

Copyright

by

Vladimir Kulić

2009

The Dissertation Committee for Vladimir Kulić
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

**LAND OF THE IN-BETWEEN:
MODERN ARCHITECTURE AND THE STATE
IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA, 1945-65**

Committee:

Danilo Udovički Selb, Supervisor

Anthony Alofsin

Gregory Castillo

Richard Cleary

Christopher Long

Mary Neuburger

**LAND OF THE IN-BETWEEN:
MODERN ARCHITECTURE AND THE STATE
IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA, 1945-65**

by

Vladimir Kulić, M.S.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2009

To my parents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe gratitude to numerous donors whose generous contributions made the research for, and the writing of, this dissertation possible. I received a 2007 Trustees Merit Citation from the Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts. Prior to that, I also received a John Anson Kittredge Educational Fund Grant. From the School of Graduate Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, I received a William S. Livingston Endowed Graduate Fellowship (2006-07), A. D. Hutchinson Endowed Graduate Fellowship (2003-04), and two Professional Development Awards (2006 and 2007). From the School of Architecture, University of Texas at Austin, I received a Carl O. Bergquist Endowed Scholarship (2002), Bartlett Cocke Endowed Scholarship (2001), and three Mebane Travel Grants (2004, 2006, and 2007). Finally, a generous loan from Rada Galetin Smith made my arrival in the United States possible.

Thanks to my professors at the Ph.D. Program in the History of Architecture, my studies at UT were an exciting and fulfilling experience. First of all, I am grateful to my supervisor, Danilo Udovički Selb, for his relentless support and enthusiasm, and the countless hours devoted to discussing, reading, and editing my work. Christopher Long made my landing in Austin smooth and has been a supportive teacher and a good friend ever since. Anthony Alofsin offered me a chance to witness the process of writing an exciting and masterful book; I

benefited tremendously from that experience. Finally, Richard Cleary taught me how to teach over the many semesters that I TA'd in his classes.

My two outside readers, Greg Castillo and Mary Neuburger, provided invaluable suggestions and comments on my work. I owe them my warmest thanks for their time and effort.

A reduced teaching load in my first semester at the School of Architecture, Florida Atlantic University, enabled me to write, in spite of the stress of moving from Texas to Florida. My sincerest thanks to Dr. Rosalyn Carter, Dean of the College of Architecture, Urban and Public Affairs, and to Aron Temkin, Director of the School.

During my research, I interviewed numerous architects and historians around former Yugoslavia. Bogdan Bogdanović spent many days talking to me; I thank him and his wife Ksenija for their generosity. Many other people were kind enough to share their experiences and knowledge with me: Braco Mušič and Stane Bernik in Ljubljana; Aleksander Laslo in Zagreb; Zlatko Ugljen and Ivan Štraus in Sarajevo; Miodrag Protić, Irina Subotić, and Aleksandar Janković in Belgrade; and Boris Čipan, Georgi Konstantinovski, Petar Muličkovski, and Slavko Brezoski in Skopje.

The generous staff at the Archive of Serbia and Montenegro made the three months of research I spent there easy and enjoyable. I also thank the librarians at the Schools of Architecture in Skopje, Belgrade, and Zagreb, and the Academy of Sciences and Arts in Skopje. Aleksandra Mirčić at the Museum of

Contemporary Art and Marta Vukotić Lazar at the Institute of Urban Planning, both in Belgrade, as well as Dubravka Kisić at the Museum of Architecture in Zagreb were most helpful, too.

So many colleagues and friends helped me with my research that it seems almost inevitable that I will fail to mention someone; I am, however, sincerely grateful to them all. In Ljubljana, I owe my gratitude to Nataša Koselj, Ira and Helena Zorko, Tomaž Krušec, Petra Čeferin, and Tadej Glažar; in Zagreb, to Karin Šerman, Dubravko Bačić, Ines Tolić, and, last but not least, Maroje Mrduljaš; in Sarajevo to Boris Cindrić; in Belgrade, to Irina Subotić, Predrag Marković, Aleksandra Mirčić, Jelena Živančević, Irena Šentevska, Aleksandar Ignjatović, Tanja Damljanović, and Stanislava Antolić; in Skopje, to Kole and Lena Malinov, Nikola Gelev, Iskra Gešovska, Cvetan Grozdanov, and Kokan Grčev. Finally, my friends Monica Penick and Timothy Parker in Austin were supportive companions on our shared trip to graduation.

Without the support of my family, all my efforts would be in vain. Finally, I am eternally indebted to Tim for his love and patience.

**LAND OF THE IN-BETWEEN:
MODERN ARCHITECTURE AND THE STATE
IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA, 1945-65**

Vladimir Kulić, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2009

Supervisor: Danilo Udovički Selb

Land of the In-Between explores how modern architecture responded to demands for political and ideological representation during the Cold War using socialist Yugoslavia as a case-study. Self proclaimed as universal and abstract, modernism acquired a variety of specific meanings hidden behind seemingly neutral forms that, however, frequently contained decidedly political dimensions. During the Cold War, Yugoslavia deliberately positioned itself halfway between the Eastern and Western blocs, thus representing an excellent case for a study of shifting political meanings ascribed to architecture at that time.

This dissertation follows two lines of investigation: transformations of architectural profession, and changes in the modes of architectural representation of the state. Consequences of two key moments are explored: the rise to power of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1945, and its expulsion from the Soviet bloc in 1948. These two moments correspond to two distinct phases that shaped architecture in socialist Yugoslavia: a period of intense

Stalinization immediately after WW II, and a period of gradual liberalization after the country's sudden break-up with the Soviet Union. During the short-lived Stalinist period, the regime subjected Yugoslav culture to the doctrine of Socialist Realism. But after 1948, the state relaxed its iron grip, allowing for a degree of intellectual and artistic freedom. At the same time, Yugoslavia reestablished friendly relations with the West, opening itself to influences of Western culture. The revival of modern architecture that followed was in return instrumental in reinforcing Yugoslavia's new image of a reformed Communist country.

Land of the In-Between argues that Yugoslavia's political shifts gave rise to a uniquely hybrid architectural culture. It combined Communist ideology with Western aesthetic and technological influences to create a mix that complicated the common black and white picture of the Cold War. Architecture in socialist Yugoslavia thus operated within a complex framework of shifting political and cultural paradigms whose contrasts highlight the meanings that post-World War II modernism assumed on a global scale.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
A Land of Multiple Between-ness.....	3
On the Methodology.....	9
Chapter 1: Architectural culture in a Stalinist state	19
Architecture in a Planned Economy.....	23
Architecture in the “Agitprop Culture”.....	44
Theorizing Socialist Realism.....	60
Chapter 2: Power Asserted	74
A Prelude for Socialist Realism: The Red Army Monument at Batina....	77
Constructing a Cult: Tito’s Three White Houses.....	90
Chapter 3: The Beloved Capital	125
New Belgrade and Its Meanings.....	128
Architects and Politicians: Designing New Belgrade.....	142
City Constructed and Aborted.....	169
Chapter 4: Destalinization	176
Liberalizing Architecture.....	181
Opening.....	191

Appropriating Le Corbusier.....	198
Chapter 5: Navigating the Cold War.....	211
Constructing a “Wedge:”	
Architecture and US Engagement in Yugoslavia.....	213
Transcending the Cold War: The Reconstruction of Skopje.....	236
Chapter 6: The State Represented.....	253
Dobrović’s Generalštab and the Politics of Interpretation.....	255
The ‘Super-international Style’ of a ‘New’ New Belgrade.....	271
Vjenceslav Richter:	
An Avant-garde Architect for an Avant-garde Socialism.....	305
Conclusion.....	323
Illustrations.....	331
Appendix: Biographies of Architects.....	448
Bibliography.....	462
Vita.....	479

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 1.1:

Clearing up the rubble in Belgrade, 1945. ASCG, Fond Sindikat, Fascikla 7:

Razno.

Fig. 1.2:

a. Mihailo Mitrović: Railway Station in Zenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina), c. 1948.

Arhitektura II, no. 8-10 (March, April, May, 1948): 39.

b. Vjenceslav Richter and Emil Weber (painter): Pavilion of Yugoslavia at the International Fair in Brussels, c. 1948. *Arhitektura* II, no. 13-17 (1948): 106.

Fig. 1.3:

Antun Ulrich and Dragica Perak: Workers' Resort, Oteševo (Macedonia), 1950.

Arhitektura IV, no. 1-2, (1950): 32.

Fig. 1.4:

a. Volunteers at work in Marinkova bara near Belgrade, c. 1945. ASCG, Fond: Sindikat, Fascikla 7: Razno.

b. Performance for the volunteers at the construction of New Belgrade, c. 1948.

Ibid.

Fig. 1.5:

Standardized housing in Obrenovac (Serbia) and Zenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina), late 1940s. "Kako ne treba raditi: jednoobrazna naselja." *Naše građevinarstvo* II, no. 4-5 (April-May 1948): 443-45.

Fig. 1.6:

Ivo Vitić: Typical apartment building for Belgrade, competition entry, 1947.

Arhitektura I, no. 1-2 (August, 1948): 37.

Fig. 1.7:

a. Lavoslav Horvat: Standardized cooperative houses for Croatia. *Arhitektura* II, no. 7 (February, 1948): 18.

b. Jovan Krunic: Standardized cooperative houses for Serbia. *Arhitektura* II, no. 11-12 (May-June, 1948): 30.

Fig. 1.8:

Kohout, Prohaska, and Hacar: Railway Station, Sarajevo, 1950 (finished by Bogdan Stojkov). Photo by author.

Fig. 1.9:

Moisei Ginzburg: Sanatorium (Workers' Resort), Kislovodsk, published in: *Tehnika* (Belgrade) I, no. 4-5 (April-May, 1946): 121, 122.

Fig. 1.10:

Neven Šegvić: Apartment building at Moscow St., Zagreb, 1950. *Arhitektura* IV, no. 1-2, (1950): 41.

Fig. 2.1

Terazije Square in Belgrade decorated to celebrate the Fifth Congress of the CPY, 1948. ASCG, Fond: Sindikat, Fascikla 7: Razno.

Fig. 2.2

Red Army Captain Feldman: Design for the Monument to the Red Army at Batina (Croatia), June 1945. ASCG, Fond 13: Ministarstvo građevina FNRJ, Fascikla 85: Gradnja Spomenika pobjede u Batinoj skeli.

Figs. 3.3-3.6

Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army in Batina (Croatia), 1945-47. Photo by author.

Fig. 2.7

Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army, plans of the obelisk, Batina (Croatia), 1945-47. ASCG, Fond 13: Ministarstvo građevina FNRJ, Fascikla 85: Gradnja Spomenika pobjede u Batinoj skeli.

Fig. 2.8

Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army in Batina (Croatia), 1945-47. Photo by author.

Fig. 2.9

Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army in Batina (Croatia), 1945-47. Photo by author.

Fig. 2.10

Ivan Meštrović: Victor, Belgrade, 1913-1928. Photo by author.

Fig. 2.11

a. Aleksandar Bugarski: Old Court, Belgrade, 1882-84. Photo by author.

b. Stojan Titelbah: New Court, Belgrade, 1911-22. Photo by author.

Fig. 2.12

a. Tito at the Armistice Day in Belgrade, 1947. *Jugoslavija-SSSR* III, no. 19 (May, 1947), cover page.

Fig. 2.13

Tito's birthhouse, Kumrovec (Croatia), c. 1860; on the right, Antun Augustinčić's sculpture of Tito, 1948. Photo by author.

Fig. 2.14

Tito's birthhouse, interior, Kumrovec (Croatia), 1950. Photo by author.

Fig. 2.15

Vladeta Petrić and Boško Karanović: Youth Relay Baton, 1957. Photo by author.

Fig. 2.16

The arrival of Tito's Relay in Novi Sad (Serbia), 1948. ASCG, Fond Sindikat, Fascikla 7: Razno.

Fig. 2.17

Mihailo Janković and Kosta Popović: Yugoslav People's Army Stadium, Belgrade, 1947-51. Collection: Aleksandar Janković.

Fig. 2.18

Mihailo Janković: Museum 25 May, Belgrade, 1962. Photo by author.

Fig. 3.1

Juraj Neidhardt and Branko Simčić: Design for the Parliament of Slovenia, first prize at the competition, Ljubljana, 1947. Dušan Grabrijan, "Natečaj za ljudsko

skupščino Ljudske Republike Slovenije v Ljubljani,” in: *Arhitektura* II, no. 7 (February 1948): 11-13.

Fig. 3.2

Map of the city of Belgrade; the future New Belgrade in circle. *Novi Beograd 1961* (Belgrade: Direkcija za izgradnju Novog Beograda, 1961), 21.

Fig. 3.3

S. Mancini: View of Belgrade from Zemun, gravure, Vienna, 1780s. NBS, call no. GR 0414, available at: www.digital.nbs.bg.ac.yu.

Fig. 3.4

Headline “Belgrade-Moscow,” implying the political and symbolic proximity of the two cities.” Ninko Petrović, “Beograd-Moskva,” in: *Jugoslavija—SSSR* III, no.32 (June, 1948): 1.

Fig. 3.5

Nikola Dobrović: Federal Parliament on the Kalemegdan Fortress, Belgrade, 1946. Nikola Dobrović, “Obnova i izgradnja Beograda. Konture budućeg grada,” in: *Tehnika* I, no. 6 (June, 1946): 181.

Fig. 3.6

Edvard Ravnikar: Master plan of New Belgrade, competition entry, 1947. Josip Seissel, : Josip Seissel, “Konkurs za urbanistički plan Novog Beograda,” in: *Arhitektura* I, no. 3 (October, 1947): 18.

Fig. 3.7

Institute of Urban Planning of Serbia (under direction of Nikola Dobrović): Master plan of New Belgrade, competition entry, 1947. *Ibid.*, 19.

Fig. 3.8

Institute of Urban Planning of Serbia (under direction of Nikola Dobrović): Master plan of New Belgrade, competition entry, alternative version, 1947. *Ibid.*, 20.

Fig. 3.9

Marijan Haberle, Milan Tomičić, Juraj Bertol, Mila Poletti, and Galina Feldt: Presidency of federal government of Yugoslavia, competition entry, third prize, New Belgrade, 1947. Milorad Macura, "Problematika naše arhitekture u svetlosti konkursa za zgradu Pretsedništva Vlade FNRJ," in: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 1, no. 3 (October, 1947), 13.

Fig. 3.10

Vladimir Turina, Drago Boltar, and Radovan Nikšić: Central Committee of the CPY, competition entry, honorable mention, New Belgrade, 1947. Bratislav Stojanović, "Konkursi za dom Centralnog komiteta KPJ i zgradu Pretsedništva vlade FNRJ," in: *Tehnika* II, no. 6 (1947): 141-47.

Fig. 3.11

Antun Augustinčić, Drago Galić, Neven Šegvić, and Branko Bon: Presidency of the Federal government of Yugoslavia, competition entry, second prize, alternative version, New Belgrade, 1947. Macura, "Problematika naše arhitekture," 7-8.

Fig. 3.12

Antun Augustinčić, Drago Galić, Neven Šegvić, and Branko Bon: Central Committee of the CPY, competition entry, second prize, third ranking, New Belgrade, 1947. Neven Šegvić, “Stvaralačke komponente arhitekture FNRJ,” in: *Arhitektura* IV, no. 5-6 (1956): 32, Fig. 54; and Stojanović, “Konkursi za dom Centralnog komiteta KPJ,” 143.

Fig. 3.13

Neven Šegvić: Central Committee of the CPY, preliminary study, New Belgrade, 1947. Šegvić, “Stvaralačke komponente arhitekture FNRJ,” 32, Fig. 53.

Fig. 3.14

a. Mladen Kauzlarić, Lavoslav Horvat and Kazimir Ostrogović: Luxury hotel, first prize, competition entry, New Belgrade, 1947. “Hotel Beograd,” in: *Arhitektura* I, no. 3 (October, 1947): 23.

b. Design Institute of Serbia: Luxury hotel, second prize, competition entry, New Belgrade, 1947. Stojanović, “Konkursi za dom Centralnog komiteta KPJ,” 145.

Fig. 3.15

Vladimir Potočnjak, Zlatko Neimann, Antun Ulrich, and Dragica Perak: Presidency of the Federal government of Yugoslavia, competition entry, first prize, New Belgrade, 1947. Macura, “Problematika naše arhitekture,” 3, 5.

Fig. 3.16

Vladimir Potočnjak, Zlatko Neimann, Antun Ulrich, and Dragica Perak:
Presidency of the Federal government of Yugoslavia, construction drawings,
New Belgrade, 1948. ASCG, Fond: Projekti zgrade SIV, Fascikla: A6.

Fig. 3.17

Institute of Urban Planning of Serbia (under direction of Nikola Dobrović): Central
Committee of the CPY, competition entry, second prize, second ranking, New
Belgrade, 1947. Stojanović, "Konkursi za dom Centralnog komiteta KPJ," 141.

Fig. 3.18

Edvard Ravnikar: Central Committee of the CPY, competition entry, second
prize, first ranking, New Belgrade, 1947. *Tehnika* II, no. 6 (1947): front cover.

Fig. 3.19

Edvard Ravnikar: Presidency of the Federal government of Yugoslavia,
competition entry, third prize, New Belgrade, 1947. Edvard Ravnikar, "Palača
Predsedstva Vlade FLRJ v Beogradu," in: *Arhitektura* I-II, no. 4-6
(November/December 1947-January 1948): 40-41.

Fig. 3.20

a. Edvard Ravnikar: Great Yugoslav Opera House, competition entry, third prize,
Belgrade, 1948. Dušan Grabrijan, "Natečaj za ljudsko skupščino Ljudske
Republike Slovenije v Ljubljani," in: *Arhitektura* II, no. 7 (February 1948): 9.

b. Edvard Ravnikar and Jožica Strašek: Central Post Office, competition entry, first prize *ex equo*, Ljubljana, 1947. "Natečaj za novo Centralno pošto v Ljubljani," in: *Arhitektura* I-II, no. 4-6, (November/December, 1947-January, 1948): 43.

Fig. 3.21

Tito receives representatives of engineers and architects in the White Palace, Belgrade, 1947. "Graditeljstvo u Petogodišnjem planu," in: *Arhitektura* I, no. 1 (August, 1947): 5.

Fig. 3.22

Antun Augustinčić, Drago Galić, Neven Šegvić, and Branko Bon: Central Committee of the CPY, competition entry, second round, New Belgrade, 1947. Šegvić, "Stvaralačke komponente arhitekture FNRJ," 35, Fig. 61.

Fig. 3.23

Branko Bon: Central Committee of the CPY, studies, New Belgrade, 1947. Neven Šegvić, "Stvaralačke komponente arhitekture FNRJ." In: *Arhitektura* IV, no. 5-6 (1956): 36, Figs. 62, 63.

Fig. 3.24

"From the construction site of New Belgrade," photomontage with the luxury hotel in the background. *Jugoslavija—SSSR* III, no.32 (June, 1948): n.p.

Fig. 3.25

Volunteer youth brigades on the construction site of New Belgrade, 1948. Nikola Dobrović, "Izgradnja Novog Beograda" in: *Jugoslavija—SSSR* III, no.32 (June, 1948): 8.

Fig. 3.26

Construction site of the Presidency of Federal government, New Belgrade, 1948.

Naše građevinarstvo, II, no. 12 (December, 1948): front cover.

Fig. 4.1

Ivo Vitić: Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, Zagreb,

1961-68. Photo by author.

Fig. 4.2

Front cover of *Arhitekt* (Ljubljana), no. 2 (1952). Photo by author.

Fig. 4.3

Front cover of *Arhitektura Urbanizam* (Belgrade), no. 2 (1960). Photo by author.

Fig. 4.4

Article on Le Corbusier's *Unité d'habitation*, published in *Arhitektura* no. 25-27 (1949).

Fig. 4.5

Milorad Macura: Military Institute of Geography, Belgrade, 1950-53. Photo by author.

Fig. 4.6

Drago Galić: Apartment building at Proleterskih brigada, Zagreb, 1953-54. Photo by author.

Fig. 4.7

Edo Mihevc: Kozolec Apartment Block, Ljubljana, 1957. Photo by author.

Fig. 4.8

Juraj Neidhardt: Apartment buildings in Đure Đakovića St. (today Alipašina), Sarajevo, 1958. Photo by author.

Fig. 4.9

Juraj Neidhardt: Traditional Bosnian *divanhana* (glazed living room), from *Architecture of Bosnia and the Way to Modernity* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1957).

Fig. 4.10

Juraj Neidhardt: Sketch for a modern residential neighborhood in Bosnia. *Ibid.*

Fig. 4.11

Juraj Neidhardt: Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 1955, competition entry, 1st prize, *ibid.*

Fig. 4.12

Juraj Neidhardt: Parts of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina interpreted as elements of traditional typologies; the inscriptions read (counter-clock-wise from left): clock-tower, atrium, shell, *doksat*, porch. *Ibid.*

Fig. 5.1

Page from the catalogue of the exhibition of Yugoslav architecture in Rabat, Morocco, 1951. *Exposition internationale d'architecture de l'Union Internationale des Architectes / Rabat Maroc 1951: RFP Yougoslavie*, exhibition catalogue (Ljubljana: Conseil des Associations des Architectes Yougoslaves, 1951), n.p.

Fig. 5.2

Cover page of the catalogue of the exhibition “Contemporary Art in the USA,” 1956. Photo by author.

Fig. 5.3

Josip Hitil, Slobodan Jovičić, and Ivo Žuljević: Skyscraper at the Republic Square, Zagreb, 1960. *Arhitektura Urbanizam* (Belgrade) 1, no. 1 (1960): 14.

Fig. 5.4

Ivo Vitić: Pavilion of West Germany, Zagreb Fair, 1957. Photo by author.

Fig. 5.5

Bernardo Bernardi: Pavilion of “Mašinogradnja,” Zagreb Fair, 1957. Photo by author

Fig. 5.6

Plans of new self-service stores in Slovenia: Celje (top) and Ljubljana (bottom). Published in *Arhitekt* (Ljubljana), 1, no. 3 (1960).

Fig. 5.7

Kenzo Tange: Plan of the Downtown Skopje, competition entry, 1965. *Arhitektura Urbanizam* (Belgrade), 7, no. 39 (1966): 15.

Fig. 5.8

Alfred Roth: Pestalozzi Elementary School, Skopje, 1967. Photo by author.

Fig. 5.9

Performance hall donated by Bulgaria, Skopje. Photo by author.

Fig. 5.10

Jerzy Morzynski, Eugeniusz Wierzbicki, and Waclaw Klyszevski: Museum of Contemporary Art, Skopje, 1970. Photo by author.

Fig. 5.11

Petar Muličkoski: Central Committee of the League of Communists of Macedonia (today Government of Macedonia), Skopje, 1970. Photo by author.

Fig. 5.12

Georgi Konstantinovski: City Archive, Skopje, 1966. Courtesy of Georgi Konstantinovski.

Fig. 5.13

Georgi Konstantinovski: Student dormitory “Goce Delčev,” Skopje, 1969. Photo by author.

Fig. 5.14

Georgi Konstantinovski: Memorial center, Razlovci (Macedonia), 1979. Courtesy of Georgi Konstantinovski.

Fig. 5.15

Janko Konstantinov: Telecommunication center, Skopje, 1971-74. Photo by author.

Fig. 6.1

Kazimir Ostrogović: City Hall, Zagreb, 1956. Photo by author.

Fig. 6.2

Nikola Dobrović: Fedral Ministry of Defense and Headquarters of Yugoslav People's Army (the *Generalštab*), Belgrade, 1954-63. Courtesy of Wolfgang Thaler ©.

Fig. 6.3

Nikola Dobrović: Diagrams of “visual tensions,” from “Space in Motion—Bergson's “dynamic schemes” —New Visual Environment,” 1960. *Čovjek i prostor* (Zagreb) 7, no. 100 (1960): 10-11.

Fig. 6.4

Nikola Dobrović: Diagram of “growth” of forms, from “Space in Motion—Bergson's “dynamic schemes” —New Visual Environment,” 1960. *Čovjek i prostor* (Zagreb) 7, no. 100 (1960): 10-11.

6.5

Nikola Dobrović: Alternative version of cascades, from “Space in Motion—Bergson's “dynamic schemes” —New Visual Environment,” 1960. *Čovjek i prostor* (Zagreb) 7, no. 100 (1960): 10-11.

Fig. 6.6

New Belgrade in the early 1960s. Courtesy of Aleksandar Janković.

Fig. 6.7

Mihailo Janković: Federal Executive Council (SIV), New Belgrade, 1954-62. Courtesy of Wolfgang Thaler ©.

Fig. 6.8

Mihailo Janković: Sketch for the Federal Executive Council (SIV), New Belgrade, 1955. ASCG, Fond Projekti zgrade SIV, Fascikla SIV Idejni projekat 1954-58.

Fig. 6.9

Mihailo Janković: Sketch for the Federal Executive Council (SIV), New Belgrade, 1955. ASCG, Fond Projekti zgrade SIV, Fascikla SIV Idejni projekat 1954-58.

Fig. 6.10

Mihailo Janković: Federal Executive Council (SIV), New Belgrade, 1954-62.

Courtesy of Wolfgang Thaler ©.

Fig. 6.11

Mihailo Janković: Federal Executive Council (SIV), New Belgrade, 1954-62.

Photo by author.

Fig. 6.12

Mihailo Janković, Dušan Milenković, and Mirjana Marjanović: Building of Social and Political Organizations (known as the CK), competition entry, New Belgrade, 1959. Courtesy of Aleksandar Janković.

Fig. 6.13

Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: Building of Social and Political Organizations, perspective, New Belgrade, 1960. Courtesy of Aleksandar Janković.

Fig. 6.14

Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: The CK building as finished, New Belgrade, 1959-64. Courtesy of Aleksandar Janković.

Fig. 6.15

Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: Perimeter structure of the CK building during reconstruction, 2002. Courtesy of Damir Kovačić.

Fig. 6.16

Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: The CK building, facade, New Belgrade, 1959-64. Photo by author.

Fig. 6.17

Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: The CK building, lobby, New Belgrade, 1959-64. Courtesy of Aleksandar Janković.

Fig. 6.18

Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: The CK building, facade lit at night, around 1966. *Arhitektura Urbanizam* (Belgrade) 7, no. 41-42 (1966): 6.

Fig. 6.19

Ivan Antić and Ivanka Raspopović: Museum of Contemporary Art, New Belgrade, 1959-65. Photo by author.

Fig. 6.20

Ivan Antić and Ivanka Raspopović: Museum of Contemporary Art, competition entry, New Belgrade, 1959. *Arhitektura urbanizam I*, no. 1 (1960): 33.

Fig. 6.21

Museum of Contemporary Art, storage. Courtesy of MSU.

Fig. 6.22

Museum of Contemporary Art, detail of the facade. Photo by author.

Fig. 6.23

Museum of Contemporary Art, section. *Arhitekta Ivan Antić*, exhibition catalogue (Belgrade: Salon Muzeja savremene umetnosti, 1975), n.p.

Fig. 6.24

Museum of Contemporary Art seen from from Old Belgrade and from the CK building. Photo by author.

Fig. 6.25

Museum of Contemporary Art, sculpture gallery. Photo by author.

Fig. 6.26

Ivan Antić and Ivanka Raspopović: Museum of Contemporary Art, upper level galleries. Courtesy of Wolfgang Thaler ©.

Fig. 6.27

Queen Fabiola of Belgium visiting the Museum of Contemporary Art, accompanied by the Museum director Miodrag B. Protić and Tito's wife Jovanka Broz, c. 1973. Courtesy of MSU.

Fig. 6.28

Vjenceslav Richter: Pavilion of Yugoslavia, EXPO 58, Brussels, 1958. ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 25.

Fig. 6.29

Pavilions of the USA and the USSR, EXPO 58, Brussels, 1958. ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 25.

Fig. 6.30

Vjenceslav Richter: Pavilion of Yugoslavia for EXPO 58, competition entry, second round, 1956. ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 25.

Fig. 6.31

Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58 with the tensile column designed by Richter. ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 25.

Fig. 6.32

Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58, interior of the art gallery. ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 25.

Fig. 6.33

Interior of the Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58 with the concluding sentence of the Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 25.

Fig. 6.34

Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58, entry plaza. ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 25.

Fig. 6.35

Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58, interior views. ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 25.

Fig. 6.36

Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58, gallery of industry. ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 25.

Fig. 6.37

Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58, exhibition of dolls in folk costumes shown at the gallery of tourism. ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 25.

Fig. 6.38

Vjenceslav Richter: Pavilion of Yugoslavia, International Labor Exhibition, Turin, 1961; model and view of the interior. ASCG, Fond Međunarodna izložba rada u Torinu, Fascikla 6.

INTRODUCTION

If there is an architecture which stands in need of shrewd and deep interpretative study at present, it is that of Yugoslavia

*Architectural Review, August 1960*¹

Socialist Yugoslavia blurred the contours of the Cold War. The defining moment of its history—the expulsion of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from the *Cominform* in 1948—led to a spectacular political summersault in which the former staunchest ally of the USSR came to the brink of joining NATO before reinventing itself again as a leader of the non-aligned movement. Eventually, the country carved out a special niche for itself between the two blocs of the Cold War world, softening the contrast between socialism and capitalism, between the planned economy and the free market, and between liberal democracy and the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” Architecture in Yugoslavia similarly defied Cold War divisions, presenting a confounding case of an advanced modernism built in a socialist country, an idea that directly opposed the stereotypical identification of socialism with the oppressive monumentality of Socialist Realism. Socialist Yugoslavia is an excellent case-study for exploring the political meanings of postwar architecture because its position at an intersection where the East and

¹ Quoted in: George E Kidder Smith. *The New Architecture of Europe* (Cleveland and New York, 1961), 332.

the West met in political, cultural, and geographical terms; as such, its history reveals much about the acceptance of modernism in sharply differing contexts.

In this dissertation I explore the relationship between modern architecture and Yugoslav state between 1945 and 1965. It is a case-study in the multifaceted politics of postwar modernism in a complex and previously unexplored context. Through such a focus, I acknowledge the inherently political nature of the country's intense modernization and urbanization project that saw its peak in this period. The interest that architecture of Yugoslavia generated abroad was similarly political, as it often hinged on the sharp visual contrast that the country presented in comparison with the world behind the Iron Curtain.² But, despite the occasional attention from critics and journalists, the international historiography of modern architecture has almost completely overlooked Yugoslavia. It has been regarded as a marginal case, one that does not illustrate the larger history of modernism. Local historiography, on the other hand, has largely ignored architecture's political aspects, rendering much of the work produced in the period meaningless. This study is, therefore, an effort at reconstructing these meanings and, in a way, a belated answer to the half-a-century-old call by the *Architectural Review* for a "shrewd and deep interpretative study" that never materialized.

² On such interpretations of Yugoslav architecture, see my article "'East? West? Or Both?' Foreign interpretations of Architecture in Socialist Yugoslavia." In: *Journal of Architecture* 14, no. 1 (December 2008): 87-105.

A Land of Multiple Between-ness

In February 1944, American journal *Architectural Forum* published a brief note about architecture in occupied Yugoslavia:

Architecture's Melting Pot

Of all the Nazi occupied countries, Yugoslavia is most in the news and least known as a place. When American troops land there many will wonder that geography books ever classed it as a European country. Veiled women, bearded priests, towering minarets contribute eastern flavor. But that isn't all. In crumbling old towns held to the hillside by fortress-like retaining walls are some of the most modern schools and office buildings in Europe. No record could express more vividly Yugoslavia's contradictory political, social and cultural currents than does its building pattern.³

Despite expectations, American troops never landed in Yugoslavia. Instead, the country was liberated by native communist-led Partisans, aided by the Red Army. This placed the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in power for the following forty-five years, determining the country as one of the most strategic actors in the ensuing Cold War. But *Architectural Forum's* text was right to acknowledge that Yugoslavia's "between-ness" had much longer roots than

³ "Architecture's Melting Pot," *Architectural Forum* 80 (February 1944): 4.

those that would soon be caused by Cold War divisions. The notions of the “East” and the “West” encapsulated in it referred to a *longue-durée* perspective that subsumed a host of various schisms: between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, between Islam and Christianity, and between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. The country had been originally founded after World War I on the ashes of two large multiethnic empires: Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey, with the intention to bring South Slavs together in the same state for the first time in their history. But the kingdom founded under the hegemony of a Serbian dynasty was plagued by nationalist strife, uneven economic development, poverty, and class conflicts. Although extremely simplified, *Architectural Forum*'s text nevertheless correctly captured the cultural and economic contradictions of a country that had barely embarked on a road to modernization. Despite regional differences, the first Yugoslavia was a predominantly agrarian land with a rather marginal industry and a low level of urbanization. “Some of the most modern schools and office buildings” that *Architectural Forum* mentioned had been a result of, as Marshall Berman put it, a “modernism of underdevelopment” that only pointed towards a desired image of progress, rather than being a result of actual development.⁴ Moreover, at the end of World War II, the “crumbling old towns” crumbled even more as a result of large-scale war devastations. The Yugoslavia

⁴ See Marshall Berman, *Everything Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1982), 173-76.

that one encountered in 1945 was, therefore, a place suspended between cultures and between a modern civilization and undeveloped backwaters.

The common denominator of the whole postwar period was the modernization project aimed at transforming this rugged underdeveloped mongrel into a modern industrial country. But despite the continuity of the communist rule that guided this project, its specificities were not fixed. They fluctuated more or less intensely throughout the forty-five years of the country's existence. At first, the ultimate model was Stalin's USSR: between 1945 and 1948, Yugoslavia claimed faithful allegiance to "the first country of socialism," using the Soviet example as a guiding light for its own radical modernization. In this model, mercilessly imposed from above, all efforts were directed towards reconstruction and the creation of a powerful heavy industry, with little concern for more mundane human needs. Politically, this was a period of severe Stalinist repression and elimination of any remnants of ideological opposition to the rule of the Communist Party. Culturally, the period was marked by an attempt to impose Socialist Realism as the dominant doctrine of cultural production. But in 1948, following Stalin's unsuccessful attempts to effectively turn the country into a colonial puppet-state, Yugoslavia overnight became an outcast of the communist world, caught alone and friendless at the very start of an unrealistically ambitious plan to eradicate poverty and become a developed country in mere five years. While firmly clinging to power, the leadership was forced to rethink fundamentally

the very premises of its rule, as well as its alliances, and as of 1950 embarked on a program of reforms that moved the country far away from Stalinism.

What emerged was a system, sometimes labeled “Titoism” after the country’s charismatic leader Josip Broz Tito, that strove to foster a “third way” between the communist East and capitalist West. Politically, it was still based on the rule of a single party, but was allegedly aimed towards a “withering away of the state,” thus claiming to be an heir to an authentic Marxism-Leninism, as it had once existed before the Stalinist corruption. While the state apparatus never got even close to “withering away,” the system did allow for far greater civil liberties than did any other communist country. In its internal organization, it acknowledged the country’s complex ethnic composition by allowing its six constituent republics to function as autonomous national states. Economically, the system was based on the notion of “social ownership” of the means of production, which were neither owned privately, like in the West, nor by the state, like in the East. It also proposed that economic enterprises should be run by those who worked in them, pioneering a system of “workers’ self-management.” The self-managing enterprises became increasingly engaged in a market that combined free competition with state planning. In foreign policy, the country at first opened to its former ideological enemies in the West, but after Stalin’s death, it reestablished friendly relations with the communist East as well. By 1961, it became one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, choosing not to side

with either of the Cold War blocs, instead advocating for an “active peaceful coexistence” of various ideological systems.

In every aspect of its existence, therefore, Yugoslavia stood between established opposites: from its *longue-durée* position at the crossroads between Europe and the “Orient” to its contemporaneous “third way” that mediated between the ideological blocs. Out of this special position, the Yugoslavs derived a clear self-awareness of uniqueness, using it as an important ingredient in the construction of a new socialist culture. The Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža captured this awareness early on in a speech that is often credited for putting a nail in the coffin of Socialist Realism; recording a moment suspended between a troubled past and a glorious future, he optimistically asked: “How could we describe our reality if what is currently going on here happens nowhere else in the world, if everything here is infused with synchronous circles of six centuries: what emerges between the baroque, Morlania, Turkish and Austrian small-towns—within the framework of a dramatic struggle with the Kremlin for internationalist principles of Leninism—are the contours of the twenty-second century!”⁵

The culture that emerged was indeed quite unique, but it was also deeply contradictory, at once liberated of the obvious ideological impositions and

⁵ Krleža gave the speech at the Congress of Writers of Yugoslavia in Ljubljana in 1952; see: Miroslav Krleža, “Govor na kongresu književnika u Ljubljani,” published in Miroslav Krleža, *Knjiga eseja* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1961), 189; translated by the author.

constrained by the continuing domination of a regime that never truly allowed free public debate. Within this ambiguous environment, however, a remarkable flourishing of modernism occurred, fostering a striking aesthetic contrast with other communist countries, which, in return, proved beneficial in reinforcing Yugoslavia's new international position. The country opened itself for foreign influences—particularly those from the developed West—increasingly participating in the international culture of high modernism. The Belgrade painter and art critic Miodrag B. Protić cogently described the atmosphere: “The process was accelerated through a growing presence of world culture: translations of philosophers from Plato to Heidegger; writers and poets—Baudelaire, Valery, Gide, Proust, Kafka, Hemingway, Faulkner, Steinbeck, Thomas Mann, Arthur Miller, Joyce, Thomas Wolfe, Moravia, Sartre, Camus, and many others; movies; music (ranging from the almost forgotten jazz to Britten, later even Boulez and Stockhausen); exhibitions of modern art, even the theater of absurd, Ionesco and Beckett, avant-garde theater in general... But also through travels to the West and constant comparisons with it... A passport, which, as a rule, almost anyone could soon have, became a proof of a new, better status of Yugoslav citizens. Shock-worker's ascetism was replaced by a relaxed, even hedonistic, style. According to the Austro-Hungarian recipe: the pleasures of life in exchange for the displeasures of a lack of political liberties.”⁶

⁶ Miodrag B. Protić, *Hojeva barka: pogled s kraja века (1900-1965)* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1992), 308; translated by the author.

Modernism and the state became entangled in a symbiotic relationship in which they reinforced each other: the state could use the emerging modernist culture to claim its reformed status, while modernists used the means provided by the state—which was still largely responsible for financing cultural production—to explore new grounds. No other field was as closely entangled in this relationship as architecture. All other arts, from literature and film, to painting and sculpture, exhibited a broader repertoire of approaches: from stubborn remnants of dogmatic conservatism, to radical avant-garde experiments that often clashed with the guardians of official culture. In architecture, high modernism became an almost exclusive “official style” of the state, especially in the decade between 1955 and 1965. This new architecture carried an immense significance in the project of modernization and it decisively transformed the face of Yugoslav cities, forging a seemingly uniform façade of smooth white volumes hovering above the ground. Its meanings, however, were far from uniform and anything but apolitical, but they remain largely unexplored.

On the Methodology

One of the questions that I frequently encountered during my travels around the countries that succeeded Yugoslavia was whether it made any sense to study the architecture of the former country as a single unit. Indeed, the architectures of former Yugoslav republics were rooted into and centered on their

own national cultures, each with its own, more or less long, tradition, its own “patriarch” (there were no matriarchs, though), school of architecture (except for Montenegro), and architect’s association. From today’s perspective, the question seems even more pertinent, since Yugoslavia’s constituent lands have become independent states, in many instances hostile to each other. But while it would be untrue to deny the great diversity of local architectural cultures, there are many reasons why studying the former country as a larger whole still makes a great deal of sense. First of all, what united Yugoslavia’s former republics was a single political system, dominated by the same party. That political system structured broad areas of life in the same way in all parts of the country, including the organization of architectural profession, its functioning, and its relationship to the economic system. Second, living in the same state placed all architects in a similar position towards the outside world; general openness and orientation to foreign sources—in the East or the West, depending on the period—was thus similar for everyone. Finally, despite the relatively closed character of republican architectures, especially those that had their own schools of architecture, there were still many exchanges between them through personal contacts, common publications, federal organizations, meetings, competitions, awards, etc. Through various channels, architects frequently acquired commissions and built outside of their own republics, thus further blurring the allegedly sharp divisions between regions. The fact that architects in different republics responded to the

same conditions in varying ways and in recognizable patterns still does not mean that commonalities did not exist and that they should not be explored.

In a broader perspective, the same question could be posed for any other complex state, especially if it comprises multiple ethnicities. Does it really make sense to write about an “American architecture,” when so many regional and class varieties can be found in any given period? Of course, no one would ask this; but the United States successfully survives as an entity. The difference in the case of Yugoslavia is that it is a failed state and the very fact that it collapsed necessarily colors our perception of its past. In that sense, it is instructive to compare Yugoslavia with another failed multiethnic state, the Habsburg Empire. After the dissolution of Austria-Hungary in 1918, the succeeding nation-states embarked on constructing their own national histories of architecture, distancing themselves from the former dominion, but also from the former compatriots. Architectural histories thus soon became compartmentalized within their new national borders and the knowledge about the architectures of immediate neighbors soon became almost completely extinct. Each new national architecture claimed uniqueness, unaware of a past shared with the neighbors. It took more than seventy years after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire that historians began uncovering the rich architectural interconnections that once

existed in the region, revealing a far more complex picture than could be deduced from a simple sum of its parts.⁷

That is precisely what is currently going on in the former Yugoslav lands: the construction of national narratives that narrowly focus on their own borders and disregard the broader context of a shared past. Since the collapse of the country, several separate national histories have emerged. While there is nothing wrong about that, these histories, as a rule, overlook the existence of a broader political context.⁸ Some of them are, moreover, *a priori* hostile to the socialist period, offering a biased view that does not even properly critique what deserves to be criticized. One of the purposes of my work is to offer an alternative to this particularization and to reconstruct the period while it is still possible to do so with some level of plausibility, taking advantage of the fact that many of the participants in the events are still alive.

⁷ On Austria-Hungary, see Ákos Moravánszky's breakthrough *Competing Visions: Aesthetic Invention and Social Imagination in Central European Architecture, 1867-1918* (1998); and Anthony Alofsin's *When Buildings Speak: Architecture as Language in the Habsburg Empire and Its Aftermath, 1867-1933* (2006).

⁸ See: Miloš R. Perović, *Srpska arhitektura XX veka/Serbian 20th Century Architecture* (Belgrade: Arhitektonski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2003); and Stane Bernik, *Slovenska arhitektura dvajstega stoletja/Slovene Architecture of the Twentieth Century* (Ljubljana: Mestna galerija, 2004). An exception to this rule is Mihail Tokarev's book on Macedonia, which considers both Macedonia and a broader ex-Yugoslav region, but establishes a mostly mechanical connection; see between them: *100 години модерна архитектура. Придонесот на Македонија и Југославија (1918-1990)* (Skopje: Mihail Tokarev, 2006).

My original intention was to explore the aesthetics of architectural representation of the socialist state and its power. I chose a fairly straightforward approach of analyzing buildings that served the most direct representation, such as administration buildings of the state and the party, official residences, and national pavilions at international expositions. But this proved to be a far more demanding task than originally assumed, as the state influenced architecture in multifarious and previously completely unexplored ways that were directly linked with problems of representation. It was, therefore, necessary to delve into questions such as the multiple reorganizations of architectural profession; broader cultural policies and their impact on architectural discourses; and political relationships with the outside world and the broader international discourses on art and architecture. Similar investigations have been made in the field of art history; but architectural historians have not tackled them before, which meant that considerable amounts of primary research were necessary in these areas before even beginning to discuss the aesthetics of buildings that came to represent and symbolize the Yugoslav state.⁹ Because of this wealth of topics, some remained only roughly sketched out, hopefully pointing towards areas for

⁹ Among the studies that have considered art in Yugoslavia specifically within its political and ideological context, two titles deserve to be mentioned: Lidija Merenik's *Ideološki modeli: srpsko slikarstvo 1945-1968* (Belgrade: Beopolis and Remont, 2001); and Ljiljana Kolešnik's *Između Istoka i Zapada: Hrvatska umjetnost i likovna kritika 50-ih godina* (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2006).

future research. The most interesting one, in my opinion, is the functioning of architectural offices as “self-managing working organizations.”

For all these reasons, my methodology is very eclectic. The overall framework is set up through linking architecture with the political history of the period, but the exact connections are established through a range of widely varied methods. Practically every chapter relies, at least in part, on a method that was not used in others. Chapters 1 and 4 are broad studies of architectural culture and its transformations wrought by political changes; they include explorations of the organization of the profession, its economic functioning, and discourse analysis. Chapter 2 analyzes the representation of state power through strategic occupation of buildings and spaces and through appropriation of inherited languages of power. Chapter 3 dissects the competition projects for a new capital of Yugoslavia and the political motivations behind its construction. Chapter 5 analyzes broad international discourses on politics and art and their effects on the production and interpretation of architecture. Finally, Chapter 6 synthesizes most of these methods, combining analyses of political, popular, and architectural discourses with those of space, form, and tectonics, in an attempt to reconstruct or hypothesize about the possible meanings of the analyzed buildings.

As far as the chronological limits of this research are concerned, they were chosen for reasons that were at once related to political and architectural history. The lower limit—1945—is fairly obvious, coinciding with the end of World

War II and the transformation of the country under the new communist regime. The upper limit, however, is somewhat approximate: the middle years of the 1960s were a period of a succession of political changes and upheavals in Yugoslavia, from a new Constitution adopted in 1963, to student demonstrations of 1968 and the rise of nationalist and liberal forces around the same time. I chose 1965, however, because of an accumulation of significant political events in this year: the economic reform, the universal availability of passports, which facilitated a state-sponsored wave of economic emigration, and the demise of Aleksandar Ranković, the powerful Minister of the Interior, second in power only to Tito. Architecturally, the mid-1960s also coincide with the final demise of the International Style, which began losing the ground in the face of critiques coming from many different sides: from various regionalists and future postmodernists, to radical experimental practices that emerged in that decade.¹⁰

Originally, the focus of my research was on the “classic image” of socialist Yugoslavia as a self-managing and non-aligned socialist country, i.e., after the rift with the Soviets. It quickly became obvious, however, that this long period could not be understood without explaining the short one that preceded it: it was only through the juxtaposition of the two that full meanings of buildings emerged. The

¹⁰ Robert Venturi's *Complexities and Contradictions in Architecture*, which announced architectural postmodernism, came out in 1966. As Felicity Scott has recently shown, a “techno-utopian” alternative to postmodernist critique emerged around the same time; see: Felicity D. Scott, *Architecture or Techno-utopia: Politics after Modernism*, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2007).

study is, therefore, chronologically divided into two parts of roughly equal length that deal with the Stalinist and post-Stalinist periods. Each part is further divided into thematic chapters: one that traces the transformation of architectural culture, followed by two more that analyze architectural production, built or unbuilt. There is an apparent asymmetry in this approach, since the first few years after the war received almost as much attention as the fifteen years between 1950 and 1965. The reason for this lies in the fact that there were far more continuities and inter-connections between the two periods than is obvious at first sight. Much of architectural symbols of the new Yugoslavia—from the initial projects for New Belgrade to Tito's residences—were established immediately after the war and they continued functioning more or less unchanged until the country collapsed in 1991, regardless of the subsequent political and ideological changes.

Chapter 1 explores the unfinished process of Stalinization of Yugoslav architecture in the early post-war years. It discusses the economic and cultural centralization of architectural profession based on the Soviet model, as well as the apparent opposition to the doctrine of Socialist Realism among the architects. Chapter 2 explores two early architectural assertions of Communist power in Yugoslavia: a monument to the Red Army, as a statement of allegiance to the Soviet Union, and the places of the emerging cult of personality of Tito. Chapter 3 discusses the creation of New Belgrade, the country's new capital, and the meanings associated with it. I pay special attention to the analysis of architectural competitions for the new city, since they offered a representative

cross-section through architecture in Yugoslavia at the time. The remaining part of the study deals with the period after 1948 and the changes that occurred in architecture as result of the break with the Soviets. Chapter 4 discusses the introduction of self-management in architecture and cultural opening to the West. Chapter 5 explores how Cold War discourses influenced the construction and interpretation of architecture. Finally, Chapter 6 analyzes modernist buildings that served the state representation and the variety of meanings concealed behind their seemingly neutral International Style forms.

Besides being a case study in the relationship between architecture and politics, this dissertation also falls into the emerging category of studies of “other modernisms” that explore architecture as a part of broader modernization projects outside of the Western world. It is thus an attempt to cast light on a significant body of work that is largely unknown outside of its own borders, even to the otherwise well-informed specialists. I contend that the region can teach us important lessons on the meanings of postwar modernism, not only those pertaining to a little known context outside of the “First World,” but also those of the well-known canonical version of modern architecture.

* * *

At the end of this introduction, I feel obliged to acknowledge that, despite my intent to present as objective an account as possible, I am not exactly a

dispassionate outside observer. Although I was born a few years after the end of the period I discuss, I came of age whilst socialist Yugoslavia still existed and I tasted the flavor of the political and cultural context I describe. Moreover, many of the sites and buildings I discuss in the text are intimately linked with the history of my family. My maternal grandfather was wounded in the World War II battle of Batina, commemorated by a monument I analyze in Chapter 2. At around the same time, my paternal grandfather was imprisoned at the concentration camp Staro Sajmište, which stood on the grounds of today's New Belgrade, discussed in Chapters 3 and 6. Both my parents and I lived in New Belgrade during our respective studies at the University of Belgrade. While I was a child, the buildings of the state administration from around Yugoslavia were frequently shown on television and I clearly understood and remembered them as national symbols. A particular emotional meaning of this work comes from the fact that the country in which I was raised collapsed in a bloody war just as I reached adulthood. The work on this dissertation was, therefore, also a trip of self-discovery, an attempt to understand the place with adult eyes and to, perhaps, understand the causes of its destruction. I am well aware of the fact that such direct personal connections must produce some bias, but I also hope that the benefits of the intimate insight into the context that they provide will outweigh its shortcomings.

Chapter 1:

ARCHITECTURAL CULTURE IN A STALINIST STATE

In its first issue in August 1947, *Arhitektura*, Yugoslavia's chief architectural journal at the time, promised to initiate, record, and organize "a new architectural epoch, epoch of Socialist Realism."¹¹ This new epoch was to be based on "firm foundations" of correct ideology achieved through constant "healthy criticism." It was to be built using the "power of our traditional architecture," which, however, excluded the "anarchic and unplanned architectural practice of the old Yugoslavia." Instead, the model was to be provided by "the architects of the USSR, who are raising the level of their architecture through continuous criticism." By condemning the heritage of the old capitalist kingdom and by establishing the Soviet architecture as the ultimate model for the future, the journal conformed to the official rhetoric of the new socialist state. But the material that *Arhitektura* would publish during the years of Yugoslavia's adherence to Stalinism stood in intriguing contrast with its own proclaimed goal of initiating the "epoch of Socialist Realism." While the rhetoric employed in the journal had a decidedly Stalinist ring to it, only a fraction of projects presented in it can be classified as what we today know as the

¹¹ See Editorial, *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) I, vol. 1 (August 1947): 3. Besides *Arhitektura*, the questions of architecture were covered in journals like *Tehnika* (Technics) and *Naše građevinarstvo* (Our Construction Industry), but both of these dealt with broader questions of civil engineering and architecture in the narrow sense had secondary place in them.

stereotypical image of Socialist Realism defined by the most famous Soviet models of the time. Absent were its main staples: overt historicism, abundance of decoration, and oppressive monumentality. Moreover, most of these projects displayed a paradoxical continuity with the pre-war modernist practices. Thus the intentions proclaimed by *Arhitektura* were apparently violated in two ways: by failing to provide a clear break with the pre-war architecture, and by continuing an adherence to the "artless," "bourgeois" modernism, which was one of the favorite targets of socialist realist criticism.

Architectural historians have interpreted this contradiction in different ways. For some, the lack of visible traces of Socialist Realism in Yugoslav urban landscapes was a source of pride as a sign of the architects' heroic resistance to the political dictate of a foreign origin, especially in comparison to its rather successful imposition in literature and fine arts.¹² From the perspective of the subsequent triumph of modernism, it was also evidence that the modernist ethos had already been too well established among Yugoslav architects to be easily

¹² Ivan Štraus, the writer of the only comprehensive survey of architecture in socialist Yugoslavia, claimed that "the participants in other fields of art were far more eager to answer the appeal to follow the spirit of Socialist Realism than Yugoslav architects were. Their high pre-war reputation and their European education played an important role in rejecting the appeal to create architecture 'national in form, and socialist in content.'" See: Ivan Štraus, *Arhitektura Jugoslavije 1945-1990* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991), 19.

For Tomislav Odak, "that interpretation [of Socialist Realism]... appears as a creative alternative to the dogmatic and petrified 'models,' as an affirmation of the anti-dogmatic principle interpreted by our architects and architectural theorists from 1945 to 1952;" Tomislav Odak, "Hrvatska arhitektonska alternativa 1945-85," *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) XXXIX, no. 196-99 (1986): 32.

challenged.¹³ On the other hand, the same contradiction compelled some historians to redefine what Socialist Realism was. According to some opinions, the application of the Soviet-inspired "method" in Yugoslavia amounted to no more than the "grayness" and "spiritual poverty" of utilitarian architecture with no specific formal ambition, thus, strangely, being equated to the exact opposite of what it is usually assumed to be.¹⁴ According to others, some rather unambiguously modernist buildings were proclaimed socialist realist for being, for example, symmetrical, thus further diluting the criteria and adding to the confusion.¹⁵ Nevertheless, whatever the approach, historians almost

¹³ "Too strong was the continuity of architectural production to be disturbed by the doctrine of Socialist Realism, especially since it resulted from a political constellation on a different soil and in a different nation," Štraus, *Arhitektura Jugoslavije 1945-1990*, 15.

¹⁴ Poverty and utilitarian approach are often invoked in the accounts of architecture in the first post-war years: for the most explicit statement, see Zoran Manević, "Srpska arhitektura XX veka," in: Zoran Manević, Žarko Domljan, Nace Šumi, Ivan Štraus, Georgi Konstantinovski, and Božidar Milić, *Arhitektura XX vijeka* (Belgrade: Prosveta; Zagreb: Spektar; Mostar: Prva književna komuna, 1986), 27; also: Mihail Tokarev, *100 години модерна архитектура. Придонесот на Македонија и Југославија (1918-1990)*, (Skopje: Published by author, 2006), 56.

¹⁵ Ivan Štraus finds the "influence of Socialist Realism" on the Institute of Hygiene in Sarajevo (1952) by the architect Tihomir Ivanović. A simple cubic volume, this building features an abstracted thin colonnade on its front facade as the sole possible reference to classicism; see: Ivan Štraus, *Arhitektura Bosne i Hercegovine 1945-1995/Architecture of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1945-1995* (Sarajevo: Oko, 1998), 22.

Similarly, Stane Bernik somewhat confusingly finds that Stanislav Rohrman's Economic Council in Ljubljana (1948-49) "speaks with the condensed modernist pathos that architects then allowed themselves as expressing temporary allegiance to the still typical socio-realistic (sic) art

unanimously interpreted the period in terms of the stylistic opposition between modernism and Socialist Realism.

As important as it may be, this focus on style blurred the view of other ways in which architecture was subjected to and participated in the Stalinization of Yugoslavia. And these other ways were by no means negligible: the profession underwent a major restructuring and the system of patronage was completely transformed. Many major Yugoslav architects willingly took part in this transformation, regardless of their stylistic adherences. In some ways, the situation was similar to the one in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s, when the avant-garde took a leading role in the first Five Year Plan, the initial stage of Stalinization of the country. Because of the subsequent imposition of Socialist Realism as the obligatory "method" of all artistic creation in the early 1930s, the conventional understanding neatly associated the avant-garde with the 'good' utopian stage of the Soviet revolution and Socialist Realism with its 'evil' totalitarian phase, conveniently forgetting the constructivists' active role in Stalinization.¹⁶ In an analogous way, presenting the persistence of modernism in the post-war Yugoslavia as an alleged resistance to Stalinization is misleading

paradigms." See: Stane Bernik, *Slovenska arhitektura dvajsetega stoletja/Slovene Architecture of the Twentieth Century* (Ljubljana: Mestna galerija, 2004), 302.

¹⁶ About the constructivists' participation in the initial stages of Stalinization of the Soviet architecture, see Greg Castillo's "Stalinist Modern: Constructivism and the Soviet Company Town," in James Cracraft and Daniel Rowland, eds., *Architectures of Russian Identity, 1500 to the Present* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 135-149.

because it fails to recognize the participation of modernist architects in the process.

Architecture in a Planned Economy

In their notorious “percentages agreement” of 1944, Stalin and Churchill rather cynically concurred that their interests in post-war Yugoslavia would be shared fifty-fifty.¹⁷ But by May 1945, it became increasingly clear that this would not be the case. The People’s Liberation Movement, the Yugoslav antifascist resistance organized by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and recognized by both the Soviets and the Western Allies, had the whole country in its own hands.¹⁸ As soon as it took military control of a certain region, the PLM also established communist-controlled civil administration.¹⁹ By the end of that year,

¹⁷ See Albert Resis, “The Churchill-Stalin Secret ‘Percentages’ Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944,” in *American Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (1978): 368-87.

¹⁸ The Soviet Red Army made significant contribution in the liberation of Yugoslavia, but it did not stay in the country for a longer period of time, following the retreating Nazis further to the West and the North.

¹⁹ During the war, PLM had already summoned a provisional parliament, the Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), and on 29 November, 1943 elected a provisional government headed by the CPY’s Secretary General Josip Broz Tito, who was proclaimed Marshall of Yugoslavia. This date would be inscribed in the coats-of-arms of the post-war country as the date of its historical foundation and celebrated every year as a state holiday, Republic Day. For a detailed account on the creation of civil administration on liberated territories and the post-

the provisional communist rule was officially legalized and on 29 November 1945, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed, comprising six federated republics under total control of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its leader, Marshall Josip Broz Tito.²⁰

It came as a surprise to no one that this new Yugoslavia sided with the USSR. Boasting an authentic revolution that was not "imported," as in other East European countries, Yugoslavia quickly rose to the position of Stalin's most loyal satellite. The first country of socialism became a powerful role-model for a radical transformation of Yugoslavia. A new constitution, based on the Soviet constitution of 1936, was adopted in January 1946. All means of production were nationalized and placed under the State control. Cultural and economic

war legislation, see: Branko Petranović and Štrbac, *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Radnička štampa, 1977), 23-48.

The summoning of the AVNOJ was an independent act on PLM's part, against Stalin's explicit instructions. Stalin would have preferred PLM to act in a conciliatory way with the *Četniks* and the royal Government in Exile, in order not to alienate the Western allies. Instead, by 1943, AVNOJ no longer recognized the exiled Government, and expressly forbid its members to return to the country. See: Stephen Clissold, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973. A Documentary Survey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 145-153.

²⁰ Although the western Allies insisted that members of the exiled royal cabinet be included in the first post-war government, their impact was quickly minimized and they resigned one by one. In less than democratic elections for the Constituent Assembly in November 1945, the list of the communist-controlled Popular Front won absolute majority. All opposition to the Communist Party was thus eliminated and Yugoslavia became a highly centralized one-Party state. For a summary of this period, see Duncan Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 32-40.

cooperation were directed almost exclusively to the USSR and other East European countries, although in a country devastated by the war, the basic survival of the population heavily depended on the aid provided by the UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration), which was mainly funded by the United States.²¹ Despite this virtual dependence, in the emerging Cold War, relations with the West steadily deteriorated from war-time alliance to outright animosity.²² Yugoslav officials and the press constantly attacked capitalist countries, especially the USA and Britain, for imperialism, and the West in return objected to the limitations of civil rights in Yugoslavia, particularly to Stalinist show trials.²³ An especially low point was reached in 1946, when two U.S. aircraft that intruded upon Yugoslav air space were shot down. Only a year after the end of the war, during which it celebrated the Yugoslavs for their heroic

²¹ The relationship with the UNRRA was plagued by disagreements regarding the distribution of aid; see: John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 234-36;

²² The Yugoslavs first clashed with Western allies over the region around Trieste in Italy. PLM liberated Trieste before the Western forces arrived and claimed right to the area on the basis of its largely Slavic population; however, this was contested by Italy and remained a constant source of controversy until 1954.

²³ For a summary of US-Yugoslav relations in the first post-war years, see Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, 1-42.

resistance, the US press now called for the annihilation of Belgrade with an atomic bomb.²⁴

Especially decisive for further development of Yugoslavia was its refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe. The United States offered the Plan to all European countries in June 1947, but following Stalin's accusations that it was thinly veiled American imperialism, Eastern Europe declined the offer, confirming the division of the continent into the U.S. and Soviet spheres. Instead, Yugoslavia established special economic relations with the USSR as its main creditor and source of aid.²⁵ The Soviets also countered the Marshall Plan by creating the *Cominform*, the Communist Information Bureau, with the intention of bringing the countries under their influence closer together. The *Cominform* included the communist parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but it also included the powerful parties of France and Italy.²⁶ Belgrade was chosen to be the seat of the new organization,

²⁴ According to Milovan Đilas, that is how the New York paper *Daily News* reacted to the downing of the two American planes; see Milovan Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna* (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1991), 34.

²⁵ The economic arrangements with the USSR were, however, in practice colonial in character: Yugoslavia exported its raw materials to the Soviets well below the prices on the international market, getting in return overpriced Soviet machinery of low quality. The joint Yugoslav-Soviet companies had similar role, as they were designed to favor the Soviet side. See: Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost*, 73-95.

²⁶ See Duncan Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 37.

confirming, at Stalin's own insistence, Yugoslavia's special position in the emerging communist bloc as its secondary center.²⁷

Faithfully following the Soviet example, the new communist government immediately moved on towards creating a highly centralized economy based on

²⁷ The Yugoslavs, however, soon started suspecting that the actual aim of this was not so much to honor them, but instead to control them; for a first-hand account on the growing suspicion between Stalin and the leadership of the CPY, see: Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948-53* (New York: Viking Press, 1971). Such a suspicion was not unfounded, since Stalin had reasons to keep an eye on Yugoslavia. The country's communist leaders indeed styled themselves after the Soviets, but the revolution they conducted was their own and they were very proud of it. This pride also included an ambition to lead: if the USSR was the leader of world Communism, Yugoslavia was to be an analogous regional power. Thanks to their hands-on experience in the revolution and in efficient establishment of a new administration, Yugoslav communists saw themselves as natural leaders among the Balkan nations; as the historian Predrag Marković aptly described, they considered themselves "the eldest son in the brotherly family of the East;" see: Predrag Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada 1948-1965* (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1996), 73. Yugoslavia claimed this role even before the war was over through the sponsorship of the emerging communist regime in neighboring Albania and through aid to the communist insurgence in Greece, much to the dismay of the West (and, as it seems, Stalin as well, who was reluctant to disturb the power balance with the Allies). Following a long line of similar initiatives, Tito also actively pursued the idea of the creation of the so-called Balkan Federation that would include Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and, in case there was both interest and a real possibility, Albania and Greece as well. Naturally, as the largest unit with the most experienced communist cadre, Yugoslavia was to play a leading role in this union. Advanced plans were made in this direction for several years with Stalin's direct blessing, but were always put on hold for a variety of reasons. The last delay occurred in March 1948, because Yugoslavs got cold feet about diluting their own cohesion in the face of Stalin's increased attempts to control them. It seems that Tito preserved the ambition to be the leader of the Balkan communists well after the 1948 break up with the Cominform, which, however, never materialized. For a detailed account of the relationship between the CPY and Yugoslavia's Balkan neighbors, including the history of the idea of the Balkan Federation, see: Branko Petranović, *Balkanska federacija 1943-1948* (Belgrade and Šabac, Serbia: Zaslou, 1990.)

“scientific” planning that would avoid cycles of crisis characteristic for the capitalist market. In order to achieve that, property relations had to be thoroughly restructured: and, by 1948, the state took virtually complete control of all means of production.²⁸ All industry was nationalized, as were transport and banking. Private enterprises ceased to exist, except for the smallest shops. Only agriculture remained mainly in private hands, but a land reform redistributed large properties to small peasants.²⁹

The construction industry was taken over by the state as soon as that state was constituted. By the end of 1945, official decisions were made to place all construction enterprises under "exclusive control and supervision of the

²⁸ This was not difficult to achieve, because major industry had already been taken over by the Germans during the war. As the liberation progressed, the property of enemy nationals, war criminals, and collaborators was placed under the new administration, so there was not much left to expropriate by the time the war ended. By the end of 1945, 70% of mines, 90% of metallurgy, and 100% of oil production became the property of the State. By the end of the next year, all mines and industrial enterprises, wholesale and foreign trade enterprise, banks, and transport were nationalized. Only small craftsmen could keep their shops, but even they had to produce according to the State-devised plan. See: Petranović and Štrbac, *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 53-59; also: Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia* (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1971), 191-92.

²⁹ The large estates were nationalized and the size of estates was limited, but on the other hand, many small peasants for the first time gained viable property. Peasants from distant mountain villages were resettled in the plains of Vojvodina and Croatia, instead of the German minority that either left with the Nazis or was forcefully expelled. Forced collectivization of agriculture only began after the *Cominform* resolution in 1948, in order to prove to Stalin that the CPY did not divert from orthodox Communism by sparing the *kulaks* from nationalization; see: Petranović and Štrbac, *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 57-58.

Ministry of Construction," even though in practice the majority of companies had already been nationalized. Old engineers' chambers were abolished, too.³⁰ One of the reasons for this quick take-over was the pressing need to begin the reconstruction: the country was ravaged during by the war and millions of people were left homeless.³¹ About 35% of pre-war industry and some 800,000 buildings were destroyed, as well as over 10,000 km of modern roads and about fifty percent of railway tracks.³² Particularly serious was the situation in poor rural areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, which represented the main battlefields during the war: about one-third of houses were destroyed there.³³ Some urban areas also experienced large-scale destruction, having suffered bombing both from the Germans and the Allies, the latter paying virtually no attention to avoiding civilian targets in an allied country under occupation. The federal capital Belgrade, Zadar and Slavonski Brod in Croatia, and Montenegrin

³⁰ Conclusions of the Meeting of Heads of the Federal and Republican Ministries of Construction, 10 December 1945; ASCG, Fond 50, Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78, no. 78-6, 3.

³¹ Estimates differ; according to an early report of the Ministry of Construction, the number of people without homes was two million; see: Živa M. Đorđević, "Problem i zadaci Ministarstva građevina," *Tehnika* I, no. 2 (February 1946): 35. However, later standard estimates, which combined official Yugoslav reports and those of the UNRRA, raised this number to about 3.5 million; cf. Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), 19; and Petranović and Štrbac, *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 49-50.

³² Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 19.

³³ Živa M. Đorđević, "Problem i zadaci Ministarstva građevina," 35.

capital Titograd (Podgorica), among other cities, were particularly badly hit.³⁴

(Fig. 1.1)

The ambitions of the new Yugoslav government were much greater than the mere reconstruction of what had been destroyed during the war. Almost two years before any other East European country, in April 1947, the government inaugurated Yugoslavia's first (and, as it would happen, only) Five Year Plan, with the grandiose purpose to "eradicate economic and technical backwardness" and to transform the country's economy from predominantly agricultural into self-sufficiently industrial within this short time. "Industrialization plus electrification" was the formula of progress conceived by the Plan. The basis had already been set up the previous year with the establishment of the Federal Planning Committee, a government body responsible for determining the totality of economic activities in the country.³⁵ As fantastic as it may have been in its ambition, the Five Year Plan was not without precedent; the Soviet Union successfully realized two similar plans in the previous decade (although their success was paid with a very high price). The conditions at the start were indeed comparable: much like the pre-revolutionary Russia, the pre-war Yugoslavia was an underdeveloped country with little industrial production; most of the means of

³⁴ Petranović and Štrbac, *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 50.

³⁵ The Federal Planning Committee was a division of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, whose existence was sanctioned by the constitution. Its model was the Soviet GOSPLAN (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po Planirovaniyu), established as early as 1921. See: Petranović and Štrbac, *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 77.

production belonged to foreigners. Agriculture was the dominant economic activity, with about 80% of rural population. Just under 3% of the population was employed in industry, with further 7-8% indirectly living off it.³⁶ A large part of the population was illiterate and the number of the highly educated was minuscule.³⁷ But in their attempt at a fast top-down modernization, the Yugoslav communists had a somewhat easier task than their Soviet predecessors because they were not completely isolated and could rely on the USSR both for material aid and organizational experience. To draw on that experience, the prominent CPY official Boris Kidrič, the future Federal Minister of Industry and the main architect of the Five Year Plan, spent most of 1946 in the USSR, studying the organization of the Soviet planning.

Again following the Soviet model, the plan placed disproportionate attention on heavy industry in order to build a "basis" for Yugoslav economy, much at the expense of agriculture and the production of consumer goods. The accent on industrial development required a large-scale construction of new industrial buildings, which, in return, made the development of the construction industry indispensable. The same was required by the pressing housing crisis: fifteen million square meters of housing were supposed to be built until 1951, eight of which were planned in the existing cities and villages, and seven in the

³⁶ Petranović and Štrbac, *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 78.

³⁷ According to the 1931 census, 44% of adult population of Yugoslavia was illiterate, ranging from single-digit percentage in Slovenia, to about three quarters in Macedonia; *ibid.*

new industrial settlements.³⁸ In order to achieve all of this, the plan called for the development of mass produced prefabricated buildings and a general industrialization of construction materials and components. "Typification and standardization... based on progressive science and technique" were therefore given special accent.³⁹ The country's modest construction capacities also had to be increased, and in 1947 alone the state founded some 180 new companies, in addition to the existing 83.⁴⁰

The ambitions of the Communist leadership stood in sharp contrast with serious shortage of all resources: from finances and materials, to qualified labor. In such conditions, the realization of these ambitions was only possible through an extremely tight control and coordination of all production—including the producers—and architects were no exception. By the time of the inauguration of the plan, private offices had already been nationalized and the profession was reorganized into state-owned architectural and urban planning offices at different levels of administration, from the federal down to individual cities.⁴¹ Special significance was given to "state design institutes," which were attached to the

³⁸ See: "Graditeljstvo u Petogodišnjem planu," in *Arhitektura* 1, no. 1-2 (August 1947), 4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁰ Report on the Activities of the Ministry of Construction for 1947; ASCG Fond 50, Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78, no. 78-114, 1.

⁴¹ Nationalization of private architectural offices was demanded by the article 1, point 36, of Law on the Nationalization of Private Enterprises; see: B. T., "Uputstva i tumačenja: Honorari privatnih projektanata." *Naše građevinarstvo* I, no. 2 (October 1947), 99.

federal and the six republican ministries of construction and which gathered some of the best known names in the profession. Between the beginning and end of 1947, the number of such institutes almost doubled from seven to thirteen, employing 548 architects, engineers, and technicians.⁴² But the enormous building program still considerably exceeded the capacities of the existing body of professionals. In 1947, Yugoslavia had only 889 "architects and engineers" (60% of which worked in State-owned offices) and according to an official estimate, at least another 750 were needed in the next year.⁴³ This lack led to bizarre bureaucratic calculations like the counting the number of the necessary cadre in fractions, as in: "0.1 expert engineers being required per building."⁴⁴

The lack of expert cadre led to a quasi-military organization of the profession, in which architects were assigned posts according to bureaucratic command. Whenever possible, they were removed from administration and education to design offices and construction sites, and even students were encouraged to go "into production."⁴⁵ Many indeed did, working on commissions that were far from insignificant. **(Fig. 1.2)** Another problem was the extremely uneven development of Yugoslavia's six republics, with most professionals living

⁴² Report on the Activities of the Ministry of Construction for 1947, 3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴⁴ Minutes of the Conference about the construction operative, 14-15 February, 1947; ASCG, Fond 50: Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78: Građevinarstvo, no. 78-73, 7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 6. Also: Report on the Activities of the Ministry of Construction for 1947, 11.

in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, leaving the rest of the country sorely lacking. At the end of the war, Croatia had 320 architects and engineers—more than one third of the total number in the country—while the somewhat smaller Bosnia and Herzegovina had only 64.⁴⁶ In the same quasi-military fashion, some of the architects from the largest urban centers were therefore deployed to the underdeveloped republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia, and those who would not comply were supposed to be "fired from work and ostracized."⁴⁷

This migration of architects towards the South-East left significant marks on their destination regions. The case of Macedonia is illustrative in this respect. Denied nationhood in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and considered "southern Serbia," Macedonia had no local schools of architecture and a very limited number of native architects. Most monumental buildings had been designed by outsiders, generally well-known architects from Belgrade and Zagreb, including a considerable number of Russian émigrés.⁴⁸ Exceeding the capacities of native architects, the intense postwar industrialization and urbanization of the newly

⁴⁶ Panta S. Tufegdžić, "Organizacija naučnog rada za obnovu i unapređenje industrije," in: *Tehnika* I, no. 1 (January 1946): 4.

⁴⁷ For example, there was not a single urban planner in Macedonia; see: Minutes of the Conference about the construction operative, 7-11. Also: Conclusions of the Meeting of Heads of the Federal and Republican Ministries of Construction, 10 December 1945; ASCG, Fond 50: Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78: Građevinarstvo, no. 78-6, 4.

⁴⁸ See: Krum Tomovski and Boris Petkovski, *Архитектура и монументалната уметност во Скопје* (Skopje: Muzej na grad Skopje, 2003), 52-53.

established republic required an even greater participation of outsiders. This time, they came mostly from Croatia, since it had the largest supply of professionals; some worked from their home republic, while others were deployed to Macedonia for extended periods. The most prominent among them was one of the pioneers of Croatian modernism, Anton Ulrich, who not only designed a number of buildings in the southern republic, but also helped establish the new School of Architecture in the Macedonian capital of Skopje in 1949.⁴⁹ **(Fig. 1.3)** This trend continued well into the 1950s, until the new school in Skopje produced sufficient numbers of young architects to take over the job.⁵⁰

The state offices were so heavily over-commissioned that in 1947 the government officially banned the organization of architectural competitions during the construction season, because architects simply did not have enough time to work on them.⁵¹ This situation created opportunities for many architects employed outside of the official "design institutes," especially university professors, to work free-lance, even though private offices no longer existed.

⁴⁹ Ulrich taught in Skopje until his return to Zagreb in 1953; see: Vesna Mikić, *Arhitekt Anton Ulrich: klasičnost moderne* (Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić, 2002), 12. Other architects from Zagreb and Belgrade who taught in Skopje included: Đuro Ancel, Valdemar Baley, Imre Farkaš, and others. See: Tokarev, *100 години модерна архитектура*, 78; also: Georgi Konstantinovski, ????

⁵⁰ Among others, these included: Vlado Antolić and Slavko Löwy from Zagreb, Edo Mihevc from Ljubljana, Branko Petričić from Belgrade, etc.

⁵¹ Note from Branko Tučkorić, Aide to the Federal Minister of Construction, to the Presidency of the Government of FNRJ of 14 September, 1947; ASCG, Fond 50: Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78: Građevinarstvo, no. 78-902.

Free-lance practice, however, while not officially forbidden, was discouraged both through public criticism of clients that hired private architects, and through administrative limits imposed on the fees for such commissions. In a bizarre twist of economic logic, architects who took private projects were allowed to charge only half of the hourly fee normally paid to a state office, because they worked from home and, consequently, did not have additional expenses for rent, like the larger offices did.⁵² This attitude, of course, was less a result of the lack of funds than of the officially promoted distrust in self-employment as essentially bourgeois. The low official fees did not apply to prominent individuals who enjoyed a special status with the regime; for politically significant projects, some of them received amounts that verged on the astronomical, thus participating in a system that claimed to be egalitarian, but in reality from the very start instituted a privileged class based on ideological faithfulness.⁵³

⁵² See: B. T., "Honorari privatnih projektanata." *Naše građevinarstvo* I, no. 2 (October 1947), 99.

⁵³ For example, the Belgrade professor Bogdan Nestorović was lambasted in the press for charging 32,000 dinars for the design of a resort commissioned by the Committee for Social Security; eventually, his fee was reduced by two thirds to 11,000. See: "Kako ne treba raditi." *Naše građevinarstvo* I, no. 2 (October 1947), 103-04.

At approximately the same time, the sculptor Antun Augustinčić, who also happened to be the Vice-President of the Parliament, and the architect Drago Galić, received exactly a hundred times more—3.25 million dinars—for the design of the Monument to the Red Army at Batina Skela; see: Contract between the Ministry of Construction and Antun Augustinčić, 3 November, 1945, No. 8271/1945, ASCG, Fond 13: Ministarstvo građevina, Fascikla 85: Batina. Admittedly, this sum was meant to cover Augustinčić's work on the execution of clay, plaster, and stone figures, but not for casting them in bronze. Nevertheless, at 26.50 dinars, which was the net sum an architect

In a largely uneducated country, the lack of architects was only the tip of an iceberg. Even worse was the situation with the lower cadre at all levels of qualification: technicians, draftsmen, masons, carpenters, etc. To amend for this lack, the ministries of construction organized crash courses for new draftsmen, recruited from all walks of life, regardless of their preexisting skills.⁵⁴ Similarly, brick-layers, carpenters, and other craftsmen were educated directly on the construction sites.⁵⁵ But a large part of the labor force was not only unqualified, but even unpaid. Facing the lack of financial resources, the State had to rely on the considerable enthusiasm of the masses and on their volunteer work and, less visibly, on penal and semi-penal work of various categories of prisoners.⁵⁶ The

was paid per hour at a State office at the time and which was approved for Nestorović's project, Augustinčić and Galić's fee amounted to over 60 annual salaries!

⁵⁴ For example, Serbian Ministry of Construction organized a hundred-day course for draftsmen in the spring of 1946. The only demand for the applicants was their "innate drawing talent;" see: Miladin Prljević, "Sto-dnevni tečaj za crtače," in: *Naše građevinarstvo* I, no. 1 (September 1947): 11-13.

⁵⁵ The craftsmen were educated outside of the construction season; Croatia expected to add 2,000 new semi-qualified masons and carpenters at the start of the construction season 1947; see: Minutes of the Conference about the construction operative, 12.

⁵⁶ As Tito himself stated, the reconstruction could not be financed from the budget because of the lack of money. Instead, the State was to "regulate and aid" the initiative of the masses. See: "Maršal Tito o našem radu i našim zadacima", *Tehnika* I, no. 2 (February 1946): 33-34. To attract the masses, especially in the poorest regions, the State paid for the participation in the public works in food received as aid from the UNRRA; this was likely one of the sources of conflict with the UNRRA, which demanded to be in charge of the distribution of aid; see: Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, 18-21.

pattern had been established immediately after the liberation, when broad ranks of the population, regardless of their age, gender, or education, took part in volunteer brigades employed to clear up the rubble and rebuild the most important structures destroyed in the combat.⁵⁷ **(Fig. 1.4)** Later, the State continued to rely on volunteer labor, especially on the youth brigades that worked on some of the most important projects in the country, such as the construction of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway (known as the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity), the "youth railway" Brčko-Banovići in Bosnia, and New Belgrade. Volunteer brigades were encouraged to compete between themselves and the hardest workers—*udarnici*—received symbolic awards, in the vein of the Soviet *Stakhanovites*. But free labor was not the only benefit from such organization: on the one hand, the brigades were an excellent opportunity for ideological indoctrination of the masses, while on the other, they also offered a promise of upward social mobility through skills acquired at various courses organized for the participants. This provisional education helped broaden the base of qualified

Penal work was another source of free labor: it included prisoners of war and convicts, but also people sent to do "socially useful work by order of police," mostly peasants who failed to deliver their quotas; see: Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia*, 194.

⁵⁷ For example, architects, gathered into the United People's Liberation Front of architects, engineers, and technicians, volunteered in the clearing up of rubble in the cities of Čačak, Kragujevac, and Kraljevo immediately after the liberation of Serbia in the fall of 1944. They also coordinated and oversaw the clearing up and protection of industrial buildings in Belgrade in the same period. See: "Jedinstveni narodno-oslobodilački front inženjera, arhitekata i tehničara u Beogradu," *Tehnika* I, no. 1 (January 1946): 29.

labor and thus amend the chronic shortages.⁵⁸ And while they were of vital importance only in the first post-war years, volunteer brigades continued to be employed virtually until the country fell apart in 1991 because of these secondary benefits.

The aspirations of the plan seem especially unrealistic when considering the extreme poverty that plagued the country. The state may have prescribed millions of square meters to be built, but architects did not even have enough ink and tracing paper to draw all the required designs.⁵⁹ Of course, even more serious was the shortage of basic construction material: according to estimates, Yugoslavia could only produce about 60% of bricks and 75% of concrete iron needed in the first year of the plan.⁶⁰ What little there was of mechanization, the untrained operators were either reluctant to use or were quick to destroy it, while the general lack of vehicles for transport made the shortage of materials even worse.⁶¹ This led to constant appeals from the officials to rationalize and save

⁵⁸ For example, in the volunteer brigades engaged in the construction of the "Youth Railway" Brčko-Banovići, some 2,000 technicians were to be educated in 1947; see: Minutes of the Conference about the construction operative, 6.

⁵⁹ This was only one of the complaints of architects in a meeting with the Government representatives in mid-1947. See: Note on the conclusions of the conference of State design offices and the Presidency of the Government of FNRJ sent from the *Projektzavod*, Zagreb, to the Presidency of the Government of FNRJ, 3 July, 1947; ASCG, Fond 50: Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78: Građevinarstvo, no. 78-768, 2.

⁶⁰ Minutes of the Conference on the construction operative, 3.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 9; also: Report on the Activities of the Ministry of Construction for 1947, 4, and: Živa M. Dorđević, "Problem i zadaci Ministarstva građevina," *Tehnika* I, no. 2 (February 1946): 37.

wherever possible, and also to encourage innovation of new construction methods, which, however, amounted to a little more than mere improvisation.⁶²

The lack of skilled labor and mechanization created insurmountable problems for the officially proclaimed goal to industrialize the construction, despite the fact that architects seemed eager to engage in the task. With housing shortage plaguing the war-ravaged continent, the ideal of industrialized building was indeed in broad circulation across Europe, both in the East and the West. A long time obsession of modernist architects, serial production of building components was also supported, at least in theory, by the news that came from the USSR itself and Yugoslav building technology periodicals repeatedly published translations of Soviet articles on this topic.⁶³ Some attempts at prefabrication were indeed made as soon as the war was over, but very little was achieved in practice and building technology remained mostly traditional.⁶⁴ It

⁶² The Ministry of Construction of Serbia, for example, rewarded two brick-layers for their innovations leading to savings in the use of mortar; it is uncertain, however, if they were broadly used or if they really brought any rationalization. See: "Naši novotari," in: *Naše građevinarstvo* II, no. 4-5 (April-May, 1948): 272-73.

⁶³ A selection of these articles includes: "Građenje od gotovih armiranobetonskih delova u SSSR," in: *Tehnika* I, no. 9 (September 1946): 259-61; Branko Maksimović, "Problem masovnog građenja stambenih zgrada u Sovjetskom Savezu," in: *Tehnika* II, no. 2-3 (February-March 1947): 55-57; and A. Vacenko and N. Ivanov, "Konstrukcije kuća od montažnih štitova tvorničke izrade možemo i poboljšati," in: *Naše građevinarstvo* III, no. 5 (May, 1949): 394-97.

⁶⁴ As early as the fall of 1945, Croatian architects Riko Marasović and Božidar Rašica, in collaboration with the construction company Pilot D.D. from Zagreb, devised and tested a system of prefabricated concrete elements consisting of blocks, beams, and vaults, named "E2."

was not until 1949 that Jože Plečnik's former student Danilo Fürst created a semi-prefabricated system *Hitrogradnja* (rapid building), which was applied to erect some 96 two-story apartment buildings across Slovenia.⁶⁵ Fürst was then commissioned by Slovenia's Minister of Construction to design a fully prefabricated structure and the result was a modest two-story four-apartment building that was assembled in only eight days. Despite its success, the project never advanced beyond the prototype.⁶⁶ Further attempts were made in Croatia in 1950, but it seems that they also remained only prototypes.⁶⁷ Contrary to the proclaimed goals of the Five Year Plan, industrialized construction remained a dream until the late 1950s, long after the plan had expired.

If the large-scale industrialized construction was for the moment out of reach, the 'industrialization' of the design phase was not, and typization and standardization of projects became a widespread practice. This was an easy way to get around the problem of the lack of architects, since one "typical plan"

However, it remains unknown if the system was ever employed in practice. See: Letter from the Institute for the Examination of Materials, Technical Faculty, University of Zagreb, to the Department for Typisation, Croatian Ministry of Construction, 5 December, 1945; ASCG, Fond 50: Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78: Građevinarstvo, no. 78-603.

⁶⁵ See: Nataša Koselj, "Arhitekt Danilo Fürst/Architect Danilo Fürst," in: Nataša Koselj, ed., *Danilo Fürst, arhitektura*, exhibition catalogue (Ljubljana: Cankarjev dom, 2000), 23.

⁶⁶ According to Nataša Koselj, who interviewed the architect on multiple occasions, the motive for this commission was to demonstrate the supremacy of the construction industry in Slovenia over other Yugoslav republics; *ibid.*

⁶⁷ Ivo Bartolić, "Montažno građenje stambenih zgrada," *Arhitektura* IV, no. 9-10 (1950): 23-34.

could be used multiple times, especially for typologies like collective housing that needed to be built on a large scale. More often than not, this practice, coupled with the general material poverty, led to the creation of, as a contemporary report put it, "sad, gray, uniform settlements with countless identical houses;" this is probably why some historians tend to equate Yugoslav Socialist Realism with architecture of no aesthetic ambition.⁶⁸ **(Fig. 1.5)** But standardization and typization were also a major part of modernist discourse that had a long lineage back to the *Deutscher Werkbund* and Le Corbusier's *objets type* and played an important role in the development of modernist aesthetic. When allowed some freedom, as was the case at competitions, skilled architects were able to produce designs that went beyond mere utilitarianism and continued the tradition of pre-war modernism.⁶⁹ **(Fig. 1.6)** At a number of occasions, such projects managed to reach the practice, but nevertheless remained rather rare until the following decade.

Besides housing, there were other building types crucial in the Five Year Plan that were good candidates for typization. At the end of 1947, the Central

⁶⁸ "Kako ne treba raditi: jednoobrazna naselja." *Naše građevinarstvo* II, no. 4-5 (April-May 1948), 443-45. About the historians' view on this problem, see n. 6.

⁶⁹ For example, in January 1947, the city government of Belgrade organized a competition for "typical apartment buildings" to which over 80 entries were submitted; while the standard of living proposed by most participants verged on the *Existenzminimum*, some entries nevertheless displayed considerable aesthetic qualities that would not lead to "sadness, grayness, and uniformity." See: "Konkurs za izradu idejnih skica tipskih stambenih zgrada u Beogradu," in *Arhitektura* I, no. 1-2 (August, 1947): 33-45.

Committee of the party initiated a mass construction campaign for the so-called cooperative houses, several thousands of which were eventually built around the country.⁷⁰ Usually containing a meeting room with a stage for small performances, a grocery store, a reading room, and several offices for the local agricultural cooperative and social organizations, the cooperative houses served as rural community centers.⁷¹ While their stylistic nuances ranged from modernist to more traditional ones, most contained certain vernacular overtones sensitive to their environment, if nothing else, at least pitched roofs and rustic stone walls.⁷² **(Fig. 1.7)** Besides their practical purposes, in the predominantly unurbanized Yugoslavia cooperative houses were also the main loci of ideological indoctrination among the peasants, hosting state celebrations, public lectures, and various educational courses. But these buildings also acquired a more sinister meaning as sites of repression in the countryside. Since the end of the war, peasants had been forced to sell their goods to the state at prices well

⁷⁰ Petranović and Štrbac claim there were 4,000 of them built; see: *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 83. However, in a 1950 article, Belgrade architect Branislav Kojić, claimed that 3,000 cooperative houses were already built and another 3,600 were under construction; see: Branislav Kojić, "Uloga arhitekata u izgradnji zadružnog sela," *Arhitektura* IV, no. 5-6 (1950): 65-72.

⁷¹ See: "Tipovi zadružnih domova u NRH," *Arhitektura* II, no. 7 (February, 1948): 15-18; and "Zadružni domovi iz LR Slovenije," *ibid*: 19-20.

⁷² Kojić, the preeminent expert for rural architecture, advocated that cooperative houses should be designed in what could be termed "regionalist" approach: using local experiences, materials, and skills, but without literal copying of traditional forms; see: Kojić, "Uloga arhitekata u izgradnji zadružnog sela," 71.

below their market value, a notorious practice known as *otkup*. Moreover, following Stalin's condemnation of Yugoslavia in 1948, the State initiated a forced collectivization of agriculture to prove Yugoslav communists' orthodoxy, but it was sabotaged by the peasants coerced into the cooperatives in every possible way.⁷³ Cooperative houses thus arguably became the first significant battlegrounds of social conflict in the post-war Yugoslavia, acquiring a meaning that their architects could have hardly predicted.

Architecture in the “Agitprop Culture”

Just as it initiated a complete restructuring of Yugoslav economy, the CPY also set out to establish a thoroughly new culture. Despite considerable popular support, the party policies were by no means without opposition (as the resistance it met in the countryside showed), so in order to affirm its rule, it had to go beyond mere physical coercion and to win the hearts and minds of the people for the project of socialism. The restructuring of culture had another pragmatic reason: the ideal of industrialized socialist state required an appropriately educated population. Eradicating illiteracy and raising the general level of

⁷³ See: Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia*, 216; also: Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost*, 409.

education thus became a task of utmost importance.⁷⁴ Ideological indoctrination and educational efforts in effect merged to create a single-minded populist culture directed 'from above,' whose main goal was ultimately propagandistic: to ensure that the masses followed the course established by the Party.

In order to achieve this, the CPY combined Soviet experiences with its own practices developed before and during the war to create a powerful apparatus of ideological indoctrination. Known by the Soviet portmanteau *Agitprop*, the "committees for agitation and propaganda" took over complete control of cultural life in Yugoslavia. These committees acted in various environments—attached to Party units, the state administration, or mass organizations—and were intended as "advisory bodies," but in reality were always controlled by and responsible to the Party and functioned as semi-official censors. This meant that even the illusion of possible non-partisan cultural initiative was eliminated: the state provided the funding, but the Party directly determined everything else.⁷⁵ Such firm grip was enabled by a thorough take-over of institutional infrastructure: all enterprises that served cultural life were nationalized, and all private cultural associations and organizations abolished.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Educational activities among the masses included literacy courses, creation of "people's universities," organizations of theatrical, musical, and dance amateur groups, public lectures, etc.; see: Dimić, *Agitprop kultura*, 126-43.

⁷⁵ About the establishment and organization of the *Agitprop* apparatus: *ibid.*, especially 36-46.

⁷⁶ Over 200 printing shops and 100 cinematographers were nationalized; *ibid.*, 22. Private publishers and bookstores disappeared. Private libraries, reading rooms, galleries, and theaters

All “cultural workers”—artists, writers, musicians, scholars, architects—were grouped into centralized state-sponsored associations controlled by the *Agitprop*, which prescribed the topics to be treated, as well as methods of treatment. Membership in these associations was the only way to participate in cultural life and it also brought considerable material privileges to its members at a time of general poverty: economic security, access to studios, materials, instruments, etc.⁷⁷ But it was also closely overseen by politicians and any neutral, let alone opposing, engagement was out of question. Compared to their colleagues in other fields of cultural production—writers, painters, or composers—architects enjoyed somewhat more freedom, because they could earn a living as neutral professionals through their employment in the State architectural offices and could thus avoid direct political engagement. Yet State-sponsored associations were organized in architecture as well, and avoidance or direct refusal to participate in them was met with criticism.⁷⁸ On the other hand,

were abolished, as were private and religious schools and independent cultural associations, including choirs, art associations, etc. The oldest and most important institutions—national libraries, museums, and theaters—were revived, but Party members were brought to manage them; *ibid.*, 57-58.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 196-97.

⁷⁸ For example, the Croatian architect Zvonimir Vrkljan was viciously criticized for designing oversized “bourgeois” apartments. But this criticism was also used as an opportunity to raise the question of his war-time collaboration with the *Ustaša* regime. Vrkljan's ultimate sin lay in his refusal to “participate in our social life and in the association of engineers and technicians, for which reason he is out of touch with our reality and thus serves us with typical bourgeois

informal groups, very frequent before the war, especially among modernists (see Chapter 1), were completely out of question.

Architects had their own section in the republican Associations of Engineers and Technicians, which were further brought together in a federal union. Similar associations had existed before the war, but the new ones were founded in discontinuity with them, emphasizing purely "expertly" concerns since professional interests were allegedly defended in state-sponsored trade unions.⁷⁹ The task of new associations was to "organize continuous education of professionals, to popularize science, and to participate in the reconstruction and the planned economy," which was to be achieved through lectures, courses, publications, meetings, congresses, exhibitions, etc.⁸⁰ These goals were indeed actively pursued and their most lasting legacy was *Arhitektura*, the first specialized architectural journal in post-war Yugoslavia, whose first issue came out in August 1947 under the auspices of the federal Union of Associations of Engineers and Technicians.⁸¹ As the largest in the country, the Croatian

apartments from the 'good old times.'" See: "Kako ne treba raditi: 'Ekonomični' projekti gospodina profesora," in: *Naše građevinarstvo* II, no. 4-5 (April-May 1948): 435-46.

⁷⁹ See: Bratislav Stojanović, "O osnivanju društva inženjera i tehničara," *Tehnika* I, no. 2 (February 1946): 40. However, it is difficult to imagine how this alleged protection from the trade unions worked when the State had complete control over the profession, including administrative control of fees; see n. 46.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁸¹ *Arhitektura* continues to be published in Zagreb to this day.

Association was put in charge of the production of the journal, which was intended to cover the whole country. Besides *Arhitektura*, issues of importance for architecture were also covered in *Naše građevinarstvo* (Our Construction Industry) and *Tehnika* (Technics), which were, however, mostly devoted to building technology and civil engineering and published under the aegis of other institutions.⁸² Despite their professional character, all three journals were also mouthpieces of the official politics, regularly publishing proclamations of the party, especially those related to the construction industry.

Despite the proclaimed "expertly" purpose of the engineers' associations, their main goal was to imbue professional discourses with ideologically correct content. In the Manichean division of the world brought about by the rising Cold War, one of their tasks was to promote Yugoslavia's orientation towards the East.⁸³ This was manifested through an abundance of information on Soviet and

⁸² *Tehnika* was published by the Union of the Employees of Economo-Administrative and Technical Institutions of Yugoslavia, starting in January 1946. *Naše građevinarstvo* was a publication of the Federal Ministry of Construction and first came out in September 1947.

⁸³ Yugoslav culture came under total domination of the Soviets, which was institutionalized through the Society for cultural cooperation Yugoslavia-USSR. Of the total number of translations in the period 1945-49, 85% of books were translated from Russian; some of these books were published in astounding numbers, like Lenin's and Stalin's collected works that were printed in 1,4 and 1,3 million copies respectively; see: Dimić, *Agitprop kultura*, 173. In a virtual absence of Yugoslav film industry, Soviet films took up majority of audiences. As Dimić reports, in 1948, 65% of movie theater visits was to Soviet films; *ibid.*, 179. Similar situation was in the arts, where exhibitions of Soviet artists garnered the greatest attention. The peak was the exhibition "Four Soviet Painters" in 1947, which displayed the works of the star painters of Socialist Realism, Alexander Gerasimov, Sergei Gerasimov, Alexander Deineka, and Arkadij Plastov; see:

East European architecture that became available to Yugoslav professional audiences.⁸⁴ The celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the October revolution in the fall of 1947 was a prime occasion to present architectural traditions of the Soviet Union and a large exhibition of the architecture of the peoples of the USSR toured all capital cities of Yugoslav republics, attracting "tens of thousands of visitors."⁸⁵ Almost a half of the corresponding issue of *Arhitektura* was devoted to articles on the history of Soviet and Russian architecture, illustrated with staple projects of the 1930s Socialist Realism: the

ibid., 182; also Lidija Merenik, *Ideološki modeli: srpsko slikarstvo 1945-1968* (Belgrade: Beopolis, 2001), 45.

About Yugoslav-French cultural connections in the first years after World War II, see Dragan Petrović, *Francusko-jugoslovenski kulturni odnosi* (Belgrade: Institut za političke studije, 2006).

⁸⁴ For a detailed study of the image of the world and of Yugoslavia's place within it, see Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada*, 73-74, 107-122, 484-485.

The political orientation to the Soviet Union is clearly legible from the tendentiously affirmative articles on the Soviet architecture published in *Tehnika*; a selection includes: Jakov Kornfeld, "Savez Sovjetskih arhitekata," in: *Tehnika* I, no. 2 (February 1946): 58-59; Nikolaj Abramov, "Organizacija više tehničke nastave u SSSR," in: *Tehnika* I, no. 2 (February 1946): 71-72; Slavko Suvajdžić, "Moskovski metropoliten," in: *Tehnika* I, no. 3 (March 1946): 84-85; I. L. Mac, "Opštenarodna demokratska načela sovjetske arhitekture," in: *Tehnika* I, no. 4-5 (May 1946): 119-23. "Građenje od gotovih armiranobetonskih delova u SSSR," in: *Tehnika* I, no. 9 (September 1946): 259-61. Branko Maksimović, "Problem masovnog građenja stambenih zgrada u Sovjetskom Savezu," in: *Tehnika* II, no. 2-3 (February-March 1947): 55-57; *ibid.*, "Moskva—centar nove socijalističke kulture." *Tehnika* II, no. 7 (July 1947): 176-77.

⁸⁵ A large monograph with the material from the exhibition was promised to be published soon, but I did not find evidence that this really occurred; see: "Izložba arhitekture naroda SSSR u našoj zemlji," in: *Arhitektura* I, no. 4-6 (November-December, 1947; January, 1948): 8.

Palace of the Soviets, the Red Army Theater, the Frunze Military Academy, etc.⁸⁶ Soon afterward, an exhibition of Bulgarian architecture followed, which was also well covered in *Arhitektura*.⁸⁷ Then came articles on Czechoslovak and Hungarian architecture.⁸⁸ At the same time, the flow of information from the West all but stopped. The professional press published virtually nothing on Western architecture, except for a few tendentious attacks. The only event of significance in this respect was an exhibition of the post-war reconstruction of British cities organized in Belgrade in 1948, but the comments on it published in the press, while cautiously praising some of the British efforts, did not fail to point out the many problems encountered in the reconstruction and to claim that truly satisfactory planning would be impossible until capitalism is abolished.⁸⁹

Besides the relentless cultural propoganda, the Soviet Union exhibited little direct material influence in the architecture of Yugoslavia. Although many engineers arrived as part of the Soviet technical aid missions, it seems that these included few architects. Also, there were no "gifts from the Soviet people" like

⁸⁶ See: *Arhitektura* I-II, no. 4-6 (November-December, 1947; January, 1948): 3-16.

⁸⁷ The exhibition was shown in Belgrade and Zagreb; see: *Arhitektura* II, no. 7 (February, 1948): 21-25.

⁸⁸ See: "Osvrt na arhitekturu bratske Čehoslovačke," in: *Arhitektura* II, no. 8-10 (Mart, April, and May, 1948): 46-52; also: "Suvremena mađarska arhitektura," *Arhitektura* II, no. 11-12 (June, July, 1948): 40-41.

⁸⁹ "Izložba engleskog Ministarstva urbanistike," in: *Naše građevinarstvo* II, no. 4-5 (April-May 1948): 271-72.

the Palace of Culture in Warsaw. But the orientation to the East revived some older connections. Before the war, Yugoslavia had strong political and cultural links with Czechoslovakia, whose vibrant modernist architecture had a particularly strong influence in Serbia.⁹⁰ The links were restored soon after the end of the war thanks to the fact that Czechoslovakia too ended up in the communist camp, and the exchange became exceptionally strong within a short time.⁹¹ As part of the program of technical aid, several Czechoslovak architects designed buildings for Yugoslavia's underdeveloped regions, the most outstanding example being the railway station in Sarajevo. With its expansive glass façade and a daring vault comprising a series of concrete shells, the building was an excellent statement of modernist aesthetic that had flourished in Czechoslovakia before the war.⁹² **(Fig. 1.8)** Another example of the exchange was the Prague architect Ludjek Kubeš, who arrived in Macedonia in 1947 and decided to stay there even after East European countries terminated cooperation

⁹⁰ TANJA!

⁹¹ According to the materials from the Archive of Serbia and Montenegro, cooperation with Czechoslovakia was very strong. Except for the USSR, the folder on Yugoslav cooperation with Czechoslovakia contains by far the greatest number of documents in the section on international relations. See: ASCG, Fond 50: Predsedništvo Vlade, Fascikla 61: Međunarodni odnosi.

⁹² Ivan Štraus cites the team Kohout, Prohaska, and Hacar as the architects of the Railway Station. However, after Yugoslavia's conflict with the Cominform in 1948, the Czechoslovak team could no longer work on the project and the building was completed by the native architect Bogdan Stojkov. See: Ivan Štraus, *Arhitektura Bosne i Hercegovine* *The Architecture of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1945-1995* (Sarajevo: Oko, 1998), 34..

with Yugoslavia in 1948. Kubeš spent most of his career in Skopje and was the city's first resident planner. He was also responsible for designing a number of modernist apartment buildings and schools around the southern republic.⁹³ This interaction with Czechoslovakia resulted in an apparent paradox that the most material foreign influence on Yugoslav architecture in the Stalinist period came in the form of Czechoslovak modernism.⁹⁴

Regardless of this paradox, the political drive to impose Socialist Realism in all fields of culture was strong, especially in literature, where it had already had a well established tradition. And while in the 1930s some of the most prominent leftist intellectuals opposed the official Party line of Socialist Realism, after the war there was no longer any room for dissent. A telling sign of the times was an episode involving two fierce opponents of the pre-war conflict: the famous Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža and the Montenegrin poet Radovan Zogović, one of the chief ideologues of Socialist Realism and a prominent Party member. During their first meeting after the war, after an awkward discussion, Zogović made a dramatic pause, looked at Krleža, and resolutely said: "Krleža, the battle

⁹³ About Kubeš's biography, see: Kokan Grčev, "Архитект Лудјек Кубеш (1913-1996)," in: Georgi Stradelov, Krum Tomovski, and Mihail Tokarev, eds., *Архитектурата на почвата на Македонија од средината на XIX век до крајот XX на век* (Skopje: Makedonska akademija na naukite i umetnostite, 2006), 107-12.

⁹⁴ The situation seems less paradoxical if one takes into account the fact that Socialist Realism was not fully imposed around Eastern Europe until the early 1950s. Also: Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe During the Stalin Era: An Aspect of Cold War History* (New York: The Architectural History Foundation; Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992).

you led with the Party before the war—consider it lost!”⁹⁵ Zogović's message was clear and it quickly found its way to the many pre-war communist fellow travelers who supported the political goals of the CPY but opposed its Stalinist cultural policy. A remarkable wave of statements of loyalty to the new regime followed, with many pre-war advocates of artistic freedom now succumbing to the political dictate.⁹⁶ Indeed, literature and fine arts were completely subjected to the theoretical demands of Socialist Realism, both in thematic (celebration of the revolution and the cult of socialist work) and formal terms (realism). And even if these two aspects were not always applied to a full satisfaction of the guardians of socialist art, the political drive to fulfill them was relentless.⁹⁷

An episode with the prominent Zagreb architect Drago Ibler is significant in this respect. A leader of Croatian modernism, Ibler spent the war years in Switzerland, but days before Zagreb was liberated in May 1945, he wrote directly

⁹⁵ As reported by the Croatian writer Jože Horvat, who was present at the meeting; quoted after Ivo Visković, *Sukob na književnoj ljevici* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga and Alfa, 2001), 101-102.

⁹⁶ Marko Ristić, a leading Belgrade surrealist before the war, abandoned any traces of surrealism and “more openly and radically glorified the social and political changes than many writers from the movement of social literature.” He soon became the first ambassador of the new Yugoslavia in Paris. Ivo Andrić, former royal diplomat and the future winner of the Nobel Prize for literature, celebrated the “strength, values, and beauty of socialist work and competition.” See: Dimić, *Agitprop kultura*, 202-03. Krleža himself described the revolutionary events as “unprecedented, indescribable!” Quoted after Visković, *Sukob na književnoj ljevici*, 101.

⁹⁷ See: Lidija Merenik, *Ideološki modeli: srpsko slikarstvo 1945-1968* (Belgrade: Beopolis, 2001), 21-47; Dragoslav Đorđević, “Socijalistički realizam 1945-1950,” in: Miodrag B. Protić, ed., *1929-1950: Nadrealizam, postnadrealizam, socijalna umetnost, umetnost NOR-a, socijalistički realizam*, exhibition catalogue (Belgrade: Muzej savremene umetnosti, 1969), 68-81.

to Tito from Geneva to offer his services to the new Yugoslavia and its post-war reconstruction.⁹⁸ In order to stress his own political commitment to the winning side, the architect recommended himself, reminding Tito that he was a co-founder and president of “the only Yugoslav communist artists’ association *Zemlja*.”⁹⁹ As Milovan Đilas, the head of the *Agitprop*, reported, Tito indeed commissioned Ibler to design “a magnificent opera house for Belgrade,” as well as “a monumental court at Dedinje” [an elite residential area of Belgrade, also containing the old royal court].¹⁰⁰ And while the idea of a “court” for the communist leader soon died out, plans for the opera house were indeed made, though they never materialized.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Letter from Drago Ibler to Marshall of Yugoslavia of 5 May, 1945; ASCG, Fond 50 Savezno izvršno veće, fascikla 78 Građevinarstvo, no. 78-590.

⁹⁹ He also added that he belonged to a “group of Yugoslav leftist intellectuals” who “were illegally active in politics,” which was obviously a convenient stretch of truth. *Zemlja*, although gathered around the agenda of social criticism, never declared itself as an explicitly communist association, and Ibler’s alleged illegal political activity was most likely a figment of his own imagination. The word “illegal” held a thoroughly positive connotation among the communists, because the CPY was outlawed by the royal regime in 1921 and all its subsequent activity had to be illegal. During the occupation, illegal subversive activities organized by the Party were the only mode of resistance in urban areas and acquired a romantic aura.

¹⁰⁰ Ibler showed up in Belgrade sometime in 1946 or even 1945 and immediately got in touch with Tito, probably through Krlježa. See: Milovan Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna* (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1991), 58-60.

¹⁰¹ Đilas tells us that the Opera house was supposed to stand at the current location of Belgrade Railway Station, with an alternate location on the left bank of the Sava, in today’s New Belgrade; see: Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 60.

Considering Ibler's functionalist pre-war oeuvre, it is difficult to see his vaguely Venetian proposal for the Belgrade Opera as anything but yielding to the perceived imperative of Socialist Realism.¹⁰² A stripped-down version of Doge's Palace, the Opera House even had pairs of free-standing columns in front of its facades to support the allusion to St. Mark's square, except that Ibler's columns were likely meant to carry, instead of symbols of Venice, sculptures of specifically communist iconography. Although almost ascetic compared to contemporary Soviet architecture—but still containing clear historicist allusions to Doge's Palace—the project had a significant Soviet precedent: an early entry for the Palace of the Soviets competition by Vladimir Shchuko and Vladimir Gelfreich, the tandem that also designed the well known final version of the project in collaboration with Boris Iofan.¹⁰³ This suggests that Zogović's "Consider it lost!" reached Ibler loud and clear, and that the architect succumbed to the assumed victory of Socialist Realism.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² In her monograph on Ibler, Željka Čorak labels this project as socialist realist without any doubt; see: Željka Čorak, *U funkciji znanka: Drago Ibler i hrvatska arhitektura između dva rata* (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 1981), 221-24.

¹⁰³ See: Alexei Tarkhanov and Sergei Kavtaradze, *Architecture of the Stalin Era* (New York: Rizzoli, 1992), 28.

¹⁰⁴ The project enjoyed great approval from the officials and Đilas, who was in charge of it on the client side, was decades later still regretful that it was never realized; see: Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 60. Indeed, with Ibler's talents, the Opera House probably would have been a remarkable piece of architecture, even if history would have judged it unfavorably for complying with the political dictate. However, Bogdan Bogdanović claims to remember that Ibler's initial proposal was a starkly undecorated rectangular volume with only a few free-standing columns in front of it and

Still, Ibler may have capitulated too early. Considering his pre-war alliance with Krleža (and thus his opposition to the official Party policy), especially considering the fact that he had spent the war in safety in Switzerland, it is understandable that he felt a need to prove his allegiance to the new regime.¹⁰⁵ But the dynamic within the architectural profession was significantly different from that in literature and painting, where a tradition of socialist realist practice and criticism had already been established in the 1930s. In architecture, such tradition was inexistent and, as a rule, left-inclining architects had been modernists. Those who had the skills to apply Socialist Realism in architecture were already getting old and were most likely not reliable communist allies. (Ironically, it was probably the Russian émigrés who arrived in Yugoslavia after the October Revolution who would have been most competent for the task; but they were either dead or had escaped before the Red Army arrived.) Moreover, out of the war came a whole group of professionals, many of them still young, who, thanks to their participation in the Liberation Movement, did not have to

that historicist allusions, including the colonnade, were added after Đilas's intervention; author's interview with Bogdanović, 22 May, 2005.

¹⁰⁵ In his letter to Tito, Ibler also claimed that he had gone to Switzerland at the request of the Central Committee of the CPY, which is highly improbable. Instead, the Party had a policy to invite prominent intellectuals to join the Liberation Movement, regardless of their pre-war political engagement. Tito was especially intent on bringing Krleža to the join the Partisans, which never happened; in this context, it sounds very dubious that the Party would want Ibler to emigrate to Switzerland.

prove anything to anyone.¹⁰⁶ Older among them were pioneers of pre-war modernism and younger ones their students and followers. It was they who became Yugoslavia's new architectural elite.

In Belgrade, Nikola Dobrović marched into the liberated city in 1944 wearing a Partisan uniform, to become the head of the newly founded Institute of Urbanism of Serbia.¹⁰⁷ A Central European cosmopolitan educated in Prague and Budapest, Dobrović was one of the luminaries of pre-war modernism who could not break into the favored circles of the Yugoslav capital before the war, but was now in full charge of the reconstruction of the city. In Zagreb, among many other leftist or left-leaning intellectuals, Kazimir Ostrogović came to prominence; while the war was still raging, he delivered a speech on virtues of modernism to a conference of antifascist "cultural workers" held in the town of Topusko, in a Partizan-controlled pocket of Croatia.¹⁰⁸ Also present was Josip

¹⁰⁶ It seems that in Slovenia this number was especially large, which is not surprising considering the fact that the Liberation Front of Slovenia for a long time managed to keep non-partisan character, bringing together patriots of all political colors. In her speech at the Fifth Congress of the CPY in 1948, Mira Kraigher claimed that 56% of architects employed at the Design Institute of Slovenia had been active members of the Liberation Movement since its very start in 1941 and that most others were supporters. See: Mira Kraigher, "K nekim pripombam o arhitekturi na V. kongresu KPJ," *Novi svet* (Ljubljana) III (1948): 779.

¹⁰⁷ See: Marta Vukotić Lazar, *Beogradsko razdoblje arhitekta Nikole Dobrovića* (Belgrade: Plato, 2002), 60.

¹⁰⁸ See: Kazimir Ostrogović, "O arhitekturi," *Tehnika* I, no. 1 (January 1946): 6-7. The conference was held at Topusko in June, 1944; see: Mladen Iveković, *Hrvatska lijeva inteligencija 1918-1945* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1970), 239.

Seissel, former member of the avant-garde association *Zenit* and an active anti-fascist, who became one of the directors of the Croatian Institute of Urbanism after the war ended.¹⁰⁹ In Sarajevo, Muhamed Kadić, another Prague-educated modernist, became the director of Bosnian Design Institute; a long-time opponent of the old royal regime, he was also an internationally active antifascist who had campaigned throughout Europe, from Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, to Belgium, and France.¹¹⁰ In Ljubljana, Plečnik's former student and Le Corbusier's one-time collaborator Edvard Ravnikar, who had been arrested by the Italians for his activities in the Liberation Front of Slovenia, became a director of the Slovenian Design Institute and then a professor at the University, ultimately rising to the position of Plečnik's "unofficial heir."¹¹¹ All these men, and many more, had already established their reputations before the war and their continuing prominence was only confirmed by their participation in the Liberation Movement; but they were also joined by a group of much younger architects, some of them still students, who would only gain prominence after the war. Most

¹⁰⁹ Seissel was even arrested by the Croatian *Ustaša* regime for his activities, and then joined the Partisan units at the liberated territory; see: "Josip Seissel," in: Mladen Obad Šćitaroci, ed., *Sveučilište u Zagrebu – Arhitektonski fakultet: 1919./1920.-1999./2000.: osamdeset godina izobrazbe arhitekata u Hrvatskoj* (Zagreb: Arhitektonski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2000), 214.

¹¹⁰ See: Miloš Jeftić, "Akademik, arhitekt Muhamed Kadić," transcript of interview for Radio Belgrade, NBS MJ 459.

¹¹¹ See: France Ivanšek, ed. *Hommage Edvard Ravnikar*, (Ljubljana: F. in M. Ivanšek, 1995), 16-17.

significant among them were Vjenceslav Richter and Bogdan Bogdanović, both of whom fought and were wounded in the Liberation war, and both of whom would become Yugoslavia's leading architects in the 1950s and 1960s.¹¹²

But no one embodied the new political reality better than Neven Šegvić. Young and ambitious, with little experience but with a perfect pedigree both in professional and ideological terms, he quickly rose to a position of influence that could not be ignored. Born in 1917 in Split and linked through both parents to families engaged in construction business, Šegvić studied architecture with Ibler and worked in the studios of the best of pre-war Croatian modernist architects: Drago Galić and Lavoslav Horvat; and also worked for the famous sculptor Ivan Meštrović.¹¹³ In 1942 or 1943, he joined the Liberation Movement and seems to have risen to a high rank in Partisan units.¹¹⁴ After the war, he was not only

¹¹² Before the war, Richter was a member of the SKOJ (Union of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia) and during the war he actively participated in the Liberation Movement; see: Miloš Jeftić, "Arhitekta, likovni umetnik Vjenceslav Richter," transcript of interview for Radio Belgrade, NBS. Bogdan Bogdanović came from a staunch antiroyalist family and his father Milan was a prominent literary critic and a close friend of Krleža. Bogdanović also joined the Partisans in 1944, where he soon advanced in the ranks and was severely wounded in the finishing months of the war; see interview with the author, 22 May, 2005.

¹¹³ On Šegvić's biography, see: *Neven Šegvić*, special issue of *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) XLV, no. 211 (2002):

¹¹⁴ Boris Magaš implies that one of the assistants at the Zagreb School of Architecture in the early post-war years, who later became the dean of the school, acted as a "harsh interrogator of the prisoners of war who decided about their executions;" see: Boris Magaš, "Svjetla u kabinetima," in: Dubravka Kisić, ed., *Radovan Nikšić: 1920.-1987.: arhiv arhitekta*, exhibition catalogue

admitted to the circle of the most prominent Yugoslav architects and artists, but also became the first editor-in-chief of *Arhitektura*. It was under his editorship that *Arhitektura* came to reflect the paradox of Yugoslav pursuit of Socialist Realism that looked nothing like its Soviet models. And it was he who personally embodied the schizophrenic identity of Yugoslav architecture in this period, the split between the professional allegiance to modernism and ideological faith in the Soviet Union as the ultimate model.

Theorizing Socialist Realism

Between 1947 and 1950, *Arhitektura* published a series of polemical articles on the architecture of Socialist Realism that highlighted the disjunctures and paradoxes of the period. While claiming to use the Soviet Union as the ultimate model, this debate in effect sought to redefine what Socialist Realism was, subverting the official rhetoric to condemn historicism and promote functionalism. This was possible for several reasons. First, there was the fact that the Croatian Association of Engineers and Technicians was in charge of producing the journal and thus stirring the discourse; not only was the functionalist ethos most firmly established in Croatia, but Croatian functionalists were also most closely allied with the political left (see Chapter 1). Second,

(Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti and Hrvatski muzej arhitekture, 2005), 3-4. Of all the deans of the Zagreb school, only Šegvić by his age and position fits this description.

before the war, Socialist Realism had had no impact on Yugoslav architecture: although the Party could influence literary and artistic production, being illegal, it had no chance of actually building anything, and architecture stayed on the margins of its influence. Finally, there was a problem with the definition of Socialist Realism, even in the USSR, and the doctrine that strove to regulate the complete cultural production was precisely elaborated neither in theoretical nor in practical terms.

During the two decades it dominated the culture of the Soviet Union, Socialist Realism operated, as Leonid Heller wrote, in a chronic state of destabilization, “according to an ‘uncertainty principle’ of sorts.”¹¹⁵ In literature and the fine arts, at least some elements of the formula were clear: *realism* referred to the realistic mode of representation, while *socialist* prescribed the range of desirable topics, identified with “ideological commitment” (*ideinost*) to celebrate the revolution and socialist work. But in architecture the situation was much less clear: architecture is hardly a mimetic art, which undermines the most basic assumptions of the doctrine: What is realism in architecture? What is

¹¹⁵ See: Leonid Heller: “A World of Prettiness: Socialist Realism and Its Aesthetic Categories,” in: Thomas Lahusen and Evgeny Dobrenko, eds., *Socialist Realism Without Shores* (Durham, Indiana, and London: Duke University Press, 1997), 58.

Even in literature, definitions of Socialist Realism varied and evolved; see Thomas Lahusen, “Socialist Realism in Search of Its Shores: Some Historical Remarks on the ‘Historically Open Aesthetic System of the Truthful Representation of Life,’” in: Lahusen and Dobrenko, eds., *Socialist Realism Without Shores*, 5-26.

specifically socialist architecture? These fundamental questions remained open, giving rise to numerous controversies throughout the 1930s in the USSR.

In effect, socialist realist architecture was most precisely defined in negative terms, in opposition to various manifestations of modernism, especially those that, like functionalism, were associated with socialist ideas and could be seen as competition to the totalizing ambitions of Socialist Realism and the Stalinist system.¹¹⁶ Criticism was especially aimed at purging the specifically Russian sins of constructivism and formalism, the latter being associated with the formalist school of literary theory centered around Roman Jakobson and Viktor Šklovskij. Russian formalists advocated the autonomy of the artistic medium from the tyranny of the conventionally accepted meaning through “defamiliarization” (*ostranenie*): the creation of unusual or illogical relationships and contexts that draw attention to the pure form.¹¹⁷ Under Stalin, this became unacceptable as “artless” and foreign to the working class and was replaced by the ultimate conventionality so that it could be easily understood by the masses. Drawing on recognizable historical forms thus became essential, and Socialist

¹¹⁶ To quote Heller again, “Socialist Realism was normative, but only negatively so: it gave practical instructions on *what could not be done*, but its positive applications and its theorizing... remained highly nebulous;” Heller: “A World of Prettiness,” 60; italics by the author.

¹¹⁷ In his seminal text of 1914, Viktor Šklovskij also mentions architecture, whose basic elements – columns, arches, etc. – became so conventionally accepted, that their deep meanings are no longer perceived. See: Viktor Šklovskij, “The Resurrection of the Word,” in: Stephen Bann, *Russian Formalism: A Collection of Articles and Texts in Translation* (Edinburgh, 1973), 41-47.

Realism gradually came to encompass all of architectural history of humanity minus, of course, modernism, which was deemed a product of bourgeois culture.¹¹⁸

If theoretical principles of Socialist Realism were vague, the confusion among Yugoslav architects arose on a practical level as well, and simply emulating what the Soviets were building was just as problematic. Looking at the architecture of the 1930s in the USSR, one could find examples of almost any style that passed as Socialist Realism: from the well-known examples of "wedding-cake" monumentalism and Zholtovsky's Palladianism, to American skyscrapers, Italian *Novecento*, *Art Deco*, and even leftovers of Soviet avant-garde, otherwise condemned as "bourgeois" and "formalist."¹¹⁹ It was only after

¹¹⁸ A description of the project for the Palace of the Soviets exemplified this: "*All of the many centuries of the culture of human art will enter into the people's building. From the golden, glazed tiles of Moorish Spain to the architecture of American glass. From Byzantine mosaics to contemporary plastics. The old art of tapestry, carving in black oak, the revival of the fresco, the lighting engineering achievements of photo-illusionism, the folk craft of Palekh – it is impossible to enumerate the entire wealth of artistic decoration. Amid porphyry, marble, crystal, and jasper, the high technology of comfort of the twentieth century will function imperceptibly.*" From N. V. Atarov, *Dvoretz Sovetov*, quoted after Vladimir Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin: Culture Two* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21-22.

¹¹⁹ About the impact of the American architecture on the USSR, see: Jean-Louis Cohen, "America: A Soviet Ideal," *AA Files* no.5 (Jan. 1984): 33-40. On references to the *Novecento* architecture, see: Danilo Udovički Selb, *The Evolution of Soviet Architectural Culture in the First Decade of Stalin's 'Perestroika,'* Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures & Societies (Trondheim: Program on East European Cultures & Societies, 2009). Also, Udovički's forthcoming article in *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* (December 2009).

World War II that a more or less consistent style was found in the overtly historicist monumental structures exemplified in Moscow's new skyscrapers and pavilions of the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition; but these were still under construction as the debate in Yugoslavia went on. With all things Soviet held in highest regard, Yugoslav architects who wanted to argue in favor of a certain position thus enjoyed the possibility to cherry-pick from a wide variety of Soviet buildings and texts from the 1930s and to still plausibly claim that they selected a "true" example of Socialist Realism.

The highly contradictory theoretical debate that would divide the ranks of Yugoslav architects began in the very first issue of *Arhitektura*. Just three pages after the editorial promised to "initiate an epoch of Socialist Realism," the Croatian architectural theorist and historian Andre Mohorovičić advocated a "generalized functionalism" that would differ from the "narrow functionalism" by including aesthetic concerns for symmetry, eurhythm, proportion, and harmony, but would resolutely exclude any historical elements like Greek columns and entablatures.¹²⁰ Wrapping his argument in a wordy rhetoric of dialectic materialism, Mohorovičić in essence claimed that the aesthetic expression of every historical epoch reflected the social organization of its own time and that, therefore, architecture of the new socialist society had to be based on completely new forms as well. In the following issue of the journal, the Belgrade architect

¹²⁰ See: Andre Mohorovičić, "Teoretska analiza arhitektonskog oblikovanja," in: *Arhitektura* I, no. 1-2 (August, 1947): 6-8.

Milorad Macura went even further, openly arguing for “functional architecture” without even trying to qualify it with a euphemism like Mohorovičić’s “generalized.”¹²¹ Continuing on the theme of dialectic materialism, he explicitly condemned capitalism for being “unable to create its own architectural forms” and for creating eclectic imitations of the “splendor of the destroyed feudal aristocracy.”¹²² He then invoked the favorite argument of post-war modernists—that the Nazi Germany “banned functional architecture by decree”—implying that repeating any such ban would equal the ultimate evil of Nazism.¹²³

Both Mohorovičić and Macura clearly deviated from the canons of Socialist Realism, however vague they may have been. Considering how intolerant the official critics were of any such deviations in literature and the arts, the fact that these arguments remained unanswered for six months seems to be a good indicator of a different dynamic operating in the field of architecture. The response to Mohorovičić finally came in the spring of 1948 from Branko Maksimović, a Russophile urban planner and theorist from Belgrade—and a former modernist—who was responsible for most of the translations of Soviet texts on architecture.¹²⁴ The crux of Maksimović’s harsh criticism revolved,

¹²¹ See: Milorad Macura, “Problematika naše arhitekture u svetlosti konkursa za zgradu Predsedništva Vlade FNRJ,” *Arhitektura* I, no. 3 (October, 1947): 3-17.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 3.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹²⁴ See: Branko Maksimović, “Ka diskusiji o aktuelnim problemima naše arhitekture,” in: *Arhitektura* II, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 73-75.

unsurprisingly, around Mohorovičić's claim that "there is not and cannot be any place for historical elements in contemporary architecture."¹²⁵ Maksimović equaled this position to that of functionalists and constructivists, ascribing destructiveness to the "formal 'revolutionariness' of the so-called modern architecture" and claiming that architecture can only be enriched through "critical appropriation and development of everything that was positive and progressive in buildings of the past."¹²⁶ This was a classical socialist realist argument that in essence stood to the promise of the journal to look up to Soviet architecture.

This time, a counter-attack followed immediately, in the very same issue, through a response of the editorial board that was twice as long as Maksimović's original article.¹²⁷ Judging from its style, it was probably penned by the editor Šegvić himself and it set out to defend Mohorovičić by claiming Maksimović's incapacity to comprehend dialectical materialism and the "true" nature of Socialist Realism. At the same time, the article circled around the central issue of the debate, the use of historical elements, leaving the question buried under piles of rhetoric that invoked the politically correct tropes, such as "Tito's Five Year Plan" and "the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin." Criticism was also supported by passages selected from Soviet texts, some of which were, ironically, translated

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ "Napomene redakcije uz članak prof. B. Maksimovića 'Ka diskusiji o aktuelnim problemima naše arhitekture,'" *Arhitektura* II, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 76-80.

by Maksimović himself.¹²⁸ The article extensively quoted the highly ranked Soviet architect G. A. Simonov, who criticized the old Palladianist Zholtovsky for idealism, thus using a Soviet authority to imply that all historicism was wrong. Simonov's text was published in the very same issue of *Arhitektura* and, considering the convenience of its argument, it is hard not to suspect that it was selected for publication to support Mohorovičić's rebuttal of historicism. In reality, however, rather than serving as evidence that even the Soviets were against the use of historical elements, Simonov's text was an example of "ritualized criticism" rampant in the Soviet union, where an "automatic ration of guilt and mistakes was allocated to everyone," regardless of their actual standing in the hierarchy; only Stalin could be entirely "correct."¹²⁹ It is likely that such misuses of Soviet models occurred in part because the complexities of the convoluted architectural scene in the USSR escaped the attention of Yugoslav architects; but it is equally likely that they were also more or less deliberate manipulations that exploited these complexities for achieving specific goals.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Maksimović translated a booklet by the Soviet academician N. J. Koli, which is quoted in the response to his article in *Arhitektura*. See: N. J. Koli, *Realizam Sovjetske arhitekture* (Belgrade: Biblioteka za kulturnu saradnju Jugoslavije sa SSSR, 1947).

¹²⁹ Quoted from Tarkhanov and Kavtaradze, *Architecture of the Stalin Era*, 50.

¹³⁰ The exchange between Mohorovičić and Šegvić on one and Maksimović on the other side continued along similar lines until the early 1950s, but it seems that it was fueled as much by personal animosities as by stylistic preferences; see: Andrija Mohorovičić, "Prilog teoretskoj analizi problematike arhitektonskog oblikovanja," *Arhitektura* IV, no. 1-2 (January-February, 1950): 5-12; also: Neven Šegvić, "Stvaralačke komponente arhitekture FNRJ," *Arhitektura* IV, no.

A more levelheaded and less divisive argument against historicism came from the Slovenian architect Mira Kraigher. The wife of the prominent Party official Boris Kraigher, she herself held enough political clout to deliver a speech at the Fifth Congress of the CPY in July 1948.¹³¹ In it, she directly opposed a wholesale attack on Yugoslav architects by Zogović, who must have been sufficiently aware of the resistance to the adoption of Soviet models to rant that in architecture "formalism and decadence run rampant."¹³² Kraigher argued against abundance of applied ornament, stating that every epoch at its beginnings—as was the new epoch of socialism in Yugoslavia—tends to build simply and on its own sources. She went on to further relativize the formal issues of Socialist Realism by stressing that even in the USSR, thirty years after the revolution, architects were still searching for the right expression and could only cite one "true" example of Socialist Realism: the Sanatorium in Kislovodsk. Significantly, the Sanatorium, built by Moisei Ginsburg in 1938, was a rather

5-6 (May-June, 1950): 5-40. Outside of this triangle, the Soviet-style culture of personal criticism did not have much resonance with Yugoslav architects, certainly nothing like the situation in other fields of culture.

¹³¹ It seems that Kraigher had considerable reputation with the Party. Feđa Košir claims that as a student of architecture in the 1930s she was responsible for forging Tito's passport on the name of Canadian citizen Spiridon Mekas, one of his many fake identities used during the years of illegal activity, which later became part of Titoist mythology. See: Feđa Košir, "Med kladivom in nakovalom," in: Nataša Koselj, ed., *Danilo Fürst: arhitektura*, exhibition catalogue (Ljubljana: Cankarjev dom, 2000), 131.

¹³² See: Mira Kraigher, "K nekim pripombam o arhitekturi na V. Kongresu KPJ," in: *Novi svet* III (1948): 777.

atypical example of Socialist Realism that contained very little explicit historical elements and Kreigher obviously cherry-picked this building to support her own thesis.¹³³ **(Fig. 1.9)** This was probably the same kind of manipulation as selecting the quotations from Simonov to imply that Soviet architects were against historicism.

Even if the basic theoretical principles of Socialist Realism could be manipulated, there was one issue that was beyond questioning: the criticism of architecture in the capitalist West. But this theme only further displayed the split loyalties of many Yugoslav architects: while criticizing Western modernism, they showed a more competent knowledge of its latest achievements than of the Soviet ones. A text on "the aberrations and crisis of bourgeois architecture," written by Šegvić in 1948, was particularly exemplary in this respect.¹³⁴ In it he assailed Western modernism for reducing architecture to construction and succumbing to speculative interests, being especially harsh on leading European modernist, like Neutra, Gropius, Breuer, and Mies, for "selling out" to American

¹³³ Two images of the Kislovodsk Sanatorium were published in *Tehnika*; see: I. K. Mac, "Opštenarodna demokratska načela sovjetske arhitekture," in: *Tehnika* I, no. 4-5 (April-May, 1946): 121, 122. In expression the Sanatorium was closest to Italian *Novecento* architecture; see: Udovički Selb, *The Evolution of Soviet Architectural Culture in the First Decade of Stalin's 'Perestroika.'*

¹³⁴ See: Neven Šegvić, "Zablude i kriza buržoaske arhitekture," *Arhitektura* nos. 13-17, vol. 2 (August-November, 1948): 129-131. Edvard Ravnikar employed a similar approach of criticizing the West by citing Western critics and architects, like Lewis Mumford and Frank Lloyd Wright; see: Edvard Ravnikar, "Razstava sovjetske arhitekture v Ljubljani," *Novi svet* (Ljubljana) III (1948): 612-15.

bourgeoisie and "wasting their architectural potential on a few villas for millionaires."¹³⁵ Again, this was an attempt to be politically correct without undermining the basic tenets of modernism: criticizing Western modernists for selling out to the bourgeoisie did not indict their architectural principles, but only the programs they had to fulfill; after all, their "architectural potential" must have been worth something if it was such a pity that it was "wasted." This kind of criticism was of little operative value in Yugoslavia, where the State had already taken care that the bourgeoisie would no longer be able to build anything. Moreover, for someone so critical of Western architecture, Šegvić was not only well informed of it, but also suspiciously reliant on Western critics, like H. R. Hitchcock and Lewis Mumford, as well as Siegfried Giedion and his then still recent book *Space, Time and Architecture* (1941). He quoted them repeatedly and it is obvious that he knew their writings well. This again highlights his split loyalties: there is no doubt that he was sincere in his political allegiance to Communism—after all, he wrote some of the most effusive panegyrics to Tito and the party published in the professional press; but as an architect, Šegvić was clearly a modernist and he could not give it up easily.¹³⁶ And he could not hide it either. **(Fig. 1.10)**

The question of Socialist Realism was ultimately one of form, regardless of claims by Soviet theorists that it represented something more than a style—a

¹³⁵ See: Šegvić, "Zablude i kriza buržoaske arhitekture," 130.

¹³⁶ See: Neven Šegvić, "Za Titov rođendan," *Arhitektura* II, no. 18-22 (1949): i-ii.

"method." It was ultimately the question of *how* to build, since the State had already taken care of the *what*. The architectural profession in Yugoslavia underwent a major transformation in the late 1940s, both in its "material base" and its organization, and architects, regardless of their political standing, could do little about it. But the Party, in its allegiance to the Soviet Union, also tried to influence the aesthetics of Yugoslavia's new architecture and this did not go as easily as had in literature and fine arts. The reason for this likely lay in a specific dynamic in the field of architecture, which differed significantly from that in other arts, due to the fact that most of prewar communists and fellow travelers among architects were also modernists. The main ideologues of Socialist Realism, like Zogović and Đilas in literature, as well as several influential art critics, like Grgo Gamulin in Zagreb and Otto Bihalji Merin in Belgrade, thus stayed outside of architecture and could exert only a limited impact on it. Before the principles of Socialist Realism could be consistently assimilated and applied in architecture, Yugoslavia was already out of the Soviet orbit.

The survival of modernism in the early postwar years and the attempts at redefining Socialist Realism were not unique to Yugoslavia. Remarkable modernist buildings were constructed throughout Eastern Europe in this period: for example, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Moreover, after the Communist takeover was complete, architects in the newly-forged socialist states still hoped for a while that modernism would be compatible with the new

regimes.¹³⁷ When it became obvious that no such negotiation was possible, they explored strategies of clandestine resistance similar to those described in this chapter.¹³⁸ Despite similar patterns, however, the Yugoslav case was unique in some respects. Stalinization in Yugoslavia was not forced from the outside, but self-imposed, and it began virtually even before the war ended; for that reason, the thorough economic, organizational, and theoretical transformation of Yugoslav architecture predated similar processes in other East European countries by several years. The influences of the cultural policy of “Zhdanovshchina”—an extreme form of anti-Westernism and “anti-cosmopolitanism” formulated in the USSR in 1946—were obvious in that transformation, too. But the final codification of Socialist Realist architecture under Zhdanovshchina was cut short in Yugoslavia because of the conflict with the *Cominform*; in other socialist countries, it was only about to begin seriously

¹³⁷ I thank Greg Castillo for sharing with me a draft chapter of his forthcoming book *Cold War Under Construction: Architecture and the Cultural Division of Germany*, which describes how the regime thwarted the hopes of East German architects that modernist aesthetic would be compatible with the new socialist society.

¹³⁸ For example, after the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, the architectural journal *Arhitektura ČSR* used a variety of tactics to question the official discourse. In some articles, for example, illustrations of “Western formalism” served to clandestinely satisfy professional curiosity of local architects. Others paired politically correct images with polemical texts, thus avoiding to raise the suspicion of censors. See Kimberly Elman Zarecor’s unpublished paper, “The Safety of Images: *Arhitektura ČSR* and the Politics of Architectural Representation in Early Communist Czechoslovakia,” presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Architectural Historians in Pasadena, 2 April 2009.

after 1948. The transformation of Yugoslav architecture thus anticipated the situation in the rest of Eastern Europe, but it was never fully carried out.

Chapter 2:

POWER ASSERTED

Upon its establishment in 1945, the new Communist government of Yugoslavia restructured both the economic basis and the professional organization of architecture. At the same time, it also attempted to radically alter the meanings of the built environment and to make its own power immediately visible. As the Belgrade art historian Lidija Merenik aptly concluded, “the new regime completely transformed the *iconosphere* and... strove to modify the symbolic, visual environment, creating a thoroughly new semantic landscape intended to... be a metaphor of absolute power.”¹³⁹ Indeed, virtually all actions of the regime contained the subtext of creating a thoroughly new Yugoslavia based on social justice and ethnic equality, radically different from the old one, which was seen as based on exploitation. Precisely in keeping with such ambitions, socialist Yugoslavia during its lifetime was normally referred to as “new Yugoslavia,” in opposition to “old Yugoslavia” of the prewar monarchy.

Imposing a symbolic break at the level of built environment was a much more daunting task than it was for disciplines like painting and sculpture. Old paintings could be easily stored away and new ones created, conforming to the new doctrine of Socialist Realism; old sculptures could be removed from city

¹³⁹ Lidija Merenik, *Ideološki modeli*, 25.

squares and a new group of bronze heroes could take their place. But buildings could not be so easily replaced. The transformation of human environments takes a slow pace, even in much more resourceful countries than Yugoslavia was immediately after World War II. The pressing need to assert power symbolically, especially at the end of the war and in the immediate postwar period when the reign of the Communist Party not yet firmly established, thus had to be accommodated in other ways. One was the making of highly visible new symbols whose construction was not physically demanding, ranging from ephemeral decoration to permanent memorial structures bordering on architecture. Another, perhaps even more important because it functioned on a subconscious level, was the appropriation of existing architectural symbols, whose meaning was then altered.

The appropriation of existing buildings established a level of historical continuity in architectural representation of power that contradicted the dominant rhetoric of a “new beginning.” But this apparent weakness was also the greatest strength of the strategy of appropriation, since messages could be communicated in languages the masses were already familiar with. Because of this combination of the old and the new, the architectural and spatial languages of power in the early postwar years were complex amalgams that combined layers of various origins. Some of them were indeed new, some came from the Soviet Union, and some were taken over from the antithesis of the new regime—the prewar monarchy. These languages were then used to convey statements of

new power that closely corresponded with its content, structure, and personal identification.

The first statement of power was that of the victory of Communism and at the most obvious level it was transmitted through ubiquitous—although often ephemeral—displays of standard Communist iconography. Public spaces thus became elaborate poster-boards of political propaganda bearing the insignia of the Communist Party: red flags, five-pointed stars, hammer-and-sickles, portraits of Communist leaders, and popular slogans like “Workers of the world, unite!” **(Fig. 2.1)** More permanently, the same idea was to be encoded in spaces and structures occupied by the agents of power, particularly through buildings that were intended to house the growing administration of the Communist Party; however, this would have to wait for years to reach realization. The rather abstract message of the triumph of Communism also had its more specific elaborations. One was the proclamation of Yugoslavia’s “faithful” and “eternal” allegiance to the Soviet Union, the first socialist country in the world. Another—and much longer lasting—was the commemoration of the liberation war, which in Yugoslavia occurred coincidentally with the revolution. War memorials, therefore, gained an enormous importance as material manifestations of one of the most fundamental narratives of the new state: of the simultaneous national and class liberation of the Yugoslav peoples.

The second dominant message was related to the restructuring of government based on federalization, which introduced a new hierarchy of power

and required its own spatial and architectural representation. The six constituent republics, each of which had its own capital, required buildings for new state administration. Even the meaning of the federal capital, Belgrade, was affected: it was now to stand for a complex, composite identity of the new Yugoslavia, as opposed to the unitary Yugoslav identity, whose establishment had been attempted—yet failed—before the war.

Finally, the third fundamental statement cemented the personal power of the leader of Yugoslav Communists, Josip Broz Tito. Tito became the center of a classic cult of personality, which was in part inspired by the cult of Stalin. Throughout the existence of Socialist Yugoslavia, this cult remained one of the primary building blocks of the official ideology and its questioning amounted to one of the greatest political sins. Built manifestations of Tito's cult were numerous and rather diverse. Despite the political rhetoric that promoted a “new beginning,” spaces and rituals associated with Tito were largely appropriated from earlier times, establishing an important continuity in the way in which power was personified across the allegedly insurmountable divide of World War II.

A Prelude for Socialist Realism: The Red Army Monument at Batina

In early June 1945, a hectic and rather disorganized construction project started on a remote cliff overlooking the Danube, close to the Yugoslav-Hungarian border. A site near the village of Batina Skela (usually known simply

as Batina) on the Croatian side of the Danube was to be the location of Yugoslavia's first large memorial to the war that had ended only a few weeks before.¹⁴⁰ The Batina monument would also become the first important architectural statement of Communist power in Yugoslavia and one of the most explicit visual proclamations of Yugoslavia's short-lived allegiance to the Stalinist Soviet Union. Moreover, it suggested the direction in which Yugoslav architecture could have developed had that allegiance survived longer than a mere three years.

In November 1944, the village of Batina had been the site of a pitched battle in which the Red Army and Yugoslav Partisans forced the retreating Germans to retreat further west. The losses for the Soviets and Partisan forces had been high.¹⁴¹ By the end of the war, the commanders of the Red Army felt that they deserved a visible sign of gratitude for their role in the liberation of Yugoslavia and deemed Batina a perfect spot for a memorial. A particular advantage of Batina was its prominent geographic location it was easily visible to

¹⁴⁰ The war officially ended in Yugoslavia on May 15, 1945, six days after the capitulation of Germany. The retreating German units, together with various Yugoslav collaborators, continued the fight in an attempt to reach Austria and there surrender to the Western Allies, thus avoiding being captured by the Yugoslav partisans and the Red Army.

¹⁴¹ The Battle of Batina took place 11-23 November 1944 and was one of the final operations in the liberation of Yugoslavia. The Third Ukrainian Front of the Red Army and the 51st Vojvodina Shock Brigade of People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia fought German units fortified at the hilly right bank of the Danube. Crossing the river from the Vojvodina while exposed to German fire, they suffered considerable losses of at least 2,000 soldiers. Particularly bitter fights occurred at the cliff above the Danube, where the monument was placed after the war.

the Soviet troops on their way home from Central Europe. But because the war ended soon thereafter, the memorial had to be built quickly. Tito personally promised its completion in one month, by the end of June 1945.¹⁴² As the victorious Yugoslav Communists steered the country closer and closer to the Soviet Union, the monument would be more than a mere sign of gratitude: it would be a symbolic confirmation of alliance.

In order to meet what seemed to be an impossible deadline, a Red Army captain, an architect who is only known by the last name Feldman, was charged with the commission.¹⁴³ **(Fig. 2.2)** Feldman's project was a typical product of prewar Socialist Realism: a monumental, realistically-sculpted soldier was to stand atop a tall column, combining classical symmetry and detailing with elements of Russian avant-garde design. As Danilo Udovički has recently shown, this was a formula that Soviet architects frequently used in the 1930s, most famously Boris Iofan.¹⁴⁴ Adorned with five-pointed stars, Soviet coats of arms, and life-size bronze tanks, Captain Feldman's design left no doubts about its ideological underpinnings. But the profusion of iconography and sculptural

¹⁴² This is repeated through a number of documents concerning the construction of the monument, including a letter of Andrija Mendelson, supervising architect for the monument, to Nikola Dobrović, head of the Architectural Department at the Ministry of Construction, of 26 August 1945, ASCG, Fond 13: Ministarstvo građevine FNRJ, Fascikla 85, no number.

¹⁴³ For Feldman's project, see: ASCG, Fond 13: Ministarstvo građevine FNRJ, Fascikla 85, no number.

¹⁴⁴ Udovički Selb, *The Evolution of Soviet Architectural Culture in the First Decade of Stalin's 'Perestroika.'*

decoration rendered the design less than elegant. Moreover, with the weary bronze soldier dragging his banner rather unenthusiastically, the overall mood was less triumphant than was characteristic of Socialist Realism. It is tempting to interpret this lack of passion in terms of the architect's own weariness after five years of battles, during which accumulated losses must have overwhelmed any joy of victory. But whatever the reason, Feldman's attempt appeared, at most, half-hearted.

Construction efforts dragged on well into the summer of 1945. A chronic lack of materials and the chaos of a war-torn country trying to pull itself together plagued the work. And then on 21 July, the construction was suddenly halted.¹⁴⁵ The order came from Antun Augustinčić, the Vice President of Yugoslavia's provisional parliament, who was also a well-known sculptor and close personal friend of Tito. Unhappy with the design, he demanded to take over the project himself. Augustinčić had a perfect artistic and political pedigree for the project. Before the war, he was one of Yugoslavia's most prominent artists, a former student of the famous Ivan Meštrović. He was experienced in building important monumental compositions, and had been active in circles of left-leaning intellectuals since the late 1920s. He had participated in the Liberation Movement, where he was attached directly to the General Staff. He had even

¹⁴⁵ See the letter from the Yugoslav ministry of Construction to the Croatian Ministry of Construction, 14 November, 1945; Fond 13: Ministarstvo građevine FNRJ, Fascikla 85, no number.

spent most of 1944 in Moscow as a member of a military mission; thus, he had a first-hand experience of Soviet monumental art.¹⁴⁶ Now he held a prominent, if honorary, political position. With a more ambitious project in mind, Augustičić

¹⁴⁶ Antun Augustinčić (1900-79) was born in the village of Klanjec, Croatia, only a few miles away from Tito's own birthplace, Kumrovec. He studied at the Royal Academy of Fine Arts in Zagreb (1918-1924), the last two years with the famous sculptor Ivan Meštrović, the pre-eminent artist of the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. 1924-26 he studied at the *École des Arts Décoratifs* and the *Academie des Beaux-Arts* in Paris. He was a founding member of the socially engaged Artists' Association *Zemlja* (1929), but he left it in 1932. Before World War II, Augustinčić won a number of prestigious commissions for monuments around Yugoslavia and abroad, often in collaboration with the architect Drago Galić. Because of his connections to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, he was arrested by the Gestapo and imprisoned for some time in Graz (Austria). In 1943, he joined the People's Liberation Movement. He was immediately attached to the Chief Headquarters of the Movement and sculpted the first in a series of portraits of Tito. In November of the same year, he was a representative at the Second Session of the Antifascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia in Jajce (Bosnia and Herzegovina), a provisional Parliament of Yugoslavia organized by the liberation movement, where he was elected Vice President. In 1944, he spent almost a year in Moscow, as a member of the People's Liberation Movement mission to the USSR. After the war, he got the title of the "master sculptor," became a professor and dean at the Academy of Fine Arts in Zagreb, a representative of the People's Council (lower house of the Parliament of Yugoslavia), member of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb and its Presidency, *dopisni* member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade and the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo, as well as a honorary member of the Academy of the Arts of the USSR, Moscow. After World War II, Augustinčić sculpted numerous war memorials and some of the best known portraits of Tito, including the iconic statue in front of Tito's birth-house in Kumrovec. He also created another iconic sculpture, the equestrian statue *Peace*, which stands in front of the United Nations building in New York, which was featured on the 100 dinar banknote. For further information, see Drago Galić, ed., *Antun Augustinčić, 1900-1970. Spomenica posvećena preminulom Antunu Augustinčiću, redovnom članu Jugoslovenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti u Zagrebu* (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1985).

discarded Feldman's original plans; by November 1945, he was officially in charge of the project.

To devise a new design, Augustinčić teamed up with his frequent prewar collaborator, the Zagreb architect Drago Galić. Their basic design, featuring a pier surmounted by a statue, was in many respects quite similar to Feldman's, although more sophisticated. **(Fig. 2.3)** Its ideological identification was just as clear, but the overall message was quite different. A highly symbolic figure replete with traditional iconographic codes of military triumph and liberty replaced the literal representation of a weary soldier. This triumphant Victory defiantly steps forward, her hair and clothes willfully fluttering in the wind reminiscent of Nike's wings. **(Fig. 2.4)** Like New York's Statue of Liberty, she "lights the world" with a torch that she holds in her raised left hand; a five-pointed star embedded in the flame gives this traditional symbol proper ideological connotation.¹⁴⁷ In her right hand, she carries a sword pointing downward but which seems ready to be used in the very next moment, perhaps a hint at the never-ending job of revolutionary activity. Instead of the tanks, military connotations are strengthened through two bronze combatants advancing in a powerful diagonal motion. **(Fig. 2.5)** The two foci of attention, the Victory above and the soldiers below, generate such a powerful sense of dynamism that they set the whole

¹⁴⁷ Both Augustinčić's erudite references—to Nike of Samothrace and the Statue of Liberty—were noticed by contemporaneous critics; see: Otto Bihalji-Merin, "Spomenik bratstva i pobjede," *Jugoslavija SSSR*, no. 26 (December 1947), n.p.

monumental composition in motion. This sense of triumph inherent in the new design conformed to theoretical underpinnings of Socialist Realism more closely than Feldman's original one. Gone was Feldman's moody commemoration of the battle that aimed at specific Red Army units on their way back home from the war. It was replaced with a romantic, idealized image that conveyed a much more general message: that of the victory of socialism, referring not just to a past event, but even more to a promising future.

Compared to Feldman's somewhat unresolved design, Augustinčić and Galić's solution very clearly synthesized its complex program into a unified powerful message. Some of its clarity relied on the contrast between the exuberant sculptures in dark bronze and the restrained white marble architecture, whose austerity borders on minimalism. The monument rests on a simple oval marble podium that rises from the slope of the hill, with a broad semicircular staircase carved into it on the side facing the Danube. **(Fig. 2.6)** The two bronze soldiers stand on an undecorated rectangular block in the middle of the staircase. Even the pier, formally the most complex element of architectural design, rises from the podium abruptly and is equally abruptly truncated at the top without any transition, let alone a [classical molding or a capital. In its crystalline complexity, this multifaceted form may remind of Czech Cubist experiments, but it also concealed another ideological reference: the upper half of the pier is shaped in plan like a five-pointed star. **(Fig. 2.7)** In the lower half, additional five arms support a figure of a soldier that symbolizes a branch of the Red Army. **(Fig. 2.8)**

These sculptures were executed in marble to blend with the pier and not distract from the Victory on the top. The shape of the pier brings to mind another canonic piece of 1930s Socialist Realism: the Red Army Theater in Moscow, whose plan and many details, including columns, were also shaped like five-pointed stars.¹⁴⁸ Augustinčić, who had spent a year in Moscow during the war, must have known about this building and it seems very likely that it was him who transferred the idea to Batina. What made the reference particularly appropriate was the fact that both the monument and the theater were devoted to the Red Army.

But the crisp architectural forms at Batina are strikingly different from the heavy, Classically-inspired decoration of the Moscow theater, suggesting modernist connotations. Vestiges of modernism were not unusual in Soviet architecture of the 1930s, but after the war they completely disappeared, being vilified as signs of "bourgeois decadence." At Batina, modernist influence in the architectural part of the monument seemed more obvious than the orthodox doctrine of the time would allow. This impression is particularly clear from certain angles. Seen from the side, for example, the rectangular bronze reliefs, sharply cut into white marble walls of the base, easily resemble strip windows, the ultimate commonplace of modernist architecture. **(Fig. 2.9)**

¹⁴⁸ It even seems that in the development of the Red Army Theater project Alabyan and Simbirtsev considered a similar transition in plan from a ten-pointed to a five-pointed star; see Peter Noever, ed., *Tyranny of the Beautiful. Architecture of the Stalin-Era* (Munich and New York: Prestel, 1994), 187, fig. 5.

Modernist allusions were by no means a coincidence; the architect of the monument, Drago Galić, was one of the most prominent Yugoslav modernists. Before the war, he had built a series of outstanding functionalist villas in Zagreb and on the Croatian coast. Like Augustinčić, Galić had been involved with intellectual circles associated with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Both men had been members of the *Zemlja* group, but in the dispute between “realists” and “modernists” that had split the ranks of communist and left-leaning intellectuals in the 1930s, they seemed to have taken different sides. After a heated argument in which the majority of *Zemlja*’s members sided against Socialist Realism, Augustinčić left the association in which he was a founding member.¹⁴⁹ Galić on the other hand was an uncompromising modernist. In the late 1930s, he was

¹⁴⁹ Augustinčić was one of the founders of the Association, but in 1933 he left it because of his disagreement with the rest of the members in a controversy over the question of artistic freedom. In a recent text about the painter and another *Zemlja* member, Krsto Hegedušić, the prominent leftist writer Miroslav Krleža had confronted the official Party line of openly tendentious “social realism” and advocated creative liberty as the only way to produce a truly valuable art; see: Miroslav Krleža, “Predgovor 'Podravskim motivima' Krste Hegedušića,” reprinted in Miroslav Krleža, *Eseji, studije, putopisi* (Zagreb: Naprijed, Belgrade: Prosveta, Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1966), 55-89. The text caused considerable stir and divided leftist intellectuals between those who supported Krleža and the artistic freedom, and those who supported the Party and the opinion that art should be tendentiously used in the class struggle. Most of the members of *Zemlja* opted for Krleža’s side; Augustinčić found himself isolated and left the group; see Josip Depolo, “Zemlja 1929-1935.,” in *1929-1950: Nadrealizam, postnadrealizam, socijalna umetnost, umetnost NOR-a, socijalistički realizam*, exhibition catalog (Belgrade: Muzej savremene umetnosti, 1969), 44.

part of a circle around Krleža and his journal *Pečat*, which strongly opposed realism dictated by the party.¹⁵⁰

These apparently divergent positions on the place of art in the class struggle, however, did not prevent Augustinčić and Galić from working together, most notably on a series of built and unbuilt projects for monuments. All of these monuments combined Augustinčić's figural sculpture with Galić's austere cubic bases, a rather commonplace approach for the decade. What was striking about these collaborative prewar projects was not so much the fact that the two men reconciled their aesthetic differences, but that they made apparent political compromises too. Despite their leftist inclinations, the majority of Augustinčić and Galić's monuments of the period were firmly situated in the prevailing bourgeois culture, occasionally serving the exact opposite of their political persuasions: the conservative, fiercely anti-Communist regime of the prewar Kingdom of Yugoslavia.¹⁵¹ In 1940, in the city of Sombor, only fifteen miles from Batina across the Danube, the duo built a monument to the assassinated King Alexander, a dictator who practically embodied anti-Communism, having banned

¹⁵⁰ See Velimir Visković, *Sukob na ljevici. Krležina uloga u sukobu na ljevici* (Belgrade: Alfa and Narodna knjiga, 2001), 55.

¹⁵¹ Of course, the argument may work both ways: that it is equally striking that the royal regime would commission artists of openly leftist persuasions for such an important job. However, many artists and intellectuals, while declaring themselves as leftist, were careful not to reveal their sympathies for or even full-fledged memberships in the banned Communist Party. Krleža, for example, repeatedly resisted urges from the Party to join the legal organizations that served as its front, fearing being blacklisted by the regime; see Visković, *Sukob na ljevici*, 40-41.

the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1920.¹⁵² Although completely opposed in its ideological connotations, formally this monument followed the same principles as the one at Batina, contrasting an austere stone base with a realistic bronze sculpture of the monarch waving a sword. The statue did not last very long, since the Hungarian occupation forces removed it as soon as they entered the city at the beginning of the war. This fact was probably a blessing in disguise for the two artists, because the ideological content of the Sombor monument became undesirable after the war, particularly for someone like Augustinčić, who acquired a prominent position in the new Communist regime. The artist's postwar monographs illustrate just how undesirable mentioning this work became, since they always list it as an anonymous "equestrian statue" without ever mentioning to whom it was dedicated.¹⁵³ But the prior removal of the monument was probably convenient not only for Augustinčić's politically correct biography, but for Yugoslavia's Communist officials, too. Had they found the monument still standing at Sombor's main city square, there is no doubt that they would have to remove it—except that they would have to undergo a potential

¹⁵² For the monument in Sombor, see Milan Vojnović, *Сомбор, илустрована хроника/Sombor, Illustrated Chronicle* (Sombor, Serbia: Ines doo, 2003), 31. In Skopje, Macedonia, the tandem built another similar monument to Alexander and his father, King Peter (1937); see Krum Tomovski and Boris Petkovski, *Архитектурата и монументалната уметност во Скопје* (Skopje: Muzej na grad Skopje, 2003), 160, figs. 10, 11.

¹⁵³ See Galić, *Antun Augustinčić*, 65-66.

embarrassment of commissioning the very same artists to build another monument near by.

Another striking parallel between the Batina monument and the prewar period sheds further light on the problem of historical continuity. One hundred miles downstream, there is another monument on a cliff overlooking the Danube: Belgrade's Victor, a male version of Batina's "Victoria." (**Fig. 2.10**) This one, however, commemorates an older battle from World War I.¹⁵⁴ Also a bronze figure holding a sword and standing on top of a marble pier, the Victor was a well-known work of Augustinčić's own professor, Ivan Meštrović. Thematic, typological, and topological analogies between the two monuments are obvious—the question is only of intended meaning. I would suggest that Augustinčić was trying to establish himself as a Meštrović of the new postwar Yugoslavia. The great master was one of the most well-known proponents of the ideology of Yugoslavism and worked on the most prestigious symbolic commissions in the monarchy, even though he was personally critical of the specific direction in which the Karađorđević dynasty took the country. His reputation of a Yugoslav patriot transcended his association with the monarchy and his support would have been of paramount symbolic significance for the new

¹⁵⁴ The Victor was placed at its site on Belgrade's Kalemegdan Fortress to commemorate the breach of the Thessaloniki front by the Serbian army in 1918. However, Meštrović created it in 1913 as a part of a fountain celebrating Serbia's liberation from the "five centuries of Turkish yoke" and, significantly, the recapturing of Kosovo in the First Balkan War.

regime; it seems that Tito indeed hoped to acquire it.¹⁵⁵ But Meštrović was already abroad, at first in Switzerland and then in the United States. Thus, the position of the ‘official’ artist of new Yugoslavia remained vacant and Augustinčić clearly aspired to assume the mantle. Allusions to Meštrović thus may have helped Augustinčić prove that he was just as good as the older sculptor and they indeed seem to frequently reappear in his work of the immediate postwar period.

When the Batina monument was finally inaugurated in November 1947, more than two years behind schedule, it was done with great pomp—part of country-wide celebrations of the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet revolution. The monument’s meaning was clear: the influential art critic and proponent of Socialist Realism Otto Bihalji-Merin summed it up as a “symbol of eternal brotherhood” between the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples and a “symbol of the Yugoslavs’ love for and gratitude to the Red Army.” He proclaimed the monument one of the “great works of art of today,” obviously elevating it to the status of a role model for Socialist Realism.¹⁵⁶ The structure’s subtler references to the prewar period were not mentioned, but they must have been subconsciously present. The fact that Augustinčić and Galić worked for two directly opposed regimes may be interpreted as political opportunism, which is by no means unusual for artists seeking commissions in turbulent times. But much more significantly, the stylistic and iconographic similarities between the Batina

¹⁵⁵ Ivan Meštrović, *Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje* (Buenos Aires, 1961; Zagreb 1969).

¹⁵⁶ See: Bihalji-Merin, “Spomenik bratstva i pobjede,” n.p.

monument and monuments built under the royal regime point to continuity in the representation of state power across the historical divide of World War II. Visual rhetoric of the monarchy, however, would find a much more explicit application as a raw material in the construction of one of the fundamental symbols of socialist Yugoslavia, Tito's cult of personality.

Constructing a Cult: Tito's Three White Houses

Tito's personal power was arguably one of the main ingredients in the cement that held postwar Yugoslavia together.¹⁵⁷ It was built on shrewd political instinct and admirable organizational skills, as much as on exceptional personal charisma and a keen sense for public representation. Tito was an autocrat *par excellence*, who knew how to suppress opposition and did not abstain from coercion and outright violence when necessary; but he was also patently aware that persuasion was a far more efficient means to secure power. He was genuinely admired by large portions of Yugoslav population and respected by many abroad. Yet the admiration and respect were as much a result of his political decisions as of a carefully cultivated public persona. Tito was a master of the "symbolic use of politics," cognizant of eliciting a desired emotional

¹⁵⁷ Long before he died, there were fears within Yugoslavia and speculations abroad about the fate of the country after his death. See, for example: Carl Gustaf Ströhm, *Ohne Tito: kann Jugoslawien überleben?* (Graz, Vienna, Cologne: Verl. Styria, 1976).

response in his audience, not only through rhetoric, but through a full range of means: from his visual appearance and mannerisms, to art, poetry, and architecture associated with him.¹⁵⁸ When he died in 1980, after ruling Yugoslavia continuously for thirty-five years, his spectacular funeral was the final product of, and a testament to, this skill. Set on the background of massive outpouring of grief by the native population, it was allegedly the largest gathering of world leaders in history—one that remained unsurpassed until the funeral of the pope John Paul II in 2005.¹⁵⁹

Tito's cult was rooted in his biography that combined a fascinating number of social roles he espoused throughout his life: from a peasant son and modest mechanical worker, to an international adventurer, revolutionary, prisoner, warrior, and statesman, and then, finally, to an international leader, globetrotter, hunter, photographer, and snob who socialized with the international jet-set. He could thus mean something to almost anyone. Despite a modest start, he managed to find his way into all the major events that marked the 20th century.

Tito was born Josip Broz in 1892 in the small Croatian village of Kumrovec to a Croatian father and Slovenian mother. Before he was 20, he had already worked in Bohemia, Germany, and Austria. At one time, he was a test-driver for

¹⁵⁸ The expression “symbolic use of politics” comes from Murray Edelman’s classic study in political science; see: Murray Edelman, *Symbolic Use of Politics*, 2nd ed. (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985).

¹⁵⁹ For a good description of Tito’s funeral, see: Jasper Ridley, *Tito* (London: Constable, 1994), 19-25; also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Funeral_of_Pope_John_Paul_II, retrieved 8 June, 2008.

the Daimler car company. In 1913, he was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army, and during World War I he fought at the Eastern front, where he was captured by the Russians. He eventually escaped and took part in the 1917 revolution, thus becoming initiated into the Communist cause. In the 1920s, he was a member of the outlawed Communist Party of Yugoslavia and was imprisoned in 1928 after a widely publicized trial in which he famously claimed that he would not “recognize the bourgeois court.” After a stay in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the Comintern sent him back to Yugoslavia as a new secretary general of the CPY in order to reorganize and solidify the minuscule party. It was under his leadership that the party organized the antifascist revolt after the first Yugoslavia collapsed in 1941 and managed to turn the tiny Partisan units into a major military force recognized as a significant partner of the Allies.

The myth of Tito was created during World War II. There was a certain mystique to a little known guerilla leader who caused trouble to a much stronger enemy across the ethnic divides of the dismantled Yugoslavia. At first, the story of Tito’s Partisans was spread by word of mouth and folk songs, but the support of the Allies after 1943 gave it a much larger exposure, both domestically and internationally. In retrospect, one might argue that even the Germans themselves helped Tito’s propaganda by flooding the occupied regions with wanted posters featuring his striking face—one that exuded sheer determination. None of their efforts to capture “bandit Tito” succeeded, including a spectacular air-raid on Drvar (Bosnia and Herzegovina), which only further added to his

myth.¹⁶⁰ By 1944, Tito was already a “Marshall” of a significant antifascist army who negotiated directly with Stalin and Churchill.¹⁶¹

If the myth of Tito was established during the war, the construction of a full-fledged cult began as soon as the conflict was over, symbolically bolstering his personal power and through him the power of the party he led. Similar to real religious cults, this one also had its ‘sacred’ spaces, rituals, and icons, very much like the cult of Stalin in the USSR. But while Stalin was an obvious inspiration, Tito’s cult was a hybrid that relied on a broader variety of sources, incorporating motifs and symbols that were specifically Yugoslav. In a paradoxical twist, many of the spaces and rituals associated with Tito were taken over from Yugoslavia’s previous rulers from the house of Karađorđević. This may sound counterintuitive, considering that Tito was a Communist leader who had been imprisoned by the royal regime and who relentlessly fought to bring down the monarchy. But there were obvious pragmatic advantages to such appropriations and they were carefully calculated to legitimize the new power by relying on an existing set of

¹⁶⁰ The raid on the Bosnian city of Drvar, where the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army was stationed, occurred on Tito’s alleged birthday on 25 May, 1944; however, the Germans were late by eighteen days, as Tito was born on 7 May. By this time, the General Staff already had permanent connections with the Western Allies, represented by Churchill’s son Randolph and the British writer Evelyn Waugh, both of whom were at Drvar during the raid.

¹⁶¹ Tito was proclaimed Marshall of Yugoslavia at the Second Session of AVNOJ in Jajce (Bosnia and Herzegovina) on 29 November, 1943. On the same day the Yugoslav republic was proclaimed and the date was considered the official birthday of the second Yugoslavia, celebrated until 1991 as the Republic Day.

symbols that the masses already knew well. Indeed, some of the symbols and rituals taken over from the old royal regime were so successfully incorporated into the power structure of postwar Yugoslavia that their origins were soon forgotten and have ever since been primarily associated with Tito and socialism.

The first particularly symbolic appropriation by Tito's regime was that of the "White Palace," which became his formal residence. The White Palace was only one of the buildings in a larger complex known as the Royal Compound at Dedinje, Belgrade's elite residential area. An austere neo-Palladian structure, it was built in 1934-36 for the sons of King Alexander I.¹⁶² Originally used by the Yugoslav regent Prince Paul and by the German Commander of the City during the war, it was damaged in the combat for the liberation of Belgrade. After the Partisans and the Red Army entered the city on 20 October, 1944, Tito temporarily moved into a near by luxury villa at Rumunska St., but ordered the White Palace to be urgently repaired for his own use.¹⁶³ In the end, he would

¹⁶² The White Palace was designed by the renowned Belgrade architect Aleksandar Đorđević and built 1934-36. Its first resident was the Yugoslav regent, Prince Paul, a devoted collector of art, and the palace's lavishly decorated interior contained a remarkable collection of artworks, including paintings by Altdorfer, Veronese, Canaletto, and Rembrandt. See: Mirko Beoković, *Дворски комплекс, Београд, Србија* (Belgrade: Turistička organizacija Srbije, n.d.), 6.

¹⁶³ Located in the vicinity of the Royal Compound, before the war the villa at 15, Rumunska St. belonged to the wealthy contractor Acović.

Very few documents have survived from the turbulent times of the first post-war days, but an unpublished memoir of Miloš Lazarević, the architect who handled the reconstruction of the White Palace for Tito, casts some light on the proceedings. The manuscript tells about the general atmosphere in the liberated Belgrade, at the same time enthusiastic, chaotic, and cruel.

take over the whole Royal Compound, together with his private residence at 15, Rumunska St. (later renamed Užička St.), and a few neighboring properties. For decades to come, however, the White Palace would be his official workplace used for formal receptions. Tucked away amidst a well guarded forest and inaccessible to “mere mortals,” its very name became firmly associated with Tito’s personal power and its image was publicly known through countless photographs and newsreels reporting on his encounters with domestic and foreign dignitaries.¹⁶⁴

According to his long time collaborator and later dissident Milovan Đilas, Tito always displayed a “taste for palaces.”¹⁶⁵ During the war, wherever the Partisans went, he would automatically occupy the best building available, even if it sometimes meant setting up camp in a bank.¹⁶⁶ And while there is no doubt

Lazarević was originally given only two weeks to finish the reconstruction, although his estimate was that it would take at least a month. This recalls the similarly unrealistic original deadline for the monument at Batina, which in turn speak of the almost super-human ambitions of the Yugoslav Communists sparked by their victory in the war. More importantly, however, Lazarević’s account testifies to how early Tito began to rely on formal pomp in order to make his power clearly visible. See: Miloš Lazarević, *Bio sam arhitekt maršala Tita 1944-1947. Svedočanstvo jedne epohe* (unpublished manuscript, 1982), NBS, call no. 5799436.

¹⁶⁴ The White Palace was used for official receptions and meetings; the Royal Palace as residence for foreign dignitaries; and the somewhat cozier villa at 15, Rumunska St. as Tito’s personal residence.

¹⁶⁵ Đilas provides an incisive personal portrait of Tito based on personal experience; see: Milovan Đilas, *Druženje s Titom* (Harrow, England: Aleksa Đilas, n.d.), 80.

¹⁶⁶ Like in Užice, during the so-called Užice Republic, where he lived in the building of the National bank; *ibid.*

that he simply enjoyed comfort, he was just as aware of the intrinsic value that symbolic representation of his top position in the Communist hierarchy had in satisfying his hunger for absolute power. In that sense, his occupation of the former royal properties in the fall of 1944 was only logical, even if completely at odds with his own declarations. Not only was the royal luxury with which Tito lavished himself after the war against the basic Communist promise of egalitarian social justice; there was also no legal ground for him to occupy the royal court when he did, even by the malleable legal standards of the day.¹⁶⁷ In the summer of 1944, Tito had signed a British-brokered agreement with the royal government in exile promising that the Communists would not challenge the monarchy until the war was over and that the form of government in the country would be decided in democratic elections.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, in November 1944, he was appointed the prime minister of an interim coalition government that included exiled members loyal to the King, a role that did not come with a privileged residence, let alone that of the officially still reigning monarch. Tito's occupation of the White Palace violated both of these premises, symbolically and

¹⁶⁷ Đilas mentions that the fact that the Soviet leaders similarly took over old imperial palaces provided a stamp of approval for Tito's actions in the eyes of his ideological followers; *ibid.*, 84.

¹⁶⁸ The agreement, brokered by Churchill to prevent the Communists from taking over the country, was signed by Tito and Ivan Šubašić, the former Ban of Croatia, who was exiled in London with the former royal government. For details, see among many other sources: Ridley, *Tito*, 238.

practically.¹⁶⁹ Yet, no one complained. The writing on the wall was clear.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, after the elections in November 1945, the monarchy was officially abolished and the King was denied the right to return to Yugoslavia, by which time Tito had already enjoyed the former royal premises for a full year.

Tito's occupation of the royal property was an obvious symbolic statement of succession in power.¹⁷¹ Yet the possible meanings behind the specific choice of the White Palace as the architectural face of his reign are less apparent. Indeed, there were multiple royal buildings eligible for this role. First, there was the complex of official royal courts in downtown Belgrade, consisting of the Old Palace, originally built for the Obrenović dynasty (1882-84), and next to it the New Palace (1911-22) built by the Karađorđević.¹⁷² **(Fig. 2.11)** Large

¹⁶⁹ Ridley mentions this breach of agreement in his biography of Tito; *ibid.*, 248.

¹⁷⁰ Đilas claimed that even the ministers in the coalition government who were loyal to the King did not object to Tito's intrusion into the royal property; see: Đilas, *Druženje s Titom*, 82.

¹⁷¹ Đilas explicitly provided such an interpretation; *ibid.*, 84.

¹⁷² The Old Court was designed by Aleksandar Bugarski for King Milan Obrenović of Serbia. After the 1903 coup, it became the seat of the Karađorđević dynasty that came to occupy Serbian throne. The building was heavily damaged both in both world wars and underwent multiple adaptations and alterations. After World War II, it housed the Presidium of the National Assembly, Government of Yugoslavia, and since 1961, it has served as Belgrade's City Hall; for a list of different purposes, see: <http://www.beograd.org.yu/cms/view.php?id=1331>, retrieved 13 June, 2008.

The New Court was designed by Stojan Titelbah for King Peter I Karađorđević of Serbia, but was not finished until after World War I, when the Karađorđevićs got to reign in the much larger Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. After King Alexander built the Royal Compound at Dedinje, the building was given over to Prince Paul as a museum for the collection of European

monumental buildings of academic classical style, surrounded by a lavish park, they would no doubt have been worthy the new leader of Yugoslavia. But both for their size and central location they seemed to be better suited for more public purposes; indeed, after 1934, the New Palace had already been in use as the Museum of Prince Paul. More importantly, the whole downtown complex of courts was identified as part of a specifically Serbian history, since it was originally built before the first Yugoslavia came into existence. The Old Court even represented a kind of political 'prehistory' in the power games after World War II, since it was built by a dynasty brutally eliminated to allow the house of Karađorđević to rise to power.¹⁷³

Unlike the downtown courts, the White Palace was much more explicitly a private property of the dynasty, built with King Alexander's personal funds. Its occupation by Tito had a more precise meaning of a symbolic ouster of the exiled rival, whose looming possibility of return to the country was not yet legally eliminated. But the Royal Compound at Dedinje also contained the somewhat older Royal Palace, King Alexander's private residence, built in a Serbian national style, which raises the question of the specific choice of the White

art he compiled. After World War II, the building was significantly enlarged, after which it served first as the National Assembly and then as the Presidency of Serbia; see: <http://www.predsednik.yu/mwc/default.asp?c=503000&g=20061217212743&lng=lat&hs1=1>, retrieved 13 June, 2008.

¹⁷³ In the 1903 coup, King Alexander of the house of Obrenović was assassinated, which led to the rise to power of the house of Karađorđević.

Palace.¹⁷⁴ Its interior was lavishly decorated in a variety of styles, but Orthodox Christian topics dominate with references to Serbian and Russian medieval architecture and art, including a full-fledged chapel attached to the building. Were these religious connotations unsuitable for a residence of a Communist leader? Or was it the stylistic association to the prewar Serbian hegemony that the new Yugoslavia was trying to redress? Or was it simply the fact that the austere classicism of the White Palace seemed more in line with a universal image of formal and monumental representation? These questions are open to speculation, but it seems likely that they played a role in selecting Tito's official residence.¹⁷⁵

The appropriation of royal palaces went hand in hand with the construction of Tito's public persona that increasingly resembled that of a monarch. After having spent the better part of the war in desolate Balkan mountains, often residing in caves and peasant cabins, the former guerilla leader took no time to adopt a highly ritualized lifestyle, surrounding himself with an elaborate entourage of bodyguards, personal chauffeurs, chefs, doctors, food

¹⁷⁴ The Royal Palace at Dedinje was built 1924-29 by the Serbian architect Živojin Nikolić and the Russian émigré Nikolaj Krasnov; Beoković, *Дворски комплекс*, 4.

¹⁷⁵ Lazarević claims that Tito at one point told him that he did not want to have anything to do with the Royal Palace because "it still belonged to the King." However, this would be an entirely puzzling explanation for the choice of the White Palace, considering that it was no less King Peter's property than the Royal Palace; Lazarević, *Bio sam arhitekt maršala Tita*, 21.

testers, barbers, and maids.¹⁷⁶ A strict protocol quickly distanced him from communicating with 'ordinary people,' unless contacts were previously staged, in which case they were also widely publicized. His well-guarded residences, tucked away in the wooded landscapes of Dedinje, made him even more untouchable. The inspiration for this could have come from Stalin just as well as from monarchs; but Stalin was ascetic in his public appearances, usually wearing simple worker's tunics or military uniforms with minimal decoration.¹⁷⁷ Tito, on the other hand, very early on showed a taste for personal ostentation, at first appearing in perfectly tailored uniforms adorned with a profusion of gilded ornament, and later on in fashionable civilian suits, often light in color.¹⁷⁸ **(Fig. 2.12)** He never feigned modesty and never conformed to either of the two visual stereotypes of a Communist leader: military strongman in an austere uniform or bureaucrat in a drab gray suit. On the contrary, in his later years, Tito's personal style evolved towards being almost comically operatic, as if his taste was hopelessly stuck with the turn-or-the-century Austro-Hungarian imperial notions of pomp that he knew from his early youth. This was most obvious in the spectacular outfits he wore when meeting real monarchs, usually matching and

¹⁷⁶ Lazarević provides some first-hand insights about this; *ibid.*, 20, 34, 36.

¹⁷⁷ On Stalin's cult and his public image, see: Tamara Chapman, *The Personality Cult of Joseph Stalin in Soviet Russia, 1945-53*, master's thesis (The University of Texas at Austin, 1986), especially 17, 75.

¹⁷⁸ Allegedly, for his meeting with Churchill at Naples in August 1944, Tito had a specially tailored uniform flown from Moscow; Ridley, *Tito*, 241.

occasionally even surpassing the elaborate outfits of his crowned guests. If he was not a king by law, at least he looked and lived like one.

Soon after occupying the royal palaces in Belgrade, Tito claimed almost all other royal properties scattered around Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁹ With that, he simply took over an already existing system of structures that symbolically staked out the country for the personal power of the ruler, of course, with the advantageous side effect that he could also use these estates for personal pleasure. Besides the royal villas in the mountains and on the coast of the Adriatic, Tito's were also the best stables in the country, as well as all the best hunting preserves, in which he indulged his passion for stalking bears and deer.¹⁸⁰ Indeed, Tito's leisure time was increasingly devoted to activities associated with aristocracy and 'upper classes' in general—his own ideological enemies—such as hunting, tennis, golf, and photography; contemporary photos even show him playing the piano.¹⁸¹ None of this was hidden from public view, especially in the later years of economic progress, when Communist puritanism subsided. On the contrary—the ostentation metastasized with his age; a few years before his death, even a lavish book of photographs devoted exclusively to Tito's private life was

¹⁷⁹ One notable exception was Oplenac, the royal property in Topola (Serbia), which contains the mausoleum of the Karađorđević family. Đilas ascribes this omission to the superstition of Tito, who did not want to interfere with the dead monarchs; see: Đilas, *Druženje s Titom*, 85.

¹⁸⁰ Đilas describes some of the hunting parties in detail; *ibid.*, 91-93.

¹⁸¹ On the construction of a tennis court and a bowling alley within the premises of Tito's residence at Rumunska St., see: Lazarević, *Bio sam arhitekt maršala Tita*, 28, 29.

published, showing him posing in his many residences around Yugoslavia, dressed in tuxedos or in hunting gear, accompanied by his wife or with her poodles.¹⁸² Unlike Stalin's cult that presented the leader simultaneously as an almost supernatural being, but also one of great personal modesty, Tito indulged in earthly pleasures and was never coy about it.

While the many estates that Tito used throughout Yugoslavia were former royal properties, his second favorite abode was not of such provenance. A whole archipelago of some fourteen small islands off the coast of Istria in the northern Adriatic, the Brioni (Brijuni in Croatian) became his official summer residence in which he spent considerable amounts of time with other high state and party officials. Offering a more relaxed but still highly luxurious lifestyle, the islands were just as famous as the White Palace and became inseparable from Tito's name; nowadays, the main island still contains a small museum devoted to his sojourn there. The symbolic status of the Brioni was indeed immense, as it was there that some of the most important decisions in the history of postwar Yugoslavia were made: for example, the meeting of Tito, President Nasser of Egypt, and Prime Minister Nehru of India in 1956 that paved the way for the Non-Aligned Movement. But it was also there that Tito had a safari park with exotic animals and received an impressive string of foreign dignitaries ranging from Eleanor Roosevelt and Queen Elizabeth II to Muammar al-Gaddafi, not to

¹⁸² Ivo Eterović, *Tito's Private Life* (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska revija, 1977).

mention celebrities like Elizabeth Taylor, Richard Burton, Gina Lollobrigida, and Sophia Loren.

Before 1918, the Brioni belonged to Austria-Hungary, like the whole peninsula of Istria, including the port of Rijeka (Fiume) further south. Because of beautiful landscapes, mild climate, and a wealth of archeological sites from Roman and Byzantine times, the archipelago was one of the empire's favorite resorts. Equipped with luxury hotels and restaurants developed by the Viennese magnate Paul Kupelwieser after 1893, they were frequented by European aristocracy; their famous guests included the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand and Thomas Mann.¹⁸³ Between the world wars, the Brioni were under Italian sovereignty and came under Yugoslav jurisdiction only in 1945. Less than two years later, the islands were designated to be used by the Federal Government (in reality by Tito), because of which they were closed for general public for the following four decades.

As in the case of the White Palace, the choice of the Brioni raises questions about the reasons and motivations that lay behind it: there were multiple other exquisite places on the coast, a number of them former royal

¹⁸³ The Viennese businessman Paul Kupelwieser, former manager of the Vitkovice steelworks (Bohemia), bought the archipelago of Brioni in 1893 and developed it into a resort. He also hired the famous Dr Robert Koch, one of the founders of microbiology, to eradicate malaria from the islands. See: Jane Foster, *Footprint Croatia* (Footprint Handbooks, 2004), 109.

properties already in the possession of the state.¹⁸⁴ The small, sparsely populated islands were probably more convenient to guard than mainland properties, but were at the same time easily accessible, lying only a mile away from the coast. Moreover, they were indeed beautiful and had the reputation of an Austrian aristocratic resort, which may have resonated with Tito's taste formed during his youth in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But the Brioni were also part of a territory that had never belonged to Yugoslavia before; and even more significantly, they lay less than thirty miles from the bitterly disputed Free Territory of Trieste, over which Yugoslavia competed with Italy. The Trieste Crisis was one of the greatest problems of Yugoslav foreign policy in the first postwar years and it caused serious friction not only with Italy, but also with Tito's wartime allies-turned-archenemies, Britain and the United States.¹⁸⁵ The southern part of the Free Territory was administered by Yugoslavia and the northern, including the city of Trieste, by the Allies, but Yugoslavs claimed right to the whole region citing its significant Slavic population. The crisis was indeed serious, representing one of those places where the Cold War threatened to easily turn hot. In such situation, creating an official residence on a land newly

¹⁸⁴ The royal properties at the coast included a villa in Split and the so-called Queen's Palace in Miločer in Montenegro; see see: Đilas, *Druženje s Titom*, 85.

¹⁸⁵ On the crisis of Trieste, see: Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955: jugoslovensko približavanje NATO-u* (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2000), 44-75; and Darko Bekić. *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu: odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 362-83. On public perceptions of the crisis, see: Predrag Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada*, 94-98.

acquired from an unfriendly neighboring country may have been a political statement similar to the occupation of the White Palace: proclaiming that Yugoslav leadership was determined to keep its gains and hopeful to gain even more. The protracted crisis over Trieste was not resolved until 1954, by which time the islands had already become Tito's paradise in the Adriatic.

Whatever the reasons for the acquisition of the Brioni, the government did not spare any expenses to improve the place for Tito and the small circle around him. The contrast between the amounts lavished on them and the strict rationalization that was in order everywhere else was striking. The first investments were made in early 1947 and the flow of cash towards the islands never ceased, even during the disastrous economic crisis caused by the split with the Soviet Union. In 1949-50, at the time when the construction of New Belgrade all but ceased due to the lack of funding, the Federal Government financed at the Brioni not only the reconstruction of the existing buildings and the pipeline that brought water from the mainland, but also at least one new hotel and a large luxury villa, as well as the cultivation of extensive parklands.¹⁸⁶ The amounts spent on the Brioni got progressively larger, even when the country survived the 1952 draught only thanks to foreign aid.¹⁸⁷ The Brioni, of course,

¹⁸⁶ Memo to the Federal Planning Commission about the financing of works on the Brioni in 1950; ASCG, Fond 50: Predsedništvo vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 82, no. 82-197.

¹⁸⁷ That year, 250 million dinars were spent at the Brioni; "Proposal for the Investments of the Direction of the Islands of the Brioni," ASCG, Fond 50: Predsedništvo vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 82, no. 82-334.

were only one of the many estates Tito used around the country and they all required investments. And while it is true that Tito's many residences served state representation as much as his personal comfort—indeed, most of them were inherited by Yugoslavia's successor states in the 1990s and happily used by new leaders—luxury that surrounded Tito at the time of general hardship speaks of serious hypocrisy for someone who claimed to bring social equality to the country.¹⁸⁸ Tito was only the most extreme example of the rise of—to use Đilas's term—a “new class” of privileged party bureaucrats: he was, at the same time, its prime enabler and the most prodigious member.¹⁸⁹

Judging the architecture of Tito's Brioni is difficult because his residences have never been open to the public. The islands became a national park in 1983, but the luxury state villas remained inaccessible even after the collapse of Yugoslavia. Only a handful of articles and photographs about these buildings have been published recently, which, combined with the many photos of Tito at the Brioni that circulated during his lifetime, provide at least a glimpse into the kind of architecture he enjoyed in his favorite retreat. There is one well-documented building on the main island, however, whose idiosyncratic

¹⁸⁸ It is often stressed that Tito never made any of these luxury estates his private property, unlike his successors in the 1990s, who took full advantage of their positions to amass personal wealth. Indeed, Tito's family inherited virtually nothing after his death, including his wife Jovanka, who was famously moved to a leaking unheated house.

¹⁸⁹ On the “new class,” see: Milovan Đilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (London, 1957).

architecture unmistakably points to its architect, Jože Plečnik. A tiny garden pavilion in the shape of an ancient *tholos*, it was Plečnik's last architectural work, finished in 1956, only a year before his death. It was commissioned by Slovenian Partisan veterans as a gift to Tito.¹⁹⁰ Ten simplified Doric columns in white marble support an architrave that further carries a massive round slab, showcasing the old master's propensity for large monolithic elements known from his work at the Prague Castle. The pavilion's austere tectonic expression is alleviated by sensual curves of sculptures that adorn its top, a human figure of "Genius" in the middle, surrounded by a variety of birds on the perimeter. A true gem tucked within the lush greenery of the park, the pavilion offered Plečnik a perfect opportunity to exercise his imaginative interpretations of classicism since it was surrounded by abundant authentic Roman and Byzantine ruins.

As for Tito's residences, there were two on the largest island of Veli Brijun, which were used for more formal purposes, and a smaller one on the outer island of Vanga (renamed in the 1990s Krasnica), which served as his private haven and until today remains practically unknown to the public. Most significant of the three was the so-called White Villa on the main island, in which Tito received his official guests. (One cannot but wonder whether naming the building "White Villa" was an attempt to assert its status as a Mediterranean counterpart to the White Palace in Belgrade.) Its construction was surrounded by a veil of secrecy

¹⁹⁰ See: Peter Krečič, *Plečnik: The Complete Works* (London: Academy Editions, 1993), 184-85.

(even the surviving documents of the Federal Government refer to it only as “BV”—Bijela Vila), but it must have started in the late 1949 or early 1950, at the height of the political and economic crisis.¹⁹¹ Its likely architect was Branko Bon, who was also the architect responsible for the many adaptations of Tito’s ‘private’ residence at Dedinje.¹⁹² A plain rectangular two-story volume made of white embossed Brač marble, topped with a low-pitched barrel-tiled roof, the villa has a simple massive stone arcade along the façade facing the sea. A generous terrace opens in front of it, paved with an abstract mosaic in multicolor marble. There is nothing explicitly historicist about the structure. In its austere simplicity, it reveals a decidedly modernist sensibility; even its arcade is reduced to the most minimal expression, almost reminiscent of De Chirico’s paintings. At the same time, the rustic materials, simple wooden shutters over windows, and the overall form clearly speak of an intention to create a link to the local Mediterranean vernacular, thus continuing along a path on which Croatian modernists, including Bon, had already embarked before the war. The highly abstracted classicism of the arcade also recalls versions of the New Belgrade

¹⁹¹ “Proposal for the Investments of the Direction of the Islands of the Brioni,” ASCG, Fond 50: Predisništvo vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 82, no. 82-334.

¹⁹² Bon’s son Ranko cited by Ljiljana Blagojević in: *Стратегије модернизма у планирању и пројектовању урбане структуре и архитектуре Новог Београда: период концептуалне фазе од 1922. до 1962. године*, doctoral dissertation (Belgrade: University of Belgrade, 2004), 151, n. 36.

projects on which Bon had worked, likely confirming his authorship of the White Villa.

Yet, the interior of the White Villa has nothing Mediterranean about it, let alone modernist. Photographs published in *Tito's Private Life* present a very conventional picture of luxury, with heavy carved wooden furniture and brocade wallpapers.¹⁹³ The second Brioni villa, called *Brionka*, seems to point in a similar direction. Designed by Plečnik's student Vinko Glanz, who also worked on Tito's villas in Slovenia, the Brionka is an odd piece of architecture that combines explicit historicist elements with a decidedly non-classical composition in an uneasy union.¹⁹⁴ Its waterfront façade is particularly strange, featuring a balustraded fence and an arcade with molded surrounds, superimposed with a deep 'floating' trellis lacking supports. The building looks almost like a stylized Renaissance *palazzo* whose façade was disturbed by shifting every floor into a different plane; or like an asymmetrical functionalist building onto which some classical decoration was attached. This was certainly not Plečnik's playful but erudite reinterpretation of classicism. The interior of the villa seems somewhat more consistent, with an abundance of polished colored marble, mosaic tiles, and decorative furniture.

¹⁹³ *Tito's Private Life*, 62-63.

¹⁹⁴ The Brijunka was finished around 1956. See: Boris Orešić, "Budućnost Brijuna neizvjesna—predsjednički kandidati tvrde da neće na otočje ako pobjede, a elite—nema," *Nedjeljni Vjesnik* (Zagreb) (16 January, 2000): 6-7; and: Maurizio Barberis, "Tito e le Superville/Tito and his mega villas," *Domus*, no. 886 (November, 2005): 52-59.

Both the Brionka and the interior of the White Villa seem to indicate where the real architectural taste of Tito (and likely of his wife Jovanka) lay: in a rather petit bourgeois range between the palatial traditionalism of his formal residences and the rusticity of his hunting lodges. This is consistent with his choice of the White Palace as his official residence, as well as with the many changes and extensions made at his private residence at Užička Street. Tito expressed little in public about his thoughts on architecture, except from one ambiguous and somewhat self-contradictory speech in 1962, in which he claimed to be both against “regressiveness” and “ultramodernism.”¹⁹⁵ But there are anecdotal reports of his aversion to modernism, especially its glass-and-metal incarnation. Allegedly, Tito quite disliked the Villa Zagorje at Pantovčak, which the Croatian government built in 1963-64 for his stays in Zagreb.¹⁹⁶ An elegant and airy modernist structure, all in glass and simple white surfaces and decorated with abstract geometric patterns, it was designed by Vjenceslav Richter and Kazimir Ostrogović, two of the most prominent Croatian architects at the time.¹⁹⁷ Tito also disliked the new version of the Central Committee building erected in New

¹⁹⁵ Speech in Železnik (Serbia) at the end of 1962, quoted in: Predrag Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada 1948-1968*, 435.

¹⁹⁶ This is mentioned by Ridley, who also claims that Tito had the modernist villa furnished with 18th century Rococo furniture “which, surprisingly, blends very well with the building;” see: Ridley, *Tito*, 321.

¹⁹⁷ See: Marjan Susovski, *Zbirka Richter: Donacija Vjenceslava Richtera i Nade Kareš-Richter Gradu Zagrebu* (Zagreb: Muzej suvremene umjetnosti, 2003), 30, figures XII-XIX.

Belgrade around the same time: he allegedly abhorred the boxy skyscraper in glass and aluminum—so much that he set foot in it only on its opening day and never again.¹⁹⁸ And while this aversion to modern architecture remains anecdotal and cannot be confirmed by public statements, it is consistent with Tito's disdain for abstract art, which he famously expressed in a speech in 1963.¹⁹⁹ By this time, artistic liberties in Yugoslavia were so firmly established that the leader's condemnation could not really endanger abstraction, but this episode clearly tells of Tito's rather conservative tastes in the matters of culture.

Aside from the White Villa at the Brioni and the White Palace in Belgrade, there was a third “white house” intimately associated with Tito: his birth house in Kumrovec. Unlike the other two, however, this one offered a strikingly different picture of rural modesty—one that bordered on poverty. In further contrast to the other two white houses, the house in Kumrovec was open to the public and represented a major destination of state-sponsored pilgrimage, literally enshrining Tito's cult. There were probably not many children who grew up in socialist Yugoslavia who did not pay a visit to it on school field trips. The picture of the house's whitewashed walls and steep roof with a sculpture of Tito in front of it was one of the most iconic images of socialist Yugoslavia, infinitely replicated in the media, in textbooks, and even on badges and T-shirts. **(Fig.**

¹⁹⁸ This ‘urban legend’ that Tito disliked the Central Committee in New Belgrade is quoted in: Toma Džadžić, “Predskazanja: Milić rušio-Kavaja robijao,” *NIN* (Belgrade), July 15, 1999.

¹⁹⁹ On Tito's 1963 speech against abstract art, see: Merenik, *Ideološki modeli*, 98-99.

2.13) In his 1992 movie *Tito and Me*, Belgrade director Goran Marković brilliantly captured the many facets of Tito’s cult through the eyes of a chubby ten-year-old boy fascinated with the Marshall, who goes on a “pioneers’ march” to visit the house in Kumrovec, but ultimately becomes disillusioned during his adventures on the trip.

The story of turning Tito’s birth house into a site of devotion merges politics with the history of preservation and ethnography. The driving force responsible for achieving this was Marijana Gušić, director of the Ethnographic Museum in Zagreb, who conducted extensive studies of vernacular culture of Hrvatsko zagorje, the rural region north-west of Zagreb.²⁰⁰ A prominent scholar considered the “mother” of Croatian ethnography, Gušić was one of the many politically savvy left-leaning intellectuals active in the antifascist movement who came to the fore of Yugoslav culture after the war.²⁰¹ For obvious political reasons, she focused her attention on Kumrovec and in 1947 wrote a study on the village, paying special attention to the Broz family house. Soon after, the house was placed under state protection and reconstructed to reflect its turn-of-

²⁰⁰ See the official website of the “Old Village” Museum in Kumrovec: <http://www.mdc.hr/kumrovec/hr/povijest/index.html>, retrieved 18 June, 2008.

²⁰¹ Among other achievements, Gušić is credited with being the first scholar to explore the rare gender-bending phenomenon of “virginas,” women living their lives as men because of the lack of male heir to their families, characteristic for rural Balkan regions. On Gušić, see: Sanja Potkonjak, “The rule of women in Croatian ethnology: Marijana Gušić between politics and profession,” presented at the European Association of Social Anthropologists Biannual Conference, Bristol (UK), 2006.

the-century state. **(Fig. 2.14)** Augustinčić's life-size bronze sculpture of a pensive Tito in a long military coat, likely the most recognizable artistic representation of the leader, was placed in front of it in 1948 (the artist's sculptures of King Alexander were no longer to be seen anywhere). By 1950, Gušić equipped the interior with authentic period furniture and one room was devoted to an exhibition on Tito's biography. In the years that followed, the whole old core of Kumrovec was documented and by 1969 placed under protection as the "Old Village," becoming the first open-air museum of folk culture in Yugoslavia that today includes over forty restored or reconstructed buildings and some fifteen ethnographic exhibits inside them.²⁰² Despite this broadening of the scope of presentation, the Broz house remained the centerpiece of the museum together with its specific historical and ideological connotations.²⁰³

This merging of ethnography and politics was not particularly new; the two had been in a love affair ever since the nineteenth century, when the various nationalisms around Europe used the newly discovered folk cultures as raw material for the construction of national identities. Such attempts were not unusual in the Yugoslav lands either. What was new in the case of Kumrovec was the specific dynamic between the scholarly concerns of ethnographers and

²⁰² See the website of the "Old Village" Museum.

²⁰³ In a way, the whole village is still marked by Tito's presence, almost thirty years after his death, except that the adulation of the leader has been partly replaced with a certain pop-cultural irony. Thus the souvenir shop sells a variety of Tito's portraits in all media imaginable, while the local traditional café bears the name "Stari" (Old Man), one of Tito's wartime nicknames.

the needs of a personality cult, which successfully fed on each other. The association with Tito, no doubt, helped with the financing of ethnographic research; in return, ethnography and preservation provided material for narratives necessary for the construction and maintenance of the cult. Kumrovec effectively served to balance out Tito's overly aristocratic image by emphasizing his humble peasant origins. His rural roots were consistently strengthened by publicizing his visits to his relatives in the village. There was also a whole body of myths about his childhood that told Yugoslav schoolchildren of the adventures of a poor but bright "little Joža" (the diminutive of Josip).²⁰⁴ In a predominantly rural Yugoslavia of the 1940s and 1950s, this was of utmost importance in order to present Tito as 'one of the people,' much more so than presenting him as a manual worker or union leader, which would be more logical to expect of a Communist leader. Tito's image thus oscillated between two pre-modern archetypes, peasant and aristocrat, embodying the likely kind of success story that would resonate with a population that practically skipped capitalism to go directly into socialism.

The geographic location of Kumrovec in the idyllic Croatian countryside, on the very border with Slovenia, also played a role. The fact that Tito's father was a Croat and his mother a Slovenian made him symbolically linked to two of the three ethnic groups that had founded the first Yugoslavia. This offset the

²⁰⁴ This is a part of the author's personal experience of growing up in Tito's Yugoslavia.

primary locus of his reign in Belgrade in Serbia; if Belgrade remained the capital of Yugoslavia, raising possible suspicion about a continued Serbian domination, it was a half-Croat/half Slovenian who ruled from it. This rooting of Tito into the heart of Croatian countryside also had a convenient side-effect of countering the widespread rumors and speculations about his 'true' foreign origin, fed by his rather unusual accent, inconsistent use of dialects of Serbo-Croatian, and frequent use of Russian words.²⁰⁵ But the narratives constructed around Kumrovec had far deeper meanings too. They presented Tito as both an archetypal Yugoslav and an heir to the centuries-long tradition of the struggle for ethnic and social liberation. One guidebook to Kumrovec proclaimed Zagorje to be the legendary homeland of all Slavs.²⁰⁶ Another stressed how in the ninth century Zagorje became a "bloody battleground for the liberation of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenians against the Frankish rule." This was a case of politically

²⁰⁵ Đilas, *Druženje s Titom*, 12.

²⁰⁶ Indeed, a 1965 guidebook to Kumrovec and Tito's Memorial Museum heavily stressed Tito's Croatian origins and proclaimed him "the greatest son of the Croatian and other Yugoslav peoples." It even claimed Hrvatsko zagorje, area in which Kumrovec lies, to be the legendary homeland of all Slavs, thus giving Tito an aura of a 'primordial' Slav. The two other historical events, besides the emergence of Tito on the "historical stage," that the guidebook singled out as significant for the region were a 16th century peasant uprising under Matija Gubec and the 19th century 'awakening' of the Croatian national consciousness, thus establishing Tito's revolutionary pedigree. However, the stress on Tito's Croatianness was probably also related to the rise of nationalism in Croatia in the late 1960, known as the Croatian Spring. For the guidebook, see: Ksenija Dešković and Ria Durbešić, eds., *Kumrovec: Memorijalni muzej maršala Tita* (Zagreb: Muzej revolucije naroda Hrvatske and Turistički savez Zagreba, 1965).

motivated selection of a little known historical event to invoke a mythical pre-schismatic “brotherhood and unity” of South Slavs, which allegedly originated right in the heart of Tito’s homeland.²⁰⁷ The histories of Kumrovec also unflinchingly mention the sixteenth century peasant uprising under Matija Gubec, setting up a precedent for Tito’s revolutionary ‘pedigree’ and presenting him as a descendent of a long line of folk leaders. Indeed, Tito himself supported this allusion by keeping Krsto Hegedušić’s monumental painting “Battle at Stubica” (1948), which showed Matija Gubec in action, behind the equally monumental carved desk in his office in Belgrade.

The three ‘white houses’ established the basic spatial frame of Tito’s cult, distributing its main nodes on a large geographical scale along a line that ran from the westernmost promontory in the Adriatic, through Zagorje’s countryside, and then all the way east to the confluence of the Danube and Yugoslavia’s longest river Sava. The second spatial layer of the cult was established by the renaming of Yugoslav cities after the leader; in 1946, three were honored by attaching “Tito’s” to their original names (for example, former Veles in Macedonia thus became Titov Veles—‘Tito’s Veles’), while Montenegro’s capital Podgorica became Titograd (Tito City, similar to Stalingrad and Leningrad).²⁰⁸ But the fine

²⁰⁷ See: Vladimir Stopar and Veljko Žubrinić, “Hrvatsko zagorje kroz vijekove,” in: Vladimir Stopar, ed., *Kumrovec* (Zagreb: Epoha, 1965), n.p.

²⁰⁸ Besides Titograd (Podgorica) and Titov Veles (Macedonia), there was also Titova Korenica (Croatia) and Titovo Užice (Serbia). A second wave of Tito-naming occurred after his death in the early 1980s, thus producing Titovo Velenje (Slovenia), Titov Drvar (Bosnia and Herzegovina),

'weaving' that symbolically brought together even the most distant provincial parts of the country in their adoration of the leader was provided by an annual ritual. Tito's Relay was a race in which a decorative baton containing best wishes to the leader ran through the country to be presented to Tito on his birthday on May 25.²⁰⁹ It started as early as 1945 (combat still continued around the country), and ran almost the whole length of the existence of socialist Yugoslavia, several years after Tito's death.²¹⁰ The race would start from a different city every year and the baton would be carried for two months through all of Yugoslavia to the White Palace in Belgrade, where the most deserving member of the Youth Organization would hand it over to Tito. The batons were quite varied, the early ones rather naïve in design, the later ones works of art

Titov Vrbas (autonomous province of Vojvodina in Serbia), and Titova Mitrovica (autonomous province of Kosovo in Serbia). Thus in every republic and autonomous province there was one city that bore Tito's name.

²⁰⁹ Tito was actually born on 7 May, but it was celebrated on the 25th to commemorate the anniversary of the German air-raid on Drvar to capture Tito in 1944. The Germans planned the raid to surprise Tito on his birthday, but they had a wrong information that it was on the 25th instead of the 7th.

²¹⁰ The sources are contradictory about who initiated Tito's Relay. Đilas claims that it was the secretary of Communist Youth Rato Dugonjić; Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 16. Others claim that it was the youth of the city of Kragujevac in central Serbia; see: Olga Manojlović Pintar, *Ideološko i političko u spomničkoj arhitekturi Prvog i Drugo svetskog rata u na tlu Srbije*, doctoral dissertation (Belgrade: University of Belgrade, 2004), 222-25. In any case, that year Tito received eleven different batons from various parts of the country, and a modest birthday ceremony took place in Zagreb, where he happened to be on that day. However, as of 1946, Tito's Relay acquired a solemn, "all-national" character and the ceremony took place at the White Palace in the presence of the whole government and party leadership; Dilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 16.

designed by well known sculptors. **(Fig. 2.15)** In 1957, in an apparent attempt to reduce its cultish character, the ceremony was renamed the Youth Relay and 25 May proclaimed the Youth Day, although Tito remained at the center of the celebration. From that year on, he no longer received the baton in front of the White Palace, but at a massive stadium performance in Belgrade. The ceremony was traditionally broadcast on TV and was a major spectacle with a large audience.

The Youth Relay turned the streets of Yugoslav cities into stages for political theater whose iconography merged the state and the leader into a monolithic union. **(Fig. 2.16)** These elaborate festivities were likely justified by the fact that Stalin's own birthdays were publicly celebrated with large public rituals.²¹¹ But the specific form of celebration—the relay race—was not of Soviet origin: once again, it was appropriated from the prewar period, when a torch was carried in 1934 from Sarajevo to the Karađorđević mausoleum at Oplenac in honor of the late King Peter I.²¹² The inspiration obviously came from Antiquity and it is interesting that the very first Olympic torch, initiated, coincidentally, by the Nazis at the occasion of the 1936 Olympics, passed through Yugoslavia on its way from Greece to Berlin. This event must have further stamped the ritual of

²¹¹ On the celebration of Stalin's birthdays, see: Chapman, *The Personality Cult of Joseph Stalin*, 13-17.

²¹² This occurred for the first time in 1934; see: Manojlović Pintar, *Ideološko i političko u spomničkoj arhitekturi*, 224.

the relay race into the collective consciousness of the country, although its Nazi associations were forgotten, just like everywhere else in the world.²¹³ This repressed reference came back with a vengeance in 1987, causing a national scandal when it was revealed that the subversive art collective *Neue Slowenische Kunst* won the competition for the official Youth Day poster with a slightly altered replica of a Nazi-era poster, effectively announcing the end of the Youth Day celebrations and soon after of Yugoslavia itself.

The sporting connotations of both Tito's Relay and the grand performance at its end also had local predecessors. The cult of physical strength and exercise had its roots in the nineteenth century and was associated with *Sokol* (Falcon), a Pan-Slavic movement of Czech origin that nurtured physical strength and moral qualities of its members for the well-being and protection of the nation. The movement organized elaborate mass gymnastic performances called *slets* (from the Czech word for a flock of birds) held in the open air, sometimes with thousands of participants. The Sokols arrived in the Yugoslav lands during the 1890s and gained considerable popularity among the youth; Tito himself had been a member.²¹⁴ They flourished between the wars, when the movement

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ About the Sokol movement in Serbia and Yugoslavia, see: Marija Blagojević, *Vizuelna kultura Sokola*, diploma thesis (Belgrade: University of Belgrade, 2003).

enjoyed the patronage of the royal house; the largest *slets* of Yugoslav Sokols were performed in the presence of King Alexander I on St. Vitus Day.²¹⁵

Though the Sokols were outlawed in postwar Yugoslavia, their tradition continued to live by adjusting to and merging with the Soviet-style cult of “physical culture,” known by the portmanteau *fiskultura*.²¹⁶ *Fiskultura* had essentially the same purpose as the Sokol movement: to create healthy and strong citizens capable of protecting the country and contributing to its development. It was only the ideological connotations that were different, with a specific accent being placed, in Lenin’s own words, on “Communist upbringing of young people, aimed at creating harmoniously developed human beings, creative citizens of a Communist society.”²¹⁷ Yugoslav leaders readily adopted the Soviet ambition to create a “new man” and saw the promotion of *fiskultura* in precisely those terms: “to create a man who will consciously be able to participate in the construction of a new Yugoslavia and physically and mentally contribute to it as

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

²¹⁶ ‘The original Soviet term was *fizkultura* (*fizicheskaya kultura*), but in Yugoslavia it was transformed to *fiskultura* to facilitate easier pronunciation. The concept was promoted in Yugoslavia soon after the war; see: Nemanja Madžarević, “Fiskulturno vaspitanje naroda SSSR,” *Jugoslavija-SSSR* I, no. 6 (April, 1946): 33-37. For a detailed analysis of the importance of *fizkultura* and its visual representation in the USSR, see Mike O’Mahoney, *Sports in the USSR: Physical Culture—Visual Culture* (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), especially 7-38, 80-96.

²¹⁷ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, quoted in *ibid.*, 15.

much as possible.”²¹⁸ Like the Sokol movement, *fiskultura* had a pronounced visual and theatrical aspect exercised through massive street parades, a custom that was readily adopted in Yugoslavia. Indicative of the merging of traditions of different origin was the fact that mass performances of *fiskulturnici* (sportsmen and sportswomen) that were held under overbearing Communist iconography still bore the old Sokol name *slet*. By far the most well-known *slet* was the one held every 25 May as pinnacle to the celebration of Tito’s birthday. On that day, after a massive spectacle of gymnastic exercise and dance, a breathless youngster would run up a long flight of stairs to present the leader with the birthday gift from his people. If Tito’s cult ever had an altar, than it was the central box of the stadium where this transaction occurred, the eyes of the whole nation focused on its leader. Tito’s cult thus ultimately subsumed a host of spaces and rituals of various origins that simultaneously symbolized his own extraordinary position of supreme authority, the “brotherhood and unity” that brought the country together, and the youth, strength, and physical health necessary to protect and build the nation. That most of these spaces and rituals were already known to the population only increased their persuasive power.

As of 1957, the site of the final *slet* of Tito’s birthday celebration was the Stadium of Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija—JNA), not

²¹⁸ Words are by Edvard Kardelj, one of the “top four” in the party hierarchy, quoted in: “Četiri godine fiskulturnog pokreta u novoj Jugoslaviji,” *Jugoslavija-SSSR* IV, no. 41-42 (March-April, 1949): 32.

far from his residence at Dedinje. The stadium was a product of the campaign for the promotion of *fiskultura* that began soon after the war.²¹⁹ Before the war, Yugoslavia had few stadiums, and the construction of new sports facilities was meant to be yet another illustration of the superiority of the new state over its “reactionary” predecessor. Indeed, by 1947 both Belgrade and Zagreb had new modern stadiums on the way.²²⁰ The JNA Stadium in Belgrade (1947-1951) was the first major commission the little known local architects Mihailo Janković and Kosta Popović and it was the first truly modern, large-capacity stadium in the country.²²¹ **(Fig. 2.17)** Restrained in appearance, it featured exposed piers supporting the stands and presented an image of subdued elegance that was nevertheless decidedly modernist, with a long light bridge floating to the entrance of the VIP box from the near-by slope.

²¹⁹ In 1947, a series of architectural competitions for stadiums in Belgrade was organized; “Natječaj za olimpijski stadion na Banjici u Beogradu—1947,” in: *Arhitektura* I-II, no. 4-6 (November/December 1947-January 1948): 20-32. The YPA Stadium was not a subject of these competitions, but it was also designed in 1947. In Zagreb, Vladimir Turina designed a new soccer stadium as well; “Stadion F.K. ‘Akademikar’ Zagreb,” in: *Arhitektura* I-II, no. 4-6 (November/December 1947-January 1948): 33-35.

²²⁰ At the occasion of the Mayday in 1949, the journal *Jugoslavija-SSSR* wrote: “Together with other laborers, hundreds of thousands of members of our *fiskultura* organizations went into the streets of villages and cities of our homeland... *Fiskulturnici* did that all the more joyfully and cordially, since they have been given, like never before, the best conditions and means to practice *fiskultura* without impediment;” *ibid.*

²²¹ The first soccer match on the stadium was played in 9 October 1949, two years before the stadium was completed; see: <http://www.partizan.co.yu/stadion.php?Jezik=sr>.

The clear modernism of the JNA Stadium set it apart from other major sites of Tito's cult, which, as a rule, were associated with more traditional architecture. This is not surprising, considering the fact that the stadium was not originally associated with the ritual of Tito's Relay and that it did not merge with *slet* performances until 1957. Instead, the stadium was built to house the soccer club *Partizan*, founded under the aegis of the JNA. The Army enjoyed special status in postwar Yugoslav state as a successor of "glorious Partisan units," which were responsible for the liberation of the country, and this was clearly reflected in the names of both the club and the stadium. Since Tito was the Marshall of the Army, it was only natural that his birthday *slet* would take part at the Army's stadium. But the stadium itself was identified more with an institution of the state than with Tito in person. Mihailo Janković would later design another important locus of Tito's cult, the Museum 25 May in the immediate vicinity of the residential complex at Dedinje, whose primary role was to house all the relay batons and other gifts the leader received in the country and abroad. **(Fig. 2.18)** It too was obviously modernist, but again it was partly external to the cult, not a place occupied by him, but rather by others' devotion to him.

The stylistic divergence of the JNA Stadium from other, 'proper' sites of Tito's cult points to a broader distinction between the spaces of state power and the spaces of Tito's personal power. Tito was indeed cast as irreplaceable and essentially above the state; reelected President for six times, he finally became President of Yugoslavia for life, which became enshrined in the Constitution in

1974. The places of his cult thus represented a body of work appropriately distinct from buildings of state institutions, which housed the replaceable and the transitory in the regime. The distinction became especially apparent after the break up with the Soviets, when modernism became a virtual 'official' style of the state. It is tempting to theorize about the connection between Tito's political permanence and the implied timelessness of architecture associated with him, in contrast with the transitory modernism of buildings of the instable democratic process. But this connection, while appealing, would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove. It seems reasonable to assume that the very existence of a clearly delineated body of places related to his personal power 'saved' Yugoslav architecture from a more direct intrusion of a cult of personality. That such intrusions almost never reoccurred may have been due to the fact that Tito had his own playground to pursue his personal taste in architecture.

Chapter 3:

THE BELOVED CAPITAL

With the 1946 Constitution, Yugoslavia was reorganized into a federation. This decision was a result of a long-term policy of the Communist Party, dating back to 1923, when it adopted the Leninist doctrine of solving the “national question” as one of the main tenets of ‘a socialist revolution.’²²² The once unitary state was replaced with a union of six coequal republics that roughly corresponded with the complex ethnic composition of Yugoslavia.²²³ A new hierarchical structure in the country was thus created, but it did not really diminish the significance of the state’s central power. Under absolute domination of the Communist Party, in its early years the federation was, as John Lampe put it, fictional; all important decisions were still made from one center.²²⁴ Indeed, the establishment of a new seat of the federation, known as New Belgrade, preceded any other initiative to build symbols of new administrations of individual

²²² On the debate about the national question in the CPY, see: Latinka Perović, *Od centralizma do federalizma: KPJ u nacionalnom pitanju* (Zagreb: Globus, 1983).

²²³ Five of these republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) were nation-states that more or less closely corresponded with the ethnic composition of the region, while the population of the sixth one (Bosnia and Herzegovina) combined Serbs and Croats and, as of 1968, officially recognized “Muslims by nationality” that finally became Bosniaks after Yugoslavia collapsed.

²²⁴ Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 229.

republics and was the single most ambitious architectural and planning project in the country in the 1940s.

The enormous scale of the endeavor to design and build New Belgrade is particularly obvious when compared with the efforts to create other state administration centers around Yugoslavia, which were not small either. The six republican capitals varied widely in their equipment for the new role. Some, like Zagreb in Croatia, had been centers of historical provinces and already contained symbols of nationhood, like national libraries and theaters; but by 1948, a new modern Zagreb was also in the planning stages.²²⁵ Other cities, like Skopje in Macedonia, had been centers of state administration, but lacked ethnic identification, as the Macedonians were not recognized as a constituent ethnicity under the monarchy; a new master plan of Skopje was therefore under way, too.²²⁶ Titograd in Montenegro was a brand new capital and its governmental infrastructure had to be built practically from scratch, especially since the city suffered heavy destruction in the war.

These efforts resulted in some outstanding designs. A case in point is the competition for the new parliament of Slovenia. It produced one of Plečnik's

²²⁵ The plan was designed by the prewar CIAM member, Croatian architect Vlado Antolić; see: "Regulacioni plan i regulaciona direktivna osnova Zagreba," in: *Arhitektura* II, no. 18-22 (1949): 5-29.

²²⁶ On the 1948 master plan of Skopje, see: Minas Bakalčev, *Домување како урбан фрагмент на примерот на Скопје*, doctoral dissertation (Skopje, Macedonia: University St. Cyril and Methodius, 2004), 70-74.

most iconic designs, which, however, received little attention at the time.²²⁷ Instead, the winning design by Juraj Neidhardt and Branko Simčič, with its clear Corbusian connotations, implied that the profession valued modernism more than its politically correct rhetoric was ready to admit.²²⁸ **(Figs. 3.1)** But the early efforts of architects to design symbols of newly founded republics stayed mostly on paper. The only exception, dictated by sheer necessity, was the modest architecture erected in the Montenegrin capital that contained little obvious symbolism.

Both in its scope and urgency, New Belgrade surpassed all other projects of its period. The new city was meant to symbolize the construction of a new Yugoslavia, reflecting both its new internal power structure and its international aspirations. Because of the significance of the task, the proposed architecture had a chance to be more ambitious than was normally the case at the time, thus highlighting the differences between various approaches to the central question of socialist monumentality. This chance resulted in a massive mobilization of architects, who rushed to submit their proposals, despite being significantly overburdened by the ambitious Five Year Plan.²²⁹ Ranging in scale from individual buildings to the whole city, proposals for New Belgrade offered the

²²⁷ On Plečnik's design for the Parliament of Slovenia, see: Krečič, *Plečnik: The Complete Works*, 176-79.

²²⁸ See: Dušan Grabrijan, "Natečaj za ljudsko skupščino Ljudske Republike Slovenije v Ljubljani," in: *Arhitektura* II, no. 7 (February 1948): 3-14.

²²⁹ See Chapter 2.

most representative cross-section through the conditions in Yugoslav architecture and planning in the first postwar years.

New Belgrade and Its Meanings

Belgrade's role as the capital of Yugoslavia was not self-evident and could have been a potential problem since it was symbolically associated with the prewar monarchy and the dominance of the Serbian dynasty. According to his own report, Milovan Đilas, the vice-president in the federal government, in 1945 proposed to move the capital to Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina in hopes of ethnic reconciliation.²³⁰ Indeed, Sarajevo was in the geographical heart of the country and its diverse population was a microcosm of Yugoslav ethnicities and religions. However, Đilas's idea was quickly rejected because the city was not adequately equipped and was difficult to access. (Considering Tito's occupation of former royal premises, one has to wonder if the leadership also got too accustomed to the comforts of Belgrade's elite neighborhoods to exchange them for much less in Sarajevo.) Another possible reason for not moving the capital from Belgrade was the danger that this act would alienate the Serbs and could be interpreted as symbolic punishment of a city that suffered terrible losses during the war. Downplaying its role as the seat of the monarchy, Belgrade was

²³⁰ Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 228.

instead cast as a crux of social and national resistance. Often highlighted were the prewar protests and strikes, particularly the massive demonstrations that took place in the city on 27 March, 1941, against Yugoslavia joining the Tripartite Pact with the Axis. Special importance was placed on the fact that it was in Belgrade that the CPY launched its call for an armed uprising against foreign occupation.²³¹

Belgrade's prime advantage was its highly symbolic location that offered a chance to construct a clearly delineated new settlement without abandoning the existing one. The city lies at a prominent geographical point, on the confluence of the Danube, Europe's second longest river, and the Sava, Yugoslavia's own largest waterway. **(Fig. 3.2)** Continuously inhabited since the Neolithic times, it is one of the oldest cities in Europe and was occupied by a host of civilizations: Celts, Romans, Byzantines, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Ottomans, and Austrians; the last two repeatedly fought over it in the 17th and 18th centuries. In the 1940s, the city's extent and shape were still largely determined by its position

²³¹ This is just one of typical statements that sums up how Belgrade was cast at the time: "The rage [of Hitler] was unleashed upon a city in which on 27 March... the hatred against fascism and love for the Soviet Union spoke most expressively of a will that annulled the traitorous pact of rulers with Berlin. From that very same Belgrade, comrade Tito called on all the people to joined the armed uprising against the occupation and against domestic traitors, from that very same Belgrade the Central Committee of the CPY organized the armed resistance, from that very same Belgrade came countless combatants on the front, heroes of battlefields and concentration camps." See: Jovan Popović, "Град наше свесне воље," *Jugoslavija-SSSR*, no. 32 (June 1948): 7.

on the historic border between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. Belgrade occupied the hilly promontory overlooking the confluence west of the Sava, a territory that with brief interruptions belonged to the Ottomans for some three hundred years, only to come into the hands of Serbs in the mid nineteenth century. The plains immediately across the rivers, east of the Sava and north of the Danube, had been Austrian (after 1867 Austro-Hungarian) until 1918, thus rendering Belgrade a frontier city and preventing its growth across the water. The immediate neighbor and Austrian counterpart, Zemun (Semlin in German), lay upstream the Danube to the West, separated from Belgrade by large uninhabited marshlands. And although the border that divided the two cities disappeared with the unification of Yugoslavia in 1918, the marshlands were barely touched in the interwar period. All that was achieved was the construction of Belgrade Fair in the late 1930s, a speck in the vast empty space around it.²³² During the war, the Nazis used the Fair as a concentration camp, in which half of Serbian Jews—some 7,000 women and children—and over 10,000 Serbs perished during the war. This cast an eminently tragic shadow upon the area.²³³

It was this vast space between the old Belgrade and Zemun that was determined as the site of the new capital. The decision was eminently political,

²³² On the construction of Belgrade Fair, see: Marta Vukotić Lazar, “Staro beogradsko sajmište,” in: *Godišnjak grada Beograda* 51 (2004): 143-168.

²³³ On the history of the camp, see the excellent website by Dr Jovan Byford, sponsored by the British Academy, which also lists an exhaustive bibliography about the *Semlin Jugendlager*: [http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semlin/semlinjudenlager.html](http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semelin/semlinjudenlager.html), retrieved 2 July, 2008.

but it is difficult to precisely say who and when made it, considering the conspiratorial character of the party, which was run behind closed doors by the small circle of its highest officials. It is also difficult to say whether the idea for this first came from politicians or from planners. The sources on this issue amount to reading between the lines and even so they present contradictory messages: some witnesses credit the party leadership for the initiative, while others claim that the “state and party leadership and especially comrade Tito” only offered their “full support” for the construction of the new city, which seems to imply that the idea was originally professional rather than political.²³⁴ The second option is not without some basis. Plans for the left bank of the Sava existed before the war, but they were much more a product of the logic of urban planning, which suggested that the two closely neighboring cities should grow together, than of any sustained social, symbolic, or economic drive to develop

²³⁴ “The highest government and political authorities approved this scheme in principle, and gave full support and encouragement for the research and realization work.” See: Aleksandar Đorđević, “Planning and Construction of Novi Beograd,” in: *Novi Beograd 1961* (Belgrade: The Direction for the Construction of Novi Beograd, 1961), 11. Also: “The state and party leadership, especially comrade Tito, offered their full support for the construction of New Belgrade.” See: Dr Jovan Đ. Marković, *Novi Beograd 1948-1968* (Belgrade: Opštinska skupština Novi Beograd, 1968), 24.

On the other hand, Bratislav Stojanović repeatedly credited the leadership with the very idea for the creation of New Belgrade: “Thanks to the initiator of the construction of New Belgrade, comrade Tito, and to the vision of our state and party leaders, we approached these problems broadly and bravely.” See: Bratislav Stojanović, “Konkursi za dom Centralnog komiteta KPJ i zgradu Predsedništva vlade FNRJ,” in: *Tehnika* II, no. 6 (1947): 141-47.

the area. It is therefore possible to hypothesize that such plans were preserved much more vividly in the memory of architectural profession than in the minds of politicians.

The idea to extend Belgrade to the left bank of the Sava towards Zemun emerged for the first time in 1922, in an entry submitted to an international competition for a new master plan of Belgrade. Designed by Viennese architects Rudolf Perco, Erwin Ilz, and Ervin Böck, the plan proposed a polycentric neo-Baroque composition of monumental palaces and gardens.²³⁵ This plan had no practical impact, but by 1924 the name “New Belgrade” came into circulation, referring specifically to the area between Belgrade and Zemun that the Viennese architects proposed for development.²³⁶ Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, architects made occasional new designs for it, the last one being Dragiša Brašovan’s ambitious plan to develop a future business “City,” doomed by the fact that it was revealed mere six weeks before Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia.²³⁷ None of these plans was close to realization, even though in 1934 Zemun came under administrative jurisdiction of Belgrade and by 1936 the two cities were

²³⁵ For a detailed explanation of prewar plans of New Belgrade, see Ljiljana Blagojević’s exhaustive study *Стратегије модернизма у планирању и пројектовању урбане структуре и архитектуре Новог Београда: период концептуалне фазе од 1922. до 1962. године*, 14-30.

²³⁶ See: Milorad L. Čukić and Slobodan P. Kokotović, *Novi Beograd, prva naselja, savremeni grad* (Belgrade, 1981), 14.

²³⁷ See: Blagojević, *Стратегије модернизма*, 29-30.

finally physically connected by a new bridge and a tram line. Instead, the development began in a piecemeal fashion by hiring a Danish firm to fill in the marshes, which, however, worked following its own interests that in no way corresponded with the master plan.²³⁸

If it is indeed true that it was architects who first suggested the postwar construction of New Belgrade, the prime suspect for selling the idea to politicians would be Nikola Dobrović. Already one of Yugoslavia's most reputed modern architects, Dobrović joined the Liberation Movement in 1943 and marched into the liberated Belgrade in October 1944 wearing a Partisan uniform. For the first three years after the war he presided over all planning of the city and was a key figure in planning of New Belgrade. Dobrović occupied a series of prominent positions in the new administration, serving first as a director (*načelnik*) at the new Federal Ministry of Construction and then as a founding director of the Institute of Urban Planning and Belgrade's Chief Architect.²³⁹ However, his single-minded devotion to architectural development of the capital would prove excessive even for Yugoslavia's unrealistically ambitious new leadership, which resulted in his early deployment to teach at Belgrade University in 1948.

Although not known for his leftist inclinations before the war, Dobrović wholeheartedly espoused the aspirations of the new state and saw its planned

²³⁸ See: Đorđević, "Planning and Construction of Novi Beograd," 10.

²³⁹ A detailed account of Dobrović's postwar activities can be found in the recent study by Marta Vukotić Lazar, *Beogradsko razdoblje arhitekta Nikole Dobrovića* (Belgrade: Plato, 2002), 76-81.

economy as a precondition to create harmoniously planned cities, unimpeded by the chaotic speculation of the capitalist system. He hoped to integrate all levels of planning, from the micro-scale of architecture to regional plans, thus uniting all human settlements into “a biologically well founded organism,” something that was not possible before.²⁴⁰ As he wrote in 1946, “old Yugoslavia, with its wild economic system and limited political methods, was incapable to understand the advantages of regulatory planning.”²⁴¹ Belgrade in particular suffered from a development “determined by the economically powerful,” resulting in a “degenerate urban physiognomy.”²⁴² “Epochal endeavors” such as the construction of New Belgrade were impossible because of the “immaturity of the old political system.”²⁴³ Such statements were a part of the dominant discourse that took every opportunity to bash the “dark capitalist past of the former... exploitative Yugoslavia.”²⁴⁴ However, there is little doubt that Dobrović really meant what he said. Criticism of the chaotic speculative planning was one of the

²⁴⁰ See: Nikola Dobrović, “Središnji i regionalni (urbanistički) planovi,” in: *Tehnika* I, no. 1 (January, 1946): 8-9.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² In the first postwar years, Dobrović regularly repeated these ideas in his writings; see, for example: Nikola Dobrović, “Obnova i izgradnja Beograda: konture budućeg grada,” in: *Tehnika* I, no. 6 (June, 1946): 176-86. For the quote, see: Nikola Dobrović, “Izgradnja Novog Beograda,” in: *Jugoslavija—SSSR* III, no.32 (June, 1948): 9.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁴⁴ Quoted from: Neve Šegvić, “Napomene o ‘Arhitekturi,’” in: *Arhitektura* I-II, no. 4-6 (November/December, 1947-January, 1948): inside of the front cover.

mainstays of modernist theory of urbanism, dating back to the earliest days of CIAM; in Dobrović's mind, therefore, there was ultimately a convergence of the goals of socialism and modernism. Moreover, the architect himself experienced the downsides of the old system when none of his widely praised large-scale projects of the 1930s came to fruition. The new state ended the "irresponsible pursuit of subjective and self-centered desires of a minority at the expense of the whole," allowing a comprehensively planned development of the city.²⁴⁵

According to Dobrović, the construction of New Belgrade played a central role in that development, also facilitating a renewal of the historical parts and bringing the whole city into a harmonious whole.

Being consistently planned, orderly, and healthy was precisely what made New Belgrade the country's "first socialist city," a phrase that regularly reappeared in the official rhetoric. New Belgrade thus also set a "model for New Yugoslavia."²⁴⁶ This kind of argument was in no way a local Yugoslav invention. Marxist tradition saw capitalism as a society of inequality in which serene and healthy living was only reserved for the wealthy; the rest had to live in chaotic, unhealthy, ramshackle dwellings. This dichotomy, famously described in Friedrich Engels' *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, was a

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁴⁶ See: Ljubo Ilić, "Uz izgradnju Novog Beograda," *Arhitektura* nos. 8-10, vol. 2 (March-May 1948): 9; also: "Svjedočanstva visoke patriotske svijesti Titove omladine," in: *Jugoslavija-SSSR* IV, no. 41-42 (March-April, 1949): 21.

staple of socialist thought. Socialism would redress that injustice and bring good life to everyone through scientific planning of everything: from economy to cities. The particular rhetoric that linked capitalism with filth, illness, and dilapidation and socialism with cleanliness, health, and order was strikingly similar throughout the Soviet-dominated Europe and its application to New Belgrade was hardly an exception.²⁴⁷

New Belgrade was envisioned as an eminently governmental city intended to house the massive centralized bureaucracy of the new federation. Despite the intended 250,000 new inhabitants in the new city, housing was clearly secondary to governmental purposes.²⁴⁸ Again, precisely who and when determined the specifics of the program remains vague, but it is practically certain that it included a heavy involvement of politicians, if not a simple decree from them. Because of the concentration of highest state institutions of the Federation, the new city acquired a decidedly pan-Yugoslav meaning that was regularly stressed in the official rhetoric of the time. Politicians interpreted New Belgrade as “the first

²⁴⁷ See, for example, Juliana Maxim’s pioneering analysis of rhetoric concerning the socialist transformation of Bucharest in Romania: “Buchares: The City Transfigured,” in: *Sanctioning Modernism: Architecture and the Making of Postwar Identities*, edited by Vladimir Kulić, Monica Penick, and Timothy Parker (Austin: The University of Texas Press, forthcoming 2009).

²⁴⁸ As Edvard Ravnikar summed up the role of New Belgrade in 1948, “The area between the Danube and the Sava, the new railway line and the winter canal, should become a center of everything that has federal significance in Yugoslavia, so mass housing and industry should not be built here, although such buildings on a smaller scale should not be entirely excluded.” See: Edvard Ravnikar, “Veliki Beograd,” in: *Obzornik* (Ljubljana), no. 11-12 (1947): 451-56.

administrative, cultural, and ideological center for all our peoples, center of brotherhood and unity.”²⁴⁹ Despite Dobrović’s insistence on “blending” the old and the new quarters, such interpretations implied that in the minds of politicians New Belgrade was meant to have an identity somewhat distinct from the historical city. Mentioning in this context “brotherhood and unity,” which as a concept replaced the prewar attempts to impose a unitary Yugoslav identity under the Serbian dynasty, implied that it was specifically New Belgrade that had to serve as the new capital of the federal Yugoslavia, while the old city was to retain the role of the capital of Serbia. Indeed, the new ministry buildings of Serbia were supposed to stay on the right bank of the Sava, in the old city.²⁵⁰ There was certain appropriate symbolism in the fact that the new capitol/capital was to be built on a previously uninhabited soil that for centuries stood at the

²⁴⁹ See, for example, the speech of Vlada Zečević, federal Minister of Construction, at the groundbreaking ceremony: “...Building on this soil represents an immense break-through for all the peoples of Yugoslavia, because New Belgrade will be a model of the New Yugoslavia...” See: Vlado Zečević, “Govor ministra građevina FNRJ Vlade Zečevića na svečanosti prilikom otvorenja radova na izgradnji Novog Beograda”, *Arhitektura* nos. 8-10, vol. 2 (March-May 1948): 7. His aide, Ljubo Ilić, claimed on the same occasion: “New Belgrade will be our first socialist city. It will be the first in our history center of people’s government. For all our peoples the first and unique administrative, cultural, and ideological center; center of brotherhood and unity. That is the national significance of New Belgrade.” See: Ljubo Ilić, “Uz izgradnju Novog Beograda,” 9.

²⁵⁰ See: Zbirni perspektivni plan izgradnje Velikog Beograda u odnosu na prvu etapu izgradnje obuhvaćene prvim petogodišnjim planom, ASCG, Fond 50 Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78 Građevinarstvo, no. 78-422. Dobrović also mentions this in his writings of the period.

border between two foreign empires.²⁵¹ **(Fig. 3.3)** It was a border that also divided South Slavic peoples from each other, the Balkans from Central Europe, and Orthodoxy from Catholicism.²⁵² Now a new capital was to take place of the historically unclaimed land, symbolizing the “brotherhood and unity” of South Slavs. If the capital could not be moved to Sarajevo for the sake of ethnic reconciliation, perhaps a new Belgrade was at least a satisfactory compromise.

But the intended symbolism of New Belgrade was not only inwardly directed—it was also meant to showcase the abilities of new Yugoslavia to the world.²⁵³ Dobrović claimed that with its new master plan, Belgrade would be “far ahead of all other European cities,” especially in terms of its traffic solution; he even devised a map of the European railway network indicating Belgrade’s position as one of its main nodes, with lines to Moscow, expectedly, bearing the greatest significance.²⁵⁴ Such hubris on the part of the architect was not unfounded in the political situation; on the contrary, it was its logical outcome. Yugoslav Communists, while claiming absolute faithfulness to the Soviet Union,

²⁵¹ Ljiljana Blagojević appropriately called this area “no man’s land,” and an “extra-territory that belongs to the Federation;” see: Blagojević, *Стратегије модернизма*, 39.

²⁵² Indeed, during the war, Croats claimed the right to Zemun, so the border between the occupied Serbia and the puppet Independent State of Croatia ran along the Sava. The location of the *Semlin Jugendlager* is also indicative of this ambiguous meaning of the space between Belgrade and Zemun: the camp was located on the Croatian side, but it was used for the imprisonment of people from the other side of the river.

²⁵³ Zečević, “Govor ministra građevina FNRJ, 7.

²⁵⁴ Dobrović, “Izgradnja Novog Beograda,” 12.

were nevertheless immensely proud of their achievements in autonomously organizing the largest liberation movement in Europe and had an ambition to turn the country into a regional power. As more experienced, they sponsored the Communist regime of the neighboring Albania and aided the Communist uprising in Greece. At the end of the war, they seriously negotiated a federation with Bulgaria, and later there were repeated discussions of a larger Balkan federation that would also include Albania.²⁵⁵ There is little doubt that the Yugoslav leadership believed it would have a leading role in such a federation; as a popular song at the time said,

Drug je Tito zaslužio Balkan cio,

Balkan cio i Evrope jedan dio.

(Comrade Tito has deserved all of the Balkans,

All of the Balkans and a part of Europe.)²⁵⁶

With such ambitions for the country, it is not difficult to imagine that Belgrade was supposed to play a far more significant role than just the capital of Yugoslavia. Indeed, in the fall of 1947, the city became the seat of the *Cominform*, the Information Bureau of European Communist parties and the first international Communist forum after the dissolution of the Third International. This was a major statement of international recognition for Yugoslavia, although,

²⁵⁵ About the Balkan federation, see: Branko Petranović, *Balkanska federacija, 1943-1948* (Belgrade and Šabac, Serbia: Zaslona, 1990).

²⁵⁶ Quoted after *ibid.*, 139.

of course, only within the Communist orbit. With that in mind, it is logical to assume that the prime candidate for the capital of the Balkan Federation, had it ever become reality, would also be Belgrade; and, more specifically, New Belgrade as its most modern and monumental part.²⁵⁷ The desired international significance of the city was aptly captured in the slogan “Belgrade-Moscow,” popularized by the Agitprop, which drew a parallel between the two capitals as an expression of brotherhood of Yugoslav and Soviet peoples.²⁵⁸ **(Fig. 3.4)** On the surface, it was a clear statement of faithfulness to the Soviets, but it also indicated that their ‘younger brother’ was well aware of his significance and ready to claim it. It seems that Yugoslav Communists hoped to make New Belgrade into a ‘little Moscow’ of the Balkans and a secondary center of the Communist world.

New Belgrade as envisioned in the late 1940s was virtually a textbook case of a national ‘capitol,’ representing the metaphorical ‘heart’ of the nation.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁷ The ambition to make New Belgrade into a capital of the Balkans, it seems, was kept secret and only leaked outside the narrow circle of the highest officials long after the intentions to create a Balkan federation were shelved. In 1986, Belgrade planner Branko Bojović claimed that he had heard “a few years before... what very few people knew: that New Belgrade was supposed to be the seat of the announced and expected Balkan federation.” However, he did not reveal his source. See: Branko Bojović, “Od prestiža do humanizma iliti moje viđenje budućnosti Novog Beograda,” in: *The Future of New Belgrade/Budućnost Novog Beograda*, special issue of *Arhitektura Urbanizam* 25 (1986): insert, 11.

²⁵⁸ See: Ninko Petrović, “Beograd-Moskva,” *Jugoslavija—SSSR*, III, no.32 (June, 1948): 1-5.

²⁵⁹ Compare, for example, with the inscription carved inside the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.: “In this temple as in the hearts of the people for whom he saved the union the memory of

As the Slovenian architect Edvard Ravnikar wrote in 1948, indirectly confirming the poignant symbolism of the location, “The appropriateness of the selected site of New Belgrade is undeniable... as it provides all the conditions to become the heart of new Yugoslavia.”²⁶⁰ But metaphorical “hearts” of nations, as Lawrence Vale explained, usually unite a complex set of related meanings: “what is passed off as a quest for national identity is in reality a product of the search for subnational, personal, and supranational identity.”²⁶¹ New Belgrade’s multiple meanings indeed confirm this. On the subnational level, its symbolism, on the one hand, acquired a subtext of reconciliation of ethnic sub-Yugoslav identities; on the other, as I will show later, it was intended to literally enshrine the dominance of the Communist Party. At personal level, the city brought together Dobrović’s relentless demiurgic efforts, proposals from an unprecedented number of Yugoslav architects, and the great enthusiasm of the masses who volunteered in its construction.²⁶² Finally, on the supranational level, it was a face that new Yugoslavia wanted to show to the world. The writer Jovan Popović—a leading proponent of Socialist Realism—summed it all up, as if literally following Vale, in this sentences: “To rebuild and beautify the existing

Abraham Lincoln is enshrined forever;” quoted in Lawrence J. Vale, *Architecture, Power and National Identity* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 4.

²⁶⁰ Ravnikar, “Veliki Beograd,” 451.

²⁶¹ Vale, *Architecture, Power and National Identity*, 48.

²⁶² On the interpretation of Dobrović’s personal investment in the design of New Belgrade as “demiurgic,” see Blagojević, *Стратегије модернизма*, 32-39.

city—that is something. But the will of the people and the idea of the leadership go much further: to erect a completely new city across the Sava.... New Belgrade, rising from the bare riverbank, at the spot where fascist occupators kept one of their death camps, is a realization of a belief [...] in the significance of new Yugoslavia for that part of Europe in which people's democracy has been achieved. New Belgrade should be an example of what independent and free people can do for their own present and future."²⁶³

Architects and Politicians: Designing New Belgrade

In his technocratic dreams, Dobrović may have hoped that the proclamation of a planned economy would also result in an orderly and closely coordinated planning of cities and their buildings, based on “scientific objectivism.”²⁶⁴ He was wrong. The economy itself proved less than carefully planned, the Five Year Plan being so hasty and unrealistic that later estimates proclaimed it an unqualified failure.²⁶⁵ The construction of New Belgrade seems to have been just as hasty and it was a direct result of a political decision. Some time in the late 1946, the Federal Government issued an “urgent order” to begin the construction of a “monumental building” for the Presidency of Federal

²⁶³ Jovan Popović, “Grad naše svesne volje,” *Jugoslavija—SSSR* no. 32 (June 1948): 6-7.

²⁶⁴ Dobrović, “Središnji i regionalni (urbanistički) planovi,” 9.

²⁶⁵ Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 238.

Government and of other public buildings in the future New Belgrade.²⁶⁶ At this time, there was no definite master plan of the city, only Dobrović's preliminary studies, including a "Sketch of the regulation of Belgrade on the left bank of the Sava."²⁶⁷ A curious radial scheme, it focused the whole new city on a railway station in its center. Obsessed with creating a perfect traffic solution, Dobrović thus subjected the whole new city to a glorification of technology rather than to any of the required monumental state buildings.

The imposed urgency of the project must have caused a major disruption in the planning process, as it affected the whole city and required major decisions, like the positioning of bridges, to be made in a very short time and out of a normal sequence.²⁶⁸ The quasi-military style of governance through orders and decrees was not unusual in the first postwar years and it was regularly based on highly unrealistic expectations. As the case of the Batina monument showed, such hasty orders were often made for purely symbolic reasons and the construction of New Belgrade was no exception. Milovan Đilas much later admitted this complete lack of realism: "To us in the leadership, in those first

²⁶⁶ The order came directly from the Vice-President of the Federal government, Slovenian politician Edvard Kardelj. See: Memo to the Federal government from Živa Đorđević, the aide to the Federal Minister of Construction, 25 December, 1946; ASCG, Fond 50 Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78 Građevinarstvo, no. 78-343.

²⁶⁷ For a detailed analysis of the scheme, see Blagojević, *Стратегије модернизма*, 36-39.

²⁶⁸ Memo from the federal Minister of Construction Vlada Zečević to the Direction for the Construction of New Belgrade, 14 February, 1947; ASCG, Fond 50, Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78, Građevinarstvo, no. 78-364.

postwar months everything seemed possible. We had no clear idea of what something cost and even less what was most important.”²⁶⁹ The suddenly urgent need to build a new seat of government was a perfect example of this lack of “clear idea.” It is difficult to imagine that the federal bureaucracy, no matter how bloated it may have become, could not be accommodated in the numerous existing government buildings in old Belgrade; after all, forced apartment sharing between multiple families was a norm at the time and it would have been fair if the state shared some of the burden with its population. Considering the overwhelming difficulties that the country was facing in the aftermath of the war, with minuscule surviving industrial capacities and millions of people lacking proper housing, the symbolic meaning of New Belgrade disproportionately outweighed any pragmatic need that would have justified its construction. This propagandistic importance that the construction of Belgrade had at the time was vividly illustrated by the fact that it was overseen by Đilas himself, whose main role in the party was to control the Agitprop.²⁷⁰

In November 1946, two national competitions were announced asking for detailed proposals for the buildings of the Presidency and of the Central Committee of the CPY, as well as a preliminary plan for the whole area between the Sava, the Danube, and Zemun. The competitions were open to all Yugoslav citizens, regardless of their professional competencies; as Ljiljana Blagojević

²⁶⁹ Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 58.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 59.

observed, this was imperative in the light of the intended pan-Yugoslav identity of New Belgrade as the federal capital.²⁷¹ Participants were supplied with Dobrović's "Sketch," but were in no way obliged to observe it. The only firmly determined point on the plan was the position of the future Central Committee building at the very tip of the confluence of the Sava and the Danube. At the same time, another competition for a "representative" hotel intended to cater to official guests of the government was also organized at the same time, but it was only open to state design offices.

In keeping with Kardelj's "urgent order," the program for the Presidency of Federal government, devised at the Federal Institute of Design probably some time at the very end of 1946, required that by the end of the following year the concrete frame of the building already goes into construction.²⁷² This meant that everything preceding casting the concrete, from completing the competition and developing detailed construction drawings to creating the foundations, had to be done in less than one year.²⁷³ The complete lack of realism in such a demand stood in proportion only to the grandiosity of its ambition, since the Presidency was intended to be—as it indeed would—the largest structure in Yugoslavia. Of course, normal procedure was completely disrupted, since at the time when the

²⁷¹ Blagojević, *Стратегије модернизма*, 39.

²⁷² "Program za zgradu Predsedništva Savezne Vlade, Savezne kontrolne komisije i Privrednog saveta," n.d., page 5; ASCG, Fond 13, Ministarstvo građevina FNRJ, Fascikla 94.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

competition was announced urban parameters and precise briefs for the buildings were far from clearly defined and continued being perfected for months.²⁷⁴ Even the research of the stability of the soil, crucial considering how marshy the whole area was, occurred after the competition was publicized and the participants had to be separately warned not to propose abundant underground spaces.²⁷⁵

Besides the buildings of the Presidency and the Central Committee, the new Yugoslav capitol was also supposed to contain other, more or less vaguely, determined buildings: “around twenty” federal ministries, another twenty buildings for a diplomatic quarter, a hotel and business area around the railway station, and some housing.²⁷⁶ According to Dobrović’s “Sketch,” the new Federal Parliament was supposed to stand at the other side of the Sava, perched high over the historic Kalemegdan fortress, practically dwarfing Meštrović’s near-by Victor, already an established symbol of the city. **(Fig. 3.5)** The buildings on either side of the confluence had to be coordinated with each other, thus turning

²⁷⁴ “Uslovi konkursa za zgradu Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i za zgradu Predsedništva Vlade Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije,” *Tehnika* I, no. 11-12 (November, 1946): 339-42.

²⁷⁵ Memo from the Director of the Design Institute of Serbia, engineer Đorđe Lazarević, to the aide to the Minister of Construction of Yugoslavia of 30 November, 1946; ASCG, Fond 13, Ministarstvo građevine FNRJ, Fascikla 94, not numbered.

²⁷⁶ “Uslovi konkursa za zgradu Centralnog komiteta,” 339.

the river, as Dobrović envisioned it, into a “tame fluid city street.”²⁷⁷ But there were no doubts in terms of the required hierarchy: the most prominent position had to be emphatically reserved for the Central Committee, thus setting the power of the party, both symbolically and materially, in stone. This was clearly visible even from the way in which competition briefs were organized: while the program for the Presidency of the government featured a fairly detailed list of rooms and no special requirements in terms of form, in functional terms the program for the Central Committee was, to put it mildly, underdefined, but featured a lengthy list of demands for the building’s appearance.²⁷⁸ A passage is worth quoting here: “In the volumetric urban composition of New Belgrade, the building of the Central Committee of the CPY is the dominant object. It will achieve this effect: through its height (which should reach the height of 120 m above the sea level), through the relations between its masses, and through its monumental treatment. The building should be an expression of creative power, a potent symbol of the Communist party... The building is located on the axis of a boulevard that leads from the new main railway station and represents an architectural centerpiece framed by the buildings of federal ministries. When viewed from the Kalemegdan fortress, from the Sava bridge, from the banks of the Danube and the Sava, it is the main element in the composition. That is why the appearance of the building has to be treated in a fully monumental manner,

²⁷⁷ Dobrović, “Izgradnja Novog Beograda,” 10.

²⁷⁸ “Uslovi konkursa za zgradu Centralnog komiteta,” 339.

on all sides and from above. Great attention should be paid to harmonizing its architectural and sculptural treatments.”²⁷⁹

The local toponyms notwithstanding, this passage almost reads like a description of the never-built Palace of the Soviets in Moscow.²⁸⁰ The absolute dominance in height, the role of a centerpiece of the city, the geographically prominent position at the bank of a river and on axis of a broad ceremonial boulevard, pronounced monumentality, 360 degree visibility, the relationship to the historic city, assumed sculptural decoration—all these were the intended characteristics of the Moscow building too. It was almost as if Stalin’s proclamation that Moscow should be the “model for all the capitals in the world”, made around the time of the competition, was directly being applied in Belgrade.²⁸¹ But in the submitted proposals, New Belgrade with its Central Committee proved a far cry from Moscow. Despite the rhetoric, even the required height of the Central Committee seemed measly compared to the gargantuan size of the Palace of the Soviets: mere 45 meters, or less than fifteen

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ The difference was that the Palace of the Soviets was to function as a “parliament,” whereas Belgrade’s CK was to be the seat of the political power. Yet, the project for the Palace of the Soviets was the prototype of Socialist Realism that established an ultimate model of a “Communist architecture” of the Stalinist period, so the parallel was not inappropriate.

²⁸¹ Quoted in Paperny, *Culture Two*, 77.

stories.²⁸² That New Belgrade would go in a different direction from its supposed Soviet model became very apparent when competition entries arrived in June of 1947.

The jury was never revealed, but it certainly consisted of leading architects, as the comments, published after the competition, show a professional understanding of technical and aesthetic issues. But the brief for the Central Committee competition expressly stated that “the decision... would be made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.” Indeed, Đilas later remembered that the most important decisions, such as those concerning the selection of designs to be built, were made in the presence of Tito and other members of the leadership.²⁸³ The likely scenario was that a professional jury made a preliminary selection of entries, which Tito and other leaders would then accept or reject. Indeed, several architects confirmed Tito’s personal involvement, especially in relation to the Central Committee building.²⁸⁴

Despite being overburdened with their daily tasks, Yugoslav architects went into overdrive to create proposals for the new capital. Twenty-six entries arrived for the Presidency and the master plan of New Belgrade, while an impressive seventy were submitted for the Central Committee, with the

²⁸² The high waters of the rivers were at 75 meters above the sea level, while the proposed height of the building was 120 m.

²⁸³ Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 59.

²⁸⁴ Ravnikar, “Maršal Tito našim arhitektom,” 363; also: Šegvić, “Stvaralačke komponente arhitekture FNRJ,” 34-35.

participation of 111 “experts” and 36 “non-experts.”²⁸⁵ Assuming that these 111 “experts” were all architects and engineers, that would mean that exactly one in eight (of the 889 active in Yugoslavia in 1947) worked on a proposal for the Central Committee. Considering that the competition was essentially architectural, it is safe to assume that the percentage of Yugoslav architects who took part in the competition was even much higher; indeed, a contemporary text explicitly stated that “a majority of our architects participated in the competition.”²⁸⁶ This massive participation must have caused problems in the architects’ daily activities, since in the aftermath of the competition the Croatian Association of Architects and Engineers complained about the “unplanned” organization of competitions during the construction season as unfair and inefficient.²⁸⁷ The massive participation, however, also meant that the opportunity was not only supremely attractive, but that it also offered a representative cross-section through the contemporaneous state of architecture in the country.

The competition participants remained unimpressed by the suggestive language of the brief and hardly any proposals were submitted in which clear

²⁸⁵ Stojanović, “Konkursi za dom Centralnog komiteta KPJ i zgradu Predsedništva vlade FNRJ,” 144.

²⁸⁶ Edvard Ravnikar, “Maršal Tito našim arhitektom,” *Novi svet* II (1947): 362-65.

²⁸⁷ Memo from Đorđe Lazarević, President of the Union of Associations of Engineers and Technicians to the Presidency of Government of Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 24 June, 1947; ASCG, Fond 50 Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78, no. 78-866.

references to Soviet-style monumentality could be recognized. This was particularly obvious from the proposals for the master plan of the new city. Most of them were more concerned with resolving the traffic network than with creating a hierarchy of spaces to accommodate the Central Committee at its peak. Monumental ‘canyon streets’ with continual fronts, like Moscow boulevards planned under Stalin, could not be seen.²⁸⁸ Instead, the majority opted for an ultimately modernist approach of arranging free-standing buildings in a “sea of greenery;” this was already suggested by the competition brief and shown in Dobrović’s “Sketch.” Some entries even openly referred to Le Corbusier’s planning ideas, like the one by the Slovenian architect Edvard Ravnikar, who had worked in the rue de Sèvres studio before the war. Organized into parallel strips, with a ‘capitol’ on one end, the railway station on the other, and orderly rows of identical ministry buildings in between, Ravnikar’s proposal was an adaptation of the *Ville Radieuse* for a city of socialist administration, in which Le Corbusier’s monumentalization of capitalist business was replaced with a celebration of the state and the party. **(Fig. 3.6)** With its “capitol” organized around a monumental open square and displaced from the center of the city to one end of a broad central axis, the scheme anticipated the future iconic modernist capitals such as

²⁸⁸ The one exception was the entry by Branko Maksimović, Belgrade urbanist who adopted and advocated Socialist Realism (see previous chapter). For his entry, see: Josip Seissel, “Konkurs za urbanistički plan Novog Beograda,” in: *Arhitektura* I, no. 3 (October, 1947): 21.

Le Corbusier's Chandigarh and, even more closely, Lucio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer's Brasilia.

It is indicative of the opinion of the profession that competition participants overwhelmingly rejected Dobrović's radial plan from the "Sketch." Particularly badly received was the architect's own adaptation of it, submitted to the competition by the Institute of Urban Planning of Serbia, whose director he was at the time. **(Fig. 3.7)** This puzzling proposal was unique for including overt political iconography and overblown hierarchical monumentality.²⁸⁹ But it also blatantly denied the basic requirement of the competition brief by placing the Parliament at the center of the composition, in front of a gigantic round square with a five-pointed star inscribed in the paving; the Central Committee remained barely discernible on the plan. It may be tempting to interpret this as Dobrović's political statement to privilege democracy over the dominance of the party, but his true motivation is likely revealed by the fact that the proposed Parliament hides a gigantic railway station behind it, by far the largest building on the plan, thus essentially retaining his original concept from the "Sketch" and the central role that the railroad line had in it. The inclusion of a giant five-pointed star in this context seems more like a trick to catch the attention of politicians than sincere glorification of ideology. In any case, the profession judged this idea negatively. Josip Seissel, the Zagreb modernist architect who wrote a report

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.

about the competition in *Arhitektura*, criticized it as formalist and “appropriated from the past,” even though historical references, at least in theory, should have been desirable in the declared age of Socialist Realism. Moreover, Dobrović’s own colleagues organized a minor riot at the Institute because of this proposal, eventually submitting an alternative entry based on completely different, ultimately modernist principles.²⁹⁰ **(Fig. 3.8)**

Proposals for the two administration buildings offered a greater stylistic variety as well as somewhat more explicit ideological content than the submitted urban plans, but again practically none of them even remotely resembled the ‘wedding-cake’ architecture of the Palace of the Soviets. Instead, their range lay within various versions of modernism: from functionalism and even constructivism on one end, to classicized modernism/stripped-down classicism on the other. This range was largely inherited from the 1930s, when modernism started making inroads into official architecture of the state (although rarely in its more radical incarnations), parallel with the rise of an austere, simplified version of classicism for the same purpose, a process that unfolded in a similar fashion in many other countries. Monumentality was naturally one of the central questions of New Belgrade competitions, but it was far from being the only aspect that the jury valued. Moreover, it was not necessarily associated with the classicist side

²⁹⁰ This information comes from Bogdan Bogdanović, who at the time of the competition worked as an intern at the Belgrade Institute of Urban Planning; Bogdanović claims that he himself participated in the “riot,” although on Dobrović’s side; author’s interview with Bogdan Bogdanović, 21 May, 2005.

of the stylistic scale, so even some radically modernist designs won awards. Such examples included proposals for the Presidency submitted by a Zagreb team (third prize, architects Haberle, Tomičić, Bertol, Poletti, Feldt) or by Belgrade's most famous prewar modernist Milan Zloković (honorable mention). **(Fig. 3.9)** Even more strikingly modernist was an entry for the Central Committee that arrived from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb (architects Boltar, Turina, Nikšić) and earned an honorable mention. **(Fig. 3.10)** Featuring a tall glass slab and a conference hall whose roof was suspended from an outside skeleton, in its constructivist overtones it resembled Le Corbusier's infamous proposal for the Palace of the Soviets, as if making a conscious statement of refusal to comply with the tenets of Socialist Realism. Around the time of the competition, team-member Vladimir Turina designed the new stadium in Zagreb, a stunning tour-de-force of constructivism that would be completed a few years later, which may indicate how radical his group's proposal for the Central Committee was.

On the other side of the stylistic spectrum were proposals that incorporated overt historical references, but even these were not entirely conventional. Most illustrative in this respect are projects submitted by a group of architects and artists from Zagreb gathered around Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić. This was a veritable political 'dream team' of Yugoslav architecture at the time. Besides Augustinčić and Galić, who were already firmly established with their Batina monument, not the least thanks to Augustinčić's personal

friendship with Tito, the group also included Neven Šegvić, editor-in-chief of *Arhitektura*, himself politically highly influential, and Branko Bon, yet another prewar modernist from Zagreb with Communist ties and reputation of a prisoner of the Ustaša regime.²⁹¹ The group won second prizes at both competitions. But if political prestige was what brought its members together, it could not make up for their lack of a common vision. Their proposals ended up as confusing conglomerates of various references and motifs, with multiple versions submitted to the competition, as if the group could not agree on the appropriate tone. Since many motifs used in both proposals were obviously of sculptural origin, it is tempting to interpret the resulting inconsistency as a product of Augustinčić's attempt to use his political clout to dominate the design process, similar to the way in which he acquired and dominated the design of the Batina monument. But here he was facing three modernist architects, not one; and the program was for buildings that had to work as utilitarian objects, not only symbolic structures.

Augustinčić's influence was particularly obvious in the group's proposal for the Presidency. In this project, a monumental portico containing a row of caryatids encloses a gigantic courtyard the size of a soccer field. A stepped pyramid rose from the center of the complex. **(Fig. 3.11)** Both motifs were unmistakably historicist, evoking Greco-Egyptian associations. But the use of caryatids also had a more locally-oriented connotation, once again raising

²⁹¹ According to his son, after the war Bon worked directly for Tito on a number of occasions, since he was a confidant of the regime; see: Blagojević, *Стратегије модернизма*, 150, n. 36.

suspicion of the sculptor's obsession with Meštrović. The great master often employed caryatids, most famously in his Monument to the Unknown Soldier at Mount Avala near Belgrade and, even more significantly, in his 1910 proposal for the St. Vitus temple at Kosovo, the very first architectural manifestation of the attempts to forge a specifically Yugoslav identity.²⁹² This implies that Augustinčić's vision of an architecture for a new Yugoslavia transcended the ideological division caused by the revolution, relying on some of the most potent symbols of prewar "Yugoslavism." Complementing the historicist subtext of the caryatids, long "Romanesque" arcades surrounded the building; however, we only know about these arcades from a description in *Arhitektura*.²⁹³ The published drawings were of an alternative modernist version of the project, which the group also submitted to the competition. If at Batina Galić only implied strip-windows through the reliefs in the base of the monument, this alternative version of the Presidency contained real strip-windows, giving the building a decidedly modernist appearance, awkwardly superimposed with the portico and the pyramid. Despite its hybrid character, the jury preferred the modernist version and *Arhitektura*—significantly, edited by the team member Šegvić—did not even

²⁹² On the meanings of St. Vitus temple, see Tanja Damljanović, *The Question of National Architecture in Interwar Yugoslavia*, doctoral dissertation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2002), 67-71; also: Aleksandar Ignjatović, *Идеологија југословенства у архитектури, 1904-1941*, doctoral dissertation (Belgrade: University of Belgrade, 2001) 4-22.

²⁹³ Macura, "Problematika naše arhitekture u svetlosti konkursa za zgradu Predsedništva Vlade FNRJ," 12.

bother to publish the principal proposal with arcades, which clearly indicated the tastes of both architectural profession in general and at least some of the architects on the team.²⁹⁴

The team's proposal for the Central Committee was an even more awkward combination of historicism and modernism. **(Fig. 3.12)** It featured a low, almost vernacular-looking block with arcades and pitched roofs organized around several interior courtyards. Out of one of these courtyards a massive cubic base rises to support a realistic sculpture, similar to figures of combatants at Batina. A tall tower, rising from a second courtyard, serves as a backdrop for the sculpture, its verticality emphasized by dense unbroken pilasters. In its austerity, however, the tower looks completely disconnected from the rest of the building, as if artificially transplanted from another scheme; indeed, the jury criticized this inconsistency.²⁹⁵ With its silhouette and the repetitive use of arcades, the design is vaguely reminiscent of one of Augustinčić's prewar ventures into monumental architecture, the proposal for a monument at Kosovo (1937), yet another reference to Meštrović and his St. Vitus temple at Kosovo.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ Stojanović, "Konkursi za dom Centralnog komiteta KPJ i zgradu Predsedništva vlade FNRJ," 148.

²⁹⁶ The project was published in only one monograph on Augustinčić, but without further explanation; see: Boris Kukoč, and Igor Prizmić, eds., *Augustinčić* (Zagreb: Privredni vjesnik, 1976), Fig. 6.

If this was indeed the origin of the proposal for the Central Committee, it perhaps indicates how much the sculptor dominated the design process.

It seems that architects on the team were not entirely happy with the submitted version of the project, as they devised and published multiple pre- and post-competition variations of it. Particularly striking was Šegvić's reworking of the theme. In one early sketch, the arcaded base is superimposed with what most closely resembles Le Corbusier's *Unité d'habitation*. **(Fig. 3.13)** A later study, created after the competition, went much further and completely shunned any notions of historicism, creating an asymmetrical composition of horizontal and vertical slabs. It almost seems as if the young architect was trying to cleanse himself after participating in the overblown traditionalism of the submitted project. This alternative scheme was remarkable for achieving a clear sense of monumentality while using uncompromising modernist forms, a problem that was only beginning to penetrate the discourse of modern architecture, not just in Yugoslavia, but around the world. Given how well-informed he was—he quoted recent writings of Giedion, Mumford, and other Western theorists—it is not impossible that Šegvić had access to contemporary American discussions on “new monumentality.”²⁹⁷ However, that is less significant because he was

²⁹⁷ It is certain that Šegvić knew Lewis Mumford's article on “Monumentalism, symbolism and style,” published in *The Architectural Review* in April 1949, since he quoted it in the following year; see: Šegvić, “Stvaralačke komponente arhitekture FNRJ,” *Arhitektura i urbanizam* nos. 5-6, vol. 4 (1950), p. 29. But the ground-breaking texts on “new monumentality” by Giedion and Khan were already published in 1944, so, in theory, he could have known them by the time of the New

genuinely in a situation that forced him to think in monumental terms and there were hardly any clear modernist predecessors to rely upon. (Arguably the first important monumental modern building after World War II, the United Nations complex in New York, was being designed precisely at the time of New Belgrade competitions.) Of all the proposals at the two competitions, this study by Šegvić was by far the most forward-looking, relying on a composition and motifs that were not already known from the 1920s and 1930s and anticipating the answers to the need for a modern monumental expression that would become mainstream in the following decade with projects like the United Nations and Brasilia. Yet, if this alternative scheme also represented Šegvić's 'true' architectural convictions, as it appears, then his participation on Augustinčić's team can only be explained as political opportunism.

Whatever personal predilections and motivations of individual team members, Augustinčić, Galić, Šegvić, and Bon came closest to defining what could have been an authentic Yugoslav Socialist Realism as hinted in the Batina monument. Their principal problem was the inability to replicate the convincing unity of Batina on a much larger scale and with a much more complex program. In their overzealous attempt to find a monumental expression, the team obviously understood the task too literally and proposed designs that looked more like real monuments than functioning buildings. This was particularly problematic in the

Belgrade competitions; see: Paul Zucker, ed., *New Architecture and City Planning: A Symposium* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944).

case of the Presidency, which was understood as a far more utilitarian program than they realized. There was a clear hierarchy of monumentality required of New Belgrade's buildings and at its very top was the Central Committee. Further removed a building was from it in terms of its function, the less monumental it had to be. The luxury hotel, for which a parallel competition was organized, was apparently so far from the center of power that it was seen as devoid of any symbolism and was allowed to be completely functional.²⁹⁸ All the awarded entries at the hotel competition were therefore variations of a classic functionalist slab. **(Fig. 3.14)** The Presidency of the government stood somewhere in between, obviously embodying the power of the state, but not allowed to compete with the party. This was clearly expressed in comments published after the competition and it was precisely how the jury described the winning scheme: as a "middle line" between functionalism and monumentality.²⁹⁹

The winning proposal for the Presidency was designed by yet another team from Zagreb, whose members were Vladimir Potočnjak, Anton Ulrich, Zlatko Neumann, and Dragica Perak. **(Fig. 3.15)** The team had a remarkable modernist pedigree. Potočnjak worked for Adolf Loos in Paris and Ernst May in

²⁹⁸ Reports on the competition for the new hotel generally mention the complexity of the functional program, with its "representative" qualities being referred to just in passing; see: D. Momčilović, "Konkurs za zgradu reprezentativnog hotela," *Arhitektura* I, no. 3 (October 1947): 25.

²⁹⁹ Macura, "Problematika naše arhitekture u svetlosti konkursa za zgradu Pretsedništva Vlade FNRJ," 15.

Frankfurt.³⁰⁰ Ulrich studied with Joseph Hoffmann at the Viennese *Kunstgewerbeschule* and was one of the first Yugoslavs to produce clearly functionalist designs.³⁰¹ Neumann spent eight years working for Loos (1919-27), both in Vienna and Paris.³⁰² Despite the fact that most team-members had a history of designing uncompromising functionalist buildings, their proposal for the Presidency can be best described as classicized modernism. However, considering their multiple connections to Loos and Hoffmann, this should not be seen as improbable. Based on an H-shaped plan—an organization that was proposed by multiple participants at the competition and recalled Le Corbusier's *Tsentrosoyuz* in Moscow—the building also had an entrance pavilion attached at the center of the H fronted by a monumental portico. There was nothing explicitly historicist about it, but the overall symmetry, the austere colonnade of the portico, the tripartite division of the facades, and endless rows of pronounced pilasters gave the building an unmistakably classicist air. The jury praised the design's clear functional solution, as much as its “serious, harmonious, and unpretentious” monumentality; as it concluded: “A calm beauty has been achieved.”³⁰³ The

³⁰⁰ For a short biography of Potočnjak, see: Premerl, *Hrvatska moderna arhitektura između dva rata*, 67-68.

³⁰¹ For Ulrich's biography, see: Vesna Mikić, *Arhitekt Anton Ulrich: klasičnost moderne* (Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić, 2002), 11-39.

³⁰² For a short biography of Neumann, see: Tomislav: *nova tradicija* (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1990), 55-56.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 16.

overall sense of this “calm beauty” was one of a heavy solidity, as the building sat firmly on the ground; its subdued modernism relied on formal austerity and not on any notion of lightness or transparency. Since this project went into construction in 1948, it was developed to the level of construction drawings (which are being publicized here for the first time) and it is possible to observe its somewhat more overt classicism in its detailing. Construction drawings confirm the intended impression of massive weight implied in competition perspectives: large pilasters, three feet wide and two feet deep and clad in seven inch thick blocks of white marble; pronounced coursework suggesting massive masonry construction (although the actual structure was a reinforced concrete skeleton); and stylized keystones above windows. **(Fig. 3.16)**

The discord between the tastes of the profession and the politicians became obvious when it was announced that no first prize was awarded for the Central Committee and therefore no proposal selected for construction. The fundamental question of monumental expression appropriate for new Yugoslavia thus remained wide open. Considering the stipulation that this competition would be judged by the party leadership, it seems quite clear that politicians were not ready to accept the different variations of modernism that the profession was offering. Of the three highest ranked entries that won the second prize, only one—by Augustinčić and his three architect colleagues—included any overt historicist references and even it featured a rather austere tower in its center. The other two were much more obviously modernist in style. The more

surprising choice for the prize was Dobrović's entry, not only because of its modernist forms and apparent lack of any sculptural decoration, but even more for the fact that it rejected the central demand of the competition brief: that the building should be a tall tower. **(Fig. 3.17)** This project has been known only through one badly reproduced perspective, but even so it is clear that it was composed to emphasize horizontality instead of verticality. Particularly striking in the scheme is what seems like a conference hall in the shape of a truncated cone, a motif that Le Corbusier would use in various versions in his monumental postwar projects. With a complete lack of symbolic representation, it is clear why this proposal was not selected for construction.

More compliant with the competition requirements was the highest ranked entry by Edvard Ravnikar.³⁰⁴ **(Fig. 3.18)** With a tall tower placed in the center of his Corbusian 'capitol' organized around a monumental square (see Fig. 3.10), the proposal had both the required height and sufficient amount of sculptures to convey the necessary ideological message. Its symmetrical composition alluded to a vague classicism. But it too was in essence rather modernist and it revealed a synthesis of the two formative influences of Ravnikar's early career. Born in 1907, the architect at first attended the *Technische Hochschule* in Vienna, before

³⁰⁴ The project was also signed by Ervin Grohar, but Ravnikar was clearly the leading architect, as the design was rather typical of his work at the time.

coming back to Slovenia to study with Jože Plečnik.³⁰⁵ After graduation, he continued to work with Plečnik and collaborated on the iconic National and University Library in Ljubljana (1938) before embarking on his own projects.³⁰⁶ But in 1939, Ravnikar decided suddenly to go to Paris, where he spent five months working in Le Corbusier's studio, exposing himself to a completely different architectural culture. His proposal for the Central Committee merged the lessons learned from his two mentors. From Plečnik, Ravnikar absorbed a taste for sensual surfaces, proposing to clad the building with variously textured stone in rich rhythmic patterns, giving the walls, as the jury put it, "a picturesque and decorative treatment" reminiscent of a "woven rug."³⁰⁷ The lesson likely learned from Le Corbusier was a taste for openness and flowing spaces; the jury found that the proposed "airy interiors" contributed to an "expression of power and monumentality;"³⁰⁸ Indeed, the only published perspective of the Central Committee shows the building as seen from the Presidency through a dematerialized glass wall. There are also further details that seem to indicate a

³⁰⁵ On Ravnikar's education and early career, see: Peter Krečič, *Edvard Ravnikar: arhitekt, urbanist, oblikovalec, teoretik, univerzitetni učitelj, publicist*, exhibition catalogue (Ljubljana: Arhitekturni muzej, 1996), 9-14.

³⁰⁶ For example, in the Crypt at the Cemetery of the Holy Cross (finished in 1939) and his project for the Modern Gallery (designed in 1938, finished after the war), both in Ljubljana; see: Krečič, *Edvard Ravnikar*, 9.

³⁰⁷ Quoted in: Stojanović, "Konkursi za dom Centralnog komiteta KPJ," 148.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

fusion of Ravnikar's two formative experiences. The large sculptures, shown both on the very top of the Central Committee and in front of the building, all stand atop columns, a motif easily linked to Plečnik. But the specific treatment of the column on top of the tower, with a simple plinth supported by a thick cylindrical trunk, is reminiscent of the curious sculptural motif from Le Corbusier's proposal for the Palace of the League of Nations (1927). A gigantic circular medallion, presumably carrying some ideological symbol, hangs above the entrance to Ravnikar's Central Committee and also reappears in his proposal for the Presidency. **(Fig. 3.19)** This motif also seems to be of a Corbusian origin, as it appears in his Mundaneum project (1929). The Palace of the League of Nations and the Mundaneum were Le Corbusier's early explorations of modern monumentality and as such both appropriate references for the Central Committee project, which indicated the acuteness of Ravnikar's instinct.³⁰⁹

Ravnikar's Central Committee is difficult to judge in detail because little of it has survived. But several other projects he designed around the same time

³⁰⁹ In conjunction with the Mundaneum project, Le Corbusier had a famous dispute with the Czech theorist Karel Teige about the role of monumentality and aesthetics in modern architecture. The architect explicitly defended monumentality as a valid concern for modernism in the light of Teige's claim that "the sin of Le Corbusier's Mundaneum is the sin of monumentality." On the Mundaneum controversy, see: Karel Teige, "Mundaneum," *Stavba* 7 (1929): 145-155; George Baird, "Architecture and Politics: A Polemical Dispute. A Critical Introduction to Karel Teige's 'Mundaneum,' 1929 and Le Corbusier's 'In Defense of Architecture,' 1933," *Oppositions* 4 (1974): 80-82; Kenneth Frampton, "The humanist v. the utilitarian ideal," *Architectural Design* 37 (March 1968): 2-4.

relied on similar elements: the Opera House in Belgrade, and the Parliament of Slovenia and the Post Office in Ljubljana. **(Figs. 3.20)** None of these projects were built, but all of them indicate his remarkably consistent synthesis of Plečnik and Le Corbusier, sources that could easily be considered irreconcilably disparate. Ravnikar managed to find their common denominator and the picturesque motifs he used on them seem to oscillate between his two sources while never wholly conceding to either. His varied patterns of cladding, for example, imply Plečnik's sensual surfaces; but they are not far from the way in which Le Corbusier's Swiss Pavilion in Paris is clad. Similarly, slender, simple cylindrical columns clearly evoke Le Corbusier, but their superimposition over recessed windows was one of Plečnik's favorite motifs, most famously used on the National and University Library in Ljubljana, on which Ravnikar collaborated. If realized, these designs could have been a uniquely Yugoslav contribution to the search for a "new monumentality," containing specifically Yugoslav connotations for their indebtedness to Plečnik and yet being cosmopolitan and modern for their Corbusian link. The professional jury of the Central Committee competition must have recognized this when it awarded Ravnikar the highest ranking. It is a pity that the party leadership did not understand it and instead chose to organize a second, limited round of competition to find an appropriate design.

Before they were about to begin work, Tito summoned the participants to lecture them about architecture. **(Fig. 3.21)** In a highly revealing article

published after that meeting, Ravnikar described what Tito had in mind for both the Central Committee and all of New Belgrade.³¹⁰ The text is a usual panegyric that credits the leader with an apparently universal expertise and a better understanding of architecture than architects themselves had.³¹¹ But more importantly, Tito's words, at least as reported by Ravnikar, read as a summary of Soviet-style Socialist Realism, replete with both its theoretical staples and concrete motifs. Tito's first criticism was that architects did not succeed in expressing the "new political and social conditions in new Yugoslavia and the role of the party in it" and urged them to create a "powerful living form that would be characteristic only to architecture of new Yugoslavia."³¹² This was virtually a translation of the socialist realist credo "socialist in content, national in form," but it completely ignored the fact that a number of awarded entries, including those by Ravnikar and Augustinčić's team, indeed created specifically Yugoslav statements. Tito then stressed the "dynamism" of the party's role in society as the main feature to be expressed through the building. How to achieve that? "The energetic forms of the monumental central part of the building," Ravnikar reports on Tito's words, should look like a "prow of a ship that clears its way

³¹⁰ See: Ravnikar, "Maršal Tito našim arhitektom," 363-64.

³¹¹ According to Ravnikar, Tito was so perceptive that he noticed some shortcomings in the regulation of New Belgrade that none of the participating architects did; *ibid.*, 364.

³¹² *Ibid.*, 363.

through the waves.”³¹³ These words, evoking a dynamic and directional form, could easily be a description of the iconic Soviet pavilion at the 1937 International Exhibition in Paris. Tito must have visited the building in person: he spent several months in the city that year facilitating the transfer of Yugoslav volunteers to Spain to fight in the civil war.³¹⁴ The leader then reminded his architects of the “eternal beauty” of the Greek column and also of the need to engage sculpture, “the highest stage of visual art,” because “architectural forms, which can easily be abstract, must speak;” again, statements that, to sensitive ears, must have evoked Soviet Socialist Realism.

Having already won the highest ranking in the first round of the competition, Ravnikar was determined not to let his chance slip away, since his submission for the second round looked like a literal translation of Tito’s requirements. With its diagonally cut tower, whose purpose now seems to be only to support the sculptures on its top, the building indeed evoked a “prow of a ship” overlooking the water. Moreover, this tower, decomposed into three parallel slabs, also evoked Iofan’s Paris Pavilion, which was composed in a similar diagonally soaring fashion. Gone was all the subtlety of surface textures of Ravnikar’s original entry; instead, the brute force of rustic stone walls communicated the power of the party. Of all other submissions in the second

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ Indeed, the exhibition was used as an excuse for large numbers of volunteers to travel to France without raising suspicion of their true destination; see: Ridley, *Tito*, 131.

round, only one perspective by Augustinčić, Galić, Šegvić, and Bon is known. It features a more conventional sense of monumentality than implied by their original proposal, with a monumental round staircase and two obelisks carrying sculptures in front of the building, clearly relying on their success achieved with the monument at Batina. **(Fig. 3.22)** None of these schemes, however, was developed any further. Instead, Branko Bon alone was hired to work on the design of the building.³¹⁵ **(Fig. 3.23)** Some of his models, which were published several years later, reveal versions of modernism monumentalized in a fashion similar to the winning proposal for the Presidency of the government: austere classicizing forms and sparse use of monumental sculpture; but there are no traces of Tito's requirements for "ship prows." In any case, Bon's designs were never realized either and the construction of the Central Committee had to wait for another twelve years.

City Constructed and Aborted

The results of the 1947 New Belgrade competitions were workable designs for the Presidency and the luxury hotel, and proposed ideas for the master plan. In the months that followed the announcement of winners, the

³¹⁵ Bon received 40,000 dinars in May, 1948, as the first payment to develop the design of the Central Committee building; see Memo from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Ministry of Construction of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia of 14 May, 1948; ASCG, Fond 13, Ministarstvo građevine FNRD, Fascikla 94, no number.

institutional framework for the construction of the city was set up through the establishment of a series of bodies, including the Design institute of New Belgrade, founded in March 1948.³¹⁶ Under Dobrović's guidance, a schematic plan of the new city was developed, fixing the position of the most important buildings. The plan summarized some of the ideas that appeared in multiple competition entries, but essentially represented a version of the "alternative" competition proposal by the Institute of Urban Planning of Serbia, with the Presidency located on the bank of the Danube, the future Parliament on the bank of the Sava, and the Central Committee at the confluence of the two rivers. Each building was positioned as a focal point for a monumental avenue; however, the arrangement of the avenues was no longer radial, as in Dobrović's previous proposals, but perpendicular to each other.³¹⁷ Coincidentally, the location of the most important buildings on river banks corresponded with Tito's own planning ideas as reported by Ravnikar: "Broad and airy boulevards planted with lush greenery will lead to an enormous central square. All representative buildings will lie on the waterfronts of the two rivers, visible from the water and from the

³¹⁶ About the Design institute of New Belgrade, see: Resolution on the founding of the Design institute of New Belgrade of March 1948 (no date); ASCG, Fond 50, Predsedništvo vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78, no. 78-216.

Ljiljana Blagojević traces the institutional framework in detail; see: Blagojević, *Српске државе модернизма*, 44-45.

³¹⁷ For a detailed analysis of the plan, see: *ibid.*

opposite banks.”³¹⁸ And while it is difficult to recognize only one “enormous central square”—there were several large open spaces, resembling broad avenues rather than squares—the plan was indeed all about airiness, greenery, and monumentality. It seems safe to assume that such an arrangement was not really a result of Tito’s demands, since the critical elements of this plan were already recognizable even in Dobrović’s “Sketch.” Of the three proposed urban axes, only the one leading south from the Presidency towards the main railway station, generated by the suggestive symmetrical plan of the building, would have any long-term impact on later plans of New Belgrade; everything else would be subject to change in the following decades, until even the Presidency axis was discarded in the 1980s.

The construction of New Belgrade began on 11 April 1948. The text of the dedication carved in a stone plaque celebrated the pan-Yugoslav character of the endeavor: “On 11 April 1948, three years after the end of the people’s liberation war, preparations for the beginning of a new battle for happiness and well-being of the people were complete. On that day, working people and youth of all of Yugoslavia made an effort to erect New Belgrade, to expand the beloved capital of the state of coequal nationalities on this side of the Sava, to enlarge and beatify the city from which the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, headed by comrade Tito, led the uprising... and to create another eternal symbol of the

³¹⁸ Ravnikar, “Maršal Tito našim arhitektom,” 364.

victorious liberation struggle of our peoples, whom Marshall Tito leads to socialism in a state built by the people itself.”³¹⁹ Claiming that the project for the construction of New Belgrade at this stage was an effort of “working people and youth of all of Yugoslavia” was not mere rhetoric, because in its realization the state largely relied on mass volunteer labor, particularly the federal youth brigades that were assembled from all parts of the country. There was a highly symbolic dimension to this kind of work, especially in the light of the fact that enthusiasm was, for the most part, genuine. But the reliance on manual labor was predominantly a result of a pure need to harness that enthusiasm in the lack of material resources.³²⁰

The task at hand was indeed daunting. Even before any construction could begin, the level of the whole area had to be raised by several meters in order to avoid seasonal flooding. Over the length of the Five Year Plan, almost ninety million cubic meters of sand and gravel were to be dug out of the Danube to fill in the construction sites.³²¹ There were few machines in the country necessary for such an endeavor and their capacities were far below the requirements, so a great deal had to be acquired from abroad; however, the work

³¹⁹ The plaque is reproduced in *Beograd-Novı Beograd* (Belgrade: Direkcija za izgradnju Novog Beograda, 1967), 17.

³²⁰ On volunteer labor, see: Lilly, *Power and Persuasion*, 115-28.

³²¹ See: “Referat po predmetu izgradnje nasipanja Novog Beograda po petogodišnjem planu 1947-1951 god.,” 5 April, 1947; ASCG, Fond 50, Predsedništvo vlade FNRJ, Fascikla 78, no. 78-440.

was supposed to start even before any new machines were bought, using whatever was available.³²² Some machinery was used for the technically most demanding operations, but a large proportion of work was done manually, as revealed in contemporary photographs from the construction site, which were frequently publicized to document and celebrate the progress of the endeavor.

Images from the period superimpose the enthusiasm of mass manual labor, done in the most primitive and brutal conditions, with the projected modern buildings to create vivid illustrations of what Marshall Berman called the “modernity of underdevelopment.”³²³ **(Fig. 3.24)** They convey a sense of ultimate individual sacrifice for the collective good, with swarms of apparently expendable humans slaving in the service of precious machines. The role of these images was highly propagandistic, as they served to mobilize the population, especially the youth, for participation in volunteer labor brigades. The early construction of New Belgrade, as presented in these photographs, can only be understood in the light of the feverish culture of shockwork, relentlessly promoted by the Agitprop as indispensable in the achievement of the bombastic goals of the Five Year Plan.³²⁴ Following the Soviet Stakhanovite movement, shockworkers were “incredible heroes... able to work 20-30 hours under the

³²² *Ibid.*

³²³ Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1982).

³²⁴ See: Lilly, *Power and Persuasion*, 121.

most difficult circumstances, never asking is it cold or hot or whether they have anything to eat.”³²⁵ Such rhetoric of self-sacrifice implied that the peacetime labor was a direct extension of and as worthy as the wartime heroism of the Yugoslav people. That was also why New Belgrade could be understood as an “eternal symbol of the victorious liberation struggle of our peoples,” as the dedication plaque claimed, even if its construction started full three years after the end of the war.

Optimistic heroism of volunteer labor, combined with the symbolic significance of the future metaphoric “heart” of new Yugoslavia, is probably the main reason why the scenes from the construction site of New Belgrade became favored motifs of socialist realist art. Indeed, one of the ultimate icons of Yugoslav Socialist Realism, *Sounding of the Terrain in New Belgrade* by Boža Ilić (1948), replicates the motif of volunteers powering a sounding drill, which was frequently represented in contemporary photographs.³²⁶ **(Fig. 3.25)** A monumental piece, almost fifteen feet long, as if to match the monumentality of the actual endeavor it represented, Ilić’s painting was an apotheosis of the “joy of collective creativity in the construction of socialist fatherland,” as art critic Oto Bihalji-Merin explained. “The man, the machines, the building, and the landscape are united into a harmonious and realistic whole.”³²⁷ The building,

³²⁵ Trade union leader Đuro Spoljarić, quoted in *ibid.*, 118.

³²⁶ For an analysis of Ilić’s painting, see: Merenik, *Ideološki modeli*, 32-34.

³²⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*, 32.

vaguely visible at the left side of the painting, is most probably the rising Presidency of the government, whose skeleton was already half-finished by the end of 1948. **(Fig. 3.26)** Ilić's socialist realist painting thus eternalized the union between the building and the people, even though the building itself had little to do with Socialist Realism.

The quick progress in the construction of New Belgrade, however, was not destined to last long. Less than three months after works began, in June 1948, the Comintern announced its resolution against the CPY that severed almost all connections between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc and with it the country's lifeline to its main creditors and trading partners. Work continued for the rest of the year, but the ensuing economic crisis slowed it down more and more, until they came to a complete halt some time in 1951.³²⁸ The bare skeletons of the Presidency and the hotel, rising like ghosts over the sandy dunes of New Belgrade, were monuments to grand ambitions that suddenly faced a bleak reality. When the machines awoke again around them in the mid-1950s, it was to a very different Yugoslavia.

³²⁸ Mihailo Janković, "Kratok opis rada," transcript of an original document made for the Management for the construction of the building of Federal Executive Council (Direkcija za izgradnju zgrade Saveznog izvršnog veća," n.d., Aleksandar Janković Collection.

Chapter 4:

DESTALINIZATION

On 28 June 1948, the *Cominform* issued a resolution that accused the country's Communist leaders of diverging from the "correct path" of Marxism-Leninism and invited the CPY membership to put an end to their regime.³²⁹ The resolution set in motion a chain of events that would profoundly transform postwar Yugoslavia. It was a defining moment in the country's history, pushing the regime away from Stalinism and on a road toward wide-reaching internal reforms and an independent foreign policy. It was also due to the events of 1948 that Yugoslavia developed its uniqueness among socialist states, ultimately blurring the ideological and political divisions of the Cold War.

For outside viewers, the resolution came as a sensational surprise; after all, the *Cominform* was the very same organization seated in Belgrade the previous fall as a sign of Yugoslavia's special prestige in the Communist world. But conflicts between the CPY leaders and Moscow had been already brewing clandestinely for years, almost from the beginning of World War II. The rift was, in its core, about the political and economic control of the country. As Sabrina Ramet has cogently put it, "Stalin wanted the Yugoslavs to be his subordinates; the Yugoslavs, for their part, believed that they could be Stalin's *allies*."³³⁰ On

³²⁹ See: Petranović and Štrabac, *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 95-96.

³³⁰ See: Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 176.

the one side, the Soviets were unhappy with Tito's frequently unpredictable and independent actions; on the other, the Yugoslavs became increasingly disgruntled because of the colonial exploitation to which they were subjected in their economic dealings with the USSR under the guise of "brotherly cooperation."³³¹ Moreover, in their independent actions, Yugoslav Communists were often more radical than the Soviets themselves, thus frequently endangering Stalin's careful balancing of the relationship with the West. Yugoslav aspirations in the disputed areas of Trieste and Carinthia and the support to the Communist uprising in Greece therefore became major points of contention. In this context, the resolution of the *Cominform* was designed to be particularly painful, as it questioned Tito's very commitment to the Communist cause, counting on the membership of the CPY to easily overthrow him.

The resolution indeed caused a rift in Yugoslavia, but it was not sufficient to oust Tito's circle, which enjoyed loyalty among the native Communists for successfully organizing and leading the liberation war with minimal foreign aid for most of the war. The Yugoslavs at first hoped to reconcile, presenting the conflict as a "misunderstanding" and attempting to prove their allegiance to Stalinist orthodoxy through an even harsher political repression, especially through intensified collectivization of agriculture. But when it became clear that Stalin had no intention to reconcile, Tito began acting defensively and, as a good

³³¹ For the most exhaustive, first-hand account of the history of the conflict, see: Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost*.

Stalinist himself, effectively suppressed all dissent.³³² Within months of the resolution, the relations with socialist countries deteriorated so much that between 1949 and Stalin's death in 1953, there were no official or private contacts between Yugoslavia and the USSR; the two states only exchanged protest notes.³³³ All trade with socialist countries ceased. The result was a complete political and economic isolation of Yugoslavia: already confronted by the West, now it was cut off from its previous allies as well. A severe economic crisis threatened the very survival of the population.

The reforms that resulted from this situation were broad. On the one hand, the country needed foreign partners for trade; the ideological enmity towards the West was now a far smaller problem than the immediate military threats coming from the East. At the same time, it was necessary to explain why the idolized "first country of socialism" would try to subordinate an obviously faithful ally; the explanation ultimately amounted to a pervasive criticism of the Stalinist system and the deep bureaucratization of the USSR, which subverted the authentic principles of Marxism.³³⁴ Yugoslavia thus had to move away from

³³² The repression of Stalin's supporters was harsh and frequently arbitrary. It led to the creation of a Yugoslav version of the *gulags* at the "Naked Island" off the coast of Dalmatia. The issue was suppressed for decades and only began being openly discussed after Tito's death, with a range of books and films tackling it appearing in the 1980s. For the best historical account of the theme, see: Ivo Banac, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989).

³³³ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 180.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 183.

the Stalinist system and to distinguish itself politically and economically from the Soviets. The answer was a hybrid system that claimed to lead towards the Marxist ideal of “withering away of the state,” but, in reality, the party never gave up the total control of the state apparatus. Starting in 1950, Yugoslavia set off on a path of an increasing political and economic decentralization, restructuring both the state organization and the economy. The federation transferred many of its prerogatives to the constituent republics, thus strengthening their own statehood and replacing a massive federal administration with six regional ones. The Five-Year Plan was abolished and the accent was shifted from the exclusive development of heavy industry to much more consumer-friendly production. The state gave up total ownership of the means of production; instead, a rather nebulous “social ownership” was established, in which all members of society allegedly participated. A system of “workers’ self-management” was also established, allowing individual enterprises to act with much greater independence from the central power than before. Important decisions about running the enterprises were, at least on paper, made by all employees through “workers’ councils.” Enterprises were also intended to compete with each other up to a certain degree, giving rise to a hybrid economy that combined elements of the market with overall planning by the state. Economic liberalization, combined with generous amounts of Western aid, allowed for a sudden burst of economic growth, unprecedented in the country’s history and rivaled in the 1950s only by that of Japan. The new system also allowed for the development of

features not normally associated with socialist economies, most importantly a fairly developed consumer culture, including such ultimately “capitalist tools” as advertising.³³⁵

Transformations on other fronts were far-reaching too. The party changed its name in 1952 to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to signify a shift from a small conspiratorial clique to a mass organization. A range of other organizations were formed in order to mobilize mass participation in the political and social life. Around the same time, the total control of culture was abolished as well, abandoning the demand for absolute tendentiousness and allowing for far greater liberties than in the first postwar years. This, in turn, led to the abrupt demise of the doctrine of Socialist Realism, opening the door for a flourishing of modernism. This is not to say that the dominance of official ideology was ever seriously questioned; but the once stifling grip now became a much less repressive, perhaps even comfortable, confinement. The Yugoslavia that emerged after all these changes was still run by the same people as in the 1940s, but now it functioned, felt, and looked quite different.

³³⁵ On advertising in Yugoslavia, see: Patrick Hyder Patterson, “Truth Half Told: Finding the Perfect Pitch for Advertising and Marketing in Socialist Yugoslavia, 1950–1991,” in: *Enterprise and Society* 4 (June 2003): 179-225.

Liberalizing Architecture

Following the broader social and political changes, the landscape of architectural profession changed as well. The turning point occurred in 1951, when principles of self-management were applied to architectural offices, just like to any other economic enterprise. The previously centralized, highly hierarchical state-owned offices and “institutes of design” were gradually abolished and transformed into self-managing “working organizations,” based on more democratic principles than before. Some of these were in-house design units of large construction enterprises; but many functioned as independent firms, free to look for commissions in an increasingly active market. In conjunction with this new environment, design offices began advertising their services in professional journals, at first through modest text advertisements and later through more lavish ones, illustrated with photos of finished buildings. But the market in which new architectural offices operated was heavily regulated by, and dependent on, the state, which eliminated the often cut-throat competition and the weight of speculative interests characteristic of capitalism. Moreover, the market included only an exceedingly small number of private clients who could impose their personal whims and tastes on their architects. Instead, most investors were other self-managing enterprises, various social organizations, and government bodies of all levels, which generally treated their architects with a technocratic confidence in their professional expertise, rarely questioning their conceptual or

aesthetic decisions. Architects thus suddenly found themselves in a situation to operate with considerable autonomy: on the one hand, the state was no longer interested in narrowly controlling their work, while on the other, it protected them from the pressures of a capitalist market.

Architects were also allowed to self-organize and found new architectural “working organizations” based on principles of self-management.³³⁶ In Croatia, a particularly interesting situation occurred, where new offices were often founded under the name of the leading designer, thus giving rise to a unique hybrid that from the outside looked quite like a private office, often acquiring commissions largely thanks to the reputation and networking skills of the leading designer, while on the inside was a self-managing enterprise in “social ownership.” The case of the Croatian architect Ivo Vitić—one of the most active practitioners of the 1950s and 1960s—is an illustrative example in this respect: originally employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Architectural Design Institute (Arhitektonsko-projektantski zavod, APZ) in Zagreb, in 1951 he broke away from the APZ to found the Architectural Office Vitić (Arhitektonski biro Vitić, ABV), a

³³⁶ It appears that leaving the existing offices and founding new ones was not uncommon. The career of one of the most successful Serbian architects, Mihailo Mitrović, is illustrative: Mitrović originally worked in the office “Srbija,” founded by architects who had left the Institute of Urban Planning of Serbia; but in 1954, Mitrović and two other colleagues, unhappy with the organization of work, left “Srbija” and founded another studio, “Projektbiro,” with which Mitrović designed a range of prominent buildings around Belgrade and Serbia. See: Aleksandar Kadijević, *Mihajlo Mitrović: projekti, graditeljski život, ideje* (Belgrade: Nezavisna izdanja Slobodana Mašića, Muzej nauke i tehnike, Muzej arhitekture, 1999), 31.

firm in which he had total creative control as a designer, although it was legally not in his ownership. The firm's statute legalized this ambiguous situation, stressing simultaneously the artistic control of the chief designer and the collective quality of the work: "The artistic concept of the product is marked by the architectural expression of its creator, that is, the chief designer, while the technical unity of the investment and technical documentation results from the efforts of each individual in the collective who contributes his personal energy to the final result... Linking individual efforts, the working organization can elevate its communal work beyond the level of the sum of the work of all individuals."³³⁷ With ABV, Vitić designed and built a range of emblematic buildings that served the highest representation of the state, including the Museum of the Revolution in Novi Sad (1959-63), the Army Club in Šibenik (1960-61), and, most importantly, the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia in Zagreb (1961-68).³³⁸ **(Fig. 4.1)** Like a head of a proper private office, it was Vitić, rather than ABV, that was credited in the press as the sole creator of these prestigious

³³⁷ Vitić quoted the Statute in an interview he gave to the Belgrade architectural critic Mihajlo Jevtić; see: Mihailo Jevtić, "Gost drugog programa Radio Beograda arhitekt Ivan Vitić," unpublished transcript of a radio interview, 24; NBS, MJ.

³³⁸ The crucial question, of course, is whether such prominent commissions were due to the architect's political connections. In the case of Vitić, Aleksander Laslo vehemently denies them, contrary to "the local urban gossip;" he, however, does not substantiate this claim. See: Aleksander Laslo, "Ivan Vitić: A Solo Architect in a Collectivist Environment," in: *Ivan Vitić: Arhitektura*, special issue of *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 54, no. 217 (2005): 23.

buildings.³³⁹ And like a private owner, it was Vitić who enjoyed the greatest material benefits of the office's success, allowing him to support an enviably luxurious life-style that included his passion for sailing (he had his sailboat built in England) and a penchant for sports cars (including an iconic Alfa Romeo Giulietta and Pininfarina 1750).³⁴⁰

Decentralization of the state also affected professional associations, which acquired more space for local initiative. One result was the appearance of a range of new architectural journals published by republican associations of architects that replaced a central federal publication. As of the first issue of 1952, the editorial board of *Arhitektura* ceased including members from outside of Croatia, even though the journal was still officially published by the federal Union of Associations of Architects; as of 1954, *Arhitektura* officially became a journal of the Association of Architects of Croatia, focusing primarily on local architecture.³⁴¹ By that time, however, in Ljubljana the Slovenes were already publishing a new journal, *Arhitekt*, which first appeared in September 1951 and attracted immediate attention around the country for its high technical standards,

³³⁹ This, however, was not always the case. The Belgrade office "Stadion," responsible for the most prestigious administration buildings in New Belgrade under the leadership of Mihailo Janković, generally promoted its collective identity rather than its chief designer and director Janković.

³⁴⁰ Aleksander Laslo writes that in the mid-1950s, this luxury life-style of some architects drew much negative criticism in the press, which drew some of them abroad; Vitić, however, did not budge. See: Laslo, "Ivan Vitić: A Solo Architect in a Collectivist Environment," 22.

³⁴¹ See: *Arhitektura* 8, no. 1 (1954).

introducing a glossy cover, better paper, and high quality photos, along with a clean, up-to-date graphic design.³⁴² **(Fig. 4.2)** *Arhitekt* was replaced in 1964 by *Sinteza*, an even glossier and sleeker publication aimed at bringing all visual arts together. The influence of the Slovenian example was almost immediate: *Arhitektura* soon updated its format, too; in 1954, moreover, the Croatian Association also began publishing *Čovjek i prostor* (Man and Space), a bi-weekly leaflet densely packed with the latest news local and international architecture.

Throughout the 1950s architectural press remained focused primarily in Zagreb and Ljubljana. In Belgrade, the short-lived *Pregled arhitekture* saw only a few issues in the mid-1950s before it died out. But in 1960, a federal journal was revamped in Belgrade, jointly published by the federal associations of architects and urban planners under the enlightened editorship of the Belgrade architect Oliver Minić. Named *Arhitektura Urbanizam*, the journal maintained regular issues and a rather high level of material and technical quality throughout the 1960s, before losing steam in the following decade and virtually dying out by the mid-1980s. **(Fig. 4.3)** The rest of the country was far less active in publishing; the only other journal of any significance was *Arh*, first published in 1963 by the Association of Architects of Sarajevo. It lived up to some seven issues and brought mostly dry descriptions of projects, rather than any polemical or

³⁴² Bogdan Bogdanović published an article in Belgrade, praising *Arhitekt* not only for its contents, but also for its high technical and design quality, which he saw as new in Yugoslavia; see: Bogdan Bogdanović, "Arhitekt' revija za arhitekturu," in: Književne novine, August 2, 1952, 62.

theoretical articles. It is perhaps fair to say that the quality of publications was in direct proportion with the numbers of active architects in each republic.

Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Belgrade still functioned as centers of discourse, even though each republic had its own separate professional association.

Simultaneous with the reorganization of architectural profession was the process of gradual liberalization of culture, which brought about the final demise of Socialist Realism. The roots of this process can be traced back to the Third Plenum of Central Committee of the CPY, which took place in July 1949 and announced two epochal policy changes. In his report on education, the head of the federal *Agitprop*, Milovan Đilas, admitted that “trying to change people’s minds through decrees” made no sense and that instead of being run by administration, culture would be better served through democratic confrontation of opinions.³⁴³ Moreover, Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Kardelj proclaimed that Western countries should not be chastised in public by default and that a more balanced view should be allowed, opening the way for a future rapprochement with the West. By 1952, the *Agitprop* was finally dissolved; financing of cultural activities was decentralized and cultural policy became considerably more relaxed.³⁴⁴

The immediate result of these changes was a rather rapid demise of Socialist Realism. Historians generally trace the turning point to Miroslav

³⁴³ Quoted in Dimić, *Agitprop kultura*, 242.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 250.

Krleža's speech at the Third Congress of Writers of Yugoslavia in Ljubljana in October 1952.³⁴⁵ Focusing largely on visual arts, especially on painting, Krleža assailed (among many things) the very foundations of Socialist Realism in the harshest possible terms, ultimately proclaiming the contemporaneous Moscow to be in a state of "provincial confusion."³⁴⁶ At the same time, he rescued the tradition of "*l'art pour l'art*" (i.e., modernism) from the dogmatic criticism of advocates of vulgar social tendentiousness. By this time, however, architects had already long dispensed with the Soviet doctrine, if they ever really subscribed to it. Indicative in this respect was Šegvić's long essay "Creative Components of Architecture in Yugoslavia," published in June 1950 in *Arhitektura* (based on a lecture he first delivered as early as the fall of 1948). With much less eloquence but with the basic same intention, the text did for architecture what Krleža's speech would do for the arts more than two years later: it criticized the principles of Socialist Realism and rescue prewar modernism as a relevant heritage to be used as a basis for further development.³⁴⁷ Still echoing the kind of criticism practiced during the previous period, Šegvić attacked various "isms," particularly constructivism and functionalism; but he also established a line of "truly progressive efforts in capitalist architecture" that essentially included the

³⁴⁵ Miroslav Krleža, "Govor na kongresu književnika u Ljubljani," published in Miroslav Krleža, *Knjiga eseja* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1961), 187-225.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 217.

³⁴⁷ Neven Šegvić, "Stvaralačke komponente arhitekture FNRJ," in: *Arhitektura* 4, no. 5-6 (1950): 5-40.

genealogical canon of modernism as established by Giedion and Pevsner: “from Webb, Voyce (sic!), Mackintosh, Horta, Van de Welde (sic!), Richardson, Berlage, Wagner, Behrens, Loos, Wright, to Le Corbusier, Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, Oud, Mendelsohn, Aalto, Neutra, Lescaze, Markelius, Lurcat (sic!), Nelson, etc.”³⁴⁸ At the same time, Šegvić provided an extensive account of Croatian prewar modernism (which may be best described as functionalist, despite Šegvić’s criticism of functionalism), in an attempt to establish a similar local genealogy, inviting architects from other republics to do the same for their own regions. In that way, not only was continuity established with the local tradition of modernism, but the sharp breach with the prewar period was somewhat alleviated too.

It is widely accepted that Socialist Realism saw its final demise in architecture at the First Conference of Architects and Urban Planners of Yugoslavia, held in Dubrovnik in November 1950, a few months after Šegvić’s essay came out and a full two years before Krleža’s speech. Participants seem unanimous in this claim; but reading through a wealth of rather technically focused papers delivered at the conference, one encounters only a few statements that explicitly deal with Socialist Realism and the Soviet influence.³⁴⁹ One of the more explicit statements was from the Belgrade architect Milorad

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 29.

³⁴⁹ See, among other sources: Zoran Manević, “Od sorealizma do autorske arhitekture,” in: *Tehnika*, no. 3 (1970): 62-63; Ivan Štraus, *Arhitektura Jugoslavije, ???*.

Macura, who had already voiced his opposition to historicism during the debate in *Arhitektura* in 1947-48 (see Chapter 1). Macura's criticism was mainly aimed at the dryly utilitarian architecture of the previous period; he only mentioned the Soviets in passing—as a clearly negative example—which indicated that by that moment their influence was so out of question that it did not deserve any specific elaboration.”³⁵⁰

The specter of Socialist Realism, however, was still alive outside of architecture, when the first independent group of artists was founded in Zagreb in 1951. Named *Eksperimentalni atelier 51* (*Experimental Studio*, or EXAT 51), it came together around the ideas of abstraction, perpetual experimentation, and the synthesis of visual arts, building on the traditions of Constructivism, the Bauhaus, and other avant-garde movements from the prewar period.³⁵¹ Although the group's activities were not strictly architectural—its members rather strove to transcend the boundaries between the media—it is significant that its membership included a disproportionate number of architects and that its first public show—the very first exhibition of abstract art in Yugoslavia—was held at

³⁵⁰ Milorad Macura, “Архитект и пројектовање,” in: *Реферати за I саветовање архитеката и урбаниста Југославије*, (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1950), 187-96.

³⁵¹ On EXAT, see: Ješa Denegri, and Želimir Košćević, *EXAT 51: 1951-1956* (Zagreb: Galerija Nova, 1979).

the Croatian Association of Architects in Zagreb in 1953.³⁵² The group's Manifesto, written by the architect Vjenceslav Richter and signed by five other architects (Bernardo Bernardi, Zdravko Bregovac, Zvonko Radić, Božidar Rašica, and Vladimir Zarahović) and two painters (Ivan Picelj and Aleksandar Srnec) included defensive language meant to fend off the kind of dogmatic criticism characteristic for the previous period: "[the Group] consider that work methods and principles within the sphere of nonfigural or so-called abstract art are not the expression of decadent aspirations, but, rather, believe that the study of these methods and principles could develop and enrich the sphere of visual communication in our country."³⁵³ In light of the fact that architecture seemed more resistant to the official dictate—by 1951 the final demise of Socialist Realism in architecture was a *fait accompli*, which was not yet the case in visual arts and literature—it is tempting to speculate that the large number of architects among the group's membership contributed to its daring in breaking away from the existing ideological framework. Indeed, by the time EXAT 51 was founded, the group's key members— Picelj, Richter, Radić, and Srnec—had already been

³⁵² On the exhibition, see: Krešimir Rogina, ed. Kristl, Picelj, Rašica, Srnec: Obljetnica prve izložbe članova grupe EXAT 51 u Društvu arhitekata, 18. veljače-4. ožujka 1953 (Zagreb: Nakladništvo Udruženja hrvatskih arhitekata, 1998).

³⁵³ For an English translation of the Manifesto, see: EXAT 51, "Manifesto," in: *Impossible Histories: Historical Avant-gardes, Neo-avant-gardes, and Post-avant-gardes in Yugoslavia, 1918-1991*, edited by Miško Šuvaković and Dubravka Đurić (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2003), 539.

active designing various exhibition pavilions in Yugoslavia and abroad, in which they employed an unapologetically constructivist aesthetic without causing much trouble; but as soon as they moved towards a more narrowly defined “art,” conservative critics emerged.³⁵⁴ In their idealistic attempt to initiate public discussion, EXAT’s members actively courted controversy, causing sharp polarization in public debates on art in the early 1950s, but also decisively adding to a liberalization of both the discourse and the production.³⁵⁵

Opening

Some time during 1950, while transforming itself internally, Yugoslavia also changed sides in the Cold War. Since its expulsion from the *Cominform*, the former staunchest supporter of the Soviet Union became a target of incessant propaganda attacks from other Communist countries, which threatened to escalate into a full-fledged war. All trade with Eastern Europe ceased. Stalin plotted to murder Tito. Soviet troops gathered on Yugoslav borders. The country descended into a state of paranoia, anticipating an imminent attack. Completely friendless, the Yugoslav leadership was forced to look for new allies to secure

³⁵⁴ The polemic between Richter and the Socialist Realist critic Rudi Supek is illustrative in this respect; see: Dengri and Košćević, *EXAT*, 275-79.

³⁵⁵ For public debates stirred by EXAT’s membership, see: “Diskusija u Ritz-baru,” *ibid.*, 344-64.

bare survival. It was Stalin who pushed them into the hands of his own enemies, as the Americans were the only ones powerful enough to guarantee protection.

Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the West was for both sides a cautious marriage of convenience. Under blockade of its former allies, the country needed new trading partners and economic support, as well as protection from the ominous saber-rattling along its borders. On the other hand, once it became certain of the definitiveness of Tito's split with Stalin, the West was happy to exploit the first major crack in the international Communist movement. In light of the extreme hostilities between Yugoslav leadership and Western powers in the early postwar years, the shift had to be cautious and gradual; but once the doors of Yugoslavia opened for Western culture, they were never shut again.

Western aid, predominantly American, British, and French, was essential in preserving Yugoslavia's independence after 1948 and it virtually saved the population from a famine caused by a disastrous drought two years later.³⁵⁶ It also created new military alliances. Only a few years after its attempt to create a socialist Balkan Federation, Yugoslavia entered a different Balkan pact, now with Greece and Turkey, both of which were capitalist states and members of

³⁵⁶ Just between 1950 and 1955, Yugoslavia received almost \$600 million of American economic assistance and approximately the same amount in military assistance, only a minor fraction of it in the form of repayable loans. See: Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), 44-46. For a more extensive account of Yugoslav-American relations, see: Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*.

NATO.³⁵⁷ Moreover, the West was hoping to fully integrate Yugoslavia into NATO, as well as into the Organization for the European Economic Cooperation.³⁵⁸ Despite constant minor ups and downs, this was the period of Yugoslavia's closest connections with the West, but it lasted only until the mid-1950s, to be replaced with the policy of equidistance from both blocs.

In terms of cultural cooperation, however, this was an important period of radical reorientation that set up a pattern for decades to come. Unlike politics, Yugoslav culture would never establish symmetrical relations with the two poles of the Cold War world, and Western influences retained a privileged position over all others. France was the first partner in the cultural opening to the West, building on the traditionally warm relations dating back to the prewar period. For the Yugoslavs, France had the reputation of a preeminent center of modern art and architecture; for the French, particularly the many left-leaning intellectuals, the Yugoslav reformist experiment offered a renewed hope in socialism after the disappointments of Stalinism. Indeed, as the *New York Times* somewhat condescendingly reported in 1950, "For the French intellectuals, who sit on the left in the Paris literary salons, there is a steady and growing flight from the

³⁵⁷ On the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey, see: Darko Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu: odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 488-511. Also: *ibid.*, "The Balkan Pact: the Still-Born of the Cold War," in: *Jugoslavija v hladni vojni/Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, edited by Jasna Fischer, Aleš Gabrič, Leonid J. Gibianskii, Edith S. Klein, and Ronald W. Preussen (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino; Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 125-42.

³⁵⁸ Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu*, 494.

Mecca of Moscow to the Medina of Belgrade.”³⁵⁹ Among those who “flew” to the “Medina of Belgrade” were such names as the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre and the art historian and famous public intellectual Jean Cassou.³⁶⁰ The founder and director of the *Musee d’Art Moderne* in Paris, Cassou was also the first president of the Cultural Society France-Yugoslavia, and he went on to relentlessly support Yugoslav art abroad. It was, therefore, appropriate that the first show of foreign art that announced the reorientation was an exhibition of French modern painting in Belgrade in 1950.³⁶¹ In return, Paris was the first Western destination for a major Yugoslav exhibition after the war. A brainchild of Krleža, it was shown that same year at the Palais Chaillot. Its topic, however, was not modern, but medieval art and architecture, its goal to “prove that we are not barbarians and that we are not a people without culture and tradition, but that we are capable of providing quality documents of our tradition.”³⁶²

³⁵⁹ Joseph A. Barry, “Letter from Paris,” *The New York Times*, 11 June, 1950.

³⁶⁰ Petrović, *Francusko-jugoslovenski kulturni odnosi*, 82. Cassou arrived in Belgrade as early as 1949, and offered his support against the attacks of the Cominform; Merenik, *Ideološki modeli*, 51.

³⁶¹ Admittedly, the material shown was from the local prewar collections of Prince Paul and Erih Šlomović; but it included such modern artists as Henri Matisse, Edgar Degas, and Vincent Van Gogh, who was, for some reasons, especially reviled by socialist realist critics. However, in 1952, an exhibition of contemporary French works was shown in Belgrade and Zagreb; see: Merenik, *Ideološki modeli*, 51.

³⁶² A Bauer, “Osvrt na izložbu jugoslavenske srednjevjekovne umjetnosti u Parizu,” in: *Arhitektura* IV, no. 5-6 (1950): 73-77.

Subtle but eloquent clues of this shift in foreign relations can be detected in the changing editorial policies of *Arhitektura* between 1948 and 1950. Through most of this period, the published material testified to an almost total isolation of the country. The journal focused exclusively on domestic topics; the last pieces on architecture of other Soviet satellites dated back to July 1948.³⁶³ But signs of change were soon in place. From its first issue in 1947, in addition to Yugoslav languages, the journal published its tables of contents and captions in Russian and French translations. In the last issue of 1949, however, the Russian translations were quietly dropped, coinciding with the final disillusionment of Yugoslav political leadership in the possibility of reconciliation with Stalin. The same issue brought a piece on Le Corbusier's *Unité d'habitation* in Marseilles, which was translated in full from a British source.³⁶⁴ **(Fig. 4.4)** The manner in which the article was presented reflected the still uneasy ideological relationship towards anything coming from the West: the original English text was quite effusive about Le Corbusier's work and lavishly illustrated, but *Arhitektura's* editors nevertheless felt it necessary to attach a note in fine print that criticized the project as a "reflection of capitalist ideology" and accused him of succumbing to "speculative interests" that "placed human beings to the last place in the hierarchy of values." Just a few months later, however, such politically correct excuses were no longer needed. By the spring of 1950, *Arhitektura* published a

³⁶³ See: Simonov, "Najznačajniji zadaci sovjetskih arhitekata."

³⁶⁴ See: "Ormarski stanovi—'marseilleski' projekat," in: *Arhitektura* III, no. 25-27 (1949): 76-77.

text by Walter Gropius on architectural education and explicitly presented it as potentially useful for application in Yugoslavia.³⁶⁵ In the following few issues, articles from Western journals became increasingly frequent, until overviews of foreign architectural press became regular. And then, when a second foreign language reappeared in the captions and summaries in mid-1951, there was no surprise that it was English. Yugoslav architecture thus officially defected to the West.³⁶⁶

This “defection,” of course, was only conditional and partial. Yugoslav architecture’s broader social framework remained firmly socialist, which defined its prevalent typologies, patterns of financing, professional organization, etc. But in terms of influential formal models, theoretical discourses, and technological innovation, as well as participation in international organizations, Yugoslav architects shifted their attention to the political West. That is where all the ‘heroes’ of modernism, whom the Yugoslavs had already known, now resided, since the East had thoroughly purged its own modernists. It was in this context, for example, that Richard Neutra visited Zagreb in 1962.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁵ Walter Gropius, “Jedna osnova za studij arhitekture,” in: *Arhitektura* IV, no. 3-4 (1950): 75-78.

³⁶⁶ These changes in *Arhitektura*’s publishing policies are consistent with the broader shift in Yugoslav media of the period; see: Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada*, 484.

³⁶⁷ Richard and Dione Neutra arrived in Zagreb on October 20, 1962. *Arhitektura* commemorated the visit with a lusciously illustrated article on Neutra, which showcased his most influential American buildings, from the Lovell Health House, to late Case Study Houses, followed by a selection of quotes by Neutra. See: Alfred Albini, “Richard Neutra,” in: *Arhitektura* 16, no. 5-6 (1962): 22-41.

CIAM X, held in Dubrovnik in August 1956, could have been a crowning moment in the symbolic reintegration of Yugoslav architecture into international modernism, had the CIAM itself not been waning. Yugoslavia had already rejoined the organization at the IX meeting in Aix-en-Provence in 1953, when it was represented by four Slovenian architects, including Edvard Ravnikar and the young editor of *Arhitekt*, France Ivanšek.³⁶⁸ It seems that this delegation was responsible for inviting CIAM to organize its next congress in Dubrovnik.³⁶⁹ By 1955, however, Drago Ibler, the founding member of the original Yugoslav section of CIAM, took over the coordination of the congress on the hosts' side, reestablishing continuity with the local prewar organization. But the meeting was all about a generational shift, as young architects were taking over the lead from the old guard. None of the great prewar heroes—Le Corbusier, Gropius, Van Esteren, Aalto—showed up in Dubrovnik. The rising tensions were perhaps also a reason why CIAM tried to avoid publicity and insisted on limiting the access of Yugoslav architects to the meeting, despite the considerable excitement it generated among them.³⁷⁰ The immediate effect in Yugoslavia therefore

³⁶⁸ The rest of the group included the young architects France Ivanšek, editor of the Ljubljana journal *Arhitekt*, Vladimir Mušič, and Stanko Kristl; see: "Liste des personnes présentées par le groupe Yougoslave au Congrès de travail CIAM 9, inclusivement les deux jours de réception," May 20, 1953, FLC, no number.

³⁶⁹ "CIAM. Reunion des Délégués à La Sarraz, 8, 9, 10 septembre 1955. Compte rendu de la reunion," September 11, 1955, FLC, 03-0750.

³⁷⁰ Belgrade architect Oliver Minić testified to this exclusion in an article published almost a decade later, at the occasion of Le Corbusier's death: "Poslednji CIAM 1956. godine u

remained very limited; apart from a rather general report published in *Arhitektura*, in which Sigfried Giedion related a little about the ongoing ideological changes within the organization, not much leaked outside the closed doors of the congress.³⁷¹ Perhaps the most obvious outcome was that CIAM X provided the young Belgrade architect Aljoša (Alexis) Josić an opportunity to meet the Team X members Georges Candilis and Shadrach Woods, which would subsequently lead to their successful partnership as Candilis-Josic-Woods.

Appropriating Le Corbusier

Almost a decade after CIAM X, the Belgrade architect Oliver Minić still wrote about the occasion primarily as a missed opportunity to meet Le Corbusier.³⁷² This lament was a testimony to the changes that had occurred in the 1950s: only a few years before CIAM X Le Corbusier had still been criticized as an exponent of “bourgeois architecture,” but now he could again be revered without reservations. His public reception functioned as a perfect litmus test both for the cultural opening towards the West and the resurgence of modernism. Le Corbusier enjoyed unrivaled reputation in Yugoslavia, which dated back to the

Dubrovniku: Neostvareni susret s Le Corbusierom,” in: *Arhitektura Urbanizam* (Belgrade) 6, no. 35-36 (1965): 84.

³⁷¹ See: Sigfried Giedion, “CIAM X,” in: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 10, no. 1-6 (1956): 3-4.

³⁷² Minić, “Poslednji CIAM 1956. godine u Dubrovniku.”

prewar period, when a remarkable number of young Yugoslavs worked at his studio at rue de Sèvre. After the war, many of them reached leading positions in practice and academia, including Edvard Ravnikar in Ljubljana, Juraj Neidhardt in Sarajevo, and Milorad Pantović in Belgrade, all of whom taught at their respective universities and received major state commissions.

In the light of the politically motivated criticisms of Le Corbusier in the late 1940s, it was highly symbolic that the first major international exhibition of architecture to arrive in Yugoslavia after World War II was a retrospective of his own opus. The exhibition, which showed not only his architecture, but also his paintings and sculptural works, had been originally organized in 1948 by the Boston Institute of Contemporary Art and had toured the United States and South America before arriving in Europe in the fall of 1952. Its first stop was Berlin and the plan was to continue to Munich, Vienna, and Milan, before going to Yugoslavia, the only socialist country on the schedule. After Berlin, however, the show was sidetracked from its planned route and sent directly to Belgrade, apparently at the request of the Yugoslav Committee for Science and Culture; it never went back on its original route and ended its European tour in Yugoslavia. And while the precise motivation for this sidetracking remains uncertain, there are unmistakable Cold War overtones to it, as the show's only two European destinations ended up being the two contested sites of the Cold War geography: West Berlin and Yugoslavia.

On display between December 1952 and May 1953, the retrospective visited not only Belgrade, but received an unusual country-wide exposure, making stops at Skopje, Sarajevo, Split, Ljubljana, and Zagreb. In all six cities, it drew considerable attention and was widely reviewed, not only in architectural periodicals but in general press as well.³⁷³ The reviews, more than anything else, confirmed Le Corbusier's reputation: virtually all of them highlighted his exceptional status as a pioneer of modernism and his long combat against conservatism, which only a few years before would have been a highly politically incorrect point to make. They also revealed that the reviewers were well acquainted not only with Le Corbusier's creative work, but also with the finer points of his theory and his activities as a relentless propagandist. All the published texts, however, were surprisingly level-headed and praise never crossed into uncritical adoration, indicating that political restrictions of the previous several years had not substantially affected the level of the modernist discourse.³⁷⁴ Multiple reviewers demonstrated a healthy awareness of the limitations of Le Corbusier's approach to design, particularly warning against

³⁷³ At Le Corbusier's request, the cultural attaché of the Yugoslav Embassy in Paris sent him a detailed report on the exhibition, including some of the associated press clippings. See: Letter from Drago Šega to Le Corbusier of September 16, 1955, FLC C1 11-139.

³⁷⁴ Nikola Dobrović, for example, wondered if the excessive numbers of paintings shown in the exhibition would blur the significance of Le Corbusier's architecture; see: Nikola Dobrović, "Osvrt na izložbu arhitekta Le Corbusiera," *Arhitekt* (Ljubljana) 2, no. 9 (June, 1953): 32-34.

epigones who may reduce his ideas to formulas used for purely formalist effects.³⁷⁵

Such warnings were made for good reason. Even before the exhibition, there had been some limited attempts to employ Le Corbusier's latest formal explorations; but soon after the show, a veritable Corbusian epidemic hit the country. By the second half of the 1950s, virtually every major city had at least one recognizably Corbusian building, predominantly smaller and simplified versions of the *Unité d'Habitation* in Marseilles. The exhibition was certainly not solely responsible for this sudden wave, since local architects had already been well acquainted with the architect's work; it probably only provided a signal that direct references to him would no longer be politically problematic. The very first among the reinterpretations of the *Unité* had already been under construction while the exhibition toured the country. The building in question was not a residential block, but the Military Institute of Geography in Belgrade and it was not a completely new project, but a redesign of a previously begun structure. **(Fig. 4.5)** The architect was Milorad Macura, the young Belgrader who had already voiced his opposition to historicism when he presented the competition for the Federal Government for *Arhitektura* in 1947. The original design, created

³⁷⁵ Both Bogdanović and France Ivanšek specifically warned against uncritical formalist appropriation of Le Corbusier's influence. See: Bogdan Bogdanović, "Ле Корбизије и његово дело: поводом изложбе у Београду," in: *Ревуја књижевности, позоришта, музике, филма, ликовних уметности* (Belgrade), no. 2 (January 1, 1953): 7; and: France Ivanšek, "Le Corbusier in mi," in: *Slovenski poročevalec* (May 16, 1953).

in 1946, envisioned a symmetrical building consisting of two parallel wings, one concave and one straight; by the time the construction was interrupted two years later, only the reinforced concrete skeleton of the first two levels was finished. Macura's redesign completed the existing two floors, but then treated them as a pedestal for a scaled-down version of the *Unité*, complete with a simplified Corbusian roofscape and massive tapering *pilotis*. The fact that the *pilotis* occurred mid-way through the height of the building and that there was really no open ground-floor did not obscure the clear reference to the *Unité*.

Critics and historians have simultaneously praised Macura's design as the first fully modernist building in postwar Belgrade and criticized it for its overt formal dependence on Le Corbusier.³⁷⁶ Regardless of the fact that it was indeed a predominantly formal exercise in Corbusian architecture, it holds a significant place not only as an emphatic reassertion of a modernist style, but also as a symbolic rejection of Stalinism. Sources are ambiguous, but it seems that the original 1946 project that Macura redesigned was intended for a building that would seat the *Cominform*, the very organization that purged Yugoslavia from its

³⁷⁶ See: Zoran Manević, "Srpska arhitektura XX veka," in: Zoran Manević, Žarko Domljan, Nace Šumi, Ivan Štraus, Georgi Konstantinovski, and Božidar Milić, *Arhitektura XX vijeka*, series, *Umjetnost na tlu Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Prosveta; Zagreb: Spektar; Mostar: Prva književna komuna, 1986), 28.

ranks in 1948 and propelled its subsequent flight to the West.³⁷⁷ The exact style of the original structure also remains unknown, but if it was indeed meant to be the seat of the *Cominform*, it must have leaned heavily towards Socialist Realism.³⁷⁸ The building's subsequent stylistic switch to an overtly Corbusian expression represented an uncannily explicit architectural statement of the political shift away from the Soviet Union.

After the Military Institute of Geography, Macura went on to design several other Corbusian buildings, mostly apartment blocks in Belgrade. Again, these were predominantly formal exercises, since they were all conventional structures that did not explore the spatial planning or the material expression of the original *Unité*; moreover, they were all built into the dense traditional fabric of downtown Belgrade, instead of standing freely amid “space, sunshine, and greenery.”

Far more faithful interpretations of the original model were Drago Galić's two apartment buildings in Zagreb. **(Fig. 4.6)** Designed in 1953 and 1954, both were situated along Zagreb's new prestigious avenue, Proleterskih brigada St. (originally Moskovska St., then Beogradska St., today Grada Vukovara St.),

³⁷⁷ The claim comes from architectural historian Milan Milovanović, but he does not provide a source for it; see: Milan Milovanović, “Арх. Милорад Маџура: Отпор диктатима,” in: *Врачарски гласник* (Belgrade, March 2004): 13.

³⁷⁸ The concave façade of the original project seems to be consistent with its presumed socialist realist style: the two socialist realist buildings finished in Belgrade, the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Trade Unions Building, both have concave fronts, which seems to amount to a formal staple of the local Socialist Realism.

which was planned according to principles of the Athens Charter and thus provided an appropriate setting for Galić's eminently Corbusian design. Both buildings were much larger than Macura's and contained split-level units, with double-sided orientation; the chief difference from the *Unité* was the fact that instead of an "interior street," they featured open galleries on the façade.³⁷⁹ They also shared some formal details with the original *Unité*, such as syncopated rhythms on the façade of one and simplified *brise-soleils* on the other, and both had open ground-floors supported by massive *pilotis*. Moreover, unlike Macura's facades in gray stucco, both Galić's buildings were built in exposed concrete with the textures of the formwork deliberately left visible. The statement was similarly symbolic to that of Macura's Institute: the architect who only six years before had completed an icon of Socialist Realism—the Monument to the Red Army at Batina—was now again an uncompromising modernist and an unabashed follower of Le Corbusier.

Ljubljana had its own version of the *Unité*, Edo Mihevc's Kozolec building, which, together with Galić's and Macura's projects, perhaps ranks among the most recognizable appropriations of a modernist model in the history of Yugoslav architecture. **(Fig. 4.7)** But the 1950s also saw a more original interpretation of the Swiss master's work. Two apartment buildings in Sarajevo's Đure Đakovića St. also bore unmistakable references to the *Unité*, particularly because of the

³⁷⁹ In a sense, the gallery instead of an "interior street" was a return to the original concept that inspired Le Corbusier's own project: Moisei Ginzburg's *Narkomfin* building in Moscow.

partly open ground floor and the *pilotis*, as well as the concrete vaults on the roof.

(Fig. 4.8) The original model, however, was substantially transformed to accommodate the topography and the surrounding neighborhoods. The buildings were positioned perpendicular to the street-front, creating long green courtyards between them that introduced vegetation into the street. They were also placed perpendicular to the contours of the sloping site to avoid blocking the views down the hill as courtesy to the neighbors above; because their orientation, their contact with the ground was far more complex than was the case in the original *Unité*. There was also a certain rustic quality to the materials and textures that resembled Le Corbusier's prewar experiments with regionalism rather than his urbane postwar residences; this tied the buildings to their cultural context, particularly the cobbled stone paving recalling the streets of old Sarajevo.

The Sarajevo buildings were not merely a product of the moment, but the result of a long-term effort to organically incorporate Le Corbusier's ideas into Bosnian modernism. Their architect, the Zagreb-born Juraj Neidhardt, had a remarkable modernist pedigree, having studied with Peter Behrens in Vienna in the 1920s, after which he worked for Le Corbusier in Paris between 1933 and 1935. One of the few paid employees in the rue de Sèvres studio, he collaborated on such seminal projects as the *Ville radieuse* and plans for Algiers. Although he returned to Yugoslavia in 1935, Neidhardt maintained a relationship with his

“cher Maître” until the latter’s death.³⁸⁰ Just a year before the buildings in Đure Đakovića St. were finished in 1958, he had published a book entitled *Architecture of Bosnia and the Way to Modernity* for which Le Corbusier himself wrote a laudatory preface, indeed a rare occurrence.³⁸¹ The book was a collaboration with the Slovenian architect Dušan Grabrijan, a former student in Plečnik’s first generation at the University of Ljubljana, who had spent the 1930s in Sarajevo conducting relentless ethnographic research. He was also directly responsible for drawing his friend Neidhardt to Bosnia, where the latter would spend the remainder of his life, eventually becoming the patriarch of Bosnian modern architecture.

Architecture of Bosnia and the Way to Modernity was a monumental endeavor, over 500 pages long and equipped with hundreds of exquisite photos and drawings. Its basic argument was that in its spatial layout, formal simplicity, and reliance on nature the traditional Bosnian house paralleled principles of modern architecture, particularly as defined by Le Corbusier. **(Fig. 4.9)**

Fascinated with Bosnian vernacular heritage, the authors presented it as a sort of ‘modernism before modernism’, an ‘ur-modernism’ that can easily be updated to contemporary needs and should therefore provide a natural basis for a modern architecture of Bosnia. Le Corbusier’s formative 1911 “Journey to the East,”

³⁸⁰ Correspondence between Le Corbusier and Neidhardt at FLC...

³⁸¹ See: Dušan Grabrijan and Juraj Neidhardt, *Arhitektura Bosne i put u moderno—Architecture of Bosnia and the Way to Modernity* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1957).

during which he passed through the Balkans, provided some basis for this claim, as the master himself was ready to acknowledge in the preface. Le Corbusier's spirit is repeatedly invoked throughout the book and is especially visible in Neidhardt's numerous sketches, whose style is clearly reminiscent of that of the *chère Maître*.

But the book also appropriated Le Corbusier in ways that departed from some of his core ideas, displaying a marked sensitivity for the social structure of Sarajevo's traditional neighborhoods and arguing for their evolutionary transformation rather than a radical break. **(Fig. 4.10)** Such ideas were reminiscent of the backlash against modernist orthodoxy that emerged at CIAM X, except that Neidhardt and Grabrijan had promoted them ever since the 1930s. Moreover, the projects of the Smithsons, Jaap Bakema, and others inflated traditional neighborhoods to the scale of mega-structures, ultimately destroying any realistic chance of intimacy and man's close identification with the space. Neidhardt's projects, on the other hand, including the two buildings in Đure Đakovića St., retained a much more manageable scale and had a better chance to succeed, being rooted in a living tradition that did not require artificial resurrection. All of this could have made *Architecture of Bosnia* highly relevant at an international scale. It seems that its writers were aware of this potential, since the book was published with bilingual text, in Serbo-Croatian and English, and equipped with a preface by the most famous architect in the world; the choice of English as the second language was also a clear indication of the perceived

potentially important foreign audience. Nevertheless, that potential never became reality and the book's impact remained very limited even within Yugoslavia itself. Facing demands for a fast and efficient modernization, Grabrijan and Neidhardt's subtle evolutionary ideas could not compete with a sudden flood of exciting information from abroad based on advanced technology and promising cosmopolitan worldliness.

In *Architecture of Bosnia*, Neidhardt also published what could have been the symbolic high point of the acceptance of Le Corbusier in the post-1948 Yugoslavia: his winning competition proposal (with Džemal Čelić) for the new Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo, designed in 1955, but built in a much revised form only in the 1970s.³⁸² The proposal bore a clear Corbusian stamp: volumes raised on *pilotis*, ramps, parabolic plans of assembly rooms (reminiscent of Le Corbusier's projects for the League of Nations and the Palace of the Soviets), and even a free-standing sculpture resembling Chandigarh's Open Hand. **(Fig. 4.11)** But it also interpreted Le Corbusier in a decidedly local key, attaching to his staple elements meanings intended towards the construction of a specifically Bosnian-Herzegovinian identity that united the past and modernity into a synthetic statement. In their detailed analyses of the traditional Bosnian city, Grabrijan and Neidhardt claimed that the most characteristic architectural element of public neighborhoods—the *charshiya*—were the domes

³⁸² *Ibid.*, 409-26. See also: Jelica Karlić-Kapetanović, *Juraj Neidhardt: život i djelo* (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša), 171-76.

of mosques, baths, and bazaars, in contrast with the “cubic” architecture of residential neighborhoods, the *mahala*.³⁸³ (Neidhardt’s proposal for the Assembly therefore prominently featured thin concrete shells over main meeting halls as modern reinterpretations of traditional domes and signifiers of Bosnia’s newly established statehood. In a small sketch that accompanied the proposal, he further identified the open ground floor as a traditional “porch,” the long ceremonial balcony above as a “*doksa*” (an open or glazed porch on the second floor), and the tower as both a “bell-tower” and a “*stećak*,” a sculptural medieval tombstone unique to the Balkans, which after World War II was touted as a bearer of Bosnian identity and one of Yugoslavia’s original contributions to the history of world art. **(Fig. 4.12)** Le Corbusier’s lessons were not only fully assimilated, but also thoroughly ‘domesticized’ and used in the construction of a local identity.³⁸⁴

³⁸³ See: Grabrijan and Neidhardt, *Architecture of Bosnia*, 260-63.

³⁸⁴ Linking Le Corbusier’s forms and medieval Bosnian tombstones was not as arbitrary as it may sound. For a long time, the *stećci* were thought to be associated with the Bogomils, a Manichean medieval heresy similar to the Cathars in France, from which Le Corbusier believed his family to originate; see: Paul Turner, “The Beginnings of Le Corbusier’s Education, 1902-1907,” *The Art Bulletin*, LIII, 2 (June, 1971). It was, however, later disputed that the medieval Church of Bosnia had anything to do with the Bogomils. The *stećci* were prominently featured in *Architecture of Bosnia* as specifically Bogomil creations; considering the fact that Le Corbusier wrote a preface for the book, it is possible to assume that he found a personal connection there because of his own alleged heretic origin. Indeed, there are indications for such reading, as one of Le Corbusier’s employees, a certain Valentine Fougère, claimed that the Modulor was inspired by motives from the *stećci*, which frequently featured relief figures of men with a raised right hand; see author’s interview with Bogdan Bogdanović, May 2005.

* * *

The unconditional acceptance of Le Corbusier in 1950s Yugoslavia was perhaps the most eloquent symbolic statement of the changes that occurred in the country's architecture after the rift with the Soviets. Even more illustrative of the atmosphere was the following anecdote: when his mentor offered to get him an internship at Le Corbusier's studio in Paris—a prestigious experience about which most young architects around the world could only dream—Neidhardt's protégé Zlatko Ugljen chose not to take the opportunity and instead decided to stay in Sarajevo. However attractive this chance may have been, for him it paled in comparison with the professional prospects that awaited him at home: barely out of university, he could nevertheless count on building immediately and on a large scale.³⁸⁵ The combination of economic prosperity and gradual liberalization made the Yugoslavia of the late 1950s a far more appealing place than the country of universal poverty and Stalinist repression of the previous decade.

³⁸⁵ Author's interview with Zlatko Ugljen, August 2005.

Chapter 5:

NAVIGATING THE COLD WAR

Yugoslav foreign policy between 1945 and the early 1960s may be best described as a pendulum oscillating between the two poles of the Cold War world. The swing of the pendulum was at its largest at the beginning of this period, when Yugoslavia staunchly sided with the Soviet Union against the “imperialistic West.” Only a few years later, the country switched sides—more by being forced to do so than of its own will—and the former ideological enemies in the West became partners and creditors, while the former ideological allies became bitter enemies. Then, in 1956, Tito reconciled with the Soviets, but still retained the friendly relations with the West, only to run into a second conflict with the USSR the following year. By the late 1950s, however, these oscillations became smaller and smaller, until Yugoslavia settled down in a balancing act half-way between the extremes, its own independence the ultimate goal of its foreign policy. In pursuing this policy, however, it did not take an isolationist road, but instead engaged in international cooperation and actively promoted such orientation as an alternative to Cold War confrontations. As a result, Yugoslavia’s new partners became not only the two superpowers and their satellites, but also the recently decolonized Third World countries that belonged to neither blocs. These partnership with them was formalized through the creation of the Movement of Non-Alignment in Belgrade in 1961. Ever since

World War II, the country thus managed to maintain the role of a significant international player whose opinions and reactions counted far more than its size would suggest.

For architecture, these shifts meant that its international frame of reference—foreign journals, exhibitions, books, and destinations for travel—underwent drastic changes in a relatively short period. Through a 180 degree turn, the virtually exclusive orientation to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe before 1948 made way in the early 1950s for a complete reorientation to the West. When the relations with the Communist bloc thawed after 1956, however, symmetry between the East and the West was only partly established. Yugoslav architectural periodicals never again paid much attention to the Soviet Union and articles about it published after 1948 amounted to no more than a handful. Exchange with some other socialist countries, primarily Poland, was at moments intense, allowing a few Polish architects to build in Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s; nevertheless, this did not result in a more sustained presence. On the other hand, Yugoslav construction companies and their resident architects found a new market in the Communist bloc, often facilitating a transfer of technology and know-how from the West. The connections established through the Non-Aligned Movement provided construction industry with an even larger new

market in the Third World, turning architecture and civil engineering into one of Yugoslavia's most successful export products.³⁸⁶

Besides merely 'opening' Yugoslav architecture to influences of an increasing range of foreign cultures, the shifts in foreign policy also contributed to the construction of interpretative frameworks in which architecture operated. This was a multi-sided process with many agents of various motivations, which testifies to an ever-changing dynamic in the postwar politicization of modernism, not only in Yugoslavia but around the world. Yugoslav architects were only one group active in this process; others involved local and foreign political circles, architectural organizations, media, and various official and semi-official organizations aimed at cultural propaganda, all engaged in a complex interplay that defined the meanings of architecture locally and internationally.

Constructing a "Wedge:" Architecture and US Engagement

After its split with Stalin, Yugoslavia became a key strategic ally of the United States. As part of the broader doctrine of "containment" of the Soviets, the Americans saw the renegade country as a "wedge" in a previously monolithic Communist bloc and, under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, adopted a policy of "keeping Tito afloat" in hopes that Yugoslav influence would spread to

³⁸⁶ These connections, however, despite being extremely interesting, occurred mainly in the late 1960s and 1970s and thus fall outside of the chronological scope of this study.

other socialist states and undermine the Soviet control of the bloc.³⁸⁷ The strategy included military and economic aid to help Yugoslavia fend off the threats coming from its former allies. Throughout the 1950s, economic and military aid flowed from the United States. This aid provided the survival of an independent Yugoslavia outside of the Communist bloc, which was a common cause both for the Yugoslavs and Americans.³⁸⁸ Tito, however, skillfully maneuvered away from making any real concessions to his sponsors; the reforms undertaken in the country were far more necessary to internally legitimate the system as distinct from bureaucratic Stalinism than to appease the West. Despite the hopes of Eisenhower's administration and initial steps made in that direction, Yugoslavia never joined NATO and jealously maintained its independence. In one of the few explicit gestures of gratitude to the US, the Yugoslav government donated in 1951 a large building in Kneza Miloša St. in downtown Belgrade to be used as the American embassy; the building still serves the same purpose today.³⁸⁹ With the scarce concessions on the Yugoslav side, the wedge strategy proved to be no less problematic than useful.

³⁸⁷ For a detailed account of the "wedge strategy" and the American involvement in Yugoslavia in the 1950s, see Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, especially Introduction, xiii-xviii, and chapters 3-5, 81-194.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 227.

³⁸⁹ The gift was promised in July 1951, but the arrangements were finalized only in 1955. See, among other documents, letter from Veljko Mićunović, State Undersecretary of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Chief of Staff of the Vice President Edvard Kardelj, October 22, 1951; ASCG, Fond 130, Fascikla 640.

Above all else, the Americans found it increasingly challenging to reconcile the pragmatic benefits of their support of a renegade Communist state with the ideological underpinnings of Yugoslavia's unwavering allegiance to socialism. In a climate of rabid antiCommunism, especially during the McCarthy era, but also long after that, the strategy faced frequent criticism from the US Congress. Both Truman's and Eisenhower's administrations had to invest considerable efforts in acquiring public support for it.

At the level of 'high politics,' the wedge strategy and the problems associated with it have been well researched. But its repercussions in the sphere of culture—including architecture—remain far less explored. On the one hand, its cultural effects paralleled and were part of a broader campaign of American cultural propaganda in Western Europe, which has been well documented in other countries.³⁹⁰ On the other hand, Yugoslavia was a far more specific case than any West European country, which provided not only a unique context for the reception of American propaganda, but, in turn, also required unusual modes of presenting Yugoslav culture to American audiences. In the light of the lingering resistance to extending aid to a Communist country, it

³⁹⁰ Some of the titles include: Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2005); Robert H. Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s* (Washington, D.C., and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997); and Reinhold Wagenleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

became critical to promote Yugoslavia as reformed and clearly distinct from the rest of the Communist world; culture—including architecture—played an important role in such efforts. In return, the obviously beneficial role that art and architecture had for the international image of the country paved the way for further liberalization of culture and contributed to the remarkable flowering of modernism in the late 1950s.

The Americans first proved cooperative in the field of architecture remarkably early, in 1950, by assisting Yugoslavia in joining the *Union Internationale des Architectes* (UIA). The Union had been founded at a meeting in Lausanne (Switzerland) in June 1948, a brainchild of Pierre Vago, editor-in-chief of the influential French journal *L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui*, with the purpose of establishing a broad basis for international cooperation between architects. Instead of that, however, it immediately became a battleground of the Cold War *Kulturkampf*. The still pro-Soviet Yugoslavia did not have its delegation at this first meeting in Lausanne, but *Arhitektura* published an article sympathetic with the struggle of Soviet delegates against the alleged imperialism of the “Anglo-American bloc.”³⁹¹ Two years later, when Yugoslavia tried to join the organization, the tables were turned. Serving as a proxy for the Soviets, the Polish delegation repeatedly sabotaged the admission and Helena Syrkus, formerly a long-time Polish representative in CIAM, practically blackmailed the

³⁹¹ “Na međunarodnom kongresu arhitekata u Lausanni,” in: *Arhitektura* II, no. 13-17 (1948): 139-41.

UIA in a letter to Pierre Vago that stated: “The Polish section can only continue to participate in the work of the UIA if Yugoslavia does not participate.”³⁹² To rescue came the representative of the American Institute of Architects, Ralph Walker, whose carefully orchestrated plotting behind the scenes ensured that Yugoslavia was finally admitted to the Union at a meeting in Paris in October 1950, in the absence of delegates from the Soviet bloc. *Arhitektura* briefly reported on the hostile attitude of delegations from the Cominform countries, but it did not mention who was responsible for thwarting their disruptive efforts.³⁹³ But Walker received lavish praise from the US Mission to the United Nations for having “skillfully met... the Communist tactics” and for defeating the “Iron Curtain boys... in an attempt to penetrate organizations of a purely technical nature.”³⁹⁴ Such rhetoric revealed this episode as the “cultural Cold War” at its most explicit; the fact that Yugoslav architects played a role in it—however obscure and passive—casts a completely new light on all their subsequent international achievements.

³⁹² Helena Syrkus and Josef Ufnalewski to Pierre Vago, 3 April 1950, Walker Papers, Syracuse University. I thank my colleague and friend Kate Holliday for bringing this episode to my attention and also for being so kind to share the results of her research with me.

³⁹³ “Drugi kongres Međunarodne unije arhitekata u Maroku,” *Arhitektura* V, no. 9-12 (1951): 118-19.

³⁹⁴ Frederick T. Rope, Education Liaison officer of the United States Mission to the United Nations, to Ralph Walker, 1 August, 1950, Walker Papers, Syracuse University; kindly provided by Kate Holliday.

At the Second UIA Congress in Rabat, Morocco, in September 1951, the Soviet bloc was completely absent, and Yugoslavia's uniqueness as the only participating socialist country was all the more obvious. Its ambitious national display was the third largest of the eight presented at the First International Architectural Exhibition organized on the occasion of the Congress.³⁹⁵ The exhibition showed a broad range of material, from Yugoslav landscapes and folk costumes, to vernacular architecture and master plans of cities; the accent, however, was on current production.³⁹⁶ The buildings presented were by and large modest and the more ambitious ones were still under construction, but none of them departed from a rather *sachlich* modernism or betrayed any hints of Socialist Realism; even the graphic design of the exhibition panels was restrained. **(Fig. 5.1)** Such an approach was probably not deliberately calculated to achieve a particular effect, especially since it was not at odds with the actual situation in the country. But within only a few years, the promotion of Yugoslav modernism in the West, both in visual art and architecture, would prove politically beneficial and would be deliberately pursued as the ultimate visual statement of the country's independence from the Soviet bloc.

³⁹⁵ "Drugi kongres Međunarodne unije arhitekata u Maroku," 119.

³⁹⁶ *Exposition internationale d'architecture de l'Union Internationale des Architectes / Rabat Maroc 1951: RFP Yougoslavie*, exhibition catalogue (Ljubljana: Conseil des Associations des Architectes Yougoslaves, 1951).

Such interpretation fit comfortably within the broader Cold War discourse on art and architecture that associated styles with political ideologies. For the past thirty years, art historians have been embroiled in a protracted argument about the use of modern art as a “weapon of the Cold War,” focusing on the intriguing question whether the US government (and the CIA as the prime suspect) covertly contributed to the international promotion of Abstract Expressionism as a symbol of America’s succession on the cultural throne of the world.³⁹⁷ But this question, regardless of the ‘correct’ answer to it, masks a broader and more significant fact that, during the early Cold War years, modernism in general became explicitly associated with Western liberal democracies, in direct visual and philosophical opposition to Socialist Realism that the Soviets promoted in their own sphere of interest. This politics of style, however, was not as obvious as it may seem. It required concerted efforts of many pundits, especially in the United States, to erase the prewar leftist associations of modern architecture and art and counter the resistance of the conservative public that cast modernism (and especially its more radical

³⁹⁷ Bibliography on this topic is long; see, among other sources: Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War*, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983); Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 1999); Paul Wood, Francis Francina, Jonathan Harris, and Charles Harrison, *Modernism in Dispute: Art since the Forties* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, in association with the Open University, 1993).

European strains) as “Communist” and “un-American.”³⁹⁸ The reasoning behind such association went like this: the Nazis and the Soviets—both arch-enemies of American democracy—promoted similarly conservative, academic art and architecture, while hating and relentlessly suppressing modernism. The presence of modernism in a society was therefore understood as a sign that art in it was free to develop in its ‘natural’ direction, further indicating the existence of personal freedoms in the given society.

Texts like *Art Under a Dictatorship* were instrumental in promoting such views.³⁹⁹ Written in 1954 by Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt, an American art historian of German origin, the book was widely circulated and by the 1970s had at least four editions. The writing of the book was, at least in part, and likely unbeknownst to the author, sponsored by a covert CIA establishment in Berlin.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁸ In the context of architecture, characteristic of the situation was the advocacy of Elizabeth Gordon, editor of *House Beautiful*, that proclaimed the austere modernism of European immigrant architects “un-American.” She received support from Frank Lloyd Wright, but also vigorous protests from the AIA. See: Monica Penick, *The Pace Setter Houses: Livable Modernism in Postwar America*, doctoral dissertation (University of Texas at Austin, 2007).

³⁹⁹ Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt, *Art under a Dictatorship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954).

⁴⁰⁰ During his research for the book, Lehmann-Haupt was a guest of the *Amerikahäuser*, the “outposts of American culture” in Germany directly sponsored by the government; he also enjoyed support from Melvin Lasky, the “father of the Cold War in Berlin” and the editor of the American German-language journal *Der Monat*; see: *Lehmann-Haupt, Art under a Dictatorship*, vii-ixi. As Francis Stonor Saunders has shown, *Der Monat* was an instrument of the US government, directly sponsored by the CIA; Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, 19-20, 29-30. It is ironic that Lehmann-Haupt’s project simultaneously received help from Meyer Schapiro,

In a lengthy comparison, Lehmann-Haupt effectively equalized the Nazi and Stalinist art, conveniently smoothing out the differences between them and drawing a clear connection between monumental historicism and totalitarian societies. In a direct opposition to this connection, he identified modernism with democracy, aiming the argument at contemporary American discussions about the political meanings of culture. This was an important point to make because, within the United States, modernist art and architecture, especially their specific brand 'imported' from Europe just prior to the war, encountered significant opposition. From the end of the war until the decline of the McCarthy era, conservative politicians repeatedly used the pulpit of the US Congress to hurl insults against modernism as "Communist art," an accusation that was not entirely unfounded considering the leftist inclinations of many prewar modernists. Thanks to interventions such as Lehmann-Haupt's, combined with the theoretical grounding provided by Clement Greenberg's doctrine of artistic autonomy, modern art and architecture were effectively purged of their prewar associations with movements for social reform and became 'protégés' of a specific subset of the American society: the anti-isolationist, liberal business elite that sought to actively pursue US interests around the world.

This context provided an ideological framework for American interpretations of Yugoslav art and architecture throughout the 1950s and 1960s,

the Marxist art historian, which testifies to the subsuming of American left-wing intellectuals by the establishment in the face of confrontations with Stalin.

starting with the country's very first significant success at the international stage. At the Bienal of Art in Sao Paulo in 1953, the Yugoslav selection made a double triumph with awards both in the categories of art and architecture. The Croatian architect Zvonimir Požgay won a prize for a small beach complex in Zadar (Croatia), a simple exercise in 'regional' modernism that superimposed rustic stone walls and vaulted concrete canopies. This put him in the company of such rising international 'stars' as Philip Johnson, Paul Rudolph (then on the threshold of world fame), and Craig Elwood, who were also awarded in Sao Paulo.⁴⁰¹ Požgay, however, never capitalized on this success and his star never really took off, unlike that of the Montenegrin painter Petar Lubarda, who also won a prize at the Bienal. After this breakthrough, Lubarda established a respectable international career and was favorably reviewed by such international authorities as Herbert Read, Henry Moore, and Jean Cassou.⁴⁰² His forcefully expressive paintings caused a minor sensation at the Bienal, both for their originality and, perhaps even more, for their unexpected country of origin.⁴⁰³ Aline Louchheim, the art critic of the *New York Times* (soon to become Mrs. Eero Saarinen),

⁴⁰¹ "Awards at the Sao Paulo Bienal," in: *Architectural Review* 115 (June 1954): 413.

⁴⁰² For more on Lubarda in this context, see: Ješa Denegri, *Pedesete: teme srpske umetnosti (1950-1960)* (Novi Sad: Svetovi, 1993), 62-66.

⁴⁰³ Henry Moore, for example, proclaimed that the "Bienal did not show anything new... except for Yugoslavia and its Lubarda;" quoted after *Lubarda*, edited by Draško Todorović, Radovan Todorović, and Ivana Todorović (Podgorica, Montenegro: Galerija Todorović, 2004), 450.

explicitly put Lubarda's work in a political perspective, explaining its showing as a deliberate statement of "Tito's break with Russia:"

One country in particular realized how emphatically art can make a point. Yugoslavia, keenly aware that the Western World queries how philosophically deep the break with Russia is, shrewdly eschewed the overlife-size bronze of Tito... which dominated the Yugoslavian pavilion in the Venice international show three years ago. Here all its eggs were put into one modern basket—the work of Petar Lubarda. It was perfectly clear that these semiabstract, expressionist and extremely forceful works indicated a freedom of expression and a modern idiom which... would not have been acceptable in the Soviet Union.⁴⁰⁴

Louchheim's revealing description of Lubarda's work as "semiabstract expressionism" put Yugoslav art in direct reference to the art of the United States and in opposition to the Soviet Union. Within Yugoslavia such interpretations were flatly rejected, but this was a message aimed primarily at Louchheim's domestic public, which was still deeply suspicious of the prudence of sponsoring of a Communist state. In 197, the *New York Times* would bring a similarly explicit political interpretation of the new architecture in Belgrade, which came at a particularly charged moment, after Tito's rapprochement with the Soviets the

⁴⁰⁴ Aline B. Louchheim, "Cultural Diplomacy: An Art We Neglect," *New York Times* (Jan. 3, 1954): SM16.

previous year. The author was Harrison Salisbury, a reputed expert on Eastern Europe and a Pulitzer-Prize winner for his reports from the Soviet Union, who apparently lent his authority to reinforce the fact that Yugoslavia was still independent of the Communist bloc:

To a visitor from eastern Europe a stroll in Belgrade is like walking out of a grim barracks of ferro-concrete into a light and imaginative world of pastel buildings, “flying saucers,” and Italianate patios. Nowhere is Yugoslavia’s break with the drab monotony and tasteless gingerbread of “Socialist Realism” more dramatic than in the graceful office buildings, apartment houses and public structures that have replaced the rubble of World War II.

Thanks in part to the break with Moscow and in part to the taste of some skilled architects no Stalin Allées, Gorky Streets or Warsaw skyscrapers mar the Belgrade landscape...

...Simplicity, airiness, pastel pinks, blues, and yellows are the hallmark of the new Belgrade school, sharply contrasting not only with the mixed baroque of Stalinist style but with the heavy, dark constructions that were typical of the pre-war city.

The same break with Socialist realism is found in the field of Yugoslav art where the most advanced schools in the West have apt practitioners in Belgrade.

A modernistic exhibition of the latest Yugoslav painters presented at the summer resort of Dubrovnik this year had much in common with contemporary Paris. But nothing that would fit into Moscow's Tretyakov Gallery.⁴⁰⁵

Salisbury especially highlighted the recently finished central dome of the Belgrade Fair—indeed a striking prefabricated structure whose span of 340 feet was at the moment the largest in its category in the world—and did not fail to mention that its architect, Milorad Pantović, was educated in Paris, London, and New York. And as if to shed any last doubt about the devotion of Yugoslav officialdom to Western culture, Salisbury illustrated the article with a photo of the “Council of Ministers Building” in New Belgrade (actually the redesigned former Presidency of Federal government whose construction resumed in 1954).

Salisbury's suggestive rhetoric translated the Manichean construct of the Cold War world into architectural language, establishing a set of visual opposites: simplicity, airiness, and imagination of the “free world” vs. heaviness, darkness, and the “baroque” of its antipode behind the Iron Curtain. While on the surface speaking of architectural qualities, these words had obvious moral connotations, evoking a quasi-religious imagery of good and evil, heaven and hell. The architecture that in Salisbury's description represented the ‘forces of good’ was essentially a Yugoslav version of the International Style, which at the time was in

⁴⁰⁵ Harrison E. Salisbury, “Building Pattern Set by Belgrade,” *New York Times* (Aug. 22, 1957): 8.

the process of not only transforming Belgrade, but also the centers of virtually all major cities in the country. It is ironic that in the popular discourse in Yugoslavia, it was precisely this kind of architecture that became identified—wrongly but revealingly—as a "Socialist Realism," highlighting the powerful connection that was established between modernism and the socialist state.

Statements like Louchheim's and Salisbury's, published in America's leading opinion-making paper, made it clear to Yugoslav officialdom that modernism was a powerful tool for strengthening the country's international position. By the late 1950s, it became a calculated strategy to show the most advanced modern art and architecture to Western audiences, while reserving the more conservative works for display in the East.⁴⁰⁶ With the support of the Federal Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and other state institutions, throughout the 1950s artists exhibited in the West fairly frequently and with considerable success; but praise was commonly accompanied by surprise with the quality of the exhibited works, which seemed to contradict the expectations associated with their geographic, cultural, and

⁴⁰⁶ For example, at a meeting of the Board for Visual Arts, the ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ivo Vejvoda, explicitly spoke of the propagandistic benefits of art and of the great political potential of the promotion of Yugoslav contemporary art in the West. See: Minutes of the First meeting of the Board for Visual Arts, Federal Committee for Cultural Connections with Foreign Countries, held on 14 November, 1960, at the Federal Executive Council; ASCG, Fond 559, Fascikla 200a, 31-33.

ideological origin.⁴⁰⁷ Architects gained much less exposure, simply because of the nature of their medium; but when they did, similar perpetual surprise followed them well into the 1960s.

The large exhibition of Yugoslav architecture shown in Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Warsaw, London, Glasgow, and Liverpool between March and September 1959 presented consistently modernist material both in Poland and in the West and received similarly flattering reviews wherever it was shown.⁴⁰⁸ This uniform reaction highlighted the fact that architecture in the Communist bloc was undergoing a significant change (announced the previous year at the EXPO in Brussels), with modernism again gaining solid footing there as a result of cultural reforms conducted under Nikita Khrushchev several years before. This, however, meant that Yugoslavia's glaring aesthetic difference from the countries under Soviet control was about to fade; with it, American interest in Yugoslav architecture faded as well, resurging occasionally with the same single-minded focus on purely ideological interpretation. It reached an absurd level in a 1966 *Newsweek* article that described the newly opened Museum of Contemporary Art

⁴⁰⁷ On the exhibitions of Croatian (and Yugoslav) artists during the 1950s and their reception abroad, see Ljiljana Kolešnik's excellent book *Između Istoka i Zapada: Hrvatska umjetnost i likovna kritika 50-ih godina* (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2006), 339-55, esp. 354.

⁴⁰⁸ About the exhibition and its reception, see: S. S., "Izložba savremene arhitekture Jugoslavije u inostranstvu," in: *Arhitektura Urbanizam* I, no. 1 (1960): 31. For the material shown at the exhibition, see: *Contemporary Yugoslav Architecture/Architecture yougoslave contemporaine*, exhibition catalogue (Ljubljana: Association of the Architects of Slovenia, 1959).

in Belgrade—a remarkably inspired modernist building filled with modernist artworks—as a "joyful tombstone to Socialist Realism."⁴⁰⁹

While trying to present Yugoslav culture as distinct from that behind the Iron Curtain, the United States also invested much in its own propaganda within Yugoslavia, working simultaneously on several fronts: promoting American culture—both ‘high’ and popular—to broad audiences, attempting to export the American commercial culture, and subtly influencing Yugoslav officials to appreciate and embrace the American system and way of life. Despite being an epitome of capitalism, American popular culture was perhaps most warmly embraced, although not exactly unselectively. Once it restarted, the import of movies, comics, and music from the United States, despite the occasional official grudge, never ceased again.⁴¹⁰ Jazz musicians, like Dizzy Gillespie, Ella Fitzgerald, and Louis Armstrong, were received with standing ovations.⁴¹¹ During its ten years of touring the world, *The Family of Man*, an ambitious exhibition of American photography organized by the Museum of Modern Art in New York,

⁴⁰⁹ "Slavs Without Marx," *Newsweek* (February 7, 1966): 40.

⁴¹⁰ In accord with broader American efforts at promoting their own culture and way of life in Europe, the import of much of American cultural products—movies, for example—was frequently funded directly from US coffers. The US Technical Aid to Yugoslavia funded the import of American movies; Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada*, 445. On the reception of American mass culture (film, popular music, and comic strips), see: *ibid*, 444-53; 465-77.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, 471.

attracted its largest audience not in Paris or London, but in Belgrade in 1957.⁴¹² The demand for American popular culture was so great that some things did not even have to be offered; the market could have consumed even more films than the US were willing to export, being reluctant to send to Yugoslavia movies with socially-charged themes that could be construed as criticism of the American way of life, as was the case with *Rebel Without a Cause* and *On the Docks of New York*.⁴¹³

In a similar fashion, the promotion of American art and architecture did not require much persuasion either: another major MoMA exhibition, *Contemporary Art in the USA*, arrived in Belgrade in 1956 at a direct request of the Yugoslav side.⁴¹⁴ The exhibition was remembered for introducing Abstract Expressionism to Europe, but it showcased latest architectural achievements as well, especially the icons of the International Style, such as SOM's Lever House in New York, which was featured on the cover of the catalogue. **(Fig. 5.2)** Among others, Mies van der Rohe's Lake Shore Drive towers in Chicago and Philip Johnson's

⁴¹² The exhibition was commissioned by the US Information Agency for showing abroad. It was on display in Belgrade January 25-February 22, 1957; and in Zagreb October-November, 1958; see: Internationally Circulating Exhibitions, <http://www.moma.org/international/PDF/icelist.pdf>, accessed February 6, 2007.

⁴¹³ Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada*, 445.

⁴¹⁴ The recently established Federal Committee for Cultural Connections with Foreign Countries was responsible for the invitation. See: *Savremena umetnost u SAD: Iz zbirki Museum of Modern Art, New York*, exhibition catalogue (Belgrade: Komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom, 1956), 3.

Glass House were shown, too. The fact that a wave of glass curtain walls hit the country soon after the exhibition, replacing the recent Corbusian epidemic, is indicative of the new prestige that American architecture acquired in Yugoslavia. Indeed, by the late 1950s, buildings modeled on the Lever House, combining horizontal and vertical slabs encased in light curtain walls—at the time, significantly, known as “American façades”—began appearing in major Yugoslav cities. **(Fig. 5.3)** These, however, were often plagued by problems of transferring a highly sophisticated technology into an environment lacking the material means to support it.⁴¹⁵ It should not, however, be assumed that the exhibition itself sparked the emergence of curtain walls; it only strengthened the already existing interest fed by abundant information on America available in Yugoslav architectural journals since the early 1950.⁴¹⁶ Besides that, the

⁴¹⁵ For a technical analysis of curtain walls in Belgrade in the early 1960s, see: Ranko Trbojević, “Zid zavesa i njegova primena u Beogradu,” *Arhitektura Urbanizam* 8, no. 44 (1967): 18-19.

Illustrating the problems of technological transfer is the story of Zagreb's first curtain-wall skyscraper, built as part of the so-called Foundation Block on the main city square. The construction of its curtain wall was a case of ‘industrial espionage,’ in which prefabricated curtain-wall panels bought in Italy were disassembled and copied at the *Utvra* aircraft factory in Pančevo to be used in Zagreb. I thank the Zagreb architectural historian Aleksander Laslo for sharing this story with me in an interview in June 2005.

⁴¹⁶ *Arhitektura* regularly published overviews of foreign architectural journals and books, including *Architectural Forum*. One of the more spectacular presentations of American architecture was a review of the book *The American House Today* by Katherine M. Ford and T.H. Creighton, published in *Arhitektura* in 1953 and abundantly illustrated with photographs of latest glass and metal houses in California, Texas, and Oregon; see: “Suvremena američka arhitektura,” in: *Arhitektura* 7, no. 1 (1953): 38-42.

American reading room, sponsored by the United States Information Agency, functioned in Belgrade with almost no interruption since the end of World War II, offering, among other publications, latest issues of architectural magazines and books.

Not all American propagandistic efforts were met with the same enthusiasm. The US attempt to sell supermarket technology in Yugoslavia, for example, was a case of the conditional acceptance of the more openly ideological incursions.⁴¹⁷ The occasion was the 1957 International Fair in Zagreb, at which the US Department of Commerce staged a typical American supermarket in order to create, as the historian Robert Haddow stated, “a sensational picture of the American way of life that focused on food and basic amenities.”⁴¹⁸ The attempt was part of the US campaign at promoting consumerism at West European markets.⁴¹⁹ The US pavilion featured a fully equipped supermarket, complete with merchandise—including the fresh packaged produce and meat flown daily from the States at an enormous expense. Local students were hired to demonstrate the concept of a self-service store in action, either as shoppers or cashiers. Next to the supermarket was a model home that showcased a range of domestic appliances. In another corner of the pavilion, a fully automated laundromat was installed for the first time in

⁴¹⁷ I thank Greg Castillo for drawing my attention to this example.

⁴¹⁸ Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty*, 64.

⁴¹⁹ See *ibid.*, 38-69.

Yugoslavia, next to an exhibit of the most advanced agricultural machines. All this abundance was calculated to convey an inherently ideological message without any obvious ideological symbols: that American-style capitalism was beneficial to every individual member of the society, unlike the competing Soviet system that oppressed one's individuality for sake of the collective.

The success of this message was only partial. *The New York Times* reported that the supermarket was the popular "hit" of the Zagreb fair.⁴²⁰ But the same conclusion could not be made from the local press coverage: the whole fair was an enormously popular and highly publicized event, opened by Tito himself, that in two weeks attracted more than one million visitors and the American pavilion was only one of the many attractions in it. The press did record the supermarket as a minor sensation, especially during Tito's visit to the fair; the Belgrade daily *Politika* complimented the whole US show for its elegance and taste.⁴²¹ Its impact, however, was largely overshadowed by a showcase of Yugoslavia's own attempts at fostering a more consumer-friendly economy, the exhibition "Family and Household 1957," which displayed modern, locally-made furniture and appliances, but also plans for "residential communities" and the equipment for the various communal services associated with them, such as

⁴²⁰ Elie Abel, "Typical American Supermarket Is the Hit of Fair in Yugoslavia," in: *The New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1957, 1.

⁴²¹ M. Mimica, "Загребачки Велесајам добија све већи значај као један од прворазредних сајмова међународног значаја," in: *Политика* (Belgrade), September 8, 1957, 2.

kindergartens, centralized kitchens, laundries, etc.⁴²² Similarly, the rather understated architecture of the US pavilion, the work of the prominent American designer Walter Dorwin Teague, went completely unnoticed by Yugoslav architects. Instead, a few spectacular, locally designed structures garnered far more attention, especially Ivo Vitić's Pavilion of West Germany and Bernardo Bernardi's pavilion of the heavy machinery company Mašinogradnja, both of which featured innovative technological solutions. **(Figs. 5.4, 5.5)**

After the fair, a local company bought the complete equipment of the American supermarket and installed it the following year in Yugoslavia's first self-service store at Cvetni trg in downtown Belgrade.⁴²³ The supermarket functioned continuously in the same building until 2005, when it was converted, despite its historical significance, into a BMW dealership.⁴²⁴ Soon after Cvetni trg, supermarkets started opening all over Yugoslavia, forever transforming the model of commercial culture in the country. But the appropriation of the model was only partial: while the self-service approach was wholeheartedly accepted, the sale of prepackaged produce and meat did not really take off until after the

⁴²² See: "Стан савременог човека." In: *Политика* (Belgrade), Sept. 21, 1957, insert. Also: M.S. "Помоћ радној породици." In: *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Sept. 15, 1957, 9.

⁴²³ About the opening of the supermarket in Belgrade, see: Z. B. "Прва продавница са самопослуживањем." In: *Политика* (Belgrade), Sept. 27, 1958, 2.

⁴²⁴ Ironically, it was during the socialist times that the significance of the supermarket at Cvetni trg was recognized more than in the post-socialist period: the store was significantly remodeled in 1988, to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of its opening and of the arrival of self-service stores in the country.

collapse of the socialist state and the arrival of international grocery chains. Similarly, the concept of the supermarket as a large centralized establishment that serves whole neighborhoods and is visited only once every week or two was transformed into smaller self-service stores visited daily. These often moved into the same rooms previously occupied by old local groceries, whose small and irregular spaces impaired the desired efficiency of the shopping experience. **(Fig. 5.6)** The arrival of the supermarket, however, also gave rise to purposely designed new structures, derived from models developed for department stores. They also merged with the nascent industry of metal prefabrication, although massive buildings in reinforced concrete were just as common.

A final way in which American propaganda influenced Yugoslav architecture was through sponsored visits of prominent Yugoslavs to the United States. Starting in the late 1950s, numerous minor officials, as well as leading scholars, scientists, and artist began travelling across the Atlantic through a range of exchange programs, including the Fulbright Program.⁴²⁵ American invitations were so frequent, that in 1962 Yugoslav government discussed limiting the number of officials who traveled to the US on the Leaders Exchange Program; the motivation, however, for such limiting was not fear of unwanted

⁴²⁵ Negotiations for the Fulbright Program began in 1959, but they dragged until 1964; see: Secretary Veljko Zečević to Federal Executive Council, June 11, 1959; ASCG, Fond 130, Fascikla 640.

indoctrination, but rather the lack of reciprocal American visits to Yugoslavia.⁴²⁶ Particularly influential on architecture were the invitations from the Ford Foundation, which enabled a range of architects, artists, and critics to establish close contacts with their American colleagues and to transplant the experiences acquired in the US back to Yugoslavia. The convenience of the Ford Foundation lay in the fact that it was not a government agency, but an independent channel that could act on its own, escaping the frequent limitations on cooperation with Yugoslavia imposed due to the antiCommunist sentiment of the US Congress.⁴²⁷ American influence in Yugoslavia and, by extension, the wedge strategy could thus be sustained even when the relations between the two countries were officially strained.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁶ Letter from the State Undersecretary Marko Nikezić to the Secretary of the Federal Executive Council Veljko Zeković of November 19, 1962; ASCG, Fond 130, Fascikla 640.

The limitations were subsequently abolished in a deliberate attempt maintain a balance of good relationships with the two superpowers; see: "Informacija o stanju odnosa SFRJ-SAD i zaključcima Saveznog izvršnog veća," July 18, 1964; ASCG, Fond 130, Fascikla 640.

⁴²⁷ As Frances Stonor Saunders has shown, the Ford Foundation was one of a number of American private foundations that seemed as "simply an extension of government in the area of cultural propaganda;" see: Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, 138-42.

⁴²⁸ One such instance was in 1963, when the Congress abolished agreements on trade with Yugoslavia, apparently for no specific reason other than intervention of Yugoslavia's own fiercely antiCommunist diaspora and against plans of the Kennedy administration. George Kennan, who was at the time US ambassador in Belgrade, resigned in protest.

Transcending the Cold War: The Reconstruction of Skopje

By the early 1960s, Yugoslavia established its foreign policy as a balancing act between the Eastern and Western blocs. As a leader of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries, it placed itself not in opposition to one of the rivals in the Cold War, but to the Cold War itself. The policy of “active and peaceful coexistence” was advertised as a willingness to respect the differences and to collaborate with almost any country in the world, regardless of its dominant ideology or political system. The ambition to transcend the Cold War divisions found its most powerful architectural symbol in the reconstruction of the Macedonian capital of Skopje, after it was destroyed in a catastrophic earthquake in 1963.

At 5:17 am on 26 July, citizens of Skopje woke up to the sound of terrible thunder coming from below their feet. Within just five seconds, the thriving capital of Macedonia suffered great losses: over a thousand of its inhabitants were killed, four thousand were injured, and some 170,000 were rendered homeless. More than three quarters of its buildings became unsafe for occupation.⁴²⁹ Although there had been earthquakes with much greater numbers of casualties throughout the century, this disaster was nevertheless of a monumental scale. The reconstruction, however, was equally monumental. The

⁴²⁹ See: Jovan Šćekić, *This was Skopje* (Belgrade: Federal Secretariat for Information, 1963), n.p.

aid that poured into the city in the days that followed the earthquake was already becoming somewhat of a standard response to such disasters. But the international involvement in the reconstruction, both through the agencies of the United Nations and the donations of individual countries, was on an unprecedented scale, placing the minor provincial capital into the focus of international attention. Macedonia, which only fifteen years before had had only a handful of architects, received an injection of cosmopolitanism that would reverberate in the circles of its architects long after the last UN expert left Skopje.

Macedonia acquired its statehood only after World War II, when Macedonians were recognized as one of the six constituent nations of Yugoslavia. In the first Yugoslavia, Macedonians were denied an identity of their own and were instead proclaimed "Southern Serbs." The last among South-Slavs to be liberated from the "Turkish yoke," and thus the most "backward" by Western standards, Macedonians continued to yearn for recognition under yet another regime they perceived as foreign. With a rich native building tradition, but lacking in formally educated architects, Macedonian cities were modernized under the leadership of outsiders, including many architects from Belgrade, a few modernists from Zagreb, and a considerable number of Russian émigrés who found refuge from the revolution in Yugoslavia.⁴³⁰ Skopje's first planner, Josif

⁴³⁰ For a history of interwar architecture in Skopje, see Krum Tomovski, and Boris Petkovski, *Архитектурата и монументалната уметност во Скопје меѓу двете светски војни*, (Skopje: The Museum of the City of Skopje, 2003).

Mihailović (1887-1941), is a telling example of Macedonia's contested identities: born in a village in Western Macedonia to a master builder named Mihailo Georgiev—a name that sounds clearly Macedonian—Mihailović adopted a Serbianized last name ending in –ić, apparently to help his career in a Serbian-dominated state.⁴³¹ After having studied architecture in Belgrade, he worked as an architect in the United States for ten years, and then studied urban planning in France and England, before returning to Belgrade in 1927. Between 1929 and 1936, he was the mayor of Skopje and during this time he devised the first comprehensive urban plan for the city, attempting to transform its irregular, "Oriental," structure into regular monumental one, according to the principles he learned during his practice in the West.

After World War II, Macedonia acquired the status of a constituent People's Republic within Yugoslavia and Skopje became its capital. The new Republic, however, was incredibly poor and had a chronic shortage of educated professionals, including a minuscule number of architects. The postwar reconstruction of Macedonia occurred largely with the help of Croatian architects, who were deployed there by the Federal Government; they were also instrumental in establishing an architecture school at the University of Skopje,

⁴³¹ For Mihailović's biography, see *Архитектурата на почвата на Македонија од средината на век до крајот на век*, edited by Georgi Stardelov, Krum Tomovski, and Mihail Tokarev, (Skopje: Makedonska akademija na naukite i umetnostite, 2006).

enabling a local architectural elite to emerge and finally take over the construction in the young republic.

But although the Croats dominated Macedonian architecture in the first post-war years, the engagement of the first post-war planner of Skopje was a result of another set of political circumstances that reflected Yugoslavia's international position at the time. The 1948 Master Plan of Skopje was designed by Ludjek Kubeš, a Czechoslovak modernist architect who arrived in Macedonia in June 1947 lured by its exoticism and Pan-Slavic sentiments.⁴³² His arrival, however, was only possible because of the very close cultural cooperation between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the first post-war years, when both countries found themselves in the Soviet camp. That cooperation abruptly ceased after the *Cominform* Resolution, but Kubeš nevertheless decided to stay in Skopje, where he spent most of his professional career. Besides the Master Plan of the city, he also designed a number of modernist apartment buildings and schools around Macedonia.

During the 1950s, Skopje experienced a period of significant growth as the newly appointed administrative and industrial center of Macedonia, similar to other republican capitals in Yugoslavia. In the 17 years from 1945 to 1961, its population more than doubled from about 82,000 to over 171,000, largely at the expense of other parts of the republic, growing to the size of Yugoslavia's third or

⁴³² About Kubeš's biography, see: Kokan Grčev, "Архитект Лудјек Кубеш (1913-1996)," *ibid.*

fourth largest city.⁴³³ From a predominantly craft- and agriculture-based economy, it became a center of metallurgical, textile, chemical, and pharmaceutical industries, monopolizing Macedonia's economic growth. The city became the seat of a university with seven faculties, a national library, a state philharmonic orchestra, museums, and all other institutions that signify a national capital. New schools, administration buildings, and cultural institutions were built, alongside a number of modernist housing blocks. Skopje participated in the period of general progress of Yugoslavia, sharing the ups and downs of a top-down modernization with the rest of the country.

All that came to a sudden stop on July 26, 1963. The epicenter of the earthquake that struck Skopje on that day lay directly beneath the city, causing disastrous effects. The number of 1,100 casualties was not so great compared to other similar natural disasters around the world and from a distance the city looked fine; but even if they were not simply razed from the ground, most of the city's buildings and infrastructure were rendered unusable. Even the new residential areas were badly struck because of the lenient construction code that did not take into account seismic loads. About 80% of homes were destroyed or seriously damaged, as well as practically all public buildings, including schools and administration buildings; all equipment in hospitals and clinics was demolished; and only about a third of industrial plants could resume production

⁴³³ See: *Skopje Resurgent: The Story of a United Nations Special Fund Town Planning Project* (New York: United Nations, 1970), 43.

after minor repairs. The loss of personal property was just as severe, with many of the survivors finding themselves in the streets only in their underwear.

After the initial shock, Yugoslavia quickly pulled itself together and organized aid within hours of the catastrophe in a remarkable wave of solidarity. Medical and rescue teams were immediately sent to the city, together with all kinds of necessary supplies. At the same time, casualties were removed to hospitals in other parts of the country. Tito visited the city the day after the earthquake, and while the earth was still shaking promised to rebuild "a more beautiful and joyful Skopje as a symbol of fraternity and equality of Yugoslav people."⁴³⁴ Indeed, the city was immediately cast as a symbol of Yugoslav "brotherhood and unity." Some 10,000 school children were evacuated to other Yugoslav cities, where they were to stay until the city's schools were repaired; in their new temporary homes they were to receive education in their native Macedonian.⁴³⁵ Having already experienced continuous material and expert support from the more developed parts of the country for its efforts to "overcome backwardness," Skopje now received even more funding to facilitate the reconstruction. In this sense, it became the showcase and the material evidence of the unity and solidarity among Yugoslavia's constituent nations.

But what was even more remarkable was the international aid that started pouring into the city from literally every part of the world, eventually equaling the

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁴³⁵ *This was Skopje*, n.p.

amounts that came from within Yugoslavia. From the immediate neighbors to the most distant countries, from superpowers to the smallest nations—almost everyone felt they had to contribute something.⁴³⁶ Even anti-colonial movements, like the Liberation Movement of Southern Rhodesia (later Zambia) that could not offer any material aid, at least expressed their sympathies in testimony to Yugoslavia's anti-colonialism exercised through the non-aligned movement.⁴³⁷ The most tangible aid came in the form of prefabricated buildings, built exceptionally quickly to provide shelter before the arrival of the severe Macedonian winter. Yugoslavia itself provided the largest portion of such buildings, but complete prefabricated neighborhoods, hospitals, and schools also arrived from a stunning range of countries from around the world: Scandinavia, Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, France, Italy, Mexico, Poland, the United States, etc.⁴³⁸ Most of these Levittown-like settlements were intended as temporary relief, but some, like the residential neighborhoods donated by Sweden and Finland, survive until today due to their relatively high quality.

⁴³⁶ Committee for Reconstruction and Development of Skopje published a special journal devoted specifically to documenting foreign aid to the city; see: *Your Aid to Skopje, July— September 1963* (Skopje: Committee for Reconstruction and Development of Skopje, 1963).

⁴³⁷ Kenneth Kaunda, the leader of the Liberation Movement of Southern Rhodesia and future President of Zimbabwe, said in his telegram: “Our country is still enslaved, and we deeply regret that we are unable to offer you material aid. But you have at your disposal our hearts and our hands which can build.” Quoted in: *ibid.*, n.p.

⁴³⁸ See: *Skopje Resurgent*, 93-97.

Such expressions of international solidarity were not entirely new; the two recent earthquakes in Morocco and Chile in 1960, both much more deadly in terms of human casualties, had also attracted aid from all over the world. What was unusual in the case of Skopje, however, was the scope of that aid and the meaning attached to it. The world coming together to the rescue of the Macedonian capital was repeatedly interpreted in terms of the alleviation of Cold War divisions, especially in the light of the early *détente* that practically coincided with the aid efforts. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow on August 3, 1963, just a week after the earthquake, and the connection with the international cooperation in aiding Skopje was immediately made. The London paper *Daily Mail* clearly expressed this sentiment: "The irony is that Nature has done this at the very moment when man has taken a small but important step towards bridling the destructive power created by science. The sympathies of the whole world today are with the Yugoslav people. Let it be a consolation for them that in these days of internationalism not one nation need suffer such a disaster alone."⁴³⁹ Indeed, the sight of the US and Soviet soldiers working side by side in Skopje did not go unnoticed, and one of the many Yugoslav publications devoted to the reconstruction of the city aptly captioned a photograph of such cooperation with the words "First meeting since the Elbe."⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁹ Quoted in *This was Skopje*, n.p.

⁴⁴⁰ Jovan Popovski, *Скопје/Skopje 1963*, second edition (Skopje: NIP "Nova Makedonija," and Zagreb: Agencija za fotodokumentaciju, 1964), n.p., Fig. 173.

All these efforts were only directed to a temporary relief, however, and a more permanent stamp on Skopje's urban structure came later, most significantly in the form of urban plans forged under the auspices of the United Nations. The UN experts were involved very early in the process, most likely through the agency of Ernest Weissmann, then the Assistant Director of the Bureau of Social Affairs, in charge of the Housing, Building and Planning branch of the UN Secretariat's Department of Economic and Social Affairs.⁴⁴¹ In the interwar period, Weissmann had been one of the most progressive Yugoslav modernist architects before WW II, a former employee in Le Corbusier's studio and a founder of the Yugoslav section of the CIAM.⁴⁴² Sensing that his Jewish origin could soon put him in trouble, Weissmann was sufficiently farsighted to escape the war by emigrating to the United States in the late 1930s, where he first worked as a photographer and later for the government. After the war, he joined the UN as one of its leading experts for housing and planning. Apparently sympathetic with his homeland's post-war efforts at modernization, Weissmann was instrumental in mobilizing the UN resources to aid the reconstruction of Skopje to a greater degree than in other similar cases. This proved beneficial for both sides: the United Nations had a perfect opportunity to test the coordination

⁴⁴¹ On Weissmann's involvement through the UN, see: *Skopje Resurgent*, 68-71.

⁴⁴² For a biography of Weissmann, see: Ariana Štulhofer and Andrej Uchytíl, *Arhitekt Ernest Weissmann: monografija radova* (Zagreb: Arhitektonski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1993).

of its many agencies at a task of a great complexity, while Yugoslavia had a chance to benefit from free top-notch expertise.

On the Yugoslav side, however, there was a more subtle subtext to this cooperation. There is little doubt that the country possessed the capacities to conduct the planning of Skopje on its own; after all, it had already succeeded in a similar effort on a much larger scale during the post-war reconstruction, while receiving almost no foreign aid. But the cooperation with the United Nations offered a possibility to strengthen the international position of Yugoslavia as an open country devoted to cooperation on equal terms with everyone else in the world. Yugoslav participation in the UN had special resonance in terms of such position and Yugoslav officials never failed to emphasize that the country was one of the founding and active members of the international organization. It is not much of a stretch to assume that the internationalization of the reconstruction of Skopje, besides its practical benefits, at least in a certain measure, had a representational role too.

Jointly appointed by Yugoslav government and the UN Special Fund and headed by Weissmann, the International Board of Consultants advised and coordinated the process of the planning of Skopje. The Board brought in a number of foreign experts who aided the reconstruction and planning with various degrees of efficiency. The Greek planning office Doxiadis Associates, known for the planning of the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, made an early preliminary proposal for the master plan of the city, but it was rejected for being

too costly and idealistic, suggesting that even the surviving industrial plants should be demolished and moved to a different location.⁴⁴³ More useful was the expertise of the British engineer T. Whitley Moran, who had specialized in the repair of bombed houses during the Battle of Britain.⁴⁴⁴ The future Project Manager of the Master Plan, Adolf Ciborowski of Warsaw, however, entered the project not through the UN, but thanks to the independent initiative of the Polish government to aid the friendly country; Ciborowski's realistic planning, together with his experience in the reconstruction of Warsaw, eventually secured him a position within the UN-established network.⁴⁴⁵ (In the light of this Polish initiative, one needs to recall that it was the Polish delegation that tried to block Yugoslavia's inception into the UIA in 1950, which illustrates how much the situation had changed in the meantime.) The final Master Plan, completed in the fall of 1966, was a product of the cooperation of an eclectic mix of groups and individuals that included the Doxiadis Associates, the Polish state office *PolSERVICE*, an American subcontractor, several other foreign experts, including a Swedish expert for the regulation of rivers, and a number of Skopje's own local planners. This was a complicated collaboration that clearly violated the Cold War divisions; it seems somehow appropriate that it occurred in Yugoslavia, in a country that deliberately cherished its image of an "in-between" place.

⁴⁴³ See: *Skopje Resurgent*, 82-85.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 96.

The competition for a more detailed plan of the city center was organized in 1965, again under the auspices of and financed by the UN, with the intention to take advantage of the best available talents in the world.⁴⁴⁶ Half of the invited teams were local, the other half international, including the well known Dutch team Bakema and van der Broek, who had already been influential in Yugoslavia through their engagement in CIAM.⁴⁴⁷ The winner was the Japanese architect Kenzo Tange, a rising international star, who had just come under the international spotlight for his design of the main venues of the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo. His concept, although not the most realistic, was by far the most distinctive of all submitted entries, based on monumentalization of traditional urban elements, city walls and city gates.⁴⁴⁸ **(Fig. 5.7)** Allegedly, Tange's inspiration for this concept came from his stay in Dubrovnik during the tenth meeting of CIAM in that Yugoslav city in 1956. Although remarkable for its desire to reconnect with traditional planning, Tange's proposal was a case of misplaced regionalism, transplanting urban forms characteristic of clearly delineated and walled Mediterranean cities into the significantly different environment of a

⁴⁴⁶ On the international competition for the plan of downtown Skopje, see *ibid.*, 297-312.

⁴⁴⁷ The Zagreb architect Radovan Nikšić worked in Bakema's studio in the 1950s; he was responsible for the design of the Workers' and People's University in Zagreb (1962, with Ninoslav Kučan), one of the most celebrated modernist buildings in the city. For more, see: Dubravka, Kisić, ed., *Radovan Nikšić: 1920.-1987.: arhiv arhitekta*, exhibition catalogue (Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti and Hrvatski muzej arhitekture, 2005).

⁴⁴⁸ See *Skopje Resurgent*, .

traditional Ottoman city with a much more open, dispersed structure. This was likely one of the reasons why Tange's plan was only partially implemented, but despite its problems, the widely publicized design by the famous Japanese architect renewed international interest for Skopje, once again drawing world-wide attention to the city.

In addition to this intense international involvement in its planning, Skopje also functioned as an international architectural exhibition, with multiple monumental structures donated by various countries, again from both sides of the Iron Curtain. Switzerland built a school, designed by another CIAM luminary, Alfred Roth. **(Fig. 5.8)** Bulgaria donated a multipurpose performance hall, supposedly identical to one already in existence in Sofia. **(Fig. 5.9)** Romania built a hospital. Poland built the Museum of Contemporary Art, perched prominently on top of the Kale hill overlooking the city. **(Fig. 5.10)** But the broadest imprint on the structure of Skopje arguably came from the two superpowers, both of which opted for the kind of donations that would not be just one-time gifts, but could reproduce long-lasting influence in Macedonia. The USSR donated a factory of prefabricated concrete panels used for the construction of apartment buildings, the kind that was very typical around the Eastern bloc but not in Yugoslavia.⁴⁴⁹ Some of Skopje's residential neighborhoods were built using the original Soviet system, but it seems that after

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 278-81.

a while the production was readjusted to accommodate the more flexible skeletal systems, also more common in Yugoslavia.

The United States, on the other hand, chose to fund the specialized education of several young and promising Macedonian architects, six of whom received funding from the Ford Foundation for master's studies in architecture and urban planning at American universities, including Harvard and the University of California at Berkeley. All of them returned to Skopje after their American sojourns, bringing the acquired knowledge back to their hometown and designing some of the most prominent new structures in Skopje, including the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Macedonia. **(Fig. 5.11)** The seventh member of the group, Georgi Konstantinovski, did not receive the funding from the Ford Foundation; according to his own testimony, the Yugoslavs on the selection committee blocked his candidacy, allegedly because he was not a member of the party (the decision, in reality, could have been just as well someone's arbitrary personal vengeance).⁴⁵⁰ Instead, being spotted as talented by the American members of the committee, he was sponsored directly by the Department of State, outflanking the local guardians of political correctness. Konstantinovski chose to go to Yale, where he studied under the current star of American architecture, Paul Rudolph, after which he worked for six months in the studio of another rising star, I. M. Pei in New York. Like his remaining

⁴⁵⁰ Author's interviews with Konstantinovski, 5 June 2007.

Macedonian colleagues, Konstantinovski also returned to Skopje, transplanting direct influences of the most prominent American architects into the heart of the Balkans. His City Archive of Skopje (1966) and the student dormitory “Goce Delčev” (1969) combined sculptural, textured *béton brut* characteristic of Rudolph, with Pei’s geometrically rigorous forms. **(Figs. 5.12, 5.13)** Even decades later, the imprint of his stay in the United States was visible in Konstantinovski’s work: his Memorial Center in the village of Razlovci (1979) features a triangulated ceiling that is a direct homage to Louis Kahn’s Art Gallery at Yale. **(Fig. 5.14)**

The prolonged exposure to international influences during the post-earthquake reconstruction of Skopje opened up new perspectives for Macedonian architects, giving them the experience of a more cosmopolitan world than their provincial city could originally offer. This included the invaluable experience of working directly with some of the most prominent architects of the period. Arguably through the combined influence of Kenzo Tange and Paul Rudolph, Skopje became the city of sculptural *beton brut* buildings that still dominate its cityscape; and although the so-called brutalism became popular throughout Yugoslavia in the late 1960s, it nowhere left as deep an imprint as it did in Skopje. **(Fig. 5.15)** This new cosmopolitan spirit was, ironically, enabled by the destructions caused by an earthquake; but it was also critically facilitated by the specific international position that Yugoslavia consciously pursued in the 1960s. Had the sensitive balance that the country found between the Eastern

and Western blocs been any different, it seems reasonable to claim that the shape of the reconstructed Skopje would have likely been significantly different too.

* * *

Both the American enlisting of Yugoslavia as an important, albeit unreliable, ally in the cultural Cold War and the meanings associated with the post-earthquake reconstruction of Skopje testified to the fact that Yugoslav foreign policy played a significant role in the establishment of frameworks of interpretation pertaining to architecture. On the one hand, the flourishing of modernism in the 1950s became a signifier of the country's distinction from the Soviet bloc, effectively erasing its pre-1948 associations from the memory of Western audiences. On the other hand, with the emergence of the policy of non-alignment, Yugoslavia began to carefully distance itself from the West as well, deliberately taking the middle ground between the established poles of the Cold War. Architecture participated in the construction of this median position, but it never really reoriented its already established gaze towards the West. The emerging ambiguity of operating within architectural discourses emanating from the political West while constructing the narrative of Yugoslavia distinct from either side in the Cold War deeply marked the country's architectural production

of the late 1950s and early 1960s, especially when that production served the explicit representation of the state.

Chapter 6:

THE STATE REPRESENTED

After 1950, modernist architecture and planning dominated the expansion of Yugoslavia's largest cities. Many of these new buildings were in residential neighborhoods in response to the continuing housing crisis. But all of major cities, especially the capitals of Yugoslavia's six new constituent republics, saw the construction of important institutional buildings. The ten years from 1955 to 1965 was the period when the new socialist state constructed its official face. Inside the country, government buildings, party seats, and cultural institutions of the federation and the individual republics were built at an unprecedented rate; abroad, national pavilions at various exhibitions projected an image of a progressive and open country. These buildings ushered in a new type of official architecture that, almost invariably, mirrored the High International Style. Smooth, white 'floating' volumes, large expanses of glass, a pervasive sense of lightness and transparency—in Colin Rowe's terms, both literal and phenomenal—austerely geometricized abstraction, a new taste for monumentality: this was the architectural language of the socialist state, which it shared with the rest of the "progressive" world. Zagreb's Proleterskih Brigada Street, which introduced a new, monumental axis outside of the old city,

exemplified this transformation.⁴⁵¹ Aside from the Corbusian housing blocks by Drago Galić, the avenue contained the new City Hall by Kazimir Ostrogović (1956) and the Workers' and People's University (1961) by Radovan Nikšić and Ninoslav Kučan—both smooth white boxes raised above the ground, with flat roofs and strip windows. **(Fig. 6.1)**

But behind this seemingly homogeneous image, the new institutional modernism concealed a surprisingly complex array of specific meanings, which were everything but homogeneous and hardly apolitical. The range of these meanings contradicts the stereotype of a neutral, abstract, and universal modernism that resisted representation and narrative content. A closer examination of the seemingly abstract volumes of Yugoslav official architecture may reveal not only *what* their meanings were, but also *how* they transcended their apparent muteness and how their messages were constructed. This is not a simple process: on the one hand, architects attached meanings to buildings through specific formal solutions, through their own concrete explanations, or through references to other existing buildings; clients defined them through their demands and programs; and the public could ascribe their own interpretations with or without respect to the previous two. But these meanings also emerged through broader interpretive frameworks, which unavoidably bore political overtones since the buildings served the official representation of a state.

⁴⁵¹ The street was planned by the Croatian architect Vlado Antolić in 1948.

Dobrović's Generalštab and the Politics of Interpretation

After his short stint as the chief planner of Belgrade, Nikola Dobrović was removed from his position in 1947 and sent off to teach at the University of Belgrade. The reason was, presumably, his combative and inflexible character. He accepted his new job with his typical zeal, but his removal was still a severe blow to his ego, especially because it denied him the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to put his ideas into practice at the urban scale. Up to the time of his death in 1967, Dobrović managed to build only two more buildings, but one of these was his *magnum opus*: the Yugoslav Army Headquarters and the Federal Ministry of Defense, known as the *Generalštab* (General Staff). **(Fig. 6.2)** The large complex in downtown Belgrade is one of the highlights of the city's postwar modernism. But half a century after its construction, it remains controversial. The building's meanings have become especially problematic after it was damaged in the NATO bombing in the spring of 1999, which left it with gaping holes that, a decade later, still await repair.⁴⁵²

In 1954, Dobrović won a prestigious invited competition for the design of the *Generalštab*. The full list of his competitors has not been preserved, but it included the famous Slovenian architect Jože Plečnik. Despite the fact that the

⁴⁵² For a detailed account of the politically controversial contemporary readings of the *Generalštab*, see my text "Architecture and the Politics of Reading: The Case of the *Generalštab* Building in Belgrade," in: *Visible Culture: Design Artifacts and Participated Meaning*, edited by Leslie Atzmon (West Lafayette, Indiana: Parlor Press, forthcoming September 2009).

new complex belonged to federal institutions, the site was not in New Belgrade, but comprised two neighboring blocks separated by the intersection of Kneza Miloša and Nemanjina St., one of the busiest in the old city. Neighboring the old royal Army Headquarters, the two blocks were approached from the Main Railway Station via the wide uphill Nemanjina Street lined with bombastic pre-war governmental and judicial edifices built in heavily decorated historical styles. Plans called for the new structure to consist of two functionally and physically separate units, but in Dobrović's interpretation they created a whole overshadowed the surrounding buildings of the *ancien régime*, all of which lay lower than the site of the new structure.

Dobrović was experienced in dealing with such complex urban projects. In 1930, he had won a competition for the Terazije Terrace, a large undeveloped slope in the very heart of Belgrade, for which he had proposed an imposing symmetrical composition of stark modernist volumes accentuated by two towers. In his project for the *Generalštab*, he used many elements similar to the almost quarter-century-old project. He visually united the disconnected blocks by placing two identically cantilevered 9-story-high volumes on either side of Nemanjina Street, stressing symmetry of the two parts—despite the fact that one of them was significantly longer than the other. This discrepancy was not obvious in the narrow perspective from Nemanjina Street, but it was very noticeable when seen from Kneza Miloša Street, along which the two blocks lay. Dobrović addressed this problem by counter-balancing the gap between the two

buildings with a tall tower at the end of the longer portion. In this way, he created an impression of a single structure with a cut-out at about one-third of its length and a tall addition at the opposite side. The main formal theme thus became the dialectic between the tower and the gap, between the solid and the void, the positive and the negative.

Of all the official buildings of Yugoslav federation, the *Generalštab* perhaps diverts the most from the standard International Style architecture through contrasts and tensions of materials, textures, and forms. Rough square blocks of red stone, which form the main volume of the building, are certainly not characteristic for the International Style, but here they are superimposed with slightly protruding fields of strip-windows—staples of modernism—their continuous long spandrels clad in smooth white marble slabs set flush with the glass. In front of each of the two main wings is an entrance pavilion in white marble, raised on columns, posing a further contrast between the massive red walls and the light marble volumes. The point of greatest tension is the gap between the two sides of the complex, framed by symmetrically cascading setbacks.⁴⁵³ The use of cascades reinforced the symmetry and monumentality of the motif, which was further emphasized by similar stepping of the white parapets and strip windows, creating a fan of diagonals radiating from an imaginary point

⁴⁵³ Dobrović had used similar cascades on King Alexander's College in Prague (1932), except that they were only applications on a solid wall and one could not pass between them. For an account of Dobrović's career in Prague, see Tanja Damljanović, *Češko-srpske arhitektonske veze 1918-41* (Belgrade: RZZSK, 2004), 109-115.

somewhere below the ground. The result was an imposing monumental composition particularly impressive when seen from Nemanjina Street.

The cascades created a colossal gate in the middle of the street, implying a transition from one space to another. But no actual transition occurs when passing through this gate, as the street continues without changing its character. What was Dobrović's reason for the creation of such an elaborate form, at once wildly eloquent and apparently mute? Did the formal dialectic of the building have any meaning? As it turns out, the architect offered not only one, but two parallel explanations of his work. One was a complex theoretical construct based on the writings of the French turn-of-the-century philosopher Henri Bergson; the other a symbolic reading that tied the building to the history and the ideological system of socialist Yugoslavia. This ambivalence would be a source of much future controversy among architects and historians over the "true" meaning of Dobrović's masterpiece.

In 1960, Dobrović published an article entitled "Space in Motion—Bergson's "dynamic schemes" —New Visual Environment," in which he laid out theoretical concepts for a "new enriched image of the world," illustrated with diagrams of the soon-to-be finished *Generalštab*.⁴⁵⁴ The text and the diagrams

⁴⁵⁴ See Nikola Dobrović, "Pokrenutost prostora – Bergsonove 'Dinamičke sheme' – nova likovna sredina," first published in *Čovjek i prostor* (Zagreb) 7, no. 100 (1960): 10-11; reprinted in *Dobrović*, special issue of *Urbanizam Beograda* XII, no. 58 (1980): 38-51; and in Miloš Perović, Spasoje Krunić, eds., *Nikola Dobrović: Eseji, projekti, kritike/Essays, Projects, Critiques* (Belgrade: Arhitektonski fakultet and Muzej arhitekture, 1998), 115-134.

correspond well, offering a lucid statement for the concept of his building. Still, considering the fact that the original designs preceded the text by seven years, it is uncertain if the building was really designed according to his theory, if the theory was concocted to justify the building, or if they grew organically from each other. In any event, as the title suggests, the text drew heavily on Bergson's philosophy, in particular on his most popular book *Creative Evolution* (1907).⁴⁵⁵

Bergson argued in *Creative Evolution* that our world is in a perpetual state of becoming, undergoing constant change and evolution. Our practical concerns limit the perception of this unceasing motion to a succession of static states, however, similar to the experience of watching a movie, where static snapshots are being shown one after another. Our ordinary knowledge is thus of a "cinematographic kind," and we cease to experience the real *duration* of time.⁴⁵⁶ Since our perception is so strongly motivated by our practical concerns and desires, we tend to see an absence—*void*—where we do not find what we may expect or want; but the very idea of Nothing is an illusion, a mere word produced by our failed expectations, and it would be unnecessary if we perceived reality with disinterested eyes.⁴⁵⁷ In order to truly see the world around us and to experience the *duration* of time instead of a sequence of discrete moments,

⁴⁵⁵ See Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (New York: Random House, 1944).

⁴⁵⁶ Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 332.

⁴⁵⁷ Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 324.

according to Bergson, we must set our expectations and desires aside and rely on intuition rather than intellect.

In his text, Dobrović directly transplanted some of Bergson's ideas into the realm of architecture. Bergson's claim that the world is in permanent flux, as opposed to being a succession of static states, was transformed into a call for modern architecture to foster a "new visual environment," in which the space would be in motion. Of course, what Dobrović argued was not that buildings should be physically moving; but rather than being isolated static objects, they should produce an illusion of motion by engaging in dynamic visual relationships between each other. In order to achieve such dynamic relationships, the empty space between objects must be engaged, too: Bergson's claim that there is no such thing as nothing was thus transformed into a celebration of the spatial void and its active use as integral element in design. Instead of arranging unrelated objects like "randomly fallen dust," architects should connect "dynamic" solids with carefully shaped voids into an unbroken chain of relationships that work both on the architectural and the "macroubanistic" level, presumably uniting the whole city into a continuous whole.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵⁸ It is questionable how correctly Dobrović understood Bergson's ideas. A good example are his references to cinematography. The architect compares space in motion—a chain of dynamic connections between solids and voids—with the way a film strip arranges snapshots into sequences: "[T]he new urbanized person, 'homo spatiosus,' [is] trained to observe and experience the city as a color film (macrofilm) on the cinemascope of urban prospects."⁴⁵⁸ Obviously, for Dobrović the cinematographic metaphor was a *desirable* aspect of architecture—so much so that he used it as the motto of his text. But Bergson actually argued *against* the

The seemingly objective and scientific manner of the text further supported the idea that space in motion was an appropriate expression of the *Zeitgeist*. The concept is represented as an architectural extension of the achievements of the twentieth century science and the text is accordingly interspersed with catchphrases such as Non-Euclidean geometries, space-time continuum, fourth dimension, radiation, etc.⁴⁵⁹ All these notions figured in the early avant-garde discourses to which the young Dobrović was exposed during his formative years in Prague, Bergson's philosophy being their integral part.⁴⁶⁰ But Dobrović also coined several metaphorical terms that only sounded scientific, like "spatial energy," "visual radiation," and "visual vacuum." They

"cinematographic character of knowledge" as a mere approximation of reality. It seems that Dobrović and Bergson spoke about completely different things: the former about "cinematographic perception" similar to a camera registering its own movement through space, the latter about "cinematographic cognition" as a collection of discrete "snapshots" of reality. The architect probably appropriated only the philosopher's terminology and used it to reiterate completely unrelated ideas about the cinematic quality of flowing space, which had been a commonplace in modern architecture since the 1930s.

⁴⁵⁹ See: Dobrović, "Pokrenutost prostora," 40, 46-47.

⁴⁶⁰ As Linda Henderson has shown, an ambition to represent the ground-breaking concepts of modern science was a major aspect of the avant-garde art in the first decades of the 20th century, spanning the movements from Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism and *De Stijl*. Bergson's writings were another integral part of the avant-garde discourse and they were also deemed compatible with the latest scientific discoveries, so much so that they were often seen as a philosophical counterpart to the Relativity Theory (which Einstein himself denied). For a comprehensive treatment of scientific ideas in avant-garde art, see, Linda Dalrymple Henderson, *The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

served to rationalize the intangible visual impressions and support a scientific approach to architectural creation; in Dobrović's own grandiloquent words: "[T]he architect creates his own science of space-shaping by connecting a quantum of work and a quantum of visual energy with the creation of new aesthetic values."⁴⁶¹

His quasi-scientific ambition was most powerfully expressed in a series of diagrams that showed an idealized version of the *Generalštab* as an illustration of how the "science of space-shaping" functions. These diagrams are also the most explicit connection between the building and the theory. An elevation of the whole ensemble indicated positive and negative "visual tensions," "positives" apparently identified as solids and "negatives" as voids.⁴⁶² **(Fig. 6.3)** Two more diagrams displayed "lines of forces" within the solid forms, one of them showing "horizontal stretching" of strip-windows, the other how the building "grew up" from the ground. **(Fig. 6.4)** One small sketch showed the negative example of isolated static objects that do not engage the space around them; if one recalls that all "static objects" surrounding the *Generalštab* were built in the "reactionary" Yugoslav kingdom, this drawing acquires powerful political undertones. But Dobrović's greatest attention was devoted to the gap between the two parts of the building. A sequence of three diagrams explored its different versions and they included combinations of normal and reverse cascades arranged into

⁴⁶¹ Dobrović, "Pokrenutost prostora," 43.

⁴⁶² Dobrović, "Pokrenutost prostora," 42.

symmetrical and asymmetrical schemes. **(Fig. 6.5)** The captions accompanying them indicated “visual tensions” between the volumes and “sparks of discharge” of these tensions. In all the diagrams, empty spaces are suggestively filled with hatching, emphasizing the theoretical importance of the void.

Presented in this way, the *Generalštab* seems to be conceived as a kind of rationally devised generator of spatial dynamism, an allegedly scientific contraption for capturing ultimately illusory effects. But in the concluding paragraph of the same text, Dobrović hinted at another interpretation of the building, arguing that a new understanding of space should be regionally adjusted to match the “geophysical and social conditions and innate characteristics of national groups.”⁴⁶³ Following this claim, he explicitly defined the specific symbolism of the *Generalštab* in a few brief sections that accompanied one of the diagrams. In a paragraph entitled “Space in Motion and Ideas,” he claimed that the building was a “carrier of all important characteristics of a defiant and bold nation, from the uprising—by organic growth from the ground—to the ascension to cragged heights. Power, élan, and courage are embodied in sculptural masses that rear like an armored tank.”⁴⁶⁴ This statement clearly referred to the Partisan uprising and the war of liberation: defiance and courage were indeed cherished as national features in a country whose peoples had suffered foreign occupation for centuries. The four years, from 1941 to 1945,

⁴⁶³ Dobrović, “Pokrenutost prostora,” 51.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

provided abundant motifs for the cult of defiance, as small and poorly equipped Partisan units faced much stronger occupying forces, a story that was relentlessly perpetuated in the official mythology of the new Yugoslavia.

In another brief independent section of his essay, entitled “Symbolism of the Content,” Dobrović pinpointed the building’s specific meaning in precise terms: “The builder broke off a piece of the mountains in which the fiercest and the most decisive struggle for the fate of the peoples of Yugoslavia was led, and he moved them to the center of the capital. An urban symbol of the Sutjeska is formed on either side of Nemanjina Street in a new spatial tone of a ‘visual Eroica.’”⁴⁶⁵ This explanation was something that everyone in Yugoslavia could understand and accept. The Canyon of the Sutjeska in the mountains of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the site of one of the most difficult battles the Partisans led during the liberation war. The battle took place in the impassable Bosnian mountains in late spring 1943, when 16,000 Partisans, accompanied by 3,500 sick and wounded soldiers and civilians, struggled for a month to escape the 120,000 well-equipped German troops. An event of epic proportions, it was naturally adopted into the official cosmogony of socialist Yugoslavia: it perfectly epitomized the “characteristics of a defiant and bold nation.” The evocative shape of the *Generalštab*’s gap thus symbolized the site of the battle—a canyon—at the same time commemorating a historical event and linking the

⁴⁶⁵ Dobrović, “Pokrenutost prostora,” 43.

building's form to its function as Army Headquarters. Thus, the gate motif was not so much meant to mark a transition from one space to another, but rather to commemorate the transition from one time to another, functioning as a permanent urban reminder of the already mythologized roots of the post-war Yugoslav state. In this context, even the building's tectonics could be interpreted as an explicit political narrative: the rough, rustic red stone—symbolizing socialism, the liberation war, and the “defiant and bold nation” of rugged peasants— physically supports and provides a background for the smooth white marble façade with modernist strip-windows, which stood for a new modern Yugoslavia striving to become a sophisticated civilization.

The dual interpretation of the *Generalštab* posed a challenge for the public. Architects had a hard time accepting the reference to the Sutjeska.⁴⁶⁶ The reason was probably modernism's resistance to narrative content, all the more powerful because of the recent experience with Socialist Realism, which tended to privilege the narrative over the abstract. In the post-socialist years, the Sutjeska interpretation has become even more problematic, since, on the one

⁴⁶⁶ Ivan Štraus wrote that in the *Generalštab* “some look for a symbolism of the cliffs of the Sutjeska,” but that “better connoisseurs of Dobrović's pre-war opus see in his work continuity with Central European modernism of his youth;” therefore, the reference to the Sutjeska is possible, although doubtful, and the “real” interpretation of the building is in Bergsonian terms. See Ivan Štraus, *Arhitektura Jugoslavije 1945-1990* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990), 40.

Bogdan Bogdanović, who knew Dobrović personally, vehemently rejected the reference to the Sutjeska as “nonsense;” author's interview with Bogdanović, May 21-25, 2005.

hand, the heritage of socialism acquired an automatic negative connotation, while on the other, Dobrović is too important to be expelled from the national architectural pantheon. The Sutjeska interpretation is thus simply ignored, as if the architect himself had not concocted it.⁴⁶⁷

The problem with this is that the reference to the Sutjeska was immediately understandable to anyone who lived in socialist Yugoslavia. The battle was one of the most publicized official myths of the state. Hundreds of books, poems, songs, and artworks were devoted to it. It was commemorated

⁴⁶⁷ In 2002 a well-known Belgrade architect and prominent right-wing politician told me that he was “appalled” that I described the *Generalštab* as “narrative” in an earlier text [“The Construction of Belgrade in the Period of Socialism, 1945-2000,” in Anamarija Kovenc-Vujić, ed., *50 beogradskih arhitekata/50 Belgrade architects* (Belgrade: Akademska misao, 2002), 15-27]. When I explained that I was referring to the symbolism of the Sutjeska, he immediately dismissed it, repeating the old story that “it was all invented by journalists.”

Of the many recent authors who wrote about Dobrović, only Marta Vukotić Lazar (who, significantly, is not an architect but an art historian) mentions the symbolic content of the *Generalštab*; still, even she does not discuss its relevance at any length. See: Vukotić Lazar, *Beogradsko razdoblje*, 113.

Bojan Kovačević in his monographic study of the *Generalštab* discusses the building’s symbolic content but he doubts—without explanation—that the Sutjeska represents a “correct” reading. Kovačević is probably right to say that Dobrović, who had already had problems with the execution of the project, may have encouraged the reference to the battle as a way to secure greater support from the Army and the public; but he fails to explain why the “discussion of the Sutjeska” should be “overcome.” See: Kovačević, *Arhitektura zgrade Generalštaba*, 109.

Finally, Miloš Perović, who is responsible for the largest number of titles about Dobrović, never mentions a single word about the Sutjeska. See: Perović, Krunić, eds., *Nikola Dobrović*; Miloš Perović, “Nikola Dobrović,” *Centropa* 3, no. 1 (January 2003): 67-78; *Ibid.*, *Srpska arhitektura XX veka/Serbian 20th Century Architecture* (Belgrade: Arhitektonski fakultet, 2004), 160.

every year with elaborate celebrations. It was an unavoidable part of school programs, not only in history, but also in literature, music, and art. It was effectively stamped upon the collective memory through the medium of film, through the most expensive cinematographic spectacle ever made in Yugoslavia, Stipe Delić's 1973 *Battle of Sutjeska*, which boasted an international cast with celebrities like Orson Welles, and Richard Burton in the role of Tito.

The battle was also a ubiquitous topic in visual arts, where the canonic imagery identified with the motif of the canyon.⁴⁶⁸ Indeed, the canyon was widely exploited through a variety of media, from modest wood-cuts to the central monument of the battle, which featured two gigantic white rocks facing each other in a dramatic manner, quite reminiscent of Dobrović's cascades in Belgrade. It became one of the most recognizable images in the iconography of socialist Yugoslavia, endlessly reproduced in a multitude of formats, from badges to T-shirts and postcards. A canyon motif—or anything that resembled it—could thus naturally be associated with the battle of the Sutjeska, especially in an appropriate context like a structure erected as the seat of Yugoslav Army. Even if Dobrović had never made any allusions to it in his writing, it is likely that the

⁴⁶⁸ While the battle spread over a wide region that included a variety of different landscapes, the motif of the canyon was considered the most appropriate for artistic representations of the epic: "For an artist and a poet, only that first [landscape], the one with heights and wells, with horrifying cliffs and abysses, can serve as a setting for the big drama... Only such setting corresponds to the bloodiest and most dramatic battle of the people's liberation war and one of the most dramatic battles ever." See: Toman Brajović, *Sutjeska u delima likovnih umetnika Jugoslavije* [Sutjeska in the works of Yugoslav artists] (Cetinje: Obod, 1969), n.p.

general public would sooner or later recognize the connection between the function of the building, its form, and the ever-present symbolism of the canyon. Until relatively recently, the reference to the Sutjeska was indeed the most widespread popular interpretation of the building and it was circulated both orally and in the media.⁴⁶⁹ Even foreigners easily recognized it: in 1965, the New York Times correspondent from Belgrade, David Binder, wrote about the *Generalštab* as an “architectural nightmare... [that] represented the chief Partisan battlegrounds in concrete and pink stone.”⁴⁷⁰

On the other hand, the Bergsonian interpretation was not only obscure and inaccurate; it was also completely obsolete in the 1960s Yugoslavia. The philosopher was at the highest point of his popularity in European intellectual circles during the first decades of the century, at the time of Dobrović’s youth; he was awarded a Nobel Prize for literature in 1927, precisely the time when the young architect must have been at the peak of his intellectual curiosity. Decades later, in 1960, Bergson was all but forgotten. His name might have meant something to philosophy students, but it is highly doubtful that young architects would have known his writings.⁴⁷¹ The fascination with the achievements of the

⁴⁶⁹ Mihailo Mitrović, “Osobeno delo Nikole Dobrovića,” *Politika* (26 July 1964): 16.

⁴⁷⁰ I owe this reference to professor Danilo Udovički at the University of Texas at Austin, who has remembered the offense for almost forty years; see: David Binder, “Those Friendly Beogradjani,” *The New York Times* (Nov. 21, 1965): 92-104.

⁴⁷¹ In the context of socialist Yugoslavia, Bergson’s relevance was particularly dubious. Marxism was uncontested as the official ideology in the country and any philosophical system that showed

early 20th century science, which by 1960 had all become general knowledge for educated audiences, was equally obsolete. Moreover, Dobrović's indiscriminate references to scientific concepts combined things that did not exactly belong together in their original contexts, like the fourth dimension and space-time.⁴⁷² Dobrović's simultaneous use of both terms is therefore tautological and anachronistic, rendering the whole theory of "space in motion" completely obsolete.

The anachronism of Dobrović's discourse also points to a certain formal and stylistic anachronism of the building. Belgrade historian Bojan Kovačević, for example, reports that when the French journal *L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui* published an image of the building, the editors assumed that the construction date 1963 was an error because to them the building looked rather like

no signs of class consciousness was labeled bourgeois and reactionary; Bergson certainly fell into this category. An odd little article published in the daily *Politika* in 1957 criticized Bergson as a decadent mystic, but it also acknowledged some of his achievements and showed that they unwittingly supported the Marxist doctrine of dialectic materialism; see Dušan Nedeljković, "Anri Bergson," *Politika* (11 August, 1957): 16. Dobrović cited the text as a nod from an established expert that Bergson is not opposed to the official Marxist ideology; see Dobrović, "Pokrenutost prostora," 38.

⁴⁷² Before 1920 the fourth dimension was believed to be a higher geometric dimension that could not be perceived by ordinary senses, but Einstein's General Relativity (1916) proposed that *time* should be considered the fourth dimension. After General Relativity was widely accepted, previous notions of the fourth dimension lost their appeal and were superceded by the notion of "space-time."

something from 1936.⁴⁷³ Strip-windows flush with white marble spandrels indeed belong to the 1930s International Style rather than to its 1960s version; and the “dynamic” forms seem indebted to even older architectural movements like Futurism and Expressionism. Considering the many similarities between the *Generalštab* and Dobrović’s prewar projects, one might argue that the architect’s style remained remarkably unchanged for several decades. On the other hand, the many cantilevers, cascades and inverted cascades, as well as the overall desire to create an elaborate unified composition, bring to mind the contemporaneous work of Frank Lloyd Wright, especially the Guggenheim Museum in New York. Wright was indeed Dobrović’s great hero, which easily comes across in his writings, for example, the monumental textbook on the history of modern architecture he wrote for his students.⁴⁷⁴ This reference renders the building not so much obsolete in comparison to the dominant line in the period modernism as *outside* of it, an *alternative* discursive and formal route with many predecessors but few progeny.

⁴⁷³ The text in question was by Zoran Manević: “L’Architecture Contemporaine Yougoslave,” *Architecture d’Aujourd’hui* 112-114 (1964): XXVII. See: Kovačević, *Arhitektura zgrade Generalštaba*, 75, n. 185.

⁴⁷⁴ See: Nikola Dobrović, *Savremena arhitektura I-V*, 1952-71.

Bojan Kovačević also justly connects the square stone blocks of the *Generalštab* to the houses of Wright’s “lost years” in California; Kovačević, *Arhitektura zgrade Generalštaba*.

The ‘Super-international Style’ of a ‘New’ New Belgrade

If the *Generalštab* verged between the prewar and postwar periods and somewhat outside of the preoccupations of its time, the New Belgrade that emerged in the 1950s emphatically realigned itself with the latest developments in modern architecture. Within a year of the 1948 *Cominform* Resolution, the ensuing economic crisis brought the construction of the city to a virtual halt. The Presidency of the Government and the luxury hotel were abandoned as half-finished reinforced-concrete skeletons; the filling-in of the marshy terrain stopped as well. As the economy recovered in the mid-1950s, plans for the construction of the new capital were resurrected. In the meantime, however, the federal state underwent considerable decentralization and the power of the federal government decreased accordingly, causing New Belgrade’s extensive original program to shrink as well. The original three buildings designed in 1947—the Federal Government Building, the Central Committee Building, and the hotel—still provided the backbone of the city, but the many federal ministries were no longer necessary. In a series of new urban plans created throughout the 1950s, housing gained an increasingly important role, replacing the previously expansive administration quarters.⁴⁷⁵ Moreover, the Federal Assembly remained seated in the old historicist building across the Sava and the intended separation of

⁴⁷⁵ Blagojević, *Osporeni modernizam*.

identities of New Belgrade, as the seat of the Federation, and Old Belgrade, as the capital of Serbia, became blurred. Simultaneously, the involvement of architects from other parts of the country in the design of New Belgrade decreased as well. The city lost a good portion of its originally dominant pan-Yugoslav connotations; and despite the fact they were never entirely erased, the construction of New Belgrade from the mid-1950s on became an increasingly local affair.

In a broader international framework, the meanings of New Belgrade also underwent significant changes. Gone was the role of a secondary center of the Communist bloc, but in return the city acquired a potentially far broader responsibility as one of the centers of the emerging Non-Aligned Movement. It was a different Yugoslavia that it was supposed to represent: instead of a side in the Cold War, it was now a country that touted its openness and advocated international cooperation. It was somehow appropriate, then, that the New Belgrade that emerged in the early 1960s effectively summarized the key formal and technological themes of the “International Style.” This was exemplified in the city’s most important new structures: from the already partly constructed hotel and the redesigned building of the Federal Government, to the new tower of the Central Committee and the two new museums that became parts of the federal “capitol”—even including some of the first housing blocks in the city’s central area. **(Fig. 6.6)** The style that New Belgrade acquired, however, was not only ‘international’ in the sense that it was geographically neutral, but it became

almost “super-international,” incorporating a range of high modernist inflections normally associated with extremely varied cultural, political, and climatic contexts. There is no evidence to believe that such an orientation was the result of a political program; but it was clearly a side-product of the country’s cultural opening in the early 1950s. An often paradoxical consonance emerged between New Belgrade’s stylistic diversity and Yugoslavia’s newly found friendliness with the world.

The first building that exemplified this transformation was the former Presidency of the Federal Government. **(Fig. 6.7)** Renamed Federal Executive Council and widely known by the acronym SIV (Savezno izvršno veće), it was the first structure whose construction resumed after the break up from the Soviet bloc. This was now the seat of a much smaller administration that no longer controlled the development of the country, but instead only coordinated a limited number of functions of the federal government.⁴⁷⁶ Except for the central entry pavilion, the reinforced concrete skeleton of the structure had already been finished; but before any further construction could continue, a thorough adaptation of the original project was necessary for functional reasons. A committee was formed in the fall of 1954 to oversee the adaptation and it included, besides officials from the government, several prominent architects, including Kazimir Ostrogović from Zagreb, Edvard Ravnikar from Ljubljana, and

⁴⁷⁶ Petranović, Štrbac, *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 143

Belgrade's leading prewar modernists, Dragiša Brašovan and Milan Zloković.⁴⁷⁷ Since Vladimir Potočnjak, the head of the original design team, had died in the meantime, a new designer had to be found as well. One of the original architects of the building, Zlatko Neumann from Zagreb, was invited to serve as a consultant on the committee, though not as an active designer; he was offended by the fact that the three and a half years that he and Potočnjak invested in designing the building were practically in vain, he refused to participate.⁴⁷⁸ Instead, Belgrade office *Stadion* was commissioned.

Stadion was one of the self-managing "design working organizations" whose activities were defined by its leading designer and director. In this case it was the relatively young Belgrade architect Mihailo-Mika Janković. Born in 1911, he had graduated from Belgrade University and had made his name as an architect of the Yugoslav People's Army Stadium, built between 1947 and 1954.⁴⁷⁹ It was his team for the stadium project that was transformed into the *Stadion* office, which would be fully responsible for finishing the SIV building. It is not exactly certain how Janković was selected for such a prestigious task. The

⁴⁷⁷ "Stenografske beleške sa sastanka revizione komisije stručnjaka po pitanju adaptacije zgrade SIV na Novom Beogradu," Sept. 29, 1954, Aleksandar Janković Collection.

⁴⁷⁸ Letter from Zlatko Neumann to the Committee for Revision of the Project of the Building of the Federal Executive Council of January 10, 1955; Aleksandar Janković Collection.

⁴⁷⁹ Janković had a family tradition in architecture. His father Aleksandar studied architecture in Vienna in the late 19th century and was responsible for such prestigious commissions as the National Bank in the southern city of Niš; he also worked on the central building of the National Bank in Belgrade; author's interview with Janković's son Aleksandar, July 2002.

YPA Stadium was a competent work and it earned praise; but Janković was neither one of the young modernist prodigies nor had he been associated with the left-leaning intellectual circles; he was not even a member of the Party.⁴⁸⁰ His choice is all the more puzzling in light of the fact that the adaptation was not a purely technical endeavor of rearranging the interior spaces in accordance with new functional requirements. The client specifically demanded a redesign of the exterior as well, which meant creating the new ‘official face’ of Yugoslavia—a task of great responsibility and a sign that the architect enjoyed special status with the government.⁴⁸¹ This status would be further confirmed with Janković’s subsequent commissions, which included the new Central Committee building and the Museum May 25, one of the “temples” of Tito’s cult of personality.

The redesign of the exterior was necessary to bring it in harmony with the new urban plans of New Belgrade. The SIV was no longer to be a part of a larger administrative complex surrounded by various ministries, but instead stood isolated amidst greenery in a large open space. Perhaps more importantly, this demand also demonstrated the client’s awareness of how obsolete the heavy classicism of the original design became in the short seven years since the competition. In a series of studies, Janković tried to answer the new urban

⁴⁸⁰ Interview with Janković’s son Aleksandar.

⁴⁸¹ Mihailo Janković, “Kratok opis rada,” transcript of an original document made for the Management for the construction of the building of Federal Executive Council (Direkcija za izgradnju zgrade Saveznog izvršnog veća,” n.d., 1, Aleksandar Janković Collection.

situation by visually tying the building to the ground; emphasizing its horizontality, adding low extensions around it, and creating a central tower that would contribute to a pyramidal build-up of volumes from the periphery to the center.⁴⁸²

(Fig. 6.8) But even more pronounced was an obvious desire to undermine as thoroughly as possible the classicism of the 1947 design and to “break the monotony” of its forms.⁴⁸³ The first to go were the austere, massive marble pilasters whose steady rhythm marched around the building.⁴⁸⁴ Instead, Janković experimented with various solutions to increase the visual dynamism of the complex, from strip-windows—a staple of modernist design—to irregular, checkerboard patterns reminiscent of Le Corbusier’s contemporaneous façades. Particularly prominently featured were the various versions of the *brise-soleils*, which had a practical function of protecting the interior from excessive sunshine as much as an aesthetic role of lightening up the exterior through layering and a reinforced sense of transparency. **(Fig. 6.9)**

The committee, however, criticized the *brise-soleils*, denying them any meaningful purpose and proclaiming them mere decoration in Belgrade’s climate.⁴⁸⁵ Indeed, the element had recently arrived in the city and was prominently featured on several downtown buildings, to a great dismay of

⁴⁸² This is what the architect explicitly stated in one of the descriptions of the project; *ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁴ ASCG, Fond Projekti zgrade SIV-a, Fascikla SIV-Idejni projekat, razne varijante—skice.

⁴⁸⁵ “Stenografske beleške sa sastanka revizione komisije.”

modernist puritans. Just around the time when the designs for the SIV were being discussed, the short-lived architectural journal *Pregled arhitekture*, edited by Zloković, one of the committee-members, published an article that lambasted the use of the *brise-soleils* in Belgrade as “pseudo-ornamental fashion” that violated the basic principles of modern architecture.⁴⁸⁶ Notwithstanding the often scorchingly hot Belgrade summers, the article claimed that the *brise-soleils* had no place in moderate climates and relegated their appropriateness to the tropics; the author went to great lengths to compare the climatic conditions of Belgrade to those of Rio de Janeiro to prove the point. A photo of Lucio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer’s Ministry of Education in Rio served as an example of the appropriate use of the device, while the recently finished Lever House in New York illustrated the point that a simple curtain wall provides a perfectly appropriate protection from the sun anywhere outside of the equatorial region.

From the 21st century perspective, of course, anything would have been better and more sustainable than the notoriously thin curtain-walls of the 1950s and attaching the *brise-soleils* on the SIV would not sound so ludicrous today. More importantly the quoted article indicated how present the awareness of Brazilian modernism was in Yugoslavia in the mid-1950s. At the time of the renewed efforts to build New Belgrade, Brasilia was under construction and Niemeyer’s designs were widely published, both in local journals and in the many

⁴⁸⁶ Slobodan Vasiljević, “Заштита од сунца у нашем поднебљу,” *Преглед архитектуре*, no. 4-5 (June 1954-55): 122-25.

foreign publications that by this time were available to Yugoslav architects. Niemeyer offered not only fashionable “decorative motifs,” but also a practical example of the emerging sense of modern monumentality that was being realized in a city whose meanings resonated powerfully with those of New Belgrade: the brand new capital of a recently decolonized developing country that, at the time, was run by a socialist government. Despite the fact that at the same moment Le Corbusier was also busy designing the *brise-soleils* for Chandigarh—another new capital in an even politically closer country, India—it seems that Janković’s studies for the SIV had a far more pronounced ‘Brazilian’ flavor. Not only does this apply to the specific type of the device that Janković proposed on several sketches, similar to those at Rio’s Ministry of Education, but also to the rejected idea of contrasting the sprawling horizontality of the building with a thin vertical slab of the tower. Considering the fact that all of the sketches proposed smooth, elegant surfaces, rather than the rough brutalism à la Chandigarh, it seems clear that it was Brasilia that provided Janković with a guiding model of modern monumental expression. This is even more plausible considering a small restaurant the architect was just finishing in downtown Belgrade, perched above a stadium he designed with Uglješa Bogunović: a free-form curvilinear slab hovering above a glass enclosure closely resembled Niemeyer’s own house in Rio de Janeiro.

The committee, however, had little understanding for this kind of reasoning and the SIV was finished without *brise-soleils*, additional horizontal

wings, or a tower. Nevertheless, the compromise with the committee's puritan distaste for architectural fashion did not completely neutralize Janković's penchant for layering, lightness, and transparency. The facades ended up as flat repetitive non-directional grids. But if the architect's intent to provide a strong emphasis on horizontality was muted, the verticality of heavy marble pilasters of the original design was gone altogether. Instead of the original colonnaded portico, an elegant glazed box now floated above the main entrance and the reflecting pool in front of it. **(Fig. 6.10)** Containing the most luxurious representational spaces, this pavilion was connected to the side wings through light, newly added one-story corridors raised above the ground. A series of canopies hovering on thin round columns further added to the sense of lightness, engulfing the solids of the original building from all sides: on the roofs, in front of the side entrances, and above underground garages off the southern ends of the H-plan. The only place where any hint of the original classicizing aesthetic was preserved were the two concave side facades, whose slightly projecting central fields featured shallow pilasters between the windows of upper floors. **(Fig. 6.11)**

In light of a variety of international references that would find their way into New Belgrade's "capitol" complex, it is somehow appropriate that in 1974 the government of Iraq—at the time, a friendly non-aligned country—requested to replicate the SIV for its own purpose in Bagdad.⁴⁸⁷ Moreover, the Iraqi offer

⁴⁸⁷ Letter of Vidak Krivokapić, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia, to Mihailo Janković, 8 February, 1974, and Notes from the meeting with the

included a contract to the Yugoslav construction firm “Rad” to complete the works. The Yugoslav side concluded that an exact replica of the building in Bagdad would not make sense and, moreover, because of national security, it would not be reasonable to share the plans of the country’s central government structure; but it offered the services of the building’s architect and contractors. Even before this time, large Yugoslav construction firms had been heavily involved in the planning and construction of the non-aligned world, from Africa and Middle East to Indonesia; the offer from Iraq was not unusual. Because Mihailo Janković died the following year, he was not involved in Iraq; but during the 1980s, “Energoprojekt,” another Yugoslav construction firm, after completing a long list of infrastructural and other projects there, became involved in designing a sprawling palace for Saddam Hussein. By this time, both “Rad” and “Energoprojekt”—firms that have become almost synonymous with Yugoslavia’s business in the Third World—had their new headquarters within a few blocks of the SIV, thus explicitly participating in the Yugoslav “capitol.”

* * *

Well before the SIV was completed in 1962, Janković was already engaged in another project near by, also of the highest political significance: the

Secretary of the Federal Executive Council of January 30, 1974; both in Aleksandar Janković Collection.

revamped building of the Central Committee. As the Yugoslav federation changed since the 1947 competitions, so did the party: it was no longer a secretive elite of conspiratorial initiates, but a much broader organization intent on building a mass membership. Even its name had changed: instead of the Communist Party, it became the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. As a part of the wide-reaching attempts to democratize the country and engage the masses in the political life, a range of organizations was created under the umbrella of the Socialist ` of the Working People of Yugoslavia, including war veterans, trade unions, and the official youth organization. The seats of all these organizations were supposed to be housed in the new building together with the Central Committee—hence its official name, the Building of Social and Political Organizations. Nevertheless, the edifice was widely known—and remains so—by the acronym CK (Centralni komitet), reflecting the hierarchy of power that remained untouched despite all the reforms.

According to new urban plans, the site for the building was removed from the confluence of the Sava and the Danube further inland, two blocks east of the SIV, marking the entry into New Belgrade when approached from the old city. A new competition was organized some time in 1959 or 1960, but the exact proceedings remain obscure (all of the documents about the competition have been lost).⁴⁸⁸ According to Sarajevo architect Ivan Štraus, who took part in the

⁴⁸⁸ The Archive of the Central Committee of the League of Communists, kept at the Archive of Serbia and Montenegro in Belgrade, holds no material about the design of the building. The

competition, one top architectural team from each republic was invited to participate; aside Štraus and the winner Janković, however, no other competitors are known.⁴⁸⁹ For this occasion, Janković teamed up with his younger colleagues from *Stadion*, Dušan Milenković and Mirjana Marjanović; of the two, only the former would participate in further development of the design. Since almost no competition drawings have been preserved, it is impossible to say whether Janković's design was really superior in a competition with the Yugoslav cream of the crop; considering the sensitivity of the task, one can also imagine that he was selected by default, as a confidant of the government who required no further vetting.

The competition program remains equally unknown. Considering how elaborate aesthetic demands were at the original 1947 competition, it would be interesting to know whether any similar requirements still existed in 1960. Urban legend has it that the powerful Minister of the Interior and the regime's 'number two,' Aleksandar Ranković, insisted that the building should be the tallest in Yugoslavia, for obvious symbolic reasons; considering that the finished structure,

Archive of the City of Belgrade, on the other hand, contains a full set of construction drawings, but nothing from the competition stage or from the design process. Only Janković's papers, in possession of his son Aleksandar, contain the drawings that partly document the design process, but no communication with the client.

⁴⁸⁹ Interview with Sarajevo architect Ivan Štraus, August ??, 2005. Štraus participated in the competition as a representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina; because of an administrative glitch, two Bosnian designs were submitted,

with its height of 100m, indeed held that title for a few years, the theory is probably not entirely unfounded.⁴⁹⁰ It is further supported by the fact that Štraus's entry—the only one known besides that of the winning team—also proposed a tall tower. Both surviving proposals played upon the generic theme of the 1950s International Style: a composition of a floating horizontal slab and another tall vertical one—drawn from the Lever House in New York. **(Fig. 6.12)** In various combinations, this compositional strategy was becoming virtually ubiquitous throughout Yugoslavia at the time.

During the development of the design, however, the winning entry underwent significant transformations, as the rectangular horizontal slab became a disc-shaped conference hall resembling a flying saucer. **(Fig.6.13)** A previously generic building type thus gained obvious specificity, pointing toward Brasilia far more explicitly than any sketches for the SIV, Niemeyer's convex and concave 'bowls' here are united into a single piece. But the ensemble was a curious hybrid, as the tower was decidedly not inspired by Niemeyer: clad in an apparent curtain wall on all sides, with pronounced vertical mullions that added texture to the facade, it differed from Niemeyer's smoother forms often framed with solid white walls. Instead, the Belgrade tower evoked a different source, the American postwar skyscraper—a reference that eventually overshadowed

⁴⁹⁰ The claim that Ranković demanded the building to be the tallest in Yugoslavia was most recently made in: Toma Džadžić, "Predskazanja: Milić rušio, Kavaja robijao," in: *NIN* (Belgrade, July 15, 1999).

Brasilia as the 'flying saucer' was never built **(Fig. 6.14)** Contemporary critics quickly identified the solitary prism in glass and metal as Miesian, although it is questionable whether it was exactly Mies van der Rohe who provided the model; in any case, they criticized the CK for not being as 'pure' as Mies would have made it.⁴⁹¹ According to his co-designer Milenković, it was Janković who was responsible for some of the 'impurities,' the canopies at the entrance and above the roof terrace. Milenković recently claimed that he indeed wanted the tower to be as austere simple as possible.⁴⁹²

Aside from its appearance, the CK contained a far more profound deviation from its American models. Constructing a steel skeleton would have been a challenge to Yugoslav builders in the 1960s because of the lack of high quality materials and know-how. Moreover, the country's industrial production of building components was in its infancy; in such conditions, curtain-walls, known at the time as "American facades," while far more expensive, were technically still inferior to conventional facades.⁴⁹³ Structural steel, therefore, had to be replaced with reinforced concrete, which was easily available and could be used with a wealth of expertise. During the process of translation from one material to another, however, the structural logic of the American skyscraper, which

⁴⁹¹ Trbojević, "Zid zavesa i njegova primena u Beogradu," 18-19.

⁴⁹² Mare Janakova, "Moje životno delo," interview with Dušan Milenković, www.a4a.info, retrieved December 19, 2004.

⁴⁹³ Ranko Trbojević, "Zid zavesa i njegova primena u Beogradu," 7.

separated the exterior envelope from the skeleton inside, was transmuted. The ground floor of the CK is supported on conventional large-span (18-foot) columns, but the structure of all upper floors consists of a dense perimeter 'cage' of thin structural fins spanning about six feet. **(Fig. 6.15)** One system transitions to the other via a massive concrete slab between the first and second floors. The dualism of load-bearing columns and a light suspended façade, characteristic for most American skyscrapers, was thus conflated into a hybrid structure that at the same time supports the building itself and defines the exterior, with façade panels inserted between the fins. During the construction, further transmutation occurred when the prefabricated spandrel units, envisioned by the design, had to be replaced with conventional masonry walls, which were subsequently covered with green glass on the outside.⁴⁹⁴ The assembly logic of the American skyscraper was thus compromised, too; on the other hand, the result was superior performance compared to any similar façade constructed in Belgrade at the time, an important requirement considering the prestige of the commission.⁴⁹⁵

Because it was not a membrane independently suspended on the bearing structure, the façade of the CK was not really a curtain wall. But the architects

⁴⁹⁴ Construction drawings reveal that the infill between the perimeter columns were supposed to be prefabricated panels; but when the building was bombed in 1999, the damaged façade revealed brick spandrel instead.

⁴⁹⁵ Ranko Trbojević, "Zid zavesa i njegova primena u Beogradu," 18-19.

went at great lengths to create an impression that it was: windows were pushed to the outer edges of the 'cage' to minimize the visual impact of perimeter columns; the visible sides of columns were clad in aluminum to resemble vertical mullions; and masonry walls were clad in glass mimicking the appearance of prefabricated panels. **(Fig. 6.16)** While it may be argued that each component and material used had at least some technical justification, there was still more than a hint of a Ruskinian "fallacy" here, as the façade played with one's expectations by combining a building type, finishing materials, and a visual appearance that are together commonly associated with curtain walls. An orthodox modernist could be easily offended by this deception. Yet, there was a paradoxical honesty in CK's façade too: in essence, it literally translated what in a typical Miesian skyscraper is a purely visual appearance into real structure: open ground-floors that transition into a dense weaving of mullions on the upper floors. This was a remarkable feat that preceded the far more famous—and infinitely more monumental—application of a similar structural logic of dense façade columns in Minoru Yamasaki's World Trade Center in New York. One cannot but wonder how in the case of the Belgrade building a more self-assured architect would have tectonically articulated this invention rather than concealing it behind a conventionalized appearance. Except that it was precisely the image that drove the very invention: completely masked, the 'cage' structure has no *raison d'être* unless there is a desire to create a façade that looks like a curtain wall but avoids problems of shoddy construction.

References to American commercial skyscrapers, especially those by Mies van der Rohe, were visible in the interior of the CK tower as well. With its sleek marble walls and large expanses of glass, the entry lobby was a less monumental version of the lobby of Mies's Seagram Building in New York. **(Fig. 6.17)** But the fact that a bust of Lenin—which would have been hardly appropriate in the corporate headquarters of a whiskey manufacturer—stood opposite the main entrance highlighted an inherent paradox of the insistence on replicating an existing model. Mies's skyscrapers and their progeny were commercial buildings that became symbols of corporate architecture; housing the seat of a Communist party in a building like that meant that the original meanings implicitly associated with the building type were replaced by a completely new ideological content. This was not an entirely new phenomenon: as Jean Louis-Cohen has shown, in Stalin's Soviet Union there was a fascination with American technology and the most iconic buildings of Socialist Realism, such as the seven monumental towers that surround Moscow, were based on American pre-World War II skyscrapers.⁴⁹⁶ Like the Soviet examples, the CK's repeated references to American corporate architecture may not only be interpreted as mere following of an architectural fashion, but also as a symbolic act of "catching up" with the industrially developed capitalist world—a persistent source of frustration for socialist states—through appropriation of architectural form, if not exactly of

⁴⁹⁶ Jean-Louis Cohen, "America: A Soviet Ideal," in: *AA Files* no.5 (Jan. 1984): 33-40.

technology. But the case of the CK was more complex than those of Stalinist skyscrapers: by insisting on the imagery of the contemporaneous International Style, it quietly re-ideologized an allegedly politically neutral version of modernism that, in the postwar years, had become entirely subsumed in and identified with the capitalist mode of production. The CK paradoxically re-confirmed the declarative universality of the International Style, not only in terms of its climatic and cultural applicability, but even more through its ideological ambiguity.

The bust of Lenin in the lobby notwithstanding, there was indeed nothing inherent to the tower that would identify it with Communism; this fact has been fully confirmed in recent years, when the building became the most expensive rental office space in Belgrade, smoothly transitioning to its new purpose. The problem of ideological representation, however, remained. Its resolution was a striking anticipation of an advertising technology developed much later, as each of the building's many windows contained a special light that allowed the four facades to be lit at night in different patterns.⁴⁹⁷ The building thus functioned as a primitive version of a gigantic digital display that, instead of commercial advertising, showed political slogans, such as "Long Live Tito." **(Fig. 6.18)** It was a major urban spectacle: an imposing, brightly illuminated, modern skyscraper, standing at the center of a brand new city and visible from a great

⁴⁹⁷ For an analysis of the curtain wall of the CK building, see *ibid.*

distance, celebrating the “greatest son of Yugoslavia” with 100 meter tall messages. Even the *New York Times* correspondent felt compelled to write about it, although his subtly sneering comment meant that this was probably a bit too much for his taste.⁴⁹⁸ Yet this hi-tech propaganda completely removed any ideological signification from the physical body of the building: there were no longer any sculptures of triumphant proletarians, no five-pointed stars, and no inscriptions engraved in the walls to convey the meaning. Instead, the message became transitory and fully dependent on those who controlled electrical switches inside. The ease with which the building would later alter its function was built into it from the very start, which has become ironically obvious during the last few Christmas celebrations, when the newly refurbished facades projected gigantic Orthodox crosses instead of Communist slogans.

* * *

Only a few hundred meters east of the CK, extending the line established by the SIV and the CK towards the river Sava, stands a third building of the unofficial Yugoslav capitol: the Museum of Contemporary Art (MSU—*Muzej savremene umetnosti*), built to house the twentieth century art from all parts of

⁴⁹⁸ David Binder, “Those friendly Beogradjani,” in: *New York Times*, (Nov. 21, 1965): 98. A photograph of the building lit up with the words “Long Live Tito” was published in *Arhitektura urbanizam* 7, no. 41-42 (1966): 6.

Yugoslavia. **(Fig. 6.19)** The institution, which between its opening in 1965 and the demise of the country in 1991 indeed lived up to the intention to gather the best possible collection of Yugoslav modernism, nevertheless illustrated the declining significance of federalism, since its official founder and financial supporter was not the Federation, but the City of Belgrade and the Cultural Council of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.⁴⁹⁹ As an institution, the Museum embodied Yugoslavia's internationalist aspirations, offering an array of important visiting exhibitions from various parts of the world, while as a building, it perfectly matched the similar connotations of its immediate surroundings by adding yet another foreign reference to the stylistic equation of New Belgrade.

MSU was the brainchild of the modernist painter, art critic, theorist, and historian Miodrag B. Protić, who had made a meteoric career after the demise of Socialist Realism in the early 1950s. An erudite writer and the key advocate of the autonomy of the arts as much as a successful artist, Protić skillfully straddled the line between politics and art, always close to centers of power but never crossing the line into explicit political involvement, let alone becoming a member of the party. His allegiance was, ultimately, to art and its promotion and the political connections were just a means to achieve that. It was through Protić's tireless advocacy that an old idea to create a permanent building for modern art came to fruition, first through the founding of the Modern Gallery in 1958 and

⁴⁹⁹ Miodrag B. Protić, *Muzej savremene umetnosti* (Belgrade: Muzej savremene umetnosti, 1965), 18-19.

then through the construction of a new museum building between 1959 and 1965. Protić became the first director of the Gallery (renamed Museum of Contemporary Art in 1965) and in this position led the assembly and conceptualization of its permanent collection and the establishment of a remarkable network of foreign contacts.⁵⁰⁰

According to contemporary estimates, the 1959 competition for the new museum building was not particularly successful in bringing about a broad range of thoughtful new ideas.⁵⁰¹ That is perhaps why the winning entry by two young architects from Belgrade, Ivan Antić and Ivanka Raspopović, stood out so distinctly from its competitors. Antić had already enjoyed some reputation in Belgrade thanks to several well-reviewed structures he had built in the previous few years, including Belgrade's first residential skyscrapers at Zvezdara hill.⁵⁰² The museum project was an inspired work based on a vaguely New Brutalist language of exposed concrete frame and brick infill, which Antić had already explored and which at the time was popular among the younger generation of

⁵⁰⁰ Modern Gallery was renamed Museum of Contemporary Art in May 1965, five months before the opening of the new building; see: MSU, letter of the Director of the Modern Gallery to the Assembly of the City of Belgrade, May 15, 1965.

⁵⁰¹ "Konkurs za zgradu moderne galerije u Beogradu," in: *Arhitektura urbanizam* I, no. 1 (1960): 33.

⁵⁰² Vjenceslav Richter, "Stambeni tornjevi u Beogradu," in: *Arhitektura* 14, no. 1-3 (1960): 33.

Belgrade architects.⁵⁰³ Just around the time of the competition, the Museum's so-called Salon, a small temporary exhibition space in downtown Belgrade, was opened on the ground level of an elegant building in exposed concrete and brick, designed by Miroslav Jovanović.⁵⁰⁴ But the spatial and formal complexity of the museum, despite being derived from a very simple geometrical system, was an original solution that departed from the down-to-earth straightforwardness of New Brutalism. In plan, the building was based on a rectangular structural grid of reinforced concrete columns three spans wide and five spans long; within every other spatial bay, a brick volume rotated forty-five degrees in relation to the main grid was inserted, creating a complex zigzagging contour of six diamond-shapes connected at their tips. **(Fig. 6.20)** In elevation, each of the resulting volumes ended with a triangular gable, forming a multifaceted roof truncated at the top, which extended the jagged line of the plan into the silhouette. The building thus consisted of six crystalline masses in red brick floating above the surrounding greenery, anchored to the ground by a slender concrete frame, a structure that was at once formally complex and geometrically rigorous. Inside, however, the apparent modularity of spaces dissolved, as the partitions between individual

⁵⁰³ Other such buildings included Antić's own Warehouse ???, an apartment building with artists's studios in Pariska St. by Mirko Jovanović, an apartment building in Dositejeva St. by Mihailo Mitrović, etc.

⁵⁰⁴ See: Mihailo Mitrović, *Novija arhitektura Beograda*, ... 70-71.

volumes all but disappeared, while floors of gradually decreasing heights spiraled from the open ground level to the intimate, top-lit rooms under the roof.

The competition design did not change much in the development process beyond further clarifying the already clear concept. The originally detached lecture hall was integrated into the main structure and two of the six upper-level volumes, which in the competition entry morphed into a single mass, now became separate like the remaining four. The most obvious change came not from the architects, but at the urging of Protić, and it concerned neither the function of the building, nor its form, but the material. While visiting the mausoleum of the Karađorđević dynasty at Oplenac, a building in a “national style” clad in white marble from Venčac (Serbia’s best quarry), Protić came to the idea to replace the exposed brick on the exterior, which the original museum design proposed, with polished white marble.⁵⁰⁵ In order to achieve this expensive addition, he had to lobby with politicians, as the funding for the construction was repeatedly in danger of being cut.⁵⁰⁶ The motivation to use

⁵⁰⁵ Author’s interview with Protić, June 2007. Protić also writes about the change in his memoirs, entitled *Noah’s Ark*; see: Miodrag B. Protić, *Hojeva barka* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1992), 571.

The decision to use marble on the exterior was already in place by the end of 1961, before the construction began; see: “Галерија у зарубљеним призмама,” in: *Borba* (Belgrade, December 16, 1961).

⁵⁰⁶ Protić, *Hojeva barka*, 571.

marble was to “emphasize the crystalline clarity of the museum’s forms.”⁵⁰⁷ But as a side-effect, this change transformed a key element in the design’s genetic code, replacing the rough immediacy of the New Brutalist aesthetic with the smooth whiteness of the International Style. The Museum, which originally departed from such an approach, was placed in harmony with its projected surroundings: the marble-clad SIV and the never-realized white conference pavilion of the CK.

Protić’s further influence had only a limited effect on the physical form of the Museum, but it bears great symbolic significance, completing the range of internationalist connotations of New Belgrade’s key buildings. In 1962, while the Museum was still under construction, Protić was one of the many prominent Yugoslavs who were invited to spend time in the United States, sponsored by a grant from the Ford Foundation. He used his tenure to study modern American art and the organization and functioning of New York’s great museums, especially the Museum of Modern Art. The prestigious grant allowed him free access to collections, as well as a chance to meet the patriarchs of American modernism—among others, the former and current directors of the MoMA, Alfred H. Barr Jr. and René d’Harnoncourt, the director of the Guggenheim Thomas Messer, the aesthetician Thomas Munro, and the architect Philip Johnson. The latter—at the moment himself busy with the expansion of MoMA—was, allegedly,

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 567.

impressed with the plans for the new building in Belgrade that Protić showed him during a visit to Johnson's studio at the top of the Seagram building.⁵⁰⁸

Although he had already been formed as a painter and critic, the American experience was formative for Protić the museum director, perhaps the most significant and far-reaching role in his diverse career. Particularly important was the lesson he learned from MoMA and Alfred Barr Jr., which he used in his own museum in Belgrade. Protić copied the organization of the institution: following MoMA's lead, MSU was the first museum in Yugoslavia to have permanent departments for documentation, public relations, education, and international exchange.⁵⁰⁹ The technologies of exhibition installation and storage were also transplanted, including a system of suspended sliding frames used for storing paintings in the depot.⁵¹⁰ **(Fig. 6.21)** MSU thus transcended the traditional role of a museum that merely collects and exhibits art works and became a far more comprehensive institution aimed at the research and promotion of modern art of Yugoslavia. During the two decades of Protić's directorship, from which he stepped down in 1980, MSU presented seven ground-breaking shows of Yugoslav modern art 1900-1960, each devoted to one decade of the period; over thirty exhibitions of individual artists; major shows of Serbian modernism in the republican capitals of Yugoslavia; and almost two hundred smaller exhibitions

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 531.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 527.

⁵¹⁰ Author's interview with Protić, June 2007.

dispatched around provincial Serbia. MSU also became an active locus of international exchange, conceptualizing and organizing forty two exhibitions of Yugoslav art to be sent abroad and hosting a hundred and fourteen foreign exhibitions. The latter emphatically defied the Cold War boundaries, comprising a range of national retrospectives, including those from the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Italy, side by side with those from India, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The most important international artists were represented as well, ranging from the *Blue Rider* group, Pablo Picasso, and Vladimir Mayakovsky's revolutionary posters, to Yves Klein, Willem de Kooning, and Henri Cartier-Bresson.⁵¹¹

From Barr and d'Harnoncourt, Protić also absorbed the philosophy of exhibiting a large and complex collection of modern art. In its concept, his permanent exhibition in Belgrade was for the modern art of Yugoslavia what MoMA's permanent exhibition was for international modernism: an authoritative, almost canonical view. The solution adopted from American curators consisted in finding a balance between thematic and chronological approaches through organizing the exhibition into smaller "poetic sequences" related to certain movements and periods, which were then presented in a chronological order to

⁵¹¹ See: Radmila Matić-Panić, "The Painter and Critic as the Founder of the Museum of Contemporary Art," in: Jerko Denegri and Radmila Matić-Panić, eds., *Miodrag B. Protić* (Belgrade: Clio, 2002), 246-47.

create an apparently objective view of the development of art.”⁵¹² This was a patently aesthetic, formalist method, based on a firm belief in the autonomy of art and the existence of objective criteria of its evaluation, exemplified in Barr’s own trust in establishing a “distinction of quality from mediocrity.”⁵¹³ At the time of Protić’s visit to the United States, this ideology of “art for art’s sake” dominated American art through the writings of the modernist critic Clement Greenberg and his followers. This is not to say that Protić passively absorbed these ideas thanks to his stay in the US; prior to his trip, he had already written a range of texts—most notably his 1960 book *Image and Meaning*—in which he strongly advocated both the essential autonomy of art and the predominance of aesthetic judgment in its evaluation.⁵¹⁴ Even though *Image and Meaning* revealed a certain mistrust in abstraction—which, for Greenberg, was the pinnacle of artistic development—Protić had already been attuned to ideas he would encounter in the United States, which probably made his stay there all the more productive. Contemporary Yugoslav critics were also easily recognized ; as an early review

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, 244; and Protić, *Hojeva barka*, 524.

⁵¹³ Barr’s words quoted in: Alan Wallach, “The Museum of Modern Art: The Past’s Future,” in: Francis Frascina and Jonathan Harris, eds., *Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Texts* (London and New York: Phaidon Press, 1992), 283.

⁵¹⁴ See: Miodrag B. Protić, *Slika i smisao* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1960). Protić wrote the book influenced mainly by European writers—he only started learning English while staying in New York—and was at the time unaware of Greenberg’s influential work; author’s interview with Protić, June 2007. Besides, Greenberg’s key essay, “Modernist Painting,” became public only in 1961, one year before Protić’s stay in New York.

of the museum stated, its collection represented a “triumph of aesthetic criteria.”⁵¹⁵

There is a certain irony in the fact that the concept of art as an “autonomous” endeavor preoccupied only with its own internal logic simultaneously came to govern top cultural institutions of two vastly different—if not directly opposed—political and ideological systems: corporate capitalism of the 1960s America and the self-managing socialism of Yugoslavia. At a closer inspection, however, this coincidence was not as strange as it may seem, since in both instances it resulted from a reaction to Stalinist cultural policies, albeit at different times. Greenberg, who had been a Marxist critic in the 1930s but became disillusioned with Communism because of Stalinist show-trials of that decade, saw art’s disengagement from society as the only viable form of authentic practice. In the 1960s, he would famously claim: “Some day it will have to be told how anti-Stalinism... turned into art for art’s sake, and thereby cleared the way, heroically, for what was to come.”⁵¹⁶ Protić similarly defended the ‘disengaged’ Yugoslav modernism of the 1950s, which subsequent critics labeled ‘socialist aestheticism,’ as true progress after the politically imposed Socialist Realism and art’s return to its own intrinsic qualities: “The period of break with Stalinism was less and less about an apologetic ‘engagement’ and more and

⁵¹⁵ V. Maleković, “Trijumf estetskog kriterija,” in: *Vjesnik* (Zagreb, October 24, 1965).

⁵¹⁶ Clement Greenberg quoted in: Gilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art*, 17.

more about a deliberate disengagement.”⁵¹⁷ In both instances, however, it was precisely because of the “disengagement” that the respective political systems were able to assimilate this “autonomous” art for art’s sake and to use it as implicit ideological propaganda: of liberal democracy in the American case and of a reformed socialism in the Yugoslav. And it was precisely because of such propagandistic motives that Protić was invited to the United States in the first place, which allowed him to fine-tune his own ideas to those of the self-proclaimed new center of modern culture and to apply them in his own institution in Belgrade.

The building that Protić got for his museum could not have been more appropriate for housing such a vision of modern art. Indeed, if MSU in its curatorial policies paralleled the Greenbergian canons of modernism, as a piece of architecture, it embodied the key modernist ideas about space, form, and tectonics, as canonized by Sigfried Giedion and Hitchcock and Johnson. The museum itself became a luxury art object that pushed the tropes of modern architecture to their logical conclusions, not merely embracing, but amplifying and transforming them into deliberate aesthetic statements like few other buildings anywhere. If Hitchcock and Johnson prescribed clean undecorated volumes with taut white surfaces, MSU stressed pure voluminosity through its

⁵¹⁷ Denegri and Matić-Panić, eds., *Miodrag B. Protić*, 250.

austere windowless cubes that float above the surrounding park.⁵¹⁸ If the canon required a truthful expression of structure and material, MSU exaggerated the demand into a rigorous tectonic coding, in which each material denotes a single structural purpose, further coupled with its position in the geometric system of the building. The gray concrete thus exists only as a linear three-dimensional frame that follows the primary orthogonal grid; where it encounters the exterior, it is enclosed only with large glass surfaces. The white marble, on the other hand, serves only as exterior partitions and an infill to the concrete skeleton; geometrically, without exceptions, it follows the secondary grid rotated by forty-five degrees in relation to the primary. **(Fig. 6.22)**

But it was the notion of space—the ultimate trope of modern architecture—that MSU explored most exhaustively. Not only is the building’s interior “open” in plan, but it is open in section as well, so much so that it evokes Adolf Loos’s *Raumplan*. **(Fig. 6.23)** Furthermore, the museum literally epitomizes the third, final stage of Giedion’s genealogy of architectural space, in which buildings, with equal importance, exist as free-standing objects and hollowed-out interiors, the inside and outside merging through “the incorporation of movement as an inseparable element of architecture.”⁵¹⁹ On the outside, the

⁵¹⁸ Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Jr. and Philip Johnson, *The international style: architecture since 1922* (New York, W. W. Norton & company, 1932).

⁵¹⁹ Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time, and Architecture*, fifth edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), lvi.

museum's crystalline volumes are infused with a heightened sense of sculptural expression.⁵²⁰ **(Fig. 6.24)** Sitting like modern-day Egyptian pyramids in the open plains of New Belgrade, they embody Giedion's observation that "architecture is again approaching sculpture, and sculpture is approaching architecture."⁵²¹

Inside, however, the building blurs its boundaries with the exterior, especially on the second floor sculpture gallery, which offers a spectacular panoramic view of the Sava river and the old Belgrade. **(Fig. 6.25)** A sense of guided movement is implied through a long canopy at the front entrance that determines the path well before a visitor reaches the building, continuing in the interior through a jagged spiral of the main staircase that connects the half-levels and leads to the top floor.

The upper level galleries, inside the marble "cubes," seem to explore another of Giedion's ideas about modern space, namely, that it was derived from Cubist painting.⁵²² Indeed, the use of two overlapping geometrical grids in the plan radically abolishes the one-point perspective, engendering a somewhat disorienting space whose boundaries dissolve into facets that meet at different sharp angles. **(Fig. 6. 26)** As Giedion claimed, in order to "grasp the true nature of space, the viewer must project himself through it;" in the case of MSU, even

⁵²⁰ The sculptural qualities were noticed in the public even before the building was finished; see: "Зграда расте—галерија живи," in: *Ekspres* (Belgrade, August 12, 1964).

⁵²¹ Giedion, *Space, Time, and Architecture*, lvi.

⁵²² *Ibid.*, 434-35.

“projecting” oneself through the space does not guarantee its full comprehension.⁵²³ In this context, the experience of climbing up the spiraling central staircase of the museum evokes Giedion’s classic description of the movement up the Eiffel tower as the ultimate experience of Cubist space.⁵²⁴ All of this must have been a powerful statement in a museum of modern art, considering that the view of modern art on which it was based held Cubism as a primary building block in its evolution. And while it is uncertain precisely how aware the architects were of some of the finer points in Giedion’s theory (*Space, Time, and Architecture* was not translated into Serbo-Croatian until 1968), its basic ideas had already been in sufficiently broad circulation to be easily assimilated and aestheticized.

MSU opened on the twenty-first anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade on October 20, 1965. If there were any doubts about the design, by the opening day it was seen as an unqualified success and the architects won that year’s October Prize, the highest recognition for cultural achievement awarded by the City of Belgrade.⁵²⁵ Praise was almost unanimous and few pieces of architecture ever completed in Yugoslavia rivaled the attention that the press lavished upon

⁵²³ *Ibid.*, 436.

⁵²⁴ It was first expounded in Giedion’s book *Building in France, Building in Ferro-Concrete* (:), . It was also mentioned in *Space, Time, and Architecture*, 436.

⁵²⁵ “Хармонично и функционално,” *Borba* (Belgrade, October 17, 1965).

the new museum.⁵²⁶ The opening ceremony attracted not only domestic dignitaries, but a considerable number of foreign guests, including a range of French and Italian art critics. A series of laudatory texts, concerning both the building and the collection, appeared in European press, including a much-quoted enthusiastic exclamation by the French critic Michel Ragon that “in Yugoslavia, living art is at the same time official art.”⁵²⁷ Conspicuously absent from the opening ceremony were Protić’s mentors from New York, perhaps a testimony that American interest in Yugoslavia went only one way: towards promoting their own influence. Soon after the opening, however, *Newsweek* described MSU as a “monument to artistic freedom” and in a bizarre, almost offensive, choice of words, a “joyful tombstone to Socialist Realism.”⁵²⁸ This confirmed not only the already entrenched association between modernism and liberal values, but also the singularly political meanings that the Americans still attached to Yugoslav art, despite the fact that Socialist Realism had been abolished for no less than fifteen years. In return, Yugoslav political establishment happily exploited such views of the museum, as it became an obligatory stop for foreign dignitaries. Among the most frequent official guests

⁵²⁶ The Archive of MSU contains dozens of articles published in Yugoslav press at the occasion of the building’s opening.

⁵²⁷ Quoted, among other sources, in: Denegri, “Inside or Outside ‘Socialist Modernism?’,” 174.

⁵²⁸ “Slavs Without Marx,” in: *Newsweek* (February 7, 1966): 40.

were the art-loving wives of Western presidents and crowned heads, often accompanied by Tito's own wife, Jovanka Broz.⁵²⁹ **(Fig. 6.27)**

Compared to its predecessors, MSU represented an evolution in the integration of New Belgrade's official architecture into the mainstream international modernism of the postwar period. The SIV and the CK were hybrids of sorts, both in pursuit of replicating a preexisting image of modernity. The former updated a more archaic version of modernism, dating back to the 1930s, and brought it in line with the style of the 1950s. The latter appropriated the appearance of a foreign building type but combined it with native technical possibilities, arriving at an innovative structural solution that, however, was not tectonically articulated with the same self-conscious originality. MSU, on the other hand, recombined the stereotypes of high modernism into an original statement that had no obvious predecessors. At the same time, however, it also supported the ideology of aesthetic autonomy associated with high modernism, which, however, was everything but apolitical. What was unusual about it—and perhaps hybrid, at least with respect to the political preconceptions about high modernism entrenched in the West—was the fact that this “autonomous art” supported a socialist one-party system, rather than a Western liberal democracy. In that context, however, MSU was much more than a mere representation of

⁵²⁹ Among the prestigious visitors of MSU were: the wife of the French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing; the wife of the German president Willy Brandt; British Princess Margaret; Danish Princess Benedicte; Queen Juliana of the Netherlands; Queen-Mother Fabiola of Belgium; Mayor of Vienna; official delegation of the City of Moscow, etc. MSU, photo collection “Život.”

“artistic freedom,” as its many programs, such as the children’s studio and the exhibitions dispatched to provincial regions, truly sought to bring the ‘high art’ to the people. This was a paradoxical revival of the ideals of socialist culture through a theory and form language appropriated from a political system that was firmly opposed to socialism.

Vjenceslav Richter: An Avant-garde Architect for an Avant-garde Socialism

For the past thirty years, foundations of an unfinished building have stood between the SIV and the CK as a further testimony to the declining power of Yugoslav federalism, all the more convincing considering the building’s high ideological charge: the Museum of the Revolution of the Peoples and Ethnicities of Yugoslavia. Designed in 1961 (although the construction did not begin until 1978), the museum never advanced beyond the basement level. If finished, it would have been a white box raised on large-span columns, topped by a dynamic sculptural skylight, in style not unlike the neighboring floating volumes of the SIV and MSU and the also unfinished conference pavilion of the CK. But despite this formal similarity with the rest of New Belgrade, the design of the Revolution Museum was a result of significantly different motivations and theories about the role of architecture in a socialist society and about the appropriate architectural representation of the country.

The museum's designer was Vjenceslav Richter, a Croatian architect, designer, artist, theorist, and activist, whose career reveals a radically different path from those of his colleagues who designed other New Belgrade structures. Unlike Janković and Antić, who were both politically inactive (or, more precisely, in Antić's case, closeted antiCommunists), Richter was closely involved in the political life. Born in 1917, he began his studies of architecture at the University of Zagreb in 1936, where he became active in leftist circles and joined the Association of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia in 1939. Because of such engagement, he was not allowed to continue the studies under the Ustaša regime in Croatia and joined the resistance movement from its very start. In 1943, during a raid of a resistance printing shop that he ran outside of Zagreb, he was badly wounded, arrested, and interned in a work camp in Vienna.⁵³⁰ After the war, he continued his studies of architecture at the University of Zagreb, where he graduated in 1949 under professor Zdenko Strižić, an eminent modernist and former student of Hans Poelzig in Dresden.⁵³¹

While still a student, thanks to his political reputation, Richter was able to acquire modest, but important commissions for various small exhibition pavilions at fairs in Yugoslavia and abroad, including those in Stockholm (1949), Vienna (1949), Hannover (1950), Paris (1950), etc. Such commissions allowed him to

⁵³⁰ For Richter's political engagement, see: Mihailo Jeftić's interview with Vjenceslav Richter, January 27, 1990, unpublished transcript, NBS.

⁵³¹ See: Marijan Susovski, ed., *Richter* (Zagreb: Muzej suvremene umjetnosti, 2003), 15.

travel to the West well before it was possible for ordinary Yugoslavs and thus to acquire first-hand information on latest foreign architecture. This experience also determined Richter's architectural career, since exhibition pavilions comprised the bulk of his executed projects. Some of them were among the most important architectural representations of Yugoslav socialism, all the more potent for being shown abroad. Besides exhibition pavilions, Richter designed only a handful of permanent buildings; but he also had a significant international career as sculptor and painter, carving for himself a unique professional niche. He held a conventional job for only a few years, when he taught at the Academy of Applied Arts in Zagreb; but after the Academy was abolished in 1954, he started a free-lance practice that allowed him to pursue a variety of artistic interests, from architecture, to interior, furniture, and stage-set design, and further to 'pure' art (all of which were for Richter a continuum rather than distinct, separate fields).

From his earliest pavilions of the 1940s, Richter showed an allegiance to modernism. By 1950, this allegiance acquired a much more specific tone that revealed references to constructivism, which Richter himself repeatedly emphasized as a major influence on his work.⁵³² The sources of this fascination were diverse: from Richter's own professor Zdenko Strižić, who had won a prize at the international competition for the a theater in Kharkov, Ukraine, in 1930, to the lingering presence of the historical avant-garde in Yugoslavia (the journal

⁵³² *Ibid.*, 15-17. Also: Jeftić, Interview with Vjenceslav Richter, 20.

Zenit, published in Zagreb and Belgrade from 1921 to 1926, was the first in the world to publish Vladimir Tatlin's *Monument to the Third International*), and to contemporary books and journals. During a trip to Chicago in 1950, Richter made a point of paying multiple visits to László Moholy-Nagy's Institute of Design at the Illinois Institute of Technology, a successor to the "New Bauhaus" founded after Moholy-Nagy immigrated into the United States in 1937.⁵³³

Richter was the main ideologue of EXAT 51, Yugoslavia's first independent group of artists, and he who wrote the group's "Manifesto."⁵³⁴ In it, Richter argued for a synthesis of visual arts in the creation of totally designed environments based on abstraction and continuous experimentation.⁵³⁵ Moreover, in Richter's view, artists were supposed to be leaders in the construction of socialism, rather than to merely follow or retreat from the realities of social life. This was a stance in total opposition to the modernist ideology of autonomous "art for art's sake," and it indeed continued the socially minded concerns of the interwar avant-garde, especially Russian constructivism and the Bauhaus. Richter's neo-avant-garde position, which owed significantly to his ongoing immersion in the world of the historic avant-garde, is perhaps best exemplified by his 1964 book *Synthurbanism*, which radically denied the

⁵³³ Susovski, *Richter*, 17.

⁵³⁴ See: Vjenceslav Richter, "Tko je pisac manifesta grupe EXAT 51?"

⁵³⁵ For an English translation of the Manifesto, see: Exat 51, "Manifesto," in: Šuvaković and Đurić, eds., *Impossible Histories*, 539.

separation of visual media and argued for a continuity in design of human environments, from the smallest scale of individual objects to the largest scale of the city.⁵³⁶ The motto at the beginning of the book is particularly indicative both of his allegiance to such ideas and of how well informed he was of their genealogy: a verse from an unpublished poem by Kurt Schwitters, whose *Merzbau* projects represented some of the most striking examples of ‘synthetic’ environments.⁵³⁷ *Synthurbanism* also clearly revealed that Richter saw his artistic activities as part of his political commitment, since the book was dedicated to the “engaged youth” and repeatedly raised the issue of socialism as a part of and precondition for a “general transformation of our image of the world.”⁵³⁸ Ješa Denegri’s cogent characterization of EXAT’s social engagement can be applied to Richter without reservations: “the group apparently emerges not only as a consequence of, but also as the initiator and promoter of, the spiritual and material reconstruction shortly after World War II. Under such circumstances, the group tended to act constructively, that is, in favor of and within the context of the socialist society..., acting with the earnest conviction of its members and by no means in response to the demands, commissions, or

⁵³⁶ Vjenceslav Richter, *Sinturbanizam* (Zagreb: Mladost, 1964).

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

support of the authorities, which tolerated the group no more than they did the other art phenomena of the same historical period.”⁵³⁹

Richter’s greatest contribution to architectural representation of Yugoslav socialism—and a pinnacle of his efforts to achieve a synthetically designed environment—was the Pavilion of Yugoslavia at the 1958 Universal and International Exposition in Brussels. **(Fig. 6.28)** The EXPO 58, as the show became widely known, was the first “world’s fair” in almost twenty years, envisioned as a showcase of universal cooperation between nations and a record of humanity’s technological and social progress since World War II. Despite great optimism invested in them, these lofty goals remained in the shadow of new political rivalries and old patterns of domination: the raging Cold War, the continuing colonialism, and the growing gap between the developed and undeveloped world.

Architectural purists do not remember the Brussels EXPO particularly fondly. It was a statement of modernism’s worldwide victory; but this was now a modernism that showed signs of compromise of its once lofty principles for the sake of extra-architectural motivations and purposes.⁵⁴⁰ However different in

⁵³⁹ See: Ješa Denegri, “Inside or Outside ‘Socialist Modernism?’ Radical Views on the Yugoslav Art Scene, 1950-1970,” in: Đurić and Šuvaković, eds., *Impossible Histories*, 174.

⁵⁴⁰ For an in-depth overview of the Brussels EXPO, see: Rika Devos and Mil De Kooning, eds., *L’Architecture moderne à l’Expo 58. ‘Pour un monde plus humain,’* (Brussels: Fonds Mercator and Dexia Banque, 2006); also: Rika Devos, “Smaltz, googie and honky-tonk? Belgian architects

their ideological messages—one selling the pleasures of the “American way of life,” the other the advantages of Communism—the gargantuan pavilions of the two superpowers, the US and the USSR, were strangely similar in their highly formal, classicized monumentality. **(Fig. 6.29)** Even more disturbingly, the EXPO was a sign of modernism succumbing to popular taste, particularly through the arrival of American commercial architecture in Europe. The Belgian section was especially reviled for its abundance of brightly-colored “space-age” ornament that became known as the Expo Style or the Atomic Style. The Atomium—the chief landmark of the exhibition—captured the spirit of the EXPO and its fascination with science and technology, which was translated into one of Brussels’ favorite attractions endlessly reproduced in tourist merchandise, but which did not result in a ground-breaking piece of architecture on par with its British and French counterparts of the nineteenth century. Only a handful of pavilions received favorable reviews. Among them were Le Corbusier’s *poème électronique*, materialized as the Phillips Pavilion; Egon Eiermann’s Pavilion of West Germany, which, understandably, steered away from classicized monumentality as far as possible in order to avoid the still fresh memories of Nazism; and Sverre Fehn’s Pavilion of Norway, a masterpiece of the emerging Scandinavian version of regionalist modernism. Among them was Richter’s Pavilion of Yugoslavia, one of the great surprises of the EXPO.

at Expo 58 and the Atomic Style,” available at:

https://archive.ugent.be/retrieve/1829/def+devos_JDS8.pdf, retrieved October 10, 2008.

Consistent with its own newly stated foreign policy of peaceful coexistence transcending ideological divides, Yugoslavia was one of the first countries to accept the invitation to the EXPO. The participation was seen as an opportunity to showcase the reforms that the country recently underwent and to stress its commitment to building a humane socialism that harmonized the needs of individuals with those of the collective.⁵⁴¹ A General Commissariat was formed to organize the exhibition and to secure the support of the most prominent politicians and intellectuals in its conceptualization; the Commissariat included Branislav Kojić, an architect and professor at Belgrade University, a prewar modernist who would oversee the installation of the pavilion to its completion.⁵⁴² From the very start, organizers decided that the exhibition would have four sections: State and social organization; Culture, science, art, and education; Economy; and Natural beauties, a program that was at the same time too vague and too ambitious, and which perhaps contributed to the partial failure of the show. As a result, only some of the sections were well developed, among them most significantly the gallery of art. An Arts Council that oversaw its organization brought together some of the most prominent intellectuals, like Kojić and Drago Ibler; but its driving force was the writer and art critic Otto Bihalji-Merin. Bihalji-Merin was a striking personality: a long-time leftist and intellectual of European

⁵⁴¹ "Izveštaj pripremnog odbora za Opštu međunarodnu izložbu u Brislu 1958. godine o pripremnim radovima i učešću FNRJ," 12; ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 6.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*, 10.

reputation, in 1937 he wrote for Penguin Books the first study on German modern art in reaction to Nazi persecutions, but then converted to Socialist Realism, only to renew his allegiance to modernism after Yugoslavia's break with the Soviets.⁵⁴³ Thanks to his connections with European modernist circles, he found his way into the selection committee—alongside such luminaries as Herbert Reed—of the international exhibition *50 Years of Modern Art*, which was organized as a separate pavilion of the EXPO, and lobbied for a significant inclusion of Yugoslav artists in the show.

Richter won the second round of a rather uninspired national competition for the pavilion in 1956 with a spectacular project that proposed a building suspended from a central cable-stayed mast, focusing the support to only one point and completely opening the ground floor. **(Fig. 6.30)** The jury praised the proposal's spatial and functional qualities, but from the very start expressed concerns about the viability of the suspension structure. This proved to be a major point of contention during the developmental stage. Richter insisted on keeping the mast—going as far as privately hiring a structural engineer to prove

⁵⁴³ Oto Bihalji Merin was indeed an extraordinary personality: founder of Nolit, the still-existing Serbian publishing firm, he closely collaborated with circles of European modernist artists and left-leaning intellectuals, including Kandinsky, Klee, Thomas Mann, Oscar Schlemmer, and György Lukacs, with whom he co-edited the journal *Die Linkskurve*.

For a biography of Otto Bihalji-Merin, see: Ješa Denegri, "In memoriam: Oto Bihalji Merin (1904-1993). Oto Bihalji Merin kao pisac o modernoj umetnosti i likovni kritičar," in: *Projekart* (Novi Sad), no. 3 (July 1994): 2-8; also: Slobodan Lazarević, "Естетички и политички ангажман Ото Бихаљџи-Мерина," in: *Кораџи* (Kragujevac) 21, no. 11-12 (1986): 729-32.

his point—but the Commissariat’s experts judged differently.⁵⁴⁴ At one point, even some of Yugoslavia’s leading politicians expressed their opinions on the competing concepts: Moša Pijade, former President of the Federal Assembly, himself a painter, was very enthusiastic about Richter’s solution; Edvard Kardelj, the ‘architect of self-management,’ thought it was too extravagant and hoped for something “quieter.”⁵⁴⁵ There is no proof, however, that their opinions mattered in the final decision, which seems to have been made purely on technical grounds.⁵⁴⁶ Eventually, the pavilion was built on twelve conventional steel columns; instead of a central mast, Richter succeeded in constructing a daring sculpture in front of the pavilion, a light obelisk consisting of six tensile arches that functioned as a visual marker of the pavilion. **(Fig. 6.31)**

For the rest of his life, Richter held a grudge against Bihalji-Merin, whom he held responsible (as the sources suggest, mistakenly) for the omission of the

⁵⁴⁴ Richter hired certain engineers Draganić and Špringer to estimate the suspended construction and they claimed to be capable to calculate and build it within the required time, with only marginal raise in expenses. See Richter’s letter to the Commissariat, August 11, 1956; ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 1.

⁵⁴⁵ Letter from Vojo Pekić to “comrade Bata” (probably Mihailo Bata Javorski, the Ambassador of Yugoslavia to Belgium) of October 5, 1956, Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore, Fond 56, Fascikla 1.

⁵⁴⁶ Official reports repeatedly state that the reasons for the elimination of the mast were structural: estimated 100 cm displacements under the impact of strong winds, gradual sinking of the foundations, and lack of time to find satisfactory solutions for these problems. See, among other documents: “Izveštaj pripremnog odbora za Opštu međunarodnu izložbu u Brislu,” 16. The same report also expressed regret that the mast concept could not realized, stating that it would have been an “exceptionally attractive accent at the exhibition, which would have had a positive impact on numbers of visitors to our pavilion;” *ibid.*

mast, illustrating how important it was for him. The suspension concept may be ascribed to his indebtedness to constructivism, whose members had a penchant for such structures, famously exemplified in Ivan Leonidov's project for the Lenin Library in Moscow (1927) and Hannes Meyer's *Petersschule* in Basel (1926). The removal of the mast, therefore, also meant the removal of some of the pavilion's neo-avant-garde connotations, putting it more in line with the art shown within and around the pavilion, which largely belonged to the moderate, 'autonomous,' politically neutral modernism. **(Fig. 6.32)** This 'taming' of the concept probably did not hurt the country's representation in the West, where such apolitical art was seen as a prime virtue. Yet it was a missed opportunity for a more powerful political statement that could have been built into the very fabric of the building. Only two months before the opening of the EXPO, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia held its Seventh Congress in Ljubljana, in which it inaugurated its new Program that proclaimed a return to the original "revolutionary creative spirit of Marxism."⁵⁴⁷ In the spirit of Marx's "ruthless criticism of everything existing," the Program ended with an emphatic statement of anti-dogmatism, clearly referring to the ossified, quasi-religious role that Communist parties played in the Soviet bloc: "Nothing that has been created so far should be so sacred that it cannot be overcome, that it cannot be replaced

⁵⁴⁷ *Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije usvojen na sedmom kongresu Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije 22-26. aprila 1958* (Belgrade: NIP Komunist, 1972). Quoted in: Petranović, Štrbac, *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*, 156.

with something more progressive, more liberated, and more human.”⁵⁴⁸ This sentence was prominently displayed inside the Brussels pavilion, projecting the image of Yugoslav Communists as heirs to “true,” uncorrupted Marxism. **(Fig. 6.33)** Had the suspension structure of the pavilion been realized, its reference to constructivism—and thus to the “original” art of the revolution—could have made this political message truly palpable, organically connecting architecture and politics.

Even without the mast, however, the pavilion was a small masterpiece and a full realization of Richter’s ideas about the synthesis of visual arts. Raised on thin steel columns, the building’s weightless interlocking volumes appeared to float above a marble-paved plaza, creating a dynamic cascade of flowing spaces with no barriers between the exterior and interior. **(6. 34)** Part of the building’s success lay in the fact that, compared to the overcrowded commercialism of much of the EXPO, it seemed like an embodiment of good taste. Rather than a fair pavilion, it resembled an elegant, sparsely furnished art gallery, in which every exhibit yielded to a dominating Mondrianesque aesthetic of three-dimensional grids, a “symphony in black and white” interspersed with occasional splashes of color.⁵⁴⁹ **(Fig. 6.35)** In such settings, even the exhibited pieces of industrial machinery looked like objects of art. **(Fig. 6.36)** Indeed, the building

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁹ “Symphony in black and white” was a description published in the Belgian Communist daily *Drapeau Rouge*; “Izveštaj TANJUG-u,” May 10, 1958, ASCG , Fond 56, Fascikla 26.

itself was the most successful part of Yugoslav participation at the EXPO.⁵⁵⁰ *Architectural Review* ranked it among the “six outstanding pavilions” at the EXPO; for the French daily *L’Express*, it fared even better, among the top four.⁵⁵¹ Belgian press described it as a “palace in steel, glass, wood, and marble whose elegance lies in its restraint.”⁵⁵² Gurus of modernism, such as Alfred Barr Jr. and Jean Cassou of the Paris Museum of Contemporary Art, praised the pavilion and students of architecture flocked to see it.⁵⁵³ Many visitors and journalists commented that, in the visual noise of the EXPO, Richter’s pavilion offered a welcome point of calm and repose.⁵⁵⁴ One journalist particularly highlighted the building’s photographic appeal, noting how it attracted amateur-photographers always in search of good shots.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵⁰ Reports of officials and hosts of the pavilion are virtually unanimous in such estimates.

⁵⁵¹ *Architectural Review*, for example, ranked Richter’s Pavilion among the “six outstanding pavilions” at the EXPO; see: “Six Outstanding Pavilions: Jugoslavia,” in: *Architectural Review* 124, no. 739 (August 1958): 116-18.

⁵⁵² “Première manifestation au pavillon yougoslave,” *Le Peuple* (Brussels), February 4, 1958.

⁵⁵³ The hosts of the pavilion reported about numerous architects and architecture students who came to see the pavilion specifically for its architectural reputation; see: “Izveštaji domaćina paviļjona,” n.p., ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 6.

⁵⁵⁴ See Visitors’ comments (Knjiga utisaka), ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 26.

⁵⁵⁵ Belgian *Le Peuple* wrote in an article entitled “A Miracle of Elegance and Good Taste:” “No one gets upset here. One can peacefully stroll or sit down, watching how photographers walk around. For it seems that lovers of good photography scheduled a meeting at the Yugoslav pavilion, which proves its complete architectural success.” Partial translation of the original text in: “Izveštaj TANJUG-u,” May 10, 1958, ASCG, Fond 56, Fascikla 26.

Despite the removal of the central mast, the overwhelmingly positive reception of the pavilion was in itself a political message that further strengthened the already existing views of Yugoslav modern art as symptom of the country's break from the Soviet orbit.⁵⁵⁶ Starting from such frame of mind, it was not much of a leap to interpret other qualities of the building in political terms as well: its completely open ground floor and the fact that it had no doors were understood as analogous to Yugoslavia's open borders and its recently established international policy of "peaceful active coexistence." Modesty and restraint were seen as signs of a focus on human values instead of megalomaniac representation, etc.⁵⁵⁷ It is open to discussion to what extent the architect and the Commissariat consciously pursued some of the finer points of these interpretations. An uncompromising modernism and avoidance of anything stereotypically folksy were from the start main points in the concept of the pavilion; but Richter himself doubted the ability of architects to capture the

⁵⁵⁶ Admittedly, the three other socialist states participating at the EXPO 58, the USSR, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, also presented pavilions whose architecture could be described as modern. But they were equipped with artworks that revealed traces of Socialist Realism, especially in the Soviet pavilion, so that Richter's building, devoid of any obvious ideological symbols, still presented immediate visual distinction.

About foreign views of Yugoslav architecture, see my essay "'East? West? Or Both?' Foreign interpretations of Architecture in Socialist Yugoslavia," in: *Journal of Architecture* 14, no. 1 (December 2008): 87-105.

⁵⁵⁷ These were all comments of foreign visitors; see: Izveštaji domaćina paviljona, n.p., Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore, Fond 56, Fascikla 6.

character of their nations, even though he eventually acknowledged that his pavilion expressed Yugoslavia's "optimism and openness."⁵⁵⁸

If the pavilion was an unqualified success with educated elites—critics, artists, architects—popular reception was much cooler. Many ordinary Yugoslavs who visited the EXPO thought that the pavilion was "empty" and "too modern."⁵⁵⁹ Some foreigners, too, observed that the elegant but cool building conveyed nothing of the country's "vibrancy" and that it was more suited to a quiet Switzerland than the colorful Yugoslavia—it obviously frustrated the stereotypical views of a Balkan country.⁵⁶⁰ Faced with such criticisms and dwindling numbers of visitors, the Commissariat decided to make some adjustments: during the last month of the exhibition, a collection of hand-made dolls in folk costumes by an amateur ethnographer were installed. Obviously playing up to folksy stereotypes, these dolls were finally a large popular success that significantly boosted visits and attracted attention from the media. **(Fig. 6.37)**

In retrospect, the avant-garde nature of Richter's work became muted in the Brussels pavilion both through the alteration of the original concept of the building and through the stereotypical interpretations that focused on it as an

⁵⁵⁸ See: Vjenceslav Richter, "Osvrt na arhitektonske rezultate izložbe u Bruxellesu 1958.," in: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) XII, no. 1-6 (1958): 56-62.

⁵⁵⁹ See Visitors' comments.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

expression of “artistic freedom,” overlooking its politically charged aspects. Unfortunately, Richter never again got a chance to make his point with a similar potential for publicity, despite his subsequent successful career as sculptor whose pieces were bought by some of the most prestigious collections of modern art, including the New York MoMA and the Tate Gallery in London. After Brussels, however, he realized two more pavilions representing Yugoslavia at smaller international exhibitions, both in Italy and both within an existing building rather than freestanding structures. One was designed for the 1961 International Labor Exhibition and installed in Pier-Luigi Nervi’s Palace of Labor in Turin. Based on a geometry of circular segments, it was a formally and technologically imaginative project, with hinged zigzagging roofs that could fold flat like an accordion for easy transport. **(Fig. 6.38)** Appropriate to the context of an exhibition of labor, here “socialist self-management” itself was the subject of the presentation and Richter created another formally and spatially rich environment to showcase the virtues of the system. A centerpiece of the pavilion was a three-dimensional model of self-management that combined concentric, rotating segments in Plexiglas, reminiscent of Moholy-Nagy’s famous *Space-Time Modulator*.

Even more imaginative was Richter’s other pavilion in Italy, designed for the XIII Triennale in Milan in 1963-64, which showcased his recent obsession with repetitive modules, which he was exploring through sculpture. The theme of the Triennale was spare time. The Committee for Cultural Connections with

Foreign Countries allowed the Association of Visual Artists of Yugoslavia to freely conceptualize the exhibition, the former EXAT 51 member Bernardo Bernardi serving as a Commissar and Richter in full charge of the design.⁵⁶¹ In the context of this freedom, it seems especially significant that Bernardi and Richter again highlighted self-management and how it “reflected in the sphere of spare time” as the actual content of a highly aestheticized formal exercise, showcasing the activities and the self-managing character of various houses of culture, workers’ and people’s universities, people’s technical associations, and sports organizations.⁵⁶² Yet again, they stressed the subtle connection between the avant-garde aesthetics of the exhibition and the avant-garde status of Yugoslav system. The complete environment consisted of thin wooden laths of uniform section of 4x8 cm, arranged in a three-dimensional orthogonal grid. Like an artificial forest, the freely arranged vertical laths define the space only in the fuzziest sense of the word; even the exhibited photographs are cut into thin strips and coalesce and dissolve as one walks around.

The striking presentation in Milan proved so efficient that it won the Golden Medal of the Triennale, which is even more remarkable in the light of the fact that Yugoslavia was the only socialist country in the show and that its

⁵⁶¹ See: Bernardo Bernardi, “Jugoslavija na XIII Trijenalu,” in: *Arhitektura* 19, no. 90 (1965): 41-43.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, 42.

exhibition contained explicitly political overtones.⁵⁶³ Although small, this was perhaps the most radical design with which the country ever presented itself abroad; that something like that would ever be constructed for an official presentation was a testimony to Richter's unique artistic vision and his considerable political reputation.

* * *

The architecture of Yugoslav state closely intertwined various discourses of modernism with those of politics into a dense network of signification that explicitly or implicitly spoke of the country's political uniqueness, thus defying the alleged abstraction and universality of the International Style. Even the buildings that directly referred to foreign sources—or, perhaps, especially such buildings—confirmed this thesis, illustrating the fact that in the process of transfer of culture across political and national borders meanings of cultural artifacts unavoidably undergo transformation. In this context, the very idea of an “international style” becomes illusory as soon as one moves beyond mere physical form. Yugoslav official modernism, therefore, simultaneously transcended and confirmed cultural boundaries, at once a testimony to their permeability and to their function as guardians of local identities.

⁵⁶³ Also participating were: Italy, France, the United States, Mexico, Belgium, Finland, Brazil, West Germany, Austria, Great Britain, Holland, Switzerland, and Canada; *ibid.*

CONCLUSION

During the first twenty years after World War II, socialist Yugoslavia built its official “architectural face”—one that did not change much before the country disintegrated in 1991. This “face” was far from uniform, which is not unusual: any country, no matter how large or small, rarely achieves uniformity in that respect (US capitols may be an exception, but even they are only one segment of official architecture representing the state). But there was a striking—if, at first sight, superficial—common thread to Yugoslavia’s official architecture that stretched from the early postwar years well into the 1960s: most of the buildings I discussed in this dissertation were white. From Tito’s residences to the SIV in New Belgrade and Ostrogović’s City Hall in Zagreb, there was a pervasive *whiteness* to them, which was only challenged after 1965. One could endlessly theorize about the meaning of this whiteness, but I would argue that, more than anything else, it suggested a continuity of modernism in Yugoslavia. As Mark Wigley has argued, whiteness became in the late 1920s a signifier of the Modern Movement, a fashionable garb that most obviously identified a building as modern.⁵⁶⁴ Their common whiteness indicated that such diverse structures as the Batina monument and the MSU in New Belgrade belonged essentially to the

⁵⁶⁴ Mark Wigley, *White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995).

same “new tradition” (as Sigfried Giedion termed it), despite the apparently insurmountable stylistic and ideological differences that separate them. Even the most “colored” of the buildings I discussed, Dobrović’s *Generalštab*, uses its partial whiteness precisely to indicate its modernity, associating it with another modernist staple, the strip window, and contrasting it with the ruggedness of a “native” rustic wall.

But the remarkable diversity of meanings and motivations subsumed under this white uniform points in a direction completely opposite of uniformity. Thanks to its wildly shifting political orientations, in a short twenty years socialist Yugoslavia compressed almost every existing version of modernism—together with the relevant social and political program, not always and not necessarily associated with the political Left. Functionalism of the 1930s survived in the early postwar social housing with the appropriate social motivation. Tito’s White Villa at the Brioni was an example of a classicized modernism that could have just as well served a wealthy bourgeois or aristocrat, whom Tito, in many ways, emulated. The Stalinist appropriation of modernism and its incorporation into Socialist Realism—perhaps best exemplified in Boris Iofan’s iconic projects of the 1930s—had its counterpart at Batina and other projects of the Augustinčić-Galić team. Postwar calls for a modern monumentality were answered in the projects for New Belgrade, both those before and after 1948. The apparent depoliticization of modernism in the high International Style, which, in reality, allowed it to be used as a political “weapon” against Stalinism and an expression

of (corporate) liberal democracy, directly occurred in the CK building. The MSU further pushed the same message as a deliberate statement of an “autonomous” art that follows only its own logic, but actually allows itself to be incorporated into the dominant ideology. Finally, the radical avant-garde of the 1920s was preserved in the work of Vjenceslav Richter, not only formally, but also with the appropriate theoretical and political motivations.

What is astonishing is that this wealth of manifestations of modernism of diverse origins—from “middle-of-the-road” to radical—occurred not only in a tight geographic and temporal space, but also directly serving the representation of a state. Few—if any—similar examples could be found elsewhere. It could be argued that other socialist countries experienced similar violent shifts in their official attitudes towards architecture, beginning with the continuity of modernist practice in the early postwar years, followed by its suppression and the imposition of Socialist Realism, and ending with a return to modernism after Stalin’s death. But this return to modernism in the Communist bloc immediately modified the meanings of modernism everywhere else, stripping it of its previous role of a visual signifier of liberalism and democracy; other East Europeans were thus never able to use modernism as a way to differentiate themselves from their socialist confreres. Yugoslavia was unique in this respect and used that uniqueness consciously and efficiently.

It should not be assumed, however, that these diverse manifestations of modernism were not modified by the country’s political context. Perhaps the

most interesting point to consider is modernism's complex relationship with the traditions of the political Left. While the Yugoslav state exploited the seemingly depoliticized modernism of the 1950s in order to strengthen its international position, it simultaneously re-politicized and re-contextualized its meanings. (The same, after all happened in the West, too, but with a different ideological motivation.) The CK tower is well suited to illustrate this point: while appropriating the image of the postwar American corporate skyscraper—a hybrid of a quintessentially American building type and an originally European aesthetic—the CK transplanted that image to a radically different ideological and physical context. The emergence of American skyscrapers was a product of a pressing need for space in dense metropolitan areas; they competed with each other for physical space and symbolic prestige, creating an ultimate urban “delirium,” as Rem Koolhaas claimed.⁵⁶⁵ The CK skyscraper, on the other hand, was a solitary landmark in a city rationally designed according to the ideas of modernist urbanism that was born of social concerns and sought to ameliorate the chaos of the capitalist city. Le Corbusier's simultaneous fascination with, and detest for, Manhattan, which played a part in the formulation of his planning ideas, found its paradoxical resolution in New Belgrade. The CK was a case of politics and modernism working in synergy: the building derived its symbolism in part from its dominating position over the surrounding open landscape, while its

⁵⁶⁵ Rem Koolhaas, *Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1978).

need for symbolic power strengthened the principles of modernist planning that determined the building's solitary position. It reclaimed the modern skyscraper as both a symbolic and physical tool of socialism, identifying it, simultaneously, with a Communist party and with a harmonious, rationally planned settlement.

The story of Yugoslav official modernism also dismantles an easily established equivalence between periods in political and architectural history. Firm temporal boundaries in politics do not necessarily coincide with those in architecture. There were, therefore, numerous continuities in Yugoslav architecture that have been frequently overlooked. The modernism of the late 1940s was in many ways an extension of the previous decade. In time of an extreme poverty, when most buildings barely reached beyond the strictly utilitarian motivations, those associated with state power were the only opportunities for architects to explore *any* kind of complex architectural statement; and it was precisely in this area that this continuity was most obvious. There was an apparent paradox in this fact, considering how much the New Yugoslavia was supposed to differ from its predecessor. But it was a paradox only on the surface: the many stylistic and iconographic borrowings and appropriations from the old regime were as much a result of persistent stylistic and formal modalities within architectural profession, as of pure convenience that allowed an already comprehensible language of power to be used for a new set of rulers. Similarly, 1948 was not really a temporal boundary in architecture either. As the case of New Belgrade demonstrates, there was an essential

continuity in its basic planning principles across this apparent chronological divide. If anything, 1948 contributed to the demise of a 1930s aesthetics that survived in the original plans for the city's buildings; a new aesthetic, however, did not emerge until the mid-1950s, not only because it was impossible to build in the meantime, but also because it took time for new aesthetic models to be established internationally.

These chronological continuities suggest an attitude towards historical time that is perhaps not expected from a society that came into being as the result of a revolution. As the Sarajevo architect Mate Baylon proclaimed in the very first issue of the journal *Tehnika*, “We do not begin our work from scratch—we continue our work.”⁵⁶⁶ To be sure, what Baylon meant was that Yugoslav architects were continuing in the footsteps of a generation that had already fought for social change before the war; but even in a narrower sense, his statement implied that there was a past to rely on. Indeed, despite the ubiquitous rhetoric of a new start, Yugoslav architects never really resorted to the kind of radicalism known in the Soviet Union. To use Vladimir Paperny's models, they never tried to institute either a symbolic beginning of a new history, as the Russian avant-garde did, nor a symbolic end of historical time, as Socialist

⁵⁶⁶ Mate Baylon, “Mi ne počinjemo s radom iznova—mi nastavljamo sa radom,” in: *Tehnika* I, no. 1 (January, 1946): 5.

Realism did.⁵⁶⁷ Instead, they were simply continuing, while at the same time adjusting and transforming, the models inherited from previous periods or borrowed from other regions.

What emerged was not something entirely new that negated everything before it, but a hybrid situation that reconciled and modified the existing, forging an essential “eclecticism of taste,” as Henry-Russell Hitchcock called it, concealed behind the apparent uniformity of modernism.⁵⁶⁸ To raise the parallel with the Habsburg Empire that I made in the Introduction and to paraphrase Ákos Moravánszky’s characterization of its architecture as a conglomerate of “competing visions,” it is perhaps fair to say that the “visions” of architects in Yugoslavia were not really in a sharp competition as much as in an “an active peaceful coexistence.”⁵⁶⁹ They merged, blurred, hybridized, and compromised, which was, perhaps, inevitable considering that the country in which they lived was a cultural and political hybrid *par excellence*, too.

Yugoslavia offers an alternative history of modern architecture, which blurs the common division of its history into a socially-minded, left-leaning period

⁵⁶⁷ Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*. In opposition to Paperny, Boris Groys theorized that both the avant-garde and Socialist Realism strove to create a “post-historical” time; see Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism*. Whatever the interpretation, both ambitions were radical and they are difficult to detect among Yugoslav architects.

⁵⁶⁸ Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Jr., *Modern Architecture: Romanticism and Reintegration* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1993), 50.

⁵⁶⁹ Ákos Moravánszky, *Competing Visions*.

up until the 1930s, and a socially “neutral” style after World War II. Yugoslav socialist modernism exhibited continuity with the prewar social concerns that helped it resist the incursions of Socialist Realism and allowed it to re-claim the postwar modernism for use in a socialist state. Yugoslav architecture also raises a range of important hypothetical questions that destabilize the received notions of the political nature of modernism: What would have happened with Yugoslav modernism had there been no break with Stalin in 1948? Would it have been suppressed, as was the case in other socialist countries after 1948? Or would it have survived, as the implicit theoretical resistance to Socialist Realism that architects raised before 1948 seemed to indicate? In the case of its survival, would the resulting official architecture—as the competitions for New Belgrade promised—be another example of a “Stalinist modern,” far more obviously symbolically charged than the Soviet industrial cities were?⁵⁷⁰ Would it not, then, completely undermine the Cold War idea of modernism as a natural expression of democracy and liberty? What kind of Cold War aesthetics would have developed instead: would Wright’s organicism, in that case, be successful in establishing itself as an architecture of the “pax Americana?” Answers are, of course, impossible to make, but that such questions can be meaningfully asked at all suggests that the possibilities were far less fixed than we are often led to believe.

⁵⁷⁰ Here I refer to the term used by Greg Castillo; see: “Stalinist Modern: Constructivism and the Soviet Company Town.”

ILLUSTRATIONS



Fig. 1.1
Clearing up the rubble in Belgrade, 1945.



Fig. 1.2

Commissions given to students of architecture:

- a. Mihailo Mitrović: Railway Station, Zenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 1948.
- b. Vjenceslav Richter and Emil Weber (painter): Pavilion of Yugoslavia at the International Fair in Brussels, c. 1948.




Fig. 1.3
Anton Ulrich and Dragica Perak: Workers' Resort, Oteševo (Macedonia), 1950.



Fig. 1.4

- a.** Volunteers at work in Marinkova bara near Belgrade, c. 1945.
- b.** Performance for the volunteers at the construction of New Belgrade; the inscription reads "Life and work in the brigade is school for us," c. 1948.





Fig. 1.5
Standardized housing in Obrenovac (Serbia) and Zenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina), late 1940s.



Fig. 1.6
Ivo Vitić: Typical apartment building for Belgrade, competition entry, 1947.




Fig. 1.7

- a. Lavoslav Horvat: Standardized cooperative house for Croatia;
 b. Jovan Krunić: Standardized cooperative house for Serbia.



Fig. 1.8
Czech architects Kohout, Prohaska, and Hacar; finished by Bogdan Stojkov:
Railway Station, Sarajevo, 1950.




Fig. 1.9
Moisei Ginzburg: Sanatorium (Workers' Resort), Kislovodsk, published in *Tehnika* in 1946.




Fig. 1.10
Neven Šegvić: Apartment building at Moscow St., Zagreb, 1950.



Fig. 2.1
Terazije Square in Belgrade decorated to celebrate the Fifth Congress of the CPY, 1948.



Fig. 2.2
Red Army Captain Feldman: Design for the Monument to the Red Army at Batina (Croatia),
June 1945.



Fig. 2.3
Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army in Batina (Croatia), 1945-47.



Fig. 2.4
Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army in Batina (Croatia), 1945-47.




Fig. 2.5
Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army in Batina (Croatia), 1945-47.



Fig. 2.6
Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army in Batina (Croatia), 1945-47.

OBZIDAVANJE STUPA KAMENIH KLESANCIMA. STAVKA TROŠKOVNIKA 1. 12. 14.

I.-IX. SLOJ.



X.-XI. SLOJ.




Fig. 2.7

Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army in Batina (Croatia), 1945-47.



Fig. 2.8
Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army in Batina (Croatia), 1945-47.



Fig. 2.9
Antun Augustinčić and Drago Galić: Monument to the Red Army in Batina (Croatia), 1945-47.



Fig. 2.10
Ivan Meštrović: Victor, Belgrade, 1913-1928.



Fig. 2.11

- a.** Aleksandar Bugarski: Old Court, Belgrade, 1882-84.
- b.** Stojan Titelbah: New Court, Belgrade, 1911-22.



Fig. 3.12
Tito at the Armistice Day Parade in Belgrade, 1947.



Fig. 2.13
Tito's birthhouse, Kumrovec (Croatia), c. 1860. To the right, Antun Augustinčić's sculpture of Tito, 1948.



Fig. 2.14
Tito's birthhouse, interior, Kumrovec (Croatia), 1950.



Fig. 2.15
Vladeta Petrić and Boško Karanović: Youth Relay Baton, 1957.



Fig. 2.16
The arrival of Tito's Relay in Novi Sad (Serbia), 1948.



Fig. 2.17
Mihailo Janković and Kosta Popović: Yugoslav People's Army Stadium, Belgrade, 1947-51.



Fig. 2.18
Mihailo Janković: Museum 25 May, Belgrade, 1962.





Fig. 3.1
Juraj Neidhardt and Branko Simčič: Design for the Parliament of Slovenia, first prize at the competition, Ljubljana, 1947.




Fig. 3.2
Map of the city of Belgrade; the future New Belgrade in circle.



Fig. 3.3
 S. Mancini: View of Belgrade from Zemun, gravure, Vienna, 1780s.



Fig. 3.4
Headline “Belgrade-Moscow,” implying the political and symbolic proximity of the two cities.




Fig. 3.5
Nikola Dobrović: Federal Parliament on the Kalemegdan Fortress, Belgrade, 1946.




Fig. 3.6
Edvard Ravnikar: Master plan of New Belgrade, competition entry, 1947.



Fig. 3.7
Institute of Urban Planning of Serbia (under direction of Nikola Dobrović): Master plan of New Belgrade, competition entry, 1947.



Fig. 3.8
Institute of Urban Planning of Serbia (under direction of Nikola Dobrović): Master plan of New Belgrade, competition entry, alternative version, 1947. p. 20.




Fig. 3.9
Marijan Haberle, Milan Tomičić, Juraj Bertol, Mila Poletti, and Galina Feldt: Presidency of federal government of Yugoslavia, competition entry, third prize, New Belgrade, 1947.








Fig. 3.10
Vladimir Turina, Drago Boltar, and Radovan Nikšić: Central Committee of the CPY,
competition entry, honorable mention, New Belgrade, 1947.



Projekt zgrade Predsjedništva vlade FNRJ: perspektiva • Проект здания Председательского правительства Ф.Н.Р.Ю: перспектива • Le projet de l'édifice de la Présidence du gouvernement de la R.N.F. de Yougoslavie: la perspective



Projekt zgrade Predsjedništva vlade FNRJ: presjek i pročelje glavne zgrade • Проект здания Председательского правительства Ф.Н.Р.Ю: разрез и фасад главного здания • Le projet de l'édifice de la Présidence du gouvernement de la R.N.F. de Yougoslavie: le profil et la façade du bâtiment principal



Projekt zgrade Predsjedništva vlade FNRJ: perspektiva krila • Проект здания Председательства правительства Ф.Н.Р.Ю: перспектива флигелей • Le projet de l'édifice de la Présidence du gouvernement de la R.N.F. de Yougoslavie: la perspective des ailes

Fig. 3.11

Antun Augustinčić, Drago Galić, Neven Šegvić, and Branko Bon: Presidency of the Federal government of Yugoslavia, competition entry, second prize, alternative version, New Belgrade, 1947.





Fig. 3.12
Antun Augustinčić, Drago Galić, Neven Šegvić, and Branko Bon: Central Committee of the CPY, competition entry, second prize, third ranking, New Belgrade, 1947.




Fig. 3.13

Neven Šegvić: Central Committee of the CPY, preliminary study, New Belgrade, 1947.





Fig. 3.14

- a. Mladen Kauzlarić, Lavoslav Horvat and Kazimir Ostrogović: Luxury hotel, first prize, competition entry, New Belgrade, 1947.
- b. Design Institute of Serbia: Luxury hotel, second prize, competition entry, New Belgrade, 1947.





Fig. 3.15
Vladimir Potočnjak, Zlatko Neimann, Antun Ulrich, and Dragica Perak: Presidency of the Federal government of Yugoslavia, competition entry, first prize, New Belgrade, 1947.




Fig. 3.17

Institute of Urban Planning of Serbia (under direction of Nikola Dobrović): Central Committee of the CPY, competition entry, second prize, second ranking, New Belgrade, 1947.








Fig. 3.18
Edvard Ravnikar: Central Committee of the CPY, competition entry, second prize, first ranking,
New Belgrade, 1947.



Fasada Predsedstva vlade FLRJ uz paradno alejo • Фасад председательства Правительства Ф.Н.Р.Ю. вдоль парадной аллеи • La façade de l'édifice de la Présidence du gouvernement de la RNF Yougoslavie à côté de l'allée d'honneur.



Plan prizemlja Predsedstva vlade FLRJ • План нижнего этажа председательства Правительства Ф.Н.Р.Ю. • Le plan du rez-de-chaussée de l'édifice de la Présidence du gouvernement de la RNF Yougoslavie

Fig. 3.19
 Edvard Ravnikar: Presidency of the Federal government of Yugoslavia, competition entry, third prize, New Belgrade, 1947.





Fig. 3.20

a. Edvard Ravnikar: Great Yugoslav Opera House, competition entry, third prize, Belgrade, 1948.

b. Edvard Ravnikar and Jožica Strašek: Central Post Office, competition entry, first prize *ex equo*, Ljubljana, 1947.




Fig. 3.21
Tito receives representatives of engineers and architects in the White Palace, Belgrade, 1947.






Fig. 3.22
Antun Augustinčić, Drago Galić, Neven Šegvić, and Branko Bon: Central Committee of the
CPY, competition entry, second round, New Belgrade, 1947.



62

62. Arh. Bon: CK KPJ, prva studija nakon natječaja. 63. Arh. Bon: CK KPJ, druga studija nakon natječaja
 • 62. Arch. Bon: Première étude après le concours, CK KPJ. 63. Arch. Bon: Seconde étude après le concours, CK KPJ



63

36

Fig. 3.23

Branko Bon: Central Committee of the CPY, studies, New Belgrade, 1947.




Fig. 3.24
“From the construction site of New Belgrade,” photomontage with the luxury hotel in the background.



Fig. 3.25
Volunteer youth brigades on the construction site of New Belgrade, 1948.




Fig. 3.26
Construction site of the Presidency of Federal government, New Belgrade, 1948.



Fig. 4.1
Ivo Vitić: Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, Zagreb, 1961-68.




Fig. 4.2
Front cover of *Arhitekt* (Ljubljana), no. 2 (1952).




Fig. 4.3
Front cover of *Arhitektura Urbanizam* (Belgrade), no. 2 (1960).



ORMARSKI STANOVİ - »MARSEILLESKI« PROJEKAT

Arhitekt: Le Corbusier. Izgled iznad stana u ovom stanovima.

Prostorni plan stanova u ovom stanovima... (text describing the spatial organization and architectural details of the apartment units).

Le Corbusier je projektirao ovaj stan... (text discussing the architect's approach to the design, including the use of pilotis and open-plan spaces).

...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text further detailing the architectural features and the influence of modernist principles).

LE CORBUSIERE-A

Arhitekt: Le Corbusier. Izgled iznad stana u ovom stanovima.

...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text describing the architectural details and the overall aesthetic of the project).


...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text further elaborating on the design choices and the impact of the project on modern architecture).

...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text describing the architectural details and the overall aesthetic of the project).

...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text further elaborating on the design choices and the impact of the project on modern architecture).

...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text describing the architectural details and the overall aesthetic of the project).

...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text further elaborating on the design choices and the impact of the project on modern architecture).




...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text describing the architectural details and the overall aesthetic of the project).



...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text describing the architectural details and the overall aesthetic of the project).

...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text describing the architectural details and the overall aesthetic of the project).



...kao što je bilo uobičajeno... (text describing the architectural details and the overall aesthetic of the project).



Fig. 4.4

Article on Le Corbusier's *Unité d'habitation*, published in *Arhitektura* no. 25-27 (1949).




Fig. 4.5
Milorad Macura: Military Institute of Geography, Belgrade, 1950-53.



Fig. 4.6
Drago Galić: Apartment building at Proleterskih brigada, Zagreb, 1953-54.



Fig. 4.7
Edo Mihevc: Kozolec Apartment Block, Ljubljana, 1957



Fig. 4.8
Juraj Neidhardt: Apartment buildings in Đure Đakovića St. (today Alipašina), Sarajevo, 1958.




Fig. 4.9
Juraj Neidhardt: Traditional Bosnian *divanhana* (glazed living room), from *Architecture of Bosnia and the Way to Modernity* (1957).




Fig. 4.10
Juraj Neidhardt: Sketch for a modern residential neighborhood in Bosnia, from *Architecture of Bosnia and the Way to Modernity* (1957).




Fig. 4.11
Juraj Neidhardt: Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 1955, competition entry, 1st prize.




Fig. 4.12

Juraj Neidhardt: Parts of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina interpreted as elements of traditional typologies; the inscriptions read (counter-clock-wise from left): clock-tower, atrium, shell, *doksat*, porch. From *Architecture of Bosnia and the Way to Modernity* (1957).




Fig. 5.1
Page from the catalogue of the exhibition of Yugoslav architecture in Rabat, Morocco, 1951.



Fig. 5.2
Cover page of the catalogue of the exhibition "Contemporary Art in the USA," 1956.



Fig. 5.3
Josip Hitiš, Slobodan Jovičić, and Ivo Žuljević: Skyscraper at the Republic Square, Zagreb, 1960.



Fig. 5.4

Ivo Vitić: Pavilion of West Germany, Zagreb Fair, 1957.

Fig. 5.5

Bernardo Bernardi: Pavilion of "Mašinogradnja," Zagreb Fair, 1957.





Fig. 5.7
Kenzo Tange: Plan of the Downtown Skopje, competition entry, 1965.



Fig. 5.8
Alfred Roth: Pestalozzi Elementary School, Skopje, 1967.



Fig. 5.9
Performance hall donated by Bulgaria, Skopje.



Fig. 5.10
Jerzy Morzynski, Eugeniusz Wierzbicki, and Waclaw Klyszevski: Museum of Contemporary Art, Skopje, 1970.



Fig. 5.11
Petar Muličkoski: Central Committee of the League of Communists of Macedonia (today
Government of Macedonia), Skopje, 1970.




Fig. 5.12
Georgi Konstantinovski: City Archive, Skopje, 1966.



Fig. 5.13
Georgi Konstantinovski: Student dormitory "Goce Delčev," Skopje, 1969.



Fig. 5.14
Georgi Konstantinovski: Memorial center, Razlovci (Macedonia), 1979.



Fig. 5.15
Janko Konstantinov: Telecommunication center, Skopje, 1971-74.



Fig. 6.1
Kazimir Ostrogović: City Hall, Zagreb, 1956.



Fig. 6.2
Nikola Dobrović: Federal Ministry of Defense and Headquarters of Yugoslav People's Army (the *Generalštab*), Belgrade, 1954-63.






Fig. 6.3

Nikola Dobrović: Diagrams of "visual tensions," from "Space in Motion—Bergson's "dynamic schemes" —New Visual Environment," 1960.

Fig. 6.4

Nikola Dobrović: Diagram of "growth" of forms, from "Space in Motion—Bergson's "dynamic schemes" —New Visual Environment," 1960.



6.5

Nikola Dobrović: Alternative version of cascades, from "Space in Motion—Bergson's "dynamic schemes" —New Visual Environment," 1960.



Fig. 6.6
New Belgrade in the early 1960s.



Fig. 6.7
Mihailo Janković: Federal Executive Council (SIV), New Belgrade, 1954-62.




Fig. 6.8
Mihailo Janković: Sketch for the Federal Executive Council (SIV), New Belgrade, 1955.





Fig. 6.9
Mihailo Janković: Sketch for the Federal Executive Council (SIV), New Belgrade, 1955.



Fig. 6.10
Mihailo Janković: Federal Executive Council (SIV), New Belgrade, 1954-62.



Fig. 6.11
Mihailo Janković: Federal Executive Council (SIV), New Belgrade, 1954-62.



POGLED SA MOSTA



Fig. 6.12

Mihailo Janković, Dušan Milenković, and Mirjana Marjanović: Building of Social and Political Organizations (known as the CK), competition entry, New Belgrade, 1959.

Fig. 6.13

Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: Building of Social and Political Organizations, perspective, New Belgrade, 1960.



Fig. 6.14
Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: The CK building as finished, New Belgrade, 1959-64.



Fig. 6.15
Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: Perimeter structure of the CK building during reconstruction, 2002.




Fig. 6.16
Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: The CK building, facade, New Belgrade, 1959-64.



Fig. 6.17
Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: The CK building, lobby, New Belgrade, 1959-64.



Fig. 6.18
Mihailo Janković and Dušan Milenković: The CK building, facade lit at night, around 1966.



Fig. 6.19
Ivan Antić and Ivanka Raspopović: Museum of Contemporary Art, New Belgrade, 1959-65.





Fig. 6.20
Ivan Antić and Ivanka Raspopović: Museum of Contemporary Art, competition entry, New Belgrade, 1959.



Fig. 6.21
Museum of Contemporary Art, storage.



Fig. 6.22
Museum of Contemporary Art, detail of the facade.




Fig. 6.23
Museum of Contemporary Art, section.



Fig. 6.24
Museum of Contemporary Art seen from from Old Belgrade and from the CK building.



Fig. 6.25
Museum of Contemporary Art, sculpture gallery.



Fig. 6.26
Ivan Antić and Ivanka Raspopović: Museum of Contemporary Art, upper level galleries.



Fig. 6.27
Queen Fabiola of Belgium visiting the Museum of Contemporary Art, accompanied by the
Museum director Miodrag B. Protić and Tito's wife Jovanka Broz, c. 1973.



Fig. 6.28
Vjenceslav Richter: Pavilion of Yugoslavia, EXPO 58, Brussels, 1958.



Fig. 6.29
Pavilions of the USA and the USSR, EXPO 58, Brussels, 1958.




Fig. 6.30
Vjenceslav Richter: Pavilion of Yugoslavia for EXPO 58, competition entry, second round, 1956.




Fig. 6.31
Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58 with the tensile column designed by Richter.



Fig. 6.32
Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58, interior of the art gallery.



Fig. 6.33
Interior of the Paviloin of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58 with the concluding sentence of the Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia..



Fig. 6.34
Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58, entry plaza.



Fig. 6.35
Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58, interior views.



Fig. 6.36
Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58, gallery of industry.



Fig. 6.37
Pavilion of Yugoslavia at EXPO 58, exhibition of dolls in folk costumes shown at the gallery of tourism.




Fig. 6.38
Vjenceslav Richter: Pavilion of Yugoslavia, International Labor Exhibition, Turin, 1961; model
and view of the interior.

Appendix:

BIOGRAPHIES OF ARCHITECTS

Antić, Ivan

1923, Belgrade—2005, Belgrade

Ivan Antić was one of the most celebrated and prolific Serbian architects after World War II. He graduated from the School of Architecture in Belgrade in 1950, where he also taught for the better part of his career. He designed a number of influential buildings, but wrote very little.

Antić's early buildings, like Belgrade's first residential skyscrapers at Zvezdara (1953-55), are characteristic for rationalist simplicity and straightforward use of materials, frequently combining exposed concrete and red brick. He later ventured into more complex forms, always retaining a level of geometric rigor.

His most famous building is the Museum of Contemporary Art in New Belgrade (1959-65), which he designed in collaboration with Ivanka Raspopović. The building combines two orthogonal systems rotated at 45 degrees to create a complex combination of cubic volumes in white marble, outlined by an exposed concrete frame. A second significant collaboration with Raspopović was the Museum in Šumarice (Kragujevac, Serbia, 1968-75) that commemorates local victims of Nazi persecution, an expressive abstract form in red brick. Besides

these, Antić designed a number of residential buildings, several sports facilities (in Belgrade, Zemun, and Split), as well as public and administration buildings. His Ministry of Interior of Serbia in Belgrade, subtly incorporated into a difficult location, was destroyed in NATO bombing in 1999.

Arhitekta Ivan Antić, exhibition catalogue. Belgrade: Salon Muzeja savremene umetnosti, 1975.

Manević, Zoran, ed. *Лексикон српских архитеката XIX и XX века*. Belgrade: Klub arhitekata i Građevinska knjiga, 1999.

Bogdanović, Bogdan

Belgrade, 1922

Bogdanović was likely the most prolific and influential memorial builders in socialist Yugoslavia. He was born to a family deeply steeped into left-leaning intellectual currents of interwar Yugoslavia. His father Milan was a prominent literary critic who introduced his son into the intellectual circle that included the famous Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža, Belgrade surrealist poet Marko Ristić, and architects like Nikola Dobrović and Drago Ibler, which left an indelible mark on the young Bogdan.

Bogdanović started his studies in architecture in Belgrade in 1940, but they were interrupted by the war. During this war, he discovered the work of Jože Plečnik. He joined the Partisans in 1944, quickly advanced in their ranks and was severely wounded in combat. After demobilizing, he continued his studies at

Belgrade University, graduating in 1950. He spent his career teaching at the Department of Urbanism at Belgrade's School of Architecture, where he initiated and taught the course in the History of the City until his retirement in 1987. He also led an annual workshop in the village of Mali Popović near Belgrade, in which he and his students explored philosophical and anthropological foundations of architecture. He was a highly ranking official of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Mayor of Belgrade 1982-86. As an outspoken opponent of the regime of Slobodan Milošević, he went into exile in 1992 and has been living in Vienna ever since. Besides the highest honors of the former Yugoslav state and professional associations, he also received Herder's Prize and the Carlo Scarpa Award for Gardens.

Bogdanović was disappointed by the overly rational aspects of modernism and was equally repulsed by the prospect of working under strict rationalization of the early postwar years. He found his refuge in the construction of memorials, which allowed him to develop a highly personal architectural language based on his erudite knowledge of architectural history and his studies of anthropology. In his monuments, he employed construction techniques highly unconventional for the time, often working with stonemasons directly at the site. His first monument was the Memorial to Jewish Victims of Fascism in Belgrade (1952), in which he used recognizable architectural elements from buildings destroyed during the war. During the 1960s, he designed a series of highly praised memorials around

Yugoslavia, which include those at Prilep in Macedonia (1961), Kruševac in Serbia (1965), Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1965), and the former concentration camp of Jasenovac in Croatia (1966). While completely different from each other, all of these monuments integrate elaborate symbolic forms into carefully manipulated landscapes, bringing architecture, sculpture, and landscape architecture together to make unique statements. The memorials he built in the 1970s and 1980s were generally on a smaller scale, but contained an increasingly idiosyncratic and erudite symbolism.

Bogdanović is also a very prolific writer. He started publishing in the 1950s with a series of articles that praised small-scale traditional ambiances, in direct opposition to the reigning modernist doctrines; these articles were collected into his first book, *Mali urbanizam* ("Small-Scale Urbanism," 1958). His second book, *Zaludna mistrija* ("The Vain Trowel," 1963), is an oneiric fantasy about the esoteric meanings of architecture, whose characters include Bramante, Palladio, and Piranesi. The following books dealt with the symbolic meanings of architecture and the history of the city in an equally personal and idiosyncratic manner, often with titles that use paradoxical expressions or newly coined words; for example, *Krug na četiri ćoška* ("The Four-Cornered Circle," 1986). His later books written in exile in Vienna deal mostly with the destructions of cities in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and some have autobiographical character; these include *Der Stadt und der Tod* (1995), *Architektur der Erinnerung* (1995), and

Der Verdammte Baumeister (1997).

Bogdanović, Bogdan. *Mali urbanizam*. Sarajevo: Narodna prosvjeta, 1958.

_____ *Zaludna mistrija: doktrina i prakтика bratstva zlatnih (crnih) brojeva*. Belgrade: Nolit, 1963.

_____ *Urbanističke mitologeme*. Belgrade: Vuk Karadžić, 1966.

_____ *Urbs Logos: Ogledi iz simbologije grada*. Niš (Serbia): Gradina, 1976.

_____ *Gradoslovar*. Belgrade: Vuk Karadžić, 1982.

Bon, Branko

1912, Krk (Croatia)-2001, Redding (UK)

Branko Bon studied architecture with Drago Ibler in Zagreb. During the 1930s, he designed several modernist villas in Croatia in which he explored regionalist themes. He became known for winning the competition for the Albania Palace, Belgrade's first skyscraper (1938), in collaboration with Milan Grakalić. However, the architects of record for the constructed building were local designers Đ. Lazarević i M. Prljević.

As a communist fellow traveler, Bon was arrested by the Ustaša regime during the war and he spent a year in a concentration camp. After the war, he was part of a team with A. Augustinčić, D. Galić, and N. Šegvić that won second prizes for the Presidency of the Government of Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of the CPY in New Belgrade (1947). He also designed the Cemetery of the

Liberators of Belgrade (1954) and worked on the conversion of the island of Sveti Stefan in Montenegro into a luxury hotel (1953-56). He spent several years as the architect of the Institute of Nuclear Energy in Vinča (Serbia). As a confidant of the regime, Bon was engaged in some high-ranking projects for the state and President Tito, but these have not yet been documented since their construction was secretive. Tito's White Villa at the Brioni Archipelago seems to be the work of Branko Bon and it indeed bears similarity with the architect's prewar Villa Antić at the island of Korčula.

Dobrović, Nikola

1897, Pécs (Hungary)—1967, Belgrade

Nikola Dobrović was born to a Serbian family in the Hungarian city of Pécs, a younger brother to the well known painter Petar Dobrović. He studied architecture in Budapest (1919) and at the Czech Technical University in Prague (1919-23), where he came under the influence of Czech modernists. In Prague, he worked for several local offices, as well as an independent architect. His largest commission there was the Yugoslav Student Dormitory (also known as King Alexander's College, 1932). In the early 1930, Dobrović took part in architectural competitions in Yugoslavia and won a number of awards, including the visionary design for the Terazije Terrace in Belgrade (1932), which, although

never built, made a strong impact on local architects and helped the breakthrough of modern architecture in the city in the 1930s. In 1934, Dobrović moved to Dubrovnik, where he designed a series of elegant villas that combined modernist language with local Mediterranean materials. His most well known building from the period was the Grand Hotel at the island of Lopud near Dubrovnik (1936)

After the capitulation of Fascist Italy, Dobrović joined the Partisans and spent the rest of the war in their uniform. He arrived in the recently liberated Belgrade in the fall of 1944 and immediately acquired a series of high-ranked positions, taking charge of urban planning in Serbia. For several years, he was responsible for the urban planning in Serbia and in Belgrade and was the founder and first director of the Belgrade Urban Planning Institute. However, he was soon removed from that position and deployed to teach at Belgrade University's School of Architecture (1947). There, he taught Contemporary Architecture and wrote a monumental five-volume history of modern architecture as the textbook for the course (*Savremena arhitektura I-V*, 1952-71).

After World War II, Dobrović's built much less than before, but in this period he designed his largest and most famous building, the Ministry of Defense and Yugoslav National Army General Staff (1954-63) in Belgrade. Besides this, he only built a few smaller projects in this period.

"Dobrović, Nikola," in Zoran Manević, ed., *Лексикон српских архитеката XIX и XX века*

(Belgrade: Klub arhitekata and Građevinska knjiga, 1999.), 48-50.

Kovačević, Bojan. *Arhitektura zgrade Generalštaba: Monografska studija dela Nikole Dobrovića*. Belgrade: Vojska, 2001.

Perović, Miloš, and Spasoje Krunic, eds. *Nikola Dobrović: Eseji, projekti, kritike/Essays, Projects, Critiques*. Belgrade: Arhitektonski fakultet and Muzej arhitekture, 1998.

Vukotić Lazar, Marta. *Beogradsko razdoblje arhitekta Nikole Dobrovića (1945-1967)*. Belgrade: Plato, 2002.

Janković, Mihailo

1911, Belgrade—1976, Belgrade

Janković studied architecture graduated from Belgrade University in 1936. He first came to prominence designing the Stadium of Yugoslav National Army in Belgrade (1947-51) in collaboration with Kosta Popović. With the expertise from this project, he also designed the smaller stadium at Tašmajdan in Belgrade (1953-56 with Uglješa Bogunović), as well as the adjacent Taš Hotel (1966-69). Janković was the founder and director of architectural office “Stadion,” through which he designed some of the most significant buildings in Belgrade, many of which were symbols of postwar Yugoslav state. These include the redesign and completion of the building of the Federal Executive Council in New Belgrade (1954-61), Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, also in New Belgrade (1959-64), and the Museum 25 May (1961-62) at Dedinje (Belgrade), built to house the gifts that President Tito received in the country and

abroad, including a large collection of decorative batons that circulated through Yugoslavia in a relay race before his birthday. Janković mastered the language of high International Style, thus giving the Yugoslav state a decidedly modernist face.

Manević, Zoran, ed. *Лексикон српских архитеката XIX и XX века*. Belgrade: Klub arhitekata i Građevinska knjiga, 1999.

Konstantinovski, Georgi

1930, Kragujevac (Serbia)

Konstantinovski graduated from the Technical Faculty, in Skopje in 1956 as a member of the first generation of students at the Department of Architecture. Upon graduation, he was first employed at the Institute of Urban Planning in Skopje and after 1958 as an assistant at the Department of Architecture. In 1965, Konstantinovski went to the USA on a State Department scholarship. He received his master's degree in architecture at Yale University, where he studied under Paul Rudolph and Sergey Chermayeff. After graduation, he worked for six months in the New York City office of Ieoh Ming Pei, Henry Cobb, and Araldo Kasuta. Between 1985 and 1988, he was the Dean of the Faculty of Architecture in Skopje, where he retired as full professor in 1995. Konstantinovski is a full member of the Academy of Architects of Macedonia and a member of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Ljubljana.

Konstantinovski's most important buildings include the City Archive (1966), Student Dormitory "Goce Delčev" (1969) and Institute of Seismology in Skopje (1978); City Archives in Štip (1972) and Ohrid (1974); and the Memorial center in Razlovci (1979), as well as a number of private and collective residential buildings. He has lectured and written extensively on modern architecture in Macedonia. Besides a range of articles, he published a two-volume encyclopaedia of Macedonian architects, *Builders of Macedonia, 18-20th century* (2004).

Konstantinovski, Georgi. *Градителите во Македонија, XVIII-XX век*, vol. 2. Skopje: Tabernakul, 2004.

Neidhardt, Juraj

Zagreb, 1901—Sarajevo, 1979

Neidhardt was an architect of a remarkable modernist pedigree. He studied with Peter Behrens at the Viennese Academy of Fine Arts 1920-1924, and in 1930 joined Behrens again in his Berlin office, where he spent eighteen months. With such reputation, he realized his first commission, the Archbishopric Seminary in Zagreb in 1929. Then he moved to Paris and from the beginning of 1933 until the end of the summer 1935 he was employed on and off in Le Corbusier's atelier at 35, rue de Sèvres. One of a few paid collaborators in the atelier, Neidhardt worked on such seminal projects as *La Ville Radieuse* and plans for

Algiers. He also worked on his own and in 1935 exhibited his designs at the Galerie des “Cahiers d’Art,” alongside such other promising young names as Charlotte Perriand, Tecton, and Claude Laurens.

In 1935, Neidhardt moved back to Yugoslavia. At the urging of his friend and colleague, Slovenian architect Dušan Grabrijan, in 1939 he finally settled down in Sarajevo, where he would stay for the rest of his life. Grabrijan passionately recorded Bosnian vernacular architecture and soon initiated Neidhardt into his passion. The two architects would soon devise a theory that in its spatial layout, formal simplicity, and reliance on nature the traditional Bosnian house paralleled principles of modern architecture, particularly as defined by Le Corbusier; a claim that, in a way, acknowledged Le Corbusier’s early indebtedness to the vernacular of the Balkans. Until Grabrijan’s premature death in 1952, they incessantly promoted their idea that traditional architecture should be the basis for a Bosnian modernism, both through their writings and architectural projects. Their joint efforts culminated in the monumental book *Architecture of Bosnia and the Way to Modernity* (1957), for which Le Corbusier himself wrote a laudatory preface.

In 1939, Neidhardt got a job with a mining concern, for which he designed a number of workers’ residences in Bosnian small towns, merging Corbusian principles and forms with those of the local vernacular. After the war, Neidhardt became a professor at the newly founded School of Architecture in Sarajevo in 1953, where he would become highly influential for the generations of students.

In the same year he became a member of the RIBA. Neidhardt's postwar practice resulted in an abundance of projects, but few realizations. Some of Neidhardt's early postwar projects exhibited special sensitivity in merging Corbusian modernism with Bosnian traditions, such as his skiing lodge at Mount Trebević near Sarajevo (1947, burned down soon after). His longest-lasting project was the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for which he won the first prize at competition in 1955 for a project that attempted at synthesizing the complex identity of Bosnia into a synthetic statement. However, the building was not erected until after his death, according to a later, considerably altered project.

Karlić-Kapetanović, Jelica. *Juraj Neidhardt: Život i djelo*. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1990.

Ugljen, Zlatko, ed. *Juraj Neidhardt*, exhibition catalogue. Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti BiH, 2001.

Grabrijan, Dušan, and Juraj Neidhardt. *Arhitektura Bosne i put u suvremeno/Architecture of Bosnia and the Way to Modernity*. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije, 1957.

Richter, Vjenceslav

1917, Drenova near Zagreb (Croatia)—2002, Zagreb

Vjenceslav Richter was one of the most important Croatian and Yugoslav architects of the 20th century. He began his studies of architecture in 1936 at the University of Zagreb under Zdenko Strižić (former student of Hans Poelzig in Dresden), and graduated in 1949. As a student, Richter became active in the circles of left-leaning and antifascist youth. After the outbreak of the war, he

joined the Liberation Movement, was wounded and imprisoned by the Ustaše, and interned in a labor camp in Austria. After the war, his communist and antifascist reputation helped him acquire commissions even before he graduated, the first of which were a series of exhibitions and small pavilions at various fairs in Yugoslavia and abroad. Richter taught at the Academy of Applied Arts in Zagreb until it was abolished in 1954; after this, he maintained an independent position until the end of his life.

Richter's activities straddled architecture, art, design, and theory, striving to achieve their ultimate synthesis. He was one of the founders of Yugoslavia's first postwar avant-garde group EXAT 51, for which he wrote the Manifesto (1951) that called for a collaboration of various fields of art in the creation of synthetically designed human environments. In the 1960s, he was active in New Tendencies, an international network of artists centered in Zagreb, which explored the expressive potentials of geometry and new technologies. From the late 1940s to the end of 1960s, Richter was predominantly active as an architect and interior, exhibition, and stage-set designer. After 1960, he became increasingly involved in sculpture, graphics, and painting, creating an enormous body of work that found its way into prestigious international collections, such as the Museum of Modern Art in New York, Tate Gallery in London, Smithsonian Museum in Washington, D.C., Museum of Contemporary Art in Helsinki, etc.

Richter built relatively few buildings: the Pavilion of Yugoslavia at the EXPO 58 in

Brussels (1958), Plant of the Saponia Factory in Osijek (1960), Catering Trade School in Dubrovnik (1961), Villa Zagorje, the official residence of the President of Yugoslavia in Zagreb (with Kazimir Ostrogović, 1963-64), and several family houses around Croatia. His unbuilt projects are far more numerous, including, most importantly, the unfinished Museum of the Revolution of the Peoples of Yugoslavia in New Belgrade (1961).

Richter was a prolific writer, who published dozens of articles, as well as several exhibition catalogues and books, most importantly, *Synthurbanism* (1964). He was the first editor of the Zagreb journal *Čovjek i prostor* (*Man and Space*).

Vjenceslav Richter was the recipient of numerous awards at architectural competitions and exhibitions of art. His life achievement awards include the Gottfried-von-Herder-Preis (1981), the highest award for architecture in Croatia, Viktor Kovačić Award (1988), and the Vladimir Nazor Life Achievement Award of the Republic of Croatia (1992).

Susovski, Marjan. *Zbirka Richter: Donacija Vjenceslava Richtera i Nade Kareš-Richter Gradu Zagrebu*. Zagreb: Muzej suvremene umjetnosti, 2003.

Horvat-Pintarić, Vera. *Vjenceslav Richter*. Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1970.

Denegri, Ješa, and Želimir Košćević. *EXAT 51: 1951-1956*. Zagreb: Galerija Nova, 1979.

Vjenceslav Richter. *Sinturbanizam*. Zagreb: Mladost, 1964.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources

Archival sources:

ASCG—Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore (Archive of Serbia and Montenegro), Belgrade

NBS—Narodna Biblioteka Srbije (National Library of Serbia), Belgrade

MSU—Muzej savremene umetnosti (Museum of Contemporary Art), Belgrade

FLC—Fondation Le Corbusier, Paris

Arhiv grada Beograda (Archive of the City of Belgrade), Belgrade

Arhiv Arhitektonskog fakulteta (Archive of the School of Architecture), University of Zagreb

Private collection of Aleksandar Janković, Belgrade

Articles

Anon. "Awards at the Sao Paulo Bienal." In: *Architectural Review* 115 (June 1954): 413-14.

_____ "Corbusier." In: *Porumuka*, January 9, 1953.

_____ "Drugi kongres Međunarodne unije arhitekata u Maroku." In: *Arhitektura* V, no. 9-12 (1951): 118-19.

_____ "Graditeljstvo u Petogodišnjem planu." In: *Arhitektura* I, no. 1 (August, 1947): 4-5.

_____ "Hotel Beograd." In: *Arhitektura* I, no. 3 (October, 1947): 23-25.

_____ "Izložba bugarske arhitekture u FNR Jugoslaviji." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 7 (February 1948): 21.

_____ "Konkurs za veliku jugoslavensku operu u Beogradu." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 14-21.

_____ "Konkurs za zgradu moderne galerije u Beogradu." In: *Arhitektura urbanizam* I, no. 1 (1960): 33.

_____ "Na međunarodnom kongresu arhitekata u Lausanni." In: *Arhitektura* II, no. 13-17 (1948): 139-41.

_____ "Natečaj za novo Centralno pošto v Ljubljani." In: *Arhitektura* I-II, no. 4-6, (November/December, 1947-January, 1948): 42-43.

_____ "Natječaj za olimpijski stadion na Banjici u Beogradu—1947." In: *Arhitektura* I-II,

- no. 4-6 (November/December 1947-January 1948): 20-32.
- _____ "Nekoliko misli o liniji naše arhitekture." In: *Arhitektura* 2, no. 13-17 (1948): 126-29.
- _____ "Nekoliko misli o liniji naše arhitekture." In: *Tehnika* 3, no. 8-9 (1948): 288-91.
- _____ "Novi Beograd." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 10-13.
- _____ "O teorijskom i naučnom radu u oblasti sovjetske arhitekture." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 1-2, no. 4-6 (December, 1947-January, 1948): 15-16.
- _____ "Obnova i izgradnja Beograda. Konture budućeg grada." In: *Tehnika* I, no. 6 (June, 1946): 176-86.
- _____ "Osvrt na izložbu arhitekta Le Corbusiera." In: *Arhitekt* (Ljubljana) 2, no. 9 (June 1953): 32-34.
- _____ "Pokrenutost prostora – Bergsonove 'Dinamičke sheme' – nova likovna sredina." In: *Čovjek i prostor* (Zagreb) 7, no. 100 (1960): 10-11.
- _____ "Povodom Petog kongresa Komunističke partije Jugoslavije." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 3-6.
- _____ "Pred koncem Le Corbusierove razstave." In: *Ljubljanski dnevnik* May 16, 1953.
- _____ "Realizam sovjetske arhitekture (Povodom brošure N. J. Kolija)." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 1-2, no. 4-6 (December, 1947-January, 1948): 16.
- _____ "Referat zagrebačke sekcije arhitekata o arhitektonskoj problematici." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 13-17 (1948): 122-26.
- _____ "Rezolucija II. Kongresa inženjera i tehničara Jugoslavije o izvršenju Petogodišnjeg plana i zadacima tehničkih stručnjaka." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 13-17 (1948): 113-14.
- _____ "Rezolucija II. Kongresa inženjera i tehničara Jugoslavije o stručnoj štampi." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 13-17 (1948): 114-15.
- _____ "Rezolucija povodom klevetničke kampanje koja se void protiv naše zemlje, naših naroda, KPJ i njenog rukovodstva." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 13-17 (1948): 115.
- _____ "Six Outstanding Pavilions: Jugoslavia." In: *Architectural Review* 124, no. 739 (August 1958): 116-18.
- _____ "Slavs Without Marx." In: *Newsweek* (February 7, 1966): 40.
- _____ "Spomenik majstora-kipara Antuna Augustinčića Crvenoarmejcima palim u borbama kod Batine Skele." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 1-2, no. 4-6 (December, 1947-January, 1948): 17-19.
- _____ "Spomenik NOB na Rabu," in: *Arhitekt* (Ljubljana), no. 11 (1954): 14-15.
- _____ "Stadion F.K. 'Akademičar' Zagreb." In: *Arhitektura* I-II, no. 4-6 (November/December 1947-January 1948): 33-35.
- _____ "Staljinški plan rekonstrukcije Moskve." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 1-2, no. 4-6 (December, 1947-January, 1948): 9.

- _____ "Stambeni tornjevi u Beogradu." In: *Arhitektura* 14, no. 1-3 (1960): 33.
- _____ "Svjedočanstva visoke patriotske svijesti Titove omladine." In: *Jugoslavija-SSSR* IV, no. 41-42 (March-April, 1949): 21.
- _____ "Veliki Beograd." In: *Obzornik* (Ljubljana), no. 11-12 (1947): 451-56.
- _____ "Галерија у зарубљеним призмама." In: *Borba* (Belgrade, December 16, 1961).
- _____ "Зграда расте—галерија живи." In: *Ekspres* (Belgrade, August 12, 1964).
- _____ "Ле Корбизије и његово дело: поводом изложбе у Београду." In: *Певуја књижевности, позоришта, музике, филма, ликовних уметности* (Belgrade), no. 2 (January 1, 1953): 7.
- _____ "Ormarski stanovi—'marseilleski' projekat." In: *Arhitektura* III, no. 25-27 (1949): 76-77.
- _____ "Стан савременог човека." In: *Политика* (Belgrade), Sept. 21, 1957, insert.
- _____ "Хармонично и функционално." In: *Borba* (Belgrade, October 17, 1965).
- Abel, Elie. "Typical American Supermarket Is the Hit of Fair in Yugoslavia." In: *The New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1957, 1.
- Antolić, Vlado. "Regulacioni plan i regulaciona direktivna osnova Zagreba." In: *Arhitektura* II, no. 18-22 (1949): 5-29.
- Baird, George. "Architecture and Politics: A Polemical Dispute. A Critical Introduction to Karel Teige's 'Mundaneum,' 1929 and Le Corbusier's 'In Defense of Architecture' 1933." In: *Oppositions*, no. 4 (1974): 80-82
- Barberis, Maurizio. "Tito e le Superville/Tito and his mega villas." In: *Domus*, no. 886 (November, 2005): 52-59.
- Barry, Joseph A. "Letter from Paris." In: *The New York Times*, 11 June, 1950.
- Berberov, Hristo. "Povodom izložbe bugarske arhitekture u Beogradu i Zagrebu." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 7 (February, 1948): 22-24.
- Bernardi, Bernardo. "Jugoslavija na XIII Trijenalu." In: *Arhitektura* 19, no. 90 (1965): 41-43.
- Binder, David. "Those friendly Beogradjani." In: *New York Times*, (Nov. 21, 1965): 98.
- Bogdan Bogdanović, "Arhitekt' revija za arhitekturu," in: *Književne novine*, August 2, 1952, 62.
- Bogojević, Rata. "Povodom konkursa za zgradu Velike jugoslavenske opera u Beogradu." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 22-23.
- Bojović, Branko. "Od prestiža do humanizma ili moje viđenje budućnosti Novog Beograda." In: *The Future of New Belgrade/Budućnost Novog Beograda*, special issue of *Arhitektura Urbanizam* 25 (1986): insert, 11-13.
- Bošković, Đurđe. "Srednjevekovna arhitektura naroda SSSR (Povodom izložbe 'Sovjetska arhitektura' Beograd-Zagreb)." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 1-2, no. 4-6 (December, 1947-January, 1948): 10-11.
- Dobrović, Nikola. "Izgradnja Novog Beograda." In: *Jugoslavija—SSSR* III, no.32 (June, 1948): 8-12.
- Džadžić, Toma. "Predskazanja: Milić rušio, Kavaja robijao." In: *NIN* (Belgrade, July 15, 1999).
- Frampton, Kenneth. "The humanist v. the utilitarian ideal." In: *Architectural Design*, no. 37

- (March, 1968): 2-4.
- Gomboš, Stjepan. "Uloga arhitekta kod projektiranja." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 72-73.
- Grabrijan, Dušan. "Natečaj za ljudsko skupščino Ljudske Republike Slovenije v Ljubljani." In: *Arhitektura* II, no. 7 (February 1948): 3-14.
- Gropius, Walter. "Jedna osnova za studij arhitekture." In: *Arhitektura* IV, no. 3-4 (1950): 75-78.
- Ilić, Ljubo. "Uz izgradnju Novog Beograda." In: *Arhitektura* 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 9.
- Ivanšek, France. "Le Corbusier in mi." In: *Slovenski poročevalec* (May 16, 1953).
- Janakova, Mare. "Moje životno delo." www.a4a.info, retrieved December 19, 2004.
- Kojić, Branislav. "Arhitektura ruskog sela." In: *Arhitektura* 1-2, no. 4-6 (December, 1947-January, 1948): 12-13.
- Kraigher, Mira. "K nekim pripombam o arhitekturi na V. Kongresu KPJ." In: *Novi svet* III (1948): 777-85.
- Krat, Pavle. "Rekonstrukcija zgrade Pošte 2 u Beogradu." In: *Arhitektura* 2, no. 7 (February, 1948): 26-28.
- Louchheim, Aline B. "Cultural Diplomacy: An Art We Neglect." In: *New York Times* (Jan. 3, 1954): SM16.
- M.S. "Pomoć radnoj porodici." In: *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Sept. 15, 1957, 9.
- Macura, Milorad. "Problematika naše arhitekture u svetlosti konkursa za zgradu Predsedništva Vlade FNRJ." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 1, no. 3 (October, 1947): 3-17.
- Madžarević, Nemanja. "Fiskulturno vaspitanje naroda SSSR." In: *Jugoslavija-SSSR* I, no. 6 (April, 1946): 33-37.
- Maksimović, Branko. "Ka diskusiji o aktuelnim problemima naše arhitekture." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 73-75.
- Maleković, V. "Trijumf estetskog kriterija." In: *Vjesnik* (Zagreb, October 24, 1965).
- Miličević-Nikolić, Olga. "Svedoci revolucije: Kamen u Mostaru i voda u Jasenovcu." In: *Arhitektura Urbanizam* no. 40 (1967): 5-18.
- Mimica, M. "Zagrebački Velесајам добија све већи значај као један од прворазредних сајмова међународног значаја." In: *Политика* (Belgrade), September 8, 1957, 2.
- Minić, Oliver. "Poslednji CIAM 1956. godine u Dubrovniku: Neostvoreni susret s Le Corbusierom." In: *Arhitektura Urbanizam* (Belgrade) 6, no. 35-36 (1965): 84.
- Mohorovičić, Andrija. "Teoretska analiza arhitektonskog oblikovanja," (Theoretical Analysis of Architectural Form). In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 1-2, no. 1 (August, 1947): 6-8.
- Momčilović, D. "Konkurs za zgradu reprezentativnog hotela." In: *Arhitektura* I, no. 3 (October 1947): 25.
- Nenadović, Vladimir. "O zadacima inženjera i tehničara u izvršenju Petogodišnjeg plana." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 13-17 (1948): 116-121.
- Ostrogović, Kazimir. "Arhitektura SSSR 1917-1947. Povodom 30-godišnjice Oktobarske revolucije." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 1-2, no. 4-6 (December, 1947-January, 1948): 3-

8.

- Petrović, Ninko. "Beograd-Moskva." In: *Jugoslavija—SSSR* III, no.32 (June, 1948): 1-5.
- Ravnikar, Edvard. "Maršal Tito našim arhitektom." In: *Novi svet* II (1947): 362-65.
- Richter, Vjenceslav. "Osvrt na arhitektonske rezultate izložbe u Bruxellesu 1958." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) XII, no. 1-6 (1958): 56-62.
- S. S. "Izložba savremene arhitekture Jugoslavije u inostranstvu." In: *Arhitektura Urbanizam* I, no. 1 (1960): 31.
- Salisbury, Harrison E. "Building Pattern Set by Belgrade." In: *New York Times* (Aug. 22, 1957): 8.
- Šegvić, Neven. "Arhitektonsko naslijeđe naroda Jugoslavije." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 13-17 (1948): 6.
- _____ "Napomene redakcije uz članak prof. B. Maksimovića 'Ka diskusiji o aktuelnim problemima naše arhitekture.'" In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 76-80.
- _____ "Stvaralačke komponente arhitekture FNRJ." In: *Arhitektura* IV, no. 5-6 (1956): 5-40.
- _____ "Zablude i kriza buržoaske arhitekture." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 13-17 (1948): 129-31.
- Seissel, Josip. "Konkurs za urbanistički plan Novog Beograda." In: *Arhitektura* I, no. 3 (October, 1947): 18-22.
- _____ "Osvrt na protekle arhitektonske natječaje." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 67-69.
- Simonov, G. A. "Najznačajniji zadaci sovjetskih arhitekata." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 63-67.
- Stojanović, Bratislav. "Konkursi za Dom Centralnog komiteta KPJ i zgradu Predsjedništva Vlade FNRJ." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10 (March, April, and May, 1948): 69-71.
- _____ "Konkursi za dom Centralnog komiteta KPJ i zgradu Predsjedništva vlade FNRJ." In: *Tehnika* II, no. 6 (1947): 141-47.
- _____ "O socijalističkoj arhitekturi." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 1-2, no. 4-6 (December, 1947-January, 1948): 14.
- Trbojević, Ranko. "Zid zavesa i njegova primena u Beogradu." In: *Arhitektura Urbanizam* 8, no. 44 (1967): 18-19.
- Vasiljević, Slobodan. "Заштита од сунца у нашем поднебљу." In: *Преглед архитектуре*, no. 4-5 (June 1954-55): 122-25.
- Vukotić Lazar, Marta. "Staro beogradsko sajmište." In: *Godišnjak grada Beograda* 51 (2004): 143-168.
- Z. B. "Прва продавница са самопослуживањем." In: *Политика* (Belgrade), Sept. 27, 1958, 2.
- Zečević, Vlado. "Govor ministra građevina FNRJ Vlade Zečevića na svečanosti prilikom otvorenja radova na izgradnji Novog Beograda." In: *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) 2, no. 8-10

(March, April, and May, 1948): 7-8

Books

- Ademović, Fadil. *Sarajevo: Foto monografija*. Sarajevo: NIP Zadrugar, n.d.
- Belousov, Vladimir N. *Современная архитектура Югославию*. Moscow: Stroizdat, 1973.
- Beograd-Novi Beograd*. Belgrade: Direkcija za izgradnju Novog Beograda, 1967.
- Bobot, Rajko. *Josip Broz Tito: илустрирана биографија*. Skopje: Naša kniga and Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, Jugoslovenska revija, and Vuk Karadžić, 1980.
- Bogosavljević, Milutin. *The Economy of Yugoslavia*. Belgrade: Yugoslavia, 1961.
- Broz, Josip. *Govori i članci*. Zagreb: Naprijed, 1966.
- Čukić, Milorad L., and Slobodan P. Kokotović. *Novi Beograd: prošlost, revolucija, izgradnja*. Belgrade: Društveno-političke organizacije i Skupština opštine Novi Beograd and NIRO Književne novine, 1981.
- Dedijer, Vladimir. *The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948-1953*. New York: The Viking Press, 1971.
- Đilas, Milovan. *Memoir of a Revolutionary*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973.
- _____. *Vlast i pobuna*. Belgrade: Književne novine, 1991.
- Draskovich, Slobodan M. *Tito, Moscow's Trojan Horse*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957.
- Eterović, Ivo. *Tito's Private Life*. Belgrade: Jugoslovenska revija, 1977.
- Fürst, Danilo, ed. *Contemporary Yugoslav Architecture/Architecture yougoslave contemporaine*, exhibition catalogue. Ljubljana: Association of the Architects of Slovenia, 1959.
- Grabrijan, Dušan, and Juraj Neidhardt. *Arhitektura Bosne i put u suvremeno/Architecture of Bosnia and the Way to Modernity*. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije, 1957.
- Hoffman, George W. and Fred W. Neal. *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962.
- Janevski, Slavko, ed. *Скопје*. Belgrade: Mladost and Skopje: Sобрание na grad Skopje, 1970.
- Kalvoda, Josef. *Titoism and Masters of Imposture*. New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1958.
- Kardelj, Edvard. *Self-Management and the Political System*. Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1980.
- Kidder Smith, George E. *The New Architecture of Europe*. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1961.
- Koli, N. J. *Realizam sovjetske arhitekture*. Belgrade: Biblioteka za kulturnu saradnju Jugoslavije sa SSSR, c. 1947.
- Krleža, Miroslav. *Eseji, studije, putopisi*. Zagreb: Naprijed, Belgrade: Prosveta, Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1966.
- Krleža, Miroslav. *Knjiga eseja*. Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1961.

- Lehmann-Haupt, Hellmut. *Art under a Dictatorship*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- Marković, Jovan Đ. *Novi Beograd 1948-1968*. Belgrade: Opštinska skupština Novi Beograd, 1968.
- Meštrović, Ivan. *Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje*. Buenos Aires: Knjižnica Hrvatske revije, 1961.
- Novi Beograd 1961*. Belgrade: Direkcija za izgradnju Novog Beograda, 1961.
- Ostović, P. D. *The Truth about Yugoslavia*. New York: Roy Publishers, 1952.
- Petranović, Branko, Ranko Končar, and Radovan Radonjić, eds. *Sednice Centralnog komiteta KPJ (1948-1952)*. Belgrade: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1985.
- Planić, Stjepan. *Problemi savremene arhitekture*. Reprint of the 1932 edition. Zagreb: Nakladništvo Udruženja hrvatskih arhitekata, 1996.
- Popovski, Jovan. *Skopje/Skopje 1963*. Second edition. Skopje: NIP "Nova Makedonija;" and Zagreb: Agencija za fotodokumentaciju, 1964.
- Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije usvojen na sedmom kongresu Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije 22-26. aprila 1958*. Belgrade: NIP Komunist, 1972.
- Richter, Vjenceslav. *Sinturbanizam*. Zagreb: Mladost, 1964.
- Savremena umetnost u SAD: Iz zbirki Museum of Modern Art, New York*. Exhibition catalogue. Belgrade: Komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom, 1956.
- Skopje Resurgent: The Story of a United Nations Special Fund Town Planning Project*. New York: United Nations, 1970.
- Statistički godišnjak FNRJ*. Belgrade: Savezni zavod za statistiku i evidenciju, 1954.
- Stopar, Vladimir, ed. *Kumrovec* (Zagreb: Epoha, 1965).
- Šćekić, Jovan. *This was Skopje*. Belgrade: Federal Secretariat for Information, 1963.
- Реферати за I саветовање архитеката и урбаниста Југославије*. Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1950.
- Your Aid to Skopje, July— September 1963*. Skopje: Committee for Reconstruction and Development of Skopje, 1963.

Secondary Sources

Architecture—Yugoslavia

- Arhitekta Ivan Antić*, exhibition catalogue. Belgrade: Salon Muzeja savremene umetnosti, 1975.
- Arhitektura 1947.-1997.*, special issue of *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) LI, no. 214 (1998).
- Arhitektura u Hrvatskoj 1945-1985*. Special issue of *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) XXXIX, no. 196-199

- (1986).
- Bakalčev, Minas Ž. *Домување како урбан фрагмент на примерот на Скопје*. Doctoral dissertation. Skopje: University St. Cyril and Methodius, 2004.
- Barberis, Maurizio. "Tito e le Superville/Tito and his mega villas." In: *Domus*, no. 886 (November, 2005): 52-59.
- Begović, Miroslav, ed. *Arhitekt Viktor Kovačić: život i djelo/Architect Viktor Kovačić: life and work*. Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 2003.
- Beoković, Mirko. *Дворски комплекс, Београд, Србија*. Belgrade: Turistička organizacija Srbije, n.d.
- Bernik, Stane. *Bernardo Bernardi*. Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske and Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica, 1992.
- _____. *Slovenska arhitektura dvajstega stoletja/Slovene Architecture of the Twentieth Century*. Ljubljana: Mestna galerija, 2004.
- Blagojević, Ljiljana. *Modernism in Serbia: The Elusive Margins of Belgrade Architecture 1919-1941*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2003.
- _____. *Novi Beograd: Osporeni modernizam*. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, Arhitektonski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, and Zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture grada Beograda, 2007.
- _____. *Strategije modernizma u planiranju i projektovanju urbane strukture i arhitekture Novog Beograda: period konceptualne faze od 1922. do 1962. godine*. Doctoral dissertation. Belgrade: University of Belgrade, 2004.
- Čorak, Željka. *U funkciji znaka: Drago Ibler i hrvatska arhitektura između dva rata*. Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 1981.
- Curtis, William J. R., Tomaž Krušec, and Aleš Vodopivec. *Arhitekt Edvard Ravnikar, spominski kompleks na otoku Rabu, 1953/Architect Edvard Ravnikar, Memorial Complex on the Island of Rab, 1953*, exhibition catalogue. Ljubljana: Dessa, 2004.
- Damljanović, Tanja. *The Question of National Architecture in Interwar Yugoslavia*. Doctoral dissertation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2002.
- Dolenec, Metka. *Savin Sever arhitekt/Savin Sever architect*. Ljubljana: Nuit, 2003.
- Exposition internationale d'architecture de l'Union Internationale des Architectes / Rabat Maroc 1951: RFP Yougoslavie*. Exhibition catalogue. Ljubljana: Conseil des Associations des Architectes Yougoslaves, 1951.
- Galić, Drago, ed. *Antun Augustinčić, 1900-1970, Spomenica posvećena preminulom Antunu Augustinčiću, redovnom članu Jugoslovenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti u Zagrebu*. Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1985.
- Horvat-Pintarić, Vera. *Vjenceslav Richter*. Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1970.
- Ignjatović, Aleksandar. *Arhitektonski počeci Dragiše Brašovana 1906-1919*. Belgrade: Zadužbina Andrejević, 2004.
- Ivan Vitić, special issue of *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) LIV, no. 217 (2005).
- Ivanšek, France, ed. *Hommage Edvard Ravnikar*. Ljubljana: F. in M. Ivanšek, 1995.
- Kadijević, Aleksandar. *Mihajlo Mitrović: projekti, graditeljski život, ideje*. Belgrade: Nezavisna

- izdanja Slobodana Mašića, Muzej nauke i tehnike, Muzej arhitekture, 1999.
- Karlič-Kapetanović, Jelica. *Juraj Neidhardt: Život i djelo*. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1990.
- Kisić, Dubravka, and Vesna Mikić. *Antun Ulrich: arhiv arhitekta*, exhibition catalogue. Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti and Hrvatski muzej arhitekture, 2003.
- _____ ed. *Radovan Nikšić: 1920.-1987.: arhiv arhitekta*, exhibition catalogue. Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti and Hrvatski muzej arhitekture, 2005.
- Knežević, Snješka. *Zagrebu u središtu*. Zagreb: Barbat, 2003.
- Kolacio, Zdenko. *Spomenici i obilježja*. Zagreb: Globus, 1984.
- Konstantinovski, Georgi. *Градители во Македонија, XVIII-XX век*, vol. 1 and 2. Skopje: Tabernakul, 2004.
- Korisić, Marko. *Zamejski opus arhitekta Eda Mihevca*. Trieste, Gorica, and Ljubljana: Založba Kulturni dom, 2002.
- Koselj, Nataša. *Arhitektura 60-ih let v Sloveniji/Architecture of the 60ies in Slovenia*, special issue of *Arhitektov bilten* (Ljubljana) XXV (November 1995).
- _____ *Danilo Fürst: arhitektura*, exhibition catalogue. Ljubljana: Cankarjev dom, 2000.
- Kovačević, Bojan. *Arhitektura zgrade Generalštaba: Monografska studija dela Nikole Dobrovića*. Belgrade: Vojska, 2001.
- Krečič, Peter, ed. *Edvard Ravnikar: arhitekt, urbanist, oblikovalec, teoretik, univerzitetni učitelj in publicist*, exhibition catalogue. Ljubljana: Arhitekturni muzej, 1996.
- _____ *Plečnik: The Complete Works*. London: Academy Editions, 1993.
- Kulić, Vladimir, and Maroje Mrduljaš. "Yugoslavia and Beyond: From Modern Architecture to Current Practices." *S AM* (Basel, Switzerland), no. 6 (October, 2008): 14-34.
- Kulić, Vladimir. "'East? West? Or Both?' Foreign interpretations of Architecture in Socialist Yugoslavia." In: *Journal of Architecture* 14, no. 1 (December 2008): 87-105.
- _____ "'East? West? Or Both?': Foreign Perceptions of Architecture in Socialist Yugoslavia," in: *Journal of Architecture* (London: Routledge for the RIBA) 14, no. 1 (2009): 87-105.
- _____ "Labyrinth of Interpretation: The Example of the CK Building in Belgrade," in: *Centropa* 5, no. 1 (January 2005): 49-58.
- _____ "Politika arhitekture" [Politics of Architecture], in: *Arhitektov Bilten* (Ljubljana, Slovenia) XXXV, no. 167/168 (November 2005): 82-87, 108-12.
- _____ "Richter's Brussels Pavilion at 50," in: *Oris* (Zagreb, Croatia), no. 54 (December, 2008): 72-85.
- Kurto, Nedžad. *Sarajevo MCDLXII-MCMXCII*. Sarajevo: Oko, 1997.
- Manević, Zoran, Žarko Domljan, Nace Šumi, Ivan Štraus, Georgi Konstantinovski, and Božidar Milić. *Arhitektura XX vijeka*, series, *Umjetnost na tlu Jugoslavije*. Belgrade: Prosveta; Zagreb: Spektar; Mostar: Prva književna komuna, 1986.
- Manević, Zoran, ed. *Лексикон српских архитеката XIX и XX века*. Belgrade: Klub arhitekata i Građevinska knjiga, 1999.
- _____ *Богдановић*. Series Велика награда архитектуре САС. Belgrade: Savez

- arhitekata Srbije, n.d.
- _____ *Бркић*. Series Велика награда архитектуре САС. Belgrade: Savez arhitekata Srbije, n.d.
- _____ *Јовановић*. Series Велика награда архитектуре САС. Belgrade: Savez arhitekata Srbije, 1993.
- _____ *Личина*. Series Велика награда архитектуре САС. Belgrade: Savez arhitekata Srbije, 1994.
- _____ *Мандић*. Series Велика награда архитектуре САС. Belgrade: Savez arhitekata Srbije, n.d.
- _____ *Мартиновић*. Series Велика награда архитектуре САС. Belgrade: Savez arhitekata Srbije, n.d.
- _____ *Мацура*. Series Велика награда архитектуре САС. Belgrade: Savez arhitekata Srbije, n.d.
- _____ *Пантовић*. Series Велика награда архитектуре САС. Belgrade: Savez arhitekata Srbije, n.d.
- _____ *Цагић*. Series Велика награда архитектуре САС. Belgrade: Savez arhitekata Srbije, 1992.
- Manojlović Pintar, Olga. *Ideološko i političko u spomničkoj arhitekturi Prvog i Drugo svetskog rata u na tlu Srbije*. Doctoral dissertation. Belgrade: University of Belgrade, 2004.
- Maroević, Ivo. *Antologija zagrebačke arhitekture*. Zagreb: Art studio Azinović, 2003.
- Mikić, Vesna. *Arhitekt Antun Ulrich: klasičnost moderne*. Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić, 2002.
- Milovanović, Milan. "Арх. Милорад Мацура: Отпор диктатима." In: *Врачарски гласник* (Belgrade, March 2004): 13.
- Mitrović, Mihailo. *Novija arhitektura Beograda*. Belgrade: Jugoslavija, 1975.
- Neidhardt, Tatjana. *Sarajevo kroz vrijeme*. Sarajevo: Arka Press, 2004.
- Neven Šegvić, special issue of *Arhitektura* (Zagreb) XLV, no. 211 (2002).
- Obad Šćitaroci, Mladen, ed. *Sveučilište u Zagrebu – Arhitektonski fakultet: 1919./1920.-1999./2000.: osamdeset godina izobrazbe arhitekata u Hrvatskoj*. Zagreb: Arhitektonski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2000.
- Perović, Miloš R. *Srpska arhitektura XX veka/Serbian 20th Century Architecture*. Belgrade: Arhitektonski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2003.
- Perović, Miloš, and Spasoje Krunic, eds. *Nikola Dobrović: Eseji, projekti, kritike/Essays, Projects, Critiques*. Belgrade: Arhitektonski fakultet and Muzej arhitekture, 1998.
- Prelovšek, Damjan. *Plečnik, 1872-1957: Architectura Perennis*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Premerl, Tomislav. *Hrvatska moderna arhitektura između dva rata: nova tradicija*. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1990.
- _____ *Zagreb, grad moderne arhitekture: stoljeće zagrebačke arhitekture*. Zagreb: Durieux, 2003.
- Prešeren, Damjana, ed. *20th century architecture: from modernist to contemporary: guide to*

- architecture*. Ljubljana: Institute for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage of Slovenia, 2003.
- Rogina, Krešimir, ed. *Arhitekt Edo Šen: skice i crteži*. Zagreb: Nakladništvo Udruženja hrvatskih arhitekata, 1998.
- _____, ed. *Arhitekt Viktor Kovačić: skice i crteži*. Zagreb: Nakladništvo Udruženja hrvatskih arhitekata, 1997.
- _____, ed. *Arhitekt Vjekoslav Bastl: skice i crteži*. Zagreb: Nakladništvo Udruženja hrvatskih arhitekata, 1998.
- _____, ed. *Kristl, Picelj, Rašica, Srnc: Obljetnica prve izložbe članova grupe EXAT 51 u Društvu arhitekata, 18. veljače-4. ožujka 1953*. Zagreb: Nakladništvo Udruženja hrvatskih arhitekata, 1998.
- Stardelov, Georgi, Krum Tomovski, and Mihail Tokarev, eds. *Архитектурата на почвата на Македонија од средината на век до крајот на век*. Series Прилози за истражувањето на историјата на културата на почвата на Македонија, vol. 14. Skopje: Makedonska akademija na naukite i umetnostite, 2006.
- Štraus, Ivan. *Arhitektura Jugoslavije 1945-1990*. Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991.
- Susovski, Marjan. *Zbirka Richter: Donacija Vjenceslava Richtera i Nade Kareš-Richter Gradu Zagrebu*. Zagreb: Muzej suvremene umjetnosti, 2003.
- Tokarev, Mihail. *100 години модерна архитектура. Придонесот на Македонија и Југославија (1918-1990)*. Skopje: Mihail Tokarev, 2006.
- Tomovski, Krum, and Boris Petkovski. *Архитектурата и монументалната уметност во Скопје меѓу двете светски војни*. Skopje, Macedonia: The Museum of the City of Skopje, 2003.
- Tušek, Darovan. *Arhitektonski natječaji u Splitu 1918-1941*. Split (Croatia): Društvo arhitekata Splita, 1994.
- _____. *Arhitektonski natječaji u Splitu 1945-1995*. Split (Croatia): Građevinski fakultet Sveučilišta u Splitu and Društvo arhitekata Splita, 1996.
- Ugljen, Zlatko, ed. *Juraj Neidhardt*, exhibition catalogue. Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti BiH, 2001.
- Vojnović, Milan. *Sombor, Illustrated Chronicle*. Sombor, Serbia: Ines, 2003.
- Vukić, Feđa, ed. *Zagreb: modernost i grad*. Zagreb: AGM, 2003.
- Vukotić Lazar, Marta. *Beogradsko razdoblje arhitekta Nikole Dobrovića (1945-1967)*. Belgrade: Plato, 2002.

Architecture—general

- Abel, Chris. *Architecture and Identity: Responses to Cultural and Technological Change*. Oxford, England: Architectural Press, 2000.
- Ades, Dawn, Tim Benton, David Elliott, and Iain Boyd Whyte, eds. *Art and Power: Europe under the dictators 1930-45*, exhibition catalogue. London: Thames and Hudson, in association with Hayward Gallery, 1996.

- Alofsin, Anthony. *When Buildings Speak: Architecture as Language in the Habsburg Empire and Its Aftermath, 1867-1933*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
- Åman, Anders. *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe During the Stalin Era: An Aspect of Cold War History*. New York: The Architectural History Foundation, Inc.; Cambridge, Mass., and London: The MIT Press, 1992.
- Baird, George. "Architecture and Politics: A Polemical Dispute. A Critical Introduction to Karel Teige's 'Mundaneum,' 1929 and Le Corbusier's 'In Defense of Architecture' 1933." In: *Oppositions*, no. 4 (1974): 80-82.
- Banks, Miranda, ed. *The Aesthetic Arsenal: Socialist Realism under Stalin*, exhibition catalogue. New York: The Institute of Contemporary Arts, P.S. 1 Museum, 1993.
- Cracraft, James, and Daniel Rowlands, eds. *Architectures of Russian Identity 1500 to the Present*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003.
- Crowley, David, and Susan E. Reid. *Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc*. Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002.
- Devos, Rika, and Mil de Kooning, eds. *L'Architecture moderne à l'EXPO 58: "Pour un monde plus humain."* Brussels: Fonds Mercator and Dexia Banque, 2006.
- Diefendorf, Jeffrey M. *In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Dobrenko, Evgeny, and Eric Naiman, eds. *The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003.
- Five Architects: Eisenmann, Graves, Gwathmey, Hejduk, Meier*. Introduction by Colin Rowe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Frampton, Kenneth. "The humanist v. the utilitarian ideal." In: *Architectural Design*, no. 37 (March, 1968): 2-4.
- Giedion, Sigfried. *Space, Time, and Architecture*. Fifth edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Hitchcock, Henry-Russell Jr. *Modern Architecture: Romanticism and Reintegration*. New York: Da Capo Press, 1993.
- Hitchcock, Henry-Russell Jr., and Philip Johnson. *The international style: architecture since 1922*. New York, W. W. Norton & company, 1932.
- Hudson, Hugh D. Jr. *Blueprints and Blood. The Stalinization of Soviet Architecture, 1917-1937*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Rem Koolhaas, *Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1978).
- Leach, Neal, ed. *Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory*. London and New York: Routledge, 1997.
- Lefaivre, Liane, and Alexander Tzonis. *Critical Regionalism: Architecture and Identity in a Globalized World*. Munich: Prestel, 2003.
- Loeffler, Jane C., *The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America's Embassies*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998.
- Moravánszky, Ákos. *Competing Visions: Aesthetic Invention and Social Imagination in Central*

- European Architecture, 1867-1918*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998.
- Noever, Peter, ed. *Tyranei des Schönen: Architektur der Stalin-Zeit*, exhibition catalogue. Munich and New York: Prestel, 1994.
- Paperny, Vladimir: *Architecture in the Age of Stalin: Culture Two*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Tarkhanov, Alexei, and Sergei Kavtaradze. *Architecture of the Stalin Era*. New York: Rizzoli, 1992.
- Teige, Karel. "Mundaneum." In: *Stavba* (Prague), no. 7 (1929): 145-155.
- Danilo Udovički Selb, *The Evolution of Soviet Architectural Culture in the First Decade of Stalin's 'Perestroika,'* Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures & Societies. Trondheim: Program on East European Cultures & Societies, 2009.
- Vale, Lawrence J. *Architecture, Power, and National Identity*. New Haven, Connecticut, and London: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Vogt, Adolf Max. *Russische und französische Revolutions-Architektur 1917- 1789*. Cologne: Verlag M. DuMont Schauberg, 1974.
- Wigley, Mark. *White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995.
- Zhuravlev, A. M., A. V. Ikonnikov, A. G. Rohegov. *Архитектура советской России/Architecture of the Soviet Russia*. Moscow: Стройиздат, 1983.
- Zucker, Paul, ed. *New Architecture and City Planning: A Symposium*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1944.

Art—Yugoslavia

- Blagojević, Marija. *Vizuelna kultura Sokola*. Diploma thesis. Belgrade: University of Belgrade, 2003.
- Denegri, Ješa, and Želimir Košćević. *EXAT 51: 1951-1956*. Zagreb: Galerija Nova, 1979.
- _____. *Pedesete: teme srpske umetnosti (1950-1960)*. Novi Sad: Svetovi, 1993.
- Kečkemet, Duško. *Ivan Meštrović*. Belgrade: Jugoslavija, 1964.
- Kolešnik, Ljiljana. *Između Istoka i Zapada: Hrvatska umjetnost i likovna kritika 50-ih godina*. Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2006.
- Krsto Hegedušić*. Foreword by Miroslav Krleža. Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1974.
- Kukoč, Boris, and Igor Prizmić, eds. *Augustinčić*. Zagreb: Privredni vjesnik, 1976.

- Merenik, Lidija. *Ideološki modeli: srpsko slikarstvo 1945-1968*. Belgrade: Beopolis and Remont, 2001.
- Protić, Miodrag B., ed. *1929-1950: Nadrealizam, postnadrealizam, socijalna umetnost, umetnost NOR-a, socijalistički realizam*, exhibition catalogue. Belgrade: Muzej savremene umetnosti, 1969.
- Revolucionarno kiparstvo*. Zagreb: Spektar, 1977.
- Todorović, Draško, Radovan Todorović, and Ivana Todorović, eds. *Lubarda*. Podgorica, Montenegro: Galerija Todorović, 2004.

History—Yugoslavia

- Balfour, Neil, and Sally Mackay. *Paul of Yugoslavia*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980.
- Bekić, Darko. *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu: odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955*. Zagreb: Globus, 1988.
- Bogetić, Dragan. *Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955: jugoslovensko približavanje NATO-u*. Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2000.
- Božić, Ivan, Sima Ćirković, Milorad Ekmečić, and Vladimir Dedijer. *Istorija Jugoslavije*. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1973.
- Byford, Jovan. *Semlin Jugendlager*. Available at: <http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semlin/semlinjudenlager.html>, retrieved 2 July, 2008.
- Clissold, Stephen. *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1973. A Documentary Survey*. London, New York, and Toronto: The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Denitch, Bogdan Denis. *The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976.
- Đokić, Dejan. *Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
- Fischer, Jasna, Aleš Gabrič, Leonid J. Gibianskii, Edith S. Klein, and Ronald W. Preussen, eds. *Jugoslavija v hladni vojni/Yugoslavia in the Cold War*. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino; Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.
- Gavranov, Velibor, and Momir Stojković. *Međunarodni odnosi i spoljna politika Jugoslavije*. Belgrade: Savremena administracija, 1972.
- Iveković, Mladen. *Hrvatska lijeva inteligencija 1918-1945*. Zagreb: Naprijed, 1970.
- Lampe, John R. *Yugoslavia as History. Twice There Was a Country*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Lasić, Stanko. *Sukob na književnoj ljevici 1928-1952*. Zagreb: Liber, 1970.
- Lees, Lorraine M., *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
- Lukić, Sveta. *Contemporary Yugoslav Literature. A Sociological Approach*. Urbana, Illinois,

- Chicago, and London: University of Illinois Press, 1972.
- Maclean, Fitzroy. *Disputed Barricade: The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1957.
- Marković, Predrag. *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada 1948-1965*. Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1996.
- Patterson, Patrick Hyder. "Truth Half Told: Finding the Perfect Pitch for Advertising and Marketing in Socialist Yugoslavia, 1950–1991." In: *Enterprise and Society* 4 (June 2003): 179-225.
- Pavlowitch, Stevan K. *The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems, 1918-1988*. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1988.
- _____. *Yugoslavia*. London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1971.
- Peković, Ratko. *Ni rat ni mir: Panorama književnih polemika 1945-1965*. Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1986.
- Perović, Latinka. *Od centralizma do federalizma: KPJ u nacionalnom pitanju*. Zagreb: Globus, 1983.
- Petranović, Branko, and Čedomir Štrbac. *Istorija socijalističke Jugoslavije*. Belgrade: Radnička štampa, 1977.
- Petranović, Branko. *Balkanska federacija 1943-1948*. Belgrade and Šabac, Serbia: Zaslou, 1990.
- Petrović, Dragan. *Francusko-jugoslovenski kulturni odnosi*. Belgrade: Institut za političke studije, 2006.
- Potkonjak, Sanja. "The rule of women in Croatian ethnology: Marijana Gušić between politics and profession." Paper presented at the European Association of Social Anthropologists Biannual Conference, Bristol (UK), 2006.
- Protić, Miodrag B. *Hojeva barka: pogled s kraja veka (1900-1965)*. Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruka, 1992.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. *The Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006.
- Ridley, Jasper. *Tito*. London: Constable, 1994.
- Rusinow, Dennison. *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.
- Udovički, Jasminka, and James Ridgeway, eds. *Burn this House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997.
- Wachtel, Andrew Baruch. *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- West Richard. *Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994.
- Wilson, Duncan. *Tito's Yugoslavia*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

History—general

- Arvidsson, Claes, and Lars Erik Blomqvist, eds. *Symbols of Power: The Esthetics of Political Legitimation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987.
- Banks, Miranda, ed. *The Aesthetic Arsenal: Socialist Realism under Stalin*, exhibition catalogue. New York: The Institute of Contemporary Arts, P.S. 1 Museum, 1993.
- Chapman, Tamara Joy. *The Personality Cult of Joseph Stalin in Soviet Russia, 1945-53*. Master's thesis. The University of Texas at Austin, 1986.
- De Grazia, Victoria. *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe*. Cambridge, Mass., and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2005.
- Fer, Briony, David Batchelor, and Paul Wood. *Realism, Rationalism, Surrealism. Art between the Wars*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press in association with the Open University, 1993.
- Field, Douglas, ed. *American Cold War Culture*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005.
- Gilbaut, Serge. *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.
- Günther, Hans, ed. *The Culture of the Stalin Period*. New York: St. Martins Press, 1990.
- Haddow, Robert H. *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s*. Washington, D.C., and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997.
- Kramer, Hilton. *The Twilight of the Intellectuals: Culture and Politics in the Ear of the Cold War*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999.
- Kroker, Arthur and Marilouise, eds. *Ideology and Power in the Age of Lenin in Ruins*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
- Lahusen, Thomas, and Evgeny Dobrenko, eds. *Socialist Realism Without Shores*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997.
- O'Mahoney, Mike. *Sports in the USSR: Physical Culture—Visual Culture*. London: Reaktion Books, 2006.
- Resis, Albert. "The Churchill-Stalin Secret 'Percentages' Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944." In: *American Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (1978): 368-87.
- Stonor Saunders, Francis. *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*. New York: The New Press, 1999.
- Tucker, Robert C. "The Rise of Stalin's Personality Cult." In: *The American Historical Review*, 84, no. 2 (April, 1979): 347-66.
- Verdery, Katherine. *What was Socialism and What Comes Next?* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Wagenleitner, Reinhold, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States after the Second World War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.

Theory—art, culture, aesthetics, politics

- Althusser, Louis. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1971.
- Berman, Marshall. *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1982.
- Calinescu, Matei. *Five Faces of Modernity*. Durham, Indiana: Duke University Press, 1987.
- Edelman, Murray. *From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- _____. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, 2nd ed. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985.
- Freeden, Michael. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1996.
- Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Basic Books, 1973.
- Groys, Boris. *The Total Art of Stalinism. Avant-garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Lukes, Steven. *Power: A Radical View*. London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1974.
- Malešević, Siniša. *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Basingstoke, England: Pallgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Robin, Régine. *Socialist Realism. An Impossible Aesthetic*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992.
- Taylor, Ronald, ed. *Aesthetics and Politics*. Afterword by Frederic Jameson. London: NLB, 1977.

VITA

Vladimir Kulić attended Technical High School in Sombor (Serbia). In 1987, he entered Faculty of Architecture, University of Belgrade, where he received the degrees of Graduate Engineer of Architecture in 1994 and Master of Science in Architecture in 2002. Between 1996 and 2001, he was employed at the Faculty of Architecture, University of Belgrade, where he taught at the Department of Urban Design and the Department of History of Architecture and Art. In August 2001, he entered the Graduate School at the University of Texas at Austin. Since December 2007, he has taught at the School of Architecture at Florida Atlantic University in Fort Lauderdale.

Permanent Address: 1808, West 38th Street, Austin, TX 78731

This manuscript was typed by the author.