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Creating Political Opportunities: Civil Society Organizations, Advocacy, and Policy Influence in Argentina and Chile

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Creating Political Opportunities: Civil Society Organizations, Advocacy, and Policy Influence in Argentina and Chile

by

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Much of the existing literature on Latin American democracies leads us to expect limited civil society involvement in policy making. Scholars tend to emphasize a plethora of institutional, structural, and societal factors that conspire against meaningful citizen participation in the region. However, in the dissertation, I demonstrate that non-governmental organizations and other civil society groups have managed to exert considerable influence over policy making. In some cases, they have been effective agents of change through their efforts to shape the content of policy, collaborate with government officials, and pressure legislators to adopt reforms. This finding is puzzling given the received wisdom, which suggests that groups' advocacy efforts will meet with little success.

The main goal of my project is to explain why some civil society organizations are more likely than others to achieve policy influence in democratizing countries.

Focusing on the strategies that groups use to influence the policy process, I identify two important "pathways" to participation: the successful framing of issues and the formation of effective civil society alliances. I argue that when civil societal actors frame ideas in persuasive ways and join forces in alliances, they increase their chances of participating in policy agenda setting, formulation, and adoption. This approach helps solve the puzzle of influence in environments where access to the political system is restricted and/or individual groups lack resources and political strength.

I test the theory with empirical evidence collected in Argentina and Chile. Specifically, I perform a comparative analysis of multiple cases of policy making drawn from three issue areas: the environment, the rights and well-being of children, and transparency in government institutions. By offering an original theory of civil society participation in policy, I seek to bridge a lacuna in the democratization literature, which has largely neglected this theme, and to contribute to the comparative politics field. The central themes motivating my research are political participation and influence, the exercise of citizenship, and the impact of civil society activism in democratizing nations. These themes have implications for both the consolidation and the quality of democracy.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

General:

CSO	Civil society organization
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IGO	Intergovernmental organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OAS	Organization of American States
SMO	Social movement organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	US Agency for International Development

Argentina:

ADC	Civil Rights Association
ADI	Children's Rights Association
APDH	Permanent Assembly for Human Rights
CASACIDN	Committee for the Monitoring and Application of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child
CEDEM	Women's Studies Center
CELS	Center for Legal and Social Studies
CELIJ	Center for Legal Studies of Children and Youth
CENOC	National Center for Community Organizations
CESPEDH	Center for Political and Social Studies for Human Development
CIPPEC	Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth
CIRSA	Integrated Center for Social Rehabilitation
CODESEDH	Committee for the Defense of Health, Ethics, and Human Rights
CONAF	National Council of Childhood, Adolescence, and the Family
FARN	Environment and Natural Resources Foundation
INECIP	Institute of Comparative Studies in Penal and Social Sciences
SERPAJ	Peace and Justice Service
UCR	Radical Party

Chile:

ACCION	Chilean Association of NGOs
ACHNU	Chilean Association Pro United Nations
ASONG	Association of NGOs
CIPMA	Environmental Research and Planning Center

CODEFF	National Committee for the Defense of Fauna and Flora
CONAMA	National Environmental Commission
DOS	Division of Social Organizations
IEP	Political Ecology Institute
MIDEPLAN	Planning and Cooperation Ministry
PET	Economy of Work Program
RENACE	National Network for Ecological Action
RN	National Renovation Party
SENAME	National Service for Minors
UDI	Independent Democratic Union

Chapter 1: Theoretical Perspectives

CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

In the early 2000s, Argentina was mired in a profound economic, social, and political crisis. As a result of the nation's economic debacle, more than one-half of the population and an estimated two-thirds of all children were living in poverty.[1] Growing numbers of children were abandoning school, working in the informal economy, and suffering — and dying — from malnutrition. During this period, disgust with governing elites increased to epic proportions, as the public repudiated the policies that had brought only "hunger and misery."[2] Indeed, scores of Argentines clamored for the removal of *all* politicians from power. Perceptions that corruption was rampant within the country's institutions also fueled the flames of discontent.

In the midst of the crisis, various civil society groups sought policy change. Children's advocates called attention to the plight of Argentina's youth, while proponents of political reform pushed for greater transparency in government institutions. Some of these groups fared better than others in their attempts to engage and influence the policy process. At times, civil societal actors succeeded in articulating demands, contributing information and analysis, and collaborating with policy makers.

Throughout the dissertation, I examine advocacy efforts such as these and explain why certain civil society organizations (CSOs) are more likely to achieve policy

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[1] The sources for these figures are Cáritas Argentina and Fundación SES.

influence. Drawing on empirical evidence from Argentina and Chile, I demonstrate that non-governmental organizations and other CSOs in Latin America have managed to exert considerable influence over policy making in some instances. This finding is surprising in light of the existing literature, which leads us to expect limited civil society involvement in policy decision making and influence in democratizing countries. Although scholarly works seldom address these themes directly, they often suggest that successful advocacy is unlikely. The literature on Latin American democracies in particular discusses an array of institutional, structural, and societal factors that conspire against meaningful citizen participation and policy engagement.

To begin with, scholars often underscore the exclusionary and elitist features of the countries' formal political institutions. In Chile, for example, authoritarian enclaves, *de facto* powers vested in designated senators, the military, and other non-elected individuals, and the over-representation of the right in the legislature all contribute to the nation's status as a "protected" democracy (e.g., Bickford 1998; Posner 1999; Segovia 1999).[3] Similarly, in reference to Argentine politics, scholars frequently emphasize the "delegative" nature of governance (O'Donnell 1994) and presidential rule by decree, or *decretismo* (e.g., Carey and Shugart 1998).[4] Such characteristics bode ill for non-elite inclusion in decision making.

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[2] *Página 12*, issue dated 3/24/03. All translations from the original Spanish are my own.

[3] These features are often considered to be the enduring effects of Chile's pacted transition from authoritarian rule: the concessions that facilitated regime change but have since become "impediments" to further democratization (e.g., Posner 1999).

[4] This is the case despite the fact that Argentina's constitution does not bear the mark of a constrained, pacted transition and even includes "semi-direct" democratic mechanisms (i.e., popular initiatives and referenda). For a critique of the delegative democracy argument, see Peruzzotti (2001).

Analysts also argue that political parties — for instance, the "renovated" parties of Chile's *Concertación* — are increasingly distant and insulated from their constituents, especially the popular sectors (Barrera 1999; Greaves 2001; Posner 1999; Roberts 1998; Segovia 1999).[5] These observations tie into a broader debate surrounding the "decline" of the region's representative and intermediary institutions (Hagopian 1998; see also Chalmers et al. 1997; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002). State-society linkages have undergone a process of transformation and disarticulation, and scholars are uncertain as to whether new modes of representation are replacing the old.[6] Corporatism, for example, is largely viewed as an arrangement from a bygone era that is incompatible with the neoliberal state's diminished role in economic production, regulation, and distribution (e.g., Barrera 1999; Bickford 1999; Johnson 2001; Panfichi et al. n.d.; Robinson 1998).[7]

In fact, Latin American specialists trace a number of political quandaries to the hegemony of neoliberalism.[8] First among these is the prevalence of technocratic policy making: when most parties and politicians serve merely as custodians of the neoliberal

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[5] In recent years, the rightist UDI (Independent Democratic Union) has endeavored to become Chile's new "people's party" by reaching out to grassroots leaders and unionists. Political parties historically have penetrated civil society and played an intermediary role between ruling elites and social groups in Chile (Oxhorn 1995).

[6] Hagopian (1998) inquires as to whether such changes indicate a secular decline, a transformation, or merely a temporary "pause" in representation in democratizing polities. Friedman and Hochstetler (2002) explore the possibility of CSOs playing a representational role, while Chalmers et. al suggest that "associative networks," discussed below, are emerging as a "new structure of representation for the popular sectors" (1997, 543).

[7] In contrast, some scholars (e.g., Weyland 1997) use the concept of neo-corporatism to elucidate neoliberal economic reforms. Beginning in the 1930s, corporatist arrangements became more common across Latin America. In corporatist systems of interest articulation and representation, the state recognizes and grants a representational monopoly to certain private, corporate actors organized into hierarchical units (Schmitter 1974). The state includes these actors (e.g., business and labor) in policy making, often through institutions designed for consultation and bargaining.

[8] Neoliberalism has become shorthand for various pro-market reforms, which usually entail state retrenchment from the economic and social realms — through privatization, deregulation, the reform of

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model, few political alternatives are available, and the preferences of certain segments of the populace must be ignored.[9] Additionally, international financial institutions and other entities beyond the reach of citizens sometimes constrain (or impose) economic and social policies (e.g., Roxborough 1997; Vilas 1997).[10] Moreover, as the public sector's social welfare responsibilities and expenditures decrease, programs are contracted out to CSOs, prompting some to conclude that the state "harnesses" civil societal actors, placing their expertise and labor in the service of neoliberalism (Gideon 1998; see also Dagnino 2003).[11] Several scholars warn that organizations involved in policy implementation risk serving as "transmission belts" for government policies, "with a consequent loss of autonomy, initiative, and capacity for critical assessment" (Loveman 1995, 138; see also Cardelle 1998; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Foweraker 2001; Pearce 1997).[12]

Some analysts argue from a structuralist perspective that neoliberalism and socioeconomic marginalization have weakened vast segments of the citizenry. For example, Roberts suggests that the demobilization of organized labor and grassroots

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social welfare, social spending reductions, and a shift away from universal entitlements — trade liberalization and export promotion, labor market "flexibilization," and currency adjustments.

[9] Analysts of Chilean politics generally conclude that policy making is characterized by intra-elite bargaining, which privileges business interests (Bickford 1998; Cardelle 1998; Drake and Jaksic 1999).

[10] Thus, citizens often view the political system as an irrelevant mechanism for solving socioeconomic problems and helping families meet their needs (Cavarozzi 2000; Powers 2001).

[11] According to this new policy agenda, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are cost-effective, innovative, and "close" to the poor or other groups targeted for social programs in such areas as health, agriculture, and habitat. These views are closely linked to the international donor community's enthusiasm for civil society and its ostensible contributions to "good governance," democracy, and development, which I discuss below.

[12] Furthermore, groups bogged down with policy implementation are arguably less able to dedicate resources to advocacy (or trying to shape the actual content of policies). However, some argue that this role does not preclude their ability to engage in advocacy and that groups gain technical expertise, contacts within the government, credibility, and visibility by performing this role effectively. These resources position them well to influence policies (Interview in Cáritas Argentina, National Committee, 4/8/03, Buenos Aires; see also Najam 1999 and Taylor and Warburton 2003).

actors, the suppression of their demands, the unequal distribution of economic and political power, and social atomization have accompanied neoliberal reforms and authoritarian experiments in "market individualism" (1998, 161; see also Barton 2002, Petras and Leiva 1994, Posner 2003).[13] The model apparently necessitates the political exclusion of working class and other social movements.

Other scholars posit the "demobilization" of civil society in a more general sense. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) contend that civil society "surges" during the initial transition to democracy and then "declines" as political society returns to center stage.[14] According to Fitzsimmons (2000), many of the organizations that manage to survive this process subsequently retreat from conventional politics. To illustrate, "remobilized" groups in Chile tend to be "depoliticized" and detached from policy making and government institutions. Even if CSOs somehow retain an interest in engaging the political system, they are said to lack the organizational resources necessary to achieve influence. Groups that resemble the National Rifle Association or American Association of Retired Persons, with their large, dues-paying memberships, are uncommon. Furthermore, philanthropy in developing areas is not on a par with support of non-profits in wealthier nations; consequently, Latin American civil societies generally comprise

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[13] Posner likewise contends that "structural reforms have in many instances weakened collective actors and undermined incentives for collective action" (2003, 39). Some scholars suggest further that neoliberalism threatens classic understandings of citizenship based on universal human rights and egalitarianism, which are being supplanted by market-based conceptions that view individuals as consumers or producers (e.g., Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Dagnino 2003; Nardacchione 2000; Schild 2000; Taylor 1998).

[14] Social movement scholars also note this post-transition decline in mobilization, often attributing the pattern to elite-driven transitions, limited forms of democracy, authoritarian legacies, and the neoliberal model (e.g., De la Maza 1999; Hipsher 1998; Oxhorn 1995; Taylor 1998). Some also detect "mobilization fatigue" among activists after years of struggle against dictatorship (Craske 1999).

groups with less funding compared to the better-endowed non-profit sectors of more developed areas.

Stated briefly, the received wisdom suggests that citizens generally enjoy limited opportunities to engage government institutions and officials, and civil societal actors lack the political resources and strength required for effective advocacy. Scholars often describe the region's democracies as "socially disembedded:" "nominally democratic rule rests on the absence — and even the active destruction — of political links both within civil society and between it and the state" (Chalmers et al. 1997, 552). Observers use a wealth of other adjectives to modify democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997). In Chile, for instance, democracy is "cupular" (Bickford 1999) and "restricted" (Barrera 1999; Drake and Jaksic 1999); in Argentina, it is "anemic" (Munck 1997) and "autocratic" (Taylor 1998). Thus, in broad terms, much of the scholarship leads us to expect that CSOs are unlikely to influence policy decision making in Latin American democracies.

In some cases of policy making, civil society's involvement has been scant. However, in other instances, groups have been able to exercise influence over the process. The extent to which CSOs participate in policy making varies significantly both *within* and *across* nations. The dissertation's primary objective is to explain these different levels of involvement and influence in democratizing countries. What factors affect the likelihood that CSOs will participate in the policy process during the agenda-setting, formulation, and adoption phases? Why do some groups exert more influence than others? What accounts for policy influence in environments characterized by resource scarcity, "weak" civil societies, and/or unfavorable political institutions?

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In response to these questions, I identify two important "pathways" to participation: the successful framing of issues and the formation of effective civil society alliances. I argue that groups are more likely to be involved in policy decision making when they frame ideas in persuasive ways and join forces in alliances. This theoretical approach helps solve the puzzle of seemingly resource-deficient organizations participating in policy making. I suggest that civil societal actors can sometimes overcome their political "weakness" by engaging in strategic framing and combining their available resources in alliances. Similarly, the theory explains how CSOs can influence policy even in relatively inhospitable contexts, where most citizens have limited access to institutions and elites. I demonstrate that activists do not merely respond to existing "political opportunities;" they also try to *create* opportunities for participation.[15]

In this dissertation, participation signifies that groups are able to exercise their political "voices" and influence policy debates and decisions. The essential themes motivating my research are the exercise of citizenship and the political impact of civil society activism in democratizing countries. Questions surrounding political participation, voice, and influence have implications for both the *quality* and the *stability* of democracy and are thus of great practical importance to citizens.[16] They also speak to enduring theoretical debates within political science.

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[15] In reference to transnational advocacy, Price contends that "activists not only try to make use of the political opportunity structures they are presented with" but also seek to "make those opportunity structures themselves" (2003, 595; see also Berry 1999; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002 and Tarrow 2001). I define political opportunity structures below.

[16] In this study, I adhere to an "expanded" procedural definition of democracy entailing contestation, participation, civil liberties, and military acquiescence to civilians (Dahl 1971; Karl 1990). Diamond

Yet in spite of their significance for democratic theory and practice, the subjects of civil society advocacy and influence are strangely absent from the literature on "Third Wave" democracies. Scholars of democratization have gravitated toward the study of elites, institutions, *or* civil society. Moving in largely separate orbits, analysts tend to overlook linkages among citizen groups, governing elites, and the political institutions in which policy making unfolds.[17] They commonly argue that *one* set of factors is most decisive for democratic consolidation.

For example, a number of scholars consider institutions to be *the* crucial factor for consolidating democracy (e.g., Mainwaring 1999). Many institutionalist works scarcely mention civil society and lack any "serious consideration of the aspirations of citizens and the way in which they engage democratic institutions" (Hagopian 1998, 101). Meanwhile, of the numerous analysts who examine the relationship between associational life (and/or social capital) and democracy (e.g., Avritzer 2002 & 2000; Brysk 2000; Chalmers 1999; Putnam 1993), few exchange ideas with their institutionalist counterparts.[18] Critics of the "neo-Tocquevilleans" therefore conclude that political

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correctly points out that Dahl's seminal work on polyarchy takes seriously the non-electoral aspects of democracy, including opportunities for citizens to organize and "have multiple, ongoing channels for expression and representation of their interests and values" (1999, 11). Schumpeterian definitions (e.g., Huntington 1991), which reduce democracy to electoral contestation, are too minimalist for an in-depth study of participation.

[17] Noteworthy exceptions are works on Latin American state–civil society relations by Bickford (1999 & 1998), Chalmers et al. (1997), and Friedman and Hochstetler (2002). For a conceptual discussion of interactions between civil society and governments, see Manor (1999).

[18] Existing works on social capital, largely stimulated by Putnam's (1993) research on the topic, are too numerous to cite here. For representative examples, see Armony (2004), Booth and Richard (1998), Edwards and Foley (1998), Edwards, Foley and Diani (2001), and Seligson (1999).

institutions "appear to have been cast away from the debate" on consolidation (Encarnación 2001a, 77; see also Berman 1997).[19]

In short, a theoretical and empirical lacuna characterizes existing scholarship. This gap contrasts dramatically with the frequent discussions of policy involvement and influence in the literature on longstanding democracies, such as the United States. It also is surprising given the widespread interest in democratic consolidation and quality within the comparative politics field.[20] I aim to bridge the gap by exploring interactions among CSOs, elites, and institutions and presenting an original theory of civil society participation and influence. My first task in the present chapter is to elaborate these theoretical arguments. In the following section, I critically assess rival explanations of the dependent variable. Next, I outline the research methods that guided the collection and analysis of the dissertation's empirical data. Finally, I summarize some of the principal contributions of the project. The central goal of this chapter is to lay the theoretical and methodological groundwork for subsequent chapters, in which I test the theory with evidence collected in Argentina and Chile. Throughout the dissertation, I perform a comparative analysis of four cases of policy making drawn from three issue areas: political transparency, the rights and well-being of children, and the environment.

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[19] Encarnación asserts that although Tocqueville himself recognized the importance of such institutions, civil society enthusiasts view them as "colonizing pariahs" (2001a, 77).

[20] In recent years, scholars have shifted their attention from democratic transitions to democratic consolidation, sustainability, and quality. Because transitions typically entail elite negotiations and elections that catapult new leaders into power, works examining this phase of democratization often focus on political society. For instance, rational choice and elite frameworks (e.g., Przeworski 1991; Higley and Gunther 1992, respectively), though different in several respects, share a similar focus on the actions of a few pivotal actors.

THE ARGUMENT

My explanation of civil society participation centers on two main variables: successful framing and effective inter-organizational cooperation in alliances. Figure 1 summarizes how these factors affect policy involvement and influence.

Figure 1: Pathways to Participation

Successful framing	*Successful alliances*

• Motivational elements
    Convey urgency, severity
• Diagnostic elements
    De-emphasize blame
• Prognostic elements
    Provide feasible solution(s)
    Offer positive message(s)
	• Solve scarcity problem by pooling resources
	• Solve coordination problem
	    Create effective division of labor
	• Achieve strength in numbers
	    Present united front
	    Balance diversity and cohesion
	    Collaborate with other alliances

**Policy participation
and influence**

Both variables emphasize civil societal actors' *strategies* and their ability to overcome some of the obstacles summarized above. Indeed, this approach privileges agency over structure. Even in difficult environments, activists can mobilize ideas and resources in strategic, innovative ways. Although existing structural and institutional constraints are significant, my work contains a "bias for hope" (Diamond 1999).

The power of ideas

By using effective strategies for framing and politicizing issues, groups can create opportunities for policy involvement. Successful framing thus represents a significant pathway to participation. Civil societal actors often rely on the persuasiveness of their ideas and information to influence fellow citizens and governing elites endowed with more "authoritative" forms of power (Shepard 2003; Sikkink 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998a).[21] Public interest groups in particular seek to become credible purveyors of ideas and interpreters of reality. By devising creative ways of "spinning" the issues and disseminating their views, they endeavor to shape public discourse and the public agenda. Not surprisingly, some CSOs are more effective than others at performing this ideational work. Understanding their varying degrees of success strengthens our grasp of policy influence.

Although it is necessary to incorporate ideational variables into the study of activism, these generally do not hold as privileged a place in the field of political science as interests and institutions. Nevertheless, recent years have seen a renaissance of inquiry into the role of ideas and norms in politics. Scholars of comparative politics, international relations, and political economy have viewed ideas through different theoretical and methodological lenses, including constructivism, historical

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[21] Scholars such as Dryzek and Habermas (cited in Sikkink 2002) have theorized about "communicative power" in reference to the persuasiveness of information or communication. Analysts suggest that persuasive power and moral authority are relevant when accounting for the influence of international non-state actors, including non-governmental organizations (e.g., Florini 2000). This view is often predicated on the notion that such actors are "weak" relative to states, transnational capital, and other forces in the international political system. However, Price (2003) warns against creating a dichotomy between ideas (or principles) and power, arguing instead that power is not only material, but ideational.

institutionalism, and rational choice models.[22] One of the questions inspiring these varied

works is how ideational factors influence political outcomes (Berman 2001).

An interest in the debate surrounding the usefulness of ideas as explanatory

variables also motivates my research. However, I avoid reifying ideas as "things" or

conceptualizing them in an overly static fashion. I opt instead for a more dynamic and

agency-driven approach to ideational factors: rather than examine ideas *per se*, I explore

the ways in which civil societal actors use ideas strategically. The concept of collective

action framing is a promising tool for just such an examination: frames are not

synonymous with ideas but are ways of *presenting* ideas.[23]

Frame analysis, while under-utilized in political science, has flourished in the

interdisciplinary literature on social movements. In fact, analysts identify collective

action frames, political opportunities, and mobilizing structures as central components of

an "emerging synthesis" in social movement theory (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald

1996).[24] Scholars define framing as "strategic efforts" to fashion shared understandings

that "legitimate and motivate collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, 6;

see also Benford 1997; Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1992; Snow et al.

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[22] The fields of international relations and political economy stand out in this regard (e.g., Clark 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Florini 2000; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Hall 1989; McNamara 1998; Sikkink 1991; Tannenwald 1999). See Berman (2001) for a review of comparative politics works that incorporate ideational factors.

[23] Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002) credit Tarrow for making this distinction.

[24] McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) conceptualize political opportunities as factors external to social movements that influence the timing and type of mobilization; these usually include elite instability and the presence of elite allies, increasing popular access to the political system, and decreasing state repression. Mobilizing structures are formal and informal vehicles — such as social networks — "through which people mobilize and engage in collective action" (1996, 3).

1986; Tarrow 1994).[25]   Frames help encode events, experiences, and actions with meaning (Benford 1997).   Activists use them to identify, interpret, and express grievances and to make demands (Reese and Newcombe 2003; Taylor 2000). Historically, they often have articulated perceived injustices and rights-based claims in their frames.   When frames strike a "responsive chord" by tapping into grievances in compelling ways and suggesting remedies to worrisome problems, they are said to achieve "resonance" (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986).

Activists also use frames to rally others to "take their side" (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002, 12).   The targets of framing are multiple and can include prospective participants, constituents, opponents, and bystanders (Snow and Benford 1992).   Much of the existing scholarship emphasizes how activists and social movement organizations (SMOs) employ frames to mobilize would-be participants.   In other words, they analyze how frames draw individuals into the movement and facilitate the formation of collective identities.[26]   The literature is less clear with respect to the *consequences* of framing strategies for movement goal attainment or outcomes.[27]   As a result, our understanding of

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[25] Zald defines frames as "specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues" to differentiate them from ideology and other concepts (1996, 262).   Social movement scholars are indebted to Goffman's (1974) work, which identifies frames as schemata of interpretation at the level of the individual.   Framing also occurs at the collective and organizational levels (Croteau and Hicks 2003).   Related framing concepts can be found in sociology, cognitive psychology, and other fields (Benford and Snow 1992).

[26] Recurring themes in the literature include frame construction and diffusion, intra-movement frame disputes, and frames shared across different movements.   Burstein, Einwohner and Hollander (1995) define social movements broadly as organized, collective efforts to achieve change.

[27] Cress and Snow's (2000) work is a noteworthy exception.   In their study of homeless movement organizations in cities in the United States, the authors present evidence of the importance of framing for obtaining relief, resources, and rights.   They also consider other variables, such as the use of disruptive tactics.   In general, the social movement literature has been more concerned with movement *emergence* than with movement outcomes (Burstein, Einwohner and Hollander 1995; Cress and Snow 2000; and Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1998).

the interplay between framing and governing elites, political allies, and other targets "outside" of the movement is inadequate.

In addition, scholars usually limit the scope of frame analysis to SMOs and protest movements in spite of its relevance to other types of CSOs. This is a predictable consequence of disciplinary boundaries and literatures neglecting to "talk" to one another (Andrews and Edwards 2004).[28] Nevertheless, analogous processes occur within NGOs, base organizations, and other groups, even though they may not be connected to identifiable social movements or engaged in mass mobilizing activities.

Moreover, few analysts have explored the significance of frame analysis for activism in Latin America.[29] Fewer still have undertaken comparative studies of framing across different countries and issue areas. Instead, works detailing a single case in a particular setting — such as the American civil rights movement — abound. I try to overcome these limitations and demonstrate that framing is a concept with untapped theoretical reserves and broad empirical applicability.

Indeed, framing turns out to be a crucial part of group efforts to mobilize ideas and politicize issues. Through effective frames, CSOs are better poised to disseminate understandings of issues and interpretations of reality, to shape the public agenda, and to capture and retain the attention of decision makers and/or the citizenry. In short, effective framing is a key factor explaining civil society participation in policy. I therefore extend conventional frame analysis by offering a set of novel arguments

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[28] In their review of literature on advocacy in the United States, Andrews and Edwards (2004) suggest that frames are a potentially important way organizations exert political influence but should be considered in tandem with other explanatory factors.

[29] Exceptions include Baldez (2002), Friedman and Hochstetler (2002), and Noonan (1995).

regarding the policy implications of framing. The three main "tasks" of framing identified in the social movement scholarship serve as my point of departure. These include motivational, diagnostic, and prognostic elements (e.g., Benford and Snow 2000).

Motivation, which offers a rationale for collective action, is a major function of framing. Frames often convey urgency, severity, and propriety. Activists commonly use terms such as "crisis" or "emergency" and warn that the problem will persist (or worsen) over time if disregarded. Additionally, frames tend to characterize continued neglect of the problem as morally reprehensible. The *salience* of an issue lies at the heart of motivation, and this aspect has clear relevance for policy making. For instance, CSOs that seek to influence the formal agenda and/or engage in advocacy try to convey at least three messages to policy makers and the public: why "their" cause is important, why it is more urgent or worthwhile than other issues, and why it deserves the immediate attention of the government.

Providing a dramatic "call to arms" is certainly a key objective of framing. By itself, however, this motivational aspect is rarely sufficient for propelling groups into policy-making debates and processes. CSOs also must attend to the diagnostic and prognostic tasks of framing. Diagnostic framing "problematizes and focuses attention on an issue, helps shape how the issue is perceived, and identifies who or what is culpable" (Cress and Snow 2000, 1071). Meanwhile, prognostic framing offers potential solutions to the problem. In brief, frames identify a problem, a responsible actor or institution, and a remedy.

I argue that successful or "policy-friendly" frames contain three strategic elements besides motivation. Activists are better positioned when their diagnostic and prognostic

frames include a positive or constructive message, de-emphasize blame, and propose feasible solutions to pressing problems. The more groups incorporate these characteristics into their framing, the more effective their strategies will be, thus improving their chances of policy involvement.

First, an effective frame contains a *positive* message. CSOs can take as critical or oppositional a stance on an issue as they deem necessary. Nevertheless, it behooves them to include some constructive and/or hopeful element(s) in their frames. To illustrate, even movements strongly opposed to "globalization" (increased trade, capital flows, and economic integration) within Europe, Latin America, and other regions have created a fairly upbeat slogan: "another world is possible." On the other hand, if groups engage mostly in the politics of negation or contradiction, forever arguing *against* something, policy makers may perceive them as having little to offer. Hence, their role in decision making is likely to be limited.

Second, the attribution of *blame* is an integral part of diagnostic framing according to existing scholarship. However, with respect to policy making, frames that emphasize blame over other elements can be more of a hindrance than a help. A dose of flexibility and caution are more politically expedient when articulating who (or what) bears responsibility for social and political ills. For instance, assigning blame to certain powerful elites — as opposed to more "faceless" practices or policies — can threaten these individuals and provoke their active resistance.

Third, organizations enjoy an advantage when their frames suggest *feasible* remedies for problems. To be sure, CSOs often call for large-scale, ambitious change. Indeed, many public interest groups view such demand making as remaining loyal to

their principles, such as the sanctity of human rights or a more just and democratic society. Nevertheless, when groups offer a pragmatic solution (even if they couch it in more grandiose rhetoric), demands appear more realistic and "reasonable." It is also conceivable that elites will integrate the groups' ideas into the content of a policy during the formulation phase and eventually implement the resulting policy. The policy process, usually incremental in nature, can accommodate such inputs. CSOs thus present policy makers with a task within their power to perform. In contrast, frames sometimes communicate that the only response to a structural or institutional problem is to dismantle or transform the entire "system." However justifiable their criticisms may be, groups that underscore the dysfunctional nature of the prevailing social or political order without offering workable proposals are more likely to be sidelined.[30] Moreover, it is beneficial for activists to convince elites that change is not only possible, but desirable — that a new policy accords in some way with their own political agendas, platforms, or preferences. In this sense, frames can appeal not only to altruism, but to self-interest and self-preservation.

CSOs also fare better in the policy arena if they succeed in defending themselves against "counter frames," should they arise. Counter framing is an attempt to invalidate or undermine an interpretive framework or rendition of reality (Benford & Snow 2000).[31] It occurs when opposition forces — for example, other civil societal actors or members of political parties — publicly challenge one's diagnostic and prognostic framing. Groups

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[30] This argument holds under ordinary political circumstances (as opposed to a regime change or other extraordinary circumstances).

[31] For a case study of these dynamics as they pertain to abortion politics in the United States, see McCaffrey and Keys (2000).

may find themselves at a disadvantage if they face opponents who are actively producing competing sets of ideas and discourses. Under such circumstances, it is possible that opposition forces will sway decision makers and the public to *their* side. Furthermore, CSOs have to expend energy defending their frames and, at times, their credibility.

In fact, a group's perceived credibility can matter a great deal during the framing process.[32] Its integrity as a "bearer" of ideas commonly rests on expertise, past experience, and proven credentials as a reliable monitor of the state.[33] These characteristics give frames added legitimacy. Civil societal actors in Latin America frequently wear their credentials as monitors of the state like a badge of honor. Some groups emerged during periods of state-sponsored human rights violations and are experienced in holding leaders accountable for their actions. CSOs created more recently likewise have established themselves as monitors and public defenders, building on this inheritance of previous activism. The "watchdog" role, though not unique to the region, is widely respected in countries where abuses of power have occurred. Groups can leverage this credibility and social recognition while engaging in framing (and advocacy

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[32] Benford and Snow (2000) identify the perceived credibility of the frame "articulators" as one of the factors influencing the overall credibility of a frame.

[33] The boundaries separating ideas from information, expertise, and analysis are empirically indistinct. CSOs — and professionalized NGOs in particular — often support their choice of frames with technical information and data.

more generally).[34] Additionally, an organization's ability to propagate frames and reach a broader audience depends largely on its ties to the mass media.[35]

In summary, through motivational framing, groups can attract the attention and interest of governing elites and fellow citizens. They can dramatize an issue, conveying a sense of urgency or severity and calling upon the government to "do the right thing." Nevertheless, CSOs that seek to influence policy during the agenda-setting, formulation, and adoption phases are more likely to do so if their frames include the other elements of diagnostic and prognostic framing outlined here.

Framing strategies account for variation in policy participation better than rival ideational explanations. For example, an alternative approach would emphasize group ideology, defined as a set of beliefs used to interpret the political world and to justify or challenge the dominant order (Zald 1996). Scholars sometimes argue that CSOs with "radical" ideologies or agendas are marginalized from decision making (e.g., Gideon 1998). However, the available evidence is more complex. To begin with, groups may espouse so-called radical views on certain issues and more conciliatory views on others. Depending on a variety of circumstances, they sometimes accentuate the moderate aspects of issues while downplaying the more controversial aspects. Moreover, deciding what constitutes a radical mode of thought across multiple contexts poses a methodological challenge of considerable magnitude. Lastly, a substantial number of the

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[34] Fox (2001), citing evidence from Mexico, argues similarly that CSOs can gain credibility from effective, independent monitoring activities (see also Avritzer 2002). In addition, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2002 & 2001) discuss a form of vertical accountability called "social accountability," which entails monitoring elites, combating corruption, and exposing wrongdoing through legal action, media coverage, and social mobilization. CSOs often contribute to these processes.

CSOs included in this study are internally pluralistic: although their members support the organizational mission, they subscribe to different political ideologies. For these reasons, a focus on ideology *per se* can lead us down a blind alley.[36]

We can draw a similar conclusion about the *nature* of the issue at stake. Analysts occasionally suggest that the characteristics of a given issue or policy domain influence the dynamics between groups and governments. Giugni and Passy (1998), who apply this reasoning to social movements, assert that cooperation with the government is less likely if SMOs work on threatening or contentious issues. Determining which issues hold intrinsic appeal and which ones do not (and for whom) is arduous work. To illustrate, the authors cite environmentalism as an example of a less threatening issue.[37] In Chile and other developing nations, however, green issues are contested — sometimes vehemently. As I will demonstrate in later chapters, "it's not easy being green" in such contexts.

Furthermore, at first glance, the well-being of children seems to be a very appealing cause that taps into deeply ingrained cultural values shared around the world. Brown Thompson (1997) describes it as a "feel good" issue, noting that children are often seen as innocent and vulnerable and that a variety of states and non-governmental actors have championed the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Nevertheless, the degree to which children's CSOs participate in policy varies within and across countries, and we

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[35] On the relationship between framing and the media, see McCarthy, Smith and Zald (1996). Manzetti (2000) and Payne (2000) also address the importance of media exposure for Latin American CSOs seeking political influence.

[36] A group's ideology is important insofar as it affects its framing strategies. However, it is one of many such influences.

[37] Price also notes, "It has long been suspected that activists' efforts are apt to be most effective on issues like the environment" (2003, 598).

must account for this variation. My findings suggest that the extent to which issues

threaten the authorities depends more on framing strategies than on the issue itself.

Frame analysis also allows for an emphasis on agency and the strategic

mobilization of ideas. A focus on the deliberate or purposive aspects of framing does not

amount to an argument that frames are disingenuous or purely contrived. Framing is

seldom completely disconnected from the "true" beliefs or principles of the actors

involved. Rather, my central claim is that groups have significant room for maneuver

while selecting frames, and their strategies for "spinning" ideas have policy implications.

The power of partnerships

In addition to mobilizing ideas, CSOs can combine and mobilize organizational

resources in alliances. If groups form and join effective partnerships, their chances of

policy participation improve markedly. Civil society alliances vary significantly with

respect to their size, scope, internal organization, goals, and strategies. While some

partnerships are built on a large, diverse membership base, others involve a spattering of

CSOs with similar characteristics, such as professionalized NGOs.[38] Alliances also differ

in terms of the structure of their leadership and the frequency and intensity of their

activities.[39] On one end of the spectrum, we find informal, temporary arrangements, such

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[38] The alliances discussed here are not coterminous with social movements, which unite individuals as well
as groups. Domestic alliances can be local, regional, or national in scope, and some also have ties to
transnational networks, which I discuss later in this chapter and in Chapter 5.

[39] It is necessary to examine the frequency with which participating groups actually undertake joint
endeavors, which can range from continuous to intermittent. Alliances can either remain leaderless or
select leaders to coordinate their efforts and speak on their behalf. Moreover, their internal decision-
making processes range from vertical to more horizontal arrangements.

as *ad hoc* coalitions, which tend to be motivated by a set of concrete objectives. Certain individuals or organizations may serve as coordinator, but coalitions sometimes lack nominal leaders. More formal, permanent partnerships, which usually have their own legal status as second- or third-tier organizations (including federations and peak associations) are situated at the other end of the continuum.

Networks (*redes*) generally fall somewhere between these two ends of the spectrum.[40] They are more likely than coalitions to be formally constituted, with a name, charter, and identifiable membership.[41] They frequently comprise larger numbers of groups and are meant to endure over time. In addition, their aims and activities are manifold: they often seek to "strengthen" their members by providing services, building group capacities, and facilitating the exchange of information, for instance.[42] Networks commonly establish an explicit process for choosing leaders, though they also purport to use more "horizontal" forms of internal decision making than classic peak associations, characterized by vertical structures.[43]

Alliances of varying types can help individual groups surmount the obstacles that most limit their political strength in Latin America: insufficient resources, low visibility,

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[40] The same can be said of "forums" (*foros*), consortia, and coordinating bodies. The boundaries separating these different types of alliances are not rigid in practice. For example, a network can serve as a "launching pad" for issue-specific coalitions (Shepard 2003); conversely, short-term coalitions can metamorphose into more formal bodies. Throughout the dissertation, I discuss several types of alliances but focus more intensively on networks and *ad hoc* coalitions.

[41] Umlas distinguishes a formally constituted network from a submerged network: the first is a "higher-profile named entity with identifiable members," while the second is an amorphous set of relationships underlying collective action and thus explored in social movement theory (1998, 162). Some (but not all) networks obtain legal recognition from the state.

[42] An exclusive focus on policy-related activities is not a necessary condition for a network to become involved in policy processes. Few existing networks identify policy influence as their sole *raison d'être*.

and high fragmentation. In interviews, members of CSOs in both Argentina and Chile commonly cite all three limitations as major concerns. With respect to visibility, they worry that their social, political, and policy contributions are under-valued. Perceptions of low social and governmental recognition of their work have prompted a collective "loss of self-esteem" in post-transition Chile in particular.[44] Representatives of CSOs also lament fragmentation, often a product of civil society's heterogeneity and minimal inter-organizational communication. Furthermore, a relationship exists between high fragmentation, resource scarcity, and low visibility: groups competing against one another for funding and recognition tend to remain atomized. In short, these are major issues facing CSOs in Argentina, Chile, and other developing and democratizing nations.

The main advantages of building alliances are threefold. First, groups pool their organizational resources, namely information, analysis, expertise, prior experience, credibility or name recognition, administrative capacity, and political and media contacts. By doing so, they marshal greater amounts of resources than any single CSO can muster and overcome the scarcity problem. Second, through alliances, CSOs can coordinate their advocacy efforts and avoid redundancies in their activities, which conserves precious time and resources. Third, they are better able to generate a critical mass, bolster their collective demands with greater numbers, and present a united front vis-à-vis

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[43] Even more stable and elaborately structured networks lack authority over individual member groups, which have significant room for maneuver. For a similar distinction concerning horizontal and vertical ties among organizations, see Chalmers and Piester (1995).

[44] This observation was made during a number of conferences that I attended in Santiago (see also Aguila et al. 2001a & 2001b and a contribution by Ana María Medioli, President, ACCION, in *Las últimas noticias*, issue dated 1/20/01).

the authorities or other civil societal actors. These combined benefits increase the likelihood that governing elites and the public will notice and/or listen to CSOs.

My findings indicate that not all alliances are created equal. Certain features increase their overall effectiveness and enhance their impact on the dependent variable. These are related to the advantages noted above and include:

- An efficient division of labor. Alliances function better when they take advantage of their members' individual strengths and areas of expertise through the distribution of tasks and responsibilities.
- A balance between internal cohesion and diversity. It is beneficial for an alliance to comprise likeminded people who agree on both goals and strategies. On the other hand, if participating groups exemplify a range of ideological proclivities, focus areas, and organizational missions and structures, the alliance will appear more representative of larger civil society constituencies.
- A willingness to collaborate with other alliances or broader social movements in pursuit of common objectives. Forging such ties achieves an effect similar to that of increasing internal diversity. At the same time, alliances maintain their flexibility because they do not seek to absorb these other movements.

No single category of alliance embodies these characteristics by definition. In theory, coalitions, networks, and other arrangements are equally likely to have these attributes. In practice, however, coalitions often enjoy more internal agreement on specific goals and tactics compared to networks. Moreover, groups participating in coalitions appear to view their differences more as benefits than as risks that could jeopardize the alliance. They tend to emphasize the benefits of combining their different

strengths in the short term to achieve a shared policy objective.[45] In contrast, in alliances designed to last indefinitely, CSOs must negotiate internal differences on a continual basis. Thus, issues surrounding the diversity of organizations — and potential disagreements among them — can be less problematic for coalitions.

Inter-organizational cooperation increases the likelihood of civil society influence during each of the policy phases examined in the dissertation. To begin with, the benefits of joining forces have important consequences for the involvement of CSOs in policy formulation. It is more efficient and convenient for decision makers to consult representatives of an existing alliance than to meet with dozens of separate organizations. Government officials sometimes welcome the existence of such an entity, accepting it as "representative" of a wide range of civil societal actors and/or a legitimate "spokesperson" for a certain issue or policy domain. NGO networks or other semi-permanent alliances can be particularly relevant during this stage. When the authorities seek the input of civil societal actors, networks seem a "logical choice because their membership includes many organizations" and they "can legitimately claim to represent a broader range of voices and experiences than any one organization" (Shepard 2003, 9; see also Bebbington et al. 1993).[46]

Strength in numbers is also a boon to CSOs seeking to influence policy agenda setting and adoption. Working collectively augments the capacity of groups to persuade decision makers that an issue deserves attention and to pressure them to enact a certain

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[45] Some American politics analysts also note that interest groups in coalitions tend to emphasize their commonalities over their differences (Costain 1980; Jenkins 1987).

[46] Clearly, the extent to which networks and other alliances can "legitimately" claim to speak for their members varies from case to case.

policy. *Ad hoc* coalitions often play a significant role during both stages. I therefore expect activists to create — or, in some cases, reactivate — these short-term alliances when a shared policy goal is at stake.

The arguments that I present here build on the corporatist and pluralist traditions, which address different categories of alliances in longstanding democracies. In synthetic terms, corporatism draws attention to *encompassing associations* (i.e., peak associations, umbrella groups, or federations). In corporatist systems of interest representation, the state grants a representational monopoly to private interests organized into hierarchical units (Schmitter 1974). Over time, analysts have broadened this conceptual category to include other actors besides labor and business, such as non-profits (Appleton 2003; Hunter 1993; Zimmer 1999). This scholarship indicates that the formation of encompassing associations facilitates the involvement of social groups in policy making. Governments regularly consult their top echelons and treat them as "legitimate representative bodies" (Hunter 1993, 131). Meanwhile, the American politics literature sometimes examines *interest group coalitions* (e.g., Berry 1997; Costain 1980; Gelb and Palley 1996; Hrebenar 1997; Hula 1999).[47] For instance, scholars have proposed that coalitions help groups synthesize their demands, merge their constituencies and memberships, and present a "united political front and the image of broad-based political support" (Gelb and Palley 1996, 125). Outside observers are less likely to perceive a group participating in a coalition as an "isolated maverick" (Berry 1997, 188).

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[47] Hula's (1999) analysis of interest group coalitions in Washington, D.C. is an unusually comprehensive study on the topic. SMOs in the United States and Europe also have used coalitional strategies (Hathaway and Meyer 1997)

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In short, these bodies of literature outline several benefits of alliances, which have informed my analysis. However, corporatism and pluralism fail to accurately characterize contemporary state-society dynamics in Latin American countries. CSOs tend to be more heterogeneous, dispersed, and self-organized than the corporatist model suggests.[48] Existing alliances generally lack the vertical structure, national scope, and representational monopoly of the traditional encompassing association, and the equivalent of such an association is not a necessary condition for policy involvement. Additionally, according to the archetypal pluralist formulation, coalitions emerge in open, porous political systems with many access points, yet coalitions also can be important players in other institutional contexts.

Thus, the logic of joining forces to increase one's political strength motivates group strategies in a variety of political settings. In fact, this logic may be even *more* compelling in countries where individual CSOs tend to lack material resources and/or access to institutions compared to their counterparts in other nations. Furthermore, patterns of civil society organizing differ cross-nationally. For these reasons, the time has come to re-assess and re-fashion our ideas about alliances in light of recent developments in democratizing areas. A re-examination also is overdue given the shortage of works on partnerships within Latin America.[49] To date, no one has

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[48] For distinctions between historically corporatist forms of civil society mobilization in Latin America and more recent tendencies toward self-organization, independence, and pluralism, see Foweraker (1995), García Delgado (1994), Jelin (1987), Panfichi et al. (n.d), and Roitter and Bombal (2000).

[49] Several Latin America specialists have contributed to this area of inquiry. See, for example, Friedman's (2000) discussion of a coalition of women's groups in Venezuela, Shepard's (2003) research on networks comprising women's sexual and reproductive rights advocates, and Umlas' (1998) case study of an environmental network in Mexico. For an additional study of networks in Mexico, see Chalmers and Piester (1995). For more technical, development-oriented analyses of networks, see Bebbington et al. (1993), Fisher (1993), and Fowler (1997).

formulated a more general set of theoretical arguments and tested them with comparative data from multiple issue areas and democratizing countries.

This lack of attention to CSO partnerships in re-emergent democracies is puzzling for at least two reasons. First, the conceptual and empirical leaps forward in the study of *transnational* advocacy networks make the neglect of *domestic* alliances even more conspicuous (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002).[50] Second, the literature appears to be out of sync with empirical trends. The global proliferation of NGOs since the Third Wave of democratization has resulted in changed dynamics within civil societies and, as a consequence, novel types of partnerships.[51]

Scholars who have theorized networks in Latin America conceptualize the term quite broadly. An "associative network," for instance, can include government officials, members of political parties, business leaders, NGOs, popular movements, and other individual and collective actors (Chalmers et al. 1997). It "should not be thought of as sitting in civil society, separate from the government, but rather as connecting segments of civil society with the state" (1997, 569). The associative network approach provides a snapshot of the myriad people and groups involved in policy issues at a given point in time or in a specific issue area.[52] However, lumping them together does not help us understand how CSOs form partnerships to achieve political strength *in relation to other*

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[50] The alliances analyzed in Chapter 4 are domestic and (so far) have neither attracted nor spawned major transnational campaigns. International actors are not the main drivers of these partnerships. On the other hand, the alliances and the groups comprising them do maintain ties to international actors, as I discuss in Chapter 5.

[51] The number of NGOs in Latin America has grown in recent decades, owing in part to the increase in the number of "sophisticated activists," the "globalization" of policy issues, and the "complexity of problems and of the programs people devise to deal with them" (Chalmers 2000, 3).

actors — especially governing elites.[53] The alliances examined in this dissertation can be thought of as "sitting in civil society." They are of, by, and for the CSOs that furnish their members, resources, and ideas. A fresh analysis of these domestic-level partnerships is urgently needed.

In addition to providing such an analysis, I pose a further question: if forging effective partnerships increases the likelihood of participation, under what circumstances will CSOs manage to act collectively? Groups do not always succeed in cooperating with one another; in fact, they often fail. Building an alliance can be a Herculean task fraught with obstacles, including competition among individual groups, leadership rivalries, and perceived threats to organizational autonomy.[54] Such challenges help explain the variation we observe across cases in levels of inter-organizational cooperation. I propose that while all CSOs that endeavor to create, maintain, and participate in alliances face these and other obstacles, *coalitions* are better able to surmount them. Coalitions usually operate with greater flexibility compared to more formal, enduring alliances with varied goals and larger memberships. To illustrate, because coalitions seldom entail the creation of a more permanent alliance structure, participants are able to work in concert without relinquishing their independence. Groups do not have to reach agreement on as wide a range of issues or over as long a period of time. Other types of alliances are hardly

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[52] Additionally, my findings lend little support to the notion that interactions among various private and public actors approximate the non-hierarchical character of associative networks. On the contrary, power differentials and mutual distrust continue to complicate such relationships.

[53] The propensity to lump together a multitude of actors, both societal and governmental, is also evident in the literature on policy making. A labor "policy domain," for instance, includes unions, trade associations, business interests, legislative committees, and government agencies (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Knoke 1990). See also Heclo (1978) on "issue networks" and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) on advocacy coalition frameworks.

doomed to failure; however, they must be painstaking in their efforts to establish mechanisms for internal decision making and accountability.

In summary, the theoretical approach I have outlined is agency-centered. Both explanatory variables emphasize actions within the power of civil societal actors to perform, and even in difficult circumstances, groups enjoy some room for maneuver. This emphasis on actors' strategies contrasts with other approaches to civil society. For instance, Armony questions the utility of examining the "kinds of groups, movements, or networks" that one finds in civil society (2004, 205). He argues instead that the political, social, and economic surround shapes the "nature, dispositions and orientations" of associational life, as well as its effects on democracy (2004, 3). Civil society basically reproduces and reinforces the broader context in which it is embedded; and group efforts to re-shape their environment — by changing policies and politics more broadly — are less relevant.[55] I offer an alternative perspective in the dissertation. Nevertheless, because framing and alliance building do not occur in a vacuum, I also consider the broader cultural, social, and political *milieu*. Analyzing contextual factors that constrain group choices is necessary to avoid an overly voluntaristic account of policy participation.

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[54] I address these challenges to inter-organizational cooperation in greater detail in Chapter 4.

[55] Armony (2004) emphasizes two contextual variables, the degree of inequality and the strength or weakness of the rule of law, though he explores additional factors in his case studies. Among other civil societal actors, the author examines civil and human rights groups in Argentina that addressed such issues as discrimination, police brutality, and citizen safety during the 1990s. He discusses the limited impact of groups who have tried to strengthen the rule of law through legislative and legal means, namely institutional reforms and convictions of police officers who abuse their authority.

Putting things in context

The dissertation explores several domestic and international factors that affect framing and alliances and thus have an indirect impact on the dependent variable. These variables are shown below in Figure 2. For instance, a domestic ideational factor that influences framing is the availability of a "master frame," such as the human rights frame within Argentina (e.g., Snow & Benford 1992). CSOs can build on the ideas and rhetorical strategies introduced by the activists who have preceded them. Master frames affect groups' understandings and interpretations of issues; they also can attract a broader audience and legitimate advocacy.

Meanwhile, a country's political system can shape patterns of alliance building by encouraging certain types of partnerships over others. For instance, formal alliances of national scope are well suited to Chile's relatively centralized political institutions. By contrast, informal coalitions are a reasonable choice in Argentina given its more dispersed policy-making authority.

Because civil societies in democratizing countries are embedded in global relationships, I weave international variables into the fabric of my analysis. I single out two modes of transnational influence on domestic activism: flows of ideas and resources. Domestic advocates can incorporate global norms — shared standards for behavior that are sometimes codified in conventions — into their frames. Additionally, resources (e.g., funding and technical assistance) help maintain and strengthen alliances and ease the creation of new partnerships. This does not imply, however, that domestic actors are merely passive recipients of foreign "aid" and ideas. Indeed, they often participate actively in international networks and events. Furthermore, because the most effective

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frames resonate with domestic realities, the more politically savvy groups do not simply "import" pre-packaged discourses from abroad.[56]

By exploring these "entanglements" between comparative politics and international relations, I put my arguments into conversation with several burgeoning literatures (Putnam 1988). For example, a large body of scholarship examines the international donor community and its fascination with civil society (e.g., Carothers and Ottaway 2000, Foweraker 2001, Grugel 2000, Howell and Pearce 2001, Hulme and Edwards 1997, Meyer 1999).[57] Moreover, a growing sub-field is dedicated to the study of transnational advocacy networks, social movements, and NGOs (Boli and Thomas 1999, Clark 2001, Della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999, Florini 2000, Gordenker and Weiss 1995a & 1995b, Jordan and Van Tuijl 2000, Keck and Sikkink 1998a & 1998b, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002, Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001, Smith 1997, and Wapner 1995).[58] A number of works emphasize the role of transnational activists as promoters of "world culture" (Boli and Thomas 1999), principled ideas (Keck and Sikkink 1998a), and norms (Clark 2001; Florini 2000; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). Many also propose that domestic activists can benefit from these ideational

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[56] In fact, Latin American activists have been important contributors to the development and institutionalization of human rights norms at the international level. These norms, in turn, have created political opportunities for other activists.

[57] Examples of civil society enthusiasts include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the Organization of American States (OAS), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Children's Fund (UNICEF), foundations such as Avina, Ford, Tinker, OXFAM, and NOVIB, as well as the National Endowment for Democracy and United States' Agency for International Development (USAID). Foreign governments and multilateral banks (which I discuss below) also support CSOs.

[58] Tarrow (2001) distinguishes between contentious, mass-based social movements and less contentious networks of activists and NGOs (for similar distinctions, see Keck and Sikkink 1998b and Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). Keck and Sikkink's transnational advocacy networks can include NGOs, social movements, intellectuals, and the media (1998a, 2). More ambitious terms include "global civil society" and "world civic politics" (Lipshutz 1996; Wapner 1995).

resources and from international political support.[59] However, more research linking global and domestic politics is needed (Tarrow 2001). It is in this spirit that I examine the consequences of these factors on participation through their effects on the explanatory variables.

Figure 2: Summary of the Variables

Transnational flows of ideas Master frames		Transnational flows of resources Political institutions
↓		↓
Framing strategies		Alliance building

Policy participation

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION

I noted at the outset of the chapter that the democratization literature has largely neglected civil society's involvement in policy. Accordingly, the scholarly debates that have predominated within that sub-field offer little theoretical traction for the

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[59] See Keck and Sikkink (1998a) on the domestic impact of transnational advocacy networks and Smith (1997) on ties between national and transnational social movements. Several case studies discuss similar global-domestic cooperation in Latin America on issues such as human rights (Brysk 1994 & 1993), women's rights (Ewig 1999; Navarro and Bourque 1998), the environment (Hochstetler 2000), and indigenous communities (Brysk 1996).

dissertation's research question. It is therefore necessary to consult a wider range of literatures in search of contending perspectives on civil society participation. In this section, I address alternative explanations of the dependent variable, which I derive from different theoretical approaches.[60]

For simplicity's sake, I organize potential explanatory factors into two broad categories: "from above" and "from below." Government practices and institutions can either encourage or discourage the inclusion of civil societal actors in policy making. Governing elites typically create and direct these institutions, which we can envision as variables affecting participation from above (or from the top-down). In contrast, factors that influence the prospects for participation from below are not government-driven; rather, they include CSOs' capacities, strategies, and demands to be included.[61]

Explanatory factors from above

With respect to top-down factors, the "new institutionalism" in political science is my theoretical point of departure.[62] Such arguments are predicated on the idea that

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[60] A dosage of theoretical pluralism and flexibility is warranted, given that few scholars have addressed my research question directly.

[61] Bickford (1999) makes a similar distinction between the "push" (government-driven) and "pull" (society-driven) factors that shape citizen participation but focuses mostly on the former category.

[62] This ample body of scholarship includes theoretical works distinguishing among rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalism (e.g., Hall and Taylor 1996) and more concrete analyses of constitutional design, presidentialism and parliamentarism, political parties, electoral systems, and other institutions. Examples include Dix (1992 & 1989), Linz and Valenzuela (1994), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), Roberts and Wibbels (1999), and Shugart and Carey (1992). Knight (1992) and North (1990) are examples of rational choice institutionalism; Collier and Collier (1991) and Thelen, Steinmo, and Longstreth (1992) are influential historical institutionalist works.

institutions structure political behavior and thus affect outcomes.[63] Institutionalism is a useful approach for understanding the political and policy-making architecture that all citizens face in a given context. As mentioned previously, analysts working in this tradition often paint a portrait of the limited access points available to citizen groups in Latin American countries. However, their brush strokes are quite broad, and relatively few scholars have performed a more variegated analysis of Latin American democracies by investigating the decision-making processes occurring at different levels of government and within various government agencies. Instead, they cast the debate at a general level, hovering above a simple empirical reality: even in a seemingly inauspicious institutional context, CSOs *can and do participate in policy*. This approach cannot account for their involvement or capture the variation on the dependent variable within a single nation.[64]

An alternative institutionalist framework would focus on governmental bodies that generate opportunities for citizen participation. Examples of government "invitations" to participate include advisory or consultative councils, committees, and task forces, as well as participatory budgeting and other forums for public debate and

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[63] Institutionalism hardly constitutes a "unified" body of scholarship, and analysts have not often achieved clarity or consistency in defining or operationalizing institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996). A common approach is to define institutions broadly as formal or informal procedures and routines "embedded in the organizational structure" of a polity (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938; see also Thelen, Steinmo, and Longstreth 1992).

[64] As noted above, the concept of "political opportunities" in the social movement literature is similarly general. Political opportunities are factors external to social movements which influence the timing and type of mobilization (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). These include elite instability and the presence of elite allies, increasing popular access to the political system, and decreasing state repression (McAdam 1996). A broad concept to begin with, political opportunity structure has been stretched further to include numerous elements of the environment in which collective action takes place (see, for instance, Friedman 2000 and Friedman and Hochstetler 2002). Gamson and Meyer thus warn that political opportunity structure is "in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment" (1996, 275).

decision making.[65]   Institutions of this type have become more common in Latin American and other Third Wave democracies. They span countless issue areas, function at multiple levels of government, and often involve NGOs and other civil society groups.[66]   Consequently, when I embarked on my field research, I expected these institutional innovations to be an important pathway to CSO involvement in policy.

However, echoing the familiar refrain, "institutions matter," only takes us so far in this line of inquiry. The institutions do not explain the variation on the dependent variable across issue areas or across Argentina and Chile.   For example, the environmental policy domain in Chile boasts a wealth of institutions designed to encourage citizen participation, yet levels of group involvement in decision making remain low. More generally, Chile has surpassed Argentina in terms of participatory reforms: the Lagos Administration has encouraged citizen participation in policy making during multiple phases partly through the creation of advisory councils and other institutions.[67]   In contrast, Argentine leaders have not embraced the discourse on citizen participation and policy collaboration between CSOs and the government with such enthusiasm. No administration has implemented comprehensive reforms of this sort in the post-authoritarian period. Advisory councils and other participatory venues exist but tend to be comparatively *ad hoc* and dependent on the discretion of elites (Friedman and

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[65] Common terms in Spanish for such entities include *consejos consultivos* and *consejos ciudadanos*. On participatory budgeting (mostly in Brazilian cities), see Abers (1998), Avritzer (2002), Baierle (1998), Nylen (2002), and Wampler (2004 & 2000). Posner (2003) discusses these and other local institutions. Barring these exceptions, scholars thus far have paid little attention to the institutional innovations described here.

[66] Invitations to participate also are extended to universities and research centers, religious denominations, industries and businesses, and other social and economic sectors.

Hochstetler 2002; Ryan 2001). Based on these marked differences between the two countries, we would expect to find more robust evidence of policy participation in Chile. So far, available data do not support such a pattern.

A related set of top-down explanatory factors can be derived from a growing literature — distinct from the body of work discussed above — on international discourses and practices in favor of citizen participation in governance.[68] At its most condensed, this scholarship indicates that participatory models are undergoing a process of international diffusion, principally through the efforts of powerful philanthropic, intergovernmental, and financial institutions.[69] The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and World Bank, for instance, require Latin American governments to consult citizens as a condition of financing. We therefore should observe greater numbers of programs and policies that include civil society groups in Argentina, Chile, and other funded countries. Over time, such patterns also could lead to the institutionalization of participation at the domestic level.

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[67] In 2000, Lagos issued a Directive mandating participatory reforms across the entire executive branch (this and other related government documents are available at: http://www.participacionciudadana.cl). I discuss these institutional changes in Chapter 5.

[68] Because institutionalist works rarely analyze the international dimensions of institution building, I discuss them separately from the literature focused on these global tendencies. Relevant works on the latter include Acuña and Tuozzo (2000), Cardelle (1998), Chalmers et al. (1997), Edwards and Hulme (1996), Friedman and Hochstetler (2002), Howell and Pearce (2000), Kaimowitz (1993), Molenaers and Renard (2002), Rabotnikof (1999), Robinson (1998); Rutherford (1997), Schild (2000), Tussie (2000), and Tussie and Tuozzo (2001).

[69] Various United Nations agencies, the Ford Foundation, and the Avina Foundation are examples of intergovernmental and philanthropic organizations that have funded such initiatives. This discussion centers mostly on what Weyland (2004) refers to as the "external pressure" framework within the policy diffusion scholarship. He distinguishes this approach (and its focus on international financial institutions' incentives and sanctions) from others emphasizing rational choice, cognitive heuristics, and symbolic imitation.

The international community has adopted the rhetoric of citizen participation and "alliances" between the state and civil society. This increasingly hegemonic discourse is closely tied to donors' unabashed enthusiasm for "civil society" and its purported contributions to development, democracy, and "good governance."[70] Although many conflicting meanings lurk under the surface of the shared vocabulary, a new global agenda is coalescing nonetheless. An important aspect of the model is the integration of civil society in social policy formulation, implementation, and monitoring. Donors claim that participation results in more sustainable, consensual policies.[71]

The multilateral banks have pursued the new agenda in Argentina and Chile by financing programs that stipulate citizen involvement of one variety or another. However, the preferred roles for CSOs are policy implementation and, to a lesser extent, monitoring.[72] Not surprisingly, participation in decision making is less common, even though the model makes explicit reference to the design phase of policy (and donors

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[70] International donors do not often acknowledge the complex relationships among civil society, development, and democracy and opt instead for a simplistic synergistic model (Molenaers and Renard 2002; see also Armony 2004). Citizen participation is one of several elements of the concept of governance, which usually entails transparency, a smooth-functioning bureaucracy, and the rule of law (e.g., Tussie 2000).

[71] Policies are more consensual because stakeholdership increases and conflicts are "managed" (see the IDB's "Resource Book on Participation, available at http://www.iadb.org, Rabotnikof 1999, and Tussie 2000). The IDB and World Bank also operate under the assumption that participation and social capital are positively related.

[72] In Argentina, for instance, over 90% of social programs supported with external funding or credit involve NGOs, base organizations, faith-based groups, and other CSOs in their administration, compared to only about 42% of the nationally funded programs. I base these figures on data collected by the national body that coordinates social policies (Consejo Nacional de Coordinación de Políticas Sociales). Included are programs implemented in 2002 intended for infants, children, young adults, indigenous communities, and rural populations, among other groups, in the areas of social inclusion and community development, productive activities, housing and infrastructure, health, education, and nutrition ("Guía de Programas Sociales Nacionales").

sometimes earmark funds for that purpose).[73] Thus, international initiatives have not

significantly affected the cases analyzed in the dissertation.

This lack of supporting evidence highlights two general problems with top-down

explanations that center on global factors. First, multiple and even competing goals often

co-exist behind the façade of a "common" agenda, as illustrated by the ambiguity and

myriad connotations of "citizen participation." Second, international influences are

filtered through domestic institutions and translated into action in different ways (and to

varying degrees) across countries. Scholars should provide evidence linking global

trends to domestic effects.[74]

In short, although domestic political institutions and international trends shape the

context in which policy making occurs, institutions and programs designed to "invite"

participation do not appear to explain civil society involvement in policy. Indeed, top-

down approaches generate a number of further questions. Which groups are invited to

participate? Do CSOs usually await invitations, or do they instead demand to be

included? Who is able to stay involved in policy debates and decisions long after

government-led opportunities cease? To address these issues, we must examine the

characteristics of civil societal actors and their efforts to participate from below. Several

literatures are relevant to this task, including comparative works on longstanding

democracies, the American politics field within political science, and interdisciplinary

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[73] The IDB was instrumental in the Lagos reforms discussed previously by funding a program to "strengthen alliances between civil society and the state" in the early 2000s. The program's goals were to strengthen civil society and volunteerism and to establish citizen participation as a criterion for policy making.

[74] Hunter and Brown (2000) do this when they assess the influence of World Bank lending on government spending in the areas of education and health in Latin America. They conclude that "policy change

scholarship on various collective actors, such as social movements, interest groups, and non-profits.

Explanatory factors from below

Alternative explanations of policy participation and influence tend to emphasize the attributes of individual groups. A standard approach is to identify organizational resources that correlate with political clout. The conventional wisdom on interest groups in the United States, for example, suggests that money, members, information and expertise, respected leadership, administrative capacity, and political allies are key assets (e.g., Berry 1999; Gais and Walker 1991; Gelb and Palley 1996; Greenwald 1977; Hrebenar 1997; Lehman, Schlozman, and Tierney 1986; Petracca 1992).[75] Analysts of non-profit NGOs (e.g., Hudson 2002; Rees 1999; Taylor and Warburton 2003) and social movement organizations (e.g., Dalton 1994; Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973) in Europe and the United States discuss similar categories of resources.[76] Studies of NGOs in other regions likewise cite the importance of expertise, legitimacy, and a membership base (Bratton 1994 & 1990; Fisher 1998).[77]

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ultimately depends on the political dynamics that exist within borrowing countries" and that powerful domestic interests can override Bank recommendations (2000, 137).

[75] The standard definition of an interest (or pressure) group is a voluntary association that communicates the interests of its members to government officials in an effort to influence policy (e.g., Dexter 1969; Key 1964; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).

[76] The resource mobilization school in particular emphasizes the resource needs of SMOs.

[77] Bratton (1994 & 1990) underscores factors such as a domestic funding base (which provides legitimacy), a homogenous membership, and a federated structure. Fisher (1998) argues that a diversified funding base, linkages to the grassroots, expertise, and other attributes correlate with organizational autonomy, which in turn is associated with influence.

My findings indicate that some resources are significant regardless of the political context in which groups operate. As noted previously, certain organizational attributes — credibility and media contacts, for example — also help groups disseminate their frames. Legal and other forms of expertise facilitate work on policy proposals: activists are armed with an understanding of existing policies and able to design alternatives. Additionally, groups with connections to political leaders and/or government officials are likely to enjoy an edge over CSOs without friends in "high places." In fact, members of CSOs sometimes transition into government positions or party politics. If they remain in contact with their former colleagues in civil society, this can prove advantageous to groups during policy making. I refer to this movement of individuals between civil society and the government (or political society) as "leadership exchange."[78] Clearly, each of these resources can be useful to CSOs.[79]

Nevertheless, because "there is no automatic equation by which group resources translate into political resources," merely identifying resources as correlates of influence leaves out a large part of the political story (Greenwald 1977, 333). More importantly, even CSOs that are relatively deficient in resources can participate in policy under some circumstances. I therefore submit that CSOs' efforts to combine and mobilize resources in alliances are more crucial than resources *per se*. I argue further that CSOs mobilize

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[78] This pattern also can occur during periods of non-democratic rule. For instance, under authoritarian regimes, when political society ceases to function as such, individuals may migrate from leadership positions in parties (and/or government agencies) to CSOs. Following the democratic transition, some return to their former positions, leading to "brain drain" from civil society (Loveman 1995).

[79] In this study, I contemplate a broader set of resources than is usually found in existing scholarship, which is somewhat out of touch with the realities of democratizing and developing countries. For instance, I incorporate transnational flows of resources, which can increase the political clout of CSOs, into the analysis. I also discuss legacies of authoritarianism that endow certain organizational resources with special meaning, as suggested above.

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ideas, and their *ideational* strategies enable them to overcome shortages of *material* resources to an extent.

Stated briefly, the rival approaches discussed here fall short of elucidating civil society participation and influence. Contrary to initial expectations, participatory institutions and the new global agenda encouraging citizen involvement in governance have failed to explain the observed variation on the dependent variable. Throughout the dissertation, I offer an alternative perspective that privileges factors from below. However, although my approach is driven mostly by civil societal factors, I move well beyond resource-based explanations of influence. Much of the remainder of the dissertation is devoted to evaluating the theory I have proposed and determining whether it holds across multiple issue areas and both Argentina and Chile. I have used several methods of data collection and analysis during this process, which I summarize in the following section.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD OF INQUIRY

Civil society is a ubiquitous and contested concept. Academics, activists, government officials, and donors across the globe have incorporated civil society into their respective vocabularies, though they differ in their understandings and usages of the term. Various conceptualizations exist within the field of political science, as well. Scholars have envisioned civil society as an arena of consolidated democracy (Linz and

Stepan 1996), a "civic community" steeped in social capital (Putnam 1993), and a "neutral multiplier" that reflects the broader political environment (Berman 1997).[80]

Rather than propose an alternative vision of civil society, I embrace the standard definition: an arena of self-organized, voluntary, associational life distinguishable from the state and from political society, which includes political parties and leaders (Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996).[81] Included under the rubric of civil society are formal organizations, such as labor unions, professional associations, and an endless variety of cultural, social, identity-based, issue-oriented, territorial, self-help, development, recreational, and other citizen groups. The sphere also comprises less formal social and interpersonal networks.

Due to the sheer abundance and diversity of civil societal actors, it is necessary to narrow the scope of my research to a subset of CSOs. Hence, I focus on non-profit, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) motivated by some notion of the "public interest." Such groups seek a "collective good" that will not selectively and materially benefit their own membership or activists (Berry 1977). By investigating the behavior of groups, I base my research on a disaggregated view of civil society. In this sense, my project contrasts with other works, which seek to measure the overall strength or vitality of associational life.[82]

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[80] Dozens of works review the different philosophical traditions associated with civil society and discuss the conceptual haze surrounding the term. Overviews can be found in Cohen and Arato (1992), Diamond (1999), Foley and Edwards (1996), Hall (1995), Hyden (1997), Keane (1998), Manor (1999), Seligman (1992), and White (1996). For typologies of CSOs, see Fitzsimmons (2000) and Manor (1999).

[81] In reality, the boundaries separating these spheres are fluid. See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the "gray area" between civil society and political society and civil society and the state.

[82] Utterances about a "strong" civil society or "vigorous" associational life are commonly heard both inside and outside of academe, as if the sphere were an undifferentiated whole.

I discuss the dimensions of the dependent variable in greater depth in Chapter 2. However, it bears noting that in this study, participation is operationalized as groups exerting some influence over policy debates and decisions. Although CSO involvement in policy making does not necessarily lead to the attainment of desired *outcomes*, groups do have a "say" in the *process*.

CSOs use myriad strategies while engaging in advocacy. They can participate in policy making during multiple phases, including the *agenda-setting*, *formulation*, and *adoption* stages.[83] When the policy agenda is being determined, CSOs endeavor to capture the attention of elites and convince them that an issue or problem requires government action. They often disseminate their views in the mass media, share research findings and analysis, and organize events to raise public awareness and gain the ear of policy makers. Civil societal actors also try to shape the content of policy during the formulation phase by conducting research, presenting information to elites, and authoring legislation or other proposals. Additionally, groups seek to persuade and pressure decision makers to adopt the preferred policy. They resort to a variety of tactics aimed at conveying their demands to the authorities and galvanizing the broader public. During all three phases, CSOs can engage in *direct* or *indirect* advocacy: the first mode of influence entails interacting directly with legislators and executive branch officials; the second mode involves pressuring them indirectly by mobilizing certain constituencies and/or the public.

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[83] Because the policy implementation and monitoring phases do not correspond well with this operationalization of participation, I exclude them from the dependent variable, as discussed in Chapter 2.

As mentioned at the outset, the dissertation's main cases of policy making are drawn from three issue areas: political transparency, the rights and well-being of children, and the environment. For each case, I gauge the frequency and diversity of the group activities outlined here and judge overall levels of policy participation to be low, intermediate, or high. The cases are instances of *national* policy making and thus represent a difficult test of the theory. Political analysts tend to conclude that the *local* level of government is the more propitious environment for citizen involvement in politics, often discounting the possibility that groups will influence decision making at the national level (e.g., Posner 2003; Reilly 1995).[84]

A further rationale behind the selection of cases is that the groups involved in each issue area vary with respect to their resources, characteristics, strategies, and attitudes toward advocacy. This diversity provides for a richer investigation of civil societal actors and behaviors. In addition, the multiplicity of CSOs signifies that inter-organizational cooperation is possible.[85]

Argentina and Chile, both examples of democratizing polities, are interesting contexts for research. I examine the post-transition period of each nation, with an emphasis on political and policy events that occurred between 1997 and 2004. While the countries share certain similarities — for instance, their experiences with military dictatorship and democratization — they differ on several key dimensions, ranging from

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[84] Investigating policy participation at other levels of government is beyond the scope of this project. Moreover, Argentina's provincial governments and federal system differ considerably from Chile's regional governments.

[85] Notwithstanding this diversity, the groups are representative of the broader category of CSOs that interests me in this study: public interest NGOs. Due to the relative lack of a "critical mass" of organized

political institutions and patterns of state-society linkages to political culture, existing repertoires of collective action, and master frames.[86] These differences lend themselves to a cross-national examination of how the domestic context influences the independent variables (and indirectly affects the dependent variable). In short, a two-country study provides opportunities to analyze how the political surround constrains and shapes the strategies of CSOs and to determine whether the dissertation's arguments hold across polities.

Owing to the paucity of scholarship that directly and systematically addresses civil society participation in policy, there is no existing data set with "many well-recorded cases" (Van Evera 1997, 55). I therefore conducted field research during 2002-2003 to collect new evidence pertaining to the frequency and forms of participation, the organizations involved, and their strategies. The sites of this research were Buenos Aires and Santiago and their environs, where national policies are made and executive branch institutions are concentrated.[87] The primary sources of data were more than 60 semi-structured interviews with representatives of government agencies, civil society alliances, NGOs, community organizations, and other CSOs. I chose interview subjects from available directories and supplemented this strategy with a modified snowball procedure, requesting the names of other government officials and/or activists working within a

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CSOs, particularly at the national level, it was not feasible to research environmental organizations in Argentina and transparency groups in Chile.

[86] A military *junta* presided over the National Reorganization Process in Argentina from 1976 to 1983, and Pinochet's regime lasted from 1973 to 1989 in Chile. Argentina and Chile also are similar with respect to their overall levels of socioeconomic development and implementation of neoliberal reforms.

[87] There is also a preponderance of CSOs and archival resources in these capital cities.

certain policy domain during each interview.[88]   Throughout the dissertation, I use

interview data to shed light on both political events and the subjective views of the actors

involved.

Additional research methods included participant-observation of meetings and

events and the examination of a variety of archival materials, including reports, position

papers, press releases, and other documents published by organizations and government

agencies.[89]   Moreover, through an analysis of print and on-line sources of news, I

uncovered information related to multiple phases of policy making and ascertained the

extent to which the media covered individual groups, alliances, their activities, and their

causes (an indication of political visibility).[90]   These activities also helped me discern

civil societal actors' framing strategies.

I have analyzed these data using qualitative methods, most notably process tracing

and structured comparisons.   Process tracing is a helpful tool for establishing causal

linkages between the independent and dependent variables (George and McKeown 1985).

By reconstructing the sequence of events for each case, I examine the policy process, the

various dimensions and phases of participation, and the range of behaviors of both civil

societal and governmental actors. The dissertation entails various modes of comparison.

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[88] The *Guía Silber* in Chile is a useful directory. Umbrella organizations, such as ACCION and ASONG in Chile and the Social Sector Forum in Argentina, also provided listings of their members. Documentation centers devoted to civil society issues, such as GADIS (Grupo de Análisis y Desarrollo Institucional y Social) in Buenos Aires, offered additional resources (e.g., GADIS 2000).

[89] In addition, I visited private and public documentation centers and libraries, attended conferences and seminars, examined pertinent governmental and civil societal web sites, and consulted members of political parties and party documents mentioning citizen participation. The project also builds on over thirty interviews that I conducted during a pilot study in Argentina in 2001.

[90] This type of analysis is particularly helpful for investigating both public and formal agenda setting and the role of civil societal actors therein. However, a generic limitation of news analysis stems from the fact

First, I compare cases of policy making *within* Argentina and Chile. The variation on the independent variables across the cases permits an analysis of their effects on the dependent variable. Second, I evaluate children's advocacy *across* Argentina and Chile to show the different strategies that groups use to mobilize resources and ideas in a given issue area. Third, I perform the country-level comparisons outlined previously to gauge the influence of contextual factors.

In brief, tracing causal relationships between variables and undertaking comparative analysis are both necessary to advance our understanding of advocacy. This research design facilitates comparison between Argentina and Chile and across the different policy domains, an approach which yields more generalizable results than would a study of a single case in one polity. The results also are more robust due to the multiple dimensions of the dependent variable outlined earlier; each case actually entails a large number of "observations" (King, Keohane and Verba 1994).

This method of inquiry has allowed me to investigate causality more closely than some quantitative methods, which "tell us more about whether hypotheses hold than why they hold" (Van Evera 1997, 55). Ideally, large-*n* studies would complement qualitative work in this area of research. However, given the current lack of relevant quantitative data, such studies are not yet feasible.[91] In fact, gathering a sufficient number of

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that the media often cover civil society activities considered to be more dramatic (such as large mobilizations or protests), while more mundane activities go unnoticed (Dalton 1994).

[91] The World Values Survey and other data sets provide information about individual participation in voluntary associations, which is not directly related to the research question. Quantitative analysis is probably better suited to research on the correlates of policy influence at the organizational level, such as groups' financial resources and other attributes. Nevertheless, selection bias could pose a significant challenge to such a study in Latin America. For instance, one could draw a random sample of groups from existing registries of CSOs, but these are often outdated, incomplete, skewed toward more formally constituted organizations, and/or based on a self-selected subset of groups that chose to submit their

observations, designing appropriate measures for variables, and assigning accurate values would likely necessitate a team of investigators to carry out the requisite field research.

The values of the dependent and independent variables for each case are summarized in Table 1, which presents the central empirical findings. As indicated by Table 1, the proposed theory holds across Argentina and Chile and all three issue areas.

Table 1: Summary of the Evidence

Issue area: Case of policy making	Transparency: Freedom of information law	Children's issues: Child protection policy	Children's issues: Child protection law	Environment: Bío Bío River dam project
Country	Argentina	Chile	Argentina	Chile
Successful framing strategies?	Effective framing	Mixed success	Mixed success	Less effective
Successful alliance building?	Highly effective coalition	Moderately effective national network	Moderately effective alliances (multiple)	Limited cooperation among green NGOs
Level of policy participation	High	Intermediate	Intermediate	Low

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY

The dissertation is organized into six chapters. In **Chapter 2**, I provide an overview of the dependent variable and the cases of policy making selected for investigation. I tell the political "story" of each case, emphasizing the extent to which civil societal actors participate in the policy process. In **Chapter 3**, I elaborate the relationship between effective framing, the first explanatory variable, and policy involvement. **Chapter 4** examines successful alliances, the second explanatory variable.

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information to the agency in charge of the registry. Many other complications arise from the large number

In **Chapter 5**, I consider framing and alliance building in their broader international and domestic contexts and discuss several factors that affect both independent variables. In essence, I look at the advocacy efforts of civil societal actors through a wider-angle lens. Finally, **Chapter 6** explores the implications of my research for democracy, both in theory and in practice. I also propose an agenda for future research and summarize the dissertation's main theoretical, methodological, and other contributions. What follows is an abbreviated version of that summary.

Policy involvement in democratizing nations is poorly understood; a major lacuna exists within comparative politics and especially within the democratization literature. In fact, scholars have neglected the political effects of civil society activism more generally. By examining civil society's engagement with political institutions and decision-making processes, I take a step toward remedying these shortcomings. I contribute to the study of comparative politics by advancing an original theory of influence. This framework includes novel explanatory variables that are underdeveloped in the field. First, scholars rarely extend frame analysis to the policy-making realm or even to civil societal actors in democratizing countries. There is a dearth of comparative work on group strategies for politicizing and framing issues and the policy implications of these choices. This stems in part from some political scientists' misgivings about ideational variables. However, the political "power" of ideas is significant and merits close attention. Second, work on the creation, evolution, and political impact of civil society alliances has been scant, and scholars have not embraced alliances within democratizing countries as enthusiastically

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of defunct, unreachable, or unlisted CSOs.

as *transnational* advocacy networks. The dissertation seeks to redress the paucity of research in these areas.

Although I emphasize domestic politics, I also examine international exchanges of funding, ideas, and norms, thus taking into account several bodies of literature on global trends. It has become increasingly necessary to explore the nexus between comparative politics and international relations and the "internationalization of many policy spheres and political arenas" (Chalmers et al. 1997, 555). Indeed, analysts of democratizing and developing nations who ignore such transnational factors do so at their own peril.

Additionally, I connect my ideas to existing scholarship on pluralism, corporatism, and different types of collective actors, building on these literatures while introducing new arguments. The strategy of simply transferring theories developed in particular social, economic, and political contexts — especially the United States and Western Europe — to other areas has serious drawbacks. It is imperative that we question the assumption that civil societies in newer democracies can (or ought to) resemble civil societies in other environments.[92] It is also essential to undertake more comparative, systematic examinations of civil society organizing. I try to fulfill this need by offering the first analysis of alliances and framing that spans three different issue areas and two countries. The dissertation's research design therefore expands the existing

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[92] For instance, it is important to avoid a simple rehashing of classic pluralism. Language reminiscent of this tradition already has crept into studies of associational life in democratizing countries. Diamond (1999), for example, suggests that democracy rests on a dense and pluralistic — as opposed to a "totalistic" — civil society. He argues that democratic survival is contingent on cross-cutting cleavages and multiple solidarities, which produce a more moderate and less polarized constellation of political interests.

repertoire of empirical research on civil society, which often includes descriptive and/or non-comparative case studies.

Furthermore, much is at stake for Argentines and Chileans with respect to the issue areas analyzed in the dissertation. Deforestation, over-fished waters, hazardous waste, air pollution, the loss of biodiversity, and the depletion of the ozone layer are problems that affect the health, safety, and economic livelihood of vast numbers of Chileans. Indeed, all societies struggle to define the proper balance between economic growth and development and environmental quality. The well-being of children is similarly related to economic and social development: experts have concluded that a country that fails to meet the basic needs of its children has no "imaginable future."[93] Child welfare and environmental health both speak to the success and sustainability of the neoliberal model, themes of utmost importance in Latin America and other regions. Meanwhile, proponents of political reform consider freedom of information to be crucial for strengthening democracy; transparency is a major concern in nations with high levels of corruption and citizen disillusionment with political elites. In short, these policy domains have significant implications for both democracy and development.

Lastly, the extent to which CSOs are involved in policy has practical relevance for citizens in democratizing countries. In addition to experiencing firsthand the effects of civil society activism in terms of policy outputs, they have a vested interest in the questions examined here: how is democratic citizenship exercised, who participates in

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[93] "Pacto social por la niñez," dated 5/01 and issued by Argentina's Social Development Ministry. Few works have addressed children's rights in Latin America; exceptions include Guidry's (2000) work on Brazil and Maclure and Sotelo's (2004) research on Nicaragua.

decision making, and who governs (Dahl 1961)? Moreover, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, these queries are vital to the study of democratic quality and stability.

Of course, advocacy is one of several political roles that CSOs play in a democratic regime.[94] They also can influence politics by monitoring the state and governing elites (Avritzer 2002; Fox 2001; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2002 & 2001), generating social capital (e.g., Putnam 1993), initiating broader social and cultural changes (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Wapner 1995), and redefining the boundaries of the "political." My focus on the policy-related activities of CSOs should not be interpreted as a normative preference for this role over any other. I do not favor a scenario in which most CSOs pursue narrowly-defined "interest group" activities at the expense of their efforts to achieve additional goals.[95] Still, research on policy influence is long overdue, especially given its status as a "bread and butter" theme in the discipline.

In conclusion, the literature generally leads us to expect the policy engagement and influence of CSOs to be relatively limited within democratizing countries. I do not dispute the magnitude of the challenges facing groups that seek political influence. The obstacles to successful advocacy summarized earlier — civil society's many "discontents" — should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, the search for meaningful forms of participation does not represent a chimerical quest. I therefore propose that we examine advocacy from a different vantage point, which emphasizes the strategies that civil societal actors use to overcome obstacles, thus allowing for more agency. Such an

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[94] Diamond (1999) summarizes several of these roles in a chapter devoted to civil society.

[95] Baker (2002), for instance, would label such an approach as an "instrumental" view of civil society, which gauges the significance of the sphere only in relation to the state.

approach will help us solve the puzzle of civil society influence in environments where we expect to find "low-intensity" citizenship (O'Donnell 1993).

Chapter 2: Civil Society Participation in Policy Making

INTRODUCTION

A stronger grasp of political participation, voice, and influence is vital to our understanding of democratic quality and stability in Latin America. Nevertheless, given the paucity of works that directly address civil society advocacy, our knowledge of these themes remains limited. What strategies do CSOs use while engaging in advocacy? What specific activities are associated with their efforts to influence policy debates and decisions? How do civil societal actors endeavor to create opportunities for participation in democratizing nations?

In this chapter, I elaborate the dependent variable, civil society participation in policy making. I first establish which categories of civil societal actors I have targeted for analysis and what "participation" signifies in this dissertation. After specifying and operationalizing the dependent variable, I turn to the project's main cases of policy, drawn from the issue areas of transparency, the environment, and the rights and well-being of children. I summarize the politics of each case, highlighting the different levels of civil society involvement and influence therein.

A further aim of this chapter is to describe the broader political context in which advocacy and policy participation occur in Argentina and Chile. Specifically, I discuss the public disillusionment with political elites and institutions that has become widespread in Latin American democracies. I analyze citizens' diminishing confidence in conventional politics and the political behaviors that have accompanied these attitudes.

Although civil societal actors are not immune to these trends, my findings suggest that many continue to engage the political system in spite of its perceived failings. Examining the contemporary political landscape of both countries places the dissertation's empirical data in their proper perspective.

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS: NARROWING THE FIELD

As outlined in Chapter 1, for the purposes of this study, civil society is defined as an arena of voluntary associational life distinguishable from the state and political society. Of the myriad actors included in this category, I focus on public interest groups rather than professional associations, unions, and other organizations that usually pursue more particularistic aims (e.g., benefits for their members and/or a narrowly defined group).[1] Members of public interest CSOs commonly see their work as part of a larger struggle to extend and deepen citizenship rights. My emphasis on these public-minded and seemingly altruistic groups should not be interpreted as a rose-tinted view of associational life. This study discards romantic assumptions that CSOs embody all that is good, noble, or democratic. In fact, plenty of questionable, corrupt, and un-civic organizations dot the civil societal landscape.[2] Moreover, in practice, the extent to which groups benefit an identifiable "public" varies immensely.[3] Still, regardless of their actual

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[1] Berry defines a public interest group as one that "seeks a collective good, the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization" (1977, 7).

[2] See Carothers (1999) for an example of the numerous critiques of "benevolent" visions of civil society and Armony (2004) and Payne (2000) for analyses of some markedly un-democratic civil society groups.

[3] For example, the elite composition of some NGOs raises questions as to whether they "represent" broader segments of society. I address this issue, a source of preoccupation for scholars (e.g., Alvarez 1999; Dagnino 2003), in Chapter 6.

track records, public interest CSOs differ from other groups in terms of their objectives; focusing on them helps limit the scope of my project.

The CSOs examined in the dissertation share a further characteristic. They tend to consciously identify themselves as part of civil society, which exists as a sort of "imagined community" (Anderson 1983). Thus, an allegiance to the non-governmental sector — or the "third sector," a sphere distinct from the state and the market — connects otherwise disparate individuals and groups. These self-perceptions are important because they often signal a commitment to maintaining organizational autonomy from the state, political parties, and private (for-profit) sector. Empirically, the boundaries separating those realms are fluid.[4] For instance, a considerable gray area exists between civil society and political society: individual politicians and parties establish think tanks that perform policy research and analysis and/or foundations that operate as partisan vehicles or even "black boxes" for financial transactions (Manzetti 2000).[5] The separation between the state and certain CSOs is similarly indistinct. When groups receive the lion's share of their funding from the state and administer its policies, their independence is uncertain. I revisit these questions surrounding autonomy and co-optation at various points in the dissertation. However, it bears noting that the organizations studied here are driven primarily by a cause or set of issues rather than partisan interests or the state's bidding.

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[4] This is an analytic distinction that facilitates theory building and helps achieve clarity. It is not my intent to maintain rigid boundaries between civil society and political society or civil society and the state. Rather, such distinctions serve as a starting point for research. As mentioned in Chapter 1, people often move in and out of positions in the government, political society, and civil society. Furthermore, individuals can have "dual militancy," or loyalties to both parties and CSOs.

[5] For instance, Bickford (1999) observes that some center-left think tanks in Chile have functioned as a "research arm" of the Concertación government. Levy (1996) provides an overview of private research centers in the region.

Additionally, most of the groups are legally constituted as non-profit civil associations or foundations, and the majority self-identify as non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[6] This term often evokes the image of entities with reasonably formal organizational structures staffed by professionals. For example, NGOs typically are distinguished from social movement organizations (SMOs) because of their more developed "infrastructures," greater numbers of paid professionals, and lower levels of commitment to mass mobilizing activities (Sikkink 1996).[7] In Latin America, some self-described NGOs resemble this image, while others do not. NGOs in the region engage in both conventional political activities, such as lobbying and litigation, and disruptive behaviors, including demonstrations. A single organization may be involved simultaneously in research, public education, grassroots organizing, and advocacy.[8] The NGO category therefore is an inclusive one that does not indicate a particular set of tactics or a certain amount of resources, which vary across groups.

Indeed, the CSOs analyzed here vary significantly with respect to their memberships, focus areas, political inclinations, administrative capacities, and past

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[6] The private, non-profit category in Argentina and Chile usually comprises these two types of organizations. Civil associations (or "corporations" in Chile) are groups of people, whereas foundations are usually created from an individual's estate. Examples of other legal categories are community organizations (territorial and functional), professional associations, unions, indigenous communities and associations, and cooperatives and mutual aid societies. Although civil society should not be equated with formal associations, these are largely the focus of the present study.

[7] The literature on advanced democracies maintains that compared to interest groups, SMOs have more fluid organizational structures and open membership criteria and focus more often on social and lifestyle changes (Norris 2002).

[8] Moreover, the balance of activities shifts over time in response to external changes, such as funding opportunities and constraints, and internal changes in leadership or mission. Instead of creating *a priori* categories of groups based on these and other attributes, it is preferable to treat them as variables (Andrews and Edwards 2004). To further complicate matters, some groups in Latin America considered to be SMOs due to their involvement in a broader movement (such as the struggle for human or women's rights) refer to themselves as NGOs.

histories. For instance, some are relatively new, whereas others trace their origins to authoritarianism in Argentina and Chile. The Argentine armed forces' National "Reorganization" Process (1976-83) epitomized state repression of associational life and the closure of traditional avenues of participation and representation. The so-called "Dirty War" was notorious for its high levels of arrests, torture, and disappearances. The extreme nature of the repression gave rise to new social movements — most famously the human rights movement — that opposed the dictatorship (e.g., Brysk 1994; Jelin 1987 & 1985; Mainwaring and Viola 1984). The Pinochet regime in Chile (1973-89) also used torture, disappearances, and executions to quell political mobilization and militancy.[9] Nevertheless, over time, the regime grudgingly tolerated the existence of development, human rights, women's, and other NGOs supported by international donors and/or protected by the Catholic Church, as well as organizations that met subsistence needs at the grassroots.[10] Many of these CSOs were active during the campaign against Pinochet's continued rule and the 1988 plebiscite, in which the general was defeated. Civil societal actors in Argentina likewise had played an important role during that country's democratic transition.[11] The present study includes CSOs that predate the re-emergence of democracy in both polities and groups created more recently.

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[9] During the first two years following the 1973 coup that ousted the Allende government, security forces detained approximately fifty thousand people and executed over two thousand; in such an environment, few organizations could survive (Schneider 1995).

[10] In fact, technocrats within the Pinochet government valued the expertise of a handful of research institutes and NGOs, which assisted in the development of social policies (Levy 1996; Loveman 1995). Economic crisis triggered a different form of civil society organizing during this period: an explosive cycle of protest (1983-86) concentrated in the shantytowns of Santiago (Oxhorn 1995; Schneider 1995).

[11] Human rights activists, for instance, enjoyed a large audience for their "eloquent" critique of the authoritarian regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 56).

In short, while the CSOs scrutinized throughout the dissertation differ considerably from one another, they share several general characteristics. Sketching the contours of the groups to be analyzed is necessary given the proliferation of terms in existing scholarship. Although the conceptual categories of public interest groups, social movement organizations, and non-profit advocacy organizations overlap, scholars focusing on the respective categories rarely engage in dialogue (Andrews and Edwards 2004). Consequently, different literatures address parallel themes — namely, the origins and consequences of collective action — in isolation from one another. In the next section, I elucidate the political behaviors of civil societal actors that are relevant to my research question. Of particular interest are the strategies that groups use to exercise their policy voices.[12]

SPECIFYING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

In this dissertation, participation signifies that CSOs are contributing to policy debates and exerting some degree of influence over policy decision making.[13] Understood in this way, participation entails a number of activities, such as conveying demands, offering information, analysis, and ideas, organizing campaigns and mobilizing

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[12] Fox (2001) notes that because the origins of the word "advocacy" are legal, it has connotations of lawyers defending their clients. However, the contemporary usage refers more broadly to interventions that target the government on behalf of a third party (often an excluded group), usually in pursuit of citizenship rights, the public interest, or justice (see Jenkins 1987 for a similar definition).

[13] Anderson (1984) defines a public policy as a purposive governmental course of action to address a problem or matter of concern. Policies can assume the form of laws, rules, orders, court rulings, and administrative guidelines. The types of participation and state-society linkages that interest me differ from classic understandings of clientelism and the co-optation of civil societal actors. However, because these patterns persist in Latin American politics, I briefly address them in Chapter 6.

the public, and collaborating with and/or putting political pressure on policy makers. Groups pursue different combinations of these and other activities during the agenda-setting, formulation, and adoption phases of policy making.

Scholars typically distinguish the public agenda, which comprises highly visible issues, from the formal agenda, the smaller list of items that government officials have selected for "serious consideration" (Cobb, Ross and Ross 1976; see also Kingdon 1995). Although groups aspire to influence both agendas, I focus mainly on the *formal agenda-setting* phase of policy making, when CSOs endeavor to capture the attention of elites and convince them that an issue or problem requires government action. They often disseminate their views in the mass media, share research findings, and organize events to raise public awareness and gain the ear of policy makers. Groups frequently criticize existing policies or the lack thereof.

Alternative proposals sometimes emerge from these critiques. In fact, during the *formulation* or design phase, policy makers may embrace proposals that have originated within CSOs. Groups also try to shape the content of policy by presenting information, ideas, and analysis to governing elites and assisting in the drafting of legislation (or other proposed reforms). Once a policy has been formulated, civil societal actors try to ensure its *adoption* —assuming they approve of its content.[14] CSOs seek to persuade decision makers to choose the preferred policy, especially when they are considering a number of competing proposals. Pertinent strategies range from the contentious (protests) to the more mundane (meetings and negotiations). The objective is to convey demands to the

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[14] If groups are not favorably disposed toward a policy proposal, they may oppose it and/or offer alternatives during this phase.

authorities while building public interest in and support for the policy through a continuous presence in the media, for instance (Najam 1999). These activities thus parallel the behaviors associated with the agenda-setting phase; the key difference is the increasing emphasis on a specific *policy* rather than on a general *issue* or problem.

Throughout the policy process, CSOs engage in advocacy through direct or indirect means.[15] On the one hand, members of groups come into contact with executive branch officials, legislators, and other decision makers, depending on where the policy is being created or its fate decided.[16] On the other hand, they pursue strategies that do not involve linking up directly with governing elites but nevertheless pressure them indirectly by mobilizing certain constituencies and/or the broader public. Groups commonly resort to both modes of influence.

Table 2, which summarizes the dimensions of the dependent variable as I have operationalized it, combines these two modes with the three policy phases. I measure participation in terms of the *frequency* of the activities included in Table 2 and the multiplicity or *diversity* of activities in a given case of policy making.[17] The variable is trichotomous, with values of high, intermediate, or low.

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[15] Scholars of American politics have made a similar distinction between direct and indirect lobbying (e.g., Berry 1997; Hrebenar 1997).

[16] In this study, the government refers to actors — politicians and administrators, for example — who occupy "dominant positions" within a regime at a given point in time (Karl 1997, 14). Although my project emphasizes advocacy directed toward the executive and legislative branches, many CSOs also target the judiciary.

[17] In practice, these phases sometimes overlap chronologically; thus, Table 2 should not be interpreted in too rigid a manner. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) and other policy analysts have critiqued Anderson's (1984) and Jones' (1977) "stages heuristic," which differentiates among agenda setting, adoption, implementation, and evaluation. Despite the purported limitations of this approach, government officials and activists commonly use similar distinctions, and ignoring the phases altogether can lead to ambiguity.

Table 2: Civil Society Participation in Policy

Type of Advocacy

Policy phase	Indirect	Direct
Agenda-setting	research issues raise public awareness mobilize public around issue (organize campaigns, petition) demonstrate use mass media (press conferences, articles)	meet with officials to: raise their awareness share information, ideas criticize existing policies (or lack thereof)
Formulation	research issues analyze existing policies propose alternatives publish position papers organize public events on issues author proposals	meet with officials to: share ideas, advice, analysis convey demands co-author proposals
Adoption	demonstrate educate public mobilize public around policy use mass media	meet with officials to: lobby share information, ideas convey demands negotiate

Policy participation clearly involves a variety of activities. At its most distilled, however, participation signifies that groups are able to engage in policy debates and exercise some influence over decision making, possibly altering the content or direction of a policy. While investigating these processes, I take into account participants' subjective assessments of the "quality" of their experiences. Do groups involved in policy making describe their encounters with government officials as satisfying or futile? Are they under the impression that the authorities heed their suggestions?[18]

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[18] I exclude this subjective aspect from Table 2. Burdening the dependent variable and the concept of participation with a host of additional "defining attributes" would limit the number of cases to which it applies (Collier and Levitsky 1997). I instead propose a more general category in order to capture a greater number of observations.

It bears mentioning that influence over the policy *process* is not equivalent to influence over *outcomes*. Civil society involvement in policy making does not necessarily lead to the attainment of desired results. Advocacy "is a question of articulating positions or sets of demands, not necessarily securing them" (Jenkins 1987, 297; see also Taylor and Warburton 2003). Because many causal factors govern policy outcomes, discerning group influence can be challenging. In addition, although it is possible to uncover evidence of CSOs changing the hearts and minds of policy makers, the political process necessarily entails bargaining and compromise; civil societal "inputs" are seldom automatically translated into policy "outputs."[19] Furthermore, even if a preferred policy is eventually approved, activists cannot be certain that it will be enacted. In Latin American countries, for example, policies sometimes lack the regulatory framework or funding needed for timely implementation. For all of these reasons, I avoid exaggerating the importance of outcomes and focus more diligently on the decision-making process and the role of civil society therein.

Because I understand participation as groups exercising their policy voices during this process, I exclude the implementation and monitoring phases from the dependent variable. Implementing policies — especially programs designed with little or no consultation of citizens — is not an appropriate indicator for policy influence.[20]

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[19] A process of reciprocal influence between governmental and civil societal actors also can occur: according to Dahl, "leaders do not merely respond to demands; they also help to generate them" (1961, 155).

[20] Strasser (2002) argues similarly that the administration of government policies by CSOs should not be construed as a form of "democratic" participation.

Meanwhile, supervising the administration of policies should be understood as a form of citizen *control* over government rather than participation in policy decisions.[21]

In brief, as indicated in Table 2, the dependent variable captures an array of political behaviors that are essential to advocacy. Having specified these components, I now turn to the task of summarizing the dissertation's empirical evidence and demonstrating how levels of civil society participation and influence vary across cases of policy making.

CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN POLICY: THE EVIDENCE

In this section, I discuss the dissertation's four main cases of policy making. I begin each summary with an overview of the types of CSOs involved in the policy domain, the particular issues in which they are engaged, and their focus areas and activities. I then examine the role of civil societal actors in the specific case of policy making selected for analysis. As I recount the details of each case, I emphasize the extent to which CSOs participated in the policy process and how they did so. The values on the dependent variable are as follows: high levels of policy participation in the case of freedom of information legislation in Argentina; intermediate levels in the cases of comprehensive child protection policies in Argentina and Chile; and low levels of involvement in the case of the Bío Bío River dam project in Chile.

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[21] CSOs involved in this phase concern themselves with the efficiency, transparency, and effectiveness of the policy's administration; they attempt to keep the program "honest," blow the whistle on any irregularities, and perform other tasks to keep government officials in check (Najam 1999).

Advocating for freedom of information in Argentina

In May 2003, Argentina's lower house of congress, the Chamber of Deputies, passed legislation promoting access to public information. Members of the multiple CSOs that favored the bill viewed its approval as the result of their steadfast advocacy efforts. Activists also identified the campaign as an important "test case" for both citizen participation in policy making and serious political reform in Argentina.[22]

The basis for this transparency-enhancing reform is every citizen's right to solicit and receive information from all branches and levels of government. Information related to governmental actions and outputs is public by definition. It encompasses laws, acts, and data on existing and proposed policies, public facilities (such as hospitals or schools), public spending in general, and the voting records of elected officials. The right to information is already codified in three articles in the constitution, as well as in the international human rights conventions that were incorporated into the text in 1994; advocates nevertheless have clamored for national legislation.[23] Supporters agree that a concrete, legal framework is required to ensure that these norms are put into practice. Access to information traditionally has depended on the discretion of public officials, who often reject or ignore requests. In many cases, legal action and a judge's order are needed to obligate public servants to release documents. The proposed law thus

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[22] Interview in the Center for the Implementation of Public Policies promoting Equity and Growth (CIPPEC), Transparency Area, 2/11/03, Buenos Aires. I am grateful to María Poli, who first drew my attention to this case.

[23] Articles 38, 41, and 42 address the right to information as it pertains to political parties, the environment, and consumers, respectively. Examples of relevant international conventions include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, or San José Pact (Salvioli 1995; Travieso 1996).

establishes deadlines for furnishing requests, penalties in cases of non-compliance, and other provisions detailing its implementation and enforcement.

The main proponents of the reform are NGOs involved in defending citizenship rights, encouraging citizen participation in governance, and/or supporting institutional transparency and other political reforms.[24] Many organizations serve as monitors of the state, political institutions, and elites; some also are experienced in public interest law and legal advocacy. For instance, both the Civil Rights Association (ADC) and the Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN) have engaged in legal and policy advocacy. ADC is a pioneer in public interest law and the defense of constitutional rights.[25] Since the late 1990s, its legal experts have pursued cases pertaining to gender-related and other forms of discrimination. FARN is active in the struggle for increased citizen participation in decision making and transparency, especially in the area of sustainable development.

Citizen Power is another important foundation that has promoted citizen participation and control since 1989. The group takes civil society's watchdog role seriously and has gained prominence through its efforts to hold political elites

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[24] Examples of groups in favor of the law include: ADC (Civil Rights Association), CELS (Center for Legal and Social Studies), Center for Social Responsibility, CIPPEC (Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth), Citizen Commitment, Citizens for Change, Citizen Power, FARN (Environment and Natural Resources Foundation), Democratic Change Foundation, Government and Society Foundation, INECIP (Institute of Comparative Studies in Penal and Social Sciences), Innova, and Sophia Group Foundation. Civil society networks, such as the Social Sector Forum and Social Forum for Transparency, also participated.

[25] Interview in the Civil Rights Association (ADC), 3/11/03, Buenos Aires. In addition, ADC, FARN, Citizen Power, CELS, and other NGOs have supported reforms of Argentina's Supreme Court and other changes in the judicial branch. The Argentine constitution provides citizens with tools that facilitate their monitoring of government institutions and officials. Examples include the ombudsman (*defensor del pueblo*), who protects citizens' rights, and legal instruments which allow citizens to clamor for their rights when public authorities or private actors threaten or abuse them (*acciones de amparo*).

accountable. In particular, Citizen Power has scrutinized legislators, their campaign finance practices, and their compliance (or lack thereof) with extant public ethics laws.[26]

The Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (CIPPEC) shares Citizen Power's interest in making information about elected officials, institutions, and policy processes available to the public.[27] Several staff members are dedicated to transparency issues, and CIPPEC's overall mission is to work toward a "more just, democratic, and efficient state that can improve people's lives."[28] The organization is routinely involved in various phases of policy, including formulation, implementation, evaluation, and monitoring. Founded in 2000, CIPPEC is a relatively new NGO on the block.

In contrast, the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) is a veteran human rights organization that emerged during the dictatorship. CELS has become a leader in monitoring police brutality and the use of excessive force.[29] Since the democratic transition, participants in the NGO have documented hundreds of cases of police officers with itchy trigger fingers or who mistreat individuals in their custody. In addition to

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[26] Manzetti (2000) suggests that Citizen Power has influenced campaign finance practices by raising public awareness and obligating politicians to abide by existing laws.

[27] One of the ways CIPPEC has done so is by publishing a legislative directory with information on elected officials' activities, earnings, and basic personal data (Interview in Transparency Area, 2/11/03, Buenos Aires).

[28] Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires. The NGO seeks to improve the quality of policies and public administration and has focused on the areas of health, education, and fiscal policy (along with transparency). Similarly, the Sophia Group Foundation and Innova endeavor to make public administration more effective.

[29] CELS also works on issues related to discrimination, economic, social, and cultural rights, and the human rights abuses committed during the dictatorship. CELS (2002) estimates that in Greater Buenos Aires, 261 civilians died in violent episodes involving the police in 2001 alone; its figures for 1998, 1999, and 2000 are 163, 257, and 232, respectively. The term in Spanish for such violence is *gatillo fácil,* which translates loosely as "trigger-happy." See Armony (2004) and Brinks (2003) for analyses of police brutality and the rule of law in Argentina.

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specializing in the rule of law, CELS uses legal means to advocate on behalf of Argentines whose rights are systematically violated, such as immigrants and the economically marginalized.

These NGOs and other groups that support the information access law differ in terms of their specific areas of emphasis, political and ideological proclivities, and historical trajectories. Two attributes shared by the majority of the organizations are reasonably well-developed administrative infrastructures and socially "elite" members. Their personnel tend to be educated professionals, and most lack an extensive membership base and ties to grassroots groups.[30] Notwithstanding their more elite character, a number of the NGOs enjoy high levels of recognition and credibility among fellow CSOs and the broader public.

Thus, various civil societal actors have championed freedom of information. While their interest in transparency reforms may come as no surprise, their extensive involvement in the policy process is more remarkable — especially in light of the scholarship summarized in Chapter 1. In this case, CSOs participated in policy agenda setting, design, and adoption.

For several years before the legislation made its way onto the formal agenda at the national level, groups had been researching and publishing on freedom of information.[31] Additionally, CELS invoked the right to public information in a court case related to

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[30] There are exceptions. FARN, for example, involves base organizations in its annual colloquia, and ADC is trying to broaden its membership, which mostly comprises lawyers. In addition, some of the CSOs pursuing political reform are small, informal groups of concerned citizens.
[31] FARN stands out as an early contributor (e.g., FARN 1997); see also Abramovich and Courtis (2000) and "Principios fundamentales para la promoción de leyes de acceso a la información," by CELS, ADC, and the Inter-American Dialogue.

police brutality. The suit served to call attention to the norm and pushed advocacy in "positive directions," according to one activist.[32] Reforms were being debated at the provincial level of government, as well. In 1998, the Legislature of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires passed an information access bill supported by Marta Oyhanarte, a deputy and founding member of Citizen Power. Roberto Saba, presently a lawyer with the Civil Rights Association, had authored the legislation.[33] This law later served as a model for the national bill. In this sense, the reform bore a civil societal imprint from the very beginning.

A preliminary version of the legislation was drafted in the Anticorruption Office in 2001.[34] This government agency, housed in the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, investigates cases of corruption and designs policies to increase transparency in public administration. During the formulation stage, the staff of the Anticorruption Office invited suggestions from various non-governmental actors largely through a process of negotiated rulemaking.[35] Representatives from the media, universities, businesses, and CSOs participated in a series of workshops, and some of their recommendations were

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[32] Interview in CELS, 4/3/03, Buenos Aires.

[33] Interview in ADC, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires. Similar laws are on the books in other Argentine provinces (including Chubut, Jujuy, and Río Negro). Saba modeled the legislation on the United States' 1966 Freedom of Information Act.

[34] The bill, known as *Proyecto de Ley Nacional de Libre Acceso a la Información Pública*, is available at: http://www.anticorrupcion.jus.gov.ar (Accessed 8/2/03). The Anticorruption Office's jurisdiction includes executive branch ministries and secretariats, national agencies, public corporations, and public or private institutions receiving federal funding (and excludes the judicial and legislative branches and provincial and municipal governments).

[35] Negotiated rulemaking has been enacted in the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of Education and Agriculture, and other government bodies in the United States. Proponents of "reg-neg" argue that the process decreases costly litigation, because interested parties refrain from challenging the agreed-upon rules in court (Harter 1982). In the U.S., the phrase commonly refers to the preparation of the rules that implement policies or statutes. The term in Spanish is *procedimiento de elaboración participada de normas*.

incorporated into the bill.[36]   Not surprisingly, most of the participants evaluated the

sessions favorably.[37]

The rulemaking process created an opportunity for citizen involvement and was

therefore a welcome development. However, *personal* ties between NGO members and

the Anticorruption Office staff were more significant than this *institutional* innovation.

Individual-level relationships — which predated the rulemaking sessions for the most

part — proved advantageous for the groups.[38] Stated differently, had the Anticorruption

Office failed to extend a broader "invitation" to civil societal actors, certain NGO

members probably would have been consulted nonetheless.

Moreover, several key players within the Anticorruption Office were themselves

former civil societal actors.   For example, Roberto de Michele, director of the

Department of Transparency Policies from its founding in 1999 to 2002, previously had

served on Citizen Power's administrative board. Other personnel had similar histories in

the NGO world and shared common views and policy goals with some of the activists.

These factors help explain the Office's distinctively inclusive style of policy

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[36] Interview in the Anticorruption Office, Department of Transparency Policies, 3/20/03, Buenos Aires.
The Anticorruption Office's Department of Transparency Policies, which carried out the negotiated
rulemaking process, also made the draft publicly available — for instance, via the Internet and major
newspapers — and encouraged feedback. Transcripts of the rulemaking sessions reveal that participants
had the opportunity to comment on both the broad contours of the policy and its specific provisions,
although the consultations were non-binding. The transcripts are included in the document, "Procedimiento
de elaboración participada de normas. Anteproyecto: Ley de acceso a la información (Talleres de trabajo y
opiniones recibidas por escrito)," published by the Anticorruption Office in 2001.

[37] Evaluations of the workshops indicate that 74% found them to be a "very useful" way to increase
transparency; for 22%, they were "somewhat useful." 100% concluded that the process should continue in
the future (Oficina Anticorrupción, Dirección de Planificación de Políticas de Transparencia. 2001.
"Procedimiento de elaboración participada de normas. Anteproyecto: Ley de acceso a la información").

[38] This was pointed out in several interviews with participants. I am also grateful to Manuel Balan for his
observations along these lines.

formulation.[39] It is no wonder that participants in NGOs have described the agency as an "oasis" within the government.[40]

Thus, participatory practices *per se* do not account for civil society influence in this case. Nor is the presence of sympathetic elites in the Anticorruption Office a sufficient explanation. Although this benefited CSOs during the design stage, it cannot explain their involvement during other phases of policy making. As a matter of fact, during the adoption phase, the Office was no longer the locus of decision making, and groups sought to influence a variety of other government officials. According to a staff member, civil society "pressure and follow-through" were vital for the bill's advancement.[41]

In March 2002, the executive branch approved the freedom of information bill and presented it to the Chamber of Deputies. CSOs mounted a campaign to ensure that the legislation did not lose momentum. One participant noted that continued political engagement was essential: "Some activists mistakenly assumed that reform would be easier due to the strong support of the Anticorruption Office and civil society. Instead, it was necessary to go from legislator to legislator, from committee to committee, and to

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[39] In Chapter 1, I refer to this flow of individuals between civil society and the government as leadership exchange. Staff members of the Office describe their relationship with CSOs as "positive" and the inclusion of groups as "necessary" (Interview in Department of Transparency Policies, 3/20/03, Buenos Aires). In addition, their publications criticize the limited contact between governing elites and the governed during policy making ("Seminario de Filantropía," dated 5/10/02; see also "Informe Anual de Gestión 2002. Resumen Ejecutivo").

[40] Interviews in ADC, 3/11/03, and CELS, 4/3/03, Buenos Aires.

[41] Interview in the Anticorruption Office, Department of Transparency Policies, 3/20/03, Buenos Aires. I am indebted to María Baron, Director, Transparency Area, CIPPEC, for providing me with a timeline tracking the bill's progress.

build an enormous network of volunteers."[42] As the bill's future was being decided, advocates used diverse strategies to influence the process. They organized public events, circulated research, and disseminated their views in the mass media to pressure governing elites and raise public awareness. They also met with legislators in both chambers, including high-ranking members of congress.[43]

To illustrate, CSOs lobbied policy makers to approve the bill in the relevant legislative committees. For instance, several groups submitted a joint publication to the committee that attends to constitutional issues while its members were reviewing different versions of the reform.[44] The document recommended various provisions considered essential for an effective freedom of information law. In July 2002, activists received assurances from the president of the free speech committee that the bill would pass. By August, both committees had approved the proposal. However, owing to repeated failures to achieve quorum and other delays, the bill did not reach the floor of the Chamber of Deputies for several months.

In the meantime, the CSOs pressured the executive branch to exercise its agenda-setting prerogative and include the bill on the agenda for extraordinary legislative sessions. Group members met with President Duhalde's staff as well as officials in the Ministry of Justice on a number of occasions and were promised that the bill would be

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[42] Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires.

[43] Some of the activities summarized here involved two dozen or more groups, whereas other events were organized by fewer organizations. According to some estimates, approximately two hundred groups participated in the campaign at one time or another.

[44] The document, authored by ADC, CELS, Citizen Power, FARN, and INECIP, is entitled "Requisitos Mínimos Para una Ley de Acceso a la Información Pública."

included.[45] Much to the activists' chagrin, the executive branch officials did not follow through.[46] Nevertheless, legislative actors took the next crucial step by calling for a special session, partly in response to the groups' efforts.

Subsequently, in the early months of 2003, the groups tried to persuade legislators to vote for the bill. One advocate remarked that the organizations had "dozens" of meetings with lawmakers.[47] According to another participant, "not a day went by without the deputies arriving at their offices to find ten calls from citizens asking that they lend their support"[48] They also collected more than 160 signatures of deputies who endorsed the legislation — almost two-thirds of the lower chamber.[49]

In addition to linking up with policy makers, the CSOs sought a wider audience for their views on freedom of information. During the campaign, they continued to disseminate their ideas by sponsoring conferences and other events, holding press conferences, and targeting both the mainstream and alternative media. A member of CIPPEC, for example, regularly contributed editorials to *La Nación*, Argentina's most important daily. Meanwhile, Citizen Power published related articles on *Infocívica*, an

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[45] Members of CSOs also leveraged other political contacts: in a meeting with a Peronist senator close to Duhalde, they requested that she personally urge him to advance the legislation (Interview in FARN, 1/31/03, Buenos Aires).

[46] In December 2002, for the second time in two months, Duhalde did not include the bill on the legislative agenda. However, the Minister of Justice did convene a meeting with some of the CSOs to reiterate his commitment to cooperating with them.

[47] Interview in CIPPEC, Transparency Area, 2/11/03, Buenos Aires. The groups sometimes targeted those lawmakers in a position to hasten the bill's progress, including the president of the lower house.

[48] Norberto Borzese, of the Social Forum for Transparency, quoted in an *Infocívica* article, dated 3/24/03 (http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 6/1/03).

[49] This figure appears on CIPPEC's website at: http://www.cippec.org. (Accessed 7/10/03). The advocates also planned a press conference in which they would commend those who supported the legislation and expose its detractors.

online medium dedicated to news about (and from) civil society.[50] These strategies helped generate interest in transparency, expand their base of public support, and put further pressure on policy makers. The CSOs also achieved these goals by reaching out to broader constituencies, such as other civic organizations and civil society alliances that were promoting various types of political reforms. In fact, a key point, developed at length in Chapter 4, is that civil societal actors worked *in concert* during this phase.

The Chamber of Deputies passed the bill in May 2003. Advocates promptly announced their plans to lobby the Senate until it adopted the legislation. Some had begun to secure commitments from senators as early as September 2002.[51] The Peronist majority finally approved a version of the reform in December 2004; however, the legislation had been modified substantially in committee.[52] Critics charge that the non-trivial changes effectively limit the right to information and thus violate the spirit of the law. According to one of the provisions, an individual who requests information from the government must provide a reason for doing so under oath. Members of NGOs have insisted that such information *by its very nature* belongs to the public: citizens should not have to offer a rationale for claiming what is rightfully theirs.[53] In response to the new requirements, a Radical Party (UCR) senator scoffed, "they practically ask for a blood

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[50] A goal of the "Civic Information" news service, located at http://www.infocivica.org, is to help CSOs develop media strategies (Interview in Citizen Power, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires). Citizen Power also enjoys substantial coverage in the mainstream press.

[51] Timeline provided by Transparency Area, CIPPEC. For instance, ADC, CIPPEC, FARN, and the Social Forum for Transparency were involved in these efforts.

[52] Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (currently Argentina's First Lady) presides over the committee, which deals with constitutional issues.

[53] ADC editorial published in *La Nación*, issue dated 11/30/04; see also *La Nación*, issue dated 11/9/04.

test."[54]   Additionally, the category of potentially classified (or restricted) information has expanded: the previous version limited access to information pertaining to national security, for example; in contrast, under the current version, financial, commercial, industrial, scientific, and other types of data also could be placed off limits.[55]   The fate of the modified text now rests with the lower chamber.

This turn of events was hardly the happy ending that activists had sought.[56] Nevertheless, it does not diminish the fact that CSOs were active participants during multiple phases of the policy process.   To a considerable extent, they succeeded in influencing the original bill and pushing it forward.   Civil society pressure on both branches of government was crucial for the bill's passage in the Chamber of Deputies. Looking ahead, the unwelcome changes to the legislation are bound to complicate the groups' advocacy efforts, though they will likely remain engaged in the issue.   Moreover, assuming the law is eventually passed, we can expect CSOs to monitor its implementation and enforcement.   Proponents of increased transparency insist that constant vigilance is needed to bridge the gap between parchment and practice in Argentina.[57]

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[54] Senator Gerardo Morales is quoted in *La Nación*, issue dated 12/2/04. Some Peronist legislators likewise criticized the changes to the bill.

[55] Critics also note that when the law itself fails to establish how far confidentiality extends (and under what circumstances), bureaucrats exercise significant discretion (ADC editorial published in *La Nación*, issue dated 11/30/04).

[56] Because these events occurred many months after I concluded my field work, more research is needed to ascertain what happened between the passage of the bill in the lower chamber and its approval in the Senate (and to gauge the reactions of activists).

Children's advocacy in Argentina

Argentine CSOs that advocate on behalf of children vary significantly. Their particular focus areas can include intra-family violence, neglect, abandonment, health and nutrition, substance abuse, education and school retention, and discrimination. Other common concerns are social and economic indicators as they pertain to children and conditions in private and state-run shelters, orphanages, and other institutions that house young people. To a lesser extent, groups take up the issue of law enforcement, investigating episodes of violence perpetrated against teens and other youth during run-ins with the authorities.[58] Because a wide variety of CSOs are involved in children's issues, it is hardly the exclusive domain of professionalized NGOs. At the same time, individuals with advanced degrees in relevant fields — pediatrics, child psychology, social work, education, and the law, for instance — are often active in such causes.

Some groups are committed to promoting children's rights in accordance with international norms and conventions, which I discuss below. Others are dedicated to helping families meet their basic necessities by providing services (namely, communal kitchens and gardens, shelter, or a safe haven). They address these needs by implementing social policies or other programs that rely extensively on public funding and through their own independent initiatives.[59] The Children's Rights Association

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[57] The 1999 Public Ethics Law is one example of legislation that thus far has lacked teeth. A document authored in CIPPEC's Transparency Area notes delays in the creation of a national committee to exercise oversight vis-à-vis the legislative branch ("Educación de los representantes y funcionarios públicos").

[58] In 2000, CELS estimated that 42% of those killed during such encounters in Greater Buenos Aires were under the age of 21. The group also monitors the treatment of youth in police stations.

[59] According to some estimates, in the early 2000s, close to one-half of government funds channeled to CSOs were destined for nutritional programs and policies that targeted children or youth in poverty and/or "at risk" (CENOC bulletin, issue dated September/October 2001).

(ADI) and similar groups wear multiple hats: they conduct research, educate the public about children's rights, and provide direct assistance to communities.[60] While such advocates approach their work from a rights-based perspective, others are inspired by their religious faiths. The Emmanuel Foundation, whose specialties include foster parenting and related family issues, is an example of a faith-based CSO.

The Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, who participated in the human rights movement under authoritarian rule, have brought added legitimacy and symbolism to children's advocacy. During the dictatorship, security forces sometimes sequestered children along with their parents, and pregnant woman occasionally gave birth in clandestine detention centers. After disappearing the parent(s), the authorities arranged illicit adoptions. The Grandmothers dedicated themselves to the identification and restitution of the children of the disappeared. Hundreds of these children (now young adults) have sought to recover their biological and familial identities.[61] Since the democratic transition, the Grandmothers have become involved in other aspects of children's rights. They are joined by the Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ) and the

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[60] A rights-based perspective also motivates the work of the Civil Association for the Equality of Rights. Examples of additional CSOs involved in children's issues include: the Argentine Pediatrics Society, Anahí, El Arca, Center for Legal Studies of Children and Youth (CELIJ), Center for Political and Social Studies for Human Development (CESPEDH), Christian Youth Association (YMCA), Hacer Lugar, Integrated Center for Social Rehabilitation (CIRSA), Pelota de Trapo, and Surcos.

[61] The Grandmothers have located over 70 sons and daughters of disappeared persons and helped create the National Bank of Genetic Data, which stores their blood for identification purposes. The Grandmothers emphasize the children's right to their own identity, the truth about their family backgrounds, and the love of their surviving kin (Interview in Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 6/30/97, Buenos Aires; see also Arditti 1999). In 1995, some of the children of the disappeared, imprisoned, and exiled organized HIJOS (Children for Identity and Justice and Against Forgetting and Silence). Members of this human rights group underscore the importance of discovering the truth about their parents and the "missing pieces of the puzzle" of their own identities (Interview in HIJOS, 7/31/97, Buenos Aires).

Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), human rights organizations that likewise existed during the authoritarian period.

The legacy of state-sponsored human rights abuses is evident not only in the types of groups active in children's issues, but in their behaviors, as well. For instance, like their colleagues in the area of transparency, children's advocates serve as watchdogs of the state. Groups scrutinize the policies of the National Council of Childhood, Adolescence, and the Family (CONAF), the main executive agency devoted to child welfare and the Social Development Ministry's health, nutrition, and other programs, which frequently target children and pregnant women. A number of CSOs coincide in their evaluations of current programs toward children as poorly developed and under-funded; they also criticize the lack of policy coordination across different government agencies. In addition, they monitor the treatment of young people in the aforementioned institutions for children "at risk" and the criminal justice system.[62]

A centerpiece of the groups' monitoring activities is the preparation of non-governmental reports for the United Nations. CSOs have generated these reports on a regular basis since Argentina ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990 following its adoption by the General Assembly.[63] The documents usually conclude that Argentina falls short of complying with the Convention and call attention to rights violations. They provide "alternative" assessments of the extent to which the state has

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[62] To illustrate, CONAF has authorized the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH) to inspect some of the institutions that it directs (Interview in the APDH, Judicial Committee, 4/15/03, Buenos Aires).

[63] In addition to becoming a national law, the Convention was incorporated into the 1994 Constitution, along with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and other international norms. States are obligated to report their progress toward complying with the Convention to

conformed to international norms to challenge the official (government-authored) accounts.[64] The Convention, which marks an important shift in understandings of child welfare, establishes that all children are entitled to certain rights "guaranteeing their care and protection" (Maclure and Sotelo 2004, 86).[65] Examples include the right to health, education, and recreation, protection from discrimination, abuse, and exploitation, freedom of expression and the right to participate in the broader community, the right to an identity (e.g., a name and a nationality), and the chance to live with one's own family.

Thus, the CSOs enjoy an international audience for their observations regarding the status of Argentine youth. Nevertheless, children's advocates have not been content to limit their activities to monitoring the state and underscoring the deficiencies of existing policies. Rather, they have sought to influence the direction of policy, pushing for wide-ranging reforms at different levels of government.[66] At the national level, groups have been involved in the policy process with the goal of achieving comprehensive child protection legislation.[67] From the mid-1990s to the present, CSOs

the Committee on the Rights of the Child in Geneva within two years of ratification and every five years thereafter (Brown Thompson 1997).

[64] In their response to Argentina's official report, members of the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, like members of children's CSOs, have noted the lack of inter-agency policy coordination and the absence of a national plan of action with respect to the rights and well-being of children ("Consideración de los Informes Presentados por los Estados Partes," dated 10/4/00).

[65] The Convention signals a global change in perceptions of children, who are regarded as rights-bearing subjects in need of special protection rather than as "objects solely dependent on adult authority" (Maclure and Sotelo 2004, 86; see also Brown Thompson 1997).

[66] Children's groups have influenced policy at the provincial level and were especially instrumental in the creation and passage of Law 114 in the Legislature of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires in the late 1990s. The legislation (*Ley de Protección Integral de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes*), which purports to protect the rights of children, is guided by the international norms discussed above (Interview in ADI, 4/4/03, Buenos Aires; for details on the legislation, see the 2002 publication, "Una joven ley para los más jóvenes de la ciudad," by ADI, UNICEF, and the Council on the Rights of Girls, Boys, and Adolescents).

[67] This type of legislation is referred to as *ley de protección integral*. Governments and civil societal actors elsewhere in Latin America have pursued reforms in this policy domain: examples include Brazil's 1990

have participated in the agenda-setting, formulation, and adoption phases. However, compared to the freedom of information case, their involvement has been more limited with respect to the number of organizations that have mobilized, their levels of activity, and their access to policy makers in both branches of government. Furthermore, their presence in policy debates and interactions with elites so far have resulted in few clear "victories." This case is therefore an example of intermediate levels of participation.

CSOs' efforts to influence the public and formal agendas have borne fruit. In particular, their ability to attract media coverage of issues pertaining to the rights and well-being of children has helped them raise awareness of the cause.[68] Additionally, children's advocates are adamant that the U.N. reports discussed previously serve as tools for educating the public and pressuring government officials. One of their goals in preparing the 2002 document, for instance, was to create a "space" from which they could propose alternative policies.[69] Group members also have organized conferences to facilitate discussions of policy issues, the exchange of information and ideas, and consensus building among diverse bureaucratic, governmental, and civil societal actors.[70]

During the formulation stage, children's advocates have entered into dialogue with lawmakers, offered proposals, and voiced their opinions, though government-civil society interactions tend to be intermittent and *ad hoc*. CONAF does have an advisory

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Statute on Children and Adolescents (Guidry 2000) and Nicaragua's 1998 Code of Childhood and Adolescence (Maclure and Sotelo 2004).

[68] Interview in the Committee for the Monitoring and Application of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CASACIDN), 3/11/03, Buenos Aires; see also Bombal and Garay (2000).

[69] Interview in the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires.

[70] One such event occurred in Mendoza in 1997 (*Encuentro Federal de Políticas de Infancia y Adolescencia*). In addition to bringing together a variety of actors involved in children's issues, the

council designed to facilitate the involvement of non-governmental actors in the agency's operations. However, the majority of the activists whom I interviewed expressed little interest in (or knowledge of) the council's activities and participants. The institution appears to play a limited role in incorporating CSOs' policy contributions.

A number of advocates have tried consistently to pressure decision makers to pass child protection legislation. ADI and other CSOs, for instance, have petitioned and lobbied members of congress. They also have published opinion pieces and disseminated analyses that compare and contrast competing policy proposals. Notwithstanding these endeavors, the groups have encountered several challenges during the adoption phase. First, their levels of engagement with — and influence over — the policy process do not rival the intensity of the freedom of information supporters. Second, their policy involvement seems to have declined since the late 1990s. Third, the actual content of some of the proposals currently pending in the legislature does not reflect the inputs of activists, especially those who promote children's rights. Since the early 2000s, groups have continued to engage in dialogue with policy makers; however, they hesitate to support bills they deem to be "problematic" owing to unwelcome provisions or changes. As discussed in reference to the freedom of information campaign, this complicates CSOs' advocacy efforts and occasionally puts them in the position of *opposing* proposed reforms.[71] Children's advocates found themselves in a similar predicament in the late 1990s: after collaborating with policy makers during the formulation phase, they were

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conference is thought to have helped stimulate policy reforms in the provinces (Interview in CASACIDN, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires).
[71] Interviews in ADI, 4/4/03, CASACIDN, 3/11/03, and the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires.

dismayed to learn that the version that the Chamber of Deputies actually approved lacked the rights-based perspective upon which they had insisted (Bombal and Garay 2000).[72]

Children's advocacy in Chile

Children's advocates in Chile resemble their Argentine counterparts in their diversity. A number of the CSOs active in this domain identify themselves principally as development, human rights, and/or religious organizations. They intervene in children's lives in a variety of areas, such as intra-family violence, mistreatment, education, health, substance abuse, disabilities, crime, and sexual exploitation. The socioeconomic status of children — and the relationship between social indicators and the issues listed above — is a major theme of interest. Many organizations pursue a mixture of research, rights education, and community-based projects intended to help families meet their needs.[73]

As in Argentina, an array of small, grassroots groups are committed to the well-being of children. Several prominent, stable, and relatively large NGOs exist, as well. To illustrate, the Chilean Association Pro United Nations (ACHNU) comprises numerous professionals and multiple divisions, including policy and legal areas. OPCION ("option" or "alternative") is another sizeable, well-known NGO. The Foundation to Overcome Poverty is a further example of an important organization involved in

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[72] The lower chamber passed a bill in 2001, but its future remains uncertain at present.

[73] Like some of the Argentine groups, a number of CSOs are involved in implementing the government's social policies and programs, but many also attend to these needs through their own independent initiatives.

children's issues, and the social ministry vicariate of the Catholic Church in Santiago has a committed Children and Youth Area.[74]

CSOs have taken on the responsibility of monitoring state policies and practices. They tend to focus their attention on the government agencies that directly address children's issues, such as the National Service for Minors (SENAME), housed in the Ministry of Justice. SENAME assists children and teens "at risk" who have committed crimes, are undergoing rehabilitation, and/or find themselves in other circumstances of "vulnerability."[75] Additional targets include the Planning and Cooperation, Education, and Health Ministries, and other agencies that design and implement social policies that affect the welfare of children.[76]

Children's advocates voice several concerns regarding existing policies.[77] First, they describe extant laws as inadequate and contradictory. Second, they point to the insufficient degree of coordination among different ministries and agencies within the executive branch. Some note the absence of a governmental body that could better synchronize policies and thus call for institutional reform in this area. Third, groups evaluate the government's progress on a number of specific fronts, including access to

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[74] The vicariate's Children and Youth Area organizes school retention, recreation, and other programs.

[75] Like Argentina's CONAF, SENAME is involved with private and state-run shelters, orphanages, and other institutions for children and teens. During (and subsequent to) my stay in Chile, reforms within the agency were being discussed, and ACHNU, OPCION, and other organizations served in an advisory capacity during this process.

[76] Other government entities are likewise involved in issues pertaining to young people. For example, Chile's social investment fund (FOSIS) supports local programs that sometimes target children and youth (e.g., school retention initiatives). Separate funds are earmarked for projects designed to improve assistance for children (PMI) and to educate students about drug abuse.

[77] This section draws on interview data and the alternative report that CSOs submitted to the U.N. in 2002, entitled, "Comentarios al Segundo Informe del Estado Chileno Acerca de las Medidas Adoptadas para Dar Efectividad al Cumplimiento de la Convención Internacional de los Derechos del Niño (Informe Alternativo)." I discuss the preparation of this report below.

health care and education, and the legal and penal codes that apply to children and teens. In more general terms, advocates often conclude that the rights of children are not observed regularly in practice.[78]

Like their Argentine colleagues, the CSOs communicate these findings and concrete recommendations to both domestic and international audiences. The main vehicles for disseminating their views are the non-governmental reports that ascertain the extent to which Chile has complied with the Convention on the Rights of the Child since its ratification in 1990. Groups that contribute to the preparation of these documents have become progressively more committed to advocating for institutional and policy reforms that are compatible with global norms.[79] They therefore envision other roles for themselves besides that of the watchdog.

Children's advocates have been moderately successful at leveraging their monitoring activities into other forms of political and policy engagement. They have increased the visibility of the rights-based perspective and contributed to public and policy debates. Civil societal and governmental actors alike tend to perceive children's organizations as political players of growing relevance. For example, participants in other CSOs have noticed a "buzz" of excitement surrounding this issue area in recent years.[80] Meanwhile, officials in the Planning and Cooperation Ministry (MIDEPLAN)

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[78] This observation was made during interviews in ACHNU, 11/4/02, NGO "Roots," 11/4/02, and Children and Youth Area, Social Ministry Vicariate, Catholic Church, 11/4/02, Santiago.

[79] Examples of CSOs that participated in the preparation of the 2002 report include: ACHNU, La Caleta Norte, Aldeas SOS, Amnesty International, ASPAUT, CEMURI, CEPPAC, CERSO, FORJA (Juridical Training for Action), FUNCASE, Fundación Tierra de Esperanza, GENESIS, Hogar de Cristo, KAIROS, MOANI, OPCION, PIDEE, SERPAJ (the Peace and Justice Service), SEDEJ, and SEPADE.

[80] Interviews in ACCION, 9/16/02, and Participa, 10/14/02, Santiago. I am grateful to the staff at ACCION, who first brought the children's organizations to my attention.

characterize the groups as capable, organized, and proactive: in short, promising "counterparts" for the government.[81] Staff members regularly maintain contact — and exchange information and analysis — with CSOs, especially the more technical, professional NGOs.[82] They seldom plan events without first "inviting" the participation of such actors, according to one official.[83]

Not surprisingly, CSOs were involved in the formulation of the National Policy and Integrated Plan of Action in Favor of Children and Adolescents, which the Lagos Administration introduced in 2001. The official document detailing this executive branch initiative identifies several areas for policy intervention on behalf of children (MIDEPLAN 2001). Examples include: guaranteeing their survival and a suitable standard of living (measured in terms of education, safety, health, and other indicators); providing services to children with special needs (such as disabled individuals or members of minority groups); preventing domestic abuse and drug use; and encouraging youth participation in matters that directly involve or interest them.[84] The policy embraces children as "strategic" actors who will contribute to Chile's future

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[81] Two separate interviews in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/18/02, Santiago. Officials describe their relationship with CSOs in positive terms overall.

[82] These linkages enhance MIDEPLAN's ability to develop and coordinate social policies (Interviews in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/10/02 & 10/18/02, Santiago). On the other hand, children's advocates regret the apparent decline in interest in this issue area within the legislative branch. The dedication of members of Chile's parliament and political parties to children's issues decreased following the 1997 elections, according to the 2002 U.N. report ("Comentarios al Segundo Informe del Estado Chileno Acerca de las Medidas Adoptadas para Dar Efectividad al Cumplimiento de la Convención Internacional de los Derechos del Niño").

[83] Interview in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/18/02, Santiago.

[84] The document also addresses family life, access to social welfare, and other themes. It bears noting that separate laws guide the government's response to intra-family violence, abandonment, adoptions, and juvenile crime. Implementing the plan requires the combined efforts of the different government bureaus mentioned above.

development; President Lagos himself states that ensuring their welfare is the "best investment" for the country (MIDEPLAN 2001, 9).

In this case, we observe intermediate levels of CSO participation. The fact that policy collaboration occurred primarily during the design phase differentiates this case from those discussed earlier, in which groups targeted legislators during the adoption phase. Executive branch officials conferred with a good number of children's advocates through a series of meetings and workshops.[85] This consultation process was officially sanctioned but not formalized into a large advisory board comprised of civil societal and governmental actors. Thus, participatory institutions *per se* do not explain CSO involvement. However, the National Policy and Integrated Plan of Action did order the establishment of a new council, which was to include representatives from CSOs, schools, the Chilean branch of UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), and the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (MIDEPLAN 2001).[86]

Although groups enjoyed moderately high access to policy makers, they appeared to lack attitudes of ownership toward the resulting policy. One participant characterized the policy as "very much the *government's*."[87] Others candidly described their interactions with government officials as "unsatisfactory."[88] Such sentiments contrast sharply with the perceptions of many transparency activists in Argentina, who believed

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[85] Interview in ACHNU, 11/4/02, Santiago (see also the NGO's annual report for 2001). ACHNU's leader noted that the number of groups that participated was quite high, though the precise figure was not known. See MIDEPLAN (2001) for the government's own description of the consultation process.

[86] This "Extended Consultative Council" had not yet been organized at the time of my field research in 2002.

[87] Interview in Children and Youth Area, Social Ministry Vicariate, Catholic Church, 11/4/02, Santiago.

that their participation influenced the content of the freedom of information legislation early in the process. They experienced a large degree of stakeholdership during the bill's formulation and its subsequent adoption by the lower chamber.

These specific reactions to the creation of the National Policy echo a more general set of observations concerning the role of children's CSOs in policy making. For instance, some advocates suggest that the government is "not very receptive" to proposals that have originated within civil society.[89] Others remark that policy makers have already made key decisions by the time they consult CSOs.[90] Interestingly, MIDEPLAN staff members acknowledge the government's tendency to "hand down" decisions and "provide answers to social problems;" hence, NGOs and other groups are "not necessarily seated at the table" with officials during every stage of the decision-making process.[91] At the same time, they insist that governmental actors genuinely value the groups' opinions and regard these as welcome contributions.[92]

The child protection policy therefore demonstrates more of a top-down, government-led dynamic relative to the other cases examined so far. We find less evidence of civil society pressure from below: petitioning, holding press conferences, and using other tactics aimed at rallying the public and other civil societal actors to the cause. Such pressure often accompanies the more collaborative, direct advocacy

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[88] This description appears in the 2002 U.N. report discussed above ("Comentarios al Segundo Informe del Estado Chileno Acerca de las Medidas Adoptadas para Dar Efectividad al Cumplimiento de la Convención Internacional de los Derechos del Niño").

[89] Interview in NGO "Roots," 11/4/02, Santiago.

[90] Interview in ACHNU, 11/4/02, Santiago.

[91] Two separate interviews in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/18/02, Santiago.

[92] Interviews in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/10/02 & 10/18/02, Santiago.

strategies included in Table 2 (e.g., meeting face-to-face with governing elites).

Moreover, because the provisions of the policy were decided largely on the government's

terms, CSO influence remained limited. Thus, this case is an example of middling levels

of involvement.

Nevertheless, these conclusions are not grounds for dismissing the political

potential of children's groups. A greater role in policy decision making is possible, and

advocacy on behalf of children in both Argentina and Chile may meet with more success

in the future. To keep matters in perspective, we should bear in mind that children's

rights activism in particular is a relatively "young" movement at both the domestic and

international levels.

Environmental advocacy in Chile

Like children's advocacy, the rubric of environmental activism captures a vast

array of actors, issues, and behaviors. A multiplicity of Chilean organizations are

involved in such causes, including ecology clubs, research centers in universities, and

"green" NGOs, which are my focus. Scientists, lawyers, and other educated people

frequently have gravitated toward environmentalism in various nations, and Chile is no

exception. In fact, activists identify a recent trend in the direction of further

professionalization in this policy domain. Terram, a foundation that promotes sustainable

development, exemplifies the "technical-professional" approach and produces copious

amounts of analysis.[93] At the same time, some of the NGOs maintain ties to grassroots groups, and the Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF) and Greenpeace Chile have over 4,000 and 3,000 members, respectively.[94]

It has become increasingly common for groups to carve out an organizational "niche" by specializing in a certain constellation of issues within the broader categories of environmentalism and sustainable development.[95] To illustrate, Ecoceanos focuses on marine wildlife and pollution, as well as fishing-related industries, whereas the Defenders of the Chilean Forest concentrates on protecting Chile's native woodlands. In contrast, House of Peace identifies itself as an authority on environmental education and citizen participation.[96]

Green NGOs also differentiate themselves in terms of their overall approach to this issue area. Both activists and outside observers typically categorize the groups as conservationist, ecological, or environmental (Carruthers 2001; Claude 1999).[97] CODEFF and other conservationist organizations emphasize the preservation and protection of natural resources, habitats, and wildlife. The Political Ecology Institute and similar ecological groups clamor for a fundamental shift away from Chile's existing

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[93] Interview in Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago. See also Claude (1999), which provides an overview of green NGOs in Chile. Two additional groups, which predate the NGOs mentioned here, are the Environmental Research and Planning Center (CIPMA) and the Chilean Ecology Institute.

[94] Interviews in CODEFF, 10/14/02, and Greenpeace Chile, 9/27/02, Santiago.

[95] Interview in House of Peace, 9/17/02, Santiago. Hudson (2002) notes a similar tendency among NGOs in the United Kingdom that seek to differentiate themselves from one another. According to the World Commission on Environment and Development, sustainable development is defined as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.

[96] Other issues of concern for green NGOs include hazardous wastes, pollution, smog and other air quality issues, and the depletion of the ozone layer.

[97] These categories also were proposed during an interview in the Political Ecology Institute, 9/16/02, Santiago.

model of development, which they regard as unsustainable.[98] Environmentalist NGOs, including House of Peace, promote sustainable development and respect for the limits of nature but usually approach these from a more reformist perspective compared to ecologists.

The groups' activities range from research, legal advocacy, and environmental conflict resolution to public education and consciousness-raising.[99] Through such efforts, the NGOs have managed to influence the public agenda and contribute to political debates. To illustrate, newspaper content analysis indicates that some organizations have achieved a considerable media presence. This is no small feat: compared to the Argentine press, Chile's mainstream media provide limited coverage of civil society activities and tend to focus instead on governing elites and party leaders.[100] During the 1990s, the press consistently provided a venue for the opinions of members of CODEFF, the Political Ecology Institute, and other groups. Terram also gained exposure due in part to its regular columns in *La Tercera* and *La Nación* and its especially vocal director.[101]

Additionally, the NGOs are adept monitors of public officials and institutions, politicians, and private industry. They keep a watchful eye on the National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) and other governmental entities, report on cases

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[98] For instance, a member of the Political Ecology Institute explained that participants in the NGO share a critical, politicized view of current development policies (Interview, 9/16/02, Santiago). An eco-centric view of society motivates the work of such groups.

[99] Because single NGOs can pursue different strategies simultaneously, they often defy categories based on tactics (for instance, "contentious" versus more "conventional" approaches). Hochstetler (1997) argues similarly that environmental groups in Brazil use a variety of tactics, including lobbying, offering expert testimony, and protesting, among others.

[100] CSOs of all types try to counter this tendency by posting their own news on websites such as http://www.sociedadcivil.cl.

of alleged corruption, reveal deficiencies in public access to environmental information, and research the health of the environment.[102] Members of Ecoceanos, for instance, accuse powerful business elites of using government and legislative posts to pursue private interests rather than the common good.[103] Moreover, FIMA, an NGO dedicated to public interest environmental law, monitors the state's compliance with existing laws and adherence to the rights enshrined in the constitution.[104]

The majority of the groups are critical of the government's environmental policies but willing to engage in dialogue with elites. None maintains a rigidly oppositional posture vis-à-vis the authorities. One activist remarks that because a major policy shift toward sustainable development appears unlikely, they prefer to work within the "realm of possibility."[105] Another advocate describes her approach as critical yet cooperative in areas of common interest with the government.[106]

Notwithstanding their willingness to cooperate, the NGOs generally have been less involved in policy making compared to the CSOs discussed previously. Accordingly, we observe lower levels of participation and influence in the case of the Bío

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[101] I refer here to economist Marcel Claude, who has since left Terram to direct a different NGO. Manuel Baquedano, of the Political Ecology Institute, and Adriana Hoffman, of Defenders of the Chilean Forest, also are widely recognized.

[102] Terram is a further example of an NGO that takes this monitoring role seriously (Interview, 10/10/02, Santiago).

[103] Group members claim that in some cases of corruption, officials enjoy impunity; in addition to avoiding responsibility for their actions, they often land superior positions within the government ("*caer hacia arriba*"). The activists also maintain that citizens lack mechanisms for accountability and participation owing to the paucity of available information about campaign finance and public administration (Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02; see also the bulletin published by *Parlamento del Mar*, issue dated 9/02).

[104] Interview in FIMA, 10/2/02, Santiago. Members of FIMA and other lawyers have undertaken legal actions to thwart development and industrial projects that they consider to be harmful to the environment.

[105] Interview in Greenpeace Chile, 9/27/02, Santiago.

Bío River dam project relative to the three preceding cases. Since the mid-1990s, the government has embarked on the process of planning and building a series of dams and hydroelectric power plants in Southern Chile. The Ralco dam, currently under construction, is being financed by Endesa, a multinational corporation. Ralco will entail the flooding of approximately 3,500 hectares of land and forest (Aylwin 2002).[107] Much of the territory in question belongs (or belonged) to the Pehuenche, one of Chile's Mapuche communities.[108] The investment project has caused the displacement of more than 500 individuals, who signed their land over to Endesa and were resettled.[109] Critics have questioned some of the company's tactics for acquiring these lands, citing cases of pressure, manipulation, and/or "divide and conquer" strategies (Aylwin 2002, 12). The project has therefore disrupted indigenous people's customs and economic livelihoods, based largely on pastoral activities and access to the renewable resources of the forest (Aylwin 2002). The dam also threatens an estimated 50 animal and aquatic species.

In spite of the investment project's anticipated consequences — which many perceived as harmful to both indigenous communities and the environment — it was authorized by the relevant government agencies. CONAMA gave the go-ahead, prompting charges that it was approving Ralco without the proper analysis of its

[106] Interview in Sustainable Chile, 10/4/02, Santiago. Additionally, the 2001 annual report of House of Peace describes its "reformist environmentalist" approach as radical in its mode of thought but conciliatory in its methods.
[107] Together, the dams reportedly would have the capacity to generate some 2,680 megawatts of power; Ralco by itself would generate 570 megawatts (Aylwin 2002). Construction of the first dam, Pangue, was completed in 1994.
[108] There are approximately one million Mapuche people in Chile. The majority live in urban areas (Millaman 2001).

environmental impact.[110] CONADI, the state agency created to address the needs of

indigenous communities, lent its approval, as well.[111] This was a controversial move

given the land ownership provisions of Chile's 1993 Indigenous Law, which some

interpret as limiting the sale of indigenous lands to members of the same ethnic group

(Aylwin 2002).[112] In short, the Bío Bío River dams are a paradigmatic "mega"

investment project, which involves the large-scale appropriation of land, water, native

forest, and other natural resources and enjoys the support of both the government and big

business (Aylwin 2002).[113]

A variety of individuals and collective actors — indigenous, human rights, and

other civil society groups, academics, and others — mobilized to oppose the dam.

Activists disseminated technical studies of the project's environmental and ethno-cultural

impacts, organized demonstrations, and took legal action on behalf of affected parties.

They also maintained contact with sympathetic international NGOs, such as Friends of

the Earth and the International Federation on Human Rights, and sought the counsel of

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[109] Aylwin (2002) estimates that the project has directly affected 674 people. Endesa was a state-owned company until its privatization during the Pinochet regime; since 1998, it has been under the ownership of a Spanish corporation.

[110] The official report evaluating the environmental impact was later questioned in court.

[111] CONADI (the National Indigenous Development Corporation) is charged with the protection and development of indigenous peoples, as well as the coordination of policies that affect the communities. Mallon (1999) and Muñoz (2002) discuss the departure of two CONADI leaders who were reticent to authorize the project; these personnel changes helped facilitate its eventual approval.

[112] The Indigenous Law has come into conflict with a Pinochet-era law that seeks to promote energy-generating projects.

[113] Such initiatives are referred to as *mega proyectos*. Similar events have transpired in other countries. Khagram (2002), for instance, analyzes the political mobilization that occurred at the local, national, and international levels in response to dam projects in India's Narmada Valley. Transnational coalitions, comprised mainly of NGOs, stalled the project's implementation and influenced international norms and practices concerning environmental and indigenous rights.

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the United Nations' Working Group on Indigenous Populations.[114] Their efforts slowed

the project but did not bring it to a halt: by late 2002, 65% of Ralco had been built; and

by early 2004, the dam was close to being operational.[115]

Most of the green NGOs did not contribute to the above campaign. Their

participation in this case was limited with respect to overall numbers of groups involved

and their engagement with the government. They were relatively unsuccessful at gaining

an audience for their concerns and grievances during the policy-making process and

rallying the public to their cause. Government officials apparently did not view them as

legitimate actors to be consulted. Additionally, I found little evidence to suggest that

groups played a role in mediating the conflict between the government and the families

affected by the dam's construction. In short, we observe low levels of involvement and

influence.

To be sure, powerful forces conspired against civil society influence in this case.

A large-scale investment project, backed by both the government and private interests,

was at stake. Such policies have an air of inevitability about them: it seems as though no

amount of civil society mobilization or access to elites can change the outcome.

However, the Bío Bío River case, though dramatic, is by no means unique. It is

representative of other instances of policy making in this issue area, which show similar

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[114] Opponents, convinced that the construction of Ralco violates World Bank directives on environmental and indigenous issues, took their case to that institution. Meanwhile, some indigenous groups engaged in direct actions, such as road blocks and land occupations. For summaries of these and other events, see Aylwin (2002) and Claude (1999).

[115] *El Mercurio*, issue dated 2/15/04, and *La Nación*, issue dated 10/14/02. Construction had gone forward in spite of ongoing controversy and the refusal of some landowners to sell.

signs of government–corporate alliances.[116]   In other cases of environmental policy making, green NGOs have exercised limited influence over the formal agenda and policy formulation (Claude 1999).   For example, Ecoceanos described the 2003 National Aquaculture Policy as catering — and offering concessions — to the large national and multinational companies involved in Chile's salmon industry and criticized the relatively closed debate that preceded the initiative.   Moreover, environmental advocacy in Chile (and elsewhere) is sometimes more defensive than proactive.   Activists find themselves in the position of opposing policies already selected by the government instead of participating in the actual decision-making process.[117]

Not surprisingly, NGO members offer mainly negative assessments of their policy role.   A leader in Terram, for instance, observes that the majority of the groups lack access to government officials and are situated "on the margins of politics."[118]   Several advocates note that these officials rarely think of civil societal actors as welcome counterparts to be included in the design phase.[119]   Rather, elites are more prone to "inform" CSOs of decisions already made than to incorporate their views and analyses into policies, according to a member of CODEFF.[120]

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[116] *El mostrador*, issue dated 8/1/03; see also *Ecoceanos News*, issue dated 7/31/03. In more general terms, Silva (1997) suggests that a "two-tier" arrangement exists in Chile: business interests enjoy the inside track to governing elites, while environmental groups have a more conflictive relationship to the government.

[117] This type of activism can take the form of NIMBY ("Not in My Backyard"), or opposition to proposed highways, gas pipelines, waste facilities, cellular towers, etc. However, this defensive posturing does not necessarily preclude CSOs from pursuing a more proactive, forward-looking agenda.

[118] Interview in Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago.

[119] Interviews in House of Peace, 9/17/02, the Political Ecology Institute, 9/16/02, and Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago.

[120] Interview in CODEFF, 10/14/02, Santiago. A veteran conservationist likewise remarks that most decisions are made without consulting NGOs, which are "invited but rarely listened to" (*La Tercera*, issue dated 6/19/94). Children's rights advocates in Chile describe a similar dynamic, as mentioned previously.

The creation of participatory institutions and programs in this policy domain has not altered these perceptions. CONAMA has organized advisory councils at the national and regional levels with representatives from NGOs, universities and research centers, business, and labor.[121] In addition, varied civil societal actors contribute to the much larger Sustainable Development Council, which makes recommendations on environmental issues to President Lagos.[122] CONAMA has instigated a number of other participatory programs, as well.[123] Civil society involvement in decision making has been lacking in spite of the proliferation of such initiatives.[124]

Thus, some of the patterns found in the Bío Bío River example are discernible in other cases of environmental policy making. NGOs that aspire to greater policy influence therefore must negotiate difficult political terrain. It is possible, however, that the groups will one day achieve more success. As suggested earlier, they have been effective in their efforts to thrust issues onto the public agenda, contribute to environmental debates, and monitor elites and institutions. Looking ahead, we can expect their continued political engagement.

In the following sections, I leave the particulars of each case behind to consider the broader context in which these events occurred. My focus is the widespread public

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[121] Records of former and current participants in CONAMA's advisory councils are available at: http://www.conama.cl.

[122] The Council has over 90 members, including (but not limited to) representatives from indigenous communities, religious denominations, women's organizations, green NGOs, and universities, and government officials from the executive and legislative branches and the armed forces. Among its objectives are building consensus on environmental issues and guiding policy formulation.

[123] See the working document, "Mesa Gubernamental 'Participación Ciudadana en Políticas y Programas Públicos': Panorama General," authored in 2000 in the Division of Social Organizations (DOS).

dissatisfaction with political elites and institutions in Argentina and Chile. In addition to reviewing relevant survey data, I briefly discuss the political behaviors associated with negative attitudes toward "politics as usual." As stated at the outset of this chapter, civil societal actors are hardly impervious to these trends. Consequently, we would expect them to mostly refrain from linking up with elites and institutions. However, my findings indicate that many CSOs seek to engage the political system and the policy process in spite of such perceptions.

DISTANT GOVERNMENTS AND DISENCHANTED DEMOCRATS

Observers of democracy in Argentina and Chile and other Latin American countries often note pervasive disenchantment (*desencanto*) with politicians and political institutions. According to such analyses, ties between citizens and governments are fragile at best and severed at worst. To illustrate, from the perspective of many Chileans, politics appears "distant from the people's demands and aspirations;" rather than a means to pursue the common good, it is largely a "self-referential activity" for politicians vying for power (PNUD 2000, 245; see also Siavelis 1999). Attitudes of indifference are captured in the phrase, "I'm not at all into politics" ("*no estoy ni ahí con la política*"), a particularly ubiquitous sentiment among the country's youth (Barton 2002; Fitzsimmons 2000; Segovia 1999).[125] Many citizens also feel politically impotent, as illustrated by the

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[124] Some of these initiatives originated with the 1994 Environmental Framework Law, which also established a system for evaluating the environmental impact of development projects by creating opportunities for non-governmental actors to provide information and analysis.

[125] According to Segovia (1999), a 1997 national survey of Chilean youth found that some 80% opined that politicians were not interested in young people.

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65% of survey respondents who agreed with the statement, "the opinions of people like me don't count for much" (PNUD 2002). Furthermore, confidence in elected officials and political parties has decreased.[126]

In Argentina, disillusionment with political elites and institutions is even more pronounced. Throughout the 1990s, the public generally regarded politicians as corrupt, obsessed with their own status, and unwilling or unable to represent the citizenry (Taylor 1998; see also Powers 2001).[127] The "crisis of legitimacy" and "crisis of representation" have long been part of the country's political lingo (Inter-American Democracy Network 1998). The socioeconomic crisis of the early 2000s obviously compounded these political woes. In December 2001, the country verged on the brink of economic, financial, and political collapse: a volatile combination of massive protests, spontaneous uprisings, and a repressive state response left 33 dead and over 300 wounded (Bonasso 2002). By the end of the month, De la Rúa and his team had resigned, and a presidential game of musical chairs ensued.[128] Unemployment had tripled between 1991 and 2001, enveloping almost one-quarter of Argentines by the middle of 2002; more than one-half of the population was enduring poverty.[129] By 2002, a mere seven and eight percent of

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[126] Some scholars offer institutionalist explanations of these attitudes, pointing to technocratic policy making, limited access to institutions, and the other factors discussed in Chapter 1. They argue that Chileans are aware of the elitist, "cupular," and "protected" nature of democracy there (Bickford 1998; Garretón 1999; Hite 2000; Portales 2000; Segovia 1999; see also PNUD 2002). Observers within Chile also cite limited government transparency as a source of these attitudes (e.g., interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago; *La Tercera*, issue dated 9/12/02).

[127] Manzetti (1993) notes that by the late 1980s, "only union leaders and military officers were evaluated more negatively" than politicians (1993, 137; see also Munck 1997).

[128] De la Rúa, of the Radical Party (UCR) and *Alianza* coalition comprising the UCR and Frepaso parties (the Alliance for Jobs, Justice, and Education), had taken office in 1999.

[129] Unemployment reached 21.5% in May 2002, and poverty climbed to 57.5% by January 2003. These figures suggest that approximately 21.3 million Argentines were living below the poverty line. The sources of these data are INDEC and Cáritas.

the populace still had faith in congress and political parties, respectively.[130] Many young people came to associate the formal political sphere with "failure, disillusionment and betrayal."[131]

Political discontent has manifested itself in different behaviors within both countries. For instance, scholars link attitudinal shifts in Chile to electoral trends, including a decline in voter registration and an increase in abstention and null and blank ballots (Barton 2002; Posner 1999; Segovia 1999; Siavelis 1999).[132] Argentines likewise have shown signs of rejecting existing political alternatives by casting null and blank ballots in elections and abstaining from voting (Peruzzotti 2003).[133] However, disaffection is even more apparent in non-electoral behavior and, more specifically, protest politics.[134] Disgust with the political class is captured in the damning slogan chanted at countless anti-government street protests, which peaked in late 2001 and early 2002: "*que se vayan todos; que no quede ni uno solo*," translated literally as "they all must go; not a single one should stay" or, more figuratively, "to hell with all of the politicians" (Trigona 2002). *Que se vayan* was not only incorporated into the lexicon of protest and social movements; it also reverberated across vast segments of the population,

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[130] Survey conducted by Gallup Argentina and reported in *La Nación*, issue dated 8/6/02.

[131] *Clarín*, issue dated 3/17/03.

[132] For instance, in Chile's 1997 legislative elections the sum of non-registered votes, abstentions, and blank votes totaled over 40% of total eligible voters (Segovia 1999).

[133] In Argentina's midterm elections in 2001 abstentions and blank and null votes increased and totaled 43% of the electorate (Peruzzotti 2003).

[134] Other Latin American specialists have discussed the relationship between protest and the failure of representative institutions (e.g., López-Maya 2002; Vilas 1997). Although protest movements in contemporary Chile do not approach the scale of the Argentine movements, indigenous communities, "anti-globalization" groups, and professional associations of teachers and medical workers regularly engage in contentious activities (see Espinoza 2000 for an in-depth analysis of the professional associations).

as illustrated by the two-thirds of survey respondents who agreed with the slogan in late 2002.[135]

The combination of disruptive politics, grassroots mobilization, and organizing outside of traditional institutions prompted some observers to conclude that citizens were "abandoning traditional political structures and inventing alternatives" (Trigona 2002, 1; see also Dinerstein 2003). For example, hundreds of neighborhood assemblies (*asambleas barriales*) emerged spontaneously from the street protests mentioned above. Some first convened as an act of civil disobedience during the state of emergency that De la Rúa had declared (Bielsa 2002). They quickly became forums in which neighbors gathered to discuss and criticize the political and economic situation and to conduct an experiment in "direct democracy."[136] The movement generally has declined since that time.

One of the more significant — and less ephemeral — movements to have emerged in recent years is organized by unemployed workers known as *piqueteros* (picketers), who block roads and stage other protests to draw attention to their plight and to demand jobs and social assistance. Different *piquetero* groups, which espouse varying political goals, motivations, and ideologies, have mobilized considerable numbers of jobless individuals. Since 1997, they have blocked major arteries in multiple

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[135] Survey conducted by Nueva Mayoría and reported in *La Nación*, issue dated 11/26/02. Dinerstein suggests that in addition to its literal call for the renewal of all elected posts, the slogan embodies a symbolic critique of the prevailing economic system and the "parody of democracy" supporting it (2003, 193).

[136] According to *La Nación*, issue dated 12/16/02, between March and August 2002, the total number of assemblies in Argentina increased from 272 to 329. Well over 100 were operating within the city of Buenos Aires alone. Dinerstein (2003) argues that they contributed to the reinvention of politics by refusing to conform to traditional modes of participation and re-appropriating public space for deliberation.

regions on thousands of occasions, including a record-shattering 2,154 times in 2002.[137]

Additionally, worker-controlled factories (*empresas recuperadas/fábricas tomadas*) have become sites for collective action. Workers have seized an estimated 160 businesses — usually closed and abandoned by their owners — to generate income.[138] Although the authorities sometimes tolerate the workers' occupations and the *piqueteros*' demonstrations, episodes of violence have recurred since the emergence of both movements.[139]

In summary, a near-consensus exists in the literature that citizen disillusionment with politics as usual is widespread in Latin American democracies. Analysts point to indifferent or negative attitudes toward the political system, waning confidence in elites and institutions, and the "crisis" of political representation. The crisis that has dominated Argentine politics is an especially dramatic case of this representational void and the ever-growing gulf between citizens and governing elites. The perceived distance separating most citizens from political elites and institutions is yet another feature of a relatively inauspicious context with respect to civil society participation. We would

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[137] *La Nación*, issue dated 12/9/02 (figures are through the end of November). There were 140 protests involving roadblocks in 1997, 51 in 1998, 252 in 1999, 514 in 2000, and 1,383 in 2001. Some of the groups tend to negotiate with the government, while others, deemed as hardliners (or *duros*) by the Argentine media, keep their distance.

[138] *The New York Times*, issue dated 7/6/03, estimates that the factories employ over 10,000 people. Two examples of worker-controlled factories are the Brukman textile factory in Buenos Aires and the Zanon ceramics plant in Neuquén. Human rights advocates, *piqueteros*, and workers have participated in joint demonstrations and tried to prevent the eviction of workers from occupied factories. For example, the Association of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo has created a "support committee" in solidarity with the worker-controlled factories, with the participation of several *piquetero* groups, university students, and alternative media. Other human rights organizations have provided legal support.

[139] Hundreds of participants have been wounded and a smaller number killed in clashes with security forces during attempts to break up protests and eject workers from factories. One protest that ended in violence occurred on the outskirts of the capital in June 2002. Two *piqueteros* were shot and killed, and ninety were wounded (*La Nación*, issue dated 6/26/02).

expect many non-governmental actors facing such an environment to have little interest in engaging the political system and little hope of exercising any influence. Indeed, members of CSOs are hardly immune to these general trends. The following section addresses some of the challenges that groups face when deciding whether to link up with elites and institutions.

LINKING UP IS HARD TO DO

The NGOs and community organizations included in this study differ from other civil societal actors in Argentina and Chile, who are more prone to abandon traditional politics altogether in favor of less conventional alternatives. However, their members are not impervious to the disenchantment described above: feelings of estrangement from politics as usual are fairly common. They sometimes regard politics as a sphere in which individuals and groups compete for power and privilege instead of working for the greater good. The term "lobbying" in particular carries negative connotations of corruption, bribery, and the exchange of political favors: questionable activities that occur behind closed doors and largely advance personal agendas.[140] In short, they conclude that it is probably best to avoid sullying one's reputation by getting mixed up in politics.

The mutual distrust that often characterizes relations between governments and civil societies poses additional challenges. Some government officials portray organizations as mere vehicles for partisan interests or cults of personality; meanwhile,

civil societal actors frequently view government institutions as opaque, bureaucratic mazes full of public servants with antiquated views on policy issues. CSO members also worry that public officials or politicians will take advantage of an organization's "good name" to lend legitimacy to their actions. According to one NGO leader, "the biggest risk is that the government will use us to legitimate its own initiatives."[141] Co-optation and other threats to organizational autonomy are perennial concerns.

Furthermore, it is not uncommon for civil societal actors to view the state in adversarial terms, essentializing it as the enemy. In fact, many participants in social movements that emerged during authoritarian rule in Argentina and Chile operated under such assumptions. Even today, some Argentine activists continue to regard the state as "inherently authoritarian and corrupt" (Armony 2004, 149). Owing to their monolithic understanding of the state, they are less prone to seek dialogue and cooperation. Other analysts note that nearly all CSOs in democratizing nations are forced to reevaluate this oppositional stance vis-à-vis the government following the transition (e.g., Rutherford 1997; Reilly 1995).[142]

My own research suggests that many groups have embraced a flexible approach toward collaboration in the post-authoritarian era. Their members seem aware of two basic facts: the state remains a primary target for citizen demands, and the policy realm

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[140] Interview in Cáritas Argentina, National Committee, 4/8/03, Buenos Aires.

[141] The president of the Social Forum for Transparency, quoted in *Clarín*, issue dated 1/20/2003.

[142] It is useful to highlight these very general patterns under different regime types; however, it must be noted that one can find evidence of confrontation *and* collaboration between governmental and civil societal actors during periods of *both* democratic and authoritarian rule in Latin American countries.

continues to be an important site for political change.[143] During interviews with activists,

I detect varying degrees of resignation, pragmatism, realism, and optimism that change

can be effected through conventional political channels. Many seem to advocate

"idealism of principle" and "realism of action" (Mignone 1991). To illustrate, some

participants in the human rights movement engage the political system on a regular

basis.[144] A member of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo explains, "It's the only

system we've got. We have to work with it or else we won't achieve anything." One of

her colleagues underscores their desire to "get things done" and pursue change through

institutional as well as other means.[145] Accordingly, a majority of the human rights

organizations maintain contact with government agencies, such as the Subsecretariat of

Human and Social Rights in the Ministry of the Interior; some also have worked with

elected officials to pass legislation.[146] This more pragmatic approach is surprising in light

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[143] According to Foweraker, "since no form of politics, however popular, can occur in a political and institutional vacuum, social movements have little choice about setting out across this terrain" (1995, 62).

[144] The main organizations that emerged during the 1976-83 dictatorship include: the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (who later split into two distinct groups), the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), Relatives of the Disappeared and Detained for Political Reasons, the Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights (MEDH), and the Service for Peace and Justice (SERPAJ). Examples of groups that have formed since the transition are: the Association of Ex-Detained and Disappeared, and Children for Identity and Justice and Against Forgetting and Silence (HIJOS). See Brysk (1994) for an analysis of the movement's emergence and subsequent evolution.

[145] Interviews in Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 6/30/97 and 5/20/01, Buenos Aires. A smaller number of human rights groups remain more intransigent in their views. For example, the longtime leader of the Association of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the more radicalized of the two groups of Mothers, calls the state an agent of terror and urges Argentines to "combat and resist it." (An interview transcript, dated 2/12/02, available at: http://www.madres.org/entrevistas/contenido/020212hebeafondo.htm. Accessed 8/23/02).

[146] For example, reparation laws (*leyes de indemnización*) that have benefited victims of human rights abuses resulted from such efforts. Legislation passed in 1992 and 1994 offers compensation to ex-detainees and family members or spouses of the disappeared.

of the received wisdom on the movement, which is described as uncompromising and unable to adapt to democratic politics (Brysk 1994).[147]

Numerous participants in "young" Argentine NGOs (founded after the transition) likewise are amenable to the idea of cooperation. One civil society leader expressed interest in "building bridges between political leaders and civil society," finding "honest and capable" public officials with whom to collaborate, and avoiding the most "corrupt and inept" individuals.[148] Another NGO member commented that because "all politicians are suspect," one of their goals is to "produce proposals, changes, and reforms that are sustainable over time, independently of who is [in office]."[149] An additional participant remarked that CSOs would benefit from sharing their ideas and specific proposals with government officials instead of "merely exchanging them with other groups."[150] Evidence that civil societal actors in Argentina are willing to collaborate is all the more remarkable considering that I conducted most of these interviews in the aftermath of the country's political and economic crises. Moreover, interest in advocacy has grown in recent years. According to a 2001 survey of some 300 organizations, for example, over 90% aspired to influence policies.[151]

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[147] Scholars note that politics in democratic regimes rewards "the logic of bargaining," whereas human rights activists often make non-negotiable, ethical demands related to their pursuit of justice for the victims of dictatorship-era abuses (Brysk 1994, 20).

[148] Interview in Citizen Power, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires.

[149] Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires. Similar comments were made during interviews in FARN, 1/31/03, and Social Forum for Transparency, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires.

[150] Interview in Social Forum for Transparency, 2/4/03, Buenos Aires.

[151] *La Nación*, issue dated 6/11/01. It is possible that activists are using the language of advocacy and influence in a more self-conscious manner. This could indicate a change from previous patterns of CSOs in Latin America "doing advocacy" but failing to recognize it as such (Bombal and Garay 2000, 33).

Similarly, a survey of Chilean NGOs conducted by an umbrella association sheds light on the main factors motivating groups to engage governing elites (Morgan 2001). 52% of the NGOs seek greater influence, particularly over policy making, while 44% want access to information, funding, and other resources. In addition, 27% view articulation as a means to improve their organizational capacity.[152] The survey also indicates the perceived benefits of past cooperation with government officials: 28% of the respondents note that the government has adopted their proposals (or cite other "tangible" results); 33% perceive changes in bureaucrats' attitudes and understandings of issues; and 28% cite increased recognition of their work.

Attitudes such as these help us understand why many groups try to link up with institutions, elites, and the policy process. Although CSOs often have misgivings, they weigh both the costs *and* the benefits of collaboration. Certain organizations act primarily out of necessity or expediency, but others harbor some hope that their participation in conventional politics can yield positive results.

CONCLUSIONS

The principal goals of this chapter were to elaborate what civil society participation signifies in the dissertation and to provide empirical evidence of varying levels of policy involvement. After first outlining the characteristics shared by the CSOs targeted for analysis, I summarized the different strategies they can use to engage in

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[152] 19% express interest in obtaining more validation of their work. The survey results also illuminate perceived problems characterizing state-NGO relations. Some of the principal challenges (also mentioned

advocacy and exercise influence during policy agenda setting, formulation, and adoption. I then presented an in-depth, comparative analysis of the study's main cases of policy making, emphasizing the role of civil societal actors therein. I argued that CSO involvement and influence reached high levels in the case of freedom of information legislation and intermediate levels in both cases of child protection policies, while remaining low with respect to the dam project.

Next, I discussed the larger political context in which these events unfolded. I emphasized the proliferation of negative views toward politics as usual and the electoral and non-electoral behaviors that these attitudes have bred in both countries. Argentina clearly provides dramatic examples of disruptive politics and attempts to organize outside of traditional institutions. In such environments, we would expect non-governmental actors to show little interest in collaborating with elites and institutions. Yet in spite of these impediments, many groups are open to collaboration and aware that the policy-making arena is an important site for pursuing their interests. This finding challenges some of the received wisdom on the subject, which focuses on the costs rather than the benefits of this strategy.

Indeed, as suggested in Chapter 1, much of the scholarship emphasizes the myriad obstacles that hinder civil society participation in Latin America. Commonly cited challenges include: a weakened, atomized, and/or politically dormant civil society in post-transition contexts; the "harnessing" of CSOs for the sake of the neoliberal project and their diminished capacity for an autonomous, critical, and proactive agenda;

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earlier) include mutual mistrust and a limited understanding between the two sectors, state bureaucracy and lack of transparency, and divergent approaches to (or understandings of) issues.

restricted institutional opportunities for participation and technocratic policy making; and tenuous state-society linkages and uncertain arrangements for political representation. When these works alone guide our research, we anticipate low levels of involvement and little variation on the dependent variable. However, the data presented here demonstrate that the extent to which civil societal actors participate in (and influence) policy making varies significantly. The evidence therefore calls into question too hasty a dismissal of the political potential of civil society in democratizing areas.

Instead of discounting the possibility of effective advocacy, scholars must explain the varying degrees of success and failure that we observe. I perform this task in the next two chapters, which elaborate the explanatory variables proposed in Chapter 1: civil society alliances and strategic framing. These theoretical tools help solve the puzzle of CSOs influencing policy even in relatively inhospitable environments.

Chapter 3: The Power of Persuasion

INTRODUCTION

In the midst of the 2001-2002 political crisis, numerous Argentines demanded the immediate removal of all governing elites from power (*que se vayan todos*). As noted in Chapter 2, citizens got considerable mileage out of the slogan during demonstrations, street protests, leftist political party rallies, and other public events. However, some civil societal actors were conveying a political message that contrasted significantly with the discourse of *que se vayan*. Proponents of freedom of information, for example, emphasized the need for political and institutional renewal, which could be achieved by improving government transparency and accountability. Advocates linked such reforms to the strengthening of democracy and made the following proclamation: "To deny the right to information is to deny the right to democracy."[1] They thus offered more constructive ideas in an environment where the politics of negation and anger had reached a fever pitch.

In the present chapter, I analyze the myriad ways in which these and other civil societal actors politicize issues, articulate demands, and "frame" ideas. I argue principally that CSOs that mobilize ideas successfully are more likely to influence policy making. Thus, effective framing is a significant pathway to participation.

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[1] This phrase appears in the CSOs' declaration of principles (*Infocívica* article dated 12/17/02, available at: http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/15/03).

In essence, this chapter is about the exercise of "persuasive" power. CSOs frequently rely on the persuasiveness of their ideas and information to influence governing elites — who enjoy more "authoritative" forms of power — and the broader public (Shepard 2003; Sikkink 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998a). The ideational realm is a site of creativity and innovation, especially for the types of groups analyzed in the dissertation, which seek to defend (and define) the public interest. Such CSOs endeavor to become credible purveyors of ideas and interpreters of reality. By disseminating their views widely, they struggle to shape the public discourse and agenda, to affect how people think and talk about a given issue.

Of course, some CSOs are more efficacious than others at performing these tasks. Understanding their varying degrees of success is vital to our grasp of civil society's involvement in policy making. Indeed, any thorough examination of civil society entails an inquiry into the role of ideas. Despite the importance of ideas, however, the ideational realm is one where some political scientists fear to tread. We have not explored this unfamiliar terrain as much as one would expect in light of the recent revitalization of interest in ideas and norms. Accordingly, there is a dearth of comparative work on group strategies for politicizing and framing issues and the policy implications of these choices. In the analysis that follows, I take a step toward remedying this shortage.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. First, I briefly summarize the arguments presented in Chapter 1, which propose that CSOs' predominant framing strategies affect their chances for policy participation. Next, I support this claim with evidence drawn from each of the dissertation's issue areas. I conclude with a discussion

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of the importance of researching civil societal actors' inventive approaches to mobilizing ideas.

THE ARGUMENT

Framing is a key aspect of organizational efforts to disseminate understandings of issues and interpretations of reality, influence public discourse, and gain an audience among policy makers and the citizenry.[2] My argument builds on the motivational, diagnostic, and prognostic aspects of framing (e.g., Benford and Snow 2000). Motivational framing offers a rationale for collective action and frequently conveys urgency, severity, and/or injustice; diagnostic framing identifies a problem and a locus of responsibility for the problem; and prognostic framing proposes a remedy.

How do CSOs' framing strategies affect the dependent variable? I argue that effective frames contain positive messages, offer feasible solutions to problems, and de-emphasize blame. To begin with, activists are better positioned when they communicate a constructive and/or hopeful set of ideas — even if they are critical of existing practices and policies. Alternatively, if they focus their energies on arguing *against* a position rather than crafting their own, policy makers may discount their views. In addition, frames are more successful when they suggest a pragmatic remedy for a pressing problem, a realistic solution that elites can conceivably incorporate into policies and, down the road, implement. Groups can couch these remedies in terms of a more ambitious set of reforms. However, if they only call for major transformations that are

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[2] As outlined in Chapter 1, framing is defined in the social movement literature as "strategic efforts" to fashion shared understandings that "legitimate and motivate collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy and

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out of sync with the incremental nature of policy making, their demands will seem impractical. Activists must persuade power holders that change is both possible and desirable (i.e., in keeping with their own political goals and agenda). Lastly, CSOs are wise to exercise caution while attributing blame for problems. After all, targeting powerful elites as culpable agents may create political enemies.

When groups integrate these elements into their frames, they increase their likelihood of policy involvement during various phases. Throughout the process, they usually have to defend their frames against the competing discourses of opposition forces seeking to influence elites and the public. If they succeed in doing so, and if they use effective framing strategies, CSOs can create opportunities for participation. In the next section, I provide evidence to support this claim. Specifically, I analyze the framing strategies employed by CSOs working on transparency, children's, and environmental issues, as well as the policy consequences of their choices.

THE EVIDENCE

Comparative evidence suggests that the theoretical arguments hold for all three issue areas and in both Argentina and Chile. The main findings are summarized as follows: transparency activists used effective or "policy-friendly" framing strategies; environmentalists enjoyed less success; and children's advocates in the two countries had

Zald 1996, 6; see also Benford 1997; Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1992; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1994).

mixed success. For each case, I discuss the predominant approaches to framing and trace their effects on policy participation.[3]

Advocating for freedom of information in Argentina

The access to information campaign nicely illustrates the benefits of effective framing. To a considerable extent, transparency advocates succeeded in persuading lawmakers that supporting the bill was a necessary step in the direction of overcoming Argentina's political crisis of representation and restoring some semblance of credibility to political elites. Instead of echoing civil society's resounding cry to "throw the bums out," proponents suggested ways in which those "bums" could do their part to strengthen democracy.

With respect to the motivational aspects of framing, activists chose to emphasize the ongoing political crisis. As outlined in Chapter 2, the country was experiencing unparalleled levels of disenchantment and disgust with the "political class."[4] In such an environment, members of NGOs could make a strong case for the salience of the transparency issue.[5] The perception of rampant corruption was one of the main factors contributing to the outrage directed at elected officials and parties. Corruption is a

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[3] Although the framing strategies of CSOs engaged in a particular issue area often vary considerably, it is possible to discern framing *patterns*. Focusing on dominant frames makes the scope of this chapter more manageable.

[4] To illustrate, a Gallup Argentina poll conducted in 2002 revealed that the percentage of Argentines who still had faith in congress and political parties had plunged into the single digits (seven and eight percent, respectively) (*La Nación*, issue dated 8/6/02).

[5] In fact, public discontent was fueling a variety of political reform movements besides the transparency initiative. These movements have called for changes in electoral systems, the institutions of the legislative and judicial branches, and other reforms targeting multiple levels of government.

problem of broad concern to Argentines. Survey data collected in the 1990s indicated that citizens consistently ranked corruption among the most worrisome problems plaguing society, including unemployment and poverty (March 2001). In 2002, Transparency International reported that an extraordinary 93% of survey respondents concluded that corruption affected Argentine political life "very significantly;" 64% thought that it affected their personal and family lives "very significantly."[6] In a different survey conducted prior to the 2003 presidential elections, 17% of those polled hoped that corruption would be eliminated under Argentina's new executive, while 20% wished that poverty and hunger would be eradicated. It is striking that corruption would cause nearly as much alarm as poverty in a context of increasing deprivation.[7]

Argentina's recent political history has solidified such attitudes. When the *Alianza* presidential candidate, De la Rúa, took office in 1999 after campaigning on an anticorruption platform, expectations for change were high. The 2001 bribery scandal in the Senate and other questionable activities on the part of the country's leadership dashed these hopes. It seemed as though "the problem of legal unaccountability was not circumscribed to the Menem government but was a problem that affected all of political society" (Peruzzotti 2003, 15). Stated briefly, vast segments of society have expressed their preoccupation with corruption. Transparency activists were able to seize upon these popular sentiments by consistently noting the gravity of the political situation.

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[6] The results of the survey are discussed in "The Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer: A 2002 Pilot Survey of International Attitudes, Expectations and Priorities on Corruption," available at http://www.transparency.org/surveys/barometer/dnld/barometer2003.en.pdf (Accessed 2/12/04).
[7] Survey conducted by Graciela Römer and Associates and reported in *Página 12*, issue dated 3/19/03.

Moreover, proponents of freedom of information increased the salience of the issue by incorporating Argentina's social and economic crisis into their framing. Advocates suggested that improved access to information meant increased awareness of public spending, existing social programs, and public facilities (such as hospitals). Discussing the categories of information that people required to meet their nutritional, health, and other basic needs further reinforced the importance of the issue. It also underscored the fact that access to information could be a matter of life or death; it was not merely an abstract subject for legal scholars to debate.

By calling attention to the persistent political and social crises and communicating their urgency and severity, civil societal actors largely succeeded in the motivational aspect of framing. They sent a clear message that these problems deserved the attention of policy makers. Nevertheless, several *other* elements besides this crisis-laden discourse account for the groups' relative success. To begin with, the organizations tried to persuade their audiences that meaningful reforms could emerge from the crisis, that this political cloud might have a silver lining. Their frames contained two positive themes. First, the NGOs framed the legislation as an *opportunity* for policy makers to ameliorate the political crisis. The second strategy, related to the first, was discursively linking the reform to building institutions and, more generally, to strengthening democracy.

The groups presented officials in both the executive and legislative branches with an opportunity to do their part to rectify the situation. They framed the reform as a chance for politicians to slow their dramatic descent in the polls and to improve their public image. For example, to persuade lawmakers to support the bill, activists described it as an essential step toward restoring some of the legitimacy politicians had

squandered.[8] This rhetoric proved effective during the campaign to collect signatures of deputies who backed the legislation: nearly two-thirds of the lower chamber endorsed the reform, and it eventually was passed. Afterwards, a legislator trumpeted the law as a "very important mechanism of control … that will allow transparency to become an effective weapon against corruption."[9]

The NGOs' constructive, "face-saving" approach contrasted dramatically with the popular slogan demanding the swift exit from power of all governing elites. As mentioned at the outset of the chapter, *que se vayan todos* was the more ubiquitous message emanating from civil society during this period. Nevertheless, criticisms of the *que se vayan* approach arose in numerous interviews with proponents of freedom of information. A leader in Citizen Power, for instance, deemed it a "useless" message.[10] In addition, the president of the Social Forum for Transparency emphasized the need for more "constructive" proposals and alternatives to the politics of negation.[11]

The groups also shifted the locus of the discussion away from politicians and their foibles to political institutions. In accordance with their missions, a number of NGOs viewed freedom of information as one of many desirable political reforms that would strengthen Argentina's institutions and public administration. I noted in Chapter 2 that

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[8] *Infocívica* article dated 3/6/03 (http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/15/03). Similar language can be found in "Educación de los representantes y funcionarios públicos," authored by the Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (CIPPEC), Transparency Area.

[9] Marcela Rodríguez, ARI (the Affirmation for an Egalitarian Republic Party), quoted in *La Nación*, issue dated 5/9/03.

[10] Interview in Citizen Power, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires. Some of the foundation's literature suggests that occupying "public space" is not synonymous with protesting in the streets; there are more "constructive" ways in which citizens can become involved in political life (see its undated publication entitled, "Monitoreo Cívico del Consejo de la Magistratura").

[11] Interview in Social Forum for Transparency, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires.

groups such as Citizen Power tend to emphasize the implications of these reforms for citizen participation and control. Meanwhile, the Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (CIPPEC), the Sophia Group Foundation, Innova, and other NGOs generally call for higher quality policies and more effective and transparent public administration at all levels of government. Even though the organizations approach these themes from different angles, they coincide in the importance they assign to strong, well-functioning institutions. Indeed, according to one group, "the most institutionally advanced countries" of the world have decent freedom of information laws; and if Argentina had one, its "institutional quality" would improve beyond a shadow of a doubt.[12] The inclusion of these eminently constructive elements in their framing helped their cause.

Activists also tied freedom of information to the positive message of strengthening Argentine democracy. In publications, groups asserted that "to deny the right to information is to deny the right to democracy," as mentioned earlier.[13] Thus, a *pro-democracy* frame dominated their discursive strategies.[14] The rationales that they have provided for the legislation penetrate to the very essence of democracy in both its representative and participatory forms. Supporters argue that access to information is necessary for the functioning of representative democracy by facilitating the scrutiny and

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[12] These remarks were made by members of ADEPA (*Association of Entidades Periodísticas Argentinas*), published in *La Nación*, issue dated 12/1/04.

[13] *Infocívica* article dated 12/17/02, available at: http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/15/03.

[14] This discussion draws on various interviews and documents that argue in favor of the legislation. See, for instance, Abramovich and Courtis (2000), FARN (2002 & 1997), and "Principios fundamentales para la promoción de leyes de acceso a la información," by CELS, ADC, and the Inter-American Dialogue. A succinct summary of such arguments is found in "Ley de Acceso a la Información: Fundamentos del

control of government actions. A member of the Civil Rights Association, for example,

contends that without a mechanism that allows Argentines to know "what governing

elites do in our name and with our resources," real citizen control will never be

achieved.[15] Citizens require information to select and monitor the public servants to

whom they delegate power. How else can they know whether governing elites and

bureaucrats are safeguarding their rights and fulfilling the obligations of the state?

In addition to emphasizing the role of information in fostering accountability and

responsive government, proponents of reform discuss more participatory elements of

democratic practice. Most consider the right to information as a prerequisite for effective

citizen participation in public debates and decisions. Freedom of information thus has

important implications for the ability of citizens to make informed, reasoned judgments

about community affairs. Without the proverbial marketplace of ideas, public debate

would be impoverished.[16] Furthermore, the "semi-direct" democratic mechanisms

included in Argentina's constitution — public hearings, popular initiatives, and

referenda, for example — are bereft of much meaning without access to information.

In short, freedom of information is intimately tied to the fulfillment of other

democratic and citizenship rights. Supporters have emphasized these inter-connections in

their frames. The organizations have challenged policy makers with a straightforward

question: why have they failed to pass legislation when it is so fundamental for

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Proyecto definitivo de Ley enviado al Congreso Nacional para su consideración," available at:
http://www.anticorrupcion.jus.gov.ar (Accessed 8/2/03).

[15] Editorial authored by Alejandro Carrió and published in *La Nación*, issue dated 11/30/04. He argues
further that all countries truly committed to "republican" ideals have such a law.

[16] "Ley de Acceso a la Información: Fundamentos del Proyecto definitivo de Ley enviado al Congreso
Nacional para su consideración," available at: http://www.anticorrupcion.jus.gov.ar (Accessed 8/2/03).

democratic consolidation?[17]   Or, as one NGO leader put it, "Two decades after the democratic transition, and still no law."[18]

The groups' dissemination of positive, constructive themes has relevance for a further aspect of framing: the blame game. The NGOs framed the initiative as an opportunity for policy makers to improve their image and to strengthen institutions and democracy. They therefore avoided some of the dangers associated with the attribution of blame. To be sure, the NGOs were critical of how Argentine political elites had comported themselves and cited the ongoing political crisis as grounds for reform. However, instead of emphasizing the corruption or ineptitude of government officials, they called for institutional renewal. In doing so, the advocates refrained from alienating vast numbers of the policy-making elite. Additionally, because the organizations' frames did not revolve around the issue of culpability, they could channel more energy into the elements of framing discussed above.

Moreover, with respect to prognostic framing, the NGOs offered a feasible remedy in response to corruption and other political ills. They asked policy makers to pass legislation, a task that elites were capable of performing. In spite of the apparent enormity of the corruption problem, activists suggested that change was possible. This framing strategy tends to bode well for participation in the policy process. A further advantage enjoyed by proponents of reform was the absence of major "counter framing" in response to their discourse. Although some interests likely opposed stronger transparency norms, I did not uncover evidence of an active effort to disseminate

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[17] This question was raised during a December 2002 conference organized by CELS, ADC, and international organizations.

competing frames.[19] Thus, the groups did not have to spend precious time combating counter frames. In other cases of policy making, CSOs have not been so fortunate.

Finally, this case provides evidence that the perceived credibility of the groups articulating frames is important, as noted in Chapter 1. Many of the NGOs involved in the campaign have established credentials as monitors of the state, political institutions, and/or power holders. Several groups are experienced in the areas of legal advocacy, the defense of citizenship rights, and citizen participation in (and control of) public affairs. Their expertise suggests that they "know of what they speak" and can support their ideas with analysis and factual data. Additionally, other civil societal actors and the public have recognized and validated the NGOs' work. Solid reputations have boosted their efforts to persuade governing elites and reach a wider audience.[20]

In summary, the CSOs' framing strategies were effective. They successfully made a case for the overall importance of the transparency issue by calling attention to Argentina's severe political and social crises and the widespread concern over corruption. In this way, they not only motivated their own memberships but also attracted the attention of policy makers and the citizenry. More importantly, the groups integrated a number of constructive and positive messages into their frames. To begin with, they framed freedom of information in a way that presented elites with an opportunity to address — or redress — the crisis. Executive and legislative officials could "do the right

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[18] Interview in Citizen Power, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires.

[19] For instance, Argentina's intelligence and security forces tend to guard their secrecy. It is likely that the law will encounter some resistance from these quarters.

[20] Moreover, the groups' media and political connections enhanced their ability to disseminate their frames and gain the attention of both elites and the public. In Chapter 4, I discuss these and other organizational resources and how groups mobilize them in alliances.

thing" by approving the reform. Their framing strategies also underscored the need for more robust political institutions. The NGOs cast freedom of information as a tool that would strengthen the representative and participatory forms of democracy enshrined in the constitution. Activists linked transparency, citizen control and participation, democratic consolidation, and other positive themes, suggesting that these "good things go together." The emphasis on political and institutional renewal conveyed a sense of hope in a context characterized by widespread anger and disgust with the political system.

The groups made further choices that proved advantageous. First, they offered a feasible, tangible solution to pressing political problems. Passing a law was within the power of legislative and executive branch actors, and the activists made the reform seem long overdue. Their frames also avoided the pitfalls of assigning blame, including alienating or threatening the policy-making establishment. This caution should not be interpreted as an entirely conciliatory approach, however. The organizations did not hesitate to criticize politicians or use provocative rhetoric. For instance, one pro-reform document circulated among civil societal actors chastised elites for refusing to cease their "immoral practices" and for closing ranks to "defend their privileges."[21] Moreover, representatives of key NGOs expressed dismay when Duhalde failed to include the bill on the legislative agenda and criticized the president for turning his back on "legitimate

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[21] The source of these sentiments is a document entitled the "May Laws," which the Social Forum for Transparency circulated in May 2002.

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societal demands."[22] Still, for the most part, the activists packaged their ideas in ways that were palatable to elites.

The case lends support to the theoretical arguments developed earlier. The NGOs' framing strategies had important consequences for their involvement in policy. They also made progress toward persuading legislators and executive branch officials to support and approve the reform. The manner in which they politicized the transparency issue was captivating but also accorded well with the realities of policy making.

Children's advocacy in Argentina

Children's advocates in Argentina have experienced more mixed success with framing. Some of their framing choices have been effective, while others have been less policy-friendly. On the one hand, CSOs have succeeded in politicizing and calling attention to children's issues and rights; they have made a compelling case for the importance of this policy domain and the consequences of neglecting it. On the other hand, certain aspects of their frames — for instance, the explicit critiques of the prevailing social and political order — are ill suited to the policy process. Each of these factors has influenced their policy involvement in the case of national protection legislation.[23]

Motivational framing is the strong suit of many groups active in children's issues. There are a number of reasons for this strength. First, the human rights discourse enjoys

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[22] *Infocívica* article dated 12/17/02 (http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/15/03).

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a great deal of prominence within Argentina. Awareness that children are rights-bearing individuals has risen steadily since the early 1990s. Children's advocates — especially those who support this rights-based perspective — benefit from past human rights activism and the continuing resonance of these ideas.[24] They draw on the existing discourse for their own frames. Second, advocates are able to appeal to cultural values that transcend political, ideological, class, and other differences. In general terms, most people accept children's issues as a worthy cause.

Third, the CSOs link the well-being of children to broader social themes of undeniable importance, including poverty. In contemporary Argentina, children are abandoning school, working, and even dying as a consequence of the social crisis. Although these problems are hardly of recent origin, their sheer magnitude suggests that government officials and the public can no longer look the other way. The salience of this issue area is almost beyond question. Children are an exceptionally vulnerable segment of the population in the context of increasing unemployment and pauperization. To illustrate, an estimated two-thirds of Argentine children — more than 8,319,000 individuals — were living in poverty by June 2002 (Fundación SES 2002). In the country's northernmost provinces, the proportion was calculated to be as high as 80%.[25] Reported cases of abuse increased, along with numbers of children whose basic health

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[23] Although CSOs working on children's issues are relatively diverse, as noted in Chapter 2, it is possible to discern and evaluate the more dominant approaches to framing.

[24] I develop this point further in Chapter 5. CSOs that specialize in children's rights do not merely benefit from the salience of human rights but also work to raise awareness of how these rights apply to young people.

[25] These include the provinces of Chaco, Formosa, Jujuy, Salta, and Santiago del Estero. The source of this estimate is CELS.

and nutritional needs were not being met.[26] Instances of infant mortality also rose. Other worrisome trends included declining school retention and growing numbers of children working in the informal sector. A national task force on child labor estimated that some 1,500,000 youngsters were working in 2003, and 75% were between six and twelve years of age.[27] The sight of children selling items, washing car windshields, and collecting garbage became commonplace. Concurrently, greater numbers of teenagers and young people — over 1,145,000 nationwide — were neither attending school nor working. They were simply "inactive" (Fundación SES 2002).[28]

In an environment such as this, it is not surprising that children's advocates have connected the welfare of children and families to social and economic issues. By opting for this strategy, they gain the ear of policy makers, as well as a broader public audience. It becomes less politically feasible to undermine their frames, which convey a sense of urgency, severity, and propriety shared widely across Argentina. Dismissing their concerns as exaggerated is no longer an option. Calling attention to existing social conditions and their consequences for young people is therefore an effective way to galvanize decision makers and fellow citizens.

Nevertheless, Argentines differ in their interpretations of (and proposed remedies for) these problems. For example, when faced with increasing school dropout rates, some

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[26] *La Nación*, issue dated 3/14/03. Gaudin (2002) notes that increasing malnutrition accompanied the crisis in spite of Argentina's status as a global leader in the production of food, a large percentage of which is exported.

[27] *Clarín*, issue dated 4/7/03. It is further estimated that 70% of these working children were collecting garbage. Meanwhile, the school dropout rate rose to approximately 20%, compared to an average rate of 6% over the past two decades (Gaudin 2002). Teenagers were abandoning school for economic reasons at a rate of about 48% in urban areas according to UNICEF (Gaudin 2002).

[28] The Fundación SES (2002) study targets the 15-24 age bracket.

observers view the affected children as victims deprived of their right to an education. Others associate greater numbers of uneducated and/or "inactive" youth with crime, delinquency, and decreasing personal safety. Although the implications of children abandoning school may alarm both sets of individuals equally, they have divergent understandings of the problem and are predisposed to contrasting frames. One NGO member explains that he would prefer to convince policy makers to address such issues by using a children's rights discourse, but it is sometimes necessary to use "cruder language" — alluding to the consequences for law and order — to get them to appreciate the extent of the crisis.[29] These considerations complicate children's issues and the framing process. Thus, referencing the social crisis by itself is insufficient as a discursive or persuasive strategy.

Compared to the proponents of transparency, children's advocates have a different approach to diagnostic and prognostic framing. The more vociferous CSOs criticize and condemn government practices. They have not often integrated constructive messages into their frames: rather than look for a silver lining in the dark clouds of crisis, groups tend to convey just how gray a shadow these clouds cast over Argentine youth. Instead of suggesting a series of "good things" that go together (such as transparency, strong institutions, and democracy), activists offer a sequence of negative associations linking children's problems to questionable institutions and policies. Furthermore, they tend to frame problems affecting young people as structural and systemic.

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[29] Interview in SES Foundation, Educational Policy Area, 3/12/03, Buenos Aires.

To begin with, when diagnosing the problems that afflict children, members of CSOs frequently discuss neoliberal reforms.[30] Indeed, many of their discursive strategies rest on the assumption that the neoliberal model, poverty, and the regrettable state of the nation's children are interconnected. Those motivated by rights-based perspectives note the precariousness of social and economic rights (to work, housing, health, and education) in the wake of structural adjustment, social spending cuts, and growing unemployment. According to this approach, structural factors go a long way toward explaining the plight of children.

Advocates also trace numerous ills to national state institutions. They underscore several aspects of the country's criminal justice and legal systems that conspire against the rights and well-being of children. One observer laments the "tragic" combination of antiquated laws and strong administrative capacity: the government is effective at "doing what *should not be done*" to children, whereas provincial governments have more satisfactory laws but lack the resources to implement them.[31] Groups emphasize that penal codes created during the dictatorship remain in effect today, and Argentina lags behind other Latin American countries in terms of granting rights to children accused of a crime (e.g., the right to legal defense). Additionally, the framework "protecting" children "at risk," which dates to 1919, is based on the doctrine of the "irregular situation."[32] The doctrine applies equally to children who have been mistreated and those who have committed offenses. Judges who deem children to be at "moral or material risk" (defined

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[30] Neoliberal reforms have included privatization, deregulation, welfare reform, trade liberalization, labor market "flexibilization," and other changes, depending on the country and time period under study.
[31] Interview in UNICEF Argentina, 4/11/03, Buenos Aires.
[32] I refer here to the *Ley de Patronato de Menores*.

vaguely) remove them from their families and place them in institutions. Because the system "does not distinguish between those who have committed a crime and those who have been victims of one," an abandoned, neglected, or abused child may end up in facilities similar to juvenile detention centers. Critics charge that this approach is supported by a paternalistic view of children as the "property of their parents" — property that the state, "embodied by the figure of the judge," can "expropriate" should the parents fail.[33]

These wards of the state enter institutions that activists and other observers criticize as outmoded and antithetical to child development. The exact number of institutionalized children is unknown, and living conditions obviously vary from place to place. However, children's advocates voice concerns over ill-treatment, overcrowding, and the lack of educational opportunities and privacy in many facilities (CELS n.d). In multiple interviews, activists described the institutions in unequivocal terms as "prisons."[34] Members of CSOs often implicate the National Council of Childhood, Adolescence, and the Family (CONAF) in their critiques, because the agency oversees the system.[35] In light of this model, group members have arrived at a number of negative conclusions. Foremost among these is that "the state doesn't care about the rights of

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[33] "Legislación Penal Juvenil: Las trampas del discurso," by Marta Pesenti, the Children's Rights Association (ADI), available at: http://www.derechosdelainfancia.org (Accessed 5/9/04).

[34] I am keeping the organizational affiliations of the individuals quoted here anonymous. They also point out that children remain in the system for as long as the authorities see fit.

[35] Some facilities are state-run, while others are community organizations subsidized by the state. Accusations of corruption and clientelism have plagued CONAF and led to the removal of the agency's director in the late 1990s (Bombal and Garay 2000). The agency purportedly implements programs to promote children's rights; however, while conducting research, I was unable to find evidence that such programs actually had been put into practice.

anyone."[36] CSOs — particularly those that adhere to the Convention — regard existing policies and practices as anathema to human rights norms. An activist familiar with the system laments that "children are just a number."[37] Children's advocates also conclude that the system is, in a word, "perverse."[38] Activists frame institutions as harming children, and the need to transform them is implicit in their critique.[39] We observe less discursive signaling to elites that legislation is an "opportunity" to improve or strengthen institutions. The groups' framing strategies thus differ from the ones used by supporters of transparency.

The "criminalization of poverty" discourse is an additional frame that children's CSOs use. This discourse, which has become increasingly common, knits together both the structural and institutional threads discussed above.[40] In essence, advocates point to the inclusion of economically disadvantaged children in the category of youth at risk and the system's failure to differentiate between those children and the ones in breach of the law. Activists further sharpen their critique by connecting a perceived increase in "punitive policies" to neoliberalism — specifically, the state's reduced role in economic and social matters and the mal-distribution of wealth. Poverty is criminalized when

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[36] I have kept the organizational affiliation of the person quoted here anonymous.

[37] Interview in the Emmanuel Foundation, 4/4/03, Buenos Aires. The same individual warns that once you enter the bureaucratic maze, "you'll never find your way out."

[38] The source for this characterization is a document dated April 2002, authored by members of FADO, a group of community organizations dedicated to children at risk.

[39] CSOs also draw attention to other ways in which the state harms young people. For instance, CELS notes that teenagers and young adults are often victims of police brutality and excessive force.

[40] This section draws primarily on the following sources: Interviews in ADI, 4/4/03, Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, and Committee for the Monitoring and Application of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CASACIDN), 3/11/03, Buenos Aires. Further sources include the non-governmental reports for the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (e.g., "Informe de organizaciones no gubernamentales argentinas sobre la aplicación de la Convención Sobre

power holders leave the causes of "social exclusion" intact while using the penal system to maintain the status quo. Advocates take issue with a longstanding vision of children, reinforced by contemporary neoliberalism, as a "social menace" that "can only be controlled through punitive intervention rather than social policies" that are sensitive to child development.[41] In the words of an NGO leader, questions that "should be addressed in the sphere of social policy are instead decided in the penal system."[42]

The groups thus interpret social exclusion and punitive policies as "complementary" elements of a system and advance other structural critiques. Although this approach provides a fairly sophisticated diagnosis of the problems affecting children, it poses some dilemmas with respect to prognostic framing. In addition to falling short of offering viable solutions, it implies that real change would necessitate an overhaul of existing institutions *and* non-trivial adjustments to economic policies. As argued previously, such a framing strategy is less amenable to the policy process.

On the other hand, like the NGOs supporting freedom of information, children's groups generally have welcomed legislation as a vehicle for change. Passing a child protection law is a realistic response for CSOs to expect of governing elites. Still, such reforms may require significant state intervention and expenditure, complicating policy making. Moreover, some CSOs insist that bills contain provisions for institutional transformation. For instance, members of the Committee for the Monitoring and

Derechos del Niño," authored in 2002 by the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents) and documents published on ADI's website (http://www.derechosdelainfancia.org).

[41] Page 5, "Informe de organizaciones no gubernamentales argentinas sobre la aplicación de la Convención Sobre Derechos del Niño," authored in 2002 by the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents. For similar points, see "Régimen penal para menores," an *Infocívica* article dated 4/27/04 (http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/9/04), and "Los informes presentados al Comité de los Derechos del Niño de Naciones Unidas," (http://www.derechosdelainfancia.org. Accessed 5/1/03).

Application of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CASACIDN) have called for a "new normative institutionality" and a "profound redesign of the state entities" involved in children's issues (namely, CONAF).[43]

Children's advocates also reap the consequences of assigning blame as part of their framing strategies. They risk threatening powerful actors, including proponents of neoliberal policies and authorities in both the judicial branch and CONAF. Activists often call attention to the power of judges, who exercise considerable authority and discretion over the fate of children at risk.[44] They also tend to identify CONAF officials as a vested interest and/or potential obstacle to reform. Some argue that the agency seeks to maintain its own hegemony in children's affairs and will likely resist the decentralization and democratization of policy making in this domain.[45] All of these entrenched actors can use their political and bureaucratic power to oppose activists and their proposals.[46]

In fact, some opposition forces have introduced counter frames. For example, the use of a youth-as-delinquents frame emphasizing crime and chaos has intensified in recent years. As mentioned earlier, the delinquency frame is a predictable consequence

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[42] Interview in CASACIDN, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires.

[43] *ANSA*, issue dated November 2003 (Año 5, no. 60).

[44] Several advocates describe judges as "too powerful" because they interpret the meaning of this imprecise category.

[45] According to activists, decentralization and democratization would ensure the participation of provincial authorities and civil societal actors in decision making (Interviews in CASACIDN, 3/11/03, and Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires).

[46] Such resistance can be active or passive. For instance, activists commonly encounter "passive resistance" or the failure to effect change; meanwhile, opponents of reform have actively blocked the implementation of a law recently approved in the Province of Buenos Aires (Interview in ADI, 4/4/03, Buenos Aires).

of the deepening social crisis in Argentina and growing concerns over safety.[47] It undermines the discourse on children's rights and slows the progress toward comprehensive policies to protect young people. The CSOs therefore are forced to expend some effort defending their frames against this competing rhetoric, especially if they wish to stay involved in policy.[48]

In summary, this case provides evidence of both adroit and ineffectual framing. Children's advocates have succeeded in drawing the attention of policy makers and the public to the plight of children. They have made a compelling case for the importance of this issue area by attending to the motivational tasks of framing. Their frames effectively communicate the severity and urgency of the problems afflicting young people. They also suggest that society and the state have a moral obligation to tackle these problems.

The CSOs offer persuasive critiques of existing practices. Nevertheless, their emphasis on structural and systemic factors — perverse institutions, the "criminalization of poverty," and the purported effects of neoliberalism — complicates their involvement in policy. Identifying these as the main forces harming children is key to diagnostic framing but problematic for prognostic framing. The frames do not emphasize feasible, workable solutions to problems, nor do they contain the positive elements observed in the transparency frames. For instance, although civil societal actors seek the transformation of extant institutions and policies, they rarely make institutional "strengthening" a centerpiece of their frames.

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[47] Maclure and Sotelo identify similar tendencies within Nicaragua, where "many people question the value of assisting youth who are deemed to be hooligans" (2004, 98).

[48] Fortunately, a number of CSOs working on children's issues enjoy credibility and social recognition, which boost their status as "carriers" of ideas.

Furthermore, the advocates face opposition in the form of counter frames, or alternative approaches to politicizing children's issues. Some also engage in the politics of blame and risk alienating powerful elites. These framing strategies collide to some extent with the policy-making process and the "powers that be." Their mixed success with framing helps explain their intermediate levels of policy involvement.

Children's advocacy in Chile

I suggested earlier that the nature of an issue (or issue area) rarely suffices as an explanation of the variation in policy involvement. It is instead more fruitful to perform a comparative analysis of the strategies groups use to frame a given issue. Investigating children's advocacy in both Argentina and Chile affords us this opportunity.

The majority of the Chilean CSOs contrast markedly with the Argentine groups in their approach to framing. Many have made framing choices that are nearly the reverse of the strategies discussed above. On the one hand, their frames frequently entail constructive messages and feasible remedies to problems; in addition, structural or systemic critiques are unusual. Consequently, these discursive choices are less threatening to government officials and better suited to the policy process. On the other hand, the organizations' rhetoric tends to be somewhat muted and cautious. CSOs have yet to introduce a set of captivating, compelling ideas that perform the motivational task of framing. Notwithstanding these differences, their overall record of success, like that of

their Argentine colleagues, is mixed.[49] This performance is reflected in their middling levels of participation in the executive branch policy designed to protect children.

The groups' motivational framing tends toward the conventional, which differentiates them from the Argentine CSOs. First of all, unlike Argentina, Chile has not recently endured an economic and social crisis. Because similarly high levels of moral outrage over the welfare of the nation's children do not exist within Chile, groups cannot leverage this indignation in their framing. Although the severity and urgency of Chile's social problems do not parallel the emergency situation in Argentina, CSOs nevertheless have emphasized social issues in their attempts to galvanize decision makers and the public. Like their Argentine counterparts, children's advocates have drawn connections between poverty and threats to the well-being of youth. Because people aged fourteen and under comprise approximately 39% of the total population living in poverty, groups tend to view children as a vulnerable segment of society in need of attention.[50]

This emphasis on poverty has contradictory effects. It is effective in that poverty alleviation is already a salient theme in Chile. In fact, reducing poverty has been a leading preoccupation of the Lagos Administration and a predominant discourse shared by both governmental and civil societal actors. Combating poverty has become a sort of joint enterprise between both spheres, an area of policy collaboration and co-administration. Many groups involved in children's issues contribute to the implementation of these policies in fulfillment of their missions to help families meet

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[49] Children's advocates in Chile do not share a single vision of the issue area (Interview in Children and Youth Area, Vicariate of the Social Pastoral, 11/4/02, Santiago). Nevertheless, we can discuss the frames that predominate there.

basic needs.[51] These cooperative activities and the existence of a shared discourse between governmental and non-governmental actors signify that the poverty alleviation discourse is amenable to the policy process and acceptable to most elites.

At the same time, however, CSOs have less "ownership" of this frame. The poverty alleviation discourse emanates from government offices and multilateral banks as well as from the third sector. After all, the Inter-American Development Bank has declared that "investing" in children is investing in a "better future" for countries in the region.[52] Groups thus lose some authority as the originators — or main articulators — of ideas linking the problems affecting children to poverty. Their message becomes somewhat diluted as it joins mainstream ideational currents. Moreover, because the government discursively signals its concern with the well-being of children, the CSOs are less able to politicize the issue by arguing that leaders lack such concern.

The CSOs' diagnostic and prognostic framing strategies also differ substantially from the tactics used in Argentina. For instance, they seldom connect the welfare of children to structural and institutional factors. Interestingly, UNICEF has published critiques of the Chilean system that mirror those articulated by CSOs in Argentina. Experts argue, for example, that the framework for dealing with children at risk fails to distinguish between juvenile offenders and victims of poverty or abandonment. Young

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[50] The source of this figure is the 2000 Casen Survey. UNICEF estimates that 29% of minors under the age of 18 live in poverty and 8.5% are indigent (*ANSA*, issue dated May 2004, Año 6, no. 63).

[51] The Planning and Cooperation Ministry (MIDEPLAN) is one example of the executive branch agencies that promote such cooperation. Chilean CSOs of varying types receive substantial amounts of public funding to implement anti-poverty policies (Interview in the Division of Social Organizations (DOS), Citizen Participation and Public Policy Area, 10/9/02, Santiago).

[52] See, for instance, "Políticas de Infancia y Adolescencia: La Experiencia del Proame (1996-2000)," a 2000 publication that the IDB co-authored with Argentina's Social Development Ministry. Poverty

people are institutionalized and removed from their families and communities, with grave implications for their integration into society. The familiar theme, the "criminalization of poverty," thus emerges in these reports.[53]

However, Chilean CSOs generally have not embraced this discourse. Rather than promote a frame emphasizing the harm that such forces inflict on young people, groups sometimes disseminate pro-family messages. The basic idea underlying this rhetoric is that families are *the* fundamental social unit responsible for child development. Although the state shares in some of the responsibility, families bear the brunt and must therefore be strengthened.[54] To illustrate, the Rodelillo Foundation helps impoverished families resolve conflicts, become educated, join the labor force, and obtain housing. For this organization and others like it, "the family comes first."[55] The strengthening of the family is a positive frame on a variety of levels. It conveys a message that is constructive, hopeful, and consistent with cherished values.

This strategy clearly differs from tracing the hardships suffered by Chilean youth to a series of "perverse" state institutions, practices, and/or social and economic policies. On the contrary, pro-family framing is compatible with an individualistic or "privatized" approach to social problems and poverty, an increasingly common perspective in contemporary Chile. One can view any number of problems affecting children and

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alleviation is a component of the second generation of neoliberal reforms and a prominent goal of the international financial institutions and broader development community.

[53] *ANSA*, issue dated May 2004 (Año 6, no. 63); "Infancia: Documento de Trabajo" no. 3 (November 2003). The penal codes governing juvenile crime, like those in Argentina, are quite old, dating to 1928.

[54] Of course, a variety of Argentine CSOs active in children's issues also operate under the assumption that the family is fundamentally important. Nevertheless, the family strengthening discourse has not predominated.

teenagers — abuse, neglect, poor health and education, for instance — through an individualistic or familial lens. This tendency is reflected in the concern among activists with high levels of *domestic* abuse and mistreatment of children. According to UNICEF estimates, three of every four children is the victim of some form of physical or psychological abuse.[56] CSOs also draw attention to child pornography, pedophilia, and the sexual exploitation of youth, viewed largely as private-sphere practices.[57]

Thus, for a number of reasons, the groups' framing choices are digestible to policy makers. The pro-family and poverty alleviation frames also suggest feasible remedies to pressing problems; governing elites can redress some of the most worrisome problems facing children by helping families in need and reducing overall poverty levels. Neither approach necessarily entails any deviation from the current neoliberal model of development. In fact, similar logic already informs a number of government programs, including "Solidary Chile," which targets the very poorest families for assistance.[58]

A further advantage of the CSOs' framing is their approach to assigning blame. Unlike some of the Argentine groups, Chilean organizations have not emphasized culpability in their frames. They tend to keep the targets of blame general or vague.

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[55] Over the past decade, the Rodelillo Foundation has collaborated with national government agencies and municipalities.

[56] See the 2000 UNICEF study cited in the online news service located at: http://www.sociedadcivil.cl/nuevodiario/default.asp (Accessed 6/10/04). A 1994 study found that about 63% of surveyed children had suffered some form of physical abuse at the hand of their parents. See the data available on Paicabi's website, located at: http://www.paicabi.cl. (Accessed 6/10/04).

[57] In 2004, the issue of pedophilia was squarely on the formal agenda following the discovery of a pedophilia ring. The Concertación government passed new legislation designed to protect children from sexual exploitation.

[58] *Chile Solidario* combats extreme poverty and provides families with monetary assistance and preferential access to other social programs. The government planned to extend benefits to some 225,000 families during 2002-2005 (*La Nación*, issue dated 10/9/02). Chileans living in conditions of extreme poverty comprise approximately 5.7% of the population (Casen Survey 2000).

While Argentine advocates charge that the authorities who operate facilities for children at risk — and judges who place minors in such institutions in the first place — mistreat young people, Chilean activists cite high instances of abuse within private households. Moreover, rather than contend that *neoliberal policies* harm children, CSOs are more likely to suggest that *poverty* harms children. From the perspective of policy makers and other power holders, these discursive choices are less threatening and confrontational.

However, it is *not* the case that CSOs always refrain from criticizing existing government institutions and policies. In fact, a number of groups describe extant laws as contradictory and faulty, and few activists believe that the state lives up to its responsibility of guaranteeing children's rights, as noted in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, compared to the Argentine groups, children's advocates in Chile have not emphasized these aspects in their framing as vigorously. It bears reiteration that the primary concern of this chapter is not the ideas that reside in people's hearts and minds, but their strategies for articulating ideas.

It also should be noted that Chilean activists, like Argentine advocates, must contend with incipient counter frames that equate youth with delinquency. The media and certain political figures, for instance, have drawn attention to this theme in spite of the fact that only about ten percent of the suspects apprehended by the police are minors.[59] Members of CSOs consequently express their unease with the "stigmatization"

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[59] This figure, provided by the Chilean police, is reported in a UNICEF publication entitled, "Infancia: Documento de Trabajo" no. 3 (November 2003).

of young people.[60] Still, at present, the delinquency rhetoric does not appear to be a strong counter frame actively undermining the groups' conceptions of children's rights and needs.[61]

Children's advocates in Chile have used frames that differ starkly from the strategies observed in Argentina. These differences highlight the varying ways in which civil societal actors can use their powers of persuasion within a given policy domain. In their approach to diagnostic and prognostic framing, Chilean CSOs have addressed social issues by emphasizing poverty alleviation and strengthening the family. Rhetoric that identifies structural and institutional factors (such as the legal and penal systems and/or the neoliberal model) as the main forces harming children is not as common as individualistic or familial discourses. The pro-family frame offers positive imagery, a constructive message, and workable solutions to problems of widespread concern. In general terms, the groups' frames can be described as policy-friendly.

The motivational aspects of the frames also are at variance with those found in Argentina. Clearly, CSOs defending children in Chile face an altogether different social and political context. Accordingly, they cannot tap into the kind of moral outrage over the condition of young people that one detects within Argentina. Moreover, their discourse does not contrast dramatically with broadly accepted ideas linking the well-being of children to the reduction of poverty. Some of the groups' rhetorical strategies overlap with those of other civil societal actors and government officials.

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[60] *INFOACNHU*, issue dated April 2004 (Año 2, no.5). In fact, experts within both Argentina and Chile are trying to collect more accurate data on the numbers of young delinquents to counter "alarmist" interpretations of the problem (*ANSA*, issue dated November 2003, Año 5, no. 60).

I have argued that the combination of these elements amounts to mixed success with framing, which helps explain the middling levels of policy involvement and influence in this case. While the CSOs' frames are generally amenable to both policy makers and the policy process, they also are fairly cautious. Groups have yet to stimulate broader public interest in the well-being of children through the politicization of this issue. It may be the case that CSOs must incorporate more forceful messages into their frames to rally the public and fellow civil societal actors to their cause. This motivational work would put sufficient wind in their sails to increase their chances of participating in the adoption and agenda-setting phases of policy instead of playing a role primarily during the formulation stage.

Environmental advocacy in Chile

I already have suggested that environmentalism is a vastly more complicated and contentious policy domain than one might expect. In Chile, one person's environmental "calamity" is another's economic "miracle." The Bío Bío River dam project lays bare this controversy. In addition to analyzing this final case of policy making, I draw on other cases to demonstrate the challenges that CSOs face while devising frames in the environmental issue area. Compared to the groups discussed above, the green NGOs' success with framing has been limited. Activists tend to emphasize institutional and structural factors, including the state's architecture for environmental policy making and the neoliberal development model, which they depict as a destructive force. Moreover,

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[61] The discourse could gain ground if personal safety concerns increase, though the CSOs' reputations as

their frames rarely contain positive messages or feasible solutions to problems. These strategies have affected their capacity to influence decision making.

Studies of environmental movements in other parts of the world note several frames that activists often employ. These include endangerment, calamity, loss — the disappearance of nature and culture — and injustice (Taylor 2000).[62] Chilean groups have used similar rhetoric. Their critiques of the current development model touch on each of these themes, which they interpret as the environmental sacrifices made in exchange for economic growth. Although the NGOs vary in terms of their conservationist, environmentalist, ecological, and technical-professional orientations, as discussed in Chapter 2, they mostly coincide in this point.

Green NGOs encounter some difficulties with respect to the motivational task of framing. Unlike children's advocates and supporters of increased transparency in Argentina, Chilean environmental activists cannot incorporate the language of "crisis" into their framing in as straightforward a manner. Even though an array of environmental problems, such as smog and pollution, affect countless people, it is difficult to motivate the public and policy-making elite with a crisis discourse. Whereas the gravity of Argentina's social and political crises was undeniable, plenty of Chileans deny that anything approaching an environmental crisis is occurring in their country. Indeed, some

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credible sources of information would help them combat such tendencies.

[62] Activists often emphasize environmental catastrophes, degradation, and hazards to humans and other species. The environmental justice movement, which has gained ground in the United States in recent decades, focuses on the disproportionate effects of environmental problems on minorities and the economically disadvantaged.

are apparently "in denial" that environmental problems have accompanied Chile's economic development.[63]

As regards diagnostic and prognostic framing, the groups resort to several strategies, most of which convey negative messages. To begin with, they tend to depict Chile's model of development as a destructive force. Deregulation, privatization, foreign direct investment, and exports are the most criticized aspects of "the model." All are thought to privilege the exploitation of natural resources and conspire against sustainable development. Activists commonly identify environmental pillage as the main source of the country's economic growth. They assert that Chile's integration into the global economy is driven by its natural resource base (e.g., minerals, forests, seafood, fruits and vegetables), and the environmental consequences of this export-oriented model are significant. An estimated 80% of exported goods are natural resources, some of which remain unprocessed; the forestry, mining, and fishing industries alone account for 70% of these exports.[64] Moreover, a report authored in Terram poses the following question: if development projects generate unemployment, inequality, and environmental risk in the regions they are supposed to benefit, how can this pattern be construed as "development"

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[63] This denial prompted the head of the Ecology Institute of Chile to compare the typical government official to an ostrich burying its head (*La Tercera*, issue dated 6/19/94).

[64] The sources of these figures are position papers authored in Terram, including reports written by economist Marcel Claude, its former director ("Gestión Ambiental del Gobierno: Balance de una Década y su Proyección a Cuatro Años," "Política Ambiental de Chile;" see also Claude 1999). Members of Terram also estimate that copper production tripled during the past decade, and the native forest diminished by two million hectares from 1985-96 (Interview in Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago). Moreover, by the mid-1990s, seafood exports had risen to account for 12% of Chilean export earnings; by 2001, farmed salmon and trout exports accounted for over 5% of these earnings (Schurman 2003). Environmental consequences include over-fished waters and risks associated with salmon aquaculture (e.g., organic pollution and infectious diseases), which is increasingly common along the south-central coast of Chile's lake district (Schurman 2003).

at all?[65] In short, advocates frame existing policies and practices as "the archetype of a radically unsustainable model" (Claude 1999, 61).

Challenging the "economic growth first" mentality that predominates among policy makers is important to nearly all green NGOs representing a range of approaches.[66] One environmentalist considers this focus on growth as bordering on the "pathological."[67] A longtime conservationist concludes that economic considerations are consistently privileged; in spite of the incorporation of the "language" of environmentalism into the official discourse over the past decade or so, little has changed in practice.[68] Furthermore, according to a member of the Political Ecology Institute (IEP), most government authorities and politicians are unable or unwilling to incorporate green ideas into their way of thinking. Instead, they simply "administer the model."[69]

From the perspective of many NGO members, state agencies are largely configured to implement this unsustainable model. Like children's advocates in Argentina, the activists expend much energy critiquing institutions. In their view, these essentially serve to accommodate the "growth first" agenda by favoring big business interests and large-scale investment projects and ensuring lax environmental standards and regulation. The National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) is the main target

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[65] "Gestión Ambiental del Gobierno: Balance de una Década y su Proyección a Cuatro Años;" "Política Ambiental de Chile."

[66] Interview in the Environmental Research and Planning Center (CIPMA), 9/17/02, Santiago.

[67] Interview in Greenpeace Chile, 9/27/02, Santiago.

[68] For instance, Lagos included environmental issues in his "growth with equity" platform. However, activists maintain that the political elite tend to lack the political will necessary to address environmental problems. The conservationist quoted here claims he has grown "tired" of trying to persuade them (Interview in the Ecology Institute of Chile, 9/11/02, Santiago; see also the editorial published in *La Tercera*, issue dated 6/19/94).

[69] Interview in the Political Ecology Institute, 9/11/02, Santiago.

of criticism. A coordinating body (as opposed to a ministry), CONAMA is deficient in

the autonomy and decision-making power necessary to protect the environment. The

agency depends upon the Ministries of Economy, Agriculture, Mining, Public Works,

Health, Housing, and Planning, for example, and exercises little control over Chile's

natural resources.[70] A chorus of NGO members describe CONAMA as lacking political,

economic, and scientific clout, resources, leadership, and a clear purpose.[71] It is therefore

incapable of complying with the environmental norms codified in Chilean law.

According to one characterization, CONAMA has "less weight than a box of popcorn."[72]

Participants in green NGOs are almost unanimous in their perception that

CONAMA is biased in favor of large companies and permissive with respect to

development projects funded with private and public investment. A member of the

Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF) contends that these interests

prevail even when "environmental damage is certain." Another participant in CODEFF

disapproves of the government's belief in the "panacea" of concessions for business.[73] A

leader in Ecoceanos argues further that CONAMA defends polluting industries *instead* of

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[70] These ministries and other government entities are represented on CONAMA's board of directors (Interviews in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, and Greenpeace Chile, 9/27/02, Santiago).

[71] Interviews in the Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF), 10/14/02, FIMA, 10/2/02, and the Political Ecology Institute, 9/11/02, Santiago. In approximately one decade of existence, CONAMA had five different directors; one of the more recent resignations was that of Gianni López in 2004.

[72] Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago. Carruthers explains further that Chile's environmental regime is borrowed from more developed countries and predicated on a strong, regulatory state. However, the Chilean state provides limited resources to its institutions, which therefore lack "meaningful enforcement power" (2001, 349). In fact, because government agencies must self-finance, the one in charge of forestry issues (CONAF) does so through revenues collected from turning native forests into chips and paper pulp for export.

[73] Interview in CODEFF, 10/14/02, Santiago; editorial in *Ecoscodeff, La Voz de la Naturaleza* (Winter 2002).

the environment.[74] Numerous activists believe that the agency was designed to operate in this way. Several different groups criticized the Environmental Framework Law passed in 1994, which created CONAMA and the system for evaluating the environmental impact of development projects.[75] They warned that the law would benefit polluting industries and projects.[76] Not surprisingly, 95% of the investment projects that underwent the environmental impact process during its first four years of existence were approved (Aylwin 2002). Moreover, projects usually have been accepted "along favored lines" and subject to little modification (Carruthers 2001, 351).

Activists have incorporated other destructive aspects of the economic model and its caretaker institutions into their framing. These include inequality and injustice. Members of organizations suggest that environmental policies and problems affect some groups of Chileans disproportionately. One's vulnerability tends to vary according to her socioeconomic status, occupation, dwelling place, and ethnicity. Indeed, some green NGOs have integrated the threats to indigenous communities and their ways of life into the discourse on environmental harm. They politicize the loss of ethnic and cultural diversity as well as the loss of nature and biodiversity. Both are viewed as consequences

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[74] Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago.

[75] The Law (*Ley Sobre Bases Generales del Medio Ambiente*), approved during Aylwin's Administration, also addresses access to environmental information and citizen participation. Silva (1997) attributes the chosen design of CONAMA to political divisions within the Concertación at that time. A more progressive group of politicians, active in developing the law and supportive of an environmental ministry instead of a coordinating body, was politically sidelined, and business interests were favored. For an assessment of the system for evaluating the environmental impact of projects (*Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental*, or SEIA), see Sabatini, Sepúlveda and Blanco (2000).

[76] *La Época*, issue dated 2/3/94; *La Nación*, issue dated 2/3/94. Some groups, including the Political Ecology Institute, have claimed that the law was a means to an end: an eventual free trade agreement with the United States (*La Nación*, issue dated 6/7/94). FIMA, a public interest law firm, argues similarly that CONAMA is an institution that the Chilean government created to showcase to the world. Chile is a

of the model, which "razes cultures and ecosystems to impose a 'modern' vision, which is leading us irreversibly to self-destruction," according to the Political Ecology Institute.[77] Such outlooks are reminiscent of Polanyi's classic analysis of market forces. "To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment… would result in the demolition of society," he warns; "nature would be reduced to its elements… and landscapes defiled" (1944, 73).

The Bío Bío River dam project is a paradigmatic case that has come to signify the model's potential to threaten — and ultimately destroy — landscapes and ethno-cultural identities. The case illustrates each of the alleged effects of the model: the acceptance of large-scale investment at a high environmental cost, the "growth first" agenda, permissive institutions, and the resulting loss of nature and culture. An ecologist declared the project to be "one of the most serious attacks" on the environment in recent history; another called it an ethnic and cultural (as well as an environmental) "disaster."[78] As discussed in Chapter 2, the project already has entailed the displacement and relocation of hundreds of indigenous people and the disruption of their economic activities and customs.

In summary, the activists present a series of negative associations: the utter destruction wrought by the model, the almost "pathological" focus on growth among policy makers — poor stewards of Chile's natural resources — biased institutions, loss,

member of Mercosur and the Asia Pacific Economic Conference and has agreements with the United States, Mexico, Canada, and the European Union, for instance.

[77] The source of this quotation is the Institute's website (http://www.iepe.org. Accessed 3/15/04).

[78] The leader of the Political Ecology Institute, quoted in *La Insignia* (January 2002); an editorial authored by the director of Sustainable Chile, dated 6/12/03 (http://www.sociedadcivil.cl/nuevodiario/default.asp.

injustice, and devastation. However valid their diagnosis of environmental problems and issues may be, the NGOs encounter complications with respect to prognostic framing. Their general approach suggests that a significant transformation of existing institutions and policies is required.[79] More specifically, their frames have not emphasized viable alternatives to the dam project. These strategies do not readily lend themselves to policy making.

Furthermore, assigning blame is an integral part of some groups' frames. In addition to alienating politicians who back neoliberal policies and the current configuration of environmental institutions, they have provoked the resistance of other powerful elites in both the government and the business world by criticizing large investment projects. In fact, the area of overlap between these two spheres makes this strategy even more problematic. Because public officials often are involved in certain industries and/or commercial ventures, it is difficult to know where private interests end and the public interest begins. To illustrate, Frei, as president from 1994 to 2000, reportedly had prior ties to a consulting firm that helped build the first of the six Endesa dams, prompting accusations of a major conflict of interest.[80]

According to green NGOs, this pattern is a recurring motif in Chilean environmental politics. A member of Ecoceanos, for example, notes that high-ranking legislators and party leaders have personal and familial interests in the fishing industry.

Accessed 6/10/04). The lawyer for families who resisted the dam project went so far as to use the term "genocide" (*The Miami Herald*, issue dated 11/6/02).
[79] A handful of NGOs offer more pragmatic solutions to environmental problems. For instance, CIPMA has studied ways in which CONAMA and some of its programs can be improved (see Sabatini, Sepúlveda and Blanco 2000). In addition, CIPMA and House of Peace have pursued conflict resolution strategies in an effort to achieve dialogue among different actors (i.e., communities, business representatives, and government officials).

Business leaders also obtain executive branch appointments, raising the possibility that they will grant concessions to themselves.[81] An ecologist likewise concludes that the interests of big business, including foreign companies, frequently prevail over Chile's national "environmental principles." She also accuses the government of riding roughshod over the law of the land and "trampling" the rights of Chileans who lack political power.[82]

Targeting powerful individuals with considerable stakes in this issue area is a risky strategy. It has helped fuel *active* opposition against green NGOs and environmentalism more generally. Opponents within the mass media, government, and political parties on the right have engaged in counter framing.[83] They have publicly questioned the activists' ideas and advanced alternative understandings of this policy domain. These rival frames besiege environmental activists, who must defend both their ideas *and* their credibility. Adversaries usually counter the frames that emphasize the destructive elements of the development model by communicating an array of messages. For instance, critics sometimes portray green NGOs as foes of growth, employment, and the struggle against poverty — busy defending wildlife instead of families struggling to

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[80] *The Miami Herald*, issue dated 11/6/02. The first dam was completed in 1994.

[81] The activist likens this to "putting the cat in charge of the fish." Examples of political figures with ties to the fishing sector are the Zaldívar Brothers: one is president of the Christian Democrats, and the other is president of the Senate (Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago). In late 2002, Marcel Claude, then director of Terram, publicly noted these connections in an editorial, arguing that the brothers' participation in the process of reforming the sector were in breach of congressional rules forbidding legislators from voting on issues involving personal interests (*La Tercera*, issue dated 11/27/02).

[82] Editorials authored by the director of Sustainable Chile, dated 6/12/03 and 6/16/03, available at: http://www.sociedadcivil.cl/nuevodiario/default.asp. Accessed 6/10/04.

[83] Some of these actors ally with business interests opposed to environmentalism.

put food on the table.[84] A similarly common view holds that Chile cannot aspire to a

cleaner environment than its level of economic development allows; the country cannot

yet afford this luxury reserved for advanced, industrialized nations.[85] A related tactic is to

discredit environmentalism as a foreign import, an ideology thrust upon Chile from

abroad. Members of UDI (Independent Democratic Union) and other politicians used

this strategy when they raised questions about the support some groups receive from

green parties in Europe and foreign NGOs, such as the Deep Ecology Foundation.[86]

Since the mid-to-late 1990s, actors on the right of the political spectrum have

become vigorous producers and articulators of competing ideas about the environment.

For example, Freedom and Development, a powerful think tank, describes itself as a

"factory" of ideas pertaining to a variety of policy domains.[87] The institute, closely

connected to parties such as UDI, occupies the gray area between political society and

civil society. Its founder, Hernán Büchi, created it as a space where the architects of the

political, economic, and social reforms of the Pinochet era could continue to advocate for

— and act as custodians of — those changes.[88] To an extent, it represents a "shadow

government" for the right while the Concertación controls the executive branch.

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[84] Interview in House of Peace, 9/17/02, Santiago. Green activists obviously take issue with such dichotomies.

[85] Interview in FIMA, 10/2/02, Santiago; see also Greenpeace Chile's 2002 "Balance Ambiental."

[86] *La Época*, issue dated 5/26/95. Nationalist sentiment also can be used in defense of the environment and to critique the "race to the bottom" to attract foreign investment. For instance, activists are critical of multinational companies operating in Chile with much lower labor and environmental standards than those of their countries of origin (Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago).

[87] The Institute analyzes a vast array of economic, social, and political issues and advises policy makers in both the executive and legislative branches. Its staff frequently weighs in on subjects ranging from agriculture, labor, housing, and education to national defense and other topics.

[88] Büchi also ran for president in 1989 as an independent. Freedom and Development was created the following year.

Freedom and Development offers market-based solutions to environmental problems as alternatives to what they deem "populist" or "fundamentalist" approaches. In publications, its members accuse green NGOs of spreading falsehoods and even hurting the economy.[89]

The press has disseminated these alternative ideas with gusto. Freedom and Development staff members are regular contributors to *El Mercurio*, *Qué Pasa?*, and *El Diario*. Furthermore, the editorial board of *El Mercurio* has asserted that radical strands of ecology amount to a kind of "fundamentalism." NGOs are harming Chile's image with "distorted or false information" about companies and industries and should be punished for their defamatory campaigns.[90] It bears noting that these critiques are not reserved for ecologists but levied against all groups that question the model's sustainability.

Although such contending discourses complicate the work of green NGOs, they also are an indication of the groups' influence on Chile's political discourse. Environmentalism has become a fixture of the public agenda. In spite of their politically stronger position vis-à-vis green NGOs, opponents are compelled to engage (and debunk) environmentalist ideas.

A final aspect of counter framing relates to Chile's indigenous communities and therefore is particularly relevant to the Bío Bío River dam project. As discussed

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[89] To illustrate, some NGOs have been active in a transnational campaign urging consumers to buy Chilean wood products with the "sustainable" seal of the Forest Stewardship Council. Freedom and Development argues that the initiative has harmed exports and that US\$ 550 million in exports are at stake, along with numerous jobs (*Libertad y Desarrollo* no. 122, dated August 2002; see also *La Nación*, issue dated 9/17/02).

previously, some NGO members lament the propensity of large-scale investment projects to encroach upon the lands of indigenous groups and threaten their way of life. However, frames emphasizing the loss of ethno-cultural identity compete with a different interpretation: indigenous peoples stand in the way of development and progress. An historian suggests that the dam project symbolizes a fundamental conflict between such communities, the state, and proponents of neoliberalism, who cannot understand why these "backward" people resist the "benefits of modernization" (Mallon 1999, 461; Muñoz 2003). Why do they refuse to participate in the market like "good Chileans" (460)? The discourse of native peoples as obstacles to modernity has deeper roots in Chilean (and Latin American) history. Contentious acts in opposition to the dam's construction sometimes reinforce such views. In 2001, for instance, activists under cover of foliage hurled sticks and stones at a convoy of trucks carrying equipment through indigenous territory (Muñoz 2003).[91] When environmental NGOs integrate ethnic concerns into their framing, they take on centuries-old cultural baggage.

In brief, this case provides evidence of relatively unsuccessful framing as it pertains to the policy process. However trenchant the green NGOs' critiques of existing institutions and practices may be, their emphasis on structural and systemic factors can hinder their policy participation. Constructive messages and feasible solutions are

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[90] These ostensible attacks on companies and/or industries amount to "economic crimes" according to an UDI legislator (Ecoceanos News article dated 9/23/02, available at: http://www.parlamentodelmar.cl. Accessed 11/15/02).

[91] Some Mapuche activists have engaged in other acts of contention, such as land occupations. These draw the ire of landowners and logging companies, who have pressed the government to respond (Muñoz 2003; see also Millaman 2001). Some observers point to the increasing "judicialization" of ethnic conflict and attempts to cast the actions of some Mapuche as subversive. Using national security measures inherited from the dictatorial period, government officials are pressuring the legal system to seek convictions of Mapuche leaders for "terrorist conduct" (Muñoz 2003).

relatively scarce in these frames. The activists, like children's advocates in Argentina, weave together a series of negative threads, including critiques of existing institutions, environmental decision making, and the elites who implement the model regardless of the consequences. They also underscore inequality and injustice, suggesting that the fate of the natural world and the fate of indigenous groups are intertwined (and both imperiled). They frame the development model as a largely destructive force. Some question whether an approach that requires so many environmental sacrifices in exchange for growth is worthy of the name "development." The dam project embodies each of these elements and is thus an emblematic case.

Additionally, participants in green NGOs walk a difficult road with respect to the motivational task of framing. In contrast with their colleagues working on transparency and children's issues in Argentina, the activists are less able to make the case that Chile's environmental health is in "crisis." They try nonetheless to heighten the salience of green issues. Moreover, the advocates have played the blame game, often placing powerful leaders on the defensive. The combination of targeting structures, institutions, *and* individuals for criticism is a dangerous one. Not surprisingly, groups have encountered strong opposition, active counter framing, and competing approaches to politicizing environmental issues.

For several reasons, then, the groups' framing choices have set them on a collision course with the political establishment and the policy-making process. It is no wonder that they are less involved in policy decision making compared to the other CSOs analyzed here. Interestingly, some groups have begun to link environmental issues to a democratic discourse instead of focusing predominantly on questions surrounding

development. They do so by invoking themes such as citizen participation in public affairs and citizen control (for instance, through better access to environmental information). Further integration of these positive — and rather voguish — ideas into their frames could improve their chances of policy participation going forward.

Stated briefly, framing is an important explanatory factor in each of the cases detailed above. Varying degrees of success in framing help account for the high levels of policy participation in the struggle for freedom of information, the intermediate levels in the cases drawn from children's advocacy, and the lower levels in the environmental case. The comparative evidence therefore supports the dissertation's theoretical arguments.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I have focused on group strategies for mobilizing ideas — politicizing issues and articulating claims — through framing. An overarching goal of the analysis has been to better understand the power of persuasion. Activists exercise this form of power when they disseminate their understandings of issues and interpretations of reality, influence the public discourse and agenda, and capture the attention of policy elites and/or the citizenry. They struggle to convince others that their cause is worthy and their message important. Framing is a crucial aspect of these processes.

Frames are arrayed along a broad spectrum, and the cases I have examined illustrate this diversity. While some Chilean activists call attention to a "pathologically" growth-centered development model that leads to injustice, inequality, and devastation,

others emphasize strengthening families and easing their poverty. Meanwhile, in Argentina, a number of civil societal actors underscore "perverse" institutions and practices — social exclusion and the criminalization of poverty, for instance — and their lamentable effects on children. Other advocates look to political and institutional renewal as a way to achieve greater transparency, accountability, and democratic consolidation.

Some of the above strategies are more policy-friendly than others, and I have argued that effective frames entail certain characteristics. In addition to underlining an issue's importance or salience, CSOs need to include positive or constructive messages and feasible remedies to problems in their frames. They also must avoid an emphasis on blame and defend themselves against counter frames. Groups that successfully meet these conditions are more likely to participate in policy.

The evidence supports the proposed relationship between effective framing and policy involvement, which holds across issue areas and both countries. Specifically, Argentine transparency activists have met with more success than Chilean environmentalists; we observe mixed success on the part of children's advocates in Argentina and Chile. This variation is reflected in their respective levels of policy participation and influence.

Advancing a set of new theoretical arguments concerning the policy consequences of framing choices and testing them empirically are among the dissertation's main contributions. Although my approach builds on the concepts of motivational, diagnostic, and prognostic framing, I move beyond existing work in several ways. To begin with, research on the impact of framing remains scarce compared to work on how frames

mobilize would-be participants (i.e., drawing individuals into a social movement). The causal relationship between framing and policy involvement is poorly understood. Additionally, I extend frame analysis to other categories of collective actors besides mass mobilizing social movements. This conceptual tool is applicable to non-profit NGOs and community organizations working toward the public interest. Thus, I try to transcend some of the disciplinary boundaries separating analysts focusing on different types of groups. I also have taken a step in the direction of redressing the shortage of comparative work on CSOs' strategies for politicizing issues and articulating ideas.

Moreover, I weigh into the more general scholarly debate over the role of ideas in influencing political processes and outcomes. I suggest that framing explains the observed variation in policy participation better than rival ideational factors, such as a group's ideological proclivities or the characteristics of the specific issue at stake (how threatening, contentious, or intrinsically appealing it is). The explanation offered here emphasizes the latitude that CSOs have while concocting frames: some make difficult issues sound appealing, whereas others opt for more polemical language. Although groups rarely use frames that are antithetical to their "true" beliefs or ideologies, they can select from different options. They choose from many alternative approaches to "spinning" ideas.

Of course, a number of factors govern these choices. I therefore discuss both international and domestic factors that influence framing strategies in Chapter 5, placing frames in a broader political, cultural, and ideational context. Although my theoretical approach favors agency over structure, I recognize that the mobilization of ideas does not occur in a void. Furthermore, because framing does not suffice as an explanation of

policy participation and influence, Chapter 4 is dedicated to analyzing civil society alliances, the second independent variable of this project. It is necessary to examine group strategies for combining and mobilizing *resources* along with their strategies for mobilizing *ideas*.

In conclusion, more research is needed if we are to understand these ideational processes and their consequences. Analyses of framing tactics, their political and policy effects, and their relationship to the political, cultural, and social context would be especially useful. Additional studies on the selection and crafting of frames also could be revealing. Scholars can employ various modes of comparison — across different issue areas, nations, regions, and time, for example — to shed light on these questions. Moreover, a variegated analysis of distinct types of CSOs could uncover similarities and differences in their framing strategies.

Future work also should address the long-term implications of framing choices. I have taken a relatively short-term view of the process, emphasizing the more immediate effects of framing on policy involvement. An examination of framing over a longer period of time would reveal distinct patterns.[92] Further research on the creative ways in which civil societal actors mobilize ideas will elucidate these and other issues. Because little work has been completed, the possibilities for further research are practically endless, and the need is great.

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[92] Additionally, some CSOs contribute to changes in political culture, which eventually can yield political and/or policy changes.

Chapter 4: The Power of Partnerships

INTRODUCTION

A veteran NGO leader in Argentina once stated that no civil society organization is "strong" enough to effect political change by itself; however, none is so "weak" that it cannot make some contribution to the reform process.[1]   In this chapter, I analyze the dynamics of groups joining together to overcome individual "weakness" and influence policy.   I argue that when CSOs combine and mobilize organizational resources in alliances, their chances of policy involvement improve.   Effective civil society partnerships therefore represent another important pathway to participation.

Few scholars have examined the creation, evolution, and impact of these partnerships in democratizing countries.[2]   Because analysts have neglected the relationship between alliances and policy influence, the causal arguments that I propose in the dissertation contribute to theory building in this area of inquiry.   I also undertake one of the first comparative analyses of alliances that draws on evidence from three distinct issue areas and two polities.

I begin the chapter by recapitulating the arguments advanced in Chapter 1 concerning the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables.   I then turn to the dissertation's cases of policy making and trace the effects of alliance building on

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[1] Carlos March, Executive Director, Citizen Power, quoted in an *Infocívica* article dated 12/6/02 (http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/15/03).

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policy participation. I demonstrate that by forming successful alliances, civil society groups can create opportunities for policy involvement. However, given that CSOs do not always manage to cooperate with one another, I elaborate some of the challenges they face while endeavoring to create, maintain, and participate in alliances in the final section.

THE ARGUMENT

When asked about government–CSO relations in Argentina, the president of a small foundation answered wryly, "If you don't attend a meeting, they won't miss you. They're not going to call to see why you didn't show up."[3] It does seem far-fetched to expect policy makers to "miss" a single organization absent from such a gathering. On the other hand, what occurs when groups join together? Are governing elites as likely to marginalize an entire network or coalition of CSOs as they are to ignore individual groups during the policy process?

The central claim of this chapter is that successful inter-organizational cooperation increases the likelihood of civil society involvement in policy. Alliances can help individual groups overcome the obstacles that tend to limit their political influence in Latin America: few resources, limited visibility, and high fragmentation. Through cooperation, CSOs can combine and mobilize resources, solve coordination problems,

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[2] Barring a few case studies and more technical, development-oriented studies of networks, there is little research on the topic (e.g., Bebbington et al. 1993; Chalmers and Piester 1995; Fisher 1993; Friedman 2000; Umlas 1998).

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achieve strength in numbers to back their collective demands, and present a united front vis-à-vis governing elites and other actors.

Alliances facilitate participation during multiple phases of policy making. During the formulation stage, for example, it is easier for government officials to consult representatives of a network or coalition than to address the needs of many separate groups. Throughout the agenda-setting and adoption phases, CSOs seek the critical mass necessary to capture the attention of policy makers, persuade them to address an issue or problem, and pressure them to enact a certain policy. As suggested in Chapter 1, coalitions are more likely to participate in policy agenda setting and adoption, whereas networks are often instrumental during the formulation stage.

My findings indicate that not all alliances are created equal. Several characteristics enhance their overall effectiveness and their impact on the dependent variable. First, it is advantageous for groups to strive toward a delegation of responsibilities and a division of labor that maximizes their members' respective strengths. Second, they should strike a balance between internal diversity and cohesion. An alliance obviously unites CSOs that agree on particular objectives and strategies. At the same time, the more diverse the participating groups' ideological and political hues, areas of expertise, and organizational types are, the more the partnership will seem "representative" of broader constituencies. Third, it is beneficial for alliances to forge ties to other networks, coalitions, or wider political movements pursuing similar goals.

The logic of joining forces is compelling in countries where CSOs tend to lack certain resources — for instance, money and members — compared to their counterparts

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in other nations. As noted at the outset of the chapter, individual organizations in Latin American countries are rarely "strong" enough to get the job done alone. However, most every group has talent and energy to contribute to a partnership. Chilean and Argentine activists often bear in mind past experiences with resource constraints and political marginalization when weighing the relative costs and benefits of alliance building. For many civil societal actors, cooperation seems an obvious choice: in the words of one member of an Argentine NGO, "Either we unite, or we unite." She explains that team work is "a question of resources, efficiency, and pressure" and asks, "Why make similar demands separately from one another?"[4] In short, trying to effect change single-handedly strikes some advocates as unproductive.

THE EVIDENCE

Available evidence suggests that the dissertation's argument holds in both Argentina and Chile and across all three issue areas. Comparative analysis of the four cases uncovers some very different inter-organizational dynamics and levels of cooperation. These include: an effective coalition in Argentina's freedom of information campaign; weaker alliances uniting children's advocates in Argentina; a more formal network of children's groups in Chile; and lower levels of cooperation among Chilean environmentalists. For each case, I summarize the organizational resources of the groups involved in that particular issue. Specifically, I am interested in the potential for

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[4] Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires. In an analysis of social movement organizations, Hathaway and Meyers also mention the "undesirability of the alternatives" to participating in a coalition: working separately often seems "inefficient and illogical" to participants (1997, 73).

translating these resources into political gains through alliance building. I then outline the main features of the alliances that have emerged — their members, configurations, strengths, and weaknesses — and/or the forces conspiring against partnerships. More importantly, I analyze the relationship between alliances and policy participation and influence.

Advocating for freedom of information in Argentina

The struggle for access to information legislation demonstrates the importance of alliances for policy influence. The civil society coalition that favored reform was a principal means by which CSOs participated in policy debates, kept the issue on the formal agenda, and pressured leaders to approve the law. The coalition is a crucial factor explaining civil society's involvement during the adoption phase, the focus of the following paragraphs.[5]

The coalition exemplifies many of the proposed benefits of forming alliances. Individual NGOs making similar demands separately from one another seemed like a recipe for political marginalization. Instead, the strategy of joining forces created a critical mass and a common voice used to sway the authorities. The CSOs coordinated activities skillfully, established a good division of labor based on their respective specialties, and pooled valuable resources. Additional characteristics strengthened the coalition's effectiveness: a clear, specific objective motivated its collective actions; the participating NGOs were fairly diverse in their missions, histories, and politics; and they

succeeded in combining various audiences into a wider public constituency interested in transparency.[6]   Finally, other civil society networks and actors seeking a variety of political reforms joined with the coalition and augmented its influence.

The alliance was not formalized into a legally constituted organization. Moreover, the coalition lacked both an official name and a designated set of leaders, though a member of the Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (CIPPEC) became an effective coordinator during the campaign.[7] The core participants in the coalition were NGOs dedicated to transparency, political reform, citizenship rights, and/or public interest law.[8] The groups successfully pooled organizational resources, including prestige, credibility, expertise, and political and media connections.

To begin with, prestige was one of the more potent resources mobilized during the freedom of information campaign. As suggested in Chapter 1, CSOs with proven credentials can sometimes leverage their credibility into policy advocacy. The NGOs in question tend to enjoy high levels of recognition and credibility among fellow civil societal actors and the wider public. Several of the organizations have established track records as legal advocates and/or watchdogs of the state. Citizen Power, for example, has become a leader in monitoring political elites and institutions and encouraging citizen participation and control. The Civil Rights Association (ADC), which specializes in

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[5] Parts of this discussion are based on Risley (2003).

[6] Interview in Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN), 1/31/03, Buenos Aires.

[7] I refer here to María Baron, Director, Transparency Area.

[8] Examples include: ADC (Civil Rights Association), CELS (Center for Legal and Social Studies), CIPPEC (Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth), Citizen

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public interest law and the defense of constitutional rights, is also prominent. Meanwhile, the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) has the status of a veteran human rights organization that has taken on "new" issues since the democratic transition (most notably, the rule of law and institutional and police violence). Thus, NGOs held in relatively high esteem were involved in the coalition.

In addition to their reputations as monitors and public defenders, the NGOs possess specialized expertise. In fact, the two resources are closely intertwined. For instance, the Transparency Area Director of CIPPEC has an uncommon understanding of the legislative branch's inner workings; this tactical knowledge assisted the coalition's lobbying efforts. Legal savvy also proved instrumental: transparency proponents put their technical expertise to use while crafting policy proposals and arguments in support of access to information.[9] One participant identified these high-quality proposals as key ingredients in achieving influence in the area of political reform.[10] In short, the groups involved in the coalition combined their specific areas of knowledge (legal, institutional, and political) and used them ceaselessly during the campaign.

Through their coalitional endeavors, activists also pooled media and political contacts. As noted in Chapter 2, several groups regularly contributed to both mainstream and alternative media, thus increasing public awareness of the issue. One NGO leader was partly joking when he claimed to use his professional experience in marketing to increase the visibility of civil societal actors; however, available evidence suggests that

Commitment, Citizen Power, FARN (Environment and Natural Resources Foundation), Democratic Change Foundation, Innova, and Sophia Group Foundation.
[9] The NGOs also boast relatively strong administrative capacities, a further example of the organizational resources that they pooled through coalition building.

he often has succeeded at circulating CSOs' proposals and ideas in the media.[11] Additionally, some NGOs had connections to legislators and their staff members, while others enjoyed ties to executive branch officials.[12] By merging these contacts, participants in the alliance increased their access to policy makers.

The CSOs also enjoyed access to the Anticorruption Office, which was a useful resource during the formulation phase.[13] Indeed, this case illustrates the leadership exchange pattern — the flow of individuals between civil society and the government — mentioned in Chapter 1. The presence of former civil societal actors in the Anticorruption Office was a boon to a number of NGOs. Moreover, the Office actually served as a venue for increased coordination among the CSOs, who decided to further harmonize their advocacy efforts during this stage.[14]

In summary, by building a successful alliance, the organizations combined their resources and brought them to bear on policy makers throughout the freedom of information campaign. When members of congress were considering the bill, the coalition lobbied both lawmakers and executive branch officials to ensure its inclusion on the legislative agenda, approval in the relevant committees, and eventual passage in the

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[10] Interview in Social Forum for Transparency, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires.

[11] I refer here to the president of Citizen Commitment, also a leader in the Social Forum for Transparency (Interview, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires).

[12] For example, CIPPEC often works with legislative actors and government officials at various levels (Interview with the Project Coordinator, 4/14/03). In addition, the Social Forum for Transparency collaborated with the government in the late 1990s on a program promoting access to public information (see the official website at http://www.cristal.gov.ar. Accessed 10/1/03).

[13] As described previously, the Anticorruption Office developed the freedom of information bill with input from various societal actors. Preexisting personal relationships and the negotiated rulemaking sessions created opportunities for non-governmental actors to participate in the formulation of the policy.

lower chamber. As outlined in Chapter 2, participants in the coalition used myriad

strategies to pressure elites and engage the broader public, ranging from meeting with

high-ranking officials to disseminating their message in the media. Coalitional tactics

help explain the CSOs' high levels of participation and engagement in the policy process.

What is more, the alliance actually succeeded in pushing the legislation forward.

Accordingly, the participants' subjective views of the coalition's effectiveness

were unanimously positive during interviews. All agreed that the alliance was significant

in terms of their own policy involvement and the bill's progress in the legislature. One

NGO leader, for example, opined that pressuring jointly was "the *only* way" to get

decision makers to listen and to effect change.[15] Another concluded, "You can't do

anything alone."[16] Though perhaps overstated, such views provide evidence of the

perceived importance of coalitional work. The fact that most of these interviews

occurred before the lower chamber passed the legislation in May 2003 makes this

sanguine evaluation even more striking: regardless of the ultimate outcome, the activists

viewed the process as a good "model" for action.[17] Moreover, they believed in the merits

of joining forces despite the fact that their own individual organizations were relatively

rich in resources.

In Chapter 1, I suggested that CSOs participating in coalitions tend to view their

differences as benefits rather than as risks that will imperil the alliance. This tendency is

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[14] Although the Office's personnel played a less significant role during the adoption phase, they did maintain contact with participants in the coalition. Personal relationships thus continued to be valuable resources for the groups as they engaged in advocacy.

[15] Interview in Social Forum for Transparency, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires.

[16] Interview in CIPPEC, Transparency Area, 2/11/03, Buenos Aires.

[17] Interviews in ADC, 3/11/03, CIPPEC, Transparency Area, 2/11/03, and FARN, 1/31/03, Buenos Aires.

evident within the coalition promoting freedom of information. In interviews, participants were quick to point out the dissimilarities among their respective NGOs. Although they did not describe the groups as "strange bedfellows," they did highlight their varying areas of expertise, political proclivities, and other characteristics. The advocates also underscored the benefits of combining these different strengths in the short term to achieve a shared policy objective.

The experience of the campaign was also positive because other citizens joined and/or collaborated with the coalition at various stages, boosting its efforts. Preexisting networks interested in political change were vital in this regard. While some of the activities summarized above were coordinated by the core members of the coalition, others involved larger numbers of groups and volunteers. For example, an open citizens' forum, which convened organizations, networks, and religious figures, among others, served as a space for dialogue, coordination, and collective action.[18] In addition, the Social Forum for Transparency, a highly visible network comprising NGOs dedicated to promoting citizen participation and control, became involved.[19] In 2002, the network launched the "May Laws," a pro-reform campaign designed to improve mechanisms of

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[18] I refer here to the *Cabildo Abierto Ciudadano*, which translates as an open town meeting (in fact, it convenes in Buenos Aires' historic city hall building near the Plaza de Mayo).

[19] Examples of the Forum's members include: Citizen Commitment, Citizen Control Association, Citizen Power, CODESEDH (Committee for the Defense of Health, Ethics, and Human Rights), Democratic Change Foundation, Forum for Institutional Reconstruction, Permanent Forum for Social Ethics, and Sophia Group Foundation. Other groupings of people and organizations pursuing similar reforms, such as Vox Populi and the Action Group, have emerged in recent years.

transparency and accountability. The access to information law was among the changes proposed in this platform, which represented another tool for activists to leverage.[20]

Hundreds of organizations also took part in an initiative entitled, "more information, less corruption, less poverty," coordinated by the Argentine Dialogue. The United Nations Development Program and the Catholic Church instigated the Dialogue in 2002, with the support of President Duhalde. The process, which sought to formulate an agenda of "governability" amidst the crisis, entailed consulting multiple sectors of society (e.g., business, unions, religious denominations, grassroots and non-governmental organizations). Participants authored several documents with sweeping recommendations on the social, economic, and political reforms needed to overcome the crisis. Once again, access to information was among the proposed reforms, and transparency achieved a prominent status as one of the guiding principles of the Dialogue's charter.[21]

This concurrent activism in the area of transparency fueled the coalition's efforts. Because the alliance was loosely organized, its members could absorb volunteers and coordinate with other groups and networks when such opportunities arose. At the individual and organizational levels, there was considerable overlap between the coalition and the other initiatives described here. Nevertheless, the existence of a broader, more diversified support base helped the coalition step up its pressure on policy makers.

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[20] Interview in Social Forum for Transparency, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires; pamphlet on the May Laws (*Leyes de Mayo*), dated 5/02. The document supports the recommendations of the political reform committee of the Argentine Dialogue.

[21] In addition to defining the broad contours of future policies, the recommendations called for specific policies (such as emergency social programs) and new institutions, namely councils to monitor social policies. I am indebted to Norberto Borzese for sharing his materials on the Dialogue.

In short, the coalitional strategy was a crucial means by which CSOs participated in and influenced policy. The CSOs' coordinated advocacy efforts, directed at both branches of government, were instrumental for the passage of the bill in the lower chamber. The freedom of information case therefore supports the causal arguments developed earlier.

Children's advocacy in Argentina

The experiences of groups working on children's issues contrast with those of the transparency advocates. Partnerships among children's advocates have been less effectual than the strong coalition analyzed above. Specifically, inter-organizational cooperation has facilitated CSO participation in policy since the early 1990s; however, in recent years, growing fragmentation has hindered the development of a broader alliance and produced two separate, smaller partnerships. This tendency partially accounts for the intermediate levels of participation observed in the case of national legislation designed to protect children.

Compared to most of the NGOs involved in the access to information campaign, many of the CSOs active in children's issues are somewhat deficient in funds, staff, and administrative capacity.[22] However, they are hardly devoid of organizational resources, and the most important groups count on several important assets, including expertise, media contacts, and credibility. To begin with, numerous professionals — social

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[22] A United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) official describes Argentine children's organizations as under-institutionalized and lacking in managerial capacity compared to CSOs in other issue areas (Interview in UNICEF Argentina, 4/11/03, Buenos Aires).

workers, lawyers, psychologists, and pediatricians — have developed specialized knowledge of children's themes. Their expertise is potentially valuable to policy makers. In addition, the press has been something of an ally for promoters of children's rights.[23] The resulting media exposure has helped raise public awareness of (and respect for) the work of both domestic and international organizations, such as UNICEF.[24]

As mentioned in Chapter 2, groups associated with this policy domain have gained credibility through their monitoring activities and, in particular, their preparation of the non-governmental reports for the United Nations on Argentina's compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Like activists in favor of transparency, children's advocates have strong credentials as watchdogs of the state. Moreover, the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo are especially esteemed actors involved in children's rights. Indeed, their group is among the most respected and recognized CSOs in all of Argentina.[25] The Grandmothers' participation in this issue area thus brings additional credibility and authority to children's advocacy.

A final set of resources worth noting are political connections. Some of the activists maintain contact with legislators interested in children's issues and note that a

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[23] Interview with Committee for the Monitoring and Application of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CASACIDN), 3/11/03, Buenos Aires; see also Bombal and Garay (2000). Examples of newspaper editorials and other analyses can be found on the Children's Rights Association website (http://www.derechosdelainfancia.org).

[24] Interview in UNICEF Argentina, 4/11/03, Buenos Aires. The Argentine office of UNICEF has provided groups with project-based funding and technical assistance (e.g., administrative guides, research, educational materials). Additionally, international NGOs offer funding and support to domestic groups. I analyze these transnational linkages in Chapter 5.

[25] The group is also widely recognized abroad. One of its most recent honors was the United Nations Prize in the Field of Human Rights, bestowed on its president, Estela Carlotto, in 2003.

healthy dialogue exists between them.[26]   On the other hand, the majority of those interviewed characterize their interactions with officials in the National Council of Childhood, Adolescence, and the Family (CONAF) as unsatisfying.   Moreover, the exchange of leadership between this bureau and the NGO world has yielded few benefits for civil societal actors.[27]

Have children's advocates converted their organizational assets into political strength through alliance building? Various CSOs have in fact combined and deployed their resources by forming partnerships. Nevertheless, in recent years, problems have arisen within the main existing alliance, the Committee for the Monitoring and Application of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CASACIDN). This internal discord and the general trend toward fragmentation in this issue area help explain civil society's intermediate levels of involvement in the case of national child protection legislation.

A number of groups — including the Argentine Pediatrics Society and the aforementioned Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo — created CASACIDN in 1991. Compared to informal alliances like the access to information coalition, CASACIDN is slightly more structured, with an identifiable leadership and membership.[28]   The Committee emerged from the collective effort to prepare the first non-governmental report for the U.N. Committee on Children's Rights. Upon the document's completion in

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[26] E.g., interview in the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires.

[27] After Norberto Liwski, the leader of an NGO (CODESEDH), became the director of CONAF, a dramatic shift toward including more CSOs in policy making did not occur according to most activists; some also conclude that "state practices have remained the same" under his leadership.   I am keeping the organizational affiliations of the persons quoted here anonymous.

1993, the alliance gained members and increased its activities through the mid-1990s (Bombal and Garay 2000). CASACIDN's goals were not limited to monitoring existing state practices; participants also sought to encourage institutional and policy reforms in accordance with the Convention.[29] During this more promising phase, the alliance became an interlocutor vis-à-vis the government and a legitimate source of information on the well-being of children (Bombal and Garay 2000).

CASACIDN endures but is not an especially robust alliance. Bombal and Garay's (2000) earlier study of the Committee identified several internal weaknesses, including limited mobilization and coordination of its member groups, inadequate delegation of responsibilities to these participants, and inefficient decision-making processes. In the absence of an external stimulus, such as an approaching deadline for reporting to the U.N., CASACIDN's activities tend to diminish, and its members focus inward on their own individual groups. Coordination and decision making increasingly have fallen into the "hands of a smaller number of people" (2000, 26).

Since the time Bombal and Garay conducted their research, these problems have worsened. For instance, some members verbalize their disillusionment with the concentration of decision-making authority within CASACIDN. They maintain that a few individuals have been "running the show" and "making pronouncements" on behalf of the alliance without consulting others.[30] In addition, all of the individuals whom I

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[28] Specifically, the Committee has a president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer, as well as an executive director. It lacks a separate physical space and staff.

[29] Members of the Committee also strive to monitor the state and promote children's rights through education, training workshops, and raising overall public awareness. In addition to preparing the 1993 U.N. report, they generated the 2000 report.

[30] The organizational affiliations of the persons quoted here are kept anonymous.

interviewed acknowledge personal and political rifts. Although the fragmentation process has not yet culminated in the disintegration of CASACIDN, its membership apparently has undergone changes and a net decrease. Additionally, while the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo remain involved, they tend to collaborate more closely with fellow human rights organizations than with CASACIDN in their day-to-day work, according to one participant.[31]

Furthermore, a new alliance, the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, was founded in 2001.[32] One of the more vigorous rights-promoting groups, the Children's Rights Association (ADI), left CASACIDN to help organize the Collective, which comprises approximately eight active groups.[33] Ironically, the circumstances of its creation parallel those surrounding the establishment of CASACIDN: participants joined together to prepare the following year's report to the U.N. (when it became evident that CASACIDN did not intend to submit one). Meanwhile, other organizations, such as the Emmanuel Foundation, have abandoned CASACIDN but so far have refrained from joining the Collective.

The trend toward fragmentation manifests itself in other ways besides the existence of these two separate (and more diminutive) alliances. There is no national

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[31] Interview in CASACIDN, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires. This is the case in spite of the fact that the president of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo holds a leadership position in CASACIDN.

[32] Based on documentary evidence, CASACIDN has lost approximately 13 members but gained several others. Presently, it comprises an estimated 15 members, down from about 20 in the mid-1990s. Examples of current members include: American Association of Jurists, Argentine Pediatrics Society, Buenos Aires Lawyers' Association, Civil Association for the Equality of Rights, Center for Legal Studies of Children and Youth (CELIJ), Center for Political and Social Studies for Human Development (CESPEDH), Christian Youth Association (YMCA), Foundation for Participation (FUNDAPART), Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Integrated Center for Social Rehabilitation (CIRSA), Union of Argentine Women (UMA), Women's Studies Center (CEDEM), and affiliates in the provinces.

network on children's issues, which some activists regard as an important deficiency.[34]

Moreover, outside observers also note that effective team work has eluded advocates. A government administrator, for instance, opines that they have been largely unable to view themselves as a "collective" and a "potential political force;" similarly, a UNICEF official concludes that groups have fallen short of achieving the "critical mass necessary for pressuring the authorities."[35]

These tendencies have clear implications for CSO involvement in policy making. In Chapter 2, I offered the case of child protection legislation as an example of intermediate levels of policy participation. Groups have advocated for reforms in this policy domain and collaborated with legislators in the formulation of bills, and the existence of CASACIDN eased civil society participation in policy making through the mid- to late-1990s. However, more recently, the alliance has experienced a decline in membership and activity. It is likely that a stronger partnership would have led to better access to policy makers and more influence over the content of legislation. In short, we observe mixed success with respect to alliance building, which helps account for the middling levels of policy involvement.

Several factors have impaired the development of more effective alliances in this issue area. As noted in Chapter 2, CSOs involved in children's issues are diverse with respect to their missions, activities, organizational structures, and understandings of child

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[33] Surcos and El Arca also left the Committee to participate in the Collective. Additional participants include: Anahí, Pelota de Trapo, Hacer Lugar, and the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH).
[34] Interview in the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires. Members of organizations in Buenos Aires also express interest in building bridges to groups in Argentina's interior (Interview in the Children's Rights Association, 4/4/03, Buenos Aires).

welfare. For example, the fact that some groups (and not others) embrace a rights-based perspective is a basis for differentiation as well as an ongoing source of tension.[36] Personal and political schisms also have conspired against stronger partnerships and the pursuit of shared goals. Thus, compared to participants in the freedom of information coalition, the CSOs seem less capable of combining their individual specialties and strengths, thereby achieving "unity in diversity."

Furthermore, the access to information case demonstrates that collaborating with existing networks and broader reform movements bolsters an alliance's strength. Groups working on children's issues would benefit from closer ties with other civil societal actors who share common interests.[37] A plethora of research institutes, human rights groups, and other organizations have provided children's advocates with technical assistance and information during the preparation of the U.N. reports.[38] CELS, for instance, has furnished statistics pertaining to children's social and economic rights and the incidence of police and institutional violence affecting young people. However, groups have garnered less support when the time comes for advocacy as opposed to monitoring, for pressuring decision makers to enact reforms rather than critiquing existing policies.

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[35] Interviews in the Council of the Rights of Girls, Boys, and Adolescents, the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, 4/15/03, and UNICEF Argentina, 4/11/03, Buenos Aires.

[36] Interview in CASACIDN, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires. Activists who promote children's rights sometimes dismiss providers of direct assistance as embodying Argentina's long tradition of "paternalistic" forms of charity. Bombal and Garay (2000) also identify this cleavage.

[37] For instance, there is some overlap between so-called children's issues and issues of concern to women's advocates. In fact, several members of the Children's Rights Association were previously active in the women's movement.

[38] Numerous groups also have lent their support to the finished reports. The 2002 document counted on such approval from CORREPI (Coordinating Body against Police and Institutional Repression),

The struggle for transparency also highlights the importance of seizing opportunities to gain wider public support for one's cause. As outlined previously, the promotion of access to information dovetailed with the recommendations in favor of increased transparency that emerged from the Argentine Dialogue. The status of children was also at the forefront of these proposals in 2002, because overcoming the socioeconomic crisis was a major objective of the Dialogue. Yet it was other actors — not children's CSOs — who organized a campaign for emergency social policies. An assortment of NGOs, alliances, a journalist, and the newspaper, *La Nación*, formulated a proposal for nutritional assistance targeting impoverished children and pregnant women. Choosing the popular initiative as their advocacy instrument, they collected over one million signatures of support and submitted the bill to the legislature. In less than a year, the law was passed and implemented, reaching an estimated ten million Argentines.[39] Observers tend to regard the campaign as a successful case of varied civil societal actors working in concert, but it also represents a lost opportunity for children's advocates to make political demands alongside other citizens.[40]

In fact, the social crisis has posed further challenges to groups, especially those trying to ameliorate its effects. In the context of growing hunger, homelessness, and child labor, activists increasingly have devoted time and resources to direct assistance activities. This has complicated their efforts to mobilize organizational resources through

Foundation for the Study and Research of Women (FEIM), Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Founding Group), Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ), and a variety of university-based institutions, among others.

[39] *La Nación*, issue dated 12/1/03. The campaign, entitled "The Most Urgent Hunger," involved Citizen Power, the Sophia Group, the Solidary Network, and other actors. The resulting program targets poor children under the age of five. It is reportedly the second time a popular initiative has become law (Infocívica article dated 7/7/03, available at: http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 8/2/03).

alliance building and, more generally, to engage in advocacy. A member of a faith-based group lamented that "there's always some urgent task to perform," and "you can only fit so much into a day's work."[41] Even members of organizations primarily interested in promoting rights, most notably the Children's Rights Association, have become involved in meeting children's nutritional needs and providing other services.[42] Thus, the social situation has overwhelmed some CSOs; transparency activists were not forced to grapple with such dilemmas.

The factors that have hindered the development of stronger CSO partnerships among children's advocates will likely persist in the near term. Nevertheless, it is possible that CSOs will overcome some of the fragmentation analyzed here by regrouping in CASACIDN, consolidating the newer Collective, or creating other alliances.

Children's advocacy in Chile

Because children's advocacy in Chile differs from activism within Argentina in several respects, interesting opportunities for comparative analysis exist. In this section, I focus on one key difference: Chilean groups have established a national NGO network. The experiences of this emergent network provide empirical support for the theoretical arguments presented earlier: it is more convenient for government officials to consult

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[40] Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires.

[41] This comment and others like it were made during a meeting of the Social Sector Forum's committee on children's issues, held on 3/5/03, in Buenos Aires.

more formal and/or permanent alliances than to seek out many atomized groups; and decision makers often regard such entities as "representative" of a wider range of civil society voices. In short, CSO partnerships can be advantageous during policy formulation. At the same time, the Chilean example suggests that this mode of civil society participation may entail certain limitations, which I discuss below.

Like children's advocates in Argentina, Chilean activists have valuable organizational resources to bring to bear on the political process. A number of groups have professional staff members and/or volunteers and relatively well-developed administrative capacities. Most CSOs possess much-needed expertise and information on the status of their country's youth; and through the preparation of the reports for the U.N., they have become reliable monitors of the state.[43] Some of the groups also have useful political and bureaucratic contacts and audiences interested in their work in both the legislative and executive branches.

It bears mentioning that numerous CSOs are involved in combating poverty and helping families meet their basic needs.[44] However, the social and economic circumstances under which they operate obviously are less dire than the Argentine

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[42] Interviews in the Children's Rights Association (ADI), 4/4/03, and the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires. Among other activities, ADI has organized a network of community kitchens in Buenos Aires Province.

[43] In addition, they are embedded in the international children's rights movement and recipients of funding and support from abroad. For instance, as suggested by its name, the Chilean Association Pro United Nations (ACHNU) has ties to the U.N. community, as well as other global actors.

[44] Groups address basic needs by implementing government policies or running their own programs, as noted in Chapter 2.

context. They are thus more able to resist being drawn into the emergency assistance quagmire, which consumes precious resources.[45]

Children's advocates have succeeded in pooling their resources, coordinating their efforts, and presenting a united front vis-à-vis governing elites. They formalized their cooperation by creating the National Network of Children's and Youth NGOs, constituted in 2001 during a series of meetings involving approximately 60 organizations. However, some of the member groups had collaborated previously while preparing the U.N. reports and engaging in other common pursuits. The network is comprised of regional branches and a national board, which currently includes representatives from the Chilean Association Pro United Nations (ACHNU) and the Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ), among others. It is both large and diverse.

The network has three main objectives. First, it seeks to facilitate collaboration, dialogue, and the exchange of information, know-how, and experiences among member groups. Second, participating organizations identify themselves as "critical and constructive" monitors of the state's compliance with the Convention. Third, the network aspires to influence policy reforms. A goal underlying all three objectives is to become an authoritative "spokesperson" for children's issues.[46]

Although the network is in a nascent stage of development, it appears to be moving in the intended directions. From the perspective of a board member and coordinator, the formation of the network has been a significant impetus for both its

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[45] These CSOs, like most in the region, must deal with resource shortages: an oft-cited constraint is the preponderance of short-term, project-based instead of longer-term funding for organizational development.
[46] The source for these objectives is an introductory document, "Carta Presentación," authored by the network.

members and the government. Public officials are more obligated than before to take their presence into account, she argues: "At least now they have to call us."[47] The leader suggests further that the network's more "representative" character is one reason why decision makers should consult the alliance (as opposed to individual groups).

Indeed, governing elites seem content to take them up on this offer. They tend to welcome the existence of something approximating an encompassing association that speaks on behalf of myriad CSOs. Accordingly, a staff member at the Planning and Cooperation Ministry (MIDEPLAN) accepts the network as a legitimate civil society interlocutor.[48] More recently, the network has become involved in a newly created civil society advisory committee convened by the government. Members have expressed their hope that participating in this forum will improve their chances of influencing the agenda and promoting their proposals.[49]

Thus, in terms of access to government policy makers, the national NGO network has one foot in the door. While the network was being formally constituted, officials in the executive branch were involving CSOs in the formulation of their child protection policy. However, as noted in Chapter 2, this is a case of intermediate levels of civil society participation in policy making. One of the reasons for these middling levels is the relative lack of stakeholdership in the resulting policy: the role of CSOs in shaping the actual contours of the reform was minor compared to that of government officials. In

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[47] Interview in ACHNU, 11/4/02, Santiago.

[48] Interview in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/18/02, Santiago. Similar views were expressed during a further interview in this Division, held on 10/10/02.

[49] Specifically, the committee is organized by a council of ministers involved in children's issues (*Consejo de Ministros por la Infancia*), over which MIDEPLAN presides (For details, see ACHNU's website, available at: http://www.achnu.cl. Accessed 6/10/04).

general, this case exemplifies more of a top-down, government-led dynamic compared to the instances of policy making examined earlier. It is understandable that a civil society network would aspire to be consulted by the government; nevertheless, if pressure from below does not accompany such consultations, CSO participation may remain limited. Further research is needed to ascertain whether networks are more susceptible than informal coalitions to these top-down modes of inclusion in policy making.

Additionally, some members question the extent to which the network actually represents them. People involved in smaller CSOs, for instance, express concern that the more dominant NGOs seek a "monopoly" on children's issues.[50] The resources and leadership of a few large, well-organized, and bureaucratic NGOs in this issue area may have facilitated the establishment of the network; ironically, however, these same factors may cause problems within the alliance that hinder its endurance and efficacy over time. In a later section of the chapter, I discuss apprehensions regarding unequal power relationships within alliances, as well as other common pitfalls for inter-organizational cooperation.

In summary, instead of a loose coalition, children's advocates in Chile have established a more formal vehicle for cooperation. Unlike the Argentine alliances examined previously, the network is national in scope. Moreover, in this issue area, no other alliance currently rivals the network, which is trying to consolidate its status as the foremost interlocutor vis-à-vis the government. I have argued that the network's effectiveness has helped facilitate CSO involvement in policy formulation. On the other

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[50] I am keeping the organizational affiliations of the persons quoted here anonymous.

hand, I have cautioned that the "participation via consultation" dynamic may differ qualitatively from participation bolstered by pressure "from below."

Environmental advocacy in Chile

The final instance of policy making discussed in this section is drawn from the environmental issue area in Chile. Although I emphasize the case of the Bío Bío River dam project described in Chapter 2, a number of my conclusions are generalizable to other environmental policies. In this domain, we find less robust evidence of CSOs joining forces to generate a critical mass, present a united front, and coordinate their political actions. These lower levels of inter-organizational cooperation have hindered civil society participation in policy making.

Green NGOs tend to have abundant organizational resources — such as expertise and administrative capacity — which they theoretically could devote to alliance building. For instance, over the past decade, most of the groups have become more professionalized. Laboring under the assumption that government officials "only listen to technical arguments," they commonly defend the environment with detailed research rather than emotional pleas on behalf of whales or pretty birds.[51] Moreover, the NGOs have moved toward further specialization. As discussed previously, they have created specific niches within the broader issue area of environmentalism (such as public interest law, Chile's native forests, and marine wildlife and resources).

Like their counterparts in the policy areas discussed earlier, environmentalists are adept monitors of the private and public sectors. They have demonstrated their citizen

control capabilities time and again by holding government officials to account, alleging irregularities or cases of corruption, and calling for increased public access to environmental information. The Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF), active since 1968, probably enjoys the most prestige, and its wide membership provides some additional legitimacy. Although green NGOs have yet to achieve the high levels of social recognition enjoyed by some of the other CSOs described earlier, they count on a fairly strong media presence.[52]

In addition, the Political Ecology Institute (IEP), Terram, and other NGOs have working relationships with legislators representing various political parties, especially members of the parliamentary green caucus (*bancada verde*).[53] Examples of collaboration include organizing meetings, exchanging information and analysis, and holding joint press conferences. To a lesser extent, members of groups — for example, CODEFF — also enjoy a good rapport with officials in the National Environmental Commission (CONAMA).[54]

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[51] Interview in the Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF), 10/14/02, Santiago.

[52] As discussed in Chapter 3, the relationship of the organizations to the press (and consequently, to the public) is complicated. Actors with opposing views, including pundits on the right, have targeted environmentalists for criticism, and vitriolic exchanges in the media occasionally ensue. Some civil society personalities gain notoriety instead of prestige from this type of coverage.

[53] Interviews in Political Ecology Institute, 9/16/02, and Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago. Deputies Alejandro Navarro and Leopoldo Sánchez and Senator Antonio Horvath, among others, have been active in environmental issues. Green NGOs also are embedded in international environmental advocacy networks; many gain access to material and ideational resources by participating in transnational movements and events, as I outline in Chapter 5.

[54] As in the case of children's advocacy in Argentina, the movement of civil society leaders into government positions (an aspect of leadership exchange) has not led to favorable outcomes. The most high-profile example is Lagos' appointment of Adriana Hoffman, of Defenders of the Chilean Forest, as director of CONAMA. All those interviewed regarded the policies approved during her brief tenure as setbacks for the environment, though they respect her as a colleague.

Chilean environmental groups have considerable organizational assets that could be mobilized through alliance building. However, compared to the other CSOs analyzed in this chapter, they have been less successful at combining and mobilizing these resources in partnerships. Concretely, the green NGOs did not form a broad-based alliance in response to the Bío Bío project. Additionally, with the exception of CODEFF and the Political Ecology Institute, the most important NGOs refrained from joining the alliance that did emerge. That coalition, which remained active throughout the 1990s, comprised individuals and groups involved in human rights, indigenous rights, and similar causes.[55] Thus, limited inter-organizational cooperation has been a significant barrier to CSO participation in this case of policy making.

Moreover, looking beyond the particulars of the dam project, one observes that no broadly inclusive network or umbrella group exists at the national level. As discussed previously, the children's network brings together a diverse range of organizations, including those perceived as the most "significant" actors in that issue area. In contrast, the environmental CSOs have yet to create a network of comparable breadth. The National Network for Ecological Action (Renace), for instance, has a large and diverse membership that includes grassroots actors. Nevertheless, Renace does not include most of the green NGOs examined here and is representative of the ecological wing of the movement.[56] Hence, no existing network unites the most prominent NGOs, transcends

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[55] The name of the task force was Action Group for the Bío Bío, GABB (*Grupo de Acción del Bío Bío*). For descriptions of its activities, see Aylwin (2002) and Claude (1999).

[56] The Political Ecology Institute is closely affiliated with (and helped create) Renace. There has been some coordination between Renace and the Bío Bío task force.

some of their differences, and appears to outsiders (i.e., governing elites) as a legitimate representative of the majority of environmental advocates.

The lack of sustained cooperation among groups does not escape several NGO leaders, who conclude that "solidarity has been scarce," and that groups exist as small, separate, and largely "self-sufficient" entities (Claude 1999).[57] The absence of a national environmental network or other encompassing association also provokes unease within CONAMA. For example, an official charged with incorporating CSOs into the agency's advisory councils remarks that this absence complicates her work: selecting "representative" groups is hardly a straightforward task.[58]

The sources of this fragmentation are varied. To begin with, the NGOs are diverse in terms of their specific focus areas, as mentioned previously. For now, organizations appear to be consolidating their respective niches rather than joining forces to combine their expertise. Furthermore, they do not share a single understanding of all policy issues owing to the divergent conservationist, environmental, ecological, or technical perspectives of their members.

Strategic and tactical differences among the NGOs also have provoked disagreements. Activists claim, for instance, that past adventures in the realm of electoral politics have caused estrangement. Specifically, an NGO member became a candidate in the 1999 presidential race with the backing of some fellow ecologists; other individuals

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[57] Interview in House of Peace, 9/17/02, Santiago. *Ad hoc* coalitions occasionally emerge during issue-specific campaigns.

[58] Interview in CONAMA, Department of Environmental Culture and Human Environment, 10/7/02, Santiago. The agency's solution is to ask CSOs to elect representatives.

and groups instead endorsed Lagos' candidacy.[59] In addition, some groups have moved in

the direction of increased dialogue with businesses to facilitate conflict resolution

between the private sector and local communities.[60] Observers often note as an example

the perceived coziness between the Environmental Research and Planning Center

(CIPMA), a research institute dating to the dictatorial period, and the business elite

(Carruthers 2001; Silva 1997). Other NGOs view this sort of rapprochement and the

search for market-based solutions for environmental conflicts as objectionable, given that

the political and economic systems already privilege business interests.

In brief, several factors have encumbered alliance building in this issue area.

However, the NGOs may be able to better negotiate their differences and achieve greater

coordination in the future. Additionally — or perhaps as an alternative strategy — they

will likely forge partnerships with other social actors. In fact, several organizations

already have made serious efforts to work with aggrieved or "affected" groups, whose

livelihoods are intimately connected to the health of the environment. To illustrate,

Ecoceanos and Terram each maintain ties to organizations of traditional fishermen in the

South-Central regions of Chile.[61] The existence of encompassing associations of

fisherman, such as the national confederation, CONAPACH, facilitates such linkages.

Traditional, small-scale fishing methods are widely recognized as more sustainable in

terms of both the environment and employment opportunities compared to the practices

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[59] I refer here to Sara Larraín (Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago). Claude (1999) provides further details of the resulting rift.

[60] House of Peace also serves as an intermediary between communities and business and facilitates dialogue among a variety of social actors (Interview, 9/17/02, Santiago).

[61] Interviews in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, and Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago; see also the bulletin published by *Parlamento del Mar*, issue dated 9/02). The term in Spanish is *pescadores artesanales*.

of larger enterprises and multinational corporations. NGOs also have collaborated with indigenous communities. Environmental advocates likewise could pursue alliances with segments of the agricultural sector and the tourism industry. In short, a more inclusive movement for reform — one that involves actors besides urban, middle-class activists — may coalesce and engage the policy process.[62]

Based on the empirical data summarized above, it should be clear that CSOs do not always succeed in forging alliances; indeed, they often fail. This raises a key question: if the strategy of building partnerships increases the likelihood of policy involvement and influence, what are the chances that groups will in fact cooperate? Because collective action cannot be taken for granted, it is necessary to discuss the challenges involved in forming, maintaining, and participating in alliances. These factors help explain the considerable variation across time and space in levels of inter-organizational cooperation.

THE CHALLENGES OF COOPERATION: CREATING AND MAINTAINING ALLIANCES

To build a successful partnership, CSOs first must overcome the collective action problem. Olson's (1965) classic work analyzes the collective action dilemma at the level of the rational individual considering membership in a group.[63] The logic of his argument

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[62] Studies conducted by Hochstetler (1997) and Umlas (1998) provide comparative evidence from Brazil and Mexico, respectively, of middle-class, urban environmental activists cooperating with grassroots, base, and indigenous organizations.

[63] A rationalist perspective suggests that an individual is unlikely to join an organization pursuing collective goods, or indivisible benefits intended for a larger group. Consequently, organizations offer selective incentives: a glossy newsletter, discounted insurance, or other "noncollective" goods and services that increase the private value of membership. Otherwise, individuals will free ride, enjoying the collective

extends to organizations contemplating joining an alliance. However, in a study of lobbying coalitions in the United States, Hula (1999) argues that the collective action and free rider dilemmas are less stark at the organizational level.[64] Unlike inactive individuals, interest groups need no enticing to jump into the political fray; they are already active and invested in a given policy issue. The author also suggests that coalitions provide selective benefits, such as information, to participating organizations. Members of individual groups also perceive coalitional tactics to be effective strategies for realizing their objectives. Thus, alliance building can be understood as a rational, utility-maximizing behavior.

Moreover, commitment to a set of common values or views can be an equally important source of motivation for alliance building. Much as "principled ideas" are an impetus for the transnational advocacy networks analyzed by Keck and Sikkink (1998a), shared ideas sustain domestic-level cooperation. In short, we can identify both rational and principled motivations for inter-organizational cooperation.

Nevertheless, groups encounter many obstacles along the path of cooperation. In this section, I focus on some of the internal difficulties plaguing alliances, namely, factors

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benefits without contributing to the group. Some social movement scholars (among others) have taken issue with elements of this approach. In addition to noting the ubiquity of collective action, they challenge the notion that organizations often rely on selective incentives. They suggest that moral and "solidary" incentives, which blur the distinction between collective and selective, are important for organizational maintenance; examples include a shared "moral vision" and the "self-respect" of the collectivity (Jenkins 1987, 303; Tarrow 1994). Analysts also expect the free rider problem to be more serious for groups "whose members are self-consciously seeking to maximize their own material self-interest" than for "purposive groups, whose members are more committed to an ideology stressing the collective welfare" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 138).

[64] Hula (1999) focuses on traditional pressure groups engaged predominantly in lobbying inside the beltway, but a similarly rational calculus occurs within other types of citizen organizations.

over which groups exercise some control.[65] These include competition among individual organizations, concerns about their autonomy, leadership rivalries, perceptions of unequal power relations within alliances, and limited human resources. *All* alliances, whether nascent or longstanding, must address the challenges summarized here; partnerships require continual maintenance and constant renegotiation.

To begin with, the perennial problem of inter-organizational competition hampers the emergence and persistence of alliances. CSOs compete with one another for financing and recognition. Groups — seeking satisfaction for their "organizational egos" — vie for both funds and "credit" for successful projects or outcomes (Berry 1997).[66] In a competitive or zero-sum environment, a CSO is likely to regard a certain source of funding, piece of information, area of expertise, or other asset as a strategic advantage. When the group shares such resources with others, it risks losing its competitive edge. The organization also may lose some of the credit its members think it deserves when recognition is distributed among several CSOs. For instance, an NGO member suggests that groups are uncomfortable with the notion of sharing what they consider to be "theirs."[67] Similarly, Shepard (2003) identifies a process of "dilution," whereby a network's success masks the contributions of its member groups. This phenomenon applies to other types of alliances, as well. In brief, competition should not be underestimated in contexts where CSOs often struggle for their very survival.

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[65] CSOs trying to create and maintain alliances also confront a number of environmental challenges (e.g., political cultural or institutional factors), which I address in Chapter 5.

[66] In a description of this tendency in American politics, Berry states that "a group's organizational ego makes it want to shine on its own some of the time and to gain the reputation of being able to make things happen in Washington" (1997, 193).

[67] Interview in the Commitment Foundation, 2/26/03, Buenos Aires.

The question of autonomy also arises when CSOs consider entering into partnerships.[68] Groups carefully guard their independence and self-determination. They seek to maintain their capacity to determine organizational goals and courses of action and are usually unwilling to relinquish their independence for the sake of the collectivity. Stated differently, almost everyone likes the idea of coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated (Gordenker and Weiss 1995b; Jönsson and Söderholm 1995).

Leadership rivalries pose several related challenges. One would expect leadership problems to complicate the *creation* of an alliance, as various individuals and/or groups compete for control of the incipient partnership. On the other hand, it may be more common for such problems to threaten the *survival* of an alliance. My findings indicate that members of CSOs sometimes question leaders and express misgivings about the extent to which they adequately represent participating organizations. While some activists cast doubt on the abilities of specific people to direct the alliance, they more often communicate reservations about internal decision-making processes. A recurring perception is that one or two organizations dominate these procedures and lack accountability to other participants, who conclude, "They don't speak for *all* of us."[69] I presented evidence of such views in the analysis of the Chilean National Network of Children's and Youth NGOs and Argentina's CASACIDN. In both cases, there are participants who question the degree to which leaders represent the membership and harbor fears of concentrated decision making, inequality, and/or dominance. They

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[68] Scholars tend to dwell on CSOs' independence from political parties and the state, a theme which I address in Chapter 6.

[69] The organizational affiliation of the person quoted here is kept anonymous.

remark that a few people make pronouncements on behalf of the alliance, sometimes without consulting other contributors.[70]

It also can be difficult for overcommitted and overstretched groups to devote human resources to partnership-related activities. An NGO member explains that civil societal actors contemplating involvement in an alliance realize that "the coordination of all those projects requires time and effort."[71] Indeed, time is a precious commodity for all participants in CSOs and especially volunteers, who usually have other jobs and responsibilities. Furthermore, CSOs that routinely cooperate with other groups risk developing a sort of alliance *fatigue*. This can occur when a certain constellation of issues, such as political reform in present-day Argentina, spawn multiple alliances. Oftentimes, the same people participate in various working groups, "chatting about the same things" at different meetings.[72] Too much *overlap* can lead to *overkill.*

Each of these issues affects the decision calculus that occurs within individual groups with respect to creating, joining, and staying active in a partnership. Even members of organizations that collaborate with other groups on a regular basis are sometimes ambivalent on the subject: one such activist explained that working in alliances is not a "unanimous policy" among her colleagues, who frequently discuss the pros and cons involved.[73]

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[70] According to Olvera (2000), Mexico's Civic Alliance has experienced internal tensions related to the degree to which the centralized leadership consults its geographically dispersed support base.

[71] Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires. Shepard (2003) makes a similar observation.

[72] Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires.

[73] Interview in CELS, 4/3/03, Buenos Aires.

In short, the degree to which CSOs succeed in joining forces varies significantly owing to a number of challenges inherent to alliance building. Additionally, groups always face multiple obstacles simultaneously, given that they are closely intertwined. Enumerating all of the creative strategies that CSOs use to overcome these difficulties is not among the goals of this chapter. Instead, I propose one strategy: opting for a coalitional structure. Compared to other types of partnerships, *ad hoc* coalitions are better able to surmount the obstacles discussed above. In fact, coalitions can circumvent some of the thornier issues altogether. Coalitions tend to be informal, temporary arrangements motivated by a concrete and/or limited set of goals. By nature, they confront internal and external obstacles with greater flexibility than alliances that are formally constituted, permanent, interested in multiple objectives, and comprised of numerous groups. Coalitions are particularly adept at dealing with questions surrounding autonomy, leadership, and alliance fatigue.

Members of individual groups often view coalitions favorably, because they believe such arrangements do not require that they surrender much organizational autonomy. Coalitions entail CSOs acting in concert but not necessarily joining a more permanent collectivity. Participants thus enjoy the benefits of presenting a united front to outsiders — for instance, governing elites and the broader public — on a given issue while also retaining their independence. When the time comes to decide an organization's position or course of action on other issues, groups can do so without

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consulting their peers. They are free to either go on hiatus or continue coordinating their efforts for the foreseeable future.[74]

In addition to guarding their freedom to maneuver, individual CSOs tend to protect their own resources. They therefore express reluctance to devote material and human resources to building a more lasting (or bureaucratic) alliance structure. Coalitional strategies rarely necessitate the creation of such a structure. Moreover, once created, formal alliances usually compete with individual groups for scarce funding. As a result, some civil societal actors view them as potential rivals or threats. In contrast, coalitions can allay these concerns to a large extent.

A coalitional approach also may diminish anxieties related to leadership. With respect to representation and accountability, more is at stake for leaders of formal alliances, especially those with wider memberships. As discussed previously, networks and umbrella groups commonly purport to "represent" particular segments of civil society, such as the majority of children's NGOs. Sometimes encompassing associations include an even broader cross-section of issue areas or types of CSOs (e.g., NGOs or base organizations). Their leaders consequently claim to speak on behalf of these constituencies. Coalitions, on the other hand, are organized around specific issues or policy goals and rarely make such claims.

By and large, it is not feasible for formal alliances to remain leaderless. Even networks — which frequently aspire to "horizontal" decision making — often select

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[74] The ability to retain group autonomy is sometimes cited as a benefit of coalitions in other political contexts. Examples of works that discuss interest group coalitions in the United States include Berry (1997), Costain (1980), Gelb and Palley (1996), Hrebenar (1997), and Hula (1999). In addition, Shepard

leaders. In contrast, coalitions sometimes refrain from naming official leaders. Instead, one or more individuals (or groups) coordinate the coalition's activities without necessarily making key decisions or regularly speaking on behalf of the participating CSOs. I observed this sort of coordination in the freedom of information campaign. Such an arrangement circumvents the leadership issue to an extent. Furthermore, leadership rivalries and disputes tend to be "less intense," because activists realize that future opportunities for leadership will surface along with new political struggles and different coalitions (Costain 1980, 491). These considerations help lower the stakes.

A final advantage of coalitions also stems from their temporary nature. If members of a coalition are experiencing alliance fatigue, they can dissolve the alliance or suspend its activities. They may reactivate the coalition at a later date, especially when personal friendships have formed among participants. However they proceed, periods of abeyance or inactivity are acceptable. On the other hand, when a more permanent alliance undergoes such a period, outsiders usually interpret it as a sign of decline or weakness.

In summary, coalitions confront certain obstacles with superior agility compared to more formal, enduring alliances with varied goals and larger memberships. Coalitions frequently skirt around some of the tougher issues facing partnerships, such as leadership disputes. Nevertheless, other types of alliances are not doomed to failure; rather, they must go to greater lengths to create appropriate mechanisms for internal decision making

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(2003) suggests that coalitions are better able to respond rapidly to changing political circumstances compared to more formal alliances.

and democracy.[75] In particular, good "governance" can mitigate some of the problems associated with representation and accountability and smooth the path of cooperation.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I have elucidated the difficult choices that members of CSOs encounter in the pursuit of cooperation. Earlier I cited an NGO member who expressed confusion as to why an individual organization would make policy demands alone instead of teaming up with other groups that share its goals. Trying to achieve change single-handedly struck her as inefficient. For her, the "choice" that participants in CSOs face was clear: "Either we unite, or we unite."[76] For others, the choice can be more agonizing, especially when they perceive dangers to their autonomy or unequal power relations within alliances. Even groups motivated to construct, join, and remain involved in alliances confront serious challenges; hence, levels of cooperation vary across cases.

The results of my comparative analysis demonstrate that these varying levels have a direct impact on policy involvement. For instance, the coalition in favor of freedom of information legislation illustrates many of the advantages of forming alliances and produced positive results. In contrast, the case of children's advocacy in Argentina

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[75] Sikkink (2002) underscores the need for internal democratic practices within *transnational* networks to address accountability, transparency, and representation (see also Florini 2000). Similarly, Jordan and Van Tuijl (2000) suggest that members of transnational networks have a "political responsibility" toward others engaged in an advocacy campaign to conduct democratically. Examples of the dimensions of this responsibility include establishing transparent goals, ensuring equitable flows of information, and jointly managing strategy. In her study of networks uniting women's sexual and reproductive rights advocates, Shepard (2003) emphasizes issues pertaining to internal governance within NGO networks (e.g., membership and decision making).

[76] Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires.

produced more mixed results: inter-organizational cooperation facilitated CSO participation in policy for a time, but a more recent trend toward fragmentation has hindered their ability to stay involved. Their counterparts in Chile, however, are in the process of solidifying a national network. This case provides evidence that networks can be instrumental during policy formulation. Finally, several factors conspire against partnerships among Chilean environmental NGOs. The dearth of broad-based alliances helps explain the lower levels of policy involvement in this instance.

The evidence thus supports the arguments proposed in Chapter 1, which suggest that the likelihood of policy participation increases when CSOs combine and deploy organizational resources in alliances. By joining forces, groups pool their expertise, credibility, political and media connections, administrative capacities, information, ideas, and know-how. In addition, they can create a critical mass and back their collective demands with greater numbers, thereby attracting the attention of governing elites and the public. Through alliances, CSOs also can coordinate their advocacy efforts and avoid redundancies in their activities. These benefits of alliances have consequences for civil society influence during the formulation, agenda-setting, and adoption phases of policy.

Moreover, certain characteristics enhance the effectiveness of alliances and their impact on the dependent variable. These include ties to other alliances or political movements, a good division of labor and successful coordination, and a balance between internal diversity and cohesion (or agreement on basic goals and strategies). Given the

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difficulty of this balancing act, advocates often identify group differences as *the* most challenging aspect of alliance building.[77]

By advancing causal arguments and weighing them against the available evidence, I seek to contribute to an area of inquiry that has received surprisingly little attention. To date, few scholars have investigated CSO partnerships in countries that have undergone democratic transitions. I have put my ideas into conversation with the pluralist and corporatist traditions, as well as more recent work on Latin American civil societies. However, my theoretical contribution is distinctive in a number of ways. To begin with, the logic of cooperating to augment one's political strength is relevant in political systems that lack the features traditionally associated with pluralism or corporatism. Furthermore, the imperative to join together not only governs the behavior of narrowly defined "interest groups" but applies more broadly to the non-profit, public interest CSOs that are the focus of this dissertation. Indeed, alliances are probably even more essential in countries where the third sector is developing, CSOs generally lack material resources, and the relationship between the government and civil society is in the process of being defined and negotiated.

A further contribution of the chapter is methodological: I undertake a comparative analysis of alliances using evidence from three distinct issue areas and two countries. This fulfills an urgent need for more comprehensive, systematic, critical, and comparative analyses of civil societal behavior.

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[77] Interviews in the Civil Rights Association, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires, ACHNU, 11/4/02, Santiago, and House of Peace, 9/17/02, Santiago.

Future research should delve more deeply into a number of questions related to the internal structures and practices of alliances. For instance, what other strategies do CSOs use to overcome the above-mentioned challenges of building and maintaining partnerships? What are the origins and consequences of different types of governance procedures: how do member groups decide on these arrangements; and how do they affect the overall agility, accountability, and effectiveness of alliances? In general, more data are needed to elucidate the trade-offs involved in selecting particular types of alliances.

Another question worth investigating is whether partnerships have implications for citizen control as well as for citizen participation. For instance, alliances may facilitate civil society's role in *monitoring* existing policies. By cooperating, CSOs can pool their expertise and maximize their ability to gather the information needed to evaluate government programs. Additionally, it is probably difficult for the government to co-opt every last member of the alliance; hence, the groups involved are more likely to remain independent from the government, which is necessary for effective, credible monitoring. Recent initiatives in Argentina serve to illustrate this point. The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank selected a national consortium of over 50 NGOs to monitor the social policies they were funding in late 2002 and early 2003. The consortium's coordinator describes the civil societal effort as "pioneering" and unprecedented.[78]

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[78] Interview with the General Coordinator of the Social Sector Forum Consortium, 3/12/03, Buenos Aires. At this time, the banks were financing a number of emergency social programs to address Argentina's economic crisis. The consortium includes a diverse array of development, direct assistance, and faith-based organizations. Its main responsibilities are to obtain feedback from recipients of social programs, register

In conclusion, alliances, like effective framing, represent a significant pathway to civil society participation in policy making. To explain policy influence, we must look to CSOs' strategies for mobilizing both ideas *and* resources. Together, successful framing and partnerships account for much of the observed variation on the dependent variable. By forming effective alliances and framing ideas in persuasive ways, groups are generating their own opportunities for participation. In this chapter and the last, I have privileged the agency of civil societal actors over structural factors. My purpose in Chapter 5 is entirely different: I address the broader domestic and international context in which framing and alliance building occur.

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complaints or irregularities, produce reports, and make recommendations about the administration of the policies (*La Nación*, issue dated 2/4/03). First on its agenda was evaluating a program providing assistance for unemployed heads of households with children (*Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados*).

Chapter 5: Factors That Influence Framing and Alliance Building

INTRODUCTION

While many civil societal actors are preoccupied with the implications of international flows of trade and investment, some also are mindful of other forms of "globalization." A Chilean environmental activist, for instance, considers the transnational exchange of ideas, analysis, and information to be the "more positive aspect of globalization."[1] Like his fellow NGO leaders, he participates in regional and international events and values these opportunities to link up with sympathetic individuals active in NGOs and networks. Civil societies in Latin America are thus embedded in a complex web of global relationships. With these linkages in mind, I have argued throughout the dissertation that it is necessary to integrate transnational factors into analyses of domestic-level advocacy to achieve a closer fit between theory and the empirical realities of democratizing, developing nations.

In the present chapter, I examine the global and domestic political context in which groups mobilize. Up to this point, I have investigated the strategies that CSOs use to exercise their political voices and influence the policy process. I therefore have focused on the agency of civil societal actors rather than on structural variables. In the paragraphs that follow, however, I contemplate the environmental factors that constrain and shape activists' choices with regard to framing and alliance building. By placing

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[1] Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago.

group strategies in their proper perspective, I offer an analysis of advocacy that is not purely agency-driven.

My main goal in this chapter is to take a step back in the causal chain by proposing domestic and international factors that affect the independent variables of the dissertation and consequently have an indirect impact on the dependent variable. These include political institutions and "master frames" at the domestic level and flows of resources and ideas at the international level.[2] I argue that institutional features — the extent to which the political system is centralized, for example — shape patterns of alliance building. Additionally, I suggest that master frames and the political rhetoric previously used by activists influence CSOs' framing strategies. Investigating these domestic contextual factors requires a shift in the mode of comparative analysis from the case comparisons performed in Chapters Three and Four to country-level comparisons between Argentina and Chile. I also analyze the two forms of transnational influence on domestic activism mentioned above: the availability of international norms and financial and other resources.

THE POWER OF IDEAS: CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

In this section, I discuss two factors that affect groups' framing strategies, turning first to international exchanges and transfers of ideas. I submit that these factors can influence the process of frame selection but seldom dictate that choice.

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[2] Although other contextual variables could be discussed, I have narrowed the scope of this chapter to these four factors, which I consider to be the most significant.

Transnational flows of ideas

Analysts of various global actors — multilateral banks, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and international NGOs, networks, and social movements — often underscore their role as "carriers" of world views, ideologies, and ideas.[3] In particular, studies of transnational activists and NGOs tend to highlight their contributions to the development, diffusion, and institutionalization of *norms* (Clark 2001; Florini 2000; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). These shared standards for behavior are sometimes codified in international or regional conventions, which subsequently are ratified by states. Hence, they can serve as useful tools for domestic activists, who try to bring government institutions and policies in line with existing norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998a).[4]

We cannot examine any of the dissertation's issue areas without considering the international circulation of ideas and discourses. However, civil societal actors rarely incorporate global norms into their frames in an automatic or absolute way. Because the most effective frames resonate with domestic circumstances, activists who merely "import" pre-fabricated or -packaged sets of ideas are unlikely to enjoy much success. Norms are thus better understood as one of several factors influencing a CSO's approach

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[3] Representative works on transnational advocacy networks, social movements, and NGOs include Boli and Thomas (1999), Della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht (1999), Gordenker and Weiss (1995a & 1995b), Jordan and Van Tuijl (2000), Keck and Sikkink (1998a), Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002), Korzeniewicz and Smith (2001), Smith (1997), and Wapner (1995). Another growing literature addresses international policy diffusion, or the process whereby policy alternatives and analysis travel across nations owing to a variety of mechanisms (e.g., Rogers 1995; Weyland 2004).

to politicizing issues. Specifically, I argue that norms can contribute to activists' interpretations of reality and understandings of a given policy domain. These are key ingredients in framing, which infuses experiences with meaning that can legitimate and guide collective action. The exchange and availability of international ideas also can provide discursive shortcuts: rather than create their own political discourse "from scratch," groups can build on existing ones. Moreover, they lend legitimacy to their demands by appealing to norms that (by definition) are accepted widely among global actors.[5]

Transnational norms are especially relevant for the motivational aspects of framing discussed in Chapter 3. Norms can help activists communicate the importance of an issue and a sense of moral obligation, thus providing a rationale for action. I therefore offer illustrations of domestic CSOs drawing on international norms for their motivational framing. To begin with, activists promoting freedom of information have made frequent appeals to global and regional norms of transparency in newspaper editorials and their own publications on the subject.[6] The norms are articulated in the Organization of American States' (OAS) Inter-American Convention against Corruption, among other texts. Argentina integrated the Convention into its legal framework in

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[4] Keck and Sikkink (1998a) define "accountability politics" as exposing the distance between governments' actual practices and their discursive positions on issues such as human rights.

[5] In addition, by putting their ideas into conversation with international discourses, CSOs can reach a wider audience of people who speak a similar language.

[6] See, for instance, an editorial authored by Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (CIPPEC) in *La Nación*, issue dated 8/1/01.

1997.[7]   Because the document explicitly recognizes the role of civil society in the struggle against corruption, a committee comprising the Social Forum of Transparency, Citizen Power, Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), associations of lawyers, and other actors has been created to monitor Argentina's compliance with the Convention.[8] Argentina is likewise a signatory to the United Nation's Convention against Corruption, adopted in December 2003. Transparency International, a global coalition of NGOs, is another important advocate and carrier of norms in this issue area.[9]   Citizen Power has served as the Argentine chapter of Transparency International since 1996, and other groups have maintained contact with the alliance (as well as with other international actors). These ties facilitate the exchange of ideas.

The promotion of these norms in international venues stems from two main sets of ideas. First, global actors often consider transparency as one of several indicators of democratic consolidation and deepening. Second, curbing corruption is part of the second generation of neoliberal reforms recommended by proponents of the Washington Consensus. Thus, transparency is associated with democracy and neoliberalism, the two most hegemonic global discourses of the current era. This lends considerable authority to the demands of domestic activists.

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[7] I refer here to Law no. 24.759. The right to information is also included in Argentina's constitution. Specifically, Articles 38, 41, and 42 address access to information in reference to political parties, the environment, and consumers, respectively.

[8] Judges, representatives from the University of Buenos Aires law school, and other participants also are active on the Committee, which is apparently the first of its kind (see the 2002 report entitled *Primer Informe*, authored by the Colegio Público de Abogados de la Capital Federal, Sede de la Secretaría Ejecutiva, Comisión de Seguimiento del Cumplimiento de la Convención Interamericana Contra la Corrupción).

[9] Transparency International, founded in 1993, is well known for its annual index, which gauges perceptions of corruption across nations. In addition, the Inter-American Dialogue and Konrad Adenauer Foundation have been involved in the struggle against corruption.

Indeed, NGOs have used transparency norms and conventions to justify swift political reforms within Argentina. Their assertion that every self-respecting democratic regime should have freedom of information laws and safeguards is based in part on the international community's shared view that corruption produces negative effects in *all* of the world's democracies. Activists ask why governing elites have failed to pass legislation so essential to democratic consolidation. Whether an appeal to international norms is necessary to convey the policy's salience is debatable, however. The groups have been able to make a compelling case for the importance and urgency of transparency issues by emphasizing Argentines' widespread concern over corruption (as well as the larger political crisis there). Citizens perceive rampant corruption as an eminently Argentine problem, and the NGOs' frames resonate with these domestic realities and perceptions.

Children's advocates in Argentina and Chile likewise have drawn on international norms and tailored them to domestic politics. The adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the United Nations in 1989 was a defining moment for the global children's rights movement, which has sought to institutionalize the Convention's norms over the past decade. The 1990s began with the World Summit for Children, hosted by the U.N., and the 2000s got underway with the Organization of American States designating 2001 as the Year of Children and Adolescents. The shift from a needs/welfare perspective to a rights/protection discourse represents a significant victory for the movement (Brown Thompson 1997).[10]

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[10] According to Brown Thompson (1997), compared to other global movements, the children's rights movement is still in the early stages of incorporating these perspectives into legal norms and institutions.

As suggested in previous chapters, the Convention on the Rights of the Child is essential to the work of myriad groups within Argentina and Chile. Both states ratified the Convention, and Argentina also incorporated the text into its constitution. Activists take advantage of these normative (and legal) frameworks to raise awareness of children's rights, monitor state compliance with the Convention, and advocate for change.[11] According to the leader of a Chilean organization, groups try to exploit the "gap" between the Convention's standards and reality.[12] In addition, many advocates have strong ties to the United Nations community, including the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Latin American and Caribbean "caucus" of NGOs involved in children's rights. Some travel to global conferences to engage in further exchanges.[13]

It is therefore not surprising that a number of Argentine and Chilean CSOs invoke international norms in their publications and organizational materials, as well as during public events. In addition to providing a discursive shortcut, children's rights norms help groups persuade others that both the state and society have a moral obligation to ensure the welfare of young people. Children's advocates can further legitimate their demands

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[11] As discussed previously, the most common monitoring activity is the preparation of non-governmental reports for the U.N.'s Committee on the Rights of the Child in Geneva, which tracks state compliance with the Convention. The Children's Rights Association (ADI) tries to use the norms of the Convention to effect cultural change by training public school teachers and encouraging youth participation in public or community affairs (Interview in ADI, 4/4/03, Buenos Aires).

[12] Interview in Chilean Association Pro United Nations (ACHNU), 11/4/02, Santiago.

[13] The Committee for the Monitoring and Application of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CASACIDN), ADI, and the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, among other Argentine groups, have participated in international meetings and events. A recent example of such a meeting is the children's summit held in New York City in 2002. However, activists observe that other Latin American countries tend to have a stronger presence in these venues compared to Argentina (Interview in Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires).

for immediate policy and institutional reforms.[14] As in the freedom of information case, however, domestic groups encountered a special set of circumstances in Argentina: as increasing numbers of young people suffered from malnutrition, dropped out of school, and worked in the informal sector, the plight of children became undeniable. With respect to their motivational framing, activists could underscore the severity of these problems and tap into the public's moral indignation. Domestic factors therefore were more integral to the framing process than global norms.

Lastly, participants in green NGOs in Chile have appealed to international normative frameworks. Transnational linkages in the environmental issue area are quite dense: Keck and Sikkink, for instance, note the "hundreds" of environmental networks that exist worldwide (1998a, 132; see also Kamieniecki 1993). In addition to networks and NGOs, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and other global agencies have been at the forefront of ideational and discursive change. These transnational actors have served as promoters and articulators of ideas — concerning sustainable development, conservation, and stewardship, for example — and norms, including the right to a healthy environment.[15] It bears noting that international networks of environmentalists are usually bound by both norms and scientific ideas; thus, they often

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[14] Like transparency, poverty alleviation is a component of the second generation of neoliberal reforms and a prominent goal of the international financial institutions (and broader development community). "Investing" in children is an investment in a country's future development and prosperity, as mentioned in Chapter 4. Because the well-being of children is related to reducing poverty, children's advocates may gain an even wider international audience in the future.

[15] In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development proposed a definition for sustainable development (development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs). In addition, global discourses and norms have emerged with respect to the rights of indigenous peoples. These clearly are relevant to the Bío Bío River dam project, which has threatened indigenous communities in Chile, as discussed in Chapter 3.

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resemble epistemic communities as much as transnational advocacy networks, which share more "principled" sets of ideas (Haas 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998a).[16]

Members of green NGOs make use of both sets of ideas in their advocacy work. In fact, an activist who is generally critical of economic and financial globalization refers to this transnational exchange of ideas as the "more positive aspect of globalization," as noted at the outset.[17] Chilean groups participate in movements, events, and dialogues at the international and regional levels, often liaising with groups or alliances abroad that share their respective niches. For instance, FIMA is involved in an environmental law partnership; Defenders of the Chilean Forest have found global counterparts interested in native forest protection; and the Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF) maintains ties with the Nature Conservancy, Forest Stewardship Council, and Friends of the Earth, among others.

Once again, activists have emphasized the disparity between global standards and practices within their home country and used international norms to lend legitimacy to their demands. For example, several green NGOs have drawn on international norms regarding citizen participation in environmental decision making and access to information. These norms appear in the "Access Initiative" of the Rio Declaration's Principle 10. This document was prepared during the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, better known as the Earth Summit. An alliance called "Partnerships for Principle 10" has since promoted the norms on a global scale. Principle

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[16] Partly for this reason, Keck and Sikkink (1998a) suggest that environmental advocacy networks are less clearly "principled" than the human rights networks discussed in their study.

[17] Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago. The NGO leader also values the exchange of information and analysis in global forums.

10 is thus another instrument that domestic CSOs use to improve levels of citizen involvement in policy and public access to environmental information, such as analyses of the environmental impact of major investment projects and statistics pertaining to the overall state of the environment.[18]

In summary, transnational norms should be considered as factors that influence domestic framing strategies by shaping activists' understandings of issues and providing discursive shortcuts. They also can help legitimate the claims that groups advance. Because norms help communicate values and principled stances on issues, they often benefit motivational framing. International norms therefore affect CSO involvement in policy making indirectly through their influence on framing.

Examining the relationship between norms and framing strategies leaves room for the agency of domestic actors. Transnational flows of ideas are multi-directional, and Latin American activists have contributed to the development and institutionalization of norms over time. For example, human rights advocates collaborated with Amnesty International to create a normative framework against the "forced disappearances" and other violations that had occurred in the region from the 1960s–1980s (Clark 2001). Additionally, members of CSOs within Latin American nations are seldom passive, unquestioning recipients of ideas or discourses from abroad. Rather, they are free to emphasize certain aspects and (re)configure them in distinctive ways depending on their environment. The following section suggests one important reason why global ideational influences rarely produce uniform effects at the domestic level.

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[18] The Environmental Research and Planning Center (CIPMA), Terram, and Participa authored a study on these subjects. The 2001 report is available at: http://www.participa.cl/html/not_cumbreConama.htm

Master frames in Argentina and Chile

Because CSOs respond to their political, social, economic, and cultural surround, framing patterns vary across time and space. Innumerable domestic factors affect groups' framing strategies, constrain their choices, and encourage some types of frames over others.[19] The present discussion focuses narrowly on one ideational factor: the availability of a "master frame." Master frames essentially perform the same functions as regular frames but on a larger scale (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow & Benford 1992). An array of movement-specific frames can be derived from these "generic" frames, which are sometimes quite flexible and inclusive. For instance, scholars regard the civil rights movement in the United States as a "progenitor" movement: subsequent activists, including feminists and women's rights advocates, inherited certain ideas and discourses from the movement (Zald 1996).

Once a master frame enters the cultural lexicon, activists may tap into it while devising their own framing strategies, much in the same way that they draw on international norms. Like norms, master frames influence groups' understandings and interpretations of issues, provide discursive shortcuts, and legitimate collective action. Civil societal actors can build on discourses introduced by those who preceded them. Accordingly, one finds different master frames in Argentina and Chile based on their respective histories and legacies of prior activism. A human rights master frame exists in

(Accessed 6/10/03). Such initiatives also are known as environmental "right-to-know" movements.
[19] Reese and Newcombe (2003) offer a model of frame creation that includes cultural and political conditions, as well as organizational ideologies, which shape framing options.

Argentina, while a democratization frame has developed in Chile (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002; Noonan 1995). Argentina's master frame is a legacy of the human rights abuses committed under military rule and the movement that emerged in response. Since the democratic transition, Argentina has experienced a "flowering of dialogue on human rights issues" (Brysk 1994, 136). Human rights organizations no longer have ownership of this dialogue, because a variety of groups and individuals — labor unions, neighborhood organizations, academics, journalists, artists — have contributed to it.[20] The human rights master frame has achieved a high degree of resonance.

Contemporary civil societal actors in Argentina thus find themselves in an ideational environment shaped by several decades of rights-based activism. To illustrate, children's advocates tend to benefit from the continuing resonance of human rights. They draw on and reinforce this discourse in their framing, as explored in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the inclusion of social themes — such as marginalization and the criminalization of poverty — in their frames echoes discursive trends within the human rights movement. Since the democratic transition, human rights activists increasingly have called attention to social issues. Some even refer to poor and unemployed Argentines as the "socially disappeared" or "the system's new disappeared."[21] In their view, the neoliberal model entails the pauperization of the middle and working classes and the further marginalization of the poor by excluding them from the labor market and social welfare. They construe this social exclusion as a form of violence that parallels the

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[20] For an appraisal of the movement's contributions to political cultural change, see Peruzzotti (2002).

[21] Interviews in Children for Identity and Justice and Against Forgetting and Silence (HIJOS), 7/31/97, and the Argentine League for the Rights of Man, 7/10/97, Buenos Aires; see also SERPAJ's publication *Paz y*

brutality of the military dictatorship.[22] In a broader sense, elements of both the children's

and human rights frames illustrate the larger historical pattern of Argentines demanding

social and economic rights. An awareness of this tradition provides some additional

perspective on the frames of children's groups.

By comparison, the human rights "rallying cry" is heard less often in Chile. The

human rights movement there has not been as influential as Argentina's; the concept,

though important, does not resonate as broadly and deeply.[23] The myriad NGOs that

opposed the continuation of the Pinochet regime converged around a "return to

democracy" master frame at the time of the transition (Noonan 1995).[24] More than a

decade later, the ideas of democratization and democratic citizenship continue to

motivate civil society organizing. They also serve as the nucleus of a discourse that

revolves around notions of citizen participation and control.

The CSOs that most often couch their activities in these terms are Participa

("participate" in English) and the Ideas Foundation. Citizen participation has been the

specialty of both NGOs since they organized to educate and mobilize voters during the

1988 plebiscite. Participa seeks to develop an informed, responsible citizenry and to

encourage cooperation among civil society, the government, and private, for-profit actors.

The Ideas Foundation draws on a similar discourse by emphasizing the need for a

Justicia, dated December 1996, and documents posted to the web site of the Association of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, at: http: //www.madres.org. (Accessed 8/23/02).

[22] See Risley (2004) for an analysis of the neoliberalism-as-violence discourse in contemporary Argentina.

[23] I am not suggesting that human rights advocacy has dissipated in Chile. A number of groups — The Center for Mental Health and Human Rights (CINTRAS), Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the People's Rights (CODEPU), and Social Assistance Foundation of the Christian Churches (FASIC), as well as groups of families of the disappeared and executed, for example — have continued their efforts in the post-transition era.

stronger civil society, a more active citizenry, and a "deeper" democracy.[25] As suggested

earlier, green NGOs also occasionally use this language, though it has yet to become the

predominant discourse of that issue area. These tendencies demonstrate the continuing

resonance of the democracy/democratic citizenship master frame within Chile. Like

global norms, master frames affect but do not govern CSOs' framing strategies.

THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIPS: CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Having considered framing activities in their broader political and ideational

contexts, I now turn to environmental factors that influence alliance building. As in the

last section, I discuss both transnational and domestic variables: funding and other

resources from abroad and political institutions in Argentina and Chile.

Transnational flows of resources

I alluded to the international donor community and its unabashed enthusiasm for

civil society in Chapter 1 (e.g., Carothers and Ottaway 2000; Foweraker 2001; Grugel

2000; Howell and Pearce 2001; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Meyer 1999). Domestic

alliances frequently maintain ties with foreign governments and foundations, multilateral

banks, U.N. agencies, and other donors, as well as with international NGOs and advocacy

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[24] As mentioned in Chapter 2, Pinochet was defeated in a 1988 plebiscite preceded by a broad-based campaign against the continuation of his regime.

[25] Both Participa and the Ideas Foundation have been involved in the Citizens' Council convened by the Lagos government (and other advisory boards), as well as a variety of civil society alliances, including ACCION (Chilean Association of NGOs), discussed below. FORJA (Juridical Training for Action) is a

networks. I argue that resources and support from abroad can help sustain and strengthen

existing domestic partnerships.   In some cases, global actors play a role in shaping

alliances and influencing their structures or activities. They also can ease the creation of

new alliances, thereby diminishing some of the challenges of building partnerships that I

outlined in Chapter 4. In that discussion, I identified resource deficiencies as a hindrance

to inter-organizational cooperation. It is challenging for overstretched groups to devote

human and other resources to joint endeavors. However, an influx of international funds

and technical assistance changes the calculus of the costs and benefits of participating in

alliances. The effect can be direct, when the support is destined for the establishment or

maintenance of alliances *per se*, or indirect, when individual groups receive assistance.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Bank, Inter-American

Development Bank (IDB), the Ford and Avina Foundations, and various international

NGOs have supported alliances directly in Argentina and Chile.[26] In general, donors find

alliances appealing for both logistical and normative reasons. Funding an alliance limits

the number of grant actions, lowers administrative costs, and eases the burden of program

officers, who can quickly familiarize themselves with the characteristics of a single

alliance instead of learning the nuances of many different CSOs competing for funding

(Fisher 1993; Shepard 2003). Additionally, the Ford Foundation and other important

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further example of a public interest organization seeking to strengthen citizen participation; its area of
emphasis is improving access to justice.

[26] The Ford Foundation and the IDB have supported Chile's ACCION, and the Avina Foundation has
funded Argentina's Social Sector Forum through programs intended to strengthen civil society. The Forum
also has received general support and project funding from the UNDP, foreign NGOs, and multilateral
banks, particularly the World Bank. I address these and other alliances below.

agencies support networks with the goal of strengthening groups' advocacy efforts (Shepard 2003).[27]

International assistance can affect alliance building indirectly by supporting the individual CSOs that constitute partnerships.   This support frees up group resources for use in alliances. Many of the organizations examined in the dissertation have benefited from such funding. The Argentine organizations backing freedom of information, for instance, have connections to an impressive assortment of global institutions: the Ford and Tinker Foundations have supported the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), Citizen Power, and the Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN), among others. Additional foundations, intergovernmental organizations, and multilateral banks also have provided assistance.[28]

Likewise, a number of children's organizations in Argentina and Chile receive substantial support from Save the Children and other international NGOs. In 2001, roughly one-half of the financing of the Chilean Association Pro United Nations (ACHNU) came from foreign sources, such as the European Union.[29] Additionally, as part of its effort to strengthen civil society, UNICEF offers CSOs project-based funding

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[27] Moreover, donors such as OXFAM support individual CSOs with the goal of enhancing their advocacy role. Great Britain also has funded ACHNU and OPCION in Chile to augment civil society's capacity to influence policy and promote institutional reforms.

[28] Further examples of supporters include the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Kettering Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation (which have assisted Citizen Power), the International Republican Institute, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank (which have assisted CIPPEC), and Organization of American States and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation (which have assisted FARN). CELS also maintains ties to European organizations, foreign universities, the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) in the United States, and other institutions. Additionally, the Organization of American States and Inter-American Dialogue helped domestic groups — CELS and the Civil Rights Association (ADC) in particular — organize a conference in Buenos Aires in December 2002 on freedom of information. Journalists, legislators, public officials, academics, and members of CSOs participated in the conference.

and technical assistance (e.g., research and educational materials).[30] In short, these NGOs tend to be well supported by global actors.

Two qualifications regarding transnational exchanges of resource must be noted. First, under some circumstances, international support can hinder as much as help domestic partnerships. For instance, when leaders appear more beholden to foreign donors than to member groups, tensions within alliances are created or exacerbated. Similarly, CSOs that lack the necessary opportunities or know-how to secure international funding may resent organizations with more grant-writing experience, money, and connections abroad. Certain NGOs — namely, larger, more bureaucratic organizations — have better grant-seeking infrastructures and access to donors compared to other groups within developing countries. A cycle is set into motion that continues to privilege those NGOs, creating a funding hierarchy among CSOs (Sikkink 2002).[31] Such dynamics also may hamper inter-organizational cooperation. Thus, global assistance is no panacea.

Second, domestic alliances and CSOs are not mere beneficiaries of international support. Their members are often active participants in international (and regional) networks and contributors to global events, conferences, and campaigns. Though largely incapable of donating money to such causes, they are able to share other resources. For

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[29] The source of this information is the ACHNU's annual report for 2001.

[30] Furthermore, the Argentine office of UNICEF sometimes provides political support for the advocacy work of domestic CSOs (Interview in UNICEF, 4/11/03, Buenos Aires).

[31] Some scholars express concern over the power differentials involved with the donor community in the "North" funding civil society in the "South," as well as CSO dependence on external funding. In addition, members of CSOs often lament the relative abundance of short-term, project-based funding over funding intended for organizational maintenance and capacity building. For analyses of donor-related issues in

example, many swap information and analysis with representatives of intergovernmental entities and fellow NGOs in international forums. In fact, some domestic groups have founded their own transnational networks: the Inter-American Network for Democracy, which originated within Argentine NGOs Citizen Power and Conciencia, comprises more than 250 member organizations.[32] As mentioned previously, civil societal actors in Latin America are not only *affected by* international trends; they also influence and play a role in these processes.

In brief, transnational flows of resources can help sustain and strengthen domestic alliances, ease the establishment of new ones, and influence the shape of emergent partnerships. Nevertheless, although we find similar international dynamics across Latin America, alliances are not uniform across the region (or other democratizing and developing areas). It is therefore necessary to examine the different domestic environments in which alliance building occurs. In the next section, I place particular emphasis on the political institutional *milieu*.

Political institutions in Argentina and Chile

Patterns of alliance building within Argentina differ from those observed in neighboring Chile. A comparison of the two countries suggests that national political institutions shape these patterns by encouraging certain types of partnerships over others.

Latin America, see Carothers and Ottaway (2000), Foweraker (2001), Grugel (2000), Howell and Pearce (2001), Hulme and Edwards (1997), and Meyer (1999).

[32] This network, created in 1995, seeks to "consolidate participatory democracy, build citizenship and work for a solidary continental integration" (*Infocívica* article, dated 1/19/04 (http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/9/04).

Specifically, formal alliances of national scope are well suited to Chile's more centralized political institutions, whereas less formal coalitions are a reasonable choice in Argentina considering its multiple access points, more dispersed decision-making power, and relatively *ad hoc*, improvised approach to interacting with civil society. Borrowing Skocpol's (1992) term, civil society organizing sometimes achieves a good "fit" with a country's political institutionality.[33]

Chile provides evidence of two interrelated trends. The first is an impulse to formalize inter-organizational cooperation through the establishment of permanent networks and coordinating bodies. Second, alliance building is moving in the direction of encompassing associations that include a wide cross-section of CSOs. These multi-sectoral entities comprise NGOs, base organizations, and other types of civil society groups. The most important coordinating bodies are ACCION (Chilean Association of NGOs) and ASONG (Association of NGOs), which comprise approximately 75 and 35 organizations, respectively. ACCION members are predominantly organizations active in the areas of development, poverty alleviation, the environment, and women's, children's, and indigenous peoples' issues. Many were involved in broad-based mobilizations demanding human rights and democracy during the final months of the Pinochet regime. The profile of a typical ASONG affiliate is a charitable, volunteer-

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[33] From a historical institutionalist perspective, Skocpol (2003 & 1992) argues that the federated structure of the American women's movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries achieved a good "fit" with the federalism of the political system.

based, and/or ecumenical group with ties to transnational organizations, including the Salvation Army, Girl Scouts, and Global Mother's Movement.[34]

In addition, Chilean CSOs have formed even larger groupings: "meta-networks" or "networks of networks" (Shepard 2003; see also Fisher 1993). For example, seven existing alliances — including ACCION and ASONG — comprise the Convergence of NGO Networks (Congress). The Civil Society Forum is broader still, encompassing think tanks, professional associations, indigenous groups, neighborhood organizations, cultural and recreational centers, as well as a variety of NGOs.[35]

A meta-network of comparable magnitude and breadth has yet to emerge in Argentina. The only encompassing association that approximates the Chilean alliances summarized above is the Social Sector Forum, a national federation of around 220 diverse civic associations, foundations, and networks. Member groups range from charitable, faith-based, and/or globally embedded organizations (similar to ASONG's membership) to NGOs and research centers with myriad social, educational, and developmental aims (like the participants in ACCION).[36] One of the Social Sector Forum's objectives is to represent the third sector vis-à-vis the government, for-profit

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[34] Interviews in ACCION, 9/16/02, and ASONG, 9/26/02, Santiago. ACCION translates into English as "Action." Examples of its members include ACHNU, Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF), Economy of Work Program (PET), Ideas Foundation, OPCION, Participa, Political Ecology Institute (IEP), SERPAJ Chile, the Women's Institute, and Women's Studies Center (CEM).

[35] In addition to ACCION and ASONG, Congress (*Congreso*) comprises the Chilean Alliance for Fair and Responsible Trade, Komyuniti Platform, Novib Platform, Solidary Development Network (REDESOL), and National Network for Ecological Action (RENACE). Launched in 2002, the Civil Society Forum (*Foro de la Sociedad Civil*) is extremely large and diverse but still in the beginning stages of development.

[36] The majority of the members are involved in the areas of health, education, the well-being of children, culture, and community development. Some examples include the Argentine Federation of University Women, Argentine Israelite Mutual Aid Association (AMIA), Cáritas, CELS, Christian Youth Association, Citizen Power, City Foundation, Conciencia, Democratic Change Foundation, FARN, Lion's Club, and Red Cross.

sector, and international actors. However, under this veneer of unity is a rather fragmented — and in some cases inactive — membership. A recent source of disagreement is the Forum's public image. To an extent, its leaders have emphasized the traditional charity role of CSOs and their social assistance activities, such as attending to orphaned children, running soup kitchens, and growing vegetables in communal gardens.[37] Some of the member groups would prefer the federation to project a more updated and multifaceted image of associational life.[38]

Stated briefly, compared to their Argentine peers, Chilean civil societal actors are making more concerted efforts to organize the sphere and build bridges among its different components. Additionally, Argentine CSOs have not yet created an equivalent to the Chilean meta-networks. These national differences suggest that alliances tend to mirror their institutional environment. In general, Chile's political system is more centralized than Argentina's, and although the executive branch is dominant in both polities, decision-making and political power is more dispersed in Argentina.[39] For instance, Argentine provincial governors often assert their power vis-à-vis the president, a federal dynamic largely absent from Chilean politics. Furthermore, Argentine political parties have undergone fragmentation in recent years, as evidenced by the dissolution of the *Alianza* coalition and the multiple Peronist factions (three of which ran their own

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[37] This orientation is apparent in a supplemental section of *La Nación*, to which the Forum contributed for a time. The supplement, entitled "Solidarity," focused on CSOs' direct assistance activities and encouraged volunteerism and philanthropy.

[38] Interview in CODESEDH (Committee for the Defense of Health, Ethics, and Human Rights), 3/21/03, Buenos Aires.

[39] On presidentialism in Latin America, see Linz and Valenzuela (1994) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997). For analyses of Chile's local democracy and the more limited extent of decentralization there, see De la Maza (1999) and Garretón (1999).

presidential candidates in 2003).[40] In Chile, on the other hand, two party blocs have

prevailed: the center-left governing bloc, the *Concertación*, and the alliance between the

UDI (Independent Democratic Union) and RN (National Renovation) on the right.

Political power in Chile thus tends to be relatively concentrated.

Moreover, analysts typically characterize Chile as a polity with a "statist soul"

(PNUD 2002).[41]   The Chilean state has long been active in structuring and

institutionalizing political life (PNUD 2000). In keeping with this historical pattern, the

state has sought to define and regulate its relationship to civil society through legal,

financial, and other mechanisms.[42] The Lagos Administration's policy of encouraging

citizen participation in governance can be understood as the most recent effort to do so.

As a presidential hopeful, Lagos embraced a discourse of citizen involvement in public

affairs and increased cooperation between civil society and the government.   Upon

assuming office in 2000, he issued a Directive mandating participatory processes and

institutional reforms across the executive branch.[43]   The Administration also has

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[40] The *Alianza* (Alliance for Jobs, Justice, and Education), emerged in 1996 and comprised the Radical Civic Union (UCR) and Frepaso parties. De la Rúa, the Alliance's presidential candidate, occupied office from December 1999 to December 2001.

[41] The phrase in Spanish is *alma estatal*.

[42] For an historical overview of the civil society–government relationship, see the final report of the Citizens' Council convened by Lagos (Consejo Ciudadano Para el Desarrollo de la Sociedad Civil), "Informe Final," dated 12/00. The authors contend that the state largely has determined the nature of the relationship (sometimes through coercive means).

[43] Most government documents define participation as the intervention of citizens (both individuals and organized groups) in decisions affecting them and their surroundings (e.g., Segpres 2001). Each ministry and agency decides how to incorporate the participatory "variable" into policy making. According to an evaluation of 161 pilot programs conducted in several government agencies, participation was evenly distributed across three phases of policy: design and diagnosis (31%); implementation (32%); and evaluation and control (37%) ("Mesa Gubernamental 'Participación Ciudadana en Políticas y Programas Públicos': Panorama General," authored in 2000 in DOS). See Margård and Rindefjäll (2001) for an early assessment of this discursive shift and the resulting reforms.

implemented programs intended to strengthen the administrative capacity of civil society organizations and networks.

The received wisdom within the Chilean government is that cooperation among the state, the market, and the "third sector" is necessary and desirable for development and poverty alleviation. However, Lagos provides political and democratic rationales for the initiatives, citing the Administration's goal of bridging the perceived "gap" between the government and the citizenry (SEGEGOB 2001).[44] Government officials are familiar with an analysis undertaken by the Chilean branch of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2000, which emphasizes public disenchantment with political elites and institutions.[45] One of the report's most vigorous recommendations is to integrate this disaffected citizenry into politics ("*ciudadanizar la política*") by promoting associational life and creating participatory spaces within the public sphere.

In short, the Chilean government is taking steps to strengthen civil societal actors and include citizens in policy making. The process has been uneven, and critics doubt that it will result in meaningful forms of participation.[46] Even so, these recent initiatives fit into a more enduring pattern: the institutionalization of the government–CSO relationship (and politics in general).

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[44] Government documents on the subject are available at: http://www.participacionciudadana.cl. Chileans commonly use the term *brecha* (which translates as rift or gap) to assess the relationship between political elites and institutions and citizens. Chapter 2 provides an overview of such perceptions and the oft-cited "crises of political representation" in Latin American countries.

[45] The analysis was included in the UNDP's widely disseminated human development report (PNUD 2000). Officials (for instance, in MIDEPLAN) often cite the report's conclusions during interviews and conferences and in documents.

[46] In Chapter 6, I briefly discuss the concerns raised in Chile and elsewhere about the merits of such reforms.

Argentina's approach to government–civil society interactions contrasts markedly with these institutionalizing tendencies. To begin with, the ideas of citizen participation and cooperation between CSOs and the government are less pervasive. Such notions, though not completely absent from the official discourse, do not enjoy the same currency as they do in Chile. No administration in the post-transition era has granted them a privileged place on the formal agenda or designed a comprehensive, national policy to foster participation. Consequently, government–CSO linkages tend to be relatively *ad hoc* and dependent on the discretion of individual elites or public officials (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002; Ryan 2001).[47] While Chilean elites apparently have sought to channel participation and keep the proverbial "lid" on political activity, the pot boiled over in Argentina in late 2001 and early 2002, when scores of citizens turned to contentious, disruptive politics. However, even in the aftermath of the crisis, government officials refrained from enacting major participatory reforms.[48]

A comparison of the countries' agencies charged with liaising with CSOs further illustrates these differences. In Chile, bureaucrats are attending to the institutionalization of citizen participation. For example, the Division of Social Organizations (DOS), whose mandate is promoting participation, has been overseeing executive branch compliance

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[47] Advisory councils and other types of participatory institutions have existed at the national level, but they do not appear to be the product of a comprehensive set of policies toward civil society. Armony concludes that Argentine state agencies have "failed to create and institutionalize channels, incentives, and chances for civil society involvement (2004, 215). Ryan (2001) argues that the participatory mechanisms included in Argentina's constitution should be institutionalized so that citizen involvement does not depend solely on the discretion of officials.

[48] Councils were created at various levels of government during 1990s in the areas of social policy, women's issues, and the environment (Filmus 1997). In the midst of Argentina's political and social crises of the early 2000s, the government established further councils in an attempt to recover some legitimacy (Interview in FARN, 1/31/03, Buenos Aires). A number of these are involved in monitoring the administration of emergency social programs.

with the Lagos Directive.[49] An official there describes her work as "institutionalizing the participatory variable" across various ministries and agencies.[50] The staff also researches associational life (e.g., DOS 2001). In addition, the Social Division of the Planning and Cooperation Ministry (MIDEPLAN) has published a number of studies and held countless conferences on civil society organizing and CSO-government partnerships in the area of social policy.[51]

In theory, similar goals motivate the work of Argentina's National Center for Community Organizations (CENOC), housed in the Social Development Ministry. The agency's publications state its interest in strengthening CSOs, raising awareness about their areas of expertise, encouraging their involvement in policy making, and opening new "spaces for dialogue and citizen participation" (CENOC 1998, 11; CENOC 2003).[52] In practice, however, CENOC's main achievement arguably has been to build a database of Argentine organizations. In a number of interviews, members of CSOs expressed uncertainty with respect to the agency's other activities, speculating that these have

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[49] DOS, created in 1990, is part of the General Secretariat of the Government Ministry (SEGEGOB).

[50] Interview in the Division of Social Organizations, Citizen Participation and Public Policies Area, 10/9/02, Santiago.

[51] Examples of such conferences include "Innovative Perspectives on Social Policy" (5/23-24/02) and "Relevant Experiences for Overcoming Poverty" (10/29-30/02), both organized by MIDEPLAN and CEPAL, and the Thirteenth Annual Johns Hopkins International Philanthropy Fellows Conference, held in 2001 (see MIDEPLAN 2002 for the published proceedings). MIDEPLAN's Social Division was formerly the Department of NGO-Government Linkage, created immediately after the democratic transition to disseminate information about CSOs and funding opportunities, study the needs of the third sector, and promote dialogue with between civil societal actors and the government (Clewett 2001; Crino et al. 2000; Jiménez de la Jara 1996).

[52] For further examples of these goals, see CENOC's bulletins, for example, the issue dated September/October 2001 (Año 6, no. 40). Its staff considers greater awareness of CSOs and their work as a necessary condition for increased dialogue between governing elites and the third sector (and the inclusion of CSOs in policy making).

declined over time.[53] Additionally, the CENOC officials whom I consulted had little knowledge of the degree to which government agencies have created "spaces for dialogue" with civil societal actors.[54] Friedman and Hochstetler (2002) likewise note CENOC's unclear mandate and lack of progress in facilitating ties between the government and CSOs. Compared to their Chilean counterparts, the Argentine officials appear less invested in the institutionalization of citizen participation and ill aware of the actions of other government bureaus on this front.

Stated briefly, Chile's political system is more centralized than Argentina's, and political power remains relatively concentrated. The Chilean state traditionally has shaped and directed its relationship to civil society; the Lagos Administration's policies can be understood as part of this historical pattern and ongoing effort to institutionalize government–CSO relations. In contrast, linkages in Argentina are often informal, improvised, and/or dependent on the will of individuals occupying government positions.

These differences help explain the divergent patterns of alliance building within both countries. Informal, short-term alliances (such as coalitions or working groups) are a reasonable choice given Argentina's political system. Alliances situated at this end of the spectrum of possible partnerships can respond ably to the system's dispersed decision-making power, varied access points, and *ad hoc*, informal opportunities for policy involvement. Similarly, alliances located near the formal, permanent end of the spectrum — encompassing associations, umbrella groups, or federations, for instance —

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[53] Interviews in the Commitment Foundation, 2/26/03, and the Children's Commission of the Social Sector Forum, 3/5/03, Buenos Aires. Some of these issues stem from CENOC's limited budget, which has been reduced in recent years (Interview in CENOC, 3/4/03, Buenos Aires; see also Friedman and Hochstetler 2002).

are well suited to the Chilean context. Stable networks, meta-networks, and coordinating

bodies are also good matches. An organized, enduring alliance is better able to interact

with the nation's centralized institutions and to accept top-down invitations to participate

in decision making. A decent "fit" with Chile's political institutions is achieved (Skocpol

1992).

Moreover, government-civil society linkages in Chile are being shaped by

attitudes that are sometimes reminiscent of corporatism.[55] Networks, encompassing

associations, and other alliances are frequently perceived as legitimate actors and useful

tools for achieving greater efficiency in civil society-government relations. In addition,

governmental and civil societal actors alike often share the expectation of increased

interaction as a result of establishing CSO partnerships. To illustrate, government

officials seem inclined to accept formal alliances as civil society interlocutors that

represent some broader constituency. They also openly welcome the convenience of

alliances: consulting a network or umbrella group strikes them as a more efficient

strategy than seeking the input of many different groups.[56] It is therefore not surprising

that one component of the Lagos initiative is strengthening such partnerships.

Conversely, when sectors of civil society are fragmented or divided, it is difficult to

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[54] Interview in CENOC, 3/4/03, Buenos Aires.

[55] Notwithstanding these attitudes, Chile's approach to interest articulation and representation does not approximate the classic corporatist model, as suggested in Chapter 1 (Bickford 1999). The government does not grant representational monopolies to encompassing associations, and existing alliances generally lack the vertical organization and national scope of the traditional peak association.

[56] Such views were expressed by a member of MIDEPLAN's staff (Interview in the Social Division, 10/10/02, Santiago) and also appear in government documents pertaining to the Lagos initiative, available at: http://www.participacionciudadana.cl.

ascertain who "speaks" for them, according to a staff member of DOS.[57] This scenario is disquieting for bureaucrats responsible for reaching out to CSOs. As noted in Chapter 4, an official in Chile's environmental commission (CONAMA) points out that the absence of a national network of green NGOs complicates her task of finding groups to represent civil society groups in advisory councils.[58]

The behavior of governmental actors is sometimes consistent with these views, and they have conferred with both issue-specific alliances and encompassing associations that include wider cross-sections of NGOs and/or CSOs. For example, representatives from the NGO associations, ACCION and ASONG, have weighed in on debates over tax, legal, and other reforms pertaining to the third sector. They also have participated in various advisory boards, including the Citizens' Council that made recommendations to Lagos as he embarked on the participatory reforms.[59] In addition, MIDEPLAN regularly invites them to meetings and conferences on themes such as development and poverty reduction.[60] The leadership of a federation of approximately 2,800 neighborhood organizations in the Metropolitan Region likewise has served on the Citizens' Council

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[57] Interview in the Division of Social Organizations (DOS), Citizen Participation and Public Policy Area, 10/9/02, Santiago. Some members of CSOs believe that, on the contrary, the government prefers civil society to be "atomized" and fragmented (Interview in NGO "Roots," 11/4/02, Santiago).

[58] Interviews in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/10/02 & 10/18/02, and CONAMA, Department of Environmental Culture and Human Environment, 10/7/02, Santiago.

[59] As a presidential candidate, Lagos committed himself to promoting citizen participation and strengthening civil society via a 1999 agreement with CSOs. He convened a Citizens' Council comprising representatives of NGOs and other civil societal actors, who reported on the nature of government-civil society linkages, and legal, funding, and other issues in 2000 (Consejo Ciudadano para el Desarrollo de la Sociedad Civil, "Informe Final"). A number of these points were included in the Lagos Directive.

[60] The associations also have served on MIDEPLAN's Social Policy Committee, an advisory board involved in the design, control, and evaluation of social policies. The leader of ASONG characterizes her relationship with government officials as "cordial," whereas members of ACCION tend to be more critical of the quality of their encounters with officials, though they remain open to continued dialogue (Interviews in ASONG, 9/26/02, and ACCION, 9/16/02, Santiago).

and maintained contact with several ministries.[61] Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 4, the emergence of the National Network of Children's and Youth NGOs generally has met with the approval of government officials.

Participants in alliances commonly aspire to play a representational role but are cautious when making claims of representation. An oft-cited objective of alliance building is to transform civil society into a legitimate "counterpart" or "interlocutor" vis-à-vis the state and the private, for-profit sphere.[62] For instance, the organizers of the Civil Society Forum, a meta-network, use this language to convey their goal of countering the power of the government and business while also engaging in dialogue with both sectors.[63] Similarly, the founding members of the National Network of Children's and Youth NGOs seek to become a respected authority on children's issues. At the same time, although leaders of alliances may feel comfortable speaking on behalf of their membership, few claim the status of "spokesperson" for *all* groups active in a particular issue area or *all* NGOs.[64] Fewer still harbor delusions that they serve as proxies for "civil society" as a whole. Nevertheless, within Chile there is palpable interest in alliances that purport to represent myriad CSOs. The quasi-corporatist inclinations described here are

[61] I refer here to the *Federación Metropolitana de Uniones Comunales de Juntas de Vecinos*. The organizations are grouped into sixty unions at the *comuna* level and then into the federation, which has interacted with the Health and Transportation Ministries, MIDEPLAN, and DOS, for example.

[62] See the report of the Citizen's Council (Consejo Ciudadano Para el Desarrollo de la Sociedad Civil), "Informe Final," dated 12/00, and Castillo (2002). The Spanish words often used by civil societal actors include *referente* and *interlocutor*, which lose something in translation.

[63] The Forum also seeks to strengthen civil society and achieve a greater presence in policy making. The overarching vision motivating the alliance is a less elitist democracy (Castillo 2002). As discussed earlier, the Argentine Social Sector Forum also seeks to become a civil society interlocutor vis-à-vis the public and private sectors.

[64] In her study of sexual and reproductive rights NGO networks, Shepard (2003) likewise points out that leaders of networks are aware that they do not "represent" the women's movement or civil society. On the

less evident in the words and deeds of Argentines. Indeed, the dynamics of alliance building are bound to differ considerably in Argentina, where power is more dispersed and government–civil society linkages are rather *ad hoc*.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I have examined civil society organizing through a wider-angle lens that captures both domestic and international variables that influence patterns of framing and alliance building. A more complete view of advocacy has emerged from this analysis. First, I suggested that global norms and domestic master frames are available to activists when they devise their frames. They can shape civil societal actors' understandings and interpretations of issues and legitimate their advocacy efforts. Norms and master frames may be thought of as the rhetorical and discursive inheritance that groups receive from the activists who have preceded them.

I then discussed two additional factors with implications for alliances. I proposed that transnational flows of resources and support can strengthen existing alliances and facilitate the creation of new ones. At times, international actors — especially donors — have a say in what type of alliance emerges. Turning to the domestic level of analysis, I underscored the ways in which alliances in Argentina and Chile mirror their institutional surround. Political institutions do not determine the characteristics of partnerships, which civil societal actors ultimately choose; rather, they constrain such choices, encouraging and discouraging certain types of alliances.

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other hand, Olvera (2000) asserts that participants in the Civic Alliance have "monopolized" the identity of

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In fact, we can draw similar conclusions regarding all of the contextual factors analyzed here. Such factors influence, shape, and/or constrain group behavior with respect to framing and building partnerships. However, CSOs have significant room for maneuver while selecting frames and participating in alliances. Thus, the external environment rarely dictates the strategies of groups or the outcome of a particular case of policy making.

More cross-national, comparative research is needed to elucidate the origins of civil society frames and alliances, as well as the contextual variables that affect CSOs' strategies. For example, culture could be an important topic for investigation. In addition to influencing framing, political cultural factors may shape alliance building indirectly by creating expectations of either cooperation or conflict.[65] To illustrate, Chileans often discuss the "culture of consensus" that predominates in that country, citing as evidence the tendency to avoid overt disagreement and low levels of trust in society's ability to deal with conflict (PNUD 2000; Portales 2000).[66] Their more conciliatory and consensus-based approach to politics probably eases the formation and maintenance of alliances. Individuals who have internalized social expectations of cooperation are more likely to believe that partnerships are desirable and/or achievable.

On the other hand, Argentines are more prone to describe their political culture as adversarial. Because political contestation and discord often prevail over consensus and

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Mexican civil society and tried to make it synonymous with NGOs (and movements close to NGOs).

[65] Legal structures also deserve attention. For instance, an inhospitable legal environment can dissuade or complicate the establishment of formal partnerships. Many federations, umbrella associations, and other formal alliances seek to obtain their own legal status as second- or third-tier organizations.

[66] Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago. Fittingly enough, a number of individuals whom I interviewed agree unanimously with this characterization. Some observers also note that unresolved

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accommodation, people expect conflict rather than cooperation. It is no wonder, then, that an NGO leader comments that civil society groups may claim to work together, but seldom is the collaboration very "serious."[67] Similarly, a member of a different organization remarks that the "culture of joining together" remains weak in Argentina.[68] Armony (2004) concludes further that civil societal actors are often competitive and hostile toward one another due to low levels of social trust.[69] Of course, the fact that CSOs manage to overcome such obstacles serves as a reminder that political culture is neither hegemonic nor immutable. In fact, social movements and citizen groups frequently contest and challenge — and occasionally even transform — the dominant culture.[70] Likewise, they often seek to change political and legal institutions. It is therefore essential that scholars explore the interplay and the reciprocal influence between these factors and civil societal behavior.

Indeed, one of the goals of this chapter has been to bridge the divide separating the literatures on institutions and civil society. Political scientists can combine these

political issues tend to lurk beneath this seemingly placid surface; they identify these tendencies as legacies of authoritarian rule (e.g., Portales 2000).

[67] Interview with the Coordinator of the Social Sector Forum Consortium, 3/12/03, Buenos Aires.

[68] Interview in the Commitment Foundation, 2/26/03, Buenos Aires.

[69] Armony (2004) goes beyond cultural factors to emphasize other aspects of Argentina's political and social context — in particular, inequality and a weak rule of law — which are said to hinder cooperation. Armony does note that some CSOs are open to collaboration and cites CELS and Citizen Power, both discussed in the dissertation, as examples. Some sources argue alternatively that cooperation levels among NGOs have risen since the mid-1990s (Interview in the Social Forum for Transparency, 2/4/03, Buenos Aires; see also CENOC 2003). Moreover, community groups historically have formed alliances in Argentina. For instance, mutual aid associations (*mutuales*), which help people meet health, housing, and other needs, have long united into larger organizations, such as the leagues of the early twentieth century (Di Stefano et al. 2002).

[70] Some activists in Latin America view solidarity as intrinsically valuable because of their lived experiences under authoritarianism, which seeks to instill (or reinforce) social atomization. On the legacies of fear and repression in the Southern Cone, see Corradi, Weiss Fagen and Garretón (1992). Left-leaning activists also tend to contrast solidarity with neoliberalism. They perceive themselves as combating what Roberts calls the "authoritarian experiment in market individualism" (1998, 161; see also Portales 2000).

analytic perspectives and investigate the relationship between civil society organizing and institutions. Such an approach yields findings that merit further attention. For instance, the patterns of government-civil society linkage that are emerging in Chile and Argentina entail both advantages and disadvantages. As an example, interactions between Chilean elites and CSOs are more regular and predictable; however, this process of articulation tends to be government-dominated and could yield limited forms of participation or even co-optation. In the future, scholars may observe a progressively more top-down dynamic, whereby the consultation of civil societal actors occurs largely on the government's terms. Additional work is needed to fully understand the trade-offs associated with different patterns of linkage in Argentina, Chile, and other democracies.

Furthermore, in Chapter 4, I suggested that coalitions confront several of the challenges associated with alliance building with greater flexibility than more formal partnerships. Examples of such obstacles include competition among individual organizations, concerns about their autonomy, and leadership rivalries. If formal and/or permanent alliances continue to proliferate in Chile, activists will have to devise strategies to overcome these obstacles and create adequate mechanisms for internal decision making and democracy.

Another lesson of this chapter is that political scientists should continue to situate their work at the nexus between comparative politics and international relations. Examining connections between international and domestic politics has become increasingly necessary in studies of Latin American civil societies, which form part of a complex web of transnational relationships. This is especially the case for the dissertation owing to its focus on the areas of transparency, the rights and well-being of

children, and the environment. As discussed previously, these issues have spawned global epistemic communities and advocacy networks; thus, they are fertile ground for research on the internationalization of ideas and norms (Haas 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998a). Moreover, some of the donors that support civil society in Latin America have gravitated toward organizations involved in causes related directly to democratization, such as the promotion of citizenship rights (Carothers and Ottaway 2000).[71] This funding preference further necessitates the integration of global factors into the analysis. Scholars should endeavor to trace transnational trends and processes to domestic outcomes.[72] For instance, drawing connections between norms and framing is more instructive than merely noting the existence of norms and assuming some domestic political effect.

In conclusion, throughout the dissertation, I have argued that successful framing and alliance building help explain policy participation and influence. However, to steer clear of an overly voluntaristic account of participation, I have considered other factors besides the strategies of CSOs in this chapter. Their advocacy efforts do not occur in a vacuum; they are shaped and constrained by myriad contextual factors. In the following chapter, I return to the dissertation's central argument. After summarizing the main findings of my research, I discuss their broader significance and identify several promising opportunities for future research on civil society advocacy and related themes.

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[71] Carothers and Ottaway (2000) focus primarily on the funding patterns of USAID.

[72] Examples of works that span the international and domestic levels of analysis include Keck and Sikkink (1998a) and Smith (1997) and case studies authored by Brysk (1996, 1994 & 1993), Ewig (1999), Hochstetler (2000), and Navarro and Bourque (1998).

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions

Civil societal actors pursuing policy influence in Latin American countries face a number of daunting challenges, which I have discussed throughout the dissertation. They operate in environments often characterized by political crisis and disenchantment, hard economic times, and resource scarcity. Groups must contend with the mutual distrust that commonly taints government–civil society relations, threats to their autonomy, and deep misgivings about linking up with political institutions and elites. Legacies and shared memories of authoritarian rule occasionally exacerbate these difficulties.

However, CSOs are sometimes able to surmount the obstacles to successful advocacy and to exercise their policy voices. Within Argentina and Chile, for instance, they have raised public awareness of pressing issues, offered ideas and analysis to policy formulation, collaborated with governing elites, conveyed political demands, put pressure on elected officials to pass reforms, and contributed to policy debates and processes in other ways. Thus, the search for meaningful policy participation that motivated this project has not been in vain.

Although I have focused my research on the politics of civil society advocacy in Argentina and Chile, I seek to contribute more generally to the study of policy influence in democratizing polities. I have analyzed the strategies that groups use to influence policy decision making, as well as the consequences of their strategies. In this concluding chapter, I review the accomplishments and failures of CSOs in the policy arena and restate my explanation of these varied levels of success. Next, I summarize the

dissertation's main theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions. I also discuss its implications for democracy, both in theory and in practice. I then suggest some avenues for further research that will deepen our understanding of advocacy and the political impact of civil societies in Latin America and beyond.

PATHWAYS TO PARTICIPATION: A REVIEW

Much of the existing literature leads us to expect low levels of citizen engagement with the policy process and limited influence over decision making. Latin American specialists in particular tend to emphasize a plethora of institutional, structural, and societal factors that hinder meaningful policy participation in the region. For all of the reasons discussed previously — ranging from the effects of neoliberal reforms and the technocratic, delegative, and/or exclusionary nature of policy making to the post-transition "demobilization" of civil society — scholars presume that the advocacy efforts of CSOs will meet with little success.

The literature therefore contrasts markedly with analyses of longstanding democracies, which often take interactions between governments and organized groups of citizens for granted. Scholars assume a certain degree of citizen influence over policy in both the "actively inclusive" corporatist environments of some European nations and the "passively inclusive," pluralist United States. In fact, political scientists and pundits

alike frequently conclude that the upsurge in "single-issue" and "special interest" advocacy has "overloaded" the American political system.[1]

Notwithstanding these divergent tendencies in existing scholarship, NGOs and other civil society groups can and do influence policy in democratizing nations. This is true even in environments characterized by resource scarcity and restricted access to the political system. In every case of policy making drawn from the dissertation's three issue areas (the environment, the rights and well-being of children, and transparency), CSOs have participated in the agenda-setting, formulation, and/or adoption phases. This finding is puzzling in light of the conventional wisdom. Of course, we observe different levels of civil society involvement and influence in each case. Proponents of freedom of information in Argentina largely succeeded in their efforts to articulate their interests, shape both policy debates and the actual content of the legislation, pressure for its passage in congress, and build momentum and broader support for the reform. On the other hand, green NGOs in Chile were less able to influence and stay involved in environmental policy making, and children's advocates in Argentina and Chile achieved intermediate levels of participation.

I have explained this variation by analyzing group strategies for combining and mobilizing their resources in alliances, as well as their strategies for mobilizing ideas. In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that civil societal actors often rely on the persuasiveness of their ideas to achieve influence. CSOs that politicize issues and frame ideas successfully are more likely to influence policy. Certain framing strategies are well suited to the

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[1] See Jenkins (1987) for a summary of the "overload" arguments. I am borrowing the categories of actively inclusive and passively inclusive from Dryzek et al. (2003).

policy process. In addition to increasing the salience of an issue or problem, successful frames include positive or constructive messages and feasible, realistic solutions to problems. Effective frames also de-emphasize culpability when assigning blame is likely to antagonize policy makers and others in positions of authority. Groups sometimes are forced to defend themselves against counter frames and other competing discourses during this process.

Framing is a crucial aspect of organizational efforts to disseminate understandings of issues and interpretations of reality, influence the public agenda, capture the attention of governing elites, fellow civil societal actors, and the broader public, and convince these audiences that their cause is worthy. Clearly, the degree to which CSOs excel at using their powers of persuasion varies significantly. This variation was captured by the dissertation's main cases: freedom of information supporters engaged in effective framing; children's advocates in both countries experienced more mixed success with framing; and the environmental groups enjoyed the least success.

In Chapter 4, I showed that effective civil society alliances can facilitate participation and influence during policy making. The logic of forming partnerships is compelling in countries where CSOs are comparatively deficient in resources. When individual groups pool resources in alliances, they can overcome their political "weakness" and translate organizational assets into political strength. Through alliance building, CSOs can coordinate their political activities and avoid redundancies or overlap in their work. They also can achieve strength numbers and present a united front to governing elites, other civil societal actors, and the public.

I have argued further that certain characteristics enhance the effectiveness of alliances, including an efficient division of labor, a proper balance between internal diversity and cohesion, and a willingness to forge ties to other alliances or movements. The coalition pressuring for freedom of information had these attributes and therefore nicely illustrates the advantages of joining forces. In contrast, environmental NGOs failed to achieve a broad-based alliance, which limited their political influence. Children's advocates in Argentina have experienced middling levels of success: an alliance did coalesce but subsequently weakened and fragmented. Meanwhile, their counterparts in Chile have constructed a national network, which seems poised to play an important role in that policy domain.

The cases demonstrate that existing partnerships differ considerably in terms of their organization, characteristics, and overall efficacy. In addition, the findings indicate that CSOs do not always manage to establish (or participate in) alliances in the first place. Inter-organizational cooperation is contingent upon their ability to surmount a number of obstacles involved in forming, maintaining, and participating in alliances. The evidence also suggests that coalitions are more adroit at addressing challenges related to organizational autonomy, leadership issues, and alliance fatigue.

In short, by forming successful partnerships and framing ideas in persuasive ways, CSOs can *create* opportunities for policy influence. My theoretical approach helps solve the puzzle of influence in contexts where we rarely expect to find successful advocacy. Because the explanatory variables emphasize the strategies that civil societal actors use to exercise their political voices, my framework privileges agency over structure. On the other hand, I have placed these strategies in their proper perspective by

considering the broader domestic and international context in which framing and alliance building occur. Chapter 5 focused on transnational flows of resources and ideas, domestic master frames, and political institutions. These factors — which are external to the CSOs themselves — can influence, shape, and constrain group behaviors; they therefore affect policy influence indirectly. Nevertheless, the contextual variables did not determine the political outcomes of the cases examined here.

For the sake of clarity, I have discussed framing and alliances in separate chapters. However, it is worth noting that these independent variables sometimes work in tandem and have a synergistic effect on the dependent variable. For instance, my arguments concerning framing strategies also apply to alliances. Like individual groups, coalitions, networks, and other partnerships engage in framing.[2] In fact, when CSOs participate in an alliance, this may increase the "volume" of their frames and political rhetoric, thereby improving their chances of being heard by governing elites and the public. Partnerships also allow groups to combine resources that are instrumental for the dissemination of ideas and frames. Good contacts in the mass media or within the government are key examples of such resources. Another vital attribute is perceived credibility or integrity: CSOs with proven expertise and/or established reputations in a certain issue area will be greeted as more legitimate "carriers" of ideas. Alliances facilitate the pooling of these and other resources that are relevant to framing. We observed these patterns in the freedom of information case.

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[2] Croteau and Hicks (2003) discuss framing that takes place at the level of the coalition, which they conceptualize as a diverse group of actors (not only SMOs) seeking social change. Such a coalition must link together various organizational frames.

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Furthermore, when groups share ideas, discourses, or even incipient frames, these commonalities can ease the formation of alliances. As mentioned previously, shared ideas — especially "principled" ideas and norms — are powerful factors motivating inter-organizational cooperation (Keck and Sikkink 1998a). Members of a particular CSO working on an issue independently may find that members of other groups understand (or talk about) issues in similar ways.[3] These similarities will likely help them overcome some of the barriers to alliance building and maintenance discussed in Chapter 4. In brief, the project's two explanatory factors are interrelated and thus can have a joint effect on civil society influence.

In summary, when successful framing and alliance building are present simultaneously, the likelihood that CSOs will be involved and influential in policy decision making increases. What are the implications of this conclusion? What is the theoretical, methodological, and practical significance of the dissertation's findings? I address these questions in the next two sections.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

This dissertation makes a number of theoretical contributions to the comparative politics field. The first is to bridge a considerable lacuna in the literature. Scholars have not paid sufficient attention to civil society involvement and influence in democratizing nations. Analysts largely have neglected the political and policy *impact* of civil society

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[3] Ideological and discursive similarities among groups often stem from their respective organizational missions, areas of emphasis, composition (i.e., elite versus grassroots), and access to the international ideas and norms outlined in Chapter 5.

organizing; instead, they tend to explore the emergence and evolution of groups or movements, the overall vibrancy of civil society, and the production of social capital. Those who do examine the policy role of CSOs frequently emphasize their responsibilities in the *implementation* of policies and the delivery of social services. My focus on advocacy differentiates this project from much of the existing work on civil society.

In addition to exploring political activities that are poorly understood, my research counters the prevailing tendency to discount the possibility of effective advocacy. Thus, as noted above, the dissertation helps solve the puzzle of civil society influence where it is generally not expected. The project's theoretical approach offers a superior explanation of this influence compared to alternative accounts. For example, in Chapter 1, I evaluated institutionalist perspectives, with an emphasis on participatory institutions within governments; I also discussed the international diffusion of discourses and practices that favor citizen participation in governance. Contrary to initial expectations, neither of these factors "from above" is as significant as civil societal factors "from below" in the dissertation's cases. Moreover, explanations that simply identify group resources as correlates of influence fail to illuminate the process whereby organizations translate these resources into political gains. Such an approach also falls short of explaining how resource-deficient groups exercise their policy voices.

My theoretical framework builds on several bodies of scholarship, including literatures on state-society linkages, collective action frames, and different types of voluntary associations (namely, interest groups, non-profits, and NGOs). However, the theory moves well beyond existing works in several ways. First and foremost, I propose

original arguments regarding the policy consequences of framing and alliance building. Scholars have not traced the effects of frames and partnerships on civil society involvement and influence in decision making. For instance, research on the impact of framing is rare compared to studies of frames mobilizing would-be participants in social movements; likewise, there are few studies of the policy implications of alliances.

Second, I extend frame analysis to other categories of collective actors besides social (or protest) movements. Similarly, I show that the logic of inter-organizational cooperation transcends the narrowly defined interest group category and applies more broadly to the CSOs examined in the dissertation. Third, I redress the surprising paucity of comparative work on group strategies for building alliances and framing ideas in Latin American and Third Wave democracies.

Furthermore, my frame analysis contributes to a larger debate over the role of ideas in shaping political processes and outcomes. In recent years, political scientists have shown a renewed interest in ideas and norms; nevertheless, more research is needed on the ideational work that civil societal actors perform. Rather than operationalizing ideas *per se* as independent variables, I examine how these actors use ideas strategically, in accordance with the dissertation's agency-centered approach.

I contribute to each of these areas of research by positing new causal relationships, building on existing analytic and theoretical tools, and applying them to different types of groups and political contexts. I tackle a neglected research question and challenge several common propositions found in the scholarship. I also engage a variety of literatures in an effort to break down some of the disciplinary walls that divide analysts focusing on similar dimensions of collective action.

From a methodological perspective, I seek to offset the tendency toward descriptive and non-comparative case studies in the literature on civil society. My comparative analysis of framing and alliances draws on evidence from three issue areas and two democratizing countries and thus produces more generalizable results. In addition to comparing cases of policy making within Argentina and Chile, I contrast children's advocacy in Argentina and Chile to demonstrate the variety of possible approaches to framing and alliance building within a single policy domain. Moreover, Chapter 5 entails a shift from case-level to country-level comparisons to show how the domestic political context influences group behavior. National-level policy making — usually considered to be a less auspicious venue for citizen participation — represents a more difficult test of the theory.

Finally, while the dissertation is chiefly a study of domestic advocacy, I contemplate various types of connections between international and domestic politics. By incorporating transnational exchanges of resources and ideas into the analysis, I have put my ideas into dialogue with several growing literatures situated at the nexus between comparative politics and international relations. Indeed, I have argued that it is crucial to examine the global dimensions of civil society organizing in developing, democratizing countries.

My research has further implications for the study of democratization, a core subfield within comparative politics. The following section therefore suggests several ways in which the dissertation deepens our understanding of democratic consolidation, stability, and quality.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE

This project seeks to contribute to the theoretical and methodological debates that recur in the democratization literature and to strengthen our grasp of democratic *praxis* in Latin America and elsewhere. Questions surrounding political participation, voice, and influence are relevant to citizens, activists, and policy makers in democracies.[4] The exercise of citizenship and the types of democracies being consolidated in Latin America are issues that weigh heavily on the minds of numerous civil societal actors. Moreover, these themes are essential to the study of politics.

Advocacy is one of several roles that CSOs play in a democracy. As mentioned in Chapter 1, they also seek to achieve cultural, social, and political change in the longer term. Thus, my emphasis on advocacy should not be construed as a normative preference for this role over all others; I do not recommend that CSOs become "pressure groups" that only endeavor to shape policy. Still, policy influence has been surprisingly absent from the literature on Third Wave democracies. Democratization scholars tend to focus on elites, institutions, *or* civil society. Sub-divided into separate literatures, analysts spar over which of these factors is most crucial for democratic consolidation. Meanwhile, they tend to overlook linkages among CSOs, governments, and parties and the ways in which citizens engage the institutions and processes of democracy.

One would expect a division of labor to emerge in a field as vast as democratization. However, analysts occasionally aggravate these divisions by placing civil society and political institutions (or parties) in opposition to each other.

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[4] This research is also relevant to international donors dedicated to strengthening CSOs and citizen participation.

Encarnación (2001a & 2001b), for instance, maintains that the post-transition "recession" of civil society in various countries is not cause for concern; rather, it indicates that political institutionalization, which is more decisive for consolidation, is occurring.[5] Encarnación (2001b) also suggests that civil society must be "subordinated" to political society to achieve consolidation.[6] When one sphere declines, the other apparently thrives. A number of scholars appear to draw their inspiration from what Avritzer (2002 & 2000) calls the "Huntingtonian matrix," which posits the dangers of social mobilization that outpaces political institutionalization.[7]

Oppositional and dichotomous approaches merely widen the gulf separating analysts of civil society and institutions. They also fail to address key questions. Do most civil societal actors remain hostile toward conventional politics following democratic transitions? Do contentious forms of politics — common in both established and Third Wave democracies — threaten democratic consolidation or stability? And how can we reconcile this view of civil society with perceptions of the "NGOization" of the sphere in democratizing countries (Alvarez 1998)?

In this project, I have refrained from discussing civil society, political society, or the state in monolithic terms, operationalizing civil society as an independent variable and democracy as the dependent variable, and arguing that the subordination of any one

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[5] O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) base their "demobilization" argument on similar logic, suggesting that civil society "surges" during the transition and then "declines" as political society returns to the fore. Linz and Stepan reject the thesis as "bad democratic theory" and argue that neither civil society nor political society should be "neglected in favor of the other" (1996, 9).

[6] Along similar lines, Berman (1997) argues that the "feverish" civil society activity that occurred outside of — and in opposition to — political institutions contributed to democratic breakdown in Weimar Germany.

sphere is a condition for successful consolidation.   Instead, I examine civil societal

actors' interactions with elites and institutions, motivated by the notion that predictable

linkages among political society, civil society, and the state are necessary for democratic

stability (Kubik 2000).   I therefore seek to transcend the great divide in the

democratization literature and to encourage dialogue among scholars who generally

speak past one another.

Indeed, mediating, channeling, and representing societal interests and demands

are fundamental aspects of political institutionalization and a smooth-functioning

democracy.[8] Bickford (1998), for instance, argues that the survival of democracy may be

contingent on "stakeholdership" in policy making, or the extent to which citizens can

claim a stake in policy decisions. Citizens who perceive some degree of meaningful

influence tend to be more invested in (and supportive of) the political system.   Such

conclusions have special relevance for nations where dissatisfaction with political

institutions and elites is widespread: Latin Americans often believe that they lack

political weight and that policy decisions are far removed from their concerns and needs,

as outlined in Chapter 2.   Political environments that are rife with anti-institutional

sentiment can become breeding grounds for populism. To illustrate, Peru's Fujimori and

Venezuela's Chávez ascended to power by using popular opinion to their advantage and

rejecting traditional institutions and parties. Populist leaders usually weaken the "real

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[7] Avritzer (2002 & 2000) and Peruzzotti (2001) critique dichotomous views of civil society and political institutionalization.

[8] At times, Berman (1997) and Encarnación (2001a & 2001b) seem to share this view of institutionalization, and Encarnación (2001a) even identifies the close ties between civil societal actors and parties as a boon for democratization in Spain. However, rather than insist on stable linkages, they tend to privilege political society over civil society in an effort to debunk the scholarship on associational life.

and perceived effectiveness of these institutions," setting a "self-reinforcing cycle" into motion (Hagopian 1998, 104).[9] Moreover, even if the *survival* of democracy is not necessarily in jeopardy, its *quality* surely diminishes if decision making is exclusionary and stakeholdership limited (Bickford 1998; Fitzsimmons 2000).

Few would disagree with the assertion that excluding organized groups of citizens from policy making lessens the overall quality of democracy. However, does the involvement of civil society groups in the policy process necessarily signify more (or better) democracy? Are groups able to "represent" some identifiable constituency? Can their participation benefit broader segments of society? Doubts about the responsiveness and legitimacy of CSOs are voiced routinely in academic and non-academic circles alike.[10] NGOs in particular have been subjected to criticism because they usually lack clear "mechanisms of accountability to the citizenry" (Hagopian 1998, 126). The Secretary General of CIVICUS, an international alliance of CSOs, explains:

> It is frequently said that civil society groups don't represent the views of anyone but themselves and that if they are accountable at all, it is usually 'upward' to their funders, rather than 'downward' to those they purportedly serve. Those that offer this critique sometimes evoke a range of derogatory acronyms to describe certain kinds of wannabe NGOs: BONGOs (business-organised NGOs), PONGOs (politically-organised NGOs), BRINGOs (briefcase NGOS), DONGOs (donor-organised NGOs), GONGOs (government-organised NGOs) MONGOs (my own NGO), and RONGOs (royally-organised NGOs).[11]

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[9] Similar concerns are expressed in a report on Chile authored by the United Nations Development Program (PNUD 2000). As mentioned in Chapter 5, an awareness of these potential threats to stability is one of the factors motivating the participatory reforms carried out under Lagos.

[10] Brysk (2000) provides a useful overview of the various "democratic deficits" within civil society.

[11] World Bank Presidential Fellows Lecture by Dr. Kumi Naidoo, Secretary General and CEO of CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation, delivered at the World Bank headquarters on 2/10/03 (Available at: http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf. Accessed on 4/14/03). CIVICUS, comprised of more than 650 members in 110 countries, was founded in 1993 to promote civil society and citizen action (http://www.civicus.org. Accessed 1/25/05).

In addition, governments and international donors sometimes regard NGOs as convenient "surrogates" for civil society and "intermediaries" to the grassroots (Alvarez 1999). Yet given their tenuous relationship to base organizations, many do not deserve this status.[12]

Renditions of this debate can be found in comparative work on non-profits and other categories of voluntary associations, as well as in the American politics literature. Schattschneider (1960) famously remarked that the interest group chorus in the United States sings in an upper-class accent. More recently, Skocpol (2003) concluded that associational life has become more elite and oligarchic and less participatory over time due to the proliferation of professional advocacy groups (usually lacking members or chapters).[13]

My findings complicate several aspects of the received wisdom on representation. To begin with, many of the groups that I examine do not fit the generic profile offered in existing literature of the elite, professionalized, and/or bureaucratic NGO. As discussed in Chapter 2, self-described NGOs in Latin America often lack the formal organizational structure and professionalized staff that the term evokes. I also have argued throughout the dissertation that an examination of organizational resources *per se* tells an incomplete political story. By engaging in framing and alliance building, even less privileged CSOs

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[12] Piester (1997) and Segarra (1997) are more generous toward the Latin American NGOs included in their studies, suggesting that they give voice to the needs and interests of popular sectors in venues that traditionally have provided little access to such groups and that analysts should examine these processes instead of requiring direct ties to the grassroots as proof that NGOs are representative.

[13] For Skocpol (2003), associational life reflects the privileged, professional makeup of elite America, which does not engage the rest of the citizenry yet often claims to speak for large numbers of Americans. The result is "diminished" democracy. Verba, Lehman Schlozman and Brady (1995) also address the question of whether voluntary associations in the United States are representative of the broader public. They refer to the disparity between the preferences and demographics of activists and those of the entire population as participatory "distortion." At the same time, they note that "proxy representation" is

can participate in policy debates and decisions.[14]   An emphasis on these activities differentiates my analysis from most of the works that address the issue of representation, which fixate on the attributes of NGOs.

Additionally, because the issues outlined here are so thorny, members of Argentine and Chilean NGOs rarely make broad claims of representation.   This is especially the case for NGOs dominated by individuals of higher social status, which approximate the image of the "typical" NGO in the scholarship.   During interviews and informal conversations, participants were quick to point out that their NGOs "do not represent *anyone*."[15]   Some also emphasized that representation is the job of political parties and elected officials (in theory if not in practice).[16]

Although many NGO members consulted for this study resist using the language of "representation," they still view their work as benefiting a broad cross-section of the public.   This is hardly surprising given my focus on public interest CSOs.   Indeed, the groups active in the dissertation's policy domains often share an interest in extending, deepening, and defending citizenship rights: many children's advocates eschew paternalistic attitudes toward "minors" in favor of a rights-based approach; green NGOs struggle for the right to a healthy environment and sustainable forms of development, as

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sometimes the only representation available to people less able to articulate their demands directly (e.g., children, prisoners, the homeless).

[14] Alliances face their own set of challenges with respect to representing (and remaining accountable to) their members, as discussed in Chapter 4.   They therefore must establish mechanisms for internal decision making and governance.

[15] Interviews in Citizen Power, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires, Economy of Work Program (PET), 9/25/02, Santiago, and Participa, 10/14/02, Santiago.   See Alvarez (1999) for similar comments concerning Latin American feminist NGOs.   Some more professionalized groups are reforming their internal structures partly in response to these issues.   For example, the Civil Rights Association (ADC) in Argentina, whose affiliates are mostly lawyers, is trying to broaden its membership base to enhance its internal democracy and accountability as well as its financial sustainability (Interview, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires).

well as access to information about the state of the environment; and transparency proponents support the right to all categories of public information.[17] In the words of a veteran human rights activist, "if only one [social] group has rights, they are no longer rights, but privileges."[18] These issue areas therefore have special significance for democracy.

The policy domains also affect the daily lives of Argentines and Chileans in more concrete ways; indeed, they literally can entail matters of life and death. For instance, children's basic dietary, health, and other needs often go unmet, with dire consequences for working and lower class families. Meanwhile, environmental hazards, such as toxins and pollutants, affect the health, safety, and livelihood of entire communities. We have seen how indigenous and environmental issues frequently overlap and that development projects can threaten ethno-cultural diversity as well as biodiversity. While such problems affect society as a whole, they are closely intertwined with poverty and inequality.

Furthermore, access to information is not an instrument for the exclusive use of public interest lawyers, journalists, or others considered to be "elites," but a tool for citizens requiring public assistance to meet their basic needs. Additionally, concern with high levels of corruption and low levels of accountability is a widespread phenomenon that cuts across class and other social cleavages: almost two-thirds of survey respondents

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[16] Interview in the City Foundation, 3/19/03, Buenos Aires.

[17] In addition, increased transparency is often correlated with citizen satisfaction with the political system, which is advantageous for democracy.

[18] Interview in the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), 7/24/97, Buenos Aires. Scholars of Latin America have noted "the vast distance separating the formal sphere of law and the ways in which social subjects actually perceive and act according to their rights" (Jelin and Hershberg 1996, 7).

feel that corruption affects their personal lives "very significantly," as mentioned in Chapter 3.[19] In short, advocacy efforts — and policy reforms — in these issue areas can have a considerable impact on the lives of citizens.

Thus, the CSOs and alliances that I analyze tend to emphasize themes of broad public concern. While articulating their own interests, they often express the needs and aspirations of other citizens. Doubts about the representational role of NGOs are justified; however, scholars can wrestle with these questions only by analyzing further comparative evidence. Sweeping statements that either impugn or extol *all* NGOs (or other types of groups) are unlikely to resolve the debate.[20] In fact, each of the themes discussed above deserves further scrutiny. I suggest several additional areas of research that will advance our understanding of civil society's political potential in the next section.

AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

By this point in the dissertation, it should be clear that more work is needed to illuminate civil society's engagement with the policy process. Explaining patterns of political participation and influence in democracies is a fundamental task of the

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[19] "The Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer: A 2002 Pilot Survey of International Attitudes, Expectations and Priorities on Corruption," available at: http://www.transparency.org/surveys/barometer/dnld/barometer2003.en.pdf (Accessed 2/12/04).

[20] Price wonders if CSOs are held to a higher standard of accountability than other entities, such as governments or corporations; the "very fact that civil society activism is needed is often testimony that these actors are responding to democratic deficits in existing institutions" (2003, 591). Furthermore, it is not clear whether NGOs should answer to their board members, intended beneficiaries, or some other constituency (Hudson 2002; see also Taylor and Warburton 2003).

discipline. Moreover, because scholars of re-emergent democracies have paid little attention to this subject, my call for research is anything but gratuitous.

To begin with, future studies should test, refine, and/or extend the arguments presented here. As I have suggested in previous chapters, further analysis of alliances and framing would be most welcome. Possible topics could include the origins of frames and alliances, the internal characteristics and decision-making processes of partnerships, whether and how different types of CSOs use varying strategies, and, of course, the policy consequences of all of these factors. Alternatively, research may uncover other patterns of successful advocacy and entirely new pathways to participation.

Although I have privileged civil societal variables in this project, my findings suggest some interesting propositions concerning *elites*. Specifically, it is feasible that the presence of "likeminded" individuals in government offices, legislative committees, or other sites of policy making facilitates CSO participation. Such elites are more receptive to civil societal actors' demands, policy goals and prescriptions, understandings of an issue, and frames; thus, they will likely listen to CSOs and heed their advice during the decision-making process. In short, a "meeting of the minds" may occur.[21] Some officials are sympathetic to a certain cause — or the objectives of a particular group — due to their ideological and political beliefs. However, this sort of compatibility can stem from several other factors besides party affiliation.[22] I submit that shared world views,

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[21] A related idea, which civil societal actors frequently mention in interviews and conversations, concerns the willingness of government officials to pursue political and policy change. Activists refer to the presence or absence of "political will" (*voluntad política*) on the part of bureaucrats, legislators, and other elites.

[22] Other possible factors include the dominant culture within a particular government office or agency and whether most personnel are political appointees or civil servants.

approaches to issues, and experiences are equally important. These commonalities between governmental and civil societal actors can result from exposure to international discourses and understandings of policy issues. The transnational diffusion of general sets of ideas as well as more concrete policy alternatives and proposals may nudge CSOs and government officials closer together.[23] Commonalities also can be an effect of leadership exchange, or the circulation of individuals between civil society, political society, and the government.

The freedom of information case provides support for both propositions. As I noted in Chapter 2, several staff members of the Anticorruption Office previously had been active in NGOs. They therefore shared similar backgrounds, world views, and policy goals with participants in CSOs who supported the legislation. In addition, both sets of actors had access to the ideas about transparency that were circulating in international venues and to various transnational actors, such as Transparency International. The Anticorruption Office, for instance, maintains contact with the U.N., Organization of American States, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Mercosur, and foreign governments.[24] The Office's staff and members of NGOs also shared an interest in upholding the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and other norms.

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[23] I address the international circulation of ideas, norms, and discourses in Chapter 5. The literature cited there often underscores the role of international NGOs, networks, social movements, and epistemic communities, as well as multilateral banks, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other global actors as "carriers" of ideas. For analyses that deal more specifically with policy diffusion, see Rogers (1995) and Weyland (2004).

[24] For details, see the Anticorruption Office's 2002 annual report (*Informe Anual de Gestión 2002. Resumen Ejecutivo*). Chapter 5 discusses the Argentine NGOs' ties to international actors and initiatives.

Recent trends in the area of children's advocacy further illustrate this pattern. Available evidence indicates that some governmental and civil societal actors have found common ground through their mutual adherence to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (and other sets of international norms and ideas). In particular, children's rights activists have found a receptive audience among the personnel of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires involved in children's issues.[25] Their good working relationship owes in part to the staff members' embrace of the rights-based perspective. This approach is reflected in the comprehensive children's rights law that the legislature passed in the late 1990s with the backing of various CSOs.[26]

The presence of likeminded officials in the government may ease the work of civil societal actors, who try to sway policy makers to their side. Nevertheless, this elite variable does not appear to be a necessary or sufficient explanation of CSO participation in (and influence over) decision making. In an effort to secure their preferred outcome, groups endeavor to persuade a variety of other individuals involved in the policy process, as well as the broader public, that their cause is worthwhile. For example, proponents of freedom of information had to target myriad policy makers outside of the confines of the Anticorruption Office, including other authorities in the executive branch and legislators. In spite of such limitations, this area of inquiry deserves more attention.

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[25] The CSOs' generally more positive assessments of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires contrast with their views of the national government agencies involved in child welfare, such as the National Council of Childhood, Adolescence, and the Family (CONAF).

[26] I refer here to Law 114, the *Ley de Protección Integral de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes* (see the 2002 publication, "Una joven ley para los más jóvenes de la ciudad," by the Children's Rights Association, UNICEF, and the Council on the Rights of Girls, Boys, and Adolescents). A number of children's CSOs participated in the formulation and supported the passage of the law (Interviews in the Council on the Rights of Girls, Boys, and Adolescents, Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, 4/15/03 and 4/23/03).

Additionally, scholars should continue to explore the global aspects of domestic civil society organizing and advocacy. Political scientists who address these themes will be better able to grasp the empirical realities of Latin America and other regions and to construct theories that shed light on both comparative politics and international relations. Tracing the domestic *effects* of international factors is a crucial task. For example, I have suggested that transnational actors can influence politics from below, or via civil societal actors. However, more work is needed to ascertain when and how activists, NGOs, and donors intervene in domestic political events and shape outcomes.

Research also can focus on the international forces that affect politics from above by influencing governments. For example, the multilateral banks, among others, have heartily endorsed a global agenda that promotes citizen participation in governance, as discussed in Chapter 1. Partly as a result of pressure from abroad (and also in response political exigencies at home), leaders in some Third Wave democracies are carving out participatory "spaces" within the government. Although such institutions had a limited effect on policy involvement in the dissertation's cases, they merit further investigation. Because the Lagos Administration has undertaken participatory reforms at all levels of government, Chile provides fertile ground for research on these top-down dynamics.[27] In Argentina, future work could target the provincial and local levels. For instance, the 1996 Constitution of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires calls for the inclusion of civil society in policy making.[28] Several advisory councils and other institutions have been created, though the process remains in an incipient stage. Buenos

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[27] I summarize these reforms in Chapter 5.

Aires also has been the site of participatory budgeting programs since 2002, and Citizen Power, the Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (CIPPEC), and other NGOs have served in an advisory capacity. In addition, various councils have been established at the municipal level.

Scholars will likely discover that these institutions vary widely: they are not "created equal" on paper, nor do they necessarily function as planned. Consequently, while investigating a given body, it is necessary to pose several questions. Does it convene regularly? How are participants chosen, and how transparent and inclusive is the selection process? Do they make meaningful decisions, and/or is the government bound to follow their advice? Alternatively, do participants conclude that they are "invited but not paid attention to," that this form of consultation is a mere formality?[29]

Moreover, the government ministries and agencies in which councils and other entities are embedded differ substantially in terms of resources, authority, transparency, and legitimacy. In fact, these institutional factors may be more significant than the nature of the participatory body itself. For instance, the fact that advisory councils operate in Chile's National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) does not erase the overall weakness of that agency as a locus of environmental policy making and a worthwhile target of advocacy. As noted in Chapter 3, most observers agree that CONAMA lacks funding, strong leadership, political clout, and autonomy vis-à-vis the ministries that

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[28] Examples of advisory councils include the Strategic Planning Council and the Economic and Social Council; some of the entities were not established until the early 2000s.

[29] This is how an NGO member perceives an environmental advisory council in Chile (Interview in FIMA, 10/2/02, Santiago). Other civil societal actors have voiced similar concerns with respect to the Lagos initiatives. For comparative perspectives on these issues, see Friedman and Hochstetler (2002) and Alvarez (1997) on the "council democracy" created by the Brazilian constitution, Jenkins (1987) on the United

direct it.[30]   Finally, the extent to which participatory institutions will fundamentally reshape policy processes in democratizing countries remains to be seen. Seemingly novel institutions can be grafted onto ages-old practices, including clientelism and government co-optation of CSOs.

Indeed, it is not clear that civil societal actors want to be "institutionalized" in this way.   After all, co-optation and other threats to organizational autonomy are major concerns for CSOs. This brings us to another question and potential area of research: do groups that participate in policy making jeopardize their integrity, authenticity, or independence from the state, governing elites, and political parties?   In addition to investigating the *causes* of CSO involvement in policy, my focus in the dissertation, scholars should examine its *consequences*.

Thus far, existing work has emphasized the potential pitfalls of government-civil society interactions. Analysts of civil society sometimes cast political institutions (and especially parties) as "colonizing pariahs" (Encarnación 2001a, 77). Such perspectives have deeper roots in the scholarship on social movements — particularly the "new social movement" literature — which is susceptible to the "fetishization" of autonomy (Hochstetler 2000, 169; see also Hellman 1990).[31]   According to some analysts, movements that manage to avoid outright co-optation nevertheless may tone down their criticisms of the government, moderate their tactics, and/or experience a "watering-down

States, and Dalton (1994), who discusses the experiences of environmental groups with such institutions in Europe.

[30] CONAMA is a coordinating body dependent on the Ministries of Economy, Agriculture, Mining, Health, and Planning, among others.

[31] New social movement works on Latin America underscore activists' distinctive ways of "doing politics" and their oppositional posture toward the state. This approach is prevalent in analyses of movements that

of principles" (Taylor 1998, 159).[32] As a result, they risk losing authenticity and legitimacy in the eyes of their members and the broader public. Like social movements, CSOs face a dilemma: remaining outside of conventional politics but risking political "marginalization" versus cooperating and possibly giving up their independence (Foweraker 2001; Waylen 2000).[33]

Most of the groups examined in the dissertation did not appear to compromise their autonomy while engaging in advocacy. As mentioned in previous chapters, the vast majority are committed to non-partisan goals and opposed to relinquishing their independence from the state.[34] However, CSOs do perform a tricky balancing act: on the one hand, they aspire to be involved in policy making; on the other hand, they want to maintain their freedom to criticize institutions, government officials, and parties. Latin American groups often struggle with preserving the tradition of *denuncia* — condemning government actions — while also providing more constructive proposals. Many

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emerged under authoritarianism, when conventional political institutions were closed to civil societal actors (e.g., Jelin 1987 & 1985; Mainwaring and Viola 1984).

[32] Other expected consequences include the professionalization of SMOs, decreased mobilization, fewer protests, and the fragmentation of the movement — the radicalization of some sectors and moderation of the ones that collaborate (e.g., Giugni and Passy 1998). The dilemma of integration versus autonomy is discussed in the literature on feminist and women's movements in Latin America (e.g., Alvarez 1999 & 1998; Jaquette 1994; Molyneux 2001; Waylen 2000).

[33] As noted in Chapter 1, civil society, political society, the state, and the private sector are not as distinct in reality as they are in theory. In fact, civil societal actors themselves may become part of the policy-making establishment through their regular involvement in the process, as David Crow has observed during our informal conversations. Scholars exploring CSOs therefore must be mindful of the areas of overlap between these spheres.

[34] Moreover, a number of the CSOs are experienced watchdogs of governing elites and the state, a role which is contingent in part on impartiality and independence. Because these groups do not constitute a representative sample of CSOs, the remarks made here are not generalizable to all civil societal actors.

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organizations are better versed in one tradition or the other. Some try to excel at both simultaneously.[35]

Financial dependence on the government is probably a greater hindrance to autonomy than engagement with the political process. When CSOs receive the majority of their funding from government sources, their independence is called into question. NGOs involved in policy implementation sometimes find themselves in this predicament; still, even groups that receive public funds to conduct research or undertake other projects must proceed cautiously.[36] Civil societal actors express concern that recipients of such funding will hesitate to criticize the government and bite the proverbial hand that feeds them. The ability of groups to deal with such challenges, which are perennial sources of anxiety for their members, deserves more scholarly attention.[37]

Future research also should examine the effects of CSO involvement in decision making on policy *outputs*. Does the quality of a given policy generally improve when its content reflects civil societal inputs? Can we discern any patterns by comparing policies over which groups have exercised influence with policies that are bereft of their contributions? In addition to developing appropriate indicators for "quality," analysts will have to grapple with the fact that much depends on whether (and how) policy

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[35] According to one of its members, the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) tries to strike a balance between the two traditions, though this can be challenging (Interview in CELS, 4/3/03, Buenos Aires).

[36] The received wisdom suggests that NGOs in the service of the government (and the neoliberal model) risk losing their autonomy and ability to chart a course independent from that of the government. On these and related issues, see Dagnino (2003), Edwards and Hulme (1996), Foweraker (2001), Gideon (1998), Loveman (1995), Pearce (1997), and Taylor (1998). Bebbington et al. (1993), Meyer (1999), and Reilly (1995) approach the subject from a more technical standpoint.

[37] The international sources of funding discussed in Chapter 5 help CSOs avoid becoming totally reliant upon government sources. However, some fear that groups trade one form of dependence for another. For examinations of the international donor community, see Carothers and Ottaway (2000), Foweraker (2001), Grugel (2000), Howell and Pearce (2001), Hulme and Edwards (1997), and Meyer (1999).

ultimately is enacted. Policies that have been approved may not be implemented in the manner originally envisioned, especially when the necessary funds and administrative capacity are lacking.

Scholars who delve into the issues discussed above can use and combine various modes of comparative analysis. Cross-national, cross-regional, and sub-national studies would be welcome additions to existing scholarship, and comparisons of policy making can be made across different levels of government, distinct policy domains, and multiple cases of policy within a particular issue area.

In conclusion, a number of worthwhile questions await answers. Scholars who are interested in civil society's advocacy and policy roles have much left to do. Moving this proposed research agenda forward can enrich both the democratization literature and the comparative politics field by deepening our understanding of political participation in a neoliberal age and strengthening our grasp of the government–citizen nexus in democratizing nations. O'Donnell and Schmitter have suggested that authoritarian regimes "trivialize" citizenship, which becomes "a matter of holding a passport, obeying national laws, cheering for the country's team, and, occasionally, voting in choreographed elections or plebiscites" (1986, 48). In contrast, citizenship in a democracy theoretically involves more meaningful activities, such as organizing in civil society, participating in public affairs, and making demands on governing elites. The time has come to determine whether democratic citizenship actually lives up to its theoretical potential and entails something less trivial than the authoritarian variant.

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Amy Elizabeth Risley, the daughter of William and Diane Risley, was born on September 23, 1972 in Macomb, Illinois. She grew up in Macomb and Madison, Wisconsin, where she attended Madison West High School. Upon graduating in 1991, she entered the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where she majored in international relations and political science. She studied abroad at the Universidad Complutense in Madrid from 1994 to 1995 and earned her B.A. with Distinction in 1995. In 1996, she pursued graduate work in Latin American and Caribbean studies at New York University. After completing a thesis project on human rights advocacy in Argentina, she received her M.A. in 1998. She then worked as an analyst in the Latin America Equity Research division of Goldman, Sachs & Co. in New York City until 1999, when she entered the University of Texas at Austin to earn a doctorate in Government. Her main fields of study were comparative and Latin American politics. In 2001, she conducted pre-dissertation field research in Argentina with support from the Tinker Foundation. In 2002-2003, she conducted dissertation research in Chile and Argentina with funding from the Government Department and the David L. Boren Graduate Fellowship program. In August 2005, she will join the Department of International Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis as an Assistant Professor.

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