> vigor of the master soul, desire is its own justifi-
> cation; and conscience, pity or remorse can find no
> entrance.[20]

Against men of such an emotional type, Mohammed launched
his preaching campaign. According to some of the authentically
preserved sayings of Mohammed, he is known to have personally
encouraged thinking and free use of reason. "Religion," he once
declared, "is reason. He who has no reason has no religion."
"The religion of man will not be complete unless his reasoning
capacity is complete."[21] Mohammed particularly ridiculed those
pious men who blindly indulge in worshipping ceremonies without
realizing the reason behind them.[22] He did not like dogmatic
or fanatic attachment to the rules of religion. He vehemently
encouraged his followers to exert themselves and use their reason-
ing power in the solving of religious problems. For thus apply-
ing themselves, they would, according to a tradition from the
Prophet, receive a reward even though their decisions were wrong;
while if they were right, they would receive a double reward.[23]

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[20]W. Durant, The Story of Philosophy, pp. 316-17.

[21]Al-Maghribi, op. cit., p. 50.

[22]Cf. Ibid., p. 55.

[23]See D. B. Macdonald, "Idjtihad," Encyclopedia of Islam,
Vol. II, p. 448.

However, Mohammed was unable, in spite of his relatively strong rationalistic tendency, to influence the minds of the nomadic Arabs. As a result of thirteen years of vehement preaching and arguing, only one nomadic person was converted to his religion.[24] This person was Abu Thar.[25] But, afterwards, when the nomadic Arabs saw that Islam brought victory to its converts, they entered it, as the Koran puts it, "in shoals."[26] After victory, almost all the tribes of Arabia sent their delegations to Mohammed declaring their "sincere" adoption of Islam.[27] What historians call "the year of delegations," (9 A. H., 630-31 A. D.) was indeed an excellent example of the collective conversion.

It is interesting to notice that Mohammed changed, to some extent, his tone of reasoning owing to the rise of his worldly

[24]As we noticed before, most of the converts at the Meccan period came from the lower classes of the commercial town of Mecca. Purely nomadic persons were hardly influenced by the Prophet's reasoning.

[25]This man, whose strong socialistic tendency has been discussed in the preceding part, was a peculiar person indeed. He strangely adopted Islam at the beginning, and strangely strived to preserve its original principles afterwards in spite of the rising secularization. Abu Thar can be an excellent case of study for psychologists or sociologists.

[26]The Koran, Chap. CX, Verse 3. Immediately after the death of Mohammed, the Arab tribes abandoned Islam in the same way as they entered it, "in shoals."

[27]P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 119.

fortune. He began to attract the attention of the nomads to
the fact that his victory over his enemies was a sure sign of
his rightfulness. The Koran says in this regard,

> Ye have had a sign in the two parties who met;
> one party fighting in the way of God, the other mis-
> believing; these saw twice the same number as them-
> selves to the eyesight, for God aids with His help
> those whom He pleases. Verily in that is a lesson
> for those who have perception.[28]

and again,

> Ye slew them not, but God slew them.[29]

This kind of reasoning is, in spite of its flat identifi-
cation of "right" and "might," not less rationalistic than the
old one. The proof has changed, it is true, because of the change
in the mental orientation of the audience; but the chain of
argument that connects cause and effect is still rationalistic
in nature. In the Meccan period, Mohammed was mostly addressing
the oppressed classes of the town. Any proof, therefore, based
on the identification of "might" and "right" was naturally con-
sidered irrational and illogical, for the simple reason that it
contradicted the actual events of the time. After the "Higra,"
Mohammed began to address the nomadic tribesmen of Arabia. The
"illogical" proof of the Meccan period became then quite logical.

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[28] The Koran, Chap. III, Verse 11.

[29] Ibid., Chap. VIII, Verse 17.

Logical apparati in general are formulated, as C. W. Mills
points out, by the rebuffs and approvals received from the
audiences of our thought. What we call illogicality is similar
to immorality in that both are deviations from norms set by the
group. Arguments which in the discourse of one group or epoch
are accepted as valid, in other times and conversations are not
so received.[30]

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One of the well-known characteristics of the religion of
Mohammed is that it permits no place for functionary priesthood.
"Islam," says Wells, "to this day has learned doctors, teachers,
and preachers; but it has no priests."[31] Every Moslem can be his
own priest. The hostility of Mohammed against formal priesthood
may be attributed to his general hostility against conservatism
and blind traditionalism. It may be safely said that Mohammed
was quite antagonistic toward the institutionalization of religion,
or in other words, toward the development of the "church" in
religion. He met in his prophetic mission with an enormous opposi-
tion from the priest-like Kurashites. The greatest obstacle that
stood in his way to convert his countrymen was their institutionalized.

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[30]C. W. Mills, "Culture, Logic and Language," The American
Sociological Review, Vol. IV, No. 5, Oct. 1939, pp. 673-74.

[31]H. G. Wells, The Outline of History, p. 611.

conservatism. He frequently found them saying, as the <u>Koran</u>
puts it, "We have found our fathers doing that, and so we are
following their footsteps."

Here, we come again to the general problem of "church"
versus "sect" which has been partly discussed in the last
chapter. "Some of the most interesting phases in the history of
religion," says Wach, "are characterized by the struggle between
charisma and office, spiritualism and ecclesiasticism, or between
prophet and priest."[32] Almost all prophets who preach for new
principles and beliefs come sooner or later into conflict with
the existing religious institutions. Mohammed, in fact, was not
the only prophet who hated official priests and churchmen. To
use Troetsch's terminology, every newly rising "sect" is a
natural enemy to every old-established "church." This enmity is
not less natural than the political enmity between conservatives
and revolutionaries.[33]

In this light, one can readily understand the well-known
attitude of Mohammed against the rigid institutionalization of
religious ceremonies and worships. He looked at worship and

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[32] J. Wach, <u>Sociology of Religion</u>, p. 361.

[33] Max Weber used to think of "church" and "sect" in
general as types of "parties," that is, as groups specifically
concerned with the struggle for power. See J. Yinger, <u>Religion
in the Struggle for Power</u>, p. 230.

prayer ceremonies not as a formal duty that should have been performed for its own sake, but rather as a living symbol of submission to, and belief in, Allah. He repeatedly emphasized the fact that the prayer and all other rituals were meant to remind the pious believers of their moral and social duties. We read in the Koran, "Verily, prayer prevents vice and evil act." Mohammed commented on this Koranic verse by saying that he whose prayer did not prevent him from vice and evil acts became, when he prayed, more distant from Allah than ever.[34] He also said,

> A stupid worshipper obtains by his ignorance more harm than a sinner by his evil doing. Verily, men come nearer and nearer to their God according to their ability of understanding and reasoning.[35]

According to a saying attributed to Ali, which can be rightly considered as a true reflection of Mohammed's teachings,[36] many of those who devote themselves to praying and fasting gain nothing but toil and hunger.[37]

Mohammed emphatically declared that his religion was built

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[34]Al-Maghribi, op. cit., p. 33.

[35]Ibid., p. 55.

[36]Ali was the closest disciple of the Prophet and so regarded as the best authority on the original principles of Islam. The Prophet is known to have said, "I am the city of knowledge and Ali is its door." See Amir Ali, The Spirit of Islam, p. 335.

[37]M. Abdu, Nahi Al-Balagha, Vol. III, p. 185.

on morality and good deeds.[38] He flatly preferred justice and
acts of relief and help for others to prayer and fasting. In
one of his traditional sayings we find that "an hour of justice
is better than sixty years of worshipping."[39] This clearly
indicates that Mohammed was bent in favor of the lower class
ideology, and that Islam was inclined, like any other new religion
that rises in the "secular" society, toward the "sect" type of
religion as against the "church" type--toward the oppressed as
against the oppressors. In fact, there are many sayings attributed
to Mohammed which denote his preference of the poor to the rich.
One of them, for example, says, "The poor enter Heaven five
hundred years before the rich."[40]

Goldziher is of the opinion that these sayings which are
inclined toward the poor are not truly Mohammedan. They rather,
according to Goldziher, entered Islam after it came into contact
with Christianity.[41] It seems that Goldziher overlooks the fact
that Mohammed had been himself greatly influenced by the Christian
ideology. In the opinion of Nicholson, Mohammed at the Meccan

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[38]Al-Maghribi, op. cit., pp. 28-31.

[39]Ibid., p. 33.

[40]Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 359.

[41]Loc. cit.

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period believed the doctrines of Islam and Christianity to be
essentially the same.[42] In other words, Mohammed arose almost
for the same aim as that of Jesus and any other prophet—to
lead the oppressed against the oppressors. In Mecca where
Mohammed started his prophetic mission, the gap between the poor
and the rich was enormous, as we have seen already in the present
chapter. "In Mecca," says a Mohammedan tradition, "he who was
not merchant counted for nothing."[43] It is quite interesting
that Mohammed himself was in his youth, in spite of his aristo-
cratic birth, very poor—so poor that he was obliged to work as
a shepherd in order to earn his livelihood.[44]

However, Mohammed seemed to be aware of the fact that
his moralistic principles might be institutionalized with the
passing of time after his death, and then Islam would develop
into a formalistic "church" with no care whatsoever for the lower
classes.

Perhaps as a check against such a possibility, he expounded
a peculiar doctrine in Islam under the name "bidding the good and

[42]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 155 (footnote).

[43]Cited by H. Lammens, "Mecca," Encyclopedia of Islam,
Vol. III, p. 440.

[44]A poor aristocrat is often a revolutionary leader. In
a sense, he is a marginal man par excellence.

forbidding the evil." Mohammed ordered his followers, as a
religious duty, to protest against injustice whenever it was
committed.[45] In one of the sayings attributed to him, the
Prophet said, "When my followers begin to be afraid to protest
against an evil act, it is an indication of their approaching
doom."[46]

The doctrine of "bidding the good and forbidding the
evil," actually played a very significant part in the history of
Islam. It indeed delayed and handicapped the evolution of a
formalistic "church" in Islam. As soon as the Mohammedan ideals
began to be somewhat overlooked or neglected, particularly dur-
ing the time of Omayyads, many Moslems rose in protest.

Here it should be remembered that not all the Moslems
interpreted or adopted the doctrine in the same way. They dif-
fered widely in this regard. We can arrange them along a continuum
beginning, on the one extreme, with the "Kharijites" who openly
resorted to the sword to defend the Islamic ideals,[47] and ending
on the other extreme, with the "Murjiites" who refrained from an

[45]See Al-Maghribi, op. cit., pp. 159-165.

[46]Ibid., p. 160.

[47]Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, p. 263.

immediate judgment as to what is good and what is evil.[48]
There were some groups in the middle who were of the opinion
that in order to protest against injustice, the protester should
have possessed enough power behind his back to support him in
his dangerous errand.[49]

The majority of the Moslems were of the opinion that
there were three degrees of protest: by hand, by tongue, or
by heart.[50] Since men, they said, were usually unable to pro-
test against a powerful despot by hand, and even sometimes by
tongue, it is their religious duty, therefore, to do what was
safer and more practical—to protest within heart only.[51] This
was, of course, the weakest form in which a Moslem could fulfil
his duty,[52] but it also was the most practical.

This last opinion eventually developed to become the
nucleus of the Islamic "church."[53] The doctrine of "heart"

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[48]Ibid., p. 292; Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III,
p. 324.

[49]Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III, p. 66.

[50]They rely in this upon a well-known saying attributed to
Mohammed and to Ali also. See Al-Maghribi, op. cit., p. 162;
M. Abdu, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 243-244.

[51]Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III, p. 64.

[52]Al-Maghribi, op. cit., p. 162.

[53]Cf. Ahman Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III, p. 64.

protest is in fact a cover under which the real intention of
drifting along with the institutionalization process is hidden.
The orthodox "church" of Islam is based on this "drifting"
principle.

Consequently, there developed in Islam a new doctrine
which completely counteracted the effect of that of "bidding
the good and forbidding the evil." This was the doctrine of
"Ijma."[54] With this doctrine, the "church" of Islam had been
firmly established. According to it, the agreement of the ortho-
dox Moslems on a certain thing, makes the thing permissible what-
ever may be its logical contradiction to the original principles
of Mohammed. As they put it, the "Ijma" of the Moslems is
infallible. According to Schacht, even the Koran and the true
traditions of the Prophet were permitted to be abrogated by the
infallible authority of the "Ijma."[55] Mohammed is supposed to
have said, "My followers never agree on an error."[56] In the
words of Macdonald,

> Its existence on any point is perceived only on
> looking back and seeing that such an agreement has
> actually been attained; it is then consciously accepted

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[54] The word "Ijma" literally means in Arabic "agreement of
opinion."

[55] See J. Schacht, "Usul," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. 4,
p. 1057.

[56] See D. B. Macdonald, "Idjma," Encyclopedia of Islam,
Vol. II, p. 448.

and called an Idjma. . . . It could be expressed in speech or in action or by silence regarded as assent. . . .[57]

In this way, Islam drifted away from its original spirit of revolt and moralistic transvaluation, and gradually developed into a formalistic "church" which maintained the status quo. By means of the doctrine of "heart protest" and that of "Ijma," the Moslems began to approve of everything that would happen in the political and social processes. Islam became then a "group religion" rather than a "class religion." The horrible misery and the extreme poverty of the lower classes began to be of no importance to the "churchmen." The "churchmen" began to look at the group as a whole, or in other words, at the Islamic Empire, as the most important thing to be taken care of. Any caliph who was efficient in expanding the boundaries of the Empire, against the outside world, and suppressing seceding or heretic movements, inside, was considered by them good and great. They demand from their followers nothing but blind obedience to the existing government,[58] and unhesitating abstention from "dangerous" thought and philosophical contemplation.[59] They began to teach,

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[57]Loc. cit.

[58]Abu Yosof, Kitab Al-Kharaj, Introduction, passim.

[59]M. Abdul-Raziq, Failasuf Al-Arab, p. 124.

"whosoever rebel against the caliph rebels against Allah."[60]
They also began to see in reason the opposite of Revelation
and divine teaching.[61]

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[60]A. T. Arnold, "Khalifa," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. III,
p. 884.

[61]See M. Abdul Raziq, op. cit., p. 121.

ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC IN ISLAM

The establishment of the Abbasid régime was peculiarly associated with two events which came afterwards to be of crucial importance in the development of the Islamic thought. First, the development of the "church"; second, the introduction of the Aristotelian logic.

The Abbasid caliphs encouraged the development of the formal "church" in Islam. In order to show the difference between their own régime and that of their "irreligious" predecessors, they attracted the bearers of "traditions" and the religious leaders to their court, humbled themselves in front of them and respectfully listened to their preaching.[1] To quote Wellhausen,

> They wished, as they said, to revive the dead tradition of the Prophet. They brought the experts in the Sacred Law from Medina, which had been their home, to Baghdad, and always invited their approbation by taking care that even political questions should be treated in legal form and decided in accordance with the Koran and the Sunna. In reality, however, they used Islam only to serve their own interest. They tamed the divines at their court and induced them to sanction the most

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[1]See R. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, pp. 365-66.

objectionable measures. They made the pious opposi-
tion harmless by leading it to victory. With the
downfall of the Umayyads, it had gained its end and
could now rest in peace.[2]

Consequently, Islam became once more a politico-religious
system. The orthodox Moslems hailed the change and considered
it a real revival of the original religion of Mohammed. However,
there was, as we have noticed, a big difference between the Islam
of Mohammed and that of the Abbasids. At the time of the
Abbasids, Islam was no longer the religion of a "sacred" society.
It had to be built, then, on a "compartmentalized" basis with
two different patterns of behavior. The duty of the caliph began
to be, not to apply the Mohammedan principles in letter and
spirit, but to perform the formal ceremonies required from him
before the public eyes, and, then, turn back to their usual
activities like any other "secular" ruler.

During the Abbasid régime, the Aristotelian logic was
translated to Arabic and introduced into the learned circles
of the Moslem society. It was soon adopted by a certain heretical
"sect," and consequently came into an open conflict with the
newly rising "church." It may be not exaggerating to say that
this conflict, and the long repercussion resulting from it,
produced a tremendous influence on the Islamic thought in general

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[2]Cited by Ibid., p. 365.

and on that of Ibn Khaldun in particular. However, it is
highly advantageous, before directly launching into this compli-
cated subject, to understand the nature of the Aristotelian
logic in the light of the preceding discussion.

The Aristotelian logic is in reality, as recent re-
searchers have clearly shown, a "societal" tool rather than a
"scientific" one. In other words, it is fit to be a tool of
attack and defense in the hands of conflicting societies or
value-systems, rather than to be a tool in the hands of a neutral
investigator.[3] Its goal is not to discover, but to prove or
disprove.[4] In brief, it can be a powerful weapon in the hands
of a group which tries to prove that what it has, is the truth,
and what its enemy has, on the other hand, is the falsehood. In
describing the logic viewing of the truth, Schiller says:

> The absolute system of immutable truth is one.
> Not more than one view, therefore, can be true. You
> either have the truth or you have not. If you have
> it not, you are lost; if you have it, no one should
> dare to contradict you. You do right, therefore, to
> get angry with those who dispute the truth. The
> truth is yours, nay, it is you, if you truly purged
> yourself of all human feelings.[5]

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[3]See F. C. S. Schiller, Formal Logic, Chap. XXV, passim.

[4]It is, says Henry Thomas, a dogmatic logic of established
beliefs rather than a free logic of progressive knowledge. H.
Thomas, The Living World of Philosophy, p. 103.

[5]F. C. S. Schiller, op. cit., pp. 398-99.

This indicates that the Aristotelian logic springs out of, and correlates with, the ethnocentric spirit of the "sacred" society.[6] This may explain why it has been readily accepted by many peoples for over two thousand years. In fact, man can easily find in this logic a tendency similar to what he has been accustomed to in his primary group. Through the perspective of this logic, one views the world, as Dewey points out,[7] in pairs of dichotomies, good versus evil, beauty versus ugliness, truth versus falsehood, etc. It is impossible, with this world-view in mind, to find a midway between two extremes. You are either good or bad, either have the whole truth or none. By studying the well-known laws of thought which are supposed to underlie the whole edifice of the Aristotelian logic, one can readily

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[6]As we have seen before, the members of the "sacred" society are accustomed to consider their own value-system as the only natural and valid system in the whole world. They see in the values of the others, perversion, criminality and something to be ridiculed and be amazed at. The truth is one and everything that differs from it is absolutely false. They look at the world through the perspective of a dichotomy or a conflict between good and evil. They see a spirit or a "mana" behind every value. A value is good merely because a good spirit lies behind it. One cannot, of course, entirely deny the advantage of such dogmatic world-view in the cementing of the social solidarity. To believe in the absolute validity of values may be fundamental to the development of man's self as well as to the rise of society. Cf. G. Murdock, "Ethnocentrism," Encyclopedia of Social Science, Vol. V, p. 614; L. M. Bristol, Social Adaptation, p. 304.

[7]John Dewey, Logic, p. 89.

notice its strong inclination toward the "sacred" thought-style in general,[8] and its dichotomous orientation in particular. Let us briefly examine them one by one.

(1) The law of identity. This law says that "everything has a certain character which it retains more or less."[9] This indicates the insignificance of time. If a given thing is good once it is good forever. From the societal standpoint, this "eternalistic" view is quite advantageous. It provides the member of the society with an indubitable faith in the permanent character of its values and makes him confident of their absoluteness.

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[8]By studying the origin of the Aristotelian logic and how it arose in ancient Greece, one can easily understand the reason behind its inclination toward the "sacred" thought-style. As we noticed in the first part, one of the most important factors that lay behind the rise of the Aristotelean logic was the coming of the Sophists. The Sophists were itinerant teachers who came to Greece from some foreign countries, most probably from Egypt and Mesopotamia, the cradles of the ancient civilizations. They were, in other words, "strangers," to use Simmel's term. They represented the secularization process that was strongly under way in the Greek society of that time. They taught a highly relativistic doctrine. To them, "man was the measure of everything." Their profession was to train their students how to win an argument by every means available. The Aristotelian logic most probably arose as a reaction against such "secular" thought-style. As a matter of fact, Plato, who had an undeniable influence on the codification of the logic, was a great admirer of the "sacred" society. His famed "Republic" can be rightly considered as an attempt to apotheosize certain sort of "sacred" society as he imagined it to be. See Barnes and Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science, Vol. I, p. 8.

[9]M. Blunt and A. Wolf, "Laws of Thought," Encyclopedia Britanica, Vol. XIII, p. 175.

(2) The law of contradiction. "A thing cannot both have and have not a certain attribute."[10] This law is obviously hostile to the "relativistic" point of view. A thing cannot be good and evil at the same time. The "relativistic" formula of "good versus good," is, of course, out of court. This is also a socially advantageous view. Esprit de corp seems to be impossible without such an "absolutistic" orientation. As soon as one begins to believe in the relativity of the social values, he can no longer retain the vehemence and sincerity which are necessary for an active member in a "sacred" society.

(3) The law of excluded middle. "A thing must either have or not have a certain character."[11] This law, in other words, excludes any middle between the two opposed points of a dichotomy. It indicates the "spiritualistic" orientation of the Aristotelian logic. Things are either godly or devilish. You are, as Jesus puts it, with us or against us. There is no midway between good and evil.[12] In the light of modern sciences, natural and social, this two-valued, or bivalent, pattern of

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[10] Loc. cit.

[11] Loc. cit.

[12] Those who think along these lines, are, as one writer puts it, "color-blind." They view the world either in white or black. No intermediate color is possible in their eyes.

thinking is no longer held to be valid. Things are now arranged
along continuum rather than in dichotomies of only two poles.
There are actually a limitless number of degrees that inter-
vene between the two poles of the classic dichotomy. The
polyvalent logic, rather than bivalent one, is the acceptable
pattern of thinking in the modern time.[13]

The story of the Aristotelian logic in Islam is quite
interesting indeed. When it was introduced into Islam, the
mental climate had been already prepared to understand and
digest its dichotomous argumentation. Two factors paved the
ground for it. First, the rise of Mutazilism, the rationalistic
sect of Islam. Second, the establishing of the Abbasid caliphate.
There are some modern students who consider these two factors as
one. In their opinion, the Mutazilites were merely Abbasid
propagandists.[14] However, both Mutazilism and the Abbasid move-
ment were well fitted for the two-valued spirit of the Aristo-
telian logic. Both used the classical type of reasoning in
their politico-religious campaign against the Omayyads. They
often tried to criticize the Omayyad régime in the light of the

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[13]See Louis Rougier, "The Relativity of Logic," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, December 1941, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 146-50.

[14]"Everything leads us to believe that the theology of Wasil and the early Mu'tazila represents the official theology of the Abbasid movement." H. S. Nyberg, "Mu'tasila," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. III, p. 789.

original principles of Islam. By some sort of dichotomous
argumentation they placed the Omayyad "real" beside the Moham-
medan "ideal," and so they strongly supported their propaganda
by showing the wide discrepency between the two.

When the Abbasids won the fight, and then established
their caliphate, they kept their friendship and intimate relation-
ship with the Mutazilites.[15] It was, of course, a superficial
relationship, for the Mutazilites continued in their rational-
istic vehemence, while the Abbasids drifted along with the
institutionalization of Islam and the development of its formal
"church." But the mental climate retained its dichotomous
spirit. According to Zaidan, the Mutazilites were acquainted
with, and inclined toward, what they called the Greek logic long
before its translation into Arabic.[16] It seems that the Abbasids
themselves unconsciously encouraged the rationalistic and logical
tendency in Islam.

The Abbasids encouraged, as we have already seen, the
development of the Islamic "sciences" especially the sciences
of "tradition" and history. Consequently, the "traditionists"
and historians began to draw a very dark picture of the Omayyads

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[15]See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III, p. 202.

[16]G. Zaidan, Al-Tamaddon Al-Islami, Vol. III, pp. 140-41.

in contrast to the bright picture of Mohammed and the "Rashidin" caliphs.[17] They began to view the controversy of the Abbasid versus Omayyad along the same line as that of good versus evil, God versus the devil, and the like. History-writing was intended not to tell what had really happened, but rather to teach and preach by means of historical lessons.[18]

When the Aristotelian philosophy[19] was first made known to the Islamic world, "It was received," O'Leary says, "almost as a revelation supplementing the Koran."[20] This harmony between the Koran and Aristotle may be attributed to the fact that both of them were advantageously utilized by the Abbasid propagandist for the purpose of criticizing and undermining what had remained of the Omayyad régime. It was a temporary harmony that was doomed to last for only a short time. The conflict between Aristotle and the Koran or between rationalism and the

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[17]See Ahmed Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. II, pp. 26, 124; L. D. Vida, "Umaiyad," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 999; J. Schacht, "Usul," Encyclopedia of Islam, Pt. IV, p. 105.

[18]See D. S. Margoliouth, The Early Development of Mohammedanism, p. 143.

[19]"Aristotelian philosophy /in Islam7 became important, although more, at the least in the beginning, as logic and methodology." D. D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, pp. 17-18.

[20]De L. O'Leary, Arabic Thought and Its Place in History, p. 123.

"church" was then knocking at the door. It was, in other words,
inevitable. The conflict started at first in the theoretical
realm. Then an official war was in a sense declared.

On the side of the "church," were the Moslem masses led
by the "traditionists" and the pious element of the society. On
the side of rationalism and reason, on the other hand, stood the
Mutazilites whose leading idea, to quote Steiner, "is best
characterized as the enduring protest of sound human understanding
against the tyrannical demands which the orthodox teaching imposed
upon it."[21] It seems that the conflict between the "traditionists"
and the Mutazilites resembles that which arose in France, as a
result of the French revolution, between the conservatives and
the progressives, between the so-called "sociology of order" as
propounded by De Maistre and De Bonald, on the one hand, and the
"sociology of progress," as propounded by Condorcet and Proudhon
on the other hand.[22] The "traditionists" believed that rational-
ism and logic would produce disorganizing and demoralizing effects
if they were taught to the masses. The masses should, in their
opinion, be kept away from free reasoning and Aristotelian logic;

[21] Cited by E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia,
Vol. I, p. 281.

[22] See G. Gurvitch, "Social Control," in Gurvitch and
Moore, Twentieth Century Sociology, p. 274.

they should, instead, be taught to unquestionably submit to
the will of Allah and to blindly obey His orders.[23] The Muta-
zilites, on the other hand, believed that man should, before
everything else, listen to reason. By this way alone, they said,
man can discover the real orders of Allah, for Allah never orders
something that differs from the dictation of reason. "It was
possible," they said, "to know God and distinguish good from
evil without any Revelation at all."[24]

The Mutazilites were firm in their conviction that God
could not and would not sanction a bad thing to be good and
vice versa. Things are good or bad by their own eternal nature.
God only sees that a thing is good in order to sanction it as
such. In other words, the Mutazilites sought, as Nicholson points
out, to replace the common idea of God as will by the Aristotelian
conception of God as law.[25] The "traditionists," on the other
hand, considered Revelation as the only source of moral judgment.
Things were good or bad merely because God had ordained them to
be so. Human reason had, therefore, nothing to do with the

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[23]See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III, p. 179.

[24]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 368.

[25]Ibid., p. 369.

distinguishing between good and evil.[26] If there were no prophet
sent to distinguish between good and evil, nobody deserved to
be punished by God for his violation of the moral law.[27]

Finally, this theoretical conflict, between the "tradition-
ists" and the Mutazilites, became intensified and entered into the
arena of politics. The upshot came when one of the Abbasid
caliphs, Al-Mamun, who was well-known by his extraordinary rational-
istic tendency ascended the throne of the caliphate.[28] The year
218, H. A., is quite well-known in the history of Islam for it

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[26] This is quite reminiscent of the voluntarism-intellectualism
controversy that arose between Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas at
the end of the medieval ages. Whether the good is good because
God has ordained it to be so, or just the contrary—God has ordained
it because it is good in itself. See Rudolf Eucken, Main Currents
of Modern Thought, p. 71.

[27] See M. H. Al-Dhawahiri, Al-Tahqiq Al-Tamm, p. 146.

[28] As a matter of fact, Al-Mamun can be taken as a rare
example of a man who is hardly aware of, or careful about, his
self-interest. At the very beginning of his reign, he tried to
cede the caliphate to an Alid. When the Alid refused it, he
made him his crown prince. This was considered a Shiite inclina-
tion on Al-Mamun's part. However, after the Alid's death, Al-
Mamun shifted to the side of the Mutazilites. Finally, he declared
Mutazilian to be the state religion, without being attentive to the
danger inherent in the situation. He had contempt for the orthodox
masses and perhaps considered them the biggest obstacle in the
way of human enlightment. (See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III
pp. 152-53.) Al-Mihna, the well-known event in the history of
Islam, was instituted at his order. Through it, a wide-spread
inquisition and persecution in favor of Mutalizism was carried
out, as we shall see.

marked the beginning of what was later called Al-Mihna.[29] After

Al-Mamun declared his conversion to Mutazilism he ordered all

the "jurists" and the religious leaders to be examined and con-

sequently persecuted on account of their "irrational" beliefs

about the origin of the Koran. In discussing the central point

of Al-Mihna, Nicholson says,

> It was the same conflict that divided Nominalists
> and Realists in the days of Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus,
> and Occam. As often happens when momentous principles
> are at stake, the whole controversy between Reason and
> Revelation turned on a single question—'Is the Koran
> created or uncreated'? In other terms, is it the work
> of God or the Word of God? According to orthodox belief,
> it is uncreated and has existed with God from all eternity,
> being in its present form merely a transcript of the
> heavenly archetype. Obviously this conception of the
> Koran as the direct and literal Word of God left no room
> for exercise of the understanding, but required of those
> who adopted it a dumb faith and a blind fatalism. There
> were many to whom the sacrifice did not seem too great.
> The Mu'tazilites, on the contrary, asserted their intel-
> lectual freedom. It was possible, they said, to know God
> and distinguish good from evil without any Revelation at
> all. They admitted that the Koran was God's work, in the
> sense that it was produced by a divinely inspired Prophet,
> but they flatly rejected its deification. Some went so
> far as to criticise the 'inimitable' style, declaring that
> it could be surpassed in beauty and eloquence by the art
> of man.[30]

It is very strange indeed to find the exponents of free

reasoning and rationalism imposing their beliefs by force on the

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[29]Al-Mihna literally means the time of inquisition or
examination.

[30]R. A. Nicholson, Literary History of The Arabs,
pp. 367-68.

opposing parties. This may be considered as an unconscious
recognition on the part of the Mutazilites that the rules of logic
were not so universally valid or spontaneously convincing as they
claimed to be. History tells us that the more they enforced their
logical doctrine on others, the more it was rejected and dis-
proved.[31] They overlooked the fact that man was _rationalizational_
rather than _rational_.

Finally, the "traditionist" camp won the battle. In the
year 232, A. H., during the reign of Al-Mutawakkil, the scale was
overturned against the Mutazilites. They began, in their turn,
to be examined, persecuted and oppressed.[32] Despite the fact
that Al-Mutawakkil was one of the most unjust and vicious caliphs,
the "traditionists" considered him, as Professor Amin notices,
one of the three greatest caliphs who revived the original spirit
of Islam.[33]

The "traditionists" victory, however, was tremendously
important in the development of the Islamic thought.[34] The short
period of Al-Mihna can be said to have influenced the minds of

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[31]Cf. Ahmad Amin, _Dhuha Al-Islam_, Vol. II, p. 241.

[32]_Ibid._, Vol., III, p. 198 et seq.

[33]_Ibid._, Vol., III, p. 182.

[34]See W. M. Patton, _Ahmad Ibn Hanbal_, p. 2.

the following generations with a certain dogmatic inclination against logic and rationalism.[35] Moreover, it clearly showed that the masses were incapable of following the rules of logic in their religious life. Mutazilism was, as Professor Amin points out, an aristocratic movement.[36] Only the intellectual élite could understand its profound meaning. The masses must have been driven by force to it. In this way, it became as dogmatic as any other sectarian doctrine.

At any rate, the logical doctrine did not entirely disappear from the Islamic society after the disappearance of the Mutazilites. A new vigorous sect appeared carrying in their hands the Bible of logic. This new sect, which was called the "Batinite,"[37] did not preach like the Mutazilites for a direct reliance on reason and logic in the religious activities. In fact, they agreed with the "traditionists" as to the danger inherent in teaching logic to the masses. In order to solve the dilemma of reason versus tradition, the Batinites classified

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[35]See M. Abdul-Raziq, Tamhid, pp. 90-91 et passim.

[36]Ahmad Amin, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 241.

[37]The term Batinite is derived from the Arabic word "batin" which means "the inner meaning." They were called so because they interpreted, as we shall see later, the religious teachings according to the philosophical spirit behind them.

people mainly into two classes: the élite who were capable of
understanding philosophy and behaving according to it, and the
masses who could only be submissive and traditional. The élite
had to think and issue orders in accordance with the rules of
logic, while the masses should have unquestionably obeyed what the
élite had already issued.[38]   All the prophets are, according to
the Batinite doctrine, philosophers in disguise, or as Al-Maqrisi
puts it, both the prophets and philosophers seek the same goal,
that is, the public welfare, but the prophets are sent for the
masses, while the philosophers are sent for the intellectual
upper class.[39]

The Batinites established for their politico-religious
propaganda a kind of "freemasonry" in seven grades of initiation.
To quote O'Leary in this regard:

> The initiate was then taught that the true meaning
> could not be discovered by private interpretation but
> needed an authoritative teacher. . . . In the higher
> grades the disciple had this inner meaning of the Qur'an
> disclosed to him, and this proved to be substantially
> the Aristotelean and Neo-Platonic doctrine in general
> outline, together with certain oriental elements derived
> from Zoroastrianism and Masdekism. These oriental
> elements figured chiefly in the doctrines taught to the
> intermediate grades. The higher ones attained a pure
> agnosticism with an Aristotelean background.[40]

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[38]Cf. H. Lemmens, Islam, Beliefs and Institutions, p. 71.

[39]Al-Maqrisi, Khotat, Vol. I, p. 395, cited by Ahmad Amin,
Dhuhr Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 191.

[40]O'Leary, op. cit., p. 158.

In contrast to the Mutazilites, the Batinites were firm in their belief that the masses could not be forced to think in the same way as the élite. This can be taken to be the first instance in the history of religion in which a formal and elaborate distinction is made between the two types of thought-styles, the "sacred" and the "secular." The Batinites seem to believe that the masses who lead, more or less, a secular life are not capable of arriving at the religious truth. The truth can be arrived at only by some infallible men[41]--infallible perhaps because they are directly connected with the infallible world in which the Aristotelian logic rules.[42] To quote Browne,

> Man cannot attain to the Truth by his unaided endeavours, but stands in need of the teaching (ta'lim) of the Universal Reason, which from time to time becomes incarnate in the form of a Prophet or "Speaker" (Natiq), and teaches, more fully and completely in each successive Manifestation, according to the evolution of the Human Understanding, the spiritual truths necessary for his guidance.[43]

The fallible man-in-the-street is entirely unable of attaining the eternal truth of religion. The Batinites waged bloody wars against

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[41]See Al-Ghazzali, Al-Munqidh, p. 108.

[42]In fact, the infallible élite of the Batinites are not ordinary men. According to the Batinite doctrine, they must be direct descendants of the Prophet. Their infallibility is due partly at least to their sacred descent.

[43]E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, p. 408.

the orthodox caliphs who were, in their opinion, just "fallible" like any other men. It is ridiculous, they say, that the Moslems submit in their religious affairs to men like themselves who are just as ignorant of the eternal truth as anybody else.

In this way, the Batinites solved, at least to their own satisfaction, the Mutazilite dilemma. They were able, in a way, to bridge the wide gap between the intellectual élite and the ignorant masses. Thus, they synthesized the valid elements of both the "traditionists" and the rationalists. Both traditionalism and rationalism represent, according to the Batinites, certain phases of the truth. There are advantages and disadvantages in both phases. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the masses to be submissive and obedient, while their leaders are permitted to understand what goes on behind the lines in order to lead their subjects to what is eternally and absolutely good.

However, the reaction of the "traditionists" against this Batinite doctrine was more severe than that held against the Mutazilites. If the Mutazilites were accused by the "traditionists" of being heretics, the Batinites were accused of being unbelievers whose goal was to destroy the whole religion of Islam and to establish instead of it some sort of atheism or materialistic philosophy.[44] It may be safe to say that logic and

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[44]It is very interesting to notice that most of the modern orientalists have the same opinion about the Batinites. They

philesophy became at that time synonymous with atheism or
irreligiosity. In fact, it was not rare then to see philoso-
phical books being burned in the market-place, or philosophers
being ostracized.

The last nail in the coffin of philosophy was driven by
Al-Ghazzali. Al-Ghazzali was one of the greatest enemies of the
Batinites. His criticism of their doctrine was quite severe and
highly convincing.[45] He, nevertheless, adopted their theory of
classifying people into élite and masses. One of his numerous
books was entirely devoted to expounding the idea of preventing
the ignorant masses from theological contemplation.[46] However,
he differed from the Batinites in this respect. He placed in the
upper class of the élite, not philosophers as the Batinites did,
but Sufite leaders.[47]

Accordingly, he delivered a deadly blow to the Aristotelian
logic. As a result of his greatly convincing argument, reason

seem to have been influenced in their study of the Batinites'
doctrine by what the "traditionists" have told about them, without
paying much attention to what the Batinites themselves have said.
See E. G. Browne, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 406-407; Ahmad Amin,
Dhuhr Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 191.

[45]See Al-Gazzali, op. cit., pp. 108-121.

[46]Ibid., p. 10.

[47]It should be mentioned that Al-Gazzali was himself a
Sufite. In fact, he was the man who made the orthodox Moslems
lift the label of heresy from the Sufites.

was entirely dethroned from its high position. Reason was no
longer the only means for attaining the truth. Al-Ghazzali had
a complete faith in what might be called "intuition" or Sufite
revelation. "Intuition" was preferred, in his opinion, to
reason in the religious realm, just as reason was preferred to
sensation in everyday life. When your senses, says he, tell
you, for instance, that the shade is motionless, your reason
falsifies your sensation and tells you that the shade gradually
and slowly moves. Al-Ghazzali comes then to the conclusion that
perhaps there is some other capacity in man that can falsify
reason in the same way and provide man with more valid informa-
tion about the universe.[48] In discussing Al-Ghazzali's philosophy,
O'Leary says,

> By revelation only can the primary essentials of
> truth be attained. Philosophy itself is no equal or
> rival of revelation: it is no more than common sense
> and regulated thinking, which may be employed by men
> about religion or any other subject; at best it acts
> as a preservative against error in deduction and argu-
> ment, the primary material for which, so far as religion
> is concerned, can be furnished only by revelation. . . .
> Revelation indeed is given by means of the Qur'an and
> tradition, and it is sufficient to accept what is thus
> revealed, but the ultimate truth of revelation can be
> tested and proved only by the experience of the indi-
> vidual. So far as men are concerned this is possible
> by means of ecstasy whereby one becomes a knower ('arif),
> and receives assurance and enlightenment by direct com-
> munication from God.[49]

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[48]Ibid., pp. 73-75.

[49]De L. O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 220-21.

Al-Ghassali was indeed one of the greatest minds in the whole history of mankind. Fortunately or unfortunately, his lucid pen was mostly directed against reason and logic. It is often held that he was the man who put an end to philosophy in Islam.[50] To be more exact, one may say that he attacked only the Greek philosophy and the Aristotelian logic.[51] His influence in this regard can be in some sense likened to that of Kant in the modern time. He considerably weakened the faith in the capacity of human reason to understand the ultimate truth of the world. The orthodox Moslems began, after Al-Ghassali, to look upon madness as something sacred or prophetic. Certain kinds of insanity began to be considered as an indication of divine inspiration.[52] Ibn Arabi, the well known Sufite, boasts of having lost his reason at times.[53] In the words of Margoliouth, "that the higher stages of Sufism were akin to madness is not only clear of itself, but is acknowledged."[54] It is, in fact, not hard to find in the Islamic countries of today, men of

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[50]See T. De Boer, Tarikh Al-Falsafa Fil-Islam, p. 231.

[51]Cf. De L. O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 167-68.

[52]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, pp. 110-11.

[53]D. S. Margoliouth, op. cit., p. 176.

[54]Loc. cit.

eccentric character wandering in the streets and being treated
with awe and respect.[55]

After Al-Ghazzali, no important philosopher appeared
in Islam except those who rose in the western part of the Islamic
world, under cover or disguise. It seems as if philosophy was
driven under the pressure of the Ghazzalian doctrine from the
East to the West, i.e., to Spain and North Africa.[56] In the
West, it should be noted, the social environment was quite dif-
ferent from that of the East. The nomadic influence was much
greater there than in the East.[57] This may explain why the
philosophers of the West were in the habit of disguising them-
selves under various names or occupations. The lynching of
those who were accused of philosophical inclination was not

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[55]This writer saw some years ago a Sufite in Bagdad who
was in the habit of riding on the front of any car that happened
to pass by him. People did not usually prevent him from doing
that. There was a rumor spreading around him saying that any
car that prevented him from riding on its front would sooner or
later stop running. Consequently they permitted him to ride as
nobody liked his car to stop running.

[56]See De L. O'Leary, op. cit., p. 295.

[57]This can be readily explained by the fact that the
desert forms an overwhelming part in North Africa. The culti-
vated part is very small and scattered here and there. Generally
speaking, the towns and the cultivated part are often found
to fall under the nomadic rule. Nomadic values are therefore
more influential than the civilised ones.

infrequent.[58] However, it can be said that the revival of
philosophy in the West resembled the last flame of a burning
candle that was touched by a strong wind.

In dealing with the Western philosophy, Macdonald says,

> . . . the problem of the philosopher was how to
> gain and maintain a tenable position in a world
> composed mostly of the philosophically ignorant and
> the religiously fanatical. . . . was how to so present
> his views and adapt his life that the life and the
> views might be possible in a Muslim community.[59]

It is interesting to notice that in the West, where the
nomadic or the "sacred" society prevailed, rationalism was taken
as an indication of doubting the cause of the community. As
we have already seen, there is no place for rationalistic ques-
tioning or free reasoning in the "sacred" society, where every-
thing is taken for granted, and where doubt is considered as a
sort of betrayal.[60]

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[58]Cf. Afifi, Ibn Al-Arabi, p. 175; T. De Boer, op. cit.
p. 238.

[59]D. B. Macdonald, The Development of Muslim Theology,
Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory, p. 250.

[60]The same thing happened in the East when the nomad
Mongols ruled. It is also noticed that one of the factors which
weakened the position of philosophy in the East after Al-Mihna
was the rising power of the nomadic Turks. (See Ahmad Amin,Dhuhr
Al-Islam, Vol. I, pp. 41, 45.) In fact, the severe conflict
between the "traditionalists" and the Batinites can be taken to
represent in a sense the conflict between the nomadic Turks and
the civilized Persians. Cf. E. G. Browne, op. cit., Vol. I,
pp. 406-407.

The western philosophers particularly distinguished
themselves by emphasizing the complete separation between the
world of the élite and that of the masses. For them, the
philosopher should have lived in his own world according to his
own logic. The masses are, in their opinions, big children.
They cannot understand abstract universals. Their only field
of thinking and acting is that of concrete particulars.[61] It is
indeed interesting to notice in the three well-known philosophers
of the West, Ibn Baja, Ibn Tufail and Ibn Rushd, a gradual trend
from a complete state of intolerance to a state of some tolerance
and understanding toward the way of life of the masses.

Ibn Baja, the first of them, teaches that philosophers
must live in a pure world of abstraction and logically guided
ideation. They must free themselves from the mean and hedonistic
world of the masses and unite themselves with the "active mind"
who is, in Ibn Baja's theory, God himself. Ibn Baja's theory
is characterised by the firm conviction of a complete, uncompro-
misable separation of the philosophers from the masses. Philoso-
phers should live, Ibn Baja says, in "a state within a state."[62]
To quote Macdonald about Ibn Baja's scheme of philosophical
retirement,

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[62]Cited by Ibid., p. 247.

He must live rationally at all points; be able
to give reason for every action. This may compel him
to live in solitude; the world is so irrational and
will not suffer reason, or some of the disciples of
reason may draw together and form a community where
they may live the calm life of nature and of the pursuit
of knowledge and self-development. So they will be at
one with nature and the eternal, and far removed from
the frenzied life of the multitude with its lower aims
and conceptions.[63]

Ibn Tufail, who succeeded Ibn Baja as the leading philoso-
pher of the West, was somewhat lenient toward the masses. He
believes that the philosopher in spite of his different orienta-
tion should pay some attention to the masses. The philosopher
may be permitted to take into consideration their "childish" ways
of life, for the purpose of ruling them and consequently direct-
ing them toward the good. The Prophet Mohammed himself, accord-
ing to Ibn Tufail, did the same. The Prophet could not show the
"perfect light" to the masses; he nevertheless was able to
achieve certain social reforms by means of showing them some
"concrete examples."[64]

When we come to Ibn Rushd,[65] the last great philosopher in
Islam, we will find the tolerance toward the masses' ways of
life obvious. In fact, Ibn Rushd did not only tolerate them,
but also attempted in a particular way to bridge the gap between

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[63]D. B. Macdonald, op. cit., p. 251.

[64]See T. De Boer, op. cit., pp. 251-53.

[65]Europe of the medieval ages knew Ibn Rushd by the name
of "Averroes." He was of great influence on Aquinas and other
European scholastic thinkers.

them and the philosophers. He agrees with his predecessors
that philosophy and logic are the only way for the eternal
happiness. However, since the masses are entirely incapable of
understanding and following what logic ordains, it is necessary
for the philosopher, therefore, to come down to their earth and
try to educate them in a way which they are able to understand.[66]
Ibn Rushd disagrees with Ibn Baja as to the merit of the
philosopher's retirement and ascetic withdrawal from the masses'
world. Retirement produces, in Ibn Rushd's opinion, neither arts
nor sciences. The philosopher must spend some effort in reform-
ing his society.

Ibn Rushd is well-known by his insistence on the fact
that the philosopher should not expose his philosophical doctrine
to the masses.[67] It is a horrible crime on the part of the
philosopher to teach philosophy to the masses. They are sick
men; it is poisonous therefore to give them the same food that the
healthy man eats.[68] The government must stop, by severe punish-
ment if necessary, similar practices on the part of philosophers.[69]

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[66]See M. L. Juma, Tarikh Falasifat Al-Islam, p. 120.

[67]See M. Y. Musa, Ibn Rushd, p. 100.

[68]See M. F. Al-Rifai, Al-Ghazzali, Vol. I, pp. 192-94.

[69]D. B. Macdonald, op. cit., pp. 2-5, 9-10.

The only medicine for the masses is religion. Thus religion must not be confused with philosophy. The theologians who try to compromise between the two are, according to Ibn Rushd, completely wrong.[70] It is harmful and therefore illegitimate to impose the rules of one on the other. The philosopher should do what the Prophets usually do--teach the masses by applying their own hedonistic concepts and customary ways of life.[71]

In this way, the Greek philosophy ended its life in Islam. Ibn Rushd was, according to Renan, the last representative of the Islamic philosophy.[72] His theory which shows, more than any other theory in Islam and perhaps in the whole world, the unbridgable gap between the thought-style of the philosophers and that of the masses, indicates the death agony of philosophy in Islam. In the opinion of Renan, the orthodox "church" ruled supreme, after Ibn Rushd, for over six centuries without facing any important rival.[73]

This writer is of the opinion that the Greek philosophy did not entirely disappear after Ibn Rushd as Renan has tried to

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[70]M. F. Rifai, op. cit., pp. 205-206.

[71]See Ibid., p. 256 et seq.

[72]M. J. Musa, op. cit., p. 102.

[73]Loc. cit.

emphasize. To be more exact, it was disintegrated or broken
up into its two original elements—logic and theory. In fact,
the Greek philosophy can be rightly said to have remained active
in Islam under certain sort of schizophrenic disguise. It was
divided into two distinct parts each of which went its own way
along separate lines. At that time, one could readily find that
the Aristotelian logic was still active at the hands of orthodox
theologians and social thinkers,[74] while the metaphysical and
the psychological theory was amply rife in Sufism.[75] It is
indeed interesting to find theory without logic on the one side,
and logic without theory on the other.

The orthocox theologians, or the "Kalamis," as they were
called in Islam,[76] extensively used the Aristotelian logic. In
the words of O'Leary, "Kalam" was an orthodox theology "in which
the methods of philosophy were used, but the primary material was
obtained from revelation, and thus was one which was closely

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[74]See A. J. Wensinek, The Muslim Creed, p. 83.

[75]De L. O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 167-68.

[76]The Arabic term "Kalam" literally means talking or
argument. The Islamic theology was called "Kalam" perhaps in
order to be a parallel in religion with logic in philosophy. It
should be remembered here that logic indicates in Greek the same
meaning as that of "Kalam" in Arabic. In fact, the term logic
was translated to Arabic as to mean talking also. In brief,
logic and "Kalam" were taken in Islam as to be of similar nature.

parallel with the scholastic theology of Latin Christendom."[77]
In this way, the theologians did not resort to philosophical
theorization and speculation per se. They found their philosophical
material ready at hand in the Koran and the Mohammedan traditions.
They had only to search for it in its familiar places and then
apply the logical syllogism on it. They, as Macdonald puts it,
with their formal methods and systems, their subtle deductions
and endless ramifications of proof and counter-proof, drew away
attention from the fact of nature.[78]

The Sufites, on the other hand, used much theorising and
philosophical speculation, without paying enough attention to
logic and formal reasoning. To quote O'Leary,

> In substance, it /i.e., philosophy/ remains in
> Sufism, and we may say that the essential change lies
> in the new meaning given to "wisdom," which ceases to
> signify scientific facts and speculations acquired
> intellectually, and is taken to mean a supra-
> intellectual knowledge of God.[79]

In other words, the Sufites relied too much on "intuition" and
ecstatic inspiration. They ridiculed formal reasoning, and some-
times boasted of being mad or crazy.[80]

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[77] De L. O'Leary, op. cit., p. 211.

[78] D. B. Macdonald, op. cit., p. 135.

[79] De L. O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 167-68.

[80] D. C. Mergolioth, op. cit., p. 176.

A very interesting example of the Sufite philosophy can be found in Ibn Arabi who is regarded, as Nicholson points out, the greatest of all Mohammedan mystics.[81] As we have already noted, Ibn Arabi boasted of having once lost his reason. His highly celebrated and well-known works, The Meccan Revelations, and The Bezels of Philosophy, were written, more or less, under "intuitional" or ecstatic conditions. The Meccan Revelations was largely written, as the title indicates, in Mecca--the same town where inspiration descended on Mohammed six hundred years before. Ibn Arabi believed, or pretended to believe, that every word of The Meccan Revelations, was dictated to him by super-natural means.[82] It is quite instructive in this connection to quote Nicholson about how Ibn Arabi was inspired in his Meccan Revelations,

> The author relates that he saw Muhammad in the World of Real Ideas, seated on a throne amidst angels, prophets, and saints, and received his command to discourse on the Divine mysteries. At another time, while circumambulating the Ka'ba, he met a celestial spirit wearing the form of a youth engaged in the same holy rite, who showed him the living esoteric Temple which is concealed under the lifeless exterior, even as the eternal substance of the Divine Ideas is hidden by the veils of popular religion--veils through which the lofty mind must penetrate, until, having reached the

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[81] R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 400.

[82] Loc. cit.

splendour within, it partakes of the Divine nature
and beholds what no mortal eye can endure to look
upon. Ibnu 'l-'Arabí immediately fell into a swoon.
When he came to himself he was instructed to contemplate
the visionary form and to write down the mysteries which
it would reveal to his gaze. Then the youth entered
the Ka'ba with Ibnu 'l-'Arabí, and resuming his spiritual
aspect, appeared to him on a three-legged steed, breathed
into his breast the knowledge of all things, and once
more bade him describe the heavenly form in which all
mysteries are enshrined.[83]

In this intellectual atmosphere, Ibn Khaldun was born.
The Sufites, with the "intuitional" emphasis, were pounding on
his mind, from one side, while the "jurists" and theologians,
with their formal, logical manipulations, were active, on the
other side. Between these two opposed influences, he seemed to
have been perplexed and puzzled for some time. A third influence
might have affected his mind as a result of his extremely secular
career, and his sensational social experience. It is quite pos-
sible that what Sorokin calls the three-dimensional truth with
its sources of intuition, reason and senses appeared to Ibn
Khaldun in a well-integrated form. In fact, each of these three
sources of truth, alone, can hardly lead us, as Sorokin points
out, to approach the infinite metalogical reality of the world
in general or the society in particular. Each of them, when
adequately used, gives us knowledge of one of the important

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[83] Loc. cit.

aspects of the true reality. On the other hand, each taken
separately, not supplemented by the others, may prove misleading.[84]
Sorokin says,

> The history of human thought is a graveyard filled
> with wrong observations and observational conclusions,
> with misleading reasoning and speculation, and with
> false intuitional conclusions. In this respect the
> position of intuition is in no way worse than that of
> sensation or dialecticism. None of them in itself, as
> has been said, can embrace the whole of truth. In the
> three-dimensional aspect of faith, reason, and sensa-
> tion, integral truth is nearer to absolute truth than
> that furnished by any one of these three forms.[85]

It is quite interesting indeed to find that Ibn Khaldun
caught some hold, in one way or another, of all the three dimen-
sions or sources of the Sorokinian truth. As regards the sensual
aspect of the truth, it is really difficult to find in Islam,
even in the present time, a writer, who matches Ibn Khaldun in
the great attention paid to, and the extensive use made of, the
actual data of society. It is, as Becker puts it, that "the
logico-observational character of his work is striking through-
out."[86] Ibn Khaldun, as we have already noted, took the actual
events of human society as data of importance for intellectual

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[84] P. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age, Chap. III, passim.

[85] Ibid., p. 112.

[86] Barnes and Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science,
Vol. I, p. 269.

study just contrary to the view held by the orthodox thinkers
who normally overlooked these temporary phenomena for the sake
of some other eternal ones.

Ibn Khaldun did not, nevertheless, belittle the role of
"intuition" in the intellectual realm. He often advised his
readers to quit relying entirely on the formal logic in his
search for new ideas, and expect the truth to be inspired into
his mind by Allah himself.[87] In fact, his whole theory is
supposed to have been inspired by Allah, as he claims, within a
very short period of time during his retirement in the nomadic
resort.[88] In his own words, "Allah has revealed it to me,
without a teaching from Aristotle or an information from a Persian
sage."[89] In another place, he confessed that after he had read
the various historians' works for the purpose of preparing him-
self to write his Universal History, his "intuition"[90] suddenly

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[87]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 535.

[88]See S. Hasri, Dirasat, pp. 69-71; M. Enan, Ibn Khaldun,
p. 56.

[89]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 40.

[90]In fact, Ibn Khaldun did not mention "intuition" as
clearly as the Sufites were in the habit of mentioning it. He
called it "qariha," and this term is normally used in Arabic by
poets to indicate a poetic type of inspiration rather than a
prophetic one. Ibn Khaldun used this term perhaps intentionally
in order to distinguish his own inspiration which dealt with
social and secular facts from that of the Sufites which usually
dealt with religious ones.

was awakened in him and then drove him to establish a new discipline for history in spite of the fact that he was bankrupt in historical knowledge.[91] This is quite reminiscent of what we have seen in the case of The Meccan Revelations of Ibn Arabi. In brief, we can rightly say here that the "intuitional" character of Ibn Khaldun's work is, just like the sensate character, striking throughout.[92]

As to the strictly logical character of his work, we can consider Ibn Khaldun an inventor of a new logic. This is a complicated and highly important subject indeed. The following chapter is going to be devoted to this peculiar aspect of Ibn Khaldun's theory.

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[91] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[92] See De Boer, op. cit., pp. 271, 279.

CHAPTER XV

IBN KHALDUN AND HIS NEW LOGIC

Ibn Khaldun can be considered in a sense a product of
the philosophical evolution that started early in Islam with
the Mutazilites in the East and culminated long afterwards with
Ibn Rushd, the great philosopher of the West. Modern scholars
are inclined to see in Ibn Khaldun's theory an unexplainable
stroke of genius that was the product of nothing but the inspired
mind of its great author.[1] This is, of course, too naive to be
maintained in the light of the recent sociological researches.
Sociologically speaking, there is no innovation in the world,
theoretical or material, that does not owe most of its elements
to a previous development.[2] An innovator, whatever genius he
may have, cannot create a thing out of nothing. His contribu-
tion consists mostly of combining some previously-existing
elements. What he adds is, in fact, as Ogburn points out, very
little in comparison to what has existed before him.[3] "The
momentum of change," says Brinkmann, "is overwhelmingly on the

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[1] See A. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. III, pp. 321-
22; M. Enan, Ibn Khaldun, p. 127.

[2] See W. Ogburn, Social Change, pp. 82-83.

[3] Ibid., p. 88.

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side of collective action; the singularity of heroism of invention and inventor is negligible."[4] It is therefore not entirely right to maintain that Ibn Khaldun's theory was just born in a vacuum with no influence whatsoever that can be traced in it to his social and intellectual heritage.

The question which needs to be answered in this chapter is: From where and how did Ibn Khaldun get the starting point of his famed social theory? According to some students, Ibn Khaldun was Ghazzalian.[5] According to others, he was a Rushdian.[6] This may be confusing in view of the fact that Al-Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd were greatly opposed to each other in their philosophical orientation. While Ibn Rushd was the most vehement student and admirer of Aristotle in Islam,[7] Al-Ghazzali was its bitterest enemy.[8] One of the well-known controversies that raged in Islam

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[4]Carl Brinkmann, "Invention," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. VIII, p. 247.

[5]See D. B. Macdonald, The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam, p. 131.

[6]M. L. Juma, Tarikh Falasifat Al-Islam, pp. 234-38; Taha Hussain, Fasafat Ibn Khaldun, p. 76.

[7]Ernest Renan, Averrees et Averroisme, pp. 54-56, cited in De Boer, Al-Falsafat Fil-Islam, p. 257 (footnote).

[8]De Boer, op. cit., p. 206.

was a result of the Ibn Rushd hostility to Al-Ghazzali.[9] In order to refute Al-Ghazzali's work, The Destruction of Philosophy, Ibn Rushd wrote The Destruction of Destruction. The two books are now considered classic in Islam.

This writer is of the opinion that Ibn Khaldun can be regarded as Ghazzalin and Rushdian at the same time. He can be said to have adopted from Al-Ghazzali his "destructing" hostility to the Aristotelian logic, and, at the same time,to have adopted the favorable attitudes of Ibn Rushd toward the masses. By this peculiar combination of two previously existing ideas, Ibn Khaldun came out with his strangely modern-sounding theory, as Becker puts it. Since the Aristotelian logic is, as Al-Ghazzali points out, useless in the religious as well as in the secular affairs, and since the masses' ways of life deserve, as Ibn Rushd points out, to be attentively taken care of by the philosophers as against the dictation of their lofty logic, one has the full right then to look for a new logic that can be more suitable to the understanding of actual life than the Greek logic.

This might be the starting point of Ibn Khaldun's theory. Everything leads us to believe that Ibn Khaldun intended, by

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[9]Ibn Rushd called Al-Ghazzali, "the wicked ignorant man." See M. F. Al-Rifai, Al-Ghazzali, Vol. I, pp. 192-94.

writing his Prolegomena, mainly to develop a "realistic" kind
of logic in order to replace the old "idealistic" one. As we have
seen before, he wrote his Prolegomena to be an introduction to his
Universal History. He saw that the Moslem historians, who wrote
before him, were overwhelmingly ridden by the two-valued orienta-
tion of the old logic. Influenced by his personal admiration for
the Omayyads in particular and the Arabs in general, he might
have been quite indignant toward the historians' anti-Omayyad
views. As a cunning diplomat, he might have noticed the futility
of the attempt to directly correct or refute their views by means
of their own logic. He was then obliged to invent a new logical
system through which an indirect, and more penetrating, attack
could be made against their dogmatic ideas.

Ibn Khaldun can be safely considered the only writer in
Islam who realized, consciously or unconsciously, the importance
of presuppositions and categories of thought in the settling of
intellectual dispute. The various schools and sects of Islam had
struggled for centuries, before Ibn Khaldun's time, in order to
know which party was the right one, with no avail whatsoever.
All of them have strongly fortified themselves with proofs
strictly inferred according to the Aristitelian logic. The result
was, as one writer puts it that "what had been proved by logic

could be dispreved by it too.*[10]

In order to settle these controversies, the old logic should have been pushed aside, and a new tool of a higher effi- ciency should have been invented. This need was probably felt by some Moslem thinkers before Ibn Khaldun. It seems that, in the intellectual atmosphere in which Ibn Khaldun was born, some pene- trating suspicion was rising against the efficiency of the old logic to reach the absolute truth.[11] It had been noticed that there was no difference whatsoever between the logicians and the illiterate in this regard. Each group disagreed among themselves about the supposedly absolute truth as widely as the other. Logic was therefore of no use in settling the disagreement. If the function of logic was to lead to the indubitable and undis- putable truth, as it was often maintained, there must have been no dispute whatsoever among the logicians, the theologians, or the philosophers.[12]

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[10]See an interesting discussion of this point in Ibn Hazm, Al-Milel Wel-Nihel, Vol. V, p. 119. There is a great possibility that Ibn Khaldun had read this discussion of Ibn Hazm. Ibn Hazm was a well-known authority in the "West" where Ibn Khaldun lived. In some of his arguments, Ibn Khaldun quoted Ibn Hazm apparently with certain sort of confidence. See for example, Ibn Khaldun, Kitab Al-Ibar, Vol. VII, p. 380.

[11]Cf. Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, p. 348 et seq.

[12]See Ibid., pp. 349-50.

Some of these ideas might have struck Ibn Khaldun's mind when he set himself to write his Universal History. However, he did not pay much attention to the truth in its metaphysical or religious sense. He left this sort of truth, as we have already observed, to be discovered and fixed by the Prophets and the men of "intuition." The only type of truth, which he cared for, was the historical one. He set himself, therefore, to discover a logic or what he called a "scientific tool," with which he could distinguish between the true and the false in the historical data and so settle the age-long disputes and controversies which were waged about them.

Instead of the eternalistic, absolutistic, spiritualistic logic of Aristotle, Ibn Khaldun invented, as we saw in the first part of this present work, his temporalistic, relativistic, materialistic logic. Instead of viewing the conflicting parties of Islam through the dichotomous perspective and trying to see that some of them were right and the others were wrong, he came to the conclusion that every one of them was right within its own field; or as he put it, "If you look at all parties with the eye of justice and understanding, you will find an excuse for every one of them."[13]

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[13] Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 215.

It should be mentioned here that Ibn Khaldun did not
recognise his new logic as such. He called it "the science of
human association" or "the science of civilisation."[14] According
to Taha Hussain, Ibn Khaldun wanted his new "science" to be used
in history-writing just as the old logic was normally used in
philosophy and theology.[15] The social laws, which he expounded,
were intended to be mere tools or rules that could be advanta-
geously employed for the purpose of verifying the validity of
the historical data.[16]

In order to understand the profound meaning of the
Khaldunian term, "science," it may be useful to refer to the last
part of his Prolegomena in which he elaborately discussed the
evolution and the history of the various "sciences" up to his
time. According to Taha Hussain, this part of the Prolegomena is
particularly significant. It is, in his opinion, the first attempt
in Islam to view "sciences" through the historical perspective and
to treat each one of them as a historical figure which could be

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[14]It is interesting indeed to see that this is the first
time in the history of mankind in which an entire work of research
is particularly devoted to the study of human society. Ibn
Khaldun can be in this sense considered the founder of sociology.
See M. Fahmi, Ibn Al-Iitima, pp. 13-18.

[15]T. Hussain, op. cit., p. 34.

[16]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mooaddima, p. 6 et seq.

separately studied sui generis.[17] It seems that there is an
indicative connection between Ibn Khaldun's elaborate discussion
of "sciences" and his discovery of the new "science" for history.

In each chapter, where one of the various "sciences" is
carefully discussed, he seems to be somewhat inclined towards a
particular mention of the founder of the "science." Ibn Khaldun
shows that each founder has tried, by founding his new "science,"
to establish some rules that can be advantageously used in regu-
lating the debate or settling the dispute among the students of
certain discipline. Ibn Khaldun has accordingly thought of himself
as a new founder of new "science," that is, the "science of human
association," just like any other founder of the past.

Actually, the Islamic civilization is well-known by the
development of its numerous and highly complicated "sciences."[18]
The Moslem thinkers seemed to be fascinated and greatly influenced
by the story of the Greek logic and how it was founded by Aris-
totle for the purpose of regulating the debating tendency which
became rife in ancient Greece due to the rise of the Sophists.[19]

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[17]T. Hussain, op. cit., p. 156.

[18]A good account of the Islamic "sciences" can be found in
the last part of Ibn Khaldun's Prolegomena.

[19]Cf. Al-Razi, Manacib Al-Shafii, p. 100 et seq, cited by
Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. II, p. 228.

In the early history of Islam, and especially when the Persians
were converted, the founding of new "sciences" became the fashion
of the time.[20] Every now and then, a new "science" would appear,
carrying with it the fame of its founder. A notorious example
of this tendency can be found in the establishment of the "science"
of Usul Al-Fiqh (i.e., the principle of jurisprudence) by the
famous jurist, Al-Shafii. Al-Razi flatly paralleled and likened
the work of Al-Shafii to that of Aristotle.[21] Another example
was the founding of the "science" of Arudh (i.e., prosody or the
balance of poetry) by Al-Farahidi.[22] It is not exaggerating to
say that there was no limit to the number of "sciences" in Islam.
Things that were quite insignificant might allure some innovator
to found a "science" for them. Even dreams became subject of a
respectable "science," the science of the dream interpretation,
with its own rules and generalisations.[23]

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[20]A well-known "tradition" attributed to the Prophet says,
"If science were attached to the ends of the sky, some amongst the
Persians would have reached it." Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 544.

[21]Cited by Ahmad Amin, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 228.

[22]The story of how Al-Farahidi was inspired in founding his
new "science" is well-known in the history of Arabic literature.
According to the story, Al-Farahidi was walking one day in the
bazaar of coppersmiths. Suddenly he found himself unconsciously
regulating his steps according to the rhythm of the coppersmiths'
hammerings. A notion then struck his mind, driving him to establish
rules for balancing the verses of poetry in the same way.

[23]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mocaddima, pp. 475-78.

It is true, however, that at the time and the place of
Ibn Khaldun the fashion of founding "sciences" was very weak.
This can be attributed mainly to the prevailing of the nomadic
culture in North Africa in contrast to the "East" where most of
the Islamic sciences were established. Moreover, the time was
too late for any "scientific" inovator. Most of the then-
existing knowledge appeared to have been already exhausted, so
that there seemed no available place for a new "science" to be
developed. The dominant idea was that everything had been already
discovered; and there was nothing new under the sun. Instead of
writing a new original book or expounding a new doctrine,
scholars busied themselves in explaining and interpreting what
had been already written. Consequently, there arose too many
commentators and annotators, and very few original authors. The
old masters were considered as extraordinary men and inimitable
authors; the only thing possible then for the later generations
was to write commentary notes on them. There was seldom any
master work of the old time that passed the hands of later genera-
tions without being crowded, up and down and on the margin of
every page, by explanations and interpretations.[24]

Ibn Khaldun seems to complain of such conservative

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[24] Actually, many of the master works of the early authors
of Islam, which are republished today in modern printing, carry,
around their pages, explanatory notes much bigger in volume than
the original texts.

tendency among his contemporaries.[25] He frankly declares that
the later generations may be as efficient in their writing and
original in their thinking as the early ones. "Merit," Ibn
Khaldun says, "is not a monopoly of the early masters."[26] It
is quite possible that Ibn Khaldun has written the last part of
the Prolegomena merely to show that "sciences" are, like any
other historical facts, evolving with the passage of time, and
the later masters can be as original in developing them as the
early masters in founding them.

     At any rate, this genuis call of Ibn Khaldun went into
the history of Islam like a cry in the wilderness. When he
founded his great new "science" of history, and proudly delivered
it to his contemporaries, no one seemed to have noticed any-
thing great in it. Their minds were so tuned that they could
not perceive any importance in the ideas discovered in their own
time. Important ideas were supposed to have been already dis-
covered by the old masters. His contemporaries, especially
those from his native country, considered him void of any real
knowledge,[27] as if the "science" he discovered was nothing but
a worldly infatuation that did not befit a seriously devoted thinker.

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[25]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, pp. 531-33.

[26]Ibid., p. 532.

[27]See M. Enan, Ibn Khaldun, p. 94.

Instead of dealing with the eternal ideas of an ideal world, as was required of serious thinkers, Ibn Khaldun indulged in describing and cataloging the "silly" affairs of this illusory and temporary world. He wrote about the actual happenings of society and the customary ways of life as if he considered them permanent or wished them to be so. Thinkers of his time were, as we have seen, of the opinion that these customary ways of life, according to which the ignorant masses were living, should have been drastically reformed or entirely replaced by those of the old Prophets. In the minds of these thinkers, there was a clear-cut dichotomy of good versus evil. They normally placed the customary ways of life on the side of evil, while the side of good was wholly devoted to their "idealistic" dreams and utopian schemes.

In Ibn Khaldun's opinion, on the other hand, there is no dichotomy of this sort. Good and evil are two aspects of one reality, or as he puts it, "It is necessary for the great portion of good to have a small portion of evil as a by-product."[28] Ibn Khaldun's logic is dialectical, to use a Hegelian term, rather than dichotomous. He takes the actual happenings of human society as inescapable. For him, they run according to a permanent

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[28] Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 390.

pattern, and so he set himself to discover that pattern.

Ibn Khaldun entirely rejects the Mutazilites' idea that ignorance is not an acceptable excuse for wrong-doing. As we have noticed, man's mind is, according to the Mutazilites, always able to see the truth whenever or wherever it may be; man's guide is always within himself; and every man can be a prophet for himself. In their opinion, man is able to discover, through logical syllogism, the existence of God and the contents of His Commandments. God, according to the Mutazilites, orders what is good and man can therefore know the order of God by merely knowing what is logically good.

There appeared several thinkers in the orthodox camp who rejected this extremely rationalistic doctrine. To the orthodox writers, prophets are necessary for the guiding of man in the moral realm. The good is what God has ordained it to be so, and there is nothing that is good by its own nature. Any man who has not heard of a prophet will not be punished by Allah for his misbelief or misbehavior, for he is unable by himself alone to distinguish the good from the bad.[29] Ibn Khaldun seems to have adopted this orthodox doctrine and then stamped it with his relativistic-temporalistic-materialistic logic. Since man is not

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[29] See M. H. Al-Dhawahiri, Al-Tahqiq Al-Tamm, p. 146.

punished for what he usually does under the impact of ignorance,
one has no right to condemn the customs of any society. The
idealistic reformers and the followers of the formal logic should
therefore go away and strike their heads against the walls.

Common people, of all times and places, do or view things
according to what they have been accustomed to. They inherit
their customary manners and beliefs and consider them the most
natural and valid things in the world. In other words, they are
completely ignorant of the "ideal" ways for which the logicians
and philosophers usually preach. Besides, they may be incapable
of understanding them even if they were diligently taught. Ibn
Khaldun seems to acknowledge the fact that man is ordinarily
unable to understand the ideas for which he has no presupposi-
tion or mental preparedness.[30] Ibn Khaldun is, more or less, of
the opinion that human mind is a product of environment,[31] and
man is the child of his habits and customs.[32] Even the Prophets,

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[30]Ibn Khaldun tells a very instructive story of a boy
who was imprisoned with his father since his early infancy and
so he was unable to imagine or think correctly of what his father
told him about the outside world. According to Ibn Khaldun, all
men are more or less like this boy. They cannot correctly think
of things that are beyond their familiar experience. (See Ibn
Khaldun, op. cit., p. 182.) Ibn Khaldun might have been influenced
in this idea by the Ghazzalin criticism of human mind.

[31]See Ibid., p. 433.

[32]Ibid., p. 125.

says Ibn Khaldun, who are supposed to perform miracles, achieve their religious reforms in an indirect way, and in accordance with the customs of the people.[33]

Ibn Khaldun has taken perhaps the doctrine of "Ijma" and developed it to its logical end. The "Ijma" of the orthodox Moslems can be considered a conservative institution. Everything that has been agreed upon by the previous generations is taken to be valid.[34] A new thing is, in the eyes of the orthodox Moslems, a "Bida," (that is, a forbidden innovation) as far as it is new. It will be permissible as soon as it becomes a matter of the past, already approved by the preceding generations. Thus, many customs which are in reality contradictory to the spirit of Islam have been finally introduced and approved by the orthodox jurists with the help of "Ijma."[35] Ibn Khaldun might find it possible to extend the principle of "Ijma," not only to what has happened, but also to what is happening and what will happen. So, if one has the ability to anticipate what will happen in the society, he may have a right to follow its future trend, that is, to be fickle like Ibn Khaldun!

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[33] Ibid., p. 159.

[34] See D. B. Macdonald, "Idjma," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. II, p. 448.

[35] See loc. cit.; R. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, p. 179; Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 396.

Since "Ijma" will sooner or later follow the dictation of the expediency, for instance, there is no wrong therefore in following it from now, or in drifting with it wherever it goes. In brief, it seems not evil, in the opinion of Ibn Khaldun, to follow the rules of the relativistic-temporalistic-materialistic logic as far as you are entangled within the netting of the society. There is no way out except through individual retirement and private devotion. Then, and only then, man can apply the religious, "idealistic" logic of the absolute-eternal-spiritual truth.[36]

For the first time in the history of Islam, Ibn Khaldun wrote a detailed and long autobiography. Moreover, he wrote it with an amazing frankness and literary honesty.[37] He described what he had actually done apparently with no intention to hide the dark side of his life as most of the autobiographers do. The modern students of Ibn Khaldun are astonished at the frankness of his autobiography. Most of them appear unable to refrain from

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[36]It should be mentioned at this point that the above discussion of Ibn Khaldun's opinion does not exactly portray what he has literally expressed in his work. It is rather an imaginary "construction" of what Ibn Khaldun would say if he were absolutely free to express himself without any fear of ostracism or persecution. After carefully reading the whole work of Ibn Khaldun and trying to view the world through his own perspective, one may readily find that the "construction" made is as near as possible to the real opinion of Ibn Khaldun.

[37]M. Enan, Ibn Khaldun, p. 127.

condemning his fickleness, meanness, or lack of loyalty as
realistically told by him.[38] As a matter of fact, Ibn Khaldun's
autobiography can be rightly considered as an application of
his social theory. He seems to be sure that the reader, after
carefully studying his arguments, will find no difficulty in under-
standing the real meaning of his career and in approving of his
"fickle" tendency.

Ibn Khaldun appears to be an admirer of the Pharisaical
wisdom that "where all are at fault, none are at fault." He is
not ashamed of his fickleness and diplomatic flattery because all
men are fickle and flatter in one way or another.[39] To Ibn
Khaldun, it is not evil to be fickle as far as you follow the
social laws, following what the expediency obliges you to do.

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[38]Alfred Bel, "Ibn Khaldun," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. II,
p. 395; M. Enan, op. cit,, pp. 28, 137, 140; T. J. De Beer, Tarikh
Al-Falsafa Fil-Islam, p. 270; Taha Hussein, op. cit., p. 24.

[39]It is instructive to notice here that Ibn Khaldun lived
in a society which was greatly similar to that which produced
Machiavelli. (M. Enan, Ibn Khaldun, p. 162; Cf. Taha Husain, op.
cit., p. 24.) We may then rightly conclude that Giddings' con-
cept, "conspirital society," is quite applicable to the social
environment in which Ibn Khaldun lived. In describing an ideal-
type of the "conspirital" society Professor Giddings says: "/this
type/ . . . arises in populations that, like the Italian cities
at their worse estate, have suffered disintegration of the pre-
existing social order. Unscrupulous adventurers came forward and
created relations of personal allegiance by means of bribery,
patronage and preferment. Intrigue and conspiracy are the social
bonds. . . ." (F. H. Giddings, Readings in Descriptive and
Historical Sociology, Macmillan Co., 1922, pp. 12-13.)

Ibn Khaldun clearly distinguishes between the men of knowledge and the men of practice, or in other words, between those who follow the old "idealistic" logic and those who follow the "realistic" logic which he is himself following. He emphasises the fact that the old logic is a handicap in the way of success in actual life. He declares that the logicians and the men of knowledge in general are always far from success in the political field.[40] Logic, he says, tends to deal with abstract ideas which usually differ from actual things. Men of practice, on the other hand, do not pay attention to these abstract, imaginary ideas. They often restrict themselves to know what actually happens in society and try to adapt themselves to it.[41] Whereas the men of knowledge deal only with the "universal," the men of practice deal with the "particular,"[42] and there is, according to Ibn Khaldun, a big difference between the two. "Thus," he says, "the discipline of logic is not a safe way of thinking, on account of its tendency toward abstraction and its farness from the tangible world."[43]

Even in the religious realm, logic is not a safe or

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[40] Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mocaddima, pp. 542-43.

[41] Ibid., p. 543.

[42] Ibid., p. 516.

[43] Ibid., p. 543.

efficient tool of knowledge, according to Ibn Khaldun. Here,
the influence of Al-Ghazzali is clearly observable in his thought.
Ibn Khaldun greatly prefers, as we have already noticed, the
inspiration of Allah, or "intuition," to logic.[44] In his advice
to his reader, he says:

> . . . ridicule and never rely upon those who tell
> you that mind is able to understand the whole world
> and its underlying causes. You should know that the
> world is, to every observer, what can be normally
> observed by his observational means. But the truth
> is much far beyond that. . . . If we ask an animal about
> mental conceptions, supposing it can answer us, we will
> find it completely ignorant of them as if they do not
> exist at all. It is possible, therefore, that there is
> some mental capacity that is different from ours in the
> same way as ours is different from that of the animal.
> Allah's creation is unlimited. The world is too big to
> be wholly restricted within the boundaries of our know-
> ledge. You should, therefore, belittle the ability of
> your mind and obey what the Prophet has told as regards
> belief or action. He is more concerned and more informed
> about your own interests than you, because he knows some-
> thing you do not know, and his mind reaches far beyond
> the limit of your mind. This does not mean that human
> mind is entirely wrong. It is able to be indubitably
> right and certain within its own limit; but you must not
> be so ambitious to try to decide for yourself about the
> reality of diety, prophethood, the hereafter and the
> like. This is an impossible endeavor. You become, then,
> like a man who sees a balance of gold, and likes to use
> it in the weighing of mountains.[45]

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[44]Ibid., pp. 535, 536.

[45]Ibid., pp. 459-60. Notice that these ideas were expounded
about four centuries before the appearance of Kant's Critic of
Pure Reason. It should be noticed also that Al-Ghazzali advocated
similar ideas about three centuries before the appearance of Ibn
Khaldun's Prolegomena.

Ibn Khaldun seems to have extended this idea, of the limitations of human mind, to its logical end; and consequently made it the philosophical basis of his social theory. Since common people in general are mentally unable to understand the abstract conceptions of the logicians it is useless and wasteful, therefore, to force them to quit their customary ways and adopt, instead, what logic suggests. It is much better on the part of logicians to come down from their "ivory tower" and go along with the multitude, than to demand from the multitude to come up with them. Here, the Rushdian theory is of some undeniable influence on Ibn Khaldun's theory.

Ibn Khaldun flatly denounces those trouble-makers who, under the influence of some idealistic "halucination," often disturb the society. In his opinion, they eventually perish on the ground of their thoughtless violation of the rule of "asabiyya."[46] Then, he frankly declares, they will die as "sinners" rather than "martyrs."[47] When Ibn Khaldun comes to the Mohammedan doctrine of "bidding the good and forbidding the evil," on which these trouble-makers often base their campaigns, he considers it a duty that concerns only those who are able to

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[46]Ibid., pp. 159-61.

[47]Ibid., p. 189.

do it. If one is unable to bid the good or forbid the evil
openly, he should exercise it within his heart.[48]

What does Ibn Khaldun mean by ability in this regard?
Most probably, he has meant it to be largely in terms of "asabiyya."
He once alludes to the fact that kings are normally too strong to
be successfully attacked without an equally strong "asabiyya."[49]
In some other place, he emphatically advocates that Allah never
orders man to do anything that he is unable to do.[50] Thus, as far
as man has no strong party, or "asabiyya," that supports him in his
bidding the good or forbidding the evil, he should submit to what-
ever the holders of "asabiyya" dictate upon him, good or evil. In
fact, this is what Ibn Khaldun personally did.

One of the basic qualifications of a good ruler or a
caliph, in Ibn Khaldun's opinion, is to be well informed about,
and well-acquainted with, the holders of "asabiyya,"[51] and to
respect their positions.[52] Ibn Khaldun seems to be of the opinion
that the "asabiyya" is nothing but the public opinion of people,[53]

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[48]Loc. cit.

[49]Loc. cit.

[50]Ibid., p. 196.

[51]Ibid., p. 193.

[52]Ibid., p. 143.

[53]See Loc. cit.

in the modern sense of the term. A tribal chief should be
respected, therefore, and obeyed in proportion to the strength
of the "asabiyya" that he can command, that is, in proportion
to the number of his loyal followers. Consequently, the ruler
should not be misled by the "idealistic" formula that "to each
man according to what he absolutely deserves," the ruler should
rather follow the dictum of expediency, that is, "to each man
according to his relative power."

It is worth noting that Ibn Khaldun prefers a stupid ruler
to a very intelligent one. The very intelligent ruler, in his
opinion, tends to overlook what his subjects usually need and
neglect what they feel. Because of his well-developed mental
conceptions, he may force his subjects to do what they are unable
to comprehend, and thus, he may greatly harm them. Ibn Khaldun
wants the rulers to be somewhat of the "drifting" type, that is,
the type who behaves according to the normal and customary way.[54]

Generally speaking, Ibn Khaldun believes that man is a
passive tool in the hands of society. Man is hardly able, in
his opinion, to affect any important change in the pattern of
social process. Man has, therefore, to drift along with the

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[54]Ibid., p. 189. Ibn Khaldun finally decides that the
middle between two extremes is the best of all. The ruler should
be neither too stupid nor too intelligent.

inescapable process rather than to resist it.[55] He particularly believes that any man who holds power deserves to be obeyed and respected. The man of power may act unjustly sometimes, but this is, according to Ibn Khaldun, too little to counterbalance the social advantage that results from power relationship. For him, the men of power are the main factors behind social control. Without them, injustice certainly becomes more prevalent.[56] This idea is, no doubt, in accordance with Ibn Khaldun's "realistic" logic which advocates that good and evil are two necessary aspects of one reality.

Ibn Khaldun bitterly attacks those men of knowledge who look down upon the men of power and belittle the significance of their social role.[57] He considers this haughtiness on the part of the men of knowledge bad manners and baseless superciliousness. He prefers, instead, those yes-men who try to propitiate, please and flatter any power holder, and consequently obtain wealth and position.[58]

Finally, after discussing certain aspects of Ibn Khaldun's new logic and his criticism of the old one, a question may be

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[55]See Taha Hussain, op. cit., p. 42.

[56]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 390-91.

[57]Ibid., pp. 391-92.

[58]Ibid., p. 393.

raised with regard to religion, and what type he has in mind
in connection with his new logical scheme and social theory.
Ibn Khaldun, it is true, does not give a clear definition of
what he means by religion, nor pay any particular attention to
the discussion of religion as such. What type of religion he
advocates, "church" or "sect," group religion or class religion,
is difficult to know. It is possible, nevertheless, to find,
here and there throughout his work, certain allusions to religion
which may provide us with some clues to the answer.

In view of his highly "realistic" logic, one may be able
to infer that he must have advocated a "church" type of religion.
As a matter of fact, this tendency can be readily observed
throughout his whole work. He bitterly criticises the Moslem
theologians, or the "Kalamis," for their attempt to base religious
beliefs on certain philosophical premises and defend them with
logical syllogisms. In his opinion, as we have already noticed,
religion must be restricted to heart, where mind has nothing to
do with it. In other words, he believes in a blind submission
to the "church" institutions and beliefs rather than a theo-
retical attachment to a system of "ideal" values.[59]

Ibn Khaldun clearly distinguishes between Islam and any

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[59]See _Ibid._, p. 460.

other religion. He considers that Islam differs from all other
religions of the world by its institution of "Jihad," i.e.,
holy war. Islam, according to him, positively requires from its
followers to declare war on other peoples, conquer them and
force them to adopt the religion of Allah.[60] For him, any other
religion is meant to be practiced only within its own community,
with no intention whatsoever to conquer other peoples as the
case in Islam.[61] Hence, Islam has established the peculiar
institution of the caliphate by means of which war and political
affairs can be managed for the advantage of the Islamic com-
munity.[62] According to Ibn Khaldun, there are two kinds of "holy
war": first, the war performed, for the sake of Allah, against
the unbelievers; second, the internal war that is waged by a
ruler against rebels and trouble-makers.[63]

In the light of the above discussion, one may be able to
discover the strong tendency of Ibn Khaldun toward the "church"

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[60]This idea of Ibn Khaldun is completely rejected by the
Moslem writers of today. They consider Islam as a religion that
is entirely based on personal conviction and logical proof. They
always refer to an oft-quoted Koranic verse which declares,
"There is no compulsion in religion; the right way has been dis-
tinguished from the wrong. . . ." The Koran, Chap. II, Verse 256.

[61]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 231.

[62]Ibid., pp. 230-31.

[63]Ibid., p. 271.

type of religion in contrast to the "sect" type. He is not
interested in how the ruler treats his subjects or how the class
relationships are maintained in the religious community. He
seems to take these considerations as to be beyond the concern
of religion. He probably wants religion to be a solidifying and
unifying factor within the group against the outside world.[64]
He perhaps evaluates the validity of a religion in the same way
as the nomadic tribe or any other "sacred" society does, namely,
by the fortune it has brought or will bring to its followers.[65]

He once mentions, in a tone of praise or pride, how the
Islamic fleet was capable in the old "golden" time to inflict
great damage and spread much destruction upon the Mediterranean
coasts that belonged to non-Moslem peoples.[66] He appears here
not different from any "churchman" who usually believes that God
is absolutely on the side of his group against its enemies.
This is the attitude of every religion that develops into "church."
Even in the modern civilization where peoples are supposed to
be much more rational in their thinking and religious beliefs,
we can easily notice the Khaldunian attitude prevailing. We can

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[64]See Ibid., pp. 151-152.

[65]See Ibid., p. 152.

[66]Ibid., pp. 253, 256.

find in every front of the wars of today "churchmen" vehemently
urging their followers to kill their enemies and destroy their
"wrong" beliefs or doctrine.

There is some disagreement among modern students as to
whether Ibn Khaldun was a really religious person or not. In
the opinion of T. Hussain, Ibn Khaldun was not truly religious
in view of his extremely fickle and perfidious character.[67]
T. Hussain may not be entirely right in this respect. He seems
to impose his own religious values on Ibn Khaldun. In order to
see whether a person is religious or not, it is necessary at
first to find out what conception of religion he has in mind.

It is true, Ibn Khaldun can be rightly regarded as an
irreligious person if we evaluate religion in terms of the original
teaching of Mohammed. Mohammed, as we have already noted, viewed
religion as to cover all the various aspects of man's life. But
this is positively not what Ibn Khaldun had in mind about reli-
gion. To Ibn Khaldun, religion has nothing to do with secular
activities of man. In fact, man is unable, according to Ibn
Khaldun, to do anything but to drift along with the irresistable
currents of social life. In this light, Ibn Khaldun's fickleness
or perfidy cannot readily be taken as an indication of his irreligious-
ness.

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[67]Taha Hussain, op. cit., p. 25.

It is interesting to notice at this point that Ibn Khaldun speaks, in his Autobiography, of his perfidious behavior and unfaithful character, as T. Hussain notices, in a tone of an amazing objectivity as if he has done nothing wrong.[68] T. Hussain notices also that Ibn Khaldun was wont to refer to his social theory, not as a philosophical system, but rather as a religious creed.[69] Here, it seems as if Ibn Khaldun has viewed his social theory, that is, his "realistic" logic in the same way as the Mutazilites had viewed, before him, the Aristotelian logic. The Mutazilites, as we have already seen, considered the Aristotelian logic as a revelation supplementing the Koran. After attacking this logic and expounding a new one, Ibn Khaldun has perhaps thought that his logic has a right, more than the old one has, to be considered as revelation supplementing the Koran.

In his opinion, the Koran is meant to be applied strictly to the religious life where pious men devote themselves to the worshipping of Allah; but when men come out of their devoted retirement and become active members of the society, they inevitably follow his "realistic" logic. If the Aristltelian logic is often in conflict with religion, the "realistic" logic

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[68]Ibid., p. 24.

[69]Ibid., p. 31.

is, according to Ibn Khaldun's theory, complementing rather than opposing religion. This is merely because of the fact that the "realistic" logic portrays the natural ways of behavior which man is unable to evade, while the Aristotelian logic is neither natural nor inevitable.

To Ibn Khaldun, religion does not prohibit what is necessary,[70] or as he puts it, "It is seldom to find a religious order contradicting the actual order."[71] The Khaldunian logic is the logic of the multitude, that is, the majority of people, while the Aristotelian logic is the logic of the minority. However, Allah is always, according to the doctrine of "Ijma," on the side of the majority.[72]

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[70]Al-Ghazzali, whose influence on Ibn Khaldun's theory is undeniable, emphatically declares that "necessity makes lawful what is forbidden." See T. Arnold and A. Gullaume, The Legacy of Islam, p. 302.

[71]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 196.

[72]This argument is not actually expressed by Ibn Khaldun, but it can be easily observed in various points of his writing. In fact, Ibn Khaldun often refers to the doctrine of "Ijma" in order to support his social theory. He is of the opinion that anything is true and valid as far as people in a certain time or place believe it to be so. He has refuted, for instance, the accusation of Fatimad's enemies and vehemently supported the Fatimids in their claim that they are direct descendants of Fatima, on the basis of "Ijma." It is impossible, he says, for a lying pretender to win the support of people. The mere fact that the people have believed in their claim, is a satisfactory proof of their rightfulness. (See, Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 21-25.)

The old logic portrays the rules according to which the philosopher's mind thinks, whereas the new logic of Ibn Khaldun shows the rules according to which the maltitude's mind behaves. Which one of these opposed systems of thinking is nearer to religion? The answer depends on what kind of religion the thinker has in mind. To those thinkers who adopt a "moralistic" religion, the "idealistic" logic of Aristotle is, of course, preferable. But those who adopt a "formalistic" religion find in the "realistic" logic of Ibn Khaldun the only legitimate way of thinking.

Today, in view of the fact that modern social sciences see in both logics certain elements of truth, there is, as Max Lerner points out, a third logic that lies in the middle between the "ideal" and the "real," between what ought to be and what is, that is, the logic of what can be.[73] In this idealistic-realistic pattern of thinking seems to lie the ultimate goal of all the religions of the civilised world. After ruling out the vicissitudes in the history of religion, and erasing the ups-and-downs of its dialectical evolution, there remains a core which is "realistic" and "idealistic" at the same time. The civilised man is, as Von Wiese points out, hardly able to dispense with the vision of a more perfect world. He is, too, unable to

[73]See M. Lerner, "Introduction," in N. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. xlvi.

completely free himself from the complicated network of the actual and "defective" world. As Von Wiese puts it, the ideal perfection continually clashes with the real imperfection. And, just as the "real" must always and everywhere be present if any ordered social life is to exist, so must the "ideal" be immortal, for one is the necessary complement of the other. Man gains courage to struggle in the here and now by envisaging the nowhere and never.[74]

[74]See Wiese-Becker, Systematic Sociology, p. 416.

PART IV

ISLAM VERSUS NOMADISM

Most of the modern students of Islam consider that
there is a natural antagonism between the spirit of Islam
and that of nomadism. In this part, we are going to
examine how this antagonism has arisen in the Islamic
society, what is the real reason behind it, and whether
it is natural or not. A large section of this part is
devoted, then, to the study of Ibn Khaldun's personality
and theory in connection with this oft-maintained con-
troversy.

CHAPTER XVI

ISLAM AND THE ARABS

Most of the modern students of Islam agree with Goldziher
that the spirit of Islam runs contrary to the cultural pattern of
the nomad Arabs.[1] The Mohammedan ideals are, to them, primarily
intended to abrogate the Arabian ideals. To quote Nicholson
about this point,

> The teaching of Islam ran directly counter to the
> ideals and traditions of heathendom, and, as Gold-
> ziher has remarked, its originality lies not in its
> doctrines, which are Jewish and Christian, but in the
> fact that it was Muhammad who first maintained these
> doctrines with persistent energy against the Arabian
> view of life.[2]

This writer is of the opinion that Goldziher's theory is
not entirely true. Following the logic of the present thesis, we
can find no fundamental difference between the spirit of Islam
and that of the Arab nomadism. It may be quite safe to generalize
that all the religions that arise in "secular" societies tend to
derive their fundamental principles from the ideals of the "sacred"
society. The disintegration of social life under the impact of

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[1]See for example, R. Nicholson, A Literary History of the
Arabs, pp. 177-78; Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, p. 76 et seq.;
P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 26; E. Browne, A Literary
History of Persia, pp. 189-91.

[2]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 177.

the secularizing or civilizing process seems to be one of the main reasons that lie behind the rise of the great prophets. The strong solidarity of the "sacred" society, and the feeling of brotherhood among its members are found to be, more or less, preached by all the great religions of the world. Mohammed is no exception in this regard. Islam is known to have emphasized the fact that its followers should act toward each other like brothers.[3] In one of the Mohammedan sayings, it is urged that "mankind is the family of Allah, and so, the most beloved man in the sight of Allah is that who is most helpful to His family."[4]

It is quite instructive to notice that the Hebrew prophets, whom Mohammed greatly admired, were in fact vehement critics of the moral disintigration and social secularization of the ancient civilization. They were, in other words, preaching for the ideals of the old nomadic life after it had been replaced by sedentary one in Palestine. In the words of H. G. Wells, "They kept up the nomadic traditions as against the 'new ways' of settlements."[5]

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[3]"The believers are but Brethern, so make peace between your two brothers." The Koran, Chap. XLIX, Verse 10.

[4]Al-Maghribi, Al-Akhlaq Wel-Wajibat, p. 128.

[5]H. G. Wells, Outline of History, p. 268.

Will Durant says of them,

> In one phase they were Tolstoians incensed at
> industrial exploitation and ecclesiastical chicanery;
> they came up from the simple countryside and hurled
> damnation at the corrupt wealth of the towns.[6]

It should be remembered here that the nomadic society of
Arabia was, and still is, highly integrated as far as the tribal
unit is concerned. Brotherhood, cooperation and loyalty are
undoubtedly prevalent among all the members of the tribe, rich
or poor, powerful or powerless. The Arabian is, as Professor Hitti
points out, a born democrat.[7] The trouble comes when he meets men
from other tribes. Then he becomes extremely aristocratic.[8] He
looks upon his tribe as the best and most honorable of all the world.
"He is excessively fond of prodigious genealogies and often traces
his lineage back to Adam. No people, other than the Arabians, have
ever raised genealogy to the dignity of a science."[9]

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[6]W. Durant, The Story of Civilisation, p. 316.

[7]P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 28.

[8]The students of Arab culture are usually perplexed as to
whether the Arabs are democratic or aristocratic by nature. In
the opinion of this writer, there is no reason to be perplexed
about this question. The Arabs are democratic and aristocratic
at the same time. They are democratic within the tribe, aristo-
cratic without, i.e., in the inter-tribal or inter-national rela-
tionship.

[9]Loc. cit.

Here lies the main source of conflict between Islam and Arab nomadism. It is, in fact, not a conflict between two systems of values. It is rather a conflict regarding the question of who are going to be included within the system. In the eyes of the nomads, man must be loyal to his tribesmen, hostile to the stranger. According to the Mohammedan point of view, on the other hand, all the tribes within the boundaries of the Islamic community are equal. With one stroke Mohammed shifts the center of loyalty from the tribe to the community of religion. "All of you," Mohammed says, "are the children of Adam, and Adam was created from the dust of the earth. The best among you is, then, the most pious of you."[10] "Know that every Moslem is the brother of every other Moslem. All of you are on the same equality."[11]

To quote The Koran:

Mohammed is the messenger of Allah and those who are with him are severe against the unbelievers—compassionate among themselves; thou mayest see them bowing down, adoring, craving grace from Allah and His goodwill, their marks are in their faces from the effects of falling down in prayer;—that is their similitude in the Bible and the Gospel; as a seedling puts forth its sprout and strengthens it, and grows stout, and straightens itself upon its stem, delighting the sowers!—in order to tease unbelievers. . . .[12]

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[10]Al-Miqdadi, Tarikh Al-Ummat Al-Arabiyya, p. 124.

[11]H. G. Wells, op. cit., p. 611.

[12]The Koran, Chap. XXVIII, Verse 29.

This quotation from the Koran clearly indicates the fact that the tribal spirit of the nomads is adopted by Islam after it has been expanded to include the whole community of the "believers" as against the "unbelievers."[13] Mohammed vigorously attempted to implant among his followers the same spirit of solidarity and loyalty that usually prevails within the nomadic tribe. This was indeed a very difficult job to achieve. The nomad tribesman is hardly able to forget his loyalty toward his old tribe in order to be immersed in an enlarged sort of new loyalty.

The extraordinary devotion of Mohammed to the idea of one God, Allah, and his great hate of the Arabian polytheism[14] may be

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[13] It is interesting indeed to notice that the new social unit of loyalty, which was supposed to replace the old unit of the tribe, was called by Mohammed as "Umma," (i.e., congregation or community). Anyhow, this term has lost now its original meaning. It is now used by the Arabs of today to mean nation or nationality, according to the modern conception of the term as recently developed in modern times. In other words, the Mohammedan term "Umma" is now used to indicate, more or less, a racial unit in contrast to a religious one. This is of course contradictory to what Mohammed really meant by it.

[14] Islam is widely known by its antagonism against all forms of sculpture and representational arts. This antagonism was originated by Mohammed himself when he launched his intensive campaign against the Arabian idolatry. "Destroy every image you see," was the positive order of Mohammed to his generals. The Moslem theologians, later on, forgot the real factor behind that order, and began to take the "saying" of the Prophet in its literal sense. A few years ago, when the Iraqi government erected a statute for one of the Iraqi national heroes, some religious men rose in protest, shouting, "Destroy every image you see."

attributed to his intention to unite the hostile tribes of Arabia
into one nation. The Arabian idolatry, or polytheism, was, in a
sense, as Ahmad Amin notices, a symbol of their tribal spirit.
Each tribe used to have a special idol, or a god, which was sup-
posed to be its protector against the other tribes.[15] Mohammed
came with his extreme monotheism perhaps in order to make the Arabs
feel as if they belong to one community—the community of Allah—
rather than that of the various gods. Professor Hitti says:

> This new community . . . was established, on the
> basis of religion as the Ummat (congregation of) Allah.
> This was the first attempt in the history of Arabia at a
> social organization with religion, rather than blood,
> as its basis. Allah was the personification of state
> supremacy. . . . All within this community, regardless
> of tribal affiliation and older loyalties, were now
> brethern at least in principle. . . . Thus by one stroke
> the most vital bond of Arab relationship, that of tribal
> kinship, was replaced by a new bond, that of faith; a
> sort of Pax Islamica was instituted for Arabia.[16]

The modern students of the nomad Arabs try to discover what
is the central point around which the Arabian values revolve, or
to use Ruth Benedict's term, the Arabian pattern of culture. After
studying the various opinions about this point, one may come to
the conclusion that almost all of the Arab values are centered

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[15]Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, pp. 74-75.

[16]P. Hitti, op. cit., pp. 120-21.

around the tribal spirit.[17] To belong to a strong tribe, to protect its honor, to be "good" toward its members and "bad" against its enemies, are the main characteristics of the nomadic life. To quote Hitti,

> No worse calamity could befall a Bedouin than to lose his tribal affiliation. A tribeless man, in a land where stranger and enemy are synonymous, like a landless man in feudal England, is practically helpless. His status is that of an outlaw, one beyond the pale protection and safety.[18]

Two characteristics can be observed in this strong tribal spirit of the Arabs: first, the complete incorporation of the

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[17]It should be remembered at this point that Ibn Khaldun's term of "asabiyya" has been popularly interpreted as the tribal spirit, or esprit de clan. (See S. Hasri, Dirasat, pp. 302-303.) This may explain why Ibn Khaldun has paid so much attention to the "asabiyya" in his social theory. As we shall see later, Ibn Khaldun's starting point in his social philosophy is the social structure of the nomadic tribe. Almost all social phenomena can be, in his opinion, explained by the changes that happen to the "asabiyya" relationship in the various stages of the social process. However, the "asabiyya" may have, according to Ibn Khaldun's usage, a slightly different meaning. As we have noticed in some previous chapters, it has been taken by Ibn Khaldun at times to mean something like a party affiliation that supports tribal chiefs in their political activities. At any rate, the difference is not so big, for the "asabiyya" can represent the social relationship within the tribal unit and also the loyalty of the tribe to its chief when he comes into contact or conflict with other chiefs in the political field. The "asabiyya" binds the members of the tribe closely to each other, and, at the same time, binds them as a whole for the support of their chief as against the outside world.

[18]P. Hitti, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

individual in his tribe, that is, the dissolving of "I" into "we";[19] second, the vanity and the aristocratic pride with which the Arab treats men from other tribes. The others are always considered by him as to be below his high honor,[20] and to be his legitimate victims and objects of plunder and murder.[21] According to Sir William Muir, "honor and revenge" constitute the keynotes of the Arab culture.[22] Actually, the disdainfulness, the vanity, and the arrogance of the nomad Arab are well-known throughout history. He cannot understand at all that men from other tribes have the same rights, as he has, for honor and decent living.

It is interesting indeed to notice that "the five pillars of Islam"[23] are all intended to combat this arrogant nature of the Arabs. The non-Moslem observers are often astonished at the hardness, complicatedness, and rigidity of these "Islamic pillars" which normally consume a big part of the Moslem's time. Some modern thinkers are inclined to ridicule them and regard them as

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[19] See *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[20] I. Van Ess, *Meet the Arab*, p. 67; K. I. De Goeje, "Arab," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, Vol. I, p. 376.

[21] P. Hitti, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[22] Cited by E. Browne, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 193.

[23] The five pillars of Islam are in brief: (1) the belief in the unity of Allah and in the prophethood of Mohammed (2) prayer (3) alms giving (4) fasting (5) pilgrimage.

obstacles which handicap the Moslems in their secular activities.
However, these complicated and difficult "pillars of Islam" were
indeed quite meaningful and highly advantageous in the early days
of Islam. They were meant to weaken the tribal pride of the Arabs.

Ali, the fourth caliph, was perhaps the first man who dis-
covered the social meaningfulness of the "pillars" along these
lines. In his opinion, to prostrate one's self in the prayer and
put one's face on the dust of the earth, to be hungry in the fasting
from the sunrise to the sunset everyday for a whole month, and the
like, are all intended to train man to be humble toward his fellow-
men, and submissive toward his God.[24]

As regards the prayer, which is considered the most important
"pillar" of Islam[25] after the belief in Allah and His Prophet,
Hitti says:

> As a disciplinary measure this congregational prayer
> must have had great value for the proud, individualistic
> sons of the desert. It developed in them the sense of
> social equality and the consciousness of solidarity. It
> promoted that brotherhood of community of believers which
> the religion of Muhammad had theoretically substituted
> for blood relationship. The prayer ground thus became
> "the first drill ground of Islam."[26]

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[24] See M. Abdu, Nahj Al-Balagha, Vol. II, pp. 173-74.

[25] Sharaf Al-Din, Al-Fusul Al-Mohimma, pp. 68-69.

[26] P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 132.

Mohammed was wont to call the age before his prophetic mission, the "Jahiliyya." Historians often interpret this term as "the time of ignorance." Recent investigation proves that Mohammed really meant by the term "Jahiliyya," not ignorance, but rather vanity and insolence.[27] On the other hand, the term "Islam" means the submission to the will of Allah.[28] These two terms can explain, in a way, the main point of contrast between Islam and nomadism. Instead of being incorporated in, and being proud of, his tribe, the Moslem must devotedly believe in, and submit to the will of, Allah.

Sir William Muir is of the opinion that Islam was not originally meant to be a universal religion. He maintains that Mohammed's world was Arabia, and for it Islam was sent. "From the first to last the call was made primarily to the Arabs and to them alone."[29] Professor Arnold, on the other hand, argues that Islam was never designed for the Arabs alone. "As there was but one God," he adds, "so there was to be but one religion in which all men were to be invited."[30] Khadduri rightly points out that The Koran and the history of Mohammed support the opinion of Arnold that Islam was meant to be a

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[27] See Ahmed Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, pp. 69-70.

[28] Loc. cit.

[29] Sir William Muir, Annals of the Early Caliphate, p. 61.

[30] T. W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam, p. 28.

universal religion.[31]

Nevertheless, one cannot deny the fact that Mohammed was himself an Arab, and his mission was greatly colored by the values and the thought-style of the nomadic culture. It seems that both the opposite opinions, of Muir and Arnold, are valid at the same time. Each represents one single phase of the multi-phased reality, but not the whole of it. It is true that Islam is a universal religion sent to the various peoples of the world.[32] It is also true, that most of the ideals, values, "pillars" and beliefs of Islam are built on an Arabian foundation and purported to satisfy certain Arabian needs.

Overlooking the difference, in the consideration of the social unit, we can find no other fundamental differences in the value-system between Islam and Arab nomadism. In fact, the "sacred" society of the nomadic tribe provided Mohammed with most of his moral values. The main thing he hated most from the Arabs, as we have noticed, was their extreme loyalty to the tribe. The other values are taken for granted.[33] Mohammed is known to have said, "Men are like metals—those who were good before Islam, become

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[31]M. Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam, pp. 4-5.

[32]See The Koran, Chapt. LXVIII, Verses 51-52, and Chapt. XXI, Verse 107.

[33]See R. Levy, Sociology of Islam, Vol. II, pp. 68-71.

equally good in Islam."[34] And also, "Look to those moral practises
you had before the coming of Islam and apply them in Islam; give
security to your guest, be generous toward the orphan and treat
your neighbor with kindness."[35] A similar sentiment can be found
in The Koran.[36] It is relevant to quote Levy about this point,

> It is significant of the position of Muhammad's
> teaching in relationship to the practise current in the
> Jahiliyya that he appears to have adopted the tribal
> terminology for good and evil. When he has occasion,
> as occurs frequently in the Koran, to refer in a single
> term to the beliefs and conduct accepted as good, he
> speaks of them collectively as al-ma'ruf, literally
> "the known" and probably, like 'urf, "what is customary
> and approved"; misbelief and misconduct being al-munkar,
> i.e., what is disapproved, or more literally, "what is
> regarded as unknown or foreign." Tribal societies in a
> state of civilisation parallel to that of the Arab
> tribes of the Jahiliyya, would, in the same way as they
> did, regard the known and familiar as the good and the
> strange as the evil. In The Koran there are frequent
> general exhortations to enjoin the ma'ruf and forbid
> the munkar.[37]

We are told that Hatim's[38] daughter was led as a captive

before the Prophet and thus addressed him,

> . . . My father was wont to free the captive, and
> protect those near and dear to him, and entertain the
> guest, and satisfy the hungry, and console the

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[34]See Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 134.

[35]A. Hanbal, Musnad, Vol. III, p. 425.

[36]See The Koran, Chap. 4, Verse 40.

[37]R. Levy, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 70-71.

[38]Hatim was well-known in Arabia before Mohammed by his
extreme generosity, hospitality, and goodness. He was taken by
the nomad Arabs at that time as a representative of their ideals.

afflicted, and give food and greeting to all; and
never did he turn away any who sought a boon. . . .

The Prophet answered her: "O maiden, the true believer is such
as thou hast described. . . ." He then turned to his followers
and said: "Let her go free for her father loved noble manners,
and Allah loves them likewise."[39]

In dealing with the fundamentals of their religion, the
Moslem theologians have distinguished between believing, worshipping,
and right-doing.[40] To them, Islam primarily consists of these
three elements. In the light of the preceding discussion, it may
be right to say that the first two elements, i.e., believing and
worshipping, were most probably instituted by Mohammed for the
purpose of weakening the tribal spirit of the Arabs, whereas the third
element, i.e., right-doing was instituted in order to retain and
strengthen their moral values. Mohammed is popularly known to have
said that he was sent by Allah for the purpose of completing the
good morals.[41]

After discussing Goldsiher's theory of the antagonism
between the Islamic and Arabian ideals, Nicholson comes to the con-
clusion that the Arabs "althouth they became Moslems en masse, the

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[39]See R. Nicholson, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

[40]P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 128.

[41]See Al-Maghribi, op. cit., p. 29.

majority of them neither believed in Islam nor knew what is meant."[42]
In this conclusion of Nicholson right? Generally speaking, it can
be right only with respect to the tribal spirit. The Arabs seemed
to be unable to replace their age-old narrow spirit of the tribe
by the wider spirit of the Islamic community. In spite of the
Prophet's persistent condemnation of the tribal spirit, the Arabs
continued to be, consciously or unconsciously, influenced by it. In
reality, long living norms are hard to kill by mere systems of beliefs
and worships.

However, it is quite right to say that when the tribal spirit
of the Arabs coincided, for one reason or another, with the spirit
of religion, they became extremely religious. As we shall see later,
they actually showed amazing zeal, sincerity, and devotion to Islam
when their tribal spirit was directed, immediately after the Prophet's
death, against the "unbelievers" outside of Arabia.

Modern historians think that the Arabs were, then, merely
fighting with a utilitarian motive. Their ends were, the historians
say, secular rather than sacred.[43] Many of the Arabs, no doubt,
were seeking in their fight mere booty and plunder. But one cannot

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[42]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 178.

[43]See M. De Goeje, "Arabia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. I,
p. 376; R. Nicholson, op. cit., pp. 177-79; O'Leary, Arabia Before
Mohammed, p. 20; E. Browne, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 187-89.

deny, nevertheless, that the majority of them were ready to sacrifice their own lives in what they firmly believed a holy war. Nicholson says:

> That these men were capable of religious zeal is amply proved by the triumphs which they won a short time afterwards over the disciplined armies of two mighty empires; but what chiefly inspired them, apart from love of booty, was the conviction, born of success, that Allah was fighting on their side.[44]

It is true, as Nicholson has just said, that what chiefly inspired the Arabs in their religious vehemence was their success in the fighting against the "unbelievers," but this should not be taken as a flat indication of utilitarianism or materialism. As we have seen before, the nomads, or any other people who belong to the "sacred" society, cannot imagine the existence of a true religion which is not positively associated by some sort of success of fortune. They cannot, in other words, think of "right" as separate from "might." This is not a utilitarian attitude as it appears on the surface. It is, rather, a deep belief in the fact that as far as men are on the side of God, God must be on their side too.

In conclusion it seems that the oft-mentioned antagonism between Islam and the Arabian values is not entirely true. This writer is of the opinion that the antagonism developed later when Islam began to be adopted by civilized peoples of the conquered

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[44]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 179.

territories. It is highly reasonable to suggest that the conquered peoples adopted Islam after they changed it to fit their own social and psychic needs. Consequently, it became antagonistic to the nomadic values of the conquerors. To this we shall return in a following chapter.

THE TRIBAL SPIRIT IN ISLAM

In the preceding chapter, we have seen that there was no
fundamental conflict between the Islamic and the nomadic values.
The only main difference between the two lay in the fact that the
nomads restricted the application of their values to the narrow
circle of the tribal unit, while Islam tried to extend the boundary
from the tribe to the religious community. In nomadism man was
accustomed to be kind to his fellow tribesmen, severe to the out-
siders. In Islam, it was required from him to be kind to his
fellow Moslems and severe to the non-Moslems. In describing the
true Moslems, The Koran points out that they are merciful among
themselves, severe against the "unbelievers."[1]

Mohammed tried very much indeed to suppress the narrow
tribal spirit of the nomads and install in its place the religious
spirit. He vehemently attacked the nomadic pride in genealogy,
and preached that birth counted for nothing and that zeal for faith
was the only criterion of honor. However, it was highly difficult
for the nomads to quit, so quickly, the tribal spirit which they
had been accustomed to since the beginning of their known history.
In the words of Levy, "It is obvious that so intangible an element

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[1] See The Koran, Chap. XLVIII, Verse 29.

in social organisation as a feeling of pride in ancestry was not
to be destroyed by edict at one stroke."[2]

As soon as the Prophet was known to have died, many tribes
broke off from the newly organised state of Islam and followed
a number of local "false" prophets.[3] Some of the Arabs flatly
declared that a "false"prophet from our own tribe is better than
a true one from the tribe of Kuraish."[4] This, of course, indicates
that the tribal spirit was one of the main factors that underlay
the nomadic revolt against the Islamic rule.

Fortunately, the reins of the Islamic government, after the
Prophet's death, were placed in the hands of a highly far-sighted
man, Omar, the son of Al-Khattab.[5] This man seemed to have a
great capacity for penetrating into the deep nature of the Arabs.[6]

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[2]R. Levy, Sociology of Islam, Vol. I, p. 78.

[3]P. Hitti, op. cit., pp. 140-41.

[4]Al-Tabari, Tarikh, Vol. III, p. 145, cited by Al-Miqdadi,
Tarikh Al-Ummat Al-Arabiyya, p. 138.

[5]It should be mentioned that Omar was the second caliph
after the Prophet's death. He was, however, the adviser and the
"right hand" of the first caliph, Abu Bekr, whose caliphate lasted
for a relatively short time. It is right therefore to conclude
that Omar was, more or less, the actual ruler of the Islamic state
in its critical situation after the death of its founder, the
Prophet. Some modern writers are inclined to call Omar the "St.
Paul of Islam."

[6]Cf. Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, pp. 146-47.

After suppressing the apostasic revolt of the Arab tribes, he appeared to have realised that unless the Arabs' attention could be deviated by some positive activities to a new sort of loyalty their old tribal spirit would continue to make trouble.

"The warlike spirit of the tribes," says Hitti, "now brought together inte a nominally common fraternity, had to find new channels for asserting themselves."[7] The historic wars of conquest which were waged shortly after the Prophet's death can be regarded therefore as a technique mainly intended to replace the tribal raids and the internal wars of the desert by an organised campaign against the outsiders. Omar most probably had thought that the tribal spirit of the Arabs could be replaced by the new spirit of Islam if they were brought face to face against a common enemy who was, at the same time, an enemy to the religion of Islam.

There is a well-known Arabic proverb which indicates that an Arab tends to ally himself to his brother against his cousin, and to his cousin against a stranger.[8] This tendency is observable, indeed, everywhere in the Arabian society. It is interesting to notice that the tribal spirit extends its limits among the Arabs as

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[7] P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 142.

[8] G. Zaidan, Al-Tamadden Al-Islami, Vol. IV, p. 14.

a result of the extension in their social contacts. An Arab is
usually vehement against men from a neighboring tribe; but as soon
as he comes into contact with men from further tribes or nations,
he forgets his hostility against his neighbors and tends to join
them against the newly-rising strangers.

This most probably was in the mind of Omar when he mobilized
the Arabs against the "unbelievers" of the outside world. History
tells that Omar converted the whole of Arabia into a military camp.
He dispelled the non-Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula as if he
intended to free it from the danger of a "fifth column." According
to an oft-quoted saying of his, the nomad Arabs furnished Islam with
its raw material.[9] He appeared as if he had attempted to make the
Arabs identical with the Moslems, and Arabism synonymous to Islam.[10]

In fact, there are several "sayings" attributed to Omar that
indicate his personal inclination toward the Arabs and his apprecia-
tion for their cultural values. He is known to have even urged the
Arabs to preserve their traditional pride in genealogy.[11] Ibn
Khaldun relates a story in which one can notice that Omar encouraged,

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[9]P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 29.

[10]See G. Zaidan, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 31-32, 34-25.

[11]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 130; G. Zaidan, op. cit.,
Vol. I, p. 14.

rather than discouraged, the well-known nomadic arrogance among his soldiers.[12]

This should not be taken, however, as flatly as it appears to the superficial observer. Omar was a true Moslem beyond any doubt. Looking through his own perspective, we can see the situation in a different light. In the time of Omar, the nomadic arrogance and the tribal spirit were advantageously utilized in the war against the enemies of Islam. Therefore, he did not mean, by encouraging the nomadic spirit, to strengthen it at the expense of the religious spirit. Both nomadism and religion were led by Omar against the outsiders.

History, shows, also, that Omar mobilized the nomad Arabs along the tribal lines. Hitti says in this regard,

Islam made full use of the tribal system for its military purposes. It divided the army into units based on tribal lines, settled the colonists in the conquered lands in tribes and treated new converts from among the subjugated peoples as clients.[13]

In this way the nomadic spirit became, under the wise supervision of Omar, identical with the Islamic spirit.

It is true, however, that the tribal spirit was not entirely eliminated. It was rather put in a new form. It was, therefore,

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[12]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 126.

[13]P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 27.

liable to be revived in its old form as soon as the new condition
would cease to exist. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what
happened after the death of Omar. During the reign of the third
caliph, Othman, when the conquests practically stopped, the tribal
spirit began to appear again and play its role in the political
affairs of Islam.

Moslem historians tend to consider the death of Omar (who
was murdered by a Persian while leading the prayers in the great
mosque of Medina in 644, A. D.) as one of the greatest calamities
in the history of Islam. In the words of one historian, "the good
fortune of Islam was shrouded in the grave-clothes of Omar, the
son of Al-Khattab."[14] Historians agree that most of the turmoil
and social unrest, which took place during the reign of Othman,
would not have happened if Omar was alive. This is, to some extent,
true. Omar was, as Nicholson points out, "a born ruler and every
inch a man."[15] Just to the contrary, his successor, Othman, was
a weak man, "an easy tool in the hands of his ambitious kinsfolk."[16]

However, it seems here that the historians are over-estimating
the personal factor in history and underestimating a much more

[14]Cited by R. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs,
p. 190.

[15]Ibid., p. 189.

[16]Ibid., p. 190.

important one—that is, the social factor. This writer is of the opinion that the stoppage of conquests was much more effective in the causation of the social unrest than the personal weakness of the caliph. The tribal spirit, which was directed at the time of Omar against the "unbelievers," became when the "holy" wars slowed down at the time of Othman, free to turn back to its old pattern.

Othman practiced nepotism. Consequently, his relatives, who formed the leading family of the tribe of Kuraish,[17] climbed into most of the lucrative and important offices of the newly established empire, and lived on the fat of the land.[18] This naturally drew the attention, and probably the envy, of the other tribes.

The trouble might have been less if the relatives of Othman had been considered true Moslems. Their ungodly behavior, says Nicholson, gave point to the question whether these converts of the eleventh hour were not still heathens at heart.[19]

The other tribes seemed to have found the situation unbearable. There was, of course, a very fertile soil for the old tribal spirit to flourish again. History shows that the first instance of

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[17] It should be mentioned here that Othman belonged to the well-known Omayyad family. As we shall see later, his murder provided his cousin, Muawiya, with a strong pretext to contest the right of Ali to the caliphate, and to revolt against him.

[18] Ibid., p. 190.

[19] Loc. cit.

trouble against Othman's regime arose in Iraq as a result of a
heated conversation between certain tribesmen and the governor of
Iraq who was a Kuraishite, and a close relative of Othman. During
the conversation, the governor declared that Iraq was an "orchard"
of the tribe of Kuraish and that the Kuraishites had a right to
reap its product any time they wanted. The tribesmen vehemently
protested against this, saying that what had been conquered by their
own swords could not be easily permitted to be monopolistically
exploited by the tribe of Kiraish alone.[20]

This can be considered the spark from which the historical
turmoil against Othman resulted. Reading the story in its full
details, one may not fail to notice that the hostility of the Arabian
tribes against the tribe of Kuraish was present, in one form or
another, throughout the whole trouble.[21] Othman rivals made full
use of this hostility for their own advantage. In some of their
letters to the indignant tribesmen, they said, "if you want a holy
war, come here, for the religion of Mohammed has been spoiled by
your caliph."[22] Actually, many tribesmen responded to these letters
and went to Medina, where Othman lived, seeking a cause for a "holy
war."[23]

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[20] Ibn Khaldun, Kitab Al-Ibar, Vol. III, Part I, p. 140.

[21] See Ibid., p. 140 et seq.

[22] See M. H. Al-Zain, Al-Shia Fil-Tarikh, p. 105.

[23] See M. Aqqad, Abqariyyat Al-Imam, p. 64, et seq.

Othman summoned the governors and the politicians from
the various parts of the empire and held a conference with them
for the purpose of studying the real cause behind the trouble and
to find out a remedy for it. One of the conferees flatly advised
the caliph to start fresh campaigns against foreign people in
order to divert the warlike energy of the tribe from one another.[24]
To quote Khadduri about this point,

> During the second half of 'Uthman's caliphate
> there was an interval of recession from "fighting in
> the path of Allah." One would have expected that
> this interval should have been one of consolidation
> of the state and assimilation of the many elements
> incorporated in it. Quite the opposite result
> occurred. The resident tribes of the newly conquered
> provinces, especially in southern 'Iraq and Egypt,
> began to show signs of discontent and, later on,
> started on vigorous seditions activities. We need
> not involve ourselves here with a study of the many
> factors which contributed to that movement. But among
> the factors which undoubtedly led to it was the
> inherent tribal desire for fighting.[25]

The tribal spirit of the Arabs had to have an outlet for
asserting itself. If there was no outlet for it against the outside
world, it would eventually turn toward the inside. An Arabian poet,
who lived about the time in which these events took place, gave
expression to the guiding principle of such tendency in two verses:

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[24] Ibid., pp. 27-73.

[25] M. Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam, p. 34.

"Our business is to make raids on the enemy, on our neighbor and on our brother, in case we find none to raid but a brother."[26]

When Othman was finally besieged in his house by the indignant Arabs, one of his cousins, Marwan, came out from the house and addressed the excited beseigers with a tone which was quite indicative of a challenging tribal spirit. He said,

> What is the matter with you? You have come here as if you are going to make a raid. Curse be upon your ugly faces, you have come merely for the purpose of depriving us from our own kingdom. Turn back to your tents. By Allah, we shall never be robbed of what we have in our hands.[27]

Marwan appeared here as if he had considered the rebellion against his cousin as a mere raid against his tribe. This tribal consideration took a clearer form through the events which took place as a result of the murder of Othman at the hands of his beseigers.

The relatives of Othman considered his murder as a family concern rather than a political one. They abstained from giving their allegiance-oath to Ali, who succeeded Othman in the caliphate, on the ground that he did not take revenge on the murderers of Othman according to the old traditions of the Arabs.[28] Muawiya,

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[26]Cited by P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 25.

[27]M. Aqqad, op. cit., p. 76.

[28]See L. D. Vida, "Umaiyad," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 999.

the governor of Syria, raised, as Nicholson points out, the cry
of vengeance for the murdered caliph and refused to take the oath
of allegiance to Ali.[29] Thus, the historic conflict between Ali
and Muawiya started.

As we have noticed in the previous parts of the present
work, the clash between Ali and Muawiya was regarded by the
orthodox Moslems of later days as a representative of the age-old
conflict between "right" and might," the "ideal" and the "real,"
"politics" and "religion." Many historians believe that one of
the sure reasons, behind the failure of Ali in his war against
Muawiya, was his neglect to pay attention to the tribal spirit of
the Arabs. He treated all kinds of people equally according to
the original spirit of Islam. He "did not prefer the hihg-born
to the low-bern, nor the Arabs to the non-Arabs, and he did not
eajole the leaders and the chiefs of the tribes."[30]

Muawiya, on the other hand, based his whole policy on the
expediency of the tribal spirit. He divided the public revenue,
neither equally as Ali did, nor according to the religious merit
as Omar did, but according to what Ibn Khaldun calls, the principle
of "asabiyya." The stronger a person's tribe or his political

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[29]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 191.

[30]Abu Al-Hadid, Sharh Al-Nahj, Vol. I, p. 180, cited by
Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 23.

power was, the bigger his lot would be in the budget of Muawiya .. Some of Ali's intimate friends advised him, at the time, to do what his rival, Muawiya, was doing as regards the tribal spirit of the Arabs; but he persistently refused, saying, "Do you want for me to attain victory by means of injustice!"[31]

It is of significance to notice that the tribe of Kuraish disliked Ali, and he himself disliked it[32] in spite of the fact that he belonged to one of its leading families. He can be said to have led, in a sense, the religious opposition against the tribal spirit of Kuraish. It is interesting to see that he retraced his own genealogy and the genealogy of all Kuraishites with him to a non-Arab origin, to a small village near Babylon which was outside of Arabia. The Moslem "jurists" were, and still are, perplexed as to the real meaning of this "saying" of Ali, for Kuraish is considered the noblest tribe of all the Arabs.[33] This saying seems to symbolize Ali's deep hate toward the tribal spirit of Kuraish and his protest against its genealogical pride.

According to Ibn Khaldun, as we have seen in a previous chapter, Muawiya was forced to revolt against Ali by the "asabiyya"

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[31]Ahmad Amin, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 23-24.

[32]See M. Abdu, Nahj Al-Balagha, Vol. II, p. 103.

[33]Ahmad Amin, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 76.

of his tribe, i.e., Kuraish, and the tribes which were allied to
it. Muawiya was, therefore, in Ibn Khaldun's opinion, merely a
passive tool in the hands of the revived tribal spirit of the
time. This, however, cannot entirely be true. Muawiya did not
only drift with the revived tribal spirit; he also helped it in
its revival. The connection between the cause and effect was not
so simple as Ibn Khaldun suggests.[34]

In the conflict between Ali and Muawiya, there can be
noticed a peculiar phenomenon to which historians have not paid
due attention. Strothmann points out that the early Shiites, i.e.,
the partisans of Ali, were mostly from the Southern part of Arabia.[35]
Zaidan also shows that the historic battle which raged between Ali
and Muawiya in Siffin was regarded at the time as a war between the
Southern Arabs, or the Yamanites as they were usually called, and
Kuraish.[36] An important question may be raised in this regard as
to the reason behind this peculiar attachment of the Yamanites to
the cause of Ali.

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[34] As a matter of fact, Ibn Khaldun is known by his bias in
favor of Muawiya. Muawiya is to Ibn Khaldun the ideal ruler. He
stands in the eye of Ibn Khaldun perhaps in the same position as
Caesar Borgia stands in the eye of Machiavelli.

[35] R. Strothmann, "Shia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV,
p. 353.

[36] G. Zaidan, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 58.

After examining the social background of the Yamanites, the answer appears very simple. In the South of Arabia, or Yaman, people were, and still are, not so accustomed to the nomadic life as in the northern part of Arabia. Agriculture is quite common in the south; and the sedentary civilisation has a long history there. This may explain how the Yamanites could endure the rule of Ali with his extreme neglect of the tribal spirit. It may be safe to say that they did not pay attention to the tribal spirit as much as the northern Arabs did.

Goldziher believes that the Yamanites were more religious than the northern Arabs.[37] In the light of the preceding discussion, we can see that the difference in religiousness between the northern and the southern Arabs was a matter of quality rather than of quantity. That is to say, the Yamanites were, not more religious than their northern brothers. They adopted rather a different kind of religion.

The Yamanites can be said to have adopted a "class religion," while the northerners a "group religion." History shows that many of the Yamanites vehemently persisted in their partisanship of Ali long after Ali's death. Muawiya tried very hard to suppress this "Shiite" tendency among them. He used both methods of persecution

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[37] See T. H. Weir, "Djahiliyia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. I, p. 999.

and bribing in order to draw them to his side. Just in contrast to the more nomadic Arabs of the north, the Yamanites seemed to have believed that "might" was not a necessary phase of "right." They remained, more or less, sincere to the cause of Ali, in spite of his defeat in war, and failure in politics.

It is interesting indeed to notice that there were, on the side of Ali, at the beginning of his conflict with Muawiya, certain northern tribes, but as soon as they glanced the first signs of his failure they seceded from his side and formed the well-known sect of the Kharijites, that is, the sect of the Seceders. The Seceders began to fight both Ali and Muawiya. They fought Ali because he failed in war, and fought Muawiya probably because he was biased in favor of the tribe of Kuraish. Thus, they showed the deep-rooted characteristics of their nomadic nature.

It is interesting to see that those nomadic "Seceders" considered that Ali was a good caliph until the time when he was defeated by Muawiya.[38] After that, Ali became, in their opinion, a

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[38] As a matter of fact, Ali was about to win the victory in Siffin when his cunning rival ordered his troups to raise copies of the Koran up on their spears and shout, "Let the Koran be the judge between us." Driven perhaps by a pious motive, Ali accepted the proposal and ordered his troops to stop fighting. The "Seceders" were in fact among those who influenced him to make this erroneous decision which resulted finally in his defeat. Afterwards, they condemned him on account of this decision. In the last analysis, they condemned him on account of his failure to win the war.

"heathen" and a "bad" caliph. The historians of Islam are often amazed at the apparently trivial reason which caused them to secede from Ali's side after they were greatly devoted in the beginning to his cause. However, Ali was good and just, in the eyes of the "Seceders," so far as he was victorious. To them, defeat was an indication of the fact that Allah had quit his side.[39]

In one of his famous speeches Ali attacked this sort of identifying "might" with "right." Ali is of the opinion that "right" must be powerless at first in order to become a sort of examination for true "believers." If "might" and "right" always go together, Ali says, there will be no way of distinguishing the sincere "believers" from the pretenders. The reward of Allah is given, according to Ali, according to how much the believer has suffered for the sake of his faith. Ali gives several examples from the history of religion known to him to prove his theory. He emphasizes the fact that all the true prophets rose at first with no power behind them; they attracted only a few disciples in the beginning, but afterwards they were able to found their great religions as a result of their endeavor and patience and suffering.[40]

This idea is, of course, difficult for the nomadic Arabs to

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[39]Cf. Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, p. 261.

[40]See M. Abdu, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 161 et seq.

understand. The nomads cannot understand, as we have already noticed,
a "right" without a "might" behind it. It should be noted that this
identifying of "might" with "right" among the nomads is normally
associated with their strong tribal spirit. It is hardly possible to
separate them from each other.

The nomadic man firmly believes that the only rightful group
in the world is his tribe. His vehement attachment to his tribe
is usually associated with an indubitable belief that the diety,
whatever it may be, is always standing on its side. Speaking of the
ancient nomadic Semites, W. R. Smith says:

> In the same measure as the god of a clan or bath-ab
> had indisputable claim to the reverence and service of
> the community to which he belonged, he was necessarily
> an enemy to their enemies and a stranger to those to whom
> they were strangers.[41]

The nomadic man can hardly understand how a true religion
goes against his tribe. "Right" is always with his tribe. The
nomadic honor, says Nicholsen, requires that a man should stand by
his people through thick and thin.[42] The ideal of the nomads in this
respect is that they should jump to the help of their fellow tribes-
men without ever asking why. An Arabian poet says:

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[41]Cited by J. Wach, Sociology of Religion, p. 77.

[42]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 83.

> They ask not their brother, when he lays before
> them his wrong
> In his trouble to give them proof of the truth
> of what he says.[43]

Another poet says:

> If kinsmen seek help it should be given promptly,
> without respect to the merits of the case. . . .[44]

When the nomadic man jumps to the help of his fellow tribes-
men against strangers, he is sure beyond any doubt that they are
always right. It seems that the severe struggle for existence in
the desert life has taught him that the mere survival of his tribe
indicates its rightfulness.[45]

The "Seceders," in fact, provide us with a good example of
this nomadic tendency. They are well-known in the history of Islam
by their extreme piety and devotion to Islam.[46] Shahristani describes
them as "people of fasting and prayer."[47] In the words of Nicholson,

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[43]S. Lane-Poole, The Speeches and Table-talks of the
Prophet Mohammed, p. xiii.

[44]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 83.

[45]It is observable that, in every long fight, the man, who
comes out from the fighting safe believes that he has some sort of
divine power or a protecting spirit. His survival after experienc-
ing a series of dangerous experiences gives him a confidence in his
latent power and a faith in his "mana," so to speak.

[46]Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, pp. 262-63.

[47]Cited by R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 211.

The Koran ruled their lives and possessed their imaginations, so that the history of the early Church, the persecutions, martyrdoms, and triumphs of the Faith became a veritable drama which was being enacted by themselves. The fear of hell kindled in them an inquisitorial zeal for righteousness. They scrupulously examined their own belief as well as that of their neighbours, and woe to him that was found wanting![48]

Notwithstanding all the phenomena of piety, the "Seceders" did not hesitate, at all, to kill the women and children of their enemies and to plunder their property wherever they found them.[49] The Moslems who refused to execrate Othman and Ali were, in their eyes, the worst of infidels. For them, it was the duty of every true "believer" to take part in the "holy" war against such sort of "false" Moslems, and to kill them, together with their wives and children.[50]

In this respect, the "Seceders" were not greatly different from the nomads of the pre-Islamic days, despite their extreme piety and devotion to Islam. The only difference between the pre-Islamic nomads and the "Seceders" lies in the fact that the former had many gods, each tribe had its own god that stood on its side against the others; whereas the latter believed in only one God who was supposed to support them against the whole world on account

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[48]Loc. cit.

[49]See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III, p. 334.

[50]See R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 211.

of their great worship and devotion.[51]

When one of them killed Ali, he was reciting from memory some chapters of the Koran, firmly believing that he had, then, achieved a good act in the sight of Allah. He remained calm when Ali's followers began to mutilate his arms and legs in revenge. As soon as they began to cut his tongue, he bitterly cried saying that he hated to stop praying just immediately before dying.[52]

In spite of their extreme piety and devotion to Allah, the "Seceders" could not understand the equalitarian principle of Islam. They revolted against the tribal spirit of Kuraish and retained, at the same time, their own. According to Ahmad Amin, they had a great pride in their pedigree, and an intense contempt for the non-Arab Moslems.[53] They often quarreled among themselves and fought each other in the same way as the pre-Islamic nomads were in the habit of doing.[54]

After the establishment of the Omayyad dynasty on the throne

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[51]They flatly attributed their victory in the battle of "Asak," where only forty of them defeated two thousand of their enemies, to the aid of Allah. (See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. III, pp. 343-44.)

[52]Ibid., Vol. III, p. 335.

[53]Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, p. 262.

[54]Ibid., p. 259.

of the caliphate, the "Seceders" continued to make trouble. But they began gradually to withdraw from Iraq, where their movement first started, to the desert. They seemed to have intended to leave the country where the values of civilization prevailed to their original abode, the desert, in which they might be able to preserve their nomadic-religious values intact. The rising tide of social secularisation and civilization in Islam appeared to have worked against them. A few remnants of the "Seceders" can be found today in a complete isolation in certain places of the Arabian and the African deserts.

Thus, the "Seceders" who represented the true nomadic values in Islam were practically eliminated. The remaining majority of the nomadic Arabs joined the side of the Omayyads.

It is of significance that the Omayyads, after establishing themselves on the throne, found it necessary to resume the "holy" war against the outside world. A great series of foreign conquests, second to that of Omar, had been achieved during the Omayyad reign. The Arab soldiers reached the frontiers of China in the east and penetrated France in the west.

The tribal spirit of the Arabs began, however, to give ground, as a result of their contact with various peoples, to some wider spirit. Two kinds of spirit began to develop and take the place of the old one. First, the spirit which distinguished

the North Arabs from the South Arabs. Second, the spirit which combined all of the Arabs against the non-Arabs.

The Omayyad government persistently sided with the Arabs against the non-Arabs. It was in reality a government of the Arabs for the Arabs.[55] The Arabs began, under the rule of the Omayyads, to form a strict aristocratic class and to look down upon their non-Arab subjects.[56] This was, as we have seen before, one of the main causes which undermined the Omayyad regime in particular and the Arab rule in general. The Abbasids came to power mainly with the help of the Persians. Consequently, the Arabs were driven back to the desert.[57]

Another factor, which helped to undermine the rule of the Omayyads and the Arabs, was the conflict between the Northern and the Southern Arabs. To quote Hitti,

> Conscious of some deep-rooted racial distinction, the North Arabians, who traced their descent to Ishmael and styled themselves 'Adnani, were never fully amalgamated with the South Arabians, who carried their pedigree back to Qahtan, the Joktan of Genesis 10:25 seq. The Qaysites became in course of time the nucleus of one political party, and the Yamanites of another.[58]

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[55]See L. D. Vida, "Umayiad," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 998.

[56]See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 23.

[57]See Ahmad Amin, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 33 et seq.

[58]P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 280.

Actually, the Omayyad government fluctuated in its support
and bias between the two parties. One caliph might side with one
party, another might do the reverse.[59] To quote Hitti again,

> The polarization of the Moslem world by this Arab
> dualism of Qays and Yaman, who also appear under other
> names, became now complete. It precipitated the down-
> fall of the dynasty and its ill effects were manifest
> in years to come and in widely separated places. The
> district of Damascus itself was once the scene of
> relentless warfare for two years all because, as we
> are told, a Ma'addite had filched a watermelon from a
> Yamanite's garden. In distant Murcia in Spain blood
> is said to have flowed for several years because a
> Mudarite picked a vine leaf from the yard of a Yamanite.
> Everywhere, in the capital as well as in the provinces,
> on the banks of the Indus, the shores of Sicily and the
> borders of the Sahara, the ancestral feud, transformed
> into an alignment of two political parties, one against
> the other, made itself felt. It proved a potent factor
> in ultimately arresting the progress of Moslem arms in
> France and in the decline of the Andalusian caliphate.
> In Lebanon and Palestine the issue seems to have
> remained a living one until modern times, for we know
> of pitched battles fought between the two parties as
> late as the early part of the eighteenth century.[60]

Finally, the Arabs' rule came to an end largely as a result
of their tribal spirit. They returned at last to the desert from
which they came, and which was more suitable to their deep-rooted
nomadic values. Thus, the nature of Islam began to be moulded again
according to a different system of values—the values of civiliza-
tion.

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[59] _Ibid._, pp. 280-88.

[60] _Ibid._, p. 281.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE NATURE OF ISLAM

Modern students widely disagree as to what fundamentally constitutes the nature of Islam. Their disagreement is probably due to a difference in their perspective. Generally speaking, the nature of a religion is determined by the nature of the group which adopts it.[1] In order, therefore, to understand the nature of Islam, it is necessary, first, to understand the various groups which entered it.

From the previous discussions, we can conclude that Islam was adopted successively by three different groups in its early development. Each group tried to stamp Islam with its own world-view or mental orientation. When Islam was finally institutionalised and took its last form at the hands of the last group, it could not, of course, get rid entirely of the impression of the previous groups.

In order to fully understand the nature of Islam, let us briefly examine the three groups which adopted it, in their chronological order.

The group which formed the first converts of Islam was

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[1] See H. R. Neibuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, p. 27 et passim.

recruited, as we have already seen, largely from the lower classes of Mecca. At that time Islam was a religion of the lower classes that arose in protest against their secular oppressors.

Islam was, at that time, greatly influenced by the Judeo-Christian world-view. Mohammed, then, was on friendly terms with the Jews and the Christians. The vehement protest of the Hebrew prophets against the rich of their time provided Mohammed with a ready ideological weapon against the rich of Mecca.

When Mohammed migrated, with his few followers, to Medina, he found himself in a society which was quite different from the "secular" society of Mecca. Medina was an agricultural village. It seemed to have suffered much less than Mecca from class conflict and social disorganisation. It was, in other words, nearer to the ideal-type of the "sacred" society.

There was, in fact, an internal conflict within the society of Medina before the arrival of Mohammed, but it was a group conflict rather than class conflict. The population of Medina was divided into two hostile camps along tribal lines.[2] The first thing which Mohammed did after his arrival at Medina was to draw up a charter in which he vehemently declared: "They are one Umma /community/ over against mankind."[3]

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[2] R. Levy, Sociology of Islam, Vol. I, p. 278.

[3] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 279.

It is indeed interesting to find Mohammed including the
Jews who lived around Medina in the charter. In the charter we
can read,

> The Jews of the Banu Awf (and other tribes) are
> a community alongside the believers (the Jews keeping
> their faith and the Moslems theirs); they with their
> clients; except anyone of them who has committed a wrong
> or an offense and he does not involve anyone but himself
> and his household in destruction.
>
> The friends of the Jews stand on the same ground as
> they themselves.
>
> None of them shall take the field in war except with
> Muhammad's leave. None shall be hindered from avenging
> a wound.[4]

This charter has indeed a great significance from the
sociological point of view. It clearly marks the shift of Islam
from being a religion of a "secular" society to a religion of a
"sacred" one,[5] or in other words, from a class-religion to a group-
religion. It may be quite safe to say that Mohammed did not find
in Medina an important gap between the upper and lower classes
similar to that which existed in Mecca. His religious spirit was
shifted, therefore, from a vehemence against the upper classes
inside the society to a vehemence against the outside enemies of
the society.

There developed, however, another factor which strengthened

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[4] Cited by _Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 281.

[5] Modern historians of Islam usually refer to this change as
a shift from a pure religion to a publico-religious system.

the shift of Islam from a class-religion to a group-religion. This was the change in the Jews' attitude toward Mohammed. The Jews began to mock Mohammed's religion and to belittle his knowledge.[6] Why? The historians of Islam do not give us a satisfactory reason for that surprising change in the relation between Mohammed and the Jews.

At any rate, as a result of this newly-rising hostility, Mohammed fought the Jewish tribes, one by one, and forced them, in one way or another, to leave Arabia.[7] At the same time, a tremendous change in the ceremonial structure of Islam was affected. Hitti says about this change as follows:

> In this Madinese period the Arabianisation, the nationalisation, of Islam was effected. The new prophet broke off with both Judaism and Christianity; Friday was substituted for Sabbath, the adhan (call from the minaret) was decreed in place of trumpets and bells, Ramadan was fixed as a month of fasting, the Qiblah (the direction to be observed during the ritual prayer) was changed from Jerusalem to Makkah, the pilgrimage to al-Ka'bah was authorised and the kissing of the Black Stone--a pre-Islamic fetish--sanctioned.[8]

It is reasonable to suggest that the change was mostly caused by the intense conflict which arose between Mohammed and the Jews. Mohammed began to accuse the Jews of adulterating their "sacred"

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[6]See R. Nicholsen, A Literary History of the Arabs, p. 172.

[7]Loc. cit.

[8]P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 118.

Bible, and of unjustly murdering their "good" prophets. He began
to preach for a return to the old faith of Abraham, who was
believed at the time to be the father of both the Hebrews and
the Arabs. In the Medinese chapters of The Koran, the Ka'ba,
the Arabian center of pilgrimage, began to be considered the "house
of Allah" that was erected by Abraham himself.[9]

In the tenth year after the hegira (the migration to
Medina) Mohammed, as we have already noted, conquered Mecca and
destroyed the many idols which had been installed on the roof of
the Ka'ba. After witnessing the great victory of Mohammed, and
the disgraceful destruction of their idols, the nomadic tribes of
Arabia believed at last that Allah was truly the only God and
Mohammed was really His messenger. If their idols were true gods,
they would be able to defend themselves against the onslaught of
Allah.

Thus, Islam became the religion of the Arabs, and the Arabs
became the soldiers of Islam. During the reign of Omar, as we
have noticed in the preceding chapter, the amalgamation between
the Arabs and Islam reached its zenith. This amalgamation resulted
in building a huge empire--an empire whose soul was the religion
of Islam and body was the nation of the Arabs.

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[9]See The Koran, Chap. XXII, Verses 26, 27.

During the establishment of the Islamic empire, a third group entered Islam. This group was recruited from among the conquered peoples. It is strange indeed to find the conquered peoples, especially of Persia and Iraq, adopting Islam soon after they came into contact with the conquerors. Historians differ as to the reason behind such rapid conversion. There are, however, three explanations given in this connection.

First, the explanation which is usually expounded by the enemies of Islam. They believe that the Arabs came out from their desert, carrying The Koran on the one hand and the sword in the other. The Arabs, according to this opinion, imposed the religion of Islam by force on the conquered peoples. Neutral students hold no brief for this explanation. History shows, beyond doubt, that the Arab conquerors actually did not encourage the conversion to Islam. Conversion meant to them at that time a drastic reduction in the public revenue of the state, and the Arabs did not like, of course, to receive less taxes from their subjects.[10]

This leads to the second explanation which is based on economic considerations. According to the law of Islam, the conquered peoples must pay an annual poll tax as well as a high rate of taxes on their cultivable lands. When they were converted to

[10]See Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, p. 92.

Islam, they were supposed to be exempted from the poll tax; they also were supposedly permitted to leave their highly taxed lands and join the conquerors on equal footing. This explanation is, however, no longer held to be entirely valid. The Arabs did not readily treat the new converts according to the original law of Islam. Nicholsen says:

> The new converts were attached as clients to an Arab tribe: they could not become Moslems on any other footing. Far from obtaining the equal rights which they coveted, and which, according to the principles of Islam, they should have enjoyed, the Mamali were treated by their aristocratic patrons with contempt, and had to submit to every kind of social degradation; while instead of being exempted from the capitation-tax paid by non-Moslems, they still remained liable to the ever-increasing exactions of Government officials.[11]

Professor Arnold expounds a third explanation for the rapid conversion of the conquered peoples to the religion of Islam. He points out, as regards the conversion of the Persians who formed the majority of the conquered peoples, that the coming of Islam was regarded by them as a sort of relief from the oppression of the old regime. In many Persian subjects, says Arnold, persecution had stirred up feelings of bitter hatred against the established religion and the dynasty that supported its oppressions, and so caused the Islamic conquest to appear in the light of deliverence.[12]

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[11] R. Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

[12] See T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, pp. 177, 184, 201.

It seems that each of these three explanations is valid to some extent. Social phenomenon is seldom caused by one single cause alone. There may be some other reasons in addition to these three, for the rapid conversion to Islam. This writer is of the opinion that the conquered peoples might have resorted to the religion of Islam partly as a protest against their conquerors, the Arabs. This may be indicated by the fact that they adopted an aspect of Islam that was quite different from that which was adopted by the Arabs. They saw in Islam, a class religion which could be utilized as a tool against their conquerors. In other words, they tried to convert Islam to its old nature of the Meccan period and to revive its original principle of equality and social justice.

It is interesting indeed to find that the early converts of Islam, i.e., the first group of converts who entered Islam during the Meccan period, became attached to, and heartily inclined toward, the new converts from the conquered peoples.[13] It may be safe to say that the new converts received the religion of Islam, not from the nomad Arabs who considered Islam as their own national religion, but from the early converts who considered Islam as a world religion that was intended to make all kinds of peoples equal to each other.

Thus, two kinds of Islam appeared, one for the conquerors

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[13] Cf. Ahmad Amin, op. cit., p. 92.

and the other for the conquered. The first was a group-religion, the second was a class-religion. Each party began then to support its religion by certain "sayings" attributed to the Prophet, and each began to view the Prophet from an angle just opposite to that of the other. The conflict between the two religions was, for some time, quite intense.

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the Arabs were driven back to the desert as a result of the fall of the Omayyad dynasty, and Islam began to be moulded anew at the hands of the non-Arab converts. It may be right to conclude that Islam began now to be positively colored by the values of civilization and to erase the values of nomadism which were stamped on it by the social environment of its birthplace.

During the Abbasid caliphate, which was mostly a non-Arab regime, the Mohammedan "tradition" began to be collected and be fixed into their final forms. The "traditionists" of Islam developed, then, a peculiar discipline—the "science of Hadith." Through this "science," it was intended to sift the true "traditions" from among the hundreds of thousands which were attributed to Mohammed and his companions.

It is of importance to notice that, in no other culture, such a discipline has been established.[14] This may be ascribed to

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[14]See A. Guillaume, Traditions of Islam, pp. 12-13.

the fact that the Mohammedan "traditions" were extensively utilized
by the various parties of Islam. Each party tried to support its
claims by certain "traditions." In this way, many were invented
and deliberately put into the mouth of the Prophet. The "tradi-
tions" were, in fact, effective weapons in the politico-religious
conflict of the early days of Islam. To quote Lammens,

> The parties which rose up in the midst of primitive
> Islam soon sought to utilize the method of Hadith to
> further their political aims. Omayyads, Abbasids, and
> Alids are to be seen fighting and disputing, calling
> to their aid multitudes of Hadith. They are imitated
> by the dissident sects.[15]

In order to check such unhealthy growth in the Mohammedan
"traditions," the Moslems developed Ilm Al-Hadith, i.e., "the science
of tradition."[16] The method consisted in a complicated system of
checking and cataloguing the isnads, or the bearers of "tradition,"
so as to know just who they were, from what sources their "traditions"
came and what degree of confidence could be assigned to them.[17]

The "traditionists" did not care, at all, to examine the
text of the "tradition" and to see whether it was reasonable and
logical or not. As we have seen, they considered that the laws of

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[15]H. Lammens, Islam, Beliefs and Institutions, p. 71.

[16]See A. Guillaume, op. cit., p. 79.

[17]See Barns & Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science,
Vol. I, p. 267.

logic were not applicable to the Prophet's "sayings." The
Prophet's "sayings" were, in their opinion, beyond the realm of
human mind; they were inspired to the Prophet by God, and so man
was not permitted to examine them in the light of his limited
mind. The job of the "traditionists" was, therefore, limited to
the examining of the integrity of those who carried the "traditions,"
rather than the "traditions" themselves. That is to say, their
job was to examine the authenticity of the "traditions," not their
logicality.[18] However, they overlooked the fact that, by examining
the integrity of the bearers of the "traditions," their logicality
also might come, in some indirect or unconscious way, under con-
sideration.

The "traditionists" generally refuse the "traditions" that
are told by two kinds of persons: the liars and the biased.[19] They
classify the bearers of "traditions" in degrees, according to their
personal truthfulness and honesty, on the one hand, and according
to their prejudice or partisanship toward certain heretic sects
or unpopular parties, on the other hand. By doing that, they are
in reality examining the reasonability of the "traditions" in the

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[18]See Taha Hussain, Falsafat Ibn Khaldun Al-Iltimaiyya,
pp. 28-29.

[19]Cf. Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. II, pp. 117, 211.

light of their own logical system or mental presuppositions. Any one who tends to bear the "traditions" that contradict their mental presuppositions, is labeled, of course, by them as a liar or a biased man. Thus, "traditions" are in reality sifted by them in a manner which eliminates all but those "traditions" that fit into their own rules of logicality and reasonability.

In the final analysis, they have moulded the whole body of the Mohammedon "traditions" according to their own unconscious prejudice. The problem lies in the fact that they have been able to discover the prejudice in their opponents without being able to notice it in their own selves.

In the light of the above discussion one can easily understand how the nature of Islam was finally colored by values of civilization. It should be remembered here that the "sciences" of Islam, and particularly the "science of traditions," had been developed by the non-Arabs alone—by the peoples of the conquered civilizations. While the Arab conquerors were busy with their military activity, and proud of their fighting ability, the conquered were busy in the cultivating of religious knowledge. The Arabs built the Islamic Empire with their <u>swords</u>, whereas the non-Arabs built the Islamic "sciences" with their <u>pens</u>. The work of the <u>sword</u> soon dwindled in importance with the passage of time. The work of the <u>pen</u>, on the other hand, gradually grew and flourished.

Thus, Islam has finally become saturated with the preconceptions of the conquered rather than those of the conquerors.

It is quite interesting to find in Islam of later days several aspects which are hard to find in nomadism. Islam has most probably adopted these aspects after it has been institutionalised at the hands of the last group of its converts—the peoples of the conquered civilizations. We can find, for example, in Islam of later days three aspects which particularly run contrary to the basic tendencies of nomadism. Let us examine them, one by one.

(1) There is a deep-rooted inclination in Islam toward scientific knowledge of all sorts. This is of course contrary to what the typical nomads are normally inclined. The nomadic man normally has a profound contempt for intellectual learning and of everything related to it.[20] We are told that a certain nomadic poet had to conceal the fact that he was able to write, "because," he said, "it is regarded a disgrace amongst us."[21] In the words of Ibn Khaldun,

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[20] It is interesting to notice that the profession of teaching is greatly despised by the Arabs. In the modern Iraq, a government job is much preferable than a teaching job. A teacher in a government school would try almost anything in order to be transferred to the public service. He may accept a lower pay in the public service in order to escape the contemptible position of teaching.

[21] Cited by E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, Vol. I, p. 261.

. . . the Arabs, who had recently emerged from a
nomadic life, found the exercise of military and
administrative command too engrossing to give them
leisure for literary avocations which have always
been disdained by a ruling caste.[22]

According to the "traditionists," however, Mohammed
vehemently urged his followers to seek for scientific knowledge and
to run after it to the farthest ends of the earth. There are
actually many "traditions" indicating the high position of "science"
in the opinion of the Prophet.[23] But, what did the Prophet really
mean by the term "science"? The "traditionists" unhesitatingly
take the term to mean the same thing to which they are accustomed
to refer in their civilizational environment.

Looking through the perspective of Mohammed, one may be
able to see in the word "science" a meaning somewhat different from
that which the "traditionists" have normally attributed to it,
under the influence of civilization. This writer is of the opinion
that Mohammed meant by "science," or ilm, as it is in Arabic, the
opposite of jahl (i.e., the root from which the term Jahiliyya

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[22]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddima, p. 543. It can be said that
the nomadic man is naturally disposed toward poetry rather than
toward science. Scientific discipline requires, more or less, a
calm disposition to which the nomadic man is not ordinarily accustomed.
The constant raiding and fighting of the desert life has made him
a man of emotion and quick anger. The nomadic Arabs, in fact, are
known throughout history by their profound inclination toward
poetry and emotional oration.

[23]See Al-Maghribi, Al-Akhlaq Wel-Wajibat, pp. 49-55.

was derived). The "traditionists" usually interpret Jahiliyya
(the Mohammedan name of the pre-Islamic days) as "the time of
ignorance." Here again, the "traditionists" are influenced in
their interpretation of the Mohammedan "traditions" by the values
of civilization.

Recent researchers have come to the conclusion that what
Mohammed meant by Jahiliyya is not "the time of ignorance" as it
appears to the superficial observer; but rather, "the time of
arrogance."[24] It may be right, therefore, to interpret the word
ilm in the same way. In fact, ilm can be taken to indicate a mean-
ing similar to that of Al-Maruf. As we have already seen, in the
Mohammedan terminology, Al-Maruf literally means "the known," and
really means what is approved or good. (In the same way, Al-Munkar
literally means, "the unknown," and really means what is disapproved
and evil.)[25]

It is quite possible, therefore, that ilm in the Prophet's
terminology means "the understanding of the moral or religious
rules of conduct." When Mohammed declared that the seeking for
"science" was a duty on every Moslem, he most probably meant the
seeking for good morals and the obtaining of religious knowledge.[26]

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[24]See Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, pp. 69-71.

[25]See R. Levy, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 70-71.

[26]Cf. D. B. Macdonald, "Ilm," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. II,
pp. 469-70.

(2) There is another characteristic in the Islamic doctrine of later days that is seldom found among the nomads. It is the praise and encouragement of agriculture and handicraft. The nomadic Arabs do not like hard work of any sort. As Ibn Khaldun puts it, they like to earn their living with the points of their spears.[27] They consider it below the dignity of man to earn his living by means of hard work. Hard work should be, in their opinion, allotted to woman who is unable to raid and fight.[28] What Veblen calls "bellicose frame of mind,"[29] is clearly noticeable among them.

The Northern Arabs were in the habit of insulting the Ismaanites by referring to the prevalence of trade and handicrafts in Yemen.[30] Wihba points out that the worse insult for the nomadic man of the Arabian desert, today, is to call him "the son of an artisan."[31]

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[27]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 149.

[28]In the Arabic language, trade or profession is called mihna. This word indicates at the same time a meaning of contemptibility and dishonor.

[29]Veblen defines this frame of mind as "a prevalent habit of judging facts and events from the point of view of fight." T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 19.

[30]See M. Abdu, Nehj Al-Balagha, Vol. I, p. 51.

[31]H. Wihba, Jazirat Al-Arab, p. 132.

The Arabs are particularly indignant against agriculture. They always associate agriculture with humiliation and low status. They tend to conquer the agricultural peoples and exploit them, rather than to identify themselves with them. In the Modern Iraq, the pure-blooded Arabs often form the sheikhly families who rule and exploit the peasants.

The Moslem "traditionists," on the other hand, believe that Mohammed was enthusiastic in his encouraging of agriculture and craftsmanship. Several "traditions" are attributed to the Prophet to this effect.[32] There is, however, one "tradition" which appears condemning agriculture and regarding it a cause for humiliation.[33] The "traditionists" are, as Taha Hussain points out, puzzled as to the real meaning of this anti-agricultural "tradition." They think that there must be some mistake in it.[34] They seem to be unable to realise that Mohammed was not entirely free from the nomadic valuation. They seem to try to impose their own values on the Prophet.

(3) Another tendency can be found in the Islamic doctrine of later days, which runs contrary to the nomadic values. This is

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[32]See Al-Maghribi, op. cit., pp. 84-96.

[33]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 394.

[34]Taha Hussain, op. cit., p. 152.

what modern psychologists call oppression psychosis or masochism.
The same tendency which makes the nomads dislike scientific occupation and hard work, makes them also arrogant and sadistic people.
They are typical fighters.

It is difficult indeed for a man to be an excellent fighter and also an industrious worker. Typologically speaking, man can hardly be both sadistic and masochistic, rough and gentle, arrogant and humble at the same time. Human personality is normally well-integrated around a fixed pattern from which it seldom deviates toward the opposite direction. A typical fighter, who is accustomed to strike his foes with his usual severity, cannot easily become a humble man when he comes out from the war. He tends to retain in the peacetime the same attitudinal-complex that has helped him to be a good fighter in the wartime.[35]

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[35]This phenomenon can be said to be less observable in the modern times. In the old civilization, or the agricultural civilization as to contrast it to the industrial civilization of today, there were, as Veblen puts is, mainly two classes: the productive class and the predatory one. Each one of these two classes can be said to have an attitudinal-complex that runs opposite to that of the other. In contrast to the upper classes, the lower classes are inclined, as Nietzsche points out, to consider the wretched alone as the good. The needy, the suffering, the sick, the loathsome, are, in their eyes, the only ones who are blessed and for whom is salvation. (See F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, pp. 13-14.) The upper classes, on the other hand, have the opposite attitudes. They consider wretchedness, oppression, suffering, humiliation, and the like as the worst calamities that befall man. In brief, the old type of civilization can be said to have two opposite classes, the oppressing and the oppressed, the predatory and the productive, the sadistic and the masochistic, with special set of values for each.

It is instructive at this point to quote Veblen,

The predatory habit of mind involves an accentuated
sense of personal dignity and of the relative standing
of individuals. The social structure in which the
predatory habit has been the dominant factor in the
shaping of institutions is a structure based on status.
The pervading norm in the predatory community's scheme
of life is the relation of superior and inferior, noble
and base, dominant and subservient persons and classes,
master and slave.[36]

It is interesting to notice in this regard that it is more

preferable in the eye of the nomadic Arabs to suffer death than to

suffer a slight sign of humiliation or insult. An old Arabian

poet once advised the young generation, with a natural and touching

allusion to his venerable age, as follows::

He that for his cistern's guarding trusts not in his
   own stout arm
Sees it ruined: he must harm his foe or he must
   suffer harm. . . .[37]

Another poet rebuked his tribesmen on account of their kind-

ness to their foes, he says,

In the modern civilisation where the industrial leaders have
taken the place of the politico-military leaders, classes are no
longer arranged along such a dichotomous polarisation. Social mobility
has disturbed the polarization of values, to a very large extent.

[36]T. Veblen, op. cit., p. 301.

[37]R. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 118.

But as for my people, though their number be not small,
They requite with forgiveness the wrong of those that
    do them wrong,
And the evil deeds of the evil they meet with kindness
    and love!
As though thy Lord had created among the sons of men
    themselves alone to fear him, and never one man more.
Would that I had in their stead a folk who, when they
    ride forth strike swiftly and hard, on horse or on
    camel borne![38]

According to O'Leary, the Arab's "sense of personal dignity
is so strong that he is naturally in revolt against every form of
authority."[39] This may explain the reason why the Arabs before
Mohammed were unable to unite themselves and form a state. As we
have seen before, by the idea of one impersonal god, Mohammed could
unite the Arabs and establish a state in the Arabian desert for the
first time in history.

It is interesting to notice that Mohammed was in the habit
of referring to his orders as to be the orders of God Himself.
H. G. Wells seems to criticize this habit of Mohammed, and to con-
sider it as a sign of vanity. To quote Wells,

Muhammad was no imposter, at any rate, though at
times his vanity made him behave as though Allah was
at his beck and call, and as if his thoughts were neces-
sarily God's thoughts.[40]

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[38]Cited by S. Lane-Poole, Prophet Mohammed, p. xiii.

[39]De L. O'Leary, Arabia Before Muhammad, p. 20.

[40]See H. G. Wells, Outline of History, p. 609.

Actually, Mohammed was far from being vain. According to Al-Ghazzali, he was of exceeding humility and self-abasement.[41] His frequent reference to Allah can be more readily interpreted as a social technique performed for the purpose of making the Arabs react favorably toward the new authority of Islam. It can be regarded, in other words, as a technique for the depersonalization of the Mohammedan authority.

As Simmel points out, the depersonalization of authority relations makes subordination more tolerable and less humiliating.[42] So far as the Arabs were too sensitive against all sorts of authority, it was necessary for Mohammed to evade any mentioning of his personal orders. Every order was to be taken as the order of Allah. When the newly converted chief of an Arab tribe said to the Prophet, "You are our prince," the Prophet answered quickly: "The prince is Allah, not I."[43] In this way he was able, more or less, to establish the authority of Islam over Arabia.

At any rate, Mohammed appeared to have been fully aware of the great danger inherent in this revolting tendency of the Arabs against authority. In fact, he tried very hard to teach his followers

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[41] Cited by R. Levy, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 74.

[42] See H. Barnes, History of Sociology, p. 259.

[43] D. de Santillana, The Legacy of Islam, ed. T. W. Arnold and A. Guillaurne, p. 286.

that it was their duty to obey their ruler whatever he might
be.[44] In one of his well-known "sayings," he stressed the idea
that any ruler should have been obeyed even if he was an enslaved
Negro.[45] Mohammed condemned also all sorts of arrogance and
undue sense of personal dignity.[46] The Koran describes the true
Moslems as "those who walk on earth humbly and, when offended by
the insolent people, reply peacefully."[47]

A dilemma, however, arose when the Arabs were enlisted
into the conquering armies of Islam. It was difficult for the
Arabs, then, to be peaceful and humble according to the Mohammedan
teaching, and retain, at the same time, their high propensity for,
and ability for, fighting. Islam appeared to have been standing,
shortly after the death of its founder, at the crosspoint of two
roads, each was supposed to lead to a different direction. Which
side was Islam destined to take? The side of humility and peace-
fulness or the side of pride and warlike spirit?

Historians are completely silent about this sociologically
important question. They are perhaps unaware of the nature of the

[44]Abu Yusof, Kitab Al-Kharaj, pp. 10-12.

[45]Ibid., p. 10.

[46]Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, p. 70.

[47]Cited by Ibid., p. 67.

dilemma that arose in Islam as a result of this situation. From the scattered information that can be found in the formal history of Islam, one may be able to notice that the dilemma was quite intense at the time that immediately succeeded the Prophet's death.

Alaili tells us that immediately after the Prophet's death, some of his companions, who belonged to the early group of the Islamic converts, retired from political life and began to practice their religious activities privately considering that Islam had no longer to be concerned with military or political affairs.[48] This story seems highly indicative and important, in spite of the slight attention paid to it by the historians of Islam. It indicates, in fact, the inner conflict that appeared within the souls of the pious Moslems owing to the rise of the above-mentioned dilemma.

Finally, as we have already noticed, Omar took the lead and directed Islam, fortunately or unfortunately, toward the path of war and conquest.

As a matter of fact, Omar adopted several positive measures which clearly indicated his policy of directing Islam toward the politico-militant spirit rather than toward the peaceful devotion of pure religion. Let us examine them one by one.

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[48]A. Alaili, _Tarikh Al-Husain_, p. 81.

(1) One of these Omarian measures was the effecting of some change in the traditional "calling for prayer." According to Sharaf Al-Din, the "calling" contained, before Omar's time, a sentence which was intended to remind the Moslems that the prayer was the best of all religious activities. Omar ordered the emission of this sentence from the "calling." He might have noticed in it a certain sort of encouragement for a peaceful life. In the opinion of Sharaf Al-Din, Omar was urging the Moslems, at that time, to concentrate their attention and devotion upon the war activity, and so, he might have seen in the sentence a cause of deviation from this direction.[49]

The orthodox historians may raise serious questions about the historical authenticity of this story of emission. But, viewing it in the light of the general inclination of Omar, one may be willing to accept it, more or less, as a true story.

(2) Another of the Omarian measures, in the same direction, was his prohibition of the Arabs from any kind of agricultural activities. He even prevented them from living in the towns or mixing with the town peoples. In the opinion of Alaili, Omar did that, contrary to the orders of the Prophet, in order to make the Arabs retain their old war-like spirit and fighting vehemence.[50]

(3) Another measure lay in his encouragement, in one way

[49]See A. Sharaf Al-Din, Al-Fusul Al-Mohimma, pp. 68-69.

[50]A. Alaili, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

or another, of the Arabian tribal spirit for the support of the "holy" war. He arranged the Islamic armies along the tribal lines,[51] and urged the Arabs to preserve their old pride in genealogy.[52] According to Zaidan, Omar was the first caliph in Islam who preferred the Arabs to the non-Arabs. He warned the Arabs, too, against adopting the customs of the non-Arabs.[53]

He prevented, once, the general of the Iraq army from treating his soldiers with severity. In the opinion of Ibn Khaldun Omar did that in order to keep the soldiers away from any humiliation tendency.[54]

(4) Another of the Omarian measures lay in his tendency to appoint what Ibn Khaldun calls the holders of the "asabiyya" in the government and military offices.[55] Many of the offices, were filled during his reign by certain members of the Omayyad family, while the Hashimid family, the family of Mohammed and Ali, was avoided in these appointments.[56] Al-Maqrizi, the famous Moslem historian, was

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[51] See Ibid., p. 87.

[52] Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 130.

[53] G. Zaidan, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 31-32.

[54] Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 126.

[55] Cf. Ibid., p. 131.

[56] See Alaili, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

amazed at the reason behind such a discrimination.[57]

In view of the big difference in the attitude toward the Arabian tribal spirit between the Omayyads and the Hashimids, one may easily discover the reason of Omar's discrimination. The reason did not lie in the personal hate of Omar toward Ali, as some historians have suggested. It lay, rather, in the general policy of Omar to utilize the tribal and the warlike spirit of the Arabs for the victory of Islam. The Omayyads, as we have already seen, were strongly inclined toward the nomadic values of the Arabs, whereas Ali and his relatives were of the opposite inclination.

All in all, one may come to the conclusion that Omar has tried to solve the dilemma of Islam by adopting one of the two opposite sides, that is, the side of fighting spirit, at the expense of the other side. The result was that Islam became a religion of conquests and empire-building rather than one of submissive devotion and humble piety. The holy war was, as Khadduri points out, a "required duty" imposed on the whole Islamic community until the word of Allah shall be supreme in the world.[58]

This has placed the "traditionists" face to face with a dilemma of their own. As civilized men, they are oriented toward

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[57]See Ibid., p. 86.

[58]M. Khadduri, op. cit., p. 5.

a religion of humbleness and devotion. But, as orthodox Moslems, they are required to believe in the "holy" war and to fight all the "unbelievers" wherever they find them.[59] How have they been able to escape these two sharp horns of the dilemma?

It seems that the "traditionists" have found the solution in what can be called "the depersonalization of the human traits." According to their opinion, man can attain, through the exertion of his will power, any trait he likes. A true Moslem, therefore, can be humble and arrogant as the situation requires. In the wartime he can become a lion, while in the peacetime he can be a sheep. In their opinion, human personality can be moulded, with the help of Allah, to fit every form, with no restriction whatsoever.

The "traditionists" have not failed, of course, to give ample examples of this from the early history of Islam. They have been able to paint the personalities of Mohammed and his companions along these lines. Mohammed and his companions were, according to the "traditionists," exactly as The Koran has described them— severe against the "unbelievers," compassionate among themselves. The later generations failed to follow this high example of the companions, says the "traditionists," merely because of their weak will and corrupted religion.

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[59] Loc. cit.

In describing the Islamic tendency of "depersonalization,"
von Grunebaum says,

> Ideal types of behavior were evolved and identified
> with certain personages. . . . So the reader was taught
> to think in types, to appraise people for individual
> traits, to disregard the fulness of their humanity.
> This outlook fosters the idea of the human character as
> a compound of unintegrated traits—traits which are
> found typified here or there, for the most part arbitrarily,
> and which, it was felt, could be put together so as to
> produce a perfect individual.[60]

In this way, the "traditionists" have solved the dilemma of Islam.

As a matter of fact, the dilemma was, in the later days,
no longer of any significance as it was in the early days of Islam.
Islam has yielded, then, to the soft proclivities of civilization
and, so lost its tendency to fight. The duty of "holy war" has
lost its actual value and become a mere word in the religious term-
inology of Islam. "The depersonalization of human traits" has been
of use only for the study of the religious history and for the
moralistic preaching and teaching.

Islam, as a militant religion, remains only in the desert.
Several religious movements have recently arisen, in the deserts
of Arabia and Africa, attempting to revive Islam along the same
pattern as that of Omar.[61] They have succeeded only within the

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[60]G. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, p. 226.

[61]Excellent examples of this type of nomadic revival can
be found today in the Wahhabi movement of Saudi Arabia, and in the
Sanusi movement of the African desert.

desert boundaries without being able to cross them into the civilisation as in the time of Omar. The reason behind this inability of the nomads to invade the modern civilisation lies perhaps in the fact that the civilisation is today no longer an abode of submissive peoples. The modern civilisation is <u>industrial</u> rather than <u>agricultural</u>.

IBN KHALDUN AND THE ARABS

It should be asserted in the beginning that Ibn Khaldun was an Arab, and a great admirer of the Arab nation. He was neither a Shuubite[1] as Amin says, nor a Berber as Enan suggests. This will be discussed in the next chapter. It suffices here to study how Ibn Khaldun could defend the cause of the Arabs as against the overwhelming attitude of the orthodox writers.

As we have already noted, orthodox Islam had been institutionalized upon the values of civilization; the nomadic Arabs had been regarded therefore as an evil, irreligious, and savage people. Several writers had tried before Ibn Khaldun to defend the Arabs. They seemed to have failed perhaps because of the fact that they used in their argumentation the same conceptual tools as those of the Arabs' opponents. They did not realize that the fight needed a new weapon in order to win a decisive victory.

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[1] The Shuubites, or "the partisans of the Gentiles," who, beginning with the contention that all Moslems were equal, finished in some cases by declaring the Arabs inferior to many races. The Arabic word Shuub is used for the "nations" of the non-Arabs as opposed to the "tribes" (qabail) of the Arabs. (See E. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, Vol. I, p. 265.) According to Ahmad Amin, the Shuubites were greatly influential in the formation of the Islamic "sciences," in general, and in the "science of traditions," in particular. (See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, pp. 76-80.)

The defenders of the Arabs, before Ibn Khaldun, had tried
to construct a bright picture for the Arabs, deriving their
materials from otrhodox sources. Consequently, their effort appeared
ridiculously ineffective and fruitless in comparison to the gigantic
work of their opponents. Ibn Khaldun seemed to have realized the
futility of this way of defense. It was, in fact, enormously dif-
ficult to defend the nomads, the Arabs or the Omayyads,[2] as we have
noticed before, by means of the old logic. Furthermore, the great
historians and "traditionists," of the early days, whose works had
become classical in Islam, were inclined, consciously or unconsciously,
against the Arabs' cause. To refute therefore their classical ideas
means, according to the rules of the old logic, that they were con-
sidered liars or untrustworthy men. Nobody could win a case while
arguing on such a slippery and risky ground.

Ibn Khaldun most probably was aware of this.[3] He tried to

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[2]It should be remembered here that the nomads, the Arabs
and the Omayyads were taken by the orthodox writers as three phases
of one reality. In order to defend one, it was necessary then to
defend them all. The defenders of the Arabs, before Ibn Khaldun,
seemed to have overlooked this important point.

[3]Actually, he has started his writing by pointing out the great-
ness and the truthfulness of the early historians and "traditionists."
In fact, he has borrowed almost all of the data about the history of the
Arabs, in his Universal History, from them. Modern students have tried
to belittle the value of his Universal History, on account of that.
They consider his history-writing as naive as any of an earlier time.
They seem to overlook the fact that Ibn Khaldun's main aim is not to
provide the readers with new historical data, but rather to give them
new logical tools with which they can examine the old data through a
new light.

show in the beginning of his argument that lying might not be
intentional. An honest man may lie without realising that he was
lying. In the opinion of Ibn Khaldun, lying is natural and
inevitable and there are several causes for it.

Ibn Khaldun gives seven causes for lying as if he tries
to show that there are several innocent reasons for lying beside
the customary one.

(1) The first cause of lying lies, according to Ibn Khaldun,
in bias and partisanship in favor of a certain school or sect. In
his own words,

> If the soul of man is not bent toward certain side,
> it will give the news a worthy share of objectivity and
> neutral investigation. When it is touched by a bias
> toward an idea or a sect, it becomes no longer objective:
> it will accept, from the news, only that element which
> suits its bias. The bias becomes like a cover on the
> eye which prevents it from neutral criticism and calm
> investigation. Thus, the soul accepts a lie and tells
> it to the others.[4]

(2) The second cause of lying is the normal one. The
reporter lies because he wants to lie; the hearer takes the lie as
true because he relies upon the honesty of the reporter. Ibn
Khaldun does not pay much attention to this cause. He explains it
with one short sentence. The reason behind his neglect of this
cause most probably lies in the fact that the "traditionists" of

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[4]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mocaddima, p. 35.

Islam have considered it the most important cause of lying; thus, they have developed what they call the "science of men," whose main purpose is to examine the honesty of the reporters of the "traditions" and to classify them according to the degree of confidence which can be assigned to them. Ibn Khaldun does not pay much attention to this cause of the intentional lying because he is fully engaged with the causes of the unintentional one.

(3) The third cause lies in the overlooking of the aim of the act. The observer, says Ibn Khaldun, may explain an event as he imagines it to be without knowing its real aim.[5] Here, Ibn Khaldun seems to realise the methodological importance of what Weber calls "verstehen," in the studying of social phenomena. Unless the investigator is fully aware of the goal and the evaluating apparati of an actor, he is unable to understand the real meaning of his act.

(4) The fourth cause is, in the opinion of Ibn Khaldun, the tendency to believe. This often comes, says he, as a result of an unwarranted confidence in the reporter of the news. By this, he has probably tried to criticise the tendency of the "traditionists" to accept any "tradition," if it has been reported by many.[6] According to his opinion, the numerousness of the reporters does not

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[5] Loc. cit.

[6] See S. Hasri, Dirasat, p. 227.

necessarily indicate the indubitability of the report. The many
may fall together under a similar prejudice or influence, and so
they may come to the same wrong conclusion in their report.

(5) The fifth one lies in the fact that an act is a part
of a complicated whole. An observer may see an act and fail to
see the context within which the act has been achieved. In the
opinion of Ibn Khaldun, an act as it appears to the observer may
be quite different from it as it is actually in its objective
context.[7]

(6) The sixth cause comes from the attempt, on the part of
some publicists, to flatter and propitiate the men of power and so
many false reports will be invented and circulated among various
peoples as indubitable facts. Men, says Ibn Khaldun, are naturally
inclined to be praised and flattered. They, therefore, encourage
false rumors to spread in their favor even if they do not really
deserve them.[8]

(7) The last, and the most important, cause of lying is a
result of "the ignorance of the nature of things which are born of
civilisation."[9] In the discussion of this cause, lies, in reality,
the immortal fame of Ibn Khaldun. The whole of his social theory

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[7]Loc. cit.

[8]Loc. cit.

[9]Ibid., pp. 35-36.

can be said to have been propounded in order to show how a lie
or an error may be unintentionally committed as a result of over-
looking the laws of civilisation or human association.[10]

Ibn Khaldun then comes to discuss the nature of the materials
which the historians usually deal with, or what he calls "informa-
tions" or "news." He differentiates what he calls the "religious
informations" from those which deal with "actual events."[11]   In his
opinion, a thinker who studies the "religious informations" may not
need to know the social laws or what he calls "the nature of things
which are born of civilisation."

The only source of the "religious informations" is the
divine revelation. They must be taken as they are with no manipula-
tion or alteration whatsoever. God knows what is best for man with
regard to his religious affairs. Man must therefore receive what
God has ordered with unhesitating obedience.

The only thing man has to do in this respect is to examine
the integrity, and truthfulness of the bearers of the "religious
informations." Man has here, according to Ibn Khaldun, one problem,
that is, whether the "information" has been really said by the
Prophet, the messenger of God, or not. After being sure that the

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[10]See H. Barnes and H. Becker, Social Thought from Lore to
Science, Vol. I, p. 267, et seq.

[11]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mecaddima, p. 37.

Prophet has said a certain thing, man has, then, nothing but to accept it as it is.

Here, Ibn Khaldun appears to be in full agreement with the orthodox "traditionists." In reality, he is not so. There is actually a big difference between the two opinions. In the opinion of the "traditionists" there is no clear-cut distinction between the religious affairs and the secular affairs. To them, the religion of Islam is concerned with all human activities. Islam is, as Khadduri puts it, "the embodiment of a complete system of life."[12]

Thus, they tend to treat historical data in the same manner as they treat the sacred "traditions" of Mohammed. In fact, history-writing started in Islam, as Ahmad Amin points out, as a part of the "science of traditions."[13] It developed lately as a separate "science," it is true; but the intellectual preconceptions which influenced it in the beginning, remained active till the end.

Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, greatly emphasizes distinction between the secular and religious affairs. To each realm, as we have noted in the first part, he allots a certain sort of activity which is quite different from the other.

Ibn Khaldun bitterly criticizes the orthodox historians on account of their handling the secular data on the same basis as

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[12]M. Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam, p. 3.

[13]See Ahmad Amin, Fajr Al-Islam, p. 223.

that of the religious data. Secular events come, in his opinion, under the rule of social laws. A true historian, therefore, should carefully study these laws before committing himself to the examination of historical data. The knowledge of the social laws is, in his opinion, an efficient apparatus with which historians can distinguish the correct from the erroneous informations, the truth from the lie, and so, they can evade the pitfalls of the old historians.

Ibn Khaldun observes that most of the authors who wrote in this field before him had some sort of preaching orientation, i.e., they had a tendency to exhort their reader rather than to tell him what had actually happened. History-writing must be, in his opinion, separated and quite differientated from "the science of tradition." In the former, the writer must be well-informed about the social laws, just in contrast to the latter with which the social laws have nothing to do.

After establishing this criterion for the historians, Ibn Khaldun tries to give them a brief picture of what these social laws are. He started his discussion by mentioning the oft-quoted dictum of Aristotle that man is a political animal. Then, he proceeds along the same lines that Farabi and other classical thinkers had followed before him in this regard. He shows the great advantage of social life and notes how man has been able, by

means of his association and cooperation with others, to produce
and consume the various economic goods which are impossible with-
out the social life.[14]

Then, he notices that man is aggressive and unjust by nature
because he is an animal in his original nature. It is necessary
therefore to have in every group of men an accepted authority in
order to prevent men from attacking each other and to make social
life possible.

Here a question is raised by Ibn Khaldun. How and from where
does this authority arise in the human society? In answering this
question, the first important cleavage appears between Ibn Khaldun
and the classical thinkers. Ibn Khaldun attacks the classical idea
that social control is always a result of religion. He points out
that there are many peoples in the world who have no "true" religion
and manage, nevertheless, to live in well-organized societies.[15]

On this point, with which Ibn Khaldun took his first
departure from the classical approach, he seems to build the whole
structure of his social theory. Human society is no longer a
religious affair. It has an independent entity and can be treated
with a complete freedom from the religious values.

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[14]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 43.

[15]See Ibid., pp. 43-44.

Ibn Khaldun classifies human society, from the standpoint of social control, into two kinds, nomadic and civilised. In the nomadic society, when blood relationship prevails, men are controlled by their own spontaneous motivation, while in the civilised society force is necessary for the controlling of its members. Among the nomads, the tribal spirit, or what he calls the "asabiyya,"[16] tends to attach men to their group values, whereas policemen achieve such function among the civilised.

Through this classification, Ibn Khaldun places the tribal spirit of the nomads in general, and of the Arabs in particular, in a favorable light. As we have already noticed, the tribal spirit was regarded by the orthodox writers as an evil character that had been cursed and dispraised by the Prophet. No writer before Ibn Khaldun was able to defend it or to show any advantage in it. Ibn Khaldun seems to have noticed that the Arabs could not be successfully defended unless their "condemned" tribal spirit be, at first, defended.

He points out that man's qualities are a result, not entirely

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[16]It should be remembered here that the Khaldunian "asabiyya" has two aspects: political and social. The political aspect of the "asabiyya" tends to attach the members of the tribe to their leader in his conflict with other tribal leaders, while the social aspect attaches the members of a tribe to each other and forms a well-integrated group out of them.

of his original nature, but rather of his social conditions.[17]
When he discusses the qualities which distinguish the civilized
man from the nomad, i.e., the scientific inclination, craftsman-
ship and humbleness as against the nomadic illiteracy, predatory
spirit and arrogance, he comes to the conclusion that the civilized
men are by no means better than the nomads. He admits that the
nomads are ignorant, predatory and savage, but he stresses the
fact that they have also a very strong tribal spirit. The tribal
spirit seems to compensate, in his opinion, for all the virtues of
civilization.

There is indeed great similarity between Ibn Khaldun's
description of the nomadic tribal spirit and Durkheim's description
of mechanical social solidarity.[18]

The same spirit which makes the members of a group strongly
attached to each other against strangers, makes them, at the same
time, strongly attached to the values of the group. Strong tribal
spirit and strong morals seem to go hand in hand in Ibn Khaldun's
theory.[19] To him, the nomads are nearer to the spirit of religion

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[17]See Ibid., p. 175.

[18]See H. Barnes and H. Becker, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 706.
It is interesting to notice that, while Durkheim considers the rate
of suicide rises as a result of the weakening of the mechanical
solidarity, Ibn Khaldun believes that the weakening of the tribal
spirit among the civilized men indicates the approaching suicide
of the society as a whole.

[19]Philosophically-minded thinkers may not agree with Ibn

for they have strong morals. Vice and moral laxity are rare in
nomadism, just contrary to what is normal in civilization. He
attributes the prevalence of vice and rascality in civilization
to the use of force in the social control. An oppressed man is,
in his opinion, obliged to be a liar and a cheater in order to
protect himself from further oppression.[20]

As a matter of fact, Ibn Khaldun's inclination in favor of
nomadism can be more or less clearly observed throughout his whole
work. He prefers nomadism to civilization for several reasons.
These reasons can be gathered as follows:

(1) At first, he seems to prefer the nomads on the ground

Khaldun about this point. In their opinion, the criterion of good
morality does not lie in the quality and the intensity of the moral
emotions; it rather lies in the enlargement of the circle of persons
embraced by the moral feelings. The nomadic morality cannot be,
therefore, as good as that which prevails in civilization. In
civilization the circle of morality includes many more members than
the tribal spirit of nomadism tends to include. According to this
theory, the tribal spirit is a handicap to the improvement of
morality; it restricts the application of the moral values to only
small numbers. (See P. Myers, History as Past Ethics, p. 4.)

Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, believes that the stronger
the tribal spirit is, the better the morality. His criterion of
good morality seems to lie, not in the largeness of the moral circle,
but rather in the intensity of it.

[20]One of the great differences which distinguishes Ibn Khaldun
from the orthodox writers lies in his insistence on viewing human
traits through the perspective of personalization, as we shall see
later. He seems to disbelieve in the ability of man to attain the
traits he wishes to have.

of his values concerning human nature. To him, man is good and
bad at the same time;[21] man's badness is due to his being an
animal in his original[22] nature. Man's goodness, on the other
hand, comes from his association with other men.[23] From this, one
can conclude that Ibn Khaldun is of the opinion that the stronger
the attachment of man to his group is, the better he becomes, for
his social nature will be strengthened at the expense of his animal
nature. Here, Ibn Khaldun appears as if he considers that the bad
side of man's nature shifts, as a result of his association with
others, from within the group to the outside; that is to say, man
becomes good toward his fellow kinsmen, bad against strangers.
And when man becomes civilized, his badness against the outsiders,
as well as his goodness to his fellowmen, will be less. Man will
be, then, less aggressive, it is true, but also less brave, generous
and helpful.[24]

In this, Ibn Khaldun stands in opposition to the "tradi-
tionists" who have "depersonalized" the human traits, as we have
seen in the preceding chapter.

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[21] See Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 127.

[22] Ibid., p. 142.

[23] Ibid., pp. 142-43.

[24] See Ibid., p. 138.

(2) Another reason why Ibn Khaldun prefers the nomadic to the civilized peoples lies in the fact that the nomads are more capable to fight and to conquer other peoples. In his opinion, man is naturally bent to be a master over others.[25] A submissive man is imperfect. To yield to a humiliation of any kind indicates defectiveness in the essence of manhood. As he puts it, "No people submit to slavery except the black people, and this is because of some defectiveness in their human nature, and of their similarity to animals."[26] On this ground, Ibn Khaldun comes to the conclusion that the nomadic man is of a higher rank as regards the essence of manhood in comparison to the civilized man.[27]

(3) Ibn Khaldun also notes that the use of force in the social control makes man liable to be a liar and a cheater.[28] In order to evade the oppression of government, the civilized man tends to appear different from what he really is,[29] while the nomadic man does not like to conceal himself. He is afraid of no one. A coward cannot survive in the desert.

(4) He also notes that civilization is usually associated

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[25] Ibid., p. 148.

[26] Loc. cit.

[27] Ibid., p. 150.

[28] See Ibid., p. 540.

[29] Ibid., p. 142.

with luxurious tendencies. Luxury leads, according to Ibn Khaldun, to cheating, gambling, stealing, adultery, false swearing, taking usury, etc. When man finds himself in urgent need of money in order to satisfy the various wants of his luxurious life, he may be obliged to use illegitimate means to earn it. With the passing of time, bad morals will become the prevailing custom in civilization.[30]

(5) The mere existence of commerce and craftmanship in civilization may make men accustomed to cheating and lying. In Ibn Khaldun's opinion, men of high rank cannot be traders. Only the lower classes adapt themselves to the mean character of commerce.[31]

(6) He also mentions that the nomads can quite readily adapt themselves to the religious discipline and the ascetic tendency. The nomads usually wear simple clothes, live in simple houses, and eat simple food. This means, of course, less entanglement in the affairs of this world.

Ibn Khaldun points out that tailoring does not exist in nomadism. It is a characteristic of civilization.

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[30] Ibid., p. 372.

[31] Ibid., pp. 395-96.

This explains why Allah has prohibited the wearing
of tailored clothes in the pilgrimage of Mecca. The
purpose of the pilgrimage is to make man reject all his
secular relationships and turn his face toward Allah,
as he is originally created, in order that his heart
will be free from the luxurious habits . . . which
have dirtied his soul. All of these habits will be
eventually eliminated after death when man goes to the
judgment-day with humble heart.[32]

As to houses, Ibn Khaldun prefers the simple to the com-

plicated ones. He mentions the order of Omar, the celebrated

caliph of Islam, who prohibited his soldiers in Iraq from building

high and large houses. According to Ibn Khaldun, Omar says:

Do not build houses with more than three rooms,
and do not erect high buildings. Stick to the old
tradition, in order that the Empire will stick to
you.[33]

Ibn Khaldun devotes a whole chapter to the study of the

effects of food on the character of man. He stresses the fact that

the food of civilisation, which contains much meat and fat, affects

harmfully the mind and body. The mind is usually stupefied by

the "thick vapour" arising from the stomach that has been crowded

with much meat. The body also becomes, at the same time, distorted

in form and ugly in color.[34] Moreover, the heavy food of civilisa-

tion handicaps man from adequate worship and pious practices.[35]

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[32]Ibid., pp. 411-12.

[33]Ibn Khaldun, Kitab Al-Ibar, Vol. II, Part II, p. 111.

[34]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mogaddima, pp. 87-91.

[35]Ibid., p. 89.

The nomads, on the other hand, tend to be, because of their simple and "dry" food, pure in their color, strong in their body, good in their character, and profound in their insight and intuitive knowledge.[36]

At any rate, we may do justice to Ibn Khaldun if we stress the fact that he does not admire the nomadic culture without reservation. He is, in fact, quite aware of the existence of certain "bad" traits in the nomadic culture of which no one can rightly approve. However, he has distinguished himself from the other students of the nomadic culture by viewing these "bad" traits as inherent by-products of some other "good" traits. In other words, he has not accepted the "depersonalization of the human traits" which the orthodox writers have maintained.

As we have seen before, Ibn Khaldun does not treat social phenomena in general according to the law of the excluded middle as orthodox writers usually do. He does not view them, in other words, as dichotomies in which absolute good is against absolute evil.[37] He emphatically points out that there is necessarily a

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[36]Ibid., p. 87.

[37]In describing such tendency among the orthodox writers in Islam, von Grunebaum says: "Depersonalization was favored by the moralists's habit of decomposing the human character into individual qualities, such as pride and humility, liberality and miserliness, truthfulness and dishonesty, which were discussed one after another, preferably in pairs of opposites. Here again individual man was

bad by-product for every good product.[38] This indicates that
he arranges social phenomena along continuum rather than dichotomy.
Through this perspective, he views the whole pattern of the nomadic
culture as well as the type of personality which normally prevails
in it.

Throughout his discussion of the nomadic culture, one can
more or less notice that he believes that the "bad" traits of the
nomads are mere by-products of their "good" traits. He is perhaps
of the opinion that insofar as certain people are good in some
aspects of their life, they inevitably develop "bad" traits in
other aspects; the more they approach a certain goal, the further
they will be from other goals.

It seems as if he comes to the conclusion that since the
nomadic man is braver, stronger and more capable in fighting than
the civilized man, he must be also more arrogant and less obedient
to the rules of an orderly life. According to Ibn Khaldun's
definition of the perfect man, the nomadic man is the most perfect
man on earth. He is also the greatest trouble-maker. One necessarily

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interesting merely as an illustration of a general observation which
was owed to the sagacity of one of the wise. In well-ordered and
well-written chapters al-Mawardi discusses, for example, the avoidance
of arrogance and self-conceit, modesty, urbanity and irascibility,
envy and emulation, silence and speech, etc. The number of similar
works testifies to the public response. (G. von Grunebaum, Medieval
Islam, pp. 225-26.)

[38]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 390-91.

leads to the other. The nomadic man can easily establish a state with his sword, but he hardly submits to its rules.[39]

When Ibn Khaldun discusses the nature of the Arabs, who are, in his opinion, the most nomadic people in the world, he emphatically shows that they are the most difficult people to rule. They tend to envy, rival, dispute, and fight each other as soon as they come close to each other. When they glance any sign of weakness in their leader they quickly jump to compete with him for the leadership.[40] The only bond which binds them together is their strong tribal spirit.

Ibn Khaldun considers the tribal spirit a natural tendency in man. In his opinion, man generally tends to be kind and helpful to his relatives; and he will naturally feel insulted if one member of his family or clan is insulted by an outsider.[41]

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[39]See _Ibid._, p. 151.

[40]See _Ibid._, p. 150. It is interesting to notice that O'Leary has a similar opinion about the Arabs. He describes an Arab as follows: "His sense of personal dignity is so strong that he is naturally in revolt against every form of authority: his own chieftains, his leaders in battle, can expect little but hatred, envy, and treachery from the moment of their election and from those who were their friends and supporters to that moment. A benefactor is a natural object of attack because a benefactor confers a sense of obligation, and consequently a sense of inferiority, upon the recipient of his generosity." (De L. O'Leary, _Arabia Before Muhammad_, p. 20.)

[41]Ibn Khaldun, _op. cit._, pp. 128-29. Here, Ibn Khaldun appears to be influenced by the nomadic values. He considers the tribal spirit natural and universal. He does not realise that this

Ibn Khaldun notices that this tribal spirit usually weakens among the civilized peoples due to their softened and protected life within the fortified walls of the town. Among the nomads, on the other hand, it develops to the utmost. The members of the tribe must be one against the other tribes, or, otherwise, they will, sooner or later, perish from the face of the desert.

In the light of the preceding discussion, it appears that there are two opposite forces working in the nomadic life: the tribal spirit which unifies men into strong social units, and the nomadic arrogance and rebellious tendency which antagonize them against each other. On the one hand, it is required from the man of the desert to stand by his own people through thick and thin, and to jump to the help of his fellow tribesmen without hesitating, and, on the other hand, he is ready, as the Arabian poet puts it, to make raids on his brother, in case he finds none to raid but a brother.

It is quite advantageous for a tribe in the desert to be big; the more numerous its members are, the greater opportunity it

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also can be viewed through the relativistic perspective which he has advocated and applied to many other aspects of the social life. However, he believes that a real blood relation is not necessary for the existence of the tribal spirit. In his opinion, man is naturally inclined to help anyone who is socially presumed to be his relative. Whether the relation is true or false in reality does not matter in this regard. What actually matters is the social consideration. Ibn Khaldun regains at this point his usual sociological insight.

has to survive at the expense of the other tribes. In reality, a nomadic tribe likes to increase its population by every means possible, but there is always an opposing factor that tends to counteract this growing tendency in the tribe. As soon as a tribe becomes large, up to a certain limit, the nomadic tendency of envy and arrogance starts operating and tends to break it up into smaller units.

The nomadic man is hardly able to bear seeing a large tribe led by one sheikh. The minor sheikhs, within the tribe, are bound to envy him and compete with him. Consequently, the tribesmen tend to quarrel among themselves. Each group will then support the sheikh who is the nearest to them in his blood relation, as against the more distant one. Eventually, the large tribe will be broken up into smaller ones.

Ibn Khaldun notes that the Arabs are unable to establish a state or successfully manage it without a religion. Their arrogance and roughness normally make it difficult for them to be unified into a large state. The only factor which is able to unify them and make them conquerors over others is religion. When the various tribes submit, under the influence of religion, to one authority, they can achieve miracles.[42] Their extreme roughness will, then, be shifted from within to be directed against the outsiders.

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[42] Ibn Khaldun, _op. cit._, pp. 149-52.

As we have noticed in the third part of the present work,
Ibn Khaldun is inclined toward a group-religion rather than a class-
religion, toward a "church" type rather than a "sect" type of
religion. He believes that the social function of religion is to
unify the group, rather than to break it. He seems to be of the
opinion that the purpose of the true religion is not to change or
reform the morés of the people. Morés form, in his opinion, an
inevitable aspect of the social situation in which the people happen
to live. The people cannot change them by the exertion of their will
power. The true religion, therefore, does not interfere with the
popular morés. It merely tries to eliminate the fratricidal hos-
tility from among the people in order to make them one solid body
against their enemies. As we have noticed before, he does not
believe in the class-religion which usually arises in the civilized
society. The only type of religion he seems to care for is that
which springs out from among the nomads, unites them, and makes them
conquerors.[43]

In his discussion of the Arab culture, he stresses the fact
that the Arabs are, by nature, well prepared to adapt themselves to
the moral discipline of religion. As he puts it, they are still

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[43]In fact, his well-known formula, that religion without
"asabiyya" is ineffective, clearly indicates this, as we shall see
later.

primitive and natural in their habits; they are free therefore
from the moral disorganisation of civilisation. The only weak
point in their moral values is, in his opinion, their nomadic savage-
ness.[44] When a unifying religion rises among them, they get rid
of this weak point and then draw their swords in the path of holy
war.

It is interesting indeed to find Ibn Khaldun, in some other
part of his work, emphasizing the fact that religion without
"asabiyya" is ineffective.[45] He seems to believe that a religion
without followers who are capable of fighting and conquering is
useless or perhaps false. A true religion has to be, in his opinion,
a victorious religion.

It may be safe to conclude here that, in his opinion,
nomadism and religion are highly compatible with each other; each
is useless without the other. The nomads are scattered savages
until religion comes and makes them victorious. In the same way,
religion is an impotent system of ideas until the nomads adopt it
and make it a tangible system of social order. In brief, religion
and nomadism, or "right" and "might," cannot be separated, according
to his theory. They are necessary to each other.

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[44]Ibid., p. 151.

[45]Ibid., pp. 159-161.

However, Ibn Khaldun's job is not yet finished. Nor is it an easy job. He has to face the multitude of the Mohammedan "traditions" that positively condemn the nomadic traits. It has been noticed that he usually overlooks the "traditions" that contradict his theory, and unduly emphasizes those which can be more or less utilized for its support.[46] At any rate, he seems to be unable to proceed along these vulnerable lines to the extreme. He cannot particularly refute the "traditions" that are unanimously considered valid by the orthodox Moslems. This will be invalidating the principle of "Ijma" of which he himself is a vehement advocate. He should, therefore, resort to some other means.

As a matter of fact, Ibn Khaldun utilizes, in this connection, his temporalistic, relativistic, materialistic logic to a great extent. As it has been noticed before, he criticizes the orthodox "traditionists," on the ground that they treat the Mohammedan

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[46]It is quite relevant to mention at this point that Ibn Khaldun often relies on the "traditions" that are attributed to Omar. He often supports his theory with the "sayings" and "doings" of Omar. This can be readily explained by the fact that, during the reign of Omar, as we have already seen, Islam and Arabianism, or religion and nomadism, were identical and synonymous. As regards Ali, the caliph who profoundly hated the tribal spirit of the nomadic Arabs and vehemently stove against it. Ibn Khaldun seems to be somewhat cold. Beneath his superficial praising of Ali, there is some undeniable attitude of dispraise and contempt. After reading Ibn Khaldun's work, one may be able to discover an unconscious element of dislike toward Ali and the Alids running throughout his whole writings.

"traditions" as if they are absolutely and eternally valid. To him, the "traditions" should be viewed within the context of time and place in order to understand their real meaning. In this way, Ibn Khaldun has been able to criticize and refute the anti-nomadic "traditions" of Islam.

It is quite instructive indeed to study how Ibn Khaldun has handled these "traditions." Let us therefore examine them one by one.

(1) It is a well-established "tradition" in Islam, as we have noted, that Mohammed urged his followers to quit the desert and adopt the city life.[47] Ibn Khaldun points out that this "tradition" does not represent a permanent order which should be executed at all times and places; the Prophet issued it, after hijra, in order to urge his followers to join him in the city of Medina for the purpose of mobilizing them against the "unbelievers." It is therefore a temporary order. It has no meaning after the "victory."[48]

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[47] ven Grunebaum says about this point, "Migration into town, hijra, is recommended and almost equalised in merit to that more famous migration, again called hijra, of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina. To forsake town for country life is severely condemned." (G. von Grunebaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-74.) Max Weber assigns the town in Islam "only political importance," contrasting Islam in this respect with the Judeo-Christian attitudinal-complex. According to von Grunebaum, there is no difference between the two in their attitude toward town life. (See *Ibid.*, p. 174.)

[48] See Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-24.

(2) The Prophet is known to have encouraged and praised agriculture, as we have seen in the preceding chapter. There are several "traditions" to this effect. Ibn Khaldun seems to regard them as meaningless or insignificant. He only mentions one "tradition" out of them, that is, the "tradition" which condemns agriculture. As we have noted, the "traditionists" have agreed that there must be something wrong with this "tradition," and so they have not accepted it at its face-value. Ibn Khaldun alone, from among them, takes it seriously and bases a great part of his argument on it.[49] He is of the opinion that agriculture is adopted only by humble and weak people. The strong nomads are too proud to be the cultivators of soil and payers of taxes. They are accustomed to extract taxes from others, rather than to pay them.

(3) The nomadic tribal spirit is condemned by the Prophet, as we have already seen, to a very great extent. Ibn Khaldun interprets this condemnation as to be directed, not against the tribal spirit as such, but against its utilisation by man in the path of Satan rather than in the path of Allah. In his opinion, it is difficult to imagine the Prophet unconditionally condemning the tribal spirit, in view of the fact that it is necessary for the holy war which is, in turn, necessary to maintain religion.[50] Ibn Khaldun

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[49]See Ibid., p. 142.

[50]Ibid., p. 128.

points out that the Prophet condemns only the tribal spirit of the pre-Islamic days which was generally used in the inter-tribal wars and raids. According to his theory, the tribal spirit can be like any other human traits, good or bad according to the purpose for which it is used. It will be good if it is used for some good purpose such as the support of religion or the maintenance of justice; whereas, it becomes bad if used for the purpose of maintaining self-interest or supporting an unjust cause.[51]

(4) Along with the nomads' tribal spirit, the Prophet condemns their pride in lineage. Just in contradition to their custom, he considers all men are equal, as far as lineage is concerned, for all of them are children of Adam and Eve. The Koran says:

> O Ye folk, verily we have created you of male and female. . . . Verily the most honorable of you in the sight of Allah is the most pious of you.[52]

Also, the Prophet is known to have said, "There are no genealogies in Islam."[53]

In Ibn Khaldun's opinion, the pride in genealogy is a natural tendency in man; it is also the basis of the tribal spirit. Wherever

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[51]Ibid., p. 203.

[52]The Koran, Chap. 49, Verse 13.

[53]Cited by R. Levy, Sociology of Islam, Vol. I, p. 80.

the pride in genealogy is weak, he says, its fruit, that is, the tribal spirit, is weak too.

He attributes the fall of the Arabs to their mixture, with the non-Arabs, which made them neglect their celebrated genealogy. He brings a "saying" from Omar for the support of his theory. Omar says, according to Ibn Khaldun, "Keep your genealogy, and do not be like the non-Arabs who retrace themselves to their villages /instead of their ancestors/."[54] As we have already noted, Omar views genealogy through the same perspective as that of Ibn Khaldun. Both are inclined to see the Arabs conquerors over other nations. This may explain the reason why Ibn Khaldun leans heavily on the "sayings" of Omar for the support of his theory.

(5) When Ibn Khaldun discusses the known virtues of civilization such as science and industry, he emphasizes the fact that these are relative virtues. He explains them in terms of materialistic, or sociological, causes. He points out that they are usual in civilization, not because the civilized people are of higher capacity or brighter mind. Science and industry are, according to Ibn Khaldun, necessary products of civilized life. He alludes to the fact that they develop as a result of the inter-action between supply and demand. In civilization, he says, the

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[54]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 130.

division of labor is so well-developed[55] that a great variety of
economic goods are produced. They are produced in a quantity
much more than to satisfy the necessary wants of the civilized man.
The surplus is directed, therefore, to cultivate and satisfy the
luxurious wants. In this way, sciences and industries develop in
civilization.[56]

In nomadism, on the other hand, men are entirely busy in
their effort to satisfy their basic wants. They are usually con-
tent with the bare means of subsistence. There is neither a demand
nor a supply for luxurious indulgences.[57]

Ibn Khaldun points out that the civilized people produce
much and consume much. Their standard of living is higher, it
is true, than that of the nomads, but there is no intrinsic advan-
tage in that. The big income of the city-man is hardly enough to
cover his big expenses.[58] There is, however, he asserts, a great
disadvantage in civilization, in contrast to nomadism, as a result
of its higher standard of living. In his opinion, it is harmful

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[55]Here again, Ibn Khaldun comes close to Durkheim who
attributes the shift of society, from the "mechanical" solidarity
to the "organic" one, to the rise of division of labor. (See
S. Durkheim, Division of Labor, passim.)

[56]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 400-401.

[57]Loc. cit.

[58]Ibid., p. 361.

for man, from the secular as well as the religious point of view, to live a luxurious life. As a result of his big expenses, man is obliged to work hard and to seek money by every means possible. This eventually leads to moral disintegration, along with social disorganization.[59]

Then, Ibn Khaldun comes to the conclusion that civilization represents the old age of society. It indicates the approach of its death or suicide;[60] whereas nomadism indicates its youth.[61]

It is interesting to mention that Ibn Khaldun classifies the nomads into grades according to their nearness or farness from civilization. He takes civilization as if it is the center of social disorganization; so, the farther a society is from the disorganizing influence of civilization, the better it will be. There are, according to his theory, mainly three types of nomads: (1) the agricultural nomads (2) the sheep nomads (3) the camel nomads.

(1) Agriculture is usually adopted, according to Ibn Khaldun, by a weak and humble sort of nomads. The brave nomads of the "camel" type never himiliate themselves by an agricultural settlement or tax

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[59]Ibid., pp. 372-73.

[60]Ibid., p. 371.

[61]Ibid., p. 122.

payment.[62] Taxes indicate humiliation in the eyes of the true nomads.[63] Ibn Khaldun agrees with the "camel" nomads that a "perfect" man is he who is capable of maintaining his complete freedom and dignity against any encroachment whatsoever. Those who accept himiliation and slavery such as the Negroes of the Sudan are defestive in their manhood.[64]

(2) The sheep nomads are higher in their manhood than the agriculturals. They are somewhat farther from the humiliating influence of the cities and their unjust government.

(3) The "camel" nomads are the best of all. Camels carry them to the most isolated and barren parts of the desert where contact with civilisation is most difficult. They are the most "savage" and so the most perfect of all men. The tribal spirit is then still in its prime.[65] There is no place for laxity of morality or for weakness in character. Human nature in its shining originality is dominant among such "savage" nomads.[66]

In this extreme type of nomadism, Ibn Khaldun places the

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[62] Ibid., p. 394. See also Taha Husain, op. cit., p. 152.

[63] Ibn Khaldum, op. cit., p. 142.

[64] Ibid., pp. 148, 374.

[65] Cf. Ibid., pp. 138-39, 129-30.

[66] Ibid., pp. 128, 134.

Arabs. He considers them the best of all because they are the
most uncivilized of all. Courage, fortitude, physical strength,
honor, hospitality, equality, and the like cannot be found as clear
elsewhere as among the Arabs.

As soon as the nomads become civilized, they begin to rely
on the walls and the mercenary soldiers of the city for their
defense. So, they will sooner or later lose their original tribal
spirit, bravery, and honor. They may become scientists, architects,
or skilled craftsmen, but these are not enough to compensate for
the shameful weakness in their manhood.[67]

Ibn Khaldun admits that all the "scientists" of Islam are,
with rare exception, non-Arabs. But this must not be taken, he
argues, to indicate a defectiveness in the original nature of the
Arabs. They are not scientific people, merely because they are
nomadic. He proceeds to explain the cause of this singular cir-
cumstance in an interesting passage which may be summarized as
follows:

> The first Moslems were entirely ignorant of art and
> science, all their attention being devoted to the
> ordinances of The Koran, which they "carried in their
> breasts," and to the practice of the Prophet. At that
> time the Arabs knew nothing of the way by which learning
> is taught, of the art of composing books, and of the
> means whereby knowledge is registered. Those, however,

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[67]Ibid., pp. 373-74.

who could repeat the Koran and relate the Traditions of
Mohammed were called Readers. This oral transmission
continued until the reign of Hárún al-Rashíd, when the
need of securing the Traditions against corruption or
of preventing their total loss caused them to be set down
in writing; and in order to distinguish the genuine
Traditions from the spurious, every isnád (chain of wit-
nesses) was carefully scrutinised. Meanwhile the purity
of the Arabic tongue had gradually become impaired:
hence arose the science of grammar; and the rapid develop-
ment of Law and Divinity brought it about that other
sciences, e.g., logic and dialectic, were professionally
cultivated in the great cities of the Mohammedan Empire.
The inhabitants of these cities were chiefly Persians,
freedmen and tradesmen, who had been long accustomed to
the arts of civilisation. Accordingly the most eminent
of the early grammarians, traditionists, and scholastic
theologians, as well as of those learned in the principles
of law and in the interpretation of The Koran, were
Persians by race or education, and the saying of the
Prophet was verified—"If Knowledge were attached to the
ends of the sky, some amongst the Persians would have
reached it." Amidst all this intellectual activity the
Arabs, who had recently emerged from a nomadic life, found
the exercise of military and administrative command too
engrossing to give them leisure for literary avocations
which have always been disdained by a ruling caste. They
left such studies to the Persians and the mixed race which
sprang from intermarriage of the conquerors with the con-
quered. They did not entirely look down upon the men of
learning but recognised their services—since after all it
was Islam and the sciences connected with Islam that
profited thereby.[68]

Along these valid lines Ibn Khaldun has defended the Arabs.

But, unfortunately, nobody has listened to him. Islam has been

already institutionalised according to the value of civilisation.

The Arabs have been unable to express themselves, again, through a

wide-spread conquest. The voice of Ibn Khaldun has been, therefore,

like a cry in the wilderness.

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[68]Ibid., pp. 543-44.

THE PERSONAL FACTOR BEHIND IBN KHALDUN'S THEORY

It is amazing indeed to find that almost all of the students
of Ibn Khaldun's theory have misunderstood his real attitude toward
the Arabs. They tend to take his description of the Arabs'
characteristics at its face-value, and to view his theory through
their own perspective rather than his. In Ibn Khaldun's opinion,
the Arabs are the most nomadic people on earth. By this, he
intended to praise the Arabs, not to dispraise them, in view of the
fact that he evaluates nomadism much higher than civilisation, as
we have already seen.

In order to understand the real meaning of a writer or a
speaker, we should penetrate, as deep as possible, into his value
system and try to view the world through his own eyes. Most of the
modern students of Ibn Khaldun's theory are inclined to interpret
his theory as it appears to them now through the value system of
modern civilisation. When they see him saying that the Arabs are
savage, destructive, illiterate, and hostile to science and
industry, they jump to accuse him of deep hate toward the Arabs.
They do not attempt at all to examine what he really means by
these characteristics. They do not, in other words, attempt to see
that perhaps he means by them virtues, rather than disgraceful

attributes. In fact, they should study at first his scale of values or measuring apparatus before ascribing a certain attitude to him.

The common fault of the modern students of Ibn Khaldun seems to lie in their tendency to evaluate things according to the two-valued measurement of the Aristotelian logic. They overlook the glaring fact that Ibn Khaldun holds no brief for this kind of logic. To him, as we have seen before, nothing is absolutely good or absolutely bad. Every goodness, according to his theory, necessarily has a by-product of badness. By showing, therefore, the supposedly "bad" side of the Arab culture, he most probably means to show, in a roundabout way, the "good" side of it.[1]

As we have noticed in the beginning, almost all of the modern students of Ibn Khaldun agree that he has a profound hate and contempt for the Arabs. However, they disagree as to the reason behind this hate. It may be useful to discuss in some detail the various reasons which they have brought about, one by one.

(1) M. Enan, an Egyptian writer, firmly believes that Ibn Khaldun was a Berber. He, according to Enan, hated the Arabs merely because of his nationalistic sentiment against the conquerors of

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[1]It should be remembered here that Ibn Khaldun was a diplomat and a politician. He can be said, therefore, to have preferred the indirect, roundabout, fashion in handling things to the direct one.

his home country.[2] This seems to be the most influential opinion among modern students. Consequently, Ibn Khaldun is usually referred to as Berber.[3] As we will see later, Ibn Khaldun was an Arab, and he was, consciously or unconsciously, proud of being an Arab.

Taha Hussain, whose influence on Enan's opinion is undeniable, considers Ibn Khaldun's genealogical tree, which indicates his Arabian descent, as doubtful or invalid.[4] It is needless to say that Taha Hussain's consideration is unimportant in this regard. Whether Ibn Khaldun's nationalistic sentiment is against or with the Arabs does not depend on his genealogical tree. What is important here is his personal attitude. If he believes that he is an Arab and he is proud of his Arabian descent, his outlook will be colored in favor of the Arabs, regardless of whether the tree of his descent is really valid or not.

(2) Hasri, a Syrian writer, tries to refute Enan's opinion. He believes that Ibn Khaldun meant by the word "Arabs," the nomadic people in general. Hasri bases his argument on certain philological considerations. According to his argument, the terms "Arab" and

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[2]See M. Enan, Ibn Khaldun, p. 114.

[3]See, for example, H. Barnes & H. Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science, pp. 266, 707. Ahmad Amin considers Ibn Khaldun a Shuubite, or a confirmed enemy of the Arabs. (See Ahmad Amin, Dhuha Al-Islam, Vol. I, p. 61.)

[4]Taha Hussain, Falasafat Ibn Khaldun Al-Iitimaiyya, p. 9.

"nomad" were regarded at the time of Ibn Khaldun, and still are regarded by the modern Arabs, to be synonymous.[5]

It is interesting to notice that Hasri is an admirer of both Ibn Khaldun and the Arabs. This appears to have necessitated his reconciling the two. Consequently, he comes to the conclusion that Ibn Khaldun did not mean to dispraise the Arabs, he meant only to dispraise the nomadic people; the Arabs of the towns who are not nomadic are therefore exempted from the insult of Ibn Khaldun.[6] By this, Hasri tries to defend the Arabs of the towns who form the majority of the Arabs of today; but he seems to overlook the fact that the town-dwellers, whether Arabs or non-Arabs, fall under the disgrace of a more systematic insult according to the theory of Ibn Khaldun.

It will be much better indeed for Hasri to classify the Arabs with the nomadic people, than with the civilized town-dwellers, if he really wishes to exalt the Arabs. The "bad" side of the town-culture is, according to Ibn Khaldun, much worse than that of the nomadic, as we have already seen.

(3) Arnold Toynbee attempts to explain Ibn Khaldun's dispraising of the Arabs on a somewhat different basis. He refers to

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[5] 8. Hasri, Dirasat, p. 115.

[6] See Ibid., pp. 107-124.

the fact that Ibn Khaldun belongs to the Arabs of the South. By
dispraising the Arabs, Ibn Khaldun meant therefore, according
to Toynbee, the Arabs of the North.[7] This argument of Toynbee
is reasonable to a large extent. As we have already noticed, the
hostility between the Northern and Southern Arabs was notorious in
the early days of Islam. Ibn Khaldun might have unconsciously felt
some sort of it while he was writing his Prolegomena. But there are
two important reasons which make it quite difficult to accept
Toynbee's explanation. First, Ibn Khaldun, as we have seen, did not
dispraise the Arabs; in reality, he praised them. Second, he was
personally inclined, in spite of his being originally from the
South, in favor of the Northern Arabs, as we shall immediately see.

As a matter of fact, Ibn Khaldun was not a true Southern
Arab, or Yamanite. His family originally came from Hadhramut, and
Hadhramut was, and still is, quite different from Yaman. Toynbee
is not entirely right when he likens Hadhramut to Yaman in the
development of its sedentary culture. Hadhramut is much nearer to
nomadism than Yaman, and has contributed much less to the history
of civilization than Yaman has.

Geographically speaking, Yaman falls, to some extent, in

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[7]See A. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. III, p. 324,
(footnotes).

the same zone of the monsoons that gives India its heavy rain
and enormous vegetation; while Hadhramut, on the other hand,
receives nothing of the monsoonic rain; it resembles in its arid-
ness, with slight exception, the majority of the Arabian desert.
Hitti says,

> Only in al-Yaman and 'Asir are there sufficient
> periodic rains to warrant a systematic cultivation
> of the soil. Perennial vegetation is here found in
> favoured valleys to a distance of about two hundred
> miles from the coast.[8]

Moreover, Hadhramut was attached to the Omayyad cause from
the beginning, just contrary to Yaman. It is interesting indeed
to find that Mohammed sent Ali to Yaman and Muawiya to Hadhramut
for the purpose of teaching the peoples of these two countries the
principles of Islam. It seems as if Mohammed sent each one of
these two different men to a people who could understand him better.
Chance seems to have played no important part in this mission.[9]
Ali, the extremely idealistic man, appeared to be the most suitable
man for a preaching mission among the town-dwellers of Yaman.

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[8] See P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 18.

[9] The historians of Islam are completely silent about this
point. It is reasonable, however, to suggest that Mohammed was
quite far-sighted and clever in selecting Muawiya to the mission
of Hadhramut, and Ali to that of Yaman. In fact, Mohammed is well-
known for his deep understanding of the nature of his various
followers.

Muawiya, the realistic politician, on the other hand, might have been highly successful in his mission among the nomads of Hadhramut.

Moslem historians tend to ascribe the reason, behind the historical attachment of the Yamanites to Ali's cause, to this early mission of Ali in their country. The reason might not be so simple as that. Men do not usually follow a preacher unless his attitudinal complex coincides with their own. The same thing can be said about the people of Hadhramut as regards their close relationship with Muawiya. They liked him probably because he was pro-nomadic in his attitudes as much as they were.

In addition to this general reason for the attachment of Hadhramut people to the Omayyad cause, we find the family of Ibn Khaldun particularly attached to it. The main reasons behind this particular attachment can be summed up as follows:

(1) There was some sort of personal friendship and mutual liking between Muawiya and Wail, the head of Ibn Khaldun's family. As Ibn Khaldun tells us in his autobiography, this Wail visited Muawiya during his reign and was received by Muawiya with great honor and welcome.[10]

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[10]Ibn Khaldun, Kitab Al-Ibar, Vol. VII, p. 380. Ibn Khaldun tells also that Muawiya presented Wail with a royal gift, but Wail refused it. Why? Ibn Khaldun is silent about this.

(2) Ibn Khaldun tells us, also, that Wail sided with
Muawiya in the murder of Hijr, the pious Yamanite who persisted
in his loyalty to Ali and refused to join Muawiya after Ali's
death.[11] The case of Hijr is a well-known episode in the history
of Islam. It had been often utilized by the orthodox Moslems
in their propaganda against Muawiya in particular and the Omay-
yads in general. It was presumed that Muawiya had no right to
kill Hijr. Ibn Khaldun, however, has a different opinion about
this case. In his Universal History, he tries to show, in an
indirect way, that Hijr was a rebel against the legitimate rule of
Muawiya and he deserved what he received at the hands of Muawiya's
executioners.[12] It should be mentioned here that Wail, the great
ancestor of Ibn Khaldun, was among the executioners who killed
Hijr.[13]

(3) During the Omayyad regime, Spain was conquered. Among

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[11] Loc. cit.

[12] See Ibid., Vol. III, p. 12.

[13] This episode must be of a tremendous influence on Ibn
Khaldun's mind. In the culture in which Ibn Khaldun lived, one
should have adhered to the same cause to which his ancestors adhered
before. Betraying the cause of one's ancestors meant betraying his
own honor. One should have defended the past acts of his family
no matter how unjust they were. This might be a necessary aspect
of the tribal spirit which was by no means absent in the time and
the place of Ibn Khaldun.

the conquerors was the family of Ibn Khaldun.[14] Afterwards,
Spain was detached from the Abbasid rule by an Omayyad prince.[15]
It is reasonable, therefore, to suggest that Spain remained
attached to the Omayyad cause, while the remaining part of the
Islamic Empire fell under the rule of the Abbasids. It may be
right to say that those Moslems who happened to live in Spain
escaped, more or less, the influence which the other Moslems fell
under. The orthodox "dichotomous" mentality which was firmly
established in the East under the auspices and encouragement of
the Abbasid capiphs can be said to have been less effective in
Spain. That is to say, the Omayyad-versus Abbasid dichotomy which
was paralleled in the East to that of bad-versus-good was almost
absent in the pro-Omayyad Spain.

Ibn Khaldun tells that one of the great "jurists" of Spain
flatly denounced the revolution of Hussain and considered him as
having been killed by the very sword of his grandfather, the
Prophet.[16] This opinion is, of course, impossible for any writer
in the East to have declared publicly. As we have seen before,
the revolution of Hussain, against Yazid, the drunkard Omayyad

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[14]Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 380.

[15]See P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 505 et seq.

[16]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 217.

caliph, was regarded by the orthodox Moslems of the East as a
revolution of religion against irreligiousness, good against
evil, Islam against nomadism, etc.

Ibn Khaldun's family lived in such an environment for a
long period of time. When the Islamic regime in Spain began to
be threatened by the Christians from Castile, the family left Spain
for Tunisia in North Africa. In Tunisia, the family might have
found itself in an intellectual atmosphere which widely differed
from that of Spain. Tunisia was distinguished at that time by
two important characteristics. First, it was, then, a great center
of Islamic orthodoxy and "scientific" knowledge.[17] Second, it was
still suffering from the horrible destruction that fell, few
decades before, upon North Africa in general and upon Tunisia in
particular, as a result of the invasion of certain nomadic tribes
from Arabia.[18]

These two factors, which characterized Tunisia at that
time, seemed to have antagonized its inhabitants against the

[17]E. Enan, op. cit., p. 17.

[18]In the middle of the eleventh century, A. D., several
nomadic tribes from Arabia invaded North Africa and profoundly
altered the appearance of the country, economically, ethnograph-
ically and politically. The invasion was originally directed against
Tunisia, and from there it spread to most parts of North Africa.
(See R. Brunschvig, "Tunisia," Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV,
p. 851 et seq.) It is quite reasonable, therefore, to suggest
that the name of the Arabs became, as a result of this destructive
invasion, a "curse" in the annals of Tunisia, in particular, and
of North Africa in general.

Omayyads, the Arabs and the nomads.

It was not easy indeed for the members of Ibn Khaldun's family to live comfortably in such an intellectual atmosphere without some psychological conflict inside their souls. After living in Spain where the Omayyad caliphs were regarded as the legitimate successors of the Prophets, and where the Arabian descent was taken as a great honor,[19] the family came to live in Tunisia where the orthodox opinion about the Omayyads was prevalent, and where the name of the Arabs was associated with stories of destructiveness and savageness. The conflict of conscience might have been rife. This critical situation required a man who could raise his soul to some higher level, or to use T. V. Smith's terminology, to a level that lies "beyond conscience." This seemed to have finally produced Ibn Khaldun.

From what Ibn Khaldun tells about the history of his family, one may be able to infer that the "inner conflict" was quite rife within the souls of its members in Tunisia. In Spain they were always inclined toward politics and the realistic aspects of life. They were worldly, ambitious and active.[20] When they moved to Tunisia, pious and mystic tendencies began to penetrate their souls.

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[19] See M. Anan, op. cit., p. 13.

[20] See Ibn Khaldun, Kitab Al-Ibar, Vol. VII, p. 381.

It was not infrequent that some of its members suddenly withdrew from political life and resorted to a mystic retirement and a pious devotion.[21]

The same dilemma that had perplexed the whole Islamic society and placed it between the two opposed poles of religion and politics, the "ideal" and the "real," seemed to have disturbed the souls of Ibn Khaldun's family. Ibn Khaldun himself could not escape this dilemma. "Everything indicates," says Hasri, "that Ibn Khaldun was under two opposed strong tendencies: a tendency toward politics and government affairs, and another toward scientific learning and thinking."[22]

The four decades which Ibn Khaldun lived, before writing his famed Prolegomena, can be roughly divided into two consecutive parts, the first of which was spent in the cultivating of religious knowledge; the other part was devoted to a diplomatic and political career. The contrast between the two parts was very great indeed. In the first part, he was extremely religious under the influence of his pious father. In the second part, on the other hand, he became extremely worldly under the influence of his "conspirital" society.

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[21]See Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 383 et seq.

[22]S. Hasri, op. cit., p. 65.

Finally, at his mature age, he retired to a nomadic tribe, trying to find a safe way out of this deadly dilemma. He probably felt an urgent need to discover a way of compromise between the two sharp horns of the dilemma. His mind might have been concentrated upon the controversial dichotomies of Omayyads versus Abbasids, Arabianism versus Islam, nomadism versus civilisation. Which of these two opposed poles was right, and which was wrong? He might have found the solution to lie "beyond" the conflicting consciences rather than within a certain one of them.

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One of the interesting aspects of Ibn Khaldun's life was his intimate relationship and close friendship with the religious scholars, on the one hand, and the tribal sheikhs, on the other. He seemed to have been able to approach each group according to its own way. Some may call this ability hypocrisy or flattery. According to Ibn Khaldun's theory, it can be considered, rather an ability of penetrating into the attitudinal complex of the others, and of understanding their deep-seated values. A naive flatterer may antagonize rather than please those whom he flatters.

Ibn Khaldun was particularly lovable and influential among the tribal sheikhs. Hasri ascribes the influence of Ibn Khaldun among the tribal sheikhs to his convincing tongue and penetrating

eloquence. This is what made the rulers of the time, says Hasri, try always to attract Ibn Khaldun to their side and to prevent him from joining the side of their enemies.[23]

It appears that his penetrating understanding of the values of the tribal sheikhs was more effective than his penetrating eloquence in this regard. Eloquence without understanding may give the impression of superficiality and pedantry; it may distract rather than attract the audience. It is amazing indeed to find that Ibn Khaldun was able to attract, not only the tribal sheikhs who spoke the same language as he did, but also Pedro the Cruel, the King of Castile, and Timur the Lame, the emperor of the Mongols.[24]

Everything leads us to believe that Ibn Khaldun had a great talent of penetrating into the depths of the others' minds, or of what Max Weber calls "Verstehen." In fact, Islam has produced many great travelers,[25] diplomats and politicians, other than Ibn Khaldun. But it seems that there appeared no one who could match Ibn Khaldun in his deep understanding of the various value systems. He was not satisfied with the mere describing of what he had seen in his wide travels, as other travelers usually did.

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[23]S. Hasri, op. cit., p. 65.

[24]See N. Schmidt, Ibn Khaldun, pp. 34-36.

[25]See Z. Hasan, Al-Rahhala Al-Moslemun, p. 5.

He liked to penetrate beyond the surface and try to discover the hidden motives and conceptions of the peoples observed.

A few decades before the writing of the Prolegomena, Ibn Batuta, the greatest traveler of Islam, published his memoirs. Instead of trying to understand the values of the various cultures that he visited, Ibn Batuta was inclined to be contemptuous of them or to laugh at them. His tremendously wide traveling seemed to be of no influence on his absolutistic perspective. This may be attributed to the fact that he was, unlike Ibn Khaldun, free from any "conflict of consciences." His mind, in other words, remained clinging to the values of his "sacred" society.

In fact, Ibn Khaldun can be rightly considered as a marginal man. He was driven by his "conflict of consciences" to stand on the margin between civilisation and nomadism.[26] His intimate relationships with the men of knowledge, on the one hand, and with the tribal sheikhs, on the other hand, made him, no doubt, perplexed between the two opposed systems of values.

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[26]"The marginal man," says Park, ". . . is one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic, cultures. . . In that case, his mind is the crucible in which two different and refractory cultures may be said to melt and, either wholly or in part, fuse. One runs across individuals who are caught in this conflict of cultures in the most unlikely places." (Robert E. Park, "Introduction," in E. Stonequist, Marginal Man, p. xv.)

The civilized values which were imbued into his mind
during his early years under the profound influence of his pious
father[27] and scholastic teachers,[28] could not of course be com-
pletely wiped out in the later years when he came into a close con-
tact with the nomadic tribes. These values probably remained in his
subconscious, ready to make trouble. It seems as if the trouble
arose when he began to be employed by the rulers of his time for
the purpose of appeasing the nomadic tribes or of making deals
with them. He might have found himself, then, personally attracted
toward the nomadic culture.

As a matter of fact, one can hardly avoid admiring the
nomadic people after he has visited them or come into close contact
with them. They are extremely hospitable, helpful, and generous
to their guest. They are quite lovable to those who approach them
on a friendly basis. They appear cruel or unjust only to those
who happen to stand in their way of conquest or plunder. They are
often disliked by the town-dwellers, as we have already noticed,
merely because they are accustomed to view the town with envy and

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[27]See Eman, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

[28]Toynbee says: "The education which he received from his
masters—of whom he gives an account in his *Autobiography*—seems
to have been exceedingly thorough but entirely scholastic." (A.
Toynbee, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 322, footnote.)

avarice and tend always to see in it a rich opportunity for plunder and easy spoil.

The particular dilemma of Ibn Khaldun lies in the fact that he was brought up in a town which had suffered a horrible destruction at the hands of the nomads; then, he happened to become closely acquainted with the nomads and to find them, to his great amazement, very "good" people.[29] He was perhaps obliged to search for another criterion of goodness and badness, in order to solve this apparent contradiction of life.

The same "conflict of conscience" that had disturbed both his society and his family came finally to disturb his mind. The same dilemma that had made Islam fluctuate between the "ideal" and "real" and made his ancestors fluctuate between religion and politics, most probably made him worried and perplexed. From what he has told us in his Autobiography, one can easily discover in

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[29]This seems to be, more or less, the problem of every town-dweller who happens to be well-acquainted with the nomads. In the towns that lie on the border of a certain nomadic desert, today, the same problem or the dilemma exists in the conscience of some men. They are accustomed to see two phases, "good" and "bad," in the nomadic man. In their eyes, the nomadic man is extremely good as a host, a friend or a protector; he suddenly becomes bad when he attacks, or is angry at, someone. This is, in fact, the problem with all men who belong to the "sacred" society. It appears more glaring or intensive with the nomadic man mainly because he often comes into contact with "strangers."

him the same hesitation and perplexity that characterized his
family. He was inclined at times to flee from his secular entangle-
ment and to retire to a mosque or a Sufite monastery in order to
appease his worried mind.[30]

At the age of 43 or so,[31] as we have already noted, he
finally decided to cut all his relations with politics and to seek
a refuge with a nomadic tribe, called Awlad Arif (i.e., the children
of Arif). He remained there for about four years writing and think-
ing. On this retirement Ibn Khaldun says:

> As I renounced public affairs, in order to live in
> retreat, . . . I fell in with the 'Awlad 'Arif and they
> welcomed me with gifts and honours. I took up my abode
> with them; and they sent to Tilimsan to fetch my family
> and my children. They promised at the same time to
> represent to the Sultan that it was positively impossible
> for me to fulfil the mission with which he had charged me;
> and in fact they induced him to accept my excuses. There-
> upon I established myself with my family at Qal'at ibn
> Salamah, a castle situated in the country of the Banu
> Tujin which was held from the Sultan by the Duwawidah in
> feudal tenure. I remained there for four years, entirely
> free from worries and from the turmoil of public affairs;
> and it was there that I began the composition of my work
> /on universal history/. It was in this retreat that I
> completed the Muqaddamat: a work which was entirely

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[30]See, for example, Ibn Khaldun, Kitab Al-Ibar, Vol. VII,
p. 432.

[31]According to the lunar calendar, which is normally used in
Islam, Ibn Khaldun was, at that time, 44 years old. But to calculate
his age by the solar years, he should have been 42 years old. Count
as you like! Life begins after forty.

original in its plan and which I made out of the cream
of an enormous mass of research. When I settled at
Qal'at ibn Salamah, I installed myself in a large and
solid suite of rooms that had been built there by Abu
Bakr ibn 'Arif. During the prolonged stay which I made
in this castle, I completely forgot the kingdoms of
the Maghrib and of Tilimsan and thought of nothing but
the present work.[32]

Ibn Khaldun gives us, in this historic retirement, an
interesting example of what Toynbee calls the process of "withdrawal-
and-return."[33] By withdrawing to such a peaceful refuge, and becom-
ing free from the turmoils and disturbances of actual life, Ibn
Khaldun was able to contemplate deeply in order to discover a
solution for his overwhelming dilemma. He was, in other words,
ready to receive the intuitive insight, or what Bergson calls the

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[32]Cited by A. Toynbee, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 325-26.
This quotation clearly indicates the close friendship that existed
between Ibn Khaldun and the nomadic tribes. Toynbee has been
amazed to see Ibn Khaldun writing his great dispraise against
the Arabs while living under their hospitable protection. Toynbee
says: "It is amusing to reflect that the great work on the
philosophy of history which had been originally inspired in Ibn
Khaldun's mind by the portent of Arab barbarism in the Maghrib
/i.e., the West/ was actually composed under the aegis of the
very barbarians who were the author's betes noires. We may con-
jecture that Ibn Khaldun found means of excusing himself from
reading aloud to his ingenuous hosts the biting satire on their
ancestral way of life which he had been composing under their
hospitable roof!" (Ibid., Vol. III, p. 326, footnote.)

[33]See Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 321-28.

mystical inspiration of the _élan vital_.[34]

As we have seen in Chapter XIV of this dissertation, Ibn Khaldun actually experienced a certain sort of inspiration or mystical intuition. In fact, he was, as Hasri points out, amazed at the tremendous flow of the new ideas that poured into his mind at that time.[35] He felt as if some prophetic light was suddenly rising within his soul.

In describing the creative process of "withdrawal-and-return," Toynbee points out that the individual, after participating in the practical affairs of life, withdraws temporarily. This withdrawal constitutes a spiritual crises and creative experience.

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[34]For Bergson it is the mystics who are the superhuman creators _par excellence_, and he finds the essence of the creative act in the supreme moment of the mystical experience. "Shaken to her depths by the current that is to carry her away, the Soul ceases to turn upon herself and escapes for one instant from the law which requires the species and the individual to condition one another in a vicious circle. The Soul stops still, as though she heard a voice calling her. Then she lets herself go—straight forward." (Cited by _Ibid._, Vol. III, p. 232.) It is interesting indeed to find Ibn Khaldun himself explaining the mystical inspiration in a way quite reminiscent of Bergson's. Ibn Khaldun says: "The human soul has an innate disposition to divest itself of its human nature in order to clothe itself in the nature of the angels and to become an angel in reality for a single instant of time—a moment which comes and goes as swiftly as the flicker of an eye-lid. Thereupon, the soul resumes its human nature, after having received, in the world of angels, a message which it has to carry to its own human kind. This is the meaning of the terms Revelation and Discourse of Angels." (Ibn Khaldun, _Al-Mooaddima_, p. 100.)

[35]S. Hasri, _op. cit._, pp. 70-71.

Eventually the "transfigured" personality returns to the social
scene in a new role.[36] It is of significance to find that many
of the individual cases, which represent the process of "withdrawal-
and-return" as discussed by Toynbee, indicate the same "conflict of
conscience" and the perplexity of the marginal personality which
characterised Ibn Khaldun. Most of them appear to have fallen under
a similar culture conflict, and to have passed through the same
crisis[37] as that of Ibn Khaldun.

It is interesting to notice that Ibn Khaldun has passed in
his life through the three phases that normally characterise the
life-cycle of a typical marginal man. According to Stonequist,
the marginal man has at least three significant stages in his personal
evolution:[38]

(1) A stage when he is not aware that the culture conflict
embraces his own career. He has as yet no inner conflict. This
stage may correspond to the protected environment of childhood in
which he is still under the influence of the "sacred" society and
its absolute values.

(2) The second stage is a period when he consciously

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[36] A Toynbee, _op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 217 et seq.

[37] Cf. E. Stonequist, _op. cit._, p. 123.

[38] See _Ibid._, pp. 120-30.

experiences the conflict of values. It constitutes a crisis--a situation in which his usual habits and attitudes break down to some extent. The individual must then "find himself" again. He has been lost.

(3) The third stage consists of the ways in which the marginal man responds to his situation, the adjustment he makes or attempts to make. He may reach a successful adjustment which permits him to be at ease again: he then may evolve out of the marginal class. However, the marginal man may not be able to solve his dilemma. The difficulties may be so overwhelming, relative to the individual resources, that he is unable to adjust himself and so becomes disorganized.[39] In fact, many criminals evolve in this way.

Fortunately, Ibn Khaldun was able, in a sense, to adjust himself and to discover a safe way out. It is reasonable, however, to suggest that he was about to become disorganized, had he not found a peaceful and "inspirational" refuge. It seems that his conscience was on verge of collapse during the period that preceded his retirement. His extreme realism and amazing fickleness at that time indicated, in a way, that he was drifting toward a disintegrated life. To quote Schmidt,

[39]See Ibid., p. 123.

He easily changed his allegiance, leaving one
master to serve another, shrewdly watching their chances
of success. He was as versed in intrigue as any diplomat
in any other age. But politics was then a particularly
dangerous occupation. . . . Ibn Khaldun has an unmistak-
able taste for living and taking an active part in this
world. That seemed to imply the necessity of using, not
only prudence and tact, courtesy and generosity, but also
flattery and bribes. His poems, correspondence and
historic narratives show to what perfection he brought
the art of flattery, subtle and suggestive or fulsome
and ingratiating, according to circumstances. It was so
commonly cultivated, and deemed so useful, that he
probably did not reflect much on its pernicious effect
alike on the artist himself and the subject. How far
he recognized the distinction, not yet too clearly
perceived in political circles, between a gift that is
a legitimate as well as beautiful expression of sympathy,
thoughtfulness, or fellowship and the present or favor
that has an ulterior object may possibly be questioned.
There is a road that leads almost imperceptibly from
ordinary tipping, almsgiving and birthday remembrances
to the payment for political support, the purchase of
governmental favors, and the sale of public offices.[40]

It is astonishing indeed to find Ibn Khaldun being completely

changed after emerging from his historic retirement, or to use

Toynbee's terms, after his "withdrawal-and-return."[41] By writing

the Prolegomena, he has probably solved, to his full satisfaction,

his overwhelming problem. With one stroke, he has solved the

practical dilemma of his own life as well as the theoretical dilemma

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[40]N. Schmidt, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

[41]According to Hasri, the retirement was a turning-point in
the life of Ibn Khaldun. "He was, before it, primarily a man of
politics and action. He turned to be, afterwards, a man of learn-
ing and thinking in the full sense of the word." (S. Hasri, op.
cit., p. 66.)

of his society.

As a matter of fact, the two dilemmas, i.e., the dilemma of his own life and that of his society, are two aspects of the same reality. By solving one of them, the other will be simultaneously solved.

It is, as Stonequist puts it, the practical efforts of the marginal man to solve his own problem that led him consciously or unconsciously to change the social situation itself. His interest may shift from himself to the objective social conditions and launch him upon the career of a prophet, teacher, reformer, interpreter, conciliator and the like. In these roles he inevitably promotes acculturation, either upon a basis of larger political and cultural unity or in terms of a modified political and a cultural differentiation—a new state. It is in the mind of the marginal man that the inner significance and the driving motives of such culture change are most luminously revealed.[42]

These are the lines along which many of the great marginal men of history proceeded in their solutions. These are the ways of Confucius, Buddha, Moses, Jesus, Paul, Mohammed, Solon, Caesar, Machiavelli, Peter, Kant, Ibn Khaldun, etc. Each one of them can be said to have experienced a certain kind of "inner conflict" as

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[42]See E. Stonequist, op. cit., pp. 221-22.

a result of a clash between different cultures, and each of them have tried to solve the psychic conflict as well as the social one with one stroke.

The marginal man tends usually to solve his problem either by joining one of the conflicting cultures or by devising a new way that lies in the middle.[43] A creative thinker usually dislikes to follow the first way, that is, to join one of the two opposed cultures. His profound insight into the defects of both of them, may urge him to develop a system of his own making in which the advantages of both are retained while the disadvantages are eliminated.

Ibn Khaldun seems to have adopted the middle way. As we have already observed, he has discovered particular abuses in both nomadism and civilisation. He set himself, therefore, to reconcile the two and to create a new one out of ther.

It is interesting indeed to note that Ibn Khaldun has been well-acquainted with Aristotle's formula of ethics that a virtue lies in the "golden mean," that is, in the middle between two extreme vices. Ibn Khaldun says, "the two extremities of every human trait are bad. The good lies only in the middle; thus, between stinginess and extravagance is liberality; between cowardice

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[43]Cf. Ibid., p. 130.

and rashness is courage. . . ."[44]

From the practical point of view, there is, however, a big defect in Aristotle's theory of the golden mean. It is a purely theoretical formula which can exist only in the minds of the arm-chair philosophers. In his actual life, man can hardly follow this ideal of Aristotle. Human traits, as we have already noticed, can-not be depersonalized or treated separately in order to arrive at the golden mean in each of them.

Ibn Khaldun was more realistic than to accept such a purely idealistic solution. His solution should have been practicable and derived from the historical experience of mankind.

The students of Ibn Khaldun's theory almost agree that Ibn Khaldun has not developed any solution for the problem of his society. According to their opinion, he was mainly interested in describing his society rather than to discover any remedy for its illness. In fact, this is what appears te the superficial observers who tend to understand Ibn Khaldun's theory on its face-value with-out trying to penetrate deeper into its real meaning.

In the final analysis, Ibn Khaldun can be rightly considered, not only a founder of new "science," but also a preacher of new

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[44] Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moqaddima, p. 189. Here, it appears that Ibn Khaldun has adapted the formula of Aristotle word by word. (Cf. Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, p. 60.)

systems of values. He can be considered, in other words, a con-
ciliator of nomadism and Islam.

It is amazing to see that Ibn Khaldun does not fully appreciate,
from among all great men of Islam, but only three men. These men are
Omar, Muawiya, and Ibn Tumart, the "Mahdi" of the Muwahhid dynasty.
By studying the lives of these three men, one may be able to discover
Ibn Khaldun's profound philosophy of life and his new system of
values. In appreciating a certain kind of people, a person usually
reflects, in an indrect way, his admiration of their values.

As we have noticed, during the caliphate of Omar, Islam and
nomadism became identical. After Omar's death, the two began to
show signs of separation and antagonism. At the hands of Muawiya,
they were, more or less, re-united again. It is reasonable therefore
to suggest that Ibn Khaldun's appreciation of Omar and Muawiya indi-
cates that he likes nomadism and Islam to be reconciled according to
the same pattern—the pattern which was successfully achieved at
the times of Omar and Muawiya.

This will be more clearly indicated if we study Ibn Khaldun's
attitude toward the "Mahdi" of the Muwahhid dynasty. Ibn Khaldun
was, as we noticed in Chapter XI of this work, the most antagonistic
critic in Islam of the "millennial hope" and of the doctrine of
"Mahdism." The only "Mahdi" he appreciated was that of the Muwahhid
dynasty.[45] Why? The reason will be very clear if we realise that

[45]See Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

this "Mahdi" was successful in combining Islam and nomadism in
a way quite reminiscent of that of Omar or Muawiya. The empire
which he established was second to none in the annals of Africa.[46]

> Thus for the first time in Moslem history the whole
> coast from the Atlantic to the frontier of Egypt became
> firmly united with Andalusia under one sceptre. . . .
> From every pulpit in this immense new empire Friday
> prayers were read in the name of the Mahdi or his caliph
> instead of in that of the 'Abbasid caliph as heretofore.[47]

By studying the life-story of Ibn Tumart, more light may be

shed on the present subject. To quote Hitti again,

> The Muwahhid dynasty had its inception in a politico-
> religious movement founded by a Berber. This was Muhammad
> ibn-Tumart (ca. 1078-ca. 1130) of the Masmudah tribe.
> Muhammad assumed the symbolic title of al-Mahdi and pro-
> claimed himself the prophet sent to restore Islam to its
> pure and original orthodoxy. He preached among his own
> and other wild tribes of the Moroccan Atlas the doctrine
> of tawhid, the unity of God and the spiritual conception
> of Him, as a protest against the excessive anthropomorphism
> then prevalent in Islam. Accordingly his followers were
> called al-Muwahhidun. Small, ugly and misshapen, this
> son of a mosque lamplighter lived the life of an ascetic,
> and opposed music, drinking and other manifestations of
> laxity. When a young man, his zeal led him to assault in
> the streets of Fas (Fez) a sister of the reigning Murabit
> 'Ali ibn-Yusuf because she went unveiled.[48]

In Ibn Tumart, as well as in Omar and Muawiya before him,

Ibn Khaldun seemed to have discovered actual examples of what he was

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[46]See P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 546.

[47]Ibid., p. 548.

[48]Ibid., p. 546.

going to preach—examples of an excellent combination of nomadism and Islam, or in other words, of "might" and "right." Thus, Ibn Khaldun found his long-sought solution, and so, he emerged from his retirement content and enlightened.

Ibn Khaldun's philosophy has been considered, throughout the present work, as "the philosophy of drifting." Now we can say that it should be rather considered as "the philosophy of drifting and watching." He preaches, it is true, that one should drift with, not resist, the social process. In the light of the preceding discussion, this drifting policy can be understood according to its own inner meaning, rather than according to our own interpretation of it.

In Ibn Khaldun's opinion, the social process is self-correcting. It is a dialectic that runs on a cycle: from good to bad and, then to good again. "Might" and "right" are originally two phases of one reality. According to his theory, nomadism is the abode of the original society where "might" and "right" are well-integrated into each other. They begin to be separated from each other only when the nomadic tribes come into contact with each other. Thus, hostility and destruction are the result. Hence, comes the usefulness of religion through which the hostile tribes are united for the purpose of establishing a benevolent politico-religious system.

In this politico-religious system, according to Ibn Khaldun, the hope of humanity lies. It is a system where "might" and "right" are combined again on a much larger scale. In it, the advantages of both nomadism and civilization are gathered, while their disadvantages are eliminated. It is, of course, not permanent. The dynamics of social life do not permit it to continue for a long period of time. However, it will, sooner or later, appear again after its disappearance.

When Ibn Khaldun returned from his historic "withdrawal," he was perhaps expecting that such a benevolent system was about to rise. The Muwahhid empire had collapsed a few decades before his time. The rulers of his time whom he served, before his withdrawal, began to appear to his eyes now unworthy of his service. He began probably to consider them as representatives of the phase of decline in the social dialectic.

Ibn Khaldun was, then, looking for a new "Mahdi" or prophet. He bitterly criticised those false "Mahdis" who tried to rise without paying attention to the law of the social dialectic. He advised them to be silent, to drift along with the social process, and to look for the coming of the true "Mahdi" who will possess "might" as well as "right."

Ibn Khaldun quit his earlier career and adopted, then, the role of a teacher. When he reached Egypt, the students crowded his

"Mosque-circle."[49] According to Enan, the Egyptian students were enchanted by his eloquent explanation and profound social philosophy.[50]

Afterwards, he was appointed as a judge. He accepted the appointment, after hesitation, but he did not turn back to his old habit of exploiting public offices to further personal ends. He proceeded in his judicial practices, as all historians agree, with strict honesty and great integrity.[51] This, in fact, clearly indicates that Ibn Khaldun was, at that time, quite different from his early days. As a result of his "withdrawal" he became a different man, or to use Toynbee's terminology, a "transfigured" personality.[52]

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[49]In Islam, until today, religious teaching is usually performed in the mosque where the teacher sits down on the carpet and his students sit around him in a *circle*. In Al-Azhar, in Cairo, where Ibn Khaldun taught, six centuries ago, students still receive their daily lessons in the same way—in circles.

[50]M. Enan, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

[51]See *Ibid.*, pp. 71-73.

[52]"The disengagement and withdrawal make it possible for the personality to realise individual potentialities which might have remained in abeyance if the individual in whom they were immanent had not been released for a moment from his social toils and trammels. The withdrawal is an opportunity, and perhaps a necessary condition, for the anchorite's transfiguration; but, by the same token, this transfiguration can have no purpose, and perhaps even no meaning, except as a prelude to the return of the transfigured personality into the social milieu out of which he has originally come. . . ." (A..Toynbee, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 248.)

Schmidt errs when he attributes to the later days of
Ibn Khaldun the same tendency of corruption as that of his early
days. Schmidt says: "Yet to the end of his life he continued to
use the mammon of unrighteousness to further personal ends. . . ."[53]
This is, in reality, very far from the truth. Even the bitterest
enemies of Ibn Khaldun in Egypt acknowledged, in a way, his honesty
as a judge.[54] Al-Sakhkhawi, one of the severe critics of Ibn
Khaldun, flatly declared that "He was well-known by the maintenance
of justice."[55]

In contrast to Schmidt, von Wesendonk considers that the
whole life of Ibn Khaldun, from the beginning to the end, was
sincerely devoted to the search of knowledge. Ibn Khaldun, accord-
ing to von Wesendonk, was always honest, sincere, and a high-
principled man.[56] It appears that each of Schmidt and von Wesendonk
concentrates upon one part of Ibn Khaldun's life and overlooks the
other part. The truth seems to lie in the fact that Ibn Khaldun
was both fickle and sincere--fickle before the "withdrawal,"
sincere after it.

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[53] See N. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 43.

[54] See M. Enan, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

[55] Ibid., p. 73.

[56] von Wesendonk, "Ibn Khaldun," in Taha Hussain, op. cit.,
p. 175.

Schmidt particularly mentions Ibn Khaldun's visit to Timur, the Mongolian conqueror, and considers it an indication of the continuing of Ibn Khaldun along the same line of fickleness and corruption as that of his early days.[57]

The story of Ibn Khaldun's visit to Timur is interesting indeed. While Damascus was beseiged by the nomadic Mongols, Ibn Khaldun hauled himself down by a rope from the wall of Damascus, and then he was taken to the tent of Timur. He relates himself how he first tasted the fruits he presented to Timur, whereupon he also ate them. He spent thirty-five days in writing an account of the Maghrib at Timur's request. He would not sell his richly caparisoned mule to Timur, but gave it to him as a present. After the entry of Timur into Damascus, when the city was pillaged and the inhabitants massacred, he offered to the conqueror a gift composed of a beautifully bound Koran, a "borda" which he had probably wirtten himself in praise of Mohammed, a tapestry, and two boxes of Egyptian candy. He aroused Timur's interest in his Universal History and cleverly used it for his own purposes. "Wouldst thou return to Egypt?" asked Timur. "My Lord, I have no desire but to follow thee," answered Ibn Khaldun.[58]

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[57]N. Schmidt, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

[58]See Ibid., p. 40; M. Enan, op. cit., pp. 81-86.

It might be possible that Ibn Khaldun intended, by his visit to Timur, to examine this famous nomadic conqueror and to see whether he might fit into the criterion which Ibn Khaldun had established in his social theory for the expected "Mahdi." According to this theory, as we have noticed, the nomads cannot conquer other peoples and establish an empire without a religion. It is reasonable to suggest therefore that, observing the great empire established by the nomadic Mongols under the leadership of Timur, Ibn Khaldun visited Timur in order to examine him in the light of his theory and to see whether the theory could be applicable to him or not.

After witnessing the horrible pillage and massacre which the nomadic Mongols had committed upon the helpless inhabitants of Damascus, Ibn Khaldun might have decided that Timur could not be the right "Mahdi" whom he had expected. Timur was purely nomadic in his character. He was not like Omar or Ibn Tumart, a really religious man. Ibn Khaldun returned, then, to Egypt possibly with some sense of disappointment.

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The orthodox thinkers can raise another objection against Ibn Khaldun's visit to the Mongolian conqueror. According to the Mohammedan "traditions," the true Moslem should protest against every

unjust ruler; he should, as we have seen, "bid the good and for-
bid the evil," wherever and whenever he finds them. Therefore,
Ibn Khaldun had violated the sacred "traditions" of Mohammed by
flattering Timur and by presenting precious gifts to him.

According to Ibn Khaldun's theory, as we have already
noted, the Mohammedan principle of "bidding the good and forbidding
the evil" is meant to be applied within the "heart" only. Here,
his philosophy of "drifting and watching" is quite observable.
In his opinion, one should not protest or revolt against an evil
act, publicly and actually. A public protest usually results in
social unrest and wasteful bloodshed without any compensatory
advantage. The "heart" protest is enough. Nobody is able, in Ibn
Khaldun's opinion, to alter the course of the social dialectic.
One should, therefore, leave the social process alone, for it will,
sooner or later, correct itself.

Here, Ibn Khaldun appears to have discovered the solution
for his personal problem, parallel with his solution for the
cultural problem. According to this solution, the marginal man
should drift along with the social process, watching its dialectical
turn toward the good.

Stonequist points out that the marginal man may become,
on account of his in-between situation, an acute and able critic
of the dominant group and its values. This is, says Stonequist,

because he combines the knowledge and insight of the insider with
the critical attitude of the outsider. His analysis is not neces-
sarily objective—there is too much emotional tension underneath
to make such an attitude easy of achievement. "But he is skillful
in noting the contradictions and 'hypocrasies' in the dominant
culture. The gap between its moral pretension and its actual
achievements jumps to his eye."[59]

Ibn Khaldun seems to fit exactly into this pattern of the
marginal man. He has been quite efficient in his criticism of the
prevailing values of civilisation. He attacked the orthodox
advocates of civilisation and labeled them as hypocrites, or
accustomed of saying what they did not actually do.

When he comes to discuss the oft-maintained conflict between
"idealism" and "realism," he takes the "compartmentalisation" which
has characterised the thought-style of the orthodox thinkers and
developes it to its logical conclusion. He bitterly criticises
their habit of thinking in one way and behaving in another, of
their vehement preaching for the "ideal" and their actual following
of the "real." In his opinion, there is no conflict between the
"ideal" and the "real." Each has its own realm from which it
should not emerge in order to molest the realm of the other. Man
should, according to his theory, be "idealistic" only within his

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[59]E. Stonequist, _op. cit._, p. 155.

purely religious retirement and devotion; but, when man comes out
to be entangled in the network of the social relationships he
should be extremely "realistic," because the "idealistic" tendency
usually harms, rather than benefits, the social process. Social
process, according to Ibn Khaldun, is unchangeable and inevitable;
one should therefore drift with, rather than resist, its rolling
currents.

As to the relationship between religion and reason, Ibn
Khaldun proceeds along a similar line. In his opinion, human
reason is capable only of solving the everyday problems of this
phenomenal world; it is completely unable to solve the mysteries
of the metaphysical world from which the religious beliefs normally
spring. Trying to discover the religious truth by means of reason
is, according to Ibn Khaldun, exactly like the weighing of mountains
by means of the small balance with which gold is usually weighed.
Hence, he looks down upon the Aristotelian logic. He criticises
this logic on the ground that it tries to discover the metaphysical
truth which lies beyond its capacity, while it overlooks the social
truth which lies within its grasp, ready to be discovered.

In this way, Ibn Khaldun shuts the door against any
criticism that may be raised by the orthodox thinkers against his
policy of "drifting and watching." He refutes "idealism" which
has been always the refuge of every rebel and trouble-maker. He
also belittles the Aristotelian logic which has been often used as

a tool for pedantic argument and senseless ideation.

He sets himself, therefore, to be the _teacher_ of a new logic—a logic which opens the eyes of its student to the real factors of life and to their actual interaction and operation. Through this logic, man can fully understand his social environment and successfully adapt himself to it. Instead of the absolutistic, eternalistic, spiritualistic logic of Aristotle, Ibn Khaldun has developed a relativistic, temporalistic, materialistic logic which reflects, rather than distorts, the actual life.

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It is interesting to notice that the new logic, with its three laws of relativism, temporalism, and materialism, has actually solved one of the chronic problems of Ibn Khaldun. As we have already noticed, the Aristotelian logic has been utilized by the orthodox thinkers in their condemnation of the Omayyads, the Arabs and the nomads.

It is amazing indeed to find Ibn Khaldun using the laws of temporalism, relativism, and materialism in defending the Omayyads, the Arabs, and the nomads respectively. He expounds the idea that there is nothing intrinsically evil in those peoples. They may be good or evil according to the time, place and cause in which they happen to be involved.

Let us discuss in some detail how Ibn Khaldun deals with each of these three elements, one by one.

(1) As to the Omayyad dynasty, Ibn Khaldun believes that it was like any other dynasty in the history of mankind, good in the beginning, bad at the end. This is due to the work of the dialectical or the "temporalistic," principle which governs all the world. No one can escape from falling under its cyclical rolling. The Omayyads were very good in the beginning, just like the Abbasids; but with the passing of time they began to be indulged in the luxury of civilization and so they deviated from the "good" path of their beginning. The Abbasids, according to Ibn Khaldun, fell exactly under the same pattern: Good in the beginning, bad at the end![60]

(2) As to the defense of the Arabs, Ibn Khaldun applies the principle of "relativism." The Arabs are not absolutely bad, as the orthodox writers would say. They are, according to Ibn Khaldun, bad for certain things, good for others. They are good or bad according to the standpoint from which you look at them. They are savage, illiterate and destructive, and they are, also, brave men, able fighters and good conquerors. It is difficult to find a man who is good in fighting and learning at the same time.

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[60]See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Mocaddima, pp. 206-07.

You have to have either one or the other.

(3) As to the defense of the nomads in general, Ibn Khaldun applies the principle of cause and effect, or the principle of "materialism." The nomads, in his opinion, are savage or "bad" not because they are driven by evil spirits or cursed by God. Human nature is the same all over the world, according to Ibn Khaldun. Man is the child of his social environment, rather than of his biological nature.[61] The nomads, as a result of their peculiar life in the desert, cannot be different from what they are. The tribe that roams in the desert, under no rule but the rule of the sword, must be rough, or it will, sooner or later, perish from upon the face of the earth.

Thus, Ibn Khaldun applies the rules of his new logic to defend the Omayyads, the Arabs and the nomads. It is quite probable that he has intentionally invented his new logic for the purpose of defending them. After seeing that the old logic, with its eternal-istic, absolutistic, and spiritualistic characteristics, has been advantageously used against them, he might have endeavored to develop a logic with opposite characteristics in order to reverse the process.

It is undeniable, however, that Ibn Khaldun's rich experience

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[61]See _Ibid._, p. 120.

of the actual life and his wide traveling, to the east and west,
were of no small significance in this respect. Schmidt says about
the wide experience of Ibn Khaldun as follows:

> It has brought him into touch with Pedro the Cruel
> in the West and Timur the Lame in the East. It has
> taken him into the huts of savages and into the palaces
> of kings, into the dungeons with criminals and into the
> highest courts of justice, into the companionship of the
> illiterate and into the academies of scholars, into the
> treasure-houses of the past and into the activities of
> the present, into deprivation and sorrow and into affluence
> and joy. It had led him into the depths where the spirit
> broods over the meaning of life.[62]

Whether his rich experience or personal attitude has been
the main reason behind the development of his new logic is difficult
to decide. It is quite reasonable indeed to suggest that both of
these two factors were influential in this regard. It is possible
that his personal attitude has provided him with the scaffolding
of his logic, while his experience has supplied him with the building-
materials.

Concept and percept usually go hand in hand. They are, in
a sense, necessary to each other, or as Kant puts it, "concept
without percept is empty; percept without concept is blind." Thus,
the rich experience of Ibn Khaldun might have been of no avail if
there were no conceptual inclination, within his mind, toward the
arranging of the collected data along certain lines.

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[62]N. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 41.

CHAPTER XXI

CONCLUSION

After spending such a large effort in studying the theory of Ibn Khaldun, one may raise an important question as to the use of such a study. He may ask: what is the lesson which the people of the twentieth century can get from studying the theory of a fourteenth century writer. This question puts us indeed face to face with a controversy that has engaged the mind of the modern man for a long period of time.

Some thinkers are of the opinion that there is no use in studying the theories of the past. It is more useful, they would say, to concentrate our effort on the understanding of the most recent theories. The modern theories, in their opinion, contain the valid elements of all the past theories; they are, in other words, the end-products of all of what the creative minds of the past have produced. There is no use therefore to study the less developed theories of the past while the modern theories are waiting to be studied.

Is this argument right? It seems that it can be right, to some extent, in the field of natural sciences, where the last-developed theories are, more or less, the sifted end-products of most of the previous ones. In the natural sciences one can, with

some reservation, say that the newer a theory is the more valid it will be. In the social sciences, on the other hand, the matter is quite different. The newer theory is not necessarily the better. The students, who are influenced by the pattern of natural sciences, are usually inclined to view social theories in the same light as they view natural-science theories, without observing the big difference between the two.

A social theory is usually expounded by its author in response to a certain particular problem which is, more or less, restricted, in its effects, to his time and place. It is, in other words, part of the culture within which it appears.

The superficial student tends to belittle the importance of the past theories mainly because he overlooks the historical perspective in studying them and tries to view them through the perspective of his own culture. Consequently, he considers them as naive and even ridiculous.

This is, in fact, the problem with some of the modern students of Ibn Khaldun. They tend to read his writings in the light of the modern thought-style, and so they often find them boring rather than interesting, useless rather than useful.

By viewing an old social theory within the context of its culture, one may be able to understand certain aspects of the social phenomena that he is unable to understand otherwise. Social phenomenon, as Scheler points out, has several phases. A "socially-

bound" observer can see only one phase of it—that is, the phase

toward which his group has been directed.

> The historical and sociological relativities of
> norms, purposes and goods of society . . . is only a
> relativity of perspective in the absolute realm, for
> each represents a partial participation in the "eternal
> and objective logos." Given all cultures, past,
> present, and future, the logos may be expressed so
> fully that there is a total perspective, the varieties
> of cultures contributing . . . to the "meaningful unity
> of a magnificent painting."[1]

In order to see the social phenomenon from all its phases, it is

necessary therefore to go around it and try to view it through

the eyes of the various groups that are interested in it.

> Mannheim says:

> . . . in certain areas of historical-social knowledge it
> should be regarded as right and inevitable that a given
> finding should contain the traces of the position of the
> knower. The problem lies not in trying to hide these
> perspectives or in apologizing for them, but in inquir-
> ing into the question of how, granted these perspectives,
> knowledge and objectivity are still possible. It is not
> a source of error that in the visual picture of an object
> in space we can, in the nature of the case, get only a
> perspectivistic view. The problem is not how we might
> arrive at a non-perspectivistic picture but how, by
> juxtaposing the various points of view, each perspective
> may be recognized as such and thereby a new level of
> objectivity attained. Thus we come to the point where
> the false ideal of a detached, impersonal point of view must
> be replaced by the ideal of an essentially human point
> of view which is within the limits of a human perspective,
> constantly striving to enlarge itself.[2]

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[1] Becker, and Dahlke, "Max Scheller's Sociology of Knowledge,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. II, No. 3, March 1942,
p. 314.

[2] K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 266-67.

This may explain partly, at least, why social scientists are more interested in studying the histories of their theories than the natural scientists. A social scientist believes that by studying the various theories of the past in the light of their various social environments, he may develop a profound insight into the real meaning of the modern theories.

Moreover, by seeing how an early thinker attempted to solve the problems of his time and what the weak and strong points in his theory were, as criticised by later thinkers, one may find, within his mind, a powerful "intuitive" urge toward a similar attempt. He may be, however, more successful than the earlier thinkers in his attempt, for he is able to examine the social phenomenon from more angles. He is less "socially-bound" in his world-view, because he sees through the perspectives of the early thinkers as well as through his own.

According to Mannheim, the creative thinking, or what he calls "the synthetic thinking," is a prerogative of the "socially-unbound" or "free" class of intellectuals. Such class of intellectuals, Mannheim says, can "discover the various right or partial truths, and synthesize them into a new view."[3]

It may be right to say that the less "socially-bound" the theorist is, the deeper will be his insight into the real meaning

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[3] See Barnes, Becker and Becker, Contemporary Social Theories, p. 84.

of the social phenomenon.

A question may be raised here: Is it possible for a social thinker to be completely "socially-unbound"? In the light of what we have seen in the present dissertation, a complete "socially-unboundness," or the Aristotelian objectivity, is tremendously difficult and may be, in a sense, impossible. As we have noticed, the human mind is usually imprisoned within three circles—within the circles of his personal attitudes, class position, and cultural values. Man seems to be able rarely to escape all of these three circles by one single leap. If he escapes one, he will fell into another, as if he jumps from the frying pan into the fire.

At any rate, this should not discourage the social thinker from trying to be "socially-unbound," as far as possible. Man cannot, of course, be absolutely objective in his social study. He is a social being before he is a social student. He cannot always stand on the hill watching his group striving without, consciously or unconsciously, participating in their activities.

Following Titchener's suggestion, it may be safe to say that the social thinker is able to be objective, in a way, for a small fraction of his time at least.

> . . . No man, as Titchener says, can be a scientist
> for more than about four hours a day; for those four
> hours he must subject himself to an iron discipline,
> but for the other twenty he is as free as human beings
> ever are. Granted, he cannot wholly compartmentalize
> himself; as a consequence his function as a scientist

> is continually interfering with his function as a
> human being and vice versa, just as his experience as
> a scientist is continually contributing to his
> experience as a human being and vice versa—neverthe-
> less, the two aspects of his personality should be not
> confused.[4]

Therefore, a social student can be objective in his library in the same way as a physicist can be in his laboratory. He can work, then, strictly according to the rules of his scientific discipline, while watching at the same time his personal attitudes or cultural values lest they should unduly interfere with his objective procedure. Thus, he may play in his life a double role, so to speak, becoming "socially-unbound" within his research realm, while retaining his normal "socially-boundness" within his social activities.

In fact, we can find an excellent example of such a compartmentalized life, in Ibn Khaldun himself. As we have already observed throughout the present dissertation, Ibn Khaldun's religious devotion has not prevented him from describing the social phenomenon as it is, rather than as it ought to be. He has taken the schizoid "compartmentalization" that has characterized the thought-style of his contemporaries and developed it to its logical conclusion.

It is amazing indeed to find that the civilized man tends generally to be less "socially-bound" in his business dealings than

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[4]Wiese-Becker, Systematic Sociology, p. 7.

in the other kinds of his social activities. In moral matters,
as Kimball Young points out, he may thoroughly accept the codes
and the ideals of his group, but he feels "free to break these
codes in dealing with competitors in business."[5] He, in other
words, becomes less "socially-bound" when he feels that the social
values are going to contradict his economic values.

Accordingly, it is quite possible that the social theorist
may develop the same attitude toward the social values as that
which the business man has developed. He may violate them as soon
as they begin to interfere with his scientific procedure. In
reality, the scientific values to the scientist may be more precious
and engaging than the economic values to the business man.

It seems, however, that not all men are equally capable of
achieving such a scientific objectivity. It can be said that there
is a particular type of personality that fits, more or less, into
such a "socially-unbound" pattern. A man, with a fanatic disposi-
tion or a strong attachment to his group, is seldom able to be
objective in his view of social phenomenon. Only the marginal man,
in other words, is able to go around the social truth and examine
its various phases.

Social theorists have been accustomed to look at the marginal

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[5] K. Young, Social Psychology, p. 130.

man with disfavor. He is, in their opinion, the carrier of moral and social disorganization.[6] This is no doubt true, but it does not tell the whole story. As a matter of fact, the marginal man has helped a great deal in humanizing and generalizing morality. This is true especially in the ancient times when civilization was still in its cradle. At that time, the marginal men were not able, as they are now, to disintegrate the moral values of their group. Owing to the lack of efficient means of transportation and communication, the number of marginal men was not large enough to do that. The marginal man was obliged then to replace the locally-restricted conscience by a freer one. He helped a great deal in the moral progress by extending the moral limits to include outside groups. It is relevent to quote Myers about this point,

> ⁻ ⁻ Moral progress consists not so much in changes in the quality or intensity of the moral emotions—as in the successive enlargement of the circle of persons embraced by the moral feeling. 'It is not the sense of duty to a neighbor, but the practical answer to the question, who is my neighbor? that has varied' . . . the moral feelings embrace at first only kinsmen, that is, the members of one's own family, clan or social group. All others are outside the moral pale. But gradually this circle grows larger and embraces in successive expansions the tribe, the city, the nation, and lastly humanity.[7]

In this way, the local god or totem which symbolises the

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[6] See for example, P. Landis, _Social Control_, pp. 419-20.

[7] P. V. N. Myers, _History as Past Ethics_, p. 4.

social values of the group has been replaced by a universal God with universal moral system. Undoubtedly, this can be achieved only by the marginal man. The ordinary man who is educated to view things through his group's eyes is hardly able to do that. He cannot even imagine its possibility. The marginal man alone, because of his acquaintance with some value-systems other than his own, can easily achieve it. He soars high above the local moral-systems into a synthesized, generalized one.[8]

Robert Park says, "The marginal man is always relatively the more civilised human being."[9] By the term "civilised," Park means, most probably, "individualised" or "emancipated" from the locally-restricted conscience. Professor Teggart seems to agree with R. Park on that. Teggart says,

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[8] The fact that the first monotheistic religion in the world appeared in Palestine, supports this thesis. Palestine was the only land thoroughfare between the main centers of civilisation of the ancient times. The migrating peoples, the traders' caravans, the armies, the diplomats and the scholars were going back and forth through Palestine. The ancient Hebrews therefore made contacts with various cultures and civilisations. They could be called "the culture middlemen" of the ancient times. (Hertzler, The Social Thought of the Ancient Civilisations, p. 559.)

Studying the life-stories of the founders of the three great monotheistic religions of the world we find that they were more or less marginal men: Moses was a Jewish child and reared in the Pharoah Palace. When he grew up, he left Egypt and lived for several years among the nomads. Jesus spent some years of his childhood in Egypt and returned as a boy to Palestine. Mohammed spent more than thirty years in traveling as a merchant and caravan leader.

[9] R. Park, "Introduction," in E. Stonequist, The Marginal Man, p. xviii.

Now, while, historically, advancement has been
dependent upon the collision of group, the resultant
response has taken place in the minds of individuals,
and so we are led to see that all transitional eras
are alike in being periods of individual mental awaken-
ing, and of the release of emancipation of individual
initiative in thought and action.[10]

It seems that the same factor that makes the marginal man

a trouble-maker or an agent of social and moral disorganization,

may make him at the same time a creative personality or liberal

thinker. As Ibn Khaldun has noticed, the areas of moral organiza-

tion are usually fertile soils for the growth of arts and sciences.

In the words of K. Young,

He /i.e., the marginal man/ may be a trouble-maker,
but he may also be creator. He is one whose "I" has
not been completely dominated by the moral "me's" laid
down for him by tradition or custom.[11]

This means that "objectivity" is moving forward another

step in the mind of the marginal man. In discussing the character-

istics of the "stranger," which is, in some sense, a marginal man,

Simmel reaches the same conclusion. The stranger, according to

Simmel, merely because he is not rooted in the peculiar attitudes

and biased tendencies of the group, stands apart and tends to be

objective in his outlook with a peculiar composition of nearness

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[10]F. Teggart, Processes of History, pp. 155-56.

[11]K. Young, op. cit., p. 142.

and remoteness, concern and indifference.[12]

Simmel says:

> . . . One can define objectivity also as freedom.
> The objective man is bound by no sort of proprieties
> which can prejudice for him his apprehension, his under-
> standing, his judgment of the given. This freedom which
> permits the stranger to experience and deal with the
> relation of nearness as though from a bird's-eye view,
> contains indeed all sorts of dangerous possibilities.
> From the beginning of things, in revolutions of all sorts,
> the attacked party has claimed that there has been incite-
> ment from without, through foreign emissaries and agitators.
> As far as that is concerned, it is simply an exaggeration
> of the specific role of the stranger; he is the freer man,
> practically and theoretically; he examines the relations
> with less prejudice, he submits them to more general,
> more objective standards, and is not confined in his
> action by custom, piety and precedents.[13]

Modern civilization is intensively facing the problem of
the marginal man—with its double-phased phenomena. The ancient
civilization did not face, as we have noticed before, such an over-
whelming number of marginal men. Urban centers, where marginal man
usually flourishes, were very few and too small to be of any great
sociological significance. Today, urban population is tremendously
growing at the expense of other kinds of population. It is quite
possible in view of the continuous increase in volume and pro-
portion of urban population that the marginal personality will

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[12]See Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of
Society, p. 324.

[13]Cited by Ibid., pp. 324-25.

become in the future the ordinary rather than the exceptional type of personality.

In the ancient times marginal men were scattered here and there and many of them were, as we saw, active agents in expanding the limits of morals and the horizon of conscience. Marginal men of today are so many that the phenomenon of the so-called "beyond-conscience-thinking"[14] begins to prevail. Instead of the Prophets and the conscientious reformers of the ancient times, we find today Hegelians, Romanticists, Pragmatists and finally sociologists of knowledge. In the words of Leys:

> If good and right are relative to custom and, in a complex society, to station in the community, then some disagreements between classes, sects, and nations are not the result of ignorance or wickedness. They are not oppositions of good and bad; they are the pitting of good versus good, and duty versus duty. . . . the dream of a world that is ruled by right and not by might seems to go up in smoke.[15]

> Instead of the ancient idea that history is a series of struggles between good people and bad people, the sociologists's idea is that many of the bitterest struggles are oppositions of your group's good and some other group's good. It is no longer good versus bad, but good versus good and evil versus evil.[16]

Karl Mannheim points out that every thinker is limited by

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[14] See T. V. Smith, Beyond Conscience, passim.

[15] Wayne Leys, Ethics and Social Policy, pp. 250–51.

[16] Ibid., p. 257.

the preconceptions and motives of his cultural group and social class. Nevertheless, he says, a sociologist may study the idealogies or culturally limited views of all classes and nations. By becoming an observer of all other men's knowledge and opinions, the sociologist gets into position to interpret his group's ideas to another. As interpreter, he rises above a merely partisan point of view.[17]

This epoch-making change in thinking from a state of con-scientousness to that of "beyond conscience" is no doubt a marginal man's achievement. As we have noticed before, a man who is ordinarily educated to view things through the social values of his group, is not able to transcend beyond conscience into a state of such a creative "objectivity." It should be remembered at this point that the marginal man is not only "objective" in observing the values of the various groups, he develops also a sense of understanding or "Verstehen" according to Weber's terminology.

In this way, he is not merely an indifferent recorder, but rather a sympathetic observer of the various phases of the social phenomena. Simmel elaborates excellently this point as regards the stranger. He says:

. . . with the objectivity of the stranger is con-nected the phenomenon which indeed belong chiefly, but

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[17]See Karl Mannheim, op. cit., passim; Leys, op. cit., p. 266.

not indeed exclusively, to the mobile man: namely, that often the most surprising disclosures and confessions, even to the character of the confessional disclosure, are brought to him, secrets such as one carefully conceals from every intimate. Objectivity is by no means lack of sympathy, for that is something quite outside and beyond either subjective or objective relation. It is rather a positive and particular manner of sympathy. So the objectivity of a theoretical observation certainly does not mean that the spirit is a tabula rasa on which things inscribe their qualities, but it means the full activity of a spirit working according to its own laws, under conditions in which accidental dislocations and accentuations have been excluded, the individual and subjective peculiarities of which would give quite different pictures of the same object.[18]

The recent rise of sociology indicates the prevailing of the marginal man's attitudinal-complex in the modern thinking. The marginal man of the old time could not dare, as we have noticed, reveal his objective attitude to the masses. He would be soon condemned to be a traitor or an infidel. The majority of the people were value-ridden, and biased against what belongs to the out-groups. It is right to say, therefore, that objective viewing of social life is a new phenomena which has risen just with the rise of the marginal man in the industrial civilization of today.

It is interesting indeed to notice that most of the founders of modern sociology were, in one sense or another, marginal men. In Europe, most of them were Jews, and the European Jew is,

[18]Cited by Park & Burgess, op. cit., p. 324.

as Park, Stonequist, and Simmel point out, a typical marginal
man.[19] It may suffice for the present purpose to mention the names
of Gumplowicz, Marx, Simmel, Bergson, Durkheim, Oppenheimer, Freud,
Mannheim, etc. It is also interesting that sociology in the
United States excels, in many ways, that of any other country in
the world. This may be attributed to the variety of cultures and
peoples inhabiting this new country—that is to say, to the marginal
personality prevalent in its complex society.[20]

        In the opinion of Park, the vast expansion of the modern
civilization during the last four hundred years has brought about
changes more devastating than in any earlier period in world history.
The movements and migrations incident to this expansion have
brought everywhere an interpenetration of peoples and a fusion of
cultures. As a result of this culture contact, according to Park,
the personality type of the marginal man has been produced, "a
type which if not wholly new is at any rate peculiarly character-
istic of the modern world."[21]

        It is quite relevant at this point to note that the modern a
world has grown up at the expense of the little world, the world

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[19]See Stonequist, op. cit., p. xviii, 3, 76 et seq.; Park
and Burgess, op. cit., p. 323.

[20]Cf. Ibid., p. 3.

[21]O. R. Park, op. cit., pp. xiv-xv.

of intimate, personal loyalties in which men were bound together by tradition, custom and natural piety. In other words, the "secular" society has grown up at the expense of the "sacred" society. Nevertheless, the general pattern of the "sacred" society still persists in the depths of the human nature.

It is still in the family and under the influence of the tribe, the sect or the local community, as Cooley points out, that man acquires those habits, sentiments, attitudes and other personality traits that characterize him as human.[22] But, the modern man is often obliged to come out, in one way or another, from his "sacred" shell in order to face a complicated world of an intertribal, interracial or international nature.

This may explain the reason why the distinction and the comparison, between the "sacred" and the "secular" society, constitute one of the most frequent subjects in the modern sociology. The student may be amazed at noticing that many of the prominent sociologists of today have been engaged, in one form or another, with a typological study of these two kinds of society. The sociologists have differed in the terminology they have given to this phenomena, but they seem to have agreed upon its major features.

Thus, we find: Gemeinschaft and Gesellscaft (Tönnies),

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[22] See *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

mechanical and organic solidarity (Durkheim), community and
society (MacIver), nomadic and town people (Ibn Khaldun), primary
and derivitive society (Bernard), primitivism and civilization
(Toynbee), sacred and secular society (Becker), localism and
cosmopolitanism (Zimmerman), status and contract relationship
(Maine), primary and secondary grouping (Cooley), stationary and
changing society (Ogburn), unibonded and multibonded society
(Sorokin), etc. All of these dichotomies seem to fall within a
similar pattern and different names.

It may be reasonable to suggest that the starting-point
of the modern sociology lies in the observation of this peculiar
social phenomenon. It appears that the science of society itself
would be impossible if there was no "secular" society that could
be contrasted to the "sacred" society. As we have already noticed,
a man, who has not been familiar with societies other than his
own primary group, is seldom able to be objective or scientific
in his social observation. He needs to be somewhat "socially-
unbound" in order to understand fully his own society as well as
others. He needs to be a marginal man.

It is of significance that Comte who is popularly considered
the father of the modern sociology has built his whole social
theory on the thesis of the three states in the development of
human intellect. By carefully examining his theory, we may find

in it a strong allusion to the dichotomy of the "sacred" and the "secular" societies.

> . . . He made the generalization that "from the nature of the human intellect, each branch of knowledge in its development has to pass through three different theoretical states: the theological, or fictitious, state; the metaphysical, or abstract, state; and . . . the scientific, or positive." The first two of these states, however, he regarded as closely similar to each other; the real advance is made when the positive state is reached. The theological state is that in which all questions of causation are answered in terms of the activity of supernatural beings; the metaphysical state is that in which abstract forces or entities are conceived as the causes of phenomena; while in the positive state a branch of knowledge abandons the search for absolute causes and seeks simply to establish laws of coexistence and sequence. As the advance to the positive state is made, imagination is systematically subordinated to observation. In short, by "positive," as the term is applied to a science or branch of knowledge, Comte meant much the same thing that we usually express by the term "scientific."[23]

It is interesting indeed to notice that the "positive" stage in the development of human intellect, according to Comte's theory, is greatly reminiscent of the "secular" society, while the "theological" stage, "in which all questions of causation are answered in terms of the activities of supernatural beings," parallels the "sacred" society.

When we come to Spencer, the god-father of sociology, we find in his writings a similar strong allusion to the dichotomy

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[23]F. House, The Development of Sociology, p. 115.

of the "sacred" and "secular" societies. He regarded the develop-
ment and equilibration of the social order as a specific mani-
festation of a generic tendency or process which operates through-
out the universe. In First Principles, he sums up the theory in
a single definition, which occurs, with minor variations, through-
out his later writings:

> . . . "Evolution is an integration of matter and
> concomitant dissipation of motion: during which the
> matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity
> to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which
> the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.[24]

As a matter of fact, the "incoherent homogeneity," of
society, in Spencer's theory, is very similar to the mechanical
social solidarity in Durkheim's theory, whereas the "coherent
heterogeneity" is similar to the organic solidarity of Durkheim.
It can be said also that Spencer's distinguishing between the
"militant" and the "industrial" societies has more or less some
relevance to the same dichotomy.

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Turning back to Ibn Khaldun, we find him a marginal man in
a peculiar way. His fate had destined him, as we have noticed in
the last chapter, to live along the border-line between the "sacred"

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[24]Cited by Ibid., p. 124.

and the "secular" society, or according to his own terminology, between nomadism and town civilization. So far as the cultural conflict in general is concerned, Ibn Khaldun was not particularly different from any other marginal man, but there was an aspect in his social experience that made him quite distinct from his fellow "strangers." He experienced a sort of social situation which is seldom available to the Western thinkers of the twentieth century. We may be able, therefore, to find in Ibn Khaldun's writings a particular perspective which can hardly be found in the writings of any other sociologist of the ancient or the modern times.

It should be remembered here that in Ibn Khaldun's theory the nomadic tribe is taken as an ideal-type of the "sacred" society. In contrast to modern sociologists who usually refer to the primitive village or to the rural community in their typological study of the "sacred" society, Ibn Khaldun refers to the nomadic tribe. Here lies a point of a tremendous sociological significance.

The nomadic tribe is, undeniably, similar to any other "sacred" society in several aspects of its social life; but it has, nevertheless, a peculiar characteristic which is indeed worthy of a special study. In comparison with the primitive village or the rural community, the nomadic tribe has a peculiarity which no other "sacred" society has. This is the peculiarity of constant

moving from one place to another without losing its social inte-
gration or weakening its moral values.

It is now agreed upon among modern sociologists that
migration and movement normally push the group into the process
of social disorganization and moral disintegration. As soon as
man comes, through his movement, into contact with various value-
systems, he begins to lose faith in the absoluteness of his group's
values.

There is, however, a certain aspect in the nomadic life
which helps the tribe to retain its strong social solidarity and
"primary" grouping despite its constant movement. The movement
of the nomads can be distinguished from any other social mobility
by the fact that the tribe moves as a whole and carries with it,
while moving, all of its cultural traits, material and immaterial.
Its movement hardly results in a disorganizing effect on its
social structure or value system. Its members do not observe any
significant difference as a result of moving; everything around
them will be almost similar, at the end of the movement, to that
which was at the beginning. The natural, as well as the social,
environment in the desert does not change much from place to place.
The members of the tribes continue to be the same throughout their
whole movement.

The nomadic life is well-adapted to the process of con-
stant moving. The nomads usually live in light tents that are

easy to carry while moving. They are normally content with the
simplest kinds of house-utensils and home-furnishings.[25] They
are content, as Ibn Khaldun points out, with the barest neces-
sities of life.[26] They are accustomed to care very little for
material goods. They do not use anything that handicaps them
from quick departure or efficient migration. Slow moving may mean
in the desert a defective adaptation to life, and often brings
them catastrophe.

In compensation for this sort of scantiness in material
satisfactions, the nomads can be said to have developed a strong
tendency toward immaterial satisfaction. In fact, the nomadic man
is known by his intensive craving for fame, status, and even exag-
gerated praise. He is ready to die in order to establish a name
for himself or his family. He does not crave so much for delicious
food or a comfortable house as the civilized man ordinarily does.
He rather prefers to be loudly praised by a poet, or stared at by
admiring eyes.

Imru Al-Qais, the famous poet of Arabia in the pre-Islamic
days, reflects the nomadic extraordinary craving for fame in one
of his oft-quoted poems. He says:

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[25] See M. F. Jamali, The New Iraq, pp. 19-26.

[26] Ibn Khaldun, Al-Moaddima, pp. 400-401.

If I strove for a bare livelihood, scanty means
would suffice me and I would seek no more. But I
strive for lasting renown, and 'tis men like me that
sometimes attain lasting renown. Never, while life
endures, does a man reach the summit of this ambition
or cease from toil.[27]

Glubb, the famous British Arabist and traveler, once
declared, in a speech before a certain geographical society in
London, that the nomadic man tended always to distribute his
property among his fellow tribesmen or guests as soon as he earned
it. Glubb attributes this extreme generosity of the nomads to the
prevalence of raiding and counter-raiding in the desert. Thus,
the nomadic man, says Glubb, tends to give away his property before
it is taken from him. Since the holding of property is not perma-
nent in the desert, he likes to obtain fame by it rather than to
lose it with disgrace.[28]

Glubb's explanation may be quite true, but it does not
represent the whole story. Man is, generally speaking, not wholly
rational in his behavior; or in other words, he is not a calculating
machine. He does not always do a certain thing merely because he
prefers it to other things on a rationalistic or utilitarian basis.
Particularly in the "sacred" society, as MacIver points out, man
usually considers the value as an end for itself, rather than a

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[27] R. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, p. 136.

[28] See A. Zayyat, Al-Risala Magazine, (1938), Vol. VI, p. 261.

means for another end.[29] He often achieves it, not purely for a
utilitarian purpose, but also because he culturally inherits it
as such.

In the "secular" society or what MacIver terms "civilisa-
tion," man is inclined, it is true, toward a rationalistic, or
utilitarian consideration. It seems that Glubb, who comes from
an extremely secularised society, tries to impose the presupposi-
tion of his culture on that of the nomads. Hence, he has ascribed
their craving for fame to a utilitarian reason.

There is, however, a well-known Arabic story, which is
usually taken by Glubb and others to support their thesis. This
story tells us that Hatim, the ideal nomadic man of the pre-Islamic
days, was once blamed by his wife on account of his extreme gener-
osity. He answered her, with a piece of poetry, saying:

Oh, my wife, property is going out in the morning,
turning back in the evening; nothing remains from it
except fame.[30]

Does this story really indicate a rationalistic or utili-
tarian intention on the part of Hatim. It seems to indicate an
intention of rationalization rather than of rationalism. Hatim,
most probably, tried by his poetic answer, to find a reasonable
explanation for his unexplainable drive toward the achievement of

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[29] See M. MacIver and H. Page, Society, pp. 630-31.

[30] D. Miqdadi, Tarikh Al-Ummat Al-Arabiyya, p. 41.

the cultural values. Man in general tends to act at first, and then, tries to find an explanation for his act.

However, this extreme desire for fame among the nomads seems to strengthen the factor which prevents the nomadic tribe from being disintegrated as a result of its constant moving. The nomadic man likes, in fact, to excel his fellowmen in the following of the social values. He is always inclined to become an active and respected member of his group. Hence, we find that the *esprit de corps*, or what Ibn Khaldun calls the "asabiyya," is tremendously rife among the nomads.

Looking through the perspective of Ibn Khaldun and situating ourselves upon the same margin between nomadism and civilization upon which he was situated, we may be able to notice an interesting polarization between the nomadic craving for immaterial satisfaction, on the one hand, and the civilized yearning for material enjoyment, on the other hand, or to use Ibn Khaldun's terminology, between the intensity of the "asabiyya" in nomadism, and the lack of it in civilization.

Here lies, in fact, a highly interesting point. It is of significance to observe that this polarization becomes often a cause for a peculiar social phenomenon. The nomads, despite their desire for immaterial satisfaction, do not usually refrain from the enjoying of certain material satisfaction when they conquer

civilisation or come into close contact with it.

Material satisfaction is, indeed, a treacherous thing.
It creeps into the soul of the nomadic man unconsciously and
gradually. The nomadic man sees at first no harm in enjoying a
little of the luxury of civilisation. He may not be able to
foresee the ultimate consequences of the distant future in his
small enjoyment of the present time. Eventually, his present
whim will develop, as Ibn Khaldun points out, into an uneradicable
habit; and so, his old "asabiyya" will be replaced by a moral
laxity and a personal disorganisation.

Ibn Khaldun emphasizes the fact, as we have seen throughout
the present work, that the strong "asabiyya" of the nomads, leads
them willy-nilly to conquer the towns that border their desert.
The town-dwellers, says Ibn Khaldun, merely because of their lack
of "asabiyya" and firm morality, easily yield to the conquest of
the nomads; they, then, begin to provide their conquerors with
their elaborately-made products and luxurious commodities. The
conquerors tend consequently to enjoy consuming these products,
proudly and happily, without realising its "poisonous" conse-
quences. Thus, they die gradually, giving ground to a new wave
of nomads who come up, with a fresh "asabiyya," in order to go
down later, along the same pattern as that of their predecessors.

This is indeed an excellent example of a dialectical
process. Ibn Khaldun was fortunate to observe it in an actual

and tangible form. As a matter of fact, many thinkers, in the ancient and the modern times, have discovered some sort of a dialectical process in the human phenomena, but they have not been able to see it as tangible and practical as Ibn Khaldun did.

In the ancient times, they derived, as we have seen, the notion of dialectic, not from the actual happenings of the social phenomena, but rather from the cycling of certain natural phenomenon such as the continuous succession of day and night, summer and winter, sowing season and reaping season, etc. Through this naive observation, they have tried to construct a dialectic theory or what has been called a "millennial hope." They seem to have constructed a scheme for a future hope in order to counter-balance the disappointment in their present hope.

In the modern times, on the other hand, the dialectic theory can be said to have been misused or lost between the extreme idealism of the Hegelians and the extreme materialism of the Marxians. The fate of the dialectic theory today can be likened to that of the sheikh's beard, which was, according to an Arabic proverb, destroyed by his two wives, the old and the young; because each tried to pick off, from it, the hairs that did not suit her age.

The modern social scientists should, therefore, turn back to the fourteenth-century sociologist of Islam, in order to see

the dialectic theory in its original setting, undistorted by any idealistic or materialistic preoccupation.

In the light of Ibn Khaldun's theory, one may be able to see that the dialectic theory is not a universal law as its exponents are inclined to suggest. It does not explain all the phenomena of change. Change is too complicated to be explained by one single formula. Social theorists differ widely as to the form which social change normally takes. Whether it is unilinear, cyclical, oscillating, branching, or spiral, is difficult to decide. It appears that change takes several forms, and all of the various explanations are valid to some extent. Each of them probably represents one of the several phases of the phenomenon. The form of change may depend on the situation or the condition in which it takes place. There is, most probably, no single law that universally governs it.

The dialectical form can be said therefore to be one of these various explanations of social change. Studying Ibn Khaldun's theory, we may notice that the dialectical process requires certain conditions in order to proceed along the lines suggested. Presuming the presence of such conditions seems to be, more or less, a necessary requirement for its cyclical procedure.

The conditions which Ibn Khaldun has suggested for the dialectical process may be stated as follows:

(1) There should be a sort of polarization in the value

systems of the two cultures between which the dialectical inter-
action takes place. Each culture should possess certain character-
istics that the other normally lacks. Thus, a cyclical movement
may arise as a result of the desire of each culture to seek in the
other what it lacks in itself.

(2) There should be also a polarization, within each
culture, between what it possesses and what it lacks. That is to
say, what it possesses cannot exist side by side with what it lacks.
In nomadism, for instance, man cannot possess a strong "asabiyya"
and lead at the same time a luxurious life; he cannot, in other
words, enjoy the habit of immaterial satisfaction along with that
of material one. He will lose one if he obtains the other. Hence,
the dialectical process begins operating as soon as he conquers
civilization and adopts its luxurious life.[31]

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[31] In view of these two requirements, it seems that the
dialectical process can hardly arise as a result of the contact
between the "secular" and the "sacred" societies in the modern
times. There is today no polarization between a simple and con-
quering society, on the one hand, and a complicated and submissive
society, on the other hand. It may be said that, in the present
time, the complexity of culture goes hand in hand with the ability
to conquer. Modern war is no longer carried on in the same pattern
as that of the old time. Today, the personal fortitude and bravery
of the soldiers are not so important in the winning of a war as the
quality and the quantity of the weapon, the cleverness of the com-
mand, and the hugeness of the army. (Cf. W. Willkie, One World, p. 68.)

Thus, the contact between the "secular" and the "sacred"
societies of today runs according to a linear pattern rather than a
dialectical one.

In this way, Ibn Khaldun explains the reasons behind the dialectical process in the human history. He considers it a result of a dichotomous polarization between two value systems. It is inevitable, in his opinion, not because there is a universal idea, or spirit influencing its movement from behind the scene, nor because there is a teleological factor or a prime mover driving the world toward a certain end. It is a local phenomenon relative to the time and the place in which it arises. Thus, Ibn Khaldun provides us with an explanation of the social change in his culture more convincing than many of the modern theories in this respect.

This theory, in fact, can be of great use in the explaining of certain historic events that took place in a social situation similar to that which Ibn Khaldun has described. Let us take, for example, the well-known successive waves of the nomadic Semites[32] who invaded the ancient civilizations of the Near East during the

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[32]These nomadic waves were consisted of the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Chaldaeans, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Aramaeans, the Phoenicians, the Hebrews, the Nabataeans and finally the Arabians. Hitti says, "A comparative examination of the dates quoted above suggested to certain Semitists the notion that in recurrent cycles of approximately one thousand years Arabia, like a mighty reservoir, became populated to the point where overflow was inevitable. These same scholars would speak of the migrations in terms of "waves." It is more likely, however, that these Semitic movements partook in their initial stages more of the nature of the European migrations into the New World: a few persons would start moving, others would follow, then many more would go, until a general

four milleniums before Christ, and try to examine the factor
behind their amazing pattern of happening.

It is a peculiar phenomenon indeed and needs to be seriously
explained. Theorists have given several explanations to it without
much avail. Huntington and his school have tried to explain it
through a geographical factor. According to this school, the
Arabian desert had been subject to a prolonged period of desica-
tion.[33] Consequently, its population was driven to migrate to,
or invade, the neighboring civilizations, time after time.

It seems that the desiccation factor is a necessary, but
not sufficient, cause for these nomadic "waves." It may explain
the overflowing of the desert population toward the outside world,
but it does not sufficiently explain why it overflowed by waves.

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popular interest is aroused in the idea of going.

"This transplantation en masse or in bands of human groups
from a pastoral desert region to an agricultural territory con-
stitutes a common phenomenon in the Near East and provides an
important clue to the understanding of its long and checkered
history. The process by which a more or less migratory people
impose itself upon a people which has become rooted in the soil
usually results in the invaders assimilating to some degree the
main features of the previously existing civilization and in
infusing a certain amount of its blood, but hardly ever in the
extermination of the indigenous population. This is exactly what
happened in the ancient Near East, whose history is to a certain
extent a struggle between the sedentary population already domiciled
in the Fertile Crescent and the nomadic Arabians trying to dis-
possess them. For immigration and colonization are, as has been
well said, an attenuated form of invasion." (P. Hitti, History of
The Arabs, pp. 11-12.)

[33]M. Jamali, op. cit., p. 17.

Ibn Khaldun's theory appears here to be of some importance in explaining a certain phase of this great historic event. It is relevent to quote H. G. Wells about this point.

> The alternation of settlement, nomadic conquest, refinement, fresh conquest, refinement, which is characteristic of this phase of human history, is particularly to be noted in the region of the Euphrates and Tigris, which lay open in every direction to great areas which are not arid enough to be complete deserts, but which were not fertile enough to support civilised populations.[34]

At any rate, Ibn Khaldun seems to be quite optimistic as regards this cyclical process of human history. His optimism may be indicated by his oft-quoted theory of imitation. According to this theory, the conquered are always fond of imitating the customs, dress, beliefs, and all other characteristics of their conquerors. In his own words,

> Man always believes in the perfection of his conquerors to whom he has submitted. This is either because he has become accustomed and conditioned to look up to them, or because he believes in their perfection as a rationalisation for their victory over him and his submission to them, convincing himself that their victory over him has been not because of their military excellence or tribal strength, but rather because of their good customs and beliefs; and so he always tries to imitate them in everything they have . . . Even if there are two neighboring nations, where one of them is more powerful than the other, a great diffusion of traits will run from

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[34]H. G. Wells, *Outline of History*, p. 164.

the strong to the weak. Hence, the common proverb
says: that the subjects adopt the religion of their
king. . . .[35]

In view of Ibn Khaldun's conviction that "might" tends to
be associated with "right" and that the conquerors normally have
better values than the conquered, it is reasonable to suggest
that the human history is, according to his theory, moving toward
a continuous improvement of moral values. The students of Ibn
Khaldun's theory usually refer to it as a pessimistic or melancholic
philosophy of history. This is largely because they impose their
own values on Ibn Khaldun. They do not recognize his profound
admiration of the nomadic values, and so, they see in his dialectic
a backward trend rather than a forward one.

Studying Ibn Khaldun through his real scale of values, we
can see, rather, a strong element of optimism in his theory. Since
the nomads are far better than the civilized peoples and since
they often conquer civilization, the human society is therefore
gradually improved through the process of imitation.

According to his theory, as we have already seen, nomadism
is the birthplace of perfect men, while civilization is their
graveyard. The dialectic process, it is true, carries the perfect

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[35]Ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddima, p. 147. It is interesting to
notice the similarity between Ibn Khaldun's theory of imitation
and that of Tarde. According to Tarde, imitations "usually proceed
from the socially superior to the socially inferior." (See P.
Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories, p. 639.)

men from the desert and buries them in civilisation; but this
does not indicate at all a backward trend in the human evolution.
The process can be likened to the life-cycle of the individual
man, through which he is first born and finally dies, whereas
humanity in general continues to move forward.

Here, Ibn Khaldun stands in complete opposition to many
social theorists. His hope seems to lie in the ultimate victory
of the nomadic values over those of civilisation,[36] of the "sacred"
society over the "secular" one. He believes that moral values are
originated and well-maintained only where the "asabiyya" is strong.
As soon as man comes out from his "primary" shell and lives along
weak "asabiyyas" and heterogeneous peoples, his animal nature
begins to grow in strength at the expense of his human nature.

Philosophically-minded thinkers may not agree with Ibn
Khaldun on this point. They may consider the strong ethnocentricism
of the "sacred" society as a handicap, rather than a facilitation,
for the improvement of morality.

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[36]It is interesting to notice that, at the time of Ibn
Khaldun, nomadism was growing at the expense of civilisation in
North Africa, especially after the invasion of the Hilali tribes.
Cities began to dwindle in importance and population, and the
sedentary culture was on the decline. The nomadic sheikhs were
competing with each other for the conquering and ruling of what
had remained from the declining civilisation. Ibn Khaldun's
optimism can be considered therefore as a reflection of the actual
trend in his society.

It seems that to decide whether morality improves or
declines as a result of the shift from the "sacred" to the "secular"
society, depends on the way one looks at it.   The moralists, who
are oriented toward humanity in general and who wish to see all
the various people of mankind united under one social or political
system, are naturally inclined to consider that morality improves
with the shift from the "sacred" to the "secular" organisation of
society. Their criterion of good morality is, as we have seen,
not in the intensity or the quality of morals but rather in the
enlargement of the circle embraced by the moral feelings. Accord-
ing to this criterion, the secularisation of society is therefore
quite beneficient to morality; it weakens the enthnocentrical, or
the tribal, spirit which characterises the "sacred" society and
tends to make men treat each other equally regardless of their
pedigree or group attachment.

Ibn Khaldun might see in such moral consideration an element
of the same "idealism" which he has bitterly attacked. In his
opinion, morality is not a product of will power or arm-chair
speculation. It is rather a social phenomenon with which individual's
will or idealistic tendency has nothing to do. It is, in other
words, a product of the social organisation, rather than the indi-
vidual mind. He admits that the circle of moral feelings in
civilisation embraces larger number of men than the tribal spirit
does in nomadism; but this should not be taken as a sign of

improvement in morality. When the tribal spirit weakens as a result of the social "secularisation," the vehement attachment to the group values weakens too.

Here lies, in fact, one of the penetrating insights of Ibn Khaldun that can be of profound instructiveness to the thinkers of the twentieth century. His theory reflects, of course, the conditions of his society; but to understand the past, as we have seen, is necessary for the understanding of the present. In contrast to the idealistic thinkers, Ibn Khaldun provides us, at this point, with a sociological analysis of a great significance. His analysis, as we shall see, cannot be unconditionally applied to the modern civilisation, but it can be, nevertheless, quite useful for the understanding of the background out of which the modern society has grown.

The moral circle can be likened, according to his analysis, to a piece of rubber: the more you stretch it, the thinner and weaker it will be. Philosophically-minded moralists usually overlook this important fact. They want man to be both strict in his morality and tolerant of the different moral systems of others. It seems that they demand the impossible. It is enormously difficult for man to be strongly attached to his group's values and be, at the same time, tolerent of the other groups' values. There may be certain men who are exceptionally able to do this, but, as

regards society as a whole, it is quite difficult, if not impossible.

The fault with the idealistic moralists is that they view moral values through a Platonic perspective, and so, they always try to discover an absolute and universal basis for them. They believe that there are certain eternal standards of moral values existing "there," in the metaphysical world, and so they sit in their armchairs contemplating in order to find out what this eternal standard is.

Modern social scientists are inclined, more or less, to consider values, in general, as an aspect of the social life. There are no values existing "there" outside the realm of human association. In order to understand their original nature and their consequent development, it is necessary, therefore, to study them within the context of the social structure.

Human values are originated, as Cooley points out, in the primary group.[37] In this type of society where the individual

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[37]In the bosom of this group, says Myers, were born and nurtured the chief of those affections and sentiments into which enters an ethical element and which form the basis of moral life. (See P. Myers, op. cit., p. 12.)

W. R. Smith says, "The larger morality which embraces all mankind has its basis in habits of loyalty, love, and self-sacrifice which were originally formed and grew strong in the narrow circle of the family or the clan." (W. Robertson Smith, The Religion of the Semites, 2d. ed., p. 54.)

"self" is the looking-glass of the other "selves," and where the
"I" is disolved in the "we," man tends to behave exactly as the
other members of the group want him to behave. He does not strain
or force himself to do what others like him to do. He merely
finds himself spontaneously motivated toward the achievement of
the group values. He may be pleased to do it even at the expense
of his own self-interest. To be more exact, he has no self-
interest apart from the group-interest.

In order to understand this more clearly, it should be
remembered that the development of man's "self" is achieved, as
Mead points out, as a result of his association with the other
members of his group. In other words, his "self" does not exist
in its own right. It is a product of what Mead calls "taking the
role of others." So, when the others are satisfied with what he
has done, his "self" is, in its turn, satisfied. Thus, human
values arise. They arise, not as a reflection of the moral
ideals which exist in the Platonic world, as the philosophically-
minded moralists would suggest. They are, rather, a reflection
of many "selves," within the primary group, upon the individual
"self." In brief, they are a product of the incorporation of the
"I" into the "we," of the individual into the group.[38]

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[38]In describing the characteristics of the nomadic clan of
ancient Arabia, W. R. Smith says, "The members of one kindred,

A problem usually arises when the members of the "sacred" society meet strangers from other societies. The problem will be of no practical significance if the "strangers" are few and scattered throughout time and space. It becomes of tremendous importance only when the "strangers" meet each other in large number and on somewhat permanent basis. It is interesting to note that Ibn Khaldun lived in a social environment where such kind of problem prevailed.

Following the logic of Ibn Khaldun, we may be able to see that there may arise two alternative consequences as a result of the meeting of "strangers" on a large scale. The "strangers" have either to tolerate the values of the others, and so, drift into the path of social disorganisation and moral disintegration, or to retain their old vehement intolerence, and so, drift into the path of conflict and fratricidal fighting. It seems there is no way out of this dilemma.

It may be right to say that the strong attachment to the group values is, in a sense, incompatible with the tolerance toward the "strangers'" values. Typologically speaking, each leads, in

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looked on themselves as one living whole, a single animated mass of blood, flesh, and bones, of which no member could be touched without all the members suffering. . . . If one of the clan has been murdered, they say 'Our blood has been shed.'" (W. R. Smith, op. cit., pp. 12-13.)

its extreme development, to the destruction of the other. In order
to believe in the values of his group, and to obey them, unhesi-
tatingly, man should consider them absolute, eternal, and sacred;
any deviation from them is to be regarded as a crime, a sin, or a
disgraceful perversion. When he comes into contact with "strange"
values, he tends either to fight them, under the influence of his
lively conscience, or to tolerate them and so lose his conscientious
attachment to his group's values.

In the opinion of Ibn Khaldun, when man loses his con-
scientious attachment to his group's values, nothing can control
him but brute force. He, then,begins to check his "animal" impulses
under the fear of punishment. Man, says Ibn Khaldun, is an animal;
what makes him behave like a man is the social customs and morés
which are imbued in his soul by his group. When he is detached
from his group and enters the secularized society of the towns, he
comes nearer to the "animal" nature. In the absence of a strong
government, secularized men actually behave like animals: attack
each other or cheat each other with no restriction whatsoever.

In the light of Ibn Khaldun's theory, we are really in a
dilemma. Both horns appear to be sharp. We have either to be
engaged in a conflict among ourselves or to be morally disorganized,
either to fight a tangible enemy from the outside or to suffer the

damage of an invisible enemy from the inside. As soon as the
outside enemy disappears from our sight, we tend to fight ourselves.

Here, Ibn Khaldun seems to have been greatly influenced
in formulating his theory by the pattern of the culture in which
he lived. A question may be raised, at this point, as to the
extent within which this theory is applicable to the modern culture.

This is, in fact, a tremendously important question. In
order to be able to answer it, it is necessary to examine the
present culture in the light of that of Ibn Khaldun.

As we have already noticed, the modern culture is mainly
a marginal man culture. It is quite normal for the modern man to
come out from the sacred shell of his primary group and fall in the
midst of a cosmopolitan center where various patterns of culture
are fused. In contrast to the man from an isolated "sacred"
society, the modern man is accustomed to see strange values and to
acknowledge their right to exist side by side with his own values.
He does not feel indignant when he sees them. He may be rather
interested in them and try to be closely acquainted with them.

At the time of Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, things
were quite different. As we have noticed, the marginal personality
was not so prevalent as it is now. The society of Ibn Khaldun can
be called a "transitional" society. It is neither a typical
"sacred" society nor a typical "secular" one. It is instructive
indeed to examine the characteristics of this type of society that

differentiate it from both the "sacred" and the "secular" types.

It seems that there is no serious problem as regards "strangers" in the typical "sacred" society because there is no frequent contact with them in such a society. In the typical "secular" society, it can be said also that there is no serious problem in this regard. The members of the "secular" society are accustomed, as we have just mentioned, to see "strangers" always and tend to acknowledge their right to have values different from theirs.

The problem arises in the "transitional" society, when men are still under the influence of the "sacred" thought-style, on the one hand, and are condemned to contact "strangers" frequently, on the other hand. In such a society, the problem takes, in fact, a serious form. Its members are neither isolated, as in the "sacred" society, nor accustomed to tolerate them as in the "secular" society. Conflict is, therefore, inevitable.

This is exactly what had happened at the time of Ibn Khaldun. The nomadic peoples were in the habit of contacting the civilized peoples, for one reason or another, while they were still under the influence of their strong tribal spirit or what Ibn Khaldun calls "asabiyya." Thus, they were driven willy-nilly to draw their swords and fight everyone who differed from them in his values. They were brought up to believe that they were the only righteous

people on earth, and so, their duty was to declare a "holy war" on all other peoples who were considered infidels or misbelievers.

Even in the large towns at the time of Ibn Khaldun, the marginal men were few in comparison to the cosmopolitan cities of today. The ancient towns were not so cosmopolitan as the modern towns are. The primary grouping was observable in the ancient towns, although to a less extent than in the "sacred" society of the tribe.

Ibn Khaldun noticed that there was a certain sort of "asabiyya" among the town-dwellers of his time. It was not, however, a blood "asabiyya." It was, rather, a local "asabiyya" that bound the members of every quarter of the town to each other, as against the other quarters.[39] According to his theory, the blood "asabiyya" is the natural type of "asabiyya," and it is therefore the strongest and the best of all other types.[40] The local "asabiyya" of the town, in his opinion, is weaker and so it does not strongly prevent

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[39] A similar phenomena can be noticed in some of the towns of the Near East today. Each quarter of a town forms, more or less, a solid group. The member of each quarter feels, in a way, bound to the other members as against those from other quarters. It is not infrequent to see some sort of war waged between the peoples of the various quarters. Not very long ago, the population of a well-known town in Iraq were engaged in a bloody series of raids and counter-raids, along the same pattern as that of the nomadic tribes.

[40] See Ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddima, pp. 377-78.

the moral laxity and the social disorganization prevalent in the towns of that time.

In this sense, the towns of the ancient times can be considered an abode of a certain type of "transitional" society also. Men were, there, in the habit of viewing the world through the "sacred" thought-style, due to the influence of their local "asabiyya"; whereas, their somewhat "secular" environment brought them into contact with various peoples and different values. Conflict was, therefore, unavoidable.

It is interesting indeed to find a similar situation prevailing in some of the oriental countries of today, and in many other countries which can be classified under the concept of the "transitional" type of society. In such type of society, man falls between two incompatible factors--between the "sacred" world-view imbued into his mind by his local group, on the one hand, and the "secular" environment which obliges him to become acquainted with various values and different morés, on the other hand.

According to the "sacred" world-view, values are the measure of everything; man has, therefore, no importance except as a representative of certain values; he is "good" if his values are "good," and vice versa. Thus, values are not separable from man. They represent the essence of his man hood, and he symbolizes their tangible incarnation.

This is, in a sense, reminiscent of the heated controversy that raged between the Sophists and the idealistic philosophers of of the ancient Greece. While the Sophists considered that man was the measure of everything, the philosophers, who were representing the "sacred" thought-style, considered the ideas or the ideals as the true measure. In describing the world-view of the Aristotelian logic, Shiller points out that man and his opinion about the truth is, in some sense, inseparable.

> You either have the truth, or you have not. If you have it not, you are lost; if you have it, no one should dare to contradict you. You do right, therefore, to get angry with those who dispute the truth. The truth is yours, nay, it is you, if you truly purged yourself of all human feelings.[41]

This discussion may give us a clue to the reason behind the social conflict that prevailed at the time of Ibn Khaldun and is still prevailing, to some extent, in the modern world. One is accustomed, according to the "sacred" thought-style, to see no difference between man and his opinion, creed or morés. All form, in his eyes, a well-integrated whole. It is quite difficult to say to a man of such a mentality, "I do not agree with your opinion." Disagreement with his opinion positively means a declaration of a personal hostility.

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[41]F. C. S. Schiller, Formal Logic, pp. 398-99.

In the "transitional" society, therefore, man tends to fight everyone who disagrees with him. He may consider such fighting a "good" deed or even a "sacred" duty. His conscience, in other words, will be restless if he does not respond to its urge and declare a "holy war" against the "false" beliefs.

This may explain why a democratic government is extremely difficult to maintain in such a society. Man cannot endure, there, an impersonal discussion or a free expression of personal opinions. Those who differ from him in their opinion, are traitors, and they should be punished. Thus, we find bloody revolution instead of peaceful election, bullets instead of ballots, in the countries which have adopted a democratic way of government while living in a "transitional" type of society.

The same thing happened at the time of Ibn Khaldun. The social conflict which he reflected in his theory, may be said to be a true picture of the actual conditions of that time. Let us now examine the situation in the modern society in order to see whether the theory of the fourteenth-century writer is applicable in the twentieth century society or not.

Professor Harry Moore has discovered that modern sociology is penetrated, in a way, by the idea of conflict, especially in the discipline of public opinion. Many of the early American sociologists, he points out, have been influenced in their world-view by the European sociologists who were, more or less, advocates

of the conflict theory.[42] This is a highly indicative point in
respect to our present subject.

It is significant to note, at this point, that Europe,
particularly its Eastern and Southern parts, is still lagging
behind the secularizing process of the modern civilization. Rural
communities are still prevalent, there; and the contact between
the "sacred" and the "secular" society is still in its "transi-
tional" stage, in comparison to that which exists now in the
United States, for instance.

We cannot say, of course, that there is a clear-cut dis-
tinction between Europe and America in this respect. Social
phenomena in general do not easily yield to clear-cut distinction.
The present description is merely a typological or a heuristic one.
Hence, it may be right to say that Ibn Khaldun's theory of conflict
is more applicable to the society of Europe than to that of the
United States. It is still more applicable to the oriental
countries than to the occidental. The closer a society approaches
the "ideal type" of the "secular" society, the farther it becomes
from the "transitional" stage and the less social conflict it
will undergo.

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[42]See H. E. Moore, "The Role of Controversy in the Public
Opinion Process," *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude
Research*, Vol. II, No. 2, Summer 1948, pp. 207-14.

Here we come to an important point as regards the future trend of the modern civilization. As we have already mentioned, the modern civilization is a marginal man culture. This may indicate, it is true, a process of social disorganization and moral disintegration; but it may indicate also a process of reorganization. Human society tends always to reorganize itself after it has come under a disorganization process. As Durkheim rightly points out, society is a set of values and ideals; it can neither create nor recreate itself without at the same time creating values.[43] In other words, human society cannot maintain itself for long without a well-integrated system of values.

The modern civilization can rightly be said to be now under a process of "transvaluation." The dominant marginal personality of today is being obliged to discover a new system of values that suits its new social situation. This does not necessarily mean the abrogation of the existing values which are normally derived from the primary pattern of grouping. It may mean discovering of values that complement rather than displace the old ones.

This may be deemed possible in view of the fact that the new outlook may be able to shift the central point of its system

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[43]See G. Gurvitch and W. Moore, Twentieth Century Sociology, p. 276.

from the values to man himself. Instead of concentrating our
attention on the values and neglecting the person who carries
them, we may be able, sooner or later, to consider the person
as our starting-point and regard his values as a reflection of
his social needs. We may be able, then, to retain the basic
features of old values, or what has been called the Golden Rule,
regarding them as the fundamental basis of our human relationship
without paying attention to the minor differences of the cultural
settings.

According to Mead's theory of the "self," this is quite
possible.[44] Instead of taking the role of our fellow kinsmen or
countrymen only, we may be able to take the role of every person
we meet. The role we take will not reflect, then, the complex
folkways of the person, but rather his entity and respectibility
as a human being. We will be extremely careful as to guard our-
selves against hurting him or wounding his feelings as far as he
does the same to us.

According to Ibn Khaldun's theory, this is impossible.
When man becomes less vehement against the values of others, he
will be also less vehement in his attachment to his own values.

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[44]See G. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, pp. xxxiv, 317-
379 et seq.

The hostility of the out-group, in his opinion, is a necessary requirement for the solidarity of the in-group. The friendliness toward the outsiders is, therefore, the opposite pole of the friendliness toward the insiders. One leads to the destruction of the other.

Is this true in all types of society? In the "transitional" society, in which Ibn Khaldun lived, this is true to a great extent. In that type of society, the marginal men are, as we have already noticed, comparatively few and scattered throughout time and space. They do not form a large solid body as in the case in the large cosmopolitan cities of the modern world. They are not able, therefore, to develop a new system of values that suit their own peculiar situation. Values are usually a group product, not an individual one. It is true, there appeared in the ancient times, as we have already noted, some marginal men who were able to develop a new system of values that soared above the locally-restricted consciences; but they were exceptional men, they were, as Toynbee puts it, "mystically inspired." Furthermore, they were not fully understood by the masses. Only a few disciples, who were probably marginal men themselves, were able to understand their humanized morality. The remaining majority of their followers were as vehement against the out-group as any ordinary man from a "sacred" society. Hence, the world religions of the

great prophets have become, at last, group-religions with an
intense antagonism against the other groups.

In the cosmopolitan cities of today, people do not need
a "mystically" inspired prophet in order to develop a humanized
morality. Such a morality seems to be now in the process of
making. Consciously or unconsciously, the cosmopolitan society
of the modern cities is creating a certain sort of cosmopolitan
values. This might explain, partly at least, the reason why the
prophethood of the ancient type has ceased to appear in the
cosmopolitan society of today. The mystical inspiration is now
unnecessary for the evolution of new morality. The society itself
is developing it through its interactional process.

Perhaps a commonplace and somewhat trivial illustration
will serve to make clearer the shift from a society in which
every man feels himself to be the guardian of values to that
in which protection of values is left largely to officials and
institutions. Coming from a "transitional" type of society,
this writer has been really amazed at observing, let us say,
the extraordinary large number of swimmers, in one of the big
swimming beaches of America, enjoying themselves merrily and
peacefully without causing any individual dispute or social dis-
turbance. This phenomenon is extremely difficult to imagine in
the "transitional" society, where each man feels responsible for
educating others or preaching his ideals to them. In such a

society, one is hardly able to endure seeing a man, sitting very close to him, and at the same time making exciting love with some girl friend. This is unbearable in his eye, because it disgracefully violates the sacred values of his group. His conscience does not let him, then, rest in peace. He should declare a "holy war" against the violaters of values, as his father and grandfather had done before him. Thus, a crowd of swimmers like that of Coney Island, for example, usually results in an endless quarreling and reciprocal insulting.

At any rate, this may indicate the trend along which the cosmopolitan society of the modern world is moving. It seems to be a movement toward an end where the welfare of man will be more important than the rigidity of values.

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