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EOtdf I BCtH I At  945  Poss  DUPE  
PA GE  -­01  PARIS  20012  272020Z  
84 ACTION  EUR  20  

P R 27l858Z AUG 68 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHOC PRIORITY 5492 INFO AMEM8ASSY BONN AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASS 'f MOSCOW AMEMBASSY ROME USMISSION NATO USUN NEW YOPK 1261 
C Q ~J F I 0 E P4 T I ,a, L P AP J S 2 n0 I 2 
SUBJg QUA! VIEWS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
lo QUA! DEP DIR FDR SOVIET/IEE AFFAIRS (ANDREANI) PROVIDED FOL~ LOWING PRELJMINARY VIES ON CZECH ' SITUATION AFTER MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE& 
(A! ACCORDING TO WH~T WAS MADE PUBLIC1 CZECHS CAME OUT SURPRISINGLY ~/EL!_ FPrv-1 THEIR 080.Ft.Lr !F Ol'J~ COULO .A.Ss-u~·~E-~~oRST__ ~~AS .OV[Ru FGR sc~rcTS. oav1ous IMPORTANT GAIN WAS CO~TINUED OF PRESENCE OF TROOPS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR CERTAIN PERI001 WITH 
LEGITIMACY GIVEN BY CZECH AGREEMENT AND INSTRucTIONS TO CZECH MILITARY TO TO COOPERATE. 
(Bl PRICE PAID BY CZECHS WAS NOT VERY HEAVY JUDGING BY APPEAR­
ANCES1 ALTHOUGH BIG QUESTIONS REMAINED1 ESPECIALLY (I) WHAT WOULD BE POSITION OF CERTftIN LEADERS (DUBCEK AND HIS ASSOCIATESS L E A D E R S AB R 0 A D L I K E S'I K AND H A J EK 1 " NE W L I B E R A L S u E L E C T E D BY PARTY ouqING OCCUPATION): ( 2) HHAT WOULD BE FATE OF SCHEDULED 
PARTY CONGRESS: {31 MOST !MPOQTANT1 COULD LEADERS KEEP CONFI­
DENCE OF PEOPLE WHILF sovrEr TROOPS SJ UATTEO IN THEIR COUNTRY· ANDPEANI THOUGHT PRINCIPAL SOVIET AIM ALL ALONG WAS TO DIVORCE DUBCEY FROM THE REAL LIREPALS·uCOULD THEY DO THIS NOW WITHOUT 
DECLASSIFIED 
E.O 13292, Sec. 3.4 
«.1~!~~;pt Guidelines By~'.'nARA, Date:!Hi·ofo 
• Department of State 
CQtJF I BENT I r1<L 
PAGE 02 PARIS 20012 272020Z 
. AROUSING CZECH RESISTA rJ CE? PuT ANOTHER WAY, ONCE LIRE~ALIZATION WAS STARTED COULD IT BE CONTAlNED·-WITH OR WITHOUT SOVIET TROOPS? 
(() IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT SOVIETS HAD ACHIEVED WHAT THEY SET 
OUT TO DO WHEN THEY SENT TROOPS IN1 IF COMMUNIQUE WAS GOOD EVIDENCE-~ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING SEVERE LOSSES SOVIETS TOOK POLITICALLY. THEREFORE IT SEEMED PLAUSIBLE THAT ONCE AGAIN SOVIETS MISJUDGED T~:EIR CAPACITY TO RUN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AN6 IN TH I S SENSE I ( AM 0 NG 01 HE F·; ~:i l r-: l L. I TAR Y I NT ERVEN T I 0 N HAD T 0 BE CONSIDERED MAJOR SCV l t. Y Lh f.IJk ., 
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(0) ANDREANI VERY INTEREST~O IN WHAT WENT ON IN SOVIET POLIT­
BUREAU DURING CZECH CRISIS AND SAID FOR LONGaRANGE PLANNING, 
GDF WANTED KNOW ALL IT COULD ABOUT WHICH LEADERS FAVORED HAR0° 
LINE POLICY AND WHO WAS ON TOP NOWo HE REMARKDED ON RUMORED 
ABSENCE OF MUCH OF LEADERSHIP DURING WEEK BEFORE INTERVENTION: 

NOTING THAT KOSYGIN HAD BEEN OUT OF TOWN OFTEN LATELY BEFORE IMPORTANT DECISIONS• HE ALSO ASKED US VIEWS1 CITING PRESS STORIES . PURPORTEDLY FROM US SOURCES ABOUT SPLIT IN LEADERSHIP1 EMBOFF C1T ED P AR A 6 0 F ST ATE 2 2 ·; 8 ~' 8 A ND PROM I SE D P R 0 VI DE UR T HE R I NF 0 I F Av AIL ABLE 0 ~N_Q_B_f.AlU_. __$ AI[~ _L:__Q~LCAL __Sl).P_pos.LTJ.ON . WOULD .-BE.-,THA T. HARD• bJ_~£8.S__J•U..GHLJ-d.AY...E_~J£..t1EURl\RY.-S£J.BAC~.1 __ f3_U_T HARD TO JUDGE NOW~ (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC FUNCTION PHILIPPE MALAUD ALSO BROUGHT UP KREMLIHOLGY WITH POLCOUNS AUG 271 SAYING GOF VERY INTERESTED IN FFFECT OF CRISIS UPON SOVIET . LEADERSHIP FOR PLANNING FUTURE RELATIONS. ~NOREAN! MAY BE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW THIS PARTICULARLY CLOSELY NOW•) 
2° IN SUM1 ANDREANI'S INITIAL VIEW AFTER COMMUNIQUE WAS THAT WE c;.QUL D H_A__Y._E_ Exp E cTE;___Q_tj u_c.H. 1iOR sE, AND THAT IF cZECH LE ADE Rs co ULD KEEP SUPPORTO~-EOPLE THERE WAS RE ASON FOR OPTIMISM THAT SIT"• 
UATION WOULD START WORKING OUTo HE ADDED THAT~ OF COURSE, WITH SOVIET TROOPS THERE, WE MUST EXPECT MORE CAUTIOUS POLICY IN PRAGUE, ESPECIALLY AS 'coNCERNS FOREIGN ~FFAiRso 
GP~3 SHRIVER . 
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