

~~SECRET~~

Ambassy WA SAW

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 2-8-01

STATE

EXDIS

THE
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM AMBASSY SECRETARY
Re Warsaw's 293

1. We have studied your message with great care and we commend your

efforts to explore usefulness of this channel in light of your July 25
talk with Michalowski. We wish to encourage Poles and Michalowski in
initiating negotiations in one way or another.

2. We nevertheless see serious pitfalls in device of interpreting

Hanoi's third point in terms of Ho's description of NLF program contained
in para 7 of his January 24 letter. Ho's description is manifestly
incomplete and designed to counter US 14 points. Elsewhere in same
letter Ho once again insists that "if US really wants peace it must
recognize NLFSV as sole genuine representative of people of South Viet-Nam
and engage in negotiations with it." Moreover, Ho's rejection of 14
points as essentially designed to maintain US "puppet administration" is
consistent with first point of NLF program which calls for "overthrow
of disguised colonial regime of US imperialists" -- language which
incidentally highlights basic insurrectionary aim of NLF program.

3. In addition, Ho's tacit assumption throughout this letter (and other
NVN message before and since) that an "independent" SVN must by

FE/VN:Wishamjm 8-8 4536

FE/VN - Mr. Miller

FE - Mr. Unger

FE/SEA - Mr. Jacobson

CSO/ISA - Mr. McNaughton

S/S - Mr. Walsh

The
Under Secretary

S/AN - Amb. Harriman

S/AL - Amb. Thompson

White House - Mr. Jordan

~~SECRET~~

WARSAW

~~SECRET~~

definition be hostile to US is also paralleled by point eight of NLF program which includes call for cancellation of "all unequal treaties signed with foreign countries by US henchmen which violate national sovereignty."

4. In brief, we feel that the elements of essential parallelism between Ho's letter and NLF program are compelling. In our view, to single out any single phrase of letter to serve as bridge between US and NVN positions would at this juncture be stretching matters too far for either credibility or sound negotiating position. We would be most reluctant to modify our stated negotiating position without much harder evidence of Hanoi's willingness to reciprocate.

5. In this latter connection, we would think it valuable for you to probe at earliest appropriate opportunity basis for Michalowski's brushing off Hanoi NLF's "sole genuine representative" claim as not being part of four points. Strictly speaking, of course, he is correct, but this is immaterial since point three in particular, by seeming to stress NLF program as only basis for settling VN affairs, leads us back to totally unacceptable provisions of program which would permit neither self-determination, neutrality or independence in accepted sense of those words.

6. Believe you should tell Michalowski that one of the principal difficulties we encounter in considering four points is their ambiguity. Point three in particular has been interpreted in different, even contradictory ways by Hanoi and its friends.

If Michalowski believes there is disposition in Hanoi to clarify or reinterpret meaning or significance of point three, as it relates to NLF role in settlement, ^{this could be} ~~useful contribution.~~

~~Under no circumstances should you judge that the four points are a basis for any form~~

~~negotiation~~

GP-8

END