

✓ Mr. Bundy

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→ Mr. Smith

June 18, 1964

Job - 7/2/64

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Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Cvijeto Job, Press Attache,
Embassy of Yugoslavia

Mr. Job was interested in the results of the Erhard visit, in view of the Soviet-East German action and Elegant's report (the Washington Post) from Bonn. I described the visit a success; the Soviet-East German action as a bit of nonsense; and the Elegant piece for what it was worth. Job, in turn, following what seems to be a consistent line from Eastern Europe (and probably not unreal) said in the Yugoslav view, the Soviet-East German treaty was a formal sign off of the Soviet campaign against Berlin launched in November 1958.

I asked Job about the Tito-Khrushchev meeting in Leningrad and particularly with reference to the Moscow-Peking dispute and Rumanian developments.

As for the Chinese, Job said that the Yugoslavs feel an early break is needed to clear the lines and demonstrate the strength of the Soviet position in this conflict. Yugoslavia could not understand why the other Eastern European states felt this conflict was needed so they could pursue a more independent course. The Eastern European independence movement, Job said, was not a "function of the Chinese problem;" it had a logic and an inevitability of its own and would go on with or without a Moscow-Peking conflict.

He claimed Khrushchev spent much of the Leningrad meeting denouncing the Rumanians and implying that the Soviets were considering action to curb the Rumanians. But Tito reminded Khrushchev of Belgrade's 1948 conflict with Moscow and pointed out that Rumanian conformity could not be forced by the application of Soviet pressures.

Turning the conversation to the coming non-aligned conference, Job said Khrushchev was very helpful. He gave Tito the encouragement the Yugoslavs were looking for and assured him of the Soviet Government's continued support for the enterprise. By the same token, Job

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By JC, NARA, Date 7-6-01

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was critical of apparent U.S. standoffishness and suggested that a more positive stance would be helpful and useful.

In this connection, he said Khrushchev and Tito were deeply distressed by Nehru's death. Neither Khrushchev or Tito had yet factored out the consequences of the Indian succession, but an immediately apparent fact was that non-alignment lost its most influential advocate. Now the ball had to be carried by Nasser and Tito.

On bilateral U.S. -Yugoslav relations, Job was more relaxed than the last time we talked. He said Belgrade was satisfied that President Johnson's policies were consistent with those of President Kennedy and that the President was providing the confident and understanding leadership the world needed at this time. The unsettling factors, he added, were the questions raised by this year's U.S. presidential campaign and particularly the meaning of the Goldwater candidacy.

David Klein

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