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**Morality and Creativity Part 1**

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**Morality and Creativity Part 1**

**by**

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**Thesis**

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## **Dedication**

I dedicate this paper to my family, both given and chosen, who have tirelessly supported and motivated me during this process.

## **Acknowledgements**

“We are not going to be ethical. We are going to be creative, so we cannot worry about ethics or political correctness.” I have heard this phrase or some variation of it countless times while walking into brainstorming sessions as a creative copywriter in the advertising industry. And, every time, I have cringed, and I have questioned, “In order to be creative do you have to be unethical?” I returned to academia specifically to study this question, and so began my first, truly deep dive into research. Admittedly, I got lost down in the depths—multiple times.

If it were not for Dr. Robert Lewis, providing guidance that varied from topic refinement and survey structure to moral support and data analysis, I surely would have stayed lost. He pushed me to write in ways I have never considered and understood the struggle that can be for someone who writes for a living. He gave me time to figure things out on my own and took the time to explain minute details that otherwise would have remained a mystery to me.

If it were not for Dr. Gary Wilcox, I would never have approached Dr. Lewis about supervising my thesis. For this, I am incredibly grateful.

Dr. Minette Drumwright, thank you immensely for lending your keen editing eyes and brilliant mind on the topic of ethics. And, perhaps thank you even more for your patience in waiting for my drafts.

## **Abstract**

### **Morality and Creativity Part 1**

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Abstract: All too often, ethics are not only thrown out the window in creative brainstorming sessions but barred from entry under the guise that ethics stifle the creative process. A clear sense of ethics in line with those of mainstream society is considered a desirable characteristic (Amabile, 1988). Ethics may, however, have a negative effect on creativity—another desirable characteristic (Amabile, 1988). By integrating trait activation theory and recent literature in media psychology, the current study tests the effects of reading and assessing morally ambiguous (vs. clear) narrative resolutions on creative thinking via a divergent thinking test. Results show evidence consistent with the idea that trait creativity, when activated by morally clear story-resolutions, leads to greater performance on a divergent-thinking test, whereas trait creativity is unrelated to performance after exposure to morally ambiguous story-resolutions. So, while there may be positive associations between unethical behavior and creativity, the current study shows that not all activators of creativity are “dark.”

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## **I. Introduction**

While the value placed on creativity as a virtue varies across cultures, it is generally considered a constructive activity and is often connected with humor, altruism, positive well being, better mood, and resiliency (Beaussart, Andrews, & Kaufman, 2013). Creativity is critical in facilitating economic growth and social reform (e.g., novel protesting methods and unique slogans for social change; Florida, 2004; Zhou & Shalley, 2011) as well as performance enhancement and competitiveness (Amabile, 1988, 1996; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Zhou, 1998). Innovative businesses have a competitive edge over less innovative businesses (Afuah, 2009). Innovation and in turn creativity are central to the economic progress of society (Beaussart et al., 2013). Yet recent research has linked creativity to unethical behavior (Beaussart et al., 2013; Cropley, Kaufman, & Cropley, 2008; Gino & Ariely, 2012; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Mai, Ellis, & Welsh, 2015), which is also considered to be financially detrimental, resulting in the loss of trillions of US dollars annually (Beer, 2011).

The current paper furthers this topic by investigating whether witnessing moral clarity (vs. moral ambiguity) in narrative scenarios influences creativity. My rationale reveals competing hypotheses. On one side, research has shown that moral ambiguity might be associated with greater creativity. For example, creative minds primed with creative tasks are more likely to behave unethically (Mai et al., 2015), and reciprocally, dishonest activity is associated with enhanced creativity (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014).

Based on this logic, it seems that witnessing moral ambiguity may enhance divergent thinking, as it primes individuals to perceive gray areas of morality rather than hardened categories. However, there is equal reason to believe that witnessing moral ambiguity would *decrease* divergent thinking. The mental appraisals evoked by morally complex or ambiguous narratives may be mentally exerting and deplete cognitive resources necessary for divergent thinking to occur. Below I elaborate on these competing logics and present a study testing them. The next section discusses the manner in which I conceptualize moral ambiguity and moral clarity.

## II. Literature Review and Theoretical Background

### MORAL CLARITY VERSUS AMBIGUITY

Moral clarity and ambiguity are understood from a cognitive perspective in a manner consistent with dual-process models of moral judgment (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). This view sees moral judgments as resulting from either an intuitive or a deliberative appraisal process (e.g., Gibbs, 2014; Tamborini, 2011, 2012). Intuitive appraisals are heuristic or emotional in nature, wherein respondents rely on innate and universal *moral intuitions* posited by social-intuitionist understandings of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). However, when respondents judge actions in which moral intuitions are internally conflicting, the judgments become slower and more deliberative (Greene et al., 2004; Lewis, Tamborini, & Weber, 2014). This occurs when an individual must violate one moral intuition to adhere to another. In fictional narratives, this can be brought about by an unresolved moral dilemma or anti-hero story (Lewis, Tamborini, & Weber, 2014).

For example, consider the film *Taken* in which the good guy saves his daughter. This story is easily processed, because good prevails (i.e., it is morally clear). In the film *Titanic*, however, one of the main characters tragically dies while the antagonist lives and the movie ultimately ends ambiguously. This story is not as easily processed, because it is riddled with moral ambiguity (i.e., good does not prevail and stories are left unresolved). Therefore, moral clarity can be understood as situations that elicit easier, faster, and intuitive moral judgments as well as general agreement across diverse individuals. By

contrast, moral ambiguity elicits slower judgments due to the weighing of conflicting moral concerns, which is generally more cognitively effortful and generates disagreement between individuals.

## **CREATIVITY AND UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR**

Unethical behavior and creativity both require breaking at least some rules within a given domain (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014). In the case of unethicity, one must break social principles (e.g., dishonesty requires breaking the social principle that people should always tell the truth; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014). In the case of creativity, one must engage in divergent thinking, which requires breaking rules in a particular domain in order to construct new associations between seemingly disparate elements (Bailin, 1987; Guilford, 1950). The rule breaking required in both unethical behavior and creativity is also known as cognitive flexibility.

According to Mai, Ellis, & Welsh (2015), “Cognitive flexibility is defined as the ability of individuals to reconnect information and restructure knowledge in multiple ways depending on demands, and enables creative individuals to switch their approach to meet the needs of the situation at hand” (p. 77). Research has shown that having people think “outside of the box” (i.e., in a way that requires cognitive flexibility) can lead to more unethical behavior (Cropley, Kaufman, & Cropley, 2003; Gino & Ariely, 2012). As mentioned above, there is also research suggesting that behaving dishonestly can lead to an increase in creativity (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014).

Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) conducted five experiments in which respondents were given the opportunity to over-report their performance in an activity and were then given creative tasks to complete. In experiment 1, Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) found that those who were dishonest scored higher in the subsequent creative tasks than those who did not cheat, even when accounting for creative personality differences. Their experiments 2 and 3 confirmed using random assignment that dishonest behavior enhances creativity in subsequent creative tasks (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014). Gino & Wiltermuth's (2014) experiments 4 and 5 indicated the connection between creativity and dishonest behavior can be explained by an enhanced feeling of being unbound by rules.

Mai et al. (2015) expanded upon the current literature on the relationship of creative personality and unethical behavior by integrating trait activation theory. Trait activation theory suggests that personality traits or "dispositional variables" (e.g., creative personality) will more strongly predict trait-relevant outcomes such as behavior in contexts with trait-relevant situational cues (Tett & Burnett, 2003; Tett & Guterman, 2000; Mai, Ellis, & Welsh, 2015). In its original definition, cognitive flexibility is noted as a response to environmental stimuli (Scott, 1962). Since the expression of traits is dependent on external situational cues, this earlier definition lends cognitive flexibility to being appropriate for integrating with trait activation theory. Trait-relevant situations provide cues for expressing trait-relevant behavior (Tett & Guterman, 2000; Mai, Ellis, & Welsh, 2015). In fact, in order to elicit behavioral variance between creative and non-creative individuals, creative personality must be activated by using a creative task (Martindale, 1989). Mai et al. (2015) found that creative personality can encourage

unethical behavior, but that this effect is much stronger when activated by a creative task (Mai et al., 2015).

Borrowing the logic from these studies, it seems moral ambiguity would act as an activator for creativity and thus lead to higher scores on a divergent thinking task. On the other hand, there is also logic from other literatures to suggest that moral clarity may increase creativity and, equally likely, moral ambiguity may decrease creativity. There is evidence that witnessing moral clarity is a more intuitive and enjoyable activity (Lewis, Tamborini, & Weber, 2014), and some scholars even argue this type of enjoyment can be likened to a form of *flow* (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Sherry, 2004). Such feelings of perceptual fluency are known to aid memory storage and retrieval processes in subsequent tasks (Macrae, Duffy, Miles, & Lawrence, 2008; Marsh, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009; Ravizza, 2003). This effect would be helpful in divergent thinking, where mental effort is used to realize alternative, unintended, or novel applications of older elements. Additionally, moral ambiguity may drain the mental resources necessary for divergent thinking.

## **MORAL AMBIGUITY AND EGO DEPLETION**

Richards Lewis et al. (2014) found that appraising morally ambiguous scenarios is a more deliberative task than appraising morally clear scenarios by comparing appraisal speeds for these two types of content. There is also evidence that deliberative tasks exhaust mental resources from the ego-depletion literature (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998).



Ego depletion is based on the theory that acts of volition (e.g., self regulation, choice, active response, etc.) draw on a common, limited inner resource akin to energy or strength (Baumeister et al., 1998). One act of volition depletes the supply of an inner limited resource and has detrimental effects on a subsequent volition (Baumeister et al., 1998). Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998) through a series of four studies have shown ego depletion occurs across wide gaps of irrelevance. For example, if a person actively limits her consumption of a particular food, she is more likely to give up on a complex puzzle more quickly than they otherwise would have had she not spent the day limiting her consumption of that particular food (Baumeister et al., 1998).

Assessments or judgments of complex stimuli are inherently rooted in choice, an act of volition, making them a source for ego depletion. By having respondents assess morally ambiguous scenarios, I will be requiring them to put forth more effort in an act of volition (i.e., a judgment that is more cognitively taxing due to moral ambiguity), making morally ambiguous assessments a potentially great source for ego depletion whereas moral clarity should not drain mental resources. As creativity is often thought of as the coming together of two seemingly disparate ideas to create something new or to solve a problem (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014), it is understandable that creativity assessments often focus on divergent thinking abilities, where the majority of responses will be the result of these connections. Being creative in that way requires mental resources. If previously witnessing morally ambiguous scenarios has exhausted mental resources, it stands to reason performance on a divergent thinking task would be hampered.

## **RATIONALE**


Following the logic presented above, it is reasonable to assume moral ambiguity would act as a activator for trait creativity. However, assessing morally ambiguous scenarios may lead to ego depletion, thus decreasing creative output in a creative task (Baumeister et al., 1998). It is also equally likely that moral clarity (vs. ambiguity) would act as a trait activator for creativity, since moral clarity may lead to a form of *flow* (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Sherry, 2004), which aides in memory storage and retrieval processes (Macrae, Duffy, Miles, & Lawrence, 2008; Marsh, Richardson, & Shmidt, 2009; Ravizza, 2003). In the face of these competing logics, I pose two research questions:

RQ1: How are exposure to moral ambiguity and clarity in narratives related to subsequent performance on a divergent thinking task?

RQ2: Does trait creativity moderate the effect of clarity-ambiguity on divergent thinking?

Figure 1 presents the potential outcomes of these competing logics

**Figure 1.** Potential results.



*Figure 1.* This figure illustrates all logically foreseeable results of the effects of exposure to moral clarity (vs. ambiguity) on high (red) compared to low (blue) trait creative personalities. When it is anticipated that the same results will be seen for both personalities, they are represented in green. Clear refers to exposure to moral clarity in narratives, and ambiguous refers to exposure to moral ambiguity in narratives. Panels A and C to the left represent the competing logics for the main effect of moral clarity-ambiguity on fluency in the divergent thinking task. Panels B and D on the right represent these competing logics as well, but including ambiguity as a trait activator (Panel B) versus clarity as a trait activator (Panel D).

### **III. Method**

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

Participants were recruited from the Advertising Participant Pool of the Stan Richards School of Advertising and Public Relations at the University of Texas at Austin,  $N = 341$ . The convenience sample consisted of a female majority,  $n = 269$ , with a mean age of,  $M = 19.80$ ,  $SD = 1.55$ .

#### **DESIGN AND PROCEDURE**

The experiment was conducted online. After anonymously giving consent, participants were first asked to complete the Gough creative-personality scale. Subsequently, participants read and rated three stories, which consisted of moral dilemmas that were either resolved (morally clear) or not resolved (morally ambiguous) in the storyline resolution depending on an individual participant's assigned condition. Participants were split into the two conditions, with  $n = 187$  in the morally ambiguous condition and  $n = 154$  in the morally clear condition. See appendix for these stimulus materials. Participants rated each scenario using Oliver and Bartsch's (2010) narrative appraisal scales that measure narrative enjoyment as well as appreciation. After reading and rating the stories, participants completed the divergent thinking task described below. Demographics were collected on the final screen.

## **STIMULI**

Stimuli were adopted from Lewis et al. (2014), and consisted of three short narrative scenarios each with two alternative endings. The scenarios were entitled *Amelia's Justice*, *Courtroom Drama*, and *Saving Civilians* (see Appendix). Each scenario had one of two types of endings (labeled *morally ambiguous* and *morally clear*). Either the scenario ended in a morally clear way (morally clear condition), or the scenario ended in a morally ambiguous way (morally ambiguous condition).

## **MEASURES**

### **Creative Personality Assessment**

The Gough personality scale was used to assess participants' self-report trait creativity, a method used in previous research on creativity and its relationship to unethical behavior (Mai et al., 2015). The Gough personality scale was designed to determine a person's creative potential (Gough, 1979). The measure uses a checklist of 30 adjectives respondents must select if applicable to their personalities. There are 18 positive adjectives and 12 negative adjectives. Some of the positive adjectives are *clever*, *inventive*, *humorous*, *individualistic*, *insightful*, and *unconventional*. Some of the negative adjectives are *artificial*, *commonplace*, *cautious*, *submissive*, *narrow interests*, and *honest*. To compute a composite score, participants received a point for each positive adjective selected and lost a point for each negative adjective they selected.

## **Appraisals**

Participants rated each of the three scenarios they read on enjoyment and appreciation using two 3-item scales (see Oliver & Bartsch, 2010 for scale validation). Both measures use a 7-point Likert-type response scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Reliabilities were computed for enjoyment and appreciation for each of the three narrative scenarios. They ranged from,  $\alpha = .84$ , to,  $\alpha = .89$ .

## **Creative Exercise**

As a measure of divergent thinking, respondents were asked to come up with as many uses for six random objects as possible (i.e. alternative uses test; Wilson, Christensen, Merrifield, & Guilford, 1960). The objects were: brick, tire, pencil, shoe, and hanger. Participants completed them all in the same order, starting with brick and ending with hanger. Respondents were given two minutes to list as many uses as possible for each object. A timer was present in the corner of the screen. When the timer ran out, their browsers were redirected to a transition screen before beginning the next object. Divergent thinking was operationalized as fluency in the task. The number of uses listed by the participants was counted for each object and served as the outcome variable. This scoring component is referred to as *fluency* (Wilson et al., 1960).

## IV: Results

To examine my research questions, I ran separate ANCOVAs on all the objects in the divergent thinking task with condition serving as a between-subjects factor, trait creativity as a covariate, and an interaction between condition and trait creativity (see Table 1). Significant differences were not observed for condition on any object, but an interaction between trait creativity and condition was present for the first object on the list (brick). The interaction pattern suggests that whereas moral clarity was associated with greater fluency in the divergent thinking task than ambiguity, this difference was only present for those higher on trait creativity. Those lower on creativity saw no detectable effect or even a small (non-significant), negative effect. Including enjoyment and appreciation ratings in the ANCOVAs did not alter the results. Appreciation levels were similar for both clear,  $M = 4.66$ ,  $SD = 1.21$ , and ambiguous conditions,  $M = 4.65$ ,  $SD = 1.38$ . By contrast, enjoyment levels were much higher for the clear,  $M = 3.30$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ , than for the ambiguous condition,  $M = 1.77$ ,  $SD = .92$ ,  $t(339) = 13.35$ ,  $p < .001$ .

Table 1

*ANCOVAs for each dependent variable*

<i>Variable</i>		<i>F</i>	<i>Partial eta squared</i>	<i>p</i>
Brick	Condition	.30	.00	.59
	Gough*	4.27	.01	.04
	Condition x Gough*	4.78	.01	.03
	Corrected Model*			.03
Tire	Condition	1.73	.01	.19
	Gough*	9.63	.03	.00
	Condition x Gough	1.23	.00	.27
	Corrected Model*			.00
Barrel	Condition	.00	.00	.99
	Gough*	5.77	.02	.02
	Condition x Gough	.17	.00	.68
	Corrected Model			.12
Pencil	Condition	.23	.00	.63
	Gough*	4.74	.01	.03
	Condition x Gough	.00	.00	.98
	Corrected Model			.17
Shoe	Condition	.31	.00	.58
	Gough*	9.80	.03	.00
	Condition x Gough	.98	.00	.32
	Corrected Model*			.01
Hanger	Condition	3.33	.01	.07
	Gough	2.07	.01	.15
	Condition x Gough	.20	.00	.65
	Corrected Model*			.04



Table 2

*Descriptive Statistics for each dependent variable*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Condition</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
Brick	1	6.36	3.62
	2	6.70	4.17
	Total	6.51	3.88
Tire	1	5.22	2.81
	2	6.06	3.91
	Total	5.60	3.38
Barrel	1	5.25	3.05
	2	5.36	3.60
	Total	5.30	3.30
Pencil	1	5.14	2.96
	2	5.36	3.60
	Total	5.24	3.26
Shoe	1	4.95	2.98
	2	5.42	3.62
	Total	5.16	3.29
Hanger	1	4.09	2.69
	2	4.90	3.24
	Total	4.46	2.98

## V. Discussion

This study was designed to assess how moral ambiguity (vs. clarity) affects performance on a task that measures creativity in terms of divergent thinking. Through the current study, I found that exposure to moral clarity in narratives increased creativity in individuals with high trait creativity.

Following the logic of the existing research on unethicity and creativity, I anticipated exposure to moral ambiguity in narratives would enhance creativity. Just as unethicity and creativity break the rules in one or more domains, moral ambiguity breaks some intuitions in order to adhere to others (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Lewis et al., 2014). However, presumably due to the effects of ego depletion on cognitive ability (Baumeister et al., 1998), exposure to moral ambiguity did not have a positive effect on creativity in the current study. Exposure to moral clarity on the other hand may have created a *flow* that aided perceptual fluency and in turn aided memory storage and retrieval processes, as has been shown in other research (Macrae, Duffy, Miles, & Lawrence, 2008; Marsh et al., 2009; Ravizza, 2003), explaining the increase in creativity seen in the current study.

While research has shown unethical behavior activates trait creativity (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014), so may moral clarity. Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) found that unethical behavior enhances creativity by triggering rule breaking, a necessary element of creativity itself. Mai et al. (2015) found that a creative activity increases the likelihood that a creative person would behave unethically because it activates the creativity

necessary to make unethical justifications for breaking the rules. Moral clarity may also act as a trait activator for trait creativity, because it brings people into a state of perceptual fluency in which the brain is primed to go into giving intuitive responses. This intuitive mode of thinking carries on into subsequent tasks and in the case of this study allows individuals with high trait creativity to let their creativity flow. In this state of cognitive fluency, people do not overthink their responses and simply respond.

## **LIMITATIONS**

The current study had at least three limitations. First, in order to get a fuller picture of respondents' creativity in the divergent thinking test, the results would need to be coded in several different ways. These include *originality*, *detail* (elaboration), and *number of categories* (flexibility) in addition to the raw number of responses (*fluency*) that I conducted here. However, I lacked the resources to hire and train third-party coders for originality, elaboration, and flexibility who were naïve to conditions and expectations. The coders would need to be completely naïve to the hypotheses, and the training for this type of analysis would take weeks of trial and error.

It would be interesting to see if the results of this study would be consistent using all four scoring components (i.e., originality, detail, flexibility, and fluency). For example, not using all four scoring components also leaves me wondering if moral ambiguity has opposite effects on different dimensions of creativity. I found positive effects of moral clarity on fluency in the divergent thinking task, but one might imagine moral clarity (vs. ambiguity) would have negative effects on, say, originality in the task. I

introduced logic in the introduction suggesting that moral ambiguity primes people to see gray areas rather than hardened categories, and that such feelings may make individuals feel unbound by rules (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014). Perhaps this process is mentally tiring, and so it drains cognitive resources necessary for the participants' fluency in the task, but at the same time enhances originality in the task.

The second limitation regards the sample for this study, which was a convenience sample of largely homogenous, mostly female university students. This is a common limitation. Although important because one cannot generalize these findings to, say, children, other cultures, or older adults, the fact that the mechanisms involved are basic cognitive processes (i.e., cognitive exertion and trait activation), one may have some confidence that these effects generalize at least more broadly than the sample used in this study.

A third limitation is that there is no offset control condition in the study. As such, it is impossible to tell whether (a) moral clarity is having a positive effect, (b) moral ambiguity is having a negative effect, or (c) some combination of those two. However, what would an offset control condition look like for this study? You could eliminate any task whatsoever, but we would not be able to know what psychological state individuals were in (i.e., whether they had been exposed to intuitive or non-intuitive thinking prior to the task), so we would not be able to interpret their results.

## **CONCLUSION**

Much research has focused on the dark side of creativity (Beaussart et al., 2013; Cropley et al., 2008; Gino & Ariely, 2012; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Mai et al., 2015;). Creativity has been shown to be linked with unethical behavior and dishonesty (Gino & Ariely, 2012; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Mai et al., 2015), terrorism and crime (Cropley et al., 2008), and a lack of integrity (Beaussart et al., 2013). This existing research may lead people to believe that creative individuals are less likely to be ethical. However, the current study shows that moral clarity does enhance some aspects of creativity. It seems that moral clarity engages a system of thinking that is so intuitive to creative individuals that they enter into a state of perceptual fluency and subsequently perform better on the divergent thinking task. While creativity lends individuals the ability to reasonably break the rules and this rule breaking enhances creativity, this study shows that not all activators for creativity are “dark.”

## **Appendix**

### **STIMULI**

The stimuli were adopted from Lewis et al. (2014), in which there were 12 narratives, each having either a morally clear or morally ambiguous ending.

#### **Amelia's Justice**

Amelia was always a happy child. One day when she was 8 years old, she stopped speaking. Her father Kenneth finds out that she stopped speaking because their neighbor raped her, and now she is traumatized with fear. Unfortunately there is not enough evidence to convict him of the rape. A few weeks later, Kenneth is at a restaurant with his friend and they see the neighbor. They quickly leave because they are so upset. The next day they find out that the neighbor is in trouble for a murder that took place at the exact time they saw him at the restaurant. Even though Kenneth and his friend knew he didn't commit the murder, they really want to see him get what he deserves for the time he raped their daughter.

Morally clear condition ending: Luckily, the police find out everything and the neighbor is eventually put in prison.

Morally ambiguous condition ending: Sadly, the neighbor is still free because Kenneth will not lie.

## **Courtroom Drama**

Set in the early 1990s, Bobby is an assistant District Attorney in Mississippi. He discovers evidence that would convict a white supremacist who murdered a black civil rights leader. Without this evidence, the supremacist would be freed by a racist jury. The jury seems to be willing to convict if Bobby would show the new evidence. Bobby knows that pursuing the case would destroy his father's family business and put him in danger from being killed by local KKK members.

Morally clear condition ending: In the end, Bobby pursued the case and sent the supremacist to prison, standing up to the KKK.

Morally ambiguous condition ending: In the end, Bobby sent the supremacist to prison, but his father was badly injured by the KKK.

## **Saving Civilians**

Enemy soldiers have taken over Ava's village. They have orders to kill all remaining civilians. Ava and some of her townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a large house. Outside she hears the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables. Her baby begins to cry loudly. She covers his mouth to block the sound. If she removes her hand from his mouth his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill her, her child, and the others hiding out in the cellar.

Morally clear condition ending. In the end, Ava comforts and quiets the baby so the group is saved.

Morally ambiguous condition ending: In the end, Ava is forced to suffocate the baby to save the group.



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