INCOMUG TELEGRAM Departnzent of State NNNNVVV FHE556CA328 PP RUEHCR DE R FHJA_ 08 161172,Z Info P 161700Z ZEA_ ·n 'r 5 · · .. FM USBEB_BEJfL LNJ , tV, · .. ,0 .9 ' { T 0 RUE HCR /SE CST ATE WASHD C 17 39 PR I OR I T.,Y,..-. INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1568 PRIORI1T·YJUiiJ 16 Pl.1 3 OO RUFHD N/ .AMEMBASSY LONDON 661 PH I OR IT Y .. RUFHPAIAMEMBASSY PARIS 726 PRIORITY RUDLSK/USNMR SHAPE FOR BURNS UNN PRIORITY RuFLC/uSCI NCEUR FOR POL AD UNN PR I ORIT yRUFLUE/uSELMLO UNN PRIORITY RUrPAG/USAREUR FOR POLAD UNN PRIORITY RUFPBW/USAFE UNN PRIORITY ZEN/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 654 PRIORITY ST ATE GRNC . BT -G 0 N F I D E N T I-A L ~ JU NE 16 PARIS ALSO FOR USRO SUBJ: EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER FLIGHTS REFS: BONNTEL .4859 TO DEPT (!3) BERLINTEL 1721 TO DEPT 1554 TO BONN L I M D I S FROM AMBASSADOR MCGHEE l· AMB. SEYDOUX, IN HIS MEETING YESTERDAY WITH AMB. A~RASIMOv, DID NOT RECEIVE ANY SATISFACTORY REPLY CONCERNING THE FLIGHTS OF EAST GERMAN HELICOPTERS IN THE BCZ. A8RASIMOV MERELY NOTED SEYDoux·s PAGE TWO RUF HJ A 089 -e-i>--N-F -9-E N T I A t-EXPOSE AND SAID HE wouLm INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTIN WITH THE LATTER •S REPLY TO THE TRIPARTITE NOTE OF MAY 6. I THEREFORE BE­LIEVE .THAT WE MUST MOVE URGENTLY TO MORE POSITIVE MEASURES TO DIS­COURAGE A CONTINUATION OF THESE FLIGHTS. I AM CONCERNED THAT OUR FAILURE TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES NOW WILL LEAD THE EAST GERMANS AND THE SOVS T'O CONCLUDE THAT WE DO NOT STRONGLY OPPOSE THEM. THIS WILL MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT AND RISKY TO INDUCE THEM TO ABANDON THE PRACTICE LATER, OR AT LEAST THOSE ASPECTS OF IT WHICH WE FIND MOST OBJECTIONABL£. .. 'If' ' ,... .li...r''fi::f ·~-.-w· ".,,. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS "=· C_· "·_~.!.J._·_ _ ___.~'_·_.d__'~r.8_"'-~-----PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" y c -2-1617002 JUNE, FROM USBER BERLIN 2. · SPECIFICALLY, I RECOMMEND TH AT USCOB BE AUTHORIZED TO SEND US HEL.ICOPTERS OVtR lAST BERLIN OR TH~ SOV ZON~ UND£R THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES CIT IS ASSUMED THAT A US HELICOPTER WILL BE SENT ALOFT TO FOLLOW, IN THE WESTERN SECTORS, ANY EAST GERMAN HELI­COPTER THAT IS OBERVED TO BE FLYING IN PROXIMITY TO THE BORDER -READY TO CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING): 1 (A) WHEN AN EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER OVERFLIES WEST BERLIN. IN THIS CASE THE _us HELICOPTER WOULD, IF IT CAN GET THERE IN TIME, EN­COUNTER THE EAST GERMAN AIRCRAFT WHILE STILL OVER WEST BERLIN. IT WOULD ATTEMPT BY CLOSE BUT NOT DANGEROUS APPROACHES TO MANEUvER IT our OF WEST BERLIN, FOLLOWINT ·IT FOR A SHORT DISTANCE (300-500 METERS> INTO EAST BERLIN OR THE SOVIET ZONE . CB> WHEN AN EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER FLIES IN THE BCZ OUTSIDE WEST BERLIN BUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CONSTITUTE A HAZ AR D TO S AFETY OF NORMAL AIR TRAFFIC LEAVING AND DEP ARTING WEST BERLIN AIRFIELDS. TO THE EXTENT COMPATIBLE WITH AIR SAFETY, THE US HELICOPTER WOULD ATTEMPT BY CLOASE BUT NOT DANGEROUS APPR OCHES TO MANEUvER IT our OF THE AREA WHEREIN IT CONSTITUTES A HAZARD. CC> WHEN AN EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER FLIES IN A P ARTICUL ARLY PRO-· VOCATIVE WAY NEAR TO WEST BERLIN, EVEN THOUGH NOT OVER IT. A PERSISTENT FLIGHT ALONG THE \~EST BERLIN BOUNDARY WOULD BE SUCH AN OCCASION, AS WOULD A FLIGHT UP TO THE BORDER AT CHECKPOINT CHARLIE OR OTHER PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE POINT COVER STEINSTUECKEN, FO~­ANOTHER EXAMPLE>. IN SUCH CASES THE US HELICVPTER WOULD CROSS THE WEST BERLIN BOUNDARY AND APPROACH THE OTHER AIRCRAFT. IT WOULD FOLLOW IT OR FLY ALONGSIDE IT, NOT NECESSARILY AT­TEMPTING TO CHASE IT AWAY. (0) IN ANY OF THE ABOVE CASES IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE US HELICOPTER WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LOCATE THE EAST GERMAN ON ARRIVAL AT THE POINT OF THE SIGHTING. IN SUCH A CASE, THE US IRCRAFT WOULD CROSS THE BORDER AND FLY FOR TEN MINUTES OR SO IN SEARCH OF THE OTHER, THEN RETURN. . CE> IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE TYPES CA THROUGH C) OF FOLLOWING OR ACCOMPANYING US FLIGHTS RELATED TO SPECIFIC EAST GERMAN FLIGHTS CON¥ I ™'F-rAl:I ­ ' / / • • .eoNF!DEfv'fIAt ­ -3 7002 JUNE , FROM USBER BERLIN P G FOUR UFHJ 089 {;~-i N + I A I:= W SHOULD CO~'DUCT A SEPARATE BRIEF DEMONSTRATIVE FLIGHT OVER EAST ERL! N OR PLACES AT OUR OWN CHOOSING, BUT NOT OVER INTELLIGENCE TARGETS, --SAY FOR 5 TO 10 MINUTES --JUST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE T E CH EAST GERMAN INCIDENT. 3. I FULLY AGREE WITH USBER AND GENERAL · FRANKLIN (REF B PARA 5)THAT IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO SEND UNARMED AMERICAN HELICOPTERS BEYOND THE BORDERS OF WEST BERLIN TO DEAL WITH EAST GERMAN HELI­COPTERS THAT ARE VERY LIKELY TO BE ARMED. · I BELIEVE ARMED HU-18 HELICOPTERS SHOULD BE FURNISHED TO USCOB FOR THIS PURPOSE ONCE AUTHORIZATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO CONDUCT FLIGHTS OUTSIDE WEST BERL! N. I UNDERSTAND IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE TO INST ALL ARMAMENT ON HELICOPTERS NOW BASED IN BERLIN. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE ARMED AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE BROUGHT HERE UNTIL WE ARE DECIDED TO USE THEM, HOWEVER. THE ARMAMENT IS CONSPICIOUS AND WOULD COME QUI CKL Y T 0 PU BL I C AT TE NT I 0 N • IT W 0 UL D BE EM B ARR ASS I NG T 0 BR I N G THEM IN AND THEN NOT PROCEED QUICKLY TO USE THEM MEAN WHILE, FOR ANY FLIGHTS OUTSIDE WEST BERL I N PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF ARMED HELICOPTERS, GENERAL FRANKLIN INTENDS TO STATION IN THE US HELICOPTER A SOLDIE~ PASSENGER CARRYING AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON OUT OF VIEW. I CONCUR IN HIS INTENTION. IN FACT, I BELIEVE THIS WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE FOR DEALING WITH EAST GERMAN HELICOPTERS WITHIN WEST BERLIN. PAGE FIVE RUFHJA 089 ~-N--F--~~-f) g N T·-l A L I 4. IN Ci>NNECTION WITH THESE RECOMMENDATIONS IT IS SIGNIFIC NT TO NOTE THAT LAST EVENING, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH MINISTER CALHOUN, BOTH GOVMAYOR BRANDT AND CDU OPPOSITION LEADER AMREHN SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF BERLIN PUBLIC OPINION THAT THERE BE FURTHER US HELICOPTER OVERFLIGHTS OF EAST BERLIN IN RESPONSE TO THESE EAST GERMAN PROVOCATIONS. AMREHN STRESSED THAT HE AND OTHER BERLINERS HAD NOTED WITH CONCERN THAT PERIODIC US OVERFLIGHTS HAO NOT TAKEN PLACE FOR MANY MONTHS IN CONTRAST TO THE EARLIER REGULAR PATTERN OF SUCHFLIGHTS. HE URGED THAT THESE FLIGHTS BE RESUMED IMMEDIATELY. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT RECOMMEND A RESUMPTION OF THE PATTERN OF OUR FLIGHTS PRIOR TO DECEMBER 23, 1964, THIS CONCERN OF THE WEST BERLIN ATTITUDE REINFORCES MY BELIEF THAT URGENT STEPS ALONG THE LINES NOW RECOMMENDED ARE NOW NECESSARY TO BRING THE NEW EAST GERMAN PRACTICE UNDER CONTROL. MY RATIONALE IN THIS REGARD IS DICTATED BY THE JUDGMENT THAT THE RESUMPTION OF REGULAR FLIGHTS ON OUR OLD PATTERN WOULD SERVE TO ESCALATE EAST GERMAN HELICOPTER ACTIVITY IN THE BERLIN AREA BY INVITING FLIGHTS ON THE PART OF THE EAST GERMANS IN REPRISAL. THE LIMITATION OF OUR FLIGHTS TO FOLLOWING EAST GERMAN FLIGHTS AND TO DEMONSTRATIVE ACTION IN OBVIOUS DIRECT RET LIATION AGAINS ASi cna MAN P'l..X . HTS Wll..l. . B!'.:l..IltVi H va: rwi;: OP OSI TE ErfiECT OF DISCOURAGING FURTHER EAST GERMAN FLIGHTS. GP-4 C LHOUN BT