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**Sign of Contradiction? Religious Cultural Heritage
and the Nuclear Paradox of Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan**

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**Sign of Contradiction? Religious Cultural Heritage
and the Nuclear Paradox of Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan**

by

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Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

August, 2013

Dedication

To my parents.

Acknowledgements

The academic endeavor is a team sport. The doctoral dissertation is an individual event, but no one successfully completes a dissertation without coaches, trainers, teammates, and fans. While space does not permit me to thank everyone to whom I am indebted, I would like to recognize a few of those most directly involved.

My coaches are the members of my committee. Frank Gavin and Will Inboden are magnificent co-supervisors. They give encouragement and constructive criticism in equal measure and supply each exactly when needed. Moreover, their comments and timing perfectly complement each other. I could not wish for more supportive mentors. Victoria Rodriguez was present from the beginning, for she taught me my first course at the LBJ School – a class in the theory and philosophy of public policy. Research I began in that course has found its way into my dissertation, so her presence on my committee brings my graduate school experience full circle in a most satisfying way. I first came to know J Budziszewski as his student in a superb course in philosophy of government. In his class he pushed us to think critically and carefully about the authors we encountered; he brings an equally discerning eye to my dissertation, and I have learned much about making careful distinctions from our conversations. Valerie Morkevicius and I first met at a conference. After running into each other at one panel after another, we had lunch together and discovered a great deal of commonality in our research interests. She graciously consented to serve on my committee, and I have benefited from the way she thinks about subject matter and about framing ideas.

My trainers include faculty and professionals who have shared their insights over the years. Chief among these are Eugene Gholz, who invigorated my desire to think

theoretically, and Jeremi Suri, who has a wonderful knack for placing both the forest and the trees in a unified perspective. Mary Norton, a guide both in the academic world and in the world of UN-accredited NGOs, made sure my bearings remained true throughout my studies, and Ambassador John Menzies, the person who first suggested that I apply to The University of Texas at Austin, consistently supported and encouraged me. Thanks are also due to Pat Wong, Chandler Stolp, and Ambassador Robert Hutchings. The experience I gained as a teaching assistant under their guidance will serve me well in the future.

My teammates are my fellow graduate students. Jaehee Choi graciously served as a second set of arms and legs when my research and writing took me away from the UT campus; Wu Zheng similarly provided a stable base of operations toward the end of my dissertation project. No one could ask for better study partners than Ana Ramirez and Beibei Zou when preparing for comprehensive qualifying examinations. Gabriel Cardona-Fox and Greg Cumpton served as midwives as this dissertation came to birth; our weekly meetings allowed us to appraise each other's work, to encourage each other's progress, and to celebrate each other's successes. I also doff my cap to three former teammates, Dan Zimmerman, Guillaume Lessard, and Gustavo Joseph. All four of us earned MS degrees at Caltech; the three of them went on to earn doctorates there while I went on to seminary and ordination to the priesthood. The lessons we learned together about maintaining a balanced life as graduate students served me well during my doctoral studies at UT Austin.

Last, but definitely not least, are my fans. To refer to people as "fans" may seem flip or even cheeky. However, fans are actively engaged both inside and outside their team's stadium – as opposed to "spectators" who merely watch passively from the sidelines. Among my most supportive fans are members of my spiritual family. Most

Reverend John Joseph Myers, of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, encouraged me to pursue doctoral studies and shared some of his personal recollections of Ronald Reagan's family. Monsignor Robert Sheeran and Monsignor James Cafone were steadfast in making sure I remained connected to my home archdiocese, and Paulist priests Father Ed Nowak and Father Jamie Baca helped integrate me into the Catholic chaplaincy serving the UT Austin community. Monsignor Dick Liddy and Father John Dennehy showed me great hospitality whenever I returned home for visits, and Father Gerry Buonopane first made me aware of the existence of the "Atoms for Peace" artifact treated in this dissertation. My greatest fans, thank God, are found in my natural family. Although I am grateful to my loving relatives on both sides of the Atlantic, my parents are, and will remain, my first, most consistent, and most active supporters. They, my first and best teachers, taught me to appreciate and develop whatever God-given gifts and talents I found in myself and in others. This dissertation is meant to develop my own gifts; my return to the university classroom as a teacher, a direct result of this dissertation, presents the opportunity to develop the gifts found in others.

Sign of Contradiction? Religious Cultural Heritage and the Nuclear Paradox of Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2013

Supervisors: Francis Gavin and William Inboden

Presidents Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Ronald W. Reagan embody a paradox. All three presidents made nuclear decisions ranging from hawkish and belligerent to dovish and restrained. How can such marked differences be explained? I argue that religious cultural heritage (RCH) can provide a parsimonious link which unifies the seemingly disparate nuclear choices of these presidents. I propose a theory to connect religious cultural heritage, decision-making frameworks, and nuclear choices. I apply this theory to Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan at the individual level of analysis. Since these three presidents were immersed in a Christian cultural milieu, I move beyond the simplistic treatment of religion as a proxy for morality to explore both Christian thought on war and the philosophical ethics, philosophy of government, and philosophy of human nature which underlie Christian thought. Using secondary and primary sources including archival research, I analyze each president and his nuclear decisions. Each presidential chapter presents the RCH of each president, pieces together each worldview, establishes patterns of thought and patterns of action, and analyzes a number of salient nuclear decisions ranging from choices in the midst of crises to programs for nuclear sharing and cooperation. In the final chapter I discuss and integrate my findings through the lenses of history and policy science, present avenues for future work, and draw policy lessons which can be applied today.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

THE PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR PARADOX

On August 6, 1945, the world entered the age of atomic warfare. An atomic bomb known as “Little Boy” was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima and killed 70,000 people; another 70,000 were injured.¹ Three days later on August 9, 1945, a second atomic bomb known as “Fat Man” was dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki and killed 40,000 people while injuring an additional 60,000.²

Even after the long, bitter struggle in the Pacific theater of World War II, US reactions to the atomic bomb were mixed. Letters to newspapers immediately after the atomic bombings give a sense of the public responses.

Some reactions to the atomic news were positive. One letter to the editor lauded “the courage, the foresight and the wisdom” of the US decision as a source of “thankfulness and pride” and declared, “We, as a nation, are not to blame for the monstrous advances made in the science of war, nor that women, and indeed the whole civilian population, being quite as essential to its waging as the fighting men themselves, have become the objects of its merciless fury.”³ Other letters praised the bomb itself as a “formidable secret”⁴ and as a “stupendous scientific revolution.”⁵ Brushing aside the “sensational news of the past few days about the catastrophic effects of the new atomic bomb,” another letter focused instead on the idea that science and scientists might finally

¹ United States Department of Energy, *National Security History Series, Vol. 1, The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb*, DOE/MA-0002 Revised (January 2010), 96.

² Ibid., 97.

³ William O. Morse, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, August 11, 1945.

⁴ A. Garcia Diaz, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, August 9, 1945.

⁵ Florence Green, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, August 9, 1945.

“have found a means of ending all wars, after centuries of futile efforts by statesmen, pacifists and economic groups.” Indeed, the writer believed, “Modern science has won this war for us... is winning the peace for us...[and] will provide a means of living and a security of living for the generations to come which this world has never dreamed of.”⁶

Other responses to the news of the atomic bomb were negative. Some Americans did not dismiss the reports of the bombs’ effects so quickly, and even those who generally favored the bomb found reasons for concern. One writer, apprehensive about the bomb’s power, opined that “we must not forget that we can be boomeranged in just as hellish [a] manner” as were the Japanese – and not just by enemies, but “through mistakes in handling the weapon” or through “unforeseen, uncalculated reasons.”⁷ Another letter, even more concerned about human nature, stated, “Science has reached to the fringe of the universe and stolen the secret of life inviolate since the beginning of time.... Man is too frail a being to be entrusted with such power as atomic energy possesses.”⁸ Fearing the twin perils of political instability and the spread of nuclear technology, one letter urged that “the United States should use all its power to obtain military and political control. If this is not done soon other nations will soon use atomic power themselves....”⁹

Finally, some letters raised moral, even religious, objections to the atomic bomb. One writer confessed, “The destruction of Hiroshima by an atomic bomb fills me with horror,” and declared the first atomic attack to be “a stain upon our national life.” He continued, “If the use of this terrible power can be confined to war personnel and war material, all right; but if it will result in the killing of 100,000 women and children, it is

⁶ Walter Niebuhr, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, August 11, 1945.

⁷ Julius Zirinsky, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, August 11, 1945.

⁸ William Fanning, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, August 11, 1945.

⁹ Robert Harrow, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, August 9, 1945.

all wrong.” He predicted, “When the exhilaration of this wonderful discovery has passed we will think with shame of the first use to which it was put.”¹⁰ Indeed, some letters raised objections with explicitly religious and spiritual overtones. One writer stated, “I am horrified at the indiscriminate, inhuman and un-Christian bombing of cities which we are committing,” and declared, “It is simply mass murder, sheer terrorism on the greatest scale the world has yet seen.” The writer contended that “we have meanwhile sunk to the spiritual level of the Nazis. If there is any moral order in the universe, our disregard of human values will as surely make forfeit any claim of ours to moral hegemony as did the crimes of the Nazis and Fascists.”¹¹

The above letters exhibit a variety of attitudes. Some Americans felt that Japan had simply gotten what was deserved. Other Americans praised the bomb or lauded the science and scientists that had made possible the production of atomic weapons. Some letters expressed ambivalence toward the bomb because of misgivings about its power or about human ability to control this power wisely. Finally, some letters raised ethical and religious concerns. Perhaps the polar opposites among these trends, the staunchly pro-atomic and anti-atomic opinions, can be exemplified by Senator Richard B. Russell, who called for unrestricted atomic warfare against Japan, and the Federal Council of Churches (FCC), which was deeply troubled by the first salvo of atomic weaponry.

What were the thoughts of the man who decided to unleash this new and devastating weapon? President Harry S. Truman addressed letters directly to Senator Russell and the FCC. On day that Fat Man fell on Nagasaki, August 9, 1945, Truman wrote Russell,

¹⁰ William Church Osborn, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, August 11, 1945.

¹¹ Francis Walton, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, August 11, 1945.

I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can't bring myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same manner.¹²

Two days later Truman wrote the FCC:

When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true.¹³

Using one vivid image, President Truman revealed himself to be of two minds in two letters written two days apart. This paradox encapsulates a larger paradox embodied by Presidents Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Ronald W. Reagan. All three presidents made nuclear decisions ranging from hawkish and belligerent to dovish and restrained.

Not only did Truman use atomic weapons during World War II, he considered recourse to them during the 1948 Berlin blockade and the Korean conflict. Moreover, Truman made the decision to pursue more powerful thermonuclear weapons. If Truman pursued nuclear ambiguity in his attitude toward the Soviet Union over the Iran crisis of 1946, his favorable reactions to the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and support of the Baruch Plan, both of which dealt with the issue of nuclear internationalization, contrast with the aforementioned bellicose moves.

Eisenhower was on watch for perhaps half of the Cold War's nuclear crises including Korea, the 1954-1955 Asian crises, the Suez crisis, the Lebanon and Taiwan Straits crises, and the Berlin deadline crisis which was so intertwined with the later Cuban Missile Crisis under President John F. Kennedy; yet Eisenhower's Solarium

¹² Harry S Truman to Richard B. Russell, August 9, 1945, Official File, Truman Papers, accessed September 12, 2012, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-08-09&documentid=9&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1.

¹³ Harry S Truman to Samuel McCrea Cavert, August 11, 1945, Official File, Truman Papers, accessed September 12, 2012, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1945-08-11&documentid=11&studycollectionid=abomb.

exercise and the New Look illustrated a greater flexibility in his approach to nuclear issues than his crisis involvement might suggest, and Eisenhower's "Cross of Iron" and "Atoms for Peace" speeches appear conciliatory by comparison.

Reagan was associated with a nuclear and conventional military buildup including a controversial missile defense initiative. Nevertheless, he offered to share missile defense technology, undertook "quiet diplomacy" initiatives, reacted strongly to the military exercise Able Archer 83 and to the TV movie *The Day After*, and desired that nuclear weapons be abolished.

How can such marked differences in the same person be explained? In this dissertation, I ask the following question: Can religious cultural heritage (RCH) help provide a unified explanation to the paradoxical nuclear decisions of Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan? I argue that religious cultural heritage indeed can provide a parsimonious link to unify these otherwise disparate nuclear choices. For example, considering Truman's response to the senator and to the FCC above, I contend that RCH can shed light on how a leader could make a decision to use nuclear weapons without apology yet not without restraint. Moreover, multiple RCHs could pull in multiple directions; even the same principles from the same general RCH, when applied to two different problems, might suggest a hawkish-looking decision in one case but a dovish-looking decision in another case.

I have no quarrel *per se* with other models of nuclear decision-making which attempt to resolve the paradox exemplified by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan; however, by excluding RCH from the explanations, much prior work leaves gaps which this dissertation strives to close. As a result, I begin with a brief survey of a number of literatures which grapple with various aspects of nuclear decision-making.

PRIOR WORK

In order to take seriously the selectivity, multi-dimensionality, and multi-directionality of nuclear decisions, it makes sense to look at several literatures which could shed light on how religious cultural heritage (RCH) could fit in to nuclear decision-making. One would expect the proliferation literature to address nuclear motivations. Likewise, the literature dealing with the ethics of weapons of mass destruction should provide useful secular and religious viewpoints in comparative perspective, and one might anticipate that the literature on religion, culture, and international politics would address factors pertinent for connecting RCH and nuclear decision-making. A review of the secular and Christian streams of realist thought in international relations should highlight useful contrasts in approach, and the operational code literature might be expected provide a suitable basis for analyzing decision-making frameworks. In the representative tour of these literatures below, I highlight not only the contributions of these literatures but the ways in which they fall short of helping me study the relationship between RCH and presidential nuclear decision-making in the way I wish to engage it.¹⁴

Reasons for Proliferation, and Whether Religion Could Matter

Because of Truman's decision to pursue possession of thermonuclear weaponry, and to a lesser extent because of Reagan's decision to pursue strategic defenses against nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, it makes sense to survey a sample of the proliferation literature. This literature asks the following question: Why do states pursue, maintain, or forego nuclear weapons? The views of the following scholars are varied; moreover, many premises of these theories speak to nuclear doctrines and decisions as well as to

¹⁴ One could start with other literatures such as ethics in foreign policy or presidential decision-making. At this point in time, however, the global zero debate dominates much of the current nuclear discussion, and global zero has components of religious cultural heritage in it dating even to before the time when the crest of the "nuclear freeze" movement coincided with a series of letters and statements from Christian religious leaders in NATO countries in the early 1980s.

proliferation. However, none deal explicitly with religions in international politics, although some of these frameworks could be extended to encompass religious cultural heritage.

In general, the two most basic proliferation questions are the following: “Shall we as a state acquire and maintain nuclear weapons?” and, if the first question is answered in the affirmative, “How many nuclear weapons shall we as a state acquire and maintain?” The first question concerns what is called “horizontal proliferation” while the second question concerns what is called “vertical proliferation.” There are a number of factors which may influence the answers to these questions including issues of political stability, risk, and the “security dilemma”¹⁵ whereby increasing the security of one state poses a threat to the security of neighboring states; deterring a war and fighting a war; national pride and honor; and the psychology of leaders and elites. In general, purely systemic and materialist explanations seem to exclude by their very nature the possibility of engaging the research question at hand because there appears to be no space for religion or culture in these frameworks. The psychological explanations should, in principle, be able to accommodate RCH insofar as religion and culture form and inform the thought processes of leaders and elites, including the frameworks they use to make nuclear decisions; however, to date RCH seems not to have been included in such theories of proliferation.

Proliferation Literature Which Cannot Accommodate RCH

Consider first some proliferation literature from the first category which cannot incorporate religious cultural heritage. Although these authors may disagree with each

¹⁵ The term “security dilemma” was first used in John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157-180. A classic analysis of the intensity of the security dilemma can be found in Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214.

other, I group them together because they make choices of framework or methodology which preclude the consideration of RCH.

Total Proliferation. Waltz has contended that the Cold War vindicates the universal logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD): The elites in Washington and Moscow dared not risk nuclear holocaust to advance goals of territory or power, so peaceful stalemate ensued.¹⁶

Selective Proliferation. Mearsheimer has argued for nuclear proliferation to be implemented as policy in certain places to balance power and to stabilize historical animosities.¹⁷

Like Begets Like. It is Sagan's belief that history shows, "Every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security."¹⁸

Shields, Badges, and Swords. Cha explores three possible goals of North Korea's opaque nuclear doctrine: nuclear weapons as shield (deterrence), badge (national prestige), and sword (to deny the United States access to the Korean peninsula).¹⁹

Proliferation Literature Which Could Accommodate RCH but Has Not

Now consider some proliferation literature from the second category which in principle could, but in practice does not, incorporate religious cultural heritage.

¹⁶ Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 24.

¹⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (1990): 5-56 and John J. Mearsheimer, "Case for a Ukrainian Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993): 50-66.

¹⁸ Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-1997):70.

¹⁹ Victor D. Cha, "North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?" *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 209-230.

Psychology of Proliferation. To explain the limited proliferation of nuclear weapons, Hymans argues that state leaders who seek nuclear bombs are always those who view other states as enemies and their own state as inferior to none. For leaders who have a “national identity conception” of this sort (“oppositional nationalism”), Hymans claims “the decision to acquire nuclear weapons is not only a means to the end of getting them; it is also an end in itself, a matter of self-expression.”²⁰

Nuclear Logics. Where others emphasize state security, Solingen emphasizes the model of domestic political survival preferred by the ruling elites: Regardless of the external security environment, outward-looking elites are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons while inward-looking elites are more inclined to seek them. Hence, nuclear policies within the same state may vary over time with the domestic environment.²¹

As noted above, religions appear to have little or no place in the outlooks of Waltz, Mearsheimer, Sagan, and Cha. However, Hymans’ notion of national identity conception and Solingen’s notion of domestic politics could accommodate religious cultural influences on nuclear decisions, should any be found. In both cases, however, an explicit connection between RCH and nuclear decision-making has been left unexplored. This dissertation will explore that connection.

Nuclear Ethics in Secular and Religious Perspective

The above outlooks on proliferation propose different motivations to acquire nuclear weapons. How do different religions view such weapons?

²⁰ Jacques E.C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 13.

²¹ Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). This book is an extension and refinement of “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” *International Security* 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 126-169.

I wish to employ a consistent methodological approach which is theoretically motivated in order to explore how RCH relates to nuclear decision-making. Although *Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, edited by Hashmi and Lee, reappraises the ethical debate by placing realism, natural law, liberalism, and Christianity in comparative perspective with Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, feminism, and pacifism,²² I cannot base my dissertation on this book. The many chapter authors do conduct moral analyses in terms of the use of strategic nuclear weapons for deterrence and war, and an important strength of the book is that it compares different ideas concerning force, violence, and war within the various traditions (noting, for example, that warrior-monks and pacifists both exist within Buddhism). However, the book discusses traditional topics without systematic case exploration or other uniform methodology and without treating the interaction of religions and politics as a primary focus. This dissertation will undertake such treatment for three American presidents.

In my view, Doyle rightly criticizes the book because “the mainstream commentary does not depart significantly from the familiar cold war analysis.” He suggests research should focus on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and the norm of nonproliferation; ethics and nuclear democracies; and ethics, regime insecurity, and nuclear aspirations.²³ I agree with Doyle’s inclusion of norms and ethics in his critique. However, I must point out that explicit religious-political interaction is not a main emphasis for Doyle, and I further note that Doyle’s critique is simply a proposal for a research agenda. Explicitly incorporating RCH into agendas similar to those of Doyle,

²² Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee, eds., *Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

²³ Thomas E. Doyle, II, “Reviving Nuclear Ethics: A Renewed Research Agenda for the Twenty-First Century,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 24, no. 3 (2010): 287-308.

and actually carrying out such an agenda, would enrich the scholarly discourse, and my argument in this dissertation tackles a piece of that agenda.

Religion, Culture, and International Politics

My dissertation engages RCH, so religion and culture are central aspects of my investigation. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* incited scholars to reconsider the explanatory power of religions as factors in international relations. Huntington proposes that culture and cultural identity can help explain conflict and cooperation in the post-Cold War world.²⁴ Although Huntington's book brought religions to the foreground, most international relations scholars who reexamined the explanatory value of religions rejected their importance.²⁵ Contrary to Huntington, Berman has argued that distinct cultural boundaries no longer exist, that there is no Islamic civilization or Western civilization, and that evidence for civilizational clash is unconvincing; he provides the US-Saudi relationship as a counterexample. Berman also pointed out that many Islamic extremists spent significant time in the West living, studying, or both. Significantly, Berman claimed that conflict arises because of shared or unshared philosophical beliefs regardless of cultural or religious identity.²⁶ Since this dissertation treats culture, religion, and the philosophical ideas which underlie religious approaches to war, force, and violence, my dissertation will enrich the foregoing discourse as well.

²⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

²⁵ See, for example, Jonathan Fox, "Paradigm Lost: Huntington's Unfulfilled Clash of Civilizations Prediction into the 21st Century," *International Politics* 42, (December 2005): 428–457; Errol A. Henderson and Richard Tucker, "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 2 (June 2001): 317–338; A. Mungiu-Pippidi and D. Mindruta, "Was Huntington Right? Testing Cultural Legacies and the Civilization Border," *International Politics* 39, no. 2 (June 2002): 193–213; and Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 5 (September 2000): 583–608.

²⁶ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003).

My argument will depend on gaging the influence of RCH. Recently, Toft et al. have related religions to democracy; to terrorism; to civil war; and to peace, settlements, and reconciliation. Several of these items deal with larger question of religions, force, and violence. Although not treating nuclear issues *per se*, Toft et al. find three factors bear on a religion's influence: how independent a religion is from the government, how it deals with peace, and how it deals with injustice.²⁷ These categories calibrate expectations for when a religion will be more or less likely to have greater or lesser impact on public policy.

Because my RCH approach takes culture seriously, a strategic culture perspective is also informative, for this point of view explores culture as a formative component of grand strategy and national security policy.²⁸ *The Culture of National Security*,²⁹ edited by Katzenstein, investigates the impact of state identity and interests on state behavior. Most of the chapter authors use rich definitions from sociological or constructivist approaches. However, the book uneven, for terms and variables are used inconsistently, and hypotheses are not clearly stated.

The mechanics of actually investigating RCH have not been worked out previously, but Johnston's work in strategic culture is suggestive and helpful. In *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Johnston advanced the following three-step approach to strategic culture: First, look for a central paradigm

²⁷ Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).

²⁸ The term "strategic culture" was introduced in Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*, RAND Report R-2154-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, September 1977). The term was defined as referring to "a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force" in Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979), 121.

²⁹ Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

concerning whether conflict in human affairs is normal or not, whether threats and enemies can be dealt with in a zero- or positive-sum fashion, and whether and how well force can be used to control threats and outcomes; next, look for an ordered set of strategic preferences derived from this paradigm, explore whether these preferences are congruent across time, and test whether these preferences are consistent across policy makers; and, finally, use these preferences to generate predictions of behavior, observe whether the predictions are borne out, and compare the results to realist predictions.³⁰ This approach provides a framework which can be adapted to investigate the influence of religions on public policies, especially when placed alongside Toft et al.'s definition of political theology, "the set of ideas that a religious actor holds about what is legitimate political authority."³¹ Note also the overlap of Johnston's approach with Toft et al.'s factors bearing on religious influence. Explicitly adverting to RCH in the nuclear discourse as I do thus brings together aspects of exploration raised in the work of Huntington, Toft et al., Katzenstein, and Johnston, namely religion and culture informing a framework for deciding strategy and policy.

Realism, Christian and Secular

Johnston's *Cultural Realism* draws on the realist school of international relations theory, a school which has already dealt with nuclear weapons in several ways. In some ways realism and RCH of the Christian variety have been in dialogue since the beginning of the atomic age, perhaps even in embryo in the contrasting points of view of Senator Russell and the FCC. In the post-World-War-II debates realists told a story about the

³⁰ Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

³¹ Toft et al., 27. Because Christianity falls into the category of a revealed religion I use the broader term "philosophy of government" to recognize that there is a distinction between the content of revelation and the content of ordered reflection on that revelation, both of which are part of RCH.

limits of morality and argued that an unbridgeable chasm separated politics and morality; Christian theologians rejoined (1) that realism was reacting to moralism rather than to moral reasoning properly understood and (2) that realism raised false paradoxes of the supposed gap between personal and social ethics, of self-interest, and of power that could be resolved by referring to natural law, by using moral reasoning properly understood, and by recognizing distinctions such as the difference between force and violence.³² This brief example illustrates the conversation between politics and religion underway since the beginning of the nuclear age.

To understand the importance of realism to my argument about RCH, it is worth turning to Craig's³³ insightful analysis of the Christian realism of Niebuhr, the classical realism of Morgenthau, and the structural realism of Waltz (the same Waltz as in the nuclear proliferation section above). Several points made by Craig are useful for advancing this dissertation.

Reinhold Niebuhr, although often categorized as a Lutheran, was in fact an ordained minister in the German Evangelical Synod,³⁴ a professor at Union Theological Seminary, and a public intellectual. The basis of Niebuhr's realism, namely individual morality and communal immorality, was initially set forth in 1932 in *Moral Man and*

³² For an example of a realist view, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948); for an example of a Christian view, see John Courtney Murray, SJ, *We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition* (Garden City: Doubleday Image Books, 1964).

³³ Campbell Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

³⁴ Founded in the nineteenth century from mixed congregations of Lutheran and Reformed background, after 1927 the German Evangelical Synod of North America became the Evangelical Synod of North America. In the 1930s the denomination merged with the Reformed Church in the United States to form the Evangelical and Reformed Church. Upon uniting with the Congregational Christian Churches, the United Church of Christ was formed in 1957. Since Niebuhr was active from the teens through the 1960s, different sources may identify his Protestant Christian religious affiliation differently.

Immoral Society.³⁵ Starting with a philosophical anthropology (or theory of the human person) which emphasized the fallen, sinful nature shared by all of humanity, Niebuhr explained that the will to live was at the root of all politics; thus, the will to live was the root cause of the will to self-realization which ultimately metamorphosed into the will to power. Niebuhr then turned to international politics. Balancing a non-pacifist Augustinian anti-war idealism with an unwillingness to ban recourse to coercion to achieve social justice, Niebuhr critiqued idealists, Marxists, and isolationists alike. Developing his thought further in *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* in 1944,³⁶ Niebuhr argued that World War II was a battle between evil and slightly-less-evil. The Children of Light, as Niebuhr called political actors who pursued normative goals, were able to overcome only partially the human sinfulness and self-love that completely blinded the Children of Darkness. The Children of Light, argued Niebuhr, must shed their vain belief in human perfectibility. However, World War II was not a conflict between morally equivalent sides, for the defense of democratic civilization was necessary to prevent tyranny on the one hand and mob rule on the other. Thus Niebuhr's realism was defensive in concept. Note also how Niebuhr's account moved from an explanation at the individual level to one at the group level.

In contrast to Niebuhr, Hans Morganthau was a secular Jew who emigrated from Hitler's Europe in the late 1930s. With a background in political philosophy and international law, Morganthau eventually took a position at the University of Chicago. Morganthau's 1946 work *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*³⁷ offered a realist critique of liberals and Marxists based on individual rationality and communal irrationality. Like

³⁵ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribner's, 1932). This book was republished in 2001 in Louisville by Westminster John Knox Press.

³⁶ Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York: Scribner's, 1944).

³⁷ Hans J. Morganthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

Niebuhr, Morgenthau began with philosophical anthropology, that is to say, a theory of human nature. Unlike Niebuhr, Morgenthau saw no Children of Light, for he considered all to be motivated by lust for power. Hence Morgenthau argued that all politics, including international politics, must be equally dominated by irrational power drives. Moral behavior, then, is to engage in power politics in order to survive in a world in which national interests are defined in terms of power. Defensiveness is mistaken and responsible for the tragedies of the 1930s. In the 1948 first edition of *Politics Among Nations*,³⁸ in which he stressed analysis of international relations over philosophical anthropology, Morgenthau contended that states seek to maintain, increase, and demonstrate power. Morgenthau emphasized that the United States – newly a superpower in a precariously-balanced bipolar world in which purposeful and limited warfare had been eclipsed by technological and total war – could either seek normative transformation or pursue a traditional balance of power. However, trying to change the world would lead to defeat, leaving power politics as the right and only alternative. Note how, like Niebuhr, Morgenthau moved his explanation from the individual level to the group level.

Very different from Niebuhr and Morgenthau was Kenneth Waltz. In *Man, the State, and War*,³⁹ Waltz argued that thinkers who were enamored of human nature had not dealt with international relations in a theoretically cogent fashion. Waltz used the individual, the state, and the international system (alluded to by “war” in his title) as three explanatory images. Waltz argued human nature was an un-falsifiable explanation; it was allegedly both the cause of war in wartime and the cause of peace in peacetime. Rather than argue from the fallen nature of human beings (first-image) or from the political

³⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948).

³⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

nature of certain states (second-image), Waltz argued war results from the anarchical nature of the international system (third-image), for there is no final arbiter among states. When critiquing liberalism and Marxism, Waltz charged that liberalism and Marxism fail to explain actual behavior by showing from history how liberals and Marxists hung onto the state despite their professed ideologies.

Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz, however, all drifted from their initial moorings when they confronted atomic and especially thermonuclear weapons. Craig, analyzing the development of these three thinkers over time, discerns the following pattern:

Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz all gravitated toward the normative goal of great-power peace in the thermonuclear age.... Niebuhr rather suddenly determined in 1957 that nuclear war was unwinnable and hence no longer a just *ultima ratio*; thermonuclear war became for him the unambiguous moral evil of collective power politics, but he found no way to slay this evil other than by muddling through the Cold War. Morgenthau... remained ambiguous about [this idea] in his public writings until 1961. Once having made this decision, however, he announced in a more dramatic fashion the death of the nation state and the imperative of world government. Like Niebuhr, though, Morgenthau only hinted at the way such a state could develop.

Waltz's experience was different. Without the novel terrors of Cold War crises to move him, he tacitly advanced a normative program of nuclear peace by gradually incorporating it into his theoretical writings on neorealism.... Waltz has never uttered the kind of things Niebuhr and Morgenthau were saying in the early 1960s, though. Niebuhr and Morgenthau came around to admitting that nuclear weapons had devastated their worldviews; Waltz has not.

But in a fundamental sense the same thing occurred to all three Realists. Each had become famous for articulating a political philosophy that regarded great-power war as a tragic inevitability of international power politics. Each of them came to reconsider this philosophy in the face of the overwhelming normative end of great-power nuclear peace. All three eventually chose to favor an atheoretical program for great-power war avoidance over philosophical consistency.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Craig, *Glimmer*, 164-165.

Craig finds what, for this introduction, is the crucial connection in Waltz's article "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,"⁴¹ because "Waltz admits that a unit-level phenomenon, the fear of nuclear war, plays a *decisive* role in determining whether great powers, along with other states, go to war."⁴²

Craig's insight is keen and directly related to my investigation and argument. If three prominent realist writers espousing three varieties of realism gravitate over time to a first-image point of view when confronted with a nuclear dilemma, it makes sense for this dissertation to take seriously the individual level of analysis. The decision-making frameworks (DMFs) of leaders and elites have been studied in fields ranging from international relations to political psychology. The operation code literature spans these disciplines, so I turn to this literature now.

Operational Code Literature⁴³

Operational code can provide the basis of a theoretical framework to study religious cultural heritage (RCH) influence. An operational code encompasses "approaches to political calculation"⁴⁴ by characterizing a subject's philosophical beliefs (concerning the nature of politics, conflict, the individual, history, and so forth) and instrumental beliefs (concerning end-means relationships).

⁴¹ Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," *Adelphi Paper No. 171* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

⁴² Craig, *Glimmer*, 167.

⁴³ See Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," RM-5427-PR (Santa Monica: RAND, September 1967) and "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (June 1969): 190-222. Although both works are similar, the earlier work is more explicit in stating that instrumental issues are policy issues. See also Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, eds., *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), especially the chapters "Belief Systems as Causal Mechanisms in World Politics: An Overview of Operational Code Analysis" (on pages 3-22) by Walker and Schafer and "Operational Code Analysis at a Distance: The Verbs in Context System of Content Analysis" (on pages 25-51) by Schafer and Walker.

⁴⁴ George, "Operational Code," 1969, 220.

The operational code approach is suitable for studying decision-making styles in particular situations. Data can be obtained by means accepted in history and social science. Knowing a subject's operational code allows prediction of behavior patterns and can thus suggest or prescribe policy approaches in concrete sets of circumstances. Nevertheless, a subject's operational code does not *cause* policy but does *predispose* decision-makers. Operational code thus captures an important part of decision-making.

However, operational code literature tends to omit ethical, normative, or religious influence of whatever source. Even when implicitly treated, religion is usually viewed as a proxy for morality rather than viewed as truly contributing to causal aspects, explanations, and influences.

Nevertheless, the operational code approach has proven adaptable. It has been used to study elites⁴⁵ and individuals⁴⁶ as well as qualitative⁴⁷ and quantitative⁴⁸ data; although initially used to study state-centric and international politics, it has been used to study non-state⁴⁹ actors and domestic⁵⁰ politics, too.

⁴⁵ For example, Nathan Leites' books *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951) and *A Study of Bolshevism* (New York: Free Press, 1953).

⁴⁶ For example, Ole Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs," *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique* 3, no. 1 (March 1970): 123-157.

⁴⁷ For example, J. Philipp Rosenberg, "Presidential Beliefs and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Continuity during the Cold War Era," *Political Psychology* 7, no. 4 (December 1986): 733-751. Rosenberg explicitly treats religion and politics; on page 736 he observes, "The primary similarity [among US Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson] is a belief that the principles which should guide human behavior are not man-made but rather dictated by God. The other two similarities are a belief in an individual's responsibility for his own actions and a common belief in Man's obligation to help those less fortunate than himself." Rosenberg's article as a whole demonstrates the operational code framework can be made to incorporate religious cultural heritage.

⁴⁸ For example, Michelle Keck, "The Operational Code of Nikita Khrushchev Before and After the Cuban Missile Crisis" (masters thesis, Midwestern State University, 2003) uses the Verbs in Context System (VICS) computerized quantitative content analysis; Stephen G. Walker and Lawrence S. Falkowski, "The Operational Codes of US Presidents and Secretaries of State: Motivational Foundations and Behavioral Consequences," *Political Psychology* 5, no. 2 (June 1984): 237-266 predates VICS but makes quantitative comparisons.

⁴⁹ For example, Peter Michael Picucci, "Terrorism's Operational Code: An Examination of the Belief Systems of Al-Qaeda and Hamas" (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 2008).

I proceed from the operational code approach to a more comprehensive tool to characterize decision-making frameworks (DMFs) in order to explore religious cultural influence on nuclear decisions. Like operational codes, DMFs are not rigorous philosophies but do help define the space for thinking about war and nuclear war. I do not use DMF analysis to render moral judgments on nuclear decisions; rather, nuclear weapons contribute to, and force into the open, the actual DMFs which guide policy choices by the leaders and elites of nuclear-armed states. It is the nuclear burden, the international threat environment, and the society, including its religious cultural heritage, which influence leaders and elites (who also have their own experiences of cultural religious heritage) as nuclear decisions are undertaken. Moreover, DMFs may undergo as much “character development” over time as leaders and elites themselves. Such findings can then be used to refine theoretical frameworks and suggest testable propositions in further work.

MOVING BEYOND THE OPERATIONAL CODE⁵¹

To discover whether and how religious cultural heritage (RCH) helps form the decision-making framework (DMF) of leaders and elites, consider in isolation a subject who, presented with a menu of choices including a nuclear option or options, must make a nuclear decision. At the time of a given decision, any influence on the subject’s DMF by RCH (and other factors) will have already taken place, and the DMF will frame the

⁵⁰ For example, Huiyun Feng and Kai He, “Decoding China’s Political Future and Foreign Policy: An Operational Code Analysis of Hu’s and Wen’s Belief Systems,” in *International Politics in Times of Change*, ed. N. Tzifakis, The Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Series on European and International Affairs (Athens: Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, 2012), 135-152.

⁵¹ This section and the following section are both dependent on Brian Muzas, “With Justice He Judges and Makes War: Elite Leadership Choices, Nuclear Weapons Decisions, and Religious Cultural Heritage,” *The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 11-22.

issues, the information, and nuclear options at hand and so set in motion the nuclear decision.

RCH is in a sense an equivocal term since there are at least two pathways by which RCH could influence the formation of a leader's DMF. First, RCH influence could be felt at the societal level: For example, there could be ways of thinking and speaking about war, force, violence, social order, justice, and the like that are common currency in the culture and that had their origins in, or had been influenced by, the principal religion or religions in the culture. Second, RCH influence could be felt at the individual level: For example, a particular leader may have had first-hand experience with a principal religion in the culture, perhaps by being reared in a religious household, perhaps through encountering a religious institution like a school, perhaps by choosing to adhere to that religion, or perhaps through a combination of the preceding paths.

State leaders rarely make a single nuclear decision. Hence, it may be incomplete to consider nuclear decisions in isolation, for as results of prior nuclear decisions become apparent, these outcomes may affect future nuclear options and may modify leaders' DMFs. It thus makes sense to "close the loop" on the model by recognizing that RCH may have indirect as well as direct effects on DMF formation. Therefore, both the societal and the individual modalities of RCH each have at least three possible ways to influence nuclear decisions: by directly contributing to DMF formation, by indirectly contributing to DMF formation by intensifying or moderating lessons learned from prior nuclear decisions, and by indirectly affecting future nuclear options by intensifying or moderating lessons learned from prior nuclear decisions.⁵²

⁵² Note that the third possible way of influence does not affect the DMF; it is nevertheless affects nuclear decisions by affecting the menu of nuclear options.




Figure 1.1: Religious cultural heritage (RCH) helps form a leader's decision-making framework (DMF) such that, when the leader is presented with options that include one or several nuclear options, a given nuclear decision is made. Although only single arrows are shown coming out of the RCH box, RCH can influence a leader's DMF at societal and individuals levels, so each single arrow represents both of these distinguishable modes. There are other factors which can influence the formation of the DMF, but, since RCH is under-studied, the other factors are not illustrated in this diagram.⁵³

Figure 1.1 illustrates the model. For clarity the model is shown with only one modality at a time and without illustrating the other factors which affect DMF formation, for the goal is to understand how the under-theorized, under-explored RCH factor

⁵³ Muzas, 16.

behaves in isolation. The figure does not present a comprehensive model of nuclear decision-making. Rather, the figure is a tool to explore whether RCH matters enough to merit attention in its own right. Interactions with other features can be modeled in subsequent work.

To take these next steps, however, one must first characterize leaders' DMFs. One way of thinking about a DMF is to divide it into two principal parts: how leaders retrieve the past to the present, and how leaders move from the present into the future.

The past-oriented part of the DMF may be subdivided into data gathering, interpretation, historical narrative, and dialectical evaluation. "Data gathering" encompasses seeking information such as known facts or evidence-backed beliefs, enumerating what is not known, and establishing relevance and reliability. "Interpretation" designates further understanding based on analysis that synthesizes the gathered data. "Historical narrative" means understanding not only the sequence of events but their context and trends. "Dialectical evaluation" recognizes that more than one factor may drive the historical narrative and so appraises the roles of the different factors, including errors that have appeared in historical narratives and in actual history.

The future-oriented part of the DMF may be divided into foundations, policies, plans, and implementations. "Foundations" mean the intellectual, moral, and affective commitments in explanatory categories for undertaking political action. "Policies" identify judgments of fact or value expressed in such categories. "Plans" organize the systematic interrelationships among policies based on models in the foundations. "Implementations" communicate, promote, and put these understandings into effect using means and media available.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ The underlying thought draws on the North American school of critical realist philosophy, for example, Bernard Lonergan's books *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London: Longmans, 1957). The eight subdivisions and their definitions are inspired by Lonergan's *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder

Such a characterization of DMF coheres well with the closed-loop model of Figure 1.1, for implementations become data for further understanding within historical contexts to be evaluated. However, this characterization is not a rigid sequential construct; indeed, the different subdivisions can interact with each other both within the same time orientation (e.g. an implementation interacting with a policy; both are future-oriented subdivisions) and across time orientations (e.g. a historical narrative interacting with a policy; the former is past-oriented and the latter is future-oriented).

The literature reviewed earlier fits nicely into this approach. For example, operational code's philosophical questions come under foundations while the instrumental questions come under policies, plans, and especially implementations. Realist accounts, generally ahistorical, tend to fall under the present-to-future categories; much of the historically-conditioned national-identity-conception and nuclear-logic accounts come under the past-to-future categories. Toft et al.'s characterization of religions, in terms of independence from the government on the one hand and in terms of teachings on peace and justice on the other hand, falls within the purview at least of historical narrative and foundations, respectively. My approach thus allows insights from past work to be incorporated.

My methodological orientation improves upon the earlier frameworks such as Johnston's by explicitly seeking to account for RCH. As such, I can treat information whether it manifests a religious, secular, or mixed source – or I can frankly record uncertainty if congruence testing and/or qualitative content analyses yield ambiguous information. Moreover, military *commitments*, *doctrines*, *plans*, and *communications* parallel *foundations*, *policies*, *plans*, and *implementations* since military commitments are

and Herder, 1972) but have been cast in such a way as to suit this interdisciplinary investigation which cross-cuts political science, public policy, nuclear strategy, international relations, and religion. See also Muzas, 17-19.

foundational to its mission, doctrines are military policies, military plans integrate doctrines into a whole, and military implementations in the international arena are a means of communication ranging from signaling to “continuation of *Politik* by other means.”⁵⁵

In principle, the above methodological orientation is a good way to look at the development and interaction of DMF components. In practice, the DMF is revealed only by actual decisions. Using this approach I explore the three arrows of societal RCH and the three arrows of individual RCH that could influence DMFs and nuclear options. In short, the three steps are: carrying out congruence testing and qualitative content analysis; characterizing the DMF based on these analyses; and characterizing RCH influence by sourcing the components of the DMF. I employ this methodology because no suitable methodology already existed as I began this investigation.

Illustration

This section illustrates how the above methodology would be put to use. The scope of this chapter precludes a full case study. However, the following quotation of President Eisenhower allows a brief illustration. During a press conference, Eisenhower said:

All of us have heard this term “preventive war” since the earliest days of Hitler. I recall that is about the first time I heard it. In this day and time, if we believe for one second that nuclear fission and fusion, that type of weapon, would be used in such a war—what is a preventive war?

I would say a preventive war, if the words mean anything, is to wage some sort of quick police action in order that you might avoid a terrific cataclysm of destruction later.

⁵⁵ Carl von Clausewitz’s characterization of war is famously multivalent. Antulio J. Echevarria II looks at three possible meanings of *Politik* in “The Legacy of Clausewitz,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 1995-96): 76-80.

A preventive war, to my mind, is an impossibility today. How could you have one if one of its features would be several cities lying in ruins, several cities where many, many thousands of people would be dead and injured and mangled, the transportation systems destroyed, sanitation implements and systems all gone? That isn't preventive war; that is war.

I don't believe there is such a thing; and, frankly, I wouldn't even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked about such a thing.

... It seems to me that when, by definition, a term is just ridiculous in itself, there is no use in going any further.

There are all sorts of reasons, moral and political and everything else, against this theory, but it is so completely unthinkable in today's conditions that I thought it is no use to go any further.⁵⁶

The passage allows us to sketch Eisenhower's decision-making. Suppose the above passage were part of a case study of an actual crisis in which preventive nuclear war was considered. Such a nuclear option falls under implementation. Avoiding cataclysm falls under policy. A police action falls under plans. Eisenhower's first encounter with the term "preventive war" falls under data gathering while "since the earliest days of Hitler" implies a historical narrative. Moreover, data clearly have been gathered on the likely outcomes of nuclear strikes, and these data have been interpreted to forecast the results of such strikes (ruins, casualties, and so forth). The question of implementing preventive war is subjected to cursory dialectical analysis (assured destruction in preventive war vs. potential destruction in the future without the war). The moral, political, and other reasons which militate against a nuclear preventive war fall under foundations.

As the suppositional case study continued, one would explore the interactions, if any, of the elements mentioned above (e.g., how moral or political foundations interacted with understandings proposed by historical narrative). Once exploration of this case was

⁵⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The President's News Conference," August 11, 1954, accessed August 6, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9977>.

completed, research into Eisenhower's DMF would give way to exploring the different influences of RCH on it. For example, one could explore the ways in which the moral foundations that worked against a decision to pursue nuclear preventive war found their way into Eisenhower's DMF. Perhaps RCH helped form these moral foundations.

Taking Stock

This section of the chapter so far has presented a model of religious cultural heritage (RCH) influence, taken in isolation, upon nuclear decisions. RCH acts at two levels or in two modalities, societal and individual. There are three paths through which RCH can affect nuclear decisions: by shaping decision-making frameworks (DMFs) directly, by shaping DMFs indirectly, and by shaping nuclear options indirectly. This chapter also presents ways to characterize DMFs by congruence testing and qualitative content analysis. Once a DMF is thereby characterized, the three paths and two modalities (six corridors total) through which RCH act can be analyzed. This chapter advances a new methodology because existing literature either ignores RCH or deals with RCH unevenly and unsystematically.

A Way Forward

This investigation is challenging because it explores the effect of RCH on nuclear policies, stances, and doctrines. It can be hard to tell where a religion ends and a culture begins; as a result, the difference between cultural and religious influences can require subtle distinction. For example, there is a strong Christian tradition of just war thought, and Christianity has had a profound effect on Western culture. This influence extends even to everyday language and idioms. Many expressions in common parlance are quotations of, or allusions to, the Bible. How does one distinguish between religious

influence and, for example, an appeal to a politically-important constituent group based on wording? Herein lies the importance of interpretation.

For this investigation, I look only at Western Christianity. Eastern Orthodoxy will not be considered. Protestantism and Catholicism both are in play in the US context, so I look at modes of thought, theological approaches, and habits of reasoning with respect to morality in order to come to terms with RCH.

Although distinguishing RCH is challenging, people nevertheless talk about religions as if religions have a distinct existence and as if religious discourse is identifiably different from other discourses. The distinctiveness of Christianity, and distinctiveness within Christianity regarding Scripture, authority, social organization, human nature, and right and wrong, will prove important.

Building on the framework outlined above, I will emphasize three intermediary connections between RCH and DMF. First, I will look at RCH and philosophical ethics. I will ask: What theory of good and bad, right and wrong does a particular RCH bring to the table? Second, I will look at RCH and philosophy of government. I will ask: What theory of the scope, role, aptitude, legitimacy, and competence of the civil government belongs to a particular RCH, and is the theory optimistic or pessimistic, hopeful or fearful in attitude toward the secular sphere? Finally, I will look at RCH and philosophical anthropology. I will ask: What theory of human nature belongs to a particular RCH? I will look at these questions by seeking the guiding principles that arise as I explore the historical records of the nuclear decisions Presidents Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Ronald W. Reagan. As depicted in Figure 1.2, I plan to stress the direct connection between RCH and DMF; however, I will report how RCH acts as an intensifier or moderator of learning with regard to DMFs and nuclear options should such information present itself.




Figure 1.2: This investigation will focus, at the individual level, on three intermediary connections between RCH and DMF: the philosophical ethics, philosophy of government, and the philosophical anthropology (theory of human nature) of the RCH. Although I will focus on direct connections between RCH and DMF, I will report how RCH acts as an intensifier or moderator of learning with regard to DMFs and nuclear options should such findings present themselves.

The three basic philosophies above have been applied to concrete questions. For example, all three philosophies of ethics, human nature, and government come together in different ways to deal with topics including war and even fraternal correction. In a sense, these thoughts on war and correction illustrate how Christian philosophies are

lived out. For this reason, my dissertation will draw on Christian thought on war and, occasionally, correction. For now, I turn to other facets of religious cultural heritage to illustrate how RCH could arise in this investigation.

FACETS OF RELIGIOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE

Demonstrating the influence of religious cultural heritage depends on establishing patterns of thought and patterns of behavior. Before beginning a formal investigation of these presidents, their RCHs, their DMFs, and their nuclear decisions, it is worth taking note of some illustrative examples of what one might find when systematically approaching these three presidencies. These half-dozen vignettes reveal the importance of interpretation in the social sciences, illustrate how RCH can condition attitudes toward decisions and interactions concerning foreign cultures or peoples, demonstrate how morality can affect political decision-making, show how politics can affect RCH, clarify how the reach of RCH can be limited by politics, and reveal that RCH can act in multiple directions at the same time.

Preliminary Thoughts on History, Social Science, and the US Presidency

The chapter on President Harry S. Truman will deal with an elusive ultimatum which Truman claimed in his memoirs to have sent to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin during the Iran crisis of 1946. For now, consider but once piece of that puzzle, not so much to explore RCH but to characterize larger questions of history, social science, and the American presidency. In particular, this story highlights the importance of interpretation in the social sciences.

In a 1969 letter to an inquiring scholar, George V. Allen (Truman's Assistant Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the State Department and aide to Secretary of State James Byrnes in New York when the Iran issue was before the

Security Council) wrote that he knew of no such ultimatum; neither, he claimed, did Averell Harriman (Truman's US Ambassador to the Soviet Union), James Byrnes (then Secretary of State), or Allen Dulles (Truman's Director of the Central Intelligence Agency).⁵⁷

Allen allowed that Truman might have thought of sending a message such as he described in his presidential memoirs and that Truman might indeed be convinced in his own mind that he did send such a message, but Allen was equally convinced that Truman had not done so. Allen concluded his letter with three salient observations. First, Allen rightly noted, "When an incorrect statement appears in presidential memoirs, writers go on repeating it year after year and all the political scientists and historians in the country are unable to prevent its continued currency."⁵⁸ Allen's remark stands as a reminder to scholars about the importance of careful analysis of sources lest their scholarship be found credulous. Second, Allen declared, "The 'ultimatum' story illustrates the problem of pinning down factual information in the so-called social *sciences*."⁵⁹ While Allen probably has the positivist, behaviorist, and reductionist methods of social science in mind, his point reminds us to bear in mind functional, voluntarist, and intentional styles of social science as well, for structures, processes, power, conflict, ideology, and phenomenological perspectives require interpretation as part of their analysis. Finally, Allen stressed, "More importantly, the fact that a president of the US could have sent such an ultimatum demonstrates the power of the presidency under our system. If Truman had sent an aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf in 1946, it might well have carried an

⁵⁷ George V. Allen to Alexander L. George, June 4, 1969, Papers of George V. Allen, Correspondence File.../Manuscript File.../Family File..., Correspondence, 1945-1969, Box 1, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

atomic bomb.”⁶⁰ Such presidential power supports my choice to focus on the presidents themselves in this dissertation.

RCH Matters to Politics and Policy Decisions

If the above passage illustrates the importance of interpretation in the social sciences, the following episode shows how RCH can condition attitudes toward foreign cultures and people in such a ways as to affect decision-making in politics and policy.

Frederick Osborn served as the Deputy Representative of the United States on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) from 1947 to 1950. A number of his speeches illustrate how RCH can matter to international politics. In one such speech Osborn first laid out a cultural gap in the world population, claiming in general, “[T]he mass of the people in the world are divided into what the anthropologist would call two very different cultural patterns. One group has been brought up in the Western European tradition.” Osborn then explained that “[f]or almost 2,000 years there has been a Christian background to their thinking and while we sometimes think this has not changed them much,” yet he argued for the importance of the religious cultural heritage of this group, claiming that their Christian heritage “has certainly given them some important points of view with respect to the value of human life, the integrity of the individual, and a widely-held desire to improve conditions of life on earth.” Moreover, Osborn noted that a “large part of this group has also had a long experience... in developing forms of government responsible to the people.” Moreover, Osborn claimed that “this group has to a large extent been freed of superstitions and primitive mysticisms, and to an extraordinary degree are able to use their minds freely for practical purposes.”⁶¹

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Frederick H. Osborn, “Talk by Mr. Frederick H. Osborn, Deputy United States Delegate to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, before the WOMEN’S ACTION COMMITTEE FOR LASTING PEACE, Hotel Shoreham, Washington, D.C.,” March 29, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Frederick

Osborn contrasted the 600 million Christianized Westerners to the other 1.6 billion people of the world “who have a different tradition with respect to the value of the individual.” Osborn claimed these people’s “aspirations toward better things are likely to be of a philosophical rather than a practical nature” and further asserted that education had not been available to the bulk of these people “whose minds have been conditioned in a way that it is difficult for them to think clearly in the European sense.” He then noted that the majority of such people, two-thirds of the world’s total, were located in Asia, the Pacific islands, and Africa. Osborn concluded that while such disparities were insignificant when distance was great and travel was difficult, “[t]hese differences became dangerous with the advent of steamships and airplanes and radio. And now atomic energy increases the danger.”⁶²

The above quotations from Osborn illustrate that the religious aspect of culture and the consequences of thought patterns influenced by it – particularly related to practical ethics, philosophy of human nature, and philosophy of government, as well as how these philosophies are lived out – are intimately linked to his approach to atomic energy in his role at the UN’s AEC and as a promoter of the Baruch Plan for nuclear internationalization. Osborn clearly believed nuclear internationalization was important because different cultures, with different RCH and thus with different ethics, anthropologies, and philosophies of government, were not to be trusted with their own atomic capabilities. RCH mattered in international politics and in nuclear decisions because Osborn believed RCH mattered and acted as if it did. Moreover, these were not isolated expressions of Osborn’s views. In a speech delivered less than two weeks after the one above, Osborn stated, “Less than a fifth of all the people in the world are

Osborn, Subject File, Atomic Energy and Related Foreign Affairs to Foreign Policy—Speeches Concerning Box 1, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

⁶² Ibid.

sufficiently free of taboos, superstitions, queer dogmas, to think clearly about any distant practical matter.” He continued, “Worst of all, this one-fifth who are capable of taking part in a world civilization are not scattered evenly over the world; they are found in quite disproportionate numbers in a few areas, particularly in Europe and the Americas.”⁶³ While aspects of Osborn’s thought could be attributed to ethnocentrism or even racism, the prominence of an RCH angle in his speeches, and the influence of this angle on his thought, illustrate one way that RCH can matter to policy and policy decisions.

Morality Can Constrain Politics

Can RCH and politics mutually affect each other? The following two cases suggest that they can. Consider first the following occurrence wherein morality shows its potential to constrain political decision-making.

Ann Whitman was President Dwight David Eisenhower’s secretary during his two terms as President of the United States of America. As a result, Whitman had the opportunity to see the president as few other observers. Her diary files include the following on a page of notes dated September 25, 1960:

The other night, talking about Mr. K[hrushchev] and his threats, the President told me what Lord Home said, with sarcasm, that sometimes he wished “the world could go back to the old methods of diplomacy.” ... meaning of course the big stick. The President strongly intimated that he wished there was no moral restriction that prevented him from one night pushing the proper button and sending all of our atomic bombs in the direction of the Communist bloc. This is the strongest statement I have ever heard him make on the subject.⁶⁴

⁶³ Frederick H. Osborn, “Crisis in Civilization,” Talk by Mr. Frederick H. Osborn, Deputy United States Delegate to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, before the Junior League of the City of New York, Inc., 221 East 71st Street, April 11, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Frederick Osborn, Subject File, Atomic Energy and Related Foreign Affairs to Foreign Policy—Speeches Concerning Box 1, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

⁶⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Ann Whitman Diary Series, ACW Diary September 1960, Box 11, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum, Abilene, KS.

Eisenhower thus found his options constrained by moral principles.

While Eisenhower refers to moral principles in general rather than to RCH directly, the above passage nevertheless illustrates how RCH could constrain political or military choices insofar as the particular RCH in question had a philosophical ethics or philosophy of government which treated the use of violence.

RCH Can Be Affected by Politics

If the above passage indicates that religious cultural has the potential to constrain political decision-making, then the following artifact discloses that the political arena can also affect RCH.

Religious cultural heritage denotes more than a legacy of intangible attributes inherited from past generations, maintained by the present generation, and preserved for future generations. RCH consists not only of intangible culture such as stories, traditions, languages, and knowledge but also of physical artifacts such as buildings, monuments, memorials, places, landscapes, books, and works of art. The tangible and the intangible aspects of RCH are of course interrelated and may be mutually expressive of each other.

One artifact of RCH interacting with the nuclear age is what at first appears to be a garden-variety Catholic religious medal.⁶⁵ On one side is an image of St. Michael the Archangel standing in triumph over Satan depicted as a dragon, a picture which makes reference to Michael's appearances in the Biblical books of Daniel, Jude, and Revelation and which, to the Catholic imagination, calls to mind God's protection. On the other side is a depiction of Mary the Mother of Jesus, a depiction which at first glance resembles the Medal of the Immaculate Conception (often called the Miraculous Medal), especially since the words "O' Mary" are found on the background, and these words are the

⁶⁵ Medal in the Form of a Key Chain. Private collection of the author.

beginning of the prayer which the medal is meant to remind adherents to pray; moreover, as in the Miraculous Medal, Mary appears to be standing on a globe. However, on closer inspection, Mary is seen standing not on the globe but on a cloud coming out of the globe – and the cloud is a nuclear mushroom cloud. The mushroom cloud is coming right out of the earth, and the earth itself is marked “PAX,” the Latin word for “peace.” Finally, the upper border of the medal reads, “Atoms for Peace,” a clear reference to President Eisenhower’s famous speech of the same name which he delivered before the United Nations on December 8, 1953. December 8, in an interesting coincidence, is celebrated as the Feast of the Immaculate Conception by Catholics.



Illustration 1.1: From left to right, the obverse of a typical Medal of the Immaculate Conception, the obverse of the “Atoms for Peace” medal, and the reverse of the “Atoms for Peace” medal.⁶⁶

The existence of this medal is an example of how, in addition to affecting policy and politics, RCH can be affected *by* politics. Moreover, one can imagine the effect this medal might have had at the time of its manufacture. Consider an airman on alert with the Strategic Air Command in the 1950s. Perhaps the airman was ill at ease, questioning the

⁶⁶ Ibid.

moral rectitude of his role at the tip of the nuclear spear. Upon reaching into his pocket and looking at his key chain, he might have found reassurance of protection and reaffirmation of the morality of his state in life. Although not much more than an inch in size, this artifact not only teaches valuable lessons to students of history, politics, and policy about the *Zeitgeist* of the times but also about the reciprocal nature of RCH, both influencing and influenced.

RCH Can Be Constrained by Politics

Not only can the political sphere influence the RCH sphere. As the passage below shows, the reach of RCH can be limited in the political sphere.

William P. Clark, Jr. Clark, a devout Catholic who once studied for the priesthood, was a key early figure in the first Reagan Administration. He served as Reagan's National Security Advisor during the period leading up to Reagan's "Star Wars speech" in 1983;⁶⁷ the nuclear freeze movement was also cresting at this time. During the time when Clark was National Security Advisor, and during the time preceding the Star Wars speech, the Catholic bishops' conferences in a number of NATO nations were drafting pastoral letters on war, peace, and nuclear weapons. In the United States the Reagan administration was aware of the work of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), and in December of 1982 it was proposed that the bishops be briefed at an information policy group. Deputy National Security Advisor Robert "Bud" McFarlane wrote an undated note asking whether he could "get some judgment" about this meeting, asking, "Have we staffed the Bishop's letter? Should we meet with them?"⁶⁸ Clark's

⁶⁷ Clark never wrote memoirs, but much information about his life and career can be found in Paul Kengor and Patricia Clark Doerner, *The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan's Top Hand* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007).

⁶⁸ Robert McFarlane, undated note addressed to Bob Sims, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Nuclear Freeze (12/82), Box 70, Ronald Reagan Library and Museum, Simi Valley, CA.

handwritten response on a routing sheet, received on December 17, 1982, was terse and to the point: “I will not meet bishops – nor should George Shultz – elevates a group that should not be elevated – leave as staff – wpc.”⁶⁹

If Eisenhower’s comments suggest how RCH could influence politics and the Eisenhower-era artifact exemplifies how the political environment can influence RCH, then the above episode is an example of how the influence of RCH can be constrained or circumscribed. It is particularly fascinating that Clark, a devout Catholic, seems to have acted to limit the apparent reach of his RCH, but Clark, who had once studied for the priesthood, also might have been attuned to Catholic teachings on the proper and complementary functions, spheres, and interactions of sacred and secular authorities. Either way, the importance of RCH and its bearing on philosophy of government will be an important feature of this dissertation.

RCH Can Act in Multiple Directions at Once

The above interactions between RCH and the political world make clear that there are at least two directions in play, namely that RCH can both influence and be influenced. However, the following development illustrates that RCH itself can work in more than one direction at the same time in the same episode.

In the post-Vietnam 1970s, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) began a sustained critique of American policies concerning nuclear arms and strategic deterrence. By the early 1980s the bishops had tasked a committee to draft a pastoral letter on war, peace, and nuclear arms, and the committee’s progress was receiving regular media attention. Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)

⁶⁹ William Clark, undated note received December 17, 1982, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Nuclear Freeze (12/82), Box 70, Ronald Reagan Library and Museum, Simi Valley, CA.

and a serious Catholic (whose nickname at the Pentagon was “the Cardinal”⁷⁰), anticipated that the final form of the letter could pose a problem in a nation with more than fifty million Catholics. In the late summer of 1982, the US Navy’s chief chaplain told Watkins that news of the bishops’ work was causing both officers and enlisted personnel to leave the Navy because they no longer believed military service to be compatible with living a moral life. As a result, Watkins began to speak out strongly on the morality of nuclear deterrence and naval service⁷¹ long before the adoption of the final draft of the NCCB letter in May of 1983.

This episode relates an instance of RCH causing a realist, materialist problem (a manpower drainage) affecting the ability of a nuclear-armed superpower to provide national security or to bring power to bear. It is not clear whether the “hollow force” weakness of the post-Vietnam American military intensified Admiral Watkins’ reaction, but it is clear is that Watkins’ aggressive defense of US deterrence was situated firmly in the Catholic approach to the just war tradition: Watkins even quoted the Second Vatican Council in his speeches. In this episode we also see RCH pushing its adherents in two directions at once, the retiring sailors in one direction and the CNO in the other. Moreover, Watkins’ response seems to carry though to his involvement in the genesis of SDI.⁷²

The above account provides one example of how RCH influence could be felt: the news reports of an institutional statement-in-development influenced many believers to

⁷⁰ William Lanouette, “James D. Watkins: Frustrated Admiral of Energy,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 46, no. 1 (January/February 1990): 40.

⁷¹ Donald R. Baucom, *The Origins of SDI, 1944-1983* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 185-187.

⁷² See, for example, Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006), 93-100. Admiral Watkins was no nuclear abolitionist himself.

exit military service. Admiral Watkins turned out to be led along a different path by the same RCH. Thus, RCH can act in more than one direction at the same time.

THE PLAN OF THIS DISSERTATION

Having illustrated how one might expect to find RCH through the six vignettes above, I proceed to the formal part of the investigation. I look for RCH in general and for philosophical ethics, philosophy of government, and philosophy of human nature in particular as I explore the nuclear decisions of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan. I will look mainly at crises and across transitions. By “at crises” I mean to look episodes which have a discernible beginning, middle, and end – something like the Cuban Missile Crisis of John F. Kennedy’s presidency – in other words, a historical episode which goes from ground state to spike in tension back to (the old or new) ground state. By “across transitions” I mean to look at episodes where there is something resembling a sea change – not necessarily a change in tension but a transition to a new ground state. Speeches, programs, and initiatives are examples of such transitional points.

The presidencies Truman and Eisenhower saw many crises, but there were also transitions. One episode unique to Truman is the first (and so far only) nuclear bombings; another important Truman episode is the development of Baruch Plan (an attempted sea change which was never realized). In addition, I will explore Truman’s decision to pursue the hydrogen bomb. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative was an important transitional point rather than a crisis; Solarium, the New Look, and the “Cross of Iron” speech also provide non-crisis insights. Reagan had no crises that looked like the Cuban Missile Crisis *per se*, but Reagan dealt with Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) during his presidency – and one clear sea change is the pre-Gorbachev to Gorbachev

transition. Reagan's responses to the Able Archer 83 exercise and *The Day After* also provide insight. By looking at crises I can gauge decisions under pressure, and by looking at transitions I can compare presidents to themselves across temporal lines of demarcation. The substantive chapter on Reagan will focus particularly on transition and consistency while the chapters on Truman and Eisenhower will have crises, transitions, and consistencies.

The classical conditions of causality hold when the putative cause is related to the putative effect by priority in time, co-variation, and the lack of plausible alternative explanation. Thus, I need to show that RCH affected presidential DMFs before presidential decisions were made, I need to show how RCH differed among the three presidents, and I need to show the fingerprints of RCH on what happened. Hence my historical investigation is appropriate. Note that I am taking a correlational paradigm as the basis of my approach.

The next chapter treats different Christian RCH by exploring various streams of Christian thought on war with particular attention to the philosophical approaches to ethics, government, and human nature exhibited in the different streams. Three broad categories of DMF emerge, namely holy war, just war, and pacifism. Since just war thought focuses on open hostilities, I very briefly supplement the application of Christian ethical theories by providing some discussion of fraternal correction since the criteria governing fraternal correction, like the criteria covering the waging of war, are also applications of more general principles.

The subsequent three chapters are the heart of the dissertation. The meat of each presidential chapter presents the RCH of each president, pieces together each worldview, establishes patterns of thought and patterns of action, and analyzes a number of salient nuclear decisions ranging from choices in the midst of crises to programs for nuclear

sharing and cooperation. Sometimes I will ascertain patterns of thought and behavior by exploring non-nuclear questions. Such examples are justified because my level of analysis is the individual, and I am treating the person of each president as an integral whole. The layout of the chapter on President Reagan will be somewhat different from the chapters on Presidents Truman and Eisenhower because nuclear diplomacy never reached the fever-pitch crisis levels of earlier presidencies during Reagan's term.

The final chapter will discuss and integrate the findings through the lenses of history and policy. I will present avenues for future work as the research agenda develops, and I will draw policy lessons which can be applied today.

Chapter 2: Christian Decision-Making Frameworks on War and Correction

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I focus on Christian religious cultural heritage (RCH) as found in the United States of America. I characterize the expected relationships of decision-making frameworks (DMFs) with different RCHs; connect DMF and RCH via philosophical ethics, philosophy of government, and philosophical anthropology, that is, theory of human nature; and distinguish the permissiveness of nuclear policy choices which one would expect of such DMFs. The DMFs on which I focus concern Christian thought on war and on fraternal correction. I acknowledge the need for case studies since case paucity invalidates large-N assumptions. Nevertheless, I support the plausibility of the framework set forth in this dissertation and point the way forward for future work.

There are two principle undercurrents running through this chapter. The first concerns how and why Christian thought on war, especially concerning just war, ended up as part of the US political discourse. The second concerns the actual content of this discourse. These undercurrents will prove important to understanding the relationship between RCH and presidential nuclear decisions.

CHRISTIAN DMFs: THOUGHTS ON WAR IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In Bainton's seminal work on the topic from the 1960s, Christian thought on war was divided into the following three categories: crusade, just war, and pacifism.⁷³ Crusade has taken on a pejorative connotation, so this dissertation uses the term "holy

⁷³ See Roland H. Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960). For contrasting accounts, see Kenneth W. Kemp, "Just-War Theory & its Non-pacifist Rivals," International Studies Association—South Regional Meeting, Montgomery, Alabama, October 10, 1993; Nigel Biggar, "Christianity and Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee, eds., *Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 168-199; and Martin L. Cook, "Christian Apocalypticism and Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Hashmi and Lee, 200-210.

war” instead. Thus, I consider the following three decision-making frameworks (DMFs) which could arise from different varieties of Christian religious cultural heritage (RCH). These DMFs are holy war (a framework distinguished by religious motivation), just war (a framework which requires that strict criteria be met before force can be employed), and pacifism (a framework which is uniformly opposed to war and violence).

In this dissertation the causal factor under study is RCH – a consideration which in principle could take on as many categorical values as there are Christian denominations in the United States. Although I have noted in Chapter 1 that RCH could act at the societal and individual levels, this investigation focuses on the individual level. Thus, the number of RCH values considered will be quite manageable: There is no need to sort Christianity into groups and subgroups, for only three postwar presidents will be treated in this dissertation – Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND WHY THE TRIO OF PRESIDENTS MIGHT PUSH BACK

In Western culture, secular international law has important Christian roots. Conventionally, the secularization of international law is considered to start at or after Grotius,⁷⁴ yet scholars have identified problems with this development. Cole has warned against the danger of the position that treats peace, understood merely as the absence of war, as a sacrosanct good.⁷⁵ Charles has argued that tyranny has victimized mankind

⁷⁴ For an analysis of the texts of Grotius, Vattel, Wheaton, Oppenheim, and Browlie in an Anglo-American context, see Mark W. Janis, “Religion and the Literature of International Law: Some Standard Texts,” in *Religion and International Law*, ed. Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), 121-143. Whether or not Grotius intended to develop a new philosophical approach to the use of natural law will not be debated here. For purposes of this dissertation, it suffices to say that, after Grotius, thinkers realized that one could take a different philosophical approach to natural law than had been taken previously. I make no claims about secularization; I simply point out the conventional story.

⁷⁵ Alexander F.C. Webster and Darrell Cole, *The Virtue of War* (Salisbury, MA: Regina Orthodox Press, 2004), 138.

more than war.⁷⁶ I explain how this trio of presidents, having sensed these weaknesses, reached into the store of Christian philosophical ethics, philosophy of government, and philosophy of human nature to right what they intuited was wrong with the international system. It is as though these presidents were returning *ad fontes* to re-conceptualize their approach to international relations in the nuclear age and deal anew, and more cogently, with the situation in which they found themselves. After all, Wright observed as early as 1947⁷⁷ that religion is integral to every culture's values and ethics, and both values and ethics regulate recourse to arms. Huntington⁷⁸ and Rubin⁷⁹ both argue that religion is a dimension of statecraft which transcends others. Even Yoder, a noted pacifist, does not merely acknowledge but rather argues cogently that Jesus' teachings are applicable to contemporary political theory and diplomacy, not just social and personal ethics.⁸⁰

Indeed, the presidents treated in this dissertation demonstrate agreement with Webster⁸¹ that Christian thought was not merely pertinent but vital, even central. A core Christian ethic is *caritas*, love or charity, understood in a human-to-human context as loving one's neighbor as one's self,⁸² so it follows that such must be a paramount consideration in international politics in general and in both war and nuclear issues in particular. Such Christian reasoning has persisted at least from Augustine onward, with perhaps a detour at the Enlightenment.

⁷⁶ J. Daryl Charles, *Between Pacifism and Jihad: Just War and Christian Tradition* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 102.

⁷⁷ This dissertation references the following version of the work: Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 155.

⁷⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49.

⁷⁹ Barry Rubin, "Religion in International Affairs," in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, eds. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 20.

⁸⁰ John Howard Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1994), 144ff.

⁸¹ Webster and Cole, 52.

⁸² Matthew 22:39, Mark 12:31, and Luke 10:27 quote Jesus in this regard.

However, just war reasoning aspires to universal application independent of culture and creed. This aspiration is grounded in the conviction that Biblical sources do not contain all things required to comprehend just war thought. Thus, one must draw from the natural law, “a universal moral sense that informs human beings on what is good and just over what is evil or unjust”⁸³ as Charles puts it, or the idea that universal values exist and are accessible to human beings – values which, while divine in origin, are not Christian or non-Christian in and of themselves but which, nevertheless, require one to reach beyond Christian creeds and philosophies to comprehend.⁸⁴

Herein is a point to be highlighted. The prohibition of war in international law in all cases but self-defense is itself traceable to Christian just war thought. The Spanish Catholics Francisco de Vitoria (Franciscus de Victoria) and Francisco Suárez and the generally-acknowledged “father of international law,” the Dutch Protestant Hugo Grotius, were all theologically conversant. To understand the values the United States sought to advance in its international politics and in its employment of military force, one must understand the foundations of the just war theoretical tradition which, as Johnson notes, is deeply seated in the US tradition of normative thinking,⁸⁵ thinking which he identifies as the “principal locus”⁸⁶ of the attempt to recover the just war tradition. After all, every US president has been Christian; moreover, today over three-fourths of the US

⁸³ Charles, 122.

⁸⁴ James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 111-114.

⁸⁵ James Turner Johnson, *The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 16.

⁸⁶ Johnson, *Just War Tradition*, 330.

population identify as Christian,⁸⁷ and during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan eras the Christian fraction of the population was never below four-fifths of the total.⁸⁸

CRITERIA FOR A JUST WAR

Because of the general unity of Christian perspectives and because of the clarity and influence of the US Catholic bishops' pastoral letter, the following just war criteria are drawn from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops' 1983 pastoral letter *The Challenge of Peace* as representative of Christian just war thought. Moreover, these criteria were articulated in a document specifically critiquing nuclear policies.

Just Grounds for War

The principles of *ius ad bellum*, just grounds for war, are summarized in the pastoral letter as follows:

- a) *Just Cause*: War is permissible only to confront "a real and certain danger," i.e., to protect innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for decent human existence, and to basic human rights....
- b) *Competent Authority*: In the Catholic tradition the right to use force has always been joined to the common good; war must be declared by those with responsibility for public order, not by private groups or individuals....
- c) *Comparative Justice*: ...the question in its most basic form is this: do the rights and values involved justify killing? . . .
- d) *Right Intention*: Right intention is related to just cause – war can be legitimately intended only for the reasons set forth above as a just cause....
- e) *Last Resort*. For resort to war to be justified, all peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted....

⁸⁷ Frank Newport, "In US, 77% Identify as Christian: Eighteen percent have no explicit religious identity," Gallup Politics, December 24, 2012, accessed February 22, 2013, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/159548/identify-christian.aspx>.

⁸⁸ Frank Newport, "This Christmas, 78% of Americans Identify as Christian: Over time, fewer Americans identify as Christian; more have no religious identity," Gallup Politics, December 24, 2009, accessed February 21, 2013, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/124793/this-christmas-78-americans-identify-christian.aspx>.

f) *Probability of Success*. This is a difficult criterion to apply, but its purpose is to prevent irrational resort to force or hopeless resistance when the outcome of either will clearly be disproportionate or futile....

g) *Proportionality*: In terms of the *ius ad bellum* criteria, proportionality means that the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms....⁸⁹

Just Means for War

The principles of *ius in bello*, just means in war, are twofold: discrimination (meaning differentiation between civilian and military targets) and proportionality.

Turning to the same document cited above, one reads,

When confronting choices among specific military options, the question asked by proportionality is: once we take into account not only the military advantages that will be achieved by using this means but also all the harms reasonably expected to follow from using it, can its use still be justified?... The principle [of discrimination] prohibits directly intended attacks on non-combatants and non-military targets.⁹⁰

Note that the principle of discrimination is moderated by the principle of double effect: Simply put, if an action is foreseen to have both good and bad effects, the action is permissible in a grave situation if the action itself is at least at least morally neutral, only the good effect is intended, and the good effect outweighs the bad effect. Evil means are never permitted to achieve good ends, and diligence is necessary to minimize the anticipated harm.

We know, of course, that no ends can justify means evil in themselves, such as the executing of hostages or the targeting of non-combatants. Nonetheless, even if the means adopted is not evil in itself, it is necessary to take into account the probable harms that will result from using it and the justice of accepting those harms.⁹¹

⁸⁹ National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response*, (Washington, DC: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, May 3, 1983), Nos. 86, 87, 92, 95, 96, 98, and 99, accessed February, 14, 2011, <http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/TheChallengeofPeace.pdf>.

⁹⁰ Ibid., Nos. 105 and 107.

⁹¹ Ibid., No. 105.

Note also that proportionality shows up twice in the discussion above: once for proportionality of ends, once for proportionality of means.

JUST WAR SITUATED IN A LARGER CONTEXT

Reinhold Niebuhr defined good as “the harmony of the whole on various levels” and evil as “the assertion of some self-interest without regard to the whole.”⁹² These definitions parallel the classical and Christian understanding of *bellum* vs. *duelum* (recourse to force on public authority vs. recourse to force on private authority) and *caritas* vs. *cupiditas* (charity vs. selfishness) as Johnson explains.⁹³

Table 2.1 illustrates how attitudes toward war or use of force can be characterized in terms both of propensity for using force and of motivation for using force. That restraint and charity characterize pacifism is clear. It may at first blush seem less clear that holy war occurs at the convergence of militancy and charity, but it is important to recall that elites who engage in the use of force in such instances do not do so out of concern for their own well-being and advantage; rather, they act out of a higher calling for the good not only of their own people but for the good of those in other states. When restraint and self-interest combine, isolationism is the product, for elites refrain from use of force purely out of concern for their own well-being and the well-being of their people while ignoring the rest of the world and devoting no resources except to their own advancement. Self-interest and militancy converge to produce realism where force and security preserve the well-being of elites and people alike. Like holy war, the focus of realism is on advancement, but the advancement is that of the elites and their people, not

⁹² Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), 9.

⁹³ James Turner Johnson, “Just War, As It Was and Is,” *First Things* (January 2005), accessed February 22, 2013, <http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/just-war-as-it-was-and-is-2>.

that of others. The self-focused mean between the extremes militancy and restraint is selective engagement; the other-focused mean between militancy and restraint is just war.

		Motivation	
		Self-Centered	Other-Centered
Propensity	Militant	Realism	Holy War
	Moderate	Selective Engagement	Just War
	Restrained	Isolationism	Pacifism

Table 2.1 Just War Thought Situated by the Motivation and the Propensity for Recourse to Arms

The above table is granular in the sense that it lays out six categories of ideal types. In practice, there is a continuum of mixed motivations and a sliding scale of propensities. Thus, even within a single category there will be variations with respect to motivation and propensity for recourse to force. For example, consider two leaders who are in the just war category, two leaders who are both basically motivated by other-centric ideas of sovereignty as responsibility. The two leaders may both be moderate in their propensity to turn to force, but one may be more militant and the other may be more restrained. In this dissertation I claim that such is the case with Truman compared to Eisenhower; I argue further that, although both Truman and Eisenhower were mainline Protestants (Baptist and Presbyterian, respectively), Eisenhower's upbringing in an environment dominated by pacifist River Brethren and Mennonites can help explain why Eisenhower's restraint is greater than Truman's. However, to understand this argument it is necessary to understand holy war, pacifism, and just war in more detail.

Holy War

The Judeo-Christian roots of holy war are found in God's promise to give the Promised Land, Canaan, to Abraham's descendants.⁹⁴ After the nation of Israel emerged from slavery in Egypt, God kept the promise by directing Israel to defeat Canaan and leave no survivors.⁹⁵

Long has enumerated the following four characteristics of holy war: (1) religious motivation, (2) promise of spiritual reward, (3) erosions of restraints on war-making, and (4) absolutism that justifies recourse even to means considered immoral in other contexts.⁹⁶ However, Yoder warned against idolizing single objectives including "defense of the 'free world'" and "liberation of 'the working class'" to the exclusion of other moral frameworks.⁹⁷ In this sense, the definition of holy war can be extended, and in fact the use of the term "crusade" in common parlance often reflects this expanded usage.

Endy identified how holy war differs from just war in at least three ways.⁹⁸ First, in just war thought the legitimate authority to declare war lies with the secular authority which acts on its own terms; holy war is declared either by religious authority or by God Himself through a special revelation (in which case political leaders may receive such revelations but so act under divine authority rather than their own). Second, just war thought does not consider disparity of religion to be a just reason for war, but holy wars are fought for religious reasons. Finally, just war thought recognizes the possibility that some justice may be found on both sides insofar as a good person could fight in a bad war

⁹⁴ Genesis 17:6-8.

⁹⁵ Deuteronomy 7:1-5, 24-25; 20:16-17.

⁹⁶ Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., *A Survey of Christian Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 33-41.

⁹⁷ John Howard Yoder, *When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1984), 27.

⁹⁸ Melvin B. Endy, Jr., "Just War, Holy War, and Millennialism in Revolutionary America," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (January 1985), 8.

and the political and moral legitimacy of leaders is not irrevocably damaged by fighting for an unjust cause *per se*; holy war, however, is understood as a struggle between good and evil in which the opposing side is a “demonic and damned enemy committing sacrilege.”⁹⁹ Indeed, in the context of a holy war the effort to stamp out evil “is considered more important than holding coercive techniques under critical judgment.”¹⁰⁰

Pacifism

Pacifism has long counterbalanced holy war and just war thought within Christianity. At a root level pacifism could be said to ground the Christian outlook not only on international relations but on interpersonal relations. In his Sermon on the Mount, Jesus, the “Prince of Peace,”¹⁰¹ called both peacemakers and the persecuted blessed,¹⁰² called on the crowd of hearers to turn the other cheek should they receive a blow on one,¹⁰³ and enjoined them to love even their enemies and pray even for their persecutors.¹⁰⁴

Some followers of Jesus extended such nonviolent bearing of injustice from the personal level to the corporate level. Since violence against others was ruled out, so too was participation in war.¹⁰⁵ Tertullian argued for total submission to persecution and martyrdom even though Christians were sufficiently numerous potentially to revolt successfully.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, Tertullian cites Jesus’ rebuke of Peter’s attempt to prevent Jesus’ arrest at the hands of Roman guards as the definitive moment: By reprimanding Peter for

⁹⁹ Endy, 8.

¹⁰⁰ Long, 245.

¹⁰¹ Isaiah 9:6.

¹⁰² Matthew 5:9-10.

¹⁰³ Matthew 5:39.

¹⁰⁴ Matthew 5:44.

¹⁰⁵ C. John Cadoux, *The Early Christian Attitude to War: A Contribution to the History of Christian Ethics*, (London: Headley Bros., 1919).

¹⁰⁶ Tertullian, *Apologeticus*, section 37, in Cadoux, 79; Tertullian, *De corona militis*, section 11, in John Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations* (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1935), 36.

cutting off the ear of a Roman, Jesus “cursed the works of the sword for ever after”¹⁰⁷ and “unbelted every soldier.”¹⁰⁸ Hence, Christians should not serve in the army.¹⁰⁹

More recent pacifist movements were limited at first to smaller sects like Anabaptists in the sixteenth century, Quakers in the seventeenth century, and Brethren in the eighteenth century.¹¹⁰ In contrast to Protestant state churches, these denominations were suspicious of state power and encouraged their members to remain separate from the world. Basing their politics on the “doctrine concerning the separation of the faithful from the world” and a “conception of the church as a suffering church,” most Anabaptists historically embraced “the practices of persecution and oppression,”¹¹¹ refusing either to defend either themselves or their state; some went so far as to refuse to serve the state in any capacity. The relationship between Anabaptists and the state Protestant churches and the Catholic Church was troubled, and just war thought was a significant issue separating the Anabaptists and mainline churches. Because they refused to serve the state in wartime, Anabaptists were seen both as theologically heretical and as politically dangerous.

The above approaches of Anabaptists, Quakers, and Brethren can be grouped as forms of deontological pacifism; that is to say, their pacifism focuses on immediate duty rather than long-term consequences. At least two other frameworks can be found in postwar Christianity. Pragmatic pacifism, often with a philosophical anthropology

¹⁰⁷ Tertullian, *De Patientia*, section 3, in Cadoux, 51.

¹⁰⁸ Tertullian, *De Idolotria*, chapter 19, in Eppstein, 37.

¹⁰⁹ Tertullian, *De Corona Militis*, section 11, in Eppstein, 36; cf. Cadoux, 113-114. Part of the background on Tertullian’s approach also has to do with Christian prohibitions against idolatry and the oaths sworn by soldiers; cf. Tertullian, *De Idolotria*, chapter 19, in Eppstein, 36.

¹¹⁰ Bainton, 136.

¹¹¹ Harold J. Grimm, *The Reformation Era: 1500-1650* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 267.

optimistically disposed toward human nature, views pacifism to be a practical strategy.¹¹² Nuclear pacifism, while conceding that conventional war might be permissible or even necessary, expressly condemns any form of nuclear warfare.¹¹³

Just War

Just war uses force to impose or restore justice to an unjust situation.¹¹⁴ Like holy war, the objective is pleasing to God but only insofar as the good outweighs the evils of death, destruction, and suffering that will almost certainly result. Like pacifism, the objective is peace, but force is used as a means at the service of the accountability needed for a just and durable peace.

Just war thought is not the same thing as Christian realism. R. Niebuhr affirmed the New Testament enjoins complete nonresistance even to the exclusion of nonviolent resistance.¹¹⁵ Thus, war in this view forces Christians to put aside Christian ethics. Cole has pointed out that such an approach makes no provision for discerning between good and evil.¹¹⁶ Niebuhr argues against the just war position because it makes the assumption that it is possible to distinguish justice from injustice and defense from aggression.¹¹⁷

¹¹² A typical pragmatic argument for Christian pacifism might run as follows: To offer no resistance to evil is in fact a great show of power. Christianity is based upon a paradox of power, for Christianity, following Jesus, is a way of self-sacrifice based on the Way of the Cross. Moreover, nonviolence can be a provocative reminder of the cost of violence, a cost measured in terms of lives lost or devastated, of financial expenditures on arms and on the aftermath of conflict, and of further alienation which can lead to future conflict.

¹¹³ James F. Childress, "Pacifism," in *The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics*, ed. James F. Childress and John Macquarrie, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 447.

¹¹⁴ Johnson, "Just War, As It Was and Is"; and C. Macksey, "War," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912), accessed February 22, 2013, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15546c.htm>. My word choice in this dissertation tries to respect the classical distinction between force and violence whereby only force which is unjustified, unnecessary, or both is rightly termed violence.

¹¹⁵ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), 10.

¹¹⁶ Webster and Cole, 174-175.

¹¹⁷ Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. 1 (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 283.

Moreover, in contrast to pacifism, just war emphasizes the responsibility to defend others. In the context of loving neighbor as self (even when the neighbor is an enemy and even if the Christian may submit voluntarily to harm or death), Jesus never taught that it was permissible to allow others to suffer. The Apostle James even states that it is sinful to know the right thing to do but to fail to do it.¹¹⁸ Thus, Christians have a duty to use force when justice demands.¹¹⁹ To borrow a succinct phrase employed by Pope Paul VI in another context, justice is “the minimum measure” of charity.¹²⁰ Couched in terms of defending others, Ramsey holds the Augustinian perspective that the use of force is a charitable act, asking rhetorically what “Jesus would have made the Samaritan do if he had come upon the scene while the robbers were still at their fell work?”¹²¹ Walzer, treating pacifism as a species of radicalism, argues pacifism is a stance for those who never expect to wield coercive temporal power and thus will not be burdened with the choice of whether or not force should be used.¹²²

Defense of others is found throughout Christian denominations. Gratian’s synthesis of ecclesiastical law reads, “He who does not ward off an injury done to his fellow-man is like him who does the injury.... They are not immune from crime who do

¹¹⁸ James 4:17.

¹¹⁹ On the obligation to defend one’s neighbor, see James Turner Johnson, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 75-76. On the duty of magistrates to defend the common good, see Charles, *Between Pacifism and Jihad*, 97. On the duty to fight under conditions that satisfy the criteria for a just war, see Daryl Cole, *When God Says War is Right: The Christian Perspective on When and How to Fight* (Colorado Springs: WaterBrook Press, 2002), 78. For moral imperatives which would compel responsible state leaders to end evil, defend innocents, and promote order, see George Weigel, “The Development of Just War Thinking in the Post-Cold War World: An American Perspective,” in *The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Charles Reed and David Ryall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 23.

¹²⁰ Pope Paul VI, *Address for the Day of Development* (August 23, 1968), *Acta Apostolica Sedes* 60 (1968): 626-627.

¹²¹ Paul Ramsey, *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1983), 143.

¹²² Michael Walzer, *Arguing About War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 14.

not liberate those whom in fact they have the power to free.”¹²³ Contemporary catechisms from major denominations likewise allude to this principle. The Presbyterian catechism states that the “duties required in the sixth commandment are:... protecting and defending the innocent,” the Catholic catechism states that legitimate defense “can be not only a right but a grave duty for one who is responsible for the lives of others,” and the Lutheran catechism, going further, states that not only “is he guilty who does evil to his neighbor, but he also who can do him good, prevent, resist evil, defend and save him, so that no bodily harm or hurt happen to him, and yet does not do it.”¹²⁴

Recourse to force is supported in the New Testament. After the Last Supper, Jesus told the apostles to sell their cloaks to buy swords;¹²⁵ and Jesus cleansed the Temple in Jerusalem by making a whip.¹²⁶ If these examples seem contrary to the injunction not to resist those who do evil,¹²⁷ Cahill contends the intended meaning is that one ought “not approach the enemy or evildoer in hard, resistant, alienating, and self-righteous judgment, but in a compassionate desire to meet the needs of the wrongdoers and victims as well as possible in the circumstances.”¹²⁸

¹²³ *Decretum Gratiani* II, causa 23, q. iii, cc. 7 and 11, in Eppstein, 82.

¹²⁴ The Larger Catechism, q. 153, available at <http://www.opc.org/lc.html>, accessed February 18, 2013; *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, sec. 2265; The Large Catechism, The Ten Commandments, sec. 189, in *Book of Concord*, available at <http://bookofconcord.org/lc-3-tencommandments.php>, accessed February 18, 2013. Note that the Presbyterian Church and most Protestant denominations in the United States number the prohibition against killing as the sixth commandment while Catholics and Lutherans number it as the fifth commandment.

¹²⁵ Luke 22:36.

¹²⁶ John 2:15.

¹²⁷ Matthew 5:39.

¹²⁸ Lisa Sowle Cahill, *Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 32.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUST WAR THOUGHT

Catholic Heritage

After the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity, the Roman army changed roles from imperial oppressor to defender against barbarians; in this context, Christian thinkers reappraised their thoughts on war.¹²⁹ Typical in this regard was Ambrose of Milan, a man who was both a bishop and a public official. Approaching questions of self-preservation, protection of others, and forceful intervention from the point of view of a Christian conversant in the traditions of Cicero (including Cicero's notions of public and private duty), Ambrose identified justice in wars which preserved "the country from barbarians" or defended "one's neighbors from robbers."¹³⁰

Ambrose was Augustine's mentor. Augustine argued that it was not the death and destruction of war that was evil but rather the love of these things that was evil.¹³¹ War could be legitimately waged by the wise to oppose wrongdoing and end the commission of sin.¹³² Indeed, Augustine taught that by restraining the sinner from committing sin, one engages in an act of charity; moreover, physical punishment of sin is not precluded by love, although malicious intent in its administration is.¹³³ The *charitable* notion of war as punishment for sin predominates in Augustine's thought; as Bainton writes, "Killing and love could the more readily be squared by Augustine because in his judgment life in the

¹²⁹ See Bainton, 86-88.

¹³⁰ Ambrose, *De Officiis*, I, 27, 129, in Eppstein, 58. I have removed the italics.

¹³¹ Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, XXII, 74, trans. Richard Stothert, in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, vol. 4, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), revised and edited by Kevin Knight, accessed February 22, 2013, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/140622.htm>.

¹³² Augustine, *De civitate Dei contra paganos*, XIX, 7, in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, vol. 2., trans. Marcus Dods, ed. Philip Schaff, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), revised and edited by Kevin Knight, accessed February 22, 2013, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120119.htm>.

¹³³ Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, XXII, 76.

body is not of extreme importance. What matters is eternal salvation. The destruction of the body may actually be of benefit to the soul of the sinner.”¹³⁴

The next major development of Augustine’s line of thinking came from Thomas Aquinas who articulated three classic criteria for a just war: sovereign authority authorizing that war be waged, just cause that those fought should deserve it on account of some fault, and right intention that good be advanced and evil be avoided.¹³⁵ Thomas furthers Augustine’s thought by differentiating the role of the state as protector from external threats and the role of the state as protector from internal disorder. The just war, then, was the appropriate Christian response to two different sins contrary to peace. After all, according to Thomas, “Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace.”¹³⁶

Working within a Thomistic context, Cardinal Cajetan was the first thinker to distinguish between offensive and defensive wars. While a defensive war required no special authorization, an offensive war was a voluntary action which had to be scrutinized.¹³⁷ Cajetan concentrated on war as a punishment, but Luis de Molina, a Spanish Jesuit working a century later, suggested that one could injure another out of invincible ignorance and thus not incur guilt, although war was still permissible for the sake of justice but not of retribution.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Bainton, 92.

¹³⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 40, a. 1, *The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Second and Revised Edition (1920), trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, online edition ed. Kevin Knight (2008), accessed February 22, 2013, <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3040.htm>.

¹³⁶ *Summa* II-II, q. 40, art. 1, r.o. 3.

¹³⁷ Cajetan, “From Commentary to *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 40, a. 1.” in Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, eds., *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Madden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

¹³⁸ Luis de Molina, *De justitia et jure*, II, 102, 3; see Frank Bartholomew Costello, SJ, *The Political Philosophy of Luis de Molina, SJ (1535-1600)* (Spokane: Gonzaga University Press, 1974), 115.

Spanish Dominican Francisco de Vitoria offered the most complete analysis of just war thought since Thomas through two works. *De indis* presented a devastating critique of the Spanish conquest of the New World; *De jure belli* was a more general work.¹³⁹ Taken together, Vitoria treated war as a punishment of wrongdoing, a means of self-defense, a tool to defend others, a way to recover what has been taken wrongfully, and a punishment of evil; moreover, Vitoria discussed virtuous means to accomplish these goals. Of key importance is Vitoria's decision to link rules for dealings among nations in general, and just war thought in particular, with divine or natural law. This innovation would prove to be foundational in the history of the formation of international law as we know it today.

Francisco Suárez offered his own comprehensive treatment.¹⁴⁰ Unlike Vitoria's treatment which engaged current events, Suárez's treatment of war and justice was dispassionate, philosophical, and systematic. He emphasized how real justice and security were fundamental to true peace, stating that one "may deny that war is opposed to an honorable peace; rather, it is opposed to an unjust peace, for it is more truly a means of attaining peace that is real and secure."¹⁴¹

Suárez's work crystalized the evolution of the Christian understanding of war from an instrument of retribution (in Cajetan's sense that war punished a deliberately-committed evil act) to an instrument of vindication (in the sense that one state may punish another by force on account of the other state's fault whether or not the fault was committed intentionally). Suárez continued Cajetan's distinction between defensive and

¹³⁹ Franciscus de Victoria, *De Indis Et De Jure Belli Relectiones: Being Parts of Relectiones Theologicae XII*, vol. 7, ed. Ernest Nys, trans. John Pawley Bate, *Classics of International Law*, ed. James Brown Scott (New York and London: Oceana Publications Inc., Wildy and Sons Ltd, 1964), available at <http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/Law508/VitoriaDeIndis.htm>, accessed February 22, 2013.

¹⁴⁰ Francisco Suárez, *Opera Omnia, Editio Nova*, Tomus XII, *De fide, spe, et charitate, Transactus de Charitate*, Disputatio XIII, *De Bello* (Paris, Ludovicum Vivès, 1858).

¹⁴¹ Francisco Suárez, I, 3. Translation by author.

offensive wars.¹⁴² In addition, he expanded Thomas' criterion of proper authority, and restored the Thomistic criterion of just cause.

However Suárez also went beyond Thomas. Instead of Thomas' third criterion of right intention, Suárez wrote of a criterion of proper manner of conduct, including a sense of proportionality, from the beginning of the war through the prosecution of the war and to the victory afterwards.¹⁴³ This formulation introduced criteria including necessity (that the ends the war seeks to achieve, namely the redress of injury, cannot be achieved in any other way) and likelihood of victory balanced against the risk of further loss in the event of failure (which Suárez considers more important in the case of offensive wars). The modern terms for these criteria are "last resort" and "probability of success." Finally, although we noted above that Vitoria was the first Christian writer to treat both grounds and means in his treatment of just war, it was Suárez who linked charitable prosecution of war with the question of the overall justice of a war.¹⁴⁴

Protestant Contributions

The Protestant Reformation split Western Christianity starting in the 1500s. Its four main branches include the Lutheran branch which takes its name from Martin Luther, the Reformed branch which draws from the theology of John Calvin, the Anglican branch which resulted from a disagreement between Henry VIII and the Roman pontiff, and the Radical Reformed branch which is largely derived from the Anabaptist movement; Baptists, although "often sorted into this [fourth] branch" are nevertheless "far too decentralized and diverse in viewpoints to uniformly fit into any one branch of

¹⁴² Suárez, I, 6.

¹⁴³ Suárez, I, 7.

¹⁴⁴ Suárez, VII.

Protestantism.”¹⁴⁵ In fact, as we shall see in the section on Calvin below, Baptists fit well within the Reformed branch in terms of thought on war. Despite this diversity, all Protestant denominations share with Catholics one and one half millennia of heritage including just war thought, a legacy which has been continued with the exception of the pacifist denominations in the Anabaptist stream,¹⁴⁶ and the works of Augustine and Thomas still carry influence.¹⁴⁷

Just War in the Lutheran Church

The works of Luther and Calvin are generally considered the most fundamental to American Protestantism. It thus makes sense to consider just war thought in the Lutheran Church and the Reformed Church.

Luther’s political philosophy stressed the importance of temporal authority, regarding coercive power to be essential for community survival. Like Thomas, Luther’s approach to human beings, the state, and war started with the question of just authority. However, like Augustine, Luther considered the worldly kingdom to be tainted by sin; hence, the “coercive and violent”¹⁴⁸ powers of the state were needed for the protection of the innocent. Unlike Augustine, who conceived the ideal kingdom to be realized at the end time, Luther conceived the ideal kingdom to be realized in private Christian life here and now; however, since true Christians are few, temporal authority is necessary to preserve earthly peace.¹⁴⁹ Luther’s political philosophy incorporated a measure of

¹⁴⁵ Davis Brown, *The Sword, the Cross, and the Eagle: The American Christian Just War Tradition* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 32.

¹⁴⁶ Bainton, 142.

¹⁴⁷ For example, Presbyterian just war criteria are expressed in continuity with Augustinian and Thomistic thought in Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., *War and Conscience in America* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), 25-26.

¹⁴⁸ Cahill, 107.

¹⁴⁹ Martin Luther, “Temporal Authority: To What Extent it Should Be Obeyed,” International Relations and Security Network, Primary Resources in International Affairs (PRIA), 4, accessed October 25, 2012,

political realism: “Certainly it is true that Christians... are subject neither to law nor sword, and have need of neither. But take heed and first fill the world with real Christians before you attempt to rule it in a Christian... manner.”¹⁵⁰ Luther thereby resolved the tension between the conditional toleration of violence found in just war thought and the conception of peace found in the Gospel. Concerning the nature of war and its underlying intent, he wrote, “What else is war but the punishment of wrong and evil? Why does anyone go to war, except because he desires peace and obedience?”¹⁵¹

For Luther, the only just wars were defensive ones which occurred “when an enemy or neighbor makes the attack and starts the war, and will not help when one offers to settle the case by legal procedure, discussion, or agreement.”¹⁵² Luther further maintained war must be the last resort: Pointing to Law of Moses, Luther contended Christian princes always should offer disputants “justice and peace” before resorting to force.¹⁵³

Although Luther’s thought restricted the grounds for a just war, he took a less restrictive approach to the means for fighting it. In a just war of self-defense, “[I]t is both Christian and an act of love to kill the enemy without hesitation, to plunder and burn and injure him by every method of warfare until he is conquered,”¹⁵⁴ according to Luther. In one passage Luther exhorted the nobility to suppress a peasant rebellion as follows: “Let no one have mercy on the obstinate, hardened, blinded peasants who refuse to listen to

http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/125470/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/69617310-4d41-490d-84e9-ac89ddea246a/en/606.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ Luther, “Temporal Authority,” 5.

¹⁵¹ Martin Luther, “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved,” in *Works of Martin Luther*, vol. 5, C.M. Jacobs, trans. (Albany, OR: AGES Software, Version 1.0, 1997), 25, accessed October 25, 2012, http://www.holycrossdakotadunes.org/resources/Luther/Luther_Philadelphia_Edition_Vol_5.pdf.

¹⁵² Martin Luther, “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved,” 46.

¹⁵³ Luther, “Temporal Authority,” 20.

¹⁵⁴ Luther, “Temporal Authority,” 20.

reason; but let everyone, as he is able, strike, hew, stab and slay, as though among mad dogs....”¹⁵⁵ The preceding suggests almost any wartime use of force is acceptable, yet Luther did distinguish between legitimate wartime use of force and illegitimate acts of violence which might occur in war. Starting with the 20th chapter of the Book of Deuteronomy wherein God commands the Israelites not to fell fruit trees for siege works, Luther deduced God would “never have permitted them to rage against women and girls in debauchery, lust, and other violence after conquering the enemy, as happens nowadays in our barbarity.”¹⁵⁶ Thus, while the enemy may be destroyed in almost any manner during battle, an army should exercise self-control and exhibit restraint towards the conquered after victory.

Luther does not permit holy war, for the role of the sovereign is simply to defend the state and not to appropriate God’s work by trying to save souls.¹⁵⁷ Still, in accordance with his “two kingdoms” theory, Luther argued it was possible to wield the sword against non-Christians “in a Christian manner” for the sake of justice and order,¹⁵⁸ for although “no Christian shall wield or invoke the sword for himself and his case, on behalf of another... he may and should wield it... to restrain wickedness and to defend godliness.”¹⁵⁹

Luther distinguished between the profession and the person of the soldier. “We must distinguish between an occupation and the man who holds it, between a work and the man who does it. An occupation or a work can be good and right in itself yet be bad

¹⁵⁵ Martin Luther, “An Open Letter on the Harsh Book Against the Peasants,” in *Selected Writings of Martin Luther*, vol. 1, ed. Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 373.

¹⁵⁶ Martin Luther, “Lectures on Deuteronomy,” in Jaroslav Pelikan, ed., *Luther’s Works*, vol. 9 (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1960), 204.

¹⁵⁷ Martin Luther, “On War Against the Turk,” trans. C.M. Jacobs, *Works of Martin Luther: Translated With Introductions and Notes*, vol. 5 (Philadelphia: A.J. Holman Company, 1931).

¹⁵⁸ Luther, “Temporal Authority,” 7.

¹⁵⁹ Luther, “Temporal Authority,” 10.

and wrong if the man who does the work is evil or wrong or does not do his work properly.”¹⁶⁰

The 1531 Augsburg Confession incorporated just war thought into Lutheran doctrine and permitted Christians both to hold public offices and to serve as soldiers.¹⁶¹

Just War in the Reformed Church

Like Luther, Calvin was concerned with man, the state, and war, but Thomas was of greater importance for Calvin than for Luther, as were classical writers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Calvin derived his idea of natural law from the classics and wrote, “[T]he law of God which we call moral, is nothing else than the testimony of natural law, and of that conscience which God has engraven on the minds of men.”¹⁶²

Nevertheless, Calvin considered the legitimacy of warfare from a standpoint similar to Luther’s, emphasizing the importance of civil authority. Like Luther, Calvin made clear that Christians should not withdraw from public life: “Wherefore no man can doubt that civil authority is, in the sight of God, not only sacred and lawful, but the most sacred, and by far the most honourable, of all stations in mortal life.”¹⁶³ Leaders’ powers are invested in them by God, creating a set of reciprocal duties: Rulers owe their subjects protection and should strive to uphold God’s will while subjects owe their rulers respect and obedience.

According to Calvin, rulers must use force to fulfil their duty as “ordained guardians and vindicators of public innocence, modesty, honour, and tranquillity... for the

¹⁶⁰ Luther, “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved,” 24.

¹⁶¹ Augsburg Confession, XVI, “Civil Government,” in *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, trans. and ed. Theodore Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1959), 37:1-3. The Augsburg Confessions are also available online at <http://bookofconcord.org/augsburgconfession.php>.

¹⁶² John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (4.20.16), trans. Henry Beveridge, accessed October 19, 2012, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.txt>.

¹⁶³ Calvin, (4.20.4).

common peace and safety.”¹⁶⁴ The ruler’s army “is not only an agent of the kingdom of the World, but of God.”¹⁶⁵ Christian leaders “are armed with power to curb manifest evil-doers and criminals, by whose misconduct the public tranquillity is disturbed or harassed.”¹⁶⁶

Concerning just grounds for war, Calvin asserted leaders have the right to wage wars to execute “public vengeance” and to “maintain the tranquillity of their subjects” by “repressing the fury of him who disturbs both the ease of individuals and the common tranquillity of all; who excites seditious tumult, and perpetrates acts of violent oppression and gross wrongs.”¹⁶⁷ However, like Luther, Calvin argued war must be a last resort: “assuredly all other means must be tried before having recourse to arms.”¹⁶⁸ Indeed, Calvin taught a ruler “must not readily catch the opportunity” to fight or even accept the opportunity should it arise “unless compelled by the strongest necessity.”¹⁶⁹

For Calvin, like Luther, self-defence is also a just reason for war. Calvin saw an invader as a robber to be punished as such.¹⁷⁰ Although Luther based his justification of war on biblical sources, Calvin pointed to “natural equity and duty.”¹⁷¹ Rather than teasing out a comprehensive doctrine justifying war from the two testaments of the Bible, Calvin somewhat abruptly stated “even the Holy Spirit, in many passages of Scripture, declares to be lawful” such wars.¹⁷² Calvin argued that “in the Apostolical writings we

¹⁶⁴ Calvin, (4.20.9).

¹⁶⁵ Paul Munday, “John Calvin and Anabaptists on War,” *Brethren Life and Thought* 23 (Autumn 1978): 244.

¹⁶⁶ Calvin, (4.20.9).

¹⁶⁷ Calvin, (4.20.11).

¹⁶⁸ Calvin, (4.20.12).

¹⁶⁹ Calvin, (4.20.12).

¹⁷⁰ Calvin, (4.20.11).

¹⁷¹ Calvin, (4.20.11).

¹⁷² Calvin, (4.20.11).

are not to look for a distinct exposition of these matters, their object being not to form a civil polity, but to establish the spiritual kingdom of Christ.”¹⁷³

Calvin touched on the question of just means. Rulers “must not be borne headlong by anger, nor hurried away by hatred, nor burn with implacable severity.”¹⁷⁴ Citing Augustine, Calvin argued leaders should instead have pity on the common nature even of enemies¹⁷⁵ who should be shown the same regard one would wish for one’s self.

Protestant groups which trace their origins to Calvin’s movement generally respect just war thought. For example, Article 23 of the 1648 Westminster Confession of the Presbyterian and Congregationalist traditions states,

It is lawful for Christians to accept and execute the office of a magistrate [i.e., an appointed or elected political office], when called thereunto: in the managing whereof, as they ought especially to maintain piety, justice, and peace, according to the wholesome laws of each commonwealth; so, for that end, they may lawfully, now under the New Testament, wage war, upon just and necessary occasion..¹⁷⁶

Because of the size and importance of the Baptist denominations in the United States, it is worth noting that the Second London Baptist Confession of 1689 includes a treatment of civil magistrates, and the first two sections of this treatment are almost identical to the equivalent sections of the Westminster Confession.¹⁷⁷ One should also

¹⁷³ Calvin, (4.20.12).

¹⁷⁴ Calvin, (4.20.12).

¹⁷⁵ Calvin, (4.20.12).

¹⁷⁶ Accessed July 9, 2013.

http://www.reformed.org/documents/wcf_with_proofs/index.html?body=/documents/wcf_with_proofs/ch_XXIII.html.

¹⁷⁷ *Second Baptist London Confession* (1689), XXIV, 1-2, accessed February 19, 2013, <http://www.reformedreader.org/ccf/1689lbc/english/Chapter24.htm>. Interestingly enough, the Westminster Confession cites only New Testament sources (Roman 13:1-4, Luke 3:14, Matthew 8:9, and Acts 10:1-2) while the Baptist document cites both testaments (2 Samuel 23:3, Psalm 82:3-4, and Luke 3:14). The shared citation from the Gospel of Luke is the verse in which John the Baptist tells soldiers to act justly and be content with their wages.

note that, despite their lack of centralization, typical Baptist groups would recognize and accept just war ideas although not necessarily just war technical terminology.

Modern Christian Developments

Hugo Grotius, a Dutch Protestant, revolutionized the just war field through *De jure belli et pacis* in 1625. He is considered by some to have secularized the law of nations.¹⁷⁸ A student of Arminius who rejected Calvinist predestination and argued Jesus had been sent to save all of humanity,¹⁷⁹ it was a universalist religious doctrine, not secularism, which provided the twofold impulse in *De jure*: first, to moderate the excesses of the 30 Years War (1618-1648) by providing a beneficial *jus ad bellum* (just grounds for war) and a moderating *jus in bello* (just means in war), and, second, to push back against the ideas, on the one hand, that Christians ought never take up arms to kill (as argued for example by Erasmus) and, on the other hand, that law did not apply to international relations (as argued for example by Euphemus). In addition to classical Greek and Roman authors, Grotius relied heavily on Biblical evidence in his argument. In contrast to a true secularist like Machiavelli who scorned Christianity, Grotius argued that commitments, freely made, had to be kept even by sovereigns. His final chapter includes typical references to secular and sacred sources and concludes with a prayer.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ David Kennedy, "Primitive Legal Scholarship," *Harvard International Law Journal* 27, no. 1 (Winter 1986), 77-81. What I said in the second footnote of this chapter, I reiterate here: Whether or not Grotius intended to develop a new philosophical approach to the use of natural law will not be debated here. For purposes of this dissertation, it suffices to say that, after Grotius, thinkers realized that one *could* take a different philosophical approach to natural law than had been taken previously.

¹⁷⁹ Edward Dumbault, *The Life and Legal Writings of Hugo Grotius* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 11-19.

¹⁸⁰ Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, edited and with an Introduction by Richard Tuck, from the Edition by Jean Barbeyrac (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), Book III, Chapter XXV, Sects. I, III, and VIII. It is worth quoting these passages at some length:

We ought to preserve our Faith for several Reasons, and amongst others, because without that we should have no Hopes of Peace. *For by Faith, (says Cicero) not only every State is preserved, but*

Given the universalism of his Arminian perspective, Grotius used RCH as a source of legal principles which could tolerate religious and political diversity at a time when Europeans sought to structure and legitimize a turbulent international society that had not yet solidified into a final form. Nevertheless after Grotius, the natural law approach slowly gave way to the positive law approach in which states were only bound to follow law to which they consented, and God is absent from such a framework.¹⁸¹ It is not without irony that the secular writers began to influence religious works.¹⁸²

that grand Society of all Nations is maintained. If this be taken away, says Aristotle rightly, All human Correspondence ceases.

Therefore the same *Cicero* calls it detestable to break Faith, the Observation of which is the Bond of human Life, and, as *Seneca* says, *Faith is the most sacred Good of the rational Soul*. Which Sovereign Princes ought the more solemnly to keep, by how much they offend with more Impunity than others. Wherefore take away Faith, they will be like wild Beasts, whose Rage all Men dread. Justice indeed in other Parts, has often something that is obscure, but the Bond of Faith is self-evident, and to that End do Men engage their Faith in their Dealings, that all Doubts may be removed.

How much more then does it concern Princes religiously to observe their Faith, first for the sake of their Conscience, then for that of their Reputation, on which depends the Authority of their Government. Let them not then doubt, but that they who endeavour to instill into them the Art of Deceiving, practise the same they teach. Their Practices cannot possibly prosper long, which render Men unsociable to Men, and hateful to GOD....

A safe and honourable Peace then is not too dearly bought, at the Expence of forgiving Offenders, Damages, and Charges, especially among Christians; to whom our LORD bequeathed Peace, as his last Legacy, whose best Expositor *St. Paul*, *Rom. xii. 18. Would have us live peaceably with all Men, as far as in us lies*....

May the *ALMIGHTY* then (who alone can do it) impress these Maxims on the Hearts of Christian Powers; may he enlighten their Minds with the Knowledge of every *Right*, Divine and Human, and inspire them with the constant and dutiful *Sense* of their being the *Ministers of Heaven*, ordained to govern *Men*; *Men*, for whom, of all his Creatures, GOD has the greatest *Regard and Affection*.

¹⁸¹ An account of the relationship between religion and international law can be found in Mark W. Janis, "Religion and the Literature of International Law: Some Standard Texts," in *Religion and International Law*, Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans, eds. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), 121-143. The account, attuned to England and America, focuses on Grotius, Vattel, Wheaton, Oppenheim, and Brownlie.

¹⁸² See Charles Mackey, "War," *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 15 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912), available at <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15546c.htm>, accessed February 19, 2013. Among others, Mackey's list of references includes sources like Thomas, Suárez, and Grotius, but the last reference is US jurist T.J. Lawrence.

Just war thought itself developed as well. The end of wars of religion and the Enlightenment fostered a rejection of holy war.¹⁸³ This tended to fulfill Grotius' intention that religion not serve as a dividing factor. However, natural-law based just war thought could not flourish in a positive-law environment. Nevertheless, Christianity continued to exert indirect influence on Western states, especially the United States.

Justice in War: Secular and Religious Perspectives from the 1930s

A useful snapshot of secular and religious approaches to war on the eve of World War II can be gathered from the following two well-regarded sources: Joachim von Elbe's article, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law,"¹⁸⁴ and from John Eppstein's book, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations*.¹⁸⁵

After outlining the Greek and Roman roots of just war thought, von Elbe writes,

It remained to Christianity to give material content to the formal concept of the *justum bellum* [just war] of the Romans.... War, under certain conditions, was recognized as a necessity; the Christian concept of the just war furnishes rules for limiting and guarding it in accordance with the precepts of the new religion.¹⁸⁶

This quotation is important because it recognizes that the contemporary international laws of war have Christian roots. In other words, upon exposure to an environment where the legality of war is part of the common currency of the discourse, RCH could come into play even for individuals who may have little or no exposure to it in the lived experience of private, personal, or family life.

¹⁸³ Bainton, 173ff.

¹⁸⁴ Joachim von Elbe, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law," *The American Journal of International Law* 33, no. 4 (Oct. 1939): 665-688. A search for this article conducted at scholar.google.com on January 31, 2013 indicated that this article has been cited no fewer than 144 times.

¹⁸⁵ John Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations* (London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne Ltd., 1935). This book was recently reissued by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., Clark, NJ as a hardcover in 2008 and a paperback in 2012. The reprint follows the Washington, DC version published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by the Catholic Association for International Peace in 1935.

¹⁸⁶ von Elbe, 667.

Also in von Elbe one reads

By what criterion can it be determined that a war falls within the permissible ones? The answer is that a war must be “just” in the substantive sense of the term. Just are those... which are waged to redress a wrong suffered. Thus, wars must always be preceded by an injury [and not] waged for personal motives, like territorial aggrandizement.... The injury may consist either in the neglect of a state to suppress crimes committed by its subjects, or in attacks upon the rights of others. Consequently, the just war, as a procedure for the repression of wrongs, is either a punitive action or in the nature of a civil suit for damages. Punishment and measure of damages are determined by the purpose of the just war; its aim is not primarily victory, but the establishment of peace, viz., a state of “*tranquillitas ordinis*” or ordered harmony where all things have their allotted place. Thus, the concept of the just peace is from the outset closely associated with the idea of the just war. No specific rules, however, are as yet laid down with respect to the content of the peace; it must, in general, restore the injured rights and lead to a well-ordered concord among men.¹⁸⁷

Elbe recounts Thomas’ three rules for just war “waged under the authority of a prince as the responsible leader of a nation, not be a private individual” who has recourse to a tribunal, “just cause,” and “belligerents must be animated by the right intention, namely, to advance the good or to avoid the evil.” He writes further,

While to Augustine the injury itself provides the just cause for the war, Thomas Aquinas demands some fault on the part of the wrongdoer: his culpability which deserves punishment is the justifying reason for going to war. Thus just war is primarily in the nature of a punitive action against the wrongdoer for his subjective guilt rather than his objectively wrongful act. Again, its aim must be peace in the Augustinian sense of the term, viz., the maintenance of justice in the interest of the common good.¹⁸⁸

Eppstein’s book sought “to draw from St. Augustine’s doctrine its logical conclusions” while at the same time drawing from other authors. Philosophical ethics is on display in the statements that there is “a greater merit in preventing war by peaceful negotiation and conciliation than in vindicating rights by bloodshed” and that peace

¹⁸⁷ von Elbe, 668-669.

¹⁸⁸ von Elbe, 669.

through conciliation is better than peace through victory. Philosophy of human nature underlies the statement that there is “a natural society of mankind which gives rise to certain rights and duties relevant to the morality of war.” Moreover, an aspect of philosophy of government is expressed by the statement that only the “absence of a superior tribunal before which a prince can seek redress” can justify the making of war unless an actual attack is underway and must be resisted. In addition, barring the direct intervention of God, no less than seven other conditions must be met for a war to be just: just cause, necessity, formal warning and declaration, sovereign authority (with the consent of the Church if the defense of religious rights is involved), the reasonable supposition that the good to be obtained from the war is greater than the certain material and spiritual evils which the war will entail, right intention (i.e. “the restoration or attainment of true peace”), and the use of only such force as is necessary. Moreover, it is clarified that the “*moral responsibility* for the war lies upon the *sovereign authority*, not upon the *individual soldier* or citizen” (whose duty is to obey unless “certainly convinced” the war is wrong), that priests “may not fight even in a just war,” and that the “duty of *repelling injury inflicted upon another* is the common obligation of all rulers and peoples.”¹⁸⁹ These additional criteria also divide themselves into statements about government and statements about human nature, reaffirming our observation of how RCH connects to DMF via philosophies of ethics, government, and the human person.

The article written by von Elbe was published the month following Germany’s invasion of Poland. Eppstein’s book was published earlier, but Hitler was already in power, Japan was already in China, and the Spanish Civil War was to begin the following year. One cannot help but marvel at the relevance of, and urgent need for, such works

¹⁸⁹ Eppstein, 92-93. Emphasis original.

during that period, and these works not only breathed the atmosphere of the time, but they also helped to create that atmosphere. This was the atmosphere of the mature Truman and Eisenhower and the youthful Reagan prior to their presidencies.

Contemporary Developments

It was not until the period between the First and Second World Wars that the just war tradition began to be recovered. Johnson credits the renaissance to Vanderpol's *La Doctrine Scholastique du droit de guerre*, Scott's *The Spanish Origin of International Law*, and Eppstein's *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations*.¹⁹⁰ However, Johnson reserves particular credit for American Protestant Reinhold Niebuhr¹⁹¹ who expressly objected to the assumption that all violence is immoral. Writing in 1932, Niebuhr contended, "Nothing is intrinsically immoral except illwill and nothing intrinsically good except goodwill," thereby highlighting the fact that not all force can be attributed to bad intentions and not all nonviolence can be attributed to good intentions.¹⁹² Niebuhr encountered what he saw as a paradox because he believed Jesus had proscribed violence absolutely.¹⁹³ He resolved the paradox by devising Christian realism, based on the idea that, since Jesus' call to nonviolence is impossible to follow at all times in a fallen world, this call must be abandoned at times. He wrote,

... I am forced to admit that I am unable to construct an adequate social ethic out of a pure love ethic. I cannot abandon the pure love ideal because anything which falls short of it is less than the ideal. But I cannot use it fully if I want to assume a responsible attitude towards the problems of society.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ Johnson, *Just War Tradition*, 329.

¹⁹¹ Johnson, *Just War Tradition*, 330.

¹⁹² Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 170-172.

¹⁹³ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), 9-10.

¹⁹⁴ Reinhold Niebuhr, "Must We Do Nothing?" March 30, 1932, accessed February 19, 2013, <http://www.ucc.org/beliefs/theology/must-we-do-nothing.html>.

As a result, Niebuhr argued that to refrain from fighting Nazism and Communism would be to permit a greater evil.

After World War II the just war thinkers naturally turned their attention to nuclear weapons, and Niebuhr was an important member of the Calhoun Commission, tasked by the Protestant interdenominational Federal (now National) Council of Churches to examine World War II through the lens of Christian ethical principles. The commission's first report¹⁹⁵ found the war just but lamentable; the document it issued has been called the 20th century's the best theological case for the use of force.¹⁹⁶ The commission's second report condemned counter-value strategic bombing and condemned the atomic attacks on Japan.¹⁹⁷ Pius XII, pope during World War II, condemned aggression but permitted self-defense;¹⁹⁸ Pope John XXIII rejected war but on the basis of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, holding that "in this age which boasts of its atomic power, it no longer makes sense to maintain that war is a fit instrument with which to repair the violation of justice."¹⁹⁹ Paul VI repudiated the destructiveness of war before the

¹⁹⁵ First Calhoun Commission, "The Relation of the Church to the War in the Light of the Christian Faith," *Social Action* 10, no. 10 (1944): 3-79.

¹⁹⁶ Charles E. Raynal, "The Relation of the Church to World War II in the Light of the Christian Faith," *The Presbyterian Outlook* (July 24-31, 1995): 4.

¹⁹⁷ Second Calhoun Commission, "Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith," *Social Action* (May 15, 1946): 5-24.

¹⁹⁸ Pope Pius XII, "Christmas Message" (1944), in is available in part in Robert Heyer, ed., *Nuclear Disarmament: Key Statements of Popes, Bishops, Councils and Churches* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), 13-14 and, in a slightly different translation, in its entirety online from <http://www.ewtn.com/library/papaldoc/p12xmas.htm>, accessed February 2, 2013. The section quoted in Heyer corresponds to paragraph 62 through the first sentence of paragraph 66 of the complete version.

¹⁹⁹ Pope John XXIII, *Pacem in terris* (April 11, 1963) available in English translation at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html, accessed February 19, 2013. Ramsey argues that John XXIII's choice of wording left open the possibility that war could be waged to stop an injustice in progress. Paul Ramsey, *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1983), 192-210.

United Nations on October 4, 1965, but it is unclear as to whether he meant to repudiate war entirely or just aggression.²⁰⁰

The ambiguity of the papal statements may reflect the dilemma posed by NATO-Warsaw Pact nuclear standoff. Certainly the dilemma spurred Ramsey's landmark *War and the Christian Conscience*.²⁰¹ Ramsey treated nuclear warfare by returning to Augustine to recover the original impetus behind just war thought, rooted in Christian love. Love of one's innocent neighbor justifies, even obliges, the use of force when needed to defend one's neighbor from harm or injustice. Likewise, love of enemy, understood as love of guilty neighbor, requires that force be limited to that which is necessary.²⁰² If Ramsey's treatment was limited to the *in bello* principles of discrimination and proportionality concerning a war that is already underway rather than also treating *ad bellum* principles that concern the just grounds for waging a war in the first place (a problem shared with certain Christian documents), then Johnson remedied the omission and emphasized the forms of justice which a *justum bellum* must uphold: distributive justice (whereby the war waged should dispense justice against wrongdoers in proportion to their guilt) and vindictive justice (whereby the war should right the wrongs done).²⁰³ Moreover, Johnson treated questions other than nuclear war.²⁰⁴ Johnson

²⁰⁰ Pope Paul VI, Speech to the United Nations Organization, October 4, 1965. Links to several non-English versions are available at the Vatican web site as linked from http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/speeches/1965/, accessed February 17, 2013. An English version is available from <http://www.christusrex.org/www1/pope/UN-1965.html>, accessed February 17, 2013.

²⁰¹ Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly?* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961).

²⁰² For summaries of Ramsey's contribution to the just war thought, see James Turner Johnson, "Paul Ramsey and the Recovery of the Just War Idea," *Journal of Military Ethics* 1, no. 1 (2002): 136-144; James Turner Johnson, *The War to Oust Saddam Hussein* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 23-26; and Cahill, 198-201.

²⁰³ Johnson, *Just War Tradition*, 5.

²⁰⁴ James Turner Johnson, *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); James Turner Johnson, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare*

perceived a hierarchy of criteria: like Thomas, he places just authority at the top of the list because, fundamentally, a contest of arms not waged on state authority is not war but banditry.²⁰⁵

Having transitioned above from papal statements directly to Ramsey and Johnson, it is worth mentioning at this point that both Ramsey and Johnson represent approaches to just war thought from outside Catholic Christianity. (Ramsey was a Methodist; Johnson, now a professor of religion at Rutgers University, was his student.) Their engagement in the just war discussion both illustrates the degree to which the just war framework is part and parcel to US ethical discourse independent of denominational adherence and demonstrates that the just war thought in this period remained part of the American and Christian tradition broadly conceived. Besides, as mentioned above, it is useful to remember that history prior to the Reformation is considered the common history of Western Christianity, so it is not surprising that Protestant thought sometimes draws on concepts which depend on sources including theologians who happen to be Catholic saints from eras preceding the 1500s.

Contemporary Christian Just War Thought

The Catholic position on just war has remained strikingly stable over many centuries. Two important data points are the catechisms of the Council of Trent and the current catechism. The Tridentine document holds guiltless the soldier “who, actuated not by motives of ambition or cruelty, but by a pure desire of serving the interests of his country, takes away the life of an enemy in a just war.”²⁰⁶ Moreover, should one kill “in

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); and James Turner Johnson, *The War to Oust Saddam Hussein* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).

²⁰⁵ Johnson, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare*, 46.

²⁰⁶ *Catechism of the Council of Trent*, On the Fifth Commandment, J. Donovan, trans. (Baltimore: Fielding Lucas, Jr., n.d.), 280.

self-defense, having used every precaution consistent with his own safety to avoid the infliction of death, he evidently does not violate this commandment [of thou shalt not kill].”²⁰⁷ Conditions like “pure desire” and “every means” set a high bar. The modern catechism is even more explicit.

Because of the evils and injustices that accompany all war, the Church insistently urges everyone to prayer and to action so that the divine Goodness may free us from the ancient bondage of war. All citizens and all governments are obliged to work for the avoidance of war.²⁰⁸

Nevertheless, the catechism states that while “the danger of war persists and there is no international authority with the necessary competence and power, governments cannot be denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed.”²⁰⁹ Moreover, protecting “the common good requires that an unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm. For this reason, those who legitimately hold authority also have the right to use arms to repel aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their responsibility.”²¹⁰

Protestant catechisms appear to make stronger statements in their earlier forms than in their later forms. The Lutheran Augsburg Confession states Christian office-holders are right “to award just punishment, to engage in just wars, to serve as soldiers.”²¹¹ The Presbyterian Westminster Confession permits Christian magistrates to “lawfully... wage war upon just and necessary occasions.”²¹² The Anglican Articles of

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 281.

²⁰⁸ *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 2307-2308. An online version is available from <http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catechism/catechism-of-the-catholic-church/epub/index.cfm>.

²⁰⁹ *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 2308.

²¹⁰ *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 2265.

²¹¹ Augsburg Confession XVI, 2. An online version is available from bookofconcord.org/augsburgconfession.php, accessed January 21, 2013.

²¹² Westminster Confession XXV, 2. An online version is available from http://www.reformed.org/documents/wcf_with_proofs/, accessed January 21, 2013.

Religion declare it “lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the Magistrate, to wear weapons, and serve in wars.”²¹³ The Second London Baptist Confession is nearly identical to the Presbyterian Westminster Confession in this regard.²¹⁴ However, the 1967 Presbyterian Confession of Faith says only, “God’s reconciliation in Jesus Christ is the ground of the peace, justice, and freedom among nations which all powers of government are called to defend.”²¹⁵ The Southern Baptist Convention simply expresses a desire that wars end once and for all.²¹⁶ The common thread connecting the modern Protestant statements is regret that war be undertaken or be necessary. This regret is not present in the early documents.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SPECIFICALLY

In the 1980s there was a wave of Christian statements on nuclear deterrence. As related above, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (now the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops) issued the 1983 pastoral letter called *The Challenge of Peace* which set forth specific just war criteria and then examined US nuclear policy in light of them.²¹⁷ Three years later the United Methodist Council of Bishops issued *In Defense of Creation*.²¹⁸ In 1987 the Episcopal Diocese of Washington published *The*

²¹³ Articles of Religion, XXXVII. An online version is available from anglicansonline.org/basics/thirty-nine_articles.html, accessed January 21, 2013.

²¹⁴ Second London Baptist Confession, XXIV, 2. An online version is available from <http://www.vor.org/truth/1689/1689bc00.html>, accessed January 21, 2013.

²¹⁵ United Presbyterian Church, Confession of Faith (1967), Part II, Sec. A, Art. 4(b). The entire document can be found in *The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (USA)*, Part I, Book of Confessions (Louisville: Office of the General Assembly, 1999), 251-262, available from <http://www.creeds.net/reformed/BookOfConfessions.pdf>, accessed February 1, 2013.

²¹⁶ Southern Baptist Convention, Baptist Faith and Message, art. 19 (1925), art. 16 (1963 and 2000), available at <http://www.sbc.net/bfm/bfmcomparison.asp>, accessed February 20, 2013.

²¹⁷ National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response*, (Washington, DC: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, May 3, 1983), accessed February 14, 2011, <http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/TheChallengeofPeace.pdf>.

²¹⁸ United Methodist Council of Bishops, *In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace* (Graded Press, 1986).

*Nuclear Dilemma*²¹⁹ and the Presbyterian Church in America published *Christian Responsibility in the Nuclear Age*.²²⁰ Yet as counterintuitive as it may seem, it is appropriate to begin with sources which actually predate atomic weapons.

As the Second World War loomed in 1939, Catholic philosopher Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe voiced reservations about the coming conflict. In Anscombe's view this war would likely be fought for unjust reasons and with unjust means. She interpreted the rules of war and the statements of leading politicians to mean that the traditional rules governing conduct in war would be broken by the British government if Great Britain were to fight Germany. In her view some war against Germany might have been justified – just not the war which she saw coming, a war which she foresaw would include, for example, attacks against civilians.²²¹ While World War II was still underway, Father John Ford criticized Allied bombing of population centers because of the direct targeting of civilians.²²² Pope Pius XII's 1944 Christmas message seems almost prescient when read in light of the atomic bombings Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for the pontiff decried how

the progress of Man's inventions, which should have heralded the realization of greater well being for all mankind, has been employed instead to destroy all that had been built up through the ages. By that very fact the immorality of wars of aggression has been patently demonstrated.²²³

²¹⁹ Episcopal Diocese of Washington Commission on Peace, *The Nuclear Dilemma* (1987).

²²⁰ Presbyterian Church in America, 15th General Assembly, *Christian Responsibility in the Nuclear Age* (1987), available from <http://www.pcahistory.org/pca/1-439.html>, accessed February 1, 2013.

²²¹ G.E.M. Anscombe, "The Justice of the Present War Examined," in *War in the Twentieth Century: Sources in Theological Ethics*, ed. Richard B. Miller (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), 125-137.

²²² John C. Ford, SJ, "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," *Theological Studies* 5, no. 3 (1944): 293-295. Ford recognized the justice of the Allied cause (See page 267.), so his criticism applied only to the means the Allies were employing.

²²³ Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message, December 12, 1944, in Robert Heyer, ed., *Nuclear Disarmament: Key Statements of Popes, Bishops, Councils and Churches* (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 13-14.

The first major development after the atomic bomb dealing expressly with nuclear weapons was the 1946 Second Calhoun Commission of the Federal (now National) Council of Churches. Expressing sorrow and regret for the “irresponsible” use of the bomb in World War II,²²⁴ the commission was divided as to whether nuclear use was ever permissible. Some saw the bomb as a last resort if it were to be “the only effective restraint” on aggression,²²⁵ others objected to all forms of obliteration bombing in all circumstances, and still others sought to discredit just war thought, but all urged a no-first-use nuclear weapons policy.²²⁶

Such a policy, however, presented evident weaknesses as the cold war solidified and the West confronted an Eastern Block with more powerful conventional forces at its disposal. Because of this conventional weakness, the United States could only halt a Soviet invasion by using atomic weapons. However, such declared intent would be negated by a no-first-use policy. The Dun Commission, less pacific and less representative of American Protestantism than the Calhoun Commission, recognized under the circumstances that “for the United States to abandon its atomic weapons, or to give the impression that they would not be used, would leave the non-Communist world with a totally inadequate defense.” Christians who supported such a policy would “share responsibility for the world-wide tyranny that might result.”²²⁷

²²⁴ Second Calhoun Commission, “Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith,” *Social Action* (May 15, 1946): 11.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 13 (note 6).

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

²²⁷ Dun Commission, “The Christian Conscience and Atomic War,” *Christianity and Crisis* (December 11, 1950): 165. It should be noted that the document was not passed unanimously. In fact, Calhoun himself and one other did not even sign the document. See Charles E. Raynal, “The Response of American Protestantism to World War II and Atomic Weapons,” in *Peace, War, and God’s Justice*, Thomas D. Parker and Brian J. Fraser, eds. (Toronto: United Church Publishing House, 1989), 158.

This realization figured in Ramsey's approach whereby he divorced the question of threat from the question of use and the question of intended effect from the question of foreseeable effect. In terms of use, only military targets were fair game; population centers were off limits. Employing the principle of double effect, Ramsey considered counterforce threats to be licit despite the likely civilian casualties; moreover, this unintended effect would likely deter actual conflict.²²⁸ These careful distinctions, balancing use against threat and what is intended against what is foreseen, allow the possibility of Christian RCH either supporting or not supporting various nuclear options depending on the concrete situation to be addressed.

COLD WAR IS NOT WAR: ILLUMINATING NUCLEAR DECISIONS THROUGH CHRISTIAN THOUGHT ON FRATERNAL CORRECTION

Just war thought is meant to grapple with issues concerning the initiation and conduct of war. As a result, a cold war at best falls under its framework only incompletely. However, there is a plausible relationship between the nuclear diplomacy under study and the peer-to-peer fraternal correction approach of Christianity. That is to say, the criteria which describe fraternal correction can be used to illuminate the diplomatic aspects of the superpower nuclear relationship.

The Bible is full of admonitions for believers to correct wrongdoers. In the Old Testament Book of Leviticus, for example, believers are enjoined to rebuke frankly their erring neighbors so that they will not share in their neighbor's guilt.²²⁹ Likewise, in the Book of Proverbs, giving correction and accepting correction are approved while failing to correct or to accept correction is censured.²³⁰

²²⁸ See Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961), 226-227 and Paul Ramsey, "The Limits of Nuclear War," in *The Just War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983), 211-258.

²²⁹ Leviticus 19:17.

²³⁰ Proverbs 10:10, 17.

The New Testament also treats fraternal correction. One notable example comes from the Gospel of Matthew in which Jesus instructs the listeners to speak to sinners to summon them to repentance. If a private rebuke does not work, others who are trustworthy should be summoned to the task. Finally, if all else fails, Jesus says the Church should be informed. Sinners who will not listen even to the Church are to be treated as Gentiles or tax collectors, that is, treated as those outside the community.²³¹ However, the Letter to the Galatians notes that one should attempt to recall a sinner in a spirit of gentleness and burden-sharing lest the one doing the fraternal correction be tempted.²³² The Letter of James states that whoever recalls a sinner will save a soul and cover a multitude of sins.²³³ Indeed, admonition and reproof are mentioned in a number of New Testament letters.²³⁴ However, typical Biblical passages dealing with fraternal correction are at most a few verses long.

More extended and systematic treatments of fraternal correction can be found in the works of Christian writers such as Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas. The first book of Augustine's *City of God* contains a chapter which deals with fraternal correction.²³⁵ Thomas deals with fraternal correction in several places in his *Summa theologiae*.²³⁶ From works of systematic theology such as these, one can extract several principles of fraternal correction.²³⁷

²³¹ Matthew 18:15-18.

²³² Galatians 6:1-2.

²³³ James 5:19-20.

²³⁴ For examples, see 1 Thessalonians 5:14; 2 Thessalonians 3:6, 14; Colossians 3:16; and 2 Timothy 3:16.

²³⁵ Augustine, *De civitate Dei contra paganos*, I, 9, in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, vol. 2, trans. Marcus Dods, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), revised and edited by Kevin Knight, accessed April 5, 2013, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120101.htm>.

²³⁶ *Summa* II-II, q. 33; II-II, q. 43, art. 3; Supp., q. 62, art. 3.

²³⁷ The following discussion of the principles of fraternal correction depends on Joseph Delaney, "Fraternal Correction," *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 4 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1908), accessed April 5, 2013, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04394a.htm>. However, the connections I draw between public matters of sin and international relations, as well as the examples I give, are my own.

Fraternal correction envisions both public and private matters. For the usual case of private persons, one would be obliged to act to correct or prevent a delinquency (1) if the delinquency in question were grave, (2) if there were no good reason to believe the other would self-correct, (3) if there were reason to expect that an admonition would be heeded, (4) if no one else could or would be likely to undertake the charitable work of correcting the other, and (5) if there would be no disadvantage for the one giving the correction. Only if each and every one of these five criteria were met would there be an obligation to act. One could envision the application of such principles in the international arena between and among peer states.

However, fraternal correction also envisions the cases where the delinquency in question might be a public matter. In such cases, the presence of any one of the following would oblige public action, namely (1) when public offense occurs (compare the just cause criterion of just war theory), (2) when a third party or the entire community could be adversely affected by the delinquency (for example, by threatening the common good of the world, conceived through the lens of sovereignty as responsibility for the realization and maintenance of the *tranquillitas ordinis*), (3) when a delinquency could only be dealt with by authority (though the world be anarchic, nevertheless a peer disputant or the United Nations would seem to have the appropriate recourse to force needed to vindicate justice), (4) when a rebuke is required to preclude scandal (in terms of alliance relations, for example, or world opinion), and (5) when the delinquent has relinquished right to his good name (perhaps by violating international norms, for example). Thus, the public matter criteria could prove illuminating in an interstate context as well.

These fraternal correction criteria highlight the strategic and interactive aspect of nuclear diplomacy. While moving beyond just war thought, the fraternal correction

framework still fits with the philosophies of ethics, government, and human nature which underlie just war thought, and so the fraternal correction framework is a legitimate and relevant part of the Christian religious cultural heritage in question.

CHARACTERIZING NUCLEAR POLICY CHOICES: TOOLS AND REASONING

Having explored the Christian heritage, development, and criteria of pacifism, holy war, and especially just war, it is time to return to the question of the three presidents and the seeming paradox of their nuclear decisions. The DMFs of leaders and elites are not directly observable, but they are revealed by actual policy decisions. In this investigation I consider nuclear-weapons policy decisions both in times of crisis and in times of comparative calm. I characterize the policy decisions by how they cohere with the DMF outlooks sketched above.

Different categories of Christian RCH, given their varied approaches to the human person, the state, and the institution of war, should foster different DMFs. Mainline branches with Lutheran and Calvinist RCH, the central tendency found in American Protestantism, would be expected to foster just war DMFs; similarly, historic peace church RCH should tend to foster pacifist DMFs. Recalling how RCH implies not just a system of ethics but a philosophical anthropology and a philosophy of government, different policy choices reveal the DMFs of leaders and elites; these can be compared with the DMFs expected of different RCH categories.

In terms of prior expectations, I do not expect leaders and elites necessarily to be practicing or practical adherents to the RCH in which they have been reared or to which they have been exposed, nor do I expect them necessarily to have read Augustine, Thomas, Luther, Calvin, or other such authors. I do expect exposure to RCH to yield discernible influence, and I further expect RCH influence usually to be positive rather

than negative – positive not in sense of good rather than bad, but positive in the sense that leaders and elites will find aspects of RCH reasonable, applicable, useful, or even helpful in general cases, specific cases, or both. Negative influence in this sense means leaders and elites find the RCH in question to be wrongheaded, so they seek to avoid or even counter any such RCH influence in their DMFs.²³⁸ Most importantly, I expect to discover a spectrum of DMFs which can be connected convincingly to RCH.

²³⁸ The just war thought of the theologians and the just war thought of the international lawyers can be clarified by considering the meaning of the classical terminology. *Bellum* is usually translated “war,” but to Augustine and Thomas *bellum* would have been at least implicitly contrasted against the term *duellum*. The former is any use of armed force, internal or external, by the ruler for public purposes. The latter is the private use of force for private purposes. *Duellum* is clearly unjust because it manifests *cupiditas* (cupidity, self-love, self-motivation, self-centeredness); *bellum*, to be just, should manifest *caritas* (charity, love in the divine sense and not the carnal sense). It is for this reason that Thomas put his discussion of war in the *Summa Theologiae* in the section on *caritas*. See James Turner Johnson, “Just War, As It Was and Is,” *First Things* (January, 2005), available at <http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/just-war-as-it-was-and-is-2>, accessed February 22, 2013.

There is a more subtle point here: the classical thought on war makes sense because sovereignty was not thought of in Westphalian or Weberian terms having to do with territorial control and a monopoly on organized violence. Sovereignty instead had to do with responsibility for the maintenance of the *tranquillitas ordinis*, the tranquility of order, perhaps better rendered in the twenty-first century as the well-ordered peace (and yes, the peace envisioned is the Latin *pax* or the Hebrew *shalom*), and this responsible sovereignty is implicitly highlighted when Thomas lists sovereign authority as his first just ground for war ahead of just cause and right intention. See George Weigel, *Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace* (Oxford University Press, 1987), *passim*.

Moreover, just cause receives the following twofold elaboration: to recover what has been wrongly taken and to punish evil. Self-defense is not mentioned. However, Thomas’ rationale is defense of the common good, the *tranquillitas ordinis*; in fact, it is central to the just war theory that Thomas expounds as a whole. As a result, Thomas’ conception of defense makes redundant a separate enumeration of self-defense as a just cause. In other words, self-defense comes from the top down (sovereign responsibility to communal good to self-defense) rather than an individual’s right of self-defense writ large for the body politic.

The Westphalian-Weberian notion stands all of this logic on its head and is probably also why classical just war theory focuses so much on just grounds while contemporary international law, growing out of the early modern or reformed approaches to natural law thought, focuses on just means. The default preference expressed in the UN Charter, with all of its restrictions on force and scant distinction between force and violence, clearly favors the maintenance of peace, understood as the absence of war, even over justice.

Now, when exploring the DMFs of American presidents, I expect to find that these presidents had a conception of justice and sovereignty quite a bit closer to the classical thought than to the international law. Maybe this was because of a personal commitment to Christianity. (Several Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan quotations come to mind along these lines, e.g., Truman’s predilection for the Sermon on the Mount and the Golden Rule as well as the Golden Rule, Eisenhower’s oft-misquoted “and I don’t care what it is” statement on religion, and Reagan’s speech to the evangelicals.) However, it could be due to the fact that leaders must “justify” actions to an electorate in a democracy. However, I will be exploring the

I further anticipate even naïve applications of the theoretical framework to work fairly well as a predictor of the policies of Truman and Eisenhower. Earlier in this chapter I foreshadowed the following predictions: Truman was a Baptist, so one would expect his policies to reflect a just war tradition by simplistic reasoning; Eisenhower grew up in a River Brethren/Mennonite milieu – both of which are pacifist forms of Christianity – but was baptized a Presbyterian less than two weeks after his inauguration (and after a long career in the mostly-mainline-Protestant military), so one again would expect decision-making which reflects just war thought but with a somewhat greater restraint with respect to force. However, I expect that while the predictions in these cases will be mainly correct, I further expect that my explanations will have to take a more detailed account of the actual beliefs derived from leaders' RCH – so much so that I would not be surprised to find that even a superficial examination can yield evidence that the naïve approach would best be discarded.

In terms of greater challenge, I expect Reagan to provide tougher fodder for the framework to digest. Reagan had a Protestant mother and a Catholic father and brother, and his first wife and their two children became Catholic after the divorce, so Reagan was exposed to both Protestant and Catholic varieties of RCH. Moreover, although he joined his mother's church (the Disciples of Christ, abbreviated DOC) and received his higher education at Eureka College (a DOC-affiliated institution), Reagan's expressions of faith feature evangelical overtones. Granted, the DMF spectrum proposed here is intended to capture the forms of Protestant RCH more prevalent in the United States; however, much Catholic RCH is held in common with Protestants as mentioned above, so the model should still suffice. The naïve approach is probably applied at some risk, but, although

explanatory suitability of the DMF framework derived from the discussion of RCH, so this issue will not arise.

Reagan's RCH milieu may challenge the theoretical framework to expand and adapt, I expect the more sophisticated approach to be adequate.²³⁹

The plan for the rest of the dissertation is to try out the framework on these three presidents as they deal with nuclear-use, nuclear-crisis, or nuclear-policy decisions. In particular the foregoing historical narrative highlights a proliferation of just war sub-criteria over time, and this proliferation indicates where to look for probable sources of nuclear paradox in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan presidencies.

One source of tension is the relationship among the elites, the people, and authority. Thomas' first criterion is authority. The president is the government official who has ultimate nuclear authority. However, the United States is a democracy, so the people have ultimate political authority. How do these presidents think about authority? How do they value the lives of their own people against the lives of others? What criteria play into this valuation? Where does the final judgment lie? RCH plays into these questions, particularly in terms of philosophy of government.

Another source of tension comes from the conflict between right, wrong, and relativism. Thomas' second criterion is just cause understood in terms of an actual fault committed. How do these presidents conceptualize such war-worthy faults or injuries? RCH may prove formative to the framework these leaders bring to bear on the question, especially in terms of human nature and ethics.

A third source of tension arises concerning the issue of intended consequences, foreseen consequences, and double effect. Thomas' third criterion of right intention, though sound in and of itself, seems to have spawned a series of sub-criteria which try to flesh out even more details. Criteria such as comparative justice and proportionality raise

²³⁹ The chapter on Reagan will treat several DOC resolutions from 1979 and 1981 which apply RCH to nuclear questions around the time of Reagan's presidential campaign and early time in office.

questions about ends-means relationships. How did Truman, Eisenhower, Reagan deal with such issues? Again, both human nature and ethics enter the picture.

A fourth source of tension comes from the interplay of threat, use, and credibility. The daughter criteria of right intension in this case are those of necessity or last resort and probability of success. It is here, rather than in one of the three classical just war criteria, that some of the derivative criteria and the fraternal correction criteria can be illuminating. In this dissertation I will deal with such sources of tension under the category of prudential judgment, for exercise of prudence is presupposed in the application of other criteria, and I am borrowing from the criteria for fraternal correction in order to amplify it how RCH comes into play in the presidential nuclear DMFs.

Moreover, the *in bello* criteria of discrimination between civilian and military targets and of proportionality of the means used in actually waging a war cast their shadow over the above four tensions.

As a result, the chapters on Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan will include a brief literature review of works treating each president as well as a brief sketch of the president's RCH. The presidential chapters will explore various nuclear decisions in light of RCH. Throughout these chapters, bear in mind that just war is a school of thought; it is not monolithic, and diversity exists under the just war umbrella. I expect RCH to influence which just war principles are stressed both in terms of Thomas' three classic criteria of authority, cause, and intention as well as the more detailed corollary criteria laid out in the NCCB document; I also expect underlying philosophies of ethics, government, and human nature to play a role. Thus, each chapter will point out principles which guided the decision-making of these presidents and explain how these principles should affect nuclear decision-making. The chapters will then trace the sources of these principles from each president's background and experience. Finally, the chapters will

relate how these principles played out in actual nuclear decision-making to show how RCH can help to resolve the nuclear paradox of Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan.

Chapter 3: Harry S. Truman

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I examine President Harry S. Truman's religious cultural heritage and nuclear decisions. I connect his philosophical ethics, his philosophy of government, and his philosophy of human nature to a decision-making framework predicted to describe his nuclear decisions, namely a just war framework. I then explore his nuclear decisions at the end of World War Two, during the Berlin Blockade crisis, and during the Korean Conflict. Next I treat two interrelated affairs, the Iran Crisis and the Baruch Plan to internationalize nuclear energy. Finally, I consider Truman's decision to pursue thermonuclear weaponry. Truman's decisions are indeed commensurate with a just war framework expected to flow from his religious cultural heritage (RCH).

TRUMAN IN PRIOR WORK

My argument that RCH matters to Truman's nuclear decisions is supported by the work of Spalding, for Spalding sees Truman as a man steeped in history and RCH. Spalding has argued that President Truman was the key architect who "grasped the meaning of the war of nerves" and "not only remade liberal institutionalism but also constructed a corresponding grand strategy of containment."²⁴⁰ In contrast to Truman's moral grounding in his faith and his understanding of history, Spalding finds George Kennan to be a moral relativist, a man who did not view "the fundamental essence of the Cold War as Truman understood it."²⁴¹ Spalding perhaps reaches too far in claiming that Truman "created and implemented a different strategy entirely."²⁴² Nevertheless,

²⁴⁰ Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Institutionalism* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 231.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 105.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 218.

Spalding and I agree in that we both recognize the role of faith, meaning, and prudential judgment in Truman's decision-making.

Miscamble would certainly agree that the Cold War did not simply follow a Kennan-style blueprint: "Only in a piecemeal and staggered manner did the Truman administration decide upon the American response to the Soviet Union."²⁴³ Rather, Kennan was "one of the on-site builders who contributed in important ways to the eventual structure which emerged,"²⁴⁴ even though what emerged included a military form of containment to what Kennan saw as basically a Soviet political threat. (Kennan opposed both NATO and the H-bomb, for example.)

In support of my argument, I note that Miscamble's analysis is compatible with RCH. To start with, Miscamble has argued that "tactical policy making on the run" in the Truman administration generally produced sphere-of-influence arrangements "in sync with the broad Roosevelt approach" of cooperation.²⁴⁵ However, Miscamble also has portrayed Truman as a president who spent a lot of time reflecting on decisions rather than making them with timeliness; in addition, Miscamble has emphasized how little Truman knew about foreign and defense policy when he came into the presidency. It follows that Truman's decision-making would have to be based on something other than his expertise in the subject matter. I argue that RCH is part of Truman's basis for decision-making.

As for Truman's "most controversial decision"²⁴⁶ to drop the atomic bombs on Japan, Miscamble refutes claims that Truman unleashed nuclear weapons primarily to

²⁴³ Wilson D. Miscamble, CSC, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 347.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 348.

²⁴⁵ Wilson D. Miscamble, CSC, *From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 213, 215.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 218.

intimidate the Soviets; rather, Truman desired to end the war in the Pacific with the fewest possible American casualties. Again, Miscamble's analysis is compatible with the type of RCH argument I am making. In a carefully-balanced moral account, Miscamble, a Catholic priest, lays out the "least abhorrent" choices available in August 1945 and concludes that Truman had "blood on his hands, but he stopped the veritable flood of blood on all sides."²⁴⁷ Miscamble minimizes the extent to which Soviet policies hardened in response to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thereafter, from autumn 1945 until the end of 1946, Truman's approach to the Kremlin was marked by "indecision and even confusion" and by "floundering between collaboration and confrontation."²⁴⁸ Not until the Truman Doctrine did the president and his advisers "in a piecemeal and staggered manner"²⁴⁹ adopt a calculated Cold War strategy of containment.²⁵⁰

Inboden, explicitly engaging religious and spiritual matters, argues that existing accounts of the origins and trajectories of the Cold War are "insufficient" because they "ignore God," for although "Cold War historians may neglect the spiritual factor, Americans in the 1940s and 1950s did not."²⁵¹ As the USSR opposed capitalism and democracy but favored atheism and materialism, so Truman and Eisenhower used religion as a political, cultural, and ideological counterbalance. However, the heterogeneity of American religious belief (e.g. Jews and Christians, Catholics and Protestants, mainline Protestants and evangelical Protestants) required Truman and Eisenhower to create, through institutions and language, at least the facade of a unified

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 248.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 262.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 303.

²⁵⁰ An even more detailed analysis is provided in Wilson D. Miscamble, CSC, *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

²⁵¹ William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4.

civil religion to align with US policy. These institutions and language are part and parcel of RCH.

Did RCH play a role in Truman's Israel policy? If so, it is plausible that RCH played a role in other important decisions, including nuclear ones. Concerning the Holy Land, Snetsinger²⁵² has argued President Truman's decision to recognize Israel was based solely on political considerations. Benson²⁵³ has argued Truman's Israel policy was rooted in moral convictions which themselves had their source in his religious upbringing as well as in his friendship with Jewish friends. The moral aspect of Truman's policy-making indeed is often overlooked. However, Benson seems not to take into account the full range of political and pragmatic factors which also could have figured into Truman's decision-making process. In this sense, Benson's work seems to have committed an omission rather than a deliberate bracketing of such factors in order to study the role of religious cultural heritage in Truman's decision-making. Ultimately, both Snetsinger's and Benson's arguments appear simplistic by themselves but complementary together. A more balanced account is provided by Radosh and Radosh²⁵⁴ who have argued that Truman was not moved solely by political expediency but was moved at least in part by RCH. Radosh and Radosh argue that Truman was moved by a genuine belief that the Jews deserved statehood because of the Bible; they also believe Truman supported statehood because it was promised to the Jews by the League of Nations which had acknowledged the right of the Jewish people to self-determination and because the Jewish people suffered so horrendously in Europe during World War II. Radosh and Radosh,

²⁵² John Snetsinger, *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974).

²⁵³ Michael T. Benson, *Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).

²⁵⁴ Allis Radosh and Ronald Radosh, *A Safe Haven: Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009).

tracing both domestic and international politics from the legacy of Roosevelt onward, relate the difficult, uncertain path by which Truman came to support the case for Israel. At the same time Radosh and Radosh show how this ultimate support was, to a great extent, the outcome of Truman's deep belief – a belief, I am quick to add, which is a product of Truman's RCH. Moreover, I reiterate that if RCH matters in some important decisions, it is plausible that it will matter in others as well, including nuclear decisions.

In a striking parallel to my investigation of RCH, Leffler looks at the Cold War leaders during five crucial moments and argues that leaders' "ideas, ideologies, beliefs, and experience shaped their perceptions of threat and opportunity arising from circumstances"²⁵⁵ with special attention given to the historical memory and ideological mindsets of the leaders. Thus the interplay of human agency and historical contingency plays a major role in Leffler's analysis; moreover, RCH can fit this framework. The five moments of "lost opportunities"²⁵⁶ indicate the Cold War was not predetermined: But for individual fears, ideology, and aspirations, the Cold War might have turned out differently. Leffler's first lost opportunity occurred during the Truman administration: "Truman took action" against an inconsistent, wary Stalin even though Truman was "not eager to go on an offensive against the Soviet Union and international communism."²⁵⁷ Leffler argued that both Truman and Stalin saw how "national self-interest could be served through cooperative arrangements."²⁵⁸ However, the devastation of World War II, the task of rebuilding, and the promise of modernization prompted both leaders fall back on ideological preconceptions. Both feared an international structure that would threaten

²⁵⁵ Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 7.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 62, 70.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 79.

and contain their respective ways of life, so by 1948 Truman and Stalin opted for confrontation rather than collaboration. Thus, beliefs were important to understanding the Cold War during Truman's presidential tenure. I argue that RCH influenced Truman's beliefs.

If ideas can matter to diplomacy, then ideas based on RCH could matter to diplomacy. Thompson, although overstating that "Paul Nitze and George Kennan were the only two people to be deeply involved in American foreign policy from the outset of the Cold War until its end,"²⁵⁹ uses Nitze and Kennan as complementary counterpoints to explore the entire Cold War as he catalogues their philosophical and psychological idiosyncrasies with Nitze in the role of the hawk and Kennan in the role of the dove. In particular regarding the Truman era, Thompson balances Kennan's insistence that his idea of containment was primarily political with Nitze's successful transformation of containment into a military doctrine via the State Department's NSC-68 document. This book illustrates the balancing of ideational factors when confronting a challenging diplomatic environment. I balance ideational RCH factors as I explore Truman's nuclear decisions.

In the section below, I report principles which emerge from the patterns of Truman's decision-making. In the subsequent section I turn to Truman's RCH in order to source these principles.

PRINCIPLES WHICH EMERGE FROM TRUMAN'S DECISION-MAKING

As I investigated his biographical background and his presidency, I found that Truman exhibited a pronounced tendency to favor the common man or the underdog and saw governmental authority in this light. He also had a clear sense of right and wrong and

²⁵⁹ Nicholas Thompson, *The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War* (New York: Henry Holt, 2009), 3.

believed that people, and even the United States, have a responsibility before God, a responsibility which included an obligation to do one's best to fulfill God's plan. Truman, a man of prayer, saw philosophical and even political realism as compatible with ethics, and Truman wholeheartedly agreed with the adage that actions speak louder than words. Truman treated religion as something to be held seriously, constantly, and lightly; it should never interfere with politics. In the following section, I will explore RCH as a source of these principles; in the subsequent section, I will relate how these principles played out in Truman's decision-making.

HARRY S. TRUMAN'S RCH

Truman, a conventional mainline Protestant, was brought up in a family which was "vehemently"²⁶⁰ Baptist, and most guidelines for the rearing of children came from the Bible.²⁶¹ Even before Harry started school, his mother taught him to read the family Bible. Truman twice read the Bible before he was twelve years old²⁶² and knew many passages by heart including the Sermon on the Mount found in the Gospel of Matthew.²⁶³ Truman possessed a "remarkable familiarity with the Bible, citing texts and stories from it with a range and aptness unusual among modern statesmen...."²⁶⁴

Truman "felt a sense of salvation" at the age of eighteen,²⁶⁵ was baptized by immersion,²⁶⁶ and was a member of the First Baptist Church of Grandview, Missouri his

²⁶⁰ Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S Truman* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 6.

²⁶¹ David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1992), 54.

²⁶² Edmund Fuller and David E. Green, *God in the White House: The Faiths of American Presidents* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1968), 209.

²⁶³ McCullough, 54-55.

²⁶⁴ Fuller and Green, 209.

²⁶⁵ Hamby, 21.

²⁶⁶ Bliss Iseley, *The Presidents: Men of Faith* (Boston: W.A. Wilde, 1953), 255.

whole life²⁶⁷ even though his wife was Episcopalian and they married in the Episcopal Church. Though he rarely spoke about Jesus as a savior crucified to redeem humanity, Truman often mentioned the Sermon on the Mount (which emphasizes love over force, humility over insistence, and elevates underdogs such as the poor in spirit and the persecuted) and the Golden Rule (that one treat others as one wishes to be treated²⁶⁸), both of which he had memorized while growing up. For example, after World War II ended Truman announced, “Though we may meet setbacks from time to time, we shall not relent in our efforts to bring the Golden Rule into the international affairs of the world;”²⁶⁹ likewise, he once called the Sermon on the Mount “the greatest of all things in the Bible, a way of life, and maybe someday men will get to understand it as the real way of life.”²⁷⁰ Noted evangelist and Baptist minister Billy Graham once told Truman that the Sermon on the Mount and the Golden Rule were not enough for salvation. Truman differed. As related by Hamby, Truman disagreed with Graham’s theology but in no way denied the divinity of Christ;²⁷¹ as related by Graham himself, Truman arose and ended the interview.²⁷² Either way, it would seem improper to view Truman as an evangelical.

²⁶⁷ William G. Clotworthy, *Presidential Sites: A Discovery of Places Associated with Presidents of the United States* (Blacksburg: McDonald and Woodward, 1998), 231.

²⁶⁸ It is worth pointing out that the reciprocity inherent in Golden Rule can be worked out to involve the psychological in terms of empathy; the sociological in terms of individual-individual, group-group, and individual-group relationships; and the philosophical in terms of perceiving one’s neighbor as an “I” or a “self.” Christian RCH has, in various ways, dealt with all of these aspects. See Walter Terence Stace, *The Concept of Morals* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1937).

²⁶⁹ Harry S Truman, “Address on Foreign Policy at the Navy Day Celebration in New York City,” October 27, 1945, accessed September 6, 2012, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=187&st=&st1=>.

²⁷⁰ Fuller and Green, 209.

²⁷¹ Alonzo L. Hamby, “The Mind and Character of Harry S. Truman,” in *The Truman Presidency*, Michael J. Lacey, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1989), 21-22.

²⁷² Billy Graham, *Just As I Am: The Autobiography of Billy Graham* (New York: Harper San Francisco/Zondervan, 1997), xx.

Rather, he self-identified as a “Lightfoot Baptist.”²⁷³ In this he followed his mother who, he said, “taught us the moral code and started us in Sunday School.”²⁷⁴

Despite inconsistent church attendance, Truman prayed “when he needed guidance.”²⁷⁵ Truman further had a sense of duty before God: In his first year as president, Truman wrote that he could not understand “except to attribute it to God. He guides me, I think.”²⁷⁶

If a facet of Truman’s piety and philosophy of the human person includes the idea that people flourish under God’s guidance, his ethics are revealed in his attitude toward doing right. His approach is in accord with Truman’s Baptist grandmother’s philosophy. “Her philosophy was simple. You knew right from wrong and you did right, and you always did your best. That’s all there was to it.”²⁷⁷

Along similar ethical lines, Truman understood philosophical and political realism to be compatible with ethics. Truman’s contemporaries were impressed by his honesty. He never used a public position to make money, he was faithful to his wife to whom he

²⁷³ Harry S Truman to Bess Wallace, March 19, 1911, “Correspondence from Harry S. Truman to Bess Wallace Truman, 1910-1959,” Collection HST-FPB: Harry S Truman Papers Pertaining to Family, Business and Personal Affairs, 1876-1959, Harry S Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO. In this same letter Truman writes that Baptists “do not want a person to go to shows or dance or do anything for a good time. Well I like to do all those things and play cards besides. So you see I am not very strong as a Baptist. Anyhow I don’t think any church on earth will take you to heaven if you’re not real anyway. I believe in people living what they believe and talking afterwards....” This letter thus reinforces the points that Truman hold religion lightly and that Truman valued actions over words.

²⁷⁴ William Hillman, *Mr. President* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Young, 1952), 153.

²⁷⁵ Hamby, 21. To get a sense of his prayer life, consider that Truman memorized the following prayer in his youth: “Oh! Almighty and Everlasting God, Creator of Heaven, Earth and the Universe: Help me to be, to think, to act what is right, because it is right; make me truthful, honest and honorable in all things; make me intellectually honest for the sake of right and honor and without thought of reward to me. Give me the ability to be charitable, forgiving and patient with my fellowmen—help me to understand their motives and their shortcomings—even as Thou understandest mine! Amen, Amen, Amen.” Quoted in McCullough, 55. This prayer is a veritable compendium of ethics and anthropology, complete with an implicit theory of right action and a theory of human shortcomings that assumes an innate sociability in the human species that opens up in his philosophy of government as will be illustrated in the main text.

²⁷⁶ Quoted in McCullough, 390.

²⁷⁷ McCullough, 571.

wrote daily whenever he was away, and he consistently avoided situations that would even give the appearance of being morally questionable. The *New York Times* characterized Truman as follows: “He has the kind of experience, in short, likely to make a realist sympathetic to the problems of the varied groups rather than to produce the doctrinaire or the zealot.”²⁷⁸ Truman, then, is a philosophical realist and a political realist (as distinct from the realist school of international relations theory described earlier).

As a result, Truman was open to influence from many sources, but he held Jesus in highest esteem. In 1952 he summed up his view of ethics and integrity as follows:

The basis of all great moral codes is “Do to and for others what you would have others do to and for yourself.”... Truth, honor, and justice are at the basis of all human relations.... [T]hose great statesmen and military leaders who had the moral qualifications named made a contribution to the welfare and advancement of the world. Great teachers like Moses, Isaiah, Confucius, Buddha, Mohammed, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, John Knox and many others were imbued with honor, truth and justice. Jefferson, I think, is the greatest ethical teacher of our time.... In ancient times, Jesus Christ was the greatest teacher of them all – not only ancient but modern.²⁷⁹

Despite the above information, the fingerprints of RCH might seem hard to find in the documentary evidence since Truman valued actions over words. Truman himself stated, “I am by religion like everything else. I think there’s more in acting than in talking.”²⁸⁰ Nevertheless, it is possible to establish patterns of thought and patterns of action which connect Truman’s RCH, his DMF, and his nuclear policy choices.

To start with, RCH influenced Truman outside the realm of nuclear decisions on topic ranging from race to economics. For example, Truman worked hard to please his father but seemed uncomfortable with the capitalist principles of minimizing wages to

²⁷⁸ Quoted in McCullough, 321.

²⁷⁹ Hillman, 106.

²⁸⁰ McCullough, 83.

maximize profits. He wrote to his wife Bess of his disagreement with a newspaper editor and with his father:

They honestly believe that every man ought to have to work from daylight to dark and that the boss ought to have all the profit. My sympathies have been all the other way, and that is the reason for my lack of worldly goods. I just can't cheat in a trade or browbeat a worker. Maybe I'm crazy, but so is the Sermon on the Mount if I am.²⁸¹

Thus Truman's approach stems at least in part from a form of Christian idealism.

Similarly, RCH seems to have played a role in Truman's approach to racial equality. For example, he said in a speech to the National Colored Democratic Association, "When we are honest enough to recognize each other's rights and are good enough to respect them, we will come to a more Christian settlement of our difficulties."²⁸² Although one would expect Truman to have desired to win black votes, this quotation is consistent with his fundamental, long-term commitments to fairness, to the underdog, and to a Christian vision of righting injustice. Indeed, Truman articulated his concern for the common man as follows: "Amos [the prophet] was interested in the welfare of the common man.... Every one of these prophets were trying to help the underdog, and the greatest prophet [Jesus] was crucified because He was trying to help the underdog."²⁸³

Harry had first met Bess in Presbyterian Sunday School after his family moved to Grandview, MO when he was six years old. One might expect that he was there exposed

²⁸¹ Harry S. Truman to Bess Wallace Truman, February, 25, 1937, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Pertaining to Family, Business, and Personal Affairs, Family Correspondence File, Correspondence from Harry S. Truman to Bess Wallace Truman, 1921-1959, Box 9, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

²⁸² Harry S. Truman, Convention of the National Colored Democratic Association, July 14, 1940, Chicago, Illinois, Speech File, 1935-1945: Press Release File, 1937-1945, Box 283, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

²⁸³ Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's File, Longhand Notes – Undated, Box 284, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

to a more intellectual branch of Christianity than would have been the case had his exposure been limited to the Baptist heritage of Truman's family. In a letter to Bess, Truman wrote of his suspicion of the emotionalism of revivals, saying, "I think religion is something one should have on Wednesday and Thursday as well as Sunday." Nor did he agree with Baptist prohibitions against what he considered innocent pleasures such as playing cards and dancing, saying of his church membership, "You see I'm a member but not a strenuous one."²⁸⁴ In a handwritten autobiographical manuscript from 1945, Truman wrote, "I'm a Baptist because I think that sect gives the common man the shortest and most direct approach to God."²⁸⁵ Again, we see Truman as a serious but lightfoot Baptist whose patterns of thought emphasize the good of the common man.

Truman believed that God had a plan for the United States. Truman, because of RCH, envisioned US leadership as crucial to the establishment of a durable peace under which the world could flourish. In a revealing departure from a prepared 1944 campaign text, Truman stated, "I believe – I repeat, I believe honestly – that Almighty God intends now that we shall assume the leadership which He intended us to assume in 1920, and which we refused," a thought which recurs in many Truman speeches.²⁸⁶ Truman's vision of the US role in the world was thus influenced by religious conviction.

Nevertheless, Truman kept his personal religiosity strictly separate from his public office. For example, upon undertaking a run to serve as a Missouri senator, Truman wrote in his own hand, "And now I am a candidate for the United States Senate.

²⁸⁴ Harry S. Truman to Bess Wallace Truman, February 7, 1911, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Pertaining to Family, Business, and Personal Affairs, Family Correspondence File, Correspondence from Harry S. Truman to Bess Wallace Truman, 1921-1959, Box 1, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

²⁸⁵ Harry S. Truman, handwritten biographical manuscript, 1945, President's Secretary's File, Biographical File, Box 253, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

²⁸⁶ Frank McNaughton and Walter Hehmeyer, *This Man Truman* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1945), 179.

If the Almighty God decides that I go there, I am going to pray as King Solomon did for wisdom to do the job.”²⁸⁷ Nevertheless he stated in his diary, “I don’t believe in going to church for publicity purposes.”²⁸⁸ Although his dairy statement dates from his vice-presidential years, Truman’s adhered to this diary statement consistently throughout his public career. Moreover, Truman was concerned that he not succumb to self-importance. In June of 1945, the new president reassured his old friends in Missouri, “To keep from going high hat and stuffed shirt, I have to keep in mind Luke 6:26.”²⁸⁹ The King James translation renders the Bible the verse to which Truman refers as, “Woe unto you, when all men shall speak well of you! for so did their fathers to the false prophets.”

Consistent with his 1922 pledge never to use Sunday to advance his political career, he told a 1948 campaign crowd at Sidney, Nebraska, “I wish it weren’t Sunday so I could discuss some of the issues of the day with you, but I have made it a rule never to make political speeches or speeches of any other kind on Sunday.” Although he kept the “Lord’s Day” free from politics, Truman did talk to his audience informally about nonpolitical matters, however.²⁹⁰

Occasionally, a single instance in the historical record presents a remarkably comprehensive and in-depth portrait of Truman and RCH in terms of his philosophies of human nature, ethics, and government. One such occasion was March 6, 1946, when Truman delivered a speech at a conference of the Federal Council of Churches (FCC). This speech, broadcast to the nation via radio, treated not only the role of religion in democratic societies but addressed atomic energy as well as. First, clearly addressing an

²⁸⁷ Harry S. Truman, Longhand Notes – County Judge File, Box 282, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

²⁸⁸ Diary, May 23, 1945.

²⁸⁹ Alfred Steinberg, *The Man from Missouri: The Life and Times of Harry S. Truman* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962), 251.

²⁹⁰ *Public Papers of the US Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953*, 1948, 298.

audience broader than the one present, Truman stated that he interpreted the conference to “[represent] the spirit of the worship of God” in general. He stated that in the previous decade evil dictatorships had sought to “banish from the face of the earth both these ideals – religion and democracy. For these forces of evil have long realized that both religion and democracy are founded on one basic principle, the worth and dignity of the individual man and woman.” Warning that “[s]elfishness and greed and intolerance are again at work,” Truman offered the solution of “a moral and spiritual awakening in the life of the individual and in the councils of the world.” Moreover, turning to the advent of the atomic age, Truman argued, “If the civilized world as we know it today is to survive, the gigantic power which man has acquired through atomic energy must be matched by spiritual strength of greater magnitude.” In parallel Truman said, “If men and nations would but live by the precepts of the ancient prophets and the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount, problems which now seem so difficult would soon disappear.” As his speech dealt with pressing social problems, Truman called upon churches and synagogues to help alleviate the housing shortage confronting returning veterans by appealing for them to house one million veterans until new homes could be built. He further challenged Americans to “prove your faith and your belief in the teachings of God by doing your share to save the starving millions in Europe, in Asia, in Africa.”²⁹¹ In one speech Truman had covered everything from his philosophy of human nature to his ethics to his philosophy of government and applied these frameworks to manifold issues including atomic energy.

²⁹¹ *Public Papers of the US Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953*, 1946, 141-144.

Further background on Truman's philosophy of government and RCH comes from a memo he wrote to himself concerning government authority as responsibility for the common good.

I've no faith in any totalitarian state, be it Russian, German, Spanish, Argentinian, Dago, or Japanese. They all start with a wrong premise—that lies are justified and that the old, disproven Jesuit formula, the ends justify the means, is right and necessary to maintain the power of government. I don't agree, nor do I believe that either formula can help humanity to the long hoped for millennium. Honest Communism, as set out in the "Acts of the Apostles," would work. But Russian Godless Pervert Systems won't work.²⁹²

Despite the harsh words for Italians and Jesuits (and even Machiavelli did not originate the attributed maxim), Truman saw sovereignty as power for the common good rather than power over territory or people, and he contextualized his view according to a book in the Bible.²⁹³

As indicated earlier by Truman's openness to Confucianism, Buddhism, and Islam, Truman treated RCH broadly. In addition to the ecumenical Protestant FCC, Truman engaged Catholic Christianity as well. Writing to Pope Pius XII, Truman more than once identified the United States as a "Christian Nation" and stated, "An enduring peace can be built only upon Christian principles." Indeed, Truman stated his belief "that the greatest need of the world today, fundamental to all else, is a renewal of faith," and so Truman sought, "to encourage renewed faith in the dignity and worth of the human person in all lands, to the end that the individual's sacred rights, inherent in his relationship to God and his fellows, will be respected in every land." Truman went on, "Through faith, the purposes of God shall be carried out in the hearts and deeds of Man. I

²⁹² Quoted in Hamby, 313-314.

²⁹³ Truman clearly had no love for Fascism or Communism: On the day the Germans invaded the Soviets, he said, "If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible." Quoted in McCullough, 262.

believe with heartfelt conviction that those who do not recognize their responsibility to Almighty God cannot meet their full duty toward their fellow men.” The pope replied that “the foundations of a lasting peace among nations” could “be secure only if they rest on bedrock faith in the one true God, the Creator of all men.”²⁹⁴

A further insight into Truman’s philosophical anthropology came in another Catholic setting when he received an honorary degree from Fordham University in 1946. Noting that “[i]n preparing our veterans and other young men and women to live in the new atomic age, education faces the greatest challenge in history,” Truman quoted the charter of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization: “Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.” Then, in his own words on human nature and conflict, he stated, “Ignorance and its handmaidens, prejudice, intolerance, suspicion of our fellow men, breed dictators. And they breed wars. Civilization cannot survive an atomic war.” In this context Truman expressed his confidence that Fordham, “with its educational system founded upon Christian principles,” would do its part in “mastering this science of human relationships all over the world. It is the defense of tolerance and of understanding, of intelligence and thoughtfulness” that could provide “at least one defense against that bomb.” Truman concluded confidently, “We can and we must make the atomic age an age of peace for the glory of God and the welfare of mankind.”²⁹⁵ Below, we would do well to recall Truman’s connection between human nature, education, and peace when we explore his enthusiasm for the Baruch Plan to internationalize atomic energy.

²⁹⁴ Truman to Pius XII, August 6, 1947 and Pius XII to Truman, August 26, 1947, accessed April 16, 2013, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1902>.

²⁹⁵ Harry S. Truman, Address at Fordham University, New York City, Upon Receiving an Honorary Degree, May 11, 1946, accessed April 16, 2013, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1554>.

Although he read widely, Truman never took a college degree. Given Truman's RCH, I expect Truman's DMF to reflect just war thought. I now look at the 1945 use of atomic bombs, the 1948 Berlin Blockade, the Korean Conflict, the interplay between the 1946 Iran crisis and the Baruch Plan for nuclear internationalization, and the decision to pursue the H-bomb to see whether Truman's policy choices fall within the expected type: moral and philosophical principles from Christian RCH constrain the president into choosing policies that cohere with just war thought. Just war thought is the central tendency in Christian RCH. To a secular mindset, Truman's actions may look like selective engagement with a somewhat greater propensity for recourse to force than a president like Eisenhower. However, the other-centered aspects of his decisions come through, and a strong RCH-DMF coherence emerges.

TRUMAN'S NUCLEAR DECISIONS IN WAR AND CRISIS

1945: The End of World War II

As recounted in the opening chapter, Truman wrote two letters which give particular insight into his thoughts on the use of the atomic bomb in war. In both letters, he uses a similar analogy (likening the enemy to a "beast"), but his letters have opposite aims: In one letter he urges nuclear restraint to a warlike senator while in the other he justifies nuclear use to a Christian organization. The two "beast" letters balance each other yet strikingly recall Luther's "strike, hew, stab and slay, as though among mad dogs" quotation cited in the second chapter. To hawkish Senator Richard B. Russell (who had called for massive escalation against Japan, even writing to Truman that the US had "no obligation to Shintoism"²⁹⁶), Truman wrote the following on August 9, 1945:

²⁹⁶ Quoted in D.M. Giangreco and Kathryn Moore, *Dear Harry... Truman's Mailroom, 1945-1953: The Truman Administration Through Correspondence with "Everyday Americans"* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 294.

I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can't bring myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same manner.

For myself, I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole populations because of the "pigheadedness" of the leaders of a nation and, for your information, I am not going to do it unless it is absolutely necessary....

My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children of Japan.²⁹⁷

Like Calvin, and in line with Luther's distinction between the violence of war and violent acts which may occur during a war, Truman exhibited concern for the common humanity of the enemy. However, to the dovish Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, Truman wrote on August 11, 1945:

Nobody is more disturbed over the use of Atomic bombs than I am but I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them.

When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁷ Harry S. Truman to Richard B. Russell, August 9, 1945, Official File, Truman Papers, accessed September 12, 2012, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-08-09&documentid=9&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1.

²⁹⁸ Harry S. Truman to Samuel McCrea Cavert, August 11, 1945, Official File, Truman Papers, accessed September 12, 2012, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1945-08-11&documentid=11&studycollectionid=abomb. Truman's letter was written in response to a letter, dated August 9, 1945, Samuel McCrea Cavert, General Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, who wrote,

Many Christians [are] deeply disturbed over use of atomic bombs against Japanese cities because of their necessarily indiscriminate destructive efforts and because their use sets extremely dangerous precedent for future of mankind. Bishop Oxnham, President of the Council and John Foster Dulles, Chairman of its commission on a just and durable peace, are preparing statement for probably release tomorrow urging that atomic bombs be regarded as trust for humanity and that Japanese nation be given opportunity and time to verify facts about new bomb and to accept surrender terms. Respectfully urge that ample opportunity be given Japan to reconsider ultimatum before any further devastation by atomic bomb is visited upon her people.

Truman falls into the just war category as expected. While exhibiting concern for the humanity of his enemies, the biblically well-read Truman reasons in a way that is open to the use of appropriate means in a just war. Plus, Truman exercises restraint, ensuring that the use of the third bomb which would have been available in late August would not be automatic.²⁹⁹ Indeed, Henry Wallace points out that Truman forewent the third atomic bomb because “wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn’t like the idea of killing... ‘all those kids,’”³⁰⁰ a clear indication of right intention regarding foreseen, rather than intended, consequences; implicitly applying the principle of double effect, Truman determined that, despite just cause and right intention, the good that would come from a third atomic strike would not counterbalance the predicted, though unintended, civilian casualties. Overall, Truman appears situated well within a just war DMF.

Some may object that Truman may have had ulterior motives. However, Miscamble has made the point that while postwar concerns were present, they were not

This letter is quoted in Giangreco and Moore, 295. Also, bearing in mind that John Foster Dulles was the one to whom Truman entrusted the task of negotiating the treaty with Japan, consider the following from G. Bromley Oxnam and Dulles:

“We express profound thankfulness, which we know is felt by millions of our fellow citizens, that the Japanese Government was brought to accept the Allied surrender terms without our continuing to the end to release the wholesale destructive force of atomic energy. As indicated by our statement of August ninth, it seemed to us that the way of Christian statesmanship was to use our newly discovered and awesome power as a potential for peace rather than an actuality for war. To the extent that our nation followed that way, it showed a capacity of self-restraint which greatly increases our moral authority in the world. Also, we have given a practical demonstration of the possibility of atomic energy bringing war to an end. If that precedent is constructively followed up, it may be of incalculable value to posterity.

This letter is quoted in Giangreco and Moore, 296. John Foster Dulles later was President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State.

²⁹⁹ Barton J. Bernstein, “Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory,” *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 257.

³⁰⁰ Quoted in Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50* (New York: Knopf, 1980), 11.

driving nuclear use.³⁰¹ Indeed, there may not even have been alternatives other than the invading the Japanese home islands. On the other hand, this question actually makes the nuclear ethics/religious cultural heritage question clearer by having a concrete, very pure question (in the sense that it can be decoupled from other questions and from the fog of war) concerning justice of means in war. For example, is Truman making a utilitarian calculation in his nuclear decision? If so, is Truman's calculus moderated by means of "double effect" type of reasoning? It is doubtless a subtle operation to decouple Christian just war thought from Truman's decision-making process. However, his decision to use atomic bombs in World War II is consistent with both his RCH and his prior patterns of thought and action. Plus, there is a parallel, if less dramatic, episode from earlier in his career: In his days as a judge in Jackson County, Truman had permitted a contractor to steal \$10,000 in order to prevent the stealing of \$100,000, thereby permitting a lesser evil to prevent a greater. He saw no other alternative: "You judge it, I can't."³⁰²

Let us now consider the nuclear question directly. Truman later wrote how, on learning the staggering casualties predicted to result from an invasion of Japan, he "could not bear this thought, and it led to the decision to use the atomic bomb."³⁰³ However, "led" does not exhaust the story.

After the Japanese "immediately" rejected the July 29, 1945 plea for surrender, Truman stated, "Then I gave the final order, saying I had no qualms 'if millions of lives could be saved.' I meant both American and Japanese lives." Truman also claimed Japanese military and diplomats confirmed that a quick surrender would not have been

³⁰¹ Miscamble, *Most Controversial Decision*, 151.

³⁰² Quoted in McCullough, 440.

³⁰³ Margaret Truman, ed., *Where the Buck Stops: The Personal and Private Writings of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1989), 205.

forthcoming had the bomb not been used. “For this reason, I made what I believed to be the only possible decision.”³⁰⁴

Truman biographer Hamby has an astute take on these points which go to the heart of philosophy of government:

What were the purposes of power, whether political or military? For Truman’s one-time mentor, Tom Pendergast, power was its own reward. For Truman, it was a means for the protection and extension of deeply internalized values. His politics expressed a loose ideology that provided him with an understanding of the meaning of his own life as well as of the American social-political world.³⁰⁵

Hamby is hinting at how to characterize the role of religious cultural heritage for Truman, to show how Truman’s RCH characterized or colored these values. We must go beyond what Hamby calls “ethical absolutes of disinterested public service.”³⁰⁶ To understand Truman we must understand a central aspect of his philosophy of government, the definition and purpose of sovereignty. Bearing in mind the discussion in the previous chapter of this dissertation, we find that the Christian definition fits better with his patterns of thought and patterns of action than does the secular, international law definition. RCH has left its imprint on Truman’s decision-making.

Truman appears to have given careful thought to the use of the atomic bomb. He evidently believed the atomic bomb to be a means to end the war, to minimize American casualties, and, as a beneficial side effect, to reduce Japanese casualties. He also reasoned that it would take both American use of the bomb and Russian entry into the war in the Pacific to prompt the surrender of the Japanese. This reasoning is consistent both before and after the atomic bombs were used.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 206.

³⁰⁵ Hamby, 638-639.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., 636.

During the Potsdam Conference on July 25, 1945, Truman wrote a memo concerning the use of the atomic bomb in which he stated,

This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old Capitol or the new.³⁰⁷

Note that the above quotation precedes the “beast” letters cited above. Note further that Truman desires to avoid unnecessary casualties, especially among civilians, women, and children. Finally, he explicitly cites concern for the common welfare. His approach again coheres with the just war approach.

Perhaps a disproportionate weight has been laid on Truman’s statement that the use of the atomic bomb was “the hardest decision [he] ever had to make.” However, it was in this same 1948 speech in Milwaukee that Truman continued,

I made the decision after discussions with the ablest men in our Government, and after long and prayerful consideration. I decided that the bomb should be used in order to end the war quickly and save countless lives – Japanese as well as American. But I resolved then and there to do everything I could to see that this awesome discovery was turned into a force for peace and the advancement of mankind.³⁰⁸

Thus, by turning to prayer, Truman explicitly adverted to religious practice in his atomic decision-making in this instance, a strikingly clear statement that RCH played a role in his policy choice; Truman exhibits double effect reasoning as well. This quotation should also be borne in mind when considering the earlier Iran crisis and the Baruch plan, both covered below, as well as the contemporary Berlin Blockade crisis, covered in the following section.

³⁰⁷ Memo by Harry S. Truman, July 25, 1945, Charles Ross Folder, Personal File, President’s Secretary’s File, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

³⁰⁸ Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers*, 1948, 787-788.

One might also wonder whether or not Truman's army experience influenced the way he filled the role of commander-in-chief. After all, such experience might dominate RCH considerations. In fact, army-period evidence lines up remarkably well with other evidence already considered. While in the army Truman did not dance,³⁰⁹ but drank, gambled at poker, and swore. Nevertheless, First Lieutenant Edgar Hinde described Truman as "one of the cleanest fellows...morally that I ever saw, or know. I never saw him do anything...that would be questionable in the way of a moral situation. He was clean all the way though. I always admired him for that quality and you know when a man's in the army, why his morals get a pretty good test."³¹⁰ At the very least such data confirms Truman's consistency under pressure.

In terms of the atomic bomb, however, Truman optimistically wrote to Bess, "I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed! That's the important thing."³¹¹ Truman did wonder whether the bomb might be "the fire of destruction" foretold in the Bible,³¹² but he also wrote, "It's just the same as artillery on our side."³¹³ Indeed, Truman stated

[Secretary of War Stimson] and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we will have given them a chance. It's certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made useful.³¹⁴

Note that the above comments are not simply a calculation of happiness, utility, or welfare; Truman presupposes the existence of independent rights and duties. Similarly,

³⁰⁹ McCullough, 733.

³¹⁰ Quoted in McCullough, 113.

³¹¹ McCullough, 440.

³¹² Ibid., 443-444.

³¹³ Ibid., 440.

³¹⁴ Ibid., 444.

employment of the principle of double effect is not utilitarianism because of the universal applicability of rights and duties. Note further that the paucity, even near-absence, of reflection during World War II itself tells us something about how Truman considered the atomic question. Indeed, there never appears anything like Walzer's concept of "supreme emergency"³¹⁵ (a concept that, *in extremis*, suspends the moral norms that ordinarily would govern armed conflict). In a backhanded way, then, the "limits" of RCH influence may have extended further than might be supposed.

Returning to the difficulty of the atomic decision as described in the 1948 speech, this occasion appears to be the only time Truman characterized it as his most difficult choice. More typical is his 1952 letter to a high-school teacher:

I've had to make a great many momentous decisions. The decision to drop the bomb in Japan was not as difficult to make as some of the others for the simple reason that I came to the conclusion that we were saving lives both on our side and on the Japanese side by bringing the war to an end, and the dropping of the bomb on August sixth did bring the war with Japan to an end in a very short time.³¹⁶

It was more characteristic of Truman to identify the decision to enter the Korean Conflict as his hardest decision. Typical was a 1959 interview with the *Independence Examiner* wherein he stated his most difficult decision was "Korea! It meant going into a war, a costly one in lives...."³¹⁷ In November of the same year, Truman addressed the National Council of Catholic Youth at the Truman Library and again answered that his most difficult decision was

³¹⁵ See Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000). Walzer's concept of supreme emergency dates from the 1977 first edition of this book. Although this terminology was not developed until decades after World War II, the timing does not exclude the possibility that such reasoning could have operated in the mind of Truman – or Eisenhower and their contemporaries for that matter. I have not found evidence that such reasoning was current for either president.

³¹⁶ Harry S. Truman to Harold Moody, May 21, 1952, Chronological Name File, President's Secretary's File, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

³¹⁷ *Independence Examiner*, May ?, 1959, Vertical File, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

the decision to save the Republic of Korea and establish the United Nations as a going concern. And the reason that was the most difficult decision to make was because it involved all the members of the United Nations, something that had never been done before in the history of the world.

He continued by explaining the history of attempts to form world peacekeeping organizations prior to the formation of the UN and concluded the UN was “the only thing that stands between us and a third world war. That’s the reason I went into Korea.”³¹⁸ While these quotations should be borne in mind while reading the account of the Korean Conflict below, here they illustrate that Truman’s atomic decision of World War II may have been disproportionately stressed. All of this reasoning, however, is consistent with expectations given Truman’s RCH.

Other postwar comments typical of Truman cite an estimate of 250,000 US casualties had an invasion of the Japanese home islands taken place; the casualties estimated for the Japanese are commensurate or greater. For example, on the second anniversary of V-J Day, Truman said, “I have never had any doubt that [use of the atomic bomb] was necessary, and I didn’t have any doubt at the time. I hated very much to have to make that decision. Anybody would. But I thought that decision was made in the interest of saving about 250,000 American boys from getting killed, and I still think that was true.”³¹⁹ Truman may have hated the decision, but that is not the same thing as finding the decision hard or second-guessing the decision.

Moreover, contrary to the contention that Truman intended the atomic bomb to be an ominous signal to the Soviet Union, Truman wrote on August 9, 1945 that he had a “good feeling... over the fact Russia had entered into the war with Japan and not because

³¹⁸ Harry S. Truman, Sound Recording 60-720, November 13, 1959, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

³¹⁹ Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers*, 1947, 381.

we had invented a new engine of destruction.”³²⁰ This statement agrees with an earlier letter, written to his wife Bess during the Potsdam conference, in which Truman wrote he had “gotten what he came for – Stalin goes to war August 15 with no strings on it.”³²¹

When the Cold War frosted over, Truman had a realistic approach to the Soviet Union insofar as he felt, “We are not going to have any shooting trouble with them but they are tough bargainers and always ask for the whole earth, expecting maybe to get an acre.”³²² However, when he was vice president in 1941, he said regarding both Germany and the Soviet Union, “Neither of them think anything of their pledged word.”³²³ Thus, Truman’s Cold War view of the Soviet Union seems a deep-seated attitude rather than a spontaneous postwar response to Soviet intransigence. That view would be tested in the crises that followed. I now look at these crises and seek to discover traces of RCH in Truman’s crisis decisions.

1948: The Berlin Blockade³²⁴

Although famous for the Berlin Airlift, atomic bombs were on the table during the Berlin Blockade crisis. B-29 bombers were deployed to Europe. Though famous as the plane which struck Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs, most B-29s were not nuclear-capable; despite leaks to the contrary, the B-29s sent to Europe had only conventional capability. Although the B-29s sent to Germany and England were not equipped for atomic bombs, the “the president and his advisers clearly hoped that the

³²⁰ Harry S. Truman to Lew Wallace, August 9, 1945, Official File 692A, Atomic Bomb, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

³²¹ Harry S. Truman to Bess, July 18, 1945, Family, Business, and Personal Affairs, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

³²² Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 33.

³²³ Quoted in the *New York Times*, June 24, 1941, 7.

³²⁴ See Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 23-31, especially 26-27.

Soviets would think they might be.”³²⁵ Western leaders seemed almost unanimous that atomic weapons should be used if war erupted, but Truman seemed uncertain. Although determined to stay in Berlin, he refused to specify beforehand the military options, insisting the US “deal with the situation as it developed.”³²⁶ Despite a consensus that conventional defense against the USSR was futile, Truman did not rule out conventional operations because (1) the public might not support nuclear use and (2) the weapons might by then be proscribed (e.g., due to nuclear internationalization by the Baruch plan or something similar).³²⁷ Furthermore, concerning weapons control by the Atomic Energy Commission and the military, Truman, according to Forrestal, “wanted to go into this matter very carefully” and insisted there be no delegation of presidential atomic bomb authority lest, as Forrestal quotes Truman, “some dashing lieutenant colonel decide when would be the proper time to drop one,”³²⁸ a concern for proper authority fully in keeping with just war doctrine. After all, according to David Lilienthal, Truman said,

I don’t think we ought to use this thing unless we absolutely have to. It is a terrible thing to order the use of something that [pause], that is so terribly destructive, destructive beyond anything we have ever had. You have got to understand that this isn’t a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and not for military uses. So we have got to treat this differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that.... You have got to understand I have got to think about the effect of such a thing on international relations, This is no time to be juggling an atom bomb around.³²⁹

³²⁵ Hamby, 444.

³²⁶ Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 454-455.

³²⁷ Steven L. Rearden and Alfred Goldberg, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947-1950* (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984), 434. The US Baruch Plan to internationalize atomic energy and eliminate atomic weapons had been offered to the UN Atomic Energy Commission in June of 1946.

³²⁸ Millis, 458.

³²⁹ Quoted in David E. Lilienthal, *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal: The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950*, Vol. 2 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 391. This was on July 21.

Truman's view of right, wrong, and the enormousness (but not the enormity) of the atomic bomb made him unwilling to resort to nuclear warfare except for a just and proportionate cause. He clearly wished to distinguish between military and civilian targets, and he saw it as a last resort: "I don't think we ought to use this thing unless we absolutely have to."³³⁰ This is a development from his uncertainty in October of 1946 when, despite Soviet intransigence, he had told Harold Smith, "I'm not sure it can be used."³³¹ However, in terms of proportionality, Truman had also expressed his opinion to Eben Ayers in October of 1946 that, given the disparity between the US and the USSR, a mere half-dozen atomic bombs would be "enough to win a war."³³²

On June 23, Secretary of Defense Forrestal recommended sending bombers to Britain; one B-29 squadron was already in Germany for training. SAC moved two B-29 squadrons to Labrador and put two other B-29 groups on alert.³³³ Lt. Gen. LeMay, of the US Air Force in Europe, wanted B-29s in England for operational purposes. On June 24, Soviets closed railroads lines, cut electricity from East to West Berlin, and stopped food supplies. Truman approved B-29 deployment to Germany on June 28.

On June 30 the Soviets placed a barrage balloon near the British flight path to Berlin. The British considered shooting down the balloon, but to have done so might have provoked a war. Admiral Leahy, Truman's top military advisor, "favored using the A-bomb but revealed that no clear contingency plans existed."³³⁴ Leahy told Department of Defense officials that Truman "wanted to stay in Berlin as long as possible, but not to the

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Quoted in Gaddis, 106.

³³² Quoted in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *Truman in the White House: The Diary of Eben A. Ayers* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991), 161.

³³³ Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 257-258; J.C. Hopkins, *The Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946-1981*, Office of the Historian, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, 1982, 13.

³³⁴ Betts, 24.

point of shooting down a barrage balloon and starting a war for which the US did not have enough soldiers.”³³⁵ The US nevertheless “could make plans to use what we have... I don’t know what we could do but whatever we have we could use.”³³⁶ USAF Gen. Vandenberg “thought his service was studying potential targets, but that he wasn’t sure.”³³⁷ Others discussion “meandered” among topics ranging from whether “a reduction of Moscow and Leningrad would be a powerful enough impact to stop a war” to whether political targets should be included or left out.³³⁸

In July the United States and Great Britain began the Berlin Airlift. After a delay of more than two weeks following Foreign Minister Bevin’s immediate agreement to have two B-29 groups go to the UK, it was announced on July 15 that 60 B-29s would fly to Britain for a training mission. Nevertheless, “there were leaks that the planes were atomic-capable and even hints that they carried such bombs. Neither point was true, but on the same day Forrestal approached Truman about transferring custody of atomic weapons from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to the military. And by the end of the month three complete B-29 groups were in Europe.”³³⁹

Meanwhile, nuclear considerations intensified. On July 28, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Secretary of State George Marshall, and Army Chief of Staff Bradley met to decide whether or not Operation BROILER, an atomic fist strike against the Soviets, should be executed in response to the Berlin blockade. On September 9, Forrestal asked British Admiral Sir Frederick Dalrymple about British willingness to see the atomic

³³⁵ Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., with Steven L. Rearden, *The View From Above: High-Level Decisions and the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1950*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1975, sanitized version, 104.

³³⁶ Ibid., 105.

³³⁷ Betts, 24.

³³⁸ Williamson and Rearden, 105-106.

³³⁹ Betts, 25.

bomb used. The next day Forrestal asked Marshall to give authority to use the atomic bomb to commanders in the field. That meeting concluded with the production of NSC 30 which gave the President alone the power to order an atomic-bomb attack.

Although I can find few direct fingerprints from Truman in the documentary record, NSC 30 was clear that only Truman could authorize nuclear use. On October 13 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) sent a top secret memorandum to the National Security Council (NSC) demanding to know whether the United States should launch atomic war on the USSR. The JCS and NSC met the next day, but the JCS failed to get permission to launch war, conventional or otherwise.

In keeping with the moderate political realism of just war prudential criteria, Truman felt this crisis was “no time to be juggling an atom bomb around” as noted above; moreover, Forrestal records on September 13 that “the President said that he prayed that he would never have to make such a decision [concerning atomic use], but that if it became necessary, no one need have a misgiving but what he would do so,”³⁴⁰ a statement which shows Truman considered bomb use a last resort. (On the same day Truman wrote privately, “Forrestal, Bradley, Vandenberg, Symington brief me on bases, bombs, Moscow, Leningrad, etc. I have a terrible feeling afterward that we are very close to war. I hope not. Discuss situation with Marshall at lunch. Berlin is a mess.”³⁴¹) Thus the ambiguous signal of resolve (whether the B-29 deployment is interpreted as an implicit nuclear signal or not) and the high-level discussions and policy choices related above fit a just war DMF.

³⁴⁰ Millis, 487. Quoted in Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail*, 27; Hamby, 445; and Millis 1950, 487.

³⁴¹ Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 148-149.

The denouement in 1949 is as follows. In February, Truman reiterated to David Lilienthal that the atomic bomb would not be used again if it could possibly be helped, saying, “This isn’t just another weapon, not just another bomb. People make a mistake when they talk about it that way.”³⁴² On April 15-16 a surge of 1,383 flights in the Berlin Airlift known as “The Easter Parade” went off without a single accident. By this point, the Soviets had seen the writing on the wall: On April 15 TASS reported Soviet willingness to lift the blockade, and the next day, the US State Department stated that an end to the blockade appeared imminent. On April 21 the tonnage of supplies flown into the city exceeded the tonnage previously brought into the city by rail. The blockade ended in May, and the airlift concluded in September.

Also in September of 1949, Soviets tested their first atomic bomb. There would be no nuclear monopoly for the United States in the future.³⁴³ In October, China became Communist with the civil war victory of Mao Zedong.

Interestingly, Admirals Ostie, Burke, and Denfield testified to the House Armed Services Committee that an atomic blitz is “morally wrong.” The so-called Admirals’ Revolt was quashed by when Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews fired Chief of Naval Operations Denfield. Some factions interpreted the handing of the Admiral’s revolt as a warning to all US officers that open criticism of nuclear policy meant dismissal. It is in this context that the next nuclear crisis arose.

³⁴² Quoted in Lilienthal 1964, 474.

³⁴³ As quoted in Lilienthal, 474, Truman said, “But I know the Russians would use it [the atomic bomb] on us if they had it” during the Berlin crisis. This quotation carries interesting implications for mutual deterrence and self-deterrence. It also speaks to questions of right, wrong, and relativism in the international arena.

1950-53: The Korean Conflict³⁴⁴

On June 25, the day South Korean was invaded, President Truman asked whether the US could knock out Soviet Asian bases. General Vandenberg affirmed, “It could be done if we used A-bombs.”³⁴⁵

Four days after the invasion, Truman was asked at a press conference “whether there might be any possibility of having to use the atomic bomb.” He responded, “No comment.”³⁴⁶

Four weeks later at another press conference, it was noted that Truman had “said in the past, several times, that [he] would not hesitate to use the atomic bomb in case of aggression,” but, asked directly whether he was “considering such a step” at that time, Truman replied, “No.”³⁴⁷

Four months later at a third press conference, Truman said, “We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have.” Asked if that would include the atomic bomb, Truman replied, “That includes every weapon that we have.” Asked if “every weapon that we have” meant that “active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb” was underway, Truman answered, “There has always been active consideration of its use. I don’t want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used.” When asked to “retrace that reference to the atom bomb” and, in particular, “use against

³⁴⁴ See Betts, 31-37.

³⁴⁵ Betts, 32.

³⁴⁶ Harry S Truman, the President’s News Conference, June 29, 1950, accessed September 8, 2012, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=806&st=&st1=>.

³⁴⁷ Harry S Truman, the President’s News Conference, July 27, 1950, accessed September 8, 2012, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=832&st=&st1=>.

military objectives, or civilian,” Truman responded, “It’s a matter that the military people will have to decide. I’m not a military authority that passes on those things.”³⁴⁸

Although factual, Truman’s spontaneous responses were misleading in the sense that the active discussions tended to militate against nuclear use. Howbeit, Truman made a tacit, though unintentional, nuclear threat. However, the immediate clarification amounted to a retraction.

Nevertheless, especially from the last quotation, it is immediately clear from Truman’s statements that he punted on an important question of justice in war, namely that of discriminating between military and civilian targets. Moreover, although such discrimination is a familiar criterion for the just prosecution of a war in many Catholic, Protestant, and secular formulations of just war theory, Truman the Baptist nevertheless

³⁴⁸ Harry S Truman, the President’s News Conference, November 30, 1950, accessed September 8, 2012, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=985&st=&st1=>. On the same website, the following press release, issued by the White house on the same day, can be found:

The President wants to make it certain that there is no misinterpretation of his answers to questions at his press conference today about the use of the atom bomb. Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat.

Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon.

However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon.

In brief, the replies to the questions at today’s press conference do not represent any change in this situation.

According to this release (1) there is no change in US policy (2) there is no change or delegation of authority to sanction use of the bomb. Again, Truman is consistent with just war’s concern for legitimate authority.

again finds himself close to Luther's more permissive attitude toward allowable means for fighting just wars. As a result of these Truman quotations, one learns something about how actual religious belief, rather than mere denominational affiliation, can provide a better and more precise RCH correlate with nuclear DMFs. However, in the case of Truman, both he and Luther fall under the just war category of DMF, and the policy decisions and explorations cohere well with just war theory, so both the coarse and the refined approaches work equally well in this case.

Consider further that, on December 6, the Chinese army attacked and rapidly drove UN forces from North Korea. The following day a CIA espionage report said Chinese officials are "absolutely confident that the UN will not use the atomic bomb." Nevertheless, it was in December that General Douglas MacArthur requested 34 bombs to retard the Chinese.³⁴⁹ Contrast this attitude to that of Truman who, in a meeting with members of Congress, military and diplomatic advisers, and the head of the CIA, told them that

our entire effort had been bent in the direction of preventing this affair in Korea from becoming a major Asiatic War.... [M]ost of all, I did not wish to have any part in the killing of millions of innocents as would surely happen if the fighting was allowed to spread.³⁵⁰

Truman did not make an explicit nuclear statement – but his statement is consistent with previous ones regarding Japan. Also consistent is his statement,

I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.³⁵¹

³⁴⁹ Betts, 1987, 36.

³⁵⁰ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, Vol. 2 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1956), 391.

³⁵¹ Harry S. Truman, Speech File, President's Secretary's File, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

This statement comes from Truman's radio address on Korean and Asian policy April 11, 1951, a speech connected to the firing of General MacArthur.

President Truman fired General MacArthur in April of 1951 for insubordinately demanding immediate attacks on Chinese bases. Truman's philosophy of government is clear in a personal letter of April 10, 1951: "Even the Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion that civilian control of the military was at stake and I didn't let it stay at stake very long."³⁵² This letter is consistent with a statement from three years earlier: "A free society requires the supremacy of the civil rather than the military authority. This is in no sense a reflections upon our Armed Forces. It is part of our free institutions that military specialists must always be under the direction of civilians."³⁵³ In this regard, there is a way in which Truman's approach to democracy in governance parallels his approach to democracy in the secular state. "He found intellectual solace in being a member of a faith that allowed the common man direct access to God."³⁵⁴ Baptist church polity is democratic. There are no bishops or equivalent sort of hierarchical structure. His fellow frontier Baptists were workers and farmers. This company contrasts with the typically upper-class Presbyterian and Episcopalian circles of his wife Bess. Perhaps it is not surprising that Andrew Jackson was one of Truman's heroes. These observations also allow us to glimpse how Truman's philosophy of church governance influenced his philosophy of secular government in general.

On January 27, 1952 Truman expressed his frustration in his diary as follows: "Dealing with Communist Governments is like an honest man trying to deal with a numbers racket king or the head of a dope ring. The Communist governments, the heads

³⁵² William Hillman, *Mr. President* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Young, 1952), 33.

³⁵³ Harry S. Truman, *Personal Papers, 1948*, 790.

³⁵⁴ Quoted in Hamby, 21.

of numbers and dope rackets have not sense of honor and no moral code.” Truman then entertained an “ultimatum with a ten-day expiration limit” in order to benefit “the Korean people, the authority of the United nations and the peace of the world.” This ultimatum could lead to “all out war” and the destruction of “Moscow, St. Petersburg, [illegible],³⁵⁵ Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union.” Truman’s just cause for such an action would have been based a number of Communist wrongs including, but not limited to, the fact that the Soviets had “broken every agreement at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam” and had “raped Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania,” that “the citizens of these countries who believe in self government have either been murdered or are in state labor camps.”³⁵⁶ Philosophy of human nature and philosophy of government play into Truman’s framework.

Other than the above diary entry, I cannot find other direct indications that Truman considered at length nuclear use during the Korean Conflict. However, a top-secret memo of September 3, 1952 and an associated footnote reference a State Department request to the CIA that the CIA arrange for rumors to be spread in Korea, Japan, and China suggesting that the US electoral cycle campaign pressures might make atomic use irresistible should an armistice not be concluded quickly.³⁵⁷ Nevertheless, I cannot connect Truman directly to this memo.

³⁵⁵ My best guess is that the city could be “Mukden,” in which case Truman was referring to present-day Shenyang.

³⁵⁶ Harry S. Truman, diary entry, January 27, 1952, relating his anger and frustration with the Soviet Union and the situation in Asia, Papers of Harry S. Truman: President’s Secretary’s File; images of all seven pages available online by following a link located at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hst/1.htm>, accessed February 3, 2012.

³⁵⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 1, 484.*

THE IRAN CRISIS OF 1946 VERSUS THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL REPORT, THE BARUCH PLAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

I set aside the 1946 Iran crisis because Betts does not list it as a nuclear crisis. In fact, scholars seem divided as to whether or not the Iran crisis was in fact a nuclear crisis. In this section I mention some highlights and explore the Baruch plan as part of the background against which this crisis took place.

During the Second World War the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to occupy Iran. This joint occupation denied Iran to the Germans and allowed convoys to traverse Iran to the USSR. After World War II concluded the Soviets demanded oil concessions equal to those of the British per the agreement. To enforce this claim Soviet troops remained in northern Iran and supported a revolutionary movement in the province of Azerbaijan which bordered Soviet territory. The Soviets moved tanks to the border and showed no sign of removing their troops from Iran by March, 2, 1946, as had been agreed at the London Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Subsequently, according to Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, President Truman met with Soviet Ambassador Gromyko and delivered an ultimatum: Remove Soviet troops in 48 hours or the USA will drop the atomic bomb. Truman said, “We’re going to drop it on you,” according to Jackson, who further stated that the Soviets removed their troops in 24 hours.

If Jackson’s account is correct, this atomic threat was made by Truman only ten months after the end of World War Two. Moreover, three months after this crisis, on June 14, 1946, the United States presented the Baruch Plan for the international control of nuclear material for the production of atomic energy. The Soviet rejection of this plan would then have to be viewed in the light of their experience of American atomic

monopoly in the Iran/Azerbaijan crisis. Furthermore, it would make characterization of Truman's DMF more challenging – both in terms of initial characterization and in terms of any learning that took place as a result of the outcome of the crisis – which would in turn make the link to RCH more challenging to establish.

However, if Jackson's account is incomplete or mistaken, it is nevertheless important to clarify the record in order to establish Truman's actual DMF, to compare to expectations as predicted by RCH, and, beyond this project, to understand this episode as an instance of international crisis management and to prevent the propagation of an incorrect narrative which may lead to faulty applications and misleading historical analogizing.

My investigation suggests that Scoop Jackson's recollection is at best incomplete and that his version has misled others. To make sense of the timeline, I considered the following four questions: First, what messages did Truman send Stalin before March 24, 1946? Second, did Stalin receive the messages before March 24, 1946? Third, were any of the messages strong enough to be considered a threat? Fourth, did the messages influence the course or outcome of the crisis? I support the following answers: First, Truman directed at least three messages to Stalin before March 24, 1946. Second, the third message reached Stalin on March 24, 1946 after Stalin had already announced that Soviet troops would be withdrawn. Third, the final message can legitimately be categorized as a nuclear threat however gently in tone it may have been delivered. Fourth, the message facilitated the ending and outcome of the crisis. In short, Truman issued the "Cheshire Ultimatum"³⁵⁸ before the Soviet announcement, but it was received by Stalin after the announcement, and it subsequently helped to produce the Soviet-Iranian

³⁵⁸ So called by J. Philipp Rosenberg, "The Cheshire Ultimatum: Truman's Message to Stalin in the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis," *The Journal of Politics* 41, no. 3 (August 1979): 933-940.

agreement on April 4, 1946 as well as the Soviet agreement to the unconditional withdrawal of their troops.

The third message was the crucial one. The UN Security Council was scheduled to meet on March 25, 1946 to discuss Iran's dispute with the Soviet Union. The Soviets proposed to delay the meeting to April 10. Truman restated on March 21 that the US sought an immediate UN review of Iran's complaint against the USSR³⁵⁹ On March 23, 1946, the day before the Soviets initially announced a forthcoming troop withdrawal, Truman met with General Walter Bedell Smith, his new ambassador to the Soviet Union. In his appointment calendar is a handwritten note which states, "I told him to tell Stalin I had always held him to be a man to keep his word. Troops in Iran after March 2 upset that theory;" moreover, the calendar shows that the meeting was off the record which helps explain why other State Department officials would be unaware of a third message.³⁶⁰ Contrary to Thorpe, who suggests Truman could have fabricated evidence after the fact, Smith's memoirs from 1949 predate Truman's statements from 1952 and later. The memoirs record how Truman had two conversations with Smith before he left for Moscow. The president employed a stick-and-carrot approach: Truman directed Smith to deliver a message and to ask pointed questions, but he also invited Stalin to the United States.³⁶¹ Smith left for Moscow the next morning, March 24.

Smith was able to arrange to meet Stalin on April 4 in the evening. His description of the hour prior to the meeting is worth quoting at length.

³⁵⁹ Harry S Truman: "The President's News Conference," March 21, 1946, accessed November 20, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12614>.

³⁶⁰ Presidential Appointment Calendar, March 23, 1946, Harry S Truman Library. This evidence is mentioned both by Rosenberg and by Barry Blechman and Douglas Hart, "Dangerous Shortcut," *New Republic* 183, issue 4 (July 26, 1980): 13-15.

³⁶¹ Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1949), 13-63.

I had believed myself more or less immune to excitement...but I must confess that I experienced a mounting feeling of tension as the hour for the interview with Stalin approached. I thought the meeting might be a stormy one, and for that reason I chose to go alone, not taking any of my senior Embassy officers or even an interpreter with me. Mr. George Kennan, then our Minister-Counselor in Moscow, who had been in the Soviet Union for extended periods since our first diplomatic mission was established in 1933, and other Embassy officers, dined with me...that night, but we did more talking than eating as we tried to anticipate the course of the coming conversation, the importance of which we felt strongly.³⁶²

First, Smith knew his mission was serious. Second, it calls Kennan's above recollection, "I don't know how [Truman] could have sent it," into question. Third, Smith's anxiety is surprising since, coming after the Soviet announcement of March 24, one might expect that Smith at least could have softened the tone of the message he delivered to Stalin. Smith's report to the Secretary of State the next day is also worth quoting at length:

The President had asked me to say that both he and Secretary Byrnes had always believed that when the Generalissimo made a statement or a commitment he meant to keep it, and the American people hoped that events would confirm that belief, but it would be misinterpreting the character of the United States to assume that because we are basically peaceful and deeply interested in world security, we are either divided, weak or unwilling to face our responsibilities. If the people of the United States were ever to become convinced that we are faced with a wave of progressive aggression on the part of any powerful nation or group of nations, we would react exactly as we have in the past.³⁶³

Is the above quotation a nuclear threat? The answer is partly subjective and partly objective. Consider first the objective parts. In order for the recipient of a message to recognize that message as a threat, the recipient must perceive the sender has the means and motive to carry out the threat. Despite demobilization, the United States was still recognized to be militarily powerful enough to enforce a military threat; thus, means was not in question. Moreover, the United States had employed atomic bombs in wartime less than a year prior. The United States was led by the same president, and the president had

³⁶² Smith, 47.

³⁶³ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, vol. VI, 733.

public support for confronting the Soviet Union if need be: 71% of survey respondents disapproved of Soviet policies vs. 7% approval, and 60% thought the United States was too soft on the USSR vs. 3% who thought the United States was too tough.³⁶⁴ To “react exactly as we have in the past” thus constitutes a strong threat, even a nuclear threat.

Having established the threat, it is fruitful to compare Soviet actions before and after Smith came to Moscow. The earlier messages caused no appreciable change in Soviet behavior. The March 24 message did soften the Soviet stance but seems no more than an effort to mollify public opinion as expressed through the UN, for the bilateral talks between the USSR and Iran continued to produce no results. However, on April 4, 1946 Iranian Prime Minister Qavam and Soviet Ambassador worked through the night, awaiting Moscow’s approval for an agreement that called for the Soviet withdrawal from Iran by May, agreed to the formation of a joint oil company, and declared Azerbaijan an internal issue of Iran; they received word from Moscow at 4:00 AM on April 5 (although the document was dated April 4).³⁶⁵ Moreover, during conversation at a dinner given by Byrnes in Paris on April 28, Molotov and Vishinsky indicated that the Soviets had not made a decision on Iran until April 5 “and in general did not appear to be very much convinced with their own arguments.”³⁶⁶ In other words, the Soviets appear indirectly to confirm the importance of the Smith-Stalin meeting.

The Soviets were out before the end of May. The Soviet puppet regime in Azerbaijan fell to Iranian troops who marched into Tabriz in December and felled the regime a year and a day after its founding. The rebel regime in Kurdistan also fell. It was an Iranian success to be sure, but the US role cannot be ignored. It is also an interesting

³⁶⁴ American Institute of Public Opinion, March 13, 1946, cited in John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 315.

³⁶⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, vol. VII, 405-407 and 413-415.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 442.

example of containment. First, it was successful. Second, the limits of American tolerance were clearly expressed to Stalin. Third, the US neither covertly interfered in the political development of another state nor involved itself in fighting amongst inhabitants of a contested region but rather provided moral support to enable indigenous forces to exercise their own sovereignty and to defend their own territorial integrity. Fourth, the US continually appealed to moral and legal principles, especially as found in the UN charter (which, of course, implies an indirect effect of RCH given the history of international law outlined in the second chapter). Finally, this crisis provides an example of a just war approach to crisis involvement. Rather than serving as a challenge to integrate into the expected DMF with which we have coded Truman, the Iran crisis of 1946 reinforces our assessment of how his decision-making process follows what we predicted from his RCH, particularly concerning the common good and subsidiarity.³⁶⁷

The subsequent Baruch Plan reinforces the relevance of RCH. The plan, written by Bernard Baruch and developed from the Acheson-Lilienthal report to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, proposed international regulation of atomic energy. Truman characterized his view of the US stance in a 1948 speech in Milwaukee. He said the United States had agreed to cease producing atomic weapons “when an effective system of international control had been set up. We offered to dispose of our existing bombs, and to turn over to an international agency full information on the production of atomic energy.” Moreover, Truman stated, “The fearful power of atomic weapons must be placed beyond the reach of any irresponsible government or any power-mad dictator.”

³⁶⁷ Truman certainly felt he had just cause regarding this crisis. Truman, quoted in Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 33, believed, “Reds, phonies and... parlor pinks can see no wrong in Russia’s four and one half million armed forces, in Russia’s loot of Poland, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Manchuria.... But when we help our friends in China who fought on our side it is terrible. When Russia loots the industrial plant of those same friends it is all right. When Russia occupies Persia for oil that is heavenly.”

The reason no agreement was reached was due to the Soviet refusal to allow on-site inspections to verify compliance.³⁶⁸

Nevertheless, Truman's retrospective view of the atomic bomb also provides insight into how he viewed the Baruch Plan. Truman noted that

if atomic energy is used the way it ought to be, it can save the whole world from fighting each other to get what's necessary for people to have. It can do unbelievable good for the world, truly a world of good, if people can be persuaded to get along by looking at examples of the times they didn't get along and were wiped out and destroyed because they couldn't get along. The same thing can happen now, except this time it will wipe out the whole population of the world if we go to war with this atomic energy, which we turned loose.³⁶⁹

This passage speaks to Truman's philosophy of government – namely that he envisions sovereignty as responsibility for common good in contrast to something resembling a monopoly on organized violence in a territory as one might expect from a Weberian or international-law standpoint.

More insight into Truman's approach to authority follows from Truman's approval of Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech. In this regard, note the following part of Churchill's speech:

It would...be wrong and imprudent to entrust the secret knowledge or experience of the atomic bomb... to the [United Nations], while it is still in its infancy. It would be criminal madness to cast it adrift in this still agitated and ununited world. No one in any country has slept less well in their beds because this knowledge and the method and the raw materials to apply it are at presently largely retained in American hands. I do not believe we should all have slept so soundly had the positions been reverse and some Communist or neo-Fascist state monopolized, for the time being, these dread agencies. The fear of them alone might easily have been used to enforce totalitarian systems upon the free democratic world, with consequences appalling to the human imagination. God has willed that this shall not be, and we have at least a breathing space before this peril has to be encountered, and even then, if no effort is spared, we should still

³⁶⁸ Harry S. Truman, *Personal Papers*, 1948, 789.

³⁶⁹ Truman, *Where the Buck Stops*, 203.

possess so formidable superiority as to impose effective deterrents upon its employment or threat of employment by others.³⁷⁰

The approach to international authority, philosophy of government, human nature, and prudential judgment, while not in Truman's words, evidently met Truman's approval. Indeed, Truman read Churchill's speech beforehand, although he later "denied having done so because it advanced a harsher line than he was yet prepared to take."³⁷¹ Churchill himself reported Truman was "quite happy" with the "general line" Churchill took in the address.³⁷² Insofar as this speech also addressed right, wrong, and relativism in the international arena, Truman's reaction also accords with just cause.

THE H-BOMB DECISION

Truman learned of the hydrogen bomb on October 6, 1949.³⁷³ Vandenberg did not know of it either.³⁷⁴ Physicists Enrico Fermi and I.I. Rabi wanted a US renunciation of the hydrogen bomb along with a world-wide pledge to set aside research, development, and testing of the H-bomb; however, the failure of a world conference to reach agreement on such a pledge would, according to Rabi, allow the US to proceed with work on the H-bomb "in good conscience" although James Conant (wartime head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, now of the General Advisory Committee) and others thought "no matter what happened it shouldn't be made. It would just louse up the world."³⁷⁵

³⁷⁰ Winston Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace," March 5, 1946 at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, accessed April 2, 2013, <http://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/sinews-of-peace-iron-curtain-speech.html>.

³⁷¹ Richard Rhodes, *Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1995), 237.

³⁷² Winston Churchill, *Memoirs of the Second World War (Abridged)* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 996.

³⁷³ Sidney Souers oral history interview, December 16, 1954, 1f, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO, quoted in Rhodes, 381.

³⁷⁴ Rhodes, 387.

³⁷⁵ Quoted in Bernstein 1975, II.

In November of 1949, Truman received General Advisory Committee and AEC reports and recommendations.³⁷⁶ He stated “he was not going to be blitzed into this thing by the military establishment.”³⁷⁷ Truman subsequently met with Louis Johnson, and, on November 19, 1949 reappointed him, Acheson, and Lilienthal to the Special Committee which had been appointed earlier to consider the expansion of atomic weapons production. Truman also cut public and most private debate. These actions cohere with the just war criterion of authority.

Further, the secretary of defense passed a memo from the joint chiefs directly to Truman. The memo read in part,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States would be in an intolerable position if a possible enemy possessed the bomb and the United States did not.... It would be foolhardy altruism for the United States voluntarily to weaken its capability by such a renunciation. Public renunciation by the United States of super bomb development might be interpreted as the first step in unilateral renunciation of the use of all atomic weapons, a course which would inevitably be followed by major international realignments to the disadvantage of the United States. Thus, the peace of the world generally and, specifically, the security of the entire Western Hemisphere would be jeopardized.³⁷⁸

Truman said that the memo “made a lot of sense and that he was inclined to think that was what we should do.”³⁷⁹ Charity may undergird the just war DMF in the context of Christian RCH, but the prudential just war sub-criteria show a just war approach is not naïve.

In a meeting which took place on January 31, 1950, Truman cut off discussion: According to Sidney Souers, Truman said, “What the hell are we waiting for? Let’s get

³⁷⁶ United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), *In the Matter of Robert J. Oppenheimer* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1954), 403.

³⁷⁷ John Manley, diary, November 9, 1949, Los Alamos National Laboratory Archives.

³⁷⁸ JCS to Secretary of Defense, “Request for comments on military views of members of the General Advisory Committee,” January 13, 1950, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum, Abilene, KS.

³⁷⁹ Dean Acheson, file memorandum, January 19, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO, quoted in Rhodes, 407.

on with it.”³⁸⁰ On the same day, Truman announced he would ask “the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb.”³⁸¹ Again, Truman acts in accord with the criterion of authority.

Some might question the political trajectory of the H-bomb deliberation and wonder whether an affirmative decision was ever in doubt. Perhaps Truman’s process was politically motivated. Souers has stated, “The White House felt it was necessary to show the country that the President used an orderly process in arriving at his decisions, not snap judgments, which he has been accused of.” Nevertheless, Souers also declared, “I am sure [Truman’s] mind was made up at the very beginning.”³⁸² Further, Ayers’ diary entry from February 4, 1950 states:

The president said there actually was no decision to make on the H-bomb. He said this really was a question that was settled in making up the budget for the atomic energy commission last fall when \$300 million was allotted. He said he had discussed that last September with... Lilienthal... Acheson... and Johnson. He went on to say that we had to do it—make the bomb—though no one wants to use it. But, he said, we have got to have it if only for bargaining purposes with the Russians.³⁸³

Indeed, Lilienthal quoted Truman as saying,

We don’t want a military-minded civilian [as Lilienthal’s replacement but] someone who sees the necessary military setting, how it fits in, but he must be someone who doesn’t regard that as our objective—and we’re going to use this for peace and never use it for war—I’ve always said this, and you’ll see. It’ll be like poison gas (never used again).³⁸⁴

³⁸⁰ Quoted in Sidney Souers’ oral history interview, December 16, 1954, 8, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO. Souers places the timing as “when the Commission told him about the H-bomb,” but Rhodes, 647 notes the context suggests he is referring to the Special Committee meeting of January 31, 1950.

³⁸¹ Quoted in R. Gordon Arneson, “The H-bomb Decision,” *Foreign Service Journal* 46 (May 1969): 27.

³⁸² Sidney Souers’ oral history interview, December 16, 1954, 7, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

³⁸³ Quoted in Ferrel, *Truman in the White House*, 340.

³⁸⁴ Quoted in Lilienthal, 594.

Truman definitely avoids a just peace approach.³⁸⁵ Indeed, Truman exhibited impatience with physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer's "blood on our hands" arguments against the H-bomb; Truman argued in contrast that any American culpability would "come out in the wash"³⁸⁶ and considered Oppenheimer a "'cry-baby' scientist."³⁸⁷ Truman was not alone. Dean Acheson told Gordon Arneson, "I've listened to Oppie as carefully as I know how. But I don't know what the hell he's talking about. How do you disarm an adversary by example?"³⁸⁸ Clearly he was not persuaded by Oppenheimer's moral arguments, either.

It should be mentioned with respect to the H-bomb that Acheson realized that determining bomb feasibility could make the next step "irresistible" (Herken's word, not mine); however,

the ethical argument that Oppenheimer and the GAC [AEC's General Advisory Committee] majority had made against the H-bomb was dismissed outright. Thus, the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission], in its own recommendation to Truman, agreed with the report of Acheson's committee that 'moral considerations are not germane to the limited objective covered by this problem, i.e., the development and test of the weapon to determine its feasibility.'³⁸⁹

However, the story does not end here since "[e]ven before the January 31 White House meeting, Truman had evidently already made up his mind to proceed with the H-bomb."³⁹⁰ When Truman told a friend that "there actually was no decision to make on the H-bomb,"³⁹¹ this statement was in the context of the supposition that the Soviets were

³⁸⁵ "Just peace" thought is deliberately named to contrast with just war theory. It contends that unilateral disarmament is a good example which will so impress potential adversaries that they will follow suit and disarm as well.

³⁸⁶ Both Oppenheimer and Truman are quoted in Nuel Pharr Davis, *Lawrence and Oppenheimer* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), 257-258.

³⁸⁷ Truman to Acheson, May 7, 1946, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

³⁸⁸ Herken, 46.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 48.

probably ahead in the H-bomb race (a supposition which was untestable), the fact that Oppenheimer and Conant had raised ethical rather than practical arguments, and that “[s]ubstantive, nonpolemical arguments for and against proceeding with the superbomb—including the test-ban proposal of Fermi and Rabi—were never really put before Truman.” As a result, “the advice that Truman got—or, rather, failed to get—on the H-bomb meant that the outcome was never in any doubt.”³⁹²

However, it is worth noting that at the White House celebration for the retiring Lilienthal (AEC chairman), that Truman told “we need men with great intellects, need their ideas. But we need to balance them with other kinds of people, too.”³⁹³ On the one hand, that makes scientists ignorable. On the other hand, it means that not everything comes down to science; there is room for other things in the balance, including RCH.

While Truman rejected the unvarnished ethical arguments of the physicists, his decisions fit within the frameworks of just cause and, especially, right intention which belongs to just war thought. Moreover, the frameworks concerning prudential judgment and, especially, authority are stressed in his approach.

SUMMARY

As expected, Truman’s nuclear decision-making framework, in war, in crisis, and in peace, fit the expected just war framework. If Truman’s approach to atomic weapons is somewhat conflicted, nevertheless, despite the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan and other nuclear-internationalization tendencies, Truman told Baruch that “we should not under any circumstances throw away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can’t arm against us.”³⁹⁴ Although, as noted above, Truman told Lilienthal that the

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Quoted in Herken, 48.

³⁹⁴ Miscamble, *Most Controversial Decision*, 145.

atomic bomb would remain unused if it could at all be helped, and although Truman assured Atlee in 1950 that he had “no intention” to use atomic weaponry except if faced with “major military disaster,”³⁹⁵ nevertheless two days after the NATO treaty was finalized Truman publicly stated for the first time that he would use the atomic bomb again if needed.³⁹⁶ This stance coheres with his belief in 1949 that “[s]ince we can’t obtain international control we must be strongest in atomic weapons,”³⁹⁷ a position which coheres with a conception of sovereignty as responsibility for the common good that reaches even beyond his own political entity. In his 1953 State of the Union address, Truman offered a look at how he thought about conscience and nuclear credibility:

For now we have entered the atomic age, and war has undergone a technological change which makes it a very different thing from what it used to be. War today between the Soviet empire and the free nations might dig the grave not only of our Stalinist opponents, but of our own society, our world as well as theirs.

Moreover, Truman stated in the same speech,

The war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past—and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations. Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men.³⁹⁸

In the above quotation, Truman linked rationality with right intention while dealing with foreseen consequences. Nevertheless, along these lines, Truman saw preventive war as both impolitic and immoral: “Such a war is the weapon of dictators not of free democratic countries like the United states.”³⁹⁹

³⁹⁵ Quoted in Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” *International Security* 13, no. 3 (Winter 1988-1989): 67.

³⁹⁶ Rhodes, 354.

³⁹⁷ Quoted in David Alan Rosenberg, “Toward Armageddon: The Foundations of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1961” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1983), 181.

³⁹⁸ Harry S. Truman, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 7, 1953, accessed April 16, 2013, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2082>.

³⁹⁹ Quoted in in the *New York Times*, September 2, 1950, 4.

When trying to relate Truman's RCH to his DMF, his philosophies of ethics, government, and human nature come together in a unique way. His nuclear and non-nuclear decisions related above cohere with a post-millennial Protestant expectation that Christian ethics will prosper before the Second Coming. For this reason, in practice if not in jargon, Truman's behavior attempts to differentiate between force and violence in a way which harmonizes his understandings of human nature, the role of government, and right and wrong. Experientially, the World War I artillery captain knew the Axis could only be stopped with weapons; he viewed Soviet aggression in similar terms. He authorized the use of two atomic bombs and the development of thermonuclear weaponry, yet he withheld the use of a third bomb against Japan, made sure atomic weapons decisions were made by him and not by the military, considered the bomb in light of foreseen but unintended consequences for civilians, withheld its use in Korea, and proposed internationalization of atomic technology. At first glance, Truman might appear to be ambivalent or even amoral. A second, closer look shows the profound influence of RCH on his decision-making, an influence which, when understood, unifies his seemingly disparate nuclear decisions.

Chapter 4: Dwight Eisenhower

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I examine President Dwight D. Eisenhower's religious cultural heritage and nuclear decisions. I connect his philosophical ethics, his philosophy of government, and his philosophical anthropology to a decision-making framework predicted to describe his nuclear decisions, namely a just war framework that is distinct from Truman's. I begin with a look at Eisenhower's "Cross of Iron" speech, the Solarium exercise, and the New Look. I then explore his nuclear decisions during a series of Cold War nuclear crises. Next I treat in context his "Atoms for Peace" proposal to internationalize nuclear energy. Eisenhower's decisions are indeed commensurate with a just war framework expected from his religious cultural heritage (RCH); also as expected, his approach to force appears more restrained than that of Truman, his predecessor.

EISENHOWER IN PRIOR WORK

My argument stresses the importance of RCH to DMF formation. The work of Bowie and Immerman backs me up in this respect. Bowie and Immerman state, "While the cold war originated under Harry S. Truman, it took its mature form under Eisenhower."⁴⁰⁰ They argue that differences between Eisenhower and Truman are more important than continuities. The main principles underlying Eisenhower's approach included the prevention of nuclear annihilation, the feasibility of deterrence, the need to assure second-strike capability, the rejection of the need for a coercive rollback of Communism, the ability to maintain defense forces over the long term, the need for developed and developing nations to work together against Communism, and a realistic

⁴⁰⁰ Robert R. Bowie and Richard Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3.

approach to arms control. The decision-making process behind the strategy deserves attention because of Eisenhower's belief that "process and product were inseparable and interdependent."⁴⁰¹ If Bowie and Immerman are correct, then their work supports my undertaking to explore of the role of RCH in Eisenhower's policy-making process.

Christian RCH has clear criteria concerning proportionality, necessity, and foreseen vs. intended consequences of decisions and actions. Craig's analysis of Eisenhower's decision-making is therefore suggestive when approached through the lens of RCH. Craig examines how Eisenhower "developed a strategy to evade nuclear war."⁴⁰² President Eisenhower realized thermonuclear weapons had changed the nature of war: "A general war waged to preserve the United States would not simply be immensely destructive.... It would destroy America in order to save it."⁴⁰³ Eisenhower thus had to prevent war with the Soviet Union while protecting US national security. This "avoidance of nuclear war... did not just 'happen.' Actual people, above all Eisenhower, sought to evade nuclear war; many powerful figures at the center of decision believed that such a war was justifiable and regularly called for steps that would have begun one."⁴⁰⁴ In fact, "In 1956 and 1957 Eisenhower rearranged official American basic security policy so that a war with the Soviet Union would escalate, automatically, into general thermonuclear war."⁴⁰⁵ Thus, Eisenhower's "strategy to evade nuclear war was to make American military policy so dangerous that his advisers would find it impossible to push Eisenhower toward war and away from compromise."⁴⁰⁶ From an RCH perspective,

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., 256.

⁴⁰² Campbell Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), x.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., 9.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 12.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., 67.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., 69.

this seems a brilliant utilization and manipulation of proportionality, necessity, and foreseen consequences by someone who wished to restrain recourse to nuclear war.

Craig examines how Eisenhower implemented this strategy in the 1958 Quemoy-Matsu and 1958-59 Berlin crises. Craig also writes that in 1954-55, John Foster Dulles shifted from supporting “massive retaliation” to advocating a strategy of “flexible response” which would permit graded responses to Soviet aggression. Eisenhower rejected this approach, removing “limited, non-nuclear military planning from American general war policy, so as to ensure that any war directly between the United States and the Soviet Union would escalate automatically into an all-out thermonuclear war.”⁴⁰⁷ This decision seems consistent with Eisenhower’s original New Look policy in 1953; hence, it is not clear that internal debate among Eisenhower’s advisers had a long-term effect on Eisenhower’s strategy.

Nevertheless, Secretary of State John Foster Duller is indeed a key figure in Eisenhower’s administration, for the president “always made the decisions—but always after consulting Dulles.”⁴⁰⁸ Immerman finds Dulles to be “more of a pragmatist than a crusader.”⁴⁰⁹ Although Immerman explains Dulles’s theological outlook in the early part of the book, it is not integrated into the treatment of his diplomacy. Nevertheless, Immerman’s account of Dulles’s evolution on nuclear strategy demonstrate a “capacity to learn and change.”⁴¹⁰ As Dulles came to believe that stability in international politics depended on states balancing “static” and “dynamic” interests,⁴¹¹ he exhibited the “tension between idealism and realism, between altruism and self-interest, that

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 55.

⁴⁰⁸ Richard Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in US Foreign Policy* (Wilmington: SR Books, 1999), 46.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., 196.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., 18.

consistently pervades America's relations with the world."⁴¹² This observation ties into the discussion surrounding Table 2.1 in the second chapter.

Part of my argument is that RCH's importance does not come about in a vacuum. Korda spends perhaps ten per cent of his pages on Eisenhower's presidency. Nevertheless, Korda both ably explores Eisenhower's childhood as the third of six sons of a humorless, failed businessman and an independent, outgoing mother and effectively conveys the depth of experience Eisenhower brought to his roles as Supreme Allied Commander and as President of the United States.⁴¹³ Smith's positive portrayal of Eisenhower focuses on his army career and on how his military experience affected his presidency. Eisenhower's political and military skills stand out in Smith's account. Eisenhower was a man who "commanded on the spot. He did not dodge difficult decisions, he did not pass the buck to staff conferences or subordinate commanders...."⁴¹⁴ Smith describes a general who commanded the largest-ever combined army without untoward posturing, feuding, or favoritism and a president who led Republicans away from isolationism, kept the peace, and left office with a legacy of slashing the military budget, opposing tax cuts, supporting Social Security and federal aid, and resisting the evil of Communism without going to war. Smith sees Eisenhower as intelligent, congenial, unpretentious, and non-ideological.

If the above paragraph provides context for exploring the background against which Eisenhower would have received RCH exposure along with other lived experiences, then Jacobs buttresses my argument that RCH manifests itself in important decisions concerning international relations. Jacobs has produced a superb study of the

⁴¹² Ibid., xiii.

⁴¹³ Michael Korda, *Ike: An American Hero* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007).

⁴¹⁴ Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace* (New York: Random House, 2012), xii.

importance of RCH to one extended episode of Cold War foreign policy in Asia. Starting with Brands' insight that it "was convenient, and not completely coincidental, that three of America's principal protégées in Asia – [China's] Chiang [Kai-shek], [Korea's Syngman] Rhee, and South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem – were Christians,"⁴¹⁵ Jacobs explores US backing of Diem against the backdrop of the US religious re-awakening of the 1950s. Noting the prominence of such figures as Protestant theologians Barth, Tillich, and Niebuhr and the ratings-topping stature of Catholic Bishop Sheen's television series, Jacobs argues that "the evidence is overwhelming that Eisenhower encouraged the nationwide turn toward God" and that Eisenhower repeatedly returned to religious themes because "they had tremendous explanatory power for the audience he was addressing."⁴¹⁶ In contrast to Gibbs and Duffy, whose narrative suggests that Eisenhower's approach to civil religion may have masked some genuine spiritual awakening during his presidency,⁴¹⁷ Jacobs interprets Eisenhower's piety as "more strategic than heartfelt;" however, Jacobs declares Eisenhower's chief cabinet officer, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, to be "the most unapologetically religious man to superintend US foreign policy since Woodrow Wilson."⁴¹⁸ Jacobs shows how Diem's Catholicism, and the staunch anti-Communist credentials that were presumed to flow therefrom, facilitated his selection for US support over "several popular, qualified, and irreproachably anti-communist candidates in Saigon."⁴¹⁹ Jacobs convincingly portrays the

⁴¹⁵ H.W. Brands, *The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 56.

⁴¹⁶ Seth Jacobs, "'Our System Demands the Supreme Being': The US Religious Revival and the 'Diem Experiment,' 1954-55," *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 593, 594.

⁴¹⁷ Nancy Gibbs and Michael Duffy, *The Preacher and the Presidents: Billy Graham in the White House* (New York: Center Street, 2007).

⁴¹⁸ Jacobs, 594.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 598.

effect of RCH, considering not only Christianity and Buddhism but Vietnam's Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects.

From the above work on Eisenhower and his administration, it is clear that a careful consideration of Eisenhower and RCH is called for as I explore Eisenhower's nuclear decisions. In the following section I report principles which emerge from Eisenhower's decision-making. In the subsequent section I explore Eisenhower's RCH in order to show how these principles coalesced.

PRINCIPLES WHICH EMERGE FROM EISENHOWER'S DECISION-MAKING

As I explored his upbringing, experience, and presidency, I discovered that not only did Eisenhower possess a positive attitude toward RCH but that he even recounted having experienced divine guidance. Eisenhower understood human beings to be spiritual beings who shared a common nature. Moreover, Eisenhower understood the government to be an authoritative and sovereign actor bound to act responsibly for the common good. Remarkably, Eisenhower even saw a role of spiritual leadership for the American presidency. He did not see RCH as separate from responsibility and decision-making but drew connections between theology and policy. Below I investigate RCH as a source of Eisenhower's principles, and in the subsequent section, I relate these principles to Eisenhower's actual decision-making.

DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER'S RCH

If both naïve and sophisticated approaches situate Truman's DMF as a just war framework, what shall one make of Eisenhower? Reared in a River Brethren/Mennonite milieu of Christian pacifism, President Eisenhower chose to be baptized a Presbyterian within two weeks of taking office. One might suppose a pacifically-leaning but ultimately just-war DMF might plausibly describe Eisenhower's nuclear choices. However, in an

often-misquoted phrase Eisenhower claimed “our form of government *has no sense* unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith” [emphasis added].⁴²⁰ Does Eisenhower in fact apply such sense in his nuclear decision-making? I argue that the answer is yes.

Eisenhower experienced divine guidance. Eisenhower said that “during the war, when he was commanding the Allied forces in Europe, he had a spiritual experience. He had felt the hand of God guiding him and felt the presence of God. And he spoke of how his friends had provided real spiritual strength in the days before D-Day.”⁴²¹ Additionally, Eisenhower self-identified as a “fanatic Protestant” before a mixed audience of military chaplains,⁴²² so the middle-of-the-road Protestantism he experienced throughout his professional military life seems at least as salient as his pacifist upbringing. It seems reasonable to predict Eisenhower will exhibit a just war DMF, although one would expect that he would fall closer to the more restrained side of the DMF spectrum than would Truman with respect to propensity for recourse to force.

Eisenhower possessed a positive attitude toward RCH. Eisenhower said, “It was part of the privilege into which I was born that my home was a religious home.”⁴²³

⁴²⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address at the Freedoms Foundation, Waldorf-Astoria, New York City, NY, December 22, 1952, accessed September 9, 2012, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/quotes.html.

⁴²¹ Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Annual National Prayer Breakfast, January 31, 1985, accessed September 9, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=39099&st=&st1=>.

⁴²² Craig Allen, “Peace, Prosperity and Prime Time TV: Eisenhower, Stevenson, and the Television Politics of 1956” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio University, 1989), 266.

⁴²³ Quoted in Fuller and Green, 215. Eisenhower continued,

The history of our country is inseparable from the history of such God-fearing families. In this fact we accept the explanation of the miracle of America.... The founding fathers had to refer to the Creator in order to make their revolutionary experiment make sense; it was because “all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights” that men could dare to be free.

They wrote their religious faith into our founding documents, stamped their trust in God on the face of our coins and currency, put it boldly at the base of our institutions, and when they drew up

Nevertheless, during his presidential run, when noted evangelist Bill Graham asked Eisenhower whether or not he still respected the religious teaching of his parents, Eisenhower affirmed that he did but had gotten far from it. Graham told Eisenhower of his sense that the American public would not be happy with a president who did not belong to a church or at least attend one. Eisenhower responded he would join a church “as soon as the election [was] over” but not before, for he did not wish “to use the church politically.”⁴²⁴ As noted above, Eisenhower was baptized Presbyterian after less than two weeks of his inauguration.

Eisenhower understood people to be spiritual. A conversation which Eisenhower held with Graham concerning one of the latter’s successful crusades in 1957 sheds light on the president’s philosophical anthropology. Eisenhower commented to Graham, “I have always agreed with you that human beings – especially Americans – do have an underlying spiritual hunger which from time to time manifests itself markedly.” The president continued, “I believe that we are now experiencing such a period.”⁴²⁵

their bold Bill of Rights, where did they put freedom of worship? First, in the cornerstone position! That was no accident.

Our forefathers proved that only a people strong in Godliness is a people strong enough to overcome tyranny and make themselves and others free.... What is our battle against communism if it is not a fight between anti-God and a belief in the Almighty?

Fuller and Green point out that Eisenhower makes some “misleading assumptions and outright errors” above, but the crucial point of the passage remains. Yes, Eisenhower did not distinguish between the protection of the rights of religious practice and religious dissent on the one hand and writing religious faith into a document on the other. Nevertheless the quotation reveals Eisenhower’s attitude toward both the founding of the nation and the foundation of the American democratic experiment. Eisenhower directly links Christian RCH to the American system of government through the decision-making of the founders. Moreover, Eisenhower makes a connection between piety and civic vigor. He also casts the Cold War in RCH terms.

⁴²⁴ Billy Graham, *Just As I Am: The Autobiography of Billy Graham* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 191.

⁴²⁵ Letter from Eisenhower to Graham, August 9, 1957, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 26, Folder: August 1957 – DDE Dictation, DDE Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum, Abilene, KS. Also quoted in Inboden, 276.

In addition to being spiritual beings, Eisenhower saw humans as sharing a common nature; moreover, he understood government to be a sovereign, authoritative actor responsible to, and responsible for, the common good. Eisenhower broke with custom at his inauguration when he offered aloud a prayer of his own composition during his inaugural address. Inviting his hearers to bow their heads, Eisenhower prayed that he and his executive-branch colleagues would “make full and complete our dedication to the service of the people in this throng, and their fellow citizens everywhere.” This part of the prayer corresponds to a philosophy of government in which temporal authority and sovereignty are conceived as responsibility for the common good. Eisenhower then prayed for the “power to discern clearly right from wrong, and allow all our words and actions to be governed thereby, and by the laws of this land.” This part of the prayer places his philosophical ethics under a religious framework. Eisenhower prayed further that “our concern shall be for all the people regardless of station, race, or calling” and that “cooperation be permitted and be the mutual aim” of people of all political stripes “so that all may work for the good of our beloved country and Thy glory.”⁴²⁶ In addition to further points about the common good, there is an implicit philosophical anthropology concerning common human nature that undergirds the president’s approach.

Eisenhower later explained in his memoirs the thinking behind his decision to include the prayer. His reflections, which include references to RCH, emphasize his roots, his conception of responsibility, and his attitude that the US was becoming too secular.

Religion was one of the thoughts I had been mulling over for several weeks. I did not want my Inaugural Address to be a sermon, by any means; I was not a man of the cloth. But there was embedded in me from boyhood, just as it was in my

⁴²⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1953, accessed February 7, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9600>.

brothers, a deep faith in the beneficence of the Almighty. I wanted, then, to make this faith clear without creating the impression that I intended, as the political leader of the United States, to avoid my own responsibilities in an effort to pass them on to the Deity. I was seeking a way to point out that we were getting too secular.⁴²⁷

Note that Eisenhower explicitly adverts to the RCH to which he was exposed from childhood. He also makes clear that RCH in no way compromises individual responsibility. Finally, he assesses the state of the society which he governs and appraises a certain deficiency with respect to RCH.

Eisenhower second inaugural address exhibits continuity with his first. “Before all else,” he said, “we seek, upon our common labor as a nation, the blessings of Almighty God. And the hopes in our hearts fashion the deepest prayers of our whole people.”⁴²⁸ Although this passage might seem at first to be little more noteworthy than a “God bless America” throw-away line, Eisenhower believed that “one of the reasons I was elected was to help lead this country spiritually. We *need* a spiritual renewal.”⁴²⁹ In other words, Eisenhower saw the president as a spiritual leader.

One could argue that Eisenhower was using RCH as a tool of politics. Consider the following quotation from Richard Nixon, his vice president:

Before the 1960 campaign, President Eisenhower suggested that it would be very effective if I were to refer to God more in my speeches. After all, he pointed out, America is a Christian nation, so voters will relate to someone who quotes the Bible and shows in other ways that he shares their faith.⁴³⁰

This quotation could be taken to suggest that Eisenhower was trying to use religion to game the system. However, in addition to his statement that he would join a church *after*

⁴²⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change: 1953-1956*, Vol. 1 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 100.

⁴²⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Second Inaugural Address,” January 21, 1957, accessed February 7, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10856>.

⁴²⁹ Graham, 199.

⁴³⁰ Richard Nixon, *In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 88.

the election to avoid appearing to use religion for political purposes, Eisenhower also made statements such as the following in which he asked rhetorically, “If each of us in his own mind would dwell more upon those simple virtues – integrity, courage, self-confidence and unshakeable belief in the Bible – would not some of these problems [which currently face the nation] tend to simply solve themselves?”⁴³¹ This statement is a foray into speculative theology that touches on matters of policy. In addition, Eisenhower customarily began cabinet meetings with a prayer which could be either vocal or silent if none of the members of the cabinet wished to pray aloud.⁴³² Political expediency seems an unlikely source for such a practice. RCH is a more plausible source.

A bit more of Eisenhower’s philosophy of government can be gleaned from an address to the National Council of Churches on November 18, 1953. Eisenhower described the American form of government as

merely a translation in the political field of a deeply felt religious faith. The Magna Charta, our Declaration of Independence, and the French Declaration of the Rights of man were certainly nothing else than the attempt on the part of men to state that in their government there would be recognized the principle of the equality of man, the dignity of man. That is a completely false premise unless we recognize the Supreme Being, in front of whom we are all equal.⁴³³

Again, Eisenhower sees RCH intertwined with his theory of government and his theory of human nature. Almost a year later, on November 9, 1954, Eisenhower addressed the First National Conference on the Spiritual Foundations of American Democracy. It seemed to him that the “relationship between a spiritual faith, a religious faith, and our form of government” was “clearly defined” and “obvious.” Moving from philosophy of government to his theory of human nature, Eisenhower noted that the Declaration of

⁴³¹ Quoted in Fuller and Green, 216.

⁴³² Fuller and Green, 217.

⁴³³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks at a Luncheon Meeting of the General Board of the National Council of Churches,” November 18, 1953, accessed February 7, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9768>.

Independence argued that our decision to form our own government proceeded from reasoning that our Creator had endowed us with inalienable rights, “that a man is worthwhile because he was born in the image of his God.”⁴³⁴

Eisenhower did not see RCH as separate from responsibility and decision-making. Concerning his military experience, Eisenhower had the following to say about his experience of D-Day, the Normandy invasion crucial to victory in the European theater in World War II:

If there was nothing else in my life to prove the existence of an almighty and merciful God, the events of the next twenty-four hours did it. This is what I found out about religion: It gives you courage to make the decision you must make in a crisis, and then the confidence to leave the results to a higher power. Only by trust in oneself and trust in God can a man carrying responsibility find repose.”⁴³⁵

Eisenhower thus connects RCH to responsibility and crisis decision-making.

Eisenhower also connected RCH and nuclear issues. On signing a bill to add the phrase “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance on Flag Day, 1954, Eisenhower remarked that “the dedication of our nation and our people to the Almighty” was “especially... meaningful” because

Over the globe, mankind has been cruelly torn by violence and brutality and, by the millions, deadened in mind and soul by a materialistic philosophy of life. Man everywhere is appalled by the prospect of atomic war. In this somber setting... we are reaffirming the transcendence of religious faith in American’s heritage and future; in this way we shall constantly strengthen those spiritual weapons which forever will be our country’s most powerful resource, in peace or in war.⁴³⁶

⁴³⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks to the First National Conference on the Spiritual Foundations of American Democracy,” November 9, 1954, accessed February 7, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10127>.

⁴³⁵ Quoted in Fuller and Green, 216.

⁴³⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill To Include the Words ‘Under God’ in the Pledge to the Flag,” June 14, 1954, accessed February 8, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9920>.

Having enlarged upon Eisenhower's RCH and its connection to his thought on ethics, government, and the human person, it is time to explore his nuclear decisions in light of the just war DMF one would expect him to have adopted given his RCH.

THE "CROSS OF IRON" SPEECH, THE SOLARIUM EXERCISE, AND THE NEW LOOK

Elected by a landslide in November of 1952, Eisenhower came to the presidency at a challenging time. The Korean Conflict faced a double stalemate, for rival armies in the field were fighting to a standstill and rival diplomats at the negotiating table were deadlocked over prisoner exchanges. The nuclear arms race continued as the United States tested a hydrogen bomb, but the NATO defense relationship was hampered by French resistance to the inclusion of a rearmed Germany. France also faced Communist challenges in Indochina. In Iran, a new government, seemingly under Communist influence, had nationalized British oil concessions. Then Stalin died in March of 1953.

Eisenhower sensed an opening. Addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April, Eisenhower memorably said, "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed." Eisenhower argued, "This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron." (The crucifixion imagery alludes not only to the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth but also to an earlier allusion in William Jennings Bryan's "Cross of Gold" speech.) Eisenhower offered the following five proposals to apply to all nations: limitation of the military and security forces, limitation of the production of strategic materials devoted to military purposes, international control of atomic energy and prohibition of atomic weapons, limitation or prohibition of other greatly destructive weapons, and safeguards, including inspections, under United Nations

auspices. Eisenhower stated that these proposals “conform to our firm faith that God created men to enjoy, not destroy, the fruits of the earth and of their own toil.”⁴³⁷

Eisenhower then called for an exercise code-named Solarium to explore three approaches to national security. One task force, under the assumption of a short-term Soviet strengthening but a long-term Soviet collapse, was assigned to modify the basic Truman policy of containment. A second, under the assumption of rational, less aggressive Soviet moves, was to define US security interests in terms of territory on a map and announce that war would result from Soviet-bloc incursion. The third, under the assumption that time was on the side of the Soviets but that the United States could reverse this situation through taking action, was to propose political, economic, diplomatic, and even covert measures short of war that could be used to eliminate Soviet influence in the West and Soviet control in the East. The exercise ran for a little more than a month in June and July. Eisenhower’s approach contrasted with the rather pessimistic and unilateralist proposals of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (who had written the “roll back” foreign policy plank in the Republican platform in the presidential campaign). Indeed, at Eisenhower’s suggestion, the person who chaired the exercise was George F. Kennan whom Dulles had forced out of the State Department a number of months earlier; moreover, Kennan was in charge of the first group, the one tasked with refining the policy he himself pioneered in his “long telegram” of 1946.

According to Kennan,

The president got up at the final [Solarium] meeting on July 16, after the others of us had presented our reports, and spoke about the whole range of these problems.

⁴³⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address “The Chance for Peace” Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953, accessed April 16, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9819>. Bryan’s 1896 speech can be found in *The Annals of America, Vol. 12, 1895–1904: Populism, Imperialism, and Reform* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1968), 100–105; it is also available at historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5354/, accessed May 1, 2013.

He spoke, I must say, with a mastery of the subject matter and a thoughtfulness and a penetration that were quite remarkable. I came away from it with the conviction (which I have carried to this day) that President Eisenhower was a much more intelligent man than he was given credit for being. But like [John] Foster [Dulles] (although in a different way) he didn't reveal [to the public] how discriminating and thoughtful a person he was or how well he could present all these things.⁴³⁸

Although incorporating insights from all three panels, Eisenhower chose to follow the first of the three options without drastic change. Recommendations from Solarium included ensuring American capability for strong retaliation, for mobilization, and for continental defense as well as “strong, independent, and self-sufficient” groups of friendly nations in Europe and Asia as well as “a position of strength in the Middle East.” Similarly, the US would need to have well-demarcated lines in the sand where “a clearly recognizable advance by Soviet bloc military forces” would be considered to have started a war. At such a point the US would have to take “selected aggressive actions of a limited scope, involving moderately increased risks of general war, to eliminate Soviet-dominated areas within the free world and to reduce Soviet power in the Satellite periphery.” (General war, in this case, is a term of art for nuclear war.) Crucially, however, the US would have to “take action other than military, to reduce indigenous communist power in the nations of the free world.” The ultimate goal was to foster a “‘climate of victory’ to bolster the morale and strength of the free world while forcing the Soviet bloc on the defensive.”⁴³⁹

The above recommendations do not explicitly advert to RCH, yet the last two quotations in particular leave open an avenue for RCH to come into play. Moreover, the “clearly recognizable advance” shows concern for just cause. In addition, “Plans are

⁴³⁸ Quoted in William B. Pickett, ed., *George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower's New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium*, Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, Monograph Series, Number 1 (2004), 20.

⁴³⁹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, 2:440-441.

nothing but planning is everything,” Eisenhower liked to say. “The secret of a sound, satisfactory decision made on an emergency basis has always been that the responsible official has been ‘living with the problem’ before it becomes acute.”⁴⁴⁰ Below I look for instances where RCH presents itself as part of the framework of Eisenhower’s living with problems before they became acute.

EISENHOWER’S NUCLEAR CRISIS DECISIONS

Betts⁴⁴¹ lists 13 Cold War nuclear crises through 1980, of which the following seven fall during President Eisenhower’s administration: the Korean Conflict of 1950-1953, the Indo-China Crisis of 1954, the First Quemoy and Matsu Crisis of 1954-55, the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Lebanon Crisis of 1958, the Second Quemoy and Matsu Crisis of 1958, and the Berlin Deadline Crisis of 1958-59. President Eisenhower made the first nuclear move six out of seven times in these crises. The exception was the Suez Crisis. Betts also classifies all but one of these crises as “lower-risk cases.” The exception was the Berlin Deadline Crisis.

1953: The Korean Conflict⁴⁴²

On 21 March 1953, Eisenhower “wanted specifically to know whether” maximum damage to Chinese forces and holding the UN line “could be done without bombing the enemy’s Manchurian airfields. He indicated that the use of atomic weapons in such a campaign should depend on military judgment as to the advantage of their use on military

⁴⁴⁰ Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, “Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 342.

⁴⁴¹ Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987). Betts explains his case selection on pages 16-18.

⁴⁴² See Betts, 37-47.

targets.”⁴⁴³ Ten days later, Eisenhower brought up the issue of using atomic bombs in Korea. Although he admitted that “there were not many good tactical targets... he felt it would be worth the cost if, through use of atomic weapons, [the United States] could (1) achieve a substantial victory over the Communist forces and (2) get to a line at the waist of Korea.”⁴⁴⁴ Such prudential judgments cohere more with Luther’s more permissive approach to just means than with Calvin’s more restrictive approach to just means but certainly fall within the just war school of thought. At this same meeting, “the President and Secretary Dulles were in complete agreement that somehow or other the tabu [sic] which surrounds the use of atomic weapons would have to be destroyed.”⁴⁴⁵ Eisenhower saw nuclear weapons as a permissible means of warfare and sought to persuade others of this view.

Eisenhower returned to the issue of atomic strikes in May. In regard to a quartet of airfields located in North Korea, President Eisenhower

inquired whether these airfields might not prove a target which would test the effectiveness of the atomic bomb. At any rate, said the President, he had reached the point of being convinced that we have got to consider the atomic bomb as simply another weapon in our arsenal.⁴⁴⁶

At the second National Security Council meeting in May, Eisenhower “seemed not wholly satisfied with the argument that atomic weapons could not be used effectively in dislodging the Chinese from their present positions in Korea.” Eisenhower further “inquired as to whether or not a test had been made at Bikini [Atoll] as to the

⁴⁴³ “Memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters (Cutler) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson),” March 21, 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Korea, Part 1*, 815.

⁴⁴⁴ “Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, March 31, 1953,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Korea, Part 1*, 826.

⁴⁴⁵ “Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, March 31, 1953,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Korea, Part 1*, 827.

⁴⁴⁶ “Memorandum of Discussion at the 143d Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 6, 1953,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Korea, Part 1*, 977.

effectiveness of a penetration type of atomic weapon. Could not such weapons be used with effect on tactical targets of the Chinese Communists?"⁴⁴⁷

The above quotations from memoranda illustrate how Eisenhower sought a range of options for atomic use rather than simply a coherent policy of deterrence. Looking back at the Korean Conflict, Eisenhower later wrote, "To keep the attack from becoming costly, it was clear that we would have to use atomic weapons;" moreover, he decided "to let the Communist authorities understand that, in the absence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean Peninsula." The president concluded, "We would not be limited by any world-wide gentlemen's agreement."⁴⁴⁸

The third NSC meeting in May led to NSC Action 794 wherein it was "[a]greed that it was the sense of the National Security Council that, if conditions arise requiring more positive action in Korea, the course of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be adopted as a general guide."⁴⁴⁹ Those recommendations were "that if we went over to more positive action against the enemy in Korea, it would be necessary to expand the war outside of Korea and that it would be necessary to use the atomic bomb."⁴⁵⁰

The NSC Action above comes about as close to authorizing atomic bombing as one can without actually doing so. More insight is afforded by a memo Eisenhower wrote to Dulles in late 1953 after the armistice had already been signed in July. Worth quoting

⁴⁴⁷ "Memorandum of Discussion at the 144th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 13, 1953," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Korea, Part 1*, 1014.

⁴⁴⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-56*. Quoted in Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 51.

⁴⁴⁹ "Memorandum of Discussion at the 145th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 20, 1953," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Korea, Part 1*, 1067-1068.

⁴⁵⁰ "Memorandum of Discussion at the 145th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 20, 1953," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Korea, Part 1*, 1065.

at length, it is strikingly clear in terms of authority, just cause, right intention and prudential judgment.

We should patiently point out that any group of people, such as the men in the Kremlin, who are aware of the great destructiveness of these weapons—and who still decline to make any honest effort toward international control by collective action—must be fairly assumed to be contemplating their aggressive use. It would follow that our own preparation could no longer be geared to a policy that attempts only to avert disaster during the early “surprise” stages of a war, and so gain time for full mobilization. Rather we would have to be constantly ready, on an instantaneous basis, to inflict greater loss upon the enemy than he could reasonably hope to inflict on us. This would be a deterrent—but if the contest to maintain this relative position should have to continue indefinitely, the cost would either drive us to war—or into some form of dictatorial government. In such circumstances, we would be forced to consider whether or not our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment we could designate.⁴⁵¹

Eisenhower starts off with a reflection on the foreseen consequences of nuclear use. His reflection is in full accord with criteria such as proportionality that flow from the basic principle of right intention in just war thought. This reasoning leads him to a conclusion about needed American responsiveness. Transitioning to thoughts on deterrence, Eisenhower’s framework leads to a consideration of right and wrong in an indefinite contest contextualized by looming war or dictatorship in terms of philosophy of government and in terms of right and wrong (that is, just cause). It is in this situation that Eisenhower envisions conditions under which, prudentially judged as a last resort, the United States might be compelled, under a conception of sovereignty as responsibility for the common good, to initiate war – a valuation of the lives of both sides that only the competent authority of a sovereign can make. This memo highlights a DMF which is in full accord with presidential RCH whether considered from the fundamental principles of

⁴⁵¹ Eisenhower to Dulles, “Memorandum for the Secretary of State,” September 8, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum, Abilene, KS.

ethics, philosophy of government, and philosophy of human nature or from the derivative principles of authority, just cause, right intention, and prudential judgment.

Eisenhower's framework can be further illuminated by considering post-armistice NSC meetings. Eisenhower exhibited concern about discrimination between civilian and military targets as well as proportionality of action. He also wanted to cover the question of authority. Concerning discrimination and proportionality, Eisenhower "expressed with great emphasis the opinion that if the Chinese Communists attacked us again we should certainly respond by hitting them hard and wherever it would hurt most, including Peiping itself." Eisenhower recognized that such a response "would mean all-out war against Communist China."⁴⁵² Concerning the question of authority, Eisenhower "raised the question of how long a time it would take to get from the Congress a declaration of war against China. He referred to the charge against Mr. Truman that the latter had fought an unconstitutional war... [and] expressed a desire to avoid a repetition of this difficulty...."⁴⁵³ Eisenhower concluded "the first move in such a war would be a rapid and thorough attack on the enemy's airfields."⁴⁵⁴

At an NSC meeting in 1954, Eisenhower envisioned that such attacks would place one atomic bomb on each targeted airfield.⁴⁵⁵ At this same meeting Eisenhower concerned himself with the clarity of defensive grounds for atomic action, so he was careful to specify that sufficient time would pass between an attack and a US atomic response "to establish Communist guilt beyond reasonable doubt."⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵² "Memorandum of Discussion at the 173d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 3, 1953," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Korea, Part 2*, 1638.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁵ "Memorandum of Discussion at the 179th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, January 8, 1954," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Korea, Part 2*, 1707.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., 1705.

When in the spring of 1954 the question of preventive war came up for review, the JCS advance study group briefed Eisenhower on a plan for the United States to “deliberately precipitat[e] war with the USSR in the near future... before the USSR could achieve a large enough nuclear capability to be a real menace to [the] Continental US” Army Chief of Staff Ridgway stated that

this presentation left me with but one clear impression, which was that this Group was advocating the deliberate precipitation of aggressive war by the US against the USSR; that I thought this was contrary to every principle upon which our Nation had been founded, and which it continued to profess; and that in my opinion it would be abhorrent to the great mass of the American people.⁴⁵⁷

Before turning to the question of how the Basic National Security Policy turned out, it is worth quoting at length a furious retort which Eisenhower delivered to South Korean President Rhee in July, 1954:

There is no disposition in America at any time to belittle the Republic of Korea. But when you say that we should deliberately plunge into war, let me tell you that if war comes, it will be horrible. Atomic war will destroy civilization. It will destroy our cities. There will be millions of people dead. War today is unthinkable with the weapons which we have at our command. If the Kremlin and Washington ever lock up in a war, the results are too horrible to contemplate. I can't even imagine them. But we must keep strong.... I assure you that we think about these things continuously and as seriously as you do. The kind of war that I am talking about, if carried out, would not save democracy. Civilization would be ruined, and those nations and persons that survived would have strong dictators over them just to feed the people who were left. That is why we are opposed to war.⁴⁵⁸

In late 1954 the Basic National Security Policy stated, “The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war.”⁴⁵⁹ This statement coheres well with Eisenhower's comments on preventive war during the press

⁴⁵⁷ Quoted in in Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod, *To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans* (Boston: South End Press, 1987), 101.

⁴⁵⁸ Quoted in J. Rud Nielson, “Memories of Niels Bohr,” *Physics Today* 16, no. 10 (October 1963): 30.

⁴⁵⁹ Quoted in Rosenberg, “Toward Armageddon,” 197. Hence, the Strategic Air Command had to consider preemption rather than prevention.

conference treated in the first chapter and revisited below. Also in 1954, NSC meeting notes relate, “The President commented that, as so often, we had again gone around in a circle and come back to the same place. The problem of the Soviet Union was a new kind of problem, and the old rules simply didn’t apply to our present situation.”⁴⁶⁰ For this reason, it makes sense that Eisenhower would seek to reason from fundamental principles rather than rules of thumb.

1954-55: THE ASIAN CRISES⁴⁶¹

The two crises in this period were Indochina on the one hand and Quemoy and Matsu on the other. Although various nuclear options were considered by various officials, Eisenhower himself never favored nuclear use in this crisis. This stance may stem partly from his assessment of the nature of the conflict, for a 1951 diary entry relates, “I am convinced that no military victory is possible in that kind of theater.”⁴⁶² He also rhetorically questioned the Joint Chiefs in 1954,

I want you to carry this question home with you: Gain such a victory, and what do you do with it? Here would be a great area from the Elbe to Vladivostok and down... through Southeast Asia torn up and destroyed without government, without its communications, just an area of starvation and disaster. I ask you what would the civilized world do about it? I repeat there is no victory in any war except through our imaginations, through our dedication, and through our work to avoid it.⁴⁶³

Interestingly enough, this passage in some ways is ambiguous for purposes of this investigation: Is Eisenhower making a statement about all war (commensurate with his upbringing) or about a particular war (wherein his concern for the aftermath reflects the Calvinist sensibility that one might expect from a Presbyterian), or is his reasoning

⁴⁶⁰ 129th NSC Meeting, December 21, 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁶¹ See Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail*, 48-62.

⁴⁶² Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1981), 190.

⁴⁶³ Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Diary of James C. Hagerty: Eisenhower in Mid-Course, 1954-1955* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), 69.

strictly military? If misquotations provide insight into how authors read source texts, then at least one notable presidential biographer interpreted this passage to refer just to the Indochinese situation.⁴⁶⁴ Regardless, in the context of the meeting and the nuclear issues at hand, it seems Eisenhower is making a particular statement.

For a more general statement, consider a presidential press conference in January, 1955. While reading Eisenhower's reply to a question about the use of tactical nuclear weapons, bear in mind Luther's warning to the nobles about the unpredictability of fighting⁴⁶⁵:

I would say, normally no, because I can't conceive of an atomic weapon as being a police weapon, and we were talking really more police action. Police are to protect and stop trouble, not just to cause destruction.

Now, nothing can be precluded in a military thing. Remember this: when you resort to force as the arbiter of human difficulty, you don't know where you are going; but, generally speaking, if you get deeper and deeper, there is just no limit except what is imposed by the limitations of force itself. But I would say, normally no, would be my answer.⁴⁶⁶

Although nuclear options were considered in this crisis, no nuclear signaling took place. If nothing else, the decision to forego what one school of thought alleges would have been a "cheap" signal suggests that instances in which nuclear signaling actually takes place are not to be dismissed cavalierly. This information further bears on how particular policies should be considered more or less aggressive than other policies when assessing DMF.

⁴⁶⁴ The words "in any war" are omitted in Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, Vol. 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 206.

⁴⁶⁵ "Do not start a fight with them, for you do not know how it will end." Martin Luther, "Admonition to Peace: A Reply to the Twelve Articles of the Peasants in Swabia," in *Selected Writings of Martin Luther, 1529-1546*, ed. Theodore G. Tappert (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1967), 321.

⁴⁶⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The President's News Conference," January 12, 1955, accessed September 12, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10232&st=&st1=>.

Concerning Quemoy and Matsu later that year, Eisenhower balked at the notion of striking mainland China merely to relieve the bombardment of the islands, saying, “We’re not talking now about a limited, brush-fire war. We’re talking about going to the threshold of World War III. If we attack China, we’re not going to impose limits on our military actions, as in Korea.”⁴⁶⁷ Yet on March 10 of the following year, Eisenhower agreed with Dulles who said that, if Quemoy and Matsu were to be defended, “we’ll have to use atomic weapons. They alone will be effective against the mainland airfields.”⁴⁶⁸ The next day Eisenhower specified that the islands were to be defended conventionally with nuclear weapons used “only at the end” should conventional defenses be overcome.⁴⁶⁹ Nuclear weapons were a last resort but not out of the question. The Asian crises fit the just war DMF.

1956: The Suez Crisis⁴⁷⁰

This crisis is unusual among the cases considered in this chapter insofar as the first nuclear move in the crisis was made by the Soviets rather than the Americans; moreover, the implied threat was against Britain, already a nuclear power, and France, a state which would not yet produce a bomb for several years. The United States offered a countersignal that in some ways was more ambiguous than the Soviet signal. However, in other ways the US signal was more concrete because it included a Strategic Air Command alert; moreover, the aircraft carriers *Forrestal* and *Franklin D. Roosevelt* and the heavy cruiser *Des Moines* were ordered to sortie, and the US Navy remained tight-

⁴⁶⁷ Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 464.

⁴⁶⁸ Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 476.

⁴⁶⁹ “Memorandum for the Record, by the President’s Special Assistant (Cutler),” March 11, 1955, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. 2, China*, 359.

⁴⁷⁰ See Betts, 62-65.

lipped about their mission.⁴⁷¹ Nevertheless, Eisenhower recalled “we just told [the Soviets], really, it would be a global war if they started it, that’s all,” and White House assistant Emmet Hughes recalled Eisenhower saying that “if those fellows start something we may have to hit ‘em—and, if necessary, with *everything* in the bucket” [emphasis original].⁴⁷² A defensive war with all weapons on the table seemed possible, but the ambiguity of the nuclear initiatives of both sides was not crucial in the end, for the crisis was ultimately resolved to the satisfaction of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the American crisis response fits well with a just war DMF.

There were at least the following three strategic effects for the West regarding the Middle East: the Suez Canal was blocked and Europe’s oil was cut off, the Soviet Union’s influence expanded rapidly in the Middle East, and the United States showed that it would not back British and French imperial adventures. The United States was the clear master of Western strategy after this crisis.

However, there is an aspect of this nuclear crisis which plays out against a background of RCH. With not just United Kingdom and France but Israel on one side and Egypt on the other, the contrast between Truman’s and Eisenhower’s approach to Judaism, Islam, and religion in general.

Truman’s approach to statehood for Israel, while mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, was not treated deeply because no nuclear issue was at hand. However, to contrast Truman’s approach to the Jews with Eisenhower’s approach to the Arabs – when a nuclear issue was indeed at hand – requires one briefly to revisit Truman.

⁴⁷¹ Hans Speier, “Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance,” *World Politics* 9, no. 3 (April 1957): 325.

⁴⁷² Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 87.

Truman's Christian beliefs seem to have led him to sympathize with the Jewish people whom he understood to be the rightful owners of the biblical Promised Land.⁴⁷³ Truman advisor Clark Clifford and State Department Arab expert Alfred Lilienthal both indicated that Truman understood the Bible literally, considered scriptural truth to be the basis for moral decisions, and believed secular government naturally arose from biblical principles.⁴⁷⁴ In his memoirs Truman recalled how he wished that "God almighty would give the Children of Israel an Isaiah, the Christians a St. Paul, and the Sons of Ishmael [i.e., the Arabs] a peep at the Golden Rule."⁴⁷⁵

Beyond questions of ethics, however, Truman appears to have viewed the establishment of Israel not just as a moral imperative but as a way to participate in God's work on earth. In summing up the importance of Truman's support of Israel's statehood during a 1949 meeting, Rabbi Isaac Halevi Herzog equated Truman with Cyrus the Great, the Persian King who freed Israel from captivity in Babylon in the seventh century B.C. and thus allowed the Jewish people to reestablish themselves in the Promised Land after a lengthy exile. According to Herzog, Truman rose from his chair with tears in his eyes and asked the rabbi whether "his [Truman's] actions for the sake of the Jewish people were indeed to be interpreted thus and the hand of the Almighty was in the matters."⁴⁷⁶ Years later, at a Jewish Theological Seminary graduation ceremony when his lifelong Jewish friend Eddie Jacobsen introduced him as the man who had helped create Israel, Truman responded, "What do you mean helped create? I am Cyrus. I am Cyrus."⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷³ Lawrence Davidson, "Truman the Politician and the Establishment of Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 39, no. 4 (Summer 2010): 32-33; Paul Charles Merkley, *The Politics of Christian Zionism, 1891-1948* (London and Portland: Taylor and Francis, 1998), 158-60.

⁴⁷⁴ Clifford and Lilienthal quoted in Radosh and Radosh, 47, 344-45; cf. Merkley, 153-56.

⁴⁷⁵ Truman, *Memoirs*, 157.

⁴⁷⁶ Radosh and Radosh, 344-45.

⁴⁷⁷ Radosh and Radosh, 344-46; Shalom Goldman, *Zeal for Zion: Christians, Jews, and the Idea of the Promised Land* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 27-28; Merkley, 68-70.

Truman's sympathy seems not to have extended to the Arabs who outnumbered the Jewish residents in Palestine by three to one during this period. This indigenous population was not eager to share limited resources with European Jews. Truman was aware of this state of affairs via the State Department, the Department of Defense, the British Office of Foreign Policy, and a UN delegation.⁴⁷⁸ One might explain this difference in sympathy by returning to Truman's Christian roots, particularly the biblical portrayal of the relationship between the Jews their enemy the Philistines (a word which shares the same root as the English word "Palestinians") with whom they fought continually. The Bible casts the Philistines as violent, dishonorable, territorial pagans; in a literary sense they are the antagonists against whom God's chosen people are contrasted. Truman identified himself as a Christian who believed the Bible to be both the word of God and a reliable historical account. From within this worldview, clearly derived from RCH, Truman would seem predisposed to favor the claims of Jews over those of Arabs.⁴⁷⁹

Now, although the RCH surveys of Truman in the previous chapter and Eisenhower in the current chapter show broad overlap in the religious convictions of the two presidents, their different perspectives show how their different RCH plays out in their different affinities for the Jewish and Palestinian sides.

⁴⁷⁸ One revisionist work which questions the conventional account presented here is Joan Peters, *From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1985). Peters' work has been engaged by Bill Farrell, "Joan Peters and the Perversion of History," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 14, no. 1 (Autumn 1984): 126-134; Robert Olson, review of *From Time Immemorial*, by Joan Peters, *The American Historical Review* 90, no.2 (April 1985): 468-469; John Ruedy, review of *From Time Immemorial*, by Joan Peters, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 19, no.3 (August 1987): 373-378; and Edward W. Said, "The Joan Peters Case," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 15, no.2 (1986): 144-150.

⁴⁷⁹ McCullough, 47, 54-55, 83; Davidson, 32-33; Walter Russell Mead, "The New Israel and the Old: Why Gentile Americans Back the Jewish State," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 4 (July-August 2008): 28. Mead also sees the possibility of political appeal, but still based in RCH, when on page 46 he observes, quite apart from the Jewish vote, that his support for Israel "helped Truman compete among conservative, churchgoing, Bible-reading southern voters against Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrats."

A few words are in order about Dr. Edward Elson, the pastor of the National Presbyterian Church who baptized President Eisenhower and the army chaplain who had been General Eisenhower's contact with German Protestants after the end of World War II. With a green light from the White House, Elson co-founded the Foundation for Religious Action in the Social and Civil Order. FRASCO conferences allowed interreligious natural theology to contrast markedly with Communism. However, the closest cooperation between Eisenhower and Elson took place regarding the Middle East. Elson's interest was sparked through his knowledge of the region's history of American missionary activity, especially Presbyterian, and especially how Christianity focused on achieving cultural transformation rather than on gaining individual converts.⁴⁸⁰

Eisenhower perhaps started from a geopolitical standpoint but, at the very least, he quickly recognized a spiritual affinity with the world of Islam as well. In addition to prior theism/atheism contrasts, Eisenhower – just months after the Israeli occupation begun during the Suez Crisis had ended – delivered an address at the dedication of the Islamic Center in Washington, DC. Calling for a re-dedication to “the peaceful progress of all men under one God,” Eisenhower stated that the United States “would fight with her whole strength for your right to have here your own church [sic] and worship according to your own conscience.” The president noted how Muslim countries had “for centuries contributed to the building of civilization.” He stated further, “With their traditions of learning and rich culture, the countries of Islam have added much to the advancement of mankind.” Demonstrating his concern to emphasize religious commonality in order to present a united front against Communism, Eisenhower stressed that, “common to our innermost beliefs, we can here together reaffirm our determination

⁴⁸⁰ A useful summary of Elson and FRASCO can be found in Inboden, especially 264-266 and 278-299.

to secure the foundation of a just and lasting peace.” Striking a note of philosophical realism or philosophical anthropology, Eisenhower noted that “like all healthy relationships, this relationship must be mutually beneficial,” but he returned to the point that “the Muslim genius has added much to the culture of all peoples. That genius has been a wellspring of science, commerce and the arts, and has provided for all of us many lessons in courage and in hospitality.”⁴⁸¹

This part of the denouement following the Suez crisis illustrates the influence of RCH regarding Eisenhower’s DMF – the same DMF in play during the crisis itself. Moreover, this episode also shows how Eisenhower recognized the importance of RCH which he himself did not necessarily share or to which he did not have deep exposure.

1958: Lebanon and Taiwan Straits⁴⁸²

Concerning Lebanon, Eisenhower ordered a SAC alert. Although General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that the forward deployment of aerial tankers would be hard to conceal and might be misinterpreted, Eisenhower recalled, “But, far from objecting to the tanker aircraft deployment’s becoming known, I felt this knowledge would be desirable, as showing readiness and determination without implying any threat of aggression. The move was arranged.”⁴⁸³ Moreover, Eisenhower wrote, “Finally, I instructed General Twining to be prepared to employ, subject to my approval, *whatever* means might become necessary to prevent any unfriendly forces from moving into Kuwait” [emphasis original].⁴⁸⁴ These quotations accord with the prudential criteria in just war thought as well as the classical conception of authority.

⁴⁸¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks at Ceremonies Opening the Islamic Center,” June 28, 1957, accessed May 20, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10824>.

⁴⁸² See Betts, 66-79.

⁴⁸³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, Vol. 2 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 276.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 278.

Concerning Quemoy and Matsu, Christensen has argued that Mao manipulated a short-term interstate conflict for the sake of longer-term domestic goals to distract from domestic hardship, to instill greater discipline, and to foster a spirit of shared sacrifice among his own people. In short, opposition to the United States could be used to foster Chinese economic growth and modernization.⁴⁸⁵ Eisenhower, for his part, personally approved and edited a telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific and the Taiwan Defense Command that included the text, “In the event [of] a major attack [it] is probable that initially only conventional weapons will be authorized, but prepare to use atomic weapons to extend deeper into Chinese Communist territory if necessary.” The president, however, refrained from announcing publicly the availability of Guam-based B-47s which had no conventional capability.⁴⁸⁶ In terms of command authority, when Eisenhower was asked at a press conference whether local commanders had any discretion in the use of tactical nuclear weapons, Eisenhower clarified, “It is not possible to use these weapons except with the specific authority of the President.” When pressed about exceptions *in extremis*, the President replied,

It has been a long time since I have gone through all of these directives, and many of them go into tremendous detail.

I am not going any further than that, and if it is possible, I will take a look again, because there is one exception, but I don’t believe it mentions atomic weapons: that if the United States itself or any of its armed forces are under attack, that they

⁴⁸⁵ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁴⁸⁶ M.H. Halperin, *The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History (U)*, RAND Memorandum RM-4900-ISA (Santa Monica: RAND, 1966; portions declassified 18 March 1975), 112-114, accessed October 3, 2010, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM4900.pdf. It should be pointed out that the military misunderstood Eisenhower’s message to mean, despite the standard assumptions of the New Look policy, that the president and the JCS wanted a conventional defense of the islands only. So complete was this misunderstanding that an Air Force official history mistakenly records that planning for nuclear strikes was prohibited. See Jacob Van Staaveren, “Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958” (US Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, November 1962), 28-29, accessed September 11, 2012, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb249/doc11.pdf>.

can use any measures necessary for their defense, but I would have to make certain. My memory is not quite that good this morning.⁴⁸⁷

It would be hard to construe such an answer as a nuclear threat, and no such exception in fact existed. Again, there is both planning for nuclear warfare and less than complete commitment to carry out those plans, but the conditionality exhibited fits a just war DMF.

1958-59: The Berlin Deadline

Writing in his memoirs about December 11, 1958, the day on which TASS reported that any Western attempts to make their way into Berlin would be met with Warsaw Pact mobilization and would increase the risk of nuclear war, Eisenhower recalled saying, “In this gamble we are not going to be betting white chips, building up the pot gradually and fearfully. Khrushchev should know that when we decide to act, our whole stack will be in the pot.”⁴⁸⁸ In late January of 1959 he ordered European units to be strengthened “to show the Soviets we mean business [because] it was certain that the Soviets would detect the movements and probably interpret them correctly as evidence of our determination.”⁴⁸⁹ At a March press conference Eisenhower commented,

We are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe. What good would it do to send a few more thousands or indeed even a few divisions of troops to Europe?

I do not see why we would think that we—with something of a half a million troops, Soviet and some German in East Germany, with 175 Soviet divisions in that neighborhood—why in the world would we dream of fighting a ground war?⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “The President’s News Conference,” August 27, 1958, accessed September 11, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11188&st=&st1=>.

⁴⁸⁸ Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 338-339.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 340-341.

⁴⁹⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “The President’s News Conference,” March 11, 1959, accessed September 11, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11678&st=&st1=>.

A journalist read between the lines of the above response and pressed Eisenhower on whether the United States was prepared to use nuclear war to maintain the freedom of West Berlin. Eisenhower rejoined,

Well, I don't know how you could free anything with nuclear weapons.

I can say this: the United States and its allies have announced their firm intention of preserving their rights and responsibilities with respect to Berlin. If any threat, or any push in the direction of real hostilities is going to occur, it's going to occur from the side of the Soviets.

Now, if that would become reality, and I don't believe that anyone would be senseless enough to push that to the point of reality, then there will be the time to decide exactly what the allies would, in turn, expect to do.⁴⁹¹

Note that just war thought is concrete in that it lays out clear, black-and-white boundaries so decision-makers can better gauge the shades of gray. Note further that Eisenhower first refers allied intention and subsequently illustrates that it is a right intention by referring both to rights and responsibilities.

Questioned further on ground forces, bush wars, and responses between conventional and nuclear war, Eisenhower continued, "What would you do with more ground forces in Europe? Does anyone here have an idea?" Moving beyond rhetoric to analysis, Eisenhower queried, "Would you start a ground war? You wouldn't start the kind of ground war that would win in that region if that were going to make the way you had to enforce your will. You have got to go to other means...." Eisenhower did not want to have his hands tied. He went further, saying,

I'd say this: if we can't, then the war's gotten beyond a brush war, and you have got to think in much, much bigger terms....

I didn't say that nuclear war is a complete impossibility. I said it couldn't as I see it free anything. Destruction is not a good police force. You don't throw hand

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

grenades around streets to police the streets so that people won't be molested by thugs.

This is exactly the way that you have to look at nuclear war, or any other....⁴⁹²

Thus, Eisenhower dealt with the relationship between ends and means, his attention coming not so much from the explicit perspective of what is *malo in se* (i.e., intrinsically evil) as from one of prudential criteria. The president then moved his attention to questions of foreseen but unintended consequences:

And, I must say, to use that kind of a nuclear war as a general thing looks to me a self-defeating thing for all of us. After all, with that kind of release of nuclear explosions around this world, of the numbers of hundreds, I don't know what it would do to the world and particularly the Northern Hemisphere; and I don't think anybody else does.

But I know it would be quite serious.⁴⁹³

Finally, Eisenhower dealt with just cause and last resort, specifically adverting to necessity:

Therefore, we have got to stand right ready and say, "We will do what is necessary to protect ourselves, but we are never going to back up on our rights and our responsibilities."⁴⁹⁴

The president referred to strategic forces on radio and television less than a week later: "World-wide deployment of Army divisions, including missile units, increases the ability of the US Army and the Marines to rapidly apply necessary force to any area of trouble. At home, the Strategic Army Corps is ready and able to move promptly as needed to any area of the world."⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Radio and Television Report to the American People: Security in the Free World," March 16, 1959, accessed September 11, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11682&st=&st1=>.

Note that throughout Eisenhower rejected conventional force increases yet never wavered on his commitment to Berlin. Note further that Eisenhower exhibits a seemingly undifferentiated approach both to war and to the weapons employed in war in a way reminiscent of Luther's permissive approach toward just means. Nevertheless, here as above, Eisenhower exhibits a just war DMF that matches his RCH, especially with respect to authority commensurate with a political philosophy which understands sovereignty as responsibility for the common good. Gavin has noted that the Berlin outcome (which he traces through to the 1962 crisis) "depended on two very different things—the challenge, temptations, and dangers of demonstrating resolve in a nuclearized environment, and the play of old-fashioned great power politics."⁴⁹⁶ As a third factor, RCH helps tie together several features within and among crises.

It is worth mentioning that evangelist Billy Graham wrote a letter to Eisenhower on the same day as the president's radio and television address. Expressing his own views on the crisis, Graham said he was "delighted that you [Eisenhower] are standing up to the Russians! I think it is time we called their bluff. We cannot afford to allow them to continue nibbling at the Western World until we are too weak to withstand. They must be stopped now." Moving from questions of just cause and prudential judgment to scriptural interpretation, Graham pleaded, "Please do not allow extreme Liberal churchmen to advise you that war is the ultimate evil. There is absolutely no foundation in the Bible for such a Pacifist view." Graham then moved to philosophy of government, stating, "The Scripture teaches that good government is from God. When we stand on the side of moral justice we can be assured that God is with us." Graham then quoted Joshua 1:9, a passage in which God encourages the Hebrew leader Joshua and assures him of His presence. He

⁴⁹⁶ Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 74.

concluded, “Take this as your Biblical promise as you prepare for a showdown.”⁴⁹⁷ While I cannot find a direct link between this letter and specific, subsequent statements which it might have influenced, one can observe clearly the coherence between Eisenhower’s own remarks and Graham’s analysis and interpretations. On both politically aware and spiritually responsive levels, however, Eisenhower would no doubt have welcomed such a letter and found it comforting. Certainly the presidency in the thermonuclear age carries with it responsibilities of almost an inhuman scale. At such a level of leadership, the imbalance of power between the president and those with whom he interacts and converses is such that all involved parties must wonder each time whether the lesser wants something from the greater. Filling such a lonely role, all leaders reach for an outlet, a place of solace, a space of comfort. In addition to a source and a means for a decision-maker in the world of policy, RCH may act as a pressure vent for the policy-maker as well.

ATOMS FOR PEACE

On December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York City. Eisenhower wrote how he intended to accomplish a number of objectives with his speech. The first was “to make a clear effort to get the Soviet Union working with [the United States to] begin to divert nuclear science from destructive to peaceful purposes.” Next, if joint efforts began, then “gradually negotiation and cooperation might expand into something broader” should Soviet self-interest prompt participation “in joint humanitarian efforts.” A further goal was “to call the attention of smaller nations to the fact that they too had an interest in the uses” of nuclear material and technology and that “new and promising opportunities were steadily opening up for

⁴⁹⁷ Letter from Graham to Eisenhower, March 16, 1959, Official File, Box 868, Folder 183-A, DDE Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum, Abilene, KS.

using these materials and skills for their benefit.” Eisenhower also wished to reassure the American public “that they had not poured their substance into nuclear development with the sole purpose of using it for world destruction.” Finally, the speech “provided the opportunity to tell America and the world about the size and strength of our atomic capabilities... in such a way as to make the argument for peaceful negotiation.” At root was “the clear conviction that... the world... was courting disaster in the armaments race, that something must be done to put a brake on this momentum.” Words, Eisenhower realized, were not enough, but “ideas expressed in words must certainly have an effect in getting people to think of specific ways by which future disaster can be avoided.”⁴⁹⁸

Eisenhower’s speech was crafted well. The rhetoric is peaceful but hard-nosed. Also well balanced is a play in the speech between explicit and implicit messages. The Soviets were meant to receive a challenge, even a warning, while the rest of the world, especially the developing and non-aligned world, was meant to receive an invitation.

The speech came at significant time. The United States had lost the nuclear monopoly in 1949, and the Korean Conflict began the next year. The “super” (H-bomb) program had begun. In 1952, Eisenhower had “fully supported the [Atomic Energy] Commission’s efforts rapidly to enlarge the arsenal of nuclear weapons and to maintain that strength as a bastion of national security,”⁴⁹⁹ yet Eisenhower sought to wage peace,

⁴⁹⁸ Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 254. This page is essentially a refined draft of his diary entry for December 12, 1953, two days after the delivery of the speech. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Speech Before the United Nations,” December 10, 1953, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 [Ann Whitman File], DDE Diary Series, Box 4, Folder DDE Diary Oct.-Dec. 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum, Abilene, KS. There are interesting differences between the less refined diary entry, written when Eisenhower’s reactions were fresher. However, what is more noteworthy is that many of Eisenhower’s most striking phrases needed no editing for his book published ten years after this address.

⁴⁹⁹ Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 15.

stating in his first inaugural address, “The future shall belong to the free.”⁵⁰⁰ As a result, the “Atoms for Peace” speech provides a meaningful look into Eisenhower’s philosophies of ethics, government, and human nature.

In February before the address, the Oppenheimer Report had “declared that a renewed search must be made for a way to avert the catastrophe of modern war” including “wider public discussion based upon wider understanding of the meaning of a nuclear holocaust.”⁵⁰¹ In March, Stalin died. His death opened a window of hope, “widespread throughout the West, that the Soviet state, unable to resolve the problem of succession, would fall into confusion and helplessness.”⁵⁰²

In April Eisenhower delivered “The Chance for Peace” (the formal name of the “Cross of Iron” speech dealt with above) in which he recalled the shared hope of building “an age of just peace” in the aftermath of World War II. The speech listed numerous US objectives including settling the conflict in Korea, bringing peace to Indochina, unifying Germany, and concluding an Austrian peace treaty. In one crucial line, Eisenhower said that one of the agreements which the United States would most welcome was “International control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons.”⁵⁰³ This foreshadowing of Eisenhower’s approach to “Atoms for Peace” is the earliest I have found.

The Korean Conflict came to an end in the middle of the summer of 1953, but Sino-Soviet aggression and expansion remained a US concern. October 30, 1953 saw the

⁵⁰⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1953, accessed February 7, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9600>.

⁵⁰¹ Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 184.

⁵⁰² Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 312.

⁵⁰³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address ‘The Chance for Peace’ Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors,” April 16, 1953, accessed February 5, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9819>.

official approval of NSC 162/2 which stated, “In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for our use as other munitions.”⁵⁰⁴

The National Security Council (NSC), via the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) and the Planning board, “correlated and often integrated defense, economic, and diplomatic interests.”⁵⁰⁵ Given OCB practice, it is not surprising that the Atoms for Peace speech incorporated military, diplomatic, and economic dimensions. Militarily, the speech moved the stress from the curse of the atom to the blessing of the atom at the same time as a buildup was underway. Diplomatically, the speech opened a dialogue with the USSR about the possibilities of the IAEA proposed in the speech. (Note, however, that this address was not really a disarmament speech but rather a trust-building measure. It was not a disarmament measure in and of itself.) Economically, there were implications for US domestic industry and opportunities for foreign markets. Overall, the United States indicated pacific intent and concern for the disadvantaged. Note further that the different dimensions of the speech all interacted with each other.

In a Christmas Eve letter to his close friend and confidant “Swede” Hazlett several weeks after delivering the speech, Eisenhower wrote that the United Nations address “had been evolving in our minds and plans for many weeks.” Eisenhower related how “quite a while ago” he had begun “to search around for any kind of an idea that would bring the world to look at the atomic problem in a broad and intelligent way and still escape the impasse to action created by Russian intransigence in the matter of mutual or neutral inspection of resources.” In addition, the president wanted “to give our people and the world some faint idea of the size of the distance already traveled by this new

⁵⁰⁴ Quoted in Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 124.

⁵⁰⁵ James D. Weaver, “Eisenhower as Commander in Chief,” in *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman*, ed. Joann P. Kreig (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987), 139.

science – but to do it in a way as not to create new alarm.” After telling Hazlett about how he “hit upon the idea” of physical donations of nuclear material by the USA, the USSR, and even the UK, and how he sought “to develop this thought in such a way as to provide at the very least a calm and reasonable atmosphere in which the whole matter could again be jointly studied,” Eisenhower stated,

Once the decision was taken to propose such a plan in some form, the whole problem became one of treatment, choice of time, place and circumstance, and the niceties of language. I had, of course, a lot of excellent help – but I personally put on the text a tremendous amount of time.⁵⁰⁶

It therefore makes sense to analyze the speech closely for information concerning Eisenhower’s philosophies of ethics, government, and human nature.

The speech had three parts. The first part spoke of present risk. The middle part cataloged past efforts at conciliation. The final part provided a vision of the future. Peace was stressed throughout all three parts. In fact “peace” and its derivatives occurred two dozen times throughout the address.

Such structure permitted a message beyond a historical recapitulation of events. In fact, at least four messages were conveyed by the address. Eisenhower warned the Soviets against a nuclear attack, alerted the Americans to the destructiveness of a potential nuclear attack, depicted the US as a friendly and peaceable partner of the developing world, and challenged the Soviets.

This structure worked in Eisenhower’s favor. A chronological approach would have handicapped the speech’s effectiveness. Eisenhower would have had to start with the failure of conciliation, a poor point from which to begin a persuasive speech. Furthermore, the present would have been buried in the middle of the speech had the

⁵⁰⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower, letter to Edward E. “Swede” Hazlett, Hazlett, Edward E. “Swede”: Papers, 1941-1956, Box 1, Folder: 1953 December 24, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum, Abilene, KS.

structure been chronological. Such placement would have devalued the warning or at least lessened its impact. Moreover, by putting the failure of conciliation in the middle, the conclusion strongly contrasted past failures with a visionary future.

It makes sense to explore the following points as the three sections: US strength in atomics, Western desiderata, and an IAEA. To do so, I compared⁵⁰⁷ the fifth draft of the Atoms for Peace Speech of November 28, 1953, the editing which Eisenhower wrote on the draft in his own hand, the final version of the speech as delivered, and implicit messages intended for Soviet consumption rather than for the world audience as a whole.⁵⁰⁸ I report the main results of the analysis below in terms of comparative atomic capability, retaliatory capacity, alliance cohesion, and nuclear consequences.

First, Eisenhower opened with “hope” and its derivatives five times. He prepared his hearers for a speech on the atomic dilemma and a way out. However, he gave a warning in report’s clothing, clearly stating that US nuclear capability was growing despite budget cutbacks.

⁵⁰⁷ After this analysis was written, I came across Martin J. Medhurst, “Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ Speech: A Case Study in the Strategic Use of Language,” *Communication Monographs* 54 (June 1987): 204-220. Medhurst analyzes similar passages of an earlier draft which he dates to October 1, 1953 and makes a number of observations which have an affinity with mine. However, the main thrusts of our arguments and analyses are completely different since Medhurst is concerned with the strategic use of language in itself while I am interested in the influence of RCH on the ideas which language expresses. Moreover, Medhurst attributes the writing and ideas of this speech to Special Assistant to the President for cold war strategy C.D. Jackson, Chairman Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, and speechwriter Emmet Hughes, whereas I focus on Eisenhower’s own handwritten changes and ideas, ideas which he expressed independently in his diary, his letter to Swede Hazlett, and his memoirs. I have therefore triangulated Eisenhower’s ideas, and they are consistent. Hence I argue that Eisenhower’s speech expressed ideas which are his own even though, as Eisenhower acknowledged to Swede Hazlett above, he had help.

⁵⁰⁸ The quotations of the unedited draft and Eisenhower’s editing are taken from “Draft of Presidential Speech Before the General Assembly of the United Nations,” Draft #5, November 28, 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 25 “Atoms for Peace -- Evolution (2),” accessed February 6, 2013, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Atoms_for_Peace_Draft.pdf. The quotations from the final address are taken from Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City,” December 8, 1953, accessed February 06, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9774>.

Second, a streamlined reference at once implied that atomic weapons were a resource with which the United States military was completely comfortable in terms of the ability to employ them for operational use, that these weapons were in some respects like conventional weapons, and that the United States could and would use such weapons defensively. In other words, nuclear weapons were just means which the United States could and would employ on just grounds.

Third, Eisenhower adopted an encompassing perspective of nuclear technology which included all four nations with atomic knowledge. (The fourth country with nuclear know-how in Eisenhower's mind, in addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, was Canada: Canada was privy to US-UK cooperation since World War II. Even at this early state, nuclear knowledge was recognized to be distinct the possession, or even the desire to possess, atomic weapons.) Eisenhower's inclusiveness coheres with his apparent philosophy of government which envisions sovereignty as responsibility for the common good.

Finally, Eisenhower's instinct was to play down the punishing blow that would be sustained by an aggressor. He instead added an appeal to common humanity with which Calvin would sympathize. This choice further reinforces the impression that Eisenhower's philosophy of government has a "responsibility" rather than "prerogative" approach to sovereignty.

From a rhetorical point of view, it is clear this section of the speech engaged two audiences at once. However, for purposes of this dissertation the key lessons in the evolution of this address are that the changes made by Eisenhower reflect the DMF predicted on the basis of his RCH. Moreover, even alterations made between the time he made emendations in his own hand and the time he delivered the speech reflect the DMF of the president.

Second, Eisenhower moved from the report to the catalog – the West's track record. Eisenhower emphasized past US and Western efforts to secure peace and justice and implied the Soviets were intransigent spoilers.

Third, Eisenhower offered the Soviets a way to be cooperative through the IAEA proposal. Eisenhower couched his language in terms of a recent UN Disarmament Commission study, so there was a frame of reference already in place, and the frame of reference was one of disarmament. Thus committed to arms control, Eisenhower moved to challenge the Soviets as he argued for peaceful atomic energy. The majority of the world at that time would have been in need of energy, food, and medicine, so Eisenhower's shift would have been attractive to a broad international audience, for the United States was offering to share with the less fortunate.

Eisenhower's speech envisioned disarmament as desirable but not necessarily immediately achievable. It did not establish a framework for disarmament as such. It did, however, position the United States with respect to the peaceful use of atomic energy. It publically called upon the Soviets to cooperate. It reflected the president's RCH.

SUMMARY

I expected this chapter to be comparable to Craig's account of the paradoxes of the Eisenhower-era Cold War. As Craig tells it, by the middle of the 1950s the enormity of thermonuclear war became so appalling to Eisenhower that it had to be avoided at all costs, for general war would amount to destroying the American way of life in order to save it. Craig's account of the Berlin crisis is particularly good account of Eisenhower's skillful efforts to avoid yielding to Khrushchev's ultimatums by pursuing a policy of evasive postponement. Moreover, throughout Craig shows how Dulles managed to make Eisenhower moderate his position in order to achieve consensus within his own

administration. I expected to tell the story with a different stress refracted through the prism of religious cultural heritage, thereby adding color to Craig's insights and adding a broader spectrum of appreciation for the role of RCH in nuclear diplomacy.

In some ways, I found what I anticipated. For example, Eisenhower defined a preventive war as "some sort of quick police action in order that you might avoid a terrific cataclysm of destruction later." He believed there were "all sorts of reasons, moral and political and everything else, against this theory."⁵⁰⁹ Such data cohere both with Craig's argument and my hypothesis. Much of the data in this chapter emphasize the objectives, motivations, and values implicit in Eisenhower's language and policies.

However, there are data which go beyond a Craig-like framework. For Eisenhower to express that "he wished there was no moral restriction that prevented him from one night pushing the proper button and sending all of our atomic bombs in the direction of the Communist bloc"⁵¹⁰ seems anomalous if one were to have, as I had, presupposed Craig's viewpoint as the default. Instead, this "strongest statement"⁵¹¹ late in Eisenhower's presidency calls into question the idea that Eisenhower evolved from a hawk to a dove in nuclear matters. Thus, this chapter supplements and enriches the insights of Craig and other scholars by broadening our understanding of the apparent incongruities of Eisenhower and his nuclear decisions. The continuity of RCH principles, applied to specific problems of making policies and making decisions, provides a unifying thread, especially in terms of viewing sovereignty as responsibility for the common good, implicitly distinguishing between force and violence, and dealing with

⁵⁰⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The President's News Conference," August 11, 1954, accessed July 12, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9977>.

⁵¹⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61* (Ann Whitman File), Ann Whitman Diary Series, ACW Diary September 1960, Box 11, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum, Abilene, KS.

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

conscience and credibility. For these reasons, although the approach is distinctly different from that of Truman, the DMF of Eisenhower does fit as expected a just war framework commensurate with the president's exposure to RCH.

Chapter 5: Ronald Wilson Reagan

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I examine President Ronald Wilson Reagan's religious cultural heritage. I predict a just war framework will describe his nuclear decisions, so I connect his philosophical ethics, his philosophy of government, and his philosophy of human nature to a just-war decision-making framework. However, Reagan did not deal with nuclear crises comparable to those under Truman and Eisenhower. Instead, I look at Reagan's approach to nuclear control, reduction, and abolition in terms of right and wrong, the role of government, and the nature of the person. In particular, I explore Reagan's RCH-DMF coherence through important foreign policy speeches (including his "Evil Empire" speech and the "Star Wars" speech and program), through other policy choices, and finally through his sustained effort of quiet diplomacy which was his overarching foreign and nuclear policy. I then move on to explore Reagan's substantive policies both before and after Gorbachev. Since this chapter's approach is necessarily less crisp and more interpretive than the earlier chapters on Truman and Eisenhower, I begin by contrasting my findings with prior literature to show both the distinctiveness and the plausibility of my conclusions. In the end, Reagan's decisions are indeed commensurate with the predicted framework of just war thought. Reagan balanced principle and pragmatism, decisive stands and openness to dialogue. This balance reflects the other-centered, defensively-oriented, selectively-engaging approach of the just war framework and explains why commentators who focus on only one aspect of the balance capture only partial truths which cannot resolve the paradox of Reagan's sometimes-hawkish, sometimes-dovish nuclear decision-making.

REAGAN IN PRIOR WORK

Reagan, as a candidate and as a president, looked upon détente as a means used by the Soviets. The bulk of Reagan's critique of détente was directed toward the early 1970s, but Reagan did criticize President Carter for lack of leadership. This distinction permitted Reagan to preserve some continuity with Carter while maintaining self-consistency: Reagan used quiet diplomacy for negotiating from strength rather than for attempting to lead by example because, from his view of the history of defense spending, the Soviets had not followed US examples in the past. Reagan then used his principles, values, interests, morality, and view of human nature to pursue a foreign policy that sought not only to achieve better-than-SALT-II results but to drive the Soviet Union to the brink of collapse.⁵¹²

My viewpoint contrasts with other literature. Much has been written on internal friction within Reagan's administration – although the Schultz-Weinberger conflict could perhaps be diversified to a manifold contrast of Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey (proxy force in Central America), the Pentagon (decisive force in Lebanon), Secretary of State George Schultz (military power in support of diplomacy), and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (threats, norms, and politics). Consider the following.

I analyze Reagan's public speeches in order to understand his approach to the US-Soviet relationship. In this way account follows the spirit of Halliday. Halliday thoroughly reviewed the Cold War through 1985. Although he listed a number of explanations for the Cold War (which he divides into four periods: First Cold War 1946-

⁵¹² Brian Muzas, "Carter/Reagan and the Adjustment to the Collapse of Détente" (paper presented at *Retrenchment and/or Renewal: Grand Strategy in Times of Fiscal Constraint*, the Strategic Studies Institute with the Triangle Institute for Security Studies and the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Chapel Hill, NC, November 9-10, 2012).

1953, Oscillatory Antagonism 1953-1969, Detente 1969-1979, and Second Cold War 1979 onward), Halliday assumed détente to be the default setting of the superpower relationship. As such, détente is not well explained.⁵¹³ For this reason it makes sense to rely, as I do, on Reagan's public statements to glean his understanding of the dynamics of the superpower relationship.

Furthermore, my argument takes structural realities, ideational factors, and presidential personality seriously. Oberdorfer's extended journalistic account of the end of the Cold War, which he called a contemporary history, spans 1983 to 1990. Fortified with key informant interviews from both the US and Soviet side, some of his data were gleaned under not-for-attribution ground rules. As such, Oberdorfer's book should be considered a good first account and starting point. Although he did not offer a theory to explain how systemic factors, ideas, and personalities came together to form the rich history he relates, Oberdorfer leaned toward highlighting the importance of the individual players who came together to negotiate and to reassess military power.⁵¹⁴ My approach, bridging as it does the coverage of Halliday and Oberdorfer, allows me to better capture Reagan's approach to Soviet policy via quiet diplomacy. In addition, my approach is theoretically motivated.

I contend that Reagan has a strategic vision which flows from a moral vision formed and informed in important respects by RCH. My viewpoint contrasts with that which Zelizer has expressed. Zelizer set out to catalog national security politics from the end of the Second World War to the War on Terrorism. Although he asked four overarching questions (to which his analysis never returned and by which his analysis

⁵¹³ Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso Editions and NLB, 1986).

⁵¹⁴ Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War to the New Era, The United States and the Soviet Union 1983-1990* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991).

was never structured), the undercurrent of Zelizer's analysis was that any Cold War bipartisan consensus concerning foreign policy is a myth. In particular, Zelizer did not see Reagan operating from a mandate, a strategic vision, or a moral vision. Rather, he saw Reagan, whose closeness with Gorbachev made conservatives indignant, as working from "a defensive posture born out of the challenges of governance" and hampered by "the institutional and ideological obstacles that conservatives faced."⁵¹⁵ If Zelizer is right about the lack of bipartisan foreign policy consensus, and I believe he is, then any continuity between Carter and Reagan in strategic and moral outlook is all the more intriguing. Moreover, if Reagan's main constraints were governance, institutional, and ideological obstacles, then fiscal constraints fade in importance while RCH remains a plausible factor. I therefore disagree with Zelizer and claim that Reagan did indeed have both a strategic and moral vision, both of which were influenced by RCH.

In some ways my argument is related to Garthoff's analysis. Garthoff, treating détente as a whole, cast détente's apparent failure in terms of conflicting US-Soviet conceptions of détente: The United States wanted to shepherd the Soviets into the era of parity while the Soviets wanted to ease the United States into a less expansive international role. Each side thus wished to manage the other toward contrary directions. Overburdened by the expectations both of the public and of policymakers, adorned with general principles but bereft of specifics, the realistic political pursuits undertaken by the United States and the USSR disillusioned those who expected principle to be met in practice. Yet the inability to deliver upon the promise of détente meant neither that it was tried and failed nor that it was never tried.⁵¹⁶ In this sense, Garthoff's approach comes

⁵¹⁵ Julian E. Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—From World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 354.

⁵¹⁶ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, revised ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1994).

closest to mine. Détente was certainly tried. I differ from Garthoff in that I stress how Reagan appropriated human rights, religious cultural heritage, morality, and philosophical anthropology to pursue quiet diplomacy by continuing to seek realistic politics with openhanded offers of competition or cooperation. Reagan took “yes” for an answer from Gorbachev on the INF proposal but only after comparable offers of deep cuts had been rejected the decade earlier. Moreover, the connections between Reagan’s RCH and his DMF are particularly salient when one considers the Christian approach to sovereignty as one of responsibility for the common good. It seems probable that someone like Augustine, keenly aware of the fallen and broken nature of the political order in the city of man, would recognize Reagan’s connection between a just nuclear defense and a realistic but optimist Cold War policy.

TOWARD UNIFYING DICHOTOMOUS PERSPECTIVES ON REAGAN

As is clear from the above, Reagan’s Cold War role is debated. Some have emphasized the largest peacetime military buildup over which Reagan presided as well as the aggressive tone of Reagan’s diplomatic speech toward the Soviet Union. In contrast to a story of decisive action and fiery rhetoric, others have stressed how Reagan from 1984 onward adjusted his words and deeds toward conflict resolution and arms reduction, dovetailing with Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms which eventually led to the end of the Soviet Union. These two groups agree Reagan’s role was central to the Cold War’s denouement, but they disagree on precisely the role Reagan played.

The former school of thought can be illustrated by Krauthammer’s claim that Reagan’s Westminster Address took the “first step in the restoration of democratic militance” when he called for the “vigorous defense of the ideas of democratic revolution, not just in theory, not just as a spiritual or a political movement, but an actual

revolution by democrats against the Soviet empire.”⁵¹⁷ Similar is Noonan’s assessment that the speech “signaled the beginning of a massive shift: from the defensive crouch in which the Western democracies had long huddled into a tall-walking, truth-telling style of faithfulness that would ultimately move mountains.”⁵¹⁸ Diggins likewise identified the perspective that Reagan was essential to forcing the Soviet Union to bring the Cold War to an end.⁵¹⁹ A rather triumphant characterization was offered by Muravchick who wrote how “Reagan’s belligerent approach” led to “sublime victory” over the Soviet’s “mighty juggernaut.”⁵²⁰

While in agreement that Reagan was hostile toward Soviet intentions, the latter school of thought finds fault with Reagan’s tone, considering his characterization of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” and “the focus of evil in the modern world”⁵²¹ to be harsh to the point of provoking war. Lewis commented that Reagan’s “Evil Empire” speech was variously “simplistic,” “sectarian,” “dangerous,” “outrageous,” and even “primitive.”⁵²² Harsch contended that Reagan’s reasoning would lead “logically to an arms race, to confrontation, to avoidance of negotiation, and would someday, in logic, point toward war.”⁵²³

⁵¹⁷ Charles Krauthammer, “The Ash Heap of History: President Reagan’s Westminster Address 20 Years Later,” Heritage Foundation, June 3, 2002, accessed May 3, 2013, http://www.reagansheritage.org/html/reagan_panel_kraut.shtml.

⁵¹⁸ Peggy Noonan, *When Character Was King: A Story of Ronald Reagan* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2001), 209.

⁵¹⁹ See, for example, John Patrick Diggins, *Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 401, 353.

⁵²⁰ Joshua Muravchik, “The Past, Present, and Future of Neoconservatism,” *Commentary*, October, 2007, accessed May 3, 2013, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-past-present-and-future-of-neoconservatism/>.

⁵²¹ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida,” March 8, 1983, accessed May 3, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41023>.

⁵²² Anthony Lewis, “Onward Christian Soldiers,” *New York Times*, March 10, 1983, A27.

⁵²³ Joseph Harsch, “Are Russians Human,” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 26, 1983, 22.

I argue that neither of the above approaches is complete. The contradictions can be partially resolved by recourse to more balanced critique. Lettow, arguing that Reagan both supported genuine arms control and was truly afraid of nuclear war, has stated, “Reagan’s anti-nuclearism is one of the best kept secrets of his political career, for it fails to conform to conventional wisdom,” and continued, “Reagan’s nuclear abolitionism was visionary, even utopian.”⁵²⁴ Gaddis stated that “almost everybody at the time missed” the several times Reagan called for nuclear abolition, for those calls “defied so many stereotypes” that few could believe Reagan truly held that such weapons should be eliminated.⁵²⁵ Strobe Talbott viewed Reagan as a “radical... nuclear abolitionist.”⁵²⁶ Cannon and Cirincione respectively concluded, “Reagan’s vision of nuclear apocalypse and his deeply rooted conviction that the weapons that could cause this hell on earth should be abolished would ultimately prove more powerful than his anticommunism,”⁵²⁷ and, “Those who dismissed Reagan’s own repeated statements on the need for disarmament were... wrong.”⁵²⁸

Moreover, I observe that Reagan refused to undertake or even consider actions which would have been genuinely provocative. Diggins quoted an adviser’s assessment that Reagan had “the reputation of being a gunslinger” but was in fact “the most cautious, conservative guy” in meetings;⁵²⁹ in his own words, Diggins stated that, although “many of his admirers still think [Reagan] was the John Wayne of the cold war... [he] was just

⁵²⁴ Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2005), xi.

⁵²⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 226, 227.

⁵²⁶ Quoted in Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 292.

⁵²⁷ Cannon, 323.

⁵²⁸ Joseph Cirincione, “The Greatest Threat to Us All,” *New York Review of Books*, March 8, 2008, 20.

⁵²⁹ Diggins, 258.

the opposite.”⁵³⁰ Cannon and Cannon are in agreement, having called Reagan “a pragmatist, a negotiator, a diplomat, and a statesman” who was in fact “unconfined by ideology.”⁵³¹

Turning to the 1984-adjustment school of thought, some have argued that Reagan’s words and policies were contradictory or at least confusing; such writers stress confrontation from 1981 to 1983 and arms control thereafter. Diggins, who stated that a “president who seemed to start out a hawk and end a dove was indeed a riddle,” resolved the contradiction by claiming Reagan’s “growing fear of nuclear escalation veering out of control” led to “a profound change” his attitudes, language, and behavior such that while “his cold war speeches has once been confrontational and accusatory, they were now conciliatory and mollifying.”⁵³² Ambassador Matlock believed a “shift in focus of the president’s statements” began in late 1983 “because it represented Reagan’s aspirations for his record as president.”⁵³³ Fischer has called 1981-1983 a “Zero-Sum Competition” but 1984-1985 a “Combination of Common Interests and Rivalry” and has dated the crossover point to January 16, 1984 when Reagan called for “cooperation and understanding [that] was a significant change in the US Soviet policy [because] it reversed the administration’s earlier confrontational posture toward the Kremlin.”⁵³⁴

⁵³⁰ Ibid., 35.

⁵³¹ Lou Cannon and Carl M. Cannon, *Reagan’s Disciple: George W. Bush’s Troubled Quest for a Presidential Legacy* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 54.

⁵³² Diggins, 12, 354.

⁵³³ Jack F. Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004), 78.

⁵³⁴ Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 8, 35; Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations,” January 16, 1984. The presidential speech in question is Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations,” January 16, 1984, accessed May 3, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39806>.

Criticism that Reagan had abandoned his early hard line is exemplified by some reactions to Reagan's Moscow State University speech and the Moscow summit in general. Buckley opined that "to greet [the USSR] as if it were no longer evil is on the order of changing our entire position toward Adolf Hitler,"⁵³⁵ and Will claimed Reagan had "accelerated the moral disarmament of the West—actual disarmament will follow—by elevating wishful thinking to the status of political philosophy."⁵³⁶ According to Diggins, the resulting situation left many neoconservatives "glad to see Reagan retire to California while they awaited their next chance to advise a president on deploying power and bringing America's enemies to their knees."⁵³⁷

However, I argue that the adjustment school of thought is also incomplete, for Reagan continued to make strident remarks after 1983. The Brandenburg Gate speech (of "tear down this wall" and "open this gate" fame), as well as his early speeches, combined strong critiques, even attacks, on the USSR with forceful arguments in favor of arms control.⁵³⁸ Mann has noted that Secretary of State George Schultz and other State Department and National Security Council personnel "tried repeatedly but in vain to

⁵³⁵ William F. Buckley, "So Long, Evil Empire," *National Review*, July 8, 1988, 57.

⁵³⁶ George Will, "How Reagan Changed America," *Newsweek*, January 9, 1989, 13.

⁵³⁷ Diggins, 192-193.

⁵³⁸ In this chapter I treat as Reagan's key speeches the Eureka College commencement address, the Westminster Address to the U.K. Parliament, the "Evil Empire" speech, the "Star Wars" speech, the January 16, 1984 treatment of Soviet policy, the Brandenburg Gate speech, and the Moscow State University speech. I cited the "Evil Empire" and January, 1984 speeches above. The other speeches may be found as follows: for the Eureka College speech, see Ronald Reagan, "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College, Eureka, Illinois," May 9, 1982, accessed May 3, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42501>; for the Westminster speech, see Ronald Reagan, "Address to Members of the British Parliament," June 8, 1982, accessed May 3, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42614>; for the "Star Wars" speech, see Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security," March 23, 1983, accessed May 3, 1983, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41093>; for the Brandenburg Gate address, see Ronald Reagan, "Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin," June 12, 1987, accessed May 3, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=34390>; and for the Moscow State address, see Ronald Reagan, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the Students and Faculty at Moscow State University," May 31, 1988, accessed May 3, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35897>.

persuade Reagan to change the Berlin Wall speech and to remove its critical sentence.”⁵³⁹ Told of objections to the tone of the speech, Reagan reminded his aides, “I’m the president, aren’t I?” and reportedly said that “the boys at State are going to kill me, but [keeping that line in the speech is] the right thing to do.”⁵⁴⁰

By adding RCH to considerations raised in the preceding paragraphs, I illustrate that both of the first two disagreeing groups are partly right. Reagan’s words and actions did indeed matter, but his central strategy seems to have eluded the above perspectives. Reagan’s approach to the USSR was principled and pragmatic, but to understand his strategy one must first understand one of the main sources of his underlying principles, namely Christian religious cultural heritage. To do so will help resolve the hawk-or-dove paradox which Reagan seems to pose.

RONALD WILSON REAGAN’S RCH

Reagan’s RCH was principally the Christian Church, also known as the Disciples of Christ (DOC); even though Reagan’s father was Catholic, he left all aspects of his son’s religious upbringing to her.⁵⁴¹ Reagan wrote in a 1967 letter, “I was raised in the Christian Church which as you know believes in baptism when the individual has made his own decision to accept Jesus. My decision was made in my early teens.”⁵⁴² Reagan always listed himself as a member of the Disciples of Christ even though he did not always attend that denomination.⁵⁴³

⁵³⁹ James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Viking, 2009), 344.

⁵⁴⁰ Peter Robinson, *How Ronald Reagan Changed My Life* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003), 103.

⁵⁴¹ Paul Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan: A Spiritual Life* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 4.

⁵⁴² Ronald Reagan, letter to Mrs Warne, ca. 1967, in Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson, *Reagan: A Life in Letters* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 276. This timing places Reagan’s remark after completing his second term as Governor of California but before the founding of the Moral Majority, a conservative Christian organization, in 1979.

⁵⁴³ Kengor, 49.

Although a taxonomist of religion probably would not classify the Disciples of Christ as an evangelical denomination, Reagan nevertheless frequently used language evocative of the evangelical emphasis on a definitive decision for Jesus Christ, as when Reagan wrote, “Yes, I do have a close and deeply felt relationship with Christ and believe I have experienced what you refer to as being born again.”⁵⁴⁴ Moreover, Reagan emphasized that he did not merely know *about* Christ but rather *knew* Christ. He told the evangelical president of the Southern Baptist Convention, “I *know* Him,” when he was asked about this very distinction.⁵⁴⁵ This interpretation is noteworthy in Reagan’s decision to join the church of his mother, especially since the Disciples of Christ emphasize a reasoned belief in the Gospel message rather than a conversion experience as such. One Reagan biographer states, “At a relatively young age Reagan’s became an intellectual Christianity, and it would remain so. But his religious beliefs were always marked by a degree of emotionality, and there’s no doubt that the emotional appeal of religion was a key factor in his boyhood.”⁵⁴⁶ In fact, according to Richard V. Allen and William P. Clark, “Reagan’s Christianity was not wedded to a particular, formal denomination.”⁵⁴⁷ Along these lines, and reconnecting with the Catholic heritage of Reagan’s father, it is interesting to note that Reagan’s first wife, Jane Wyman, taught Sunday school at Beverly Christian Church (DOC) but “converted to Catholicism in

⁵⁴⁴ Ronald Reagan, letter to Dorothy D. Conaghan, ca. 1976, in Skinner et al., 256. It is hard to know why Reagan would have identified himself as such. I take the position that, taken together with the other evidence presented, that this datum simply expresses Reagan’s personal belief using vocabulary mutually intelligible to him and his reader. Of course, it is possible that, with the rise of the Christian Right, Reagan could have been influenced by members of his own party or simply naïvely reflected the linguistic conventions of those with whom he was speaking. It seems unlikely that he sought to distinguish himself for political advantage, for the other two major candidates in the 1980 election also considered themselves born-again Christians. See Glenn H. Utter and James L. True, *Conservative Christians and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook* (Santa Barbara, Denver, and Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 137.

⁵⁴⁵ Kengor, 152.

⁵⁴⁶ Kengor, 4.

⁵⁴⁷ Kengor, 367, note 25.

1953, and she and her two children were all baptized into the Catholic faith. Reagan was careful to respect his ex-wife's wishes: He had long ago learned to respect the beliefs of a Catholic parent."⁵⁴⁸

Harold Bell Wright's evangelical novel, *That Printer of Udell's*, taught the 11-year-old⁵⁴⁹ Reagan about "practical," or applied, Christianity. Reagan biographer Edmund Morris has stated that Reagan once shyly told him that the book "made him 'a practical Christian.'"⁵⁵⁰ The approaches to social welfare and subsidiarity (although Reagan might not have recognized that term) found throughout the novel bear relationship to policies he supported as an adult.⁵⁵¹ Kengor sums up,

The lesson of Udell's is that a Christian must honestly stand by his convictions, actively helping those in need. He must boldly follow God's will, and not be silent or cowardly in attacking evil. He must proselytize and evangelize, making no excuses. Parking one's Christianity at the door is simply not what Jesus wants; it is not an option. This, Udell's conveyed, is the only true recipe for betterment—for changing the world.⁵⁵²

Now, this is not just an ethic. This is, in embryo, a philosophy of government and a philosophical anthropology because, on the one hand, it recognizes limitations on the ability of the state to change the world for the better and, on the other hand, it addresses human nature, its limitations, and its orientation toward the good and the better. Indeed, "[t]he most lasting effect of these years was how surely the instilled in Reagan the conviction that God had a special plan for everyone, and for America as a whole. To Reagan that conviction became a charge for himself, his country, and his world."⁵⁵³

⁵⁴⁸ Kengor, 50.

⁵⁴⁹ Kengor, 21.

⁵⁵⁰ Edmund Morris, *Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan* (New York: Random House, 2000), 40. On reading the book, the young Reagan said, "I want to be like that man, and I want to be baptized." Morris, 42.

⁵⁵¹ Kengor, 23.

⁵⁵² Kengor, 26.

⁵⁵³ Kengor, 40.

Reagan prayed frequently. In addition to mentioning prayer throughout his autobiography, Reagan wrote a Roman Catholic nun, “I believe in intercessory prayer and know I have benefited from it.” He continued, “I have, of course, added my own prayers to the point that sometimes I wonder if the Lord doesn’t say, ‘here he comes again.’”⁵⁵⁴ Another time he said, “There hasn’t been a serious crisis in my life when I haven’t prayed, and when prayer hasn’t helped me.”⁵⁵⁵

At times, Reagan seems almost a throwback to an earlier period. In 1967, Reagan said, “Can you name one problem that would not be solved if we had simply followed the teachings of the man from Galilee?”⁵⁵⁶ This quotation compares well with Eisenhower’s comment on following the Bible that problems might solve themselves. Reagan commented in 1973, “If we lived by the Golden Rule, there would be no need for other laws.”⁵⁵⁷ This quotation compares well with the thoughts of President Truman presented previously. It is significant that these quotations are consistent with Reagan’s later policies as president since his “religious faith was, at best, dismissed or ridiculed” during his two terms.⁵⁵⁸

In further terms of motivation, Reagan knew that Christian Scripture and Christ Himself command opposition to evil with all one’s might. Reagan thought of himself as a voice for the voiceless. “To prisoners of conscience throughout the world, take heart; you have not been forgotten. We, your brothers and sisters in God, have made your cause our

⁵⁵⁴ Ronald Reagan, letter to Sister Mary Ignatius, November 26, 1984, in Skinner et al., *Reagan*, 280.

⁵⁵⁵ Kengor, 49.

⁵⁵⁶ Ronald Reagan, “The Value of Understanding Our Past,” Eureka College, September 28, 1967, in *A Time for Choosing: The Speeches of Ronald Reagan, 1961-1982* (Regnery Press, 1983), 83.

⁵⁵⁷ Frederick J. Ryan, Jr., ed., *Ronald Reagan: The Wisdom and Humor of the Great Communicator* (San Francisco: Collins Publishers, 1995), 115.

⁵⁵⁸ Lettow, 330.

cause, and we vow never to relent until you have regained the freedom that is your birthright as a child of God.”⁵⁵⁹ After this presidency he said,

For too long our leaders were unable to describe the Soviet Union as it actually was. The keepers of our foreign-policy knowledge—in other words, most liberal foreign-affairs scholars, the State Department, and various columnists—found it illiberal and provocative to be so honest. I’ve always believed, however, that it’s important to define differences, because there are choices and decisions to be made in life and history.⁵⁶⁰

Such honesty was needed to cut through illusions and misperceptions. Reagan’s philosophical realism was complemented by a careful thoughtfulness and deliberation. Indeed, Reagan stated, “I made the ‘Evil Empire’ speech and others like it with malice aforethought.”⁵⁶¹ Reagan was intentional rather than capricious. Indeed, he was attacking the idea of moral equivalency. These data also suggest Reagan’s approach to war would be a form of just war called just nuclear defense⁵⁶² – and one which would incorporate the possibility of an extended deterrent to defend the defenseless.

Reagan survived an assassination attempt a mere 70 days into his presidency. He ascribed his survival to God’s will, saying “You know, since I’ve been shot, I think I’m going to rely more on my own instincts than other people’s. There a reason I’ve been saved.”⁵⁶³ On Good Friday, he conversed with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York, Terence Cardinal Cooke. The cardinal said to the president, “The hand of God was upon you.” Reagan replied, “I know. I have decided that whatever time I have left is for

⁵⁵⁹ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Conference on Religious Liberty,” April 16, 1985, accessed February 4, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38486>.

⁵⁶⁰ Reagan, *Speaking My Mind*, 168-169.

⁵⁶¹ Reagan, *An American Life*, 570.

⁵⁶² See, for example, James W. Walters, ed., *War No More? Options in Nuclear Ethics* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989). Faced with the realities of the Cold War and arms race escalation, this viewpoint developed an intermediate position between pacifism and just war; it gave provisional moral sanction to nuclear deterrence as the best that could be done under the circumstances while clearly holding pacifist ideals.

⁵⁶³ Kengor, 199-200.

Him.”⁵⁶⁴ Reagan thus declares that RCH will, in a sense, govern the remainder of his term. I take Reagan’s statement seriously and test its veracity as I explore his nuclear decisions below.

ARMS CONTROL, ARMS REDUCTION, NUCLEAR ABOLITION AS ETHICS, GOVERNMENT AND ANTHROPOLOGY

I expect President Reagan’s DMF to reflect not simply just war thinking but the deeper philosophical principles on which just war thought rests. In particular, I expect Reagan’s approach to sovereignty to be classical in form and crucial in role to understanding his DMF. Reagan saw democracy as a key way to ensure the rights inherent as expressed in philosophical anthropology.

Already at least three principles have appeared above. I expect these to be reinforced below.

First, Reagan saw the USSR as powerful, totalitarian, dangerous, and thus a force for evil which the West had to fight in order to free the people under its rule. Not only expressive of Reagan’s ethics and theory of human nature, this principle coheres with a vision of sovereignty as responsibility for the common good.

Second, Reagan valued strong defense but eschewed direct provocations since he envisioned the military buildup as the best way to deter Soviet aggression, prevent war, and create an environment conducive to arms control. Reagan implicitly distinguished between force and violence while relating ends to means in a proportionate and prudential fashion.

Third, Reagan understood the Cold War as a struggle of powerful and universal ideas and ideals which could be understood in light of, and expressed by, the language of

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid., 200.

the Enlightenment and of religion. Thus RCH served as a basis, a source of expression, and even a weapon in Reagan's approach to the Cold War.

These principles are constant at all points of Reagan's two presidential terms. Thus, I highlight the trends in the data below and connect them to the just war tradition as well as to the philosophies of ethics, government, and human nature on which they depend.

The Westminster Speech⁵⁶⁵

The above principles were on display in Reagan's address to the British Parliament on June 8, 1982. Reagan diagnosed the state of the world by saying, "There are threats now to our freedom, indeed to our very existence, that other generations could never even have imagined. There is first the threat of global war." Speaking of the nuclear thread as unprecedented, Reagan stated further that "in today's world the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it." At this point, Reagan's expression of concern for the common good could also be interpreted as enlightened self-interest. However, Reagan continued that, because of nuclear peril, "negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces now underway in Europe and the START talks — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks — which will begin later this month, are not just critical to American or Western policy; they are critical to mankind."

Reagan's approach cohered with the principle of right intention as well. He stated, "Our commitment to early success in these negotiations is firm and unshakable, and our purpose is clear: reducing the risk of war by reducing the means of waging war on both sides."

⁵⁶⁵ All quotations from the speech are taken directly from Ronald Reagan, "Address to Members of the British Parliament," June 8, 1982 as cited above.

Next, Reagan made links to philosophical anthropology (people are made for freedom) and to philosophy of government (a healthy skepticism of government lest it overreach and trample rather than uphold the tranquility of order) when he identified the second “threat posed to human freedom by the enormous power of the modern state. History teaches the dangers of government that overreaches — political control taking precedence over free economic growth, secret police, mindless bureaucracy, all combining to stifle individual excellence and personal freedom.” Thus, Reagan's approach treats both threats as deeply intertwined, almost as distinguishable but not separable.

Returning to intention, Reagan asserted, “Historians looking back at our time will note the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions of the West.” Turning to nuclear deterrence, Reagan projected that the historians of the future would “note that it was the democracies who refused to use the threat of their nuclear monopoly in the forties and early fifties for territorial or imperial gain.” Proposing a counterfactual rooted in his philosophy of government, Reagan said, “Had that nuclear monopoly been in the hands of the Communist world, the map of Europe — indeed, the world — would look very different today.” As evidence Reagan noted, and claimed that future historians would note, that “it was not the democracies that invaded Afghanistan or suppressed Polish Solidarity or used chemical and toxin warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.”

Reagan's approach to the Cold War, and nuclear weapons, is consistent in these regards. One mark of “dilemma” was “an arms race in which the West must, for its own protection, be an unwilling participant” as “totalitarian forces in the world... [seek] to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit.” Reagan wondered, “Must civilization perish in a hail of fiery atoms? Must freedom whither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil?” He argued instead that the mission at hand was

“to preserve freedom as well as peace. It may not be easy to see; but I believe we live now at a turning point.”

Reagan saw a turning point because his outlook was one of political and philosophical realism: “The hard evidence of totalitarian rule has caused in mankind an uprising of the intellect and will.” Nevertheless, his realism was tinted by RCH, subtly marked by his observation, “Since the exodus from Egypt, historians have written of those who sacrificed and struggled for freedom.” More clearly, it was the application of universal of principles which he expressed in religious as well as Enlightenment language.

Consider the following sequence of language from this speech. Starting in secular terms, Reagan stated, “Some argue that we should encourage democratic change in right-wing dictatorships, but not in Communist regimes.” To subscribe to this notion, Reagan continued, “is to invite the argument that once countries achieve a nuclear capability, they should be allowed an undisturbed reign of terror over their own citizens. We reject this course.” However, in turning to military strength as a tool to achieve a just peace, Reagan transitioned to the language of spirituality, values, beliefs, and ideals:

Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used, for the ultimate determinant in the struggle that’s now going on in the world will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve, the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the ideals to which we are dedicated.

Finally, Reagan credited his British hosts, regarding anthropology and government, in language which drew on RCH: “Here is the enduring greatness of the British contribution to mankind, the great civilized ideas: individual liberty, representative government, and the rule of law under God.” Emphasizing human nature and sovereignty as responsibility for the common good, not just enlightened self-interest, Reagan asked and answered:

“So, let us ask ourselves, ‘What kind of people do we think we are?’ And let us answer, ‘Free people, worthy of freedom and determined not only to remain so but to help others gain their freedom as well.’”⁵⁶⁶

The “Evil Empire” Speech⁵⁶⁷

Reagan’s March 8, 1983 speech to the National Association of Evangelical provides interesting fodder for analysis. Reagan quoted Jefferson, “The God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time,” and this quotation bears on human nature. Reagan also quoted Washington: “of all the dispositions and habits which tend to lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports,” and this quotation bears on philosophy of government. Reagan directly referenced theology: “We know that living in this world means dealing with what philosophers would call the phenomenology of evil or, as the theologians would put it, the doctrine of sin.” Further, “There is sin and evil in the world, and we’re enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose it with all our might.”

Reagan dealt with the “legacy of evil” in the US – and applied that word to the United States – before applying it to the USSR He dealt with racism, anti-Semitism, and other evils and quoted the Golden Rule. Reagan also assessed the decision-making framework of the Soviet Communist leaders, noting that

as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publically declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. Lenin... said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas—that’s their name for religion—or ideas that

⁵⁶⁶ It is unclear whether the language of freedom used was an intentional allusion to Biblical passages such as the fifth chapter of Galatians, particularly the first and thirteenth verses which deal both with freedom and with helping others.

⁵⁶⁷ All quotations from the speech are taken directly from Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida,” March 8, 1983, accessed February 4, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41023>.

are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.

But Reagan subsequently invited his hearers to

pray for the salvation of all those who live in that totalitarian darkness—pray that they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.

By “they,” Reagan clearly meant the leadership of the Soviet Union, not the Soviet people as a whole.

So far, Reagan’s speech might be considered a well-directed talk tailored to a serious, religious audience. However, Reagan portrayed the arms race as a contest of good and evil, not a misunderstanding.

I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority.... I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

Moreover, Reagan connected the Cold War and God.

I believe that we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written. I believe this because the course of our strength in the quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual. And because it knows no limitation, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man. For in the words of Isaiah: “He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no might He increased strength.... But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary....”

Yes, change your world. One of our Founding Fathers, Thomas Paine, said, “We have it within our power to begin the world over again.” We can do it, doing together what no one church could do by itself.

Reagan's theory of human nature, of the spiritual and the material, is couched in the language of Christian RCH. Reagan quoted deist Thomas Paine, a man who in his own words said he did "not believe in the creed professed by the Jewish church, by the Roman church, by the Greek church, by the Turkish church, by the Protestant church, not by any church that I know of,"⁵⁶⁸ yet Reagan followed up by affirming his own contrasting belief that united interreligious activity could change the world.⁵⁶⁹

William P. Clark's take on this speech is telling: "The 'Evil Empire' speech... was not so much about the Soviet Union as it was about Ronald Reagan. It was condemned by so many people, but to many of us it was probably his greatest speech because so much of it was the real Ronald Reagan."⁵⁷⁰ Clark finds this speech to contain particularly good data.

William F. Buckley, Jr., offered germane commentary as well. First, he pointed out that Reagan did say the US was not blameless but had its own "legacy of evil." Second, he connected Reagan's speech to Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address. After giving his speech, Lincoln expected that it would not be popular immediately: "Men are not flattered by being shown that there has been a difference of purpose between the

⁵⁶⁸ Thomas Paine, *The Writings of Thomas Paine, Vol. IV, 1794-1796*, Moncure Daniel Conway, ed., released February 12, 2010, updated November 16, 2012, accessed February 4, 2013, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3743/3743-h/3743-h.htm>.

⁵⁶⁹ Earlier public figures had spoken in blunt terms about the Soviets. Adlai Stevenson spoke in terms reflective of Judeo-Christian RCH: "Communism is abhorrent. It is strangulation of the individual; it is death for the soul. Americans who have surrendered to this misbegotten idea have surrendered their right to our trust. And there can be no secure place for them in our public life." Adlai Stevenson, Speech to the American Legion Convention at New York's Madison Square Garden, August, 27, 1952, in William Safire, *Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 72. In contrast, Reagan characterized American Communists as merely having been duped. To John F. Kennedy, the U.S.S.R. was the "atheistic foe" of the USA, and Communism "represents final enslavement." Moreover, "The enemy is the communist system itself—implacable, insatiable, unceasing in its drive for world domination... This [is] a struggle for supremacy between two conflicting ideologies: freedom under God versus ruthless, godless tyranny." John F. Kennedy, *Public Presidential Papers, 1961*, 341, and *Public Presidential Papers 1962*, 723n.

⁵⁷⁰ Quoted in Peter Schweizer, ed., *The Fall of the Berlin Wall: Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold War* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 76.

Almighty and them. It is a truth which I thought needed to be told.” Buckley then drew the USSR/Confederacy slavery parallel but not a godless/not godless contrast.⁵⁷¹ Nevertheless, there is an RCH resonance which is present that Buckley’s Lincoln quotation reinforces.

Liberal and Catholic historian Garry Wills had relevant reactions to the speech. “It seemed to many (and to me) that Reagan’s talk of an Evil Empire was irresponsible. Moral absolutism looses fanaticism, a dangerous thing when nuclear weapons lie ready to a trembling hand.” However, on reevaluation, Wills found instead that Reagan was attempting a risky gamble which “might not have worked. It might have blown us up. But it didn’t.” He continued, noting that Reagan was not making a ploy but stating what was obvious to him. “His evident sincerity, even simplicity, gave weight to his view—not only abroad but at home.” Wills concluded, “And, besides, the Soviet Union was evil. Weak, but evil. Few could see the obvious weakness. But he made us see the obvious evil.”⁵⁷² Reagan’s approach fuses prudential criteria, philosophical ethics, and just cause commensurate with his RCH exposure.

The “Star Wars” Speech and Program

Many models are used to explore the development of public policy. Indeed, part of Ronald Reagan’s famous Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech of March 23, 1983 suggests a rationalist approach to policy design in the context of the defense budget:

What seems to have been lost in all this debate is the simple truth of how a defense budget is arrived at. It isn’t done by deciding to spend a certain number of dollars.... We start by considering what must be done to maintain peace and review all the possible threats against our security. Then a strategy for strengthening peace and defending against those threats must be agreed upon.

⁵⁷¹ William F. Buckley, Jr., “Reagan at Orlando,” *National Review*, April 15, 1983. Lincoln as quoted by Buckley.

⁵⁷² Garry Wills, *Reagan's America: Innocents at Home* (New York: Penguin Group, 1987), xviii.

And, finally, our defense establishment must be evaluated to see what is necessary to protect against any or all of the potential threats. The cost of achieving these ends is totaled up, and the result is the budget for national defense.

There is no logical way that you can say, let's spend x billion dollars less. You can only say, which part of our defense measures do we believe we can do without and still have security against all contingencies? Anyone in the Congress who advocates a percentage or a specific dollar cut in defense spending should be made to say what part of our defenses he would eliminate, and he should be candid enough to acknowledge that his cuts mean cutting our commitments to allies or inviting greater risk or both.⁵⁷³

SDI responded to US and Soviet technological improvements. In particular, the Dauphin X-ray laser demonstration in Nevada on November 14, 1980, based on physicist Edward Teller's H-bomb principle, married two of Teller's dream weapons: hydrogen bombs in a missile-defense system.⁵⁷⁴ Also in 1980, the Soviets demonstrated their own concern for missile defense through an improvement program to the Moscow BMD system⁵⁷⁵ permitted under the ABM treaty.

SDI was more than a technological approach to a national security problem, however. LaFeber has contended that SDI can be viewed as an example of electoral politics and claimed that Reagan wished to use SDI to counter criticisms of his first administration.⁵⁷⁶ Presidential confidante Michael Weaver saw SDI as "a campaign issue [which] held out hope [while] blunting Democratic attacks on Reagan as a warmonger."⁵⁷⁷ Moreover, Robert C. McFarlane (State Department 1981-1982, Deputy

⁵⁷³ Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security," March 23, 1983, accessed July 1, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=41093&st=&st1=>.

⁵⁷⁴ David Baker, "Making of Star Wars," *New Scientist* 115 (July 9, 1987): 40. Frances FitzGerald, *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2000), 128-129.

⁵⁷⁵ Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1996), 265.

⁵⁷⁶ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1990*, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1991), 304.

⁵⁷⁷ Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents 1962-1986* (New York: Random House, 1995), 529.

National Security Advisor 1982-1983, and later National Security Advisor 1983-1985) claimed SDI could be used as “a way of recovering the negotiating leverage in arms control that the US had lost as a result of congressional opposition to the MX missile.”⁵⁷⁸

Additionally, SDI was conceived as a means toward strategic stability. Offering commentary regarding human nature in his SDI address, Reagan characterized the Soviet-American deterrence posture known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as “a sad commentary on the human condition.”⁵⁷⁹ Indeed, SDI reversed two strategic problems by reversing the offensive arms race and by beating a path away from mutual nuclear vulnerability.⁵⁸⁰ Both points would also assuage public opinion.

Moreover, SDI was seen as a possible response to the anti-nuclear and “nuclear freeze” movements. Additionally, Reagan was influenced by a 1982 draft copy of a forthcoming pastoral letter by the US National Conference of Catholic Bishops on nuclear war and peace which caused him to wonder whether the United States could intercept incoming ballistic missiles.⁵⁸¹ Reagan’s response to these groups and movements was novel because he proposed to counter directly the nuclear missile threat rather than to maintain deterrence.⁵⁸²

SDI had other strategic armament implications as well. The MX intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was a problematic question at the time. Designed to counter the latest generation of Soviet ICBMs, the funding for this missile was defeated in the House

⁵⁷⁸ Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 204.

⁵⁷⁹ Reagan, “Address to the Nation on National Security.”

⁵⁸⁰ Keith B. Payne, *Strategic Defense: “Star Wars” in Perspective* (London: Hamilton Press, 1986), 38.

⁵⁸¹ Hans Mark, conversation with author, September 2, 2008. The final version of the pastoral letter was promulgated roughly one and one half months after Reagan’s SDI address. See US Catholic Conference, *The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response* (Washington, DC, May 3, 1983), accessed November 29, 2008, <http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/TheChallengeofPeace.pdf>.

⁵⁸² Payne, *Strategic Defense*, 38.

of Representatives on December 8, 1982. SDI therefore provided an alternative means of responding to the newest Soviet ICBMs. Indeed, on February 11, 1983, in the face of US inability to field the MX missile and the growing potential that the USSR had or would achieve a first-strike capability against US ICBMs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended unanimously to President Reagan that the US pursue a national defense strategy which increased emphasis on strategic defense systems.⁵⁸³

Reagan delivered his so-called “Star Wars” speech on March 23, 1983. Policy milestones followed in short order. Reagan called for a new research and development (R&D) program to explore the feasibility of missile defense systems to be deployed at some point in the future.⁵⁸⁴ Presidential National Security Directive 119 followed on January 6, 1984 to establish SDI.⁵⁸⁵ On March 27, 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appointed US Air Force Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson as the first director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO).⁵⁸⁶ Less than one month later, on April 24, 1984, Weinberger signed the SDIO charter.⁵⁸⁷ The US Army’s Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) successfully collided with a ballistic warhead on June 10, 1984.⁵⁸⁸ The SDI agenda had been set, and American missile defense had taken off in an unprecedented direction.

Indeed, once publicly committed to SDI, Reagan himself became a policy entrepreneur who took up this cause and made it a key part of his political agenda. Mark

⁵⁸³ Missile Defense Agency Historian’s Office, “Missile Defense Timeline: 1944-2004,” accessed November 24, 2008, <http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/milestone.html>.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁸ “HOE,” *Encyclopedia Astronautica*, accessed November 30, 2008, <http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/ho.html>.

Davis, a speechwriter for Reagan, summarized the position Reagan articulated during the middle years of his presidency.

Reagan worried about a future in which many countries would possess the ability to deter or even destroy his country. His solution was to turn US deterrence doctrine upside-down, to shift to defensive technologies that he hoped to extend to the entire world. A skeptic of traditional arms control, he believed that a global defensive system could goad reluctant powers into a commonality of interests. He sought to forge a realistic confidence with which humanity would be able to turn its back on nuclear weapons for all time. To put it in contemporary terms, Reagan believed the hardware of technology could strengthen the software of diplomacy.⁵⁸⁹

In terms of timing the SDI speech followed the Evil Empire speech by only two weeks and was a surprise to much of Reagan's staff. Noteworthy in terms of timing as well is that Reagan, in 1982 and 1983 letters, "said he believed he was seeing evidence that this long-awaited 'Christian revival in our land' was beginning."⁵⁹⁰ 1982-83 was also the time period during which the American Catholic bishops, in an unusually public process, undertook to draft the pastoral letter that became *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response*. This process was considered the cause of the personnel retention problems dealt with by the Chief of Naval Operations as related in Chapter 1. The Star Wars speech was given in 1983 right before the pastoral letter was released; although intended to take wind from the sails of the nuclear freeze movement, the timing of the speech also lessened the impact of the peace pastoral.⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸⁹ Mark W. Davis, "Reagan's Real Reason For SDI," *Policy Review* (October and November 2000): 51.

⁵⁹⁰ See Kengor, 167-171.

⁵⁹¹ Since Reagan was a member of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), it is worth mentioning two DOC documents dating from 1979 and 1981. These documents represent attempts by the DOC to apply their RCH to nuclear questions around the time of the Reagan campaign and his early administration.

The 1979 DOC resolution made a number of assumptions, namely that the "militarized world of the twentieth century is an insecure and unstable one," that the arms race provokes "an upward spiral of development and acquisition of weapons and technology... but tends to undermine [world security]," that balance of terror could never work, and that US human and physical resources were decreasing at a time of budgetary increase. Reiterating DOC statements that oppose "war as a method of settling disputes between nations," the General Assembly of the DOC called on President Carter and the Congress to "question the

God in the White House and Policy Choices

Reagan appears consistently to have distinguished between national and spiritual affairs in both privately and publically. Kengor explains,

When Reagan spoke of “restoring” or “renewing” the American spirit, he was referring to the American morale—an entirely patriotic meaning of the word “spirit.” But he consistently used the term “revival,” rather than “renewal,” to describe this spiritual or religious rebirth. It is stunning to see his consistency in this specific choice of terms—and equally telling to reflect on how prevalent both these distinct, though similar, ideas were in his thinking.⁵⁹²

Thus there is a clear equivocal use of the term “spirit” for patriotic vs. RCH uses which could have been encouraged by public sensitivities about separation of church and state – but the clarity and consistency of the distinction carried into Reagan’s private life in such a way as to suggest a true reflection of Reagan’s thought and worldview. However, Reagan did tell interviewer Bob Slosser,

What I have felt for a long time is that the people in this country were hungry for what you might call a spiritual revival a return to values, to things they really

role of the United States” as arms exporter and arms racer, to pursue a comprehensive test ban, and to seek peaceful forms of conflict resolution as well as an economy not based on military production.

A 1981 DOC statement pleaded, among other things, that “governments and peoples... stop producing [nuclear] weapons and systems, and begin reducing those now in existence, and eventually abolish them altogether.” This statement is intriguing in that this DOC application of their own RCH to nuclear issues lines up well with Reagan’s own approach. However, I cannot prove a direct link, and Reagan seems to have been on the trajectory he was before this statement.

Also in the 1981 document is a different resolution which endorses “a mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons. This is an essential, verifiable first step toward lessening the risk of nuclear war and reducing the nuclear arsenals.” Reagan of course is not pro-freeze, but he is pro-verification and pro-reduction.

From the above and from the main body of the text of this chapter it is clear that Reagan’s perspective was not the only one. To some extent, Reagan was working against the mainstream. In this context his views and rhetorical draw on RCH to form, express, and sharpen his viewpoint.

The relevant parts of the two DOC documents in question can be found in Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), “From Resolution ‘Concerning Ending the Arms Race,’ adopted 1979,” in *Nuclear Disarmament: Key Statements of Popes, Bishops, Councils and Churches*, ed. Robert Heyer (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 245-247; and Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), “Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly meeting in Anaheim, California, July 31-August 5, 1981,” in *Nuclear Disarmament: Key Statements of Popes, Bishops, Councils and Churches*, ed. Robert Heyer (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 247-252.

⁵⁹² Kengor, 166.

believed in and held dear. And I always remembered that Teddy Roosevelt said this office was a bully pulpit, and I decided that if it was possible for me to help in that revival, I wanted to do that.⁵⁹³

Several of the above passages in preceding sections establish that Reagan was a man of prayer. Prayerfulness carried over into Reagan's work life as well.

Health and Human Services Secretary Margaret Heckler once suggested that cabinet meetings should begin with a prayer. It was an unusual proposal, but not unprecedented: President Eisenhower was known to open meetings with prayer on a regular basis. Reagan's reply to Heckler was simple, direct, and revealing: "I do." Reagan was already in the habit of praying before each meeting. Don Hodel, the Secretary of Energy who witnessed the exchange, said, "He both responded to the suggestion and closed the subject. There was no debate. No controversy. That was it. He prayed himself."⁵⁹⁴

This episode raises the question of the relationship between RCH and policy positions. Consider first some non-nuclear policy. In terms of education, Reagan favored permitting prayer in schools. He asked, "Can it really be true that the First Amendment can permit Nazis and Ku Klux Klansmen to march on public property, advocate the extermination of people of the Jewish faith and the subjugation of blacks, while the same amendment forbids our children from saying a prayer in school?" and noted that George Washington believed religion was a societal pillar.⁵⁹⁵ Concerning sex education, he wrote, "The educators are fearful that any references to sin or morality will be viewed as violating the church and state separation."⁵⁹⁶ Concerning abortion he said, "God's most

⁵⁹³ Bob Slosser, *Reagan Inside Out* (Nashville: W Publishing Group, 1984), 166.

⁵⁹⁴ Kengor, 173-174.

⁵⁹⁵ Ronald Reagan, "Radio Address to the Nation on Prayer in Schools," February 25, 1984, accessed February 4, 2013, <http://www.presidency.uscb.edu/ws/?pid=39565>.

⁵⁹⁶ Ronald Reagan, letter to William A. Wilson, Presidential Handwriting Files, Presidential Records, Box 18, Folder 282, Ronald Reagan Library and Museum, Simi Valley, CA.

blessed gift to His family is the gift of life. He sent us the Prince of Peace as a babe in the manger.” He continued, “I’ve said that we must be cautious in claiming God is on our side. I think the real question we must answer is, are we on His side?”⁵⁹⁷ Reagan’s opposition to racial and religious prejudice was based on the Biblical injunction to love one’s neighbor as one’s self.⁵⁹⁸

Although perhaps most clear in his positions on Communism and the Cold War, there is generous evidence that Reagan brought a Christian perspective to many policy issues including nuclear arms. Reagan framed nuclear issues in Christian fashion. Speaking of the INF treaty on December 10, 1987 (two weeks before Christmas Eve), Reagan used language encouraging “God’s children” that “we’re moving away from the so-called policy” of mutually assured destruction whereby “nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction.” Reagan continued with reference to “the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people in a promised land, the call spoken by... the Nazarene carpenter....”⁵⁹⁹ Kengor’s analysis of this moment is pertinent:

Agree or disagree, it was quite a statement: in a moment of important political transition, Reagan was calling on all Americans from the Oval office, on prime-time television, to remember the words of Christ as they reflected on what happened at the Washington Summit the previous week. It was one of the most dramatic spiritual overtures of his presidency.⁶⁰⁰

Granted, some perceived Reagan to be a shallow, unsophisticated, and unsystematic thinker and believer. Garry Wills, for example, critiqued Reagan for a “religiosity [which] barely rises above the level of superstition” and a “hodgepodge of

⁵⁹⁷ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters,” January 30, 1984, accessed February 4, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40394>.

⁵⁹⁸ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida,” March 8, 1983, accessed February 4, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41023>.

⁵⁹⁹ Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting,” December 10, 1987, accessed February 4, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33806>.

⁶⁰⁰ Kengor, 181.

make-believe beliefs.”⁶⁰¹ However, there is some interesting data on how Reagan considered Christian apocalypticism.

His talk of the Apocalypse made his advisers very nervous. Once, when Reagan was speaking openly of the Second Coming with biographer Edmund Morris, chief of staff Howard Baker walked in, saw Morris’ tape recorder, and fretted: “I tell you, Mr. President, I wish you’d quit talking about that. You upset me!” Reagan didn’t care. He went on, speaking of Gog, Meshech, Ten Kings. He talked of Armageddon so often that some biographers suggested it was an obsession of Reagan’s. The man was an open book on mystical matters.⁶⁰²

Furthermore, at one National Security planning group meeting, Ambassador Kampelman, Secretary Weinberger, Frank Carlucci, President Reagan, and others were discussing START, SDI, and the ABM treaty. As the meeting drew to a close, Reagan said, “There has to be answer to all these questions because some day people are going to ask why we didn’t do something now about getting rid of nuclear weapons.” He continued, “You know, I’ve been reading my Bible and the description of Armageddon talks about destruction, I believe, of many cities and we absolutely need to avoid that. We have to do something now.” Carlucci agreed, “We certainly need to avoid Armageddon,” and Weinberger concluded, “The answer is SDI.”⁶⁰³ Here is a connection, then, between RCH, sovereignty conceived as responsibility for the common good, and Reagan’s nuclear abolitionism.

ABLE ARCHER 83 AND *THE DAY AFTER*

The Able Archer 83 exercise has been called the closest approach to World War III.⁶⁰⁴ Although there was no deliberate nuclear brinksmanship *per se*, President Reagan’s

⁶⁰¹ Garry Wills, “Faith and the Hopefuls,” *Sojourners* (March 1988): 14-15.

⁶⁰² Kengor, 194.

⁶⁰³ Minutes of September 8, 1967 National Security Planning Group Meeting, folder NSPG 0165, September 8, 1987 [Review of United States Arms Control Positions], Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSPG Meeting File, Ronald Reagan Library and Museum, Simi Valley, CA.

⁶⁰⁴ John Lewis Gaddis and John Hashimoto. “COLD WAR Chat: Professor John Lewis Gaddis, Historian,” September 29, [1999], accessed May 6, 2013,

reaction when he learned of the near-crisis, coupled with his reaction to the ABC made-for-television movie *The Day After*, provides useful information on RCH and Reagan's DMF.

Some context is needed to understand the import of Able Archer 83 and *The Day After*. In December 12, 1979, while Jimmy Carter was still President of the United States of America, it was decided to deploy 572 new nuclear missiles in Western Europe, subsonic Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles; this development would be NATO's response to Soviet SS-20 missiles. Furthermore, early in Reagan's presidency, the United States began a series of psychological operations (PSYOPs) against the Soviet Union. Fred Iklé, the Undersecretary of Defense at that time, recalled, "Nothing was written down about it, so there would be no paper trail." As far as the role of the US Air Force, General Jack Chain of the Strategic Air Command recalled that sometimes the United State "would send bombers over the North Pole and their radars would click on" while at other times "fighter-bombers would probe their Asian or European periphery." Exercises would begin, peaking with tempos of several flights per week, and then stop as suddenly as they began. Dr. William Schneider, then the Undersecretary of State for Military Assistance and Technology recalled that it "really got to [the Soviets]" because they "didn't know what it all meant. A squadron would fly straight at Soviet airspace, and other radars would light up and units would go on alert. Then at the last minute the squadron would peel off and return home."⁶⁰⁵ The

web.archive.org/web/20081219113829/http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/guides/debate/chats/gaddis/.

⁶⁰⁵ Quotations from Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 8. As expected from the introductory materials offered in this dissertation chapter, Schweizer's thesis that the Reagan administration's three-pronged economic, geopolitical, and psychological offensive was key to the Soviet Union's demise has been contested. However, I have not found any authors who contest Schweizer's account of the PSYOP program itself.

United States Navy (USN) played a key role in the PSYOP program after President Reagan authorized the USN in March, 1981 to operate where US warships had never before exercised, including conducting maneuvers near the maritime approaches to the Soviet Union.⁶⁰⁶

Soviet intelligence went on alert in 1981 to watch for US preparations for launching a nuclear first strike against the USSR and its allies. This alert was accompanied by a new Soviet intelligence collection program to monitor and warn of US intentions. This program was known by the acronym RYAN.⁶⁰⁷ RYAN was partly a response to the PSYOPS and partly a response to the forthcoming Pershing II deployment. In late 1983, two years after the monitoring program had begun, a major war scare flared up in the Soviet Union.

A number of events led up to the scare. After the “Evil Empire” speech, Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov called Reagan both insane and a liar. This was the first personal attack by a top Soviet leader on a US president in many years.⁶⁰⁸ Andropov’s

⁶⁰⁶ See Seymour Hersh, *“The Target is Destroyed”: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It* (New York: Random House, 1986), 17. Faringdon has noted how the Navy “was the arm of service that benefited most from the Reagan administration, and it is the one that gives the clearest evidence of the ways the Americans thought at the time.” The new US maritime strategy envisioned the following three-stage process of non-nuclear “horizontal escalation” in wartime: first, the USN. would undertake the aggressive forward movement of antisubmarine forces, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft to force the Soviets to retreat to protect their fleet ballistic missile submarines; second, the USN. would destroy Soviet naval forces and push the combat toward the Soviet home waters; and finally, the USN. would complete the destruction of Soviet naval forces by means of aircraft carrier strikes against the Soviet interior, northern, and central NATO-Warsaw Pact fronts. See Hugh Faringdon, *Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Superpowers*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1989), 144.

⁶⁰⁷ RYAN stands for *raketno-yadernoye napadenie*, or “nuclear-missile attack.” The term VRYAN has an additional letter for *vnezapnoe* or “surprise.” See Yuri B. Shvets, *Washington Station: My Life as a KGB Spy in America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 74; Oleg Kalugin with Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) refers on page 302 to a “brand-new program (the English-language acronym was RYAN)” which “was created to gather information on a potential American first nuclear strike.”

⁶⁰⁸ In a private November 1982 conversation in Moscow with Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, and Ambassador Arthur Hartman Leonid Brezhnev’s funeral, Andropov said, “Periodically excesses of rhetoric will appear in our relationship, but it is best to pay attention to the business at hand.”

allegations reacted in part to President Reagan's assertion that the USSR had violated a self-imposed moratorium on the deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles facing Western Europe. In fact, the President's statement was technically incorrect, for the Soviet moratorium had been cleverly worded to give the impression that all deployments would cease immediately, but the fine print showed the Soviets did not include in their moratorium the SS-20 launchers then under construction but as yet uncompleted. Tensions, having been compounded by the "Star Wars" speech the next month, were brought to an even higher level when a Soviet interceptor shot down civilian airliner KAL 007 on September 1, 1983.⁶⁰⁹

On September 26, 1983, a Soviet orbital early warning system reported a single intercontinental ballistic missile launch from the territory of the United States. Later, the system reported four more missiles headed toward the Soviet Union. All reports were correctly interpreted as false, but this incident surely did not make the Soviets less anxious at the time.⁶¹⁰

Such was the setting when NATO exercise Able Archer 83 was held November 2-11, 1983. New to the 1983 version of this annual exercise were unique coded communications, radio silences, and a simulated DEFCON 1 nuclear alert. President Reagan, Vice President George H. W. Bush, and Secretary of Defense Caspar

George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1993), 126. Andropov did not put his own advice into practice and did not soften his own attacks on the United States even after President Reagan moderated his statements on the Soviet Union.

⁶⁰⁹ By the day after the tragedy, the CIA and the NSA had concluded the Soviets probably had not known the intruder was a civilian aircraft and may have thought it was on an intelligence-gathering mission. See Shultz, 363; also cited in Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 199, n. 107. Nevertheless, Reagan condemned the attack as the "Korean airline massacre," a "crime against humanity [which] must never be forgotten," and an "act of barbarism ... [and] inhuman brutality." Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on the Soviet Attack on a Korean Civilian Airliner," September 5, 1983, accessed May 6, 2013, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/90583a.htm>.

⁶¹⁰ Roman Schmalz, *My Life in Stalin's Russia: A Collection of Memoirs* ([Mustang, OK]: Tate Publishing and Enterprises, 2007), 28-29.

Weinberger were originally to participate in the exercise, but Robert McFarlane, who had become National Security Advisor only two weeks earlier, recognized the potential implications of such participation and rejected it.⁶¹¹ Nevertheless, the 1983 exercise was realistic enough, and the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were troubled enough, that some members of the Politburo and the Soviet military believed Able Archer 83 to be a ruse to cover preparations for a genuine nuclear first strike.⁶¹² In response, the Soviets readied their nuclear forces and placed air units in East Germany and Poland on alert.⁶¹³

Although Reagan was not involved in the exercise due to McFarlane's decision, President Reagan watched *The Day After* on November 5, 1983, the fourth day of Able Archer 83 and fifteen days before it was televised on ABC. There was RCH in the film. The obvious example was a scene in which a man dressed in clerical attire delivers a sermon in the remains of a bombed-out church. The more interesting, subtle, and pervasive RCH in the film is musical. The score of *The Day After* is recycled from the score written by Virgil Thomson for the depression-era film *The River*. Thomson's score includes several well-known American hymn tunes. For example, the film opens and

⁶¹¹ Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 65.

⁶¹² Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 123, 131; Peter Vincent Pry, *War Scare: Russia and American on the Nuclear Brink* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999), 37–39. It is worth noting here that the first Pershing II missiles did not deploy to West Germany until late November and were not operational until mid-December.

⁶¹³ Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War*, 66. British accounts of Able Archer 83 can be found in Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Birds: The Dramatic Stories of the Top Soviet Spies Who Have Defected Since World War II* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), 329-330; Geoffrey Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), 122-123; and Nicholas Bethell, *Spies and Other Secrets: Memoirs from the Second Cold War* (New York: Viking, 1994), 191. Brook-Shepherd writes on page 330 that the West “was totally unaware of at the time [of] how far it had really passed through a war danger zone.... This was not a surge of Soviet aggression, but a spasm of Soviet panic.” Bethell writes of the same incident on page 191 that the Soviets “did apparently fear that the West might be about to launch a nuclear strike upon them. This was the most dramatic and the most conclusive confirmation there has been of the Soviet need for reassurance.”

closes to the hymn tune associated with the hymn text “How Firm a Foundation, Ye Saints of the Lord” and included the hymn tune associated with the text “My Shepherd Will Supply My Need.” Although it is plausible that Reagan would have recognized these famous tunes, I can find no evidence that this form of RCH registered when he watched the film. However, there is ample evidence the film did indeed affect the president. Reagan wrote in his diary that the film was “very effective and left me greatly depressed,”⁶¹⁴ and wrote in his autobiography that it changed his mind on nuclear policy.⁶¹⁵ The film was also screened for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Steven Puchinick, a government advisor on terrorist psychology who attended the screening and who was a friend of director Nicholas Meyer, told him, “If you wanted to draw blood, you did it. Those guys sat there like they were turned to stone,” thereby offering further evidence of the film’s impact.⁶¹⁶

This impact would still have been fresh for Reagan when he learned of the Soviet response to Able Archer 83. President Reagan said in his memoirs—without reference to Able Archer 83—that in late 1983 he was surprised to learn that “many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans,” and “many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike.”⁶¹⁷ Several weeks after the exercise

the London CIA station reported... the Soviets had been alarmed about the real possibility that the United States was preparing a nuclear attack against them. [National Security Adviser Robert] McFarlane, who received the reports at the White House, initially discounted them as Soviet scare tactics rather than evidence of real concern about American intentions, and told Reagan of his view

⁶¹⁴ Quoted in Simon Braund, “How Ronald Reagan Learned to Start Worrying and Stop Loving the Bomb,” *Empire* 257 (November 2010): 135.

⁶¹⁵ Ronald Reagan, *An American Life: The Autobiography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 585.

⁶¹⁶ Braund, 137.

⁶¹⁷ Quoted in Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War To A New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union 1983-1990* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), 67.

in presenting them to the President. But a more extensive survey of Soviet attitudes sent to the White House early in 1984 by CIA director William Casey, based in part on reports from the double agent [Oleg] Gordievsky, had a more sobering effect. Reagan seemed uncharacteristically grave after reading the report and asked McFarlane, “Do you suppose they really believe that?... I don’t see how they could believe that—but it’s something to think about.”... In a meeting the same day, Reagan spoke about the biblical prophecy of Armageddon, a final world-ending battle between good and evil, a topic that fascinated the President. McFarlane thought it was not accidental that Armageddon was on Reagan’s mind.⁶¹⁸

Reagan’s comment on Armageddon is an RCH leitmotif of his thinking about nuclear war. It is worth jumping from Able Archer 83 and *The Day After* to a National Security Planning Group Meeting almost four years later. A conversation concerning the importance of keeping START and SDI de-linked, the nature of the SDI program as research, the right to deploy such a system, and the ABM treaty prompted Reagan to interject, “There has to be an answer to all these questions because some day people are going to ask why we didn’t do something about getting rid of nuclear weapons.” He continued, “You know, I’ve been reading my Bible and the description of Armageddon talks about destruction, I believe, of many cities and we absolutely need to avoid that. We have to do something now.” Frank C. Carlucci replied, “We certainly need to avoid Armageddon,” to which Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger replied, “The answer is SDI.”⁶¹⁹ RCH thus reinforced Reagan’s commitment to strategic defense, as well as colored his response to Able Archer 83.

QUIET DIPLOMACY, THE SOVIETS, AND REAGAN’S FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES

Much of Reagan’s overall approach to foreign policy in general and nuclear policy in particular can be expressed in terms of deterrence, dialogue, and signaling. To

⁶¹⁸ Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 67.

⁶¹⁹ Minutes of September 8, 1987 National Security Planning Group Meeting from folder NSPG 0165, 8 September 1987 [Review of United States Arms Control Positions], Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSPG Meeting File, Ronald Reagan Library and Museum, Simi Valley, CA.

President Reagan, the détente of the 1970s was not playing out well; hence, he was determined to change course. Reagan treated military power as a prerequisite for US-Soviet negotiations, first to attract Soviet attention, second to deter Soviet aggression, and third to permit the United States to bargain from a position of strength. Reagan emphasized the importance of clear signaling through concrete action, noting in an interview that “the Soviet Union... during what was supposed to be a detente, has gone forward with the greatest military buildup in the history of man. And maybe we need to get their attention.”⁶²⁰

On one hand, then, Reagan read a clear signal from Soviet activity, faulted US policy, and proposed a policy change to attract Soviet notice. At the midpoint of his presidency, Reagan reiterated the practical importance of commanding Soviet attention in the following critique:

... Mr. Brezhnev said that detente was serving their purpose and that by 1985, they would be able to get whatever they wanted by other means.

So, I have no illusions about [the Soviets]. But I do believe that the Soviets can be dealt with if you deal with them on the basis of what is practical for them and that you can point out is to their advantage as well as ours to do certain things....

Evil empire, the things of that kind, I thought... it was time to get their attention, to let them know that I was viewing them realistically.⁶²¹

On the other hand, however, Reagan avoids a “just peace” approach,⁶²² for he believed strengthened US military power was a prerequisite to fruitful US-Soviet engagement.

⁶²⁰ Ronald Reagan, “Interview With Western European Television Correspondents on the President’s Trip to Europe,” June 1, 1982, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42592>.

⁶²¹ Ronald Reagan, “Interview With Representatives of the Washington Times,” November 27, 1984, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39441>.

⁶²² “Just peace” theory, so named to contrast with just war theory, contends that the good example of unilateral disarmament will so impress potential adversaries that they will follow suit and disarm, too.

I believe that the United States... went all out in various efforts at détente... in which we unilaterally disarmed with the idea that maybe if we did this and showed our good faith, [the Soviets] would reciprocate by reducing their own [arms]. Well, they didn't. They've engaged in the most massive military buildup the world has ever seen. And therefore, the reason I believe that there is more security today is the redressing that we've done of our own military strength, the strength of the alliance, and the unity that we have.⁶²³

Strength precedes, originates, and fosters security in Reagan's view. Strength coupled with arms reductions were keys to productive US-Soviet relations in Reagan's vision, but he also recognized that American public support for both was necessary to undergird and sustain them.

Philosophical Underpinnings of Reagan's Approaches

If Reagan's military policy is seen as rebalancing of the superpower relationship in order to allow a secure relaxation of tensions, then Reagan's approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) is a key nuclear decision. Reagan saw a serious disparity between the goals of relaxation and the results of détente as practiced in the 1970s – “a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims.”⁶²⁴ As a result, Reagan offered four points in a personal communication to Leonid Brezhnev – three of which bear directly on nuclear issues. The United States would “cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles,” would readily “negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable,” would cooperate with the USSR “to achieve equality at lower levels of conventional forces in Europe,” and would work to “reduce the risks of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation” – all of which were based on “fair-minded” principles

⁶²³ Ronald Reagan, “Interview With Foreign Journalists,” May 31, 1984, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40006>.

⁶²⁴ Ronald Reagan, “The President's News Conference,” January 29, 1981, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44101>.

of “substantial, militarily significant reduction in forces, equal ceilings for similar types of forces, and adequate provisions for verification.”⁶²⁵

One can move from proposals to principles by looking a NATO statement offering carefully-struck balances between the power reserved to states and the rights reserved to people, the freedom of travel of both ideas and of people, and the equilibrium and transparency of military relations.⁶²⁶

Reagan acknowledged the different manners in which the United States and Soviet Union had treated détente. A document issued by the North Atlantic Council read in part,

The decade of so-called detente witnessed the most massive Soviet buildup of military power in history. They increased their defense spending by 40 percent while American defense actually declined in the same real terms. Soviet aggression and support for violence around the world... eroded the confidence needed for arms negotiations. While we exercised unilateral restraint, they forged ahead and today possess nuclear and conventional forces far in excess of an adequate deterrent capability.⁶²⁷

Speaking specifically on disarmament, Reagan told the UN General Assembly, “We’ve seen, under the guise of diplomacy and detente and so forth in the past, efforts to kind of sweep the differences under the rug and pretend they don’t exist.” Rejecting the inevitability of war, Reagan noted both how START had surpassed SALT II and how progress had been made on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) as well; he concluded, “I

⁶²⁵ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons,” November 18, 1981, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43264>.

⁶²⁶ Ronald Reagan, “Documents Issued at the Conclusion of the North Atlantic Council Meetings Held in Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany,” June 10, 1982, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42621>.

⁶²⁷ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks in New York City Before the United Nations General Assembly Special Session Devoted to Disarmament,” June 17, 1982, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42644>.

think that this just proves that maybe being willing, frankly, to recognize the differences between us and what our view is has proven that it's successful."⁶²⁸

When accused of “wrecking detente with the INF statement,” Reagan again noted “detente, as it existed, was only a cover under which the Soviet Union built up the greatest military power in the world. I don't think we need that kind of a détente” while reiterating the United States was “ready at any time that they want to make it plain by deed, not word” that the Soviets were ready to progress.⁶²⁹ In a similar vein, he addressed the role of the nonaligned movement and cautioned, “Pseudo nonalignment is no better than pseudo arms control.”⁶³⁰

Reagan thus concluded that a firmer, better-armed United States was ultimately helpful both to US-Soviet bilateral relations and to world peace, even to the extent of facilitating nuclear abolitionism.

I think the Soviets... liked it the other way when under a kind of detente, they were having things their own way. Now they know that we're not going to make ourselves vulnerable.... But they also know... anytime they want to sit down, we are willing to start reducing these weapons. And my ultimate goal is—I think common sense dictates it—the world must rid itself of all nuclear weapons. There must never be a nuclear war. It can't—shouldn't be fought, and it can't be won.⁶³¹

⁶²⁸ Ronald Reagan, “Interview With Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times and News Service on Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues,” March 18, 1983, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41072>.

⁶²⁹ Ronald Reagan, “Interview With American and Foreign Journalists at the Williamsburg Economic Summit Conference in Virginia,” May 31, 1983, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41406>.

⁶³⁰ Ronald Reagan, “Address Before the 38th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York,” September 26, 1983, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40523>.

⁶³¹ Ronald Reagan, “Interview With Brian Farrell of RTE-Television, Dublin, Ireland, on Foreign Issues,” May 28, 1984, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39976>.

According to Reagan, he is not pursuing détente. Nevertheless, he seeks to abolish nuclear weapons. Reagan wished both to deter the Soviets and to constructively engage them. Reagan's phrase, "quiet diplomacy," is a suitable label for his approach.

What the above passages adumbrate should be made explicit. A good starting point is Reagan's Eureka College speech. Reagan viewed the fruits of détente in the 1970s both in terms of the bilateral superpower relationship and in terms of the world as a whole as follows: "If East-West relations in the detente era in Europe have yielded disappointment, detente outside of Europe has yielded a severe disillusionment for those who expected a moderation of Soviet behavior."⁶³² Questioned on his commitment to the idea of linkage, the "concept whereby you link arms control negotiations, East-West trade, summitry with the Soviet Union with political progress by the Soviet Union on things like Poland and Afghanistan," Reagan pointed out that, although the concept was not mentioned in his Eureka College speech, nevertheless

in the many times that I've spoken of that concept, I have never particularly linked it to something as specific as arms reductions talks. But it was done in the context of the summit meetings that have taken place with regard to trade and to features of détente.... The fact that you do not proclaim such subjects... does not mean that they can't be brought up when you're sitting at a table. I think sometimes that politically to publicly discuss things of that kind makes it politically impossible to get them, where maybe in what I've called quiet diplomacy you secure them.⁶³³

Quiet diplomacy may be the closest Reagan came to giving a name to his policies which included "features of detente."

Reagan also dealt with the limits of cooperation between the West and the East. Questioned about a communiqué stating one aim was "a more constructive East-West

⁶³² Ronald Reagan, "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois," May 9, 1982, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42501>.

⁶³³ Ronald Reagan: "Interview With Representatives of Western European Publications," May 21, 1982, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42572>.

relationship aiming at genuine detente through dialog and negotiations and mutually advantageous exchanges,” Reagan noted 19 arms reduction efforts since World War II and efforts at persuasion, but, “It seems to me that now, with the Soviets having the economic problems I mentioned, that this is an opportunity for us to suggest to them that there might be a better path than they’ve been taking. And if so, we’d like to explore that better path.”⁶³⁴ Subsequently asking of the implications of the Polish announcement that Lech Walesa would be freed, that Brezhnev had died, and that new leaders would be coming to power in the USSR, the questioner questioned whether any new initiatives to lessen tension were forthcoming. Reagan responded, “We have been trying to do that in the area of quiet diplomacy, tried in the summit conference, tried in the NATO conference, of various things.... But it’s going to require some action, not just words.”⁶³⁵ Pressed on whether he was prepared to take a first step, Reagan said, “Well, there are some people that have said I took the first step with lifting the grain embargo. Have we gotten anything for it?”⁶³⁶ Although this latter example does not deal with nuclear issues specifically, it does foreshadow possible future interactions with the new Soviet leader.

Reagan insisted that superpower parity had to work both ways. He suggested “parallel paths” of deterrence and verifiable arms reductions to equal levels, noting that “never before have we proposed such a comprehensive program of nuclear arms control” and concluding, “We... want a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, based on mutual restraint, responsibility, and reciprocity. Unfortunately, Soviet-backed aggression

⁶³⁴ Ibid.

⁶³⁵ Ronald Reagan, “The President’s News Conference,” November 11, 1982, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41985>.

⁶³⁶ Ibid.

in recent years... has violated these principles. But we remain ready to respond positively to constructive Soviet actions.”⁶³⁷ Reagan saw deterrence as required for relaxation.

Reagan’s principles of “restraint, responsibility, and reciprocity” also strike a familiar chord. Moreover, Reagan noted

From 1970 to 1979, our defense spending, in constant dollars, decreased by 22 percent....

Potential adversaries saw this unilateral disarmament... as a sign of weakness and a lack of will necessary to protect our way of life. While we talked of detente, the lessening of tensions in the world, the Soviet Union embarked on a massive program of militarization. Since around 1965, they have increased their military spending, nearly doubling it over the past 15 years.⁶³⁸

Hence, Reagan saw the US policy as one of rebalancing for relaxation. When pressed on whether he wanted “to contain [the Soviets] within their present borders and perhaps try to reestablish detente—or what goes for detente—or... roll back their empire,” Reagan replied

I believe that many of the things they have done are evil in any concept of morality that we have. But I also recognize that as the two great superpowers in the world, we have to live with each other.... [B]etween us, we can either destroy the world or we can save it. And I suggested that, certainly, it was to their common interest, along with ours, to avoid a conflict and to attempt to save the world and remove the nuclear weapons. And I think that perhaps we established a little better understanding.

I think that in dealing with the Soviet Union one has to be realistic....

The Soviet Union has been engaged in the biggest military buildup in the history of man at the same time that we tried the policy of unilateral disarmament, of weakness, if you will. And now we are putting up a defense of our own. And I’ve made it very plain to them, we seek no superiority. We simply are going to provide a deterrent so that it will be too costly for them if they are nursing any

⁶³⁷ Ronald Reagan, “Responses to Questions Submitted by Latin American Newspapers,” November 30, 1982, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.Rw.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42046>.

⁶³⁸ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Recommissioning Ceremony for the USS. New Jersey in Long Beach, California,” December 28, 1982, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42153>.

ideas of aggression against us.... There's been no change in my attitude at all. I just thought when I came into office it was time that there was some realistic talk to and about the Soviet Union. And we did get their attention.⁶³⁹

Thus, Reagan saw his policy as a recalibration of goals and a drawing of attention to this redirection. He characterized his policy in terms of morality, conflict avoidance, political and philosophical realism, and attention-getting.

Intertwined with Reagan's policy are principles of verification and reciprocity. Reagan stated arms reduction must not proceed "naively or pretending... that we can have a detente while [the Soviets] go on with their programs of expansion" but must rather "persuade them to, by deed, prove their contention that they want peace also."⁶⁴⁰

Reagan further clarified that the word *détente* had "been a little abused in the past in some ways. Yes, we would welcome such a thing as long as it was a two-way street. Our problem in the past has been that it has too much been a one-way street, and we were going the wrong way on that."⁶⁴¹ Indeed, one week before Gorbachev came to power, Reagan emphasized reciprocity.⁶⁴² Reagan placed less emphasis on leading by example and more emphasis on verifiability of actions. Note also that the US military buildup, begun under Carter, was itself a US action that the Soviets could verify, so one could additionally read this signal as a backhanded nod to reciprocity.

⁶³⁹ Ronald Reagan, "Debate Between the President and Former Vice President Walter F. Mondale in Kansas City, Missouri," October 21, 1984, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39296>.

⁶⁴⁰ Ronald Reagan, "Interview With Western European Television Correspondents on the President's Trip to Europe," June 1, 1982, available from accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42592>.

⁶⁴¹ Ronald Reagan, "The President's News Conference," January 9, 1985, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38344>.

⁶⁴² Ronald Reagan, "Interview With Morton Kondracke and Richard H. Smith of Newsweek Magazine," March 4, 1985, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38303>.

Reagan's policies can best be understood by recognizing that the roles of morality and human rights arise from his philosophy of human nature which in turn is informed by his RCH. In terms of philosophical ethics, Reagan observed the Soviets

openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order to attain that [goal], and that is moral, not immoral, and we operate on a different set of standards, I think when you do business with them, even at a detente, you keep that in mind.⁶⁴³

Building on what he saw as the stark difference between Soviet and American understandings of morality, Reagan delineated how human rights ought to fit into superpower relations and American foreign policy in general by calling for consistently-applied standards. Reagan said, "I think human rights is very much a part of our American idealism... [but] we were selective with regard to human rights." Contrasting Cuba and the USSR – both human rights violators, yet some were proposing to better relations with Cuba anyway – Reagan argued for consistency: "I think that we ought to be more sincere about our position of human rights."⁶⁴⁴

If the discussion of human rights seems a distraction from hard nuclear issues, note how philosophy of human nature arose more explicitly in Reagan's approach to the Soviet Union when he responded to a question about "suggestions...made to the Soviets [concerning] ways they can improve their behavior [and so] get back to detente and reduce this war of words." Reagan said he had told Brezhnev "that sometimes it seems that the governments sometimes get in the way of the people" who essentially wish to raise families, choose a career, and exercise control over their own lives. He concluded, "I doubt that the people have ever started a war," so Reagan suggested that he and

⁶⁴³ Ronald Reagan, "The President's News Conference," January 29, 1981, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44101>.

⁶⁴⁴ Ronald Reagan, "Excerpts From an Interview With Walter Cronkite of CBS News," March 3, 1981, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43497>.

Brezhnev discuss what the people really wanted.⁶⁴⁵ Here is a connection that transitions from human rights to war via philosophical anthropology.

In another venue, Reagan raised a philosophical point even more explicitly: “[I]n the years of detente we tended to forget the greatest weapon the democracies have in their struggle is public candor: the truth....” He continued, “It’s not an act of belligerence to speak to the fundamental differences between totalitarianism and democracy; it’s a moral imperative. It doesn’t slow down the pace of negotiations; it moves them forward.”⁶⁴⁶ Thus, Reagan was a philosophical realist who, in pursuit of a moral imperative, sought to ground his foreign policy in true judgments of fact and value. To quote one of Reagan’s favorite Russian proverbs, “Trust but verify.”

Substantive Foreign Policy Before and After Gorbachev

Continuing the focus on nuclear policy and nuclear decisions, it is worth considering Reagan’s approaches before and after the Gorbachev era. This exploration across a transition is a natural marker in the political atmosphere of the time. One could argue that Reagan before and after the assassination attempt would also be a natural marker, but Reagan’s scant 70 days do not provide much time to establish a baseline. Gorbachev is a better demarcation.

⁶⁴⁵ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks on Signing the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters,” August 13, 1981, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44161>.

⁶⁴⁶ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville,” December 16, 1988, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35272>.

Towards the end of his presidency, Reagan summed up the “four legs” on which the “table” of the US-Soviet relationship stood: arms reduction, regional conflicts, human rights, and bilateral exchanges.⁶⁴⁷

Combining his desire for relaxation and his steadfast adherence to principled foreign policy, Reagan, after noting expansionism in several places in the world, observed how Soviet leaders consistently “restated their goal of a one-world Socialist revolution, a one-world Communist state. And invariably, they have declared that the United States is the final enemy.”⁶⁴⁸ This quotation comes toward the middle of his presidency.

Clearly Reagan was to tread cautiously. But move forward he did, and, between the Washington and Moscow summits, Reagan discussed the “fundamental approach to arms reduction” followed by the United States. The remarks he made concerning arms reductions are worth quoting at length:

At first, many critics viewed the goal of genuine arms reductions as unrealistic, even... misleading, even put forward in bad faith.... But by the autumn of 1985... the media began reporting a Soviet willingness to consider a 25-percent, then a 40-percent, and finally a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms....

With regard to our zero-option proposal for intermediate-range nuclear forces... the critics again derided our position as unrealistic when we first advanced it in 1981. Today it’s my hope that the Senate will... give its... consent to the INF treaty that Mr. Gorbachev and I signed last December in Washington so we can exchange instruments of ratification next month in Moscow.

... You’ll recall that the Soviets rejected [a 1977] American offer [of deep nuclear cuts] out of hand. Why? And what has changed in the meantime?...

⁶⁴⁷ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Luncheon With Radio and Television Journalists,” June 8, 1988, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35945>.

⁶⁴⁸ Ronald Reagan, “Interview With Representatives of College Radio Stations,” September 9, 1985, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39083>.

First, the United States in the 1970's slashed our defense budgets and neglected crucial defense investment. We were dealing... from a position of weakness. Well, today we're dealing from a position of strength. Second, the United States, those 11 years ago, had not yet shown what might be called a tough patience—a willingness to stake out a strong position, then stand by it as the Soviets probed and made their counteroffers, testing American determination....

... I said when I first ran for President that our nation needed to renew its strength. Some called me bellicose, even a warmonger.... Now we know, without doubt, that strength works, that strength promotes the cause of freedom and, yes, the cause of peace.⁶⁴⁹

The above quotation does address political realism. It also coheres well with some of the fraternal correction characteristics laid out in the second chapter. The conclusion is an invocation of the *tranquillitas ordinis* by another name.

A further, more concise retrospective view is provided by Reagan's farewell address. Reagan said, "The detente of the 1970's was based not on actions but promises," and he mentioned the gulag, Soviet expansionism, and proxy wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. He continued, "Well, this time, so far, it's different," and mentioned Gorbachev began internal reforms, started to withdraw from Afghanistan, and freed prisoners.⁶⁵⁰

Did Reagan provide retrospective structure, or was his narrative representative of how the United States approached foreign policy during his two terms? In fact, we can trace a number of the points raised throughout the Reagan-Gorbachev era, starting with

⁶⁴⁹ Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Broadcasters in Las Vegas, Nevada," April 10, 1988, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35650>.

⁶⁵⁰ Ronald Reagan, "Farewell Address to the Nation," January 11, 1989, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29650>.

Reagan's promise, "[W]e are not going to let them get enough advantage that they can ever make war."⁶⁵¹

Although a military buildup began under President Carter, President Reagan intensified the buildup, using one of the tools Carter was already employing. Moreover, Reagan's policies aspired to better the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union:

[O]ur desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace. We didn't go in pursuit of some kind of illusory detente. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace"⁶⁵²

Throughout his two terms Reagan insisted on actual progress, not merely irenics. When it was pointed out to Reagan that "many Europeans consider Gorbachev the politician more aggressively looking for disarmament and detente than you," he was asked, "Is he [Gorbachev] simply a better communicator than you, or do you accept that view?" Reagan answered, "The last guest to arrive at a party usually gets the attention.... But the search for peace requires more than slogans and reassuring words; it requires genuine actions and concrete proposals that deal with real problems...." He noted INF reduction and elimination were "[b]oth... in fact US proposals" and that measures agreed to in Stockholm to improve military openness, to reduce the risk of surprise attack, and to discourage military intimidation were "based on NATO proposals. The Soviets wanted an empty, declaratory accord. We held out for something concrete that would enhance our

⁶⁵¹ Ronald Reagan, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Students and Faculty at Gordon Technical High School in Chicago, Illinois," October 10, 1985, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37893>.

⁶⁵² Ronald Reagan, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Following the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Geneva," November 21, 1985, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38088>.

security, and we got it.”⁶⁵³ For similar reasons, Reagan insists, “We do not want mere words; this time we’re after true peace.”⁶⁵⁴ Shortly after his presidency ended, he got his wish: the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.

SUMMARY

Reagan saw the world in terms of universal ideas. By the light of these ideals he understood the Soviet Union as a force for evil which had to be fought. He chose to do so with a strong military, but he avoided direct provocation in order to foster arms reductions. Reagan was consistent in his approach across both of his presidential terms, and RCH was foundational to Reagan’s worldview and decision-making, was a source of language and expressions, and was a tool for achieving his aims. Although perhaps more defensive in orientation than Truman or even Eisenhower, Reagan falls within the just war framework expected of the broad contours of the RCH of American Christianity. Because Reagan did not face nuclear brinksmanship in the way that Truman and Eisenhower did, in this chapter I focus more on the philosophies of ethics, government, and human nature which underlie just war thought rather than on the just war framework itself. Reagan’s conception of the Soviet Union expressed Reagan’s ethics and theory of human nature and implied a vision of sovereignty as responsibility for the common good, even the good of one’s adversaries. Moreover, Reagan’s approach to peace through strength implicitly differentiated between force and violence while proportionately and prudently relating ends to means. Finally, Reagan expressed his ideas, which he believed to be universal in scope, not only through secular illustrations and terminology derived

⁶⁵³ Ronald Reagan, “Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Deutsche Presse-Agentur of the Federal Republic of Germany,” June 2, 1987, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=34366>.

⁶⁵⁴ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Area High School Seniors in Jacksonville, Florida,” December 1, 1987, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33751>.

from the Enlightenment but from imagery and literary allusions originating from RCH. Was Reagan a hawk or a dove? In a sense this question is misplaced because the binary categories of hawk and dove do not capture the RCH which is fundamental to understanding Reagan's worldview and nuclear decisions.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

A COUNTEREXAMPLE?

During the Second World War an ecumenical Protestant commission of the Federal Council of Churches (FCC) examined the war in the light of Christian ethics. The commission came to be known as the Calhoun Commission after the man who chaired it. The commission produced a document called “The Relation of the Church to the War in the Light of the Christian Faith”⁶⁵⁵ which found the war regrettable but just. The document, described by Raynal as the twentieth century’s finest theological basis for the use of force,⁶⁵⁶ argued that God, while favoring good and detesting evil, nevertheless leaves the decision to go to war in the hands of human beings. “God is not a combatant, nor a neutral onlooker, nor a helpless victim,” the commission writes. “He is, in war as in peace, the Creator and Sovereign whose power sustains and governs, but does not annul, the activities of nature and of men.”⁶⁵⁷

In 1946, eight months after the end of World War II, the Second Calhoun Commission issued “Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith”⁶⁵⁸ which contritely deplored “the irresponsible use already made of the atomic bomb.”⁶⁵⁹ Beyond this, however, the members of the commission were perhaps more divided than unified. Some saw the possibility for just nuclear deterrence or even use as “the only effective restraint upon would-be aggressors.”⁶⁶⁰ Others objected to counter-value targeting (i.e. counter-

⁶⁵⁵ First Calhoun Commission, “The Relation of the Church to the War in the Light of the Christian Faith,” *Social Action* 10, no. 10 (1944): 3-79.

⁶⁵⁶ Charles E. Raynal, “The Relation of the Church to World War II in the Light of the Christian Faith,” *The Presbyterian Outlook* (July 24-31, 1995): 4.

⁶⁵⁷ First Calhoun Commission, 33.

⁶⁵⁸ Second Calhoun Commission, “Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith,” *Social Action* (May 15, 1946): 5-24.

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 13, note 6.

population targeting) even *in extremis*; still others, particularly those with pacifist leanings, sought to use the examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to rebut just war thinking. All agreed to urge a national policy of no-first-use.⁶⁶¹

Against the backdrop of the Soviet Union's first successful atomic detonation, a new FCC commission revisited the nuclear question. The committee was not wholly new: new commission and the previous Calhoun Commission had significant overlap, including Calhoun himself.⁶⁶² Named for the man who chaired it, the Dun Commission composed "The Christian Conscience and Atomic War."⁶⁶³ The document stated,

As long as the current situation holds, for the United States to abandon its atomic weapons, or to give the impression that they would not be used, would leave the non-Communist world with totally inadequate defense. For Christians to advocate such a policy would be for them to share responsibility for the world-wide tyranny that might result. We believe that American military strength, which must include atomic weapons as long as any other nation may possess them, is an essential factor in the possibility of preventing both world war and tyranny. If atomic weapons or other weapons of parallel destructiveness are used against us or our friends in Europe or Asia, we believe that it could be justifiable for our government to use them in retaliation with all possible restraint.⁶⁶⁴

Do these three data points call into question the research project of this dissertation? The First Calhoun Commission took a just war stance, the Second Calhoun Commission took an anti-nuclear stance, and the Dun Commission took a pro-nuclear stance, yet the Bible remained the same and the people involved remained nearly the same. It might seem, therefore, that RCH cannot explain the decision-making outcomes even for explicitly religious organizations.

⁶⁶¹ Ibid., 14.

⁶⁶² H. Richard Niebuhr declined to participate this time around. Physicist Arthur Compton, a Nobel laureate and former head of the S-1 Committee which became the Manhattan Project, and William Waymack, a Pulitzer-winning newspaper editor and former member of the Atomic Energy Commission, were new additions.

⁶⁶³ Dun Commission, "The Christian Conscience and Atomic War," *Christianity and Crisis* (December 11, 1955): 161-168.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid., 165.

The above example does not in fact undermine the dissertation. The commissions of the FCC were urging policy choices. The underlying principles remained constant throughout, but applying the same principles to different questions yielded different answers because of the particulars involved. The central tendency in Christianity is to teach moral principles in black-and-white terms so that concrete, real-life situations which encounter gray areas can be dealt with as dark gray or light gray, so to speak. For such concrete reasons the Dun commission, for example, explicitly qualified its statement with the phrase “as long as the current situation holds” above. Thereafter, the reference to “share[d] responsibility” draws on the notion of sovereignty as responsibility for the common good; “preventing both world war and tyranny” shows concern for, and attention to, the *tranquillitas ordinis* and Christian philosophy of government; and “retaliation and restraint” refer to well-understood just war concepts of defense and proportionality. Likewise, RCH matched expected presidential DMFs throughout the data explored in this dissertation. Sophisticated treatment of RCH, applied to the actual situations encountered by the presidents, enables explanation of contrasting nuclear decisions, in a causal manner, parsimoniously. How so?

In terms of a causal story, my argument must address three classical criteria. The first criterion is priority in time: The putative cause must precede the putative effect. The second criterion is co-variation: The putative effect must not be present without the putative cause and vice versa, and as the putative effect must vary in some regular way as the putative cause varies. Finally, there should not be a plausible alternative explanation for the putative effect.

This investigation meets these criteria. Exposure to RCH is prior in time to the careers of all three presidents and their nuclear decisions. There is variation in the RCH to which these presidents were exposed and which corresponds to variations in nuclear

decisions of various types. One could object that plausible alternative explanations exist for all presidential nuclear decisions, for indeed the bulk of the previous analyses of nuclear diplomacy have offered explanations in which religious cultural heritage played little or no role. This objection is handled as follows: I set out to investigate how RCH fits into the making of nuclear decisions. I never claimed RCH was the most important factor, but I did contend that explanations which omitted RCH were incomplete. As a result I undertook to study RCH while bracketing other questions and influences. I now have evidence, direct and indirect, that RCH does indeed matter – and, based on this evidence, some decisions were made, at least in part, because of RCH, and all of the investigated decisions fit with patterns of thought and patterns of behavior which verify a connection between RCH and DMF.

I do not object to previously offered explanations *per se*. I do note that I have not come across a single explanation which can successfully explain the nuclear dove/hawk paradox posed by these three presidents in particular. However, including RCH in the analysis does allow the hawk/dove paradox to be resolved. RCH provides an underlying framework which unifies the decision-making of these three presidents. Examining RCH shows how applying a consistent set of principles to concrete problems of nuclear policy can lead to nuclear choices which may appear radically different when considered superficially but which exhibit meaningful unity when explored deeply.

Granted, there are at least two possible objections to the use of religious cultural heritage as part of the explanation of presidential nuclear choices. The first objection is similar to Waltz's original objection to the use of human nature as an explanation for international affairs. Just as human nature is the cause of war in wartime and the cause of

peace in peacetime,⁶⁶⁵ so religions can explain everything and thus nothing. Consider the following examples: Victories are blessings, defeats are punishments, and what we do not understand are God's mysteries. A second objection would be to note that I have carried out only congruence testing in this dissertation, so I lack the advantages of full process traces; moreover, I could have unintentionally cherry picked data.

In reply to these objections, recall that, first of all, this dissertation is looking at the role of RCH in the formation of policy choices which had not yet been made, not simply retroactively explaining outcomes. Second, this dissertation claims that RCH is a variable which should be included in the analysis on its own merits; indeed, when RCH is included, it becomes possible to resolve the hawk/dove paradox parsimoniously. That RCH is part of a causal story is the contribution of this work; all of the other explanations contain valid insights as far as they go, but leaving out RCH leaves incomplete explanations. That RCH allows a unified explanation of seeming disparate and dissimilar nuclear decisions shows further that history and parsimony can sometimes be friends and even allies.

ENGAGING ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES IN EARLIER PRESIDENTIAL RESEARCH

In this dissertation I explore RCH and its effect on the nuclear policy choices of three US presidents. There are earlier works which look at presidential RCH, and many

⁶⁶⁵ Note that even if human nature is shared in common, it does not follow that human nature is completely determinative or deterministic. Here is not the place to rehash the nature-nurture debate. Let it suffice to observe that there is both central tendency and variability; there is a mean part and a fluctuating part. The part that never fluctuates is the common nature. So, returning to Craig's analysis of Waltz, Craig's claim of hard contradiction need not apply. Indeed, RCH can account for experience as noted in Figure 1.1 and in Figure 1.3. Further, recall that just war thought does not consider war necessarily to be a scourge insofar as it removes the scourge of injustice and instantiates or restores the *tranquillitas ordinis*. Distinguishing between physical evil and moral evil helps sharpen this point. The destruction which may take place during a war is a physical evil; the rectification of moral evils may provide just grounds for war. War in and of itself is not *malo in se*, for, although the lack of just cause renders a war morally evil, the presence of a just cause (with right intention and proper authority) renders a war morally good and perhaps morally obliged.

of these writings are valuable sources of data. However, from the perspective of my research question, past analyses typically are wanting for one of two reasons: Either the analysis provided is suspect because the authors associate themselves with a particular type of RCH⁶⁶⁶ or the analysis is not theoretically unified in an explicit manner. Consider the following examples of the existing literature.

Of the books on the faith of America's presidents, one of the most valuable is the 1968 book *God in the White House* by Fuller and Green.⁶⁶⁷ The authors are affiliated respectively with the Episcopalian and Presbyterian churches, perspectives which were apparent to me as I read the book.⁶⁶⁸ Although their evident perspective should lead readers to take their commentary with a grain of salt, this book is a useful resource both as general background and as a source of material not found in other works. Of the older books in this genre on US presidents, I consider this one the best.

The similarly-titled 2008 book *God in the White House: A History* by Balmer⁶⁶⁹ was disappointing by contrast – but not because of any defect of quality or perspective but because the narrative focused on the politicization of religion, and vice versa, rather than on the influence of RCH on presidential decisions *per se*. My argument focuses

⁶⁶⁶ In my view, the gold standards for dispassionate analysis concerning RCH are the works by Miscamble and Inboden cited in this dissertation. The abbreviation after Miscamble's name identifies him as a Catholic priest from a religious order, and Inboden occasionally uses certain turns of phrase which indicate that his background is that of an American Protestant. However, these two authors never let their own RCH color their keen analyses. It is my hope that I have managed to follow their example of evenhandedness and insightfulness.

⁶⁶⁷ Edmund Fuller and David E. Green, *God in the White House: The Faiths of American Presidents* (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1968).

⁶⁶⁸ When I first read the book, which I had found by title, I assumed it was the work of a single author. On reading, I felt I was being whipped between Episcopalian and Presbyterian commentary on the lives of the various presidents. When I read the dust jacket, however, and realized that there were two authors with exactly these backgrounds, I understood my confusion.

⁶⁶⁹ Randall Balmer, *God in the White House: A History: How Faith Shaped the Presidency from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush* (New York: HarperOne, 2008). On the fourth page of the book the author identifies himself as a left-leaning evangelical Christian. This book covered the period from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush, so the only parts of the book relevant to this dissertation concerned President Reagan.

explicitly on the influence of RCH on presidential decisions and nuclear decision in particular.

There are two more recent books that are equally valuable and which focus on policy as much as religion. One is Mount's 2007 book *The Faith of America's Presidents*.⁶⁷⁰ The book is written from a born-again Christian perspective.⁶⁷¹ The other is Holmes' 2012 work *The Faiths of the Postwar Presidents*.⁶⁷² Holmes is an emeritus professor of religious studies, and his writing and analysis are of high quality. Both Mount and Holmes provide useful analysis of presidential RCH and its influence on policy. However, my argument treats nuclear policy choices in great depth whereas these authors, covering so many presidents, offer analyses of a more cursory scope.

Although there are many good presidential biographies of Truman, Eisenhower and Reagan, the only character study accenting RCH for the three presidents explored in this dissertation was Kengor's 2004 book *God and Ronald Reagan*.⁶⁷³ Kengor's book does an admirable job of connecting Reagan's RCH to his political positions and strategies as would be expected from an author with a background in political science and political history.

This argument in this dissertation falls between the scope of presidential books like those of Fuller and Green, Mount, and Holmes on the one hand and Kengor's on the other. The dissertation is narrower than the former books because its substance is confined to three presidents, but it is broader than the latter book because of its focus on

⁶⁷⁰ Daniel J. Mount, *The Faith of America's Presidents* (Chattanooga: Living Ink Books/AMG Publishers, 2007).

⁶⁷¹ Again, I read the book without first exploring the author's background. Mount identifies himself as a "born-again Christian historian" in his preface; see Mount, vii.

⁶⁷² David L. Holmes, *The Faiths of the Postwar Presidents: From Truman to Obama* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2012).

⁶⁷³ Paul Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan: A Spiritual Life* (New York: ReganBooks, 2004).

more than one president. It is narrower than all four of these books because of its insistence on the nuclear issue. None of these books make explicit my threefold focus on presidential philosophies of ethics, government, and human nature. Thus, my argument engages RCH in a new way which both supplements and goes beyond the previous literature.

RECAPPING THE FINDINGS: RCH, DMF, AND RELEVANCE FOR POLICY MAKERS

This dissertation was propelled by a simple question: Can RCH help provide a unified explanation to the paradoxical nuclear decisions of Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan? After surveying the literature for spaces to which I could contribute, and after surveying Christian holy war, pacifism, and just war thought – all three of which are decision-making frameworks – I sought relevant RCH-influenced principles for each president; predicted how RCH principles affect application of just war thought and thus nuclear decisions; showed the origin of RCH influence in the biography, background, and experience of the presidents; and recounted how RCH principles were used in practice.

The data available to me concerning the presidents included archival material, memoirs, public statements, and secondary sources. The data available to me concerning RCH included tangible sources such as sacred texts, philosophical and theological works, and artifacts as well as less-tangible sources such as language, traditions, and knowledge. For this investigation specifically, I investigated Christian ideas on holy war, pacifism, just war, and even fraternal correction as well philosophies of ethics, government, and human nature.

I found that the decision-making frameworks all three presidents cohered with the just war school of thought. However, their different RCH led to different realizations of just war principles in practice: Truman was the president most willing to use force

unapologetically, Eisenhower was more restrained in his willingness to resort to force, and Reagan, despite his muscular military build-up, exhibited the most pacific form of the just war DMF which could be termed just nuclear defense. Table 6.1 presents a each president, the relevant religious cultural heritage, and the decision-making framework exhibited by the nuclear decisions made while in office.

President	RCH	DMF
Truman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baptist membership, “lightfoot” • Exposure to Presbyterian Sunday school (where he met his wife) • Married in the Episcopal church 	Just war principles with a fairly unrestrained approach to means
Eisenhower	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raised in a River Brethren/Mennonite (pacifist) environment • Exposed to middle of the road US Protestantism throughout military career • Baptized Presbyterian after taking office 	Just war principles with a fairly reserved propensity to use force
Reagan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DOC membership • DOC mother, Catholic father • Attended other churches than DOC • Sometimes spoke of faith in Evangelical terms 	Just war principles with overtones of just nuclear defense and peace through strength

Table 6.1: Presidents, Religious Cultural Heritage, and Decision Making Frameworks

The implications of this research should not be lost on policy analysts and policy makers. This dissertation explored RCH to discover its role in the policy process in terms of policies that have not yet been designed or selected, in terms of problem framing, and

most saliently in terms of decision-making framework. While my research does not lend itself well to point predictions (“Will world leader N do X, Y, Z, or something else if placed in situation Q?”), this research suggests that RCH can be a useful factor in scenario generation as policy makers strive to adapt in real time to a dynamic world. For example, Truman’s and Eisenhower’s contrasting policies toward Israel and the Middle East might not have been predictable in minute detail, but an analyst conversant in RCH would have been equipped to brainstorm scenarios in which the US might adopt a variety of different positions towards the Holy Land and the peoples in that area of the world. Similarly, an analyst conversant in the Shiite nuclear debate in Iran might plausibly develop and explore more nuanced and perceptive scenarios than would be the case if RCH were excluded. Certainly President Eisenhower would have appreciated the practicality of such a scenario-based approach, for he wisely observed, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”⁶⁷⁴

For both scholars and policy analysts it is worth considering how the findings apply to issue areas outside nuclear decisions. Rosenau defines issue areas as follows:

Stated formally, an issue-area is conceived to consist of (1) a cluster of values, the allocation or potential allocation of which (2) leads the affected or potentially affected actors to differ so greatly over (a) the way in which the values should be allocated or (b) the horizontal levels at which the allocations should be authorized that (3) they engage in distinctive behavior designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values.⁶⁷⁵

Rosenau also makes a claim about the relationships of values and political behavior regarding issue area as shown in Table 6.2.

⁶⁷⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference,” November 14, 1957, accessed July 1, 2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10951&st=&st1=>.

⁶⁷⁵ James N. Rosenau, “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 81 (emphasis original).

		MEANS	
		Intangible	Tangible
ENDS	Intangible	<i>Status area</i>	<i>Human resources area</i>
	Tangible	<i>Territorial area</i>	<i>Nonhuman resources area</i>

Table 6.2: The Relationship of Values and Political Behavior Regarding Issue Area⁶⁷⁶

Although a bit impressionistic, this approach at least suggests that, if security is a nonhuman resources area then, using one of the vignettes from the first chapter as an example, the 1982 Navy chaplain's concern and Admiral Watkins' response are anomalous – unless security is both a nonhuman resources area *and* a status area, in which case the tangible aspect of security and the intangible aspect of security have some sort of (presumably limited) substitutability. This latter interpretation would make sense: an extra division of tanks might make one feel more secure – but would knowing that nuclear deterrence is “doing the right thing” make one feel more secure? Hence, CNO Watkins felt the need to set consciences at ease and quote Vatican II. Tying this approach to the main substantive chapters of this dissertation, a similar lens can clarify our understanding of Truman's approach to the Baruch Plan, Eisenhower's approach to the Atoms for Peace address, and Reagan's approaches to statements like the “Evil Empire” speech and to addresses and undertakings like the “Star Wars” speech and program.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK

This dissertation has explored the connection between religious cultural heritage and the nuclear decisions of three US presidents. This investigation was prompted when I encountered the postwar debates between realist thinkers and Christian theologians: I wondered whether these fascinating interchanges made a difference in the real world.

⁶⁷⁶ Adapted from Rosenau, 86.

Could religious cultural heritage really affect nuclear decisions? If so, how? Realizing that there are nine nuclear-armed states, that there are five so-called great world religions, and that the cultural heritage of the nine states covered the five religions, I recognized I had an independent variable with sufficient variation to answer my questions. Moreover, I had a puzzle which no one had explored before, and the puzzle had policy relevance, even urgency, because nuclear weapons remain the only means by which human civilization could be brought to its knees in less than an hour. Indeed, the probability of nuclear war has been estimated to be greater than one percent per year.⁶⁷⁷

Inspired by certain insights in the operational code literature, principally the recognition that decision-making frameworks include both philosophical and prudential components, I built upon work exploring how religious cultural heritage could influence nuclear decisions by acting at two levels, the societal level and the individual level. This prior work proposed three paths by which the influence could be felt: by shaping decision-making frameworks directly, by shaping decision-making frameworks indirectly, and by shaping nuclear options indirectly. Thus, according to this framework, there were six paths through which religious cultural heritage could act. My dissertation built on these insights: Although pitched at the individual level of analysis, I explored the coherence between religious cultural heritage and decision-making frameworks by means of three intermediaries: philosophical ethics (theories of good and bad, right and wrong), philosophy of government (concerning its scope, role, aptitude, legitimacy, and competence), and philosophical anthropology (theories of human nature). I found evidence that all three intermediaries play a role in the decision-making.

⁶⁷⁷ Anders Sandberg, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, quoted on page 52 of Jeff Wise, "That's All Folks..." *Popular Mechanics* 189, no. 2 (February 2012): 46-53.

The approach I used allowed me to move beyond the “religion equals morality” or “religion is a proxy for morality” treatment prevalent in much political science and historical literature. Part of the story is that religious cultural heritage often carries with it an aspect of eschatological expectation – that is to say, religious cultural heritage includes a theory of how things ultimately will turn out, and that means that RCH also carries with it expectations about the effects of actions and choices. The fact the operational code approach was first developed to deal with Bolshevism parallels this line of thinking, for the Bolsheviks had a very certain idea about how history would turn out in the end, and Communism was supposed to be “scientific” as practiced in the Soviet Union, so there were clear expectations about the effects of actions and choices. If Stalin could stumble by assuming that capitalist nations could not long remain at peace with each other and that the USSR could move into the vacuum when the capitalist nations committed fratricide, then we have a clear example of how expectations could affect policy, although this is an example of how it led, from a Soviet point of view, to bad policy. Nevertheless, an RCH-derived conception of ethics, prudence, means, and ends could similarly lead to or buttress certain types of policy choices. For this reason, the three decision-making frameworks associated with different streams of RCH assumed crucial importance in the investigation.

Moreover, I found that the concept of sovereignty – that is, the conception of the purpose and goal of governmental power – which was exhibited in the presidential philosophies of government and presidential decision-making resembled the classical Christian conception of sovereignty rather than Weberian or Westphalian/international-law conceptions of sovereignty. In other words, these presidents saw their role and the US role to be one of responsibility for the common good, even the common good beyond the borders of the United States, rather than as a monopoly on the legitimate use of force

within a well-defined territory. This approach to sovereignty and power is a striking connection among the diversity of these presidents. While sovereignty is indeed part of a philosophy of government, finding sovereignty as a connecting thread was an unexpected. As a result, this finding is particularly important and should be explored in future work.

Handling nine states and five religions would have sacrificed depth for breadth, so I focused on US Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan in my dissertation. There was still considerable variation in religious cultural heritage, although within one religion rather than among several religions, and variation among other factors to promote solid case exploration. Indeed, these three presidents were particularly apt subjects for study because of the individuality of their nuclear choices and policies: For example, Truman is the only leader to use atomic weapons in war, Eisenhower was in office for about half of the Cold War nuclear crises and made the first nuclear move in all but one, and Reagan's approach to strategic defense was distinctive and controversial.

In the dissertation I laid out how various Christian streams of religious cultural heritage would be expected to lead to a series of three classes of decision-making framework, depending on the philosophies of ethics, government, and human nature which belong to each stream. I then explored the religious cultural heritage to which each president was exposed (noting, of course, that exposure and adherence are two different things); I characterized the decision-making framework of each president and established patterns of thought and patterns of behavior (sometimes drawing on non-nuclear decisions); I predicted which of the three classes of nuclear decision-making the president was most likely to exhibit; and I looked at actual nuclear decisions made in times of crisis and across times of transition. Supported by historical sources and archival research, I argued that the decision-making of the presidents consistently followed the predictions.

The above research agenda, though currently conceived through the lens of historical, archival, and qualitative content analytical methodologies, has encouraged me to consider set-theoretic paradigms for future work, bringing together the strengths and nuance of qualitative methods with the clarity of mathematical assumptions.

One next step in my research agenda will be to add a fourth leader to the investigation, President Carter. In addition to explorations similar to those I have undertaken with Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan, the inclusion of Carter will make possible a series of pair-wise comparisons: early and late Cold War; Democrats and Republicans; mainline and evangelical Protestantism; and two presidential transitions.

One might wonder why the next step would not treat President Kennedy, the only Catholic president, or President Nixon, the pro-nuclear Quaker who led the era of détente. In fact I am already progressing toward a second prong in my ongoing research. A thorough exploration of Kennedy would require additional treatment of Catholicism, of the non-Catholic (both secular and, especially, Episcopalian) intellectual formation he received during all but one year of his formal schooling, and of the interplay of schooling and experience at home or in church. Do multiple forms of religious cultural heritage reinforce each other, cancel each other, selectively do both depending on the subject matter, or persist side by side in dynamic tension? How is decision-making affected? Similar questions can be asked of Nixon whose evangelical form of the Quaker religion was “shattered” (his words) when he took the required course on liberal Protestantism at his Quaker college, yet his religion helped form his new philosophy. As a result, these two presidents form a natural, complementary avenue of research.

My nuclear research agenda ultimately will include American and European Christianity in comparative perspective (America as Protestant, France as Catholic, the United Kingdom as Anglican, and the Russian Federation as Orthodox though officially

atheist during the Soviet period). Subsequently I will treat China and North Korea and their mix of Buddhism and other religions and philosophies, Israel and Judaism, India and Hinduism, and Pakistan and Islam. Indeed, because of Iran's nuclear program, I have done some work to characterize the nuclear debate within Shi'ite Islam.

RCH and the Connection to Nuclear Doctrine and Crisis Behavior

Once RCH frames the exploration of the nuclear age, one notices a possible correlation between RCH and the development of nuclear doctrine. Truman and Eisenhower are mainline Protestants. Although nuclear doctrines were only beginning to coalesce under Truman, nevertheless, NSC 30 under Truman called for readiness "to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including nuclear weapons, in the interest of national security" (although "the decision as to the employment of atomic weapons... is to be made by the Chief Executive").⁶⁷⁸ It is not a far step to Eisenhower's approach of massive retaliation. Note, however, that both presidents have a mainline Protestant RCH and thus take a commensurate just war approach to crisis behavior and other nuclear decisions. These nuclear strategies contrast with John F. Kennedy's criticism of massive retaliation and his desire for a strategy of flexible response. Interestingly, Kennedy's strategy suggests adherence to the principle of proportionality – a principle which seems to be treated differently in Catholic RCH than in the RCH derived from seminal mainline leaders like Luther and Calvin as shown in Chapter 2. Moreover, it is Richard M. Nixon, a man who was brought up Quaker but whose religious views found aspects of liberal Protestantism persuasive, who championed détente and joint support in his nuclear strategy. Finally, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, though by no means two of a kind, share aspects of evangelical Protestant

⁶⁷⁸ NSC 30, United States Policy on Atomic Warfare, September 10, 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 1, Part 2, General; The United Nations*, 624-628.

RCH, and both presidents fall under the umbrella of the just war DMF. These connections are an open invitation for me to pursue more detailed research into other American presidents but also call me to address important questions about the characterization of different DMFs.

Non-Pacifist Alternatives to the Just War DMF

A typical formulation of just war theory points out at least the following three things: first, killing human beings is not always wrong, and there is a difference between making war, personal combat, and murder; second, one may wage war only on certain grounds (*jus ad bellum*); and third, soldiers in war may only use certain means (*jus in bello*). I would say the zero-eth, assumed but often-unmentioned, point is that there is such a thing as a just and orderly peace (*tranquillitas ordinis*); some contemporary approaches to just war theory, either having recognized that just war thought has become unmoored from its historical tradition or having become themselves unmoored from or unaware of that tradition themselves, have advanced a category of justice after war (*jus post bellum*). Both *tranquillitas ordinis* and *jus post bellum* have generally the same intention in view. Thus, the real questions concerning just war concern justice of grounds and justice of means. Hence, there needs to be a thorough characterization of just war and its non-pacifist alternatives.

If there are criteria for just grounds and just means, then these criteria could be made more permissive or more restrictive – and in several combinations and for different motives. Although choosing a standard of comparison is arbitrary, any consistently-applied starting point should be fine. Christian just war theory is a suitable reference point: It is neither overly restrictive or overly permissive; it is an ancient DMF that has proved consistent over time (from Augustine of Hippo in the 4th century to Thomas

Aquinas in the 13th century to the ecumenical, papal, conciliar, and pastoral documents of the 20th century); it has been applied to nuclear weapons in the nuclear age; and historically it has influenced thought on war in philosophy, ethics, and international law.

From this point, one could speak of permissive and restrictive alterations to the default just war theory. I can envision different brands of political permissiveness which accept reasons of state as just grounds for waging war. For example, one such form of permissiveness could find reasons of state sufficient in themselves to justify war, whereas another form of permissiveness might accept reasons of state only in conjunction with other just war criteria. Indeed, a third such permissiveness might be a humanitarian or altruistic permissiveness, perhaps related to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Similarly, I can envision streams of military permissiveness which accept military utility as justifying the use of particular means. In terms of restrictiveness, analysis of the national interest could serve to narrow the just grounds for war.

A thorough, systematic exploration of these ideas is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is clear that such work would afford me, other researchers, and policy makers a generalized DMF approach which would be important to future academic work and practical policy analysis.

RCHs and Nuclear Decisions Beyond the American Context and the Christian Religion

As noted above, this dissertation invites further investigation to understand one possible story of how the RCH-DMF connection influenced nuclear doctrine. The era of Massive Retaliation, though usually associated with Eisenhower, is a fair description of Truman as well. That period was succeeded by the era of Flexible Response under Kennedy. The era of Détente is associated with Nixon. A time of Nuclear Renewal took place under Carter and Reagan. The RCH of these presidents aligns with the nuclear

doctrines of their eras: Massive Retaliation was overseen by two mainline Protestant presidents and coheres with approaches that Luther and Calvin would have recognized; Flexible Response was overseen by a Catholic president, and Catholic thought on war stresses proportionality in a way that the thought of Luther and Calvin does not; Détente was overseen by a Quaker president, and the Quaker stream of Christianity is one of the most prominent of the historic peace churches; and Nuclear Renewal was overseen by two evangelical Protestant presidents who, despite two different denominational backgrounds as well as styles and substance of religious affiliation and adherence, nevertheless exhibit striking continuity in many respects. Before conducting this dissertation, such a sweeping observation would have seemed doubtful or at best coincidental. Now, however, it is a plausible idea which merits serious further exploration and research.

One possible direction would be to extend in the direction of other voluntary societies or associations which could serve as channels mediate, intensify, or moderate RCH. For example, Truman said, “I owe a great deal of my familiarity with the Bible to my Masonic studies – and to the fact that I read it through twice before I was 12 years old,”⁶⁷⁹ and,

It [freemasonry] is a system of Morals that is based entirely on the Scriptures. There is no reading as interesting as the Old and New testaments, especially those parts referred to in every Masonic Degree from 1 to 33 in the Scottish Rite and through Chapter and Commaradery [sic] in the York rite.⁶⁸⁰

However, this aspect of the psychological and spiritual lives can already be incorporated into analyses such as the one undertaken here.

⁶⁷⁹ Hillman, 169.

⁶⁸⁰ President’s Secretary’s File, Longhand Notes – Undated, Box 284, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

As suggested above, the first logical extension is to other forms of Christianity – an extension which simultaneously brings Europe, and thus NATO and the Warsaw Pact, into the picture. The larger picture remains the Nuclear Nine states and the Big Five religions. A generalized DMF approach is best used here.

Some groundwork has already been laid. For example, see Table 6.3 for a comparison of just grounds and just means in Christian, Islamic, and Hindu thought.

		Christian	Islamic	Hindu
<i>Ad bellum</i>	Just Cause	X	X	X
	<i>Self-Defense</i>	X	X	X
	<i>Right Wrongs</i>	X	X	X
	<i>Expand Community</i>		X	X
	<i>Strengthen State</i>			X
	Legitimate Authority	X	X	X
	Public Declaration	X	X	X
	Right Intent	X	X	
	Last Resort	X	X	
	Proportionality	X		
<i>In bello</i>	Civilian Immunity	X	X	X
	<i>Depends on Role</i>	X	X	X
	<i>Depends on Action</i>		X	X
	<i>Depends on Religion</i>		X	
	Protect Environment		X	X
	Even Match			X
	Proportionality	X		

Table 6.3: A Comparison of Just War Criteria in Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam⁶⁸¹

The step for moving from Christianity to Hinduism and Islam will be straightforward since some groundwork has thus been laid already to facilitate that part of the research agenda. Extending the framework to include Judaism and Buddhism will be

⁶⁸¹ Adapted from Valerie Ona Morkevicius, “Unholy Alliance: Just War Traditions as Power Politics,” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2008), 130.

a bit of a challenge, especially since the above table shoehorns Islam and Hinduism into an existing Christian framework although not too uncomfortably. Nevertheless, the above table already shows important commonalities between all three religions in both *ad bellum* and *in bello* criteria, commonalities between only two religions, and areas where one religion is distinctive.

Final Thought on Methodology

One step for future research would be to figure out the relative importance of RCH compared to the bracketed factors. One way to do so would be to move from the correlational paradigm outlined above to a set-theoretic paradigm such as qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) which explores the necessity and sufficiency of various baskets of conditions; in other words, QCA provides another way of formulating if-then statements.⁶⁸² Given the possibilities of crisp and fuzzy set membership (as shown not only by this dissertation but by Table 6.3 above), the small universe of cases, and the diversity of national leaders, this avenue seems particularly appropriate.

⁶⁸² For a good introduction, see Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

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