The Dissertation (or Treatise) Committee for Kristin Noella Wylie Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation (or treatise):

Strong Women, Weak Parties:
Challenges to Democratic Representation in Brazil

Committee:

Wendy Hunter, Supervisor

Robert Moser

Tse-min Lin

Kurt Weyland

Victoria Rodriguez

Strong Women, Weak Parties:
Challenges to Democratic Representation in Brazil

by

Kristin Noella Wylie, B.A.; M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

December 2012

Dedication

To all the amazing women who have made this research possible by sharing their stories, and to those who have been a source of inspiration in my life – Happy, Jo, Jacquelyn, Dot, and Kathie – I dedicate this dissertation to you.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my advisor, Wendy Hunter, for her enduring support throughout my graduate studies. She has been a stalwart source of encouragement, at once patient and exacting, and has provided thorough feedback since the initial phase of this project. I am immensely grateful for her academic, professional, and personal mentorship, and for the time and insights generously shared by my entire committee.

Each supporting member of my committee contributed a vital component to the final product. Robert Moser shared his profound comprehension of and interest in electoral systems and representation, always helping me to dialogue with and enhance the extant literature. Tse-min Lin has been a consistent advocate, honoring an open door policy that led to countless statistical, mathematical, and musical consultations. For inspiring me with methodological rigor and innovation, I am truly grateful. Kurt Weyland's incisive comprehension of the fundamental questions of comparative politics is exceptional; at several junctures in this project, he shared formative insights on research design, framing, and theoretical implications that have improved the dissertation substantially. Finally, I want to thank Victoria Rodríguez. Her work on women politicians in Mexico provided the blueprint for transforming my interests in women and party politics in Brazil into a dissertation project.

This research would not have been possible without the generous financial and administrative support of the Department of Government and Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies. I would particularly like to thank Annette Carlile, Nancy Moses, Stuart Tendler, and Anne Dibble for their always timely logistical support.

The University of Texas' Department of Government is exceptionally well-endowed with an array of leading scholars and mentors. From my first semester, when I was fortunate enough to be the teaching assistant for Tasha Philpot, she and Eric McDaniel have been supportive and kind, a constant source of encouragement and inspiration. As a master's student in the Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies, I had the privilege of working with Raúl Madrid, Dan Brinks, and Ken Greene. They cultivated my initial interest in political parties and representation in Latin America and are to thank for my perseverance in graduate school. Finally, I want to thank Henry Dietz, an exemplary teacher, scholar, and individual. He has remained invested in my progress since the beginning and serves as a source of great inspiration and encouragement.

The UT and broader Austin intellectual communities have provided an ideal environment with which to engage Latin America. Many participants in our Latin American Faculty-Student Working Group helped to shepherd along this project. I am especially indebted to Danilo Contreras, Austin Hart, Mary Slosar, and Randy Uang, as well as Manuel Balán, Daniel Budny, Paula Muñoz, Rachel Navarre, and Rodrigo Nunes. To Laurin, Claire, William, Jenn, Ashley, Carmen, Gary, Julia, Tom, Starla, Thomas, Jeanie, Mose, Eva, Tyson, Jen, Evan, Ashley, Burnett, and particularly Summer Harlow, thank you for being such gracious hosts and generous friends, especially in the final stretch of my dissertation. Life with all of you in Austin has been intellectually, culturally, and spiritually abundant, and I will forever treasure the experiences we shared.

I incurred innumerable debts conducting fieldwork throughout Brazil, too extensive to list here. I am profoundly grateful for the mentorship of Ana Alice Alcântara Costa, and the entire team at the Universidade Federal da Bahia's Núcleo de Estudos Interdisciplinares sobre a Mulher. Ana Alice was always there to share ideas, invaluable

contacts with scholars and activists across Brazil, and her deep insight on questions of gender and politics. Her guidance enriched this project substantially. It was Luis Fujiwara who first introduced me to Ana Alice while assisting me in securing a research affiliation in Brazil. Luis also helped to improve my research instruments and methods at several stages in the project, and put me in contact with his wonderful colleagues at UN Women in Brasília. I want to thank Luis and Vanessa, as well as Vicente, Sol, Renata, and the entire galera mineira for graciously hosting me during extended stays in Brasília and providing a home away from home.

I am thankful for the insights and cafezinhos shared by various staffers and activists in the corredors of Congress while scheduling interviews and awaiting committee meetings, especially Patrícia Rangel, Sílvia Rita Souza, Mara Paraguassu, Leany Lemos, and Mônica Almeida, Rose Barreviera, and the rest of the women's caucus. The staff and collections at the congressional libraries and the Feminist Center for Advocacy and Studies (Cfemea) were a wonderful source of information and guidance. I would also like to thank Tim Power, David Fleischer, Octávio Cintra, and David Samuels for sharing with me their data and general insights on Brazilian politics. I extend my deepest gratitude to the women and men who granted me interviews throughout Brazil – politicians, party leaders and militants, bureaucrats, activists, and scholars – candidly responding to my questions about their paths to power and the struggles they have confronted.

Finally, I want to thank my family, without whom this endeavor would have been impossible. My parents, Steve and Kathie Wylie, have been steadfast supporters of my educational pursuits, providing constant encouragement and understanding, an ear when I needed to vent, and a healthy distraction when I needed to take a break. I am also thankful for the support of my brothers and their families, especially my nieces and

nephew who inevitably forewent playtime with Tia on family holidays and vacations when I was otherwise engaged with this research project. My husband's parents, Alan and Libbey Watkins, and entire extended family have been a wonderful source of encouragement throughout my graduate studies as well, checking in with me in the run up to and celebrating with me in the wake of each major milestone. I thank them for their support, and for blessing me with their son, Case, the love of my life. Cássio, you continue to enrich my life profoundly, and your companionship, compassion, determination, and editorial and navigational prowess were essential to this project; I could not have done it without you.

Strong Women, Weak Parties:
Challenges to Democratic Representation in Brazil

Kristin Noella Wylie, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2012

Supervisor: Wendy Hunter

As a crisis of representation challenges third wave democracies, two of its most salient indicators – weak party institutionalization and the underrepresentation of marginalized groups – have thus far been evaluated only in isolation. This dissertation contends that the two dynamics are related, and uses extensive variation within Brazil, the third wave's most populous democracy, to analyze the relationship. Employing an original empirical database of 21,478 candidacies, 73 interviews, and field observations from throughout Brazil, I explain how voters, electoral rules, and parties interact to undermine women's political participation and representative democracy.

Despite socioeconomic progress, an effective women's movement, an electorate increasingly receptive to female politicians, and a legislated gender quota, Brazil ranks poorly in global assessments of women's legislative presence. Using mixed methods, this dissertation analyzes variation in women's electoral performance across districts, electoral rules, parties, and women to explain the puzzle of women's underrepresentation in Brazil. I argue that the weakly institutionalized and male dominant character of most Brazilian parties has undermined the quota while also hindering women's political prospects and circumscribing their pathways to power.

I subject the hypotheses of the women's representation literature and my own arguments to empirical testing and find that Brazil's female political aspirants are thwarted not by development level, electoral size, or ideology, but rather by the preponderance of inchoate and male-led parties. The analysis demonstrates that to effectively promote women's participation in candidate-centered elections, parties must have the **capacity** to provide women with essential psychological, organizational, and material support and the **will**, heralded by the party leadership, to do so.

The paucity of such support and persistence of traditional gender norms have led Brazil's few female politicians to craft novel profiles; by conforming to traditional gender norms as supermadres, or converting social, organizational, or professional experiences into political capital as lutadoras or technocrats, such women have nonetheless thrived in inhospitable electoral contexts. I conclude that reforms that strengthen parties while incentivizing the promotion of women's participation within parties offer the greatest potential for mitigating Brazil's crisis of representation, situating once more the goals of the women's movement within the broader democratic reform agenda.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1 – Introduction

INTRODUCTION

Three decades after the third wave of democratization swept Latin America and Southern Europe, processes of democratic consolidation are still underway. While procedural elements of democracy and accountability have improved, the representativeness of government remains limited in many countries of the third wave. Indeed, respondents across Latin America in a 2006 Inter-American Development Bank survey indicated that a "crisis of representation" was one of the most serious challenges confronting democracy in the region (Berkman and Cavallo, 2006).

This dissertation contends that two important manifestations of the crisis – the weak institutionalization of parties and party systems and the underrepresentation of women and other marginalized populations – which have thus far only been evaluated in isolation, are related. It uses the lens of women's representation in Brazil, the third wave's most populous democracy, to explain how weakly institutionalized parties undermine the representativeness of the formal political sphere in Latin America and beyond. It demonstrates that weakly institutionalized parties, which lack "value infusion" (Janda, 1980) and stability (Huntington, 1968) or "internal systemness" (Panebianco, 1988) and are thus susceptible to personalist politics, are ill-equipped to provide the psychological, organizational, and material support necessary to mitigate the persistent gender gap in formal political power. In contrast, well-institutionalized parties operate as an organization, according to clearly defined rules of the game, and have at their disposal a host of material and human resources that they can marshal to cultivate, recruit, and support viable women candidacies.

The enduring political marginalization of women and minorities despite widespread democratization has led to a burgeoning literature on the causes and

consequences of their underrepresentation. The literature, however, cannot fully explain the dilemma in Brazil, where a dearth of female candidates and deputies persists in spite of substantial socioeconomic progress, an effective and dynamic women's movement, an electorate increasingly receptive to female politicians, and the 1996 implementation of a women's quota law mandating that political parties reserve at least thirty percent of the spaces on their legislative candidate lists for women.[1] Less than nine percent of Brazil's federal deputies are female.[2]

This dissertation explains the puzzle of women's extreme underrepresentation in Brazil, illuminating how voters, electoral rules, and parties interact to undermine women's political participation. I argue that while the gender quota's poor design and enforcement certainly thwart its effectiveness, that fact alone cannot fully explain the paucity of female candidates and elected deputies, nor can it explain the variation in women's prospects across parties. Rather, it is the weakly institutionalized and male-dominant character of most Brazilian parties that has hindered women's political prospects and bounded their pathways to power. I find that the intraparty competition in Brazil's candidate-centered elections and the preponderance of inchoate parties have maintained women's political marginalization, and conclude that to effectively promote women's participation parties must have both the **capacity** to recruit and provide female political aspirants with essential psychological, organizational, and material support (forthcoming in well-institutionalized parties) and the **will** to do so (heralded by women in party leadership).

---

[1] The Brazilian legislature adopted the electoral quota in 1996, with a 1997 amendment extending the quota from 20 to 30 percent. The law requires political parties to reserve at least 30% and no more than 70% of the spaces on their candidate lists for candidates from each sex (9100/1995, 9504/1997). A 2009 mini-reform (12.034/2009) changing the language slightly will be discussed below.

[2] Ranked a lowly 116th (of 189 countries) in terms of women's legislative presence, Brazil is outranked by the entire region, with the single exception of Panama, which had actually reached 16.7% women in 2004 before falling to 8.5% in the 2009 legislative elections (IPU, 2012).

In this introductory chapter I briefly contextualize the puzzle of women's underrepresentation in Brazil, and introduce the central research questions, research design, and data, and the relevance and contributions advanced herein. I then conclude by previewing the ensuing chapters.

THE PERSISTENT GENDER GAP IN FORMAL POLITICAL PRESENCE

The Women's Movement

Figure 1.1. "A Constitutional Assembly That Counts Must Have the Voice of Women." Women and the Constitutional Assembly National Meeting, 1986.

The continued underrepresentation of women in Brazil is particularly puzzling given the strength and breadth of the country's women's movement. Women were active participants in the Amnesty and the *Diretas-Já* (Direct Election Now) movements of the 1970s and 1980s, and played a significant role throughout the (re)democratization process in Brazil (Alvarez, 1990). Their forceful and consequential presence in the Constitutional Assembly of 1987-88 led them to be considered one of "the most organized sector[s] of civil society" (Costa, 2008; Macaualay, 2006). Indeed, the *bancada feminina* (women's caucus) unified female politicians and activists across party lines, achieving approval for an impressive 80% of the proposals laid out in the "Carta

das Mulheres aos Constituintes" (Women's Letter to the Members of the Constituent Assembly) (Pinto, 1994).

Preparation for and follow-up to the United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 led nearly 800 Brazilian women's organizations to coalesce under a "cohesive feminist platform" and advance the "Declaração das Mulheres Brasileiras à IV Conferência" (Declaration of Brazilian Women to the Fourth Conference) (Costa, 2008). In recent years, activists have rallied around the National Plan of Policies for Women (PNPM), a comprehensive set of objectives and specific proposals for advancing women's rights.

Figure 1.2. Second National Conference of Policies for Women, 2007.

In 2007, with the participation of then President Lula, several members of his cabinet, and politicians and activists from throughout South America, 2,559 delegates

elected from over 600 local and regional councils advanced the Second PNPM, which was subsequently approved by executive decree on March 5, 2008 (Secretary of Women's Affairs, 2010). Michel Temer, then president of the Chamber of Deputies and current Vice President of Brazil, declared, "The *bancada feminina* is one of the most active and present in political activity and knows how to defend its causes, make a presence, and make demands" (Temer, 2009, 3). In sum, women have enjoyed considerable success in both articulating and actualizing their demands, thus rendering quite conspicuous their absence from the highest echelons of political decision making.

Socioeconomic Progress

The near exclusion of Brazilian women from formal politics persists in spite of impressive progress on the fronts of education, literacy, and presence in the workforce (Htun, 2002). As of 2010, women are 59.76% of college graduates, have on average 1.1 more years of schooling than men, and represent 43.59% of the workforce and 45% of the three lowest tiers of federal government posts (Secretary of Women's Affairs, 2010). Moreover, the Order of Attorneys of Brazil (OAB) indicates that 44% of registered attorneys are women and gender parity is in the near future, with 51% of those recently registered in São Paulo being women and 52% of OAB interns also being female. Men still drastically outnumber women in political office, however, comprising more than 10 times the number of federal representatives than women. As shown in Table 1.1, with less than 10% women in its national congress, Brazil remains stymied as Latin America's second-most male-dominant legislature, behind only Panama (Inter-Parliamentary Union's Women in National Parliaments Database, 2012).[3]

[3] As noted above, in the elections after its implementation of a 30% candidate quota, Panama's percent of women legislators increased from 9.7 to 16.7 percent. Yet in the 2009 elections, it dropped back to 8.5 percent.

Table 1.1. Women's Parliamentary Presence in the Americas (2012)

Rank	Country	% Women in Lower House
9	Nicaragua	40.2%
14	Costa Rica	38.6%
17	Argentina	37.4%
23	Ecuador	32.3%
38	El Salvador	26.2%
38	Mexico	26.2%
39	Bolivia	25.4%
42	Canada	24.7%
59	Peru	21.5%
62	Dominican Republic	20.8%
67	Honduras	19.5%
78	Venezuela	17.0%
79	United States	16.9%
89	Chile	14.2%
93	Guatemala	13.3%
98	Paraguay	12.5%
100	Colombia	12.1%
100	Uruguay	12.1%
116	Brazil	8.8%
118	Panama	8.5%

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2012.

Favorable Public Opinion

Further confounding the extreme underrepresentation of women is the postulated support of the electorate. In recent public opinion polls, Brazilians have responded rather favorably to the prospect of female politicians. A nationally representative survey conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Ibope) in February 2009[4] found that 94% of respondents would vote for a woman, 83% believed that "women in politics and other spaces can improve politics and these spaces," 75% agreed

[4] It is important to note that these surveys were conducted prior to the emergence of Dilma Rousseff's candidacy for the presidency.

that "true democracy exists only with the presence of women in spaces of power," and 73% concurred that "the Brazilian population wins with the election of a greater number of women." When asked explicitly about the offices for which respondents would support female candidates, 66% of 2,002 respondents – male and female – indicated they would vote for a woman for any office or federal deputy in particular (Ibope, 2009).[5] So while residual levels of machista bias do persist among both men and women, survey data demonstrate a postulated receptiveness to female candidates among most Brazilians that varies only slightly by respondent sex.

Table 1.2 displays the percent of respondents who, in the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Survey, agreed with the statement "men make better politicians than women," in several nations around the world (WVS, 2005-2008). It also includes 2012 data from the IPU on the percent of women in the lower house of parliament for those 60 nations. As we can see in Table 1.2, public opinion on women in politics in Brazil suggests an electorate that is neither ideal nor determinatively hostile to women. Ranking 23rd of 60 nations (4th of 10 in Latin America), many countries exhibit far more prohibitive levels of bias against women than does Brazil. Note that, with the single exception of Brazil, in every country where the level of women in the lower house of congress hovers at less than ten percent, a majority of the respondents agreed with the survey question on male political superiority. Clearly, while public opinion toward women is less than ideal, it cannot explain the striking underrepresentation of women in Brazilian politics.

[5] The fact that 80.2% of those surveyed indicated only two questions later that they would vote for a black woman (who are included in the prior question) for any office or federal deputy in particular is suggestive of the social desirability bias likely at work in this survey (Streb et al., 2008).

Table 1.2. A Cross-National Glimpse at Voter Bias

Rank	Nation	% Male Superiority	% Wmn in Leg	Rank	Nation	% Male Superiority	% Wmn in Leg
1	Sweden	8.2	44.7	31	D. Repub.	41.1	20.8
2	Andorra	9.7	50.0	32	Taiwan	43.6	
3	Norway	14.5	39.6	33	Japan	43.9	10.8
4	Switzerland	14.9	28.5	34	Chile	44.5	14.2
5	Canada	15.8	24.7	35	Poland	44.7	23.7
6	N. Zealand	16.3	32.2	36	Bulgaria	47.4	20.8
7	Peru	17.5	21.5	37	Zambia	49.7	11.5
8	Netherlands	17.9	40.7	38	S. Africa	51.0	42.3
9	Finland	19.1	42.5	39	Ukraine	51.5	8.0
10	Italy	19.2	21.6	40	Thailand	51.5	15.8
11	Germany	19.4	32.9	41	Rwanda	51.7	56.3
12	UK	19.7	22.3	42	Moldova	52.3	19.8
13	Uruguay	20.4	12.1	43	China	53.7	21.3
14	Spain	20.9	36.0	44	S. Korea	54.6	15.6
15	France	21.9	18.9	45	Romania	55.0	11.2
16	Ethiopia	22.7	27.8	46	Vietnam	56.7	24.4
17	Australia	24.5	24.7	47	Morocco	58.4	17.0
18	Tr. & Tob.	25.5	28.6	48	Turkey	60.8	14.2
19	US	26.7	16.9	49	Indonesia	61.0	18.2
20	Mexico	28.1	26.2	50	Russia	62.0	13.6
21	Colombia	29.2	12.1	51	B. Faso	62.6	15.3
22	Slovenia	30.4	32.2	52	India	63.0	11.0
23	Brazil	30.8	8.8	53	Georgia	68.0	6.6
24	Argentina	31.9	37.4	54	Malaysia	68.3	10.4
25	Guatemala	32.3	13.3	55	Ghana	78.3	8.3
26	Cyprus	35.9	10.7	56	Iran	78.7	3.1
27	El Salvador	37.0	26.2	57	Mali	79.0	10.2
28	Hong Kong	37.0		58	Jordan	81.3	10.8
29	Venezuela	40.0	17.0	59	Iraq	90.2	25.2
30	Serbia	41.1	32.4	60	Egypt	92.0	2.0

Sources: IPU (2012); World Values Survey (2005-2008).

When asked about the particular gains a greater female presence would bring, 7 in 10 respondents cited greater honesty, competence, administrative capacity, and

commitment to voters, the very traits that a majority of electors claimed to evaluate when choosing a candidate. Perhaps most striking is the finding that 55% of respondents *strongly agree* (with an additional 24% agreeing in part) that it should be *mandatory* for *half* of all legislative candidates to be women (Ibope, 2009). Moreover, in Brazil's 2010 presidential election, 66% of voters cast a vote for a woman, leading to the election of Dilma Rousseff, Brazil's first female president. Despite the propensity of the Brazilian electorate to support female candidates most visibly evidenced by President Dilma Rousseff, parties, as we shall see, have failed to stimulate their candidacies, leaving women woefully underrepresented.

Gender Quotas

Many are quick to dismiss Brazil's underrepresentation of women as a result of its pairing of open-list proportional representation with a quota. While the combination is far from ideal, as I detail in Chapter 3, other nations with similar quotas, electoral systems, and cultural contexts have made significantly greater progress. In order to understand the failure of the gender quota – and indeed, to understand the successes and shortcomings of any institution – we must consider how they interact with the sociopolitical contexts in which they are embedded. Electoral rules do not exist in a vacuum, with the party system and historical tendencies of parties therein being particularly salient. I illustrate the inadequacies of the quota in detail in Chapter 3, but below quickly preview the background and explanation of its limitations.

Seeking to emulate Argentina's success with its groundbreaking gender quota,[6] and build on the international momentum surrounding women's empowerment resulting from the upcoming Beijing Conference on Women, Deputies Marta Suplicy and Paulo

[6] In 1991, women were 5.4% of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies; ten years after the full implementation of the quota they had reached 29.2 percent (Marx, Borner, and Camionotti, 2007).

Bernardo introduced a proposal to implement a gender quota in proportional elections. As will be discussed further in Chapter 3, the deputies foresaw the difficulties inherent in enforcing a gender quota in Brazil's electoral context, and therefore proposed additional measures intended to facilitate its earnest implementation. Just two weeks after the close of the Beijing Conference, Brazil approved the law, but without the additional measures, resulting in a watered down version of the initial proposal (Araújo, 1999; Marx, Borner, and Camionotti, 2007; Suplicy, 1996) and a typical instance of layered institutional change (Thelen, 1999).

Table 1.3. Candidate Quotas and Women's Representation in Latin America

Country	Legislative Body	Candidate Quota	Average % Women (before law)	Average % Women (after law)	Change in Percentage Points
Argentina	Chamber	30%	6	34	+28
	Senate	30%	3	33	+30
Bolivia	Chamber	33%	11	19	+8
	Senate	25%	4	15	+9
Brazil	Chamber	30%	7	9	+2
Costa Rica	Unicameral	40%	14	35	+21
Dominican Republic	Chamber	33%	12	17	+5
Ecuador	Unicameral	50%	4	16	+12
Mexico	Chamber	40%	17	23	+6
	Senate	40%	15	16	+1
Panama	Unicameral	30%	8	17	+9
Paraguay	Chamber	20%	3	10	+7
	Senate	20%	11	9	-2
Peru	Unicameral	30%	11	18	+7
AVERAGE			9	19	+10

Note: Adapted from Htun, 2005, updated with http://www.quotaproject.org.

Thus, in contrast to the experiences of neighboring countries, including others with open-list proportional representation (OLPR) elections, Brazil's electoral quota law and subsequent revisions (9100/1995, 9504/1997, 12.034/2009) have been unable to

mitigate the gender gap in political power. Table 1.3 depicts the average in percent women legislators in the years immediately before and after the implementation of women's quota laws, demonstrating significant variation in the gains yielded by quotas in Latin America. The countries that have enjoyed the most success with women's electoral quotas are those with closed-list proportional representation systems, which allow the parties to establish the list ranking with consideration of the electoral quotas and to alternate candidates by sex.[7] In OLPR elections, because the electors rather than the parties decide the position of candidates on the lists, a party could advance a list with 30% female candidates and not elect a single woman. Yet as I discuss in Chapter 3, Brazil's ranks the lowest in women's representation of all countries with OLPR voting.

As I argue in Chapter 3, the structural flaws in the Brazilian quota law render it a poor fit for its electoral system, yet are only part of the explanation of its spectacular failure to induce genuine change. With the 6th lowest proportion of women legislators of the more than 60 countries with legislated gender quotas, other factors are clearly at play.[8] I contend that the preponderance of weakly institutionalized parties in Brazil has instilled a norm of non-compliance,[9] facilitating an environment in which formal laws such as the quota are regularly flouted, with earnest compliance by parties with the quota stipulations remaining the exception.[10] The failure of parties to reach the 30% threshold is certainly in part due to the language of the quota law, which until a 2009 "mini-reform"

[7] There exists significant variation in the rules and enforcement of alternation.
[8] Two of these countries have low quota targets (Somalia – 12%, and Egypt – effectively 12.5%, with each party required to nominate at least 1 woman in each of the 64 8-member districts) (Quotas Project, 2012).
[9] To be elaborated in Chapter 2, this expectation of a norm of (non)compliance draws from the international organizations literature, which has found that states' internal institutional constraints (or lack thereof) affect their probability of (non)compliance with rarely enforced international laws (Dixon, 1993; Simmons, 1998).
[10] Across all state parties contesting the 1998-2010 Chamber of Deputies elections, the rate of quota compliance was 16.1%, ranging from 5.6% (PP) to 39.0% (PC do B). Beyond the PC do B, the most compliant parties (meeting the quota target more than 20% of the time) were small leftist parties (PSTU, PCO, and PMN).

(12.034/2009), only required parties to *reserve* vacancies for women. But even with the institutional change mandating that parties actually *fill* 30% of their candidate lists with women[11] – leading to a 51% increase in the overall percentage of female contenders in the 2010 elections (up to 19.1% from 12.7% in 2006) – a mere 25.4% of parties complied with the strengthened quota.[12] After ten years of parties neglecting what was essentially a toothless quota law, it had become entrenched as yet another "lei que não pega" (law on paper only), particularly among those inchoate parties lacking a norm of compliance.

In sum, although recent and significant accomplishments by women generate expectations to the contrary, the proportion of women elected to Brazil's Chamber of Deputies remains near the global low, ranking 116th out of 189 countries, with its nearest neighbors being Malta and Bhutan. As demonstrated in Table 1.1, this stands in sharp contrast to the regional experience with women's congressional representation, with three Latin American democracies (Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Argentina) currently ranking in the top twenty and the entire region (with the single exception of Panama) outranking Brazil (IPU, 2012).

Despite comprising a majority of the electorate for more than a decade[13] and considerable accomplishments in other spheres, Brazilian women remain severely underrepresented in all elected posts (see Table 1.4). Notably, women have attained their greatest presence – less than 15 percent – in the Senate, which has no candidate quota.[14]

---

[11] In other words, the mini-reform requires that 30% of the candidates actually advanced were female. Prior to the reform, the language stipulated that they reserve—but not fill—30% of candidate slots for women.

[12] Despite credible threats of enforcement by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral in Brasília (Agência de Notícias da Justiça Eleitoral, 2010b; Coelho and Costa, 2010), several regional electoral courts chose not to enforce the quota (e.g., Agência de Notícias da Justiça Eleitoral, 2010a). For further discussion of the failure of the institutional reform, see Wylie (2011).

[13] In September 2011, women were 51.95% of the electorate, up from 49.76% in October 1998 (*Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*).

[14] This puzzle is the subject of Chapter 6.

Given the aforementioned progress on women's rights in Brazil, ***why does the dearth of female politicians persist? What are the obstacles that hinder their effective political participation, and how have Brazil's few female politicians managed to defy the odds?***

Table 1.4. Percentage of Women among Candidates and Elected, by Office (1994-2010)

Federal & State Elections	Governor		Senator		Federal Deputy*		State Deputy*	
	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected
1994	9.7	3.7	7.3	7.4	6.2	6.2	7.2	7.9
1998	8.1	3.7	14.0	7.4	10.3	5.7	12.9	10.0
2002	9.9	7.4	11.9	14.8	11.4	8.2	14.8	12.6
2006	12.7	11.1	15.2	14.8	12.7	8.8	14.2	11.6
2010	11.0	7.4	13.3	14.8	19.1	8.8	21.1	12.9

Local Elections	Mayor		Municipal Councilor*	
	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected
1996	5.3	5.5	10.9	11.0
2000	7.6	5.7	19.1	11.6
2004	9.5	7.4	22.1	12.7
2008	11.2	9.1	21.6	12.5

Note: Values reflect Brazil's percentage of women among candidates and elected.
*Beginning in 1996, the candidate quota applies.

Sources: *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*; Cfemea.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

This dissertation contends that the key to understanding women's persistent underrepresentation lies in the inchoate character of most Brazilian parties. It uses party institutionalization as a lens through which the interrelated deficiencies of Brazil's political system, particularly as they relate to women's representation, come into view. In what follows, I illustrate how parties have been resistant to the gender quota and

therefore failed to transform women's substantial societal progress into political presence, and how Brazil's "entrepreneurial" electoral context (Morgenstern and Siavelis, 2008) exacerbates the gender gap in formal political ambition and maintains women's political marginalization. It subjects the central hypotheses of the extant literature on women's representation to empirical testing with an innovative multilevel database of the 21,478 candidacies to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and Senate from 1994 to 2010, dispensing with many of the leading explanations regarding culture, development, and district magnitude, recasting the role of ideology as indirect, and advancing an argument that it is the interaction of party institutionalization and women in party leadership (which are more likely in leftist parties) that is most critical to women's electoral success in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies.

This study builds on the insights from the candidate-centric US case, where women's underrepresentation is best explained not by socioeconomic development, but rather by strong incumbency bias and the necessity for "self-starting nominees in a decentralized party system" (Studlar, 2008, 65). Although the amorphous character of many Brazilian parties leads the Brazilianist literature to discount the theoretical relevance of parties for explaining electoral outcomes, this study brings parties to the center of the analysis and finds that parties play a crucial gatekeeping role through their (in)capacitation of female candidacies and are therefore essential actors in the political empowerment of women. I thus bridge the insights of the Brazilianist literature regarding the implications of Brazil's often inchoate parties for democracy, with findings from the women's representation literature heralding parties as the key gatekeepers of political power and party elites as one of the most foreboding obstacles confronting female political aspirants.

This dissertation illuminates how the preponderance of inchoate parties has bounded the profiles available to female political aspirants and draws upon case studies of women exemplifying three ideal types of electorally viable paths to power given the existing constraints – the *lutadora*, the *supermadre*, and the technocrat. While Brazil's inchoate party system and candidate-centered electoral contests allow ambitious self-promoters to parlay their individual resources into electoral success, wage inequities and traditional gender norms render such resources out of reach for the vast majority of women in Brazil. Women and other outsiders confronting similar discrepancies in elections around the world have come to power by working their way up through the party ranks of institutionalized parties.

Yet that option remains rare in Brazil, where most successful female contenders have had to convert capital acquired in alternate spheres into the political capital necessary to thrive in the face of residual levels of machista voter bias in the Chamber of Deputies' candidate-centered context rife with intraparty competition. When those constraints are alleviated, and women contest election in districts with negligible levels of voter bias against women, with the support of an institutionalized party with female leadership, women need not conform to the stipulated profiles, but are emboldened to pursue any path to power. The dissertation concludes that to effectively enhance women's representation parties must have both the **capacity** to provide essential psychological, organizational, and material support on behalf of women (forthcoming in well-institutionalized parties), and the **will** to do so (signaled by party leadership). This approach illuminates how structures and actors interact to affect women's representation.

This study also works to elaborate the effects of gender on representation as a multilevel structure, including "cultural beliefs and distributions of resources at the macro level, patterns of behavior at the interactional level, as well as roles and identities at the

micro level," and as an ongoing process of expectations and consequences (Correll et al., 2007, 3). In other words, it incorporates societal expectations deriving from traditional gender socialization and their effects on public opinion toward women in politics and the political ambitions of individual women with an explanation of how these expectations and the resultant male dominance in political party leadership have constrained women's viable paths to political power.

I find that the macro level pattern of women's near exclusion from formal politics is the result of a series of micro level social psychological processes that have prevented women from acquiring the requisite formula for success in Brazilian politics – (1) a psychological affinity for self-promotion and thus aptitude to be an entrepreneurial candidate who self-nominates, (2) political interest and knowledge and the ability and desire to use this to ascend within the party organization, or as is more often the case, to thrive independently in the absence of any real party organization, and (3) individual political (or converted) capital essential in personalist politics. Those factors, however, are neither unique nor universal to women, with particularly the last two being applicable to any traditional outsider. Political parties hold the key to enhancing the representation of traditionally marginalized groups such as women because they can mitigate the effects of those compounding factors of exclusion, providing outsiders with the psychological, organizational, and material support they need to thrive in Brazil's entrepreneurial system.

RELEVANCE

Mechanisms of exclusion/inclusion in democratic decision-making processes are inherently important for political scientists and constituents alike. A recent report card on women's representation in the Americas reminds us that "[i]t is important for women to

be represented at all levels of the political spectrum and the decision-making process and we know why: because women's political rights are fundamental in any democratic framework, because democracy isn't complete without us, and because experience shows that women at high levels are more likely to bring changes and policies that improve the situation for other women" (Inter-American Dialogue, 2008, 2). That sentiment is echoed in survey data from Schwindt-Bayer, who found that women legislators were more likely than male legislators to "place special priority on women" and women's groups, with a legislator's gender influencing the way (s)he views organized constituency groups and his/her support for issues related to women's equality and family and children (but not education or health) (2010, 67-81). With more women in legislatures, women's voices and issues are more likely to be represented. As Lovenduski and Norris (1993), Phillips (1995), and others have asserted, truly democratic representation entails both a "politics of ideas" (substantive representation) and a "politics of presence" (descriptive representation).

The full inclusion of women in formal decision-making processes is essential for truly representative democracies because female politicians bring the voice and often the interests of women to the legislative agenda. Empirical analysis has also demonstrated that the increase of women's presence in politics is responsible for enhancing citizens' satisfaction with democracy (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). With 75% of respondents across Brazil agreeing that "true democracy exists only with the presence of women in spaces of power and decision-making" (Ibope, 2009), and only 42% reporting that they are satisfied with democracy (AmericasBarometer, 2006), the representativeness of government and resultant quality of democracy bear utmost significance.

In addition to broader theoretical implications regarding representation, satisfaction with democracy, institutional change, and the interaction of structure and

agency, this dissertation bears substantive implications for the lives of Brazilians. A startling 4 in 10 Brazilian women have been victims of domestic violence (Ibge, 2009). Six of 10 Brazilians know some woman who was a victim of domestic violence, with machismo being the factor a plurality of respondents (46%) indicated as contributing to this violence (Avon Institute/Ipsos, 2011). While only 9.7% of male homicides occurred in a domestic residence, 28.4% of female homicides occurred in the home (Desidério, 2011; Waiselfisz, 2012). Every single day, *Machismo Mata* reports at least one and usually several new case(s) of a Brazilian woman being murdered – most often stabbed, shot, or strangled – by her male partner (http://machismomata.wordpress.com/). With 4,297 female homicides in 2010, or 4.4 per 100,000 women, Brazil is the 7th of 84 nations ranked by rate of female homicides (Waiselfisz, 2012). In five years, the "180" hotline for domestic violence against women – *Central de Atendimento à Mulher* – received nearly two million calls. In 72% of the cases of women reporting abuse, they are victimized by their husband (Desidério, 2011).

The 180 hotline and the pioneering *Lei Maria de Penha*,[15] which protects victims of domestic violence, were the fruit of collaboration among the women's caucus of the 2003-2007 Congress. Those are the kind of laws and changes in women's lives that increased women's political empowerment can bring. So while enhancing the political representation of women is important in its own right for furthering democratic representativeness, by improving and perhaps even saving the lives of ordinary citizens, it also wields an immeasurable practical value.

[15] A law implemented in September, 2006, that raised the legal penalties for cases of domestic violence.

CONTRIBUTIONS

In addition to posing an interesting empirical puzzle, the Brazilian case proffers several under-theorized and untested dimensions for the research agenda on women and politics. Despite recent acknowledgement of the methodological and substantive implications of a "Western" country bias for research on women's representation (e.g., Salmond, 2006), the bulk of the literature is either based exclusively on Western Europe and the US or simply applies expectations developed in the advanced-industrial context to the developing world. The drive to understand women's representation outside the advanced-industrial context is, therefore, a principal enterprise of this research.

A related limitation of the women and politics literature, derived primarily from Western Europe and the US, is the general assumption of the institutionalization of party systems. As demonstrated in the Brazilianist literature on electoral institutions and career paths, the weakly institutionalized character of the Brazilian party system renders many of the traditional assumptions (e.g., reelection, party discipline) untenable, often warranting important theoretical revisions. I build on the Brazilianist insights regarding the critical importance of party institutionalization but extend the domain of the literature, which in studying congresses that have remained vastly masculine, has depended upon male-dominant samples and largely neglected gender (e.g., Ames, 2001; Mainwaring, 1995, 1997, 1999; Samuels, 2003).

In introducing women and gender into the analysis of Brazilian electoral and party systems, this dissertation enhances our understanding of the role of parties in open-list elections. Although parties have indeed proven less important for men possessing independent political (or converted) capital, the negation of the party gatekeeping role simply does not hold for actual outsider candidates. This finding could only be uncovered by bringing gender into the analysis. Moreover, as the literature itself acknowledges,

variation exists among Brazilian parties (Mainwaring, 1999; Morgenstern and Vázquez-D'Elía, 2007; Samuels, 1999), with the Workers' Party (PT) often the cited exception to the country's pattern of weak party institutionalization. This dissertation capitalizes on such interparty variation to illuminate the critical role of parties in mediating the effects of electoral rules and enhancing the political empowerment of women.

Another contribution offered in this dissertation is one of the only *individual candidate-level* quantitative analyses of the conditions under which women can acquire political power.[16] The country-level aggregation prevalent in the dominant cross-national approach potentially obscures the relationship between electoral success and the factors that drive it,[17] especially in candidate-centered elections. Moreover, using aggregate-level findings to infer effects on individuals is to commit an ecological fallacy (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). Rather, if we are to understand the effects of voters, electoral rules, and parties on women's electoral prospects, we must test them at the candidate level.

Although the country context remains constant, I use an explicitly comparative lens to assess the variance in the relationships between candidate electoral performance and several multilevel characteristics over states, electoral rules, and parties. In an article on the state of the art of gender and politics, Childs and Krook (2006) argue that future work must proceed from a micro-level approach to elaborate the causal linkages in our theories. Childs and Krook push gender and politics scholars to progress beyond oversimplifying assumptions regarding female politicians and instead to disaggregate women (2006) and acknowledge and analyze the diversity of women (Avelar, 2001). Accordingly, this dissertation also allows for heterogeneity among women, analyzing the

[16] An important exception is Rainbow Murray's 2007 piece on candidate performance in France's 2002 parliamentary elections.

[17] A recent advance on this front has emerged from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems with its groundbreaking cross-national study using multilevel analysis to embed individual voters in their country-level contexts (Dalton and Anderson, 2011).

variation in individual characteristics and campaigns of Brazil's female contenders. Rather than assuming that women represent a homogenous group and pursue a single path to power, I examine the (albeit circumscribed) range of profiles of women in Brazilian politics and the individual, party, and district level characteristics that comprise those profiles, explaining how parties have interacted with voters and electoral rules to bound women's paths to power, and how the structure and process of gender are intertwined throughout those interactions. I work to consider how gender manifests at various levels, including traditional gender norms regarding women's aptitude for politics and the issue areas women should engage, structural disadvantages, voter and party biases, and the perceptions and confidence of female political aspirants themselves.

In sum, this study aims to fulfill the goals of the literature with a contextually embedded individual-level theory of women's representation outside the standard US/Western European setting. I push beyond oversimplified and untested explanations of how women attain elected office in Brazil that focus merely on family connections and/or ties with civil society and instead specify precisely and provide empirical evidence for whether and how several individual, party, and district-level characteristics interact to illustrate how women, as individuals, are elected. This work thus illuminates how female political aspirants navigate Brazil's weakly institutionalized party system through an analysis of the interaction of the individual, party, and district-level characteristics associated with successful electoral strategies of Brazil's female politicians, thereby exploring the conditions under which women can acquire political power.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

This dissertation research is expressly mixed-method, drawing on cross-national aggregate-level data, survey data, an original database of several individual, party, and

district characteristics of all 21,478 candidacies to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate (1994-2010), primary source documentary research, and 73 in-depth interviews with female politicians, candidates, party officials, bureaucrats, activists, and experts in eleven states throughout Brazil's five regions. I also accompanied a female candidate for local office[18] on the campaign trail and observed several meetings of the *bancada feminina* in Brasília.

I overcome a significant limitation of most individual-level research on representation by broadening the universe of observations analyzed to include all candidates. We cannot speak confidently about what it takes to win by focusing merely on the winners, but must also consider the losers. Similarly, if we wish to comprehend the effects of candidate gender on electoral prospects, we must consider both women and men. The database comprises the full universe of valid candidates to the Brazilian Congress in the last five election cycles (1994-2010), negating the need to sample from the population. A common approach to individual-level data in the extant literature is to analyze a subset of the data, such as elected legislators or candidates from the major parties. Instead, I analyze all 21,478 cases of candidacy to the Brazilian Congress from 1994 to 2010. I also incorporate case studies of the pathways to power pursued by Brazil's few female politicians.

In sum, this study engages the central research questions – what are the barriers preventing women's substantial societal gains from parlaying into greater political presence, and how have Brazil's few female politicians managed to overcome those obstacles – by advancing an array of quantitative and qualitative data. I use those data to explore variation in the electoral performance of candidates across districts, electoral

[18] Councilwoman Vânia Galvão, Municipal President of the PT in Salvador da Bahia.

rules, parties, sex, and women, thus illuminating how state, electoral, and party contexts can interact to mediate the effects of gender on electoral outcomes.

Interview Selection

Table 1.5. Interviews with Female Politicians

	LEFT	NON-LEFT
NORTH	Sen. Fátima Cleide (PT-RO)*	Dep. Bel Mesquita (PMDB-PA)
		Dep. Rebecca Garcia (PP-AM)
		Dep. Nilmar Ruiz (PFL-TO)
NORTHEAST	Dep. Alice Portugal (PCdoB-BA)	Dep. Nice Lobão (PFL-MA)*
	Sen. Patrícia Saboya Gomes (PDT-	Dep. Jusmari Oliveira (PR-BA)
	Dep. Ana Arraes (PSB-PE)	**Telma Pinheiro (PSDB-MA)**
	Dep. Lídice da Mata (PSB-BA)	Dep. Tonha Magalhães (PR-BA)
	Gov. Wilma de Faria (PSB-RN)	
	Kátia Born (PSB-AL)	
	Dep. Fátima Bezerra (PT-RN)	
	Lenilda Lima (PT-AL)	
CENTER-	**Sen. Serys Slhessarenko (PT-MT)**	**Sen. Marissa Serrano (PSDB-MS)**
		Dep. Raquel Teixeira (PSDB-GO)
		Dep. Thelma de Oliveira (PSDB-MT)
SOUTHEAST	**Benedita da Silva (PT-RJ)**	**Judge Denise Frossard (PSDB-RJ)**
	Dep. Cida Diogo (PT-RJ)	Dep. Rita Camata (PMDB-ES)
	Dep. Iriny Lopes (PT-ES)	Dep. Rose de Freitas (PMDB-ES)
	Dep. Janete Rocha Pietá (PT-SP)	
	Dep. Jô Moraes (PCdoB-MG)	
	Dep. Luiza Erundina (PSB-SP)*	
	Dep. Marina Maggessi (PPS-RJ)	
SOUTH	**Dep. Emília Fernandes (PT-RS)**	
	Dep. Luciana Genro (PSOL-RS)	
	Dep. Manuela d'Ávila (PCdoB-RS)	

I selected my interviews with failed and successful female candidates to ensure representation from the major parties (PFL, PMDB, PP, PSDB, PT) and the PC do B and

in each of the five regions. Table 1.5 displays the interviewees, their party and state as well as title at the time of the interview (*or questionnaire), organizing them by region and ideology. Names in bold indicate a failed candidacy at the time of the interview.

I interviewed party officials, most often the Women's Secretary or Secretary of Organization, in those six parties in six states (Bahia, Maranhão, Pará, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, and São Paulo) and the Federal District. I also interviewed scholars of women and politics and activists in the women's movement in each of the five regions to ascertain local historical dynamics regarding women's participation in informal and formal politics. Finally, I interviewed federal, state, and municipal-level bureaucrats in the women-specific secretariats in Brasília, Alagoas, Fortaleza (municipal), Pará, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro (municipal), Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, Salvador (municipal), and São Paulo. The 73 interviews were conducted from September, 2008 to July, 2009, with follow-up interviews conducted in July, 2010, and April and May, 2012.

SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION

Chapter 2 reviews the insights and limitations of the extant explanations of women's representation for understanding the obstacles confronting female political aspirants in Brazil. It then maps out the theoretical argument advanced in this dissertation, which contends that two important challenges to Latin American democracies – the underrepresentation of women and minorities and the weak institutionalization of parties and party systems – are related. I explain how Brazil's weakly institutionalized parties undermine women's representation. First, a lack of clearly defined rules of the game makes it difficult for outsiders to ascend the party ranks. Such limited transparency also fosters a norm of non-compliance with internal and

external laws, such as the quota. Second, absent an effective party recruitment network, candidates must self-select with political entrepreneurs being the norm. A resilient constructed gender gap in formal political ambition means that women are far less likely than men to self-select. Weak party organizations are also unable to offer opportunities for capacity-building, whether through internal elections, political training, or mobilizational events, which deprives outsider candidates of the chance to develop the requisite political skillset. Finally, in weakly institutionalized parties, personalist politics dominate and programmatic appeals are rare. Due to wage inequities and traditional gender norms, women generally lack the personal political capital – accrued by individual status, wealth, and connections – necessary to sustain a candidate-centered campaign, and also tend to eschew individualistic enterprises in favor of more collective endeavors.

Together, those manifestations of inchoate parties undermine the electoral prospects of women by leaving intact a constructed gender gap in political ambition and favoring individuals with accumulated personal political capital. Given the paucity of women in Brazilian politics (see Table 1.4), I argue that parties must actively intervene to enhance women's political participation. Their **capacity** to do so effectively, however, is constrained by their **level of institutionalization**, with weakly institutionalized parties being ill-equipped to provide women (and other outsiders) with the requisite psychological, organizational, and material support for confronting Brazil's entrepreneurial system. I contend that the capacity of parties to promote women's participation is effectuated by their **will** to do so, with parties that incorporate **women in their party leadership** being the most likely to mobilize resources on behalf of women. Often a sin of omission rather than commission, when party leadership lacks a critical mass of female voices it will likely lack consciousness of the need and mechanisms for

leveling the playing field for women. An explicitly gendered frame of reference, whereby we consider the implications of and for gender in structures and processes (Lovenduski, 1998) must be introduced,[19] and women leaders are far more likely than male leaders to show the initiative and know how to do so.

Figure 1.3. Interparty Variation among Brazilian Parties' Capacity for and Will to Support Female Candidates, National Level (By Ideology)



Figure 1.3 depicts how party capacity and will interact, and the variation among parties within Brazil. It previews the *national* averages across a party's state-level organizations over the 1998-2010 elections to the Chamber of Deputies on the central party characteristics of interest, illustrating the range within Brazil as well as the extent of

[19] A similar conclusion has finally been reached in the development community, where gender is now an explicit consideration for budgeting and other policy decisions. For more on this, see Quinn (2009) and UN Women's Gender Responsive Budgeting website (www.gender-budgets.org).

the obstacles confronted by female contenders, with half of the parties having neither the capacity nor the will to support women, and only three of the 28 parties enjoying both.

By acknowledging interparty variation in key party characteristics and women's electoral prospects, I can unpack the mechanisms substantiating leftist parties' apparent superiority in electing women. Leftist parties have, through their greater tendency to be institutionalized and to incorporate women in party leadership, proven more capable and willing to actively promote women's participation. The finding has important implications for the future of women's empowerment in Brazil, because the institutionalization of parties and inclusion of women in their decision-making structures are universal goals within the reach of leftist and non-leftist parties alike.

Finally, I examine aggregate-level data from throughout Latin America on party system institutionalization, women in national party leadership, and women in the lower house of Congress to explore the generalizability of my theory beyond Brazil. Those data lend tentative but inconclusive support for the ability of party institutionalization and women in party leadership to enhance democratic representativeness, while also justifying the strength of this dissertation's candidate-level approach, with its ability to differentiate among parties within Brazil.

In Chapter 3, I discuss the successes and failures of the Brazilian gender quota, asserting that there are limitations to formal institutional fixes in a context of weak institutions. Although many observers are quick to attribute its inadequacies to the open-list electoral context, I reveal that that is only part of the explanation. I explain why the open-list system has been expected to disadvantage women and its incompatibility with candidate quotas, and explore the experiences with women's representation in the other nations with candidate-based proportional representation (hereafter, "preferential") voting. I then review the literature on quotas as a fast-track for women's representation.

Next, I discuss Brazil's process of quota implementation and examine recent mobilization by various organs of the women's movement for greater female presence in politics. I draw on accounts of the quota negotiations to explain how the finished product was a diluted version of the initial proposal, and discuss why the quota – poorly implemented and weakly enforced – has been unable to enhance women's representation, even after attempts to reform it.

Chapter 4 addresses issues related to the data, measurement, and methods employed in this dissertation. I introduce my party institutionalization index, and also advance several descriptive analyses of the individual, party, and district-level variables of interest. The chapter highlights the extensive variation observed across states, electoral rules, parties, and sex, which is subsequently explored in the following chapters.

Chapter 5 employs a multilevel model of the electoral performance of candidates to the Chamber of Deputies (1994-2010) to explore variation across states and parties. I review the obstacles confronted by women, present various model specifications, and elucidate the conditions hindering/hastening female candidates. The findings demonstrate that the traditional explanations of women's underrepresentation emphasizing district modernization and magnitude do not hold at the candidate level in Brazil. While non-negligible levels of voter bias against women exist, and are predicted by district development, such bias has not depressed the vote share of female candidates. Moreover, women have not performed better in districts or parties with a greater seat share.

Instead, party institutionalization and the presence of women in party leadership explain variation in women's electoral performance in Brazil. I find the role of party ideology to be indirect; while running with a leftist party is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for women's electoral success, leftist parties are more likely than are non-leftist parties to be institutionalized and incorporate women into party leadership,

which in turn leads such parties to mobilize resources on behalf of women. I then use the illustrative case of the Workers' Party (PT) to examine how ideology, party institutionalization, and women in party leadership have interacted to enhance women's electoral prospects, and discuss the challenges that remain for the PT and other parties, and the inroads accomplished by the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B). The most striking and unique contribution of Chapter 5 is the finding that party matters in Brazilian elections.

In Chapter 6, I compare women's electoral performance across the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, using the variation in electoral rules within Brazil as a natural laboratory to explore the effects of electoral rules on women's electoral prospects while holding constant numerous potentially confounding factors. While the more prestigious Senate poses a higher electoral hurdle, low magnitude plurality elections with restricted ballot access generate significantly greater incentives for party support than do the Chamber's high-magnitude OLPR elections. I demonstrate that women have consistently achieved proportionately greater electoral successes in the Senate since 1994 because its electoral rules incentivize unified party support, which when mobilized by women in party leadership provides a powerful boost to female candidates.

The empirical evidence provides support for an indirect rather than direct effect for electoral rules. While an analysis of the direct effects of plurality elections, low district magnitude, and no candidate quota would expect those conditions to undermine women's electoral prospects, a broader consideration that accounts for how those rules are mediated by political parties demonstrates their relative favorability for female contenders. The distinct electoral rules across the chambers yields varying incentives for party support and intraparty competition, with the implications of those incentives for female candidates being contingent upon party institutionalization in the Chamber, and

women in party leadership in both houses. When compared to the intense climate of intraparty competition incentivized by the electoral rules of the Chamber of Deputies, it is no surprise that female candidates running in parties with a critical mass of women leaders have performed better in the Senate, where the electoral rules incentivize unified party support.[20]

Drawing on the findings of Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 explains how Brazil's few female deputies have been able to attain election in the midst of such intraparty competition, weakly institutionalized parties, and bias among party elites and the electorate. I contend that the demonstrated insignificance for explaining women's electoral prospects of the traditional explanatory factors for women's representation does not mean that obstacles such as voter bias and electoral arrangements do not exist. Rather, (some) women have crafted profiles enabling them to thrive in inhospitable contexts. Those alternate profiles are necessary because the traditional path pursued by most successful male politicians in Brazil – the consummate insider, with status, wealth, and connections – is closed to most women because of wage inequities and traditional gender norms.

Chapter 7 uses the cross-national literature and descriptive data from Brazil to delineate women-friendly and women-averse parties and districts, and the profiles that have enabled women to thrive in the face of those intersecting constraints. Exemplified with case studies, the chapter explains how the characteristics of the *lutadora*, the *supermadre*, and the technocrat have afforded women electoral success despite the obstacles. In sum, I explore how the preponderance of inchoate parties and persistence of

[20] As I discuss in Chapter 6, while female party leaders in the traditional oligarchic parties (PFL) are more likely to mobilize such unified party support in the Senate elections on behalf of women candidates running with familial capital (wives and daughters), women elected with the PSDB are more likely to have converted technocratic capital, and women elected from the PT most often worked their way through the party ranks. These three parties represent 73% of the women elected to the Senate.

traditional gender norms have bounded the profiles available to women, and explain how the strengthening of parties can open up space to female political aspirants and in turn enhance both the accountability and representativeness of Brazilian democracy. I also illuminate how women have employed alternate spaces to acquire political capital and the role played by those experiences in developing their political aspirations and campaign strategies.

The concluding chapter reviews the core findings, and ties the central themes together. I contend that reforms intended to strengthen parties can pose a powerful remedy for the representative deficits in Brazilian democracy and beyond. I then consider the theoretical implications of this dissertation, revisiting the "crisis of representation" confronting many countries of the third wave of democratization.

I make explicit my point of departure, which is an understanding of democracy that entails both descriptive and substantive representation. Rather than appointing a few elite men to represent the interests of an electorate that is 52% female, descriptive representation requires that representatives loosely mirror their constituents in demographic characteristics. In accordance with this vision of democratic governance, a legislature that is 91% male cannot adequately represent a majority female electorate. The same holds for ethnicity, religion, and income and educational background. In other words, representatives should best represent their constituents' interests because they themselves share those interests. That is, however, an incomplete conception of democracy, with substantive representation also playing an important role.

I consider how institutions can shape the quality of a democracy – both its representativeness and accountability, and contemplate the viability of institutional engineering in the context of weak institutions. I close by placing the substantive

implications of this research agenda into perspective, and then review avenues for future research.

Brazil's "crisis of representation" – in part manifested by weakly institutionalized parties and the underrepresentation of marginalized groups – can be mitigated by reforms that strengthen parties and incentivize their active promotion of women's political participation. Thus the goals of the women's movement and the broader movement for democratic reforms coincide once more. This dissertation endeavors to elucidate the conditions that realize the goal of increased representativeness. As outlined in the 1995 Beijing Conference and reiterated in the Millennium Development Goals, the equalization of opportunities for women to reach the highest nodes of decision-making is a critical next step in the ongoing processes of democratization and development in Latin America and beyond.

Chapter 2 – Explaining the Underrepresentation of Women in Brazil

> If there is a single conclusion to be drawn from our account of the political representation of women, it is that their exclusion from politics is ubiquitous, operated through layer upon layer of established male dominated institutions (not least political parties) that are insulated by layer upon layer of formal and informal rules of exclusion (Childs and Lovenduski, 2012, 20).

INTRODUCTION

The lingering underrepresentation of women in Brazil despite having the region's strongest women's movement (Alvarez, 1990; Costa, 2008), substantial socioeconomic progress (Secretary of Women's Affairs, 2010), an increasingly receptive electorate (Ibope, 2009), and the 1997 implementation of a gender quota for proportional elections poses an important challenge to Brazilian democracy. Not only does women's political presence remain woefully scarce even in the "representative" chamber of congress, but institutional remedies have thus far proven insufficient mechanisms for altering the largely masculine political landscape. I argue this failure results from the weak institutionalization of most Brazilian parties – itself a shortcoming confronting many third wave democracies – and contend that the preponderance of inchoate parties has fostered a climate in which decisions on leadership and candidate selection lack transparency and the expectations of compliance with formal rules such as the gender quota are limited. Moreover, weakly institutionalized parties are ill-equipped to level the playing field for female political aspirants because they lack clearly defined rules of the game for ascension within the party, rely on self-nomination, are unable to provide critical capacity-building opportunities, and suffer from a deficit of programmatic politics.

In this chapter I review the extant explanations for women's representation, and demonstrate their contributions and limitations in the context of elections to the Brazilian legislature. I argue that parties are the central arbiters of women's political empowerment in Brazil, with weak party institutionalization constraining their capacity to reach out to women and disproportionately male party leadership often limiting their will to do so. I contend that reforms that strengthen parties and incentivize their active promotion of the political participation of women can enhance the representativeness and accountability of Brazilian democracy.

THE LITERATURE ON WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION

Traditional explanations of women's (under)representation emphasize economic development and culture (Inglehart and Norris, 2003),[21] electoral systems (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994; Duverger, 1955; Matland, 1993; Moser, 2001a; Rule and Zimmerman, 1994), the strength of leftist parties (Duverger, 1955; Studlar and McAllister, 1991), and the presence of women in party leadership (Kittilson, 2006). Below, I survey the central arguments of each approach and then apply them to the Brazilian context, demonstrating their contributions and limitations.

Machista Voter Attitudes and State Development

Hostility among voters and party elite are two of the primary barriers female political aspirants confront throughout the world. Gendered associations with politics lead many to the conclusion that women's presence in formal decision making spheres remains marginal because voters and/or elites (both male and female) doubt women's capacity for the political realm. As displayed in Table 1.2, World Values Survey data

[21] Other renditions of the cultural argument look to structural manifestations of economic changes, such as women's workforce presence (Salmond, 2006) and the welfare state (Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies, 2006).

demonstrate a striking resilience of constructed perceptions of women's capacity for politics rooted in traditional gender norms in countries around the world (WVS, 2005-2008). Voter bias is conventionally considered the most formidable impediment to women's representation due to the glacial velocity of changes in cultural attitudes (IPU, 2000).

National gender ideology – the extent to which the national sociopolitical climate is receptive to female politicians – is indeed a key predictor of women's overall legislative presence (Paxton and Kunovich, 2003, 93). Many cross-national studies of women's representation have employed region or religion as a proxy for the women-friendliness of the sociopolitical climate, with the Scandinavian region usually deemed the most open to women and Islamic countries considered the most restrictive for women (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Tripp and Kang, 2008). Gendered expectations for the appropriate division of labor in public and private spheres often dictate the societal and political latitude afforded both women and men (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, 8). Substantial levels of perceived male political superiority can disincentivize female candidacies and undermine the electoral prospects of the few women who run for office, thus perpetuating male dominance in the political arena.

Following Paxton and Kunovich (2003), Figure 2.1 plots cross-national responses to the World Values Survey (2005-08) question "men make better political leaders than women" to illuminate variations in national gender ideology, also incorporating data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) on women in national parliaments (2011) to graphically examine the bivariate relationship between voter hostility to women and women's legislative representation. As predicted in the literature, the scatterplot and imposed regression line demonstrate a clear negative relationship between the two, with countries with high levels of perceived male political superiority having lower female

legislative presence. This finding often yields the assumption that women's electoral prospects will be limited where voter bias against women is prevalent.

Figure 2.1. Voter Bias and Women's Representation



Institutional Rules of the Game

Another prevalent explanation for women's (under)representation emphasizes the primacy of electoral rules. From discussions of gender quotas (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009; Tremblay, 2008; Tripp and Kang, 2008) and the relative benefits of proportional representation (PR) or plurality elections (Matland, 1993; Matland and Studlar, 1996; Matland and Taylor, 1997; Moser, 2001a; Rule and Zimmerman, 1994; SalmonPd, 2006), to analyses of how these factors interact (Jones, 2009; Krook, 2009; Schmidt, 2008;

Schwindt-Bayer, 2010), the emphasis on electoral institutions so prevalent in contemporary political science (i.e. Cox, 1997; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Peters, 2005; Weingast and Shepsle, 1995) is echoed in studies of women's representation.

A resolute consensus of the literature on women's representation and electoral systems is that the elections most conducive to women's representation are those conducted under closed-list PR rules with enforced gender quotas that include placement mandates (Htun and Jones, 2002; Krook, 2009; Moser, 2001a; Tremblay, 2008, Tripp and Kang, 2008). In what follows, I discuss the three factors substantiating the superiority of PR electoral systems over majoritarian/plurality systems for enhancing the representation of women: (1) party-centered rather than candidate-centered elections, (2) higher district magnitude, and (3) compatibility with gender quotas.

Party-Centered Elections

In the vast majority of countries with PR elections, closed-list rules dictate that voters cast their ballot for a party rather than a candidate (Schmidt, 2008). In such a system, party reputation and platforms are more salient in the elector's vote choice than are the relationships personalized by clientelism, pork, and/or "identifier characteristics" that permeate candidate-centered elections (Valdini, 2010).

Closed-list PR's party-centered elections can also enhance women's representation through the mechanism of candidate selection. Whereas candidate-centered elections (whether majoritarian, plurality, or OLPR) often result in decentralized and inclusive candidate selection processes, in closed-list PR elections the selectorate – the actors responsible for selecting candidates – is more likely to be centralized and exclusive (Rahat and Hazan, 2001). A centralized selectorate allows national party leaders to circumvent predominantly male "local power monopolies," freeing them to

nominate outsiders such as women (Hinojosa, 2009). While this does not guarantee that national party leaders will promote women's candidacies, they are more likely to select candidates that will benefit the party's overall fortunes and image, while local power monopolies focus on preserving their own power (Hinojosa, 2009). And as discussed below, due to a socialized gender gap in formal political ambition women are significantly less likely to self-nominate than are men. When external rather than self-nomination is the norm, the effects of this gender gap are attenuated (Fox and Lawless, 2004; Hinojosa, 2009; Lawless and Fox, 2005, 2010).

District and Party Magnitudes

The most prominent explanation for PR's demonstrated empirical superiority in electing women is based on the higher district magnitudes, or seats available per district, in PR elections. While elections in single member districts (SMD) are largely zero-sum endeavors, requiring candidates to be the last one standing (in their party) to even have a shot at high-level elected office,[22] PR elections by definition enhance proportionality (Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1994; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). By reducing the threshold required to gain a seat, PR's higher district magnitudes increase the viability of outsider candidacies unlikely to command a plurality of votes (Moser and Scheiner, 2012; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Moreover, by virtue of the multiple seats available per district, large district magnitudes facilitate "ticket balancing," whereby parties can reach out to particular constituencies (including women), promoting equity while maintaining party peace (Matland, 1993; Matland, 2005; Matland and Taylor, 1997; Salmond, 2006). Finally, SMD systems foster an incumbency advantage, while higher district magnitude elections are associated with a higher rate of turnover (Moser and Scheiner, 2012;

[22] For an assessment of how primary elections in the US have disadvantaged female candidates, see Lawless and Pearson (2008).

Schwindt-Bayer, 2005), itself conducive to women candidates in electoral systems currently dominated by male incumbents.

Extremely high district magnitudes, however, are associated with a proliferation of parties, which often splits the seat share across parties, resulting in low effective magnitudes for each party. Party magnitude, or "the number of seats a party has (wins) in a district" (Matland, 1993, 742), has thus been used as an alternative institutional variable explaining the positive correlation found between PR and women's representation (Matland, 2005; Matland and Taylor, 1997; but, see Jones, 2009; Schmidt, 2008). If parties win more seats, they are able to delve deeper into their candidate lists when allocating seats. In the context of closed-list elections with no placement mandates, this will help women since parties (unless mandated otherwise) tend to cluster female candidates at the bottom of their lists (Htun and Jones, 2002; Moser and Scheiner, 2012; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010).[23]

Quotas and Placement Mandates

By enabling the use of placement mandates, PR's multimember elections also facilitate the mechanics of quotas (Htun and Jones, 2002; Tremblay, 2008). Placement mandates, which are unfeasible in SMD elections,[24] overcome the party tendency to place female contenders in unelectable list positions in closed-list elections (Htun and Jones, 2002; Moser and Scheiner, 2012; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Furthermore, resistance to quotas is more likely in the context of SMD rules, where the introduction of outsider candidates necessarily displaces traditional power holders. Again, the availability of

[23] As I discuss below, the logic changes in open-list PR elections.

[24] Several parties (e.g., Canada's Liberal Party), however, implement the equivalent of placement mandates in SMD elections, mandating that their candidates for a certain percentage of "safe seats" are female. This stands in contrast to the common practice of parties, which seeking to merely gesture to gender equality, advance women candidates as "party standard bearers" or sacrificial lambs in contests the party has little to no chance of winning (Thomas and Bodet, 2011).

multiple seats in PR elections is expected to enhance women's representation; when nominations are a scarce resource, the introduction of a quota is more likely to generate opposition from other contenders.

Party Ideology and Women in Party Leadership

Two other conventional explanations for women's representation focus on political parties, in particular, ideology and the proportion of women in party leadership. The left's historical emphasis on social equality – a stance hypothesized to be conducive to gender egalitarianism – generates the expectation that parties that lean left are more hospitable to women politicians (e.g., Duverger, 1955). Many cross-national analyses uphold the influence of ideology (on overall proportions of women in parliaments), operationalizing and measuring the concept as the strength of leftist parties based on the proportion of seats in the lower house of congress held by leftist parties (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Kittilson, 2006; Norris, 1987; Reynolds, 1999; Rule, 1987; Schmidt, 2008). Some have suggested a potential "contagion from the left" effect whereby the promotion of female candidates by leftist parties drives all rational and competitive parties to advance female candidacies therefore leading to a declining salience of ideology (Matland and Studlar, 1995).

A few studies of women's representation have also looked to the role of women in national party leadership in promoting women's political participation (Caul, 1999; Kittilson, 2006; Kunovich and Paxton, 2005). Female party leaders are able to "let the ladder down" to other women, using their position to convince traditionally male party leaders of the electoral utility of recruiting and training female candidates, and can also pressure for the adoption of internal gender quotas (Kittilson, 2006; Kunovich and Paxton, 2005).

This possibility becomes more likely as women approach a critical mass, conventionally deemed somewhere between 20 and 30 percent, and thus progress beyond the constraints of mere "token" status (Childs and Krook, 2008; Kittilson, 2006; Matland, 1998). Childs and Krook trace the application of critical mass theory (Schelling, 1978) to gendered dynamics to Kanter (1977), which subsequently spawned its use as a lens to explain why incremental increases in women's legislative presence have often not ushered in drastic changes in the substantive representation of women (e.g., Dahlerup, 1988).

In a study of corporate men and women, Kanter finds that until minority groups reach at least "tilted" status – of a ratio around 65:35, the "dominants" (or majority, which in her case, are men) "control the group and its culture" while the minorities (women) confront "performance pressures…, token isolation, which forces them to remain an outsider or become an insider by being a 'woman-prejudiced-against-women…, and role entrapment, which obliges them to choose between alternative female stereotypes" (Kanter, 1977, 966, cited in Childs and Krook, 2008, 727). As their presence approximates titled status, members of the minority group can form alliances to diminish pressures and isolation, and are also increasingly free to differentiate themselves. Dahlerup applies Kanter's approach to the study of women in politics, concluding that "critical acts" are key, and what is "most significant is the willingness and ability of the minority to mobilize the resources of the organization or institutions to improve the situation for themselves and the whole minority group" (1988, 296, cited in Studlar and McAllister, 2003, 236).

Whereas evidence that a critical mass of women *legislators* facilitates women-friendly policies or the election of more women is mixed (Studlar and McAllister, 2003), Kittilson (2006) finds strong support that a critical mass of women in national *party*

leadership structures enhances women's representation. Leveraging Tarrow and McAdam's insights on political opportunity structures, Kittilson contends that "the addition of women to the subset of party elites may introduce a new perspective on the utility of women's votes," with women leaders introducing "new frames of meaning" of women's groups' demands for greater representation (2006, 26). Women in party leadership can thus provide a new outlook that convinces male leaders of the electoral value of promoting women's participation. While women acting on behalf of women is not guaranteed, at a minimum, the inclusion of women in party leadership structures helps them to "stop functioning exclusively as masculine clubs" (Godinho, 1996, 155), in turn bringing the voice of women to the decision-making table rather than ghettoizing them in women's sections as has long been the norm in parties around the world (Roza et al., 2010). Moreover, incorporating women in party leadership can itself capacitate women for high-level electoral campaigns, with service in party leadership often considered a "necessary apprenticeship" (Henig and Henig, 2001, 48, cited in Kunovich and Paxton, 2005, 521) for political aspirants.

In her study of Western European democracies, Kittilson finds that the parties most likely to have women in leadership are those that are centralized (providing a clear target for women's movements to lobby, and minimizing veto players), with internal party quotas, New Left values of equality, and are fractionalized with strong external ties, thus augmenting access points to the party (Kittilson, 2006).

Next, I consider the contributions and limitations of these traditional explanations of the literature on women and politics for understanding women's underrepresentation in Brazil.

Lessons from and Limitations of the Literature on Women's Representation

Machista Voter Attitudes and State Development

The observed relationship between overall proportion of women in parliaments and voter bias against women (see Figure 2.1) implies that female candidates are less likely to succeed among biased electorates. Can voter hostility to women explain their extreme underrepresentation in Brazil? This explanation seems plausible in Brazil's patriarchal cultural context, where machismo sentiments persist. As stated in Chapter 1, 30.8% of Brazilian respondents in the 2006 wave of the World Values Survey and 33.5% in the 2008 wave of the AmericasBarometer survey expressed agreement with the statement "men make better political leaders than women," including nearly a quarter of female respondents (LAPOP, 2008; WVS, 1981-2008).[25] But ranking 23rd of 60 nations surveyed, perceived male political superiority in Brazil is actually moderate, comparable to many other countries in the Americas, where the regional average is 28.6 percent. Can this residual hostility to the idea of women in politics explain the drastic underrepresentation of women in Brazilian politics?

Such a cursory glance at the Brazilian situation might lead one to suspect machista voter attitudes as the culprit of women's continued exclusion from high-level elected office, particularly given the open-list electoral context, with it ultimately being voters (rather than parties) who determine the end ranking of candidates. As I discuss in Chapter 3, however, Brazil has the lowest proportion of women legislators of any country with preferential (candidate-based) list voting, with even countries that exhibit significantly greater voter bias electing more women than Brazil (see Tables 3.1 and 1.2).

---

[25] I would like to thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United Stated Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.

And how does such bias affect the electoral prospects of female contenders? In spite of conventional wisdom otherwise, the empirical evidence on the relevance of voter hostility for *individual* women's electoral prospects is actually mixed. Furthermore, voters appear to be warming up, however gradually, to the idea of women politicians. Indeed, although machista voter bias remains a commonly employed justification for the dearth of female candidates and politicians, public opinion polls in Latin America suggest that the electorates are actually quite receptive to female candidates for high-level office, as exemplified in the recent election of female presidents in Brazil (Rousseff) and elsewhere in the region (Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica). Women are often seen by voters as novel alternatives to the corrupt status quo (Barrionuevo, 2007).

According to an exploratory[26] Gallup poll (in coordination with the Inter-American Development Bank [IDB] and the Inter-American Dialogue [IAD]) conducted in 2001, 72% of Brazilian respondents said they would vote for a woman for president (Fêmea, 2000; Sacchet, 2007). In 2010, 93.5% of Brazilians in a nationally representative sample said they would vote for a woman for any majoritarian office, with a majority of these respondents believing women could be just as competent as men (CESOP, 2010). And on October 3, 2010, a majority of the Brazilian electorate actually did vote for a female presidential candidate! Dilma Rousseff and Marina Silva won more than 47.6 and 19.6 million votes, respectively, together earning 66% of just over 100 million total votes; in the second round, Rousseff increased her vote share to 56 percent, becoming Brazil's first woman president.

Moreover, these survey data suggest that "the Brazilian electorate regards women in government positively, rating them higher than men not just on honesty and reliability,

[26] The sample was limited to 2,000 respondents in five of Latin America's major cities.

but also on competence, responsibility, toughness and capability, normally deemed more 'masculine' attributes, with little resistance to electing women to executive positions" (Macaulay, 2006, 45).[27] Results from a more recent and nationally representative survey found that 7 in 10 respondents thought more women in politics would improve competence and honesty in politics as well as commitment to constituents, administrative capacity, and authority (Ibope, 2009).[28]

In sum, there are reasons to question the explanatory capacity of voter bias for women's electoral prospects in Brazil. First, while hostility to women in politics in Brazil persists, it is relatively moderate (See Table 1.2). Second, the extant literature has drawn largely on aggregate-level evidence to substantiate the claim, a relationship which may not necessarily apply to the individual level. Finally, public opinion polls in Brazil and the recent election of Dilma Rousseff demonstrate substantial postulated support for female candidates.

Institutional Rules of the Game

What can we learn from the literature on electoral systems discussed above? As elaborated in Chapter 3, distinctions in list type or "ballot structure" are critical. Yet, most studies attesting to the superiority of PR in enhancing women's representation draw on cases with closed-list rules to make the comparison with majoritarian elections. Open-list variants of PR elections, however, significantly heighten the incentives to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Thames and Williams, 2010; Valdini, 2010) and are thus candidate- rather than party-centered. Indeed, the simple dichotomization of electoral systems between majoritarian/plurality and PR overlooks important variations in

[27] Instituto Vox Populi polls conducted in 2000 and 2001 suggest that these ratings are improving over time.
[28] Recall, these surveys were conducted prior to the emergence of Dilma Rousseff's candidacy for the presidency.

ballot structure and beyond, leading many to explore how certain characteristics (rather than categorizations) of electoral systems affect women's representation (Jones, 2009; Krook, 2009; Schmidt, 2008; Thames and Williams, 2010).

PR's association with gender quotas certainly hinges on the common closed-list ballot structure (Htun and Jones, 2002; Jones, 2009; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). With open-lists, the proportion and placement of women on candidate lists has a less direct effect, with electors rather than party leaders determining the final ranking of candidates. Yet, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Poland have all achieved significantly greater results than has Brazil in combining a legislated gender quota with open-list electoral rules.

Can variations in party magnitude – another driving factor behind PR's demonstrated superiority in electing women – shed light on women's limited access to political power in Brazil? While the rationale changes in open-list elections, where ordering on a party's pre-electoral list is presumably irrelevant for a candidate's chance of success, party magnitude may also affect women's electoral prospects in Brazil due to strategic concerns.

Parties with a history of winning several seats in a given statewide district are less likely to suffer a scarcity of organizational and other campaign resources than would be a party that is fighting for a single seat. As mentioned above, when only one seat is within reach, the contest tends toward a zero-sum game whereby party resources given to one candidate are necessarily diverted from another. Thus, a quite rational party strategy would be to concentrate resources on its top candidate in each state, which with very few women in power, still tends to be male. Limited party magnitude may then intensify the already heightened intra-party competition for resources in Brazil's open-list elections, where partisans compete against one another for support within the party, among donors,

and in the electorate (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Nicolau, 2006). It follows that higher party magnitudes can benefit female contenders.

Party Ideology and Women in Party Leadership

Much like voter bias, evidence linking ideology and women in party leadership to women's representation has almost exclusively been tested at the aggregate or party rather than candidate level. Most studies of the role of ideology operationalize the concept as the strength of Leftist parties in the legislature and/or executive (Caul, 1999; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Krook, 2010; Reynolds, 1999; Tripp and Kang, 2008). The relationship appears not to hold in Brazil, where leftist parties hold 34.2% of congressional seats, the presidency, and 11 of 27 governorships (40.7%), yet women comprise less than 10% of the Congress.[29]

Again, the mechanisms connecting a country's tendency to elect a large share of leftists in parliament with the overall proportion of women legislators may not operate at the individual level. Countries with an affinity for leftist parties may have greater support for welfare state policies, which has been shown to enable women to enter the paid workforce – especially the public sector – and thus change working women's political interests sufficiently to induce an ideological gender gap, which in turn incentivizes electorally motivated parties to respond by competing for women's votes by augmenting their female parliamentary presence (Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies, 2006). It is not immediately clear how such logic would apply to the individual candidate running in a leftist party. We do often see a disproportionate representation of leftists among elected women (Avelar, 2001). Does this mean that women are electorally advantaged in leftist parties? If so, why? Must female contenders then run with a leftist party to have a shot at

[29] Numbers tallied by author using data from the Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and party (PSB and PT) websites (July, 2012).

election? Has the salience of ideology's effect truly declined (Matland and Studlar, 1995)? The hypotheses must be assessed at the candidate level to discern their effects on individual women.

While the argument has yet to be empirically tested at the candidate level, women politicians do believe that the presence of women in party leadership is beneficial (IPU, 2000). Indeed, cross-national findings (aggregated across parties) suggest that women running in candidate-centered campaigns are bolstered by the presence of women in party leadership. This is because female party leaders have access to and are able to distribute material and institutional support to women candidates (Kunovich and Paxton, 2003, 538), an argument I develop further below.

In Brazil, the mean proportion of women on party NECs is 12.99 percent.[30] This average conceals significant variation across parties, with the PT and PDT[31] respectively having 37.0% and 4.2% women in their national decision-making structures. While Brazil fares moderately on all the obstacles discussed above, ranking 23rd of 60 nations in terms of perceived male political superiority (30.8%), having high magnitude (but open-list) PR elections with a (only recently enforced) gender quota, and leftist parties holding 34.2% of congressional seats, its poor incorporation of women in party NECs is far more proportionate to its exceedingly low level of women in Congress. Although the other obstacles certainly persist at non-negligible levels, with 1 in 3 Brazilians expressing skepticism of women's capacity for the political realm, and a quota that constitutes a far from ideal fit for open-list electoral rules, Brazil's middling status on these factors – with numerous countries faring much worse on these fronts, including those with significantly

[30] Calculated by the author using data from party websites and the Inter-American Development Bank's Gender and Political Parties in Latin America Initiative (GEPPAL) (2010).
[31] The Democratic Labor Party PDT) is a center-leftist party founded in 1979.

higher levels of women in parliament – simply cannot explain its severe underrepresentation of women in Congress. The expectation that incorporating women into party decision-making structures will facilitate increases in women's legislative representation, however, appears quite plausible. I consider how each of these obstacles affects individual women's electoral prospects in the analyses ahead.

An Alternative to the Aggregate Cross-National Approach

Although the abovementioned explanations of women's representation have been substantiated in an array of cross-national studies, their generalizability and influence on women's electoral prospects remain open to debate (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Matland, 1998; Salmond, 2006; Schmidt, 2008; Tripp and Kang, 2008). While such cross-national studies have illuminated interesting aggregate trends, I contend that disparate findings in the literature persist because: (1) until recently, the majority of studies on women's representation have had a distinct advanced-industrial focus, (2) the predominant mode of cross-national analysis is often executed at excessively aggregated levels, and (3) the unspoken but usually present assumption of causal homogeneity is tenuous.

In light of these gaps, this dissertation offers three important contributions: (1) a candidate-level analysis of women's paths to power in an understudied context (2) a rich examination of variation in candidate electoral performance across districts, electoral rules, and parties that brings into focus the centrality of parties in arbitrating the political empowerment of women, and (3) a typology differentiating the accessibility to women of electoral districts and parties, i.e. a measure of "women-friendliness," and the varying profiles most likely to thrive in the midst of intersecting district and party constraints.

The analysis of obstacles to women's representation at the candidate level elucidates their actual effect on the electoral prospects of women. To infer the effects of these barriers on individual women's electoral performance from aggregate country-level analyses is to commit an ecological fallacy (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, 30; Robinson, 1990).[32] As discussed above, the mechanisms linking such barriers to the overall proportion of women elected may not operate at the individual level. Moreover, the majority of studies on women's representation have been based largely on OECD countries, producing expectations that simply may not hold in the Brazilian case.

Indeed, by conducting an individual-level analysis of women's electoral prospects in the context of Brazil's open-list elections and preponderance of weakly institutionalized parties, this dissertation challenges the explanatory power of aggregate-level findings derived from more developed and institutionalized contexts. Despite being practiced in more than a dozen nations, the open-list context remains an understudied environment, with the majority of findings regarding women's representation hinging upon party-centric systems and thus ignoring important distinctions that may alter the effects of these obstacles on women's electoral prospects.[33] This dissertation addresses this lacuna by theorizing the relationship between female political aspirants, electorates, and parties in the candidate-centric open-list context.

I take advantage of variation across Brazil's 29 registered political parties to assess their role in mediating women's access to political power. Whereas cross-national analyses consider only the averages across a nation's political parties and thus overlook variation within a country, my research design introduces partisan variation to explore

---

[32] An *ecological fallacy* is committed when "incorrectly using aggregate data to make inferences about individuals" (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, 30).

[33] For recent exceptions, see Thames and Williams (2010), Jones (2009), and Schmidt (2008).

how parties negotiate electorates and electoral rules to affect the representation of women. Parties are, after all, widely considered in most contexts to be the primary gatekeeper of political power. Analyzing the candidate (rather than national) level assesses variation in key party characteristics such as ideology, party institutionalization, and women in party leadership, and how these factors influence a party's tendency to promote the political participation of women and support their pursuit of electoral office.

In the upcoming empirical chapters, I explore why the postulated support for female candidates in Brazil has not translated into greater women's representation. I assess the ability of the modernization hypothesis – which associates economic development with gender egalitarianism (Inglehart and Norris, 2003) – to explain the variation in voter bias and its ability to predict women's electoral prospects, taking advantage of the wide range in development levels across Brazil. I find that while residual levels of machista voter bias persist, and are predicted by a respondent's state development level, this bias cannot explain variation in women's electoral prospects. Lesser levels of voter bias in more developed regions have not translated into the election of more female deputies. Moreover, several women have achieved considerable electoral successes in the context of voter bias. Similarly, while I find party ideology (indirectly),[34] institutionalization, and proportion of women in leadership are significant predictors of women's electoral prospects, some women have attained electoral office even in the absence of the party support effectuated by these party-level factors. I explore these intriguing findings in Chapter Seven.

[34] As I elaborate below, party ideology retains an indirect role in explaining women's electoral prospects. While party institutionalization and women in party leadership actually bear more direct explanatory power for the electoral chances of female legislative candidates than does running with a leftist party per se, leftist parties have historically been those most likely to incorporate women in party leadership.

My typology of women-friendliness, combined with an elaboration of successful electoral profiles in Chapter 7 moves beyond the assumption of causal homogeneity common to cross-national studies. Rather, I explain how discrete profiles have enabled women to navigate both women-friendly and averse contexts. Women are a heterogeneous group, and have found innovative ways to thrive electorally in ostensibly inhospitable districts and parties.

The typology and profiles help to explain what at first glance may seem to be conflicting findings. Residual machista voter bias among the electorate does exist, but at a relatively moderate level cannot explain variation in women's electoral prospects. Moreover, several women have achieved success under the condition of voter bias by either working with their party to overcome such bias as *lutadoras* with a substantial party organization and firmly rooted platform, or by conforming to traditional gender norms in the absence of such party support. *Supermadres* can simultaneously overcome the constraints posed by bias among voters and party elites by basing their political presence and campaign on some extension of their role in the private sphere, and thus minimizing their perceived threat to established order. Finally, technocrats take advantage of evolution in their societal status in more women-friendly states and apply their expertise acquired in the professional world to counteract lacking party support, converting their expertise into political capital and using their professional contacts to raise campaign funds.

The fact that party-level factors retain a significant role in predicting women's electoral performance, even while some women have found a way to thrive electorally in the absence of the party support these factors enable, reflects the preponderance of inchoate and male dominant parties in Brazil. It also puts into stark relief the essential role parties have to play in enhancing the political participation of women in Brazil. Even

with these innovative profiles affording (some) women electoral success in women-averse contexts, party-level factors continue to predict a woman's ability to succeed. This finding contrasts with the dominant approach of the Brazilianist literature, which tends to de-emphasize 'party' as a predictive factor for electoral success.

I thus employ variation in candidate electoral performance across districts, electoral rules, political parties, sex, and individual women to elucidate the barriers impeding women's political participation and the paths to overcoming these obstacles. By lowering the level of analysis, I reveal that contrary to conventional wisdom – which considers political parties to be less relevant for candidate recruitment and electoral success in the candidate-centric open-list context – parties are the central arbiters of women's political empowerment in Brazil, Latin America's most populous democracy. Far from insignificant, the particular characteristics of each party shape its capacity and will to promote women's participation.

PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION

For decades the significance of institutionalization for democratic governance has been a stalwart in the political science literature (Diamond, 1988; Jones, 2005; Mainwaring, 1998, 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Schedler, 1995; Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997). Under-institutionalized parties have been shown to hinder identifiability, accountability, and programmatic appeals, are conducive to anti-system politics, and result in a Wild-West style politics where each politician is on her own and collective party organizations are elusive.

Recently, however, a new debate has emerged over the conceptualization of party institutionalization, with some suggesting that the general decline of political parties in society (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) warrants a narrowing of the concept to focus

merely on their electoral presence, with parties participating in at least three national elections considered institutionalized (Rose and Mackie, 1988; Braga, 2010; Tarouco, 2010). Here however, I understand the *process* of party institutionalization as the "process through which the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behavior and of attitudes, or culture" (Randall and Svåsand, 2002, 12). This conceptualization builds on Huntington's initial formation of the concept as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (1968, 12) and Panebianco's related notion of internal "systemness" (1988), or in Huntington's terms, organizational "complexity" and "coherence" (Quoted in Randall and Svåsand, 2002, 10). It also includes an external/societal dimension elaborated by Janda (1980) and Levitsky (1998) centering on the meaning and value of the party label, or "value infusion" with an institutionalized party being "reified in the public mind" (Janda, 1980, cited in Randall and Svåsand, 2002, 11).

To be precise, in what follows I work with the *outcome* of an institutionalized party. I conceptualize a party as institutionalized if it possesses value infusion – observed by its maintenance of a relatively stable electoral base and membership over time, and an identifiable and programmatic platform – and internal systemness, made evident through a solid party organization with material and human resources wherein "internal party processes are predictable and routinized, and the party as an institution is prescient over individual party leaders" (Jones, 2005, 12). This work thus follows the traditional scholars of party and party system institutionalization, operationalizing the outcome of party institutionalization as an index of the stability in party vote and seat share (volatility), party membership (societal roots), and party organization (e.g., Mainwaring, 1999).

I improve the measure of party organization by supplementing the traditional proxy of party age with data I collected on party funds and original measures of organization that assesses current information on: (1) the number of active municipal party directorates each party has across each state and (2) whether there exists an alternation in state party leadership. Together, these factors enable the measurement of party institutionalization across time (elections) and space (parties, states) while holding the institutional context constant, allowing for a more precise examination of the relationship between party structures and representation within open-list PR electoral rules. This approach allows me to highlight how some parties – in particular, those that are well-institutionalized and incorporate women in party leadership – have been more effective in counteracting the detrimental implications of open-list PR for the quota and women in general.

And while the general issue of party institutionalization has enjoyed a rather salient position within the literature, surprisingly little has been said about its implications for the representation of women and minorities (Guadagnini, 1993; Caul, 1999; Kittilson, 2006; Moser and Scheiner, 2012).[35] This dissertation helps to fill this void, contending that the prevalence of weakly institutionalized parties in Brazil has undermined women's representation[36] in four ways. (1) The absence of a norm of compliance has facilitated an environment in which internal and external formal laws are flouted, providing no clear means for ascension through the party making it difficult for

[35] I discuss Marila Guadagnini (1993) and Miki Caul Kittilson's (1999; 2006) arguments from their studies of the Italian party system and Western European parties, respectively, below. Moser and Scheiner find that the condition of weakly institutionalized parties negates the expected negative effects of single member district (SMD) systems relative to proportional representation systems due to the absence of SMD's usual mechanical effect of constraining the number of parties (2012).

[36] Although this discussion emphasizes women's representation, it may also explain the paucity of minority representation in Brazil. I will consider this in the conclusion and hope to address the question more adequately in future research. Unfortunately, the extremely limited *N* and difficulties involved with classifying race in Brazil have prevented me from undertaking the effort here.

outsiders to gain entry, while also crippling the gender quota. (2) By emphasizing self-nomination it exacerbates the socialized gender gap in formal political ambition. (3) Amorphous party organizations are ill-equipped to provide critical capacity-building opportunities for women. (4) The rarity of programmatic appeals and dominance of personalist politics favor those with personal political and financial capital, which due to wage inequities, traditional gender norms, and the still vastly masculine character of Brazilian electoral politics (see Table 1.4) tend to be men. Each of these points deserves further development below.

"*Lei Que Não Pega*": A Norm of Non-Compliance

The inchoate character of the Brazilian party system has facilitated an environment in which formal rules remain nominal and informal norms and practices carry the day. A clear understanding of the rules of the game and expectation that these rules will be followed is less likely in weakly institutionalized parties because the few leaders that dominate such parties often operate beyond the bounds of formal rules. An extensive study by Fernando Guarnieri (2011) reveals a disconcertingly common tendency especially among parties characterized by "monocracy" but also "oligarchy" to use the mechanism of provisional commissions as a means of manipulating the construction of party lists in their favor. Guarnieri (2011) builds on Angelo Panebianco, who contrasts a monacracy – "a form of domination characterized by a predominant influence of one person over the group's decisions," with an oligarchy, under which a few groups control the process, and a polyarchy, where the existence of multiple groups prevents any one member/group's hegemonic control (Panebianco, 1988, 172).

The formal rules of most party statutes (the PT is somewhat different, which as of 2001, has direct membership elections for its party leadership through the Process of

Direct Elections, PED [Hunter, 2010]) dictate hierarchical participation in a clear, predictable way, with municipal conventions electing state conventional delegates and choosing municipal directorates that in turn choose the municipal executive commission (which selects municipal candidates), with the process repeated at state and national levels (Guarnieri, 2011). The executive commissions often present an already composed candidate list (*chapa única*) at the conventions, with the expectation that they will be summarily approved (Braga, 2008).

Yet, as revealed by Guarnieri, parties disproportionately wield the mechanism of provisional commissions, which is intended for instances of limited party members but by his account vastly abused by all parties (2011).[37] He characterizes Brazil's major parties as following – *weakly organized/monocratic* (PP, PTB), *of mixed organization/oligarchic* (PSDB, PDT, PFL), and *organized/polyarchic* (PT, PMDB), and finds that party leaders in oligarchic and especially monocratic parties are less accountable to the formal rules of the game than those in polyarchic parties (2011). By dissolving a municipal or state party directorate and replacing it with a provisional commission, the leaders of monocratic and often oligarchic parties are free to nominate who they want rather than working through the constraints of lower level conventions or delegations.[38] In contrast, polyarchic parties in general abide by clear and universal criteria for leadership and candidate selection (Braga, 2008; Guarnieri, 2011). Guarnieri's analysis demonstrates that the absence of strong party organizations substantially undermines the ability of outsiders to "anticipate the criteria" for ascending the ranks, as well as substantial inter- and intra-party variation.

[37] Note, Guarnieri limits his analysis to the major parties: PDT, PFL, PMDB, PP, PSDB, PT, PTB (2011).
[38] Guarnieri uses the proportion of municipal party organizations that are provisional to measure their centralization, which he turns uses to predict a party's strategic decision to not run a candidate in executive contests, something unlikely in the context of clear and predictable rules to which party leaders were held accountable by lower level conventional delegates (2011).

Such a norm of (non-)compliance with internal party statutes may carry over into other realms, with party leaders accustomed to being held accountable to internal rules of the game more likely to comply with external rules such as the gender quota, in spite of its until recently weak enforcement. Indeed, studies from the international organizations literature have documented the greater likelihood of rule-bound states to comply with rarely enforced international agreements due to a norm of compliance entrenched in such states. "Political leaders accustomed to constitutional constraints on their power in a domestic context are more likely to accept principled legal limits on their international behavior; therefore, governments with strong constitutional traditions, particularly those in which intragovernmental relations are rule governed, are more likely to accept rule-based constraints on their international behavior" (Simmons, 1998:83-84).

I draw on the norm of (non-)compliance instilled by transparent and universal internal rules of the game to explain the significant variation across Brazilian parties in their responsiveness to the quota provisions. This yields superior analytical leverage than does the emphasis on the quota law's poor fit for the OLPR system and only recent enforcement, which while certainly inhibiting its effectiveness, cannot explain variation across parties confronting the same Electoral Law.

For Brazil's inchoate parties, the gender quota persists as a "*lei que não pega*" (roughly, "law on paper only") in spite of the recent mini-reform emboldening enforcement efforts. As mentioned above, only a quarter of state parties participating in the 2010 elections complied with the reinforced quota law. The vast disregard of the quota in spite of the mini-reform strengthening it and credible threats of enforcement is reflective of the abundance of weakly institutionalized parties. I argue that such parties are unlikely to comply with the quota because they – rather than existing as an organization in their own right operating under transparent rules of the game – suffer

from a norm of non-compliance, dominated by a few leaders who function with impunity in decision-making. The dominant leaders of such parties often use the mechanism of provisional commissions to circumvent compliance with other party statutes, which in effect "permits the more absolute control over the formation of (party) lists" (Guarnieri, 2011, 241). Indeed, a simple logistic analysis of state party compliance with the quota since its implementation demonstrates that a one unit increase in party institutionalization increases a party's odds of quota compliance by 25.2 percent.

Moreover, even in the few instances where Brazilian parties have nominally complied with the gender quota, the quota's intended result has not been met. This is because party leaders often do not confront their deficit of female contenders until the last moment, at which point they fill the slots reserved for women with "*candidatas laranjas*"[39] (sacrificial lambs) with no intention of supporting their candidacies. The 2010 elections—the first after the mini-reform strengthened the quota—saw a striking number of apparent *candidatas laranjas*, with an average of 39.5% of female candidates earning less than one percent of the minimum vote acquired by a winning candidate in their state. For male candidates, this average was less than half that, at 16.6 percent. With 21 of 27 states having significantly more *candidatas laranjas* in 2010 than in 2006, I contend that this preponderance of female sacrificial lambs in 2010 constitutes an observable implication of the elite resistance to even the reformed quota.

While the mini-reform enabled greater enforcement of the formal quota law, the decade-long disregard for the quota by Brazil's often inchoate and male-run parties was entrenched. Nearly 80% of women surveyed in a recent poll had never even heard of the

[39] According to a Brazilian etymologist from the University of São Paulo, using the term *laranja* (orange) to describe a figurehead or pawn is thought to have emerged in the 1970s, with two potential origins: (1) the juice of the orange is extracted, leaving only the tasteless remains behind, and (2) people in countries prohibiting the public consumption of alcohol injected their booze in an orange to avoid getting caught (Perissé, 2010).

gender quota more than a decade after its implementation (Ibope, 2009), suggesting that for the majority of parties and electors, the law existed only in the books, or "para ingles ver,"[40] with no real intention of compliance. To be discussed at length in Chapter 3, the emphasis of Brazil's gender quota on the formal rules of candidate selection leaves much to be desired.

Figure 2.2. Deputy Nice Lobão in a Winning Multi-Party *Dobradinha* (2010)

In the Brazilian case, such formal electoral rules have long gone unheeded with local bosses often calling the shots.[41] Aspiring candidates cozy up to mayors and governors to gain entry and access to resources (Samuels, 2003), with the coveted *dobradinha* (an alliance between candidates running concurrently, see Figure 2.2) serving as visual evidence to this practice. For most parties, the leadership simply presents candidate lists at state party conventions; for the few more institutionalized

[40] "For the English to see," meaning a law existing on paper only. The Brazilian idiom references the country's 1831 law declaring free any Africans arriving in Brazilian ports, which was promulgated as a symbolic act to appease the British, who had prohibited the slave trade in 1807 (Bethell and Carvalho, 1985, 696).

[41] Guadagnini paints a similar portrait in her analysis of the Italian party system. "Although the various parties have developed formal rules governing the selection of candidates…, in fact candidate selection has been a prerogative of top party leaders. Furthermore…mere inclusion on a party's list of candidates is not highly significant as it does not mean that an individual's candidacy has the real support of his or her party" (1993, 183).

parties, party delegates propose and vote on individual candidates or slates of candidates at local or state meetings (Braga, 2008).

Finally, recent work on candidate selection in Latin America contends that exclusive candidate selection processes facilitate the nomination and election of women, while decentralized processes (as is the case throughout Brazil, with the exception of the PSOL [Morgenstern and Siavelis, 2008]) undermine women's prospects for inclusion due to the influence of "local power monopolies" generally dominated by men (Hinojosa, 2009). In sum, Brazil's electoral infrastructure, a widespread lack of transparency and associated norm of non-compliance have undermined women's ability to anticipate the criteria for selection and deterred all efforts at leveling candidate selection processes, effectively nullifying the country's gender quota.

Self-Nomination and the Gender Gap in Political Ambition

In the weakly institutionalized context where "political parties have limited resources, internal processes are unpredictable, and individual party leaders dominate the parties, with the party as an institution weak to nonexistent" (Jones, 2005, 12), self-nomination is the norm. Such an "entrepreneurial" (Morgenstern and Siavelis, 2008) system has led many to conclude that "parties do not perform even minimum functions of gatekeeping" with "routes to power" deemed "open for easy ascent" (Schedler, 1995, 18; Samuels, 2008); entrepreneurial systems have, however, proven daunting for women and other marginalized groups. Morgenstern and Siavelis' authoritative volume on candidate selection in Latin America characterizes Brazil as conducive to the "entrepreneur" ideal type of legislator due to its high-magnitude open-list elections, federal structure, weak legislative parties, localized and exclusive candidate selection, reliance on self-selection,

inchoate party organizations, and campaigns financed privately, rather than by parties (2008, 18).

The authors assert that these variables converge to make parties "unnecessary for entrepreneurs to succeed in getting on the ballot and being elected" (Morgenstern and Siavelis, 2008, 23). But while a weakly institutionalized party system may facilitate political outsiders' entry due to the diminished ballot control of party leaders in such systems (Mainwaring, 1999), these partisan outsiders gain entry by converting their economic and/or social capital into political capital (Bourdieu, 1986). So although the notion that the electoral context constitutes "nonregulated markets" open to all (Schedler, 1995, 18) is formally true, the open or "entrepreneurial" system in fact tends to reproduce societal inequities and maintain patterns of marginalization. If party leaders do not actively cultivate female political aspirants, women will be reluctant to confront this elitist system. As professional career paths become increasingly viable alternatives for women, who comprise 46% of the economically active workforce (IBGE, 2010),[42] and Brazil's political system remaining executive-dominant, women may understandably be hesitant to seek election to a position they perceive as corrupt and ineffective (LAPOP, 2010).[43]

The socialized gender gap in formal 'political ambition,' or the expressed desire to seek political office, intensifies the marginalization of outsiders (Lawless and Fox, 2005, 2010; Schlesinger, 1966). Through socially constructed gender roles and norms, women have long been dissuaded from entering the public sphere, particularly at the

[42] It is not my intention, however, to gloss over the fact that women continue to confront foreboding obstacles in the workforce, where they receive less pay for equal work (Ibge, 2010), have to wait longer to get promoted (Ipea, 2010b), and remain disproportionately absent from leadership positions, with less than 14% of the leadership positions in Brazil's top 500 businesses being women (Mulheres Brasileiras, 2012).
[43] Women express significantly lower levels of agreement that the federal government is fighting government corruption, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with Brazilian democracy than do men (LAPOP, 2008, 2010).

national level. Three manifestations of traditional gender socialization identified by Lawless and Fox, the leading authorities on gender and political ambition, are instructive. Traditional gender socialization, along with disenchantment with the corrupt and ineffective state of politics, inherent risk and uncertain reward of seeking office, and increasing opportunities in the professional realm, comprise part of an interconnected web of factors dissuading women from entering the formal political sphere. First, traditional family role orientations mean that for women, party activism usually entails a "triple shift."

As corroborated in my interview findings presented in Chapter 5, women simply may not have time to be the entrepreneurial candidate advantaged in the Brazilian system. Traditional family role orientations produce expectations that women remain confined to the private (or some extension thereof) rather than public sphere. In the 2006 wave of the LAPOP surveys, 17.4% of respondents answering a question on whether men deserve the right to jobs over women during times of elevated unemployment agreed or strongly (LAPOP, 2006). Moreover, although the vast socioeconomic inequalities within Brazil have made domestic labor an affordable commodity for even the middle class, even relatively well-off women nonetheless endure time constraints on the basis of traditional gender norms. Income has no relationship to the number of hours men dedicate to domestic chores, and 76.6% of women earning more than eight times the minimum wage spend on average 25.2 hours a week on domestic chores (Ipea, 2011, 37). While the percent of women that devote this amount of their time – equivalent to a part-time job – to household labor jumps to a striking 93% for women who earn the minimum wage or less, with income certainly reducing the constraints on women's time, it is safe to say that traditionally gendered domestic responsibilities constitute a second shift for women working outside the home across income levels in Brazil (Ipea, 2011).

Political party meetings are often held at night, which due to these traditional family role orientations, poses a disadvantage to women because they are expected to be home with their family. *Marianismo* (the counter-part to machismo) idealizes women as "semi-divine, morally superior and spiritually stronger than men" (Stevens, 1973, 62) and in addition to sustaining these traditionally gendered family obligations, can make it less acceptable for women to leave the house at night to attend party meetings. As I discuss in detail in Chapters 5 and 7, the women I interviewed frequently cited the incompatibility of party meeting times and locations with their familial commitments. Moreover, elected federal deputies divide their time among their home district and Brasília,[44] spending Monday to Thursday afternoons in the Congress and the extended weekend at home. Also corroborated through my interview data, this schedule poses significant constraints to women, who remain largely accountable for most household responsibilities.

As stated by the National Secretary of Women's Affairs, Eleonora Menicucci, "Women enter politics, but they have a world that goes with them: the house, their kids…so they enter politics either when they are single, or when their kids have already left the house" (Quoted in Grayley, 2012). The fact that 68 and 78 percent of male Chamber candidates and elected deputies, respectively, are married, but only 45 and 56 percent[45] of female Chamber candidates and elected deputies are married lends support to Secretary Menicucci's claim. In sum, party activism and high-level electoral office constitute a "triple shift" for the vast majority of Brazilian women, leading them to be reluctant to throw their hat in the ring to compete for an office they perceive as corrupt and ineffective.

---

[44] Poor road conditions and Brazil's vast geographic terrain add to the logistical difficulties of the commuter schedule – deputies from many states in the Amazon region have to travel five hours by plane(s) to reach Brasília.

[45] These differences are statistically significant at the $p<0.000$ level.

Second, the vastly male dominant character of the majority of political institutions entrenches a masculinized ethos of politics that privileges masculinity and devalues femininity. As discussed in Chapter 1, while Brazil did elect a female president in 2010, the proportion of women in all other elected offices has not exceeded 14.8 percent, with no more than 22.1% of candidates in any election being female (see Table 1.4). President Rousseff's appointment of 11 women to her cabinet has elevated women's presence in the federal ministries (28.9%),[46] but as late as 2009 (under former President Lula), only 5.4% of federal ministries were held by women with less than 20% in women in other appointed bureaucratic posts (Secretary of Women's Affairs, 2010). The proportion of women among federal government personnel is 45% at the lowest three levels, but decreases to 38.6, 25.6, and 23.0 percent at the top three levels (Inter-Union Department of Socioeconomic Statistics and Studies, 2011).

The few recent prominent exceptions in President Rousseff and Maria das Graças Silva Foster (named President of Petrobras in January, 2012)[47] belie the widespread pattern of exclusion of women from high-level office demonstrated in Table 1.4. The vast male dominance of Brazil's political institutions not only discourages women from getting involved in politics, but also maintains a set of rules and norms that was designed by and for men. An extensive literature on institutional change suggests that those in power formulate institutions to preserve their own position (North, 1990; Thelen, 1999), and Brazil's largely male politicians are by no means exempt from this tendency.

---

[46] Calculated by author from information on the Planalto website (http://www2.planalto.gov.br) (2012), also including in the count Bel Mesquita, who recently resigned as Secretary of Tourism.

[47] Graça Foster gained significant clout while serving as the Secretary of Petroleum and Gas under President Rousseff when she was Minister of Mines and Energy. Occupying an office of the same title in Petrobras since 2007, Graça Foster was then the first woman to assume a leadership role in any of Brazil's powerful state-owned enterprises (Globo, 2012 January 23).

As I illustrate in Chapter 7, some women have managed to overcome such constraints by conforming to traditional gender roles, working with their party, or, as is the case with President Rousseff, converting their expertise from the professional world into political capital. Yet, like most women, President Rousseff was initially encouraged to embark upon electoral politics and run for the presidency by a male party leader, former President Lula, who had appointed her to serve as Minister of Mines and Energy and Chief of Staff. Even Brazilian women with great personal ambition often espouse a disdain for electoral politics and are hesitant to enter an arena which they perceive to be not only vastly male dominant, but also extremely corrupt.

Indeed, nearly all of the female politicians I interviewed, questioned, and studied have cited external encouragement rather than some internal affinity for electoral politics in their decision to run for office. This leads to Lawless and Fox's final point about traditional gender roles – the resilient gendered psyche, "a deeply embedded imprint that propels men into politics, but relegates women to the electoral arena's periphery," which is instilled and sustained by traditional gender role expectations and the masculinized ethos of politics (2005, 10-11).

In spite of economic development and cultural progress, from an early age girls continue to be socialized as caregivers rather than leaders. The results of this traditional gender socialization are manifest, with pervasive gender gaps in political interest, political knowledge, and political efficacy (Moore, 2005). In the 2010 LAPOP surveys, Brazilian women reported significantly lesser levels of political interest than did men, with 4.9% and 10.5% of women and men, respectively, saying they were very interested in politics, and an additional 17.1% and 22.3% indicating mild interest (LAPOP, 2010). Experimental and observational evidence demonstrate that self-promoting behavior enhances public perception of one's competence, yet women are penalized for self-

promotion while men are rewarded for it (Correll et al., 2007; Rudman, 1998). By "violat(ing) prescriptive stereotypes" of femininity, self-promoting or assertive women "are derogated as interpersonally hostile… (and) personally disliked" (Correll et al. 2007, 7).

> Women, in essence, tend not to be socialized to possess the qualities the modern political arena demands of its candidates and elected officials. Whereas men are taught to be confident, assertive, and self-promoting, cultural attitudes toward women as political leaders, expectations of women's family roles, and the overarching male exclusiveness of most political institutions leave an imprint suggesting to women that it is often inappropriate to possess these characteristics (Lawless and Fox, 2005, 11).

Although I unfortunately do not have access to such experimental or extensive survey data in Brazil, the empirical evidence cited above, interviews discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, the gendered treatment of women in the media (Finamore and Carvalho, 2006; Miguel and Biroli, 2009, 2011; Paiva, 2008), and my own observations of the double binds confronted by President Rousseff in her 2010 campaign[48] give me no reason to suspect that such traditional gender roles would be more egalitarian in Brazil than they would in the US case discussed in Lawless and Fox (2005; 2010), Correll et al. (2007), Moore (2005), and Rudman (1998).

Figure 2.3 maps the gendered processes and structures conceptually, demonstrating the interacting effects of traditional gender socialization on individual women's political ambition, public opinion of women in politics, and the structural disadvantages confronted by women in parties and society. The outcome of these

[48] I surveyed media coverage of President Rousseff's campaign for an expert survey solicited for Murray and Piscopo's manuscript on the double bind confronted by women in executive elections. The "double binds" are lose-lose scenarios in which women are at once penalized for being too feminine and too masculine, are considered either too young or too old, or too connected or too independent, and are often criticized for a lack of experience when attempting to emphasize their novelty (Murray, 2010; Murray and Piscopo, n.d.).

gendered processes and structures is a resilient gender gap in formal political ambition that is sustained by women's disillusionment with the corrupt state of electoral politics and increasing availability of professional alternatives.

Figure 2.3. Voters, Parties, and Women's Representation



The problems of the ambition gender gap are compounding, with women more likely than men to doubt their qualifications for office and less likely to be encouraged to run (Fox and Lawless, 2004). Hinojosa confirmed these findings in her study of gender and candidate selection in Chile and Mexico, concluding that while men were open about their political ambition, women would defer to the party, stating that they would do "whatever the party asks of me" (2009, 389). In concordance with the literature on the US, Hinojosa found that women were less likely than men to espouse political ambition, with the constructed gender norms regarding women's appropriate societal roles remaining a powerful psychological constraint on their ambition (2009). Building on these findings and the parallels with these cases illustrated above, I expect that similar dynamics operate in Brazil and argue that women's hesitance to self-nominate coupled

with the entrepreneurial character of Brazilian elections renders active party recruitment essential for their meaningful inclusion in formal politics.

Amorphous Party Organizations

Weakly institutionalized parties are also characterized by amorphous party organizations that provide few opportunities for less experienced political aspirants to ascend the ranks and hone their political capital. Such parties – in addition to eschewing a universal set of rules and thus negating the ability of women and other outsiders to "anticipate the criteria" for candidate selection and to hold leaders accountable to these rules (Kittilson, 2006, 29) as discussed above – are ill-equipped to recruit and develop viable female candidacies. Often a one-man show rather than a cohesive organization, inchoate parties may have few internal leadership positions, are dominated by a small and unchanging cadre of party elite, offer little in the way of programmatic training, and exist as a mere electoral vehicle with inadequate mobilizational activities.

In contrast, an institutionalized party is more likely to facilitate training opportunities and other mechanisms for capacity-building. Studies suggest that women are in general more risk averse than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Schubert, 2006) and therefore unlikely to throw their hat in the ring without the requisite preparation. An observable implication of this tendency is that women candidates are in general much more qualified than male candidates (Anzia and Berry, 2011). So opportunities for capacity-building not only provide organizational support by enabling women to acquire the requisite toolkit, but they also instill a powerful psychological effect, boosting women's political ambition.

I will elaborate on the capacity-building opportunities offered in institutionalized parties – with a strong organization, programmatic platforms, and material and human

resources – further in Chapter 5, but a quick preview of the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B) is illustrative. The PC do B regularly offers multiday courses in "political formation" or training through its National School of Formation (ENF), where party members take several levels of courses on philosophy, class and the state, economics, socialism, and the party, and are certified at advanced levels only after they submit a monograph or article with themes and bibliography to be approved by senior party members (PC do B, 2010). The ENF works with state party organizations to offer "local courses that help in the training and realization of candidates" (PC do B, 2010). This reality sharply contrasts with the entrepreneurial candidate setting painted in Morgenstern and Siavelis (2008) and Samuels (2008), which while capturing the overall patterns of Brazilian politics, gloss over significant variation across the parties. By providing women and other outsiders with opportunities to acquire the requisite toolkit, a strong party organization can level the playing field for these contenders while also enhancing their confidence, thus preparing them for the difficult path to elected office.

Personalist Politics

As demonstrated by Ames (2001) and others, weakly institutionalized parties are particularly susceptible to personalist politics. Such parties are fleeting, have weak societal roots, and due to weak party discipline and shifting loyalties within constituencies, coalitions, and ideologies, party switching is rampant (Ames, 2001; Mainwaring, 1999; Nicolau, 2006). True outsiders will often lack the personal appeal necessary to thrive in such a system (Guadagnini, 1993). Institutionalized parties are more conducive to "less 'advantaged' groups and individuals, like women, who possess fewer external resources" (Guadagnini, 1993, 181). In contrast, personalist competition advantages those with accumulated personal political capital, "all those resources based

on status (social position, professional career etc.) and/or on strong external group support and/or on a political career through which an individual can develop an extensive electoral base… [as well as] the capacity to channel funds from the business community and other powerful interests to the party leadership" (Guadagnini, 1993, 181).

The personalist politics that dominate weakly institutionalized parties result in candidate-centered elections that require a contender to distinguish herself from her co-partisans, thus necessitating an inflated campaign budget. Tellingly, the correlation between both the self- and corporate-financed proportion of candidate campaign contributions and party institutionalization is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that candidates in weakly institutionalized parties are compelled to either seek funding from corporate donors, or finance their own campaign. In the 2010 elections to the Chamber of Deputies, campaign contributions to winning candidates averaged over R$1.1 million (more than US$600,000), with campaign finance being one of the strongest predictors of an individual candidate's chance of success (Samuels, 2001a, 2001b; author calculations).

Given Brazil's pervasive wage inequities (Ipea, 2009),[49] with men earning 30% more than women of the same age and education level (Downie and Llana, 2009), such expensive campaigns further disadvantage women (and minorities) while favoring incumbents and others with established material capital. Personal wealth allows candidates to self-finance their costly campaigns and also affords status and access to business elites and corporate donations. While winning candidates to the Chamber of Deputies (1994-2010) draw on average 47.9% of their campaign budgets from

[49] The median monthly salary for women and men, respectively, in 2009 was R$1097.93 and R$1518.31. Among those with a college degree working in the commercial/business sector, the disparity was even more pronounced, with women and men's median monthly salaries at R$2066.90 and R$3720.60, respectively (Ibge, 2010).

corporations, female candidates tend to raise significantly less from corporate donors (39.4%) than do male candidates (48.6%). Overall, women candidates received only 14.6% of their funds from corporations, compared to 24.8% for male candidates. The average campaign contributions of female candidates was R$225,575 (R$834,621 for elected), while male candidates averaged R$347,400 (R$997,389 for elected). In sum, the necessity of personal wealth and/or access to corporate donors in weakly institutionalized parties disadvantages most women and other outsiders.

The emphasis on programmatic politics in institutionalized parties, however, allows women to focus the campaign on their policy positions rather than their individual characteristics. In addition to being more palatable to female political aspirants, who in general eschew the combative climate of personalist campaigns (Ellis, 2002; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008, 350; Shugart, 1994), emphasizing programmatic policy appeals may enhance women's electoral prospects in two ways. First, it allows for a more collective campaign, where party militants rather than material resources driven by personal wealth or political capital fire up the base, and parties shoulder more of the financial burden. Indeed, the correlation of the proportion of candidate campaign contributions from parties and party institutionalization is positive and statistically significant. Second, as I discuss in Chapter 3, ideas-based campaigns may diminish the elector's reliance on gender stereotypes to evaluate the candidate (Valdini, 2010).

Party Institutionalization and Women: The Argument in Brief

As summarized in Table 2.1, the debilitating effects of weakly institutionalized parties for women's electoral prospects are compounding. Not only are such parties lacking transparent rules of the game internally and a norm of compliance and thus apathetic in enforcing the letter or spirit of the quota law, but the necessity to self-

nominate upholds the constructed gender gap in formal political ambition, fabricating a robust psychological disincentive to participate. Amorphous party organizations sustain this disincentive by inhibiting the development of political skillsets and organizational support, essentially leaving women (and others) to survive on their own devices. The prevalence of personalist politics and prioritization of personal political and financial capital then exacerbates inchoate parties' inability to develop capacity-building opportunities for women.

Table 2.1. The Argument: The Effects of Party Institutionalization on Women's Electoral Prospects

Capacity – Party Institutionalization	Weakly Institutionalized	Well-Institutionalized
(1) ♀ Norm of compliance	No transparent rules for candidate selection and ascending party ranks, no expectation of quota compliance with good ole' boy network prominent in leadership and candidate selection	Clear and universal rules for leadership and candidate selection, women can anticipate the criteria for ascension and there is an expectation of quota compliance
(2) ♀ Nomination	Self-nomination exacerbates gender gap in political ambition	External nomination, active recruitment mitigates gender gap in political ambition
(3) ♀ Organizational strength	Insufficient organizational strength (human/material resources) to offer capacity-building opportunities	Training opportunities offer chance to acquire requisite toolkit, enhances confidence and perceived viability
(4) Personalist/ programmatic	Personalist politics favors those with accumulated personal political and financial capital	Programmatic politics favors more collective campaigning, minimizes prospect of gender stereotyping by electorate

♀ Will – Contingent upon women-friendly leadership promoting these opportunities for women

In contrast, institutionalized parties provide a more hospitable environment for outsiders as they are more likely to actively recruit candidates, be accountable to clear

internal rules and thus conform to a norm of compliance, offer opportunities for political training, emphasize programmatic politics, and have and distribute material party resources. These benefits bolster female candidates, both in the eyes of voters, and in candidates' own self-perceptions. Nevertheless, I argue that the prospective psychological, organizational, and material support effectuated by party institutionalization is conditioned by the presence of party leadership that is willing to mobilize this potential in the name of actively promoting women's participation. Thus, a given party's level of institutionalization influences its capacity to support women, but its will to do so is determined primarily by the party leadership's willingness to champion women's involvement (see Figure 1.3).

Ideology, Party Leadership, and the "Women-Friendliness" of Parties

Most explanations of the "women-friendliness" of parties center on ideology, with some expecting a declining salience of ideology (Matland and Studlar, 1995). I build on the latter expectation, arguing that any remaining observed effects of ideology on women's electoral prospects are indirect. I contend that the mechanisms substantiating leftist parties' apparent superiority in accommodating women's demands operate through their greater propensity to: (1) be institutionalized, which grants them the capacity to support women, and (2) to have a strong female presence in their top decision-making bodies, which enhances their will to support women.[50]

Drawing on prior studies of OECD democracies that have demonstrated that "women's presence among the party leadership is the single most important mechanism for initiating women's gains in parliament" (Kittilson, 2006, 37), I argue that the most

[50] Note, I demonstrate these two tendencies empirically in Chapter 5.

women-friendly parties are those that are well-institutionalized and that have a "critical mass" of women in top party decision-making structures.

In male-dominant parties, women are usually ghettoized into women's sections often denied any say in important party decisions. Such parties call upon their women's sections to mobilize women in the electorate with the sole intent of rallying support for the campaigns of male candidates (Llanos and Sample, 2008; Roza et al., 2010, 9-10). In contrast, parties with a substantial female presence in party leadership allow women a space at the decision-making table. This is a critical distinction; when women have a real voice within party decision-making structures, they are able to "let the ladder down" to other women (Godinho, 1998; Kittilson, 2006).

As mapped conceptually in Figure 2.4, when women occupy a critical mass of leadership positions in institutionalized parties, they can hold parties accountable to the quota provisions, recruit and train female candidates, and mobilize party resources on behalf of female aspirants and their campaigns. Indeed, a simple logistic analysis of party compliance with the quota demonstrates that state parties with a critical mass of women in their leadership are 76.2% more likely than those without a critical mass of women leaders to comply with the quota. As summarized by expert José Eustáquio Diniz Alves, "The more women in party directorates, the more support to women to run for office. The parties that have women in their party leadership are able to elect more women" (quoted in Agência Patrícia Galvão, 2011). A critical mass of women leaders in institutionalized parties enables them to carry out a range of "critical acts" (Dahlerup, 1988), portrayed in Figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4. The Effects of Women in Leadership of Institutionalized Parties on Women's Electoral Prospects



With women in party leadership, the ideals of equality espoused but often relegated to the realm of the theoretical in leftist parties are more likely to be realized. Leftist parties are more likely than non-leftist parties to incorporate women in party leadership, yet being leftist per se guarantees neither a party's incorporation of women in leadership nor the electoral success of its candidates. Note, for example, that the effect of being a leftist party was statistically insignificant in a simple logistic model predicting a party's odds of complying with the gender quota. In sum, while there is certainly a tendency of leftist parties to be sympathetic to issues of equality, leftist ideology is an insufficient condition for the incorporation of women in party leadership and the resultant promotion of women's participation.

Analyzing the rich variation of Brazilian parties in gender composition of party leadership and in party institutionalization, I explore how party ideology, women's presence in party leadership, and party institutionalization interact to explain variation in women's electoral prospects across parties. As expected, I find that the positive effect of leftist ideology for women's electoral performance is actually a proxy for party institutionalization and women in party leadership. When we bring women in party leadership and party institutionalization into the analysis, the effect of ideology for women dissipates. This is because these are the mechanisms through which running with a leftist party helps female contenders, with the effect of leftist ideology being indirect.

Moreover, my analysis shows that the positive effects of women's presence in party leadership and party institutionalization for women's electoral prospects condition each other; when party capacity is lacking, regardless of female presence in parties' top decision-making bodies, and vice-versa, I demonstrate that the psychological, organizational, and material support so critical for realizing women's political ambition will also be deficient. In short, parties must have **both** the **capacity** (institutionalization) to promote women's political participation and the **will** (women-friendly leadership) to do so.

GENERALIZABILITY

This dissertation analyzes the extensive variation across Brazil's 29 political parties, 27 electoral districts, five election cycles, and 21,478 candidacies to the Brazilian Congress to assess the ability of the central hypotheses advanced in the extant literature to explain women's electoral prospects outside the standard advanced-industrial and institutionalized party context. I use the full universe of cases of candidacies to the Brazilian Congress from 1994 to 2010 to evaluate the conventional wisdom and advance

an original argument that establishes the interrelationship between two fundamental challenges to democratic representation in Brazil and beyond. The research design thus holds constant the national context while exploiting a diverse internal variation in parties (Chapters 4 and 5), electoral rules (Chapter 6), and in how parties interact with those rules (Chapters 5-7). While the focus of the dissertation is not therefore cross-national, an approach which I have argued cannot explain the conundrum of women's extreme underrepresentation in Brazil, consideration of the generalizability of my theory that party institutionalization and women in party leadership are the key predictors of women's electoral prospects is nonetheless worthwhile.

Latin America provides an excellent opportunity to explore the generalizability of my theory because, beyond being Brazil's broader geographic region, it is home to five of the 13 countries that employ candidate-based, or "preferential" proportional representation voting. In addition to Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru all have some form of preferential list voting (Schmidt, 2008). It is also the world's leading region in the use of legislated gender quotas, with Argentina pioneering the mechanism in 1991 and 10 other countries throughout Latin America soon following suit (see Table 1.3). Moreover, the crisis of representation by which I have framed this dissertation is one confronting the region in general (Jones, 2005). Can reforms that strengthen parties and incentivize their active promotion of women's political participation resolve democratic deficiencies in countries throughout Latin America and potentially beyond?

Table 2.2 incorporates aggregate-level data from Jones (2005), the Inter-American Development Bank's initiative – Gender and Political Parties in Latin America (GEPPAL) (http://www.iadb.org/research/geppal), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, 2012), and the Quotas Project (http://www.quotasproject.org) to demonstrate the

variation in party system institutionalization, the average proportion of women in the national executive committees (NECs) of the major parties in each country, and the overall percentage of women in their national legislatures. Although the limited N and aggregated character of the data prevent us from drawing any conclusions about the effects of our central variables of interest on the electoral prospects of individual women, the data allow for an illustration of the general plausibility of my theory beyond the Brazilian context.

Table 2.2. Party System Institutionalization, Women in National Party Leadership, and Women in Parliament: The Latin American Experience

COUNTRY	ELECT. VOL.	PARTY ROOTS	PARTIES & ELECTIONS LEGIT.	PARTY ORG	PSI INDEX	WMN IN LEG.	WMN IN NEC
URUGUAY	84	73	51	97	76	12	19
D.R.	75	75	50	98	75	21	14
NICARAGUA	84	62	34	98	70	40	20
HONDURAS	94	66	40	74	69	20	38
MEXICO	88	62	33	85	67	26	23
PANAMA	77	66	41	83	67	9	13
EL SALVADOR	90	62	35	78	66	26	25
CHILE	95	49	40	77	65	14	15
PARAGUAY	79	82	32	65	65	13	16
ARGENTINA	74	46	34	94	62	37	17
COSTA RICA	77	62	40	67	62	39	41
COLOMBIA	89	49	30	73	60	12	34
BRAZIL	80	49	40	66	59	9	16
BOLIVIA	66	60	26	72	56	25	40
VENEZUELA	60	47	42	73	56	17	21
PERU	51	54	34	75	54	22	31
ECUADOR	73	53	23	62	53	32	17
GUATEMALA	58	45	34	58	49	13	16

Note: Countries in bold have an "effective quota" (Jones, 2009).

Argentina and Costa Rica, the two nations historically enjoying the highest rankings on women's representation (excluding from consideration Cuba's non-democratic elections), do indeed fall at the median of Jones' party system institutionalization index, which captures electoral volatility, party roots in society, perceived legitimacy of parties and elections, and party organization (assessing party age and survey data of elites from the University of Salamanca's Parliamentary Elites of Latin America project) (Jones, 2005). Bolivia also scores at a moderate level of party system institutionalization (PSI), and has 25% women in its lower house. While both Costa Rica and Bolivia have an impressive average of 40% women in national party leadership structures, the average level of women in leadership across Argentine parties is only 17 percent. The PSI index for Chile and Paraguay is moderate, but their proportion of women in party leadership is weak, leading to a low proportion of women in office.

While the available data constrain any cross-national inferences, in future research, I hope to work collaboratively with country experts to compile a cross-national candidate-level database. Doing so would facilitate a more thorough assessment of the generalizability of my argument, and thus illuminate the capacity of reforms to strengthen parties and incentivize their promotion of women's political participation to resolve the crisis of representation confronting Latin America and beyond.

CONCLUSIONS

In the ensuing chapters, I empirically test the relative explanatory capacity of the rival hypotheses of the extant literature discussed above – voter bias and development, electoral institutions such as district and party magnitude, and party ideology – and of my central argument on the predictive power of party institutionalization and leadership for

women's electoral prospects in Brazil and beyond. I test these alternative explanations at the lowest available level, revealing their influence on the election of individual women (rather than on the overall proportion of women elected). Bringing the analysis to the candidate level and thus seizing Brazil's extensive interparty variation, this dissertation demonstrates the limitations of the traditional explanations for understanding women's extreme underrepresentation in Brazil, while illuminating the unanticipated role of parties in mediating women's political empowerment. My unique approach yields a thorough candidate-level analysis in which I amass a rich array of individual, party, and state-level data to examine how electoral rules, parties, and voters interact to affect women's representation.

While I do not contest the persistence of residual machismo and traditional gender roles in Brazil, I contend that neither machista voter attitudes nor state development levels bear explanatory power for women's electoral performance in Brazil. To be elaborated in Chapter 7, I argue that these traditional explanations of women's underrepresentation do not hold at the candidate level in Brazil because (some) women have crafted profiles enabling their electoral success even in the context of non-negligible voter hostility. Two ways in which female candidates can win in less developed states is by conforming to the traditional gender norms still present among machista electorates (supermadre), or by confronting such bias, bulwarked by the psychological, organizational, and material support of one's party (lutadora). In sum, I argue that although voter bias against women in politics will certainly deter women's political ambition (see Figure 2.3), once they become candidates, the development of their state does not determine their electoral prospects.

I explore variations in party support across states, parties, and sex in elections to the Chamber of Deputies in Chapters Five. Although the institutional context remains

constant, district development levels, district and party magnitudes, and party ideology, institutionalization, and leadership are varied, and I use this variation to explore how parties interact with electoral rules across distinct district and party contexts to mediate the effect of gender on electoral outcome. This approach allows me to bring parties to the fore of the analysis, which in turn highlights the unanticipated centrality of parties in arbitrating women's political empowerment in Brazil's candidate-centered elections.

In Chapter 6, I analyze variation in women's electoral prospects across the above mentioned electoral rules and the incentives for party support or party competition these rules generate to assess their explanatory capacity in elections to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and Senate. I contend that women have achieved unexpected success in the more prestigious Senate with seemingly unfavorable electoral rules because these rules incentivize parties to rally behind their candidate(s) in Senate elections. The analysis demonstrates that when electoral rules incentivize party support, the positive effect of women in party leadership is amplified, with female candidates of such parties being particularly well-equipped to win. The cross-chamber comparison highlights how the effects of electoral rules are not always direct, are often mediated by parties, and can interact to affect the electoral prospects of female political aspirants in Brazil.

Indeed, as illustrated in the chapter ahead, an exclusive emphasis on formal electoral rules rarely yields an adequate explanation of political outcomes, particularly in the context of weak institutions. Next, I discuss the limitations of Brazil's poorly designed and only recently enforced gender quota, and the resistance by inchoate and male-led parties to the implementation and subsequent reforms of the quota. I contend that the poor compatibility of open-list electoral rules with gender quotas cannot fully account for the severe underrepresentation of women in Brazil, nor can it explain the variation across its political parties. I conclude in Chapter 3, as in the chapters that

follow, that electoral and party systems intersect, and that comprehensive explanations for our most fundamental questions – such as the conditions enhancing representation and accountability – necessitate an integrative approach.

Chapter 3 – Brazil's *Lei de Cotas*: The Challenges of Incentivizing the Representation of Women in the Context of Preferential Voting and Inchoate Parties

Countries around the world have achieved considerable gains in women's representation through the implementation of gender quotas (Krook, 2009; Tripp and Kang, 2008). Whether through reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, or voluntary party quotas, such mechanisms have contributed to leveling the playing field between male and female contenders in the heretofore pervasively masculine political realm. The results, however, have not been uniformly positive. In several cases there have been instances of elite resistance and backlash, leading to a circumvention of the intended results of the quota (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, 2009).[1] Moreover, as will be explored below, not all electoral and party systems have proven conducive to the use of quotas.

This chapter contends that Brazil's *Lei de Cotas* has been substantially undermined not only by the country's open-list electoral context, but also by its abundance of inchoate parties. I start with a brief explanation of Brazil's electoral and party systems that establish for the reader a baseline understanding of Brazilian elections. I then discuss the hypothesized effects of the electoral system on women's representation, drawing on cross-national experiences under the condition of preferential (candidate-based list) voting to explain how open-list and other preferential electoral systems[2] may disadvantage female contenders. This is followed by a brief discussion of women's roles in contemporary Brazilian politics. Next, I review the literature on gender quotas and the

[11] In Bolivia for example, (predominately male) party elites actually tweaked the names of candidates to feign compliance with their electoral quota (Costa Benavides, 2003)!

[2] Examples of preferential voting systems are open-list PR, flexible formats, single transferable vote, and the single non-transferable vote (Schmidt, 2009).

global campaign to fast-track women's representation through quotas, and discuss the process of quota design, implementation, and reform in Brazil. Building on these discussions, I explain how Brazil's electoral context – shaped by both the electoral and party systems – has posed challenges to the quota law. I conclude that because electoral rules do not exist in a vacuum, formal institutional fixes to the electoral system must be paired with reforms that target the informal practices of party elites.

Driven by select success stories widely trumpeted by international organizations and pressures to appear 'modern' and inclusive, the use of quotas to enhance women's representation has diffused around the world (Dahlerup, 2006), reaching countries from Rwanda (ranked 1st worldwide, with 56.3% women in the lower house) to Afghanistan (ranked 35th with 27.7% women in the lower house) (IPU, 2012). Since closed-list proportional representation elections greatly facilitate the mechanics of candidate quotas (Htun and Jones, 2002), many analyses quickly dismiss quotas in open-list elections such as those in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and move on.[3] As a result, knowledge of the effects of quotas on women's representation in preferential voting systems remains limited. Discussions of the effects of party systems on the functioning of quotas are even more elusive.[4]

If quotas are to be promoted as mechanisms to achieve equality in legislative representation, we must broaden our understanding of their interactions with the electoral and party systems in which they are embedded. This chapter contributes to this mission, responding to Mona Lena Krook's call – "Ideally, future work will focus on analyzing single cases and situating them in relation to other quota campaigns" (2009, 226) – and

[3] Brazilian political scientist Clara Araújo (1999, 2001, 2005, 2007) has been a pioneer in research on the Brazilian quota, but much work remains.

[4] A noteworthy exception is Mona Lena Krook's recent study, which examines how systemic (electoral and party systems), practical, and normative institutions are gendered, can hinder women's representation, and can be ameliorated by reserved seats, party quotas, and legislative quotas, respectively (2009).

thus enhancing our comprehension of how quotas may be successfully employed to empower marginalized groups. It also reveals that while the Brazilian quota law is certainly limited in scope by the open-list format of its proportional elections, this feature cannot fully account for its striking failure to induce real change in the tendencies by many parties to marginalize women, nor can it explain the variation among parties. Rather, a key component of the explanation for why the quota has failed rests in the inchoate character of most Brazilian parties, for which the quota law remains a "lei que não pega" (law on paper only) and where, in the absence of effective party organizations, candidate recruitment and support are driven by the whims of domineering personalist party leaders. This conclusion has fundamental implications for reform efforts, which must work to strengthen parties if they are to achieve significant advances in the representation of women and other marginalized groups.

BRAZIL'S ELECTORAL CONTEXT

The Brazilian legislature is bicameral, with an upper house (Senate) and lower house (Chamber of Deputies) comprised of 81 and 513 members, respectively. Elections to the Chamber of Deputies are held every four years, concurrently with presidential, gubernatorial, senatorial, and state legislative assembly elections. Each of Brazil's 27 districts elects multiple statewide representatives to the Chamber of Deputies, with a minimum of 8 and maximum of 70. These floor and ceiling limits on the number of representatives per district, or "district magnitude," induce a high degree of malapportionment, with the most populous state, São Paulo, having more than ten times more inhabitants per deputy than the least populous state, Roraíma (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, 2010).

Voters cast a single vote for federal deputy, and while they can vote either for a party (*voto de legenda*) or a candidate, over 90% of valid votes[5] cast in the 2010 Chamber of Deputies elections were for a candidate (25% of *legenda* votes were for the governing Workers' Party [PT] alone).[6] Coalitions across Brazil's 29 registered political parties are common, and often afford political influence to smaller parties in spite of an electoral threshold. Seats to the Chamber of Deputies are allocated using the highest averages method (known as the d'Hondt formula) to calculate the electoral quotient threshold – the minimum votes parties/coalitions must earn to gain a seat.

Seats are then divvied up among each party/coalition according to each candidate's preference votes. For example, if a candidate attains the third highest quantity of votes in her coalition, but the coalition only wins enough total votes (equal to the sum of its candidates' preference votes and the member parties' *legenda* votes) for two seats, this candidate is not elected but remains the highest ranked substitute (*suplente*). Substitutes are called upon when elected members leave office before their term is up. It is quite common for federal deputies to contest the mayoral post, with municipal elections staggered by two years with presidential, gubernatorial, and federal and state legislative elections. In 2008, 277 senators and federal and state deputies ran for mayor or vice-mayor (Folha, 2008). Five senators and 87 federal deputies in the 54th Congress (2011-2014) ran for mayor in the October 2012 elections; 25 of those deputies were ultimately successful (Brazil Focus, 29 October 2012; Congresso em Foco, 2012). This practice means that substitutes often reach office, with the 53rd Congress (2007-2010) including 123 substitutes serving as federal deputies.[7]

---

[5] The "valid votes" total used in electoral calculations excludes blank and null ballots (as of 1998).
[6] Calculated by the author using data from the TSE website (http://www.tse.gov.br).
[7] Calculated by author using data from the Chamber of Deputies website (http://www2.camara.gov.br).

Brazilian elections – even for the legislative bodies – are largely candidate-centered affairs. This is a by-product of the open-list proportional representation (OLPR) system used in elections for federal and state deputy and municipal councilor, with electors casting their votes for candidates rather than for parties (as is the case in closed-list PR elections).[8] The open-list format incentivizes fellow partisans to compete amongst themselves (Ames, 2001; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Nicolau, 2006), leading to extremely expensive candidate-centered campaigns as candidates spend to lend visibility to their individual campaign (Samuels, 2001). The name and number of candidates rather than the party label often figures most prominently. In the (usually electronic) voting booth, electors are not presented with a list of candidates but instead must recall and key in the four-digit number of their candidate for federal deputy.[9] The first two digits are the party number (the PT is 13), with the second two indicating the candidate.

Figure 3.1. Electoral Flyer, Rio Grande do Sul (2010)

Figure 3.1 depicts a flyer from the 2010 elections, intended as a guide for electors to bring into the voting booth. Candidates scramble for the most desirable (easy to remember) number, with incumbents entitled to their

[8] As mentioned above, the *voto de legenda* option is infrequently exercised.

[9] Candidates for president and governor run under the two-digit party number, senatorial candidates have a three-digit number, and state legislative assembly candidates have a five-digit number. Electors must recall all of these numbers, or as is common, bring in a cheat sheet of sorts (see Figure 3.1).

number from prior campaigns and newcomers left to pick among the remaining available numbers. Throughout the 45-day campaign season, candidates contract drivers to circulate their districts in cars with external speakers blasting jingles that pound home their number for constituents.

Campaigns are privately-financed by donations from individuals and corporations, with an increasing share of revenues coming from parties. In the 2010 Chamber of Deputies elections, on average 16.1% and 43.5% of reported candidate funds came from corporations and party organizations, respectively. These campaigns are extremely expensive, with the average contributions for winning candidates in 2010 reaching R$1.1 million (over half a million dollars). Candidates spend a significant portion of their budgets traveling the large distances usually required to run a statewide campaign. For example, Amazonas (Brazil's largest state), is more than double the size of Texas at 1.5 million square kilometers, without the benefit of a well-maintained highway system. The production of campaign publicity materials (flyers, banners, stickers, etc.) often consumes the bulk of candidate budgets.

While candidates are also responsible for paying to produce their media advertisements, which can be quite expensive, the federal government actually allocates free television and radio air time to each party, with purchased air time being strictly forbidden and even "earned" media being highly regulated during the campaign season.[10] Negative campaigning – including parodies or other sketches by media outlets ridiculing particular politicians – is also illegal. For the Chamber of Deputies elections, a 25-minute segment is broadcast twice a day, three days a week, on all open (non-cable) television channels and radio stations for the 45-day campaign season in the form of *Horário*

[10] If the TSE deems a media outlet to have non-equitable coverage of candidates, fines are assessed. However, this practice, "isonomy," has thus far primarily been applied in executive elections (Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas, 2010).

Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral (HGPE, Free Hour of Electoral Propaganda), and also in off-years for party building in the form of *Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Partidária* (Free Hour of Party Propaganda). The federal government allocates this time in part (1/3) equally among parties and coalitions[11] and in part (2/3) in proportion to the size of their congressional presence (Lei Eleitoral 9.504/1997, Article 47). How parties subsequently divvy up the HGPE time among candidates has historically been at their discretion, although mandates for equitable distribution of HGPE time are the subject of proposed political reforms.

As predicted by Duverger's Law, the mechanical and psychological effects of Brazil's proportional representation electoral system have resulted in a plethora of parties, with 29 currently registered and an effective number of parties at the legislative level (ENPP) of 10.36 in 2010 (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2008, 2011). It is important to note, however, that nearly 42% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies are currently held by the top three parties (PT, PMDB, PSDB), with these parties winning five of the six presidential elections held since the country's return to democracy.

The PMDB, or Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, is a catch-all party that emerged from the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the only sanctioned opposition party for most of the 1964-1985 military regime. Although the PMDB has not run its own viable presidential candidate since it won the 1985 election, it remains a highly sought after coalition party that has alternately supported the rival parties, the PSDB and the PT.

The Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) was originally a center-left off-shoot of the PMDB, but since its 1988 founding has drifted rightward and become known

[11] To qualify parties/coalitions must currently have representation in the Chamber of Deputies.

for its support of neoliberal economic policies and technocratic directives, in addition to administrative decentralization and anti-corruption efforts. The PSDB's most prominent politician is the widely respected social scientist and popular former president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2001), who is credited with stabilizing Brazil's fiscal and political systems after rampant hyperinflation and the impeachment process of former president Fernando Collor de Melo (1990-92).

Finally, the Workers' Party (PT) is "Latin America's largest, most organized and arguably most innovative left party" (Hunter, 2010, 2). Founded in 1980 by São Paulo union leaders, liberation theologists, and leftist intellectuals and artists, the PT was pivotal in mobilizing the citizenry on a grassroots rather than corporatist basis and bringing democracy back to Brazil. The PT was seemingly in perpetual opposition until Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) finally won his (fourth!) bid for the presidency in 2002. Since then, the PT has grown tremendously and has remained in control of the presidency, with Lula's former chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, gaining election in 2010.

One of the most defining characteristics of Brazil's party system stems from its open-list variant of proportional representation legislative elections. The OLPR system formally diminishes the ballot control of party leaders, with candidates' rank order on lists and thus prospects for a seat determined not by the party leader but by candidate vote share. Until 2002, the *candidato nato*, or "birthright candidate," provision actually guaranteed incumbents a place on the party list, even if they had switched parties since first gaining election. This can result in weakened party discipline and undermine the significance of party labels for constituents. While a voluminous debate exists over the end product of the Brazilian party system, with Figueiredo and Limongi being the most prolific advocates of the view that presidential power and intra-legislative mechanisms

induce party discipline and cohesion in spite of OLPR (1995, 2000), "there is much less debate over the (anti-party) incentives of the electoral rules" (Desposato, 2006, 7-8).

The diminished ballot control by party leaders, the prevalence of candidate rather than party voting by electors, and the intraparty competition these factors induce led Carey and Shugart to characterize Brazilian elections as having a high degree of personalization (1995). Moreover, under the condition of intraparty competition, evidence suggests that the incentive to cultivate a personal vote increases with district magnitude (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Validini, and Suominen, 2005).[12] This is because candidates must differentiate themselves from the mass of candidates running in their party and others.

As demonstrated in the U.S. and comparative literatures, the personal vote – "that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record" (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987, 9) – reifies the "electoral connection" (Mayhew, 1974), incumbency, and personal wealth (Ames, 1995; Carey and Shugart, 1995). In such a system, candidates may also successfully use "identifier characteristics" indicating their societal grouping to distinguish themselves (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen, 2005). While voters often use party label as a heuristic, or information shortcut, in their decision-making calculus, voters may also employ such candidate traits, with "the gender of a candidate [being] one of the 'cheapest' bits of information to gather" (Valdini, 2010, 13). This is particularly likely in Brazil's open-list elections, where a single party is allotted at minimum 1.5 times the number of seats up for grabs, with the elector casting a single vote. For example, in 2006, the Partido Verde (Green Party – PV) in São Paulo ran 90 candidates (five were elected).

[12] Interestingly, the authors found district magnitude to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of a personal vote for systems without intraparty competition (Shugart, Validini, and Suominen, 2005; Valdini, 2010).

WOMEN AND THE PERSONAL VOTE

Recent studies find that the presence of the personal vote often has a negative effect on women's electoral prospects (Thames and Williams, 2010; Valdini, 2010). Although earlier scholarship had anticipated a positive effect of preferential voting on women's representation, presuming party elites to harbor more bias against women than would the electorate, these studies were based primarily in Western European countries (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994; Rule, 1994). Are Brazil's political parties also more biased against women than the electorate? Valdini explains the discrepancy in recent and earlier findings by the moderating effect of even moderate levels of voter bias on the relationship between the personal vote and women's representation (2010). In other words, the negative effect she finds of the personal vote on women's representation is conditional upon voter bias against women. In countries where voter bias is nearly absent, however, the personal vote does not have a significant effect on the overall proportion of women elected, a finding she expected would also apply to individual women's electoral prospects.[13]

To be precise, Valdini finds that when the percent of World Values Survey (WVS) respondents in a country strongly agreeing with the statement "men make better politicians than women" is very low (one standard deviation below the mean of 10%), the marginal effect of the personal vote on women in the legislature is not statistically different from zero. As more and more respondents strongly agree with this statement, the effect becomes increasingly negative (Valdini, 2010). With 11.4% of Brazilian respondents in the 2008 wave of the LAPOP survey strongly agreeing with this statement, but only 5.9% of Brazilian respondents for the 2005 World Values Survey strongly agreeing with the statement, it is not quite clear, but is plausible that the personal

[13] Personal communication with Valdini, April 30, 2011.

vote[14] may exercise a negative effect on women's representation in Brazil (LAPOP, 2008; WVS, 2005-2008).[15]

Table 3.1. OLPR, Voter Bias, and Women's Representation

	% Women in Lower House	Bias Against Women (% Strongly Agreeing)
Legislated and Party Quotas		
Brazil	8.8	5.9
Brazil*	8.8	11.4
Dominican Republic*	20.8	20.2
Ecuador*	32.3	5.0
Legislated Quotas		
Peru	21.5	2.3
Peru*	21.5	3.9
Poland	23.7	10.5
Party Quotas		
Chile	14.2	17.6
Cyprus	10.7	10.2
Luxembourg	25.0	-
Switzerland	28.5	3.5
No Quotas		
Finland	42.5	3.9
Latvia	23.0	-
Liechtenstein	24.0	-
San Marino	18.3	-

Sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2012); Schmidt (2008); World Values Survey (2005-2008)
* WVS unavailable so substituted 2008 AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2008). Given the observed differences between the AmericasBarometer and WVS, I included both scores when possible.

If the electoral disadvantage for women posed by the incentive to cultivate a personal vote is conditioned by voter bias, the severity of women's underrepresentation in Brazil is excessively heightened given relatively moderate levels of intense bias

[14] Valdini codes this dichotomously, and includes non-list variants such as SMD/plurality systems.
[15] This discrepancy is smaller for the total percentage of respondents agreeing (somewhat and strongly), with 30.8% of the 2005 WVS respondents agreeing, and 33.5% of the 2008 AmericasBarometer respondents agreeing (LAPOP, 2008; WVS, 2005-2008).

("strongly agree") against women. In a 2010 nationwide survey, 81.0-83.8% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with similar statements regarding perceived male political superiority, with only 4.1-4.7% strongly agreeing (and an additional 12.1-14.3% agreeing) (CESOP, 2010). Nevertheless, as displayed in Table 3.1, despite relatively moderate levels of voter bias, Brazil suffers the lowest rate of women's representation of all countries with preferential voting. Even countries with comparable (and higher!) levels of bias among voters outperform Brazil in terms of women's legislative presence (IPU, 2012; LAPOP, 2008; WVS 1981-2008).

Moreover, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Poland have all had significantly more success combining legislated gender quotas with preferential voting (see Table 3.1). In short, Brazil's OLPR electoral system cannot fully account for the near exclusion of women from political decision-making. It is also an insufficient explanation for interstate and interparty variation within Brazil. Accordingly, in the ensuing chapters, I consider how various parties interact with electoral rules such as OLPR and the quota to affect the electoral prospects of women in Brazil.

WOMEN AND POLITICS IN BRAZIL

As discussed in Chapter 1, this extreme underrepresentation of women persists in spite of the strength and breadth of the women's movement, their vast participation in other avenues of informal politics and among the party rank-and-file, and significant societal progress. Since gaining the right to vote by Getúlio Vargas' presidential decree in 1932 – itself the result of a prolonged battle for women's suffrage – women's political progress in Brazil has been gradual (see Table 3.2). Vargas' authoritarian *Estado Novo* phase (1937-1945) and the 1964-1985 military regime posed setbacks to this crawling progress. While a handful of women did serve during the period of military rule, it was

mostly as surrogates for their husbands or male relatives who had been imprisoned, exiled, or otherwise declared ineligible through the infamous Institutional Act Number 1, in what was a largely ceremonial congress (Avelar, 2001). Throughout this period, women remained economically and politically marginalized. As late as 1988, 78% of working women were employed in the lowest sectors, earning only 60% of that earned by men (Ipea, 1988, cited in Avelar, 2001).

Table 3.2. Women's Representation in the Chamber of Deputies (1932-2010)

Year	Candidates	Elected	Year	Candidates	Elected
1932	1	1	1978	-	4
1935	-	2	1982	58	8
1946	18	0	1986	166	26
1950	9	1	1990	229	29
1954	13	3	1994	185	32
1958	8	2	1998	348	29
1962	9	2	2002	480	42
1965	13	6	2006	627	45
1970	4	1	2010	929	45
1974	4	1			

Nevertheless, women mobilized in great numbers in the Amnesty and *Diretas Já* (Direct Elections Now) movements of the 1970s and 1980s, helping to re-democratize Brazil (Alvarez, 1990). Their activism propelled women's engagement in formal politics and in 1986, 26 women were elected to the Constitutional Assembly. This so-called "lobby do batom" (lipstick lobby) of the Constitutional Assembly achieved impressive results and revitalized women's insertion into the formal political realm. In the second election to occur since the implementation of the gender quota, the 2002 elections saw

another increase in women's political presence. It has since, however, plateaued across elected offices (see Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2. Women's Political Progress Stalled



To clarify the pervasively masculine character of Brazilian politics, a few points regarding the incumbency advantage and the revolving door are in order. Although the abovementioned "candidato nato" (birthright candidate) provision no longer exists, and rates of renewal are higher in the Brazilian Congress (an average of 46.2% from 1994-2010) than that of many countries allowing reelection, incumbency remains the key predictor of electoral success. Even after controlling for several candidate (sex, education, occupation, marital status, campaign finance), party (ideology, party magnitude, women on NEC), and district (Human Development Index) characteristics,

incumbents were 5 to 10 times more likely to win election than non-incumbents in the five recent elections to the Chamber of Deputies (1994-2010).

Moreover, this renewal, or "oxygenation" as it has been called in Brazil, has itself historically occurred among the politically savvy, with it "difficult (for an aspirant) to reach the parliament without having had some type of political experience" (Santos, 1999, 105). While Samuels' (2003) work on political ambition in the context of Brazilian federalism demonstrates that most politicians in Brazil do not seek a legislative career (using it instead as a springboard to subnational offices), it is also true that there is essentially a revolving door linking elected and appointed positions, with many politicians returning to the Congress after serving as mayor, governor, or even president. Of the federal deputies serving from 1987-1999, 19.8 and 72.3 percent (respectively) had already won executive and legislative elections in prior years, with 39.1% having been previously appointed to the bureaucracy (30.5% in the primary post) (Santos, 1999, 102-4).

Table 3.3. Women's Limited Presence across Elected and Appointed Posts

Elected office	**% Women (2010)**	**Appointed post in bureaucracy**	**% Women (2009)**
Governor	7.4	Federal Minister	5.4
Senator	14.8	State Secretary	16.5
Federal Deputy	8.8	Municipal Secretary (capitals)	19.9
State Deputy	12.9	Municipal Secretary	8.0
Mayor	9.1		
Municipal Councilor	12.5		

Yet, such a "political trajectory" has proven the least accessible to women (Álvares, 2004). In short, the widespread claim of permeability of Brazil's Chamber of Deputies rings hollow for those without some kind of prior political experience. As shown in Table 3.3, women comprise a meager 7.4 to 19.9 percent of all bureaucratic and

elected posts (other than the presidency) (Secretary of Women's Affairs, 2010), constituting a "vicious cycle" of exclusion that is difficult to break (Pinheiro, 2007, 83). The incapacity and/or unwillingness of most Brazilian parties to promote women's participation have essentially closed the traditional party-based trajectory to women. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, most of Brazil's few female politicians have managed to break the cycle of exclusion by toting traditional gender norms, inheriting familial political capital, or converting capital acquired through their experiences outside of formal politics into the requisite political capital.

An explanation of the limitations of Brazil's quota requires a brief survey of the international discourse and tremendous moment for the use of quotas to remedy gender inequities, followed by a discussion of the processes of quota design, implementation, and reform.

FAST-TRACKING WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION

Confronting the generally glacial pace of cultural changes, many nations have looked to quotas and other institutional reforms as promising mechanisms for fast-tracking the political participation of such marginalized groups. Indeed, the more than 100 countries that have implemented gender quotas have achieved marked results in enhancing the representation of women, with recent studies finding quotas to be the single greatest explanatory factor of women's representation (Tripp and Kang, 2008).[16] As I illustrate in this dissertation, however, due to extensive variation in the dynamics and enforcement of quotas and the nuances of the electoral and party systems in which

[16] With a sample of 153 countries (77 with a quota), Tripp and Kang found the effect of gender quotas to be positive and statistically significant. Constructing a baseline model (setting other common explanatory factors to their mean), they find that the addition of a quota raises the percentage of women elected from 9.3 to 16.1, a jump of more than 70% (2008, 351).

they are embedded, such institutional remedies have in many countries proven insufficient agents for enhancing women's representation.[17]

The *Platform for Action* agreed upon at the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 shifted the discourse on women and politics toward targeting mechanisms of exclusion and affirmed the goal of women's *equitable* decision-making power, recommending the use of positive affirmative action to achieve equality (Dahlerup, 2006, 4). Women's movements leveraged this discourse to confer legitimacy to still controversial quota measures, with international organizations such as the UN, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) playing an active role in promoting quotas (Dahlerup, 2006; International IDEA, 2011; IPU, 2011).

In 1992, the IPU issued a strong resolution emboldening the drive for equitable representation, "The concept of democracy will only assume true and dynamic significance when political policies and national legislation are decided upon jointly by men and women with equitable regard for the interests and aptitudes of both halves of the population" (IPU, 1994). The Beijing Platform subsequently asserted that "without the active participation of women and incorporation of women's perspective(s) at all levels of decision-making, the goals of equality, development and peace cannot be achieved" (Fourth UN World Conference on Women, 1995, Article 181). In sum, by the mid-1990s, the goal of women's empowerment had gained tremendous visibility, with quotas becoming *the* go-to solution to remedy their persistent exclusion from political power in many parts of the world (Dahlerup, 2006).

[17] Furthermore, recent studies have shown the insufficiency of quota laws in achieving meaningful substantive representation ("politics of ideas" (Phillips, 1995)), due not only to the unintended consequence of such laws limiting their benefactors' credibility and policymaking latitude (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008), but also to the heterogeneity of these groups and their interests (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, 2009). This study, however, is limited to explaining the conditions under which women get elected.

With 11 of 18 Latin American democracies adopting legislated gender quotas, it is considered the leading region in the drive to fast-track women's representation through quotas.[18] Eager to differentiate themselves from military regimes and accrue both domestic and external legitimacy, post-dictatorial governments have espoused a rhetoric of "good governance," a discourse often associated with equality and rights for marginalized groups (Araújo and Garcia, 2006). The story of Argentina's impressive success was widely trumpeted – just four years after introducing the quota in 1991, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies saw a fivefold increase in women's legislative presence. Referred to as the "Argentina 'contagion effect,'" countries across the region (and beyond) implemented party and legislative quotas in the late 1990s (Araújo and Garcia, 2006; Marx, Borner, and Camionotti, 2007).

BRAZIL'S *LEI DE COTAS*

The use of gender quotas in Brazil was initiated by the PT, which in 1991 instituted a requirement that party directorates must at minimum be comprised of 30% women. In 1993, the Unified Workers' Central (CUT), the country's largest union, followed suit. Although discussions of the successes of these measures as well as the Argentine quota appeared in reports from meetings of the women's movement in preparation for the 1995 Beijing Conference, along with recommendations for positive actions to achieve gender equality in decision-making spheres, much of the women's movement appears to have tiptoed around any explicit reference to legislated gender quotas (Araújo, 1999).

Instead, it was PT Deputies Marta Suplicy and Paulo Bernardo who first introduced the proposal to amend the electoral law to require parties to advance female

[18] Venezuela's 1997 gender quota was declared unconstitutional in 2000, reducing the number to 10. Most of the remaining countries have voluntary party quotas.

candidacies. In preparation for the pivotal 1995 Beijing Conference, Marta Suplicy (then federal deputy, currently senator) had attended two conferences, one in Brussels of the European Union, and one soon thereafter in São Paulo of Latin American and Caribbean women legislators where the groundbreaking experiences with quotas in Scandinavian countries and Argentina, respectively, were discussed. A few weeks after the São Paulo conference, building on Argentina's success and the international attention surrounding women's empowerment resulting from the upcoming Beijing Conference, she and Deputy Bernardo proposed the gender quota (Suplicy, 1996).

With a surprising lack of publicized debate throughout the process (Araújo, 1999, 117), several qualifications of the proposed quota law emerged.[19] One entailed an increase in the number of vacancies on candidate lists from 100% of the seats contested to 120% for each party (Suplicy, 1996).[20] Former Deputy, Senator, and Minister Emília Fernandes said the *bancada feminina* knew then that the quota law was "completely insufficient," but it was all they could get through (Interview with author, April, 2009). In practice, this compromise ensured that the number of vacancies available for men was not reduced, therefore sustaining general support for the measure (Fêmea, 2007). For example, before the increase in vacancies, each party in a state with a district magnitude of eight could advance eight candidates. Instead of the quota requiring that of these eight, no more than five were men, the increase allows each party to advance twelve candidates (and thus still allowing each party to advance eight male candidates).

---

[19] Among the provisions excluded from the approved version were proposals to require each candidate's sex be listed on ballots/electronic voting machines, greater female presence in HGPE, and a publicity campaign divulging the existence of the quota. The TSE did, however, require candidates to list their sex upon registering their candidacy (Araújo, 1999, 116).

[20] The quota approved also entailed a reduction of the target to 20 percent. Soon thereafter, the target was raised to 30%, with the permitted vacancies on candidate lists increased to 150% per party, or 200% per coalition. For the eight states with a district magnitude greater than 20, the number of vacancies is 200% per party (or 250% per coalition) (Araújo, 1999; Macaulay, 2006).

The result, however, is a diluted quota (Suplicy, 1996). With so many vacancies, parties need not fill their lists to be competitive and are therefore not incentivized to fill the quota (Interview with Former Deputy Judge Denise Frossard, June, 2009). In the end, the candidacies most lacking are female candidacies, with parties rarely coming close to meeting the quota. For example, in the 2010 elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the electoral rules allowed 11,414 candidacies (for 513 seats!), but there were "only" 4,857 candidates (42.6% percent of the available spots), 19.1% of these women.[21] Moreover, such a large number of candidates drives up campaign budgets by requiring that candidates spend more to differentiate themselves from their co-partisans. Given gender gaps in campaign finance (discussed above and in Chapters 4 and 5), this factor further disadvantages most women contenders.

Moreover, the effects of the Brazilian quota are inherently limited given open-list PR elections, where a party could advance 30% women candidates and still elect an exclusively male delegation. Closed-list PR elections with placement mandates almost guarantee that candidate quotas will deliver results. Placement mandates, which require parties to present a pre-ordered list of candidates that alternates candidates by sex in accordance with the quota target, stipulate that party leaders put women in electable positions. For example, for a quota of 30%, every third candidate must be female. This inhibits the disturbing tendency of party leaders to cluster female candidacies at the bottom of their lists. But in the Brazilian case, where candidate ordering on the pre-electoral list is presumably irrelevant for electoral outcome, placement mandates are inapplicable.

[21] Calculated by the author using data from the TSE, following Samuels (2008).

The top-down implementation of the *Lei de Cotas* driven by the Argentine experience and the hype surrounding the Beijing Conference resulted in a process that was not only a poor fit for the Brazilian system, but also not organic, lacking broad participation from the women's movement (Araújo, 1999). Many feminists viewed quotas with reservation due to their emphasis on difference, quantification, and the potential to set a ceiling, and no consensus emerged. In the final reports and statements of the women's movement leading up to the Beijing Conference, quotas were not mentioned; rather, the women's movement emphasized pushing parties directly to incentivize women's participation in party life and as candidates and in particular, to promote political capacity-building opportunities for women (Araújo, 1999). As recently as 2009, more than a decade after its implementation, less than a quarter of respondents in a national survey had even heard of the quota law (Ibope, 2009). It is therefore no surprise that the generic quota, a product of diffusion from the Argentine success, has not materialized results in Brazil's quite different open-list PR elections.

While the above narrative provides part of the explanation for the failure of the quota, it is not the entire story. Brazil ranks the 6th lowest in terms of women legislators of the more than 60 countries with legislated quotas, and other countries have attained considerably greater success combining OLPR and quotas (IPU, 2012; Quota Project, 2012). Moreover, some parties have achieved significantly more results than others. In sum, the mechanics of OLPR elections are part of the problem, but we must also consider the context in which these rules are embedded. The following discussions on the limited results of the quota and its recent mini-reform demonstrate the insufficiency of an exclusive focus on changing the formal rules; rules do not exist in a vacuum, and adequate consideration must be given to the interactions between electoral rules, parties, and voters.

PARTIES AND THE (REFORMED) *LEI DE COTAS*

As North argued, formal institutional change that "ignores the deep-seated cultural inheritance that underlies many informal constraints" will often fall short of producing a new equilibrium; even in the instance of a "wholesale change in the formal rules…there will be many informal constraints that have great survival tenacity" (1990, 91). Consistent with accounts of layered institutional change (Thelen, 1999), male politicians voting to implement the quota sought rationally to accommodate demands for change and greater inclusion while maintaining their own power, which would have necessarily been diluted by an effective gender quota (Fêmea, 2007).[22] As will be substantiated in the ensuing chapters, electoral rules are endogenous to power structures themselves, and despite the focus of the electoral systems literature, such rules rarely exercise a direct and unmediated effect on outcomes.

Araújo explains that debate against the quota was so limited because there was a complicit understanding that "quotas would not alter the political engineering of the process of political composition of candidacies and of competition" (1999, 129). A clear instance of layered institutional change (Thelen, 1999), the quota was summarily diluted and pushed through with no expectation that it would actually change the power structures in place. Indeed, Deputy Jandira Feghali stated that while it was politically incorrect for a politician to position himself against the gender quota, "they also knew deep down that it (the quota) did not have the power to alter this structure, such that nothing passed that signified concrete support" (quoted in Araújo, 1999, 125). Given that mere inclusion on the electoral list was secondary to "the weight of subsequent

[22] "The political parties – institutions notoriously masculine in terms of their leadership, functioning, and priorities – were able to make it such that the minimum of 20% was not defined as obligatory in the legislation, and that the number of spaces on the electoral list was increased…so that the number of spaces available for male candidates did not diminish" (Fêmea, 2007, IX.150, 10).

arrangements that are necessary to turn a candidacy potentially electable," the potential of the quota to fundamentally alter power structures through the incorporation of new voices into the political decision-making process was inherently limited (Araújo, 1999, 129). As stated by Deputy Luiza Erundina, the quota law "has had almost no efficacy, it was merely a formal achievement" (quoted in Agência Câmara de Notícias, 2011a).

In short, an excessive emphasis on formal structures is inappropriate. "Many studies have focused on the formal recruitment process as set out in legal regulations, constitutional conventions and formal party rules. These studies often assume that the formal processes determine the outcome. The obvious weakness of this approach is that formal rules may have little bearing on informal practices" (Norris, 1997, 9). As I make clear in the following discussion of the inability of even the emboldened quota to compel party leaders to comply, comprehensive reform efforts must target both formal and informal constraints in order to induce adaptation.

In the wake of international women's day in 2009 with heightened pressure from the women's caucus (*bancada feminina*) and women's movement stalwarts such as the Feminist Center for Studies and Advisory Services (Cfemea), President Lula's Secretariat of Women's Affairs (SPM) formed a Tripartite Commission (with representatives from the executive and legislative branches as well as from civil society) to deliberate and propose changes to the Electoral Law that would enhance women's participation in formal politics. According to then Minister Nilcéa Freire of the SPM, the Commission's approach was to ratchet up support for proposals that had already made their way to Congress, thereby facilitating their quick adoption.

One such measure is Deputy Luiza Erundina's 2002 proposal (6216/2002) requiring parties to devote: (1) 30% of their federally-allocated funds for party organization to the promotion of women's participation and (2) 30% of their publically-

funded television and radio propaganda time to women. Although a government that espouses rhetoric of equality[23] should in theory not object to directing federally-funded party resources to effectuate such equality, debates with Chamber leadership ensued in the Commission deliberations[24] and the approved version entailed only a fraction of these requirements. Other proposals of the women's movement considered by the Commission included public financing of electoral campaigns and the adoption of closed-lists with placement mandates,[25] which would respectively level the playing field for outsider candidates (which women often are), and strengthen Brazil's notoriously inchoate parties while allowing for a strict implementation of the gender quota.

Despite this broad toolkit of possibilities advocated by the *bancada feminina* and women's organizations in the Tripartite Commission, the accomplishments of the subsequent mini-reform (12.034/2009) were more limited. The approved measures directly affecting women include: (1) changes in the language of the quota law from "reserve" to "fill" a minimum of 30% and maximum of 70% of candidacies per party list with candidates of each sex (Article 10), (2) a minimum of five percent of federally-allocated party organization funds devoted to the promotion of women's participation (Article 44), and (3) a dedicated 10% of each party's publically-funded television and radio time (in both election and non-election years) to women (Article 45). Importantly, these changes come with enforceable sanctions, perhaps the most noteworthy achievement of the mini-reform.

---

[23] On March 5, 2008, President Lula approved by executive decree the Second National Plan of Policies for Women, a comprehensive plan of objectives and specific proposals for advancing women's rights (Secretary of Women's Affairs).

[24] Personal communication with civil society and *bancada feminina* representatives to the Commission.

[25] Comissão Tripartite irá rever a Lei Eleitora [Tripartite Commission to reform the Electoral Law]. March 30, 2009; Alerta Feminista dos Movimentos de Mulheres que Assinam a Plataforma dos Movimentos Sociais pela Reforma do Sistema Político [Feminist Alert of Women's Movements that Signed the Social Movements' Platform for Reforms of the Political System], October 31, 2008.

In spite of this impressive convergence of attention to women's underrepresentation and the ensuing concrete policy proposals and actual changes to the institutions perceived to be undermining women's participation, the immediate results were minimal. Although significantly more women threw their hat in the ring in the 2010 elections, the end result was stagnation, with a Chamber of Deputies with exactly the same number of women that it had in the prior legislature, for a meager total of 8.8 percent. This failure to induce change corroborates my claim above that formal institutional mechanisms are poorly situated for alleviating inequality in the context of weak institutions.

The often mere formality of the written rules of the game among Brazil's weakly institutionalized parties becomes evident when considering the enforcement of the 2009 mini-reform to the gender quota (12.034/2009). In a 6-1 vote on August 12, 2010 by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the ministers ruled that "30% women is law" and lists that did not comply with the recently revised electoral law would have to increase the number of female candidates, decrease the number of male candidates, or have the list rejected, with "exceptional" justifications being granted only by the electoral court (Abreu, 2010; Coelho and Costa, 2010).

The decision was widely praised by scholars, activists, and politicians sympathetic to women's representation, with Sônia Malheiros Miguel, Undersecretary of Institutional Articulation for the Minister of Women's Affairs, proclaiming "The decision of the TSE is historic, because it signifies recognition by the highest electoral court in Brazil of the necessity for this country to overcome this embarrassing democratic deficit, ensuring a more equitable participation of Brazilian women in the political process." After all, as stated by demographer and Professor for the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) Dr. José Eustáquio Diniz Alvez, "The decision of the TSE to

require compliance with Law 12.034, of the 29th of September of 2009, must be doubly celebrated, because the Law is meant to be complied with and the country cannot condone this culture of 'Lei que não pega' ('Law on paper only')" (quoted in Agência Patrícia Galvão, 2010).

But under pressure from political parties, regional electoral officials varied widely in their enforcement of the quota in the 2010 legislative elections (e.g., Agência de Notícias da Justiça Eleitoral, 2010a), and in the end less than 18% of the party/coalition lists met the 30% quota (*Diário do Grande ABC*, 2010). Of the 606 parties contesting the Chamber of Deputies elections, more than 44% did not run a single female candidate.[26] In spite of the reformed quota and credible threats of enforcement, the "lei que não pega" culture among party elites of Brazil's inchoate and male dominant parties persists unscathed.

MIXED RESULTS

The 2010 elections delivered mixed results. In addition to the election of Brazil's first female president (with Dilma Rousseff winning 56% of the vote in the second round) a female candidate was the top vote earner in seven of the 27 statewide districts in the Chamber of Deputies elections. Nevertheless, the percent of female deputies remained the same, and there was a drastic increase in the proportion of extremely unviable candidacies among women, reeking of a widespread offering of sacrificial lambs by parties seeking to make a minimal but empty gesture at the reformed gender quota law (Wylie, 2011). Secretary of Women's Affairs, Eleonora Menicucci, quipped "The political parties are not interested in complying with the (quota) legislation. The law is as follows for every party: it must have at least 30% (candidates) of each sex. So if it has

[26] Calculations by the author using data from the TSE.

70% men, it has to have 30% women, but the parties do not respect it. At all. Party resources for women are few and far between." (Quoted in Grayley, 2012). Looking just to party funds (which, along with campaign materials, production assistance for the HGPE spots, and support from the party's gubernatorial campaign, constitute valuable party resources for a campaign), we see that in 2010, among the top 14 parties, national directorates devoted only 8% of their party funds to the campaigns of women, who represented 19.7% of the total candidates. The PSDB, which advanced 20.4% female candidates, dedicated less than 2% of its funds to women candidacies (Mendonça and Navarro, 2012).

In the next chapters, I descriptively explore the variation in the central explanatory factors and women's electoral performance (Chapter 4), subsequently delving into variation across and within candidate sex, states, and parties in the Chamber of Deputies elections and how this variation can explain women's electoral prospects in Chapter Five. I find that female candidates are indeed electorally disadvantaged, but that party-level factors can ameliorate this disadvantage. Next, in Chapter 6, I compare electoral prospects in concurrent elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. By providing institutional variation while maintaining most other factors under consideration constant, the controlled comparison analysis sheds light on the difficulties faced by women in Brazil's OLPR elections, where incentives for intraparty competition often leave female candidates un-prioritized and lacking the necessary structure to wage a successful campaign, and how party support can overcome these obstacles. When electoral rules incentivize party support, as in the Senate, its effect is amplified, with women running in parties that are institutionalized and incorporate women in party leadership being particularly well-equipped for electoral success.

Chapter 4 – Data, Methods, and Descriptive Analyses

The current chapter highlights the significant variation in women's electoral performance across Brazilian political parties and states, around which I design the comparative analyses that follow. I advance an array of quantitative and qualitative data to reveal the central explanatory factors substantiating gendered variation in electoral success as well as variation in women's electoral prospects across states, parties, and electoral rules. The research design thus blends most-similar and most-different strategies, comparing women vs. men who succeed in elections to the Chamber of Deputies, women who succeed vs. fail in the Chamber elections, women vs. men who succeed in elections to the Senate, and women who succeed in the Chamber elections vs. women who win election to the Senate.

This strategy illuminates the two central research questions – (1) what are the obstacles confronting female political aspirants in Brazil, and (2) how have Brazil's few female politicians managed to defy the odds and gain election – by allowing me to control for several individual, party, district, and institutional characteristics potentially explaining women's extreme underrepresentation in Brazil. In answering these questions, I focus on the candidate level, leveraging extensive variation across Brazil's 29 registered political parties which in turn reveals parties' unanticipated centrality in arbitrating women's political empowerment in Brazil.

First, in this chapter I discuss issues related to data, methods, and measurement, while presenting several descriptive analyses and introducing my party institutionalization index. This step exhibits the extensive variation within Brazil across states, electoral rules, parties, sex, and women that I endeavor to explain in the ensuing chapters. Before proceeding, however, I want to emphasize that I meticulously collected

data from numerous sources to bring to bear on this research agenda. My database of several individual, party, and district-level characteristics of *all* 21,478 candidacies to the Brazilian Congress – carefully crafted in the last three years – is a unique contribution, and it is my hope that it will be employed to illustrate numerous other research inquiries concerning electoral success in Brazil. Unfortunately, data limitations mean that exceedingly few studies outside the US literature (which is itself inherently limited in variation given the two-party system) analyze the effect of gender on electoral performance at the candidate level.[77] In spite of the intense data collection required, I was compelled by my initial observations of intriguing variation in women's political presence across Brazil's 27 states and 29 parties to eschew the more straightforward, but given my research questions, excessively aggregated[78] cross-national approach and delve into measuring and explaining the variance in women's electoral prospects in Brazil. In this chapter, I preview this variation. First, I discuss the data and methods employed.

MISSING DATA

The full universe approach has the advantage of ample variation on electoral success and party-level factors. Yet, the inclusion of effectively non-viable candidates introduces missing data on a few variables, particularly campaign finance. Of the 21,478 candidacies, 36.0% did not report their campaign contributions. While 164 of the 7924 candidacies with missing data for campaign finance were successful, the vast majority were non-viable, with an average vote share of 0.19 percent. There are also missing data

[77] The two exceptions that I know of are Murray's 2007 study of electoral performance in France, and Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki, and Crisp's 2010 analysis of electoral success in single transferable vote systems.

[78] The aggregate approach is especially suspect in a case like Brazil, where vast variation across its many parties is averaged out thus leaving unanswered fundamental questions regarding how different parties interact within similar constraints. It is also not conducive to understanding electoral success in candidate-centered contests.

on some of the other individual characteristics and the proportion of women in party leadership for a few parties.

James Honaker, Gary King, and Matthew Blackwell's Amelia II program uses a bootstrapping-based algorithm to impute data missing from time-series-cross-sectional data (Honaker, King, and Blackwell, 2010). In short, this program uses a bootstrapping-based algorithm to impute *m* values for the missing data, based on the case's scores on the nonmissing variables and the scores of other cases in the cross-section or time-series with nonmissing data on campaign finance. It runs a series of imputations to produce *m* datasets that the user can append to a single dataset.[79]

While it is mathematically sound (Honaker, King, and Blackwell, 2010), it can generate nonsensical values and leaves you with *m* new datasets, which can be merged and accounted for in Stata, but at the cost of additional computing time. It also presumes that the data are missing completely at random (MCAR), which may very well be untrue in the case of campaign finance. In the multilevel analyses of electoral performance in the Chamber of Deputies (Chapter 5) and Senate (Chapter 6), I alternately estimated the models including the original data with observations missing data listwise deleted (with most of these cases being non-viable), and using the multiply imputed data.

I exclude from consideration candidacies that were deemed invalid by the electoral court, as such candidacies introduce unwarranted error into the prediction of electoral prospects. For example, a seemingly viable candidacy of a longtime politician recently exposed in a corruption scandal and therefore deemed ineligible, would have likely been predicted to succeed by the model had their invalid status been ignored. With their name removed from the final ballot due to ineligibility, their vote total would be

[79] Statistical software allows the user to specify the merged dataset (of *m* datasets + the original) as multiply imputed thus taking into consideration the uncertainty regarding the imputed data.

zero despite prediction for success thus enhancing the residuals (difference between observed outcome and predicted outcome based on values of independent variables) and decreasing the fit of the model to the data. Instead, I include only valid candidacies in the analyses included in this dissertation.

DATA COLLECTION

Candidate Level

Using the *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*'s (TSE) online electoral returns, I gathered data on the quantity of votes, electoral outcome, party name/number, sex,[80] educational attainment, and reported occupation of the 21,478 valid candidates to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate from 1994 to 2010. I gathered data on members of congress from the Chamber of Deputies and Senate websites as well as Senate biographies to determine the mandates (to be) served ("titular" and substitute) from 1991-2015, and used this information to determine incumbency. Distinct use of accents and spellings and orderings of names or nicknames on these websites and in the electoral rolls required that I manually input the information it into my database.

I also collected state-level rolls of individual campaign contributions to candidates by election and created subtotals of contributions to each candidate disaggregated by source (corporate, party, individual, self-financed). I merged these data into the database meticulously to navigate issues related to the extensive missing data on campaign finance for non-viable candidacies. I created a unique identifying number for each candidate, reconciling disparities in the spelling, ordering, and use of accents in names, parties, and even dates of birth across the five election cycles. Finally, I calculated subtotals of each

[80] Women are coded 1, men 0. I scrolled the candidacies looking for instances of (apparently) random error based on the baby name guidelines (Valdini, 2010), conducting internet searches when possible. Based on these findings I manually adjusted the sex coding when necessary.

state-level vote in each election, and used this and each candidate's quantity of votes attained to measure their share of the valid candidate votes. This measure excludes from consideration blank and null votes, as well as party label votes.[81]

Party Level

Figure 4.1. Power and Zucco's Scaled Estimates of Ideology – Variation over Time



Source: Brazilian Legislative Surveys (Power and Zucco, 2011).

For party ideology, I attained Tim Power and Cesar Zucco's scaled estimates of the ideology of 11 of Brazil's 28 legislative parties based on several waves of their Brazilian Legislative Surveys (see Power and Zucco, 2009).[82] The ten-point scale ranges from left (1) to right (10), with a range of 1.36 (PC do B in 2001) to 7.37 (PPB in 2001)

[81] For more information on the prevalence of blank and null voting in Brazil, see Power and Roberts (1995) and Power and Garand (2007).
[82] The data used here have yet to be published and were obtained from the authors, 25 March, 2011.

and mean of 4.18. The authors use survey responses from legislators of other parties, rescaling the data "to account for idiosyncrasies in responses as well as variation in use of the survey scale across time" (Power and Zucco, 2009, 218). An advantage of the data is the variation of time, which accounts for the moderation of many parties over time (See Figure 4.1). Although using this superior measure of ideology necessitates dropping smaller party candidates from the analysis, the 11 parties included (PC do B, PDT, PFL/Democratas, PMDB, PPR/PPB/PP, PPS, PL/PR, PSB, PSDB, PT, PTB) do represent 94.7% of the candidates elected to the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010).[83]

To maintain the full universe of candidacies, I supplement Power and Zucco's ideology variable with a dichotomous coding of ideology (a left-non-left indicator) using data from Mainwaring (1999) and platforms on party websites. This tremendously facilitates the inclusion of the barrage of "partidos nanicos" (tiny parties) that often lack precise ideological platforms; most are clearly non-leftist, locating somewhere between center and right (if on the traditional scale at all).

I employ the proportion of women in both national and state-level party leadership in this dissertation. I gathered data on women's presence in party national executive commissions (NECs) from the Inter-American Development Bank's Gender and Political Parties in Latin America (GEPPAL) website, and cross-checked these against party websites. For state party leadership, I examined party leadership rolls submitted to the TSE for each party across the 27 districts. If a roll was missing, I searched the party website, looking either for a list of the leadership or signed documents, which often include the party leaders at the end. For both levels, I researched any names

[83] This excludes candidates from the following parties with congressional representation: PAN, PHS, PMN, PRB, PRN, PRONA, PRP, PRTB, PSC, PSD, PSDC, PSL, PSOL, PST, PT do B, PTC, PV (148 elected of 6800 candidates = 2.18% success rate); and candidates from the following parties with no congressional representation: PCB, PCO, PGT, PSN, PSTU, PTN, PTRB (0 elected of 825 candidates = 0.00% success rate).

with an ambiguous gender, and counted as party leadership only those members with an office. At minimum, this includes the party president, vice-president, secretary general, and treasurer.

In creating my party institutionalization index (discussed further below), I first calculated measures of party seat shares (=party magnitude/district magnitude) and vote share, merging into my database a separate tally from the TSE of each party's total candidate and party label votes in each state, by election. I then collected data on party age from party founding dates listed on TSE website, cross-checked against party websites, used this information to calculate party age, by party in each election, and merged it into my database. In cases where the party simply changed names but maintained the same party number,[84] I used the original founding date to calculate the age.

I compiled data on state party membership from counts of affiliates by state party over time reported to the TSE. I calculated each state party's share of party affiliates by state in 2002, 2006, and 2010 (using 2002 data for 1998). For party funds, I analyzed each party's 2010 report to the TSE of monies and intraparty (national to district) transfers, including both "fundos partidários" (publically-funded party funds) provided by the government in proportion to its vote share in prior Chamber of Deputies elections,[85] and "fundos próprios" (a party's own funds), and merged this into my database.

For additional data on party organization, I explore party presence in a state and party leadership. My data on party presence throughout each state come from the municipal party organizations reported to the TSE. For each state party, I totaled up the

[84] PFL/DEM, PL/PR, PPR/PPB/PP, PRN/PTC, PSN/PHS, PTRB/PSL.
[85] Five percent of the funds are distributed equally among parties, 95% in accordance to their vote share.

municipal party organizations that are currently active,[86] and then calculated each state party's share of the total number of active municipal party organization across parties in their state. For party leadership, I analyzed multiple years of each state party's leadership rolls on the TSE website to determine whether there exists alternation in party leadership.

To ascertain party magnitude, I merged into my database the TSE data (reported separately) on the number of seats won by each state party, by election. I then cross-checked these data with my own measure of the total number of candidates in each state party reported as "elected" in my database. This additional step was necessary because the separate TSE report does not include a zero for the parties that did not win seats, so this allowed me to manually code 0 for candidates running in state parties that did not win a single seat. Party magnitude varies from 0 to 20.

District Level

District magnitude is constant in each state for the elections under consideration, and readily available from the Chamber of Deputies website. As discussed in Chapter 3, district magnitude varies from 8 to 70 in the Chamber of Deputies. For the Senate, elections in 1994, 2002, and 2010, were for two-thirds (54) of the seats, while elections in 1998 and 2006 were for one-third (27), so the district magnitude varies from one to two. To control for the competitiveness of a district, I calculate the effective number of candidates in each election by state, which is equal to 1 divided by the sum of the squared vote share of all candidates in district j in election k: $1/\sum voteshare_{ijk}^2$ (Moser and Scheiner, 2004; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989).

[86] Current as of June, 2012. Data retrieved from http://www.tse.jus.br/partidos/partidos-politicos/certidao-de-composicao-partidaria.

Figure 4.2. From South Africa to Estonia: A Map of Brazilian States' Country Equivalents on the Human Development Index (2005)



For district development, I use district-level measurements of the Human Development Index (HDI), which is an index of the adult literacy rate and gross enrollment ratio, the log of GDP per capita, and longevity (UNDP).[87] I gathered these

[87] The following link further illuminates how the HDI is calculated:

data from Brazil's Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea, 2010a). As depicted in Figure 4.2, the HDI scores across Brazil vary significantly, with 2005 assessments from the UN showing the most developed state (the Federal District) on par with Estonia (ranked 38/175), and the least developed state (Alagoas) ranking just under South Africa at 120th of 175 (Ipea, 2010a; UN Human Development Report, 2009).[88]

These data comprise a multilevel database of the electoral performance of candidates to Brazil's two legislative chambers. I use this database to ascertain the factors most conducive to women's electoral success in elections to the Brazilian legislature.

HIERARCHICAL MODELING

Many quantitatively-inclined scholars of gender and politics have advocated the adoption of multilevel modeling techniques (e.g., Hughes, 2008; McConnaughy, 2007; Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes, 2007). Through multilevel modeling, we are able to model the influence of context (i.e., time, state) and thereby avoid the assumptions of interchangeability and independence of individuals often made in standard regression analyses. Moreover, whereas inferring individual-level characteristics from the aggregate level is susceptible to the ecological fallacy, the inference of group-level phenomena from aggregated individual-level data may suffer from the atomistic/individual fallacy. In order to avoid these inference-based problems, we should take advantage of the availability of multilevel modeling techniques to consider these varying levels in their rightful contexts. This approach provides leverage on the role of district-level phenomena in differentiating the impact of individual-level factors such as gender and education on the electoral performance of candidates. Such an approach renders greater appreciation of

---

http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/technote_1.pdf. While gender related indices are also available nationally, they are unfortunately not yet available subnationally in Brazil.

[88] With recent changes to the calculation of the HDI, I used 2005 data to be sure both the cross-national data and the UNDP's calculations for the Brazilian states were measuring the same thing.

the variation across states in the significance of a candidate's gender for their electoral prospects.

In addition to these theoretical justifications, empirical evidence further attests to the relevance of multilevel modeling for this research. First, state-by-state regression analyses demonstrate that the effects of a candidate's sex on candidate vote share are not constant across Brazil, but vary significantly by state (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3. Running as a Woman in Chamber of Deputies Elections – Differences across Brazil (1994-2010)



We can use the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which measures the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by each level and is derived from the individual- and group-level variance components of the unconditional multilevel

model, to quantify this variation (Luke, 2004). Another way of looking at the ICC is the expected correlation between two candidacies chosen randomly from a given level (Hox, 2002). Given the district-level ICC of 0.139,[89] we see the non-negligible extent of clustering at the state level. The expected correlation between any two randomly chosen candidates in a state is 0.139. This means that if we merely pooled the data and used OLS to estimate the model, we would violate the classical assumption of uncorrelated error terms. A rule of thumb for evaluating the size of the ICC is whether the design effect (1 + [average cluster size -1] * ICC) exceeds two; if so, multilevel modeling is warranted (Muthén and Satorra, 1995). The design effect (105.69)[90] here well exceeds the convention, thus providing further evidence of the increased leverage proffered by the multilevel design.

In sum, the use of hierarchical modeling allows us to account for the non-independence of observations, in particular the correlations among candidates running in the same state. It nests candidates within their state-level contexts, modeling cross-level interactions such as the potentially mediating roles of district development, magnitude, and competitiveness on the effect of candidate sex on electoral outcome. By estimating the naïve model (empty, with only the hierarchical structure modeled) of candidate vote share in the Chamber of Deputies, we found a district level ICC of 0.139, demonstrating that 13.9% of the variance in vote share is attributable to the district level. It is therefore essential that the correlation among candidates running in the same district is accounted for, and hierarchical modeling is the most sophisticated accessible technique for handling such clustering at the district-level.

---

[89] ICC = $\rho = \sigma^2_{u0} / (\sigma^2_{u0} + \sigma^2_r)$, or proportion of variance explained by level 2.

[90] Design effect = 1 + (Average cluster size 754.2 – 1) * 0.139 = 105.69

Given the theoretical, statistical, and empirical justifications outlined above, in the analyses of Chapters 5 and 6 I estimate hierarchical models of an individual candidate's prospect of election. Rather than assuming an interchangeable blob of individuals (as in the standard regression analysis), I use the hierarchical approach to embed the individual candidates in their electoral contexts while controlling for several proxies of candidate quality. This technique also sheds light on how these multilevel characteristics interact, i.e. how district magnitude or party ideology may intermediate the effect of candidate sex on electoral outcome. I estimate both continuous (Models (1-3)) and dichotomous measures of electoral performance (Model (4-6)), where Y_{ij} denotes the predicted vote share of individual i in district j, with u_{ij} assumed to be normally distributed (0, σ^2), and π_{ij} denotes the probability of individual i in district j getting elected:[91]

(1) $Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1\mathrm{j}} x_{ij} + r_{ij}$

(2) $\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} W_j + u_{0j}$

(3) $\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} W_j + u_{1j}$

(4) $\log[\pi_{ij}/(1 - \pi_{ij})] = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1\mathrm{j}} x_{ij}$

(5) $\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} W_j$

(6) $\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} W_j$

Models (2-3) and (5-6) display how hierarchical modeling uses level-2 variables to model the intercepts and effects (slopes) of level-1 variables on the outcome of interest. The cross-level interaction allows me to explore whether district magnitude, competitiveness, development, or some unobserved district influence predict the effect of candidate gender on electoral outcome (instead of assuming that the effect of candidate

[91] Note Model (1) includes a level-1 variance term, r_{ij}, or the variation between individuals within a district j, which is not used in the logit model (Models (4-6)) where the mean determines the variance (Luke, 2004).

gender is the same throughout Brazil). Moreover, by including cross-level interactions and district-specific error terms (u_{0j}, u_{1j}), this structure allows for non-independence – or observed and unobserved correlations – among candidates running in the same district. Given the particularities of state campaigns in Brazil's decentralized federalist context, the hierarchical approach is much preferred to the common but untenable assumption of independence of observations, with at best clustered error terms by district (as would be done in more standard regression analysis with the clustered robust standard errors option) that do not explicitly model the district-level effects.

Note that in addition to the random intercepts by district, I also include random slopes for *female*. By maintaining only random intercepts for the remaining variables, I model unobserved correlations between any two candidacies from the same district, but model fixed effects for these other independent variables, thus assuming that their effects on the outcome are the same across districts. The addition of random terms to the slopes for *female* allows for the possibility that the effect of this predictor varies across states, with the values of these coefficients calculated for each district rather than across the entire sample.[92] The understanding that women's electoral prospects vary across Brazil is, after all, one of the central premises of this dissertation.

To account for the possibility that an individual's prior candidacy could influence their latter candidacies, I incorporated a third-level, essentially estimating a latent growth curve model that models an individual's change over time. In this three-level model, level 1 is the election year *i* and time-varying covariants, level 2 is the individual *j* and time-invariant covariants, and level 3 is the district *k* and district-level variables. With rampant

[92] Because the introduction of random predictors consumes a great deal of statistical power, I use them sparingly when justified by theoretical expectations (Hox, 2002; Hughes, 2008). I also tried including random slopes for *left* and *female*left* but they approximated zero, did not improve the model, and immensely extended the computational power required to estimate the models, so they are dropped from the presented models.

party switching, the only time-invariant variable was candidate sex. Several candidates changed electoral districts, with a few even reporting different birthdays over time![93]

A naïve (unspecified, with only the hierarchical structure and level-specific error terms, but no predictors) three-level model of electoral outcome allows me to calculate the ICC. Recall, the ICC is the percent of variance in electoral outcome attributed to each level (Luke, 2004), or the expected correlation between two candidacies chosen randomly from a given level (Hox, 2002). The ICCs measuring expected correlations among an individual's candidacies over election cycles approximated zero, with an individual's candidacies over time no more likely to be correlated than any other randomly selected candidacies. Given the substantive and statistical insignificance of this potential for correlation, and the extreme computational intensity of three-level models with random intercepts and coefficients,[94] I estimate two-level models below with controls for the election year to capture any election-specific effects.

For a candidate's vote share in the Senate, the district-level ICC increases from 0.04 to 2.48 percent when the third level is dropped in the naïve model. Given such a low expected correlation (0.0248) among any two randomly chosen candidates from the same district, and the relatively small number of level 1 units (24 to 77 candidates, average 41.3) in each level 2 unit (27 districts), the hierarchical model may not be warranted in the case of the Senate-only analysis (Hox, 2002). I therefore estimate both hierarchical linear models and standard regression models using OLS to explore candidate *vote share* in the Senate. One of the OLS estimations adjusts standard errors to correct for

[93] A few times I saw different days of the month or years for what was ostensibly the same individual in different election cycles. It seems a bit much to fib about your age to the electoral court, so I'll attribute this to the non-universality of birth certificates (see Hunter, n.d.) and thus uncertainty about one's actual birthdate.

[94] My first go at a near fully-specified three-level model of these data finally converged (over iterations of starting values and optimizations) after almost 48 hours straight, even specifying fewer integration points!

unobserved correlations among candidates in the same district and one corrects for such clustering of errors among the same candidate running in several elections over time.

MEASUREMENT AND A FIRST GLANCE AT THE DATA

Sex

I measure candidate sex dichotomously, with those reporting female coded as 1, and those reporting male coded 0. Note, I refer to candidate "sex" rather than "gender" in the quantitative analyses throughout this dissertation because the latter is a socially constructed concept not amenable to quick quantification. As shown in Table 4.1, women remain a minority in the Brazilian legislature. Table 4.1 also highlights the success of women candidates in the Senate relative to the Chamber – in three election cycles (1994, 2002, and 2010), women actually comprised a greater share among elected Senators than among candidates. Indeed, in these elections, the success rate ratio of female to male candidates was above 1, indicating that women were, overall, more successful than were male candidates to the Senate in these elections. I investigate such unexpected relative success for women in Brazil's more prestigious legislative chamber in Chapter Six.

Table 4.1. The Brazilian Congress – Percent Women among Candidates and Elected

Election Year	Federal Senate		Federal Chamber of Deputies*	
	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected
1994	7.3	7.4	6.2	6.2
1998	14.0	7.4	10.4	5.7
2002	12.4	14.8	11.4	8.2
2006	15.8	14.8	12.7	8.8
2010	12.9	14.8	19.1	8.8

Note: Values reflect the percentage of women among candidates and elected.
*Beginning in 1996, the candidate quota applies.
Sources: TSE, Cfemea.

Educational Attainment

Table 4.2. Educational Attainment of Candidates to the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010)

	Chamber of Deputies			Senate		
Education	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Read and write	102	16	118	5	0	5
	0.57%	0.62%	0.58%	0.52%	0.00%	0.45%
Primary	1702	181	1883	36	2	38
	9.57%	7.05%	9.25%	3.71%	1.47%	3.44%
Secondary	4093	667	4760	135	20	155
	23.02%	25.99%	23.39%	13.92%	14.71%	14.01%
College	11887	1702	13589	794	114	908
	66.84%	66.33%	66.78%	81.86%	83.82%	82.10%
Total	17784	2566	20350	970	136	1106
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*

In the analyses that follow, I include a series of proxies for candidate quality. First, education is coded as an ordinal variable, with 1 = read and write, 2 = primary school, 3 = secondary school, and 4 = college. Most candidates to the Brazilian legislature have attended college, with 74.14% of candidates to the Senate having completed college, and 66.78% of Chamber of Deputies candidates indicating at least some college education (See Table 4.2). Relatively speaking, three times more candidates in the Chamber reported primary schooling as their educational attainment than did candidates for the Senate. Nearly a quarter of Chamber candidates had only a high school education, compared to just 14% of Senate candidates. This is reflective of the Senate's

greater prestige relative to the Chamber of Deputies (discussed in Chapter 6). Only a handful of candidates – about half a percent of the total – indicating the ability to read and write as their educational attainment have run for Congress. No such women have sought a Senate seat, although five men have (all unsuccessful). Overall measures of educational attainment show no statistically significant gender differences.

Occupation

There are literally hundreds of occupations[95] reported to the TSE in the candidate registrations, which change over time, rendering less useful the traditional battery of dummy variables for common feeder occupations. Instead, I use the reported occupations to create a single dummy variable for feeder occupation, with candidates reporting their profession as lawyer, doctor, politician, public servant/bureaucrat, educator, or businessman coded 1, and all others coded 0. I run the analyses alternately with the 2473 Chamber and 83 Senate candidates reporting the amorphous category "other" excluded, and coded as 0, but find no significant differences in results. I used my research for the incumbency variable (discussed next) to manually adjust the coding of feeder occupation for prior politicians who reported either "other" or their hobby/old day job as their primary profession.[96]

As demonstrated in Table 4.3, while the most common profession overall in both chambers is lawyer, for women candidates it is educator. More than 20% of female candidates to the Senate are educators. The bureaucratic route is also common for

[95] Nine political scientists won a measly 33,312 votes!

[96] Abelardo Lupion, for example, may in fact breed cattle, but declaring "pecuarista" as his primary occupation in 2006 when he was a four term incumbent, president of the PFL in Paraná, grandson of the former governor, and declared millions of dollars in assets (www.excelencias.org.br) is a bit of a stretch. I changed his coding to "1" for feeder occupation.

women, with 14.7% of female candidates (and only 6.3% of male candidates) reporting their occupation as civil servant.

Table 4.3. Occupations of Candidates to the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010)

	Chamber of Deputies			Senate		
Top Occupations	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Lawyer	1991	186	2177	167	8	175
	11.55%	7.48%	11.04%	17.43%	5.88%	16.00%
Elected Office	1490	156	1590	151	18	169
	8.64%	6.28%	8.06%	15.76%	13.24%	15.45%
Educator	900	359	1251	79	28	107
	5.22%	14.44%	6.34%	8.25%	20.59%	9.78%
Bureaucrat	1323	233	1556	60	20	80
	7.68%	9.37%	7.89%	6.26%	14.71%	7.31%
Doctor	887	62	949	49	8	57
	5.15%	2.49%	4.81%	5.11%	5.88%	5.21%
Engineer	587	12	599	51	2	53
	3.41%	0.48%	3.04%	5.32%	1.47%	4.84%
Business	1147	119	1266	45	2	47
	6.65%	4.79%	6.42%	4.70%	1.47%	4.30%
Journalist	234	25	259	37	4	41
	1.36%	1.01%	1.31%	3.86%	2.94%	3.75%
Subtotal	8559	1152	9711	639	90	729
Total reported	17237	2486	19723	958	136	1094
Percent of total	49.65%	46.34%	49.24%	66.70%	66.18%	66.64%

Source: *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*

Cross-chamber comparisons suggest that while the business world has a greater entrée into the Chamber than the Senate, journalists and engineers are more represented

in the Senate elections. As would be expected by the prestige of the Senate, the proportion of candidates reporting elected office as their primary occupation is nearly twice as high in the Senate than in the Chamber. Lemos and Raninchesk report that more than 40 and 70 percent of the senators from 1991-1999 had held elective executive and legislative office, respectively (2008, 103-7). Santos found that more than 70% of elected deputies also had legislative experience (more clustered in the Chamber itself), but far fewer had held executive elective posts (19.8% from 1987-1999) (2000, 102-4).

Incumbency

Although the incumbency advantage is not as high in Brazilian elections as in many other nations, with a "renewal rate" of nearly 50 percent (Samuels, 2003; TSE), it remains an advantage nonetheless and is important to consider. I used the data discussed above on incumbency to generate a binary variable, with candidates serving in the current term and running for reelection coded 1, and all others coded 0. For the Chamber of Deputies, I included substitutes running for reelection as incumbents, since they had earned the substitute role by virtue of their votes. For the Senate, however, I did not include substitutes as incumbents, since they had not actually been voted on in the prior election but were essentially appointed by the "titular." In any case, there were relatively few senators who were currently serving as substitutes while running for election (compared to the greater frequency in the Chamber). In elections to both the Chamber and the Senate, 5.8% of female candidates ran as incumbents. Men were significantly more likely to run as incumbents in both chambers, but particularly in the Chamber, with 11.6% of male candidates to the Chamber running as incumbents (8.5% in the Senate).

Campaign Finance

I amass extensive data on campaign contributions.[97] Following other analyses of campaign finance (e.g., Samuels, 2001a, 2001b), I calculate the square of campaign finance to account for diminishing returns. The wide variations in finance over time and space lead me to advance an array of variations on the concept, including a candidate's share of all contributions in the state, and a candidate's contributions standardized by the average contributions in the state. None of these various manifestations of campaign finance significantly change the results, but make for interesting descriptives.[98] In each rendition of campaign finance, women candidates are overall outspent by male candidates.

Table 4.4 displays the gendered discrepancies across both legislative chambers for several measures of campaign finance. While the average campaign contributions of male candidates is much higher than that of female candidates, substantial variation renders the observed differences just outside standard bounds of statistical significance. It is interesting to note that the average in campaign contributions for winning female candidates to the Senate is lower than the average of all male Senate candidates. This suggests that those few women who have done so are in general winning office with fewer resources than are men. The average female candidate to the Senate and Chamber earned just 12.7% and 0.8% of all candidate contributions in her district elections, compared to 17.0% and 1.1% for male candidates, with all observed differences being statistically significant (across gender groups and chambers).

---

[97] I would like to thank David Samuels for sharing his data from 1994 to 2002. For 2006 and 2010, I scoured lists of donations for each candidate to generate a sum of campaign contributions for all candidates with reported data.

[98] In Chapter 5, I delve deeper into variations within the Chamber, including differences in campaign finance across parties and states.

Table 4.4. Campaign Finance of Candidates to the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010)

	Senate		Chamber of Deputies	
	Men	Women	Women	Men
All Candidates				
Overall	R$ 2,255,488	R$ 906,078	R$ 225,575**	R$ 347,400^
	(685237)	(275375)	(46786)	(29878)
Share of State Total	17.0%	12.7%^	0.8%***	1.1%**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Relative to State Average	1.03	0.75*	0.63	1.05***
	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Cost per Vote	R$ 6.47	R$ 1.18	R$ 31.42	R$ 27.49
	(2.43)	(0.28)	(8.28)	(6.96)
Share from Corporations	36.7%	26.2%*	14.6%***	24.8%***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Share from Party	18.0%	23.8%^	34.2%*	19.1%***
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Share from Individuals	22.6%	28.6%^	33.8%	32.7%
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Share Self-Financed	21.0%	17.3%	16.2%	22.5%***
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.00)
N	559	74	1510	11340
Elected				
Overall	R$ 6,129,084	R$ 2,067,136	R$ 834,621*	R$ 997,389
	(2417233)	(688855)	(198967)	(113849)
Share of State Total	38.0%	29.8%	4.3%***	3.3%
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Relative to State Average	2.14	1.89	2.96^	3.25
	(0.12)	(0.31)	(0.22)	(0.08)
Cost per Vote	R$ 10.33	R$ 1.97	R$ 29.17	R$ 18.14
	(5.50)	(0.70)	(15.26)	(3.20)
Share from Corporations	57.0%	47.3%	39.4%	48.6%***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Share from Party	19.3%	20.5%	14.4%	9.2%***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.00)
Share from Individuals	12.5%	15.8%	31.9%**	25.0%***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Share Self-Financed	8.1%	12.0%	13.1%	16.1%^
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)
N	153	21	184	2283

Notes: One-tailed tests of statistical significance of observed differences between: men and women in the Senate, between women across the Senate and Chamber, and between men and women in the Chamber.
^ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

The measure "relative to state average" divides a candidate's contributions by the average in contributions in her statewide district, with numbers higher than one indicating the candidate raised more funds than the average. In both chambers, the average female candidate raised less than the state mean, while the average male candidate's campaign finance was just above the mean. For winning candidates, the observed gender differences in relative campaign finance are not statistically significant. Together these measures indicate gendered discrepancies in campaign finance, a clear manifestation of the gender inequalities maintaining an un-level playing field.

An interesting finding is that women candidates to the Senate appear to do substantially more with less. Although women winning Senate seats earned on average much less in campaign contributions, their success rates were higher than those of men in 1994, 2002, and 2010 (See Table 6.5). The "cost per vote" measure divides a candidate's campaign contributions by her quantity of votes, and demonstrates that the average female candidate to the Senate spent a couple of *reais*[99] per vote, while for male candidates the average was R$6.47 (R$10/vote for winning male candidates). Note the greater cost of election to the Chamber, where the average cost per vote is nearly R$28. This is reflective of the vast quantities of candidates in elections to the Chamber, where individuals must spend to differentiate themselves from candidates running on their list and others.

Women get more of their campaign funds from individuals, and finance less of it themselves (the statistical significance of these observed differences varies). The proportion of campaign funds financed by the candidates themselves is greater in

[99] In the past several years the exchange rate between the Brazilian Real and US Dollar has fluctuated between 1 and 2. From 1994-2010, the range was just under 1 in 1994 (months after the *Plano Real*), to 3.7 in 2002. I have left the contributions in their original form, since I am comparing candidates with one another (who are facing the same inflationary constraints).

Chamber elections, with an average of 21.7% for all candidates, and 15.9% for successful candidates (corporation contributions comprise a large share of successful candidates' funds). Successful candidates to the Senate contributed on average 8.6% of their own budgets, with party organizations and corporations contributing the vast majority (67-77%) of their campaign finance. Measures of campaign finance help to control for such discrepancies when exploring the effects of gender and electoral rules on electoral success. In the multivariate analyses in Chapters 5 and 6, I used these variations on campaign finance to explore its role in undermining women's electoral prospects.

Party Ideology

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the hypothesis on ideology's influence on women's representation stems from the understanding that leftist parties most often embrace an egalitarian platform that is more consistent with the premise of equality and active measures to attain it. Given that the question is not the extent of (non)left-ness but rather a simple statement of whether a party can be considered leftist, I alternately employ Powers and Zucco's scaled ideology estimates discussed above and the dichotomous coding prevalent in the women and politics literature to estimate the effect of ideology on candidate performance. Following Mainwaring (1999) and platforms on party websites, I coded the following parties as leftist: PCB, PCO, PC do B, PDT, PMN, PPS, PSB, PSOL, PSTU, PT, and PV. I coded all other parties as non-leftist.

Women candidates are more likely than are male candidates to be running in leftist parties, with 41% and a striking 63.3% of female candidates to the Chamber and Senate coming from a leftist party. In contrast, 35.9% and 43.5% of male candidates to the Chamber and Senate ran with a leftist party. The average ideology score for male legislative candidates is 4.2, which is closest to the scaled estimate for the PMDB.

Women are slightly left of that, with the average for female candidates to the Chamber at 4.0 (around the PSDB) and Senate at 3.5 (PDT).

Figure 4.4. Ideological Distribution of Elected Female Legislators, 1994-2010



As shown in Figure 4.4, many of the women elected to the Brazilian Congress are from leftist parties – especially in the Senate (with the exception of 2006) – with 45.1% and 57.5% of elected female deputies and senators, respectively, winning election with leftist parties. Yet, non-leftist women also have a presence, with right wing parties electing 23.8% and 30.8% of elected female deputies and senators, respectively. Still, the fact that most women are elected with leftist parties in the Senate – where nearly three-quarters of those elected are from non-leftist parties – is striking. Women's disproportionate presence among leftist delegations also manifests in the Chamber, which has just over 30% deputies from leftist parties overall, but 45.1% leftists among female

deputies. In the ensuing chapters, I draw on party institutionalization and women in party leadership to explain this apparent women-friendliness of leftist parties.

Women-Friendly Parties

Party Institutionalization

The most commonly utilized proxy for party institutionalization is electoral volatility (e.g., Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Tarouco, 2010), or the swing in the party vote and seat share from election to election (Pedersen, 1979). While it is certainly the most amenable to quick quantification, it is an incomplete concept for our purposes here. As discussed in Chapter 2, I conceptualize institutionalized parties as those with established value infusion (Huntington, 1968; Janda, 1980; Levitsky, 1998) and internal "systemness" (Panebianco, 1988; Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Rather than footnote the exceptionalism of the PT and then continue to work from the unfounded assumption that Brazilian parties act as mere electoral vehicles and are therefore secondary to explaining electoral outcomes, my conceptualization and index of party institutionalization incorporate parties not only in the electorate but also as an organization.

I measure *electoral volatility* with each state party's difference (absolute value) in vote share and in seat share in elections at time *t* and *t*-1 (Jones, 2005; Pedersen, 1979). I take the average of each state party's volatility across votes and seats, and include the inverse of this average volatility (votes and seats) in my party institutionalization index (Jones, 2005). To remedy nonsensical values, I round up volatility for state parties with a difference in vote/seat share less than one to one. Thus, if a state party earns within one percentage point of its prior vote/seat share, it gets the full point for volatility in the index.

Along with *electoral volatility*, I incorporate *party membership* and *party age* to get at the societal perception or "value infusion" of a party. I measure each state party's share of their state's party members, and each party's age relative to the country's longest registered parties – the PDT, PMDB, and PTB (29 years). A party with no real platform or established significance in the public imagination will be unlikely to attract a consistently sizeable membership or vote/seat share over time, but rather be contingent upon a particular politician/state/time. It will then, as discussed in Chapter 2, be susceptible to personalist politics and less conducive to women's participation. Moreover, similar to the lagged party magnitude argument, a party unable to predict its electoral fortunes across Brazil (due to volatility, newness,[100] and/or a lack of on-the-ground information from members) will be less able to recruit and support candidates.

I measure the internal systemness of each state party by the funds it has at its disposal, its presence throughout the state, and an original measure of whether there exists an alternation in state party leadership. Parties with limited funds (measured relatively, as a state party's share of all party funds in the state) are poorly situated to recruit candidates or provide training opportunities and campaign assistance, and thus lack the capacity to promote women's participation. Candidates running in such parties will be dependent upon their own capital, which due to an un-level playing field is likely to disadvantage women contenders.

I expect that parties with a weak municipal presence – based on the proportion of municipalities in which a party has an active municipal party directorate (not provisional commission) – will be ill-equipped to actively recruit candidates, which will disadvantage

[100] This raises the question of newness vs. institutionalization, which are distinct. Nevertheless, a truly new party (i.e. did not merely change its name) will likely pose similar barriers to outsider candidates, because they often lack a consolidated party organization to recruit and support candidacies. It is important to note, however, that new parties may very well have a programmatic platform and potentially inclusive structure.

women. Parties with a more extensive presence throughout the state will have more contact with municipal leaders and a better network for recruiting potential candidates. Because of the constructed gender gap in political ambition discussed above, parties with no statewide network – which will have to rely largely on self-nomination – are less favorable for women. Parties with a limited municipal presence will also be less able to support candidate campaign efforts, which will deter female contenders by undermining the prospect of a collective campaign.

For the final indicator in my index of party institutionalization, I use the state party leadership rolls discussed above to measure whether there exists alternation in state party leadership. State parties with a 0 have no alternation across elections (specifically, more than one election cycle), and state parties coded 1 consistently introduce new blood into their leadership. A party that remains dominated by the same president and/or secretary general and vice-president over time is likely to be subordinate to the leader(s), and unlikely to develop as an institution in its own right. Such weakly institutionalized parties will be more dependent upon their leader(s)' image and charisma than on programmatic policy positions and will be highly susceptible to personalist politics, which will disadvantage (most) women contenders. Moreover, because the electoral appeal of such a party is likely contingent upon the particular leader, it is not sustainable. Finally, the leader will fight to maintain his power rather than work to recruit and support independent female candidacies.

There is a possibility, however, that women can be elected when running in parties dominated by such monopolistic leaders due to the pooling of votes in the allocation of seats. In 2006, for example, Aline Corrêa[101] was elected with the right-wing

[101] Aline Corrêa is the daughter of Pedro Corrêa, a 7-term deputy sacked in the wake of the Mensalão scandal (Diap, 2007).

Partido Progressista (PP) in São Paulo despite winning only 11,132 of the nearly 18.8 million statewide candidate votes cast.[102] This is because the domineering state party leaders Paulo Maluf and Celso Russomanno[103] (Braga, 2008, 461) led the PP-SP ticket with a combined vote total greater than 1.3 million votes. Maluf and Russomanno's votes in excess of the electoral quotient (296,987) accrued to other members on the PP's list. While this component of my party institutionalization index would not code the PP in São Paulo as institutionalized, but rather susceptible to personalist politics, it is clear that Corrêa's electoral chances were substantially improved by running with the PP.[104] I therefore estimate the model alternatively using an index of the abovementioned factors, and with each factor modeled separately.

Table 4.5 displays the means and standard deviations across states on these six dimensions of party institutionalization for each party. The parties are arranged by ideology (left/center/right) and then electoral size, with the parties no longer active displayed at the bottom of the list.[105] The values represent the average over time and states for each party.

---

[102] Notably, Corrêa increased her vote share to 78,317 in the 2010 elections.

[103] In 2011, with an eye on the São Paulo mayoral contest, Russomanno left the PP for the PRB (Serapião, 2011).

[104] Corrêa received nearly R$10,000 in campaign contributions from Maluf's campaign and the PP-SP, as well as R$82,000 from the national party directorate (Diap, 2007). The ability to fund candidates would be picked up in the party funds component of the index.

[105] Because the party funds are 2010 data, parties no longer active are missing data on this measure.

Table 4.5. Party Institutionalization Index – Component Averages, by Party

PARTY	Vote volatility	Seat volatility	Party age	% of st.party members	% of st.party funds	Pr. of munic. w/p.org	Change in party leaders
LEFT							
PC do B	1.4 (2.1)	1.2 (3.0)	14	2.0 (2.1)	0.4 (0.8)	0.2 (0.2)	0.5 (0.5)
PCB	0.1 (0.4)	0.0 (0.0)	10	0.2 (0.2)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.4 (0.5)
PCO	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	7	0.0 (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.2 (0.4)
PDT	3.2 (3.6)	4.0 (6.3)	21	7.4 (4.4)	3.1 (9.2)	0.3 (0.2)	0.3 (0.5)
PMN	1.2 (2.3)	1.3 (3.5)	13	1.8 (1.1)	0.9 (1.5)	0.0 (0.1)	0.7 (0.5)
PPS	2.9 (3.5)	3.1 (4.6)	11	3.6 (2.3)	1.4 (1.8)	0.3 (0.2)	0.3 (0.5)
PSB	3.5 (4.1)	4.7 (5.9)	15	3.6 (2.1)	4.2 (4.1)	0.2 (0.2)	0.4 (0.5)
PSOL	0.6 (0.9)	0.2 (0.8)	3	0.2 (0.4)	0.4 (0.5)	0.1 (0.1)	0.7 (0.5)
PSTU	0.1 (0.2)	0.0 (0.0)	10	0.2 (0.2)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.3 (0.5)
PT	3.9 (3.3)	4.8 (6.5)	20	7.8 (2.8)	16.2 (16.7)	0.9 (0.1)	0.8 (0.4)
PV	1.2 (1.5)	0.8 (2.5)	11	1.5 (1.0)	1.0 (1.9)	0.1 (0.2)	0.5 (0.5)
CENTER							
PMDB	6.8 (6.0)	9.0 (8.3)	21	16.9 (5.6)	21.4 (11.5)	0.6 (0.3)	0.2 (0.4)
PSDB	6.0 (4.8)	7.9 (7.3)	13	9.6 (2.6)	27.9 (20.3)	0.4 (0.2)	0.7 (0.5)
RIGHT							
PAN	0.3 (0.4)	0.1 (0.8)	6	0.5 (0.5)	0.0 (0.0)	-	-
PFL/DEM	8.1 (8.0)	9.5 (9.2)	16	10.4 (4.6)	11.1 (9.7)	0.2 (0.3)	0.3 (0.5)
PGT	0.3 (0.6)	0.0 (0.0)	7	0.3 (0.3)	0.0 (0.0)	-	-
PHS	0.4 (0.5)	0.0 (0.3)	8	0.7 (0.5)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5 (0.5)
PL/PR	3.9 (3.9)	4.6 (6.3)	12	5.1 (1.6)	3.4 (4.5)	0.0 (0.1)	0.4 (0.5)
PPR/PPB/PP	5.7 (6.1)	6.7 (7.9)	9	11.0 (3.9)	6.8 (3.8)	0.2 (0.3)	0.2 (0.4)
PRB	1.6 (2.0)	1.2 (3.2)	4	1.6 (1.7)	0.3 (0.9)	0.0 (0.0)	0.4 (0.5)
PRONA	0.9 (1.7)	0.3 (1.4)	12	0.6 (0.7)	0.0 (0.0)	-	-
PRP	0.4 (0.5)	0.2 (1.5)	13	1.6 (1.2)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.4 (0.5)
PRTB	0.4 (1.2)	0.2 (1.5)	10	0.9 (1.4)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.4 (0.5)
PSC	1.5 (2.5)	1.0 (3.0)	13	2.1 (1.2)	0.4 (1.6)	0.0 (0.2)	0.7 (0.5)
PSD	1.4 (2.2)	1.9 (3.7)	12	2.8 (2.1)	0.0 (0.0)	-	-
PSDC	0.3 (0.9)	0.1 (0.4)	8	0.9 (0.7)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.3 (0.5)
PSL	0.7 (1.1)	0.2 (0.8)	8	1.3 (0.9)	0.2 (0.7)	0.1 (0.1)	0.3 (0.5)
PST	0.8 (2.0)	0.7 (2.5)	5	1.0 (0.7)	0.0 (0.0)	-	-
PTB	3.5 (5.0)	4.6 (6.7)	22	6.9 (2.2)	4.7 (4.7)	0.1 (0.1)	0.3 (0.5)
PTC	0.4 (0.9)	0.3 (1.6)	14	1.1 (0.7)	0.4 (1.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.6 (0.5)
PTdoB	0.5 (1.1)	0.3 (1.6)	11	1.1 (0.8)	0.3 (0.8)	0.1 (0.1)	0.3 (0.4)
PTN	0.3 (0.6)	0.0 (0.0)	8	0.6 (0.4)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5 (0.5)
AVERAGE	2.5 (4.2)	2.9 (5.8)	13	4.3 (5.0)	5.0 (10.6)	0.2 (0.3)	0.4 (0.5)

In particular, Tables 4.5 and 4.6 display what I argue throughout the dissertation – that there exists significant variation across parties, thus rendering inadequate the traditional cross-national aggregate approach. Brazil with its numerous parties is simply not the US, UK, or Mexico. Rather, it implores a lower level analysis that uses the rich interparty variation to illuminate on the relationship between parties, voters, and representation. Also evident in the data (See Table 4.7) is extensive variation across the states, even within many parties. Such variation renders Brazil an excellent selection for the analysis of individual women's representation. I employ this variation to analyze how the central explanatory factors of the literature on women's representation interact to affect individual women's prospects outside the traditional developed and institutionalized contexts.

We also see that, while the smaller parties endure significantly less volatility in their electoral fortunes than do the major parties, their overall share of votes, seats, party members, and funds are limited. This demonstrates that electoral volatility cannot itself capture the concept of party institutionalization or even societal roots, but rather must be considered in tandem with the other components. The party with the highest average levels of volatility is the PFL/Democratas party, which has seen its longtime near oligopolistic dominance of the northeastern states eclipsed in recent years by the PT.

It is important to note from Tables 4.5 and 4.6 the variation across parties of the same ideological orientation. While many of the larger leftist parties are more institutionalized, the fit is not perfect.[106] The index provides a real and plausible alternative to ideology.

[106] In fact, the correlation with "left" is actually negative for some of the index's component parts.

The resource advantage of the larger parties is striking, with all but the major parties having on average less than one percent of the total state party funding (including private and public party funds). So while smaller parties may suffer from less volatility, their limitations in human and financial resources are apparent. I transform the scores on these six dimensions (taking the inverse of the average of vote and seat volatility) into a factor-based index of party institutionalization, with lower values indicating a weakly-institutionalized party. I expect that parties with a higher score on the index of party institutionalization will have a greater capacity to support female candidacies and will be more conducive to women's active political participation.

Figure 4.5. Party Institutionalization Index and Women Elected



Figure 4.5 plots the bivariate relationship between the party institutionalization index and the number of women elected by a state party in a given election. In the multivariate analyses in Chapters 5 and 6, I expect to find that the interaction of the party institutionalization index and women in party leadership is positively correlated with the electoral performance of female candidates in Brazil.

Women in Party Leadership

I use the above mentioned state party leadership rolls to calculate the proportion of women, and then code state parties as having a critical mass if at least 25% of their their leadership is female. I also reference women in each party's national executive commissions (NECs) when developing the argument. As portrayed in Table 4.6, there is significant variation across parties in their incorporation of women in top party leadership. Leftist parties (including the old left Communist Party of Brazil, PC do B) are the Brazilian parties with the greatest female presence in NECs, and it is also these parties that tend to see through more of their female candidacies.

In the 2010 elections, over 25% of the PC do B's candidates were women, with 40% of its elected representatives and 26% of its top leadership body being female. In sharp contrast, the PSDB (a non-leftist party) advanced over 20% female candidates but had less than six percent women among its elected deputies and 11% women in party leadership. This suggests that the electorally smaller PC do B's female candidates are actually more viable, enjoying significantly greater support from the party and electorate than do the PSDB's female candidates.

Table 4.6. Female Presence in National Party Leadership

Party	National Executive Committee Members	National Executive Committee Women (%)	Women Candidates in 2010 (%)	Women Elected in 2010 (%)
PCdoB	27	7 (25.9%)	30 (25.4%)	6 (40.0%)
PDT	24	1 (4.2%)	44 (16.9%)	2 (7.7%)
PFL	52	5 (9.6%)	21 (11.0%)	2 (4.7%)
PMDB	25	2 (8.0%)	57 (16.9%)	7 (9.0%)
PP	87	6 (6.9%)	35 (18.0%)	4 (9.1%)
PR	25	2 (8.0%)	34 (20.7%)	2 (5.0%)
PSB	31	6 (19.3%)	63 (21.6%)	4 (11.8%)
PSDB	46	5 (10.9%)	55 (20.2%)	3 (5.7%)
PT	27	10 (37.0%)	71 (21.2%)	9 (10.2%)
PMN	16	2 (12.5%)	51 (24.9%)	1 (25.0%)
PSC	20	2 (10.0%)	33 (16.9%)	2 (11.8%)
PT do B			21 (16.7%)	1 (25.0%)
PTB	26	2 (7.7%)	66 (23.2%)	1 (4.5%)
PV	32	7 (21.9%)	73 (19.9%)	1 (7.1%)

Notes: Data compiled by author from TSE and party websites; left parties are italicized.

Figure 4.6. Average Proportion of Women in State Party Leadership, by Party



Because congressional campaigns in Brazil are state-centered rather than national affairs, state-level measures of women in party leadership are far more appropriate for assessing the influence of party leadership on women's electoral prospects. Figure 4.6 displays the variation across parties and within ideological positions. As shown by Figure 4.6, the parties that have an average proportion of women in their state leadership nearing the critical mass (25%) are not all leftist (PRP, PRTB). Also evident in Figure 4.6 and Table 4.6 is the existence of leftist parties with minimal women's representation in state party leadership (PCB, PDT, PPS), as well as disparities in some parties' national and state-level leadership structures.

For example, while the PT has 37% women in its national leadership, its average proportion of women in state party leadership is less than 25 percent. This is reflective of the decentralized character of Brazilian politics, with even one of the country's most centralized parties having such discrepancies between its national and state-level leadership structures – only 56% of the PT state executive commissions have a critical mass of women leaders. The PC do B, on the other hand, more consistently incorporates women in its party leadership, with 26% women in its national leadership, and 75% of its state executive committees having a critical mass of women leaders.

In Figure 4.7, I plot the women in state party leadership against my index of party institutionalization. I expect parties most conducive to female political aspirants to be those approximating the upper-right quadrant, where the proportion of women in party leadership reaches a critical mass of 25 percent, and the party institutionalization index is above 1.90 (the mean).

Figure 4.7. Party Institutionalization Index and Proportion of Women in State Party Leadership, by State Party



We can see from Tables 4.7 and 4.8 that there is extensive variation in the central variables of interest across Brazilian parties and states. Although the success rate of all female candidates to the Chamber of Deputies is 7.51%, this number conceals a low of 0% in various parties and a high for the PC do B, which has managed to elect more than a quarter of its female candidates. Also evident is that such electoral success is not simply a question of ideology, with more than 20% of the PFL/Democratas female candidates winning election. Yet the measure of candidate success rate by party also obscures relevant information; the parties with more female candidates running will inevitably have a higher denominator in the calculation of success rate, regardless of their actual

electoral outcomes. This means that parties running fewer female candidates might enjoy higher success rates. For example, the PFL's 20% success rate belies that fact that a mere 8% of its 1150 candidates to the Chamber were women, which pales in comparison to the PC do B, which advanced 23% women among its 322 candidates.

Variation across party averages on the party institutionalization index demonstrates that it is not merely a question of electoral strength, with several small parties such as the PMN (Party of National Mobilization), PSC (Social Christian Party), and PTC (Christian Workers' Party) scoring relatively well. The PP (Progressive Party) and PR (Party of the Republic) are two parties that are fairly strong electorally, each with 8% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, but are extremely low on the party institutionalization index, hovering just above one (on a scale of six).

Table 4.7 also allows shows the proportion of a party's state executive commissions across Brazil that have a critical mass of women leaders. Just over half of the PT state party organizations have a critical mass of women leaders. This is reflective of both the nature of their internal quota, which can be satisfied with posts that do not actually have a voting position on the executive commission, and the relatively large size of their state party leaderships. The two parties with the highest proportion of state organizations with a critical mass of women are leftist (PSTU and PC do B). As mentioned above, the PRTB also performs quite well on this front, with 58% of its state party organizations having at least 25% women, an average proportion of 27%, and 10% comprised by a female majority.

Table 4.7. Party Institutionalization Index, Women in Party Leadership, and the Success of Female Candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, by Party

Party	Avg Female Candidate Vote Share	Female Candidate Success Rate	Party Institutionalization Index	Proportion w/ Critical Mass of Women
PAN	0.02%	0.00%	-	-
PC DO B	1.65%	25.33%	2.07	0.75
PCB	0.07%	0.00%	1.68	0.19
PCO	0.01%	0.00%	1.42	0.43
PDT	0.40%	4.52%	2.08	0.25
PFL	1.45%	20.62%	1.70	0.15
PGT	0.05%	0.00%	-	-
PHS/PSN	0.10%	0.00%	1.77	0.13
PMDB	1.43%	18.46%	2.29	0.07
PMN	0.15%	1.06%	2.07	0.64
PP (1994)	2.62%	14.29%	-	-
PP/PPB	0.74%	11.58%	1.38	0.19
PPS	0.25%	1.98%	1.74	0.19
PR/PL	0.23%	3.13%	1.44	0.19
PRB	0.03%	0.00%	1.36	0.48
PRN	0.02%	0.00%	-	-
PRONA	0.08%	1.82%	-	-
PRP	0.04%	0.00%	1.88	0.43
PRTB	0.07%	0.00%	1.68	0.58
PSB	0.62%	9.27%	1.81	0.38
PSC	0.17%	2.97%	2.09	0.09
PSD	0.36%	5.88%	-	-
PSDB	0.83%	13.56%	2.36	0.04
PSDC	0.04%	0.00%	1.60	0.47
PSL	0.11%	0.00%	1.62	0.32
PSOL	0.15%	1.22%	1.82	0.46
PST	0.78%	7.14%	-	-
PSTU	0.06%	0.00%	1.70	0.80
PT	0.86%	16.87%	3.17	0.56
PT DO B	0.24%	2.08%	1.65	0.38
PTB	0.26%	2.26%	1.89	0.32
PTC	0.10%	1.47%	2.09	0.18
PTN	0.02%	0.00%	1.76	0.20
PV	0.07%	0.55%	1.81	0.47
Total	**0.53%**	**7.51%**	**1.90**	**0.34**

Table 4.8. Party Institutionalization Index, Women in Party Leadership, and the Success of Female Candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, by State

State	Avg Female Candidate Vote Share	Female Candidate Success Rate	Party Institutionalization Index	Proportion w/ Critical Mass of Women
Acre – N	2.41%	17.95%	2.02	0.29
Alagoas – NE	1.07%	9.76%	1.69	0.28
Amazonas – N	1.73%	15.00%	2.01	0.33
Amapá – N	2.31%	22.45%	1.98	0.45
Bahia – NE	0.33%	12.70%	1.59	0.31
Ceará – NE	0.14%	3.08%	1.94	0.26
Distrito Federal – CO	0.79%	7.69%	1.98	0.41
Espírito Santo – SE	1.47%	21.05%	1.91	0.47
Goiás – CO	1.49%	20.75%	2.09	0.25
Maranhão – NE	0.66%	9.52%	1.85	0.41
Minas Gerais – SE	0.11%	4.83%	1.86	0.24
M.Grosso do Sul – CO	0.66%	4.48%	2.02	0.30
Mato Grosso – CO	1.19%	10.71%	2.03	0.23
Pará – N	0.81%	10.81%	1.81	0.33
Paraíba – NE	0.45%	6.06%	1.99	0.35
Pernambuco – NE	0.30%	4.29%	1.82	0.46
Piauí – NE	0.60%	4.26%	2.06	0.39
Paraná – S	0.14%	2.78%	1.77	0.08
Rio de Janeiro – SE	0.12%	5.81%	1.67	0.37
R.G. do Norte – NE	1.89%	18.92%	1.73	0.37
Rondônia – N	1.51%	9.43%	1.89	0.44
Roraima – N	1.18%	10.20%	1.56	0.55
Rio Grande do Sul – S	0.37%	8.33%	2.25	0.20
Santa Catarina – S	0.38%	4.82%	2.42	0.16
Sergipe – NE	0.30%	0.00%	2.02	0.48
São Paulo – SE	0.07%	4.47%	1.81	0.36
Tocantins – N	1.62%	7.84%	1.80	0.30
Total	0.53%	7.51%	1.90	0.34

The variation across states in the variables of interest is evident from Table 4.8. The northeast has both the fourth highest success rate – Rio Grande do Norte at 18.9%, and many of the lowest success rates, with only 3-5% of female candidates in three

northeastern states winning election and not a single woman winning in Sergipe. The highs for female candidate success rate (Amapá) and average vote share (Acre) are both in the northern Amazonian region. The low average vote share for female candidates in São Paulo reflects the large number of candidates; in 2010, 1017 candidates sought one of its 70 seats up for grabs.

Variation averaged across state parties on the party institutionalization index is less informative, since the measure includes each state party's share of statewide affiliates and funds. But Table 4.8 does reveal significant variation in the presence of women in party leadership. The fact that women have struggled to gain election among the more developed southern states is less puzzling once we appreciate women's limited presence in its state party organizations – only 8 to 20 percent have a critical mass of women! In contrast, all but two of the eight states in which at least 40% of the party organizations include at least 25% women in their leadership are in the lesser developed northern and northeastern states.

CONCLUSION

The primary contribution of this chapter has been to demonstrate the immense variation in our central variables of interest across Brazil's 29 registered political parties and 27 statewide electoral districts. I first discuss the intensive data collection process, and then provide theoretical, empirical, and statistical justifications for the appropriateness of hierarchical modeling for my central research questions on the barriers confronting and paths to power of female political aspirants in Brazil's still vastly masculine legislature. I explicitly outline my operationalization and measurement of the central variables, and advance an original state-level index of party institutionalization

and comprehensive multilevel database of all candidacies to the Brazilian Congress from 1994-2010

I provide an initial reading of the individual and party variables comprising the database, and discuss variation in women's presence among candidates and elected across states, parties, and electoral rules. I also examine the range of and gendered discrepancies (or lack thereof) in educational attainment, occupations, incumbency status, and campaign finance, finding that while women candidates tend to be as educated as male candidates, they are in general less likely to run as incumbents and have less access to campaign finance. Finally, I explore the variance in party ideology, party institutionalization, and women in party leadership, and exhibit the disproportionate level of women among leftist parties' candidates and elected legislators relative to their overall legislative presence. After observing the disproportionate concentration of leftists among women elected to the rather conservative Brazilian Congress, I advance party institutionalization and women in party leadership to substantiate leftist parties' apparent women-friendliness.

In the ensuing chapters, I use my original database introduced in this chapter to model and explain the gendered variation in electoral performance across states, parties, and electoral rules, thus elucidating the obstacles hindering women's representation and the paths to overcoming these barriers. In a departure from the aggregate cross-national approach so prevalent in the women's representation and electoral systems literatures, which most often considers only averages across a nation's political parties, I seize the interparty variation revealed above to illuminate the role of particular party characteristics – party institutionalization and women in party leadership – in explaining women's extreme underrepresentation in the Brazilian legislature.

Chapter 5 – Machista Voters, the Rules of the Game, or the Good Ole' Boys' Club? Assessing the Obstacles to Female Politicians in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies

INTRODUCTION

This chapter demonstrates that the extensive interstate and interparty variation in women's electoral prospects in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies outlined in Chapter 4 are best explained not by machista voters in less developed states or electoral rules producing varying district or party magnitudes, but rather by variation across state parties in institutionalization and the presence of women in their decision-making structures. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, the design and enforcement of the gender quota has been inadequate and prompted little more than unsubstantiated rhetoric from the vastly male leaders of Brazil's often inchoate parties. Yet, some parties have managed to overcome these deficits and effectively promote women's participation.

Here, I use interstate and interparty variation in women's electoral prospects within the Chamber of Deputies to empirically assess the explanatory power of the rival explanations for women's underrepresentation – voter bias and development, electoral rules (district and party magnitude), and ideology – along with my argument that (a lack of) party institutionalization and women-friendly leadership are the key predictors of women's electoral prospects in Brazil.

Although conventional wisdom rooted in the formal rules of the game dismisses the gatekeeping role for parties in an entrepreneurial context like Brazil's, this chapter demonstrates that parties, or more precisely, weak party institutionalization and unsupportive party leadership—manifested as an absence of critical psychological, organizational, and material support—remain the central barrier to women's representation in Brazil. The successful incorporation of women in Brazilian politics is

contingent not on the development levels or electoral size of districts, but rather on the effective commitment of parties to the promotion of women's political participation. Thus, the amorphous character of many Brazilian parties does not preclude their theoretical and empirical relevance for explaining electoral outcomes. This research brings parties to the center of the analysis, exploiting significant interparty variation and finding the key to enhancing women's political empowerment in Brazil to be the inclusion and championing of women by party leadership in institutionalized parties.

The parties that have proven women-friendly have tended to be leftist due to their often more comprehensive infrastructure (Toole, 2003) and historical emphasis on egalitarianism (Duverger, 1955). Yet rather than leftist ideology per se, the most salient factors for predicting women's electoral prospects are the party structure and critical acts performed by women in party leadership. This is especially true given the postulated support for female candidates in the electorate, and the recently emboldened gender quota, with all parties standing to gain from the effective promotion of strong female candidacies. As such, leftist and non-leftist parties alike can mitigate the severe gender gap in women's legislative presence by institutionalizing their party and including women in their party leadership, conditions under which, as my analysis demonstrates, women's electoral prospects are heightened.

To make my argument, I subject the central explanations for the underrepresentation of women to empirical testing at the candidate level, in a context that is recently (re)democratized, has open-list elections, and a still inadequately institutionalized party system replete with a range of institutionalization among parties, ranging from inchoate to fully-institutionalized. I leverage extensive quantitative and qualitative data to assess the explanatory capacity of the principal explanations in contexts that extend beyond the traditional approach. While the conventional wisdom of

the extant literature considers voter hostility and district magnitude to be significant barriers undermining women's representation, this research finds that they have had only negligible effects on women's electoral performance in Brazil. Moreover, lesser levels of voter bias against women have not correlated with increases in female candidates or deputies. Instead, I find that parties play a crucial gatekeeping role through their (in)capacitation of female candidacies and are therefore the essential actors in the political empowerment of women. The chapter concludes with a discussion of findings, how the electoral rules of the Chamber amplify the importance of party institutionalization for women (demonstrated in Chapter 6), and the lingering variation to be explained (the subject of Chapter 7).

THE OBSTACLES TO POWER

To set up my argument and hypotheses, I first review each of the rival arguments from the women and politics literature, focusing on their hypotheses of the principal obstacles to women's representation, and considering their applicability for explaining women's electoral prospects in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.

Machista Voter Attitudes and State Development

In Chapter 2, I discussed Paxton and Kunovich's measure of voter bias against women – *national gender ideology* – and their aggregate cross-national evidence that found it to be a key predictor of women's overall representation (Paxton and Kunovich, 2003, 93). Here, I use the wide range in development levels across Brazil mentioned in Chapter 4 (See Figure 4.2) to explore the covariates of voter bias and assess the ability of this rival explanation to predict female candidates' electoral prospects in Brazil. I use data on public opinion, state development levels, and candidate electoral performance to

investigate whether voters across Brazil are equally likely to support women in politics both hypothetically and at the polls.

Nationwide data from the 2008 LAPOP surveys reveal considerable interstate variance among respondents' perceptions of the political aptitude of women. The variation in public opinion may have important implications for women's electoral prospects, with women in states with more favorable perceptions of female candidates faring better electorally than women in states with negative perceptions of female candidates. Can the modernization hypothesis – which asserts that as societies develop economically, the rates of educational attainment, literacy, and workforce presence of women increase, leading invariably to a shift from traditional societal values to modern values, and thus significant attitudinal change toward more progressive conceptions of gender equality (Inglehart and Norris, 2003) – explain such interstate variability? If so, the least developed states would harbor more negative perceptions of female candidates than would the more developed states, leading female candidates to enjoy their greatest electoral prospects in the latter.

Figure 5.1 maps these 2008[1] LAPOP data on negative perceptions of women in politics and the Brazilian Central Bank's 2009-2010 estimates for state-level values of the HDI (Banco Central, 2009; LAPOP, 2008). It suggests a plausible bivariate relationship between voter bias and district development, with many of the larger circles (indicating that the majority of respondents in the state expressed bias against women in politics) clustered in the lesser developed Northeast, and the southern and southeastern states having mostly small circles. Indeed, the correlation between a respondent's answer to the question "in general, men make better politicians than women" (where 1 indicates

[1] Unfortunately LAPOP did not ask the question about perception of women in politics in the 2010 wave of their survey.

“strongly agree” and 4 indicates “strongly disagree”) and her state’s HDI is positive (0.195) and statistically significant (LAPOP, 2008). A simple logistic regression with only two binary predictors – one for respondent sex, and one for whether the respondent lives in a state with an HDI above the national mean – suggests that the odds of a respondent in a more developed state (compared to one in a less developed state) agreeing that men are superior politicians are 0.46 to 1. In sum, the LAPOP data suggest that HDI and the prospect of strongly disagreeing with the statement increase together (LAPOP, 2008).

Yet, as demonstrated in Figure 5.1, there are some noteworthy outliers. In the southeastern and southern states of Rio de Janeiro and Santa Catarina for example, a striking 41 and 45% of respondents, respectively, either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. Respondents in Ceará (31.0%), Pará (28.6%), and Rio Grande do Norte (33.3%) – three states which at the time of the survey had leftist female executives (capital city Mayor Luizianne Lins and Governors Ana Júlia Carepa and Wilma de Faria) – exhibited levels of machista voter bias below the national mean (33.5%). In any case, limitations in the reach of the LAPOP survey, which was not designed to be representative at the state level, preclude firm conclusions.

Figure 5.1. Do State Development Levels (HDI) Predict Voter Bias Against Women?



The recent wave of the Brazilian Electoral Study (CESOP, 2010), however, was designed to be representative at the regional level. As shown in Table 5.1, the data do not support the notion that the more developed southern and southeastern regions are more conducive to women's representation than the poorer regions. While respondents in southern states did express significantly lower levels of voter bias in 2010, this has not

translated into more women politicians. Descriptive evidence thus suggests that machista voter attitudes may not predict women's electoral prospects in Brazil. Although residual voter bias against women does persist across Brazil, several female candidates have nonetheless found way to succeed electorally in inhospitable contexts, with some doing so even without the support of an institutionalized and women-friendly party (illustrated in Chapter 7).

Table 5.1. Women's Electoral Prospects (1994-2010) and Voter Bias, by Region

	Female Candidates	Female Deputies	Female Success Rate	Female-Male Success Rate Ratio
North	355 (15.3%)	46 (14.2%)	13.0%	0.91
Northeast	452 (10.2%)	34 (4.5%)	7.5%	0.42
Center-West	241 (14.9%)	25 (12.2%)	10.4%	0.79
Southeast	1186 (12.9%)	69 (7.7%)	5.8%	0.57
South	335 (12.1%)	19 (4.9%)	5.7%	0.38
BRAZIL	2569 (12.6%)	193 (7.5%)	7.5%	0.56

	Voter Bias (2008)	Voter Bias (2010)
North	36.8%	23.7%
Northeast	46.7%	18.7%
Center-West	38.6%	18.7%
Southeast	25.6%	20.8%
South	28.0%	12.6%
BRAZIL	33.5%	19.0%

Notes: Voter bias in 2008 and 2010 represent the percent of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with the statements "men make better politicians than women" (2008) and "in general, men are more appropriate for a political career than are women" (2010).
Sources: TSE, LAPOP (2008), CESOP (ESEB, 2010).

Interestingly, empirical work has actually revealed female candidates to be most successful in their bids for *local* elected office in Brazil's more traditional municipalities (Miguel and Queiroz, 2006). Several of Brazil's most prominent female politicians do in

fact come from the lesser developed north and northeastern regions (e.g., Marina Silva of Acre, Heloísa Helena of Alagoas, Roseana Sarney of Maranhão), and these regions have consistently had the greatest proportions of female mayors and municipal councilors (Miguel and Queiroz, 2006; TSE, 2008). Moreover, February 2009 public opinion polls suggest that the northeast region has the country's highest postulated support for women in politics, a hypothetical translated into action when electors in the Northeast voted in droves for Dilma Rousseff in the 2010 presidential election. Together, these observations weaken the traction of the modernization hypothesis on the question of women's representation in Brazil.

Some analyses of aggregate level data, however, suggest that female candidates for national office should be most likely to thrive in the more developed regions of Brazil, with others finding no effect (Araújo and Eustáquio, 2007). Table 5.2 depicts the variation in female candidacies and success rates across Brazil's five regions over the last five election cycles. While women have in fact struggled to gain national-level power in the impoverished northeast, they also confront challenges in the more developed South and Southeast. As shown in Table 5.2, women's political presence in these more developed regions has actually rated lower – on several dimensions – than that of the lesser developed northern states of the Amazon region in all of the five recent elections under consideration.

Table 5.2. Female Candidacies and Success Rates in the Chamber of Deputies, by Region (1994-2010)

	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
Women Candidates					
North	**43 (11.6%)**	**49 (12.1%)**	**76 (13.8%)**	**84 (15.3%)**	**103 (23.0%)**
Northeast	**30 (4.3%)**	**62 (9.2%)**	**99 (10.3%)**	**110 (10.2%)**	**151 (14.7%)**
Center-West	**18 (7.4%)**	**38 (14.0%)**	**58 (15.1%)**	**57 (15.1%)**	**70 (20.5%)**
Southeast	**71 (5.5%)**	**158 (10.4%)**	**199 (11.2%)**	**303 (13.3%)**	**455 (19.3%)**
South	**23 (5.6%)**	**41 (8.3%)**	**48 (9.2%)**	**73 (10.9%)**	**150 (22.1%)**
Women Elected					
North	**10 (15.4%)**	**5 (7.7%)**	**8 (12.3%)**	**12 (20.0%)**	**10 (15.4%)**
Northeast	**3 (2.0%)**	**3 (2.0%)**	**8 (5.3%)**	**9 (6.0%)**	**11 (7.3%)**
Center-West	**6 (14.6%)**	**7 (17.1%)**	**5 (12.2%)**	**3 (7.3%)**	**4 (9.8%)**
Southeast	**11 (6.1%)**	**12 (6.7%)**	**15 (8.4%)**	**16 (8.9%)**	**15 (8.4%)**
South	**2 (2.6%)**	**2 (2.6%)**	**6 (7.8%)**	**4 (5.2%)**	**5 (6.5%)**
Female Candidate Success Rate					
North	**23.3%**	**10.2%**	**10.5%**	**15.5%**	**9.7%**
Northeast	**10.0%**	**4.8%**	**8.1%**	**8.2%**	**7.3%**
Center-West	**33.3%**	**18.4%**	**8.6%**	**5.3%**	**5.7%**
Southeast	**15.5%**	**7.6%**	**7.5%**	**5.3%**	**3.3%**
South	**8.7%**	**4.9%**	**12.5%**	**5.5%**	**3.3%**
Female-Male Success Rate Ratio					
North	**1.39**	**0.61**	**0.87**	**1.38**	**0.61**
Northeast	**0.45**	**0.20**	**0.49**	**0.56**	**0.46**
Center-West	**2.14**	**1.27**	**0.78**	**0.44**	**0.42**
Southeast	**1.12**	**0.62**	**0.73**	**0.64**	**0.38**
South	**0.45**	**0.29**	**0.84**	**0.45**	**0.24**

Notes: Values in parentheses represent the percent of women among the region's total candidates and elected. Source: Compiled by author with data from the *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*.

Given such mixed findings, this research seeks to clarify the relationship between state development level, public opinion, and women's representation by subjecting the hypothesis to empirical testing at the individual level.[2] I first use public opinion data to

[2] Although I intended to avert the confusion often rendered by such hyper-aggregated concepts as modernization by breaking it down into its component parts—urbanization, educational attainment, workforce participation of women, and income—multicollinearity concerns prevented me from including all of these variables in a model.

explore the covariates of voter hostility to women, expecting *machista bias* to remain more pronounced in lesser developed states and especially in rural areas. While the literature would therefore predict a positive influence of state development level upon the electoral performance of women (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Schmidt, 2008; Thames and Williams, 2010), with other studies restricting this relationship to women on the left (e.g., Avelar, 2001), I expect that state *HDI* will nonetheless be an insignificant predictor of vote share for all candidates, including leftist women. As is discussed at length in Chapter 7, women have crafted means to thrive even in the context of machista electorates. I test the following hypotheses with survey data[3] from three nationally representative surveys conducted in 2001,[4] 2009,[5] and 2010,[6] as well as the LAPOP survey, and my multilevel database of the individual, party, and district-level variables discussed in Chapter Four.

Modernization Hypothesis: Development level will predict the bias against women, with respondents from rural areas and lesser developed states harboring heightened levels of machista bias relative to those from urban areas and more developed states.

Voter Attitudes Hypothesis: A candidate's state development level will nonetheless be uncorrelated to her electoral performance, irrespective of sex or ideology.

*Rival Machista Voters Hypotheses 1-2***:** (1) For female candidates, district development level will be positively correlated to her electoral performance. (2) For leftist female candidates, district development level will be positively correlated to her electoral performance.

-[3] I would like to thank Rachel Meneguello of UNICAMP's CESOP for making these data available.

[4] Survey, "The Brazilian Woman in the Public and Private Spheres," conducted by researchers from the PT's Fundação Perseu Abramo in October, 2001, with 2,502 respondents from 187 municipalities throughout Brazil.

[5] Survey, "Women in Politics," conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Ibope) in February, 2009, with 2002 respondents from 142 municipalities throughout Brazil.

[6] Survey, "Brazilian Electoral Study," conducted by Vox Populi in November, 2010 with 2000 respondents in 149 municipalities throughout Brazil, and representative at the regional level.

Institutional Rules of the Game: District and Party Magnitude

A second rival explanation for women's representation focuses on the institutional rules of the game. The feature of electoral systems most commonly considered in cross-national analyses of women's representation has been the allocation of seats per district (district magnitude).[7] As discussed in Chapter 2, a greater district magnitude is widely considered favorable for women's representation. When there are multiple vacancies on a party list, the resource of a candidacy is less scarce. Parties are therefore able to diversify their lists, including candidates from various societal sectors, constituencies, or groups.

Party magnitude brings this measure to the party level, accounting for the fragmentation of votes that results from the multiplicity of parties associated with high district magnitude elections (Duverger, 1954). The predictive power of party magnitude for women's representation stems from the tendency of party leaders to place female candidates in unelectable positions at the bottom of their closed party lists (Matland, 1998). As the party magnitude increases, candidates in less desirable list positions enjoy a greater chance of election. This explanation loses ground in open-list PR elections, where voters rather than party leaders determine the rank order of candidates.

Indeed, Jones finds that party magnitude is an insignificant predictor of the proportion of women elected on party lists in recent open-list elections in Latin America (2009). But party magnitude may retain relevance for strategic reasons. In a party that anticipates winning only one seat, the candidacies of women will in most instances be subordinated to candidacies of those with a proven track record of attaining votes and/or raising funds. In the Brazilian electoral system, prioritized candidates on the so-called "unofficial list" and particularly the "*puxadoras da legenda*" – candidates who enhance

[7] Given the widespread diffusion of quotas in the last two decades (Krook, 2009), most cross-national analyses now also incorporate a measure of quota systems among their institutional variables.

the electoral prospects of fellow partisans by virtue of their anticipated quantity of votes in excess of the electoral quotient – enjoy greater access to the state-funded propaganda time (HGPE) allocated by the party, more support in producing their advertisements for HGPE and other propaganda materials, and a greater chance of garnering organizational support and endorsement from their party's gubernatorial campaign (Matos, 2008; Samuels, 2003). A party that is fighting for a single seat will likely be hesitant to encourage and support additional candidacies, recruiting instead *candidatas laranjas* (sacrificial lambs) intended solely to garner votes for the top (usually male) candidate.

Conversely, a party that anticipates winning more seats in a state will be more willing to share party material resources such as campaign literature, time on and production assistance for HGPE, the highly-desired *dobradinha* in concurrent elections, and funds among its candidates. Such support generally parlays into a perception of viability in the media and electorate. Given these strategic considerations, I expect party magnitude – lagged to account for the anticipatory quality of the effect – to exert a positive influence on women's electoral performance in Brazil. I expect that parties that, based on prior performance in a district, anticipate winning less than two seats will not support outsider candidacies and will therefore disadvantage most female contenders.

Of the 2,390 state parties that ran in four election cycles (1998-2010)[8] across Brazil's 27 statewide multimember districts, with more than 20 parties in each election, 838 won at least one seat. Only 147 (17.5%) of these successful state parties had women in their delegations, with 691 – more than 82% – failing to elect a single woman.[9] A pairwise correlation demonstrates a slight positive relationship between a party's seat

[8] Because I am using the lag of party magnitude, the 1994 elections are excluded due to limited data availability from 1990 elections.
[9] This number jumps to 2,243 – nearly 94% – when including those parties that competed but won no seats.

share and their election of women, and the parties with women in their congressional delegation tend to be those with a party magnitude of two or more (17.3% of the total) rather than one. Yet, the fact that some of the numerous all-male delegations hail from parties enjoying higher party magnitudes suggests that other factors such as the biases confronted in the electorate (machista voter attitudes) and among party elites (the "good ole boys' club") must also be considered.

I use the wide range in district and party magnitudes in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies (ranging from 8 to 70, and 0 to 20, respectively), to empirically test their effects on female candidates' electoral prospects. Although most prior studies of women's representation and district and party magnitude contend that both measures of magnitude are positively correlated to women's electoral success, I argue that it is a logical leap to expect that more female candidates presumed to result from greater district magnitude will automatically lead to the election of women.

Table 5.3. Do More Female Contenders Translate into More Women Elected?

Year	***N* Female candidates***	***N* Total candidates**	**% Female candidates**	***N* Women elected**	**% Women elected**
1994	185 (1% ⇧)	3008	6.2	32	6.2
1998	348 (69% ⇧)	3357	10.4	29	5.7
2002	480 (10% ⇧)	4198	11.4	42	8.2
2006	627 (11% ⇧)	4946	12.7	45	8.8
2010	929 (51% ⇧)	4854	19.1	45	8.8

*The percentage in parentheses indicates the increase in proportion of female candidacies from the prior election.

On the contrary, the only two elections in contemporary Brazilian politics in which the percentage of women deputies decreased or stayed the same were 1998 and 2010, the two elections where the increase in female candidacies was the greatest (see

Table 5.3).[10] Increases in the number of female candidates have not automatically translated into more female deputies.

I therefore expect *district magnitude* to have a negative influence on candidate electoral performance, irrespective of gender, due to the greater number of candidates and thus more competitive electoral contexts in states with higher district magnitudes. I also include the effective number of candidates running in each state, (1 divided by the sum of the squared vote share of all candidates running per state), which accounts for the fragmentation of the vote resulting from the mass of candidates in Chamber of Deputies elections (Moser and Scheiner, 2004; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). I hypothesize that once competitiveness and seat availability are taken into account through *effective number of candidates* and *party magnitude*, we will see a positive relationship for party magnitude, with candidates emerging from parties with greater seat shares enjoying superior electoral performance.

I estimate the model with party magnitude from both the current and prior election (as a lag, or *party magnitude*$_{t-1}$). Again, given the open lists, I expect party magnitude to exercise an effect that is anticipatory in quality; parties that based on their performance in past elections do not expect to win many seats will therefore have a scarcity of resources and be less likely to support outsider candidacies. I expect the effect of lagged party magnitude to be positive for all candidates, but especially salient and thus elevated for female candidates because they are less likely than are male candidates to run as the consummate insider of the "unofficial list," and therefore stand to gain more from the potential of shared party resources.

[10] This is in part due to the widespread occurrence of sacrificial lamb candidacies among women contenders in the wake of the gender quota and subsequent reform (see Wylie, 2011).

Although this expectation runs contrary to Jones' (2009) finding that party magnitude does not predict a coalition's proportion of women elected in open-list elections, I contend that we must subject these hypotheses to testing at the individual level in order to elucidate the conditions under which individual women can thrive.[11]

Rules of the Game – District Magnitude Hypothesis: District magnitude will be negatively correlated to candidate electoral performance, irrespective of candidate sex.

Rules of the Game – Party Magnitude Hypothesis: Party magnitude$_{t-1}$ will be positively correlated to candidates' electoral performance, with an elevated effect for female candidates.

Rival Rules of the Game Hypothesis 1 (conventional wisdom): District magnitude will be positively correlated to female candidates' electoral performance.

Rival Rules of the Game Hypothesis 2 (Jones): Party magnitude$_{t, t-1}$ will be uncorrelated to female candidates' electoral performance.

The Good Ole Boys' Club: Party Institutionalization and Leadership

The literature on Brazilian electoral politics emphasizes the weakness of most Brazilian parties and thus tends to discount their role in explaining electoral outcomes (e.g., Ames, 2001; Mainwaring, 1995, 1999; Samuels, 2003, 2008). Yet, most comparative studies of women's representation point to political parties as the key gatekeepers (Caul, 1999, 2001; Kittilson, 2006; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993). Parties' (albeit varied) roles in candidate recruitment, capacity-building, and resource allocation are understood as critical to the development of viable female candidacies in both party- and candidate-centered contexts (Lawless and Fox, 2005).

I bridge these seemingly disparate literatures to explain precisely how the above mentioned weakness of many Brazilian parties has undermined their capacity to recruit,

[11] While Jones' party/coalition list-level analysis represents a significant advance from the bulk of studies that aggregate at the country level, it cannot tell us how these factors affect individual women. Moreover, it is unclear how he codes "left" for Brazil's rarely ideologically coherent coalitions.

develop, and support viable female candidacies. I use interparty variation to explain which of Brazil's parties have proven most conducive to women's electoral prospects, finding that rather than ideology per se, party institutionalization and inclusion or exclusion of women into the "good ole boys' club" (party leadership) best predict the electoral performance of female candidates.

Ideology

Ideology's role as a conventional predictor of women's electoral fortunes derives from the left's historical emphasis on social equality and a platform of active policies intended to realize equality (e.g., Duverger, 1955). Due in part to this professed ideological commitment to equality by parties on the left, non-leftist parties are more likely than are leftist parties to be dominated by men. These men will fight to maintain their status and therefore be unsupportive of female candidacies (Duverger, 1955).

The causal process through which leftist ideology should exercise a positive effect on the electoral prospects of women is not entirely clear in extant work. Most explanations point to the left's historical emphasis on egalitarianism, but discussion of the precise mechanisms substantiating the relationship at the individual level is elusive. Kenworthy and Malami argue that the strength of leftist parties can predict overall women's representation because leftist parties' ideological commitment to reducing inequality should lead them to nominate more women candidates, with the assumption being that more female candidates will translate into more women elected (1999, 238). Have Brazil's leftist parties run and elected more female candidates?

In the elections under consideration here, 14.3% of leftist candidates were female, compared to 11.9 and 11.4 percent for centrist and rightist parties, respectively. When looking at only elected deputies, we see that 11.1% of deputies elected by leftist parties

are female, with only 5.9% of those elected in non-leftist parties being women. These observed differences between left and non-leftist parties' advancement and election of female candidates are statistically significant at the $p<0.000$ level. But the question remains – what is it about running with a leftist party that seems to benefit female contenders? Is the apparent electoral advantage in fact a product of egalitarian ideology, and therefore universal to leftist parties?

The potential for a "contagion from the left" effect, whereby the initial promotion of female candidates by leftist parties drives other competitive parties to do the same, gives us reason to expect ideology will lose predictive power over time (Matland and Studlar, 1995). Given the gender quota, especially in the wake of reforms that enable its enforcement, as well as great diversity among women, I do not expect the circumstance of running with a leftist party per se (after controlling for other key party characteristics) to advantage female candidates. I contend that it is the institutionalized structure and incorporation of women in leadership common – but not universal – to leftist parties that enables and motivates their effective promotion of women's participation.

Among the 2180 state parties competing in the 1998-2010 elections, *left* is indeed positively correlated at the highest level of statistical significance with *party institutionalization* ($\rho=0.15$), *proportion of women leaders* ($\rho=0.21$), and *critical mass* ($\rho=0.26$). A logistic model of *critical mass* – whether or not a state party has at least 25% women in its leadership – demonstrates that leftist parties are much more likely than non-leftist parties to have a critical mass of women leaders, with an odds ratio of 3 to 1. Yet recall from Chapter 4 that there are non-leftist parties outperforming some leftist parties on these fronts, with the country's largest leftist party (the PT) having a critical mass of women in just over half of its state leadership committees (See Figure 4.6, Table 4.7).

Given these observations, and the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 2, I argue that while the mass and participatory character and ideological commitment to equality of most leftist parties have given them a head start on effectively promoting women's participation, leftist ideology per se is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for women's electoral success. I contend that party institutionalization and the incorporation of women in party leadership yield superior analytical leverage for explaining variation in women's electoral prospects. The effect on female candidates of leftist ideology is *indirect*, with parties with a mass and participatory orientation more conducive to institutionalization, and those supporting egalitarianism more likely to incorporate women in top decision-making structures. Next, I recall the discussion from Chapter 2 outlining precisely why I expect well-institutionalized parties with women leaders to improve the electoral prospects of female contenders.

Transparency and the Norm of Compliance

Well-institutionalized parties are more likely to cultivate an environment in which the rules of the game are transparent, and where there is a reasonable expectation that such rules will be respected by all. The implications for women's electoral prospects are many, with two being particularly salient. First, institutionalized parties will be more likely to abide by a norm of compliance with internal and external formal rules, and thus more compelled to comply with the gender quota than will parties in which formal rules are regularly flouted.[12] When decisions are made within an exclusive realm of state party elites rather than according to clearly defined rules of the game, transparency and accountability suffer. The propensity of party leaders in inchoate parties to dominate

[12] As discussed in Chapter 2, this logic derives from findings in the international organizations literature that constitutional constraints on states instill a norm of compliance that carries over to the international realm, inducing compliance with rarely enforced international laws (Dixon, 1993; Simmons, 1998).

internal decision-making and act with total impunity spills over into the realm of external rules. This is particularly true in the case of the Brazilian quota, which until the 2009 mini-reform provided ample loopholes for circumventing the law.

In contrast, when parties have a propensity to abide by their own transparent internal rules, the norm of compliance extends to external rules. As a result, institutionalized parties are more likely than are inchoate parties to make a good-faith effort to comply with the gender quota. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the odds that a well-institutionalized party (party institutionalization=3) will comply with the quota, relative to a weakly institutionalized party (party institutionalization=1), are approximately 2 to 1.25, with a one-unit increase in party institutionalization yielding a 25% increase in the odds that a party will meet the quota target.

The absence of any real expectation that formal laws will be complied with in inchoate parties is well-illustrated by the frequent manipulation of the provisional commissions mechanism by domineering party leaders eager to defuse any challenges to their authority (Guarnieri, 2011). This leads to the second implication of such an environment for women; absent a universally understood set of rules and a norm of compliance, those new to or low in the party ranks cannot anticipate the path of ascension within the party. This means that women and other outsiders will have a difficult time attaining intermediary leadership positions as well as candidacy.

If top party leaders regularly circumvent elected delegations for the purpose of candidate nomination, political aspirants must cozy up to these party leaders in order to attain the nomination and subsequent campaign support, rather than cultivate a broad base of support within the party (Braga, 2008; Guarnieri, 2011). The fact that the upper echelons of party decision-making in most parties remain largely male means that most women are insufficiently connected to such good ole' boy networks, and therefore less

likely to have success ascending the ranks of inchoate parties. On the contrary, where parties make a concerted effort to comply with the quota and exhibit clear processes for ascending to candidacy, women are able to work their way up through the party, with party leaders seeking to meet the quota target eager to capitalize on their potential.

The Psychology of Self-vs.-External Nomination

In Brazil's entrepreneurial electoral context, where party organizations are often a few-man-show rather than a collective and well-structured organization, self rather than external nomination is the norm (Samuels, 2008). It is up to candidates to get themselves on the party list, which will most often simply be presented—as is—at a ceremonial convention (Braga, 2008; Mainwaring, 1999). This is problematic for women's representation in part because of the constructed gender gap in political ambition, with women socialized to perceive their appropriate societal role as in the home. Despite the fact that women are transcending such constructed barriers, are the head of household in 35% of Brazilian homes – often times the manager of family funds (with 94% of the Bolsa Família transfers benefitting millions of Brazilian families going to women (Leonardi, 2011)), and comprise the majority contingency of many if not most social movements, many women maintain a distance from formal politics.

This is a result of a complex interconnected web of factors, including traditional gender socialization, disillusionment with pervasive political corruption, and the inherent risks of the campaign. As illustrated in Chapter 2, traditional gender socialization has left women largely responsible for domestic duties, with the vast majority of women who work outside the home having to take on a "triple shift" in order be active in party life. This has a fundamental influence on the kind of women seeking and winning election. Women deputies are less likely than their male counterparts to be married and have

young children while serving, and if they do have a family at home, must have the conditions to contract household help in their stead. With societal gender norms still privileging women as mothers, a family supportive of female political ambition – which if successful, will result in her spending a sizeable portion of her time away from home – is not a given.

Moreover, women are often reluctant to make such a sacrifice to enter an arena they perceive as corrupt and ineffective. Public opinion data demonstrate statistically significant gender gaps in trust in and satisfaction with the country's political institutions. More than a third of female respondents indicated that they had absolutely no trust in parties, 20.6% reported no trust whatsoever in elections, and 41.2% said they were unsatisfied with the functioning of Brazilian democracy (LAPOP, 2008). An oft repeated expression characterizes politics as dirty and a man's world, a bastion of corruption and masculinity that women are frequently hesitant to confront. Add to these already powerful deterrents the expense and combative character of campaigns alongside gendered wage inequities, and the disincentives for women to self-nominate are evident. Without the strong encouragement and assurance of support from her party, most women will be hesitant to embark on such an endeavor that is fraught with abundant risk and questionable rewards.

Women in general also have a greater affinity for parties that recruit *loyalists* rather than *entrepreneurs*, with women being "more likely to try to obtain their party's nomination when a *loyalist* is the type of deputy the party commonly wants" (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008, 347). The probability of combative intraparty competition will drive away most women, with experimental evidence suggesting that women prefer being a part of collective team-based strategies "rather than intraparty

competition that directly pits co-partisans against each other" (Ellis, 2002; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008, 350; Shugart, 1994, 38).

Women running in weakly institutionalized parties are likely to be those that either possess family or converted political capital independent of their party (to be discussed in Chapter 7), or those that have been tapped at the last moment as *candidatas laranjas* (sacrificial lambs) intended to garner votes for the priority (usually male) candidate(s) while allowing the party to feign an attempt at compliance with the gender quota. The latter candidate will be poorly equipped for the campaign and have no party support, with any success achieved by the former candidate done so in spite of her party.

In well-institutionalized parties, on the other hand, municipal party organizations collect suggestions for candidates, with leaders from the women's and organizational sectors often approaching women leaders in the community about considering a run well in advance of the election (rather than at the last minute solely to gesture at the gender quota). Nominations are evaluated by municipal and state party leadership, and then a unified party ticket is presented at an inclusive state party convention, where popularly elected delegates are allowed to propose and debate changes to the party slate, after which the final candidate list is voted upon (Braga, 2008). These conditions are propitious for women because they externalize the decision to run, with being selected itself serving to boost women's self-confidence and thus viability. Greater vetting by an active party organization is also likely to result in a more qualified candidate pool, leading to greater prospects of electoral success among women candidates from such parties.

Organizational Support

Well-institutionalized parties also provide opportunities for newcomers to cut their political teeth. Whereas inchoate parties often have only a couple of offices that remain in the hands of a few leaders, more institutionalized parties have various sectors that are represented by internally elected leaders, with regular alternation. This range of electable internal party positions affords aspirants a lower risk opportunity to gauge their support within the party and explore their broader electability, with those elected having the chance to learn the ropes and eventually demonstrate their political prowess to co-partisans. Frequent meetings and mobilizational events are other means through which active party organizations facilitate the acquisition of political skillsets by their members. As illustrated in the discussion of the PC do B in Chapter 2, well-institutionalized parties also often offer courses designed with candidate capacity-building in mind. Such opportunities demonstrate both the *how* and *what* of politics.

As discussed above, women are in general predisposed to collective strategies based on constructive ideas rather than combative and individualistic campaigns (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008). Particularly given the intraparty competition prevalent in Chamber of Deputies elections, the ability to campaign on party (or faction) ideals and proposals, rather than clientelistic strategies that favor incumbents, is advantageous for female contenders. An institutionalized party has clearly identifiable policy positions, with participation in party events providing on-the-ground training allowing women to adopt and articulate these positions. By offering candidates the chance to develop political wherewithal, institutionalized parties enhance their candidates' electoral viability. In contrast, a weakly institutionalized party is problematic for women because it lacks coherent platforms, and offers little or no opportunities for outsiders to acquire the necessary skillset. With a party organization that is fleeting at

best, candidates are left to fend for themselves. One result of this extremely entrepreneurial setting is that many of the few successful female candidates have developed their political capital in alternate spheres rather than coming up through the party ranks (see Chapter 7).

Organizational support from one's party can also have a psychological effect, with women unlikely to contest an election for which they feel unqualified. Fox and Lawless' surveys of men and women from the "candidate eligibility pool" in the US (law, business, education, political activism) reveal that women are significantly more likely than men to doubt their qualifications and capacity for both electoral politics and the campaign itself (Fox and Lawless, 2004, 2011; Lawless and Fox, 2005, 2010). I expect the same dynamic of "gendered evaluative standards" to hold in Brazil, where socialized gender norms are equally (if not more) resilient despite recent progress. The availability of additional training opportunities, whether through courses or on-the-ground training, thus improves women's political prospects by not only teaching the *how* and *what* of politics, but also by providing a powerful psychological boost to their political ambition. Together, such organizational and psychological support projects to the electorate an image of viability.

Personalist-vs.-Programmatic Politics and Material Support

The prospect of programmatic campaigns rather than personalist politics is far greater in institutionalized parties than in inchoate parties (Ames, 2001; Guadagnini, 1993). Programmatic politics facilitate collective, ideas-based strategies, with candidates running in such parties able to emphasize party policy positions rather than their own personal appeal. This may in turn lead the elector to evaluate a candidate on the basis of her articulated policy positions rather than personal traits such as gender (Valdini, 2010).

An ideas-based evaluation can mitigate the potential for voter bias against women, which is elevated in electoral systems such as Brazil's (Valdini, 2010), where open-list electoral rules and large district magnitude foment intraparty competition (Shugart, Valdini, Suominen, 2005).

In such a context, weakly institutionalized parties exacerbate the potential for personalist politics, favoring those with accumulated personal political capital – which as a result of constructed gender roles are primarily men (or women relatives of male politicians). While candidates in weakly institutionalized parties will have to themselves hire most of their campaign help and thus independently garner extensive campaign funding, well-institutionalized parties with strong party organizations can provide female candidates with funding and militant (wo)man power to overcome their probable finance deficit. Indeed, among the candidacies studied here, as *party institutionalization* increases, the proportion of campaign contributions financed by one's party grows. But as *party institutionalization* decreases, the proportion of campaign funds coming from the candidate herself and from corporations increases. Absent the support of a well-institutionalized party, candidates must fend for themselves.

In spite of women's substantial advances in education and workforce participation, they continue to receive less remuneration for equal work and perform the vast majority of unpaid labor in the home (Ipea, 2009).[13] This means that most women will simply not possess the material capital to bank a campaign, and thus be dependent upon the availability of party or external (corporate, individual) funding. A well-institutionalized party will have both party funds and militants at its disposal, which can provide women with much needed material support for the campaign.

[13] In 2007, the average reported weekly hours on domestic duties for women 16 and older was 27.2 hours, compared to only 10.6 weekly hours for men 16 and older. Only 50.7% of men (compared to 89.9% of women) affirmed that they took care of any household labor (Ipea, 2009).

A materially well-off campaign (whether through money or [wo]manpower) is essential due to the vast numbers of candidacies and often extensive territory within a district. Parties can assist with the acquisition of necessary resources and otherwise help to orient newcomers to the nuances of this daunting electoral arena that privileges incumbents (Araújo and Alves, 2007) and others possessing political and/or economic capital (Avelar, 2001; Pinheiro, 2007). Party (and external) funds help to produce electoral propaganda and stage and attend political rallies, parades, and other events over the course of the campaign. Candidates without such campaign materials and/or events will be lost in a sea of competitors and thus have little to no chance of election. While there are several deputies who have won election with limited funds, campaign finance remains one of the strongest predictors of an individual candidate's chance of success (Samuels, 2001a, 2001b; author calculations).

In sum, institutionalized parties are well-equipped to provide female contenders with the psychological, organizational, and material backing critical in Brazil's entrepreneurial electoral context. Recruitment by party leaders, the availability of party training and support, and prospect of an ideas-based campaign convinces women to throw their hat in the ring, and enhances their self- and externally-perceived viability.

Women in Party Leadership

The *capacity* to recruit and promote female candidacies, however, is only effectuated with the endorsement and active support of party leadership. When women attain a "critical mass" among party leadership, they are able to lobby for the active promotion of women's participation (Agência Patrícia Galvão, 2011; Kittilson, 2006).[14]

[14]In an event history analysis of the adoption of candidate gender quotas in sixty parties in ten Western European democracies, Kittilson found that even after controlling for several party and electoral system variables, "for each percentage point gain in the proportion of women among the party's leadership, or

Once reaching a critical mass, and therefore less hindered by the constraints of token minority status, women in party leadership can use their awareness of the barriers confronted by female contenders to introduce a gendered frame of reference and carry out a number of "critical acts" (Dahlerup, 1988). As illustrated in Figure 2.4, women leaders can pressure parties to adopt women-friendly policies, hold parties accountable to the quota, serve as mentors for women aspiring to ascend within the party, recruit and recommend women for inclusion on candidate lists, lobby for and host capacity-building events, and mobilize party resources to support female candidacies. Such critical acts, which help women overcome an array of obstacles, are less likely to be promoted by male party leaders, who are often incognizant of the significance of such acts for women and/or unwilling to support efforts that may ultimately dilute their own influence.

While female presence in party leadership can be a potent mechanism for enhancing women's legislative representation, acquiring power within these largely male decision-making circles is difficult. According to a recent study of several Western European parties by Kittilson, the parties most likely to have women in their high-level party leadership structures are those that have internal party quotas, are centralized, have New Left values, and are fractionalized with strong external ties (2006). As depicted in Table 4.8, women's presence on the national executive committees (NECs) of most Brazilian parties remains minimal, with women at least approximating 20% in only five leftist parties (PC do B, PPS, PSB, PT, PV). While there are several outliers at the national and state levels, with even those five parties having some state organizations with few women and other leftist parties having only minimal representation of women in their national and state leadership, it is noteworthy that leftist parties are 3 times more

---

national executive committee, the likelihood that the party will adopt quotas increases by almost 8% in the first model (1975-1995) and by 13% in the second model (1985-1995)" (2006, 60).

likely to have a critical mass of women leaders in state leadership than non-leftist parties (author analysis).

Ideology thus retains an indirect influence, with leftist parties being more likely to provide the initial conditions propitious for women. Under historical conditions of inclusion, women in leftist parties are more likely to have developed critical organizing experience allowing them to ascend the party ranks. In short, there is a certain degree of path dependency, with leftist parties traditionally more conducive to women's participation than non-leftist parties. While this can illuminate why leftist parties have been overall more likely than non-leftist parties to incorporate women in their leadership structures, it is less convincing for explanations of women's electoral prospects. I contend that the fact of not being leftist does not itself lead a party to defy the quota law while diminishing its own electoral conquests by squandering candidate slots. Rather, male party leaders evade efforts they perceive will dilute their influence and/or lack awareness of how they can effectively recruit and develop viable female candidacies.

A critical mass of women in state party leadership facilitates a greater commitment of resources toward women. For instance, two critical acts that women in party leadership can perform are to hold party leaders accountable to the quota and recruit female candidates. Looking to Table 5.4, which displays the results of a logistic model of a state party's odds of complying with the gender quota, we see that state parties with a critical mass of women are 75% more likely to comply with the gender quota than are parties lacking a critical mass of women in their leadership.[15] As mentioned above, a one unit increase in *party institutionalization* is associated with a 25% increase in the odds that a party will comply with the quota. Notably, the introduction of *critical mass*

[15] The robust standard errors adjust for clustering among a state party over time.

diminishes the effect of *left*. This suggests that it is the inclusion of women in party leadership rather than leftist ideology per se that is more important for quota compliance.

Table 5.4. Which Parties Comply with the Gender Quota?

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Odds Ratio	Robust SE		Odds Ratio	Robust SE	
Left	1.417	(0.185)	**	1.262	(0.164)	
Critical mass				1.750	(0.226)	***
Party institutionalization	1.252	(0.125)	*	1.254	(0.127)	*
N	2192	(691 clusters)		2180	(683 clusters)	
Pseudo R^2	0.008			0.019		

So while leftist parties are in general considered to be more women-friendly, with parties being constrained in their ability to respond to new demands by their historical ideological orientation (Kitschelt, 1994), I argue that any observed correlation is spurious, with leftist ideology being an insufficient condition for a party to be deemed open to women. I contend that it is not leftist ideology per se that enables female political aspirants, but rather the party institutionalization and incorporation of women in party leadership more common to parties on the left that has proven women-friendly in recent elections. These are, however, two distinct mechanisms enabling women's electoral success – a party's capacity to provide conditions propitious to women, and their will to mobilize this capacity on behalf of women.

Boys' Club Hypothesis: Leftist party ideology will have a negative effect on the vote share of male candidates, and a positive effect on the vote share of female candidates. The effect of ideology, however, will be subsumed by party institutionalization, which will have a positive effect on the vote share of female candidates. Moreover, the positive effect of ideology or institutionalization for women will be conditioned by the proportion of women in the party leadership, with the interaction effect between left or institutionalization and women in the party leadership rendering insignificant the main effect of ideology or institutionalization.

Rival Ideology Hypothesis: Leftist party ideology will have a positive effect on the vote share of female candidates, independent of party institutionalization and irrespective of the proportion of women in the party leadership.

DATA AND METHODS

Hierarchical Modeling[16]

As elaborated in Chapter 4, the use of hierarchical modeling allows us to account for the non-independence of observations, in particular the correlations among candidates running in the same state. It nests candidates within their state-level contexts, modeling cross-level interactions such as the potentially mediating roles of district development and magnitude on the effect of candidate sex on electoral outcome. A naïve (empty, with only the hierarchical structure modeled) estimation of candidate *vote share* demonstrates that 13.86% of the variance in *vote share* is attributable to the district level. It is therefore essential that the correlation among candidates running in the same district is accounted for, and hierarchical modeling is the most sophisticated technique for handling such clustering at the district-level.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is a candidate's electoral outcome in elections to the Chamber of Deputies. I use both *vote share* – a candidate's share of the valid candidate vote[17] (range 0.00% to 28.36%, mean 0.66%) – and whether a candidate attains election, and report any significant and interesting differences.

[16] For more information on the appropriateness of hierarchical modeling for this research question, see Chapter 4.
[17] Party label votes and blank and spoiled votes are excluded from the calculation.

Independent Variables

To test the alternative explanations and my argument, I interact with *female* the above-mentioned variables for machista voter attitudes (*machista bias* and *state HDI*), rules of the game (*district magnitude*, *party magnitude*, and *effective number of candidates*), and the good ole' boys' club (*ideology*, *left*, *party institutionalization*, and *critical mass*), along with the battery of individual controls for candidate quality introduced in Chapter 4 – *education*, *feeder occupation*, *incumbency*, and *campaign finance;*[18] – I expect these controls to exercise a positive effect on candidate vote share.

Before introducing the model, I examine the variables descriptively (see Table 5.5). With the exception of education (and campaign finance, due to great variation among women), the gender discrepancies in all of the variables are statistically significant. Most but not all of these disparities remain significant among successful candidates. Women candidates are on average just as educated as male candidates, but are less likely to win election and have a lower vote share. They are also less likely to be married, come from a feeder occupation, or be running as an incumbent. The campaign finance of women candidates is lower than that of male candidates, although wide variation renders the difference insignificant. As mentioned above, women candidates receive on average a greater share of their campaign contributions from parties and a lesser share from corporations.

Women are on average running in districts that have (minimally) lower levels of voter bias against women and higher scores on the HDI, as predicted by the Rival Machista Voters Hypothesis. With the average female candidate coming from district and

[18] Following previous analyses of campaign finance (e.g., Samuels, 2001a, 2001b), I also include the square of campaign finance – *campaign finance*^{2} – to account for diminishing returns, and expect its effect to be negative, while the main effect of campaign finance should be positive. Although more campaign finance will certainly enhance a candidate's competitiveness, after a certain point the positive effects taper off, which is captured by the quadratic term.

parties with lower magnitudes, but a lower average effective number of candidates, the relationship between electoral rules and women's prospects is unclear. Whereas 71% of male deputies won with non-leftist parties, only 55% of women did so. Women are also running and winning in parties that are on average more institutionalized than the parties of male candidates. The average proportion of women in state party leadership is two percentage points higher for female candidates than for male candidates, a discrepancy heightened to 4.7 percentage points among successful candidates.

Table 5.5. Descriptive Statistics

	All candidates		Successful candidates	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Election	0.075	0.133***		
Vote share	0.525	0.683***	4.446	3.193***
Education	3.580	3.562±	3.819	3.834
Married	0.444	0.680***	0.557	0.785***
Feeder occupation	0.480	0.506*	0.802	0.825
Incumbent	0.058	0.116***	0.451	0.554**
Campaign finance	R$225,575	R$347,400	R$834,621	R$997,389
Prop CF – Party	0.340	0.190***	0.144	0.092**
Prop CF – Corps	0.145	0.247***	0.394	0.486**
District voter bias	25.558	25.930*	25.678	26.139
District HDI	0.796	0.783***	0.780	0.768*
District magnitude	34.749	5.898*	27.358	32.772***
Party magnitude	2.152	2.527***	4.306	5.141*
Effective *n* of cands	55.389	58.875***	46.324	53.998**
Left	0.446	0.387***	0.451	0.294***
Ideology	3.998	4.214***	3.837	4.566***
Pty institutionalization	2.033	1.976***	2.198	2.094±
Women in party leadership	16.700	14.870***	16.573	11.893***

Two-tailed tests of the gender differences are significant at the following levels:
± p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Model

I use those variables to assess the relative explanatory power of machista voter attitudes, the rules of the game, and the good ole' boys' club for women's electoral prospects in Brazil, estimating the following hierarchical model:

$$\text{Vote Share}_{ij} =$$

Individual-level model: $\beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}\,\text{female}_{ij} + \beta_{2j}\,\text{left}_{ij} + \beta_{3j}\,\text{female*left}_{ij} + \beta_{4j}\,\text{partymag}_{ij} + \beta_{5j}\,\text{partymag}_{(t-1)ij} + \beta_{6j}\,\text{female*partymag}_{ij} + \beta_{7j}\,\text{female*partymag}_{(t-1)ij} + \beta_{8j}\,\text{PII}_{ij} + \beta_{9j}\,\text{female*PII}_{ij} + \beta_{10j}\,\text{c.mass}_{ij} + \beta_{11j}\,\text{female*c.mass}_{ij} + \beta_{12j}\,\text{PII*c.mass}_{ij} + \beta_{13j}\,\text{female*PII*c.mass}_{ij} + \beta_{14j}\,\text{education}_{ij} + \beta_{15j}\,\text{occupation}_{ij} + \beta_{16j}\,\text{incumbent}_{ij} + \beta_{17j}\,\text{campfinance}_{ij} + \beta_{18j}\,\text{campfinance}^2_{ij} + r_{ij}$

District-level model:

$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\,\text{HDI group}_j + \gamma_{02}\,\text{dmag group}_j + \gamma_{03}\,\text{eff n cands}_j + u_{0j}$
$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}\,\text{HDI group}_j + \gamma_{12}\,\text{dmag group}_j + \gamma_{13}\,\text{eff n cands}_j + u_{1j}$
$\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21}\,\text{HDI group}_j$
$\beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30} + \gamma_{31}\,\text{HDI group}_j$
$\beta_{4j} = \gamma_{40}$
$\beta_{5j} = \gamma_{50}$
$\beta_{6j} = \gamma_{60}$
$\beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70}$
$\beta_{8j} = \gamma_{80}$
$\beta_{9j} = \gamma_{90}$
$\beta_{10j} = \gamma_{100}$
$\beta_{11j} = \gamma_{110}$
$\beta_{12j} = \gamma_{120}$
$\beta_{13j} = \gamma_{130}$
$\beta_{14j} = \gamma_{140}$
$\beta_{15j} = \gamma_{150}$
$\beta_{16j} = \gamma_{160}$
$\beta_{17j} = \gamma_{170}$
$\beta_{18j} = \gamma_{180}$

I also estimate the above model with each of the dimensions of the party institutionalization index analyzed in turn and as an index and factor score. To improve our confidence in the use of HDI as a proxy for machista voter attitudes, I estimate a

supplemental multilevel model of *machista bias*$_{ij}$ (of respondent *i* in state *j*) that explores the covariates of sexist attitudes toward women in politics.

Qualitative Evidence

I complement the findings from these multilevel analyses of candidate electoral performance with extensive qualitative data from documentary, ethnographic, and participatory research conducted across Brazil. I draw upon party and campaign materials, 18 years of the quarterly journal of CFEMEA – Brazil's foremost feminist organization, 73 interviews, field notes and observations of women's caucus meetings and the successful campaign of a female candidate for the municipal council and President of the PT in Salvador, Bahia, as well as primary data compiled by others to illuminate, contextualize, and reinforce the quantitative findings on the challenges to women's representation in Brazil.

QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

My supplemental analysis finds that machista voter attitudes persist, and are indeed predicted by a respondent's district development level, with heightened bias existing in less developed areas. An even stronger predictor of that bias is the variable differentiating locales on the basis of size,[19] with male and female respondents in rural areas having a predicted probability of expressing machista bias of 0.53 and 0.36, compared to 0.39 and 0.24 in capital cities, even after controlling for respondent education, age, and income. Those findings provide confidence that the *HDI* variable will indeed capture the dynamic of machista voter attitudes, and lend support to the Modernization Hypothesis. Of 2,454 women surveyed in a nationally representative sample, less than one percent said machismo did not exist in Brazil, with 37% agreeing

[19] Ranging from 1 (capital/metropolitan area) to 5 (rural area).

that machismo was extensive (Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2001). Support for the Modernization Hypothesis paves the way for us to assess the Rival Machista Voters Hypothesis by exploring whether such machista attitudes impede female candidates using *HDI* in the multivariate analyses below.

Table 5.6 displays the results of the above-specified multilevel model of candidate electoral performance, estimated in steps. Model 1 includes the traditional predictors of women's representation and their interactions with *female – HDI* (as a proxy for machista voter attitudes), *party magnitude* and *district magnitude*, and *ideology*. Model 2 incorporates controls for candidate quality, as well as electoral competitiveness (*effective number of candidates*). Finally, in Model 3, I test my argument – introducing the main effects for female candidates of the party institutionalization index, women in party leadership, and their interaction.

Machista Voters

Although the supplemental analysis discussed above demonstrates that machista voter bias is negatively correlated to development level in Brazil – thus supporting the Modernization Hypothesis – we see from the insignificance of γ_{11} and γ_{31} which assess the *female*HDI* and *female*left*HDI* cross-level interactions (see Table 5.6), that women in less developed districts nonetheless do not face an electoral disadvantage nor do women in more developed districts enjoy an advantage. I therefore find no support for the first Rival Machista Voters Hypothesis that the district development level of female candidates would be positively correlated to their electoral performance. Interestingly, after the introduction of controls for electoral competitiveness and party institutionalization in Models 2 and 3, district development level actually exercises a negative effect (γ_{01}) on candidate vote share, irrespective of gender.

Table 5.6. Multilevel Analyses of Candidate Electoral Performance (1994-2010)

	Model 1 - Rivals			Model 2 - Controls			Model 3 - Wylie		
Fixed Effects	*Coef.*	*SE*	*sig*	*Coef.*	*SE*	*sig*	*Coef.*	*SE*	*sig*
Level 2 District Variables									
For Intercept (β_{0j})									
Intercept (γ00)	0.018	(0.001)	***	0.019	(0.002)	***	0.021	(0.002)	***
HDI (γ01)	-0.001	(0.001)		-0.002	(0.001)	**	-0.002	(0.001)	**
District magnitude (γ02)	-0.001	(0.000)	***	-0.001	(0.000)	***	-0.001	(0.000)	***
Effective n cands (γ03)				0.000	(0.000)		0.000	(0.000)	
Cross-Level Interactions									
For Female slope (β_{1j})									
Intercept (γ10)	-0.005	(0.001)	**	-0.004	(0.002)	*	-0.007	(0.003)	**
HDI (γ11)	0.000	(0.001)		0.000	(0.002)		0.000	(0.002)	
District magnitude (γ12)	0.000	(0.000)		0.000	(0.000)		0.000	(0.000)	
Effective n cands (γ13)				0.000	(0.000)		0.000	(0.000)	
For Left slope (β_{2j})									
Intercept (γ20)	-0.005	(0.000)	***	-0.005	(0.001)	***	-0.006	(0.001)	***
HDI (γ21)	0.002	(0.000)	***	0.003	(0.000)	***	0.003	(0.000)	***
For Fem*Left slope (β_{3j})									
Intercept (γ30)	0.003	(0.001)	**	0.003	(0.001)	*	0.001	(0.002)	
HDI (γ31)	-0.001	(0.001)		-0.001	(0.001)		-0.001	(0.001)	
Level 1 Party Variables									
Party magnitude ($\beta 4j$, γ40)	0.001	(0.000)	***	0.001	(0.000)	***	0.001	(0.000)	***
Fem*P.mag$_{(t-1)}$ ($\beta 7j$, γ70)	0.000	(0.000)		0.000	(0.000)		0.000	(0.000)	
PII ($\beta 8j$, γ80)							-0.001	(0.000)	***
Fem*PII ($\beta 9j$, γ90)							0.001	(0.001)	
C.Mass ($\beta 10j$, γ100)							-0.002	(0.001)	*
Fem*C.Mass ($\beta 11j$, γ110)							-0.005	(0.003)	*
Fem*PII*C.Mass ($\beta 13j$, γ130)							0.002	(0.001)	*
Level 1 Candidate Controls									
Education level ($\beta 14j$, γ140)				0.001	(0.000)	***	0.001	(0.000)	***
Feeder occupation ($\beta 15j$, γ150)				0.000	(0.000)	±	0.001	(0.000)	±
Incumbent ($\beta 16j$, γ160)				0.012	(0.000)	***	0.012	(0.000)	***
Campaign finance ($\beta 17j$, γ170)				0.000	(0.000)	***	0.000	(0.000)	***
Random Effects	*Var*	*SE*	*sig*	*Var*	*SE*	*sig*	*Var*	*SE*	*sig*
Intercept (u_{0j})	0.000	(0.000)	***	0.000	(0.000)	***	0.000	(0.000)	***
Female slope (u_{1j})	0.000	(0.000)	***	0.000	(0.000)	***	0.000	(0.000)	***
Level-1 (r_{ij})	0.000	(0.000)	***	0.000	(0.000)	***	0.000	(0.000)	***
N	17355			11211			10855		
LL	49542			32295			31238		
AIC	-99047			-64542			-62411		
BIC	-98908			-64366			-62178		

***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 ±p<.10 (one-tailed tests)

I anticipated in my Voter Attitudes Hypothesis that a candidate's district development level would, in spite of the greater machista voter bias in less developed states uncovered in the supplemental analysis, be uncorrelated to candidate vote share irrespective of sex or ideology. The findings of Models 1-3 do not support this hypothesis. The main effect of *HDI* (γ_{01}) and its two-way interaction with *left* (γ_{21}) actually are both statistically significant, although their three-way interaction with *female* (γ_{31}) is insignificant. This means that the relationship between district development level and electoral outcome does exist, and is differentiated by ideology. Yet because the interactions of *HDI* (γ_{11}) and *HDI*left* with *female* (γ_{31}) – which are measuring the difference in slopes across candidate sex – are not statistically different from zero, we can conclude that the effects of district development on candidate vote share are not gendered.

As suggested by *HDI*'s negative main effect (γ_{01}) – which assesses the effect of *HDI* for non-left men (when both *left* and *female* equal zero) – and affirmed in the disaggregation of marginal effects displayed in Figure 5.2, for non-leftist men the effect of *HDI* is negative, with these candidates being worse off electorally in more developed states (even after controlling for district competitiveness). For leftist male candidates, the effect is reversed, with γ_{21} being positive and statistically significant. That finding, as well as the breakdown of marginal effects discussed next, would seem to lend partial support to the second Rival Machista Voters Hypothesis, which expected leftist women's electoral prospects to be better in more developed districts. Yet, the beneficial effect of district development for candidates in leftist parties is no greater for female candidates than it is for men. Again, neither of the effects of district development level on male candidate vote share – negative for non-leftists and positive for leftists – is differentiated by gender.

As depicted in Figure 5.2,[20] which breaks down the *HDI* into three groups and treats them as factors rather than presuming a continuous scale, the positive effect of *HDI* for female leftist candidates is exercised when moving from the mean HDI level (1) to the high HDI level (2). Moreover, Figure 5.2 shows that female candidates have the highest predicted vote share in states at the low levels of development (0.80%), and the lowest predicted vote share in states at the mean levels of development (0.39%). Thus, although I cannot quite reject the second Rival Machista Hypothesis, I can say that even leftist women running in more developed states fare no better electorally than those running in less developed states.

Figure 5.2. Predicted Vote Share of Male and Female Candidates, by Ideology and District Development Level (1998-2010)



[20] It is important to keep in mind when viewing Figure 5.2 that the interaction of *female* with *left*HDI* is insignificant, as can be inferred by the overlapping confidence intervals of male and female candidates.

In sum, while the supplemental analysis demonstrates that residual machista voter attitudes do persist, especially in less developed states, they have not depressed the electoral performance of female candidates. Rather, non-leftist candidates have performed best in less developed districts, with development not exercising a gendered effect on candidate vote regardless of party ideology. In Chapter 7, I explain how women have cultivated profiles enabling them to navigate the constraints of voter bias, either by conforming to traditional gender norms, or by working with supportive and programmatic parties to overcome such bias.

Rules of the Game

Models 1-3 lead me to reject the Rival Rules of the Game Hypothesis 1 (conventional wisdom), which predicted that *district magnitude* would be positively correlated to female candidates' electoral performance. Rather, I find support for my Rules of the Game – District Magnitude Hypothesis, which contends that *district magnitude* is negatively correlated to candidate electoral performance, irrespective of candidate sex. As we see in Table 5.6, while the main effect of *district magnitude* (γ_{02}) is negative, its interaction with *female* (γ_{12}) is insignificant. This means that the disadvantage posed by the more competitive electoral climate in high district magnitude elections – a finding that holds even after the introduction of a control for the *effective number of candidates* – is not gendered. Even when breaking down the marginal effects, the effect of district magnitude on candidate vote share does not vary significantly by gender, and is negative. Thus, I reject the first Rival Rules of the Game Hypothesis, and find support for my Rules of the Game – District Magnitude Hypothesis.

Beyond the sheer number of candidates, which I control for, the dynamics of electoral competition in high district magnitude elections are distinct. Campaigning as

one of 39 candidates (Acre-2010) is qualitatively different than being one of 1029 candidates (São Paulo-2010), and is substantially more costly. The average in campaign contributions among candidates running in states with a district magnitude of 8 to 25 (approximately R$190,000) is less than half the average for candidates running in larger districts (R$428,577). Even after controlling for funding discrepancies through *campaign finance*, as well as the *effective number of candidates*, high district magnitude elections prove challenging for both male and female contenders.

The findings of Models 1-3 displayed in Table 5.6 do not support my expectation in the Rules of the Game – Party Magnitude Hypothesis that *party magnitude*$_{t-1}$ would be positively correlated to female candidates' electoral performance. Rather, the main effect of *party magnitude* ($\beta_{4j,}$ γ_{40}) is positive, and the lagged effect (*party magnitude*$_{t-1}$: $\beta_{5j,}$ γ_{50}) is actually negative,[21] with neither interaction with *female* ($\beta_{6j,}$ γ_{60}; $\beta_{7j,}$ γ_{70}) being statistically significant. Those findings and a disaggregation of the marginal effects of lagged party magnitude lead me to reject my Party Magnitude Hypothesis that women would be advantaged in parties that, based on their prior share of seats, anticipate winning more than one seat. The vote share of both male and female candidates actually depresses with higher prior seat shares for their party. Thus, my prediction that parties with a record of electoral success in a district would be more open to women did not hold. As I argue throughout the dissertation, a party having the resources and capacity to support female candidacies is not sufficient to bring about women's effective participation; it must also have the will.

Although Jones' argument outlined in the second Rival Rules of the Game Hypothesis expects that party magnitude will not predict female candidates' electoral

[21] Due to constraints of space, those results for *party magnitude*$_{t-1}$ ($\beta_{5j,}$ γ_{50}) and *female*party magnitude* ($\beta_{6j,}$ γ_{60}) are not displayed in Table 5.6.

performance in the open-list context, the main effect of *party magnitude* ($\beta_{4j,}\ \gamma_{40}$ – the total predicted effect for men and part of the effect for women) is actually positive and statistically significant. Yet, once again, the interaction with *female* ($\beta_{6j,}\ \gamma_{60}$) is not statistically different from zero, meaning that for women the effect party magnitude on vote share is simply β_{4j} rather than $\beta_{4j} + \beta_{6j;}$ in other words, the positive effect of party magnitude is not differentiated by gender.

Figure 5.3. Predicted Vote Share of Male and Female Candidates, by Party Magnitude (1998-2010)



An analysis of the marginal effects disaggregated by party magnitude and candidate sex reveals that the vote share of both men and women increases with party magnitude, with considerable variation among women at the upper bounds of party magnitude. As shown in Figure 5.3, the predicted vote shares of male and female candidates at a party magnitude of one – 0.69 and 0.72 percent respectively – increases to

0.76 and 0.77 percent for a party magnitude of two, and continue to increase with party magnitude. The overlapping confidence intervals in Figure 5.3, however, suggest that a candidate's sex does not mediate the effect of party magnitude.

To recap, neither state development level nor district/party magnitude has exercised a statistically distinct effect on the vote share of male and female candidates, with all of their interactions with *female* being insignificant. Moreover, two of those overall effects operate in the opposite direction expected by the cross-national literature on women's representation. Candidate vote share – both female and male – declines as the development (for non-leftists) and electoral size of one's district increases. Vote share does increase with the electoral fortunes of a candidate's party (captured in party magnitude), but the effect is not significantly amplified for female contenders. Therefore, the conventional explanations for women's overall representation – district development and district/party magnitude – are not mediated by gender at the candidate level. Female candidates fare no better electorally in more developed and larger districts than in districts with lower development levels and magnitudes. Next, I discuss several party-level factors that do operate in gendered ways to predict female candidates' electoral prospects.

The Good Ole' Boys' Club

Models 1 and 2 corroborate the Boys' Club Hypothesis, which expected leftist party ideology to have a negative effect on the vote share of male candidates, and a positive effect on the vote share of female candidates. The negative main effect of *left* (γ_{20}) and its positive interaction with *female* (γ_{30}) demonstrate that while running with a leftist party disadvantages candidates electorally, that negative effect is mitigated for women. Looking to the marginal effects for Model 2 reveals that for non-leftist

candidates, men have a higher predicted vote share; but among leftist candidates, this is reversed, with women enjoying the greater predicted vote share. Leftist parties' historical commitment to general ideals of equality – and active measures to attain it – has provided an environment more fertile for women's participation. Can that ideological affinity for egalitarianism itself explain variation in the electoral success of female candidates, or are there also organizational considerations at work?

My analysis demonstrates that the mechanisms through which running with a leftist party hastens the electoral success of female candidates are the greater tendency of leftist parties to be institutionalized and incorporate women in party leadership. Indeed, the positive interaction of *female*left* (γ_{30}) dissipates with the introduction of my index of party institutionalization (*PII*) and *critical mass* (which measures whether at least 25% of a party's state leadership is female) in Model Three.[22] The effect of *left* (γ_{20}) remains negative, but its interaction with *female* (γ_{30}) loses statistical significance. This means that the gendered effects of *left* seen in Models 1 and 2 are in Model 3 captured through interactions with *PII* and *critical mass*, and provides support for my argument that leftist ideology per se is insufficient to induce electoral gains for female candidates. A breakdown of the marginal effects demonstrates that female candidates running in leftist parties *with a critical mass of women leaders* enjoy a greater predicted vote share (0.99%) than women and men in non-leftist parties (0.84 and 0.93 percent, respectively) and men in leftist parties (0.69%). Absent the critical mass of women leaders, however, leftist women's predicted vote share falls to 0.55 percent.

[22] I also added these variables stepwise, and again find that once I include either *PII* or *critical mass* and their interaction with *female*left*, the significance of *female*left* is not statistically different zero.

Figure 5.4. Willing and Able: The Predicted Vote Share of Male and Female Candidates, by Party Institutionalization and Critical Mass



As shown in Figure 5.4, I also find as expected that the electoral benefit of party institutionalization for women is conditioned by the proportion of women in state party leadership. Moreover, the predicted vote share for female candidates in parties at low or middling levels of institutionalization is not differentiated by *critical mass*, as seen by their overlapping confidence intervals in Figure 5.4. But once parties gain the capacity to support women (at above average levels of *PII*), the trajectories diverge with the predicted vote share of women in parties with a critical mass of women leaders significantly higher than that of women in male-led (more than 75% men in state leadership) parties. Once *PII* exceeds the average, we see a divergence of women's

electoral prospects both with those of men, and according to the presence of women in party leadership. Indeed, the positive effect of *PII* on the vote share of female candidates does not gain significance until the introduction of *critical mass*. This means that party capacity is insufficient on its own, with its positive effect on women's vote share contingent upon its joint occurrence with party will. Thus, as I theorized, female candidates are electorally advantaged when running in parties that have both the capacity and will to support the political participation of women.

The findings lead me to reject the Rival Ideology Hypothesis; the positive effect of leftist party ideology is diminished by the introduction of *PII* and/or *critical mass*, thus refuting the rival expectation that leftist women are advantaged regardless of other important party-level factors. Leftist ideology per se has not yielded superior electoral gains for female candidates. Instead, it is the combination of a structure favorable to outsiders and the presence of actors willing to mobilize resources on their behalf. In sum, the quantitative findings support my argument that it is the institutionalization and incorporation of women in leadership common to leftist parties that has proven beneficial for female candidates. I substantiate these findings qualitatively in the following section.

QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

Machista Voter Bias

Corroborating the quantitative findings, most of the female candidates interviewed believed that voter bias no longer posed a significant hurdle. Yet as demonstrated in the survey data cited above, few would contest the persistence of residual machismo in Brazil (Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2001). Why does such bias not appear to have depressed the vote share of female candidates? The fact that many of the women discounting machista voter attitudes in my interviews conformed to traditional

gender roles suggests that while the voter bias did not prevent their election, it has certainly affected the dynamics of women's campaigns and political profiles (to be discussed in Chapter 7).

Deputy Rebecca Garcia of the conservative PP in the northern state of Amazonas thought being a woman actually helped her in the eyes of the elector, because she represented a fresh alternative to the corrupt, largely male status quo (Interview, December, 2008). Garcia also thought that given her pro-business stance, her gender enhanced her portrait of viability in the perspective of corporate funders, who were looking to back pro-business candidates but eager to endorse a novel candidate such as herself (young and female). Deputy Iriny Lopes of the PT in Espírito Santo (Southeast) also said that she had never suffered gender discrimination from electors, but drew a sharp contrast to her experience with corporate donors, the media, and interactions in the legislature, where she reported being "a victim of prejudice" (Interview, December, 2008). Lopes' sentiment that the legislature was considerably more machista than the electorate was echoed in several interviews, and suggests a troubling disconnect between elected and electors.

Others reported that they had confronted voter bias (Interviews with Tonha Magalhães, November, 2008; Ana Arraes, March, 2009; Fátima Bezerra, March, 2009; Olívia Santana, April, 2009), with even many women constituents being hesitant to vote for female candidates (Interview with Maninha, April, 2009). For Municipal Councilor Olívia Santana (PC do B-BA) and Deputy Benedita da Silva (PT-RJ), Afro-descendent[23] women from impoverished backgrounds, prejudice in the electorate was intensified by multiple and intersecting layers of marginality (Interviews, April, 2009; June, 2009).

[23] This designation is a translation of the Portuguese language term used to depict Brazilians descended from Africans: *afrodesendentes*.

Santana felt that these factors damaged her ability to acquire corporate funding, which undermined her campaign and ability to reach her constituents (Interview, April, 2009). Another stereotype faced by female contenders, especially heightened for physically attractive women candidates, is the challenge of being objectified and discredited (Interview with Rita Camata, December, 2008; Murray, 2010).

In sum, the qualitative evidence on voter bias is mixed. The interviews suggest that while many women have been affected in some way by voter bias, most do not think it has diminished their chances of election. This perception is reinforced by the quantitative finding demonstrated in Figure 5.3 that female candidates and male non-leftist candidates perform best in lesser developed districts. In Chapter 7, I advance an explanation for the apparent inconsistency of residual machista attitudes in less developed states existing alongside the perceived and observed insignificance of development level for women's electoral prospects. By conforming to traditional gender norms, or campaigning collectively in a programmatic and supportive party, (some) women have managed to navigate the constraints of machismo.

Rules of the Game

District and party magnitude were not explicitly mentioned in any of my interviews with politicians. To be discussed further in Chapter 6, women who had contested majoritarian/plurality positions often contrasted the varying electoral rules and the implications for party support. Several of the interviewees also mentioned electoral rules in passing when asked about the political reforms under debate, with the proposal for public financing being more commonly mentioned but a handful expressing support for or opposition to adopting closed party lists. It is suggestive that although I asked

interviewees about electoral rules in several instances, few respondents actively engaged the question.

Good Ole' Boys' Club

On the contrary, structural inequities and party support were repeatedly emphasized across my interviews with candidates, bureaucrats, activists, and scholars. Every single female candidate I interviewed underscored the importance of party support. This focus stands in contrast to the image of a minimal or non-existent gatekeeping role so often painted for Brazilian parties. Rather, as outlined in Chapter 2 and the current chapter, supported in the quantitative findings presented above, and illustrated in what follows, parties with the capacity and will to provide female aspirants with critical psychological, organizational, and material support hold the key to enhancing women's political empowerment in Brazil.

The Norm of (Non-)Compliance

Formal institutional change is often insufficient to induce genuine change (North, 1990). Rather than a wholesale shift in the rules of the game, such formal change often maintains intact "tenacious" informal norms (North, 1990), and can occur in a gradual process that allows actors to nominally accommodate demands for change while maintaining their power (Thelen, 1999). Such limitations to formal institutional change are especially heightened in a context where formal laws are regularly flouted and informal norms carry the day. The abuse of the provisional commissions mechanism by party leaders in inchoate parties seeking to defuse threats to their interests (Guarnieri, 2011) is illustrative of the frequent malleability of formal laws in Brazil's weak parties. Absent a norm of compliance, parties are unlikely to comply with either internal or external rules.

Indeed, domineering male leaders of Brazil's inchoate parties have acted with impunity in their resistance to the legislated gender quota. Even in the wake of the 2009 electoral reform strengthening the measure, only a quarter of state parties met the 30% target for female candidates. A striking 268 of the 607 (44%) state parties participating in the 2010 elections did not advance a single female candidate. The PP – the most frequent manipulator of the provisional commissions mechanism (Guarnieri, 2011), with the second lowest mean on the party institutionalization index (1.38) and a critical mass of women leaders in less than one-fifth of its state organizations – has only complied with the quota in 5.6% of the elections it has contested since 1998! In contrast, the more institutionalized PC do B (2.07), with a critical mass of women leaders in three-quarters of its state organizations, complied with the quota in 39% of the elections it contested.

As I demonstrate statistically above, and corroborate with interviews, the likelihood of compliance with the quota varies across Brazilian parties, and is predictable. The state parties most likely to meet the quota target are those that are institutionalized and have a critical mass of women in party leadership, with the latter factor being particularly salient. Regina Perondi, Vice-President of the women's organ of the strongly-institutionalized PMDB,[24] confirmed the importance of women in party leadership for meeting the quota. Under her leadership, PMDB Women has set out to meet the quota target by the 2012 elections through "occupying spaces throughout the party," pushing for an internal quota, and establishing a national PMDB female working group (Interview, July, 2009). Perondi has traveled throughout the country seeking to embolden state-level PMDB female working groups, with an eye on consolidating the national PMDB female working group to enhance their bargaining power in top party

[24] The overall mean for the PMDB across the states over time is 2.29, with 63.9% of state parties scoring at least two on the party institutionalization index.

decision-making circles (Interview, July, 2009). Her efforts were ultimately successful, with the national working group since being reinforced and advancing a national strategic plan for furthering women's participation that includes capacity-building courses designed to incentivize female candidacies. In June, 2012, PMDB Women compelled a guarantee from the national executive commission that it would comply with the mini-reform's requirements to devote HGPE time and publically-provided party funds to advancing women's participation (PMDB Mulher, 2012).

Although the PMDB has long counted on active women's sectors (Perondi, 2007), women have not been included in the upper echelons of the party's leadership,[25] and the promotion of women's political participation has therefore not been prioritized. As Perondi stated, "the biggest obstacle is precisely the men in the party, they don't want to listen to us. They think that we want to take control of the party, they don't perceive it as a way to democratize the party" (Interview, July, 2009). As a result of the failure to incorporate women in top party leadership and thus absence of an effective commitment to furthering women's candidacies, less than 13% of state parties complied with the quota in the last four elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In our 2008 interview, Deputy Rita Camata expressed frustration with what she perceived as disregard for the quota among PMDB leadership; the men "não vão abrir a mão,"[26] or will not give up their power and privileges, and, she continued, do not seek out female candidates until the last hour in a meaningless gesture toward the quota with no intent of supporting their candidacies (Interview, December, 2008).

---

[25] The median proportion of women in state party leadership is only 12.5 percent, with an average of 8.8% and less than 8% of its state parties incorporating a critical mass of women leaders in 2010.

[26] Literally, "will not open (or extend) their hand," a Brazilian expression that illustrates stinginess.

In 2010, the PMDB's rate of quota compliance doubled to 25.9%, but much work remains. To be developed in Chapter 6, since 1994, the PMDB has not elected a single female senator despite winning nearly a quarter of the senate seats, and has elected only 36 women deputies of a total 433 (8%). My analysis suggests that the limited presence of women in party leadership is responsible for their poor record electing women. Although the PMDB is sufficiently institutionalized in most states, with the largest share of affiliated voters of any party, and active party directorates in most municipalities in 19 of 27 states (average 61.1%) with very few provisional commissions, and is thus both rule-bound and capable of fulfilling the quota, it has simply not been a priority for male leaders who refuse to "abrir a mão" to women. However, I predict this pattern to change with the bold initiatives recently introduced by Regina Perondi, former President of PMDB Women and Deputy Maria Elvira, and Deputies Fátima Pelaes, Rose de Freitas, and Marinha Raupp to hold the party publically accountable to the women-friendly provisions of the 2009 mini-reform (PMDB Mulher, 2012). Indeed, among the 608 variations on the PMDB's multiparty coalitions for October 2012 elections to municipal councils across Brazil, the average proportion of female candidates is 31.3%, a striking 44% increase from 21.7% women among their 2008 municipal councilor candidates (TSE, 2012).

In sum, as stated by Deputy Luiza Erundina, many parties have not complied with the quota due to a "lack of commitment to questions of gender" (Questionnaire, April, 2009). Responding to a question about the quota law, Deputy Roberto Santos (PSDB-BA) of the Special Commission of Electoral and Party Legislation stated, "It is only the leaderships in favor of women that end up (improving the political process for women)" (quoted in Araújo, 1999, 125). Once women leaders reach a critical mass, they are able to explicitly incorporate gender into party decision-making, and hold the party accountable

to the pro-women provisions of the electoral law. If the party then has sufficient resources to recruit and develop women's candidacies, quota compliance is within reach.

However, if the party is insufficiently institutionalized and regularly skirts formal laws, as seen in the frequent manipulation of the provisional commissions mechanism by leaders of inchoate parties (Guarnieri, 2011), even women leaders may have a hard time holding the party accountable to quota measures. Indeed, the party with the worst record of quota compliance (met the quota in only 5.6% of Chamber of Deputies elections contested) and proportion of women contenders (6.4%)[27] is the PP, a notoriously inchoate party with domineering male leadership. A clear portrait of the PP's disregard for formal laws is its maintenance of provisional commissions in an average of 70.7% of the municipalities across its state organizations despite having the second greatest average share of affiliated voters.[28] In 21 of its 27 state party organizations, leadership has remained in the hands of one or two individuals over at least two election cycles. In sum, the weakly institutionalized PP succumbs to the whims of its few dominant leaders and is therefore not a party held accountable to the formal rules of the game. The parties most likely to make concerted efforts to comply with the quota are those that are both well-institutionalized and incorporate the voice of women in party decision-making structures.

The second implication of the norm of (non-)compliance – whereby inchoate parties do not operate regularly in accordance with clearly defined rules of the game, but rather in pursuit of the more particularistic interests of the few dominant party leaders – is that women and other outsiders cannot anticipate the criteria for promotion within the party and candidate selection. The story of Deputy Jô Moraes of the PC do B in Minas

[27] The PPR/PPB/PP is second only to the old PP (1994), which advanced on average on 5.5% women candidates.

[28] The legitimate use of the provisional commissions clause is for parties in the process of building their membership, with a certain number of affiliated voters required before a municipal directorate can be established (Guarnieri, 2011).

Gerais illustrates how universal criteria for party ascension can illuminate the path to power for outsiders. Moraes climbed her way up the PC do B ranks by "working through party structures," regularly attending meetings and mobilizational events, and participating in leadership roles in panels whenever possible (Interview, March, 2009). A member of the then underground PC do B since 1972, Moraes served as a staff member for party members in municipal government, and was eventually elected Municipal Councilor in 1996 and 2000, State Deputy in 2002, and Federal Deputy in 2006 and 2010. She is state president of the PC do B for Minas Gerais, a member of the National Directorate, and has served as Vice-Leader of the governing coalition and Leader of the PC do B in the Chamber of Deputies (Chamber of Deputies, 2012a).

Moraes knew that her party militancy and demonstrated base in the community would garner party support, and in 2006, she earned the privilege of being the party's priority candidate. Priority status secured human and material resources for the campaign, including the coveted "6565" campaign number (Interview, March, 2009). The party chose Moraes to run for mayor of the capital city, Belo Horizonte, in 2008, although the campaign ultimately proved unsuccessful. In 2010, 45.4% of her rather sizeable campaign budget (R$861,148, more than twice the state mean) came from the party. Moraes stated that the strong party militancy and deliberate treatment of gender in the PC do B – which she argued had created "a virtuous cycle" furthering women's empowerment – were critical for her electoral successes (Interview, March, 2009). She has demonstrated her militancy and electoral viability at each level, inching her way to the top and developing a solid base.

Such an orderly progression through the party ranks is unlikely in inchoate parties, where candidacies are not cultivated according to clear guidelines. The candidacy of Deputy Rebecca Garcia of the PP, for example, emerged when her father decided not

to run for reelection[29] to the Chamber of Deputies and suggested she leave her position in the family-owned media outlet to contest the election (Interview, December, 2008). This is hardly a replicable path for the vast majority of party newcomers, and can prove daunting for actual outsiders who lack the economic and/or familial capital to convert into political capital.

External vs. Self-Nomination and Psychological Support

Several women I interviewed spoke of the difficulties in reconciling family life and a political career, and the second/triple shift it entailed (e.g., Interviews with Emília Fernandes, April, 2009; Jô Moraes, March, 2009; Maninha, April, 2009; Raquel Teixeira, April, 2009; Rita Camata, December, 2008; Serys Slhessarenko, December, 2008). Tonha Magalhães (PFL/PR-BA), who is from a modest background and acquired her political capital heading up a neighborhood association and then in municipal politics, lamented that her children were practically raised by a maid (Interview, November, 2008).[30] District Deputy Eliana Pedrosa (PFL-DF) actually lost her marriage over the time and energy she committed to politics rather than spending at home – only two years into her mandate her husband (also in politics) delivered an ultimatum – either politics or their marriage. She chose politics (Interview, July, 2009). Deputy Iriny Lopes (PT-ES) confirmed the importance of a supportive network for her electoral successes, with fellow party militants even helping to care for her children when necessary. Lopes stated, "The militancy and level of solidarity in the PT has no substitute" (Interview, December, 2008).

---

[29] Francisco Garcia ran instead as 1st Substitute on the unsuccessful reelection campaign of Senator Gilberto Mestrinho.

[30] Magalhães has no relation to Bahia's longtime dominant Magalhães family. She has belonged to a number of parties, moving from the PMDB→PMB→PFL→PDT→PP→PFL→PR.

Given such constraints, the vast majority of the women I interviewed said they never intended to get involved in politics. All but two (Judge Denise Frossard[31] and Emília Fernandes[32]) said that the decision to be a candidate was not "their decision," but was externally made, providing strong support for the importance of external rather than self-nomination. Women in institutionalized parties most often said it was their party that pushed them to candidacy, with those running in weaker parties saying it was their group (association/movement) and one telling me "o povo" (the people) that decided she should be a candidate. Deputy Emília Fernandes (PT-RS) corroborated the importance of external nomination for women, saying that female candidacies "have to be stimulated" by parties, who play a fundamental role in building the self-esteem and audacity of potential female aspirants (Interview, June, 2009). In contrast, a young male deputy and son of the longtime president of the PMDB in Rio de Janeiro highlighted the typical male experience when he proclaimed cavalierly that he had always liked politics and wanted to be a politician, so decided to run for office (Interview, December, 2008).

Although party support for the decision to be a candidate is critical, parties "do not offer conditions for women to be candidates…many times…lacking a structure that facilitates their participation." Even with the quotas, the majority of parties "do not seek to incentivize enhanced participation by women" (Governor Ana Júlia Carepa, PT-PA, quoted in Paiva, 2008, 34-35). Senator Patrícia Saboya Gomes (PDT-CE) proclaimed, "among the principal (obstacles) is the lack of party investment in women…It is fundamental to stimulate the entrance of women…which necessitates a greater party

[31] Judge Denise Frossard is an exceptionally ambitious individual. Her experience in the magistrate – which she contended was significantly more egalitarian than electoral politics, and national fame after her involvement (and death threats thereafter) in bringing down 14 figures in organized crime – augmented her self-confidence and self-perception of viability. She ran for governor in 2006, but lost in the second round.
[32] Emília Fernandes said the firing of her colleagues (teacher) after their participation in a strike provoked her and led to her first candidacy for city councilor in 1982 with the PTB (she is now with the PT).

investment in women's sectors and a change in the mentality regarding the importance of women's participation" (Questionnaire, April, 2009). Deputy Thelma Oliveira echoed this sentiment, placing the onus directly on party structures, "You do not have this reasonable number of women launching their campaigns because of the lack of party support…the party has to first make their presence possible…the party has to invest in women" (Interview, December, 2008).

Without influential women in the party pressuring party leaders to make this investment and develop and recruit female candidates, those (men) in power will seek to maintain the status quo. "The parties need to perceive that it is time to invest in women" (Peron paraphrasing José Eustáquio Alves, 2012). Armed with favorable public opinion data, a (recently) enforced quota law, and the impressive electoral showing of women throughout the country at various levels (seven were the top vote earners in their state in 2010 Chamber elections), women in party decision-making structures can convince male leaders of the electoral utility of cultivating viable female candidacies. The female leaders of PMDB Women are perhaps the foremost example of the importance of such pressure. Fighting to change the status quo of male dominance in their party by infiltrating party leadership and recruiting and training more women members, their goal of quota compliance is within reach (Interview with Regina Perondi, July, 2009).

The PC do B is exemplary of the ability of women in institutionalized parties to further the electoral prospects of women through active recruitment. It is well-institutionalized and has 25.9% women in its NEC, an average of 27.1% women in state party leadership, and five state committees presided by women.[33] Accordingly, it has run an average of 25.5% female candidates across the elections it contested (more than twice

[33] São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catarina and Sergipe.

the national mean of 12.8%), complied with the quota in 39% of these elections, and enjoys an overall success rate of 29.2% among its female candidates.

As discussed above, the PC do B operates a thorough recruitment and training process for candidates. Female leaders such as Nereide Saviani, Director of the PC do B's National Training School (ENF), have mobilized this infrastructure with a particular emphasis on women, offering courses that prioritize women's participation, gender equality issues, and even provide day care for children during the course, alleviating in each instance prominent impediments to women's participation analyzed here (PC do B, 2009a; PC do B, 2011). Such efforts are at the heart of the PC do B's impressive success promoting women, and should continue to bear fruit through the 2012 elections. After the PC do B's Second National Conference on the Emancipation of Women, Liège Rocha, the party's National Secretary of Women commented, "I think that women and the Party itself are more alert for this necessity of the promotion of women and the guarantee of female candidates for the Party" (PC do B, 2012).

Without active measures to recruit and promote female candidacies, the socialized gender gap in political ambition is likely to remain intact and women's disproportionately limited participation in formal politics will persist. Well-institutionalized parties have proven more conducive to women's political participation because their recruitment process externalizes the decision to seek office and mitigates the constructed gender gap in political ambition. When female leaders mobilize supportive party networks to recruit, train, and campaign for women, they provide significant psychological incentives for women's participation. Parties lacking such resources favor entrepreneurial candidates who must fend for themselves in the absence of any real party recruitment effort or organization in general. This results in an individualistic campaigning effort that will deter most female aspirants (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008).

Even with these resources at their disposal, however, without a gendered frame of reference introduced by female leaders, male leaders may be unwilling to mobilize resources for women or unaware of how best to do so. Former Deputy, Mayor, Senator, and Governor Mário Covas' (PMDB/PSDB-SP) characterization of the PMDB is typical, "Women have political space in the party. But for me, a woman is a politician not a woman politician, it is not a question of being a woman or not…Politics is all equal and the space is open to anyone. It would be highly improbable that the PMDB, in any way, made the (political) life of women difficult" (Quoted in PMDB, 1986, 234). Contrary to Covas' statement – the sentiment of which was echoed in my interviews with male party leaders across the ideological spectrum, male and female contenders do not compete on a level playing field. The interrelated implications of traditional gender socialization – the wage gap, women's disproportionate burden of domestic responsibilities, aversion to risk, and distaste for the corrupt formal political sphere – create powerful disincentives for women to participate. Yet, Covas' statement is indicative of the failure of many male leaders to comprehend the necessity for parties to actively intervene on behalf of women; "parties have to make (women's) presence possible" (Interview with Deputy Thelma Oliveira, December, 2008). Women in party leadership can introduce a gendered frame of reference that conveys to male leaders the obstacles confronted by women and the means to overcoming them.

Organizational Support

A strong party organization can provide training opportunities that incentivize women's participation. For example, some parties offer "political capacitation" courses early in the year of elections. They explain what is in the purview of each office, what to expect in the campaign, give lessons in rhetoric, and review key party policy positions (if

applicable). Since the 2009 mini-reform, which in part requires parties to spend 5% of their publically-provided funds on promoting women's participation, several parties have adopted such courses and incorporated gender into the program. In the PC do B's courses at the ENF, participants are required to read over 100 pages of Marx and Engels as well as the resolutions of recent party congresses and excerpts from assessments of socialism and capitalism in the 21st century, with units on philosophy, class, political economy, socialism, gender, and race and ethnicity (PC do B, 2009b).

Political training and capacity-building courses such as those discussed above educate women on their collective party platform. This acquisition of knowledge and sense of community prepares female political aspirants both organizationally and psychologically, instilling self-confidence and a potentially powerful boost to their political ambition. Sílvia Rita Souza, a veteran congressional staffer and former Executive Secretary of PSDB Women, emphasized the importance of familiarity with the "*how* and *what*" of party politics for success, and the power of such knowledge to enhance women's self-confidence and electoral viability (Interview, December, 2008). Souza conveyed the difficulties women often confront, and the importance of party support for overcoming them, "The parties in general have not invested in building the capacity of female candidates. After having the courage to run, women often become lost with the instruments of the campaign, principally the media" (Quoted in *Jornal Cidade*, 2008). Responding to the limited accessibility of such information, Souza self-financed the publication of a brief and easy-to-understand non-partisan book on the process titled, *The Woman Candidate – A Guide to Dispute Elections* (2008), and has served as a consultant in capacity-building courses for women.

In sum, the solid party organizations of well-institutionalized parties are conducive to the participation and electoral success of outsiders because they provide

lower stakes opportunities for newcomers to acquire the political skillset, and can offer capacity-building courses that further awareness of party platforms and aspirants' sense of preparedness. But as I discuss next, the prospect for learning party platforms depends, of course, on their presence. If a party exists as a mere electoral vehicle and lacks coherent, shared positions, there is little for women (or any candidate) to latch onto (Interview with Deputy Rita Camata, PMDB-ES, December, 2008). Thus inchoate parties are detrimental to any candidate unable to marshal a suite of individual or familial resources.

Programmatic vs. Personalist Politics and Material Support

In contexts where party platforms remain elusive, a candidate's campaign will be based more on accumulated personal political capital than collective party ideas. Previous studies have shown that female candidates may be advantaged by the prospect of a collective campaign because they are more disposed to collective rather than individualistic endeavors, it is less costly to the individual candidate, and it diminishes the elector's prospect of voting on individual candidate traits and related stereotypes such as gender, with candidates running with more institutionalized parties able to count on a loyal base engaged with the party platform. Senator Fátima Cleide (PT-RO) stated, "I know no name in the PT that you could point to as elected by his or her own force and individual expression with no help from the party" (Questionnaire, May, 2009).

Candidates' campaigns in the PT and other institutionalized parties are more collectively-run endeavors, with the party often establishing a common platform to which it holds its candidates accountable, and providing campaign materials and assistance with the production of candidates' segments on the HGPE (publically-funded electoral propaganda hour) that reiterate the collective campaign message. Former Deputy

Maninha reported that PT financing of electoral flyers and her HGPE spot[34] was fundamental for her 2002 victory. She contrasted this campaign to her under-funded and unsuccessful 2006 campaign with the then nascent PSOL, which still lacked the infrastructure to support her candidacy.

Nearly all of the women I interviewed spoke of the difficulty posed by campaign finance. Deputy Luiza Erundina, the women's caucus' most vocal and informed advocate within Congress for political reforms to enhance women's representation, emphasized "Without a doubt the financing of campaigns is the most difficult problem," with the related lack of party support being the second most pressing challenge (Questionnaire, April, 2009). In weakly institutionalized parties, the problem is compounding – the campaigns are often more expensive as candidates spend to distinguish themselves as individuals rather than as part of a collective campaign, and weak parties often suffer from a resource disadvantage and therefore cannot fund their candidates' campaigns. Pairwise correlations lend support to this argument, with party institutionalization being positively correlated to the proportion of campaign contributions from parties, and negatively correlated to the proportion financed by corporations or the candidate herself. The magnitude of these correlations grows when looking at female candidates only. With a gendered discrepancy both in professional wages at large and in candidates' proportion of campaign contributions from corporate donors, the need to depend on self and corporate financing in inchoate parties bodes poorly for women.

Former Deputy Rita Camata also considered campaign resources one of the most significant obstacles to women's representation, saying women "do not have the culture

[34] Maninha said the PT spent R$700,000 on the HGPE spot (it was unclear whether this was just her ad, or for all 10 candidates in the district). Because this expenditure is indirect (by the party, not the candidate) it does not appear in reported campaign contributions. This is one reason, along with "caixa dois" – under the table campaign finance – why the quantification of party funding is challenging (Interview, April, 2009).

of power," with men having an easier time asking for money (Interview, December, 2008). Municipal Councilor Olívia Santana (PC do B) reported difficulties in raising money for her campaign for federal deputy, saying businessmen preferred to fund male candidacies (Interview, April, 2009). According to Deputy Iriny Lopes, businesses commonly discriminate in their donations, giving male candidates much higher contributions than they do female candidates (Interview, December, 2008). Parties with limited funds cannot compensate, and even where party resources are available, those without women-friendly leadership may not avail the resources for women.

While the relationship between women party leaders and financing for female candidates' campaigns is not determinative, with all rational leaders hesitant to divest resources from their own or close allies' campaigns on behalf of untested newcomers, the overall pattern suggests that the presence of a critical mass of women in leadership does increase the likelihood that female candidacies will receive funding. In 2010, the average share of state funding among female candidates in well-institutionalized parties was significantly greater among parties with a critical mass of women leaders than those without. If women have an effective voice in party leadership, they can pressure party leaders to distribute funds more equitably. The PSDB's National President Sérgio Guerra recently echoed this sentiment when responding to the publicized finding that the PSDB ran 20.4% women candidates in 2010, but dedicated only 1.7% of their dispersed funds to these women – "This pattern will only change with more mobilization and pressure by women" (Quoted in Mendonça and Navarro, 2012). Notably, the women-inclusive PC do B actually gave proportionately more money to the campaigns of female candidates than to men (Mendonça and Navarro, 2012).

As the ultimate "fortress of machismo" (phrase stated in several interviews), even many institutionalized parties have remained closed to women, with the vast majority of

state parties still led by men. The average percentage of women in state party leadership is 17.33, with four of the five major parties falling well below this (PFL – 10.6%, PMDB – 8.8%, PSDB – 11.6%, PP – 10.7%). The fact that the leading PSDB has only one state party leadership with a critical mass of women (Roraima) is appalling. Unfortunately, several of the parties that have incorporated women into their leadership such as the PRB and the PRTB have yet to institutionalize adequately and are thus unable to provide the conditions ripe for women to thrive in Brazil's candidate-centered electoral system.

The lack of party support diminishes women's viability while also discouraging female aspirants from waging future campaigns. As Almira Rodrigues of CFEMEA stated, "The electoral campaigns of women tend to receive less support and sustenance from parties and to have less visibility than the campaigns of men, and consequently, to received less support and votes from electors" (Fêmea 2007, IX.151, 11). Often, parties will recruit female candidates as *laranjas* (sacrificial lambs), only to satisfy the quota requirements for their party. Many ambitious and respected female party activists I interviewed indicated their own reluctance to run, knowing well from their front-row seat to the paucity of party support that their party's initial encouragement would ring empty during the campaign and in the end, they would confront an uphill battle on their own, committing their personal time and money for an endeavor fraught with risks. For a campaign to be viable, a candidate needs material and human resources that endure.

In sum, "women need to have concrete investment from the parties" (Laisy Moriére, National Secretary of Women of the Workers' Party, quoted in Paraguassu 2008, 31). CFEMEA summarizes the conundrum, "the parties have not undertaken the challenge to stimulate and contribute substantively to the increased political participation of women. In this sense, very few have adopted gender quotas for the composition of party leadership and, in general, they (parties) do not have policies to devote resources

and media time to the promotion of women's political participation. They are masculine institutions whose functioning and structure make female participation difficult. It is necessary to democratize the party life and structures" (Fêmea, 2004, XII.135, 5).

When parties include a critical mass of women in decision-making structures, the promotion of women's participation is more likely to become a party priority. Although women do not always work on behalf of women, once they reach a critical mass this possibility is far more probable. And at minimum, women's presence among the leadership forces party structures to "stop functioning exclusively as masculine clubs" (Godinho, 1996, 155). Next, a brief discussion of the PT illustrates how incorporating women in party leadership facilitates the recruitment and support of female candidates.

A Glimpse at the Workers' Party through the Lens of Women

Brazil's largest leftist party has since its founding reached out to women (Macaulay, 2003). Leading *petistas* such as Bete Mendes, Benedita da Silva, and Sandra Starling have figured prominently in the party since its founding, establishing the importance of women's participation for the PT and serving as role models for aspiring female politicians. The PT's embrace of women stands in sharp contrast to the right-wing *Democratas* party (PFL), where women have had a minimal role since its inception (which has its roots in the military regime) with very few female politicians who are not the wife or daughter of a prominent male politician.

In spite of the historical involvement of women in the PT – sustained in part by the party's affinity with social movements, where women's participation is far less constrained – and their strength among the party rank and file, in 1990, women comprised less than 10% of party leadership compared to around 40% of total party affiliates. In response to this disparity, the proposal of a quota for party leadership was

introduced at the PT's Second National Women's Congress in 1988, and debated and finally approved at the party's Third National Women's Congress in 1991 (Godinho, 1996, 1998). After a rigorous fight for a voice in the party's top decision-making circles, the PT implemented its pioneering 30% gender quota for all instances of party leadership at the National Party Congress later than year (1991) (Godinho, 1996). Female presence in the PT's national directorate catapulted from 6.1% in 1990 to 29.8% in 1993 (Godinho, 1996; Macaulay, 2003, 7).

According to Tatau Godinho, then Secretary of Organization of the PT's National Executive Committee, the results were profound. The demand for more women in elected office "became more frequent" and gained traction and visibility, persuading both the men in leadership and female political aspirants themselves of the importance and viability of women as political subjects in general and candidates in particular (Godinho, 1996, 153; 1998, 29). In the 1994 elections, the proportion of women in the PT's congressional delegation doubled, up from 8.3% in the 1990 to 16.7 percent (TSE). Again citing Godinho, of all the mechanisms considered for enhancing women's participation, "none have altered the access and role of women in the party as significantly" as the PT's quota for leadership positions (1996, 156; 1998, 31).

At the PT's 4th National Congress in 2011, the party approved a pioneering parity statute for all instances of party leadership, to be implemented in the 2013 internal party elections (Agência Patrícia Galvão, 2011). The effort to approve the parity quota was the result of a coordinated campaign by female petista leaders and women's sectors, which strategically targeted individual "puxadores de legenda" (vote champions) for the party in advance of the National Congress and secured their support (Aggege, 2011). The PT's National Women's Secretary Laisy Morière anticipates a "radical transformation" as a result of the parity measure, facilitating "a new party vision" in which "parity is possible

and is something that we can attain" (PT, 2012b). Former Deputy and current Minister of Human Rights Maria do Rosário was similarly enthusiastic, saying "parity in the PT will have a great influence in the parliament" (PT, 2011).

The equal presence of women will facilitate a more equitable distribution of party funds to female candidacies, and will embolden efforts to hold the party accountable to its rhetoric of women's empowerment. One example of these efforts is the PT's thorough audit of the legislated 5% of publically-provided party funds that must be devoted to promoting women's participation, per the 2009 mini-reform (PT, 2012a). While many parties have neglected this requirement, choosing instead to incur a fine (deduction in publically-provided party funds in the next allocation), with other parties using the funds for dubious purposes, women PT leaders have demanded accountability in the spending of these funds. The PT has, once again, advanced as a pioneer for the cause of women's empowerment.

Still, there remains extensive work ahead for the PT to achieve parity in all instances of power in the party and in government. While women leaders in the PT have used their voice effectively, 12 of its 27 (44%) state party leadership structures do not have a critical mass of women. It does have the largest share of elected female deputies of all parties (21.8%), but only 13.8 and 11.3 percent of its candidates and elected deputies, respectively, are female. So although the PT has made significant advances in mitigating the structural disparities confronted by women, the incentives toward intraparty competition in the Chamber of Deputies loom large for all parties, including the parties heretofore most successful in recruiting and electing women, the PT and PC do B. To further the analysis, in the following chapter, I contrast the experiences of the PT and other major parties across the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, bringing into

focus how electoral rules incentivizing either intraparty competition or party support affect parties, and in turn, the electoral prospects of women.

CONCLUSIONS

While parties that have historically incorporated women such as the PT and the PC do B enjoy a head start in women's participation, the findings presented here suggest that parties without such women-friendly legacies can overcome their historical deficits in women's presence. By developing a clear and universal set of rules for party ascension (including candidate selection) that furthers a norm of compliance, a recruitment network, and training and capacity-building programs, while also cultivating a programmatic party platform, parties can provide women with critical psychological, organizational, and material support that will facilitate their successful participation. These tools for enhancing women's empowerment are not monopolized by leftist parties in general, or the PC do B and PT in particular, but are available to any party seeking to at once comply with the electoral law while enhancing its electoral fortunes, representativeness, and accountability to the electorate. Parties that are well-institutionalized and incorporate a critical mass of women in their decision-making structures provide the conditions most propitious for the mobilization of such resources on behalf of women.

Although the obstacles to women's representation are formidable, parties can help women overcome them. In spite of the incentives for intra-party competition induced by the open-list electoral system and related weakness of the gender quota law discussed in Chapter 3, when parties are well-institutionalized and have a critical mass of women in their leadership, they can level the playing field for female contenders. Psychological, organizational, and material support mitigates the constructed gender gap in political

ambition, enabling women to acquire the necessary political skillset and participate in a collective, ideas-based campaign.

Voter bias does persist, especially in Brazil's lesser developed areas, but has not precluded women's electoral success. As I demonstrate in Chapter 7, this is because women have crafted profiles enabling them to thrive in spite of such bias, either by working through parties to convert their own experiences in informal politics into political capital driven by programmatic linkages, or in the absence of party support, by conforming to the traditional gender norms persistent in less developed districts. The conventional explanations for women's representation centered on electoral rules such as district and party magnitude do not consistently hold for women. This is because many of Brazil's most electorally successful parties (e.g., PSDB) remain dominated by men at the upper echelons of party decision-making and are thus difficult for women to infiltrate.

While leftist parties have certainly reached out to women more than non-leftist parties, ultimately, running as a leftist woman in Brazil – where the median voter is right of center and traditional gender norms persist – is hardly a generalizable winning strategy. What has helped many leftist women is not their ideology per se but rather the mobilization of party resources to recruit them and support their candidacies from within well-institutionalized parties with programmatic platforms and women-friendly leadership.

As I illustrate further in Chapter 6, rather than negating the role of parties, the intraparty competition incentivized by the Chamber of Deputies' open-list electoral rules introduces great variation in women's electoral prospects across parties, with the few well-institutionalized parties with women in leadership being able and willing to work toward closing the gender gaps in political ambition and legislative presence. I contrast women's electoral performance in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies to reveal how the

presence or paucity of party support can modify the effect of candidate gender on electoral outcome, with the Senate's ostensibly greater electoral hurdle overcome by party support. The result is that women senatorial candidates have enjoyed greater success than women seeking a seat in the Chamber of Deputies, where a combative climate of intraparty competition undermines women and other outsiders by intensifying personalist politics, with inchoate and male-led parties being ill-equipped and/or unwilling to recruit and support female contenders in their efforts to confront such an entrepreneurial system.

That party does matter in the Brazilian context is the key contribution of this chapter. Bridging the Brazilianist literature – which downplays or even negates the gatekeeping role of parties – with the women's representation literature's emphasis on parties as the key gatekeeper, I have demonstrated that Brazil's extreme underrepresentation of women can be explained by the prevalence of weak parties and disproportionately male party leadership. But this overall pattern obscures variation in party institutionalization and incorporation of women in top leadership structures, which when uncovered, helps to explain how Brazil's few female politicians have managed to defy the odds and attain office.

I thus recast the assumption that Brazil's often amorphous parties exert little or no explanatory capacity in its candidate-centered electoral context, a finding which was generated from disproportionately male samples unrepresentative of the experiences of women. Honing the analysis to the candidate (rather than legislator, party, or aggregate) level and explicitly incorporating women demonstrates how parties do in fact have an essential gatekeeping role to play in Brazilian electoral politics. This finding has fundamental implications for reform efforts, which must target political parties rather

than just electoral rules, if they are to enhance the representativeness and accountability of Brazilian democracy.

Chapter 6 – Electoral Rules, Party Support, and Women's Unexpected Successes in Elections to the Brazilian Senate

> Electoral institutions should be seen as part of a self-reinforcing equilibrium that also includes voters and party organizations. Although they are widely treated as key explanatory variables, electoral institutions are probably the weakest and least important of these three (Desposato, 2006, 1028).

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I analyze variation in electoral rules across Brazil's bicameral legislature to illuminate the (dis)incentives they yield for party support, and the implications thereof for women's electoral prospects. While candidates to Brazil's more powerful and prestigious legislative chamber – the *Senado Federal* – confront an evidently greater electoral hurdle than do candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate's low district magnitude plurality elections generate incentives for parties to rally behind their candidate. This stands in contrast to the high-district magnitude open-list PR elections to the Chamber of Deputies, which motivate intraparty competition. If, as argued throughout this dissertation and substantiated in Chapter 5, party support is in fact critical for the development of viable female candidacies, these varying incentives for party support should lead women contenders for the Senate to confront a more level playing field than their counterparts in the Chamber of Deputies. Indeed, in all five election cycles since 1994, a greater proportion of women have attained seats in the Senate than in the Chamber.

After discussing the contributions and limitations of the extant literature on electoral institutions and women's representation, I elucidate why the Brazilian Congress

offers a particularly compelling environment for testing how rules and parties interact to affect women's representation. I then discuss the electoral rules in Senate elections, differentiating them from those of the Chamber of Deputies described in Chapter 3, and compare the incentives for party support generated by each. Next, I marshal descriptive evidence to examine the observed differences across the two legislative chambers, and finally scrutinize these differences with multilevel analyses of candidate electoral performance in five concurrent elections to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate.

The cross-chamber comparison in turn assesses the relative explanatory capacity of the rival approaches and my central argument – that psychological, organizational, and material support mobilized by women in the leadership of institutionalized parties enables female candidates to overcome the barriers posed by the entrepreneurial electoral context of the Chamber of Deputies. If the standard explanations of women's underrepresentation such as voter bias and party ideology indeed rang true in Brazil, women's electoral prospects in the Chamber of Deputies should exceed those in the Senate, given its greater prestige and the higher electoral hurdle of its low magnitude plurality elections.

But contrary to conventional wisdom, there is a record of consistently greater proportions of women elected to the Brazilian Senate than to the Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, while gender exercises a negative and statistically significant effect on women's electoral prospects in the Chamber, it loses its predictive power in the Senate elections. Following the argument developed in Chapter 2 and substantiated in Chapter 5, I attribute women's greater levels of electoral successes in Brazil's upper rather than lower house to the more forthcoming party support typically enjoyed by candidates to the Brazilian Senate. Senate seats are valuable partisan assets, and parties are generally generous in their investments of time and money. From the moment of nomination

through election day, party elites, organizations, and activists rally behind their candidate(s), mobilizing substantial party support to further their campaigns.

My multilevel analysis reveals two key elements: the Senate's favorable electoral structure, and its amplification of the positive effects of women-friendly party leadership, which together enhance women's electoral prospects. The presence of a critical mass of female leaders affords women a say in candidate selection and the distribution of party resources, enabling them to mobilize unified party support on behalf of other women. But when parties lack a viable female presence in party decision-making circles, I expect they will be less likely to develop, advance, and support women candidates in the lower magnitude Senate elections, where candidacy itself is a scarce and prized resource.

In sum, electoral rules and parties interact to generate varying incentives for party support and thus, women's electoral success. Whereas tendencies toward intraparty competition in the Chamber of Deputies OLPR elections substantially undermine women's electoral prospects in all but well-institutionalized and women-friendly parties, the abundance of party support in Senate elections provides a more propitious context for female contenders. Parties with women in party leadership are well-positioned to capitalize on the favorable electoral environment with viable female candidacies.

Contributions and Limitations of the Literature on Electoral Systems and Women's Representation

As stated in Chapter 3, the literature on women's representation is no exception to the general primacy of electoral institutions for explaining political outcomes in contemporary political science. Electoral rules figure prominently in explanations of women's (under)representation, with the implication being that the rules of the game can be modified to augment the political participation of women and other marginalized groups (Larserud and Taphorn, 2007; Matland, 2005). Amassing considerable evidence,

several cross-national studies have affirmed that countries with closed-list proportional representation and gender quotas with placement mandates tend to elect more women (Htun and Jones, 2002; Krook, 2009; Moser, 2001; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Tremblay, 2008; Tripp and Kang, 2008). Accordingly, international organizations and NGOs seeking to advance female political participation advocate for the adoption of such measures, with a growing number of countries following suit (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Tripp and Kang, 2008).

Yet, results of such efforts to fast-track women's representation have been neither uniformly positive nor as "fast" as anticipated (Htun and Jones, 2002; Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Such mixed evidence on the effectiveness of quotas stems from wide variation in quota design and implementation as well as the compatibility of quotas with particular electoral and party systems. Indeed, the case of Brazil's *Lei Eleitoral de Cotas* discussed in Chapter 3 demonstrates how negotiated compromises, open-list proportional representation (OLPR) electoral rules, and intransigent party elites conspired to reduce the Brazilian quota to a mere symbolic measure. It is critical, therefore, that analyses of electoral rules account for the specifics of the party system in which they operate.

Most studies of the institutional factors underpinning women's (under)representation suffer from two key limitations: (1) they analyze electoral rules in a vacuum, with at best tenuous controls for the sociocultural and historical contexts in which such rules are embedded, and (2) they infer the effects of electoral rules on individual women's electoral prospects from aggregate level analyses of women's representation in legislatures, i.e. they commit an ecological fallacy.

Following Moser and Scheiner (2012), the current chapter avoids these two shortcomings with an individual-level, controlled comparison analysis of women's

electoral prospects in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Similar to analyses of the effects of electoral rules in mixed electoral systems, the comparison of Brazil's two legislative chambers allows me to hold constant innumerous site-specific (and often unquantifiable) confounding explanations while providing rich variation on the traditional institutional predictors of women's representation – ballot structure, district magnitude, and quotas – and the incentives these electoral rules generate for parties. The intra-national, bicameral analysis thereby affords great variation across both parties and electoral rules, focusing on their interaction. Comparing the effects of electoral rules on legislative party cohesion and discipline in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and Senate, Desposato demonstrated how such a setting yields "a powerful opportunity for testing and inference" (2006, 1018).

Moreover, this analysis of women's electoral prospects in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and Senate advances an interesting puzzle. The electoral rules for ascension to the Senate – i.e. plurality elections with a low district magnitude and no gender quota – are widely considered disadvantageous for women's representation (Duverger, 1955; Kittilson, 2006; Rule and Zimmerman, 1994; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Further, upper chambers in the Americas are the more prestigious legislative arena (Desposato, 2006; Lemos, 2008), with an issue domain traditionally gendered masculine (Kahn, 1996). Indeed in most bicameral legislatures, women's presence is greater in the lower house than in the upper house (IPU, 2012). Yet, the current (54th) Brazilian Congress includes 14.8% women in the Senate and only 8.8% women in the Chamber of Deputies. As shown in Table 1.3, the proportion of women elected to Brazil's Senate has over the last five elections consistently exceeded the proportion elected to its Chamber of Deputies.

I explain this apparent puzzle by honing the analysis to the candidate level, and thus leveraging interparty variation in women's electoral performance across Brazil's

bicameral legislature. This approach illuminates how parties mediate the effects of electoral institutions, in particular, how the differing electoral rules in the Senate and Chamber generate distinct incentives for party support, and the implications thereof for women's chances of election. I thus respond to several recent studies on electoral systems and women's representation that call for consideration of not only electoral rules per se but also the party system in which they are embedded (Jones, 2009; Krook, 2009; Moser, 2001; Moser, 2003; Moser and Scheiner, 2004, 2012).

With few exceptions,[141] most quantitative studies of the effects of electoral systems on women's representation are conducted at the aggregate level, employing the percentage of women in the legislature as the dependent variable to be explained. In response, Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki, and Crisp recently asserted that the dominance of the aggregate-level approach explaining women's overall descriptive representation "has nearly precluded research on other equally essential and related questions" (2010, 693).

How do electoral systems and other hypothesized obstacles to women's overall representation affect the electoral prospects of female candidates? To infer such effects on women's electoral performance from aggregate country-level analyses is to commit an ecological fallacy (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994; Robinson, 1990). Recall from the discussion in Chapter 2, the mechanisms linking voter bias and ideology, for example, to the proportion of women in the legislature are distinct from those substantiating the effects of these barriers on individual women's electoral success.[142] Only with a

[141] Moser and Scheiner (2012) conduct a legislator-level study, analyzing the chance that a given legislator is female, and Jones (2009) conducts an analysis of the percent of women elected on a party/coalition-list.
[142] For instance, the strength of leftist parties in parliament is a common predictor variable in studies of the overall proportion of women legislators. The mechanisms linking a country's affinity for leftist parties to women's representation are their support for welfare state policies, which can incorporate women in the paid workforce and in turn change their interests and induce an ideological gender gap, leading parties to compete for women's votes by advancing more female candidates (Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies, 2006). This logic does not readily extend to explaining individual women's electoral prospects, but must be re-theorized to apply to candidates, and then tested at the appropriate level.

candidate level analysis can we elucidate their actual effects on the electoral performance of female contenders. Lost within aggregates are the individuals that run for, and sometimes win elected office, as is any variation across parties.

Still, most of the cross-national studies on women's representation analyze the data as static rather than longitudinal – adjusting for temporal effects rather than modeling them – and thus cannot illuminate change over time (see Hughes and Paxton, 2008; Kittilson, 2006; McConnaughy, 2007).[143] The introduction of gender quotas in many countries will, once sufficient time has passed to allow several pre- and post-treatment observations, provide a sort of natural experiment, where researchers can isolate the actual effects of changes in electoral systems on women's representation. In the meantime, scholars of mixed electoral systems have conducted innovative analyses that exploit the laboratory-like setting, contrasting women's representation in distinct tiers within countries to infer their effects (Fortin and Eder, 2011; Moser, 2001a; Moser, 2003; Moser and Scheiner, 2004, 2012).

Controlled Comparison Analysis

The within-country, controlled comparison approach allows for variation across electoral rules while holding constant a range of potentially cofounding explanations such as political culture and historical background, many of which are simply unquantifiable. Several scholars have employed such quasi-natural experiments to enrich our understanding of electoral rules and their implications for legislative party discipline and cohesion (Desposato, 2006; Ferrara, 2004; Haspel, Remington, and Smith, 1998), for representation in the context of inchoate parties (Moser, 2001b), and how the mixed electoral system can, under the condition of a weakly institutionalized party system,

[143] Paxton, Hughes, and Painter's (2011) latent growth curve model of changes in women's representation over time represents an important advance on this front.

create a mandate divide (Thames, 2005). This chapter extends this line of research by analyzing the electoral performance of female candidates to each house of the bicameral Brazilian Congress, attentive to the distinctions in electoral rules. I investigate why women have enjoyed relatively more electoral success in the Senate than in the Chamber, first revealing observed differences across candidacies to the two chambers, and then discussing the effects of differences in candidate qualities, ideology, electoral rules, and party support on the electoral prospects of women.

LESSONS FROM THE BRAZILIAN LEGISLATURE

Female candidates to both houses of the Brazilian Congress confront a preferential electoral system that, in contrast to closed-list PR elections, is candidate- rather than party-centered. Such candidate-centered campaigns undermine women, who studies show are generally predisposed to collective, rather than individualistic, endeavors (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008), and because voters in such elections generally rely on heuristics such as gender and thus potentially negative stereotypes in choosing candidates (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen, 2005; Valdini, 2010). Therefore, neither the Senate nor the Chamber of Deputies provides an ideal environment for women contenders.[144] Yet, I marshal evidence to argue that willing parties can go a considerable way toward overcoming those obstacles. Compared with the lower house, the potential positive effect of party support for women is heightened in the Senate's low magnitude plurality elections, where all parties play a greater and more unified role in the electoral process. In what follows, I compare the electoral rules of the Senate and Chamber, their varying incentives for party support, and their anticipated effects on women's electoral prospects.

[144] Recall from preceding chapters, OLPR rules also undermine the gender quota.

By most considerations, gaining election to the Senate should be more difficult – especially for women – than acquiring a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. Enjoying exclusive jurisdiction over impeachment, international financing, and setting debt limits for federal, state, and municipal spending, as well as eight-year mandates, Brazil's upper house is the country's more prestigious legislative chamber (Desposato, 2006; Lemos, 2008). Comparisons of the recent legislative agenda in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (when not in joint session) suggest more appointments and treatment of fiscal and trade policy in the Senate. Such issues are traditionally gendered masculine (Kahn, 1996), which along with the greater prestige of the office, poses a disadvantage to female candidates (Bohn, 2007). Indeed, only 40 women have ever served in the Senate.[145] With most of the politicians occupying Senate seats being "veterans," both in terms of their record of elective or executive office and their age[146] (Lemos and Rainicheksi, 2008, 100), such a cycle of exclusion is difficult to break.

The Senate's Heightened Electoral Threshold

Given the discussions of electoral systems in Chapters 2 and 3, the electoral rules of the Senate should also disadvantage women contenders. Whereas multiple available seats and vote pooling across parties/coalitions mean that candidates often win a seat to the Chamber of Deputies with less than one percent of the statewide vote, Senate candidates must themselves win a plurality of votes, with no vote pooling. In 2010, the average winning vote share of Chamber of Deputies candidates was 3.4%, compared to

[145] This count excludes the first female senator to serve, the Imperial Princess Isabel from the late 19th century. With a long era of exclusively male senators during the Old Republic, the Vargas Era, the Second Republic, and the military regime (one woman, Eunice Michiles, was elected as a substitute for the ARENA, and served from 1979-1987), women's participation in the Senate has grown significantly in the New Republic (1985-present), with the first two women (Júnia Marise and Marluce Pinto) elected in 1990 (Senado Federal, 2004).

[146] While the electoral law requires Chamber of Deputies candidates to be 21 years of age, Senate candidates must be at least 35 (Lemos and Rainicheksi, 2008, 101).

31.9% in the Senate elections. The higher candidate vote threshold and expense this requirement entails (Lemos, 2008) will surely prove prohibitive for most outsiders.

Figure 6.1. Statewide Constituencies in the *Senado Federal*



While both chambers have statewide districts, candidates to the Chamber of Deputies can win a seat with votes in only a few municipalities. Senate candidates, on the other hand, undertake the prohibitive expense of having to garner votes throughout the state. Given the often extensive geographies and precarious highway infrastructure, statewide campaigns are costly. Moreover, candidates to the Senate must seek to represent a diversity of constituents rather than electoral niches, as is common in the Chamber of Deputies. Figure 6.1 maps a characteristic municipality-breakdown of winning candidates' electoral performance in the Chamber of Deputies (Alice Portugal)

and Senate (Lídice da Mata) in the northeastern state of Bahia, demonstrating the necessarily broader appeal of Senate candidates.

Varying Incentives for Party Support

These characteristics of the Senate create an environment disadvantageous to women and other outsiders. Yet, the low magnitude plurality rules generate greater incentives for party support than do the Chamber of Deputies' high magnitude OLPR elections. With the forthcoming analysis, I argue that this more salient and unified role of parties in Senate elections provides a context more propitious for female candidates, allowing women in party leadership to capitalize on their potential. In contrast, the combative climate of intraparty competition in the Chamber of Deputies means that only well-institutionalized and women-friendly parties will have the capacity and/or will to mobilize resources to recruit women candidates and provide them with the psychological, organizational, and material party support necessary to thrive in the entrepreneurial electoral context. Next, I compare the electoral rules of the two houses – focusing on district magnitude, ballot access, and votes – and the incentives they generate either for party support or intraparty competition (Carey and Shugart, 1995).

The Senate has significantly lower district and party magnitudes than the Chamber of Deputies. As discussed in Chapter 3, district and party magnitude in the Chamber of Deputies varies from 8 to 70, and 0 to 20 (in 1994-2010 elections), respectively. Each district elects three senators, who serve staggered eight-year terms. Every four years (concurrent with elections for president, governor, federal and state deputy), each district elects one or two senators. Elections in 1994, 2002, and 2010, sat two-thirds (54) of the Senate; elections in 1998 and 2006 selected one-third (27). In other words, district magnitude in the Senate varies from one to two. Looking back on the

literature discussed in Chapter 2, this lower magnitude – especially in the elections with a district magnitude of one – should diminish women's representation because it makes candidacy itself a scarce resource.

Conversely, higher district magnitudes entail a dizzying number of candidates. This is especially true in elections to the Chamber of Deputies, where parties are permitted to run 12 candidates in the smallest districts (8*1.5) and 140 candidates in the largest district (70*2). Under the condition of intraparty competition (i.e., OLPR), the vast quantity of candidacies in high district magnitude elections intensifies the incentive to cultivate a "personal vote" as candidates work to differentiate themselves from the masses of candidates on their list and others (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Validini, and Suominen, 2005).[147] Such tendencies dilute party support across candidacies, with most parties strategically devoting disproportionate party resources to the favored "puxadoras de legenda" or vote champions, who, by virtue of their votes in excess of the electoral quotient, often elect other candidates on the party list.

In elections to the Senate, however, parties tend to concentrate their efforts on a single seat. This means that the party elite, organization, and militants campaign collectively for their candidate, and a spot on the party's gubernatorial ticket presented at rallies and on campaign materials is assured (recall the *dobradinha*). In those elections with a district magnitude of two, voters have two votes (which they cannot give to the same candidate), so even if parties do advance two candidates in such elections, there remain substantially fewer incentives for intraparty competition in Senate elections (Desposato, 2006).

[147] This contrasts with closed-list PR, where higher district magnitudes decrease the incentives to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Validini, and Suominen, 2005).

Ballot access for Senate elections is controlled by the state party leaders. A few parties are considering the introduction of primaries to extend the selectorate (Fonseca, 2012), but the majority of candidate selections for plurality/majoritarian elections have heretofore been conducted in the proverbial smoke-filled rooms (Braga, 2008).[148] While I dispute the portrayal of Chamber of Deputies elections as "open for easy ascent" (Schedler, 1995, 18; Samuels, 2008) and maintain that parties do exercise a gatekeeping role, party leaders certainly exercise less formal control over access to Chamber candidacies, with 1-2 Senate candidacies being far more scarce and contested. Parties do not present a fixed ballot in elections to either legislative chamber, with the rules allowing voters to "disturb" the party list. In the Chamber's OLPR elections, this means that in contrast to closed-list PR elections, the end ranking of candidates on the party list is determined by voters. For the Senate, it means that when two-thirds of the seats are up for grabs, voters can divide their two votes among parties.

Because voters can "disturb" the party list for both houses, personalist politics and thus intraparty competition is implied in each system. Yet for the Senate, this only applies in the elections for two-thirds of the seats, where parties can advance two candidates. And again, even in the elections allowing more than one candidate per party, there are no real incentives for intraparty competition because voters command two votes that cannot be cast for the same candidate. In elections to the Chamber, however, voters cast a single ballot, and each party's numerous candidates seek to differentiate themselves from and outperform their co-partisans. This breeds an every-man-for-himself mentality and diminishes party support for all but the most favored candidacies. Many candidates to the

[148] While the Workers' Party (PT) has formal guidelines requiring a broader approval and are thus more inclusive than most parties, state PT leaders retain considerable influence (Álvares, 2008; Braga, 2008). Of the major parties, the conservative PFL/Democratas and Progressive Party (PP) have the most exclusive candidate selection procedures (Braga, 2008).

Chamber receive absolutely nothing from the party organization beyond the party label itself (Author analysis of database, corroborated in interviews).

The lesser scarcity and control of ballot access in the Chamber elections also raises the premium on personal reputation relative to party reputation, leading once more to intraparty competition. With so many candidate slots available, there may be candidacies advanced that the party organization has absolutely no intention of supporting. In contrast, in the Senate, party support is always unified behind their 1-2 candidates with any intraparty competition having been hashed out prior to nomination.

In sum, the lower district magnitude, fewer candidacies, multiple votes, and restricted ballot access in elections to the Senate generate considerably more incentives for unified party support than elections to the Chamber of Deputies, where the rules tend toward intraparty competition. If women can acquire access to this restricted and scarce resource of candidacy in the Senate, they stand to benefit from forthcoming party support. I expect that their likelihood to do so is significantly greater among parties with a critical mass of women in their leadership. Conversely, the greater scarcity of candidacies and more restrictive ballot access for the Senate will, I expect, disadvantage female political aspirants if women lack a voice among party leadership.

Given the heightened incentives for intraparty competition in the Chamber relative to the Senate, I anticipate that female candidates bulwarked by a party organization with a critical mass of women leaders will enjoy the most success in elections to the Senate. In parties where women lack a voice in decision-making, however, successful female Senate candidacies are unlikely. And as demonstrated in Chapter 5, female candidates to the Chamber enjoy the most success when running in parties that have women in party leadership, and are sufficiently institutionalized to overcome the vast incentives toward intraparty competition that deter most female

political aspirants. In elections to the Brazilian Congress, women's electoral prospects are shaped by the interaction of incentives for party support or intraparty competition and the will of party leadership to mobilize this party support on behalf of women, which in the Chamber, mitigates the difficulties of intraparty competition. Table 6.1 outlines these expectations.

Table 6.1. Varying Incentives for Party Support in Elections to the Brazilian Congress

	Senate: Unified Party Support	**Chamber of Deputies: Intraparty Competition**
Women Inclusive Party Leadership	#1 Most women-friendly: Women leaders mobilize forthcoming party support and level the playing field	#2 Intraparty competition difficult, but women leading institutionalized parties mobilize party support and help to overcome
Male Dominated Party Leadership	#4 Least women-friendly: Scarce resource unlikely to be mobilized for women	#3 Parties unwilling (and often ill-equipped) to mitigate intraparty competition

So although the Senate is more prestigious than the Chamber of Deputies, candidacy is a scarcer resource, the electoral threshold is higher, campaigns are more expensive, and ballot access is tightly regulated, with no gender quota,[149] I argue that unified party support mobilized by women in party leadership helps female aspirants overcome all of these obstacles. Because intraparty competition disincentivizes party support for most individual candidates in the Chamber, women running in all but the most institutionalized and women-friendly parties essentially undertake the campaign alone. The Senate, however, poses a different incentive structure whereby party support

[149] As elaborated in preceding chapters, the quota law for proportional elections remains a "lei que não pega" – merely nominal, and flouted by the vast majority of political parties. Therefore, the absence of a gender quota in Senate elections does not pose a stark disadvantage for female candidates.

is more forthcoming. It is this distinction in party support that explains women's unexpected electoral successes in Brazil's upper chamber. Next, I discuss the observed differences across chambers in the presence, qualities, and success rates of female candidates.

THE PRESENCE, QUALITIES, AND COMPETITIVENESS OF FEMALE CANDIDATES

As displayed in Table 6.2, women's congressional presence remains limited. Of the 2781 representatives elected to the national congress from 1994 to 2010, only 219 (7.87%) were women. Although the absolute number of women senators is paltry, their presence is proportionally greater than that of the Chamber. Of all the senators and deputies elected over the last five election cycles, 12 and 7.5 percent, respectively, were women. This is especially striking because in most bicameral legislatures women's presence is greater in the lower house than in the upper house (IPU, 2012). Next I consider whether women in both legislative chambers tend to cluster in the same parties and regions.

Table 6.2. Women's Congressional Presence (1994-2010)

Election Year	Federal Senator				Federal Deputy			
	Candidates		Elected		Candidates		Elected	
1994	17	7.3%	4	7.4%	185	6.2%	32	6.2%
1998	23	14.0%	2	7.4%	348	10.4%	29	5.7%
2002	38	12.4%	8	14.8%	480	11.4%	42	8.2%
2006	32	16.8%	4	14.8%	627	12.7%	45	8.8%
2010	27	12.7%	8	14.8%	929	19.1%	45	8.8%

Sources: *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*; Cfemea.

Parties Electing Women

As shown in Table 6.3, in both legislative chambers, most women are elected with leftist parties, and a greater proportion of leftist delegations are women. This tendency is exaggerated in the Senate, where nearly 58% of female senators elected from 1994 to 2010 are from the left. A striking 42.3% and 21.2% of women elected to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, respectively, hail from the PT. The PT has advanced 23 female candidates to the Senate, 22.3% of its total, electing eleven. Such an impressive *petista* female presence in the Senate – particularly when contrasted with the Chamber of Deputies – suggests that, as anticipated, when the rules of the game incentivize party support (as in the Senate), parties with women in leadership are able to capitalize electorally while enhancing women's representation. With the internal quota for women in all instances of party leadership (30% since 1991, extended to 50% in 2011), and a significant contingent of women among party founders (Macaulay, 2003), the PT is one of Brazil's more women-friendly parties. This relative openness to women has translated into significant – although still insufficient – female legislative representation, especially in the Senate where the electoral rules incentivize unified party support.

The women-friendly and organizationally strong but electorally smaller PC do B has only elected two senators, one of whom is a woman (Vanessa Grazziotin-AM), with 7 of its 28 candidates being female (25%). These proportions are slightly higher than those for the Chamber, where 23 and 33 percent of its candidates and elected deputies, respectively, are female. The PC do B women's greater success rates in the Chamber (25%) relative to the Senate (14%) are a product of the party's electoral strength, with the plurality electoral system concentrating seats in the hands of the larger parties. Of the 214 Senators elected from 1994-2010, 75% were from the five major parties (PFL, PMDB, PP, PSDB, PT).

Table 6.3. Women in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, by Party, Ideology, and Region (1994-2010)

PARTY / REGION	WOMEN SENATORS		WOMEN DEPUTIES	
	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected
LEFT	**87 (16.9%)**	**15 (25.4%)**	**1147 (14.3%)**	**87 (11.1%)**
PT	23 (22.3%)	11 (36.7%)	249 (13.8%)	41 (11.1%)
PC do B	7 (25.0%)	1 (50.0%)	75 (23.3%)	19 (33.3%)
PDT	6 (9.2%)	0 (0.0%)	155 (10.2%)	7 (5.3%)
PMN	0 (0.0%)	0 (-)	94 (15.8%)	1 (7.1%)
PPS	5 (12.2%)	1 (25.0%)	101 (12.3%)	2 (3.7%)
PSB	7 (14.3%)	1 (11.1%)	151 (12.6%)	15 (12.8%)
PSOL	12 (27.3%)	1 (50.0%)	82 (18.3%)	1 (16.7%)
PV	2 (5.3%)	0 (-)	181 (17.4%)	1 (2.9%)
CENTER	**10 (5.3%)**	**3 (3.6%)**	**372 (11.9%)**	**60 (7.6%)**
PMDB	3 (2.7%)	0 (0.0%)	195 (11.3%)	36 (8.3%)
PSDB	7 (9.1%)	3 (9.7%)	177 (12.6%)	24 (6.8%)
RIGHT	**40 (9.7%)**	**8 (11.1%)**	**1050 (11.4%)**	**46 (4.6%)**
PFL/DEM	5 (6.0%)	5 (13.2%)	97 (8.4%)	20 (5.2%)
PPR/PPB/PP	4 (8.3%)	1 (11.1%)	95 (8.6%)	11 (4.6%)
PP (1994)	1 (11.1%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (4.2%)	1 (2.9%)
PL/PR	2 (7.7%)	0 (0.0%)	96 (10.9%)	3 (2.6%)
PRB	1 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)	29 (19.0%)	0 (0.0%)
PSC	4 (21.1%)	0 (0.0%)	101 (13.1%)	3 (9.4%)
PTB	4 (12.1%)	2 (22.2%)	133 (12.0%)	3 (2.3%)
PTC	2 (25.0%)	0 (-)	68 (17.9%)	1 (25.0%)
PTdoB	1 (9.1%)	0 (-)	48 (11.8%)	1 (25.0%)
NORTH	33 (14.3%)	9 (16.4%)	355 (15.3%)	46 (14.2%)
NORTHEAST	37 (10.4%)	7 (9.9%)	452 (10.2%)	34 (4.5%)
CENTER-WEST	14 (9.5%)	4 (12.5%)	241 (14.9%)	25 (12.2%)
SOUTHEAST	29 (12.5%)	2 (6.3%)	1186 (12.9%)	69 (7.7%)
SOUTH	24 (16.0%)	4 (16.7%)	335 (12.1%)	19 (4.9%)
TOTAL	**137 (12.3%)**	**26 (12.0%)**	**2569 (12.6%)**	**193 (7.5%)**

Note: The values in parentheses represent the proportion of the party/region's candidates and elected that are women.

This does not mean to imply that all major parties have elected women to the Senate. While female deputies have fared relatively well in the PMDB, with 18.7% of the

women elected to the Chamber of Deputies being from this big tent party, they have not elected a single female senator despite winning over 24% of all Senate seats from 1994 to 2010.[150] As predicted above, when a party leadership remains dominated by men as has the PMDB, the scarcity of Senate candidacies and more restrictive ballot access makes women unlikely to gain access to these resources. Indeed, only 3 of the PMDB's 111 Senate candidates (2.7%) are female.

As shown in Table 6.3, the conservative and often male-dominant PFL/Democratas party has an impressive 100% success rate among its five female candidacies to the Senate. This feat is suggestive of the power of unified party support to level the playing field for women. It also exhibits the role of women leaders in mobilizing this support. Less than 20% of the PFL's state parties contesting Senate elections since 1998 have had a critical mass of women, with an average of 10% women in party leadership. Yet, among the five state parties running the PFL's successful female candidates, the average proportion of women leaders was 27.5%, with all but one (Roseana Sarney, the daughter of a former President) emerging from a state party with a critical mass of women leaders. This provides tentative support for my prediction that the Senate will prove more favorable than the Chamber if there is a critical mass of women in party leadership.

It is worth noting that ideology will certainly affect the kind of woman a party will promote and elect, with independent feminists being less likely to gain access to a highly coveted Senate seat in non-leftist parties. Indeed, all but one of the PFL's female

[150] The PMDB did have one woman, Iris de Araújo Rezende Machado – wife of the party leader and former governor of Goias – serve as a Senate substitute three times from 2003 to 2007, for a total of 13 months.

Senators emerged from powerful political families[151] in the northeast (Rosado, Sarney, Alves). Whereas the non-left parties exhibit a tendency to elect wives and daughters of male politicians (8 of 11, or 73%),[152] the PT has elected strong independent women such as Ana Júlia Carepa, Benedita da Silva, Heloísia Helena, and Marina Silva. Of the 11 women *petistas* and four other leftist women elected to the Senate, only four are associated with political families, with two of these (Marta Suplicy and Gleisi Hoffmann) having political capital of their own (from the student movement) in addition to that of their (ex-)husbands, Senator Eduardo Suplicy and former Deputy and Minister of Planning, Budgeting, and Management, and current Minister of Communication, Paulo Bernardo. Nevertheless, the experience of the PFL suggests that women in the leadership of even non-leftist parties can improve the electoral prospects of female candidates, and will be assessed empirically in the analyses below.

As shown in Table 6.3, while many of the leftist parties have advanced and elected proportionally more women to the Senate relative to the Chamber, the opposite is true for most non-leftist parties (with the exception of women elected to the Senate on the right, driven by the PFL women discussed above). This finding is once again suggestive of the influential role of party support in Senate elections. Recall from the preceding chapters, due in part to leftist parties' historical emphasis on equality, they are significantly more likely than non-leftist parties to have a critical mass of women in their leadership. In the multivariate analyses below, I explore the interacting effects of electoral rules incentivizing party support or intraparty competition and the presence of

[151] Such *parentesco*, or familial connection, is not unique to women. Over 30% of male senators in the current (54th) legislature are the son, grandson, or nephew of male politicians, with several more having other family members in politics (*Congresso em Foco*, 2011).

[152] Of these 8 wives and daughters elected to non-leftist parties in the Senate, only Ana Amélia Lemos developed independent capital. Married to Octávio Omar Cardoso, politician for the military regime's ARENA and PDS parties, Ana Amélia was also a reporter for several well-known media outlets. Her 2010 affiliation with the PP and successful Senate election bid was her first time to contest electoral office.

women in party leadership to mobilize party support. But first, I examine the differences in candidate quality across the chambers.

Differences in Candidate Quality

In general, are female candidates to the Senate qualitatively different than male candidates? Is there a difference between female candidates to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies? Table 6.4 suggests that women competing for a seat in the Senate are just as qualified as the male candidates. Although female candidates to the Chamber of Deputies have won a significantly lower vote share than male candidates and are also less likely to be an incumbent and to gain election, for Senate candidates such gender gaps are not statistically different from zero. As is true among candidates to the Chamber as well as society at large, the average educational attainment of women candidates to the Senate is slightly higher than that of the male candidates, but the minimal difference is not statistically significant.

One significant gender difference persisting in both chambers is a much greater tendency of female candidates to hail from leftist parties. A striking 63.3% of female candidates to the Senate come from leftist parties, compared to only 43.5% of male candidates. This concentration of leftist women is more pronounced in the Senate than in the Chamber, where just over 41% of female candidates come from leftist parties, providing yet more evidence suggesting that incentives for party support in the Senate can, when paired with women in party leadership, create a favorable environment for female contenders.

Looking across the two legislative chambers, we see that when compared to female candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, women aspiring to gain a seat in the Senate have had greater electoral success, are significantly more educated and likely to

come from a feeder occupation and a leftist party, and are less likely to come from a developed state.[153] In the multivariate analyses below, I take into account these differences in education, occupation, and party ideology, thus allowing me to control for varying candidate quality and execute a structured evaluation of the greater successes of women candidates to the Senate. This gives us confidence that any disparities in women's electoral performance across the bicameral legislature found in the multivariate analyses are not due to such differences in candidate quality.

Table 6.4. Differences in Candidate Quality? A Comparison Within and Across Legislative Chambers (1994-2010)

	Senate		**Chamber of Deputies**	
	Men	Women	Women	Men
Election	0.192	0.190	0.075***	0.133***
Vote share	12.109	11.731	0.525	0.683***
Education	3.769	3.819	3.580***	3.562
Married	0.736	0.438***	0.444	0.680***
Incumbent	0.085	0.058	0.058	0.116***
Feeder Occupation	0.629	0.672	0.469***	0.473
Left	0.435	0.633***	0.410***	0.359***
Ideology	4.225	3.482***	3.998**	4.214***
District magnitude	1.682	1.604	34.749	35.898*
Developed district	0.474	0.496	0.686***	0.666*
N	997	139	2569	17794

Notes: Two-tailed tests of statistical significance of observed differences between: men and women in the Senate, between women across the Senate and Chamber, and between men and women in the Chamber.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

[153] This is likely due to the greater district magnitude in the Chamber of Deputies in many of the more developed states. Note, differences across women candidates to the Senate and the Chamber in vote share and district magnitude are not comparable and were thus not tested for statistical significance.

District Magnitude and the Election of Women to the Senate

It is unclear from Tables 6.2 and 6.4 if the Senate elections with a district magnitude of two have indeed been the most favorable for female candidates. Although there have been more women elected in these elections in absolute terms, the percentage has remained at 14.8% since 2002. The average district magnitude of Senate elections contested by female candidates is 1.6, which is not statistically different than that of male candidates. For winning candidates only, the average is slightly higher but the gender difference remains insignificant. Of the Senate elections with a district magnitude of two (1994, 2002, 2010), nearly a quarter of female candidates were successful. This success rate falls to 11% in years when each state elected only one senator (1998, 2006). Interestingly, as Table 6.5 below demonstrates, the 1998 and 2006 elections actually saw the greatest proportion of female candidates. So while women's success rates have indeed been more favorable in the elections electing two-thirds of the Senate, with less female candidates and more seats up for grabs, this is in part a mathematical truth. In the following analyses, I explore the statistical relevance of district magnitude for a woman's electoral prospects.

Women's Success Rates in the Brazilian Congress

Looking at women's success rates across the two chambers, we see that female candidates to the Senate have enjoyed more electoral success than have women running for the Chamber of Deputies. Even when taking into consideration women's relative competitiveness through the Female-Male Success Rate Ratio, the Senate has proven more conducive to women's success than has the Chamber in recent elections. This discrepancy remains despite the Chamber's gender quota. That women candidates perform their best in the legislative chamber lacking a quota suggests that the quota's effects have been neither forthcoming nor direct.

Table 6.5. Women's Success Rates in the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010)

	Senator				Federal Deputy			
Election Year	Fem Cands	Fem Elected	Fem S Rate	FMSR Ratio	Fem Cands	Fem Elected	Fem S Rate	FMSR Ratio
1994	7.3%	7.4%	23.5%	1.01	6.2%	6.2%	17.3%	1.02
1998	14.0%	7.4%	8.7%	0.49	10.4%	5.7%	8.3%	0.52
2002	12.4%	14.8%	21.1%	1.23	11.4%	8.2%	8.8%	0.69
2006	16.8%	14.8%	12.5%	0.92	12.7%	8.8%	7.2%	0.66
2010	12.7%	14.8%	29.6%	1.2	19.1%	8.8%	4.8%	0.41

Notes: Success rate ("S Rate") = number of (women) elected / number of (women) candidates. A Female-Male Success Rate Ratio ("FMSR Ratio") greater than 1 indicates that women candidates have a higher success rate than male candidates. In 1994, 2002, and 2010, each state elected two senators.
Sources: *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*; CFEMEA. Calculations by author.

Overall, women's impressive success rates in Senate elections (18.7%) refute the enduring argument that the electorate is reluctant to elect women politicians. Even in the less developed North and Northeast, women candidates have performed quite well, with 27.3% and 18.9% of women contesting Senate seats in these regions gaining election. In both chambers, women running for office in the richer southern and southeastern regions have actually had the lowest success rates.

Having discussed the expectations of the literature and explored the nuances of observable electoral trends, we may now scrutinize Brazilian women's unexpected success in the Senate. In the multivariate analyses that follow, I control for the observed differences in candidate quality and explore the effect of gender on electoral outcomes in the Brazilian Congress. Drawing on the statistical findings and interviews with female candidates to both chambers, I explain how, even in Brazil's candidate-centered electoral context, party support makes the difference for women contesting electoral office.

DATA AND METHODS

Analyzing both chambers simultaneously, I employ institutional variation that reveals how distinct electoral rules affect women's electoral prospects in Brazil while controlling for a barrage of potentially confounding variables. I assess variation within and across chambers, using hierarchical modeling to explore how gender (or more precisely, sex) interacts with electoral rules and particular individual, party, and district-level factors to predict candidate electoral success.

Independent Variables – Candidate Characteristics

I expect that, because the extensive intraparty competition incentivized by the electoral rules in the Chamber of Deputies concocts a disadvantageous environment for women and other outsiders, *female* will have a negative effect on the electoral prospects of candidates in the Chamber of Deputies. Yet because party support is more forthcoming in elections to the Senate, with competition fiercer between parties rather than within, I expect *female* to have an insignificant effect on candidate electoral outcomes in the Senate. Public discontent with the corruption scandals of recent years and societal perceptions of women as novel candidates who are more honest and less corrupt may even render the effect of *female* positive, particularly under the condition of party support, which helps to project an image of viability. Recent public opinion data suggest the Brazilian electorate is increasingly receptive to female candidates (e.g., Ibope, 2009), in spite of residual levels of machista voter attitudes. Thus, I expect the effect of *female* to be insignificant but positive in the Senate, and negative for candidates to the Chamber.

As in Chapter 5, I anticipate the controls for candidate quality will exercise a positive effect on candidate electoral outcome. I expect *education* to have a positive effect of candidate electoral outcome, regardless of electoral rules or candidate sex. In both chambers, coming from a feeder occupation (including but not limited to elected

office) should substantially increase one's chances of victory, so I expect *feeder occupation* to have a positive effect on electoral outcome, regardless of electoral rules or candidate sex. Given the lower threshold in Chamber elections, and thereby the greater prospect of winning a seat with the support of a small societal sector (e.g., a particular union, soccer club, etc.), I expect the magnitude of *feeder occupation* to be greater for Senate elections.

Although I expect *incumbency* to have a positive effect on the electoral prospects of all candidates, with eight-year terms and only three senators per state, I anticipate the magnitude of *incumbency* to be lesser for candidates to the Senate. I also include *campaign finance* and *campaign finance*^{2} and expect the former to be positive and the latter negative to account for the diminishing returns of increasing campaign funding. I expect the effects of *incumbency* or *campaign finance* to be positive and statistically significant for all candidates, regardless of gender.

Independent Variables – Party Characteristics

As the median Brazilian voter is right of center (LAPOP, 2008; WVS, 2005-2008), I expect the effect of leftist party affiliation to be negative overall, with *ideology* being positive (0 to 10 is left to right) and *left* being negative regardless of electoral rules. But given the historical commitment of leftist parties to equality, and their greater incorporation of women, I anticipate the interactions of *female*ideology* to be negative, and *female*left* to be positive across legislative chambers. As in Chapter 5, however, I expect that the positive effect of *female*left* will dissipate with the introduction of the interaction of *female* with party institutionalization (*PII*) and *critical mass*, which I contend are the key mechanisms substantiating the electoral success of women in leftist parties.

Because the electoral rules in the Chamber incentivize intraparty competition, I expect *female*PII*critical mass* to be heightened in the Chamber, with institutionalized parties able to mitigate the tendencies toward combative, personalist politics and women mobilizing this capacity on behalf of female candidates. The positive effects for female candidates of women in party leadership are enhanced in institutionalized parties because they facilitate the provision of psychological, organization, and material support critical for women to thrive in the entrepreneurial context. In the Senate, I anticipate that *PII* will be less salient, as the electoral rules generate broad incentives for unified party support of candidates across parties. I argue that such party support is especially likely to be galvanized in the name of recruiting, developing, and supporting female candidacies when women have a voice in party leadership, and therefore expect that *female*critical mass* will be positive in the Senate. When bulwarked by a women-friendly party, female candidates thrive in the context of unified party support.

Independent Variables – Institutional Characteristics

District Magnitude

District magnitude is measured at the district-level of the model, and is scored one for candidates to the Senate in 1998 and 2006, and two for Senate candidates in 1994, 2002, and 2010. *District magnitude* for Chamber of Deputies varies over state (but not time) from 8 to 70. While I use party seat share, or *party magnitude*, in the models of candidacies to the Chamber of Deputies in Chapter 5, the variation in party magnitude in the Senate elections is small, and proffers little explanatory power with such lengthy time between mandates. Moreover, if a party currently holds one or two seats they may actually be *less* likely to win the third seat, with voters more apt to give another party a

chance. In any case, as discussed above, the key variation in the Senate is between the elections with a district magnitude of one and two.

As in Chapter 5, I expect the effect of *district magnitude* to be negative for all candidates because it introduces additional competition. Recall from the discussion above, the vast quantity of candidates in the Chamber's high district magnitude OLPR elections only increases the tendencies toward intraparty competition. And given that the unification of party support is the principal reason I expect Senate elections to be most favorable for female candidates (in parties with women leaders), I anticipate that women will enjoy more success in the Senate's single district magnitude elections. Women-friendly parties will not hesitate to advance a female candidate in single seat elections, and women-averse parties will be unlikely to devote even a second candidacy to women. To enable simultaneous cross- and within-chamber assessments of the effect of district magnitude, I also estimate the models with *dmag group* coded categorically (1: 1; 2: 2; 3: 8-12; 4: 16-31; 5: 39-70).

Effective Number of Candidates

An important difference between the Senate and Chamber in terms of women's electoral prospects is the anticipated fragmentation of the vote and thus party support. Despite the presence of various seats, with a profusion of candidates in Chamber elections, party resources are necessarily fragmented. In the Senate elections, with all eyes focused on the prize of a prestigious Senate seat, and where parties run at most two candidates (only 17.2% of district parties from 1994-2010) but more often a single candidate (mean of 1.15 number of candidates per party), this fragmentation is minimized availing dedicated party resources to the candidate(s) with their hat in the ring. To explore this effect on women's electoral performance, I include *effective number of*

candidates (Moser and Scheiner, 2004; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). The mean of *effective number of candidates* in Chamber of Deputies and Senate elections, respectively, was 58.44 and 4.15. I expect a higher *effective number of candidates* to depress availability of party support and thus have a negative effect on all candidates' electoral performance, with an elevated significance for women running in elections to the Chamber, for whom the detrimental effect of fragmented party support poses a particular challenge.

Gender Quotas

With the *Lei Eleitoral de Cotas* implemented in the 1998 elections to the Chamber, I include a binary variable, *quotas*, coded 0 in all Senate elections and in the 1994 Chamber elections, and 1 in the 1998-2010 Chamber elections. But with the concept and implementation of quotas being far from dichotomous, and in line with the differentiation of quota regimes in cross-national analyses (Jones, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010), I alternately include a trichotomous variable, *quotas2*, which is the same as *quotas* but codes the 2010 elections occurring after the 2009 mini-reform that strengthened the quota and enforcement as two. Given the potential for limited effectiveness of quotas in OLPR elections, and the preponderance of inchoate parties that regularly defy formal laws governing elections and parties, I expect the effects of both measures of quotas to be weakly positive, at best.

Senate

In addition to these particular measures of differences across the chambers, I include a binary variable, *senate*, which is 0 in Chamber candidacies and 1 for candidacies to the Senate, to capture any remaining variation. The greater power and prestige of the Senate lead me to expect *senate* to be negative overall. Yet as discussed

above, I expect the interaction *female*senate* to exercise a positive effect on electoral outcome, with the disadvantages posed by being a woman mitigated in the Senate, where party support is more forthcoming. I also interact *senate* with several of the variables discussed above to evaluate the hypothesized differences across chambers.

Independent Variables – District Development Levels

I supplement these data on candidates, parties, and electoral rules with district-level measurements of development (HDI) (Ipea, 2010a). As discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 5, voter bias against women may depress their electoral prospects. Drawing from a modernization-based approach, Inglehart and Norris contend that "the most egalitarian attitudes toward the division of sex roles should be found in the most affluent societies," wherein economic development ushers in changes in the workforce and educational opportunities for women believed to transform gender norms (2003, 32). If so, women's electoral prospects would be greater in Brazil's more developed states, leading *HDI* (modeled at the district level) to have a positive effect on the electoral outcome of female candidates. Scholars of women and politics in Brazil have argued this to be especially true for women from leftist parties, who as feminists have difficulties gaining electoral support in states/regions where traditional gender norms dominate (Araújo, 2005; Avelar, 2001).

But as demonstrated in Chapter 5, there are several reasons to question the applicability of the modernization hypothesis for explaining women's electoral prospects in Brazil. Indeed, the foregoing analysis found that as the development level of a congressional candidate's district increased, his/her chance of election decreased, with leftist men the lone exception. If *HDI* is insignificant for predicting women's chance of election to the Brazilian legislature, we will have further support for rejecting the claim. I

include a cross-level interaction between *HDI* and the interaction of *sex* and *left* to assess this hypothesis in the analyses that follow.

Models

I estimate the model in steps, with Models 1-3 assessing various hypotheses (H1-H3 below), and Model 4 assessing them jointly (H4):

> H1: Women face numerous challenges in their efforts to attain political representation in Brazil, with the effect of *female* on chance of election to the Brazilian Congress being negative. In the Senate, however, the greater prospect of party support mitigates these negative effects, with the *female*senate* interaction being positive.
>
> H2: Although being from a leftist party usually disadvantages a candidate in Brazil, leftist parties are more likely to be supportive of women candidacies, with *female*left* exercising a positive effect on electoral success, whereby the constitutive terms in this interaction mitigate each other's negative "main effects."[154] In other words, being a leftist helps women's electoral prospects, and being a woman helps leftists.
>
> H3: According to an extensive literature on electoral systems and women's representation, greater district magnitude and quotas should enhance female candidate's electoral prospects. Yet, given the heightened incentives for intraparty competition with increased district magnitudes, and the limitations of Brazil's quota, I expect *district magnitude* to be negative and *quotas2* to be weakly positive at best. I test these rival hypotheses while holding all else constant.
>
> H4: Even after controlling for the differences in electoral rules between the chambers, the effects of ideology (with more leftist women in the Senate), and the superior candidate quality of Senate candidates, I expect that when interacted with *critical mass*, *female*senate* will remain positive because if mobilized by women in party leadership, the greater party support in the Senate levels the playing field for female contenders and enables them to thrive. For candidates to the Chamber, the heightened incentives for intraparty competition render these positive effects of *female*critical mass* contingent upon *party institutionalization*.

[154] Although this is common parlance, with two interacted dummy variables we are not quite referring to a main effect in the traditional sense but rather the effect when the variable is coded zero. Here, I am comparing the effect on probability of election of being a woman from a leftist party to the effect of *left* on men, and the effect of *female* on non-leftist candidates. Figure 6.2 below illustrates this point.

Dependent Variable

The central dependent variable of interest is candidate electoral success. As shown in Table 6.4, there is a sizeable discrepancy in the electoral threshold across the Senate and Chamber, rendering incomparable the traditional vote share variable. Instead, I code electoral outcome dichotomously, with those elected coded one, and all others coded zero. Given the binary outcome variable, I estimate the below hierarchical logit model, where π_{ij} denotes the probability of individual i in district j getting elected, and u_{ij} is assumed to be normally distributed (0, σ^2):

$$\log[\pi_{ij}/(1-\pi_{ij})] =$$

Individual-level model: β_{0j} + β_{1j} female$_{ij}$ + β_{2j} left$_{ij}$ + β_{3j} female*left$_{ij}$ + β_{4j} quotas2$_{ij}$ + β_{5j} female*quotas2$_{ij}$ + β_{6j} senate$_{ij}$ + β_{7j} female*senate$_{ij}$ + β_{8j} left*senate$_{ij}$ + β_{9j} female*left*senate$_{ij}$ + β_{10j} c.mass$_{ij}$ + β_{11j} female*c.mass$_{ij}$ + β_{12j} c.mass*senate$_{ij}$ + β_{13j} female*c.mass*senate$_{ij}$ + β_{14j} PII$_{ij}$ + β_{15j} female*PII$_{ij}$ + β_{16j} education$_{ij}$ + β_{17j} occupation$_{ij}$ + β_{18j} incumbent$_{ij}$ + β_{19j} campfinance$_{ij}$ + β_{20j} campfinance$^2_{ij}$

District-level model:

$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}$ HDI group$_j$ + γ_{02} dmag group$_j$ + γ_{03} eff n cands$_j$ + u_{0j}
$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}$ HDI group$_j$ + γ_{12} dmag group$_j$ + γ_{13} eff n cands$_j$ + u_{1j}
$\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21}$ HDI group$_j$
$\beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30} + \gamma_{31}$ HDI group$_j$
$\beta_{4j} = \gamma_{40}$
$\beta_{5j} = \gamma_{50}$
$\beta_{6j} = \gamma_{60}$
$\beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70}$
$\beta_{8j} = \gamma_{80}$
$\beta_{9j} = \gamma_{90}$
$\beta_{10j} = \gamma_{100}$
$\beta_{11j} = \gamma_{110}$
$\beta_{12j} = \gamma_{120}$
$\beta_{13j} = \gamma_{130}$
$\beta_{14j} = \gamma_{140}$
$\beta_{15j} = \gamma_{150}$
$\beta_{16j} = \gamma_{160}$
$\beta_{17j} = \gamma_{170}$

$\beta_{18j} = \gamma_{180}$
$\beta_{19j} = \gamma_{190}$
$\beta_{20j} = \gamma_{200}$

I also estimated a separate model for candidates to the Senate, using a candidate's valid vote share as the dependent variable. This continuous measurement of the concept of electoral success allows for greater differentiation in outcome. The additional model is worthwhile because the difference between third place candidates and party standard bearer candidates attaining only a small fraction of votes is substantively and statistically important. *Vote share* is displayed here as a percent, equivalent to the number of votes for the candidate divided by the number of "valid votes" cast for candidates in the candidate's state. This denominator excludes from consideration blank and null votes as well as party-label votes. In the Senate, *vote share* ranges from 0.01% to 88.76%,[155] with a mean of 12.06 percent.[156]

Interview Sample

I supplement the quantitative analyses with interviews with seven female politicians (and questionnaires with an additional three) who have run for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with varying degrees of competitiveness. I selected these women to ensure representation from several parties and each of the five regions, resulting in a sample that includes eight parties and nine states (See Table 6.6). Although the sample is comprised mostly of leftist women politicians, this is also true of the Senate's women's contingency itself, and as such is a reasonably representative sampling of women's presence in the upper chamber.

[155] This astounding vote share was won by Tião Viana (PT-Acre) in 2006, when the candidacy of the other major contender (Aírton Rocha-PDT) was declared invalid at the last moment (Terra, 2006).
[156] In the end, these results do not provide new information, and so I cut their presentation and discussion. Results are available upon request.

Table 6.6. Interviews with Female Candidates to the Senate.

Name	Party (Ideo)	State (Region)	Office, Year, Success
Benedita da Silva	PT (L)	Rio de Janeiro (SE)	Senate, 1994, Elected Chamber, 2010, Elected
Judge Denise Frossard	PPS (L) PSDB(C)	Rio de Janeiro (SE)	Senate, 1998, Not elected Chamber, 2002, Elected
Emília Fernandes	PTB(R) PT(L)	Rio Grande do Sul (S)	Senate, 1994, Elected Senate, 2002, Not elected Chamber, 2006, Substitute Chamber, 2010, Not elected
Fátima Cleide*	PT(L)	Rondônia (N)	Senate, 2002, Elected Senate, 2010, Not elected
Jô Moraes	PC do B (L)	Minas Gerais (SE)	Senate, 1994, Not elected Chamber, 2006, Elected Chamber, 2010, Elected
Lídice da Mata	PSB (L)	Bahia (NE)	Chamber, 2006, Elected Senate, 2010, Elected
Luiza Erundina*	PT (L) PSB (L)	São Paulo (SE)	Senate, 1994, Not elected Chamber, 1998, Elected Chamber, 2002, Elected Chamber, 2006, Elected Chamber, 2010, Elected
Marisa Serrano	PMDB (C) PSDB (C)	Mato Grosso do Sul (CO)	Chamber, 1994, Elected Chamber, 1998, Elected Senate, 2006, Elected
Patrícia Saboya Gomes*	PPS (L)	Ceará (NE)	Senate, 2002, Elected
Serys Slhessarenko	PT (L)	Mato Grosso (CO)	Senate, 2002, Elected Chamber, 2010, Not elected
Wilma de Faria	PSB (L)	Rio Grande do Norte (NE)	Chamber, 1986, Elected Senate, 2010, Not elected

*Unfortunately, these three women were unavailable for interviews, but submitted their responses via questionnaire.

I also draw on secondary sources, including an extensive Brazilian(ist) literature – based largely on male politicians – on political ambition and the Brazilian party and electoral systems (Ames, 2001; Lemos, 2008; Mainwaring, 1999; Nicolau, 2006; Rodrigues, 2002; Samuels, 2003; Samuels, 2008; Santos, 2000) as a base of comparison

for my interviews with female politicians. Together, these data inform the analyses that follow.

FINDINGS

Table 6.7 displays the results of Models 1-4 of the probability of election of candidates to the Brazilian Congress, converted to odds ratios. I rely on analyses of marginal effects to discuss the findings of the cross-chambers models, relate the findings to Hypotheses 1-4, and speculate on the variation that remains to be explored.

Discussion of Results

Gender

Model 1 displayed in Table 6.7 includes only the binary variables, *female* (γ_{10}) and *senate* (β_{6j}, γ_{60}), and their interaction (β_{7j}, γ_{70}), and models the correlations among candidates running in the same state. This is a purposively underspecified model to simply model (before introducing the interaction terms and series of controls) the relationship between candidate sex and electoral outcome across the chambers demonstrated in the descriptive statistics above. As demonstrated by Model 1 in Table 6.7, the simple effect of *female* (γ_{10}) decreases a candidate's chance of election; yet the *female*senate* interaction (β_{7j}, γ_{70}) is statistically significant and greater than one, meaning that as predicted in H1, the adverse effect of being a woman is mediated in the Senate. A disaggregation of the marginal effects reveals that the difference in predicted probabilities of male and female candidates gaining election is statistically significant in the Chamber, but approximates zero in the Senate.

Table 6.7. Multilevel Analyses of the Chance of Election of Congressional Candidates

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Fixed Effects	*Coef.*	*SE*	*sig*	*Coef.*	*SE*	*sig*	*Coef.*	*SE*	*sig*	*Coef.*	*SE*	*sig*
Level 2 District Variables												
For Intercept (β_{0j})												
HDI ($\gamma 01$)							0.763	(0.043)	***	0.630	(0.052)	***
District magnitude ($\gamma 02$)							1.159	(0.079)	*	0.760	(0.082)	**
Effective n cands ($\gamma 03$)							0.998	(0.002)		1.008	(0.003)	**
Cross-Level Interactions												
For Female slope (β_{1j})												
Intercept ($\gamma 10$)	0.539	(0.073)	***	0.453	(0.069)	***	1.510	(0.793)		0.510	(0.337)	
HDI ($\gamma 11$)							0.911	(0.164)		1.111	(0.226)	
District magnitude ($\gamma 12$)							0.928	(0.202)		1.048	(0.282)	
Effective n cands ($\gamma 13$)							0.994	(0.006)		0.996	(0.008)	
For Left slope (β_{2j})												
Intercept ($\gamma 20$)				0.609	(0.029)	***	0.479	(0.036)	***	0.642	(0.082)	***
HDI ($\gamma 21$)							1.279	(0.069)	***	1.243	(0.099)	**
For Fem*Left slope (β_{3j})												
Intercept ($\gamma 30$)				1.644	(0.264)	***	1.179	(0.304)		0.672	(0.285)	
HDI ($\gamma 31$)							1.368	(0.251)	*	1.301	(0.334)	
Level 1 Variables												
Quotas2 ($\beta 4j$, $\gamma 40$)							0.736	(0.044)	***	0.940	(0.054)	
Fem*Quotas2 ($\beta 5j$, $\gamma 50$)							0.560	(0.130)	**	0.775	(0.149)	
Senate ($\beta 6j$, $\gamma 60$)	1.433	(0.122)	***	1.819	(0.186)	***	1.700	(0.273)	***	1.625	(0.327)	*
Fem*Senate ($\beta 7j$, $\gamma 70$)	1.788	(0.450)	*	1.753	(0.665)	±	0.642	(0.364)		0.107	(0.246)	
Left*Senate ($\beta 8j$, $\gamma 80$)				0.515	(0.100)	***	0.546	(0.106)	**	2.646	(1.516)	*
Fem*Left*Senate ($\beta 9j$, $\gamma 90$)				1.362	(0.706)		1.398	(0.724)		13.348	(21.628)	±
C.Mass ($\beta 10j$, $\gamma 100$)										0.649	(0.152)	*
Fem*C.Mass ($\beta 11j$, $\gamma 110$)										1.419	(1.002)	
Fem*C.Mass*Senate ($\beta 13j$, $\gamma 130$)										152.4	(500.4)	
PII ($\beta 14j$, $\gamma 140$)							1.159	(0.079)	*	0.954	(0.047)	
Fem*PII ($\beta 15j$, $\gamma 150$)										1.133	(0.186)	
Level 1 Candidate Controls												
Education level ($\beta 16j$, $\gamma 160$)										1.362	(0.086)	***
Feeder occupation ($\beta 17j$, $\gamma 170$)										1.352	(0.111)	***
Incumbent ($\beta 18j$, $\gamma 180$)										8.265	(0.612)	***
Campaign finance ($\beta 19j$, $\gamma 190$)										1.000	(0.000)	***
Random Effects	*Var*	*SE*	*sig*	*Var*	*SE*	*sig*	*Var*	*SE*	*sig*	*Var*	*SE*	*sig*
Intercept (u_{0j})	0.058	(0.019)	***	0.061	(0.020)	***	0.029	(0.012)	***	0.047	(0.024)	***
Female slope (u_{1j})	0.273	(0.131)	***	0.279	(0.133)	***	0.201	(0.118)	***	0.004	(0.016)	***
N	21478			21478			21478			11174		
LL	-8130			-8053			-8000			-3511		
AIC	16274			16128			16047			7100		
BIC	16329			16216			16047			7386		

***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 ±p<.10 (one-tailed tests)

Although the Senate is more prestigious than the Chamber, *senate* (β_{6j}, γ_{60}) exercises a positive influence on chance of election. Male and female candidates to the Senate, respectively, are 1.43 and 1.79 times more likely to win election than male candidates to the Chamber, who in turn are almost twice as likely to get elected than female candidates to the Chamber. The predicted probability of election for female candidates to the Senate is 0.19, but only 0.08 for female candidates to the Chamber. It is possible that the smaller ratio of candidates to elected in the Senate (216 elected of 1115 candidates, compared to 2565 elected of 20,363 candidates in the Chamber), not controlled for in this underspecified model, affects the findings here. Does the positive effect of *senate* persist for women candidates after the introduction of controls?

Ideology

The results of models estimating *ideology* and *left* did not differ, so I present the models using *left*, which maintains the full universe of candidacies. Model 2 in Table 6.7 introduces *left* (γ_{20}) and its interactions with the predictors of Model 1, *female*left* (γ_{30}), *left*senate* (β_{8j}, γ_{80}), and *female*left*senate* (β_{9j}, γ_{90}), to assess H2. As predicted, the "main effects," or more precisely, the effects of *left* for male candidates (γ_{20}), and *female* for non-leftists (γ_{10}) are statistically significant and less than one, thus negatively affecting probability of election. This means that being a leftist disadvantages men, and being a women disadvantages non-leftists.

Yet, the interaction effect of *female*left* (γ_{30}) is greater than one and statistically significant, with female leftist candidates 1.64 times more likely to win election than male non-leftists, thus supporting H2. In sum, the simple effect of ideology on electoral prospects is different for men and women. Being a leftist mitigates the negative effect of gender, and being a woman diminishes the disadvantage posed by running with a leftist

party in an electorate that is right of center. The other interactions with *female* of *senate* (β_{7j}, γ_{70}) and *senate*left* (β_{9j}, γ_{90}) are both positive but not quite statistically significant.

Figure 6.2. The Simple Effect of Being a Woman on the Electoral Prospects of Candidates to the Brazilian Congress, by Party Ideology (1994-2010)



As Figure 6.2[157] illustrates, running with a leftist party diminishes the negative influence of being a woman on electoral outcome. The negative slope modeling the simple effect of candidate gender is less steep for leftist candidates in the Chamber than it is for non-leftists. For leftist candidates to the Senate, the simple effect of candidate sex

[157] Note that Figure 6.2 depicts the simple effect of the independent variable on the outcome, with no other predictors. Moreover, the regression line is imposed on binary data, and intended solely as an illustration.

on probability of election actually becomes *positive*. This suggests that women can in fact thrive electorally in the Senate. It should be noted, however, that the probability of election to the Senate of both male and female non-leftists is still higher than that of leftists. Moreover, this is before introducing electoral rules or candidate quality – do the positive effects for women of being from a leftist party persist once these differentiating factors are introduced in Models 3 and 4?

As depicted in Table 6.7, while the "main effect" or effect on male candidates of *left* (γ_{20}) remains negative and statistically significant after the inclusion of controls for electoral context and candidate quality in Models 3 and 4, the gendered mitigating effect of running with a leftist party for women, measured in *female*left* (γ_{30}) loses statistical significance. Table 6.7 shows that the introduction of *PII* (β_{14j}, γ_{140}) and *critical mass* (β_{10j}, γ_{100}; β_{11j}, γ_{110}; β_{13j}, γ_{130}) subsumes the positive effect of *female*left* (γ_{30}). Are these factors equally important for women's success in both chambers?

Although not displayed here, comparing the separate analyses of Senate and Chamber candidate vote share demonstrates that, as predicted, the positive effect of *female*critical mass*PII* on women's electoral prospects manifests only in the Chamber elections where institutionalized parties help to overcome the tendencies toward combative intraparty competition. While the positive effect of *critical mass* for women is contingent on *party institutionalization* in the Chamber, this is not the case for the Senate. An analysis of the marginal effects of *female*critical mass*senate* (β_{13j}, γ_{130}) demonstrates the greater magnitude of its positive effect in the Senate – women's predicted probability of election in parties without a critical mass (0.17) is half that of female candidates running in parties with a critical mass of women leaders (0.35). As predicted, the combination of electoral rules generating incentives for party support and

parties with women in their decision-making structures amplifies their positive effects for female candidates' chance of election.

Institutional Variables

By testing for the effects of institutional variables – *district magnitude*, *dmag group*, *effective number of candidates*, and *quotas* – across Brazil, I was able to assess their impact on electoral outcome while holding constant a barrage of potentially confounding factors. It also allows me to examine their effects on the electoral prospects of individual women rather than representation as a whole, in a domain beyond the advanced-industrial context still prevalent in the extant literature. The evidence supports the findings of Matland (1998) and Moser and Scheiner (2004, 2012) that institutional variables function differently in recently (re)democratized contexts. It also affirms that we must look beyond the simple implementation of quotas to understand their (in)effectiveness, and consider their interaction with the party and electoral systems in which they are embedded (e.g., Krook, 2009; Schmidt, 2008).

A breakdown of the marginal effects suggests that the simple effect of *dmag group* on the probability of election of candidates to the Chamber of Deputies is negative, with this adverse effect being more pronounced for female candidates. Yet in the Senate, the bivariate relationship is precisely the opposite, with female candidates seeing a positive effect of *dmag group* on electoral prospects that is stronger than its positive effect for male candidates. But as shown in Table 6.7, once the other variables are introduced, in particular, the *effective number of candidates* (which is itself insignificant, γ_{03}, γ_{13}), district magnitude does gain a positive effect on the chance of election for male candidates, with one unit increase in *dmag group* increasing their electoral prospects by 16 percent (captured in γ_{02}). But the effect of *dmag group* is not statistically differentiated

by gender, as shown by the insignificance of γ_{12}. An analysis of the marginal effects of Model 4 demonstrates that the gender differences in predicted probability of election are only significant when district magnitude is greater than two; i.e., in the Chamber elections.

Although the literature expects women running in elections with two Senate seats up for grabs to see an electoral advantage, the multivariate analyses suggest otherwise. A model incorporating a factor-based differentiation of all possible combinations of *dmag group* and *female* suggests that women in the Senate elections with a district magnitude of two are 2.07 times more likely to win election than male candidates running in an election with a district magnitude of one; yet, the large confidence interval (0.70 to 6.11) includes 1, meaning the effect in fact is not statistically significant. Put more simply, there has been too much variation in women's experiences in two-seat elections to declare the relationship to be universally positive or negative.

As would be expected from the discussion in Chapter 3, which explains the shortcomings of the *Lei Eleitoral de Cotas*, *quotas2* (β_{5j}, γ_{50}) does not exercise a positive effect on women's electoral prospects. Rather, the effect on candidate chance of election has been negative (β_{4j}, γ_{40}), with this negative effect being heightened for female candidates (β_{5j}, γ_{50}). The pressure to advance candidates alongside resistance from party leaders has led many parties to advance sacrificial lambs, with no intent of supporting their candidacies (Wylie, 2010). The plethora of non-viable candidacies undermines efforts to assess the quota's potential, although the 2009 mini-reform and recent emboldening of enforcement efforts in 2012 should facilitate assessment in future elections.

Despite the Senate's electoral rules which at first glance seem more arduous, elections to the Chamber of Deputies are in fact more bitterly competitive because of the

extensive intra-party competition, as well as the fact that such internal competition for (the chance to seek) Senate seats is hashed out long before the campaign begins. During the campaign, parties and the campaign committees of other candidates from one's party avail substantial resources to bank the campaign, and foot soldiers are unified in the effort to elect their party's candidate. Perhaps most importantly, Senate candidates secure much coveted space in the electoral propaganda (*santinhos*, or electoral flyers) of their party/coalition's gubernatorial candidate (Samuels, 2003).

It is suggestive that the inclusion of electoral rules – *dmag group*, *effective number of candidates*, and *quotas2*, and district development (discussed below) hardly improved the model fit to the data (although it did reduce the district-level error term). Moreover, Wald tests of the joint significance of the interaction of *female* with *dmag group* and *effective number of candidates* after all three full models suggests that together, these predictors do not gain much traction in explaining the variation in electoral outcome. Yet, once I introduced the party characteristics of *critical mass* and *PII*, the model fit improves by one-third. This suggests that for women's electoral prospects, these factors operate most significantly through their effects on political parties. In turn, party characteristics such as institutionalization and women in leadership positions have mediated their response to the incentives generated by electoral rules. Put simply, I find that supportive parties are pivotal to women's electoral success.

These findings demonstrate how party characteristics mediate institutional variables to influence women's electoral prospects and therefore suggest that the generic application of quotas in high district magnitude PR elections is insufficient to enhance women's electoral prospects. By holding constant the context in which these electoral rules operate, their assumed universal effects dissolved. These findings then deviate from those first generated from samples in Western Europe and later confirmed through

aggregate level cross-national analyses. Rather, this analysis demonstrates that the effects of electoral rules on women's electoral prospects in Brazil are mediated by party characteristics, with important variation across political parties. It is critical then to consider interactions between these rules and the political and historical contexts in which they operate, with variation across parties, states, and women themselves explaining these disparities in findings. Indeed, as demonstrated with statistical analysis and corroborated in interviews, electoral rules exercise their effects on women's representation in Brazil indirectly, through the incentives they generate for intraparty support or competition, and are mediated by party characteristics such as party institutionalization and the incorporation of women in party leadership.

Voter Bias and Development (HDI)

Interestingly, once the structure of candidates nested in districts is modeled, the effect of *HDI* (γ_{01}) is actually negative on electoral outcome, across specifications and office. An analysis of the predictive margins demonstrates that district development has a negative effect on the electoral prospects of both male and female candidates. Holding all else constant (Model 4) the predicted mean probability of election for male and female candidates, respectively, is 0.25 and 0.18 in the low *HDI group* (average≤0.75), 0.18 and 0.16 in the median *HDI group* (0.75<average<0.80), and 0.17 and 0.16 in the high *HDI group* (average≥0.80). As in Chapter 5, for candidates on the left *HDI group* gains a positive and significant, although not quite statistically gendered effect, with leftist men and women in the high *HDI group* 1.49 and 1.79 times more likely to win election than non-leftist men in the median *HDI group*. The positive effect is exercised when moving from a median to high HDI level. This finding lends weak support to Avelar (2001) and

Araújo's (2005) conjecture that that the alleged positive effects of development on women's political representation would be limited to women on the left.

When the multilevel structure of the data is ignored, *HDI* attains a positive and significant effect on the electoral outcome of candidates overall, with a positive but insignificant boost for leftist women candidates in developed districts. It is perhaps the inferences generated at excessive levels of aggregation for individual candidates, and the unwarranted pooling of candidates across districts and general assumption of causal homogeneity across female candidates that have sustained this (mis)understanding. Although as Chapter 5 demonstrated, residual voter bias against women does persist in less developed contexts, it has not depressed the electoral performance of female candidates. In Chapter 7, I discuss how some women have come to thrive in Brazil's less developed regions in no small part by crafting profiles (*lutadoras* and *supermadres*) that overcome or conform to machista voter attitudes.

Candidate Quality Controls

The combined Model 4 of the probability of election for candidates to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate affirms that traditional predictors of electoral success – incumbency and campaign finance – are indeed central to one's electoral prospects. In various specifications, *incumbent* (β_{18j}, γ_{180}) and *campaign finance* (β_{19j}, γ_{190}) were always positive and statistically significant, usually with a substantively sizeable effect. Even after controlling for a range of competing factors, candidates running as incumbents are 8.25 times more likely to win election than non-incumbents. As expected, the influence of *incumbent* is greater in the Chamber of Deputies than in the Senate.

A factor-based differentiation of the possible interactions between *incumbent*, *senate*, and *female* suggests that the incumbency advantage is largest for women

candidates in the Chamber. Indeed, an analysis of the marginal effects demonstrates a proportionately bigger boost to the predicted probability of election for female Chamber candidates, with the likelihood increasing from 0.11 to 0.41 when running as an incumbent. Male candidates seeking reelection in the Chamber increase their odds of election from 0.14 as non-incumbents to 0.47 as incumbents. Looking to the Senate, we see that female candidates' odds of election are higher than that of male candidates. Non-incumbent men and women, respectively, have in the Senate a predicted probability of success of 0.06 and 0.14, which increases to 0.25 and 0.36 for male and female incumbents.

In all estimations, the effect of campaign finance was statistically significant, but very close to one. In terms of odds ratios, this means that an increase in one unit (*reais*) of campaign contributions maintains a 1:1 shot of election for candidates. This is due to the scale of the variable; when standardized as the ratio of a candidate's contributions to the average candidate contributions in the state, the magnitude of the effect increases substantially and the significance remains.

Education (β_{16j}, γ_{160}) and *feeder occupation* (β_{17j}, γ_{170}) were always positive and usually statistically significant, with issues with reporting and coding discussed above potentially undermining the explanatory value of this latter variable. Interestingly, the magnitude and significance of the effect of education was greater in estimations without *campaign finance*. Perhaps candidates with greater educational attainment are more likely to have access to the economic elite and their financial resources (Avelar, 2001; Smith, 1979). Indeed, the correlation between corporate campaign contributions and educational attainment is positive and statistically significant.

With several terms interacting with *female* in Table 6.7, it is difficult to perceive from the odds ratios their substantive effects. After running Models 3 and 4, I calculated

the average marginal effect of *female*, and its interaction with *senate*, finding that women in the Senate have a higher predicted probability of election (0.173) than either men in the Senate (0.105) or women in the Chamber (0.170), with male candidates to the Chamber having the highest predicted probability of success (0.199). While the difference between men and women in the Chamber favors men and is statistically significant, in the Senate, this difference favors women although it is not statistically significant (CI of difference: -0.049, 0.185). This means that when all other predictors, including differences in candidate quality, electoral rules, several party characteristics, and unobserved country-specific factors are taken into consideration (held at their observed values), women in the Chamber face a gendered disadvantage not shared by their female colleagues seeking a seat in the Senate. Note that although women's odds of election are greater in the Senate than in the Chamber, the opposite is true for male candidates.

Moreover, in a supplemental full model of Senate candidate vote share, I disaggregated the marginal effect of *female*, finding that the negative effect of being a woman on a candidate's electoral prospects loses statistical significance. Although the greater prestige and higher electoral threshold should yield more difficult path for women to the Senate, the marginal effect on *vote share* of negative 3.29 (standard error of 8.19), and confidence interval of -19.34 to 12.76, is not statistically significant. In sum, as I expected, a candidate's gender does not predict her electoral prospects in the Brazilian Senate.

The principal finding that emerges is that, although the electoral rules of both chambers are less than ideal for women, female candidates to the more prestigious Senate actually face a less difficult campaign than do female candidates to the Chamber. Even after controlling for differences in candidate quality and a range of other factors, the

negative effect of being a woman we see in Chamber of Deputies elections is rendered null for Senate candidates. To illuminate this disparity further, I turn to my interview data. For these women, the most salient difference between their electoral prospects in the Senate and the Chamber is the former's concentration of party support. Indeed, of the 26 women senators who won election, 22 did so as their party's sole candidate.

Interview Findings on the Importance of Party Support

My interviews with party officials and candidates throughout Brazil affirmed that candidates in majoritarian/plurality elections count on significantly more party support than candidates in proportional elections. Former Senator, Governor, Minster, and current Deputy Benedita da Silva (PT-Rio de Janeiro) stated, "the party has to invest in majoritarian campaigns, but in the proportional (campaigns) it does not pass (along) resources, it is *your* campaign" (Interview, June, 2009). Emília Fernandes (PT-Rio Grande do Sul) emphasized the issue of factional support in the PT, which is divided into "tendencies" or factions. "In majoritarian elections, it's more about the party, but in proportional elections, only your party faction supports you," with municipalities governed by a mayor of a faction other than your own being considered off-limits (Interview, April, 2009). In 2002, then State Deputy Serys Slhessarenko (PT-Mato Grosso) wanted to run for reelection, but "the party said Senate or nothing" (Interview, December, 2008).

Parties acting strategically generally prevent their candidates from the same municipality and/or base from contesting the same proportional election (which would lead them to split the vote). The candidacies given the go-ahead are most often male, at times regardless of seniority. According to a PT state party official in São Paulo, this was the cause for former three-term city councilor and then two-term Deputy Iara Bernardi's

defeat in her reelection campaign in 2006 – the party launched another candidate (from a different faction) in Sorocaba, her municipality (Interview, June, 2009). Former Governor Wilma de Faria (PSB – Rio Grande do Norte) echoed this sentiment – in 1986, she proposed to run for State Deputy, but her party denied her request, in an effort to consolidate votes for her (male) partisans. Presuming she had no chance, they allowed her an open spot on the party's candidate list for federal deputy in the Constitutional Assembly; in the end, she was the most voted in her party (Interview, July, 2009).

Former Senator Fátima Cleide (PT-Rondônia) indicated that in her two races for the Senate and one for governor, party support – including that of various party factions – was "importantíssimo" (Questionnaire, May, 2009).[158] All but one of the 11 female candidates to both the Senate and Chamber included in this sample affirmed that the party played a fundamental role in their candidacy, with the majority pointing to a lack of party support as the most important barrier facing women in Brazilian politics. With difficulties obtaining financial resources as the second most frequently stated obstacle, and party support retaining at minimum an indirect role in the acquisition of resources, parties hold the key to enhancing women's representation.

Yet as many women attested, most of Brazil's political parties remain machista. Recall from Chapter 5, several interviewees said they confronted far more gender bias in their parties and the Congress than in the electorate. When women acquire a space in party decision-making this overwhelming male dominance in leadership is mitigated, and they are able to "let the ladder down" to female political aspirants. Indeed, as verified above, female candidates are significantly more likely to win election when running with parties that have a critical mass of women in their leadership. The data also demonstrate

[158] This questionnaire was answered before her failed reelection campaign in 2010. I am reaching out to her former assessor to try to get a follow-up that takes into account 2010.

that such women-friendly parties are more likely to comply with the quota in the Chamber elections and have higher female candidate success rates and more favorable success rate ratios than do parties lacking women leaders. In sum, parties that afford women a real voice in decision-making more effectively promote female political participation, and when the electoral rules incentivize party support, this potential is optimized.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter used the variation in electoral rules across Brazil's legislative chambers as a natural laboratory to examine the interacting effects of electoral institutions and party support/competition on women's electoral prospects. I found that the explanatory power of these electoral rules for the electoral successes and failures of female candidates is mediated by party characteristics. In spite of the Senate's greater prestige and higher electoral threshold relative to the Chamber of Deputies, female candidates to the Senate have had higher probabilities of electoral success, even after controlling for a range of potentially confounding factors. The Senate's low magnitude plurality elections with more restricted ballot access and multiple votes incentivize unified party support, while the Chamber of Deputies' high magnitude OLPR elections induce intraparty competition.

In both chambers, the presence of a critical mass of women in party leadership induces the will to support female candidates, but in the Chamber, this potential effect is contingent upon party institutionalization, which affords parties the capacity to overcome the incentives for intraparty competition. In contrast, the forthcoming party support in the Senate has a powerful effect on female candidates when women have a voice in party

decision-making, regardless of party institutionalization. In the end, the negative effect of being a woman on one's chance of election is rendered null in the Senate.

In conjunction with the multilevel models, interviews with women politicians who have run for both offices corroborate my findings. Based on that evidence, I contend that the greater successes of women in Senate elections despite an ostensibly difficult electoral context is attributable to the greater incentives for party support for Senate candidates, which motivates parties to rally behind their candidate(s). This is in stark contrast to the Chamber, where intraparty competition induces an internal struggle for organizational and material resources. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, women can still succeed in the context of intraparty competition, albeit at lower ratios of success, but require an institutionalized party – which enjoys the means to recruit and support candidates and to execute programmatic campaigns – and women in party leadership willing and able to extend resources to female contenders. In Chapter 7, I advance this argument with case studies of women who have worked with or around their parties to navigate the constraints of intraparty competition in the face of bias in the electorate and/or among party elites.

The findings produced here have implications for proponents of an institutional design approach to resolving gender inequities. Countries do not adopt electoral institutions tabula rasa, but rather layer them upon layers of existing formal and informal institutions in a graduated process of change (Thelen, 1999). Ample consideration of the sociocultural, historical, and political contexts in which electoral rules are/will be embedded is imperative before invoking generic recipes for success. After all, these very electoral rules are often endogenous to social and historical legacies (Desposato, 2006).

This is not to say, however, that electoral rules do not matter, but rather, that they do not act in a vacuum. The same formal institutions may function differently in distinct

contexts. Desposato drives home this point by contrasting the functioning of OLPR in Finland and Brazil, with the former having an institutionalized party system "while Brazil has been labeled the 'anti-party system'" (2006, 1019). The factors thought to enhance women's overall representation have not played out for female candidates in Brazil because of the particularities of the parties and party system to which these rules are endogenous.

As other controlled comparison analyses of electoral rules in recently (re)democratized nations have shown (e.g., Moser, 2001b), the institutionalization of parties and the party system can have drastic effects on the operation and implications of electoral rules. While the inchoate character of most Brazilian parties has led many Brazilianists to discount the role of parties in elections, we must not simply footnote the exceptionally strong parties, but instead seek to explain variation among parties and the implications for political recruitment and representation. As demonstrated here, parties remain the primary gatekeeper to political office in Brazil, and have a central role to play in the empowerment of women.

Chapter 7 – *Lutadoras*, *Supermadres*, and Technocrats: The Bounded Profiles of Brazil's Female Politicians

The findings of preceding chapters on the only recently emboldened gender quota, incentives for intraparty competition in the Chamber, importance of party support, preponderance of inchoate and male-led parties, and residual gender bias in Brazil beg the question of how women have attained even the measly 9.6% of the seats in Congress. In the current chapter, I explain how the relatively few women who have acquired elected office in Brazil have done so largely by following one of three pathways to power. The *lutadora*, *supermadre*, and technocrat profiles have enabled women to overcome women-averse districts and/or parties and afforded female candidates improbable electoral success. Yet the bounding of potential profiles viable for Brazilian women limits their possibilities, constricting and conditioning their political aspirations, trajectories, and subsequent roles in government. This chapter explores these profiles, asking whether the country's female politicians have progressed beyond simple extensions of traditional domestic roles (Chaney, 1979).

I find that women seeking electoral success in inhospitable district and party contexts often do remain squarely in the mold of the *supermadre*, substantiating their political presence with feminine, maternal perspectives, and thus remaining narrowly confined to social issues in their political discourse and agenda. But when bulwarked by a supportive party, *lutadoras* have deviated from traditional gender norms still prevalent, particularly in lesser developed states. Working with their party to transform experiences in informal politics into the requisite political skillset while confronting voter bias, such women are enjoying electoral success while expanding the political possibilities for women. Another novel pathway to power is that of the technocrat, prominent in more

women-friendly districts absent the party support generally extended to the lutadora. Technocrats demonstrate professional competence, and thrive by converting area-specific expertise from the professional world into political capital. This helps technocrats to convince male party elites of their relevant skills and electability, overcoming the challenges of an unsupportive or deficient party organization. When women run in both parties and districts that are open to women, however, the bounding of profiles ceases and they are free to pursue any path to power.

I draw on expectations from the literature on women's representation discussed in Chapter 2, as well as aggregate cross-national data and descriptive evidence to advance a typology of the "women-friendliness" of statewide electoral districts and parties, thus exploiting the interstate and interparty variation discussed throughout the dissertation. I then deploy my typology to explain how anti-women biases among voters and party elites have constricted the profiles viable for female contenders. I apply the findings of the multilevel analyses from Chapters 5 and 6 and interviews with candidates and party elites to delineate three electorally viable profiles for women under the constraints of Brazilian politics – the *lutadora*, the *supermadre*, and the technocrat. Finally, I illustrate each profile with case studies of female political aspirants in Brazil. In illuminating these circumscribed paths to power, this chapter provides further evidence that parties are the gatekeepers that alone can mitigate Brazil's persistent gender gap in formal political power by expanding the opportunities available for women.

OBSTACLES TO WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT

The explanations for women's underrepresentation highlighted in the literature have long emphasized voter hostility, electoral institutions, and the "male conspiracy" (i.e. political parties dominated by male elites who act to maintain their own power)

(Duverger, 1955). Yet as discussed in the preceding chapters, while numerous cross-national studies have analyzed the relative weight of such cultural, structural, and political factors in explaining women's underrepresentation, findings on their predictive powers remain mixed (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Matland, 1998; Salmond, 2006; Schmidt, 2009; Tripp and Kang, 2008). The analysis in Chapter 5 and description of women's profiles below explain the disparity in results by moving beyond the common assumption of a homogenous electoral experience for women and revealing the causal heterogeneity at work. I show how different profiles have enabled women to thrive not only in contexts the extant literature predicts to be women-friendly, but also in those that it has deemed disadvantageous for women (or "women-averse").

Although the preceding chapters demonstrate the insignificance of district development levels and associated machista voter bias for female candidates' electoral prospects in Brazil,[1] I contend that this does not mean these attitudes do not persist in Brazil, but rather that (some) women have found a way around them. Next, I use Brazil's extensive variation in levels of state development, state party institutionalization, and proportion of women in state party leadership to identify the intersecting constraints confronted by female contenders. I advance a typology of women-friendly and women-averse contexts, and then detail how women have crafted viable political profiles allowing them to thrive even in inhospitable conditions, before illuminating their experiences with case studies of lutadoras, supermadres, and technocrats.

[1] Recall, 23.2% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement of male political superiority in 2010 (down from 33.5% in 2008), an average proportion that obscures great variation – while only 6.7% of respondents in Mato Grosso agreed with the statement, 55% of those in Sergipe did (CESOP, 2010; LAPOP, 2008). So while machista voter bias has not predicted female candidates' electoral prospects, it remains present. The current chapter explains this apparent anomaly.

Machista Voter Attitudes and State Development

In line with the modernization hypothesis and the analysis of the covariates of machista voter bias in Chapter 5, I expect that Brazil's less developed states will be less women-friendly than the more developed states. While machista voter bias has not predicted female candidates' electoral prospects, the fact that less developed states rank the highest in perceived male political superiority (LAPOP, 2008; CESOP, 2010) suggests that women in such districts are somehow circumnavigating machista voter bias. Of the 27 statewide districts, 14 fall below the national average in HDI in at least one of the five election years under consideration, and are thus coded as less developed. As displayed in Figure 5.1, the correlation with development and region is perfect, with the less developed states found exclusively in the north and northeastern regions – where clientelistic politics have historically dominated in a predatory cycle of local political bosses (*coronéis*) enriching themselves at the expense of the impoverished masses (Hagopian, 1996; Montero, 2010). Women may then be doubly disadvantaged in such contexts, with an electorate harboring skepticism of their aptitude for politics and a largely male political and economic elite maintaining power among themselves.

Party Elites and the "Good Ole Boys' Club"

As declared by Duverger decades ago, the "male conspiracy" poses an important obstacle to women seeking to enter politics (1955). In spite of the provocative term, Duverger's argument is more rationalist than conspiratorial, contending that predominantly male party elites are hesitant to share their power and therefore resist newcomers who may dilute their influence. Although many deemphasize the power of most parties by contending that "the candidate nomination process is wide open and that candidates self-select" in Brazil's candidate-centered legislative elections (Samuels, 2008, 84), I have demonstrated throughout this dissertation that this "entrepreneurial"

system and gendered structural disadvantages together render the support of an institutionalized party critical for women.

To connect parties with profiles, it is necessary first to summarize the relevance of institutionalization. To recall, previous research has shown that a party's promotion of female political participation is essential in overcoming the gender gap in political ambition (e.g., Lawless and Fox, 2005). By providing opportunities for political training and offering party funds and campaign materials, parties can stimulate female candidacies. Further, whereas inchoate parties are prone to personalist campaigns, well-institutionalized parties typically provide a coherent ideological platform, allowing women to deflect personal characteristics such as gender and focus the campaign instead on concrete policy proposals (Valdini, 2010). Such a collectivist endeavor is in general more palatable for women than the individualistic campaigns common to weaker parties (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008).

Regardless of a party's capacity to promote women, however, without an earnest commitment, the women-averse exclusionary incentives discussed above prevail and women's participation remains marginal. Based on arguments outlined in Chapters 2, 5, and 6, I contend that the parties least susceptible to exclusionary tendencies are those that have a critical mass of women in party leadership bodies (Duverger, 1955; Kittilson, 2006). When women have a real voice in party leadership they are able to perform critical acts, lobbying for the promotion of women-friendly policies and providing the necessary opportunities to minimize a gender gap in political ambition (Kittilson, 2006). While the relationship is not determinative, women leaders are more likely than male leaders to possess the know-how and the will to cultivate viable female candidates, particularly once they supersede token status.

In determining which of Brazil's many parties can be considered women-friendly or averse, I employ as the key predictors whether a party is (1) well-institutionalized[2] and (2) the proportion of women in its state leadership is greater than or equal to 25 percent. According to these criteria (state party institutionalization and leadership composition), of the 607 state parties that advanced female candidates in the 2010 elections, only 105 – 17.3% – can be considered women-friendly. Across the 1998-2010 elections, the numbers fall, with 331 of the 2383 (13.9%) state parties participating in election rating as women-friendly. The state parties most often enjoying a level of institutionalization and women in leadership that qualify them as women-friendly are the PC do B, the PMN, and the PT. Notably, less than five percent of the elections contested by four of the major five parties – PFL, PMDB, PP, and PSDB – were done so under conditions propitious for female contenders. This is suggestive of the difficult battle confronted by female political aspirants and illustrates why women remain so underrepresented in the formal political sphere. The puzzle thus becomes not why there is such extreme underrepresentation of women in Brazilian politics, but rather, how the few successful female politicians have defied the odds and acquired office.

I incorporate the expectations from the women and politics literature regarding the obstacles to female political aspirants and the findings of preceding chapters to surmise that Brazil's most "women-friendly" states will be those with a development level above the national average (where machista voter attitudes are less prevalent), while the most women-friendly parties will be those that are well institutionalized, and that have a critical mass of women in their leadership (whether through a quota or

[2] As discussed in Chapter 5, I consider a state party to be "well-institutionalized" if it exceeds the mean (mean=1.9) level of state party institutionalization in Brazil. To recall, my 5-point scale of institutionalization incorporates each state party's relative measures on electoral volatility, age, membership, funds, active municipal organizations, and propensity of leadership to alternate.

organically). After identifying the intersecting constraints confronted by women, I delineate particular profiles that have enabled (some) female candidates to overcome those obstacles.

Figure 7.1. Percent of Women-Friendly Parties Contesting Chamber of Deputies Elections, by State (1998-2010)



As Figure 7.1 depicts, women by and large confront very hostile contexts in their bid for political power. From 1998-2010, the percent of parties running in Chamber of

Deputies elections and qualifying as "women-friendly" across all the states averaged only 11.7%, ranging from 1.3% in Alagoas to 24.4% in Piauí. This means that the vast majority of parties contesting the Chamber of Deputies elections are inchoate and/or top heavy with men. Nevertheless, as I explain in the following section, some women have managed to overcome seemingly formidable obstacles, gaining office not only in the rare contexts the literature expects to be women-friendly, but also in Brazil's most conservative states and inchoate and male-led parties.

CIRCUMVENTING THE OBSTACLES

In spite of the barrage of women-averse contexts confronted by female political aspirants, several pioneers have blazed trails into the still male dominant arena of Brazilian politics. Of the 161 instances (2,052 possible) that women were elected to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies during the period from 1998-2010 (comprising 104 women, with several gaining reelection), an astonishing 93.8% came from districts and/or parties predicted to be women-averse. Slightly less than one-fifth of the successful candidacies emerged from the ideal condition of a women-friendly party. This means that most of Brazil's few female politicians have boldly confronted extremely difficult conditions, in turn illuminating the reluctance of many would-be candidates to throw their hat in the ring. The constraints confronting female candidates to the Chamber of Deputies are profound, with electoral rules that promote combative intraparty competition and expensive campaigns, weak parties lacking strong organizations and programmatic platforms and thus susceptible to personalist politics, male-dominant party leadership structures, and non-negligible levels of voter skepticism regarding women's political role fabricating a formidable electoral climate.

The puzzle then shifts from why there is such an extreme underrepresentation of women in Brazil to how the few female politicians have been able to overcome electoral and party structures seemingly rigged against them. As I show, women have forged novel paths to power to achieve improbable electoral successes in Brazil. By crafting certain profiles, these pioneers have expanded the realm of possibilities for female political action by mitigating the impediments posed by biases and institutional arrangements.

While these profiles are neither necessarily mutually exclusive nor consistently adopted by the women in each context, I delineate three ideal types (see Table 7.1) that are most likely to afford women electoral success in the face of these obstacles: (1) the *lutadora* profile is viable for women running with the support of a women-friendly party but in women-averse districts, (2) the *supermadre* profile affords women electoral success in women-averse parties and districts, and (3) the technocrat profile enables women who are lacking such party support to win in women-friendly districts. The "open" designation for women in women-friendly districts and parties means women in these contexts are open to pursue any (mix of) profiles.

Table 7.1. Ideal Types of Viable Profiles in Women-Friendly and Averse Contexts

	Women-Averse Districts	**Women-Friendly Districts**
Women-Averse Parties	SUPERMADRES	TECHNOCRATS
Women-Friendly Parties	LUTADORAS	OPEN

The fact that the vast majority of Brazil's numerous parties remain weakly institutionalized with few women leaders means that most female candidates have run without the support of a women-friendly party. Of the 2384 women seeking election to the Chamber of Deputies (1998-2010), 84.9% did so in inchoate and/or male-run parties.

Interestingly, 17 of the 136 women running in a women-averse district but friendly party were elected for a success rate (n female elected / n female candidates) of 12.5 percent, which is 67% higher than the than women's overall success rate (See Figure 7.2).[3] As I discuss below, these women achieved such success as lutadoras, defying traditional gender norms and running collective, ideas-based campaigns. But the lutadora path is contingent on party support, so in order for the profile to prove viable for more contenders across Brazil, reforms must emphasize institutionalizing parties and incentivizing their active promotion of and support for female candidacies. The success of lutadoras provides yet another piece of evidence suggesting that the problem of women's underrepresentation in Brazil is fundamentally political rather than societal.

Figure 7.2. Profile Ideal Types by Success Rate (Percent Elected), 1998-2010



[3] The drop in success rates in 2010 – when credible threats of enforcement of the gender quota strengthened in the 2009 mini-reform to Brazil's electoral code prompted a widespread offering of *candidatas laranjas* (sacrificial lambs) by many parties (Wylie, 2011) – reveals the futility of mere symbolic gestures and the imperative of sincere party involvement on behalf of women.

Table 7.2. Individual Characteristics of Women Running in Women-Friendly and Women-Averse Contexts

	Wmn-Averse District		Wmn-Friendly District	
	WF Party	**WA Party**	**WA Party**	**WF Party**
CANDIDATES				
Electoral Perf.	0.14	0.08	0.06	0.05
Pct Vote Share	1.53%	0.81%	0.26%	0.35%
Pct Elected	12.50%	8.36%	5.89%	4.46%
Education	3.64	3.55	3.56	3.65
Pct Feeder Occup.	64.62%	58.61%	54.54%	54.02%
Pct Incumbent	8.09%	6.35%	5.19%	2.68%
Pct Married	40.00%	46.57%	45.23%	34.91%
CF	R$ 97,843	R$ 86,668	R$ 78,667	R$ 87,502
Pct CF from Corps	12.17%	14.32%	14.21%	11.52%
Pct CF from Ind	35.75%	36.39%	31.22%	36.64%
Pct CF from Party	32.41%	30.16%	39.51%	31.81%
Pct Left	69.12%	33.11%	34.78%	85.27%
Ideology	2.98	4.26	4.14	2.86
Pct Wmn Leaders	33.80%	15.59%	12.98%	31.65%
ELECTED				
Electoral Perf.	0.84	0.58	0.59	0.81
Pct Vote Share	9.54%	5.62%	2.67%	5.50%
Education	3.94	3.82	3.79	3.60
Pct Feeder Occup.	94.12%	87.76%	83.13%	80.00%
Pct Incumbent	52.94%	46.00%	46.43%	40.00%
Pct Married	52.94%	62.00%	52.56%	30.00%
CF	R$ 336,542	R$ 381,939	R$ 458,206	R$ 906,416
Pct CF from Corps	29.37%	32.55%	43.89%	40.96%
Pct CF from Ind	24.83%	35.19%	34.04%	33.14%
Pct CF from Party	32.65%	17.87%	11.52%	19.42%
Pct Left	82.35%	26.00%	45.24%	90.00%
Ideology	2.93	4.47	3.90	2.18
Pct Wmn Leaders	34.04%	15.28%	11.66%	33.88%

Below, I discuss how the three profiles have afforded women political space in such inhospitable contexts. I draw upon my original database of several individual, party, and district-level characteristics of the 20,363 candidates to the Chamber of Deputies (1994-2010) and 73 interviews with both failed and elected women candidates as well as party staff and activists conducted in 11 states across Brazil. As discussed in Chapter 1, I selected these interview participants to ensure representation from each of the country's five regions and seven major parties (DEM, PC do B, PMDB, PP, PSB, PSDB, PT), and variation on the women-friendliness of districts and parties. In the discussion below, I will refer to Table 7.2 – which includes the averages for several characteristics of women candidates and elected deputies across the women-friendly and women-averse contexts.

First, to establish a baseline for comparison, I discuss the political trajectory of Judge Denise Frossard, an ambitious woman exemplary of the kind of self-promoting individual capable of thriving independently in Brazil's entrepreneurial electoral system. Judge Frossard gained her entrée into electoral politics five years after convicting 14 members of an organized crime ring involved in the *Jogo do Bicho*, a lottery of sorts that infamously launders money and has been implicated in a number of corruption scandals. Undeterred by death threats and determined to fight against corruption, Judge Frossard decided to join the Socialist People's Party (PPS – a leftist but anti-PT party) and run for the Senate in 1998, obtaining fourth place with 635,415 votes.

Judge Frossard was one of only two women I interviewed who said the decision to run for office was hers alone, with no party role (Interview, June, 2009). She ran again in 2002, that time with the PSDB, and earned the highest vote share of all 560 candidates in Rio de Janeiro, winning an impressive 5.21% of the valid vote (the average vote share was 0.18%). As Judge Frossard herself said, she was larger than either of her two parties, and did not need them to advance or sustain her candidacy (Interview, June, 2009).

Indeed, she received no campaign funds from the party for her Chamber candidacy. In 2006, Judge Frossard ran a competitive campaign for governor, but was ultimately defeated by Sérgio Cabral in the second round of elections.

Judge Frossard entered party politics with vast self-confidence, political interest and knowledge, and name recognition already under her belt. With fifteen years of experience in the state government magistrate, which Judge Frossard accredited as significantly more equitable than the machista parties and parliament (Interview, June, 2009), she was able to thrive in the absence of any party support mobilized on her behalf. Judge Frossard launched her own candidacy, advanced her own already well-developed anti-corruption platform, raised her own funds, and depended upon her own cultivated base. This is indicative of the path to power pursued by entrepreneurial candidates with independent converted capital, and is unlikely for women who lack the intense ambition, independent fame, connections, and resources of Judge Frossard. Next, I discuss the profiles more commonly pursued by female contenders, and how they have navigated the constraints of women-averse contexts.

Lutadoras

Female candidates in less developed states often conform to traditional gender norms in their campaigns, as elaborated in the discussion of the supermadre profile below. But when bolstered by a supportive party, women contenders can deviate from the traditional notion of feminine embodied by the supermadre and still thrive in women-averse states. To overcome (rather than conform to) the gender biases persistent in such states, women must be resilient and battle-proven, thus the designation lutadora—or female fighter. Lutadoras typically earn their stripes and demonstrate their political prowess through party militancy and activism in labor unions or popular social

movements. By actively participating in such arenas, lutadoras gain political and social capital and signal their viability to party leaders looking to recruit candidates for office. A women-friendly party – well institutionalized and with women in party leadership – is most likely to (at least attempt to) comply with the gender quota and has clear processes for the party to recruit and select its candidates. Lutadoras are thus well positioned for advancement, having proven their commitment to the party and broader social causes while demonstrating their base of support in the community.

A deep connection to the community helps stimulate political ambition and often leads parties to recruit women for candidacy, but the ultimate decision to run is always personal and fraught with economic risk. Many of the women interviewed across seven women-averse states expressed their unwillingness to run a campaign in such a context if the party had no intention of supporting her, with one woman declaring she would not "take bread off the family table" to serve as a "*candidata laranja*" (sacrificial lamb).[4]

When parties have the resources to allocate and the will to do so, however, lutadoras are well-prepared for the challenge. Institutionalized parties with a critical mass of women in their leadership prove helpful for female candidates seeking to solidify their platform because these parties are more likely to advance effective capacity-building programs. Such programs nurture women's political ambition by solidifying their sense of preparedness. They teach female aspirants the scope of the office at stake as well as party positions on key issues, thus enabling them to run knowledgeable and ideologically-grounded campaigns. In weakly institutionalized parties, ideological roots are elusive, leaving women contenders with nothing collective to latch onto.

[4] Recall the discussion in Chapter 3, in which officials and politicians from several parties revealed the disconcertingly common practice of parties including women on their candidate lists in a post-hoc manner to simply pay lip service to the gender quota, only noticing the void at the final hour (when lists are due to the electoral court) with little or no effort to actively recruit and support female candidacies.

A firmly rooted ideological platform that she can present to voters skeptical of her political aptitude is a critical component of the lutadora's toolkit. Where voter bias against women exists, women's representation will be lower in electoral systems that incentivize the personal vote (Valdini, 2010). The emphasis on policy positions rather than personal traits such as gender allows the lutadora to recast the campaign around policy debates rather than personal characteristics, in turn diminishing the elector's prospect of employing gender stereotypes. When prompted in interviews for advice for less electorally fortunate women, successful female politicians often highlighted the importance of defining one's "bandeiras" (central campaign themes) and related community activism (Interviews, November, 2008; March, 2009).

Lutadoras have at their disposal extensive mobilizational resources such as footwork by party and movement militants that can overcome deficits in financial resources, another obstacle impeding most female political aspirants. This is particularly important given the growing expense of elections in Brazil; in 2010, the average in campaign contributions for winning candidates to the Chamber of Deputies was more than R$1.1 million, with the overall average jumping 106% from the 2006 average.[5] When party militants are encouraged and willing to mobilize on behalf of women and help to wage labor-intensive "corpo a corpo" (person to person) campaigns, the effects of campaign finance discrepancies between men and women and leftists and non-leftists can be mitigated, enabling female candidates to thrive even in women-averse states.[6]

---

[5] These figures become even more striking when one considers the state-funded air time and compulsory voting law. Calculated by author using TSE data.

[6] As discussed further in the preceding chapters, in 2010, the averages in campaign contributions were R$273,595 for male candidates, R$126,323 for female candidates, R$264,950 for non-leftists, and R$227,089 for leftists. Simple difference in means tests show these differences to be statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ and $p<0.05$ levels respectively.

Candidates are increasingly relying on party funding for their campaigns, with 48.3% of candidate funds coming from party organizations in 2010 Chamber of Deputies elections. Women draw even more of their funding from party organizations – 61.7% on average – reflecting gendered wage discrepancies in the workforce and the difficulty many women have in attaining funds from large donors. The average proportion of campaign funds from a party for successful lutadoras is 33 percent, nearly twice that as winning supermadre candidates and three times that of successful technocrat candidates. Whether in the currency of foot soldiers or finance, party support can level the playing field for any female candidate.

Although this path is still significantly less pursued than that of the supermadre, many of Brazil's most prominent female politicians – including Marina Silva and Heloísa Helena – are lutadoras. These pioneers from Brazil's north (Acre) and northeastern (Alagoas) regions have represented their historically women-averse states as social movement and Workers' Party[7] militants, city councilwomen, state deputies, senators, minister (Silva), and presidential candidates, serving as role models for lutadoras to come. Moreover, the lutadoras exemplify a female insurgency in the male-dominant system; as shown in Table 7.2, women running with women-friendly parties in women-averse districts have enjoyed the highest overall success rates and vote shares.

Most of the 17 women elected in women-averse districts but women-friendly parties epitomize this lutadora profile. One woman has drawn heavily on familial political capital (Interview with Deputy Ana Arraes, March, 2009), and two women qualify as technocratic types, new to party life but effectively leveraging their

[7] Both Helena and Silva were early members of the PT, but have since joined other parties (PSOL and the Green Party). Helena was expelled from the party in 2003 for voting against more than a dozen measures backed by the Lula administration, in particular the pension privatization. Silva left the party in 2009, disillusioned by the inadequate attention given by the Lula administration to issues of sustainable development.

professional experiences, but the others are long time party militants with an active union and popular movement background. The late Francisca Trindade joined the PT at an early age, serving as two-term municipal councilor of the capital city of her northeastern state of Piauí, state deputy, and candidate for vice-mayor before winning a seat to the Chamber of Deputies. Perpetua Almeida and Vanessa Grazziotin have been members of the Communist Party of Brazil since the 1980s, both serving as municipal councilors before becoming federal deputies of their northern states in the Amazon region. In the case study that follows, I show how party support helped one lutadora to overcome bias in the electorate and climb her way to the Chamber of Deputies, twice winning the highest vote total for federal deputy in her state.

Deputy Fátima Bezerra – The Essence of A Lutadora

A woman of humble origins in northeastern Brazil (Rio Grande do Norte), Deputy Fátima Bezerra confirmed the critical role of her background in social movements in helping her to confront and transcend class and gender discrimination, pointing to movement and party militants as "shapers of opinion." In contrast, local political elites had at first only impeded Bezerra's political ambition, maintaining that the role of deputy was "predestined for the sons (and daughters) of traditional families." Yet, a lifetime of precarious living conditions in the rural northeast coupled with her experiences fighting injustices at the helm of several social movements emboldened Bezerra to pursue and eventually, with the encouragement of her party, fulfill her political ambitions.

Like so many other (often leftist) female politicians, Bezerra cultivated her political aptitudes during the student movement of the 1970s. She participated in the National Student Union's (UNE) formative 1979 Congress in Salvador, where UNE was restructured in the wake of its weakened status during the military regime. Later drawing

on her experience in the student movement and as a public school teacher, Bezerra founded and presided over a prominent teacher's union, served as the secretary general of another, and was a two-term president of yet another – the influential Union of Education Workers (*Sindicato dos Trabalhadores em Educação*).

During that time Bezerra joined the then nascent Workers' Party, which was closely aligned with union activity on behalf of education. When asked whether she got involved in party life in 1981 with an idea of being an elected official, she responded "I confess to you, this never even crossed my mind" (Interview with TV Seridó, 2009). But seeking to make headways in state and local politics, the PT tapped Bezerra's considerable clout in the education community and encouraged her to run for the state assembly. Bezerra recalled that her candidacy for state deputy in 1994 "was a fruit of my involvement in the social movements and at the same time, a necessity of my party (PT) to advance candidacies in the state legislatures" (Interview, March, 2009). She recognized the fundamental role of the party in recruiting her into party politics and enabling her success, "The PT was certainly the most responsible for me having entered in party politics and also for me having arrived to this stage" (Interview with TV Seridó, 2009).

Bezerra served two terms as state deputy and leader of her state party delegation, in her first term winning awards for the Deputy of the Year in 1996 and Best Deputy of the Legislature (1995-1998). She gained ideological coherence, demonstrated her political skills, and shored up the good will of her fellow members, forming a support base that would enable her to thrive even in her less developed district.[8] In 2002, the PT advanced Bezerra's name for the Chamber of Deputies, and she won the most votes of all

[8] As stated compellingly by President Lula at a 2008 rally for Bezerra's mayoral bid, you need "character of force (to govern), and this lady here has that and more" (2008, September 19).

the 74 candidates in her state, 12.3% of the statewide vote. Bezerra won the honor again in 2010, when she competed against 59 other candidates and captured an impressive 14.6% of the statewide vote, winning more than 15% in nearly one-fifth of her state's 167 municipalities and over 23% of the vote in the capital city. She just missed the second round of mayoral elections in 2008, winning 36.8% of the vote and losing to Green Party candidate Micarla de Sousa, who allied with several right wing parties (DEM, PP, PR, PTB) to win a narrow majority of votes in the first round.

Bezerra's roots in the social movements are enduring and have informed her legislative efforts. She remains involved with the education unions, was elected president of the Chamber's Commission on Education and Culture, and is an active proponent of education issues such as establishing a minimum wage for public school teachers, protecting the right to strike, and improving access to quality education. Most of her more than 900 current legislative proposals relate to education, the rights of marginalized populations (primarily LGBT, women, indigenous, domestic workers, Afro-Brazilians, and the impoverished), and regional development (Chamber of Deputies, 2012b). Bezerra also serves in the state and national leadership of the PT, and has most recently been active in the mayoral campaigns of her co-partisans throughout Rio Grande do Norte.

The ability of Bezerra to thrive in Rio Grande do Norte, where 33.3% of survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that men make better politicians than do women (LAPOP, 2008), is quite remarkable given her deviation from the traditional feminine. As a never-married woman in her late 50's who promotes the civil rights of marginalized populations – with an emphasis on LGBT issues[9] – and a far reaching education agenda, Bezerra bucks the traditional perception of femininity in the

[9] A Google Brasil search of – "Deputada Fátima Bezerra" LGBT – returned over 30,000 hits.

less developed northeast. Accordingly, she has been a "victim of hateful prejudice" (President Lula, quoted at a 2008 rally for Bezerra), with an alarming rejection rate of 23% in the wake of the 2008 mayoral elections (Macedo, 2008). But campaigning on the issues for which she had earned great credibility, and relying on a strong party organization of militants, Bezerra has overcome such bias, and twice been the most voted deputy in her state. Running under the coveted "1313" campaign number, and receiving R$235,000 from the party organization (42.4% of the overall contributions from her extremely successful 2002 and 2010 campaigns), Bezerra benefited extensively from PT support.[10] Alternately, as we see next, to achieve election without the support of a strong party, women politicians are often forced to embrace traditional gender roles.

Supermadres

Absent such party support to overcome bias in the electorate, female candidates in both districts and parties averse to women certainly confront the most restrictive situations. Yet, women confronting these constraints can and have for generations in countries around the world managed to chip away at the monolith of male political dominance. As elaborated in the fundamental text on women politicians in Latin America, the profile most likely to succeed in such a situation is that of the *supermadre*, whereby women politicians extend their role in the private sphere to the public sphere (Chaney, 1979).[11] Given that the inegalitarian attitudes and resultant machista biases

[10] It is telling that in the 2006 elections, when the party played a lesser role in Bezerra's campaign – donating zero funds – she fell to 6th place in the state (4th in her coalition). This is in spite of raising overall nearly three times more funds than she raised in 2002, and only 36% less funds than she did in 2010.

[11] Although the term denotes a maternal association, *supermadre* was initially coined to suggest that women remained confined to an extension of their role in the home, not necessarily – but usually – as mother. In my reading of Cheney (1979), women are conceptualized as supermadres regardless of their actual maternal status but rather as their exemplification of the traditional feminine (which due to traditional gender roles, is associated with motherhood). In this sense, a more appropriate label would perhaps be "superfeminine," but I stick to the term supermadre here to maintain consistency with Cheney's concept.

persistent in less developed areas are generally associated with traditional beliefs regarding the societal roles of women (Inglehart and Norris, 2003), supermadres can mitigate the effects of such biases by conforming to traditional gender norms.

The primary emphasis on the role of familial connections in the extant literature on women politicians in Brazil (e.g., Araújo, 2001; Avelar, 2001; Haas, 2001) is reflective of the capacity of such connections to minimize the threat to traditional gender norms posed by female political aspirants. By running as the wife or daughter of a male politician, these privileged female candidates corroborate the patriarchal order found in women-averse contexts. Furthermore, the wives and daughters of male politicians can employ their family name and experience in politics to assuage biased voters' and elites' fears of the political ineptitude of women. Because they have already experienced a life of politics, male politicians' wives and daughters may also be deemed more "fit" for politics than the average woman. If so, women candidates with familial connections may be relatively exempt from the persistent biases in women-averse districts and parties, therefore hastening their electoral success in such contexts. And even in the context of such biases, access to familial capital can catapult women to insider status through political endorsements, financial backing, and the family name.

Of the 598 female candidates in women-averse states and parties, 50 women were (re)elected, 29 of whom are the wives or daughters of a male politician. The concentration of wives and daughters winning amidst those constraints has remained constant over time, at 56-58% of the women elected in women-averse districts and parties, which exceeds the proportions found in other contexts. Two interrelated factors explaining this pattern are the ability of familial capital to assuage and/or overcome voter bias against women, and the persistence of oligarchic clientelist politics dominated by a handful of political families in the less developed states, particularly the northeast.

This is not to say that the fit between familial ties and the supermadre profile is perfect, as many women with connected family members develop their own political capital rather than simply inheriting it from their father or husband. For example, two influential female senators mentioned in Chapter 4 are the (ex-)wife of prominent male politicians, but these women (Marta Suplicy and Gleisi Hoffmann) cut their political teeth outright as activists in the student movement and eventually in party politics. While Suplicy's fame as a televised sexologist propelled her directly to the Chamber of Deputies in 1994, Hoffmann worked her way up through the party ranks, serving as assessor, in several administrative and campaign roles, and as the state party presidency before entering electoral politics as a mayoral candidate in 2008. Whether their independent capital-building efforts will be supported is a product of their party and district constraints, with such independence perceived as a threat in inegalitarian contexts. Notably, Suplicy and Hoffman both come from more developed states (São Paulo and Santa Catarina) and at least a nationally supportive party (Workers' Party).

But women lacking familial ties can withstand gender inegalitarian electorates and elites by conforming to traditional gender norms through other means. Because traditional gender norms confine the areas of expertise of women to issues such as education, health care, and non-feminist women and children's rights,[12] voter and elite biases in women-averse states and parties may be attenuated for women with traditionalist prior careers in education, health, and social work. Of the 2,569 female candidacies from 1994-2010, at least 28.5% emerged from these professions.[13] Another viable means of conforming to traditional gender norms is for women candidates to

[12] For analyses on how gender norms have influenced committee and ministerial assignments, see Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005).

[13] The total of female candidates excludes candidates that did not report their occupation. Also included in this calculation are other occupations conforming to traditional gender roles, such as model, priest/nun, housewife, and receptionist.

employ their church connections (i.e., with the *bancada evangélica* or *comunidades eclesiais de base*). Indeed, among the 50 women elected (and re-elected) in women-averse states and parties from 1998-2010, all but seven report such supermadre backgrounds.

In interviews I conducted with women conforming to the supermadre trajectory, they consistently justified their political presence through the maternal, more humane perspective they felt they, as women, could bring to politics. The goal repeatedly expressed was to "cuidar" (care) for their constituents. Jusmari Oliveira, former deputy for the conservative PFL and current mayor of a town in the interior of Bahia, lacked political family connections but by working with her father's agricultural association and through church involvement she managed to forge a constituency unthreatened by her political ambition. Reflective of her acceptance of traditional gender roles, Oliveira believed that women politicians should emphasize social issues, arguing "God gave us greater sensitivity, an understanding of the suffering of humanity" (Interview, November, 2008), a stance illuminated by her prioritization of social issues while in the Chamber of Deputies as well as her mayoral administration's slogan, "Governo Cidade Mãe" (Government Mother City). Next, I demonstrate how one deputy has had mixed results complying with traditional gender norms in her women-averse state and party.

Bel Mesquita – A Proud Supermadre

Building on the political capital of her ex-husband as well as her own developed while serving as municipal president of the Foundation of Social and Cultural Action[14] under his administration, Bel Mesquita followed her husband's mayoral mandates with two of her own and subsequently served as federal deputy for the centrist PMDB in the

[14] Such posts are extremely common for first ladies; in interviews, many former first ladies stated that their role in these positions served as a catalyst for the development of their own political aspirations.

northern state of Pará. She firmly believed in her responsibility to "cuidar" for her district and to humanize politics, enthusiastically affirming her role as the supermadre of her constituents (Interview, December, 2008). Mesquita's sentiment was echoed in a recent interview – when asked about the appointment of ten women (including her) to President Dilma Rousseff's cabinet, Mesquita declared, "I have conviction that women were born with the gift of management, organization, and administration. She takes care of the kids, [and] is able to provide for her family with what little resources she can have…she knows what to do" (Diário do Turismo, 2011). As a supermadre, Mesquita draws a direct parallel between overseeing a home and overseeing a federal government.

In contrast to the movement and party-based path to power of the lutadora, Mesquita – a psychologist by training – inherited her capital from her husband only to cultivate it while serving in his Foundation of Social and Cultural Action (1989-92) and as the Municipal Secretary of Health (1992) under his administration. Unlike Bezerra who has been an active member of the PT for more than three decades, Mesquita has belonged to three different parties. Initially a member of the PSDB from 1995-1999, Mesquita soon joined the PTB, under which she served as municipal party president from 1999-2004. She was first elected mayor with the PSDB in 1996 – in a municipality that she and her husband helped to create – and then gained reelection under the PTB. While party was central to Bezerra's success, Mesquita succeeded in spite of only fleeting party ties.

After completing her second mandate as mayor of Parauapebas, Pará, Mesquita left the PTB for the PMDB. Soon thereafter, she ran an ultimately successful campaign for federal deputy, earning over 44,000 votes, the 21st in her state (of 137 candidates) and 5th (of 12) in her party, which ran without a coalition. Mesquita ran under the number 1501, and won a majority of the vote in Parauapebas and more than 10% of the statewide

vote in five nearby municipalities. With nearly 70% of her campaign contributions originating from individuals, and only 12% from the party, Mesquita went it alone in the campaign. As shown in Table 7.2, women who have succeeded under the constraints of a women-averse district and party on average draw greater share of funds from individuals than do women in the other contexts.

It must be noted, however, that much like Deputy Aline Corrêa (discussed in Chapter 5), Mesquita did benefit from running in the PMDB in Pará, which has long been dominated by the Barbalho family. Jader Barbalho alone won 1.7 times the electoral quotient (183,438), with his wife Elcione[15] also winning election with over 114,000 votes of her own. As such, women who anticipate no party support are wise to run on party lists headed by such *puxadoras da legenda*, and thus squeeze some benefit yet from the unsupportive party.

As Deputy, Mesquita served in the Commissions on Education and Culture, and Social Security and Family, as the president of a congressional inquiry on missing children, and as the *Procuradora-Adjunta Especial da Mulher* (Assistant Special Solicitor General of Women). She remained pinned to issues conforming to the traditional feminine, with the vast majority of her 132 proposed pieces of legislation concerned missing and exploited children (Chamber of Deputies, 2012b). Although Mesquita herself embraced the supermadre role, it has not parlayed into more recent electoral success. While representing the interests of children is generally uncontroversial, it has left neither electors nor corporate backers with much (pork) to rally behind.

[15] Elcione Barbalho ran under the highly sought "1515" number.

Mesquita ran for another mandate as mayor of Parauapebas in 2008, and with just over 40% of the valid vote was knocked out in the first round by the PT incumbent. The male incumbent, Darci Lermen, raised almost twice as much in campaign funds (more than R$3 million, much of this from corporate donors) as did Mesquita, who attained less than 15% of her campaign budget from the party and herself financed over 80 percent of her overall funds. In 2010, she ran unsuccessfully for a seat in the state legislature, earning 70th place among 460 candidates (16th of 40 on the PMDB list) seeking one of 40 seats. Although she expressed interest in running again in the 2012 elections, and showed favorably in public opinion polls, her would-be campaign "lacks structure for this and for this reason the PMDB opted for an alliance with the PT" with Mesquita running in the vice-mayor position[16] (Mesquita, quoted in Rodrigues, 2012). The alliance has surprised many of the parties' rank-and-file, as the PMDB and PT have long been at odds in Parauapebas.[17] The latest polls show the unlikely PT-PMDB pairing at a meager 9 percent, a distant third from the front-runner, Valmir da Integral of the recently formed PSD (split off from the PFL/Democratas), who has 42% of the intended votes. In sum, Mesquita's political ascendance appears to have been limited.

While the supermadre path has increased (restricted) access, it maintains a "commitment to the eternal feminine" (Bourque and Grossholtz, 1998, 25), with motherhood rather than citizenship providing "the principal *mobilizational referent* for women's participation" (Alvarez, 1990, 50). The issues and political arenas perceived societally to be "appropriate" for women to engage are thus tied inextricably to

[16] Mesquita left her prestigious position as National Secretary of Tourism, effective June 6, 2012, so she could contest the vice-mayoral post.

[17] Ideologically unsavory alliances are a norm in Brazil, as evidenced by the recent endorsement by the PT's historical foe, Paulo Maluf (PP), of the PT ticket for mayor in São Paulo. Unable to stomach the thought, Luiza Erundina actually left her spot on the ticket as vice-mayor rather than share a stage with her longtime adversary (Studart, 2012, June 21).

motherhood, effectively preventing women's unfettered participation in the formal sphere.[18] Women are, however, no longer confined to the supermadre mold and have instead transcended the private-public dichotomy by concerning themselves with a diversity of issues, including the economy, foreign policy, and national and public security in addition to health care, education, and women's and children's rights (Schwindt-Bayer, 2006).[19] Building on this finding, I contend that the supermadre pathway is but one of the available avenues of political ascension for women in Brazil. Next, I survey how women have used their expertise in the professional world to convince women-averse party elites of their political potential.

Technocrats

Among all female candidates, the most common predicament in which women candidates find themselves is that of a women-friendly district and a women-averse party (59.8% from 1998-2010). As stated by Manuela d'Ávila, popular federal deputy, former city councilwoman, and mayoral candidate for the PC do B in the developed southern region (Rio Grande do Sul), "society is evolving but the political structure still is not," with the PC do B being one of the few parties in which traditional outsiders have a shot.[20] In order to thrive in this context, where hostilities from party elite have persisted in spite of an evolution in gender norms and women's progress in society at large, women must convert their intellectual and experiential capital into political capital. By employing the knowledge and skills they are increasingly acquiring in the workplace, women

[18] For a discussion of the resilience of these norms in Brazil, see Pinheiro (2007).
[19] While Schwindt-Bayer finds reported attitudes/preferences among male and female legislators to be similar, thus her conclusion that women are not "still supermadres" in Latin America, she also finds gendered patterns of bill initiation that she attributes to the marginalization of women by male legislators who perceive their powers to be threatened by the increasing presence of women (2006).
[20] Interview on blog *Eleições 2010: Ascensão da Mulher na Política* (2010).

technocrats demonstrate their area-specific expertise and can convince stubborn party elites of their capacity for politics.

Technocrats may also enjoy a fundraising advantage. Candidates with higher than average educational attainment (i.e., those with university education) are in general more adept at forging connections with the predominantly male political and economic elite, and thereby more likely to be successful in attaining campaign contributions (Avelar, 2001, 155). Indeed, as shown in Table 7.2, women succeeding under the constraints of a women-averse party in a women-friendly state received, on average, a significantly greater proportion of their campaign contributions from corporate donors (43.9%) than did women in the other contexts. An exceptional educational and vocational background is particularly helpful for female candidates that lack familial or party ties, with their knowledge and skills compensating for their politically-unconnected status. Although they will likely lack leadership experience in their male-dominant parties or may not be partisans at all, female political aspirants in women-friendly states can use skills acquired in the professional world to demonstrate competence and viability.

While not all women running in women-friendly districts and averse parties do so as technocrats, and a few technocrats have found success in women-averse districts, the profile is more common in the context of developed states and inchoate and/or male-led parties. This is because women in such states are more likely to have developed professional skills, with a greater insertion into the paid workforce than women in less developed states. Moreover, women running in weak, male-dominant parties will have been unable to work their way up through the party ranks and thus have to convert their political capital from the professional arena. Alternatively, female candidates amidst such constraints will draw on familial political capital, which is more prevalent in but certainly not exclusive to the less developed northeast. Of the 84 women elected in women-

friendly districts despite their women-averse parties, 31 (36.9%) are the wife or daughter of a male politician. This extent of women winning with family connections is less than the concentration found among women elected in women-averse parties and districts, but significantly higher than what we see for deputies from women-friendly parties.

The overall success rate of women running in more developed states but inchoate and/or male-led parties is only 5.9 percent, which is significantly poorer than the success rate for female candidates in women-averse districts. Several factors help to explain this weak performance, including the overall competitiveness of many of the women-friendly districts, the fact that women's insertion into the paid workforce and general societal progress is a relatively recent phenomenon, and most importantly, the absence of party support. Even though female candidates in more developed states enjoy an ostensibly less machista electorate, absent party support, they may be either unable or unwilling to navigate the contours of such a competitive electorate climate. Once again, we see that the problem of women's representation in Brazil appears to be political rather than societal. Next, I discuss two female technocrats who have managed to convert their successes in the professional world into political capital.

Tucana (PSDB) Technocrats Yeda Crusius and Raquel Teixeira

The technocrat profile is particularly amenable to the PSDB, with its emphasis on "good governance" policymaking priorities such as administrative decentralization, economic growth, and the stemming of corruption. Although the party leadership at all levels remains dominated by men, with not a single state-level PSDB organization meeting the minimalist critical mass benchmark of only 25% women among their leadership, women have nonetheless begun to make inroads into the party by demonstrating technical prowess. Technocrat Yeda Crusius, former PSDB federal deputy

and governor of Rio Grande do Sul, exemplifies this profile. A Vanderbilt-trained economist and professor of economics, Crusius converted capital acquired in her roles as an academic and the federal Minister of Planning, Budget, and Management. She then successfully parlayed her experience in the federal government into electoral mandates as federal deputy and governor.

Professor Raquel Teixeira, also of the centrist PSDB, similarly gained entry into the political sphere through her area of expertise (education) and educational background. Teixeira earned her Ph.D. in linguistics from Berkeley in 1986, and had a postdoctoral stint in Paris at the prestigious École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in 1988. She was the Vice-President and President of the Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Letras at the Federal University of Goiás (UFG) (1989-94), and in 1997 contested the position of Dean of the university (UFG), an elected post which had been almost exclusively occupied by men. She served in the leadership of several state and national education organizations, including CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development) and Capes (Brazilian Federal Agency for Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education). Her extensive experience eventually landed her an appointment as the Secretary of Education of Goiás under PSDB Governor Marconi Perillo.

Typical of the technocrat experience, Teixeira was not a partisan, considering her work in the state bureaucracy to be "superpartidária" (above party lines), but was soon recruited by the governor to join the PSDB and run for office. While this invitation was perhaps intended solely to help the party image while gathering a few votes for the five male politicians running in her coalition list,[21] Teixeira used her expertise to gain votes and in 2002 earned the third highest vote total in her state. She was reelected in 2006,

[21] One such man proclaimed, "How great, you'll help the *legenda* (party list)!" In the end, Teixeira won more votes than the male candidate making this comment.

falling to 12th place after questions of her ethics surfaced. Teixeira maintained her innocence throughout the scandal[22] and claimed to have been betrayed by her party. Although Teixeira did win reelection, the affair left a bitter taste in her mouth, leading her to complain, "my party is very machista" and "party solidarity does not exist" (in the PSDB) (Interview, April, 2009).

When prompted for advice to female aspirants lacking family connections and party support, she said you can thrive "if you can construct your own path, but you have to work harder" (Interview, April, 2009). Although she did not have the family connections of most other women politicians in her party, she did have her academic title, which she believes afforded her respect. By demonstrating her technical capacities and authority on her area expertise in academia and the state bureaucracy, Teixeira overcame party skepticism of her electoral viability. The small push from the gubernatorial candidate was all she needed to throw her hat in the ring. While she received only 31% of her 2002 campaign budget from the party, Teixeira ran a corpo-a-corpo (person-to-person) campaign in neighborhood meetings and the homes of friends, using fundraisers and donations from individuals to finance her extremely successful 2002 campaign (Interview, April, 2009). In 2006, Teixeira received less than 13% of her budget from the PSDB, drawing instead on corporate donors.

Teixeira's slogan, "Uma vida pela educação" (A life for education), reflects the centrality of her area expertise for her mandate. Importantly, however, she was not

[22] Teixeira was approached as part of the mensalão scandal, in which allies of the Lula Administration bribed individual members of congress in exchange for their support on the legislative floor. She was offered a monthly payment of R$50,000 and lump sum of R$1 million to switch to the PL, one of the parties in the government alliance. She immediately brought the information to Perilli, who instead of thanking Teixeira for her stand against corruption – a tenet of the PSDB – acted to make himself look good (now seemingly lost as his alleged connections to Carlos Cachoeira, a racketeer currently under trial, are exposed) and left Teixeira appearing guilty of non-disclosure. In the commission that voted on whether to expel Teixeira, two co-partisans actually voted against her, in an apparent pact to save Aécio Neves, the governor of Minas Gerais, to whom Perilli was somehow indebted.

limited to manifestations of the traditional feminine, with Teixeira serving not only in the Commissions on Education and Culture, but also Science and Technology and Tourism and Sports, and in the Council of Advanced Studies. Of the 280 pieces of legislation Texeira proposed, she considers those with the greatest potential to affect change to be her approved bill requiring children from age 6 to 9 enroll in school, and her proposed Law of Educational Responsibility (modeled after the Law of Fiscal Responsibility) (Chamber of Deputies, 2012b). Teixeira entered on a platform of education, and remained largely focused on this issue. A potential drawback of pursing a profile emphasizing one's area expertise is the tendency to be confined to a single issue domain. But for Teixeira, who in June, 2011, withdrew from the PSDB to assume the position of Executive Director of the Jaime Câmara Foundation, education is, after all, her passion. In her new role, Teixeira will work through local initiatives to improve primary education in Brazil (Almeida, 2011).

STILL SUPERMADRES?

For District Deputy Eliana Pedrosa in the highly-developed Federal District, family ties initiated her political involvement. While at the helm of the small conservative Liberal Party (PL), Pedrosa's brother suggested she help the party fill the 30% candidate quota, expecting her to garner 800 votes or so. Building on the name of her brother and husband at the time, Pedrosa won more than 11,000 votes in 2002, gaining reelection in 2006 for the PFL, and subsequently serving in the Federal District bureaucracy. What helped her confront the "largest fortress of machismo" found in party politics, which she called a "clube de bolinha" (essentially, good ole' boys' club), was at least initially her family name (Interview, July, 2009). Indeed as mentioned above, family connections remain a viable means for thriving in the absence of party support even in a more

developed state, with 31 of the 84 women elected (and re-elected) in women-friendly districts but women-averse parties being wives or daughters of a male politician.

Moreover, not all women in a context ripe for converting professional skills into political capital have pursued this path. Some women in women-averse parties, such as Deputy Lauriete (PSC) of the southeastern state of Espírito Santo, remain in the supermadre mold despite having independent capital and hailing from a women-friendly district. Lauriete is the wife of a male politician but is also a famous evangelical gospel singer with significant convertible capital of her own, yet she campaigned in a way very consistent with the supermadre profile outlined above, using her 25 seconds of HGPE to stand alongside her husband while emphasizing "defense of life, family values, women, children, and adolescents."

Although women such as Crusius and Teixeira have forged a new pathway for female aspirants lacking party support, demonstrating that women can nonetheless convert their professional experiences into political capital, the supermadre profile persists for women in both women-averse and friendly states. As the feminist movement marches on and the electorate's perceptions of female politicians continue to improve, women should be more equipped to translate their professional gains into political presence. Parties that seek to capitalize on these changes (and follow the electoral law) would be wise to invest in developing viable female candidacies and expanding the paths to power available to women.

The ideal context, after all, is one in which a woman contender can campaign without the threat of bias from either the electorate or party leadership. Under these conditions, women recognize and seize opportunities from within parties and society at large to develop their political capacities. The path to power pursued by Deputy Manuela d'Ávila represents the fruition of such forthcoming support.

Free to Succeed - Manuela d'Ávila

D'Ávila is a journalist by training, who, like many of the women politicians who preceded her, cut her political teeth in the student movement. Yet d'Ávila matured politically in a Brazil very different from that lived by women like Gleisi Hoffmann, Fátima Bezerra, and President Dilma Rousseff herself, who risked imprisonment, torture, and exile in their struggles against the military dictatorship of the 1970s. Coming of age in democratized and developed Rio Grande do Sul in the 1990s, d'Ávila was free to confront the remaining injustices. The PC do B and the developed state of Rio Grande do Sul had both long been open to the idea of women in politics, and without having to convince party leaders or her constituents of a woman's capacity for politics, d'Ávila quickly signaled her strength.

At 18 years of age, d'Ávila joined the Union of Socialist Youth (UJS), one of the nation's more influential student unions, and an affiliate of the PC do B. She officially became a member of the PC do B two years later, and soon acquired the requisite skillset of a political leader, immersing herself in politics. D'Ávila learned how to win elections, serving as a Councilor to the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, National Director and later State President of the UJS, and Vice-President of the National Union of Students (UNE). In 2004, at age 23, she was elected to the city council of Porto Alegre, winning the 8th most votes in the (capital) city – in a contest of 439 candidates for 36 seats – and becoming its youngest city councilor to date.

When asked of her decision to run, d'Ávila said, "It was not my candidacy, I did not want to be a candidate – it was the party that selected me" (Interview, March 2009). D'Ávila reported that it was "the type of party" that the PC do B is which enabled her to thrive (Interview, March 2009). Its history of strong women's involvement nationally and in her state rendered tangible the possibility of women in power. According to d'Ávila,

with greater internal democracy and a more just distribution of party resources, the PC do B enabled rather than impeded her political aspirations. Accordingly, her advice to unsuccessful female candidates was to commit to democratizing their party internally, which she considered the "decisive" factor in women's underrepresentation (Interview, March 2009).

In 2006, she ran a successful campaign for Federal Deputy. As the "priority candidate" of the PC do B, she had the full backing of the party, including ample time on the HGPE, assistance waging a free but intense internet campaign, and 43% of her campaign funds. Spending R$1.32 per vote won (more efficient than 66% of the candidates), d'Ávila and the PC do B ran an ideas-based, militant-driven campaign. Her tenure as City Councilor and National Director of UNE gave her a strong base, and party support sustained the campaign logistics. D'Ávila was the most voted of all 279 candidates in her statewide district, at 271,939 votes (almost 5 percent of candidate votes).

In an unsuccessful campaign for mayor of her state's capital and its most populous city, Porto Alegre, in 2008, d'Ávila competed against two other leftist women, Maria do Rosario (PT) and Luciana Genro (PSOL, former PT), ultimately knocking each other out of the race and enabling the reelection of the PMDB incumbent, José Fogaça. Undeterred, d'Ávila gained reelection with ease in 2010. She was once again the state's most voted, as well as the most voted female deputy in Brazil, doubling her prior vote total and breaking state records for a total of 482,590 votes (8.5% of candidate votes among 270 candidates). Although d'Ávila commanded the lead in polls leading up to the October 2012 mayoral contest, she ultimately lost the election to the incumbent mayor.[23]

[23] Fogaça renounced his post to run for governor, a race he lost. His vice-mayor José Fortunati (PDT) assumed the mayoral post in 2010, and defeated d'Ávila in the first round of the 2012 mayoral elections.

Emerging from partisan and electoral contexts that cultivated, rather than debilitated, her political acumen, d'Ávila was never confined to a single or secondary issue and has thrived in a range of prestigious posts. She served as the President of the Commission of Human Rights, the Vice-President of the Commission on Labor, Administration, and Public Service, and currently as Vice-President of the Commission on Foreign Relations and National Defense. Less constrained by politicized gender roles, d'Ávila has also ascended among her peers, serving as Vice-Leader for the governing coalition in Congress. She has been active on the freedom of information campaign, and rights for youth, the LGBT population, and other minorities. D'Ávila was honored with Congresso em Foco awards in 2009 and 2011, indicated as one of the 100 most influential members of Congress by DIAP (100 Cabeças do Congresso), and named by *The Independent* as one of the principal future world leaders. In sum, d'Ávila and the PC do B represent the great possibilities of the combination of encouraged political ambition, party support, and a receptive electorate.

CONCLUSIONS

The recent wave of successful female presidential candidates throughout Latin America suggests that machista hostility to female political leaders is diminishing. Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil have all elected women presidents in recent years. In Brazil, survey data suggest the electorate to be extremely receptive to women in politics, with 83% saying that women's presence in the political sphere would improve the quality of politics (Ibope, 2009). Yet despite such societal progress, hostilities among party elite persist. According to a report by the Feminist Center for Studies and Advisory Services (CFEMEA), Brazilian parliamentarians "seem disposed to perpetuate women's parliamentary underrepresentation," with the majority of deputies and senators surveyed

disagreeing with various proposals designed to enhance women's legislative presence (2009, 39).

In sharp contrast, a majority of Brazilians surveyed in a recent nationally representative poll indicated that in the short term (five years) parties should change their statutes to guarantee equal representation to women and the electoral law should increase the quota to 50 percent (Ibope, 2009). It is worth noting that respondents in the northeast reported the highest levels of support for these initiatives, thus calling into question any presumptions by party elite that voters in Brazil's lesser developed areas remain unwilling to support female politicians. Moreover, women have, when bulwarked by party support, achieved their greatest success rates in Brazil's less developed states. Parties wishing to capitalize on women's potential and conform to the electoral law must actively work to reconcile the yawning gap between societal preferences for more women in politics and the woefully scarce proportion of women among candidates and elected deputies.

Historically, in order to develop training opportunities for female political aspirants within parties, women have had to first acquire space in party decision-making organs. Yet, by mandating that parties devote funds to the promotion of women's participation, the 2009 mini-reform has now incentivized all parties to implement such programs. Given that elite culture is particularly resistant to change, with women-averse parties therefore unlikely to open up without some kind of exogenous stimulus, the mini-reform represents a promising first step toward the meaningful inclusion of women in Brazilian politics. Only by incentivizing parties to cultivate and support the political ambitions of women can future reforms reconcile the discrepancies between elector and elected in their support of women in politics, and thus improve the representativeness, quality of, and citizen satisfaction with Brazilian democracy.

Chapter 8 – Conclusions

Beset by a crisis of representation, many third wave democracies remain undermined by weakly institutionalized political parties and the underrepresentation of marginalized groups. While the extant literature has engaged those dynamics only in isolation, this dissertation uses extensive variation across Brazilian parties to explain how the two are related, employing mixed methods to analyze the relationship. Deviating from previous findings, this work demonstrates that parties are the central gatekeepers of women's political power in Brazil, sending a clear message: reforms that strengthen parties and incentivize their promotion of women's participation present a powerful remedy for the representative deficits in Brazilian democracy and beyond.

Chapter 1 introduces the empirical puzzle posed by the Brazilian case, the central research questions explored and argument advanced, along with the data, design, and methods used to investigate those questions. Despite substantial socioeconomic progress, an effective and dynamic women's movement, an electorate increasingly receptive to female politicians, and a gender quota – factors that have furthered women's representation across Latin America – women remain scarcely represented in Brazilian electoral politics. I marshal an extensive array of original qualitative and quantitative data to refute and recast the conventional explanations of women's (under)representation, concluding that the poor compatibility of quotas and open-list PR elections, voter bias, and district magnitude cannot fully explain the variation in electoral prospects of women across Brazil. Those expectations of the literature emerge from aggregate-level findings that cannot be simply extended to the individual level. While such studies have contributed by exploring the conditions under which a *country* will elect more women – an aggregrate level question, they have done little to theorize the conditions under which

individual women will acquire election. The latter question is more conducive to a divergance from the assumption of causal homogeneity among women, and thus facilitates the explicit consideration of how gender interacts with individual, party, and district level factors to explain electoral prospects. The extant findings on voter bias and electoral rules also derive largely from Western Europe and the US, where parties tend to be far less inchoate and democracies more consolidated. My findings thus call into question the generalizability of such expectations for both the individual level and a recently (re)democratized and weakly institutionalized context.

Due to gendered social psychological processes and structural disadvantages, women tend not to possess the factors comprising the traditional recipe for success in candidate-centered elections such as those to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies: (1) a psychological affinity for self-promotion and thus aptitude to be an entrepreneurial candidate who self-nominates, (2) political interest and knowledge and the ability and desire to use this to ascend within the party organization, or as is more often the case, to thrive independently in the absence of any real party organization, and (3) personal political (or otherwise converted) capital essential in personalist politics. Traditional gender socialization, the certain risk but uncertain reward of seeking election to an arena women perceive to be corrupt and ineffective, and increasing opportunities in the professional realm comprise part of an interconnected web of factors dissuading women from entering the formal political sphere. While Brazilianist studies of elections and representation have downplayed the importance of parties, I argue that political parties hold the key to enhancing the representation of traditionally marginalized groups such as women because they can mitigate the effects of those compounding factors of exclusion, providing outsiders with the psychological, organizational, and material support they need to thrive in Brazil's entrepreneurial system.

In Chapter 2, I review the contributions and limitations of the orthodox explanations for understanding women's electoral prospects in Brazil. While machista voter bias is a commonly employed explanation for the underrepresentation of women in Brazil's historically patriarchal cultural context, the contemporary electorate exhibits relatively moderate levels of gender stereotypes that doubt women's capacity for the political realm. Moreover, many countries with higher levels of gender bias – including other countries with candidate-centered voting – have more women in politics than Brazil. Furthermore, Brazilian voters have expressed increasing levels of support for women in politics, suggesting that such gender bias is diminishing. Eighty-three percent of respondents in a recent nationally representative poll agreed that women's political presence improves the quality of politics, and three-quarters of respondents affirmed that true democracy exists only with the presence of women. Such postulated support for women in politics was corroborated in the October 2010 presidential elections, when Dilma Rousseff and Marina Silva won more than 47.6 and 19.6 million votes, respectively, together earning 66% of just over 100 million total votes. In the second round, Rousseff increased her vote share to 56 percent, becoming Brazil's first female president. Considering those recent developments, I surmise that Brazil's relatively moderate levels of machista voter bias cannot explain its drastic underrepresentation of women.

Electoral rules are another prominent explanation for women's representation, with most studies emphasizing distinctions between plurality and proportional representation rules, and in particular, the candidate- and party-centered elections they entail. Yet the implications of such expectations for female candidates in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, which employs the open-list variant of PR elections, remain unclear. While increased numbers of candidacies and party seat share should make those

resources less scarce and therefore more accessible for outsider contenders, they also tend to generate heightened incentives for intraparty competition, the implications of which I explore in Chapters 5 and 6.

Party ideology and women in party leadership are the final two explanations I consider from the literature on women's representation. Again, Brazil's sizeable presence of leftist parties in government – the principal indicator for ideology's influence on women's overall representation – is not congruent with the paucity of women in Congress. There is, however, a close parallel between the low proportion of women in the national leadership structures of Brazilian parties – an average of 12.99 percent – and in Congress (less than 10%). A disaggregation of those numbers by parties reveals considerable interparty variation, which I describe, model, and explain in the analyses of Chapters 4-7.

After discussing several other limitations of the extant literature and the contributions offered in my candidate-level analysis, I advance and substantiate an alternate explanation for Brazil's dearth of female politicians. I contend that it is the weak institutionalization and disproportionately male leadership of most Brazilian parties that has maintained women's political marginalization, and emphasize four mechanisms through which the relationship operates. First, inchoate parties suffer from a lack of transparency and accountability, with no clear guidelines for ascendance within the party and thus no norm of compliance with internal rules. Such parties, particularly those that are male dominant, are less likely to comply with the gender quota. Second, the reliance on candidate self-nomination in weakly institutionalized parties exacerbates the socialized gender gap in formal political ambition. External nomination through an active and women-inclusive recruitment network is more conducive to women's participation. Third, amorphous party organizations are ill-equipped to provide critical capacity-

building opportunities for women. Finally, the rarity of programmatic appeals and dominance of personalist politics favor those with personal political and financial capital, which given gendered discrepancies in income, wealth, and status, and the connections such resources confer, and the underrepresentation of women in appointed and elected posts, tends to be men.

The leadership of most Brazilian parties remains dominated by men, who even in well-institutionalized parties will be less likely than female party leaders to mobilize party support for women. Conversely, when women occupy a critical mass of leadership positions in institutionalized parties, they are afforded an effective voice in party decision-making. Space in party leadership enables female party leaders to carry out a range of "critical acts," such as holding the party accountable to fulfilling the gender quota, recruiting female candidates, mentoring female political aspirants, hosting capacity-building opportunities, and helping female candidates acquire party resources. Although the relationship is not determinative, with women not always acting for other women, female party leaders are more likely than male leaders to understand how to level the playing field for women contenders and to levy the party for resources for female aspirants.

As concluded in the development community and beyond, the effective mitigation of gender inequities necessitates an explicitly gendered frame of reference (Lovenduski, 1998; Quinn, 2009), whereby we consider the implications of and for gender in structures and processes. Female party leaders can introduce a gendered frame of reference in party decision-making, forcing leadership to stop functioning as an exclusively male domain, while raising awareness of gender inequities and means to resolve them. In particular, women in the leadership of institutionalized parties can hold parties accountable to the quota provisions, recruit and train female candidates, lobby for and host capacity-

building opportunities for women, and mobilize party resources on behalf of female aspirants and their campaigns.

I thus integrate party institutionalization and the representation of women in party leadership and electoral politics to theorize that to effectively promote women's participation in a context of intraparty competition, parties must have both the **capacity** to recruit and provide female political aspirants with the psychological, organizational, and material support (forthcoming in appropriately institutionalized parties) essential for overcoming the combative entrepreneurial electoral climate, and the **will** to do so (heralded by women in party leadership).

I argue that it is capacity and will, rather than ideology per se, that substantiates leftist parties' apparent superiority in accommodating female candidates. A mass and participatory character and historical emphasis on equality means that leftist parties are certainly more likely than non-leftist parties to be institutionalized and incorporate women in their leadership. Yet leftist ideology per se is neither necessary nor sufficient for women's electoral success. Parties must have both the structural conditions that provide the capacity to help women overcome the tendencies toward combative intraparty competition in the Chamber of Deputies, and the critical mass of women leaders actualizing this potential on behalf of female contenders through a series of critical acts; parties must be willing and able to promote women's participation. Thus women's electoral representation is most effectively enhanced when a critical mass of female leaders ascend to the leadership of an institutionalized party.

In Chapter 3, I complicate the characterization by many observers that Brazil's extreme underrepresentation of women is easily dismissed by the poor fit of gender quotas for the open-list electoral context. While such a stance does offer some merit, I show that this is but one component of a more nuanced explanation. A singular focus on

electoral rules holds limited weight for explaining the variation within Brazil. Brazil's open-list proportional representation (OLPR) electoral system does in fact dilute the potential of the gender quota to enhance women's representation, but Brazil actually ranks the worst among countries with candidate-based list elections, and the 6th lowest of the more than 60 countries with legislated gender quotas. Moreover, some Brazilian parties have had significantly greater success with quota compliance and the election of women than have others. Clearly then, there are other dynamics at play.

I establish for the reader a baseline understanding of legislative elections and parties in Brazil, and then explain why the OLPR system poses an obstacle to women's representation, focusing on the incentives it creates to cultivate a personal vote. I quickly review the historical role of women in Brazilian politics, the recent plateau in women's gradually progressing political presence, and the pervasiveness of male dominance in Brazilian politics. Next, I survey the global use of gender quotas to fast-track women's representation, and the process of quota implementation and reform in Brazil.

Following the arguments developed in Chapters 1 and 2, my analysis of the inadequacies of the Brazilian quota law bridges party institutionalization and the underrepresentation of women. It points to the preponderance of weakly institutionalized and male-led parties – which continue to resist complying with the quota law despite a recent reform expanding its reach – to explain the variation in quota compliance across parties and the failure (thus far) of quotas to empower women politically in Brazil. In the context of weak institutions, formal institutional fixes are insufficient to induce real change and if the gender quota is to be effective, the *lei que não pega* (law on paper only) culture among party elites must be vanquished. This is best achieved by furthering party institutionalization and thus transparency, accountability, and a norm of compliance.

Chapter 4 discusses the intensive data collection process and construction of my multilevel database of all 21,478 candidacies to the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010). I introduce hierarchical modeling and its suitability for my research questions, and present theoretical, statistical, and empirical justifications for the models I estimate in Chapters Five and Six. I then review decisions on measurement and variation across the control and explanatory variables, and introduce my index of party institutionalization. Finally, I preview the extensive interparty and interstate variation in the variables of interest.

In Chapter 5, I subject the conventional explanations for the underrepresentation of women to empirical testing at the candidate level, in a context that is recently (re)democratized, has open-list elections, and a still inadequately institutionalized party system replete with inchoate parties. I integrate public opinion data with my multilevel database of candidacies to the Chamber of Deputies to assess the relative explanatory power of the rival explanations for women's underrepresentation – voter bias and development, electoral rules (district and party magnitude), and ideology – along with my argument that (a lack of) party institutionalization and women in party leadership are the key predictors of women's electoral prospects in Brazil.

I use descriptive analyses of women's legislative presence and success rates throughout Brazil, public opinion data, multivariate analyses of candidate vote share, interviews, and documentary research to demonstrate that while residual machista voter bias does persist in less developed areas, it has not depressed women's electoral performance in the Chamber of Deputies. Rather, with the lone exception of male leftists, candidates actually have a higher predicted vote share in the less developed states than in the more developed states. I also find that the effects of district and party magnitude are not gendered, with the former exercising a negative effect and the latter a positive effect on candidate vote share overall but interactions with *female* consistently insignificant. So

contrary to the expectations of the rival hypotheses, even when controlling for electoral competitiveness and a range of other factors, men and women running in more developed states with more seats up for grabs actually perform worse than those running in less developed and smaller states, with no gendered effects for those variables.

Employing descriptive analyses of party variation in quota compliance, female candidate success rates, and election of women, along with multivariate analyses of candidate vote share, interviews, and documentary research, I find strong support for my argument that women's electoral prospects are heightened in well-institutionalized parties with a critical mass of female leaders. It is not leftist ideology per se that improves the electoral prospects of women contenders, but rather the combination of a structure favorable to outsiders and the presence of actors willing to mobilize resources for female candidates. I use the experiences of two of Brazil's largest parties – the PMDB and PT – to illuminate the critical acts performed by women in party leadership. Women leaders are more likely to understand that it is insufficient to simply reserve candidate slots for women and allow them to go unfulfilled, and are more likely to then pressure other party leaders to provide conditions favorable to women's candidacies that will in turn facilitate compliance with the gender quota. By availing psychological, organizational, and material support to female political aspirants, women in the leadership of institutionalized parties can level the playing field for female contenders.

Chapter 6 uses variation in electoral rules across Brazil's bicameral legislature and the incentives for party support or intraparty competition the differing rules generate to illuminate the interacting role of electoral rules and parties in explaining women's limited electoral presence in Brazil. The controlled comparison analysis provides a potent opportunity for testing the relative explanatory power of my central argument, as it allows me to control for a barrage of potentially confounding cultural and historical

factors, while analyzing variation in electoral rules, incentives for party support or intraparty competition, and party characteristics. If party support is in fact critical for the development of viable female candidacies, the Senate's heightened incentives for such support should lead women congressional contenders to confront a more level playing field in the upper rather than lower house.

Indeed, in the last five elections, a consistently greater proportion of women have been elected to the more powerful and prestigious Senate than to the Chamber of Deputies. I advance background information on the varying electoral rules and incentives generated, descriptive analyses of interparty variation in the proportion of women they nominate and elect, cross-chamber multivariate analyses of candidates' chance of election, and interview data and documentary research to explain how the Senate's low magnitude, multi-vote plurality elections yield an electoral climate significantly more propitious to female contenders than do the Chamber of Deputies' high-magnitude OLPR elections. While the Senate rules generate incentives for unified party support, the electoral rules of the Chamber incentivize combative intraparty competition.

As demonstrated in Chapter Five, well-institutionalized parties are capable of overcoming those tendencies, but the potential is much more likely to be mobilized when a party has incorporated women in its decision-making structures. While party institutionalization is less important for women in the Senate due to the existing incentives for party support, the scarcity of Senate candidacy and restrictive ballot access mean that those benefits of unified party support are unlikely to be mobilized on behalf of female contenders without women in party leadership. When women do have an effective voice in party decision-making structures, however, the Senate incentives for party support amplify the positive effects of critical acts performed by women leaders. So although the upper house is more prestigious and poses a higher electoral hurdle than

does the lower house, incentives for unified party support in the Senate have been able – when mobilized by women in party leadership – to nullify the negative effect of gender on electoral outcome that persists in elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In sum, the conditions most favorable for the election of women are electoral rules that incentivize unified party support, and party leadership that carries out critical acts to cultivate viable female candidacies.

Given the importance of party support, incentives for intraparty competition in the Chamber, the preponderance of inchoate and male-led parties, and residual gender bias in Brazil, it is impressive that even the few female deputies were able to win election. In Chapter Seven, I explain how, even under conditions of machista bias in the electorate and/or in party leadership, some women have cultivated particular profiles enabling them to overcome prejudices and attain office. By working with supportive parties to transform their experiences in informal politics into the requisite political capital and run a collective ideas-based campaign, or by conforming to the traditional gender norms prevalent in some areas and therefore minimizing their perceived threat to the established order, lutadoras and supermadres have managed to win election in less developed states, with supermadres doing so without the benefit of a supportive party.

As demonstrated in Chapter Five, women are not afforded any electoral advantage in developed districts. The scenario is particularly dire when such women run with parties that are, by virtue of their weak institutionalization and/or lack of female party leaders, women-averse. Women running as technocrats have nonetheless succeeded under such constraints by converting their area-specific expertise acquired in the professional world into political capital and thus convincing resistant male party elites of their electoral viability. Chapter 7 tells the stories of women elected under those intersecting constraints, elucidating their paths to power and how they have managed to overcome the obstacles

and gain election. These circumscribed profiles represent successful strategies in women's struggle to gain power in Brazil but come at the cost of constraining and conditioning their political participation, often reinforcing gender roles and limiting the scope of women's power once in office. Unfortunately, the inchoate character and/or male-dominant leadership of so many Brazilian parties means that the most women-friendly context of a supportive party and developed district persists as the least common among elected female deputies. Once this path becomes more viable through the strengthening of parties and incorporation of women in party decision-making, I am confident we will see a great boost in women's political participation.

While societal progress and public opinion data suggest an electorate increasingly receptive to female politicians, the largely male party elite have been unable or unwiliing to adapt to shifting demands from the electorate. Male party leaders in part are rationally hesitant to dilute their own influence, but are also often unaware of how they can incentivize and support viable female candidacies. For those in inchoate parties, their party simply lacks the structure to effectively marshal such support.

Bridging the women's representation literature, which affirms the critical gatekeeping role of parties, with the Brazilianist literature's underestimation of such a role due to the amorphous character of most Brazilian parties, I move parties to the center of the analysis and confirm that they are the key arbiters of women's political empowerment in Brazil. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the image of a minimal or non-existent gatekeeping role so often painted for Brazilian parties, every single female candidate I interviewed underscored the importance of party support. Within an entrepreneurial electoral context, weakly institutionalized and male-led parties exacerbate the gender gap in formal political ambition and impede women's political prospects, while circumscribing their pathways to power. Well-institutionalized parties, however,

provide an organizational structure and programmatic orientation capable of overcoming the tendencies toward intraparty competition, and women in party leadership are able to incorporate gender considerations in party decision-making and mobilize party resources on behalf of female political aspirants.

If development, electoral rules, and ideology were the most important factors for women's electoral prospects, we would need to accelerate economic growth in order to stimulate modernization, while also implementing a top-down quota or other requirement on non-left parties which are, the story goes, ideologically opposed to the incorporation of women. Indeed, that has been the approach of most advocates for enhancing women's representation in Brazil. The analyses advanced here suggest that such an approach is misguided. Rather, gender-friendly reformists must align their interests with those seeking to enrich the quality of Brazilian democracy in other ways. Foremost are reforms that strengthen political parties.

Even when faced with an unfavorable entrepreneurial electoral system, Brazil's few female politicians have proven themselves capable of electoral success. Women's shared history of structural disadvantages, the societal weight of traditional gender socialization, and an affinity for the collective leave female contenders wary of self-promotion, good ole' boy networking, and personalist politics. Yet those traits describe precisely the political status quo maintained by Brazil's predominantly inchoate parties. When provided the opportunity to acquire political skillsets, bulwarked by a solid party organization, and able to run an ideas-based campaign, women's success in the political realm increases. In the absence of those conditions of party support, however, (some) women have enjoyed success by converting capital acquired elsewhere into sufficient political capital.

In sum, residual gender bias, a faulty electoral quota, and the plethora of non-left parties cannot fully explain Brazil's woefully scarce female political presence, nor can it explain variation among Brazilian parties in furthering women's participation. Rather, it is the rarity of institutionalized parties and prevalence of male-dominance in party leadership that has sustained women's marginalization in the legislature. Therefore, only by strengthening parties and incentivizing their active promotion of women's participation can Brazil (and other countries facing similar crises of representation) expect to even the biased playing field and enhance women's self-perceived and actual electoral prospects.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The approach and findings of this dissertation speak to some of political science's most enduring questions. We remain engaged in debate on the form representation should take; for example, must representatives mirror their constituents (descriptive representation) to represent their interests' adequately? The point of departure of this dissertation is that representation does indeed entail descriptive representation, which in turn engenders a powerful socializing effect through symbolic representation. Brazil's 2010 election of its first female president has ruptured any vision of political power as exclusively masculine, but an electorate that is majority female is still "represented" by a Congress that remains more than 90% male. This dissertation helps to illuminate the conditions under which male dominance of political institutions can be assuaged.

A greater perception of representativeness may increase citizen satisfaction with democracy (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). If so, enhanced representativeness might increase the currently dire levels of trust and confidence in political parties and parliament in Brazil and beyond. Indeed, three-quarters of Brazilian respondents in a recent nationwide

poll agreed that there is only true democracy with the presence of women in spaces of power and decision-making, with 80% agreeing that half of the candidates on party lists should be women (Ibope, 2009). While the Brazilian electorate has exhibited itself to be open to electing women, both in public opinion polls and in elections, political parties have resisted. How can political parties be compelled to respond to evolving societal preferences in a context where the party label is of dubious significance?

This dissertation bridges two critical challenges confronting Latin American democracies – the weak institutionalization of parties and party systems and the underrepresentation of marginalized groups – and demonstrates that reforms aimed at strengthening parties can go a long way toward resolving both manifestations of the crisis of representation. My analysis suggests that stronger parties would enhance both accountability and representativeness, two virtues of democratic governance historically considered to exist as tradeoffs.

Another fundamental question engaged in this dissertation is the power of institutions to induce change. The implementation and reform of Brazil's quota law was a clear instance of graduated change, where power holders sought to nominally accommodate societal demands for change while maintaining their power (Thelen, 1999). The gender quota represents just one layer of several formal and informal layers of institutions, and has been unable to reach a new equilibrium in Brazil's inchoate and male-led political parties. In the more rule-bound context of Brazil's few well-institutionalized parties, however, the introduction of new actors – a critical mass of women leaders – has induced a genuine shift in party decision-making, which has in turn had important implications for women's electoral prospects. This suggests the difficulty of institutionally-driven change in the context of weak institutions. Reformers must seek to trigger a new equilibrium by not only changing the formal institutions, but also

introducing new actors capable of generating a sufficient shock to break from the multiple layers of informal institutions. Given the resistance by many parties to incorporate women in their leadership, national, state, and municipal level bureaucratic organs for women's affairs should launch a coordinated campaign on the inequalities faced by women, the potential electoral gains at stake, and precisely what parties can do to level the playing field and thus capitalize on the evolving electorate's postulated support for women.

The crux of this dissertation and so many other social science analyses is that structures and actors interact to produce outcomes, and that we are remiss to consider those fundamental pieces in isolation. I demonstrate that neither electoral rules nor party institutionalization have proven independently capable of empowering women, but rather must be mobilized by willing party leaders. Electoral rules do not function in a vacuum, but are endogenous to and interact with the actors that created and sustain them. Future reform efforts must therefore consider not only electoral rules but also the political parties that will mediate the effects of these rules.

REFORMS TO ENHANCE BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY

Proposals for electoral and various political reforms have been at the forefront of the legislative agenda – in rhetoric if not action – since the return to democracy in the 1980s. Indeed, David Fleischer has often characterized the ongoing reform attempts as a "never-ending story" (2011a, 2011b). While the 1987-88 Constitutional Assembly achieved substantial gains (Fleischer, 2011b), the outcome left standing three critical challenges for the Brazilian party system and resultant quality of democracy: party (in)fidelity, campaign finance, and the open-list format of proportional elections. Most of the rules governing those issues are resolved through the Electoral and Party Legislation,

continually updated by the Congress (Power, 2000). It is hardly surprising then that elected officials have not voted to change the laws under which they themselves were elected. Civil society groups have, however, mobilized under a "Platform for Reform to the Political System," gathering signatures and pressuring elected officials to undertake a series of reforms. A similar collaborative civil society effort, which drew on 1.3 million signatures and mass mobilization, resulted in the significant accomplishment of the approval in 2010 and judicial declaration of constitutionality in 2012 of *Ficha Limpa*, an anti-corruption law.[1] Such success suggests that reform is possible, but requires substantial collaboration among civil society and with the various branches of government.

As discussed by Power, the fact that party fidelity measures had been imposed by the *authoritarian* regime spelled their undoing – the Brazilian Congress swiftly abolished party fidelity statutes after the return to democracy in 1985 (Power, 2000, 118). Some progress toward reform was subsequently made by the Cardoso Administration, which attempted to reengineer electoral institutions so as to strengthen parties, not only imposing stricter standards for party fidelity but also adopting a threshold for representation that works against fragmentation, barring coalitions in proportional elections, and advocating greater transparency in campaign contributions (Mulholland and Rennó, 2008).[2] Most of those measures were rejected, however, and it was not until a series of judicial rulings in 2007 that enhanced standards for party fidelity enjoyed the force of law. The Supreme Electoral Court ruled in March, 2007 that federal and state deputies and municipal councilors (later expanded to include those elected to majoritarian

[1] For more information, see the campaign's website, www.fichalimpa.org.br.
[2] Two important and successful Cardoso-era reforms not discussed here are the reelection provision for executive posts and the Law of Fiscal Responsibility (Mulholland and Rennó, 2008).

posts) switching parties after election would forgo their mandate. So-called "party migrations" decreased substantially in the wake of the court decisions – 51 in 2007 and just 1 in 2008 – and a few switchers unable to prove just cause[3] for jumping ship actually did lose their mandate (Cunow, 2010).

With progress on party fidelity underway, much of the current reform effort is focused on instituting public financing of campaigns. As documented throughout this dissertation, Brazilian electoral campaigns are expensive, draw on significant corporate funding, and serve to reproduce societal inequities resulting from gendered and racialized disparities in wealth and status. In sum, (most) non-white and/or female candidates do not confront a level playing field, a fact that deters many would-be political aspirants from throwing their hat in the ring. Such an imbalance, which confines allegedly representative spaces to the privileged few, could be rectified through the mechanism of public campaign financing. Although the use of public funds for campaigning would be a significant investment of state resources, in the words of one former deputy and mayor, who had recently changed her mind on the proposal, "the democratic process is the biggest public works project of all" (Interview with Former Deputy Jusmari Oliveira, November, 2008).

While a great distrust of political parties has provoked skepticism in the electorate of the reform agenda, public financing enjoys greater support than does the proposal to shift to closed lists (discussed below). Of 1073 recent callers to the Chamber of Deputies hotline,[4] 37% were in favor of and 57% opposed to public financing of campaigns

[3] If the politician can prove that the party with which (s)he won election substantially changed its platform or s(he) faced personal discrimination, switching can be deemed justifiable by the electoral court (Cunow, 2010).

[4] "Disque-Câmara" is a service created in 2003 facilitating constituent communication with deputies. They receive hundreds of thousands of calls and emails each year with solicitations, complaints, denouncements, and compliments. The hotline is staffed Monday through Friday, 8am to 8pm (Agência Câmara de Notícias, 2008).

(Agência Câmara de Notícias, 2011b). Although Fleischer's prediction is that such a proposal would not be adopted (2011), it actually enjoys significant support within the Congress, with 58.7% of parliamentarians surveyed in a more representative sample in favor of exclusive public financing of campaigns and only 15.3% supporting the current system (Inesc, 2009). The PT's Rapporteur on Political Reform, Deputy Henrique Fontana stated, "Exclusive public financing, through the reduction of the prices of campaigns, which each time are more expensive and unattainable for most of the population, is one of the measures with the greatest impact in fighting corruption, in addition to guaranteeing more autonomy for the governments" (Quoted in Agência Câmara de Notícias, 2011b).

As with the proposal for public financing, constituents' profound distrust of politicians and their parties has substantially undermined support for closing candidate lists and giving parties the ultimate say on the ordering of lists. Although closing the lists would strengthen parties and enable them to enforce the gender quota, many fear that in the interim, weak parties dominated by personalist leaders would simply elect their cronies, thus depriving the electorate of the ability to 'disturb the lists.' Moreover, as discussed above, in the absence of placement mandates party leaders tend to cluster female candidates at the bottom of party lists. In sum, the closing of party lists, if accomplished, must be done so judiciously, requiring transparency in party selection of candidates and guidelines for establishing representative lists. In any case, there is scant support for such a proposal in the electorate and the Congress, and despite propositions from Deputy Fontana and the PT, we are unlikely to see such a wholesale shift in the electoral system any time soon.

The fact that open lists are here to stay for the time being, and that any eventual shift to a closed-list system would entail a rather shaky transition if executed by weak

parties, means that reform efforts should focus on other means to strengthen parties. The party fidelity measures discussed above represent a promising first step. Party members and citizens in general must also demand accountability of party leaders. As Deputy Fontana and countless others have argued, the public financing of campaigns is one such way to enhance accountability to constituents by removing the need for candidates to curry favor with corporations and wealthy individuals in order to run a viable campaign. Public financing of campaigns would also reign in ever-growing campaign budgets, thus counteracting another troubling side effect of open-list elections.

While the adoption of public financing of campaigns and closed list elections remain a tough sell to the electorate, there already exists broad societal support for reforms requiring parties to enforce the gender quota. According to a nationally representative survey in Feburary, 2009, 8 in 10 Brazilians support the adoption of legislative measures for political gender equality, 75% support the quota law, and 55% agree completely (and another 25% in part) that candidate lists should have equal numbers of men and women. A striking 86% think that parties that do not comply with the quota stipulated by the electoral law should be punished. Such support exists across Brazil's five regions, and is only slightly lower for male respondents (Ipobe, 2009). But when asking parliamentarians similar questions, support plummets (Cfemea, 2009), yet another demonstration of the fact that the problem of women's extreme representation in Brazil is fundamentally political rather than societal. Politicians are aware that changing the rules by which they were elected, and requiring more accountability with the gender quota, could fundamentally restructure political power, and are likely reluctant of change that may ultimately spell their undoing.

The 2009 mini-reform and subsequent decisions by the electoral courts in 2010 and 2012 to enforce the quota provisions represent substantial progress in the battle for

women's representation in Brazil. But as I have argued throughout this dissertation, it is not enough to change the formal rules of the game; reformers must also target informal tendencies among party elite. Deputy Luiza Erundina's 2002 proposal (6216/2002) addresses precisely this concern by requiring parties to devote: (1) 30% of their federally-allocated funds for party organization to the promotion of women's participation and (2) 30% of their publically-funded television and radio propaganda time to women. The accomplishments of the 2009 mini-reform were more limited, however, devoting only 5% of party organization funds and 10% of propaganda time to the promotion of women's participation.

Future reforms must achieve more – they must change the incentive structure adequately so as to make it irrational for parties to not invest in cultivating viable female candidacies, forcing their hands to promote women's political empowerment. The electorate appears poised to respond favorably to party advancement of quality female candidacies, but most party elites remain slow to adapt. Reforms along the lines of Deputy Erundina's proposal would help to jumpstart party change, thus diminishing the yawning gap between electorate expectations and party elites, and improving the quality of Brazilian democracy.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

The ability of institutionalized parties with women in party leadership to further women's empowerment even in Brazil's entrepreneurial OLPR elections is encouraging. But does this story of capacity and will have broader applicability? Can such a combination of structure and agency also further the representation of other marginalized groups? Does it apply beyond Brazil? If so, institutionalized parties with women in party leadership should prove capable of and willing to facilitate women's political

participation. In line with the argument of Chapter 6, where there are fewer incentives for intraparty competition, such as in the Brazilian Senate and even more so in closed-list PR elections, women in party leadership rather than party institutionalization should be most salient for predicting women's electoral prospects.

In Peru's open-list PR elections, women have enjoyed unanticipated successes, winning 28% of the congressional seats in the 2011 elections. Schmidt explains that success in part by pointing to constraints on intra-list competition by party leaders and the fact that voters can cast two ballots[5] (Schmidt, 2003), which both help to mitigate intraparty competition and make the campaign less of a zero-sum endeavor in spite of the open-list electoral rules. Another important consideration is the 2004 provision of the Law of Political Parties, Article 26, which requires parties to include at least 30% women not only in their candidate lists but also in party leadership (Apra, 2012). In the 2006 elections, the participation of women in the executive commission, among candidacies, and elected deputies for the "major" parties – Partido Aprista Peruano (APRA), Cambio 90, and the Nationalist Party[6] – were, respectively: 26.7 / 28.6 / 42.9 percent women in their national executive commissions, 36.2 / 36.9 / 42.9 percent women among their congressional candidates, and 22.2 / 38.5 / 33.3 percent women among their elected deputies (IDB, 2009).

In contrast, Panama, which also employs a variant of open-list PR elections for its multimember districts (it has an additional tier elected through single member districts), the proportion of women is even lower than that of Brazil, currently at 8.5 percent (IPU, 2012). In the 2009 elections, the participation of women in the executive commission,

[5] Feminist non-governmental organizations advocated, "Of your two preferential votes, cast one for a woman" (Schmidt, 2003).

[6] The Aprista party has been around since 1924 but suffered serious setbacks in recent years. Cambio 90 was formed as an electoral vehicle for Alberto Fujimori in 1990 and shows increasing signs of staying power. The Nationalist Party, the party of President Ollanta Humala, is a new leftist party formed in 2005.

among candidacies, and elected deputies for the top three parties (together winning 87% of the seats) – the Partido Revolucionario Democrático, Partido Político Panameñista, and Cambio Democrático – were, respectively: 11.1 / 6.7 / 20.0 percent women in their national executive commissions, 14.3 / 2.9 / 12.3 percent women among their congressional candidacies, and 7.7 / 0 / 16.7 percent women among their elected deputies (IDB, 2009).

Two tentative patterns emerge from the above data points from Panama and Peru – first, there is substantial interparty variation within Panama, with the party with the highest proportion of women leaders (Cambio Democrático – a right wing party) performing significantly better in terms of women's participation than its coalition partner, the Partido Político Panameñista, which had only minimal women in its leadership and an ultimately all-male congressional delegation. Second, the contrast with the Peruvian case is stark – Panama has significantly fewer women in party leadership and in Congress than does Peru despite sharing the open-list electoral context. A key distinction, brought into focus by considering interparty variation within Panama, and comparing Panama and Peru overall, is the proportion of women in party leadership. Moreover, as discussed by Schmidt (2003), the excesses of intraparty competition in the Peruvian system are mitigated by party leaders and the dual vote.

Another candidate for comparison with women's performance in Brazil's open-list elections is Chile, where candidates to the Chamber of Deputies also run in preferential list elections. Chile's binomial system, a relic of Pinochet's authoritarian regime instituted in the transition to democracy to over-represent the right, complicates any analysis of congressional candidacies, but a few points merit discussion. First, despite having no gender quota, Chile outperforms Brazil in its female legislative presence, ranking 89th with 14.2% women in the Congress (compared to Brazil's ranking

of 116th) (IPU, 2012). In spite of Chile's preferential voting system, the country's party system is significantly more programmatic than the Brazilian party system, with stronger party organizations and stable patterns of electoral competition (Jones, 2005). In the 2009 elections, the participation of women in the executive commission, among candidacies, and elected deputies for the top three parties – the Socialist Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) – were, respectively: 10.0 / 18.2 / 15.4 percent women in their national executive commissions, 28.6 / 22.2 / 11.1 percent women among their congressional candidacies, and 20.0 / 10.0 / 12.1 percent women among their elected deputies (IDB, 2009).

At the municipal level, the conservative party UDI performs exceptionally well in electing women – 26.3% of its municipal councilors elected for the 2008-12 mandate were female (IDB, 2009).[7] Magda Hinojosa credits the UDI's success to its exclusive-centralized candidate selection process, which helps to mitigate the problems discussed in the preceding chapters regarding self-nomination and local power monopolies. Hinojosa applies her framework of candidate selection to several other cases, finding that even in the context of candidate-centered elections, parties that actively recruit candidates can counteract the constructed gender gap in formal political ambition, and an exclusive process allows national party elites working to expand the party's overall electoral fortunes to sideline largely male local power monopolies seeking merely to preserve their individual influence (Hinojosa, 2009).

[7] The UDI's superior female presence at the municipal level relative to the national level is likely a product of its traditional gender role orientation, espoused in party platforms and party elites, which "especially values the virtues and proper functions of women as carriers of life, nuclei of the family, and the principle transmitters of values, morals, and traditions. Consequently, Unión Demócrata Independiente will work so that women's work in society can be compatible with their proper functions, especially those related to maternity, child-rearing, and caring for their families" (UDI, 2007, Quoted in Hinojosa, 2009, 394). Municipal politics are widely considered more accessible to women due to lesser competitiveness, cost, greater proximity to family, and a more 'natural' extension of the private sphere (Chaney, 1979; Hinojosa, 2009).

The above discussions of women's political presence in in Peruvian, Panamanian, and Chilean parties lend broader support to my finding that women in the leadership of institutionalized parties can overcome the problems posed by intraparty competition and improve the situation for female candidates. In my cross-chamber comparison of women's performance in Brazil, I found that the combination of women in party leadership and incentives for unified party support offer a context particularly conducive to the election of women. A quick glance at women's representation in Nicaragua's closed list elections affirms the relevance of women in party leadership in such a context.

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) adopted a parity statute in all instances of party leadership and candidacies in February 2011 (Radio Primerisima, 2011). In November 2011, the FSLN elected a record 33 women deputies – 53% of its 62 member delegation, catapulting Nicaragua to 40.2% women in the legislature (up from 21.6% in 2006), 9th in global rankings and in the entire hemisphere second only to Cuba (IPU, 2012). For a point of comparison, in the 2006 elections, Nicaragua's Independent Liberal Party (an offshoot of the Constitutional Liberal Party, which suffered a dramatic defeat in the 2011 elections) had 14.3% women in its national executive committee and elected only 9.1% women of its 22 member delegation. In sum, preliminary evidence from several Latin American countries provides tentative support for the central findings of this dissertation: (1) parties mediate the effects of electoral rules and are thus the key gatekeepers of women's political power in Brazil and beyond, and (2) reforms that strengthen parties and incentivize their active promotion of women's political participation offer the most effective tools for remedying the democratic deficits confronting many countries of the third wave.

In a recent report on political parties and gender equity, the IDB issued several recommendations of how parties can facilitate the participation of women, drawing on

successful examples from throughout the hemisphere. These can be considered "critical acts" (Dahlerup, 1988), most likely performed by women in party leadership, which help to introduce a gendered frame of reference to the party. In Costa Rica, the electoral court itself "established that parties should include in their statutes mechanisms that assure principles of gender equality and non-discrimination and also parity in all party structures (at all levels), and signaled that that it will not register or renew the registration of parties not in compliance with these principles" (Llanos and Sample, 2008, 71). Note that gender parity in party leadership is a critical component of that apparent formula for success.

Most of the recommendations echo the findings of this dissertation. The report states that parties should bring women's voice to the decision-making table, with the remaining recommendations far more likely to come to fruition after opening up the space to women in leadership. In line with the critical acts discussed in this dissertation, the IDB recommends that parties seeking to enhance women's representation incorporate a gendered frame of reference in party statutes and programs of government, require party leadership to endorse those policies, and be aware of the electoral utility of reaching out to women (Llanos and Sample, 2008, 29). As argued by Kittilson, women leaders can introduce "new frames of meaning" to party leadership emphasizing the strategic value of reaching out to women (Kittilson, 2006). Other critical acts entail increasing accountability by monitoring the distribution of public resources such as electoral propaganda time and party funds, and devoting a party organ to monitoring party compliance with an electoral quota if applicable. Finally, the IDB report suggests that parties mobilize resources for women's participation and recruit local leaders (Llanos and Sample, 2008, 29). Those recommendations for Latin America and the Caribbean are precisely the kinds of critical acts I outlined in the discussions above. Yet, many of these critical acts presume a viable party infrastructure, which is not addressed. In future

research, I will collaborate with country experts throughout Latin America to investigate variations in party capacity for executing the critical acts advocated above, the role of party institutionalization in enhancing such capacity, and the implications thereof for women's representation.

FUTURE RESEARCH

One of the most pressing questions that emerges from the core findings of this dissertation is why male party elites remain so reluctant to promote women's participation despite an apparently evolving electorate. Why have they not responded to changing societal demands? The standard response I received in several interviews with male party leaders was that women were not interested in participating; yet that line was resolutely rejected by the same parties' female leaders and activists. Rather, women are often unwilling to run a campaign that their party has no intention of supporting. In future research, I will investigate the issue further to expose the roots of party elites' persistent resistance to opening the door to women. Recent institutional reforms provide an ideal context to observe and contrast party adaptation to changing institutional constraints and societal prferences.

While this dissertation has illuminated the conditions under which women can(not) acquire political power in the context of candidate-centered elections, a critical research question for future consideration is how political barriers impeding women affect other outsider groups, such as Brazil's marginalized Afro-Brazilian majority. An extensive body of literature on intersectionality attests that gender and race cannot be understood independently, making such a consideration of race a pertinent extension of this research agenda. Many of the findings center on outsider status and thus should also apply to other marginalized groups, but explicit consideration is warranted. In a study of

race, gender, and political ambition in the US, Moore found that men and women of color were significantly more likely to report political ambition than white respondents (Moore, 2005). How might the various factors constraining and cultivating women's political ambition discussed above be racialized? Moreover, Holmsten, Moser, and Slosar's analysis of ethnic parties' tendency to elect fewer women (2010), and Hughes' cross-national analysis of quotas and minority women's political representation remind us that parties and electoral institutions often affect majority women, minority women, and minority men differently (2011). In future work, I will examine how various dimensions of marginality intersect and the implications for representation.

Another question raised by the findings of this research is – how do women's bounded paths to power affect their policymaking latitude once in office? Scholars at the vanguard of women's representation are investigating the connections between descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation. To understand how women's limited presence in formal politics, and the struggles to remedy their exclusion affect the quality of democracy, we must integrate explanations of how women get elected with the policies they promote in office and the effects their presence have on constituents. With a better understanding of how the salient questions of women's representation intersect and interrelate, we can formulate stronger mechanisms facilitating their effective participation in the formal political sphere.

Women's representation remains limited in Brazil not because of a lack of political interest among women, but rather due to the weakness of its political institutions. With stronger institutions, Brazil's strong women can challenge the crisis of representation and enhance the quality of democracy.

Appendix

Aleluia, Caroline (PFL). Pre-candidate for Federal Deputy, daughter of longtime politician José Carlos Aleluia. Salvador, Bahia. July, 2010.

Almeida, Mônica, and Rose Barreviera (PSB). Parliamentary Assistants to Deputy Sandra Rosado, then President of the Women's Caucus. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008; March, 2009; July, 2010; April, 2012.

Álvares, Dr. Maria Lúcia. Scholar of women and politics. Belém, Pará. May, 2009.

Araújo, Dr. Clara. Scholar of women and politics. Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro. June, 2009.

Arraes, Ana (PSB-PE). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. March, 2009.

Ávila, Betânia. Coordinator of SOS Corpo, Activist in the women's movement. Recife, Pernambuco. May, 2009.

Bezerra, Fátima (PT-RN). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. March, 2009.

Biancarelli, Aureliano, and Mariangela Ribeiro. Journalists at Instituto Patrícia Galvão. São Paulo, São Paulo. June, 2009.

Born, Dr. Kátia (PMDB, PSB). Former two-term mayor, municipal councilwoman (president), unsuccessful candidate to the Chamber of Deputies, president of CUT/AL, State Secretary of Health; then State Secretary of Science, Technology, and Innovation. Maceió, Alagoas. May, 2009.

Brietenbach, Zila (PSDB). Two-term State Deputy, PSDB State Secretary General. Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul. June, 2009.

Buarque, Cristina Maria. State Secretary of Women's Affairs, President of State Council of Women's Rights, scholar of women and politics, activist in the women's movement. Recife, Pernambuco. May, 2009.

Callegaro, Vera Lúcia Maróstica (PSDB). President of PSDB Women. Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul. June, 2009.

Camata, Rita (PSDB, PMDB-ES). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

Campos, Eugênia (PSDB). State President of Provisional Commission of PSDB Women. Salvador, Bahia. July, 2010.

Campos, Dr. Gervasio (PSDB). Candidate for Federal Deputy. Salvador, Bahia. July, 2010.

Cardoso, Ana Cristina Telles (PFL/DEM). State President of Women Democrats. Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul. June, 2009.

Carneiro, Professor Aroldo (PC do B). PC do B Secretary of Organization. Belém, Pará. May, 2009.

*Cleide, Fátima (PT-RO). Federal Senator. Brasília, Distrito Federal. May, 2009.

Corrêa, Rosemary (PSDB). President of the State Women's Council, former State Deputy, helped to open the first women's police stations. São Paulo, São Paulo. June, 2009.

d'Ávila, Manuela (PC do B-RS). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. March, 2009.

da Costa, Dr. Ana Alice (PT). Scholar of women and politics, activist in the women's movement. Salvador, Bahia. November, 2008; April, 2009; July, 2010.

da Mata, Lídice (PSB-BA). Federal Senator. Salvador, Bahia. April, 2009.

da Silva, Benedita (PT). Former Senator, Federal Deputy, Governor, federal Minister, then State Secretary of Social Assistance and Human Rights. Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro. June, 2009.

de Faria, Wilma (PSB). Governor, former Federal Deputy. Natal, Rio Grande do Norte. July, 2009.

de Freitas, Rose (PMDB-ES). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

de Oliveira, Thelma (PSDB-MT). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

de Souza, Micarla (PV). Former State Deputy, then Mayor. Natal, Rio Grande do Norte. July, 2009.

Diogo, Cida (PT-RJ). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. March, 2009.

do Amaral, Telma Lililan (PT). PT Secretary of Popular Social Movements. Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro. June, 2009.

Dorigo, Cristina (PT). PT Women's Secretary. Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro. June, 2009.

*Erundina, Luiza (PSB-SP). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. April, 2009.

Fernandes, Angélica (PT). PT State Secretary of Political Formation, member of National Collective of PT Women, party militant, activist of the women's movement. São Paulo, São Paulo. June, 2009.

Fernandes, Emília (PTB, PT-RS). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. April, 2009.

Ferreira, Dr. Maria Mary. Scholar of women's participation, activist in the women's movement. São Luis, Maranhão. May, 2009.

Freire, Amélia (PSB). State Coordinator of Women's Affairs, activist of the women's movement, President of Maria Maria Institute of Studies, Research, and Citizenship. Natal, Rio Grande do Norte. July, 2009.

Frossard, Judge Denise (PPS, PSDB). Former Judge, Federal Deputy, candidate for Senate and governor. Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro. June, 2009.

Galvão, Vânia (PT). Municipal councilwoman, PT Municipal President. Salvador, Bahia. Trailed campaign September-October, 2008; Interviewed July, 2009.

Garcia, Rebecca (PP-AM). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

Genro, Luciana (PT, PSOL-RS). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

*Gomes, Patrícia Saboya (PDT-CE). Federal Senator. Brasília, Distrito Federal. April, 2009.

Helena, Maria (PSDB). State Women's Coordinator. Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul. June, 2009.

Jurema, Dr. Solange (PSDB). Former (first) president of the National Council of Women, then State Secretary of Social Assistance and Development. Maceió, Alagoas. May, 2009.

Lima, Lenilda (PT). Former candidate for governor, party militant, leader of CUT/AL. Maceió, Alagoas. May, 2009.

*Lobão, Nice (PFL-MA). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. June, 2009.

Lopes, Iriny (PT-ES). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

Madeira, Augusto (PC do B). PC do B Chief of Staff in the Chamber of Deputies, Member of the PC do B Central Committee, party militant. Brasília, Distrito Federal. July, 2009.

Magalhaes, Eliana. Political Assistant for the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies (Inesc). Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

Magalhaes, Tonha (PFL, PR-BA). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. November, 2008.

Maggessi, Marina (PPS-RJ). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. November, 2008.

Jorge, Márcia Andreia (PT). State Coordinator of the Promotion of Women's Rights. Belém, Pará. May, 2009.

Marcio (PSDB). PSDB Administrative Secretary, Secretary of Organization. São Luis, Maranhão. May, 2009.

Marinho, Gesane (PDT, PMN, PSD). State Deputy (PDT). Natal, Rio Grande do Norte. May, 2009.

Martins Caldas, Domingas de Paulo (PT). PT District President, State Women's Secretary, former Secretary of Organization. Belém, Pará. May, 2009.

Menezes, Vanda (PDT). Activist in the women's and Black movement, party militant, and former President of the Municipal Council of the Female Condition, State Secretary of Women's Affairs, candidate for vice-mayor. Maceió, Alagoas. May, 2009.

Mesquita, Bel (PMDB-PA). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

Moraes, Jô (PC do B-MG). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. March, 2009.

Morière, Laisy (PT). National PT Women's Secretary. Brasília, Distrito Federal. July, 2009.

Motta, Diana (PSDB). Omsbudwoman of the National Secretariat of PSDB Women, Director of Management of the Paulista Company Project of Metropolitan Planning and Development, Brasília, Distrito Federal. July, 2010.

Nunes , Etelvinio de "Oliveira" (PC do B). PC do B Secretary of Organization, party militant. São Luis, Maranhão. May, 2009.

Oliveira, Jusmari (PFL, PR-BA). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. November, 2008.

Paraguassu, Mara (PT). Assistant to former Senator Fátima Cleide and Deputy Padre Ton, scholar of women and politics, party militant. Brasília, Distrito Federal. April, 2009; May, 2012.

Pedrosa, Eliana (PFL). District Deputy, District Secretary of Tourism. Brasília, Distrito Federal. July, 2009.

Perondi, Regina (PMDB). Vice-President of PMDB Women, National and State Party Leader. Brasília, Distrito Federal. July, 2009.

Picciani, Leonardo (PMDB). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

Pietá, Janete Rocha (PT-SP). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

Pinheiro, Luana. Scholar of women and politics, official at the Federal Secretary of Women's Affairs and Ipea. March, 2009.

Pinheiro , Telma (PSDB). Former Federal Deputy, unsuccessful candidate for reelection. São Luis, Maranhão. May, 2009.

Pinto, Laurinda (PC do B). PC do B State Women's Secretary, PC do B Municipal Secretary of Formation (Training), party militant. São Luis, Maranhão. May, 2009.

Portugal, Alice (PC do B-BA). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

PT. Salvador, Bahia. Informal interviews with numerous leaders and members at 2008 municipal campaign events and 2010 state party convention. September-October, 2008; July, 2010.

Querino, Ana Carolina. Coordinator of Economic Rights Thematic Area for UN Women. April, 2012.

Rangel, Patrícia. Researcher at the Feminist Center for Studies and Advisory Services (CFEMEA). September, 2008; March, 2009.

Rigo, Roseangela Maria. Director of the Subsecretary of Institutional Articulation and Thematic Actions. National Secretary of Women's Affairs. April, 2012.

Rios, Ana (PMDB). State President of PMDB Women, Director of Loreta Valadares Center of Reference (for victims of domestic violence). July, 2010.

Ruiz, Nilmar (PFL-TO). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. November, 2008.

Saiki, Madalena (PFL). President of Women Democrats. Brasília, Distrito Federal. June, 2009.

Salazar, Sandro (PMDB). PMDB Coordinator of Working Groups for the National Directorate, party militant, active on women's issues. Brasília, Distrito Federal. July, 2010; April, 2012.

Santos, Ana Cristina (PC do B). Communications Assistant to Deputy Luciana Santos (PC do B-PE), party mlitant. Brasília, Distrito Federal. May, 2012.

Serrano, Marisa (PSDB-MS). Federal Senator. Brasília, Distrito Federal. April, 2009.

Silva, Clovis (PC do B). PC do B State Secretary of Unions, party militant. Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul. June, 2009.

Slhessarenko, Serys (PT-MT). Federal Senator. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

Soares, Cecilia Teixeira. State Superintendent of Women's Rights, President of State Council of Women's Rights. Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro. June, 2009.

Souto, Dona Isabel (PFL). Wife of longtime politician Paulo Souto. Salvador, Bahia. July, 2010.

Souza, Sílvia Rita (PSDB). Assistant to Senator Marisa Serrano, former President of PSDB Women. Brasília, Distrito Federal. December, 2008.

Starling, Sandra (PT). Former Federal and State Deputy, Party Founder and National and State Leader, Municipal Secretary of Education. July, 2009.

Tabak, Dr. Fanny. Scholar of women and politics, activist in the women's movement. Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro. June, 2009.

Tavares, Dr. Rebecca Reichmann. Regional Director of UN Women. April, 2012.

Teixeira, Professor Raquel (PSDB-GO). Federal Deputy. Brasília, Distrito Federal. April, 2009.

Vebber, Celica (PT). PT Women's Secretary. Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul. June, 2009.

Viana, Raquel (PT). Municipal Special Coordinator of Women's Affairs. Fortaleza, Ceará. May, 2009.

Viera, Patrícia (PC do B). PC do B State Secretary of Organization, State Coordinator of the Union of Brazilian Women. Salvador, Bahia. July, 2009.

*Indicates that the Senator / Deputy responded to my interview questions via questionnaire.

Bibliography

2008, September 19. "Eleições 2008 - PT - Natal - Prefeita - Fátima - 13 - Comício com Lula." Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xYx9dAozfwc

2012, June 6. "Bel Mesquita Deixa a Secretaria Nacional de Políticas de Turismo." Retrieved from http://www.turismo.gov.br

Agência Câmara de Notícias. 2008, January 22. "Cidadãos Também Pedem Soluções para Problemas Municipais." Retrieved from http://www2.camara.leg.br/agencia/

Agência Câmara de Notícias. 2011a, June 16. "Deputada Defende Cotas para Mulheres na Reforma Política." Retrieved from http://www2.camara.leg.br/agencia/

Agência Câmara de Notícias. 2011b, August 17. "Pesquisa com Disque-Câmara Revela Preferências sobre Reforma Política." Retrieved from http://www2.camara.leg.br/agencia/noticias.html

Agência de Notícias da Justiça Eleitoral. 2010a, August 3. "TRE-SP define não obrigatoriedade da cota de 30% dos registros de candidature para mulheres." Retrieved from http://agencia.tse.gov.br

Agência de Notícias da Justiça Eleitoral. 2010b, August 12. "TSE determina que o PDT-PA cumpra os percentuais mínimo e máximo de candidatos por sexo." Retrieved from http://agencia.tse.gov.br

Agência Patrícia Galvão. 2010. "Now it will Count: 30% Quota for Women will be Enforced in the 2010 Elections." Retrieved from http://www.agenciapatriciagalvao.org.br

---. 2011, September 5. "Com Mais Mulheres na Direção dos Partidos, Haverá Mais Mulheres no Executivo e no Legislativo, Diz José Eustáquio Diniz Alves." Retrieved from http://agenciapatriciagalvao.org.br

Aggege, Soraya. 2011, September 3. "No PT, Mulheres Tomam o Poder." *Carta Capital*. Retrieved from www.cartacapital.com.br

Almeida, Cleomar. 2011, June 6. "Raquel Teixeira Troca Política pela Fundação Jaime Câmara." *Jornal Opção*. Retrieved from http://www.jornalopcao.com.br

Álvares, Maria Luzia Miranda. 2004. "Mulheres na Competição Eleitoral: Seleção de Candidaturas e o Padrão de Carreira Política no Brasil." Ph.D. Dissertation, IUPERJ.

Alvarez, Sonia. 1990. *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements in Transition Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ames, Barry. 2001. *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Anzia, Sarah, and Christopher Berry. 2011. "The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?" *American Journal of Political Science 55*(3), 478-493.

Apra. 2012. "En Pos de la Igualdad de Resultados." Retrieved from http://www.apra.org.pe/dest_p_equidad.asp

Araújo, Clara. 1999. "Cidadania Incompleta: O Impacto da Lei de Cotas Sobre a Representação Política das Mulheres no Brasil." Ph.D. Dissertation, UFRJ.

---. 2001. "Potencialidades e Limites da Política de Cotas no Brasil." *Revista Estudos Feministas 9*(1):231-252.

Araújo, Clara, and Jose Eustáquio Diniz Alves. 2007. "Impactos de Indicadores Sociais e do Sistema Eleitoral sobre as Chances das Mulheres na Eleições e suas Interações com as Cotas." *DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais 50*(3):535-577.

Avelar, Lúcia. 2001. *Mulheres na Elite Política Brasileira* (2nd ed). São Paulo, Brazil: Fundação Konrad Adenauer.

Avon Institute / Ipsos. 2011. "Pesquisa Percepções sobre a Violência Doméstica contra a Mulher no Brasil." Survey, conducted January 31 – Febraury 10. Retrieved from http://www.ipsos.com

Banco Central. 2009. "Evolução do IDH das Grandes Regiões e Unidades da Federação." *Boletim Regional do Banco Central do Brasil*. Retrieved from http://www.bcb.gov.br

Barrionuevo, Alexei. 2007, November 4. "Political Tango, Women in the Lead." *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com.

Berkman, Heather, and Eduardo Cavallo. 2006. "The Challenges in Latin America: Identifying What Latin Americans Believe To Be the Main Problems Facing Their Countries." Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Bethell, Leslie, and José Murilo de Carvalho. 1985. "Brazil from Independence to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century." In Leslie Bethell (Ed). *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. III: From Independence to c.1870*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, Pp. 679-746.

Bohn, Simone. 2007. "Women and Candidate Quality in the Elections for the Senate; Brazil and the United States in Comparative Perspective." *Brazilian Political Science Review 1*(2):74-107.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. "The Forms of Capital." In J. Richardson (Ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. New York, NY: Greenwood, Pp. 241-258.

Bourque, Susan, and Jean Grossholtz. 1998. "Politics an Unnatural Practice: Political Science Looks at Female Participation." In Anne Phillips (Ed.) *Feminism & Politics*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Pp. 23-43.

Braga, Maria do Socorro Sousa. 2008. "Organizações Partidárias e Seleção de Candidatos no Estado de São Paulo." *Opinião Pública 14*(2):454-485.

---. 2010. "Eleições e Democracia no Brasil: A Caminho de Partidos e Sistema Partidário Inistitucionalizados." *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política 4*:43-73.

Braga, Maria do Socorro Sousa, and Adla Bourdoukan. 2009. "Partidos Políticos no Brasil: Organização Partidária, Competitição Eleitoral e Financamento Público." *Perspectivas 35*:117-148.

Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). 2009. "Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios." Survey.

---. 2010. "Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego – Mulher no Mercado de Trabalho: Perguntas e Respostas." Retrieved from http://www.ibge.gov.br

Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Ibope). 2009, February. *Mulheres na Política*. Retrieved from http://www.agenciapatriciagalvao.org.br

Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Carey, John, and Simon Hix. 2011. "The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science 55*(2):383-397.

Carey, John, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies 14*(4):417-439.

Caul, Miki. 1999. "Women's Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties." *Party Politics 5*(1):79-98.

---. 2001. "Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross-National Analysis. *Journal of Politics 63*(4):1214-1229.

Center for Studies and Advisory Services (Cfemea). 2009. *Como Parlamentares Pensam os Direitos das Mulheres?* Retrieved from http://www.observatoriodegenero.gov.br

CESOP (Center of Studies and Public Opinion), 2010. *Brazilian Electoral Study* (ESEB). Universidade Estadual de Campinas: São Paulo, Brazil.

Chamber of Deputies. 2012a. Author Analysis of Deputy Biographies. Retrieved from http://www2.camara.gov.br/deputados/pesquisa

---. 2012b. Author Analysis of Legislative Proposals. Retrieved from http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/default.asp

Cheney, Elsa. 1979. *Supermadre: Women in Politics in Latin America*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. 2006. "Gender and Politics: The State of the Art." *Gender & Politics 26*(1):18-28.

---. 2008. "Critical Mass Theory and Women's Representation." *Political Studies 56*:725-736.

Childs, Sarah, and Joni Lovenduski. 2012. "Political Representation." In Georgina Waylen, Karen Celis, Johanna Kantola, and Laurel Weldon (Eds). *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Coelho, Mário, and Sylvio Costa. 2010, August 14. "TSE Exigirá Cumprimento de Cotas para Mulheres.". Retrieved from http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br

Congresso em Foco. 2011, April 7. "Os Senadores e Seus Parentes na Política." Retrieved from http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br

---. 2012, June 4. "Quase 20% dos Congressistas Disputarãao Prefeituras." Retrieved from http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br

Correll, Shelley. 2007. *Social Psychology of Gender (Advances in Group Processes Volume 24)*. New York, NY: Elsevier.

Correll, Shelley, Sarah Thébaud, and Stephen Benard. 2007. "An Introduction to the Social Psychology of Gender." In Shelly Correll (Ed). *Social Psychology of Gender (Advances in Group Processes Volume 24)*. New York, NY: Elsevier, Pp. 1-18.

Costa, Ana Alice Alcântara. 2008. "Women and Politics: The Brazil Paradox." *Open Democracy.* Retrieved from http://www.opendemocracy.net

Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Cunow, Saul. 2010. "Party Switching and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from Brazil's National and Subnational Legislatures of the Impact of Party Switching on Legislative Behavior." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Dahlerup, Drude. 1988. "From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics." *Scandinavian Political Studies 11*(4):275-297.

---. 2006. *Women, Quotas, and Politics*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Dalton, Russell, and Christopher Anderson. 2011. *Citizens, Context, and Choice: How Context Shapes Citizens' Electoral Choices.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Darcy, Robert, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark. 1994. *Women, Elections, and Representation.* New York, NY: Longman.

Desidério, Mariana. 2011, August 8. "28% das Mulheres Assassinadas no País Morrem em Casa." *Folha de São Paulo.* Retrieved from http://www1.folha.uol.com.br

Desposato, Scott. 2006. "The Impact of Electoral Rules on Legislative Parties: Lessons from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies." *Journal of Politics 68*(4):1018-1030.

Diáro do Grande ABC. 2010, November 7. "Efeito Dilma Não Chega ao Congresso." Retrieved from http://www.dgabc.com.br

Diário do Turismo. 2011, June 22. "Três Perguntas a Bel Mesquita, Secretária de Políticas de Turismo." Retrieved from http://www.diariodoturismo.com.br

Dix, Robert. 1992. "Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin American Political Parties." *Comparative Political Studies 24*(4):488-511.

Dixon, William. 1993. "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution 37*(1):42-68.

Downie, Andrew, and Sara Miller Llana. 2009, October 13. "Latin America's Worst Wage Gap for Women and Minorities? Powerhouse Brazil." *Christian Science Monitor.* Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com

Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.

---. 1955. *The Political Role of Women*. New York, NY: Wiley and Sons.

Eckel, Catherine, and Philip Grossman. 2008. "Differences in the Economic Decisions of Men and Women: Experimental Evidence." In Charles Plott and Vernon Smith (Eds). *Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Volume I*. North Holland, United Kingdom: Linacre House, Pp. 509–519.

Eleições 2010: Ascensão da Mulher na Política. 2010. Interview with Deputy Manuela d'Ávila. Retrieved from http://eleicoes2010mulhernopoder.blogspot.com

Escobar-Lemmon, Maria, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson. 2005. "Women Ministers in Latin American Government: When, Where, and Why?" A*merican Journal of Political Science 49*(4):822-844.

---. 2008. "How Do Candidate Recruitment and Selection Processes Affect Representation of Women?" In Scott Morgenstern and Peter Siavelis (Eds.) *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Penn State University, Pp. 345-370.

Fêmea, monthly newsletter published by CFEMEA, Brasília, various issues.

Ferrara, Federico. 2004. "Frogs, Mice and Mixed Electoral Institutions: Party Discipline in Italy's XIV Chamber of Deputies." *The Journal of Legislative Studies 10*(4):10-31.

Ficha Limpa. 2012. Retrieved from http://www.fichalimpa.org.br

Finamore, Claudia Maria, and João Eduardo Coin de Caravalho. 2006. "Mulheres Candidatas: Relações entre Gênero, Mídia e Discurso." *Estudos Femininstas 14*(2):347-362.

Fleischer, David. 2011a. "Political Reform: A Never-Ending Story (1995-2009)." In Maurício Font and Laura Randall (Eds.) *The Brazilian State: Debate and Agenda*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

---. 2011b. "Attempts at Political Reform in Brazil: A Never-Ending Story." Presented for *Brazil under Rousseff Task Force* at the University of Miami's Center for Hemispheric Policy. Retrieved from https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/

Fonseca, Marcelo da. 2012, January 16. "PT e PSDB Devem Realizar Primárias para Escolha de Candidto a Prefeito só em Três Capitais." *Estado de Minas.* Retrieved from http://www.em.com.br

Fortin, Jessica, and Christina Eder. 2011. "Mapping the Interactive Effects of Electoral Rules on Gender Representation in Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) Systems." Presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, WA.

Fox, Richard, and Jennifer Lawless. 2004. "Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office." *American Journal of Political Science 48*(2):264-80.

Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer Piscopo. 2008. "Gender Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina." *Politics & Gender 4*:393-425.

Franceschet, Susan, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer Piscopo. 2012. *The Impact of Gender Quotas*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Fundação Perseu Abramo. 2010. "A Pesquisa Mulheres Brasileiras nos Espaços Público e Privado." Survey.

Globo. 2012, January 23. "Graça Foster Tem 32 Anos de Petrobras; Veja Perfil." *Globo.* Retrieved from http://g1.globo.com

Godinho, Tatau. 1996. "Ação Afirmativa no Partido dos Trabalhadores." *Revista Estudos Feministas 4* (1):148-157.

---. (Ed.) 1998. *Mulher e Política: Gênero e Feminismo no Partido dos Trabalhadores*. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo.

Grayley, Mônica Villela. 2012, July 12. "Ministra Diz que Partidos Não Facilitam Candidaturas de Mulheres no Brasil." *UN Radio News and Media*. Retrieved from http://www.unmultimedia.org

Guadagnini, Marila. 1993. "A 'Partitocrazia' Without Women: The Case of the Italian Party System." In Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (Eds.) *Gender and Party Politics.* London, United Kingdom: Sage, Pp. 168-204.

Haas, Liesl. 2001. "Changing the System from Within? Feminist Participation in the Brazilian Workers' Party." In Victoria González and Karen Kampwirth (Eds.) *Radical Women in Latin America: Left and Right*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pp. 249-271.

Hagopian, Fran. 1996. *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, Peter, and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies 44*(5):936-957.

Haspel, Moshe, Thomas Remington, and Steven Smith. 1998. "Electoral Institutions and Party Cohesion in the Russian Duma." *The Journal of Politics 60*(2):417-439.

Heilman, Madeline. 2001. "Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes Prevent Women's Ascent up the Organizational Ladder." *Journal of Social Issues 57*:657-674.

Henig, Ruth, and Simon Henig. 2001. *Women and Political Power: Europe since 1945.* London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Hinojosa, Magda. 2009. "'Whatever the Party Asks of Me': Women's Political Representation in Chile's Unión Demócrata Independiente." *Politics & Gender 5*:377-407.

Holmsten, Stephanie, Robert Moser, and Mary Slosar. 2010. "Do Ethnic Parties Exclude Women?" *Comparative Political Studies 43*(10):1179-1201.

Honaker, James, Gary King, and Matthew Blackwell. 2010. *Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data*. Retrieved from http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia/

Hox, Joop. 2002. *Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications*. Mahwah, NJ: Psychology Press.

Htun, Mala. 2002. "Puzzles of Women's Rights in Brazil." *Social Research, 69*(3):733-751.

Htun, Mala. 2005. "Women, Political Parties, and Electoral Systems in Latin America." In Julie Ballington and Azza Karam (Eds.) *Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers (A Revised Edition).* Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Pp. 112-121.

Htun, Mala, and Mark Jones. 2002. "Engendering the Right to Participate in Decision-Making: Electoral Quotas and Women's Leadership in Latin America." In Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux (Eds.) *Gender and Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America*. London, United Kingdom: Palgrave, Pp. 32-56.

Htun, Mala, and Timothy Power. 2006. "Gender, Parties, and Support for Equal Rights in the Brazilian Congress," *Latin American Politics and Society 48*(4):83-104.

Hughes, Melanie. 2011. "Intersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Women's Political Representation Worldwide." *American Political Science Review 105*(3):604-20.

---. 2008. "Politics at the Intersection: A Cross-National Analysis of Minority Women's Legislative Representation." Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University. Retrieved from http://etd.ohiolink.edu

Hughes, Melanie, and Pamela Paxton. 2008. "Continuous Change, Episodes and Critical Periods: A Framework for Understanding Women's Political Representation over Time." *Politics & Gender 4*(2):233-264.

Hunter, Wendy. 2010. *The Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil: 1989-2009*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea). 2009. *Retrato das Desigualdades de Gênero e Raça* (3rd ed.). Brasília, Brazil: Ipea.

---. 2010a. *Human Development Index*. Retrieved from http://ipea.gov.br.

---. 2010b. *Mercado de Trabalho: Conjuntura e Análise.* Retrieved from http://www.ipea.gov.br

Institute of Socioeconomic Studies (Inesc). 2009. *Sondagem de Opinião Parlamentar: Reforma Política.* Retrieved from http://www.inesc.org.br

Inter-American Development Bank. 2012. *Gender and Political Parties in Latin America*. Retrieved from http://www.iadb.org/research/geppal

Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). 2012. *Women in National Parliaments Database*. Retrieved from http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm

---. 2000. *Politics: Women's Insight.* Geneva, Switzerland: Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Inter-Union Department of Socioeconomic Statistics and Studies (DIEESE). 2011. *Anuário das Mulheres Brasileiras*. São Paulo, Brazil. Retrieved from http://www.dieese.org.br

Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." *American Political Science Review 100*(2):165-181.

Janda, Kenneth. 1980. *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*. London, United Kingdom: Macmillan.

Jones, Mark. 2005. "The Role of Parties and Party Systems in the Policymaking Process." Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. Retrieved from http://www.iadb.org

---. 2007. "Democracy in Latin America, Challenges and Solutions: Political Party and Party System Institutionalization and Women's Legislative Representation." Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. Retrieved from http://www.iadb.org

---. 2009. "Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election of Women: Evidence from the Latin American Vanguard." *Comparative Political Studies 42*(1):56-81.

Jornal Cidade. 2008, July 20. "Cota Obrigatória para Candidaturas Femininas Ainda Não Foi Atingida." Retrieved from http://jornalcidade.uol.com.br/rioclaro

Kahn, Kim Fridkin. 1996. *The Political Consequences of Being a Woman: How Stereotypes Influence the Conduct and Consequences of Political Campaigns*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. "Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life." *American Journal of Sociology 82*(5):965-990.

Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces 78*(1):235-269.

King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Kittilson, Miki Caul. 2006. *Challenging Parties, Changing Parliament: Women and Elected Office in Contemporary Western Europe*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.

Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

---. 2010. "Women's Representation in Parliament: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis." *Political Studies 58*:886-908.

Kunovich, Sheri, and Pamela Paxton. 2005. "Pathways to Power: The Role of Political Parties in Women's National Political Representation." *American Journal of Sociology 111*(2):505-552.

LAPOP: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project. Retrieved from http://www.LapopSurveys.org

Larserud, Stina, and Rita Taphorn. 2007. "Designing for Equality: Best-Fit, Medium-Fit and Non-Favourable Combinations of Electoral Systems and Gender Quotas." Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA.

Lawless, Jennifer, and Richard Fox. 2005. *It Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

---. 2010. *It Still Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Lemos, Leany (Ed). 2008. *O Senado Federal Brasileiro no Pós-Constituinte.* Brasília, Brazil: Senado Federal.

Lemos, Leany, and Sonia Rainicheksi. 2008. "Carreiras Políticas no Senado Brasileiro: Um Estudo das Composições do Plenário e da Comissão de Constituição, Justiça e Cidadania na Década de 90." In Leany Lemos (Ed). *O Senado Federal Brasileiro no Pós-Constituinte.* Brasília, Brazil: Senado Federal. Pp. 87-120.

Leonardi, Gisele. 2011, October 21. "Bolsa Família: 94% dos Beneficiários são Mulheres." *PT Macro ABC*. Retrieved from http://www.macroabc.com.br

Levitksy, Steven. 1988. "Institutionalization and Peronism: The Concept, the Case and the Case for Unpacking the Concept." *Party Politics 4*:77-92.

Lin, Tse-min, Chin-En Wu, and Feng-Yu Lee. 2006. "'Neighborhood' Influence on the Formation of National Identity in Taiwan: Spatial Regression with Disjoint Neighborhoods." *Political Research Quarterly 59*(1):35-46.

Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems in Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Llanos, Mariana, and Francisco Sánchez. 2008. "Conselho da Anciãos? O Senado e Seus Membros no Cone Sul." In Leany Lemos (Ed). *O Senado Federal Brasileiro no Pós-Constituinte.* Brasília, Brazil: Senado Federal, Pp. 121-150.

Lovenduski, Joni. 1998. "Gendering Research in Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science 1*:333-356.

Lovenduski, Joni, and Pippa Norris (Eds). 1993. *Gender and Party Politics.* London, United Kingdom: Sage.

Luke, Douglas. 2004. *Multilevel Modeling*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Macaulay, Fiona. 2003. "Sexual Politics, Party Politics: The PT Government's Policies on Gender Equity and Equality." Centre for Brazilian Studies Working Paper CBS46-03, University of Oxford.

---. 2006. *Gender Politics in Brazil and Chile: The Role of Parties in National and Local Policymaking.* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Macedo, Thyago. 2008, May 16. "Fátima Bezerra Tem Maior Índice de Rejeição entre os Candidatos a Prefeito de Natal." *Nominuto.com*. Retrieved from http://www.nominuto.com

Machismo Mata. 2012. Blog. Retrieved from http://machismomata.wordpress.com/

Mainwaring, Scott. 1995. "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy." In Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Eds.) *Building Democratic Institutions: Parties and Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Pp. 354-398.

---. 1999. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: the Case of Brazil*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully (Eds). 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Parties and Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Edurne Zoco. 2007. "Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies." *Party Politics 13*(2):155-178.

Marx, Jutta, Jutta Borner, and Mariana Camionotti. 2007. *Las Legisladoras: Cupos de Género y Política en Argentina y Brasil*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Siglo XXI Editora Iberoamericana.

Matland, Richard. 1993. "Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures: The Case of Norway." *Journal of Politics 55*(3):737-755.

---. 1998. "Women's Representation in National Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries." *Legislative Studies Quarterly 23*(1):109-125.

---. 2005. "Enhancing Women's Political Participation: Legislative Recruitment and Electoral Systems." In Julie Ballington and Azza Karam (Eds.) *Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers* (2nd ed). Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA, 93-112.

Matland, Richard, and Michelle Taylor. 1997. "Electoral Systems' Effect on Women's Representation: Theoretical Arguments and Evidence from Costa Rica." *Comparative Political Studies 30*(2), 186-210.

Matland, Richard, and Dudley Studlar. 1996. "The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway." *Journal of Politics 58*(3), 707-733.

Matos, Marlise. 2008. Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and Coordinator of the Working Group of Studies and Research on Women at the Federal University of Minas Gerais. Interviewed by Mais Mulheres no Poder. Retrieved from http://www.maismulheresnopoderbrasil.com.br

Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

McConnaughy, Corrine. 2007. "Seeing Gender over the Short and Long Haul." *Politics & Gender 3*:378-386.

Mendonça, Ricardo, and Silvio Navarro. 2012, June 11. "Mulheres Recebem Apenas 8% dos Repasses dos Partidos." *Folha de São Paulo*. Retrieved from http://www1.folha.uol.com.br

Miguel, Luis Felipe, and Flávia Biroli. 2009. "Mídia e Representação Política Feminina: Hipóteses de Pesquisa." *Opinão Pública 15*(1):55-81.

---. 2011. *Caleidoscópio Convexo: Mulheres, Política e Mídia*. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora da Unesp.

Miguel, Luis Felipe, and Cristina Monteiro de Queiroz. 2006. "Diferenças Regionais e o Êxito Relativo de Mulheres em Eleições Municipais no Brasil." *Revista Estudos Feministas 14*:363-385.

Money, Jeanette, and George Tsebelis. 1992. "Cicero's Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative Perspective." *International Political Review 13*(1):25-43.

Montero, Alfred P. 2010. "No Country for Leftists? Clientelist Continuity and the 2006 Vote in the Brazilian Northeast." *Journal of Politics in Latin America 2*(2):113-153.

Moore, Robert. 2005. "Religion, Race, and Gender Differences in Political Ambition." *Politics & Gender 1*(4):577-596.

Morgenstern, Scott, and Javier Vázquez-D'Elía. 2007. Electoral Laws, Parties, and Party Systems in Latin America." *Annual Review of Political Science 10*(1):143-168.

Moser, Robert. 2001a. "The Effects of Electoral Systems on Women's Representation in Post-Communist States." *Electoral Studies 20*(3):253-269.

---. 2001b. *Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

---. 2003. "Electoral Systems and Women's Representation: The Strange Case of Russia." In Richard Matland and Kathleen Montgomery (Eds.) *Women's Access to*

Political Power in Post-Communist Europe. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Moser, Robert, and Ethan Scheiner. 2004. "Mixed Electoral Systems and Electoral System Effects: Controlled Comparison and Cross-National Analysis." *Electoral Studies 23*:575-599.

---. 2012. *Electoral Systems and Political Context: How Electoral System Effects Differ in New and Established Democracies*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Mulheres Brasileiras (Brazilian Women). 2012. Retrieved from http://www.brasil.gov.br

Mulholland, Timothy, and Lúcio Rennó. 2008. *Reforma Política em Questão.* Brasília, Brazil: Editora Universidade de Brasília.

Murray. Rainbow. 2007. "The Power of Sex and Incumbency: A Longitudinal Study of Electoral Performance in France." *Party Politics 14*(5):539-554.

--- (Ed.). 2010. *Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling: A Global Comparison of Women's Campaigns for Executive Office.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Murray, Rainbow, and Jennifer Piscopo. (n.d.). "Gendered Media Coverage of Candidates for Executive Office." Unpublished Manuscript.

Muthén, Bengt, and Albert Satorra. 1995. "Complex Sample Data in Structural Equation Modeling." *Sociological Methodology 25*:267-316.

Nicolau, Jairo. 2006. "O Sistema Eleitoral de Lista-Aberta no Brasil." *DADOS – Revista de Ciências Socias 49*(4):689-720.

Norris, Pippa. 1987. *Politics and Sexual Equality: The Comparative Position of Women in Western Democracies*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

PC do B. 2009a, September 9. "Escola do PC do B Marca Novo Curso e Quer Mais Presença Feminina." Retrieved from http://www.pcdob.org.br

---. 2009b, November 30. "Escola Nacional Divulga Programa e Bibliografia do Próximo Curso." Retrieved from http://www.pcdob.org.br

---. 2010, January 28. "Escola Quer Formar Quadros e Estimular Cursos Locais para Eleição." Retrieved from www.pcdob.org.br

---. 2011, December, 6. "Fique Atento ao Curso de Nível III da Escola Nacional." Retrieved from http://www.pcdob.org.br

PMDB. 1986. "Mulheres, Jovens e Negros." São Paulo, Brazil: Fundaço Ulysses Guimarães.

PMDB Mulher. 2012, June 14. "PMDB Fortalece o Núcleo Feminino do Partido." Retrieved from http://www.pmdb.org.br/noticias

PT. 2011, September 4. "Mulheres Petistas Vibram com a Aprovação da Paridade de Gênero para o Estatuto do PT." Retrieved from www.pt.org.br

---. 2012ª, May 10. "Resolução sobre Gastos de Recursos do Fundo Partidário com Mulheres." Meeting of the National Executive Commission, São Paulo. Retrieved from http://www.pt.org.br

---. 2012b, March 8. "Secretária Nacional de Mulheres do PT Diz que Partido Vai Passar por Transformação com a Paridade de Gênero nos Cargos de Comando." Retrieved from http://www.pt.org.br

Paiva, Raquel. 2008. *Política: Palavra Feminina.* Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Mauad Editora Ltda.

Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Paraguassu, Mara. 2008. "As Eleições para a Câmara dos Deputados em 2002 e 2006: Grandes Partidos Elegendo Menos Mulheres." Master's Thesis. Universidade do Legislativo Brasileiro, Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso do Sul.

Paxton, Pamela, Melanie Hughes, and Matthew Painter. 2011. "Growth in Women's Political Representation: A Longitudinal Exploration of Democracy, Electoral System and Gender Quotas." *European Journal of Political Research 49*:25-52.

Paxton, Pamela and Sheri Kunovich. 2003. "Women's Political Representation: The Importance of Ideology." *Social Forces 82*(1):87-114.

Paxton, Pamela, Sheri Kunovich, and Melanie Hughes. 2007. "Gender in Politics." *Annual Review of Sociology 33*:263-284.

Pedersen, Mogens N. 1979. "The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility." *European Journal of Political Research 7*(1):1-26.

Perissé, Gabriel. 2010. "Laranja Ingênua...ou Não." *Palavras e Origens: Considerações Etimológicas.* Retrieved from http://palavraseorigens.blogspot.com

Peron, Isadora. 2012, March 7. "80 Anos após o Voto Feminino, Papel das Mulheres na Política ainda é Pequeno." *Estado de São Paulo.* Retrieved from http://www.estadao.com.br

Perondi, Regina Heurich. 2007. *Partidos Políticos e Terceiro Setor.* Brasília, Brazil: Fundaço Ulysses Guimarães.

Peters, B. Guy. 2005. *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism.'* (2nd ed.). London, United Kingdom: Continuum.

Pierson, Paul. 2004. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pinheiro, Luana Simões. 2007. *Vozes Femininas na Política*. Brasília, Brazil: Secretaria Especial de Políticas para as Mulheres.

Pinto, Céli Regina Jardim. 1994. "Mulher e Política no Brasil: Os Impasses do Feminismo, Enquanto Mmovimento Social, Face as Regras do Jogo da Democracia Representativa." *Estudos Feministas 2*(2):256-270.

Planalto (Office of the Presidency). 2012. "Ministérios." Retrieved from "http://www2.planalto.gov.br/presidencia/ministros/ministerios

Power, Timothy. 2000. *The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization*. College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Power, Timothy, and James Garand. 2007. "Determinants of Invalid Voting in Latin America." *Electoral Studies 26*:432-444.

Power, Timothy, and J. Timmons Roberts. 1995. "Compulsory Voting, Invalid Ballots, and Abstention in Brazil." *Political Research Quarterly 48*(4):795-826.

Power, Timothy, and Cesar Zucco. 2009. "Estimating Ideology of Brazilian Legislative Parties, 1990–2005: A Research Communication." *Latin American Research Review 44*(1), 218-246.

---. 2011. "Elite Preferences in a Consolidating Democracy: The Brazilian Legislative Surveys, 1990-2009." Unpublished Manuscript, Oxford University.

Quinn, Sheila. 2009. *Gender Budgeting: Practical Implementation.* Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe.

Radio Primerisima. 2011. "FSLN Incorpora a Jóvenes y Mujeres a Todos sus Órganos." Retrieved from http://www.rlp.com.ni

Rahat, Gideon, and Reuven Hazan. 2001. "Candidate Selection Methods: An Analytical Framework." *Party Politics 7*(3):297-322.

Randall, Vicky (Ed.). 1988. *Political Parties in the Third World*. London, United Kingdom: Sage.

Randall, Vicky, and Lars Svåsand. 2002. "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies." *Party Politics 8*(1):5-29.

Robinson, William. 1990. "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals." *American Sociological Review 15*:351-357.

Rodrigues, Leôncio Martins. 2002. *Partidos, Ideologia e Composição Social: Um Estudo das Bancadas Partidárias na Câmara dos Deputados*. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo.

Rodrigues, Lima. 2012, June 19. "Bel Mesquita Anuncia Oficialmente que Compôs Chapa com o PT." *Jornal Successo – Panoramio Noturno de Parauapebas*. Retrieved from http://jornalg3.blogspot.com

Rodríguez, Victoria. 2003. *Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics*. Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press.

Rosenbluth, Frances, Rob Salmond, and Michael Thies. 2006. "Welfare Works: Explaining Female Legislative Representation." *Politics & Gender 2*(2):163-192.

Roza, Vivian, Beatriz Llanos, and Gisela Garzón de la Roza. 2010. *Partidos Políticos y Paridad: La Ecuación Pendiente*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Rudman, Laurie. 1998. "Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of Counterstereotypical Impression Management." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74*:629-645.

Rule, Wilma. 1987. "Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies." *Western Political Quarterly 40*:477-498.

Rule, Wilma, and Joseph Zimmerman. 1994. *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspectives: Their Impact on Women and Minorities*. London, United Kingdom: Greenwood Press.

Sacchet, Teresa. 2007. "Political Parties and Women's Leadership in Latin America." Prepared for the IAD/IADB/LWV/OAS Conference, *Women in the Americas: Paths to Political Power*.

Salmond, Rob. 2006. "Proportional Representation and Female Parliamentarians." *Legislative Studies Quarterly 31*(2):175-204.

Samuels, David. 1999. "Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-centric Electoral Systems: Evidence from Brazil." *Comparative Political Studies 32*(4):487-518.

---. 2001a. "Money, Elections, and Democracy in Brazil." *Latin American Politics and Society 43*(2):27-48.

--- 2001b. "Does Money Matter? Campaign Finance in Newly Democratic Countries: Theory and Evidence from Brazil." *Comparative Politics 34*:23-42.

---. 2003. *Ambition, Federalism and Legislative Politics in Brazil*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

---. 2008. "Political Ambition, Candidate Recruitment, and Legislative Politics in Brazil." In *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*, Eds. Scott Morgenstern and Peter Siavelis. State College, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, Pp. 76-91.

Santos, Fabiano. 2000. "Deputados Federais e Instituições Legislativas no Brasil: 1946-99." In Renato Boschi, Eli Diniz, and Fabio Santos (Eds.) *Elites Políticas e Econômicas no Brasil Contemporâneo: A Desconstrução da Ordem Corporativa*

e o Papel do Legislativo no Cenário Pós-Reformas. São Paulo, Brazil: Konrad Adenauer, Pp.91-117.

Sartori, Giovani. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Schedler, Andreas. 1995. "Under- and Overinstitutionalization: Some Ideal Typical Propositions Concerning New and Old Party Systems." Kellogg Institute Working Paper #213, University of Notre Dame.

Schelling, Thomas. 1978. *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.

Schlesinger, Joseph. 1966. *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States.* Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Schmidt, Gregory. 2003. "Unanticipated Successes: Lessons from Peru's Experiences with Gender Quotas in Majoritarian Closed List and Open List PR Systems." Presented at International IDEA Workshop. Lima, Peru.

---. 2008. "The Election of Women in List PR Systems: Testing the Conventional Wisdom." *Electoral Studies 28*(2):190-203.

Schubert, Renate. 2006. "Analyzing and Managing Risks – On the Importance of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes." *Managerial Finance 32*(9):706-715.

Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science 50*(3):570-585.

---. 2010. *Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie, Michael Malecki, and Brian Crisp. 2010. "Candidate Gender and Electoral Success in Single Transferable Vote Systems." *British Journal of Political Science 40*(3):693-709.

Secretary of Women's Affairs. 2010. Evolução dos indicadores sociais sobre as mulheres no Brasil. Retrieved from http://www.maismulheresnopoderbrasil.com.br

Senado Federal. 2004. *As Senadoras: Dados Biográficos, 1979-2004*. Brasília, Brazil: Senado Federal.

Serapião, Fabio. 2011, September 21. "De Olho em 2012, Russomanno Deve Trocar PP por PRB." *O Estado de São Paulo*. Retrieved from http://blogs.estadao.com.br

Shugart, Matthew, Melody Valdini, and Kati Suominen. 2005. "Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators Under Proportional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science 49*(2):437-449.

Simmons, Beth. 1998. "Compliance with International Agreements." *Annual Review of Political Science 1*:75-93.

Souza, Sílvia Rita. 2008. *A Mulher Candidata – Guia para Disputar Eleições*. Brasília, Brazil: Sílvia Souza.

Stevens, Evelyn. 1973. "Machismo and Marianismo" *Society 10*(6):57-63.

Streb, Matthew, Barbara Burrell, Brian Frederick, and Michael Genovese. 2008. "Social Desirability Effects and Support for a Female American President." *Public Opinion Quarterly 72*(1):76-89.

Studart, Hugo. 2012, June 21. "O Contubérnio Ilícito entre Lula e Maluf." *Brasil 24/7.* Retrieved from http://brasil247.com

Studlar, Dudley, and Ian McAllister. 1991. "Political Recruitment to the Australian Legislature: Towards an Explanation of Women's Electoral Disadvantages." *Western Political Quarterly 44*:467-485.

---. 2003. "Does a Critical Mass Exist? A Comparative Analysis of Women's Legislative Representation since 1950." *European Journal of Political Research 41*:233-253.

Suplicy, Marta. 1996. "Novos Paradigmas nas Esferas de Poder." *Estudos Feministas 4*(1):126-137.

Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects of Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Tarouco, Gabriela da Silva. 2010. "Institucionalização Partidária no Brasil (1982-2006)." *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política 4*:169-186.

Temer, Michel. 2009, March 11. "Ações Concretas para Ampliar a Participação Política das Mulheres." *Jornal da Câmara 2210*, Pp. 1-12. Retrieved from http://www.camara.gov.br/internet/jornal/jc20090311.pdf

Terra. 2006, October 4. "AC: Tião Viana é o Senador Mais Votado do Brasil." Retrieved from http://noticias.terra.com.br

Thames, Frank. 2005. "A House Divided: Party Strength and the Mandate Divide in Hungary, Russian, and Ukraine." *Comparative Political Studies 38*(3):282-303.

Thames, Frank, and Margaret Williams. 2010. "Incentives for Personal Votes and Women's Representation in Legislatures." *Comparative Political Studies 43*(12): 1575-1600.

Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science 2*(June):369-404.

Thomas, Melanee, and Marc Bodet. 2011. "Sacrificial Lambs No More? Women Candidates and Party Competitiveness in Canada." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Tremblay, Manon. 2008. *Women and Legislative Representation: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Sex Quotas.* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). 1994-2010. Electoral Results and Statistics. Retrieved from http://tse.gov.br/internet/eleicoes.htm

Tripp, Aili, and Alice Kang. 2008. "The Global Impact of Quotas: On the Fast Track to Increased Female Legislative Representation." *Comparative Political Studies 41*:338-361.

TV Seridó. 2009, March 27. "Conversa com Deputada Fátima Bezerra." Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18u36y9wTA0

United Nations Development Report. 2009. *Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org

---. 2010. *The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org

UN Women. 2012. Gender Responsive Budgeting. Retrieved from http://www.gender-budgets.org

Valdini, Melody. 2010. "Democracy or Diversity: The Effect of the Personal Vote on the Representation of Women." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA.

Waiselfisz, Julio Jacobo. 2012. *Mapa da Violência: Caderno Complentar 1: Homicídio de Mulheres no Brasil.* São Paulo, Brazil: Instituto Sangari. Retrieved from http://mapadaviolencia.org.br/pdf2012/mapa2012_mulher.pdf

Weingast, Barry, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1995. *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions*. (Eds.) Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Weyland, Kurt. 1996. *Democracy Without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

---. 2002. "Limitations of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for the Study of Latin American Politics." *Studies in Comparative International Development 37*(1):57-85.

Wolbrecht, Christina, and David E. Campbell. 2007. "Leading by Example: Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models." *American Journal of Political Science 51*(4):921-939.

World Values Survey 1981-2008. 2009. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.

Wylie, Kristin. 2011. "Institutional Change and Sacrificial Lambs: Explaining the Underperformance of Female Candidates to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies in 2010." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Vita

Kristin Noella Wylie was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on March 2, 1980, to Stephen Russell Wylie, Senior, and Kathleen Bardy Wylie. She attended the Louisiana State University (LSU) Laboratory School from 1985 to 1998, and received the TOPS Honors Award to fund her four years of study at LSU. She was accepted into the LSU Honors College in 1998, and earned the Sophomore Honors Distinction in 2000. As a participant in the National Student Exchange, Kristin spent two semesters at the College of Charleston (2000-2001). She graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and minors in History and International Studies from LSU in 2002. Kristin received the Academic Competitive Scholarship and Tinker Travel Award from the Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of Texas at Austin (UT), where she completed a Masters of Arts in 2005. Since joining the Government Department at UT in 2005, Kristin has won several fellowships including the: Graduate Student Professional Development Awards (2008, 2010, 2011), Macdonald Dissertation Fellowship (2008, 2009), Lozano Long Study and Research Abroad Fellowship (2008), Anna Luiza Ozorio Field Research Grant (2008), and Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Clifford C. Clogg Scholarship (2007) and Government Department Fellowship (2007). Kristin has presented her research at a number of national and international conferences. She will spend the 2012-2013 academic year as a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the State University of New York in Geneseo.

Permanent address (or email): kristinwylie@gmail.com

This dissertation was typed by Kristin Noella Wylie.