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The Politics of Amnesty

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The Politics of Amnesty

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Dedication

For Jeremy and Caleb.

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The Politics of Amnesty

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What effects policy choice, especially when the policy chosen is widely held to be unpopular? This dissertation aims to answer why and when certain policy solutions are chosen over others by focusing on a specific policy area (immigration) and a specific policy solution (amnesty or regularization of unauthorized migrants). This work argues that narratives put forth by political entrepreneurs are essential in understanding how policy is made. These policy narratives create new interpretations or understandings of political problems by changing how issues are framed. Additionally, by connecting policy "problems" with larger belief systems, politicians and activists can use narratives to widen their coalition and explain why their preferred solution will resolve the "problem." Quantitative data from the United States and European Union support the hypothesis that demographic, partisan, economic, and country level variables cannot explain immigration policy choice. Qualitative data, obtained from text analysis of debates in the U.S. Congress and Spanish Parliament are used to support the hypothesis that ideas are the missing variable in explaining immigration policy-making.

This dissertation connects the immigration and public policy literatures by exploring how facts are presented and connected to existing ideologies via narratives and framing. This dissertation also makes further contributions by incorporating unsupervised

content analysis methods into the study of immigration and policymaking. It takes up the challenge to show that content analysis can be a fruitful way to identify ideas and narratives, and when used to categorize text, these categories can then be used in a process tracing approach to trace the development, rise, and fall of specific frames in policy debates.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Since the 1990s, Spain has seen consistent growth in the number of immigrants entering the country, both legally and illegally. As a newer country of immigration, its immigration policy regime was new and did not provide adequate means to respond to, or incorporate, the growing number of incoming migrants, particularly those who were undocumented. Despite a range of policy options to choose from, Spain chose again to regularize undocumented immigrants in 2005, leading other European Union states to criticize this policy, suggesting that it would create a pull effect that would send waves of unauthorized migrants throughout the EU (Adler 2005).

In other countries, the debate about moving immigrants from irregular status to a legal status has also caused politicians to attack these proposals as unfair, arguing that not only do immigrant regularizations reward law breakers but they also incentivize others to enter without authorization (Casciani 2006). Opposition parties use immigration regularizations as a way to attack the government in power as weak on immigration, as conventional wisdom holds that they are unpopular with the electorate.

Given this uproar, it seems that regularizations of irregular migrants should be an extremely rare occurrence, yet we continue to see many states moving irregular or unauthorized migrants into legal status. Even among countries that state they are against 'forgiving' those who either entered their countries without authorization or fell out of status, we still see large numbers of immigrants regularized. For example, Kraler (2009) and Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler (2009b) point out that between 2005 and 2006, 118,000 persons were regularized in ten EU states, with France regularizing 85,000 persons between 2002 and 2006 and Belgium regularizing 40,000 people between 2000 and 2007. In fact, France regularized the situation of over 30,000 immigrants a year in the 2000s, a

number which exceeds its official number of deportations (Chauvin, Garcés-Mascareñas, and Kraler 2013, 5). While many politicians may deny it, immigration regularizations are not uncommon, nor do they appear to be going away.

This dissertation explores how and why this supposedly unpopular policy choice is chosen. Integrating insights from both the immigration policy literature and the policy process literature, my research questions prevailing approaches that explain immigration policy making. In brief, this dissertation focuses on policy change, asking why and when certain policy solutions are chosen over others by focusing on a specific policy area (immigration) and a specific policy solution (amnesty or regularization of unauthorized migrants). I contend discourse used by political entrepreneurs to frame debates and define issues is essential in understanding how policy is made. These discourses seek to change how issues are defined by shifting attention to previously neglected aspects of a policy area, thus creating new opportunities for policy change. Strategic uses of frames can change how political actors understand and interpret facts. Furthermore, actors such as politicians and activists use issue definitions and frames to connect issues with their preferred solutions. In order to understand why one policy is chosen over another, it is essential to study discourse and ideas.

This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I will discuss what qualifies as an immigrant regularization and provide a brief history of this policy tool. The next section discusses the previous literature on immigration regularization. This will be followed by a short overview of the theoretical underpinnings of the work. Finally, the chapter closes by outlining the plan of dissertation.

CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS: WHAT ARE IMMIGRANT REGULARIZATIONS, AND WHERE DO THEY COME FROM?

There are many debates over what does and does not count as immigration regularization, both in the political sphere and in the world of policy specialists. It is not uncommon for politicians to emphatically deny a program is regularization, even as a program serves the same purpose of moving immigrants who are currently out of legal immigration status into a legal category. This concept is furthered muddled by the various terms used, such as amnesty, regularization, normalization, and pathway to legality. Politicians that favor these policies use terms like "regularization" and focus on the steps and qualifications that immigrants must meet, while those opposed simply refer to any program that does not end in deportation as an "amnesty."

Making it harder to classify theses programs is their diversity; some programs are one-shot initiatives that last only a few months. Others are long-term mechanisms that apply to a specific group over a longer period of time; this can include a mechanism that allows for regularizations for immigrants that have been living in a country for a certain amount of years among other options (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009b, 40; Levinson 2005b). In addition, individual regularizations can target a specific type of "illegality"; some focus on giving unauthorized migrants work authorization, while others focus on housing or entry permission.

While some researchers divide programs on the basis of humanitarian or economic rationales, the fact is that many of the so-called humanitarian regularizations also have employment or work requirements, and many of the economic regularizations are defended in the light of economic justice and workers rights (see Chauvin, Garcés-Mascareñas, and Kraler [2013] for a more in-depth discussion of the evolution of economic regularizations).

In light of these considerations, I opt for an expansive definition of regularizations: any policy instrument that allows a previously unauthorized migrant to become authorized, regardless of how permanent the new status is or how long the policy instrument lasts, is an immigrant regularization.[1]

While many countries had regularizations before the 1980s and 1990s, it is only in the 1990s and 2000s debates about their utility and fairness emerge in immigration policy debates. With the generous definition of regularization used in this study, the number of regularization programs has grown in recent years; there have been 78 regularizations between 1986-2012 in the EU and the US, with 45 occurring after 2000. Overall, between 1986 and 2012, over 7,500,000 migrants were regularized in programs in twenty-one countries in the EU and the US, with the U.S. responsible for the single largest mass regularization. Both the U.S. and most of the EU countries have permanent regularization mechanisms in their immigration policy, but these mechanisms receive much less coverage than general regularizations, even though they can include large numbers of people. For example, between 1986 and 2012, more than 1,700,000 migrants were regularized through forty-four mechanisms throughout the U.S. and EU.[2]

In the US, regularizations have been used as a policy tool by presidents to achieve foreign policy goals throughout the 20th century, while the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) lead to the single largest immigration regularization. In Europe, we

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1 A note on word usage: Regularization is the preferred term in the European literature, while most of the work done in the United States speaks of legalizations (Levinson 2005b). Amnesty, a term used frequently to describe the U.S. 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) regularization, has fallen out of favor. While I hold that regularizations, amnesties and legalizations are synonyms, I will mainly use the word regularization throughout this dissertation as most of the work cited comes from European researchers.
2 The number for immigrants regularized through mechanisms is an approximation, and the actual count should be assumed to be much higher. This number does not include immigrants regularized in programs started before 1986, and many countries do not have publicly available statistics on the numbers regularized through these mechanisms.

see regularizations used to respond to asylum crises created the fall of the USSR and war in the Balkans (Kraler 2009). Later, we see the rise of regularizations based on the ties unauthorized immigrants have to their new country of residence or their employment status (Kraler 2009; Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009).

Amnesties in both the United States and Europe coincide with growing numbers of authorized and unauthorized immigrants. Since the late twentieth century, the number of immigrants has grown dramatically in the United States, with the number of foreign born rising from 19.7 million, (7.9% of the population) in 1990 to about 40 million (13 percent of the population) in 2012 (Brick 2011). The number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States has also risen s from 3.5 million in 1990 to a peak of 12 million in 2007 before decreasing by 8 percent in 2009 after the economic crisis (Passel and Cohen 2011). Passel and Cohn (2012) estimated that unauthorized immigrants make up 28 percent of the 40 million foreign born in the United States (See Table 1.1).

Table 1. 1 Number of Unauthorized Immigrants in US

Year	Population in Millions
2000	8.4
2001	9.3
2002	9.4
2003	9.7
2004	10.4
2005	11.1
2006	11.3
2007	12
2008	11.6
2009	11.1
2010	11.2
2011	11.1

Numbers complied from Pew Hispanic Center: Passel, Jeffrey S., and D'Vera Cohn. 2011. "Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010." Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, February. http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/02/01/unauthorized-immigrant-population-brnational-and-state-trends-2010

The growth of immigration in Europe has seen the same trends. While some countries have been receiving immigrant flows for generations, others, such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, have only recently moved from being countries of emigration to countries of immigration (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004). Across the EU, the number of both authorized and unauthorized migrants has increased over time (see Table 1.2), especially in the "new" countries of immigration. For example, by 2012, 10 percent of the population in Spain was foreign born (OECD 2012). Unlike the United States, there are few reliable figures and estimates regarding the number of unauthorized immigrants in most European countries, and even fewer measures that are comparable over time. For Spain, Levinson (2005a) quotes estimates of 200,000 (1991), 150,000 (1995) and 200,000 (2005).

Table 1.2 Population of Foreign Born in Selected OECD Countries 2000-2010

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Belgium	1058.8 (10.3)	1112.2 (10.8)	1151.8 (11.1)	1185.5 (11.4)	1220.1 (11.7)	1268.9 (12.1)	1319.3 (12.5)	1380.3 (13.0)	1444.3 (13.5)	1504.3 (13.9)	..
France	4379.6 (7.4)	4467.7 (7.5)	4572.8 (7.6)	4689.7 (7.8)	4811.2 (7.9)	4926.4 (8.1)	5040.5 (8.2)	5147.8 (8.3)	5342.3 (8.6)	..	..
Germany	10256.1 (12.5)	..	..	..	..	10399.0 (12.6)	10431.0 (12.7)	10534.0 (12.8)	10623.0 (12.9)	10601.0 (12.9)	10591.0 (13.0)
Spain	1969.3 (4.9)	2594.1 (6.4)	3302.4 (8.0)	3693.8 (8.8)	4391.5 (10.3)	4837.6 (11.1)	5250.0 (11.9)	6044.5 (13.5)	6466.3 (14.2)	6566.6 (14.3)	6659.9 (14.5)
UK	4666.0 (7.9)	4865.0 (8.2)	5000.0 (8.4)	5143.0 (8.6)	5338.0 (8.9)	5557.0 (9.4)	5757.0 (9.6)	6192.0 (10.3)	6633.0 (11.0)	6899.0 (11.3)	7056.0 (11.5)
US	30273.3 (10.7)	31548.1 (11.1)	33096.2 (11.5)	33667.7 (11.6)	34257.7 (11.7)	35769.6 (12.1)	37469.4 (12.6)	38048.5 (12.6)	38016.1 (12.5)	38452.8 (12.5)	39916.9 (12.9)

In thousands, percentages in parenthesis
Data from OECD (2012). "Table A.1.4 Stocks of Foreign-Born Population in OECD Countries" *International Migration Outlook 2012*. OECD publishing

THE PUZZLE AND ARGUMENT

This increase in migrant numbers leads to more questions than answers. Even though regularization programs became more common as these numbers rose, an increase in migration has not been enough to spark regularization in many countries. In fact, the U.S. was unable to pass several regularizations in the 2000s, both during times of increasing and decreasing migration. More generally, there is not a direct correlation between high numbers of immigration and regularization; states with various levels of immigration flows have chosen this policy instrument. Across the globe, both liberal and conservative governments have passed these programs, and countries that are supposedly against them still use them. Nevertheless, they continue to be fruitful targets for political opponents who take them as opportunities to paint the party in power as "weak on immigration," and conventional wisdom holds that they are unpopular with the electorate. So why do we continue to see them and why are they chosen over other, more politically palatable, policy solutions?

The literature on immigration amnesties, while growing, is sparse and theoretically underdeveloped. While some have focused on the outcomes of these policies, there has been little focus on why this tool is chosen over others. Typically, the politics behind amnesties are covered in one or two short sentences, stating that they are a response to economic or political pressures, with little attention to the groups that promote them, argue against them, and how the issue gets placed on the agenda in the first place. For example, in her 2005 working paper, Levinson writes "since they are rarely a country's first option, regularization programs are usually undertaken only when internal and external migration controls have failed" (Levinson 2005a, 5). Yet she does not provide evidence of this failure or more extensively discuss this point. Nor does this

explain why countries often choose these programs when establishing their immigration control system. Ideas and ideology are also downplayed in the literature, even though immigration itself is highly ideologically charged. When it comes to studies of immigrant regularizations, the politics has been left behind.

The first strand of regularization literature focuses on conceptual issues regarding regularization, but from a policy perspective rather than a theoretical political science perspective. These projects tend to describe regularization programs, their requirements, goals (as given by policy makers), and when these may be appropriate policy tools (Arango and Finotelli 2009; Brick 2011; Bruquetas-Callejo, Garcés-Mascareñas, Morén-Alegret, Penninx et al. 2008; Rosenblum 2010). The extensive Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler REGINE report (2009a) comes closest to dealing with politics through a survey they sent to NGOs, trade unions, and governments to explore their reasons for supporting regularizations. Their in-depth study of regularization mechanisms did incorporate some of the broader framework of the immigration policy literature, but overall, it focuses on description over theoretical frameworks of policy choice and policy change. They do provide coverage of previous research, including attempts to systematically categorize regularization programs by type.

These regularization typologies vary across the literature. The most basic categorization is the distinction between "one-off" programs and mechanisms, which tend to be part of a larger immigration policy framework (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009a; Brick 2011; Kraler 2009; Levinson 2005a, 2005b). The EU Odyssey report adds to this category four non-exclusive descriptions (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009, 19-20), and a report by the Council of Europe develops its own typology (Greenway [2007] quoted in Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler [2009, 26]). Finally, the REGINE report suggests distinguishing between two main goals of regularization: an economic tool that aims at

labor market policy and a mean to correct illegal residence/stay instead of deportation. It also suggests there are six policy clusters across the EU towards regularization, yet these descriptions are based more on the country's stated orientation toward regularization rather than the immigration policies themselves.

What these attempts at typologies show is the difficulty of creating mutually exclusive categorizations of these policies. Even the simplest divide -- that between one-off programs and mechanisms -- becomes blurred with cases such as Belgium in 2009, where a one-time program evolves into a mechanism. Even dividing countries along their orientations is fraught with difficulty, as most countries engage in multiple types of legalization programs. While some easily fit into an economic or humanitarian divide, most are a blend of the two.

The second strand of the literature consists of attempts to measure the outcome of these amnesties (Baker 1997; Chiswick 1988; Martin 1994; Orrenius and Zavodny 2003). While these reports are useful in determining if a policy is successful in meeting a certain outcome, it is difficult to know if it has succeeded in its objectives, considering that these policies were encouraged by diverse coalitions each with their own motivations. These works tend to assume rationality and ignore that immigration is a multifaceted issue that does not lend itself neatly to the traditional left/right divide. For example, immigration policy can be described in humanitarian terms (ending worker exploitation, consideration of those that have nowhere else to go), as a matter of control (who is entering and exiting the state), or as a way to achieve certain material and economic interests. Rather than measure success across a variety of policy goals, these works tend to focus on the ability of the programs to reduce further migration or their economic impact in one sector.

A final strand of the literature does attempt to create theoretical models to explain policy choice via game theory. Chau (2001) argues that amnesties are needed to

prevent labor shortages and often accompany the introduction of employer sanctions; however, she also notes that in the United States at least, employer sanctions were rarely enforced. Her later work (2003) assumes that labor will not support immigration due to the negative effect it has on native wages. Yet these assumptions, while useful in creating game theoretic models, are not empirically supported. While maintaining wages is important to unions, so is incorporating immigrants as new members and promoting workplace protection, something which large pools of unauthorized migrants undermines (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009c; Tichenor 2009).

In order to answer why this policy option is chosen, it is necessary to turn towards the wider political science literature. The existing literature in political science often explains policy choice via institutional and rational choice variables. In immigration studies in particular, policy choice is explained by liberal norms (Hollifield 1992), partisanship (Gimpel and Edwards 1998; Casellas and Leal 2013), as well as more rationalist variables such as a rising number of immigrants, economic outcomes, or public opinion. Yet these variables are often hard to compare across presidential and parliamentary systems. Furthermore, as Baumgartner and Jones (2012) note, the rational choice model assumes stability and a clear left/right divide of preferences to support the median voter theorem, yet immigration is known for creating "strange bedfellows" that span the ideological spectrum (see also Tichenor 2001).

Other theories of immigration policymaking have been contradicted by empirical studies. For example, while some research suggests convergence, either towards restrictive positions (given the securitization of migration (Hampshire 2008)) or expansionary policies (due to the spread of liberal norms (Freeman 1995), some studies have found either no trend towards securitization (Boswell 2007), restrictive positions

specifically (Berkhout 2012, 12), or congruence in policy making in general in the EU (Berkhout 2012, 15).

Finally, research that aims to predict economic outcomes is based itself on assumptions about what variables matter, what future growth will look like, and what economic outcomes are most important. For example, the decision to say that immigrants are beneficial for an economy can vary depending on whether emphasis is placed on growing the tax base, wage rate growth, low consumer costs, etc.   Furthermore, promoters of "rights" or liberal ideas are also motivated by ideas and narratives. How do political entrepreneurs convince others that their narrative, and therefore their policy solution, is right? How do they expand their coalition? What key beliefs are these ideas connecting to in immigration politics?

My work argues that theories from the policy public field and comparative politics that focus on issue definition, framing, and narratives can better explain policy choice. While many in the field of political science have expressed skepticism that ideas and narratives are anything more than cheap talk or epiphenomenal, a growing field of work has challenged this idea. Based on the works of Riker (1986) and Schattschneider (1960), the public policy subfield has provided theoretical and empirical support for the idea that narratives are tools for expressing political beliefs. Furthermore, work in this area also argues that frames and discourse are strategically used by policy entrepreneurs to gain support for their preferred policy outcome. There are two key frameworks that inform the research in this dissertation: Discursive Institutionalism and the Narrative Policy Framework.

The first framework that guides the research presented here is the Discursive Institutionalism (DI) framework, which arose from the new institutionalism of the early 2000s. DI is an institutionalism that allows for the study of both context and agency

(Schmidt 2010). Here, institutions are not merely rules or norms, but are "simultaneously constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning" (Schmidt 2010, 4). Unlike other forms of institutionalism, the question here is not *if* ideology matters, but *when* and *how* it does. According to Schmidt (2010, 17), the micro-foundations of this framework hold that:

> agents are rational in a thinking manner: they also pursue their goals in accordance with their beliefs about the facts but … they are not only able to think, say, and act but also to think about their thoughts, reflect upon their actions, state their intentions, alter their actions as a result of their thoughts about their actions, and say what they are thinking of doing and change their minds in response to persuasion by others regarding what they are thinking, saying, and doing.

In studying which ideas prevail, DI focuses on the power of actors, framing, venue choice, issue ownership, proposed solutions, and how well the solutions fit into the broader environment (Mehta 2011). Institutions limit how actors can act, what discourses can be used, and what outcomes are possible; however, how the solutions are matched to problems and which one of the competing solutions is selected is a matter of narrative and persuasion.

In the policy process literature, we see several theories and approaches that incorporate information, attention and beliefs. Like DI, many of these theories include micro-foundations which hold that individuals exhibit bounded rationality; that is, they are capable of planning and strategic behavior, yet they are not able to process all information and maintain ranked, non-contradictory preferences. According to the theory of punctuated equilibrium, public policies are marked by equilibrium until the policy inertia is 'punctuated' by shifts in attention caused by change in how the issue is defined and framed (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Rose and Baumgartner 2013). As Baumgartner, De Boeuf, and Boydstun (2008) argue, when it comes to policy change:

policies shift not smoothly in response to changing social inputs, but in a disjointed manner associated with threshold effects, information cascades and shifts in the focus of attention. Policies are often stable for decades as the status quo is reinforced by an established way of thinking about that problem, but when new dimensions arise, policies can change sharply, not just incrementally. (11)

Like DI, this framework does not ignore contexts or institutions. While attention can be a critical variable in explaining changes, institutional designs and friction can also impede change, regardless of shifts in attention (Jones and Baumgartner 2012). There are several ways to investigate the hypotheses presented in the theory of Punctuated Equilibrium.

The "Narrative Policy Framework" (NPF), proposed by Jones and McBeth (2010), is meant to move the study of narratives more firmly into the field of positivist social science and away from critical discourse analysis. Their articulated framework provides both a micro- and meso-level of analysis, with the micro-level focusing on public opinion as effected by narratives, while the meso-level analysis focuses on "how policy narratives influence policy outcomes" where variation in the coalition composition is the key dependent variable, and policy narratives are the independent variable to be studied (Shanahan, Jones and McBeth 2011, 540). McBeth et al. (2007) "use content analysis and hypothesis testing to study how interest groups use political tactics in their narratives and how these tactics are predictable using Schattschneider's (1960) classic articulation of issue expansion and containment" (339) as well as how narrative strategies can be used to ""impede policy learning" (538).

This project aims to use the DI framework to create testable hypotheses about narratives in policy choice. Borrowing from NPF, this dissertation will use content analysis to trace the development of frames over time.

USING MIGRATION POLICY TO EXPLORE POLICY CHOICE

Migration policymaking provides an interesting area for the comparative study of public policy for several reasons. First, it is relevant across nations, allowing us to study how different institutional arrangements inside a country can affect the policy chosen. In addition, the migration area allows for comparison across time, as once migration becomes an issue for a country, it tends to remain an issue.

Additionally, immigration policymaking is a new issue in many places, which allows for easier historical tracing of the issue (Berkhout, Ruedin, Brug, and D'Amato 2015). Migration provides many 'objective' variables that we can use to test alternative hypotheses, e.g. GDP, unemployment, population numbers, etc. (Berkhout, Ruedin, Brug, and D'Amato 2015).

Finally, previous work has suggested that ideas are particularly important in immigration policy. Sides and Citrin (2007) show that information about the actual size of immigrants population does little to correct perceptions of immigration; rather, what matters in opinion formation is if a person believes that immigrants are a strain on the community. In addition, groups that were once against expansive immigration have switched over time to supporting expansive policies (Tichenor 2009). Unions, once against liberal immigration policy due to fears of decreasing wages, switched to supporting immigration as immigrants were seen as a source of new membership.

THE RESEARCH DESIGN IN BRIEF

As stated above, this dissertation will build on works in the public policy process literature, especially those that focus on the role of coalitions, and research on attention and information processing. Using Discursive Institutionalism, I will focus on a meso-level analysis where policy choice is the dependent variables. Using content analysis to

categorize themes and patterns in narratives, I will test my proposed hypotheses against several alternative explanations proposed by the literature.

If the theory I purpose to explain policy choice is true, I expect to see regularizations agreed to in times of right-wing party dominance, not just during left-wing control, regardless of the amount of immigration change. Furthermore, if business needs are driving immigration policy (Freeman 1995), amnesties should be promoted and proposed by businesses, while if imbedded liberalism is promoting expansionist policy, human and civil rights should be at the forefront (Hollifield 1992).

I develop this argument in three substantive chapters. One chapter will be quantitative analysis that tests several theories used to explain policy choice using a dataset compiled from multiple sources that cover economic, political, and demographic variables that apply to EU countries and the US. This model will be described in greater detail in Chapter 3, which will further lay out the dependent and independent variables and the data sets used.

Finally, to better tease out the causal mechanisms in policy choice, I will conduct two case studies. In order to study discourse and shifting policy ideas, I will use qualitative and quantitative content analysis as suggested by the NPF framework to analyze debates in the U.S. Congress and Spanish Congreso de Diputados. By studying how discourse changes over time, and what frames are used during the debate, this content analysis will help identify the causal pathway that policy decisions take.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation will start with a comprehensive discussion of the overall research design and the theoretical foundations of the research. In Chapter 2, I provide an overview of the immigration literature and show how current approaches leave the

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question of why immigration regularizations are chosen unanswered. Next, I outline the Discursive Institutionalism framework and how it has been used to explain policy choice in the literature. Here I integrate insights from the literature regarding ideas and issue definition and discourse, discussing how these variables can be studied within a positivist framework. After stating the research questions, the chapter discusses case selection and a brief overview of the quantitative methodology that will be used Chapter 3. The chapter finishes with an in-depth discussion of the content analysis methodology that is used use to code frames and narratives in the case study chapters.

Chapter 3 involves a statistical model that will test the prevailing theories towards immigration policy choice. This chapter explores immigration regularization as a policy choice by testing demographic, economic, political, and country-specific variables to see if they have an effect on regularization as a policy choice. Using policy choice as a dependent variable, a logistic multi-level mixed effect model is utilized to test several alternative explanations for why regularization is chosen. As it is a multilevel model, it allows for testing the effect of both country-specific factors and time-varying factors on immigration policy choice. Most importantly, this chapter introduces a comparative model of regularizations and policy choice to the literature. This model finds that there is no statistically significant effect from any of the economic, political, or demographic independent variables tested. Most surprisingly, it also shows no statistically significant country-level effect.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide case studies of the legislative debates leading up to the passage of bills authorizing immigration regularization. Chapter 4 will trace the usage of frames in the debates leading up the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, while Chapter 5 will focus on the debates held in 1998-2000 that lead to two immigration regularization in Spain. These chapters test the utility of unsupervised topic modeling,

specifically latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model in tracing issue frames across time. Ultimately, these case studies show that frames are used strategically and that some frames can be described as partisan; in other words, one political party favors their usage. While utilizing the LDA topic model to discover and code topics provides many useful insights into issue definition and framing over time, this analysis also reveals some shortcomings in using this method.

The dissertation concludes in Chapter 6. This chapter will suggest practical implications of the findings and avenues for future research. It summarizes the findings of the case studies, comparing and contrasting the use of LDA topic modeling for content analysis in two different institutional settings, as well as discussing what generalizations can be taken from this research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review, Theory and Methods

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical and empirical foundations that underpin this dissertation. I first discuss the prevailing approaches in the immigration literature, which leave unanswered the question of why amnesty is chosen as a policy. I then move to the policy process literature, which establishes the importance of issue definition and framing in creating policy change and explaining policy choice. In describing my theory of policy choice, I propose that policy choice is not the outcome of objective inputs into a system but rather the result of strategic behavior on the part of political entrepreneurs to focus attention on one aspect of a policy issue over others. In the same manner, solutions are connected to problems due to how the issue is defined. My approach highlights the fact that actors often begin with a policy preference and then search for a problem it can arguably "solve." as suggested by Kingdon (1984). Finally, I contend that content analysis is a useful way to study policy choice by collecting causal process observations. Like Nowlin (2015), this dissertation uses a "model of issue definitions that assumes issues are multidimensional, competition exists among policy actors in defining issues, and that collective issue definitions can be understood as the aggregation of individual issue definitions. This model is then estimated using quantitative text analysis."

EXPLAINING POLICY CHOICE

The Immigration Literature

Prevailing approaches in the immigration literature have started to question the traditional "rational" explanations for immigration policy making, such as GDP, employment, and party identification. Recent works have asked whether immigration flows play a role in immigration policymaking. For example, Givens and Luedtke (2005), argue that partisanship is only a factor in integration policy, not immigration policy. Issue salience, more than partisanship, is likely to

lead to more restrictive immigration laws. While their research weakly confirms that lower levels of GDP growth and/or high unemployment can lead to more restrictive policies, researchers involved in the Support and Opposition to Immigration (SOM) project found that, in general, "salience and polarization of immigration and integration are not clearly related to the influx of immigrants, to the share of foreign born residents, the policy responses or the state of the economy" (SOM 2012, 2); rather they argue that country-specific factors played a role in how and when immigration is politicized and gains salience. Low employment rates can actually push immigration off the agenda as policy makers chose to focus on issues other than immigration. Tichenor (2009) also found that in the U.S. case, immigration policy was unrelated to the economy.

Additionally, we do not observe a direct correlation between immigration numbers and regularizations: states with various levels of immigration flows chose this policy instrument. While the number of immigrants has risen in the U.S. since the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), we have not seen a second large-scale regularization program. Furthermore, countries sometimes enact regularizations when immigration has in fact started to decrease (e.g. Ireland 2009).

Other works on public opinion towards immigration have also challenged the usefulness of seeing policy makers as rational vote maximizers. Current research has revealed that public opinion on immigration is full of contradictory opinions, much of which can be accounted for by the multidimensionality of this policy area. For example, one can obtain different results if one studies opinions on "illegal" versus legal migrants, as well as high-skilled versus low-skilled migrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Suro 2009). Others argue that outside factors can act as intervening variables to influence how the public feels about immigration at any one time. Some show that economic concerns (Borjas 2001), local partisanship (Rodriguez, Ramakrishnan, and

Wong 2010), national salience of immigration (Hopkins 2010), or divisions between elites and the public (Freeman 1995) can shape and change how the public sees immigration.

It is therefore clear that another variable is needed to help explain changes in policy, and why public opinion can be so contradictory and changeable in regards to immigration. Work on framing and ideas provides a way to explore this, and it helps to explain why the common variables thought to shape policy choice (numbers of migrants, GDP, unemployment, salience, etc.) only explain part of the change in policy.

Historically, immigration has been framed as an economic issue, a rights issue, and a cultural issue, with many of these frames occurring at the same time and place (Higham 2006; Tichenor 2009). The literature provides some evidence of shifting regularization frames. Previous work has noted that the economic framing of regularizations has shifted to one that considers human rights, with European countries that are perceived as pursuing regularizations on economic grounds arguing for them in terms of humanitarian reasons (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009b). However, to better understand the effect of framing on immigration policymaking, it is necessary to turn to the broader public policy literature in political science.

The Public Policy Literature

How does policy, in general, change? According to the rationalist school of thought on policy making, policy change occurs because the status quo is no longer sufficient for dealing with or containing a societal problem (Smith and Larimer 2009). Change will occur when the numbers or indicators demand change, after which, as rational vote maximizers, politicians will enact policy responses that will garner them the highest number of votes. Yet there are problems with this theory. If most politicians will move towards the middle to gather the largest number of votes, why do parties have differing platforms? Why do we see politicians move certain items to the agenda that were previously un-politicized? Why do we see politicians vote in ways that goes against public opinion?

Political science has given several answers to these questions in both policy studies and other fields. Comparative politics favors institutional or structural explanations that, while applicable in specific cases, are often not very generalizable other than arguing we must take context into account. The field of policy studies has tried to move past the rationalist assumption by bringing in ideas of bounded rationality, advocacy coalitions, and punctuated equilibrium. While these explanations can explain patterns of change, they can not provide guidance on how policy *will* change.

Either way, in the larger literature of policy change, we see growing support for a viewpoint that understands policy, politics, and problems existing independently of each other. Here, information is not neutral but can be used strategically to change meaning and context. These assumptions have led researchers to focus on how issues rise to the agenda and how definitions affect information processing (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Kingdon 1984; Stone 1989). That a situation exists is not enough for government attention, contrary to the public choice and rational choice hypotheses (Baumgartner and Jones 2005). Even when events occur, they require actors or groups to contextualize them as problems that can be solved by government intervention (Carpenter and Sin 2007; Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1984). Therefore, labeling something a problem is often a political calculus based on values rather than neutral information (Stone 1989). In addition, data are often politicized, or collected in such a way that analysis is limited to answer only certain types of questions (Piven 2004).

In this environment, actors can introduce (or reintroduce) items to the agenda by reframing the issue to highlight a previous neglected aspect. This shift in attention can achieve several things: it can connect a favored solution to a larger problem (for example, promoting smaller government by encouraging charter schools); or it can open up new avenues for change and increase an advocacy group's coalition (Baumgartner and Jones 2005, 2009; Chong and Druckman 2007; Schattschneider 1960). The importance and dynamic nature of frames has been

demonstrated across multiple policy areas; the multidimensional nature of policy allows for shifts and changes as some aspects become more salient than others.

Connecting Issue Definition, Framing, and Ideas

Chong and Drukeman (2007, 105) argue that "framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue." The idea that frames help individuals to organize information and understand connections between issues and beliefs is common in the political science and political psychology literatures (Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Blyth 2011; Jones and Song 2014). The framing of an issue and ideas help explain how actors understand policy legacies and can be useful to "legitimize or oppose policy change" (Beland and Waddan 2012, 10).

Riker (1986), building on the work of Schattschneider (1960), developed the idea of heresthetics, which he describes as a political story that allows policy entrepreneurs to shape debate, reframe issues, and build coalitions. He argues "politicians can reasonably expect to change the outcome if they can change the way that questions are posed, or the considerations that influence participants judgments or the way votes are counted and so on" (Riker 1986, 143). Part of how this is done is through framing by political entrepreneurs, who then create narratives that showcase these frames.

Frames, as conceived here, "are never neutral" (Berinsky and Kinder 2006, 641). These narratives and frames help organize political ideas and can connect seemingly unrelated issues with broader underlying belief structures or philosophies (Baumgartner and Jones 2015; Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Berman 2011; Givens and Evans Case 2014; Jones and Song 2014). These narratives and stories establish what the problem is, who it affects, why, which action should be taken, and why inaction is not an option (Stone 1989).

Yet ideas and narratives do not take place in a vacuum. They occur inside of institutions and are entangled in the legacies of previous policy choices. Institutional rules and legacies

structure how debate occurs and may define the borders of debate, but they are not sufficient in explaining how policy change is made (Beland and Waddan 2012).

The Problem with Ideas

While it appears clear that ideas matter, and that actors use frames, ideas, and stories to understand the world around them, there has been little work on this aspect of political science and how it applies to policy change. Berman (2011) notes that there exists skepticism about studying ideas in much of political science. While some work focuses on discourse by studying framing, bounded rationality, and issue definition, there is the vague sense that focusing too much on discourse may push one out of the positivist school of social science and into the world of the post-modernist constructivists. Indeed, much of the work on discourse comes from the Critical Discourse Analysis School which focuses on interpretive meanings of text, but whose analyses often lack falsifiability and are non-systematic.[3]

Overall, the concerns about ideas tend to fall into two categories: the first argues that ideas are epiphenomenal and the second is a methodological concern of how to measure and isolate ideas (Parsons 2002). Yet as Blyth (2011) points out, this skepticism about methods is not isolated to work that wishes to incorporate ideas: non-ideational theories tend to assume that variables are independent and that decision makers are certain about their preferences, not uncertainty and interdependence which are more empirically sound.

The concept of framing itself also has its problems. Campbell (2002) points out three problems of studying the role of framing in policy change: 1) studies tend to lack comparisons and provide functionalist answers; 2) they ignore how frames are "contracted, tested, transformed and fit to the prevailing normative frameworks and native paradigms residing in the

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[3] For a deeper discussion of the differences between positivist and post-structural theories of narratives, see Jones and McBeth (2010).

background of policy debates" (27); and 3) the impossibility of knowing when politicians are speaking truthfully.

In response to these criticisms, work has emerged that attempts to make theories about the role of ideas in policy change generalizable and empirically testable. Campbell (2002) suggests "compar[ing] different policy positions and their frames in a single policy debate to determine whether different frames affected which policy received the most support" (27) and to "ask how ideas and interest interact" (33).

Parsons (2002) argues that we should look at situations where ideas are cross cutting. If we see similar situated individuals favoring different policy solutions or interpretations and there is evidence that actors "consistently say and write that they believe certain things, and that their peers think differently - we have strong evidence that ideas alone are causing individual variation across the range" (2002, 51).

Here, the problem of symbolic politics can be diminished. In the immigration literature, it has been noted that there is a gap between how immigration policy is described by governments and how it is actually implemented (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004). This gap can also be the result of inefficient legislative design (Calavita 1994). Boswell and Geddes (2001, 3) argue that this is the result of malintergration along the policy process that is, a "decoupling of talk, decision and action." While acknowledging that politicians may not be telling the "truth" and actually support policies that do the opposite of what they proclaim, what is important is that they are using their arguments strategically to convey ideas and structure the debate. Other politicians will have to deal with the questions brought up in these narratives, even if the questioner is being disingenuous.

Empirical Support

Empirical work also supports the idea that frames are used to connect issues to key beliefs and that people will focus on some aspects of narratives over others, regardless of the

'facts' in a given situation. Gains et al. (2007) tested how partisans revised their views on the Iraq War when given new information. When given updated information and facts, partisans are more able to support their views by interpreting the facts to focus on the aspect of policy they care about. Other research has found that "stories containing content likely to evoke disgust, fear or happiness are spread more readily from person to person and more widely through social media than are neutral stories" (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, et al. 2012, 108). This runs contrary to the idea that facts can speak for themselves and solutions are suggested based merely on the facts; rather, interpretations and stories matter.

Other works have used these ideas to explore issue definition, frame shifting, and policy change. These works use process tracing to explore frame shifting in U.S. social welfare policy (Rose and Baumgartner 2013); explore the interplay between ideational and institutional factors and issue ownership to generate policy change (Beland and Waddan 2012); use the changing of frames in explaining and understanding the death penalty (Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun 2008); trace the development of rights regimes in the European Union (Givens and Evans Case 2014); and compare competing interest group narratives and connects them to key beliefs (McBeth, Shanahan, and Jones 2005).

Furthermore, the idea of framing is not merely an abstract notion to be found in political science textbooks. These frames are used in narratives, or strategic ways politicians and policy entrepreneurs talk about their ideas. Even if political science may discount the role they play, politicians themselves do not. For example, Harris (2010, 45) recounts how in a January 1994 meeting, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich "recommended to all House Republicans a memorandum written by public opinion expert Frank Luntz on the 'key words, phrases and ideas' need to achieve majority status." Later, he notes that during a party strategy planning meeting, an aide to Speaker Tip O'Neil wrote that "in framing the debate and defining the stakes on key issues, there are a number of themes the Democratic Party should consistently stress. As

legislative issues unfold and opportunities to communicate with the electorate arise, Democrats should be prepared to forcefully and graphically focus the dialogue on these themes" (46).

How to Test the Role of Ideas and Discourse

As Schmidt (2011, 62) writes:

Part of the reason many political scientists avoid explanations related to discourse is that it is difficult to separate it from other variables, to identify it as the independent variable. But instead of ignoring discourse because of the difficulties, because it might not be the cause, it is much better to ask when is discourse a cause, that is when does discourse serve to reconceptualize interest, to chart new institutional paths, and to reframe cultural norms?

As noted above, many empirical works have taken Schmidt's advice to study how and when ideas matter. In addition to these, public policy scholars have also created the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) to help move the study of narratives into a more systematic schema (Jones and McBeth 2010). NPF's goal is to "accurately capture and describe policy narratives", focusing on narrative elements and strategy, and then, using testable hypothesis, allow researchers to evaluate the role of these narratives on policy change (Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth 2011). Underlying this framework is the idea that narratives have structure - plot, characters, and morals - and occur within a policy setting.

In Comparative Politics, discursive institutionalism (DI) provides another way to study the impact of ideas through both context and agency (Schmidt 2010, 2011). This framework sees institutions as "simultaneously constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning" (Schmidt 2010, 4). In studying which ideas prevail, this framework focuses on the power of actors, framing, venue choice, issue ownership, proposed solutions, and how well the solutions fit into the broader environment (Metha 2011). Unlike in other forms of institutionalism, the question here is not merely if ideology matters, but when and how it does. According to Schmidt (2010, 17), the micro-foundations of this framework hold that agents are rational in a thinking

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manner: they also pursue their goals in accordance with their beliefs about the facts but … they are not only able to think, say, and act but also to think about their thoughts, reflect upon their actions, state their intentions, alter their actions as a result of their thoughts about their actions, and say what they are thinking of doing and change their minds in response to persuasion by others regarding what they are thinking, saying, and doing.

As such, frames and ideas are not only used strategically, but actors also use them to react to their opponents. They are intentionally used in order to persuade, attack, and structure the debate in certain ways. By tracing the development of frames throughout a debate, we can see how ideas are used to structure what arguments are discussed and which aspect of an issue is ignored.

This dissertation will use Discursive Institutionalism to structure the analysis of immigrant regularizations. Using essentially a process tracing approach, which Bennet and Checkel (2011) define as "analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case" (7), this dissertation will trace debates surrounding immigration regularizations. Using content analysis, this work will identify frames present in debates and how they are related to policy change and coalition strategies.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

If narratives play a role in explaining policy change, I expect to see regularizations enacted in times of right-wing party dominance, not just during left-wing control, regardless of the amount of change of immigrants present. Furthermore, if business needs are driving immigration policy (Freeman 1995), amnesties should be promoted and proposed by businesses, while if imbedded liberalism is promoting expansionist policy, human and civil rights should be at the forefront (Hollifield 1992).

H1: Supportive discursive institutions must be in place for a policy solution to be chosen regardless of changes in demographic, political and economic variables. Narrative influences what solution one wants regardless of unemployment, rate of immigration, and other traditional variables examined in the immigration policy literature.

H2: Pro-regularization talk will be different from anti-regularization talk.

H3: Frames and issue definitions are used strategically. Losers will try and broaden their coalition, while winners will try and contain the issue

H4: Latent Dirichlet Allocation(LDA) topic modeling can be used to study how frames are used over time, party and location[4].

I first argue that we can expect attempts at coalition growth and containment based on the frames that are being promoted in Hypothesis 3. This stands in contrast to the liberal state hypothesis and explains the strange bedfellows we often see in immigration politics. From Hypothesis 3, we will also be able to discover the strategy that is being promoted by policy entrepreneurs. In testing Hypothesis 2, we see evidence that the narrative is different for pro-regularization and anti-regularization groups. Finally, the results from Hypothesis 2 (narrative) and Hypothesis 3 (strategy) can be used to explain policy outcome and change. When the strategy is expansionist and successful, we will see change regardless of party dominance, the number of immigrants, public opinion or various other factors. The fourth hypothesis aims to test if the unsupervised topic modeling method LDA can be applied to framing and issue definition studies. While this method has been explored in other areas of social science and in some political science research (see Nowlin 2015 for an example), this method is still rather under-utilized in political science.

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[4] LDA is a form of unsupervised topic modeling which can be used for content analysis. A more in-depth explanation of the method and the theory behind is presented later in this chapter starting on page 20.

METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

As noted in Chapter 1, the questions posed above will be studied using a mixed methods approach. First, Chapter 3 describes in detail my quantitative model that looks at the impact of demographic, economic, and institutional variables related to the passing of immigration regularization. This chapter tests the prevailing approaches to understanding immigration policy making as highlighted in Section II.A of this chapter. Most importantly, it will confirm my initial assumptions that immigration policy making is driven by issue definition.

This dissertation aims to take the critiques of studying ideas seriously. Following the advice of Campbell (year), I aim to compare policy positions and framing across single policy debates in both the U.S. and Spain. By using two case studies in Chapters 4 and 5, I can also incorporate knowledge of the institutional structures and legacies that shape these debates. In order to collect causal process information, I engaged in a content analysis of legislative debates in the U.S. and Spain. These in-depth case studies allow for systematic comparisons regarding the use of framing, as well as information about historical and institutional processes to be incorporated into the analysis. The final sections in this chapter will explain the rationale of case selection and a discussion of the content analysis methodology used in these chapters.

Case Selection

Why study the United States and Spain in order to understand immigration regularizations? First, they each represent a different type of country of immigration (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004). This framework, established in the edited volume *Controlling Immigration,* creates a typology of countries based on their historic experience with immigration and is commonly used in the immigration studies literature. Using this framework, countries are divided into three typologies: traditional countries of immigration (US, Canada and Australia); reluctant countries of immigration (France, Germany, the Netherlands and Britain); and recent countries of immigration (Italy, Spain, Japan and Korea).

The U.S. began as a country of immigrants, accepting large immigration flows since its colonial era (see Chapter 1, Tables 1.1 and 1.2 for detailed charts on immigration populations). As such, immigration policies and politics are not new in this country; rather immigration policy was first developed over a century ago and has undergone many revisions. Immigrants came to the United States for a variety of reasons: to escape religious persecution, for political freedom, or for new economic opportunities. This history is represented by the Statue of Liberty, the idea of the "melting pot," and the term "nation of immigrants." The history of immigration also has another legacy: the tension between being a country of immigrants and the urge to protect the "native" born culture. Groups that favor expanding immigration and those that favor restriction can both pull from the historical record to support their argument.

Spain, for most of its history, was a country of emigration. Over the centuries, many Spaniards have left Spain to settle in other countries -- New Spain during the colonial period, Argentina and other burgeoning Latin American Countries pre-World War II, and Northern European countries in the late twentieth century. These immigrants left Spain for a variety of reasons – religious, political, and economic. In the 1990's, this movement out of Spain reversed. With the establishment of democratic government and the accession of the country into the European Union, Spain became a destination country for immigrants. Unlike the U.S., Spain created its first immigration policy regime in 1986, mainly in response to requirements set by the European Community rather than in response to migration flows. These laws were created with the assumption that the low level of migration into the country would continue. By the time we arrive at the debates profiled in Chapter 6, this assumption no longer held.

However, just because immigration is a recent phenomenon in Spain does not mean that there are no historical precedents that provide ways to contextualize immigration or that policy entrepreneurs can use. There are strains of symbolic politics which focus on the fact that Spaniards were once emigrants and should have compassion for those coming to their country.

There is also the idea of "convivencia" or coexistence. This idea includes the historical (if oversimplified) Muslim-dominated Spain, where Jews, Muslims and Christians lived together under Muslim rule. It also can be extended to the idea that the multiple countries (Catalonia, Basque, Galicia, etc.) inside the single state of Spain live together despite their differences in culture and language. These legacies can be drawn on by supporters of expanding immigration as examples of Spain always being a mixture of cultures and people.

Second, the U.S. and Spain provide interesting points of similarity and difference. Both states are "border" nations and both experience large flows of unauthorized migrants. In the U.S., the debate focuses on border crossers coming across the U.S.-Mexico border; in Spain, this border is the Mediterranean Sea. Border crossers do not just come from the countries located closest to these borders. In the U.S., Central and Southern Americans also use the Mexican border as a point of entry; in Spain, border crossers come from both supra- and sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite these similarities, each also provides important differences starting with their historical legacies of previous experiences with immigration, as described above. Furthermore, the governmental structure of each country allows for institutional variation to be considered in the case studies. While both countries are democracies with a bicameral legislature, their electoral systems have several important distinctions. The U.S. is a presidential democracy, in which the president is elected separately from the legislature. Therefore, divided government (where the executive comes from a different party than the majority party in the legislature) is possible. In Spain, a parliamentary republic, the public votes for legislators and then the majority party (or the majority coalitions of parties) votes for the government. Here, divided government is an impossibility. Another important distinction is party control. In Spain, party control over legislators is much stronger than in the U.S., so most Spanish legislators vote along party lines.

These differences also extend into the structure of debate in the legislature; this difference will be expanded upon in the respective case study chapter for each country.

In Spain, I will focus on the two regularization programs of 2000 and 2001. In the United States, I will examine the development of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), a version of which was first introduced in 1972.

Regularizations and the United States

As seen in Table 1.1, the United States has the highest number of foreign born residents. As a country of immigration since its colonial era, the United States has experienced considerable flows of foreigners that wished to work and settle. While immigration policy was lax for many decades after the founding of the country, the state developed "qualitative" immigration requirements in the early 20th century that restricted immigration based on ethnicity and country of origin (Martin 2004). This immigration regime lasted until 1965 with the passage of the Hart-Celler Immigration and Nationality Act, which established the current immigration regime based on skills and family reunification.

The next change in U.S. immigration policy occurred with the passage of the 1986 IRCA, which established an amnesty in conjunction with sanctions for employers that hired unauthorized migrants. The amnesty program was divided into two sections. The first, a general regularization, applied to anyone who could prove they had resided continuously in the U.S. since January 1, 1982. After 18 months, the recipient could apply for legal permanent resident (LPR) status, which requires basic knowledge of English. After five years in LPR status, the recipient could apply for citizenship. The second program, Special Agricultural Workers (SAW), focused on agricultural workers, who had to prove they worked in perishable crop agriculture for at least 90 days before May 1, 1986. While this program legalized a large number of unauthorized migrants, many analyses point out that many were left out because they either could not satisfy (or provide proof for) the residency requirement or feared owing back taxes and

deportations (Chiswick 1988; Levinson 2005a). This program left a lasting legacy on the immigration debate in the United States, and preliminary research indicates that this legacy guides many of the arguments against comprehensive immigration reform today.

Regularizations and Spain

Spain has traditionally been a country of emigration, with large-scale immigration starting at the end of the last century and continuing until the present (Cornelius 2004). The first immigration law (Ley de Extranjería) was passed in 1985. In 1993, a quota system was created, which called for the government to establish quotas based on employment needs. However, this system faced problems with both regional governments and employers routinely underestimating the number of workers needed. Since establishing their immigration policy regime, there have been six regularization programs: 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005. Many of the first regularization programs were criticized as those they regularized often fell back into illegality due to the complicated nature of Spain's work permit system and culture of short-term labor contracts (Calavita 1998; Cornelius 2004; Levinson 2005a).

In 2000, the parliamentary groups (PG) Convergence and Union (Convergència I Unió (CiU)), United Left, (Izquierda Unida (IU)) and the Mixed Group (Group Mixto) introduced a Proposición de Ley (a proposal from legislators outside the government) to modify the Foreigners' law (Ley de Extranjeras). While the Popular Party (Partido Popular (PP)) lead government objections to the legislation, they lacked the absolute majority needed to block the bill. Once the PP gained the absolute majority in the March 2000 elections, the government passed a second law modifying the Foreigner's Law. While both of these laws involved regularization, the second law has been referred to as a counter reform measure.

Content Analysis Methodology

Using content analysis to study political phenomenon has increased in recent years. Researchers have used these methods to study agenda setting (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Quinn et al. 2010); policy positions (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Lavar and Benoit 2002; Laver, Benoit and Garry 2003); congressional topics (Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson 2008); and issue definition (Nowlin 2015), among others. Content analysis has also been used to explore hypotheses raised by the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), including if core policy beliefs can be inferred through public statements (McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell, and Hathaway 2007) and identify narratives and strategy (Merry 2015; McBeth, Shanahan, and Jones 2005).

This dissertation aims to use content analysis to trace the development and strategic use of frames throughout immigration debates in the U.S. and Spain, and if the usage of these frames can help us explain policy choices. Underlying all coding analysis of this nature is the idea that there are unobservable topics -- be they frames, narratives, or beliefs -- that can be indirectly observed through text. The issue at hand is how to code political speech in order to uncover these underlying narratives and allow for an analysis that not only traces how the debates change over time but also reveals who uses them and if they are deployed strategically.

While the works mentioned above use a variety of coding methods and schema in order to understand their data, the wide availability of text data and increasing computing power has led many in political science to explore computerized methods to help code text. Computerized methods are more efficient than human coders, being both quicker and requiring less subjectivity.[5] Broadly speaking, there are two main options for coding topics outside of manual coding: supervised and unsupervised learning. Supervised models rely on a training set that is hand coded to train the model, and then the remaining (or new documents) are coded according

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[5] While computerized methods are less subjective in that they do what they are programmed to do, they are still programmed by humans. Decisions about pre-processing text, and even which text to use, can affect the results one receives.

to this schema. However, supervised models rely on an *a priori* knowledge of the categories contained in the corpus. Unsupervised learning models examine the text for latent categories and themes in the documents[6] using topic modeling. Research has shown that when used in conjunction with human oversight on coding categories, unsupervised methods are useful as a substitute for human coding (Simon and Xenos 2004; Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson 2008). This dissertation will use the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) developed by Blei et al. (2003).[7]

Topic modeling assumes that within a corpus of documents, the words in each document are drawn from latent topics, or "distributions over fixed vocabulary" (Blei 2012, 77). LDA assumes that "all the documents in the collection share the same set of topics, but each document exhibits those topics in difference proportions" (Blei 2012, 79). By using LDA, we create model that estimates how much each topic appears in each document using the co-occurrence of words that makes up the documents.

The corpus are first pre-processed and converted into plan text documents. Common phrases, such as United States, were combined using underscores (United_States), and a stoplist was created to remove high frequency function words (Mr., Speaker, Señores, etc). The corpus was then uploaded into Mallet (McCallum 2002), a java based package that can be used for many natural language processing tasks, including topic modeling. While the topics themselves are not specified beforehand, the number of topics, k, is chosen by the researcher. As such, numerous specifications of the model were fitted allowing the k to vary so the correct number of topics may be chosen.

Mallet provides several types of output that will then be used in further analysis of the corpus. First, it provides a document of topic keys. This document lists the weight of each topic, as well as the words with the highest probability of being associated with that topic. Using this

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6 See Grimmer and Stewart (2013) for an overview of text as data methods in political science

7 For a full explanation of this model, see Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003) and Blei (2012).

document, topic names are assigned based on the word clusters, knowledge of the corpus, and previous empirical work.

Second, Mallet provides a spreadsheet that indicates the distribution of each topic across each document in the corpus. When combined with information about the speaker, chambers, and year, this allows for research into if and how the use of frames varies over party, chamber, and years.

As noted by Grimmer (2013), the goal of the modeling process here is "revelation of substantively interesting information" rather than ensuring statistical fit. In other words, the model will be selected with the k that ensures best semantic validity and interpretability. (Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson 2008). As such, selecting the best *k* is more of an art than a science.

The corpora to be studied was assembled by the researcher. In the U.S. case, legislative debates pertaining to the Immigration Reform and Control Act from 1972-1986 were identified via the legislative history of the bill via *ProQuest Congressional Database*. The debates from before 1985 were available as scanned PDFs of the *Congressional Record*. These pages of the Congressional Record were downloaded from the *ProQuest Congressional Database* and converted into text documents using Adobe's OCR tools. Since OCR text is often riddled with errors, I developed a macro in Word that would utilize regular expressions to clean up the text and convert it into a CSV file that could later be analyzed. Debates from 1985-1986 were retrieved from *ProQuest Congressional's* website in HTML format.

In the Spanish case, debates were identified in a similar manner. Debates relating to the Ley 4/2000 Proposición de Ley Organica (122/000154)(122/000167)(122/000158)(122/000295) and Ley 8/2000 Proyecto de Ley (121/000012) were found in a similar manner using the Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados) website and *the Journal of Debates (Diarios de sesiones)*. These were then obtained from the website and converted into CSV files. The

Spanish corpra also include debates occurring in committees due to the structure of debates in the Spanish parliament (Martin Rojo 2000, 25).

CONCLUSION

While current research on immigration policymaking has incorporated a host of variables from the broader political science literature, questions about immigration policymaking still remain. Due to the multidimensional nature of immigration, the way a policy or immigrants themselves are framed can have a large impact on how the issue is seen.

The policy process literature, with its emphasis on issue definition, framing, and multiple streams provides guidance in explaining immigration policymaking. Politicians often start out with a policy goal that is connected to some deeper belief -- less government is good, immigration is a cultural good, etc. -- and then search out policies that fit this goal. It is up to the politicians and policy entrepreneurs to then connect their chosen policy to these underlying goals and explain how a) there is a problem that needs government intervention, b) what the problem is, and c) how their policy will fix that problem. They must convince not only the public but also other policymakers. This convincing is done through narratives, or policy stories that include frames, characters, goals, and morals. It is also done by broadening the scope of areas that the policy touches on so that these actors can increase their coalition size to help achieve their goals.

Immigration provides a way to explore these narratives across countries and time. As immigration is a multidimensional issue, how it is framed will affect what the "problem" is; that is, what needs to be fixed? Depending on how the problem is conceived, different solutions can be drawn upon to "fix" the issue. This can also help explain why seemingly unpopular ideas are re-introduced to the agenda and why they are chosen. In the cases discussed in this dissertation, immigration is connected to other issues such as labor rights, human rights, economic goals, and religious beliefs, with regularization being proposed as a way to solve unauthorized migration by

improving the economy, worker's and social rights, and providing a needed humanitarian solution. It also explains why we see so many "strange bedfellows" alliances in this area.

Empirical work has consistently shown that ideas and framing matter more than mere facts. This dissertation aims to explore this in the context of legislative debate by exploring how facts are presented and connected to existing ideologies.

This dissertation also makes further contributions by incorporating unsupervised content analysis methods into the study of immigration and policymaking. It takes up the challenge to show that content analysis can be a fruitful way to identify ideas and narratives, and when then used to categorize text, these categories can be used in a process tracing approach to understand the development, rise, and fall of frames in policy debates.

Chapter 3: Introduction

Broadly speaking, this dissertation is concerned with understanding how narratives and frames affect policy choice. As part of this exploration, this chapter aims to test alternative hypotheses to see if other variables can explain when immigration regularizations are more likely to be chosen. Since the dataset collected is longitudinal panel data, it allows for two main questions to be asked: first, are there changes over time within the U.S. and Spain that lead to an increased chance of regularizations being chosen; and second, are there country-level factors that shape policy choice as well?

This chapter will explore the passage of immigration regularization over multiple countries and over time. Using variables suggested by the literature and previous research, it will test which -- if any -- country-year specific demographic, economic, or political variables matter for the passage of a regularization of unauthorized migrants.

The chapter begins with an overview of alternative hypotheses suggested by the literature. This is followed by a discussion of how the dependent variable, regularization, has been defined as well as a descriptive account of the variable. The third section presents the independent variables and their sources, followed by a description of the models used to test the alternate hypotheses described in Chapter 2. It closes with a discussion of the results.

ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES AND THE CURRENT DEBATE

The literature on immigration holds that this is a crosscutting policy issue that often creates "strange bedfellows" of supporters (Tichenor 2002; Calavita 1992; Martin 1994; Baker 1997). Labor, business, and civil rights groups often find themselves on the same side of this issue, pushing for expansionary immigration policies over restrictionist ones. According to Freeman's (1995) client politics theory, immigration politics in liberal

democracies has an expansionary tendency for one main reason: the benefits of expansionary immigration policy are concentrated while its costs are diffuse. While this theory has been influential in the field of immigration studies and seems to explain the politics of the late 1980's and early 1990's, some empirical research question if this still accurately describes immigration politics in more recent years. In these works, it is not race, the level of business interests, or the percentage of foreign born in one's district that has the greatest effect on immigration policy votes in Congress; rather it is partisanship (Gimple and Edwards 1999; Leal and Casellas 2013; Andreas 2009).

Others have identified demographic change as an important independent variable to explain immigration policy (Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong 1997). Another school holds that it is the nature of liberal states to extend rights and freedoms towards migrants, which prevents them from taking meaningful actions to exclude or prevent migration (Hollifield 1992).

I argue that attention level and ideology are essential in explaining why policy entrepreneurs choose to pursue certain policy solutions over others. It is when they are successful in focusing attention on previously neglected aspects of the problem that we will see policy change. According to Levinson (2005) and Kraler (2009), discourses should focus on improving immigrant rights, establishing control over the market, and be sold as one-time events, rather than other aspects of immigration.

As such, the hypothesis I test in this chapter is whether policy choice can be explained by variables outside of frames and issue definition. In Chapter 2, this is defined as Hypothesis 1:

H1: Supportive discursive institutions must be in place for a policy solution to be chosen regardless of changes in demographic, political and economic variables. Narrative influences what solution one wants regardless of unemployment, rate of

immigration, and other traditional variables examined in the immigration policy literature.

If this hypothesis is true, I expect to see a lack of effect for demographic, political, and economic variables on the selection of regularizations of unauthorized immigrants as a policy solution. Specifically, this chapter aims to test the following alternative hypotheses described below:

Alternative Hypothesis 1: (Client Politics): We should see immigration regularization that results in pro-business policies when pro-business (right or liberal) parties are in power.

Alternative Hypothesis 1a: (Rational Choice): We should see immigration regularization in response to growing numbers of unauthorized immigrants.

Alternative Hypothesis 1b: (Rational Choice -- Single Minded Election Seeker): We should see immigration regularization emerge when the majority of the public is in favor of these programs and when unemployment is low.

Alternative Hypothesis 1c: (Rational Choice -- Increasing Supply of Workers): We should see immigration regularizations to increase the supply of workers when unemployment is low.

Alternative Hypothesis 2: (Liberal State): We should see immigration regularization when left wing parties are in power, as they are concerned with ensuring the human and civil rights of unauthorized migrants.

In this chapter, I argue that the variables mentioned above in the alternative hypotheses are not sufficient to ensure change without a supporting discursive structure.

POLICY CHOICE AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if an immigration regularization program or mechanism was passed in a year. Information on

regularizations and the number regularized come from three main sources: the indexes of the REGINE report (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009), MPI policy papers (Brick 2011) and, for those that occurred after 2007, the OECD's International Migration Outlook Handbooks 2007-2012 (OECD).

It is important to note that my analysis includes both regularization programs and mechanisms, including some that governments have refused to categorize as a regularization or normalization program. The debate over what is a regularization program and what is not is widespread. First, there is the issue of what to call this policy option. As noted in chapter 1, regularization is the preferred term in the European literature, while most of the work done in the United States speaks of legalizations (Levinson 2005). Furthermore, the decision to call a policy a regularization, normalization, or legalization program for unauthorized migrants is politically sensitive. Many times this policy solution is seen as unpopular with the public, and opposing parties have often campaigned against government programs they deride as "amnesty". This is evident in the U.S. case, where the terms pathway to citizenship and earned legalization have gained favor in the immigration debates of the 21st century.

Classification is further complicated by the idea of normalization, which is an English translation of the term the Spanish use to describe their programs, yet also has a second meaning given by the authors of the REGINE study as a "short term residence status awarded to persons already with legal (but transitional) status" (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009, 7).

Second, regularization programs vary greatly in their intents, goals and durations. Some are one-shot initiatives (referred to in this dissertation as programs), while others are long-term mechanisms (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009, Levinson 2005). In addition, different programs aim to target different types of "illegality"; in some countries

this is a matter of work authority, in others, housing permission, and in others, entry violations.

In light of the variety of programs and the political incentives to classify these programs as something else, I opt for an expansive definition of regularizations. Any policy instrument which allows a previously unauthorized migrant to become authorized, regardless of how permanent the new status is or how long the policy instrument lasts is a regularization program for the purpose of this dissertation.

I have relied on previous work on this area, including those authors noted above, to establish when de facto regularization programs have occurred despite governments not identifying the policy as such.

Over the time frame of this dataset a total of 74 regularizations were passed; 50 programs and 24 mechanisms. There were 5 years where no regularizations were observed (1987, 1988, 1993, 1994 and 2010). The dependent variable *Regularization,* will be denoted by $Reg_{ti,}$ or regularization at time t (t=1,…..t_i) for country i (i = 1,...,n).

Figure 3.1 Numbers of Regularizations per Year

The full data set consists of 16 countries. These countries are the 15 that are typically referred to as the EU 15[8] and the United States. While information was collected on regularizations in other countries, data was often lacking for these cases regarding both the dependent variable and the independent variables. Therefore, these observations were dropped from the dataset. Overall, there are 428 observations for the 16 countries over a 27-year time period. Due to missing variables for party representation for the year 2012 and for the country of Luxembourg entirely, these observations were dropped from the analysis when the models were run, leaving 15 countries over a 26 year time period for a total of 390 observations.

The independent variables were drawn from several sources to include information on unemployment, total number of foreign born, total number of migrants, and left-right party dominance. These control variables were chosen on the basis of existing research, as well as explanations given for regularizations that appear in the media as common knowledge.

Information on how many immigrants were regularized (*granted*) was drawn from the same sources as the dependent variable: the indexes of the REGINE report (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009), MPI policy papers (Brick 2011), and for those that occurred after 2007, the OECD's International Migration Outlook (OECD). The lowest number of immigrants that were regularized was 200, with the highest being 2,727,675 (1986 US). The mean number of immigrants regularized was 16877.58 (standard deviation 143628.5), with a median of 19,408. The total number regularized was about 7,172,972; however, it should be noted that the total numbers are estimates, as not all countries

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[8] These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

report how many immigrants are regularized per event. Due to the lack of reliable information on the *granted* variable, it was not included in the model.

Several independent variables were included to examine the rate of immigration on policy choice. A variable accounting for the percentage of the population that is foreign born was included (*perFB)*. This variable is a composite variable derived from data obtained from the OECD for two variables: total number foreign born and total population. A variable that measures immigrant inflow (*inflow)* was also obtained from the OECD stat export database. Finally, a variable that measures asylum rates (*asylum*) was obtained from Eurostat for the EU 15 countries and from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for the U.S. The asylum variable was log-transformed because the variable's impact on regularization was non-linear. As with GDP, after asylum numbers reach a certain level, its effects have a diminishing impact.

While it would have been ideal to include a measure for the level of unauthorized migrants in each country, this data is hard to obtain due to the clandestine nature of unauthorized migration. While there have been several attempts to measure unauthorized populations, these measures suffer from a variety of drawbacks. The clearest hurdle this presents to the project is that only the U.S. regularly publishes estimates of this population and there are no estimates that can be compared across nations (OECD 2008, 39).

Economic variables were also included. Information on unemployment (*unemploy)* and foreign-born unemployment (*FBunemploy)* was collected from the OECD stat export database. Information on GDP per capita (*GDP)* comes from the World Bank National Accounts Data and is measured in U.S. 2005 Dollars. GDP growth *(GDPgrow)* measures the annual percentage growth or decline of GDP, and was also

obtained from the World Bank. Following common practice, the variable GDP was logged.

Finally, several variables control for the partisan makeup of the government. Common wisdom holds that leftist governments are more immigrant friendly, and therefore should be expected to pass more expansionary policies. However, the case studies highlighted in this dissertation contradict this idea. Since this dissertation argues that underlying facts such as framing and political opportunity structures better explain when these policies are chosen, I do not expect to see leftist party dominance having a strong effect on regularization passage.

Information on partisanship comes from the Comparative Political Parties Dataset (Swank 2013). This dataset provides information on the legislative seats per party as a percent of all legislative seats. It includes measures for Left Parties (*left)*, Right Parties (*right)*, Christian Democrat parties (*CDems),* Centrist Christian Democratic (*CCD),* Center (*center)*, Right-Wing *(populist)*, and left-libertarian (*greens)*.

To explore additional systemic variation, two country-level variables were included. The first is a binary variable that identifies the country's history of migration following Cornelius and Tsuda (2004) as a Reluctant Country of Immigration, a New Country of Immigration, or a Historic Country of Immigration. The second is a dichotomous variable indicating a multiparty structure. If this variable is marked 0, it indicates that the country has a two-party dominated system, while those marked 1 indicate a multiparty dominated system.

There are several notable outliers in the dataset. The first is the United States, which in 1986 had the largest regularization, as noted above. The next largest regularization is 748,789, which was also in the U.S. (2011 DAPA), followed by 578,375

in Spain (2005). The U.S. is also the only historic country of immigration included in the dataset.

A second notable outlier is Luxembourg. This country has an exceptionally high number of foreigners, although most of these foreign born are citizens of the EU rather than Third Country Nationals (TCN). For all other countries and years, the foreign-born population ranges from less than 1% to 12.83% with a mean of 5.61 (standard deviation 2.93). Luxembourg however, ranges from 26.41% to 44.98% foreign born. However, as noted above, Luxembourg was dropped from the model due to missing variables regarding party representation in its legislative branch.

THE MODEL

The effect of demographic, political, and economic variables on the passage of regularization is estimated using a logistic multi-level mixed effect model, or, as it is alternatively known, a hierarchical generalized linear model. Using this model, I can assess if there are country-level characteristics that affect the passage of regularizations and which variations over time affect the dependent variable.

Here, time (level 1) is nested within country (level 2). This model allows for fixed and random effects. The fixed effects model (level 1) is similar to the typical regression model as it tells us how the expected outcome for an observation varies with the value of the independent variables. In other words, it explains within country variation over time. The random effects model allows for variation across countries (level 2), or systematic variation.

The advantage of this model over other models is that it corrects for biases in parameter estimates and standard errors resulting from the hierarchical structure of the dataset (Guo and Zhao 2000). It also allows for the separation of the variances between

levels to understand how these and cross-level interactions affect the outcome variable (Guo and Zhao 2000).

As noted above, the dependent variable is formally denoted as Reg_{ti}, or Regularization at time t (t=1,.....t_i) for country i (i = 1,...,n). Incorporating the independent variables, the general model consists of two equations as shown below:

EQ 3.1: $Reg_{ti} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{1\ i}\ left_{ti} + \beta_{2\ i}\ right_{ti} + \beta_{3\ i}\ CDems_{ti} + \beta_{4\ i}\ CCdems_{ti} + \beta_{5\ i}$

$cents_{ti} + \beta_{6\ i}\ populist_{ti} + \beta_{7\ i}\ greens_{ti} + \beta_{8\ i}\ logAsylum_{ti} + \beta_{9\ i}\ perFB_{ti} + \beta_{10\ i}$

$inflow_{ti} + \beta_{11\ i}\ unemploy_{ti} + \beta_{12\ i}\ FBunemploy_{ti} + \beta_{13\ i}\ logGPD_{ti} + \beta_{14\ i}$

$GDPgrow_{ti} + \varepsilon_{ti}$

EQ3.2: $\beta_{0i} = \gamma_0 + \mu_i$

Using substitution, the general model can then be represented formally as in EQ3.3 below:

EQ3.3: $Reg_{ti} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{1\ i}\ left_{ti} + \beta_{2\ i}\ right_{ti} + \beta_{3\ i}\ CDems_{ti} + \beta_{4\ i}\ CCdems_{ti} + \beta_{5\ i}$

$cents_{ti} + \beta_{6\ i}\ populist_{ti} + \beta_{7\ i}\ greens_{ti} + \beta_{8\ i}\ logAsylum_{ti} + \beta_{9\ i}\ perFB_{ti} + \beta_{10\ i}$

$inflow_{ti} + \beta_{11\ i}\ unemploy_{ti} + \beta_{12\ i}\ FBunemploy_{ti} + \beta_{13\ i}\ logGPD_{ti} + \beta_{14\ i}$

$GDPgrow_{ti} + \varepsilon_{ti} + \mu_i$

Equation 3.3 represents the value of the independent variable for the *i*th country at *t* time as a function of the effects of the dependent variables listed, which are the same for all countries with an error term (ε_{ti}) as found in traditional, fixed-effect regression models. Added to this model is a random intercept (μ_i), *which* allows for the possibility that regularization passage is systematically higher in some countries than in others.

DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

Several versions of the model were run. First, a mixed effects model was run where observations missing variables were discarded. This model was run both with the U.S. included and excluded to see if there was a European effect. The results of the model including the U.S. case are presented in Table 3.1 under Model A. As indicated by the random intercepts, it is unlikely that the random-intercept model allows for significant improvement over a logistic linear model with fixed-effects; in other words, it is unlikely that there is a systematic difference in the passage of regularizations across countries. Furthermore, none of the independent variables presented are statistically significant. However, due to missing variables, this model was restricted to a subset of n=115 observations.

Table 3.1 Mixed Effects Logistic Regression

	Model A				Model B				Model C			
	β	SE	T	P	β	SE	T	P	β	SE	T	P
Level 1- Within Country												
Intercept	-0.01	27.57	0	1	9.76	12.39	0.79	0.431	11.30	12.76	0.89	0.376
Demographic												
Percent Foreign Born	-0.25	0.21	-1.19	0.233	-0.12	0.11	-1.13	0.260	-0.12	0.11	-1.12	0.261
Inflows	0.00	0.00	-0.26	0.791	0.00	0.00	1.89	0.058	0.00	0.00	1.35	0.176
Asylum	0.17	0.33	0.51	0.607	0.13	0.16	0.78	0.437	0.11	0.17	0.63	0.525
Economic												
Unemployment	0.53	0.36	1.47	0.143	-0.08	0.07	-1.09	0.276	-0.09	0.08	-1.21	0.227
FB Unemployment	-0.17	0.15	-1.13	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GDP	-0.94	2.57	-0.36	0.716	-1.63	1.13	-1.44	0.151	-1.79	1.17	-1.54	0.124
GDP Growth	0.00	0.18	-0.01	0.99	0.06	0.10	0.56	0.578	0.04	0.11	0.33	0.742
Governmental												
Left Parties	0.09	0.09	1.08	0.282	0.07	0.07	1.13	0.257	0.08	0.07	1.22	0.223
Right Parties	0.04	0.07	0.48	0.629	0.03	0.06	0.49	0.625	0.03	0.06	0.55	0.584
Christian Democrat	0.02	0.05	0.33	0.743	-0.04	0.02	-1.68	0.094	-0.04	0.03	-1.40	0.163
Center C. Democrats	0.09	0.09	0.94	0.345	0.08	0.07	1.16	0.246	0.08	0.07	1.14	0.253
Center	0.07	0.08	0.91	0.363	0.04	0.06	0.57	0.572	0.03	0.06	0.48	0.631
Populist/Right Wing	0.06	0.08	0.81	0.419	0.01	0.04	0.33	0.739	0.01	0.04	0.26	0.796
Greens	-0.18	0.18	-0.96	0.339	0.03	0.08	0.40	0.690	0.04	0.08	0.44	0.661
Level 2- Between Countries												
Intercept	0.00	0.27	0	1	0.00	0.26	0.000	1.000	0.00	0.26	0.000	1.000

The model was run again, this time dropping the variable for unemployment levels of the foreign born, as this variable had the highest missing observations. The results of this model are presented in Table 3.1 under Model B. This model had n= 257. Once again, none of the variables are statistically significant.

A third and final model was run that excluded the U.S. case. The results of this model can been seen in Table 3.1 under model C. Here, n =243, and again, none of the variables were statistically significant.

For all of these models, the random intercept (μti) does not appear to be significantly different than zero. In addition, the Wald χ^2 for all models has a significance level greater than .05. Specifically, this value is p>0.56 for Model A, p>0.41 for Model B and p> .41 for Model C. In other words, it is very unlikely that there are country-level effects, and the random-intercept model does not provide significant improvement over the fixed effect model.

There were a large number of missing values, even with the exclusion of Luxembourg and the year 2012. Due to the number of observations dropped due to missing variables, a multiple imputation process was used to create "multiple sets of artificial observations in which missing clues are replaced by regression predictions plus random noise" (Hamilton 2013, 241). Using Stata 12, missing values were imputed in 50 separate imputations and the mixed effects models were run again, both with and without the U.S. All of the models that used multiple imputations were run without the foreign-born employment variable. The variables that were missing observations included Percentage Foreign Born (82 missing); Asylum (54 missing); Inflows (45 missing); and Unemployment (8 missing)

Table 3.2 Mixed Effects Logistic Regression with Multiple Imputation

	Model D				Model E			
	β	SE	Z	P	β	SE	Z	P
Level 1- Within Country								
Intercept	-8.96	9.35	-0.96	0.338	-9.05	9.54	-0.95	0.343
Demographic								
Percent Foreign Born	0.03	0.08	0.35	0.724	0.03	0.09	0.33	0.739
Inflows	0.00	0.00	0.45	0.651	0.00	0.00	0.36	0.719
Asylum	0.02	0.13	0.15	0.881	-0.02	0.13	-0.11	0.911
Economic								
Unemployment	0.02	0.05	0.46	0.648	0.01	0.05	0.30	0.767
GDP	0.66	0.78	0.84	0.399	0.69	0.79	0.88	0.381
GDP Growth	0.04	0.06	0.67	0.506	0.02	0.06	0.32	0.751
Governmental								
Left Parties	0.01	0.05	0.29	0.774	0.02	0.05	0.38	0.706
Right Parties	-0.01	0.05	-0.23	0.815	-0.01	0.05	-0.24	0.812
Christian Democrat	-0.01	0.02	-0.37	0.713	-0.01	0.02	-0.30	0.764
Center Christian Democrats	0.01	0.06	0.14	0.886	0.01	0.06	0.13	0.896
Center	0.00	0.05	0.09	0.929	0.00	0.05	-0.08	0.938
Populist/Right Wing	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.984	0.00	0.03	-0.08	0.937
Greens	-0.10	0.07	-1.35	0.176	-0.09	0.07	-1.23	0.220
Level 2- Between Countries								
Intercept	0.00	287.93			0.00	29.32		

The results of the models run with missing variables replaced through multiple imputations can be seen in Table 3.2. Model D includes the U.S. case, while Model E drops it. Model D had 390 observations, while Model E has 364.

Following multiple imputations, the logit coefficients on the missing variables did change for most of variables. The coefficient increased for Percent Foreign Born, but decreased on Asylum and Unemployment. The coefficients on other variables changed as well, with the Economic variables generally increasing, while the Political variables decreased. The standard errors were generally larger in the models following multiple imputation.

The Relative Increase (RVI) is an indicator of the increases in the variances of the estimators; as such, the closer it is to zero, the less effect the missing data will have on the variance. The RVI, which is averaged over all coefficients in model D = 0.6169 and in model E = 0.5922. Therefore it is likely that the missing variables did have an effect on the model.

Despite these results, as with the models in Table 3.1, these models fail to return statistically significant results, indicating that a change in the independent variables does not result in a statistically significant change in the dependent variable. While logit models report the F statistic, here the model Z test is reported and the p value for this statistic is not significant. In addition, the random intercept is very close to zero, indicating that there is not a systematic effect on the country level that leads to some nations being more likely to select this policy choice than others.

Finally, to explore if there was another second-level variable that could cause systematic differences in outcomes in countries, the models were run a second and third time with the variables for Immigration History and Two-Party Domination used as the country-level variables. These models (results not presented) did not prove to have either

a significant improvement over a linear model with fixed effects, nor were any of the independent variables significant when run with missing and imputed variables.

CONCLUSION

Unlike most statistical tests conducted in political science, these tests were conducted with the expectation that the variables would not be statistically significant and another intervening variable would need to be used to explain policy choice. This was confirmed; however, caution must be taken in relying on these data. First, as with much of the statistics that have been collected on immigration, the measures here are often incomplete. Secondly, there is the possibility of measurement error, as how immigration statistics are measured often varies across countries. While I attempted to mitigate this error as much as possible by relying on data compiled by international organizations, which may have more internal consistency, this is not often a realistic assumption. Third, states have an incentive to hide information on regularizations, as they are not popular with the electorate. In addition to this, regularizations also can suffer from being hastily put together without having sufficient monitoring mechanisms in place. Forth, no data are comparable across nations to estimate the number of unauthorized migrants living in a country. While there have been estimates made, these often are based on different methodologies in different countries, or are only recent. Finally, these data are selected on the dependent variable. Unfortunately, while there are regularizations that are not well covered in the EU and the US, outside of these countries, it is even harder to gather such information and adequate statistics on immigration in general.

These cautions aside, the results do indicate that quantitative analysis alone is not sufficient to explain policy choice in this area, an important first step in understanding why regularizations are chosen. While earlier research has explored immigration policy choice, these models largely focused on legislative voting rather than explaining policy

choice. In addition, most work on explaining the choice of immigrant regularizations is descriptive; by contributing a comparative regularization model to the literature, I aim to improve the available data and justify the importance of case studies and process tracing in explaining policy choice in immigration. Despite the expectation of a lack of statistically significant results, the lack of country level effects as indicated by the multilevel models was not expected. This seems to indicate that cross-country comparisons (at least of the U.S. and EU-15) can be made with less concern about specific country-level variables.

Chapter 4: Defining Immigration in the US: The Debate Over IRCA

As a country of immigration, the United States has long absorbed new and changing flows of foreigners who wished to work and settle. While immigration policy was largely unregulated for many years after the founding of the country, the state eventually developed "qualitative" immigration requirements that restricted immigration based on ethnicity and country of origin (Martin 2004). This immigration regime lasted until 1965 with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which established the current framework based on family reunification and employment. The next major change in U.S. immigration policy occurred with the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which established sanctions for employers that hired unauthorized migrants as well as a regularization program for unauthorized migrants.

The path to the 1986 IRCA was not short or easy. While bills introducing various aspects of the eventual legislation started to appear in 1972 and hearings on immigration-related issues rose during this time period, a comprehensive immigration reform bill was not passed by both chambers and signed by the president until 1986. The question this dissertation seeks to answer is why was a law that included the commonly derided policy of regularizing unauthorized migrants chosen at this time? By understanding how the debate around this bill evolved over time, this dissertation aims to gain insight into the strategic use of frames and discourses by political actors to support (or attack) a certain policy solution.

Previous work in immigration policy has suggested that the main variables shaping policy choice in this area include partisanship, demographics, economics, and country-specific historical immigration legacies. However, as found in the previous chapter, changes in these variables do not lead to a statistically significant likelihood of a regularization occurring.

To answer the question of what can influence the choice of policy solution, this chapter will turn to the Discursive Institutionalist (DI) framework (Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2011; Schmidt 2014; Givens and Case 2014). This framework holds that there are multiple policy images or frames that can be used to discuss an issue. By focusing on one frame over another, this directs attention towards some policy solutions over others. DI attempts to understand the connection between these broader frames to specific policies, while paying attention to actors and the institutional framework that discourse occurs in. The institutional aspect is essential as institutional rule may prevent certain frames from being brought to the table, structure the debate and also place limits upon it.

This chapter is divided into the following sections. The first will provide a brief review of the LDA method used to analyze the text and then describes the corpus of text that was analyzed. Next, I will review the history of IRCA to provide background for the discussion of frames used in the debate. The chapter will then include a brief review of the theory under examination, describe how the frames used in the debate were identified, and provide a description of these frames. Following that, I examine the semantic validity of the frames by comparing the topics obtained through LDA analysis to the history of the bill, as well as trace the changes in discourse. The next section will then examine the

differences in the issue definitions of comprehensive immigration reform used by each party, as well as between supports and detractors.

ANALYZING TEXT USING LDA

Using a type of topic modeling, latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), I will identify the frames of the debate relating to IRCA and measure the change in frame usage over time. Topic modeling is a type of unsupervised content analysis that is predicated on the assumption that in a collection, or corpus, of documents, there are underlying latent topics. Here, a document can be any collection of words; for example a document could be a single article, a large report, a speech, or the script of one movie. The corpus is then a collection of these documents, whatever they may be. The words used in each document are drawn from distributions of these topics. LDA specifically assumes that all documents in a single corpus will share the same topics, however, how much (or little) a topic appears varies from document to document. A corpus is created and then the model is run through an open source program, Mallet, to create output that reflects this distribution.

Important to this analysis is the fact that LDA requires no a prori assumptions about what the topics are. Rather, the topics are created based on the co-occurrence of words and the number of topics, k, the researcher specifies. While a choice must be made about how many topics to include, this choice is more of an art than a science.

The output from Mallet comes in two documents. The first is a "key" which lists the most frequent terms for each topic. It is this document that I use to name the topics (or frames). The second document is a csv chart where a single row represents a

document, and the columns represent a topic. A specific row and column point indicates the percentage of the topic/frame that is used in that particular document.

The Corpus: Who Spoke When?

To explore the discourse and framing of this debate, I analyzed the transcripts of 41 days of debate from *The Congressional Register* via the *ProQuest Congressional* Database. Debates on the floor of the U.S. Senate and Congress are transcribed in *The Congressional Record*, indicating who made each statement. Members of Congress are also allowed to insert supporting documents into the register, such as letters or newspaper articles, and can also expand upon their spoken comments.

Speech is restricted in Congress; in the House time is often divided between supporters and opponents of the bill, and representatives of these sides must yield time to speakers. As such, there is a large amount of speech that focuses on asking for time and agreeing to give time to another. Procedural questions and calls for votes are also included in the transcripts. In addition to the main text of the bill, amendments are also offered and can be debated as well.

In the Senate, senators seek recognition to speak, and once recognized, hold the floor. Typically they can speak for also long as they want, limited only by the rule that they can only speak twice a day on the same question. When a Senator is recognized, they can offer an amendment or motion. Typically in the Senate, as long as there are senators wishing to debate a question debate will continue indefinitely. However, unanimous consent agreements, also known as time agreements, can be made to control

and limit the time for debate. If a time agreement is made, floor managers are given control of the time and senators must have time yielded to them in order to speak.

A bill can be introduced by any member of Congress, after which it is referred to the appropriate committee, where hearings can be held and changes can be made to the bill. If a committee votes to report the bill, a report is written that argues for the bill's passage. After a bill is reported, it is scheduled for debate under the rules of the Chamber.

For the purposes of this research, I divided the debates by speaker. Here, a "document" is a single speech by a speaker. For example, if Speaker A spoke, then Speaker B, and then Speaker A spoke a second time, that would be considered three individual documents by the topic model.

Text from the speaker, presiding officer, and the chair were removed, leaving 314 speakers who spoke 9015 times for a total of 1,192,505 words. In addition, 160 letters, articles, and reports were submitted into the record. The corpus of speech was then trimmed again. Due to the structure of the U.S. congressional debates, speakers often engage in back-and-forth questioning or use highly formalized speech. For example, many statements only include information such as "I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin," questions about the rules governing the debate, and monologues which serve only to thank those who have worked on the bill. Due to the nature of LDA, these "documents" are included in the output and the model includes a percentage of topic coverage for them. They were removed to provide better substantive results.

After this editing, there were 299 speakers who spoke 4,726 times, leading to 4,726 documents. The average number of speeches was 15.8 per member, with the median number 4.[9] Not surprisingly, the main sponsors of the bill spoke the most: Alan K. Simpson (R-WY) at 350 and Romano Mazzoli (D-KY) at 335. Dan Lungren (R-CA) followed them at 236, and Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Peter W. Rodino (D-NJ) , Abraham Kazen Jr. (D-TX), and Robert Garcia (D-NY) all spoke over 100 times. The rest of the speakers spoke fewer than 100 times each, with the majority only contributing 1 substantive speech.

Figure 4.1 Speeches by Chamber by Year

Democrats spoke more, contributing 2,827 (62.19%) speeches total, while Republican members gave 1,719 (37.81%) speeches. There were more speeches in the House (70.4% of all speeches) versus the Senate (29.6%) There were also more speeches made by those who eventually voted for the bill as compared to those who voted against (2,541 (66.07%) vs. 1,305 (33.93%)); however, this does not include those who left Congress before they could vote on the final bill, which means 880 speeches lack observations for this variable.[10]

THE PATH TO IMMIGRATION REFORM

Efforts to reform the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act first arose due to concerns about unauthorized migrants, especially in regards to employment. The 1965 Act, while prohibiting unauthorized migrants from accepting work, did not make it illegal to hire these migrants. Legislation focused on the issue of "illegal" migration; as noted by the Congressional Research Service, more than 50 bills were introduced that dealt with the issue of immigration, and illegal immigration specifically, during the 94th Congress (Vialet 1977). While there are no debates between 1973 and 1980, action was still being taken on the immigration issue outside of the House and Senate floor. As shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, the number of hearings on the issue rises during this time, and bills are still introduced. Outside of Congress, President Ford established the Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens in 1975. The Attorney General chaired this committee and it ultimately recommended increasing coordination across the highest levels of government, an immigrant legalization, employer sanctions, extending the preference system, revising the labor certification program, and increasing penalties for

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[10] These numbers parallel the first corpus with non-substantive bill talk included. Here, the numbers of speeches were Democrats: 5466 (60.60%) vs. Republican: 3367 (37.30%); House (69.50%) vs Senate (30.5%); and For: 5157 (57.2%) vs Against 2459 (27.3%). The For variable lacked 1246 observations.

smugglers. Notably, the committee called mass deportation "both inhumane and impractical" (Vialet 1977, 73).

Figure 4.2 Immigration Related Bills Introduced in Congress 1970-1986[11]

Figure 4.3 Immigration Related Hearings Held by Congress 1970-1986[12]

In 1978, during the Carter administration, the Select Commission on Immigration

Reform Policy (SCIRP) was created by PL 95-412. Consisting of 16 members, SCIRP

included four members from each chamber's Judiciary Committee, four Carter

administration cabinet members, and four members of the public. According to Tichenor

(2002, 249), SCIRP would be "advancing a 'policy paradigm' that helped framed reform

choice and official narratives for over a decade."

The four key ideas that emerged from its official report, *U.S. Immigration Policy

and the National Interest* (1981), were that: immigration was a part of America and

migration was in the national interest; illegal immigration needed to be controlled before

expanding visa numbers; the system should be based on three goals -- family

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[12] The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and are distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin at http://www.comparativeagendas.net. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.

reunification, importing skilled workers in under-filled areas, and refugee admission; immigration also required a focus on racial justice and civil rights. While Tichenor argues that this report did not change public opinion, it was reflected in the Reagan administration's proposed legislation announced on July 31, 1981 and also in the frames used by members of Congress, and therefore in the database categories used by this dissertation.

The Regan administration's bill, the "Omnibus Immigration and Control Act," was introduced on October 22nd in the Senate as S. 1765 by Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC) and in the House as H.R. 4832 by Rep. Peter Rodino (D-NY), each the chair of their respective chamber's Judiciary Committee (Vialet 1981) The Reagan administration came out strongly against the creation of a national identification card, something we see reflected in the debates on verifying workers' eligibility to work in the US, given the high likelihood of the words "card", "social security", and "documents" appearing in this frame (Vialet, 1981, 5). However, no action was taken on the administration bill. Rather, what would eventually be known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill emerged. This bill can be traced to the extensive hearings that were held in 1981 and 1982 that focused on the SCIRP commission report and the Reagan administration's bills. The "Immigration Reform and Control Act" was introduced by the chairs of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) and Representative Romano Mazzoli (D-KY), as S. 222, H.R. 5872, and S. 2222 on March 17, 1982 (see timeline in Figure 4.6)

The 1982 Simpson-Mazzoli bill, as introduced in the Senate during the 97th Congress, placed restrictions on family reunification. The salience of the topic "family" reflects this, as the word appears the second most in the conversation, at 13 percent. Both bills had provisions that would have provided some federal reimbursement to state and local governments based on the cost of legalizations; irregular immigrants that were

legalized would be eligible for increased public assistance. These costs would include the administration of the program, as well as costs for education, social services, and increased public assistance costs. The Senate bill provided for block grants but the House bill called for full reimbursement, an issue reflected the rising salience of cost in the debates. Furthermore, the House bill sought to introduce changes to the ways asylum cases would be adjudicated. This would have changed the role of judicial review and established a U.S. immigration board. The Senate bill passed with amendments on August 17th, 80-19, after three days of debate. The House bill stalled, with no vote taken.

The second version of Simpson-Mazzoli was introduced in 1983 as H.R. 1510 and S. 529. The chamber differences that had emerged in the bills in the previous Congress continued. While S. 592 passed in the Senate on May 18 76-18, the bill spent more time in committees in the House. House Speaker Tip O'Neill (D-MA) said that the bill would not be brought to a vote in the House until he had the approval of the House Hispanic Caucus (Vialet 97). However, by November he said the bill would be brought to the floor in 1984.

The House debated the bill for seven days in 1984, passing H.R. 1510 by 216-211 on June 20th. It included amendments to expand the seasonal agricultural worker program as well as a Barney Frank (D-MA) amendment making it unlawful to discriminate in hiring based on national origin. Also debated but defeated was the Bill McCollum (R-FL) amendment to strike the legalization provision, which would have removed the immigration regularization from the bill (233-195). As both chambers passed a version of the bill, a conference committee was formed to reconcile the difference between the two. The conference committee met for ten days before failing to reconcile the two versions, so no legislation was passed that year.

The Simpson-Mazzoli bills introduced in each chamber in 1985 were very different from each other. Nevertheless, both dropped the provisions related to legal immigration and criminal penalties for employers that had been major points of contention in previous versions of the legislation. The bill put forth in the Senate by Sen. Simpson dropped these provisions to focus on unauthorized migration. The House bill, now also sponsored by Rep. Rodino, was very similar to the bill that had been submitted to conference in the last Congress. The Senate debate included discussions of several amendments: a seasonal worker program (defeated), a cap on workers at 850,000 (passed), and an amendment which would sunset the seasonal agricultural worker program (passed). While the bill included provisions that would create employer sanctions to penalize employers that hired unauthorized immigrants, it also included a sunset provision that would end the sanctions if they were shown to contribute to discrimination based on race or national origin. The House bill was introduced as H.R. 3810, debated, and then replaced by S. 1200, which passed. In conference, the sunset provisions and the provisions that would stall legalization until certain benchmarks were met were dropped. The conference kept the more generous amnesty in the House version as well as the caps on block grants from the federal government.

EXPLAINING POLICY CHOICE

How did the U.S. Congress finally arrive at a bill that included immigrant regularization? This chapter studies the development, usage, and changing frequencies of frames to answer this question. Unlike previous research, this chapter will incorporate a discursive institutionalism framework to understand how discourse is used strategically to promote one policy solution over others and how immigration regularization is chosen. As noted in Chapter 2, this case study will aim to test Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4, which are listed below:

H2: Pro-regularization talk will be statistically different from anti-regularization talk.

H3: Frames and issue definitions are used strategically. Losers will try and broaden their coalition, while winners will try and contain the issue.

H4: LDA topic modeling can be used to study how frames are used over time, party, and location.

PREPARING THE CORPUS

As noted above, I identified legislative debates pertaining to IRCA from 1972-1986 via the legislative history of the bill in the *ProQuest Congressional* Database. The debates from before 1985 were available as scanned .pdfs of *The Congressional Record*. These pages of the *Congressional Record* were downloaded and converted into text documents using Adobe's OCR tools. Since OCR text conversion is prone to error, I developed a macro in Word that utilizes regular expressions to clean up the text and convert the cleaned text into a CSV file. I retrieved debates from 1985-1986 from *ProQuest Congressional'*s website in html format. The text was then further pre-processed with another spellcheck for unknown words. I grouped text by speaker; all statements by the Presiding Officer, the Chair, or the Speaker were removed from the analysis. Speakers were also coded for party membership[13] and vote in the final approval of the 1986 law, using GovTrack.us roll call vote information for House Vote #872 and Senate Vote #191.

Commonly used words ('yield', 'gentleman', 'friend' etc.) that did not relate to the content of the bill but are examples of formalized speech commonly found in Congressional debates were excluded from analysis. Common phrases, such as United

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[13] Pages from the registrar that were not included are: the conference report on October 10, Senate disagreement to the House amendments to 99 S. 1200, agreement to a conference, and appointment of conferees p. S15933-34; October 14, Submission in the House of the conference report on 99 S. 1200 p. H10068-95; October 15, Senate consideration of the conference report on 99 S. 1200 p. S16374-75.

States and illegal immigrant, were combined into one phrase by inserting an underscore between the words (e.g. united_states, illegal_immigrant). In order to categorize the corpus, I tried two methods of unsupervised analysis: LDA utilizing Mallet, and Factor Analysis utilizing WordStat. In comparison between the two outputs, the LDA output from Mallet provided categories that were a better substantive fit. Analyses were run with text at several levels of pre-processing, with text that had only been processed with stop lists and exclusion lists provided the most insightful categories. LDA was then run over iterations of k^{14} between 5 and 50, with $k = 17$ chosen. While a smaller k resulted in overlapping categories, a larger k, while having the benefit of providing substantive, finer grain categories, also provided categories with low frequencies that did not occur over the entire time period. For example, running a $k \geq 25$ provided categories of refugees that could be broken down by national origin (Cuban, Haitian, Salvadorian); however, these categories occurred at very low rates. When $k \leq 13$, themes overlapped in ways that meant responses or arguments against certain solutions were subsumed by the solution category. For example, legalization was combined with the topic costs, and refugee was subsumed under family. At $k \leq 11$, discrimination and employer sanctions were often combined. Therefore, choosing a $k = 17$ provided the most accurate and distinctive coding schema for this project.

DIMENSIONS OF THE IRCA DEBATE

Running LDA with a $k = 17$ resulted in 17 frames of the immigration debate leading up to passage of IRCA. Table 4.1 indicates that despite the assumption that each document will contain some of each topic, we see that there are some documents where certain frames make up less that 1% of that document. For example, the minimum of the

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[14] As noted in Chapter 2, k stands for the number of clusters the LDA algorithm should identify.

frame Fees is 0%, indicating that there are documents that essentially did not utilize this frame at all.

Table 4.1 Summary of LDA Topics Across Documents

Topic	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Legalization	5.19%	0.1008	0%	86%
Family	3.58%	0.1047	0%	81%
Asylum	4.89%	0.1131	0%	96%
Costs	4.63%	0.1048	0%	87%
ID	5.49%	0.1246	0%	87%
English	1.45%	0.0626	0%	82%
Bill Talk	24.01%	0.1940	0%	94%
Discrimination	5.02%	0.1073	0%	80%
Fees	1.50%	0.0717	0%	84%
Employ	7.05%	0.1305	0%	90%
Urge	11.80%	0.1203	0%	92%
North America	1.67%	0.0540	0%	60%
Guest	8.78%	0.1604	0%	88%
Refugee	1.91%	0.0675	0%	73%
INS	2.90%	0.0939	0%	84%
Work	2.32%	0.0646	0%	68%
Problem	7.82%	0.1118	0%	82%

By looking at the maximum score, we can see that there are documents almost entirely taken up with one dimension; for example, there is a document where 96% of its content is related to the topic of Asylum. The standard deviation indicates the amount of variation of topics across documents. A visualization of how the topics are distributed over time and documents is available in the scatterplots in Figure 4.4. These scatterplots indicate the proportion of each dimension for each statement by year. We can see that the given categories make up less than half of the topics in a document most of the time.

While there are those that have large percentages of text dedicated to one topic, these are outliers. Most speeches utilize more than one frame per speech.

Figure 4.4 Scatterplots Topic Proportion Per Document

Table 4.2 provides a description of each dimension and the terms that have the highest chance of being associated with that dimension or topic. These terms are listed in order from those that have the highest probability of being associated with a topic to those with a smaller probability. For example, under the category Legalization, the first word listed is "legalization" followed by "status", meaning that legalization has the highest probability of being associated with that category, with status following next. While some terms appear in more that one category, it is the grouping of word clusters that help to assign names and descriptions to topics. For example, "employer" appears in multiple categories (ID, Discrimination, and Employ), but when looked at in conjunction with the other highly probabilistic terms, it is apparent that they are discussing the issue of employment in different contexts. I assigned topic names based on knowledge of the corpus, the most frequent terms, and previous empirical work.

Table 4.2 Topic Names, Descriptions and Common Terms

| Legalization | Discuss legalization/amnesty of unauthorized migrants. | legalization status program permanent date alien year resident united_states legal amnesty country undocumented_alien january temporary persons undocumented eligible ins residence |
| Family | Incorporates issues of family preference, reunification, immigration caps and ceilings. | refugee family preference immigrant immigration legal american numbers u.s citizens reunification united_states cap relatives ceiling families admissions country admitted system |

Table 4.2 (continued)

Asylum	Focuses on asylum cases, especially in regards to administrative review and the asylum process.	asylum court law cases review process administrative judicial alien case immigration exclusion deportation attorney_general rights committee section class authority procedure
Costs	Focuses on the cost of unauthorized immigrants is, especially in regards to social services. Also deals with state and local costs versus federal responsibility.	cost federal state year alien percent million states illegal_alien public assistance government local benefits services education welfare programs children estimates
ID	Discusses identification, using social security as identification and the burden verification could place on employers.	card system social_security employer identification verification documents government person information employment national individual burden records required ins document form documentation
English	Topic covers English language, the role of minority languages, and American society.	language english united_states american nation students country learn history university society speak cultural study year world faculty immigrant america foreign
Bill Talk	Mainly discusses work around the bill- how it was created, developed and evolved.	year fact committee issue work problem important support new_york country language state subcommittee conference case day sense opportunity situation concern
Discrimination	Focuses on discrimination that could result from employer sanctions.	discrimination employer_sanction employer employment rights sanction hispanic civil national title origin hire vii discriminatory enforcement job employee citizens eeoc hawkins

Table 4.2 (continued)

Fees	Discusses issues of international visa and travel fees, tourism and ports of entry.	fee international inspection visa cost ins entry border travel tourism forfeiture alien united_states section customs waiver user facilities airport visitors
Employ	Deals with employment of unauthorized aliens, including issues of employer sanctions and penalties.	employer alien illegal_alien penalty law employment criminal hire sanction united_states employee problem violation hiring knowingly civil work illegal status person
Urge	Often deals with urging others to support the bill. Also makes references to the commission and committee hearings.	immigration year support provisions reform policy issue united_states commission important problems report current major effective urge committee illegal_immigration control simpson
North America	Mainly discusses immigration and trade from Mexico and Canada	mexico mexican united_states countries economic border foreign percent population economy canada u.s immigrant migration migrant development trade unemployment american illegal
Guest	Focuses on guest worker programs, especially in agriculture.	worker program labor agricultural foreign domestic work growers agriculture employer perishable temporary bracero crops industry year job harvest country secretary
Refugee	Words pertaining to refugees, especially Haitians, Cubans and Salvadorians	refugee united_states government haitian political florida country haitians asylum emergency cuban salvadorans status rights persecution salvador boat policy human cubans
INS	Deals with the INS and enforcement, especially dealing with warrants to conduct raids and searches in open fields	ins enforcement field search warrant law open border_patrol illegal_alien agents officers agricultural illegal farm property immigration agriculture service rights laws

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Table 4.2 (continued)

Work	Focuses on immigrants, mainly Mexican, in California, Texas and in Unions. Also discusses raids and unemployment.	job worker work district mexican los_angeles texas california union hour americans illegal_alien hispanic american county small unemployed area it's city
Problem	Focuses on the "problem" of illegal immigration, including border crossing and amnesties.	country border immigration amnesty job problem american year million illegal_alien work citizens nation control legal americans millions illegally world united_states

While I anticipated some of the frames identified here, others were surprising. Issues of visa fees and airport inspection were more prominent than expected, while agricultural workers were not as prominent. With a higher *k,* the guest category was divided into two categories, one that dealt with guest workers and temporary workers in general, and a second that focused on agricultural, seasons, and perishable goods workers. The INS category also subdivided into Border Patrol, INS issues, and the need for warrants in conducting raids in open fields. The Employ category also could be broken down (into employment of unauthorized migrants and sanctions) as well as the Legalization category (legalization and amnesty) at higher *k*. However, using a higher *k,* while providing more detail, did not help advance the analysis. As *k* increased, the frequency of use of each topic dropped greatly, making further analysis and comparison difficult.

SEMANTIC VALIDITY OF FRAMES

While the categories largely reflect themes that were expected based on previous work and knowledge of the corpus, it is valuable to ask: do the topics have semantic

validity? By comparing the previous history of the debates, we can assess whether the framing categories reflect issues that in general are expected, as well as trace the development of the issue via the fluctuations in categories. Table 4.3 lists the average coverage of each topic per year. In other words, for the average document in 1972, 2.32% of the document would include the topic Legalization, while 5.83% of the average document would be dedicated to costs.

Table 4.3 Topic Averages Per Year

	1972	1973	1980	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Legalization	2.32%	1.31%	8.60%	4.81%	6.27%	5.58%	5.40%	5.65%
Family	1.38%	1.53%	5.47%	9.17%	3.10%	2.54%	1.88%	2.25%
Asylum	10.49%	5.72%	13.13%	3.77%	7.67%	4.99%	2.90%	3.01%
Costs	4.83%	2.66%	2.36%	4.21%	8.15%	4.07%	5.13%	5.69%
ID	5.62%	2.82%	2.22%	5.97%	3.67%	5.71%	7.67%	3.59%
English	0.58%	0.39%	0.55%	1.77%	1.56%	1.43%	2.49%	0.77%
Bill Talk	18.71%	17.78%	10.38%	21.41%	15.28%	27.33%	22.94%	24.49%
Discrimination	2.68%	4.20%	0.58%	4.92%	5.54%	5.23%	4.91%	5.56%
Fees	0.84%	8.22%	9.81%	0.81%	5.13%	0.57%	4.06%	0.70%
Employ	19.74%	23.89%	7.12%	3.81%	2.79%	7.21%	4.16%	6.02%
Urge	9.22%	10.62%	23.05%	14.57%	15.13%	9.88%	13.36%	13.74%
North America	1.26%	0.82%	2.84%	2.16%	1.87%	1.44%	1.78%	2.04%
Guest	11.08%	5.81%	5.98%	5.97%	7.41%	9.84%	11.79%	6.60%
Refugee	0.80%	0.69%	1.07%	3.01%	5.66%	1.16%	1.40%	2.48%
INS	1.36%	2.83%	2.62%	2.01%	3.36%	3.12%	2.61%	4.21%
Work	2.75%	3.07%	0.18%	2.91%	1.43%	2.18%	1.95%	2.44%
Problem	6.36%	7.64%	4.04%	8.75%	5.98%	7.71%	5.59%	10.76%

From this recounting, the frames identified by LDA are to be expected. The focus on employment (Work), employer sanctions (Sanctions), and guest workers (Guest worker) are all evidenced in the categories and themes identified at $k=17$. We also see the themes identified by Tichenor from the SCIRP report reflected in the words of family reunification, discrimination -- and briefly, refugee admissions. The question of national identification cards, highlighted as important by the Reagan administration, was identified as well.

The Fees and English frames show how LDA can expose unexpected frames. While an English Only frame or a frame that deals with the U.S. as a country of immigrants was not unexpected, it is interesting that these two frames were used together

often enough to combine in the analysis. Going into the data set, the reason for this becomes clear: often times, congressmen argue for an English Only amendment by invoking waves of immigrants in the past, often using their family history as example of immigrants who came to the U.S. and then learned English. However, looking at Table 4.3, it is clear that this frame was not frequently used, even though it involves these two areas and issues of international students. The Fee category, which also deals with issues of tourism and travel, was not an expected category. Overall, the categories identified reflect the history of the bills and can be expected to provide insight into the framing of the issue over time.

FRAME OWNERSHIP

The second question that this research seeks to answer is "Who says what?" Do we see a separation in speech by those who eventually vote for and against the bill? Do we see differences in speech between the parties as well? To answer these questions, I perform a two sample t-test to examine the relationship between support for the bill and use of a category. This test is intended to assess if there were frames that could clearly be classified as pro-IRCA and anti-IRCA.

As indicated in Table 4.4, the relationship between support for the bill and topic use was statistically different for ID, Bill Talk, Discrimination, Fees, North America, Guest, Refugee, INS, Work, and Problem. Of these categories, we can say that those that voted against the final bill had speeches that focused more on ID, Discrimination, North America, INS, Work, and Problem. Those that supported the final bill had speeches that focused more on Bill Talk, Fees, Guest, and Refugee. In short, there is a clear distinction between the frames used by IRCA supporters as compared to the bill's opponents.

Table 4.4 Average Use of Topic By Those For and Against the Bills Per Document

Topic	Against	For	T	P
Legalization	5.44 (0.102)	5.59 (0.106)	-0.4108	0.6812
Family	3.48 (0.101)	3.33 (0.1)	0.4193	0.675
Asylum	4.1 (0.095)	4.5 (0.102)	-1.1573	0.247
Costs	4.45 (0.104)	4.77 (0.107)	-0.8794	0.379
ID**	6.18 (0.132)	4.91 (0.115)	3.0769	0.002
English	1.74 (0.073)	1.33 (0.057)	1.9259	0.054
Bill Talk**	23.49 (0.188)	26.54 (0.203)	4.5378	0.000
Discrimination**	6.25 (0.12)	4.65 (0.103)	4.2887	0.000
Fees**	0.68 (0.033)	1.21 (0.06)	-3.0088	0.003
Employ	6.22 (0.117)	6.2 (0.121)	0.0561	0.955
Urge	11.65 (0.118)	12.07 (0.121)	-1.0138	0.311
North America**	2.02 (0.059)	1.38 (0.047)	3.6638	0.000
Guest**	7.74 (0.145)	9.74 (0.173)	-3.5784	0.000
Refugee*	1.47 (0.053)	1.93 (0.068)	-2.1689	0.030
INS*	3.46 (0.105)	2.72 (0.097)	2.2464	0.025
Work**	2.81 (0.072)	1.66 (0.048)	5.8601	0.000
Problem**	8.85 (0.119)	7.48 (0.111)	3.5511	0.000

For all categories above, n=3,846 with df=3844. Means are given as percentages with Standard Deviation in parenthesis.

* indicates significance at the p<.05 level

**indicates significance at the p<.01 level

I then test whether or not topics can be classified as Republican or Democrat with a two-sample t-test. The frames of ID, Bill Talk Discrimination, Fees, Employ, North America, Guest, Refugee, INS, Work, and Problem were statistically different between the two parties. As noted in Table 4.5, Republicans were more likely to have a higher percentage of the frames Fees, INS, and Problem in their speeches. Democrats had a higher percentage of ID, Bill Talk, Discrimination, North America, Guest, Refugee, and work in their speeches. We can therefore conclude that party does, indeed, matter as legislators choose frames for speaking about the IRCA.

Table 4.5 Average Use of Topic By Party Per Document

Topic	Republican	Democrat	T	P
Legalization	5.76 (0.1091)	4.91 (0.0962)	-0.4108	0.6812
Family	3.67 (0.1028)	3.09 (0.0965)	0.4193	0.675
Asylum	4.41 (0.1047)	5.11 (0.1165)	-1.1573	0.247
Costs	5.3 (0.1154)	4.07 (0.0948)	-0.8794	0.379
ID**	5.43 (0.123)	5.56 (0.1262)	3.0769	0.002
English	1.39 (0.0648)	1.45 (0.0609)	1.9259	0.054
Bill Talk**	23.7 (0.1826)	25.39 (0.1998)	4.5378	0.000
Discrimination**	4.51 (0.1023)	5.4 (0.1104)	4.2887	0.000
Fees**	1.68 (0.0702)	0.96 (0.0469)	-3.0088	0.003
Employ	6.61 (0.1264)	7.54 (0.135)	0.0561	0.955
Urge	12.31 (0.1268)	11.23 (0.1148)	-1.0138	0.311
North America**	1.51 (0.0495)	1.53 (0.0504)	3.6638	0.000
Guest**	8.49 (0.1581)	9.18 (0.1631)	-3.5784	0.000
Refugee*	1.61 (0.0576)	1.9 (0.0666)	-2.1689	0.030
INS*	3.12 (0.0986)	2.84 (0.0921)	2.2464	0.025
Work**	1.95 (0.0559)	2.27 (0.0592)	5.8601	0.000
Problem**	8.54 (0.1228)	7.56 (0.1063)	3.5511	0.000

For all categories above, n=4546 with df=4544. Means are given as percentages with Standard Deviation in parenthesis.

* indicates significance at the $p<.05$ level

**indicates significance at the $p<.01$ level

DISCUSSION

There are several strands of discourse that this analysis reveals. First, there are discourses that relate to employment, frames labeled here as Employ, Work, and Guest. Employ focuses on the employment of unauthorized migrants, and legislators using this frame often proposed a solution that would prevent employers from hiring them. Counter to the Employ narrative, Guest draws on discourses relating to the need for hiring immigrant workers, especially in agriculture, and the Work frame often focuses on the effect of raids on unauthorized immigrants and their role as workers.

Figure 4.5 Average Use of Frames Over Time

Discrimination, INS, and ID frames connect issues of immigration to wider philosophical debates in the United States. Discrimination ties immigration to historic issues of immigrant integration and the civil rights movement. The ID frame ties immigration enforcement to issues of big government and government surveillance, as well as discrimination. For example, Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-OR) stated that "I strenuously oppose creation of such a card and I believe that the vast majority of the American people do also. Such an ID card would be a gross invasion of privacy and a violation of the liberties secured to all citizens by the Constitution" (Cong. Rec. October 1986). The INS frame, likewise focuses on big government as it highlights the need to require a warrant before INS officers may raid open fields. Refugee, Family, Asylum, and even Guest are all ways to diversify how immigration is being understood, varying from an issue involving employment and economics to one incorporating human rights and families.

Looking at how the frames vary in Figure 4.5 and Table 4.3, we can see notable variation in the frequency of use of each frame over time. Some of these variations can be explained by exogenous events. For example, the Refugee category typically is a very low frequency frame, yet starts to rise in 1982 and peaks in 1983 at 5.66%. This follows the Mariel Boatlift and the Haitian Refugee Crisis of 1981. There is also support for the theory that SCRIP influenced the debate. After the report was issued, frames focusing on solutions (such as legalization and ID) and different immigrant types (Family and Refugee) rise, as well as Discrimination and Costs. The Employment category is prevalent in the 1970s but falls dramatically in the 1980s. The Guest worker category somewhat mirrors the salience of employment, yet it does not match the frequency the Guest worker frame was employed in 1980s. This suggests that while issues of employment, especially employer sanctions, are important (as their frequency never

drops below 3.81% per document), this solution is not enough to pass immigration reform alone. It is only with the combination of the solution of legalization and a growing diversification of types of immigrants being discussed that a bill that passes both chambers occurs.

Legalization and asylum both peaked in salience in 1980. This provides an anomaly in the data and the limits of the LDA method. While a general legalization itself was not directly advocated in 1980 by any of the speakers, what was discussed was administrative relief of some who had been convicted of drug offenses in foreign countries and other administrative categories, using terminology that would be later used in the debates about legalization, such as hardship and administrative review. While speakers in 1980 did advocate for a regularization mechanism, this was not the same as the legalization provisions introduced in later bills.

As noted above in Table 4.5, those that voted against the final bill focused more on ID, Discrimination, North America, INS, Work, and Problem. This suggests a success in connecting the issue of immigration, and therefore immigration reform, with larger political issues in regards to big government and discrimination. IDs managed to connect both of these issues. While issues of warrants and identifications were on the anti-bill side, it is interesting that Employ, which mainly deals with issues of punishing employers, was not identified as either pro- or con speech. While the ID and INS frames increased in frequency in the last year of debate, 1986, we see this increase after the anti-IRCA coalition had effectively lost the debate. When looking at the corpus of ICRA speech in America, an interesting trend occurs. Those who voted against the bill tended to call for addressing push factors, such as Rep. Henry B. Gonzales (D-TX) when he stated that "immigration reform is needed but that will not stop illegal entry or even discourage it very much. The only way to solve the problem is to start alleviating the misery that

creates it" (Cong. Rec. Oct 1986). Those that eventually voted for the bill and had a high percentage of their speeches dedicated to this issue focused on increasing the number of visas allocated to Canada and Mexico instead.

It is not surprising that Problem would be identified with anti-talk, as the Problem frame is essentially an issue definition frame. Reading through the corpus and looking at the words that are high frequency in the frame, it is clear that this frame is intended to shift the definition of the problem that needs to be solved, although many speakers differ on what exactly that problem is. For some it is the inability to control unauthorized entry, for others it is how to pragmatically deal with those that are currently in the United States, and for still others it is a humanitarian issue of alleviating suffering. There is also the issue of border control and whether regularization is a problem itself, rather than a solution.

It is highly likely that the frame Bill Talk being categorized as pro-bill talk is highly influenced by the fact that the sponsors of the bill often used it, and it was often found in documents where representatives and senators thanked the bill sponsors for their work, among other frames. The frames Refugee and Guest focus on diversifying the understanding of immigrant, broadening the issue definition of immigration by focusing attention on family members, refugees, workers, and legal immigrants. This is reflected in statements such as those by Rep. Dante Fascell (D-FL) who argued, "we must remember that the great majority of individuals who would benefit from this amendment are not illegal aliens" (Cong. Rec. June 1984). Rather then define an immigrant as "illegal" or "undocumented" these frames focus on the immigrant as a worker or refugee. For example, Rep. Hamilton Fish (D-NY) argued that:

> The American people in the face of an illegal immigration crisis should
> not lose sight of the fact that immigrants have been a great source of this

country's strength and refugees have made an immense contribution to our society. (Cong. Rec. Oct 1986).

As noted in Table 4.5, Republicans were more likely to have a higher percentage of the frame Fees, INS, and Problem in their speeches, while Democrats had a higher percentage of ID, Bill Talk, Discrimination, North America, Guest, Refugee, and Work in their speeches. It was unexpected that ID would be a Democratic issue; however, in reviewing the corpus, it was tied to the Discrimination frame and the debate questioning whether Hispanic-looking individuals would be required to carry proof of their immigration status with them.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, unsupervised learning methods were used in an attempt to trace how an issue -- in this case, immigration reform -- was defined over time in the United States. I found variation in the salience of themes over time in the debate, with some frames being emphasized at one time over another.

It is clear that unsupervised learning methods can help identify frames; however, the method has proved not useful in understanding who is arguing against a frame and who is arguing for it. Hypothesis 2, however, proved correct, showing that there is a statistically significant difference in "pro" versus "anti" talk.

There was also talk that could be described as partisan talk; some frames have a greater presence in speeches given by members of one party than the other. Some of these differences were expected given the Republicans nature as a center-right party and the Democrats as a center-left. Democrats unsurprisingly used the Work category, which encompasses workers of immigrant descent, INS raids on places on employment and unions, more often. The frames of Discrimination and Refugee were also Democrat,

while the Republicans favored the INS category with its focus on warrants for field searches. Two categories, ID and Guest, were identified as Republican frames, a finding which was unexpected. However, looking back at the corpus and the common words, it is clear that these two categories are a mixture of issues that create the oft-citied strange bedfellows of policy making. ID corresponded to issues and concerns about civil liberties, but also issues of the burden id verification would place on employers. The Guest category focused on guest workers, both the need for, and their ability to be exploited. While LDA can highlight the general categories, separating these categories out into more specific categories to capture these differences means the frequency of all go down to the point it is difficult to compare them.

The broader question that this chapter seeks to answer, however, is whether frames were used in a strategic manner to broaden the pro-coalition? While an immigration reform bill did succeed at some level each year, those that were against the bill were essentially the winners until 1985. While some of this can be attributed to institutional rules -- for example, when the Speaker of the House decided not to put the bill up for a vote, the rules of the House precluded action - there were years where the ideological divide simply could not be bridged. While issues of warrants (INS frame) and identifications (ID frame) were on the anti-bill side, it is interesting that the Employ frame, which mainly deals with issues of punishing employers, could not be classified as either pro-or con speech.

By using LDA and returning to the corpus for a deeper reading of the documents, it is clear that many of the frames that were identified as pro or con frames were used in attempt to emphasize one issue definition over the other and to push for the preferred solution by each side. In looking at the frequency of the legalization frame over time however, it does not appear that issue moved the bill forward. Rather, it appears to be a

combination of institutional factors -- such as the desire to be seen addressing the problem -- as well as a shift to a broader understanding of what immigration entailed. Approaching the bill's final passage, there is a decrease in the use of the Employment and Guest category and greater focus on Discrimination, which indicates a movement away from seeing the issue as one that focuses on the employment of illegal migrants in the 1970s towards one that focuses also on immigrant incorporation and preserving the rights of those of immigrant heritage.

Unfortunately, here is where LDA lays bare the limitations of unsupervised coding analysis, especially in regards to understanding how frames and narratives are used. It is clear that in tracing the history of the bills, the categories provided through LDA are accurate representations of the discussion in the U.S. Congress, and as such, have semantic validity. And, while we might expect a certain topic to fall out of favor over time and disappear from the conversation, what instead occurs is the popularity of the frame changes, indicating that speakers are responding and learning from previous debates. Yet, it is harder to understand how these frames are used overall.

While broad trends are easy to pick out, it seems the best value for LDA may instead be in the creation of codebooks, to ensure that categories that may be overlooked by human coders are given proper attention (while pointing out that other issues may have been given too much importance). For example, it is notable what is left out given what the literature and current debates on immigration in the U.S. might predict. There is nothing on smuggling, trafficking, crime, or drugs. Terrorism does not appear; neither does a large focus on the border. This points to a future direction of research that includes incorporating a longer time frame of immigration debates to better understand the changing dynamics of the framing of this issue.

Figure 4.6 U.S. Immigration Timeline

Events	Year	Legislative Action
	72*	92 HR 16188 introduced (clean version of HR 14831). Would make it unlawful to knowingly hire aliens and establish employer sanctions; Passes House after 1 day of debate.
	73*	93 HR 982 introduced. This bill is almost identical to HR 11688; includes adjustment of status for Western Hemisphere immigrants; Passes House after 1 day of debate
		Sen. Kennedy introduces S. 3872 which calls for graduated penalties and amnesties
	74	94 HR 982 introduced; is a reintroduction of 93 HR 982
		Sen. Kennedy's introduces 2nd bill, S. 561, calling for graduated penalties and amnesties
President Ford established "Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens"	75	94 HR 8713 (clean version of 94 HR 982) introduced. This bill was the result of the immigration subcommittee's deliberations and was reported with amendments. It called for amnesty and had anti-discrimination provisions.
		94 S. 3074 Omnibus bill introduced to create an amnesty and modify H-2 program.
		95 HR 1663 introduced. Similar to HR 5871, this bill omitted "ban against adjustment" on aliens that had been illegally employed
		Carter Administration Bills' "Alien Adjustment and Employment act of 1977" 95 HR 9531 and 95 S. 2252 are introduced. They include provisions for President's proposals for employer sanctions and adjustment of status
		96 S. 1763- Reported to Senate Judiciary Committee
"Study of Fraudulent Entrant Study"	76	
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy create	78	
Mariel Boatlift/Haitian Boat lift	80*	96 HR 7273 passes House
Refugee Act of 1980		
Final Report of SCIRP "US Immigration Policy and National Interest."	81	Regan Administration bill, 97 S. 1765, The "Omnibus Immigration Control Act" introduced in Senate; this bill is related to HR 4832.
		97 HR 4832- Omnibus Immigration Control Act introduced on behalf of the Regan Administration; related to S.1765

Figure 4.6, cont.

	82*	97 S 776 introduced. This bill would have changed eligibility requirements for change of status in two ways: alien had to prove they were in the US before 1/1/1978 and they would face "undue hardship" if removed.
		Regan Administration bill, 97 S. 1765, The "Omnibus Immigration Control Act" introduced in Senate; this bill is related to HR 4832.
		97 S. 2222- "Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982" (Simpson-Mazzoli)- Passed Senate after 4 days of debate
		97 HR 5872- Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 (Simpson-Mazzoli) is introduced, followed by 97 HR 6514 (clean version).
		97 HR 7357 is introduced. This bill is based on HR 6514 as it was debated in the House, with amendments from both House Judiciary and Education and Labor Committee. After 3 days of debate, no action is taken.
	83*	98 S 529, The Simpson Mazzoli bill is introduced. This bill is identical to S. 2222; passes Senate after 4 days of debate
	84*	98 HR 1510- Simpson-Mazzoli bill introduced. This bill was almost identical to HR 6514 with the added provisos that would prevent immigrants who change status from receiving federal public assistance and ensure the federal government reimburse states for state level programs these immigrants would use. Passes House after 7 days of debate
	85*	99 S. 1200 passes Senate after 8 days of debate
	86*	99 HR 3810 introduced in House and is tabled after 2 days of debate. House passes 99 S 1200 after 1 day of debate.
		Conference report submitted Oct 14 to House, House agrees after debate.
		Conference report submitted to the Senate, Senate agrees to report on October 17 after debate.

Chapter 5: Defining Immigration in Spain: When and How to Regularize

Spain presents an interesting case in the immigration policy literature. It is a country that until recently was a country of emigration. While it experienced internal migration from the rural south to the more industrialized north under the Franco regime (1939-1978), the country did not start attracting large-scale immigration until democratization and its ascension to the European Community. As noted before in this dissertation partisanship, demographics, economics, and country-specific variables have been offered by the literature to explain immigration policy choice. Yet, as shown in Chapter 3, when these variables are formally modeled, variation among them does not lead to a statistically significant change in the likelihood of a regularization being chosen.

As in the previous case study chapter, this chapter will utilize the Discursive Institutionalist (DI) framework (Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2011; Schmidt 2014; Givens and Case 2014) to help uncover how frame usage and issue definition directed the adoption of immigrant regularizations. The DI framework arose from the three other institutionalisms in political science (Hall and Taylor 1996). While all institutionalisms focus on the role institutions play in structuring political life, each has a different analytical emphasis and microfoundations. DI's microfoundations are based in the idea of bounded rationality; that is the assumption that actors are strategic and have preferences, yet often make tradeoffs between preferences rather than view their preferences as absolute. Actors are strategic, yet can be influenced by others. While historical institutionalism focuses on the effect the past has on future policy choices and rational choice institutionalism focuses on how institutions can be used to structure incentives to overcome collective action problems, DI focus on how ideas and discourse occur within institutional structures

(Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2011; Schmidt 2014; Givens and Case 2014). Here, the content and interactive nature of ideas in policy-making are studied to understand how these ideas connect to policy solutions.

This chapter is divided into the following sections. First, I will review the LDA text analysis method. This is followed by a section that discusses the structure of the Spanish Parliament and a history of the two bills passed during the time frame this chapter studies. The next section contains a brief review of the hypotheses to be tested. The next section will discuss the text corpus that was analyzed, providing descriptive statistics about the parliamentary debates. A description of the frames that were discovered will be included, followed by a short investigation on semantic validity. The next section will focus on the partisan usage of these frames and the chapter will end with a discussion about how these rames varied and changed over time and the course of the debates.

USING LDA TO ANALYZE TEXT

The path from ideas to policy choice will be traced using content analysis. Here, I will use topic modeling. Underlying all topic modeling is the assumption that within a set of documents, collective referred to as the corpus, there is a mixture of topics. The topics are collections of words that have varying probability distributions across the topics. By using topic modeling, we can infer the latent topic structure behind a collection of documents by looking at word distribution and frequency. The latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) is a type of probabilistic topic model that assumes that while the topics are the same for all documents within a corpus, there is variation in how much of the topic appears in each document (Blei 2012).

As in the U.S. case study chapter, a set of "documents" was assembled to create a corpus. Each document here is a single statement given in the Spanish Parliament by one

speaker. This corpus underwent pre-processing (described below) and then the LDA topic model was run on the corpus using the open source program, Mallet. Mallet requires the input of certain parameters, such as the number of topics, k, the researcher believes underlie the documents.

There are two types of output from Mallet that are then used for the analysis in this chapter. The first document is a "key". Using the number k entered, this document outputs those terms that have the highest frequency and probability of co-occurrence grouped together. This is the document that is used to identify the latent topics (or frames) that structure the corpus. The second document records the variation of each topic (or frame) per "document" (or speech), with each row indicating a specific "document" and each column indicating a specific frame.

BACKGROUND

Composition of the Spanish Parliament and the Debate Process

The legislative branch of the Spanish government, known as the Cortes Generales, is made up of two chambers. The lower house is the Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados) and the upper house is known as the Senate (Senado). Representatives in the Congress serve 4-year terms and are elected in a closed list proportional representation system, while Senators, the less powerful chamber, are elected directly.

In both chambers, parties form parliamentary groups (Grupos Parlamentarios) to represent their interests; therefore in the transcripts of debates, speakers are introduced by the parliamentary group, not their political party. The Mixed Group is made of those that lack the numbers needed to qualify as an independent parliamentary group. The debates typically have the following structure. First, there is a presentation of the subject of the

debate and the speakers. A spokesperson for the group supporting the bill then has the opportunity to make a statement. This is followed by arguments and counter-arguments from the spokesperson from the other parliamentary groups (GPs). There then is an optional round of questions and replies. The debate closes with a statement by the moderator. Unlike in the U.S. case, the discussion alternates between having a supporter of the bill speak, then one against it, followed by speeches by each parliamentary group's spokesperson. Therefore, the speeches here tend to be longer in duration.

How a bill becomes a law and the types of debate depend on what type of bill it is. There are two types of bills: proyectos de ley and propositions de ley. The government creates the first, while any one Member of Parliament (MP) may enter the second with the support of 14 MPs, or by a parliamentary group's spokesperson (portovoz). Government bills start out in the Council of Ministers, then are submitted to the Presiding Council of the Congress and then are published in the Official Bulletin (Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generalas, (BOCG)). Deputies have 15 days to present amendments after this point. Non-Governmental laws are published in the BOCG and the government is given 30 days to object. If the government fails to do so, the bill converts into a government bill. The bill is passed to a working party, which creates a report (dictamen); this report is then debated in the committee. Finally, the bill goes to a debate in a Plenary (Pleno) sitting of Congress, where if passed it goes to the Senate where a similar procedure is followed. However, the Senate has less time to act on the bill and less options to modify it; if it passes it goes to obtain the royal signature. If the Senate introduces a veto or amendment, the text returns to the Congress of Deputies, where MPs may approve or reject Senate amendments with a simple majority, or lift a veto with an absolute majority.

Overview of the 4/2000 and 8/2000 Organic Law Immigration Reform

Spain's first immigration Law was passed in 1985 as Spain entered into the European Community. This law, the Foreigner's Law (Ley de Extranjería), was mainly focused on restricting entry and creating an immigration policy regime consistent with that of the European Community.

In 2000, two laws on immigration were passed that modified the 1985 Foreigner's Law. The first bill was introduced in at the end of the VI Legislature (1996-2000). The Popular Party (PP) had won the 1996 election with a simple majority, and was supported by Convergencia I Unió (CiU), Nationalist Basque Party (PNV), and Canary Coalition (CC). Table 5.1 shows the distribution of Congressional seats by Party and Table 5.2 shows the distribution by Parliamentary Groups.

Three proposiciones de ley were entered by Convergencia I Unió (CiU), the center-right Catalan nationalist party, The United Left (UI), a left wing party, and the Mixed Parliamentary group. These bills focused on integrating immigrants into Spain and seeing immigrants as groups that would stay in Spain rather than simply temporary labor. The Socialist Party (PSOE) also introduced a proposal. This attempt at reform eventually produced the Organic Law 4/2000, which was approved by all parties except the PP.

Table 5.1 VI Legislature- Congressional Seats by Party

Party Name	Position	Seats
Popular Party (PP)	Center-Right	156
Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE)	Center-Left	141
United Left (IU)	Left	21
Convergence and Union (CiU)	Center-Right	16
Basque National Party (PNV)	Center-Right	5
Canary Coalition (CC)	Center-Right	4
Galego Nationalist Block (BNG)	Left	2
Popular Unity (HB)	Extreme Left	2
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)	Left	1
Basque Solidarity (EA)	Left	1
Valencia Union (UV)	Center-Right	1

Table 5.2 VI Legislature- Congressional Seats by Parliamentary Groups

Name	Member Parties	Seats
Popular	PP, UNP	155
Socialist	PSOE	141
United Federal Left	IU	16
Catalan CiU	CiU	16
Basque-PNV	EAJ-PNV	5
Canary Coalition	Canary Coalition	4
Mixed Group	PDNI, BNG, ICV, PIL, EA, UV, PAR	11
Without Group	HB	2

The 4/2000 law allowed for unauthorized migrants to receive health care and education when they registered with the local government (el padrón), as well as providing for family reunification and permanent residency. The Popular Party first abstained from the vote in Congress and added many amendments in the Senate, which were then rejected when it returned to the Congress (Aja 2000; González-Enríquez 2009).

In the VII Legislature, the PP had won an outright majority (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). Freed from coalition constraints, it passed its own reform of the Foreigner's Law, which other

parties objected to- as well as some members of the party itself. The minister of Labor was against the reform, while the Minister of Interior for it (González-Enríquez 2009). This reform was pushed through with the support of the CiU and the Canary Coalition (CC) GP; its detractors called it a counter reform.Table 5.3 VII Legislature- Congressional Seats by Party

Party Name	Position	Seats
Popular Party (PP)	Center-Right	183
Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE)	Center-Left	125
Convergence and Union (CiU)	Center-Right	15
United Left (IU)	Left	8
Basque National Party (EAJ/PNV)	Center-Right	7
Canary Coalition (CC)	Center-Right	4
Galego Nationalist Block (BNG)	Left	3
Andalusian Party (PA)	Center-Left	1
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)	Left	1
Green Initiative for Catalonia (ICV)	Left	1
Basque Solidarity (EA)	Left	1
Aragonese Union (CHA)	Left	1

Table 5.4 VII Legislature- Congressional Seats by Parliamentary Groups

Name	Member Parties	Seats
Socialist	PSOE, PDNI, PSC	155
Popular	PP, UPN	141
Catalan	CiU	16
Federal United Left	IU	16
Basque-PNV	EAJ/PNV	5
Canary Coalition	CC	4
Mixed Group	BNG, PA, ERC, ICV EA CHA	11

According to González-Enríquez, it was this reform that "marked the first time in which immigration emerged as a major issue for the Spanish public, with extensive media coverage, comments and pressure from NGOS, associations of immigrants, trade unions, legal experts and

the Catholic Church" (2009, 143). Elsewhere in Spain, in February 2000, Moroccan immigrants where attacked in El Ejido in Algeria, Spain. The regularization relating to the 4/2000 reform was held between March and July of that year, while regularizations relating to the 8/2000 reform were held in 2001.

EXPLAINING POLICY OUTCOMES IN SPAIN

Structuring the Debate

How did the Spanish Parliament decide to pass two bills that included immigrant regularizations in such a short period of time? While other works in the literature have aimed to understand policy making in general, none have looked specifically at regularization or used a Discursive Institutionalist framework to structure their research to explain this policy choice. As in Chapter 4, this case study chapter will focus on Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, which are listed below:

> H2: Pro-regularization talk will be different from anti-regularization talk.
>
> H3: Frames and issue definitions are used strategically. Losers will try and broaden their coalition, while winners will try and contain the issue.
>
> H4: LDA topic modeling can be used to study how frames are used over time, party, and location.

Preparing the Corpus

I complied the Spanish corpus by collecting the transcripts from the Journal of Debates. Due to the structure of debates in the Spanish Parliament, this corpus includes debates that occur in committee as well (Martin Rojo 2000, 25).

The first round of debates analyzed concerned 3 different bill propositions:

- Proposition for an Organic Law to Reform the Organic Law 7/1985, July 1, Regarding the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain. (Proposición de Ley Orgánica de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 7/1985, de 1 de julio, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España. (122/000154)), submitted by GP Federal United Left.

- Proposition for an Organic Law of Measures to Favor Greater Protection and Integration of Immigrants. (Proposición de Ley Orgánica de medidas para favorecer una mayor protección e integración de los inmigrantes) submitted by GP Catalonia (Convergència i Unió)

- Proposition for an Organic Law to Reform the Organic Law 7/1985, July 1, Regarding the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain by the Mixed Group.

These debates took place over three days. These bills were then subsumed under the Proposition for an Organic Law regarding the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration (Proposición de Ley Orgánica sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social (122/000295)) by the Constitutional Commission. There were four days of debate on this proposition: one in the Constitutional Commission, one the plenary sitting of Congress, and one in the plenary sitting of the Senate.

The second reform attempt includes one bill project: Project for an Organic Law to Reform the Organic Law 4/2000, January 11, regarding Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social. (121/000012). This bill had two days of debate in the plenary sitting of Congress, one day of debate in the Congress Constitutional Commission, one day of debate in the Senate Constitutional Commission, and one day of debate in the plenary sitting of the Senate.

As in the U.S. case, each time a speaker spoke, it was considered one speech or "document" for purposes of the LDA analysis. The speeches from the President and Vice President of each chamber were removed. As the speeches in the Spanish Parliament occurred in larger blocks, there was no need to remove text that was merely procedural aside from statements from the debate moderators. When a speaker was interrupted briefly for procedural reasons, for example to be reminded of their time allotment, I included the speech before and after the interruption as one speech. While certain words and phrases, including the names of political parties, were added to a stop list so they would not be included (senores, muchas gracias, etc) the

main modification to the corpus was to combine commonly occurring phrases with an underscore. For example, Union Europea (European Union) was converted to union_europea. In this way, common phrases would appear together in the output key, making it easier to assign names to a topic or frame.

Who Spoke?

There were 178 speeches given by 42 speakers. 41 of these speakers were the spokesperson of their parliamentary group, and 1 was the Minster of the Interior speaking to represent the Popular Party Government's bill. Table 5.5 shows how many speeches were given per Parliamentary Group.

Table 5.5 - Speeches by Group

Group	Freq.
Catalan CiU	24
Canary Coalition	18
Catalan Agreement of Progress*	3
United Federal Left	10
Mixed Group	37
Popular	32
Socialist	35
Basque-PNV**	19
Total	178

* GP Catalan Agreement of Progress (Entesa Catalana de Progrés, ECP) is only represented in the Senate.
**The Basque-PNV Parliamentary group includes speeches by both the Basque-PNV from Congress and the National Basque Parliamentary Group in the Senate.

Table 5.6 shows the location of speeches. As expected, most speeches occurred in the Congress, both in the plenary seating and in the Constitutional Commissions. As noted above, the Congress is the more powerful legislative chamber. Although the Senate can amend bills, Congress must accept any amendments added. Unlike in the United States, there is no reconciliation process if the chambers pass two different bills.

Table 5.6 Location of Speeches

	Year			
Where	1998	1999	2000	Total
Congress-Constitutional Commission	0	26	38	64
Senate- Constitutional Commission	0	0	18	18
Plenary Congress	15	20	25	60
Plenary Senate	0	19	17	36
Total	15	65	98	178

DIMENSIONS OF THE DEBATE

Descriptive Statistics

As in the U.S. case, an iterative process was used to determine the *k* that would provide the most useful categories[15]. Analysis was also run at several levels of pre-processing to discover additional words that need to be added to the stop-list to create clearer categories. For example, an analysis was run using varying levels of *k* both with and without the names of political parties and parliamentary groups. When group names did not substantively add to understanding the latent frames in the document, they were placed on the stop-list so they would not be included in future analysis. With a large *k* topics ranged from international development, Spain's history of emigration and the different background of immigrant flows, such as a frame that focused on Moroccan immigrants; however, these occurred at very low rates. With a $k < 10$, useful topics overlapped. Therefore, a $k = 10$ was chosen.

Running LDA with a $k=10$ resulted in creating 10 frames that cover the debate leading up to these two bills. Table 5.7 indicates the average proportion of each topic per document. The minimum shows that for all topics there are documents where that frame makes up less than 1 percent of that document. The maximum shows the highest proportion of a theme present in a document. For example, there is one document that is almost entirely composed of words drawn

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[15] *K* here refers to the number of latent topics the LDA analysis aims to discover.

from the Political Rights frame. The standard deviation provides insight into the variation across documents.

Table 5.7 Summary of LDA Topics Across Documents

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Issue	178	17.08%	0.1530	0.65%	85.55%
Political Rights	178	17.00%	0.1528	0.19%	93.47%
Numbers	178	4.52%	0.1000	0.01%	57.31%
Border	178	5.66%	0.1087	0.01%	50.86%
Consensus	178	19.02%	0.1814	0.13%	85.12%
Punishment	178	6.60%	0.1290	0.02%	66.30%
Amendment	178	4.02%	0.0888	0.01%	50.19%
Human Rights	178	4.21%	0.0868	0.01%	46.20%
Family	178	16.98%	0.1736	0.23%	86.96%
State Role	178	4.91%	0.1176	0.01%	65.79%

A scatterplot visualization of how the topics are distributed by time and document can be found in Figure 5.1 to this chapter. These charts allow for a visualization of how proportions of topics vary. While most topics cluster below 40 percent coverage per document, there are some that have a greater spread, such as Issue, Family and Consensus. However, like in the U.S. case, most documents utilize more than one frame.

Figure 5.1 Scatterplots Topic Proportion Per Document

Table 5.8 provides the name for each frame, a description of it, and lists the terms that have the highest probability of being associated with that topic in both Spanish and English. With the terms, each is listed in order from those having the highest probability of being associated with a topic to those with a smaller probability. While there may be some words that appear in multiple topics, topics are uncovered by viewing them in conjunction with the other terms they are grouped with. Topic names were assigned based on corpus knowledge, most frequent terms and previous empirical work.

As with any translation, there were several words that could be understood to have multiple meanings. Therefore, if a word had a highly likely secondary meaning, that was included in parenthesis behind the first principle translation in Table 5.8 to provide readers with a greater context.

One of the major findings was that frames about rights were very prevalent, no matter what the k was. Even at very low k, ($k <9$), there were two topics that discussed rights. One, described in Table 5.8 as Human Rights, focused on issues such as the Declaration of Human Rights and dignity. The second, titled Political Rights, focused on rights given in the Spanish Constitution, such as the right of association and to strike.

Table 5.8- Frame Name and Description

Issue	Discusses various aspects of the immigration issue.	inmigración gobierno política inmigrante estado ano fenómeno materia reforma políticas conjunto sentido proceso español integracion_social sociedad ciudadanos cuestión irregular poder	immigration government policy immigrant state year phenomenon matters reform political group(together) sense process Spanish social integration society citizens issue(matter) irregular power(can)
Political Rights	Deals with political rights from the Spanish Constitution.	derecho extranjero libertad España constitución situación asociación españoles reunión ejercicio personas legal reconocimiento tratados gratuita derechos sindicación ciudadanos huelga veto	law foreign freedom Spain constitution situation association Spaniards meeting exercise person legal recognition treaties free rights unionization citizens strike veto
Numbers	Discusses the number of immigrants and births, especially the aging of society and the possibility of a regularization mechanism	inmigrante país trabajo ano personas Europa porciento habla reglamento irregulares sociales millones textos integración estatuto tribunal_constitucional racismo seguridad_social ministerio social	immigrant country work year people percent speak regulations irregular social millions text integration Constitutional Tribunal racism social security ministry social
Border	Border issues, including migrants coming via the Mediterranean	países canarias frontera obra emigración caso problema mundo mano territorio políticas problemas ministro emigrantes derechos_humanos union_europea serie patera policial desarrollo	countries Canary border hand emigration case problem world hand territory political(policies) problems ministry emigrants human rights EU series patera(boat) police development

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Table 5.8 (continued)

Consensus	Talks about the need to pass a bill, including the need or existence of a consensus	consenso cuestión gobierno país tramite inmigrante política responsabilidad situación importante intervención posición tramitación esfuerzo trabajo social llegar sentido trabajar forma	consensus issue(matter) government country process immigration policy(politics) responsibility situation important intervention position processing(proceedings) effort work social arrive(become) sense work form
Punishment	Discusses punishments and infractions	grave expulsión infracciones ilegal personas sanciones procedimiento caso asilo situación relación judicial infracción disposiciones disposición arraigo apartado pensamos plazo preferente	serious expulsion infringements illegal persons sanctions procedure case asylum situation legal(judicial) infraction order[16] settle[17] isolated(section) we think deadline(window) preferred
Amendment	Typically focuses on if the GP will accept an amendment or not.	concepto sociedad relación realmente incluir limitación considerar español embarazo admitir dificultad referencia propone contratar positiva determinados castellano aceptar positivo encima	concepts society relationship actually include limitation consider Spanish pregnancy admit difficulty reference propose hiring positive Castellano[18] accept positive above

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[16] *disposition judicial* can be translated as a remand for trial

[17] *arriago* can also be translated as the concept of settling down or establishing roots.

[18] Castellano here refers to a last name.

Table 5.8 (continued)

Human Rights	Issues of human rights. Often cites the declaration for human rights and the constitution	estado principios España razón derechos_humanos declaración intereses ciudadanos constitución vida clase consenso pacto nombre fuerzas universal dignidad acuerdos respeto rigor	State principles Spain reason human rights declaration interests citizens constitution life class consensus pact name forces dignity agreements respect rigor
Family	Talks about residence, family reunification and the concept of "arriago", or rootedness	extranjero residencia trabajo España visado situación importante caso permiso ano punto situación familiar reagrupación supuestos régimen sentido forma posibilidad modificación	foreigner residence work Spain visa situation important case permission year point situation family reunification suppose(assumption) regime sense form possibility modification
State Role	Deals with issues of government role, especially in the autonomous communities and in issues of security	referencia relación gobierno precepto materia contenido puesto estado sistema intervención seguridad social comunidades objeto correcta expresión votar contiene manifestar repito	reference relationship government precept material(subject) content position state system statement security social community object correct expression vote contain manifest(protest) repeat

Two frames focused on aspects of passing the reform bills. One focused on Consensus, and discussed the agreement and the need to pass a bill to reform the previous Foreigner's Law. The second, Amendment, often focused on if a parliamentary group would accept an amendment or not and was marked by phrases such as "There will be no difficulty accepting [the amendment]"[19].

Frame Occurrences Per Debate

Table 5.9 lists the average coverage of each topic per debate. By comparing how the averages shift over time, we can trace the development of different frames and how focus on certain aspects of the immigration issue shift over time. For example, in the December 16, 1999 debate in the plenary seating of the Senate, 8.34 percent of the average document would be dedicated to the frame of Borders.

There are two main divisions in the debate. The first occurred on December 16, 1999, when the Popular Party, through its parliamentary group, proposed over one hundred amendments to the bill previously approved by Congress. Since the Congress has to approve all Senate amendments, the debate that follows in the Congress largely concerns those issues.

The second division in the debates occurs on October 5, 2000. This is when the Popular Party, introduces a bill as the governing party to reform the bill passed in the previous legislature. This time period is marked by the absolute majority of the governing party, the Popular Party, as opposed to its simple majority it held in the previous legislature.

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[19]"No habría dificultad de aceptar"

Table 5.9 Topic Averages Per Debate

Time	Issue	Political Rights	Numbers	Border	Consensus	Punishment	Amendment	Human Rights	Family	State Role	Location
6/16/98	22.93%	22.25%	11.66%	3.21%	7.54%	2.60%	3.59%	5.94%	15.38%	4.91%	Congress
12/10/98	13.27%	14.43%	12.78%	6.67%	36.64%	0.95%	3.70%	3.37%	6.09%	2.11%	Congress
11/10/99	12.35%	15.43%	5.17%	2.39%	8.52%	17.40%	11.06%	1.83%	20.62%	5.22%	Committee (C)
11/15/99	17.96%	14.62%	8.74%	7.79%	23.85%	1.56%	2.56%	8.57%	8.70%	5.66%	Congress
12/16/99	11.22%	14.21%	2.29%	8.34%	38.43%	1.09%	5.38%	7.93%	8.93%	2.19%	Senate
12/22/99	11.94%	15.54%	8.55%	4.88%	26.05%	4.37%	3.01%	15.65%	5.64%	4.36%	Congress
10/5/00	31.76%	17.92%	3.62%	15.84%	10.63%	3.63%	1.44%	4.21%	7.86%	3.10%	Congress
11/6/00	19.52%	12.05%	2.28%	2.09%	12.37%	7.33%	2.18%	1.58%	30.75%	9.85%	Committee (C)
11/24/00	21.34%	29.62%	3.51%	5.06%	15.65%	3.02%	0.68%	4.04%	13.59%	3.50%	Congress
12/7/00	14.39%	20.51%	1.39%	4.75%	25.38%	8.66%	3.07%	0.40%	19.12%	2.32%	Committee (S)
12/14/00	16.18%	20.89%	4.09%	9.41%	19.60%	6.07%	3.00%	4.55%	13.53%	2.68%	Senate

All debates labeled Congress and Senate occurred in the plenary seating of those chambers. All committee debates where held in the Constitutional Committee of the respective chambers.

The frames that were identified by LDA analysis were largely in keeping with the literature, with the exception of a lack of a theme on economic rationales. While the Numbers topic does touch on issues of work and the revenue that regularized immigrants can bring into the social security system, it also focuses on the numbers of immigrants in the country and their numbers in the population. There is also no one topic that focuses on regularization. Rather, there are topics that touch upon aspects of it. Numbers discusses the numbers of people that it could affect, but Political Rights and Human Rights touch upon why regularizations are necessary for the promotion of the goals of the Spanish constitution and as beneficial to Spanish society. At a larger k, there does emerge topics that focus specifically on integration and work; however, a larger k creates multiple categories that are not semantically valid, and are not interpretable to the human reader.

One aspect is that is interesting is the fact that there are two categories where rights emerges as a significant issue. This is true in analyses as low as $k = 5$, indicating the strength of these associations. While there is overlap between the two categories, there has emerged a distinct focus for each. One category focuses on the Spanish constitution and the rights it assures for those inside the Spanish state. I have titled this frame Political Rights, to reflect its difference from the second category, which I have titled Human Rights. The Human Rights frame often invokes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and talks about the principles of human rights, the state's role in ensuring them, and the dignity of all. A visualization of the variation of each frame over time can be found in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 Average Use of Frames Over Time

Frame Ownership

Are there political parties, or parliamentary groups, that use some frames more than others? Table 5.9 shows the average coverage of each frame by parliamentary groups. It is clear that some groups favor some frames more than other groups. Issue is favored by the Catalan-CiU PG with a mean of 40.1 percent per document. There is a large gap between how evident this frame is in Catalan-CIU group's speeches and other groups. The next highest average use of this frame comes from the Catalan Agreement of Progress where this frame makes up 20.02 percent of their speeches on average. However, looking at the standard deviation displayed in parenthesis in Table 5.10, the Catalan-CIU also has the widest variation in use of this frame.

A similar pattern repeats with Borders, Human Rights, Family and State Role, albeit not as dramatically. The Canary Coalition, whose representatives hail from the Canary Islands, which are close to Africa and often deal with high flows of border crossers, unsurprisingly dedicates the largest proportion of its speeches to Borders. Their average use of this frame is at 18.64 percent compared to the second highest at 11.73 percent. Human Rights use is dominated by the leftist United Left at 17.1 percent, while the State Role frame use is driven by the Basque- PNV group. In both the Human Rights and State Role frame, outside of these two dominate groups usage is rather low. Interestingly, the Socialist group, made up of mainly the center-left PSOE party members, has the highest average in its speeches for Punishment. However, in looking through the corpus, the party is often arguing against changing the penal code to give harsher penalties to those who participate in human trafficking for sex work than other human traffickers, stating that the current penal code is sufficient.

Table 5.10 Mean of Topics by Parliamentary Groups

Group	Issue	Political Rights	Numbers	Borders	Consensus	Punishment	Amendment	Human Rights	Family	State Role
Catalan- CiU	40.15	8.36	2.84	0.37	24.42	5.51	1.2	1.23	12.72	3.2
	(23.13)	(9.03)	(4.05)	(0.74)	(25.53)	(12.6)	(2.62)	(3.31)	(10.59)	(4.39)
Canary Coalition	16.15	12.68	2.1	18.64	19.56	4.32	0.86	3.49	21	1.21
	(9.78)	(12.67)	(4.09)	(16.46)	(15.77)	(5.53)	(1.99)	(11)	(19.57)	(1.77)
Catalan Agreement	20.02	20.81	6.67	5.61	22.82	4.88	1.04	2.35	14.98	0.82
	(6.14)	(11.46)	(9.17)	(9.55)	(27.1)	(7.8)	(1.67)	(1.95)	(14.36)	(1.26)
United Federal Left	9.62	23.15	2.94	11.73	9.8	4.92	9.46	17.14	8.89	2.35
	(7.05)	(14.88)	(2.67)	(16.5)	(6.05)	(9.24)	(17.23)	(17.28)	(6.58)	(4.53)
Mixed Group	14.45	21.43	4.59	9	22.07	4.69	3.86	5.52	12.62	1.77
	(8.88)	(15.21)	(5.21)	(13.23)	(17.47)	(10.27)	(6.69)	(8.76)	(10.61)	(3.55)
Popular	12.97	21.66	1.84	2.99	14.75	6.48	6.11	2.71	28.18	2.3
	(9.99)	(17.67)	(2.84)	(6.15)	(13.94)	(9.63)	(11.77)	(6.09)	(24.95)	(5.3)
Socialist	13.43	14.92	11.67	1.64	17.58	13.66	4.79	3.24	17.41	1.66
	(10.08)	(17.55)	(19.59)	(2.72)	(17.78)	(21.14)	(10.4)	(6.9)	(18.3)	(3.41)
Basque-PNV	11.06	15.48	0.66	2.22	19.85	2.25	3.53	3.93	11.94	29.08
	(11.25)	(10.01)	(1.02)	(4.97)	(19.5)	(2.45)	(5.8)	(6.3)	(10.75)	(23.1)

Family is used predominantly by the Popular Group, which is made up of mainly members of the center-right Popular Party. However, one party does not drive the usage of theses frames as much as the Human Rights and State Role frames.

A one-way ANOVA was conducted in Stata to determine if the usage of each frame was different for speakers belonging to differing parliamentary groups. As noted above, members were combined into groups based on membership in an established parliamentary group. Groups that represented the same parties but had differing names in each chamber were combined under a common name. All groups, except for the Catalan Agreement on Progress, were represented in both chambers. There was a statistically significant difference between group usage of all frames as determined by an one-way ANOVA, except for Consensus (p=0.339) and Amendment (p=0.1406). Difference in usage of the frame Political Rights (p =0.0105) and Punishment (p =0.0408) were significant at the p<0.05 level. The rest of the frames were significant at the p <0.01 level.[20]

Discussion of Results

As noted earlier in this chapter, the debate on reform to the Foreigners Law between 1998 and 2000 falls into three distinct stages. The first covers the period of debate on the three proposition of law that were proposed by non-governmental members of the parliament. These three bills were later subsumed by one bill that was approved by the Congress of Parliament. However, once this bill went to the Senate, a large number of amendments were added to the document. While it passed the Senate in this new version, these new amendments were stripped when the bill was returned to Congress.

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[20] Issue, State Role, Numbers, Border were significant at the p<.000 level. For Family p=.0019 and for Human Rights p=0.001.

The third phase occurred in the VII Legislature, where the government introduced a new project bill. Here, the Popular Party, represented in Parliament by the Popular Group, had an absolute majority rather than a simple majority.

These stages and the institutional rules that shape them help explain some of the variation of frame usage over time. For example, Consensus makes up the largest proportion of speeches in the December 16, 1999 debate that occurred in the Senate. Here, opposing parties decried the attempt of the Popular Party to radically change the bill, arguing that the consensus that was reached in the Congress should stand. Except for the debates on June 16, 1998, and November 11, 1999, the Consensus frame makes up a higher than average proportion of text of the speeches given in the period

Numbers is high in the first two debates in Congress where parties are generally explaining their support (or opposition) of the bill. Issue, which covers what immigration is, is also high in the first debate. Speakers at this time set out their arguments, which largely include discussion on why the 1985 Foreigner's Law no longer applies. Joan Saura Laporto (IC-VE), from the GP Mixed Group, typifies this argument stating:

> Estamos hablando de iniciar un cambio de perspectiva una ruptura de las inercias con las que hasta ahora se han desarrollado las políticas relacionadas con el mundo de la inmigración; dejar de entender la inmigración como un problema fundamentalmente dejar de entender la inmigración como un problema de orden público de seguridad; ir más allá incluso de una visión de la inmigración basada en el supuesto choque de civilizaciones. Iniciemos un proceso que nos lleve a entender la inmigración como un factor de progreso y de cambio de nuestras sociedades como en definitiva ha sido siempre en la historia de la humanidad cualquier proceso migratorio.
>
> *We are talking of the start of a change of perspective, a rupture of the inertia with which has so far developed the policies relating to the subject of immigration; we are leaving the understanding of immigration as a fundamental problem of public order, of security; we are going beyond a vision of immigration based on the supposed clash of civilizations. We are beginning the process that will bring us to understand immigration as a factor of progress and of change of our society as it*

ultimately has always been in the history of mankind with any process of migration.

However, Issue remains higher than average throughout most of the debate in 2000, indicating that there is much more discussion regarding how to define immigration reform in the governmental bill versus the non-governmental bills.

The Bill proposed by the Popular Party government in 2000 has a slightly different debate structure. As it is a government bill, a Minister of the Government, specifically the Minister of the Interior, introduces it. He argues that the Foreigners Law as it stood after the 4/2000 reform is out of step with the EU when it comes to immigration issues. He then focuses on three issues in his introduction: integration, legal entry, and ending trafficking.

In general, the frame Numbers is lower in this part of the debate, although it does rise sharply on October 5, 2000, while the frame Family is generally higher. The Numbers frame usage seems to follow the institutional structure of how a bill is introduced in the Spanish parliament. Another category that seems to be related to the institutional structure of debates in the parliament is the Amendment frame as it is higher when it occurs within debates in committee.

The Border frame peaks in the November 6, 2000 debate that occurred in the Congressional Constitutional Committee. The increased focus on Borders follows the added emphasis the Minster of the Interior placed on ensuring the bill fit with in the wider European Framework. Yet the proportion of each speech that is dedicated to Borders tends to be above the total average for the frame in the debates that occur on the non-government bill. When the bill returned to the Congress on November 24, 2000, the Family and State Role frames peak.

The two rights frames follow different patterns in the corpus. The average document has higher proportion of its text from the Political Rights frame than the Human Rights frame. The Human Rights frame is at its highest on the December 22, 1999 debate. The Political Rights frame starts with a high frequency of use (22.25 percent) then stays between 14 and 15 percent until the Government bill in introduced. It is at its highest- almost 30 percent- when the debate returns to the Congress from the Constitutional Commission and then stays at 20 percent while it is debated in the Senate. Throughout most of the debates in the 2000, the Political Rights frames makes up a larger proportion than average in speeches, while this occurs in the 1998 and 1998 debates for the Human Rights frame.

CONCLUSION

The debate in the Spanish Parliament during 1998-2000 covers a variety of topics. Some of these frames are partisan in their usage; that is the frames feature more prominently in speeches given in by members of certain political groups. The rights frames, while used by all parties, make up the highest proportions of frames in statements given by left-leaning groups. However, in researching the corpus, while we can say that there is partisan speech, we cannot support hypothesis 2 as it focuses on pro- and anti-regularization groups. Unlike in the United States, the question in Spain was not if there were to be regularization, but what form it would take and how far it would go.

This was not the only policy solution discussed. Regarding the rights frames, many argued extending rights to any individual residing in Spain independently of their immigration or citizenship status. For example, Margarita Uría Etxebarría (EAJ-PNV) states:

> Se avanza en ellas en el reconocimiento de derechos que corresponden a todos los extranjeros con independencia de su situación administrativa como inherentes a su condición de personas. (6/16/98)

They are advancing in them [the three bill propositions] the recognition of the rights that pertain to all foreigners, regardless of their administrative status, as rights inherit to their conditions as persons.

Others, especially the Popular Party, contested this point of view. In arguing against the extension of all rights to immigrants regardless of their status, the Minster of the Interior (PP; 10/5/2000) argued:

Esta difuminación de la distinción entre residencia legal e ilegal dificulta claramente la aplicación de los mecanismos que el ordenamiento jurídico prevé para controlar los flujos migratorios y para asegurar la legalidad de entrada y permanencia de los extranjeros en territorio español.

This blurring of the distinction between legal and illegal residence clearly hampers the implementation of the mechanisms that the law provides to control migratiory flows and to ensure the legality of entry and residence of foreigners in Spanish territory.

In regards, to hypothesis 3, it does appear that frames and issue definitions are used strategically; however, this is less evident in the LDA analysis then it is by examining the corpus. The Popular Party essentially "loses" the first round of reform in 1999 as their amendments are voted down. All parties in this first period stress rights over economic or other variables. Consensus is also stressed as the bill did not arise from the government and requires multiple parties to support its passage. When the second round of reform occurs, the institutional structure of the Spanish parliament automatically favors the passage of the government's bill.

Yet, when the corpus is examined, what emerges is an attempt by the Popular Party to expand their coalition by focusing on crime, trafficking, and arguing that the current law does not meet standards imposed by EU treaties. Even with the institutional

structure assuring them of a win, the Party still uses its platform in the debates to attempt to widen its coalition.

The opposition parties however, appear to want to contain the issue. Calling it a counter-reform, the spokesperson for the Basque Parliamentary Group, Margarita Uría Etxebarría (EAJ-PNV) states that "Casi nunca se habla por el grupo mayoritario en términos humanitarios o de derechos; siempre la alarma social y el tremendismo" (*Almost never does the majority group speak in terms of humanitarianism or of rights; always of social alarm and alarmism.)* (10/5/2000). The spokesperson for the Catalan Greens in the Mixed Parliamentary group, had a similar argument, alleging that Popular Party had misrepresented the previous bill. Joan Saura Laporta argues that in public, the Popular Party had been suggesting that the bill did not contain border controls, mechanisms for combating human trafficking, and that the Party attempted to connect immigrants with crime (Saura Laporta (IC-EV) 10/15/200).

Hypothesis 4, which states that LDA topic modeling can be used to study how frames are used over time, party, and location, is partially supported. LDA did identify semantically valid topics, yet as in the U.S. case I had several shortcomings in providing understanding into how these frames were used. The biggest finding of this work is the lack of importance of work or economics. Most work on regularizations focuses on the Spanish (and often the Greek, Portuguese and Italian) regularizations as economic regularizations, yet the analysis here suggests that economics plays a secondary role. This is not to say that economics is not mentioned. In the Debate on November 10, 1999, Matilde Fernández Sanz (PSOE) and Margarita Uría Etxebarría (EAJ-PNV) make the argument that immigration is needed to maintain Social Security in the face of Spain's declining birth rates and that regularization will bring in increased tax revenue. This finding complicates the classification schemes used in previous research (Baldwin-

Edwards and Kraler 2009b, 40; Levinson 2005b), and suggests that the divide between economic and humanitarian regularizations is much smaller than previously suggested.

Figure 5.3 Immigration Legislation Timeline in Spain

	Year	
		Foreigner's Law (Ley de Extranjería) first passed
First Regularization Program	1985	
		Schengen Agreement signed leading to the removal of border checks between certain European nations.
Spain joins European Community	1986	
	1990	Schengen Convention supersedes Schengen Agreement creating common visa policy and abolishes border controls
Second Regularization Program	1991	
	1992	Maastricht Treaty signed creating European Union
Third Regularization Program	1996	
		Start of VI Legislature (1996-2000); PP has a simple majority
Treaty of Amsterdam signed, revised freedom of movement within EU	1997	
	1998-1999	Bill Propositions introduced by CiU, IU and Mixed Group
As part of Treaty of Amsterdam, the Schengen Convention is incorporated into EU law.	1999	

Figure 5.3, cont.

		4/2000 Organic Law passed (January)
El Ejido attacks (February)		
	2000	General Elections held (March 12)
Forth regularization program (March – July) 2000		
		April, Start of VII legislature (2000-2004); PP gains absolute majority
PP reform passed (8/2000) on December 23, 2000.		
	2001	Ecuadorian regularization (January-June 2001)
Regularization from 8/2000 (those rejected from previous from February-June, all others, June), 2001		

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation was to answer why and when certain policy solutions are chosen by focusing on a specific policy area (immigration) and a specific solution (regularizations). Starting from the proposition that policy entrepreneurs are boundedly rational actors that use frames and discourses to connect policy solutions to policy problems and broader belief systems, the proceeding chapters focused on how to trace this effect over time. I made the argument that in order for a policy solution to be chosen at a certain time, it requires a discursive framework that defines what the problem is, explains why the offered solution will fix the problem, and connects the policy and solution to larger political belief system.

This dissertation started with a literature review, covering the theoretical and empirical framework that underpins this research. First, it reviews the immigration policy literature, from where I draw several alternate hypotheses that could be offered to explain policy choice in this area. Next, I review the public policy literature, focusing on how shifting issue definitions can create opportunities for coalition broadening. By shifting an issue definition to focus on a previously ignored aspect of a policy, it creates the possibility of new allies (Baumgartner and Jones 2005; 2009). For example, by focusing on how unauthorized status can lead to a violation of civil rights, those supporting regularization can then bring civil rights organizations and legal aid groups into their coalition. Those that want to restrict immigration can focus on immigration as security issue, incorporating law enforcement and anti-crime organizations into their coalition.

In order to empirically test the idea that frames and discourse matter in policy choice, I first collected information on immigration regularizations in fourteen European countries and the United States. This information was entered into a dataset that included

demographic, political, and economic variables for the years 1986-2012. Using policy choice as the dependent variable, Chapter 3 used a logistic multi-level mixed effect model, also referred to as a hierarchical generalized linear model. The fixed effect part of this model tested within-country variations over time, while the random effects model allowed for testing of systematic variation, or variation across countries. This model was run both with and without multiple imputation to replace missing values. It was also run with and without the U.S.

This chapter demonstrated two main findings. First, as indicated by the random intercepts, it is unlikely that there exists a systematic effect on the passage of regularizations across countries. Secondly, the models failed to return statistically significant results, indicating that a change in the independent variables did not lead to a change in the dependent variable.

These results provided support for my proposition that discourse plays a role in explaining policy choice. However, analyzing discourse is a complex undertaking. I rely on the Discursive Institutionalism (DI) framework to structure my case studies in Chapters 4 and 5. DI places "the focus on ideas as explanatory of change, often with a demonstration that such ideas do not fit predictable 'rational' interest, are under-determined by structural factors, and/or represent a break with historical paths" (Schmidt 2011, 54). Combining this framework with the public policy literature, I see ideas as issue definitions and frames, and their use by actors as ways to direct attention towards one policy solution over another.

In order to empirically test the effects of frames on policy choice, I utilized methods familiar in natural language processing research, including content analysis and unsupervised topic models. The method used, latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic modeling, assumes that underlying a set of documents is a number of latent topics. Words

are drawn from these topics, and the frequency of words and their co-occurrence leads to a probabilistic model that predicts what proportion of a document is drawn from each topic (Blei et al. 2003; Blei 2012). Given a specific number of topics, k, LDA uncovers the latent topics in the corpora providing a way to examine large amounts of text for reoccurring frames.

Using this method had a twofold purpose. First, the goal was to trace the development and use of frames over time. Second, I wanted to test if this particular method of content analysis was useful in tracing frames. Overall, the results suggested that LDA can be used to discover frames; however, several caveats are in order regarding its use.

After running the LDA analysis, it was clear that institutional rules governing a speech affect the resulting topics one gets. With U.S. Congressional debates, there were large numbers of speeches that were short or dedicated to procedural matters. These short speeches, even if they were about substantive issues, created very low frequencies of all topics that were not mentioned in that short speech, driving the average frequency of a topic downwards. Furthermore, having longer speeches also seems to have an effect as the number of topics, k, is increased. With both corpora, increasing the k has several effects. One, the topics become more finely grained; second, the frequency of occurrence drops; and third, the number of categories that do not have semantic validity rises. The increase in semantically invalid frames appears to happen at a lower k in the Spanish dataset; however, this dataset also has many fewer observations than the U.S. case, which may skew the results.

Yet, overall, the LDA analysis was useful in identifying topics used in the debates that might be overlooked by human coding. With the Spanish corpora, this revealed two

frames pertaining to rights. With the US, this revealed one frame for asylum and another that focused on refugees.

Coding speeches according to party and, in the U.S. case, voting, allowed for a test of whether some frames were more popular among members of one political party than another. The LDA topic model codings also revealed cultural differences between the two nations. For example, while both included frames that touched on the broader theme of human rights, in the U.S. this focused on preventing discrimination, while Spain focused on ensuring political and general human rights for all. Furthermore, in the US, issues of identification were more prominent due to the lack of national identity cards, an item that already exists in most European nations.

There was also more focus on international treaties and multilevel governance in the Spanish corpus. This focus was driven by the European Union and the limitations it placed on Spanish policymaking. Interestingly, both corpora included frames that dealt with border issues and border crossers, while much less of the debate was spent on visa over-stayers.

The shortcomings of the LDA topic model are apparent when it comes to how the frames were used and understanding the effect of their variation over time on the passage of the bills. It is important to understand the institutional structure that governs the debate and the vote and incorporate this into any analysis. Despite the institutional rules however, we see frames used very strategically in the Spanish case, even when the government party has an absolute majority and therefore is assured of a "win." Here, the research shows that the government as the losers in the previous reform effort in 2000 still attempt to expand their coalition through framing, while the winners try to maintain the focus on the issue that were used in the previous debates, even though institutional rules guarantee a positive vote.

Another important finding was the lack of focus on economic issues in the Spanish case. While the economy was mentioned, it was often as an afterthought, or in conjunction with the human rights frame. In other words, it was presented as something we should do on the basis of human rights, but also because it will provide an economic benefit. For example, MP Margarita Uría Etxebarría ((EAJ-PNV) 11/10/99) states that "the reform undertaken not only meets humanitarian goals or that of justice, but also reflects an economic necessity"[21] before she discusses the tax revenue that legalized immigrants would bring in.

Contributions

As with all dissertations, this project aimed to make several contributions to the literature and the field of political science. First, I brought together the literatures in the fields of immigration policy, policy studies, and comparative politics to use Discursive Institutionalism to study why immigrant regularizations were chosen. While there have been studies about this policy choice before, most were written from the standpoint of policy papers and focused on either classification or evaluation of the programs without a theoretical framework. As such, this work contributes the first explicit formal modeling analysis on immigration regularization that compares influencing factors across time and space. In order to create this model, I compiled an original dataset that included information on economics, demographics, political structures, and partisanship of 15 countries.

Secondly, I applied the LDA topic modeling technique, familiar in natural language processing, to preform content analysis on immigration debates. While this model has become more popular recently in political science (for example, Nowlin 2015),

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[21] "La reforma emprendida no sólo responde a objetivos humanitarios o de justicia también obedece a una necesidad económica."

this is the first time it has been used to analyze legislative debates on immigration policy in two countries and the first time it has been used to analyze text in the discursive intuitionalist framework. This also required converting text that was stored as pdfs in the United States to computer readable text.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK

This dissertation, while furthering our understanding of policy choice, indicates possibilities for future work. First, while LDA is useful in identifying topics, it needs to be further combined with human coding to understand how the frames are used. LDA topic modeling provides a wonderful overview of topic usage, and would prove valuable in creating a coding dictionary; however, natural language processing is not currently developed enough to distinguish between a speaker using a frame or, for example, attacking someone else for using that frame. While it provides an overview, this overview must be combined with an in-depth analysis of the corpus in order to fully understand the strategic use of frames and issue definitions.

Second, this dissertation lacks a counterfactual. Here, the U.S. case provides an opportunity for exploring immigrant regularizations further. In the United States, there have been several attempts to pass further comprehensive immigration reform during the Bush and Obama administrations. While these attempts have passed one chamber, so far no bill has passed both houses of Congress. By extending the analysis, we can see if new frames emerge or older frames disappear, and thereby gain further insight into policy choice. Another aspect that was overlooked was the role of the media in their reporting of these debates. Did the mass media focus on similar frames? Did their focus follow the legislative focus, or was it the other way around? Did the media and legislators deem the same frames as important? These considerations point the way to expand the research presented here.

Appendix: List of Abbreviations

IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act
PG	Parliamentary Groups
PM	Parliamentary Member
CiU	Convergence and Union (Convergència I Unió)
IU	United Left (Izquierda Unida)
PP	Popular Party (Partido Popular)
PSOE	Socialist Worker's Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español
UI	United Left (Izquierda Unida)
PNV	Basque National Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco)
CC	Canary Coalition (Coalición Canaria)
BNG	Galego Nationalist Block (Bloque Nacionalista Galego)
HB	Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna)
ERC	Republican Left of Catalyuna (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya)
EA	Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna)
UV	Valencia Union (Unió Valenciana)
UPN	Union of the People of Navarre (Unión del Pueblo Navarro)
PDNI	Democratic Party of the New Left (Partido Democrático de la Nueva Izquierda),
ICV	Initiative for Catalonia (Iniciativa per Cataluny)
PIL	Independent Party of Lanzarote (Partido Independiente de Lanzarote)
PAR	Argonese Party (Partido Argonese)
PA	Andalusian Party (Partido Andalucista)
ICV	Green Initative for Catalonya (Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds)
CHA	Aragonese Union (Chunta Aragonesista)
BOCG	Official Bulletin (Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generalas)
NPF	Narrative Policy Framework
LDA	latent Dirichlet allocation

US	United States
DI	Discursive Institutionalism
SCIRP	Select Commission on Immigration Reform Policy
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
UK	United Kingdom

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