[0:00:01 Speaker 1] mhm. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Mm. Yeah. Well it's my pleasure to welcome you all to the first in our series of lectures this academic year put on by the thomas jefferson Center for the study of cortex and ideas. I'm thomas Pangle and I'm the co director of the center with my wife, Professor Lorraine Pangle. This is the University of texas New Great Books program for undergraduates in all schools of the university. And we put on a range of courses in the great books of our tradition And a certificate program consisting of six courses, four of which are required to our elective. And students from any school and university can graduate with a certificate in the great books. And we also put on each year a lecture series in the great books. This will be the first lecture and I'll introduce it in just a moment but shortly to other lectures or performances if you will, this month will be coming up October 18 We're going to have in the evening a symposium on why scientists should study the great books with two distinguished scientists, one from MIT, one from the University of texas and a distinguished position from Houston. And then at the end of the month, October 29, we will have a lecture on Adam Smith and nationalism by the Adam smith scholar, Professor Richard Boyd at Georgetown University. So those are upcoming attractions and we will have other lectures later in the year. Uh They are advertised on our website, which I urge you to go and visit. Uh They're also brochures on the table outside the door uh that you're free to pick up, that have the website address on them. At that website, you can download and listen to all of the lectures that we have presented over the last three years. Uh There there are video and audio versions of so you can listen to them in the car or watch them at home and are seeking a second time. And this will be also be recorded and it takes a couple of months. But we eventually will have each lecture up available for viewing. If you know people who would have liked to come and couldn't or if after the lecture, you're sure they should see it. You can tell them about now. Today, it's my, my privilege and honor to introduce dr eric Dempsey. He is our senior postdoctoral teaching fellow. One of the features of our center is that with the generous contributions of donors, we are able to bring to the university two or three distinguished young doctorates to do postdoctoral research and also to teach in our program. And eric Dempsey has been a stand uh style word of his uh, in his teaching and his support and organizing for our program. Since he arrived here two years ago, he got his PhD at boston college writing on Aristotle's ethics and he's completing a book on that subject. And today he's going to be speaking to us about Aristotle and the foundations of american liberalism. Eric Yeah. 

[0:03:37 Speaker 0] Mhm. How does this push these? Hi, did that work? That's good. All right, well, good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, I'm glad to see so many of you here today who I recognize so many friendly faces. Um I hope by the end of my lecture, you're still friendly. Um So I'm here today to talk a little bit about american politics and to say something about why studying the great books and why studying Aristotle in particular can help us understand our own political situation more adequately. Um Now, to start with, I know that there's something provocative about suggesting that these old books can teach us something useful about our own political life. Uh They can't speak to specific problems we face today. They can't tell us much about the health care package, about the war in Afghanistan or Iraq, the fiscal crisis or the condition of the global environment. Um despite that, I think that studying the great books and studying the history of political philosophy in particular has certain advantages. Um in the first place, they give us an opportunity to reflect not only on sort of issues of immediate importance, um but on the principles or purposes of political life, more general, moreover, because they've been written by people um outside of our own society, they can provide us with a vantage point that otherwise we would not have, and that can help us understand our own society and our own problems uh more adequately. Um beyond that, we can see where some of our own ideas about politics and our own traditions came from today. I'm going to talk a little bit about how reading the great political philosophers and above all, reading Aristotle and some of his successors, uh and also his critics can help us think about our own situation more clearly and deeply. Now I want to begin with a problem which seems to me of special importance in contemporary american society. The issue of what I'll call inherited ideas. I get that term from Mark Twain's book, Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court. The main character, the Yankee is a man named hank morgan. Um and he at one point describes these inherited ideas as permanent fixtures of human life. Everyone has them, he says, and they're very tough to change. They flow in ruts formed by time and habit and the man and the man who should have proposed to divert them by reason and argument would have had a long contract on his hands. Their beliefs which society holds only because they've always held them while admitting that they are an inevitable feature of the human condition. Morgan seems to regard such ideas as almost entirely baleful. He laments the way in which they have lent an air of authority to an abusive aristocracy. Um and his great nemesis, not migrate nemesis, but his great nemesis, the catholic church, uh morgan, therefore embarks on a project to do away with the vestiges of old outdated traditions. Um and that project my senses has only become stronger in the, in the century since Twain wrote his book. But Twain's judgment on hank's wisdom is not necessarily so positive. His project ends in the brutal slaughter of 30,000 nights, a fact which might cause us to wonder whether twain himself might have had reservations about Hank's quest, and so also somewhat more favourable judgement on the value of those inherited ideas than did his hero. Now the classic statement on this problem of inherited ideas was made long before Twain lived by Aristotle, the greek political philosopher. Um his politics is the most comprehensive treatise on policy, is the most comprehensive treatise on political life produced in the ancient political world. He takes up in somewhat different language. Uh this question of inherited ideas in some remarks that he makes about the Athenian political reformer and urban planner named him pajamas, hippopotamus had proposed that there should be a law that every discovery which improves the existing regime, every every discovery which benefits the city should be rewarded. From Hank's point of view. Of course, that would be a fine idea, the sort of thing that would promote a spirit of public service, innovative thinking and progress. But Aristotle doesn't endorse Hanks proposal. He warns of an important danger that it poses. If the laws are changed too easily and too often, they'll lose their authority. As he says, law has no force of persuasion other than habit and have, it gets established only by long passage of time. In other words, laws and customs are generally obeyed, not because everyone appreciates the best arguments that each of them is good, but out of habit or ancestral customs because that's what's always been done to change the laws too easily and often would run the risk of undermining the very ground on which people obey them so that they would cease to do any good at all. Aristotle is right about that. Then then our inherited ideas and even the very fact that we've inherited them rather than reasoning to them. Um, and that they are worn into ruts as hank puts it are part of what makes their society work. That may make sense of course. But there's another side to the problem. If our inherited ideas are good, of course it makes sense to keep them. Um, but what about the bad ones? If we accept bad laws on faith, then aren't we doing a disservice to our community? Don't, don't those inherited ideas have the potential to do at least as much harm as good Aristotle's treatment recognizes that part of the equation too. In fact, he says many of the customs of his own society are followed only because they were set down, but by what he calls the first humans, people whom he described as being probably simple tunes, at least some of them. Uh, at least some of those laws, He says we're barbaric. He speaks of the fact that Greeks used to quote, go about carrying arms and purchased their wives from one another. Um, and he mentioned the law according to which in homicide cases, if the plaintiff can get together a certain number of witnesses to the crime from his own kin, the defendant is guilty of murder. The fact that these laws were old and well established doesn't change the fact that they're awful. Um, and uh, yeah, it's kind of funny that they were awful and deserved to be eliminated for in general, Aristotle says what's most important is not what's old, but what's good all seek what is good, not the ancestral. That means that as citizens were faced with kind of a difficult situation. It's not enough to say that we should preserve laws just because they've always been there um by doing so. There's a real risk that will close off avenues to progress that will treat some group or class unfairly, or that will perpetuate some other injustice. Um, and we would be doing so only because that's the way things were done in the past. If we recognize in principle that it's possible that some of our inheritance is harmful, then it seems that we also have an obligation now to try our best to take as few of them on faith as possible. At the same time, if we follow Aristotle, we need to exercise exceptional caution. If we go changing all the laws, we'll risk undermining their authority and thus keeping them from doing even those goods they're supposed to do. Uh moreover. But more than that, uh, Aristotle's case, the examples that he provides a bad law are bad laws rather are exceedingly clear instances where it's. But in our case, in our society, there are also much more difficult cases, cases where it's hard to see what good specific customs rules or traditions serve, but where it's also hard to be sure that they don't serve any good. While Aristotle's subtle treatment of the problem accentuates the amount of caution and care we need to exercise. Doesn't give us any simple rule we can follow to sift out the good beliefs from the bad. But that when we apply Aristotle's approach to american political life, we find that we face a somewhat different situation. Our traditions are not just decisions made by simple tunes. We know a lot about the american founding and we know that our founders were educated men of exceptional intelligence and prudence does. The principles of our government aren't arbitrary, but the products of serious reflection on both the nature and the purposes of political life. At the beginning of the first federalist paper, alexander Hamilton said, And here, I quote, um it has been remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, either conduct and example, to decide the important question whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend on their political, to depend for their political constitutions, on accident and force. The reflection which went into the framing of our government not only address the complicated set of political problems that our founders faced, but also included a serious sustained consideration of the nature and purposes of government as such, and even on the nature of human beings. That means that are inherited ideas, at least some of them are significantly higher rank than those of the barbaric creatures Aristotle imagines as the first humans, but that very fact gives us a kind of opportunity because we can see and unearth the process of reasoning that went into the framing of our political system, uh we can understand it more adequately. So let me turn now to what our founders said. While it's true that there were disagreements among the founders themselves about many weighty issues for my purposes. Today, I only want to talk about two components, which I would say formed the backbone of what was new in the american regime. First, the doctrine of natural rights and equality embodied above all of the Declaration of Independence and the institutional framework set forth in the constitution and defended in the federalist papers. The Declaration asserts, as you all know, that all men are created equal and are endowed with certain unalienable rights uh life liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Constitution meanwhile, provides the basic institutional framework for our government, um defining what the different branches are, what powers they have, the requirements for office and election to office. Uh And the like, these two components aren't really separate but work together with each other. Abraham Lincoln at least asserted that the framework set by the Constitution was not at all separate from what's in the from what's in the Declaration. Rather, the very purpose of the Constitution was to secure the rights articulated in the Declaration, according to what he says in a famous sort of famous um Note that he wrote in 191,860, the expression of the principle liberty to all in our Declaration of Independence was most happy and fortunate. The assertion of that principle at that time was the word Finley spoken, which has proven an apple of gold to us. The Union and the Constitution are the picture of silver subsequently framed around it. The picture was made not to conceal or destroy the apple, but to adorn and to preserve it. The picture was made for the Apple, not the Apple for the picture. So at least for Lincoln, the true core of the american founding was to be found in precisely those principles of the Declaration. Of course not everyone agrees with Lincoln, but for our purposes today, I think that's a good starting point. Lincoln believed that the principles embodied in the Declaration were not only suited to our society, are suited to our particular situation, but simply and unqualified lee. True. He called the Declaration an immortal emblem of humanity. The founders, he said, hope that its statement of principles might become a beacon to guide their Children and their Children's Children. But his Lincoln admits those ideals had not yet been fully realized in his time. And he believed that we would make progress in. So far as we were able to realize, the more and more fully the most obvious example of progress, especially if we're talking about Lincoln is slavery. He saw it as a clear violation of the principles of that declaration, which had, which may have had, which perhaps it was necessary to accommodate for a time, but which ultimately ought to be abolished. And yet there was an american society, also a defense made of slavery, not one based on the declaration, but on other traditions, which also make up an important part of the whole. These included justifications from the bible and from classical political thought. Uh, if we consider the examples of slavery, we might think that those other traditions are just are simply are simply harmful, um, to use the terminology I employed before, that they prop up poisonous inherited ideas and that we would do well to purge them as much as possible in the name of freedom and equality. But as our look at Aristotle and Twain indicated, it may be that at least some of these ideas served some salutary purpose. So this then, is the question I've been leading up to, and everything I've covered so far is a strict principled liberalism, one rooted on those basic premises in the declaration, something politically desirable. Is it even something possible? Or do those alien traditions which still form a part of our society and always have contribute something indispensable even for achieving the goals that liberal society sets for itself naturally. There are lots of ways to treat this question. So I have to limit myself to one. And I'm going to focus on the role that virtue moral virtue plays in the political community or to put it differently. What kind of character the community requires for its health and flourishing. And as we'll see, there is an important shift when we turn away from the understanding of moral virtue offered by those older traditions, not only Christianity but Aristotle and a city all focus today, especially on classical political thought. Um and that tradition out of which the liberal understanding group in looking at this issue, I'm going to talk not really about how how exactly people were expected to behave or what rules they might be expected to follow, but more broadly what it was that made the, about what it was that made the virtues, virtues, what end they served and why people would choose to practice them. I'll begin with Aristotle and then use one of his great interpreters, the medieval catholic theologian uh, and political philosopher Marcellus of padua to try to pin down one of the more problematic aspects of what Aristotle says. Then I'm going to look at how these, I'm going to briefly, at least at how these questions came to be treated in a different fashion in the liberal tradition. Um, the one would shape the american founding by looking above all thomas, hobbes. Uh, but then also briefly at some subsequent thinkers. I know that this tore um, about to take is very brief, but my conviction is that it will prove to be of some use in clarifying the specific issue of what kind of virtual character, thriving political community needs its citizens to practice. So to start with Aristotle, what Aristotle says about moral virtue is notoriously complicated. You can take my word for that, but rather than trying to treat it comprehensively, I want a spotlight three key claims Number one, that the purpose of the political community is the cultivation of virtue. Number two, that virtuous action, if it's really to be virtuous, should be performed for its own sake. And three, I'll get what I want to talk about this in a moment. Just hold off that the care for the Divine and the class of priests form a necessary part of Aristotle city. So first, when Aristotle explains the character of the political community, it puts moral virtue front and center, not just as one of its requirements, but as its very purpose. In book three of the politics, he takes up the position of a certain greek so fist, who are who argued salafist, who argued that a city was primarily an alliance which existed for the sake of protecting economic activity and to guarantee some level of security for its citizens. To punish wrongdoing. Aristotle insists that a community constituted for such purposes would not truly be a city. It maintains that all those who are concerned about the city's laws, uh, ought to pay attention to political and virtue and vice from which it is manifest. He says that the true city, and not just the thing which is called. The city must make virtue. It's concerned every city or every political community truly worthy of the name makes its highest concern the cultivation of a certain character among its citizens. In that, we should note, Aristotle departs from the Declaration, which holds the purpose of the government is to secure certain individual rights. The second point has to do with the way Aristotle expects virtuous people to think about their own virtue. They choose virtue, he says, for its own sake, or put differently, they choose it because it's something noble. This that means that there's something intrinsically appealing or attractive about moral virtue. Uh, something about performing is something um, yeah, I'm sorry, something appealing about performing the best actions regardless of any good that might follow from them. In other words, he suggests that we, as individuals, find our own deepest fulfillment or satisfy our own deepest needs by acting in a noble, virtuous way. Virtue in this sense calls us beyond ourselves to do things from which we don't expect any reward, but which are worthwhile, whatever benefit we may later receive. Now, in addition to these first two proms, uh there's a third point which I said was a little tricky, which I want to draw out, which comes not from Book three of the politics, but from book seven and one of Aristotle's discussions of the best regime. When he's describing the parts of the city, all of which he says are necessary and without which he says, quote, a city could not be, he mentions among them Care for the Divine, which is called the priesthood. Now, in the context, Aristotle doesn't explain why he regards the priesthood is necessary to see what the reason is. I think it may be of some use to turn to turn to the more direct account given by one of Aristotle's great interpreters, the medieval catholic theologian, Marcellus of Padova. Since I'm sure he's less familiar than the others I've been speaking about. Let me say a little about who marcellus was. As I said, he was a Catholic theologian and his magnum opus called the defense or pockets was published in 1324. He held that in the realm of political philosophy, that is with regard to what can be known about politics by unassisted human reason, what Aristotle taught remained essentially valid. It's true, Aristotle didn't have access to christ's revelation, and that meant that he couldn't address the fate of our immortal souls. But Marsellus is very careful to delineate which truths are available to unassisted reason, in which come from God's revelation. And he says that what's needed for a healthy political community can be known through unassisted reason. For that reason, Marsellus's view of the priesthood is of special interest. Now again, as a christian. He, of course, holds that the true and primary purpose of the priesthood is eternal salvation. But he says further that even pagan philosophers recognized that the priesthood served an important political purpose. One which he describes as useful and echoing Aristotle quasi necessary for the status of this world. Their political function is to act as quote teachers of virtue. This they would do by setting by the setting forth of divine laws or religions, which were meant to ensure the goodness of human acts, both individual and civil, on which depends almost completely the quiet tranquility of the communities and finally the sufficient life of the present world, not having the true religion at the disposal at their disposal. He concedes that the pagan philosophers found it useful to invent new religions, promising rewards and punishments after death is incentive for good conduct. They would thereby, quote, inducing men, reverence and fear of God, and a desire to free vices and cultivate the virtues. This was necessary, Marsellus's asserted, because there are some good act which the legislator cannot regulate by human law that is quoting again those acts which cannot be proved to be present or absent in someone, but which nevertheless cannot be concealed from God in the context, marcellus spotlights the virtue of moderation, but says more generally that from fear of these posthumous punishments, mena shoud wrongdoing were instigated to perform virtuous works of piety and mercy and were well disposed both in themselves and toward others. As a consequence, many disputes and injuries ceased in communities. Hence, to the peace and tranquility of states and the sufficient life of men for the status of the present world were preserved with less difficulty. So from our serious, this concern for the Divine and a sense that God is watching our actions serves the political purpose of cultivating necessary virtues and making states more peaceful. Now, this is not to say that Marsellus's teaching is coarsely mercenary or that he believes that people only act rightly because they expect some prize in the afterlife. In fact, when he discusses the mosaic, he notes that it does not promise eternal life or eternal happiness, but it inspired obedience. Nonetheless, the sense that God is watching us and that we have sins which need to be expatriated provides a key incentive for acting rightly even absent the promise of heavenly rewards and even when, and even when no one, is there no other human being, is there to watch one's actions? Now, it's true that Marsellus's treatment of virtue has a different spirit or strikes a different note than what Aristotle says. The sense that virtuous actions should be performed for its own sake or on account of its nobility is scarcely mentioned in his great work, The defender of the peace. Um, nevertheless, I think it's fruitful to treat them together for the following two reasons. Um, Number one, there is the fact that Aristotle, again, the first and simplest, there is the fact that Aristotle does assert that care for the divine is necessary for the political community. Um, more serious claims that in articulating this, he's giving voice to the thought of the pagan political philosophers, and indeed it's marsellus's reading of that passage. That makes the most sense to me. Um, so I think there's at least some good reason to conclude that Aristotle would have agreed with with more serious on this point. But second, even if one emphasizes the difference between the two pictures, they do have one important thing in common. In either case, the incentive for acting virtuously is not any worldly good that the virtuous person expects for Aristotle. The nobility of virtuous action is treated as an end in itself. Um, uh, so that no reward beyond that is needed from our serious whether one thinks of posthumous rewards or the desire for God's approval, there's no sense that the wages of virtue consistent, any material benefit. That's neither for Aristotle nor from our silly asses, the incentive to act rightly security, profit comfort or any other material good because of that. I think it's I'm going to use the term and I think it's fair to call the to both transcendent pictures of virtue in the sense that both rest on something higher than the desire for any worldly satisfaction, simply material and worldly satisfaction. Um and to repeat of Aristotle and marcellus regard this kind of transcendence as something essential for the flourishing of the political community. The importance of that distinction, I think will become clearer when we turn to thomas Hobbes. Yeah, in sharp contrast to Aristotle and marcellus stands the great english thinker, thomas Hobbes, He was an Englishman of the 17th century, and a staunch critic of Aristotle, as he put it succinctly in his leviathan, There's nothing so absurd that the old philosophers have, not, some of them maintained, and I believe that scares anything can be more absurdly said in natural science than that, which is now called Aristotle's metaphysics, nor more repugnant to government than much of what he had said in his politics, nor more ignorantly than a great part of his ethics. Um, I would go on, But after that, it gets kind of mean, 

[0:30:31 Speaker 1] uh 

[0:30:34 Speaker 0] moreover, he saw his work, he saw Hobbs, that he saw his own work as a possible replacement for Aristotle's in the university's going so far as to suggest explicitly that a sovereign would do well to take Plato's and Aristotle's books out of his schools and replace them with his own. At the same time, Hobbs is one of the key figures in the emergence of the liberal tradition. He was the first modern to announce that all human beings possessed certain pre political natural rights and that our obligations to the political community are contingent on it's protecting our interests. He thus anticipates the notion that governments are instituted among men in order to secure those basic natural rights. And therefore, although Hobbs himself was not a liberal, in fact, he preferred monarch. Ng is assertion of the existence of these rights makes him essential to establishing the conceptual framework out of which the american understanding of natural rights emerged. And for Hobbs, that teaching was associated with the belief that the only really necessary incentive for virtuous conduct, The expectation that by obeying the laws, we could expect to live more safely in the here and now. Okay, in his leviathan, Hobbes lays out a doctrine of duties in terms of what he calls the Natural law. Um They're all based upon the community's ability to provide something in return or the authority of the law. So the authority of the law is based on the community's ability to provide something in return for following them, namely the preservation of its citizens. Hobbs begins in his leviathan from the suggestion that we all possess a certain natural right to do whatever we can and use whatever tools we can find in the cause of our preservation that goes up to and includes using one another's bodies as tools. It's easy to imagine how dangerous that state of affairs would be if everyone behaves that way. The result is what Hobbes describes in the state of nature, a condition characterized by war of all against all, in which we constantly fear for our safety and where our lives are. In his famous phrase, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short, The primary purpose of the political community then is to make it possible to exit this horrible state and thus to live more peaceably and securely. But is this incentive this prod to the need for preservation enough to get to get people to act rightly once they've entered into society? Hob seems to think that it is and he tackles this problem in his leviathan, when he addresses the concerns of an individual whom he refers to as the fool. This fool Hobbs says, Hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice by that it doesn't mean that there's no idea or concept of justice. Even the fool grants that there are covenants and agreements and that breaking them maybe called unjust. But the fool quote, question is whether injustice taking away the fear of God for the same fool has said, there is no God may not sometimes stand with that reason which dictated to every man his own good, and particularly then when it conducive to such a benefit shall put man in a condition to neglect not only the displays and reviling, but also the power of other men translate that into simpler language. Hobbs Fool asks whether it's in the interest of an individual to act unjustly, and if it's not why he shouldn't. Hobbs replies to this by saying that this show called Fool makes a mistake. The mistake is not that he thinks it's more important to protect his own interest than to be just. It's rather that he fails to see that protecting his own interest necessarily entails acting justice as he puts it. He he therefore that break with his covenant and consequently declared with that he thinks he may with reason, do so, cannot be received into into any society that unite themselves for peace and defense, but by the error of them that received him, nor when he has received be retained in it without seeing the danger of their error. Uh Which errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security, and therefore, if he'd be left or cast out of society, he perished. And if you live in society, it is by the errors of other men, which he could not foresee nor reckon upon, and consequently, against the reason of his preservation. And so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, for bear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves. Sell Hobbes argues a prudent person, if he really cares for his safety, and really understand what's necessary to secure, it will act justly for the simple reason that he's not likely to get away with breaking the law for very long or failing to keep his agreements. The contrast then, with Aristotle and Marcel ius, the latter of whom let me remind you believe that people needed to be worried about God's judgment in order to remain just when others aren't watching should be clear, but in fact, Hobbs goes one step further than this. Not only does he regard this as the only incentive necessary for virtuous conduct, um but he regards the kind of virtue which more serious had endorsed, which looks to otherworldly rewards and punishments has something potentially politically dangerous. Right after the remarks just quoted, he takes up the question of those who might rebel from the community and the names of in the name of a higher law, and especially a divine law, he answers them in the following terms. There be some that proceed further and will not have the law of nature to be those rules which conduce to the preservation of man's life on earth, but to the attaining of an eternal Felicity after death, to which they think the breach of covenant may conduce and consequently be just and reasonable. Such are they that think it a work of merit to kill or depose or rebel against the sovereign power constituted over them by their own consent. Hobbs acknowledges the possibility that a concern with eternal Felicity after death might lead some individuals to rebel. From that point of view, the species of virtue recommended by Marsellus's would not only be unnecessary, but even something potentially harmful. Now, in the same breath, I should say the question, and Hobbs is a bit more complicated than that, since Hobbs also goes to great pains to show that his political teaching is in conformity with the christian teaching and in fact actively endorsed by it. So following, it should also redound to the benefit of our immortal soul. Nevertheless, he argues that there are dangers from paying too much attention to the afterlife. And there's no suggestion that being deeply concerned for happiness in the afterlife or possessing a keen sense that God is watching our actions is an essential component of a healthy political life. The virtue required of the citizen has a sufficient ground and the desire for self preservation alone. Now, of course, the liberal tradition does not end with Hobbs. I mean, I already said it doesn't begin with Hobbs either. Um what Hobbies suggests about the kind of morality to be practiced in political life is modified by some of his successors, his liberal successors in important ways. and I think it will be helpful to say just a little bit about that. Consider the writings of john mark and marty skill. They, unlike Hobbes, actually were liberals in the sense of defending liberal political institutions and the cause of freedom, but together with that, they also placed a much stronger emphasis on the government's role in protecting property, and expected that the majority of individuals would devote their lives above all to business. In other words, the government would look not only to the protection of life but also to the encouragement of commerce. This commercialism, as it turns out, is a key part of the american way of life. Hamilton and the Federalist papers speaks of the uh here, I quote, the industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce. But commercial life carried with it somewhat different expectations than those that Hobbs had relied upon. Whereas Hobbs focuses so strongly on a prudent regard for self preservation, um from Montesquieu for lock and for Hamilton to the great motives of liberal citizens, our freedom and the comfortable enjoyment of a peaceful, prosperous, worldly life. So at this point, I think it's fair to speak of two distinct modes of understanding virtue which have emerged, remain, repeat what I think the key points, both Aristotle and Marsellus's defend an understanding of virtue which transcends the expectation for any worldly material reward. Moreover, each suggests that it is possible. Okay, I'm sorry. Um each suggest that it is possible to recognize the need for this kind of virtue by looking only at what the health of the political community requires. Hobbs, on the other hand, suggests that the understanding of justice best suited to the needs of the political community is one which is directed towards goods and toward goods in this world. That is in which citizens recognize that the government supplies certain worldly goods, especially protection, and so they follow. They can be expected to follow the natural law out of prudence. And while Hobbs, great liberal successors couch their suggestions in different terms than he did, and even substantively depart from him and their emphasis on commerce and freedom. Still, it seems to me that they agree with him and giving worldly goods pride of place as the necessary incentive for virtuous action, and they treat such virtue as being adequate to the needs of the community. Having laid these out, then there's a simple alternative, which model is to be preferred. What is the case for taking either path? Hobbs, as I already mentioned, regards his mode of looking at virtue, not as the only thing politically necessary. Not only is what is uh politically necessary, but even is something politically cell. You Terry Montesquieu, when he describes the beneficial effects he expects commercial life to have goes a bit further than obstacle. He believes that prosperity encourages good tendencies among human beings that despite the fact that its outlook is somewhat more narrowly selfish, um but at the same time that it but at the same time it's also likely to make relations among people more peaceful and more humane. Through commerce. He says pure more has become gentler and barbara smores are polished and softened. Above all, commerce cures people of destructive prejudices eats away. In other words, that those inherited ideas with which we began this talk. Um and that change renders human beings more fully able to enjoy peace and liberty. But if Montesquieu was right about that, this way of life really does lead to more peaceful politics, then there's a strong moral case to be made for trying to transform society in accord with this new understanding of virtue. It's not simply an emancipation of man's desire for worldly goods that motivates Montesquieu, but a belief that it's possible to substance to, to substantively improve our political condition by affecting this change. And if that's true, then would it not be right to do everything possible to spur on his project? In fact, wouldn't precisely the most virtuous person, someone animated by compassion for other human beings regard this as a great service to humanity. I think that such a person would. But if that's the case, if that argument follows, how would Aristotle or marcellus respond, what positive contribution can they point to which the older idea of virtue makes to society? Of course, they couldn't have read Hobbes and Montesquieu, so we can only try to imagine what they might have said. And I would suggest that there is a two pronged reply which they might have made in the first place. I think that both Aristotle and more serious would assert that by confining our attention to worldly goods alone, we do not we don't do full justice to what we are as human beings, to our deepest hopes and desires as much as they may enjoy it. Human beings aren't of such a sort as to be truly satisfied by comfortable prosperity, and they're deeper needs and hopes are much better served by a commitment to some deeper cause, or a hope for happiness better than anything they can experience on earth. In short, they might say this new notion, this new and lower notion of virtue is untrue to who we are in taking this route, I should say, Aristotle and marcellus. Would it be an agreement with at least some of the late modern critics from the enlightenment? But as I said, that may be true, Um one may think that Aristotle captures our concerns as human beings more adequately than Hobbes and Montesquieu, or that he speaks to deeper human needs. But it could still be the case that a lower understanding of human virtue is better for political life. In other words, Grant at least, hypothetically, that the ancient account of human beings or the arrest, Italy and more Cillian account of human beings and what they are, reflects a better understanding of the human condition than what Hobbes and Montesquieu offer. Um and that by accepting this lowering of human ends in practice, the fact of our deepest hopes and desires becomes obscured. Still, the question has to be raised If that change brings peace and prosperity to more of the world, isn't the loss of some self knowledge a reasonable price to pay. And now let me come to what I take to be at least possibly the second part of the response that Marcellus and Aristotle might have made. They would reply, I think that this shift, in fact, does not leave to healthier politics. They spoke of the role of priests and turning our attention to transcendent goods not only as not only being useful but even necessary. In other words, I think they would deny the contention. Obs and Montesquieu, um that healthy political life can be built from such notions of virtue as they offer. Now, why, right at this point, I can't do anything more than venture a few possibilities. They might question whether Hobbs reply to the fool will really be enough to guarantee that men will not behave wickedly marcellus, Uh, you know, Yeah, marcellus. In his account of what it means to, in his account of the importance of a divine oversight for our virtues, had emphasized that it's important that people behave even when no one's looking and even when they're not going to get caught. Isn't that something which might redound to the cause, which might serve to benefit the cause of political peace? Um, Alternately, might one not wonder what people will do if they amassed great power. Um, after all, if they care only for securing worldly goods for themselves, what constraint is there to prevent them from using it to the great harm? Great disadvantage of others? And what is there to guarantee that at least some people will not become disproportionately powerful. Lastly, one might wonder whether liberal principles really provide sufficient support for that smallest essential community, the family. I know that by pointing to these questions, I don't come close to settling the issue. My main goal today has really been to open it up by showing what the two sides are and where the difference between them lies. But in conclusion, let me try to return to the beginning. As I said, we in the United States are not merely the product of liberal traditions, but pre liberal traditions as well. And it seems to me at least possible that one of America's great strengths lies in the presence in the persistence of those uh persistence of those traditions in a way which complements our liberal principles, inspiring us to act out of something greater than self interest. Of course, seeing that doesn't resolve us from the responsibility of thinking carefully about each and every one of those inherited ideas, trying to see whether they're doing more harm than good and trying to change them when we decide that they are. But it does suggest that we should not be closed to the possibility that they contribute something essential to the health of our society and that we should remain open to those parts of ourselves that look beyond simple material comfort. That's it. 

[0:48:24 Speaker 1] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Mhm, mm. Yeah. Yeah, mm hmm