'-..r .., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • IN PAGE 1 OF 9 PAGES Intelligence Irµormation Cable STATE/IN.. CIA NMCC/MC f SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR> CIA/NMCC HIC: NSA &DO ONE CRS NPIC AEC OSR FBI DDI EXO OER PSIS DC:S IRS :+:MK USIA Tbl• material contain• lnfonnatlon &a'ect.ln~Ula Hat.tonal DefeDM ot t.be t7nlied· 8t.atee wlt.blA \he meanlq at t.be :-g1onaire Lawa. T1tle 1a. u.s.c. Sec9. 713 and 'fM, the uanaml•lon or ren tlon of wbich 1n an7 manAtr to u unaut.hOIUed penoD la probiblted y law.~-=~--­ YO iORiI~~ ~IiSEM THIS IS AN JNF SECR&T DIST 24,JULY 1968 COUNTRY CZECHOSLOVAKIA ED 12958 3.4(b1l11>25Yrs (CJ DOI ? L/ f 6 45Z Jul hR SU~ECT ASSESSMENT OF CUR~'iT SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ED 12958·3.4111JhJ>25Yrs (SJ ­ . .J • ! . -........ ACQ FIELD NO. SOURCE J SUMMARY: IT IS SOURCE'S OPINION THAT THE CRISIS IN ~ CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS NOW AT AN END AND THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAKS 'i ~ ' WILL PROBABLY CAPITULATE TO THE SOVIETS. A CURTAILMENT OF THE .. ~-.s..,.............-.....r,. ~...,......,.................... ................. ··~..........._. ,.... .......... .~ CZECHOSLOVAK LIBERALIZATION PROGRA~f IN THE POLITICAL, ......__.___.....................~............. . . ........ ... , • • .. ~J •••• • --· ­. . ........... _.,&.•....... .""!~ ~.. s; . ... .. .. ··~ -·· ~ .. ... •• • • ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AREAS WILL ENSUE AS A RESULT OF SOVIET .,.......,,, • - M .................,.....~....., 4WJ. .... -\ , • ' •' __ ••.,. ...,,_. ; ... '"'\'11111 \o• --... 5 4 3 2 1 PRESSURE. ALTHOUGH THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP IS CONCERNED THAT ' IT:·::· MAY INVITE STRONG ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION BECAUSE OF ANY RETRENCHMENT OF ·: ITS. PREVIOUSLY STATED 5 4 3 2 1 SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 N~/fUt, 'i'\-.10$ By ::> NARADate ~~· IN • SECRET/lJQ l'OREIGM DTSSJM C,,.,dl!fflffonl CcUwm oontrollJ POSITION t SOURCE FEELS THAT THE REGIME! IS OVERLY. ~QNCER?{Ep__j ABOUT.THIS .. ·.SINCE NEITHER THE CZECHOSLOVAK WORKERS NOR -:.• ~., ..._.......,....,...... ~..........,.......... .·,;.~....... · ··llWl'W........~... . ..",,.,,,................. ~....."... ~'h.. ;,..:.ic.-:1M.:.' -~ ••• ·• _..... . , THE SLOVAKS HAVE AS YET BECOME ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE ..............-... •..AA6........~...........,.....,......., •• .._..._....~...........'4......., • .:c:,..., ."....... .: ........-.. ..~...,., ~ 1,m.,,.....,.......,, ............ :. ·~·· . .. ··--<· ., .... '~ . LIBERALIZATION. BARRING AN EXTREME SITUATION IN • WHICH THE WORKERS ARE CALLED TO DEMONSTRATE, SOURCE DOES NOT ANTICIPATE PROBLEMS FROM THE MILITARY, WHO MAY BE CALLED UPON TO RESTORE PUBLIC ORDER, BECAUSE THEY ARE BASICALLY· PRO-SOVIET AND CONSERVATIVE IN _ __...a --· I t rB lll----...~-..-:r.r._:_ -•"t•••• _____ THEIR POLITICAL ORIENTATION.-.-.. ANOTHER POINT WHICH ..._.._ I_.-...,...... IS TO THE SOVIETS' ADVANTAGE IS THAT SOVIET ADVISORS STILL HAVE UNLIMITED ACCESS TO INFORMATION INSIDE CZECHOSLOVAKIA ---'••~--.... ~··w.-....-.:-·~-.....~•·'-•···:·.................;¥ •···-.,~·-.•:..... .• , ... ... ... -... , ,_ > • ESPECIALLY TO PRESIDIUM PROCEEDINGS THROUGH THE CONSERVATIVE LCZECHOSLOVAK ELEMENT~ OF THA~-BODY •. ·-END. OF SUMMARY. 1. OF PRIME CONCERN TO THE SOVIETS .CO~CERNINq CZECHOSLOVAKIA . . . --. TODAY IS· THEIR FEAR THA~ ':l'ffE REFORMS ~ND LIBE~LIZl;NG TENDEN.C.IES. IN ..­CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH ARE NOW TAKING PLACE WILL BE CAST IN CONCRETE ._lf....~1'...llft •• .., P -~·C.._~,,l!fl'·,:.,•A'.'...,~•t• .....~.\•-".. ,. BY THE UPCOMING COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS IN SEPTEMBER 1968. rrnc; • " I U I llF t az -1.-:;;... ,r;~o'• .•.1..,.;,;..-' 89VIETS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY UNDER VERY HEAVY PRESSURE FROM CONSERVATIVE FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA BUT ESPECIALLY FROM CONSERVATIVE FORCES 5 . . 5 4 IX POLAND AND EAST GERMANY TO CONTROL 'J;'HE SITUATION IN 4 3 3I 2 1 I liCA&:f',<119 P8HHilf »I11:111 1 '*'"'=!fnt ,....,..,,,, ](1J>25Yrs IN PAGE 4 Of 9 PAGES &&CR&T /M9 fQRi:It):T g1 !iSill Cdbaem oo"trou) :M:I;L;.IT~A;;.;R;:Y;...;M;.;;O~V.;E;Sj...;B;.Y~S~O;;.;V~I~E-T-._F~OR;:.;..C;.;E-..s-..,;1.-N_T_o.....c.,zE,_C_H_o.s.._LOv...,.Aq1. .... 3. THE DUBCEK REGIME IS PROBABLY HAVING A VERY DIFFICULT TIME INDEED IN CONVINCING THE SOVIETS THAT THEY MEAN IT WHEN THEY SAY THAT THEY WILL NOT LET THE SITUATION GET OUT OF CONTROL AND THAT THEY WILL REMAIN LOYAL TO THE SOVIET BLOC. AS EARLY AS JANUARY 1968 RIGHT AFTER DUBCEK REPLACED NOVOTNY AS PARTY FIRST SECRETARY THE LIBERALS BEGAN REASSURING THE SOVIETS ALONG THESE LINES. THE CONSERVATIVES, HOWEVER, WERE QUICK TO POINT OUT TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE LIBERALS WERE LYING AND THAT LITTLE BY LITTLE THEY WOULD LEAD CZECHQSLQYAKIA AWAY FRQM sgyrEI INTEBB§T~. WITH THE ABOLITION OF CENSORSHIP, AND CERTAIN STEPS TOWARD REHABILITATION AS WELL AS OTHER REFORMS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ·THE LIBERALS HAVE TO AN EXTENT CONFIRMED -NW1 ' ,.. ~.. :"~ &..... ·~ .,... r.,... ... ~ ~ · .• ­ Ft THAT THE CONSERVATIVES WERE RIGHT. THEREFORE, THE SOVIETS ARE _,,,, =···· MIM'M~-· PROBABLY MORE RELUCTANT THAN EVER BEFORE TO BELIEVE THE LIBERALS. ALTHOUGH DUBCEK IS UNDOUBTEDLY SINCERE WHEN HE TELLS THE SOVIETS THAT HE DOES NOT WANT TO WEAKEN THE LEADING ROLE OF' THE PARTY OR FRIENDSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION, HE IS KNOWN TO THE SOVIETS AS WELi.! c_z_E,_c_Ho_s_LOiV_A_K_PO_L_I_T_I_C_I_A_N_S_A_s_-:A:MA-N-~-~-C-K_-IN-2_-_}-~---~­7 _A_s_ro__ __ .....-.~-~-!-!C-_~~~.:~:;_:t~. a '\ID FORTITUDE...... FROM THE VERY BEGINNING THE SOVIETS AND THEIR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA FEARED THAT DUBCEK WOULD BE s:• .. INPLUENCE FROM THE MORE RADICAL LIBERALS IN 3 2 1 IN ~ PAGE 5 Of 9 PAGES (CIHd/fCGtioftJ (dtuem cmatrol.tJ THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY (KSC) LEADERSHIP. · THEREFORE, IN PAGE 7 OF 9 PAGES • 5iCRl5T/M9 P8'REI8!f BI8BEM (dtsaam ccmtrouJ FACT THAT NEITHER THE SLOVAKS AS A WHOLE NOR· THE CZECHOSLOVAK WORKERS HAVE AS YET BECOME VERY ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE LIBERALIZATION, THE REGIME'S PROBLEMS IN THIS RESPECT ARE NOT AS GREAT AS THEY MIGHT BE. EVEN UNDER CAPITULATION DUBCEK MAY STILL