



Department of State

S 223  
**TELEGRAM**

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ACTION EUR 20

INFO SA 01,SAH 02,SAL 01,CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,  
NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,NIC 01,NSA 02,E 15,CU 04,  
SCI 05,COM 08,TRSY 11,ACDA 16,IO 13,RSR 01,/165 W  
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R 201644Z AUG 68  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9579  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BONN 15817

SUBJECT: STRAUSS' VIEWS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EUROPEAN UNITY

1. DURING A LUNCHEON CONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR, STRAUSS  
EXPRESSED THE FOLLOWING VIEWS:

2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. STRAUSS STRONGLY FAVORED GIVING ECONOMIC  
ASSISTANCE TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BUT FELT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO LET  
THE CZECHS SET THE PACE. THE BEST MEANS FOR CHANNELING LOANS  
WOULD BE THROUGH COMMERCIAL BANKS, ALTHOUGH ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE  
WOULD BE THE COMMON MARKET'S EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK. STRAUSS  
DID NOT FEEL USING A NEUTRAL COUNTRY, LIKE AUSTRIA, WAS A VERY  
LIKELY POSSIBILITY. STRAUSS SAID THAT THE CZECHS WERE MUCH  
INTERESTED IN THE IDEA OF A PRAGUE-NUREMBERG AUTOBAHN. THE FRG  
WAS NATURALLY HIGHLY FAVORABLE, IT WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE  
CONTACT.

3. STRAUSS COMMENTED THAT ULBRICHT'S POPULARITY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
HAS SUNK TO AN ALL-TIME LOW. HE NOW RANKS ALONG WITH HITLER AS  
THE "MOST HATED MAN" IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

4. EUROPEAN UNITY. STRAUSS STRESSED, IN WHAT HAVE NOW BECOME FOR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By BM/c, NARA, Date 1-12-06

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HIM STANDARD TERMS, THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN UNITY. HE REFERRED TO HIS OWN BOOK, WHICH IS COMING OUT IN GERMANY IN SEPTEMBER, AND WHICH MAKES A STRONG PLEA FOR EUROPEAN UNITY. HE SAID THAT EUROPE, IF IT IS TO PLAY ANY KIND OF ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY, MUST UNITE. HE ADDED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A FOLLOWER OF A GREAT MANY OF DE GAULLE'S POLICIES, HE PARTS COMPANY WITH DE GAULLE ON TWO FUNDAMENTAL POINTS: (A) HIS FLIRTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, BASED ON A NAIVE ASSUMPTION THAT FRANCE CAN COMPETE WITH THE USSR ON EQUAL TERMS; AND (B) HIS VIRULENT ANTI-AMERICANISM.

5. STRAUSS REFERRED TO KIESINGER'S RENEWED EFFORTS TO PUSH FOR EUROPEAN UNITY. HE SAID KIESINGER'S NO. 1 OBJECTIVE IN HIS SEPTEMBER 27-28 MEETING WITH DE GAULLE IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER DE GAULLE, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE MAY EVENTS IN FRANCE, IS NOW READY TO BE MORE AMENABLE TOWARD STEPS TOWARD TRUE EUROPEAN UNITY.

LODGE

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