.1 CO I G TELEGRAM 9JJepartment ofSt~e n }v 50...,52 Adion ' BTF 0 I 5 7 .4.·s· VV EUB086FUB151 Info 00 RUEHC DE RUFDBG 2877 20/185Sz · SS 0 P 201820Z ZEA G ~FM .AMEMEASSY BONN) . 7>ECIIASSIF'IED SP TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC '.A: I L INFO RUFLC/CINCEUR uthorlty_E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D), . RUFPBW/USAFE H B.f kerz€ , NA.RS, Dat.e t/-~6 -/lb RUFPAG/USAREUR . . SAL RUDLSK/USELMLO . ~ EUR ZEN/USMISSION BERLIN ZEN/ AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 10 BT DAC C 0 N I D E N T I A L ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENTt~40§)INFO ~ . E PRIORITY BERLIN 947 MOSCOW 593 CINCEUR USAFE USAREUR USELMLO, FROM p BONN, MARCH 20, ~ PM. USIA ' REF: Moscow·s 2927 NS·C INR .. I h SUBJ: SOV NOTES OF MAR 19 CIA NSA 1. AT QUADRIPARTITE MEETIN~ THIS AFTERNOON IT WAS AGREED THAT OSD SOV NOTES MARKED HfCINNING OF 'NEW IF LIM ITE:D OFFENSIVE AGAINST FULL ALLIED USE OF AIR CORRIDORS. BRITISH, GERMANS~ AND WE ARMY TENDED TO LINK NOTES TO GROMYKO'S PARTIAL MEASURE DEMAND ON NAVY AIR CORRIDORS. ALL AGREED. THAT THEY WERE .DIFINITE SOV . EFFORT AIR NIC .. { FAA PAGE 2 RUFDBG 2877 0 N F I D E N T I A L RMR TO LEND SUPPORT TO GDR PRETENSIONS TO SOVEREIGNTY, AND THUS PART OF 'BROADER CAMPAIGN T 0 ENHANCE STATUS OF ZONt. 2. IT ~ IS STILL TOO EARLY TO KNOW PRECISE SOV AIMS IN EXERCISE, I.E. DO THEY HAVE DEFINITE OBJECTIVE OF STOPPING FLIGHTS? WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO JUDGE SERIOUSNESS OF INTENT ' UNTIL SOVS EXEMPLIFY IN PRACTICE JUST WHA"f THEY MEAN BY WITHHOLDING AIR SAFETY. IF THIS IS PASSIVE ACT,THEN SITUATION WILL BE NOTHING MORE THAN REPETITION OF WIT.HHOLDING OF SAFETY GUARANTE.E IN SOUTH CORRIDOR FROM FEB -OCTtq62. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO THREATED TO TREAT AIRCRAFT AS AIR•SPACE VIOLATORS AND THEN FOLLOW-UP WITH SOME HARASSMENTS POTENTIALLY SERIOUS ENOUGH TO ENDAGER AIRCRAFT. -2-3406, March 20, 8 p.m. from Bonn ··" IT IS LIKELY THAT MAX IM UM SOV POL IT !CAL AIM WOULD BE TO FORCE ALLIES TO DEAL WITH GDRe SI NCE NONE OF us FtLT THAT SQ,~ REGARDED THIS AS REALISTIC, QUADRIPARTITE vIEW WAS TO LOOK FOR MINOR AND MORE LIMITED OBJECTIVES. TWO SUCH OBJECTIVES COULD BE: A>~ TO SATISFY INSISTENT GDR DEMANDS FOR A SHARE OF AIR SPACE RESPONSIBILITY BY FORMALLY ENDORSING GDR POSITION WITH SPECIFIC SOV BASC INSTRUCT IONS, WHICH HOWEVER, C~N BE INTERPRETED IN SO SLACK A MANNER AS T 0 AVOID. PRECIPITATING ) PAGE 3 RUFDBG 2877 C 0 N F I D E T I A L SERIOUS SHOWDOWN; AND B> TO PUBLICIZE ENTIRE MArTER iN SUCH J WAS AS TO FRIGHTEN FLYING PUBLIC FROM USING THES-E-F[!"GHTS~-:.·-·-n 4. US REP POINTED OUT THAT SOV NOTES CHOSE LANGHAGE WHICH WAS MUC~ MORE RESTRAINED THAN GDR AUSSENPOLITISCHE KORRESPONDENZ · C01111ENT OF FEB 21, DIRECTED TO PROSPECTIVE .PANAM NEW YORK ­BERLIN SERVICES. GDR COM1ENT WE"'T SO FAR AS TO CLAIM THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIR CORRIDORS HAS LAPSED. · sov · NOTES ·sroPPED . FOR SHORT OF IMPLYING T.HIS. 5. FRENCH POINTED OUT DISTINCTIONS IN NOTE AND BASC STATEMENT, IN THAT BOTH FOCUSSED ATTENTION ON IN!ERNATIONAL FLIGHTS FROM FR0.·1 BERLIN TO EUROPEAN CITIES NOT SITUATED .IN FRANCE OR UK. ALTHOUGH REFERENCE TO FLIGHTS 10 "AMERICA"cOULD ..INDIRECTLY REFER TO PANAM 'S N~W YORK -BERLIN PLAN, SPECIFIC EMPHASIS WAS ON FLIGHTS TO cou~RIES OTHER THAN THOSE OF BERLIN PROTECTING POWERS. _._ ~ · 6. BRITISH AND FRENCJ{ ~ : ·= =----~ . CONSIDERED THAT RESPONSE TO 1945 CONTROL COUNCIL DIScuSSIONS sov DID NOT SUPPORT THEIR CASE IN NOTE. 7. ACTION RECX>MMENDATIONS OF MEETING.WERE REPORTED SEPARATELY. EMBAss'v COMMENT: IT IS HARD TO SAY EXACTLY WHAT LEGAL IMPLICATIONS SOVS INTEND ,,1 PAGE 4 RUFDBG 2877 0 F I D E N I A L TE TO ATT CH TO ADMONITION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL·FLI H~~suc~OFLIGHTS TO INDICA. E THAT USSR WOUL~, CONTINUE: TO HANDL 1 E IAL .-• .z. • CONFIDENTIAL~ -3-3406, March 20, 8 p.m. from Bonn IN BASC, PROVIDED THEY WRE REGUL AR IZED BY GDR CO~CURRENCE. IT IS FAIRLY OBVIOUS HOWEVER, THAT A Y ATTEMPTS TO GAIN STJCH CO. CURRENCE WOULD PROBABLY BE BROUGH""" UNDER Pn°VIEW OF GDR AIR DECREE OF AUG 1, 1963. PROVISIONS OF THED: DECREE IN ESSENCE PROVIDE FOR FULL SCALE GDR AIR TR AFFIC CONTROL, E.G. ALL COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS ARE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT WITH ZONAL ATC, AND MUST HAVE PR I OR ATr APPROVAL(BERLIN'S TEL 239, AUG 26, 1963). AIRCRAFT WHICH DO NOT COMPLY CAN BE FORCED TO LAND BY GDR AIRCRAFT. EMB CONSIDERS THAT THERE .IS FAIR CH ANCE THAT SOVS WILL ?t'SH ACTION ON NOTE IN LOW KEY AND NON-DANGEROUS MANNER. NOTE IS HOWEVER, MORE SHARPLY DEF IN l:: l.) LEGAL STATEMENT. OF POSIT ION THAN WERE SOV DEMANDS OF FEB 1962. LATTER WERE LARGELY PROCEDURAL, AND CONVEYED ORALLY AT · BASC LEVEL. THEY THUS DID NOT FORMALLY ENGAGE SOV PRESTIGE. ALTHOUGH LEVEL OF INTERFERENCE, AND SCOPE OF DEMANDS IN 1962, WERE SUCH AS. TO CONSTITUTE MAJOR CHALLENGE TO OUR ENT IRE AIR ACCESS, THEY CONSTITUTED POSIT ION FROM WHICH · PAGE 45 RUFDBG 2877 0 , ... ... ll a I A L IT WAS EASIER TO BACK DOWN AND v CLOSE OUT EXERCISE. IN cONTRAST ' THIS NOTE STATES DEMANDS FOR MALLY AND UPON BASIS OF LEGAL . PREMISES, WHICH SOVS CANNOT REALLY AFFORD O?ENL Y TO ABANDON. · SINCE NOTE WILL BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO REMOVE FROM RECORD, IT SEEMS THAT ONLY FREEDOM OF MANEUVER SOVS HAVE LEFT THEMSELVES IS I WAY THEY REGISTER DISAPPROVAL OF OUR F~IGHTS. GP-4 HILLENBRANO Advance copy to S/S-0 3-20-64 3:30 p.m. Passed to White House 3-20-64 4:55 p.m. r . ( .' ...'