'tf'OP 8!!CRET/SENSITIVE FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SUMMARY NOTES OF 591st NSC MEETING September 25, 1968; 12:05 to 1:40 P. M. The 23rd UN General Assembly The President: The purpose of the meeting of the Council is to review the i•auea before the current United Nations General Assembly and to discuss our position on these questions. Secretary Rusk will comment in general on the General Assembly meeting and Ambassador Ball will deal with the specific problems. Secretary Ruek: Suggested that Ambassador Ball lead off and he would comment later. Ambassador Ball: The session of the General Assembly meeting in New York will probably be the moat routine in UN history, barring some unforeseen event. (See copy of State Summary of UNGA issues attached.) The following major issues will be raised: 1. Czechoslovakian Situation a. A specific General Assembly agenda item on Czechoslovakia is unlikely, especially if the Czech delegation takes the position that it does not want a separate item. b. There is very little support from NA TO members for a specific Czech item. c. The Czech situation will be fully debated under other agenda ltema which will make it easier to avoid Soviet rebuttal by citing Vietnam and other world problems. d. If there la further Soviet repression in Caechoalov lda, the ltuation ln the UN could change drastically. 2. The Middle East • We have the last cle r chance for an Ar b-I•raell ttlement in the next fe months. TOP SECltlC'!'/SENSITIVE -2­ _ &13GRE'f/SENSITIVE (Ambassador Ball, continued) b. Ambassador Jarring will be in New York and will be meeting with Arab foreign ministers and the Israeli foreign minister. The work on the Middle East will be done in hotel rooms, not in the United Nations Assembly. c. Currently, the A rahs appear to the public to be readier to settle than the Israelis. d. There is very small chance for settlement unless we push on the Israelis and the Russians push on the A rahs. Even if this were done, a settlement is doubtful because the two sides are so far apart. This is a sad prognosis. e. Unless action comes within the next few weeks, Jarring will be ending a year of activity without results. If he cannot advance toward accomplishing the objectives of the November 22 resolution, he may quit. The problem then becomes even more difficult for us because it will be returned to the UN Security Council. The subject is complicated by the U. S. election. 3. Biafra a. The sad situation in Biafra is a result of federal Nigerian leaders who are willing to sacrifice millions of lives to gain a military advantage. Efforts of the Ethopian Emperor to bring the two ides to an agreement have been unsuccessful. The result is a human tragedy in which thousands are starving. b. It is difficult to get the Biafra problem into the United Nations becaus the African members say the OAU should handle the case. Asian members side with the Africans in opposition to UN intervention. Despite world pressure, the General Assembly cannot act because of this African opposition. c. To handle the humanitarian aspects of this problem, we should name a man to coordinate U.S. Government assistance to the Biafrans. 4. Chinese Representation There is no change in the U.S. position of opposition to the a mission of Communist China. The voting pattern of past General Assemblies is likely to be repeated. There is therefore no serious problem this year. TOP Si.:CRETISENSITIVE ,,,r SEGRE'f"/SENSITIVE Secretary Rusk: The general debate of the Assembly is beginning later this year than usual. The debate will occupy the Assembly during most of October. Consequently, GA votes on major issues are unlikely before our election is over. Ambassador Ball: Secretary General U Thant's press statement on halting the bombing in Vietnam upset many UN delegates. There is no serious effort b introduce a Vietnam resolution as a result of the Secretary General's intervention. U Thant may have learned a lesson from this incident. He was rebuked by us for his action and in a later statement has "walked the cat back" from the position many people thought he was advocating, i.e., a United Nations resolution calling for a bombing halt in North Vietnam. Assistant Secretary Sisco: U Thant's statement on Vietnam will not change the direction of the General Assembly. However, some 80 foreign ministers who will be in New York will all be asking Secretary Rusk whether progress is being made in the Paris talks with the North Vietnamese. The President: The U Thant statement was certainly not helpful. It added further confusion. Even the enemy must be confused by the various statements, including that of Representative Laird (reported plan to reduce by 90, 000 the number of U. S. troops in Vietnam). Handing a copy of Secretary Clifford's recent Congressional testimony to the Secretary, he asked that the pertinent positions be read to the CounciL Secretary Clifford: During a Congressional Hearing, epresentative Lipscomb asked what wa the basis of report that the number of U. S. troops in Vietnam woul be decreased this year or next. The quotation makes clear that we hav no plan to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam. W do not plan to reduc the number barring some unforeseen development. No prediction can be made that troops will return in 1969. A Defense Department statement i being released to the press which will quote the testimony given on September 10 and restate that today' position i the s me. There is no pl n to drop below the authorized level of 549, 000 men, in fact, we are sending troop to Vietnam to bring it up to the authorized level. (A copy of the draft stat ment is attached.) (Tab A) General Wheeler: In Vietnam, General Abrams' taff i re-examining the composition of our forces. H may recommend that som units now there be "TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE replaced with other units for which he has higher priority. In a conversation this morning General Abrams aaid this turnover would involve nowhere near 90, 000 men, the figure cited by Representative Laird. Secretary Clifford: Our plan is to reply firmly to Rep. Laird first, if he come• back and tries to say that the present consideration of a reshuffle of troops is confirmation of his earlier statement, we should let Abrams explain to the press that his present examination of forces has nothing whatsoever to do with any plan to reduce the U.S. troop level by 90, 000 men. The President: Asked Secretary Rusk to report on the talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris. Secretary Rusk: The prospect in Paris is that we will not reach an early settle­ment. Today's meeting with the North Vietnamese makes clear that they will not talk seriously until we halt the bombing. The President: What do they mean when they say we must not only halt the bombing but all at er acts of war? Several members contributed to the reply that the North Vietnamese are referring to naval bombardment above the DMZ and aerial reconnai sance of North Vietnam. Both Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford said that we must insist on the con­tinuation of aerial reconnaissance even after a bombing halt. This involves high­level filghte as well as the use of drones. Both Secretaries indicated that the North Vietnamese know that we will lnaiat on aerial reconnaissance. The Preaident asked if General Taylor' a comments on the negotiation• had been seen by Secretary Ruak. Mr. Rostow gave the Preaident a copy of the paper which wa1 handed to Secretary Ruak. The Pre1ldent aaked Secretary Rusk and Ambaaaador Ball to 1end to him recommendation• on specific UN problems which needed to be act d upon. Secretary Ruak: A1ked to report on hie conversation with the Spanlah Foreign Mlnlater thla mornlna. No pro1re1a haa been made on negotlatln1 the renew 1 of our baae a1reement wlth the Spantah. Madrid la aaldn1 $500-600 million ln mill ry equipment aa price for renew 1. Th pp between what we are prepar d o f r, i:oP IECltET/SENSITIVE (Secretary Rusk, continued) about $100 million over five years, is very wide. They want equipment for an army but no one knows whom they would fight. The Spanish apparently have concluded that they will invoke Article 5 of the existing agreement which starts in motion our withdrawal from the bases. They have been asked to extend the existing agreement for six months during which time we might be able to reach some solution. The initial reaction of the Spanish to this proposal was negative but the Spanish Government has not yet turned it down. We must Łace the prospect of closing our bases in Spain if no solution can be found. The President: Asked whether the appropriate Congressional Committees had been briefed on UN problems. Secretary Rusk said he or Assistant Secretary Sisco would brief the proper Congressmen. Ambassador Ball pointed out that there are two Senators on the U.S. delegation who will be in New York this week and will remain for a few days of the General Assembly. Secretary Rusk: Mentioned to the President that many of the Foreign Ministers coming to New York would want to come down to Washington. He said he would speak to the President later about those Foreign Ministers whom the President should see. Secretary Fowler: Said that he wished to add to the list of those wanting to come to Washington who wanted to see the President, 110 Finance Ministers and over 100 representatives of central banks. The Pr sident: A ked Secretary Ru k to ummarize the in tructions under which the negotiator in Paris were op rating. There might be ome lack of understanding and it would b good to spell out to the Council members exactly what our negotiators were trying to do. Secretary Ru k: C utioned the member to in ure th er cy of his remarks, made the following points. 1. 1V re in Pari on th ba i of th proposal the Pre ident m de on M ch 31. The North Vietnam e are in Paris on the b si of their April 3 reply. Hence, there is no agreed agen for th P ris talk . In large p rt, we h ve been talking p st ch oth r. TOP SECRE'FfSENSITIVE -6­ (Secretary Rusk, continued) Z. Our objective is peace in Southeast Asia, not a bombing halt. Therefore, we have asked continuously what would happen if we stopped the bombing. 3. We have suggested several ways in which the North Vietnamese could reply--restoration of the Demilitarized Zone, no attacks on cities, participation of the Government of South Vietnam in the negotiations, etc. We have told them that the National Liberation Front representatives may sit on the Hanoi side of the table but the North Vietnamese have refused to say that we can bring representatives of the Government of South Vietnam with us. 4. The North Vietnamese have come back with no counter proposals. They repeat merely that after we stop the bombing, they will discuss issues which either side wishes to raise. They refuse to agree to take any action which implies reciprocity for our present limitation on the bombing of North Vietnam. 5. There are three basic points --restoration of the DMZ, no attacks on cities, and no talks without the legal Government of South Vietnam. \Ve have pointed out that they must accept as a fact of life that we cannot stop the bombing without knowing that they accept the three basic points. We have made clear that we would not be able to continue negotiations if the North Vietnamese attack in the DMZ, attack cities in South Vietnam, or refuse to accept on our side repre entativ s of the South Vietnamese Government. 6. Hanoi has refused to say anything more than that the atmosphere will improve if w stop the bombing. No one can say what they would actively do. 7. If the actions of the North Vi tnamese were such to endanger our position in bombing halt, we would have to re ume bombing. We would pay a very high political co t if we resumed th bombing. Hanoi is trying to put us in the position where we would either h ve to pay this cost or accept their taking advantage of the bombing halt. 8. In today's meeting, th North Vietnam e tated c t gorically th t they would not s y, in adv nee of a bombing h lt, wheth r the S igon government could participate in the n gotiation involving the future of South Vietnam. 9. There is no r ason why we c nnot insi t th t th North Vietn mes be specific a to what thy will do. In th n gotiations involving Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Korean Armistice negoti tion , nd v n in the Berlin crisis, -TOP SECRE'P/SENSITIVE -7­ (Secretary Rusk, continued) we were dealing with specific positions. The North Vietnamese are men. There is a man-from-Mars aspect about the North Vietnamese. There is no reason why we have to approach them as if they were different, and no reason why we cannot insist that they state specifically what they are prepared to do. 10. As to the prospects of the Paris talks, it is possible that something more will develop there. It is well to recall that the North Vietnamese held out for a month for Warsaw as the site of the talks before they finally accepted Paris. 11. Both sides are now at a watershed--at a critical point: a. Hanoi may consider that our terms are such as to have an unravelling effect on their war effort, i. e. , morale of troops, Viet Cong guerillas, etc. b. Our side, Saigon, as well as our other allies could unravel if we halt the bombing for nothing, i. e. , Hanoi might say we were caving in and therefore take a harder position on items other than the bombing, our allies would be dismayed, and the Saigon government might feel we were selling them out. General Wheeler: There would be an adverse effect on the morale of our troops, on our allies and th ir troops, and on the Saigon governm nt and their troop if we were to halt the bombing for nothing in return. Gener 1 Abrams grees with this statement. The President: A ked why U Thant made his pr tatement nd what could we expect from it. Amb ssador Ball: U Thant i Burme e and wh n h is in pre conferenc , he is impelled to talk at 1 n th. Ev n Under Seer tary G n ral Bunche cknowl dg d that U Thant' pres conf r nc r ·mar 's on the bombing h lt wer fooli h. U Th nt' Vi tnam press conf renc stat ment will h v r 1 tively ittl eff ct on UN member who r mor r laxed now that talk re oing on in P ri • Th ir comments on Vietnam will be limit d bee us they do not de ire to say nything which might hinder the prcgre of the pe c talks. TOP SEGRET•SENSITIVE -8­ The President: Asked Secretary Clifford if he wished to comment. Secretary Clifford: Of the three items mentioned by Secretary Rusk--DMZ, cities and GVN participation, the shelling of cities can be a condition not precedent, but subsequent. If serious talks begin, the shelling of South Vietnamese cities would be exceedingly serious. Therefore, the conditions can be reduced to two--the DMZ and GVN participatio in the talks. The latter condition is absolute. If the North Vietnamese won't yield on this, we have no agreement. On restoration of the DMZ, we should be prepared to proceed on the assumption that Hanoi won't attack in this area during the talks. This position is based on the San Antonio Formula, i.e., that we assume the North Vietnamese would not take advantage of a bombing halt. Hanoi turned this proposal down, but since then conditions have changed so much in the last year that the President could revive this offer. The risk of doing so would be minimal The gain would be that sub­stantive negotiations would be under way. Adding up all our military assets, bombing can be said to amount to only 5 percent of 100 percent. If we halt the bombing, a very small part of our total military effort, we have perhaps a 65:35 chance of getting substantive talks resulting in a peace settlement. If Hanoi took advantage of the bombing halt, we could resume bombing. A bombing halt would not affect morale of troops or governments. It might even go up if bombing is halted, talks proceed, and the level of combat consequently decreases. We would be trading 5 percent of our efforts for talks which would likely be successful. Secretary Clifford: In response to the President's question, said his 5 percent figure was merely hypothetical. Secretary Rusk: Th~ political value of the bombing is much higher than has be n stated. If we halt the bombing, Hanoi may ju ge that we caved in because they were adamant and because world and domestic opinion forced u to giv in. Hanoi might conclude that haa ing won on the fir t point, they would move on to th last point, i.e., refuse to allow South Vietnamese participation in the substantive negotiations. The President: Thought the North Vietnamese might move on to rejecting our insistance upon aerial reconnai s nee. ~OP SE:G-P EI'/SENSITIVE Ambassador Ball: Noting that the President had not heard his heresies for a long time, said he shared Secretary Clifford's view wholeheartedly. He said our present position reminded him of the positions in the Arab-Israeli dispute, i.e., both sides dug in. As there are risks in any kind of war, there are risks also in peace-making. The risks involved in trying to get substantive discussions going with the North Vietnamese are low. The President: The North Vietnamese have rejected our San Antonio offer to reply on an assumption that they would not take advantage of the bombing halt. )\mbassador Ball: The North Vietnamese have to take this position of formal rejection but even though they do, we should act as if they understood our assumption of no advantage. We have blown up the importance of bombing way beyond life-size--at least on the basis of information made available to me. We are dealing with Orientals. They have operated on their Eastern standards for thousands of years. We must recognize the element of face in their position. Secretary Rusk: What about the face of our allies and that of other nations in Asia? Ambassador Ball: There is no loss o:f f ce for us or for our allie in proceeding to a bombing halt based on an as umption. We are providing the bulk of milit ry force. We are taking a doctrinal position on the war. We say ve1·y imply, it is aggression by the North Vietnamese. This is not a correct view. It i a Communist theory o! the war. The Rus ians are prep red to help end the Vietnam w r but they c nnot do o until the war is being fought only in South Vietnam. The Ru si ns c nnot help s long as socialist state i being attac e . Hanoi is under pr ure to negotiate, but it cannot accept quid pro quo. It i impossible for them to offer to ign a firm contract a to what they would do when the bombing h lts. --!'fOP-SECRE I1SENSITIVE -10­ ENSITIVE (Ambassador Ball, continued) We are needlessly continuing the war, resulting in the loss of lives. It is not nearly as difficult to resume the bombing as some here have said. We should ask for all three of our conditions but the North Vietnamese won't give us assurances on any of the three. We should test the good faith of the North Vietnamese by halting the bombing for, say, two weeks. The talks would begin the next day. Secretary Rusk: If we turn up with South Vietnamese representatives and the North Vietnamese refuse to go on with the meeting on the second day, would we then resume the bombing? Ambassador B 11: We have to take some risks for peace. We are now in a box which we must get out of. Hanoi wants peace. They are afraid of Mr. Nixon, consider him irresponsible, and think that he might use nuclear weapons were he elected. Secretary Cliffo Have we considered ending the Paris talk if the North Vietnamese do not move from their position? Ambassador Ball: To end the talks in Paris would be the worst possible mistake. Hanoi wants to end the war by negotiation. The Soviets can't help now because they are stopped by the attacks on North Vietnam. They do want to help. Secretary Rusk: To stop the bombing with no conditions would result in many Democrats voting for Nixon. The President: Mr. Nixon shouldn't enter into thi question in any way. The North Vietn mese feel the same way about all of u . The North Vietname e are not hell-bent on reaching agreement. Several times we have made s umptions, halted the bombing, and been di appointed. The arlier pauses didn't work. The assumption we made proved false because the North Vietnam se took dvantage of the pauses and of the Tet st nd-down. We r ked to proc ed on the th ory that they will not attack our defen s along the DMZ r the citie . They have iven us no evidence. We must h ve some reason for a suming that they will not take dvantage of th bombing halt. W cannot b e such action on hope or prayer. We need wink or nod or omething. A burned child dreads fire. Our gambles for peace have, in the p st, de d-nded. 'fOP Sl!!CRETiSENSITIVE {The President, continued) Is it prudent to halt the bombing if we then have to face an objection to Saigon's participation in the negotiations? To negotiate without the South Vietnamese would be the surest way to defeat ourselves in South Vietnam. Is it not possible to ask for an understanding? We have halted the bombing eight times without result. Ambassador Ball: The situation has changed radically--both politically and militarily since we last halted the bombing. (The President agreed.) The pause helped our worldwide position as well as our domestic position. The American people are confused and a bombing halt would clarify our policy. The President: We are not going to halt the bombing until we get something from the North Vi tnamese--participation of the South Vietnamese Government in the negotiations, no shelling of cities, and no action in the Demilitarized Zone. The decision has been made and we are not about to change it. Acceptance of a bombing halt without conditions is not in the offing. General Vvheeler: We have hard evidence that we have achieved a strong military position in Vietnam. The bombing is a much higher percentage of our total military effort than the five percent suggested. Secretary Clifford: The five percent figur is an effort to describe th percentage of our total as eta which bombing represents. If we dd up 11 our military as ets, Army, Navy, etc. , the bombing of North Vietnam comprises only five percent of our total as ets. General Wheeler: Bombing of North Vi tnam is the only pr ssure we h ve on North Vietnam. Ambassador B 11: The pressure on Hanoi is repres nted by the fighting in South Vietnam where they are suffering v ry h avy losses nd r hurting badly. General Wheeler: General Giap is quoted s aying thou and are dying today and thousand will die tomorrow. Th North Vi tn mese will send more m n into t'OP SECRE'r/SENSITIVE -l 2­ (General Wheeler, continued) South Vietnam no atter what their losses. If we stop bombing above the 17th parallel, Hanoi can m ove up forces and ammunition into the combat zone and, on short notice, hit us very hard. It will be impossible for us to resume the bombing unless the North Vietnamese take some major action--something more than refusing to negotiate with the South Vietnamese Government. A halt will adversely affect the morale of our forces and the morale of the people of South Vietnam. The unilateral action on our part will be considered a victory for the enemy and encourage him. The U.S. people, according to a recent poll, are not anxious to halt the bombing. Some 65 percent are recorded as opposing a no-condition bombing halt. It is wrong militarily to halt pressure on a weakening enemy. Politically, the action would also be wrong. All the Chiefa of Staff share this view. Deputy Secretary Nitze: We have the alternatives of continuing our present course or adopting a new course. Vl e could halt the bombing, continue our aerial reconnaissance, and bring with us to the meeting in Paris representatives of South Vietnam on the first day of the negotiations. What will the North Vietnamese do? They might shoot down our reconnaissance planes, but I doubt it. They might refu e to come to the meeting, but I think the odds r 50: 50 that th y would come. 1Ł they on•t ppear for the meeting and refuse to do eo for a week, we could e sily re ume the bombing. The problems as ociated with neutralizing the Demilitarized Zon could be worked out. Director Ma1·k What would be the military cost br two week of following the Ball propo al? General Wheeler: It is impossible to y exactly. Gen ral Abr m , on the scene, said that a bombing halt for two or three week would m ke pos ible a ub tantial build-up of North Vietname e fore a. Th y could mov up artillery, etc. , o the DMZ. In two week , th y could build up suffici nt force to mount a 1 rge off n ive. In a dition, a two-week halt would lncr e U.S. nd allied ca ualtie . Secretary Ru k: The real qu stion i how would it b po ible to hold Saigon together during the two..week p riod. TOP SECRE+/SENSITIVE The President: General Abrams has told us that if there were a bombing halt, the enemy in ten days could increase his capability five times along the DMZ. If the North Vietnamese did this, General Abrams says he would be forced to move his troops back from the DMZ line. Director Marks: The issue thus narrows down to how much risk is involved in a bombing halt. The President: If we thought they would not take a dvantage of a bombing halt in a two-week period, we would ju p at the proposal. Secretary Clifford: The basic point involved is to get a test of Hanoi1s intentions. They say if we stop the bombing, they will discuss all points which we wish to raise. If we halt the bombing, the Soviets would help along peace negotiations. General Wheeler's point is academic. The question we want answered is are these people ready to sit down to negotiate? If the North Vietnamese start building up their forces the day after the bombing is halted and talks begin, we will then know they are not sincere. Then we will know that we have been turned down and will have a eoun basis for re urning the bombing. From then on, we could go as far as we wished. The President: We have repeatedly stood down the bombing, once for ix days, and another time for 37 days. They will move as they did before. They will take advantage of our r straint. We won't be ble to conclude the next day that their intentions are clear because they won't move whole division or act in a way to make it appear that they ar taking advantage. We will have no immediate evidence. The result will be that we will be here de ting, s we have in the past, what their actions mean nd wheth r they are, in f ct, u ing the bombing halt to their military advantag . Secretary Clifford: o plan is acceptable which does not include the requirement of the North Vietn mese to accept the p rtici tion of the South Vietn meee Governm nt in the n gotiation . The President: Secretary Clifford recommend th t we drop on of the basi points and A mba sador B 11 b lieves w hould drop all thre . Our policy i to hold to all thre condition --'!OP SECRET/SENSITIVE -14­ (The President, continued) If we restrict our actions by halting the bombing, they also have to restrict their actions in the DMZ, against cities, and accept GVN participation in the talks. (Mr. Rostow handed the President a copy of the summary report of today's Tea Break in the Paris talks. Others had copies circulated during the meeting-­copy attached.) (Tab B) The President: The North Vietnamese haven't agreed on a meeting. The summary of their attitude in Paris this morning adds up to zero. They have flatly refused to discuss anything before we halt the bombing.