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A tear in my eye but I cannot cry: An ethnographic multiple case study on the language ecology of Urumchi, Xinjiang and the language practices of Uyghur young adults

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of Charles Wilson and Nancy Koppen.

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Finally, *mening ayalim*, always know: *men sizni mengu soyma*.

A tear in my eye but I cannot cry: An ethnographic multiple case study on the language ecology of Xinjiang and the language practices of Uyghur young adults

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This ethnographic study investigates the language ecology of Urumchi, Xinjiang with a focus on contextual factors as related to the language practices of Uyghur young adults. The thesis explores how the migration and settlement of Han Chinese, coupled with the expansion of Mandarin (and corresponding marginalization of Uyghur and other ethnic minority languages) in the Xinjiang education system has resulted in a punctuation of the linguistic equilibrium of the province. This study demonstrates how socio-political forces contribute to the devaluation of minority linguistic capital in a linguistic market, and how a language policy in the domestic field, as the primary structuring structure, may be utilized to stabilize diglossia and maintain the intergenerational transmission of a minority language.

Participant observation, interview and documentary data were collected over an 18-month period of fieldwork in Urumchi. The analysis of interview data from 26 Uyghur adults, defined as early to mid-twenty years of age, who had been educated in

Mandarin classes (*mínkǎohàn*), Uyghur classes (*mínkǎomín*), and bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur classes (*shuāngyǔ*) or a combination of these programs yielded four themes: context and language investments; expected returns; language choice; and linguistic anxiety. The data suggests a high degree of ambivalence among Uyghur young adults toward Mandarin; this form of cultural capital is conceived of as requisite for participation in the Han Chinese dominated economy, yet of a colonial nature and damaging to the demarcation of Uyghur social identity.

Case study narratives are presented on four Uyghur young adults: one female educated in Mandarin classes (*mínkǎohàn*); one male educated in Mandarin classes (*mínkǎohàn*); one female educated in Uyghur primary and Mandarin-Uyghur secondary classes (*mínkǎomín/shuāngyǔ*); and one male educated in Uyghur primary and Mandarin-Uyghur secondary classes (*mínkǎomín/shuāngyǔ*). Each case study consultant completed a 94-item expressive vocabulary assessment. The data suggests that the expansion of Mandarin as the language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system has resulted in unstable diglossia among Uyghur communities, evidenced by Uyghur language attrition and Mandarin-Uyghur code-switching. Findings emphasize contextual factors that are contributing to the disruption of the intergenerational transmission of Uyghur and actions to support the vitality of this cultural heritage.

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List of Abbreviations

Chinese Communist Party	CCP
People's Republic of China	PRC

Note on Toponyms and Transliterations

Place names associated with the territory that is the focus of this dissertation are loaded with implication and ideology. The Qing Dynasty in the late eighteenth century introduced the Chinese place name *Xīnjiāng* (new frontier). This toponym reflected the perspective of those who imposed it and has colonialist connotations (Millward & Perdue, 2004). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) later designated this area as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Others identify this territory as East Turkestan. This toponym was once widely used by Turkic nationalists and Russians to refer to the area west of the Pamir Mountains. However, "East Turkestan" now has subversive connotations (Dwyer, 2005). Through extensive CCP propaganda, *dōng tūjuésītǎn* (East Turkestan) is now associated by many Chinese with the "three evil forces" of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism (Tan, 2009).

Some Uyghurs continue to use the place name East Turkestan to "assert their cultural distinctiveness from China proper" (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2009a). Others use it in recognition of the inaccuracy of the Chinese toponym. After all, to the Uyghurs, there is nothing new about the territory they have resided in for over 1,200 years. Still, others use it to signify a pro-independence position. In this dissertation, I use the term "Xinjiang" because this is the highest frequency term for the area under consideration.

I employed the *hànyǔ pīnyīn* romanization system with diacritics to mark tones when transliterating from Chinese. I used Uyghur Latin Yëziqi when transliterating from

Uyghur. Chinese and Uyghur words are italicized throughout this text. Upon initial usage of Chinese and Uyghur terms, I provide an English translation in parenthesis.

Following the October 11, 2006 recommendation of the *Terminology Normalization Committee for Ethnic Languages of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region*, I use the spelling "Uyghur" as the ethnonym signifying one group of sedentary Turkic urban dwellers and farmers of the Tarim Basin and Ili who follow traditional Central Asian sedentary practices (among Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar, Taranchi, Loptik, Dolan) as distinguished from nomadic Turkic populations in Central Asia (e.g. Äynu, Kirghiz, Tajik, Kazakh) (Benson, 1990).

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, also known as East Turkestan, is located in the northwest of the People's Republic of China (PRC). This territory shares borders with eight countries: Mongolia to the northeast; Russia to the north; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the west; and Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to the southwest. Xinjiang is at the crossroads of Eurasia; oasis settlements to the north and south of the expansive Taklamakan Desert served as transport hubs along the ancient Silk Road. Xinjiang is a vast territory accounting for nearly 1/6 of the total area of the PRC. From around 60 BCE, Chinese empires and governments have claimed sovereignty over this territory.

The CCP strives to maintain tight control over Xinjiang. Some scholars, such as Toops (2004a) and Joseph (2010), attribute the tenacity of this grip to a fear that the loss of Xinjiang might trigger the secession of Taiwan and Tibet. Speculations aside, it is a fact that Xinjiang is both a valuable source of natural resources (e.g. oil, natural gas, coal, minerals and metals) and a strategically important link to the territories and economies of neighboring Central Asian states. Evidence of government measures taken to enhance social stability in the region are apparent in the form of public security expenditures ($423 million in 2010, up 88% from 2009 (Wong, 2010)) and the 130,000 troops that were deployed to safeguard Xinjiang following the Uyghur uprising of July 5, 2009 (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2009a).

The demographics of this region have shifted significantly since incorporation in the PRC. A 1953 census registered 4.87 million inhabitants of which 75% were Uyghur, 6% Han Chinese, and the remainder consisting of smaller ethnic communities such as Hui, Kazakh, and Kirghiz (Toops, 2004a). By 2011, the population had increased to 21.81 million with 40.1% Han Chinese and 59.9% "minority population" (Ling, 2011a). The demographic shift in Xinjiang is part of a broader government objective to develop minority nationality areas. In order to promote Han Chinese migration to Xinjiang, land and tax incentives have been offered to Han Chinese migrants and their dependents (Dana, 1998). Along with the promotion of Han Chinese immigration, the CCP has implemented measures to encourage Uyghurs, mostly young women, to leave Xinjiang for factory jobs in the interior of China (Liang, 2009).

Scholars have noted that Han Chinese migration has intensified cultural and linguistic assimilative pressures on Uyghurs (Becquelin, 2000). Han Chinese occupy most top positions in the Xinjiang CCP bureaucracy while a disproportionate number of Han Chinese workers engage in the mining and export of the region's natural resources (Wiemar, 2004). The Xinjiang education system also shows evidence of disproportionate ethnic representation. For example, in Aqsu, a notice of job vacancies in district schools reserved 347 of 436 positions for Han Chinese, with the remainder reserved for Uyghurs (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009d). These practices contradict the protections granted to ethnic minorities made explicit in the PRC constitution and laws related to regional autonomy (Bovingdon, 2004a).

The Uyghur culture and language is being marginalized in official institutions and public domains, a form of top-down pressure (Nettle & Romaine, 2000). A government policy shift toward cultural assimilation in the border regions began in the mid-1980s and continues until today, perhaps most intensely in Xinjiang and Tibet. A form of Mandarin dominant bilingual education is being standardized throughout the Xinjiang education system. Differing from bilingual education programs that use the first language as the initial medium of instruction or a first and second language continuously throughout instruction, the type of bilingual education practiced in Xinjiang bears a closer resemblance to immersion programs with marginal heritage language support: a second language (i.e. Mandarin) is the medium of instruction and the first language (i.e. Uyghur) is taught as a subject in grammar and literature courses (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2008a).

From the 1980s, most Uyghur parents in urban locations could choose from schools (preschool through secondary) where the medium of instruction was Uyghur or Mandarin (Dwyer, 2005). Since the mid-1980s, the CCP has prioritized Mandarin as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system in order to linguistically assimilate the ethnic minority students of Xinjiang (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007). The option of school choice is now obsolete; Uyghur as a language of instruction is being phased out through the process of school consolidation and the replacement of Uyghur with Mandarin as the sole language of instruction (Dwyer, 2005). This language policy promotes subtractive bilingualism and language shift. The CCP advertises a narrative and ideology that connects Mandarin language proficiency with economic

development (Tan, 2009). Whereas in the past, Uyghur and Mandarin had their own set of functions and spaces, the establishment of Mandarin as the sole language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system has resulted in unstable diglossia (Fishman, 1972). Mandarin now dominates the academic field, indicating a shift in the relative balance of power between the groups speaking these languages (Nettle & Romaine, 2000).

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

In the spring of 2006, while studying Mandarin in Kunming, I met a Han Chinese from Xinjiang who told me about her experience as a student and the sometimes-violent animosity between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. After some investigation, I learned that among the set of Uyghur grievances, many Uyghurs were upset that their language was being replaced with Mandarin in the Xinjiang education system. Much of the literature I encountered, while replete with proclamations issued by the CCP, lacked input (other than anecdotal) from a Uyghur perspective.

From my time as a Peace Corps volunteer in Leyte, the Philippines (2002-04), I had a scholarly interest in language policy and language management. This is because members of my resident Waray-Waray community sometimes expressed frustrations that their language was not a primary language of instruction in the Tagalog-dominant education system. These conversations prompted a deep interest in state-sponsored efforts to manage language education in multiethnic contexts (Spolsky, 2004). This trajectory of experience, exposure and inquiry led me to develop a study to systematically investigate the language practices of Uyghur young adults.

The purpose of this study was to explore how domestic and academic fields structure the language practices of Uyghur young adults, defined as early to mid-twenty years of age. I was interested in how the home and school (i.e. structuring structures) promote or contribute to the disruption of the intergenerational transmission of Uyghur. From the 1980s, most urban Uyghur parents had a choice of schools for their children according to language of education (Dwyer, 2005). Options included *mínkǎohàn*, defined as "minority testing using Han language" (i.e. Mandarin); and *mínkǎomín*, defined as "minority testing using minority language." More clearly, *mínkǎohàn* refers to ethnic minority students educated in Mandarin-medium classes; *mínkǎomín* refers to ethnic minority students educated in an ethnic minority language.

This thesis focus on cultural, political and historical conditions germane to the language ecology of Xinjiang (Haugen, 1972; Mühlhäusler, 1996), and how these conditions influence language practices. This study explored how Uyghur young adults respond to assimilative pressures to join Han-stream society. This study also investigated how entrenched ethnic discrimination problematizes the conversion of linguistic capital into other forms of capital such as social and economic (Bourdieu, 1986). I employed ethnographic research methods in order to obtain empirical evidence to ground arguments regarding the impact of CCP language policy on the language practices of Uyghur young adults.

1.3 THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This dissertation draws upon concepts from the disciplines of sociology and language policy. Pierre Bourdieu's sociological theory (C. J. Calhoun, LiPuma, & Postone, 1993), and theory of practice (1977b, 1991), form the theoretical and investigative framework of this dissertation. Through this lens, I analyzed the language practices of Uyghur young adults, including reproduction and forms of resistance to cultural and linguistic assimilation (Bourdieu, 1977c).

From the field of language policy, this dissertation makes reference to a theoretical concern of Bernard Spolsky (2004), namely the recognition of contextual factors on language vitality. I also make reference to the concepts of forced and voluntary language shift (Nettle & Romaine, 2000). The disciplines of sociology and language policy are connected in that they emphasize the importance of structures and actions in the social world. My reading and extensions of these theories and constructs are influenced by my own secular ideology of humanism, manifest in advocacy for linguistic human rights and a belief in the value of linguistic diversity (Nettle & Romaine, 2000; Skutnabb-Kangas & Dunbar, 2010).

Bourdieu's theory of practice was a useful heuristic with which to investigate language practices in Xinjiang because of its emphasis on mechanisms of social reproduction and domination. In Xinjiang, there is a clear distribution and balance of power between the two most populous ethnic groups. Han Chinese, privileged by their association with the CCP, are the dominant group, while Uyghurs, an involuntary minority, are subordinate (Ogbu, 1978). Han Chinese and Uyghurs possess distinct

systems of habitus, defined as a matrix of dispositions developed in response to objective conditions. Bourdieu's concept of field is relevant because my work is largely concerned with education – a structured social space with its own rules and schemes of domination. Apart from the visible curriculum, the academic field is a site of unconscious learning where habitus and linguistic capital (a form of embodied cultural capital) is acquired (Bourdieu, 1977b).

Concerning language policy theory, this study explores dynamics associated with the impact of colonization on the linguistic equilibrium of a territory, and the responses of the colonized (Bovingdon, 2002; Dixon, 1997; Gladney, 1998). While many nation-states have enforced policies toward the cultural and linguistic assimilation of ethnic minority peoples, the CCP is currently engaged in an aggressive brand of internal colonialism. Ethnic minorities within the CCP are compelled to comply with the mandates of the state, but however restricted, many members do create spaces for resistance and the maintenance of culture and language practices.

1.4 PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study was motivated in part by a practical concern to create knowledge that might be used to alleviate turmoil and contribute to social justice in Xinjiang. In many conversations, Han Chinese and Uyghurs confided in me their distrust and (sometimes vehement) dislike of one another. In order to obtain data on Han Chinese and Uyghur perceptions of each other, I administered a short-answer questionnaire (in English and Mandarin) in June 2009 to a group of Han Chinese and Uyghur freshman and sophomore

college students at a public university in Urumchi. I was fortunate to have administered this questionnaire prior to July 5, 2009 because after that date, I do not believe it would have been possible to elicit candid responses. Students in the Uyghur region have since been subjected to a succession of patriotic education campaigns aimed in part to "establish the ideology that the Han are inseparable from the ethnic minorities, the ethnic minorities are inseparable from the Han and the minorities cannot do without one another" (The Associated Press, 2010). One hypothetical question asked, "What advice would you give to a foreigner new to Urumchi? Are there any places or people he or she should avoid?"

Some of the respondents specified Uyghur (and Muslim) areas as places foreigners should avoid, while others identified Uyghurs as dangerous. Two Han Chinese students and a Uyghur student made the following comments, respectively:

> If you are the first time been to [Urumchi] be careful for the [Uyghurs].
>
> I will tell him/her not to get along with the [Uyghur] nationality and don't surprised to the [Uyghur] nationality's manner.
>
> Do not believe the words which Chinese talk about Uyghurs! Try to make friends with Uyghurs. They are not lazy, not dirty!

In my experience, these responses were typical of comments made by Han Chinese and Uyghurs in conversations on perceptions of each other. Many Han Chinese characterize Uyghurs as lazy and ungrateful of CCP efforts to develop Xinjiang (Kaltman, 2007).

The CCP promotes a narrative of ethnic unity that serves to obfuscate animosity among ethnic groups (Millward & Tursun, 2004). However, ethnic discrimination is

pervasive in Xinjiang – a subject of private conversation, but taboo in public discourse. People tend to make assumptions because many topics are deemed too sensitive to discuss in public. For example, Yan Sun, a Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York, offered a perspective on "the imposition of Chinese language instruction in schools" in Xinjiang that is possibly shared by many Han Chinese. She said, "Rather than seeing bilingual education as forced assimilation, my relatives see it as a good skill to have in the job market, because many modern-sector jobs will involve interaction with Han Chinese in and out of Xinjiang" (Yan, 2009). There is some truth to this statement but it is not complete.

Many Uyghurs do want to learn Mandarin in order to participate in the Han Chinese-dominated labor market, but many also believe that the CCP is trying to weaken the vitality of their language – one of the most salient aspects of their identity. Some Uyghurs believe that the CCP is attempting to disrupt the intergenerational transmission of Uyghur culture and language in an effort to assimilate them and weave them more securely into the national fabric. In an effort to clarify assumptions, one purpose of this dissertation is to present Uyghur perceptions of CCP language policy in Xinjiang.

In certain historical circumstances, government language policy has provoked protest among communities in opposition. This was the case on February 21, 1952 in Dhaka, Bangladesh when a demonstration by students and political activists against the imposition of Urdu turned bloody (Mohsin, 2003), and June 16, 1976 in Soweto, South Africa when a student protest against Afrikaans as a language of instruction turned into a riot resulting in hundreds of causalities (Makoni, 2003). The violence of July 5, 2009 in

Urumchi was not a direct result of Uyghur resentment toward the promotion of Mandarin in the Xinjiang education system, but language policy continues to contribute to the sum total of Uyghur discontent (Bovingdon, 2004a; Dwyer, 2005; Schluessel, 2007).

Language policy is one item on a list of Uyghur grievances, including prohibitions and restrictions on religious practices, pro-Han Chinese hiring practices, the rapid in-migration of Han Chinese, the coerced out-migration of mostly young Uyghur women and the disenfranchisement of Uyghurs in decision-making processes at the government level (Bovingdon, 2002, 2004a; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009a; Dwyer, 2005; Toops, 2004a; Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2009a). These factors, in aggregate, by 2009, had turned Xinjiang into a tense area. News of the Han Chinese-Uyghur ethnic brawl and anger at the CCP response in Shaoguan, Guangdong was the spark that set off the Uyghur protest on July 5, 2009. That peaceful demonstration was met with violent military action and escalated into a full blown riot (Millward, 2009).

As many Uyghurs are hesitant to engage in public criticism of CCP policies, this dissertation is a platform for the expression of views that should be considered by parties interested in making Xinjiang a more humane environment (Amnesty International, 2010b; Human Rights Watch, 2009b; S. Roberts, 2009).

1.5 Overview of the dissertation

In the preceding sections of this first chapter, I have broadly contextualized this study by providing data on recent shifts in the demographic composition of Xinjiang and

the implementation of policies that promote Mandarin, the language of the dominant group. The massive influx of Han Chinese migrants has punctuated the cultural and linguistic equilibrium of the Uyghur region (Dixon, 1997). That is, a state of continuity (or at least gradual change) has been punctuated by a period of dramatic change. Prior to the contemporary wave of CCP propaganda that encourages Uyghurs to identify as members of *yījiārén* (one big [Chinese] family), Uyghur identities were bound to the oasis or village of residency. The contemporary demographic shift, along with language policies that promote Mandarin in the academic field, threatens to disrupt the intergenerational transmission of Uyghur, an important component of Uyghur identity.

In chapter two, I review literature relevant to this study, beginning with a history of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang. I describe the ideological foundations of Confucian and Communist civilizing projects. I provide an overview of the history of language policy and bilingual education in Xinjiang. I then present the theoretical framework of this study, Bourdieu's theory of practice, and applications of this theory to the study of language. The conclusion of the literature review indicates the contributions of the present study to existent trends of inquiry. In the third chapter, I present the research methodologies used in this study, along with the study objectives and framework; a description of the research site; participant selection criteria; a synopsis of methods; and data analysis procedures. Content on Xinjiang in chapters two and three serve to historicize the socio-political milieu of this region, a necessary precondition for a Bourdieusian analysis of language practices. In chapters four and five, I present data collected during fieldwork in the form of four emergent themes and four case study

narratives. The case study narratives focus on the development of language practices of female and male *mínkǎohàn* and bilingual students. In chapter six, I present conclusions on Uyghur language practices; Uyghur linguistic assimilation and discontent; and thoughts on the unequal distribution of symbolic power among Uyghur and Han Chinese ethnic communities in Xinjiang, and how these inequities contribute to the social stratification of "legitimate" and "illegitimate" speakers (Bourdieu, 1977a, p. 648). I conclude by suggesting actions to support the vitality of this cultural heritage.

Chapter 2: Literature review

2.1 Introduction

This literature review consists of a body of research and knowledge related to the region of Xinjiang; the Uyghur ethnic community; sources of Uyghur discontent; the geopolitical significance of Xinjiang to China; Confucian and Communist ideologies; language policy as implemented by governments of Xinjiang; a critical analysis of bilingual education in Xinjiang; Bourdieusian thinking tools; and applications of these tools to the study of language. The concluding section serves to situate this study as an extension of existing scholarly pursuits, with a focus on ethnography and language policy; linguistic rights; case study methods in applied linguistics; and Bourdieusian approaches to the investigation of language minority practices in colonized contexts.

2.2 Background on the Uyghurs and Xinjiang

The modern Uyghurs, depending on where in Xinjiang they reside today, likely trace their ancestry to resettled Old Uyghurs, Tocharians (who resided in the area prior to the arrival of the Old Uyghurs), in addition to later arrivals of Kipchak speakers near Qumul, Turpan, and Lopnur, and later descendants of the Kharakhanids to the west, etc. A direct line cannot be drawn between the Uyghur khaghanate (Old Uyghurs) and the modern Uyghurs. Any attempt to do so would be ideological and ahistorical. Though the following paragraphs focus on the Old Uyghurs, it should be stressed that they are not the *sole* ancestors of the Modern Uyghurs (A. Dwyer, personal communication, November

15, 2011).

The modern Uyghurs have some relation to the Old Uyghurs of the Uyghur Khanganate (744-846 CE), an empire based in the Orkhan River valley of Mongolia (Barat, 2009; Millward and Perdue, 2004). This empire rose to power after the fall of the Göktürk Khanganate, a nomadic confederation that had controlled much of Central Asia since the middle of the 6th century. The Göktürk Khanganate was overthrown by a conglomerate of tribes, but it was the Huíhú Uyghurs – a branch of the Göktürks – who wrested power and took control of Mongolia (Barat, 2009). The Uyghur Khanganate eventually extended its rule into Dzungaria, an area in northwest China that corresponds with the northern half of present-day Xinjiang and as far west as the Fergana valley of Central Asia. Under the Khan Tengri Bögü, the Uyghur Empire adopted Manichaeism as its religion. At the end of the 8th century, the Uyghur Khanganate began to fragment, and following a famine, civil war and raids by Kyrgyz marauders, collapsed in 846.

A diaspora resulted, with groups of Old Uyghur people settling across Central Asia (Millward & Perdue, 2004). A large contingent of Old Uyghur tribes settled between present-day Urumchi and Turpan, establishing the Gāochāng Huíhú Khanate. Other tribes went west to the Chu River valley and established the Qarakhanid dynasty of Kashgar. The Uyghurs of the Gāochāng Huíhú Khanate intermarried with the indigenous populations of the Tarim Basin including Iranian and other Indo-European peoples. While this population had adherents of a number of religions including Buddhism, Manichaeism and Nestorian Christianity, Buddhism eventually became the dominant faith of the Gāochāng Huíhú Uyghurs (Rudelson, 1997). The Qarakhanids of the western

Chu River valley began converting to Islam in the middle of the 10th century, but it was not until the 18th century that the people of the Tarim Basin oasis, extending to Kumul (*Hāmì*), converted to Islam – often under the threat of violence. The historian Kahar Barat asserts that Buddhism continued to be practiced by some Uyghurs in villages in the eastern parts of Xinjiang until the 19th century (2009).

Following a succession of overlords, Chaghatai, the second son of Genghis Khan asserted control of Xinjiang in 1227 (Millward & Perdue, 2004). The Moghul successors of the Chagatai Khanate ruled the region from the mid-14th century through the 16th century. Under the rule of these khans, the people of Xinjiang were heavily influenced by Turkic-Islamic culture. Barat identifies the type of rule that existed in Central Asia as having a dual nature:

> [T]he two millenia from the Xiongnu to the Manchu, pastoral-nomadic powers of the grasslands and settled city-state powers existed in parallel. Two types of culture, two types of societies prospered and existed together. For the most part, the horseback peoples were the colonizers and the settled city-states were permitted self-rule (2009).

The Manchu Qing invaded this region in 1759 and expelled the ruling Mongols. Toops estimates that in the early 1800s, Uyghurs made up around 320,000 (62%) of the population of the region, while Han and Hui Chinese constituted around 155,000 (30%) (2004a). The Qing settlement policy resulted in the establishment of Chinese towns juxtaposed with Uyghur towns or cities where Chinese areas were walled-off from Uyghur areas. The historical remnants of ethnic segregation in Urumchi can be discerned by the bus stops that feature the names of former city gates like *běimén* (north gate) and *nánmén* (south gate) (Gaubatz, 1996).

Peter Hopkirk captures the state of affairs in Xinjiang by the middle of the 19th century:

> Chinese Turkestan, or Sinkiang as it is today called, had long been part of the Chinese Empire. However, the central authorities' hold over it had always been tenuous, for the Muslim population had nothing in common with their Manchu rulers and everything in common with their ethnic cousins in Bokhara, Khokand and Khiva [all in Uzbekistan], lying on the far side of the Pamirs (1992, pp. 321-322).

In the early 1860s, the Dungan Revolt, an uprising by Hui Chinese and other Muslim ethnic groups, spread from east to west. Taking advantage of the turmoil, the Tajik Yaqub Beg captured Kashgar and Yeken (*Shāchē Xiàn*) from the Chinese and by 1867 had extended his reign over most of Xinjiang (Shaw, 1871). Beg crowned himself Amir of Kashgaria and established his capital in Kashgar. In 1877, Yakub Beg died (by stroke or poison) and by 1878 General Zuo Zongtang had reclaimed Xinjiang for the Qing Empire (Hopkirk, 1992). On November 18, 1884, the vast northwest frontier was declared a province of the Qing Empire and named "*xīnjiāng*" (new frontier). After the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, and through the Republic of China period, Xinjiang was ruled by a succession of Chinese warlords.

In the early 20th century, most Uyghurs would have referred to themselves not as Uyghur, but by a term indicating their oasis or village, or if nomadic, their tribe (Shahrani, 1984). The Uyghur ethnonym, fell out of use for nearly 500 years, and not just because of Buddhism. It was also associated with Old Uyghur places near Turpan, and therefore not associated with Kashgar, Khotan, etc. (A. Dwyer, personal communication, November 15, 2011). This ethnonym was only resurrected and repurposed in 1921 when

Chinese government officials, coordinating with Soviet advisors, embarked on a naming project of "all the groups of these people who had been known hitherto by the names of the localities where they lived" (J. Chen, 1977, p. 100). Thus, the modern Uyghur ethnonym is a revival of a historical ethnonym. From that instance of revival, the ethnonym lost its linkage with Buddhism; "Uyghur" from that point until present denotes the sedentary Muslim, Turkic people of Xinjiang (Millward & Tursun, 2004; Rudelson, 1997).

In 1931, a Uyghur rebellion occurred in Kumul that spread to the southern rim of the Tarim Basin (Rudelson, 1997). This rebellion resulted in the establishment of the Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan (also called the Republic of Uyghurstan), comprising the territory from Aksu, along the northern rim of the Tarim Basin, to Hotan in the south. The Chinese warlord Sheng Shicai put down the Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan by the spring of 1934, aided by the Soviets, who feared that the rebellion would spread to neighboring Soviet Central Asian Republics.

In 1944, this time with the assistance of the Soviets, the East Turkistan Republic was established in the northern Xinjiang districts of Ili, Tarbaghatai and Altai (Benson, 1990). The leadership of the East Turkestan Republic advocated independence from Chinese rule and a cessation of Chinese migration to the region. They also called for equality among nationalities, the elevation in status of indigenous languages and positive relations with the Soviet Union. The East Turkestan Republic came to an end with the advance and entrenchment of the People's Liberation Army in 1949. The leaders of the republic, who intended to negotiate the status of their independent state at a conference in

Beijing, died in an airplane crash en route to the conference. "Whether it was an accident or sabotage was never clarified" (Kadeer, 2009, p. 11).

The state-sanctioned history of Xinjiang promotes the idea that Han Chinese occupation of and sovereignty over this territory originated sometime in deep antiquity (Bovingdon, 2004b). CCP texts on the history of Xinjiang feature identical content regardless of the language they are printed in, such as the publication *History of the Xinjiang Region*, written in both Uyghur and Chinese (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Education Commission Higher Education History Teaching Materilas Compilation Group, 1992). In its first white paper on the region, the CCP asserted, "since the Western Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 24 CE), [Xinjiang] has been an inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation" (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2003). Wang Emmao, then secretary of the Xinjiang CCP, proclaimed in 1986 that, "the Uyghur nation is not a branch of the great tree of the 'Turki nation'; the Uyghur nation is a branch on the great tree of the Chinese nation" (Bovingdon, 2004b).

At present, the CCP has softened its stance on assertions of Uyghur-Han Chinese shared ancestry, although some Chinese historians maintain that the forefathers of Uyghurs were related to Han Chinese (Rahman, 2005). The CCP has banned and burned books deemed antithetical to the official narrative (Dillon, 2002).[1] Still, Uyghur counter-narratives persist, passed down and around by Uyghur community members. Consistent

[1] In June 2002, the Kashgar Uyghur Press burned copies of Turghun Almas' *A Brief History of the Huns* and *Ancient Uyghur Literature* because these texts were thought to support separatist ideas, i.e. information that contradicted the CCP assertion that Xinjiang has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times.

with Gladney, my experience was that "the Central Asian Uyghurs know a great deal about the two East Turkestan periods of sovereign rule, and they reflect on that quite frequently" (Bhattacharji, 2009).

The history of post-1949 Xinjiang is marked by policies calculated to consolidate CCP power and territorial control. In 1954, a group of 100,000 demobilized troops, known as the *xīnjiāng shēngchǎn jiànshè bīngtuán* (Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps), were employed to reclaim farmland, build agricultural settlements and guard the PRC frontier (Millward & Tursun, 2004). In October 1955, Xinjiang was renamed an "autonomous region" of the PRC, a designation widely recognized as spurious (Bovingdon, 2004a; Dwyer, 2005; Ghai, 2000). Beginning in 1956, the CCP and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics began to divert ideologically; Maoist policies advocating "class struggle" gained ascendency over policies that advocated gradual development (Millward & Tursun, 2004). The people of Xinjiang suffered through a series of national calamities including The Hundred Flowers movement (1956), The Great Leap Forward (1959-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Of this latter campaign, there are no detailed published accounts (Millward & Tursun, 2004), but I did hear some stories about this period. Messi[2], a consultant, said that during the Cultural Revolution many Uyghurs were forced to raise pigs, a repugnant activity because Uyghurs, being Muslim, loathe these animals. By 1966, the demography of Xinjiang was further altered due to the two million Han Chinese refugees that migrated during The

[2] All consultants' names are pseudonyms.

Great Leap Forward famine and the 1.6 million Han Chinese relocated for Maoist youth-rustication programs during the Cultural Revolution. From a historical perspective, Han Chinese colonization was not a new policy; since imperial times, Chinese governments had implemented policies to settle Han Chinese on peripheral territories to which it laid claim (Millward, 2007; Toops, 2004a). However, the scale of Han Chinese settlement was remarkable.

By the mid-1980s, the extremism of the Cultural Revolution had subsided, and the people of Xinjiang enjoyed a period of relative cultural and political liberalization; many mosques and unofficial religious schools re-opened (Ramzy, 2010). Uyghurs benefited from several affirmative action policies. These included exemption from the single-child policy (except in urban areas), a lower rate of taxation, better (albeit Mandarin) education for their children, greater access to public office, more freedom to speak and learn Uyghur, and more freedom to practice Islam (Gladney, 2009). Dwyer, cited in an *Al Jazeera* article (2008), summed up Uyghur popular sentiment in the 1980s and early 1990s by saying there were many Uyghurs "particularly intellectuals and those in the northern area, who felt that the Chinese project in Xinjiang, though very far from perfect, was okay."

In the 1990s, the CCP began to implement a series of policies aimed at the Sinification of Xinjiang; Han Chinese migration was incentivized and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps population swelled again (Becquelin, 2000). Starting in the first decade of this century, the CCP introduced a policy of "China Western Development" to boost the economies of the western provinces. Han Chinese migration,

along with the transfer of natural resources to mainland China and a visible growth in prosperity in areas populated by Han Chinese, began to shape perceptions of internal colonization among the Uyghur population (Bovingdon, 2002; Gladney, 2004).[3]

The September 11, 2001 attacks had a profound effect upon Uyghur communities in Xinjiang. CCP efforts to "combat separatism," which had begun in response to the Ghulja (Yining) Protests in 1997 were refreshed within the framework of the global anti-terrorism campaign (Channel Four News, 1997; Human Rights Watch, 2005).[4] On August 27, 2002, the U.S. listed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization (Scheuer, 2004) although, according to Gladney, the majority of information on this group was not independently corroborated.[5] The dubiousness of this information provided for "a real credibility gap" and was perhaps "part of a U.S.-China quid pro quo, where China supported the 'war on terror'" and "support of the U.S. for the condemnation of [the East Turkestan Islamic Movement] was connected to that support" (Goldstein, 2009). Both U.S. and Chinese officials have claimed that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement has ties to al-Qaeda, although there is a paucity of evidence to substantiate this accusation. The CCP blamed this group, but provided no evidence, for a 2008 attack in Kashgar that resulted in the deaths of 16 police officers (Wong, 2008).

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[3] By definition, an internal colony typically produces wealth for the benefit of areas most closely associated with the state. Members of internal colonies are distinguished by cultural variables such as ethnicity, language or religion. They are excluded from prestigious social and political positions, which are held by members of the dominant group (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 2000). Although Uyghurs do occupy prominent political positions in Xinjiang, no Uyghurs are members of the CCP Politburo, the country's effective ruling body.

[4] The phrase "combat separatism" is in quotes because the CCP typically classifies Uyghur protests as "separatist" regardless of the motives of the protestors.

[5] Gladney notes that many of the "terrorist incidents" that China attributes to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement are actually "spontaneous and rather disorganized" forms of civil unrest (Bhattacharji, 2009).

After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, 22 Uyghurs were captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan; these men were sent to the U.S. off-shore prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (Fletcher & Bajoria, 2008). None were indicted for crimes against the U.S.; five remain in U.S. custody despite the fact that these men are not considered "enemy combatants." The difficulties in resettling these men have been well-documented; few nations are willing to accept the detainees because they fear economic retaliation from China (Stout, 2007).

2.2.1 Sources of Uyghur discontent

The primary sources of Uyghur discontent are CCP policies and projects that encourage the migration and settlement of Han Chinese in Xinjiang (Bovingdon, 2004a; Toops, 2004b), the forced or coerced migration of mostly young Uyghur women to factories located in China's eastern provinces (Forced Migration Online, 2010; Human Rights Without Frontiers, 2010), and ethnic discrimination in the job market (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009d). Many of the Uyghurs who participate in labor-transfer programs do not find the working and living conditions satisfactory (Qiu, 2007) and sometimes encounter ethnic violence, as did the Uyghur workers of the Xuri toy factory in Shaoguan on June 26, 2009 (Millward, 2009).

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China reported that the majority of employment opportunities in the civil service and state-owned enterprises in Xinjiang are consistently reserved for Han Chinese (2009a). The systematic form of ethnic discrimination in hiring practices has ramifications on socioeconomic stratification in

Xinjiang. In a study of income inequality by region over the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2004, Xinjiang had the highest level of inequality in all four years (Lin, Zhuang, Yarcia, & Lin, 2008). Then Xinjiang CCP chief Wang Lequan explained that the disparity in hiring practices was due to the lack of qualified candidates. He stated, "One common problem of the western region is that the education and cultural level of the people here is quite low" (Lim, 2003).

Uyghur Economist Ilham Tohti indicated that hiring practices were influenced by other factors. He estimated in 2010 that as few as 20% of Uyghur college graduates are employed. He stated, "Don't talk about how big China's GDP is. Even if it becomes the world's largest, who gets to enjoy it? The cities are more and more beautiful, but even if it is all as beautiful as the Forbidden City, when we see those buildings, we just feel uncomfortable. This is not merely an economic problem. When it comes to looking for work, we face discrimination. But it's not acknowledged" (Ramzy, 2010).

Uyghurs also complain of discrimination in healthcare. In a survey of 34 Uyghurs in Urumchi, Kaltman found that 88% believed that members of their ethnic community did not receive the same quality of medical care as Han Chinese (2007). Kaltman hypothesized that language was a barrier to adequate treatment, but discovered that the majority of Uyghur interviewees believed that "Han doctors simply do not treat [Uyghur] patients as well as Han" (2007, p. 42).

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China and the Uyghur Human Rights Project have documented many human rights violations against the Uyghurs of Xinjiang (2008b, 2009a; 2009a). Some of these violations are related to the suppression

of expressions of Uyghur identity including religion and language. These include the non-transparent selection process and arbitrary limitations on the number of Uyghurs permitted to make the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca; the prohibition of fasting by Uyghur government employees during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan; government regulation of training and appointment of Imams at mosques and supervision of sermons. Government policies to strengthen the implementation of bilingual education have marginalized the use of Uyghur and other minority languages in schools throughout Xinjiang by reducing or eliminating class instruction in languages other than Mandarin, flaunting protections for ethnic minority languages codified in Chinese law. In population control policy, non-Han Chinese ethnic groups, previously exempt from the one-child policy, have been targeted in the government's effort to curb population growth (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2006b).

Uyghur grievances are not well known because public dissent is not tolerated. Those who do criticize CCP policy to foreigners put themselves at risk of detention and retaliation (Kadeer, 2009; Public Broadcasting Service, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2010b). The CCP justice system is sometimes used as a weapon for punishing dissent; peaceful expressions of ethnic identity and religious activities are often penalized as "extremist" or "separatist" (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009a). The *Procuratorial Daily* reported that arrests on state-security charges in Xinjiang numbered 1,300 in 2008. Arrests on these charges in the entire PRC in 2007 only amounted to 742 (Szadziewski, 2010). Courts in Xinjiang handled a total of 437 cases of "endangering state security" in 2009, compared with 268 such cases in 2008. "More than 250 people were sentenced to

ten years in prison or more for offenses related to endangering State security," said Rozi Ismail, president of the Higher People's Court of Xinjiang in his 2009 work report (Jia, 2010b). On December 31, 2009, the Xinjiang CCP "adopted what appeared to be a sweeping law barring the spread of views deemed to threaten national unity" (Wong, 2010). For Uyghurs in Xinjiang, there really is no "legal and peaceful means for disenfranchised people to voice their desires" (S. Roberts, 2009).

On June 26, 2009, a massive ethnic clash, prompted by an Internet-based rumor that six Uyghur men had raped two Chinese girls, took place between Han Chinese and Uyghur workers at the Xuri toy factory in Shaoguan, in Guangdong Province in southern China (Millward, 2009). According to Chinese media, two Uyghurs were killed and 118 injured (Xinhua News Agency, 2009c), although many suspected that the CCP underreported the death toll. One Han Chinese man claimed to have assisted in the murder of seven or eight Uyghurs during the riot and estimated the death toll to be more than 30, including a few Han Chinese (Watts, 2009).

On the afternoon of July 5, 2009 in Urumchi, thousands of Uyghurs staged a protest demanding a more thorough investigation of the Shaoguan incident. No one will ever know who instigated the violence that day, but it is clear that the reservoir of discontent referred to above was ignited. Thousands of riot police and security forces flooded the city. According to Chinese media, 197 people were killed and 1,721 were injured (Hu & Lei, 2009), although those numbers are widely disputed as underestimates. The CCP has never provided any count of the Uyghurs killed and injured in revenge attacks by Han Chinese on July 7, 2009 or an accurate tally of Uyghurs killed by security

forces. The only thing certain is that many people died violent deaths.

Amnesty International, along with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, urged the Chinese government to launch an independent investigation into the July 5, 2009 violence, including the conditions of arrest of 1,400 people, claims of unnecessary or excessive use of force, and torture and ill-treatment of detainees (2010b). A Human Rights Watch report *We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them* (2009b) documented the disappearances of 43 men and boys, although the true number of disappearances is thought to be higher. World Uyghur Congress leader Rebiya Kadeer claimed that "nearly 10,000" Uyghurs disappeared "overnight" (Jacobs & Fackler, 2009). A Uyghur policeman who fled to Kyrgyzstan claimed that 196 Uyghurs "were tortured and killed" at a detention center south of Urumchi (Agence France-Presse, 2009).

Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur intellectual, had warned Xinjiang government officials that Uyghurs were not satisfied with the CCP handling of the June 26, 2009 Shaoguan Incident, but was ignored. After the unrest, Niyaz criticized the CCP when speaking with Hong Kong-based journalists. On July 23, 2010, Niyaz was sentenced to prison for 15 years for charges of endangering state security. According to police, Niyaz had "given too many interviews" (Amnesty International, 2010a).

The CCP blamed the July 5, 2009 violence on "mastermind" World Uyghur Congress leader Rebiya Kadeer for fomenting the "three evil forces" of "terrorism, separatism and religious extremism" (Human Rights Watch, 2009b). Although the CCP alleges that the violence was orchestrated, scant evidence has been produced thus far, the primary pieces being a phone call made by Kadeer to her brother, shortly before the

violence, warning him to stay off the streets (Jacobs & Fackler, 2009) and letters written by Kadeer's imprisoned family members holding her to blame (Xinhua News Agency, 2009a).

"To prevent further unrest, the government blocked access to the Web and suspended international calls and short message services in the region 24 hours after the [July 5, 2009] riot because they were vital tools used by ringleaders to instigate the riots in Urumqi, capital of the region," said Yang Maofa, director of the regional telecommunications administration (Cui, 2009). Thus began "the largest and longest such blackout in the world… No country [had] shut down an information infrastructure so widely for so long, said the Open Net Initiative, a Harvard-linked partnership that monitors Internet restrictions around the world" (Anna, 2010a). Text communication services (SMS), with a 20 text per-day limit, were restored on January 17, 2010; International calling capabilities were restored on January 20, 2010 and, more than 10 months after the July 5, 2009 violence, the Internet was restored on May 14, 2010.

As of April 2012, in connection with the July 5, 2009 violence, 26 people have been sentenced to death (Radio Free Asia, 2010a). Human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch (2009a) and Amnesty International (2009), contend that these trials did "not meet minimum international standards of due process and fair trials" (Human Rights Watch, 2009a). Nine people have been "hastily" executed thus far (Amnesty International, 2009).

Another spate of protest and violence broke out on September 3 and 4, 2009 when, incited by rumors that Uyghurs were stabbing Han Chinese with H.I.V.-tainted

hypodermic needles, tens of thousands of Han Chinese surrounded government buildings in Urumchi and demanded more aggressive government control of Uyghurs (Wong & Yang, 2009). In early August, the first syringe attacks had been reported to police, but the government did not disclose this information to the public until the middle of the month (Wong and Ansfield, 2009). Local officials confirmed 531 cases of reported syringe attacks, though only 171 people showed signs of wounds upon examination (BBC, 2009b). According to the reports, the victims were mostly Han Chinese while the attackers were allegedly Uyghur. Many of the protestors called for the resignation of the Xinjiang CCP chief Wang Lequan; some called for his execution. At least five people were beaten to death during the demonstrations (Hornby, 2009). Three journalists from Hong Kong were "punched, kicked and tied up before being detained for three hours" by paramilitary police (BBC, 2009a). Xinjiang provincial information director Hou Hanmin accused the journalists of inciting crowds of demonstrators "by making hand gestures" (Radio Television Hong Kong, 2009).

During this period of violence, the Uyghur calligrapher and journalist Kaynam Jappar was beaten by a Han Chinese mob. While Jappar escaped with his life, the Uyghur singer Mirzat Alim was not so fortunate; Alim was beaten to death, his eyes reportedly gouged out (Radio Free Asia, 2009a). Urumchi CCP chief Li Zhi and the Xinjiang police chief were sacked shortly after the protest. A total of 51 suspects were arrested for the syringe attacks – called "terror attacks" by Du Xintao, an official with the regional public security department (BBC, 2009b). On September 12, 2009, three Uyghurs, two male and one female, were sentenced after a three-hour court session for prison terms ranging from

7 to 15 years (Wong & Ansfield, 2009). Laboratory tests found no evidence of victims' exposure to viruses or chemicals (Xinhua News Agency, 2009d).

2.2.2 Geopolitics, natural resources and CCP investments

Xinjiang is of incredible strategic importance to the CCP in terms of location and resources, including fossil fuels and renewable energy. The Sino-Kazak pipeline, a $700 million project, which runs 2,798 km from the Caspian shore of Kazakhstan to Xinjiang came into operation in 2006, with millions of metric tons already pumped through (Xinhua News Agency, 2010). The Central Asia-China gas pipeline, a $7.3 billion project, which runs 1,833 km from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan to Xinjiang came into operation in December 2009, and will be capable of delivering 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year once it reaches full capacity between 2012 and 2013 (Kramer, 2009).

At 1.66 million square kilometers, Xinjiang is of vast size, and though much of its geography is composed of rugged mountains and desert, nearly 68 million hectares (41.2%) of the region's total area is suitable for agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry (China Internet Information Center, 2009). Below ground, Xinjiang has substantial reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, ferrous metals (e.g. iron ore) and non-ferrous metals (e.g. jade). Oil and natural gas reserves are estimated at 30 billion tons, more than 25% of the national total while estimated coal reserves are about 38% of the national total (China Internet Information Center, 2009).

As of December 2009, the Tarim Oilfield was supplying "nearly 50 million cubic

meters of [natural] gas each day to 80 [eastern] cities including Beijing and Shanghai" (Xinhua News Agency, 2009b). In part from the melting of massive glaciers set in the mountains, Xinjiang has an annual 88 billion cubic meters of surface water together with 25 billion cubic meters of groundwater. Xinjiang is a source of solar energy region as it receives sunshine in the range of 2,600 to 3,400 hours per year (China Internet Information Center, 2009). Wind is another natural resource; numerous wind farms with giant wind turbines convert the winds of the region into energy.

Between 2000 and 2009, the CCP invested nearly $48 billion in projects aimed at the development of infrastructure and transportation (i.e. aviation, railway and road), agriculture, forestry and energy sectors (Wines, 2010). Six new airports are scheduled open by 2015, bringing the regional total to 22; China's civil aviation authorities has ordered that domestic airlines offer more flights connecting the cities in Xinjiang with cities in the mainland. On the ground, the rail network will be increased to more than 12,000 km by 2020; another $17-20 billion will be spent on the roads of the region, including 7,155 km of highways (Xinhua News Agency, 2010). To further integrate the region, a pairing-assistance program will require 19 prosperous coastal provinces and cities to divert .3 to .6% of their revenues to impoverished parts of Xinjiang from 2011-2020 (e.g. Beijing is expected to contribute more than $1 billion to the southern city of Hotan and surrounding counties) (Jia, 2010a). In addition to projects funded by the CCP, the World Bank has committed hundreds of millions of dollars toward transportation and agriculture projects throughout Xinjiang, many with the stated goal of raising rural incomes in places with predominantly minority populations.

The political leadership and economic policies in Xinjiang have undergone significant recent change. In April, Wang Lequan, who had served as the Xinjiang CCP chief for 15 years, was replaced by Zhang Chunxian (Wong & Ansfield, 2010). In the spring and summer of 2010, government-owned newspapers were publishing stories touting development and financial investment on a near-daily basis. Many of these articles celebrated the initiation of "leapfrog development" or "rapid economic development" in Xinjiang, to be funded by tax revenue on coal, oil and natural gas (X. Zhang, 2010). Businesses and commercial banks will be eligible for tax breaks, a move calculated to encourage expansion in the region. Local authorities will reportedly use resource-tax revenues to develop the places where the resources had been extracted. President Hu Jintao has pledged that per capita GDP in Xinjiang, now trailing the national average by about 25%, will reach parity with the national average by 2015 and that poverty will be mostly eliminated from the region by 2020 (Ramzy, 2010).

As part of the CCP development plan, the Old City of Kashgar – a place that many consider a bastion of Uyghur culture – is currently being demolished (Wines, 2009). The government claims that the Old City, an architectural marvel of mud-brick design, is not earthquake safe, despite having endured for centuries. Approximately 200,000 Uyghurs will be relocated from their homes to Chinese-style apartment blocks (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009a). Kashgar has also been "awarded" status as a Special Economic Zone – a designation that is intended to bolster trade with Central Asian states.

Despite these policy changes, questions persist regarding the beneficiaries of the

economic development projects launched in Xinjiang. Nicholas Bequelin, a researcher for Human Rights Watch, stated, "In respect of [Uyghur]-Han relations, the main issue is discrimination. That cuts across every social class…It's very clear that [Uyghurs] did not have a say in the design of these polices, so it unlikely they will benefit from the outcome" (Ramzy, 2010). The CCP calculates that economic investment will resolve the ethnic tensions that simmer below the surface of a heavily militarized state of peace (Chan, 2010).[6] But some are concerned that economic development will not resolve tensions in Xinjiang. Tohti remarked, "Xinjiang's problem isn't a lack of money, it's how it is allocated" (Ramzy, 2010). Decisions regarding the distribution and investment of tax revenue and other funds fall under the purview of the government, from which Uyghurs are largely excluded (S. Roberts, 2009).

2.3 Confucian and Communist civilizing projects

A useful heuristic for interpreting CCP policy is the "civilizing project," defined as "a kind of interaction between peoples, in which one group, the civilizing center, interacts with other groups (the peripheral peoples) in terms of a particular kind of inequality" (Harrell, 1995, p. 4). In this type of interaction, the center is positioned as the preeminent form of civilization within a state. Actors authorized by the center have a duty to elevate the peripheral peoples' civilization to that of the center.[7] Civilizing

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[6] In addition to the thousands of troops currently stationed in Urumchi, 40,000 high-definition surveillance cameras fitted with "riot-proof" protective shells monitor the busses, bus stops, schools, supermarkets, department stores, streets and lanes of the city (Anna, 2010b).

[7] *Zhōngguó* (China) literally means "middle/center country." *Zhōngguórén* (Chinese citizen) literally means "middle/center country people."

projects are necessarily invasive enterprises where policy is used to re-orient peripheral people by altering their language, religion and other daily practices (i.e. habitus (Bourdieu, 1977b)). Harrell characterizes the center and periphery interactions as "asymmetrical dialogues" (Harrell, 1995, p. 7). This phrase captures the relative degrees of power vested by the center and periphery peoples of China whereby the hegemonic center manipulates the socio-cultural value system to create and perpetuate a world view justifying the *status quo* of Han Chinese domination over other ethnic communities (Gramsci, 1972).

Chinese civilization has been deeply influenced by Confucianism, one component being a hierarchy of human development. This development is based on the training and acquisition of a set of philosophical, moral and ritual principles. The molding of the person is referred to as *wénhùa* (culture) – a process of "literary transformation" (Dwyer, 1998, pp. 70, 72; 2005, pp. 7, 72). The center is in possession of culture, while peripheral peoples, lower on the scale of Confucian social evolution, are lacking or without culture. Through moral education, acculturation is possible.[8] Like any ideology, defined as a set of beliefs that is in some degree partial and distorted and serves some specific set of social interests (C. Calhoun, 2003), Confucian ideology, and the Communist ideology that was to follow, functioned to legitimate an unequal social order. This ideology influences the center's perception of and engagement with peripheral peoples. The center operates with the premise that they are obliged to bring the gift of civilization to the

[8] This idea of education (as designed and implemented by the center) as fundamental to elevate peripheral peoples toward civilization was also a central component of European imperialism (Willinsky, 1998).

periphery; the center has a duty to impart and facilitate transformations. This ideology manifests as both altruism and chauvinism as the center asserts a superior cultural and political position, always above others (i.e. non-Chinese) who were "not even indirectly acquainted with the moral principles laid out in the classics" (Harrell, 1995, p. 18).

Prior to the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Chinese governments had tolerated the diverse cultural practices of peripheral peoples. Since the founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949, the CCP has been engaged in work to consolidate peripheral territories and peoples into a unified nation-state. Aspects of Confucian ideology have carried over into the Communist period and now inform the perspective and policy of the CCP civilizing project. Drawing from Gramsci's theory of hegemony (1972), Harrell describes the CCP civilizing center as conducting a "civilizing project through the creation of hegemony, a relationship of superiority and inferiority that maintains the hierarchy by justifying it through ideology and institutions, making it seem both proper and natural to both the rulers and the ruled (in this case the center and the periphery) and enlisting both rulers and ruled in service of the institutions that maintain the order" (1995, p. 8). Harrell suggests that the ideology of the civilizing center is reinforced by metaphorical conceptions of peripheral peoples as women/children/ancient and the center as male/adult/modern (1995, pp. 10-17).

Where the Confucian scale of development was organized according to variables related to culture and technology, the Communist Marxist categorization of the stages of societal development is organized according to modes of production. This latter scale consists of "the particular stage in the universal progression of history (the primitive,

slave, feudal, capitalist, and socialist modes of production) that people have reached at the time of [ethnic] classification" (Harrell, 1995, p. 23).[9] Since the establishment of the PRC and through contemporary times, students in the Chinese education system learn this scale as objective fact.[10] Unlike the Confucian project, the Communist civilizing project does not overtly promote a particular group as the preeminent model of civilization, but the de facto center of civilization in the Communist project is also the same group in power – the Han Chinese.

Chinese social scientists conducted an ethnic classification campaign in the 1950s. One objective of this campaign was to determine where each ethnic group fit on the scale of historical development.[11] Han Chinese were recognized as having reached the highest point on the universal progression of history scale (i.e. socialism) sometime in the 1950s (Harrell, 1995). The CCP invested itself with a responsibility to raise the civilization levels of the ethnic groups within the borders of the PRC through educational and developmental plans (i.e. *mínzúo gōngzuò* (ethnic work)).

Under CCP law, all ethnic groups have equal status, and according to Marxism-Leninism, all ethnic groups are to work together toward common goals. However, in practice, pervasive ethnic discrimination obstructs the realization of these objectives. Han Chinese ethnic discrimination is described by Harrell as "ingrained prejudice and local negative evaluation of minorities. This manifests itself at practically every level of

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[9] The universal progression of history scale is a good example of how "colonized knowledge perpetuates the hierarchical structure of society" (Carnoy, 1974, p. 3).
[10] This scale is not accepted without question; one Uyghur friend told me he found it "disgusting."
[11] Uyghurs were classified as semi-slave, semi-feudal.

Chinese society today" (1995, p. 25). Harrell elucidates, "As long as such an innate, almost visceral Han sense of superiority remains, the actual program of the Communist project will be based on the assumption that Han ways are better, more modern ways. Peripheral peoples who act like Han – who are educated, Hanophone, cultured – will be treated equally with their Han compatriots. But it is Han culture that sets the standard" (1995, p. 26).

The civilizing center promotes a conception of ethnicity that serves to reproduce the hegemony of the center and a divided, yet co-dependent, relationship between this center and the periphery. This relationship is often described in familial terms – that of a *xiōngdì* (brotherhood) under mother China (Dwyer, 2005, pp. 53-54). In this metaphorical order, Han Chinese are the big brother, while most ethnic minorities are little brothers. The little brother is dependent on his elder sibling for social and economic advancement.[12] It is important to note that within the Chinese family, the older brother always has authority over the younger brother, so this *xiōngdì* relationship locks the positions of Han Chinese and other ethnic groups in a perpetual trajectory of dominance and subordination. However contrived this metaphor might be, many Chinese fully accept it as doctrine and the CCP uses it to justify and legitimize their reign.

The Communist civilizing project is assimilative because one ideological tenet is the convergence of ethnicities, but as Harrell points out, this eventuality "is inconceivably

[12] This sibling metaphor has substantial currency in the Chinese imagination. When the U.S. sold billions of dollars worth of high-tech weaponry to Taiwan in the fall of 2008 (Shanker), many Chinese were infuriated. One Dongxiang man explained this anger to me by invoking the sibling metaphor. He characterized the fight between China and Taiwan as that between two brothers. He interpreted the American weapon deal as a form of interference in a family (i.e. internal) affair. The Dongxiang man told me, "When two brothers are fighting with their fists, you don't sell one of them a gun."

far in the future" (Harrell, 1995, p. 27). Han Chinese must set the standard to which other ethnic communities conform, and minority ethnic practices (e.g. religion, language) that are deemed impediments to progress must be eliminated. In practice, the Communist project is much like the Confucian project because hierarchies of development justify center policies that are imposed on the periphery. In this way, the contemporary rulers in Beijing constitute an authoritarian, paternalistic form of government that has much in common with the dynastic emperors of the past.

2.4 Language Policy in Xinjiang: A historical overview

This section will bring into focus a specific type of policy – language policy as imposed upon the peripheral peoples of Xinjiang in the past century. I first address the period spanning 1912-1944, that is, Xinjiang under the rule of Chinese warlords. I then describe language policy under the East Turkestan Republic, from 1944-1949. In 1949, the CCP took control of this territory and declared it a Chinese province. I will address CCP language policy in Xinjiang in terms of decades, working from the 1950s through the current millennium. Starting in 2008 and through 2010, the period that I lived in Urumchi, I describe CCP language policy in terms of years.

After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Xinjiang was ruled by a series of Chinese warlords who used language policy as one tool to retain control of the region (Bellér-Hann, 2000). Yang Zengxin, the Governor of Xinjiang from 1912-1928, attempted to restrict external (i.e. Central Asian) influences on the peoples of the region by restricting the teaching of Russian and making Chinese language instruction

compulsory (Bellér-Hann, 2000). However, it is unlikely that Yang had the personnel to implement this language policy (Toops, 2004b). Sheng Shicai, the Governor of Xinjiang from 1933-1944, took a different approach and reestablished native languages in the schools of the region. His objective was not to maintain the vitality of the native languages of Xinjiang, but to use the native languages in order to achieve more complete government control over the native population (Bellér-Hann, 2000). During this period, government schools (staffed mostly by Soviet-trained teachers) co-existed with schools operated by ethnic and religious associations. These latter schools, some of which were Madrasas, provided education in the native languages of Xinjiang. Ethnic and religious schools increased in number and became more popular than government schools. By one estimate, between 1934 and 1937, ethnic and religious schools outnumbered government schools five-to-one and had nearly double the student enrollment (Bellér-Hann, 2000).

In 1944, the East Turkestan Republic was established in the northern districts of Ili, Tarbaghatai and Altai. The Peace Agreement of January 2, 1946, signed by representatives of the East Turkestan Republic and representatives of the Chinese central government, had a specific provision for languages of formal school education:

> In all primary and middle schools, students will be educated in their own native languages; in middle schools, Chinese (guówén) will be used in all compulsory classes. At the university level, according to the needs of the subject, Chinese (guówén) or the Muslim language (Huíwén) will be used equally for education (Bellér-Hann, 2000, p. 191).

The East Turkestan Republic promoted both native languages, including Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, Tatar and Taranchi, and Mandarin as languages of instruction in the education system. These languages were used as mediums of instruction

in primary school, and through junior secondary school, Mandarin was taught as a subject for six to eight hours a week (Schluessel, 2007). The education system of the East Turkestan Republic came to an end when the PRC took control over the territory in 1949.

Starting in 1949 and through the 1950s, the founders of the PRC gave a certain amount of control over local education to the autonomous units established in the regional autonomy system; official language policies were tolerant of linguistic diversity (Benson, 2004; Dwyer, 2005; Zhou & Hongkai, 2004). The first constitution of the PRC decreed, "every ethnic group has the freedom to use and develop its own language and script" (Lam, 2005). In 1952, the State Council issued a set of guidelines for the autonomous regions of the PRC, which required autonomous governments "to adopt the languages of all minority nationalities within their jurisdiction for the development of these minorities' culture and education" (Zhou, 2003, p. 44).

The CCP concurrently maintained a language ideology that promoted a common language as indispensible – a tool for survival. Mandarin, the language of the most populous and most "developed" ethnic group was positioned at the top of the PRC linguistic hierarchy. In line with Marxist-Leninist thought, the spread of this language was deemed both natural and necessary. As asserted by Stalin, "without a language understood by society and common to all its members, that society must cease to produce, must disintegrate and cease to exist…while [language] is a medium of intercourse, it is at the same time an instrument of struggle and development of society" (Cheng & Lehmann, 1975). This ideology of monolingualism was not unique to Stalin or Marxism-Leninism. British linguist Randolph Quirk characterized the link between

language and nation as one of necessary unity:

> We have come to take it as axiomatic that the norm of national unity is linguistic unity: One nation, one language, with its standard determined by and emanating from the nation's capital – the seat of political authority, as well as authority in other respects (taste in architecture, literature, couture) (Quirk, 1982, p. 57).

In the early 1950s, Uyghur schools were modeled on the Soviet education system; the curriculum was designed by Uyghur and Russian educators and Uyghur was the language of instruction (W. C. Clark, 1999a). The CCP's close relationship with the Soviet Union resulted in a language policy that replaced the Arabic-based script with a Cyrillic-based script (Dwyer, 2005). When the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1958, the Cyrillic-based script was abandoned for a Latin-based script – the same orthography used in the transliteration system of *hànyǔ pīnyīn* (Benson, 2004; Dwyer, 2005). The selection of *hànyǔ* p*īnyīn* was motivated in part by a desire to facilitate the convergence of writing systems (Zhou, 2003). With each change in the Uyghur orthographic standard, new teaching materials had to be prepared and teachers retrained; these shifts had negative implications on Uyghur literacy. Han Chinese in Xinjiang were educated in separate Chinese schools, using materials prepared in mainland China (Benson, 2004). In 1956, the curriculum was modified, requiring all students attending native language schools to study Mandarin for two to three hours (Taussig, 1956). Starting in 1957, Uyghurs in Urumchi were permitted to attend Han Chinese schools, an attractive prospect to Uyghur parents who envisioned Mandarin fluency as a useful skill for their children to advance in the new Han Chinese dominated system (W. C. Clark, 1999a).

Maoist policies for socialist construction and enforced labor that had begun in the

1950s continued into the 1960s. The ideological persecutions of The Hundred Flowers movement in 1956 were followed by the economic chaos and famine of the Great Leap Forward period of 1959-1961. Mao Zedong's horrific succession of mass movements reached a catastrophic climax in the Cultural Revolution, beginning in 1966 (Millward & Tursun, 2004). Like other places in mainland China, the Xinjiang education system was brought to a halt during much of the Cultural Revolution (Benson, 2004). During this period, minority languages were considered useless and backward. "The use of some minority languages was discontinued by force" (Lam, 2005, p. 127)

The Cultural Revolution "officially" ended with Mao's death in 1976. A CCP Constitution promulgated in 1975, shortly before Mao's passing, was amended so that while ethnic minorities were still allowed to use their languages, they were no longer encouraged to develop them (Zhou, 2003). In December 1978, linguistic rights were restored to ethnic minority groups.

In 1979, another shift occurred in Uyghur orthography; the Arabic-based script was revived and the Latin-based script was abandoned (Dwyer, 2005). This resulted in a situation where Uyghurs educated in the 1950s and 1960s were literate in a Uyghur script that differed from the script being taught to their children. These script changes aroused suspicions among Uyghurs that the CCP was attempting to divide the Uyghur generations, but it is more likely that these changes were motivated by the CCP's shifting foreign relations (Benson, 2004).

In the 1980s, several pieces of legislation were passed that gave legal protection to ethnic minority languages and autonomous regions. A new constitution, the current

version, was adopted in 1982, which affirmed in Article 4 that "[t]he people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs" (Chinese Communist Party, 1982). Article 121 provided for local language use in government functions and Article 134 provided for local language use in legal proceedings.

The Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of 1985 included several articles on language and education. Article 10 stated that "[a]utonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas guarantee the freedom of the nationalities in these areas to use and develop their own spoken and written languages and their freedom to preserve or reform their own folkways and customs" (Chinese Communist Party, 1984). Article 36 stated that "[i]n accordance with state guidelines on education and in accordance with the law, autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas decide on educational plans in these areas, on the establishment of various kinds of schools at different levels, and on their educational system, forms, curricula, the language used in instruction and enrollment procedures" (Chinese Communist Party, 1984). Article 37 specified that "[s]chools (classes) and other educational organizations recruiting mostly ethnic minority students should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the media of instruction" (Chinese Communist Party, 1984). The role of Mandarin language education was also made explicit; Article 37 stated that "[b]eginning in the lower or senior grades of primary school, Han language and literature courses should be taught to popularize the common language used throughout the country and the use of Han Chinese characters" (Chinese Communist Party, 1984).

A separate-but-equal education system was established in Xinjiang for schools using Mandarin and ethnic minority languages as languages of instruction (Schluessel, 2007). In practice, this segregated system was unequal – funds were not allocated uniformly and instructors at ethnic minority schools lacked sufficient training. Mandarin was taught as a second language at ethnic minority schools, typically four hours per week. Ethnic minority students were required to study Mandarin as a second language, which denied them the choice of studying English or another foreign language, options available to their Han Chinese counterparts (Benson, 2004).

In 1984, Mandarin language education was expanded at ethnic minority schools through the region; the starting year for Mandarin language study was lowered to the third grade of primary school (Dwyer, 2005). A 1985 law made Mandarin language education compulsory in all cities and towns; schools serving nomads (i.e. boarding schools) were expected to make this transition by 1987 (Schluessel, 2007). Despite numerous laws and proclamations calling for Mandarin competency among the ethnic minority students of Xinjiang, levels of Mandarin competence in the mid-1980s were markedly lower than in other areas of China with sizable ethnic minority populations (Dwyer, 2005).

In 1991, a note from the CCP State Council indicated that despite there being insufficient guidance, personnel and financial support for ethnic minority language development, bilingualism should be encouraged among government personnel, and minority languages should be used in education or bilingual education (Chinese Communist Party, 1996). Lam (2005) speculated that "[t]his bilingual policy stance could

in part be motivated by the recognition that, without a good balance of accommodation and assimilation tendencies among its ethnic groups, a country with several nationalities might disintegrate into its component nationalities as in the case of the Soviet Union in 1991" (2005, p. 128).

In the early 1990s, bilingual education was made compulsory in large technical schools and universities and experimental bilingual language classes for minority students were established in several cities throughout Xinjiang (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007). Although bilingual education was conducted in both Uyghur and Mandarin, the high status accorded to Mandarin was demonstrated by the use of this language as the language of instruction in math and science courses. In 1997, "Xinjiang classes" (boarding schools in mainland China) were established in 12 cities; top performing minority students in Xinjiang are awarded the opportunity to attend these schools (Su, 2006).

This first decade of the new millennium has been marked by CCP rhetoric denigrating the value of ethnic minority languages in Xinjiang. In 2002, Xinjiang CCP chief Wang Lequan suggested that ethnic minority languages were antiquated, had limited lexicons, and were unsuitable for formal education contexts (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 2002). In 2005, Wang asserted that government authorities are "resolutely determined" to promote Mandarin language use, which he identified as "an extremely serious political issue" (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005). Officials consistently frame the conversation on bilingual education is terms of raising the "quality" of minority students so that students can receive a "modern

education." One Uyghur professional commented, "This new wave is like a new Cultural Revolution for the Uyghurs. In the first Cultural Revolution the Chinese government destroyed the intellectuals. Now they are in the process of destroying the language" (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007). Dwyer, cited in an *Al Jazeera* article (2008), summarized the CCP and Uyghur perspectives:

> From the point of view of the government, this [change in language policy] is because Uighur pupils and university students don't have the adequate Chinese language skills to be competitive in the market economy. But from the point of view of the Uighurs, this is a bold-faced attempt to be assimilated and it has not been viewed favourably.

The CCP rhetoric has been backed up by a succession of language policies and financial support in favor of Mandarin. In September 2002, Xinjiang University was ordered to cease Uyghur language instruction (Wingfield-Hayes, 2002). The start of Mandarin instruction for ethnic minority students was lowered to the first grade (Dwyer, 2005). Ethnic minority teachers at all levels are now required to pass the *hànyǔ shuǐpíng kǎoshì* (Chinese Language Proficiency Test), an exam of Mandarin proficiency for non-native speakers. Veteran teachers who score too low are forced or retire or take Mandarin classes (Schluessel, 2007). In March 2004, the *Xinjiang Daily* decreed that "ethnic minority schools must be merged with ethnic Chinese schools and ethnic minority students must be mixed with ethnic Chinese students. Teaching should be conducted in Chinese language as much as possible" (Radio Free Asia, 2004).

Ethnic minority schools have converted, or are converting, to a bilingual curriculum where Mandarin is the language of instruction and ethnic minority languages have subject status. By 2006, the number of students receiving bilingual education in

Xinjiang had expanded 50-fold within six years (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2008a). Schools that could not convert immediately were expected to adhere to a multiyear plan where they would annually increase the amount of Mandarin instruction (Schluessel, 2007). Also in 2006, preschools in seven agricultural prefectures began using Mandarin as a language of instruction, with cash subsidies offered to entice families and teachers to enroll children (Wu, 2006). The CCP also encouraged Mandarin language studies for ethnic minority peoples who did not develop proficiency in Mandarin during their formal education. Several rural villages and counties established programs to teach basic Mandarin to migrant workers. Adult ethnic minority peoples who did not attend Mandarin medium schools in their youth were provided with a $44 subsidy toward Mandarin-language training (Schluessel, 2007).

In 2008, the government continued its push for bilingual education. In March of 2008, Nur Bekri, CCP chairman of Xinjiang, linked bilingual education with the fight against terrorism, describing criticisms of bilingual education as an attack from the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism operating from abroad. Bekri asserted that the Xinjiang bilingual education program ascribed equal value to ethnic minority languages and Mandarin, despite wide recognition, including from official Chinese media, that language policies were favorable to Mandarin (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2008b).

Bilingual preschools, already widespread in some areas of Xinjiang (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2008a), with 180,458 ethnic minority students enrolled as of 2007, received a financial boost of $549 million, nearly a nine-

fold increase in funding over amounts pledged in 2006. A target rate was set of over 85 percent ethnic minority student preschool enrollment in rural areas by 2012 (Xinhua News Agency, 2008).

Ethnic minority teachers continue to face language requirements, with penalty of dismissal or transfer to non-teaching positions for failure to conform (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2008b). Teachers above 35 years of age and those who do not have "appropriate" viewpoints toward religion, ethnicity and the Marxist state, as well as demonstrated loyalty to the CCP face additional barriers (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009a; Radio Free Asia, 2009b). In the fall of 2008, the *Xinhua News Agency* reported that 15,600 bilingual primary school teachers would be recruited to Xinjiang between 2008 and 2013 to fill the "teacher shortage" for bilingual teachers at the primary school level and maintain the bilingual language education begun in preschool (2008). Ten colleges and universities in mainland China were enlisted to dispatch students to meet the "teacher shortage" (Dalin, 2008). By October 2008, the number of ethnic minority students in preschool through high school in Xinjiang who received bilingual education increased by more than 125,000 students year on year (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009c).

The year on year increase in 2009 for Mandarin education reached 150,000 (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010b). A total of 753,300 ethnic minority students at all education levels, representing 31.79 percent of the ethnic minority student population of Xinjiang, received bilingual education, an increase of over 25 percent from the previous year. Combined with the bilingual student population, the two

groups of students receiving education in Mandarin made up almost 42 percent of the ethnic minority student population.

In 2009, the promotion of bilingual education at the preschool level continued with more teacher recruitment and pledges of hundreds of millions of dollars in funding (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010b). The government set 2012 as the target date for the establishment of 2,237 more bilingual preschools throughout the region (Jia, 2009a).

In June 2009, Xinjiang CCP chairman Nur Bekri again linked Mandarin language education with terrorism stating, "Terrorists from neighboring countries mainly target Uygurs that are relatively isolated from mainstream society as they cannot speak Mandarin" (Jia, 2009b). As opportunities for higher education are contingent on Mandarin language competence, an incentive structure has been entrenched that promotes Mandarin at the expense of other languages; however, this "need stems from government failures to implement autonomy in ethnic minority regions as provided in Chinese law" (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2008b).

The CCP language policy trends of previous years showed no signs of abating in 2010. That year, the number of students enrolled in preschools throughout the Uyghur region climbed to 290,000 (Wang, 2010). In late May, Xinjiang CCP chief Zhang Chunxian announced a series of initiatives for the region, one calling for a further intensification of bilingual education with the objective of region-wide student competence in Mandarin by 2020 (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010a). The Congressional-Executive Commission on China has asserted that "the

[Chinese] government's bilingual policy is tied to broader political objectives in the region" including the promotion of "patriotism, ethnic unity, and stability" (2010b).

My study was informed by the history of CCP language policy in Xinjiang because of my focus on how languages exist and evolve in an ecosystem along with other languages, and how they [their speakers] "interact with their socio-political, economic and cultural environments'" (Hornberger, 2002, p. 35). An ecological perspective on CCP language policy in Xinjiang is productive for the exploration of issues related to hegemony, including monolingual and monocultural ideologies. As Spolsky (2004) suggested, the investigation of language policy is meaningful because this activity facilitates our understanding of "what non-language variables co-vary with language variables" (p. 8). Language management, defined as a direct effort to manipulate a language situation (Spolsky, 2004, p. 8), is complex, whether a government is attempting to facilitate the language assimilation of a particular population or a community is engaging in language maintenance or revitalization. This study investigates CCP language policy as an activity with historical momentum and a tool (exercised through the school) for social and cultural reproduction (Apple, 1982; Bourdieu, 1977c; Valenzuela, 1999).

2.5 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN XINJIANG

According to contemporary scholars (C. Baker, 2001), bilingual education refers to education in more than one language, often encompassing more than two languages. Bilingual education programs typically use the target language as a medium of

instruction, that is, bilingual education programs teach content through a language variety other than the children's home language. According to García (2008), "Bilingual education programs operate with the broader general goal to "*educate generally, meaningfully, equitably, and for tolerance and appreciation of diversity*" (p. 38). The term "bilingual education" is used to denote both a type of program and in reference to "a wide range of programs that may have different ideological orientations toward linguistic and cultural diversity, different target populations and different goals for those target populations" (Freeman, 2007, p. 4; Hornberger, 1991).

In Freeman's (2007) review of bilingual education, models and program types are "organized around a major ideological distinction between the transitional bilingual model on the one hand and the dual language model on the other" (p. 4). Transitional bilingual programs use students' first language as the language of instruction in the early years of formal education, and then transition to the use of a target language as the language of instruction, with the goal being target language development and academic achievement in the target language. Transitional bilingual programs tend to lead to subtractive bilingualism (Valenzuela, 1999) and deculturation (Spring, 1994). Dual language programs have the goal of bilingualism, biliteracy, and academic achievement in two languages, tending to support additive bilingualism. As Freeman (2007) emphasizes, these program orientations have "serious implications for individual students, for schools, and for society overall" (p. 4).

According to Schluessel, "In the case of Xinjiang and of China in general, 'bilingual education' is a euphemism for the mandatory increase in the use of Mandarin

in minority-language-speaking children's school environments in place of the languages that are those students' everyday medium of communication" (Schluessel, 2007, p. 251). This trend toward monolingual Mandarin education can be seen at all levels of instruction (Dwyer, 2005). At the tertiary level in Xinjiang, the shift to monolingual Mandarin education was completed in September 2002, when Xinjiang University discontinued Uyghur-language instruction, despite widespread protest (Groβe, 2002; Wingfield-Hayes, 2002). Mandarin is now the main medium of instruction in the bilingual primary and secondary schools of Xinjiang (Schluessel, 2007). In the bilingual classrooms of Xinjiang, Mandarin language education and instruction through Mandarin is compulsory from the first grade, with Uyghur taught as if it were a second language (Dwyer, 2005). All subjects are taught in Mandarin, except for Uyghur language arts (i.e. reading, spelling, literature, and composition).

Bilingual education in Xinjiang consists of marginal Uyghur language support. In theory, this language policy requires all bilingual schools in Xinjiang to use Mandarin as the language of instruction, with Uyghur to be taught as a subject, providing "the opportunity to learn Uyghur language, culture, and literature as part of their curriculum" (Radio Free Asia, 2011a). Schluessel (2007) suggests that in the standard parlance of bilingual education theory, bilingual education as implemented in Xinjiang bears closer resemblance to monolingual structured immersion programs, in which minority first-language students are immersed in a second language, but with supplementary instruction in the second language or classes in the first language.

Ostensibly, bilingual education for Uyghurs in Xinjiang might be classified as a dual language program, but the dominance of Mandarin suggests that this form of bilingual education "is designed to transition minority students from education in their mother tongue to education in Chinese" (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007). In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee 2010-2020 Education Reform and Development Plan (2011), the promotion of bilingual education is described as being of "strategic significance" for goals including "building a new model of socialist ethnic relations" and "promoting cohesion and centripetal force toward the Chinese nation (*zhōnghùa mìnzù*)." The stated goals of Mandarin language development and academic achievement, coupled with a nationalist and assimilationist ideology is suggestive of a transitional orientation. Perhaps this is why many agencies, including the CCP (2008a, 2008b), U.S. (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2008a, 2009c, 2010b), and human rights organizations (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007), often use the word *bilingual*, in quotes when referring to bilingual education for ethnic minority students in Xinjiang. Bilingual education in Xinjiang might be called an ideological euphemism.

The implementation of language policy in Xinjiang is not uniform, contingent upon the capacity in particular areas to teach Mandarin effectively, policy interpretations by local government officials, local ideologies and economic resources (Dwyer, 2005). As Strawbridge (2008) noted, "All minority children in Yining City since September 2007, are required to learn Mandarin from grade one, and do not have any instruction in mother tongue. These children will continue to be taught in Mandarin as they progress

through primary school, and will learn basic skills in mother tongue only from grade four. In other areas of Xinjiang, including Urumchi Municipality, primary teachers will use Mandarin as the language of instruction from 2009, and minority children will have between two and four periods per week of mother tongue taught as a subject" (p. 2). Although implemented in different ways, the common denominator to bilingual education for Uyghurs in Xinjiang is that Mandarin is dominant and Uyghur is of marginal academic status. I make this latter claim because Uyghur language competence is not a component of the national college entrance exam, compulsory for entrance into almost all higher education institutions at the undergraduate level in China. As expressed by Zhou (2004), minority language policy in China is defined by "equality in theory and inequality in practice" (p. 71).

2.6 Bourdieu's theory of practice

In the preceding sections, I presented information on the history of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang, including sources of contemporary Uyghur discontent, and geopolitics, natural resources and CCP investments. I provided an overview of some of the ideological tenets of Confucian and Communist civilizing projects. I then examined the past century of language policy in Xinjiang. These social and material conditions, historically produced, structure the milieu under investigation. This background information is intended to support a "diachronic, or historicized, approach to language…in order to highlight and explore how particular languages come to accrue status and power over time in particular social and political contexts" (May, 2011, p.

148). This is a central component to a Bourdieusian approach to the study of language. In this section, I provide on overview of Bourdieu's theory of practice and the thinking tools I employ to analyze the language practices of my case study participants.

Bourdieu invoked the metaphor of games to capture his sense of social life, but apart from being an activity that one enters or engages in with conscious deliberation, Bourdieu's conception of social life involves games that require our active engagement, regardless of consent (1990). Agents in the game need not only grasp and follow the rules that define it, but develop a social sense of how to play. Agents learn how to conform to existing cultural practices. This conformity demonstrates a commitment to the stakes of the game – what is invested in the hope of gain. "There are different possible approaches to each contest, and to each moment in the contest" (C. Calhoun, 2003, p. 275). This game requires strategy and constant improvisation, with anticipation and responsiveness to the play of one's opponent. Improvisations and movements are responses to social and cultural structures; they are informed by previous experience and influenced by external and internal constraints.

One of Bourdieu's intellectual projects was to challenge and transcend dichotomies that he considered false, such as theory versus practice, and objective structure versus subjective action. Bourdieu saw these oppositions as inseparably related to each other, forming dialectical relationships: "Seemingly fixed objective structures have to be created and produced; apparently voluntary subjective actions depend on and are shaped by objective conditions and constraints; knowledge and action consistently inform each other, rather than theory guiding practice by a fixed set of rules" (C.

Calhoun, 2003, p. 286).

Bourdieu asserted that rules did govern complex social games, but that practical activity involves continuous adaptation and strategic action to circumstances. Culture does not consist of a finite set of rules that people must follow; individuals depend on resources, practical dispositions and strategies that allow for the improvisation of actions where no learned rules are applicable or available. Rules are "themselves the product of a small batch of schemes enabling agents to generate an infinity of practices adapted to endlessly changing situations, without those schemes ever having been considered as explicit principles" (Bourdieu, 1977b, p. 16). Players in the game attempt to accomplish things under conditions of uncertainty. "Not only is the future not yet settled, but the actor cannot see the whole of society, the player can only see the game from his or her particular position within it" (C. Calhoun, 2003, p. 287). The underlying conditions of possibility based on the practical subjective knowledge of the social world become the basis of human action. The ways human beings act are the result of practical, durable dispositions that they develop through their experience of objective structures. In this way, human action and objective structures exist in a dialectical relationship. A logic of interest shapes human action, even when not conscious, for action is interested even when it appears not to be.

When we are born into this world, we are already involved in something much larger than ourselves – a nexus of social games. Much of the power of the socialization process, our orientation to these social games, is experienced in bodily terms; these experiences are internalized and become part of who we are and how we exist in the

world. Objective structures, the "material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition," are involved in the production of our habitus, defined as "systems and durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures…collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor" (Bourdieu, 1977b, p. 72). These durable dispositions constitute our habitus – the embodiment of a highly consistent style.

Habitus is both an ontological and cognitive disposition. Though we are born with different types of potential, habitus is not some innate characteristic. Habitus forms from interactions between institutions and bodies; it is the fundamental way in which each person as a biological being connects with the socio-cultural order. This connection ensures that social games are propagated and that their meaning is retained. In Bourdieu's theory of practice, objective structures do not determine our habitus, nor do individuals possess full creativity or full free will, but through a combination of culture and cognition, we develop practical dispositions to act in certain ways. "Out of what meets with approval or doesn't, what works or doesn't, we develop a characteristic way of generating new actions, of improvising the moves of the game of our lives" (C. Calhoun, 2003, p. 292).

We learn and incorporate into our habitus a sense of what we can reasonably accept from our moves. These games require not just knowledge of the rules but a practical sense for the game. The habitus is "the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations" made up of "cognitive and motivating structures" which enable people to generate appropriate practices in response to demands placed on them by the

"objective potentialities in the situation" (Bourdieu, 1977b, p. 78). Habitus is each individual's characteristic set of dispositions for action and also a source of strategies for the effective play of social games.

Social activities are organized into different autonomous fields, such as the arts, education, politics, law and economy, each having its own distinctive set of rules and stakes of play. Habitus and field exist in a dialectical relationship:

> On one side, it is a relation of conditioning: the field structures the habitus, which is the product of the embodiment of the imminent necessity of a field (or of a set of intersecting fields, the extent of their intersection or discrepancy being at the root of a divided or even torn habitus). On the other side, it is a relation of knowledge or cognitive construction (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 127).

Social agents who possess habitus predicate the existence of a field and the particular set of perceptual schemata necessary to constitute a field and imbue it with meaning. Participation in a field impinges on habitus because involvement results in ontological and cognitive incorporation into one's habitus. The specific dispositions (including knowledge of rules and constraints) that form habitus provide for the constitution and propagation of the field. The meeting of habitus and field is one of incorporated (subjective) history and objectified history. Habitus structures the field and the field, as a structured social space, mediates between habitus and practice.

The concept of capital is an intrinsic component of Bourdieu's theory of practice because "capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 101). Capital is manifest in various forms such as material property (economic capital), networks of connections (social capital), language (cultural capital) and prestige (symbolic capital) (Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). All forms

of capital can be accumulated, lost and converted between fields, although the dynamics of conversion can be problematic. Resources and various forms of capital interact in the process of conversion. It is "[t]he specific kinds of resources accumulated by those who are winners in the struggles of various fields and the more general forms of capital – such as money and prestige – that make possible translations from one to the other" (C. Calhoun, 2003, p. 294).

Each form of capital is tied to a different field of action and conversion between fields can take one of two forms. The first is intergenerational, where capital is passed on and reconverted, such as when a parent funds the education of a child at an elite school. Educational credentials form cultural capital that can be converted into symbolic capital and later material capital. This results in the reproduction of capital. The second form of conversion is more immediate where symbolic capital accumulated by an individual is directly converted into material wealth. Bourdieu's theory of capital differs from the Marxist conception of capital in that, for Bourdieu, there are many different kinds of goods that people pursue and resources they accumulate. These resources are basically social because their meaning and value is derived from the social relationships that constitute diverse fields. Bourdieu asserts that the struggle to accumulate and reproduce capital is equally fundamental, and that successful conversions play an important role in these processes.

Bourdieu conceives of language as a form of embodied cultural capital. Linguistic capital, one's mastery of and relation to language, is a means of communication and self-presentation acquired from one's surrounding culture (Bourdieu, 1990). But language is

not only a system of communication passed down through generations. It is also a mechanism of power, shaped by and shaping socio-historical contexts (Bourdieu, 1991). The modern capitalist nation-state utilizes the education system in order to impose and naturalize the legitimate language and orthographic standard, thus sanctioning an environment of differential access. The legitimate language of instruction in the education system is also the official, standard language, and the language of the privileged or elite class. Differential access to linguistic forms, and socio-cultural experiences in which to develop notions of appropriateness, gives some students a relative advantage over others. In a stratified society, where linguistic forms exist in a hierarchy of communication, regional dialects and non-legitimate languages are socially devalued. Thus the school is a context for conflict, competition (and co-operation among the elite class) involving the corresponding levels of linguistic and social differentiation.

Bourdieu argues that particular linguistic practices obtain value from their association with prestige (or dominant) groups and institutional authority (1991). In the linguistic market, a symbolic market made up of various social domains within which linguistic exchanges take place, value both emerges and is profited from. Practices that are embedded in an individual's communicative and conceptual routines, as linguistic habitus, represent a stock of linguistic capital. As a symbolic unit of exchange, linguistic capital can be utilized to advance (or hinder) one's social and linguistic projects. However, conversion between forms of capital can be problematic.

The distribution of opportunities in a given society is shaped by power. Power is not only situated in stratified societies, but is an energy that can be exercised, transferred

and maintained. Stratified societies are not neutral – they must be reproduced and sustained (Hebdige, 1979). Reproduction occurs when an aggregate of social groups exert "total social authority" over other subordinate groups by "winning and shaping consent so that the power of the dominant classes appears both legitimate and natural" (S. Hall, 1979). Social structures are internalized as we experience them – "they are inside each of us because we have learned from the experience of previous actions" (C. Calhoun, 2003, p. 289). We develop our practical understanding of these structures through our learning of categories (doxa) made available by culture and though our own active development of understanding. Social structures, like ideologies, appear as natural and are transparent because, through a process of historical continuance, stratification becomes conventionalized.

Bourdieu's framework integrates a theory of social structure (the field), a theory of power relations (the various forms of capital), and a theory of the individual (habitus) (Bourdieu, 1977a, 1977b, 1986). This is an appropriate theoretical lens for my study because I am interested in language practices as shaped by and shaping social structures and how unequal power relations legitimize or delegitimize speakers (Bourdieu, 1977a). This theory is appropriate to address my research questions because Bourdieu advocated for the analysis of language as embedded in a cultural context and with reference to social conditions of production and reception (Bourdieu, 1991). His emphasis on context complements an ecological approach to the exploration of language practices, and contributes to the illumination of aspects of language use in multilingual environments.

2.6.1 Applications of Bourdieu's theory to the study of language

In the absence of methodological orthodoxy in which to conform, researchers have applied Bourdieu's perspective to a range of language and linguistic contexts (Grenfell, 2011c). The purpose of this section is to review a set of studies performed by scholars who have applied Bourdieu's theory of practice to language and linguistics.

Grenfell (2011b), working with a corpus of French collected in the town of Orléans, considers language variation, with a focus on phonetics, phonology and syntax. Grenfell employs quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate how and why linguistic variation occurs. This study demonstrates how the Bourdieusian concepts of linguistic capital (the legitimate language and local dialect), habitus and field can provide insight into the dynamics of language variation. Grenfell shows how national and local linguistic markets "define themselves relative to each other" (2011b, p. 90). National and local linguistic markets are a focal point of the present study because CCP language ideology consistently links Mandarin (the standard language of the national linguistic market) with increased employment opportunities (Jia, 2009a, 2009b). The present study also explores the instability of diglossia in Xinjiang among Uyghur communities, a consequence of Mandarin "leaking" (Dyers, 1999; Kamwangamalu, 2002) and spreading into formerly Uyghur domains, including education (Fishman, 1972).

Vann (2011) conducted a study on the Spanish of Catalonia, Spain, demonstrating how academic investigations of national languages reproduce linguistic ideologies. This study utilizes Bourdieu's concept of the linguistic market to reveal the way some languages come to accrue more value than others and why. Vann posits that language

ideologies in linguistic research impinge upon the description and documentation of a dominant language – "the product of the complex interaction of linguistic habitus and academic market in a political economy of language" (2011, p. 118). Vann shows how ideological issues influence researchers' conceptualizations of language, including choices related to topics of study and methodological approaches. The present study, informed by reflexive and critical ethnography (Davies, 1999; Foley, 2002), explores language ideology as a mediating link between social structures and language practices (Bourdieu, 1977b; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994).

Blackledge (2011) analyzes micro-interactions in the marketplaces of four cities in England, arguing that Bourdieu's metaphor of the linguistic market is "of particular value in understanding the ways in which access to resources is negotiated in multilingual settings" (pp. 130-131). Utilizing the interpretive stance of linguistic ethnography, this study "attempts to combine close detail of local action and interaction as embedded in a wider social world" (Blackledge, 2011, p. 123). Blackledge demonstrates how "different sets of linguistic resources function differentially as linguistic capital in particular markets, and accumulate different values in different contexts" (2011, p. 144). The present study also attends to the function of linguistic resources in the linguistic marketplace (Mühlhäusler, 1996, 2000), exploring how Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching may be interpreted to be a form of adaptation to specific environmental conditions (2003, pp. 41-42) in order to resist or redefine the value of symbolic resources.

May (2011) utilizes the Bourdieusian concepts of habitus and linguistic markets as heuristics for the interpretation of a body of research related to language policy and

language rights. May critiques the primary emphasis of language policy in the 1960s and 1970s to "solve the immediate language problems of newly emergent postcolonial states in Africa (e.g. Sudan, Tanzania), Asia (e.g. India, Pakistan), the Pacific (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia) and the Middle East (e.g. Israel, Palestine)" (2003, p. 151). Scholars of this era often expressed concern for the maintenance of minority languages, but the overriding priority was to establish and promote "unifying" national languages (Fishman, 1971).

May recognizes diglossia, a form of bilingualism with high and low prestige languages (Ferguson, 1959), as inherently unstable because the high language (often the national or official language of the dominant group) is sustained by socio-economic and market forces, and an educational system that reproduces and legitimizes the relations of power and knowledge implicated with the national language (Dua, 1994). National languages come to be associated with modernity and progress while minority languages, relegated to private domains, are associated with tradition and obsolescence.

May argues that "adopting a more pluralistic, inclusive approach to the public recognition and use of languages is actually crucial for *enhancing* social and political stability, rather than undermining it, as the political rhetoric of nationalism would have it" (2011, p. 167). Dwyer also argued for a pluralistic, inclusive approach to language recognition, stating in a policy recommendation that, "to maintain a stable nation-state and continue to develop the [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region] and the country, there is thus little other choice than to, at a minimum, support the *maintenance* of local languages and cultures if not their *revitalization*" (2005, pp. 63-64). These arguments are compelling, as is Dwyer's admonition that the prohibition of "Uyghur-language teaching

in an area as sensitive as Xinjiang will radicalize a portion of once-indifferent students" (2005, p. 64). I support these positions because I encountered many Uyghur young adults who cited the marginalization of the Uyghur language as a state-sponsored assault on Uyghur cultural autonomy.

Hardy (2011) considers how Bourdieu's approach to language and linguistic study can inform the study of language and pedagogy. This study posits that, in the classroom context, linguistic competence is an amalgam of pedagogical capital and linguistic capital. Using data from three case examples, Hardy demonstrates that the form this capital takes is specific to a field at a particular time and place. Hardy suggests that Bourdieu's theory of practice is "well suited to the field of education where change is not only frequent but endemic… Educational institutions do change over time since their continued existence and degree of consecration in relation to one another must vary in step with State policy" (2011, p. 191). As the present study focuses on the language practices of Uyghur young adults as shaped by and shaping the language ecology of Xinjiang, political conditions play a prominent role. Vacillations in CCP policy regarding economic development and cultural autonomy have implications for the academic field in Xinjiang, with educational institutions functioning to structures language practices (Bourdieu, 1977b).

Chen (2009) performed a study on Uyghur students' experience in a boarding school in mainland China, identifying four Uyghur ethnic norms on campus: a prevalence of Uyghur language use after classes; the maintenance of Muslim dietary practices; the maintenance of gendered greeting rituals; and a continuation of Uyghur ethnic dressing

customs. These norms were reinforced by Uyghur students' tight and close social networks within the segregated boarding school context. Drawing from Bourdieu, Chen argues that "Uyghur students' bonding social capital reinforces Uyghur ethnic boundaries, increases group solidarity, as well as creates a resistant culture toward school official ideology of ethnic integration" (Y. Chen & Postiglione, 2009, p. 304). The present study builds on Chen's work by examining Uyghur counter-narratives associated with CCP ideology (Giroux, 1996); investments in Mandarin (and the development of social identities) as related to contextual conditions (J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 2000; B. Norton & Toohey, 2001); deculturation (Spring, 1994); and subtractive schooling (Valenzuela, 1999).

The above studies demonstrate how Bourdieu's theory of practice can be applied to a range of languages and linguistic contexts. To reiterate, there is no definitive methodological approach, although scholars such as Grenfell (2011d) have initiated discussions on Bourdieusian methodology, including conceptions (and scrutiny of conceptions) of language across the academic disciplines; the study of language in terms of field analysis; and aspects of reflexivity in participant observation.

2.7 CONCLUSION

In this section, I indicate how my dissertation project contributes to the study of ethnography and language policy; the ethnographic-sociolinguistic approach to the issue of linguistic rights; case study methods in applied linguistics; and Bourdieusian approaches to the investigation of language practices.

Ethnographic accounts of language policy are growing in prominence (K. S. Anderson, 2009; McCarty, 2011). These studies describe the power relations that structure social-linguistic hierarchies and how individuals "make" language policy in everyday social practice. In Xinjiang, the Uyghur and Mandarin linguistic communities have an unequal power relationship, and as a consequence of the encroachment of Mandarin in the Xinjiang education system, the diglossic situation is now unstable. This study explores the language practices of Uyghur young adults among and across fields in the linguistic markets of Xinjiang (Chiswic, 2008; Heller, 1999; Rampton, 1995). This study also investigates language maintenance and language shift at the Uyghur ethnolinguistic community level, focusing on relationships between change (or stability) in language usage patterns, and continuous psychological, social or cultural processes in a Uyghur population that utilizes more than one speech variety (e.g. Uyghur, Mandarin) for intra-group or for inter-group purposes (Fishman, 1972).

Blommaert argues for an ethnographic-sociolinguistic approach to the issue of linguistic rights, stating:

> If we adopt an ethnographic viewpoint on the issue of language in society, we need to focus on how linguistic resources are actually employed, and under what conditions, in real societies. In order to arrive there, we can use a framework in which language use is seen as oriented towards multiple but stratified centering institutions that construct and offer opportunities to reproduce indexicalities. Such indexicalities determine the "social" in language use, and they are the basis of interpretive work. The way in which they are organized is the locus of inequality. (2005, pp. 409-410)

The domestic and academic fields of Xinjiang play a role as "centering institutions," or what Bourdieu called "structuring structures" (Bourdieu, 1977b). This

study utilizes ethnographic methodology in order to obtain a thick description of domains and social networks mediated by linguistic interactions (Geertz, 1973; May, 2011). This data is utilized as a point of reference to devise recommendations about what can be done to sustain the vitality of Uyghur, as opposed to starting with an ideal or static conception of language in society (Blommaert, 2005). I present three approaches for the maintenance of Uyghur language vitality, all at the level of the family unit (Spolsky, 2005), and one set of actions that may be taken by linguists, educators and activists in support of Uyghur language vitality, a cultural heritage of the Uyghur ethnolinguistic community.

Case study methodology is an established tradition in applied linguistics research (Duff, 2007). Longitudinal ethnographic case studies in applied linguistics have been designed to explore linguistic and cultural identity (Schecter & Bayley, 2002); and the educational cultures and conditions for immigrants to the U.S. learning through the medium of English as a Second Language (Harklau, 1994; Hunter, 1997; McKay & Wong, 1996; Toohey, 2000; Willett, 1995). Norton's multiple case study of five immigrant women's attempts to learn English in Canada examined issues of power, racism, reproduction, hybridity, identity, cultural capital, and the complex social histories and desires of learners (Bonny Norton, 2000). This study makes a contribution to ethnographic case studies in applied linguistics because I was an outsider performing fieldwork in an unstable place; future reserachers might find my experience at site, recorded in section 3.3.1.1, of interest or utility because of the danger management strategies I employed (Sluka, 1995).

Finally, this study makes a contribution to our understanding of the language

practices of an involuntary minority[13] (Bourdieu, 1991; Ogbu, 1978). This study will shed light on the socio-historical and socio-political processes behind language shift – the complex set of forces which "valorize majority languages and actively stigmatize minority languages" (May, 2011, pp. 148-149). This study serves to address the question: What does it mean to be in possession of linguistic capital when social conditions undermine equitable conversion? Many Uyghur young adults are competent speaks of Mandarin, the national standard and thus eminent "legitimate" language of the PRC, however symbolic power is unequally distributed among the ethnic communities of Xinjiang, resulting in social stratification and the positioning of Uyghurs as subordinate and "illegitimate" speakers (Bourdieu, 1977a, p. 648). This study explores what it means to be an "illegitimate" speaker of a "legitimate" language, and how linguistic capital is (un)successfully converted into other types of capital (e.g. economic, social, cultural, symbolic) (Bourdieu, 1986).

[13] Here I invoke "involuntary minority," to suggest that Uyghurs have an oppositional cultural frame of reference, distrusting the dominant Han Chinese and their institutions and perceiving them as the gatekeepers obstructing them from channels to success and social mobility (Ogbu, 1978; L. F. Zhang & Sternberg, 2011, p. 20). For a forward-looking criticism of Ogbu's Cultural Ecological Model, see Foster (2008).

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Research methodology overview

I conducted 18 months of fieldwork in Urumchi to collect data on the language practices of Uyghur young adults. I utilized methods associated with ethnography and case study research: participant observation, interviews and documents (Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Davies, 1999; Geertz, 1973; LeCompte & Schensul, 2010; Spindler & Spindler, 1987; Yin, 2003, 2010). I also used one quantitative method, an expressive vocabulary assessment inspired by Dunn and Dunn's *Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test* (1965, 1997). I utilized NVivo qualitative data analysis software to facilitate thematic analysis of the data, including inductive and deductive coding. In the following sections, I describe the methodologies used in this study.

3.2 The research site

Xinjiang is the largest administrative division of the PRC. At 1,660,000 square kilometers (one-sixth of the PRC), Xinjiang is nearly the size of Iran or almost 2½ times the size of Texas. Many Uyghurs in Urumchi refer to the Chinese territory outside of Xinjiang as "inner-land" or "mainland" China, signifying conscious of their location on the periphery of the PRC.

Urumchi is located 2,417 kilometers from Beijing and 1,888 kilometers from Kabul, Afghanistan. Urumchi is the furthest city from any sea in the world (2,500 kilometers from the nearest coastline) and the nearest major city to the Eurasian Pole of

inaccessibility (Harper, 2002). According to the sixth national census, conducted in 2010, the population of Urumchi was 3,110,280 (Ling, 2011b). The total area of Urumchi is nearly 11,000 square kilometers, about the size of Jamaica. Urumchi is divided into eight administrative sub-divisions and county-level units. The population density in 2000 was 174 people per square kilometer. However, the aggregate measurement of population per unit area obscures the fact that the inhabitants of Urumchi are not equally distributed across the municipality. The *Tiānshān* District is densely populated, roughly equivalent to Los Angeles, while other districts are significantly less populated.

The population in Xinjiang consists of 8,746,148 Han Chinese (40.1% of the total population) while the "minority population" is 13,067,186 (59.9% of the total population). The 2010 census does not provide detailed data on the minority ethnic demographics of Urumchi or Xinjiang (Ling, 2011b). According to the 2000 census, Urumchi was around 75% Han Chinese, 13% Uyghur and 8% Hui, with smaller numbers of other ethnic groups (National Bureau of Statistics and Population, 2003). Most Uyghurs reside in the area south of *Nánmén* and *Èrdàoqiáo*. Uyghur and Han Chinese commercial properties are concentrated in areas that serve their respective ethnic clientele, but there are some Han Chinese-owned businesses situated in the most densely populated Uyghur areas and there are some Uyghur-owned businesses (mostly restaurants) in predominantly Han Chinese areas, including the central business district. This segregation propagates a Uyghur and Han Chinese "dual economy" (Dillon, 2009b).

Travelers to Urumchi sometimes remark that it looks like a "typical" Chinese city (Harper, 2007), perhaps because of the ubiquitous signs in Chinese script and the

numerous fast food chains (e.g. KFC, Dicos and Roast King) situated along the city blocks. Most public and commercial signs in Urumchi, aspects of the "linguistic landscape" (Landry & Bourhis, 1997), feature a dominant Chinese script. But above the Chinese script is usually a line (sometimes miniscule) of Uyghur *kona yëziq* (old [Arabic-style] script). If interpreted as a marker of relative power, the Uyghur community is clearly marginal.

3.3 ETHNOGRAPHY AND EARLIER ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDIES ON XINJIANG/UYGHURS

Geertz described ethnography as "thick description," a style of inscription where the flow of social discourse (i.e. symbolic action) of a cultural group is interpreted in context (Geertz, 1973). Duranti later described "successful ethnography" as a "style in which the researcher establishes a dialogue between different viewpoints and voices, including those of the people studied, of the ethnographer, and of his disciplinary and theoretical preferences" (Duranti, 1997, p. 87). This study describes a particular type of social discourse (i.e. language practices) of Uyghur young adults. In reference to Duranti (1997) and the critical ethnographic approach advocated by Foley (2002), this study holds dichotomies like insider/outsider status and reproduction/resistance in a "useful tension" (Foley, 2002, p. 486). I employ a reflexive, realist narrative style of writing where multiple perspectives and ideological stances are presented and interpreted. In this section, I describe ethnography, reviewing theoretical orientations, and as a strategy involving the use of a variety of data-collection methods. I then review a number of

ethnographies conducted in Xinjiang with a focus on methodology and challenges in conducting fieldwork.

There is a general consensus that ethnography involves the "in-depth description of a culture or group of people sharing a culture" (Salamone, 2006), but difficult questions regarding subjectivity/objectivity, power, and privilege belie this clear objective. Clifford and Marcus brought attention to these issues in *Writing Culture* (1986), recognizing the issue of power in fieldwork and the importance of presenting the viewpoints of cultural group members. Contemporary scholars advocate the need to identify and reflect upon, "personal assumptions, preconceptions, experiences, and feelings that affect your perceptions as a researcher" (Salamone, 2006). Because the ethnographer serves as a data-collection instrument, there is a need to examine (and revisit) how positionality and identity impact one's fieldwork, including relationships at site. Regarding ethnographic research design, Johnson classified ethnography as having an "eclectic nature," a strength exhibited in its "flexibility, multiple tests of a theory, increased chances for various types of validity, triangulation, and the potential for high levels of innovation and creativity" (1998, p. 143).

I utilized ethnographic methodology to investigate the language practices of Uyghur young adults in Xinjiang because language practices are linked in a complex causal way to language ecology, language ideologies and language endangerment (Elinor Ochs & Schieffelin, 2011). I postulated that ethnographic data on language practices (i.e. real-world manifestations of linguistic phenomenon *in situ*) would shed light on the political, sociological and/or economic factors that elevate the status of Mandarin and the

long-term consequences for language shift or maintenance among Uyghur communities. I acknowledged that aspects of my identity, particularly my American nationality, would impact my data collection activities because Uyghurs have a "historically strongly pro-American stance" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 70). I remained sensitive to my consultants' biases and those of my own, particularly my advocacy for linguistic human rights (Nettle & Romaine, 2000; Skutnabb-Kangas & Dunbar, 2010), I felt that ethnography was appropriate for what I wanted to study because this approach involves repeated observations of the same variables over long periods of time, mitigating reactivity in language practices, defined as the alteration of individuals' performance or behavior due to the awareness that they are being observed (Ellsworth & Gonzalez, 2003).

Several scholars, such as Rudelson (1992), Clark (1999b), Dautcher (1999), and Roberts (2003), have conducted dissertation projects in Xinjiang that make use of ethnographic methodology. Predating these studies is an extensive body of literature compiled by late 19th and early 20th century explorers – Sven Hedin (1925), Aurel Stien (1907), Owen Lattimore (1928) – on travels and encounters in this region of Central Asia. Contemporary scholars of Xinjiang, such as Gladney (1992) and Millward (1994), have benefitted from the writings of earlier explorers of the region. And the contemporary dissertations may be seen as an extension of the earlier works. In the following paragraphs, I review four dissertation studies conducted in Xinjiang with a focus on methodology. I conclude this section by identifying the methodological commonalities among these studies.

Rudelson's *Bones in the Sand: The Struggle to Create Uighur Nationalist Ideologies in Xinjiang, China* (1992) is a study of the "Uighur intellectual elite's struggle to define their nationalist ideology" (p. ii). Rudelson conducted nearly two years of fieldwork in Xinjiang. In his section on *Fieldwork Methodology and Sources*, Rudelson wrote that he "chose to avoid any systematic way of meeting informants," and opted to wander the streets, "stopping at homes when [he] received a smile" or an invitation for tea (1992, p. vii). Rudelson employed simple random sampling (Sproull, 1988), interviewing merchants, hotel workers, random pool-players, and doctors when undergoing treatment at hospitals. He had a work unit card from the Academy of Sciences, giving him "almost unlimited freedom" to access villages (1992, p. viii). His freedom was curtailed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. From that point forward, Rudelson had to travel with an official guide when visiting Uyghur areas and could not stay in any single place longer than ten days. After an armed rebellion near Kashgar in April 1990, Xinjiang was closed to foreigners and his fieldwork was "officially over" (Rudelson, 1992, p. ix).

Rudelson's experience and scholarship impacted my methodology in two ways. First, his sampling procedure prompted me to consider the suitability of probability versus purposive sampling techniques. I ultimately chose purposive sampling techniques because of my objective to select information-rich cases for study in depth (Patton, 2002). However, like Rudelson, I did engage in many casual conversations with Uyghur young adults I encountered on university campuses, restaurants and other public areas in Urumchi. I was frequently approached by Uyghur young adults at these locations;

conversations typically ended with an exchange of contact information. [14] I believe I was approached so often because many Uyghurs study English at school and there are few native English speakers with whom to practice their language skills.[15] A second way that Rudelson's experience impacted my own was related to his involuntary exit from site. The abrupt termination of his fieldwork, spurred by social unrest, served as motivation to protect consultants' identity, and secure field notes and recordings (Sluka, 1995).

Clark's *Convergence or Divergence: Uighur Family Change in Urumqi* (1999b) is a study on Uyghur family change among educated urbanites of Urumchi, from a pre-modern system before 1949 to a modern system by 1999 (p. iv). Prior to conducting dissertation research, Clark and his family had lived and taught English for two years in Urumchi, and for three years in Ghulja (Yining). He left Xinjiang in 1990 to attend graduate school, and returned in 1994 to conduct twenty-one months of fieldwork in Urumchi. From his previous stay in Urumchi, Clark had an established network of relationships with educated urbanite couples. Clark spent many hours with a particular extended family in Urumchi to obtain "ethnographic detail on family interaction" (1999b, p. 6). He met additional informants at restaurants, including proprietors. He employed participant observation and interview methods; he did not use standardized questionnaires because he did not possess a research visa (W. C. Clark, 1999b, p. x).

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[14] On one occasion, in the fall of 2008, I was eating lunch at a restaurant on campus, when a Uyghur young woman approached me and asked me to be in a commercial for an electronic dictionary. This commercial (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FIKv5pF8cY) was on rotation on several Uyghur language channels and broadcast throughout the region. Many Uyghurs recognized me from this commercial and it served as a convenient starting point for conversations.

[15] I met one Uyghur young man through a website (http://www.mylanguageexchange.com/) that matches individuals who are fluent in one language and learning another.

Clark altered his original dissertation topic, which was to investigate "the emergence of a Uighur ethnic identity among Urumqi's Uighur population" because the tense political situation made "asking ethnicity questions uncomfortable for [him] and some of those [he] interviewed" (1999b, p. x). He also changed topics because "the focus on politics and ethnicity became a burden" and he "had to find a more neutral topic if [he] was to survive emotionally, and be able to write with integrity" (1999b, p. x). Clark found that almost everyone he knew or met was eager to talk about family relations; this experience motivated the development of his ultimate study.

A recognized characteristic of ethnographic research is the emotional toll that it takes on the researcher (Hyde, 1994; Kleinman & Copp, 1993; Reinharz, 1979). As Jones writes, "Each ethnographic researcher struggles with ethical considerations within fieldwork and this can take an emotional toll on the researcher and the researched. Ethical researchers have a responsibility to uncover injustice and challenge power" (2010, pp. 40-41). Clark's decision to change the focus of his study from politics and ethnicity may be interpreted as an abdication of responsibility to "uncover injustice and challenge power (Jones, 2010, p. 41)," but this choice was possibly motivated by an ethical consideration to protect his informants, his family, and himself (including his scholarly career).[16] Ethnicity and politics are widely considered "sensitive" topics in Xinjiang (Yee, 2003, p. 432). A critical ethnographic approach is suitable to the investigation of

[16] Victor Shih, a professor of political science at Northwestern University, testified to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission that, "[a] problem is [that] Western academics and government officials…are self-censoring themselves…For example…People who do research in Xinjiang in a very serious way are barred from going to China. So many of us avoid that topic" (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009, pp. 299-300).

these topics, yet one function of critical ethnography is to invoke "social consciousness and societal change" (Thomas, 1992, p. 4). Clark opted to practice conventional ethnography, defined as "the tradition of cultural description and analysis that displays meanings by interpreting meanings," as opposed to critical ethnography, defined as "the reflective process of choosing between conceptual alternatives and making value-laden judgments of meaning and method to challenge research, policy, and other forms of human activity" (Thomas, 1992; Thomas & O'Maolchatha, 1989).

Dautcher's *Folklore and Identity in a Uighur Community in Xinjiang China* (1999) is an ethnographic investigation of social identity in a predominantly Uyghur suburban community in Ghulja, Xinjiang in the 1990s. Dautcher stated that he "tended to avoid a proactive approach to field research" (1999, p. x). For one year, he lived with the mother of a Uyghur friend and participated in the social activities of a group of men who were childhood friends of this friend. Dautcher felt he had "considerable freedom" from his work unit, the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, and was "careful not to violate the implicit conditions of their trust" (1999, p. xi).

Dautcher described two challenges he had to contend with. The first related to field research. Dautcher stated, "in the beginning of [his] field research, [he] struggled to participate in a social world enacted in a language in which [he] was not yet fully conversant" (1999, pp. xi-xii). The second had to do with the narrative form of the ethnographic dissertation, whose linearity and logical argumentation obfuscated the "distinctly non-linear, disjointed, and often quite disheartening process" of data accumulation (Dautcher, 1999, p. xiii). My study differed from Dautcher's because my

consultants were proficient (if not fully fluent) in Uyghur, Mandarin and English. I had the good fortune and honor of meeting Uyghur consultants who embraced multiple roles, assisting me as language teachers, and cultural and linguistic brokers (Tse, 1996). But like Dautcher, I also recognize how data accumulation may be at dissonance with (and concealed by) an organized scholarly text.

The most recent dissertation in this particular line of research is Roberts' *Uyghur Neighborhoods and Nationalisms in the Former Sino-Soviet Borderland: An Historical Ethnography of a stateless nation on the Margins of Modernity* (2003). Roberts' study is a historical ethnography on the Uyghurs of the Ili valley, "a stateless Muslim nation lodged between Russian and Chinese sphere's of influence in Central Asia (2003, p. xiii)." In 1994, Roberts conducted one year of fieldwork in Almaty, Kazakhstan to collect data for his maters thesis. He returned to Almaty in 1997 and took up residence in a Uyghur neighborhood to perform fieldwork in support of his dissertation. Roberts lived with a family for the first six months and by himself for the second six months, participating and observing "the dynamics of this cross-border community" (2003, p. 10).

Roberts interviewed numerous Uyghurs in Almaty, including Uyghurs born in Kazakhstan, migrants and sojourners, and of various age, gender, and social class, collecting 38 life histories and information about "these individuals' understanding of the Uyghur nation and the Ili valley borderland today" (2003, p. 11). Roberts also conducted historical research in public and private libraries and archives of Almaty. After this year of intensive data collection, he continued to collect supplementary data for two and a half years while working for the United States Agency for International Development. During

this period of time, Roberts made four brief excursions to the Chinese side of the Ili valley. He mentions in a footnote that he was harassed on several occasions by Chinese security officers for his knowledge of the Uyghur language (2003, p. 11). While I did not encounter hostility for my knowledge of the Uyghur language, many Han Chinese were perplexed by my Uyghur language studies. Many Han Chinese questioned my motive for learning Uyghur. I responded to this question in a variety of ways, sometimes answering, "Because this is Xinjiang *Uyghur* Autonomous Region."

All of the Xinjiang and Uyghur-focused scholarship cited above conform to Spindler and Spindler's "criteria for a good ethnography" (1987, pp. 18-20), although it might be argued that Dautcher's (1999) text is the most reflexive, realist narrative (Foley, 2002; Luttrell, 2000). All of the mentioned Xinjiang/Uyghur scholars were situated at site for at least one year, and utilized participant observation and interview methods in data collection activities. These scholars also possessed a degree of fluency in Uyghur needed to conduct interviews and daily interactions in this language. The three who conducted fieldwork in Xinjiang (W. C. Clark, 1999b; Dautcher, 1999; Rudelson, 1992) all exercised some caution or reticence at site in observance of the atmosphere of intolerance toward the discussion of sensitive issues regarding politics and ethnicity. I also had to exercise caution while conducting fieldwork, a cognitive and behavioral orientation that became acute during several volatile periods of time. Below, I describe significant events that occurred while I was at site, and their ramifications on methodology.

The studies reviewed here are the result of extensive fieldwork; these authors utilized social knowledge as a key to understand phenomena and situations on which

facts were undocumented and sparse. In terms of ethnography, the political sensitivities of Xinjiang necessitate an approach whereby discretion and confidentiality are upheld to an extreme (Wayne, 2007). The crux is that, as Dorian stated, "one's fieldwork, however antiseptic it may try to be, inevitably has political overtones. If there is little overt politicization in the region, the fieldworker may be able to ignore those overtones. If there is considerable politicization, s/he cannot usually contrive to do so" (1993, p. 576). The Uyghur language is considered a sensitive topic in Xinjiang, including script reform (Blachford, 2004), along with Uyghur-Han Chinese ethnic relations and Islam (Y. Chen & Postiglione, 2009; Fuller & Lipman, 2004; Yee, 2003). In my approach to fieldwork and writing, I did not attempt to ignore political overtones and biases, but to recognize and articulate these positions with the objective of understanding practices and perspectives within a historical, cultural and social framework.

3.3.1 Significant events at site

In section 2.2.1, I described some of the social unrest that occurred while I was conducting fieldwork. In this section, I describe my personal experience as a researcher in Urumchi and what it was like to live through these events. In the following subsection, I make connections between these circumstances and their impacts on methodology and doing fieldwork in Urumchi.

In the summer of 2008, I obtained permission from a dean at a public university in Urumchi to collect data on language practices from Uyghur college students at his university. I was explicit about my intention to conduct interviews on language practices,

and had submitted an interview protocol at his request. The dean reviewed this document and offered his approval and support. But after arriving, he told me that this permission had been revoked. His superiors had determined that issues related to the Uyghur language were "too sensitive" to investigate. I captured my reaction in a field note:

> I feel like the victim of a bait-and-switch (i.e. tell the foreigner what he wants to hear so that he will sign a teaching contract, then pull back the incentive that had been agreed upon). Everything was copasetic while negotiating in the U.S., but now that I am here, research activities are a no go…I was disappointed, but I hid my reaction from the dean. (Field note: October 1, 2008)

In order to conduct observations on language practices for an extended period of time, it was requisite that I maintain residency in Urumchi. I worked in Urumchi to obtain the long-term visas necessary to maintain residency. In my early field notes describing Urumchi, I wrote about the density of people and traffic, the ethnically segregated nature of the city, and the stark contrast between poverty and wealth – beggars huddled outside of Louis Vuitton stores. I described conversations with Han Chinese (conducted in Mandarin), and conversations with Uyghurs (conducted in a combination of Uyghur, Mandarin and English).

In June 2009, my contract with the university was not renewed. An administrator told me that, due to the upcoming 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, no foreign teachers who had worked for a single year would be rehired.[17] There was no way around this; foreign teachers from other colleges and universities in Urumchi were not permitted to transfer from one school to another. Fortuitously, I had not attempted to transfer to another school. I enrolled as a Uyghur language student for the Fall 2009 semester. I had

[17] Teachers who had worked two or more years were allowed to renew their contracts.

considered enrolling at another university, but was fortunate that I did not because almost all of the foreigners who did were denied without explanation.

In Fall 2009, for financial reasons, I took a teaching position at a private English language school. At the end of January 2010, in the middle of winter, I had to vacate my apartment on one-day notice because of stipulations related to my new residency permit. Financially, this was a disaster because I had paid several months of rent in advance and my landlord kept most of this money. The private school provided a dilapidated apartment about an hour from the school. I broke my contract with the private school in April 2010 after I had completed data collection and returned to the U.S.

During fieldwork, I returned to the U.S. twice for one-month intervals. These breaks were important because I was afforded opportunities for reflection. On one of these breaks, during the winter of 2008, I wrote the following note:

> The most salient difference between Urumchi and the U.S. is the capacity to engage in free speech. This freedom is like money – you only appreciate it in its absence, when you have none or when it is taken from you. I am happy to be back in the U.S. because I can say what I want and I have no fear of retaliation. To understand this freedom, or its absence, you must experience it. It is a total experience, like swimming. How difficult would it be to describe the feeling of being surrounded with water to someone who has never had the experience? I couldn't write about the freedom of speech – indeed I never enjoyed the freedom of speech – before today. I can only appreciate it now because I've experienced its absence. (December 23, 2008)

In the following paragraphs, I describe a few occasions where I felt in peril at site. On June 12, 2009, I was at a bar with Messi, Athena and a small group of other Uyghur and Western friends. We were drinking and talking when the music stopped and a group

police officers stormed in.[18] The police demanded to see our passports, or for Uyghurs, their identification cards. Only three African men and I did not have our passports. One of the African men was not entirely cooperative and the lead officer threatened him and pushed him around. Then one officer informed us that all those without passports had to go to the police station. I had no fear up until that point, but I was afraid to get into the police car because I was not sure where I would be taken. With few options available, I complied. Messi had his identification card but came along as an interpreter.

We were taken to a police station and led to a conference room. The African men were taken away for questioning, but I was left alone. Later, one of the African men became irate. He had been told that if he produced his passport, he could leave. However, when a friend of his did procure his passport, he was not released. He demanded to know why he was being detained. I knew that the Chinese police sometimes detained suspects without charging them of a crime and that it was futile to protest. After an hour or so, we learned that the lead officer who had ordered our detention had gone to dinner. I was left without supervision, so I passed the time by roaming around the squalid police station. The lead officer returned about two hours later. We were then taken to a small office where the lead officer collected our passport numbers and checked our personal information on an online database. Fortunately, I had memorized my passport number. The lead officer recorded our phone numbers and criticized us for not having our

[18] For another perspective on this event, see this blog entry, written by an American friend: http://blogs.princeton.edu/pia/personal/xinjiang/2009/06/uyghur_music_si.php. I am identified as "RWW."

passports. Then he released us. We returned to the bar and reunited with our friends, relieved that the ordeal was over.

A few weeks later, in the early evening of July 5, 2009, I was at a food court with Möshük; we had completed our final semi-structured interview and were having dinner on the top floor of a department store complex. Midway through our meal, Möshük received a phone call from her mother; we were told that there had been a bombing in the *Nánmén* area a few blocks away. Through glass windows, we watched police set up a barricade blocking the flow of traffic into downtown. We left the food court and took a taxi to the university. Once on campus, I advised Möshük to return to her dormitory because I predicted (accurately) that the faculty dormitory resident would take attendance of the university student residents. I spent the evening online, reading reports about the Uyghur protest and the violence that was occurring downtown. At 3:00 am on July 6, the Internet was disabled.

Over the next week, following the advice of my friends and students, I remained inside my apartment for most of the time. Cell phone and text services were available intermittently. During the initial period of violence, I was not concerned for my safety; I was confident that Uyghurs would not target me. However, on July 7, I feared for my life when I heard that Han Chinese were marauding and attacking Uyghurs. The CCP had blamed Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress for initiating the July 5 uprising. Many Han Chinese know that Rebiya Kadeer, the leader of the World Uyghur Congress, lives in exile in Washington D.C. It is also known that the World Uyghur Congress receives funding from the U.S. Congress through the National Endowment for

Democracy, a non-profit organization (2009). I was concerned that my American nationality might make me a target, and that I might be attacked. Fortunately, I was not harmed.

20,000 security troops inundated Urumchi after the Uyghur uprising of July 5. After the most intense periods of violence had passed, Urumchi continued to be under military occupation. A curfew was enforced, lifted, and then reinstated during the syringe attack protests of early September 2009. On those two occasions, security forces barricaded most of the streets and intersections downtown. In additional to regular police, riot police and army troops were stationed throughout the city. Many of these security personnel carried rifles, some with large bayonets affixed to their muzzles. On the streets, civilians often carried sticks and poles. Sirens of all sorts blared day and night; helicopters continuously circled the city skies making it difficult to sleep. The tension was palatable, as if more violence could break out at any time.

Guards stationed at the university campus gates prohibited people from free passage, although I pushed my way through on a few occasions. I was with Messi two of these times. He managed to slip out with me by claiming that he was a foreigner. On July 17, 2009, Messi and I were walking down *Yŏuhăo* west road when we came upon a Uyghur restaurant that had been destroyed during the Han Chinese retaliatory violence of July 7. This restaurant was on the route taken by the crowds that day. At this particular restaurant, the kebab grill had been smashed and many windows had been shattered. A group of men were standing in front of the restaurant, watching another group of men who were cleaning broken glass. I took a few photographs, but stopped when one of the

men noticed me. Messi and I walked away briskly, but a couple Han Chinese men chased us down the block. Messi warned me, "Don't speak Chinese." We waited for our wheezing pursuer to make the first move. He pulled out an identification card and in English said, "camera." Messi started speaking to me in English, and I caught on that he was pretending to be a foreigner. I knew our pursuer was after the photographs I had taken, so I erased them without hesitation. Other men had surrounded us at that point and were talking about what to do with us, but they decided to let us go.[19]

On another weekend afternoon in September 2009, Messi and I took a walk through Urumchi and witnessed thousands of troops and military vehicles in the streets. On the Chinese national news that evening, a taxi driver from Urumchi was interviewed. He said that life and traffic in the city was normal. This is one example of how the media was used to spread a CCP-sanctioned version of reality. A calamitous event had occurred, but instead of using it as a teachable moment – an opportunity to address the core issues that had fueled the July 5 violence – the CCP blamed the event on foreign provocateurs. Police cars outfitted with loudspeakers blared messages such as, "we are all one people, people mustn't be scared." In one news story, a reporter "spontaneously" discovered a group of people of various ethnicities chatting on the street. Some of those interviewed said that all ethnic communities lived in harmony in Urumchi. Other cycled broadcasts featured Uyghurs giving police officers watermelon, kebab and water. People of different ethnic backgrounds were filmed donating blood or money, always in long lines to do so.

[19] When I left Urumchi in April 2010, this Uyghur restaurant had been transformed into a Chinese restaurant. It is interesting to note that a Hui Chinese restaurant on the opposite corner was not damaged during the Han Chinese retaliatory violence of July 7, 2009.

It was difficult to endure this campaign supporting a narrative of ethnic harmony and social stability. Curious as to how others reconciled the competing realities, my friends told me that they avoided or ignored the CCP propaganda.

During the last weekend of July 2009, Messi and I went to *Èrdàoqiào* to buy some *doppas* (Uyghur hats). A Chinese reporter requested to interview me and I agreed. I easily talked about my purchases, but when asked if I thought Urumchi was a safe place, I felt compelled to say yes. However, when the interview was broadcast, my voice was dubbed over in Mandarin with a statement about how Uyghur and Han Chinese are brothers and sisters. I did not see this interview myself, but was told about it by a Han Chinese student. He called me after seeing this news story because he found it incredible that I had said such a thing. I confirmed his suspicion that I had been "misquoted." I was also interviewed for a nationally broadcast program called *Rediscovering China.*[20] After this second interview, I decided to decline future interview requests; I did not want to contribute to a manufactured perception of "ethnic harmony." Nor did I want to compromise the trust that my consultants placed in me.

Communications were disrupted after July 5, 2009. In "the largest and longest such blackout in the world," the Internet was blocked, except for a few CCP websites, for a ten month period, between July 6, 2009 and May 14, 2010 (Anna, 2010). I was an "Internet refugee," making trips outside of Xinjiang, twice to Hong Kong and once to Lanzhou, to get online. I recognize my privilege in being able to do this and that my

[20]My interview can be viewed here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=61QybC4RkSM. This is a link to the entire show: http://english.cctv.com/program/rediscoveringchina/20100308/103274.shtml.

relative freedom to travel might have inspired some envy from acquaintances and consultants. Although I did not have enough money to fund the travel of others, I always collected a list of items to download for my friends who were unable to leave.

Overseas telephone calls were not possible from home or mobile phones from the date of the uprising until January 20, 2010. The only option was to use public phones at calling centers. In most of these places there was a single phone and often a long line. The only way to avoid the line was to go downtown at dawn in the often-frigid weather. A passport and $12 deposit was required to use the telephone. Phone calls were monitored live. If one used a language other than Mandarin, Uyghur, English or Russian, languages for which translators were available, the call would disconnect.

Urumchi was a challenging environment to conduct research because Xinjiang is undergoing dramatic transformation. Han Chinese colonization, coupled with increasing competition for scare resources (Gladney, 2004), imbues Urumchi with palatable tension. This was a volatile place, and violence, such that occurred on July 5, 2009, seemed inevitable. I had a bag packed with my most important items and was always prepared to leave on a moment's notice.

3.3.1.1 Methodological implications

Many scholars have documented their experiences conducting ethnographic fieldwork in dangerous and difficult circumstances – in environments beset by conflict, instability and terror (Delaney, 2009; Lee, 1995; Nilan, 2002; Omidian, 2009; Sluka, 2000; Van Maanen, 1988). There exists a body of literature on the practical hazards of

ethnographic fieldwork with suggestions on how to negotiate challenging circumstances (Howell, 1990; Kovats-Bernat, 2002; Sluka, 1995). Going into Urumchi, I was aware of the potential for surveillance (Dautcher, 1999) and that social unrest could occur, even forcing an end to fieldwork (Rudelson, 1992). In this section, I describe the methodological implications of conducting research in Urumchi, an unstable environment, with a focus on the ways I managed danger (Sluka, 1995).

Sluka, in *Reflections on Managing Danger in Fieldwork: Dangerous Anthropology in Belfast* (1995), draws upon personal experience and that of other anthropologists conducting fieldwork in dangerous and violent social contexts to provide recommendations concerning ethnographic research. By the term "managing danger," Sluka means to mitigate danger through "foresight, planning and skillful maneuver" (1995, p. 284). He states that the challenge of doing fieldwork in dangerous contexts can be met "rationally by considering the dangers as methodological issues in their own right" (Sluka, 1995, p. 293). For my own study, this meant maintaining consciousness of potential volatility and avoiding a false sense of security. It should be stated at the outset that the type of danger encountered in Urumchi is best understood as periodic unorganized insurrection, that is, Uyghurs intermittently engage in violent localized resistance (Wayne, 2007). Uyghurs lack the means to engage in dialogue with the CCP political authority, but some do engage in protest when provoked and civilians are often targeted. The style of protest is sometimes violent because Uyghurs do not enjoy the right to non-violent means of resistance or the right to publicize their grievances. This environment is dangerous because Uyghurs intent on expressing resistance or anger

towards the CCP do not advertise where they might demonstrate violent activism. Thus violent attacks are sporadic and seemingly random.

One danger management strategy advocated by Sluka is to "evaluate as realistically as possible the degree of danger, and try to identify possible sources of danger" (1995, p. 287). Like Sluka (1995) and Polsky (1967), I found that most of the risk in my fieldwork came from the authorities rather than from my research participants. This is why, following Dautcher (1999), I maintained a low-profile in my data collection activities. My one encounter with the police was the result of a dragnet targeting foreigners without identification, not because of my research activities. One positive outcome of this event was that it helped me establish rapport among Uyghurs. This is because many Uyghurs (particularly young men) have been subject to arbitrary detention (Amnesty International, 2010b).

A second danger management strategy I employed was to maintain neutrality with members of different ethnic communities in Urumchi. I expressed "sympathy or agreement with persons on both sides" (Henry, 1966, p. 553), an approach that contributed to my overall safety, especially during the period of intense violence on and after July 5, 2009. I make this assertion because the media could not be trusted, and it was only through personal correspondence that I learned what was happening in the city – places to avoid and safe times to be outside. I recall one of my neighbors, a Han Chinese professor, checking up on me one evening following the July 5 riots. He grumbled that "two minorities – Tibetans and Uyghurs – were always making trouble," and then provided advice on how to maintain safety during this period.

As a third danger management strategy, I took precautionary measures to secure my field notes, recordings and the identity of my research participants (Sluka, 1995, p. 289). I scanned my notes and stored these, along with interviews, on *Sugarsync* (www.sugarsync.com), an online file storage site. On the occasions I traveled outside of Xinjiang to get online, I was very anxious because I had months of data on my person. Following the advice of Jenkins (1984), I made a methodological choice not to record interviews entirely. When discussing sensitive political issues, I turned the recorder off. This was to protect my informants as well as myself. The CCP has a record of punishing Uyghurs for leaking "state secrets" to foreigners (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2011c; Kadeer, 2009).[21] Some contest that the CCP utilizes the "state secret" law as a tool to imprison and torture activists, dissidents, journalists, and religious leaders (Amnesty International, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2012; Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 2009). To my knowledge, none of my consultants were privy to state secrets, but as the definition is nebulous, I decided not to record data consisting of discussions on sensitive political issues.

While at site, I was always aware that a dangerous event might occur, something beyond management. In anticipation of such an eventuality, I kept a bag packed with my most important items and was always prepared to leave on a moment's notice. I feel fortunate that violent circumstances did not force an early termination of fieldwork (Sluka, 1995), as was the fate of Rudelson (1992).

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[21] The CCP defines "state secrets" as "information concerning state security and interests and, if leaked, would damage state security and interests in the areas of politics, economy and national defense, among others" (Huizi & Zhuo, 2010).

3.4 PARTICIPANT SELECTION CRITERIA

In order to select participants for this study, I used three different strategies: typical case sampling, involving selection based on average characteristics of a population (LeCompte & Schensul, 2010); snowball sampling, involving the recruitment of participants from other participants' existing social networks (Patton, 2002); and criterion-based selection, involving selection based on a pre-determined criterion of importance (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2010). At the beginning of fieldwork, I used typical case sampling (LeCompte & Schensul, 2010) because I wanted to select cases that were not significantly "atypical, extreme, deviant, or intensely unusual" (Patton, 2002). To participate in the first series of interviews, participants had only to identify as Uyghur, have received a formal education in Xinjiang and be in the early years of adulthood (i.e. 18-25 years of age). At this stage, I was interested in obtaining a general idea about the language practices of Uyghur young adults who had attended Mandarin language schools (*mínkǎohàn*), Uyghur language schools (*mínkǎomín*) or bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur schools (*shuāngyǔ*). Early into my fieldwork, I told one of my Uyghur language teachers about my research interests on Uyghur language practices. This teacher was an adjunct instructor at several universities in Urumchi and offered to arrange meetings with groups of Uyghur college students. In my application of typical case sampling, I asked my teacher to select equal proportions of Uyghur students who had attended the schools identified above. On two occasions, I utilized snowball sampling, selecting interviewees on the advice of existing participants (Patton, 2002, p. 236). The chart below contains the

date, number of participants, sex, location and duration of the Fall 2008 semi-structured interviews.[22]

Date	Participants (not incl. PI)	Sex	Location	Duration
10/5/2008	1	1 male	Restaurant/Bar	170 min.
10/5/2008	1	1 male	Bar	25 min.
10/9/2008	4	2 females/2 males	School office	70 min.
10/15/2008	1	1 male	Restaurant/Home	175 min.
10/16/2008	4	3 females/1 male	Classroom	40 min.
10/18/2008	1	1 female	Home	25 min.
10/22/2008	5	1 female/4 male	School office	45 min.
11/2/2008	2	2 males	Restaurant	65 min.
11/2/2008	1	1 female	Restaurant	25 min.
11/2/2008	1	1 female	Restaurant	40 min.
12/4/2008	1	1 female	Home	30 min.
12/4/2008	1	1 male	Home	60 min.
12/5/2008	1	1 male	Home	50 min.
12/8/2008	2	1 female/1 male	Home	100 min.

Table 1: Fall 2008 interviews

I employed a purposive sampling strategy when selecting case study consultants.[23] I used criterion-based selection (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2010) to select case study consultants. Two of these individuals were from the group of 26; I met the two others through chance encounters on college campuses in Xinjiang. In order to "obtain the broadest range of information and perspectives on the subject of study" (LeCompte &

[22] See Appendix for Interview Protocol I.

[23] Following Urrieta (2007), I refer to the case study participants as "consultants" as opposed to "informants" or "subjects" in order to recognize their expertise in community knowledge and active involvement in the research process. Also see Rice, for a discussion on "ethics and balancing power and priorities in linguistic fieldwork" (2006, p. 123).

Preissle, 1993), I selected participants who I felt typified certain common language education backgrounds and would "yield the most relevant and plentiful data" (Kuzel, 1992, p. 37). I selected four Uyghur young adults, one female who had been educated in Mandarin schools (*mínkǎohàn*), one male who had been educated in Mandarin schools (*mínkǎohàn*), one female who had attended Uyghur primary and Mandarin-Uyghur secondary schools (*mínkǎomín/shuāngyǔ*), and one male who had attended Uyghur primary and Mandarin-Uyghur secondary schools (*mínkǎomín/shuāngyǔ*).

These four individuals were selected because they represented two sexes and two educational trajectories. I felt that this combination of characteristics would yield insight on how the scholastic domain and language of instruction influenced Uyghur language practices. I was also interested in exploring patterns and themes of language practices as situated in a specific language ecology and of consequence to identity formation. This study sought to address questions related to the relationship between language learning contexts (i.e. second and foreign language), and investments in language learning (J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 2000; Peirce, 1995); expected returns on investments in Mandarin (i.e. anticipated conversions of capital) (Bourdieu, 1986; Peirce, 1995); language choices in multilingual contexts (Fishman, 1972; F. Grosjean, 1994); Uyghur language shift toward Mandarin and implications for the performance and demarcation of Uyghur identity (Bourdieu, 1991; Duranti, 1997; Gee, 1996); and Uyghur language vitality (UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages, 2003).

3.5 METHODS

This study utilized methods of data collection that are associated with ethnographic and case study methodologies: participant observation, various types of interviews and documents. These methods were adapted to the ethnographic setting of Urumchi (Sobo & Munck, 1998), a process that entailed the identification of situations and locations for participation observation activities (e.g. contexts with compositions of Uyghur young adults from various language education backgrounds and diverse sets of interlocutors) (Murchison, 2010); and an approach to interviewing that provoked "social critique as a means of exposing the unequal distribution and use of power within human interactions" in Urumchi (Frey, 2001, p. 61), yet mindful of ideological, political, value based, and overly biased affinities (Lapan, Quartaroli, & Riemer, 2011). The collection of documents in the ethnographic setting of Urumchi did not require adaptation, however access to this data was interrupted when the Internet was disabled following the July 5, 2009 unrest.

Sources of evidence associated with ethnographic and case study methodologies were appropriate because, consistent with a Bourdieusian approach (also called Practice Theory), I was interested in contextualizing the language practices of my case study participants – thick descriptions of domains and social networks mediated by linguistic interactions (Geertz, 1973; May, 2011). I used an expressive vocabulary assessment to collect data on the Uyghur lexical knowledge of my case study participants. This quantitative method was designed to obtain empirical evidence in support of the claim that Mandarin-educated Uyghurs possess deficient command of the Uyghur lexicon. In

the following sub-sections, I describe the methods used in this study and how they were used to collect data.

3.5.1 Ethnographic case study methodology

LeCompte and Schensul stated that "Ethnographies are case studies because of their focus on a single entity, but they differ from case studies in general in that…they always include in their focus the *culture* of the group or entity under study…Case studies are usually framed within a specific explanatory social or natural science" (2010, p. 116), but what makes the present study an *ethnographic* case study is its emphasis on cultural, political and historical conditions, and how these conditions influence language practices. These conditions have implications for language practices because they account for human agency, political intervention, power and authority in the formation of particular language ideologies (Blommaert, 1999; May, 2005). This approach focuses on the "[historically] contingent, socially embedded, and often highly unequal practices, that have so disadvantaged minority languages, and their speakers in the first place" (Blommaert, 1999, p. 7), in order to advocate for minority language rights (May, 2005; Rubio-Marín, 2003; Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 2001). This case study is ethnographic because of the "focus on the culture of the community in which the stud[y] w[as] situated" (LeCompte & Schensul, 2010, p. 117).

"An ethnographic case study is defined as prolonged observations over time in a bounded system" (Angers & Machtmes, 2005). I employed ethnographic case study methods to investigate, describe in detail and analyze a single phenomenon – that is, the

language practices of Uyghur young adults and to theorize about the influence of domestic and academic fields on language practices. The case study approach allowed for a closeness and richness of detail, obtained from extended participation and extensive interviews with four case study participants. These data collection activities took place on university campuses, consultants' homes, my apartments, and public areas in Urumchi (e.g. city streets, parks, restaurants, shopping districts). I observed the language practices of Uyghur consultants when communicating in multilingual contexts with interlocutors from various ethnic backgrounds (e.g. Uyghur, Han Chinese). When with Uyghurs only, I paid attention to Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching and Mandarin borrowings.

Ethnographic methods are useful for discovering how particular speech acts and speech events function in particular social contexts (Gumperz & Hymes, 1972), yet these methods had to be adapted to be effective for understanding "situated language practices as opposed to whole cultures as systems of meaning embodied in symbols" (Geertz, 1973; Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 66). I chose focal speech events strategically, by purposeful participation observation activities with Uyghur consultants in a variety of domains, including family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972) and spent an extended period of time in the field "in order to document and understand how specific social and cultural factors influence speakers' 'natural' performances" (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 66). I chose Practice Theory as the analytic lens because it held the promise of uniting the role of language practices, domains, and social dynamics with an ethnographic perspective (Bourdieu, 1977b, 1991; Grenfell, 2011d). This is because, as Blackledge stated, "What Bourdieu offers ethnographic research with

a language focus, and language research with an ethnographic focus, is a way of representing social and linguistic phenomena which specifically engages with dimensions of history, power and social structure. His metaphors enable us to situate interactions between people in the context of the relations of power that are obtained in the linguistic market" (2011, p. 144). Ethnographic methodology is suitable for the investigation of the interrelationship of contextual factors and language practices, understood as an evolving language ecology (Haugen, 1972; Mühlhäusler, 1996), enabling researchers to say something about what particular people do with language in particular historically constituted, politically conditioned and socially structured circumstances (Blommaert, 1999; Bourdieu, 1991; May, 2005; Wolcott, 1999).

As stated by Riain, "Ethnographic research has long been synonymous with case studies, typically conceived of as grounded in the local and situated in specific well-defined and self contained social contexts. Furthermore, these contexts were to be seen as cases of some larger phenomenon" (2009, pp. 290-291). The larger phenomena addressed by this study are language maintenance and language shift, "the relationship between change (or stability) in language usage patterns, on the one hand, and ongoing psychological, social or cultural processes, on the other hand, in populations that utilize more than one speech variety for intra-group or for inter-group purposes" (Fishman, 1972, p. 76). This ethnographic case study investigates language maintenance and language shift phenomena related to a specific colonized ethnolinguistic community, but its implications are of relevancy to other unrepresented peoples and nations interested in

the intergenerational transmission of language and culture in many other parts of the world.

3.5.2 Participant observation

Dewalt, Dewalt and Wayland define participant observation, the primary research technique of ethnography, as "a way to collect data in a relatively unstructured manner in naturalistic setting by ethnographers who observe and/or take part in the common and uncommon activities of the people being studied" (1998, p. 260). Participant observation differs from "casual looking around" due to "the nature of the researcher's participation in the group being studied and the care and systematicity with which records are made and analysis undertaken" (Johnstone, 2000, pp. 81-82). This method required practice and involved developing a particular research stance whereby I could benefit from participation and observation as activities in juxtaposition. I maintained systematicity in participant observation activities by recording information on sociolinguistic domains, including the location, the participants and the topic (Fishman, Cooper, & Ma, 1971). I paid attention to the language practices of my Uyghur consultants in different domains, including family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972) and with various configurations of interlocutors, such as Uyghurs (of different language education backgrounds), Han Chinese, Westerners, and combinations thereof.

I discovered that "rich points" (Agar, 1996a, p. 106) for observations of language practices included moments when interviews or conversations with Uyghur consultants at my apartment were interrupted by the arrival of other unannounced consultants;

interruptions of interviews and conversations by phone calls; and chance encounters with the classmates and friends of consultants when on university campuses and other public spaces. These interruptions and chance encounters provided insight into the local context and the meaning of language practices, supplying data to advance my investigation of *why* things are this way and address questions related to the power and interests that "wrap this local world so tight that it feels like the natural order of things to its inhabitants" (Agar, 1996b, p. 26). In this section I focus on insider/outsider perspectives of participant observation, and how my role as a researcher might have impacted relationships and data collection.

> At the beginning of my fieldwork, I was convinced that good ethnography should be written in blood. But what I now realize is that I don't need to throw myself into a lion's den and be mauled in order to appreciate the sharpness of a lion's tooth. I don't need to sacrifice myself and submit to every opportunity for experience. I don't need to accept every invitation to do everything in order to achieve some type of totality of experience. (Field note: October 2, 2008)

I recorded the above note after one month at site. At that time, I was struggling to figure out the "degree of participation" in which to engage and interact with Uyghur contacts at site (Spradley, 1980, pp. 58-62). It took time to establish the distance needed to achieve a degree of objectivity while also participating in the lives of my Uyghur consultants (Duranti, 1997; Johnstone, 2000). When participating in activities with Uyghur consultants (e.g. visiting the homes of consultants' immediate and extended families; watching television at my apartment; eating/drinking at restaurants/bars; shopping; walking through parks, university campuses, and the streets of Urumchi), I participated at different degrees and observed from diverse stances, including complete

participant; participant as observer; observer as participant; and complete observer (Gold, 1958). These stances allowed me to exploit the "creative tension between the goal of documented observation and the critical goal of understanding the situated observer" (Dewalt, et al., 1998, p. 263).

Adler and Adler argue in *Membership Roles in Field Research* (1987) that researchers undertaking naturalistic studies take on a variety of membership roles, and that the choice of role played by the ethnographer will affect the type of information made available and, ultimately, the kind of ethnography written. During my fieldwork, I had multiple simultaneous membership roles, including researcher and Uyghur language learner. The former role did undergo modification. When I first entered the field, I revealed my research activities to casual Uyghur acquaintances, but stopped doing this after a Uyghur consultant advised me to do so, stating that scholarship on Uyghur language issues might invite suspicion from authorities. As a Uyghur language learner, I sometimes advised Uyghur consultants not to accommodate their language practices (Giles, 1973) for my benefit (i.e. use English).

Other simultaneous ethnographic identities included status as a male, young, outsider. Being male impacted this study because this identity afforded greater access to the lives and language practices of Uyghur men. I was 30 years of age when I began this study and 32 at the completion of data collection. I feel that my age facilitated participant observation activities because it was within the range of the peer-group networks of young Uyghur adults. Of these ethnographic identities, my outsider status was most consequential. As an American foreigner of European ancestry, Uyghur consultants felt

secure that I was not a Chinese spy or, in the words of my Uyghur consultant Möshük, a "Uyghur dog" who would turn information (e.g. critical perspectives) over to the CCP. My outsider status also allowed me to ask questions about linguistic phenomena that may have been generally invisible to insiders. Many of my consultants were personal friends, and aware that I was sympathetic to a strongly pro-Uyghur language position. These factors may have influenced the kind of responses I received when exploring perspectives on CCP language policy in the Xinjiang education system. Some consultants may have over-emphasized their Uyghur language practices and/or offered critical perspectives that supported my own ideology in advocacy for Uyghur language autonomy. My research activities may have provoked contemplations such as: *If this foreigner cares so much about my language, shouldn't I care too*.

To consultants, I did reveal my research interests in language practices and my advocacy for linguistic human rights (Nettle & Romaine, 2000; Rubio-Marín, 2003). When I disclosed my role as a researcher, many of my consultants commended me for engaging in research that would publicize the Uyghurs (W. C. Clark, 1999b). My status as a Uyghur language learner may have influenced the language practices of my consultants because of an altruistic motivation to help me learn Uyghur through exposure and direct teaching. However, I believe that the extended nature of my study mitigated this possibility because I observed my consultants in a variety of domains, including family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972), and with different combinations of interlocutors, such as Uyghurs (of different language education backgrounds), Han Chinese, Westerners, and combinations thereof.

The insider/outsider distinction does capture something important about the roles I played in the field, the perspectives associated with them and their impact on relationships and data collection. I entered the field with an intellectual grasp of the history, power struggles, internal tensions and social structure of Xinjiang, but with no conception of how these dimensions appeared to those on the "inside" (Wolcott, 1999, p. 144). I exploited this tension by citing academic perspectives on Uyghur identity, language policy, and political discourse in Xinjiang (Dwyer, 2005; Goodman, 2004; Zhou & Hongkai, 2004) to my Uyghur consultants in order to initiate discussion. As Wolcott writes, "Outsider status refers to an *orientation*, not to a *membership*" (1999, p. 144). My objective was to obtain a nuanced understanding of the phenomena under investigation, not to become Uyghur, although I must admit to a deep positive feeling at moments where Uyghur consultants stated that I had obtained a deep understanding of the Uyghur context (and plight). My research study was a continuous exercise, consisting of data collection in order to "throw light on the issues that [were] the emerging focus of inquiry" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 3). In my participant observation activities on the language practices of Uyghur young adults, I documented the impact of my roles (e.g. researcher, Uyghur language learner, linguistic human rights advocate) on performances of "natural" linguistic phenomena under investigation (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 66).

3.5.2.1 Notes

Social scientists define field notes in various ways according to their intent, function and purpose (Jackson, 1990). Still, there is some consensus that field notes consist of a running log inscribed in the field. I recorded field notes through the duration of my fieldwork. Cognizant of the assertion of Dewalt, Dewalt and Wayland (1998) that "*observations are not data* unless they are recorded in some fashion for further analysis" (Dewalt, et al., 1998, p. 271), I took care to record all thoughts and observations that were relevant to my study. I was intent to produce a set of data that could be drawn upon to reconstruct a "development of understanding, and to be able to review the growing relationship between [myself] and study participants in a manner that allows for reflexivity at the end of the process" (Dewalt, et al., 1998, p. 271). In the following paragraphs, I discuss three types of field notes – descriptive, analytic and reflexive – and describe my note-taking practices.

Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (2011) define descriptive field notes as a written record about one's experiences and observations derived from intense and involved participation in the lives and activities of others. My descriptive notes consisted of observations of the language practices of my consultants – descriptions about language(s) used in settings consisting of interlocutors from different ethnicities and language education backgrounds. I noted the setting and type of communication (face-to-face or telephone), number of interlocutors, ethnicity of interlocutors, and language backgrounds of interlocutors.[24] I

[24] If I did not know the language education background of the interlocutor(s), I would ask my consultant or acquaintance for this information after the conversation.

recorded information on formulatic expressions, including greetings and leave-takings (Duranti, 2009), lexical borrowing (Muysken, 1995) and code-switching (Auer, 1998).

These descriptive field notes were accompanied with analysis, including asides, commentaries and interpretations (Emerson, et al., 2011). These were questions, ideas and reactions I had to the language practices I had observed. I wrote these personal and theoretical reactions in italics to distinguish them from the descriptive text. These analytical field notes were coded for thematic analysis, a continuous process maintained through the duration of the study. Thematic analysis consisted of recording brief descriptions as related to small chunks of data on language practices. The detail of this process varied according to the saliency of the themes and expectations about the direction of the analysis. I altered and modified the analysis in the light of experience and the development of ideas. This sometimes required adjustments of earlier codings, as I developed a deeper understanding of language practices as shaped by and shaping the language ecology of Xinjiang. On the basis of these codings, I identified themes (i.e. context and language investments; expected returns; language choice; and linguistic anxiety) that integrated substantial sets of these codings, again making changes and adjustments.

I also recorded reflexive field notes – examinations of personal assumptions, preconceptions, experiences, and feelings that impacted my perceptions as a researcher (Davies, 1999; Salamone, 2006). These notes were important to my study, especially the recognition of themes; I would often "member check" my analysis (Bloor, 1983), providing my consultants opportunities to evaluate my findings and interpretations,

inviting commentary with the objective of refinement. This activity often led to energetic discussions on issues related to Uyghur identity, language policy, and political discourse in Xinjiang (Dwyer, 2005; Goodman, 2004; Zhou & Hongkai, 2004).

In reference to the language practices described above, I recorded reflexive field notes on the impact of my presence on the language practices of consultants. I was concerned with the Hawthorne effect, the alteration of language behavior by the consultants due to an awareness of being observed (Landsberger, 1958). Through I advised my consultants to use whatever language they typically used, it is possible that some chose to use English in order to ensure my full participation and/or comprehension in certain conversations. This possibility prompted intense focus on "rich points" (Agar, 1996a, p. 106), including language practices prompted from interruptions by unannounced consultants; interruptions of interviews and conversations by phone calls; and chance encounters with consultants' classmates and friends.

Other reflexive field notes captured my struggles in subjective/objective positionality, power and privilege, as I struggled to answer the questions: How do my language practices influence the language practices of my consultants in multilingual contexts? How does my advocacy for linguistic human rights and language maintenance influence my relationships at site? And what impact does my status as a Western foreigner and temporary resident of Urumchi have on my relationships at site?

3.5.3 Interviews

I conducted two types of interviews in this study: semi-structured and ethnographic interviews (Davies, 1999; LeCompte & Schensul, 2010; Lindlof & Taylor, 2010). Semi-structured interviews were conducted during planned meetings where I had a set of written questions. I did not read questions verbatim but used them as reference points to elicit open-ended responses. I addressed topics as dictated by the flow of the conversation (Davies, 1999, pp. 94-95). I conducted two sets of semi-structured interviews, the first with 26 Uyghur young adults in dyads and groups, and the second with four case study participants.[25]

The first series of semi-structured interviews were approximately one hour long. The second series spanned several meetings for at least five hours. I conducted interviews on university campuses, restaurants and my apartment. In my field journal I described the interview participants and recorded information on the contexts. For semi-structured interviews, I used an interview protocol (Yin, 2003). Some of the questions were focused (i.e. devised to elicit specific information) while others were open-ended (i.e. devised to solicit descriptions, interpretations, opinions and perspectives). Interview Protocol #1 featured 10 questions. The purpose of this first interview protocol was to obtain self-report data on consultants' language practices in different domains, including family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972); explore expected returns on Mandarin language skills; and explore the complex identity of Uyghurs educated in Mandarin

[25] The group interviews were not designed as "focus group interviews" because I was not interested in obtaining complimentary or argumentative interactions (Lindlof & Taylor, 2010, pp. 183-184).

(*mínkǎohàn*). Interview Protocol #2 was composed of 20 categories and 100 questions.[26] The purpose of this second interview protocol was to obtain data on case study consultants' language practices in various domains, including family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972).

I continuously refined the second interview protocol. I amended it several times because my case study participants sometimes provided information that I had not directly solicited, prompting me to reverse engineer questions (Cameron, Frazer, Harvey, Rampton, & Richardson, 1992). For example, during one interview, Athena revealed that she had a nickname for her mother. I later asked Möshük if she had nicknames for family members, which she affirmed. Athena, educated in Uyghur primary and Mandarin-Uyghur secondary schools, had Uyghur language nicknames for family members. Möshük, educated in Han Chinese schools, had Mandarin nicknames for family members. This data suggested that the language of the academic field might influence language practices in the domestic field. In order to explore this possibility, I formed a question on nickname language practices.

I conducted ethnographic interviews throughout the study in my apartment and public places, including city streets, parks, restaurants, shopping districts. These interviews were unstructured, in-depth and open-ended, with the purpose of exploring issues related to the socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-historical dynamics that influence language practices (Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999). These

[26] See Appendixes A and B for the Interview Protocols.

conversations were of an open-ended, exploratory nature and conducted with one consultant at a time (Davies, 1999).

3.5.4 Documents

Social scientists often use documentary research methods to supplement participant observation and interviews (Mogalakwe, 2006). Scott (1990) defined a "document" as an artifact that has as its central feature an inscribed text. Documentation can take many forms (Yin, 2003); the type of documents used in this study were classroom-based bulletin boards; and online articles consisting of news media data. Classroom-based bulletin boards were of interest because they contained ideological messages linking Mandarin proficiency with national unity and economic prosperity. Online articles contained information about the phenomenon under investigation (Bailey, 1994). Some articles on CCP Language Policy in Xinjiang – government initiatives that have implications for language practices – periodically appeared on CCP-authored websites; these documents were of interest because they illustrated the ideological stance of the state, that the expansion of Mandarin as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang school system would increase employment opportunities for Uyghur graduates and contribute to ethno-national cohesion (Jia, 2009a, 2009b).

Scott (1990) formulated four criteria for handling documentary sources: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. In the following paragraphs, I discuss how I collected news media data during fieldwork, how I used them, and how these documents measured against Scott's credibility measures (1990).

In order to collect news media data, I set up applications to filter online news sites and deliver articles via e-mail. In my *New York Times* online account, I subscribed to e-mail newsletters for articles on "Uighurs (Chinese ethnic group)" and "Xinjiang (China)." I also set up "keyword news alerts" on *Yahoo!* for articles that mentioned "Uyghur," "Uighur," and "Xinjiang." The *New York Times* delivered all published articles while the *Yahoo!* keyword alerts gathered links to ten articles per day. I subscribed to the *Uyghur Human Rights Project* mailing list, and RSS feeds from *Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service*, and the blogs *The New Dominion* and *Xinjiang: Far West China*.

This method worked well until July 6, 2009, when in the midst of the violence that had gripped Urumchi, the CCP disabled the Internet. The disruption of Internet-based communications did not interfere with the collection of documents, but retrieval was interrupted. Like many others, I became an "Internet refugee" and made several trips outside of the Uyghur region to access the Internet and obtain news media data (Dewalt, et al., 1998, p. 271).

I organized articles into themes related to: Mandarin language education policy in Xinjiang, and cultural practices (language and religion). I arrived at the first theme because of its direct relevance to the study, that is, the expansion of Mandarin as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system and the corresponding marginalization of Uyghur and other ethnic minority languages. I arrived at the second theme because of its reoccurrence and because language and religion were often mentioned together as restricted practices. I incorporated these articles into my field notes when their content seemed to support, refute or complicate data obtained through

participant observation and interview sessions. Many of these articles served as links in the chain of evidence between my research objectives and conclusions. I used these documents as supplementary data to corroborate information from my case studies (Yin, 2003). I created electronic folders to store a copy of each article, a means to compensate for low retrievablility – one weakness of documentary evidence (Yin, 2003). This was partly because the Xinhua News Agency (the official press agency of the People's Republic of China) has a record of modifying and/or removing articles within hours of publication.[27]

In terms of Scott's credibility measurements (1990), I assess the news media data as authentic and representative, but of debatable credibility and complex meaning. I use Cui Jia's article "Mandarin Lessons in Xinjiang 'help fight terrorism'" (2009b) as a representative example. In addition to the claim made in the title, this article asserts that Uyghurs who cannot speak Mandarin are susceptible to being "tricked into terrorist activities" by terrorists from neighboring countries; that there is a demand for Mandarin language education from ethnic minority students; that the desire among ethnic minority students to learn Mandarin is generated from citizens and not imposed by the state; that Mandarin language proficiency is positively correlated with employment prospects; and that Mandarin language proficiency is facilitative of the promotion of minority ethnic

[27] A *New York Times* article "New Protests Reported in Restive Chinese Region" (2007) provided evidence of this practice. The journalists wrote that "the Web site of *China Daily* published an article from *Xinhua*, the state news agency, that said police officers had detained 15 people in Xinjiang for needle attacks…After the large protests, government censors rushed to delete the news accounts on the Internet. By late afternoon, the *Xinhua* article published by *China Daily* was still on the newspaper's Web site, but a news release on the same subject, posted on the Web site of the information office of the State Council, China's cabinet, had been deleted."

culture. This article also implies that ethnic minority students who do not learn Mandarin will come to regret this decision.

Authenticity refers to the genuineness of the document and whether it is of reliable and dependable origin. This article may be considered an authentic (government) document because the CCP exercises tight control of news media (Esarey, 2007); there is no reason to believe that this document was falsified, corrupted or damaged in any way. Representativeness refers to the typicality of the document. This article represents and reflects CCP ideology on terrorism (as proliferated by external separatists) and the expansion of Mandarin language education as related to an increase in Uyghur employment opportunities (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007; Wayne, 2007). Credibility refers to document error and distortion. In the article under examination, several pieces of information may be misleading, such as a statement attributed to the CCP Chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. "[Nur] Bekri said there had been demand for Mandarin language lessons from ethnic minority students who wanted to be able to communicate with other Chinese." (Jia, 2009b). It is difficult to believe that the expansion of Mandarin language education was the result of a bottom-up movement[28] (Spolsky, 2004). Meaning refers to comprehensibility, and while this article is comprehensible, the reader must determine "which inference to make from a document about matters other than the truth of its factual assertions" (Platt, 1981).

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[28] Ron Utz made a similar argument for the promotion of English language education (and the corresponding elimination of Spanish-English bilingual education) in 1996 in California. A small group of Spanish-speaking parents had claimed that, "the Los Angeles school district was refusing to teach their children English," and pulled their children out of school for two weeks (Crawford, 2007, p. 153). Utz seized upon the publicity generated by this protest to launch Proposition 227 – the "English for the Children" initiative (Colin Baker, 2011, p. 190).

3.5.5 Expressive vocabulary assessment

One objective of this study was to assess the degree of threat faced by the Uyghur language (Dillon, 2002; Dwyer, 2005). Based on scholarship exploring the role of lexical borrowing as related to language contact and change (O'Shannessy, 2011; Weinreich, 1953; Winford, 2003), and research on loanword typology (Haspelmath & Tadmor), I created an expressive vocabulary assessment in order to obtain one measurement of my case study participants' knowledge of the Uyghur lexicon.[29] I focused on lexical borrowing because "the most common outcome in language contact is lexical borrowing from the more sociolinguistically dominant language by the less dominant one" (Carol Myers-Scotton, 1998).

I devised this instrument because in conversations on the viability of Uyghur, several Uyghur acquaintances and consultants expressed a concern that the Uyghur language was "disappearing" through the process of first language attrition (Köpke, Schmid, Keijzer, & Dostert, 2007; Lambert & Freed, 1982) and/or native language lexical deficiency (Sounkalo, 1995). However, there was an absence of empirical data to support this claim. A conversation with Messi's grandfather also compelled me to create this instrument. One afternoon in February 2009, in his living room, he pointed out a few objects – a table and dresser among them – and lamented how younger generations of Uyghurs were now using Mandarin terms to identify these objects. He expressed a fear that common Uyghur words were being lost.

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[29] See Appendixes C and D for the expressive vocabulary assessment and key.

This instrument was inspired by Dunn and Dunn's Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (1965, 1997). The purpose of this test is to provide a quick, easy and reliable assessment of vocabulary. To administer the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, the examiner orally presents a stimulus word with a set of pictures; the test taker is asked to select the picture that most accurately represents the word's meaning. Dunn and Dunn created their instrument in order to measure receptive vocabulary, the body of words that a person recognizes and understands well enough to comprehend when read or heard. However, I modified this instrument in order to measure expressive vocabulary, the body of words that a person recognizes and understands well enough to comprehend while writing or speaking. I was interested in measuring expressive vocabulary because these words indicate a person's productive, as opposed to receptive, lexicon (Cohen, 1989). Test takers were presented with pictures and asked to inscribe their signifier.

I focused on vocabulary as an aspect of language to assess because first language attrition is typically manifested first in the lexicon (Schmid & Köpke, 2008). To create an expressive vocabulary assessment instrument, I first devised nine categories: animals; body and face; family; nature; food; jobs; furniture and appliances; transportation; numbers; and colors. These categories were selected because they were commonplace and compatible with visual representation. I located 156 pictures to populate the categories. I obtained the pictures on websites that offered free images for educational purposes (e.g. http://www.coloring.ws; http://www.edupics.com). I administered this instrument to each case study participant in order to assess expressive Uyghur

vocabulary. The *mínkǎomín* case study participants wrote their answers in Uyghur and the *mínkǎohàn* case study participants wrote in Latin letters.

In administering this instrument, I reinforced the visual cues with spoken English. This is because, when Möshük returned the expressive vocabulary assessment, she had left many entries blank. Curious about this, I asked her if she knew the Uyghur word for "elbow." She then orally produced the correct Uyghur term. She told me that, for her – a self-identified "illiterate" in Uyghur – Uyghur is an oral language. It is difficult for her to produce the written form. I reviewed the expressive vocabulary assessment with Möshük, verbally soliciting vocabulary items she had left blank (or were misidentified) and recorded the results. In order to maintain consistency, I repeated this procedure with each case study participant. This verbal solicitation was a crucial step to clarify misidentifications and to determine which lexical items were genuinely unknown. I created a table for each case study participant with the number of known lexical items divided by the total number. This equation yielded a percentage of total known items featured on the assessment.

3.6 DATA ANALYSIS

This research study yielded a substantial amount of data. In the following sub-sections, I describe my approach to the recognition of emergent themes and the formation of case study narratives. In the final sub-section on thematic data analysis procedures, I provide an overview of my techniques for coding and categorizing data and how I went about generating themes.

Ethnographies are social constructions, not unambiguous representations of the "truth" (Alsop, 2006). These works are not to be read and received as "a straight-ahead cultural description based on first hand experience an author had with a strange (to both author and reader) group of people" (Maanen, 1995, p. 1). Rather, ethnographic works are to be recognized as "inventions" of culture and fictions "in the sense of something made or fashioned" (1986, p. 6). Ethnographic forms of writing that are authoritative and univocal are deceptive because the quality of "fiction" is concealed by a mode of representation about "something that actually happened to characters who actually existed" (C. Ellis, 2003). "Textaulists urge ethnographers to experiment with new forms of writing that are dialectical, dialogic, or polyphonic" instead of modes of representation that promote a perception of researcher omniscience (Brettell, 1993, p. 2).

I acknowledge that "the information provided [was] affected by the positions of both ethnographer and informant within [our] own social worlds, as well as by [our] evolving personal relationships and understanding of one another's social worlds (Davies, 1999, p. 79). By developing a reflexive understanding of my relationships with my informants, I analyzed how my experience in the field influenced data collection, blurring "subjective" and "objective" commentaries (Alsop, 2006). Instead of striving to maintain particular positions along the "degree of participation" (Spradley, 1980) continuum, I continuously exercised reflexivity and awareness of my impact on the research process (Alsop, 2006).

I do not claim that the data produced by this study, along with my interpretations and conclusions, are complete or that I have told the whole story. In the words of Bakker,

"the problem of anthropological knowledge" is that "sociocultural reality presents itself to the anthropologist in fragmented bits and pieces" (1992, p. 40). He later asserts that, "the knowledge produced in the field is necessarily incomplete, distorted, tentative, speculative, and thus essentially contestable" (Bakker, 1992, p. 40). Many scholars have suggested that this crisis in confidence in "ethnographic authority" can be solved through the method of reflexive analysis (Aunger, 2003; Davies, 1999; Foley, 2002; Sanjek, 1990). I exercise reflexivity in my data analysis by identifying and making explicit ideological, political, value based, and overly biased affinities (Lapan, et al., 2011).

However, I do assert that this study makes a contribution to our understanding of the social-life of language as practiced by Uyghur young adults, and more generally, colonized ethnolinguistic communities. My informants and I collaborated in a mutual search to examine the factors influencing Uyghur language practices in multilingual contexts. This experience did "mediate" our social worlds because conversations were motivated by a desire to understand the socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-historical dynamics that influence language practices. When discussing CCP language policy, I made efforts to articulate the government ideology related to the expansion of Mandarin language education and increased employment opportunities for Mandarin speakers. I made an effort to include the voice of the CCP in our dialogue because I aspired to refine arguments, problematize assumptions, and counter my bias toward linguistic human rights (Skutnabb-Kangas & Dunbar, 2010).

3.6.1 Thematic analysis procedure

This study employed thematic analysis, "a systematic approach to the analysis of qualitative data that involves identifying themes or patterns of cultural meaning; coding and classifying data, usually textual, according to themes; and interpreting the resulting thematic structures by seeking commonalities, relationships, overarching patterns, theoretical constructs, or explanatory principles" (Lapadat, 2009, pp. 925-926). Thematic analysis was a sensible approach for this study because I needed to manage a large volume of data without losing the context, and organize this data according to unifying themes and concepts (Lapadat, 2009).

Coding is the basic analytic strategy used in thematic analysis, "a process of closely inspecting text to look for recurrent themes, topics, or relationships, and marking similar passages with a code or label to categorize them for later retrieval and theory-building" (Lapadat, 2009, p. 926). The types of data used in my thematic analysis included field notes, interview transcripts and news media data. I utilized NVivo qualitative data analysis software to facilitate thematic analysis, including coding and searching. I coded language practices according to sociolinguistic domains, including the location, the participants and the topic. I then imported these texts into NVivo, and after reading them carefully, coded segments according to the relevant "node" – the NVivo term for "theme." Two types of nodes were used: "Free nodes" have no clear logical connection with other nodes (e.g. toponyms); "tree nodes" are organized in a hierarchical structure, from a general category at the top, *the parent node* (e.g. language contact) to more specific categories, *child nodes* (e.g. lexical borrowing; language shift; linguistic

hegemony). NVivo supported lexical searching, involving searching for text; and Boolean and proximity node searching, enabling analytic comparisons.

This study used systematic thematic analysis with a hybrid of inductive and deductive coding. Inductive themes emerged from a close examination of the empirical data for patterns (Roulston, 2010) and constant comparison, a process in which newly collected data is compared with previous data (B. G. Glaser & Strauss, 1967). I utilized free nodes when coding inductively, until categories became apparent and then organized them into trees. Deductive themes were based on Practice Theory constructs that I wished to investigate, such as habitus; fields; forms of capital (i.e. symbolic, economic, cultural, and social) and conversions of capital (Bourdieu, 1977b, 1986, 1991; Grenfell, 2011d). I used research questions and categories derived from theory (e.g. investments in the acquisition of linguistic capital; successful conversions of linguistic capital) to deduce a number of themes (i.e. context and language investments; expected returns; language choice; and linguistic anxiety). All codes were "grounded both empirically (in the data) and conceptually (linked to the wider analytic context)" (Davies, 1999, p. 79).

3.6.2 Multiple case narratives

This study includes a collection of storied vignettes on case study consultant life histories as related to language practices. A set of case studies related to the same topic are presented in narrative format (Polkinghorne, 1995). The purpose of creating a set of vignettes is to "provide [a] greater insight and understanding on the topic than any single vignette" (Seidman, 1985). I constructed case study narratives from semi-structured

interviews conducted with case-study consultants. I audio-recorded interviews and then transcribed them; Messi and Möshük assisted in the translation of Uyghur. When writing the narratives, I retained full statements and sections of dialogue when possible and/or appropriate (Davies, 1999). I quoted my consultants when they expressed sentiments that would have lost potency from summarization. These vignettes were crafted with the objective of understanding the "situated language practices" of Uyghur young adults (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 66). I described speech events in a variety of domains, including family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972) in order to explore how specific social and cultural factors influenced consultants' "natural" performances (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 66).

The narratives are structured in roughly similar chronological order, a sequence maintained because biographical information is appropriately expressed in linear format (Yin, 2003). The first sections illustrate the participants' family and background, with a focus on language practices in the domestic field. The middle section describes the participant's education and language practices in academic fields from kindergarten through university. The final section presents contemporary language practices along with perspectives on CCP language policy. The case study narratives are written in the third person. This was a stylistic choice to remind the reader that a story was being told through an intermediary.

After constructing these narratives, I read them to my consultants. Through the process of "member checking" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), I gave my consultants the opportunity to consider their respective vignettes and react to the interpretations. I invited

the participants to ascertain the veracity of the narratives in order to ensure the trustworthiness of the data. These narratives are co-creations, formed from the juxtaposition and interplay of researcher and case study participant. These texts are written from a critical realist perspective with the objective of describing the social realities – mediations formed from interactions within a social field consisting of researcher and case study consultants (Brettell, 1993; Davies, 1999; Foley, 2002).

3.7 TRIANGULATION

Participant observation, interview and documentary data was triangulated (Denzin, 1978) in an effort to obtain a deep understanding of the interrelationship of contextual factors persisting in Urumchi, Xinjiang and the language practices of Uyghur young adults, and to say something meaningful about what particular people do with language in particular historically constituted, politically conditioned and socially structured circumstances (Blommaert, 1999; Bourdieu, 1991; May, 2005; Wolcott, 1999).

The purpose of triangulation was to improve the quality of the data and the accuracy of ethnographic findings (David M. Fetterman, 2009). Field note data captured descriptions of consultants' language practices in a variety of domains, including family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972); interviews yielded insights from consultants on patterns and the meanings of language practices; documents functioned to reveal official CCP positions on language policy and ideology in Xinjiang. The expressive vocabulary assessment generated a quantified measure of consultants' knowledge of the Uyghur lexicon. I practiced triangulation, the gathering of data with a

combination of research methods, to generate a robust set of findings on the language ecology of Urumchi, Xinjiang and the language practices of Uyghur young adults.

3.8 CONCLUSION

In March 2010, near the end of my fieldwork in Urumchi, my consultant Mike and I were sitting on a couch in my apartment, discussing his frustrations associated with interactions with Han Chinese authority figures, including his conscious refusal to meet with Han Chinese "politeness expectations" in sociolinguistic interactions (Lakoff, 2005, p. 23). We had discussed politics and ethnic discrimination extensively that day; the numerous segments of audio recordings indicated the many times I turned the recorder off in order to avoid collecting data on sensitive issues (Jenkins, 1984).

At the close of this long conversation, Mike said to me, "I feel like I have a tear in my eye but I cannot cry." That sentiment hit me like a great weight. It captured a sense of exasperation. It was a visceral expression of what it felt like to be deprived the freedom to express intense feelings of frustration and sorrow. This statement prompted me to consider the feelings of Uyghurs and other ethnic minority communities whose languages are marginalized in the Xinjiang education system, that is, irritation associated with having *words* in their *mouths* that they cannot *speak*.

Several scholars, such as Concepcion (2000), Fuller and Starr (2004), and Li (2010), have suggested that far-reaching controls on freedoms of expression in Urumchi, Xinjiang contribute to the volatility of this setting (Sobo & Munck, 1998). Ironically, the CCP has responded to contemporary socio-political volatility in Xinjiang by increasing

restrictions on freedoms of expression (Freedom House, 2011; S. Wei & Cuifen, 2010). The completion of this study required methodological adaptations, including the consideration of danger as a methodological issue, and the development of ways to minimize risk in the field (Sluka, 1995).

Chapter 4: The language ecology of Xinjiang, Uyghur language practices and identity formation

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I present four themes that emerged from participation-observation activities and the transcripts of semi-structured interviews conducted with 26 Uyghur young adults [N=26] who had been educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*), Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*), bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) or a combination of these programs. The themes are: context and language investments, expected returns, language choice, and linguistic anxiety. In the following section, I review literature on the ecology of language and justify how this theoretical framework and research orientation resonates with Bourdieu's ideas on language, power and politics (1977b, 1991; Grenfell, 2011d; Haugen, 1972). Data on practices and perspectives, obtained and exhibited during participation-observation activities and semi-structured interviews, form the evidence in support of the themes (D. M. Fetterman, 1989). I conclude this chapter by linking language ecology with the language practices of Uyghur young adults along with implications for identity formation (Bazeley, 2009).

4.1.1 The ecology of language

Haeckel coined the term *ecology* to denote "the study of all those complex interrelations referred to by Darwin as the conditions of the struggle for existence" (Brewer, 1988, p. 1). Haugen applied this term metaphorically to the field of linguistics, defining *language ecology* as "the study of interactions between any given language and

the environment… [And that] "the ecology of a language is determined primarily by the people who learn it, use it, and transmit it to others" (1972, p. 325). Haugen recognized some limitations to the principles of ecology when transferred from the natural sciences to the social sciences, limitations inherent to the analysis of complex environmental factors on language contact situations (Haarmann, 1986; Winford, 2003). Haugen pioneered the application of ecological principles to languages and speakers in society, initiating a systematic exploration of interrelationships between languages and their social environments (Enninger, 1984).

Since Haugen, linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists have developed the theoretical framework and research orientation of language ecology. MacKinnon (1977) and Dorian (1973) considered ecological factors when investigating language death, as did Gal (1979) and Mackey (1980) when discussing the social determinants of language shift. These scholars approached the analysis of linguistic phenomena as an ongoing social activity, stressing the interrelationships of environmental and social factors (e.g. population factors, socio-economic mobility, interactional patterns and networks) on language practices (e.g. diglossia, code-switching, bilingualism) (Enninger, 1984; Haugen, 1972). Linguists concerned with language endangerment have also adopted the theoretical framework of language ecology because of its ideological emphasis on interrelationships and diversity (Finke, 1996; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2002); this perspective is also attractive because it can be used to link disciplines (Weinrich, 1990).

Mühlhäusler (1996, 2000) advanced a comprehensive approach to language ecology by connecting the maintenance of linguistic diversity to a concern for biological

diversity. Mühlhäusler (2001) suggested that the exploration of linguistic diversity be extended beyond the communicative functions of language (including static taxonomies) to include metacommunicative functions. He suggested that language ecology be used to investigate group identity, the role of social networks in language use and maintenance, and how speech communities adapt to specific environmental conditions. Mühlhäusler's "ecological approach incorporates the aspects of language planning traditionally considered, such as languages and speakers, with system-wide factors and system-external factors, and then shifts the frame of reference to emphasize relationships between the factors rather than on the factors themselves" (Cassell, 2007, p. 65).

The scholarship associated with language ecology resonates with Bourdieu's ideas on language, power and politics because of the shared orientation toward material conditions and the dynamics of power relations in social spaces (1991; Haugen, 1972; Mühlhäusler, 1996). "According to Bourdieu, the constitution of a language is a historical process in which socio-political and economic forces compete to empower the modes of expression of certain classes or social groups and to disempower those of others… Bourdieu argues that the political struggles that took place in the development of modern nation-states had a crucial linguistic dimension; they included struggles for the monopoly of language" (Medina, 2005, p. 114). In society, there is an exchange rate for linguistic signs. This linguistic system does not operate in isolation from social factors, but is in competition with the social values of other symbolic systems (Bourdieu, 1977a). As Weinrich suggested, "If one wants to analyze the linguistic system adequately one has to analyze simultaneously the entire social environment of this system" (1990, p. 95). The

following themes explore the language practices of young adult Uyghurs as related to historical, political, economic and cultural factors particular to the social space of Xinjiang.

4.2 THEME ONE: CONTEXT AND LANGUAGE INVESTMENTS

Peirce (1995) used the term *language investment* to describe a learner's desire to invest time and effort in learning a language to gain symbolic or material resources. She argued that *investment* was more accurate than *motivation* because the conceptions of motivation dominant in the field of Second Language Acquisition "do not capture the complex relationship between relations of power, identity, and language learning" (1995, p. 17). Peirce claimed that her idea of investment was best understood in reference to the economic metaphors utilized by Bourdieu, particularly his notion of *cultural capital* (Bourdieu, 1977a; 1995). Peirce "take[s] the position that if learners invest in a second language, they do so with the understanding that they will acquire a wider range of symbolic and material resources, which will in turn increase the value of their cultural capital. Learners will expect or hope to have a good return on that investment – a return that will give them access to hitherto unattainable resources" (1995, p. 17).

Language investment emerged as a theme from the interviews conducted with 26 Uyghur young adults who had been educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*), Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) and bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) or a combination of these programs. The following paragraphs illustrate the nature of language investments made by Uyghur young adults and how these investments in Mandarin impacted their own

social identity, “an identity which [was] constantly changing across time and space” (Peirce, 1995, p. 18).

All of the consultants had invested in learning Mandarin, although the nature of language investment was not uniform. Although all of the consultants were living in Urumchi, and several had been raised in this city, some were from other urban centers, and other consultants were from towns and rural areas in Xinjiang. The following three profiles of Uyghur young adults are presented in order to illustrate the various types of Mandarin foreign and second language learners in Xinjiang. This is not intended to be an exhaustive typology of Mandarin language learners in Xinjiang. Rather, these profiles are presented in order to bring attention to the variety of environments in which Uyghurs learn Mandarin, with an emphasis on population factors. All of the consultants identified as Mandarin language learners, but this category must be analyzed because its generality and inclusiveness obfuscates important differences related to the environment and context of Mandarin language learning.

Most Uyghurs from Urumchi and educated in majority Han Chinese classes with Mandarin as the language of instruction may be classified as Mandarin second language learners. Most of these individuals learned Mandarin following the acquisition of their first language (i.e. Uyghur). Möshük, for example, was born and raised in Urumchi. In the domestic field of Möshük’s childhood, monolingual Uyghur was the language of communication, her “primary language” and “mother tongue.” She recalled earning low scores in Mandarin in first grade because she did not comprehend this second language. For the duration of her academic career, she was educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) in a

predominantly Han Chinese class. Möshük, currently in college, reported that Mandarin was now her "strongest language." The Uyghur language is a major part of Möshük's personal, social and cultural identity (Edwards, 2009), yet she claimed a higher degree of fluency in Mandarin. Möshük's investments in learning Mandarin were facilitated by Mandarin immersion beginning in pre-school, and frequent contact with Han Chinese in her class and neighborhood.

Most Uyghur young adults from urban centers outside of Urumchi, along with towns and rural areas in Xinjiang, may be more accurately classified as Mandarin foreign language learners, because Uyghur and Han Chinese (i.e. Mandarin-speaking) communities often occupy distinct spaces (Dillon, 2009b; Rudelson, 1997).[30] Mike, for example, was from Ghulja, a city in northwest Xinjiang with a population of some 515,000 people, about 46 percent of whom are Uyghur (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Mike stated that the physical spaces of Ghulja were segregated along ethnic lines. Although Mike was educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*), and the majority of his classmates were Han Chinese, there were several Uyghurs and a smaller number of Kazakhs. Mike's Mandarin immersion began when he entered primary school, but his contact with Han Chinese was limited to interactions in the scholastic field. Mike was fluent in both Uyghur and Mandarin but he engaged in resistance by refusing to adhere to conventions of Han Chinese politeness when communicating with Han Chinese authority

[30] The distinction between second language and foreign language learners is important to this study because contextual differences impact the process of language acquisition (Gee, 1996). As Krashen (Wilton, 2009) suggests, second language contexts support natural (unconscious) acquisition while foreign language contexts involve formal (conscious) learning of the target language. However, see Gregg (1981) for a critical review of Krashen's theory.

figures (Lakoff, 2005). For example, Mike favoured directness and did not display deference in discourse (Bilbow, 1997). His Han Chinese interlocutors frequently became frustrated with him because while he demonstrated a high degree of Mandarin linguistic competence (Chomsky, 1965), he did not demonstrate a corresponding degree of communicative competence, or adherence to Han Chinese expectations of socially situated performance (Canale & Swain, 1980; Hymes, (2000 [1965])). Mike's investments in learning Mandarin were facilitated by Mandarin immersion beginning in primary school, yet this input was restricted to formal education contexts as Mandarin was not the medium of communication in his neighborhood.

Anar, from a rural area outside the city of Aksu, typifies a third variety of Mandarin language learner. Aksu has a population of around 245,000 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2000); with an increasing number of Han Chinese (Toops, 2010). Anar grew up in a rural, agrarian, Uyghur community outside of Aksu. She attended a village primary school that was entirely populated by Uyghurs and was educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*), environmental conditions that suggest a Mandarin as a foreign language context. She performed well on standardized exams and earned entrance to a boarding school in Aksu for her secondary studies. Anar's Mandarin immersion began when she entered secondary school, where she was educated in a bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) class with Uyghur classmates. Anar enrolled at a university in Urumchi after graduating from secondary school. Prior to starting college, Anar studied Mandarin (*yǔkè*) for one year, a requirement for ethnic minority students taking the *mínkǎomín* version of the National Higher Education Entrance Examination (*gāokǎo*).

I claim that Anar initially learned Mandarin as a foreign language because she studied this language in a context where it was not the primary vehicle for daily interaction and where input in that language was restricted (Allwright, 1991; Oxford, 2003). It is useful to draw a distinction between second language and foreign language contexts because population factors have implications for social interactions with the target language and culture, impacting "(a) the amount of exposure to input and opportunities for output, and (b) the learner's probable motivation to engage in the additional language learning event" (J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 2000, p. 9).

If social interaction is the vehicle in order to start the process of second language acquisition, as is suggested by van Lier (1996), then Anar's relatively deficient Mandarin exposure and corresponding opportunity for output would have influenced the development of her Mandarin language skills. Anar's secondary boarding school and college were located in contexts with a significant number of Han Chinese, bringing her into frequent contact with the target language and culture. It is defensible to claim that Anar learned Mandarin as a foreign language in primary school, but later in Aksu and Urumchi, she learned Mandarin as a second language. Anar judged herself to be proficient in Mandarin, but less proficient than Uyghurs who had been educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) in urban areas.

I was impressed by the variety of Mandarin learning experiences reported by Uyghur young adults. Each consultant seemed to have a unique educational trajectory, defying simple categorization. I encountered a small number of Uyghurs who had been educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*); these individuals were invariably from urban areas. I

encountered no Uyghurs who had been educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) for the entire duration of their primary and secondary education. The majority of the Uyghurs I consulted had been educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) primary schools and bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) secondary schools.

It was not surprising to find such as large number of Uyghurs educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) primary schools and bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) secondary schools; since the late 1980s, Mandarin has been displacing Uyghur as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system through the expansion of a Mandarin dominant curriculum and the merger of minority language and Mandarin language schools (Dwyer, 2005). The *Xinjiang Daily* proclaimed in March 2004 that all ethnic minority schools be merged with Han Chinese schools, that ethnic minority and Han Chinese students be integrated in the classrooms of these merged schools, and that ethnic minority students in Xinjiang be taught in Mandarin as much as possible (Radio Free Asia, 2004).

The Uyghur young adults consulted in this study were all college students; the youngest of the *mínkǎomín*/*shuāngyǔ* interviewees (at 18 years of age) would have begun junior secondary school in 2002 and senior secondary school in 2005. These dates are consistent with the expansion of Mandarin as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system and the supplantation of Uyghur language instruction (*mínkǎomín*) with bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) instruction. At present, monolingual Mandarin instruction (*mínkǎohàn*) and Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) instruction is displacing Uyghur language instruction (*mínkǎomín*) (Congressional-Executive Commission on

China, 2008a, 2010b; Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007). Several *mínkǎomín*/*shuāngyǔ* consultants remarked that they were the "last generation" of Uyghurs educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) and that future generations of Uyghurs would be entirely Mandarin educated (*mínkǎohàn*) and/or Mandarin-Uyghur educated (*shuāngyǔ*). Some of these individuals suggested that I conduct research on future cohorts in order to identify the implications of this shift on Uyghur language practices and identity formation.

One complicating factor was that Uyghurs educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) primary schools and bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) secondary schools sometimes identified as having been educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*). This phenomenon indicates a tendency among some Uyghurs to deny an aspect of their background and promote an ethnolinguistic identity that has more value in Han Chinese-dominated markets. This Möshük asserted that *mínkǎomín*/*shuāngyǔ* sometimes claimed to be *mínkǎohàn* because they were "jealous of *mínkǎohàn* because *mínkǎohàn* could get a better job and have a better life." That is, she suggested that Uyghur *mínkǎomín*/*shuāngyǔ* sometimes identified as *mínkǎohàn* because they wanted to emphasize their membership in a sector possessing Mandarin linguistic capital, a form of embodied cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1977c). This may be considered a form of "passing" because there is no "real" identity behind this act of performance (Butler, 1990, p. viii). In Möshük's estimation, Uyghur *mínkǎomín*/*shuāngyǔ* aspired to benefit from the socioeconomic mobility thought to be available to *mínkǎohàn*, and thus identified as such. This phenomenon may also be explained as a form of internalized oppression as it

suggests an oppressive view of Uyghur *mínkǎomín*/*shuāngyǔ* toward their own group. Möshük stated that she was a "real" *mínkǎohàn*, on the basis of having been educated in a Han Chinese majority class with Mandarin as the language of instruction with no Uyghur support for her entire education. It appeared that Möshük aspired to preserve the value of the symbolic capital accorded to *mínkǎohàn* identity claims by maintaining a particular set of criteria (Bourdieu, 1986). An expanded definition of *mínkǎohàn* might have been perceived as a threat to the integrity of this symbolic capital.

Messi offered an alternate explanation, suggesting that *mínkǎomín*/*shuāngyǔ* identified as *mínkǎohàn* because they took the *mínkǎohàn* version of *gāokǎo*. Uyghur students can select from two versions of the National Higher Education Entrance Examination (*gāokǎo*): *mínkǎomín* and *mínkǎohàn*. Uyghurs taking the *mínkǎohàn* version of *gāokǎo* are given 50 additional points, but must compete directly with Han Chinese for college acceptance. Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* examinees may begin their studies immediately if attending college in Xinjiang, though they must take one year of pre-academic Mandarin (*yǔkè*) if attending college in mainland China. Uyghurs taking the *mínkǎomín* version of *gāokǎo* are not given additional points, but they do not compete directly with Han Chinese. Uyghur *mínkǎomín* entrance requirements are lower, but these students must take one year of pre-academic Mandarin (*yǔkè*) if attending college in Xinjiang. And they must take one or two years of pre-academic Mandarin (*yǔkè*) if attending college in mainland China. It is possible that some *mínkǎomín*/*shuāngyǔ* identify as *mínkǎohàn* because they wish to emphasize that they took the *mínkǎohàn* version of *gāokǎo*, and competed directly with Han Chinese for college acceptance.

Aware of these factors, I investigated interviewees' educational trajectories in order to obtain accurate information on the types of schools attended.

Both Peirce (1995) and Bourdieu (1977a) utilized economic metaphors in the service of social theories. Peirce's conception of investment refers specifically to "effort" (1995, p. 17); but it is no less important to recognize the financial investment made by Uyghur families. A Uyghur student who takes the *mínkǎomín* version of *gāokǎo* and gains entrance to a top-tier university in mainland China must take at least one year of pre-academic Mandarin (*yǔkè*).

Many Uyghur *mínkǎomín* and *mínkǎohàn* complete *yǔkè* at a technical school in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province named *Jiāngxī gànjiàng zhíyè jìshù xuéyuàn*. The tuition for *yǔkè* is roughly equivalent in Xinjiang and Nanchang, but there is an additional cost for *yǔkè* attendance in Nanchang because of travel expenses to and from this location. The distance between Urumchi and Nanchang is over 3,700 kilometers, while the distance from Kashgar to Nanchang is nearly 5,000 kilometers. The journey from Urumchi to Nanchang takes around 50 hours and costs between $50 and $100 depending on the type of seat (e.g. hard sleeper or hard seat), although the cost is significantly less if one purchases a "standing ticket" (*zhànpiào*). Most Uyghur students who study in Nanchang make this trip and incur the associated expenses four times a year; this is a significant financial investment considering per capita net income of the region. In 2010, farmers and herdsmen in Xinjiang earned 4,642.67 RMB ($703 USD) on average (Xinhua News Agency, 2011).

Uyghur families must make a substantial financial investment in Mandarin language education for their children as a pre-condition of college entrance, an expense that is prohibitive to some (Grose, 2008). According to Möshük, Uyghur parents make this investment because *yŭkè* is requisite for gaining entrance into a top-tier college in mainland China and earning a college diploma, an academic credential (Bourdieu, 1977c) that may be converted into a, "high salary, high reputation and high position." Möshük was convinced of the certainty of this form of capital transfer *in Xinjiang* because Uyghur graduates of top-tier mainland Chinese universities are few in number, and thus attractive to potential employers. And if seeking employment in mainland China, Uyghur graduates of top-tier mainland Chinese universities can at least compete with Han Chinese for employment. However, Möshük added, "They are still in a Chinese world," implying that one should not harbor illusions that competition for employment among members of different ethnic communities is fair.

Peirce's notion of investment "conceives of the language learner, not as ahistorical and unidimensional, but as having a complex social history and multiple desires" (1995, p. 9). It is important to describe contextual factors as related to Mandarin language investments in order to demonstrate that there is no typical Mandarin language learner in Xinjiang. The autonomous prefectures, cities and districts of Xinjiang are populated by diverse ethnic groups (Toops, 2004a); I have argued that population factors have influenced the amount of exposure to input and opportunities for output (J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 2000), resulting in diverse language learning experiences. Some Uyghur

young adults learned Mandarin as a second language, while others learned it as a foreign language and, in some cases, later as a second language (Allwright, 1991; Oxford, 2003).

Socio-cultural models of second language acquisition, such as that of Peirce (1995), "assume settings where the target language is used for everyday communication. In such situations social conditions determine the extent of learners' contact with the L2 and their commitment to learning it. However, socio-cultural models may be less relevant to foreign language settings where most learners' principal contact with the L2 is in the classroom" (R. Ellis, 1997, p. 42). Most SLA models include "social factors" (Schumann, 1978), noting the significance of the context on opportunities for input and L2 use, attitudes toward assimilation, and attitudes toward the second language group, but the core of SLA research focuses on "within-the-individual" variables (Lantolf, 2005, p. 340), including cognitive, affective, and other individual factors. Contexts and social relationships have implications for investments because an "investment in the target language is also an investment in a learner's own social identity, an identity which is constantly changing across time and space" (Peirce, 1995, p. 18). The range of investments in Mandarin available to learners in Xinjiang is limited by social constraints and the ways learners assert social identities to access "a variety of conversations in their community" (B. Norton & Toohey, 2001, p. 310).

The contextual differences in Xinjiang are related to population factors, including size, distribution, and ethnicity. This diversity is a result of the influx and settlement of Han Chinese migrants to the region since 1949 (Peirce, 1995, p. 18). Some scholars, such as Gladney, refer to Xinjiang as an "internal colony," arguing that, "through initial

occupation, gradual integration through immigration, and finally 'minoritization' as a result of nationality policy, the Uyghur (and perhaps many others like them) have been internally colonized by the Chinese state (1998, p. 20). Some contest this classification (Toops, 2004a), while others argue that China's Xinjiang policy is worse than colonialism altogether (Gladney, 1998; Sautman, 2000). I support the classification of Xinjiang as an internal colony because, "the [CCP/Han Chinese] core is seen to dominate the periphery politically and to exploit it materially" (Hechter, 1975, p. 9). Although the type of colonialism (or nature of injustice) occurring in Xinjiang has been characterized in different ways, it is certain that the proportion of Han Chinese in Xinjiang rose dramatically from 6.7 percent (220,000) in 1949 to 40 percent (8.4 million) in 2008 (Hao, 2009) and that Han Chinese have taken up permanent residence in the region (Benson, 1990). The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, noted in a report that, "government-supported, large-scale Han migration into the area, has increased Uighur resentment and fears of coercive cultural assimilation" (2005). Language policy in Xinjiang is one such coercive tool, as the expansion of Mandarin as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system, is utlized to complement an evolving language ecology where "upward social, economic, and political mobility is increasingly dependent upon one's ability to use Mandarin Chinese" (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005).

Large numbers of Han Chinese have settled in the "northern urban corridor of Urumqi, Shihezi, Karamay, Bortala, Changji with the outlier to the south of Bayangol (especially Korla)" (Schuerkens, 2006). Han Chinese migration is spurred by recruitment

(accompanied with aide) and word of mouth where "people move from a village to a new place, then tell their cousins and others in the old village to also move to the new place" (Toops, 2004a, p. 22). A socio-cultural model for second language acquisition in a colonial setting must account for a variety of language learning contexts and human migration among settings. Population factors pay an important role in second language acquisition in colonial settings and first language vitality because the proportion of speakers within a population have implications for second language input and opportunities for output (J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 2000).

Möshük, Mike and Anar were raised in environments that differed according to population factors and the constellation of languages in their immediate environments (Wilton, 2009). Möshük continuously invested in the target language in a context populated by members of the target language community. As a *mínkǎohàn* in a predominantly Han Chinese class, she had daily opportunities to assert a Mandarin social identity through language-mediated social interactions with the target language community (Toohey, 2000). Mike was also a *mínkǎohàn* in a predominantly Han Chinese class, yet the ethnolinguistic composition of his neighborhood did not provide opportunities to access conversations in the target language. In addition to residential community distance, Mike indicated some social distance (Schumann, 1976) between himself and the target language group, expressed as a generally negative attitude toward Han Chinese authority figures and resentment of the unequal power relationship between Uyghurs and Han Chinese (i.e. Han Chinese dominance). Anar first invested in the target language in a context separate from the target language community, yet dominated by the

target language community in absentia. For Anar, the school was the primary site for the production and distribution of the linguistic resource of Mandarin. She then moved into a context populated by members of the target language community, with expanded opportunities for investments in Mandarin, although still limited by powerful social constraints. In the following section, I focus upon anticipated returns on investments in Mandarin (an embodied form of cultural capital) and the Han Chinese educational credential system (an institutionalized form of cultural capital) (Bourdieu, 1977c).

4.3 THEME TWO: EXPECTED RETURNS

All of the Uyghur consultants had invested in Mandarin, although the investments were not uniform due to the contextual differences described earlier. A second theme that emerged from the data was expected returns on language investments, or the anticipation of access to previously unattainable resources (Peirce, 1995). Bourdieu defines these resources as any one or combination of capital in circulation: symbolic, economic, social, and cultural.

Symbolic capital consists of the "prestige and renown attached to a family and a name" (Bourdieu, 1977b, p. 179), a concept drawn from Weber's notion of status (Bendix, 1978). Language is also considered a form of symbolic capital which may be exchanged in the "marketplace" of social interaction (Bourdieu, 1977a, p. 652). Language may be seen as a symbolic resource, accorded value depending on the market. The possession of symbolic resources, "such as certain highly valued types of linguistic skills, cultural knowledge and specialized skills, helps to gain access to valuable social,

educational and material resources" (Mejia, 2002, p. 36). These resources, which constitute symbolic capital, in turn, "acquire a value of their own and become sources of power and prestige in their own right" (Heller, 1994, p. 7).

Economic capital is "immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the forms of property rights" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 47). Economic capital is broadly connected to the societal distribution of economic and social resources. Bourdieu's notion of economic capital has been criticized for lacking "depth, precision and rigour" (Fine, 2000, p. 59). Beasley-Murray (2000) observed that Bourdieu "tends to understand (economic) capital exclusively in terms of exchange value (monetary value) but the other forms of (non-economic) capital in terms of use (value)" (Fine, 2000, p. 59). Economic capital is critical in determining the kinds of access individuals have to other forms of capital. For example, some Uyghur parents pay a relatively high amount of tuition in order to send their children to Han Chinese schools. This necessitates a certain level of economic capital that is converted to embodied cultural capital, such as a high degree of Mandarin communicative competence, including linguistic competence (Chomsky, 1965) and social knowledge about how and when to use Mandarin utterances appropriately (Hymes, 1966).

Social capital is "made up of social obligations ('connections'), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 47). Social capital consists of access to social institutions, relationships and resources as a result of group membership. In Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992) words, social capital is "the sum of the resources,

actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and recognition" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Language, a social product is acquired through social interactions; Bourdieu referred to power-laden social interactions as social capital (Bourdieu, 1991).

Cultural capital is "convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 47). This form of capital "describes the advantages that people acquire as a part of their life experiences, their peer group contacts, and their family backgrounds," including "good taste, style, certain kinds of knowledge, abilities, varieties of language, and presentation of self" (Corson, 1998, p. 20). Linguistic capital, defined as the mastery of and relation to language (Bourdieu, 1991), can be understood as a form of embodied cultural capital. Linguistic capital, a part of one's cultural heritage acquired from one's surrounding culture, represents a means of communication and self-presentation. "For Bourdieu, linguistic capital was more than the competence to produce grammatical expressions and forms of language. It also included the ability to use appropriate norms for language use and to produce the right expressions at the right time for a particular linguistic market" (Corson, 1998, p. 20).

As stated, language is a form of cultural capital, part of an "ensemble of cultivated dispositions that are internalized by the individual through socialization and that constitute schemes of appreciation and understanding" (Swartz, 1998, p. 76). A person's initial accumulation of cultural (including linguistic) capital is "the best hidden form of

hereditary transmission of capital, and it therefore receives proportionately greater weight in the system of reproduction strategies, as the direct, visible forms of transmission tend to be more strongly censored and controlled" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 49). Nieto adds that, "in the case of learning one's native culture and language, cultural capital is acquired in the absence of any deliberate or explicit teaching; it is therefore unconsciously learned" (2001, p. 141). Some Uyghurs are born into contexts where Mandarin and Uyghur are used in daily interactions (Oxford, 2003), acquiring Uyghur first at home and then learning Mandarin sequentially at school. This type of context facilitates Mandarin second language acquisition because Mandarin is part of the particular language constellation in the immediate environment (Wilton, 2009). Yet many Uyghurs are born into contexts where Uyghur is the primary vehicle for daily interaction, and with negligible opportunities for contact with the target language outside of the classroom.

Uyghur students in areas dominated by Han Chinese (e.g. Urumchi) have more opportunities to assert Mandarin social identities through conversation with members of the target language community. These students may be inclined to make investments of energy and desire due to the value of Mandarin within their social fields of activity. However, Mandarin linguistic capital is not evenly distributed in Xinjiang; in some areas, the school is the primary source for the production and distribution of Mandarin linguistic capital. For Uyghur students in contexts where the school is the only consistent site of exposure to Mandarin, and with no communicative need to use this language outside of the classroom, mastery of Mandarin will require a learner's own personal investment of time, effort, and attention.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, Mandarin was mandated to be the language of instruction in schools throughout Xinjiang, regardless of contextual factors (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004). Through a process of school consolidation and the expansion of Mandarin as a language of instruction, Uyghur students are compelled to invest in Mandarin or drop-out (Radio Free Asia, 2011a). This may be interpreted as a form of symbolic violence where the imposition of a cultural arbitrary (i.e. the expansion of Mandarin as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system) functions, for some Uyghur students, to disrupt educational aspirations and derail future possibilities (Bourdieu, 1977c; Ya'ir, 2009). In the following paragraphs, I present data collected during interviews on expected returns on investments in Mandarin, with the purpose of illustrating the variety of expectations. The perspectives on expected returns demonstrate a range of attitudes, including optimism, uncertainty and pessimism. I analyze these expected returns in reference to Bourdieu's forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986).

Tileshüp was born and raised in Urumchi. Among all of the consultants, he was the only one that was educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) through junior secondary school, yet attended a Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) high school. This was exceptional because all of the other Uyghurs I interviewed who were educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) remained on this track for the entirety of their grade school education. Typically, Uyghurs educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) during primary school streamed into Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) secondary schools. This trajectory represents a movement from primary language instruction to second language instruction with the primary language relegated to a marginal subject status. This type of bilingual education

program is comparable with early-exit or transitional programs where a native language is used as a foundation from which to transition him or her to a second language learning environment (Rhodes, Ochoa, & Ortiz, 2005).

On the afternoon I interviewed Tileshüp, he was upset because he had recently broken up with his girlfriend of two and a half years. This was a serious relationship and they had been cohabiting. His sad feelings were compounded by his approaching birthday, an event that he used to celebrate with his girlfriend. Tileshüp's girlfriend was Han Chinese; this was a rare example of a Uyghur-Han Chinese inter-ethnic relationship in an environment where many Uyghurs (and Han Chinese) disapprove Uyghur-Han Chinese romance (Kaltman, 2007). Tileshüp's mother "didn't say anything" about the ethnicity of his former girlfriend, but this relationship had caused his father some consternation. Tileshüp's relationship with a Han Chinese woman indicates that general Uyghur and Han Chinese social disapproval of interethnic romance does not prevent this type of relationship. It also suggests that Tileshüp had participated in contexts that allowed him to develop the cultural capital (including linguistic capital) requisite to transcend ethnic and social boundaries.

Tileshüp's education began with immersion in a second language with no primary language support and then second language instruction with the primary language taught as subject. Tileshüp's had been enrolled in a class where Mandarin was the language of instruction because his father wanted him to develop proficiency in Mandarin. However, while Tileshüp was in junior secondary school, his father became concerned with Tileshüp's low Uyghur literacy. Tileshüp's father enrolled his son in a Mandarin-Uyghur

(*shuāngyǔ*) senior secondary school with the intention that Tileshüp would learn how to read and write in Uyghur, an objective that Tileshüp was able to realize.

Tileshüp was attending law school at a public university in Urumchi in 2008. In response to a question about employment prospects, Tileshüp referenced his Uyghur and Mandarin language proficiencies as related to a wide-range of opportunities. He said, "I can do whatever I want. I'm a bilingual." This statement indicates a positive attitude toward Uyghur-Mandarin bilingualism – a typical stance among all of the consultants. As for the position to which he aspired, Tileshüp stated, "I can be a boss." This statement may be interpreted as an expression of confidence in maximizing returns on investments in Mandarin language learning. Tileshüp possessed both Uyghur and Mandarin linguistic capital (forms of cultural capital); he anticipated converting knowledge of these systems of communication into a position at the highest level of organizational management (labor that could be converted into economic capital).

Tileshüp indicated that he would be an effective mediator of Uyghur-Han Chinese disputes because of his command of Uyghur and Mandarin. He said, "There are a lot of contracts and dissension cases about Uyghur and Han Chinese. So I feel I could [mediate Uyghur-Han Chinese disagreements]." I was encouraged that Tileshüp was seeking out an occupation that might contribute to the resolution of disagreements between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. He envisioned himself as a linguistic and cultural broker, a person who could serve as an intermediary and facilitate communication between Uyghurs and Han Chinese (Paine, 1971; Tse, 1996). Tileshüp expected to exploit his linguistic capital by

placing himself in a domain where monolingual Han Chinese and Uyghurs meet to resolve differences.

Yusuf, educated in a Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) primary school and Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) junior and senior secondary schools, also envisioned himself as a mediator between monolingual Han Chinese and monolingual Uyghurs. Yusuf made reference to investments in Mandarin, describing the labor (and emotional pain) associated with attending a school where the language of instruction differed from his home language. He stated, "I went to a Uyghur school about one year. I wanted to stay, [but] my sister told me that I should go to Han school when I finished my first year of primary school. I did not want to go, I cried. They did not care. My mother sent me to a Han school. I could not understand anything in class at first, but later on I started to speak Chinese and I started to understand. Anyway, I was watching my sister go to a Uyghur school, so I always wanted to go to a Uyghur school. But I went to a Han school. I still regret that I did not went to a Uyghur school." Yusuf expressed an expectation to obtain a return on the possession of Uyghur and Mandarin linguistic capital, although he was not as confident as Tileshüp regarding conversions of capital. He suggested that Mandarin language skills might be "cashed in" (i.e. converted) by obtaining employment in occupations requiring linguistic competence in both Uyghur and Mandarin.

Early in my interview with Yusuf, he indicated that there was nothing optional about making investments in Mandarin, and seemed unsure that a return would materialize. He said, "One thing is if we go to a bank here and write our name in Uyghur on papers, they would refuse to serve us. So for our own good I think we have to learn.

Maybe it is good for finding a job, but other things we only hope – Allah bless us. We learned it because we thought it is going to help. And it will help." Yusuf's statement indicates that Uyghur is an unacceptable (i.e. illegitimate) script at the bank, an institution controlled by the CCP. At this institution, Standard Chinese (the script corresponding to the PRC's official language of Mandarin) is the legitimate script. Yusuf bluntly states that bank employees would "refuse to serve" individuals who did not possess Chinese literacy skills, a type of symbolic violence (an exercise of power and submission) against individuals lacking this form of linguistic capital (Bourdieu, 1991; Grenfell, 2011a).

Although Mandarin and Uyghur are the legal official languages of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Blachford, 2004), many government documents are printed only in Chinese. In 1993, of 2,069 official documents issued by three Xinjiang governmental departments, 1,873 were in Chinese, while only 196 were in Uyghur (Jianabuer, 1993). Equality of government service is challenged by the high proportion of government workers who are Han Chinese and do not speak minority languages. Public media are "perhaps the only arena where the government has done a relatively good job, particularly in radio and television broadcasting that effectively targets at minority populations with rather high illiteracy" (Zhou, 2004, p. 88). By the early 1990s in Xinjiang, the regional radio station and 36 local stations had regular programs in Uyghur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Mongolian, and Xibe. The regional television station and 23 local stations have regular programs in Uyghur, Kazakh, and Mongolian (Apana, 1992). "The CCP has held tight control over the public media because of its belief of the media's

force in stabilizing or destabilizing the state, a force that is considered second only to the armed forces" (Zhou, 2004, p. 89).

The general tone of this statement is somewhat despondent – Yusuf's expected return on Mandarin investment lacks optimism and is shaded with compulsion. Yusuf states that Uyghurs have to learn to read and write in Chinese in "for our own good." This type of sentiment is evocative of Skutnab-Kangas' argument that indigenous/tribal and minority mother tongues are subjected to structural and ideological violence through rhetoric that, "'We' are 'helping' 'them,' and that they want it, for their own good" (2010). Uyghur students consistently encounter ideological messages, such as the following (found on signs in many classrooms in Xinjiang), "Chinese is our national language. Learning Chinese is necessary to make the nation strong and the people rich." This message carries a nationalistic ideology, implying that student investments in Mandarin Chinese are essential for national development and collective prosperity. My consultant Möshük suggested that Mandarin Chinese proficiency might be rhetorically connected with national strength because academic and specialist knowledge is published in Chinese only. Mandarin Chinese proficiency is necessary for access to this information, which may be used to advance national programs (e.g. research and development, generally; the space program of the PRC, specifically). The meaning of the clause following the conjunction is unambiguous, asserting that Mandarin Chinese proficiency is requisite for the generation of collective wealth.

Yusuf says that Mandarin competency might be valuable in obtaining employment, but he is not confident that Mandarin will be beneficial for "other things."

Mandarin competence may equip Yusuf to participate in the Han Chinese labor market, but whether these skills will contribute to a strong sense of identity and a sense of belonging to his Uyghur community is unresolved. If by "other things," Yusuf is referring to the entire scope of activity beyond employment, this is an expression of a profound uncertainty in Mandarin linguistic investment. Yusuf attaches the phrase "Allah bless us" to a statement on the "hope" for a return on Mandarin linguistic investment. According to Möshük, another consultant, this supplication is usually verbalized when considering or experiencing something dreadful. This prayer indicates that Yusuf was concerned that he would not derive benefit from his Mandarin language skills, and may even have a negative consequence.

Later in my interview with Yusuf, he expressed more optimism and articulated a vision of himself, like Tileshüp, as a mediator assisting members of Uyghur and Han Chinese communities. He said, "If the society can go to the right way, I think learning Chinese can help us. Uyghur farmers can't speak Chinese, we can build a bridge between Uyghur farmers and Han Chinese, because we can speak Chinese. Also [Uyghur] *mínkǎohàn* students can't read Uyghur, we can read and write. So I think it can help us get a job." Yusuf calls attention to monolingual Uyghurs and Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* lacking Uyghur literacy skills as Uyghur populations that may need language assistance. He identifies Uyghur farmers as opposed to Han Chinese migrants, two groups that sometimes come into conflict when competing for scarce agricultural resources (Radio Free Asia, 2009c, 2009d). Yusuf envisions himself obtaining employment based on

qualifications related to Mandarin and Uyghur language skills – as a linguistic broker between Han Chinese and Uyghur linguistic communities (Tse, 1996).

Both Tileshüp and Yusuf demonstrate how Uyghur young adults are exercising agency and repositioning themselves in opposition to the official discourse on Uyghurs. By exploiting the climate following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., and the fact that some Uyghurs were found fighting in Afghanistan, China has portrayed Uyghurs as a source of serious Islamic terrorist threat in Xinjiang. According to *Human Rights Watch*, "The incorporation of the 'terrorist' label into the public discourse has in turn heightened distrust between the Uighur and ethnic Chinese communities in Xinjiang. Uighurs interviewed in the region point out that opponents to Chinese rule in the area have been given many labels over the last half-century: they were described by the state as feudal elements and as ethnic nationalists in the 1950s and 1960s, as counter-revolutionaries in the 1970s and 1980s, as separatists in the 1990s, and now, since 2001, as terrorists" (2005). Tileshüp and Yusuf's ambitions diverge markedly from the sinister motives attributed to the Uyghur ethnic community in public discourse. The association of "Uyghur" with "terrorist" is a form of symbolic violence, representing the imposition of a category of perception upon dominated social agents (Bourdieu, 1991). I argue that this state-authored perception is especially pernicious because, as China lacks media freedom (Reporters Withour Borders, 2012), citizens have little ability to compare sources of information and come to independent judgments about this claim.

Anwar, like Yusuf, was educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) primary and Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) junior secondary and senior secondary schools. Anwar expressed a

more critical perspective than Tileshüp or Yusuf, recognizing the social inequalities that prohibited full access to state institutions. Anwar suggested that social inequalities nullified the value of Mandarin linguistic capital, thus undermining potential conversions. He stated, "Every year before high school students graduate, colleges from all around China will go to high schools and advertise themselves, but aviation universities, and astronomy universities, you can see they write that on their advertisement, 'Only take Han Chinese students.' We can see from that, we don't have a chance to learn those stuff." Anwar described ethnic discrimination in college recruitment, a practice consistent with the pervasive and well-documented ethnic discrimination in employment (i.e. job recruitment announcements in Xinjiang commonly reserve positions for Han Chinese in civil servant posts and private sector jobs) (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2006a, 2009d, 2011a). These types of discriminatory practices are instances of symbolic violence, manifest in the "imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power," a cultural practice not seen as a choice, but as natural and undisputed (Bourdieu, 1977c, p. 5). There are elements of reproduction and symbolic violence here because systemic ethnic discrimination in college/employment recruitment practices perpetuates a social structure favoring the dominant Han Chinese. Discrimination in college recruitment practices prevents Uyghur students from obtaining academic credentials (a form of institutionalized cultural capital) that might be converted into economic capital (Bourdieu, 1977c, 1991).

Bourdieu argued that "speech always owes a major part of its value to the value of the person who utters it" (1977a, p. 652). "He suggests that the value ascribed to speech

cannot be understood apart from the person who speaks, and that the person who speaks cannot be understood apart from larger networks of social relationships... However, speakers' abilities to command respect are unequally distributed because of symbolic power relations between interlocutors" (McKinney & Norton, 2011, p. 78). Bourdieu argued that the definition of linguistic competence should be expanded to include the "right to speech" or "the power to impose reception" to account for unequal power relations between what he termed "legitimate" and "illegitimate speakers" (1977a, p. 648). "Bourdieu's foregrounding of power relations in language use has important implications for how language learners are positioned by others, for the opportunities they get to speak, and for the varieties of language that we teach and they use" (McKinney & Norton, 2011, p. 78). Systemic exclusion from certain disciplines in higher education and employment is indicative of a stratified society where the value of Mandarin linguistic capital in Uyghur possession is undermined by powerful social forces, such as ethnic discrimination. For Uyghurs engaged in Mandarin language acquisition, contextual factors, including population (Toops, 2004a) and social distance (Schumann, 1976) effectively restrict access to "a variety of conversations in their community" (B. Norton & Toohey, 2001, p. 310), impacting the development of target language competence (Hymes, 1966) and the assertion of social identities.

Anwar seemed frustrated when contemplating conversions of linguistic capital into economic capital. He stated, "When we are looking for a job, our identity is our disadvantage. Han Chinese is the first. We talked about *mínkǎohàn*, *mínkǎomín* and bilingual. Maybe *mínkǎohàn* can be the second to concern and then bilingual and then

mínkǎomín." Anwar presented what might be called a *hierarchy of employability*. In this ranking system, Han Chinese are positioned on the top tier (i.e. have the highest prospects for employment); Uyghurs educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) are positioned on the second tier; Uyghurs educated in Mandarin and supplemental Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) are positioned on the third tier; and Uyghurs educated in Uyghur only (*mínkǎomín*) are positioned on the bottom tier (i.e. have the lowest prospects for employment). Anwar's *hierarchy of employability* indicates that the value of linguistic capital is undermined by entrenched social discrimination. According to Anwar, Han Chinese are more employable than Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* (individuals whose Mandarin competence is often equivalent with Han Chinese) solely because of Han Chinese ethnic membership. Anwar positions Uyghurs according to education types, with language of instruction serving as the distinguishing factor.

I argue that this ranking system belies something more complex because "language of instruction" is a designation that does not plainly reveal socialization factors, that is, "socialization through the use of language and socialization to use language" (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986, p. 163). On language socialization, Ochs stated, "children and other novices in society acquire tacit knowledge of principles of social order and systems of belief (ethnotheories) through exposure to and participation in language-mediated interaction" (1986, p. 2). Uyghurs educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) from an early age in predominantly Han Chinese classrooms learn not only Mandarin, but Han Chinese cultural knowledge, norms, conventions and *ways of being* that are accepted by and acceptable to Han Chinese communities (Cole & Zuengler, 2003, p. 99).

Immersed in Han Chinese "communities of practice," Uyghurs educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) acquire Mandarin linguistic competence (i.e. capital) through social interaction and collaborative activity (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). "Through their participation in social interactions, children come to internalize and gain performance competence in these sociocultural defined contexts" (Elinor Ochs, 1986, p. 2). An education in Mandarin "allocates" some Uyghurs to positions of higher social status among other Uyghurs, but not equal to or above Han Chinese (Meyer, 1977, p. 74).

Anwar's use of *mínkǎohàn* deserves parsing because an education in Mandarin is significantly different given contextual differences stemming from population factors (Meyer, 1977, p. 74). Uyghurs in predominantly Uyghur classrooms, whether educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*), Mandarin and supplemental Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*), or Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) do not acquire Mandarin linguistic competence through social interaction and collaborative activity with Han Chinese (Enninger, 1984; J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 2000; Haugen, 1972). They do not have the opportunity to internalize and gain Mandarin performance competence or familiarity with Han Chinese cultural knowledge, norms, conventions and *ways of being* because of ethnic segregation (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). I argue that a lack of Han Chinese cultural capital (Cole & Zuengler, 2003; Elinor Ochs, 1986) is why Uyghurs are positioned below Han Chinese on the *hierarchy of employability*. Some Han Chinese employ Mandarin proficiency (however measured) in academic and employment recruitment activities as discrimination by proxy (Bourdieu, 1986). Uyghurs are excluded from sectors (and preemptively silenced) by recruitment practices that propagate symbolic violence through a process of systematic

misrecognition and the reproduction of a cultural arbitrary (K. R. Johnson & Martinez, 2000).

The Uyghur young adults interviewed in this study expressed a variety of expectations on returns from their investments in Mandarin. In this section, I presented the perspectives of Tileshüp, Yusuf and Anwar in order to demonstrate the variety of expectations on returns. Tileshüp and Yusuf envisioned themselves as linguistic brokers between Uyghur and Han Chinese communities (Bourdieu, 1991; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2011b; McKinney & Norton, 2011); they anticipated converting linguistic capital into economic capital by obtaining employment in positions requiring linguistic competence in both Uyghur and Mandarin. Tileshüp anticipated a maximum return on investments in Mandarin by leveraging his linguistic capital to obtain a position at the highest level of organizational management. I argue that his confidence may be attributable to his *mínkǎohàn* social status and Uyghur-Han Chinese bicultural competence (Tse, 1996). Yusuf was more tentative than Tileshüp in his expectations on returns from investment in Mandarin. Yusuf stated that it was important to learn Mandarin "for our own good," suggesting a motivation informed by survival criteria in a Han Chinese-dominated environment (LaFramboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Meyer, 1977). Anwar articulated a more critical perspective, suggesting that systemic and systematic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity determines the range of available opportunities to an individual in Xinjiang. Anwar stated that members of the dominant Han Chinese ethnic community had the widest range of employment prospects, while Uyghurs of differing education types had fewer opportunities. I also argue that the

ranking system described by Anwar, though based on Mandarin language competence, makes tacit reference to degrees of Han Chinese language socialization, the formation of Han Chinese cultural capital and habituation to Han Chinese *ways of being* (Leather & van Dam, 2003). In the following section, I focus on the language choices of Uyghurs, and how these practices are mediated by the changing language ecology of Xinjiang (Bourdieu, 1986; Cole & Zuengler, 2003; Elinor Ochs, 1986).

4.4 THEME THREE: LANGUAGE CHOICE

All of the Uyghur consultants, being bilingual in Uyghur and Mandarin, indicated that they made language choices, a process governed by the interlocutors involved, the situation of the interaction, the content of the discourse, and the function of the interaction (Mühlhäusler, 1996, 2001; Toops, 2004a). Several of my consultants affirmed that they engaged in Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching, defined by Myers-Scotton as "the alternation between two varieties in the same constituent by speakers who have sufficient proficiency in the two varieties to produce monolingual well-formed utterances in either variety" (F. Grosjean, 1994). In this section, using data obtained during interviews, I analyze the language choices (including code-switching) of four of my consultants. I explore the implications of these practices on language maintenance and language shift, described by Fasold as "the long-term, collective consequences of consistent patterns of language choice (2000, p. 23). Interpretations of languages choices make reference to Bourdieu's concepts of capital and symbolic marketplaces (1984, p. 239) in a language

ecology marked by a changing population and unstable diglossia, with shifting domains for linguistic varieties (Bourdieu, 1977a; Heller, 1992).

Abdurehim was educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) primary and secondary schools in Urumchi. He completed medical school (where Mandarin was the language of instruction) and is now training in a residency program in Urumchi. Early in our interview, Abdurehim received a phone call from a friend. Through the course of his conversation, I noticed that he was engaging in Mandarin-Uyghur intersentential switching, alternating between these two languages at sentence and clause boundaries (Enninger, 1984; Fishman, 1972; Toops, 2004a). My digital voice recorder was on and I recorded Abdurehim's turns in the conversation. The original language is identified, transcribed and followed by English translations.

Abdurehim (1) [in English]: Hi

Abdurehim (2) [in English]: No.

Abdurehim (3) [in Mandarin]: Démàn kāfēiwū, gén yí gè péngyou. (Vine Coffeehouse, with a friend.)

Abdurehim (4) [in Mandarin]: Chī fàn de ne. (I'm eating.)
Abdurehim (5) [in Uyghur]: Axsham bir toygha barghan. (I was in a wedding the other night.)

Abdurehim (6) [in Uyghur]: Mes bopqaptimen he? Sen hazir nime qiliwatisen? (I got drunk right? What are you doing now?)

Abdurehim (7) [in Uyghur]: Kim ning uyi ge? (Whose home are you going to?)

Abdurehim (8) [in Uyghur]: Hammang ning. Waxting bolsa kurusheyli bir dem dinkiyin. (Your aunts. If you're free we can meet up later).

Abdurehim (9) [in Mandarin]: Chī fàn. Wǒ yě zài chī fàn. Nayí – (Eating. I'm also eating now. Which –)

Abdurehim (10) [in Uyghur]: Kim mu? Nime dey sen? (Who? What are you taking about?)

Abdurehim (11) [in Mandarin]: Wǒ jì de ne. Yǐ hòu zài shuò, hǎo bu hǎo? (I remember it. Can we talk about it later?)

Abdurehim (12) [in Mandarin]: Yǐ hòu zài shuò. Wǒ yě zài chī fàn ne. Nǐ chī wánfàn gěi wǒ dǎ diàn huà. Huò zhě shì wǒ chī wánfàn gěi ní dǎ diàn huà. Zài chéng jiè zuò yǐ hòu? (Let's talk about it later. I'm also eating. Call me when you're done eating. Or I'll give you a call when I'm done eating. We can spend some time together at Orange Street Bar.)

Abdurehim (13) [in Mandarin]: Méiyòu. Méiyòu. Wǒ gén yí gè wàiguó péngyou. (No. No. I'm with a foreign friend.)

Abdurehim (14) [in Mandarin]: Chī wánfàn kéyǐ. Yí gè xiaó shí huò shì liǎng gè xiáoshi. (I'm free after eating. In one or two hours.)

Abdurehim (15) [in Mandarin]: hǎode (Good) [in English]: okay

After Abdurehim ended the call, I commented that he had alternated between Mandarin and Uyghur during the conversation.[31] He explained that he was conversing with a Uyghur friend who was educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*). He remarked that Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* typically "mixed languages" (i.e. practiced Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching), a tendency documented by other scholars (Carol Myers-Scotton, 1989). Abdurehim elucidated his language choices by stating, "I'm with Uyghur people or *mínkǎomín* people, we all use Uyghur, our own language, but with *mínkǎohàn* people, we sometimes mix together. Just like who called me, he's *mínkǎohàn*, but he's my best friend. We sometimes mix Uyghur and Chinese, or simply in Chinese, sometimes mix English, something like that. Mix three languages together."

[31] Abdurehim had also used an English greeting (hi) and an English discourse marker (okay), habitual expressions consisting of English loanwords (1984).

Abdurehim's language practices were contingent upon his interlocutor (Finley, 2007; Smith, 2002). He reported using monolingual Uyghur when conversing with Uyghur *mínkǎomín*. Abdurehim's language practices were more varied when conversing with Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*. He described three types of language practices: monolingual Mandarin; Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching; and Uyghur-Mandarin-English code-switching. It is remarkable that Abdurehim did not include monolingual Uyghur among the languages used when conversing with Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*. This omission may be attributed to the linguistic inventory of Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*, which may be Mandarin dominant in regard to lexicon.

On Uyghur perceptions of Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching, Abdurehim said, "Some people just couldn't bear this, while we are in public location, some Uyghur people say, 'Why do you speak just in Chinese, or in Uyghur, just mix together, or something like that?' Some people will say that, or some people say, no I don't mind… Older people or some people have kind of strange ideas, like if you are Uyghur, you should something, something, something." In a context marked by significant population changes (i.e. an influx of Han Chinese migrants (F. Grosjean, 1994)) and the corresponding punctuation of Uyghur linguistic equilibrium (Toops, 2004a), it is unsurprising to encounter puristic perspectives, including negative attitudes towards code-switching or advocacy for monolingual language practices (Dixon, 1997). In Xinjiang, diglossia is extremely unstable because Mandarin is "leaking" (Dyers, 1999; Kamwangamalu, 2002) and spreading into formerly Uyghur domains, including education (Fishman, 1972). Given this instability, "Purism may then be viewed as a

tendency to reject features perceived as representing domination and threatening the distinct identity, and therefore the separate existence, of the dominated. Any number of the cultural symbols may be chosen for rejection, and language is a very common choice" (Dwyer, 2005; Schluessel, 2007).

Abdurehim later described the language practices of his nieces and nephews, all educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*). He said, "They are all in Chinese primary school right now, and they all speak Chinese at home. No kids speaking their own language… When they are playing with each other, and other boys or kids. My parents and their parents, the whole family speaks in Uyghur. They always emphasize that you should speak in your own language. But, while they are playing, or they are learning things, they always speak in Chinese." Abdurehim reported that his nieces and nephews were communicating primarily in Mandarin in several domains, including school, home and the neighborhood (Jernudd & Shapiro, 1989, p. 227). He stated that the parental generation communicated in Uyghur at home, suggesting that his nieces and nephews possess some degree of Uyghur language competency, but Mandarin appears to be their dominant language. These language practices evoke a pattern of language shift in immigrant groups whereby the first generation (represented by Abdurehim's parents) is Uyghur dominant Uyghur-Mandarin bilingual; the second generation (represented by Abdurehim) is Uyghur-Mandarin bilingual; and the third generation (represented by Abdurehim's nieces and nephews) is Mandarin dominant Uyghur-Mandarin bilingual. According to this general pattern, the fourth generation is predicted to have command of the dominant language only (Fishman, 1972).

Tileshüp, as mentioned previously, was educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) through junior secondary school but transferred to a Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) senior secondary school. When asked about language practices at home, Tileshüp stated, "When I'm with my mom, my sister, my brother, I talk to them in Chinese. When I talk to my father, I talk in Uyghur. He is *mínkǎomín*." Later, Tileshüp stated that his mother, sister and brother were all educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*). Tileshüp's language choices were related to type of language education experienced by the respective interlocutor (Appel & Muysken, 2006). According to speech accommodation theory (F. Grosjean, 1994), Tileshüp's language choices may be interpreted as acts of convergence. Tileshüp identified language of education as the variable that determined his language choices. The prominence of this variable may have implications on the process of Mandarin language shift because of the accelerated promotion of a Mandarin dominant curriculum and the consolidation of Uyghur and Han Chinese schools (Giles, 1973).

Miragul was educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) in primary school and Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) in junior and senior secondary schools. She communicated in Uyghur at home with her parents, who were also educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) schools. Miragul's senior secondary school was predominantly Han Chinese, although her class was entirely Uyghur.[32] She stated, "Han Chinese were all around us so we mix Uyghur and Chinese almost all the time. That's also happening in college." Miragul attributed her tendency to code-switch between Uyghur and Mandarin as a consequence of being "all

[32] Within school segregation, the placement of second language learners in separate classes, is also common in language minority contexts in the U.S. (Conger, 2007).

around" Han Chinese, a consequence of the Xinjiang school consolidation movement that began in the late 1980s (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010b, 2011d).

As stated by Wei, "a person's bilingualism is reflected in the internal uses of each of his languages" including non-communicative uses such as internal speech (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004, 2011a). The following statement describes the internal speech and "cognitive behavior" (i.e. language consciousness) (2000, p. 32) of Ayitbayev, a young man who was educated in Uyghur (*mínkǎomín*) primary and junior secondary schools and a Mandarin-Uyghur (*shuāngyǔ*) senior secondary school. Ayitbayev stated, "I went to a Uyghur school for nine years; we've learned Han Chinese but we never talk in Chinese. Our thoughts are in Uyghur. Now all of our classes are in Han Chinese. Sometimes I read books in Uyghur. Han Chinese always ask me why I am not reading books in Chinese. I do not like to read Chinese books at all. I like to read books in Uyghur because I understand better when I am reading. But now the way I think is changing – changing to Chinese. I think in Chinese. I use to translate Uyghur to Chinese first in my mind to understand it, now we think directly. I think I used to speak Uyghur with no problem, but now I feel like something is wrong when I am speaking Uyghur."

This statement offers a personal and profound commentary on language consciousness and the subtle process of language shift (Fishman, 1972). Ayitbayev suggests that the learning of Mandarin is leading to the replacement of Uyghur, at least as the language of his internal dialogue. This experience evokes "subtractive bilingualism," a process whereby another language eventually replaces the learner's first language

(Fishman, 1972). Consistent with an expanded definition of "subtractive bilingualism," this process "implies a society in which one language is valued more than the other, where one dominates the other, where one is on the ascendant and the other is waning" (Valenzuela, 1999). Valenzuela would also argue that subtractive schooling "subtracts" native culture "cultural resources" and cultural competency in the home culture through subtractive assimilation, a process which functions to "fracture students' cultural and ethnic identities" (1999, p. 5). Ayitbayev indicated a depletion in Uyghur language confidence, a condition that may have implications for changes in cultural identity and language shift, a process sometimes "accompanied by considerable tension and trauma" (K. Glaser, 2007, p. 153). These psychological responses to language shift sometimes result from being surrounded by structures and discourses that portray ethnolinguistic minority languages as inferior or "low quality" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 8) – an experience which "interferes with [ethnolinguistic community members'] ability to attain a positive self-image and stable cultural identity" (K. Glaser, 2007, p. 153).

The Uyghur consultants who participated in this study reported and exhibited the use of a variety of languages, including monolingual Mandarin, monolingual Uyghur, Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching, and Uyghur-Mandarin-English code-switching, language choices governed by a number of factors described by Grosjean (1994). As stated by Heller, "The use of multiple languages "permits people to say and do, indeed to *be* two or more things where normally a choice is expected" (Heller, 1988, p. 93). Strategic language choices allow Uyghurs to achieve positions in Han Chinese controlled domains, while still laying claim to a Uyghur identity. Consistent with Heller (1988), it is

reasonable to assert that Han Chinese rely on norms of language choice (i.e. Mandarin accommodation) to maintain symbolic domination, while Uyghurs use linguistic resources and practices, such as code switching, to resist or redefine the value of symbolic resources in the linguistic marketplace.

The contemporary language choices made by Uyghur young adults are consequential because they indicate a linguistic habitus that may impact the intergenerational transmission of language, considered to be the most significant factor in determining the future of a language (Austin, 2008). The domination of Mandarin in the Xinjiang education system is a critical factor because the language choices of Uyghur young adults appear to be connected with language of instruction in school (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010b, 2011d; Finley, 2007). All of the consultants were cognizant of the aggressive CCP efforts to implement a dominant Mandarin-language curriculum in schools throughout Xinjiang (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004, 2011a). In the following section, I describe "linguistic anxiety," as expressed by Uyghur young adults – the trepidation associated with subtractive bilingualism and language shift toward Mandarin.

4.5 THEME FOUR: LINGUISTIC ANXIETY

A fourth theme that emerged from the data was "linguistic anxiety," what Bulag defined as a deep unease about language loss, experienced by minority communities subject to the assimilative pressures of a dominant power (2003). Bulag formed this concept to describe the emotional condition of Mongolians from the Han Chinese-

colonized territory of Inner Mongolia regarding language shift toward Mandarin. This community is losing their language, "arguably the last stronghold of their 'nationality' status" as they become "a depoliticized and deterritorialized 'ethnic group' in an increasingly primordial, multicultural 'Chinese Nation' (Bulag, 2003, p. 753). Several consultants articulated expressions of linguistic anxiety, such as Abdurehim, who stated, "Now all of the *mínkǎomín* people are same with the *mínkǎohàn* people. No matter in speaking, no matter in thinking, when writing and hearing, all the same. Just like Han people, just like *mínkǎohàn* people. We have kind of wealth that we know all of the Uyghur culture, all of the Uyghur history, and we can write, we can hear. They can hear, they can understand, but they cannot write. We can read, but they can't. They lose so much actually. They lose Uyghur culture and writing and reading." Abdurehim expressed an anxiety concerning cultural homogenization, defined as a "loss of [Uyghur] cultural distinctions" (Grenoble, 2011, p. 34), and identified a decline in Uyghur language literacy skills among Uyghurs as a consequence of a Mandarin dominant curriculum and Uyghur-Han Chinese school consolidation (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004, 2011a).

Several Uyghur consultants expressed related sentiments, that is, consciousness of Han Chinese (*mínkǎohàn*) socialization and awareness of Uyghur *mínkǎomín* as the keepers of Uyghur tradition, such as Memet, who stated, "Are you asking that if I can speak Chinese as good as Han Chinese? Yes, I think so. But I can't speak Uyghur as good as *mínkǎomín* students. I can read Uyghur or write in Uyghur, but not as fast as *mínkǎomín*. About how they judge us – it's a fact that we grew up with Han Chinese, maybe sometimes we do act Han Chinese or think Han Chinese – I can't deny that. After

I came to collage, there are a lot of *mínkǎomín* students around me now. I also want to be friends with them. They are keeping our traditions – seems like we did not, like we betrayed. But we also want to know them – be close to them. For some reason, most *mínkǎomín* – they think that we act Han Chinese and they exclude us. So we are afraid that we can't get along. We do not know what to do. I just hope this situation can be better in the future. I will try my best to make friends with them, and try my best to let them know that we love our own traditions." Memet indicated cognizance of Han Chinese cultural transfer, and a corresponding experience of Uyghur deculturation (Spring, 1994). The following paragraphs describe my consultants' sense of unease related to language shift towards the use of Mandarin and the obsolescence of Uyghur as a marker of ethnic identity.

Abdurehim expressed a concern over the expansion of Mandarin in the Xinjiang education system (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004, 2011a) as related to Han Chinese socialization. He stated, "When I was a child, there are so many Uyghur primary schools, middle school, and I studied in my own language in primary school and secondary school, but not in college. College is all Chinese and English. But now the children don't have any choice to go to their own language school. It's all Chinese right now. It's so pity, but I can't do anything for it." Speaking of his *mínkǎohàn* niece, Abdurehim said, "I'm afraid that she totally will go into the Chinese culture. And their mind, their thought, their thinking is all in this one way, just like Han people." This sentiment was evocative of Bourdieu's conceptions of social and cultural reproduction (Bourdieu, 1977c), and the

major role of the education system in the transmission and inculcation of the dominant Han Chinese culture (including cultural capital).

Abdurehim stated that Mandarin language dominance was impacting Uyghurs' English language acquisition due to Mandarin interference. He was concerned that Uyghurs might lose advantages associated with L1 Uyghur positive transfer when learning English as a second language. In terms of language structure, the Uyghur lexicon contains a number of Indo-European lexemes; both Uyghur and English are stress-based; and Uyghur has a larger consonant and vowel inventory than Chinese, facilitating the phonological acquisition of English L2 (Dwyer, 2005, p. 43). These features give Uyghurs an advantage over their Chinese-speaking counterparts when learning English.

Abdurehim suggested that some negative Mandarin L1 interference was attributable to the different phoneme combinations in the two languages, a documented pronunciation issue for Mandarin L1 English learners (F. Zhang & Yin, 2009). Mandarin morphemes generally consist of a consonant plus a vowel [CV], with no consonants clusters and usually end with a vowel (exceptions are sound combinations consisting of eight front nasal final sounds [n]; eight back nasal final sounds [ng]; and the special cases: [er], [hm], [hng], [ng], [~r]). Learners often add a schwa /ə/ to final consonants as a result of transference of Mandarin phonological rules to English. Abdurehim provided several examples of this, including *work* [wɜrk], *glass* [glæs] and *bath* [bæθ] (pronounced by his niece as [wɜr-kə], [glæ-sə] and [bæ-θə], respectively). In contrast with Mandarin, consonant final sounds are typical in Uyghur phonology [CVC, CVCC] Engesæth, Yakup, & Dwyer, 2009), a structure that being common to Uyghur and English (Odlin,

1989), would contribute to positive transfer and facilitate English language acquisition for Uyghur L1 English learners.

Rebiya linked the loss of the Uyghur language to the obsolescence of ethnicity. She said, "I think Chinese is really widespread, but how about our language?! How about Uyghur language?! Han schools, bilingual schools, someday schools are not going to teach Uyghur anymore, if it goes like this. My mother said, 'If the culture vanish, the ethnic group is going to vanish.' I think we have to think about this now." Rebiya connected the spread of Mandarin and Mandarin-Uyghur bilingual schools to the disappearance of the Uyghur language from the Xinjiang education system. An alternate reading of the phrase "teach Uyghur" may signify something more extensive than a system of communication, that is, the inculcation of ethnic habitus (May, 1998). Such an interpretation is substantiated by Rebiya's mother's subsequent quote. Uyghur schools were important to Uyghurs, not only because Uyghur was a language of instruction, but because Uyghur schools were a site for the inculcation of Uyghur cultural knowledge, norms, conventions and *ways of being* (Cole & Zuengler, 2003; Elinor Ochs, 1986).

Uyghur teachers in Xinjiang face a number of challenges. CCP restrictions on government employees practicing religion keeps many Uyghurs, who are Muslim, out of jobs as teachers. "If they are caught attending mosque or fasting during Ramadan, they can be dismissed or demoted" (Demick & Pierson, 2009). Uyghur teachers must demonstrate a certain degree of Mandarin language competence (assessed through performance on the *Hànyǔ Shuǐpíng Kǎoshì*, a standardized test of Mandarin language proficiency for non-native speakers) to maintain employment. This standard was

introduced in September 2002, when Xinjiang University discontinued courses in Uyghur and transitioned to monolingual Mandarin as the language of instruction (Groβe, 2002). "Since 2002, 140 teachers whose Chinese was deemed inadequate for university pedagogy were forced into early retirement. Younger teachers without adequate standard Chinese language skills were asked to learn those skills by May 2004 or risk losing their jobs" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 40; Radio Free Asia, 2004). According to recent interviews conducted by Radio Free Asia (2011b), at least 1,000 primary school teachers in the Xinjiang have lost their jobs since 2010 because "they could not speak Mandarin in addition to their own Uyghur language."

In September 2011, a Uyghur veteran primary school teacher of 28 years from Kashgar was jailed for eight days following an altercation with her principal over the use of Mandarin in the school's curriculum. She claimed she was overlooked for a promotion because of her inability to speak Mandarin fluently. According to the teacher, her principal admitted that she was a good teacher, but not "modern" enough and was constantly "fighting the government," so the school could not offer her the promotion (Radio Free Asia, 2011b).

Consistent with Cesàro (2002), who conducted a dissertation study on the culture and politics of food among the Uyghur in contemporary Xinjiang, I found that "the practices and discourses I had observed and recorded during my fieldwork were rather complex and could not be simply pigeon-holed as 'traditional'/'non-traditional', or 'Uyghur'/'non-Uyghur'" (Cesàro, 2007, p. 186). Several Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* indicated that beyond linguistic anxiety, a Han-stream education has resulted in the obsolescence of

Uyghur cultural knowledge. Möshük, who was educated in Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) in a predominantly Han Chinese class, explained that Han Chinese teachers sometimes spread misinformation. Möshük told a story about an incident that occurred in her junior secondary Political Education course. A Han Chinese classmate has asked why Uyghurs do not eat pork, and the Han Chinese teacher had responded that, "Pig is Uyghur's god." Möshük believed this until corrected by her parents in senior secondary school. She explained that many Han Chinese teachers, being ignorant of the meaning of Uyghur cultural practices (including Islam) contributed to the corruption of Uyghur cultural knowledge.

Another consultant, Reyhan, stated, "I went to Chinese school. I still don't know a lot of our tradition. I'm having problem with that. You can't be certain that Chinese school is the best for kids." This quote indicates a feeling of ambivalence towards a Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) education in a predominantly Han Chinese school. Reyhan appeared to be questioning the CCP ideology that a Han-stream education is irrefutably beneficial for Uyghurs (Jia, 2009a; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2010). Reyhan recognized Uyghur schools as conduits enabling the transmission of Uyghur cultural knowledge and later stated that she would send her own children to a Uyghur school if this option were available.

All of the Uyghur consultants asserted that the Uyghur language was an important marker of Uyghur ethnic identity. However, this form of cultural capital did not set a parameter on perceived boundaries of Uyghur in-group membership. Some consultants recognized a "conflict" between Uyghur *mínkǎomín* and Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*, particularly

those Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* who used Mandarin in the home domain. Yakub articulated this distinction when stating, "One [group of Uyghurs] grew up with Han Chinese and also went to Han school so they act like Han Chinese. Another one type is even though they went to Han school, but they speak Uyghur in when they came home, they play with Uyghur kids, their friends are also Uyghur, so there won't be language gap between us, and there will be no conflict." Uyghur language competence was recognized by my consultants as important although none suggested that Uyghur language proficiency was a criterion measure for ingroup or outgroup membership (Sumner, 1906). Rather, several consultants expressed grief and resignation regarding changing structural conditions, such as the expansion of Mandarin through curriculum modification and the consolidation of Uyghur and Han Chinese schools (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004, 2011a). As Abdurehim opined on the elimination of Uyghur as a language of instruction, "It's so pity, but I can't do anything for it."

Factors of power and influence do play a significant role in language planning, the dominance of some languages and the dominated status of other languages (Colin Baker & Jones, 1998). However, as Fishman (1997) has pointed out, languages become endangered because they lack informal intergenerational transmission and daily life support, not because they are not being taught formally in schools or lack official status. While Fishman's assertion may pertain to some contexts, I would argue that in Xinjiang, coercive, institutional, and hegemonic practices are in place lead to families not transmitting the language over generations. The language policy currently implemented in Xinjiang "implicitly categorizes the Uyghur language as disloyal" (Dillon, 2002).

Institutionally, the CCP has made significant investments to eliminate Uyghur language schools through compulsory transition to a Mandarin dominant curriculum and consolidation with Han Chinese schools (Dwyer, 2005; Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2009b). A Uyghur teacher, whose classes consisted of both Uyghur and Han Chinese students remarked that the current language policy undermined the status of the Uyghur people. She stated, "Of course we need to learn the Han language. Everyone knows that it is important to use the Han language but our Uyghur language is also important. The policy makes our Uyghur students feel our language is not important, so the Han students do not have to learn it. We Uyghurs often regard people who speak our language as our friends because they respect our culture – like the Uyghur saying, 'recognize the language not the face to be friends' (L. Tsung, 2009, p. 136). These state-sponsored practices contribute to the sum total of symbolic violence towards the Uyghur language.

4.6 Discussion

This study utilizes language ecology as one component of a theoretical framework to describe language-related issues with an emphasis on contextual factors (Haugen, 1972). I argue that the migration and settlement of Han Chinese (Toops, 2004a) coupled with the promotion of Mandarin (and corresponding marginalization of Uyghur and other ethnic minority languages) in the Xinjiang education system (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004, 2011a) has resulted in a punctuation of the linguistic equilibrium of the region (Dixon, 1997). Although population factors are of primary importance (Enninger, 1984; Haugen, 1972), it should be recognized that "the current population situation [in

Xinjiang] is similar to that of the Qing when many Han lived in the area [in the early 1800s] (Toops, 2004a; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Population Census Office, 2002).

CCP Language Policies that emphasize Mandarin, developed in the bureaucratic center of the PRC and imposed on the periphery, are also of crucial importance (Blachford, 1999; Dwyer, 2005; Harrell, 1995). As phrased by Goodman, "The emphasis given to linguistic assimilation within Open Up the West policies in Xinjiang is clearly an attempt to homogenize the culture and identity of citizens, as well as to ensure the dominance of the Chinese language" (2004, p. 62). Gal cites global processes like colonization, the expansion of capitalism and transnational labor migration as having replaced the former earlier processes of "dispersion of populations and the peopling of the world," so that "relatively egalitarian linguistic diversity, based on small-scale languages whose speakers believe their own language to be superior, [has been changed] into stratified diversity: local languages are abandoned or subordinated to 'world languages' in diglossic relations" (1989, p. 356).

This description is pertinent to the language ecology of Xinjiang where, in the words of a consultant, Yakup, "Chinese is widespread, and jobs are going to require us [to speak] Chinese. It was not like this ten or twenty years ago, but along with the developing and globalization we also need to learn English, not only just Chinese. So learning Chinese is a something we must to do as a Chinese citizen." Uyghur students differ from their Han Chinese counterparts because they are expected to achieve proficiency in three languages: Uyghur, Mandarin, and English. Each of these languages

serves different functions: Uyghur for cultural identity; Mandarin for participation in Han-Chinese dominated spheres and institutions, including the economy and higher education; and English for information, employment and educational opportunities.

In my approach to thematic analysis, I have made an effort to situate and contextualize data on the language practices of my Uyghur consultants within the framework of language ecology, as deeply embedded in the social context (Spolsky, 2004). Both Haugen (1972) and Bourdieu (1991) critique descriptive linguistics for ignoring the complex social, historical and political conditions that mediate linguistic practices. In Xinjiang, "horizontally structured multilingualism is being replaced by a much less structured vertical plurilingualism," a replacement that Mühlhäusler calls, "a recipe for future conflict and of course the danger that one of the more powerful 'killer languages' such as [Mandarin] will simply take over. Colonialism, it should be remembered, through its practices, was responsible for a massive habitat destruction of indigenous languages and it is this destruction of habitat, that has made it much easier for languages such as [Mandarin] to take root" (1997, p. 11).[33] As stated by Schieffelin, "everyday language practices, local metalinguistics, and language ideologies that are embedded in complex cultural and historical moments intersect in ongoing processes of social reproduction and rapid cultural change" (2000, p. 296). "This is where a notion of language ecology in terms of an *ecology of language practices* can take us forward, since

[33] Mühlhäusler uses "English" as an example "killer language" (Malik, 1994). As is appropriate to this discussion, I have substituted "Mandarin" for "English" in brackets. Also note that the phrase "killer language" (1997, p. 11) has been criticized for imbuing languages with agentive capacities (Nettle & Romaine, 2000, pp. 5-6; Price, 1984, p. 170).

it gives us a way of thinking about language practices within changing social and cultural practices" (Pennycook, 2010, p. 104).

As an interpretive approach, a practice of the ecology of language can serve as a heuristic to the reading of statements, such as that made by Bahtiyar, "When I was a kid, bilingual [education] is not really popular in our town. All the kids of rich people or kids of cadre went to Uyghur school. At the end of the 90s, maybe it was 1996, *mínkǎohàn* students or students who can speak good Chinese became more popular or I should say can get a better job than *mínkǎohàn* students. After that, learning Chinese became popular. Rich people and cadre started to send their kids to Han school. *Mínkǎomín* students were kids of farmers – it's still same now." Here, Bahtiyar alludes to Mandarin proficiency, a form of linguistic capital, as convertible to popularity (i.e. cultural capital) and increased employment opportunities, labor that can be converted into wealth (i.e. economic capital).

It is significant that wealthy Uyghurs began the trend of sending their children to Han Chinese schools. This movement also initiated a transfer of monetary capital for Uyghurs, including tuition (e.g. Han Chinese schools require higher tuition than Uyghur schools) and transportation costs (e.g. Uyghur students at Han Chinese schools must attend school on weekends in preparation for the Mandarin-medium college entrance exam). As a corollary, the promotion of a Mandarin curriculum is contributing to the marginalization or elimination of the transmission of "traditional knowledge," defined by Posey as "the social process of learning and sharing knowledge, which is unique to each indigenous culture" (1999, p. 4). In the words of Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, "It is

exactly this transmission process that is at grave risk as soon as indigenous children attend schools where their languages are not the main teaching languages and where their cultural practices do not permeate the learning processes. This is linguistic and cultural genocide, according to articles IIb and IIe of the UN 1948 Genocide Convention" (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000; 2001, p. 14).

Several Uyghur consultants described choices related to language practices as contingent upon the *field*, defined by Bourdieu as networks of social relations between positions that are occupied by social agents with a "distribution of different currencies of power" and "relatively autonomous social microcosms, spaces of objective relations which have a logic and a necessity that is specific and irreducible to those that govern other fields" (1992, pp. 94-95). Domestic, scholastic and peer-group fields were pertinent to this study, as these configurations of settings and participants were cited frequently as related to language choices and practices. Yusuf's language practices exemplify one type of *mínkǎohàn* language practice, "I use Uyghur at home. After when I came to college, most of my roommates are *mínkǎohàn*. When *mínkǎohàn* communicate with each other we mix, we mix these two languages." Here, the Uyghur language practices of Yusuf's family (i.e. domestic field) do not correspond to the Mandarin language practices of the school (i.e. scholastic field) or the Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching language practices of Yusuf's friends (i.e. peer-group field). Yusuf was faced with the triple task of acquiring language appropriate for three markedly different field contexts.

It is well established in sociolinguistics that one language variety does not index one social position in a straightforward way (Elinor Ochs, 1990; Elinor Ochs &

Schieffelin, 1989). However, May argues that, "historically associated languages continue often to hold considerable purchase for members of particular cultural or ethnic groups in their identity claims" (2005, p. 330; 2011). Several Uyghur consultants asserted that the Uyghur language was an important component of Uyghur identity, such as Rebiya who lamented, "Han schools, bilingual schools, someday schools are not going to teach Uyghur anymore, if it goes like this. My mother said, 'if the culture vanish, the ethnic group is going to vanish.'" Rebiya linked the expansion of a Mandarin dominant curriculum with the vanishing of Uyghur culture and concurrent Sinicization. In my reading, Rebiya is concerned that language shift toward Mandarin will contribute to the loss of recognition of Uyghur as a distinct ethnic community. A shift from Uyghur would mark the loss of an important symbolic resource used to index or perform Uyghur identity (Bourdieu, 1991; Duranti, 1997).

This study utilizes a conception of identity informed by Hall, who stressed that identities are not unified but increasingly fragmented, not singular, but "multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices and positions" (1996, p. 4). Identity is not an essentialist notion, given through race, gender, community membership, or kinship network. Rather, identity "forms a trajectory across the different institutional settings of modernity" (Giddens, 1991, p. 14). Although identity is always in process and never complete, this does not equal fragmentation because, "A person may make use of diversity in order to create a distinctive self-identity which positively incorporates elements from different settings into an integrative narrative" (Giddens, 1991, p. 190).

Lippi-Green described language as “the most salient way we have of establishing and advertising our social identities” (1997, p. 5). This concept is consistent with Bourdieu for whom, “Language is a loaded resource that is inextricably bound within the construction and negotiation of identities within the development of multilingual repertories” (J. B. Clark, 2011, p. 22). However, as stated by Miller, “the concept of ‘making use of diversity’ is an important one, and presupposes a certain level of linguistic and symbolic capital. That is, using diversity in this way implies the notion of agency, in which one draws on a range of language and other resources” (2003, pp. 41-42). Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching may be interpreted to be a form of adaptation to specific environmental conditions (Mühlhäusler, 1996, 2000) in order to resist or redefine the value of symbolic resources in the linguistic marketplace (Heller, 1992), but the concern among many Uyghurs is that the choice to use the Uyghur language as a symbolic resource is being undermined. My data suggests a high degree of ambivalence toward Mandarin; this form of cultural capital is conceived of as requisite for participation in the Han Chinese dominated economy, yet of a colonial nature (Pennycook, 2000) and damaging to the demarcation of Uyghur social identity (Gee, 1992).

Chapter 5: Case study narratives

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The language ecology of Xinjiang consists of high prestige language varieties (e.g. Mandarin, Mongolian, Standard Uyghur), low prestige varieties (e.g. Kashgar Uyghur, Kazakh, Salar, Tuva, Urumchi Chinese), and foreign languages (e.g. English, Mandarin) (Dwyer, 1998; Laponce, 1987). Many educated Uyghurs, Xibe, Tatars, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz (among other groups) are bi- and trilingual, assets that may be utilized to facilitate cross-border trade (Gosset, 2006) and information technology research and development (Dwyer, 2005, pp. 64-65). Since the 1980s, "Multilingualism and cultural pluralism have been progressively curtailed in favor of a monolingual, monocultural model, and a concomitant rise of an oppositional modern Uyghur identity" (Dwyer, 2005, p. ix).

In the Xinjiang education system, Uyghur schools are shifting to Mandarin, if not subject to outright consolidation with Chinese schools (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004; Schluessel, 2007). Contemporary CCP language ideology is notable for linking Mandarin language proficiency with increased employment opportunities for Uyghurs (Jia, 2009a, 2009b). Most Uyghurs are multilingual: L1 Uyghur and L2 Mandarin. In addition to these languages, some Uyghurs are proficient in other high prestige, low prestige and foreign languages. The Uyghur young adults who participated in this study reported and exhibited the use of a variety of languages, including monolingual Mandarin, monolingual Uyghur, Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching, and Uyghur-

Mandarin-English code-switching; language choices governed by a number of factors described by Grosjean (1994). This study is concerned with language practices of Uyghur young adults.

This chapter consists of four narratives, from a male and female Uyghur *mínkǎomín* and a male and female *mínkǎohàn*. These narratives were formed from semi-structured and ethnographic interviews, and observations of language practices. At the end of each narrative, I present a table that features the results from a 94-item expressive vocabulary assessment. Consultants were tasked to name pictures, kinship terms, jobs, numbers, and colors. The purpose of this assessment was to obtain one measure of consultants' expressive vocabulary in Uyghur, that is, the richness of their Uyghur mental lexicon and Uyghur lexical retrieval (Ammerlaan, 1996; Schmid & Köpke, 2008). The prediction is that attriters would have a reduced Uyghur lexicon through consistent L1 underuse (Köpke & Schmid, 2004).

In the following narratives, I focus on domestic and academic fields of language use because these domains play a prominent role in structuring language practices. The approach taken in this study is to analyze and understand language in a cultural context and the social conditions of its production and reception (Bourdieu, 1991). Language practices are investigated in context, as shaped by and shaping cultural, political and historical conditions.

The four case study narratives provide a foundation for the discussion of how domestic and academic fields structure linguistic competence, and give momentum to language practices. This chapter builds on the previous chapter by presenting detailed

vignettes. Where the earlier chapter incorporated quotations in support of general themes, this chapter is a "thick description" of consultants' language practices (Geertz, 1973). The purpose of this chapter is to provide insight into the dense, contextual, and interpenetrating nature of contextual factors that influence young adult Uyghurs' language practices.

5.2 ATHENA

Athena was twenty-two years old and in her fifth year of college when we first met in 2008. I made her acquaintance at an English speech competition in which she was a contestant and I was a judge. When she spoke at the podium, I was impressed by her confidence and articulate delivery. During a break in the competition, I approached her in the lobby and invited her to participate in my study. She agreed and we exchanged contact information.

Athena is a close friend of Messi, another case study participant. He was present for a few minutes during two semi-structured interviews with Athena. I asked Athena if his presence had any effect upon her and she said that she was at ease with him around. One special memory I have is when Athena, Messi and I had lunch – mutton and leghmen – at Athena's family's home. The three of us were also together on a more frightening occasion, when during a police sweep of a bar, Messi and I were taken away and detained for a few hours. When Messi and I were released, we reunited with Athena at the bar and enjoyed a night of Uyghur hip-hop.

I chose Athena's pseudonym because I knew she had an affinity for Greek Mythology. I later asked her to select her own pseudonym, but she decided to keep the one I had given her. Athena attended a mínkǎomín *primary school and bilingual middle and high schools. At the end of high school, Athena opted to take the* mínkǎomín *college entrance exam. She is currently a graduate student studying modern Uyghur at a public university in Urumchi. Athena has a light complexion and long, dark brown hair. She wears glasses with thick rims. Athena asserts that she looks smarter than she actually is, but I believe that comments like this are part of her self-deprecating charm.*

Athena's paternal grandparents are from Atush, a city in west Xinjiang. They did not speak Mandarin, but before her paternal grandfather died, "he told my father to study Chinese very hard." Athena's father was born in Kashgar, a city in the extreme west of Xinjiang, and was educated as a *mínkǎomín*.[34] When he was eighteen, he became a member of the CCP and joined the People's Liberation Army. He attended college at the Minzu University of China in Beijing. After leaving the army, Athena's father returned to Urumchi and started work at a television station. Athena addresses her father with the Uyghur kinship term *dada* (father); she has various jocular nicknames for him, including *noghuch* (rolling pin) on account of his protruding belly. Athena described her father as strict and with little tolerance for misbehavior, especially when it came to her studies.

Athena's maternal grandparents were born in Kashgar. They moved to Korla, a city in central Xinjiang, where Athena's mother was born. Her mother's immediate

[34] Athena's father and mother do not know their date of birth. On her father's identification card, his date of birth is listed as 10/1/1949 (the date of the establishment of the PRC) while his *hùkǒuběn* (official residence file) has a different date.

family moved to Urumchi when her mother was in primary school, but her mother remained in Korla with other relatives to attend school. Athena's mother identifies as a *mínkǎohàn*, but Athena challenges this designation because her mother did not complete school. The Cultural Revolution interrupted her studies. As part of the "Down to the Countryside Movement," she was sent to live and work in a rural area. She reunited with her parents and siblings in Urumchi after the Cultural Revolution. In Urumchi, Athena's mother worked at a general store and later at a printing company. Her proficiency in Mandarin and Uyghur helped her obtain a job as a translator in this printing company. Athena addresses her mother with the Uyghur kinship term *apa* (mother). Athena sometimes teasingly calls her mother *xotun* (old lady) or *choshqa* (pig).

Athena has one older sister who works as a Mandarin-Uyghur translator at a television station. Athena said, "Her Chinese is really good. We together watched only Chinese television when growing up." Athena's sister took an exam to enter a bilingual middle school but failed. According to Athena, this "really pissed off" her father. Athena calls her sister *choshqa* (pig) because this is her year-animal according to the Chinese zodiac. Her sister calls Athena *kala* (cow) because Athena was born in the year of the cow.

Athena's family converses entirely in Uyghur, although they do use Mandarin lexical borrowings such as *diànshì* (television), *shǒujī* (cell phone) and *duǎnxìn* (text message). Athena stated that she does not like to use Mandarin when conversing with Uyghurs. She said, "As long as he or she can understand Uyghur, I just speak Uyghur. I think it's weird to speak another language to a person who knows both the mother

language [and Mandarin]. I don't like that. I hate that. To *mínkǎohàn* – I really don't have much *mínkǎohàn* friends – if I have to, I would [speak] half-Uyghur, half-Chinese. I wouldn't just speak Chinese. Uyghur is natural because we are not *mínkǎohàn*."

Athena's *mínkǎomín* father sometimes teases her *mínkǎohàn* mother on account of her mother's Uyghur pronunciation. Athena said that she does this too "because some Uyghur words my mother can't say correctly. My father will not make those mistakes." This quote reveals that Athena and her father have a normative conception of Uyghur phonology that does not always accord with Athena's mother. Although Athena attributes her mother's Uyghur phonology (for a certain number of lexical items) to her education, it is possible that her mother is using Kashgar Uyghur, a low-prestige variety, and that Athena and her father are using the high-prestige variety of Standard Uyghur (Dwyer, 1998; Laponce, 1987).

Athena's family members speak Mandarin only when a Han Chinese guest is present, such as her father's workmates. "We use Chinese only to those people. We have to because they don't understand Uyghur." This quote indicates that Athena and her family (all Uyghur-Mandarin bilinguals) accommodate their speech toward Han Chinese interlocutors by using Mandarin, a common language (Giles, 1973); the direction of accommodation described by Athena is the unmarked choice (Gross, 2009).

Athena has lived in the same district of Urumchi her entire life. In her youth, Athena interacted only with Uyghur children. However, after her family purchased their first television, Athena and her sister spent more time watching television than playing with other neighborhood children. She attributes her Chinese television viewership to

giving her an advantage in developing proficiency in Mandarin. She did not watch Uyghur programs. With one good friend, Athena often read Japanese comics that were translated into Chinese.

Athena spent four years in preschool. Uyghur and Han Chinese children attended this center, but within this building, classes were ethnically segregated. Uyghur teachers (using Uyghur as the language of instruction) and Uyghur children occupied some rooms. Han Chinese teachers (using Mandarin as the language of instruction) and Han Chinese children occupied other rooms.

Athena and her sister attended a Uyghur primary school. She said, "I guess [my parents] thought we don't really have to go to Han Chinese school to learn Han Chinese because we watch Chinese TV already at home. So I guess we can learn Chinese through the TV." Athena spoke Uyghur with classmates and friends. In primary school, she became literate in Uyghur *kona yëziq*. All of the teachers at her primary school were Uyghur, including the Mandarin-language teacher. This was her favorite teacher and Mandarin was her favorite subject, "Maybe because I know that Chinese is important at that time, already." There was little content on Uyghur culture in school although Athena did recall learning of Sadir Palwan (1798-1871), a legendary Uyghur hero from Ghulja who battled Qing dynasty warlords. The lack of a culturally relevant pedagogy for Uyghurs in Xinjiang is indicative of how schools "deculturalize" students, that is, the educational process of destroying a people's culture and replacing it with a new culture (Spring, 1994). The curriculum (i.e. content and textbooks) of the Xinjiang education system reflects only the culture of the dominant Han Chinese group. Through this

curriculum, the culture of schools in Xinjiang undermines the culture of Uyghur students. During vacations in fourth through sixth grades, Athena and her sister took private English courses. During these courses, Athena learned the English alphabet and some vocabulary.

Athena took a comprehensive Mandarin and mathematics test after completing primary school. She earned a high score and was placed in a *shuāngyǔ shìyànbān* (bilingual experimental class) in a Uyghur middle school. Students with relatively low scores (like Athena's sister) received a middle school education with Uyghur as the language of instruction. In 1999, the year after Athena finished middle school, all classes transitioned to Mandarin as the language of instruction. In Athena's *shuāngyǔ* class, Mandarin was the primary language of instruction, except for in language arts classes (e.g. literature and Uyghur grammar). English was part of the curriculum for the bilingual experimental class. English was Athena's favorite subject, and she excelled due to the advantage obtained from her participation in the private English courses. During middle school, she had limited exposure to English outside of class.

Athena attended a Chinese high school. This school was not elite, but Han Chinese students had to take an exam to gain entrance. Athena stated that all of students in her bilingual experimental class matriculated automatically, "even the worst students." At this school, all of Athena's teachers were Han Chinese, except for in literature class, which was taught by Uyghur teachers. In this class, Athena read some of the writings of Mahmud al-Kashgari, an 11th century Turkic scholar. She was also introduced to ancient Turkic languages and orthographies. In English class, Athena read excerpts of texts, such

as Martin Luther King, Jr.'s *I Have a Dream* and Charles Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities*. Outside of class, she occasionally watched English language movies.

After her first year of high school, Athena had a pivotal experience related to English. She participated in a summer course at a public university in Urumchi with student-teachers from an American university. This was a positive learning experience and she decided to major in English at college. Athena's motivation to learn English was partly driven by a desire to "understand songs…I started to listen to Eminem." Her family, especially her father, stressed "the importance of Chinese and English."

Athena took the *mínkǎomín* science discipline college entrance exam and was accepted by her first choice of college. She enrolled as an English major. Because Athena took the *mínkǎomín* version exam, she was required to take *yùkē* (a year-long preparatory course in Mandarin for ethnic minority students). Athena, already fluent and literate in Mandarin, perceived this remedial course as a waste of time. She confessed, "I became really lazy after that." In college, English courses began at an introductory.

Athena took private English courses during the weekends and breaks of her first two years because she felt her English language skills were not being developed at school. She participated in a speech contest organized by the private school and placed third. In 2007, she took part in a regional English speaking competition for the first time and finished in the top eight. In 2008, she participated in the contest again and earned a trip to a national competition in Beijing. Athena made Han Chinese friends for the first time when participating in this speech competition. Before this experience, she did not feel it was "necessary" to make Han Chinese friends; she said she had enough Uyghur

friends to share her interests. Although Athena now counts some Han Chinese as friends, she does not interact with these individuals frequently. Friendship groups are consequential for language acquisition and language use because informal conversations with target language speakers are a form of investment through which learners assert social identities (B. Norton & Toohey, 2001).

In her free time, Athena enjoys listening to music, watching movies and television programs. At the start of college, she listened to Eminem, Backstreet Boys and Michael Jackson, but her tastes have now expanded beyond American pop to include Uzbek, Spanish, Russian, Mandarin and Turkish music. Athena is an avid movie fan; she regularly purchases English language DVDs and downloads English language movies. She used to watch movies at a theater but has ceased because they are in Mandarin. She said, "I don't think it's useful anymore for me." Athena's favorite website is *bǎidù* – a Chinese search engine. She uses the Internet primarily to download music and movies, chat with friends, and email.

Athena lived in a dormitory throughout college. Her roommates were all Uyghur. They normally conversed in Uyghur and used the same Mandarin lexical borrowings as within Athena's family. Athena and her roommates occasionally spoke in English but never engaged in extended conversations in this language.

At the end of college, Athena followed her parents' directive to take the graduate school entrance exam in Uyghur language studies. She had no desire to take this exam, and purposefully did not prepare. Despite this, Athena did pass the graduate school entrance exam and now studies modern Uyghur at a public university in Urumchi. She

moved back in with her family for graduate school. More than half of Athena's graduate school classmates are members of non-Uyghur ethnic groups. Athena expressed some bitterness toward her Han and Hui Chinese classmates. According to her, "they're not learning [Uyghur] for academic purposes," but only to obtain government jobs. She was also bitter about the ease with which non-Uyghurs could enter graduate school for Uyghur language studies (non-Uyghurs do not have to take an entrance exam to study Uyghur at the graduate level). Their tuition is reduced – about half of what Uyghurs must pay. She surmised that the CCP is encouraging non-Uyghurs to enroll in Uyghur language studies.

Athena's dream job is to teach Uyghur to foreign students. She will utilize ethnic minority affirmative action policies by applying for jobs reserved for ethnic minorities.[35] Athena is not enthusiastic about teaching Uyghurs and members of other ethnic groups. However, she is excited at the prospect of teaching and interacting with Western students of Uyghur. She does not perceive her multilingualism as an asset but as a set of skills necessary for survival.

Athena desires to travel and learn about non-Chinese cultures. During one interview session, Athena was wearing a necklace with a heart-shaped American flag medallion. After pointing it out, she said, "I love America." In the past, she aspired to go to America and enjoy "freedom" but has since abandoned this dream due to financial concerns.

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[35] Athena said that ethnic minorities "don't have a chance" when competing with Han Chinese for jobs that are not reserved for ethnic minority applicants "cause the exams are in Chinese."

On the direction of her future, Athena said, "I believe in fate because we believe in God. He arranged everything for our whole life, like who you are going to marry. But still yes – you can change your fate – if you want to. I'm not fatalist, but I believe in fate…whatever God – Allah – gives you…And we can't complain about that cause it's our fate. It's the God's will."

Like her parents, Athena is a member of the CCP. She said her father forced her to join and that her head teacher changed her test score so that she would pass the CCP qualification exam. Athena recognizes CCP membership as having a utilitarian value; she believes that being a party member might help her obtain a job. Athena said that she will take an oath to join the CCP, and assert belief in atheism, but negated the importance of the content of the oath, "We can say that, but we don't really do that…you can still believe [in Allah] in your heart."

Among Uyghur friends, Athena communicates orally in Uyghur. She uses English only with English-speaking foreigners and in English Corner. English Corner is an informal time for English language communication that takes place at schools and colleges (and sometimes parks) in China. Athena added, "I don't like English." She does not converse in this language with other Uyghurs. I observed this to be true. On several occasions when Athena, Messi and I were together, she would speak Uyghur with Messi and me, only using English to verify that I was following the conversation. Athena summarized her behavior in regard to language choice, "To foreigners I would definitely speak English. To Chinese I would speak Chinese. But to Uyghur – I know they can understand English, Chinese – but Uyghur is their mother language, so that's it."

Athena sends text messages in Chinese script. She keeps her diary in Mandarin because she has an easier time articulating her emotions using Chinese vocabulary. She said, almost in defense of this predilection, "I don't hate Chinese, but I just don't want to speak Chinese to Uyghur people. But I would on texting or on the Internet."

Athena conceives of Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* as "half-Uyghur, half-Chinese. They went to school with Chinese people so the way of their thinking is more Chinese. They're more open-minded maybe – in not a very good way." According my reading, Athena's use of the term "open-minded" implied "sexually promiscuous," a stereotypical behavior that some Uyghur *mínkǎomín* associate with *mínkǎohàn*. She described Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* as having a "Chinese character." According to Athena, Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* "speak Chinese all the time, even to Uyghur and they don't know anything about the Uyghur customs. It's annoying so I don't like *mínkǎohàn*, to be honest. They are different from us." Athena attributed the development of a "Chinese character" among Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* to their immersion in Chinese schools and friendships with Han Chinese classmates.

I mentioned to Athena that some Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* were aware that some Uyghur *mínkǎomín* disliked them, and how some Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* struggle with being characterized as outsiders, and traitors to their culture and people. Athena replied that she had read articles on this topic, describing how some Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* felt they were outsiders to both Uyghur and Chinese communities. Athena expressed no sympathy for Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* feelings of ostracism. She said, "From primary school, or even kindergarten, they just speak Chinese – even to their parents. Why? They can speak

Chinese at school. It's enough. Not after class. They have to practice Uyghur. And their parents think that it's good for them to go to Chinese school, but still they have to teach them something about Uyghur culture. But maybe the *mínkǎohàn* from the Kashgar or Khotan still can speak very fluently, but not in Urumchi. They even *date* Chinese girls, Chinese boys. And *that* is disgusting for us. We don't like it." Athena expressed her acceptance of Uyghur-Chinese inter-ethnic friendship, but strongly disapproved of Uyghur-Chinese marriage. This is because Uyghurs and Han Chinese have "different religion. And we generally don't like them. But foreigners maybe – you know some [Uyghur] people really like foreign people."

Athena's apparent lack of compassion for the *mínkǎohàn* condition may be attributed to a *mínkǎohàn* sense of superiority or privilege that *mínkǎomín* resent. Tsung and Clarke (2010), in an exploration of identity, language and culture in higher education in China, found that Uyghur academics educated in Mandarin believed their *mínkǎomín* colleagues to be jealous of their achievements. Smith Finely, in an exploration of the complex self-identity of Uyghur *mínkǎomín*, suggested that contemporary *mínkǎohàn* "types" existed along a "broad spectrum of hybrid cultural combinations" (2007, p. 220). According to Smith Finely, some *mínkǎohàn* feel a sense of shame regarding their cultural background or cultural lack, while "others enjoy[ed] more positive identities, considering themselves 'modern', 'progressive' and 'internationalist'" (Finley, 2007, p. 220). Perhaps Athena found these "more positive identities" distasteful if/when used by *mínkǎohàn* to position themselves as superior to *mínkǎomín*. Athena also distinguished Urumchi *mínkǎohàn*, classifying them separately from *mínkǎohàn* from other places in

Xinjiang, suggesting that Urumchi *mínkǎohàn* had deficient Uyghur linguistic and cultural competence.

Athena was aware that Mandarin is replacing Uyghur as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system. She also recognized that more Uyghur students are being educated as *mínkǎohàn*. She said, "In primary schools, now they teach the lessons all in Chinese so [Uyghur students] don't know the Uyghur terms of the math or the biology or the chemistry." I told Athena that some Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* were also not learning basic Uyghur words. She responded, "That is *their* fault. They can learn. They know when they were little. They just forget – it's their fault. No one forced them to [speak Mandarin and not Uyghur]." Athena did not express a critical awareness of the colonial conditions and linguistic imperialism of Mandarin. She appeared to support a "blaming the victim" (Ryan, 1971) ideology where, in a clearly stratified social/educational context, Uyghurs deprived of equal access to linguistic resources of symbolic and cultural value are themselves blamed for their low Uyghur proficiency. Athena intends to raise her child in Uyghur and would prefer to send her child to a school where Uyghur is the language of instruction. If the schools of the future do not offer Uyghur as a language of instruction, Athena will take the initiative to teach her children Uyghur literacy skills. She said, "Parents are your first teachers – not the teachers at school."

Athena expressed confidence in the vitality of the Uyghur language. She said, "I think it takes a very long time to really make it disappear – maybe a hundred years." She professed a strong link between Uyghur language and culture and believes that it is

impossible to transmit Uyghur culture independent of the language (including literacy). She stated, “That would be a disaster for our people.”

5.2.1 Expressive vocabulary assessment: Athena

Athena completed the expressive vocabulary assessment in the spring of 2009. She wrote all lexical items in Uyghur. Athena produced the correct Uyghur lexical item [N=156] for each item [N=156] in each category [N=10]. She misidentified some items [N=9], but was able to produce the target lexical item upon verbal specification. Notably, Athena wrote the Mandarin borrowed lexical items for *mushroom*, *pepper,* and *potato*. She was able to produce the Uyghur-language lexical items for these objects when verbally given their equivalent in English.

Section	total items	items correct
1: Animals	12	12
2: Body & Face	25	25
3: Family	15	15
4: Nature	20	20
5: Food	19	19
6: Jobs	20	20
7: Furniture & Appliances	12	12
8: Transportation	12	12
9: Numbers	13	13
10: Colors	8	8
	156	156 (100%)

Table 2: Expressive vocabulary assessment: Athena

5.3 MESSI

Messi was a twenty-year-old college sophomore when we first met in 2008 at an English speaking competition; he was a contestant and I was a judge. I invited him to participate in my study because he was eager to discuss issues related to the Uyghur language and other aspects of Uyghur culture. He was also interested in participating in a project that would publicize the Uyghur people. We became close friends and spent a great deal of time together; Messi had a room to himself in one of my apartments. He lived with me on the weekends and during school holidays. We had contact on a near-daily basis, to share a meal, drink a beer, or do work related to the study, such as transcribing interviews and member-checking (Bloor, 1983). We traveled twice to his hometown of Korla.

Messi attended a mínkǎomín *primary school and bilingual middle and high schools. In college, he majored in computer science and information technology. Messi is currently living in Shanghai and teaching English.*

Messi's paternal grandparents were born and raised in a town located in central Xinjiang, on the northeast edge of the Tarim Basin. Messi's father was also born in this town. The family relocated to the nearby city of Korla before Messi's father entered primary school. Messi's paternal grandparents worked at a hotel, his grandfather as a guard and his grandmother as a maid. Messi's father was educated in Uyghur schools. He obtained employment at a bank after finishing high school. The director of the bank sent him to college in Urumchi, after which he returned to his post at the bank. Messi's father was unable to obtain promotion because of the rigid hierarchy in place for members of

specific ethnic groups. Frustrated and in poor health, he retired. Messi said that, "his father can't really get along with Han Chinese people and that's why he retired so young." His father passed away in the fall of 2008. Messi addressed his father as *dadoy*. Messi theorized that the term *dadoy* is a blend combining *dada* (father) and *oy* (interj. hey).

Messi's maternal grandparents and mother were born in Kashgar. The family moved to Korla to escape persecution during the Cultural Revolution because they were landowners and thus prime targets for denouncement. Messi's maternal grandfather was a prominent teacher, administrator and academic; he wrote and published articles on the Xinjiang education system. In fact, I once discovered a scholarly journal with Messi's grandfather on the cover in a bookstore in the *èrdàoqiáo* section of Urumchi. He had contributed the main article to that issue. Messi's maternal grandmother was a physician. Messi's mother attended Uyghur schools. Upon graduation, she obtained employment in the Korla public library. Messi addresses his mother as *apoy*.

Messi has one older sister who is currently a graduate student in Turkey. This is not uncommon; Shichor (2003), based on information from Enver Can in Munich, estimated that 10,000 Uyghurs resided in Turkey. Messi's sister excelled in school and earned admission to a bilingual middle school in Urumchi. She then went to college in Nanjing. After graduating from college, Messi's sister returned to Korla. Her mother wanted her to settle in Xinjiang, but his sister's dream was to study abroad. She realized this dream in 2010 when she moved to Turkey.

At home, Messi's family communicated in Uyghur. When a Han or Hui Chinese guest was present, the family spoke with them in Mandarin, but would continue to speak in Uyghur among themselves. Interactions with Mandarin-speaking guests were limited to the Qurban Héyit holiday season when Han and Hui Chinese would come to Messi's home to visit and eat mutton. On two occasions, in February and November 2009, I traveled with Messi to his home in Korla. All conversation was conducted in Uyghur. His extended family also communicated exclusively in Uyghur.

Messi grew up in a neighborhood near downtown Korla. In his youth, the neighborhood was completely Uyghur. Messi and his friends communicated in their mother tongue. In the summertime, the *mínkǎomín* and bilingual Uyghur children played football and swam. Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* did not participate in these activities, a fact that Messi attributed to their "different personality." Messi spoke with nostalgia about his old neighborhood and told numerous stories of neighbors sharing food, women drinking *chay* (tea) and men playing poker. Many of the Uyghur residents in Messi's apartment complex were employed at a nearby bank. The relocation of this bank triggered a shift in the demographics of the neighborhood; Uyghurs began to move out and Han Chinese moved in.

When Messi was four years old, he and his mother went to Urumchi. They stayed with relatives while his mother completed coursework in library studies. His friends in Urumchi were Han Chinese and they communicated in Mandarin. After returning to Korla, Messi lived at his paternal grandparents' home for a year. Messi entertained

himself by speaking to himself in Mandarin because there were few other children around. During this time, he also watched a lot of Mandarin language television.

Messi was enrolled in, and expelled from, two preschools. These expulsions were the result of fights that Messi instigated. At preschool, the teachers and students were Uyghur; they communicated in Uyghur. At the intervals where he was not in preschool, he stayed at home.

Although Messi was below the minimum age, his father managed to enroll him in a primary school. After attending first grade, all of the students at this school were relocated because the school building was unstable. Messi's second school was "kind of shitty" and far from his home. He left this school after completing second grade, and went to another school for the remainder of primary school. All of these schools used Uyghur as the language of instruction; Messi received a *mínkǎomín* primary school education. He began to learn Mandarin as a second language in the third grade. He excelled in his Mandarin classes because of the Mandarin he had previously acquired.

In both middle and high school, Messi attended bilingual schools. All of his classmates and friends were Uyghur. Core courses (e.g. physics, chemistry and math) were taught in Mandarin by Han Chinese teachers throughout secondary school. Humanities courses were taught in Uyghur by Uyghurs.

In middle school, some teachers insisted that students use Mandarin in class and during break, but Messi and his classmates refused to follow this policy. Messi felt that his teachers did not provide a strong rationale for him and his classmates to modify their linguistic habitus. I asked Messi what he would have said if his teachers had provided a

rationale along the lines that "Mandarin is the national tongue." He replied, "I would say, 'Fuck your tongue.' They didn't say anything like that. Maybe they're just following the order." Messi recalled his parents telling him that Mandarin language proficiency was good for his future, including employment prospects.

English was offered as a course of study for the first year of middle school, but then discontinued. Outside of school, Messi had some exposure to Anglophone music, mainly in the form of pirated Backstreet Boys and Britney Spears VCDs that his sister brought home.

In high school, Messi's class was transferred to a Han Chinese school where Mandarin was the language of instruction. This change prompted him and his classmates to reflect upon their language and culture. One of his teachers remarked, "[Uyghur] education is facing a really big threat because you guys are the experiment of the changing." Messi felt that the implicit message was, "You're the rats. You're the white rats. They're experimenting this new system on you." The change in the education system (i.e. the consolidation of Uyghur and Han Chinese schools and implementation of Mandarin as the language of instruction in core courses) was a topic of public debate. Messi felt that the purpose of this experiment was to achieve ethnic assimilation, "to be *one* China." From this teacher, Messi also learned a version of Uyghur history that departed from the official narrative. According to this teacher, the *Xiōngnú* and subsequent Turkic ethnic groups (e.g. Uyghur, Uzbek) descended from the Huns. This teacher was eventually fired, an incidence that Messi attributed to this teacher's inclination to address "sensitive" issues (Yee, 2003, p. 432).

Messi recalled Ismail Tiliwaldi, then CCP chairman of Xinjiang, saying that the Uyghur language is undeveloped and we have to learn Mandarin in order to develop our selves. Messi rejected this ideology. He said, "Fuck him. That's totally not true. In my mind, the language that is not developed is Mandarin. You told me what you think, but in my mind, that's the undeveloped one. We don't have to memorize a shitload of characters in order to write our language. We just have a little more than a hundred things to memorize and then you can write and read. It's more convenient. It's much easier." This latter comment was in reference to a conversation in which I had told Messi that all languages had equal communicative potential. He later said, "[Uyghur government officials] are just like puppets. That makes me really angry. There are people wants to be slaves of the Chinese government. I assume those are the governors." Messi believes that the program of bilingual education was devised by well-intentioned Uyghurs, but then operationalized in a way that resulted in the marginalization of the Uyghur language. Messi said, "I don't think the Han Chinese people came up with that idea. I think some Uyghur fucker came up with the idea. Maybe he was thinking like half-Chinese half-Uyghur, but when the Chinese person got it, it turned into totally Chinese or just one class is in Uyghur."

In high school, only humanities courses were taught in Uyghur. If refined or specialized terminology was needed, Mandarin terms were used. Messi's teachers treated these courses as marginal because his class was on track for the natural science version of the college entrance exam. According to Messi, the teachers "wouldn't give a fuck if we understand or if we listening because it doesn't important for us." English language

studies were reintroduced during his third year of high school. Most of Messi's classmates did not take this course seriously because English was not a component of the college entrance exam. Messi said that his Han Chinese high school English teacher gave special attention to him and the small group of Uyghur students who showed an interest in learning English.

Messi's parents stressed the importance of learning English. Once while watching a televised English speaking competition with his parents, Messi's father told Messi that he wanted to see him participate in the competition. One of Messi's motivations to learn English was to honor the wish of his father. He participated in the collegiate and regional English speaking competitions for two consecutive years. Messi frequently spoke to himself in English – the same method he had used when learning Mandarin, though more consciously. Messi began listening to Anglophone hip-hop and watching Anglophone films (e.g. *The Matrix*, *Lord of the Rings* trilogy, *Fight Club*). When watching a movie or television show, he memorized "cool" English words and practiced using them while walking to school. He would incorporate individual lexical items into phrases, and then converse with himself.

Messi also started listening to traditional Uyghur songs, a genre he had previously disliked. As he described it, "One day I just found this hunger, this desire from inside for traditional songs. My mom and my sister, they *love* traditional songs. That was pain in the ass when I was a kid to sit there and watch that. But from high school I start to enjoy it. I used to search Uyghur websites to find music I liked… Every once in a while, I just had to listen to traditional songs. It just feels so comfortable inside." Messi rediscovered

some meaning in Uyghur music, a cultural product. Uyghur folk and popular music is immediately distinguishable from Chinese music. Accompanied by a driving rhythm from stringed instrument(s), lyrics, vocalized in Uyghur, often refer to Uyghur heroes and legends. Dillon suggested that Uyghur music, constantly played in bazaars, restaurants and at wedding parties, is a statement of cultural assertion (2009a). I would add that, in a colonial context like Xinjiang, where freedoms of expression are restricted (Freedom House, 2011; S. Wei & Cuifen, 2010), Uyghur music is but one of a few *safe* statements of Uyghur cultural assertion.

Messi continued to do well in the core courses taught in Mandarin. He enriched his Mandarin lexicon through Chinese historical television series that he watched with his father. He picked up many literary terms and idioms from these shows and incorporated them in his compositions.

In college, Messi majored in computer science and information technology. He did not enroll in *yùkē* because he had taken the *mínkǎohàn* college entrance exam. Mandarin was the language of instruction throughout college. All of his classmates were members of ethnic minorities, mostly Uyghur. They all went to bilingual or Han Chinese secondary schools.

Messi's freshman English course was basic, and he did not attend regularly because the material was not challenging. Despite this, he performed well on the final exam and passed. His second year English course was slightly more challenging. He took an English course during his junior year that required students to memorize terminology related to technology.

When he began to participate in English speaking competitions, Messi received some attention from the foreign language department faculty. This attention was a source of motivation to attain fluency in English. His desire to leave Xinjiang was another, stronger source of motivation. He said, "English is important, especially because I want to get out." Messi said he "doesn't give a shit about [English language] certificates," the type that are requisite for employment as an English teacher within China. His motivation to learn English is directly related to his aspiration to permanently relocate abroad. The primary reason he wants to leave Xinjiang is to escape the ethnic discrimination that obstructs Uyghurs from obtaining employment.

In his first college dorm room, where he stayed for a year and a half, all four of the roommates were Uyghur. They spoke Uyghur among themselves. Messi recalled one of his roommates using Mandarin on the phone when speaking with female romantic interests. Messi said that this roommate "would pretend his Chinese is really good." He evaluated this linguistic behavior critically, saying, "I don't think there is anything to show off with your Chinese, especially since a lot of Uyghurs speak good Chinese." Messi moved out of this dorm room because his roommates did not help keep the place clean and smoked copious amounts of marijuana.

Messi's second set of roommates included a Uyghur (from southern Xinjiang), Mongolian and Xibe. All were *mínkǎohàn*; Messi communicated with the Mongolian and the Xibe in Mandarin. With his Uyghur roommate, he would speak in Uyghur. Messi said of his Uyghur roommate, "His Uyghur is pretty good even though he's *mínkǎohàn*. He was grown up at his grandma and grandpa's place – he grew in a pretty much Uyghur

environment – so that's why his Uyghur is really good, compared to other *mínkǎohàn*. His Uyghur is kind of funny though because he learned it from his grandparents so he speaks old-peoples' Uyghur." It is established in sociolinguistics that age-based variation (among other variables such as geography and gender) occurs in language use among speakers or groups of speakers (Milroy & Gordon, 2003). By "old-peoples' Uyghur," Messi was referring to the lexical, phonetic and/or syntactic patterns of his Uyghur roommate's Uyghur language variety as marked by some form of age-based variation. When the roommates played multiple-player video games, they used Mandarin as a lingua franca.

I observed Messi interacting with members of various ethnic groups on many occasions; he generally spoke Uyghur with Uyghurs, English with Westerners and Han Chinese fluent in English, and Mandarin with Han Chinese not fluent in English. When in multilingual contexts (i.e. among Uyghur, Chinese and Western interlocutors), he used English. He deviated from this pattern when communicating with Möshük; she would sometimes switch from Uyghur to Mandarin, and Messi would follow. He usually switched back to Uyghur after a few turns. Messi believed that Möshük was sometimes reluctant to speak in Uyghur because she lacked full competence in this language, feared making mistakes, and was hesitant to ask for assistance when unsure about usage. On occasion, when interacting with Han Chinese, he would pretend to be a monolingual English-speaking Westerner. He played this game with them because many Han Chinese treat Westerners with more respect than they do Uyghurs.

Outside of class, Messi continued to listen to Anglophone music; he also downloaded and watched English language television programs. He used these programs to develop his English language skills by focusing on the language practices of certain characters. He developed this technique with the television series *Prison Break*. He concentrated on specific characters and learned their speaking "style." Messi repeated this technique with the sitcom *How I met your Mother* and the character Barney. Messi said, "Barney is a big asshole in that show, but except the way he thinks about [male-female] relationships, he's pretty cool. So that's why I was repeating him and then trying to be like him. Sometimes I would even recite what he's saying, like put his idea into my mind." Because Messi's girlfriend was familiar with this television show, she could readily identify when Messi was "playing" Barney. Another show Messi regularly watched was called *Supernatural*. "There are two brothers – one is really good guy, one is a dick but he's cool – so I start to try to speak like him." Messi's girlfriend confirmed that Messi often fixated on television characters who made provocative comments, and repeated what they said.

When speaking English, Messi enjoyed offending others with irreverent comments. His sister, who had not previously heard Messi using English, once remarked, "You're not like that when you're speaking Uyghur." She then asked Messi's girlfriend if he was "*always* like this." His girlfriend confirmed this, to which his sister responded, "He's completely different when he's speaking Uyghur."

Messi believes that different aspects of his personality are on display when using different languages. He said, "My Uyghur personality is more like my father. He never

speaks that much. My teachers and my parents told me I should respect everyone around me so I was afraid that speaking anything would offend them. And also I was shy. I got embarrassed really easily. I was afraid to talk about things." As a child, Messi discovered that language could be used to overcome his shyness. "I used to have this in Chinese before. When I was a kid, I feel like I could do anything and talk it to Chinese people. I could tell [my Chinese friends] anything and then they start to acting weird as I realize when I grow up and then I just lost my thing." With English, Messi discovered a new medium for performance. His English language style is to "make jokes all the time; kind of rude, mean jokes." Messi uses profane language in English, but not in Uyghur.

Messi's multiple language proficiency has been an asset; he is currently employed as an English teacher in Shanghai. Messi pretends to be an Anglophone Westerner when teaching Han Chinese students. He hopes to study Uyghur language and literature at graduate school. Although Messi's family supports this plan, some of his Uyghur friends question the utility and profitability of this pursuit. Messi is motivated by a desire to teach Uyghur to Uyghurs and maintain the vitality of the Uyghur language.[36] Messi aspires to work in an anthropology department at a university in the West; he wants to educate others about Uyghur culture and to "let more and more people know that [Uyghurs] exist."

[36] Messi once made an implicit reference to the critical period for language acquisition, bemoaning the fact that increasing numbers of Uyghurs were not developing competence in Uyghur. He stated, "Maybe they will find out it is cool to know Uyghur when they're 18 or 20 years old. And when they try to learn it back, it's gonna be too late."

On one occasion, Messi recalled being called a member of the "57th ethnic group of China" because of his high proficiency in Mandarin.[37] Messi refuted this criticism, "If people keep thinking that, they're gonna separate their own people. They don't want to be separated. It's just miscommunication and misunderstanding on both sides." Messi was weary at the way in which some Uyghur *mínkǎomín* disparage Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*. He cited Athena, another case study participant, as an example, saying, "They think *mínkǎohàn* are almost assimilated – they're bad. Think *why*. Why they're that way. A lot of people don't think why." Messi was expressing some concern over the lack of critical awareness of the cultural, political and historical conditions that contributed to the stratification of Uyghur *mínkǎomín* and *mínkǎohàn*.

Messi stated that contemporary Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* differ from earlier generations of Uyghurs in their linguistic and other habitus. We both observed, on multiple occasions, Uyghur children speaking Mandarin when playing.[38] Messi recalled that his Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* cousins speak Mandarin when playing video games. He remarked that his cousins sometimes "said things in front of elders that [he] could not imagine saying" and also doing rude things like "walking in front of elders.[39] You have to move behind them…*Mínkǎohàn* often don't say *Essalamueleykum* (Peace be upon you) when they step into a house. That's like the first thing…Before you step in you have to say *Essalam*

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[37] The CCP officially recognizes 56 ethnic groups within the borders of the PRC. To say that someone is a member of the 57th ethnic group of China is to chastise that person as something hybrid and alien.

[38] On the topic of games, Messi said, "I've heard the names of the games my mom played. I can recognize them because we played the same games. But we're not even a generation to another generation – I can see now kids – it's like the game's totally gone. It just disappears in such a short time. It might be still exist in the countryside – I hope – but it's just kind of sad and kind of weird."

[39] Messi later added that these cousins are modifying some of their behaviors. "My grandma keeps telling them and some of them changed."

(Peace) then step in…That's how you show respect. *Mínkǎohàn* don't follow these rules. And the youngest ones, they just never do it. They were in Han Chinese kindergarten and then also Han Chinese primary school so maybe they played with Han Chinese kids all the time" and adopted certain behaviors. Some Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* eat in Han Chinese canteens, thus breaking the halal dietary practice adhered to by most Uyghurs. Messi once considered confronting a Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* who was entering a Han Chinese canteen, but his friends discouraged him from doing this because the Uyghur in question could not speak Uyghur.

If he raises children in Xinjiang, Messi prefers that they be educated in Uyghur, although he thinks that this option will not be available because of the trend towards monolingual Mandarin education (Dwyer, 2005; Schluessel, 2007). Messi intends to maintain monolingual Uyghur language practices with his future family.

Messi considers language to be the most important aspect of culture. He once compared himself with Möshük, another case study participant, saying, "She knows less Uyghur than I do…I know more about how to be a traditional Uyghur. It's in here [pointing to his heart], but she doesn't know, sometimes, but not all the time." Messi said that Möshük's relatively low Uyghur language competence might give the impression to other Uyghurs, especially in rural areas, that she has been assimilated. Messi stated that some Uyghurs indexed modernity by "speaking Chinese, English and dressing the way a Chinese person does, and also eating KFC or Dicks."[40] He rejected these linguistic

[40] Messi and I called "Dicos" – a fast-food chain – "Dicks" because "Dicos" was spelled as "Diks" in Uyghur *kona yëziq*. This was humorous to us because there is an [o] sound in the Uyghur phonemic inventory but the people who transliterated the restaurant name did not include it.

practices and consumption patterns, claiming that modernity was predicated on education and an objective perspective.

Messi said, "A lot of people think being Muslim is an important part of being Uyghur. I agree with that but I've heard there's some Christian Uyghurs and some Uyghurs even not believe in any religions. I think they're still Uyghur. Even if you force a Uyghur to eat pork, he is still Uyghur. As long as they're considering their selves as a Uyghur, as long as they speak our language and as long as they admit that they're Uyghur, they're Uyghur. It doesn't matter what you believe." Messi's belief evoked an notion explored in the previous chapter; some consultants indicated that Uyghur language proficiency was *not* a criterion measure for ingroup or outgroup membership (Jia, 2009a; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2010). Yet Messi does recognize Uyghur language proficiency, along with self-identification as a Uyghur, as markers of Uyghur identity. Of note, Messi's idea of Uyghur ingroup membership is not predicated on adherence to Islam (religion). He also signals that the compulsory ingestion of pork is not criteria for exclusion from the Uyghur ethnic community. He likely made this allowance because his mother was compelled to consume pork at one point during the Cultural Revolution.

Messi is pessimistic about the vitality of the Uyghur language. He stated, "I can assume two ways. The negative way would be the language would disappear in 50 years. It would totally disappear if it goes like this." He believes that the majority of his generation still "has the Uyghur language" but that, in subsequent generations of Uyghurs, fluent speakers will be a minority. As for the alternative, "On the positive side, if Chinese government says we're on the list of disappearing languages, they would

do something. Or they wouldn't. Of course if Uyghurs could get more attention, here and overseas, non-Uyghur people could have the awareness of there is a disappearing language and culture. Maybe people would support financially and do some research and help us to let the language survive. It's hard though. I'm gonna try that." Messi also acknowledged that Uyghurs must realize that their language is under threat. He said, "We have to get our people's awareness of the language is disappearing. We have to let them know it's in danger. A lot of people have the awareness but they don't really act. They don't do anything about it…Maybe they think it's not modern enough, fashion enough, which is stupid."

5.3.1 Expressive vocabulary assessment: Messi

Messi completed the expressive vocabulary assessment in the fall of 2008. He wrote all lexical items in Uyghur. Messi produced the correct Uyghur lexical item [N=155] for nearly every item [N=156] in each category [N=10]. He misidentified some items [N=8], but was able to produce the target lexical item upon verbal specification. Like Athena, Messi wrote the Mandarin borrowed lexical items for *mushroom* and *potato*. He also wrote the Mandarin borrowing for potato. He was able to produce the Uyghur-language lexical items for these objects when verbally given their equivalent in English.

	total items	items correct	incorrect (item #)
Section			
1: Animals	12	12	
2: Body & Face	25	25	
3: Family	15	15	
4: Nature	20	20	
5: Food	19	19	
6: Jobs	20	20	
7: Furniture & Appliances	12	11	11
8: Transportation	12	12	
9: Numbers	13	13	
10: Colors	8	8	
	156	155 (99%)	

Table 3: Expressive vocabulary assessment: Messi

5.4 MÖSHÜK

Möshük was a twenty-three-year-old college student when we first met in 2008.[41] *She was an English major at a public university in Urumchi. Möshük attended Han Chinese schools throughout grade school, and considered herself a "real"* mínkǎohàn *because the majority of her classmates were Han Chinese. This educational trajectory coupled with Möshük's enthusiasm to represent Uyghur* mínkǎohàn *were the primary reasons I asked her to participate in my study. Möshük was invested in this study because she was interested in discovering the social conditions that resulted in her own weak Uyghur literacy skills. She felt that my findings might suggest approaches to Uyghur literacy education that might help future generations of Uyghur* mínkǎohàn *learn to read and write in their first language.*

Möshük and I developed a close bond during my fieldwork in Urumchi. One of the most difficult moments in my fieldwork occurred after Möshük completed the expressive vocabulary assessment and declared, in tears, that she "didn't know [her] mother tongue." I tried to present an objective explanation of the social, political and historical conditions that shaped her present Uyghur language competence, but my words felt vacuous. I had the feeling that no analysis could soothe what my instrument had exposed, namely Uyghur lexical poverty, a symbolic resource used to index or perform Uyghur identity (May, 2005, 2011). Through emotionally charged interactions like this, Möshük

[41] Möshük initially lied about her age, telling me that she was 19. She did this because she did not feel comfortable talking about her past when we first met. She had begun college studies at a top-tier college, but eventually left that school and transferred to her present (lower ranked) institution. Möshük was concerned that I would hold her in low regard if I knew this fact. In August 2010, she revealed the truth. This narrative was revised to account for the years she had initially expunged.

and I came to understand the implications of linguistic accumulation and dispossession on Uyghur identity formation.

Möshük's paternal grandparents were born in Urumchi. Her grandfather was a truck driver and her grandmother was a housewife. Möshük's father was born and raised in Urumchi. He attended Han Chinese schools and thus was educated as a *mínkǎohàn*. When he was 18, Möshük's father left Urumchi to attend a military college in Xi'an. He sent part of his allowance home each month to help raise his sisters. This financial contribution engendered a great deal of respect for him. His authority within the family, on occasion, surpassed that of his own parents. After graduating from college, Möshük's father returned to Urumchi and worked for the People's Liberation Army. He retired, but was called out of retirement after the events of July 5, 2009. Möshük addresses her father using both Uyghur and Chinese kinship terms (i.e. *dada* and *bàba*, respectively).

Möshük's maternal grandparents were born in the town of Karghalik, southeast of Kashgar. They moved to Korla where Möshük's mother was born. Möshük's grandfather was an officer in the People's Liberation Army. Möshük's grandmother was a teacher and taught Uyghur to Uyghur students. The family moved to Urumchi when Möshük's mother was a child. She was educated in Chinese schools in Urumchi. After graduating from high school, Möshük's mother taught Mandarin to Uyghur *mínkǎomín* students for around 15 years. She retired from teaching because the salary was low and the work was exhausting. Möshük addresses her mother using both Uyghur and Chinese kinship terms (i.e. *apa* and *māma*, respectively). Möshük sometimes calls her mother by the Mandarin nickname *měinǚ* (beautiful lady).

Möshük has one younger sister. Like Möshük, she also attended Chinese schools. Her sister was not a diligent student through grade school; her low marks prohibited her from gaining entrance to a four-year college. After graduating from high school, she attended a vocational teacher college. During the 2008-09 school year, Möshük's sister performed her teaching practicum as a Mandarin language teacher at a primary school in a village near Kashgar. Because she excelled at her vocational college, she later entered a program that will grant a four-year degree. Möshük's sister's nickname is *xiǎohēi* (little black) because of her relatively dark complexion. Möshük's nickname is *xiǎobái* (little white) because of her lighter skin.

At home, the four members of Möshük's family speak in Mandarin and Uyghur, but "more Mandarin than Uyghur." They frequently code-switch between these languages. When Möshük spoke of Mandarin-Uyghur code-switching, she often became excited because she regards this type of language practice as fun. Her father refers to Mandarin-Uyghur code-switching as "modern sentence" formation, and Möshük takes pride in the ability to code-switch seamlessly. Her father said that many *mínkǎomín* learn how to "mix the sentence" (i.e. code-switch) from *mínkǎohàn*. Möshük remarked, "It's fashionable to mix languages…we always mix." She attributed the practice of Mandarin-Uyghur code-switching to the four family members' *mínkǎohàn* education.

Möshük said that language use varied if other interlocutors were present, with ethnicity and age being the primary variables. If an older Uyghur person is present, the family members speak only in Uyghur. If the Uyghur visitor is her father's age (around 55) or younger, the conversation is conducted in Mandarin or a combination of Mandarin

and Uyghur. Möshük said that when all interlocutors are Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*, this is "lots of fun. We understand each other. Everyone knows their Uyghur is poor so we don't have to be self-conscious about using correct Uyghur or making mistakes." Conversations are conducted in Mandarin if the visitor is Han Chinese of any age.

On many occasions, I listened to Möshük speaking on the phone with her mother. Conversations usually began in Uyghur, with greetings and questions about location. As conversations progressed, Möshük typically switched to Mandarin. Uyghur was again used for closings. On one occasion, I could hear Möshük's mother, and I noticed that she was speaking in Uyghur while Möshük was responding in Mandarin. When I asked Möshük if this observation was correct, she initially denied it and claimed that they were both speaking Mandarin. Eventually she admitted that my observation was correct. Möshük seemed embarrassed that she (alone) was using Mandarin.

Möshük's parents encouraged her and her sister "to learn Uyghur first." Her father said that Möshük and her sister "must speak Uyghur at home. But gradually, we broke the rule." Möshük claimed that she and her sister often spoke in Mandarin at home and/or Uyghur-Mandarin code-switched; their parents gradually adopted these language practices. Möshük's father talked about the importance of Uyghur literacy, but did not teach his daughters this skill. Möshük felt that her parents were too busy with their jobs to teach her to read and write in Uyghur.

Möshük lived her first six years in an apartment near the Urumchi airport. She had Uyghur and Han Chinese neighbors. In 1994, Möshük's family moved to a "more modern" apartment closer to downtown Urumchi. She said the neighbors frequently

changed because many of the apartments were rented out to Han Chinese businessmen from other provinces. This neighborhood is more ethnically diverse than her former one, with Han Chinese, Uyghurs and foreigners (many Russians from Kazakhstan) living and working in same area. There is a large Russian business center in the neighborhood.

Möshük attended a pre-school near the school where her mother worked. The pre-school teachers were young Han Chinese women. The students were Uyghur and Han Chinese. The teachers spoke Mandarin, so this was the first institutional setting where she was exposed to Mandarin.

Möshük's primary school was ten minutes by foot from her home.[42] During primary school, her classmates were Han Chinese, except for one or two Uyghurs. Möshük enjoyed her status as an ethnic minority because she was regarded as unique.[43] Mandarin was the language of instruction throughout primary school. All of her primary school teachers were Han or Hui Chinese. The majority of her friends were Han Chinese. The language of instruction at school differed from the language spoken at home, and she experienced some difficulties with Mandarin; she recalled earning a score of 19 (on a 100 point scale) in Mandarin in first grade. Möshük believed that her parents sent her to Han Chinese schools "in order to have a chance to succeed…in this world that is controlled by Han. My parents want me to get a better education because Uyghur schools are poor, and

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[42] In April 2009, Möshük and I tried to visit her primary school, but were turned away at the front gate. We had no authorization to enter, and no one accepted the line that I was a prospective teacher. I had hoped to speak with some teachers, take some photographs and obtain a feel for the environment where she spent her primary grade school years. Although I was unable to achieve this goal, just being in the proximity of her primary school was sufficient to elicit memories of interactions with teachers and classmates.

[43] Möshük also attracted some negative attention. She felt that her teachers were stricter with her than her Han Chinese classmates. "They think I must study hard because they think, because I am Uyghur, my native language is not Mandarin, so they want me to pay more attention to my class."

they don't have advanced education system." Möshük used Uyghur at school only during break-time on the playground with her classmate and best friend, who was also Uyghur. The two Uyghur girls were not allowed to be desk-mates.[44]

Möshük started learning English in the third grade. She believed that her school was the first in the Uyghur region to teach English as a foreign language. A teacher once told her, "If you are interested in a certain country, culture or custom, go to learn their language." Because Möshük had a nascent interest in Western cultures, these words motivated her to study English. "When I was a little girl, I was interested in English-speaking countries' culture. And I watched lots of movies and listened to lots of English language pop music. And I became more and more interested in English. And then I made a decision to learn English."

In middle and high school, the ethnic composition of Möshük's classmates remained predominantly Han Chinese. Mandarin continued to be the language of instruction. All of her middle and high school teachers were Han Chinese, except for one American English teacher. Most of her friends were Han Chinese. Her use of Uyghur continued to be limited to brief conversations with Uyghur schoolmates at break- time.

In middle school, Möshük had English class every day, or every other day, each session lasting two periods. In high school, she had English class every day for two periods. In her second year of high school, Möshük chose the liberal arts track and so focused on English, Mandarin and history. When the college entrance exam approached, the class time allotted to English study increased to four periods a day.

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[44] School desks in China usually seat two students.

Outside of class, Möshük read English language magazines. From the Internet, she downloaded and watched English language movies and television series. She frequently downloaded and listened to English language songs. In high school, Möshük developed an aversion to China's political system. She said, "Especially for Uyghurs it is unfair." She envisioned leaving China and living abroad. She cited the desire to live abroad as a major factor in her motivation to learn English. Möshük was not saying that she wanted to travel or even sojourn abroad, a sentiment expressed by many of her Han Chinese classmates, but that she wanted to permanently relocate. She figured that English proficiency would help her realize this ambition.

Möshük performed well on the college entrance exam. She intended to major in English at a top-tier public college in a city outside of Xinjiang. However, her mother managed to change her major to physics. After high school, she attended *yùkē* at preparatory center that specializes in Mandarin training for ethnic minority students admitted to top-tier colleges. She then started college. However, two and a half years into the program, she was increasingly unhappy and decided to leave. Möshük returned to Urumchi and enrolled as an English major at a public university. None of her credits were transferable so she had to begin college anew. Her classmates were unaware of her past.

At her college in Urumchi, Möshük often felt like an outsider among her peers. This is partly because she was more mature and had experience living independently. She also felt alienated because she was an "active and outgoing student." When teachers asked questions to the class, as opposed to calling on a specific student, Möshük often took the initiative to answer these questions. This behavior was in contrast to her

predominantly Han Chinese classmates who were reticent to speak in class. She attributed her behavior "partly to personality and partly to her Uyghur culture. Uyghurs are more active. Chinese are shy." One of the foreign teachers at the college commented that Möshük's classroom behavior was like "a foreign student."

In her dormitory, Möshük shared a room with five roommates (two Han Chinese, two Hui Chinese and one Uyghur).[45] She spoke Mandarin most of the time in her dorm room. With her Uyghur roommate, she sometimes spoke Uyghur, but mostly Mandarin "because the others are Chinese" and she did not want to exclude anyone.

Outside of class, Möshük sought out English media. She enjoyed reading English language magazines. She frequently downloaded and watched English language movies and television series (e.g. *Prison Break*, *Gossip Girl*). She often browsed the Billboard Top 100 and downloaded featured songs. Möshük's cell phone was programmed so that callers heard a song by the American pop star Rihanna. And when Möshük's cell phone rang, the tone was a song by the Canadian pop star Avril Lavigne. Möshük doesn't view these leisure-time English related activities as "learning." She said emphatically, "It's pleasure. I enjoy it. I don't like Chinese songs or Chinese movies. Did you ever see me listen to Chinese songs or watch Chinese movies? No way!"

Möshük sent messages in Chinese script when corresponding with family and friends. Whenever I texted her in Chinese, she always responded in English. Möshük also texted in English with Messi.

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[45] Möshük's roommates changed several times over the four-year period that she lived on campus.

Möshük sought opportunities to converse in English, often with Western English-speaking friends. When I first met Möshük, I sometimes spoke to her in Mandarin; she almost always responded in English. Even when I spoke in Uyghur, she would usually switch back to English after a few turns.

About half of Möshük's friends are Uyghur and the others are Han or Hui Chinese. She sometimes speaks in Uyghur with her Uyghur college classmates. Möshük said she "can use Chinese and English to show myself or show my emotion. But sometimes I can't use Uyghur. I can't find the words to express my feelings in Uyghur and sometimes if I fall in love with a guy, if I express my feelings to him in Uyghur, it's weird… There is a few Uyghur words to express a man's feeling, especially girl's feeling… It could be my Uyghur's poor or something… I don't feel confident when I use Uyghur sometimes. When I use English, it's a real meaning. I don't need to hide my feelings. I don't need to tell white lies to my classmates, to my roommates. But when I use Chinese, I should hide my feelings. And of course I should care about their feelings too and tell white lies sometimes, I have too. So it's not the real me." In this quote, Möshük indicates that her Uyghur lexicon is not rich enough to express emotions. She also suggests a language ideology whereby English and Mandarin license specific forms of social interaction, associating English with authenticity and Mandarin with deceit.

In the future, Möshük wants to move to the United States. She aspires to be a Mandarin teacher, "but if I could get a job related to English, I'll be very happy." She wants to become as U.S. Citizen, even if there was a possibility that she would not be able to return to China. She said, "In traditional Uyghur family values, if I were a filial

girl, I must stay with my parents. I cannot go to mainland or even go abroad. I should take care of my parents when they're getting old. I shouldn't care about my own life only… I'm having a dilemma now." Möshük longs for freedom and to live in an environment where ethnic discrimination is not so pronounced. She asked, "What should we do? [the CCP] want to kill us. They want to send us to Guangzhou."[46]

Möshük described the current grade-school generation of *mínkǎohàn* as "more like Chinese. They speak more Mandarin than Uyghur. And they have little girlfriends and boyfriends earlier." Möshük said there are now many more *mínkǎohàn* students than when she was in grade school. This "makes me feel a little bit sad. I don't want them to be like me, their Uyghur is poor." Möshük said, "Maybe we use more Chinese words instead of Uyghur words like *zhuōzi*."[47] Now Uyghur always say *zhuōzi*. Maybe few will keep the traditional language. I think [the Uyghur language] weak [in the future]." Möshük stated, "Right now, all Uyghurs, even if their classmates are all Uyghur, are being educated in Chinese. There is no more *mínkǎomín*. A lot of the [bilingual] students, they call themselves *mínkǎohàn* right now. I read some articles [about this] on the internet."

On being a Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*, Möshük said, "Neither Chinese nor Uyghurs accept us. It is said *mínkǎohàn* group is a separate ethnic. Chinese are afraid of us, because we are smarter, stronger, more open, we are getting into advanced level in Uyghur world. While Uyghurs, I mean *mínkǎomín*, are jealous of us, because we can

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[46] Möshük is referring to the government-sponsored Uyghur relocation program where Uyghurs (a high proportion of them young women) are being forcibly moved to the east coast of China to work in factories.
[47] *Zhuōzi* is the Chinese word for "table." This borrowing is often used in place of the Uyghur word of Russian origin *üstel*.

speak Chinese fluently, we know more modern technology and so on. So we are getting into an embarrassing position." Möshük said, "I feel I've been assimilated… *Mínkǎohàn* Uyghurs have been assimilated in behaviors, dress, appearance and language… From going to school with them and being with them all the time, I've become like them… Sometimes it's okay. Sometimes I feel disgust. I feel bad. Some of my weakness from Chinese, like pouring food on table."[48]

According to Möshük, "*Mínkǎohàn* disrespect *mínkǎomín*. Also *mínkǎomín* don't like *mínkǎohàn*." That is, she identified mutual animosity between the groups. She attributed these bad feelings to a "lack of communication between two groups. If your lover is *mínkǎomín* or *mínkǎohàn*, you'll never say they are bad because you love them. If you don't have a *mínkǎohàn* friend or lover, you will think of them as Chinese."

Möshük feels that the CCP has been experimenting with language policy as a tool for cultural assimilation. She said, "They control us. Last night, I read something from *rénrénwǎng* (The Chinese version of Facebook). One girl who study in Beijing, she said the government try to kill our language so they said you should learn 'bilingual.' You should learn Chinese more than Uyghur right now." She said that the government is trying to "choose the proper way…the smart way" to kill the Uyghur language. Möshük said, "The Chinese government say they want to offer jobs for Uyghurs so Uyghurs must learn Mandarin. So they produce *mínkǎohàn*." However, according to Möshük, "Uyghurs

[48] When eating, Möshük sometimes picked items that she did not like (e.g. onions, garlic, tomatoes) from her bowl and piled them on the table. She said, "This is totally from Chinese because none of my family members do that. I'm trying to correct it now."

have no jobs now... They want to kill us, kill our language. Gradually change us to Chinese so we never give them trouble because we will be Chinese one day."

Möshük said that if she were to have a son, she would have him educated as a *mínkǎohàn*. This is because "Uyghur boys drink and smoke in primary school. A boy can easily learn some bad things. How to drink, how to smoke or how to take drugs." In her estimation, Han Chinese teachers are stricter than Uyghur teachers. "I'll send him to Chinese school, or try my best to send him to oversea." But if she were to have a daughter, Möshük would have her educated as a *mínkǎomín* and "learn her mother tongue. She must know our [Uyghur] culture and customs more because she will be a wife and mother."

Möshük said, "I will try my best to maintain my Uyghur language skills because I should teach my kids Uyghur. They should know their mom is a Uyghur, then at least learn a little bit Uyghur. If I live in a place or a country [not in Xinjiang], I will teach my kid Uyghur, but I think my behavior will impress him more, such as most of ABC[49] who cannot speak Chinese at all. I believe the second Uyghur generation who was born at oversea, they probably cannot speak Uyghur, but they know they are Uyghurs." According to Möshük, "It's possible to transmit all aspects of culture without the language. You can eat the traditional food. And visit the Uyghur place. You can know, become familiar. I think the important thing is to eat the food. Maybe you will love the culture because food is part of culture." She said, "Culture includes many parts.

[49] American-born Chinese

Language is most important. But without language you can still teach customs, habits and taboos."

5.4.1 Expressive vocabulary assessment: Möshük

Möshük completed the expressive vocabulary assessment in the fall of 2008. She wrote lexical items in *Uyghur Latin Yëziqi* (Uyghur Latin alphabet) but with no diacritics and Chinese. Möshük produced the correct Uyghur lexical item [N=96] for over half of the items [N=156] in each category [N=10]. She misidentified some items [N=10], but was able to produce the target lexical item upon verbal specification. Notably, Möshük wrote the Mandarin borrowed lexical items for several lexical items [N=7], including *eggplant*, *mushroom*, *pepper, potato, desk, refrigerator, and television*. She was not able to produce the Uyghur-language lexical items for any of these objects when verbally given their equivalent in English.

After Möshük completed this task, she was momentarily satisfied with her performance, but then became upset when I revealed the percentage of items she had correctly identified. When Möshük said in tears that she "didn't know [her] mother tongue," I felt awful because I felt responsible for her sadness. I began to identify and explain some of the cultural, political and historical conditions that impacted the language ecology of Xinjiang and subsequent language practices. However, feeling more didactic than compassionate, I shifted course and suggested to her that she set some goals related to improving her Uyghur language skills. I promised to help her learn to read and write in Uyghur, an objective that she was able to realize.

	total items	items correct	incorrect (item #)
Section			
1: Animals	12	9	6, 11, 12
2: Body & Face	25	20	Body: 5, 7, 11 Face: 6, 7
3: Family	15	12	4, 13, 14
4: Nature	20	7	2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20
5: Food	19	15	2, 5, 7, 15
6: Jobs	20	7	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19
7: Furniture & Appliances	12	5	2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11
8: Transportation	12	6	2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11
9: Numbers	13	11	7, 13
10: Colors	8	4	3, 7, 8, 9
	156	96 (62%)	

Table 4: Expressive vocabulary assessment: Möshük

5.5 MIKE

Mike was a college student when we first met in 2008. During our first conversation, I told him that I was investigating Uyghur language practices among Uyghur young adults. He remarked, "Hey man, you want to go to jail?" We both smiled, and with a handshake he agreed to work with me. Mike was in Urumchi because he was waiting for some documents to be processed so that he could go abroad. He had come from a city in northwest Xinjiang and needed to stay in Urumchi because the visa office is located there, and it is closer by rail to Beijing. During our first interview session, Mike told me a vision of his future that entailed leaving China to study in Europe. He aspired to attend a European university where English was the language of instruction. As of this writing, for a variety of reasons, Mike has been unable to actualize his dream.

I invited Mike to participate in my dissertation study because he was a male mínkǎohàn; *he also struck me as confident and opinionated. The first time I showed Mike my interview protocol, he again brought up the police and asked why I was not afraid. Having grown up in a city in northwest Xinjiang, where hundreds of Uyghurs were killed, imprisoned or disappeared on and after a protest about a decade ago, Mike felt that my research might result in retaliation. As we engaged in critical discussions on "sensitive" topics, including language policy and the difficulties that Uyghurs faced when seeking employment, Mike often reminded me of the necessity of concealing his identity. I have done my best to do so; this is why his biographical sketch is less specific than the others in terms of place names or other identifying information.*

Mike did not know where his paternal grandparents were from.[50] His paternal grandfather died some time before he was born. Mike's grandparents lived in Urumchi for a period of time, and his father was born in this city, but, due to health issues aggravated by the pollution of Urumchi, the family moved to a village in northwest Xinjiang. Mike's father was educated as a *mínkǎomín*. His father is a university teacher of Uyghur. Mike addresses his father with the Uyghur kinship term *dada*.

Mike did not know where his maternal grandparents came from. His mother was born in the same prefectural capital in northwest Xinjiang where Mike was born. Mike's mother is a university professor of linguistics. He addresses his mother with the Uyghur kinship term *apa*.

Mike has one older brother whom he addresses as *aka* (older brother). Mike has no nickname for his older brother; he explained, "because he my brother I can't do that. My father and my brother will kill me. Maybe his friends call him, but I never." Mike rarely addresses his brother by his given name. His father does not allow this and has physically punished him for doing so in the past. Mike's brother was educated as a *mínkǎohàn*. The two brothers attended the same grade schools. Mike's brother is now attending college in mainland China.

Mike has no nickname. His family does not suffix his name with the Uyghur word *jan* (life), as is common among Uyghur communities in southern Xinjiang. He said that

[50] To explain his lack of knowledge of family history, Mike said, "My father didn't tell me so much for that because that's not good for me." It is possible that Mike did not reveal this information in order to protect his identity.

his mother disagrees with this practice because he already has "a life" and "a heart" and does not need another one.

Mike's family communicates in Uyghur at home, except when non-Uyghur speaking Kazakh and Han Chinese colleagues are present. Family members speak Mandarin if the guests cannot speak Uyghur. Mike's father sometimes invited his foreign (e.g. American, Canadian, British, Japanese, Korean) Uyghur-language students to the family home; conversations were in Uyghur and English. He said, "They were very surprised when I speak English better than them." Mike's father sometimes demanded he and his brother to practice their English with each other.

Mike's parents did not teach him how to read and write in Uyghur. Once, some Uyghur *mínkǎomín* neighborhood children asked Mike if he could write his name in Uyghur. He admitted that he could not and was "shocked" by this experience. Mike said, "I wondered – I really can't use my mother language to write my own name." Mike asked his mother to teach him how to write his name, the alphabet and some words. His mother responded by giving him a Uyghur illustrated alphabet. Mike learned some of the Uyghur alphabet from this book, how to write his name and the names of his immediate family members.[51]

Han Chinese, Kazakh and Uyghur were the most populous ethnic groups in Mike's hometown. These ethnic communities occupied certain spaces in the city; Mike grew up in an area that was predominantly Uyghur. His father allowed him to go to the

[51] Mike's present Uyghur literacy skills are weak. Once, at a restaurant, I asked him to read the menu. He tried and failed to identify letters.

Uyghur and Kazakh parts of town, but he was prohibited from entering the Han Chinese areas. In numerous stories Mike told me about his youth, his friends were all Uyghur. He recalled some confrontations with Han Chinese, several of which resulted from stealing apples from trees, but these were rather brief.

He attended a preschool that had both Uyghur and Han Chinese teachers; Mandarin was the language of instruction. He was watched over by Uyghur teachers because his mother "did not give the baby to Chinese."

Mike attended a primary school where Mandarin was the language of instruction. His classroom was multi-ethnic throughout grade school; most of his classmates were Kazakh, some were Han Chinese, and a few were Uyghur. His parents decided on a *mínkǎohàn* education for Mike because, by this point, Uyghur was no longer a language of instruction at the tertiary level.[52] Mike initially struggled with Mandarin; he found it difficult to learn Chinese characters. His teacher once had a conference with Mike's father, and said that Mike was "stupid" for his slow progress in learning Mandarin. Mike's father explained that Uyghur and Mandarin were different language systems, and lectured the teacher on some of the areas in which these systems differed. He said that Mike would require time to learn this second language. From then on, Mike's teacher stopped criticizing him. Mike spoke Mandarin in class most of the time in school, but would chat in Uyghur with his Uyghur desk-mate. Among Uyghur schoolmates, he used Uyghur during break-time. Mike was thankful for attending a Han Chinese school

[52] On several occasions, Mike lauded his parents for "thinking ahead" and predicting the Mandarin-Uyghur language shift in the Xinjiang education system.

because English was part of the curriculum; English was not offered at Uyghur primary schools. Mike started learning English in first grade.

Mike attended middle and high schools where Mandarin was the language of instruction. He maintained a consistent set of language practices at school, speaking Mandarin when addressing his teacher or entire class, chatting with his desk-mate in Uyghur, and conversing with Uyghur schoolmates in Uyghur. Outside of class, he spoke Uyghur with neighborhood friends and family members. He took the natural science track in high school, and the corresponding *mínkǎohàn* version of the college entrance exam. He continued to study English as a foreign language throughout grade school.

Growing up, Mike's friends sometimes teased him as being "half Chinese, half Uyghur." They would say, "You have no rights to speaking something here. They said I was a 57th *mínzú* (ethnicity)." When having a group discussion, and a friend wanted to tease Mike, they might tell Mike to be quiet and that they would translate the content of the conversation for him later. This was all in jest – he was not treated any differently than other Uyghurs in his peer group.

Mike enrolled in a college in his hometown. He studied physics for one year, but decided to change majors because the school had no equipment with which to conduct science experiments. Mike then decided to become an English major, a strategic move, and part of a long-term goal to study in Europe. Mike's parents helped him obtain a passport, but in Beijing there was a problem with the paperwork necessary for his visa. Because he needed to make several trips to Beijing in order to clarify this matter, he moved to Urumchi and enrolled in a public university.

In his current college, Mike uses Mandarin in class and Uyghur outside of class. In Urumchi, he was surprised to meet many Uyghurs who had a predilection to converse in Mandarin outside of class. Mike terms Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* who communicate predominantly in Mandarin "*hànkǎohàn*." The term "*hànkǎohàn*" is a neologism, and a play on "*mínkǎohàn*." It literally means "Han Chinese testing in Mandarin." Thus, to call a Uyghur a "*hànkǎohàn*" is to say that the Uyghur is a monolingual Mandarin Han Chinese. Mike said, "In my eyes, Uyghur *Urumchiliq*[53] is also Han…I got a *mínkǎomín* friend in my hometown – he saw me like a Han." This person would call Mike "half Uyghur, half Han Chinese." After coming to Urumchi to attend college, and meeting *Urumchiliq* Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*, this friend reappraised Mike. He said that Mike may be half Uyghur and half Han Chinese, but that *Urumchiliq* Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* were entirely Han Chinese. Mike identified Uyghur language competence as one marker of membership in the Uyghur ethnic community, but said that other practices were of equal importance, such as funerary customs (i.e. Uyghur entombment versus Han Chinese cremation), and greeting and parting conventions. For example, if someone were to arrive in a rush, Mike said that Uyghur customs favor artful greetings like "What wind brought you here?" as opposed to direct questions like "Why did you arrive in a rush?" Mike said that Uyghur conversation is like an art form.

Mike said that Uyghurs in his hometown resisted assimilation because it is older and geographically isolated; mountains and quicksand provide natural barriers. He also said that the ancestors who populated his home region were soldiers who had come from

[53] The term "*Urumchiliq*" refers to residents of Urumchi.

Turkey, and thus were versed in the art of warfare. People in his hometown maintain local customs through the practice of endogamy. Mike said that if he were to marry a Uyghur woman from another place in Xinjiang, his father would say, "Don't come back" and command him to move to his in-law's home.

Mike recounted many stories told to him by older relatives. One of the most interesting stories was a history of the toponym "Urumchi." Chinese sources claim that the name "Urumchi" originates from the Mongol language, meaning "beautiful pasture." However, according to Mike, this place name is derived from the Uyghur word "Örüme" (braid). Uyghur craftspeople lived in the area that corresponds with modern-day Urumchi and produced braided leather products (e.g. saddles, whips). Mike said that the word "Örüme" was suffixed with "chi" (a morpheme signifying the agent of an action, as in "a person who braids") to form "Ürümchi."

Mike spoke with regret about the influx of Han Chinese and the changing demographics of Xinjiang. According to Mike, Uyghur people were too gracious to the early Han Chinese settlers, with land and food. Now that Han Chinese are populous, Uyghurs are being pushed out. According to Mike, in earlier times, Han Chinese settlers would ask Uyghurs for permission to set up a homestead, but after forming a critical mass, the negotiations stopped.

Although Mike hopes to move to Europe, his backup plan is to return to his hometown and teach Mandarin to Uyghur *mínkǎomín*. However, he said, "Uyghur school have no future in now. In the future, in the next few years – maybe fifteen or twenty years – I think the Uyghur school will be disappeared totally."

According to Mike, Uyghur *mínkǎomín* have fewer prospects than Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* on the job market. Mike said, "If you don't know Mandarin, the Han Chinese says you are no knowledge. A fact is different. If I don't speak your language, I'm not stupid – just I don't know your language. That's okay, but in this country is not okay." Mike stated that many of the available jobs are for manual labor, where language skills are not requisite and "anybody can do it." However, according to Mike, Uyghurs must beg for employment, "just like a dog ask for food." Mike dismissed assertions by the CCP that Mandarin proficiency would make Uyghurs more competitive on the job market. He said, "so many guys say, 'Learning can change your life,' but after they graduate will say, 'I learnt for fifty years but I didn't change my life.'"

5.5.1 Expressive vocabulary assessment: Mike

Mike completed the expressive vocabulary assessment in the spring of 2009. He wrote lexical items in *Uyghur Latin Yëziqi* but with no diacritics. Mike produced the correct Uyghur lexical item [N=147] for over 90 percent of the items [N=156] in each category [N=10]. He misidentified some items [N=15], but was able to produce the target lexical item upon verbal specification. Like Möshük, Mike wrote the Mandarin borrowed lexical items for several lexical items [N=8], including *eggplant*, *mushroom*, *pepper, orange, table, and television*. He was able to produce the Uyghur-language lexical items for all of these objects when verbally given their equivalent in English.

	total items	items correct	incorrect (item #)
Section			
1: Animals	12	12	
2: Body & Face	25	24	5
3: Family	15	15	
4: Nature	20	19	17
5: Food	19	17	7, 15
6: Jobs	20	18	12, 19
7: Furniture & Appliances	12	10	5, 11
8: Transportation	12	12	
9: Numbers	13	13	
10: Colors	8	7	7
	156	147 (94%)	

Table 5: Expressive vocabulary assessment: Mike

5.6 Discussion

The four case study participants were selected because they experienced typical forms of language education for Uyghur young adults. From the first set of consultants interviewed in the fall of 2008, it was apparent that Mandarin (*mínkǎohàn*) and Uyghur primary/Mandarin-Uyghur secondary (*mínkǎomín/shuāngyǔ*) language education backgrounds were typical for the current generation of Uyghur college and university students in Xinjiang. However, this is not to say that these two forms of language-mediated education are representative of the language education backgrounds of all Uyghur young adults in Xinjiang. Local education policies in Xinjiang are "subject to local ideologies and economic resources" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 37; Zhou, 2004), meaning that administrative divisions are not uniform in their implementation of education policy.

The purpose of this discussion is to examine variables associated with language ecology (e.g. contextual and environmental factors) as related to Bourdieu's forms of

capital (1986). This discussion will proceed with a focus on fields, moving from the domestic to the academic. Although the language ecologies of these contexts are explored in turn, this is not to suggest that fields are bounded units. Capital can be accumulated, reproduced and converted across fields (C. Calhoun, 2003)

Messi, Athena and Mike were raised in domestic fields where language-mediated social practices were conducted in monolingual Uyghur. Mandarin exposure was limited to media such as television and movies. These consultants' peer groups were entirely Uyghur, although Messi had a formative experience in his childhood in which he engaged in Mandarin language-mediated activities with Han Chinese playmates. Experience in this social context, though brief, contributed to the emergence of a Mandarin social identity (Bourdieu, 1991; B. Norton & Toohey, 2001). As the only Uyghur child among many Han Chinese children, Messi accommodated his language practices (Giles, 1973) in order to access social relationships (i.e. build social capital) with Han Chinese children (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Athena, Möshük and Messi were from cities where the Uyghur population comprised between 13-16 percent of the total population. Athena and Möshük lived in multi-ethnic neighborhoods, while Messi lived in a predominantly Uyghur neighborhood. Mike was from a city where Uyghurs comprised nearly half of the population and lived in a predominantly Uyghur neighborhood. These population factors and ethnic demography data is important because they form part of the language ecology. Möshük was the only case study participant who indicted frequent positive interactions with Han Chinese neighbors, indicating a low degree of social distance (Schumann, 1976).

The Uyghur young adults who participated in this study were all raised in populous urban environments. However, the demographic factors of their communities differed. The following graph, from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics (1999) presents total population and ethnic percentages in 1998 of the three cities where the case study participants were raised: Urumchi (Athena and Möshük), Korla (Messi), and Ghulja (Mike). The case study participants would have been in their youth at this time.

City	Population	Uyghur (%)	Han Chinese (%)
Urumchi	1,391,896	13	76
Korla (Bortala)	204,704	16	66
Ghulja	332,022	48	36

Table 6: Xinjiang Urban Ethnicity, 1998

As Och's proposed in her theory of language acquisition (1988), "Children's language practices are partially engendered by grammatical, discourse, sociocultural, and general cognitive structures. However, these structures of knowledge are created in part through children's participation in temporarily and spatially situated practices/activities" (E. Ochs, 1988, p. 17). It appears that the sociocultural context of Möshük's multi-ethnic neighborhoods in Urumchi, coupled with a predominantly Han Chinese classroom, allowed Möshük opportunities to access a variety of conversations in Mandarin, providing for the emergence of a dynamic multilingual social identity (B. Norton & Toohey, 2001). Möshük's code-switching may be seen as an empowering process because this activity allowed her to "make use of [her] diverse knowledge and language systems, and negotiate cultural and linguistic capital" (Makin, Diaz, & McLachlan, 2008,

p. 208). The practice of code-switching emphasizes agency and can be used strategically by a speaker to maintain multiple social identities.

Mike, though educated as a *mínkǎohàn* in a predominantly Han Chinese classroom, indicated a high degree of social distance (Schumann, 1976) from his Han Chinese peers. Mike was able to develop Mandarin communicative competence (Hymes, 1966), but consciously resisted demonstrating Mandarin strategic competence when communicating with Han Chinese (Lakoff, 2005). Mike's behavior may be interpreted as the performance of an oppositional social identity (Dwyer, 2005). His disinclination to follow Mandarin-mediated Han Chinese conventions of appropriateness may also be interpreted as contributing to Uyghur social capital, as reiterations of these oppositional encounters may strengthen relationships with other members of the Uyghur ethnic community (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

5.7 CONCLUSION

This ethnographic case study consists of information, collected from interviews with consultants, on the diachronic (i.e. historically constituted) nature of language use and language education in domestic and academic fields, and synchronic data on language practices. Each case study narrative revealed interactions between objective social relations (e.g. family, friendship and peer groups) and the habitus through which consultants imagine and inhabit social spaces. Linguistic habitus, which comes into being through language use in a particular context or field, are "features of language, and consequent thoughts, individuals are disposed to have and acquire in the course of their

own upbringing and trajectories through life" (Grenfell & James, 1998, p. 73). Language is also "an objectifiable *structured* structure that is also *structuring* in practice" (Grenfell & James, 1998, p. 73). In the final chapter, I synthesize and analyze the collected data, in reference to the relevant literature, present findings and offer suggestions appropriate to the sociocultural context of Xinjiang (Blommaert, 2005) .

Chapter six: Discussion

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I use a diagnostic tool, the *Language Vitality and Endangerment* guidelines (2003) to assess the vitality of the Uyghur ethnolinguistic community of Xinjiang. I then discuss what it means for Uyghur young adults to possess, and attempt to convert, Mandarin linguistic capital in a social context where symbolic power between interlocutors is unequally distributed. Drawing on data, I illustrate what it means to be an "illegitimate" speaker of a "legitimate" language (Bourdieu, 1977a, p. 648). I then suggest what can be done to maintain the vitality and intergenerational transmission of Uyghur, placing the responsibility on the family unit. Finally, I indicate what this study contributes to the discipline of applied linguistics, a field concerned with using linguistics to make informed language decisions.

6.2 Uyghur language vitality assessment

This section consists of a review and application of *Language Vitality and Endangerment* (2003), a document produced by the UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages. This document consists of five sections: a preamble emphasizing the urgent need for reliable information about the situation of minority languages; background on UNESCO initiatives to promote languages as instruments of education and culture through partnerships with endangered-language communities; the role of speech communities and external specialists in supporting endangered languages; nine

factors for characterizing a language's overall sociolinguistic situation; and concluding remarks on the shared responsibility of individual language specialists, local speaker community, NGOs, and governmental and institutional organizations in language maintenance and perpetuation.

The UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages identified nine factors to assess language endangerment and urgency for documentation. The first six factors evaluate a language's vitality and state of endangerment: Intergenerational Language Transmission; Absolute Number of Speakers; Proportion of Speakers within the Total Population; Trends in Existing Language Domains; Response to New Domains and Media; and Materials for Language Education and Literacy. Two factors assess language attitudes: Governmental and Institutional Language Attitudes and Policies, Including Official Status and Use; and Community Members' Attitudes toward Their Own Language. And one factor evaluates the urgency for documentation: Amount and Quality of Documentation. In the remainder of this section, I assess the Uyghur language of the Uyghur ethnolinguistic community of Xinjiang according to the above factors.

In terms of the *Intergenerational Language Transmission*, I assessed Uyghur as bordering on "stable yet threatened" and "unsafe." Uyghur is being transmitted from one generation to the next, but in some Uyghur households, members code-switch from Uyghur to Mandarin and/or Mandarin is frequently used. Mandarin is replacing Uyghur as the language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system.

The *Absolute Number of Speakers* of Uyghur, extrapolated from the 2000 census, is around 8.6 million (Statistics Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 2002).

However, it should be noted that the demographics of Xinjiang are rapidly changing. The Han Chinese population, at 7.5 million, grew at 31.6 percent during the 1990s, twice the 15.9 percent rate of local ethnic minorities.

The *Proportion of Speakers within the Total Population* is "unsafe" because "nearly all speak the language." I observed that some Uyghurs did not possess adequate Uyghur language competence to be able to discuss a wide range of topics in Uyghur. I also observed that some Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* were reluctant to communicate in Uyghur with Uyghur *mínkǎomín* because ashamed of their deficiency in Uyghur and a desire to avoid criticism. The expressive vocabulary assessment indicated that Möshük's Uyghur lexicon was deficient; this low level of Uyghur language competence impedes her ability to speak Uyghur.

In reference to *Trends in Existing Language Domains*, I assessed Uyghur as having "multilingual parity" with Mandarin, but having "dwindling domains." Mandarin is the primary language in most official domains: government, public offices, and educational institutions. Uyghur language services are available in most official domains because there is a substantial number of monolingual Uyghurs, generally senior citizens. The coexistence of Mandarin and Uyghur results in Uyghurs' using each language for a different function (diglossia), whereby Mandarin is used in public domains and Uyghur is used in private and the home domain. Again, Uyghur is losing ground to Mandarin because in some Uyghur households, members code-switch from Uyghur to Mandarin and/or use Mandarin frequently in their everyday interactions. Some Uyghurs are semi-speakers of their own language (receptive bilinguals).

The factor *Response to New Domains and Media*, is assessed to be "dynamic" because Uyghur is "used in all new domains." However, this factor should be qualified. Uyghur is well represented in broadcast media and the Internet, but these technologies are regulated by the CCP. I did not observe Uyghur young adults watching Uyghur-medium news, or any news for that matter. Nor did I observe Uyghurs who were literate in Uyghur visiting Uyghur-medium websites. Many Uyghur young adults do not trust CCP authored materials, so despite Uyghur being "dynamic" in terms of new domains and media, I would contend that this factor is marginal in the given context.

The factor *Materials for Language Education and Literacy* is also of dubious value. In some regards, Uyghur could arguably be given a high grade because "there is an established orthography, literacy tradition with grammars, dictionaries, texts, literature, and everyday media." However, the written language is restricted in *mínkǎomín* education to Uyghur literature and grammar; for Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*, Uyghur literacy education is not a part of the school curriculum. It is interesting to note that *xīnhuá shūdiàn* – a countrywide bookstore chain that has several locations in Urumchi – has a large section of Uyghur books, including specialized dictionaries. As I encountered so many Uyghurs who were illiterate in Uyghur, and with knowledge that Mandarin is the language of instruction in higher education, I still struggle to understand why the CCP made this investment in Uyghur translations of Chinese language materials.

In reference to the two factors that assess language attitudes, *Governmental and Institutional Language Attitudes And Policies, Including Official Status and Use* legally guarantee "equal support" (Chinese Communist Party, 1982, 1984), however, in practice,

the Uyghur language is being subject to a combination of "passive" and "active assimilation." The dominant group (i.e. the Mandarin linguistic community) is indifferent as to whether or not Uyghur is spoken among Uyghurs. But when Uyghurs interact with Han Chinese, they must use Mandarin. The CCP is also encouraging Uyghurs to abandon their languages by providing education (starting in kindergarten) for Uyghurs in Mandarin.

Uyghur *Community Members' Attitudes toward Their Own Language*, by contrast, is highly positive. However, Messi did surmise that some Uyghurs perceived the Uyghur language to be "not modern." All of the Uyghurs I encountered saw their language "as a cultural core value, vital to their community and ethnic identity" and wished to see it promoted (UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages, 2003, p. 14). However, this attitude did not always translate to practice, as the Uyghurs I knew to be illiterate in Uyghur did not make efforts to learn how to read and write in Uyghur.

The *Amount and Quality of Documentation* is difficult to gauge. Comprehensive Uyghur grammars, dictionaries and extensive texts are abundant. Uyghur language materials are readily accessible. However, there is a need for more transcribed, translated, and annotated audiovisual recordings of natural speech. The Uyghur language has three main dialects (Yakup, 2005); all need more documentation. Further research also must be conducted on Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching in order to learn about the Mandarin language features (e.g. lexicon, syntax, morphology) that are influencing Uyghur.

The UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages notes, "A

language is in danger when its speakers cease to use it, use it in an increasingly reduced number of communicative domains, and cease to pass it on from one generation to the next" (2003, p. 2). The *Language Vitality and Endangerment* diagnostic tool reveals that the Uyghur language, despite being spoken by a linguistic community of 8 million, is threated. The CCP's "China Western Development" policy, analogous in some respects to the American 19th century Manifest Destiny, is implementing a strategy to integrate and assimilate Chinese minorities into the Han majority. This strategy is referred to as "mixing sand," whereby the local minority population is diluted by high numbers of Han Chinese migrants (Moneyhon, 2003). The influx of Han Chinese poses a threat to the Uyghur language because Han Chinese are increasing in number in so many communicative domains. The intergenerational transmission of Uyghur is under threat.

6.3 LINGUISTIC CAPITAL AND "ILLEGITIMATE" SPEAKERS

In this section, I analyze the case study participants' language practices using Bourdieusian thinking tools (1977b). I first focus on the domestic and academic domains as structuring structures. I explore the role of these fields in naturalizing the linguistic habitus of my consultants (Bourdieu, 1991). I then describe Xinjiang in terms of a linguistic market that is shifting toward Mandarin, and where Uyghurs are "illegitimate" speakers of Mandarin (Bourdieu, 1997). Finally, I discuss Uyghurs' instrumental and integrative motivations for English language learning (Gardner & Lambert, 1972).

The four consultants were raised in multilingual homes where language practices included Uyghur, Mandarin, and Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching. Athena, Mike and

Messi were raised in homes where Uyghur was the primary language of communication. Möshük was raised in a home where members practiced a combination of Uyghur, Mandarin and Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching. None of the consultants' families implemented a language policy for their respective domestic domains. Möshük's father did tell his daughters to "speak Uyghur at home," but did not model this directive; thus undermining the authority of the policy.

This study suggests a relationship between consultants' parents' language-of-instruction in education and consultants' Uyghur speaking skills. Mike and Messi's parents were *mínkǎomín*; these two consultants were highly proficient Uyghur speakers. Athena's father was *mínkǎomín*. Her mother was *mínkǎohàn* in primary school although her formal education ended with the onset of the Cultural Revolution; Athena challenged her mother's self-ascribed *mínkǎohàn* identity. Athena was a highly proficient Uyghur speaker. Möshük's parents were both *mínkǎohàn*; she assessed her Uyghur speaking skills as weak in relation to Mandarin and English. A large-scale study on Uyghur parents' language-of-instruction in education and their child's Uyghur phonology, syntax, morphology and lexicon would elucidate this relationship.

The interview and participant-observation data indicates phonological and linguistic awareness among the consultants and their family members. Athena and her father sometimes teased Athena's mother when she made "mistakes" pronouncing Uyghur words. Athena's mother was a "legitimate" speaker of Uyghur because her social position imbued her with this authority. Yet, according to Athena and her father, Athena's mother's utterances were, if systematic, not a "normalized" product (Bourdieu,

1991). Möshük's father demonstrated linguistic awareness by calling Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching "modern sentence" formation. Möshük's father appeared to be legitimizing this language practice by classifying it as "modern," a term that had a highly positive connotation in Möshük's family.

This study suggests that shame may play a factor in shaping the language practices of Uyghur young adults. On several occasions, I witnessed Messi ridicule Möshük on account of her limited Uyghur lexicon. These situations would occur when the three of us were together and I would ask the name of something in Uyghur. If Möshük was unable to produce the accurate Uyghur lexical item, Messi would call attention to her limited Uyghur lexicon and sometimes chastise her for "not knowing her own language." These situations always made me feel uncomfortable. I stopped asking her to provide Uyghur lexical items when Messi was present, but maintained this practice when we were alone. If, on these occasions, Möshük was unable to produce the Uyghur lexical item, I would often ask her to consult her parents, and report the term later. I made these suggestions for her benefit, to develop her Uyghur lexicon, as much as my own.

Möshük did not always feel comfortable speaking Uyghur, and she confirmed that she sometimes avoided using this language in order to avoid ridicule or censure. Language avoidance practices may contribute to language attrition, manifest firstly in the L1 lexicon (Schmid & Köpke, 2008). Möshük's score on the expressive vocabulary assessment was relatively low (62%), compared with Athena (100%), Messi (99%) and Mike (94%), suggesting that the process of L1 attrition may be underway. As noted above, Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching is a common practice in Möshük's family. Of

note, she enjoys linguistic interactions with other *mínkǎohàn* because all interlocutors have "poor" Uyghur, thus alleviating any fear of ridicule or censure. When among *mínkǎohàn*, Möshük does not need to spend cognitive energy to produce "pure" Uyghur.

All of my consultants recognized that some Mandarin lexical items, most of them associated with modern technologies, had been borrowed into Uyghur. Athena listed some of these borrowings: *diànshì* (television), *shǒujī* (cell phone), and *duǎnxìn* (text message). My consultant's families are not making efforts to resist certain Mandarin lexical borrowings. One of my Uyghur teachers explained that these Mandarin borrowings were shorter than their Uyghur equivalents, and that Uyghur equivalents were created after the Mandarin borrowings had been established. In addition to technological terms, Mandarin borrowings also proliferate sociopolitical and scientific terminologies, dislodging Uyghur, Arabic, Persian, and Russian words (Bruchis, 1998). This study indicates that Mandarin terms are also dislodging Uyghur terms for common household items, such as *zhuōzi* (table). Future studies might systematically investigate Mandarin lexical borrowing.

All of my consultants and their family members communicated in Mandarin when non-Uyghur speakers (e.g. co-workers) visited their homes, a necessary linguistic accommodation because Mandarin was the lingua franca. When Mike's father brought foreign students to their home, Mike would communicate with them in English, but I believe the effect was to demonstrate his English language skills as opposed to using this language for any type of sustained dialogue. The use of Mandarin as a lingua franca with Han Chinese is remarkable because this practice has been normalized. My Uyghur

consultants accepted the burden of linguistic accommodation as if it were expected. And, indeed, this is expected because Han Chinese who are conversant in Uyghur are a rarity.

Mandarin had a significant presence in the homes of some of the consultants through the telecommunication medium of television:

Consultant/Language	Mandarin	English	Uyghur
Athena	80%	19%	1%
Messi	50%	20%	30%
Möshük	70%	20%	10%
Mike	80%	N/A	20%

Table 7: Television language program percentiles

All of my consultants self-reported watched more Mandarin language programming than the other available options. This practice may be explained by the higher proportion of Mandarin language channels or a preference for the types of programs broadcast on Mandarin language channels. I often watched Uyghur language animated cartoons in order to develop my Uyghur language skills and noticed few options. In contrast, Mandarin language channels featured a broad range of animated cartoons. I also noticed that Uyghur language channels frequently broadcast advertisements for abortion clinics. I am a pro-choice proponent, but felt uneasy watching these advertisements repeatedly. Also of note, pirated DVDs are abundant in Urumchi, sold in shops and from street-side carts. There is a broader range of Mandarin than Uyghur-dubbed DVDs.

Consultants' language ideologies, defined as "sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as rationalization or justification of perceived language and use" (Silverstein, 1979, p. 193), might be reflected in their self-reporting of television viewing.

Möshük explained that Mandarin language programming was more "modern" because current television genres, movies, and news were broadcast in Mandarin. She said that news programs in Uyghur were less current than Mandarin news programs, compelling viewers to watch Mandarin channels for the latest news. Möshük stated that Mandarin language competency was requisite to view this "modern" programming, suggesting a government-authored reinforcing cycle. The public media positions Mandarin as essential and modern, conceptions reinforced by the education system, specifically that the Han Chinese language is "relatively rich in terminology" (Zhou, 2003, p. 361).

My consultants exhibited a variety of Uyghur literacy competencies and practices. Neither Möshük nor Mike's parents taught them Uyghur literacy skills. Möshük could not read the Uyghur alphabet until I taught her. Mike could recognize a few Uyghur letters but not read. Messi was literate in Uyghur but admitted that his academic writing was stronger in Mandarin. Athena possessed strong Uyghur literacy skills, but despite this, kept her diary in Chinese. This data indicates that a literacy shift is occurring.

All of the consultants expressed sorrow at the specter of Uyghur-Mandarin language shift. Both Messi and Möshük pointed out that Uyghur children communicated in Mandarin when at play; I too observed this language practice. Athena consistently, and Messi early on, displayed degrees of condemnation toward Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*. This condemnation was a mixture of negative feelings about Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* language practices, consisting of censure directed at the person for not using "their" language in communicative contexts absent of Han Chinese and disapproval of not maintaining group solidarity (i.e. low ethnic consciousness).

Some Uyghurs may believe that Mandarin-dominant Uyghurs are making conscious decisions to use Mandarin instead of Uyghur. In fact, the Mandarin-dominant Uyghur may not possess the skill to communicate in Uyghur. Thus, a language practice may be misidentified as indexing a particular allegiance when no such intention existed. All of my consultants were pessimistic toward the vitality of the Uyghur language, and predicted that this language will disappear within a few generations.

When discussing the *mínkǎomín* contempt for *mínkǎohàn*, Messi once said that Uyghurs needed to question "why" *mínkǎohàn* demonstrate markers of Han Chinese assimilation. However, this appeal for the examination of (socio-political and socio-historical) factors occurred after discussions on the consequences of subtractive bilingualism for Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*. I believe that during the course of our friendship, Messi became more sensitive and sympathetic toward Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*.

Mike identified a subgroup of Mandarin-dominant Uyghurs as "*hànkǎohàn*," an epithet that cuts to the core of ethnolinguistic identity. It connotes that you possess only the façade of a Uyghur – that you are essentially Han Chinese. Here, language is almost secondary because it is a given that a Han Chinese would be a Mandarin-speaker. The existence of this epithet is remarkable because there must have been some critical mass to provoke its inception. Mike's etymology also deserves remark because it emphasizes the importance of the relativity of context to considerations of Han Chinese assimilation. Mike was considered "half Uyghur, half Han Chinese" by a friend while in their hometown, but once these two men relocated to Urumchi, his friend encountered *Urumchiliq* Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* – individuals who displayed more Han Chinese linguistic

and cultural traits. This experience forced Mike's hometown friend to restructure his conception of Han Chinese assimilation and reposition Mike as less-Han Chinese than *Urumchiliq* Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* on his Sinification continuum scale.

When discussing assimilation, my consultants expressed not only linguistic anxiety, but anxiety over the loss of Uyghur ways of speaking. Messi indicated that Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* often do not say *Essalamueleykum* (Peace be upon you) when they cross a threshold into a house. He lamented that *mínkǎohàn* "don't follow these rules." He attributed this behavior to Han Chinese socialization, habitus structured through interactions with Han Chinese at school. However, Messi added that senior family members do have the power to influence practices. Mike pointed out that Uyghurs had a particular metaphorical style of speaking and could identify a *mínkǎohàn* on account of not using a poetic style, and favoring directness when communicating.

Möshük and Mike were both *mínkǎohàn*, but their conception of this term differed. Möshük's conception of *mínkǎohàn* was somewhat negative. She said, "Neither Chinese nor Uyghurs accept us. It is said *mínkǎohàn* group is a separate ethnic. Chinese are afraid of us, because we are smarter, stronger, more open, we are getting into advanced level in Uyghur world. While Uyghurs, I mean *mínkǎomín*, are jealous of us, because we can speak Chinese fluently, we know more modern technology and so on. So we are getting into an embarrassing position." Mike appraisal of *mínkǎohàn* was neutral. He was educated in Mandarin, but due to the dense Uyghur social network in his hometown neighborhood, his education did not result in feelings of alienation from his ethnicity.

Möshük and Mike also expressed different perspectives on assimilation. Möshük felt that she had been assimilated, that "*Mínkǎohàn* Uyghurs have been assimilated in behaviors, dress, appearance and language… From going to school with [Han Chinese] and being with them all the time, I've become like them." As to how she felt about this, she said, "Sometimes it's okay. Sometimes I feel disgust. I feel bad. Some of my weakness from Chinese, like pouring food on table." Mike, conversely, rejected the proposition that he had been assimilated. He even asserted that he used Uyghur more expertly than some *mínkǎomín* because he could *chaq-chaq* (joke) better than them. Möshük and Mike demonstrate that it is a fallacy to automatically associate *mínkǎohàn* with Han Chinese assimilation. There is a tendency for some Uyghurs to flatly characterize Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* as "the 57th ethnic group." Aside from being a simple insult, this condemnation, as said by Messi, comes at the peril of dividing the Uyghur community.

Uyghur young adults are in a difficult position because they possess the linguistic capital (i.e. Mandarin language competence) requisite for exchange on the Xinjiang (increasingly Han Chinese) market, but ethnic discrimination undermines the value of this currency, negating their ability to reap profit. Concurrently, as a result of the processes of language attrition and incomplete language acquisition, some Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* have a depleted stock of Uyghur linguistic capital. The following examination of the Mandarinization of the Xinjiang education system, along with CCP rhetorical support of this policy, seeks to explore the experience and perspective of "illegitimate"

speakers of a "legitimate" language who are residing in a social context where symbolic power is unequally distributed (Bourdieu, 1977a, p. 648).

The Uyghur-Han Chinese school consolidation movement intensified in 2004 (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004). When Uyghurs are placed in a majority Han Chinese school, as was Messi's case, laws permitting Uyghur as a language of instruction can be circumvented (Bewicke, 2009). Messi's teacher put it bluntly, "Our education is facing a really big threat because you guys are the experiment of the changing." Messi offered a metaphor comparing Uyghur students to white rats in a science experiment. Messi suggested that the purpose of this experiment was "assimilation, to be *one* China."

The CCP claims that Mandarin proficiency will help ethnic minority students be "more competitive in the workplace" (Jia, 2009a). My four consultants challenged this assertion. They stated that a Han Chinese job applicant would be selected over a Uyghur job applicant if both possessed equivalent qualifications and language skills. Some of my consultants felt that Han Chinese job applicants had better employment prospects over Uyghur competitors who possessed better qualifications and language skills.[54]

Möshük said, "The Chinese government say they want to offer jobs for Uyghurs so Uyghurs must learn Chinese. So they produce *mínkǎohàn*." She was doubtful of the CCP's altruistic motive because "Uyghurs have no jobs now." She concluded, "They

[54] Möshük stated that discrimination was a fact of life in Xinjiang, with "nationalities discrimination and sex discrimination" being the most prevalent. She said if she were to compete for a job with a Han Chinese woman, "they *must* take the Chinese girl because I am Uyghur, they don't want me." If she were in competition with a man, she asserted that the man would be selected over her. However, she claimed that a Han Chinese woman would be selected over a Uyghur man, indicating that ethnic discrimination was more pronounced than sex discrimination.

want to kill us, kill our language. Gradually change us to Chinese so we never give them trouble because we will be Chinese one day." Here Möshük described a form of top-down language death (Nettle & Romaine, 2000).

All of these responses indicated ethnic discrimination in hiring practices, something thoroughly documented by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (2006a, 2009b, 2009d). In the past, scholars have suggested that "Han bosses discriminate in favor of workers with whom they share a language and culture" (Wiemar, 2004, p. 188), but the contemporary situation differs in that many Uyghurs are proficient in Mandarin. Uyghur young adults possess Mandarin linguistic capital, but ethnic discrimination undermines the currency of this capital and disrupts its conversion into other types of capital (Bourdieu, 1991). Uyghurs accept that their language has no value in the current Han Chinese system and have agreed to invest in the development of Mandarin, the "legitimate" form of linguistic capital, but as "illegitimate" speakers are seeing little return on their investment.

One explanation for the durability of ethnic discrimination in Han Chinese society might be found in the Marxist categorization of the stages of societal development (Harrell, 1995). On this scale, ethnic groups are ranked according to level of development. For example, Han Chinese are ranked above Uyghurs because Han Chinese possess more of the symbolic capital of "development." This societal development scale is pernicious because it lends "scientific" validity to Han chauvinism. This conception of societal development is a structuring structure because it engenders a mental disposition, what might be called a "hierarchical way-of-thinking."

This is a useful entry point when interpreting certain statements from Xinjiang CCP officials, such as "The languages of the minority nationalities have very small capacities and do not contain many of the expressions in modern science and technology, which makes education in these concepts impossible" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 2002). According to this mode of thought, languages exist on a hierarchical scale, with some having more or less inherent capacity. This is form of symbolic violence against minority languages.

Xinjiang CCP officials have tied Mandarin proficiency to campaigns promoting patriotism, ethnic unity and stability (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009a, 2010b), explicitly linking Mandarin language education to the fight against terrorism. In June 2009, Xinjiang CCP chairperson Nur Bekri stated that "[t]errorists from neighboring countries mainly target [Uyghurs] that are relatively isolated from mainstream society as they cannot speak Mandarin. They are then tricked into terrorist activities" (Jia, 2009b). I argue that when the mother tongue of an ethnic minority group is criminalized through association and conflation with terrorism, the members of the targeted community may be compelled to abandon their language as a symbolic gesture to affirm non-criminality. The supposed inverse relationship assigned to Mandarin language proficiency and terrorist potential has placed the Uyghur language in a precarious position.

All of the consultants perceived that the linguistic market of Xinjiang was biased in favor of Han Chinese speakers of Mandarin; they believed that their Mandarin language competency was undermined by their "illegitimacy" as speakers (Bourdieu,

1991). Consistent with Benson (2004), I found that my highly-educated consultants had high expectations, yet were unable to convert their academic capital into economic capital (Bourdieu, 1984). Messi, Möshük and Mike expressed a desire to leave Xinjiang and China, to escape a context where symbolic power was unequally distributed. Athena harbored this desire at an earlier time in her life, but this aspiration has weakened because of financial concerns.[55] Messi, Möshük and Mike indicated that their drive to learn English was sustained by an instrumental motivation (Gardner & Lambert, 1972) – the desire to emigrate to a Western, Anglophone country where employment prospects might not be undermined by ethnic discrimination. Messi, Möshük and Mike all indicated a willingness to teach Mandarin abroad, signaling no animosity toward the Mandarin language per se.

All of my consultants displayed a combination of local/ethnic Uyghur and Western idealist interests and affiliations (Dörnyei, 2005; Lamb, 2004; Bonny Norton, 2000). They identified with Western ideals and expressed fondness for Western, Anglophone culture; these positive feelings, and the desire to index affiliation with Western, Anglophone speech communities, may have contributed toward an integrative motivation to learn English (Gardner, 1985; Gardner & Lambert, 1972). The strength of this identification may be reactionary to the bombardment of "messages calculated to heighten [Chinese] national pride" that students are subjected to at school (Vickers, 2009, p. 79). Teachers are expected to inculcate patriotism and develop students' identification

[55] Other social factors may be at play here. Uyghur parents are sometimes reluctant to allow daughters to go far from home.

with collective national achievements, goals and interests, but, instead of absorbing these messages, some Uyghurs reject (or resist) them. Uyghurs may be positioning Western ideals (e.g. democracy, human rights and freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly) as a counterbalance to the Chinese state.[56] This is a case of something strange happening on the way to Hanification.

Future research might explore how colonized or minority ethnolinguistic communities index their ethnic identity after they have lost their language. All of the consultants identified language as an important, if not the most important, marker of Uyghur ethnic identity. Messi strongly supported the notion that Uyghur cultural practices, ways of thinking and ways of being, must be habitualized through the medium of Uyghur. The strength of his assertion may have been buttressed by a reactionary stance toward one of the "benefits" of the mastery of Mandarin, that "minorities can teach Han Chinese about minority culture through Mandarin." Möshük had a more nuanced perspective, recognizing that "culture includes many parts. Language is most important. But without language you can still teach customs, habits and taboos."

Möshük, having limited Uyghur language skills, indexed her Uyghur ethnic identity through many other practices including cleanliness (e.g. use of personal spoons and chopsticks in "Chinese" restaurants), diet (e.g. avoidance of pork), and food

[56] On one occasion, I was with a friend, a Uyghur young man, at a bar. During our conversation, he told me that he wanted to go to the U.S., "because in the U.S., you can speak what is on your mind." Later that evening, while we were in a taxi, I asked him what happens to people who speak their mind in Xinjiang. He said, "They will put you in a cage." To emphasize his point, he pulled on the bars that partitioned the front and back areas of the cab. That image of an animal in captivity has remained with me.

consumption (e.g. refusal to eat or drink while walking)[57] and storage (e.g. bread placed crust-side down). Möshük explained all of these practices as parts of Uyghur culture and was resolute to maintain them. Chen's study of *Muslim Uyghur Students in a Chinese Boarding School* (2009) does identify a set of durable Uyghur social practices as mitigating again Han Chinese assimilation, an approach that deserves replication in settings throughout Xinjiang.

6.4 WHAT CAN BE DONE?

The Uyghur speech community of Xinjiang faces a number of challenges to the intergenerational transmission of the Uyghur language. The primary challenges can be classified as assimilation via dilution, where through a twin-channel influx of Han Chinese and exodus of Uyghur, Uyghurs are increasingly surrounded by a mostly-Han Chinese population that does not speak Uyghur, and for the most part, has no need to learn this language. Uyghurs are compelled to linguistically accommodate Han Chinese because Han Chinese are the dominant ethnic community, empowered by their association with the CCP civilizing center, and Mandarin is the legitimate language of the PRC (Bourdieu, 1991; Harrell, 1995).

A second major threat to the intergenerational transmission of Uyghur is unstable diglossia, a condition that has resulted from the dislocation of Uyghur as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system. In the scholastic domain, Uyghur *mínkǎohàn* are educated entirely in Mandarin; Uyghurs educated in bilingual schools

[57] In Uyghur culture, one must eat or drink while seated because to lose any of the food or spill any of the drink would cause offence to Allah (God), who provided that nourishment.

learn core subjects in Mandarin and Uyghur as a second language. Uyghur is not a component of the college-entrance exam, and consequently has lower status than tested subjects. This devaluation of Uyghur in the scholastic domain threatens the vitality of the language because Mandarin, as the dominant language of instruction, is being positioned as the language of educational and economic opportunity. Another consequence of *mínkǎohàn* and bilingual education is that Uyghurs are becoming more comfortable in Mandarin, are code-switching from Uyghur to Mandarin, and some Uyghur lexical items are being replaced by Mandarin borrowings.

So what can be done to maintain the vitality of the Uyghur language, and to ensure that this threatened language does not become an endangered language? Here, I invoke Blommaert's ethnographic-sociolinguistic approach to linguistic rights whereby the author argues that scholars take a hard look at a language as used in a given society, and utilize ethnographic data as a starting point from which to discuss what can actually be done, as opposed to starting with an ideal or static conception of language in society (2005). This perspective compliments Bourdieu's historicized and diachronic understanding of language because suggestions of activities to sustain language practices (i.e. interventions) must consider the socio-historical and socio-political context if they are to have any chance for applicability. In the following paragraph, I critique approaches to CCP language policy in the Xinjiang education system that invoke national legislation or international treaties and agreements, or PRC President Hu Jintao's socio-economic vision of a *xiǎokāng* (basically well-off) and *héxié shèhuì* (harmonious society) (W. Chen & Zhong, 2004). I then present three tactics for the maintenance of Uyghur language

vitality, all at the level of the family unit (Spolsky, 2005), and one program that I feel would be possible to implement.

Many scholars and human rights activists recognize that by forcing Uyghur children to study in Mandarin, a language that is not their mother tongue, the CCP violates its own laws and agreements, including Article 4 of the PRC Constitution, the Compulsory Education Law and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (Chinese Communist Party, 1984, 2005). The CCP has also signed and ratified a number of multilateral treaties and agreements which protect the language rights of ethnic minorities, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, (Bewicke, 2009; Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2009b). CCP language policy in the Xinjiang education system does violate the linguistic rights of Uyghurs because the Uyghur linguistic community was not consulted as to whether or not they desired for Mandarin or Uyghur to be the language of instruction. In the Xinjiang education system, Mandarin was imposed by CCP edict.

Suggestions have been made that the CCP or international community intervenes in order to protect the Uyghur language (Bewicke, 2009; Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2009b). Recommendations include appeals to the CCP to maintain existing schools, from pre-school to the university level, that use Uyghur as a language of instruction; to reinstate Uyghur as a language of instruction in schools that have adopted other language

education formats; to expand Uyghur as a language of instruction to additional schools; to promote Uyghur language learning among non-Uyghur populations, including core academic classes offered in both languages. These policies would allow for the return of a segregated Uyghur and Chinese education system, developments that some suggest would improve ethnic relations and enable social stability in Xinjiang.

An ethnographic-sociolinguistic approach to linguistic rights begins with a consideration of the socio-historical and socio-political context of a given language. For the Uyghur language, a historicized and diachronic description must take into account the priorities of the CCP: economic development, the maintenance of territorial integrity, and the achievement of harmonious society (Bovingdon, 2004a; Fan, 2006; Fravel, 2008). Appeals for the protection of Uyghur linguistic rights that invoke national legislation or international treaties and agreements are likely to go nowhere. The concept of "law" in China is a fascinating and complicated topic involving debates between Confucian and Legalist schools of thought, and conflict between the rule of law and the rule of the Communist Party. Orts calls the nature of law in China deeply "ambiguous" (2000). "Laws are seen as a way to manage the economy and people's lives, rarely to protect them from the state or enshrine individual rights" (BBC, 2011).

The second approach links the re-establishment of Uyghur as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system with the alleviation of tension and advance toward a basically well-off (i.e. moderately prosperous) and harmonious society. I find it highly unlikely that the CCP will reverse the Mandaranization of the Xinjiang education system, a policy that is being supported by substantial financial investment

(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010b; Jia, 2009a). My conviction is that the CCP is cognizant that the twin forces of Han Chinese colonization, along with increasing competition for scare resources will result in some social discord, but is willing to tolerate this condition as a temporary friction on the way to achieving ethnic integration and national unity.

Consistent with Fishman (1972), I argue that Uyghur families should take an active role in maintaining the intergenerational transmission of Uyghur. I support this position, in part, because it seems more viable than calling on the CCP or international community to intervene and enforce a language policy for Uyghur that is consistent with the guarantees provided in national legislation and ratified international treaties and agreements. In the words of Athena, "Parents are your first teachers – not the teachers at school." The domestic field is a domain where language competence is developed and language practices are naturalized as habitus (Bourdieu, 1991). In a context characterized by unstable diglossia (Fishman, 1972), the legitimate, dominant language may encroach upon the illegitimate language through a variety of linguistic processes, including, as demonstrated by this study, lexical borrowing and code-switching. Therefore, if a linguistic community is interested in maintaining the vitality of their language, they must adopt a language policy situating the illegitimate language as the primary language of the domestic field (Spolsky, 2005).

The family can do this by exercising the traditional four basic language skills: speaking, listening, reading and writing. Parents interested in transmitting their language should speak in this language and require their children to do the same. If parents fail to

require their children to speak in the language, they will possibly become receptive bilinguals of the language (Romaine, 1995); if children do not practice using the language, the vitality will be compromised. Receptive bilinguals may understand a language but do not produce it comfortably (C. Myers-Scotton, 2006), a condition that would be problematic for the transmission of language to subsequent generations. Listening is coupled with speaking in interpersonal communication; through this practice, children (learners) learn to discriminate between sounds, recognize words, identify grammatical groupings of words, identify expressions and sets of utterances that act to create meaning, connect linguistic cues to non-linguistic and paralinguistic cues and use background knowledge to predict and later to confirm meaning and recall important words and ideas (Rost, 1990).

Parents must make an effort to transmit literacy skills. It is not enough to do as Möshük's father, to recognize the importance of Uyghur literacy skills, but do nothing to help develop these skills. Nor can a parent, like Mike's mom, simply hand an alphabet book to a child, and expect the child to learn to read and write. Uyghur parents must read to their children and teach their children to read Uyghur, and the associated set of skills including phonological awareness, phonics (decoding), fluency, comprehension, and vocabulary (National Reading Panel, 2000). Uyghur parents must teach their children the Uyghur alphabet and the symbols representing individual language sounds. Parents must model reading practices, make books available in the home, and provide bracketed periods of time for free voluntary reading (Krashen, 2004). To foster writing skills, Uyghur parents should devise a home literacy plan (Tse, 2001), however, given the

intense requirements of school, it seems impractical to expect that parent or child to maintain a writing plan. In a context where a linguistic community possessed basic human rights, such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, a community language school, operated by educators and retirees, might be a practical suggestion for instruction and the intergenerational transmission of literacy skills. An international organization might assist the development of writing skills among Uyghurs by organizing an essay competition, divided by grade-levels with winners awarded cash prizes and certificates of participation.

Linguists, educators and activists might provide assistance to the Uyghur speech community of Xinjiang by providing basic linguistic and pedagogical training (UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages, 2003). Parents might be provided texts on basic Uyghur linguistics, teaching methods and techniques, curriculum development and teaching materials development. Information must be disseminated in order to dispel misconceptions about bilingualism and bilinguals, such as bilingualism will delay language acquisition, a fear that bilingual children will mix or confuse their languages, or that bilingualism will negatively effect cognitive development (François Grosjean, 2010). While these misconceptions are typical, research must identify the specific reasons why Uyghur parents are not passing down Uyghur literacy skills. Linguists, educators and activists must supply that information and knowledge that will help parents feel confident assuming the role of language teacher.

Uyghur primary and secondary school teachers might invest in approaches to support Uyghur language development among their student populations. One activity

might target Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*, students who receive no Uyghur language education. Uyghur teachers may volunteer to teach Uyghur language skills (e.g. reading, spelling, literature, and composition) to Uyghur *mínkǎohàn*. To ensure that this is a community effort, and to spread the teaching load, the Uyghur teachers might work as a team, with one teacher focusing on one aspect, each day a week. A second approach might be, for Uyghur literature arts teachers of Uyghur *mínkǎomín* students, to create a classroom atmosphere where the Uyghur language is part of a culturally relevant curriculum (Spring, 1994). Teachers may utilize content-based instruction consisting of texts on Uyghur heroes, Uyghur historical figures and famous contemporary Uyghurs; family history research; and reflective writing (where students write about beliefs and cultural assumptions).

The research community, including university professors based in Xinjiang, might take several approaches to support the use of Uyghur as the main medium of education for Uyghur first-language students. The first approach might include referencing recent research on mother–tongue medium education in discussions with education officials. Important studies to cite include Thomas and Collier's (2002) longitudinal study of 210,000 minority students in rural and urban settings in the U.S., which found that among many different education models, "the strongest predictor of L2 student achievement is the amount of formal L1 schooling. The more L1 grade-level schooling, the higher L2 achievement" (p. 7); and Ramirez's (1991) study which found that among 2,352 students grouped into English only, early-exit (one or two years of Spanish-medium education, followed by a transition to English-medium education), and late-exit (four to six years of

Spanish-medium education, followed by a transition to English-medium education) programs, the last-exit group achieved the best results in English and in educational achievement in general. A second approach might entail conducting empirical comparative studies where the role of language teaching is a variable. The variety of bilingual education programs in Xinjiang would provide for rich comparison. A third tactic might include lobbying the central government to include a minority language (e.g. Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Mongolian, Xibe, Salar…etc.) as a component of the college entrance exam. If minority language competency is part of the college entrance exam, this will function to elevate the status of minority languages, and encourage Han Chinese and other minority students to develop competence in a minority language. In closing, I advocate an approach in line with Strawbridge (2008), who stated, "working within the system, and in collaboration with government partners in Xinjiang…is the best way to influence regional bilingual education practices, and bring changes that help to restore the place of mother tongue in Xinjiang minority schools and communities."

6.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

Different factors limited my ability to effectively answer my research questions. The first is related to access to different settings. As a Western researcher, I did not have access to some spaces that would have provided rich information on language practices in multi-ethnic and multilingual settings. I could not embed myself naturally in dormitories and classrooms. For information about language practices in these naturalistic spaces, I had to rely on reported data. To address this limitation, I suggest replication by a Uyghur

researcher. A Uyghur researcher, fluent in both Uyghur and Mandarin, would be able to observe the language practices of friends, peers and relatives, in a wider variety of settings. An insider would also have a wealth of a cultural knowledge with which to recognize and describe subtleties associated with how Uyghurs use language to index identities (e.g. political, gender, ethnic…etc.).

A second limitation concerns the type of consultant who contributed to this study. The data gathered in this study was not based on large, randomly sampled populations; I selected participants purposefully (Patton, 2002). All of the consultants were college or university students. All of the case study participants came from urban, middle-class homes where at least one parent was college-educated. The case study participants were all multilingual, fluent in English, Uyghur and Chinese. While these individuals represented a certain class of urban, financially stable, and educated Uyghur young adults, data on the language practices from other populations of Uyghur young adults would complement the present study.

A third limitation is related to access to the CCP decision making process that dictates language policy in Xinjiang. As this study explored the language ecology of Xinjiang, including political conditions, a more robust study would have included a state-level perspective. However, CCP deliberations on language policy are not part of the public record. CCP language policy and ideology can only be inferred from the prepared statements of public officials, anecdotal evidence, and promulgation.

A fourth limitation of the study is related to the scope of the area under investigation. This study was situated in Urumchi. Future studies might explore a variety

of local language ecologies in Xinjiang in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the particular historical, political and cultural currents that influence language practices.

6.6 FINAL THOUGHTS

The ideology of a common national language as bound to a national culture, and requisite for modernization and economic progress, came into existence with the rise of the 19th century European nation-state (Nettle & Romaine, 2000). The nation-state, a type of imagined community, was imposed by colonial force around the globe (B. Anderson, 1983). As of 2011, there are 204 internationally recognized sovereign and independent states. Compare that figure with 6,909 – the number of living languages catalogued by SIL International (Lewis, 2009). A nation-state ideology that promotes a single language per state does not bode well for minority languages lacking institutional support (Fishman, 1989; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994).[58]

This dissertation is a product of applied linguistics, "the academic discipline concerned with the relation of knowledge about language to decision making in the real world" (Cook, 2003). This study demonstrates how socio-historical and socio-political forces contribute to the devaluation of minority linguistic capital in a linguistic market, and how a language policy in the domestic field, as the primary structuring structure, may be utilized to stabilize diglossia and maintain the intergenerational transmission of a minority language. National governments and international organizations should not be

[58] Krauss concluded after a numerical review that "the coming century will see either the death or the doom of 90% of mankind's languages," meaning that only about 600 are safe (1992).

relied upon too strongly to maintain the vitality of minority languages – the family unit should take this responsibility. This knowledge may prove useful to those who feel that linguistic diversity is an important component of human heritage, those interested in patterns of language shift and resistance. Finally, I hope that the members of minority linguistic communities use this knowledge in order to make informed decisions on language practices.

Appendix A: Interview Protocol #1

1. What language(s) did you use with your family at home?
2. What language are you most fluent in (i.e. your strongest language)?
3. Was your class *mínkǎohàn*, *mínkǎomín*, or bilingual? If you attended different types of schools, please describe the transition.
4. What language(s) did you use with your friends at school?
5. Do you think that fluency in *pǔtōnghuà* will help you get a job after graduation?
6. A *mínkǎohàn* told me that even though her Uyghur is poor, she still strongly identifies as Uyghur. But some say that *mínkǎohàn* are just like Chinese. How do you feel about that?
7. Do you ever feel that *mínkǎohàn* are a separate ethnic group, different from Chinese and Uyghur?
8. If you have children, what types of school(s) will you send them to?
9. *For *mínkǎohàn* and bilingual educated students: How was your experience with Mandarin as the language of instruction?
10. *For *mínkǎohàn* and bilingual educated students: What was the decision-making process that resulted in you attending such schools?

Appendix B: Interview Protocol #2

Family background (28 questions)

1. Where are your father and the paternal side of your family from?
2. Was your father *mínkăohàn* or *mínkăomín*?
3. What language(s) does your father speak/write?
4. How was he employed?
5. How do you address your father?
6. Do you have any nicknames, or know of any nicknames, for your father?
7. Where were your paternal grandparents born?
8. How were your paternal grandparents educated?
9. What language(s) do your paternal grandparents speak/write?
10. Where are your mother and the maternal side of your family from?
11. Was your mother *mínkăohàn* or *mínkăomín*?
12. What language(s) does your mother speak/write?
13. How was she employed?
14. How do you address your mother?
15. Do you have any nicknames, or know of any nicknames, for your mother?
16. Where were your maternal grandparents born?
17. How were your maternal grandparents educated?
18. What language(s) do your maternal grandparents speak/write?
19. What types of social events do your parents participate in?
20. Does your mother or father perform any rituals or activities that are specific to your culture?

21. Do you have any siblings?

22. Do they have any nicknames?

23. Describe their education. Did it differ from your own?

24. What are they doing now?

25. How does your family celebrate traditional Uyghur holidays?

26. Do you attend class during traditional Uyghur holidays?

27. Is it a custom in your family to pray upon completing a meal?

28. Do you fast during Ramadan?

Language Practices: Domestic field (11 questions)

1. What is the significance of your name?
2. Did your parents have any policies about language use at home?
3. Did your parents teach you to read and write in your mother tongue?
4. What language(s) do you use at home?
5. What is the balance of languages used?
6. Does code-switching occur? (If yes, solicit an example)
7. What are family members' perceptions on code-switching?
8. Does linguistic behavior change if/when other interlocutors are around?
9. What types of variables influence choices regarding language use at home?
10. Describe the neighborhood and your neighbors.
11. What languages did you use with neighbors?

Language Practices: Academic field (27 questions)

Kindergarten

1. Where did you attend kindergarten?

2. What was the language of instruction?
3. What was the ethnicity of your teacher/classmates/friends?
4. Describe the home to kindergarten transition.
5. Were there any linguistic or cultural issues in this transition?

Primary school

6. Where did you attend primary school?
7. What was the language of instruction?
8. What was the ethnicity of your teacher/classmates/friends?
9. Why did your parents choose a *mínkǎohàn* or *mínkǎomín* education?
10. What did you learn about Uyghur culture?
11. Do you remember any teacher-talk about language?

Junior secondary school

12. Where did you attend middle school?
13. What was the language of instruction?
14. What was the ethnicity of your teacher/classmates/friends?
15. What did you learn about Uyghur culture?
16. Do you remember any teacher-talk about language?

Senior secondary school

17. Where did you attend high school?
18. What was the language of instruction?
19. What was the ethnicity of your teacher/classmates/friends?
20. What did you learn about Uyghur culture?
21. Do you remember any teacher-talk about language?

22. Did you choose the Science or Liberal Arts track?

23. Which version of *gāokǎo* did you take?

College/University

24. Where do you attend college/university?

25. What is your major?

26. What is the language of instruction?

27. What is the ethnicity of your teacher/classmates/friends?

Language Practices: Dormitory (6 questions)

1. What languages are used in your dormitory?
2. If multiple languages are used, what is the balance?
3. Does code-switching occur?
4. What are roommates' perceptions on code-switching?
5. Does linguistic behavior change if/when other interlocutors are around?
6. What types of variables influence choices regarding language use in your dormitory?

Language competence self-assessment (4 questions)

1. Assess your Uyghur, English and Chinese levels of proficiency in four skill areas (reading, writing, listening and speaking).
2. What language can you best express your emotions in?
3. If you were in a new city and got lost, what language would you feel most comfortable receiving directions in?
4. If you see a street sign in Uyghur, Chinese and English, which language (script) would you read?

Language practices: Private domains (4 questions)

1. What script do you text in?
2. Do you prefer the *Yëngi Yezik* (Latin), *Kona Yekiz* (Modern Arabic) or UKY script?
3. If you had or have a romantic partner (e.g. boyfriend, girlfriend, husband or wife), and you were to call them using a "term of endearment," what word would you most likely use and in what language?
4. Of television viewing, what percentage is in Uyghur, Chinese and English?

Perceptions of *mínkǎomín* and *mínkǎohàn* (8 questions)

1. What are your ideas about *mínkǎohàn* and *mínkǎomín*?
2. Are *mínkǎohàn* a separate ethnic group?
3. Why might some people think that *mínkǎohàn* have been assimilated?
4. Do *mínkǎohàn* and *mínkǎomín* have equal opportunities for employment?
5. If you were a parent, given the available options, what type of school would you send your child to?
6. If any choice was available, what type of language education would you choose for your child?
7. What is the future of the Uyghur language?
8. Is it possible to transmit culture without language?

Online activities (2 questions)

1. Do you regularly visit any Uyghur-script websites?
2. Do you use social networks to connect with other Uyghurs?

Future and aspirations (3 questions)

1. Where do you want to live?
2. What profession do you want to enter?

3. Do you imagine that your language practices will change in the future?
4. What is your conception of fate?

Appendix C: Expressive vocabulary assessment

Instructions: In the space provided, write the Uyghur word for the item. You can write in Uyghur or Roman script. Spelling doesn't matter. Do not use a dictionary or ask a friend for help. This exercise is to be done **alone**. If you don't know the Uyghur word, write down the Chinese or English word. If you can't identify the item, write an "X" on the space.

تۆۋەندىكىلەرنىڭ ئۇيغۇرچە ئىسمىنى يېزىڭ،لوغەتكە قارىمىڭ،خەقتىن سورىمىڭ،مۇستەققىل يېزىڭ.ئەگەر بىلمىسىڭىز خەنزۇچىسىنى ياكى ئىنگلىسچىسىن ياسىسىڭىز بولىدۇ.ئەگەر زدى نى يازسىڭىز بولىدۇ‹X›بىلمىسىڭىز

说明：请在下面空白划线处，写下每个物体的维语名称。你可以使用维语文字或罗马拼音，拼写正确与否并不重要。请不要使用字典或者寻求朋友的帮助。请**独立**完成本次练习。如果你不知道怎样用维语表示，可以用汉语或英语代替。如果你辨别不出是什么物体，只需在空白处写下"X"即可。

SECTION 1: ANIMALS

هايۋاناتلار

动物

1.  _____

2.  _____

3.  _____

4.  _____

5.  _____

6.  _____

7.  _____

8.  _____

9.  _____

10.  _____

11.  _____

12.  _____

SECTION 2: BODY & FACE

بەدەن یۆز

身体&面孔





SECTION 3: FAMILY
ئائىلە
家庭（家谱）



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14. _____
15. _____

Section 4: Nature

تەبىئەت

自然

1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 

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6.  7.  8.  9.  10. 

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11.  12.  13.  14.  15. 

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____

16.  17.  18.  19.  20. 

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____

SECTION 5: FOOD

يىمەكلىك

食物

1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 

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6.  7.  8.  9.  10. 

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11.  12.  13.  14.  15. 

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16.  17.  18.  19. 

_____ _____ _____ _____

SECTION 6: JOBS
خزمەتلەر
职业

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____

6. 
7. 
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10. 

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11. 
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SECTION 7: FURNITURE & APPLIANCES

ئۆي سايمانلىرى

家具&家电

1. 

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2. 

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3. 

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4. 

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5. 

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6. 

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7. 

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8. 

_____

9. 

_____

10. 

_____

11. 

_____

12. 

_____

SECTION 8: TRANSPORTATION

ترانسپورت قوراللری

交通工具

1. 

_____

2. 

_____

3. 

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4. 

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5. 

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6. 

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7. 

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8. 

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9. 

_____

10. 

_____

11. 

_____

12. 

_____

SECTION 9: NUMBERS

سانلار

数字

Instructions: Write down the number, in Uyghur, of the number of units. Again, spelling does not matter. If you don't know the Uyghur word, write down the Chinese or English word.

说明：请在下面空白划线处用维语文字表示每个数字。拼写正确与否仍然不重要。如果你不知道怎样用维语表示，可以仍然用汉语或英语代替。

1. Number: 0	English: zero	Chinese: 零	Uyghur: _____
2. Number: 11	English: eleven	Chinese: 一十一	Uyghur: _____
3. Number: 22	English: twenty-two	Chinese: 二十二	Uyghur: _____
4. Number: 33	English: thirty-three	Chinese: 三十三	Uyghur: _____
5. Number: 44	English: forty-four	Chinese: 四十四	Uyghur: _____
6. Number: 55	English: fifty-five	Chinese: 五十五	Uyghur: _____
7. Number: 66	English: sixty-six	Chinese: 六十六	Uyghur: _____
8. Number: 77	English: seventy-seven	Chinese: 七十七	Uyghur: _____
9. Number: 88	English: eighty-eight	Chinese: 八十八	Uyghur: _____
10. Number: 99	English: ninety-nine	Chinese: 九十九	Uyghur: _____
11. Number: 100	English: one hundred	Chinese: 一百	Uyghur: _____
12. Number: 1,000	English: one thousand	Chinese: 一千	Uyghur: _____
13. Number: 1,000,000	English: one million	Chinese: 一百万	Uyghur: _____

SECTION 10: COLORS
رەڭلەر
颜色

Instructions: Write down the color, in Uyghur. Again, spelling does not matter. If you don't know the Uyghur word, write down the Chinese or English word.
说明：请在下面空白划线处用维语文字表示颜色。拼写正确与否仍然不重要。如果你不知道怎样用维语表示，可以仍然用汉语或英语代替。

1. What is the color of this text?

_____
这张纸的字体（印刷体）是什么颜色的？
بۇ خەتلەرنىڭ رەڭگى؟

2. What is the color of this paper?

_____
这张纸是什么颜色的？
قەغەزنىڭ رەڭگى؟

3. What is the color of wood?

_____
木头是什么颜色的
ياغاچنىڭ رەڭگى؟

4. What is the color of the sky?

_____
天空是什么颜色的？
ئاسماننىڭ رەڭگى؟

Please refer to the **food** items on **page 6** to answer the following questions.
请翻开第6页的"食物"，回答以下问题。
بەتنى ئېچىپ يىمەكلىكە قاراپ تۆۋەندىكىلەرگە جاۋاپ بېرىڭ-6

5. What is the usual color of item 1?

_____
第一个物体一般是什么颜色的？
ئادەتتە1 رەسىمدىكى نەرسىنىڭ رەڭگى؟

6. What is the usual color of item 2?

_____
第二个物体一般是什么颜色的？
ئادەتتە2 رەسىمدىكى نەرسىنىڭ رەڭگى؟

7. What is the usual color of item 4?

_____
第四个物体一般是什么颜色的？
ئادەتتە4 رەسىمدىكى نەرسىنىڭ رەڭگى؟

8. What is the usual color of item 7?

_____
第七个物体一般是什么颜色的？
ئادەتتە7 رەسىمدىكى نەرسىنىڭ رەڭگى؟

If you have any questions, comments or observations, please write them below or on the back of this page:
ھەركانداك سۇئالىڭىز،پىكىرىڭىز،ياكى دىمەكچى بولغىنىڭىزنى بولسا تۆۋەندىكى يەرگە يېزىپ كويسىڭىز بولىدۇ:
如果你有任何问题，意见或评论，请写在这张纸的下方或背:

Appendix D: Expressive vocabulary assessment key

Section 1: Animals

1.	cat	مۆشۈك	müshük
2.	dog	ئىت	it
3.	horse	ئات	at
4.	cow	كالا	kala
5.	snake	يىلان	yilan
6.	bird	قۇش, قۇشقاچ	qush, qushqach
7.	fish	بېلىق	bëliq
8.	monkey	مايمۇن	maymun
9.	rabbit	توشقان	toshqan
10.	sheep	قوي	qoy
11.	dinosaur	دىنوزاۋر	dinozawr
12.	spider	ئۆمۈچۈك	ömüchük

Section 2: Body and Face

Body

1.	head	باش	bash
2.	ear	قۇلاق	qulaq
3.	chest	كۆكرەك, مەيدە	kökrek, meyde
4.	elbow	جەينەك	jeynek
5.	thigh	يوتا	yota
6.	leg, lower leg	پاچاق, پاقالچاق	pachaq, paqalchaq
7.	ankle	ئوشۇق	oshuq
8.	foot	پۇت	put
9.	fingers	بارماق	barmaq
10.	hand	قول	qol
11.	shoulder	مۈرە	müre
12.	arm	بىلەك	bilek
13.	stomach, belly	قورساق	qorsaq
14.	knee	تىز	tiz

Face

1.	hair	چاچ	chach
2.	forehead	پېشانە	pëshane
3.	eyebrow	قاش	qash
4.	eyelash	كىرپىك	kirpik
5.	eye	كۆز	köz
6.	cheek	مەڭىز	mengiz

7. nose	بۇرۇن	burun
8. lip	كالپۇك	kalpuk
9. teeth	چىش	chish
10. chin	ئىڭەك	ëngek
11. neck	بويۇن	boyun

Section 3: Family

1. grandfather	چوڭ دادا, بوۋا	chong dada, bowa
2. grandmother	چوڭ ئانا, چوڭ ئاپا, موما	chong ana, chong apa, moma
3. aunt	چوڭ ئاپا, كىچىك ئاپا, هاممما	chong apa, kichik apa,hamma
4. uncle	تاغا, كىچىك ئاتا	tagha, kichik ata
5. father	دادا	dada
6. mother	ئانا, ئاپا	ana, apa
7. younger brother	ئۇكا, ئىنى	uka, ini
8. younger sister	سىڭىل	singil
9. older brother	ئاكا	aka
10. older sister	ئاچا, ئادا	acha, ada
11. sister-in-law	قېينىچا, قېينسىڭىل	qëynacha, qëynsingil
12. brother-in-law	قېينىكا, قېينىئۇكا, باجا	qëyinaka, qëyinuka, baja
13. nephew	جىيەن ئوغلى	jiyen oghli
14. niece	جىيەن قىزى	jiyen qiri
15. cousin	نەۋرە	newre

Section 4: Nature

1. tree	دەرەخ	derex
2. leaf	يوپۇرماق	yopurmaq
3. flower	گۈل	gül
4. mountain	تاغ	tagh
5. hill	تۆپىلىك, ئېگىزلىك	töpilik, ëgizlik
6. lake	كۆل	köl
7. ocean	دېڭىز	dëngiz
8. island	ئارال	aral
9. beach, seaside	دېڭىز بويى, دېڭىز ساھىلى	dëngiz sahili, dëngiz boyi
10. river	دەريا	derya
11. waterfall	شارقىراتما	sharqiratma
12. sun	قۇياش, كۈن	quyash, kün
13. moon	ئاي	ay
14. star	يۇلتۇز	yultuz
15. cloud	بۇلۇت	bulut
16. rain	يامغۇر	yamghur
17. planet	پلانىتا	planëta
18. snow	قار	qar

19. desert	قۇملۇق	qumluq
20. forest	ئورمان	orman

Section 5: Food

1. apple	ئالما	alma
2. banana	بانان	banan
3. corn	قوناق, كۆممىقۇناق	kömmiqunaq, qonaq
4. eggplant	چەزە, پىدىگەن	pidigen, cheze
5. hamburger	هامبۇرگ بولكىسى	hamburg bolkisi
	هامبۇرگ قاتلام	hamburg qatlam
	هامبۇرك توقىچى	hamburk toqichi
6. noodles	چۆپ, لەغمەن	chöp, leghmen
7. cabbage	كاللىكبەسەي	kallekbesey
8. carrot	سەۋزە	sewze
9. mushroom	گۈمبەمەدەك, موگو	gümbemedek, mogo
10. onion	پىياز	piyaz
11. pepper	مۇچ, لازا	much, laza
12. tomato	پەمىدۇر, شوخلا	pemidur, shoxla
13. grapes	ئۈزۈم	üzüm
14. melon	قوغۇن	qoghun
15. orange	ئاپېلسىن	apëlsin
16. potato	بەرەنگگە, ياڭيۇ	berengge, yangyu
17. meat	گۆش	gösh
18. rice	گۈرۈچ	gürüch
19. bread	نان	nan

Section 6: Jobs

1. painter	رەسسام	ressam
2. astronaut	ئالەم ئۇچقۇچىسى	alem uchquchisi
3. repairer, mechanic	رېمونتچى, تېخنى, مېخانىك	rëmontchi, tëxni, mëxanik
4. baker	ناۋاي, بولكىچى	naway, bolkichi
5. businessperson, cadre	سودىگەر, كادىر	sodiger, kadir
6. butcher	قاسساپ	qassap
7. dentist	چىش دوختۇرى	chish doxturi
8. nurse	سېستىرا	sëstira
9. mailperson	پوچتىكەش, پوچتالىيون	pochtikesh, pochtaliyon
10. teacher	مۇئەللىم	muellim
11. veterinarian	مالدوختۇرى	maldoxturi
12. fisher	بېلىقچى	bëliqchi
13. farmer	دېھقان	dëhqan
14. waiter	كۈتكۈچى	kütküchi
15. cook, chef	ئاشپەز	ashpez

16.doctor	دوكتۇر	doktur
17.shepherd	پادىچى	padichi
18.barber	ساتىراش	satirash
19.plumber, pipe worker	تۇرۇبا ئىشچىسى, رېمونتچى	turuba ishchisi, rëmontchi
20.policeperson	ساقچى	saqchi

Section 7: Furniture and Appliances

1. bed	كارۋات	karwat
2. bookcase	كىتاب جاھازىسى	kitab jahazisi
3. table	ئۈستەل	üstel
4. sofa	سافا	safa
5. desk	پارتا	parta
6. refrigerator	توڭلاتقۇ	tonglatqu
7. stove	ئوچاق	ochaq
8. television	تېلېۋىزور	tëlëwizor
9. computer	كومپيۇتېر	kompyutër
10.closet (wardrobe)	كىيىم ئىشكاۋى	kiyim ishkawi
11.microwave	مىكرو دولقۇنلۇق	mikro dolqunluq
12.chair	ئورۇندۇق	orunduq

Section 8: Transportation

1. bus	ئاپتوبۇسى	aptobusi
2. helicopter	تىك ئۇچار	tik uchar
3. fire engine	ئوت ئۆچۈرۈش ماشىنىسى	ot öchürüsh mashinisi
4. motorcycle	موتسىكلىت, موتو	motsiklit, moto
5. train	پويىز	poyiz
6. plane	ئايروپىلان	ayropilan
7. car	پىكاپ, ماشىنا	pikab, mashina
8. van	بولكىۋاي, ماشىنا	bolkiway, mashina
9. bicycle	ۋېلىسىپىت	wëlisipit
10. ship	كېمە, پاراخوت	këme, paraxot
11. subway, metro	يەر ئاستى پويىزى, مېترو	yer asti poyizi, mëtro
12. taxi	كىرا ئاپتوموبىلى, تاكسى	kira aptomobili, taksi

Section 9: Numbers

1. zero	نۆل	nöl
2. eleven	ئون بىر	on bir
3. twenty-two	يىگىرمە ئىككى	yigirme ikki
4. thirty-three	ئوتتۇز ئۈچ	ottuz üch
5. forty-four	قىرىق تۆت	qiriq töt
6. fifty-five	ئەللىك بەش	ellik besh

7.	sixty-six	ئاتمش ئالته	atmish alte
8.	seventy-seven	يەتمش يەتته	yetmish yette
9.	eighty-eight	سەكسەن سەككىز	seksen sekkiz
10.	ninety-nine	توقسان توققۇز	toqsan toqquz
11.	hundred	يۈز	yüz
12.	thousand	مىڭ	ming
13.	million	مىلىيون	miliyon

Section 10: Colors

1.	black	قارا	qara
2.	white	ئاق	aq
3.	brown	قوڭۇر, كارىشناۋاي	qongur, karishnaway
4.	blue	كۆك	kök
5.	red	قىزىل	qizil
6.	yellow	سېرىق	sériq
7.	purple	سۆسۈن, بىنەچشە	sösün, binechshe
8.	green	يېشىل	yéshil

Map: Uyghur Autonomous Region

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