WORLD ORDER POWER & STRATEGY

TEXAS

National Security Network

University of Texas

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Note from the Publisher

Speaking at a *War on the Rocks* party in the spring of 2015, my friend Richard Fontaine, the president of the Center for a New American Security said:

> Who would have thought nearly two years ago that the world needed another online publication on defense and foreign policy — much less one that was alcohol-themed? Well, it turns out that's exactly what the world needed.

It is true that the case for *War on the Rocks* was not self-evident. There were far more reasons not to do it than to do it and far more factors working against its success than for it. But when it comes to this new journal, the *Texas National Security Review*, the case for it could not be stronger and the gaps it seeks to fill could not be easier to see.

The chair of our editorial board, Francis Gavin, has ably laid out what our journal seeks to accomplish, especially in its scholarly activities. And the chair of our policy and strategy board and the chancellor of the University of Texas System, Adm. (ret.) William McRaven, has set the agenda for our overall effort. As the journal's publisher, I would like to explain why we need another journal focused on national and international security, how our project will be different from what you have seen before, and what we aim to accomplish.

In an era of transition, change, and instability, it is more vital than ever that our greatest scholars and our greatest leaders engage in deeper, "big think" conversations with one another — across disciplinary and professional boundaries — to solve the pressing global problems of our day. The *Texas National Security Review* is an ambitious step towards realizing that goal.

The refereed journal is one of the pillars of the scholarly profession (the others being the PhD program and the tenure system). We all know the usual complaints about these journals: The review process takes too long and the publication process even longer. And what is going on with Reviewer #2 anyway?

But there is something more troubling about them — at least to me: They are the key components in a system that creates malign incentives for rising scholars. For at least the first six years of their academic careers — perhaps the most intellectually fertile of their lives — scholars are required to dedicate large amounts of their time to the production of written works destined only to be read by small circles of their academic peers due to the way in which journals are edited and marketed as well as the style of

writing they demand. In the fields relevant to our purposes — which have a profound bearing on our security, power, and prosperity — every article that follows this well-worn path is a lost opportunity for public engagement, education, and influence. Should a junior scholar prioritize the latter type of engagement through written work, it is treated as something apart from their job and may even come at the expense of career prospects.

Must it be either/or? Must the choice be so stark? I do not believe it must.

I believe scholarly work can be accessible, useful, and interesting for policymakers and practitioners while serving a successful academic career.

I believe scholars can do cutting edge work in their own fields while speaking to scholars of other disciplines and addressing their concerns and participating in their debates.

I believe journals can be published, printed, marketed, and shared like other publications.

I believe policymakers and national security practitioners can engage alongside the refereed work of scholars in the same publication and that doing so creates something that is more than the sum of its parts.

And I believe it can all be done without sacrificing the rigor and credibility that is so important — rightfully — to advancing and communicating scholarly knowledge.

Perhaps more importantly, other people — as well as institutions — also believe these things. You will find the editorial board of the *Texas National Security Review* is filled with giants and rising stars of political science, history, and law. Our first issue, which you hold in your hands today, includes original work by scholars doing the most exciting and useful research in their respective disciplines and across disciplines. What's more, we have attracted the support of an elite group of retired military leaders and former (and likely future) senior officials who are eager to help us bridge the scholar-policymaker/practitioner gap.

Finally, one institution in particular merits special mention here: the University of Texas System, which — under McRaven's leadership — has made this all possible through a deliberate and long-term investment. This simply would not be possible without the support of a major educational institution and I am eternally grateful to be working with the University of Texas System and its eight universities.

So, please enjoy this first issue of the *Texas National Security Review*. And if you find value in what we are doing, please get involved and visit our website, tnsr.org.

Ryan Evans *is the publisher of the* Texas National Security Review. *He is also the founder, CEO, and editor-in-chief of* War on the Rocks.

TNSR: Who We Are, What We Do, and Why You Should Care

Francis J. Gavin, PhD

The Texas National Security Review launches today. What do you need to know about this ambitious project aimed at changing the way we generate policy-relevant and policy-accessible knowledge about the world's toughest challenges?

Today, we launch a new journal and I am honored to serve as the chair of its editorial board. The goal of the *Texas National Security Review* (*TNSR*) is to become the intellectual home to a growing global, interdisciplinary network of scholars working on questions of foreign policy, international relations, and national and international security. With generous and deliberate support from the University of Texas, this journal seeks the best, most innovative scholarship that transcends disciplines and speaks to a wider world. Over time, we hope TNSR will become the go-to source for scholars, decision-makers, military and government practitioners, and concerned citizens from around the world thinking about questions of war and peace.

This journal is animated by four core principles:

1. **Questions of war and peace are of fundamental importance.**

International conflict, competition, and cooperation shape the world that we live in. War has been both a great scourge on humanity as well as a driver of historical change, for both ill and good.

The profound consequences of war unfold along a wide spectrum, from heart-wrenching individual tragedies to the very structure and shape of the modern state and the global economy.

The study of war and peace goes far beyond assessing the tactics of the battlefield or understanding the diplomacy between capitals: It would be impossible, for example, to comprehend a variety of crucial issues, from modern medicine and public health, technology, finance, accounting, taxation, literacy, mass education, race and gender relations — to say nothing of how humans move about, what they eat and wear, and how they communicate with each other — without reference to war. Most national cultures, including literature, music, visual art, and even language, are suffused with reference to or inspiration from conflict. War and peace challenge and shape our core beliefs, our ethics, and our sense of identity. Still, despite great intellectual effort, we know far less about the causes, conduct, and consequences of war and peace than we'd like.

Over time, the questions surrounding conflict and cooperation have become even more complicated and consequential. Civil war, clashes driven by scarcity and environmental change, irregular conflict, information attacks, and terrorism have joined great power competition as pressing concerns. New technologies and new domains alter how and where conflict takes place. The power of norms, culture, and institutions to shape outcomes is recognized if not fully understood. The shadow of nuclear apocalypse hovers over international politics, surpassed only by the fear of some yet unknown pathogen-wreaking havoc.

TNSR recognizes and appreciates that the scope of study surrounding war and peace is extraordinarily wide-ranging, the questions endless, and the answers of great interest and consequence to the world beyond the ivory tower.

2. **Scholarship on these questions should strive to be rigorous, creative, and cumulative.**

What are the best ways to examine and explore crucial questions surrounding war and peace? To succeed, our scholarship must be held to the highest standards of rigor and excellence. *TNSR* seeks to go far beyond the world of punditry and to encourage work that generates powerful and consequential questions, employs clear and convincing research designs, and produces innovative insights. *TNSR* also recognizes the benefits of divergent communities of scholars, from different intellectual backgrounds and traditions, engaging in rigorous debate and cross-fertilizing ideas. Furthermore, style matters. It is hard for important ideas to be influential if few people read or understand the writing.

We also recognize that achieving these goals is not easy. There are different views of what constitutes rigor, impact, style, and creativity in scholarship. Even cumulating knowledge is hard. Despite over a century of effort and scores of books, scholars still cannot agree on what caused World War I. Even when consensus on such matters is elusive, however, *TNSR* believes rigorous debate and discussion has

great merit and makes everyone smarter.

TNSR is agnostic as to method and discipline, as long as the tools used to answer the question are appropriate and employed rigorously and honestly. We are not, however, interested in methodological prowess or in theory generation for the sake of itself. Archival work in scores of government repositories is beside the point if the issue examined is unimportant or if the findings are buried in jargon. Certain questions lend themselves more clearly to certain approaches. Quantitative analysis may be crucial to examine international financial flows. On questions surrounding nuclear weapons, where the Ns we truly care about are 9, 2, and 0, regressions for their own sake may hold less appeal. In other words, methods and research design are tools to identify important questions and to try to answer them the best one can. They should not be ends in themselves. Our authors will have succeeded when their arguments and evidence engage and enlighten those who do not share their methodological and disciplinary preferences and backgrounds.

In the end, we will not be the final arbiters of what constitutes great scholarship: over time, our readers and the wider world will determine *TNSR's* value. A richer, deeper understanding of important questions surrounding war and peace will be our measure of success.

3. **Our work should confront big questions of great concern to a larger public and be written in a way that is accessible to them.**

In the pages of our sister publication, *War on the Rocks*, many voices from the national and international security communities have talked about ways for scholars and thinkers to engage different audiences and communities, to confront questions of great interest and consequence in ways that reach and influence those beyond the ivory tower. There can be an unfortunate tendency in academic scholarship to ask small-bore questions and to write for "inside baseball" audiences (see principle 4). *TNSR* seeks scholarship on war and peace that go beyond these limits. We will also publish, in a separate section, insights and provocations from policymakers, military leaders, and others outside of the academic bubble.

That being said, we are not unaware of the potential pitfalls of a devotion to policy relevance. It is not the role of scholars to curry favor with governments or important people or institutions or to advise them on day-to-day decisions.

Many of the most important issues surrounding war and peace have little to do with daily grind policy, such as shifting demographic patterns, slow developing but critical shifts in national and international economic circumstances, and the impact of new technologies. Great scholarship can provide longer temporal and chronological reaches, more global and comparative national approaches, and broader topical horizons. We do not seek to court historians or scholars using these pages to get a job on Capitol Hill or in this or the next administration. Good work will challenge deeply held beliefs and assumptions. The best scholarship is often unpopular to those in power and makes people and institutions uncomfortable. *TNSR* does believe, however, that scholarship should be public-minded, policy-accessible, and engage issues and audiences beyond universities. War and peace are too important to be discussed and debated in a manner that appeals only to the professorate.

4. **The current institutional structure for understanding issues of war and peace is not performing as well as it should.**

Few would contest the importance of rigorous, accessible, relevant, and innovative scholarship on questions of war and peace. Why then do we need a new journal?

TNSR is motivated both by a challenge and an opportunity.

The challenge: It is our belief that the way universities allocate resources, incentives, and support to teaching and producing scholarship on issues of conflict, competition, and cooperation is sub-optimal. To understand why, reflect upon the role that disciplines play in universities, the function that journals play within disciplines, and how these factors influence the incentive structure for scholarship. Consider the two disciplines that have, in the past, been seen as responsible for studying and teaching about war and peace: history and political science. The story is discouraging.

Academic history departments have all but abandoned serious scholarship on the causes, course, and consequences of war. If you doubt this, take some time to look at the most "prestigious" academic history departments — say, the top 15 in the United States — and count how many professors are working on what one might consider issues of international conflict, competition, and cooperation. Even if you were to take the broadest definition — perhaps a scholar whose work focused on "sports tourism in the 1920s" — the numbers would be small compared to other subjects, with many large departments having no tenured faculty working on these issues. Examine the handful of

professors who do work on these issues in these departments, then ask — how many are under the age of 60? Are you confident their university will replace them with a scholar working on similar issues when they retire? Next, make a list of the scholars you think are doing the best historical work on war and peace. Are they in departments of history in major research universities? Or are they employed by schools of public policy, centers for international affairs, and even political science departments?

The discipline of political science has done far better, especially the sub-fields of international relations and comparative politics, where talented scholars of all ages fill departments and teach interesting courses. The narrow concerns of the discipline, however, often burden this scholarship. An obsession with methods and theory for their own sake, inaccessibility and jargon-laden prose, efforts to mimic economics and physics, and other shortcomings too often plague political science scholarship. Those outside the discipline might wonder if the overall contribution made by political science to general understanding of issues of war and peace has been relatively modest, given the amount of human capital invested.

Not all observers will agree with these assessments, and we encourage you to prove us wrong, either in the pages of *TNSR* or more established disciplinary outlets. To see where you stand, perform the following task: Look over the articles published by the intellectual gate-keepers — the leading disciplinary journals in both history and political science — over the past few years. If you find their offerings to consistently provide rigorous, engaging, compelling, accessible insights into important questions of war and peace, and leave you saying "more of this please," then TNSR may not be for you. If you think we can and should do better as a community, we welcome your help, guidance, and submissions.

This brings me to the opportunity: we hope *TNSR* will become the outlet for those who want to see their disciplines do better on principles 1 through 3. But we passionately believe questions of war and peace should engage disciplines and methods beyond history and political science. Economics, anthropology, psychology, law, public health — the list of disciplines whose insights bear on conflict, competition, and cooperation is long. Scholars from any discipline who share these principles should feel welcome in the pages of *TNSR*. In fact, one might imagine these principles animating a new way of organizing research, teaching, and public outreach in higher education around questions of war and peace, a field perhaps devoted to international history, strategy, and statecraft. One step at a time, however....

We recognize that what we propose will be difficult. We expect to make many mistakes along the way. We seek your advice, your guidance, your participation. Most of all, we count on your support for the mission to generate and disseminate innovative, rigorous, accessible, and influential scholarship on the critical issues around war and peace. ⌗

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
The Scholar

This section is dedicated to publishing the work of scholars. Our aim is for articles published in this journal to end up on university syllabi and desks from Washington to Tokyo, and to be cited as foundational research and analysis on world affairs.

World Order: Many-Headed Monster or Noble Pursuit?

John Bew, PhD

The pursuit of world order has taken many forms in the last 100 years of Anglo-American statecraft, and its terms have been bitterly contested.

There will be no day of days then when a new world order comes into being. Step by step and here and there it will arrive, and even as it comes into being it will develop fresh perspectives, discover unsuspected problems and go on to new adventures. No man, no group of men, will ever be singled out as its father or founder. For its maker will be not this man nor that man nor any man but Man, that being who is in some measure in every one of us. ...The new order will be incessant; things will never stop happening, and so it defies any Utopian description.

H. G. Wells, *The New World Order* (1940)[1]

H.G. Wells once said that civilization is a race between education and catastrophe. His thought is applicable to hemispheric relations. With common dedication to the highest ideals of mankind, including shared assumptions for a world at peace, freedom and progress, there is no insurmountable impediment to fruitful cooperation, save only insufficiency in mutual understanding.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the South American Trip, March 8, 1960[2]

... The President read passages from H.G. Wells ... [He] said nations must have great ideas or they cease to be great. They talked about what happened to England and France [in 1940] and that peoples' greatness has to be extra-dimensional and move beyond themselves. The question is whether we do what we need to both abroad and in the ghettos. If we just go to the ghettos and let go abroad, apart from the destruction that might come from a war, we might destroy ourselves. [Theodore] Roosevelt talked about it as the white man's burden. Both of these people [Wells and Roosevelt] were searching for that same feeling that people need.

Notes of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Henry Kissinger), Washington, November 5, 1969, 7pm[3]

The pursuit of something called "world order" has been an almost ever-present feature of Western — more specifically, American and British — statecraft for at least 100 years. It is embedded in a discourse about international affairs that can be traced back to the late 19th century, when Britain became increasingly conscious of the fragility of its empire, and the United States began to recognize the full extent of its potential power. Notions of regional or international order date further back than that and have long had a central place in conceptions of European statecraft, since the Treaty of Westphalia at least. But, the pursuit of world order speaks to a higher objective than the pursuit of the national interest or the mere preservation of stability and security in one's neighborhood.

All versions of world order are, to some extent, aspirational and visionary. They express a wish to guide the international future towards a more desirable destination. This is obviously true of more idealized versions of world order, some of which have gone so far as to envisage a future utopia in which humanity is unified under one law, war is abolished, and reason prevails in the governance of man (seen in the work of H.G. Wells, for example). But, it also applies to more avowedly "realist" thinking on world order, which seeks "co-evolution" among nation states or great civilizational blocs as a better means to preserve international harmony, while eschewing "universalism" (in the alternative vision of Henry Kissinger).[4] Either way, the historical record suggests that one's view of world order is inseparable from one's worldview. It reveals the beholder's hope for how the world *should* or *could* be, rather than simply *how it is*.

The pursuit of world order has taken many forms in the last 100 years of Anglo-American statecraft, and its terms have been bitterly contested. It

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1 H. G. Wells, *The New World Order: Whether It Is Attainable, How It Can Be Attained, and What Sort of World a World at Peace Will Have to Be* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940).

2 *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), 88.

3 "Notes of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," Louis J. Smith and David H. Herschler, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972* (November 5, 1969): 142-3. Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d43.

4 This is a central theme of Henry Kissinger's *On China* (New York: Penguin, 2011).

has been used as shorthand for a vast range of potential scenarios: from a unified "world state," governed by a single supranational institution, to a balance of power in which the strongest prevail. Somewhere between these two poles sits the idea of "liberal international order" — the precise terms of which are much contested today. This essay does not seek to establish a typology between these various definitions, or to place them on an idealist-realist spectrum. The fluidity of the foreign policy debate, and the changing positions of those engaged in it, belies any such attempt. Instead, the essay seeks to identify a number of key inflection points in the evolution and metastization of different Anglo-American ideas of "world order" over the last century. The method adopted is that used by scholars of intellectual history, which has increasingly been applied to the study of international relations in recent years. In the first

[W]hen ideas of world order are simply cast out as vapid utopianism, or "globalist" delusion, British and American foreign policy loses form, spirit, purpose, vision, and a sense of direction.

instance, this stresses the context-specific meaning of key political ideas (such as world order), while also opening up an inquiry into their genesis and lineage.[5] This inquiry begins with an analysis of a particular moment in November 1969, when the fundamental assumptions of American foreign policy were being re-examined, and it expands from there. Simply speaking, it demonstrates the enduring power of ideas.

Specifically, the idea that a better world was achievable — through a combination of vision and human ingenuity — has provided a higher cause and unifying philosophy in Anglo-American statecraft. While conceptual purity has been elusive, the commitment to this endeavor has transcended different historical eras. When viewed over the *longue durée*, the yearning for equilibrium, structure, and order in international affairs provides an explanatory spine to the story of American and British foreign policy over the course of the last century. It also becomes clear that contending ideas of world order have been entwined with existential questions, such as the meaning of history, the survival of Western civilization, and the very future of mankind.

The vagueness and ambiguity surrounding different definitions of world order are apt to infuriate practically-minded strategists, impatient with abstractions or images of an ideal future. The never-ending nature of the search for world order has played its part in foreign policy errors in the past. The current fashion for running down the idea of a "liberal international order" partly derives from the fact that it is regarded as a general good, rather than a clearly defined strategic goal. Yet, when ideas of world order are simply cast out as vapid utopianism, or "globalist" delusion, British and American foreign policy loses form, spirit, purpose, vision, and a sense of direction. A recognition of the historical force of such ideas is more important than ever at a time when the fundamental assumptions of Americans are being re-examined.

The Current "Crisis of World Order" and the Critique of Globalism

Within the last decade, a consensus has emerged in the West that there is a crisis of world order that must be addressed. The idea has proved particularly influential in the United States, as part of a broader debate about America's status in international affairs. The reasons for this are well-known, from fears about the rising power of China and new concerns about Russia under President Vladimir Putin, to a series of costly engagements in the Middle East. For the outside observer,

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5 Some important examples include: Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 108-148; Jonathan Haslam, *No Virtue like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations Since Machiavelli* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Lucian M. Ashworth, "Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations," *International Relations* 16, no. 33 (2002): 33-51; Duncan Bell, ed., *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York: Penguin, 2012); David Milne, *Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2015); John Thompson, *A Sense of Power: The Roots of America's Global Role* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2015); Or Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939-1950* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017).

however, what is striking is just how widely shared this consensus is. Remarkably, it also seems to encompass four of the most distinctive influential foreign policy traditions of the United States — those who tend to classify themselves as "realists," those often described as "liberal internationalists," "conservative internationalists," and those presumed to hold something more like a "neo-conservative" perspective on foreign policy.

One of the most influential interjections in this debate was Henry Kissinger's 2014 book, *World Order*, which examined competing visions of international order, from the peace of Westphalia to the 21st century. As the American-led order established in 1945 begins to come under strain under the force of global historical change, Kissinger wrote that the "reconstruction of the international system is the ultimate challenge of statesmanship in our time."[6] But, different iterations of the same concern have emerged across the political spectrum. For example, when she was regarded as the most likely nominee to be the Democratic presidential nominee, Hillary Clinton reviewed Kissinger's book at length. She spoke of her own efforts, as secretary of state, in "reimagining and reinforcing the global order to meet the demands of an increasingly interdependent age."[7] Notwithstanding the criticisms Kissinger made of President Barack Obama's foreign policy, she suggested that the two nonetheless shared a "belief in the indispensability of continued American leadership in service of a just and liberal order."[8]

Of course, Kissinger's thesis was critiqued by others on the liberal internationalist side of the American foreign policy spectrum, such as Anne-Marie Slaughter, who regarded it as a classic "realist" account, giving insufficient place to "moral considerations" in foreign policy. At the same time, however, Slaughter concurred on one fundamental point: the urgency of creating some sort of new "global order" for the 21st century, albeit one "acceptable not only to states but also to the vast majority of the world's people." In Slaughter's view, the failure of the United States to do more to prevent bloodshed in the Syrian civil war was a symptom of the crisis in world order, and the outcome of America eschewing pursuit of that higher ideal.[9] This chimed with a line of argument made by others such as Vali Nasr, who wrote in his book, *The Dispensable Nation*, that a retreat of American diplomatic leadership on the international stage deprived the existing world order of the very thing that held it together.[10]

The criticism of mainstream American foreign policy traditions — and the idea that they rest on the same misguided premise about "world order" — has a heritage on both the left and right.

From different angles, then, a growing number of foreign policy commentators joined the chorus of concern about the so-called crisis of world order. Robert Kagan, generally thought of as a neo-conservative thinker, also joined the fray in 2014 with an essay in the *New Republic* entitled, "Superpowers Don't Get to Retire."[11] In it, Kagan also bemoaned what he saw as a loss of appetite for international leadership in the United States, feeding into increased global instability. "If a breakdown in the world order that America made is occurring, it is not because America's power is declining," he wrote. He posited that the country's wealth, power, and potential influence remained adequate to meet the present challenges. Nor was it because the world had "become more complex and intractable." Rather, he said, it was "an intellectual problem, a question of identity and purpose," originating in the United States itself. Americans hoped for a "return to normalcy." But, the power and pervasiveness of the United States meant that it could not simply bow out of the world order

6 Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York and London; Penguin, 2014), 371.

7 Hillary Clinton, "Hillary Clinton reviews Henry Kissinger's 'World Order,'" *The Washington Post*, September 4, 2014.

8 Ibid.

9 Anne-Marie Slaughter, "How to Fix America's Foreign Policy: What Obama should learn from Kissinger's new book," *New Republic*, November 18, 2014.

10 Vali Nasr, *The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat* (Doubleday: New York, 2013).

11 Robert Kagan, "Superpowers Don't Get to Retire," *New Republic*, May 26, 2014.

game and expect not to feel the ramifications.[12]

By the spring of 2016, as the presidential election cycle was fully under way, the linkage between the apparent crisis of world order and this national "question of identity and purpose" became more pronounced. In a March 2016 essay for *The American Interest*, Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry suggested that the foundations of the American-led international order had been a "centrist tradition of American world leadership," marked by a "strong bipartisan internationalist tradition." A radical conservative critique was challenging the "foundations of Pax Americana" at home, with potentially grave implications for the world beyond.[13]

When the purveyors of that radical conservative critique coalesced around the figure of Donald Trump during the presidential primary season, it became clear that many mainstream Republicans were similarly uncomfortable with the potential implications for future foreign policy. The same month, March 2016, more than 100 Republican national security leaders signed an open letter in opposition to any future Trump presidency.[14] As Eliot Cohen, one of the most influential Republican critics of Trump, noted in his 2017 book, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force*, it was increasingly difficult to convince the U.S. electorate of the necessary costs involved with America retaining its position as "the guarantor of world order."[15] Efforts to reinvigorate "conservative internationalism," seen in the work of Paul D. Miller, for example, reflected the same concerns.[16]

To the critics of the Washington foreign policy establishment, impugned in recent times as "the blob,"[17] these concerns about a crisis of world order and a decline in American leadership are but a familiar refrain. The criticism of mainstream American foreign policy traditions — and the idea that they rest on the same misguided premise about "world order" — has a heritage on both the left and right. Noam Chomsky's 1994 book, *World Orders Old and New*, characterized the "guidelines of world order," as also defined by Britain and America since World War II, as follows:

> The rich men of the rich societies are to rule the world, competing among themselves for a greater share of the wealth and power and mercilessly suppressing those who stand in their way.[18]

In a more nuanced 2015 assessment, *American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers*, another New Left writer, Perry Anderson, also commented on the surprising degree of consensus across these different schools of U.S. foreign policy thinking on this fundamental goal: the desirability of preserving a U.S.-led international order.[19] In a subsequent 2017 work, Anderson noted how, since the end of the Cold War, a growing number of liberal internationalist thinkers — such as Jon Ikenberry, Joseph Nye, and Robert O. Keohane — had argued that the preservation of the liberal international order was the best means for America to exert "soft" power on the world stage. On the one hand, this was seen as an evolution away from outmoded Cold War thinking — which preferred to focus on the raw metrics of economic and military power. The exponents of this position called it a "milieu-based" grand strategy and suggested it was more sustainable than past superpower strategies because it did not aspire to dominance or empire. On the other hand, from the perspective of critics on the New Left, this was just the pursuit of "hegemony" by other means.[20]

Most recently, this so-called Washington consensus has come under attack from some of those associated with the Trump campaign and presidency. Most obvious, of course, are the views of the president himself. With striking consistency over the previous decades, he has expressed a worldview that is directly hostile to the idea of a

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12 Ibid.

13 Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, "Unraveling America the Great," *American Interest* 11, no. 5 (March 2016).

14 "Open Letter to Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders," *War on the Rocks*, March 2, 2016, available at https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/open-letter-on-donald-trump-from-gop-national-security-leaders.

15 Eliot Cohen, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force* (Basic Books: New York, 2017).

16 Paul D. Miller, *American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016).

17 The phrase is attributed to President Obama's advisor Ben Rhodes. David Samuels, "The Aspiring Novelist Who Became Obama's Foreign-Policy Guru," *New York Times Magazine*, May 5, 2016.

18 Noam Chomsky, *World Orders: Old and New* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5.

19 Perry Anderson, *American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers* (London: Verso, 2015).

20 Perry Anderson, *The H-Word: The Peripeteia of Hegemony* (London: Verso, 2017).

U.S.-led international order.[21] Many of these ideas have 19th century antecedents.[22] But, the emphasis on "America first" converged with new trends of nationalism in American political discourse to emerge on the right that, according to Iskander Rehman, contains elements of ethno-tribalism, millenarianism, decadentism, and illiberalism. When confronted with a large and influential establishment — which is perceived to be particularly deeply entrenched on issues of foreign policy — the most influential apostles of this worldview, notably former White House advisor and strategist Steve Bannon, have expressed a firm desire "to bring everything crashing down."[23]

Stripping the Altars: World Order as a "Globalist" Aberration

One of the more articulate criticisms of the shared assumptions of the foreign policy establishment has come from Michael Anton, now deputy assistant to the president for strategic communications on the National Security Council. At the time of writing, he is one of the few radical critics of the foreign policy establishment to remain in office (avoiding the fates of Michael Flynn, Steve Bannon and Sebastian Gorka who have all either been pushed aside or left).[24] In an article written before he joined the administration, Anton took aim at the consensus, firmly held on both sides of the aisle, that a Trump presidency would undermine the "liberal international order:"

> Nearly all opponents of President Trump's foreign policy, from conservatives and Republicans to liberals and Democrats, claim to speak up for the "liberal international order." A word may have been different here or there (e.g., "world order") but the basic charge was always the same. Whether voiced by Fareed Zakaria and Yascha Mounk on the left, Walter Russell Mead in the center, Eliot Cohen and Robert Zoellick on the right, or Robert Kagan on the once-right-now-left, the

consensus was clear: Trump threatens the international liberal order.[25]

Anton went on to argue that the foreign policy establishment lining up behind the liberal international order was a kind of "priesthood." The priesthood had a vested interest in protecting its status "by muddying the simple and clear, and pretending that the complex is clear and obvious — but only to themselves." They dominated the language and discourse of foreign policy and were instinctively hostile to anything that challenged their worldview. There was even a hint of Chomsky in the argument that the liberal international order was better understood as the "liberal rich-country order."[26]

There are indeed certain shared presuppositions within mainstream U.S. foreign policy traditions that have gone unchallenged and unexamined for many years.

Whether it comes from Chomsky or Anton, one has to acknowledge elements of truth in this critique. There are indeed certain shared presuppositions within mainstream U.S. foreign policy traditions that have gone unchallenged and unexamined for many years. The same might be said in the British national security debate, which takes its cue from the United States, and

21 Charlie Laderman and Brendan Simms, *Trump: The Making of a Worldview* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017).

22 Thomas Wright, "Trump's 19th Century Foreign Policy," *Politico*, January 20, 2016, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-foreign-policy-213546.

23 Iskander Rehman, "Bring Everything Crashing Down: Bannon's Reactionary Guard and U.S. National Security," *War on the Rocks*, February 27, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/bring-everything-crashing-down-bannons-reactionary-guard-and-u-s-national-security.

24 James Mann, "The Adults in the Room," *New York Review of Books*, October 26, 2017.

25 Michael Anton, "America and the Liberal International Order," *American Affairs* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 113-25.

26 Ibid., 114.

which places similar emphasis on a "rules-based international order" as its starting point.[27] There is a distance between popular perceptions of the national interest and those prescribed by individuals within the foreign policy establishment. The benefits said to arise from an American-led international order are sometimes presumed rather than explained. Vagueness around the definition of the liberal international order has sometimes led to confusion about the core strategic purpose of American grand strategy, not to mention that of its allies. There are many who would agree with Anton that the attempt, after the end of the Cold War, to enlarge the mission in pursuit of a "new world order" was "a case of American eyes being much bigger than our stomachs (or teeth), a confusion of ideology and interests." Anton himself suggests that he is not advocating the abandonment of the

The shared pool of ideals provided a more solid foundation for Anglo-American relations than sentimental appeals to the "special relationship."

liberal international order, but simply a greater willingness to reform it.[28]

Yet, the reality is that this assault on the so-called "priesthood" rests on unexamined assumptions of its own. The purported aim of bringing the Washington consensus "crashing down" has created an exaggerated disdain for the "intellectual architecture" of American grand strategy.[29] The desire to strip the altars or to rip up the sacred scripts is based on a jaundiced and limited reading of history. First, it presumes a fundamental "wrong turn" taken by the United States at some point in recent decades (and a concomitant need to press the reset button). Second, and more importantly, the radical conservative obsession with "globalism" has become the right's equivalent of the left-wing obsession with "neo-liberalism" — that is, a vague and catch-all term, designed to signal disapproval, but offering limited utility.

World Order as a Recurring Vision in the Anglo-American Mind

The idea that the high premium placed upon the idea of world order is some sort of globalist or neo-liberal aberration, tacked on to more traditional foreign policy aims by a complacent and self-interested establishment, is not supported by the historical record. It should be said, as Or Rosenboim has pointed out, that the competing visions of world order that emerged in the mid-20th century did have a significant "globalist" dimension.[30] Such ideas were particularly influential when (according to Google's Ngram tool) popular usage of the phrase "world order" peaked in 1945. But, the ideas of world order discussed in what follows have a longer heritage — one that predates and transcends the unique era of post-war planning from 1939-45.

In fact, the pursuit of world order has provided an extra-dimension to Anglo-American thinking about world affairs for more than 100 years: providing a vision that went beyond the pursuit of narrow self-interest; easily traversing the divide between so-called idealists and realists; and acting as a bridging mechanism between the immediate considerations of the nation-state and a broader concern for the future of Western civilization.

In using the hyphenated form, "Anglo-American," the intention is not to play down the differences between British and American foreign policy. Over the course of the last 100 years, as Britain's global power waned and America's waxed, both nations continued to put their own interests before anything else. Nonetheless, in the most important great power transition of the 20th century, there is a striking degree of interchange about ideas of "world order." This allowed for a commonality of purpose at a number of critical points in modern history.

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27 See, for example, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom* (London: HM Govt., 2015).

28 Anton, "America and the Liberal International Order," passim.

29 The phrase "intellectual architecture" is Hal Brands's in *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014).

30 Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism.*

In some cases, such as the wake of World War I, a shared commitment to create a new international order was undermined by a failure to define the mission and unwillingness to pursue it to its end. In others, such as the wake of World War II, there was a coalescence of views on world order that had a profound impact on international affairs.[31]

The shared pool of ideals provided a more solid foundation for Anglo-American relations than sentimental appeals to the "special relationship." Moments of perfect symmetry were fleeting and rare. But, the intellectual synergies ran deep and were transmitted across different eras. Indeed, one reason why the pursuit of world order became so entrenched in Anglo-American thinking was that so many different tributaries flowed into it. It was not the preserve of one party or one intellectual tradition. It is this that explains unlikely connections, such as the fondness of at least three Republican presidents — Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Nixon — for the work of a British socialist writer like H.G. Wells.

Given the broad period under discussion, and the amorphous nature of the concept of world order, the intention here is not to attempt a narrative sweep from the late 19th century through to the modern era. The evolution of American (and Anglo-American) ideas about international order over the last 100 years has been charted expertly by a number of scholars in recent years — notably Mark Mazower in *Governing the World*, David Milne in *Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy* and John Thompson in *A Sense of Power: The Roots of America's Global Role*.[32]

Similarly, it is not my aim to chart the competition between different versions of world order — from the "world state" to the "balance of power." Instead, I argue that what matters is not so much how world order has been defined, but the sense in which Anglo-American statesmen have continued to regard it as a noble cause. To put it another way, the endpoint may remain vague and contested, but the almost ever-present desire to work towards it is tangible, discernible, and traceable — providing an organizing philosophy and therefore a real driving force in history.

Despite the significant differences between them on foreign policy, both Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson can be seen to have dedicated significant portions of their career to a vision of world order. Some of these threads were brought together by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in the period from 1940-1945. But, the fact that almost all of the post-World War II presidents and prime ministers have paid some sort of homage to an idealized version of world order is a testimony to the enduring influence of the idea.

The challenge, then, is to test this idea on less fertile ground. For that reason, the rest of this essay takes an unorthodox approach by beginning with a freeze frame of American foreign policy thinking at a critical moment in the Cold War, in late 1969. The primary reason for starting with this episode — as opposed to one from the era of Wilson or the Roosevelts, for example — is that it sits far outside the usual idealistic lineage of American thinking about world order. Second, it took place in a period in which the fundamental presuppositions underlying American foreign

> **Both Kissinger and Nixon were willing to countenance a "revolution" in U.S. foreign policy. But, in doing so, they fell back on some unlikely sources of inspiration.**

policy were being re-examined, much as they are today. As Henry Kissinger wrote at the time, in a briefing note prepared for President Richard Nixon, it was a "period in which American foreign policy has to be put on a new foundation." For the first two decades after World War II, America's approach to the world had been

> conducted with the maxims and the inspiration that guided the Marshall Plan, that is, the notion of a predominant United States, as the only stable country, the richest country, the country without whose leadership and physical contribution nothing was possible,

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31 For that power transition, and the importance of shared intellectual traditions, see: Kori Schake, *Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2017); Walter Russell Mead, *God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World* (New York: Vintage, 2008).

32 Mazower, *Governing the World*; Milne, *Worldmaking*; Thompson, *A Sense of Power*.

and which had to make all the difference for defense and progress everywhere in the world. ...Conditions have changed enormously. We are now in a world in which other parties are playing a greater role.[33]

Both Kissinger and Nixon were willing to countenance a "revolution" in U.S. foreign policy. But, in doing so, they fell back on some unlikely sources of inspiration. Tellingly, they returned to episodes of Anglo-American foreign policy that predated 1945, and they sought to reinvigorate old ideas about world order from this shared tradition.

The canon Nixon referred to was a somewhat chaotic and unruly one, which darted back and forth across the Atlantic to Anglo-American statesman of different eras. Nonetheless, the variety of influences on his thinking tells a story in its own right. It says something revealing about how the search for world order was viewed — as the continuation of a historical mission, a search for meaning beyond national self-interest, a vehicle for the preservation of Western civilization, and an attempt to wrestle with the future rather than to let fate take its course. Seen in this way, the

pursuit of world order — in the most general sense — appears as a surprisingly ecumenical credo with a long, if somewhat controversial, backstory.

Richard Nixon and H.G. Wells

On the evening of Nov. 5, 1969, a year to the day after his election as president, Richard Nixon was in a reflective mood. At 7 p.m., he picked up the telephone on his Oval Office desk, on which he kept a stack of recently read books, and called Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor.[34] Elected with a promise to end the Vietnam War, Nixon was conscious of the weight of historical responsibility on his shoulders. He had been reading a recently published book by the World War II veteran and University of California sinologist, Laurence Thompson, titled *1940: Year of Legend, Year of History*. This book told of Winston Churchill becoming prime minister of Great Britain at its darkest hour, as the remnants of his nation's army desperately fled the Nazi advance on the beaches of Dunkirk in May.[35] The book was on Nixon's mind as he sought to advise his national security advisor

33 "White House Background Press Briefing by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," Louis J. Smith and David H. Herschler, ed., *Foreign Relations of The United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972* (December 18, 1969). Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d47.

34 "Notes of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," *Foreign Relations of The United States*, 1969-1976, Vol. 1, *Foundations of Foreign Policy*, 1969-1972 (November 5, 1969): 142-3.

35 Laurence Thompson, *1940: Year of Legend, Year of History* (London: Collins: 1966), 12.

on what to say in a forthcoming interview with *Time* magazine.

While the British survived Dunkirk to fight another day, the months that followed evacuation provided little solace. By the end of 1941, the Nazi mission to dominate Europe looked almost complete. The Wehrmacht reached the suburbs of Moscow, and the Soviet Union seemed to be on the brink of defeat. In Asia, meanwhile, Japan was preparing to launch a full-scale assault on the

Nixon feared that if America focused solely on domestic problems, giving up on its leadership of the Western world, it would lose its sense of purpose.

weakening British Empire. As it turned out, Adolf Hitler's decision to invade Russia that winter was to prove disastrous. Even more consequential was the decision by the Japanese to launch a pre-emptive attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, for fear that it would enter the war on the side of the British. In London, as Laurence Thompson has recounted, it was certainly not seen as inevitable that Washington would enter the war until the attack happened. So, Thompson described how, Churchill, on the night of Dec. 7, 1941,

> went to bed saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful. That United States, like or not, had been goaded into taking the place left vacant on the world stage by a declining Britain.[36]

With this global leadership came grave responsibilities. Almost three decades later, Nixon took charge of a country that was locked in a seemingly intractable and energy-sapping conflict in Southeast Asia. The year 1968 had been the

bleakest year yet, with the loss of almost 17,000 American servicemen, adding urgency to his campaign promises to end the war.

Yet, the bleak news from Vietnam was partially alleviated by another event in Nixon's first year in office. Just a few months prior, on July 20, 1969, two American astronauts had become the first human beings to walk on the surface of the moon. As Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin disembarked Apollo II for their moonwalk, they had been greeted by the voice of the president, channelled through a crackling line into their earpieces. "Because of what you have done the heavens have become a part of man's world," said Nixon, "and as you talk to us from the Sea of Tranquillity, it inspires us to redouble our efforts to bring peace and tranquillity to earth."[37]

Three months later, Nixon considered how previous generations would have viewed these remarkable achievements. Back in 1901, it had been left to English science fiction writer H.G. Wells, in one of his most fantastical stories, to envisage such a mission in his novel, *The First Men in the Moon,* which had been made into a feature film in 1964.[38] Such achievements were enough to spur anyone into deeper reflection about the purpose of mankind and the advance of civilization.

Reflecting on this modern day "crusade," Nixon also quoted from Well's famous 1920 work, *The Outline of History*, an ambitious attempt to tell the story of human civilization from the Neolithic era to the modern era. In the book, Wells noted a recurrent tension between the nomadic cultures that emerged in the north and the settled peoples who were more common in the south. In the tension between them, one could see, at the core of the human spirit, a desire to strive for "a new and better sort of civilization." Wells described a series of civilizational missions over the course of history, such as the Christian crusades or nomadic conquerors — Alexander the Great, Muhammed, Napoleon, and Woodrow Wilson — which had attempted to unify humanity. Although they had failed, Wells believed that mankind would never forego the goal of unity, and that the march of science and technology made the prospect of success ever more likely.[39]

By Nov. 5, 1969, as the sun was setting on first year of Nixon's presidency, the United States faced a combination of challenges at home — manifested in a surge of student radicalism and inner-city riots

36 Ibid.

37 "Telephone Conversation with the Apollo 11 Astronauts on the Moon," July 20, 1969, available at https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forkids/speeches-forkids/moonlanding/moonlandingcall.pdf.

38 H.G. Wells, *The First Men in the Moon* (London: Penguin, 2005), xxiii.

39 H.G. Wells, *The Outline of History: The Whole Story of Man* (London: George Newnes, 1920).

By evoking Wells, Kipling, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Armstrong in the space of a short phone call, Nixon clearly sought historical justification for the change of direction in American foreign policy that he was considering.

throughout the summer — and overseas, where it was unclear how America could extricate itself without a humiliating defeat. The words of Wells weighed upon the president, as he considered the challenge ahead. "In terms of history, when we talk about the crusades that H.G. Wells talked about, for example the moon thing," he said to Kissinger,

> [They] had the effect of bringing to Western Europe not just the discovery in the East but the fact that Western Europe at that time devoted itself to a great cause beyond itself. It changed Western Europe. ...The President said nations must have great ideas or they cease to be great.[40]

More than that, Nixon feared that if America focused solely on domestic problems, giving up on its leadership of the Western world, it would lose its sense of purpose:

> The question is whether we do what we need to both abroad and in the ghettos. If we just go to the ghettos and let go abroad, apart from the destruction that might come from a war, we might destroy ourselves.[41]

In addition to this unlikely fondness for H.G. Wells, Nixon also sought inspiration from one of his predecessors in the White House, Theodore Roosevelt, who had been president from 1901-1908. "Roosevelt talked about it as the white man's burden," explained Nixon as he ended the phone

call. "Both of these people were searching for that same feeling that people need." [42] Nixon's presidency was to become one of the most controversial in American history. Yet, in its infancy, and despite his reputation for cold-hearted realpolitik, he was eager to associate himself with a cause that went beyond the narrow national interest and spoke to "great ideas" and a civilizational crusade. With the moon having been conquered already, this was to be pursued in the field of foreign affairs.

The Pursuit of World Order as a "Civilizational Mission"

For many, then and now, the notion of a "white man's burden" represented the ultimate stain on the historical record of the West — the pretense to stand for a higher cause was but a thin veneer, masking racial prejudice and the grasping self-interest. There was, without question, a highly racialized component to some early Anglo-American thinking about world order.[43] So if Nixon had uttered these words in public in 1969, it would most likely have provoked an overwhelmingly negative response. In fact, the infamous phrase was not Roosevelt's creation. It was coined by the English poet Rudyard Kipling and first used in the title of a poem written for the occasion of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee in 1897, marking her 60 years on the throne.

The Diamond Jubilee was to not only symbolize the pinnacle of British imperial power, but also the growing recognition of its fragility, and the loosening of the binds that held it together. As the 19th century drew to a close, Kipling understood that the enemies of the Empire were growing in power and number. As the 20th century loomed on the horizon, he also had come to the conclusion that the "white man's burden" would be too much for Britain to bear alone for another century. It was thus, at the time of the Spanish-American War

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40 "Notes of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," November 5, 1969.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Duncan Bell, "The Project for a New Anglo Century: Race, Space and Global Order," Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Anglo-America and Its Discontents: Civilizational Identities Beyond West and East* (London: Routledge, 2012): 33-56.

in 1898, that Kipling began to look to the United States to share in Britain's burden, to preserve and spread "civilisation" in the world.[44]

The American people were undecided as to the merits of assuming such a responsibility. When the United States took possession of the Philippine Islands from Spain — and assumed responsibility for its governance — it sparked a fierce national debate as to whether a country founded on rebellion against the British Empire should itself take part in the imperial game. Conscious of the way this debate was finely poised, in late November 1898, Kipling offered his verse to Roosevelt, who had just been elected Governor of New York and was a staunch supporter of expansionism. "Now, go in and put all the weight of your influence into hanging on, permanently, to the whole Philippines," he begged Roosevelt in the letter that he sent to accompany the poem. "America has gone and stuck a pick-axe into the foundations of a rotten house, and she is morally bound to build the house over, again, from the foundations, or have it fall about her ears." Forwarding Kipling's poem to Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, Roosevelt commented that it was "poor poetry," but that it made "good sense from the expansion standpoint."[45]

By evoking Wells, Kipling, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Armstrong in the space of a short phone call, Nixon clearly sought historical justification for the change of direction in American foreign policy that he was considering. It would be easy to conclude that the president, who was not a natural intellectual, was confused by these conflicting ideas from across the political spectrum. Yet, he was not amiss in seeing the connections.

For one, there was an unlikely connection between the thinking of Wells and the writing of Kipling. Even a socialist like Wells, who rejected Kipling's imperialism in favor of his dream of a "world state" — a vision captured in his 1940 book, *New World Order* — acknowledged that the poet of Empire had influenced him in his early years.[46] As Wells wrote in *The New Machiavelli*, the "prevailing force" of his worldview as a young man was "Kiplingism … we were all, you must understand, very distinctly Imperialists also, and professed a vivid sense of the 'White Man's Burden.'" Kipling helped to broaden his "geographical sense," he recalled, while inspiring in him a "desire for discipline and devotion" that seemed to be sorely missing in the chaotic affairs of men.[47]

To be clear, as Wells moved away from the views of his youth, he distanced himself from Kipling and any whiff of sentimentality about the Empire. In fact, *The First Men in the Moon* can be partly interpreted as a critique of British imperialism, published against the backdrop of the Second Boer War.[48] At the onset of World War II, Wells's vision of a "new world order" was one in which the empires would melt away. More specifically, he believed that the British Empire was the greatest obstacle to the unity of the English-speaking peoples in pursuit of that higher ideal. He wrote:

> I dislike calling myself "British" and I like to think of myself as a member of a great English-speaking community, which spreads irrespective of race and colour round and about the world.

What he hoped for was "the realisation of a common purpose and a common cultural inheritance may spread throughout all the English-speaking communities." Foreshadowing Franklin D. Roosevelt's position, he suggested that only the dissolution of the British Empire "may inaugurate this great synthesis."[49] Such was the predictive power of Wells that many came to regard him as something of a prophet of the future.[50]

Yet, as Nixon's reference to the "white man's burden" confirmed, Kipling also cast a longer shadow over the 20th century than is often presumed. In the view of George Orwell, for example, Wells's optimistic faith in the eventual triumph of science, rationalism and reason left him ill-equipped to understand the atavistic forces that had come to define the 20th century. In his fear of a clash of civilizations, savagery, ethnic bloodlust, and the breakdown of order, Orwell even suggested that Kipling had been a better prophet for the modern era. Wells was "too sane to understand the modern world." Kipling, by contrast, "was not deaf to the evil voices of power and military 'glory.'" Had he lived to see the 1930s, suggested Orwell,

44 Gretchen Murphy, *Shadowing the White Man's Burden: U.S. Imperialism and the Problem of the Color Line* (New York: NYU Press, 2010), 36.

45 Patrick Brantlinger, "Kipling's 'The White Man's Burden' and Its Afterlives," *English Literature in Transition*, 1880-1920 50, no. 2 (2007): 172-191.

46 H. G. Wells, *The New World Order*.

47 George Orwell, "Rudyard Kipling," *New English Weekly* (January 23, 1936). Available at http://theorwellprize.co.uk/george-orwell/by-orwell/essays-and-other-works/rudyard-kipling.

48 H.G. Wells, *The First Men in the Moon* (London: Penguin, 2005), xxiii.

49 Wells, *The New World Order*.

50 See Lawrence Freedman, *The Future of War: A History* (London: Penguin, 2017).

Kipling would have better understood "the appeal of Hitler, or for that matter of Stalin, whatever his attitude towards them might be."[51]

Without stretching the point, one can see both these instincts — the Wellsian yearning for international order and the belief that it was attainable by human endeavor and Kipling's fear of the fragility of Western civilization — in the minds of Nixon and Kissinger, as they contemplated a new course in American foreign policy. There is, perhaps, another clue here in Nixon's admiration for Winston Churchill. The British statesman often testified to the influence that both Wells and Kipling had upon him. Some of Churchill's most famous wartime phrases — including his appeals to the unity of the "English-speaking peoples" and "gathering storm" — could be traced back to Wells. Most important, in this respect, was the "broad sunlit uplands" that envisaged a better future world after war.[52]

Nor was the link between Wells and Roosevelt that Nixon made at the end of his first year in office — referring to this "feeling that people need" — the product of a confused imagination. It is unclear whether Nixon knew the story or whether he had an intuitive sense of the intellectual connection between them. But the writer and the statesman had in fact met many years before, when Wells visited the White House in 1907. On that occasion, Roosevelt had revealed to Wells a fondness for one of his earlier novels, *The Time Machine*, first published in 1895.[53]

Influenced by the work of Charles Darwin, Wells had envisioned a future in which civilization had not evolved uniformly, but had led to the creation of a two-tiered world. On the surface of the earth lived the Eloi, peaceful, childlike creatures who had lost their evolutionary edge. With no apparent threat to their existence, and having triumphed over nature, they were smaller, weaker, and less motivated by the quest for survival than the humans from whom they had evolved. Then, the time travelling narrator catches sight of something called a Morlock, a "queer little ape-like figure," disappearing into a subterranean network of tunnels that was once the London underground. It dawns upon him

> that Man had not remained one species, but had differentiated into two distinct animals: that my graceful children of the Upper World were not the sole descendants of our generation, but that this bleached, obscene, nocturnal Thing, which had flashed before me, was also heir to all the ages.[54]

At the end of *The Time Machine,* the time traveller rushes forward in time once more to escape the Morlocks who have captured him. In a final scene, he finds a world in which all remnants of mankind are extinct, only the simplest vegetation remains and monstrous crab-like creatures slowly scuttle across blood-red beaches in search of giant butterflies to eat.[55]

For many readers of the book, this dystopian vision suggested a deep anxiety about the future of the world, a view verging on fatalistic despair. Yet, this was not the case for Roosevelt, who claimed to be inspired by it. As Wells recalled, the president "became gesticulatory" when the discussion turned to *The Time Machine*, gripping the back of a garden chair with his left hand and stabbing the air with his right as if he was speaking on

Kipling and Wells had different fears and hopes about the international future. What they shared, from vastly different perspectives, was the growing conviction that the United States was the best guarantor of salvation and civilization.

51 George Orwell, "Rudyard Kipling," *Horizon*, February 1942, available at https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-prize/orwell/essays-and-other-works/rudyard-kipling-1936.

52 Richard Toye, "H.G. Wells and Winston Churchill: a reassessment," S. McClean, ed., *H.G. Wells: Interdisciplinary Essays*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008).

53 Patrick Parrinder, *Shadows of the Future: H.G. Wells, Science Fiction, and Prophecy* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 70.

54 Wells, *The Time Machine*.

55 Ibid.

a platform, "his straining voice a note higher in denying the pessimism of that book..."[56] Roosevelt, crouching down on the White House lawn that afternoon in 1907, as if over a battlefield, said, "Suppose, after all that you should be right, and it ends with your butterflies and Morlocks. *That doesn't matter now!* The effort's real. It's worth going on with it — even then."[57]

The president joked, "Morlocks! Everywhere Morlocks!" as he looked out across the lawn and pretended to shoot the imaginary creatures, as if he were holding a rifle in his hand. The two men laughed. The novelist was flattered and agreed that

For a fleeting moment, America's entry into the Great War and Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points re-energized the idea that such a Western-led world order could be built.

he had not intended his book to be an expression of despair so much as a call to action.[58]

The point here was not that Wells (nor Kipling, for that matter) had some sort of decisive influence on Roosevelt or the formation of his worldview. This would be to look at the formation of an Anglo-American worldview the wrong way around, as some sort of process of British influencing America as the latter reached superpower consciousness. The president was an enthusiastic Anglophile, but he had already made his own mind up about what was in America's best interests. Kipling and Wells had different fears and hopes about the international future. What they shared, from vastly different perspectives, was the growing conviction that the United States was the best guarantor of salvation and civilization. Like many Englishmen after them, they were not manipulating the

American consciousness so much as pinning their hopes upon American leadership.

"Never did a President so reflect the quality of his time," Wells wrote after the meeting with Roosevelt. He was "a very symbol of the creative will in man, in its limitations, its doubtful adequacy, its valiant persistence, amidst complexities and confusions." At the outset of the 20th century, Wells was pleased to report that Roosevelt embodied a new political trend in the Anglo-American world that was "altogether away from the anarchistic individualism of the nineteenth century ... towards some constructive scheme."[59] At the domestic level, elements of this new approach could be seen in the policies of the Progressive era. The real "constructive scheme" that Wells had in mind, however, was the building of a new world order.

The Elusiveness of Pax-Anglo-Saxonica

While it says something about the tangled roots of Anglo-American worldview, this vignette — an account of a brief telephone conversation in 1969 — can only get us so far. It was clear that Nixon sought inspiration from this sense that he was resuming a long-term historical cause, but this did not provide him with a new blueprint for Cold War foreign policy. Meanwhile, it was one thing to see Roosevelt — as Wells did — as the harbinger of a "constructive scheme" in world affairs and a reversal of the trend towards anarchic individualism. It was quite another, as countless exponents of world order were to learn, to articulate how such a vague idea could ever be materialized. Indeed, the lack of clarity about concrete goals meant that the pursuit of world order nearly always ended in frustrated ambition.

The failures of Anglo-American internationalism in the era preceding and following World War I can, to a great extent, be explained by this confusion. On the one hand, the idea that Britain and the United States might have had a shared interest in what might be (anachronistically) called a "liberal international order" had gathered some traction among elites by the turn of the 20th century. On the other hand, divergent national interests and significant cultural differences still held sway. First, British foreign policy in this era paid great homage to certain liberal international ideals while being primarily concerned with the preservation

56 H.G. Wells, *Experiment in Autobiography* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), 648-9.

57 Norman Ian MacKenzie and Jeanne MacKenzie, *H.G. Wells: A Biography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 202-3.

58 Ibid.

59 Parrinder, *Shadows of the Future*, 70.

of Empire. Second, it soon became clear that — whatever the personal views of Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson after him — the U.S. Congress, and ergo the American people, was unwilling to assume the burden that the construction of a new international order demanded.

For those who hoped that the "Americanization of the world" would lessen the load on the British Empire, there was much frustration at the course taken by the United States. Following Roosevelt, the presidency of William Howard Taft was regarded as particularly disappointing. In 1911, the British writer Sydney Brooks — whose pieces often appeared in *Harper's Magazine* — complained that the United States did not understand the urgency of the civilizational threat to the West because of its relative security and its near-impenetrability from foreign invasion. It had become clear that Americans lived "in an atmosphere of extra-ordinary simplicity, spaciousness, and self-absorption," he wrote. Foreign policy was never a priority in American politics and the implications of American expansionism had yet to be grasped. After expansion into Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, Americans had strewn the Pacific with stepping stones from Hawaii to Manila, just as the British had done in the Mediterranean. In effect, America had an empire, but Americans had "not yet become Imperial." As Brooks complained in 1911, "The white man's burden, so far as Americans are concerned, has become the white man's boredom."[60]

For a fleeting moment, America's entry into the Great War and Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points re-energized the idea that such a Western-led world order could be built.[61] While some of the supporters of the Anglo-American alliance in Britain were imperial survivalists, there were also genuine internationalists in the mould of Wells. The failure of the United States to join the League of Nations in 1920 was a bitter disappointment to the advocates of this new world order. At the same time, quite justifiably, some of the most forthright advocates of American internationalism believed that the project had been corrupted in inception by the failure of the European powers — Britain foremost among them — to abandon their imperial ambitions.[62]

No sooner, then, had the concept of "world order" been transferred from theorists to statesmen that it became associated with failure. Tellingly, one of the earliest mentions of "world order" in the State Department archives appeared in the resignation letter of an idealistic young Wilsonian diplomat, William Bullitt, who felt that the post-war peace settlement was unduly harsh on Bolshevik Russia and that America should refuse to cooperate with Britain and France in pursuing their familiar imperialist great games. He told Wilson,

> I was one of the millions who trusted confidently and implicitly in your leadership and believed that you would take nothing less than "a permanent peace" based upon "unselfish and unbiased justice." But our Government has consented now to deliver the suffering peoples of the world to new oppressions, subjections and dismemberments — a new century of war. And I can convince myself no longer that effective labor for "a new world order" is possible as a servant of this Government.[63]

Ironically, outside the Anglo-American world, some observers took the view that the English-speaking peoples had missed an incredible opportunity to establish a dominant Anglo-American world order. Friedrich Meinecke, the foremost German theorist of "realpolitik," addressed these questions in his classic text, *Machiavellianism: The Doctrine of Raison D'État and Its Place in Modern History* (1924). Meinecke refused to believe that a true League of Nations could ever be realized and had little time for Wilsonian idealism. Instead of the League, however, he believed that the shared strategic culture of America and Britain might eventually point to a different type of international order. While the moment had passed in 1920, he speculated four years later,

> that the era of … international conflict … may be brought to an end not by a genuine League of Nations, but by the world-hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon powers, in whose hands the strongest physical powers of the globe are already concentrated.

Meinecke did not welcome the prospect of such a "pax anglo-saxonica." But, he did recognize that, through the lighter touch of liberal capitalism, it would "be more endurable for the individual life

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60 Sydney Brooks, "American Foreign Policy," *The English Review* (November 1911): 682-95.

61 Mazower, *Governing the World*, 116-153.

62 John Bew, *Realpolitik: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 123-134.

63 "Mr. William C. Bullitt to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) [Paris,]," May 17, 1919, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol. XI, Paris Peace Conf*, 184.1.

of … [other] nations" than dominance by other great powers.[64]

While there were those in the Anglo-American world who held on to such a vision in the 1920s, they grew increasingly forlorn. By November 1928, ten years after the Entente's victory in World War I, an official at the British Foreign Office sat down to compose a stark assessment of the new global order that was taking shape. Russia, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, and China were all locked in spirals of revolution and repression while being crippled by successive financial crises. One country stood supreme above all the others. In the United States, the official wrote, Great Britain was faced

> with a phenomenon for which there is no parallel in our modern history — a state twenty-five times as large, five times as wealthy, three times as populous, twice as ambitious, almost invulnerable, and at least our equal in prosperity, vital energy, technical equipment and industrial strength.

The problem, as it was to be for much of the next century, was that "in almost every field, the advantages to be derived from mutual co-operation are greater for us than for them."[65]

Against this backdrop, British imaginings of the future took on a darker form once again. It was in 1933 — the year that Adolf Hitler became Germany's chancellor — that H.G. Wells returned to his musings on the idea of world order, once again through the lens of futurology, with *The Shape of Things to Come*. A science fiction novel purporting to be a "history" of the future, it told the story of how humanity would develop from 1930 to the year 2106. The world that Wells depicted was one in which Franklin D. Roosevelt fails to implement the New Deal, causing a global economic crisis that lasts 30 years. This is punctuated by a "second world war" that, with eerie accuracy, Wells predicted would begin in January 1940, sparked by a clash between Germany and Poland over Danzig. There would be no clear victor. Instead, the leading powers would emerge exhausted. Worse would follow in 1956 with the outbreak of a plague — spread by a group of enraged baboons having

escaped from the London Zoo — that wipes out much of the world population.[66]

The saving of humanity would take drastic measures over many years. Wells envisaged the emergence of a benevolent "dictatorship of the air," formed by the global elite at an international conference convened in Basra in 1965. Through their control of the world's aircraft, they would begin by eradicating the world's religions, dropping bombs on Mecca, and waging a long war against Catholicism. Eventually, the dictatorship would melt away, making way for a peaceful humanitarian utopia in which the struggle for material existence has ended, meaning that "reason" could finally triumph. The last recorded event in the book takes place on New Year's Day 2106, when there is a levelling of the last skyscrapers that once dominated the New York skyline.[67]

Piece by piece, the theoretical fragments of this vague world order were assembled for use

[I]t was in the second half of the 1930s that American strategists began to spend more time considering what sort of international order best served national goals.

at some future date. The following year, in 1934, the English historian Arnold Toynbee published the first volume of his 12-volume work, *A Study of History*, which traced the rise and fall of 23 major civilizations.[68] It was, in part, a response to Oswald Spengler's two-volume masterpiece, *The Decline of the West*, which was produced at the end of World

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64 Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellianism: The Doctrine of Raison d'État and Its Place in Modern History*, Werner Stark, ed., Douglas Scott, trans. (New Haven: Yale University Press: 1957), 424-33.

65 Adam Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order*, 1916-1931 (New York: Viking, 2014), 463-4.

66 H.G. Wells, *The Shape of Things to Come* (London, 1933).

67 Ibid.

68 Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History, Vol I: Introduction: The Geneses of Civilizations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), 397.

War I and warned that Western civilization was approaching its twilight.[69] Spengler questioned what he saw as a Eurocentric view of history, which presumed a linear development towards modernity

There are many reasons why the world order that emerged out of World War II proved far more enduring than that which followed the previous world war.

and progress. Toynbee rejected this fatalism about the decline of the West. At the same time, he stressed the urgent need to formulate a vision for how the different civilizations of the world could co-exist and share the globe among them. "The challenge of being called upon to create a political world-order ... now confronts our Modern Western society," he warned.[70]

Coming Back Together: Anglo-American Conceptions of World Order

It was one thing to build castles in the sky, in the manner of Toynbee and Wells, or to speak in such broad civilizational terms. But the interwar era proved just how difficult it was to translate such vague aspirations about world order into tangible goals of foreign policy. The meteor-like phenomenon of Wilsonian internationalism, blazing brightly before fading out, illustrated the challenge.

The phrase "world order" had first made a debut in U.S. State Department archives in the period from 1917-1919, yet it had all but evaporated from American diplomatic parlance thereafter. It did not appear in State Department cables again for another

12 years, until 1931 and then only five times until 1935. The watershed moment, from which point "world order" began to be used with ever greater frequency, was the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935. For many contemporary observers, this was the final death blow to the authority of the League of Nations, which had already been steadily undermined since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

In response, as shown by British and American diplomatic archives, the idea of "world order" was swiftly revived. In this case, however, it was shorn of some of the more ambitious connotations associated with the Wilson era. Instead, the restoration of world order was seen in more of a palliative than a visionary sense — the only possible antidote to the coming anarchy. In their shared diagnosis of the problem, there was, once again, the beginnings of a reconvergence between the American and British worldviews. Typical of this, in 1935, the American minister resident in Addis Ababa reported back on the growing sense, in conversations with the British, that the existing "world order" was under assault from the dictators or neo-imperialists in Italy, Germany, and Japan.[71] An obstacle remained in that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, the architect of appeasement, had an almost undisguised contempt for the United States.[72]

Meanwhile, it was in the second half of the 1930s that American strategists began to spend more time considering what sort of international order best served national goals. More importantly, these ideas developed a more solid form, in a way that could be translated into political and diplomatic action. That Franklin D. Roosevelt began to talk about the important "will for peace on the part of peace-loving nation" was of critical importance. It was "international lawlessness" that threatened "the very foundations of civilisation."[73] Another crucial figure in this process was then Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who saw the challenge to world order in three ways: The first was in the unravelling of "norms" and existing laws governing international conduct. The second, arising out of the first, was the prospect of "anarchy." The third was the dividing line that had opened up between "civilized" and "uncivilized" nations in the conduct of international affairs. As

69 Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West, edited by Arthur Helps and Helmut Werner*, Charles F. Atkinson, trans. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

70 Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History, Vol III: The Growths of Civilizations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), 364.

71 "The Minister Resident in Ethiopia (Engert) to the Secretary of State, Addis Ababa Telegram," June 27, 1936, *Foreign Relations of The United States Diplomatic Papers, The Near East and Africa*, Vol. III, 765.84/4737.

72 Robin Renwick, *Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and War* (London: Biteback, 2016), 21.

73 John Thompson, *A Sense of Power: The Roots of America's Global Role* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press: 2015), 146, 280.

Welles put it in October 1937,

> No one can today affirm that such a thing as international law exists or that there is any common agreement on the part of the so-called civilized nations of the world upon the fundamental standards which should and must govern the relations between nations if world order is to be restored.[74]

Having agreed on the remedy — the restoration of world order — so a greater sense of common purpose fed into U.S. and U.K. relations. Thus, a month later, in November 1937, Secretary of State Cordell Hull discussed the international crisis at length with the British ambassador in Washington, holding out improved Anglo-American relations — and constructive diplomatic engagement on issues such as trade — as "the basis upon which a restored world order could rest."[75] Simultaneously, the United States began to impart these warnings about the dangers of anarchy to those who seemed to have veered into "uncivilized" conduct. In conversations with the Italian ambassador, Hull also expressed the hope — in reality, a thinly veiled warning — that

> sooner or later nations undertaking to live by the sword, with non-observance of the principles of world order to large extent, will decide on a permanent policy of either the sword or a course of peace and order under law such as many of our countries are pursuing.[76]

Ultimately, of course, it was only in the heat of another world war that these threads of common analysis began to coalesce into a new vision of a future world order after the end of conflict. In 1940, for example, a young John F. Kennedy wrote that the United States "ought to take our part in setting up a world order that will prevent the rise of a militaristic dictatorship."[77] Or, as Churchill put it in a speech at Harvard University in September 1943, in which he quoted Kipling, "It must be world order or anarchy."[78]

There are many reasons why the world order that emerged out of World War II proved far more enduring than that which followed the previous world war. One reason that is sometimes overlooked, however, is that it set tighter definitional bounds on the concept. More specifically, the architects of the post-1945 order sought to strike a judicious and stable balance between the utopian idea of the "world state" and a more prosaic attempt to build a structure around the existing "balance of power." The aspirations of the advocates of the "world state" were knocked down, above all, by the lack of any enthusiasm for a global "police force" that would be required to give such a body legitimacy. "Whatever its theoretical merits," noted a British Foreign Office memorandum shared with the Americans in July 1944, "this postulates a greater advance in international co-operation than States are yet prepared to make, as it implies the existence of a world State."[79]

At the founding United Nations Organization in conference in San Francisco the following year, senior American delegates were particularly allergic to anything that assumed this broader form. Sen. Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, a Republican internationalist, indicated that he would resist any measure that allowed the new organization to be presented as an embryonic world state.[80] For the same reason, just as the proposal of a "world police" made no ground, the idea of pooling nuclear weapons technology under U.N. control was similarly abortive. As a 1946 memorandum by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, the only scenario in which disarmament was possible was the "creation of a world state in which all nations surrender sufficient of their sovereignty to assure the rule of law and the prevention, if not of war itself, of illicit means of waging war."[81]

74 "Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)," October 6, 1937, Pres. Speech Oct. 5, 1937/3½, *Foreign Relations of The United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, General I*, 711.00. Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1937v01/d685.

75 "Memorandum by the Secretary of State," November 29, 1937, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East III*, 693.002/407.

76 "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," July 26, 1938, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East, and Africa II*, 865.4016/36.

77 J. Kennedy, *Why England Slept* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1940), 232-233.

78 Renwick, *Fighting with Allies*, 67-8.

79 "Tentative Proposals by the United Kingdom for a General International Organization," July 22, 1944, D.O./Conv.A/Doc. 2, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General, Vol. I*, Lot 60—D 224, Box 57.

80 "Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Tuesday, April 24, 1945, 9:30 a.m., San Francisco," April 24, 1945, U.S. Cr. Min. 14, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Vol. I*, April 24, 1945, Lot 60—D 224, Box 96.

81 "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State—War—Navy Coordinating Committee," January 23, 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; The United Nations, Vol. I*, 811.2423/2—146.

This, of course, had never been the intention of the wartime planners. As the State Department later elaborated, the United Nations was a "means to an end rather than an end in itself." It was in America's interest to preserve the means. But the "real end" was

> progressive development toward a stable world order where law and orderly processes, rather than violence and anarchy, can govern the conduct of nations in their relations with each other.

As means must come before ends, the United Nations was to be understood as "an association of independent states … based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members, rather than as a single world state." It was not designed to "terminate national sovereignty," but rather to "facilitate the joint exercise of it by separate nations acting in friendly cooperation."[82]

On the one hand, then, the idea that a "world state" could eventually emerge out of World War II was consciously counteracted by British and American officials, who set clear bounds on the functioning of the United Nations, in order to smother any such expectations at birth. Yet, the need to invest the idea of world order with some higher sense of purpose, to make good on visionary war aims and to provide that "feeling that people need" also was understood.

The case of Gladwyn Jebb (later, Lord Gladwyn), the senior British diplomat who served as the first acting secretary general of the United Nations, is particularly instructive here. Jebb, who became friends with Henry Kissinger in the mid-1960s, was known within the British foreign office establishment as the advocate of a world order based on a balance of power. In the mid-1930s, Jebb had come to the conclusion that the League of Nations had been fatally weakened by the desire to see it as a staging post towards a possible world state. "The Dictators are right in one thing at least: perpetual peace is a dream, and what is more a bad and essentially unprofitable dream," he wrote. "For it is based on the fallacy that the Kingdom of Heaven is realisable in this world, instead of in the next — or possibly 'within oneself.'"[83]

Nothing that Jebb saw in the maneuvers of the great powers during the course of the war disabused him of this belief in the paramountcy of the balance of power. As he told an audience in Oxford in February 1944, the balance of power lay "at the root of any settlement designed to provide for a long period of peace."[84] It should be

The relative success of the world order built out of 1945 was that it accepted, as its premise, the limits of perfectibility.

said that Jebb was prepared to believe that a world state was a possibility in some distant future. "It may ultimately come about, and indeed I think it probably will," he said. It could be argued,

> with some force, that the whole tendency of modern science and modern inventions lies in the direction of world unity. Radio communications, broadcasting, civil aviation and so on are linking up the various communities and disseminating ideas to an extent never achieved before; and certainly this process will develop and continue.

For the moment, however, he did not believe that any of the great powers would agree to any version of world order that "effectively limits their own ability to look after what they regard, rightly or wrongly, as their 'vital interests.'"[85]

Having arrived back in Britain from San Francisco after the foundation of the United Nations, Jebb became concerned with what he saw as a worrying apathy among his fellow Briton about the new organization. Some of this, he felt, could be explained by the fact that the British government had not been trumpeting its own role in setting up the organization. He felt that the United Kingdom had "played a very great, perhaps even a preponderating part" in what had been agreed at San Francisco. The essential features of the original British papers circulated before Dumbarton Oaks

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82 "Department of State Policy Statement Regarding the United Nations, Washington DC," September 18, 1950, *Executive Secretariat Files, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Vol. II*, Lot 57 D 649.

83 Gladwyn Jebb, "Defence of the West," April 25, 1936, UK National Archives, FCO 73/257, Def/38/1/A.

84 Ibid.

85 Gladwyn Jebb, "Balance of Power lecture, Canning Club, Oxford," February 21, 1944, FCO 73/263, Mis/44/1, UK National Archives.

had all been incorporated in the final Charter of the United Nations. The very basis of the scheme, continued cooperation between the Big Three, "had its origin in this country and was imparted by devious means to our two great Allies." For this reason, he understood why British diplomats did wish to "emphasise our achievements in public, but rather to allow the Americans to claim the principal credit for the production of the Charter as a whole." It was far better, in the long-run, "to regard the World Organisation as their special interest in order that they should play their full part in its operation."[86]

Crucially, however, Jebb felt that undue cynicism about what had been achieved was in danger of undermining the very purpose of the endeavour. Given his previous views, he was not shy to admit that there was "a great deal of truth" that the United Nations might turn out to be a new great power alliance. But he also felt this approach was

negative rather than positive and ignores the hopeful features of the Charter and notably the very fact that a machine will now be constituted whereby the Great Powers can attempt to settle their own difficulties as well as those of other people.

Jebb still saw the building of world organization in instrumental terms — as a "machine" for the management of international relations. And yet, he also felt the aspiration and hope that it held out was a force in its own right, providing that linear sense of direction and higher purpose to foreign policy, in a way that had been absent before 1938. Thus, this arch advocate of the balance of power, quoted the Biblical Proverb: "Where there is no vision the people perish."[87]

Conclusion

Unlikely as it might seem, there were indeed common threads that linked together figures as diverse as Kipling, Wells, both Roosevelts, Orwell, Churchill, Jebb, Nixon, and Kissinger and shaped their collective worldviews. The first was a yearning for some form of order, equilibrium and stability in international affairs — or at the very least, the prevention of "anarchy." The second

was a consciousness about the fragility of Western civilization, caught between so-called revanchists or savages who would upset the "natural order" and an uncertain future in which the West's privileged position would no longer be guaranteed. Within the vague and unbounded aspiration to build international order were oscillations between utopian prophesying and doom-laden visions of barbarism and anarchy.

Even after 1945, similar themes of civilizational angst and a desire to derive meaning from the march of history were never far below the surface when the question of world order was discussed. This essay began with a discussion of Henry Kissinger's 2014 book. As a prelude to any of his work on foreign policy, however, Kissinger's Harvard undergraduate thesis of 1951 wrestled with "The Meaning of History," a study of Toynbee, Spengler and Kant. He wrote:

Even though our contemplation of history may yield as its deepest meaning a feeling of limits as the basis of the ultimate moral personality of man we are still faced with the fact that no civilization has yet been permanent, no longing completely fulfilled, no answer ever gone unchallenged.

On the one hand, the work revealed the suspicion of "universalism" that shaped Kissinger's later statecraft. On the other, he could not deny the irreducible human feeling that there was always "a task to be achieved" as "an expression of the soul."[88]

The relative success of the world order built out of 1945 was that it accepted, as its premise, the limits of perfectibility. But the human urge for perfection could never be wished away. The quest for world order could never be truly complete. In June 1965, both Lord Gladwyn and Henry Kissinger were at the Serbellino Conference on Conditions of World Order, organized by the French political scientist, journalist, and philosopher, Raymond Aron. The meeting brought together a select group of theorists and former practitioners, and the proceedings were recorded by Stanley Hoffman, one of Kissinger's colleagues at Harvard. Hoffman's record of the event underscores one of the arguments of this essay — that world order could be the vaguest of aspirations, but that the

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86 Gladwyn Jebb, "Reflections on San Francisco," July 25, 1945 U 5998/12/70, *Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series 1, Vol. 1: The Conference at Potsdam July — August 1945,* Item 407, 893-897.

87 Ibid.

88 Henry Kissinger, *The Meaning of History (Reflections on Toynbee, Spengler and Kant)* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University undergraduate honors thesis, 1951), 21-22; 24-26.

pursuit of world order was an almost irresistible urge, because it spoke to the most fundamental philosophical and existential questions, from the future of humanity to the purpose of politics.

It was clear from the earliest proceedings that "world order" meant something different to almost every participant. Some definitions were "purely descriptive" — that is, a diagnosis of the existing state of international affairs and an assessment of the relationship among the different parts. Some participants defined world order in more expansive terms, as "minimum conditions for existence … [or] coexistence." Others defined it in normative, or visionary terms, "as the conditions for the good life."

As Hoffman described, Aron struggled to control the discussion or keep it within bounds, urging the speakers to avoid "platitudes" or simply resort to "an acrimonious reproduction of the conflicts of values that exist in the world." He ventured his own definition of world order as the conditions that would help mankind "not merely … avoid destruction, but to live together relatively well in one planet." For the most part, however, the conference attendees could not get past these first principles to move to the actual foreign policy challenges facing of the era. In the end, Hoffman observed a fatal split between the "builders and the critics." The builders were those whose minds were "primarily devoted to the creation of a system or the advocacy of a method or the proselytizing of an idea." The critics were those who were mostly concerned with "the analysis of reality, with the dissection (or vivisection) of systems, utopias and theories."[89]

Yet, to return to the fundamental point of this essay, the definition of world order matters much less than the sense in which it has been held out as the ultimate goal of Western statecraft. A month before the 1968 presidential election, which brought Nixon into office, the Policy Planning Council noted that attempts to define world order had proved extremely challenging in previous years. It remained crucial, however, that the "sense of direction" in foreign policy was still maintained:

> "World order" is not a goal that can be defined with any precision. The time is clearly not ripe for detailed blueprints. But that is not what is needed. People are

surfeited with oratory and have come to distrust grand designs. What they basically want is a sense of direction with which they can identify, and a clearer understanding of the kind of international relationships toward which we can reasonably hope to progress in the next decade.[90]

As H.G. Wells wrote in 1940, what was really important was not the identity of the people who pursued world order, the timeline on which it was to be achieved or the nature of the utopia they envisaged. He explained:

> No man, no group of men, will ever be singled out as its father or founder. For its maker will be not this man nor that man nor any man but Man, that being who is in some measure in every one of us.

Instead, world order would be like most great civilizational achievements, "a social product" and "collective achievement" of many lives. What really mattered was that people in a century scourged by human destruction were now engaged in this collective effort:

> A growing miscellany of people are saying — it is getting about — that "World Pax is possible," a World Pax in which men will be both united and free and creative. It is of no importance at all that nearly every man of fifty and over receives the idea with a pitying smile. Its chief dangers are the dogmatist and the would-be "leader" who will try to suppress every collateral line of work which does not minister to his supremacy. This movement must be, and it must remain, many-headed. … The new order will be incessant; things will never stop happening. …[91]

The pursuit of world order may indeed be a many-headed monster or the vaguest of aspirations. It is a work of abstract art never complete. It has been associated with some false dawns and great disappointments and no few misadventures. As John Thompson has written, the link between the pursuit of world order and American security and prosperity has always been "hard to sustain when

89 Stanley Hoffman, "Report of the Conference on Conditions of World Order: June 12-19, 1965, Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy," *Daedalus* 95, no. 2 (Spring 1966): 455-478.

90 "U.S. Foreign Policy: Current Issues in a Longer-Term Perspective", Policy Planning Council, December 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, LBJ Archive, University of Texas, National Security File, Box 50.

91 Wells, *The New World Order*.

subjected to sceptical questioning."[92] The lack of concrete definition is at the heart of repeated failures of conception and strategy in the history of Anglo-American statecraft. But it has also provided a sense of continuity, direction, and mission and acted as an antidote to excessive cynicism, fatalism, and short-termism in the making of Anglo-American foreign policy.

It is right to question the assumptions behind ideas of world order, test their philosophical foundations and internal logic, as well as the policy recommendations that arise out of them. But it would be ahistorical and self-immolating to mistake incoherence for purposelessness and abandon the venture entirely. Stripping the altars will not do. ♟

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92 Thompson, *A Sense of Power*, 281-2.

Why Did America Cross the Pacific?

Reconstructing the U.S. Decision to Take the Philippines, 1898-99

Philip Zelikow, JD, PhD

A closer examination of what led President William McKinley to take the Philippines reveals a series of deliberate and thoughtful choices that have often been overlooked or ignored.

Robin Collingwood, a British historian and philosopher, saw history as a reservoir of knowledge gained through instructive re-enactment. Consider Julius Caesar's decision to "cross the Rubicon" with his army and challenge his Roman Republic. To understand Caesar's choice, "This implies envisaging for himself the situation in which Caesar stood, and thinking for himself what Caesar thought about the situation and the possible ways of dealing with it." The work of the historian in this case is not mere reproduction or description. To offer insight, "this re-enactment is only accomplished … so far as the historian brings to bear on the problem all the powers of his own mind and all his knowledge of philosophy and politics." Such critical analysis "is not something secondary to tracing the history of it. It is an indispensable condition of the historical knowledge itself."[1]

This essay offers a micro-historical reconstruction of a fateful choice made by the United States. Satisfactory reconstructions of this kind are rare. When it comes to historical episodes of import, even those that have been extensively written about and researched, it is often difficult to identify when the critical choices actually occurred. It is even more difficult to reconstruct, with a policymaker's eye, the information available at the time, the institutional context, and the plausibly available alternative courses of action.

This essay analyzes the U.S. decision to take the Philippines. It *was* fateful. Since the decision was followed by an ugly war, it seemed even at the time to symbolize a loss of American innocence, or worse, in the country's dealings with the world. By 1934, when the Philippines seemed to be a strategic millstone and the United States chose a path to full independence for the islands, the majority Democrats in Congress led the way, eager to gain American "freedom from the colony."[2]

But before America could gain this "freedom," the American presence in the Philippines became a great pivot point of world history. In 1940 and 1941, Japanese naval planners concluded that any move through the South China Sea into the resource-rich Dutch East Indies and British Malaya had to include an attack on American bases in the Philippines. To the Japanese, this conclusion meant that, if they moved south, war with America was unavoidable. They then developed a war plan that included an opening attack on Pearl Harbor as well as the Philippines.[3]

After World War II, the American presence across the Pacific was vastly enlarged in every way. During and after the Vietnam War, historians again looked back at the 1898-99 decision to take the Philippines. They viewed it as a sort of original sin, one that now seemed to have foreshadowed all the other sins to come.

As in the story of how America stepped across the Pacific, the grand strategies in U.S. international history usually have had a traumatic birth. Grand strategies do not typically arise from visionary thinking about the future. They arise instead from the collective experience of some great disturbance, looking backward at some catalytic episode that practically everyone remembers. As people try to make sense of what has just happened, they construct quick and understandable rival narratives to explain that past, the present, and maybe the future. The shorthand narratives become entrenched, decaying into shibboleths — until the next trauma displaces them. Meanwhile, historians can slowly try to reconstruct what really did happen in the first place.

Yet the rewards of micro-historical reconstruction of fateful choices can be great. The episodes

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1 Robin G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* [1936-1940], edited by Jan van der Dussen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 215; see also William Dray, *History as Re-Enactment: R.G. Collingwood's Idea of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
"In imagining how things might have been different, the restrained counterfactualist tries to understand better what actually did happen." Allan Megill, *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 153. Following on work by James Fearon more than 20 years ago, there is also growing acceptance in political science that "[c]ounterfactuals can alert us to the possible operation of dynamics and pathways that we would otherwise be prone to ignore," Robert Jervis, "Counterfactuals, Causation, and Complexity," in *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics*, eds. Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 309-16.

2 Frank Hindman Golay, *Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations*, 1898-1946 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 443. From the 1920s until 1941, the U.S. Army's top strategic planners had been pressing for a withdrawal from the Philippines and adoption of an Alaska-Hawaii-Panama defensive perimeter in the Pacific. Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 182-83.

3 On this logic chain in the Japanese war planning, see, for example, Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," trans. Robert Scalapino, in *The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941,* ed. James William Morley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 244-48.

are usually ones that people, including most historians, think they already understand. But in my experience the more one digs, the stranger the stories get. That is, the fateful choices become more lifelike, more interesting, and more truly educational.

The Philippines decision was made, principally, by President William McKinley. For generations, McKinley himself and the way he made this decision have seemed like an opaque blur. Some historians see McKinley as a dupe of clever would-be imperialists such as the young Theodore Roosevelt and his influential friend Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge. Or they see him as driftwood pushed about by domestic politics or by great cultural or economic currents, like an American search for new markets in places like China. Or they regard him as a kind of pious nincompoop who, as one standard work puts it, permitted "missionary and business expansionists to persuade him of what he may already have believed."[4]

There is a quote, supposedly from McKinley, that is the perfect caricature. It has McKinley describing how he "went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance" until he saw

> that there was nothing left to do but take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men, for whom Christ also died.

For generation on generation this quotation has been repeated in innumerable accounts, including standard history textbooks. It is catnip for a teacher, a vivid quote to spark up a lecture. Even though the source of the quote, repeating years later what he thought McKinley had said, has long

been suspect, that should hardly get in the way.[5]

In the Philippines case, part of the cartoon is the image of President McKinley himself. There is that dreamy missionary zeal. There is also the view, as another standard work put it, that McKinley "simply lacked ideas .... as usual, he was bereft of ideas."[6]

Even those historians who are more sympathetic to McKinley, either seeing him as a hidden mastermind or agreeing that he seems to have had little choice, have not adequately understood his decision-making process in this case. As this article will show, McKinley made, in fact, five distinct sets of choices. In each he went through a fairly involved set of consultations, gathering information and weighing alternative courses of action.

In his first major public address after his decision, in Boston on February 17, 1899, before a huge crowd gathered in a large hall, McKinley's tone was somber. He gave the crowd not one whit of self-congratulation. "I do not know why in the year 1899 this republic has unexpectedly had placed before it mighty problems which it must face and meet," McKinley announced. "They have come and are here and they could not be kept away."

It was the just-concluded war with Spain. "Many who were impatient for the conflict a year ago," McKinley went on, "apparently heedless of its larger results, are the first to cry out against the far-reaching consequences of their own act." Here he was referring to the opposition Democrats and Populists — then a third party with a strong following in the rural Midwest and South. In early 1898 the Democrats and Populists, along with many members of his own Republican Party, had joined the clamor for war with Spain. Then, clearly referring to himself and his conservative Republican allies who had been less interested in war or expansion, McKinley reminded his

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4 George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 320.

5 The original source is a 1903 article by James Rusling, recounting a meeting with President McKinley in November 1899. "Interview With President McKinley," *Christian Advocate,* January 22, 1903. Rusling was no official; he had been at the White House with the General Missionary Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church and years later wrote up what he recalled for a church newspaper. McKinley was a lifelong Methodist. He had hosted a substantial White House reception for the committee the previous evening and this committee of Methodist bishops and church leaders had come to see the president and deliver a formal resolution of thanks. According to Rusling, McKinley asked the committee to play a role helping the Army vet people being appointed as Methodist chaplains (one such had just been court-martialed for misconduct). Since the Philippines issue was then much in the news, McKinley added an explanation of the reasons for his decision, which he had made a year earlier.
In Rusling's account, it is impossible to tell whether the high religiosity and florid prose is Rusling's gloss (it turns out that Rusling had a characteristic style in these things) or was the style McKinley chose to adopt for this particular group. It is certainly not the way McKinley spoke about these matters to his colleagues in government.
Yet it is, of course, the florid style and the religiosity that have given the quote its persistent allure. There are much more contemporaneous and detailed accounts of McKinley explaining his reasons, displaying quite a mastery of the substance, without any such diverting artifice or haloed color. See Ephraim K. Smith, "'A Question From Which We Could Not Escape': William McKinley and the Decision to Acquire the Philippine Islands," *Diplomatic History* 9, no. 4 (October 1985): 363-75; see also Lewis Gould, *The Spanish-American War and President McKinley* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1982), 109.

6 Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), 108, 113. Karnow's work is deservedly well-regarded. But, shaped by his own experience with the Vietnam War, Karnow also exemplifies the jaundiced mind-set.
For background on the historiographical debate, see James Field Jr., "American Imperialism: The 'Worst Chapter' in Almost Any Book," and comments by Walter LaFeber and Robert Beisner, *American Historical Review* 83 (June 1978): 644-83; and Ephraim Smith, "William McKinley's Enduring Legacy: The Historiographical Debate on the Taking of the Philippine Islands," in *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath,* ed. James Bradford (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 205-50.

audience, "Those who dreaded war most and whose every effort was directed to prevent it, had fears of new and grave problems that might follow its inauguration."

McKinley did not offer his audience much optimism. He did not borrow so much as a word from the political or economic arguments that the expansionist jingoes had been making to defend the taking of the Philippines. Instead, his message was that "Grave problems come in the life of a nation" and that "the generation on which they are forced cannot avoid the responsibility of honestly striving for their solution."[7]

It remains then to better understand just how these "grave problems," seemingly so unavoidable, had actually arisen. Why, in a war to end years of bloody fighting and devastation in nearby Cuba, did the United States end up becoming the ruler of the faraway Philippine Islands? True, the Filipinos, like the nearby Cubans, had also rebelled against Spanish rule. But hardly anyone in the United States had noticed or cared.

Also, the Philippines were really far away. They were a month's journey by steamship from California. They were a vast chain of thousands of islands. Their population was large, about 10 percent of the population of the entire United States (about 7.5 million at a time when there were 75 million in the United States). Moreover, the United States had no colonial service. Its regular Army was tiny, about 28,000 strong. So, simply on these bare facts, an American conquest of the Philippines would seem absurdly impractical. How and why then did the United States of America take such a fateful step across the Pacific?

Dewey to Manila, April to May 1898

If there was a war with Spain, everyone knew the issue would be Cuba. Since the 1820s, Spain's only remaining colonies in the Western Hemisphere were Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Cubans had rebelled and fought a "10 years war" from 1868 to 1878. War broke out again in 1895. Years of violence across the island had become a bloody stalemate. Neither side could defeat the other. Spain would not grant independence. The Cubans would not settle for anything less.

It was obvious to Americans at the time that the United States might get pulled in. There was no mystery there. Any administration from that day to

this, confronted with such awful conditions in that enormous neighboring island, would be arguing about whether or how to try to stop it. And back then Cuba was much more important to America than it is today. Many Americans had direct interests of every kind on both sides. The Cuban rebellion was headquartered in New York City. Many of the rebel leaders were American citizens. They called loudly for American intervention to stop the suffering.

In 1898, the opposition Democrats and Populists were united in favor of intervention in Cuba. It is easy to see why. Flip through the pages of the

> **Grand strategies do not typically arise from visionary thinking about the future. They arise instead from the collective experience of some great disturbance...**

Congressional Record of the time. The volume might fall open to remarks such as these, from a Kansas congressman, a Populist, that the past two years have been "years of blood and carnage; two years of nameless atrocities practiced upon the innocent and helpless portion of the Cuban population; two years of waiting and vacillation on the part of our Government; two years of our quiet consent to these butcheries." The congressman suspected that McKinley stood by because he and other conservatives were "under the powerful influence of bond syndicates" that had loaned money to Spain and were "being controlled more by commercial considerations than by the interests of humanity and the cause of freedom."[8]

While the Democrats called for war, the majority Republicans were split. Conservative Republicans tended to see the war fever as a press-fueled distraction from more important matters. They thought a war might be bad for business.

President McKinley had little desire for war and little interest in expanding America's domain. His

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7 The details of the Boston speech are all from a pamphlet prepared at the time that included photographs of the hall and the text of McKinley's address as taken down by *The Boston Globe*. *Souvenir of the Visit of President McKinley and Members of the Cabinet to Boston, February 1899* (Boston: Home Market Club, 1899).

8 Rep. Jeremiah Botkin, *Congressional Record*, April 12, 1898, 4149, 5151.

most trusted advisers felt the same way.[9]

McKinley was a private man of relatively modest personal means. He was devoted to his wife, an invalid whose health had broken after the death of their child. He was the last American president whose demeanor and values would now be called Victorian. He was soberly dressed, very concerned for the proprieties of public appearance and behavior, religious, dignified, and virtuous.

Outsiders often misjudged McKinley. Careful, gentle, and conscientious in his personal manner, he was often assumed to be dull and weak. He was neither.

McKinley probably had more personal experience as a front-line combat soldier than any American president in history except for George Washington. The last veteran of the Civil War to serve as president, he had experienced that war from start to finish. He had enlisted as a private

elect. How shall I address you?" "Call me Major," McKinley replied. "I earned that. I am not so sure of the rest."[10]

Returning after the war to his native Ohio, the major became a lawyer, gaining renown for defending striking miners. As a Republican politician, he was mentored by some of Ohio's most famous officeholders, including Presidents Rutherford B. Hayes and James Garfield, men who had known McKinley during the war. McKinley's father had been an ironworker and McKinley's politics were the politics of economic growth and tariff protection of American business.

McKinley held his seat in Congress in a battleground district of a battleground state. In the tightly matched politics of the 1880s and 1890s, Ohio was usually the crucial swing state (along with New York and Indiana). McKinley held on because he could reach some Democratic and independent voters. He was known as an honest man. His political style was not fiery or inspiring; it was amiable and deliberate.

One of the great journalists of his generation, William Allen White, recalled an interview with President McKinley. He went to the president's modest home in Canton, Ohio. By then a heavy man but "never paunchy," McKinley was clean-shaven and immaculately dressed. He laid his cigar aside so it would not show in a picture. "We must not let the young men of this country see their President smoking!"

For McKinley, getting his War Department ready for war was a hard problem.

in a regiment from his native Ohio. He had been promoted after a display of personal heroism on the terrible battlefield of Antietam, driving a supply wagon forward to beleaguered front-line troops under heavy enemy fire, an episode that stayed in the memories of all who witnessed it. Much of his fighting was as a cavalryman in the campaigns of the Shenandoah Valley, ending the war with the rank of major. One old comrade from the war wrote to McKinley after he was elected president, confessing that, "I knew you as a soldier, as a congressman, as a governor, and now as president-

"I was sweating," White recalled, "for it was a hot day. He was stainless, spotless, apparently inwardly cool and outwardly unruffled. I thought then, and I think now, that he sensed what I was seeking and guarded it from me, maybe consciously." White recalls that "his mistrust was sweet and friendly and was revealed only by the guarded complacence in what he said. He refused to tousle his hair politically. He was the statue in the park speaking."[11]

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9 Another reason the war over Cuba is not mysterious is because the quality of historical work on the events leading to war is now very high. John Offner devoted much of his professional life to a thorough scouring of the evidence on both sides of the Atlantic. His account of the diplomacy and the run-up to the war is definitive. See John Offner, *An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States & Spain Over Cuba, 1895-1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

10 H. Wayne Morgan, *William McKinley and His America* (Kent: Kent State University Press, rev. ed., 2003), 26. The best biographies of McKinley are this one and the knowledgeable, beautifully written evocation by Margaret Leech, *In the Days of McKinley* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959). Nick Kapur has placed McKinley's character firmly in the Victorian cultural context (including that era's ethic of exhibiting manliness with rationality and self-restraint, rather than strenuous demonstration) along with other aspects of his values, including the then-common belief in arbitration of international disputes. Nick Kapur, "William McKinley's Values and the Origins of the Spanish-American War: A Reinterpretation," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (March 2011): 18-38 (though Kapur can't resist the silly Rusling quote).

11 William Allen White, *The Autobiography of William Allen White* (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 333.

That was the McKinley outsiders saw. His path to the presidency had not been easy. The nomination fight inside the Republican Party had been the hardest part. To win, McKinley had taken on his party's leading political bosses.

Through a political adviser, businessman Mark Hanna, McKinley had been offered a deal. If he promised to make one of the bosses the secretary of the Treasury, the boss would help clear the way for McKinley to get the nomination. One of those present remembered that, hearing this offer, "McKinley's face grew serious — in fact, hard." He remained silent for a while and then said, "Mark, some things come too high. If I were to accept the nomination on those terms, the place would be worth nothing to me and less to the people. If those are the terms, I am out of it."

McKinley and his allies had gone on to win the party nomination by beating the party bosses. They had outfought them with an extraordinarily well-organized grass-roots effort among the state party conventions.[12]

McKinley came to the presidency hoping to concentrate on domestic matters, working closely with Congress. Most congressmen liked him. One frequent opponent (Sen. George Hoar of Massachusetts) acknowledged that McKinley's "great wisdom and tact and his delightful individual quality" gave him unusual influence.[13]

The waspish Henry Adams, a longtime White House watcher from his perch on the other side of Lafayette Park, usually reflected the "smart" Washington view that McKinley was little more than an amiable figurehead. Adams got some advice from his longtime friend John Hay, who had been an aide to Lincoln and was then in London as McKinley's ambassador to Britain. Hay warned Adams.

> [D]on't you go to making mistakes about McKinley! He is no tenderfoot — he has a habit of getting there. Many among the noble and the pure have had occasion to change their minds about him.[14]

Taking office in 1897, McKinley had chosen a Cabinet with carefully balanced political interests. McKinley soon came to regret some of these choices. At the State Department, McKinley had already been working around his senile secretary, John Sherman. He replaced Sherman as soon as the war with Spain began in April 1898.

For McKinley, getting his War Department ready for war was a hard problem. His secretary of war, Russell Alger, was a former governor of Michigan. The War Department's deputy head (then called the "adjutant-general") was a general named Henry Corbin.

The U.S. Army then had only 28,000 regulars, scattered around the country in 78 posts; the largest had a garrison of fewer than 850. The Army had leveled off at this strength since the mid-1870s. It was about one-twentieth the size of the German army and a good deal smaller even than the army of Mexico. It was not "that there was opposition to a proper military establishment," Corbin recalled later, "but rather that the people as a whole were indifferent about it, fascinated, as they were, with the wonderful growth and development of the country then going on."

Corbin had seen combat both in the Civil War and later skirmishes against Indian tribes. Where he could, he had arranged peace with Indians. He would have preferred peace with Spain. With the Civil War 33 years in the past, Corbin thought most Americans had forgotten what real war was like. "Only the poetry and fiction of war existed; the actual hardships and privations of war our young men knew nothing about."[15]

Fortunately for McKinley, the first actions in any war with Spain would fall to the Navy. The Navy would be ready. It had been developing plans for a possible war with Spain for years, after the Cubans began their latest revolt. Naturally its plans mainly focused on operations in the Caribbean.

Also fortunate for McKinley was that Secretary of the Navy John D. Long was the president's close friend. Raised in Maine, Long had made a legal and political career in Massachusetts. An occasional poet and playwright, Long had a gracious style that made him a popular speaker of the Massachusetts House, then governor, then member of Congress. It was in the House of Representatives during the 1880s that Long and then-Rep. McKinley became friends.

Long's deputy at the Navy Department was a young up-and-comer from New York, Theodore Roosevelt. A prolific writer, Roosevelt had written

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12 Karl Rove, *The Triumph of William McKinley: Why the Election of 1896 Still Matters* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015) offers the most detailed account of McKinley's road to the candidacy, which was a much more challenging path than the one he faced in the general election against Bryan. The quote on McKinley's reaction to the 1895 proposal conveyed by Hanna is on page 134.

13 Morgan, *William McKinley*, 210.

14 Hay to Adams, May 9, 1898, in *Letters of John Hay*, vol. 3 (New York: Gordian Press, 1969) (reprinting a privately printed collection of 1908), 122.

15 On the size of the U.S. Army, see Edward Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 3-4. Corbin quoted from his private autobiography, completed in 1906, 83 and 88, filed in the Corbin Papers, Box 11, Library of Congress.

a good history of the naval War of 1812 and was devoted to naval readiness. McKinley and Long knew that Roosevelt was an outspoken expansionist. They had appointed him as a concession to the lobbying efforts of Roosevelt's similarly inclined friend, Massachusetts Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge.

Long, who was nearly 60, enjoyed Roosevelt, who was about to turn 40. Long regarded his deputy about the way a parent might regard an exceptionally precocious but somewhat wild teenager. To his diary, Long appraised Roosevelt

The months leading to war had taken a toll on McKinley. He seemed visibly careworn and losing sleep.

as a man "so enthusiastic and loyal that he is in certain respects invaluable; yet I lack confidence in his good judgment and discretion. [Roosevelt] goes off very impulsively …. He has been of great use; a man of unbounded energy and force, and thoroughly honest — which is the main thing. … His forte is his push. He lacks the serenity of discussion."[16]

As the Navy planned for a war in the Caribbean, one of the lesser planning problems among its officers was: In a war with Spain, what should be done with the Navy's Asiatic squadron? Since the 1830s the U.S. Navy had maintained a few warships in Pacific waters to protect American merchantmen from pirates and show the flag. The ships usually called at ports in China and Japan, and occasionally in Korea.

In the Navy's first plans, the Asiatic squadron would go after Spain's ships and its Pacific base in the Philippines, in Manila Bay. That way the

squadron could eliminate the Spanish threat to America's Pacific commerce. Also, any gains in Manila might then become bargaining leverage for peace talks. This sort of logic was familiar to any student of the only recent transoceanic naval wars anyone could study, the wars of the rival empires long ago during the age of sail.

Some naval officers had another idea for the Asiatic squadron: Send it all the way to the Atlantic Ocean to attack Spain's Canary Islands, near the Spanish coast. But this idea seemed too risky and impractical.[17]

Long relied on the career officials running the Navy bureaus. A special planning board had junked the Canary Islands attack idea by the summer of 1897. It went back to the Manila Bay objective, which would attack the nearby enemy and might give the Americans "a controlling voice, as to what should become of the islands, when the final settlement was made."[18]

Why do anything with the Asiatic squadron at all? Why not just let them keep sailing around doing what they usually did? There were two problems, which can be summarized in shorthand as coal and neutrality.

This was an age in which the steamships ran on hundreds of tons of coal, which had to be regularly resupplied from a place where thousands of tons of coal could be stored and transferred into ship bunkers. Coal was not the only reason for a base or friendly port. The ships also needed access to repair facilities as well as occasional supplies of food and water. But coal was the most complex problem, in part because it was so difficult to store and transfer large amounts of coal at sea and to transfer it between ships. In East Asia, the United States "had no docking or coaling facilities for its handful of vessels and was completely dependent upon the British and the Japanese for these services."[19]

If war broke out with Spain, the U.S. squadron on the East Asian coast could sail the 700 miles from Hong Kong to Manila in less than a week, with all the coal its ships could carry. But unless the ships

16 John Davis Long, *America of Yesterday: As Reflected in the Journal of John Davis Long*, ed. Lawrence Shaw Mayo (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly, 1923), 168-69, 186, 188 (entries for April 25 and May 5, 1898).

17 The authoritative source is John A.S. Grenville, "American Naval Preparations for War with Spain, 1896-1898," *Journal of American Studies* 2, no. 1 (April 1968): 33-47; see also John A.S. Grenville & George Berkeley Young, "The Influence of Strategy Upon History: The Acquisition of the Philippines," in *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy*, 1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 267-76. Grenville's 1966 account is useful but was partly superseded once he discovered the work of the 1897 Sicard Board, as recounted in his 1968 article. See also David Trask, *The War With Spain in 1898* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 77-78; and Mark Hayes, "War Plans and Preparations and Their Impact on U.S. Naval Operations in the Spanish-American War," March 1998, available in the online reading room of the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC).

18 The quote is from the Sicard Board plan of June 1897. The Philippines operations are treated in just one paragraph in the plan. Grenville, "American Naval Preparations," 43.

19 Seward Livermore, "American Naval-Base Policy in the Far East, 1850-1914," *Pacific Historical Review* 13, no. 2 (June 1944): 113, 116; see also John Maurer, "Coal, Oil, and American Naval Strategy, 1898-1925," *Naval War College Review* 34, no. 6 (November 1981): 60, 62.

could secure a new base, they would have to sail around for a few weeks until the coal and other supplies ran low and then go off to some place where they could put thousands of tons of coal back in their fuel bunkers. The closest American coaling station was in Hawaii, established by agreement with the Hawaiians in 1887.

Then there were the problems of neutral rights. If there was a war with Spain all the usual ports of call for America's Asiatic squadron — Hong Kong, Singapore, and Nagasaki — would be in neutral countries such as Britain and Japan. Under the prevailing understanding of neutral rights, rights the United States had loudly insisted upon during its civil war, a neutral country could not host and supply ships of a power that was at war. If the ships of the belligerent power did not leave, the neutral power would have to intern them and their sailors. That meant that the neutral power would impound the ships and hold the sailors until they could be returned home in some neutral way.

In short, the Asiatic squadron would not be able to stay where it was, based in Hong Kong. The squadron would have to leave. Where could it go after sailing around for a while? The only possible places would be to the nearest American coaling station, which was thousands of miles away in Hawaii, or go all the way home to the nearest U.S. naval base, in California. If that happened the Asiatic squadron might play no useful part in the war at all. Worse, the squadron's withdrawal thousands of miles away would then open up the Asiatic shipping lanes to a potential Spanish attack on American merchantmen, since the Spanish did have an Asiatic base, in Manila Bay.

The only other choice was for the squadron to attack Manila Bay. There it could try to blockade the Spanish for a few weeks, until the American squadron ran short on coal and had to run home. Or, more risky, the squadron could attack the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay and try to seize it to turn it into an American base.

There was then little geopolitics or grand strategy in the paragraph of the Navy plan that dealt with the Asiatic squadron. There was a more banal question: What are we going to do with the Asiatic squadron during a war with Spain? Something had to be found for the ships to do. They could not just hang out in East Asia because of the neutrality problem in the region's ports of call. So, unless they had an object, the handful of warships would have to spend a month sailing home and effectively sit out the war.

If the Navy did not want to bring the ships the long way home, it had to find something for them to do in the Atlantic, like the Canary Islands scheme, or else send them to attack Manila. Of those two options, Manila was judged to be more practical, if risky.

That risky option was therefore what the Navy expected the Asiatic squadron to do. It was led by Commodore George Dewey, a 60 year-old Vermonter who had been in the Navy since he arrived at the Naval Academy at age 17. He had last seen combat in the Civil War. But he had wanted this sea duty and he had an aggressive spirit. That was the spirit needed for this mission, which had a bit of a "win or die" atmosphere about it. If something went badly wrong with his attack, he would be thousands of miles away from any U.S. base to which he could retreat.

When war came, the main U.S. naval forces were concentrated in the Caribbean and the Atlantic to be ready around Cuba. The five remaining battleships were assigned to the Caribbean and Atlantic. So were most of the modern cruisers. Of the 15 modern (armored or protected) cruisers in the Navy, Dewey's squadron had only four.

In principle, Dewey's squadron could still outgun the Spanish ships in Manila Bay. But Dewey's ships had to run through the entrance to the bay, which could easily be covered by shore batteries and mined. Then, even if they ran that gauntlet, Dewey's ships would have to pummel the Spanish vessels that might be supported by shore batteries.

The Spanish understood all of this. They too had expected and planned for possible war with the United States. They had developed the right kind of defensive plans for Manila Bay.

But the Spanish had not implemented those plans. They had not installed enough of the needed artillery, observation posts, or mines. An intrepid American consul in Manila observed the Spanish preparations and kept Dewey informed, escaping Manila to join Dewey just as the war began.[20]

After a mysterious explosion sank the U.S. battleship *Maine*, then visiting Havana harbor, on February 15, 1898, preparations for a war with Spain quickened. Dewey had been told to gather his squadron in Hong Kong and prepare.

There is an often-repeated story about how Roosevelt and Lodge schemed to send orders to Dewey to attack the Philippines on a day in February while Long was out of the office. The story is a myth that Lodge embellished in a later memoir. In fact, the orders that went out when Long was

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20 Ronald Spector, *Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1974), 42-54.

out that day had followed up on prior plans. Long reviewed them on his return to the office.[21]

Relations were broken and war began on April 21. That day Long walked over to see President McKinley.

It was a short walk. Back then the White House had no West Wing. Long would have strolled on a short path by some gardens between the State, War and Navy Building over to the door to the executive mansion. He was used to this. He would sometimes go over at night, dropping in on his friend to join a family dinner or while the president was reading the paper in the evening.

The Navy Department, the State Department, and the War Department were housed in the new ornate building completed in 1888, just west of the White House. Called the State, War and Navy Building until after World War II, this is now the Eisenhower Executive Office Building (and has been taken over by staff in the Executive Office of the President).

Before walking to the executive mansion Long had discussed the first set of war orders with his Naval War Board. Then he and McKinley strolled for an hour that afternoon through the streets of Washington.

The months leading to war had taken a toll on McKinley. He seemed visibly careworn and losing sleep. Long noted to his diary that the president "opens his heart to me, with reference to the struggle through which he has been and the anxiety it has involved."

Probably during this walk, Long explained that the Navy's long-standing plans were to send Dewey on to Manila to attack the Spanish forces there. McKinley took this in. But he "preferred to consider the matter a little longer."

A couple of days later, there was still no approval from McKinley. There is no evidence about why he hesitated.

Then news arrived from Dewey. As expected, the British governor in Hong Kong had just communicated the order: Dewey and his warships must leave their neutral harbor immediately. Neutral harbors in China and Japan were also expected to be unavailable, except as way stations home to America.

On Sunday, April 24, Long went back to the White House and reviewed the situation with the president. Now the matter was urgent. What else could Dewey do but go on to Manila Bay, as planned? Long's staff had drafted the order. The president finally approved it.[22]

It took about a week for the Asiatic squadron to reach Manila Bay. On May 1, Dewey's ships fought their battle. During the night, the Americans slipped into the bay without interference. The Spanish warships were engaged. All were sunk or disabled. Not one American life was lost.

What a victory! From top to bottom the country was relieved and electrified by the news. Now what? What could Dewey's squadron do next?

The Navy had not planned for this. The Spanish garrison in Manila remained intact. It did not surrender. Dewey could put some Marines ashore at the Cavite Navy Yard, about eight miles from Manila. He could hang around for a while, patrolling the bay and maintaining a blockade. But he could not remain for months unless he could secure control of the port and its facilities. Dewey could not capture Manila.

After hanging around in Manila Bay for a couple of weeks, Dewey cabled home that even if the Spanish surrendered he could not hold Manila without getting some troops. He estimated the Spanish troop strength at about 10,000 men. There were numerous Filipino rebels hemming in the Spanish by land, "although they are inactive and making no demonstrations." Dewey asked for a "well equipped force of 5000 men."[23]

McKinley had anticipated this request. He had decided to send out an expedition to hold Manila, which Dewey's victory had not quite placed in U.S. hands. A few months later McKinley would smilingly tell a friend, "If old Dewey had just sailed away when he smashed that Spanish fleet, what a lot of trouble he would have saved us." But recounting the matter later in 1898 to a more knowledgeable group, McKinley was less airy. The problem, McKinley explained, was that the battle had

taken place at Manilla and not on the high seas[.] Manilla became a question from which we could not escape. Dewey had to go there to find the Spanish fleet. ... [A]nd having destroyed their fleet Dewey found [Manila] to be the safest and indeed the only harbor

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21 See Grenville and Young, *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy*, 276-78; Trask, *The War With Spain*, 80-81. On Long's review of what Roosevelt had done, see Long, *America of Yesterday*, 168-70.

22 Long, *America of Yesterday*, 184; John Long to Agnes Long, October 9, 1898, Long Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 79, 355-57; Whittlesey to Long, August 22, 1901, Spanish-American War — Battle of Manila Bay, NHHC (online document collection).

23 Dewey to Long, May 15, 1898, Spanish-American War — Blockade and Siege of Manila, NHHC (online document collection).

open to him as by laws of neutrality he was excluded from all other countries[']ports.[24]

Once the post-battle situation became clear, an expedition was put together to secure American occupation of the port. The Army had no plan whatsoever for the Philippines. It began looking frantically for regiments and officers that could go help hold on at least in Manila until there was a peace conference. The Army made its estimates of how many troops were needed to be sure of defeating a Spanish force of about 10,000 troops. The Army and Navy agreed to send some 15,000 to 20,000 troops, including many of the new volunteers enlisted for the war, to have enough soldiers to outnumber the Spanish.

The Army's commanding general, Nelson Miles, clarified the expedition commander's mission. His orders told the commander, Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, that this was not some force "expected to carry on a war to conquer an extensive territory." The expedition was only to establish "a strong garrison to command the harbor of Manila" and to relieve the burden on Dewey's sailors and Marines.[25]

The expedition went out in three waves as the Navy scrounged ships to carry and escort them.[26]

For decades Americans had been arguing about how to assert themselves in the world.

The first group sailed at the end of May and arrived in Manila Bay on July 4. The remaining troops, including Maj. Gen. Merritt, arrived later in July.

Waiting for the expedition week after week, Dewey's situation was uneasy. Word spread that the Spanish were sending a naval force out to recapture Manila and that the force would include battleships that could outgun anything in Dewey's force. Dewey's ships might have to retreat. If American soldiers arrived, they might have to fade into the hills.[27]

Meanwhile, warships from Germany, Britain, France, and Japan arrived in Manila Bay. All these countries already had nearby bases in East Asia. These four squadrons waited watchfully, like carrion birds circling in the sky over a fallen animal. The German force alone was significantly more powerful than Dewey's squadron and, as I discuss below, it was Germany that had the most ambitious designs for the Philippines.

The potential longer-term significance of American occupation of this port began to dawn on both the McKinley administration and the American public. In the United States, the news of Dewey's victory had set off a whirl of speculation. Some wondered whether the United States should even try to take the islands as a possession.

All sorts of pressures in the United States were building about the future of the Philippines. For decades Americans had been arguing about how to assert themselves in the world. The American population was one of the largest in the world, and the U.S. economy was already the world's largest. But no one was quite sure what being a world power meant.

The 1890s had been a decade of great contrasts of old ways and new machines, as well as all sorts of domestic scars and divisions — old wounds of North and South plus new wounds from battles between labor and management in all the new industries. Amid this division, perhaps because of it, shows of patriotism, parades, and flag-waving were so common and exuberant as to almost seem neurotic, as if a frantic outward display of pride and union was the constant, soothing balm applied to ease so much inward pain and striving.

Some leading Americans had looked for ways the

24 "If old Dewey …," H.H. Kohlsaat, *From McKinley to Harding: Personal Recollections of Our Presidents* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 68. Kohlsaat was an old friend, owner of the *Chicago Times-Herald.* McKinley's more serious explanation was recorded in a detailed handwritten memorandum written by Chandler Anderson immediately after a meeting with President McKinley on November 19, 1898. Anderson was an attorney, secretary to the Anglo-American Joint High Commission, which had recently been appointed to arbitrate various disputes embroiling the United States and Canada. In his meeting with McKinley, Anderson was accompanying one of the commissioners, an influential Boston Republican, Thomas Jefferson Coolidge. Anderson's record of the meeting, in his papers at the Library of Congress, was discovered by Ephraim Smith, who reprinted the memo in full in his article "A Question From Which We Could Not Escape,'" 368-71 (quote on pages 369-70).

25 On the orders and the estimative process to arrive at troop numbers, see Merritt to McKinley, May 13, 1898; Merritt to Corbin, May 17; Miles to Alger, May 18, all in Department of the Army, *Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), 643-44, 648-49, 654, 665.

26 The framing of the expedition is handled well in Leech, *In the Days of McKinley*, 210-11. For the details see War Department memo for Alger for the Cabinet meeting, May 17, 1898, forwarded by Alger to Corbin on May 25; Adee to Alger, May 21 (conveying Dewey information on Spanish strength); Dewey to Long, May 27 (forwarded to Alger); Corbin to Merritt, May 29, in Army, Correspondence, vol. 2, 654, 665, 675, 680.

27 On the situation in Manila Bay and the danger of the Spanish expedition led by Adm. Camara, see Trask, *The War With Spain*, 372-81.

country could show off, could test its strength. But against whom? For what? [28]

Meanwhile, for nearly 20 years since the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the great European powers had been racing to expand their empires, competing in a frenzied land grab to include every open scrap of earth in the world. These scrambles had mainly focused on Africa and Asia. By comparison the Americans had seemed passive, preoccupied with what was going on in their own vast country. "As of the early 1880s educated Americans nearly all doubted the value of colonies and regarded efforts to conquer other populations as morally wrong." But, reading the news of an apparent imperialist consensus in Europe, especially among British Liberals, during the 1880s and after the former "unanimity" of American opinion leaders "had begun to break down."[29]

Some outspoken men believed that the United States had to join this global imperial race and try to catch up. These advocates were called "jingoes," a derision to mock such "by jingo" enthusiasms. The jingoes had applauded in 1893 when Hawaii's American planters and professionals had engineered a coup to overthrow Hawaii's native government. The leaders of the new government wanted to bring Hawaii into the United States. As noted earlier, Hawaii had the only U.S. coaling station in the Pacific and it had long been under American protection. But this Hawaiian government's pleas for annexation had been tabled for nearly five years.

The jingoes did not control the Republican Party in Congress or in the White House. McKinley had finally sent a Hawaiian annexation treaty to the Senate. But McKinley did not expect two-thirds of the Senate to ratify the treaty and he did little to press it.[30]

When the war began, however, Congress immediately moved on the long-simmering Hawaiian question and annexed the islands. A public debate about the Philippine islands had begun. Yet in secret, McKinley wanted to use the Philippine position as a bargaining chip, just as the prewar Navy plans had envisioned. He was prepared to give the islands back to Spain, if that would indeed bring about "an honorable and durable peace." McKinley left in his papers an undated note in which he had jotted: "While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over we must keep what we want."[31]

The Secret Offer, May to June 1898

As spring turned to summer, McKinley's main worry was about how to land troops and win the battles in Cuba. When war came, Alger, the secretary of war, was overwhelmed by his job. The Army had begun the war with no particular plans for how to fight it. To the better-prepared Navy Secretary, Long, it seemed the Army was "ready for nothing at all."[32]

As if to underscore this point, just as the war was getting underway the Army's commanding general, Nelson Miles, wrote to McKinley opposing any expedition to Cuba during the summer of 1898. "This letter reached the President two or three days after war had been declared," Corbin later recorded privately. "It shocked him beyond words. Only on one other occasion did I see him show more feeling. Among other things he said, 'God willing and not failing us, we shall end the war before the General would have us begin operations.

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28 For example in 1895, during the administration of Grover Cleveland, there had been a brief scare about war with Great Britain because the British Empire was supposed to have been bullying Venezuela over a boundary dispute. The furor, ostensibly an invocation of the Monroe Doctrine, by which the United States opposed European imperial ventures in the Western Hemisphere, was more a complaint about supposed British haughtiness. Business and political leaders on both sides had intervened to calm the situation. But, as much as any other episode, it was the neurotic quality of this Venezuela crisis that caused one perceptive historian of the period, Richard Hofstadter, to shake his head about an apparent sort of national "psychic crisis." Richard Hofstadter, "Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny," in *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 145-87.
Kristin Hoganson recasts the psychic crisis as a gender crisis for males seeking martial tests to reaffirm their manhood. She is convincing that gendered insecurities were among the many insecurities of the age. But such insecurities were nonpartisan; they could be found on all sides of the war and expansion issues, and many who supported war in Cuba were against expansion. Her argument does not help much to explain the very specific choices made about the Philippines. Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Hofstadter's essay is still a convincing general scene-setter for the period.
The best analysis of American public opinion about imperial expansion in this period remains Ernest May, *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay* (Chicago, Imprint Publications, rev. ed., 1991). It is a study of the origins and transmission belts for elite opinion. May shows an elite consensus against such expansion before the mid-1890s. The anti-expansionist consensus returned by the early 1900s. In between, the elites were split. This invited the wider public to pick a side.
See also the cultural survey of Gilded Age attitudes toward the world thoroughly canvassed in Frank Ninkovich, *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865-1890* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); and the fine period portrait in David Traxel, *1898: The Birth of the American Century* (New York: Random House, 1998).

29 May, *American Imperialism*, 166.

30 Ernest May, *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), 122-23.

31 "While we are conducting war …," Charles Olcott, *The Life of William McKinley*, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916), 165.

32 Long, *America of Yesterday*, 183 (entry for April 20).

He little understands me; no more does he know the temper of our people. I deplore the war, but it must be short and quick to the finish.'"[33]

With Alger difficult and Miles untrustworthy, McKinley decided to oversee the War Department as directly as he could. He personally supervised the Cuban campaign plan. To help, McKinley relied on Corbin, who was always just a short walk away in the new building west of the executive mansion. At the Navy Department, Long grew wearier as the conflict went on. With his young deputy, Roosevelt, off to the Army, his new deputy turned out to be very competent. But Long himself flagged. By mid-May, a McKinley aide observed,

> Secretary Long moves along quietly. He is not sure-footed as his friends would have us believe. He hesitates, questions too much, seems hampered by too great conservatism and often he seems to be in the position of the surgeon who fails of ... 'nerve' and decision at the critical moment.[34]

McKinley ordered the creation of a War Room in the executive mansion. It was staffed with clerks and telegraphers; large maps were hung with pins stuck in to show the positions of troops and ships. McKinley would often be there, reading cables as they came in and studying the maps.[35]

McKinley's style of leadership was not charismatic. He did not point the way and rally the troops. Cabinet meetings remained informal. McKinley might open with a story to put others at ease.

His was another kind of leadership style — that of a judge. People would make their arguments. He would hear them out, not revealing his own views until the time for decision. When all had spoken, McKinley would state a decision and go around asking, "You agree?"

To one of McKinley's aides, the president "is the strong man of the Cabinet, the dominating force; but with it all, is a gentleness and graciousness in dealing with men that some of his greatest victories have been won apparently without any struggle." His later secretary of war, Elihu Root, remembered McKinley as a "man of great power because he was absolutely indifferent to credit. His desire was to 'get it done!' He cared nothing about the credit, but McKinley always had his way."[36]

The new secretary of state, William Day, was used to McKinley's style. A former judge from Ohio, Day had been the deputy to his aged predecessor in the job, John Sherman. From the start, it was Day who had done most of the foreign policy work for the president. As soon as war began, McKinley pushed Sherman out and Day took over the top job.

A small-framed, thin-faced mustachioed lawyer nearing 50, Day had long been a fact-finder for McKinley on many problems. He was discreet and thorough. McKinley's secretary noted, "Here is a quiet, one might almost say country, lawyer who has so conducted the foreign affairs of this administration as to win unanimous commendation."[37]

As soon as he was elevated, Day named his deputy, picking the best expert on international law that he could find. This was a bearded, stocky former State Department official (and Democrat), a Columbia professor named John Bassett Moore.[38] Day and Moore were McKinley's allies when he made his high-risk move to use the Philippines as a bargaining chip.

After the Spanish defeat at Manila Bay, there was turmoil in Madrid. London got word that the queen regent and key ministers might be ready for a deal, to give up Cuba in exchange for peace. The British came to the U.S. ambassador in London, John Hay, who relayed the private question: What peace terms might America accept?[39]

Moore promptly drafted an answer. Terms could be generous "if *immediately* proposed by Spain, directly or by some mediator." Spain would evacuate Cuba. The United States would manage a transition of power to the Cubans. Spain would

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33 Corbin added that, after getting this letter, "while treating the General [Miles] with the consideration due his rank and position, [McKinley] never sought his advice and never gave it any weight when offered." Autobiography, Corbin Papers, 88-89.

34 George Cortelyou journal entry, May 15, 1898, George Cortelyou Papers, Library of Congress. Cortelyou was McKinley's main secretary, preparing and handling correspondence and paperwork. Cortelyou made his journal notes at the time in shorthand; they were typed up much later.

35 Leech, *In the Days of McKinley*, 232-38.

36 "Strong man," Cortelyou Journal, Cortelyou Papers, June 17, 1898, Library of Congress. The Root quote is from Morgan, *William McKinley*, 210-11. Cortelyou commented to his diary that "The President is alert and when all the facts are known it will be seen how well he has kept the reins in his own hands." Cortelyou Papers (entry for August 8).

37 Cortelyou Papers, April 16, 1898; for a contemporary and flattering biographical sketch of Day, see Henry McFarland, "William R. Day: A New Statesman of the First Rank," *Review of Reviews* (U.S.) (September 1898): 275-79.

38 Moore impressed Long too. "The most accomplished man that has yet been connected with that Department," he noted in his diary. Long, *America of Yesterday*, 189 (entry for May 6).

39 The question was posed to Hay on May 8 by Joseph Chamberlain, the very pro-American colonial secretary. Hay's original message relaying the question did not name Chamberlain as the source; Day asked for this clarification and Hay provided it. See May, *Imperial Democracy*, 224; Offner, *An Unwanted War*, 198.

cede Puerto Rico to the United States. If the Spanish did that, then the Philippines would "be allowed to remain with Spain." In the Pacific the United States would only want "a coaling station," either in the Philippines or in the neighboring Spanish-held Carolines island group.[40]

On May 11, about a week after news had arrived about Dewey's naval victory in Manila Bay, Day put this proposal for a deal before the Cabinet. Alger disagreed, but there is no evidence why. There the matter rested for a couple of weeks.

McKinley was preoccupied with plans to launch a large U.S. expedition to eastern Cuba. This expedition was to land near the port of Santiago de Cuba, where the Navy had just bottled up the fleet that Spain had sent to Cuba. It was a risky plan, relying on a lot of improvisation and luck. The Americans would try to establish a firm hold in eastern Cuba and put off the huge challenge of trying to take on Havana, where the Spanish had the bulk of their strength.[41]

Once that expedition plan was set, the diplomats went back to the peace move. Day's plan now was to bypass the Cabinet and take the proposed bargain directly to McKinley. He would leave it to the president to "ascertain what his 'jingoes' thought about it." Day was "very strongly opposed to retaining the Philippines, except possibly some coaling station in them, upon any terms."

Day met with McKinley. They agreed on what to do. Day then instructed Hay, his man in London, to float the deal. The president, "speaking for himself, would be inclined to grant terms of peace" with the Philippines to remain with Spain, ceding only a coaling station, if Spain would give up Cuba. This deal would avoid the need for "further sacrifice and loss of life." But Day asked Hay to warn that "Prolongation of war may change this materially."

To help make sure the proposed deal got through to Madrid, Day apparently also privately briefed the British ambassador in Washington. That envoy informed his French, German, and Austrian colleagues. Thus the terms soon became known on the diplomatic circuit, though there was nothing in public that linked the offer directly with McKinley.

Nor is there any evidence that this secret diplomatic move was discussed with other members of McKinley's Cabinet. No one appears to have known about McKinley's personal authorization except for Day and Moore in Washington, and Hay in London. Day reminded Hay to hide McKinley's hand in this. The proposal to give up the Philippines could not be seen as "coming from us."[42]

Secrecy for McKinley was vital; he was taking a great risk by making this offer. Spain was the enemy. Its rule in Cuba was regarded as a loathsome tyranny. Its rule in the Philippines was getting similar attention. The jingoes, like Lodge and Roosevelt (then a colonel helping to lead a volunteer regiment preparing to go to Cuba), already felt strongly that, whoever ended up with them, the Philippine Islands had to be taken from Spain. Roosevelt, writing to Lodge from his Army camp in Texas on May 19, advised: "do not make

> # The proposal to give up the Philippines could not be seen as "coming from us."

40 John Bassett Moore Papers, Box 192, Library of Congress. In early June, Moore wrote out a private memorandum for the record, preserved in his papers, in which he carefully recounted the chronology of the work on this peace move.

41 See Trask, *The War With Spain*, 172-73.

42 Moore Papers, Library of Congress, quoting from his private memorandum and from his appended copies of the "terms of peace" message from Day to Hay, June 3, 1898; Hay's reply of June 6; and Day's explanation to Hay, June 7. Had these terms been shared with other Cabinet members, such as Long, or had there been a Cabinet meeting on it, there would likely have been reference to it in one of the various diaries kept by Long, or by the Cabinet's de facto secretary, Cortelyou, or by Charles Dawes, among others.
Offner notes how the peace terms were separately provided to, and reported home by, the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Julian Paunce-fote. *An Unwanted War*, 200. Offner does not discuss the extraordinary political risk McKinley had undertaken by secretly advancing such terms. Consciousness of this risk is obvious in Day's June 7 message to Hay.
To counter the image of a weak McKinley and show how assertive he was, Lewis Gould argues that the preparation of the Philippine expedition in May shows that from May 2 onward, McKinley never gave "serious consideration to relinquishing the archipelago." Gould's wish to rehabilitate McKinley's leadership is a good one. But this particular argument is contradicted by the peace terms McKinley secretly outlined to the great powers, via Day, on June 3, and other episodes later. Gould is aware of some of this secret diplomacy but does not reconcile it with his argument. Gould, *The Spanish-American War and President McKinley*, 63. That McKinley would undertake such a move, at such risk, validates Gould's argument about McKinley's vigor, but in a different way. And McKinley was not nearly done musing about the future of the Philippines.

peace until we get Porto Rico, while Cuba is made independent and the Philippines at any rate taken from the Spaniards." He repeated this suggestion to Lodge on May 25.[43]

To many Americans it would already have seemed wrong, even immoral, for America to hand Manila and the Philippine Islands back to Spain under any circumstances. To make it worse, the American president was the one suggesting this. Disclosure of McKinley's move could have set off a terrific political storm.

Further, Spain had not yet asked for peace or tabled any ideas. The Americans feared that making the first move would signal weakness or unreadiness to fight. So the plan was for the terms to be passed secretly to the Spanish. Then the Spanish would make the proposal, knowing that it was likely to be accepted. The first part worked. The terms were passed to Spain and its friends in Europe.[44]

The second part failed to launch. The Spanish preferred to keep fighting. They had been encouraged by a naval skirmish in May and hopeful that the latest group of ships sent to Cuba might do well. They had belatedly dispatched another squadron to the Philippines.

Instead, during June, Spain's main diplomatic move was to ask the other great powers to join its fight in the Philippines, to mount a joint military intervention to take over Manila. "Spain," Hay reported, "was not yet sensible enough to ask for peace, on even the most reasonable terms."

The secret offer dissipated. Day thanked Hay for his handling of "this most delicate matter."[45] The war continued. There were more Spanish defeats. By the end of June, the American expedition to eastern Cuba had landed. The siege of Santiago de Cuba by land and by sea had begun.

In the first days of July, American troops seized the high ground near Santiago in the fights at San Juan Heights and Kettle Hill. The Spanish fleet in Santiago went to sea and accepted battle. On July 3 it was destroyed. The remaining garrison in Santiago de Cuba surrendered.

The other Spanish fleet, the one that had been sent to the Philippines, stopped. As a neutral power,

the British refused to allow the Spanish warships to pass through the Suez Canal. The Spanish recalled the fleet to Spain, now worrying that the Americans might attack Spanish home waters.[46]

From the Philippines came more news. A native Filipino government had declared its independence. Its soldiers were fighting as America's friends, alongside the troops of the newly arrived U.S. expedition. The option of returning the islands to Spain had become a good deal more complicated.

Terms for an Armistice, July to August

During the summer of 1898 Americans started learning a lot more about the Spanish possessions in the Pacific. At the beginning of June, Albert Shaw, the editor of the *Review of Reviews*, one of the most-read news digests in America, observed, "A few weeks ago the great majority of the people of the United States knew nothing about the Philippines except in the vaguest possible way." Now a great many American families were becoming aware of it because some of their young men were being deployed across the Pacific in a far-reaching expedition "absolutely without any precedent in our national history."[47]

Shaw's digest, like many newspapers, included articles that described the situation in the Philippines. McKinley himself read these and other articles, leaving behind clippings or references to some notable articles in his papers.

Anyone reading the articles in Shaw's *Review*, or any other major newspaper, would learn that the Philippines was a group of islands with 6 million to 8 million inhabitants. The native racial background was given as "Malay," with deep hostility among native groups in different portions of the islands (Tagal versus Visayan versus Moro, for example). They would also learn that a substantial number of Chinese and Chinese-descended families dominated the retail trade as well as a handful of foreign trading houses, mainly British.

There were few available experts on the Philippines in the English-speaking or scholarly world. The best account to appear in English that

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43 Lodge, replying to Roosevelt's first letter on May 24, seemed confident that the administration was making due haste to send a large expedition to the Philippines, but Lodge said nothing about the future of the islands. He agreed about Puerto Rico — that is the context for his oft-quoted remark about the administration agreeing with his "large policy." Henry Cabot Lodge and Charles Redmond, eds., *Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918*, vol. 1 (New York: Da Capo, 1971, orig. 1925), 298-301.

44 Day to Hay, June 7, in Moore Papers. Hay passed along these cautions to the British prime minister, Lord Salisbury, who had already passed on the American peace terms to the Austrians having relied, Salisbury explained, on the parallel report he had received from Pauncefote about these terms.

45 Hay to McKinley, June 10, 1898, reprinted in Olcott, *Life of McKinley*, vol. 2, 131-32; Offner, *An Unwanted War*, 200-03; Trask, *The War With Spain*, 425-26, 607 note 6.

46 On the war developments in July 1898, the standard account remains Trask, *The War With Spain*.

47 Albert Shaw, "The Progress of the World," *Review of Reviews* (U.S.) (June 1898): 643, 651-52. See also the articles on the Philippines that Shaw included in that issue.

summer in any source, in or outside of government, was an article from one of those few experts, an Englishman, John Foreman. He had long known Spain and the Philippines as a businessman and explorer, as a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, and he knew the Filipino revolutionary leaders too. McKinley read Foreman's article.[48]

Every account, including Foreman's, stressed Spanish misrule. Spanish rule was portrayed as anti-modern and purely predatory. It had added little of value and it had stunted development and education in the islands. Local priests, the friars, routinely abused their authority, answerable to no law but that of their protective bishops, while there was a veneer of mediocre Spanish administrators who were corrupt, lethargic, and cruel.

Therefore, the Filipino revolutionaries were usually portrayed sympathetically. Foreman, for instance, regarded the young rebel leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, as a "smart, intelligent man, of a serious mien" with a real following, especially among the Tagal elite in Luzon. Aguinaldo was a "would-be reformer" who had resorted to force out of necessity.

Yet every account also stressed that the local inhabitants were not nearly ready for or capable of self-government. Spain had created no intermediary institutions — no native assemblies or cadres of trained officials. There was the condition of the population, the absence of any infrastructure for modern government, and the deadly hostility among the different ethnic groups in the islands.

Foreman concluded: "At first, no doubt, the islanders will welcome and co-operate in any arrangement which will rid them of monastic oppression. The Philippine Islands, however, would not remain one year a peaceful united Archipelago under an independent native government. It is an utter impossibility."

Worse, Foreman noted,

> If the native Republic did succeed, it would not be strong enough to protect itself against foreign aggression. ... I entertain the firm conviction that an unprotected united Republic would last only until the novelty of the situation had worn off. Then, I think, every principal island would, in turn, declare its independence. Finally, there would be complete chaos, and before that took root America, or some European nation, would probably have interfered.

For the readers of his day, Foreman did not need to do more than gesture at the recent record of what had happened in other lands that had thrown off Spanish rule. Throughout their adult lives, his 1898 readers had read accounts of the revolutions, civil wars, and foreign interventions that tormented Latin America throughout the 19th century, in every liberated province of the former Spanish empire.

The possibility of foreign intervention was not abstract. During the 1880s and 1890s, every habitable rock on Earth had been claimed. Americans could remember having been caught up briefly in a strange little 1888 crisis involving British and German claims over the tiny islands of Samoa. Outside of the Qing Empire in China and the Kingdom of Siam (a kind of demilitarized zone between the British in Burma and the French in Indochina), there were no spots in East Asia and the Pacific that were not in European or Japanese control.

The German, British, French, and Japanese warships were anchored watchfully in Manila Bay. Of these the German squadron was the most intimidating presence. This was no accident. From the outset of the crisis the German navy minister, unbeknownst to the United States, was "firm as a rock in his conviction that we must have Manila and that this would be of enormous advantage to us." Kaiser Wilhelm II considered it "the first task of German diplomacy ... to obtain naval bases in

48 John Foreman, "Spain and the Philippine Islands," *Contemporary Review* (July 1, 1898): 20. There were hardly any books about the Spanish colony, only one comprehensive study having come out in the last 50 years. A few years later Foreman himself remedied this gap, publishing the most comprehensive study of the islands then available. *The Philippine Islands* (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 3rd ed., 1906).
Cortelyou recorded getting the full article for McKinley. The president had already been reading excerpts from it and wanted to see the rest. Cortelyou journal, August 1, 1898, in Cortelyou Papers.
Foreman's views were more nuanced and informed than those of American "experts" whose views were in wide circulation that summer. Of these the most prolific was a zoologist named Dean Worcester, who had made a scientific expedition to the Philippines during the early 1890s. Worcester offered vivid and extreme views of Spanish misrule and Filipino incapacity. See "Spanish Rule in the Philippines," *The Cosmopolitan*, October 1897, 587 (written with his traveling companion, Frank Bourns, who would return to the Philippines with the Army expedition in 1898); "Admiral Dewey and the Philippines," *The Independent*, May 12, 1898, 5; "In Manila: First Half," *The Independent*, June 16, 1898, 5; "A Pen Picture of Manila," *New York Daily Tribune*, June 24, 1898. Worcester would later be enlisted into U.S. administration of the islands.
The recently departed, now returned, American consul in Manila, Oscar Williams, had been there only about a month. He also wrote of cruel and "barbarous" Spanish misdeeds and repeatedly extolled America's opportunity to take over the islands. E.g., Williams to Day, May 12, June 16, and July 2, 1898, in U.S. Senate, *Message From the U.S. President Transmitting a Treaty of Peace ... and Accompanying Papers*, 55th Congress, Senate Doc. 62, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 327-31 (hereafter cited as Peace Treaty Papers).

the Far East."[49]

The Philippines problem had arisen in what, in 1898, was probably the part of the globe most likely to set off a worldwide war. The breakup and possible partition of China seemed imminent. Korean independence was tenuous and near the most volatile spot on Earth, the place where the next general war then seemed most likely to break out. It was, a veteran British leader secretly confided, a crisis "pregnant with possibilities of a disastrous kind; and it might result in an Armageddon between the European Powers struggling for the ruins of the Chinese Empire."[50]

This was the Far Eastern crisis: the simmering cauldron of Qing, Russian, Japanese, German, and British interests in northeast China and Manchuria. During the spring of 1898 Hay had sent a handwritten letter directly to McKinley, outside of official channels. "The conditions of things in China is to the last degree serious," he had warned. "[T]he present crisis is considered by English statesmen one of the gravest of our times."[51]

So far, the United States had endeavored to stay clear of this Far Eastern broil. The British secretly asked the Americans if they would consider joint action to protect everyone's trading rights in China. The McKinley government had turned down the British request. But it obviously did not want to make the situation worse and trigger a possible world war.[52]

The British ambassador to Germany had confided to Hay the British government's hope that the United States would just keep the Philippines. There was, he said, "not a power in Europe [that] would seriously object to that disposition of them, while any other [choice] might disturb the peace of the world."[53]

Foreman thought a foreign power should establish a protectorate over the Philippines. That power would organize a largely native government while providing overall direction and defense. Foreman did not believe the Americans were up to the job. England, he thought, "would probably find it a less irksome task." Shaw's conclusion, in the *Review of Review*s article mentioned earlier, was similar to Foreman's, except that he thought America had to assume the burden.[54]

All these considerations also had to account for a new factor. The Filipino insurgents had announced their own government. In late May, Aguinaldo and a number of his colleagues had returned to the Philippines from exile, encouraged by the U.S. consul in Hong Kong and aided by Adm. Dewey.

Digesting all this, officials in Washington realized that the insurgents had to be taken into account. Yet the United States wanted to do nothing to foreclose its options. They cautioned Dewey, the expedition commanders, and their diplomats. All said they had made no compromising pledges to the insurgents. Dewey added: "In my opinion these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races."[55]

In mid-July, the Spanish were ready to talk about peace, using France as their diplomatic channel. The first step was to arrange terms for an armistice, while a peace treaty could be negotiated.

From his perch in the Senate, Lodge weighed in about what he thought the terms should be. Lodge's position was intricate. He wanted the United States to take all of the Philippines from Spain but then keep only the island of Luzon. Cede the rest to Britain, he argued, in a deal to get more Caribbean islands. Lodge spent hours in meetings and dinners lobbying

49 On the views of the naval minister, Alfred von Tirpitz, as characterized in the memoir of Foreign Minister (and later Chancellor) Prince Bernhard von Bülow, and the quote from an instruction to the German ambassador in Washington, see May, *Imperial Democracy*, 228-29.

50 Lord Rosebery, 1895, quoted in T.G. Otte, *The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1.

51 Hay to McKinley, March 26, 1898, in Day Papers. This and other handwritten letters appear to have been turned over to Day after McKinley read them.

52 The British had made their request for joint action on China in early March 1898, conveyed directly by their ambassador to McKinley. Otte, *The China Question*, 112.

53 Hay to McKinley, June 30, 1898, in Day Papers. In his June 30 letter Hay commented that he was writing to McKinley in this way to avoid making an official record. In that era, all regular reports to the secretary of state (and the secretaries of war and the Navy) were usually published after a short interval. Hay wanted to keep the British request for joint action in China out of the official record so that an American rejection would not become public and thereby embarrass the British.
The issue of American action to keep an open door in China would return to the agenda in 1899 and 1900. At that time — perhaps remembering the Monroe Doctrine example of John Quincy Adams in 1823 — Hay (by then the secretary of state) and McKinley would act unilaterally. They would also stress an interest in preserving an independent China from partition. That latter object was not so important to London.

54 Foreman, "Spain and the Philippine Islands," 29-30; Shaw, "The Progress of the World," 652-53.

55 See, e.g., Day to Pratt, June 16, 1898; Dewey to Long, June 27, 1898, both in William Day Papers, Library of Congress.

McKinley and Day. They gave him the impression that they were still making up their minds.[56]

McKinley and Day wanted to hear what John Hay thought, from London. Hay still liked the earlier idea of giving the islands back to Spain if there could be some "strong guarantee of fair treatment of natives" and a ban on Spain selling the islands to some other power (such as Germany). Hay reported that the British did, though, "prefer to have us retain Philippine Islands, or, failing that, insist on option in case of future sale."

The German government's interest in getting something was all too evident.[57] What about Japan? The Japanese ambassador in Washington advised that "the Japanese government would be highly gratified if the United States would occupy the Islands." The ambassador very politely added that "it would not be as agreeable to the Japanese Government to have them turned over to some other power."[58]

Hay's views remained "conservative" (the usual adjective for Republicans not among the jingoes). But he was not sure his position was still workable. Reading that industrialist Andrew Carnegie was against the United States taking the Philippines, Hay wrote to Carnegie, "I am not allowed to say in my present fix, how much I agree with you. The only question in my mind is how far it is now possible for us to withdraw from the Philippines. I am rather thankful it is not given to me to solve that momentous question."[59]

On a hot July afternoon, McKinley invited his Cabinet members to join him on a Potomac River cruise on the presidential yacht. He wanted them to discuss peace terms. The Cabinet had longer arguments about this topic, mainly about the Philippines, than about any other subject during McKinley's presidency.

McKinley's Cabinet, sitting together on the yacht on the Potomac, began its discussion. Day led off. He was still for giving the islands back to Spain,

except for a coaling station. About half the Cabinet (including Navy Secretary Long) agreed with him.

Those on the other side pointed out that returning the islands to Spain would seem appalling, given the sort of Spanish misrule that had led to war over Cuba. One Cabinet member quoted a distinguished senator who was against American expansion but still said he would "as soon turn a redeemed soul over to the devil as give the Philippines back to Spain."

Opinions wavered. The agriculture secretary wanted to keep all the islands and evangelize them. But he altered his views as he learned more about the Filipino insurgency. War Secretary Alger went back and forth. Another Cabinet member spoke for keeping Luzon and setting up a protectorate for the rest. The interior secretary saw great commercial opportunities and wanted to hold the islands. One of the more capable Cabinet members, the attorney general, also thought the United States should keep them all. The Treasury secretary, on the other hand, argued for complete withdrawal and returning all of the Philippines back to Spain.

Through all this, hour after hour, McKinley offered little comment. He just kept the discussion going. The next day the arguments continued. As they kept going over the problems, several began emphasizing that the government needed more information about the situation, including the advice of people on the scene such as Adm. Dewey. At this point the U.S. government had not yet received a single serious written analysis of the situation in the Philippines, nor any recommendations, from any of its officers posted there.[60]

Humility and caution prevailed. Defer, wait for more information from the field: That was the consensus. Peace commissioners would be appointed. They would sort out the Philippines problem as they got more information back from the islands. Beyond Spanish evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico and an island in the Ladrones

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56 Lodge to Roosevelt, June 24, July 12, and July 23, 1898 (in the last, Lodge writing that the president's "imagination is touched by the situation [in the Philippines], and I think he grasps it fully"), in Lodge and Redmond, eds., *Selections From the Correspondence*, 313, 323, 330. Roosevelt replied at one point that "the average New York [political] boss is quite willing to allow you to do what you wish in such trivial matters as war and the acquisition of Porto Rico and Hawaii, provided you don't interfere with the really vital questions, such as giving out contracts for cartage in the Custom House and interfering with the appointment of street sweepers." Roosevelt to Lodge, July 31, 1898, ibid., 334. On Lodge's proposal to keep Luzon and make a deal with Britain for the rest, William Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 115.

57 The naval moves and some of the diplomacy were evident. What the Americans did not know was that, in mid-August, the Germans began secret negotiations with the Spanish that would end with German acquisition of all the islands in the Spanish East Indies that the U.S. did not get under the peace treaty. In this fashion the Germans acquired the Caroline Islands, the Palau Islands, and the Marianas, except for Guam. This added to their already substantial Pacific possessions in New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago. See Pearle Quinn, "The Diplomatic Struggle for the Carolines, 1898," *Pacific Historical Review* 14, no. 3 (September 1945): 290-302.

58 Day memo for the record, July 15, 1898, in Day Papers.

59 Hay to Day, July 28, 1898, in McKinley Papers, Library of Congress; Hay to Carnegie, August 22, 1898, *Letters of John Hay*, vol. 3, 129-30 (emphasis in original).

60 I do not count, and do not think anyone in Washington counted, the dispatches of Consul Williams (cited above) as a serious analysis of the situation. So far, Dewey had not offered any substantial assessments beyond the military strength of the Spanish forces.

(Marianas) that turned out to be Guam, the cease-fire terms for the Philippines were simple. The United States would occupy "the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines."[61]

McKinley and Day gave the terms to the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, representing Spain. Cambon complained that the terms were harsh. McKinley replied that Spain could have had a much better deal had it sought peace sooner. The armistice and cease-fire was signed on August 12.

At the end of August, the Americans controlled and protected the city of Manila and surrounding waters. Little more.

Aguinaldo's revolutionary government was taking control of the rest of the surrounding island of Luzon. It organized a congress to meet in the government's improvised capital, Malolos. Aguinaldo sent a message to the foreign powers reiterating the new government's independence. They ignored him. No foreign country would recognize his government.

The Spanish still held the Visayan islands south of Luzon, including Panay. Spain also retained nominal control of the large Muslim "Moro" islands in the south.

Picking the peace commissioners, McKinley immediately put his most trusted aide, Day, in the lead. Moore would be the commission's secretary. To go to Paris for the negotiations, Day would have to resign as secretary of state. John Hay was asked to come back to Washington and take over the State Department in Day's place.[62]

Gen. Greene's Mission and the Decision to Take the Philippines, August to October 1898

After the July debates, the Cabinet and McKinley agreed it was most important to get information and recommendations from the Americans who were on the scene in the Philippines. Of these men, none turned out to be more influential than a brigadier general named Francis Vinton Greene.

It was an illustrious name. Greene came from one of the most respected military families in America. His grandfather was Nathaniel Greene, one of the most celebrated generals in the Revolution. His father had been a general during the Civil War, commanding a Union brigade at Gettysburg.

Following the family tradition, Francis Greene had graduated from West Point in 1870 at the top of his class. Commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, he had been one of the surveyors on a renowned expedition during the 1870s in the Rocky Mountain West. As a staff officer in the War Department Greene had become close to President Ulysses S. Grant as well as to Gens. William Sherman and Philip Sheridan and other leading officers of the day. In these years, he first met the young naval officer George Dewey.

Greene was assigned to go out and observe the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. He witnessed the principal campaigns and wrote a book about the war that became a standard account, establishing a unique reputation as a soldier-scholar.

Greene left the Army in 1886 to go into business in New York City. Running an asphalt paving company, he became a powerful force in all the civic improvement and road-building issues of

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61 On the Cabinet discussions, see Olcott, *Life of William McKinley*, vol. 2, 61-63; Offner, *An Unwanted Peace*, 213-17; Long, *America of Yesterday*, 210 (entry for July 27). Olcott based his account on interviews with several participants in the Cabinet meeting. The quote from the senator is from Olcott, as is the conclusion that the wait-for-more-information view was the one "which finally prevailed."
The evolution of the draft armistice terms was interesting. On his stationery, McKinley noted the essence of each planned term. For the article on the Philippines he scribbled: "The military possession of Manila city & port until a commission determines the whole matter as to [indecipherable, perhaps "the claims"] insurgents etc."
Moore then drafted an elaboration of this, saying the commissioners would figure out what the United States was "justly entitled" to have and "taking into consideration the rights and claims of the Philippine insurgents and any duty which the United States may be under to them and the future security and good government of the islands." The language about U.S. entitlement and insurgent claims was lined out during the next edit. Then, after further discussion, the whole article was simplified to the form finally adopted, except that the word "disposition" was originally proposed as "possession." The drafting process indicates the thrust of the discussion. Notes are in the Cortelyou Papers.
McKinley's key aide, Charles Dawes, debriefed by one of the Cabinet members, noted at the time in his diary, "the Philippines situation to be subject of consideration by a commission of Americans and Spaniards. While the President is very conservative in his belief as to the policy of handling the Philippines situation, he wants the facts to be carefully considered, without the consideration involving the loss of any present advantage." Charles Dawes, *A Journal of the McKinley Years*, ed. Bascom Timmons (Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1950), 166.

62 For the other commissioners, McKinley initially started out with a list of conservatives, without any known jingoes already advocating acquisition of the Philippines. McKinley's initial preferences, on July 31, were to supplement Day with William Allison (leader of the Republican Senate caucus), Supreme Court Justice Henry Brown, George Hoar (Massachusetts senator known to oppose expansion), and either Elihu Root (prominent New York lawyer), Chauncey Depew (a railroad magnate then seeking entry into public life), or a California Republican, George Gorham, to replace Hoar if Hoar was disqualified by his public stance. He was also considering his former ambassador to Spain, Stewart Woodford. Dawes, *Journal*, 167 (entry for July 31).
The president did not fully revise these selections until more than a month later, in early September. It was then that he supplemented Day with three expansionists, though their specific views on the Philippines were still evolving: Whitelaw Reid (prominent editor, former minister to France and the 1892 Republican vice presidential candidate), Cushman Davis (senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), and William Frye (another Republican senator). Then he added a conservative Democratic senator he respected, a known anti-annexationist, George Gray.

that city and beyond. That connected him well to local Republican politics. He was also elected colonel of one of New York's militia regiments, the 71st New York.

As war with Spain threatened, one of Greene's friends, Theodore Roosevelt, pleaded with the colonel to accept him as a deputy in that regiment, a lieutenant colonel, if war came. (Roosevelt ended up finding such a place in a different regiment, commanded by Leonard Wood.)

When the war did come, as Greene and his regiment readied for service in Cuba, Greene was ordered to command one of the brigades being assembled for the Philippines. It was not a hard call for Corbin at the War Department. Corbin would later privately record that he regarded Greene as "one of the most competent soldiers I have ever known."[63]

After a difficult siege in the rainy season and a brief assault, Greene's brigade and the other American troops had accepted the surrender of Manila. Greene, who could speak Spanish and French, was promptly put in charge of all the finances of the Philippine administration. He met with all the Spanish officials and leading private bankers and took actions to head off a financial crisis.

This was the context when McKinley asked Dewey to provide his best advice about the situation in the Philippines. He asked Dewey to even consider returning to Washington to report directly to him on this vital matter. Dewey sent a brief reply, noting the desirability of Luzon but saying nothing about the revolutionary government that had been created by Aguinaldo. Dewey said he hoped he would not have to go to Washington while matters remained "in present critical condition."

Dewey, Army expedition commander Merritt, and Greene conferred. They decided that Greene should be the man to go to Washington.[64]

News arrived of the armistice with Spain. Outside of official channels, Greene received a telegram from a well-connected associate. It advised him that the war was considered closed. Commissioners would determine the disposition of the Philippines.

Greene's friend thought the Army would just retain a garrison there.

This informal news shocked the commanders in Manila. They feared the United States was planning to withdraw from the islands and thought that leaders in Washington did not understand the "critical" situation. On August 25, Merritt and Greene fired a salvo of telegrams to Washington through official and unofficial channels.

In one, Greene asked his friend to go see Corbin as soon as possible, to even see President McKinley if necessary. He recommended that the president should send for "a competent and responsible person immediately" to come and brief them — either Maj. Gen. Merritt or himself, going to Washington or to Paris (to see the commissioners). Greene also cabled Day and Hay to the same effect.

Washington reacted promptly. Merritt was ordered to turn over his command to a newly arrived major-general, Elwell Otis, and hurry at once to Paris. There he could brief the peace commissioners. Greene was ordered to Washington "by first transport."

Dewey said his views would come back with Greene. He again called for holding on to Luzon. He wrote little about politics or practicalities. The Filipinos, he did add, "are gentle, docile and under just laws and with the benefits of popular education would soon make good citizens" with capacities for self-government superior to the Cubans.

On August 30, the day after he received his order from Washington, Greene boarded a steamship for Hong Kong. Boarding the ship with Greene was Aguinaldo's representative, Felipe Agoncillo, who also hoped to see and influence the American president.

Greene liked and respected Agoncillo. During the weeks of traveling the two men frequently dined together and chatted.

Greene brought with him every book and relevant document he could find. He used the ensuing weeks of travel to draft a detailed report for McKinley, more than 60 pages, on "The Situation

63 On Greene's background, there are various stories in *The New York Times* and other papers, including his obituary published on May 16, 1921. Greene's father was George Sears Greene, whose distinguished Civil War record included a critical role in the defense of Culp's Hill on the second day of the Gettysburg battle. His brothers had distinguished records too; one was the executive officer of the *USS Monitor.* Francis Greene's first book was F.V. Greene, *The Russian Army and Its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-1878* (New York: D. Appleton, 1879).
Greene's correspondence with Roosevelt is in Box 2 of the F.V. Greene Papers, New York Public Library. In one of these letters, Roosevelt wrote to Greene: "I don't want Cuba. But in strict confidence (for to say this publicly would make me look like an Evening Post jingo) I should welcome almost any war, for I think the country needs one …." He thought a war might come with Japan and "least improbable" was war with Spain. TR to Greene, September 23, 1897. Corbin's comment on Greene is in the private autobiography, page 90, in Corbin Papers.

64 See Allen to Dewey, August 13, 1898; Dewey to Long, August 20, 1898, in *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1898*, vol. 2: Appendix to the Bureau of Navigation report, 55th Congress, House Doc. No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), 122-23; Greene diary, Box 4, Greene Papers (entry of August 18 discusses the conference with Dewey and Merritt).

in the Philippines."[65]

Knowing how long his trip would take, Greene sent a preview. On September 5, as he changed ships in Nagasaki, Greene personally encoded an unusual telegram sent outside of standard Army channels. Written in the tightly abbreviated style of telegrams in that era, Greene sent his message directly to Day. It read:

> Rep of Aguinaldo with me. Comes solely on his own responsibility. In my opinion Spanish Power Philippines dead. Any attempt revive it will result Civil War, anarchy and foreign intervention.

Once the 13,000 Spanish prisoners already in American hands were sent home, "Aguinaldo's army will probably dissolve. He cannot maintain independent gov't without protection of some strong nation."

Therefore: "Only safe course is for United States to hold islands and not divide them. British sentiment will support this unanimously. Have expressed these views Admiral Dewey. He fully concurs."[66]

Thus for the first time, in early September, McKinley and Day finally received a very plain statement about what their commanders in the Philippines thought about the points they and their Cabinet colleagues had been debating. In addition to the substance of this advice, McKinley would have realized its political significance. He could presume that eventually such advice would become publicly known. It would not be easy for the president to break with the advice he had received from his men on the spot, including the new national hero (Dewey).

McKinley was still not quite convinced. Later in September, he convened his freshly appointed peace commissioners to discuss their instructions. Out for a carriage ride with one of them, a vigorous expansionist, McKinley seemed (to his companion) to be "timid about the Philippines." To him,

McKinley seemed "oppressed with the idea that our volunteers were all tired of the service and eager to get home. 'The whole shooting match wants to quit,' was the way he expressed it." McKinley thought the country was in no mood for further military operations, including fights for expansion.

However, McKinley said he could no longer see how to return liberated Manila to Spain.

At the meeting, the expansionist commissioners debated Day, whom McKinley had put in charge of the delegation. Day had not budged from his view that the United States should take as little as possible. To Day, the Americans had only liberated Manila. They had no obligations beyond that. Washington, Day argued, had to place some limit on humanitarian enterprise:

> Because we had done good in one place [Cuba], we were not therefore compelled to rush over the whole civilized world, six thousand miles away from home, to undertake tasks of that sort among people about whom we knew nothing, and with whom we had no relation.

McKinley summed up. He could see why many Americans found the acquisition of territory naturally attractive. But he thought these attractions would wear off "when the difficulties, expense and loss of life which it entailed, became more manifest."

However, McKinley said he could no longer see how to return liberated Manila to Spain. Flowing from that, it also seemed doubtful to hold Manila without holding more of the surrounding island of Luzon.

"Beyond this he did not seem inclined to go."

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65 Greene diary, (entries for Auugust 25, 26, 28, 29, 30 and associated papers), Greene Papers. Greene's well-connected associate is identified in his diary only as ALB, whom I have not been able to identify. Another source is a detailed private memoir of this part of Greene's service, which he presented in 1915 as an address on "The Future of the Philippines" to the New York City Republican Club, also in his papers. Other sources: Army, *Correspondence,* vol. 2, 764-65; Dewey to Long, August 29, 1898, in Cortelyou Papers.
Initially, Dewey told Greene that he was "greatly disturbed" that Greene would be leaving Manila, given the situation, but that he would ask Washington to place Greene in "supreme command" of the U.S. expedition in the Philippines. Just before Greene left, Dewey told Greene he had decided not to write a cable requesting that Greene be put in command of the Philippines (replacing Otis) "on account creating bad feeling in Army." Greene diary.

66 Greene to Day, September 5, 1898, with Greene diary, Greene Papers. Greene preserved the original ciphered version, showing his work. It is reasonable to assume the message was received, at least by the recipient telegraph office, given the protocols of transmitting important cables in this era. I have not found this message in Day's papers, but Day does not appear to have preserved unofficial messages of this kind. Greene had exchanged unofficial messages with Day the week before; those are not preserved in Day's papers either. Assuming Day did receive the message, he would have shared it with McKinley.
Based on Greene's later discussions with McKinley at the end of September, Margaret Leech discussed how influential Greene was in her 1959 book, *In the Days of McKinley,* 331, 334-36. But later scholars touched lightly or not at all on his role, and neither she nor others had explored Greene's papers. So, for example, Leech was not aware of this earlier message of September 5, which McKinley presumably knew about (along with Dewey's August 29 cable) before he prepared instructions to the peace commissioners on September 16.

He then drafted the commission's instructions accordingly. He privately told Day that, if territory was returned to Spain, it would be good to try to get some guarantees about the treatment of the inhabitants.[67]

After four weeks of travel by ship and railroad, Greene's train steamed into Washington on September 27. Greene went straight to the White House. McKinley practically cleared his schedule for him.

Greene met for two hours with McKinley on the day he arrived. He delivered his report, which the president read and reviewed with him. The report was clear and vividly written. The next day McKinley had a copy of it sent to Paris for the commissioners, commending it to them.

The next morning Greene was back at the White House, now joined by the new secretary of state, Hay. He stayed for lunch. Greene was back yet again in the evening, now joined by his wife, for

67 All quotations are from Whitelaw Reid's diary. H. Wayne Morgan, ed., *Making Peace With Spain: The Diary of Whitelaw Reid, September-December 1898* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), 25, 28, 30-31 (entries for September 14 and 16). McKinley had recently made a similar comment to Cortelyou, that "the people could be trusted but were hasty and unreasonable some times ... the clamor would soon be for the return of our troops from Porto Rico and Manila." Cortelyou diary (entry for August 23), Cortelyou Papers.

When McKinley put Reid on the peace commission, he may not have realized how expansionist Reid's views had become. His earlier public comments had emphasized "grave apprehensions" and been more ambivalent. Whitelaw Reid, "The Territory with Which We Are Threatened," *Century* (September 1898): 788-794.

In the instructions to commissioners Moore drafted them to say that the U.S. would "be content with" Luzon; Reid intervened to rewrite this as "cannot accept less" than Luzon. McKinley went along with this. But McKinley's typed and annotated further suggestions, passed to Day, also mentioned that if territory were returned to Spain, "a guarantee of kindlier government to the people and of larger civil and religious liberty to the native population is important." Day Papers. Many years later, Moore recalled McKinley's "public spirit, courage, integrity, and delicate sense of honor." Moore to Wilder Spaulding, August 17, 24, 28, 1940, Box 161, Moore Papers.

a visit that mixed business and socializing. Two days later Greene was at the White House for still more discussions.

Greene also arranged for McKinley to meet with his traveling companion, Aguinaldo's representative Agoncillo. Greene joined that meeting too. Agoncillo was received purely as a private traveler since neither the United States nor anyone else had recognized his revolutionary government.

While en route to Washington, Agoncillo had also previewed his position. Meeting with reporters he outlined that, above all, his government wanted absolute independence.

If absolute independence was not possible, the next preference was to become a protectorate of the United States. A third preference was to be an American colony or, worse still, a British one. What they could not accept was any return to Spanish rule.[68]

In their meeting Agoncillo told McKinley about the revolution and the new government. McKinley was noncommittal. Agoncillo's written position was passed along to the commissioners in Paris, Agoncillo's next destination.[69]

In his own meetings with McKinley, in addition to going over his long report, Greene boiled down the options he thought were left to the United States. He wrote these out separately, as follows:

There are five courses open to us in the Philippines:

first, to return them to Spain, which would mean Civil War for we have destroyed Spanish authority in the Philippines; **second**, to hand the Philippines over to the Filipinos, which would mean anarchy for they are at present incapable of self-government; **third**, to hand the Islands over to Germany or Japan, either one of which could probably take them over, but this would be an act of cowardice of which we are incapable;

fourth, to put the Islands under some form of joint protectorate like that which was established [by Britain] for Egypt in 1882, but this has not proved successful and has resulted in one nation taking the whole responsibility; **fifth**, to take all the Islands as possessions of the United States and gradually work out their destiny, and this is the only proper solution.

McKinley read this over and over again, in silence. Then "with that kindly smile which was so characteristic of him," he observed "gently," that: "General Greene, that is very advanced doctrine. I am not prepared for that."

McKinley asked Greene if he knew what instructions he had just given to his peace commissioners. Greene did not. McKinley summarized his instructions as having been "to take the City and Bay of Manila and such additional portions of the Island of Luzon as they think necessary for naval purposes, and to return the rest of the Islands to Spain." This summary by McKinley is somewhat different and narrower than the language he had signed off on September 16. But Greene's account may give a truer sense of what McKinley actually had in mind.[70]

Greene then set out to change McKinley's mind, to persuade him that the United States had to take control of the whole Philippines. He went over all that he had done and learned in his six weeks in the Philippines. He talked about how he had used his Spanish to have long exchanges with all the prominent Filipinos in Manila and how he had spent more time learning from Agoncillo. Therefore he had to disagree, "respectfully but with extreme urgency."

Greene had time to go into great detail about his analysis of the situation during the three extended meetings he had with McKinley, each of which were two to three hours. It was, as Greene had explained in his written report, a situation "without

68 The interview is in "Failure for Agoncillo," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 28, 1898, 7.
As would be evident later, an American protectorate was an idea that Aguinaldo was ready to consider. Agoncillo had been learning from Greene too, during their trip, sharing a sense of mutual respect. But Agoncillo also was urging Aguinaldo to acquire all the arms he could, just in case. Agoncillo's side of the story, including his reports to Aguinaldo, are discussed in the conscientious history later written by a descendant of his family, Teodoro Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1960), 321-28.

69 Greene diary (entries for September 27, 28, 29, 30; October 1, 3, 4); Greene, "The Future of the Philippines," 11-12, 16, 18-19, Greene Papers. The five-page record of the Agoncillo-McKinley meeting is in the McKinley Papers, along with an accompanying memorandum Agoncillo presenting. For Agoncillo's papers forwarded by Greene, see Peace Treaty Papers, 429-31. For a sympathetic portrayal of Agoncillo (but with a number of inaccuracies), see Esteban De Ocampo with Alfredo Saulo, *First Filipino Diplomat: Felipe Agoncillo* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1976), especially 82-87.

70 Greene, "The Future of the Philippines," 17 (emphasis in original). This little memoir/address of 1915 was carefully prepared for a knowledgeable audience. One of McKinley's more influential Cabinet members, former Attorney General John Griggs, was there. It is evident from the text that Greene, a professional engineer and sometime historian, drew from his contemporary notes and other documents in drafting this account. Ephraim Smith quotes the slip of paper where Greene listed these five options, but Smith believed they were part of his full report, which was then amended before being sent on to Paris. Smith, "'A Question From Which We Could Not Escape,'" 372, note 25. Greene's 1915 address explains that this was a separate document he had prepared just for McKinley. He had already cabled the essence of this argument to Day on September 5.

precedent in American history." There were more than 7 million people in the Philippines. Manila, a city of 400,000, was already under U.S. military rule.

All of this had been ruled by a Spanish officialdom of no more than 30,000, most of whom were now trying to escape back to Spain. "The Spanish officials have intense fear of the Insurgents; and the latter hate them, as well as the friars, with a virulence that can hardly be described." The Spanish could neither cope with the insurgents nor surrender to them. An attempted restoration of Spanish power would produce "civil war and anarchy, leading inevitably and speedily to intervention by foreign nations whose subjects have property in the Islands which they would not allow to be destroyed."[71]

As for the Revolutionary Government of Aguinaldo, Greene assessed that it would be a "Dictatorship of the familiar South American type .... a pure despotism." He saw "no reason to believe that Aguinaldo's Government has any elements of stability." Aguinaldo was a young man of 28. Though Greene thought Aguinaldo was able, Greene did not think he could command wide or enduring support.

Also, the insurgents were purely "Tagalo" in ethnic composition. Greene did not assume that the Visayans, more numerous than the Tagalos, would fall in line. There were plenty of fault lines for conflict among "the thirty races in the Philippines, each speaking a different dialect."

Greene believed the United States could gain the support of the educated and propertied Filipino elite, since they "fully realize that they must have the support of some strong nation for many years before they will be in a position to manage their own affairs alone." Their ideal for this was a Philippine Republic under American protection, "much as they heard is to be granted to Cuba." On this desire for a protectorate, "all are agreed" among the Filipino elite. Only Aguinaldo and his inner circle were doubtful.

But, Greene argued, the protectorate option was harder than it might seem. "[I]t is difficult to see how any foreign Government can give this protection without taking such an active part in the management of affairs as is practically equivalent to governing in its own name and for its own account."[72]

Just taking only some portion of Luzon would, Greene had written, be "a terrible mistake" for all, including for McKinley's presidency. It could embroil the United States in a conflict with another country that later intervened in the other islands.

What if Aguinaldo and the insurgents did not accept U.S. rule, even temporary rule? Greene admired the way the insurgents had fought the Spanish:

> Nevertheless from daily contact with them for six weeks I am very confident that no such results could have been obtained against an American Army, which would have driven them back to the hills and reduced them to a petty guerrilla warfare. If they attack the American Army, this will certainly be the result, and while these guerrilla bands might cause some trouble so long as their ammunition lasted, yet with our Navy guarding the coasts and our Army pursuing them on land it would not be long before they were reduced to subjection.

McKinley gave Greene ample time to describe the situation and make his case. At the time, Greene thought that he had not been convincing enough. He thought he had "utterly failed to shake" the president's reluctance to take the Philippines.

Looking back on it years later, Greene saw that perhaps his seeds had borne fruit after all. He recalled that, as the two men parted at the end of September, McKinley said he intended to start a trip to the West to make a series of speeches about the unexpected results of the war. Smiling, he told Greene, "Perhaps when I come back I may think differently from what I now think."[73]

McKinley kept gathering information. During early October, Day and Moore sent him detailed, substantive reports from Paris summarizing what the commissioners had learned from Merritt and other experts, including Foreman.

All of the information gathered in Paris seemed to line up with what McKinley had heard from Greene. A report given great weight by Merritt was the view of the Army's lead surgeon in the Philippines, Frank Bourns. Bourns had spent years

71 F.V. Greene, "Memoranda Concerning the Situation in the Philippines on August 30, 1898," September 30, 1898, 35 (typescript with handwritten annotations), Cortelyou Papers. The report was sent to the commissioners and was included with the official documents in McKinley's report to Congress accompanying the peace treaty. Peace Treaty Papers, 404-29.

72 Greene, "Memoranda," 38, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46. Greene's assessment of the views of the Filipino elite appears to have been accurate. See Teodoro Agoncillo, *Malolos*, 317-18, 327, 374-76.
On the question of whether Luzon could be separated from the other islands, McKinley had also sought advice in a meeting with a well-placed shipping executive who knew the Pacific trade. He heard from this source that it was not feasible to take just Manila or Luzon because of Manila's role as a hub in inter-island trade and tariff collection. Pierre Smith to McKinley, September 15, 1898, in Cortelyou Papers.

73 Greene, "The Future of the Philippines," 20, Greene Papers.

visiting the islands as a scientist during the early 1890s. Returning with the Army, Bourns had taken charge of public health in the Philippines after the American occupation of Manila. He had worked directly with Filipino leaders to make progress.

From Paris, Bourns was reported as believing that "if a few ambitious insurgent Chieftains could be disposed of, masses of natives could be managed by the United States. Considers natives incapable of self-government because of lack of good examples, lack of union in Luzon and throughout Archipelago, and existence of race, tribal and religious differences."[74]

Outside of formal channels, McKinley had access to a more unvarnished side of Bourns' views. Someone had given the president part of a lengthy private letter Bourns had written from Manila.

In this letter Bourns did write that "these people could be managed if properly handled." Yet Bourns was angry about the attitudes of his fellow Americans. He warned that none of the other American officers, with one exception, "seem to have cared to inform themselves either of the character of the people or their desires, nor do they even care to explain our desires and intentions."

In his letter, left in McKinley's papers, Bourns bluntly sized up the situation this way:

> Aguinaldo has the whole Philippine population at his beck and call. He is the successful man and has the successful man's influence. The lower classes have a blind confidence in him. With the middle classes it is an ambitious confidence; that is they do not know quite enough to understand that an independent government cannot long continue to exist and are anxious to see it, because they expect to get the plums. With the well educated and wealthy people it is merely a question of expediency; they support the Philippine Government so that

they may influence it for the best. I venture to say that ninety-five percent of them at heart want to see American protection, and a good many of the most influential want to see annexation, but the masses of the people know nothing about Americans and think we are just like the Spaniards. Our officials take no trouble to educate them; our men simply refuse to have anything to do with them, will not recognize them nor write to them officially, and many of the line officers, such as colonels, majors, and captains, treat them as cattle to be knocked around as suits their pleasure.

Of course, Bourns wrote, "This is all wrong." If the United States did not do better, Bourns feared that it would find itself in a war with the Filipinos.

Yet Bourns thought the problem was still manageable. With some "tact and patience," and attention to the Filipinos, "the whole Filipino government could be swung our way without bloodshed."[75]

In mid-October, having received no further guidance from Washington, Dewey weighed in again. He sent a terse cable pleading for a decision about the Philippines "as soon as possible, and a strong government established."

In Luzon, Dewey wrote, Spanish authority had been "completely destroyed." Outside Manila, "general anarchy prevails." The islands to the south would soon fall into the same state. "Distressing reports have been received of inhuman cruelty practiced on religious and civil authorities in other parts of these islands. The natives appear unable to govern."[76]

McKinley left Washington for about 10 days in October, traveling around the Midwest to rally support for the upcoming midterm elections. It was during this trip that McKinley began to speak publicly, in vague terms, about American duty and

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74 Merritt's testimony and the expert statements are in Peace Treaty Papers, 362-83 (including the separate written statements from Greene, Bourns and Bell), 441-71 (Foreman statement). For the way these views were summarized for McKinley, which is what is quoted in the text, see Day to Hay, October 7 (Commission report no. 3) and October 9, 1898 (Commission report no. 8), in Hay Papers, Library of Congress; see also Reid to McKinley, October 4; Reid to Hay, October 16, 1898 (letters that would have arrived at least a week later), in David Contosta and Jessica Hawthorne, eds., *Rise to World Power: Selected Letters of Whitelaw Reid* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1986), 44-46. The reports coming in from Gen. Otis in Manila were also upbeat, more so than Dewey's October 14 wire, discussed below. E.g., Otis to Corbin, October 19, 1898, in Cortelyou Papers.

75 The undated letter from Maj. Bourns is in the Cortelyou Papers, General Correspondence, quotes are from Pages 2 and 6 of the letter. The name and position of the author is penned on the last page, in what looks like McKinley's handwriting. The letter opens to its unnamed addressee with the warning, "Will write a bit this morning about things political, but this must all be confidential and not under any circumstances for publication." It will help to place Bourns a bit by understanding that in this era Army surgeons were major figures in the life of Army posts. They could have influence and relationships with commanders well beyond their formal rank. It is possible that Bourns knew Corbin or one of Corbin's officers and that the letter was conveyed to McKinley through this back channel.
Bourns had traveled to the Philippines in the early 1890s with Dean Worcester, whose tone in writing about Filipinos was more supercilious. The other Army officer Bourns referred to in his letter as really understanding Filipinos was Maj. J. Franklin Bell. Bell had become Merritt's chief of intelligence, working beyond American lines and with the insurgents. Bell also provided a statement for the commissioners, cited above, and had worked with Greene. Bell would go on to become a major figure in the Philippine-American war and eventually rise to Army chief of staff.

76 Dewey to Long, October 14, 1898, in McKinley Papers (this appears to have been relayed to McKinley just after his departure on his trip).

unexpected obligation.

At one point some scholarly opinion tended to think McKinley was trying to gauge public opinion. In fact he was deciding how to lead it, and lead it toward the conclusion firming up in his own mind.[77]

By the time he returned to Washington, McKinley had decided that there was no good middle ground. No government had recognized Aguinaldo. With the notable exception of Germany, the other great powers seemed to prefer American control now that Spanish rule was gone.[78]

Back in Washington, Secretary of the Navy Long wrote to his wife,

> If I could have had my way, I wouldn't have had the war, and I wouldn't have been burdened with Porto Rico or Cuba or the Philippines. They are an elephant, just as everything else is an elephant that disturbs the even tenor of our national way, but there they are, and my shoulder goes to the wheel.

McKinley cabled the commissioners: "We must either hold [the Philippines] or turn them back to Spain." McKinley now saw "but one plain path of duty — the acceptance of the archipelago. ... Greater difficulties and more serious complications — administrative and international — would follow any other course."[79]

A few weeks later, McKinley talked privately to a colleague about how he had worked through the arguments. The islands could not go back to Spain. If they went to another European power "we should have a war on our hands in fifteen minutes" and the United States would be responsible, having let it happen just to escape responsibility for its actions. McKinley reviewed the geography of the islands. He discussed why it had seemed so difficult to separate them.

His visitor congratulated McKinley on his decision and remarked on what great confidence the people had in him. McKinley was having none of it:

> Yes that confidence, that awful confidence. Consider what a burden that imposes on me. I almost wish these questions were not so much left to the decision of any small number. I can foresee for myself and for the people nothing but anxiety for the next two years.[80]

The Attempt to Negotiate a Peaceful Settlement With the Filipinos, January to June 1899

Analysts of the American choice in the autumn of 1898 can easily overlook that there was no ready way the U.S. government could simply turn the Philippines over to the revolutionary Filipino republic, even if it wished to do so. Under international law and in the view of other powers, the Philippines was still sovereign territory of Spain, as was Cuba, until they were lawfully ceded to another recognized government. No foreign government had recognized the Filipino republic or had any plans to do so.

If the United States refused to take the islands, it would be leaving them with Spain. Even U.S. recognition of the Filipino republic, if America had wished to offer it, might not have disturbed other powers' belief in Spain's claim. If tired Spain wanted to give up its territories in the Pacific, the German government was already secretly discussing with Spain its hopes to get them. And Spain did end up selling to Germany all its Pacific territories that were not ceded to the United States — the Caroline, Palau, and Marianas island chains

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77 Gould, *The Spanish-American War and President McKinley*, 104 and, for more details about this electoral trip and the themes McKinley emphasized, 103-06; see also "Philippines: President Determined to Demand Archipelago," *The New York Times*, October 16, 1898, clipping in McKinley Papers.

78 See John Offner, "Imperialism by International Consensus: The United States and the Philippine Islands," in Daniela Rossini, ed., *From Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in American Foreign Policy* (Staffordshire: Keele University Press, 1995), 45-54; for more on the Spanish view of the negotiation, also see Offner, "The Philippine Settlement: The United States, Spain, and Great Britain in 1898," in Luis Gonzalez Vales, ed., *1898: Enfoques y Perspectivas* (San Juan: Academia Puertorriquena de la Historia, 1997), 353-70.

79 Long quoted in Trask, *The War With Spain*, 466. For McKinley's instructions: Hay to Day, October 28, 1898, in State Department reports, *Papers Relating to the Treaty With Spain*, 56th Congress, 2nd session, Senate Doc. No. 148 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 37-38. The instructions had already been drafted by McKinley (a handwritten draft is in his papers) for Hay to send when the cabled recommendations of the commissioners began coming in. Hay held off on sending the instructions until McKinley had read the recommendations. Hay to McKinley, October 27, 1898, in McKinley Papers. But there is no sign that McKinley materially changed the substance of his original draft.
A draft October 26 instruction, included mistakenly in the 1898 FRUS volume and often quoted by historians, was in fact not the one that McKinley sent. Richard Leopold, "The Foreign Relations Series: A Centennial Estimate," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 49, no. 4 (March 1963): 595, 598-99 no. 12.
Three of the commissioners had recommended taking all the islands. Not knowing his president's wishes, Day had held to the original view of no more than Luzon, but it seems evident that Day's views were evolving to the necessity of taking most of the archipelago. Sen. Gray dissented, arguing that the United States had neither duty nor interests in holding any of the islands. See Peace Commissioners to Hay, October 25, 1898, in State Department reports, *Papers Relating to the Treaty*, 32-36; Morgan, *Making Peace With Spain*, 88-89 (entry for October 19).

80 Interview with President McKinley, November 19, 1898, Anderson Papers, in Smith, "'A Question From Which We Could Not Escape,'" 369-70.

(except for the island of Guam).[81]

If the United States wished to grant self-government to the Filipinos it would have to do what it was doing with Cuba: first take legal control of the territory, then decide what to do. That is what McKinley had decided to do. The United States took over sovereignty of the Philippines, paying $20 million to Spain as compensation. Then President McKinley planned to decide what to do in a negotiation with the Filipinos.

The treaty of peace went to the U.S. Senate for ratification. A two-thirds majority was needed.   Opponents fought hard for votes to block ratification. Some opposed taking the Philippines because they were anti-imperialist. Racism influenced arguments all around — "white man's burden" arguments on one side; "we don't want to have anything to do with them" on the other. Both sides argued business advantages or disadvantages. Progressive reformers tended to support the treaty.[82]

As McKinley worked on how to organize governance of the Philippines with the Filipinos, he was working on a similar problem with Cuba. The two cases might seem different since Congress had decreed that Cuba was to be assured independence. But, despite that apparent difference in the legal situation, McKinley appears to have adopted the same basic approach for both cases. Both had been ceded to the United States. In both, McKinley set up interim U.S. military governments. He wanted to then replace these with local self-government.

The new Cuban government took office in 1902. Cuban independence, promised by the prewar Teller Amendment, was granted with conditions imposed by another act of Congress, the Platt Amendment. The new Cuban government agreed that it would not submit to control by another foreign power and that it would not take on unpayable foreign debts (which could lead to such control). It granted America the right to intervene "for the preservation of Cuban independence" and

granted naval basing rights to the United States. Many Cubans found these conditions offensive.

But, seen from Washington, this outcome was a defeat for the hopes of the jingo faction. The jingoes had schemed to maneuver the United States into annexing Cuba. They failed. American military occupation wound up its work in 1902. The United States did have to intervene in civil conflict in 1906 but withdrew after order was restored. The Platt Amendment had ultimately been supported by anti-imperialists such as George Hoar because of a

general recognition that the amendment represented a true compromise. It promised to give the Cubans real internal self-government. ... Besides, no one could find an alternative that had any reasonable chance of acceptance in both Cuba and the United States. [83]

As with his plans for the Cubans, McKinley hoped to work out a plan of government peacefully

81 Japan took control of these German island possessions as a result of World War I. The United States would face the consequences of Japanese control of these island chains during World War II.

82 On the variety of elite opinion and arguments in the treaty debate, see May, *American Imperialism*, 192-206; David Healy, *U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970). On the pro-expansion view of many reformers, see William Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 39, no. 3 (December 1952): 483-504. An interesting example is the position of Woodrow Wilson, who by 1898 was a prestigious academic commentator on American government. Breaking with some of his fellow Democrats, Wilson publicly argued that the United States had the duty to take the Philippines (and Hawaii) in order to prevent other colonial powers from taking them. In 1901 Wilson argued, in *The Atlantic*, that Americans should help "undeveloped peoples, still in the childhood of their natural growth … inducting them into the rudiments of justice and freedom." John Milton Cooper Jr., *Woodrow Wilson: A Biography* (New York: Knopf, 2009), 75-76.

83 David Healy, *The United States in Cuba 1898-1902* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 167. Paul Holbo had long ago noted that McKinley had headed off would-be Cuban annexationists even before war broke out and that, "The pattern established in Cuba was important. [McKinley] subsequently pursued a virtually identical course in dealing with the Philippine Islands." Paul Holbo, "Presidential Leadership in Foreign Affairs: William McKinley and the Turpie-Foraker Amendment," *American Historical Review* 72, no. 4 (July 1967): 1321, 1334. In his *Cuba Between Empires 1878-1902* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 212-327, 368-70, Louis Perez, Jr. concentrates, convincingly, on the annexationist intentions of key Americans such as Gen. Leonard Wood. But his story also reveals the constant disappointment and frustration of Wood and his annexationist allies. The Cubans had something to do with Wood's disappointment. So did McKinley.

with the Filipinos. As he assembled a commission to do this on his behalf, McKinley issued repeated instructions to his commander in Manila, Gen. Otis, to occupy strategic points in the islands but do everything necessary to avoid conflict with the insurgents. Otis was to be "firm but conciliatory."

Yet there is not good evidence that such racial views were held by McKinley and his inner circle.

The interim military rulers were to aim at some sort of "benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule" for "the greatest good of the governed."[84] This goal was necessarily vague.

To lead his commission, McKinley did not choose an expansionist. He did the opposite. He called on Jacob Gould Schurman, the president of Cornell University. McKinley knew Schurman had been opposed to territorial acquisitions; they had exchanged letters about it in August.

Schurman was startled to be asked to lead such a commission. Meeting McKinley in January 1899, he said straight out, "To be plain, Mr. President ... I am opposed to your Philippine policy: I never wanted the Philippine Islands."

"Oh," McKinley answered, "that need not trouble you; I didn't want the Philippine Islands, either ... but in the end there was no alternative." McKinley reviewed his reasons.

Now Schurman had to work out what government should come next. He recalled that McKinley's mind was entirely open on how to settle the governance question. "It was still open to us, in dealing with the Filipinos, to grant them independence, to establish a protectorate over them, to confer upon them a colonial form of government" or even to consider

statehood. "Absolutely nothing was settled."

Schurman confirmed that his commission would be McKinley's eyes and ears. He was instructed to heed the aspirations of the Philippine people "en masse" along with the various "tribes and families which compose that heterogeneous population." Schurman helped select the other commissioners and they left America at the end of January 1899.[85]

Meanwhile, McKinley asked Gen. Greene to give him some more help. He wanted Greene to talk to and reassure Aguinaldo's envoy, Agoncillo, who had returned to Washington. Getting his instructions from the president, Greene gathered that what McKinley intended for the Philippines was to build up a large system of public education with "a constantly increasing participation in civic rights and duties, starting with local government and then progressing to the governance of all the islands."

Greene was taken aback by McKinley's plan. To Greene, it seemed like "a novel experiment" and a risky one: "Englishmen of long experience in colonial affairs doubted its wisdom." To Greene, McKinley's ideas seemed unprecedented. "Self-government has hitherto grown up from the bottom; McKinley planned to donate it from the top."

Despite his doubts, Greene followed orders. He met with Agoncillo in January 1899. He outlined American hopes. Greene urged Agoncillo to wire Aguinaldo and help head off a conflict.

Agoncillo refused to do it. He feared that if he sent such a message the revolutionaries back home would regard him as a traitor. He could do nothing, he said, "unless the United States could grant absolute independence to the Filipinos under American protection against foreign nations."

It is again worth noting Agoncillo's language: "absolute independence" yet with "American protection." There was an obvious tension between these two goals that would have to be worked out, presumably in negotiation. But Greene had no authority to preempt what the Schurman commission might work out.

So Greene argued that, at this stage, Washington could not simply grant independence. The Filipinos should trust the U.S. government "to work out

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84 Corbin to Otis, relaying McKinley's instructions of December 21, sent December 27, 1898, in Army, Correspondence, 858-59. "Although the butt of many a sardonic comment, McKinley's 'benevolent assimilation' policy was of vital importance," Brian Linn has argued. It "established conciliation as the cornerstone of military policy in the Philippines." Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 30-31.

85 Jacob Gould Schurman, *Philippine Affairs: A Retrospect and Outlook* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), 2-4; Schurman to McKinley, January 11, 1899; Schurman to Alonzo Cornell, January 12, 1899, in Schurman Papers, Cornell University. The other commissioners coming from the United States were Charles Denby, who been the U.S. minister in China for 12 years and Dean Worcester, who had already been writing on the topic, a University of Michigan professor who had lived in the Philippines during the early 1890s. The remaining commissioners would be Dewey and Gen. Otis. For more on Worcester, who had been quite active calling for American acquisition of the Philippines, see Peter Stanley, "The Voice of Worcester Is the Voice of God': How One American Found Fulfillment in the Philippines," in Stanley, ed., *Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine-American History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 117-42.

such a scheme of government as would be most suited to their conditions." He warned that if the Filipinos attacked the Americans, the results would be disastrous. Agoncillo said that even to relay such a message would be the end of his career.[86]

Readers today should not assume that any negotiated agreement on Filipino self-government in some form of American protectorate was ruled out by the prevalence of racist American attitudes toward the Filipinos. Such attitudes were certainly a serious obstacle to understanding. Some advocates of American expansion were Anglo-Saxon racial exceptionalists, such as Roosevelt, Lodge, and the still-emergent Albert Beveridge, as were some presumed experts on the Philippines. Yet there is not good evidence that such racial views were held by McKinley and his inner circle.

In the context of his party, McKinley himself had been relatively forward on defending the rights of African-Americans in the South and had made news by meeting with African-Americans during the 1896 campaign. Corbin had come from an abolitionist family background, had commanded a "colored" regiment during the Civil War (clashing with another such commander whom Corbin thought had needlessly risked his "colored" troops), and had been critical of officers in the Indian wars who had sought conflict rather than compromise. Long wrote of the Anglo-Saxon character, but he diarized admiringly about black troops in U.S. service and detested Southern racial practices.[87]

Among the presumed experts on the Philippines, Foreman, Greene, and Bourns all made strong, sympathetic connections with many Filipinos. Foreman and Bourns were openly scornful about ignorant Americans who would not take the trouble to understand the Filipinos.[88]

Schurman and his fellow commissioners started their journey across the Pacific. War started before they arrived.

McKinley can perhaps be excused for not realizing that war in the Philippines might be imminent. He might well have thought he had more time. Again and again he had instructed his field commander, Gen. Otis, to "proceed with great prudence, avoiding conflict if possible ... be kind and tactful, taking time if necessary to accomplish results desired by peaceful means." Otis was repeatedly also urged to rely on Bourns, whose views had obviously impressed someone in Washington.

Otis had reassuringly reported that "order prevails." His messages discussed the tension but also conveyed that conditions were "quiet" or "improving."[89]

It was early in February 1899, while Schurman and his commissioners were on their steamship, that news flashed to Washington that fighting had begun. McKinley had been working on the speech he was to give in Boston in a couple of weeks. His assistant brought in the dispatch with the tragic news. McKinley stopped his work. He read and reread the wire. He sat well back in his chair and finally said,

> It is always the unexpected that happens, at least in my case. How foolish those people are. This means the ratification of the treaty; the people will understand now, the people will insist upon its ratification.[90]

Two days after the fighting started, on February 6, the U.S. Senate voted 57-27 to ratify the peace treaty, a margin of only one vote more than the required two-thirds. The Senate debate had been eloquent and well-covered in the nation's newspapers. Every imaginable argument had been

86 For a similar account, from Agoncillo's side, see Teodoro Agoncillo, Malolos, 357-59. Earlier, in December 1898, Aguinaldo had signaled his openness to an American protectorate of a Filipino republic, without clarifying the inherent tension between the responsibilities of a protectorate and the nature of independence. One Filipino scholar has therefore criticized Agoncillo for not sending along the American assurances he received from Greene, arguing that such assurances could have avoided the outbreak of conflict in February 1899. H.A. Villanueva, "A Chapter of Filipino Diplomacy," *Philippine Social Science and Humanities Review* 17, no. 2 (June 1952): 121, 123. Teodoro Agoncillo disagreed, regarding such a conflict as inevitable and appropriate. *Malolos*, 710-11 note 97.
By the end of 1898 Greene had been promoted to major-general and put in command of a division in Cuba, but his service there had then not been needed. Greene was very impressed by the difficulty the Americans would have faced if they had assaulted Havana. As Greene returned to civilian life, McKinley had another long meeting with him at the end of December. Greene, "The Future of the Philippines," 12-15, 20 (reading in part from Greene to Hay, February 3, 1900), in Greene Papers. See also "History of Manila Trouble," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 5, 1899, 1.

87 See Leech, *In the Days of McKinley*; Corbin, private autobiography; and Long, *America of Yesterday*.

88 Frank Ninkovich has a thoughtful study of the spectrum of American attitudes at the time about race and foreign cultures in *Global Dawn*, 137-231.

89 On the suggestion to rely on Bourns, see Corbin to Otis, December 30, 1898, at Army, *Correspondence*, 864-65. The reports from Otis had been deceptively reassuring. He reported that the "great majority of men of property desire annexation." Though many others sought plunder, the insurgents were divided and quarreling. There was much "suppressed excitement," but Otis was confident his troops "can meet emergencies." If the excitement could remain suppressed for a few days, "believe that affairs will greatly improve." Conditions were "improving. Incendiarism and mob violence in city all that is feared." Otis thought the insurgents wanted "qualified independence under United States protection." The excitement was diminishing. There was "more moderation in demands." E.g., Otis to Corbin, December 22, 30, 1898; Alger to Otis, December 30, 1898; Corbin to Otis, January 1, 1899; Otis to Corbin, January 2, 8; Corbin to Otis relaying personal message from McKinley, January 8; Otis to Corbin, January 10, 11, 14, 16, and 27, in Army, *Correspondence*, 860, 864-66, 872-73, 876-80, 888.

90 Cortelyou diary (entry for February 4, 1899), Cortelyou Papers.

made for why America should expand across the Pacific; every argument had been made for why it should not. Now the Senate had decided.

McKinley had spent much of the past month talking to the senators. Between the loud arguments of the imperialists and anti-imperialists, the "truly decisive figures" were the "conservative men" of the Senate. These men had shown no enthusiasm for expansion. Like McKinley himself, these senators had "resisted war with Spain almost to the bitter end" and they had grave doubts about the Philippines. They had finally gone along with this "radical" treaty because they had decided to follow the lead of their president.[91]

McKinley continued to remain open-minded about the political future of the Philippines. In his February 17 Boston speech, the one that was so somber in tone, he said:

> No one can tell to-day what is best for them or for us. I know no one at this hour who is wise enough or sufficiently informed to determine what form of government will best serve their interests and our interests, their and our well-being.

But his audience should be sure, he added, "No imperial designs lurk in the American mind." To this at least, the audience applauded.[92]

The fighting in the Philippines escalated into a full insurgent offensive against Manila. The insurgent attack was bloodily defeated. The campaigning began.

By the time Schurman and his fellow commissioners finally arrived, the war had been underway for a month. Even under these circumstances, there was an episode that showed how close the two sides might have been to a negotiated agreement on a model similar to that which was worked out for Cuba.

Schurman proposed, with McKinley's approval, that an American governor-general, appointed by the president, would rule with a Cabinet he would select and grant Filipinos "the largest measure of local self-government consistent with peace and good order." The Filipino Revolutionary Congress voted unanimously to accept these terms. The revolutionary Cabinet was replaced on May 8 by a new "peace" Cabinet. Aguinaldo sent word to Schurman that his new Cabinet was "more moderate and conciliatory." His envoy revealed that Aguinaldo was prepared to drop his demand for independence and accept American sovereignty.

Determined to fight the Americans, the violent-tempered commander of Aguinaldo's revolutionary army, Gen. Antonio Luna, arrested the leaders of this new peace Cabinet. Aguinaldo went along with this. The previous Cabinet returned to power.

Part of this battle was an increasingly bitter struggle among Filipinos in Luzon about who would collect taxes, own land, and wield police power when Spanish colonial rule collapsed. The war continued.

The next month, in June 1899, Aguinaldo, or at least his inner circle, apparently arranged the assassination of Gen. Luna. It was too late.

By this time, Schurman was being challenged within his commission by its other members, which included Otis. Schurman wanted to enlarge guarantees of Filipino participation and was open to a cease-fire while negotiations went on. His colleagues now preferred "prosecution of the war until the insurgents submit." McKinley was caught between his desire for peace with "kindness and conciliation" and his readiness to send whatever forces were needed to end the fighting if Filipino resistance continued. McKinley ended up deferring to Otis. Schurman returned home toward the end of 1899, his mission a failure.[93]

That war unfolded over the next three years about the way that Greene had foretold it might in his September 1898 report to McKinley. The Filipinos were soon driven "into the hills." Conflict quickly degenerated into savage guerrilla fighting. Deprived of access to outside arms by American control of the sea, after a few years practically all resistance collapsed. By this time most of the Filipino elite had decided to work with the American government.

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91 On the "conservative men" in the Senate and their decisive role, May, *Imperial Democracy*, 261.

92 *Souvenir of the Visit of President McKinley and Members of the Cabinet to Boston*, February 1899.

93 On the failed peace efforts of March to June 1899 see Agoncillo, *Malolos*, 398-405, 515-18 (describing the strength of Filipino leaders who favored a conciliatory peace based on "autonomy"); Golay, *Face of Empire*, 48-51; see also Karnow, *In Our Image*, 150-53, 156; and, on the quarrels within the Schurman commission, engineered (in his telling) by Dean Worcester, see Stanley, "'The Voice of Worcester,'" 128-30.
Filipino historians tend to interpret the internal Filipino struggles as a class conflict between the land-owning, educated, and privileged class, which wished to get or maintain power, and the frustrations of the illiterate and impoverished peasant masses. The interests of the revolutionary peasant masses are associated by these historians with the more warlike revolutionary leader Apolinario Mabini. Those favoring peace and more willing to work with the Americans are associated with the educated or privileged *ilustrado* elite. Aguinaldo is portrayed trying, impossibly, to balance and lead both factions. From this view, the privileged elite "emerged as the true victors in the Philippine revolution, politically, socially and economically." Milagros Camayon Guerrero, *Luzon at War: Contradictions in Philippine Society, 1898-1902* (Quezon City: Anvil Publishing, 2015), 164; see also Teodoro Agoncillo (an admirer of Mabini who attacks the "plutocrats" who were willing to settle for autonomy), *Malolos*, 463-64, 483-89.

Filipino soldiers fighting alongside the Americans were key to the U.S. victory.[94]

The war devastated regions, divided Filipinos against each other, and led to many atrocities. Thousands of American soldiers died, as did many more thousands of Filipinos.[95]

After Schurman returned home, McKinley tried again. To lead this second commission McKinley picked a federal appeals judge, one sitting on the same circuit court to which Day (returned from Paris) had been appointed. Day arranged an introduction. All were impressed with this young judge, William Howard Taft.

It was Schurman all over again. McKinley asked Judge Taft to lead the commission. Taft answered, "Why, Mr. President, that would be impossible. I am not in sympathy with your policy. I don't think we ought to take the Philippines."

"Neither do I," McKinley retorted. "But that isn't the question. We've got them. What I want you to do now is to go there and establish civil government."[96]

Taft's work outlived McKinley, who was assassinated in September 1901. The civilian Taft commission clashed with the U.S. military and some jingo sentiment, but it forged a consensus that worked for Americans and a great many Filipinos, especially the much-discussed Filipino elite. That elite class, the *ilustrados*, continued to dominate the country's politics, before and after independence.

U.S. military rule ended in 1901. Taft became a civilian governor. The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 created a Bill of Rights and a process for nationwide elections. This codified an American protectorate with increasingly Filipino self-government. More legislation in 1916 advanced that objective. Advocates on both sides of the Pacific, including Filipinos, argued about whether or when to end the American protectorate and fix the date for full Filipino independence. The argument was settled in 1934. The Philippines transitioned to commonwealth status with full independence set for 1944 — a date delayed until 1946 because of another war.

Alternative Futures?

Studying the exercise of judgment, the main purpose of this essay is to offer a more educational

> # McKinley did not take the Philippine islands because he was confident that America would gain power or profit by it.

"re-enactment" of a fateful choice, in light of the information and possibilities reasonably visible at the time. Carefully reconstructed, without the blinding effect of hindsight, McKinley does seem to have made remarkably deliberate, thoughtful choices at all five stages of his Philippines decisions. At each point he also improvised to get the best information he could from a system that did not naturally provide it.

Whether, in hindsight, these decisions turned out to be "right" or "wrong" is a different question. That question is worth a brief epilogue. After all, historians are like most citizens: They tend to praise ill-judged decisions that they think turned out well and condemn well-judged decisions that they think turned out badly. With the benefit of hindsight, it

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94 Although he sides with those who fought for complete independence, Teodoro Agoncillo acknowledges that such a fight had little chance of success, given the divided views among Filipinos themselves. *Malolos*, 662-68.
McKinley soon overhauled the War Department. He dismissed Alger. Greene was put forward as a candidate for secretary of war by Theodore Roosevelt, who advocated for Greene "with all the force characteristic of him." But McKinley had already settled on Elihu Root, a much-admired New York lawyer whom McKinley thought might have the breadth to take on these new tasks in Cuba and the Philippines. Roosevelt later suggested that Greene should replace Otis as commander in the Philippines. But McKinley thought it would undermine the war effort to replace Otis mid-campaign. On the selection of Root, "a man of strangely strong analytical and judicial mind" who "could more thoroughly analyze a problem of government than any man I have ever known," and Roosevelt's push for Greene, see private autobiography of Corbin, 99-101, in Corbin Papers. On the idea of Greene replacing Otis, see Roosevelt to Hay, cc'd to Greene, July 1, 1899; Roosevelt to Greene, July 10, 1899 (McKinley spoke "most warmly" of you, but ...), in Greene Papers. Greene returned to business and history writing. His last major stint in public service was a year as the New York City police commissioner.

95 The most thorough account now is Linn, *The Philippine War*. For an earlier and more negative appraisal see Stuart Creighton Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

96 Olcott, *Life of McKinley*, vol. 2, 174-75 (based on Olcott's interviews with Taft and Day); see Corbin autobiography, 101, Corbin Papers. In 1902 Schurman came out strongly advocating setting an early fixed date for Philippine independence. See generally Kenneth Hendrickson Jr., "Reluctant Expansionist: Jacob Gould Schurman and the Philippine Question," *Pacific Historical Review* 36, no. 4 (November 1967): 405-21. Day would go on to serve as an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. After becoming president of the United States, Taft would later rejoin Day on the bench when he became the Supreme Court's chief justice.

is easy to argue about McKinley's decisions. Critics can stress the subsequent agony of the Philippine-American war, the legitimacy of Filipino aspirations, and note the patronizing incompetence of many American administrators.

Yet it is still hard to sketch a plausible alternative path, one more peaceful and more prosperous, for an immediately independent Philippines. The self-government concerns were real. Such a Philippines would have had no American shield from other foreign intervention. That danger also was real. The German Empire snapped up all the Spanish Pacific possessions it could get, all that Spain had not ceded to the United States. The Filipinos also would not have had the trade openings to the American market that their business leaders considered vital. Nor would they have had the benefit of later American nation-building efforts and infrastructure investments, which were substantial.[97]

It is not hard to imagine alternative paths that could have been worse, perhaps much worse. The histories of other lands liberated after longtime Spanish rule, from Mexico to Argentina, offer a picture book of tragic examples. And, as in much of Latin American history, arguments about alternative Filipino futures soon focus more attention on the fault lines within Filipino society itself, such as the divide between pro-American *ilustrados* and others. Such fault lines produced a nationwide insurgency after 1946 (the "Huk" insurrection). They remain fault lines in Filipino life today.

Assessing the alternative futures for the United States are another matter. Americans could have shrugged and regarded the future of the islands and its inhabitants as someone else's fault and someone else's problem. The United States would have had little or no Filipino blood directly on its hands. American soldiers would not have engaged in a bitter war, stained by outrages of every kind.

McKinley did not take the Philippine islands because he was confident that America would gain power or profit by it. In every aspect of his public and private life, McKinley was a man, like many then, who tried to live by codes of duty.

In his Boston speech, McKinley explained his conception of America's duty "after freeing the Filipinos from the domination of Spain" to prevent a descent of the islands into violent anarchy. He told his audience, frankly, that "It is sometimes hard to determine what is best to do, and the best thing to do is oftentimes the hardest. The prophet of evil would do nothing because he flinches at sacrifice and effort, and to do nothing is easiest and involves the least cost."

For McKinley, circumstances had placed the United States into a position of responsibility. To him and many of his contemporaries, abandoning the islands to their fate would not have ended that responsibility. It would merely have shirked it.

Was the acquisition of the Philippines good for the United States? The liability side of the ledger is clearest: the horrors of the war and the burdens of occupation. The islands were never great net boons to U.S. trade. Nor was Manila a key to the China trade.

The U.S. position in the Philippines did extend American military power across the Pacific in a new and lasting way. In the short run, the United States used this base to help with the multinational intervention during the Boxer crisis of 1900 in China. But later that year, after the immediate crisis had passed, McKinley pulled most U.S. troops out of China, over the bitter objections of Secretary of State Hay. McKinley did not wish to use those troops as chess pieces in the great game over China's future.[98]

There would come a time, though, when the U.S. military presence in the Philippines did change the course of the history of the world. But no one in 1899 could foresee how the American presence in the islands would figure in the analysis of grand strategists in Tokyo, studying their options during 1941. ♟

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97 For a critical modern appraisal of the U.S. nation-building efforts, see Peter Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). For a somewhat more generous appraisal, though focused only on the period of military government, see John Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (New York: Praeger, 1973). Neither book attempts much comparative reflection on the range of possibilities presented by the course of national development in other nations that won liberation from Spanish rule during the 19th century. Historians of Latin American liberation would quickly recognize the familiar patterns of collaboration between American and Filipino elites and the stereotyping of good and "savage" segments of the population by the ruling elites of both countries, which is the pattern portrayed in Paul Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
Filipinos ended up constructing "a unique economic system, crony capitalism, that depended on privileged access to United States markets, aid, and multilateral lending." Filipinos did a very good job of figuring out how to manipulate U.S. policies to their advantage. Nick Cullather, *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippine Relations, 1942-1960* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 3. Cullather is right, except that such systems of crony capitalism are hardly "unique" to the Philippines case.

98 Betty Talbert, "The Evolution of John Hay's China Policy," unpublished Ph.D. diss., 1974, 304-14; see also Kenton Clymer, *John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 151.

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"Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It"

The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence

Rose McDermott, PhD | Anthony C. Lopez, PhD | Peter K. Hatemi, PhD

Malcolm

Dispute it like a man.

Macduff

I shall do so;

But I must also feel it as a man:

I cannot but remember such things were,

That were most precious to me. — Did heaven look on,

And would not take their part? Sinful Macduff,

They were all struck for thee! naught that I am,

Not for their own demerits, but for mine,

Fell slaughter on their souls: heaven rest them now!

Malcolm

Be this the whetstone of your sword. Let grief

Convert to anger; blunt not the heart, enrage it.

- *Macbeth*, William Shakespeare

Why is the instinct for vengeance so strong even when it is clear that widespread death and destruction would be a much more likely outcome than any kind of "victory"? In the event of a nuclear war, why is second-strike retaliation so certain when it may gain nothing of social or material value? We believe these things because humans share a universal thirst for retaliation in the face of threat and in the wake of loss, no matter what classical economists may say to the contrary about how people "should" behave. Indeed, the psychology of revenge and the hatred on which it rests make a seemingly irrational second strike entirely credible. We can apply this analysis to nuclear weapons, but the basic drive is no different than the one that makes most people want to kill anyone who threatens their child, or to hurt a cheating spouse. The instinct for revenge is universal, automatic, and immediate. It also serves a function: to deter the threat of future exploitation.

As long as humans have lived and competed in groups, the question of deterring threats from one's adversaries has been of central importance. Humanity's progression from living in small hunter-gatherer tribes where everyone knew one another to nation-states with millions of people has, in many cases, magnified the stakes of the challenge rather than altered its fundamental dynamics.

For all of human history, people have had to deal with challenges to their physical security and that of their family and friends. Aggression as an adaptation for conflict resolution has been extensively studied in primates[1] and in humans.[2] What has broadly been labeled "retaliatory aggression" (most often immediate but also delayed) is one of the most zoologically common, well-recognized, and well-studied behavioral responses for dealing with threats and challenges.[3]

1 James Silverberg and J. Patrick Gray, *Aggression and Peacefulness in Humans and Other Primates* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, *Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1996).

2 Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, *Homicide* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1988); Aaron Sell, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides, "Formidability and the Logic of Human Anger," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 106, no. 35 (September 2009): 15073—78.

3 John Archer, *The Behavioural Biology of Aggression* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); J. Martin Ramirez and Jose M. Andreu, "Aggression's Typologies," *International Review of Social Psychology* 16, no. 3 (2003): 125-41.

Why not then also recognize that "revenge" specifically is located within the evolutionary logic of retaliatory aggression more broadly? Indeed, we find that it evolved because of its ability to solve the recurrent challenge of deterrence, which has existed throughout the human experience and has clear implications for reproductive fitness.[4]

How can we know this? Scholars of human behavior often begin with our closest evolutionary cousins — chimpanzees and bonobos — and look for contrasts and parallels between these species and our own. Primate research has revealed that retaliatory aggression is a trait we undeniably share with non-human primates. For example, both chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit propensities toward individual and group-level retaliation, suggesting that the tendency toward retaliatory aggression dates at least to our most recent common ancestor approximately 5 to 7 million years ago.[5] In other words, retaliatory aggression in humans can be at least partly explained as a component of an evolved psychology we share with our primate ancestors.[6]

Conventionally, we say that deterrence is successful when the threat of unacceptable costs prevents an adversary from taking some undesired course of action. When effective, deterrence can achieve policy goals on the cheap and can mitigate the potential for unwelcome blowback. Failures of deterrence, however, can lead policymakers to throw good money after bad and to engage in reckless brinkmanship.

One of the best examples comes from Richard Nixon, who used such logic to seek an end to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. One day, walking along a fog-shrouded beach in California, he told Bob Haldeman, his chief of staff:

> I call it the Madman theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, "for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry — and he has his hand on the nuclear button" — and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.[7]

While this strategy did not appear to work for Nixon, he believed that it would. As with Thomas Schelling's threat that leaves something to chance, or his notion of the rationality of irrationality,[8] Nixon believed that creating a reputation for disproportionate response would advantage his play against an adversary by encouraging it to back down in the face of threat.

Although scholars have developed an understanding of the strategic function of deterrence, we have a poor understanding of the psychological underpinnings of deterrence as well as the conditions under which deterrence is likely to succeed or fail.

Classic theories of deterrence emerged in the wake of the nuclear revolution and required that for deterrence to be stable, both actors had to commit to an otherwise seemingly irrational course of action: nuclear retaliation in response to a first strike.[9] Such a commitment is awkward within a rationalist framework because, as many theorists have pointed out, a second-strike attack cannot undo or mitigate the apocalyptic damage delivered in a first strike.[10] Despite the reluctance with which rational actors should commit to nuclear retaliation, history is replete with policymakers who have credibly and sometimes eagerly committed to just this course of action. Where *homo economicus* demands ambivalence at best, *homo sapiens* prove eager and ready.

We argue that the human psychology of revenge explains why and when policymakers readily commit to otherwise apparently "irrational" retaliation.

4 Michael E. McCullough, Robert Kurzban, and Benjamin A. Tabak, "Cognitive Systems for Revenge and Forgiveness," *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 36, no. 1 (2013): 1-15.

5 Christopher Boehm, "Retaliatory Violence in Human Prehistory," *British Journal of Criminology* 51, no. 3 (May 2011): 518-34.

6 Joseph H. Manson and Richard W. Wrangham, "Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees and Humans," *Current Anthropology* 32, no. 4 (1991): 369-90; Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Richard W. Wrangham and Luke Glowacki, "Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees and War in Nomadic Hunter-Gatherers: Evaluating the Chimpanzee Model" *Human Nature* 23, no. 1 (2012): 5-29.

7 H.R. Haldeman with Joseph DiMona, *The Ends of Power* (New York: Times Books, 1978), 83.

8 Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

9 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*; Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Frank C. Zagare, "Reconciling Rationality With Deterrence: A Re-Examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 16, no. 2 (April 2004); Frank C. Zagare, "Rationality and Deterrence," *World Politics* 42, no. 2 (1990).

10 Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence," *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (1989): 183-207; Robert Powell, *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Indeed, we suggest that revenge offers the quintessentially, *psychologically* rational response to aggression. Revenge has several psychological attributes that are relevant for understanding deterrence. For example — and perhaps counterintuitively — revenge is not motivated by the rational expectation of future deterrence. It is instead driven by the intrinsic pleasure that one expects to experience upon striking back. The psychophysiological basis of this pleasure has been well-studied, and we understand that this internal reward system is designed precisely to distort cost-benefit analysis in adaptively useful ways.[11] It is precisely when revenge is sought for its own sake that it can be such an effective deterrent to adversaries and why it remains such an effective psychological strategy.[12] Revenge has evolved in part because of its deterrent effects, and these effects are greatest when retaliation is sought to satisfy a thirst for it, rather than as a product of conscious, time-consuming deliberation. For example, when someone catches a spouse cheating, particularly with a good friend, he or she may desire revenge no matter the consequences. And most people would consider someone who stepped back and, before acting, rationally considered the costs associated with losing the marriage and friendship a bit odd or weak, even if that might be the more objectively rational strategy. An evolutionary perspective reminds us that it is important not to confuse the conscious or "proximate" goals of the actors (revenge) with the evolutionary or "ultimate" function of the evolved psychology behind it (deterrence).

The psychology of revenge is irrevocably embedded in notions of deterrence. Without such a foundation, no one would find the threat of retaliatory strike credible. But with the universal recognition of the automatic satisfaction that comes with revenge, few doubt that vengeance could very well lead to mutual annihilation. This helps to explain why policymakers are often willing to commit to a course of action that otherwise appears objectively irrational. Beyond identifying an evolutionary explanation for commitments

11 Robert H. Frank, *Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988); Dominque J. F. De Quervain, Urs Fischbacher, et al., "The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment," *Science* 305, no. 5688 (August 2004): 1254.

12 Michael E. McCullough, Robert Kurzban, and Benjamin A. Tabak, "Putting Revenge and Forgiveness in an Evolutionary Context," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 36, no. 1 (2013): 41-58.

to costly retaliation, we also offer a theoretically rigorous examination of revenge that is careful to distinguish it from other forms of retaliation. Negative reciprocity, for example, follows more of the tit-for-tat or an eye-for-an-eye kind of logic.[13] It can be cold and calculating, and seemingly more objective and proportional. Revenge is more of a psychological and emotional state that gets activated automatically and provides a strong drive in people who feel they have been wronged by another. It serves a deterrent purpose for the reasons laid out in greater detail below. People are not always driven by revenge when they retaliate. Still, revenge can feel really good when it is successful. By recognizing that different motivations can precipitate various retaliatory styles, we help to clarify the conditions under which policies of deterrence can lead to stable containment or destabilizing brinkmanship.

Leaders need not, and often do not, recognize the motivational distinction between those seeking revenge and those retaliating out of rational anger. Even when they are aware of a distinction, they may conclude that their adversaries are revenge-driven and hateful when some may not be, possibly losing important opportunities for avoiding conflict and achieving compromise. A fuller theoretical exposition of the meaning and function of revenge is central to understanding when and how conflict can be deterred. Deterrence, whether nuclear or other kinds, rests on the implicit assumption that the motive for retaliation is strong enough that, even when no benefit can accrue from launching a counterattack, the opponent should count on it anyway, and this belief will deter the initial assault.[14] Clearly a second-strike attack is not economically rational because it cannot prevent apocalyptic damage already sustained. Yet the universal recognition and appeal of the desire, and emotional pleasure, of revenge is part of what makes the threat of a second strike in a nuclear exchange credible.

We develop this argument as follows: First, we discuss the current foundations of deterrence theory in international relations. We then explain how psychological adaptations — which evolved in the context of small-scale, hunter-gatherer communities rarely larger than 150 individuals — manifest within the modern environment of mass politics, particularly in the realm of nuclear deterrence. Our third section outlines the psychology of revenge from an evolutionary perspective and discusses how this might emerge in the context of modern conflicts. We explain that revenge evolved in part to respond to challenges and threats that required deterrence. Furthermore, we distinguish revenge from other forms of retaliation, such as negative reciprocity. Fourth, we discuss how particular emotions such as anger or hate can motivate revenge and other retaliatory possibilities.

Why should individuals be so spiteful in the face of a threat that renders victory or redemption implausible, or death certain?

In the fifth section, we discuss how different contexts can trigger or mitigate various forms of retaliation. We then consider the implications for individual versus group-level analysis.[15]

Nuclear Deterrence, Terrorism, and Revenge

The problem of deterrence is not unique to the modern international system, nor is it confined to the realm of nuclear strategy.[16] The emergence of nuclear weapons certainly precipitated a large wave of scholarship devoted to understanding the

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13 Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

14 Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*; Glenn Herald Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Zagare, "Reconciling Rationality With Deterrence: A Re-Examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory"; Zagare, "Rationality and Deterrence."

15 In all of this, we do not claim that states are analogous to individuals. Rather, we argue that states are made up of individuals who share an evolved psychology of revenge that emerges in predictable ways within the context of the institutions that those individuals design.

16 Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*; Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1989); George H. Quester, *Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986).

nature of deterrence and its transformation in the nuclear age.[17] Importantly, however, the underlying concept applies equally well to nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence between states, and threats from individuals and other non-state actors, as well as between and among individual actors. Historically, successful deterrence rested on a state's ability to convince adversaries that it could deny their aims via conventional force of arms. In the nuclear age, however, deterrence is no longer a function of the conventional ability of armies to defeat armies. Instead, it is a function of a state's ability to deliver a similarly severe punishment to its opponent, even if the opponent is much stronger conventionally and *even after its own assured defeat*. Scholars classically identify a key attribute of the nuclear revolution as the shift from "deterrence by denial" to "deterrence by punishment." In this world, deterrence holds when threats to use nuclear weapons are credible, when neither side can hope to eliminate the other's retaliatory capabilities, and when the retaliation that is likely to follow any attack imposes a cost that is unacceptably high for each side.[18]

Regardless of the many ways nuclear weapons constitute a qualitative difference in weapons development, the crucial element that sustains effective deterrence is not so much the speed of nuclear destruction but, rather, assurance of the capability to deliver "mutual kill." In this way, the defender can destroy the attacker as likely as the reverse. This is what led President John F. Kennedy[19] to say after the Cuban missile crisis that "[w]e will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouths." It is what led President Ronald Reagan[20] to agree with Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev that "a nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought." Perhaps most presciently, Winston Churchill remarked that in the nuclear age "safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."

Despite the horrors and intensity of these international dynamics, much of the literature on nuclear deterrence rests on a purely cognitive notion of credibility, which almost entirely excludes emotional foundations and motivations. This leaves out an important characteristic upon which the edifice of deterrence depends. In short, despite arguments and assumptions that deterrence rests on assumed calculated rationality, the only truly credible aspect of deterrence lies in the authentic emotional power and psychological persuasion of the human drive for revenge in the face of violation or attack.

An evolutionary approach provides a set of tools for illuminating the emotional foundations of deterrence that are often assumed to be exogenous or are simply missing from the broader literature.[21] What benefit is there for the fallen in delivering a devastating post-mortem counterattack upon the assailant or to guarantee death by engaging in terrorist acts? This puzzle within the logic of nuclear and modern deterrence can be explained as a political manifestation of the human psychology of revenge. Specifically, as we discuss in detail below, the instinctual desire for revenge in response to a massive first strike is an important psychological foundation from which a credible threat to launch a retaliatory second strike can emerge, even after catastrophic defeat and death are assured.

Why should individuals be so spiteful in the face of a threat that renders victory or redemption implausible, or death certain? That is what our theory seeks to explain. This theory rests on a biological and psychological foundation of revenge, which feels so good that it overrides the cost-benefit analysis that would otherwise make people think before they act. And the near-universal recognition of the desire to give in to emotion at the expense of a more objective rational calculation under duress supports the credibility of a second-strike retaliatory deterrent threat.

First, the logic of modern deterrence rests fundamentally on the promise of revenge that can have the effect of altering adversary preferences *ex ante* by raising the prospect of unacceptable loss *ex post*. The notion of "retaliation" is endemic throughout the nuclear deterrence literature. The form that this promised retaliation takes is often assumed to be massive and disproportionate rather than gradual, which highlights the centrality of revenge. The classical deterrence literature has also emphasized that in the nuclear era, adversary intentions matter more than adversary capabilities. For example, Patrick Morgan presents the issue succinctly:

17 Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1984); Schelling, *Arms and Influence; Snyder, Deterrence and Defense*; Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Santa Monica: Rand Publishing, 1959).

18 Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense.*

19 John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba," (October 22, 1962).

20 Ronald Reagan, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union," (January 25, 1984).

21 For an exception, see Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon.*

Deterrence is undoubtedly a psychological phenomenon, for it involves convincing an opponent not to attack by threatening it with harm in retaliation. To "convince" is to penetrate and manipulate the thought processes of the opposing leaders so that they draw the "proper" conclusion about the utility of attacking.[22]

This representation of nuclear deterrence, with which we agree, may nevertheless be misleading if it guides some to the false conclusion that rational thought undergirds nuclear deterrence more than revenge. It is the emotional arousal resulting from the implacable willingness to inflict maximum physical damage on an adversary that, once demonstrated, inspires adversaries to halt. In addition, as noted above, revenge seeks suffering without understanding. Its goal lies in the elimination of the adversary because, correctly or not, prospects for future cooperation have been deemed impossible. In other words, a blind desire to cause suffering *regardless of what anyone thinks* has precisely the effect of changing what the audience thinks.

This dark desire reveals much about the logic of nuclear deterrence. In a world of nuclear-capable actors, a rational retaliatory form of harm should be unachievable because it could easily ignite a race toward first strike, since all would know that none should retaliate. This is far from strategic reality. Instead, nuclear deterrence is regularly cited as a defining element of the "great-power peace." Indeed, deterrence can be stable, and it often is, because human actors automatically and universally recognize the plausibility of nuclear vengeance. The logic of revenge is further manifested in the nature of nuclear weaponry: They are primarily counter-value military instruments, designed to hurt people and destroy infrastructure, not primarily to target opponents' nuclear weapons facilities.[23] They are taken seriously because of the speed and scale of the damage they can cause and because even weak opponents can harness this power to devastating effect.

This recognition raises another important point resulting from the desire to impose suffering without regard to cost. As Schelling[24] noted, the nuclear retaliation upon which deterrence depends is given special weight when it is imbued with an "automaticity" that is designed to remove deliberation and pause from the process of retaliation. This is famously illustrated in the movie "Dr. Strangelove," in which a doomsday device makes retaliation automatic and irreversible. Of course, as the film brilliantly shows, a device guaranteeing destruction cannot serve a deterrent purpose unless the adversary is aware it exists, illustrating the psychological structure upon which the edifice of deterrence depends.

This example also highlights the problem introduced by the possibility that deterrence will fail if intentions and consequences are not fully and clearly communicated in advance. In addition, automaticity remains distinct from the invulnerability of a retaliatory response. An enemy must believe that a target's force will survive an initial attack if a guarantee for retaliation is to remain credible. If there is any doubt that retaliation will not be automatic, dependable, and irreversible (and often disproportionate), nuclear deterrence becomes less than airtight.[25] Such assurance does not require policymakers to be hateful (although they often are) and it does not require policymakers to seek suffering for its own sake (although they often do). It requires only that the policy itself contain the recognizable attributes of vengeance: guaranteed, irreversible, disproportionate, and automatic retaliation. For example, any policy that promises irreversible and disproportionate violence in response to the crossing of a red line, especially when that line entails no real threat to one's identity or welfare, may lack credibility in the eyes of adversaries. A recent example is President Barack Obama's "red line" rhetoric regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria, which produced no consequences once violated.[26]

This factor is what contributes to making the challenge of extended deterrence so vexing. It is hard to make the promise of retaliation credible in

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22 Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in *Psychology and Deterrence*, ed. Robert Jervis et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125.

23 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (September 1990); Paul H. Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy*, no. 25 (Winter 1976-77). For challenges to this notion, see Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, nos. 1-2 (2015).

24 Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

25 It is also possible, of course, that a country would be deterred from a massive nuclear first strike simply by the threat of only a few of their cities being destroyed, i.e., the notion of "minimum" or "existential" deterrence. See Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence*, Vol. 34 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

26 Greg Jaffe, "The Problem With Obama's account of the Syrian red-line incident," *The Washington Post*, October 4, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/04/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-syrian-red-line-incident/?utm_term=.0490d979236b.

the absence of sufficient emotional motivation for revenge. It also explains, at least in part, why some states put token groups of advisers as tripwires in allied territory:[27] Their presence does not make it more likely that a defensive operation would succeed. Rather, the prospect of their death ensures the emotional commitment designed to spark

Inter-state peace stands perched upon the knife of vengeance.

the revenge-driven war upon which the credible threat of deterrence is based. This also heightens the strategic military importance of policies and procedures designed to enhance emotional and cultural connections between allied countries. After all, deterrence requires one of two elements to be successful: first, a truly vengeful policymaker (which cannot always be known a priori) or, second, a policymaker willing and able to "tie one's hands" in a way that imbues state policy with the hallmarks of human vengeance: dependability, automaticity, irreversibility, and disproportionality.

Under conditions of maximum threat, a leader is most likely to be deterred when he believes that the cost of "guaranteed vengeance" from an enemy is too great to instigate an attack from the outset. While this is typically discussed in a nuclear context, it is no less true when attempting more conventional or personal deterrence. This requires that the opponents' forces have a credible probability of surviving a first strike, as well as the belief that the adversary remains sufficiently vengeful to launch a counterattack even after absorbing a decisively destructive strike. Thus, although revenge is designed to weaken adversary capabilities, it may, as a byproduct, have the beneficial effect of recalibrating adversary preferences. As a result, deterrence theorists recognize that one of the best ways to alter adversary preferences is by paradoxically appearing to be blind to adversary preferences altogether and simply promising total destruction.[28]

Strategic nuclear weapons are obviously designed to inflict suffering on an adversary. As observed earlier, they empower losers to inflict retaliatory suffering *even after (state) death*. As Schelling[29]

notes: "Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy." Nuclear weapons flatten the international hierarchy. Avoidance is not possible. Inter-state peace stands perched upon the knife of vengeance. In this way, advanced technology reduces or eliminates underlying power asymmetries that might otherwise be based on human strength, skill, intelligence, ingenuity, or other factors. Nuclear weapons represent the culmination of technological changes that have leveled pre-existing power asymmetries not only between states but also between individuals and states. Although the instinct for vengeance may be rooted in our evolutionary past, previously only states could amass the power to exert decisive state destruction. With nuclear weapons, individuals or small groups who can get ahold of such materials can also create massive damage. And both individuals and leaders acting on behalf of states share the basic psychological inclination for revenge in response to attack. Changes in weapons technology have made the role of revenge in providing the underlying emotional and psychological assurance of retaliation even more potent for establishing a credible deterrent.

However, the bond between revenge and nuclear deterrence is not immutable, and it can be broken. The greatest threats faced by nuclear states come in two forms; both represent a failure of deterrence. One is the possibility of a nuclear device in the hands of a political actor that has no "return address," such as a terrorist group or criminal syndicate. Such groups are buffered from retaliation to the extent that they can simply disperse or move across state boundaries to avoid harm, or because they espouse an apocalyptic belief system whereby they do not care about, or fear, consequences that might result in their own death. They can effectively "run and hide," a resuscitation of the avoidance mechanism once relatively available to our nomadic ancestors. In a world where deterrence depends on the certainty of retaliation, individual or non-state terrorist actors whose center of gravity is diffuse may be able to escape the constraints that would otherwise be imposed by their adversary's expected retaliation. In these cases, retaliatory impulses will fuel rather than deter conflict.

The second class of threats is the existence of "rogue" actors impervious to the sort of incentives that would keep otherwise rational survival-minded state leaders in check. What makes

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27 D. Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996).

28 Thomas C. Schelling, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006).

29 Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 22.

rogue states and individuals dangerous, and what separates them from the type of coalitional threats encountered in ancestral environments, is not that they are vengeful or even suicidal but that they are more likely in the nuclear era to be able to deliver harm *despite* state suicide. A leader with an "enemy image" is often enough to undo the revenge-deterrence link, sometimes for good reason.

Both of these conditions threaten to break the bond between revenge and deterrence. This is not to say that leaders of rogue states are not "survival-minded." A leader need not necessarily have suicidal intent to prove catastrophically destructive in the nuclear age. Some leaders, however rare, appear unwilling to give up power even when the alternative seems to ensure their own death. We now know, for example, that Fidel Castro intended to pursue a suicidal and preemptive nuclear attack against the United States had he been given authority over Soviet nuclear missiles during the Cuban missile crisis.[30]

Evolution and Security

Given the pernicious and perennial centrality of revenge for deterrence, particularly in the nuclear age, what explains why humans possess this set of motivations? For a social species such as our own, challenges to survival and reproduction come not only in the form of harsh environments, scarce resources, and animal predation but, most importantly, in the form of conflicts with other individuals and competing groups. Evidence is accumulating that the long evolutionary history of humans living in groups has resulted in a complex "coalitional psychology," which operates across almost all social dynamics, from cooperation and sharing to competition and aggression.[31] Indeed,

our ancestors were highly social, coalition-dwelling creatures for millions of years, and natural selection has shaped our minds accordingly.[32] What we call "retaliatory aggression" is a zoologically common, well-recognized, and well-studied behavior, designed by natural selection to deal with the challenges that threaten inherently social species.[33] Aggression as an adaptation for conflict resolution has been well studied in humans[34] and can be at least partly explained as a common component of an evolved psychology, refined over millions of years of human evolution.[35]

In order to further specify the nature and causes of retaliatory aggression in an international context, we introduce a framework that builds on and reconciles research in political science, psychology, and anthropology. All forms of retaliatory aggression can be placed on a behavioral continuum. We treat "retaliatory aggression" as the overarching or superordinate category, and "revenge" as an extreme form of retaliatory aggression. In other words, all revenge is an example of retaliatory aggression, but not all retaliatory aggression is properly considered revenge. As we consider it here, revenge is a specific form of retaliatory aggression that evolved at least partly because of its ability to solve the recurrent challenge posed by the adaptive problem of deterring adversaries.[36] A different and equally important form of retaliatory aggression is negative reciprocity, which we discuss in greater detail below. Distinguishing revenge from other forms of retaliatory aggression gives us greater insight into the nature of revenge and how it operates to produce deterrence. Furthermore, our argument about revenge supplies a necessary motivational dimension that is often missing from the literature on use of force.[37]

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30 Sergo Mikoyan and Svetlana Savranskaya, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

31 John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, "Groups in Mind: The Coalitional Roots of War and Morality," in *Human Morality and Sociality: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Henrik Hogh-Olesen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Anthony C. Lopez, Rose McDermott, and Michael Bang Petersen, "States in Mind: Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and International Politics," *International Security* 36, no. 2 (Fall 2011); Melissa M. McDonald, Carlos David Navarrete, and Mark Van Vugt, "Evolution and the Psychology of Intergroup Conflict: The Male Warrior Hypothesis," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B* 367, no. 1589 (January 2012); M.B. Petersen and L. Aaroe, "Is the Political Animal Politically Ignorant? Applying Evolutionary Psychology to the Study of Political Attitudes," *Evolutionary Psychology* 10, no. 5 (December 2012).

32 Frans De Waal and Alexander Harcourt, "Coalitions and Alliances: A History of Ethological Research," in *Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals*, ed. Alexander Harcourt and Frans B.M. de Waal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Matt Ridley, *The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Viking, 1997).

33 John Archer, *The Behavioural Biology of Aggression* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); J. Martin Ramirez, Andreu Rodríguez, and José Manuel, "Aggression's Typologies," *International Review of Social Psychology* 16, no. 3 (2003).

34 Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides, "Formidability and the Logic of Human Anger"; Daly and Wilson, *Homicide*.

35 Gat, *War in Human Civilization*; Joseph H. Manson et al., "Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees and Humans [and Comments and Replies]," *Current Anthropology* 32, no. 4 (1991); Wrangham and Glowacki, "Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees and War in Nomadic Hunter-Gatherers."

36 McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak, "Cognitive Systems for Revenge and Forgiveness."

37 Schelling, *Arms and Influence*; Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, ed., *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

Revenge or Negative Reciprocity?

Models drawn from evolutionary psychology emphasize the centrality of environmental triggers and explain how contextual cues, such as those embedded in the social or institutional environment, activate different psychological strategies according to an ancestrally adaptive logic. When modern situations mirror these cues, the relevant psychological mechanisms become activated and shape our perceptions of threat and opportunity, and they instigate a repertoire of behavioral responses. Different environmental circumstances trigger different types of retaliatory aggression. The many forms of retaliatory aggression, such as revenge, can each be described along many dimensions, such as the *magnitude* of retaliation, the emotional *motivation* of retaliation, and the *function* of retaliation.

Even the speed of retaliation on its own can signal the underlying intention and meaning of behavior. In criminal law, this shows up in reduced sentences for "crimes of passion," or those ostensibly committed in the heat of the moment, in a fit of anger or jealousy: Individuals acting under such duress usually receive a lesser sentence than those who engage in cold, calculated criminal planning. This can also play out at the international level. If, for example, Austria-Hungary had invaded Serbia immediately after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, the Triple Entente would likely have accepted this response as legitimate, perhaps justified by public outrage in the wake of the unexpected murder. But Austria waited six weeks to launch an attack, and its actions instead appeared to be more of a calculated political effort to change the balance of power in Europe than a justified, if unfortunate, reaction to transgression.[38] Even across many traditional societies that have strong social norms against interpersonal violence, there is an understanding that revenge is inevitable and justified in certain circumstances.[39] One of the most pronounced and systematic illustrations relates to the relationship between female subordination and political order. Such tendencies predominate in clan-based governance structures.[40] Examples of such patterns include phenomena such as honor killings, female genital mutilation, sex trafficking, and rape. To be clear, norms enforcing female subordination are not restricted to clan based governance structures. Indeed, such tendencies were also common in the American era of the Wild West. Rather, they provide examples of how strong social norms can often over-ride the institutional rule of law in a variety of circumstances, and such proclivities are particularly strong in the sexual arena. In other words, human nature engages in retaliatory violence in particular contexts, and audiences are quick to draw predictable inferences from the nature and context of these behaviors.

We can use these dimensions to identify how revenge is distinct from other forms of retaliation. For example, *negative reciprocity* is typically proportional to the initial harm, trigged by anger, and is aimed at recalibrating enemy preferences. In contrast, *revenge* is disproportional to the initial harm, often triggered by hatred, and functions to inflict harm on the enemy for the sheer pleasure of extracting vengeance (as well as possibly eliminating the adversary's ability to deliver future harm). This can have the effect of establishing deterrence ex ante. We explore each in turn just below. Of course, issues of perception can come into play, and both sides may see the same situation in different ways. Third-party observers can play a role here by siding with the aggressor or instigator in a conflict.

Negative Reciprocity

The most basic form of retaliation is tit-for-tat punishment, in which a harm received is responded to with a harm of relatively equivalent magnitude.[41] This type of retaliation is sometimes treated as synonymous with "punishment" but is more precisely understood as "negative reciprocity."[42] In their application of negative reciprocity to international relations, Eder et al.[43] describe a Negative Reciprocity Norm as "involving a unitary set of beliefs favoring retaliation as the correct and proper way to respond to unfavorable treatment." Punishment evolved as a strategy to make others pay for harms they inflicted. If such a strategy had

38 Jay Winter, ed., *The Cambridge History of the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

39 Boehm, "Retaliatory Violence in Human Prehistory."

40 Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen, "Clan Governance and State Stability: The Relationship Between Female Subordination and Political Order," *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 3 (2015): 535-555.

41 Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (December 1986); Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*.

42 Tim H. Clutton-Brock and Geoffrey A. Parker, "Punishment in Animal Societies," *Nature* 373, no. 6511 (January 1995).

43 Paul Eder et al., "Punishing Those Responsible for the Prison Abuses at Abu Ghraib: The Influence of the Negative Reciprocity Norm (NRN)," *Political Psychology* 27, no. 6 (December 2006): 810.

not developed, then bullies would always have been able to win, and the kind of cooperation that allows complex society to develop would not have been possible. The prospect of punishment helps to deter future exploitation or criminal activity. It can also help salvage the possibility for future cooperation if the aggressor comes into line.[44] A great deal of work suggests that forms of so-called altruistic punishment, such as third-party punishment, evolved precisely to facilitate cooperation over time.[45] Somewhat counterintuitively, many forms of retaliation are socially productive in that they can improve bargaining and make compromise possible.[46]

Desire and instincts toward revenge can take over, as satisfaction in the face of retribution comes to feed on itself.

A defining feature of negative reciprocity is that it facilitates cooperative bargaining with the delivery of measured punitive responses designed to signal information about interests and values. In other words, acts of punishment let the target know they have not sufficiently incorporated the attacker's interests into their calculations or are in violation of an agreement. Negative reciprocity must be measured and relatively proportional if cooperation is to be maintained or reestablished, which is a key departure from revenge. Sandra Bloom captures the reason for the measured (i.e., proportional) nature of negative reciprocity: "The injury and response must be balanced. An over-retaliatory response provokes escalation while an under-retaliatory response provokes exploitation."[47] Accordingly, people are more accepting of retaliation when it is viewed as "symmetric" (e.g., "poetic" justice).[48]

Negative reciprocity predicts that punishment allows for the possibility of future cooperation as well as possibilities for forgiveness. Extant research on anger and punishment suggests that when the target of retaliation acknowledges and understands that a wrong has been done, punishers feel satisfied, anger is reduced, and forgiveness and reconciliation become possible.[49] If such acknowledgement does not occur, then escalation can result, particularly if escape is not an option. For example, the hostility of the People's Republic of China and South Korea toward Japan is fueled in part by Japan's perceived lack of remorse for past harms it perpetuated in those countries before and during World War II.[50] By contrast, Germany has accepted a different degree of responsibility for its war crimes and offered some reparations.[51] This does not necessarily result in forgiveness, but it does open the possibility for cooperation in the future.

Revenge

In many ways, revenge can be understood as a more expressive emotional expression than the kind of tit-for-tat negative reciprocity, which is often more instrumental in nature. This is because negative reciprocity strives to change the opponent's behavior whereas revenge often only seeks the utter annihilation of the adversary. In contrast to negative reciprocity, which is motivated by anger and holds the possibility of reconciliation and future cooperation, revenge is the emotionally mediated psychological motivation or desire to harm for its own sake, expressing a form of hatred. Revenge attacks are more likely to be disproportionate, serving the evolutionary function of eliminating or reducing the target's ability to deliver future

44 Ben Seymour, Tania Singer, and Ray Dolan, "The Neurobiology of Punishment," *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 8, no. 4 (April 2007); Michael E. Price, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, "Punitive Sentiment as an Anti-Free Rider Psychological Device," *Evolution and Human Behavior* 23, no. 3 (May 2002); Napoleon A. Chagnon, "Life Histories, Blood Revenge, and Warfare in a Tribal Population," *Science* 239, no. 4843 (February 1988).

45 Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter, "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000); Dominique J. F. de Quervain et al., "The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment," *Science* 305, no. 5688 (August 2004); James H. Fowler, "Altruistic Punishment and the Origin of Cooperation," *Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences* 102, no. 19 (May 2005).

46 Sandra L. Bloom, "Commentary: Reflections on the Desire for Revenge," *Journal of Emotional Abuse* 2, no. 4 (2001).

47 Ibid.

48 Thomas M. Tripp, Robert J. Bies, and Karl Aquino, "Poetic Justice or Petty Jealousy? The Aesthetics of Revenge," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 89, no. 1 (September 2002).

49 Mario Gollwitzer, Milena Meder, and Manfred Schmitt, "What Gives Victims Satisfaction When They Seek Revenge?" *European Journal of Social Psychology* 41, no. 3 (November 2010); McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak, "Cognitive Systems for Revenge and Forgiveness"; Jeni L. Burnette et al., "Forgiveness Results From Integrating Information About Relationship Value and Exploitation Risk," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 38, no. 3 (November 2011).; Todd H. Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2015).

50 John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000).

51 Ronald W. Zweig, *German Reparations and the Jewish World: A History of the Claims Conference* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1987).

harm,[52] but the conscious motivation is simply the expected and intrinsic satisfaction of rebalancing the scales of experienced pain. People want to hurt others who have harmed them, even when they know that may not right the initial wrong done. It feels good, and people need not understand why. The instinct is automatic, effortless, and natural. While anger-fueled negative reciprocity yields psychological rewards contingent upon the target's understanding, hate-fueled revenge yields rewards that are contingent upon the target's suffering. That suffering, not just the target's understanding of the reasons for its suffering, is what satisfies the thirst for revenge.

Revenge most often occurs with no prior history of negative reciprocity or any attempt at reconciliation.[53] Men who lose comrades in combat are less inclined to negotiate with the other side and more inclined to do everything in their power to kill the enemy and extract vengeance for the lost brother. The motive can also grow out of failed attempts to compromise. Anyone who has ever watched people on the opposite side of the aisle become both more entrenched and more extreme as efforts to compromise fail has witnessed an example of this phenomenon. When bargaining through negative reciprocity fails, neither party may be willing to adjust its preferences in ways that would allow cooperation to be reestablished. This psychological stalemate can then incentivize revenge over negative reciprocity: When the adjustment of a target's preferences is perceived as increasingly unlikely or impossible, the angry individual or group must choose whether to accept the new state of affairs (e.g., through avoidance or submission) or to escalate the conflict. In these instances, an adversary's very existence may come to represent an existential threat: The challenge then shifts from restructuring the adversary's preferences through anger and negative reciprocity to weakening or eliminating the adversary altogether to reduce or eliminate the damage it can impose. The goal is then no longer to persuade and coerce but to enervate and eliminate, through brute force.

Importantly, a focus on revenge as only a consequence of the *imposition of a harm* misses at least half of the picture: Evolutionarily, the *withholding of a benefit*, is the functional equivalent of the imposition of a cost; revenge can be triggered not only in response to harms delivered but also in response to benefits withheld. Benefits can take many forms, such as trade deals over items the recipient considers essential and cooperation on international issues. They can also relate to status and prestige concerns, as when one side refuses to give public acknowledgement and status the other side believes it deserves. This approach suggests that many cases of what appear to be "preemptive attacks" may be acts of revenge triggered by the subjective perception of status benefits having been systematically and, to one side, unjustifiably withheld.

Denial of benefits can lead to violence even in the absence of obvious direct or immediate provocation. Germany's instigation of World War II provides perhaps the iconic illustration of a war that was domestically sold as both a justified attempt to rectify the disproportionate material harms and the withholding of status benefits imposed on the German population by the Allies after World War I. Hitler's ability to characterize an event driven by his personal ambitions as a service rendered to the German people to regain their proper status in the world was arguably one of the most critical factors in Germany's provocation.[54] Japan's involvement in the war, subsequent to its conquest of Manchuria, similarly can be seen in light of its frustration at not receiving the international status and deference Tokyo felt it deserved.[55]

Negative reciprocity deters by adjusting adversary preferences directly through anger and proportional forms of punishment, holding open the possibility of post-conflict cooperation or reconciliation as incentive. On the other hand, *revenge* is fueled by hatred and deters through the imposition of disproportionate and often maximum harm, including extermination, to render counter-retaliation unlikely or impossible.

The Mechanisms of Revenge

As we have suggested, one of the primary reasons deterrence can be so effective, despite the irrationality of a nuclear second strike, is that the threatened retaliation is motivated by powerful emotions that trigger physiological rewards. Recent

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52 McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak, "Cognitive Systems for Revenge and Forgiveness"; Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides, "Formidability and the Logic of Human Anger."

53 Corinna Carmen Gayer, Shiri Landman, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal, "Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Peaceful Conflict Resolution: The Role of Arguments about Losses," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 6 (2009): 951-975.

54 Ian Kershaw, *Hitler: 1889-1936 Hubris* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000); Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Keegan, *The Second World War* (UK: Random House, 2011).

55 Ian Kershaw, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World*, 1940-1941 (New York: Penguin, 2007).

evidence, particularly in conflict scenarios, reveals an important distinction between two emotions that are central to group conflict generally and to deterrence specifically. These emotions — anger and hate — provide the motivational foundations for the systems of negative reciprocity and revenge described above.

Anger

Anger is key to the operation and recognition of negative reciprocity. It is a functional component of a complex motivational system in humans designed to resolve conflicts of interest in favor of the angry individual. Anger sends the signal to another that the attacker's welfare has been undervalued; its function is to adjust or "recalibrate" the preferences of another such that they are encouraged to place greater weight on the angry individual's welfare.[56] In strategic terms, the goal would be trying to change the opponent's behavior by altering their cost-benefit analysis in the attacker's favor. In this sense, anger is the equivalent of the latent threat of force. Its purpose is well illustrated by Schelling,[57] who noted: "The threat of pain tries to structure someone's motives, while brute force tries to overcome his strength." In our approach, anger is the automatic psychological mechanism that operates to re-structure someone's motives (i.e., recalibrate their preferences) through the imposition of costs (i.e., threat of violence) or the withdrawal of benefits (i.e., threat of suspending future cooperation). In this way, emotion operates strategically in the context of negative reciprocity by functioning to shift an adversary's preference structure in the opponent's favor.

Hatred

Anger may fuel responses toward tractable enemies as opponents seek to force their adversary to recalibrate with the hope of future cooperation, but in the face of implacable enemies, hatred can spontaneously erupts. Desire and instincts toward revenge can take over, as satisfaction in the face of retribution comes to feed on itself. In this way, the goal of revenge may move beyond a means-to-an-end process, as the feeling provides enough motivation and reinforcement to generate revenge-seeking behavior. A drive to seek revenge in these situations becomes motivated by the feeling that

emerges through hormones such as testosterone and adrenaline. The hormonal regulation of a feeling of pleasure associated with retaliation is unsurprising in an evolutionary context; it is sufficient for natural selection to shape nervous systems with a "desire" or "taste" for revenge when adaptively appropriate. This is similar to the human desire for sex or high-caloric food for their own sakes, rather than because people consciously expect them to maximize their reproductive success. Babies do not need to know that more calories helped improve their ancestors' odds of survival to prefer sugar water to plain water. After all, the system works best, and most efficiently, when it relies on reinforcement mechanisms that do not require rational deliberation or attention to operate effectively. This is why preferences become automatic and effortless. Evolutionary processes seek to maximize the chance for reproductive success of the most useful variations in human traits. This is because even tiny advantages aggregate over time. Evolution is neurocomputational: It operates over billions of people across millions of years. So even if something looks counterproductive in some cases, it can prove successful over long periods of time if it results in reproductive fitness advantages of even tiny proportions for close kin.

How do such mechanisms operate? Neurological evidence has shown that when subjects are made to consider the prospect of retaliation, reward centers in the brain are flooded with activity, releasing powerful endogenous motivators for such retaliation.[58] Despite the expectation of retaliatory catharsis, however, some studies have found that the majority of subjects end up feeling worse after having inflicted retaliation.[59] A few things help explain this: The motivation for action sometimes differs from the experience of the consequences of that action. Retaliation can serve more than one purpose, even if it is motivated by a single drive. The consequence of inflicting retaliation may feel bad precisely because it signals the failure to convince the other to change its behavior.

The delicate psychological balance between negative reciprocity driven by anger and revenge fueled by hatred helps to explain the challenge of war termination and the avenues for peace following wars, genocides, civil conflict, or other kinds of institutionalized discrimination such as

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56 Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides, "Formidability and the Logic of Human Anger."

57 Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (italics added).

58 De Quervain et al., "The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment."

59 Kevin M. Carlsmith, Timothy D. Wilson, and Daniel T. Gilbert, "The Paradoxical Consequences of Revenge," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 95, no. 6 (2008); Ulrich Orth, "Does Perpetrator Punishment Satisfy Victims' Feelings of Revenge?" *Aggressive Behavior* 30, no. 1 (January 2004); Brad J. Bushman, "Does Venting Anger Feed or Extinguish the Flame? Catharsis, Rumination, Distraction, Anger, and Aggressive Responding," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 28, no. 6 (June 2002).

apartheid. It is easy to see how anger can slide into hatred and tractable opponents can become intractable enemies. Halperin et al.[60] show that, in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, inducing anger in subjects through an experimental mood-manipulation technique increased compromise-seeking in negotiations while inducing hatred in subjects reduced their support for compromise. In this example, hatred is triggered, in part, by the perception of an out-group's "inability to undergo positive change."[61] Put another way, hatred is a response to the perception that the target's preference structure cannot be recalibrated and that one cannot avoid future costs inflicted by the target.

What is significant is not that hatred makes compromise intolerable but that anger makes compromise *possible*. Similarly, in their study of vicarious retribution, Lickel et al.[62] note that the success of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was premised upon the "need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation." In effect, the commission was chartered with the task of manipulating a deescalatory slide from revenge to negative reciprocity, from hatred to anger, and ultimately toward reconciliation and understanding. Negative reciprocity motivates anger and retaliation while opening the possibility for reconciliation and understanding. It is only when anger slides into hatred that conflict escalates toward intractability.

Cueing Negative Reciprocity and Revenge

Revenge operates to prevent future exploitation by promising retaliation that no one wants but that everyone believes will happen if certain violations occur.[63] Different emotions trigger specific kinds of responses, just as different situations spark particular responses. The contrast between intra-war deterrence and classic nuclear deterrence provides such an illustration. The recognition and anticipation of these strategies (negative reciprocity versus revenge) is made possible by examining the environmental cues at play in each system.

Environmental and contextual cues can obviously serve as triggering mechanisms for aspects of motivation and behavior. Contexts of intra-war deterrence often trigger the operation of negative reciprocity, in which threats are needed to rebuff limited attacks without producing a full-scale conflagration. Almost all the literature on limited war, both empirical (such as that focused on Vietnam or Korea[64]) as well as theoretical[65] (often framed around prospects for winning a limited nuclear war) would come under this rubric of negative reciprocity. This literature has argued that for limited war to work, the response must be proportionate and function clearly to adjust the enemy's preferences. Although the distinction between changing the enemy's preferences and decreasing its capabilities is not always clear, the goal is to make the enemy change its behavior without engaging in an all-out war in which one side or the other risks decimation. This retains the possibility of engaging in cooperative behavior in the future.

By contrast, situations such as those outlined in classic nuclear-deterrence theory trigger the operation of revenge, in which the credibility of the threat to retaliate is designed to prevent a first strike. Classical deterrence theorists argued that if two adversaries could credibly commit to deliver unacceptably costly retaliation in response to the other's first strike, deterrence between them would hold.[66] As discussed earlier, scholars noted that

60 Eran Halperin et al., "Anger, Hatred, and the Quest for Peace: Anger Can Be Constructive in the Absence of Hatred," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 2 (April 2011).

61 Ibid.

62 Brian Lickel et al., "Vicarious Retribution: The Role of Collective Blame in Intergroup Aggression," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 10, no. 4 (November 2006).

63 Boehm, "Retaliatory Violence in Human Prehistory"; McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak, "Cognitive Systems for Revenge and Forgiveness"; Christopher Boehm, *Blood Revenge: The Enactment and Management of Conflict in Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984).

64 Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," *International Security* 7, no. 2 (October 1982); Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

65 Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory Is Possible," Foreign Policy, no. 39 (Summer 1980); Desmond Ball, *Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); Sidney D. Drell and Frank Von Hippel, "Limited Nuclear War," *Scientific American* 235 (November 1976); Thomas C. Schelling, "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War," *Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 1 (1957).

66 Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age;* Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*; Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict.*

this required rational actors to commit to a course that was manifestly irrational.[67] Second-strike deterrence therefore faces a glaring problem: Once a country has sustained catastrophic damage, an all-out retaliatory strike can neither "win" the war nor limit the damage already experienced. In other words, there is no rational basis for retaliation once one's fate is sealed. Yet such retaliation is precisely what deterrence requires and what human psychology delivers.

The psychology of revenge clearly reconciles this problem of making a futile second strike credible and allows second-strike deterrence to hold where classical economics suggests it should not.[68] Notably, a number of strategies have been designed and implemented to make this threat more credible from the perspective of economic rationality. Threats of retaliation can be made more credible by pre-delegation to commanders in the field, who may be less than controllable in the heat of battle. In addition, standard operating procedures can be implemented to ensure survivability, such as by invoking launch once it appears an adversary's weapons are airborne to prevent the loss of one's own missiles. Moreover, attempts to implement automaticity systems, such as the Soviet "Dead Hand" system, can also increase the credibility of threatened response.[69] Such efforts, while eminently sensible from a rationalist perspective, appear redundant and unnecessary from a psychological standpoint. Although second-strike deterrence represents a logical inconsistency for rational actors, few doubt that such retaliation would occur. Policymakers and lay people alike recognize that retaliation would be forthcoming not because they recognize the theoretical requirements of deterrence but because all humans instinctively recognize situations in which revenge is not only likely but also emotionally inevitable even when logically futile. Our shared psychology enables people to quickly and reliably recognize the power and pleasure of retaliation and revenge in the face of such an attack regardless of its logical value from a material standpoint. While irrationality may undercut formal notions of credibility for second-strike retaliation, the universal human understanding of and drive for revenge more than compensates. Few doubt that retaliation would ensue in the face of assault, even if such reaction offers little prospect of victory or salvation. Even in a court of law, crimes of passion receive significant mitigation in sentencing precisely because everyone believes individuals are less responsible for their actions under such circumstances.

In short, negative reciprocity and revenge operate according to distinct logics. This logic is reflected in and triggered by distinct emotional triggers as well as distinct contextual cues that manifest within situations of intra-war versus second-strike deterrence. Deterrence is fundamentally about the appropriate use of retaliatory threats to affect adversary behavior. The distinction between negative reciprocity and revenge, as well as an awareness of their distinct emotional antecedents and context-specificity, can deepen understanding of how, when, and why deterrence works or fails in particular situations.

Dynamics of Revenge, Within and Between

Having described the implications of revenge for deterrence and distinguished it from other forms of retaliation as illustrated by the contextual cues that trigger these mechanisms, it is useful to examine ways in which this psychology is expressed within and between individuals, groups, and states.

One of the more apparent characteristics of revenge at the group level is that avengers tend to target out-group members indiscriminately. Apropos of this recognition, one common defining attribute of "weapons of mass destruction" and modern terrorism generally is that they are relatively indiscriminate. The anthropologist Raymond Kelly has referred to this as "social substitution," which occurs when individuals hold all or any out-group members responsible for the transgressions of one member, in effect treating the group as a unitary actor.[70] This is referred to as "third-party revenge" or "vicarious retribution."[71] Osama bin Laden's fatwas and similar indictments that hold all

67 Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, *Perfect Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, ed. *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2000); Powell, *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility*; Robert S. McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1983); Robert Powell, "Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation," *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 2 (June 1989); Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited."

68 John J. Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security* 9, no. 3 (Winter 1984-85); Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015).

69 David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy* (New York: Anchor, 2009).

70 Raymond C. Kelly, *Warless Societies and the Origin of War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

71 Lickel et al., "Vicarious Retribution: The Role of Collective Blame in Intergroup Aggression."

Americans responsible for particular behavior can be seen in this category.[72] According to Michener,[73] a single attack from an out-group is often sufficient for individuals to ascribe an "enemy" image to that out-group, which enables vicarious retribution through the simple mental algorithm "one did it/ they all did it." Certainly, the scapegoating of entire groups based on the actions of some subset of individuals, such as the anti-Western bias of Islamic jihadists, or some Westerners' antipathy toward all Muslims, falls into this category of treating all members of a group as the same regardless of individual culpability for bad actions.

Our approach suggests that this representation does not capture the whole picture. On the one hand, it is often true that an attack against one's group can precipitate vicarious retribution. Of course, there can be different types of response, as was discussed above in relation to anger, negative reciprocity, proportionate response, and prospects for limited war. However, across the entirety of human civilization, especially under circumstances characterized by hatred and revenge, total annihilation of the enemy was more often the rule than the exception. Certainly sometimes what the victors do to the vanquished can incorporate an element of strategic or instrumental coercion, as Sherman's march through Atlanta at the end of the Civil War is often understood to incorporate.[74] Still, examples abound of laying waste to the enemy, from the sacking of Carthage through the siege of Stalingrad to more recent examples of ethnic cleansing.[75] Examples of the wholesale destruction undertaken by the Mongol invaders, Alexander the Great, and many others since suggest that while some population assimilation may have occurred, most often as local women were kidnapped, captured, and raped, annihilation was the more typical response to attack.[76] Vicarious retribution can be triggered not only by surprise attacks but also by humiliation or defeat. Consider as evidence Hitler's declaration that "we do not pardon, we demand vengeance!"[77] In the context of intergroup hostilities, blind vicarious retribution has historically proven the norm.

On the other hand, not all attacks from other states necessarily precipitate vicarious retribution from the victim's group. To be sure, very weak states simply may not have the capability to retaliate, although in a globalized nuclear-armed world, the ability to hurt is increasingly independent of one's

Examples abound of laying waste to the enemy, from the sacking of Carthage through the siege of Stalingrad to more recent examples of ethnic cleansing.

conventional military strength. The violation of sacred values, or the search for status, may compel even objectively weaker states and non-state actors to challenge and sometimes defeat conventionally superior powers.[78] More relevant to our approach is the recognition that in principle there should be contexts in which an attack from an out-group generates anger but not necessarily the kind of hatred that would normally be prompted by a devastating surprise attack on domestic territory or nationals. This can happen in at least two ways.

First, the assailant may be a member of an out-group who is politically aligned with some members of the in-group. As behavioral and physiological studies have demonstrated, intra-alliance bonds can mitigate the otherwise escalatory effects of victory in an inter-group context.[79] The reason is simple: The cost of losing or weakening the alliance may be greater than the benefit of intra-alliance conflict-escalating behaviors. In other words, coalitions that need to stick together to successfully face future threats will not benefit from remaining preoccupied with trivial rivalries within the group in the short

72 Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

73 Willa Michener, "The Individual Psychology of Group Hate," *Journal of Hate Studies* 10, no. 1 (January 2012).

74 Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative* (New York: Random House, 2011).

75 Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).

76 John Bagnell Bury, *A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1906).

77 Adam Hochschild, *To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion, 1914-1918 Reprint edition* (Boston: Mariner Books, 2012).

78 Scott Atran and Jeremy Ginges, "Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict," *Science* 336, no. 6083 (May 2012); Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001).

79 Mark V. Flinn, Davide Ponzi, and Michael P. Muehlenbein, "Hormonal Mechanisms for Regulation of Aggression in Human Coalitions," *Human Nature* 23, no. 1 (March 2012).

term. This is why conflicts characterized by negative reciprocity and cued by anger are more likely to exist in the context of intra-war rivalry. The 1837 Caroline affair between the United States and Britain regarding Canadian revolutionaries provides an example. British troops boarded a ship, the Caroline, sailed by members of the Canadian independence movement, led by William Mackenzie, and some American supporters. The British troops killed an American, burned the ship, and tossed it over Niagara Falls. This led Americans and Canadians to retaliate against the British; the British ship was destroyed as well. After several tit-for-tat attacks, the situation was resolved with the Ashburton-Webster Treaty of 1842, whereby Daniel Webster wrote that the necessity for preemptive self-defense must be characterized by "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." This "Caroline test" still provides the foundation for what has become a pillar of international law regarding the preemptive use of force.[80]

Not surprisingly, this tempering mechanism is reflected in humans' biological and psychological architecture. Even though victory in competition tends to lead to higher testosterone levels and dominance displays among the victors across numerous contexts,[81] this reaction is muted when the defeated party is considered part of the in-group.[82] Aside from the obviously stabilizing effect this has on intra-group relations, this muted testosterone response mitigates the prospect of anger turning into hatred and, therefore, helps to mitigate the perceived need among the defeated for revenge against in-group members.

A second context in which an out-group attack may elicit anger but not hatred is the case in which the out-group is perceived to be internally fractured. This would support the strategic adage to "divide and conquer." In this way, prospects for converting some out-group members into allies reduce the need, and desire, for total annihilation

of the out-group. If future cooperation is desirable, beneficial, and possible, it behooves antagonists to try to resolve a tractable conflict rather than turn an opponent into an intractable enemy. In contrast, when out-groups appear to operate relatively cohesively, there is evidence that individuals are more likely to hold groups collectively responsible for attacks of their individual members.[83] According

Although leaders may find it challenging, in certain contexts, to restrain a public bent upon vengeful fervor, leaders may conversely find that lighting the wick of outrage is no simple matter either.

to Lickel[84]: "If the group is perceived to be highly unified, then other members of that group are more likely to be blamed and targeted for retribution for the provocative acts of an individual group member."

A good example of this dynamic exists in U.S.-Iranian relations. There is an emotional divide within the United States between those who see Iran as an implacable enemy, based largely on events surrounding the Iranian hostage crisis from 1979, and those who view Iran as America's most logical ally in the region, given the history of close relations before 1979 and the fact that the two countries share a natural enemy in the self-proclaimed Islamic State, among other overlapping interests. Those who express a sense of betrayal and anger at Iran for overthrowing the shah and taking American personnel hostage also tend to place less emphasis on the U.S.-led coup against Iran's democratically elected prime minster, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953, when the United States helped reinstate the shah, who was friendlier

80 Robert Y. Jennings, "The Caroline and McLeod Cases," *The American Journal of International Law* 32, no. 1 (January 1938): 82-99; Martin A. Rogoff and Edward Collins, Jr., "The Caroline Incident and the Development of International Law," *Brook. Journal of International Law* 16 (1990): 493.

81 John Archer, "Testosterone and Human Aggression: An Evaluation of the Challenge Hypothesis," *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews* 30, no. 3 (2006).

82 John D. Wagner, Mark V. Flinn, and Barry G. England, "Hormonal Response to Competition Among Male Coalitions," *Evolution and Human Behavior* 23, no. 6 (November 2002).

83 Adam Waytz and Liane Young, "The Group-Member Mind Trade-Off Attributing Mind to Groups Versus Group Members," *Psychological Science* 23, no. 1 (December 2011).

84 Lickel et al., "Vicarious Retribution: The Role of Collective Blame in Intergroup Aggression," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 10, no. 4 (2006): 372-390.

to U.S. and British interests.[85] They also tend to reject the possibility that any benefit could result from closer relations; indeed, these are the people who strongly reject the Iranian nuclear deal when most experts argue that the United States benefits more than it loses from the agreement. On the other hand, those who see Iran as more useful as a potential future ally than adversary tend to argue that closer relations may incentivize the Iranians to shift their behavior in ways that are more conducive to American interests.[86] Similar arguments are made by those who seek to incorporate North Korea into the international community, hoping that greater economic integration in particular will provide enough of an incentive to offer political leverage as well.[87] Importantly, these differences in the level of anger and resentment, clearly reflected in generational differences in attitudes toward Iran, reflect how distinct emotional perspectives can yield different inferences about why Iran acts as it does, and suggests divergent responses to such behavior.

These two points taken together suggest that the well-studied "enemy image" in international relations may obscure important nuances that deserve to be conceptually unpacked. Specifically, this question relates to the uncertainty that states and leaders confront in trying to figure out the nature of the enemy they confront: Can the opponent be enticed to cooperate to the benefit of both, or does the other side present an intractable enemy who should be fought sooner rather than later? For example, the "enemy" image characterizes a state as monolithic, evil, strategically opportunistic, and yielding only in the face of the perceiver's commitment and strength.[88] Indeed, once the out-group is perceived as monolithic and evil (i.e., cohesive and not subject to preference recalibration), it is likely to inspire hatred and attacks that will precipitate escalatory and indiscriminately vicarious vengeance. But to the extent that the enemy is seen as a group that can be divided and conquered, or one responsive to coercion, negative reciprocity can offer a more useful strategy because it retains the possibility of future cooperation.

It may be the case that inter-group relations are naturally characterized by a bias toward perceiving out-groups as evil and monolithic, particularly since the consequences of misjudgment are much graver for perceiving the enemy as friendly than the reverse.[89] Nevertheless, it would be folly to mistake mere hurdles for inevitabilities, especially given the natural abilities of humans to manipulate and widen the bonds of group membership.[90] These dynamics reveal the danger of misidentifying an enemy whose preferences can be recalibrated for one whose preferences cannot, which risks precipitating the very outcome each side may wish to prevent: escalation in retaliatory violence. In addition, the potential for future cooperation may be lost as well, which can entail an extremely high cost over time. Tragically, misidentifying the character of the opponent may be one important mechanism that fuels the recurrent security dilemma in international relations whereby actors make attributions about others' intentions that are more hostile than is actually the case. This concern can easily trigger an escalatory dynamic as each side makes assumptions about the other that inspire increased weapons procurement for purposes of defense, which are simultaneously understood by the other side as signaling escalatory or hostile intent.[91]

Aside from perceptions of group cohesion, which appear to mediate the degree to which groups are prepared to engage in escalatory revenge, a second major pathway from individual psychology to coalitional dynamics lies in the role of leaders. Again, however, the natural tendency in leadership seems biased toward revenge over negative reciprocity in the face of an out-group attack. Leaders tend to be more prototypical on relevant in-group attributes and more susceptible to out-group threat.[92] By extension, leaders are more likely to seek revenge and be held as targets for revenge, given their group prototypicality and symbolism. Nevertheless, leaders are not merely powerless

85 Walter LaFeber, *American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, From 1750 to the Present* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2nd edition, 1994); Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

86 Stephen Kinzer, *Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future* (New York: Macmillan, 2010).

87 Harry G. Broadman, "Time To Try An Economic Carrot Approach With North Korea?" *Forbes*, September 30, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/harrybroadman/2017/09/30/time-to-try-an-economic-carrot-approach-with-north-korea/#48232b5712bc.

88 Keith L. Shimko, *Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

89 Martie G. Haselton and David M. Buss, "Error Management Theory: A New Perspective on Biases in Cross-Sex Mind Reading," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 78, no. 1 (January 2000).

90 Robert M. Sapolsky, "Social Status and Health in Humans and Other Animals," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 33 (October 2004).

91 Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

92 Michael A. Hogg, "A Social Identity Theory of Leadership," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 5, no. 3 (2001).

drones of the masses. Their ability to influence the direction of inter-group conflict is a function of their ability to frame events, sway opinion, and mobilize resources.

Depending on the context, in-group elites may wish to either moderate or facilitate vengeful responses to an out-group attack, whether for the sake of political expediency, strategic necessity, or alliance considerations. For example, President Grover Cleveland and his successor, William McKinley, each tried but ultimately failed to restrain a Congress and public that were increasingly eager to expel Spain from Cuba. It was the destruction of the U.S.S. *Maine* in 1898 that helped tip the political scales toward war with Spain. Although no direct evidence of Spanish culpability was unearthed, the relevant image that Americans had of Spain was that of an attacker, not an ally; there was therefore no room for pause or deliberation after the ship's destruction. As a counterfactual, one might expect that had Spain been a more valuable ally, American elites would have made more of an effort to excuse or interpret events in a different light. In reality, U.S. interests — both ideological and economic — lay with the Cubans. Perceived Cuban suffering at the hands of Spanish imperialists, and the volume of American trade and investment in Cuba being greater than even that with Spain, conspired to mute McKinley's ability to restrain his country's outrage at ostensibly hostile Spanish actions in the Caribbean. McKinley would later lament that "but for the inflamed state of public opinion, and the fact that Congress could no longer be held in check, a peaceful solution might have been held."[93]

Although leaders may find it challenging, in certain contexts, to restrain a public bent upon vengeful fervor, leaders may conversely find that lighting the wick of outrage is no simple matter either. This was Woodrow Wilson's conundrum in wanting to control the peace without entering World War I and, having opposed U.S. involvement, then having to rouse sentiment in its favor at a time of entrenched isolationist sentiment. This was also Franklin D. Roosevelt's challenge as he simultaneously sought to support the Allies in their struggle against Nazi Germany while reassuring an ambivalent public that the United States would not enter the war. According to Schuessler,[94] Roosevelt's dilemma was to reconcile two contrasting realities: 70 percent of Americans wanted to stay out of the war, but 70 percent wanted to see Hitler defeated at all costs. Despite the strategic threat posed by Germany, it was the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor that would mobilize popular sentiment in such a way as to allow Roosevelt to more overtly support the Allies.

"Be This the Whetstone of Your Sword"

Revenge is the product of complex psychological mechanisms that evolved in response to the adaptive problem of deterring adversaries in ancestral coalitional environments. Synthesizing research across disciplines, we expose the psychological underpinnings of revenge, its implications for the functioning of deterrence in its role in international relations, and its differentiation from other forms of retaliation such as negative reciprocity. Furthermore, we explore its emotional correlates and contextual triggers in order to illustrate the potency, plasticity, and application of these systems across seemingly disparate domains of international politics such as intra-war conflict and nuclear deterrence. Revenge occurs naturally and automatically; it is the psychological — even if latent — dynamic that makes deterrence possible.

Importantly, our distinction between revenge and negative reciprocity provides theoretical scope for understanding the nature of revenge and provides scholars with a useful typology for beginning to understand the many ways that states and non-state actors are likely to respond to threat. According to our typology, *negative reciprocity* operates to recalibrate adversary preferences through anger and the proportional delivery of punishment, and it holds out the possibility of post-conflict reconciliation. In contrast, *revenge*, which is motivated by more intense emotions such as hatred, operates to impose disproportionate and often maximum harm in order to render counter-retaliation unlikely or impossible. In the face of existential threat, revenge overwhelms the cost-benefit calculations that would otherwise lead rational actors to accept sunk costs and, instead, to return spiteful destruction on the attacker. This desire is endogenously motivated through the neuroendocrine system. Whereas negative reciprocity operates to resolve conflict via preference restructuring and bargaining, revenge resolves conflict by crippling or eliminating the adversary. Although it may seem odd to think of revenge as a "conflict resolution" mechanism, that is its proper domain. As Daly and Wilson[95] aptly note: "Killing

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93 Richard F. Hamilton, *President McKinley, War and Empire: President McKinley and the Coming of War, 1898* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).

94 John M. Schuessler, "The Deception Dividend: FDR's Undeclared War," *International Security* 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 153.

95 Daly and Wilson, *Homicide*.

one's antagonist is the ultimate conflict resolution technique." However, its effectiveness to end one conflict is often balanced by its ability to generate new conflicts. Disproportionate revenge has often led to friends, relatives, and others who shared a sense of community and identity with the target to respond in kind, unleashing a never-ending escalating spiral, as is often seen in civil conflicts, terrorism, and other forms of political violence. Famous family feuds often have this character as well, demonstrating that the psychological dynamics we explicate are not restricted to nuclear deterrence or nation-state behavior but, rather, that the behavior of leaders and elites reflects basic human psychological mechanisms operating within the context of the larger political domain. If the strategy of revenge was successful enough to provide even a small fitness advantage over time and across many people, especially through the annihilation of enemies, which would prevent consequent retaliation, the instinct could easily be preserved, at least among some percentage of the population, even if much of the time it may appear counterproductive in any single instance.

This perspective allows scholars and policymakers to potentially infer internal motivations from behavioral responses, which, in turn, can help policymakers avoid costly errors such as falsely identifying an adversary as implacable when bargaining is more possible than it might outwardly seem. Policymakers can also potentially distinguish between these types of adversaries by the contextual environments in which they occur, as well as the emotions they elicit. For example, anger-fueled negative reciprocity tends to occur in environments characterized by intra-war conflict, while revenge, fueled by hatred, emerges in the case of all-out war, including the prospect of nuclear conflagration. Their emotional manifestations provide the motivating force that both signals and sustains their respective functions. These predictive inferences and implications are the necessary next steps for researchers as we continue to explore the evolved psychology of threat perception in coalitional contexts.

An evolutionary perspective also reveals that revenge may be sought not only by the direct imposition of costs and harm but also by the systematic withholding of benefits that affect a group's status or resources. When revenge is triggered by the withholding of benefits, it is no less "retaliatory" simply because it is, behaviorally

speaking, a first strike. Many cases of attacks that appear preemptive in nature are better explained as acts of revenge triggered by the subjective perception of the systematic withholding of status or other material benefits. In other words, the perception of injustice can lead to anger and eventually hateful vengeance even in the apparent absence of obvious external or physical provocation. This is applicable in the case of rising powers, for example, which are likely to experience the widening differential between their material power and relative status as humiliating, precipitating a slide from angry contempt to hateful spite toward those that distribute rights and benefits in the international system. This can also happen when material benefits are withheld.

Theoretically, evolutionary models provide novel information that extends models based on traditional notions of rationality by moving beyond purely cognitive readings of credibility and deterrence to offer insight into how specific emotions or environmental contexts can serve as motivating cues for behavioral responses. Importantly, evolutionary models are not constructed along the lines of traditional economic definitions of "rationality," such as those based on immediate cost-benefit calculations. Rather, they are formulated according to an organism's long-term reproductive success, which includes emotional short cuts and cognitive heuristics that, while not appearing rational from a classical economic perspective, serve a much deeper rationality designed to facilitate the survival of the organism.

Many models of rationality assume that individual rationality, defined in classical economic terms, can lead to collective rationality.[96] Others acknowledge that collective irrationality or sub-optimal outcomes can paradoxically result from individuals pursuing their rational self-interest.[97] Yet neither perspective has paid much attention to the ultimate origins or ecological validity of such preference structures. A major contribution of evolutionary models is that they offer a means to better understand human decision making and preference structures within given contexts. Whether a behavior is rational from an economic perspective reflects only one real but very limited and narrow facet of rationality. Evolutionary psychology interrogates the adaptively functional structure of decision-making systems and preferences, and the environmental triggers that activate a wide variety of systems. In contrast, rational choice models often assume a set

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96 Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict.*

97 Russell Hardin, "Collective Action as an Agreeable N-Prisoners' Dilemma," *Behavioral Science* 16, no. 5 (September 1971); Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Rev. Ed* (New York: Schocken, 1971).

of preferences *a priori* and examine the effects of environmental constraints on those preferences. This constitutes an important point of theoretical divergence in these models. This does not mean such models must necessarily exist in opposition. Rather, evolutionary models can inform the lacuna that exists in rational models that fail to identify the origin of preferences; preferences easily emerge from the logic of reproductive success from an evolutionary perspective. In this light, a full appreciation of the purpose and function of revenge offers a universal basis for the emotional motivations that undergird, however implicitly, more economically rational notions of deterrence.

The causes of war are well studied in international politics, particularly from a more traditional rationalist perspective. Increasingly, scholars have turned to the behavioral sciences and research on human emotion to complement understanding of war and to deepen society's understanding of the triggers of political conflict. The psychological investigation of revenge is critical for international relations scholarship because revenge has for centuries remained among the most common motivations for hostility, and it involves the operation and expression of a very intense set of human emotions. Revenge is a notoriously stubborn, recurrent, and tragically prevalent motivation for political violence at all levels of social organization, and though the complexity and evolutionary novelty of international political structures may modify the behavioral expression of this basic human tendency, revenge remains a disturbingly central feature of international, sub-state, and personal conflicts. This recognition alone warrants a deeper appreciation of its significance in calibrating human conflict and supporting the structure of deterrence. ♟

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The Meaning Of Strategy:

Part I:
The Origin Story [1]

Sir Lawrence Freedman, PhD

The word "strategy," which is now commonplace, only first came into use to understand military affairs at the beginning of the 19th century in Europe. Since then, its meaning has changed in important ways.

At the heart of the historical study of strategy is a tension between the consideration of strategy as practice, which is bound up with the history of human conflict, and strategy as theory. The theorists can draw on all the practice, but their task is complicated by the fact that many practitioners did not describe themselves as strategists or, if they did, the term meant something different from how it is now understood.[2] The word "strategy" first came into use in discussions of military affairs in Europe during the 1770s,[3] but it was not until the 20th century that it acquired the broad meanings now attributed to it and that now tend to be applied retrospectively to past practitioners. Prior to World War I, the term had a specifically military character. Only later did it become concerned with the relationship between military means and political ends. Eventually the term became so detached from its military origins to be applied to all fields of human endeavor from sports to business,[4] which is why it has now become necessary to talk of "military strategy" as a sub-category of this much broader field.

The much narrower and largely apolitical early usage needs to be kept in mind when contemporary practitioners of military strategy turn to the classics of the Napoleonic period, especially Carl von Clausewitz, when seeking to gain a deeper understanding of their trade. It is best to do this critically, recognizing the specific issues these earlier theorists were addressing and the conceptual framework with which they were working.

In this, the first of two articles, I explore how "strategy" was understood when it first appeared. I first consider why it would not have been difficult to introduce strategy into the military lexicon at this time. As the value of the word was to help distinguish the higher levels of command from the lesser levels of command, I show how the concept of strategy developed in tandem with that of tactics.

One issue was whether this higher level was the domain of natural creativity, normally spoken of as "military genius," or else involved principles that could be learned and applied in a variety of different situations. The first of these was more of a French approach and the second more German. Both, however, were superseded by the focus on the decisive battle that was a feature of the work of both Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini and Clausewitz, inspired by the campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte. In a second article, I will show — largely by looking at discussions of strategy in Britain and the United States — how much a consensus on the general meaning of the term, if not a precise definition, was established during the first half of the 19th century and why this changed little during the second half. Once it was established that strategy was essentially about preparing forces for a decisive battle, this constrained — rather than liberated — thinking.

Scholars now routinely use the word "strategy" to discuss how wars were fought in the past, enabling them to explore continuities in practice and compare cases over time and space. Such explorations are undertaken, however, with a contemporary understanding of the term, which stresses the importance of using military means to achieve political objectives. In the period considered in this article, the general assumption was that any political objectives for which it was worth going to war could be achieved through the defeat of the enemy in battle. It is also important to keep in mind that even during this period, those practicing strategy by and large did not use the term. This is certainly the case with Napoleon, whose campaigns shaped the way strategy came to be viewed in the 19th century. When he eventually pondered the term in exile, he did not find it useful, reflecting his suspicion of attempts to over-intellectualize the art of war.

1 I am indebted to comments from Jeremy Black, Ryan Evans, Beatrice Heuser, and Benedict Wilkinson.

2 Beatrice Heuser described "strategy" as a word in evolution to which she casts with a small "s," as opposed to a practice in evolution, when she gives it a capital "S." This article is about small "s" strategy and, for that matter, small "t" tactics. Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3.

3 Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy*, and *The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010).

4 It was used in other contexts during the 19th century, but (as with revolutionary strategy) with a military analogy in mind. For the history of the concept see Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: OUP, 2013).

The question of how strategy should be defined and understood, therefore, was largely a matter for military theoreticians. The theoreticians had military experience of their own, and in the case of the two great figures Jomini and Clausewitz, their ideas developed through their participation in the campaigns of the Napoleonic War. But their theories were still reflections on the practice of others and were not forged through their own practice. Clausewitz, for example, had worked out his definitions of strategy and tactics by 1805, and they had not varied significantly by the time he came to wrote "On War," although his broader understanding of warfare undoubtedly did mature over this period.[5] Jomini insisted that the innovations in warfare were in the realm of tactics, while strategy had timeless characteristics. One of the striking features of this story is the lack of interaction between particular military events and the use of the term. All authors drew on military history to make their points, although at first the examples were as likely to be drawn from the ancient world as recent experience.

In the concluding section of my *Strategy: A History*, I considered strategies as scripts. In cognitive psychology, a script is defined as "a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that define a well-known situation."[6] The basic idea is that when we come across a situation we think we recognize, we draw on an available mental script that creates expectations about how events are likely to unfold. It offers guidance on how others will behave and how we, in turn, should behave, at least until we start to note deviations from the script. Then, improvisation is required. My discussion of the advantage of thinking of strategy as a script was meant not only to explain why much strategy was intuitive, but also to point to the importance of adaptability and flexibility as it became more deliberative.

Scripts are also appropriate with regard to the material considered in this article. The tactical manuals used to prepare forces for battle were often set out as scripts on the appropriate responses to defined situations. An efficient army required an almost intuitive mechanical response to the challenges of warfare. Appropriate responses were drilled into troops who were trained to follow orders mechanically so that they knew without asking how to wheel, form squares, defend, and attack, and when to fire and charge. In the manuals,

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the scripts were set out in meticulous detail, with diagrams and recommended formations. The purpose of drill was to make all of these actions second nature to the troops so that they would always know what was expected of them and would move expeditiously into position, neither flinching nor breaking in the face of the enemy. The more these scripts were internalized by the fighting units, the more effective they would be in a campaign.

The drills became increasingly demanding in the face of the complexity of potential maneuvers and the need for disciplined responses in the face of fire that was becoming heavier. But this created its own problems when circumstances arose in which mechanical responses were inadequate and improvisation was needed. By the middle of the 18th century it was apparent that command at the higher levels must have a creative aspect. This was the level at which opportunities that might be fleeting or missed by a duller eye could be seized boldly with speed and confidence. This was where "military genius" made its mark. For those engaged in officer education, this posed a problem because not every officer would be a genius. It was here that one could address the key question of whether genius was a gift bestowed upon a few great commanders or whether there were rules and principles that could be followed that could get the commander close to genius-like decisions without actually being a genius. This was the level that came to be described as "strategic."

The context in which these issues came to be identified and addressed took place has been well

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5 Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz's on War* (London: Atlantic Books, 2007).

6 Freedman, *Strategy*; Roger Schank and Robert Abelson, *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures* (UK: Psychology Press, 1977), 41.

described and explored elsewhere.[7] The spirit of the enlightenment era demanded a more scientific approach to all human affairs, even war. The systematic study of phenomena such as war required careful classification of its different branches, better to explore its differences. Innovations in cartography allowed generals to work out how they might advance from their home base to confront an enemy, with an eye to logistics, and then plot the conduct of battle. In Britain, for example, the need for better maps for war-making had been underlined during the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion. What became known as the Ordnance Survey began in 1790, under the Board of Ordnance, the government body responsible for the defense of the realm.[8] The growing size and complexity of modern armies demanded far more attention to the problems of how they were to be drilled, moved, sustained, deployed, and commanded. The first general staff designed to support the commander-in-chief was introduced in Austria after the 1750s, although it was the Prussians who made the system work most effectively.[9] Lastly, the War of the Austrian Succession (1740 to 1748) and then the Seven Years War (1756 to 1763) involved tactical innovations, notably in the campaigns of Frederick the Great. In the 1757 Battle of Rossbach, Prussian forces under Frederick defeated a combined French and Holy Roman Empire force twice their size, imposing massive losses while suffering few themselves.[10] After this, the French avoided further combat with Prussia and an introspective debate began into the failings of the French military system and the need for reform. Demands for reform extended to the wider political and economic system, leading to the upheavals resulting from the French Revolution. This provided the setting for Napoleon's wars of conquest, pushing all the issues connected with strategy to the fore, as the defeat of the enemy army in battle became the prime objective.

"Strategy" Enters the Lexicon

The agreed view is that the word "strategy" arrived in the modern European lexicon in 1771 when the French officer Paul Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy published his translation of the Byzantine emperor Leo VI's *Taktiká*. This included references to *strategía* as well as *taktiké*. *Strategía*, previously discussed as the science of the general, was now transliterated simply as *stratégie*. A word was born.[11] By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, "strategy" was in use by military theorists across Europe. When Clausewitz came to discuss the question of strategy and tactics at the opening of Book 2 of *On War*, he was almost apologetic, assuming that what he had to say was now familiar. Strategy and tactics were so "closely related" that any careful distinction would be considered "superfluous" by many readers. People knew of the distinction ("now almost universal") and could distinguish between the two ("everyone knows fairly where each particular factor belongs"), even if they could not always understand why the distinction was being made.[12]

Black notes an appearance in a Danish military dictionary in 1810. It was present in Italy by 1817, in Spain and Holland by 1822 and a bit later in Portugal.[13] As we will see in my next article for this journal, the new word was noted almost immediately in Britain, although not actively discussed until the first years of the 19th century. Why was the adoption of "strategy" so widespread and so rapid? The first reason is that it was not really a neologism and would have been understood (if not always in the same way) without much explanation. Those who aspired to contribute to the theory of war in the 18th century were likely to have a firm grounding in the classic Greek and Roman writing on the subject. The key words came from Greek. *Taktiké* meant "order" while *strategos* and *strategía* referred to generals and the things generals did.[14] They would have read Polybius

7 In addition to Heuser's work, see: Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1989); Azar Gat, *The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1992); Hew Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," *Survival*, 47, no. 3 (2005), reprinted with other relevant essays in Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

8 Rachel Hewitt, *Map of a Nation: A Biography of the Ordnance Survey* (London: Granta, 2010).

9 Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

10 Dennis Showalter, *Frederick the Great: A Military History* (London: Frontline Books, 2012).

11 This has been most definitively established by Heuser in *The Evolution of Strategy* as well as *The Strategy Makers*.

12 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 128.

13 Jeremy Black, *Plotting Power; Strategy in the Eighteenth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017). The Russians had never really lost the word, because of the Byzantine influence, although, as noted below, this was more closely associated with stratagem.

14 Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 239. Luttwak notes that the Greek word does not have the same connotation as the modern word. He suggests this would have been *strategike episteme* (general's knowledge) or *strategon sophia* (general's wisdom).

(c.200 to 118 BCE), whose treatise on tactics was lost, but regular reference was made to it in his subsequent histories of the wars of the Greeks and the Romans.[15] The Greek Aelian of the second century provided a detailed discussion of Greek tactics, which was an important source for later writers concerned with the organization of their own forces.[16] Aelian in turn influenced Arrian (86 to 180), who discussed the concept in his *History of Alexander* and also wrote a treatise on Roman tactics, *Techne Taktike*.[17] The Roman Senator Frontinus (40 to 103) wrote a wide-ranging work on strategy, which was lost, but an extract covering stratagems survived.[18] Stratagems were also addressed in Onasander's *Strategikos* from the first century.[19] Frontitus's writings, including possibly his lost work, influenced Flavius Vegetius Rematus of the late fourth century. Vegetius's *De Re Militari* ("The Military Institutions of the Romans") never lost its popularity and by the 18th century was seen as a vital guide to the military art.[20]

As Christopher Duffy has observed, "intelligent officers knew far more about classical military history than they did about the events of their own time." Vegetius had become "effectively an eighteenth century author."[21] A study of the reading habits of British officers during the course of the 18th century confirms the predominant role for the classics (Polybius, Arrian, Frontinus, Vegetius, etc.) that only latterly gave way to more contemporary authors.[22]

So even before the words strategy and tactics made their way to the center of military theory over the final three decades of the 18th century, they would not have been alien to those educated in the classics.[23] It did not take a great etymological leap for *strategía* and *taktiké* to turn into strategy

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and tactics. It might have been common, as with Sir John Cheke's 1554 translation of Leo's *Taktiká* from Greek into Latin, to refer to the art of the general or of command (*ars imperatoria*),[24] but elsewhere, variants of the Greek word were in use. They just did not employ contemporary spelling. One known instance comes from the early 17th century. James Maxwell translated Herodian of Alexandria's *History of the Roman Empire*. Against the following words in the text, "All Places of Martiall command they gave to brave noble Captains and Souldiers expert in Marshalling of Armies and Military Exploits," the translator added his own marginal note: "In which words the author hath couched both the parts of war: viz, tactick and Strategmatick."[25] As we will see when other cognate words were used, there was always this dichotomous relationship between the derivatives of *strategía* and *taktiké*.

Although the greatest interest has been in the emergence of strategy, it should be noted that tactics was also not in regular use until well into the 18th century. Up to that point, it was largely used in connection with the wars of antiquity. French dictionaries beginning in 1694 defined "tactiques" by reference to "the Ancients," as "*L'art de ranger des troupes en bataille*." ("The art

15 Fridericus Hultsch and Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, *The Histories of Polybius* (London: Macmillan, 1889).

16 Christopher Matthew, *The Tactics of Aelian* (London: Pen & Sword Military, 2012).

17 Arrian, *The Campaigns of Alexander*, trans. Aubrey de Selincourt (London: Penguin, 2003).

18 Sextus Julius Frontinus, *The Stratagems and The Aqueducts of Rome*, trans. Charles E. Bennett (London: William Heinemann, 1980).

19 Smith, C.J., "Onasander On How To Be A General," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 42, no. S71 (1998): 151-166.

20 Flavius Vegetius Renatus, *The Military Institutions of the Romans (De Re Militari)*, ed. Thomas R. Phillips, trans. John Clark (Man sfield Centre, CT: Martino, 2011).

21 Christopher Duffy, *Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 39.

22 Ira Gruber, *Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

23 Although Latin was much more in use than Greek, recent scholarship suggests that Greek was better known than had previously been supposed. Micha Lazarus, "Greek Literacy in Sixteenth-Century England," *Renaissance Studies* 29 (2014), 4 33-58. I am grateful to Dr. Naoise MacSweeney of Leicester University for this reference and also for her observation that *strategos* may well have been one of the first words that students of Greek might have learned, as it is a regular second declension noun and suitable for teaching. She suggests that it is possible that a much wider set of people had a sense of *strategos* and strategia than would necessarily have had a working knowledge of Greek.

24 Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy*, 4-5.

25 Herodian of Alexandria, *his History of twenty Roman Caesars and emperors (of his time.)*, trans. James Maxwell (London: Printed for Hugh Perry, 1629).

of putting troops into battle.")[26] The key figure in persuading Europe that tactics were "worthy of serious study" is considered to be the Chevalier de Folard.[27] He published his *Nouvelles découvertes sur la guerre* in 1724. This was followed by a new translation of Polybius's History, which Folard had commissioned and for which he contributed comments of his own.[28]

In Britain, John Harris's *Lexicon Technicum*, published in 1723, defined tactics as "the Art of Disposing any Number of Men into a proper form of Battle." Harris reported that the Greeks were very "skilful" in this branch of the military art, "having Public Professors of it," who were called *Tactici*.[29] He referred to the Emperor Leo VI, as well as Aelian and Arrias. The word "tacticks" appeared, but not with its own entry, in Samuel Johnson's 1755 dictionary,[30] under the heading of "Evolutions," a term used to describe the point when an army shifted its position, for example to move from attack to defense or defense to attack:

> The motion made by a body of men in changing their posture, or form of drawing up, either to make good the ground they are upon, or to possess themselves of another; that so they may attack the enemy, or receive his onset more advantageously. And these evolutions are doubling of ranks or files, countermarches, and wheelings.[31]

There was no reference to tactics in Humphrey Bland's 1727 *A Treatise of Military Discipline* or in Lt. Col. Campbell Dalrymple's 1761 "*Military Essay*."[32] Nor was there a mention in the most influential British work on the Seven Years War, by Major-General Henry Lloyd.[33] It was, however, introduced when Lloyd added new material as a second part of the book in 1781. Then, he described his outline of the principles of war as "the foundation of all tactics, which alone can offer us some certain and fixed principles to form and conduct an army."[34]

The most admired commander of his day, Frederick the Great of Prussia, wrote his *General Principles of War applied to Tactics and the Discipline of Prussian troops*, in 1748. Written in French, it was not translated into German until 1753 and then at first issued only to his generals. It was widely published in 1762, late in the Seven Year's War, after a copy had been taken from a captured general. Despite the title, the text did not actually discuss tactics (and discipline was clearly the highest priority). In his *Élements de Castramétrie et de Tactique*, published in German in 1771, he considered as tactics issues that would soon come under the heading of strategy.[35] Therefore, when it came to new ways of thinking about the art of war, tactics had a definite head start over strategy, and could cover the same ground, but the lead was not that substantial.

The Origins of "Strategy"

As for strategy, close cousins of the word were already in use. There were at least two important derivations from the original *strategía* in the lexicon prior to 1771. The first, which was well-established, was stratagem. Strategy and stratagem had the same origins but over time developed separately.[36] The *Oxford English Dictionary* (an invaluable source on these matters) identifies stratagem's first English

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26 *Le Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française* 1694. By the 1798 version camping and making evolutions had been added to the definition. The appearance of words in French dictionaries can be explored on http://artfl-project.uchicago.edu/node/17.

27 Duffy, *Military Experience in the Age of Reason*, 40.

28 *History of Polybius*, newly translated from Greek by Dom Vincent Thuillier, with a commentary or a body of military science enriched with critical and historical notes by F. de Folard (1729).

29 John Harris, *Lexicon Technicum: or, A Universal English Dictionary of Arts and Sciences: Explaining Not Only the Terms of Art, But the Arts Themselves*, Vol. II, 2nd ed. (London: Brown, 1723).

30 Samuel Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language* (London: 1755), http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com. Johnson gives Harris as his authority.

31 Frederick II ("the Great") of Prussia, "General Principles of War" (1748/1753), accessed at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3582.

32 Humphrey Bland, *A Treatise of Military Discipline: In Which is Laid Down and Explained the Duties of Officer and Soldier* (London: 1727). This book, which was essential reading in the British army and went through a number of editions, does contain a chapter, "Evolutions of the Foot, with an Explanation, and General rules for Wheeling;" Campbell Dalrymple, *A Military Essay: Containing Reflections On The Raising, Arming, Cloathing, And Discipline Of The British Infantry And Cavalry* (London: D. Wilson, 1761).

33 Major-General Lloyd, *The History of the Late War in Germany Between The King Of Prussia, And The Empress Of Germany And Her Allies, Vol. 1* (London: S. Hooper, 1781). This part was first published in 1766.

34 Major-General Lloyd, *Continuation of the History of the Late war in Germany, Part II* (London: S. Hooper, 1781), 20.

35 Castramétrie (Castramation) referred to laying out of a military camp.

36 Everett L. Wheeler, *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery*, Mnemoseyne supplement 108 (New York: Brill, 1988).

use in 1489 in a military sense ("Whiche subtilites and wylis are called Stratagemes of armes").[37] It soon came to refer to any cunning ploy or ruse, in some ways suffering the same fate as the modern strategy as a term with a military meaning that became adopted more generally. This can be seen in Shakespeare. In "All's Well That Ends Well," it is used in a military sense ("If you think your mystery in stratagem can bring this instrument of honour again into his native quarter, be magnanimous in the enterprise and go on") and then in a wider sense ("for the love of laughter, let him fetch his drum; he says he has a stratagem for't").[38] Samuel Johnson referred regularly to stratagems, in a wide and not uniquely military way. Stratagem, however, not only remained an essential element in the art of war, but also there were a number of derivations, identified by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, in use from the 16th through the 18th centuries — stratagematic, stratagematical, strategematist, and stratagemical.[39]

Another related word, now wholly obsolete, was *stratarithmetrie* (made up of the Greek words for army, number, and measure). This was a form of military arithmetic. John Dee, a highly influential mathematician and an important figure in the Elizabethan Court, wrote an introduction to a new translation of Euclid in 1570 in which he explained the relevance of its principles to a variety of human affairs, including war. He distinguished between "Stratarithmetrie" and "Tacticie," and in so doing referred to the Emperor Leo VI's work (this was not long after Sir John Cheke's Latin translation had been published). Stratarithmetrie, according to Dee, offered a way "by which a man can set in figure, analogicall to any *Geometricall* figure appointed, any certaine number or summe of men." It would be possible to choose the best geometrical figure (perfect square, triangle, circle, etc.) that had been used in war "for commodiousness, necessity, and advantage." It differed from the "Feate Tacticall" that would necessitate the "wisedome and foresight, to what purpose he so

ordreth the men."[40] Dee was cited as an authority on this matter long after he died. The word was used as he intended, for example, in 1652:

> Stratarithmetrie is the skill appertaining to the warre to set in figure any number of men appointed: differing from Tacticie, which is the wisdom and the oversight.[41]

The potential of mathematics as a guide to the optimum organization of troops for military engagements was a familiar theme in the 17th and 18th centuries. It was satirized by Shakespeare in *Othello* with Iago's disparaging comments about Michael Cassio, a "great arithmetician" who "never set a squadron in the field/Nor the division of a battle knows more than a spinster — unless the bookish theoric."[42]

Ephraim Chambers' *Cyclopædia*, the first edition of which was in 1728, contained a reference to tactics, taken directly from Harris's *Lexicon Technicum*. Unlike Harris, however, Chambers also included as items stratagem (a "military wile"), *stratarithmetry* ("the art of drawing up an Army or any part of it, in any given Geometric figure") and, lest the origins of the word be forgotten, *strategus* (as one of the two appointed Athenians who would "command the troops of the state").[43]

The potential of mathematics as a guide to the optimum organization of troops for military engagements was a familiar theme in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Thereafter, it was hard to find a dictionary without similar or replicated entries as they were habitually copied. In Britain, similar references

37 William Caxton, *C. de Pisan's Book Fayttes of Armes,* (1489).

38 William Shakespeare, *All's Well That Ends Well*, First Folio (England: 1623), III.vi.59, III.vi.32.

39 Richard Collier, *The Great Historical, Geographical, Genealogical and Poetical Dictionary; Being a Curious Miscellany of Sacred and Prophane History* (London: Henry Rhodes, 1701). In 1701, Collier referred to a Frederick Marabotti as "a good soldier, and particularly considerable in the Stratagemical Part of War." This was originally a translation from the French of Louis Moréri's encyclopedia, *The Great Historical Dictionary, or Curious Anthology of Sacred and Secular History* (first published in 1674). The usage here is Collier's.

40 John Dee, *The Mathematicall Praeface to The Elements Of Geometrie of the most auncient Philosopher EVCLIDE of Megara* (London: John Daye, 1570), accessed at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/22062/22062-h/22062-h.htm.

41 Silvanus Morgan, *Horlogiographia optica* (London: Andrew Kemb and Robert Boydell, 1652).

42 William Shakespeare, *Othello,* First Folio (England: 1623), I, i.

43 Ephraim Chambers, *Cyclopædia, or, An Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences* (London: J. and J. Knapton, 1728), 135.

were found in Chambers' competitors, for example in Rees's *Cyclopaedia*,[44] and the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, published from 1788 to 1797.[45] This edition was reproduced in its entirety as *Dobson's Encyclopædia*, published in the United States from 1799.

The first edition in 1694 of the authoritative *Dictionary of the French Academy* had a reference to stratagem as "ruse de guerre," repeated in later editions. The 5th edition in 1798 made no mention of *stratégie*.[46] The great *Encyclopédie*, compiled by Denis Diderot, was originally intended as a French translation of Chambers, and the eventual version, first published in 1765, had a number of items attributed to Chambers. These included entries for "stratagem" and "stratarithmetry," noting that the latter was not used in France.[47] There was also a discussion of the role of the *strategos*.[48] Unlike Chambers, however, there was a long section on tactics. This was described as "the science of military movements," and then, with reference to Polybius, "the art of matching a number of men destined to fight, to distribute them in rows and rows, and to instruct them in all the manoeuvres of war." This discussed at length the practices of the Romans, the more recent application of the core principles, and addressed the issue of whether or not the French should imitate Prussian methods, clearly an issue after the defeat of French forces in the Seven Years war.

Why the Concept of Strategy Was Readily Adopted

Thus, when Maizeroy used "strategie" by itself and without translation in his 1771 translation of Leo VI's *Taktiká*, its appearance would not have posed great difficulties for the more educated students of warfare in the late 18th century. There was the same contrast with tactics as before. Was there, however, also continuity in meaning? Through the 18th century, stratagem had been recognized as an important part of the art of war, fitting in with a preference for what later became known as an indirect approach. According to this approach it was usually best to avoid a pitched battle but if this was not possible then every available ruse should be used to fight only in the most propitious circumstances.

The classics encouraged this view, and also emphasized the use of skillful techniques to outsmart the enemy. When Polybius discussed tactics in his histories, he referred to one encounter during the Punic Wars that illustrated the difference "between scientific and unscientific warfare: between the art of a general and the mechanical movements of a soldier." At issue was not the ability to fight with fury and gallantry, but the use of tactics that helped avoid a "general engagement" by relying instead on wearing the enemy down through surprise ambushes and pushing them into positions where they could neither escape nor fight and risked starvation.

Frontinus described strategy (*strategikon*) as "everything achieved by a commander, be it characterized by foresight, advantage, enterprise, and resolution," of which stratagem (*strategematon*) was a subset, including aspects of trickery but was more generally about how success could be achieved by "skills and cleverness."[49] A key theme for Vegetius was the need to avoid battle unless necessary: "Good officers decline general engagements where the danger is common, and prefer the employment of stratagem and finesse to destroy the enemy as much as possible in detail and intimidate them without exposing our own forces." Stratagem was thus one way of waging war, distinct from more direct action.[50] Onasander's "Strategikos" described ruses designed to mislead an enemy into misapprehensions about the size of the army, or to maintain the morale of troops by demonstrating that things were not as bad as they might suppose. In this way, the "world of war" was one of "deceit and false appearances."

This was the tradition carried through the great works of Byzantium. The *Strategikon* of Byzantine

44 Abraham Rees, *The Cyclopaedia; or Universal Dictionary of Arts, Sciences and Literature* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme & Brow).

45 *Encyclopaedia Britannica: or, A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature*, 3rd ed., ed. Colin MacFarquhar and George Gleig, 1797. This contained a tiny reference to tactics in general although a long section on naval tactics.

46 *Le Dictionnaire de l'Académie française*. Sixième Éd. It only made an appearance in the 6th edition, published in 1835 (*"Faire une belle disposition, de belles dispositions, des dispositions savantes, etc., Disposer habilement son armée pour combattre"*).

47 It did include a similar word, *Strataryhmetrie*, as "the art of placing a battalion in battle on a given geometrical figure, and of finding the number of men contained in this battalion, whether we see them closely, or we see them from afar."

48 *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers,* vol. 15, 541. A dictionary published in 1801 of new words had nothing on strategy, but included tactican as (the art of training soldiers to form various military evolution); William Dupré, *Lexicographia-neologica gallica* (London: Baylis, 1801).

49 Frontinus had long been available in French. A new edition was published in 1765. An English translation was not published until 1811, although later superseded, but it was well known as a Latin text.

50 Clarke's translation was first published in 1767. It had a single mention of tactics, with reference to the Athenian schools of tactics, but a number on stratagem. An English translation was published by Caxton in 1489.

Emperor Maurice (582 to 602) contained the same theme of relying on cunning rather than brute force to gain victory:

> Warfare is like hunting. Wild animals are taken by scouting, by nets, by lying in wait, by stalking, by circling around, and by other such stratagems rather than by sheer force. In waging war we should proceed in the same way, whether the enemy be many or few. To try to simply overpower the enemy in the open, hand in hand and face to face, even though you may appear to win, is an enterprise which is very risky and can result in serious harm.

In addition: "A wise commander will not engage the enemy in pitched battle unless a truly exceptional opportunity or advantage presents itself."[51] Here was a distinction between strategy and military skill. Strategy made use of times and places, surprises and various tricks to outwit the enemy with the idea of achieving its objectives even without actual fighting. It was "essential to survival and is the true characteristic of the intelligent and courageous general."[52] The "Strategikon" was not known to Europe's military innovators as they mined the classics for useful ideas, but, along with Onasander, it influenced the later Emperor Leo VI's work, completed in the 10th century, with the same key themes (although it had a greater emphasis on the need to pray before battle).[53] As the Russians had followed Byzantine usage, for them the art of the general was very much bound up with stratagem.[54]

The Chevalier de Folard, while gaining his notoriety by his promotion of the column as a way to win battles, also shared the classical view that battle was best avoided.[55] Black describes Folard as debating Vegetius "as if he was a contemporary."[56] One of the best known works of military theory of the mid-century, Count Turpin's "Essay on the Art of War" included strong advocacy of stratagems to help generals get out of difficult situations.[57] Frederick the Great also had seen battle as subject to too many chance factors to be embraced as a preferred method.[58] The overlap between stratagem and strategy is evident in Chambers' entry for stratagem, although this also indicates that changes in the nature of warfare might require a different approach. "The Ancients dealt mightily in Stratagems; the Moderns wage War more openly, and on the Square."[59]

Thus, when Maizeroy translated Leo's *Taktiká*, he was taking on a work heavily influenced by the stratagem tradition. The prolific Maizeroy took the view that the French had paid far too much attention to other European armies and not enough to the ancients. When later he came to identify the rules of strategy, the links with stratagem became clear:

> not to do what one's enemy appears to desire; to identify the enemy's principal objective in order not to be misled by his diversions; always to be ready to disrupt his initiatives without being dominated by them; to maintain a general freedom of movement for foreseen plans and for those to which circumstances may give rise; to engage one's adversary in his daring enterprises and critical moments without compromising one's own position; to be always in control of the engagement by choosing the right time and place.[60]

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51 Emperor Maurice, *Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy,* trans. George T. Dennis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 65, 86; Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). Luttwak discusses relational manoeuvre as an alternative to attrition and to stratagems.

52 Ibid, 23.

53 Edward Luttwak, *The Taktika of Leo VI*, trans. George T. Dennis (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Texts, 2014), Chapter 12. Paradoxically, Dennis notes, Maurice's *Strategikon* was mainly about tactics (as defined by the Byzantines), and Leo's *Taktiká* was mainly about strategy. One possibility is that the works would not have had titles and that librarians with limited knowledge of the subject mislabeled the two works in their catalogues.

54 Black, *Plotting Power*, 255.

55 Ibid, 122.

56 Ibid, 122.

57 Count Turpin, *An Essay on the Art of War,* trans. Joseph Otway (London: W. Johnston, 1761). First published in French in 1754.

58 He had provided a list of the tricks and stratagems of war intended to "oblige the enemy to make unnecessary marches in favour of our own designs. Our own intentions are to be studiously concealed, and the enemy misled by our affecting plans which we have no wish to execute." Frederick the Great, *Instructions for his Generals*, 1797. On French tactical debates, see Robert S. Quimby, *The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The Theory Of Military Tactics In Eighteenth-Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).

59 The importance of the Infantry Square, as a means of dealing with cavalry charges had been underlined during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701 to 1714). The formation of an effective square required considerable skill and discipline. It was dealt with extensively in Bland, *A Treatise of Military Discipline*, 90, in his discussion of how infantry should cope with "Attacks of Horse." Bland referred to stratagems as feints a number of times in this book. The most elaborate discussion of the Infantry Square over this period was in General Richard Kane, *A New System of Military Discipline for a Battalion of Foot on Action* (London: J. Millan, 1743) published posthumously. Kane had fought in the War of the Spanish Succession.

60 Joly De Maizeroy, *Théorie de la guerre* (Lausanne: Aux dépens de la Société, 1777), 304-5.

One additional factor that might possibly have affected the debate about strategy and stratagems in the early 1770s was the publication of the first Western translation of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* by Father Joseph Amiot, a Jesuit missionary and sinologist. This was one of a number of texts grouped together in a more general collection entitled, *Military Art of the Chinese*.[61] According to one source, this was received with considerable enthusiasm, with one reviewer describing this as containing "all the elements of the great art which had been written by Xenophon, Polybius, and de Saxe."[62] Yet, other accounts suggest that the positive response was fleeting, and there was even less impact when it was re-published a decade later.[63] Little admirable was seen in Chinese military practice at this time. Despite claims that it was read by Napoleon, there is no evidence of this, and it would certainly be stretching a point to suggest he was at all influenced.[64] Amiot's translation is now considered to be poor,[65] and not based on the most reliable version of the text. In this translation, neither the terms tactics nor strategy appear, though they were prominent in later English translations. There were a few references to stratagems.[66] Nonetheless, if this translation had any impact, it would have been to reinforce a stratagem-based, indirect approach that saw battles as events to be avoided if at all possible.

"Strategy" Gave a Name to the "Higher" Parts of War

In addition to the familiarity with the language and the stratagem tradition, a third reason why the concept of strategy was adopted so readily lay in its value in filling a gap in contemporary discussions about the problem of levels of command.

Marshal Maurice de Saxe's *My Reveries Upon the Art of War* was written in 1736, but only published posthumously in 1756. Saxe was one of the most successful French generals of the 18th century. In his *Reveries*, he referred to neither strategy nor tactics, but did distinguish between the "higher" and "lesser" parts of war. He argued that commanders must understand the lesser parts, though elemental and mechanical, covering methods of fighting and discipline, as they provided the "base and the fundamentals of the military art." Once Saxe had dealt with those in the first part of his book, he then moved on to the higher — "sublime" — parts, which he suspected might interest only experts. This meant moving beyond the "methodical," suitable for ordinary minds, to the "intellectual," with which the ordinary might struggle. This is why war was like the other "sublime arts." Application was not enough. There must be talent and excellence.[67] What this part lacked was a name.

This sense that there was a level of activity that lacked a proper name is evident in Maizeroy's prolific output from the 1760s to the 1780s, which included not only his translation of Leo VI, but also editions of his *Cours de tactique, théoretique, pratique et historique*, first published in 1766, as well as works on stratagems and his own *Théorie de la Guerre*.[68] Maizeroy, a lieutenant colonel in the French army who had served as a captain under Saxe, explored the distinction between the higher and lesser forms of the art of war. The lesser was,

> Merely mechanical, which comprehends the composing and ordering of troops, with the matter of encamping, marching, manoeuvring and fighting … may be deduced from principles and taught by rules.

In his *Traité de tactique*, published in 1767, he

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61 Joseph Marie Amiot, *Art militaire des Chinois, ou, Recueil d'anciens traités sur la guerre: composés avant l'ere chrétienne, par différents généraux chinois* (Paris: Didot l'ainé,1772). Bachmann, "Jean Joseph Marie Amiot Introduces 'The Art of War' to the West," *The Shelf,* January 28, 2014, http://blogs.harvard.edu/preserving/2014/01/28/jean-joseph-marie-amiot-introduces-the-art-of-war-to-the-west/. See also "Sun-tse: Les treize articles sur l'art militaire," Chine Ancienne, accessed October 2017, https://www.chineancienne.fr/traductions/sun-tse-les-treize-articles-sur-l-art-militaire.

62 Corneli, Alessandro, "Sun Tzu and the Indirect Strategy," *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali* 54, no. 3 (1987): 419-445. For a suggestion of the influence of Amiot's translation on French plans to wage guerrlla war in Britain in the 1790s, see Sylvie Kleinman, "Initiating insurgencies abroad: French plans to 'chouannise' Britain and Ireland, 1793–1798," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 4 (2013): 663.

63 "1772, Sun Tzu atteint l'Occident," accessed October 2018, http://suntzufrance.fr/1772-sun-tzu-atteint-loccident.

64 There is, for example, no reference to Amiot's translation in Bruno Colson, *Napoleon on War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

65 When Lionel Giles later translated the book into English, he described this "so-called translation" to "be little better than an imposture. It contains a great deal that Sun Tzu did not write, and very little indeed of what he did." *Sun Tzu on The Art of War*. Amiot is also blamed for assigning to Sun Tzu a traditional Western title *The Art of War*, already used for Machiavelli and soon to be used by Jomini.

66 For a comparison of the Roman and Byzantine texts on stratagems with Sun Tzu, see David A. Graff, "Brain over Brawn: Shared Beliefs and Presumptions in Chinese and Western 'Strategemata,'" *Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident*, no. 38 (2014): 47-64. Smith, op.cit., makes a similar point.

67 Marshal Maurice de Saxe, *My Reveries Upon the Art of War*, trans. Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, *Roots of Strategy*, 1 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), 191, 248. On Saxe, see Jon Manchip White, *Marshal of France: The Life and Times of Maurice, Comte de Saxe,* 1696-1750 (Sevenoaks: Pickle Partners, 2011).

68 On Maizeroy, see David, Alexandre. "'L'interprète des plus grands maîtres: Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy l'inventeur de la stratégie," *Stratégique* 99 (2010/11); Black, *Plotting Power*, 129-133; and Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought,* 39-43.

referred to the higher as "military dialectics," including "the art of forming the plans of a campaign, and directing its operations."[69] By the time of his 1777 *Théorie de la Guerre*, and following his translation of Leo, the higher form was strategy, which was "quite sublime" (using Saxe's word) and resided "solely in the head of the general, as depending on time, place and other circumstances, which are essentially varying, so as never to be twice the same in all respects." Here is how he distinguished between the two:

> Tactics is easily reduced to firm rules because it is entirely geometrical like fortifications. Strategy appears to be much less susceptible to this, since it is dependent upon innumerable circumstances — physical, political, and moral — which are never the same and which are entirely the domain of genius.[70]

Thus, tactics could depend on scripts that could be developed in advance and followed mechanically. It was extremely important, but intellectually undemanding. Strategy, however, came into play when there was no script, when the circumstances were unique and varied.

A number of authors also addressed the potential value of the term strategy. In 1779, the Portuguese Marquis de Silva published *Pensées sur la Tactique, et la Stratégique*. For Silva, strategy was the science of the generals and employed and combined the different branches of tactics.[71] In 1783, there was the first reference to "grand strategy," although in a book now largely forgotten, by Colonel Nockhern de Schorn. He defined strategy as, "The knowledge of commanding armies, one comprehending the higher and the other the lower branches of the art." He then divided strategy into the higher (*La Grande Stratégie*) and lower (*La Petite Stratégie*) in the following way:

> The first embraces all that a commander in chief, and all that his subordinate generals

should be acquainted with; and the second, which may be called le petit guerre, the diminutive of the first, appertains to the staff and to a certain proportion of the subaltern officers.[72]

Yet when it came to classification, the most influential work of the 1770s dealt with the

In 1783, there was the first reference to "grand strategy."

distinction between the higher and the lesser parts of the art of war without reference to strategy. In his *Essai Général de Tactique*, published in 1772, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert, made his distinction solely on the basis of tactics. Tactics were the "foundation" of the science of war, "since they teach how to constitute troops, appoint, put in motion, and afterwards to fight them." He divided tactics into two parts: "the one elementary and limited, the other composite and sublime." Again, note the use of Saxe's word "sublime." Elementary tactics contained "all detail of formation, instruction, and exercise of a battalion, squadron, or regiment." The higher level, to which all other parts were "secondary," contained "every great occurrence of war" and was "properly speaking ... the science of the generals." This part was "of itself everything, since it contains the art of conveying action to troops."[73] What was art and what was science was constantly in flux over this period, and the terms often seemed to be used interchangeably,[74] yet if generalship was a matter of science and not just genius, then there was a possibility of a script that could help the general think through possibilities. In 1779, Guibert, in *Défense du Système de Guerre Moderne*, referred to

69 Paul Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy, *Traité de tactique, Two volumes* (Paris: J. Merlin, 1767).

70 Maizeroy, *Theorie de la guerre*.

71 Marquis de Silva, *Pensées sur la Tactique, et la Stratégique* (Impr. Royale, 1778). On Silva, see Black, *Plotting Power*, 133-35.

72 F. De Nockhern Schorn, *Dees Raisonnees Sur Un Systeme General Suivi Et De Toutes Les Connoissances Militaires Et Sur Une Methode Etudier Lumineuse Pour La Science De La Guerre Avec Ordre Et Discernement En Trois Parties Avec Sept Tables Methodiques* (Nuremberg et Altdorf: chez George Pierre Monath, 1783), 198-9. In his detailed discussion of the French debate of the time Black does not mention this book.

73 Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert, *Essai Général de Tactique* (1770). *Translation in Heuser, The Strategy Makers*, 161. This is based on Lt. Douglas's translation from 1781. See also Jonathan Abel, *Guibert: Father of Napoleon's Grande Armée* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016); Beatrice Heuser, *Strategy Before Clausewitz: Linking Warfare and Statecraft, 1400-1830* (London: Routledge, 2017).

74 Beatrice Heuser, "Theory and Practice, Art and Science in Warfare: An Etymological Note," ed. Daniel Marston and Tamara Leahy, *War, Strategy and History: Essays in Honour of Professor Robert O'Neill* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2016).

la stratégique.[75] But this book was largely ignored. It was the earlier *Essai Général de Tactique* that remained the most influential text of this period. As noted below, it was Guibert's original classification that stuck with Napoleon Bonaparte.

The German Development of Strategy

The Francophone debate, therefore, was bound up with this question of levels of command and the role of the sublime or genius. In the German-speaking world, the development was different. The Austrian Johann W. von Bourscheid, who translated Leo's *Taktika* into German in 1777, also referred to "strategie" and urged readers to develop their understanding of this approach to military affairs.[76] One of the more original contributions to the German literature of this period was made by Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst (1733 to 1814). He was wary of extreme rationalism, stressing genius rather than a search for rules to unlock the secrets to military success. Too much depended on factors that were "unpredictable and incalculable," including "blind chance."[77] He followed Guibert in failing to discuss strategy, but not in relying on a sharp distinction between a higher and lower form. Instead, he identified many potential subdivisions of the art of war.[78]

The most influential figure in establishing strategy as a distinctive realm of analysis was Heinrich von Bülow, son of a minor nobleman, who had served in the Prussian army. His military career had not advanced far and his independence of mind did not endear him to the authorities. He ended up in prison for his criticisms of the Prussian failure at Austerlitz. His *Spirit of the Modern System of War*, published in 1799, was in the "Stratarithmetrie" tradition, involving the application of geometrical and mathematical principles.

Commentators have not been kind to Bülow. Clausewitz considered him a charlatan and dismissed his book as the "Children's military companion."[79] Even his English translator was skeptical. Yet, according to Palmer, Bülow can be credited with "giving currency, as words of distinct meaning" to strategy and tactics, though his definitions were not "generally accepted."[80] It was certainly the case that his work reached Britain before other continental works, with the appearance of Malorti de Martemont's translation in 1806, and his influence lingered through the 19th century.

His mathematics was suspect, while his resistance to the idea of battle put him at odds with the developing Napoleonic method. ("If we find ourselves obliged to fight a battle, mistakes must have been committed previously.") Yet, if it was not quite in the spirit of its time, in some respects it now has a contemporary feel. At his theory's heart was an army's relation to its base, objective, and "lines of operations." Rather than fight a "hostile army," better to attack the means by which this army kept itself supplied, which meant that the "flanks and rear must be the objective of operations," even in an offensive war, and frontal operations should be avoided.

In a rare sign of a debate about potentially different meanings of the term, Bülow saw his concepts of "Strategics" as different from the French concept of "la stratégique." In an observation, significant in the light of my earlier discussion, he considered the French concept as being too limited for it was defined by "the science of the stratagems of war." Alternatively, he noted, that: "Some, tracing the term to its origins, have denominated it the *General's Art*." Bülow deemed this to be too extensive, "for the General's Art comprehends the whole art of war, which consists

75 R. R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War," Peter Paret ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 107.

76 Johann W. von Bourscheid, trans. *Kasier Leo des Philosophen Strategie und Taktik in 5 Bänden* (Vienna: Jospeh Edler von Kurzboeck, 177-1781); Heuser, *The Strategy Makers*, 3; Hew Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," *Survival* 47 no. 3 (August 2005): 35; J-P Charnay in Andre Corvisier, *A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War*, ed., John Childs (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 769.

77 Gat., *The Origins of Military Thought*, 155.

78 These were: the "elementary," which was essentially about how to prepare soldiers for battle; the movement of larger formations, such as a battalion, in order of battle and 'lets them advance towards the enemy who is within a shot's or a throw's reach, or lets them retreat'; the "higher" science of war, based on tactics, and involving the "art of marching with the entire army or substantial parts thereof, to advance, to retreat … of establishing … strongholds; of choosing campsites; of using the surface of the earth'; and, lastly, the great art of making apposite, reliable plans and to … adapt them cleverly to new developments, or to abandon them and to replace them by others." Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst, *Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst, über ihre Fortschritte, ihre Widersprüche und ihre Zuverlässigkeit*, (Osnabrück, Biblio Verlag, 1978), 7f. Citation and translation from Heuser, Etymology, 181-2. On Berenhorst see Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought*, 150-5.

79 Carl von Clausewitz, "On the Life and Character of Scharnhorst," in *Historical and Political Writings*, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 103. In *On War*, it became a "toy," resting 'on a series of substitutions at the expense of truth," 409. Howard describes it as "rococo absurdity." Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace* (London: Temple Smith, 1970), 25. On von Bülow, see Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought*, 79-94.

80 Palmer, op.cit., 115.

of Strategics and Tactics, sciences being essentially different."[81] His view was that this was not a matter of sublime military genius, but the sensible application of mathematical models: "the sphere of military genius will at last be narrowed, that a man of talents will no longer be willing to devote himself to this ungrateful trade."[82] This need not be a "sublime" art, but a disciplined application of set mathematical formulae. The importance of Bülow, therefore, lay in his insistence that scripts were possible and necessary. Good strategy could follow well-founded scripts.

He also established the circumstances in which these scripts were relevant. In his opening chapter, he had asserted that

> all operations of which the enemy was the object, were operations of Tactics; and that those of which he was merely the aim and not the direct object, were made a part of Strategics.

Later, he saw a problem in that it was possible to march in column formation preparatory to battle without actually engaging (this being a time when the range of sight was longer than the range of cannon). So, "a general may manoeuvre tactically before an army, and in sight of it, to make a show of attacking it, without having the least intention of it. Here we have Tactics, and no battle." Bülow, therefore, put aside the question of intent and made his definition on the basis of position and proximity. He defined strategics as "the science of the movements in war of two armies, out of the visual circle of each other, or, if better liked, out of cannon reach." By contrast, tactics were "the science of the movements made within sight of the enemy, and within reach of his artillery."[83] With strategics, there should be no apprehension of attack, and so no immediate readiness to fight. It consisted of "two principal parts; marching and encamping." There were also two parts to tactics — "the forming of the order of battle, and battles, or actual attack and defence." Taken together, this constituted the whole of the art of war:

> Tactics are the completion of Strategics; they accomplish what the other prepares; they are the ultimatum of Strategics, these ending and in a manner flowing into those. The rules of one were applicable to the other. The focus was geographical, giving priority to the importance of the land held, which explains his lack of enthusiasm for battle.

In both these respects, a focus on the land held and the potential value of mathematics, Bülow was followed by the Austrian Archduke Charles, one of the more accomplished Habsburg generals. In his 1806 *Principles of the Higher Art of War*, published as advice for generals, he showed his interest in "mathematical, evident truths" and in holding positions as much as defeating the enemy (a criticism Napoleon made forcibly of his practice). His *Grundsätze der Strategie* ("Principles of

81 Dietrich Heinrich von Bülow, *The Spirit of the Modern System of War*, trans. Malorti de Martemont, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

82 Ibid, 228.

83 Ibid, 88.

Strategy"), which appeared in 1814 and was soon widely translated (although not into English) must also take some credit for the dissemination of the term.[84] This may have been largely because of the prestige of the author as much as the novelty of the content. What was agreed was that strategy was the responsibility of the "supreme commander," while tactics, "the way in which strategic designs are to be executed" was the responsibility of "each leader of troops."[85]

Napoleon soon provided good reason to doubt both Bülow and Charles. He encouraged the idea that military genius was essential to military success, and that the test of success was the annihilation of the enemy army. Napoleon spoke of this genius as an inborn talent with which he had been fortunately blessed. It was the ability to see at a glance the opportunities for battle. This was the issue addressed by Clausewitz and Jomini, both of whom had fought in the Napoleonic wars, as it was unsatisfactory for the purposes of theory if this aptitude was intuitive and exceptional. They had to hold on to the possibility that it could be developed through experience and education, otherwise their writing had no purpose.[86]

Clausewitz published an anonymous review of Bülow in 1805 that included his formulation on the relationship between strategy and tactics, from which he did not deviate, and which made intent important. This had little impact at this stage. "Tactics constitute the theory of the use of armed forces in battle; strategy forms the theory of using battle for the purposes of the war."[87] The same formulation appeared in some of his notes in 1811 and then in On War, where his formulation was far subtler than anything else produced by this time, moving beyond simple classification of activities.[88] He emphasized the need to think of fighting not as a single act but as a number of single acts — or "engagements" — each complete in itself. Tactics were about the form of an individual engagement, so it could be won, strategy about how an engagement was to be used, and therefore its significance in terms of the overall objective of the campaign. He gave the example of ordering a column to head off in a particular direction with an engagement in mind, as being strategy, while the form taken by the column on its travels by way of preparation for the engagement would be tactics.[89]

In terms of levels of command, strategy was clearly superior to tactics, yet the point of his analysis in On War was that however much the strategist might set the terms for coming battles, the strategy would have to respond to the outcomes of the battles. Capturing perfectly the idea of a strategic script, Clausewitz explained that the strategist wrote a plan for the war, but it could only be in draft.[90] Tactical outcomes shaped strategic outcomes, which could only take shape "when the fragmented results have combined into a single, independent whole."[91] Clausewitz did not make further subdivisions. In notes written in 1804, he had distinguished between elementary and higher tactics, the first appropriate to small units and the second to larger formations.[92] There is just a trace of this in On War, with a mere reference at one point to "elementary tactics." Clausewitz's approach depended on the dialectical relationship of tactics and strategy. One could not be considered independently of the other.[93]

Clausewitz's approach depended on the dialectical relationship of tactics and strategy.

It took time before Clausewitz was appreciated, and readers were often warned of the difficulty of his analysis. By contrast, the Swiss Baron Antoine-

84 *A Grundsätze der Kriegskunst für die Generale* (1806) had been published as *Principles of War*. Daniel Radakovich, who has translated it (Nimble Books, 2010) suggests a more accurate title would refer to "higher warcraft."

85 Archduke Charles, Habsburg Commander in the wars against Napoleon, in 1806. Cited in Heuser, *Evolution of Strategy*, 6.

86 Clifford J. Rogers, "Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules," *The Journal of Military History* 66 (October 2002): 1167-1176; Jon T. Sumida, "The Clausewitz Problem," *Army History* (Fall 2009): 17-21.

87 Cited by Peter Paret, *Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 100. The review was published anonymously. His ideas were developed in an unpublished manuscript, under the heading *Strategie*, and contains the same theme. Donald Stoker, *Clausewitz: His Life and Work* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 32-5.

88 Hew Strachan, *Carl von Clausewitz's On War: A Biography* (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), 108.

89 Clausewitz, *On War*, 128-132.

90 Ibid, 177

91 Ibid, 206-8.

92 Strachan, Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, 87.

93 Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Clausewitz & Contemporary War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 140.

Henri de Jomini was generally considered a more straightforward and valuable thinker. Jomini, along with most of the new wave of military theorists of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, developed his thinking through a consideration of the campaigns of Frederick the Great of Prussia, although Napoleon's victory over the Austrians at Marengo in Italy in 1800 gave him his ideas on how the Napoleonic method might work.[94] He was stimulated by Bülow, although took a completely different tack. In his first major book, *Traité de grande tactique* (a title that betrays the influence of Guibert), he began to work out his theory.[95] He described war as being made up of "three combinations." The first was the "art of adjusting the lines of operations in the most advantageous manner, which has been improperly called 'the plan of campaign.'"[96] The second, "generally understood by strategy," was "the art of placing the masses of an army in the shortest space of time on the decisive point of the original or accidental line of operations." He saw this as no more than providing the "means of execution." The third was the "art of combat," which had been "styled tactics" and was the "art of combining the simultaneous employment of masses upon the important point of the field of battle." He did not suggest that these were alternative levels of command, only that a general accomplished in one of these combinations might be less effective with the other two.[97]

His ideas were fully formed in his *Précis de l'art de la guerre*, published in 1838. Here, Jomini defined strategy in terms of the preparation for battle, while tactics was bound up with the actual conduct of battle, a sequence that again followed Bülow. However, his approach was focused on annihilating the enemy army. Jomini's description of strategy was about making war "upon the map," taking a view of the whole theatre of operations and working out where to act. "Grand tactics" was about implementation. It was

the art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map.

In his most concise formulation:

Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops.[98]

In contrast to Bülow, therefore, strategy was geared toward the campaign's overall concept rather than its execution, and it was not a substitute for grand tactics. At the same time, he also accepted that strategy did not depend solely on a general's genius, but could benefit through the application of timeless principles which he, Jomini, had been able to discern.

Thus, he wrote in the *Traité de grande tactique* that while new inventions threatened a "great revolution in army organization, armament and tactics," strategy would "remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipios and the Caesars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they are independent of the nature of the arms and the organization of the troops."[99] And then in the *Précis*, he suggested that strategy "may be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences."[100] This conclusion, which actively discouraged conceptual innovation, depended on a fixation with battle. As with Clausewitz, he was aware of the possibility of exceptions, but the model of war he most had in mind involved the destruction of the enemy's army so that they had no choice but to seek a political settlement on the victor's terms. This sharp focus on battle clarified the tasks for both tactics and strategy, and the forms of their potential interaction.

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94 He later described a meeting with Napoleon in 1806 in which he told the emperor how he thought the Jena campaign would unfold. When asked who had told him, he replied "the map of Germany, Your Highness, and your campaigns of Marengo and Ulm." For a skeptical view of the relationship between Napoleon and Jomini, noting that all the evidence comes from the latter, see Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought,* 132-3.

95 On the interaction of von Bülow and Jomini, see Peter Paret, *The Cognitive Challenge of 1806* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 110-111.

96 He disliked the idea of a plan, as it was "impossible in a plan of operations to see beyond the second movement."

97 Henri Jomini, *Traité de grande tactique, ou, Relation de la guerre de sept ans, extraite de Tempelhof, commentée at comparée aux principales opérations de la derniére guerre; avec un recueil des maximes les plus important de l'art militaire, justifiées par ces différents événements* (Paris: Giguet et Michaud, 1805). In English translation as: Jomini, Antoine-Henri, trans. Col. S.B. Holabird, U.S.A., *Treatise on Grand Military Operations: or A Critical and Military History of the Wars of Frederick the Great as Contrasted with the Modern System*, 2 vols (New York: D. van Nostrand, 1865), 277, 432. This was published in English after the *Art of War*.

98 Jomini did envisage other "operations of a mixed nature," including "passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy." Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill [1838] (Texas: El Paso Norte Press, 2005), 79–100.

99 Jomini, *Treatise*, 48. On this point see Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought*, 114-5.

100 Charles, *The Art of War,* 321.

Conclusion

Napoleon Bonaparte, who had provided the stimulus for these thoughts, gave little away while he was earning his reputation. And, for that matter, not much was revealed after his defeat at Waterloo. What was known about his approach to war was contained in a set of published maxims. In one of these, the emperor distinguished between what an "engineer or artillery officer" might need to know, which could "be learned in treatises," whereas "grand tactics" (Guibert's phrase) required experience and study of "the campaigns of all the great captains."[101] Once exiled on St. Helena after his defeat at Waterloo, he kept himself informed on developments in military theory. His comments, generally bad-tempered and disparaging about the many authors he read, were well-recorded.

Only once did he discuss strategy, and it was when considering Archduke Charles's book on the subject. "I hardly bother with scientific words," he remarked, "and cannot care less about them." He was skeptical about the value of books — there should not be so much "intellect" in war. "I beat the enemy without so much intellect and without using Greek words." Nor could he make sense of the Archduke's distinction between strategy and tactics, as the science and art of war. He had a higher opinion of Jomini's formulation — "strategy is the art of moving troops and tactics the art of engaging them." He then offered his own, and only known, definition: "strategy is the art of plans of campaign and tactics the art of battles."[102] It left little scope for serious consideration of how to conduct war when the annihilation of the enemy army was neither practical nor appropriate.

For practitioners like Napoleon who seemed to have little use for the word, and theorists who analyzed its place in the operations of war, there was no agreed early definition of strategy, and its emergence was not announced with any great fanfare. It seeped into discussions of military strategy, but only really became a way of framing these discussions at the start of the 19th century, in part under the influence of Bülow and the Archduke Charles and the pressing need to make sense of Napoleon's string of victories. All the early efforts at definition saw strategy as a purely military concept, interacting with tactics but not with policy. This included Clausewitz, who understood better than most how political ends shaped military means. This is why there is a divergence between studies of strategy in practice over the 18th and 19th centuries, which invariably look at the interaction with policy, and the development of strategy as theory.[103]

This limitation was important not because it precluded theorizing about the relationship of policy to war, for Clausewitz showed how this could be done, but because it shaped the education of the officer class in Europe and North America, and the way in which they were encouraged to think about the responsibilities and possibilities of command. The Napoleon-Jomini view that the scripts of strategy could only be learned by studying those that worked well in the past meant that rather than being a new way of thinking, exploring the implications of a changing political context as well as technological innovations, strategy became profoundly conservative, looking to replicate the triumphs of the past. In my second article, I will demonstrate the impact of this narrow and conservative approach on British and American thinking on strategy in the 19th century, so that even when wars took place that might have questioned its validity, notably the 1861-1865 American Civil War and the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War, they did not. They did not lead to any revisions of the concept of strategy. It was only the shocking experience of World War I that led to attempts to broaden the meaning of strategy and seek new definitions. ♟

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101 In the original French, this is "la grande tactique." *Maximes de Guerre de Napoleon* (Paris: Chez Anselin, 1830)., accessed at https://ia800209.us.archive.org/26/items/bub_gb_ezQLTogcgfAC/bub_gb_ezQLTogcgfAC.pdf. This English translation, from Colonel D'Aguilar, first published as *The Officer's Manual: Military Maxims of Napoleon* (Dublin: Richard Milliken & Son, 1831), replaces "la grande tactique" with the "science of strategy."

102 Colson, *Napoleon on War*, 84.

103 Black, *Plotting Power,* is quite explicit on this point.

The Strategist

This section is dedicated to publishing the work of current and former senior policymakers, members of the military, and civilian national security practitioners.

Now What?

The American Citizen, World Order, and Building a New Foreign Policy Consensus

Hon. Kathleen Hicks, PhD

In order for the United States to adapt to current and future international challenges, it needs a foreign policy that can unite the American public and bring back bipartisan consensus on America's role in the world.

Americans are mired in disagreements. They are politically divided, with many preferring to identify as independent and significant rifts clear even within the Democratic and Republican parties. But party polarization is only one measure of what separates them. Myriad considerations — age, gender, race, religion, region, class, and education — factor into the differences in how Americans view the world.

Bipartisan consensus has often found its strongest roots in foreign policy and defense. The United States has a raucous history of democratic debate and disagreement on the use of military force and other national security questions. Since the end of World War II, however, most Americans have shared the belief that their prosperity and security are advanced by the United States pursuing a leading role in world affairs.

This bipartisan consensus on the U.S. role in the world has grown brittle. Disagreements permeate U.S. foreign policy on issues as varied as the Iran nuclear deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, and comprehensive immigration policy. Policy differences have existed throughout American history, but today's challenge is more fundamental. The exercise of American leadership globally is growing more vulnerable to challenges overseas. Moreover, the deep U.S. political divisions are obfuscating genuine differences over policy, substituting partisan action-reaction cycles. Rejections of the status quo in 2016 galvanized the success of presidential candidates who positioned themselves outside the foreign policy mainstream. The election and foreign policy of Donald Trump have further frayed the consensus. The president's preference for chaos, alternately wearing and shedding the mantle of global engagement in equal rhetorical measure, threatens the durability of a unified vision for America's role in the world.

The weakening of the U.S. foreign policy consensus reflects a failure to adjust effectively to changes at home and abroad, with resulting confusion and dismay about the nation's direction and role. The fraying in turn weakens America's ability to adapt to current and future challenges. An acknowledged consensus in favor of American engagement in the world provides the domestic foundation on which to advance U.S. interests out in the world. Such a renewed and necessarily broad consensus on the importance of a global leadership role will not resolve the disagreements or eliminate the challenges that have brought the United States to this point. But rejuvenating the consensus will aid U.S. credibility abroad, reassuring allies while deterring rivals, and strengthen the nation from within.

To build an effective foreign policy that most Americans can support, one must first understand the variety of factors shaping Americans' opinions (and U.S. government direction) on foreign policy. Some factors are tied to personal and community circumstances, others to a broader domestic political and policy context. Moreover, American views are increasingly shaped by the international arena where foreign policy is largely executed. These domestic and international factors are intertwined, at times mutually reinforcing points and other times in tension. Working from the outside in, this essay briefly explores foreign and domestic forces affecting Americans' evolving views about foreign and security policy. It assesses the foundation for an engaged American foreign policy despite evidence of fracturing support. It then draws out three touchstones for devising foreign policy and concludes by offering three actionable priorities to secure American interests in this era.

The Global Context

Americans are inundated with troubling news from overseas, much of which they feel unable to control. Six challenges to U.S. interests in the international system are noteworthy for their current and potential effect on American foreign policy:

- Capable nation-state adversaries
- Weak, unstable, and collapsing states
- Terrorism
- Enabling information and technology
- Long-term climate, resource, and demographic trends
- Threats to democratic norms

Nation-State Adversaries

More than 25 years after the Cold War ended, military opportunism and provocation from states seeking to challenge the United States are fully awakened. Four powers are particularly noteworthy as potential adversaries: China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. A U.S. military conflict with any of these countries would have profound consequences.

China is poised to be the most significant long-term competitor to the United States. Beijing is investing substantial resources in its military, developing capabilities clearly designed to prevent others from opposing its will in East Asia and, increasingly, beyond the region. China is also challenging basic norms of international order by using its might to claim and build out land features in the South and East China Seas. Ample

economic manipulation, corruption, conventional military harassments, nuclear saber-rattling, cyberattacks, and information warfare, including using active measures to affect the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Playing for reputational points abroad but also largely to a domestic audience, President Vladimir Putin appears set on a course toward serving, at best, as a spoiler of Western interests and, at worst, as a direct military aggressor.

For more than 60 years, war on the Korean Peninsula has been a concern for Washington. Under Kim Jong Un, this long-standing worry has become far graver. Korea's rapid missile and nuclear development, coupled with its jingoistic propaganda and provocations and its apparent disinterest in nuclear negotiations, raise the specter of a conflict that could embroil not only South Korea and Japan but also the United States, China, and Russia. Kim might seek military conflict in desperation during a regime collapse or by foolishly attempting territorial or other gains. More likely is the possibility that North Korea and the United States or its allies will miscalculate the other side's capability and resolve, with a subsequent inability or unwillingness to control crisis dynamics.

Finally, Iran poses a substantial challenge to American interests. The United States and its regional partners possess far greater conventional military capabilities than Iran, but Tehran's preferred tactics involve seeking to destabilize its enemies by employing proxy forces, providing substantial support to terrorist groups, harassing maritime traffic, using cyber and information warfare, and developing its missile arsenal. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — popularly known as the Iran nuclear deal — if adhered to would help forestall Iran's development of nuclear capability. But economic sanctions were lifted as part of the deal, and U.S. vigilance will be needed to curb Iranian elements from seeking to invest newly available resources in military, paramilitary, or proxy forces.

> **Americans are inundated with troubling news from overseas, much of which they feel unable to control.**

evidence of intellectual property theft and unfair trade practices, alongside its human rights record and increasing foreign investments, raise further concerns. Meanwhile, China is the world's second-largest economy and a significant trading partner of the United States and most U.S. allies. The United States has a strong interest in seeing China evolve as an economically vibrant, non-hostile, and less autocratic nation that contributes to peace and stability.

As a power in decline rather than on the rise, Russia does not have China's long-term potential. But the Kremlin still commands a nation with a substantial nuclear arsenal, a sizable conventional military, and the skill and affinity to execute full-scale political warfare that challenges the traditional weaknesses of open societies. Russia is working to revise the international order to its advantage. Its invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 is a stand-out example, but there are others. Russia has postured aggressively against the West and expanded its military role in Syria. The Kremlin's playbook has included energy and

Weak, Unstable, and Collapsing States

Although they often do not receive the same attention as nation-state threats, the failures of governments in Yemen, Afghanistan, Central America, and elsewhere manifest into security challenges that can hurt Americans at home. Security implications that can emanate from chronically weak states include, but are not limited

to, terrorism, migration, transnational crime, weapons proliferation, piracy, and cross-border health threats.

Syria's population has sat tragically astride some of the world's most complex geopolitical dynamics. The repressive Assad government's brutal crackdowns on peaceful protestors have led to a chain reaction that leaves the country incapacitated. More than 6 million Syrians are internally displaced; 5 million others have fled to Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and into Europe.[1] Key nations are on opposing sides of Syria's civil war, with Iran and Russia backing the Assad regime and the United States, Europe, and Gulf states seeking a negotiated peace settlement that could remove Assad from power. (Under the Trump administration, the U.S. government's position on the ultimate disposition of the Assad regime is unclear.) The U.S.-led coalition fights the Islamic State inside Syria and Iraq. Russia, Iran, and the Syrian government claim to do the same while also striking at opposition forces supported by the coalition. The battle space in and around Syria is fraught with risk.

Terrorism

Terrorism tops many Americans' list of national security concerns.[2] Terrorist movements can grow in repressive and supportive states alike, in places where local governance may be inadequate to address political and societal discord. The rise of the Islamic State in Syria, its rapid territorial gains there and in Iraq, and its transformation into a global movement has provided a focal point for these concerns in recent years. The U.S.-led coalition has steadily weakened the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. However, major ISIL cells are now operating out of Afghanistan, Libya, and Yemen. Islamic State and related online propaganda aim to inspire terrorism around the world. Authorities have cited ISIL as an inspiration for several attempted attacks in the United States perpetrated by U.S. citizens.[3]

Just as the Islamic State grew in the shadow of al-Qaeda, so too is the Islamic State likely to generate prominent follow-on movements. Terrorist movements motivated by other political causes include white nationalists, separatists, and anarchists. Regardless of their aims, these groups can have strategic effect at relatively low cost, aided by social media and the Internet as well as tactics such as mass shootings, using vehicles as weapons, planting car bombs, or employing more advanced capabilities.

Enabling Information and Other Technology

Terrorists are just one subset of actors enabled by the spread of information and development of critical technologies. Thanks to the growth of biotechnology, cheaper material and forms of manufacturing, such as 3-D printing, as well as the rapid proliferation of commercial and military drones, it is easier than ever for individuals, small groups, and less powerful states to achieve high-end capabilities. The increasing ease of arms sales further accelerates this trend. Whatever might be said about the U.S. approach to arms sales and technology transfer, it is guided by a body of law and established norms intended to mitigate advanced technology proliferation and end-use risks. The same cannot be said for Russia, which accounts for 23 percent of major arms exports, and China, the world's fastest-growing arms exporter.[4]

The implications of technology diffusion are perhaps most profound in the information domain. At the military-industrial level, the information revolution is enabling increased precision and actionable information and improving cyber and space capabilities. At the broader societal level, the information revolution has brought profound changes affecting the daily lives of people across the planet.

In early 2017, the Pew Research Center estimated that 77 percent of Americans owned their own smartphone.[5] Americans (and Europeans) may be ahead in the information race, but they are far from

1 ECHO, "European Commission ECHO Factsheet," *European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations*, September 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf.

2 Dina Smeltz and Karl Friedhoff, "US Public Not Convinced That Trump's Policies Will Make America Safer," *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, September 2017, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/report_ccs2017-terrorism_170908.pdf.

3 For example, on the early and rapid rise in digital identity theft, see *Identity Theft — Prevalence and Cost Appear to be Growing*, GAO-02-363 (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2002), 51; on the early digital success of al Qaeda, see Angel Rabasa et al., *Beyond al-Qaeda — Part 1* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), xxvii, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG429.pdf; on the white supremacists use of the Internet, see Jeff Daniels, *Cyber Racism: White Supremacy Online and the New Attack on Civil Rights* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 3.

4 Kate Blanchfield, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, "The State of Major Arms Transfers in 8 Graphics," *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, February 22, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2017/state-major-arms-transfers-8-graphics.

5 Aaron Smith, "Record Shares of Americans Now Own Smartphones, Have Home Broadband," *Pew Research Center*, January 12, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/12/evolution-of-technology/.

alone. There are an estimated 4.6 billion mobile phone subscriptions globally.[6] By these estimates, mobile subscriptions have surpassed the number of active fixed-line subscriptions worldwide, and it is conceivable that the overall number of devices connected to the internet — the Internet of Things — will reach at least 20 billion by 2020.[7] Much of that connectivity growth is poised to occur in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

This revolution in information accessibility drives gains in innovation and productivity. At its best, it has also promoted good governance, enabling the connectivity of people united in common peaceful causes. But this era will also be defined by the weaponization of this connectivity. Al-Qaeda, criminals, and white supremacists were among the most successful early adapters on the digital battlefield.[8] Nations have also leveraged the tools of modern connectivity to achieve security aims, both through internal control and external manipulation. Examples include North Korea's hack of Sony Pictures, Iran's cyber intrusions into Saudi Aramco, and Chinese theft of U.S. government employee data from the Office of Personnel Management.[9] Most recently, disagreements between Qatar and its Gulf Cooperation Council partners have played out in attempts to embarrass one another with leaked and falsified emails.[10] But no actor has as spectacularly advanced the potential to weaponize the current information domain for political ends as Russia, both in creating disinformation and in deploying that information in well-orchestrated campaigns enabled by artificial intelligence and humans.

Resources, Climate Change, and Urbanization

U.S. foreign policy will also confront important shifts in natural resources, demography, and climate. The United States has largely achieved its goal of being "energy independent" insofar as it is a net exporter of natural gas and the world's largest exporter of refined petroleum products.[11] But the world market has become more "energy interdependent." This is due in part to the increased number of important suppliers beyond OPEC, including the United States. It is also because energy politics are increasingly driven by issues associated with the effects of energy use, namely climate change.[12] Energy independence, as long thought of, is valuable for U.S. foreign policy, but acknowledging the world's energy interdependence and acting upon it are equally important to American security.

Climate change poses a variety of security-related challenges. Shipping lanes in the Arctic Ocean are expected to open by mid-century due to warming.[13] This will place a premium on patrol and search-and-rescue assets that can operate in the austere environment, and resource competition in the region could heighten tensions among vying nations. Rising sea levels are another major threat, particularly in the Pacific. The warming of oceans is also creating more and worse storms.[14] As the 2017 hurricanes affecting Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands demonstrated, the economic and human toll of major weather events is substantial. Already in the United States, more than 90 coastal communities face chronic flooding, which the Union of Concerned Scientists defines as "the kind of

6 Rani Molla, "Mobile Broadband Subscriptions Are Projected to Double in Five Years," *Recode*, June 18, 2017, https://www.recode.net/2017/6/18/15826036/smartphone-subscriptions-basic-phones-globally-ericsson.

7 Rob van der Meulen, "Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected 'Things' Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent From 2016," *Gartner*, February 7, 2017, http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917.

8 See, for example, Jonathan Dienst, David Paredes, and Joe Valiquette, "Three Men Charged With Plotting ISIS-Inspired Attack in New York," *NBC News*, October 6, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/man-plotted-isis-inspired-attack-new-york-concerts-say-officials-n808321; James Comey, "Director Comey Remarks During May 11 'Pen and Pad' Briefing with Reporters," Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Press Conference, May 14, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/director-comey-remarks-during-may-11-2018pen-and-pad2019-briefing-with-reporters; Paul Brinkmann, "Pulse gunman's motive: Plenty of theories, but few answers," *Orlando Sentinel*, June 4, 2017, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/pulse-orlando-nightclub-shooting/omar-mateen/os-pulse-omar-mateen-motive-20170512-story.html.

9 Andrea Peterson, "The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained," *The Washington Post*, December 18, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-hack-explained/; Nicole Perlroth, "In Cyberattack on Saudi Firm, U.S. Sees Iran Firing Back," *The New York Times*, October 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm-disquiets-us.html; David Sanger and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Hacking Linked to China Exposes Millions of U.S. Workers," *The New York Times*, June 4, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/us/breach-in-a-federal-computer-system-exposes-personnel-data.html.

10 David Kirkpatrick and Sheera Frenkel, "Hacking in Qatar Highlights a Shift Toward Espionage-for-Hire," *The New York Times*, June 8, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/world/middleeast/qatar-cyberattack-espionage-for-hire.html.

11 Sarah Ladislaw, Adam Sieminski, Frank Verrastro, and Andrew Stanley, *U.S. Oil in the Global Economy: Markets, Policy, and Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2017), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170508_Ladislaw_OilGasWorkshop_Web.pdf.

12 Jason Bordoff, "America's Energy Policy: From Independence to Interdependence," *Horizons Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development*, no. 8 (Autumn 2016), http://www.cirsd.org/files/000/000/002/43/dde28fd7d04cca8e84e00cc3467ae17fc5aa2188.pdf.

13 Jugal K. Patel and Henry Fountain, "As Arctic Ice Vanishes, New Shipping Routes Open," *The New York Times*, May 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/03/science/earth/arctic-shipping.html.

14 "Climate Change Indicators: Weather and Climate," Environmental Protection Agency, accessed September 2017, https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/weather-climate.

flooding that's so unmanageable it prompts people to move away."[15] The number is expected to reach 170 communities in the next 20 years.[16]

Food and water crises sit at the intersection of resource and climate-change challenges. Drought, exacerbated by military conflicts, has intensified the plight of more than 20 million people enduring famines in Somalia, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Yemen.[17] Underlying mismatches in projected population and food productivity portend continuing food scarcity. By 2050, the world population is projected to increase from 7.3 billion to 9.7 billion, with more than half of this growth in Africa. Over this same period, meat consumption is projected to rise nearly 73 percent and dairy consumption by 58 percent from 2010 levels. Yet while output of food, feed, fiber, and fuel will most likely continue to rise in coming decades, total food production is not on pace to meet this demand.[18] Projected shortages of clean water are also daunting.[19]

Among demographic trends of note for U.S. shapers of foreign policy, one that stands out as underexplored is urbanization. The United Nations estimates that by 2050, two-thirds of the world's population will live in urban environments, with about one-third — some 2 billion people — living in slum-like conditions.[20] All regions are expected to urbanize further over the coming decades, but Africa and Asia, home to the most rural regions remaining, are urbanizing faster than others. The combination of rapid expansion and poor living conditions creates governance challenges for cities' ecosystems, including water, power, and green space. Slum-like conditions contribute to the rapid spread of diseases. Many such growing urban areas will be situated along waterways, making them especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, including rising sea levels and more severe natural disasters. Particularly in less developed areas, cities will likely be strained to meet the security needs of citizens as population density, inadequate governance, and poverty create conditions for criminal activity and civil unrest.[21]

Threats to Democratic Norms

Many of these trends are culminating in support for anti-democratic policies and governance models. The Syrian crisis is a leading cause of the largest forced population displacement since the aftermath of World War II, with reverberations throughout the Levant, Europe, and beyond.[22] These refugee flows have fueled concerns about sovereignty and terrorism in many parts of the world, a concern reinforced by recent terrorist incidents in Europe, Australia, and the United States. Together with weak economic performance in many Western-style democracies and the use of propaganda and disinformation, the stage has been set for rising nationalism and a renewal of autocracy around the world. The U.S.-based think tank Freedom House released a report this year showing that, while the gains from non-free states are small, 2016 marked the eleventh year in a row in which the share of free countries had declined and the share of "not free" countries grew.[23] This trend, alongside tested norms regarding state sovereignty, chemical weapons use, nuclear proliferation, and the Geneva Conventions, is a direct challenge to the postwar international order built by the United States and its allies.

U.S. Domestic Context

This brief synopsis of major challenges in the world misses much, but it underscores how activity beyond U.S. borders will shape America's ability to

15 Erika Spanger-Siegfried, Kristina Dahl, Astrid Caldas, Shana Udvardy, Rachel Cleetus, Pamela Worth, and Nicole Hernandez Hammer, *When Rising Seas Hit Home: Hard Choices Ahead for Hundreds of US Coastal Communities* (Washington, D.C.: Union of Concerned Scientists, July 2017), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2017/07/when-rising-seas-hit-home-full-report.pdf.

16 Ibid.

17 Jeffrey Gettleman, "Drought and War Heighten Threat of Not Just 1 Famine, but 4," *The New York Times*, March 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/africa/famine-somalia-nigeria-south-sudan-yemen-water.html.

18 Margaret Zeigler and Ann Steensland, *2016 Global Agricultural Productivity Report: Sustainability in an Uncertain Season* (Washington, D.C.: Global Harvest Initiative, October 2016), http://www.globalharvestinitiative.org/GAP/2016_GAP_Report.pdf.

19 "Sound Water Management, Investment in Security Vital to Sustain Adequate Supply, Access for All, Secretary-General Warns Security Council," *United Nations*, June 6, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12856.doc.htm.

20 *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision* (New York: United Nations, 2014), 1, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/publications/files/wup2014-highlights.Pdf.

21 Kathleen Hicks, "New Security Challenges Posed by Megacities," *World Economic Forum*, November 2014, http://reports.weforum.org/global-strategic-foresight/kathleen-hicks-csis-new-security-challenges-posed-by-megacities/.

22 *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015* (New York/Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, June 20, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.

23 Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance, *Freedom in the World 2017: Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2017), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf.

advance its prosperity and security. The domestic context for U.S. foreign policy is equally important and far too often ignored by security analysts.

There are, in fact, multiple domestic contexts: The United States is divided along a variety of dimensions that are creating challenges for envisioning and executing a coherent foreign policy. Some of the foreign policy divide may be explained by cultural differences; this includes variations in regional, national, racial, party, gender, military, and religious identity.[24] Economic factors may also explain some of it.[25] Although the United States has the world's largest gross domestic product and is a leading source of innovation across multiple sectors, in 2015 it had the world's third-largest income gap.[26] Divisions in the U.S. electorate on issues of trade and immigration illuminate how various cultural and economic factors, and doubtless other causes, are shaping the prospect of consensus on foreign policy.

In April 2016, 49 percent of general public respondents to Pew polling indicated that they believed U.S. involvement in the world economy was a "bad thing" that lowered wages and cost jobs, while 44 percent of such respondents believed it was a "good thing."[27] That poll marked the bottoming out of a downward slide in positive views of trade, a slide that began roughly at the beginning of President Barack Obama's second term. By the time of the 2016 presidential election, trade proponents were chastened by the strong negative reaction to their arguments.

Yet just a few months into 2017 support for U.S. trade in the same Pew poll had rebounded to 52 percent of respondents.[28] This should not be surprising, given that the United States is the world's top exporter of foods and agricultural products (which account for more than 20 percent of U.S. agricultural production).[29] As consumers, Americans depend on a global supply chain from airplanes to smartphones to big-box retailers. Popular wisdom holds that the U.S. manufacturing sector opposes free trade, but consider this endorsement of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) from the National Association of Manufacturers:

> NAFTA went into effect in 1994, and since then, the United States has sold three times as much to Canada and Mexico. In 2016, the two countries alone purchased one-fifth of all manufactured goods made in the United States. This is a big deal for manufacturing workers and their families because those sales support jobs here at home — a lot of well-paying jobs. Sales of manufactured goods to Canada and Mexico, made possible through NAFTA, support the jobs of more than 2 million manufacturing workers.[30]

Not all trade is good, but many Americans do not believe that all trade is bad, and in numbers greater than many foreign policy elites have assumed.[31]

Immigration has played an even more divisive role in U.S. politics. About 15 percent of the U.S. population is immigrant, the same share as in 1920 but higher than it was for much of the post-World War II period.[32] Roughly 75 percent of that

24 For insightful examinations of two such dimensions, see Sam Tabory and Dina Smeltz, "The Urban-Suburban-Rural "Divide" in American Views on Foreign Policy," *The Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, May 2017, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/urban-suburban-rural-divide-american-views-foreign-policy; and Douglas L. Kriner and Francis X. Shen, "Battlefield Casualties and Ballot Box Defeat: Did the Bush-Obama Wars Cost Clinton the White House?," (June 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2989040.

25 See, for example, Hal Brands, "Is American Internationalism Dead? Reading the National Mood in the Age of Trump," *War on the Rocks*, May 16, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/is-american-internationalism-dead-reading-the-national-mood-in-the-age-of-trump/.

26 "The World's Biggest Economies," World Economic Forum, 2015, https://assets.weforum.org/editor/8T1VYR_rQ04Dqsi98YcbpvWBSsJCmdeNRxaItXbNf00.png.

27 Jacob Poushter, "American Public, Foreign Policy Experts Sharply Disagree Over Involvement in Global Economy," *Pew Research Center*, Oct. 28, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/28/american-public-foreign-policy-experts-sharply-disagree-over-involvement-in-global-economy/.

28 Bradley Jones, "Support for Free Trade Agreements Rebounds Modestly, But Wide Partisan Differences Remain," *Pew Research Center*, April 25, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/25/support-for-free-trade-agreements-rebounds-modestly-but-wide-partisan-differences-remain/.

29 "Infographic: Agricultural Trade Matters," *United States Department of Agriculture: Foreign Agricultural Service*, May 17, 2017, https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/infographic-agricultural-trade-matters.

30 Jay Timmons, "NAFTA: A Win for Manufacturing Workers," *National Association of Manufacturers*, August 16, 2017, http://www.shopfloor.org/2017/08/nafta-win-manufacturing-workers/.

31 Joshua Busby, Craig Kafura, Jonathan Monten, Dina Smeltz, and Jordan Tama, "How the Elite Misjudge the U.S. Electorate on International Engagement," *RealClear World*, November 7, 2016, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/11/07/how_the_elite_misjudge_the_us_electorate_on_international_engagement_112112.html.

32 "U.S. Immigrant Populations and Share Over Time, 1850-Present," *Migration Policy Institute*, 2015, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/immigrant-population-over-time.

immigrant population is estimated to be here legally.[33] Of those here illegally, most overstayed with expired temporary visas rather than illegally crossed borders.[34] About 45 percent of respondents told Pew shortly before the 2016 election that having more immigrants hurts American workers, while 42 percent said having more immigrants helps — the deepest division of opinion Pew captured on the issue over the last decade, caused by an increase in the number of respondents who react *positively* about immigration's effects on American workers.[35]

Although support for internationalism is evident even on issues as divisive as trade and immigration, the divisions among Americans should not be underestimated. They are likely to be further exacerbated by automation, which could put 38 percent of U.S. jobs at risk by the early 2030s, according to one recent estimate.[36] Urbanization, too, will create economic opportunities but exacerbate divides between the "global elite" and those who feel left behind. Income inequality and associated urban-rural divides are creating different American experiences.

These and other divisions are reflected and reinforced in the U.S. political system. Consider Pew Research Center's assessment of rising partisan antipathy. As Figure 1 illustrates, since 1994, the share of Republicans and Democrats who hold unfavorable or very unfavorable views of the other party has risen more than 20 points. Within this overall increase, the share holding very unfavorable views of the other party has climbed even higher, by about 30 percentage points in just over 20 years. Partisans are not just divided; increasingly, they do not like or respect each other. This poll was completed before the 2016 election, and the mutual antipathy it found — with implications for dividing American politics and society — almost certainly has deepened.

FIGURE 1: [37]

Republican attitudes about the Democratic Party

Unfavorable

Very Unfavorable

Democratic attitudes about the Republican Party

Unfavorable

Very Unfavorable

Political polarization is affected not only by true differences in Americans' viewpoints but also by issues inside the U.S. political structure and process, including gerrymandering, campaign finance practices, and changes in congressional norms and

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33 Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, *Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrants Holds Steady Since 2009* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, September 2016), 47, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/09/31170303/PH_2016.09.20_Unauthorized_FINAL.pdf.

34 Robert Warren and Donald Kerwin, "The 2,000 Mile Wall in Search of a Purpose: Since 2007 Visa Overstays Have Outnumbered Undocumented Border Crossers by a Half Million," *Journal on Migration and Human Security* (2017), Center for Migration Studies, http://cmsny.org/publications/jmhs-visa-overstays-border-wall/.

35 Lee Rainie and Anna Brown, "Americans Less Concerned Than a Decade Ago Over Immigrants' Impact on Workforce," *Pew Research Center*, October 7, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/07/americans-less-concerned-than-a-decade-ago-over-immigrants-impact-on-workforce/. See also Busby et al.

36 Richard Berriman and John Hawksworth, "Will Robots Steal Our Jobs? The Potential Impact of Automation on the UK and Other Major Economies," *UK Economic Outlook*, March 2017, https://www.pwc.co.uk/economic-services/ukeo/pwcukeo-section-4-automation-march-2017-v2.pdf.

37 "Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016," *Pew Research Center*, June 22, 2016, http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/.

processes.[38] The current period of polarization is also occurring against a backdrop of ubiquitous information, which many Americans cope with by creating increasingly fragmented and self-selected media environments. Polling from Pew Research Center suggests that six in 10 Americans get their news from social media.[39] As Figure 2 shows, Pew data also indicate that many Americans' social media feeds are built around networks of family and friends who share a common perspective, narrowing the range of views to which they are exposed. This trend is particularly noteworthy at the far ends of the political spectrum, as is the perspective that such "one-sided" news is okay.

FIGURE 2:[40]

Liberal Dems, conservative Reps more likely to get one-sided news from family and friends online (%)

Cons. Republican	39
Mod./Lib. Republican	33
Cons./Mod. Democrat	29
Lib. Democrat	44

% of online news consumers who say the news they get from friends and family online represents just one side

...but conservative Republicans are the most likely to think that's OK (%)

Cons. Republican	51
Mod./Lib. Republican	27
Cons./Mod. Democrat	23
Lib. Democrat	34

Of those online news consumers who say they mostly only see news from one side, % of...who say that's OK

These divisions affect U.S. security by altering the way the United States, and particularly the stability and effectiveness of its political system, are viewed overseas and by driving changes in the way Americans perceive their role in the world.

Foundations of an Effective American Foreign Policy

It can be tempting for the U.S. foreign policy community to throw up its hands in frustration in the face of this set of circumstances, but these challenges are not unprecedented in their magnitude, either at home or abroad. Blindly holding to the past is no longer viable. Change is coming too quickly. The United States must adapt to secure its interests and in ways that build domestic support. Three factors are particularly important to helping the nation navigate effectively in the current environment.

First, the United States must acknowledge that while it can probably remain the world's sole superpower for at least the next 15 years, its ability to shape events beyond its borders is diminishing. The effectiveness of American foreign policy and how much power the nation chooses to wield will vary by region and type of issue. Non-state problems are particularly difficult to tackle with traditional American strengths such as state-to-state trade, massed military force, and government-to-government diplomacy. They also test the United States where it is weakest, trying Americans' impatience, tendency toward unilateralism, and dislike and distrust of most government spending. These weaknesses inhibit the U.S. ability to undertake generational investments toward long-term solutions.

Moreover, the best solutions to many security challenges require a combination of strengths, but the United States struggles to adapt and integrate across its instruments of national power and with partners overseas. Problems such as trade, terrorism, or climate issues are seldom solvable in only one sphere, or by acting alone. When facing an assertive military competitor — such as China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran — traditional U.S. security strengths are more influential. Even in these cases, however, the United States has had difficulty deterring a range of provocations and coercive actions.

A second factor that needs to ground the vision for future U.S. foreign policy is the thread of constancy in public support of international engagement. If one American grand strategy has persisted for the

38 For an excellent overview of existing research on possible causes of polarization, see Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty, "Chapter 2: Causes and Consequences of Polarization," in *Negotiating Agreement in Politics*, eds. Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 2013), 19-53, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dtingley/files/negotiating_agreement_in_politics.pdf.

39 "News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016," *Pew Research Center*, May 25, 2016, http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/pj_2016-05-26_social-media-and-news_0-01/.

40 "The Modern News Consumer," *Pew Research Center*, July 6, 2016, http://www.journalism.org/2016/07/07/the-modern-news-consumer/pj_2016-07-07_modern-news-consumer_7-02/.

past 70 years, it is to advance U.S. interests by taking a leading role in the world. This may seem to run counter to the 2016 election results; Donald Trump won under an "America First" foreign policy banner that included pointed criticism of U.S. allies and overseas military operations and posture. Across the political spectrum, there are important limits to Americans' willingness to lead on the world stage. But the share of Americans that are truly isolationist — preferring the United States have no role in world affairs — is around only 4 percent, while more than 70 percent believe the United States should have a major or leading role. Demonstrating the stability of an internationalist consensus, these figures from February 2017 are roughly the same as Gallup's February 2001 polling.[41]

This likely reflects broad recognition that the most important interests the United States seeks to secure in the world require American engagement and leadership. Republican and Democratic administrations have generally described America's world interests in remarkably consistent ways since the end of World War II: ensuring the security of U.S. territory and citizens; upholding treaty commitments, to include the security of allies; ensuring a liberal economic order in which American enterprise can compete fairly; and upholding the rule of law in international affairs, including respect for human rights. Each administration has framed these interests somewhat differently, and pursued its own path to secure them, but the core tenets have not varied significantly.

Predictability and stability of position are not hallmarks of this administration, but there has been enough overseas activity, spending, and rhetoric in this first year to assess that President Trump's "America First" is not Charles Lindbergh's. Although an isolationist sentiment will always exist in U.S. politics, it is unlikely to upend the basic consensus view that what happens elsewhere in the world can affect Americans at home.

By no means is the American predilection for internationalism unchecked. Indeed, Americans have generally preferred to pursue a selective approach to engagement. Yes, a majority support international engagement, but the United States has never desired to act everywhere in the world, all the time, or with the same tools of power. Polling before the 2016 election showed that 70 percent of Americans wanted the next president to focus

more on national than international problems, a trend that has only strengthened since the peak of military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2007.[42]

Americans have always had to weigh the risks and opportunity costs of foreign activities and needed to prioritize investments. The projected budget environment only worsens the dilemmas. In the latest Congressional Budget Office outlook, total discretionary spending would fall to about 5.4 percent of gross domestic product by 2047 as social security, major medical programs, the deficit, and net interest on the deficit rise. All national security spending — defense, diplomacy, development, intelligence, and homeland security — and spending on everything from transportation and infrastructure to environmental protection and national parks would compete for fewer discretionary dollars.[43]

Importantly, the track record for democracies, including the United States, is one of remarkable unpredictability when it comes to the use of force to secure interests. Policymakers need to understand this and not expect to count on an iron-clad template that governs when and where the nation's political leaders will use force. Rather, they should work to frame choices on use of force using their best experience and help leaders reduce the risks of miscalculation that such unpredictability can pose.

Foreign Policy Priorities: The Now What

So, if American policymakers have the benefit of superpower status but are generally less able to wield it effectively; if Americans generally agree that leading or at least engaging abroad is important to protect U.S. interests; and if resource constraints, national character, and other factors limit us from seeking to aggressively or even consistently act overseas, especially with military forces, what imperatives should form the core of U.S. foreign and security policy? Three stand out.

Of foremost importance is avoiding the hazards of domestic political polarization. It is unlikely in this deeply dysfunctional period of governance that even a united foreign policy community could catalyze a resolution to these issues on its own. Still, the community has an important role to play in consistently and vociferously warning about

41 Gary J. Gates, "Americans Still Support Major Role for US in Global Affairs," *Gallup News*, March 6, 2017, http://news.gallup.com/poll/205286/americans-support-major-role-global-affairs.aspx.

42 "America's Global Role, U.S. Superpower Status," *Pew Research Center*, May 5, 2016, http://www.people-press.org/2016/05/05/1-americas-global-role-u-s-superpower-status/.

43 Congressional Budget Office, *The 2017 Long-Term Budget Outlook*, March 2017, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52480-ltbo.pdf.

the national security dangers posed by domestic political dysfunction.

America's deep divisions are a major strategic weakness. There is no stable understanding of the resources available to secure America's role in the world, which cripples the ability to plan and act strategically. A dysfunctional political system can make others doubt the reliability of U.S. commitments. Worse, polarizing opinions around the strength of U.S. commitments to allies creates greater agency for forces within the countries that seek opportunities to forge a path distinct from the United States and potentially antithetical to American security interests. If nations begin to routinely act independently from Washington's preference, Americans will avoid some free riding, but they will also lose say over issues that affect their security and prosperity. Political dysfunction also hampers America's core cultural appeal — the dream of the American political system as a "city on a hill."[44] In such an environment, alternative models of economics and governance gain greater

America's extensive alliance and partner network is among its most important geostrategic advantages.

resonance, notably anti-capitalist and anti-democratic, undermining enduring U.S. interests. The slight rise in global authoritarianism noted by Freedom House may reflect this decline in perceived Western effectiveness.

Finally, political dysfunction creates problems in civil-military relations. It feeds a sense of separateness in the can-do military culture, where senior members struggle to understand why the political caste cannot put aside politics to make important decisions. In fact, Americans and their elected leaders seem to be turning toward those in uniform to overcome perceived weaknesses in civilian governance. At the least, this is disheartening. More alarmingly, it is corrosive to good civilian control, a central tenet of the U.S. Constitution.

A second imperative is to focus significant leadership energy and sufficient investment on problem prevention. The nation requires capable and agile non-military instruments, such as diplomacy and development. These sectors have had difficulty convincing political leaders and the public of the value they can provide. The State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and similar organizations are unlikely to ever exert the political power of the military-industrial complex. Nevertheless, they can get better at wielding diplomacy development assistance and promoting private, foreign government, and international efforts that align with U.S. policy goals. Importantly, they can also improve on their ability to measure and communicate their pennies-on-the-dollar value. These sectors can take credit for contributing to tremendous gains made in the U.S.-led international order since World War II, from a substantial decline in global poverty to improvements in global life expectancy.[45] The United States should build on these successes to advance its interests in climate change mitigation and adaptation, global health improvements, and conflict resolution.

America's extensive alliance and partner network is among its most important geostrategic advantages. Alliances can require a lot of work and money with little to show. (From its allies' perspective, so too can the United States.) It is important to get the cost-benefit balance right. By and large, the United States has managed that well throughout the postwar period and needs to continue adapting its alliances to meet the demands of an evolving security environment. Policymakers should not let imprudent comments undermine the enterprise.[46]

A third imperative is to improve U.S. tools for deterrence and response to provocations that fall short of war. The United States has an excellent record of deterring existential threats. But potential adversaries are attacking U.S. interests in ways that fall below the threshold of traditional state-based military power; see Chinese coercion in the South and East China Seas, Russian subversion in its "near abroad" and within the United States, and Iranian asymmetric tactics, especially through proxies.

This phenomenon is as old as warfare itself. But it is an area of increasing risk, particularly with regard to the potential for miscalculation. In

44 Ronald Reagan, "A Vision for America," The White House, November 3, 1980, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85199.

45 On global poverty, see "Measuring Poverty," The World Bank, accessed, September 27, 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/measuringpoverty. On increased life expectancy, see UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision* (New York: United Nations, 2017), 7, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf.

46 Kathleen H. Hicks, Michael J. Green, and Heather A. Conley, "Donald Trump Doesn't Understand the Value of U.S. Bases Overseas," *Foreign Policy*, April 7, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/donald-trump-doesnt-understand-the-value-of-u-s-bases-overseas/.

some cases, such as cyber and space operations, escalation ladders and legal frameworks are not yet well-established. In territorial coercion, those frameworks are being actively tested. This trend creates a heightened risk of conflict not so much from intent — although as events with North Korea have demonstrated, that is possible — but from an increased chance that potential adversaries will inadvertently misinterpret U.S. willingness and capability to respond to provocations even when the precipitation of war is unintended.

In the current environment, policymakers must pay special attention to how they can best shape the considerations of states that wish to test America's response to ambiguous challenges. This will mean clearly communicating U.S. interests and its willingness and capability to defend them. It also means carrying out threats when deterrence fails. Effective messaging is not nearly as straightforward as it may sound, especially in an era when multiple messages sometimes compete. For instance, deterring future chemical weapons challenges was likely at the heart of the advice President Trump received before he ordered Tomahawk strikes on Syria in April 2017. However, the U.S. signaling may have been murky, coming less than one week after U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley and other administration officials signaled acceptance of the Assad regime, after which the regime carried out chemical attacks. It did not take long to go from a green light to a red line on Syria but too late to prevent Assad's undesirable action.

Improving America's toolkit for countering provocations will rely on many of the same multilateral and cross-functional integrative approaches on which effective problem prevention also rests. A fundamental rethink is required to improve the national security enterprise's ability to move with agility ahead of the pace of world events, the information environment, and the expanding array of adversary tactics and other challenges.

Conclusion

Discerning the shifting nature of the international system and designing an effective set of security tools within it are monumental but not unprecedented tasks. Those who shaped the post-World War II international system, who Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas nicknamed "the wise men,"[47] faced the same task. Circumstances today are equally daunting, requiring a similar re-examination of U.S. strategies and capabilities. Success will depend on

attributes not normally associated with the current U.S. administration or Washington's broader political climate: political consensus on foreign policy; long-term, preventative, multidisciplinary, and multinational responses wherever possible; and improved deterrence of "gray area" challenges to prevent miscalculation or other reasons for escalation. Yet hope can be found in the nation's foundational strengths, especially its indefatigable spirit of change and adaptation. The "now what" era of American foreign policy is upon us. President Trump is unlikely to provide the vision needed to rejuvenate U.S. foreign policy. It is time for a new generation of wise women and men to act. ◢

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47 See Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

Too Much History:

American Policy and East Asia in the Shadow of the Past

Hon. James B. Steinberg, JD

East Asian countries have a tendency to recall their historical grievances with rival nations, thus increasing the risk of eventual conflict. American policy toward East Asia, on the other hand, tends to have too short of a memory.

The great genius but also the Achilles' heel of American diplomacy is an irrepressible "can do" optimism — a conviction that every problem has a solution, that no conflict is too wicked or too intractable to defy resolution. De Tocqueville observed that Americans "have all a lively faith in the perfectibility of man. ... They all consider society as a body in a state of improvement."[1] That view has propelled America to great achievement in forging an era of peace and prosperity for nearly three-quarters of a century after World War II, ending wars and brokering peace among apparently implacable foes, and building institutions to tame economic cycles and interstate rivalries. Much of that optimism stems from our "eyes forward" approach to contemporary challenges, a conviction that the past is not prologue and that past performance is not indicative of future results. This optimism is rooted in our earliest experiences as a nation, a belief that the New World could and should forge a fresh approach to foreign policy, one not snared in the ancient quarrels of the Old World, but springing from an enlightened vision of harmonious relations among free peoples. It was an approach fitting for a nation whose very founding was an attempt to escape from the past. As Thomas Paine noted, "We have it in our power to begin the world over again."[2] The founders were not ignorant of history — they simply were determined not to be shackled by it.

That inclination to put history behind us, to focus on present interests rather than past slights, has been and remains evident in the U.S. approach to East Asia. It was reflected in our willingness to enter into an alliance with Japan only a decade after it launched a surprise attack on our homeland; it could be seen in the decision to normalize relations with a Communist China which had fought us in Korea, because contemporary security and economic interests were more important than past grievances; and in the decision to reconcile with Vietnam, two decades after a bloody war came to a bitter end for the United States.

But to our friends and interlocutors in East Asia, as T. S. Eliot observed,

> Time present and time past
> Are both perhaps present in time future.
> And time future contained in time past.[3]

Their national narratives as well as their perspectives on self and others are deeply rooted in their historical experience. It is a history that in most cases — from China, Japan, and Korea to Thailand (Siam) and Cambodia (Khmer Empire) — is measured in centuries and even millennia. These images are powerful forces both constraining the choices available to policymakers and providing tools that policymakers can use to justify their actions and mobilize their publics.

Scholars have long debated whether history influences policymakers' perceptions and choices,[4] including whether and to what extent a historically based "strategic culture" shapes contemporary policy.[5] As Robert Jervis has written, "Previous international events provide the statesman with a range of imaginable situations and allow him to detect patterns and causal links that can help him understand his world."[6] Some go beyond the impact of history on individual decision-makers to

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1 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1835).

2 Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*, Appendix to the Third Edition (Philadelphia: W. and T. Bradford, 1776).

3 T.S. Eliot, "Burnt Norton," *Four Quartets* (London: Faber and Faber, 1936).

4 See, for example, Robert Jervis, "How Decisonmakers Learn From History" in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics,* 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

5 In a seminal piece, Jack Snyder defined strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or initiation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy." Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (Santa Monica CA: RAND 1977). The concept has since evolved to embrace approaches to national security more broadly. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security* 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013).

6 Robert Jervis, "How Decisonmakers Learn From History" in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics,* 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

suggest that a "historically based strategic culture" can shape national choices.[7] Although there are skeptics (A.J.P. Taylor observed "men use the past to prop up their own prejudices"[8]), there seems to be little doubt that images of self and others drawn from the past heavily infuse the contemporary debate about the future of East Asian security.

Nowhere is this more evident than in modern China. President Xi Jinping's first evocation of the "China Dream" came in a speech pithily entitled "To Inherit From the Past and Use It for the Future, and Continuing What Has Passed in Beginning the Future: Continue to Forge Ahead Dauntlessly Towards the Goal of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People."[9] Xi's speeches frequently draw on historical images and experiences, contrasting the period of China's greatness with the "Century of Humiliation" from the Opium War to the Nanjing massacre. Lessons are to be learned from both. What made China great — its military and economic strength and its distinctive culture — is to be put at the center of policy, while what made China vulnerable — weakness and the inability to resist foreign pressure — is to be avoided.

At the center of this historic narrative is the danger posed by Japan. The "history issue" is not merely a scholarly debate but also informs China's views of Japanese behavior today. China opposes Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's effort to make Japan a "normal" nation with the usual right to pursue individual and collective self-defense, because "history" shows that an unshackled Japan is inherently a threat to its neighbors and it thus is not entitled to the same rights of sovereignty enjoyed by China and others. China refused to accept the Noda administration's 2012 decision to "nationalize" the Senkaku Islands as an effort to insulate the islands from provocative actions of the far right, led by former Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara. Instead, China insisted it was proof of a more aggressive policy.[10] Nor are China's leaders willing to let the historic lesson fade from the public mind; just three years ago, Xi led the first "national day of remembrance" for the Nanjing massacre — 77 years after the event.[11] At the speech, President Xi cautioned that "forgetting history is a betrayal."[12]

By contrast, from China's perspective, its own breathtaking military modernization is not a threat to its neighbors (unlike Japan's comparatively modest defense increases and operations) because "history" shows that when China was powerful in the past it did not threaten others but used its power to establish an era of peace and prosperity. Chinese officials' resurrection of the story of Ming Dynasty Admiral Zheng He over the past decade coincided with their effort to make the case that China's growth would be a "peaceful rise." Chinese officials regularly insist:

> During the overall course of six voyages to the Western Ocean, Zheng He did not occupy a single piece of land, establish any fortress or seize any wealth from other countries.[13]

Former President Wen Jiabao cited this example to show that "Hegemonism is at odds with our cultural tradition."[14]

Of course, for Japan, history offers quite a different story. To Japan, the story of the "divine winds" — the typhoons that thwarted China's attempt to subjugate Japan in 1274 and 1281 — is not simply a tale of Japanese heroic resistance but,

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7 For a discussion of strategic culture and its applicability to China's grand strategy, see Alaistair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). On the impact of strategic culture on U.S.-China relations, see James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon, *Strategic Reassurance and Resolve* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 38-40.

8 Jervis, "How Decisionmakers Learn From History," 217.

9 It is noteworthy that Xi's initial articulation of the China Dream was a speech at an exhibition called "The Road to Revival," dedicated to the history of China's victimization from the Opium Wars through World War II by the West. See Camilla T.N. Sorensen, "The Significance of Xi Jinping's 'Chinese Dream' for Chinese Foreign Policy: From 'Tao Guang Yang Hui' to 'Fen Fa You Wei,'" *Journal of China and International Relations* 3, no. 1 (2015), https://journals.aau.dk/index.php/jcir/article/viewFile/1146/967. See also Benjamin Carlson, "The World According to Xi Jinping," *The Atlantic*, September 21, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/xi-jinping-china-book-chinese-dream/406387/.

10 One writer has suggested that China's anger over the decision was exacerbated by the fact that it came during a period when China typically commemorates the Japanese aggressions of the 1930s and 1940s. See Scott Cheney-Peters, "How Japan's Nationalization Move in the East China Sea Shaped the U.S. Rebalance," *The National Interest*, October 26, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-japans-nationalization-move-the-east-china-sea-shaped-11549.

11 Agence France-Presse, "China Holds First Nanjing Massacre Memorial Day," *The Telegraph*, December 13, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11291820/China-holds-first-Nanjing-Massacre-memorial-day.html.

12 Ben Blanchard, "Set Aside Hate, China's Xi Says on Nanjing Massacre Anniversary," *Reuters*, December 12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan/set-aside-hate-chinas-xi-says-on-nanjing-massacre-anniversary-idUSKBN0JR03F20141213.

13 See Steinberg and O'Hanlon, *Strategic Reassurance and Resolve,* 39-40. Many commentators have questioned the accuracy of the official Chinese version of Zhang He's voyages. For the exposition of China's peaceful rise, see Zheng Bijian, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2005, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2005-09-01/chinas-peaceful-rise-great-power-status.

14 Denny Roy, *Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 28-29.

perhaps more important, a caution about the risk to Japan of a powerful China.[15]

For the Republic of Korea, too, history powerfully shapes contemporary policies and choices. Despite South Korea's strong shared interest with Japan in addressing common threats, particularly those posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, cooperation is hamstrung by lingering Korean resentment of the Japanese colonial occupation and treatment of Korean "comfort women" during World War II. This grievance is apparent not only in popular sentiment but also in the actions of Korea's leaders. It can be seen in the decision of then-President Park Geun-hye to join China in dedicating a statue to Ahn Jeung Geun, the Korean who killed Japan's imperial governor in 1907,[16] and her participation in the World War II commemoration parade in Beijing in 2015. Other historical disputes continue to dog cooperation between the two would-be allies: a territorial dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands[17] and even the name of the body of water between the two countries ("The Sea of Japan is established internationally as the only name" Japan's chief cabinet secretary insisted when lodging a diplomatic protest against a South Korean video promoting the name "East Sea").[18]

Both Koreas in turn are cautious about too great a dependence on China — despite the strong economic pull exerted by Beijing — informed by a history of tensions between the two empires. The seemingly arcane dispute over whether the Goguryeo Empire was Korean or Chinese still inflames passions on both sides of the Yalu.[19]

The contrast between American and East Asia worldviews was evident during the meeting between Xi and President Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. In recounting the meeting, President Trump told *The Wall Street Journal*

> [Xi] then went into the history of China and Korea. Not North Korea, Korea. And you know, you're talking about thousands of years ... and many wars. And Korea actually used to be a part of China. And after listening for 10 minutes I realized that not — it's not so easy.[20]

It could be seen in President Trump's suggestion during the U.S. presidential campaign that it might be a good thing for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons instead of relying on U.S. extended deterrence — a suggestion that sent shock waves through East Asia.[21]

Ironically, the contemporary political identity of each of the key countries of North East Asia was forged through a dramatic leap to "escape history." For China, the strategy of leaders as diverse as Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong was not to find solutions for China's problems in its past but, rather, to denigrate the past and to look to other models to achieve security and prosperity. Sun looked to the West, while Mao found inspiration in the Soviet Union during the early years of the People's Republic.[22]

Similarly, Meiji Japan reacted to growing pressure from the West in the mid-19th century not by trying to strengthen the traditional approaches of the shogunate that had successfully resisted foreign invasion in the past but by dramatically embracing modernity and key aspects of Western institutions and strategy, borrowing heavily from Germany, which — under Bismarck — had thrown off its own feudal past to achieve independence, unification, and prosperity. This move to "escape

15 During the Mongol dynasty, Emperor Kublai Khan mounted two attempts to conquer Japan. On both occasions the effort was thwarted by typhoons ("kamikaze" or "divine wind") that severely damaged the Mongol fleet and saved Japan from invasion.

16 Emily Rauhala, "Why a Korean-Chinese Statue Is Upsetting Japan," *Time*, November 25, 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/11/25/why-a-korean-chinese-statue-is-upsetting-japan/; Steven Denney and Christopher Green, "National Identity and Historical Legacy: Ahn Jung-geun in the Grand Narrative," *SinoNK*, June 2014, http://sinonk.com/2014/06/06/national-identity-and-historical-legacy-ahn-jung-geun-in-the-grand-narrative/

17 Japan claims that it established sovereignty over the islands in the 17th century. See "Japanese Territory: Takeshima," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed September 2017, *mofa.go.jp*. Korea argues that Japan has long acknowledged Korea's sovereignty; "Not only has the East Sea designation been in continuous use for over 2,000 years, it is also inappropriate to name a sea after a single country." "Dokdo and the East Sea," Korea.net, accessed September 2017, http://www.korea.net/Government/Current-Affairs/National-Affairs?affairId=83.

18 See "South Korea Video Renaming Sea of Japan Fuels Tension," *Japan Times,* Feb. 22, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/22/national/politics-diplomacy/south-korea-video-renaming-sea-japan-fuels-tension/. Tellingly, the video was titled "East Sea: The Name From the Past, of the Present and for the Future," claiming that the body had been named the East Sea for 2,000 years.

19 Taylor Washburn, "How an Ancient Kingdom Explains Today's China-Korea Relations" *The Atlantic*, April 15, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/how-an-ancient-kingdom-explains-todays-china-korea-relations/274986/.

20 "WSJ Trump Interview Excerpts: China, North Korea, Ex-Im Bank, Obamacare, Bannon, More," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 12, 2017, https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2017/04/12/wsj-trump-interview-excerpts-china-north-korea-ex-im-bank-obamacare-bannon/.

21 "Now wouldn't you rather in a certain sense have Japan have nuclear weapons when North Korea has nuclear weapons" Donald Trump, Town Hall, moderated by Anderson Cooper, *CNN*, March 29, 2016. See also "Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on his Foreign Policy Views," *The New York Times*, March 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html?_r=0; Austin Ramzy, "Comments by Donald Trump Draw Fears of an Arms Race in Asia," *The New York Times*, March 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/world/asia/donald-trump-arms-race.html.

22 Odd Arne Westad, *Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750* (New York: Basic Books, 2012).

the past" was replicated again after World War II; under the tutelage of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Japan adopted Western institutions and strategies as varied as labor unions and women's suffrage.[23] More recently, South Korea — the 19th-century "Hermit Kingdom" — propelled itself to the front ranks of the global stage by following in Japan's footsteps to embrace democracy and integration in the global economy.

Why does history have such a hold on contemporary relations in East Asia? After all, in other regions and other times, historic enemies have reconciled in the face of compelling contemporary challenges. Think France and Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after World War II.

Some might argue that the talk of history is mere rhetoric — that international relations theory would predict tensions between Japan and China in terms of the inevitable conflicts between a rising power and an established one. Others might point to domestic politics and the mobilization effect of using historic images to rally support for the governing parties based on patriotism and the need to unite against a foreign threat.[24] For many leaders in the region, bitter historic memories provide a convenient anchor ("useful adversaries" in Tom Christensen's evocative characterization) for nationalist policies.[25] Such policies in history textbooks can indoctrinate future generations into stereotypes of others.[26]

Undoubtedly, all these forces are at work. But there is reason to believe the structural tensions are exacerbated by the historic context.[27] As one scholar has observed:

> the rivalry context may play a causal role in determining which arms race, power transition, etc., escalate to war…. That past conflicts condition current ones and future

expectations, that leaders learn realpolitik lessons, and that peoples learn to hate each other all mean that theories of enduring rivalries are historical theories.[28]

Indeed, there is evidence to suggest the propensity for the diversionary use of force is more likely in the context of historic rivalries. "[L]eaders can capitalize on a hostile interstate environment where the relevant target public may be persuaded to consider alleged threats plausible"[29] — and the historic experience appears to establish the plausibility of the threat.

Of course, the past is not necessarily prologue. At times, countries in the region have been able to overcome historic suspicions. Consider for example the decades of Sino-Japanese reconciliation that followed normalization in the 1970s, which featured little of the rhetoric of historic grievance. Similarly, Japan's relations with Southeast Asia have improved dramatically despite the legacy of the East Asia Prosperity Sphere and the occupations of World War II. But during periods of change and uncertainty about the present and future intentions of key countries in the region, past behavior offers a convenient answer for political leaders and for publics to answer the inherent ambiguity of future actions. Thus, while one can argue about whether the perpetuation of historic grievances is cause or effect, their persistence contributes to the precarious situation in East Asia. And in the absence of concerted efforts by regional leaders to counteract this dynamic, the risk only grows of a vicious cycle leading to conflict.

Fortunately, there have been a few hopeful signs. Japanese Prime Minister Abe's statements in connection with the 70th anniversary of World War II, along with the decision (at least up to now) not to repeat the 2013 visit to the Yasakuni shrine, have

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23 Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the most prominent essayists of the Meiji era, summed it up simply: "In Japan's present condition, there is nothing in which we may take pride vis-à-vis the West. All that Japan has to be proud of is its scenery." (quoted in James L. McLain, *Japan: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. 2002)). On the influence of the Prussia experience on Meiji state building, see McLain, *Japan: A Modern History*, pp 191-197. For an account of the "McArthur constitution" which re-established Japan's political institutions along U.S. and Western parliamentary lines, see McLain, *Japan: A Modern History*, pp 537-550.

24 There is extensive literature on the "diversionary" effect in international relations.

25 Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (*Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

26 The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center conducted an intensive three-year project examining the role of history textbooks in the formation of historical memory about World War II in East Asia. The results were published in 2011. See Gi-wook Shin and Daniel C. Schneider, eds., *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories* (New York: Routledge, 2011). Interestingly, the study found that Japanese textbooks "do not highlight patriotism, revisionism or nationalism," in contrast to the more "passionate" accounts in Korea and China, where nation building and national-identity formation are more central. See Yves Russel's review of the book in *China Perspectives* 2 (2014), 79-81, http://chinaperspectives. revues.org/6494.

27 Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (June 1993): 14; Sara McLaughlin and Brandon Prins, "Rivalry and Diversionary Use of Force," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (December 2004): 937-61.

28 Gary Goertz, *Contexts of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 213.

29 Andrew J. Enterline and Kristian S. Gleditsch, "Threats, Opportunity, and Force: Repression and Diversion of Domestic Pressure, 1948-1982," *International Interactions* 26, no. 1. 28 (2000).

helped bring about more measured Sino-Japanese relations.[30] Positive change can be seen in the joint ceremony in September 2017 to commemorate the 45th anniversary of Sino-Japanese relations — an event to mark the 40th anniversary in 2012 was cancelled after the Japanese purchase of the Senkakus[31] — and Abe attended a similar event in Tokyo.[32] With the election of a new president in South Korea, and the possibility of new mandates for Xi following the 19th Party Congress in October and for Abe in the upcoming Diet election, the key leaders will be well positioned to take steps to overcome the historical legacies (or, at a minimum, to avoid fanning the historical flames further). The challenges facing East Asia are severe enough without having to refight past wars. At the same time, the U.S. administration must recognize the ever-present shadow of the past as this country seeks to build a sustainable long-term policy toward the region. President Barack Obama's visit to Hiroshima in 2016 demonstrated that it is possible to be cognizant of the past without being trapped by it.

In recent years, calls have grown for a more systematic effort to overcome U.S. ahistoricism. The proposal by Graham Allison and Niall Ferguson for a White House Council of Historical Advisers reflects one such effort. But their suggestion focuses primarily on learning from historical analogy, proposing that

> the charter for the future Council of Historical Advisers begin with Thucydides's observation that "the events of future history … will be of the same nature — or nearly so — as the history of the past, so long as men are men."

But the problems of history in East Asia are of different kind. The tensions between China and Japan, or between Korea and Japan, are not "of the same nature" as rivalries in other contexts; rather, they are specific to the history of these nations and

these peoples. What is needed are policymakers who understand "deep" history, or "the ways in which policymakers underst[and] the historical context from which the current conflict arose."[33] In this respect, the current disdain for the value of long-serving career officers in the Foreign Service, with deep grounding in the languages, culture, and history of key countries and regions, poses a serious risk to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, the Trump administration's proposal to eliminate U.S. government funding for the Fulbright Hays regional studies program under Title VI of the Higher Education Act is deeply shortsighted.[34] One dinner with Xi Jinping is not enough to compensate for the loss of generations' worth of insight if the United States is to navigate the perils of East Asia in the 21st century. 🔥

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30 Tomohiro Osaki, "Abe and His Cabinet Steer Clear of War-Linked Yasukuni Shrine on Anniversary of World War II Surrender," *Japan Times*, August 15, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/15/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-cabinet-steer-clear-war-linked-yasukuni-shrine-anniversary-world-war-ii-surrender/.

31 "Five Years After Nationalization of the Senkaku Islands," *Japan Times*, September 11, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/09/11/editorials/five-years-nationalization-senkaku-islands/.

32 Charlotte Gao, "Abe Makes a Surprise Appearance, Hails 45 years of Japan-China Relations," *The Diplomat*, September 29, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/abe-makes-a-surprise-appearance-hails-45-years-of-japan-china-relations/.

33 James B. Steinberg, "History, Policymaking and the Balkans: Lessons Imported and Lessons Learned," in Hal Brands and Jeremy Suri, eds. *The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2016): 238. As I note in the chapter, this is similar to what Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May called "issue history"; Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: Free Press, 1988).

34 Thomas P. Pepinsky, "The Federal Budget's Threat to Foreign Policy," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 16, 2017, http://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Federal-Budget-s-Threat/239796. See also Nathan J. Brown, "In Defense of Area Studies," *The Washington Post*, October 30, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/30/in-defense-of-u-s-funding-for-area-studies/.

Restoring the Vision:

Overcoming Gridlock to Reassert Congress's Role in Deliberating National Security

Sen. John McCain

In recent years, Congress's role in shaping American national security strategy has diminished due to partisan gridlock from both parties. It's time to reassert our status as a coequal branch of government and do our part to ensure our national security.

One of the early strokes of genius by the architects of the American system was entrusting to Congress the sacred duty of supporting and providing for our military. The founding fathers did so to guard against an all-powerful executive and protect the foundations of individual liberty. However, two centuries of democratic governance, separation of powers, and dedication to the propositions of our founding revealed their true brilliance and foresight.

As America has realized the limitless potential of its ideals, its citizens, and its destiny, the U.S. military has been transformed from a potential threat to liberty to the indispensable guardian of it — at home and around the world. Today, the challenge for Congress is navigating how to fulfill its constitutional duties in accordance with America's global responsibilities.

Through the years, as the country grew into its role as a world power, the obligation of Congress to ensure America lived up to the hopes and dreams of the founders only became more important. The post-World War II global order relies fundamentally on American leadership. The role of Congress, therefore, is not only to serve as the legislature of our great nation, but also — as a co-equal branch of government for the most powerful country in the world — to help maintain the stability and prosperity of the liberal order. We cannot take this charge seriously enough.

That is why the diminished role of Congress in deliberating and debating the strategy to address the global challenges and opportunities we face is one of the great tragedies of our modern political system.

Congress has a fairly straightforward set of constitutional roles and responsibilities: raising and supporting armies; providing and maintaining a Navy; providing advice and consent on treaties and nominations; controlling the purse strings; conducting oversight of executive branch departments and agencies; and exercising checks and balances as a co-equal branch of government.

Yet, Congress has a more fundamental role in shaping American national security strategy than conventional constitutional wisdom would dictate. Unfortunately, we have allowed these important duties to wither away.

The legislature, and in particular the Senate, is intended to be a deliberative body — one that is capable of providing a thoughtful, reasoned, and measured approach to matters of national import. In the national security sphere, the benefits of this deliberative approach are clear. Where the executive branch is consumed with the urgency of day-to-day events, the legislature can take time for precious debate and careful consideration of both current problems and future potentialities. Free from the paralysis of dealing with crisis management, Congress should be able to provide the strategic thinking that national security demands.

Practically speaking, the process for Congress's role starts with a sober assessment of national security threats. It then proceeds with spirited debate about the requirements necessary to meet those threats, followed by the authorization of policies and appropriation of resources to support those requirements. Finally, it provides vigorous oversight of those policies and resources. At its best, this is how Congress can — and has — functioned.

In recent years, however, Congress has become only a shadow of the deliberative body it was intended to be. Political polarization has led to partisan gridlock. No matter which party is in power, the majority seems intent on imposing its will, while the minority seems solely interested in preventing any accomplishments. As we lurch from one self-created crisis to another, we are proving incapable of not only addressing the country's most difficult problems but also fulfilling our most basic legislative duties. "Compromise" has become a dirty word and working across the aisle a political liability. But these very principles were meant to define our legislative process.

Over time, regular order — the set of processes, rules, customs, and protocols by which Congress is supposed to govern itself and do business on behalf of the American people — has totally broken down. This has led to a paralysis that has rendered the institution largely incapable of exercising its unique responsibility to thoughtfully consider broader strategic questions. In doing so, Congress has diminished its role and, ultimately, disempowered itself.

This has wrought havoc, most crucially, on our

country's national security policies. Nowhere is this more apparent than our defense budget. For years, U.S. military spending has been senselessly constrained by sequestration — perhaps the single greatest legislative failure that I have seen. Never intended to become law at all, sequestration was meant to be a threat so grave that it would force bipartisan agreement to reduce the deficit. But bipartisanship proved too difficult for Congress, and the result was that arbitrary spending caps and sequestration became the law of the land.

There is broad agreement on both sides of the aisle that defense has been woefully underfunded since the spending caps and sequestration came into effect. Even still, Congress has not been able to muster the political will to find a permanent solution to the problem. Instead, we have fallen into the habit of funding our government through short-term budget deals that we all know have a harmful

on the floor of the Senate — undercutting one of its central purposes. While in the end a large majority of senators from both parties vote for the legislation each year, it is disappointing that we can no longer find a way to openly debate matters of such consequence to our military and our national security.

It is essential that we find a way to restore Congress's unique role in providing the deliberative, strategic approach that is so needed in our national security decision-making — especially in today's increasingly dangerous and unstable world. To do so, we should look to our own past. At several key moments in recent history, Congress has demonstrated the courage and moral fortitude to do the hard work of thoughtful deliberation and strategic thinking to enact visionary reforms, policy changes, or shifts in national security strategy.

There are a few episodes that stand out during my time in Washington. The first demonstrates the ability of a small group of members of Congress with strong personal convictions to change the trajectory of national security — despite determined opposition from a president. In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter was considering withdrawing all U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula in an effort to negotiate with the Chinese and the Soviets to prevent

> **[W]e owe it to those who put our system in place to become the deliberative body we were intended to be.**

impact on our military. Congress has all but given up on the appropriations process, and we regularly threaten the possibility of government shutdown. If we cannot fund the government, we are failing to fulfill even the most basic constitutional duties in a reliable and proper way — and, in doing so, we are ceding power to the executive and further weakening our own branch of government.

I am proud to say that the Senate Armed Services Committee has long been one of the rare exceptions to the breakdown of regular order. For more than 50 consecutive years, Congress has enacted the National Defense Authorization Act in a bipartisan manner, and presidents of both parties have signed those bills into law.

Unfortunately, even the bipartisanship surrounding the defense authorization bill has proven fragile. In recent years, we have struggled to reach agreement on a process to debate and vote on amendments under an open process

another war. As a Navy liaison in the Senate at the time, I escorted a bipartisan delegation of senators, including Henry "Scoop" Jackson and William Cohen, on a visit to South Korea. That on-the-ground experience led these leaders to conclude that troop withdrawal would aggravate rather than alleviate the security situation.

Upon our return to Washington, the senators went to the White House and worked hard to convince the president that a troop withdrawal would not be the right course of action. These senators were highly regarded for their national security experience and expertise. While one of them might not have made a difference, the bipartisan group was able to change his mind and, in doing so, change the course of history. The results of withdrawing troops from South Korea would have been disastrous for our interests and those of our allies in the region.

The second episode demonstrates the value

of careful study, oversight, and reform — even when faced with bureaucratic opposition from the executive branch. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act was the most consequential reform of the Department of Defense since its creation. Passed in 1986, my last year in the House of Representatives before I came to the Senate, this legislation was the result of years of hard work by the Armed Services Committee.

Goldwater-Nichols came about in response to a series of military failures — the Vietnam War, the failed hostage rescue in Iran, and difficulties during the invasion of Grenada. After years of meticulous deliberation and study, the committee identified the root causes of these failures and enacted sweeping organizational reforms to fix the problems, increase efficiency, reduce waste, and encourage a more unified force. On the whole, those reforms have served our country well.

The third episode demonstrates the power of shifting the paradigm during a crisis — in the face of strong path dependency from the administration. In 2006, the situation in Iraq was rapidly spiraling out of control. Those dark days saw slow progress, rising casualties, and dwindling public support for the war. The Bush administration continued to pursue the same strategy in the face of mounting evidence of its catastrophic failure. In Congress, we knew a new approach was urgently needed to turn the tide. As the representatives of the people, we understood that a mood of defeatism was rising, as critics who would have preferred failure called for unconditional troop withdrawal.

Together with a group of highly-regarded national security experts, Congress demanded a change in strategy. The intellectual contributions of thought leaders were central to crafting the troop surge strategy, and Congress played an important role in building public support — in part through high-profile hearings like the one that allowed Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker to make the case against accepting defeat. In 2007, President George W. Bush finally changed course and adopted a strategy that could lead to victory, working tirelessly to earn public support for the surge. While the gains made after the surge have since been squandered, we should not underestimate how the change in strategy turned the tide.

It is time to get back to this way of doing business. To be sure, Congress is not perfect — least of all, its members. We have all made our fair share of mistakes and have gotten the details wrong on more than one occasion.

Even so, we owe it to those who put our system in place to become the deliberative body we were intended to be. When it comes to asserting our role in national security, we owe it also to the men and women serving in our armed forces who put their lives at risk every day to keep our nation free.

By reinvigorating the processes, rules, protocols, and customs of Congress, we can get back to fulfilling our unique role in national security decision-making. Through deliberation, debate, and regular order, we can overcome our current polarized, paralyzed moment — just as the founding fathers intended us to. By doing so, we can reassert our status as a coequal branch of government and do our part to ensure our national security. Only then can we — imperfectly — help our country move forward, secure our interests, defend our values, and protect the world order that has brought peace and prosperity to so many.

John McCain *graduated from the Naval Academy in 1958. He served in the U.S. Navy until 1981. He was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Arizona in 1982 and elected to the U.S. Senate in 1986. McCain was the Republican Party's nominee for president in the 2008 election. He currently serves as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.*

The Roundtable

Roundtables are where we get to hear from multiple experts on either a subject matter or a recently published book. This edition features Hal Brands' essay "The Triumph and Tragedy of Diplomatic History." We will be publishing other contributions to this roundtable on our website in the coming weeks.

The Triumph and Tragedy of Diplomatic History

Hal Brands, PhD

Academics, and academic disciplines, engage in bouts of self-doubt and even self-flagellation from time to time. They question their intellectual worth and standing within the ivory tower; they fret about their relationship to the broader world. Yet for the field of diplomatic history — simply defined, the historical study of foreign policy and international relations, and American foreign policy and international relations in particular — recent years have been a time of remarkable self-congratulation.

In the 1970s and 1980s, diplomatic history was derided by academic critics — and some of its practitioners — as a field of limited intellectual value, characterized by unimaginative scholarship that served primarily to chronicle what one bureaucrat said to another. Now, however, a sense of near-triumphalism pervades many self-assessments of the field.

Diplomatic history has become more international and less U.S.-centric, these analyses hold; it has incorporated approaches and perspectives from social, cultural, and gender history; it has regained its good name in the broader historical profession. Diplomatic history was once "on the edge of extinction," Columbia University's Matthew Connelly recently observed. "It has not only survived, but thrived by reinventing itself as part of a vastly expanded field of research on the history of world politics."[1] Another respected scholar has even written of a "diplomatic history bandwagon," the idea being that a reformed and revitalized diplomatic history is at the vanguard of historical inquiry.[2]

There is a thin line between self-congratulation and self-delusion, however, and diplomatic history stands perilously close to that line today. In some respects, the triumphalists have it right: Diplomatic historians are producing remarkable works of scholarship, often based on research in multiple archives and languages, on an array of important issues. Yet it is hard to shake the feeling that something has gone very wrong with the endeavor. Although diplomatic history may have halted its long decline within the academy in recent decades, it has simultaneously — and not coincidentally — become afflicted by three fundamental problems. Diplomatic history has become less intellectually cohesive; less concerned with traditional issues of war and peace, diplomacy, and statecraft; and less engaged with policymakers on the questions they care about most. The "triumph" of diplomatic history has also been its tragedy.[3] The field has reinvented itself, but in doing so it has lost a great deal.

The consequences of this situation are not merely academic. History, if it ever left us, has surely returned with a vengeance as geopolitical competition intensifies, authoritarian and democratic models of governance compete for primacy, security threats proliferate, and the international system enters a new era of volatility. This ought to be a golden moment for diplomatic history: An understanding of international strategy and statecraft, of how American foreign policy and state power have historically been wielded in global affairs, could scarcely be more relevant. That diplomatic history is ill-suited to answering this call is bad news for the discipline — and even worse news for a country that needs all the intellectual help it can get to navigate a dangerous world.

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1 Matthew Connelly, "The Next Thirty Years of International Relations Research: New Topics, New Methods, and the Challenge of Big Data," *Les Cahiers Irice 14* (February 2015): 85-86.

2 Thomas Zeiler, "The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field," *Journal of American History* 95, no. 4 (March 2009): 1053-1073.

3 Although space constraints preclude a fuller discussion of this point, other "traditional" forms of history — particularly military and political history — have experienced many of the same phenomena considered in this essay. See Fredrik Logevall and Kenneth Osgood, "Why Did We Stop Teaching Political History?" *The New York Times*, August 29, 2016.

Both the triumph and the tragedy of diplomatic history are rooted in the field's response to the crisis it confronted 30 to 40 years ago. During the early postwar era, diplomatic history had been at the forefront of the historical profession. "Diplomatic historians held leadership positions in the major organizations" of the field, the eminent scholar George Herring later recalled. "Diplomatic history topics were essential components of survey courses." Major scholarly debates — on the origins of the Cold War, dropping of the atomic bomb, and other subjects — played out in leading journals and attracted widespread attention both within and beyond the historical profession. "There was a sense of real importance in what we were doing," Herring reflected.[4] By the 1970s and 1980s, however, the worm had turned and diplomatic history seemed increasingly out of step with the broader historical community.

Diplomatic history stood accused of being largely devoted to studying the actions of dead white men at a time when the historical profession was — with good reason, and in response to broader societal changes — looking to excavate the experiences of the marginalized and oppressed. It represented a traditional, even conservative, approach to history at a time when newer subfields that emphasized issues of race, class, and gender had become ascendant.[5] It focused largely on U.S. foreign policy and the view from Washington, in contrast to more cosmopolitan, international approaches. Not least, diplomatic history was closely identified with the study of American power, and after Vietnam American power seemed decidedly disreputable to many academics.

The upshot was that diplomatic history — like other "conservative" subfields such as military history and political history — went from being at the center of the historical profession to its periphery. "What I encountered," one scholar later recalled, "was a sub-discipline under siege."[6] Many leading history departments stopped hiring new diplomatic historians and declined to replace retiring ones; from the 1970s onward, the proportion of college history departments employing one or more diplomatic historian began a precipitous, decades-long decline.[7] A study by three Stanford scholars later demonstrated, moreover, that articles on diplomatic history were increasingly excluded from generalist journals and pushed into more specialized publications; the number of dissertations on diplomatic history topics dropped significantly.[8] Perhaps most tellingly, diplomatic history was subjected to withering critiques from within the profession. The most famous broadside was fired by the Harvard scholar Charles Maier, who argued in 1980 that diplomatic historians were simply "marking time" — busying themselves with dull, unimaginative approaches to the study of foreign policy — during a period of great innovation in the rest of the historical community.[9] During the 1980s and 1990s, it often seemed that diplomatic history was dying; it was common to hear of the "long crisis" — perhaps the terminal crisis — of the field.[10]

Crisis can be the mother of innovation, however, and the discipline responded to these pressures by essentially reinventing itself. Diplomatic historians got culture — they incorporated insights and methods from cultural history, as well as related subfields such as social history and gender history, in their scholarship on issues as varied as containment and U.S.-Latin American relations. One prominent example: In 1997 a leading diplomatic historian published a widely read article in the *Journal of American History* arguing that George Kennan's "Long Telegram" was heavily influenced

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4 George Herring, "A SHAFR Retrospective," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 3 (June 2007): 397-400.

5 A good guide to shifts within the profession is Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

6 William Keylor, "The Problems and Prospects of Diplomatic/International History," *H-Diplo Essay No. 126*, April 10, 2015, https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/66930/h-diplo-state-field-essay-"-problems-and-prospects.

7 For two slightly different sets of statistics that convey the same basic trend, see Patricia Cohen, "Great Caesar's Ghost! Are Traditional History Courses Vanishing?" *The New York Times*, June 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/books/11hist.html; Robert Townsend, "The Rise and Decline of History Specializations over the Past 40 Years," *Perspectives on History*, December 2015, https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/december-2015/the-rise-and-decline-of-history-specializations-over-the-past-40-years.

8 Stephen Haber, David Kennedy, and Stephen Krasner, "Brothers Under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 34-43.

9 Charles Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in Michael Kammen, ed., *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 355-387.

10 Michael Hunt, "The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure," *Diplomatic History* 16, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 115-140.

by gender tropes and the "homosocial" climate in the U.S. embassy in Moscow.[11] Scholarship proliferated on how racialized worldviews and concepts such as "Orientalism" shaped America's interactions with foreign peoples; postmodern theory and deconstructionism moved into accounts of U.S. relations with the world. And with a critical assist from the end of the Cold War — which dramatically increased the availability of non-U.S. sources — diplomatic historians embraced international or even transnational approaches to the study of American foreign relations, often "de-centering" Washington to bring the perspectives of other actors to the fore.[12]

Most notably, diplomatic historians dramatically expanded the boundaries of their subfield to make room for subjects of greater interest to the rest of the profession. Greater attention was paid to the roles of migration, international public health, development, globalization, environmental activism, food security, human rights, tourism, architecture, religion, and even sports in shaping America's relationship with the world; diplomatic historians began to emphasize the interaction not just of governments but also of non-state actors, peoples, and transnational communities. Diplomatic history was once mocked as the study of "what one clerk said to another"; the field now explicitly rejected that label and claimed a more encompassing self-definition.[13] As one advocate of the "new" diplomatic history has written, diplomatic historians became "part of the global community of scholars interested not just in war and diplomacy, but also international and non-government organizations, trade and monetary policy, scientific and technological innovation, and countless other subjects that connect different countries or transcend the boundaries between them."[14]

In many ways, this transformation accomplished a great deal. There is simply no question that diplomatic history has become a broader and more intellectually diverse field in recent decades. The turn toward multiarchival and multilingual research has produced groundbreaking works of scholarship, such as Mary Sarotte's account of the end of the Cold War, Jeremi Suri's reinterpretation of the origins of détente, Odd Arne Westad's volume on superpower competition and the Third World, and Fredrik Logevall's classic study of the French war in Indochina and the origins of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam.[15] De-centering the United States has provided new insights on agency and causality on issues as varied as the Algerian war of independence and the struggle between left and right in Cold War Latin America.[16] Looking beyond state-to-state relations and the view from Washington has given us a better understanding of how U.S. power is experienced by ordinary people around the world. Historians who have drawn ideas from the study of culture and memory into more traditional works of diplomatic history, as opposed to simply replacing the latter with the former, have better illuminated the complex mix of factors that has long shaped American perceptions of and policies toward the world — and that has long pushed U.S. officials toward such an expansive definition of the country's global interests.[17] Similarly, scholars have written fascinating accounts that integrate smallpox eradication, population control, economic development, religion, and other subjects into the history of U.S. foreign relations, and the field has attained greater appreciation of the role of non-state actors in

11 Frank Costigliola, "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration': Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War," *Journal of American History* 83, no. 4 (March 1997): 1309-1339; Robert Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

12 On these sources and their significance, see John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Melvyn Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?" *American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 501-524. In some circles, in fact, the labels and approaches "diplomatic history" and "international history" have become essentially interchangeable.

13 On the origins of this dig, see Elie Kedourie, "From Clerk to Clerk: Writing Diplomatic History," *The American Scholar* 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1979): 502.

14 Connelly, "The Next Thirty Years of International Relations Research," 87-88.

15 Mary Sarotte, *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Fredrik Logevall, *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 2014); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third-World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

16 See, for instance, Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

17 For a good summary, see Melvyn Leffler, "National Security," in Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 25-41.

America's encounters with the world.[18]

Not coincidentally, diplomatic history has become more aligned with — and more acceptable to — the dominant trends in the broader historical profession. As one state-of-the-field essay noted several years ago, books authored by diplomatic historians have won awards from the American Historical Association and the Organization of American Historians. The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), the leading professional organization for diplomatic historians, reported having more than 2,000 members from 34 countries, a significant increase from a decade prior.[19] And much as another dying subfield — military history — kept one foot out of the grave by transitioning away from a traditional focus on operations and strategy to one rooted in the broader concept of "war in society," the broader category of "America in the world" has gained a measure of respectability even as traditional diplomatic history has receded. Leading universities such as Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Cornell all employ distinguished scholars concentrating in this area; so do many other research and teaching institutions.

Given all this, leading diplomatic historians no longer lament but celebrate the state of the field. As Matthew Connelly has written, "The study of U.S. diplomacy therefore has a secure place in the historical profession, *but only because it is now just part of a much larger project.*"[20] It would seem, then, that the transformation of diplomatic history has not simply enriched but resurrected that field. Diplomatic history has by no means recaptured the stature it possessed 60 years ago — not even close — but at the very least no one is talking about the end of diplomatic history these days.

So amid all this intellectual dynamism and renewed academic respectability, what's not to like? Three things, it turns out.

II

The first problem is that as diplomatic history has become broader and more eclectic, it has also become less intellectually cohesive. In any field of study, there is an inevitable trade-off between the breadth of topics covered and the intellectual coherence of the community covering them. Opening the analytical aperture is essential to incorporating new subjects and fostering intellectual diversity, but it risks atomizing the field and making its respective subcomponents less relevant to one another. This is precisely what has happened to diplomatic history.

For all the shortcomings of the field in an earlier era, its focus was at least relatively clear, and a resulting sense of intellectual community formed around much of the work produced. Diplomatic historians focused largely on issues of high politics and strategy, on the exercise of state power and government policy — particularly American state power and government policy — in the international system. There were vibrant and often heated debates on critical issues, such as the sources of American intervention in World War I and World War II, the causes of the Cold War, and U.S. nuclear strategy in the 1940s and 1950s, and those debates involved an array of leading academics in the field. This is why even proponents of the more recent changes in diplomatic history have sometimes looked back wistfully upon this earlier era.[21] Despite all the interpretive disputes that divided the field, diplomatic historians were part of a common intellectual inquiry organized largely around crucial issues in U.S. foreign policy and international affairs.

The same cannot be said today. In his definitive study of the American historical profession, Peter Novick titled the final chapter "There Was No King in Israel," the idea being that the profession had become so intellectually diffuse that it had lost any common identity or purpose.[22] Similarly, the fact that diplomatic historians are focusing on such a diverse array of issues, and are utilizing such a wide range of methodological and intellectual approaches, has made it far harder to discern any common intellectual purpose — or even for people who identify as diplomatic historians to be in meaningful dialogue with one another.

One wonders, for instance, whether one scholar who studies the origins of the Cold War from a quintessentially geopolitical perspective and a

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18 See, for instance, Erez Manela, "A Pox on Your Narrative: Writing Disease Control Into Cold War History," *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 4 (April 2010): 299-323; Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Knopf, 2012); William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

19 Zeiler, "Diplomatic History Bandwagon," 1054-1055. It is possible that Zeiler's statistics overstated the total size of SHAFR, but the basic trend he noted is clear enough. My thanks to Amy Sayward for her insight on this issue.

20 Connelly, "The Next Thirty Years of International Relations Research," 91.

21 Herring, "A SHAFR Retrospective."

22 Novick, *That Noble Dream.*

scholar who views U.S. policy toward Stalin's Soviet Union as a result of gender insecurities are really capable of doing much beyond talking past one another.[23] Similarly, is there much fruitful exchange between someone who studies U.S. foreign relations through the lens of nuclear arms control and someone who studies it through the lens of post-colonial theory or the sexual politics of U.S. imperialism?[24] More profound still is the question of whether historians who emphasize deconstructionism — the belief that truth and facts are merely social constructions — and post-modernism are simply in a dialogue of the deaf with those who take more traditional approaches to empiricism and epistemology. There remains, certainly, some intellectual commonality in that diplomatic historians are all examining key relationships across national boundaries and trying to explain America's myriad interactions with the world. But beyond such gauzy generalities, diplomatic historians have less and less in common with one another. As Marc Trachtenberg has observed,

> The work that's being produced, especially in recent years, is all over the map: the field seems fractured, Balkanized — there doesn't seem to be any overarching sense of purpose.[25]

Indeed, even the relatively recent innovations in diplomatic history have themselves been all over the map. The "internationalization" of diplomatic history that resulted from the end of the Cold War kept the analytical focus substantially on issues of statecraft and diplomacy, even as it exploited new sources to enrich the study of those issues enormously. Debates about whether the Cold War was inevitable, if there was really a "lost chance" to avert Sino-American hostility after 1949, and what level of responsibility the United States bore for the violence and upheaval that roiled the Third World during the postwar decades were all informed — and sometimes upended — by new work that gave diplomatic history a more global character.[26] Yet the turn toward diplomatic history as cultural, social, or gender history often pulled the field in a very different direction, one that dramatically deemphasized matters of foreign policy as it was traditionally understood. The upshot was that even as diplomatic history was being invigorated by new sources and a more international perspective, the field was also becoming far more fragmented — and far less congenial to the topics that had long been at its core.

One can push the point further by noting that diplomatic history has, in some ways, been so thoroughly transformed as to become unrecognizable. In writing about the larger

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23 Compare John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), and Costigliola, "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration.'"

24 There are, of course, areas in which the interchange between the "new" and "old" diplomatic history can be fruitful. Studies of nuclear strategy and nuclear war, for instance, can be enriched considerably by combining traditional military and diplomatic history with the insights provided by scholarship on public health. See "How a Nuclear War in Korea Could Start, and How It Might End," *The Economist*, August 5, 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21725763-everyone-would-lose-how-nuclear-war-korea-could-start-and-how-it-might-end.

25 Marc Trachtenberg, "The State of International History," *E-International Relations*, March 9, 2013, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/09/the-state-of-international-history/.

26 See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," *Diplomatic History* 17, no. 1 (January 1993): 1-16; Melvyn Leffler, "Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (July/August 1996): 120-135.

historical profession, the Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Gordon Wood once lamented that newer approaches — social, cultural, gender history — had become so dominant that they pushed older approaches to the side.[27] In diplomatic history, too, one sometimes gets the impression that the field has essentially reinvented itself out of existence.

The best jobs — in history departments at top-tier universities in the United States, at least — tend to go to highly talented scholars whose work is heavily influenced by social and cultural history or other relatively new approaches; scholars who study diplomacy, war, and peace through more traditional lenses are usually less competitive. Doctoral students are often, and with good reason, discouraged from taking up the more traditional approach, which perpetuates this dynamic into the next scholarly generation. Special issues of historical journals more often focus on the role of sports, gender, or ideology in international affairs than on traditional hard-power questions or key episodes in American statecraft.[28] Courses on "America in the World" are more likely to emphasize approaches of the "new" diplomatic history than details of the Monroe Doctrine or the Lend-Lease program. To give one anecdotal example, when I was pursuing my PhD at Yale University I was a teaching assistant for a course on U.S. foreign relations since 1898 that contained virtually no content on the major foreign policy initiatives of the period. Similarly, at Duke University, where I began my career as a professor, the history department offered a class on World War II — one that all but ignored issues of grand strategy, decision making, military operations, and the course of the war itself so as to focus on films, novels, and the cultural and social implications of the conflict.

In other words, newer approaches are often touted as complementing the older diplomatic history, but in a world of finite resources and opportunities they frequently displace it instead.[29] Reasonable people can debate whether this is a good or a bad thing, and it is the nature of intellectual inquiry that certain approaches recede as others advance. But this shift has resulted in a second major problem:

that at a time of surging international conflict and tension, as matters of statecraft and diplomacy, war and peace, loom large indeed, the American historical profession has less and less to say about these issues.

III

One reason for the decline and corresponding reinvention of diplomatic history was that these changes occurred in an era when it was possible to assume that the international environment was steadily becoming more benign. During the 1990s, the world seemed to be moving away from great-power competition, major war, and other geopolitical phenomena that had characterized international relations throughout the 20th century. At a time when even brilliant scholars — as well as U.S. government officials — could claim that history had ended, that major-power war was obsolete, and that countries everywhere were converging toward markets and democracy, it is hardly surprising that traditional issues of national security were no longer fashionable within the historical profession.[30]

Today, of course, such beliefs seem naïve given the resurgent great-power rivalries, ideological conflict, and general disorder roiling the international arena. In this new age of instability and geopolitical revisionism, who can seriously deny that a historical understanding of American statecraft and issues of war and peace is essential? And yet the American historical profession in general, and diplomatic history in particular, are poorly situated to provide that understanding because such matters have been intellectually marginalized.

The statistics are sobering. According to the American Historical Association, whereas roughly 7 percent of practicing academic historians described themselves as diplomatic historians in 1975, only 3 percent did so in 2015. Whereas 85 percent of all history departments employed a diplomatic historian in 1975, only 44 percent did so four decades later.[31] In academic year 2014-

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27 Gordon Wood, *The Purpose of the Past: Reflections on the Uses of History* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 2-6.

28 See, as one example, the September 2008 issue of *Diplomatic History*. To be clear, roundtables and special issues on diplomatic history subjects are still offered, but they are more likely to appear in publications such as the *Journal of Strategic Studies* than in journals such as *Diplomatic History*. This is another manifestation of how traditional diplomatic history has increasingly taken up residence in institutions and outlets not dominated by the historical profession itself.

29 A version of this argument is offered in Cohen's "Great Caesar's Ghost!"

30 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18.

31 Townsend, "The Rise and Decline of History Specializations Over the Past 40 Years." Interestingly, the number of historians identifying themselves as military historians remained relatively stable between 1975 and 2015. One suspects that, as in diplomatic history, these statistics may understate the changes at work in the field, given how many military historians now prioritize cultural and social issues over more traditional subjects such as operations and strategy. On this trend, see Wayne Lee, "Mind and Matter — Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State of the Field," *Journal of American History* 93, no. 4 (March 2007): 1116-1142.

2015, only nine out of 587 history jobs advertised with the American Historical Association were explicitly focused on diplomatic or international history; in 2015-2016, the number was three out of 572.[32] In other words, any talk about a "revival" of diplomatic history needs to be kept in perspective, because if the decline has perhaps been halted, the fact remains that the subfield that has long been the locus of scholarship on diplomacy, statecraft, and American policy is a mere shadow of its former self. In fact, these statistics probably understate the degree to which traditional issues of war, peace, and statecraft have faded from the intellectual agenda. Given how broadly diplomatic history is now defined, it seems likely that some scholars who identify as diplomatic historians engage with these issues only peripherally if at all.

Anecdotal evidence confirms the larger trend. As anyone possessing a passing familiarity with the American historical profession can attest, there may be plenty of schools where one can earn a PhD in the broad area of "America in the World," but the number of institutions that offer serious, top-flight graduate education in diplomatic history, traditionally defined, can be counted on perhaps two hands. Bright doctoral students who are serious about seeking a tenure-track job in a history department are frequently advised to stay away from issues of statecraft and diplomacy altogether or, at the very least, to study those issues through a cultural or gendered lens. Eminent diplomatic and military historians have retired and been replaced by cultural and social historians working on international topics. And, of course, classes on traditional statecraft, diplomacy, and other "hard power" topics are increasingly hard to come by; in many cases, they have either dropped off the rolls or been so thoroughly redesigned that the great issues of war and peace hardly figure in the curriculum.

According to statistics compiled by the historian Niall Ferguson, for instance, in fall 1966 the Harvard history department offered multiple courses that dealt significantly with World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the history of the British Empire. Fifty years later, in fall 2016, the department offered only a single course dealing with any of these subjects. Similar trends are evident at other elite universities.[33] The historical profession in the United States has simply deprioritized the study of statecraft and international relations, at least as those subjects were conventionally understood.

To be clear, this is not to say that excellent, even path-breaking historical work is not being done on such issues. In just the past few years, major studies have been published on the statecraft of John Quincy Adams, the origins and aftermath of World War I, the early history of the Vietnam War, the remaking of U.S. foreign policy and the international order in the 1970s, the U.S.-Cuban-Soviet struggle for influence in Southern Africa, the end of the Cold War, the history of American nuclear strategy, and U.S. statecraft in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.[34] Classes — where they are offered — on the history of American foreign policy and international relations continue to draw large enrollments; were it not for those classes, the ongoing slide in undergraduate history majors would surely be even more severe. (From 2007 to 2014, the share of undergraduate degrees awarded in history fell from 2.2 percent to 1.7 percent.[35]) And, of course, popular histories — those written not for academics but for broader public audiences — continue to emphasize issues of strategy, statecraft, and decision making, and to draw a wide readership.

Yet much of this work is being done outside of the American academic historical profession *per se*, by individuals who have made their intellectual homes elsewhere. Schools of public policy and international affairs; professional military education institutions; war studies and strategic studies programs; and universities in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Europe have emerged as refuges for scholars who still do traditional diplomatic history; the majority of work produced

32 Robert Townsend and Emily Swafford, "Conflicting Signals in the Academic Job Market for History," *Perspectives on History*, January 2017, https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/january-2017/conflicting-signals-in-the-academic-job-market-for-history.

33 The statistics are from the chart in Niall Ferguson's "The Decline and Fall of History," remarks accepting the Philip Merrill Award for Outstanding Contributions to Liberal Arts Education, October 28, 2016.

34 See Charles Edel, *Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Adam Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War, America, and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931* (New York: Penguin, 2014); Logevall, *Embers of War*; Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations During the 1970s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Sarotte, *1989*; Francis Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Michael Green, *By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia-Pacific since 1783* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); Jeffrey Engel, *When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); Piero Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Margaret MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War* (London: Profile Books, 2014); Ray Takeyh and Steven Simon, *The Pragmatic Superpower: Winning the Cold War in the Middle East* (New York: Norton, 2016).

35 Julia Brookins, "New Data Show Large Drop in History Bachelor's Degrees," *Perspectives on History*, March 2016, https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/march-2016/new-data-show-large-drop-in-history-bachelors-degrees.

on the subjects just cited, in fact, has come from historians who reside in such institutions.[36] Other diplomatic historians have gone to work for the U.S. government or moved into think tanks or political science departments.[37] As a result, classes on the history of U.S. foreign policy, traditionally understood, are still being taught and books are still being written, albeit less frequently. But most of this is happening *outside* the structures that dominate the historical discipline.

Why does it matter *where* the work gets done so long as the work — or at least some of it — *is* getting done? The reason is that there is only so much that historians working outside history departments can do to offset the larger changes within their profession. A significant proportion of the institutions where the best diplomatic history is being done these days do not educate undergraduates. A higher proportion still either does not train doctoral students or trains PhD students who mostly go on to do things other than taking traditional academic jobs.[38] This means that a generation of American undergrads — the educated public and future leaders of the United States — is less likely to emerge from college with any meaningful exposure to the history of American foreign policy and international affairs. It also means that the intellectual pipeline is drying up — that in a few decades, when the current generation of diplomatic historians has departed the scene, there may not be a critical mass of successors to take its place.

In other words, the death of diplomatic history may not have been averted but merely deferred. In the meantime, diplomatic history's shift away from its intellectual roots means that the historical profession as a whole is devoting less intellectual energy to understanding those matters of geopolitical competition and international rivalry that loom so large today.

America's rivals are not making the same mistake. Chinese scholars and the Chinese government are aggressively exploring the past for insights about what makes great nations rise and fall and how Beijing might navigate its conflicted relationship with the United States. In the mid-2000s, for instance, the Chinese regime produced a multipart documentary on the history of great-power ascendancy and decline based loosely on Paul Kennedy's classic work on the same subject. More broadly, the study of diplomatic and military history is reportedly central to the education and professional development of Chinese strategists, and a number of classic works in U.S. military and diplomatic history have apparently become required reading for Chinese cadres.[39]

Beijing is intensively engaging with these issues not just for intellectual pleasure, of course, but because it understands that mastery of such questions is likely to be critical to the fate of Chinese power and policy in the 21st century. One example that illustrates the disparity: In April 2017, the journal *Diplomatic History* featured three articles by Chinese scholars affiliated with Chinese universities that focused on issues such as U.S.-China relations, Chinese grand strategy in the 1960s, and Chinese policy on nuclear arms control. In contrast, the two original research articles by American scholars teaching at American universities focused on issues of public health in U.S.-Bolivian relations in the 1950s and U.S. planning on how to treat Japanese civilians living in Japan's overseas colonies during World War II.[40]

It is not difficult to determine which country is better using history — and historians — to prepare for what is likely to be the defining geopolitical competition of the 21st century. And this, in turn, points to a third problem with diplomatic history: that the field has become less engaged with the policy community on issues of greatest importance to American statecraft.

IV

There is sad and abundant irony here, because policymakers are hungry, as they always have been, for the wisdom that history has to offer. One survey published in 2014 found that U.S. national security officials consider the lessons of history to be more relevant to their work than those provided

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36 Of the authors cited previously, Edel, Logevall, Gleijeses, Gavin, Sarotte, Takeyh, Simon, and Green all work primarily (or at least half the time) in institutions other than history departments. So too do (or did) Trachtenberg, Jeremi Suri, Westad, John Bew, Inboden, and other leading diplomatic historians. MacMillan is a professor of history in the United Kingdom.

37 Robert Kagan, Ted Bromund, Frederick Kagan, Ray Takeyh, and James Graham Wilson are prominent examples.

38 This description applies to most professional military education institutions (except the service academies, which do have undergraduates), for instance, and a substantial proportion of policy or international affairs schools.

39 See Joseph Kahn, "China, Shy Giant, Shows Signs of Shedding Its False Modesty," *The New York Times*, December 9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/09/world/asia/09china.html; also James Holmes, "How Chinese Strategists Think," *The Diplomat*, June 19, 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/how-chinese-strategists-think/; James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

40 See the April 2017 issue of *Diplomatic History*.

by political science or other disciplines.[41] There is, moreover, endless anecdotal evidence that policymakers regularly look to history as a source of insight and perspective.

George W. Bush read dozens of works of history each year while president; Barack Obama periodically convened a council of presidential historians for reflection.[42] The current secretary of defense, James Mattis, is a famously avid consumer of history; the national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, is a card-carrying historian who has argued that the only way to understand the future of warfare is to look to the past.[43] The military services regularly send some of their most promising officers to study for PhDs in military and diplomatic history; the Office of Net Assessment in the Department of Defense has funded major historical studies on the premise that such work can help American strategists understand the current and future challenges of the global security environment.[44] During my own brief service in the Pentagon, I found that officials almost never had to be persuaded of the value of history; they frequently asked what insights the past might offer in addressing issues as varied as U.S. counter-terrorism strategy and strategic competition with Russia. And today, at a time when security threats are increasing and historical patterns of global competition are reasserting themselves, the salience of history — diplomatic history especially — ought to be greater than ever. The problem, then, is not a slackening of demand for policy engagement by historians. The problem is that academic historians are not providing an adequate supply.

The reasons for this diffidence are tightly interwoven with long-running shifts in the field. Just as the Vietnam War fanned academic disillusion with diplomatic history as an undertaking, it also created a deep ideological cleavage between diplomatic historians and government officials. In the wake of Vietnam, a broad swath of academia concluded that its proper purpose was not cooperating with power but "speaking truth to power."[45] In diplomatic history as in other fields, that ethos was imbibed by the generation that trained during and shortly after the Vietnam War and was then passed down — through PhD education, hiring decisions, and other seemingly mundane but profoundly influential ways of shaping the field — to the generations that followed.[46]

The predictable effects of this phenomenon, in turn, were compounded by the subsequent transformation of diplomatic history, which shifted the focus of the field away from those geopolitical and strategic issues of greatest importance to policymakers, and toward subjects and approaches with less obvious relevance to the day-to-day workings of foreign policy. Throw in the historical profession's perverse but persistent aversion to "presentism" — the seemingly radical idea that the past should be studied primarily for the light it can shed on the present — and the strictures of a tenure process that rewards obscure academic publications but often penalizes efforts to cultivate influence with the policy world, and the result is the unfortunate situation in which diplomatic history finds itself.[47] Diplomatic historians, at least of the academic variety, are focusing less on questions of priority interest to policymakers; the professors who study the history of American statecraft are increasingly removed from meaningful interaction with the people who make that history.

This history-policy gap is hard to quantify, but it manifests in a number of ways. Leading historians do occasionally take time away from academia to serve or consult at high levels of government, as scholars such as Philip Zelikow, William Inboden, and Richard Immerman have done in the past two decades. But historians seem to go this route less frequently than political scientists and international relations scholars (to say nothing of economists),

41 Paul Avey and Michael Desch, "What Do Policymakers Want From Us? Results From a Survey of Current and Former Senior National Security Decision Makers," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (June 2014): 227-246.

42 See Kenneth Walsh, "Obama's Secret Dinner With Presidential Historians," *U.S. News & World Report*, July 15, 2009, https://www.usnews.com/news/obama/articles/2009/07/15/obamas-secret-dinner-with-presidential-historians; Peter Feaver and William Inboden, "Looking Forward Through the Past: The Role of History in Bush White House National Security Policymaking," in Hal Brands and Jeremi Suri, eds., *The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2015).

43 Paul Szoldra, "This Viral Email From General James 'Mad Dog' Mattis About Being 'Too Busy to Read' Is a Must-Read," *Business Insider*, November 21, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/viral-james-mattis-email-reading-marines-2013-5; H.R. McMaster, "On War: Lessons to Be Learned," *Survival* 50, no. 1 (March-April 2008), 19-30.

44 An excellent example is Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

45 For one recent example of this ethos, see David Armitage and Jo Guldi, *The History Manifesto* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), which has the "speak truth to power" concept on its cover.

46 The impact of the Vietnam War on diplomatic history has not, so far as I know, been fully explored in any full-length academic treatment. But it is alluded to in Mark Stoler, "What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 3 (June 2007): 427-433.

47 "The American historical profession," Jill Lepore has written, "defines itself by its dedication to the proposition that looking to the past to explain the present falls outside the realm of serious historical study. That stuff is for amateurs and cranks." Lepore, "Tea and Sympathy: Who Owns the American Revolution?" *The New Yorker*, May 3, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/03/tea-and-sympathy-2.

and those historians who do enter the policy arena — particularly in Republican administrations — risk being rewarded with more opprobrium, or simple bemusement, than praise from their academic colleagues. Likewise, young historians participate in programs such as the Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship (which sends young academics into government for a year) at a lower rate than their colleagues in international relations and political science; in most years, the number of historians who take advantage of this program is zero, or perhaps one.[48]

Historians also seem to publish in leading policy journals such as *Foreign Affairs* or *Foreign Policy* far less frequently than their friends in political science and international relations; it is quite rare to find a peer-reviewed historical journal, or a prestigious university press series, that encourages authors to reflect on the policy implications of their research as political science and international relations outlets often do.[49] More broadly, diplomatic historians — particularly those in mainline history departments — are far too averse to choosing topics motivated by their relevance to contemporary policy challenges. They tend, even more so than political scientists, to focus on filling gaps in the literature, exploring some (often deservedly) understudied period or subject, or examining the past purely for its own sake. "History," one prominent diplomatic historian has argued, "cannot in the first instance be concerned with navigating the ship of state."[50]

In sum, policymakers see a great deal of value in historical knowledge, and they would probably be enthusiastic were historians to more energetically apply their insights to the great matters of the present. But diplomatic historians are often reluctant to take up the challenge or traverse the pathways along which academic knowledge enters policy debates.

This situation is deeply impoverishing for all involved. Academics often think of policy engagement as a way of educating historically ignorant decision makers. In reality, such engagement often makes *academics* smarter. It acquaints them more intimately with the dynamics of policy and decision making; it gives them a better appreciation of the uncertainty and severe constraints under which policymakers labor, the often-irreconcilable demands they must satisfy, and the inevitable imperfection of all options available. As Melvyn Leffler noted in his award-winning study of national security policy during the Truman era, the year he spent at the Pentagon gave him greater insight into the making of U.S. strategy — and, undoubtedly, greater empathy regarding the agonizing choices that policymakers so often face.[51] The common academic conceit is that close association with power is the enemy of good scholarship. Yet excessive distance from the policy world can be just as damaging.

If academic-policy estrangement is thus problematic for academics, it is potentially tragic for policy. For all their critiques regarding direct policy engagement, virtually no diplomatic historian would quarrel with the premise that more historical knowledge is needed in U.S. foreign policy, and few have hesitated to condemn policymakers for acting on the basis of an insufficient or incorrect understanding of history. But if more and better history makes for better policy, then the discipline's continuing diffidence appears all the more damning.

This approach will not, after all, prevent policy-relevant history from being written and aggressively marketed to decision makers. It will not prevent policy officials from seeking historical insights and analogies. But it *will* ensure that professional, academic historians are too frequently absent from these undertakings, and that the quality of the history being used — and thus the policies being produced — suffers. *Someone* will certainly scour the history of U.S.-China relations, or the Cold War, or some other subject for clues as to how Washington might handle the future of Sino-American relations or great-power competition.[52] If academic historical training is worth the time that professional historians invest in it, then they should, presumably, prefer that they be the ones undertaking the task. The alternative is that a sort of intellectual Gresham's law will take hold: When good history is ambivalent about making itself

48 Consult the historical roster of fellows, "International Affairs Fellows: 1967-2017," https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/2017%20IAF%20Historical%20List.pdf. In 2015, an outlier year, two historians (neither of whom work in history departments) were selected as fellows.

49 Indeed, historians who wish to draw out the policy implications of their work are usually best advised to take their writing to *International Security*, the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, or other outlets that fall outside the corpus of mainline history journals.

50 Bruce Kuklick, *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War From Kennan to Kissinger* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 159.

51 Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

52 For a recent example of bad history informing bad policy prescriptions, there is Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap?* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). For a sharp critique of historical inaccuracies in Allison's book, see Ian Buruma, "Are China and the United States Headed for War?" *The New Yorker*, June 19, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/06/19/are-china-and-the-united-states-headed-for-war.

accessible and competing for policy influence, bad history will effortlessly drive it from the field.

Historians ought to be particularly keen to avoid this scenario today. On an array of pressing national security matters — how to handle U.S.-China or U.S.-Russia affairs, matters of nuclear strategy and arms control, questions of counterterrorism strategy and "gray zone" competition, debates about what an American retreat into protectionism or retrenchment would mean for global order and U.S. security — there is a wealth of historical knowledge that could enrich policy debates. Likewise, so many of the adversaries and rivals the United States confronts today — Vladimir Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, Kim Jong Un's North Korea, the Islamic Republic in Iran, the Islamic State, and other jihadist groups — are driven by ideologies and narratives that are comprehensible only if one understands their respective histories.[53]

Now, as ever, there is nothing truly new under the sun; there is no foreign policy issue on which the U.S. response cannot be improved by a fuller understanding of history. What *is* new and alarming is that the threats to American security are greater, the U.S. margin for error is slimmer, and the penalties for getting policy wrong are therefore higher than at any moment since the end of the Cold War.[54] In the Trump era, moreover, we are already getting a taste of what it is like to have a president whose historical and geopolitical ignorance is often breathtaking; one shudders to think what might happen if an entire generation of leaders should be deprived of the perspective, insight, and vicarious experience that an understanding of diplomatic history can provide. It is, in sum, a spectacularly bad time for a significant gap to have emerged between diplomatic historians and the national security community — and yet this is precisely what has happened. The consequences for U.S. policy and interests, as well as for the field of diplomatic history, are likely to be regrettable indeed.

V

In his classic work *The Lessons of History*, the British historian Sir Michael Howard wrote of the recurring strategic calamities that have been caused by a dearth of historical knowledge. A proper understanding of history, he argued, offers "an awareness for which no amount of strategic or economic analysis, no techniques of crisis-management or conflict-resolution ... can provide a substitute."[55] Howard's wise words are a timeless reminder that policymakers must take history seriously. They should also give pause to those who celebrate the state of diplomatic history today.

On the one hand, diplomatic history is a more diverse, methodologically pluralistic field than it was a half-century ago; it incorporates a broader range of insights and methods than ever before; and for precisely those reasons it has been able to maintain a beachhead in the academic world. On the other hand, the transformation of diplomatic history has left that discipline less intellectually coherent; less engaged with core issues of strategy, diplomacy, and national security in a competitive international environment; and less relevant to the critical foreign policy debates of the present era.

Given the existential pressures that diplomatic history faced at its nadir, it is hard to fault the field's practitioners from choosing the course that they did. Given all that has been lost along the way, it is hard not to lament those changes as well. Perhaps the steady encroachment of a more threatening world will eventually lead to the resurgence of diplomatic history as it was traditionally defined. Yet until such sad vindication occurs, the present state of diplomatic history will not make the solution to America's most pressing geopolitical challenges any easier. ●

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53 Bruno Tertrais, "The Revenge of History," *The Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 7-18.

54 See Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, "The Upheaval," *The National Interest* 150 (July/August 2017), 30-40.

55 Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 19.