

ING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Berlin

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FM USBER BERLIN
TO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUFGRP/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUFFAG/USAREUR
RUFLO/USCINCEUR
RUDLSK/USNMR SHAPE
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~~SECRET~~ ACTION BONN 41 INFO DEPT 46 LONDON 25 MOSCOW 20
PARIS 24 USAREUR USCINCEUR USNMR SHAPE USELMLO FROM BERLIN
9 JULY 1964, 7:00 PM

USAREUR, USCINCEUR FOR POLAD'S ; USNMR SHAPE FOR BURNS; PARIS
ALSO FOR USRO

SUBJ: ENTRY OF US CIVILIAN OFFICIALS INTO EAST BERLIN

REF: (A) BERLIN'S 28 DEPT., 26 BONN
(B) BONN'S 62 DEPT., 24 BERLIN
(C) DEPT'S 69 BONN, 16 BERLIN
(D) BERLIN'S 882 BONN, 962 DEPT. DATED JAN 18, 1964

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1. MISSION WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO TAKE FIRST STEPS IN INTRODUCING NEW PROCEDURE FOR ENTRY INTO EAST BERLIN WITHOUT PLANS BEING PREPARED AND AGREED FOR CONTINGENCY, HOWEVER UNLIKELY, THAT DIFFICULTIES ARE ENCOUNTERED. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT EXPRESS TO BERLIN LEADERS AND TO SOVIETS A DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING WHICH IS WELL WITHIN OUR RIGHTS TO DO, UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO PERSIST TO THE POINT OF ALLIED RETALIATION AGAINST INTERFERENCE WITH OUR ATTEMPT TO CARRY OUT THIS DESIRE.

2. WE FEEL THIS MAY IN PART BECAUSE WE REALLY DO NOT BELIEVE VALUE TO US OF NEW PROCEDURE IS WORTH RISK OF EMBARRASSMENT WHICH WOULD RESULT IF WE ABANDONED ATTEMPT TO INSTITUTE IT IN FACE OF COMMUNIST OBSTRUCTION. WE RECOGNIZE WE ARE GIVING UP A MUCH PUBLICIZED POSITION IN ACCEPTING CONTROLS WE REFUSED IN 1961. WE ARE CONFIDENT WE CAN HANDLE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By sl/cbm NARA, Date 525-06

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OF THAT. WE ALSO THINK THAT, GIVEN PASSAGE OF TIME, SOVIETS NOT LIKELY TO INTERPRET ACTION AS SIMPLE RETREAT ON OUR PART. HOWEVER, IF WE COMPOUND SITUATION BY ALLOWING SOVIETS TO PREVENT US FROM EVEN MAKING A CONCESSIONARY MOVE SUCH AS THIS, WE BELIEVE RESULTING EFFECT ON SENAT, ON SOVIETS, AND ON PUBLIC, IF IT BECOMES KNOWN, WOULD BE TOO HIGH PRICE TO HAVE PAID.

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3. WE TAKE THIS POSITION IN PART, ALSO, BECAUSE WE BELIEVE IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY SOVIETS WILL GIVE US ANYTHING BUT EQUIVOCAL ANSWER. OUR PURPOSE IN INFORMING SOVIETS WAS TO TELL THEM WHAT WE INTENDED TO DO SO THAT THEY, IN INTEREST OF PROTECTING THEIR ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN, WOULD SEE TO IT INFORMALLY THAT WE NOT BE OBSTRUCTED. WE BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD DO THIS. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THEIR CONSISTENTLY STATED PRINCIPLE RE GDR SOVEREIGNTY IN THIS FIELD FOR SOVIETS TO GIVE US ACTUAL ASSURANCE THAT EAST GERMANS WOULD PERMIT US TO USE NEW PROCEDURE. UNLESS THEY SAW IT AS PARTICULARLY IN THEIR INTEREST TO HAVE US ADOPT PROCEDURE, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED IT COULD BE EXPLOITED FOR OTHER GAINS, THEY WOULD HAVE NO REASON TO DEPART FROM THIS PRINCIPLE. ASKING SOVS DIRECTLY FOR THEIR INTERCESSION OR TO GIVE ASSURANCES WOULD OPEN DOOR TO NEGOTIATIONS, IN WHICH WE WOULD BE AT DISADVANTAGE.

THE ONLY RECENT SIMILAR EXPERIENCE WE HAVE HAD IS ATTEMPT TO HAVE US COMMANDANT RECOMMENCE ENTERING INTO EAST BERLIN (REF D). THIS WAS OF COURSE LESS DESIRABLE EVENTUALLY FROM SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. HOWEVER, WE SUSPECT THEY MAINLY VIEWED IT AS SOMETHING WE WANTED AND THEREFORE SOMETHING THEY COULD BARGAIN AGAINST. ATTEMPT HAD TO BE ABANDONED WHEN TOO HIGH A POLITICAL PRICE WAS REQUIRED. WHILE THAT ISSUE WAS LIMITED ENOUGH AND OUR APPROACH WAS INFORMAL

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ENOUGH THAT WE COULD DROP IT WITH SOME LOSS OF FACE BUT NOT TOO MUCH DISADVANTAGE, WE WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE PRESENT PROPOSAL DEVELOP IN SAME WAY.

IN SUMMARY, WE THINK CHANCES ARE SLIGHT THAT WE WILL ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING NEW PROCEDURE, WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY THAT

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FOLLOWED ROUTINELY BY NON-ALLIED DIPLOMATS. HOWEVER, EVEN THAT SLIGHT RISK IS TOO GREAT TO TAKE WITHOUT BEING PREPARED TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH SUCH A CONTINGENCY. IF WE FIND THIS WAS NOT UNDERSTOOD BY BRITISH AND FRENCH WHEN THEY AGREED TO OUR INSTITUTING NEW PROCEDURE, AND IF THEY OBJECT, WE BELIEVE PROJECT IS NOT OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO BE PURSUED FURTHER.

GENERAL POLK CONCURS.

GP-3. HULICK

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