fgp SECRET l ] NO FOHElBN DlSSEM I l CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • Directorate of Intelligence19 November 196B INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Rumors of Soviet Military Move Into Rurnania Summary ·Reports have been received from several quartersin Europe alleging that Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops--as many ~s 150,000--are to move into Rumaniarn 22 Noyemlm;. I •·. · ··. ·. . , ) Current Soviet military dispositions and 'politi­ca·1 behavior give no ind4,cations of any immediate moves against Rumania. I 1 ·(~---------~-------------._.J. • Other unconfirmed reports sugg~st that a Warsaw Pact exercise is to take place in Rumania this month. We have observed some small-scale activity in Rumania which could relate to a minor joint exercise or other kind of military cooperation, The scale and type of this activity is not indicative of a large military exercise~ Nor has Bucharest given the signs we should expect to see if such an exercise were imminent. SANITIZED /tt'Al 0/ ·/S"'/ ~. -/-//-OZ. ...,• -TOP SECREff 1 ~___ NO FORElGN DiSSE~1 Reports of Military Move Into Rumania •:-' ' .. ·. " " . . . . ·. ·.. .. • \ 1..,I ' ' ., ' I II 1 • J 4. If a major Warsaw Pact exercise is to be held in Rumania now, it would be the first time any Pact exercise of such scope has occurred this late in the year. We know that the official Pact training schedule for 1968 contained no provision for a maneuver in Rumania. Moreover, we have good information that a Soviet-Rumanian agreement was reached last month for a Pact exercise to be held there in 1969. .. .. ~ •· ·-ffJP SECRET f · · .. ) NO FOHElGN DISSEM 5. We .have received only tenuous indications that could be interpreted as re arations for a f:;: =x:tcise in Rumartia. ( _ lthe installat on o amporary m tary communications facilities in the Bucharest area. Polish and Hungarian officers, and an East German militar transport were also observed in are e ieved to have been del very few Soviet ·air force officers subsequently were seen in two Rumanian cities. Comment 6. Although most of the Soviet forces commi}ted to the Czechoslovak inter~ention have returned to home stations, .the military preparations necessary for intervention comparable to those undertaken prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia have not been detected. We believe a Soviet-led invasion of Ruroania is unlikely at this .time. Although some Soviet forces on the Rumanian border were mobilized during the Czech crisis, f )evidence of mid-September indicated no buildup sufficient for intervention had occurred at that time, and, since then, there have been no indications from other sources of such preparations. 1. In their public attitude and in their behavior toward the Warsaw Pact since the · invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Rumanians have sought not to offer the soviets gratuitous offense. Moscow has noted these signs, too, and seems, for now, to have eased its propaganda and psychological pressures on Bucharest. 8. The Soviets can probably afford to play a waiting game with the Rumanians long enough to see what lessons the latter have learned from the intervention in Czechoslovakia. One important touchstone will be whether the Rumanians will be more visibly cooperative where the affairs of the Warsaw Pact are concerned. This would include participation in forthcoming combined exercises. -TBP.SEGRE°tj J NO FOREIGN DISSEM ·.TOP SECREf-1 f NO FOREIGN DlSSEM 9 • . Neither have the Rumanians given the signs we' might expect to see if exercises were imminent. If an exercise were to be held in Ru.mania beginning on 22 November, party and state chief Ceausescu doubtlessly would have a campaign under way to prepare the people for this event.· (The last joint Pact exercise held in Rumania was in October 1962, three years before Ceausescu ·came to power.) No such campaign is in evidence. I .· .. ( . . .~·' I f