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From Winckelmann to Wilde: Masculinity and the Historical Poetics of Nineteenth-Century British Hellenism

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by

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Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2018

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to us. There *is* no ‘them.’

Acknowledgements

As with any work of scholarship, what follows is only glimpsed from the shoulders of giants who have preceded me. Without the work of Richard Jenkyns and Frank Turner, of Yopie Prins and Nirmal Puwar, of Donna Haraway and of a number of other scholars whose work on British Hellenism and feminist philosophy precedes my own, this dissertation could not have been written. Without the strength, anger, and dedication of generations of feminist thinkers and activists, very much including my parents, this dissertation would not have been worth writing. Additionally, without the hard work of my dissertation co-chairs, Hannah Wojciehowski and Neville Hoad, and the careful attention of my dissertation committee, Carol MacKay, Josh King and Samuel Baker, it would not be worth reading. My heartfelt thanks also go out to my family, and especially my spouse, Stephanie Spitzer-Hanks. My loved ones have given me the kind of support without which I could not have survived graduate school, nor the experience of writing a dissertation.

From Winckelmann to Wilde: Masculinity and the Historical Poetics of Nineteenth-Century British Hellenism

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2018

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This dissertation is a survey of nineteenth-century British Hellenism in texts authored between 1768 and 1895 by elite, bourgeois, and working-class people both female and male. Beginning in 18th-century Germany, the dissertation tracks the influence of Johann Joachim Winckelmann on nineteenth-century British Hellenism, asserting that there is a characteristic cluster of representational attributes visible in British Hellenist texts that display a shared ideological emphasis. Winckelmann, who rose from humble beginnings to become the Vatican's prefect of antiquities, bequeathed a systematic art-historical approach to classical Greek art that became an idealist discourse of British Greekness through the influence of the annual lectures given by Sir Joshua Reynolds, founding president of the Royal Academy of Art, to students between 1768 and 1792. Posthumously the 'Grand Style' aesthetics Reynolds promulgated became highly politicized, its influence clear in the debates surrounding the parliamentary purchase of the Parthenon Marbles from Lord Elgin in 1816, in the poetry, prose, art and architecture of the 1820s and 1830s, in specific exhibits at the Great Exhibition of 1851, in the anthropological debates touched off by Darwin's *Origins of Species* after 1859, and in Oscar Wilde's *fin-de-siécle* advocacy of Dress Reform and his reformed, Reynoldsian aesthetic idealism. Particularly during Oscar Wilde's 1895 trials, the political valence of

nineteenth-century British Hellenism is inescapable, being explicitly enunciated in Wilde's famous "The Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name" speech, but I argue throughout that nineteenth-century British Hellenism tends to create 'enfigurations' of subjectivity that constrain those who adopt them through insistent reference to an ideal subjectivity that is embodied in white, abled, elite, heterosexual male bodies resembling those found in classical Greek art. Thus I show that while the political valence of nineteenth-century British Hellenism could be contested, the terms of the debate remained fixed around an unmarked yet hypervisible central term, which fixity acted to foreclose radical political change throughout the nineteenth century, and particularly in the 1890s, when British sexological debates made the figure of the modern male homosexual visible at the same time that campaigns for tolerance of homosexuality were energetically quashed.

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Introduction: Toward a Semiotic Phenomenology of British Greekness

Being is said in many ways.

Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

In the autumn of 1821, less than a year before his death by drowning, Percy Bysshe Shelley's *Hellas* was published. A verse drama written to help finance the Greek War of Independence and inspired by the Shelleys' friendship with Alexander Mavrocordatos, leader of the Greek resistance, the brief preface to the poet's retelling of Aeschylus' *Persae* is the source of an oft-quoted aphorism: "We are all Greeks" (viii).[1] Shelley uses this famous phrase to underscore his argument that, because ancient Greece is the wellspring of European culture, Europe should come to the aid of modern Greece in its struggle for independence from the Ottoman empire, which in the preface to *Hellas* takes the place of Aeschylus' original Persian opponent. Indeed, for Shelley, Greek resistance is part of a pan-European revolutionary moment: the Spanish peninsula is already "free," says Shelley, and "[T]he world waits only the news of a revolution of Germany to see the tyrants who have pinnacled themselves on its supineness precipitated into the ruin from which they shall never arise" (x). By telling his reader that "We are all Greeks," Shelley is trying to bring his readers into the same affective relation that he feels with the struggle for Greek independence, and with the specific image of Greekness he is presenting. This dissertation

[1] For more on the relationship between the Shelleys and Mavrocordatos, and the propagandistic purpose of *Hellas*, see L.M. Findlay's "'We Are All Greeks': Shelley's *Hellas* and Romantic Nationalism" (1993).

will examine similar expressions of this affective relation to Greekness across the long nineteenth century, asking why they were so common in nineteenth-century Britain, and how they led to an identification of Britain with classical Greece, specifically Periclean Athens. It will do so by analyzing the way specific authors, sculptors, speakers, journalists, and painters made repetitive, motivated use of representational tropes to engender this affective relation in others.

When we place "We are all Greeks" in its surrounding text, some of the details of this affective relation and of its presentation immediately begin to emerge:

> We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts, have their root in Greece. But for Greece - Rome, the instructor, the conqueror, or the metropolis of our ancestors, would have spread no illumination with her arms, and we might still have been savages and idolaters; or, what is worse, might have arrived at such a stagnant and miserable state of social institution as China and Japan possess.
>
> The human form and the human mind attained such a perfection in Greece which has impressed its image on those faultless productions, whose very fragments are the despair of modern art, and has propagated impulses which cannot cease, through a thousand channels of manifest or imperceptible operation, to ennoble and delight mankind until the extinction of the race. (viii-ix)

Here we are "all Greeks," but 'we' occupy that advanced position in specific contrast to the degenerate social institutions of the Chinese and Japanese, so to explicate Shelley's argument as he intended it to function in a larger rhetorical schema necessitates a shift from an inclusive to an exclusive notion of polity. In the passage quoted above and in the preface to *Hellas* generally, Shelley is imagining 'European culture' as an array of individual capacities and social practices rooted in a Greek tradition of liberal arts and religion, spread by imperial Rome, which over time has produced a polity differentiated from other, lesser

polities by kind. Shelley's is a typological argument and it is important to him that the Greeks attained "such a perfection" – a specific, special kind of intellectual and corporeal status from which "we" derive our own – because this "perfection" stands in contradistinction to the degeneracy that characterizes "savages," "idolaters," Chinese people, and Japanese people.

While Shelley is responding to a specific historical event, the Greek War of Independence, and the Ottoman Empire plays a role in European geopolitics in the first half of the nineteenth century that I will describe in more detail in later chapters, I will show in this dissertation that repudiatory ethnic nationalism is a component of British Greekness throughout the nineteenth century. This rhetorical orientation towards ethnic and national Others might easily be taken 'as read,' Shelley's enunciation of nineteenth-century racialism no worse than something Carlyle, Kipling or Kingsley could have said, and thus no more remarkable. This is precisely my point. There are in fact numerous examples of British ethno-nationalism almost identical to Shelley's over the long nineteenth century, and much of the first chapter of this dissertation will be spent in explaining why, by 1821, this statement could be interpreted as Shelley intended. This is an important task in part because we seldom consider the complexity of nineteenth-century Hellenism's political context, less so its role in codifying and commodifying a typology of whiteness and masculinity that remains central to modern ideologies of nationhood in the United States, in Britain, and elsewhere, and rely instead on commonplace interpretations of Greek antiquity as they have been handed down to us – often from nineteenth-century Anglophone sources. However, the ubiquity of similar assertions of British Greekness

during their period of maximum rhetorical utility, and even the 'expected' nature of their latter-day critique, is precisely why such statements are interesting and important. Simply put, Britain's nineteenth-century fascination with ancient Greece remains worth analyzing because the affective relations that fascination inspired and the ways they were expressed still matter in the ongoing operations of our daily existence.

In addition to my interest in nineteenth-century British Hellenism and its archive, I believe, and will argue in this dissertation, that we understand 'the ongoing operations of our daily existence' as a struggle to achieve full personhood as defined in a given social setting. Social scientists would characterize this struggle as the individual's felt experience of agential constraint by social structures, and in part this project uses a literary-critical apparatus to deepen our understanding of how an embodied, individual experience of social constraint felt in its nineteenth-century British context, and what 'full personhood' might have meant to nineteenth-century Britons in the context of what I will call 'British Greekness.' Literature can be a source of semiotic *and* phenomenological data about people and the ways they experienced their world, and in this dissertation I will argue that there is always found in the post-Enlightenment models of the subject I examine an underlying, fundamentally tensive intrapersonal dynamic that is both the wellspring of subjectivity and the challenge of subjectivity's daily accomplishment. As the example from Shelley demonstrates, this dynamic is implicitly associated with masculinity; in his comments on 'mankind' Shelley mentions law, literature, religion, and the arts as his proofs of Grecian influence, and while I will show in the second chapter that women were writing and reading women-authored texts about British Hellenism by the 1820s, the arts, law and religion

remained largely male-dominated domains in the nineteenth century. While Shelley's bluff confidence in both Greek superiority and impending European revolution is seductive, the tensive quality I am assigning to Enlightenment subjectivity is visible in Shelley's imagining of Greekness, too, as physical and intellectual perfection resulting from a spiritualized, self-disciplinary praxis.

Through an examination of historical events and of texts closely associated with nineteenth-century British Hellenism, this dissertation will furnish important details about how masculine embodiment and ideal masculinity were imagined and described in the long nineteenth century in Britain, attending in particular to the internal tensions that characterize concepts of ideal embodiment in the period, the purpose being to offer cogent suggestions as to why highly similar physical and intellectual ideals still play such an outsized role in imagining hegemonic masculinity today.[2] These details may be useful both to feminist analyses of the nineteenth century and to those of our own time, and my hope is that the project will fit well within a critical corpus I admire deeply. My approach to nineteenth-century British Hellenism relates historical events to contemporary texts displaying a specific cluster of formal and thematic attributes; these attributes relate to a

[2] 'Hegemony' remains a difficult critical concept to define and thus to use. Here I use 'hegemonic' to refer to the quality of being emblematic of a 'hegemony,' which I follow the Gramsci of the *Prison Notebooks* in understanding as "the creation of a *Weltanschauung*" by a ruling class for the purpose of exerting ideological control over ruled classes (Gramsci 1966: 7). However, I will also use the term in relation to its Greek root word – *haegemonia* – which refers to the political, economic, or military dominance of one state over others. Hegemony can thus be understood as (1) an ideological formation, as (2) a political relationship between nation-states, and as (3) an individual state of being drawing its characteristics and social influence from closely-related ideological and political discourses. 'Hegemonic masculinity' traverses these three aspects of hegemony, being a type of performative masculinity that expresses an ideology of masculine supremacy, one that has played structural role in nation-building, as I will show in later chapters, and which ideology informs individual habitus.

typology of ideal masculinity and its immanent relation to an ideology of British Greekness, and I take this approach in order to ask questions about literary-critical praxis and about the material and textual conditions that shaped nineteenth-century British Hellenism. 'Nineteenth-century British Hellenism' is in this project an ongoing representational tradition sustained by a metanarrative about the interrelations between classical Greece and nineteenth-century Britain, and I will show that this metanarrative is also applied to the interrelations between dominant and subjugated identities over the course of a busy century characterized by rapid, sometimes sudden change, both political and environmental. Because I am primarily interested in how nineteenth-century people applied classical learning to questions of individual embodiment and national identity, I do not discuss the philological and archaeological developments occurring in Britain during the nineteenth century. Even in the first chapter's discussion of the 'father of archaeology,' Johann Joachim Winckelmann, my interest is not in his information but in the metanarrative that information supports. As I will discuss in the next section, this emphasis on metanarrative is in keeping with the scholarly conversation in which I am situating this project.

THE POETICS OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH HELLENISM: THE CORPOREAL CORPUS

The scholarly conversation this dissertation takes part in begins its modern phase in 1980, with the publication of Richard Jenkyns' *The Victorians and Ancient Greece*, and with the publication of Frank Turner's *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain* in 1981, both of which I will discuss momentarily. Generally I will describe the larger scholarly

conversation about nineteenth-century British Hellenism as a shift from focusing on the thoughts and actions of elite men in the 1980s, towards a focus on questions about their sexuality in the 1990s, which focus intensifies and widens in the 2000s to include more and more of the nineteenth century, and a wider variety of the people that lived during that time. Before 1980, the study of Victorian Hellenism was largely treated as a relatively unproblematic inquiry into a commonplace aspect of British culture, though due to considerations of space I will only offer one example. In David DeLaura's *Hebrew and Hellene in Victorian England: Newman, Arnold, and Pater* (1969), the Hellenism of Arnold and Pater is as much a synthesis of Newman's religious orthodoxy and open-minded humanism with each man's artistic preoccupations as it is a vital aspect of their engagement with their wider culture, and the specific contents of Arnold's and Pater's Hellenism are not discussed at length. Where DeLaura discusses secularism and religiosity he usually does so in those terms, seldom treating the Hellenist content of either term as an object of inquiry in its own right. One exception lies in the ten pages he spends on "The Hellenism of Arnold and Pater" (171-181) and the subsequent ten pages on the sources of their Hellenism (181-191), which together provide an excellent overview of the mid-century English reception of German Hellenism, but their length and placement in DeLaura's book show their non-foundational importance to the larger project. In general, DeLaura's interest is in English literature and his attention specifically on the three literary figures of his title *qua* English literature. In a characteristic moment, we see how the social impact of Hellenism is misrecognized as almost completely internal to Arnold's subjectivity: "[A]t bottom, Arnold's Hellenism is cautious, and ultimately balanced, first,

because of his uninterrupted involvement with Christianity in the sixties, and second, because his attitude is a unique blend of rationalization and reconciliation" (172).

While DeLaura's point is interesting, there is an unacknowledged aporia here that a more thoroughgoing attention to historical context can dispel. Hellenism was an important aspect of Arnold's social existence, marking everything from the architecture of the buildings that surrounded him at Oxford to the reformed pedagogy his father instituted at Rugby, which would have formed the focus of his own and of most other English public school boys' education after the 1840s.[3] Is it not possible, or even likely, that what DeLaura calls Matthew Arnold's "unique blend of rationalization and reconciliation" was in fact a learned behavior inextricably tied to his classical education and thus to the historico-cultural context that make it possible to recognize and describe such a 'unique' blend? In Pater's case, too, DeLaura misses the structural importance of Hellenism to the author's thought, describing Pater's "Winckelmann" as a work "the central problem" of which is "how to create an art that preserves "the sense of freedom" (which Pater associates with "Hellenic humanism") while remaining aware that "The chief factor in the thoughts of the modern mind concerning itself is the intricacy, the universality of natural law even in the moral order" (Pater *Renaissance* 205, quoted in DeLaura 175). As I will demonstrate in my own reading of Pater's "Winckelmann" in the third chapter, this is deeply inadequate and describes neither the stakes of Pater's argument, the specific kind of "freedom" Pater was referring to, nor its foundation in Goethe's reception of Winckelmann's reception of

[3] For Thomas Arnold's view of the pedagogical utility of a classical education see "The Use of the Classics" (1834), while Jenkyns (1980) gives a useful overview of their effect in the first section of his fourth chapter, 'The Established Order' (60-67).

classical Greece. While DeLaura's work remains interesting and useful as an account of the interpersonal and artistic relations between Newman, Pater, and Arnold, its inattention to how British Hellenism was structurally imbricated in each man's life and its disinterest in the intersection of social mores and artistic proclivities in those lives, particularly in Pater's case, marks it as a work whose social conservatism impinges on its descriptive power.

Richard Jenkyns' *The Victorians and Ancient Greece* (1980) and Frank Turner's *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain* (1981) both take a very different tack from DeLaura. No longer works of literary criticism in a traditional sense, both Turner's and Jenkyns' are works of staggering erudition and scope, and like Shelley, Jenkyns reflects on the purpose of writing his text in his preface. While in the 1960s it was still possible to receive "what was in essence a Victorian classical education" and thus to understand "how part of a Victorian gentleman's mind was furnished," Jenkyns writes that now "there can be very few schools that still use the old system, perhaps none," and echoes Lytton Strachey in arguing that our increasing ignorance of the Victorian past has made it possible for us to begin to write its history (ix-x).[4] Jenkyns does so via an attention to common themes in order "to lower the barriers between literary criticism, art history, the history of ideas, and so forth" (ibid), and he fits his thematic survey of British Hellenism between 1832 and 1914 into chapters with names like "Homer and the Homeric Ideal," "Plato," "Self-

[4] Strachey comments in his introduction to *Eminent Victorians* (1918) that "The history of the Victorian Age will never be written; we know too much about it. For ignorance is the first requisite of the historian—ignorance, which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits, with a placid perfection unattainable by the highest art" (1).

Consciousness" and "George Eliot and the Greeks." A plangent tone marks Jenkyns' attitude towards his subject; he writes that Matthew Arnold's "simple trust" in cultural progress "is no longer so easy to come by" and widespread interest in Greek art and literature flagging (346), his purpose in studying the Victorian attitude towards Ancient Greece to enliven interest afresh and to place the scholarly study of Victorian classical reception on a firmer footing.

Turner's synoptic project is similar to Jenkyns', although Turner does not deal with questions of reception as Jenkyns does. Commenting that Jenkyns and his predecessors "concentrate primarily on the relationship of antiquity to English literature," Turner writes that his own purpose is "to explore Victorian commentary on antiquity as a means of more fully understanding Victorian intellectual life itself," necessarily making nineteenth-century British Hellenism and Victorian politics central and explicit concerns (xi-xii). Chapters with titles like "Varieties of Victorian Humanistic Hellenism," "The Debate over the Athenian Constitution" and "The Victorian Platonic Revival" organize Turner's reception history around points of contention that were important to Victorians and remain important both to Victorian intellectual history and to a history of English-language classical reception, and I hope to synthesize his attention to politics with Jenkyns' more aesthetic focus in blending historical poetics and enfiguration theory, both of which I will explain in detail below. Where Jenkyns wants to revive the study of the classics *and* to make the Victorian study of the classics its own object of inquiry, Turner treats Victorian study of the classics as a reflexive endeavor:

> Throughout the century both the conservative and the progressive tendencies within the Victorian exploration of the Greek heritage were closely related to events and developments in the world outside classical scholarship. The rediscovery of the Greek heritage by British intellectuals in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries coincided, and not accidentally so, with the vast transformations being wrought by those myriad forces designated by the terms liberal democracy, industrialism, and Enlightenment. The art, history, literature, religion, and philosophy of Greece furnished British intellectuals with new points of departure and cultural reference for thinking about themselves and the new situations they confronted. The projection of their own concerns and problems onto the Greek experience, whether from a Christian, Viconian, Comtean, or Hegelian standpoint, was one means of bringing order into their own lives and thoughts. (…) In this manner the exploration of Greek civilization provided an avenue for the evaluation of modern British experience, and as that experience changed the understanding of Greek antiquity was often modified accordingly. In turn, Greek studies came to bear profound marks of Victorian religious, philosophical, and political preoccupations, the not always faint outlines of which may still be discerned in the scholarly examinations of the Greek heritage in our own day. (451)

While I agree with Turner that much nineteenth-century classical reception was concerned not with a literary work's classical origins but with its contemporary meaning, Turner is not always particularly imaginative in defining the 'British experience,' his attention remaining largely on the thoughts and actions of elite men. This attentional bias unnecessarily constricts his analysis. In my synthesis of Jenkyns' focus on textual questions with Turner's historico-political emphasis I remain interested in how Victorians used their Hellenism to talk about a number of different subjects – the Englishness of English art, European and global international relations, individual subjectivity, nationhood, gender and race in particular – and I identify how Greek allusions, Greek artistic or political models, or a supposedly 'Greek' model of masculine homosociality allowed them to do so in specific literary works. I am also interested in the prehistory of this metanarrative of British Greekness, and thus my study ranges over a longer period of time than either

Jenkyns' or Turner's, and I also apply a literary-critical and historiographic lens to a wider diversity of writers and readers. In doing so I also train a critical eye on the mental furniture of Jenykn's "Victorian gentleman's mind," thus making the overwhelming masculinism of nineteenth-century British Hellenism an explicit object of intersectional feminist inquiry.

Approaching nineteenth-century British Hellenism from this perspective brings my project closer to the work various scholars have done since 1989, many of which (as I do) treat Jenkyns' and Turner's works as valuable points of reference. Where Turner and Jenkyns are encyclopedic, subsequent studies are much more focused on specific moments within the nineteenth century and on the specific, often emblematic issues that characterize them. The 1989 edited collection *Rediscovering Hellenism: The Hellenic Inheritance and the English Imagination* is a useful starting-point in taking Turner's and Jenkyns' focus on nineteenth-century Hellenism as a subject in itself while shifting their emphasis. Including reflections on Arnold's 'Hebrew and Hellene' alongside a survey of Sappho's nineteenth-century reception, which discusses her importance to the representation of the Greek War of Independence and her homosexuality, *Rediscovering Hellenism* unites the traditional treatment of Victorian Hellenism – as a feature of nineteenth-century masculine social discourse and Victorianist literary criticism – with a new emphasis on subjectivities existing outside the bounds of traditional heteronormativity. Jenkyns and Turner both contributed essays as well: Jenkyns' "Hellenism in Victorian painting" and Turner's "Why the Greeks and not the Romans in Victorian Britain?"[5]

[5] As it deals with an important question I do not discuss at length in this dissertation, I will summarize Turner's essay here. In "Why the Greeks and not the Romans in Victorian Britain?" Turner writes that this shift from Roman to Greek exempla in the nineteenth century "was not inevitable" or, in 1750, "even

Linda Dowling's *Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford* (1994) expands this attention to non-heteronormative subjects, becoming one of the first of a new generation of scholars who combine queer theory with an attention to classical studies, nineteenth-century cultural history, and literary studies. Dowling's is a work of social history focused on the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s in Oxford, and she argues that Benjamin Jowett's reclamation of the Oxford tutorial from its Tractarian roots and his thoroughgoing adherence to German Hellenism, with its heady mixture of philosophical idealism and philological exactitude, accidentally transformed the liberalism of Mill and Arnold into a counterdiscourse of homosexuality - a subject I will return to in Chapter five.[6] Noting how Jowett's colleagues Walter Pater and J.A. Symonds transformed the study of Plato from an

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predictable" (61), and had everything to do with the polemical utility of Roman and Greek traditions as they were understood at the time. He points out that during the 18th century, Goldsmith, Gibbon and a host of other authors penned narrative histories of Rome, and in all of these works, Turner writes, "the Roman example was related to modern British politics" (62). The similarity perceived between the two nations' political structures, particularly between what Turner calls their "allegedly mixed constitutions" (65) and between Rome's emergence from monarchical tyranny in the Republic and England's emergence from Stuart absolutism after 1688, in the 1780s and after becomes a perceived similarity between Republican Rome and Republican France with little if any political utility for conservative thinkers. The Napoleonic Wars then furnish an opportunity to identify France with Roman imperialism and illiberalism, against which British liberals could cavil using Greek exempla, and as the century wears on the Greek tradition becomes more and more identified with Britishness, and the Roman tradition continues to be perceived as both old-fashioned, a remnant of 18th-century Augustanism, and as foreign-identified and therefore suspect.

[6] Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's discussion of the traditional social-sciences distinction between homo*sexual* and homo*social* will be important throughout this dissertation, and there is clearly a connection here. In *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (1985) Sedgwick argues that the category of the *homosocial* is supposed to demarcate itself as separate from the *homosexual*, what I will in later chapters call the "connective disjunction" symbolized by their shared prefix the sign of a social problematic. The social problematic is homophobia, and it is worth noting that it is here paired with its opposite, a counterdiscourse of positive images of what I call 'sexual homosociality' in Chapter one.
In *Epistemology of the Closet* (1990), Sedgwick covers much of the same literary and historical ground I do in Chapters three, four and five, and she locates a "sudden, radical condensation of sexual categories" (9) in the 1890s – Foucault's inaugural gay male – and argues that his appearance is precipitated by the Wilde trials I discuss in chapter five. Where Dowling is generally supportive of Sedgwick's argument, I will suggest that Sedgwick's "sudden, radical condensation of sexual categories" may have become suddenly visible to scholars a century later, but was visible to contemporaries long before the 1890s.

exercise in Christian apologetics to a celebration of Platonic *paederastia*, Dowling describes the specific character of this period of Oxford history as a result of the confluence of a number of institutional, personal, and societal factors.

After the 1990s, Isobel Hurst's *Victorian Women Writers and the Classics* (2006) and Shanyn Fiske's *Heretical Hellenism: Women Writers, Ancient Greece, and the Victorian Popular Imaginary* (2008) follow Dowling in avoiding Turner's and Jenkyn's more or less exclusive focus on the thoughts and actions of heterosexual men. Both in their focus on women and in Fiske's focus on readers without university educations (Hurst examines George Eliot, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, and Charlotte M. Yonge, all of whom had some training in classical languages) these authors are particularly indebted to Yopie Prins' *Victorian Sappho* (1999), making it much easier for later writers like myself to understand how a project focused on nineteenth-century British Hellenism could also be a work inspired by the insights of feminism. In *Victorian Sappho* Prins describes the nineteenth-century reception and translation histories of Sappho's poetry as a dialogical contest between those who wished to elide Sappho's lesbianism, for instance Dr. Henry Wharton in his influential *Sappho: Memoir, Text, Selected Renderings, and a Literal Translation* (1885), which took liberties in 'rendering' Sappho that Prins shows had the effect of also rendering her rather sexless, and those who celebrated it. Celebrants included 'Michael Field,' actually two lesbian writers who published under a single male pseudonym, and Swinburne, whose enthusiastically sadistic Sappho appears in Swinburne's dramatic monologue, "Anactoria" (1866), and in Prins' argument becomes a figure of poetic inspiration closely allied to two of Swinburne's primary interests:

flagellation and poetic meter. That in my brief summary this dialogical contest breaks down along gendered lines does an injustice to Prins' thesis; in fact, in her final chapter Prins shows that women authors were among the most likely to 'render' Sappho as a lovestruck heterosexual suicide throughout the nineteenth century, and she compares Wharton to Swinburne and Michael Field because, as Prins announces in her introduction, her purpose is "to develop an approach to reading lyric that is both rhetorically and historically inflected by gender" (21). Hurst and Fiske certainly take up this gauntlet, as the titles of their respective works show clearly, and so do I.

One limitation that Hurst and Fiske fail to address is chronological. Most scholarship on nineteenth-century British Hellenism, from 1980 to today, either appends a discussion of Victorian Hellenism to a few canonical names, or to periods or groups that are very well understood already: Aestheticism, the *fin de siècle*, the 1860s-1880s, or, if it strays from Victoria's reign, the Romantics. This remains useful and often exciting scholarship; Fiske's *Heretical Hellenism* and Stefano Evangelista's *British Aestheticism and Ancient Greece: Hellenism, Reception, Gods in Exile* (2009) are excellent works of scholarship that mitigate their chronological traditionalism by including chapters on minor or working-class writers, but even here the chronological focus is not new. T.D. Olverson's *Women Writers and the Dark Side of Late-Victorian Hellenism* (2010) offers a more thoroughly minoritarian version of a Victorianist project, but it is Noah Comet's *Romantic Hellenism and Women Writers* (2013) that combines unusual periodization, the years between 1800 and 1840, a still-unusual focus on women writers' Hellenism, and a

willingness to delve into popular literature that I consciously take as model in this dissertation, most explicitly during the second and fourth chapters.

In seeking to answer modern questions through historical means I am certainly in good company, as this brief description of the literature on nineteenth-century British Hellenism since 1980 demonstrates. In composing a metanarrative around texts that functioned as metanarratives even in their own time, this dissertation apes its subject matter in being oddly liminal, and as much characterized by disjunction as by connection. In seeking to retain both breadth and depth, this highly interdisciplinary project could be characterized as synoptic or synthetic, my attention to the course of British Hellenism's enunciation over the long nineteenth century combining as it does 'distance' with 'close' reading, and literary criticism with aesthetic theory, art history, philosophy, cultural studies, feminist historiography and the 'history of ideas.' Because I am a literary critic and because my engagement with classical subject matter and nineteenth-century history is mediated by literature, this project assumes that the tools of literary criticism are useful beyond a narrow definition of the word 'text,' and even beyond a traditional understanding of the task of literary criticism. In the five chapters that follow this introduction, I take examples from the plastic arts and from non-literary sources to demonstrate not just what these texts meant to whom, but how they expressed that meaning within a larger semiotic structure that I will argue had predictable phenomenological effects. This dissertation is 'externalist'[7] both to literary criticism and to classical studies in the sense archaeologist

[7] Morris (1994) gives a usefully concise definition of his terms: internalists "concentrate on what goes on inside the discipline," while externalists concentrate on "the interaction between practitioners and the outside world" (9).

and cultural historian Ian Morris uses in arguing for the value of a relative outsider's reflexive attention to how scholarship defines its own object of study, as I will discuss in a moment, but it is 'internalist' to the academic praxis of literary criticism and of 'historical poetics' in that I proceed through the long nineteenth century with what I see as the necessary guidance of literary texts, and do so in conversation with other literary critics.

This mixed internalist/externalist orientation towards my subject, maintained throughout this dissertation, is born out of a combination of purpose and necessity. The purpose of the project's externalism has to do with the "spectre of history" Morris identifies in his "Archaeologies of Greece," an introductory essay to his 1994 edited collection *Classical Greece: Ancient Histories and Modern Archaeologies*. Morris writes that this specter haunts the archaeology of Greece, which has "at once one of the most venerated and one of the most reviled archaeological traditions," this deeply ambivalent reception of an entire body of knowledge in Morris' opinion "a product of archaeologists' lack of concern with the intellectual histories of their own practices," which practices are "intimately involved with a two-century project of understanding 'Europeanness'" (8). The same specter of unexamined Eurocentricity, compounded of an unacknowledged overvaluation of whiteness and hegemonic masculinity, still exists despite the emergence of a queer studies approach to the study of 18th- and nineteenth-century British Hellenism, and in this dissertation I analyze how nineteenth-century Britons understood the classical past in relation to an ideal masculine 'type' in order to better understand our own latter-day understanding of a similar subject position. This ideal type of European, masculine subjectivity was, I will argue, centrally important to many Britons' understanding of the

social conditions extant between 1760 and 1895 in Britain. A sustained, critical and reflexive investigation into how this type was described, manipulated, and used as a warrant for a number of important legal, artistic, and intellectual choices will clarify the intellectual history of our general 'Western' understanding of how normate bodies ought to look and work.

TOWARD A POETICS OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH HELLENISM: METHOD & METHODOLOGY

While I will maintain an internalist *and* an externalist orientation towards my subject in the chapters to follow, this project is 'external' to both literary studies and classical studies due to its critical, reflexive approach to both disciplines. This project is most 'internal' to the sub-discipline of literary-historical scholarship I describe in the previous section of this chapter, the shared focus on nineteenth-century British Hellenism linking Turner's and Jenkyn's projects with feminist and queer studies projects like Prins', and it is Prins, Hurst, and Comet who take up a position most similar to my own: somewhere between classical and literary studies, the two bodies of knowledge united by an attention to the material-historical context of a literary text – a shared method of inquiry Prins has called "historical poetics" (2008, 2016). How I am defining historical poetics, and how my attention to the historical poetics of British Greekness is reliant on an intersectional feminist methodology that combines semiotics and phenomenology, will be the subject of this section of the chapter. To define what "historical poetics" means and to explain how my theoretical approach can blend feminist theory, queer theory, and an

abiding interest in masculinity with historical poetics will require a two-part response, since the terms beg important definitional and genealogical questions.

In defining historical poetics as a methodology, Prins (2016) notes that both the adjective 'historical' and the noun 'poetics' are "essentially contested concepts," their meaning in part a function of this contestation (14). As Prins puts it, "in current debates about historical poetics, different approaches give form to radically different reading practices, research projects, aesthetic claims, and critical agendas" (ibid). This methodological catholicity allows students of historical poetics to combine the explanatory value of two seemingly-opposed methods: a way of working from the 'inside' of a text towards its original, 'outer' cultural context, and a way of working from that cultural context, the 'outside' of the text, inward. Prins ascribes the former practice to literary critics and the latter to cultural historians, but Prins also writes that in promulgating a revised version of her methodology, she is "committed to a historical poetics that works recursively as a loop, reading simultaneously from inside out and from outside in" (2016: 14). This synthesis would seem to further complicate the applied method by which historical poetics works, and the ambition of Prins' methodological innovation gives the rubric under which her recursive version of 'historical poetics' is to be performed an ambiguous shape. To soften the ambiguity and to clarify her comments on this recursive historical poetics, Prins offers a sort of dialectical response to another text of the same name, Simon Jarvis' "What is Historical Poetics?" (2014).

Though she says that both she and poetics scholar Simon Jarvis perform 'historical poetics,' Prins compares her previous focus on genre with Jarvis' focus on technique, and

ties their divergent interests to an emphasis on readers (Prins) versus one on writers (Jarvis). Jarvis, however, describes his interests less broadly; in the chapter to which Prins is responding, he writes that "[T]he (historical) truth-content of works of art is to be sought precisely in their technical organization, which, far from being a transhistorical frame for the work of art, is instead its most intimately historical aspect, that which is most vulnerable to becoming obsolete or to missing its moment" (2014: 101). Thus we can say that while Prins has previously worked from the 'outside' of a text inward, and Jarvis from the 'inside' outward, in calling for historical poetics to become recursive, Prins is dissolving the distinction between a text's outside and inside as well as between a text and its context. Whether this is desirable or even possible will be one of the questions this dissertation seeks to answer. There is certainly hope: a text's 'technical organization' is fixed in time, easily compared with contemporary texts and easily linked to contemporary events, as I will show. Readers occur across a much wider spectrum of time, however, seldom recording their experiences of reading in the kind of granularity that might reward close study, or with the regularity that might reward 'distance' approaches. Thus a recursive historical poetics supplies the social aspect of the 'historical' through comparison with other (mostly contemporary) texts, while also approaching history through textual stylistics, and this is clearly a method Prins is already using in *Victorian Sappho*, where her comparison between texts by Wharton, Field, and Swinburne co-exist with her granular analysis of Swinburne's attempts to translate Sappho's Greek into accented English.

Another way in which this project is influenced by queer studies and intersectional feminism's focus on the simultaneous action of multiple aspects of identity in a single

subject lies in the importance I will assign to theories of gender, sexuality, ethnicity and class as they relate to the historical development of ideologies of embodiment. This has long been an important aspect of feminist thought; as science studies scholar Donna Haraway (1992) writes,

> Humanity's face has been the face of man. Feminist humanity must have another shape, other gestures; but, I believe, we must have feminist figures of humanity. They cannot be man or woman; they cannot be the human as historical narrative has staged that generic universal. Feminist figures cannot, finally, have a name; they cannot be native. Feminist humanity must, somehow, both resist representation, resist literal figuration, and still erupt in powerful new tropes, new figures of speech, new turns of historical possibility. For this process, at the inflection point of crisis, where all the tropes turn again, we need ecstatic speakers. (86)

While this dissertation may not achieve ecstasy, it does seek to note the importance of Haraway's "generic universal" in the course of describing how humanity, at least in nineteenth-century Britain, was more or less explicitly defined in relation to men's bodies. What Haraway is suggesting we study, in the passage quoted above, is how a shared rhetorical habit – the reliance on "literal figuration" that has made "Humanity's face" into "the face of man" – becomes imbricated in a set of power relations that privilege masculinity above femininity and place these complementarian aspects of 'the human' in metonymic relation to a larger whole. I have already carried out this programme in miniature, by performing a critical reading of Shelley's "We are all Greeks," and in subsequent chapters I will continue in the same vein, though not always with literary texts. The 'figuration' of masculinity Haraway reads as privileged in the passage quoted above is one she has elsewhere identified with false objectivity and what she calls 'the God-Trick' (Haraway 1988), the assumption of a seemingly objective or god-like stance towards a

problem that is actually immanent to oneself. For Haraway and for myself, this semiotics of masculinity is an important object of critique because it has phenomenological effects, functioning in the world as an ordinal concept capable of forming and maintaining a social order through its reifying influence.

But what *is* this influence? What are the material practices that sustain it? How does masculinity function as an ordinal concept in specific times and places? While Haraway offers a cogent analysis of the semiotics of hegemonic masculinity, there remains a need for a phenomenological account, and to fulfill that need I will rely on sociologist and postcolonial theorist Nirmal Puwar's work on the "somatic norm." In her 2004 book *Space Invaders: Race, Gender and Bodies Out of Place*, Puwar writes of "the maleness of the state" (147) and she describes that maleness as an achievement born out of specific, material repetitions that in aggregate create a 'somatic norm' for specific, physical spaces – a pedestal in Trafalgar Square and the halls of the Houses of Parliament are two early examples – which somatic norm is subsequently generalized and mapped onto the state itself. If we return to Shelley's "We are all Greeks" we can see that this assigned, somatic spatialism is easily visible in Shelley's comments on "[T]he human form and the human mind," which "attained such a perfection in Greece" and which perfection when depicted in classical art has since ennobled and delighted "the race." That somatic norms require repetition suggests that Shelley's enunciation of British Greekness in *Hellas* is a single instance of a larger phenomenon.

When these spatialized somatic norms are brought into question by objects, events or utterances which have the effect of emphasizing what has previously been un-remark-

able in a given space, Puwar writes that the "unease" that arises "invokes the constitutive boundaries of the imagination of the nation" (5). Ottoman control of Greece certainly "invokes the constitutive boundaries of the imagination of the nation" for Shelley, and for Puwar these moments of invocation mark figurative disjunctions that offer at least potential agency to those wishing to intervene in the representational and practical politics of a given place and time. In the examples she uses, these spatialized somatic norms make public spaces like Trafalgar Square or the Houses of Parliament 'significant' in the sense that they signify on behalf of the state in accordance with previous figurative patterns, and invocations of these norms offer clues as to their phenomenological content, as well as opportunities both for critique and for advocacy. Thus invocations are to some degree always-already rhetorical, but they are also material, and thinking in terms of invocation will help make my comments on the historical poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism more precise. By attending to the historical poetics of somatic normativity it becomes possible to describe a text, a technique, or a scene as invocatory – as tending to question the un-remark-able aspects of a "literal figuration" of embodiment – or as normative and tending thus to uphold or, in some cases, to defend the un-remark-able aspects of a narrative order that relies on "generic universals." Shelley's desire for that order and for the psychic stability it offers, which he shares with (or hopes to create in) his listeners, drives the elision of disjunction that is so un-remark-able a feature of the famous phrase, a feature that is 'un-remark-able' because to remark on that disjunction is to amplify it beyond what the rhetorical frame can encompass.

For Puwar, statist spaces are always real: her project is social-scientific and deals with the British Civil Service. The statist spaces I refer to in this project's literary-critical application of Puwar's theory may occur in imaginary or in real spaces, and one of the most basic assumptions this dissertation will make is that both kinds of spaces exist in relation to specific bodies. Puwar uses Trafalgar Square as an example of her theory of somatic normativity precisely because she wishes to point out that the symbolic transactions she studies – invocatory or normative interactions with imaginary figurative boundaries – are carried out in physical spaces and involve embodied actors. These symbolic transactions can be as simple as the presence of a non-normative body in space, such as a statue of Nelson Mandela that Puwar imagines facing 'the other Nelson' atop Nelson's Column in Trafalgar Square, but they also occur in the context of bodies engaged in demonstrations and marches, as during a November 2001 anti-war demonstration Puwar describes. These invocatory interactions occurring in physical space help us to understand how often and how easily norms and invocations arising in mental space are spatialized, made-real; Puwar describes how Trafalgar Square was transformed, its "perfect acoustic properties" amplifying the Arabic call to prayer, *namaz*, at the end of a 2001 march:

> The four gargantuan bronze lions (designed by Landseer) protecting Nelson were subjected to not only an echo that belied heads of states, international agencies and the military-industrial complex, but also a wail that spoke with a postcolonial accent. The sounds of a call overwhelmingly, most especially after 9/11, associated with demonic fundamentalism stirred between the bodies of a multiply diverse crowd. For a fleeting moment, people of all religions, ages, classes and incommensurable political allegiances were, in an unimaginable way, a collectivity. As the *namaz* traversed the crowd, they stood in silence and this public space was produced anew. The proscribed sound upset predictable readings of both nation and accepted idioms of protest. The foreign exclaim (*sic*) and the gathering of a broad and multiple

> mass of thousands in the most famous and politicized square in history, steeped in Empire, created an altogether different echo. (3)

Puwar implies here that it is by retaining only the echoes of sounds previously heard that statist spaces continue to reverberate in accordance with their function as *places politique*. The unaccustomed sound of an Arabic call to prayer creates an echo, too, but it is "altogether different" from those heard before. The difference hinges on the "postcolonial accent" of that echo, which is heard by a large mass of individuals as they consider their affective relation to a 'British' (white, Christian) somatic norm and to both real and imaginary Muslim bodies.

Puwar also describes another invocation of somatic norms commemorated by Winston Churchill's oft-quoted reaction to Nancy Astor, Britain's first female MP, on her arrival in the House of Commons: "I find a woman's intrusion into the House of Commons as embarrassing as if she had burst into my bathroom when I had nothing with which to defend myself, not even a sponge" (13). Here the 'unease' generated by the invocation of spatial and somatic norms is delinked from considerations of ethnicity and religion, but its expression in phenomenological terms remains deeply personal, though it is national in the sense that the House of Commons is definitionally a statist space, and Churchill a statist actor. Churchill's affective reaction to social change, symbolized by a single woman's 'inappropriate' presence in a statist space, suggests that invocations traverse the boundaries demarcating what is 'personal' and what is 'public' in a way that will remain important throughout this dissertation. 'Public' or statist space *is* 'personal,' defining the personhood of those who occupy it much as their bodies do, and if Haraway's comments on the 'face of man' locate literal figurations and generic universals in time, Puwar's concept of the

somatic norm and her notion of invocation both describe events taking place in space as it is occupied in and by time, and by specific people. As with Ottoman control of Greece, the "stagnant and miserable state of social institution as China and Japan possess," Nancy Astor's presence in the House of Commons or the sounds of *namaz* floating across Trafalgar Square in 2001, the challenges posed to the state's somatic norm by invocations point backward, to the kinds of somatic norms that in this introduction are expressed via Shelley's Greek 'we.' My hope is that by using Prins' recursive method of historical poetics, allied to an intersectional feminist methodology, this dissertation will be an invocation that points forward *and* backward, using nineteenth-century examples to move toward what Haraway calls a "feminist humanity" which "must, somehow, both resist representation, resist literal figuration, and still erupt in powerful new tropes… at the inflection point of crisis" (86).

That my approach to an intersectional-feminist historical poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism demands explicit attention to time and space should be obvious by this point, and I will argue that this attention to time and space is also located *within* the texts to which I will apply this approach. The poetics of masculinity, of Britishness, and of Greekness in specific texts I will discuss throughout this dissertation are important as components of the text's stylistic foundation and as a function of the text's reception, and the locatedness of the texts I will discuss in later chapters, as with the Shelley text I have concentrated on here, is also important in understanding how nineteenth-century British Hellenism meant whatever it meant to whomever it meant it to. But here I also want to briefly note how space and time work simultaneously in another, non-linear kind of chrono-

logic: narrative time, which is a central feature of many of the texts I will analyze in this dissertation.[8] *Hellas* is explicitly meant to have an effect on the time and place Shelley finds himself in, and teleological metanarrative is the vehicle which is supposed to engender the hoped-for effect. This is at least partly a rhetorical act motivated by cognitive necessity. As Stephen Crites argues in "The Narrative Quality of Experience" (1971), we may simply be unable to understand the flow of events without a narrative structure in which to fit them; in his words, "the formal quality of experience through time is inherently narrative" (291). Shelley certainly refers to chronological time as an aspect of his ethno-genealogy when he writes that the ancient Greeks were the originators of a worldview so powerful that it formed the origins of western civilization, but now, Shelley adds, "the corruption of the best produces the worst" and "[T]he modern Greek… is degraded, by moral and political slavery to the practice of the worst vices it engenders, and that below the level of ordinary degradation" (x). As Shelleyan Greeks 'we' are trapped within the narrative teleology of our own cultural degradation, and this is both a geopolitical rallying cry and a description of the phenomenal experience of living in the world, because Shelley's call to revolution turns on unspoken commonsense assertions about time.

In *The Sense of an Ending* (1967) Frank Kermode explains that these assertions are as much spatial as they are chronological:

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[8] Besides being a term that, like historical poetics, is characterized by 'essentially contested concepts,' 'narrative time' is also the title of an article by Paul Ricoeur (1980) wherein he calls for "another response to the illusion of sequence than the recourse to a-chronological models" (169); I will return to this subject in the conclusion of this dissertation, to ask whether a methodology combining historical poetics and enfiguration theory has made the outlines of this alternate response to the problem of narrative chrono-logic any clearer.

> Let us take a very simple example, the ticking of a clock. We ask what it *says*: and we agree that it says *tick-tock*. By this fiction we humanize it, make it talk our language. Of course, it is we who provide the fictional difference between the two sounds; *tick* is our word for a physical beginning, *tock* our word for an end. We say they differ. What enables them to be different is only a special kind of middle. We can perceive a duration only when it is organized. (44-5)

Here Kermode depicts the spatial organization of chronological units, with a "special kind of middle" between 'tick' and 'tock' capable of containing not just the concept of duration, but our own self-concept as a continuous identitarian subject participating in sociality. The political content of this concept is of primary significance: in Kermode's model we have two opposing camps, *tick* and *tock*, and this accurately describes Shelley's rhetoric. If Kermode and Crites are correct, then one basic question this dissertation will ask is whether we manage the cognitive shift from sensation to perception through the attribution of narrative direction to events that, in themselves, have no *telos* and thus no meaning, which meaning therefore remains for us to elaborate. This is itself a poetics of history, and I will show that reliance on 'tick-tock' as a primary hermeneutic trope applied to time often becomes the binary opposition between two temporalized figures, in Shelley's case the 'classical' and the modern Greek, but also between two figures of speech located in physical space: "Europe" and "China and Japan." In the example of the clock Kermode tells a story about the passage of linear chronological time via the narrative device of forced onomatopoeia, and in Shelley's preface Shelley tells a story about European history, narrating 'Greece' as a place where the 'tick-tock' of time is mirrored by the shift from classical Greek democracy to current Greek degradation, which shift makes-visible the

distance between European "illumination" and "such a stagnant and miserable state of social institution as China and Japan possess."

A concept of narrative time does more than explain the oppositional frame Shelley depends on, and it does more than demonstrate how Shelley's rhetorical frame participates in a longstanding and possibly innate rhetorical tradition: it also makes the internal disjunction contained by the concept of narrative time more concrete. For Shelley the 'tick' of the past is both Periclean Athens, the birthplace of Greek cultural significance, and the fall of the Byzantine Empire, which inaugurated Ottoman rule over Greece in 1453. The 'tock' of the present is both the degradation of Greeks by the Ottomans since 1453 and their ongoing revolution, which "[W]e are all" bound to participate in as "Greeks." If Shelley's narrative in his preface to *Hellas* is both oddly disjunct and perfectly functional in rhetorical terms, this begs the question of how that disjunction is dealt with so successfully, how it becomes a feature rather than a defect. Donna Haraway writes in another 1992 essay that "[F]eminist theory proceeds by figuration at just those moments when its own historical narratives are in crisis," (86) and this certainly describes both Haraway's historical moment[9] and Shelley's. Not exactly a feminist, Shelley is nevertheless 'proceeding by figuration' and he is using "We are all Greeks" as a figure of speech to link narrative time and the Ottoman invocation of 'Greek' somatic norms to a specific image of Greece, Britain, Europe, himself, 'we,' and 'they' as he goes. It is this universalizing praxis of figurative representation that I will describe throughout this

[9] See Faludi 1991, *Backlash: The Undeclared War Against America's Women*

dissertation as being characteristic of nineteenth-century British Hellenism, occurring in a chronological sequence and producing a historical poetics capable of feminist literary-critical analysis, and as a final detail of my methodological apparatus I will explain how I am theorizing figuration as an integral part of this dissertation project and of representational praxis generally.

To describe a process in 'figurative' language is, first of all, to speak metaphorically rather than literally. The problem here is that like Kermode's 'tick-tock' example, metaphory often relies on a material referent. If one is 'drowning in paperwork' one is not actually drowning, but having an affective experience arising from a material cognitive process inspired by actual work that feels overwhelming. But how can scholars approach this relation between figurative language and material circumstances? One way is to ask what a figure is and how figural interpretation has heretofore proceeded. The Oxford English Dictionary provides a granular history of the word itself and its many meanings; beginning in the 1300s in English, 'figure' has meant form or shape, which in geometry encloses space, but 'figure' can also refer to proper or distinctive shape or appearance, in which usage it is still frequently applied to embodiment – a woman's figure, for instance, being the distinctive shape of her body as compared to a generalized understanding of how women 'ought' to look. There is also a strong sense that 'figure' usually refers to form or shape as it is linked to representation; a figure of fun or a figure of speech are both semiotic units useful in describing individual instances of a general phenomenon, and here too this 'figure' can be embodied or disembodied. "We are all Greeks" is a figure of speech, but in American classicist Cornelius Felton's *Familiar Letters from Europe* (1865) we are given

a representative instance of a 'figure of fun' that also relates back to the subject of this dissertation. In comparing scholarly knowledge of classical Greek with that of contemporary, spoken Greek, Felton writes

> There is nothing more comical that the figure an English scholar cuts when he first comes to Athens. He may have taken the first honors of his University, and written prize odes without number; yet he cannot utter a sentence that any mortal in Athens will understand, nor can he understand a single word he hears in the streets or in society. The Professors laugh at him; the women laugh at him; the boys in the street laugh at him. He can buy a cravat only by drawing his hand round his neck, as if he were preparing for the halter. If he wants something to eat, he must open his mouth and point down his throat. If he wants a hat, he must lay his hand on his head and say, "Eh!" For a pair of stockings, he must pull off his shoes, and, holding his foot up to the shopkeeper, show the holes in the old ones; – and so on. (343)

Here Felton's figure of fun is comical in part because he is so incapable, but the humor of his incapacity lies in the mismatch between the impressive figure "an English scholar" is supposed to cut, as befits a gentleman of high intellectual capacity who represents the most powerful Empire in the world, and his reduction variously to the status of a horse, a preverbal child, and a general laughingstock. By failing to replicate his 'type' of classbound ethnonational masculinity properly in his new context, this 'figure of fun' becomes a figuration of failure, unable on a fundamental level to enter the realm of sociality.

Another important meaning of the word 'figure' also has to do with representation, but in its emblematic form. In Macaulay's *History of England* (1855) he writes that "It has long been usual to represent the imagination under the figure of a wing" (453), and this will also be an important aspect of the figures I interpret in the chapters that follow. Emblematic figures like that of a wing, meant to represent imagination, point past the material sign to a meaning imbued with ideological significance that is located within a

history of representative repetition - a figurative tradition. In his chapter on '*figura*' from *Scenes from the Drama of European Literature* (1984), German philologist and comparative scholar of literature Erich Auerbach tracks the use of the term from Roman antiquity, through the Church Fathers and into the Early Modern period. He argues that through such comparative work it is possible to better understand what he calls "the origin and analysis of figural interpretation" (49), and I will take Auerbach's history of figural interpretation as the springboard to an explanation of my approach to figurative tradition via a theory of enfiguration.

Originally meaning 'plastic form,' Auerbach writes that after Rome's Republican period, *figura* takes on additional grammatical and aesthetic meanings as it comes to refer both to linguistic phenomena - the 'form' of the plural, for instance – and also 'outward appearance' or 'outline.' In Ovid *figura* means 'copy' and Vitruvius uses the term as we would now use 'ground plan' in describing architecture, while in Quintilian we find the term used in rhetorical theory as we still use it, as 'figure of speech.' It is with the Church Fathers that figural interpretation begins in earnest, as *figura* was used to describe something resembling 'archetype' or 'prefiguration,' and Auerbach notes that in the writings of the Church Fathers, "often vague similarities in the structure of events or their attendant circumstances suffice to make the *figura* recognizable" (29). In Augustine *figura* appears as 'idol,' as 'dream figure' or 'vision,' and as 'mathematical form,' and the willingness to recognize the truths expressed through proper figural interpretation becomes a spiritual practice. This is the logic behind the allegorical religious art of the medieval period, and Auerbach writes that secular medieval historiography also dabbled in the

figural interpretation of past events, as a guide to the interpretation of the current moment and the immediate future. Finally, in the Early Modern period, figural interpretation emerges as a praxis of critical attention to what Auerbach calls "the creative, formative principle, change amid the enduring essence, the shades of meaning between copy and archetype" (ibid). Auerbach's history of the term *figura* suggests that Haraway's call to "resist representation, resist literal figuration, and still erupt in powerful new tropes" and "new figures of speech" is a call to take part in this kind of figural interpretation, but with a difference. Where in the medieval period one could perform a figural interpretation of a stained-glass window or an icon, and thus receive spiritual benefit, in this dissertation I will perform figural interpretations of nineteenth-century 'enfigurations' of British Greekness, and the benefit I hope to receive is an enlarged understanding of how social, semiotic and phenomenological processes co-constitute each other. These 'enfigurations' will include the Elgin Marbles, Byron's "man of classical taste," and a neoclassical statue displayed in the American Section of the Great Exhibition of 1851, but I will also interpret as enfigurations Stevenson's *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886), Felicia Hemans' *Modern Greece* (1817), newspaper reports of sodomy trials between 1840 and 1870, and Oscar Wilde, particularly in his role as public speaker. The prefix 'en-' that I am adding to 'figuration' expressing the cyclic, emergent quality I find in these figurations, in each case I will ask how these enfigurations refer back to Haraway's 'generic universal' and Puwar's 'somatic norm' of hegemonic masculinity, as well as the 'enfigurative tradition' of which individual enfigurations form a part.

Because I am working with phenomenological data, my theoretical apparatus and my conclusions must perforce emerge from the course of analysis rather than be imposed from without. Therefore, the question of how enfiguration theory helps to explicate a semiotic phenomenology of nineteenth-century British Greekness will become clearer over the course of the dissertation, but I will make a preliminary argument here. In general I suspect that by attending to sets of actions, enunciations, and probabilities as they connect utterances with dialects, texts with institutions, and events with classes and ideologies, enfiguration theory offers a widely-applicable interdisciplinary methodology. Studying the historical poetics of masculinity in nineteenth-century British Hellenism through attention to enfigurations immediately focuses critical attention on questions of what a former American president called 'truthiness,' specifically the 'truthiness' of the assertions about masculinity, British Hellenism, chronological and geographical emplacement a given text makes. This is part of Haraway's feminist resistance to representation and literal figuration and of her rhetorical praxis, meant to generate "powerful new tropes, new figures of speech," and "new turns of historical possibility," and such a study also complicates any unconscious overvaluation of either the 'historical' or the 'poetical' aspects of a text by limning them together, making Prins' goal of a loop-model of historical poetics easier to attain. Finally, an attention to enfigurations forces me back into a consciousness of my relation to a constellation of disciplinary modes and histories, making Morris' internalist/externalist dichotomy a more useful methodological tool.

By following the methodological and theoretical leads offered by Haraway, Prins, Kermode and Puwar I hope to re-create and critique an enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-

century British Hellenism as a specific somatic-symbolic norm-configuration that is somehow identified with (or perhaps is coterminous with) a gendered, racialized 'type.' This 'type' exists in time and space. It is 'white,' elite, 'masculine,' heterosexual and powerful and it *is-not* non-'white,' non-elite, 'feminine,' queer, and powerless. This may seem an obvious corollary, but one of the important points this dissertation will dwell on is the repudiatory, oppositional ground on which most Western and westernized societies have located our concepts of identity and state-based rights, and the effects this has on our sociality. I am deeply concerned that selfhood, citizenship and personhood are so insistently identified with each other and with difference-from-the-Other, as evidenced in Shelley's vision of Greekness, and even the United States' rapid (in some areas) progress in allocating state-based rights to social Others since the early 1990s does not change the fact that existential opposition is the *de facto* hermeneutic underlying contemporary sociality. Indeed, a particularly emblematic version of repudiatory hegemonic masculinity has recently appeared on the world stage with unexpected force, following recent political shifts in the United States, and I strongly believe that the habitual cognitive and corporeal isolationism of post-Enlightenment individualism, our learned preference for being 'alone together'[10] in Todorov's apposite phrase, has forced our sociality and our individuality into an unsustainable opposition the effects of which are increasingly being felt as ecological and geopolitical crisis.

[10] See Tzvetan Todorov, *Life in Common: An Essay in General Anthropology* (2001)

This, however, brings up an important point. The universalizing arguments I am making or borrowing here - that there are such things as embodied *figura*, as somatic norms; that we all use narrative to create a self that is fixed in time and space; that there is some sort of shared phenomenological realm about which characterizations can be made, of course have their limits. Differences of personal history, genetic function, ancestry, sex/gender, race/ethnicity, physical ability, age, political affiliation, and mental wellness inflect individual experiences of Being-in-the-world, and this has been the case since long before Aristotle penned the epigram with which I begin this introduction. Being is 'said' in many ways by many people, and in their own ways by non-animal beings and by non-human animals, and the sheer complexity of this process forces the theorist to rely on strategic generalizations in the course of describing whatever aspect of life's problematic she or he wishes to elaborate. The hope is that these generalizations will be less numerous and less damaging than those they replace, or the elaborations they facilitate, but it is crucial to recall that the challenges posed by invocations of sexual difference in a space of continued class- and race/ethnicity-based commonality, as in the Churchill/Astor example, look very different from the challenges posed by invocations of racial/ethnic difference in a space of continued sex/gender-based commonality, as in the example of the two Nelsons in Trafalgar Square. Adding religious non-commonality or the deep historical non-commonality described by the term 'postcolonial' adds yet more aspects of difference to my project, and thus increases the challenge of promulgating critiques that remain both truthfully descriptive and usefully prescriptive. It is my hope that the use of a methodology synthesized from historical poetics and intersectional feminism will help me to remain

attuned to the shifting contours and outlines of the various enfigurations I will analyze in the course of this dissertation. I also hope this methodology will allow me both to note what is retained and what shifts as narratives and their narrators react to specific situations, and to make such generalizations as are necessitated by the desire for descriptive clarity without abandoning descriptive accuracy.

FROM WINCKELMANN TO WILDE: THE COURSE OF INTERPRETATION

From an admittedly lengthy discussion of method and methodology, the outlines of this project have become clear. This dissertation is a sustained figural interpretation of some enfigurations of hegemonic masculinity occurring within the enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-century British Hellenism, which will furnish important details about how sociality and masculine embodiment were imagined between 1760 and 1895. Fundamentally, this dissertation asks under what conditions specific texts were meaningful in which ways, and to whom. As noted, the conditions are primarily chronological and geographic, and I emphasize the importance of their materiality in keeping with my intellectual and methodological commitments. As I will demonstrate in the first chapter of this dissertation, an idealized masculine 'type' was an important component of the aesthetic theory advanced by Sir Joshua Reynolds in his *Discourses*, lectures on artistic theory and practice he delivered to graduating classes of the Royal Academy of Art from its founding in 1768 to his retirement as President of the Academy in 1790. Not only was this 'type' important as the linchpin of Reynolds' interaction with the social context in which he wrote the *Discourses*, but his use of an enfiguration of 'central form' demonstrably grows out of the internationally influential art-historical work Johann Joachim Winckelmann, a German

art historian in Rome, had published from 1750 to 1768. Through a close reading of Winckelmann's corpus, focused in particular on his environmental theory of heredity and his elaboration of a psychologically complex aesthetics, I show how Winckelmann's ideas diverge, if slightly, from continental Enlightenment philosophy and allowed him to create enfigurations of ideal masculinity through which Reynolds' theory of Grand Style art could become widely influential.

In Chapter two I show how one proof of this influence can be seen in the 1816 Parliamentary decision to purchase the Parthenon Marbles from Lord Elgin, which in combination with the end of the Napoleonic Wars created the context for Shelley's "We are all Greeks." By placing the 1816 purchase of the Parthenon Marbles in this social context and locating the debate preceding this purchase in space and time, I also examine Byron's comments on Elgin's Marbles to show how Byron's enunciation of 'classical taste' in *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers* (1809) and *The Curse of Minerva* (after 1811) seeks to re-install elite 18th-century practices of collecting and connoisseurship that Elgin was working to change. Elgin's work went on in a shed in London's Park Lane, involved naked boxing matches and famous *tragediennes*, and in placing Byronic philhellenism in the same enfigurative tradition as Elgin's I elaborate a discussion of masculine 'central form' begun in Chapter one. The second chapter also narrates how some women's interaction with the masculine monumentality of early nineteenth-century British Hellenism functioned as an invocation, especially in the case of the *Lady's Monthly Museum*'s "New System of Mythology" (1817-1819), allowing these women to carefully manage both the connective and the disjunct aspects of their own imbrication in British Hellenism. These popular-print

‘alternative musea’ helped to form conditions conducive to both the proto-feminist philhellenism so visible in Mary Shelley’s “Euphrasia: A Tale” (1838) and the devout, Christian classicism of Elizabeth Moulton-Barrett’s *The Seraphim, and other poems* (1838).

The third chapter of this dissertation narrates the challenges to the coherence of what I call the ‘Reynoldsian assemblage’ in mid-century, and the ways in which the 1851 Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations addressed the problematic political conditions facing Reynolds’ project of social coherence through two very distinct ‘texts.’ The first is a cartoon from *Punch* depicting the Trafalgar Square riots of 1848, and the second is Queen Victoria’s diary entry from the opening day of the Great Exhibition, May 1st, 1851, and these are the only two examples in this dissertation that lack an obvious and immediate connection to British Greekness. I use them to further explicate concepts of ‘ethnogenesis’ and ‘autogenesis,’ and following this I bring the reader inside the Great Exhibition, describing the somatic effect of the Crystal Palace on visitors before focusing critical attention on an artwork revolving in the American Section of the Great Exhibition: Hiram Powers’ *Greek Slave* (after 1846). The *Greek Slave* was one of the most famous mid-century examples of neo-classical statuary that in itself, and especially in its most famous poetic tribute, Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s “Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave” (1850), unites both the social function envisioned for his *Discourses* by Reynolds and the somewhat estranged relation Hemans, Barrett Browning and Mary Shelley had to the British Hellenism of the period between 1816 and 1840. Relating this bifurcated social function backward in time to the tense political conditions obtaining between 1848, the

‘year of revolutions,’ and 1851, the third chapter also looks past its supposed mid-century stasis via an analysis of Walter Pater’s “Winckelmann” ([1867] 1873) and Robert Knox’s *Races of Men* ([1850] 1862). I discuss these texts in relation to the visions of history they present: one seeing hope in sex, the other hopelessness in race.

In the fourth chapter I discuss the allusions to Greek myth in *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*. Though there are only two, I argue that between them they both illuminate the reception history of *Strange Case* and the internal dynamics of the novel’s enfiguration of masculinity. The Greek allusions in *Strange Case* also offer an excellent opportunity to perform a ‘distance’ reading of the novel as an enunciation of nineteenth-century British Hellenism, and by placing *Strange Case*’s allusions to harpies and to Damon and Pythias in a journalistic context, I show that Stevenson’s novel interacts with nineteenth-century enfigurative traditions of British Hellenism and of masculinity in ways that have not been adequately theorized. I argue that both the plot of the novel and its themes insistently locate the battle-myth of British Greekness within the masculine subject. I also show how invocatory textual interactions mirror material sociolegal circumstances, at least in this specific case; because one of the Greek allusions in *Strange Case* is as bifurcated as are the novel’s titular characters, this allusion in particular forms an excellent opportunity to discuss the question of how enfigurative traditions change, and how this mutability can be theorized within a literary-critical historical poetics.

In the final chapter of this dissertation I discuss Oscar Wilde’s post-Reynoldsian aesthetic theory of the social role of the artist, his advocacy of Dress Reform and of socialism, and his 1895 trials. In treating Oscar Wilde’s theory of the role of aesthetics as

a serious effort at social reform I show how Wilde's thoroughgoing classicism forms the context for his trials within his own mind, which interaction is clearly visible in his aesthetic theory as he enunciates it in his famous 'Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name' speech. This is foreshadowed in Wilde's "What Makes an Artist, and What Does an Artist Make?" (1883), in which he explicitly states his anti-Reynoldsian programme, and the shadow of Wilde's impending invocation of British Greekness darkens further in my reading of "The Soul of Man Under Socialism" (1891). I argue that "Soul of Man," like the Wilde trials, displays the internal disjunction of the enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-century British Hellenism as Wilde used it to limn the outlines of an ideal, post-heterosexual masculine subject position. If Wilde sought to re-enfigure British Greekness through his own eloquence at his trial, though, I show that the newspapers did, too; I conclude this dissertation after having discussed the trials and the newspaper reports of the trials, reading their competing visions of proper masculine enfiguration in terms of our own.

German Aesthetics, Greek Antiquity, Enlightenment 'Man' and the Origins of nineteenth-Century British Hellenism

Man is the measure of all things: of the things that are, that they are, of the things that are not, that they are not.

Protagoras

In this chapter I will describe the origins of nineteenth-century British Hellenism. To do so, I will first examine the life and works of Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768), sometimes described as the 'father' of Art History and of Archaeology.[11] In examining Winckelmann's aesthetic theories and their reception, which had a formative effect on nineteenth-century European classicism, we will see the formation of a particular 'type' of masculinity, presented as a figure of primary epistemological significance, around whom a political ideology is based and whose supposed characteristics provide a warrant for political action. This ideological stratum is of interest because Winckelmann's work and life were held up as exemplary of a *new* kind of masculine selfhood, whose outlines were coterminous with a new understanding of Winckelmann's subject. After describing Winckelmann's works, his life and his posthumous reception I will show how his ideas,

[11] Fernie (1999) calls Winckelmann 'the Father of Archeology' "for his catalogue of antique gems," the *Description des pierres gravées du feu Baron de Stosch* (1760) "and for the control which he introduced into the conduct of excavations" with his *Sendschreiben von den Herculanischen Entdeckungen* (Letter on the Discoveries at Herculaneum, 1762) and *Nachrichten von den neuesten Herculanischen Entdeckungen* (Report on the latest Herculanean Discoveries, 1764) (68). Leppmann (1970) calls him the "father of archaeology as we know it" (viii), primarily for the stylistic approach to ordering antiquities chronologically, explicated in greatest detail in the *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* (History of the Art of Antiquity, 1764) and his *Monumenti antichi inediti, spiegati ed illustrati* (Unpublished Ancient Monuments, explained and illustrated, 1767–1768). In the course of arguing that Hegel and not Winckelmann should be called the 'father of Art History,' in the *Tributes*, Ernst Gombrich notes that "[T]he role of 'father of Art History' which I have assigned to Hegel is usually attributed to Johann Joachim Winckelmann" (51); this nicely sums up the difficulty of such commonplace nominations.

and more especially the underlying logic supporting his presentation of those ideas, were taken up by Sir Joshua Reynolds in his *Discourses on Art*, speeches delivered to the graduating classes of the Royal Academy of Art from its founding in the 1760s to Reynolds' death in 1792.

Having assessed Winckelmann's genealogical role in relation to nineteenth-century British Hellenism, and Reynolds' mediatory role in tying Winckelmann's theory to British traditions of artistic practice, I will demonstrate how Reynolds' *Discourses* and the Royal Academy's role in creating an 'English school' of art spread an aesthetic theory of the 'Grand Style' that offered British thinkers an attractive synthesis of art's individual and social functions – one well-suited to British liberalism and to the emergent political needs of the British state. As I will show, the Grand Style of British history painting so closely associated with Reynolds has clear similarities to Winckelmann's heroic conception of Greek art and his aesthetic psychology, while in both Winckelmann's and Reynolds' systems the structural function of the artist and the socio-emotional function of Greek art is highly similar. However, I will show that there are also indigenous elements in Reynolds' system that, being enacted by Lord Elgin during his public campaign in favor of Parliamentary purchase of the Parthenon Marbles, illuminate how Winckelmann's theories were put to the service of the British state in a nationalist scheme of aesthetic indoctrination responsive to specifically British concerns. In the final section of the chapter I will discuss how these concerns were used as the raw material for a propaganda campaign that ultimately resulted in parliamentary purchase of the 'Elgin' Marbles.

WINCKELMANN'S CORPUS: A NEW VISION OF AESTHETIC SUBJECTIVITY?

Born in 1717 to a shoemaker in rural Stendal, west of Berlin, Johann Joachim Winckelmann was a child of poverty growing up in a region characterized by constant, violent shifts in political power. Fifty-one years later he would bequeath to the world an art-theoretical system so influential that he became known in his own time as a seminal figure in the study of classical art and archaeology across Europe, one whose 'new' enunciation of his subject was so influential that his contributions to classical studies are still celebrated by German universities in a yearly *Winckelmannstag* on December 9th.[12] Winckelmann's parents were assiduous in promoting his education, enrolling him in a traveling choir which paid enough for Winckelmann to attend primary and then grammar school. There he attracted the attention of the blind headmaster to whom he read, and who put him in charge of the school library at the age of fifteen (Carter 2013: 1-2). Here he began to increase the breadth and depth of his engagement with all things classical Greek, which grew into an avocation during his time at Berlin's *Cöllnisches Gymnasium*. By 21 he had enrolled in the faculty of Theology at the University of Halle, the state and the Pietist church paying his student fees while thus enrolled, and there Winckelmann encountered Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten.[13]

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[12] For more on the *Winckelmannstag* phenomenon see Harloe (2013) and Sünderhauf (2004).

[13] The years between 1717 and 1738 are an important period in German history. The memory and effects of the Thirty Years War were long-lasting; Smith (2011) notes that it was a century after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) before the Prussian population returned to 1600 levels, and that "the Thirty Years War had devastated not only a population, but a world of religious and humanistic learning… it would not be until 1765 that book production in the German lands reached the level it had attained in 1600" (5-6). Prussian ascendancy meant that Winckelmann was growing up in one of the two most powerful German states, and the Pietist church provided importance access to Prussian education. As Gawthrop (1993) points out, the 'Prussianization" of Pietism created structural conditions particularly conducive to the identification and promotion of intellectually-gifted men who could become useful to the state.

Baumgarten is one of the most important post-Renaissance theorists of aesthetics, and much of what he argued, Winckelmann applied.[14] Intellectual historian Mary Gregor (1983) sees Baumgarten's aesthetic theory as an attempt to apply Leibniz's principle of logic as *ars inveniendi,* a method capable of discovering unknown truths rather than simply explicating truths already known, to aesthetics, which until Baumgarten's time had been considered the lowly domain of the senses and of sensibility (359). Imagining aesthetics not as the niche study of one of the 'lower faculties'[15] but as an ethical philosophy would have major implications for a number of then-emerging disciplines, especially when joined to a strong psychological explanation of how sense perception operates and how it can be guided. This logic of perception is also a critique of taste and thus, where many eighteenth-century thinkers followed Leibniz in seeing art as a didactic instrument of morality, Baumgarten saw sense perception as a complex object of inquiry and believed that aesthetics could form the basis of a science of phenomenal experience.

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[14] Beiser (2009) calls Baumgarten's aesthetic theory "fundamentally cognitive" (138), by which he means that Baumgarten's understanding of the subject relies on an assumption that the soul (and thus personhood) is "the capacity for representation," and this idealist aesthetic psychology is the link between Baumgarten and Winckelmann, as it is the aspect of Winckelmann's 'orientation' towards classical Greek art which made him an important figure to Goethe and the Weimar Classicists. Beiser is the best recent English-language source for the many links between Winckelmann and Baumgarten, and he also explains Kant's opposition to (and in his opinion, misreading of) Baumgarten more clearly than does Gregor (1983). Harloe (2013) see Winckelmann as imbricated more fully in the world of collecting and connoisseurship than in that of academic aesthetic theory, and the explicit content of Winckelmann's corpus, as well as the events of his life, confirm this. However, the poetics of Winckelmann's text shows that he understood his own project in terms of Baumgartenian theory, which in applying a monistic psychological theory to aesthetics envisions the human subject as *homo aesthesis* and the artist as the ideal form thereof.

[15] 'Faculties' are in faculty psychology separable cognitive loci associated with a specific capacity, like the ability to feel love or to appreciate art. Liebniz and Kant were faculty psychologists, and Rylance (2000) argues that a mania for categorization, modeled on the increasing granularity with which faculty psychology was applied, was important to the growth of modern academic disciplines in the eighteenth century (27).

Where Leibniz's psychology depends upon a philosophical operation reminiscent of Haraway's 'God-trick,' one which by subtracting all that is specifically individual will enable the philosopher to envision a simplified model of a human's higher cognitive powers, Baumgarten wishes to theorize a richness of subjective experience capable of scientific utility. His purpose is to transcend the dichotomy separating sensualism and rationalism through the application of philosophy to the problem of sense perception via aesthetic theory, which will promote a 'scientific aesthetics' capable of explaining, and guiding, the process of *aesthesis* in specific individuals.[16] Baumgarten's sense of the high importance of what had been understood as one of the 'lower faculties' and his monistic approach to individual cognition uses concepts of beauty (*pulchritudo*) and completion *(perfectio*) to envision an aesthetic praxis gathered under the rubric of *ars pulchre cogitandi*, or 'the art of beautiful thinking.' This rubric offers a normative socio-philosophical model of phenomenological experience reliant on Baumgarten's special use of the concepts of *pulchritudo* and *perfectio*. Baumgartenian *perfectio* is not an achievable state but a doing, a striving-after the greatest possible enlargement of one's intellectual and sensitive capacities, and *pulchritudo* is theorized not as pleasure exactly, but rather as an immanent sense of the wholeness of a work of art achieved through the effort of *perfectio*.

[16] Baumgarten does this through his twinned concepts of 'extensive clarity' and 'intensive clarity,' the former being applied to the senses and the latter to the understanding. As Beiser explains, in Baumgarten's theory "we know abstract, intellectual things through the intensive clarity of the understanding, we know concrete, sensible things through the extensive clarity of the senses" (2009: 128). This binary formulation of experience is very similar to Pater's later formulation of *heiterkeit* and *allgemeinheit*, or "blitheness or repose" and "generality or breadth," respectively, in his 1867 essay "Winckelmann," the similarity suggesting that interest in the normative potential of aesthetics remained lively between the publication of Baumgarten's *Aesthetica* in the 1750s and the publication of "Winckelmann" in 1867.

The ideal aesthetic subject or *felix aestheticus*, having achieved *pulchritudo* and generalized it to his experience of the world, thus gains ideal subjectivity through the *ars pulchre cogitandi*.

I call Baumgartenian aesthetic theory 'normative' rather than 'descriptive' because, while it describes aesthetic processes, these processes are not everywhere the same for Baumgarten. Instead he envisions aesthetics as a tool for effecting purposive psychological change and also as a tool by which to evaluate the achievement and quality of that change – doubtless an attractive promise in a rapidly-developing German state whose bureaucracy needed administrators that were both intelligent and biddable. This is particularly true in that the *felix aestheticus* Baumgartenian aesthetics is supposed to produce has an internal need to strive towards an external goal. This means that, if the effort of *perfectio* is arranged such that the work of aesthetic appreciation and the state of politics are coterminous, then Baumgartenian *pulchritudo* becomes an exercise in patriotism, the *ars pulchre cogitandi* supporting the goals of the state. While this offers interesting insight into the philosophical assumptions underlying such artistic movements as Socialist Realism or Italian Futurism[17], in Winckelmann's aesthetic theory the focus is not on contemporary Prussia but on ancient Greece. This is because Winckelmann believes that the specific period of art most emblematic of Baumgarten's existentialist aesthetic praxis, the period of history in which the 'art of beautiful thinking' originates, is the ancient Greek. The 18th and nineteenth-century cult of sensibility and the related, commonplace assumption that artistic taste

[17] For more on the political content and interrelations between Russian and Italian artistic movements in the early 20th century, see Compton 1981 and Mosse 1990.

reveals something of one's inner being are obvious corollaries to Baumgarten's theory of the *ars pulchre cogitandi* and the *felix aestheticus*, and just as Winckelmann's assumption that aesthetics is intimately bound up with subjectivity drives his theorizing about classical Greece and about Hellenist art, my assumption that Baumgartenian aesthetic subjectivity is inherently political drives my theorizing about Winckelmann.[18]

In tracking Winckelmann's influence on nineteenth-century British Hellenism it is best to begin with Winckelmann's first major work, 1755's *Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst* (Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture), written while its author was a Dresdener. Historian of ideas Marcia Allentuck (1973) says in her study of Henry Fuseli's influence on English aesthetics that in the *Gedanken*, "all of Winckelmann's later writings are prefigured" (178), and in style and emphasis it is certainly characteristic of Winckelmann, whose scholarship was always simultaneously philosophic and descriptive. Additionally, this was the Winckelmann text most widely available in English in the 18th century.[19] One passage in particular became important to Winckelmann's intellectual legacy:

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[18] I describe Winckelmann's artistic subject as 'Hellenist' because his most famous descriptions of statuary are in fact of Roman copies of Greek works, and Winckelmann had very limited access to original works of classical Greek art, some of which he misrecognized as belonging to other periods. What Winckelmann and Baumgarten do not misrecognize is the importance of aesthetics to subjectivity: whether or not this is a necessary relation, what we see (and particularly what we see often) does have an effect on our ways of being-in-the-world, as Enlightenment philosophy has held since Locke, and as Stuart Hall explains with admirable clarity in his introduction to *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (1997: 1-75). Where Hall identifies language as the main process through which representation expresses meaning, I add vision, thus diversifying the senses through which the corporeal materiality of representations can be adduced. In this period, as I will show, language and vision were closely related.

[19] Whenever possible I quote from the earliest available English translation of Winckelmann's works. For the *Gedanken* I am using Fuseli's 1765 translation both because it is very early and because Fuseli was a

> To THE GREEK CLIMATE we owe the production of taste, and from thence it spread at length over all the politer world. Every invention, communicated by foreigners to that nation, was but the seed of what it became afterwards, changing both its nature and size in a country, chosen, as Plato says, by Minerva, to be inhabited by the Greeks, as productive of every kind of genius.
>
> But this taste was not only original among the Greeks, but seemed also quite peculiar to their country: it seldom went abroad without loss, and was long ere it imparted its kind influences to more distant climes. It was, doubtless, a stranger to the northern zones, when painting and sculpture, those offsprings of Greece, were despised there to such a degree, that the most valuable pieces of Correggio served only for blinds to the windows of the royal stables at Stockholm.
>
> There is but one way for the moderns to become great, and perhaps unequalled; I mean, by imitating the ancients. And what we are told of Homer, that whoever understands him well, admires him, we find no less true in matters concerning the ancient, especially the Greek arts. But then we must be as familiar with them as with a friend, to find Laocoön as inimitable as Homer. By such intimacy our judgment will be that of Nicomachus: Take these eyes, replied he to some paltry critic, censuring the Helen of Zeuxis, Take my eyes, and she will appear a goddess. (61)

Here we see a description of Classical Greece that, in extending Baumgarten's aesthetic theory into space and time, would become a commonplace of Hellenist idealism central to Winckelmann's developmental aesthetic history: Greece as the originary source of "kind influences" that can be exported in the form of art. This model of influence would be important to a later concept of British Greekness, assuming that ancient Greek climate produced ancient Greek genius, and that ancient Greek art is productive of looking relations that, if imitated, will change the course of modern life. Imitation of the genius of Greek

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careful student of Winckelmann in the German original, as well as an artist and aesthetic theoretician in his own right, and thus may be taken as an authority on Winckelmann's views. While Fuseli's father was an intimate of Winckelmann, the son and the art theorist were in correspondence with each other but did not meet, though Allentuck notes that Winckelmann thought Fuseli's translation "*fort bien traduit*" (180). I am grateful for David Irwin's selections from Winckelmann collected in his 1972 Phaidon volume, which come from the editions I myself prefer, and which volume includes helpful annotations.

artworks will, however, require the artist to be "as familiar with them as a friend," so that the artist can then show viewers this 'friend' as they appear to the artist. Traveling beyond the intrapersonal subjectivism of Baumgartenian aesthetic theory, Winckelmann's comments on the "intimacy" of his judgment and the importance of relating that judgment to another sets up a social theory of art that would form the context for much of nineteenth-century British aesthetics.

As I argue above, this theory of art and of aesthetic affect is also a theory of subjectivity and, as the passage quoted above demonstrates, it is explicitly interpellative in purpose.[20] Winckelmann wants modern Europeans to "take these eyes" so that they may see as the ancient Greeks did, and further explication of his theoretical system will explain why this goal is of such primary importance. As he elaborates his spiritual geography, Winckelmann explains how the Greek climate gave Greek artists increased opportunities to study a characteristic type of corporeal beauty: "[T]he forms of the Greeks, prepared to beauty, by the influence of the mildest and purest sky, became perfectly elegant by their early exercises" (62). The word 'form' here suggests that Winckelmann is participating in figural interpretation in the sense Auerbach uses to describe the history of *figura*, and it is no accident that his comments on a generalized form of Greekness apply to muscular young men. For Winckelmann, "perfectly elegant" ancient Greekness is exemplified by young male athletes and soldiers, and he argues that "by these exercises the bodies of the Greeks got the great and manly Contour observed in their statues, without any bloated corpulency"

[20] See Althusser 1971. Interpellation is part of Althusser's theory of ideology, describing how human objects of ideology becomes subjects, in psychological terms, through being identified as knowable in ideological terms.

(ibid.); as he writes a few pages later, "[T]he Gymnasia, where, sheltered from public modesty, the youths exercised themselves naked, were the schools of art" (64). Having inserted an audience into the subjective experience of Baumgartenian *pulchritudo* in his imagined scene of imitation in the passage quoted above, Winckelmann thus shifts the scope of Baumgarten's enfiguration of the *felix aestheticus* from the intrapersonal characteristics of a single subject to the national characteristics of an entire *ethnos*, ascribing the image of ideal masculine subjectivity as transcendent wholeness to the artists of classical Greece.[21] Crucially, this national characteristic is in Winckelmann placed within the scope of the looking relations pertaining between an older man and one or more naked, muscular young men – looking relations that carry an erotic charge. Winckelmann adds that with this masculine-identified physical beauty, Greek artists also combined something "awful and sublime:" in the Greece of Winckelmann's mind, "[S]ensual beauty furnished the painter with all that nature could give; ideal beauty with the awful and sublime; from that he took the *Humane*, from this the *Divine*" (66).

This aggregatory process moves from individual exempla, the beautiful male bodies of Greek youths, to their enfiguration as a composite 'form,' which in Winckelmann's theory "leads to general beauty, and its ideal images, and is the way the Greeks took" (65). This is enfiguration in action, and in reading Winckelmann it is important to retain this sense in which individual works of art are distillations of a way of life, and of a philosophic synthesis between ideal and natural that is capable of ennobling

[21] From Greek *ethnós*, meaning an ethnic group

a viewer because that synthesis was created by one self-ennobled. Art's distillative function is why modern Europeans need to take the eyes of ancient Greeks, but it is not solely in his aesthetic theory of climatic hereditarianism that Winckelmann created an enfiguration of ancient Greek masculinity that was to remain influential afterward. Winckelmann also used his descriptions of specific works of ancient Greek art to act out his theory, as seen in his most famous description of the *Laocoön*, from the *Gedanken*:

> The last and most eminent characteristic of the Greek works is a noble simplicity and sedate grandeur in gesture and expression. As the bottom of the sea lies peaceful beneath a foaming surface, a great soul lies sedate beneath the strife of passions in Greek figures.
>
> It is in the face of Laocoön [that] this soul shines with full lustre, not confined however to the face, amidst the most violent sufferings. Pangs piercing every muscle, every labouring nerve; pangs which we almost feel ourselves, while we consider—not the face, nor the most expressive parts—only the belly contracted by excruciating pains: these however, I say, exert not themselves with violence, either in the face or gesture. He pierces not heaven, like the Laocoön of Virgil; his mouth is rather opened to discharge an anxious overloaded groan, as Sadoleto says; the struggling body and the supporting mind exert themselves with equal strength, nay balance all the frame.
>
> Laocoön suffers, but suffers like the Philoctetes of Sophocles: we weeping feel his pains, but wish for the hero's strength to support his misery. The expression of so great a soul is beyond the force of mere nature. It was in his own mind the artist was to search for the strength of spirit with which he marked his marble. Greece enjoyed artists and philosophers in the same persons; and the wisdom of more than one Metrodorus directed art, and inspired its figures with more than common souls. (72)

Here we see Winckelmann continuing to push Baumgarten's thesis connecting mind and body through the *ars pulchre cogitandi*. By taking both the artist of the *Laocoön* and his artwork as example, Winckelmann narrates his process of 'becoming intimate' with the statue in order to properly describe both process and artwork to the reader. Winckelmann is careful to acknowledge the violence of the marine image he uses, while at the same time

he characterizes that violence as harmony through the narration of an achieved psychic equilibrium between Laocoön's "struggling body" and "supporting mind" – an equilibrium he believes the sculptor of the *Laocoön* models on his own. By telling his reader that the artist "was in his own mind… to search for the strength of spirit with which he marked his marble" Winckelmann is telling us not only that the artist is himself a *felix aestheticus* engaged in *ars pulchre cogitandi*, this engagement demonstrated through the resulting work of art, but also that the artist's earned mental state of equilibrium expressed through the work of art is an *ideal* state. Unlike Winckelmann's later descriptions of the same artwork, this one is brief, focused primarily on explicating the image Winckelmann proposes in the first paragraph – that of a "great soul" lying "sedate beneath the strife of passions" – and in the distance between sea bed and foaming surface, between the 'soul' and 'the strife of passions,' Winckelmann locates the distance between the violence of an experience and the expression of its perception.

A second description of the *Laocoön* group, one that displays both continuity and a shift in emphasis from the first, comes from Book 10 of the *Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums* (1764), Winckelmann's masterwork (known in English as the *History of Ancient Art*, quoted in this case from the 1849 Lodge translation):

> *Laocoön* is a statue representing a man in extreme suffering who is striving to collect the conscious strength of his soul to bear it. While the muscles are swelling and the nerves are straining with torture, the determined spirit is visible in the turgid forehead, the chest is distended by the obstructed breath and the suppressed outburst of feeling, in order that he may retain and keep within himself the pain which tortures him. The indrawn anxious sigh and the inhaled breath exhaust the belly, and make the sides hollow to such a degree that we are almost able to see the movements of the entrails. But his own suffering seems to distress him less than that of his children, who turn their faces to their father and shriek for aid; the father's feelings are visible in the sorrowful eyes, and his pity seems to float on them in a dim vapour. The expression of the face is complaining, but not screaming; the eyes are turned for help to a higher power. The mouth is full of sorrow, and the

> sunken lip is heavy with the same feeling; but in the upper lip, which is drawn upwards, this expression is mingled with one of pain, which, with an emotion of indignation at unmerited, unworthy suffering, rises to the nose, swells it, and manifests itself in the dilated and upward-drawn nostrils. The struggle between the pain and the suppression of the feelings is rendered with great knowledge as concentrated in one point below the forehead; for whilst the pain elevates the eyebrows, resistance to it presses the fleshy parts above the eyes downward and towards the upper eyelid, so that it is almost entirely covered by the overhanging skin. As the artist could not make nature more beautiful, he has sought to exhibit it more developed, more strained, more powerful; in the parts where the greatest pain is placed he shows us the greatest beauty. The left side, into which the serpent with furious bite discharges its poison, appears to suffer the most violently from its greater sensibility in consequence of its vicinity to the heart; and this part of the body may be termed a miracle of art. (135-6)

The fleeting inclusion of Laocoön's children in this description helps us to note how odd it is that, in both of Winckelmann's descriptions of the *Laocoön* grouping, so little attention is paid to three of the four figures represented.[22] That the coiling sea-serpents typically receive so little attention is to be expected: as in Virgil, the serpents are a given here, tools of the gods' displeasure rather than beings signifying their own desires.[23] That the two children of the priest Laocoön are not more significant is somewhat surprising; Winckelmann sees in the "dim vapour" of Laocoön's eyes that his own suffering "seems

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[22] Wojciehowski (2011) gives an interesting discussion of the *Laocoön* group *as* a group; her argument is that its status as a renowned artwork and its status as a *gruppo* are co-constitutive during the Renaissance and have social effects. To this I would add that, where in the Renaissance the *gruppo* became an important concept due in part to the fame of the *Laocoön* group and its ekphrastic description, in the German and British Enlightenments the *Laocoön* becomes emblematic of masculine subjective autonomy as the necessary concomitant and guarantor of both individual and group identity via similar means.

[23] Though this does not enter into Winckelmann's *ekphrasis*, Laocoön was a Trojan priest who warned his countrymen against bringing the Trojan Horse into the city, going so far as to sink a javelin into the side of the horse which, unfortunately, did not pierce the boards from which the horse was constructed. We learn in Virgil's *Aeneid* that Minerva, incensed by these actions, sent sea serpents to kill Laocoön and his sons. It is interesting that to Winckelmann the Trojan subject matter of the *Laocoön* is of no importance; as the passages quoted above indicate, the importance of the *Laocoön* lies in its Greekness, and according to Winckelmann's climatological theory of racialized artistic ability, its Greekness comes not from its subject matter but from the artist's located phenomenological experience.

to distress him less than that of his children," and we know that both Winckelmann and the Greeks he so admired were appreciative of youthful masculine beauty, so one wonders: why do Laocoön's children rate so little attention?

Perhaps a clue is buried in the theory Winckelmann hopes to exemplify through these descriptions, which is a theory of the interpersonal transmission of an individual, spiritualizing masculinity through intimacy, which transmission requires both intimacy and a special kind of *distance*. There is of course the physical distance between artwork and audience necessary for the artwork to be seen, but as I note in my discussion of the previous description of the *Laocoön*, there is also a preponderance of attention paid to the distance between experience and perception, and between experience and expression. The first passage's "[P]angs piercing every muscle" that "exert not themselves with violence, either in the face nor gesture" are in the second passage "[T]he struggle between the pain and the suppression of the feelings," and it is precisely in maintaining that distance between experience and expression in a moment of extreme trauma that the priest is ennobled, his controlled suffering enfigured through Winckelmann's reading as "the conscious strength of his soul." I read this special kind of socioemotional distance from one's own trauma, written on the body, as the central node around which political meaning accretes in Winckelmann's or Baumgarten's model of masculine subjectivity, and Alex Potts, art theorist, historian and author of *Flesh and the Ideal: Winckelmann and the Origins of Art History* (1994) reads it as emblematic of the socio-emotional specificities of Winckelmann's Greek ideal. This model of adult masculine subjectivity understands total

autonomy as an ideal subjective state that is also, paradoxically, incompatible with an engagement with the world.

The importance of ideal masculinity understood as subjective autarchy has everything to do with Puwar's concept of the somatic norm, and with what she calls "the maleness of the state." Winckelmann's Greek *felix aestheticus* is an ideal male figure whose art and artistry, if imitated properly, will bring the modern viewing subject into an enfigurative tradition of Greekness and make him "perhaps unequalled." As Potts notes, "[W]ith Winckelmann… freedom is not just the condition that makes possible the imaginative creation of an ideal beauty," but also "the subjective state of being figured by that beauty, through its apparent embodiment of a state of unconstrained narcissistic plenitude" (4). For Potts, Winckelmann's *Laocoön* as well as his *Apollo Belvedere* "are male figures that seem to require no female other, obliterating in their self-sufficient plenitude the psychic landscapes of the feminine" (131) and thus displaying "the 'pathological' imperatives of 'normal' masculine identity in Enlightenment culture, which made great play of the homoerotic while uncompromisingly repressing the public visibility of male same-sex desire" (144). While he doesn't use the term, by describing the ideological content of Winckelmann's *ekphrasis* in psychological terms Potts both assumes the subjective utility of enfiguration – he recognizes an enfiguration's effect on individual phenomenal experience as a special feature of its enunciation – and places the model of sociality that is the ideological content of that enunciation in a historical context, as he makes explicit here:

> When Winckelmann presented an image of ideal masculinity actively asserting itself, he configured it in explicitly violent terms… Statues such as the Apollo Belvedere and the Laocoön were imagined in scenes of violent confrontation whose only issue could be a subjugation of the outside world's resistance to the self or the annihilation of the self by the forces confronting it.
>
> The notion of the ideal sovereign subject as something that could only be truly itself when totally autonomous, either through withdrawing from the world or confronting it, is ideological if nothing else. If we say such a notion of the self also seems to haunt modern psychoanalytic accounts of narcissistic fantasy, we are not denying its ideological specificity. Rather we are simply recognizing that our present-day understanding of such fantasy grows out of politically loaded formations of subjectivity that have permeated modern 'bourgeois' culture for some time. (146)

This passage offers a useful historical-poetic account of Winckelmann's corpus. As I note in the introduction to this dissertation, Winckelmann's corporealist enfigurations of "politically loaded formations of subjectivity" and their capacity to endure over time are primary objects of inquiry here. To Pott's argument we can add the supposition that the absent presence of the two accompanying human figures in the *Laocoön* grouping serve in Winckelmann's enfiguration of ideal aesthetic subjectivity as the necessarily elided counterpart to the reified, radically autonomous subject nobly suppressing his 'natural' reaction to pain. There is some tension here between the Baumgartenian aesthetic individual and Winckelmann's social-intimacy model of *aesthesis*, requiring multiple subjectivities and complicating Potts' strong reading of Winckelmann's individualism as self-sovereignty, but at the same time Potts is right to say that Winckelmann is interested in delineating "the ideal sovereign subject." I would simply add that, like the invocatory body in Puwar's normative space, Winckelmann's 'friendly' audience is in relationship to the artist and to Winckelmann much as Laocoön's children are to him: as a Derridean

supplement[24] that at once troubles the rhetorical frame in which it exists, excuses and explains the existence of said rhetorical frame as a logical necessity, and thus ensures the frame's lasting coherence.

The Trojan Priest's children are supplemental to the *Laocoön* because their presence is unnecessary to Winckelmann's description of the group, as he proves in his first description from the *Gedanken*, while their pain provides the impetus behind the most expressive aspect of an artwork whose worth lies in the particular quality of its expressiveness. They are, in other words, an audience integral to the function of the artwork. In one of the two most striking instances of Winckelmann's seeming forgetfulness that the sculpture is not alive (the other being when he is "almost able" to see the statue's entrails) he identifies a "dim vapour" that seems at once entirely extraneous and centrally important to the passage in which it occurs. Laocoön releases this "vapour" from his eyes

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[24] I take this term from *Of Grammatology* (1967). As Derrida uses it, 'the supplement' occurs first in a discussion of Rousseau, Derrida calling the supplement "that discord… under the name of writing" (157) and describing it as

> a fatal necessity, inscribed in the very functioning of the sign, that the substitute make one forget the vicariousness of its own function and make itself pass for the plenitude of a speech whose deficiency and infirmity it nevertheless only supplements. For the concept of the supplement—which here determines that of the representative image—harbors within itself two significations whose cohabitation is as strange as it is necessary. The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the *fullest measure* of presence. It cumulates and accumulates presence. It is thus that art, *technè*, image, representation, convention, etc., come as supplements to nature and are rich with this entire cumulating function. This kind of supplementarity determines in a certain way all the conceptual oppositions within which Rousseau inscribes the notion of Nature to the extent that it *should* be self-sufficient. 144-5, emphasis original

Because "its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness," the supplement is a present absence that marks writing as the site of an overdetermined relation to signification, much as Laocoön's sons are figures whose present absence in Winckelmann's *ekphrasis* marks that *ekphrasis* as the site of an overdetermined relation to a specific style of masculinity. This is a relation that in Pott's phrase creates "politically loaded formations of subjectivity" - Derrida's "representative image" determined by its necessarily cohabiting supplement - or, in the terms of art here in play, enfigurations.

as Winckelmann regards him with his, and Winckelmann's words then relay this phenomenon to the reader's mind's eye. The looking relations are always man-to-man, symmetrically bounded within a dialectic pretending to be a one-way transmission, an interpellative hailing through which Winckelmann enfigures not just the *Laocoön* of his mind's eye but the writer and reader of its description, replacing the Trojan priest with himself and Laocoön's children with his readers.

An author-centered reading of Winckelmann's corpus shows how well a writerly model of historical poetics that is focused on stylistics can work. In this instance, the model works because Winckelmann's textual praxis continually locates the reader within the original looking relations pertaining between descriptor and described. We both see through Winckelmann's eyes and we also see Winckelmann seeing, and by this means he commingles with and to some degree replaces the artist-philosopher, himself becoming the *felix aestheticus,* his deep sympathy with products of classical Greek culture enfiguring him (and through him, his reader) as Greek. The reader feels in tandem with the writer as both writer and artist propose an implicit philosophical system that intermingles outward Stoicism and rationality with intense inner sensibility in a synthesis that is at once political, philosophical and formal. A further example will give the reader a fuller sense of Winckelmann's corpus, especially as it influenced English nineteenth-century idealist Hellenism, this example a description of the *Apollo Belvedere* from the *Geschichte*:

> Among all the works of antiquity which have escaped destruction the statue of *Apollo* is the highest ideal of art. The artist has constructed this work entirely on the ideal, and has employed in its structure just so much only of the material as was necessary to carry out his design and render it visible. This *Apollo* exceeds all other figures of him as much as the Apollo of Homer

> excels him whom later poets paint. His stature is loftier than that of man, and his attitude speaks of the greatness with which he is filled. An eternal spring, as in the happy Field of Elysium, clothes with the charms of youth the graceful manliness of ripened years, and plays with softness and tenderness about the proud shape of his limbs. Let thy spirit penetrate into the kingdom of incorporeal beauties, and strive to become a creator of a heavenly nature, in order that thy mind may be filled with beauties that are elevated above nature; for there is nothing mortal here, nothing which human necessities require. (139)

By saying that the specific statue of Apollo at which he is looking "exceeds all other figures of him as much as the Apollo of Homer excels him whom later poets paint," Winckelmann is at once placing this individual sculpture in a figural tradition, allying that tradition with poetry and painting, and demonstrating afresh why his theories were so influential. The excellence Winckelmann locates in the plastic art of Ancient Greece is not limited thereto, but instead is a *kind* of excellence that painting and poetry can also exhibit; this shows why his ekphrastic descriptions of Greek art are so useful in promulgating a theory of enfiguration that is not limited to a specific artistic medium. This passage also emphasizes one of the recurring problems enlivening these ekphrastic descriptions of art: the tension between naturalism and idealism. While in his comments on Greek climate Winckelmann is deeply enthusiastic about the effects of nature on young men's bodies, and the effects of these bodies on Greek artists' minds and his own, in Winckelmann's 1755 description of the *Laocoön* "mere nature" cannot furnish the forms through which the artist can express his philosophy. Instead, the artist must search for his philosophy's ideal vehicle in his own mind. Unlike the description in the *Gedanken,* in the *Laocoön* passage from the *Geschichte* we find that "[A]s the artist could not make nature more beautiful, he has sought to exhibit it more developed, more strained, more powerful; in the parts where the greatest pain is

placed he shows us the greatest beauty" (136) and, in the passage quoted above, Winckelmann clearly locates the ideal-ness of the "highest ideal of Greek art" precisely where the tension between ideal and 'natural' occur. In the description of Apollo from which I have already quoted immediately above, Winckelmann then continues in this vein, describing the beauty of Apollo in terms that will become important later in this chapter as he narrates an aesthetic experience that is almost traumatic in its strong effect:

> Neither blood-vessels nor sinews heat and stir this body, but a heavenly essence, diffusing itself like a gentle stream, seems to fill the whole contour of the figure. (…) The father of the gods in all the images of him which we have remaining, and which art venerates, does not approach so nearly the grandeur in which he manifested himself to the understanding of the divine poet, as he does here in the countenance of his son, and the individual beauties of the other deities are here as in the person of Pandora assembled together, a forehead of Jupiter, pregnant with the Goddess of Wisdom, and eyebrows the contractions of which express their will, the grandly arched eyes of the queen of the gods, and a mouth shaped like that whose touch stirred with delight the loved Branchus. The soft hair plays about the divine head as if agitated by a gentle breeze, like the slender waving tendrils of the noble vine; it seems to be anointed with the oil of the gods, and tied by the Graces with pleasing display on the crown of his head. In the presence of this miracle of art I forget all else, and I myself take a lofty position for the purpose of looking upon it in a worthy manner. My breast seems to enlarge and swell with reverence, like the breasts of those who were filled with the spirit of prophecy, and I feel myself transported to Delos and into the Lycaean groves,—places which Apollo honoured by his presence,—for my image seems to receive life and motion, like the beautiful creation of Pygmalion. How is it possible to paint and describe it! (139-40)

One important point to note here is that this is the first of many descriptions of the experience of feeling oneself enfigured by a work of art, and this enfiguration is centered on the point of an enduring tension between idealism and naturalism. If ideal beauty occurs where the tension between ideal and natural occur, one question this descriptive tension begs is whether Laocoön's "greatest pain" is also the artist's, and whether that pain, like

the philosophy it expresses, is occurring "in (the artist's) own mind." If in the second *Laocoön* description "where the greatest pain is placed he shows us the greatest beauty," it is interesting to note that in the above description of the *Apollo Belvedere* Winckelmann locates Apollo's ideal beauty in the aggregation of "the individual beauties of the other deities," in a composite portrait *a la* Galton that, instead of fixing the physiognomic average, displays the physiognomic ideal. This composite beauty is a curious reversal of Potts' image of autonomous Enlightenment masculinity, in that Apollo achieves the ideal through introjection rather than rejection, recalling Shelley's "We are all Greeks" and the tension between inclusive and exclusive notions of polity that saying expresses, and this reversal maps nicely onto the tension between Baumgarten's individualism and Winckelmann's sociality. Additionally, the tension here between pain and beauty maps directly onto the tension between singularity and multiplicity, as well as the tension between individuality and sociality; Apollo's singular beauty is "assembled" from "the individual beauties of the other deities." This internal tension between opposing logics is clearly an important aspect of Winckelmann's thought: in the first description of Laocoön he alone is described, the tensions of the description and the thing described located within, in the deep sea-bottoms of Laocoon's suffering-but-exceptional soul. In the second, however, the greater distress is not in his own pain but in seeing his sons "shriek for aid" he cannot give; here the enfiguration enfolds the outer drama of the group for a single sentence but again, the focus quickly returns to the mature male figure and the internal contest between his suffering and his virtue, as enfigured through the artist-philosopher's negotiation with Nature. It is in the final description of the *Apollo Belvedere* quoted above

that we see the tension between individualism and sociality most clearly, as I have already noted. Where visibility is inherently social in Winckelmann's system, sociality and ideal beauty are in conflict. This conflict is the problem to which Sir Joshua Reynolds would respond, and his response will be the subject of the next section of this chapter. I will also place Reynolds in his own social context, but before doing so it is necessary to see how Winckelmann's influence reached England.

REYNOLDS' *DISCOURSES*: FROM FRIENDLY INTIMACY TO COSMOLOGICAL SOCIALITY

As I will now describe, Winckelmann's posthumous mythos is, aptly enough, divided. The aesthetic psychology which Winckelmann's work extends into space and time – Baumgarten's *felix aestheticus* – helped him to enfigure classical Greek artists and those whose classical taste can properly appreciate them as ideal subjects, in turn giving rise to an enfiguration of socioemotional perfection with which Winckelmann was identified after his death. As the middle term in a tripartite movement away from Baumgarten's isolated aesthetic subject, Winckelmann's model of 'friendly intimacy' is inherently social but, with its lingering idealism, Winckelmann's aesthetic sociality is a strained, effortful affair. Despite this underlying tension, his immediate posthumous reputation is as the disciple of the Greek spirit understood as 'noble simplicity and quiet grandeur' ("*edle Einfalt und stille Größe*," from the *Gedanken* description of the *Laocoön* quoted above), and in this role it is difficult to overstate Winckelmann's importance to German Hellenism and to nineteenth-century German aesthetics. Hegel, in his early nineteenth-century lectures on fine arts at Heidelberg (1818) and later at Berlin (1820-1830s), saw Baumgarten, followed by Schiller, Goethe and Winckelmann, as his predecessors in the construction of "a new science, or

rather… something which at the same time was to become a philosophical discipline" (1975: 1), and the Weimar classicists were perhaps Winckelmann's most famous and influential early boosters. They were certainly not averse to hyperbole: in his essay in *Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert*[25] (Winckelmann and His Century, 1805) Goethe describes Winckelmann as a larger-than-life figure "tossed between extremes" and thoroughly imbued with the "spirit of antiquity" (102), "the reincarnation of ancient man" closely identified with an unstinting spiritual and intellectual adherence "to the immediate, the true, the real" (101).

It is fitting that in his description, Goethe places Winckelmann at a Laocoönic point "between extremes," and there are other echoes of Winckelmann's aesthetics in Goethe's encomium that remain closely associated with Winckelmann afterwards. In his characterization of "ancient man" Goethe is taking Winckelmann's comments on Greek climate and placing them within the historiographical frame of the *Querelle des Anciens et Modernes*, which played some part in other Weimar classicists' works, for instance Lessing's *Laokoön oder Über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie* (1767).[26] Goethe contrasts 'ancient man' with his modern counterpart, stating that while total subjectival coherence was possible in the Greeks' golden age, accomplished when "all (ancient man's)

[25] For Goethe's essay on Winckelmann I am using volume 3 of Goethe's *Collected Works*, edited by John Gearey and translated by Ellen and Ernest H. von Nardroff (1986). Lessing scholar and prominent eighteenth-century Germanist H. B. Nisbet calls the title of *Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert* "an obvious echo of Voltaire's *Siécle de Louis XIV*" (25) indicating Goethe's sense of Winckelmann's high importance.
[26] For more on Winckelmann and time in Lessing's *Laocoön* see W.J.T. Mitchell's chapter on "The Politics of Genre: Space and Time in Lessing's *Laocoön*" in *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology* ([1984] 2013: 95-115). See also Brandes 2017, which ties Winckelmann's valuation of equilibrium, especially in his descriptions of the *Laocoön* group, to the valuation of equilibrium in German classicism generally.

qualities unite within him and work together as one… [M]odern man often loses himself in the infinite before finally returning if possible to a limited point of reference" (101). In contrast, Goethe writes that once Winckelmann had "obtained the necessary freedom, he became, in the sense of the ancients, a whole and complete human being" (102).

This wholeness and completeness is both intra- and interpersonal. Since Winckelmann and the ancient Greeks had access to a special kind of subjectivity, they also had access to the "full scope of human relationships," and "did not want to deny themselves the delight that results from the bond between people of a similar temperament" (103). Goethe clarifies that he is discussing Winckelmann's erotic life by amending this statement almost immediately:

> Even in this respect there is a remarkable difference between ancient and modern times. The relationship to women, which in our time has become so tender and spiritual, scarcely rose above the level of physical need. The relationship of parent and child seems to have been somewhat more loving. But friendship among men was for them the only genuine emotional relationship - although two women, Chloris and Tythia, remained inseparable friends even in Hades.
>
> We react with astonishment when, with regard to two young men, we hear of passionate fulfillment of love's desire, the bliss of being inseparable, lifelong devotion, or the need to follow the other into death. Indeed, we feel embarrassed when poets, historians, philosophers, orators inundate us with stories, events, sentiments and opinions related to the subject.
>
> Winckelmann felt born for friendship of that kind. He felt not only capable, but greatly in need of it. He experienced his real self only in the context of friendship and could perceive himself as a whole only if he was complemented by another. Early in life he found a perhaps unworthy object of his feelings. He was utterly devoted to him, and even in his poverty he found the means to be generous, to give, to sacrifice for the friend; indeed, he did not hesitate to mortgage his existence, his life. It is here that Winckelmann, himself in great need, felt noble, rich, magnanimous and happy because he could be of service to the one he loved most, the one for whom he could make the greatest sacrifice, that of forgiving gratitude.

> No matter how times and circumstances changed, Winckelmann modeled all his friendships on the first. And although many of these idealized relationships faded, his idealistic attitude nevertheless ensured him the affection of many a good man. Thus he had the good fortune to establish excellent relations with some of the best people of his time. (103)

The "full scope of human relations" that 'ancient man' enjoyed as they are described here relies on a very specific meaning of 'full,' and defines 'human relations' in highly exclusive terms.[27] Women in Goethe's vision of ancient Greece were vessels for men's 'physical needs' and for children, to whom Greek women could be "somewhat more loving," but 'friendship' in this passage is clearly idealized adult male sexual attraction to men. While this particular reading of friendship illuminates some implicit aspects of Winckelmann's meaning when he states that "we must be as familiar with them as with a friend" to truly understand examples of Greek art and to describe them properly to others, it complicates the revised notion of *perfectio* Goethe associates with Winckelmann's ancient Greek-ness.

For Goethe, the *perfectio* of Ancient Greekness can be understood through Winckelmann's identification therewith and specifically through the 'friendships' he had with other men. The complicating factor is that Winckelmann's "excellent relations with some of the best people of his time" were neither legally nor socially acceptable as sexual

[27] I will return to this quotation later in this chapter to further explicate the way "The relationship to women" is discussed here. For now it is interesting to note that Goethe's remarks on Greek gender politics recall Hannah Arendt's comments on Greek polity from *The Human Condition*: "Women and slaves belonged to the same category and were hidden away not only because they were somebody else's property, but because their life was "laborious" and devoted to bodily functions" (1956: 72). This in turn informs Eve Sedgwick's analysis of whether patriarchy requires homophobia in *Between Men*, since the ancient Greek example would seem to offer an example of a patriarchy that was not homophobic. She adduces evidence from various sources and concludes that "the historically differential shapes of male and female homosociality – much as they themselves vary over time – will always be articulations and mechanisms of the enduring inequality of power between women and men" ([1985] 1992: 5). I would argue that these 'historically differential shapes' are enfigurations, and that part of the point of this project is to make them more easily visible to the reader through the praxis of historical poetics.

relationships, and Goethe is forced to acknowledge as much: he says that "[W]e react with astonishment," "we feel embarrassed" by too-free an acknowledgment of "the subject." Though we know from letters[28] that Winckelmann did have an intense relationship with the wife of his friend Anton Raphael Mengs, it was by his own statement not consummated sexually, and Goethe's association of the immediate, the true, and the real with Winckelmann suggests that while Goethe is probably not envisioning a proto-Uranian utopia, wherein sexual love between men is society's highest good, he is certainly making it plain *a la* Pott's masculinist Enlightenment psycho-ideology that male homosociality is the model for 'true' sociality.[29] If we extend this idea to Winckelmann's statement that "we must be as familiar with (works of art) as with a friend," we can see that the looking relations Winckelmann suggests must appertain when looking at works of art are not just masculine, but exist in an imagined homosocial community modeled on one in which women were second-class non-citizens, mere objects of men's "physical needs," if that. This will be important in the next chapter. The effort of *perfectio* is in such a homosocial model the effort of performing masculinity correctly, which, in Goethe's mind and in Winckelmann's writing, involves an internal distancing act separating experience from perception or expression *and* an external civic ideology of distance separating men from

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[28] See Johann Joachim Winckelmann, *Briefe*, eds. Walther Rehm & Hans Diepolder (1952-57). Potts (1994: 208-9) also discusses Winckelmann's relationship with Margherita Mengs in terms of his sexual freedom in Rome and his sexual interest in men.

[29] Keeping in mind Sedgwick's differentiation between homosocial and homosexual, with which I generally agree, I am using the term 'homosocial' to refer to a situation in which a single sex is physically present or ideologically valuable. As I will note below, I also think that 'sexual homosociality' may be a useful locution, since it offers a shorthand expression of the outcome of Sedgwick's discussion of the two terms that avoids the diffuse sexological presentism of the term 'homosexual' and the somewhat gnomic inclarity of 'homosocial.'

women *and* its epistemological counterpart, separating the social aspects of Winckelmann's 'friendship' from Goethe's image of sexuality as 'purely physical needs.'

If we ask what negotiations are taking place in Goethe's encomium on Winckelmann, we can see that they revolve around a type of masculinity characterized by inner tension *not quite* expressed, whose just-visible suppression signifies ethical exceptionality, and by a highly constrained civic and sexual diversity represented through a reified masculine singularity. As such this enfiguration of masculine subjectivity has obvious correlations to the *felix aestheticus* whose achieved habitus is the tensive outer expression of an inner-directed psychic effort, and its enfiguration is also marked by internal disjunctions. In the triangulation between the *Laocoön* group, in which only the central figure is allowed to become truly visible through his enfiguration as a radically autonomous subject at once both foaming surface and deep-sea bottom, the *Apollo Belvedere*, in which the composite beauty of the gods is distilled to such a degree that the viewer must "take a lofty position for the purpose of looking upon it in a worthy manner," and Winckelmann's version of the *felix aestheticus*, we find an ideal, homosocial space in which women are not just absent but signify, at least in Goethe's narration, that masculine sexuality which is jettisoned from ideal space in order for it to be ideal.

If we ask which 'historical crisis' this enfiguration of masculine Being was created in response to, it is difficult to make a confident answer. The Enlightenment re-evaluation of individualism is important in understanding the shift from Leibniz's to Baumgarten's aesthetics, Prussian state need for educated bureaucrats may help to explain the importance of masculine companionate autonomy in Winckelmann's aesthetic theory, and

Winckelmann's personal life also plays an important role here. The sexual mores of Rome and even of Dresden would have differed a great deal from those pertaining in rural Prussia, whether applied to heterosexual sex or not, and we know from letters and from an account written by Casanova that Winckelmann was both sexually active with men and (usually) not very cautious or discrete in Rome, even boasting that his patron, Cardinal Albani, enjoyed hearing tales of his seductions.[30] Also, it is clear from his letters that Winckelmann's works were composed partly in celebration of an experience of unwonted personal freedom that, despite Winckelmann's comfortable lifestyle and European fame, he must have known could easily disappear.[31] While Pater's 1860s encomium on Goethe and Winckelmann strongly supports this reading, as I will show in the third chapter, there are some problems with any logical-argumentative movement beyond it. Aside from the heavy burden of proof necessarily levied when speculating on another's state of mind,

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[30] see Potts 1994: 209.

[31] Ruprecht 2010 suggests that, while Winckelmann's sexual activities with men would not have been acceptable behavior elsewhere in Europe at the time, they were so in Rome as in south central Italy generally. Potts challenges this view, noting that Winckelmann had included in an unpublished revision to the *History* a disclaimer against "misinterpretation" of certain passages in his *Treatise on the Capacity for the Feeling for Beauty in Art*, "which elicited views from some people that were quite remote from my original intention" (*Kleine Schriften* 454, quoted in Potts 1994: 207). This may have as much to do with his international audience after 1764 as with Roman sexual mores, but it also introduces a note of caution into any atemporal assessment of Winckelmann's sexual liberation in Rome. Ruprecht also cautions against a presentist reading of "the 'gay' Winckelmann," (302) with which caution I agree; Ruprecht's point is that Winckelmann's paganism was more shocking and thus of more interest to his contemporaries, which argument Goethe's 'ancientist' encomium on Winckelmann bears out. My counterpoint is that Winckelmann's sexuality and his paganism seem in his own and in Goethe's accounts rather inextricable. While it is indeed too presentist to call Winckelmann's sexuality 'homosexuality' as that term is meant now, it is accurate to call it a 'sexual homosociality' because, despite his own and his contemporaries' focus on sexual acts rather than sexual 'identity,' Winckelmann's interest in sex with other men was bound up in his thoroughly identitarian, Baumgartenian aesthetic Hellenism. This unwillingness to decouple Winckelmann's sexual life from his aesthetic preoccupations is an expression of my fealty to Sedgwick's original discussion of homosociality/homosexuality, and an attempt to question Butler's later comments in *Undoing Gender* (2004), that "it is not possible to read the profound and possibly inescapable ways that heterosexuality and homosexuality are defined through one another" as Sedgwick sought to do (139).

especially considering the historical distance involved, it is no more reasonable to blame Winckelmann's sexuality for his sexism than it is to blame Goethe's sexuality for his. Generalized misogyny and sexism precede both Goethe and Winckelmann by millennia, and both mens' particular citations of misogyny and sexism occurred in a context in which it seemed to most people utterly unproblematic to assume that women were inferior to men. What seems more likely is that the 'crisis' in question is not 'historical' in the sense that it is not a single time-bound event. Rather, it is an ongoing tension within the enfigurative tradition to which the enfigurations generated thereby are necessarily addressed: the secular, Enlightenment fantasy of oppressive, totalizing complementarianism we saw in Goethe's description of the "full scope of human relations," whose ideal subject position is masculine and somehow fully autonomous, yet lives in homosocial community with other men, and whose supplements must therefore be neither masculine, nor autonomous, nor have access to masculine community.

As an addition to Prins' recursive model of historical poetics this redefinition of crisis as ongoing tension is particularly useful, because the influence Winckelmann's ideas had was as closely tied to their content as to their style, meaning that both a stylistic attention to writerly poetics and an attention to readerly, intertextual or 'distributed' poetics are necessary to describe how Winckelmann's works and their posthumous influence actually functioned. The archeological excavation of Herculaneum and Pompeii was ongoing in Winckelmann's lifetime, and he codified the excavations' procedures to ensure the preservation of artworks, and as Vatican antiquarian he was well-placed to include new

discoveries in his works and to disseminate them via the European 'Republic of Letters.'[32] His writerly poetics of exactitude were thus an important part of Winckelmann's influence, because they made his writing not just enthusiastic, but definitive; in his works he described in detail nearly every antiquarian object then known – Greek, but also Hellenic[33], Egyptian and Etruscan – and thus between 1760 and 1800, Winckelmann's systematic approach to the encyclopedic content of his works made them the best sources on ancient art available in Europe.[34] As Potts writes, "Winckelmann's *History* had a remarkable impact" across

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[32] Kelly's *The Society of Dilettanti* (2009) includes useful examples of how small the world of collecting and connoisseurship was in the latter half of the eighteenth century; not only would many members of the Society of Dilettanti have known of Winckelmann's reference works, but some of them would have known him personally, as each Dilettanti had 'been in Italy' and many had visited Rome where, as papal antiquarian, Winckelmann was often tasked with acting as *cicerone* to elite foreigners in their visit to the city's monuments and artworks. Winckelmann's effects on the excavations at Pompeii and Herculaneum and their English reception in the 18th century is admirably handled by Duesterberg (2015: 89-98).

[33] I use 'Hellenic' here to designate art of or relating to ancient Greek culture before the Hellenistic period, but also to describe art made during the Hellenistic period that is heavily influenced by Greek art traditions. A Xanthian temple mentioned during my discussion of Rose-Greenland's (2013) concept of a 'supra-national' work of art is a good example, and in fact many of Winckelmann's 'Greek' artworks were Hellenic rather than Hellenistic, or even later Roman copies.

[34] While Winckelmann is recognized by his contemporaries and their German descendants as an important figure in art history and archaeology, he is also a foundational figure in the sub-discipline whose emergence after 1980 I describe in the introduction. Frank Turner writes that "through Goethe, Schiller and Schlegel, (Winckelmann) was to have a great influence in England" (1980: 13), and Richard Jenkyns notes that, beside ancient accounts in Cicero's *Orator* and *Brutus*, Pliny's *Natural History*, and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*, Winckelmann's was the "source from which the British criticism of ancient sculpture derived, and one of the lenses through which the literary evidence became read" in the nineteenth century (1981: 39). More recent commentators assume Winckelmann's foundational status and apply it to specific cases; Stefano Evangelista (2008) devotes considerable space to Winckelmann's influence on women writers including Michael Field, Vernon Lee and Virginia Woolf, in her essay "On Not Knowing Greek" (1925), and on canonical nineteenth-century men including Pater, Symonds, and Wilde. Like myself, Evangelista begins his account of nineteenth-century British Hellenism with Winckelmann who, "more than any other single figure… was responsible, if not for inventing ancient Greece, at least for giving it a wholly new cultural significance" (26).

Noah Comet, in *Romantic Hellenism and Women Writers* (2013), writes of early nineteenth-century British aesthetics that "Winckelmann inspired an idealization of the Greek example that eventually trickled into popular culture," including attention to archeological discoveries, and developments in the decorative arts and in architecture "among other developments" (5). Comet adds that this trickle became a flood as "English Hellenism evolved into a mass-cultural phenomenon that incorporated literary and non-literary writing, as well as the consolidation and study of Greek antiquities in museums" (ibid.). Frank Turner also notes that "from 1807 onwards, when the Elgin Marbles were put on public display in London, the English

Europe upon its 1764 publication, presenting "a comprehensive synthesis of available knowledge about the visual artefacts of the ancient world" whose most important contribution was "the eloquent and hugely ambitious attempt to redefine the history and aesthetics of the ancient Greek tradition" (11).

Applying a new system to an old subject made Winckelmann's works useful, and their wide distribution through German, Italian, and French translations makes it possible to ascribe considerable influence to Winckelmann's aesthetic system on the intellectual structure of European aesthetic thought in the late 18th century. As the elaboration of a previous tradition, Winckelmann's works are equally interesting: writing as an expert commoner and as the client of various noblemen, Winckelmann catalogued their possessions and, by placing those possessions in a larger aesthetic framework, shifted the terms of their evaluation away from material worth and towards aesthetic value. That Winckelmann was widely translated and read also meant that his texts became widely distributed; in the remainder of this chapter and in subsequent chapters I will show that Winckelmann's influence becomes so widely-distributed that any attempt to do more than adumbrate the many instances in which that influence is visible would exceed the scope of this project. In Britain, the existence of a preceding elite interest in 'things Greek' which Henry Fuseli's English translations of Winckelmann potentiated is suggested by similarly shifting patterns in the elite tradition of connoisseurship and collecting at the time, and supports the idea that Winckelmann's aesthetics did not utterly change the artistic subject

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had to try to reconcile (Winckelmann's) idea of Greek sculpture" as 'noble simplicity and calm grandeur' with "the actuality" (1980: 13). I will describe in the final section of this chapter how that reconciliation took place.

of attention in England, but recast that subject in a new theoretical light. Though here there is no scope for a survey of English 18th-century connoisseurship and art collecting, or an assessment of the related concept of *gusto Greco*[35], one has only to look at the activities of Britain's Society of Dilletanti and the publications associated with that group, as well as public commentary on those activities and publications, to see that the appearance of Fuseli's translation of the *Gedanken* in 1765 fit very well into a pre-existing trend in the spread of British Hellenism.[36] However, this trend was towards a more public conception of aesthetic didacticism that might seem to signal a return to Leibniz. Where Baumgarten's aesthetic theory concerned itself with the internal processes of the individual, and Winckelmann's ekphrasticism located aesthetic value in the triangular space created by the looking relations between artist, aesthete, and 'friend,' Reynoldsian aesthetic theory would knit together an ideal individual and an imperfect nation through a scopo-social

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[35] '*Gusto Greco'* is a defining personal interest in and enthusiasm for the artwork of ancient Greece in the 18th century. In his history of Delphi, Michael Scott (2014) writes that the discovery of Pompeii and Herculaneum in the middle of the 18th century, and Stuart and Revett's depictions of Greek architecture soon after laid the groundwork for the explosion of *gusto Greco*, but that it was not until the 1770s that *gusto Greco* could be seen "in its full maturity, fueled… by the crucial writings of the German scholar Johann Joachim Winckelmann" (252). *Pace* Scott, there is some uncertainty about how widespread and deeply-felt this 'Grecian gusto' was. *Taste*, a play by Samuel Foote that was staged in 1752, includes a prologue written by David Garrick in which the elite interest in 'things Greek' is parodied as vitiating and unmanly, which suggests that such an interest was at least widespread enough among the elites and well-known enough to their lessers to publically mock; as we will see below, the term was at least common enough by the first decade of the nineteenth century for Byron to use it in attacking Lord Elgin.

[36] The Society of Dilettanti (from the Italian *dilettante*, meaning 'a lover of music or painting,' itself derived from the Latin word *delectare*, 'to delight in') was a group of aristocratic men who had gone on the Grand Tour – had 'been in Italy' – and of whom, as environmental and art historian Jason Kelly (2009) notes, "[H]istory has a bifurcated memory" (xii). As an elite group of collectors and connoisseurs they were personally receptive to Winckelmann's systematic approach to objects they might own or wish to acquire, and as a group whose donations to the British Museum and whose publications promoted public appreciation of classical antiquity – e.g., Stuart and Revett's *The Antiquities of Athens and Other Monuments of Greece* (1762), *Travels in Asia Minor and Greece* (1775-6), and *Ionian Antiquities* (1769) – they were interested in boosting Britain's cultural reputation. There will be further analysis of this latter point in the last section of this chapter and the first section of the next, during a discussion of Fiona Rose-Greenland's (2013) concept of 'supra-national' art.

collectivism that would have long-lasting influence on English aesthetic thought. This synthesis fit well with structural trends away from purely private collections and towards public collections and national musea.

However, to meet the logistical and political needs of a public aesthetics, the nation would need to train its own artists, rather than sending those who could afford it to Italy. This need was met through the creation of a Royal Academy of Art, meant to train English artists and promote the creation of a national style. The *Discourses on Art* that will be the object of analysis in the remaining pages of this section were speeches given every two years at the graduation ceremony of the Royal Academy of Art, of which Sir Joshua Reynolds was President from the Academy's founding almost to the year of his death in 1792, and in them he propounded his views on art. These were simple enough: Reynolds argued that the task of art is not to multiply realistic depictions of the details of the outer human form and thus to please the sensuality or the taste of a moment, but instead to present the viewer with depictions of humanity's grand, inner essence, which is uniform, timeless, and ennobling. Like Winckelmann, Reynolds engaged in a species of aesthetic geopolitics in the *Discourses*, though unlike Winckelmann, Reynolds wanted to develop a British rather than a European or universal aesthetic. Reynolds also shares Winckelmann's psychological model of the viewer of art, though with some important shifts in emphasis and one major difference in the intensification of Winckelmann's post-Baumgartenian shift towards the enfiguration of a 'group' viewer rather than (or as supplement to) an individual viewer. John Barrell, an authority on British art, literature, and legal history of the 18th and nineteenth centuries, sees this shift as crucial. He argues that Reynolds' theorization of

‘Grand Style’ art sought to traverse a widening gap between discourses of public and private virtue as a new, ‘commercialist’ society arose in response to increasing urbanization and the concomitant growth of middle class influence, bringing the traditional ranking of genres, with history painting in the vanguard, into a synthesis with a more egalitarian age (1986). In this reading Reynolds is Shaftesbury’s partially-faithful follower, Shaftesbury’s civic-humanist vision of the function of painting as a rhetorical goad to specific acts of individual virtue made a model of sociality in the *Discourses* (Barrell 1986: 38), and thus it should be understood that Reynolds’ aesthetic idealism modifies prior British aesthetics much as Winckelmann modifies Baumgarten’s.

In 1776, Reynolds clearly enunciated the position that would become the logic of idealist English Hellenism:

> All arts have means within them of applying themselves with success both to the intellectual and sensitive parts of our natures. It cannot be disputed, supposing both these means put in practice with equal abilities, to which we ought to give the preference; to him who represents the heroic arts and more dignified passions of man, or to him who, by the help of meretricious ornaments, however elegant and graceful, captivates the sensuality, as it may be called, of our taste….
>
> Well-turned periods in eloquence, or harmony of numbers in poetry, which are in those arts what colouring is in painting, however highly we may esteem them, can never be considered as of equal importance with the art of unfolding truths that are useful to mankind, and make us better and wiser. Nor can those works which remind us of the poverty and meanness of our nature be considered as of equal rank with what excites ideas of grandeur, or raises and dignifies humanity; or, in the words of a late poet, which makes the beholder ‘learn to venerate himself as man.’ (113)

In addition to the obvious echoes of both Baumgarten’s aesthetic subjectivity, Winckelmann’s assumption that his theories were applicable in the same way to the plastic arts and to literature, and Winckelmann’s model of looking relations in this passage, here

Reynolds argues at least two important points. The first is that art has an effect on the observer. This quality is assumed to reside in all art, but Reynolds is careful to note that while many works of art may 'captivate the sensuality' of the observer and please his taste, it is 'Grand Style' art that makes its viewers "better and wiser." Grand Style art does this by unfolding natural truths useful to mankind, by exciting ideas of grandeur, and by raising and dignifying all of humanity, thus teaching the individual viewer to "venerate himself as man." This logic suggests that since art has a variable but ineluctable effect on the observer, it is important not only to discriminate between ephemeral taste and lasting value, but also to adjudicate art's value in terms of its effect on the individual in order to increase the aggregate fund of heroism and dignity in society. The staying power of Leibniz's artistic didacticism is visible here: individual and societal ethico-moral improvement is still art's true purpose for Reynolds, the depiction of "the heroic arts and more dignified passions of man" simply a means of establishing an improving, interpellative hegemony over the individual and the nation in service of a social good conceived in Enlightenment-humanistic terms. The difference lies in the scope of the project more than in its purpose. Where Shaftesbury theorized an art that acts upon an individual, and Leibniz a simplified psychological account of that action and that individual, Reynolds gives a complex account of a theory he hopes will engender a school of art capable of acting upon the Nation *through* the individual, both of which are assumed to be internally complex. Here Grand Style art is still didactic art, but its purpose is now the enfiguration of Ideal Man through the imperfect medium of men, that purpose being carried out in a material, geopolitical context.

To achieve this purpose, an assumption of human uniformity is necessary:

> Now this appeal (to common sense deciding upon the common feelings of mankind) implies a general uniformity and agreement in the minds of men. It would else be an idle and vain endeavor to establish rules of art; it would be pursuing a phantom, to attempt to move affections with which we are entirely unacquainted. We have no reason to suspect there is a greater difference between our minds than between our forms; of which, though there are no two alike, yet there is a general similitude that goes through the whole race of mankind; and those who have cultivated their taste can distinguish what is beautiful or deformed or, in other words, what agrees with or deviates from the general idea of nature, in one case, as well as in the other.
>
> The internal fabric of our minds, as well as the external forms of our bodies, being nearly uniform, it seems then to follow of course, that as the imagination is incapable of producing any thing originally of itself, and can only vary and combine those ideas with which it is furnished by means of the senses, there will be necessarily an agreement in the imaginations, as in the senses of men. There being this agreement, it follows, that in all cases, in our lightest amusements as well as in our most serious actions and engagements of life, we must regulate our affections of every kind by that of others. (115-6)

While we see in the previously-quoted passage that Reynolds maintains the Cartesian separation between mind and body alongside Baumgarten's wish to enfold them in a single subject, also nodding to Leibniz's faculty psychology in his reference to "the intellectual and sensitive parts of our natures," this passage marks an important shift in emphasis that departs from Winckelmann's enfiguration of ideal subjectivity. In Winckelmann, the Apollo-subject is singular and alone, absorbed in his divine Self, and where Winckelmann takes this autonomy as his most important characteristic, Reynolds envisions ideal subjectivity as both corporeal and corporate, individual differences being subsumed in essential sameness much as "the individual beauties of the other deities" are in Apollo's face "assembled together" (140). The implications are numerous and complexly interrelated, and there is a debt to physiognomic traditions of scientific racialism here that

I will discuss in the third chapter, but an immediate problem lies in the task of accommodating plurality within a theory that requires an overarching uniformity. Simply put, a materialist-reductionist model of the self in which individual subjectivity is treated as an accretion of secondary variables on a primary, uniform core is a basic requirement of Reynolds' theory.[37] The impossibility of that core ever being visible or capable of description is another. A further effect of this theory is the necessary installation of what I will call the 'Reynoldsian assemblage' as an important British social form: a semi-coherent masculine homosocial grouping, in which individual conformity to group norms is enforced by panoptic appeal to the uniformitarian civic humanism and the Lockean, associationist psychology on which Grand Style theory rests.[38]

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[37] It is worth noting that Reynolds' horror of meretricious ornament is a definitional modernist predicament. I will show in the fifth chapter that Oscar Wilde expressed similar feelings about ornament, which feelings are shared in the 20th century by Adolf Loos, an Austro-Hungarian modernist architect and art theorist. In his essay "Ornament and Crime" (after 1908), Loos makes the connection between art theory and racialist theory explicit through recapitulation theory, which I will discuss in Chapter four:

> …the man of our own times who covers the walls with erotic images from an inner compulsion is a criminal or a degenerate. Of course, this urge affects people with such symptoms of degeneracy most strongly in the lavatory. It is possible to estimate a country's culture by the amount of scrawling on lavatory walls. In children this is a natural phenomenon: their first artistic expression is scribbling erotic symbols on walls. But what is natural for, a Papuan and a child, is degenerate for modern man. I have discovered the following truth and present it to the world: cultural evolution is equivalent to the removal of Ornament from articles in daily use. n.p.

The insistent mapping of 'Papuan' onto 'child' is the clearest sign of Loos' debt to Ernst Haeckel's recapitulation theory, which held that the embryonic changes undergone by a member of a species follow the developmental course of the species as a whole. The logic linking European childhood and Papuan adulthood is too convoluted to explicate here, but Stephen Jay Gould gives an excellent account in his *The Mismeasure of Man* (1981).

[38] Clearly this definition of the Reynoldsian assemblage is indebted to a Deleuzian reading of systems theory. The territorializing function of assemblages in *Thousand Plateaus* (1980) conceives the localization of an assemblage as both a semiotic and a phenomenological process, as does Reynolds, and later citations of the concept of an assemblage are also important here. In *A New Philosophy of Society* (2006) Manuel DeLanda emphasizes questions of autonomy as they relate to the individual experience of membership in an assemblage, which is an important area of tension between Reynolds' and Winckelmann's models of sociality, and offers a clarification of assemblage theory that makes it easier to apply. Much as I do in this dissertation, DeLanda understands assemblages as social forms whose analysis can free social philosophy

In treating the 'Reynoldsian assemblage' as an explicit object of inquiry we become better able to remark upon something that in this passage is meant not to be remarked on: the necessary tension between individual selfhood and group norms that is central to the entire enfigurative structure of individualist subjectivity, and which is exacerbated by sexualized Winckelmannian homosociality. Reynolds means to cancel out this problem as Shelley and many other humanists have done with his confident, commonsensical assertion of uniform inner essence modeled on uniform outer appearance, but as in Winckelmann's descriptions of the *Laocoön* or Shelley's "We are all Greeks," such a patently imaginary logic requires a supplementary Other. Thus in Reynoldsian models of sociality the *felix aestheticus* is made-plural, emphasizing the intense disjunction between the operation of stripping down what differentiates men from Man associated with Leibniz, and the connective operation of aggregatory synthesis from which emerges the idealized subjectival wholeness associated with Winckelmann and Baumgarten. This disjunction in turn raises the question of how an Other can occupy the same subject-position as a Self, and what the psychic relations between the two might be within this psychologically intimate assemblage, considering Potts' nomination of radically autonomous (masculine) subjectivity as the model of Enlightenment Selfhood. These are questions I will return to in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, during my discussion of Stevenson's *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886).

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from a constricting binary vision of individual vs society: because individuals belong to multiple assemblages, because the relationship between an assemblage and its components are complex and non-linear, and because assemblages are contingent and heterogeneous, they form part of a social theory that is emergent rather than applied from without.

One possibility is that instead of being a Self to another Self, the Reynoldsian assemblage stands in relation to the individual viewer as does the *Apollo Belvedere* to Winckelmann. The *Apollo* being in fact a composite divinity in whose face the aggregate "beauties of the other deities" can be seen, it may serve here as a precursor to the Reynoldsian assemblage: the individual reader-viewer of Winckelmann's *Apollo* sees at once the singular divinity of Apollo and the beauties of the other gods while, it is implied, he in turn is seen by that singular divinity as simultaneously one of many, part of an inclusive whole, and an Other who needs to "take a lofty position for the purpose of looking upon it in a worthy manner." If considered in this way, the political utility of the Reynoldsian assemblage becomes immediately visible. Statist aesthetics, acting on viewing audiences, will create a Reynoldsian assemblage as a stand-in for divinity, and the traditional ideological relations pertaining between men and the Church can then be mapped onto those pertaining between men 'of classical taste' and "the maleness of the state." The divine State can then be enfigured as a benevolent, surveillant omniscience closely associated with, but not identical to, elite masculinity.[39] It is interesting in light of Puwar's concepts of invocation and of the somatic norm, especially in connection with the "strange echoes" of *namaz* she describes hearing in Trafalgar Square, that this divine State should also be understood as a divine state of inner unity-in-diversity wherein the Reynoldsian assemblage is introjected in order for the individual aesthetic subject to accede

[39] I am indebted to Brooks' *The Melodramatic Imagination* (1976) in making this argument. Much as Brooks sees theatre taking over some of the functions of the Church in post-Revolutionary France, I see aesthetics taking over some religious functions in post-Napoleonic Britain, particularly those having to do with social mores and social relations. This shift is most obvious in the migration from religious to secular education during the century, with concomitant growth in the pedagogical centrality of Greek over Latin.

to membership thereof; understanding their Reynoldsian roots may help us to better understand the affective stakes at play whenever somatic norms are invoked within such assemblages, especially those at play in the delineation of normative masculinity.

I have already mentioned Goethe's lamentable construction of women's place in classical Greece which, whether accurate or not, is certainly interesting in this context, and Winckelmann's comments on male and female beauty are similarly interesting. Goethe draws a contrast between the mores of his own time and those of ancient Greece by remarking on how much more 'spiritualized' the relation between men and women has become, though in the context it is difficult to understand what to make of this comment. Goethe is not remarkable for his feminism, and in fact he is remarkable even in his own time for a lack thereof. This intensifies the confusion created by the fact that, on one hand, Goethe seems to assume the importance of gender's role in structuring social relations, and to relate a society's character to the treatment of women within it, which strikes a Wollstonecraftian proto-feminist note; on the other hand, he does so in the course of making fairly misogynist arguments. For Goethe, no matter how 'spiritualized' their relation has become, women remain in a supplementary role in relation to men. His subject, Winckelmann, has even less to say about women in the passages I quote from in the previous section of this chapter, and in his entire corpus 'Woman' never becomes a frequent or particularly important subject of discussion. In Winckelmann's *Abhandlung von der Fähigkeit der Empfindung des Schönen in der Kunst, und dem Unterrichte in Derselben* (Essay on the Beautiful in Art, 1765) we find a typical passage that in declaring

Winckelmann's thoroughgoing masculinism clearly shows the link between Winckelmann and Reynolds:

> …since human beauty has to be expressed in a general concept, I have observed that those who are only aware of beauty in the female sex and are hardly or not at all affected by beauty in our sex, have little innate feeling for beauty in art in a general and vital sense. The same people have an inadequate response to the art of the Greeks, since their greatest beauties are more of our sex than the other. (92)

Here there is the obvious mapping of erotic response to male beauty onto a proto-Reynoldsian enunciation of 'central form' – "human beauty… expressed in a general concept" – that also expresses the same idea as the epigram which begins this chapter.

For Winckelmann, 'Beauty' is here at once androgynous – it is "human" and may reside in both female and male bodies – and, bolstered by the primary importance of 'the Greeks' and their specific artistic models in his aesthetic system, 'Beauty' is implicitly masculine. There is also a further implication. Since the Greeks attained the highest ability to perceive and to communicate beauty, and in Winckelmann's opinion chose to do so more through the representation of male bodies than female, it follows that while men and women are both capable of being beautiful, and of perceiving and communicating beauty, men are *more* so than women, much as the Greeks were *more* artistically capable than anyone else. This logic has the odd effect of generalizing and gendering a seemingly ungendered psychological concept, the *ars pulchre cogitandi*, as it generalizes and genders an *ethnos* - 'the Greeks' - such that they become something of a Reynoldsian assemblage themselves, their sense of beauty and their surveillant masculinity one and the same. To see the male bodies that are the pinnacle of Greek art "as a friend" (and thus properly) is to enter into looking relations that interpellate the looker as a man in a man's world,

envisioning that world via a queer version of what Mulvey (1975) calls the 'male gaze,'[40] taking on a masculine homosocial *weltanschauung* in which 'the Human' contains two twinned figures, but the female is the Other to the male.

Taking on this ideological worldview momentarily transforms the looker from man into 'Man,' teaching him "to venerate himself" as such, though it is unclear whether this operation continues to function if 'the looker' is female. Nichomachus' eyes, taken so others may see the divine Helen of Zeuxis as he saw her, show the viewer of classical Greek art (and by extension, all Grand Style art) the world as it appears to the *felix aestheticus*, but also as it appears to the gods, as Winckelmann makes clear in a passage closely following that quoted above:

> The true feeling for beauty is like a liquid plaster cast which is poured over the head of Apollo, touching every single part and enclosing it. The subject which evokes this feeling is not what instinct, friendship and courtesy praise, but what the inner, more refined sense feels, which is purified of all other purposes for the sake of beauty. (93)

"The true feeling for beauty," arising out of the efforts of *perfectio* in the pursuit of *pulchritudo*, 'purifies' the inner sense of "all other purposes" (raising precessory echoes of Goethe's "purely physical needs"), and the "feeling for beauty" touches and encloses "every single part" of one who possesses it. Surely it is significant that the imagined result of this fantastic and insistently corporeal operation is a "true feeling of beauty" which

[40] The 'male gaze' is a looking relation supposedly modeled on that of a heterosexual man, and Mulvey argues that classic Hollywood cinematography frequently places audiences within that looking relation, especially when women's bodies are displayed on-screen. This has the effect of making men seem to be dominant subjects within a codification of heterosexual looking relations that offers women subjugation and a quality Mulvey calls "to-be-looked-at-ness" (15). See Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (1975) for more.

makes one who has it into a simulacrum of Apollo, the "liquid plaster" of the *ars pulchre cogitandi* pouring onto Apollo's head at the climax of the process of *perfectio*.

This concrete example of Winckelmann's valuation of imitation helps to explain how such a seemingly individualistic aesthetic system could become the basis for a national school.[41] While Reynolds extends Winckelmann's imitative social aesthetics by confidently enfiguring humanity as an essentially masculine uniformity, he also acknowledges the vagaries of taste that separate humans and clings to a Leibnizian psychology in which there are higher and lower, dignified and sensual impulses within the same self, mapping that self onto the nation. Alongside the mention of deformity this begs the question of how to accommodate non-uniformity, and as answer, Reynolds looks to the idea of perfect beauty:

> It has been the main scope and principal end of this discourse to demonstrate the reality of a standard in taste, as well as in corporeal beauty; that a false or depraved taste is a thing as well known, as easily discovered, as any thing that is deformed, misshapen, or wrong in our form or outward make; and that this knowledge is derived from the uniformity of sentiments among mankind, from whence proceeds the knowledge of what are the general habits of nature; the result of which is an idea of perfect beauty. (127)

Thus are the cosmological implications of Reynoldsian uniformity clarified. A (classical) standard in taste upholds a (masculine) standard of corporeal beauty, which in turn upholds both society – "the uniformity of sentiments among mankind" – and the cosmos, or what Reynolds calls the "general habits of nature." While those who attain this standard of taste exist in consonance with creation, those who lack it are drawn to corporeal and to aesthetic

[41] For more on imitation in Winckelmann see Fried (1986), "Antiquity Now: Reading Winckelmann on Imitation"

depravity, a threat to social cohesion drawn on the looker's "misshapen" body. While here Reynolds seeks to put the capstone on a coherent, sustainable aesthetic philosophy, the application of that philosophy (and thus its functional coherence) must be worked out during the long century that follows. The need to envision a physical body, a body politic and a body of knowledge capable of enforcing a 'uniformity of sentiments' among mankind, a system of surveillance and signification by which to measure individual and group accession to the normative epistemology thus created, and a supplemental system of models, rewards and punishments encouraging the proper expression of that accession would need to be codified. In the next section of this chapter I will describe how that process began, but there are still a few questions about Reynolds' system I will attempt to answer. How did Reynolds use Greece to nationalize his Grand Style? How did the associations set up between Greece and Britain then allow Lord Elgin to convince an initially stubborn Parliament to buy his Marbles? To answer these questions, I will first introduce another concept, that of auto- and ethnogenesis, and in the final pages of the chapter we will begin to widen the historical vision we have so far relied upon to include a larger dose of literary poetics than heretofore, specifically focused on Byron's opinion of the Marbles, of Elgin, and of the Reynoldsian project.

BRITISH GREEKNESS, CLASSICAL TASTE, AND SUPRA-NATIONAL ART

The State's Reynoldsian, enfigurative processes occurred within numerous discursive and geographical spaces that will be important in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, including novels, paintings, sculpture, the houses of Parliament, the national museums, the public parks, courtrooms, exhibition halls, and the streets and lanes of the

newly-United Kingdom. However, the discursive space most important to this project is ancient Greece or, more accurately, the nineteenth-century British conception thereof. In the *Discourses* Reynolds relies on classical Greek art not simply as a source of exempla, but like Winckelmann, as a constraint shaping Reynolds' assumptions about art and forming a powerful rhetorical resource in explicating them. In one passage Reynolds castigates "our dancing-masters, hairdressers, and tailors, in their various schools of deformity" for their "ill-understood methods, which have been practised to disguise nature" and which may confound the incautious artist (90), and in the *Discourses*, ancient Greek art forms a counterpoint to contemporary London artifice because the two are understood as different forms of the same thing, the modern deformity of 'disguise' being infinitely inferior to the classical "genuine offspring of nature."

In addition to the specific subjects of discussion Reynolds and Winckelmann share, and their shared enfiguration of classical Greece as exemplary of artistic virtue, there are other important associations. In a discourse delivered in 1771 Reynolds explains "the presiding principle which regulates every part of art" (39), stating that there is no proper subject of art which is not generally interesting – "some eminent instance of heroic action or heroic suffering" (40)- and gives as example

> the great events of Greek and Roman fable and history, which early education, and the usual course of reading, have made familiar and interesting to all Europe, without being degraded by the vulgarism of ordinary life in any country. Such too, are the capital subjects of Scripture history, which, beside their general notoriety, became venerable by their connection with our religion. (40)

It is interesting to note here the rhetorical displacement operating in the way Reynolds describes his texts. The Bible, Classical history and Greek myth are identified with 'all

Europe,' but the 'vulgarism' of the local and ordinary is displaced from within that identification. Resembling Goethe's "full scope of human relations" in its internal disjunction, this logic is characteristic of aesthetic-idealist enfigurations of sociality. In such enfigurations "early education, and the usual course of reading" have always-already occurred, thus evacuating the impossible non-elite supplement to that idealist aesthetics: all 'vulgar,' non-heroic, subordinate semi-subjects whose lack is the sign of their need, and whose need makes their invisibility politically necessary. The geo- and socio-politics of Reynolds' statement are certainly interesting, and it is useful to mark this passage due to the sense in which there is 'something at stake' here and with nineteenth-century Hellenism generally, something contradictory and complex that is both difficult to define and yet based on oft-repeated commonplace appeals to a past state. The "reality of a standard in taste, as well as in corporeal beauty" Reynolds uses as the central term around which to organize his aesthetic philosophy is explicitly exemplified by classical Greek art, especially sculpture, and implicitly exemplified by Man; thus Reynolds follows Winckelmann in establishing classical Greek art's ability to enfigure "the presiding principle which regulates every part of art" and more than this, as a representational system useful in regulating every part, not just of art, but of life. Its supposed ubiquity is to Reynolds both proof of its general interest, which places Hellenist and Biblical subjects higher in the hierarchy of subject matter than any other, and a key indicator of the elitist, masculinist politics of his theory. Surprisingly, the reality of a standard in taste that Reynolds describes as, if not universal, at least pan-European, does have a nationalist aspect.

This nationalism is surprising in light of Reynolds' castigation of "the vulgarism of ordinary life in any country" and its degrading effects, and especially surprising in light of his statement that the artist "must divest himself of all prejudices in favor of his age or country; he must disregard all local and temporary ornaments, and look only on those general habits which are everywhere and always the same" (91). This quote would seem to indicate that Reynolds associates nationalism with femininity, deformity and the sensuous taste of the moment, rather than the chilly masculine perfection of Grand essences. The problems with a nationalist 'Grand Style' lie in the tension between the idealist argument from perfection and the challenges inherent to figurative art and to narrative generally, in which every artistic subject is necessarily contingent, visible, and thus non-ideal. We will see these challenges in particularly high relief in the third chapter, in a discussion of Elizabeth Barrett Browning's "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" (1850), but there is also history to be considered; the question of the 'Englishness of English art,' to borrow a phrase from Sir Nikolaus Pevsner's 1955 masterwork of the same name, had been an important one since Richardson, and the Royal Academy was formed in order to create the conditions for the flowering of an 'English school.' If we combine these historic and aesthetic questions we see the outlines of the dilemma more clearly: to create an 'English' school is in Reynolds' system to create something local, possibly vulgar and (to the degree that it is coded feminine) even deformed, and to depict something purposefully as having 'Englishness' then degrades both the depiction and the nation. This is an impossible quandary, especially for the founding president of an English Royal Academy of Art, unless of course the 'English' school turns out to be that school whose style, of all European

national styles, is most 'Greek.' Where Reynolds could supply the theoretical basis, though, others were to carry out the structural elaboration of Reynolds' aesthetic philosophy, as I will now describe.

The events surrounding Lord Elgin's removal of the Parthenon Marbles in the period 1800-1806 certainly help situate the Marbles as 'supra-national'[42] objects and, as I will demonstrate, Elgin also managed to situate the Marbles as supremely national objects. Their international status is obvious: while Elgin was ambassador to the Sublime Porte, the Ottoman seat of government in Constantinople, and drawing and casting works were being carried out in Athens, Elgin's workers were much incensed to note that French diplomats were allowed to do what they themselves had not yet conceived a wish to do, which was to carry away pieces of the structure. However, as Lord Elgin's letters, the Parliamentary report and contemporary newspaper reports attest, it was only after the Battle of Alexandria and Egypt's subsequent return to the Ottomans that formal permission to make even drawings and casts from the Parthenon Marbles was given, which document included the bland but all-important final sentence giving Elgin's men permission for "taking away any pieces of stone with inscriptions or figures" (quoted in Rothenburg 1976).[43] Elgin was

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[42] "Supra-national" is a term Rose-Greenland uses to emphasize the complex political role the Elgin Marbles played in the early nineteenth century. As 'supra-national' objects the Marbles are both pre-national (their origins precede that of the British nation), international (they represent European-ness), and in the British context, national, inasmuch as they were situated as expressions of British national character useful in cohering England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and the outlying Islands as a single, United Kingdom. In that their representational role is closely tied to, but not entirely defined by their relation to English nationhood in the period, the Marbles are thus 'supra'-National.

[43] The Battle of Alexandria was the conclusion of Napoleon's military expedition in Egypt, though he had returned to France before it began. The British forces first defeated the French outside the city walls on the morning of March 21st, 1801 and then besieged those within. This was resolved by the Treaty of Paris (signed 25th June 1802), which formally ceded control of Egypt back to the Ottomans.

constantly aware of the threat of French seizure of the Marbles, spending three years as a French prisoner of war during the period 1803-1806; one anonymous correspondent with Elgin observed that

> Powerful indeed must have been the determination in Lord Elgin's mind to preserve his collection for his own country when during above three years of confinement and persecution he would at any time have obtained his liberty and any sum of money he had named for ceding them to the French government… *Memorandum* (93)

This passage shows that international rivalry with the French was an important logistical aspect of Elgin's decision to take "pieces of stone with inscriptions or figures" from the Parthenon, and details surrounding the Parliamentary purchase of the Marbles will tell a similar story.

While their international character is obvious, Fiona Rose-Greenland's research on the Parliamentary purchase of the Parthenon Marbles indicates that the Marbles had an outsized 'supra-national' symbolic role to play between 1800 and 1816, their acquisition being understood as at once an individual, a national, and an international matter. Rose-Greenland, whose archaeological and historical research on the period extends the seminal work done by Jacob Rothenburg in his *"Descensus ad Terram": The Acquisition and Reception of the Elgin Marbles* (1977), points out that this acquisitive pattern was not exactly new, kings and potentates having taken famous artworks from conquered possessions since time immemorial. In such cases the purpose had previously been to increase the victor's individual or familial repute, though, and only through these means to improve the national character. This pattern of personal acquisition was the predecessor to Reynolds' Royal Academy: the elite practice of collecting and connoisseurship that had

made Winckelmann's work possible, which work Reynolds was building upon and whose Reynoldsian aesthetic nationalism Elgin emphasized in his campaign to promote the Parliamentary purchase of the Parthenon Marbles. After 1800, Rose-Greenland writes, "antiquities were well-established as value objects in the pan-European cultural economy," and Elgin's was only one of many British acquisitions of ancient art over the course of the nineteenth century (659). "[C]ountless items… were appropriated," not just by Britain, and sent back to various nations including France, Prussia, Bavaria, and Russia - sometimes using multiple naval carriers and hundreds of enlisted service members, as in the case of a Xanthian sculptured tomb from 380-390 BCE, now reconstructed and displayed in the British Museum (ibid). That antiquities were taken from weakly administered or colonized foreign locations and sent back on British warships to reside in the national museum suggests both the international and the statist dimensions of Britain's Grand Project of archeological acquisition, and perfectly encapsulates the connection between international power and national prestige at the height of the European colonial period. Its logistical ability to acquire and display monumental works of classical Hellenic art showed Britain's power, and in order to fully deserve that power, Britain had to increase the capacity of its people to appreciate the works of art it acquired.[44]

This material-historical context underscores the political utility of the Reynoldsian assemblage and of the foundation of an 'English school' of art, and the 'supra-national'

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[44] Holger Hoock's *Empires of the Imagination: Politics, War, and the Arts in the British World 1750-1850* (2010) and his earlier *The King's Artists: The Royal Academy of Arts and the Politics of British Culture 1760-1840* (2003) are useful sources on the period and especially on the contemporary role of art. Where *Empires of the Imagination* focuses on Britain as an international power, *The King's Artists* examines the role of the Royal Academy of Art as a cultural institution in its early years.

role played by Hellenic antiquities in the nineteenth century also makes the links between nation, group, and individual in Reynoldsian theory more easily understood. Citing J.S. Mill's famous statement that "[T]he Battle of Marathon, even as an event in English history, is more important than the Battle of Hastings," Hans-Joachim Gehrke (2009) has used the concept of *ethnogenesis* to explain how the 'battle-myth' of Marathon became foundational to European self-understanding, particularly through the insistent comparative pairing of 'Greek' and 'Oriental' that is attached to this idea, and I will argue here and in later chapters that after Winckelmann, normative British aesthetics understands the individual encounter with art as another, similar battle. Gehrkean ethnogenesis connects the anthropological concept of 'intentional history,' taken from W.E. Mühlmann's post-1940 sociology of inter-ethnic systems, to a Kermodean concept of temporality perceived as narrative time. For Gehrke, ethnogenesis is the process of creating and maintaining an ethnic group through the narrative arrangement of events into this intentional history which, in its formal narrative structuration, becomes the metonym for the *ethnos*. The role assigned here to intentional history has obvious connections to the *Discourses*. Indeed, Reynolds' project is explicitly driven by ethnogenetic aspirations: he wishes to 'ennoble' the nation by creating the aesthetic conditions in which British Greekness can spread, and those aesthetic conditions hinge on the proper production of history painting.

If we consider the means by which it will spread more carefully, however, we can also see how necessary a related concept of *autogenesis* is to Reynolds' Gehrkean ethnogenetic project: Baumgarten envisions a monadic subject engaged in *ars pulchre cogitandi*, Winckelmann envisions an artwork, artist, and an audience, and Reynolds ties

the uniformity of aesthetic subject matter to the production of uniformity in an audience imagined as a plurality. For Reynolds, the 'production of uniformity' is a result of the individual gaze being compared "to that of others" *by the individuals concerned*, as all train their eyes on exemplary Grand Style artworks. This looking relation in turn requires a series of individual choices occurring in the context of a group norm: the artist who chooses the correct subject matter (classical or Biblical, and involving a certain Winckelmannian grandeur and repose), and the audience member who chooses to look at the 'right' art while also looking at the other patrons and himself in order to imitate a continually-reified psychosomatic norm. Thus the specific character of the state is a byproduct of the individual characters of its inhabitants as they either create an assemblage or fail to do so, and through sustained attention to Reynolds' enfiguration of that assemblage as the hinge connecting self and State we can understand both how the *ethnos* is supposed to originate and to reflect upon itself through normative (ethnogenetic) narratives, and how the Self is supposed to originate and reflect upon itself through normative (autogenetic) narratives.

Here concepts of ethno- and autogenesis are useful in gauging exactly why the Elgin Marbles were not an immediate national sensation, and how Elgin managed to narrate their links to Britishness so persuasively. When they were finally unpacked from their shipping boxes on Elgin's release from French captivity in 1806 they were taken to his London residence, or rather a purpose-built shed attached to it, for display. The 'shed' was not exactly grand, and its contents became a very minor sensation among a few Society of Dilettanti members. The Marbles' lack of immediate impact can be imputed to multiple factors, but the most important was obvious: as the 'private' collection of a wealthy

gentleman, admittance was initially on a case-by-case basis, and usually restricted to aristocrats and artists or their immediate associates. One of the first to see the Marbles was sculptor Joseph Nollekens, later a member of the Parliamentary Committee whose decision it was to purchase them, and his initial assessment was notably cool, as we see in the diary entry for May 6th, 1806, of Joseph Farington, landscape painter and founding member of the Royal Academy: "Nollekens told us that He had seen the works in Sculpture brought from Athens by Lord Elgin, & did not find anything free among them. He could not believe them to be the work of Phidias" (*Diary of Joseph Farington* (1923) quoted in Fehlmann 2007: 48). Nollekens' cool reception echoed the sentiments of academician and artist Richard Payne Knight, who believed the Marbles to be Roman copies despite their having been physically removed from the Parthenon.

The imperfect state of the Marbles also occasioned much mockery, with Byron's lines from *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers* (1809) being a famous instance:

> Let Aberdeen and Elgin pursue
> The shade of fame through regions of Virtu; 1010
> Waste useless thousands on their Phidian freaks,
> Mis-shapen monuments and maimed antiques;
> And make their saloons a general mart
> For all the mutilated blocks of art:
> Of Dardan tours let Dilettanti tell,
> I leave topography to classic Gell;
> And, quite content, no more shall interpose
> To stun mankind with poesy or prose.

Where Nollekens "did not find anything free among them," the word 'free' here connected to values of expressivity specifically applied to the plastic arts, the broken state of the marbles is in Byron's assessment coterminous with the lack of virtue displayed by "Aberdeen and Elgin." Some attention to Byron's annotations in the second (also 1809)

edition of *English Bards* helps to contextualize his obvious and deeply-felt scorn. Byron's note attached to the line "Let Aberdeen and Elgin pursue" reads "Lord Elgin would fain persuade us that all the figures, with and without noses, in his stone-shop, are the work of Phidias! <<Credat Judaeus!>>" (60), the use of the anti-semitic Roman dictum suggesting that true experts disbelieved Elgin's asseveration, the use of the term 'stone-shop' clearly signalling Byron's aristocratic discomfort with the semi-public display of a 'private' collection, especially one of disputed provenance. The note he attaches to "I leave topography to classic Gell" is also illuminating, and strengthens the sense of Byron's feeling of superiority to Elgin:

> Mr. Gell's Topography of Troy and Ithaca cannot fail to ensure the approbation of every man possessed of classical taste, as well for the information Mr. G conveys to the mind of the reader, as for the ability and research the respective works display. (61)

The annotations strengthen the poetic implication that Elgin is a man lacking not only *Virtu* but also "classical taste." Elgin is no *felix aestheticus*, though he pretends to connoisseurship and to membership of the Reynoldsian Assemblage with his over-confident talk of Phidias, and thus Byron implies that Elgin is not a true member of the class his wealth and Hellenism ought to place him in.[45]

[45] Elgin was in this period financially embarrassed, in large part by the costs associated with the Parthenon expeditions on which he employed more than 100 men on several occasions, and during which he had to pay daily 'fees' for admittance onto the Acropolis before the British defeat of French forces in Egypt finally pushed the Ottomans to grant his request for a *firman* allowing casting, copying, and removal of stones and figures. As can be imagined, shipping and longterm storage of the Marbles was also expensive. This featured in public commentary on the Marbles and their purchase, some treating Elgin's 'poverty' as assurance of his disinterest and nationalist goodwill, others seeing it as motivating extravagant claims of provenance and quality; possibly Byron is piqued by Elgin's financial as well as his cultural poverty.

If we ask how these narratives serve auto- and ethnogenetic functions, the answers are clear enough. In narrating Elgin's 'stone-shop' and Elgin as a "mart" for "Phidian freaks,/ Misshapen monuments and maimed antiques" Byron is implicitly placing himself elsewhere than in Elgin's Reynoldsian assemblage and, through the emphasis on disjunction and breakage, he is casting Elgin's "waste" and the Dilettanti's publications as something exceeding folly. The moral valence of Elgin's pursuit of "the shade of fame" and the Society of Dilettanti's publication of their "Dardan tours" is so negative because it upsets previous patterns of elite connoisseurship. Byron's elitist individualism is the flipside of the Reynoldsian assemblage, and Byron's sneering superiority demonstrates his feeling that a national assemblage is indeed vulgar, tending to 'deform' those who encourage its growth. The obloquy heaped on Elgin and his shed is prefigured in an excerpt from Byron's *Curse of Minerva* (after 1807), unpublished except through piracy during Byron's lifetime and closely related to the opening cantos of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*.[46] First Minerva curses Elgin's name and that of his descendants, before suggesting that Elgin has not only betrayed his family and his class, but his entire nation:

> Without one spark of intellectual fire,
> Be all the sons as senseless as the sire:
> If one with wit the parent brood disgrace,
> Believe him bastard of a brighter race:

[46] The literature on Byron and the Elgin Marbles is extensive. Peacocke (2015) situates the Marbles and Byron's comments on them in poetry and prose within a museum studies frame, while Esterhammer (2009) compares Byron's, Felicia Hemans', and Keats' attitudes towards the Marbles. Casey (2008) argues that the debate over the Marbles' parliamentary purchase was spurred by "Romantic concerns" (34), among which he includes the debate over naturalism vs. idealism and debates about restoration; Casey argues that artists' refusal to restore the Marbles signals a growing interest in "the originality of the experience they offer" in their unrestored state (56). Most accounts focus on the question of the Marbles' removal from the Parthenon and take Byron's opposition as his most important contribution to the debate, but Peacocke, Esterhammer, and Casey are all successful in putting this debate in a wider and more useful context.

Still with his hireling artists let him prate,
And Folly's praise repay for Wisdom's hate; 170
Long of their Patron's gusto let them tell,
Whose noblest, native gusto is—to sell:
To sell, and make—may shame record the day!—
The State—Receiver of his pilfered prey.

This passage is followed by a jab at Reynolds's successor as president of the Royal Academy, Benjamin West, before the 'stone shop' jibe is repeated with added emphasis:

Be all the Bruisers culled from all St. Giles'
That Art and Nature may compare their styles; 180
While brawny brutes in stupid wonder stare
And marvel at his Lordship's 'stone shop' there.
Round the thronged gate shall sauntering coxcombs creep
To lounge and lucubrate, to prate and peep;
While many a languid maid, with longing sigh,
On giant statues casts the curious eye;
The room with transient glance appears to skim,
Yet marks the mighty back and length of limb;
Mourns o'er the difference of now and then;
Exclaims, 'These Greeks indeed were proper men!' 190
Draws slight comparisons of these with those,
And envies Laïs all her Attic beaux.
When shall a modern maid have swains like these?
Alas! Sir Harry is no Hercules!

Alas, one might say as well, Lord Elgin is no Winckelmann! Here Elgin is not enfigured as a lone spectator lost in eroto-ekphrastic enthusiasm, the effort of *perfectio* leading him to spirited prosal ejaculations of *pulchritudo* (though Byron does create such an autogenetic enfiguration for himself in the following lines), but instead as a thief whose perfidy has brought low his unwonted "Receiver," the State. He is also enfigured as a shopkeeper selling false intellectual wares to others who, like himself, are too dull and ill-educated to discern that the wares are counterfeit, their thoughts instead turned to other subjects; Byron thus maps a rhetorical space onto a physical space, the 'Shed' in Park Lane, in which he

depicts Elgin as staging an invocation of traditional class and gender roles. In enfiguring Elgin as a thief and a common philistine, and his shed as a vanity fair of "brawny brutes," "sauntering coxcombs," and "languid maids" lost in erotic appreciation of the male form, Byron uses every means at his disposal to argue that Elgin, as a class traitor, is too personally deformed to be representative of 'Man' at all. For Byron, Elgin is like his statues – broken – and Elgin's failed autogenetic pretensions to 'classical taste' only further underscore the negative ethnogenetic effects of national, Reynoldsian uniformity.

The similarity between real events and Byron's poetic invocation of them suggests that Elgin was more than willing to deserve Byron's calumny as he tried to foster public interest in his Marbles. In another diary entry, this time for June 20th, 1808, Royal Academician Joseph Farington writes of visiting Lord Carlisle for breakfast at his London home. Having broken their fast, Farington writes that Lord Carlisle led his guests into an adjoining room "where we found Gregson, the pugilist, stripped naked, to be exhibited to us on account of the fineness of *His form*," the assembled guests carefully noting "the beauty of his proportions from the Knee or rather the waist upwards'" (Farington 1925 [1808]: 80, emphasis original). This unexpected private display of one of England's premier boxers was followed by an invitation to gather at Elgin's shed in ten days' time for a similar entertainment, Farington's entry for that day noting "much company" (84). The two-hour period during which they again studied the 'form' of the naked boxer as he struck various poses increased the Marbles' visibility a great deal, as both Rose-Greenland and one of the most complete accounts of the Marbles' acquisition and reception (Hall & Smith 1916) states. Rose-Greenland adds that the guests returned a month later to witness three

boxers sparring among the Marbles: John Gully, an immensely popular fighter who would become a Member of Parliament in 1832, John Jackson, then the prize-fighting champion of England, the private boxing instructor to Lord Byron, and one of the boxers asked to stand as pages at the entrance of Westminster Abbey during George IV's coronation, and Jem Belcher, bare-knuckle Champion of All England from 1800 to 1805. Whether they were clothed is not mentioned.

Elgin also arranged for Sarah Siddons, the famous *tragedienne* whose signature role was Lady Macbeth, to come to the Park Lane shed to meet Benjamin West, Reynolds' successor as president of the Royal Academy, and Thomas Lawrence, who would succeed West in 1820. Her reaction to the Marbles was immortalized in the 1811 edition of the *Memorandum on the Subject of the Earl of Elgin's Pursuits in Greece* and became widely known: "one of the groups of female statues so rivetted (sic) and agitated the feelings of Mrs. Siddons, the pride of theatrical representation, as actually to draw tears from her eyes" (42). The exaggerated affect the Marbles evoked in Siddons and the exaggerated musculature of the nude boxers are, again, excellent reason to append a notion of autogenesis to that of ethnogenesis in a phenomenological theory of aesthetic enfiguration. The personal reaction of the actress and the individual physiques of the athletes, in the context of their national fame, functioned both as proof of their individual worth and thus of the value of their opinions, and as exempla that could be imitated by other members of the *ethnos*. These exempla offered the prospect of a new kind of assemblage not immediately linked to class (Siddons was a former servant, and Byron's assessment of the class origins of the "Bruisers" is more or less accurate), and Rose-Greenland points out

that the dual purpose of Elgin's PR campaign was both to make the Marbles more popular, and thus more likely to be purchased by the British State, and also to Anglicize them through association with pugilism, an indigenous athletic pastime that enjoyed immense cross-class popularity (665).

This campaign sought to further connect Englishness and Greekness through the boxer's bodies, which were imaginatively mapped onto the Marbles' sculpted figures, their shared ascription of whiteness used, for example in *The Examiner* of September 29th, 1811, as proof of shared racial superiority:

> The exquisite, unrivalled Greek form, which is set forth as the epitome of the physiognomy of the white race, is evident in the Elgin Marbles, which, when they are publicly studied by the academy, will enable England, in art as in arms to bid guidance to the world. (629)

This confidence was shared by Benjamin Robert Haydon, a member of the Royal Academy whose name remained closely associated with the Marbles; Paul O'Keeffe notes in his biography of Haydon, *A Genius for Failure: The Life of Benjamin Robert Haydon* (2011) that the artist even used the Marbles as anatomical proof of the superiority of whites over non-whites, as well as of the biopolitical link between ancient Greece, modern Europe, and Britain (95-97). Signing himself 'An English Student' in a heated 1811 exchange with 'Niger' and 'A Friend to Human Improvement' in *The Examiner* that stretched over several weeks, Haydon asserts that "the divine works of Greece" give examples of a "standard of high form for an intellectual being" that is exactly that of an average European (597). In contrast, Haydon says, "[I]n examining negroes, I soon perceived them to sink from these characteristics of intellect in form, and approach those of the brutes" (ibid). In a later letter, Haydon adds that "[W]ith regards to John Bull, I can assure *Mr. Niger* the English head is

as elevated and as oval as the Grecian," thereby linking individual, national, and ethnic identity as Elgin intended: through the symbolic enfiguration of the Parthenon Marbles as emblematic instances of British Greekness. Sad and distasteful, this racialist component of Elgin's campaign was also probably inevitable; as Haydon's comments suggest, and as sustained attention to nineteenth-century physiognomic texts will show in the third chapter, Greek art (especially the *Apollo Belvedere*) had by 1811 already become imbricated in a commonplace visual logic of hierarchical racialism, with ethnic 'types' already codified and 'classical Greek' corporeal form the acknowledged somatic norm. That Elgin could promote his Marbles through an association with Britishness that relied on Winckelmann's model of aesthetic looking relations as it had been Anglicized and weaponized by Reynolds is clear from Haydon's account, from Siddon's reaction and even from Byron's attacks. It is interesting and deeply disturbing to note how easily Reynoldsian arguments about central form and perfect beauty and their underlying aesthetic spiritualism were transposed onto racialist arguments but, as we will see in my reading of Robert Knox's *Races of Men* ([1850] 1862) in the third chapter, this was a common feature of aesthetic appreciation throughout the nineteenth century.

Between 1809 and 1816 the Marbles enjoyed increasing fame but remained private (and troublesome) property. Though Hunt & Smith (1916) document Elgin's short-lived plan to display them in a private museum in his home, the Marbles had to be moved from the Park Lane location when it was sold, and they were housed by the kindness of the Duke of Devonshire in a coal-hole and adjacent garden at Burlington House while Elgin worked ever harder to negotiate their purchase for the British Museum (305-318). The various

negotiations and the correspondence surrounding the Marbles in this period are also well-documented by Hunt & Smith, and by 1815 Elgin's Marbles had finally become famous enough to tempt Parliament. In February of 1816 the House of Commons, to settle the question of the Marbles' artistic and financial value, appointed a Select Committee that convened for two weeks. They met to weigh, as their final report enumerates, four principal considerations: "the Authority by which the collection was acquired… the circumstances under which that Authority was granted… the Merit of the Marbles as works of Sculpture, and the importance of making them public property, for the purpose of promoting the study of the Fine Arts in Great Britain; - and… the Value as objects of sale; which includes the consideration of the Expense which has attended the removing, transporting, and bringing them to England" (1). The financial considerations of the committee and the ongoing controversy over the Marbles' rightful ownership lie beyond the scope of this dissertation. The consideration of merit, however, is central to it, and more highly political than at first it appears. The committee, all male and consisting of "several of the most eminent artists in (Great Britain)" (8), including numerous members of the Royal Academy, recommended to house the Marbles in the British museum out of considerations of artistic excellence and of the effects that excellence would have on individual viewers and the nation, but also out of geopolitical considerations that were closely collocated with the artistic.[47]

[47] Rose-Greenland includes in her study of the Marbles' reception an excerpt from the Parliamentary Inquiry concerning their purchase in which an MP asks whether "there are any princes in Europe who are now collecting" and might purchase the Marbles. The Earl of Aberdeen replies that the Kings of Bavaria and of Prussia, as well as the Emperor of Russia, might make an offer. The MP then notes the likelihood that, if not purchased for Britain, the Marbles are likely to instead be purchased by "some of the sovereigns of Europe" to be displayed in their own national museums (661).

As the 1816 *Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Earl of Elgin's Collection of Sculptured Marbles; &c* states,

> Although in all matters of Taste there is room for great variety and latitude of opinion, there will be found upon this branch of the subject much more uniformity and agreement than could have been expected. The testimony of several of the most Eminent artists in this kingdom, who have been examined, rates these Marbles in the very first class of ancient art… they consider them as among the finest models, and the most exquisite monuments of antiquity. (8)

Nollekens was one of the "most Eminent artists" and, as a sign of how much the Marbles' repute had improved, consider Nollekens' change of sentiments: though unwilling to make a financial evaluation, when asked by the committee for his aesthetic evaluation he simply said that the Marbles were "very fine; the finest things that ever came to this country" (Hunt & Smith 331). This change in sentiments has nothing to do with the Marbles themselves; they remained unrestored, and it was only their enfigurative utility that had undergone a radical shift. As a result of this revaluation, which amounts to the founding of a new enfigurative tradition, the Parliamentary report looks forward to national benefit from this new-found fineness, noting the potential for the Marbles to "form a school for study, to improve our national taste for the Fine Arts, and to diffuse a more perfect knowledge of them throughout this kingdom" (6). Additionally, the report suggests that their presence might touch off an English Renaissance, noting that Italian discoveries of classical Greek art at the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th centuries "produced in Italy an abundant harvest of the most eminent men, who made gigantic advances in the path of Art,

as Painters, Sculptors, and Architects" (9).[48] Benjamin West would state that he thought them "of the highest importance in art that ever presented itself in this Country, not only for instruction in professional studies, but also to inform the public mind in what is dignified in art" (151), and from this assessment we can see that the near-unanimous decision to display the Parthenon Marbles in the British Museum was taken on the grounds that the Marbles *could* raise the national level of artistic ability, and that they *would* raise the national level of taste through their effect on viewers.

The implication is that Winckelmann's ideas about the connection between Greek art and social excellence are entirely correct. The *Report* suggests that bringing "the most exquisite monuments of antiquity" to England and housing them in the pre-eminent national museum will re-create a Greek 'zone of kind influences' in Britain, educating and thus ennobling all those nascent *felix aesthetici* who see them. There is also a related, Haydonesque assumption that the Marbles will have this effect on the national character through a certain pre-existing sympathy; England will be improved by the Marbles' action on individual observers due to underlying similarities between Regency England and Periclean Athens:

> if it be true… that free governments afford a soil most suitable to the production of native talent, to the maturing of the powers of the human mind, and to the growth of every species of excellence… no country can be better adapted than our own to afford an honourable asylum to these

[48] The shared desire to return to a characteristic excellence associated with the Renaissance makes the connection between Winckelmann and British Greekness especially clear here. Goethe ascribes this quality to Winckelmann, arguing that it formed his exemplary character, and Parliament enunciates its desire to emulate Renaissance Italy in its guise as a symbol of antiquity. That this continues the oddly disjunct relationship with artistic nationalism we see in Reynolds' comments on "all Europe" is also apposite. See Wojciehowski (2011: 36-75), "Laocoön: The Group as Work of Art" for a lively discussion of the effect of the discovery of the *Laocoön* on Roman artistic praxis from 1506.

> monuments of the school of Phidias, and of the administration of Pericles; where secure from further injury and degradation, they may receive that admiration and homage to which they are entitled, and serve as models and examples to those, who by knowing how to revere and appreciate them, may learn first to imitate, and ultimately to rival them. *Parliamentary Report* (27)

If this Parliamentary suggestion is too subtle, the *Times* offers a more explicit enunciation of the same idea in May of 1816, arguing in favor of purchase by stating "[The] relics of the most splendid era of Greek Genius will soon, we trust, be secured by the only nation that has ever rivaled Greece in eloquence and poetry – the only nation whose policy has corresponded with the picture drawn by PERICLES" (4). The *Hull Packet* of May 6th, 1816 struck a similar note, including a selection from the House Committee's report framing Elgin's removal of the marbles as an instance of stolid British willpower in the face of Ottoman and French duplicity, while on December 26th, 1815, the *Morning Chronicle* ran in full a letter "from E. Q. Visconti, member of the Royal Institute of France, to an English Gentleman" in which the author shares his thoughts after having seen Elgin's Marbles, then housed in Elgin's London residence (4).[49] Both explicitly frame the decision to acquire the Marbles as potentially both auto- and ethnogenetic in effect.

Thus was Reynolds' scheme accomplished through Elgin, though the imputation of purpose is overblown. Reynolds had died before Elgin's men removed the Marbles, nor is the Parthenon mentioned in the *Discourses*; Reynolds' debt to Winckelmann rather than

[49] Ennio Quirino Visconti is an important figure in European artistic circles at this time, explaining the imputation of expert witness here. Winckelmann's successor as Papal antiquarian, Vosconti's six-volume catalogue of the Vatican Museum also made him the successor to Winckelmann in terms of reputation. Considering Rose-Greenland's comments on the supra-national importance of Greek art helps us to understand the national and international import of Visconti's seal of approval on the Marbles.

the Parthenon is clear in his choice of sculptural referents. However, over subsequent decades, the Parthenon Marbles would take their place alongside the *Laocoön* and the *Apollo Belvedere* in the hierarchy of classical art, across Europe but particularly in the United Kingdom. With the Parthenon Marbles in the British Museum and the Napoleonic Wars concluded, the years between 1816 and 1848 would witness an explosion in interest in 'things Greek' that retained some 'Grecian gusto' but would slowly replace ideas of connoisseurship and 'classical taste' with other, more nebulous values. Numerous enfigurations of British Greekness were penned and circulated, and by the 1840s it had become an important national discourse. An account of this process as it was narrated through poetry, prose, and painting will be the subject of the next chapter. The 'Other' subject of the next chapter will be women or, more accurately, 'Woman.' If in this chapter I have tried to describe how an Enlightenment model of 'Man' was enfigured through masculine-identified artistic practice and aesthetic theory, in the next I will describe the difficulty of doing the same for 'Woman.' As I will show, the enfiguration of 'Woman' in the early nineteenth century in Britain involved challenges whose narration helps us to understand how Reynoldsian sociality was elaborated in the period between 1816 and 1840. Examining the enfiguration of 'Woman' in the early nineteenth century will help us to understand how some of the tensions present in Winckelmann's and Reynolds' aesthetic theories would, when applied to the body politic through the 'wrong' political bodies, put on inadvertent display a great deal of the supplemental archive of nineteenth-century British Hellenism.

Between Ennoblement and Endangerment: Women and British Greekness

Matter yearns for form, as the female for the male
and the ugly for the beautiful.

Aristotle, *Physics*

I have suggested that there is a fundamentally tensive quality characteristic of post-Enlightenment 'Man' in nineteenth-century Britain, at least as we have seen Him in the examples I've given to this point. While that quality is already visible in German antiquarian J.J. Winckelmann's thinking as expressed in his masterworks of the 1760s, it becomes more pronounced as Winckelmann's influence travels across Europe, especially in England, where Reynolds' theory of the social function of 'central form' combines a belief in art's power to sway an observer through the repeated sight of a somatic norm with a paradoxically liberal conservatism. This paradoxical conservatism expresses itself in the desire to set up a surveillative group form of sociality in order to 'ennoble' the lower orders of the nation. However, Reynolds creates a theoretical impasse, the tension between a philosophical ideal requiring Man's radical autonomy and a political necessity promoting men's interrelatedness requiring a response in the form of the Reynoldsian assemblage. This dissertation inquires after the semiotic and phenomenological trappings of this response, and to generate answers I am applying enfiguration theory to a historical poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism. My hope is that this will offer a useful framework through which to understand and describe ways of thinking about selfhood and masculinity that were influential in the nineteenth century.

In the introduction, I discussed one way of thinking about selfhood and masculinity by focusing on Shelley's confident assertion of British Greekness from the preface to *Hellas* (1821), "We are all Greeks," treating this phrase as a focal point around which to arrange a discussion of method and methodology. Shelley's "We" now seems like an attempt to create something very similar to the Reynoldsian assemblage, but interestingly, Shelley's politics appear on their face diametrically opposed to Reynolds', nor does Shelley's rationale in promoting the Greek War of Independence bear an obvious resemblance to Parliament's rationale in purchasing the Parthenon Marbles from Lord Elgin. My basic point in the introduction was that the 'we' Shelley imagines is not nearly as inclusive as it might seem, and that Shelley defines the Greekness 'we' all share in opposition to non-Greekness.

In the first chapter I discussed the aesthetic theories of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768), and Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792), particularly in terms of the model of subjectivity each man's theory posits, and the political uses to which each model can be put. In relying on and seeking to control the internal complexity of a gendered, raced, and classed monadic subject while also envisioning that subject as one of many, these aesthetic theories enshrined the most basic assumptions necessary for a century of contention to take place over an ideal somatic norm that was, like Winckelmann's Apollo, definitionally impossible to imitate. In the final pages of the chapter I discussed how these assumptions were manipulated by Lord Elgin in the years between 1808 and 1816, during a public-influence campaign aimed at bolstering the fame of the Marbles he had taken from the Parthenon at the turn of the

century. Via the naked bodies of famous pugilists and the tears of a famous *tragedienne*, as well as the combined weight of elite opinion, Elgin managed to forge an identification between Georgian England and Periclean Athens that translated into the Parliamentary purchase of the 'Elgin' Marbles for the British Museum, from whence they were to spread their ennobling influence across the kingdom via the sort of cultural osmosis on which Reynolds' theory of the Grand Style's didactic purpose was based. In this chapter, I will first describe some immediate aspects of the public reception of Parliament's purchase of the Parthenon Marbles from Lord Elgin, before I look at the course of later reception as seen in various 'alternative musea.'

As I will demonstrate, these female-authored 'alternative musea' existed in relation to 'primary musea,' through the influence of which the masculine Reynoldsian assemblage was supposed to cohere. Analyzing women's citation of the classical tradition in popular print, I show that the Reynoldsian Assemblage in the years between 1816 and 1840 was at an impasse, its growth hampered by social divisions it could not yet apply itself to minimizing. While the Marbles and the British Greekness they symbolized remained out of women's reach, and the possible success of Reynolds' social engineering remained dubious even by 1840, I will show in this chapter that women's interaction with British Greekness was crucially important in enlarging the Reynoldsian assemblage so that, in 1851, it could finally encompass a majority of Britons and their Queen. Unlike the previous chapter, here I will primarily rely on literary rather than art-historical sources as exempla, placing them in their historical context in such a way that the patterns and processes that shape them are visible in their poetics. Literature is a necessary object of inquiry within a

praxis of historical poetics, but my reliance on literary texts is not simply a formal necessity: without the inclusion of contemporary fictional narratives it is difficult to understand the distributed Kermodean temporality made-visible through their aggregation, and without the attention to their stylistic and intertextual aspects that Prins' recursive historical poetics requires, there is far too little constraint on the theorizing to which historical poetics is so conducive.

FELICIA HEMANS' "GERM OF FUTURE GLORY" AND WOMEN'S ALTERNATIVE MUSEA

While the Parthenon Marbles have been some of the most important and popular objects in the British Museum since their first display, we can glean from contemporary accounts a sense of how immediately successful the nascent Reynoldsian program of national ennoblement was. Benjamin Robert Haydon, member of the Royal Academy and of the select Parliamentary committee that had earlier recommended the purchase and display of the Parthenon Marbles, wrote in his diary on May 28th, 1817:

> On Monday last there were one thousand and two people visited the Elgin Marbles! a greater number than ever visited the British Museum since it was established. It is quite interesting to listen to the remarks of the people. They make them with the utmost simplicity, with no affection (sic) of taste, but with a homely truth that shews that they are sound at the core. We overheard two common looking decent men say to each other, "How broken they are a'ant they?"" "Yes," said the other, "but how life like."

It is instructive to see the Reynoldsian assemblage already at work here, the trained upper-class artist observing the effect of the Parthenon Marbles on his social inferiors. It is likely that John Keats was the other party making up Haydon's "we" and monitoring the progress of the race on that fateful day, as Keats was inspired to write two sonnets by a visit to the

Elgin Marbles he made with Haydon during this period.[50] Another contemporary source, the Reverend E.J. Burrow, extends Haydon's localized account to the whole nation: in reference to Continental aspersions on the national level of taste, he writes "[I]t is no longer a doubtful question, whether a British public be capable of estimating real excellence… [N]o one can now hesitate to believe, that a general sentiment of rational approbation pervades the great majority of those who have visited the collection of sculptured marbles brought to this country by Lord Elgin" (1817: v).[51]

Despite these confident assertions of univocity, there were dissenting voices to be heard on the question of the Marbles' purchase and utility. Mocking parodies of 1760s '*gusto Greco*'[52] are echoed in a satirical print published on June 10th, 1816 in which John Bull himself considers the purchase of the Elgin Marbles (fig. 1). Circulated just as Parliamentary debate was concluding, the print shows the Foreign Minister, Lord

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[50] In his Keats biography, Walter Jackson Bates (1963) places the visit on "either Saturday, March 1st, or Monday, March 3rd" (146), proving this assertion through textual evidence and from a dedication Haydon wrote in a copy of Goldsmith's *History of Greece* (1809): "To John Keats, from his ardent friend, B.R. Haydon, 1817." This is supported by an unsigned item in *The Athenaeum* from 1898, which quotes a letter from Haydon to Edward Moxon stating that Keats accompanied Haydon to the British Museum in March 1817. As Gumpert (1999) points out, one can easily read "On Seeing the Elgin Marbles" and "To Haydon, With a Sonnet Written on Seeing the Elgin Marbles" not as expressions of Keats' thoroughgoing and knowledgeable romantic Hellenism but as expressions of lack; Keats was in 1817 neither highly knowledgeable about Greek art nor was he a member of the educated elite, and Haydon's gift of the *History of Greece* suggests that Keats was learning about 'things Greek' but was not 'learned.' This makes Haydon's comments on the "two common looking decent men" even more interesting, since Keats is in a medial position between Haydon's learned appreciation for the Marbles and the two men's "homely truth."

[51] From *The Elgin Marbles: With an Abridged Historical and Topographical Account of Athens*, a popular reference work including a brief history of Athens and biographies of famous Athenians alongside the Parliamentary report on the purchase of Elgin's Marbles and descriptions of the Marbles themselves. Its purpose being to inform Britons curious about Athens and the Marbles, but unable to access information about them through elite channels, Burrow's book is obviously part of the 'distributed' historical poetics of the period as they pertain to nineteenth-century British Hellenism and the reception of the Parthenon Marbles.

[52] See Chapter 1, p. 29 n. 8 for an example.

Castlereagh, as a thin, elegant salesman trying to sell assorted bits of classical statuary to John Bull, who is depicted as a stout man in patched but neat clothing, his hat under his arm and dubiety on his face.

Fig. 1: George Cruikshank. "The Elgin marbles! Or John Bull buying Stones at the time his numerous Family want Bread!!" Engraving, June 1816.

As Bull notes the necessity of feeding his family, the print shows his family strongly in agreement, a woman of considerable proportions standing at the right-hand edge of the group and angrily declaring, "Let him take his *Stones* back again to the *Turks* we don't

want them in this Country!!" This may be an echo of 18th century ribaldry, the 'stones' a reference to testicles that seems especially apposite in this theoretical context, and with the additional editorial commentary provided by the headlines just visible on the sheets of newspaper at the feet of various figures, this image is a valuable corrective to Hayden's and Burrow's suggestion that the British nation was united in its attitude towards the Marbles.[53] The print's general tone of disapprobation is clear, and John Bull, the stolid emblem of British practicality, visibly balks at buying Greek statuary during what contemporaries would have known was a difficult summer made catastrophic by years of indifferent harvest.

In fact, the post-war period was an extremely challenging one, 1816 now being known as 'the year without a summer' and historian John D. Post nominating it "the last great subsistence crisis in the Western World" in his book of the same name (1977). While this ignores the Irish Famine and a number of other, less well-known subsistence crises[54], a series of volcanic eruptions after 1809 increased the levels of atmospheric dust to a degree that would have significantly lessened the amount of solar energy penetrating the

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[53] Heringman (1998) offers a very diverse set of reactions to the Marbles and illustrates how common was the pragmatic attitude towards the stones held by Mrs. Bull and the angry woman on the right. Heringman also offers valuable readings of Keats' sonnets on the Marbles. Thomas (2016) reads the Marbles and a subsequent exhibition of living Laplanders at William Bullock's London Museum against each other, arguing that Museum Studies has too often taken the objectified body as given and not as produced by specific curatorial practices with a long and sometimes tragic history. Considering the Bull print's imagistic blending of stone, bread, and bodies this suggests that Cruikshank may also be making a comment on museums as cultural institutions that serve particular interests.

[54] 'Subsistence crisis' is a term that may be nearing the end of its usefulness, but that discussion falls outside the scope of this project. For more on pre-industrial subsistence crises see Ó Gráda 2005; for information on a subsistence crisis that will be important in the next chapter, see Berger & Spoerer 2001; for a comparative perspective on European subsistence crises during the nineteenth century see Ó Gráda, Paping, and Vanhaute 2007.

stratosphere.[55] Historian William Klingaman and his son Nicholas, a meteorologist, note that this worldwide climatic event increased and acidified rainfall in Europe while lowering temperatures globally, causing crops to rot in the Field with predictable consequences: widespread unrest, including food riots in Britain and on the Continent, economic migrancy, and subsequent state repression of unrest (2013). This suggests not only that the Bull print voices popular opinion, but that the economic conditions this print depicts were widely understood to involve a zero-sum calculation, one in which Britain's supra-national prestige was more important to the government than were actual, hungry Britons.

While this context is useful, what has not been contextualized in the image is the status of 'Woman' within it, especially in relation to the Parthenon Marbles. We have already seen Winckelmann's and Reynolds' theorization of the looking relations supposed to pertain between men and works of classical statuary, and I described in the previous chapter how Elgin was at pains to construct a specifically nationalist looking relation to the Marbles in the course of identifying the Marbles with the British, and the British with

[55] The literature on volcanism's climatic effect after the 1815 eruption is extensive, and as scientific methods change our understanding of the effects of the 1815 eruption also changes. Self et. al. (2004) suggests that the eruption at Tambora, in Indonesia, may have been smaller than previously thought, based on measurements of post-eruption sulfur concentrations in Tambora ejecta. What this does not account for is the effect of eruptions previous and subsequent to the eruption of Tambora on April 10th, for instance the earlier eruption on April 5th. Cole-Dai et. al. (2009) point out that 1816 was the coldest year in approximately the last 5 centuries and that the decade between 1809 and 1819 was the coldest decade over the same period; based on ice cores analyzed using ion chromatography, they postulate a previously unknown eruption occurring in 1809 that created climatic conditions the Tambora eruption severely exacerbated. Stothers (1984), "The Great Tambora Eruption and its Aftermath" remains a foundational scientific examination of 'the Year Without a Summer,' and his assessment of Tambora still stands: "the world's greatest ash eruption (so far as is known) since the end of the last Ice Age" (1191). Gillen D'Arcy Wood's *Tambora: The Eruption That Changed the World* (2014) is also an excellent source of information. Though not a scientific account, Wood uses a scientific understanding of the eruption's global effects to write a cultural history of the period after the eruption that takes in Chinese opium production, the first American economic depression, and the first global cholera pandemic.

Greekness. Haydon's diaristic enfiguration of two "common looking decent men" narrates the immediate, local success of this scheme after the Marbles are displayed, the mens' admiration of the life-like Marbles proof of their ongoing aesthetic ennoblement. However, in the image of John Bull *en famille*, the women oppose the Marbles' purchase, ignoring Castlereagh's insinuations in favor of a blunt gastronomic comparison between stone and bread, thus begging the question: if men could found an identitarian community through self-veneration via the influence of the Parthenon Marbles, how were women to relate themselves to British Greekness using similar means? If we look for a moment at the women depicted in one of the earliest images of the Marbles as they were first displayed in the British Museum (see fig. 2), we can see that they share their spatial arrangement with the women depicted in the Bull print – in the background and to the side – suggesting that women were considered peripheral subjects of aesthetic indoctrination, their abilities and capacities thought to make them unfit for such spiritual and intellectual labors.[56] The women's attention is also on men rather than on each other; just as Lord Castlereagh and John Bull occupy the focal point of the Bull print, the assembled women there a kind of Greek chorus, the assemblage of 'men of classical taste' and the male artist at his copying work are the inhabitants of note in *The Temporary Elgin Room* (1819), the assembled women in the dimly-lit room standing attendant upon them.

[56] It is worth noting that in discussing the Archer portrait, Smith & Hunt includes a list of "persons who can be identified" compiled by of one of the sitters, J.E. Gray (1916: 353-4). No women appear on the list.



Fig. 2: Archibald Archer. "The Temporary Elgin Room, 1819." Oil on Canvas.

As in the *Laocoön* group I discuss in the previous chapter, there is a supplemental relationship subtending the focal, masculine subject position being enfigured in these images. The peripheral, importunate women in the Bull print and the women in Archer's group portrait, barely discernible in a shadowy jumble of dark fabric and white marble, are there for a purpose. Their purpose is in part to heighten the interest of the image, to provide context that places the male figures in heterosocial space the women define through their liminal presence, but it is hard to argue that the women in the Bull print are truly peripheral, though their visibility actually heightens the sense of their liminality. The details of their representation are important: Bull's beseeching wife is dressed modestly and surrounded

by her shabby-genteel children, while her angry counterpart's semi-exposed breasts are echoed by the gaping pockets of her apron, an older child in rags standing dumbfounded beside her as she grips the dress of another, the smaller child's buttocks exposed as it tries to run away.[57] In contrast, women in the Archer image are near-invisible, the details of their dress and posture the clearest indicators of their gender; they stand in conversation with men, on the arms of men, or watching a man draw but, unlike the Bull print, they are unobtrusive. The decorative women in the Archer painting supply variety and context, their muted appreciation of the Marbles assumed, while in the Bull print the women's opposition to the Marbles' purchase and their disheveled state heighten the viewer's sense that decorum and *noblesse* are here absent. This sense of disharmony is further emphasized by the women's very presence in the Bull print, entrained with their children; the private sphere of the family is in the Bull print emphatically public, the Bull family's genteel poverty edging over into begging while the "Billingsgate" woman interjects her decided opinion into the men's conversation and treats her children with rough indifference.[58]

If this comparative reading of the Archer painting and the Bull print would seem to indicate a simple contrast in class habitus, the comic energy of the Bull print playing on

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[57] The British Museum's description of this print labels this figure "an enormously fat and disreputable woman of the Billingsgate or St. Giles type," suggesting that her class identity and her standing within the community would have been obvious to contemporary viewers. See http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?assetId=63085001&objectId=1499585&partId=1 (accessed 16 Dec. 2016)

[58] The comparative absence of adult men in the Bull print also suggests that there is a commentary on gender roles and familial structures being made; while Bull-as-Father is present, he is attending to the other adult male and not his family, and the 'Billingsgate woman' is not accompanied by an adult male at all, perhaps emphasizing her representation as a threatening, and possibly destabilizing force. Attention to the somewhat caricatural appearance of the statuary depicted in the Bull print, especially contrasted with the arrangement of statuary (male figures in front, light playing on their musculature, while the only visible female figure is located behind two men, in shadow) heightens the sense of their strong contrast.

elitist antipathy towards Britain's poor and ignorant masses, then a simple reading of the Marbles as elite objects can stand. In that reading, the unassuming women of *The Temporary Elgin Room* are 'correctly' enfigured, their attention to the Marbles entirely guided by their elite male companions, but it is difficult to retain the simplicity of this reading in the face of evidence made available through the praxis of historical poetics. For one thing, the representation of John Bull as a patched and dishevelled symbol of working-class rather than of aristocratic masculinity is unusual overall, but common in this period, which suggests an overall shift in ethnogenetic self-understanding in the post-Napoleonic years; for another, this is far from the only option for understanding how women's engagement with British Hellenism could be enfigured during the 1810s and 1820s.[59] As we saw in the previous chapter, Byron's *Curse of Minerva* gives us an imaginative reconstruction of an elite female visitor's reaction to the Marbles which is frankly erotic, the unnamed viewer envying "Laïs her attic beaux" and wishing Sir Harry were a Hercules, and the reader can almost track her eyes as they linger on the white curves and swelling musculature of the Greek statuary before her in Elgin's 'shed.' It is characteristic of him that Byron foregrounds the erotic charge inseparable from the act of gazing at nude statuary, and this is also echoed in certain details in the Bull print, the curve of the naked child's buttocks mirrored in those of the Hercules and the broken fragment at Castlereagh's feet, the naked breasts of the statuary on the left side of the print mirrored in the cleavage and apron of the Billingsgate woman on the right. Connecting the Byron reception narrative

[59] On the commonplace depiction of John Bull as a non-elite national emblem see Hunt (2017), particularly her chapter "Britannia, John Bull and National Identity." Taylor (1992) follows the course of Bull's depiction from 1712 to 1929, placing the famous figure in a much wider historical context.

with the wealth of significant detail in the Bull print shows us that the print does not function as a normative image depicting misguided peons, but as an invocation of somatic/aesthetic norms connected to issues of class, its invocatory interaction with its historical context forcing us to retain a measure of complexity as we track the enfiguration of 'Woman' through nineteenth-century British Hellenism.

Having noted three female-associated reception models here, Byron's erotic, Archer's complementarian, and the Bull print's antagonistic model, the question remains: how can we best understand 'Woman' in relation to the Parthenon Marbles? Since all three reception models feature women offering their estimation of the Marbles as depicted by male artists, it may be useful to continue with the same theme, but instead to attend to enfigurations created by women, since I have argued that they are differently situated in relation to British Greekness. One of early and mid-nineteenth century Britain's most famous and successful authors, Felicia Hemans (1793-1835), commented upon the Marbles' purchase in her lengthy and ambitious poem *Modern Greece* (1817), published anonymously in the wake of the long-awaited Museum display of the Marbles in the same year.[60] This text seeks to place Elgin's Parthenon Marbles in a historical schema in which

[60] *Felicia Hemans: Reimagining Poetry in the Nineteenth Century* (2001, eds. Nanora Sweet and Julie Melnyk) offers a useful collection of essays on Hemans. That volume is unusual in including numerous essays that discuss *Modern Greece*, for instance Susan Wolfson's "Hemans and the Romance of Byron," which tracks the influence of Byron on Hemans, and Isobel Armstrong's "Natural and National Monuments," which reads Winckelmann's aesthetics and archeological discoveries at Pompeii and Herculaneum against Hemans' "The Image in Lava," "Ozymandias," *The Restoration of the Works of Art to Italy* and *Modern Greece*. M.T. Williamson (2014) does something similar in his "Felicia Hemans's Public Poetry, Winckelmann's *History of the Art of Antiquity* and the Imaginative Plenitude of the Victory Ode." Frederick Pierce's 1917 assessment of "The Hellenic Current in English Nineteenth Century Poetry" is an interesting source of historical information about Hemans' reception and the literary context of British Hellenism between 1812 and 1830; Pierce writes of her that she is "significant through popularity if not through merit" and ties her closely to Byron (110).

their excellence is repeatedly transferred from them to their location, and it also raises afresh the question first posed by Byron's and Elgin's competing visions of British Greekness in the opening stanzas of the poem: what is the social function of 'classical taste'?

> Oh! who hath trod thy consecrated clime,
> Fair land of Phidias! theme of lofty strains!
> And traced each scene, that, 'midst the wrecks of time,
> The print of Glory's parting step retains;
> Nor for awhile, in high-wrought dreams, forgot,
> Musing on years gone by in brightness there,
> The hopes, the fears, the sorrows of his lot,
> The hues his fate hath worn, or yet may wear;
> As when, from mountain-heights, his ardent eye
> Of sea and heaven hath track'd the blue infinity?
>
> Is there who views with cold unaltered mien,
> His frozen heart with proud indifference fraught,
> Each sacred haunt, each unforgotten scene,
> Where Freedom triumph'd, or where Wisdom taught?
> Souls that too deeply feel, oh, envy not
> The sullen calm your fate hath never known:
> Through the dull twilight of that wint'ry lot
> Genius ne'er pierced, nor Fancy's sunbeam shone,
> Nor those high thoughts, that, hailing Glory's trace,
> Glow with the generous flames of every age and race,
>
> But blest the wanderer, whose enthusiast mind
> Each muse of ancient days hath deep imbued
> With lofty lore; and all his thoughts refined
> In the calm school of silent solitude;
> Pour'd on his ear, midst groves and glens retired,
> The mighty strains of each illustrious clime,
> All that hath lived, while empires have expired,
> To float for ever on the winds of Time;
> And on his soul indelibly portray'd
> Fair visionary forms, to fill each classic shade.
>
> Is not his mind, to meaner thoughts unknown,
> A sanctuary of beauty and of light?

There he may dwell in regions all his own,
A world of dreams, where all is pure and bright.
For him the scenes of old renown possess
Romantic charms, all veil'd from other eyes;
There every form of nature's loveliness
Wakes in his breast a thousand sympathies;
As music's voice, in some lone mountain-dell,
From rocks and caves around calls forth each echo's swell.

In enfiguring Hellenism through two masculine subjects, the poem sets up an evaluatory framework related specifically to the individual reception of classical Greek art and culture. In proper Reynoldsian fashion, the wanderer with his "enthusiast mind" is "blest" and "refined" by his appreciation for classical Greece, an appreciation heightened to sublimity by the learned and, in *Modern Greece*, melancholy associations with antiquity that characterize his awareness. Despite the acknowledged pains of aesthetic sensibility which the poem will dwell upon in later stanzas, in the opening stanzas it is carefully established that the enthusiast's is the preferred subjectivity, the "sullen calm" and "dull twilight" of intellection without sensibility signaling a lack of taste, genius, fancy, and thus full humanity. There is a spatial aspect to this comparison, too: the "frozen heart" and inner being of the latter figure is a spiritual dungeon characterized by dimness and cold, while the "enthusiast mind" of the wanderer is "a sanctuary of beauty and of light" where, though alone in his transcendence, the wanderer (re)creates a "world of dreams, where all is pure and bright," thus introjecting, personifying and enfiguring the balmy classical Greece of Winckelmann's climatological theory in an autogenetic register.

Considering the enfiguration of a 'man of classical taste' here presented, and considering Byron's close association with that enfiguration in 1817, it is little surprise that the *Lady's Magazine* assumed the anonymous author to have been Byron himself.

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine also linked the text to Byron, though without attributing it to him.[61] These introductory stanzas certainly situate Heman's poem in Winckelmann's and Byron's masculine Hellenist tradition of introspective, spiritualized, male-identified aestheticism, and they also establish the poem's 'academical' *bona fides* with the immediate reference to Phidias[62], the insistently learned tone that extends from the poem to its detailed notes, and the early focus on climatological determinism. As the poem continues it depicts the melancholy, Hellenist wanderer in isolated contemplation of the landscape and ruins of modern Greece, mourning the passing of heroes no longer able to defend their patrimony, bringing Winckelmann's Hellenism into unmistakable confluence with the Romanticism on which, via Goethe's interlocutory efforts, he was an early influence:

> Ye slept, oh heroes! chief ones of the earth!
> High demigods of ancient days! ye slept.
> There lived no spark of your ascendant worth
> When o'er your land the victor Moslem swept;
> No patriot then the sons of freedom led,
> In mountain pass devotedly to die;
> The martyr-spirit of resolve was fled,
> And the high soul's unconquer'd buoyancy;
> And by your graves, and on your battle-plains,
> Warriors! your children knelt, to wear the stranger's chains.

This passage's emphatic connection of opposing chronological, religious, and civic states and its plangent tone make it clear that this poem is attempting to synthesize Byronic

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[61] See *New British Lady's Magazine* July 1817 (p. 70) and *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* August 1817 (p. 517)

[62] Thought to be a Greek 5th century BCE sculptor in whose workshop the Parthenon Marbles were sculpted, Phidias was symbolically important in the 1810s and 1820s as a sign of intellectual knowledge of Greek antiquity and aesthetics, as shown in Byron's, Hemans' and numerous other citations of his name during the period.

philhellenism and Winckelmann's idealist enthusiasm in the service of Reynoldsian theory, but the poem achieves this synthesis through a Romanticism that is oddly disjunct. The enfiguration of modern Greece as fallen, the "victor Moslem" having made the warrior's children into slaves, is the basis for a political call to action that falls on ears long deaf and which is described as occurring in the past. Not for Hemans the straightforward internationalist interventionism championed by Byron: in the temporal context of *Modern Greece,* the only modern Greek it depicts has migrated to North America, though his mind dwells on his lost homeland, and while the poem mourns the death of Greek greatness, it never makes the Byronic philhellenist leap to demanding its resurrection.

Instead, the poem narrates the migration of that greatness to England with the Parthenon Marbles, the greatness of classical Greece thus transformed into a dormant, transferrable "germ." To do so convincingly, however, the 'anxiety of influence' must first be overcome. The most influential members of the masculine tradition this poem is usually associated with, Byron and Winckelmann, both believed that Greek art should ideally be viewed in its intended location; Winckelmann took this view on aesthetic grounds, while Byron's were explicitly political.[63] Winckelmann's climatological determinism offered Byron an additional logical support, so for *Modern Greece* to celebrate Elgin's removal of the Marbles, it must demonstrate that the Marbles' greatness is not location-specific:

> Yes; in those fragments, though by time defaced
> And rude insensate conquerors, yet remains
> All that may charm th' enlighten'd eye of taste,
> On shores where still inspiring freedom reigns.
> As vital fragrance breathes from every part

[63] See Comet 2013: 70-71.

Of the crush'd myrtle, or the bruised rose,
E'en thus th' essential energy of art
There in each wreck imperishably glows!
The soul of Athens lives in every line,
Pervading brightly still the ruins of her shrine.

Mark — on the storied frieze the graceful train,
The holy festival's triumphal throng,
In fair procession, to Minerva's fane,
With many a sacred symbol, move along.
There every shade of bright existence trace,
The fire of youth, the dignity of age;
The matron's calm austerity of grace,
The ardent warrior, the benignant sage;
The nymph's light symmetry, the chief's proud mien;
Each ray of beauty caught and mingled in the scene.

Art unobtrusive there ennobles form,
Each pure chaste outline exquisitely flows;
There e'en the steed, with bold expression warm,
Is clothed with majesty, with being glows.
One mighty mind hath harmonized the whole;
Those varied groups the same bright impress bear;
One beam and essence of exalting soul
Lives in the grand, the delicate, the fair;
And well that pageant of the glorious dead
Blends us with nobler days, and loftier spirits fled.

To combat the inference that the Marbles' greatness lies in their remaining in their original location, the poet first implies that whatever physical and aesthetic continuity the Parthenon retained in the past, the location in which the Marbles rested for thousands of years has undergone an important change in being colonized by the "victor Moslem." The very presence of "rude insensate conquerors" has diminished the Marbles' impact because the Marbles are no longer where "inspiring freedom reigns," and so the "vital fragrance" still remaining must be carefully husbanded in white, liberal, Christian Britain.

As Noah Comet points out in *Romantic Hellenism and Women Writers* (2013), the poet is also very clever in using the ekphrastic tradition to provide the poetic speaker an additional logical support, perhaps even one that uses that speaker's lack of fealty to Winckelmann to critique his traditional reception. While Comet locates Hemans' lack of fealty to Winckelmann in what he sees as an absence of ekphrastic description of the Marbles, I would suggest that the analogy between the fragrance of "the crushed myrtle, or the bruised rose" and "the essential energy of art" recalls Winckelmann's one-to-one transmission of the "dim vapour" of Laocoön's gaze from his own eye to his reader's mind's eye, emphasizing Hemans' simultaneous citation *and* avoidance of an ekphrastic discourse. The logic of the argument thus presented is this: since ekphrasis seeks to transfer the experience of gazing at great art from writer to reader via the medium of text, this suggests that "the essential energy of art" is dynamic and can be exchanged between locations, at least via the written word. If Winckelmann can thus transport the *Laocoön* or the *Apollo Belvedere* to our shores through their ekphrastic description, the poet subtly implies, then why not physically transport the Parthenon Marbles to a location where viewers can have an unmediated experience of their energy, particularly if that energy will 'ennoble' viewers to a greater degree than ekphrasis is capable of? The force of this argument is strengthened by the aspect of the text Comet emphasizes, the signal absence of ekphrastic description of the Marbles in *Modern Greece*: the speaker notes the glories of the Marbles almost in passing, the "storied frieze" described in the most elliptical terms, "every shade of bright existence" in only thirty-eight words. The Marbles' Reynoldsian assemblage of youth and age, matron, warrior and sage are "that pageant of the glorious

dead" whose transmissive function and permissive absence allow contemporary Britons to blend themselves "with nobler days, and loftier spirits fled."

Finally the poet discards even this nostalgic yearning for the past, contradicting the earlier idea that the Marbles were created by superhuman ability, and instead making them an expression of something universal and timeless. The question directed to Phidias, "Wert thou some spirit of a purer sphere / But once beheld and never to return?" is answered with an emphatic "No - we may hail again thy bright career, / Again on earth a kindred fire shall burn," and even the great sculptor is admonished:

> Gaze on yon forms, corroded and defaced—
> Yet there the germ of future glory lies!
> Their virtual grandeur could not be erased;
> It clothes them still, though veil'd from common eyes.

To lift the veil from these "common eyes" the poet foresees the widely hoped-for blessings of a national renaissance in the final stanzas of the poem, before imagining both in ruins:

> And who can tell how pure, how bright a flame,
> Caught from these models, may illume the west?
> What British Angelo may rise to fame,
> On the free isle what beams of art may rest?
> Deem not, O England! that by climes confined,
> Genius and taste diffuse a partial ray;
> Deem not th' eternal energies of mind
> Sway'd by that sun whose doom is but decay!
> Shall thought be foster'd but by skies serene?
> No! thou hast power to be what Athens e'er hath been.
>
> But thine are treasures oft unprized, unknown,
> And cold neglect hath blighted many a mind,
> O'er whose young ardours had thy smile but shone,
> Their soaring flight had left a world behind!
> And many a gifted hand, that might have wrought
> To Grecian excellence the breathing stone,
> Or each pure grace of Raphael's pencil caught,
> Leaving no record of its power, is gone!

While thou hast fondly sought, on distant coast,
Gems far less rich than those, thus precious, and thus lost.

Yet rise, O Land, in all but art alone,
Bid the sole wreath that is not thine be won!
Fame dwells around thee — Genius is thine own;
Call his rich blooms to life-be thou their sun!
So, should dark ages o'er thy glory sweep,
Should thine e'er be as now are Grecian plains,
Nations unborn shall track thine own blue deep,
To hail thy shore, to worship thy remains;
Thy mighty monuments with reverence trace,
And cry, "This ancient soil hath nursed a glorious race!"

While the first stanza in this passage is simply re-adjudicating questions of climatological determinism and British Greekness in support of Winckelmann and the Reynoldsian party line, the other stanzas are doing something quite different. If in 1817, following decades of political upheaval and a year of environmental catastrophe, the idea that Britain could one day lie in ruins must have seemed all too plausible, it remains a deeply odd note on which to end what is ostensibly a paean to British greatness. There is also the preceding stanza, which undercuts the argument from analogy between Periclean Athens and Georgian England subtending the typical logical fundament for the Marbles' purchase and display, stating that even on "shores where still inspiring freedom reigns," "cold neglect hath blighted many a mind;" before training our attention elsewhere we must explicate this final and typically disjunct sentiment further.

For a poem explicitly treating the subject of national greatness to conclude with an image of national dissolution is certainly unusual, and to precede that conclusion with a stanza protesting social inequality in that nation greatly increases the sense of ideological confusion in this supposedly 'nationalist' poem. Comet argues that this is part of Hemans'

disruption of "the monopolization of Hellenism by classically educated men" (71), and in my reading this remains a useful, if partial explanation of the historical poetics of *Modern Greece*. If we recall the "frozen heart" of the first stanzas, lodged within the man lacking classical taste, we can see the similarity between that organ and Britain's "cold neglect" of talent "oft unprized, unknown," suggesting that Britain is both "the germ of future glory," allying Britain with ancient Greece, and "the rose's blush that masks the canker-worm," collocating Britain with Greece's modern state of colonized iniquity, perhaps even making Britain Greece's colonizer. All of this heightens the sense that *Modern Greece* is, like its title, characterized by subtly discordant notes mingled with those more expected: the masculine tradition of classical reception is celebrated but it is also bifurcated, those lacking classical taste described in terms that are later reserved for a nation supposedly the inheritor of Periclean "inspiring freedom." The most useful way of reading *Modern Greece* is thus to situate it not in the masculine tradition, as a poem written in praise of Elgin or in support of British Hellenist pretensions to future greatness, but rather as an example of one way women could both subvert and accommodate themselves to the supplemental subjectivity made available by the intersecting pressures of class and sex, as codified through preceding masculinist enfigurations of British Hellenism in the early nineteenth century.

The logic is this: if one would not be enfigured either as the Billingsgate protestor or the shabby wife of the Bull print, nor as the silent and appreciative companions of the Archer portrait, one must synthesize the desirable qualities of each and find a way to present this achieved habitus as something socially acceptable. The acquisition of some

knowledge of classical Greek culture was a powerful way that women could do precisely this, and while the Victorian era gives us the examples of a number of woman artists who achieved such knowledge, it is also worth reading Hemans' Romanticism, and particularly *Modern Greece*, in this light. The poem's stark conclusion and the analogy between the cold-hearted Philistine of the early stanzas and the "cold neglect" of some of Britain's artists then become the 'Billingsgate' portions of the poem, as they rail at a male figure and at the "maleness of the state," though they are certainly more subtle than the figure they are here allied with, and the constant emphasis on the eventual dissolution of all things as seen in the sections dealing with modern Greece and the Greek immigrant to North America becomes their bathetic Bullian counterpart. In this sense Hemans is writing back to the tradition from which she has taken only what she needed, and while the opposition to that tradition here is muted, it is also unmistakable.

In this reading, Hemans' bifurcated depiction of the masculine tradition of classical reception suddenly becomes something more interesting than the binary evaluatory framework it at first seems to be, and instead appears as an outsider's hermeneutic, one enabling seemingly docile, supplemental women to sit in judgment on the men around them even as they also use them as sources of knowledge. This is certainly one answer to the question of how some nineteenth-century women may have used British Hellenism to create autogenetic 'intentional histories' for themselves: not by venerating themselves as Man, but by treating nineteenth-century British Hellenism's traditional enfigurative commonplaces as a "germ," both in the sense of potential and of infection. In this model, women treated the masculine reception tradition of British Hellenism as something to be

learnt by creating 'alternative musea' where they could hold the tradition at arm's length and examine it critically, the distance thus maintained a sign both of women's exclusion from the classical tradition of 'Man' and women's own partial, reflexive repudiation of that limiting ideological discourse. This is why I call the conclusion to Hemans' poem 'typically disjunct:' because disjunction characterizes early nineteenth-century women's connection with a classical tradition so often used to enfigure them as vessels of "men's physical needs," and thus to silence them.[64]

By calling these (mostly textual) spaces 'alternative musea,' I am suggesting both that we envision British Hellenism as an object of inquiry located in or emanating from a specific statist space, the British Museum, and as a cultural resource useful in spaces that might seem unconnected to such august national institutions. To speak of female Hellenism at all seems a contradiction in terms, the traditional historiography of nineteenth-century Hellenism treating women as exactly the kind of outsiders they seem to be in the Archer portrait and the Bull print, when it does not elide them completely as does the text of *Modern Greece*; Noah Comet is correct in stating that we continue to assume that nineteenth-century British Hellenism, especially in the 1810s and 1820s, was an exclusively male affair (2013: 3). However, women were demonstrably engaged in their

[64] Among others, Yopie Prins has argued this point well. In her *Ladies' Greek: Victorian Translations of Tragedy* (2017) Prins argues that the importance of Greek tragedy to the curricula of the first women's colleges in Victorian Britain proves the larger importance of classical learning to women. This 'larger importance' was twofold: learning Greek "served as a rite of passage" for women of letters, but at the same time their inability to accede to the academic mastery-model of philology meant that women had a certain 'marginal' freedom that in Prins' words "simultaneously provoked and resisted translation" (7). This is very close to my own reading of earlier patterns of women's classical reception in nineteenth-century Britain. For more on women's reception of the classical tradition in nineteenth-century Britain see Hurst (2006), Fiske (2008), Evangelista (2009), Olverson (2010), and a special issue of *Women's Studies* on "Nineteenth-century Women Writers and the Classical Inheritance" (2011) guest-edited by Noah Comet.

own forms of autogenetic Hellenism and, those forms being 'popular' and commercialized, they were also highly visible. There are of course the 'Grecian' fashions in hair and dress whose popularity was at once created and increased by the readership of *Court Magazine, or La Belle Assemblée* and other women's journals, but these journals also had a dedicated readership for articles on more 'serious' subjects.

One of the best examples of an alternative museum created by women in early nineteenth-century Britain comes, appropriately enough, from the *Lady's Monthly Museum*. In July of 1817 this magazine began an encyclopedic "New System of Mythology," framed as a series of flirtatious letters between 'Charlotte' and her cousin 'Clermont,' the latter a young man of education and leisure somewhat given to persiflage:

> My Dear Charlotte,
>
> I know not whether you recollect that, during the happy month I passed at the country-seat of your worthy father, you one day acknowledged, that you knew very little of Mythology; and, on my blaming your neglect of a subject which every accomplished female should study, you sportively declared, that if, instead of scribbling sonnets and essays, I would compose a new system of Mythology, it should form a part of your studies in future. I have not forgotten your promise, nor the saucy smile which accompanied it; a smile which, properly translated, meant, I will trust to your indolence, my good cousin Clermont, to save me the trouble of keeping my word.
>
> I dare say that, at that moment, you recollected the declaration of our friend Danvers, that when he founded the idle club, he had no doubt of my being elected president without one dissenting voice. Indolent, however, as I am, the possibility of serving or obliging you is a motive sufficiently strong to enable me to break the chains of nature and habit; too happy shall I esteem myself in doing so, if my labour should be the means of making you acquainted with a subject, which it is absolutely necessary for you to be conversant with. But do not be frightened, my sweet cousin, I shall not lead you through the labyrinth of fable by the longest road; my object is to impart just so much knowledge of Mythology, as will enable you to comprehend and relish the language of poetry, and the beauties of painting and sculpture.

> In a word, whatever may be the other defects of my system, I promise you it shall at least have the merit of brevity. (41-2)

Having already broken this last promise, 'Clermont' blithely compounds his fault by describing the Titanomachy in some detail, finishing his 'letter' by promising that his system will go on to encompass the major Greek gods, minor deities and important heroes.

In later additions the tone remains exactly the same, the chatty flirtation ongoing throughout; however, the amount of inconsequential framing matter remains fairly low. Descriptions of gods and mythic heroes are invariably accompanied by details of their typical artistic representation, and subjects like "Jupiter's *amours*" (79) are treated with modulated distaste. The sexual politics are variable: in one letter Juno's reaction to her husband's unflagging concupiscence is described as what "most mortal wives would have done," as she "first scolded, and then forgave her husband" (ibid), but she is given a fiercer aspect in the next, where she is described as being "of a haughty, jealous, and revengeful disposition" and as having been worshiped "rather through fear than love" (80). There are an astonishing number of rapes involved in narrating the "New System," as is necessarily the case in any dedicated retelling of Greek myth, and their treatment is neither bowdlerized nor graphic: the centaur Nessus is said in a representative passage to have "offered violence" to Dejanira, the wife of Hercules (95). Concluding after eighteen months, in January of 1819, the "New System of Mythology" formed a central part of the *Lady's Monthly Museum* brand identity as a "Polite repository of amusement and instruction; being an assemblage of whatever can tend to please the fancy, interest the mind, or exalt the fancy of the British Fair," and found a place alongside a series of "Lives of Celebrated

Women," a series on fashion across history, and other informative contributions, the majority submitted by the magazine's own readers.[65]

Considering the "New System of Mythology" as an example of popular female Hellenism (which Noah Comet suggests was modeled on a highly similar encyclopedic effort in *Court Magazine*[66] that ran from March 1816, at the height of the Elgin Marbles controversy, to May 1818), it is clear that some serial publications for women in the period paid sustained and pragmatic attention to the classical tradition. Indeed, it is tempting to imagine the women in the Archer portrait studying their *Lady's Monthly Museum* preparatory to sitting for the painting, since the former addressed itself to them while, at least as we have so far theorized it and as Archer paints it, the British Museum had a different audience in mind. Also, since both *Court Magazine* and the *Lady's Monthly Museum* relied on contributions from interested women readers, it is difficult to maintain the patriarchal frame narrative both of the "New System" and of pre-2000 studies of early nineteenth-century British Hellenism, which tend to place women in the role of student

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[65] The magazine's somewhat vague brand identity indicates truthfully that the contents of the *Lady's Monthly Museum* are surprisingly varied. For 'amusement' we find Polidori's *The Vampyre* serialized in the *Monthly Museum* soon after serialization began in Colburn's *New Monthly Magazine*, and for 'instruction,' the detailed account of the formation and regulation of a prison school at Newgate run by Ladies, the "Proceedings of the Ladies' Committee at Newgate," ran in the *Monthly Museum* from June to August 1818 to promote both reader instruction and prison reform. See "The Lady's Magazine (1770-1818): Understanding the Emergence of a Genre," an open-access searchable database and a subscription-only archive containing annotated, original copies of the *Museum* at www.18thcjournals.amdigital.co.uk

[66] Comet is referring to "Olympus; or, a Didactic Treatise on Mythology; with a description of the Heathen Gods, and the mode in which they were worshipped. Also a brief account of Egyptian mythology" begun in May 1816 in *La Belle Assemblée, or Court Magazine*. Since "Olympus" is almost purely a reference work, consisting of an inventory of Gods and their deeds, I have concentrated instead on the "New System of Mythology" as a more obviously 'intentional' history with a greater emphasis on narrative and thus more autogenetic utility. As for the relative success of the two publications, it is difficult, if not impossible, to gauge circulation for most of these journals. Longevity has therefore been assumed as a function of success, and both *Court Magazine* and *Lady's Monthly Museum* persisted for over two decades at a time prior to the mid nineteenth-century explosion in both literacy and publishing.

when they are included at all. As I have demonstrated, while women *were* students of the classical tradition in these pages, they taught each other, and did so in order to take part in aesthetic discourse as informed and interested partners capable of assessing their own and others' capacities. With this perspectival shift, the enfiguration of 'Woman' and of 'Man' as we see it in the "New System" becomes more instructive: Clermont is an unctuous young man with useful information to impart, while his correspondent is depicted (by Clermont, and thus by his authorial creator) as "saucy" and almost as dubious of his intentions as was John Bull of Lord Castlereagh's. In other words, the enfiguration of Clermont as a 'man of classical taste' is parodic, and the energy with which readers consumed such enfigurations allied the desire to work within a system dominated by elite men 'of classical taste' with the ability to remain dissociated from it. These parodic, invocatory enfigurations of masculine dominance function as a subversive recognition of women's imbrication in patriarchal social conditions, the disjunction of that emplacement symbolized in the Bull print by the stark comparison of 'stones,' stone, and bread, and in the *Monthly Museum* by Clermont's mixture of bootless flattery and 'improving' information.

Unfortunately, this tells us almost nothing about what actual 'Billingsgate' women would have known or thought about the Elgin Marbles, or the Hellenism they symbolized. The women in the Archer print would have had access to *Court Magazine* and the *Monthly Museum* but neither Mrs. Bull and her girls, nor the "enormously fat and disreputable woman of the Billingsgate or St. Giles type" would have had such alternative musea to attend. To know anything about their Hellenism it would be necessary to generate a highly

specific version of what Paul Thomas Murphy (1994) calls a "working-class canon."[67] Murphy states that most working-class periodicals of the 1810s and 1820s "were free of classical quotations, translations and allusions… common in the middle-class periodicals," and attention to specific journals in the period largely bear this statement out, for instance Cobbett's *Political Register* or the satirical radical journal *The Black Dwarf*. Certainly there were exceptions, but wide-ranging discussions of Greek myth, arts, or life available in a cheaply-published form were mostly found in children's encyclopedias published slightly later in the century.[68] After 1830, *Chambers' Edinburgh Journal* and the numerous dictionaries, encyclopedias and other non-fiction publications associated with the Chambers brothers would also inform the mid-century masses on a variety of subjects in a form made affordable by advances in printing technology.[69] I will return to this discussion in the fourth chapter, during a 'distributed' reading of allusions to harpies in nineteenth-century periodical literature; in the late 1810s and early 1820s, though, working-class journalism was largely focused on other political matters. As in the Bull print, these matters

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[67] See Murphy's *Towards a Working-Class Canon: Literary Criticism in British Working-Class Periodicals 1816-1858* for more.

[68] It is interesting to consider Goldsmith's *History of Greece* in this context. Published in 1806, the *History* then undergoes a great number of abridgments, improvements, and annotations over the century. By 1864, "Whittaker's Improved Edition of Pinnock's School Histories of England, Greece and Rome, with considerable additions and amendments" is being sold for 5*s* 6*d* for the thirtieth edition, meaning that the *History* has by 1864 been 'improved' to such a degree that its original author is no longer accommodated in the title. One wonders whether these improvements are aimed at making the text more usable for a wider variety of learners, but this is not made explicit. The advertisement does note that this edition has a signal advantage: "not a single expression or allusion calculated to convey an improper sentiment, has been sufficed to remain; while each volume is replete with biographical, geographical, and political information not to be met with in any other set of books of the same size and price" (n.p.).

[69] Bulfinch's *Mythology* (1867) is also a popular and important source of information about mythology later in the century, its precursor *The Age of Fable* not appearing until 1855.

were very much framed in terms of class antagonism, subsistence and survival, and in contrast to a British Greekness that still seemed to many a predominantly elite affair.

If we return to the reception narrative suggested for the Marbles by elite men after having seen how those reception narratives were supplemented by Hemans and by middle-class women's journals, we can see that the surveillatory energy characteristic of homosocial-masculine Reynoldsian assemblages is also characteristic of women's participation in what areas of the wider social context they had access to. The women close to 'men of classical taste' could acquire Hellenist knowledge and use it similarly to men. They could view the Clermonts of the world through an evaluatory framework that both accepted the terms by which value was judged, while making the underlying masculinism of that framework remark-able. Speaking generally, this is the practical importance of the recognition that early nineteenth-century British Hellenism had both female *and* male proponents: an increased awareness of British women's pragmatic engagement with this enfigurative tradition helps us to slice through the overblown, obfuscatory panegyrics on classical learning that mark the masculine-oriented literature, and to recognize the classical tradition as something specific people used as a specific means, for specific ends, within ongoing enfigurative traditions that offered access to individual pleasure and national power.

BRITISH HELLENISM, "THE VICTOR MOSLEM" AND MARY SHELLEY'S GREEK REVOLUTION

While pleasure and power are perennial human desires, the immense energies driving the slow spread of nineteenth-century British Hellenism were intimately connected

to and expressive of post-Waterloo British nationalism, the French often enfigured as the decadent Roman Other to the pure Grecian spirit of the British, particularly the English. During the 1820s there was an uptick in Hellenist enfigurations of the Ottoman empire as well. We have already seen Percy Bysshe Shelley's Orientalist Islamophobia in the introductory chapter, where his famous statement that "We are all Greeks" was placed in a geopolitical context that made it clear that Shelley's "we" could only be understood in contradistinction to a non-Western 'they;' this ethno-nationalist ideology was widely echoed in the popular press, both in journalistic reports of current events and in post-war fiction, as we will see in Mary Shelley's "Euphrasia: A Tale" (1838). However, unlike Haydon and Keats gazing at "two common looking decent men" and seeing in them the echo of their own aesthetic appreciation of the Parthenon Marbles, the British could gaze at the post-war tensions between Ottoman and Greek and find their own role in exploiting or easing them rather confused.

In his 2001 study of how Byron's Hellenism affected the historiographical enfiguration of modern Greece, David Roessel writes that there was a division between what he calls the "liberal philhellenism" of the "direct descendant from Winckelmann… the 'pure' Hellenist," and the more radical emphasis of the revolutionary philhellenists like Byron and P. B. Shelley, who saw Greece's struggle for independence from the Ottomans and a hoped-for utopianist regeneration of western civilization as intimately linked (25). Members of the London Greek Committee, for example, were also involved in advocating for Catholic emancipation, the abolition of slavery, and parliamentary reform, and the men and women fighting in the War of Greek Independence were often refugees from previous

revolutions in Spain and France, explaining why Shelley so confidently links the Greek War to Germany, where he sees revolution around the corner, and Spain, which he calls "already free." In addition to this there was the obvious problem of modern Greeks, which Hemans, Shelley and others had already noted as an integral aspect of the political response to what had seemed to Winckelmann a largely aesthetic problem. Here the 'pure' Hellenist and the revolutionary philhellenist could agree: the modern Greek was too Eastern to be the true descendant of the ancient Greek, so obviously the lesser of the two that the disparity constituted a crisis.

As I have already noted, P. B. Shelley solves this problem in the preface to *Hellas* by making everyone who is properly Western "all Greek," while nominating Others to that Greekness: Muslims, women and non-Westerners, specifically the Chinese and Japanese. In Mary Shelley's "Euphrasia: A Tale," a short story published in *The Keepsake* for 1838, alongside minor, genteel poetry and shortform fiction, we see two nested depictions of place that also function as enfigurations of 'Man,' 'Woman,' 'Muslim,' and both modern and ancient 'Greek.'[70] While these enfigurations are in some respects quite distinct in "Euphrasia," their thematic continuity and especially the place of 'Woman' in Shelley's tale demonstrates the challenges inherent in enfiguring 'Woman' in either 'pure' Hellenist terms or in philhellenist terms. Though written in the year of Victoria's coronation, 1838, the frame narrative is set in a carriage stuck in a Sussex snowstorm during winter 1836, a

[70] As a name, Euphrasia is interesting, though there is insufficient scope to explore the possible meanings this name might have had for Shelley or her readers. The word is originally Greek, the prefix *eu-* meaning 'good' and *phrasia* meaning 'mind,' and as 'euphrasy' referred to a cheerful state of mind. Euphrasia is also a plant, commonly called 'eyebright,' a folk medicament long held to improve ophthalmic health.

snowstorm so terrible it has "transformed Brighton into a town of Siberia," and the principal detail we are given in addition to the setting is that one of the carriage's occupants, a young woman, is an object of paternal concern:

> Night was drawing in, and they saw naught but one wide expanse of snow, which was scattered in thick showers by the wind. They looked from the windows; the horses were above their knees in drift, as the postillions urged them to wade on. What made it worse was, that one of the party was a woman; a being ill suited to encounter the rude elements; whose father was overwhelmed with terror lest she should be chilled by the night air, or forced to alight and wet her feet. Her spirit was high; she had insisted on accompanying him, and wrapt in fur, had braved the season; but now he wondered at his folly in bringing her, and looked at her little foot in its satin slipper, with a sort of feeling, that if she moved from the carriage, she would be but a mouthful for the tempest, and disappear on the instant. Meanwhile darkness gathered thick around; there was no hope of moving. The father of the lady had alighted to view the scene, and then was afraid of getting into the carriage again, with a coating of snow round him, lest its thawing should give his daughter cold. She was not afraid; she was afraid of nothing; but he feared for her more than words can express. At length it was agreed that the father of the young lady and the postillions should mount the horses and make their way to Lewes, when some sort of litter could be sent for her, and horses for the rest of the party, who were left to guard her. (135-6)

Those left behind look out the carriage windows, momentarily bemused by the scene's "transcendent whiteness" despite night having fallen, before looking at their watches. Time passes so slowly that "[O]ne of the gentlemen struck his repeater; the same sound was given, as when he had struck it at the departure of his friend - a quarter past six," the anonymous female passenger exclaiming in response that "The hours will never pass!" (136). To help time pass, another passenger comments that "I once passed a night more anxious than this promises to be, yet it had an end. It is strange that the scene I refer to should be so vividly present now, being so different in scenery, in season, in personages, and in country from this" (ibid), and thus begins the tale.

Considering Shelley's father's character and their relationship, as well as her own tragic familiarity with family illness and personal loss, this frame narrative offers some obvious points of interest for scholars. For the present purpose, as the last quote indicates, its value is as contrast to the 'Tale' portion of "Euphrasia." We have in this frame narrative a group of upper- or upper-middle-class Britons in the very early years of Victoria's reign, one a young, unmarried woman, in a carriage stranded in a snowstorm at night. The "transcendent whiteness" of the scene is in strange contrast with the dark night through which that whiteness can nevertheless be seen, calling to mind the odd juxtaposition of Brighton and Siberia, and this alongside the repetitive, fruitless checking of the repeater watch creates a scene whose ambiguity and sense of fragmentation echoes throughout the text. This is also true on the most basic narratorial level: the story (both framed and framing narratives) is told secondhand by an unnamed friend of one of the carriage occupants, who warns us that they misremember some details of names and dates, and promises only that "such portion of the story as reached me, I will set down" (137).

The story concerns Harry Valency, a young Englishman "not yet nineteen" who is led by his adventurous spirit to Greece, soon after the breaking out of "the Greek revolution" (ibid). He is an adoring widow's only son, "wild and reckless… his spirit too light for love," and Valency is "eager to meet even misfortune, so that it came in a guise to call forth manly and active struggle" (ibid). On arrival, the widow's son is "in a transport of ecstasy" at being in Greece, which he associates "with the most heroic acts, and the most sublime poetry man ever achieved or wrote," and traveling towards the seat of government he accompanies a band of rebel soldiers whose chief, described as "the bravest of the brave;

yet gentle and kindly as a woman," sees in Valency a kindred soul (138). This chief, Constantine, is young and handsome; his countenance is "stamped with traces of intellectual refinement" and his person is "tall, muscular and strong, but so gracefully formed, that every attitude reminded you of some Praxitilean shape of his own native land," and he labors under a sorrow born of recent disaster (ibid). Almost immediately upon setting off, the rebels and Valency are attacked by Turkish soldiers and both Valency and Constantine are wounded, the latter mortally. The dying chief tends Valency "[A]s a mother tending her sick first-born," laying the Englishman's head on his lap and feeding him grapes and bread before referring to his own impending death as a reunion with "my Euphrasia, my own sweet sister" (143-4). Thus piquing the interest of the wounded Valency, a third frame narrative is concluded and the tale of Euphrasia, told by her brother and mentioned in the title but long-deferred, finally begins.

In Constantine's story the chief and his sister Euphrasia are described as "the last of their race," being orphans, and their adoptive father as

> a glorious old man, nursed in classic lore, and more familiar with the deeds of men who had glorified his country several thousand years before, than with any modern names. Yet all who had ever done and suffered for Greece, were embalmed in his memory and honored as martyrs in the best of causes. He had been educated in Paris, and travelled in Europe and America, and was aware of the progress made in the science of politics all over the civilized world. He felt that Greece would soon share the benefits to arise from the changes then operating, and he looked forward at no distant day for its liberation from bondage. He educated his young ward for that day. (…) The education he bestowed on Euphrasia was yet more singular. He knew that though liberty must be bought and maintained by the sword, yet that its dearest blessings must be derived from civilization and knowledge, and he believed women to be the proper fosterers of these. They cannot handle a sword nor endure bodily labor for their country, but they could

> refine the manners, exalt the souls - impart honor, and truth, and wisdom, to their relatives and children. 144-5

In response to his unusually enlightened notion of women's role, the "glorious old man" gives Euphrasia a scholar's education. We are told that "[T]he study of the classic literature of her country corrected her taste and exalted her love of the beautiful" to such a degree that her favorite childish game was to "improvise passionate songs of liberty," while

> as she grew in years and loveliness, and her heart opened to tenderness, and she became aware of all the honor and happiness that a woman must derive from being held the friend of man, not his slave, she thanked God that she was a Greek and a Christian; and holding fast by the advantages which these names conferred, she looked forward eagerly to the day when Mahometanism should no longer contaminate her native land, and when her countrywomen should be awakened from ignorance and sloth in which they were plunged, and learn that their proper vocation in the creation, was that of mother of heroes and teacher of sages. (145-6)

Euphrasia has herself imbibed this ideal so well that she increases the warlike spirit of Constantine somewhat, her "poetry and eloquence" teaching him "to desire glory more eagerly, and to devote himself more entirely, and with purer ardour, to the hope of one day living and dying for his country" (146).

Joining the insurrection and feeling, in a very Keatsian passage, "[A]s an eagle chained when the iron links drop from him, and with clang of wing and bright undazzled eye he soars to heaven" (147), Constantine fights bravely for a time but is plagued by misgivings engendered by the cessation of his sister's previously regular correspondence. Returning to Athens, he finds that Euphrasia has been taken by the son of the Pasha to his palace harem. During a thunderstorm, Constantine and his rebel band then attack the palace and effect an entrance, but with reinforcements approaching, they put the palace to the flame and rescue Euphrasia, who is shot in their escape. Her brother carries her to a deserted

spot in which stands an ancient ruined temple, where Euphrasia dies, her head cradled on Constantine's lap as Valency's would one day be; Constantine leaves her body at a convent and returns to war, after which point the plot returns to one of the frame narratives as Valency describes his efforts to comfort Constantine before himself falling asleep, to be rescued in the morning. After this the text ends precipitately:

> "I am ashamed to revert to myself. The death of Constantine is the true end of my tale. My wound was a severe one. I was forced to leave Greece, and for some months remained between life and death in Cefalonia, till a good constitution saved me, when at once I returned to England. (153)

These are the last lines of the text, the occupants of the carriage left stranded in their snowstorm, surrounded by black night and "transcendent whiteness," contemplating both ancient and modern Greece, while time fails to pass and the lone female occupant of the carriage is both protected from harm by her bravery and by the carriage's warmth, and exposed to it by a lack of chaperonage and appropriate footwear.

If we put "Euphrasia" in the context of the two Hellenisms Roessel describes, it is clear that six years after the conclusion of overt hostilities and the declaration of Greek independence in 1832, Shelley was still seeking to effect a synthesis of political philhellenism and aesthetic Hellenism through her writing. This is true of "Euphrasia" but the interest in 'things Greek' so obviously a part of this text is also a consistent theme throughout her corpus, from early works like the fragments "Theseus" and "Cupid and Psyche" (both translations from the 1810s), the children's dramas *Proserpine* and *Midas* (written in 1820), to "Euphrasia: A Tale," which was the last short story she published in

The Keepsake[71] or anywhere else during her lifetime; perhaps the full title to her most famous work, *Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus* best encapsulates the frequent, reflexive use Shelley made of Hellenist allusions and themes to subtly connect what might seem contradictory ideological projects. In 1838 she was also making a living by her writing, and this synthesis enabled her to include subject matter and to work in genres not typically considered feminine in the period, and to publish in a fairly conservative journal. This does not mean that Shelley elided her sympathies with the revolutionary cause or denied her own politics; calling the War of Greek Independence "the Greek revolution" in "Euphrasia" is only one of many clear signals of her comfort with the term, with her own subtle heterodoxy and with any resonances of her mother's attitude toward the French revolution still echoing in readerly minds.

Another such signal lies in the role of Euphrasia's "singular" classical education. While her father is certainly invested in notions of sexual difference presented as both natural, logical and 'advanced,' in the context of an 1838 *Keepsake* story Euphrasia's

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[71] In *Middlemarch*, Ned Plymdale famously seeks to woo Rosamond Vincy with this publication:

> He had brought the last *Keepsake*, the gorgeous watered-silk publication which marked modern progress at that time; and he considered himself very fortunate that he could be the first to look over it with her, dwelling on the ladies and gentlemen with shiny copper-plate cheeks and copper-plate smiles, and pointing to comic verses and capital and sentimental stories as interesting. Rosamond was gracious, and Mr. Ned was satisfied that he had the very best thing in art and literature as a medium for "paying addresses"--the very thing to please a nice girl. 80

The author's subtly satiric treatment is emphasized when Lydgate enters the room and scoffs at both the text and engraving, to Ned's deep embarrassment; while Eliot's consciously Greek distance from her characters' *hamartia* displays all their flaws in the same unshadowed light (including Plymdale's instrumentalism, Lydgate's over-confidence and Rosamond's insipidity), clearly *The Keepsake* is an early-Victorian engine of *embourgoisement* in the novel, and equally clearly, its "copper-plate cheeks and copper-plate smiles" are not admired either by Lydgate or by Eliot. Generally speaking *The Keepsake* was a highly popular and fairly expensive Christmas annual, and to maintain the popularity that enabled it to sustain high production values and thus profitability, its literary offerings were highly 'respectable.'

enfiguration as a 'woman of classical taste' must have struck its readership as a remarkable thing, both in terms of its difference from the English classical curriculum – there is no suggestion that Euphrasia is at all concerned with Greek accents and the construal of difficult passages from "the classic literature of her country" as the schoolboys at Rugby would have been – and in terms of its effect. Euphrasia learns from the classics a sexual egalitarianism largely absent from their pages, and to rejoice in a Christianity totally absent therefrom. This last point is a good example of the 'connective disjunction' that marks the synthesis between radicalism and orthodoxy Shelley aims at in her tale: Euphrasia receives a classical education, but uses it to succor and assist her brother in proper female fashion; Euphrasia learns proto-feminism from the pagan classics, but revels in Christian, Islamophobic nationalism. In fact, Euphrasia learns to be an Enlightenment subject, but as in its frame narrative, in the tale itself female singularity both elevates and endangers.

That it does so demonstrates the other important aspect of the partial enfigurative synthesis Shelley achieves between politically radical, activist philhellenism and politically conservative, aesthetic Hellenism in "Euphrasia." In this text female learning and female "bravery" place the women who possess them in what would otherwise be masculine homosocial groupings – the carriage of the frame narrative, or the Ottoman palace of Euphrasia's tale – but learning and bravery also place them in mortal danger, as demonstrated by Euphrasia's abduction and murder, and by the anonymous daughter's role as object of paternal concern in the initial frame narrative. The result is the oddly fragmentary, disjunct quality of "Euphrasia," reminiscent of the disjunction of the final stanzas of Hemans' *Modern Greece*. The framed narrative comes to an abrupt end with the

male narrator's return to England in "Euphrasia," and the text never returns to the framing narrative at all. There are in fact two enfigurations of 'Woman' in the text: Euphrasia, who must die to explain Constantine's pathos, but first must live to bolster his insurgent Greekness through the classical education she shares with him, and the supplemental, anonymous daughter of the frame narrative, who can do no more than listen to a man without overburdening the frame narrative with incident requiring description (and length) the tale cannot support. Shelley must have been hampered by artistic or logistical considerations to end her tale so abruptly, but this disjunct quality is also visible elsewhere in her corpus, especially in *Persephone* and *Midas*, which contrast feminine and masculine creativity but leave implicit the radicalism Susan Gubar and others have seen there.[72]

Besides enfiguring 'Woman' as both exalted and dangerous, Shelley also enfigures Euphrasia's femininity as modern Greekness in "Euphrasia," in contrast with the pure masculinity (and aesthetic Hellenism) of her adoptive father's enfiguration and the partial purity of Constantine's. Indeed, Euphrasia's family offers clear evidence of the sequential link between Winckelmann's aesthetic Hellenism, Byron's and P.B. Shelley's political philhellenism and, in terms of narrative, between ancient Greece and modern: the father is "a glorious old man, nursed in classic lore, and more familiar with the deeds of men who had glorified his country several thousand years before, than with any more modern names"

[72] Both plays are intended for children; however, Gubar describes *Proserpine* as "a female version of *Paradise Lost* in which the original gold-ripe garden is lost not through any female sin, but because of the interference of man" in her 1979 article on women's reception of Greek myth (304), and Richardson (1993) sees Shelley's retelling of Ovid's stories of Proserpine and Midas as part of a larger project. In Richardson's estimation Shelley reaches "behind Ovid to recover something of the deeper sexual/cultural tensions expressed in Greek myths and the rituals and mysteries associated with them" (125) in order to construct female communities he suggests she takes as "precursors for her own revisionary project" (ibid).

and Constantine, who appears "Praxitilean" but under Euphrasia's influence melds the classical lore of his father and Euphrasia's philhellenist patriotism through his interpellation into her distinctly republicanist classicism, is described as a paragon of bravery and "yet gentle and kindly as a woman." Euphrasia herself is firmly focused on a Christian, nationalist, sexually egalitarian Greek future free of the contamination of Islamic worship and characterized by Greek women's glorious social task: to be the "mothers of heroes and teachers of sages." The place of women in this sequence offers a strong contrast with the place of 'Woman' (or rather, the lack thereof) in the classical tradition as it was envisioned by Reynolds and Winckelmann, and also as it was expressed by Shelley's male Romantic contemporaries. In concluding this section of the chapter, it will be useful to compare how "Euphrasia" and some of the other 'alternative musea' I have described treat their shared object of inquiry, British Hellenism, and to ask how the public and private spheres interact in "Euphrasia," how national and individual questions are treated there, and thus how women inhabit British Hellenism during this period.

As I noted earlier, the women presented in the Archer portrait are difficult to see, while in the Bull print they are all too visible. In contrast, "Euphrasia" envisions a way for women to inhabit British Hellenism properly, even with a radical political project subtending their presence there, but acknowledges the high cost of women's active participation in nineteenth-century British Hellenism. Euphrasia's death on the steps of a ruined Greek temple is certainly not encouraging, but through this textual impasse the melancholia of *Modern Greece* is transmuted into something more positive: Euphrasia dies, but before she does so she lives an ideal life, according to the evaluatory framework

Modern Greece creates in its contrast between the man of classical taste and the man who lacks it. Women's agency is also depicted at less of a remove in "Euphrasia." While in *Modern Greece* the 1803 self-sacrifice of Suliot women[73] is a sign of time's passage and of Greece's becalmed political prospects, Euphrasia's death at least occurs in the context of an ongoing insurrection. Additionally, in "Euphrasia" as in *Modern Greece* the greatness of classical Greece is a transferrable "germ," but in Mary Shelley's text the 'anxiety of influence' is absent. The classical tradition operates on Euphrasia just as Sir Joshua Reynolds would wish, and in fact "Euphrasia" envisions 'Woman' not as the vessel of men's "purely physical needs" but as the curator of men's intellectual patrimony, introjecting both alternative and primary musea to birth an auto-and ethnogenetic classical tradition through which Constantine and Harry Valency can both learn to venerate themselves and to treat women as "the friend of man, not his slave."

The Reynoldsian tension between public and private is meant to be dissolved in the enfiguration of Euphrasia-as-modern-Greekness, who will perfect the instruction of Greek infants through her and her female cohort's classical knowledge, itself presumably gained and shared through female community. In this she is herself like one of Reynolds' statues, ennobling those around her through a spiritualized intellectual and aesthetic process here identified with the story's version of proper femininity rather than Reynolds' and

[73] Known as the 'Dance of Zalongo,' this incident occurred during the 1803 Suliot War, when a group of Suliot women escaping from Ottoman forces were trapped in the mountains of Zalongo in Epirus. To avoid capture and subsequent enslavement, they threw themselves and their children from a steep cliff, and tradition records that they did so while singing and dancing. The incident was immediately famous across Europe and remains well-known, now marked by a beautiful monument on Mount Zalongo and commemorated in traditional song.

Winckelmann's masculine alternative. Her individual ennoblement, gained initially from her father's classical education but potentiated by her suffering and death, in turn promotes the text's enfiguration of ideal Greekness as both feminine *and* masculine in the person of Constantine, whose suffering and death are in "Euphrasia" expressive of his own 'Praxitilean' (but still maternal) subjective achievements. This gender bifurcation also marks Harry Valency, the injured emblem of British Greekness whose spirit "was too light for love," which helps us to understand why the party in the carriage are left there but not what their stasis means. The expatriate philhellenism of the Romantics and the patriotic Hellenism of "Euphrasia" are an exceedingly odd fit, Valency and Constantine bound together in a Laocoönic *gruppo* (one that strongly resembles a *pietà*) by Euphrasia's death and the struggle for Greek Independence her death cannot symbolize, because it is a death, because she is a woman, and because that struggle has already been successfully concluded prior to the story's composition. The carriage must remain, too, a small black shape in a still white landscape, stranded somewhere between Brighton and Lewes in their guise as Britain and Siberia, an endangered woman listening to a man talk of Greece within it, while all of Britain waits for an enfigurative synthesis applicable to the post-independence geopolitical context to present itself.

By way of conclusion to this section of the chapter, I will briefly return to P.B. Shelley's "We are all Greeks." As noted, Shelley makes this statement in the preface to *Hellas*, published in 1821 as part of the Shelleys' campaign to support Mavrocordatos' insurrection against the Ottomans. I have already discussed the racial and gender politics of the statement itself, and in the just-concluded reading of "Euphrasia" we see that the

narrative assumptions P.B. Shelley makes about the Ottomans – that they occupy a structural position opposed to Greekness and to Britishness – remain central to the ethnogenetic work the two Shelley narratives are supposed to perform. Using a recursive method of historical poetics that attends to intertextual as well as stylistic significance suggests that we can know a great deal about the prehistory of "Euphrasia" through an examination of *Hellas*, and that *Hellas* may also tell us something about Jarvis' authorial "verse-thinking" as this applies to "Euphrasia," and I have tried to demonstrate as much in the course of my analysis. However, it is not clear to me that a recursive analysis of the historical poetics of *Hellas* and "Euphrasia" offer especially immanent access to history as it applies to Greece's experience of the Greek War of Independence. *Hellas* and "Euphrasia" book-end the war, though the latter text does so from some chronological distance, and neither were particularly effective in garnering lasting public attention for modern Greek nationalism; in fact, the most obvious historical lesson to be gained from applying the recursive method of historical poetics to the two texts is an abiding sense that Britain's involvement with Greek affairs had more to do with Britishness than with Greek independence. The 'we' P.B. Shelley addresses clearly includes Harry Valency, and the transferrable "germ" of British Greekness that seems so full of potential in *Hellas* is revealed in "Euphrasia" to be an infection that kills modern Greeks.

"NO WORK, BUT A SUGGESTION": ELIZABETH MOULTON-BARRETT AND THE WOMAN OF CLASSICAL TASTE

In the next chapter I will suggest that nineteenth-century Britons arrived at a brief enfigurative accommodation between primary and alternative musea during the Great

Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations, and that the sheer spectacle inseparable from the Great Exhibition functioned as an architextual model of pop-Platonic pluralism that spoke directly to Reynoldsian social concerns, the precessory, racialist version of which had subtended even the earliest enunciations of British Hellenism. In concluding this chapter on the early nineteenth-century Hellenist enfiguration of 'Woman,' however, I want to examine how one author typically identified with the later mid-Victorian period, Elizabeth Barret Browning (Elizabeth Barret Moulton-Barrett until 1846), engaged in the late 1830s not only with the masculine classical tradition still radiating out from the German Hellenists and from Winckelmann's corpus, but also with that of Hemans and her fellow female poets of the early nineteenth century. In doing so, I am following the suggestion of Noah Comet who, in his *Romantic Hellenism and Women Writers* (2013), calls for a lowering of the barriers between the 'Romantic' and the 'Victorian' periods and also argues for a reassessment of Elizabeth Barrett Browning in terms of her poetic influences. Comet argues that Browning's Hellenist poetics traverse the barrier between 'Romantic' and 'Victorian' in part because they so clearly show the influence of Hemans and other preceding women Hellenists, and because they then impart that influence to the Victorian period. I agree, and hope that this chapter and the next form a useful addition to Comet's project of textual and theoretical reassessment. As a springboard to a wider discussion, I will examine how Moulton-Barrett synthesizes a female classical tradition and a male writerly tradition in the preface to her 1838 collection of poetry, *The Seraphim, and Other Poems*.

While *Seraphim* displays its Christian themes prominently enough, the Hellenist themes characteristic of Moulton-Barrett's corpus are still very much present. This is evident from the first lines of the preface, in which Moulton-Barrett explains the origin of the poem after which the volume is named:

> It is natural for every writer who has not published frequently, to revert, at least in thought, to his last work, in risking the publication of a new one. The me, this is most natural; the subject of the principal poem in the present collection having suggested itself to me, though very faintly and imperfectly, when I was engaged upon my translation of the "Prometheus Bound" of Aeschylus.
>
> I thought, that, if Aeschylus had lived after the incarnation and resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, he might have turned, if not in moral and intellectual yet in poetic faith, from the solitude of the Caucasus to the deeper desertness of that crowded Jerusalem where none had any pity; from the "faded white flower" of the Titanic brow, to the "withered grass" of a Heart trampled by its most beloved; from the glorying of him who gloried that he could not die, to the sublime meekness of the Taster of death for every man; from the taunt stung into being by the torment, to HIS more awful silence, when the agony stood dumb before the love! And I thought, how, "from the height of this great argument," the scenery of the Prometheus would have dwarfed itself even in the eyes of its poet (…)
>
> The subject of my two books lie side by side. The Prometheus by Aeschylus is avowedly one of the noblest of human imaginations; and when we measure it with the eternal Counsel, we know at once and for ever, how wide is the difference between man's ideal and God's divine! (v-vii)

There is certainly a great deal to say about this passage. The first two sentences lay the foundation for the whole volume in their explicit and their latent content; as with the role of a special kind of distance in Winckelmann's ekphrastic enfiguration of the Laocoön *gruppo*, the distance between "every writer" and this writer, and between "man's ideal" and "God's divine," is crucial.

The sexual character of the distance between "every writer" and this writer is obvious, clearly implying that the default sexual identity of Moulton-Barrett's generic

writerly figure is male. This forms a 'connective disjunction' the character of which differs in kind from that created and maintained through the 'alternative musea' of *Court Magazine* and *The Lady's Monthly Museum*. Moulton-Barrett is not so much maintaining critical distance from an object of inquiry that seeks to misrecognize her (and to make her misrecognize herself) as she is boldly claiming a writerly identity by identifying herself with "every writer," while at the same time softening that identification with the additional descriptive detail that this (male) "every writer" is one who "has not published frequently." She is claiming an appropriately lesser place within a male writerly tradition she herself narrates, and this is part of a subtle pattern visible throughout the preface, in which Moulton-Barrett both claims and denies her own capacity as a writer and as a Hellenist. The pattern which applies in the case of "every writer who has not published frequently" is to her "most natural" because, however "faintly or imperfectly," Moulton-Barrett has exceeded the usual (male) "every writer" not by departing from the typical pattern of writerly *après-pensees* but by following it, and by working within two privileged traditions which were based around homosocial male institutions that women could participate in primarily as spectators. Moulton-Barrett's somatic abnormality forces her into an alliance with "every writer who has not published frequently," but her intellectual attainments and subject allow her to ("faintly and imperfectly") claim a likeness to Aeschylus' "noble imagination," to "man's ideal," and to the act of writing, despite her sexual mismatch.

The connective disjunction between writerliness and Moulton-Barrett's gendered subjectivity is also mapped onto that between "man's ideal" and "God's divine." Moulton-Barrett is narrating her nascent writerly existence as occurring between a translation of

Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, "one of the noblest of human imaginations," and her current volume of poetry, which seeks to limn the Aeschylean grandeur of the *Prometheus* with that of Christ's incarnation and resurrection. The link is her own writerly labor, so in a sense she forms at the same time both the connection and the disjunction between the two texts, as well as the traditions they are emblematic of. Moulton-Barrett is aware of this, too, as she makes clear in this passage:

> But if my dream be true that Aeschylus might have turned to the subject before us, in poetic instinct; and if in such a case - and here is no dream - its terror and its pathos would have shattered into weakness the strong Greek tongue, and caused the conscious chorus to tremble round the thymele, - how much more may *I* turn from it, in the instinct of incompetence! In a manner I have done so. I have worn no shoes upon this holy ground: I have stood there, but have not walked. I have drawn no copy of the statue of this GREAT PAN, - but have caught its shadow, - shortened in the dawn of my imperfect knowledge, and distorted and broken by the unevenness of our earthly ground. I have written no work, but a suggestion. Nor has even so little been attempted, without as deep a consciousness of weakness as the severest critic and the humblest Christian could desire to impress upon me. I have felt in the midst of my own thoughts upon my own theme, like Homer's 'children in a battle.' (ix-x)

In this passage Moulton-Barrett uses her writerly imagination to excuse herself for its very existence; she wears "no shoes upon this holy ground," she has but caught the shadow of "the statue of this GREAT PAN,"[74] and as with the preceding metaphoric expressions of humility, the final *mea culpa* places Moulton-Barrett in disjunct connection to greatness,

[74] Pan is an important aspect of Moulton-Barrett's poetics throughout her life, linking her attention to gender with her Christianity and her classicism. Davies (2006) ably explores the role of Pan in both Moulton-Barrett's and Robert Browning's poetry, and references to Pan span the entirety of Moulton-Barrett's poetical works, either titular or otherwise, from "The Battle of Marathon" (1820), "The Dead Pan" (1844), "The Lost Bower" (1844), "Wine of Cypress" (1844), "Flush or Faunus" (1850), and *Aurora Leigh* (1856), to "A Musical Instrument" (1860). Patricia Merivale (1969), *Pan, the Goat-God, His Myth in Modern Times* remains a useful source of bibliographic information on literary allusions to Pan over a long period.

considering her intended purpose. For Moulton-Barrett to write that she is "like Homer's 'children in a battle'" is on one level an obvious and effective display of humility. The mental image is almost painful in its intermingling of domestic fragility and martial chaos, but Moulton-Barrett is finally caught in the preface to *Seraphim* in a connective disjunction between sex and subject matter that is left unresolved. This is because the reference to "GREAT PAN," to "holy ground" and to her prior translation of Aeschylus' *Prometheus* all bespeak her deep, scholarly familiarity with the classical tradition, the specific subject of Prometheus also linking her to the masculine Romantic tradition.[75]

There are other moments of connective disjunction in the preface, but as above, it is in her continued writerly self-defense that we find the best examples. Moulton-Barrett writes most directly of her readers' possibly negative reaction to her disjunct poetics in a revealing passage:

> Lest in any of these poems a dreaminess be observed upon, while a lawlessness is imputed to their writer, she is anxious to assure whatever reader may think it worth while to listen to her defence, that none of them were written with a lawless purpose. For instance, 'The Poet's Vow' was intended to enforce a truth - that the creature cannot be *isolated* from the creature; and the 'Romaunt of Margret,' a corresponding one, that the creature cannot be *sustained* by the creature. And if, indeed, the faintest character of poetry be granted to these compositions, it must be granted to them besides, that they contain a certain verity. For there is no greater fiction, than that poetry is fiction. Poetry is essentially truthfulness; and the

[75] Lewis (1998) writes that "Prometheus is the ur-myth of the Romantic age" and offers evidence of Moulton-Barrett's awareness of this. Aside from the prior identification of this "ur-myth" with the Shelleys, the translation of Aeschylus' *Prometheus* Moulton-Barrett refers to in the preface to *Seraphim* is only the first of two, and Wellesley College also holds a translation of Goethe's *Prometheus* in Moulton-Barrett's handwriting; according to Lootens (1996), Moulton-Barrett's public recognition as a "Promethean intellectual" was an initial step in her induction into the English literary canon, followed by the "secular trinity" of pure wife/mother/poet, the romantic heroine, or "Andromeda of Wimpole Street," and finally, the Pythian "spasmodic" (129-57). It is striking to note the disjunct connection even here between Hellenist and Christian themes, with the references to Andromeda, Pythias, Prometheus and the "secular" trinity.

> very incoherences of poetic dreaming are but the struggle and the strife to reach the True in the Unknown. (xii-xiii)

As in earlier passages, Moulton-Barrett here unexpectedly connects seemingly disjunct concepts: dreaminess and lawlessness, poetry and verity, isolation and sustenance, truthfulness and incoherence. The insistence with which she forces these not-exactly-contradictory concepts into a linked relation amounts to a method. A good example that allows both a Hellenist and a Christian reading is her commentary on "The Poet's Vow" and the "Romaunt of Margret": the theological point Moulton-Barrett makes is that "the creature," a subject with Being but without gender, cannot be isolated from its creatureliness or from the rest of creation, but neither can it be sustained by its own createdness or by creation, if "the creature" lacks a chosen relationship to its Creator or to other creatures. This is certainly of a piece with the strongly-felt religiosity and the affective femininity that pervades the volume, but read in an aestheticist-Hellenist light, this is also a commentary on idealism and naturalism that recalls Winckelmann. "The creature," the subject of inquiry and representation, in the guise of the putatively-universal 'Man,' can neither be isolated from creation and enfigured as entirely ideal, nor can "the creature" be accurately enfigured entirely through naturalistic means.

Unlike idealism and naturalism but as with her linkage between "work" and "suggestion" in the previous passage, the methodically-linked terms I mention above are not exactly binary or even paired opposites, and they are only complementary in the sense that Moulton-Barrett makes them so. She relies here as in previously quoted passages on what I am calling 'connective disjunction,' a rhetorical figure of sorts whose expression

and effect connects not disparate but 'disjunct' or logically uncanny ideas, concepts, events or objects to each other. In this case it is the citation of rhetorical 'norms' of female humility and masculine poetic prowess that allow the complacent reader to believe in Moulton-Barrett's pose of humility, but which insistently tweaks that complacency, using the readerly disjunction produced through textual manipulation of tradition and of language to both trouble and maintain the boundaries of 'proper' authorial gender/genre. The volume's Hellenist themes, and the connective disjunction with both Christian themes and ideas of female poetic agency that Moulton-Barrett narrates, are also linked to a sustained and searching attention to female poetic tradition and community.

Browning scholar Dorothy Mermin (1986) sees *Seraphim* as an important milestone in Moulton-Barrett's artistic maturation, writing that in her first mature volume of poetry published under her name, the author found both public acclaim and private liberation in the completion of a long process of "escape from patterns that had constricted her poetic development," enabling Moulton-Barrett to "make a source of power, not weakness, for her poetry out of her experience of constriction, exclusion, renunciation and rebellion" (714). This certainly helps to explain the almost hyperbolic attention Moulton-Barrett gives to her own artistic inabilities and imperfections in the preface, forming the connective disjunction under discussion; in what may be a simplistic application of Freudian theory Mermin also links this artistic method to Moulton-Barrett's feelings about her mother and about her own femaleness, which in *Seraphim* Mermin feels are expressed in the numerous poetic invocations of female sociality. "The Romaunt of Margret" and "The Poet's Vow" certainly fit this pattern; taking dead or dying women as the poetic

centerpiece of two highly religious poems we have been told should function as a pair, the poet describes Margret as she surveys the social relationships that define her life. These consist of a lover, a father, a sister, and a mother, all of whom are distant from her, and the *pathos* of whose distance (along with her own distance from God) hastens Margret's death, while in "The Poet's Vow" the titular poet is shaken from his isolated, idealist musings by reading a poem addressed to him by his dead, jilted bride of years before. In "Isobel's Child" we are shown a domestic scene peopled by women, the titular figure a baby dying in its mother's arms, and in "A Romance of the Ganges" a group of "maidens" gather at the banks of the Ganges to consider the perfidy of men. All this suggests the presence of a cross-textual pattern unifying the whole volume around the intertwined subjects of female agency and community.

There are certainly other examples of this pattern. "The Island" imagines an isolated island that is also a creative escape for the poet and her two companions, characterized by a peacefulness surpassing even that 'lofty repose' of the Ancients:

> Yea! soon, no consonant unsmooth
> Our smile-tuned lips shall reach,
> But softer than Hellenic sounds
> Shall glide into our speech -
> (What music did you ever find
> So soft as voices glad and kind?)
>
> And often by the joy without,
> And in us, overwrought,
> We shall sit voicelessly, and read
> Such poems in our thought
> As Pindar might have writ, if he
> Had tended sheep in Arcady!
>
> Or Aeschylus - the pleasant Field

He died in, longer knowing -
Or Homer, had he heard no tone
More loud than Meles flowing -
Or poet Plato, had th' undim
Unsetting Godlight broke on him!

It is interesting that in "The Island" the poetic speaker imagines an isolated space in which women can surpass famous figures of classical eloquence by writing "such poems in our thought" as Homer, Plato, Pindar or Aeschylus "might have writ" had they not been as they were; this almost seems plaintive, an acknowledgment of Browning's own experience of 'constriction and exclusion' as it is relocated to the imaginary space of the poem, and to the women in it. There are also poetic invocations of female community and of a female literary tradition in "Stanzas to Bettine, the Friend of Goethe," in "Stanzas on the death of Mrs. Hemans" and in "To Miss Mitford in her Garden," "The Young Queen" and "Victoria's Tears," but one of the most interesting is in "A Song Against Singing," addressed to "my dear little cousin Elizabeth Jane H–," which combines themes of female poetic agency, Christian models of selfhood, and maternalist concern in a poetic refusal to "sing:"

They bid me sing to thee,
Thou golden-haired and silver-voicëd child,
With lips, by no worse sigh than sleep's, defiled;
With eyes, unknowing how tears dim the sight;
With feet all trembling at the new delight,
Treaders of earth to be!

Ah no! The lark may bring
A song to thee from out the morning cloud;
The merry river, from its lilies bowed;
The brisk rain, from the trees; the lucky wind,
That half doth make its music, half doth find!
But *I*– I may not sing.

How could I think it right,
Newcomer on earth, as, Sweet, thou art,
To bring a verse from out an human heart,
So heavy with accumulated tears;
And cross with such weary years,
thy day-sum of delight?

E'en if the verse were said;
Thou, who wouldst clasp thy tiny hands to hear
The wind or rain, gay bird or river clear,
Wouldst, at that sounds of sad humanities,
Upturn thy bright uncomprehending eyes
And bid me play instead.

Therefore no song of mine!
But prayer in place of singing! prayer that would
Commend thee to the new-creating God,
Whose gift is childhood's heart, without its stain
Of weakness, ignorance and changings vain–
That gift of God be thine!

So wilt thou aye be young,
In lovelier childhood than thy shining brow
And pretty winning accents make thee now!
Yea! sweeter than this scarce articulate sound
(How sweet!) of "father" "mother," shall be found
The ABBA on thy tongue!

And so, as years shall chase
Each other's shadows, thou wilt less resemble
Thy fellows of the earth who toil and tremble,
Than him thou seest not, thine angel bold,
Yet meek, whose ever-lifted eyes behold
The Ever-loving's face!

In "A Song Against Singing" the situation resembles that of "Isobel's Child," though here the child survives. Readers are brought into a domestic space in which a woman's poetic admiration of an infant overshadows every concern but the highest, that of the child's salvation, and as with "Isobel's Child" the infant is wiser than the adult, in each case bidding the woman to concentrate her abilities on God's creation rather than her own. As with the preface there is the slightly uncomfortable connection between

masculinity/femininity and divine/human in the admonition that the child "resemble… him thou seest not, thine angel bold/Yet meek, whose ever-lifted eyes behold/The Ever-Loving's face!" which points back to the medial role between Aeschylus and Christ envisioned for herself in Moulton-Barrett's preface.

In fact, the two passages quoted above bear out the argument proposed in the first two sentences of her preface, where Moulton-Barrett locates her own task somewhere between the masculine classical tradition of Aeschylus and an imagined masculine writerly tradition which is to her "most natural." So do all the passages I have described from the book, and also the poems I have paraphrased. Whether or not Mermin is correct in discerning the face of the Mother between the lines of Moulton-Barrett's poetry in *Seraphim*, the faces of God and of Apollo are both there, while women are not relegated to the white spaces on the page but instead inhabit the text itself. Thus we can see that if in *Modern Greece*, the *Lady's Monthly Museum*, *Court Magazine*, the Archer portrait and the Bull print women are peripheral to the masculine Hellenist tradition they nevertheless participate in, if largely as opinionated spectators, the Hellenist enfigurations visible in "Euphrasia: A Tale" and in *The Seraphim* place women within that tradition, though in an odd position. The "brave" daughter of the snowed-in carriage is also Euphrasia, the motivating force behind her brother Constantine's participation in the 'Greek revolution,' and the oracular source of a vision of Greek women as the potential representatives of a classical tradition they will bear as they will the sons to whom they will teach it. The translator of Aeschylus and "most natural" writer is also a woman whose work revolves around themes of "escape from patterns that had constricted her poetic development,"

enabling Moulton-Barrett to "make a source of power, not weakness, for her poetry out of her experience of constriction, exclusion, renunciation and rebellion" (Mermin 1986: 714).

Thus we can see that for women like Shelley and Moulton-Barrett, who manage to claim their different places within British Hellenism, the writerly labor necessitated by that feat is considerable. Their heterodox femininity is enfigured as both exalted and dangerous within the context of the enfigurative tradition of British Greekness as they could inhabit it, and both authors seek a synthesis between competing strands of that tradition and with other, competing traditions as a means of easing the danger of their own exultation - a danger they both *pose to* the tradition, and which the tradition *imposes on* them. This imposition necessitates in Shelley's case the odd formal and expressive character of "Euphrasia," and like Shelley, in Moulton-Barrett's *The Seraphim* the poet's mediation between the Christian and classical traditions causes the poet to enfigure women as disjunct selves. These 'disjunct' Hellenist women are always-already imbricated in a web of relationships whose sustenance is their most important task, but they are also Reynoldsian Persons, capable of participating in Hellenist discourse. In both cases it is striking how fully the female protagonist must subsume her own energies in favor of the needs of others, or of the State. This is entirely unlike men, even working-class men, whose subjecthood is such that eavesdropping strangers can see in them a vision of the nation; the statue of "GREAT PAN" whose shadow Moulton-Barrett traces is like that of the *Apollo Belvedere* in remaining somehow opposed to femininity and to 'Woman' but not to Britishness, and certainly not to British Hellenism. The closest approach to Reynoldsian enfigurative utility a female figure manages is in "Euphrasia: A Tale," where the title character envisions a

female future for Hellenism and for philhellenism, but as in *The Seraphim*, that female figure is too much imbricated in familial relationships, and too much bound by the strictures of orthodox femininity, to carry her potential significance to term. In the next chapter we will again encounter Moulton-Barrett as she again seeks to synthesize idealism and activism, this time through the statue of a modern Greek slave; again we will see the social function of classical (or classicizing) art. We will also encounter a woman in a carriage but, unlike the anonymous woman trapped in the frozen tundra of East Sussex, this one was able not only to claim her own enfigurative agency, but formed an important aspect of the enfiguration of the nation whose Empire she symbolized in her very person. Using the Great Exhibition as a springboard to a larger topic, Victorian racialism, I will also discuss how personhood was enfigured at the Great Exhibition through the genetic logic which both predated the Great Exhibition, and made it possible.

Personhood, Plurality and Social Change:

Somatic Norms of British Greekness in mid-Century

It is impossible to conceive of many without one.

Plato, *Parmenides*

In Chapter two I argue that, through their strategic citation of competing Hellenist traditions between 1810 and 1838, some middle- and upper-class British women established 'alternative musea' that offered them a textual position of equipoise between ennoblement and endangerment. This position was characterized by 'connective disjunction,' and allowed these women to inhabit a partial relation to normate masculine subjectivity despite continuing to be defined as incapable of actual citizenship. In this chapter I will expand the application of this concept of 'connective disjunction,' using it to explain the method by which the national program of Reynoldsian ennoblement was briefly expanded to near-universal application in the middle of the nineteenth century. If this program began with elite men and later expanded somewhat to include middle- and upper-class women, or to allow them to partially include themselves, I will show in this chapter that for two hours in 1851, the Reynoldsian project expanded to include all Britons. The enfigural and literal impositions of Reynoldsian nobility I will discuss below linked selfhood to membership in the Statist assemblage via personhood, and in the first section of this chapter I will describe how the logic of this identification can be seen in the ideological tensions that marked the years preceding the Great Exhibition of 1851, and how those tensions were momentarily eased before reasserting themselves shortly afterward.

APPROACHING THE GREAT EXHIBITION: THE ROLE OF KERMODEAN 'GENETIC LOGIC'

As I state in Chapter one, ethnogenesis is the process by which a mass of individuals acquires a group identity that coheres them as a bounded, legible cultural entity – an *ethnos*. Ethnogenesis can be active or passive, occurring through self-identification with a group or as the result of a group's identification 'from without,' but it is not accidental. Thus ethnicity, the outcome of ethnogenesis, is the product of group narrative; ethnicity also resides within the individual body and informs individual experience, making it an aspect of 'autogenetic,' Kermodean narrative selfhood. As I have mentioned, while 'autogenesis' and 'connective disjunction' are my own coinages, I take 'ethnogenesis' from German archaeologist and ancient ethnographer Hans-Joachim Gehrke's "From Athenian Identity to European Ethnicity – the Cultural Biography of the Myth of Marathon" (2009). There Gehrke compares nineteenth- and 20th-century appropriations of the 'battle-myth' of Marathon and the uses 5th-century Athenians made of the same myth, arguing that the narrative impact of the Marathon battle-myth is felt on a historical timescale, and he describes a resulting 'intentional history' of European-ness built around exclusions and oppositions expressed within a geopolitical lexicon that, over centuries of repetition, reifies an imaginary distance between East and West. This takes us back to Morris (1994) and the bifurcated status of Greek archaeology, and Greek archaeology's relation to the meaning of European-ness, and this repetition includes the Orientalist Islamophobia I have noted in previous chapters; I will show in a later section of this chapter that Gehrkean intentional

history's bifurcating effects were compounded during the 18th and nineteenth centuries by a systematic, physiognomic racialism reliant on the same logic.[76]

In this chapter section I want to further link my ideas about individual narrative identity to Gehrke's point about ethnic identity by returning to the quote he uses as an example of nineteenth-century European ethnogenesis: "The battle of Marathon, even as an event in English history, is more important than the battle of Hastings." This comes from John Stuart Mill's 1846 review of George Grote's *History of Greece*, and Gehrke treats it as an example of what he calls "intentional history" (2009: 85).[77] As with previous

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[76] Gehrkean 'intentional history' and Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities" have a clear relationship, though Gehrke does not cite Anderson in his work. In an article comparing the *Hermannsdenkmal* at Detmold, which commemorates a successful German mutiny against the Roman Army, with a similar monument in New Ulm, Minnesota, Michael Sommer gives an excellent summation of the ways 'intentional history' and 'imagined communities' interlock. Sommer argues that "modern nations are prototypical imagined communities" and "need symbols and narratives around which they can cluster, inspiring the notion in its members that they know, and belong to, each other" (2016: 220). These "symbols and narratives" are Gehrke's 'intentional history.' As this section will show, there are also clear echoes of Partha Chatterjee's (1996) particular citation of Nairn's (1981) concept of "janus-faced nationalism" in Mill's narrative of "English history," though I am hesitant to force a comparison between two separate traditions, both with such explosive political undercurrents. Chatterjee's concept of janus-faced nationalism has to do with post-colonial nationalism and as such is an odd fit here, but Chatterjee's and Nairn's point about how nationalism can both look to the future and the past for political motivation is not. Mill is clearly doing this, as have so many of the authors and artists I have discussed so far, but Mill is also seeming to narrate "English history" as colonial history in that it begins with the successful defeat of one conqueror and continues through the military success of another. It is worth remembering that Nairn's original notion of 'janus-faced nationalism' argued that the forward-facing side envisions liberation, and the backward-facing side envisions fascism.

[77] Describing Marathon as a "modern figure of remembrance," (94) Gehrke moves from the actual battle of Marathon to its representation in Greek tragedy, and makes a convincing link to Hegel's *Philosophy of History* (1837), noting that both Hegel and Mill assume the cultural importance of political forms and identify Hegel's "Asian principle" with despotism, against Greek democracy. Jenkyns and Turner are good sources for Mill's Hellenism, and Mill's review of Grote's *History* is fairly self-explanatory in its Gehrkean purpose and emphases. Irwin (1998) deals with Mill's Hellenism with care, while Roberts (2011) describes the prehistory of Grote's *History* and of Grote's and Mill's relationship, and Antis Loizides (2013: 65-83) offers a useful discussion of Mill's Hellenism as it is expressed in the review in his *John Stuart Mill's Platonic Heritage: Happiness Through Character*.

aphoristic enfigurations of nineteenth-century British Hellenism I have discussed, context is important:

> The true ancestors of the European nations (it has been well said) are not those from whose blood they are sprung, but those from whom they derive the richest portion of their inheritance. The battle of Marathon, even as an event in English history, is more important than the battle of Hastings. If the issue of that day had been different, the Britons and the Saxons might still have been wandering in the woods. (273)

In this passage Mill narrates a group historiography in which progress from prehistory to the present results from the military ability of the "true ancestors of the European nations" and the sanguinary after-effects of Periclean Athens' victory over their Persian opponents. It is at once a liberal refusal of Empire (that of the Persians) and an excuse for another kind of domination, an intimate imperialism of the soul. For the Europeans of Mill's imagination, "the richest portion of their inheritance" is the ethnogenetic outcome of this battle, and "the issue of that day" is in Gehrke's reading an ethnogenetic Europeanness; my point has as much to do with *how* Mill makes this point as it does with whether the point is correct. Mill describes the outcome of this 'intentional history' in language that links biological and economic paradigms – the "issue of that day" would seem to make a seminal analogy available, while "the richest portion of their inheritance" recasts "issue" in less physiological terms – while measuring value in terms of narrative impact, and this forms an excellent example of enfiguration.

What is interesting about Mill's review is that in it, the ethnicized individual not only narrates, but exemplifies this intentional history. The group task as Mill sees it, which is to participate in the Battle of Marathon by introjecting its "inheritance," is coterminous

with the authorial task Mill assigns to Grote: "to embody in his own mind, and next to lay out before his readers, the general picture of the Grecian world" (274).[78] In thus embodying both "English history" and the "Grecian world" in "his own mind," and in narrating the State's intellectual "inheritance" in the form of a "general picture of the Grecian world," Mill assigns Grote two tasks. Praising his friend's work as a successful piece of scientific historiography, Mill places Grote and his rationalist account in conflict with previous norms of historical scholarship concerning the Greeks and their religion, just as the Greeks were in conflict with the Persians at Marathon. Additionally, Mill maps the composition of the *History* and Grote's departures from previous historiographical practice onto the true picture of Greekness Mill sees in Grote's *History*: progress away from belief in imaginary forces, and towards the freethinking observance of fact. We can see here that while Mill narrates "English history" and thus British ethnogenesis in this book review, he also imposes an autogenetic narrative onto the book's author. This narrative erects enfigurative boundaries around a thus-unified subject, in this case 'Grote the heroic historian of Greece,' who attains individual selfhood and ethnic belonging through rhetorical means while he is also assigned a medial identifier – Grote's 'Grecian mind,' his praiseworthy personhood. As with P.B. Shelley's 1821 preface to *Hellas* or Scotland's failed national monument, this example clearly demonstrates the lasting strategic potential of nineteenth-century British Hellenism. Ethnic belonging is accomplished by the definition of individual being, and in

[78] Kierstead (2014) deals with the characterological aspects of the *History* very ably, and the volume in which Kierstead's chapter appears, *Brill's Companion to George Grote and the Classical Tradition*, is one of the best and most recent assessments of Grote's classicism.

the course of expressing his admiration for his friend, Mill also identifies his own mid-Victorian liberalism with 'the Grecian mind,' promoting Utilitarianism through comparison with Greek progress from superstition to science. Mill thus re-enacts the Battle of Marathon by proxy while announcing its importance to "English history," connecting himself and his Utilitarianism to both by transposing them onto another person and onto an imaginary *ethnos*. This transposition is laudatory, though, and this positivity obscures its normative function somewhat; an example in which the interpellative violence of autogenetic identification is more emphasized may be useful in applying Gehrkean ethnogenesis to questions of personhood in the mid-nineteenth century.

Before I turn to that discussion, however, it is important to comment on the lack of 'things Greek' in the next two examples of Gehrkean intentional history I will offer here. This lack is intentional, and I will expand on my reasons for including a cartoon and a diary entry that have little to do with nineteenth-century British Hellenism below, but I can state them briefly here. In a recursive account of the historical poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism it is important to attend not only to the stylistics of the text itself, but also to the stylistics of the historical narrative or intentional history they promulgate in aggregate, as that intentional history can be accessed through a comparative, intertextual method. Close attention to the text, as in the case of my reading of "Euphrasia: A Tale," reveals its internal complexity and offers important information about the phenomenological and semiotic approaches the text takes to the world it describes; in "Euphrasia" the formal properties of the text create a fragmented, palimpsestic textual world that emphasizes in what a difficult position women and modern Greeks were placed

by the British Greekness "Euphrasia" depicts, the wounded, ephebic Valency being the only character to survive the narrative. Analyzing "Euphrasia" intertextually by linking it to *Hellas* in order to bookend the Greek War of Independence, on the other hand, reveals that this stylistic pattern is replicated in a 'distance' reading of the two texts, both of which are finally aimed at a British audience and hold before that audience the promise of Greekness divorced from more than a notional admixture of actual Greek people. In this chapter I will also attend to the poetics of history through attention to historical events, treating them as the underlying formal constraint that makes the poem of mid-century British history a Kermodean narrative structure and not simply a stream of undifferentiated phenomena. This chronological poetics conceives time as metre, or rhyme scheme, and particularly when thinking about the United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century, it is worth thinking of 1848 as Kermode's *tick* and 1851 as the *tock*. The example of *tick* I will use is a *Punch* cartoon (fig. 1) depicting the 1848 Trafalgar Square Riots of March 6-9, which began as an *ad hoc* anti-tax demonstration attracting approximately ten thousand people and morphed into a three-day riot in response to incidents of police brutality.[79] This is a departure from Prinsian orthodoxy, reading time itself and events emplaced therein as texts, but particularly in a chapter that includes the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations it is imperative to begin to expand our understanding of 'text' beyond what is written down. Gehkre has already begun this task with his concept of

[79] Like the political challenges attendant on the 'year without a summer,' mid-century political upheaval in Europe is closely related to a subsistence crisis occurring from 1845-1850 (see Vanhaute, Paping, & Ó Gráda 2007) but 1848, the 'Year of Revolutions,' offers the best example of organized, sustained political upheaval in Britain in the decade leading up to the 1851 Great Exhibition.

intentional history, and in this chapter I will apply the assumptions underlying that concept to the years between 1848 and 1870.



Fig. 3: John Leech, "The Trafalgar Square Revolution," 1848. Engraving.

The 1848 Trafalgar Square Riots are an important, understudied event in mid-nineteenth century British political history, preceding and arguably preparing police and Parliament for the larger Kennington Commons assembly held a month later, the supposed failure of which assembly is usually described as the death-knell of Chartism.[80] The riots followed a

[80] James Gregory's (2014) study of the life of James Elmslie Duncan (1822-1853), failed Chartist poet and reformer, is an excellent source of information on the years preceding 1851 and especially on political

demonstration that was cancelled by its organizer, Charles Cochrane[81], after authorities informed him that it was illegal to hold a demonstration petitioning a sitting Parliament within the City, and G.W.M. Reynolds, agitator and best-selling author of *The Mysteries of London* (1844-48), *The Mysteries of the Court of London* (1848-56), and *Wagner the Wehr-Wolf* (1846-7) appeared unexpectedly in his stead. Holding a placard reading "A Republic for France - The Charter for England" Reynolds praised the "glorious French revolution" and asked "the Parisian people not to take the leading articles of the aristocratic newspapers nor the opinions of the West End oligarchy as an expression of what the English people thought of them" (*Times* 7 March 1848, quoted in Mace 1972). This was met with cheers and little else, and it was only as the assembled masses began to leave Trafalgar Square that fighting between police and demonstrators broke out.

It is tempting to think that the *Punch* cartoon references Reynolds' speech. The two-panel illustration presents the rioters as children and their anonymous 'Cochranite' leader as a disheveled, hypocritical and cowardly old crank easily brought to heel by an burly, determined police officer; the before-and-after humor of the image underscores the

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tensions existing in that period. Taylor (2000) and Roberts (2009) offer studies of 1848 focused respectively on the British Empire and American Exceptionalism, and Jones ([1991] 2013) does the same with a focus on Continental Europe while Sperber ([1994] 2005) extends the time frame slightly backwards, to 1848. Edward Royle's (2000) *Revolutionary Britannia: Reflections on the Threat of Revolution in Britain, 1789-1848* treats 1848 as the end of one period of political tension in Britain and deals competently with a wide swath of history. On Chartism, Goodway (2002) offers a useful analysis of metropolitan Chartism between 1838 and 1848, while Royle ([1980] 1996) is still a good introduction to Chartism and vanden Bossche (2014), Briggs (2016), and Loose (2014) all make interesting points about the role of popular and novelistic representations of Chartism in the movement's social impact.

[81] Cochran's name is the source of the appellation *Punch* used for demonstrators during the Trafalgar Square Riots, 'Cochranites.' It is also another instance of the narrative displacement of Chartism from the riots in favor of a person who was not there, and whose importance to Chartism was not worthy of his elevation to a figurehead.

force of Kermode's 'tick-tock' model of narrative identity and shows how well it applies to the subject of this chapter, Kermodean selfhood being narrated in the perceived difference between '*tick*' and '*tock*' just as the Trafalgar Square print envisions personhood occurring in the space between Tableau 1 and Tableau 2. The Trafalgar Riot diptych also uses the same kind of spatial rhetoric we saw in the previous chapter's Bull print, activating ideas about public and private, perhaps even of 'home' through the depiction of protestors as children run amock. Furthermore, in the contrast between Cochranite and police officer the Trafalgar Square riot print is trading on a typology of comparative masculinity reminiscent of the Bull Print, of Hemans' two masculine figures in *Modern Greece*, and of Byron's comments on Elgin, locating the enfigurative 'truth' of the Trafalgar Square riots in the empty space that at once connects and separates the imposing, club-wielding policeman in Tableau II and the exhortative 'Cochranite' in Tableau I. This combined attention to embodiment and group membership recalls Mill's review, where he locates the enfigurative 'truth' of Greek history in Grote's mind and in his historical praxis, which both connects and separates Grote from other historians.

The role of connective disjunction within a larger genetic logic is most clearly visible in the image when we notice that the two men occupy the same space in their respective *tableaux*, but on the right the policeman is striding purposefully into the frame, preparing to strike the Cochranite, where on the left the Cochanite is the dominant figure, his hat and stick in his upraised arms as he proclaims "Hooray! Veeve Ler Liberty! Harm Yourselves! To the Palis! Down With Heaverythink!" The Kermodean, connective contrast between the panels and the men depicted in them is made complete by the Cochranite's

pleading words to the police officer in Tableau II: "Oh Sir - Please, Sir, It Aint Me, Sir - I'm for 'God Save the King' and 'Rule Britannier' Boo-- Hoo-- Oh Dear! Oh Dear!!"[82] The *Punch* cartoon thus demonstrates the flip side of Gehrke's contention that European cultural identity is founded on opposition and exclusion, depicting the Cochranite's opposition-accession to the British *ethnos* through a sort of *fort-da*, exclusion-inclusion unification of opposites, the enfiguration thus formed overlayering 'God Save the King' onto 'Veeve Ler Liberty' in aggregating the two panels into a diptych. Not only does this further silence the true character of the riot, where pro-French sentiment was clearly expressed, but the ethno-nationalism of the Cochranite in Tableau II is very much in the Gehrkean tradition of Mill's comments on Marathon's significance to English history. Also activating Puwar's theories of a spatial-somatic norm, the *Punch* cartoon depicts an 1848 riot that crippled Westminster for three days as a displaced, timeless encounter between the carnivalesque forces of misrule and their official, statist counterpart, both of which are male. While the Hellenism of Mill's review might seem to separate it from the *Punch*

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[82] While I have not explored this aspect of my topic at length for want of space, the French/British dichotomy that is so obviously activated in the post-Napoleonic reception of the Parthenon Marbles as an emblem of British Greekness is also clearly at work here. Turner (1989) argues in "Why the Greeks and not the Romans in Victorian Britain?" that

> to appeal to Rome was to draw a line of continuous cultural influence within Europe; to appeal to Greece was to appropriate and domesticate a culture of the past with which there had been, especially in Britain, a discontinuous relationship. And that very discontinuity may have been part of the attraction for nineteenth-century writers who regarded much of their own experience as discontinuous with the recent past. 61

While Mill seeks to narrate this 'continuous relationship' that Turner questions, Mill's hyperbolic claiming of that very continuity suggests the need to convince readers of its existence. Mill's reference to Rome also seems to be an effort at threading the Greek/Roman needle, while the *Punch* cartoon's depiction of the 'domestication' of the Cochranite and Turner's Victorian 'domestication' of Greece follow along similar lines. This does not convert the *Punch* cartoon into a reference to 'things Greek' but it does help to show why I consider it a useful illustration of the ideas I am exploring here.

cartoon, this is not the case; just as Greek victory at the Battle of Marathon functions as a sign of Western cultural superiority in Mill's review, marking the shift from indigenous Britons "wandering in the woods" to a hegemonic Euro-Englishness, the individual Cochranite's sudden shift from Francophile radicalism to cringing patriotism symbolizes the mob's political irrelevance and the successful operation of the Reynoldsian assemblage's interpellative energies on its leader. In both cases the victory-narrative requires that the opposition of the transformed party – "English history" or the cringing Cochranite – be elided as victory's guarantee.

Since the internal process of the Cochranite's repudiation of Francophilia and republicanism occurs in the empty space between the two tableaux, his shifting ethnic identity - his visible selfhood, habitus, or 'personhood' - becomes the individual stage on which a national drama is acted out, and this is the fundamental feature of what I am calling the 'genetic logic' of nineteenth-century British Hellenism. Here the real threat of widespread unrest becoming Chartist-led revolution first appears on his body as a false threat, in the Cochranite's absurd gesticulating in Tableau 1, and in Tableau 2 the threat is overcome through the Cochranite's forcible re-education and his subsequent return to the *ethnos*. The fate of the nation plays out on bodies in action, via State reaction, and both the Trafalgar Square print and Mill's quote on the battle of Hastings show how these enfigurations refer to a larger context through paradoxically hyper-local means. Each denies the real causes of structural change by framing cause and event within an entirely discrete narrative, an isolated '*tick-tock*' occurring in a specifically non-specific space. In the *Punch* cartoon the connective disjunction within the Cochranite's shifting ethnic

identity is foregrounded, Trafalgar Square given none of its usual visual accompaniment, Nelson's iconic column absent and surrounding buildings invisible, especially in Tableau II. This is linked to another spatialized denial of meaning I will discuss in the next section, where paradoxically empty space will be an important component of the looking relations required by both Hiram Powers' *Greek Slave*, a famous mid-century work of neo-classical sculpture, and Browning's poetic enfiguration thereof. In fact, I will show throughout this chapter that one of the functions served by connective disjunction is spatial.

As in the examples just discussed, enfigurations that rely on connective disjunction to manage meaning tend to generate depictions of aporetic space, wherein Puwar's somatic norms can be delineated. The role of aporia in enfigurative representation explains why, in the Trafalgar Square diptych, a Chartist riot is described as 'Cochranite' and peopled with children rather than the working-class adults who actually attended the demonstration, and an attention to textual aporia helps to explain why "Euphrasia" leaves its characters in an English carriage symbolically trapped between Greece and Siberia, but not entirely; the carriage in Mary Shelley's narrative is certainly an aporetic space, but beyond its "transcendent whiteness" and gender-mixing, the carriage's somatic import remains unclear. This is not true of either of the 'intentional histories' currently under discussion: in Mill's comments on Grote's ability to embody Greece "in his own mind," as in the *Punch* cartoon's depiction of the Cochranite's monarchist Britishness expressed through his bodily conduct, personhood is visible, it is legible, and it is written on specific bodies. What I will call the 'genetic logic' of such narratives thus unites ethnicity and identity in a located, visible personhood dependent on the constant enfiguration of phenomenological

experience as an inherently socioemotional process, which occurs within a temporal sequence. It is thus centrally important to an understanding of the enfiguration theory I am using to 'flesh out' my praxis of historical poetics. If the *Punch* cartoon both encompasses Kermode's tick-tock model of narrative time and forms the *tick* in another, though, that praxis will need further fleshing-out.

Another example of Gehrkean intentional history will also help to further describe this 'genetic logic' and its importance for my approach to historical poetics, and to complete this section. This example is a diary entry written by Queen Victoria on the opening day of the Great Exhibition on May 5th, 1851. In it, Victoria's odd middle-classness appears less a defensive formation functioning to obscure either her own or the age's neuroses than a vigorous, ongoing refusal of a competing, revolutionary image of the nation, but it is also an excellent example of genetic logic. If we apply to her and to the lived reality she describes the models of auto- and ethnogenetic 'intentional history' we see in the enfigurations I have so far discussed in this section, we will see that she is both Mill and Grote, Cochranite and cop, imposing ethnogenetic meaning and unity on a diffuse crowd of subjects while deriving from this imposition an intensely-felt autogenetic identity. If we apply to her the models of femininity we saw in the last chapter, Victoria appears simultaneously as Euphrasia's opposite and her double, educating and ennobling her nation not through radical philhellenism or protofeminist egalitarianism but through conservative, middle-class Christian liberalism, the focus on home and family so visible in *The Seraphim* being mingled in the Queen's very person with a slightly disjunct nationalism reminiscent

of Hemans' *Modern Greece*. As I will show, Victoria understands citizenship as a familial relation, and uses genetic logic to generate an enfiguration of demotic coherence:

> This day is one of the greatest and most glorious days of our lives, with which, to my pride and joy the name of my dearly beloved Albert is forever associated! It is a day which makes my heart swell with thankfulness ... The Park presented a wonderful spectacle, crowds streaming though it - carriages and troops passing, quite like the Coronation Day, and for me, the same anxiety. The day was bright, and all bustle and excitement. At half past 11, the whole procession in 9 state carriages was set in motion. Vicky and Bertie were in our carriage. Vicky was dressed in lace over white satin, with a small wreath of pink wild roses, in her hair, and looked very nice. Bertie was in full Highland dress. The Green Park and Hyde Park were one mass of densely crowded human beings, in the highest good humour and most enthusiastic. I never saw Hyde Park look as it did, being filled with crowds as far as the eye could reach. A little rain fell, just as we started; but before we neared the Crystal Palace, the sun shone and gleamed upon the gigantic edifice, upon which the flags of every nation were flying.
>
> We drove up Rotten Row and got out of our carriages at the entrance on that side. The glimpse through the iron gates of the Transept, the moving palms and flowers, the myriads of people filling the galleries and seats around, together with the flourish of trumpets, as we entered the building, gave a sensation I shall never forget, and I felt much moved ... In a few seconds we proceeded, Albert leading me having Vicky at his hand, and Bertie holding mine. The sight as we came to the centre where the steps and chair (on which I did not sit) was placed, facing the beautiful crystal fountain was magic and impressive. The tremendous cheering, the joy expressed in every face, the vastness of the building, with all its decorations and exhibits, the sound of the organ (with 200 instruments and 600 voices, which seemed nothing), and my beloved Husband the creator of this great 'Peace Festival', uniting the industry and arts of all nations of the earth, all this, was indeed moving, and a day to live forever. God bless my dearest Albert, and my dear Country which has shown itself so great today ... The Nave was full of people, which had not been intended and deafening cheers and waving of handkerchiefs, continued the whole time of our long walk from one end of the building, to the other. Every face was bright, and smiling, and many even had tears in their eyes ... One could of course see nothing, but what was high up in the Nave, and nothing in the Courts. The organs were but little heard, but the Military Band, at one end, had a very fine effect ...
>
> We returned to our place and Albert told Lord Breadalbane to declare the Exhibition opened, which he did in a loud voice saying "Her Majesty

> commands me to declare the Exhibition opened", when there was a flourish of trumpets, followed by immense cheering. Everyone was astounded and delighted. The return was equally satisfactory - the crowd most enthusiastic and perfect order kept. We reached the Palace at 20 minutes past 1 and went out on the balcony, being loudly cheered. That we felt happy and thankful, - I need not say - proud of all that had passed and of my beloved one's success. Dearest Albert's name is for ever immortalised and the absurd reports of dangers of every kind and sort, set about by a set of people, - the 'soi-disant' fashionables and the most violent protectionists - are silenced. It is therefore doubly satisfactory that all should have gone off so well, and without the slightest accident or mishap.

Stylistically, this passage[83] uses recurrent references to domestic details, not juxtaposed so much as merged with descriptions of the crowds and the Exhibition space, in what amounts to an "intentional history" of an ennobled Reynoldsian assemblage enjoying a "day to live forever," described in the context of national and international looking relations.[84] Statements like "God bless my dearest Albert, and my dear Country which has shown itself so great today" pepper the diary entry, always leaving aside the obvious question of exactly *to whom* "my dearest Albert, and my dear country" have shown themselves "so great today" because its answer is equally obvious. In addition to Britons showing each other their shared greatness, as befits a proper Reynoldsian assemblage (however long-deferred),

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[83] Queen Victoria's journals are now digitized and available through a subscription service run by ProQuest at http://qvj.chadwyck.com/marketing.do, but there are also multiple older versions of her diaries. I have taken this passage from Princess Beatrice's edited version of the diaries, which is the version made available through ProQuest by the Royal Family, but an excerpt from Victoria's diary entry for this day that does not show the same level of editorial incursion is quoted in T. Frederick Ball, *Queen Victoria: Scenes and Incidents from Her Life and Reign* (1888: 156-161). Ball's version of the diary entry is much longer and goes into more familial detail, and briefly describes both French and Chinese reactions on opening day.

[84] While my reading of this diary entry is focused on Victoria's experience of the day itself, it is worth returning to Chatterjee's concept of janus-faced nationalism here. Victoria explicitly mentions her inauguration as an experience she is remembering as she moves through the opening day of the Exhibition, and this suggests that the 'domestic' nationalism I am assigning to her may work according to mechanisms similar to those Chatterjee assigns to Indian nationalism, looking back in time as well as forward. There is no scope to follow this thought through, but among the many uncomfortable collocations in this dissertation I am happy to add another.

Victoria knows that they are showing British greatness to the world, and in so doing, showing the world her greatness as Queen.

While we will never know how Victoria would have reacted to protestors on that May morning, had they appeared, the *Punch* cartoon's negative depiction of Chartist rioters as children receives its positive counterpart in Victoria's diaristic mapping of her family onto her country, her people as well-behaved as Bertie and Vicky and all content to admire her "dearest Albert." This characteristically Victorian 'domestic nationalism,' which like the *Punch* cartoon echoes the maternalism of *The Seraphim*, especially in the image of children in the midst of conflict, receives an important addendum in the final sentences of this passage. The "doubly satisfactory" end to years of remonstrance and persuasion on her husband's part was also the silencing of an alternative assemblage of "'soi-disant' fashionables and the most violent protectionists"[85] that before May 1st had loudly predicted unrest. This double triumph meant that the public spectacle of the Great Exhibition would, in the moment of its opening ceremonies, limn domestic, national, and international enfigurations and successfully unify the British nation as a coherent Reynoldsian assemblage. The genetic logic is clear enough: similar to her coronation, Victoria describes herself and her people becoming "one mass of densely crowded human beings" as they share hyper-surveillative space, and the demotic unity resulting from the event and from its narration disproves the fears of "a set of people" whose non-participation in the

[85] Auerbach (1999) includes useful information on this, and Young (2009) offers an update. The first chapter of Hobhouse's history of the Royal Commission for the Exhibition of 1851 (2002) looks at the same subject from an institutional point of view.

Reynoldsian assemblage is clear in Victoria's attribution of their self-nomination (the literal meaning of "*soi-disant*" is 'saying oneself'). In enfiguring her subjects as "one mass," Victoria organizes the Reynoldsian assemblage visible from the royal carriages as one senses she organized her own family into getting in them, and in some sense she is doing for British identity exactly what Mill says Grote is doing, but on a smaller timescale: where the tick-tock of British Greekness stretches over millennia for Mill, in Victoria's case it stretches over the course of a morning. Like Mill's description of Euro-Englishness as an "inheritance" that is "the issue" of a day's battle, Victoria's diary entry also describes conflict through its resolution. Victoria praises the well-behaved among her subjects and castigates the "absurd… set of people" who had augured unrest, but the Queen's body is also a site of conflict resolved: she describes being as anxious on the opening day of the Great Exhibition as she was at her coronation, and the diary entry narrates her transition from anxiety to delight just as much as it narrates the nation's transition from a precessory state of disagreement and fear to "the crowd most enthusiastic and perfect order kept."

This transition is also the *tock* to the *Punch* cartoon's *tick*, and the work begun by the police officer in the Trafalgar Square diptych is completed by Victoria's successful opening of the Exhibition. The Queenly ascription of repose onto her people and grandeur onto her husband place her at a medial point in a mediatory narrative, and through her overarching, kaleidoscopic enfiguration of the Great Exhibition's opening day she casts a shadow over the entire proceedings that I will describe in the next section of this chapter. While I will not use further examples lacking a Greek connection in this dissertation, these two have been necessary from both an historical and a poetics point of view, and this raises

questions I will deal with in the conclusion of this dissertation. One of these questions is how to constrain one's reading of historical poetics if a recursive historical poetics potentially includes such disparate texts and events: how does one know when one's analysis is sufficient, if a newspaper cartoon from 1848 and a Queen's diary entry are part of the distributed poetics of the opening ceremonies of a single historical event? The other question is more serious. By constructing this recursive 'loop,' does the praxis of historical poetics as I am applying it simply lead back to one's analytical beginning point? If this is unclear, the question can be put otherwise: does a totalizing praxis of historical poetics simply enable scholars to spin intentional histories of their subjects more deftly, multiplying accounts of an event's meaning without ever approaching some deeper or truer object of analysis? I think not, but on the other hand, if we always-already enfigure events through a praxis of intentional history, then those enfigurations are necessarily either normative or invocatory and we can get no further than that.

"TO SEE AND BE SEEN:" THE *GREEK SLAVE* AND THE GREAT EXHIBITION

Considering how layered and compacted 'history' can become in this Kermodean, narrative mode, it is satisfying that the Royal Commission for the Great Exhibition of 1851, which *The Times* for April 15, 1851, described as being "placed at a calm and tranquil elevation from the whole din and bustle, and, like the Homeric gods, only occasionally condescending to look down upon that struggling scene of energy and enthusiasm," had recourse to both traditional and innovative means for trying to maintain the uniformity of Victoria's Reynoldsian assemblage after the Exhibition was open. Their archi-textual

success, and the invocations that spelled their failure, will be the subjects of this section of the chapter. Upon entering the Great Exhibition to await the Royal Family's approach, visitors might have noted that the main central nave of the Crystal Palace was laid out as a 'cast court,' a sculpture garden full of statuary copied from originals like those in the Vatican, where Winckelmann had scrutinized the *Apollo Belvedere* and the *Laocoön* in the 1760s. If it was too crowded on May 5th, as seems likely from the description of the day just discussed, the forms of the people and those of the statues indistinguishable in the tightly-packed crowd, images of the exhibition I will discuss below indicate that there would normally have been sufficient space for visitors to see the classical and neo-classical statuary that dotted the exhibition floor. In fact, the cast court stuffed with copies of classical statuary that visitors would have found themselves in soon after entering the Crystal Palace, as well as the Grecian, Turkish, American and Italian sections of the Exhibition, all displayed their classicism very prominently. This allowed universal access to a source of social capital that made individual visitors to the Exhibition latter-day *Dilettanti*, having "been in Italy" - or at least in the Italian section of the Crystal Palace.

In its sheer profusion, the statuary displayed at the Great Exhibition also formed a source of traditional artistic inspiration that would have amazed the students of Reynolds' Royal Academy, and a source of knowledge about nineteenth-century British Hellenism which offered working-class visitors the prospect of ennoblement, while also giving middle- and upper-class attendees a familiar sign of their own elevated class status. Despite the elite traditionalism of these objects, hearkening back to the age of individual

connoisseurship and collecting and thus borrowing a great deal of aesthetic *cachet*,[86] their impact was also inextricably tied to the triumphantly modern spatial envelope in which they stood, described in Routledge's *Guide to the Great Exhibition* (1851):

> No one can visit the Great Exhibition for the first time without being struck with surprise and delight at the brilliant and varied scene that surrounds him. The tremendous altitude of the glass arched roof, embracing and covering three mighty elms, which beneath its glass are now covered with foliage; the splendid glass fountain, glittering and playing beneath the chastened light admitted by the transparent roof; countless living beings seated on the crimson benches, everywhere interspersed among the statues, or moving slowly about, gazing at the wonders around them; the sides of the transept draped with rich Indian goods; and above, a view of the corners of the galleries abutting on the center, displaying brilliant carpets, chandeliers, and other effective objects;- all this, seen without confusion or crowding, but in one grand repose, produces an impression of wonder and admiration in every beholder, succeeded by the calm feeling produced by the glorious sight of the flags of all nations united in harmony in this Grand Temple of Concord. (66)

The ekphrastic visuality of this description of the "Grand Temple of Concord" clearly demonstrates the Exhibition's reliance on connective disjunction in its signature mixture of traditional and modern. This mixture is most obviously encapsulated in its nickname, the 'Crystal Palace,' and in the Routledge *Guide*'s analogy to a temple, but here we can also track the continuing ennoblement of the Exhibition's attendees.

The Routledge *Guide*'s description of the interior of the Crystal Palace begins with the most forceful aspect of the experience, the sheer weight of space atop the visitor's head.

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[86] The display of sculpture at the Great Exhibition and afterwards, when the Crystal Palace was moved to Sydenham following the end of the Hyde Park Exhibition, certainly had a didactic purpose: by 1854, for example, the Greek Court in the Sydenham Crystal Palace was dedicated to a representation of 'the progress of Greek sculpture' in what was effectively a physical version of Winckelmann's periodization of Greek art in the *Geschichte*. For more see Debbie Challis' chapter on "Modern to Ancient: Greece at the Great Exhibition and the Crystal Palace" in *Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851*, eds. Auerbach & Hoffenberg (2008).

The description of the "tremendous altitude of the glass arched roof" is alive with wonder, what Ruskin later called "a cucumber frame between two chimneys" ([1885] 2012: 26) here described in Alpine terms, the glass roof so shocking in its effect that even the light it "admits" is "chastened" by the experience. Also chastened are the "countless living beings… everywhere interspersed among the statues" who "move slowly," who gaze in wonder but "without confusion or crowding, in one grand repose." This depiction of somatic normativity is serene in its austerity, reminiscent of Winckelmann's ideal body, which Reynolds subsequently associated with Grand Style art, and this depiction demonstrates how the Great Exhibition maintained an ethnogenetic Reynoldsian assemblage through architectural means, where Victoria had created it through textual means. Additionally, this serene austerity reminds us how central a role neo-classical sculpture and nineteenth-century British Hellenism's traditional psychological typology of 'grandeur and repose' played in that archi-textual process. Of course, the Exhibition's statuary was viewed within this vast glass-roofed sculpture garden of the future, marking one connective disjunction between traditional and modern, but the statuary displayed at the Exhibition was also experienced in relation to its function as a catalogue of nations and their characteristics.

This functionality is only visible in the final sentence of the *Guide*'s description, with its reference to "the flags of all nations united in harmony," but it would have been much more so to visitors walking into the cast court through the monumental iron gates manufactured by the Coalbrookdale Iron Foundry in Shropshire. These too were emblems of nationalism, their display proffering a dramatic supra-national opportunity to compare

British excellence with foreign competition as seen in the passage from the *Illustrated London News* of May 17, 1851, quoted below; the transformation of natural resources into nationalist materiel followed the same enfigurative process as did the patriotic Britons that walked over or through them.

> The natural advantages we possess in the use of this material rendered it a matter of great importance that our display should be at least equal to our present position; and in this respect no disappointment can possibly occur, for, in whatever department of our hardware trade we may look, we find it amply represented. In ornamental iron-casting - a branch of trade to which our French neighbours have of late years devoted special attention in connection with their bronze works - there was some fear that in certain points we should not stand as well as it was desirable that we should do. The result, however, of that comparison is such as to set at rest any fears on this head; for, whilst we can well afford to acknowledge the excellence of the works exhibited by our French and German competitors, there is ample field for congratulation as to the continuance of our traditional superiority in these points. (432)

This passage is an example of what I have above called 'international nationalism,' the distance between the Routledge *Guide*'s language of "flags united in harmony" and the *Exhibitor*'s frank acceptance of competition coterminous with the boundaries of the Great Exhibition's enfiguration as an instance of both, thus serving as another example of the connective disjunction that characterized the event.

One of the most famous objects at the Great Exhibition was closely tied to questions of national and international import, addressing them through an instrumental Hellenism reminiscent of the pragmatic citations of British Hellenism that proliferated between 1816 and 1838. Unexpectedly linking Winckelmann's descriptions of the *Laocoön* with the Reynoldsian archi-textual strategy the Great Exhibition employed, the *Greek Slave* (figs. 3

& 4) chastened people through a special kind of spatiality balanced between distance and proximity, much as the Exhibition's glass roof "chastened" the light it admitted.



Fig. 4 (left): Hiram Powers, *Greek Slave*. Marble, after 1840. Fig. 5 (right): detail of *Greek Slave* with pendant and cross

In this section I will argue that the *Greek Slave* was imbricated in an enfigurative tradition that re-produced personhood and ethnicity through a complex, immanent reification of idealism, and I will show how the connective disjunction that characterizes the *Greek Slave*

and Elizabeth Barret Browning's "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" worked through the same 'genetic logic' we saw in the Mill quote, the *Punch* cartoon, and Victoria's diary entry in the previous section. Much as Reynolds sought to control the looking relations pertaining to his preferred, 'Grand Style' art, Hiram Powers and his manager, Miner Kellogg, wanted to control how people looked at the *Greek Slave*. As the images below (fig. 4 & fig. 5) demonstrate, it was possible to look at the *Greek Slave* and feel lust, but as selections from promotional materials associated with the statue will show, the recommended looking relations associated with the statue were in line with Reynoldsian aesthetic theory.[87]

The promotional materials from which I am taking accounts of the preferred looking relations associated with the statue originate in North America, but this should not be taken as a sign that the *Greek Slave* was unknown or unappreciated in Britain. It had first been displayed at Henry Graves' Pall Mall showrooms in the 1840s before marble copies were sent on North American tours, and as Martina Droth and Michael Hatt note in a special issue of *nineteenth-century Art Worldwide* devoted to the *Greek Slave*, "The marble statues were continuously and widely displayed on both sides of the Atlantic, and

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[87] These "promotional materials" are a collection of newspaper and journal articles about Hiram Powers and the *Greek Slave* taken from various sources and sold as a pamphlet by Miner Kellogg, Power's manager, during the *Greek Slave*'s North American tours. Entitled *Powers' Statue of the Greek Slave* (1848), the pamphlet guides 'the preferred looking relations associated with the statue' quite explicitly, beginning with an introduction that explains the stakes of the project:

> The exhibition of a statue by a native artist, which has successfully passed the ordeal of European criticism, and achieved an established renown before reaching our shores, is an event comparatively so rare, and in itself so worthy of consideration, that a natural curiosity is excited to learn the circumstances attending its production, the history of the sculptor, and the true design of the work. 3

The rest of the text is taken up with effusive praises of the statue and its sculptor, the "true design of the work" explained through a sort of 'distributed poetics' that itself would make an interesting study. While *Power' Statue of the Greek Slave* is a North American source and I am discussing the British reception of the *Greek Slave*, there are significant similarities between the reception narratives, as I note.

circulated globally through photographs, illustrations, and reproductions" (2016). The statue's presence at the Great Exhibition capped its fame, especially after Queen Victoria lent it royal approval by sitting in front of it for half an hour with her attendants, and in the words of Horace Binney Wallace, an American essayist and visitor to the Exhibition, "the Greek Slave… is allowed to be the finest marble in the exhibition, and is constantly surrounded by a throng of admiring gazers" (1857: 202). Particularly because the statue depicts a nude woman, it was important that the narrative associated with the statue be widely known, and from Powers' letters and from the description circulated within the Great Exhibition itself it is obvious that viewers' reception was carefully guided.[88]

The catalogue of the Great Exhibition records the description available in the Crystal Palace:

> The figure embodies an historical fact; for during the early Greek revolutions it was customary to expose the prisoners or captives for sale in the Turkish bazaar, under the name of "slaves;" and the figure here represented is intended for that of a young and beautiful Greek girl, deprived of her clothing, and exposed for sale to some wealthy eastern barbarian, before whom she is supposed to stand, with an expression of scornful dejection mingled with shame and disgust. Her dress, which is the modern Greek costume, appears on the column, and the cross implies her religion and country. The chains on her wrists are not historical, but have been added as necessary accessories. (1466)

A correspondent for the *New York Daily Tribune* wrote an account in 1847 that subtly acknowledges the complexity of the looking relations associated with the statue, an account included in the promotional materials that followed the *Greek Slave* on her travels:

[88] In *The Color of Stone: Sculpting the Black Female Subject in Nineteenth-Century America*, Charmaine Nelson quotes from a letter Powers sent to his patron, Edwin W. Stoughton, that insists on a Christian reading of the statue and describes Powers' thought process during the figure's creation (2007: 80-81).

"[W]hatever may be the critical judgment of individuals as to the merits of the work, there is no doubt about the feeling which it awakens" (n.p.). The author explains this "feeling" through analogy: "[P]eople sit before it as rapt and almost as silent as devotees at a religious ceremony" (n. p.). Here the equivocal quality of the looking relations pertaining to the *Greek Slave* arises from the connective disjunction the statue involved its viewers in: it depicts a naked woman, but depicts her such that the *Greek Slave* could claim not only the protection of classical antiquity, but also of modern Christianity.

Fig. 6 (left): Frank Bellew. "An Art Critic," 1859

Fig. 7 (right): Anonymous. "Painting of the Greek Slave with Oriental Figures," ca. 1847

Interestingly, the combination of dubiety – "whatever may be the critical judgment" – and the description of awakened feeling and rapt silence in this account suggests that, much like the pornography that was also becoming a popular and lucrative visual product in the period, "the feeling which it awakens" *was* "the merit of the work" and formed its principal point of interest.[89] This conjecture is supported by reference to satirical depictions of the statue from the period (see figs. 5 & 6 above). Another pamphlet selection supports this assertion, an account from the *New York Courier and Enquirer* of August 1st, 1847, describing the author's "painful apprehension, lest through some real deficiency in ourselves, or some fancied fault in it, we should not feel able to award to our countryman the praise which seemed to be expected of all, and which we longed to give."

The correspondent then overcomes his "painful apprehension" through description of the "spell" under which "the beautiful Greek" placed her viewers:

> It is extremely interesting to watch the effect which the statue has on all who come before it. Its presence is a magic circle within whose precincts all are held spell-bound and almost speechless. The grey-headed man, the youth, the matron and the maid, alike yield themselves to the magic of its power, and for many minutes gaze upon it in silent and reverent admiration, and so pure an atmosphere breathes round it that the eye of man beams only with reverent delight, and the cheek of woman glows but with the fullness of emotion. Loud talking men are hushed into a silence at which they themselves wonder; those who come to speak learnedly and utter ecstasies of dilettantism slink into corners where alone they may silently gaze in pleasing penance for their audacity, and groups of women hover together as if to seek protection from the power of their own sex's beauty. (25-6)

[89] Joy Kasson (1998) describes the pornographic aspects of the reception of the *Greek Slave*, while Schick (2007) offers a granular analysis of the sexual and racial politics subtending the *Greek Slave*.

Not only does this passage exemplify how ekphrastic accounts of the *Greek Slave* sought to guide audience reception away from a pornographic reading of the subject's nudity, this account also links the *Greek Slave* more closely to the Great Exhibition, despite being written four years prior to the Exhibition's opening. To explicate the link involves recourse to Prins' distributed model of historical poetics. Both the "extremely interesting" effect of the statue on its viewers and the Routledge *Guide*'s description of "being struck with surprise and delight" emphasize the powerful impact of the sensation whose perception is described. The "countless living beings seated on the crimson benches" in the Routledge *Guide* are in the Kellogg pamphlet "the grey-headed man, the youth, the matron and the maid," and the description of affect in each selection is similar. Where the Crystal Palace and its overwhelming spatial impact imposes "an impression of wonder and admiration" on those who enter it, "succeeded by the calm feeling produced by the glorious sight," the "magic circle" around the *Greek Slave* "breathes" an atmosphere "so pure" that both men and women are unwittingly and visibly ennobled by the statue's interpellative, spiritualized hygienicity. In the first passage the effect of neo-classical art permeates people through the "chastened" space they occupy, while in the second this effect permeates space through chastened people: the men whose eyes are bright "only with reverent delight," and the women whose cheeks glow "but with the fullness of emotion."

While the sexual politics of this passage differentiates it from the masculine homosociality of the original Reynoldsian assemblage as depicted in the *Discourses* or the *Punch* cartoon, it is easy to see Winckelmann and the "vapour" passing between the *Laocoön* and himself in the discussion of the "atmosphere" that "breathes round" the *Greek*

Slave. The looking relations engendered by the statue were certainly powerful in ways that would have been explicable to aesthetic theorists in the Baumgartenian mold, and through the repetition of ekphrastic accounts like those in the Routledge *Guide* or Kellogg's pamphlet, these looking relations became self-replicating. As shown above, the sculpture depicts a young female figure, naked except for the chains binding her wrist to a post, who holds a necklace with pendant and cross in one hand. The Exhibition's catalogue describes her as "a young and beautiful Greek girl, deprived of her clothes, and exposed for sale to some wealthy Eastern barbarian, before whom she is supposed to stand with an expression of scornful dejection, mingled with shame and disgust" (1466). Her head in profile and her gaze inward, her mood contemplative and downcast, the *Greek Slave* was an iconic mid-century work appearing in engravings, in song and in literary effusions in the British and North American press, its presence at the Great Exhibition only increasing its notoriety.[90]

While the accounts I have quoted from are useful in understanding how the *Greek Slave* was seen by audiences, one particular tribute to the statue, Elizabeth Barrett Browning's "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" (1850), complicates its Reynoldsian utility:

> They Say Ideal Beauty cannot enter
> The house of anguish. On the threshold stands
> An alien image with enshackled hands,
> Called the Greek slave! As if the artist meant her
> (That passionless perfection which he lent her,
> Shadowed, not darkened, where the sill expands)
> To so confront man's crimes in different lands

[90] The literature on the *Greek Slave* is too extensive to list here, but as I mention above, the 2016 special issue on the *Greek Slave* in *nineteenth century Art Worldwide* (15.2, http://www.nineteenthc-artworldwide.org/index.php/summer16) provides an excellent and varied introduction.

> With man's ideal sense. Pierce to the center
> Art's fiery finger! and break up erelong
> The serfdom of this world. Appeal, fair stone,
> From God's pure heights of beauty against man's wrong!
> Catch up in thy divine face, not alone
> East griefs, but West; and strike and shame the strong,
> By thunders of white silence, overthrown.

"Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" nicely captures the statue's complex political poetics. The poem refers simultaneously to Ottoman slavery practices and to women's oppression through images of "enshackled hands," "[T]he serfdom of this world" and "man's wrong," reliant on the same enfigurative traditions reified by the Islamophobic-orientalist and the feminist-complementarian views P.B. and Mary Shelley each took of the Greek War of Independence, the references to God also pointing toward Barrett-Browning's own evangelically-inspired abolitionism. In describing the statue as it does, "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" places the reader firmly within the affectively-charged immanence of the looking relations associated with the statue: its didactic purpose, its overdetermined whiteness, and its complex, critical participation in an idealist aesthetic. Like the Routledge *Guide*'s enthusiastic mingling of glass-roofed altitude with "countless living beings," poet and sculptor both use the pathos generated through the connective disjunction between "God's pure heights of beauty" and "man's wrong" to draw the reader's attention to other odd, unsettling and meaningful contradictions in its subject, the most obvious of which are chronological and ideological.

Unsurprisingly, Yopie Prins points out a meaningful contradiction in "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" that has to do with historical displacement. Recalling my comments on narrative time, in "Classics for Victorians" (2009) she writes that, though it is presented

at the Great Exhibition as being emplaced in the past, "the *Greek Slave* is represented in the sonnet to confront us in the present tense" (53). The poetic contradiction between the classical "Ideal Beauty" and the modern "house of anguish" is increased by contrast between ancient Greek and Victorian artistic norms of sculptural modesty, and by chronological and geographical distance between ancient Greece, 'modern' Greece[91], pre-Civil War America and post-1848 Britain. "Art's fiery finger" points in accusation at "this world" while the poet uses the statue's pre-existing Reynoldsian associations between ideal beauty, selfhood and nationhood and the effect of the "magic circle" it drew around itself to emphasize the poem's accusatory stance, which it takes from its subject and seeks to impose onto its reader. It does this by connecting the lines "not alone/ East Griefs, but West" with the explicitly 'Eastern' object depicted in the work of art, but also with the statue's implicit 'Western' subject as expressed by the statue's physical presence in the American section of the Exhibition: the ongoing brutality of slavery in the American South.

The enfigurative palimpsest thus created by "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" maps the Greek War of Independence onto the abolitionist 'war on slavery' through the image of the slave, while also juggling ancient Greek and modern Victorian representational

[91] Greece could hardly be called 'modern' in 1851, being largely rural and agricultural, some local economies still dependent on barter rather than fiscal exchange; for more see Yagou (2003). As Challis (2008) notes in her chapter on Greece at the Great Exhibition, this atemporal status meant that modern Greece was judged in comparison with ancient Greece, or the ideal mental image thereof, the resulting negative assessment then being mapped onto a Gehrkean opposition between West (ancient Greece) and East (modern Greece) that was echoed in the spatial arrangement of the Exhibition itself. This makes the *Greek Slave* an exemplary object of inquiry for present purposes; as Challis notes, the *Greek Slave* "is almost exactly a copy of the Aphrodite of Knidos… while the rosary/cross places the subject in a firmly modern Christian era" (180). Unsurprisingly, considering the discussion of 'supra-national' art in Chapter one, the Roman copies of the Aphrodite of Knidos known in the nineteenth century were scattered across Europe, with a head in the Louvre and a nearly-complete figure in the Munich Glyptothek, and other copies in the Prado and the Vatican collections.

norms through her body and through the connective disjunction between the slave's forced nudity and her sustaining religiosity. Enfiguring the viewer as a hinge between the ethnogenetic and autogenetic narratives thus put in play, this representational crosstalk has the added benefit of deftly emphasizing Britain's 'salvific' role in the 'Greek War of Independence' while foreclosing consideration of working-class repression at home, and of colonial oppression and exploitation abroad. In the American Section of London's Crystal Palace, the *Greek Slave* draws attention to the past and to the future through reference to the Greek War of Independence and the hoped-for abolition of American slavery, and by creating such a starkly oppositional tableau forces the audience's looking relations with it into the same enfigurative straitjacket. If the *Slave* is Greek then those who enslave her are "some wealthy Eastern barbarian," the Britons who view her being the same sympathetic saviors who had in the 1830s helped to broker her country's peace, and not the government of Lord Castlereagh, which until he was replaced as Foreign Secretary by Canning in 1822 had remained allied to Turkey. Additionally, if the *Slave* is in the American section then she can be read as an American slave, distinct from the slaves owned by a previous generation of British plantation owners like Elizabeth Barret Browning's father and uncles, which generation laid the foundations for Britain's nineteenth-century expansionism. Finally, if the referents the *Greek Slave* points towards with her "fiery finger" are "erelong," a timespace neither past nor future, then Britain's present remains triply obscured, the threat of British revolution again represented as absence.

It might be objected that the poem is explicitly meant "To so confront man's crimes in different lands/With man's ideal sense" and this is certainly true, but a return to the idea

of 'janus-faced nationalism' is useful here. Browning's poem is abolitionist and its abolitionism helped to enfigure the *Greek Slave* as a work of art referencing American slavery, but the poem achieves its political poetics by looking everywhere and nowhere at once. The "passionless perfection" of the *Slave*, which is "shadowed, not darkened, where the sill expands" sits at exactly the point of equipoise between endangerment and ennoblement I discussed in the previous chapter, but while the statue looks downward, in "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" she looks down onto a threshold she is rooted to. Thus while Britain may be an exception to the assured, universalizing, pan-historical vision of suffering the poem presents, the poem places that vision in opposition to an oddly ambivalent idealism. This is another instance of connective disjunction, again between the *Greek Slave*'s ideal, neo-classical beauty and the statue's referent, occurring this time on an ideological level. Both in her poem and in the statue that is its subject, the poet clearly recognizes that sheer aesthetic impact is useful both in obscuring and in exposing injustice.[92] In the poem's dismissive description of the aestheticist position, "They Say Ideal Beauty cannot enter/ The house of anguish," the poet shows how idealist aestheticism sharply separates intellectual considerations of ideal beauty from the emplaced, corporeal reality of anguish, and the poet does this to "shame the strong" through reference to their "thunders of white silence." This fundamental critique of idealism is both posed and ameliorated through the incongruous image of an idealized, enshackled, white female slave

[92] Prins strengthens this reading in her article, noting that Browning wrote a few lines from *Aurora Leigh* in Powers' visitor's book during an 1858 trip to Powers' Florence studio: "It takes a soul / to move a body; it takes a high-souled man / To move the masses" (53). For more see Katherine Gaja's excellent, if brief discussion in the *Times Literary Supplement* for June 26th, 2003 (16-17).

breaking down the aesthetic categories separating the idealizing viewer from 'reality' through her own immobility. The problem is that the very whiteness and immobility of the silent sculpture is both rebuke to and reification of idealist ideo-logic, remaining firmly within the enfigurative tradition it also critiques. Browning's poem shocks the viewer with the incongruity of the *Greek Slave*'s racial encoding but also relies on its underlying logic, forcing the poem to imply that enmeshing femininity, whiteness and enslavement as Powers has done in the *Greek Slave* is specifically useful in producing outrage in its viewers, and that enmeshing femininity, non-whiteness and enslavement is not. This strategic racialism is necessary because, outside nineteenth-century British Hellenism's naturalized racial and representational politics coding depictions of enslaved and violated non-white people as legible and expected, but placing white femininity 'on a pedestal' to be protected from harm, poem and sculpture lose rhetorical focus and narrative impact.

As Charmaine Nelson points out repeatedly in *The Color of Stone: Sculpting the Black Female Subject in Nineteenth-Century America* (2007), Powers' sculpture displaces blackness by manipulating the statue's widely-recognized indexical relationship to contemporary American slavery and abolition debates through a white medium. Nelson argues that Powers elided any obvious connection to American slavery for strategic purposes of his own, using the slave's Christianity to counter her nudity *and* her neo-classical 'paganism' while using her Greekness to mitigate her indexical connection to American slavery. I would add to Nelson's reading of the statue by noting that like the statue it enfigures, Browning's poem also emphatically displaces blackness with whiteness, setting up a supplemental relation between the two. Nelson also points out other odd

moments of juxtaposition related to the *Greek Slave*: for instance, in addition to being ennobled and brought into the "magic circle" of the Reynoldsian assemblage, the viewer of the statue is also placed in the same position as a slave-buyer, the actual viewer's ennobling and resolutely asexual, sympathetic, civilized Christian gaze existing in strong but unspoken contrast to the degrading, sexualized, unsympathetic, 'Barbarian' gaze of the imagined Turkish slave-buyer. This recalls the Trafalgar Square diptych's emplacement of Cochranite and police officer on top of each other in representations of difference that form what amount to two mirror images; what is more, the statue ennobles its viewers by distancing them from their displaced inchastity while gazing on a naked female body in a "chastened" and highly public Western space that is also, at least within the 'magic circle' of the statue's narrative emplacement, an Ottoman slave auction. This requires the viewer to perform, to shed any visible erotic reactions to the statue while undergoing an intensely affective experience in an extremely public space, which experience forms the principle attraction of the statue itself. The Reynoldsian assemblage is here the monitory guardian of the proper individual experience of art, the enfigurative tradition attached to the statue ensuring that viewers react to the *Greek Slave* according to specific and 'chastening' social scripts, even as opposing scripts are not-quite swept aside so their force can be performatively resisted.[93]

[93] Kasson (1990) argues that since "[T]he men and women who viewed nineteenth-century ideal sculpture often scrutinized these marble women with an intensity forbidden in the gaze of everyday life," this intensity "sprang from and spoke to the deeply embedded assumptions about gender shared by makers, buyers, and viewers of sculpture" in the period (2).

The *way* this dis-emplacement is resisted is remarkably similar to the way middle- and upper-class women had resisted their own dis-emplacement from nineteenth-century British Hellenism. Primers on Greek Myth had helped the readers of early-century women's magazines to accrue social capital through appeals to an earlier, masculine enfigurative tradition, and the *Greek Slave* is also enfigured as a cultural resource identified explicitly with submissive feminine whiteness and, implicitly, through its neo-classicism, with the masculinist enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-century British Hellenism. This allows the spectator to identify with the ennobling displacement the figure re-presents rather than the emplaced, oppressed slave actually presented, in turn forcing the spectator to avoid evincing unbecoming lust while incurring extreme public attention. This has the effect of leaving the viewer in an impossibly contradictory relation to an identitarian technology, which relation required repetition and reaction while defying resolution.



Fig. 8: After John Absolon, "View in the East Nave (The Greek Slave, by Power [sic])," *Recollections of the Great Exhibition of 1851* (London: Lloyd Brothers, 1851). Hand-colored lithograph.

Though it is interesting that "the house of anguish" and the reader both become archi-textual links in a chain connecting East and West in Browning's insistently placeful poem, and I have already noted the close connection between the *Greek Slave* and American slavery, the contradictions facing its viewers become more forceful and this reading more productive if we place the *Greek Slave* and Browning's poem even more emphatically in the specific physical context of the American section of the Exhibition. John Tallis, in *Tallis's History and Description of the Crystal Palace, and the Exhibition of the World's Industry in 1851* (1852) describes the *Greek Slave* and the American section as follows:

> Something less severe, but more pleasing, is the Greek Slave, by an American sculptor. It is not, perhaps, an ideal type, but it is a copy of an admirable figure. The young slave is placed in a niche, in velvet, on a turning joint, and must be a little giddy by the end of the day.
>
> After indulging, contrary to her custom, in a work of art, America exhibits another work, which characterizes her much better. It is an enormous supply of articles in caouchouc! It is difficult to conceive anything more ugly, but possibly it is useful. I presume the United States were desirous, by this frightful edifice of india-rubber, to symbolize themselves, and typify the development to which they are destined. Beside this are two of those poor Indians (Iowas,) whom we formerly saw at Paris, and with whom I remembered to have breakfasted. I still remember their air of profound sorrow, which betrayed their nostalgia, and the delight which they exhibited in a large garden. There is something cruel and ostentatious in the exhibition of these two poor red-skins. It is nothing but a trophy. They are the slaves chained to the car of the conqueror; they are the shadow of the old races that the victorious and implacable civilization of the West crushes in its progress. (149)

While Tallis is unimpressed by the *Greek Slave* and humorously dubious of America's "enormous supply of articles in caouchouc," he is scathing in his description of "those poor Indians," those "slaves bound to the car" of a civilization that "crushes" other races "in its progress." His fellow-feeling with the "poor red-skins" is clear, and while Tallis does not make this explicit, there is almost certainly some implied comparison between the celebrated statue of a slave slowly revolving in the crowded visual space of the American Section of the Great Exhibition and the dejected, living representatives of a people decimated by ongoing, systematic state-sponsored genocide standing nearby. This is

Fig. 9: John Tenniel, "The Virginian Slave", 1851.

suggested by Tallis' application of the term "slave" to indigenous North Americans, but also by the context, since satiric depictions of American slaveholders were a common aspect of the press commentary on the American Section of the Great Exhibition, and contemporary references to slavery were commonly tied to Powers' statue, the best example being John Tenniel's "The Virginian Slave, Intended as a Companion to Power's Greek Slave" (fig. 8).[94]

Placing the *Greek Slave* in this physical and ideological context emphasizes the narrative energies subtending the dis-emplacement enacted in the course of the statue's

[94] Merrill (2012) offers a useful discussion of Tenniel's illustration in the context of a protest performance held in front of the *Greek Slave* during the Great Exhibition that I will discuss briefly below, while Chaney (2008) places the illustration in a transnational framework. Morris' 2005 biography of Tenniel fills in his political and artistic background.

representational whirl, its quiet presence belying both its fame and the immense discursive work it did at the Exhibition. It was an American object, widely linked to American slavery and appearing in an international exhibition. A reminder of the successful 'Greek revolution' against the Ottoman empire, it was also the reminder of a successful American revolution against the British Empire and, in Browning's reading, an indictment of the failed abolitionist revolution. Placing the statue even more emphatically in this international context helps show how both the *Greek Slave* and the Great Exhibition functioned within an enfigurative tradition meant to serve an ethnogenetic function.

Using historical poetics to connect the *Greek Slave* with Queen Victoria's domestic nationalism and Elizabeth Barrett Browning's abolitionism, its exhibition in the Crystal Palace as well as its previous exhibition at Graves' Pall Mall and its qualified reification of Reynoldsian idealist aesthetics, to say nothing of its obvious neo-classical Hellenism, also points past actual, modern Greekness and American slavery practices to a highly politicized, seemingly ahistorical British Greekness. This makes Powers' sculpture an exceedingly complex paean to ennobled liberty, chastened personhood, transcendent whiteness, and unified Britishness, but not to actual slaves or actual Greek people. If one takes an uncharitable view of the texts in question, this is also true of *Modern Greece* and of "Euphrasia." In each case, the third term synthesized from the binary logic of Greek/Turk is the Reynoldsian ideal, an ennobled 'central form' of Britishness associated with the same masculine, emotional austerity so visible in Winckelmann's accounts of the *Laocoön* and the *Apollo Belvedere*. The attributes associated with this genetic logic of Britishness - liberty, personhood, whiteness, Christianity, visibility and 'Greekness' - are

in "Euphrasia," in *Hellas*, in Mill's aphorism and in many other early nineteenth-century British Hellenist texts so identified in opposition to Turkishness, upon which is imposed opposing characteristics: non-Christian, non-white, sexually rapacious, unspiritual and deservingly invisible.

The *Greek Slave*'s "thunders of white silence," her participation in aesthetic idealism despite Tallis' and Browning's comments to the contrary, extends to her spiritual heroism in the face of the Other, demonstrating the racial politics implicit in nineteenth-century British Hellenism. The ennobling influence of idealist or Grand Style works of art, among which I would class both the *Greek Slave* and "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" despite Browning's intentions, comes not just from their subject matter, but from the social structures they support. As Gehrke noted in his discussion of the battle-myth of Marathon and its place in European intentional history, these Reynoldsian social structures require and repeat the glorification of whiteness *in opposition to* non-whiteness, Britishness *in opposition to* Turkishness, Christianity *in opposition to* Islam, representativity *in opposition to* deformity; they define general interest and hegemonic masculinity *in opposition to* momentary taste and feminine sensuality. Universality *in opposition to* particularity. 'Tick' *in opposition to* 'tock.' This habit forces nineteenth-century British Hellenist enfigurations of personhood, identity, and ideology into a repudiatory framework which acts on observers through an aesthetic narrative producing not just selfhood but a social(ized) self: a citizen of the real, a Person. Personhood is thus a narrative achievement, the outcome of an identitarian operation characterized by connective disjunction,

producing an I that is doubled and guiding the I's eyes away from the supplemental non-persons on whom the un-remark-able characteristics of the system must be projected.

KNOX AND PATER: RACIAL AND SEXUAL HISTORICISM AFTER THE GREAT EXHIBITION

In the preceding section of this chapter I have argued that the Great Exhibition was both an auto- and ethnogenetic identitarian technology, and that the immense discursive energy required to maintain a Reynoldsian assemblage finally cohered through Victoria's writerly *coup de main* on the opening day of the Exhibition. The archi-textual role of every detail of the Exhibition from the glass roof, to the cast court full of classical statuary, to the visitors themselves was both an outcome of the Exhibition and its purpose, a response to the alternative assemblages that had threatened the state between 1846 and 1851. In other words, the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations contained the anti-uniformitarian sensibilities of the "*soi-disant*" by naming them as such, working within a Gehrkean intentional history built on a framework of oppositions unified under a 'genetic logic' made-visible in the American section of the Exhibition as a set of roiling contradictions not-quite-invisible on the smooth, white surface of the *Greek Slave*, the Exhibition's serenely austere somatic norm. In Rhetoric and Performance Studies scholar Lisa Merrill's "Exhibiting Race 'Under the World's Huge Glass Case': William and Ellen Craft and William Wells Brown at the Great Exhibition in Crystal Palace, 1851" (2012), Merrill describes a protest performance undertaken by a mixed group of abolitionists including two escaped slaves and the United States' first African-American playwrite, William Wells Brown, and she argues that the performance consisted of an intentional self-

display that mocked slavery by mimicking the *Greek Slave*. Merrill shows that by placing an image of Tenniel's "Virginia Slave" on the revolving platform on which the *Greek Slave* rested, and by moving through the Great Exhibition in mixed-race pairs, Wells Brown and his companions sought to invoke the somatic norms of the Crystal Palace; this was an invocatory act because, while the Great Exhibition was something between a trade fair and an international craft competition, "the Crystal Palace also served as a site for international encounters between British spectators and visitors from all over the world, who – like the objects displayed – were perceived (and regarded each other) as visible representations of their particular culture, class, race and/or nation" (322). As if the Reynoldsian assemblage or the 'magic circle' surrounding the *Greek Slave* were made-universal, visitors to the Great Exhibition could look at one another as representative, embodied emblems of a society, comparing cultural excellence much as the Exhibition judges compared industrial products.

This comparative evaluation, carried out via the study of individual bodies, also describes the logic animating a number of physiognomic treatises published in Britain and the United States during the nineteenth century, including one first published the year before the Great Exhibition, *The Races of Men*. In the final section of this chapter I will first show how the genetic logic I have sought to describe in this chapter existed within a physiognomic context that both predated and was potentiated by the enfigurative energies loosed during the Great Exhibition, taking as my first example a man now remembered for events which nearly ended his professional career. Following this, I will ask how his lugubrious racial historiography of social life can be collocated with another, very different

account published just five years later, by Walter Pater. The author of *The Races of Men*, Robert Knox (1792-1862), is now most widely remembered for his involvement with murder when he was a professor of anatomy in Edinburgh. In a practice then common, Knox sometimes bought corpses from 'resurrection men,' and there was widespread outrage when in 1829 it was found that of the sixteen corpses Knox purchased from a single pair of men, most were victims of murder. The sensational trial captivated the nation and gave Knox's professional enemies the opportunity to wrap him in a swaddling calumny he never entirely shook off. Historian and philosopher of science Evelleen Richards (1989) argues that Knox, "one of the most skilled teachers Edinburgh had ever known," who taught 500 students every day in 1828-9, should be remembered as an important anatomical theorist. Allister Neher (2011) adds that he was also an art theorist whose 'anatomy of beauty' was influenced by bodies he dissected, including Mary Paterson, whose corpse he posed for a portrait as Venus (see fig. 9).



Fig. 10: William Roughead. "Burke & Hare," 1921. Engraving after a lost drawing by John Oliphant of a body in Knox's dressing room powed as Venus, 1828.

Knox was a disciple of Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772-1844), whose transcendental *Philosophie Anatomique* Knox met with during his Parisian medical studies in the early 1820s, and of Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874), whose statistical theories of 'social physics' Knox helped to popularize, and the English translation of whose *Treatise on Man* he superintended and edited for the Chambers brothers in 1841. Richards sees Knox's belief in theories of transcendental anatomy as an important aspect of his influence on Victorian science and his early hereditarian stance as implicitly proto-evolutionary, especially in its reliance on a geologic timescale (380-1). By mid-century, however, his political radicalism and his stubborn materialism was so intense that the atheistical, angry

man had few close friends. Knox's *The Races of Men* (1850/1862)[95] represents an attempt to make his ongoing lecture series into a work of popular science, largely to support his family back in Edinburgh, but his views were not as influential as he had hoped.

These views are distilled in Knox's famous phrase, "race is everything," from the introduction to *Races of Men*. As with Shelley's and Mill's aphorisms, attention to context elucidates this statement and gives a sense of Knox's style as well as his argument:

> That human character, individual and national, is traceable solely to the nature of that race to which the individual or nation belongs, is a statement which I know must meet with the sternest opposition. It runs counter to nearly all the theories of statesmen, of theologians, of philanthropists of all shades – from the dreamy Essayist, whose remedy for every ill that flesh is heir to, is summed up in "the coming man," to the "whitened sepulchres of England," the hard-handed, spatula-fingered Saxon utilitarian, whose best plea for religion and sound morals, and philanthropy, is "the profitableness thereof" – impostors all! to such the truths in this little work must ever be most unpalatable. Nevertheless, that race in human affairs is everything, is simply a fact, the most remarkable, the most comprehensive, which philosophy has ever announced. Race is everything: literature, science, art – in a word, civilization, depends on it.
>
> Each race treated of in this little work will complain of my *not* having done *them* justice; of all others they will admit that I have spoken the truth. The placing the Slavonian and Gothic races foremost amongst men, first and greatest in philosophy, will much, I believe, astonish the men of other races; the Saxon and Celt; the Italian and Sarmatian: the inordinate self-esteem of the Saxon will be especially shocked thereby, nor will he listen with composure to a theory which tells him, proves to him, that his race cannot domineer over the earth – cannot even exist permanently on any continent to which he is not indigenous – cannot ever become native, true-born Americans – cannot hold in permanency any portion of any continent but the one on which he *first* originated. Physiologists will dispute with me the

[95] The initial 1850 publication of *The Races of Men* appends the description "*A Fragment*" after the title, while in the expanded edition of 1862 the subtitle has changed to "*A Philosophical Enquiry into the Influence of Race over the Destinies of Nations.*" Here I use the 1862 version because the title suggests it is a more-complete expression of Knox's philosophy of race than the fragmentary 1850 edition, because the 1862 edition also offers a post-Darwinian picture of Knox's thought, and includes illustrations not present in the 1850 edition that I will discuss below.

> great laws I have endeavoured to substitute for the effete common-place of the schools; geologists will think me hasty in declaring the era of Cuvier at an end; theologians – but here I stop; a reply shall not be wanting. As to the hack compilers, their course is simple: they will first deny the doctrine to be true; when this becomes clearly untenable, they will deny that it is new; and they will finish by engrossing the whole in their next compilations, omitting carefully the name of the author. (v-vi)

The "spatula-fingered Saxon utilitarian," by which term Knox means to refer to people indigenous to the shores of the Baltic whom he also calls 'Scandinavians,' is in fact the modern Englishman, and in Knox the Saxon's colonial pretensions are depicted as nothing less than a doomed struggle against immutable natural laws. This depiction follows logically from his intense and atypical climatological determinism; for Knox, race is always a spatial condition. This means that Knox's racialism is always also a theory of ethnic emplacement, and thus we can understand Knox's abolitionism, his fierce anticolonialism, and his equally fierce racialism as all stemming from his conviction that the Saxon should stay in his place, and the African and Asian and 'Esquimaux' and 'Bosjieman' and 'Hottentot' in theirs, because there is an underlying biological necessity for them to do so.[96] Knox believes that the colonial experiment will fail, as will American

[96] Clearly related to Knox's time in France, his climatological determinism and his assumption that climate had a role in procreation is of central importance in understanding Knox's racial theories, especially since James Hunt, Knox's posthumous defender, would cause Knox's name to be associated with a contradictory idea in which 'the Saxon race' was destined by their racial superiority to colonize the earth. For a vigorous statement of Knox's climatological determinism see "New Theory of Race: Celt *v* Saxon" (*Lancet*, 1857). This text also clarifies Knox's views on colonialism. See also "Some Remarks on the Aztecque and Bosjieman Children, Now Being Exhibited in London, and on the Races to Which They Are Presumed to Belong" (1855). While it is true that climatological determinism has a long history, stretching long past Winckelmann into antiquity, it is unusual for climatological determinism to be allied to an assumption of bio-necessitarian climatological emplacement. There is something of this idea in the nineteenth-century British fear of colonial administrators 'going native,' which implied that colonists were endangered on a subjective level simply by contact with 'natives' in their local situations, but Knox is much more extreme than this. For him the colonial administrator's very presence in a locality in which his race does not belong is misguided, even if it is his biological destiny to be so as a rapacious, 'spatula-fingered Saxon.'

slavery, for the simple reason that a race necessarily degenerates over the course of long generations spent outside its zone of origin, eventually losing the ability to reproduce.

Despite his confidence in them, Knox's racial theories have been characterized as nihilistic, the sad products of a monomaniacal misanthrope.[97] They do not always make sense: the operation of time on species' ability to reproduce is of central importance to his theory, but the mechanics of this temporal process remain rather murky. It is certainly fair to say that Knox's theories did not have the impact on Victorian scientific racialism his overweening pride predicted. His theoretical oddities and relative obscurity notwithstanding, Knox was in fact dealing with the central issue of nineteenth-century racialism: speciation. Knox's environmentalist racialism hearkens back to Winckelmann's comment on the influence of Greece's climate on its artists, forming yet another example of the genetic logic I see in Knox's *Races of Men* and in Mill's review of Grote's *History of Greece*. In Knox, this logic relies on connective disjunction between polygenism, the theory that there are multiple human species and that 'race' is a marker of speciation, and monogenism, which holds that there is a single human species, 'racial differences' being cosmetic, outward variations on a central human form. The debate between them raged throughout the nineteenth century and the work of earlier anatomists like Petrus Camper (1722-1789), who was entirely monogenist and surprisingly egalitarian, would come to be used as supports for the opposing position in much the same way that Knox's oddly egalitarian racialism would be mischaracterized by James Hunt, early speech therapist and

[97] See Richards (1989) and Bates (2011)

vehement polygenist, during Hunt's leadership of the Anthropological Society of London after 1863.



Figs.11 & 12: Richard Westmacott Jr., "Celtic groupe" (*sic*, left) and "The Jew" (right), from Robert Knox, *Races of Men* (1862)

Unlike the theory he seeks to illustrate with them, the illustrations in Knox's *Races of Men* are fairly representative of nineteenth-century physiognomic enfigurations of genetic logic via scientific racialism. The plates depicting Knox's racial categories usually show individuals or small groups of individuals, as in his image of a "Celtic groupe" (*sic*) or "The Jew," (see figs. 9 and 10 above), and these two images were among those produced especially for Knox's publication. There are also multiple illustrations copied from other works and/or repeated numerous times in *Races of Men*, his "Profile of Negro, European and Oran Outang" (see fig. 15) amalgamated from Camper's images (see fig. 12), which

makes Knox's illustrations useful both as examples of the nineteenth-century racialist-scientific archive, and as examples of enfiguration. While I will discuss their exemplary function in more detail below, Knox's borrowing of visual arguments from sources that directly oppose the conclusions he used them to prove is an excellent example of how 'untimely' enfigurative traditions last longer than the intentional histories they support, and how enfigurative traditions prove a recurring challenge to those who wish to escape the epistemological boundaries such traditions erect. This enfigurative untimeliness recalls the figurations I associate with Donna Haraway in the introduction to this dissertation, which are grouped under the rubric of a "broken and suffering humanity, signifying – in ambiguity, contradiction, stolen symbolism, and unending chains of noninnocent translation – a possible hope" (1992b: 87). These "unending chains of noninnocent translation" describe the object of inquiry historical poetics is supposed to attend to very well, and in the next few pages we see a number of 'stolen symbols' that were used to excuse the chains put on a number of broken and suffering humans over the course of the nineteenth century.



Fig. 13: Anonymous. "*Stufenfolge von dem Frosche bis zum Apollo-Profil*" (Successive Stages from a Frog to the Profile of Apollo), from Johann Christian Lavater, *Essays on Physiognomy*



Fig. 14: Petrus Camper, Tab. 1: Demonstrating the New Method of Drawing Faces Using Camper's Facial Angle, from Petrus Camper, *Works* ([1803] 1821)



Fig. 15: Petrus Camper, Tab. 2: Demonstrating the New Method of Drawing Faces Using Camper's Facial Angle, from Petrus Camper, *Works* ([1803] 1821)



Fig. 16: Petrus Camper, Tab. 3: Demonstrating the New Method of Drawing Faces Using Camper's Facial Angle, from Petrus Camper, *Works* ([1803] 1821)

Fig. 17: Richard Wesmacott Jr., "Profile of Negro, European, and Oran-Outang," from Robert Knox, *The Races of Men* (1862)



Fig 18 (left): Richard Wesmacott Jr., "Profile of Apollo," from Robert Knox, *The Races of Men* (1862)

Fig. 19 (right): Richard Wesmacott Jr., "Profile of a Cherokee Indian," from Robert Knox, *The Races of Men* (1862)



Fig. 20 (left): Anne Gliddon, Heads of a Chimpanzee, a Negro, and the *Apollo Belvedere*, from Josiah Nott & George Gliddon, *Types of Mankind* (1854)

Fig. 21 (right): Ernst Haeckel, "Die Familiengruppe der Kalarrhinen," from Ernst Haeckel, *Naturische Schöpfungsgeschichte* (1870)



These illustrations demonstrate an imagistic continuity over time, but they also provide the modern viewer with the opportunity to test my theory of enfiguration in 'real time.' The images in the preceding pages embody intellectual arguments about physical bodies, but they were also designed to carry an affective charge; as enfigurations they work to inculcate meaning through semiotic *and* phenomenological means. If we look at the images from Lavater and Camper, through which numerous 18th- and nineteenth-century racialist physiognomic theories were promulgated, and compare them with Knox's images, we can immediately see that there is a similar genetic logic at work. Despite Camper's anti-polygenist beliefs and his strong egalitarian convictions[98] his images imply a progressivist thesis similar to Lavater's, and Wesmacott's image of an 'oran-outang' is clearly copied from the second figure in Camper's Tab. 1. Apollo is the apogee of human speciation in 5 of the 8 images, and this is true from at least 1775, in Lavater's "*Stufenfolge von dem Frosche bis zum Apollo-Profil*" (Successive Stages from a Frog to the Profile of Apollo), from his *Essays on Physiognomy*, through Camper's *Works* (1794), and in various other physiognomic treatises of note up to and after Knox's initial publication of *Races of Men* in 1851. Nor is it a peculiarly British phenomenon, as evidenced by the fact that Camper was Dutch and Lavater Swiss; Apollo also served to enfigure human perfection in Nott and Gliddon's *Types of Mankind* (Philadelphia, 1854) and in Haeckel's *Naturische*

[98] Camper was willing to make strong statements of racial equality based on his empirical study of anatomy, especially of the structure of human skin; he writes that "all of us are all black, only more or less" and calls Europeans "white moors" at one point in his *Works*. For more see Meijer 1999.

Schöpfungsgeschichte[99] (1870). In this latter work, the German embryologist supports his theory of recapitulation through reference to Goethe and Darwin, combining Goethe's *naturphilosophie* with Darwin's theory of Natural Selection in a Lamarckian theory Haeckel called *Darwinismus*, for which he invented the terms 'ontogeny' and 'phylogeny' in arguing that the former recapitulated the latter. This then allowed Haeckel to describe 'childish' and 'mature' races and to search for the biological signs of racial development in individual bodies, taken as 'types' of the race to which they were supposed to belong.

Further proof of Knox's connections to a long tradition of physiognomic racialism are everywhere, as is that tradition's close links to 18th- and nineteenth-century European Hellenism. Not only does Apollo frequently play the ultimate role in a system of genetic logic marked by connective disjunction, capping the progression of human perfection towards an impossible ideal, but also, each successive step upward in the racial hierarchy depicted in these images separates *and* connects each individual (always male) head to the *ethnos* it represents, and to the other heads depicted in the encompassing physiognomic representation of homosocial humanity thus enfigured. Just as the Great Exhibition's archi-textual quality 'chastened' those who entered it, and the *Greek Slave* offered visitors a somatic norm to study, physiognomic images that place monkeys, apes, African men and European men within an ordered sequence capped by the *Apollo Belvedere* unify 'humanity' by ordering individual humans in terms of their corporeal resemblance to a

[99] Published in English as *The History of Creation* (1876)

transcendent norm, thereby imposing global control. The connective disjunction between auto- and ethnogenesis that occurs in the looking relations necessitated by these images rely on the Reynoldsian citation of a long imagistic tradition of physiognomic racialism. Through repetition of these images and the ideas associated with them occurring within the audience, this connective disjunction between I, "We" and Other is introjected and transformed into a cognitive hermeneutic, as we have already seen in the case of the *Greek Slave*. As with the *Greek Slave*, these repetitious citations of an ongoing narrative mean that Reynoldsian ennoblement is an external, spatialized, temporal process – the semiotic and phenomenological cues come from without and occur in narrative time – but the effects of this process are felt within subjective experience of the world and of the self.

As a document of mid-century British Hellenism, however, and of mid-century scientific racialism, the visible disjunction from physiognomic tradition in *Races of Men* is as important as the many connections thereto. Knox's climatological determinism is so thoroughgoing that his assumption of some innate link between people and their environment begins to resemble the language of *Blut und Boden* so important in the German *Völkisch* movement, whose romantic nationalism had no doubt been on Shelley's mind as he described potential German revolution in 1822, and Knox's transcendental anatomy depends on a prototypical version of Haeckel's recapitulation theory that assumes not only that "race is everything," but that it is the *only* thing. Everyone is the same in being different, and in being trapped within the meaning of that difference from birth onward. We are all equaly prisoners of an inborn racial destiny, which decrees that the Saxon will

invade Africa, Knox writes, just as it decreed that the Saxons would invade North America, and the racial characteristics that make Britain a world power are the same characteristics that drove Saxon immigrants to enslave Africans in the southern United States and will drive Boers to enslave Africans in Natal (558). This is a very different view of the Reynoldsian assemblage, cohering as it does around an innate racial homology rather than a learned aesthetic hegemony, and another sign of disjunction is Knox's abandonment of teleological ennoblement in favor of a secular predestinarianism that assumes the embryonic changes undergone by individual members of a race form the exact model of the race's potential capacity. Finally, we end where we began: for Knox, history – whether individual or ethnic – is always racial history.

From this account, we can see that Knox's racialism precludes individual self-fashioning, and this is partly why it is so odd in a century and in a nation where self-improvement was so highly valued.[100] The relation between selfhood and personhood and the ability to achieve personhood in the eyes of oneself and others is overwhelmingly important in this period, and while Knox last confronted his society with its errors on this point in 1862, the relation between selfhood and personhood is somewhat different in

[100] Samuel Smiles' *Self-Help: with illustrations of Character and Conduct* (1859) is an excellent example of the importance of self-fashioning in mid-Victorian Britain. A failed Chartist candidate for Parliament, Smiles decided in the 1850s that social change could come from within the individual character of a society's members, and wrote accordingly. *Self-Help* was an instant sensation; as Peter Sinnema notes in the introduction to the Oxford edition of *Self-Help* (2002), the book sold 20,000 copies within a year of publication and 250,000 by Smiles' death in 1904, causing Sinnema to describe the book as having "elevated Smiles to celebrity status: almost overnight he became a leading pundit and much-consulted guru" (vii).

another example of mid-century British Hellenism, Walter Pater's 1867 essay "Winckelmann," first published in the *Westminster Review* and then collected in *The Renaissance* (1873). While Pater's essay represents a hard break with Knox's angry, iconoclastic ethno-nationalism, the essay's themes and especially its politics will be the final object of inquiry in this chapter because they will form an important subject in the next two chapters, and because Knox and Pater do share an odd futurity and an odd fatalism tending toward unexpectedly similar ends. Seemingly an essay written in appreciation of Winckelmann, "Winckelmann" is actually an essay on Goethe, and in speaking of Goethe's Winckelmann Pater describes the specific kind of aesthetic idealism he hopes will transform British society. From the first sentence, in which Goethe's name precedes Winckelmann's, it is Winckelmann's importance as "the teacher who had made (Goethe's) career possible," who is both "an abstract type of culture" and retains "colour from the incidents of a passionate intellectual life," that attracts Pater's attention (177-8).

Pater writes that the "dark poverty" of Winckelmann's upbringing in Prussia enabled him to fully experience Greek art, and to profit from the "severe limitation to the concrete" it shares with the Kantian philosophy so formative to Goethe (181-2). Associating an "unexpressed pulsation of sensuous life" Winckelmann finds in Greek art with the importance of male beauty to artistic development, Pater fixes this 'pulsation' in classical Greek timespace *and* in the nineteenth century. He does this by transforming an imagined group of "brilliant youths in the Lysis" of classical Athens into the "line of youths on horseback" depicted on the Parthenon Marbles and displayed in the British Museum,

Pater associating both with an "unexpressed pulsation of sensuous life" in order to note that, "[F]illed as our culture is with the classical spirit, we can hardly imagine how deeply the human mind was moved, when, at the Renaissance, in the midst of a frozen world, the buried fire of ancient art rose up from under the soil" (184). This depicts nineteenth-century British Hellenism as a Reynoldsian achievement that has already occurred, "our culture" being "filled with the classical spirit" as before only Winckelmann's mind was filled, and by engendering a proper understanding of Winckelmann's experience Pater hopes to help his readers experience this cultural achievement more fully. Insofar as he "reproduces for us the earlier sentiment of the Renaissance," Pater's Winckelmann allows us to reflect on the meaning of a new and transcendent freedom:

> On a sudden the imagination feels itself free. How facile and direct, it seems to say, is this life of the senses and the understanding, when once we have apprehended it! Here, surely, is that more liberal mode of life we have been seeking so long, so near to us all the while. How mistaken and roundabout have been our efforts to reach it via mystic passion, and monastic reverie; how they have deflowered the flesh; how little have they really emancipated us! (184)

While the last sentence does bear some slight resemblance to Knox in Pater's critique of "mystic passion" and "monastic reverie," I read this as an encomium on Jowett's Oxford Platonism, and also as an implicit celebration of impending gay liberation.[101]

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[101] While the overt presentism of the phrase "impending gay liberation" is purposefully excessive, the underlying argument is supported by Linda Dowling's work on 1860s and 1870s Oxford. Dowling (1994) sees Pater and J.A. Symonds arguing in favor of "a wider emotional and erotic liberation… unintentionally yet unmistakably posited within (Victorian liberalism's) own advocacy of Hellenism," (92) and notes that while Symonds is explicit about this project in *A Problem in Greek Ethics* (1883) and *A Problem in Modern Ethics* (1891), Pater's writing "would always consist of a daring texture of covert allusions working continuously and unmistakably to demonstrate that the reiterated liberal claims for liberty,

While Winckelmann's sometimes frank expressions of homosexual desire are quoted in the essay, for example the passage from his essay on beauty addressed to Friedrich von Berg, in which Winckelmann praises the younger man's "beautiful body," which Pater immediately follows with Winckelmann's comments on masculine beauty's inherent superiority to feminine beauty, Pater subsumes their erotic content in a diffuse, enthusiastic aestheticism. Treating Winckelmann's letters as evidence of his "friendships" and his pagan appreciation for ideal beauty, Pater seems to suggest in these passages that the freedom of the imagination and the "emancipation" of deflowered flesh is part and parcel of the classical spirit with which "our culture" is now "filled," the homosociality of the original Reynoldsian assemblage being mapped onto the erotic masculinism of Winckelmann's aesthetics. This is an interesting shift in how the Reynoldsian assemblage is understood that will have increased importance as the century wears on, and will be especially important in understanding how Oscar Wilde and Stevenson's *Strange Case* are linked in the next two chapters. The 'classical spirit' in Winckelmann's schema had always been closely tied to a sublimated erotic attention to male bodies, and even in the case of the *Greek Slave* remained associated with male sexual desire, but Reynoldsian 'central form' is in Pater an unwanted imposition. Pater does not exactly celebrate his own or

individuality, self-development, and diversity as the qualities capable of rescuing England are unintelligible unless viewed within the context of a Socratic eros of men loving men in spiritual procreancy" (94).

Winckelmann's homosexual eroticism, or at least he does so subtly, but Pater does not completely sublimate that eroticism in strategic Platonism either.[102]

Instead he ties this erotic freedom to history and suggests that the classical period, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance all had characteristic sexual passions. If the classical period is one of appreciation for male beauty, on which Pater spends considerable verbiage, the Middle Ages are a period that takes the peculiar Greek combination of what Pater calls *heiterkeit* and *allgemeinheit* ("blitheness or repose" and "generality or breadth," respectively) and increases only the generality, losing the measure of realism that kept Greek art from becoming too distanced from the specificities of sensuous life. This, Pater implies, resulted in a bloodless, guilt-ridden heterosexuality that increased Greek austerity beyond serenity and into asceticism. The Renaissance is marked by a return to classical erotism in an overabundance that in turn causes sensuality to overwhelm generality in becoming the baroque accumulation of detail, and thus Pater re-writes Winckelmann's artistic history of the development of Greek art and Reynolds' Grand Style theory of nationalist aesthetics as intentional histories in which sexuality is the unmoved mover. In asking how Greece could "force its thought on Europe," Pater is in fact setting up a Grotean historical progression from darkness to light, and a hierarchy of aesthetic appreciation.

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[102] If this reading describes Pater's "Winckelmann" as well as I think it does, it also goes some distance towards answering Butler's objection to Sedgwick's seeking to understand how homosexuality is read through heterosexuality. Butler argues that "it is not possible to read the profound and perhaps inescapable ways that heterosexuality and homosexuality are defined through one another" (2004: 139) but in fact Pater does something very similar here, placing hetero- and homosocial sexualities on a continuum and treating aesthetic practice as the force driving a period's place on that continuum.

This hierarchy is most obvious when Pater writes of ancient Greek history that "the country people, of course, cherish the unlovely idols of an earlier time" while "in Athens, or Corinth, or Lacedaemon… the worship in which (the gods) live and move and have their being, borrow something of its lordliness and distinction of human nature there" (203). On one hand this is an effort at even-handedness in which Pater takes a step back from his historical model and acknowledges that, even in the classical period, there were variations of observance that puncture a too-confident ascription of Periclean univocity, but his classism allows Pater to further idolize the elite and elite-adjacent 'men of classical taste' as he wishes to understand them. While he admits that "[S]carcely a wild or melancholy note of the medieval church but was anticipated by Greek polytheism" he also writes that "the supreme Hellenic culture" of Dorian Apollo was "always opposed to the sad Chthonian divinities" and their qualities, which he associates with "oriental thought": "an exaggerated inwardness" and "want of definition in thought… which still remains in the world of shadows" (204-5). This introduction of an explicit sexual element into the auto- and ethnogenetic frameworks Pater uses, which resemble those of Mill, Grote, and Shelley, is accompanied by a thoroughgoing aestheticist individualism whose echoes in the *fin-de-siécle* I will discuss in the next two chapters. While the peasants and their "sad Chthonian deities" engage in misguided "oriental" inwardness, Pater quotes Hegel approvingly when he describes famous Athenians including Pericles, Phidias, Plato, Sophocles, Thucydides, Xenophon and Socrates as "ideal artists of themselves, cast each in one flawless mould, works of art, which stand before us as the immortal presentiment of the gods" (219).

That Pater returns to his erotic subtext immediately after quoting Hegel's assessment of Periclean notables provides some clues to the specific contents of his aesthetic individualism. Writing of the "key to the understanding of the Greek spirit," he says that Winckelmann "possessed" this key "in his own nature" much as Mill writes of Grote that he has "embodied the general picture of Greek history… in his own mind," Winckelmann nurturing and invigorating this "temperament" through friendships "which kept him always in direct contact with the spirit of youth" (220). If we return to the beginning of the essay and Pater's comments on the youths in the Lysis and on the Parthenon frieze, we can see that here we are again presented with a vision of Greek homosociality that excludes women and "orientals" in order to oppose them to elite members of urban society. Here elite habitus, shared by famous figures of classical antiquity, is then mapped onto a German antiquary of the 18th century in order to ally Pater's intellectual sensualism to Winckelmann's erotic interests and Goethe's cultural influence. The effect is ennobling for British Greekness, for Pater's Winckelmann and for Winckelmann's sexuality, but not for "the country people" and their "unlovely idols," and in Pater's "Winckelmann" the many repeatedly ennoble the one through their opposition to the one and their exclusion from… what? It is only in the final pages of his essay that Pater truly returns to the contemporary in asking whether we can "bring down that ideal" of balanced sensuality "into the gaudy, perplexed light of modern life" (227). While "[W]e can only see (that ideal) at all in the weak, reflected light which a great education creates for us" (ibid), Pater believes that there is hope, Winckelmann/Goethe having demonstrated

as much. This hope consists in a return the "proper instinct of self-culture" characteristic of 'the Greeks':

> The demand of the intellect is to feel itself alive. It must see into the laws, the operation, the intellectual reward of every divided form of culture; but only that it may measure the relation between itself and them. It struggles with those forms till its secret is won from each, and then lets each fall back into its place, in the supreme, artistic view of life. With a kind of passionate coldness, such natures rejoice to be away from and past their former selves, and above all, they are jealous of that abandonment to one special gift which really limits their capabilities. (229)

Through the "struggle" necessary to a "view of life" marked by "passionate coldness" that brings one "away from and past" one's former self, Pater says that one attains aesthetic personhood. The sense of tension characteristic of the *felix aestheticus* is palpable, and I have already noted the shared erotic content linking Winckelmann's idea of enculturation and Pater's later version. The modern *felix aestheticus* achieves *pulchritudo*, however, in a very different setting even from that pertaining to Winckelmann; Pater says that to meet their need for a "sense of freedom" modern artists must recognize that we all now live in a "network of law" that forms the "tragic situation in which certain groups of noble men and women work out for themselves a supreme *Dénouement*" (232). Not unexpectedly, Pater's thought, like Knox's, is characterized by a fatalism that Pater pairs with a faint and contradictory hope of a "supreme *Dénouement*."

Pater's conception of modern life is thus revealed to be exactly that: modern. Looking back to Greece and forward to a "supreme *Dénouement*" much as the Great Exhibition looked to both traditional and innovative means to signify demotic unity, Pater

understands the human spirit as an archi-textual hinge between possibility and happenstance, contemporary necessity not "a sort of mythological personage, with which we can do war," but "a magic web woven through and through us, like that magnetic system of which modern science speaks, penetrating us with a network, subtler than our subtlest nerves, yet bearing in it the central forces of the world" (ibid). There are clear connections to the 'chastening' effect the Crystal Palace had on attendees, as well as to the *Greek Slave*, the 'magic circle' it drew around itself and Browning's poetic description of the statue's "thunders of white silence," but Pater's individualism is no longer tied to British Greekness or to a specific nation-state. Instead 'freedom' is internal and spiritual, akin to Baumgarten's *pulchritudo*, at constant war with external forces which impose a "network of law" which "penetrates" our selfhood more subtly than our own nerves.[103] A recursive method of historical poetics applied to Pater's "Winckelmann" points us directly back to the Trafalgar Square print, with its reliance on unseen internal operations responding to the physical imposition of "a network of law" in the form of a police officer's grasp, and where that image depicted the subversion of the Reynoldsian assemblage, and the containment of that subversion, Pater simply adds that it is in the continual cyclic movement between the

[103] I have already mentioned Linda Dowling's (1994) work on Pater and his Oxford context. Iser ([1960] 2011) argues that Pater's philosophy of history bears resemblance to Hegel's and this has informed my own reading of Paterian historicism, and I have also written this section on Pater with John Paul Riquelme's comment that Wilde's *Dorian Gray* "proceeds against the background of Pater's aesthetic writings" and "provides in narrative form a dark, revealing double for Pater's aestheticism that emerges from a potential for dark doubling and reversal within aestheticism itself" in mind (2000: 609). While in the final chapter I deal with Wilde's critical essays and not his fiction or drama, I have looked there for this "dark, revealing double" and especially in my discussion of "The Soul of Man Under Socialism" (1891), I argue that this dark double is clearly visible in Wilde's comments on socialism.

two, in the white space between the separated, emblematic images, that modern personhood can attain Greek sublimity.

This Hellenist futurity, requiring that one "be away from" and "past" one's former self, certainly sounds like a species of personhood. Like Knox's views on speciation, however, Pater's views require an odd reliance on history; where Knox sees history as the temporal operation of physiology, Pater sees history as a process producing artistic periodization at the intersection between sex and law. For both men, the future is determined by an ongoing force at work in the world which none can escape but which they can describe with unique ability, Knox driven by the transcendent anatomy of Saint-Hilaire and Quetelet, and Pater by Goethe's aesthetics. For both the past is proof of the future, too, and both assume that individual history intersects with group history in the social(ized) Self. Thus, even in proffering solutions, Pater and Knox again raise the problem of cultural change and of multiplicity within a sexual/national plurality in the decades after the Great Exhibition, also raising the question of Reynoldsian uniformity after Victoria's carriage ride and the architextual influence of the Crystal Palace had momentarily laid it to rest. In the next chapter, we will see how this problem is dealt with in Stevenson's *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886). Question of perfectability, of the role of religion in daily life, and of the individual's role in the Reynoldsian assemblage are posed on the twinned horns of the characteristic Hellenist dilemma: the quest for aesthetic-spiritual perfection in an imperfect, human reality.

The Other Within and Without in *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*

All is disgust when a man leaves his own nature and does what is unfit.

Sophocles, *Philoctetes*

In Chapter three we saw a number of competing narratives: *Punch*'s commemoration of the Trafalgar Square riots and Mill's commemoration of the Battle of Hastings, the declarative universalizing of Queen Victoria and of Elizabeth Barrett Browning, and two visions of history from the 1860s. Robert Knox narrates human history as a series of misguided mass movements around the globe, marked by violence, doomed to slow failure, and driven by immutable, inborn human characteristics that he groups under the rubric of 'race.' Walter Pater's history is more explicitly Eurocentric and driven by art rather than race, but reliant on a similar logic: Pater believes that European social history is driven by a particular period's specific combination of art and ideology, transferring the application of Knox's totalizing assumptions about identity from outer to inner man, while assigning their operation not to sexual heredity but to sexual desire. That Pater's "Winckelmann" is so reliant on classical allusions in its commentary on what he regards as a pressing sociopolitical problem should come as no surprise by this point, especially considering the place of Apollo in Knox's racialist theorizing – as Frank Turner is quoted in the introduction to this dissertation, "Throughout the century both the conservative and the progressive tendencies within the Victorian exploration of the Greek heritage were closely related to events and developments in the world outside classical scholarship"

(1980: 451). Visible in the *Greek Slave* and throughout the Great Exhibition, barely implicit in Pater and totally explicit in the Shelleys, we have seen this rhetorical dependence on a nineteenth-century British understanding of classical Greek culture on display throughout this dissertation and throughout the nineteenth century.

In this chapter I will argue that *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886) also relies on the significance of the Greeks, my discussion of the novel demonstrating how the text's thematic concerns are illuminated by its classical allusions, despite their paucity. Because this is the only novel I discuss at length in this dissertation, and because it has a rich critical archive, I will use the most basic, commonplace reading of *Strange Case* in the literary-critical reception tradition attached to the novel, and in the titles of scientific papers, to narrate some aspects of the novel's reception history. I will then ask how applying a recursive model of historical poetics to the two Hellenist allusions in the novel illuminate its inner workings. In addition, *Strange Case* contains an excellent description of the phenomenal experience of invocation, which furnishes an equally excellent example of how an enfigurative order is reasserted in response. The novel also narrates a break in the enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-century British Hellenism that occurs as a comparatively simple classical allusion takes on increased complexity, and to a degree this chapter narrates a social shift after mid-century, as the pace of scientific discovery and social change increased further, making questions about human biology and male sociality even more pressing than previously. Where even in the 1860s the Great Exhibition and the cult of self-improvement associated with Samuel Smiles and the etiquette book retained

their power, the 1870s and 1880s saw the gradual diminution of their importance as the century wore on.[104] Because of these features, *Strange Case* offers an excellent opportunity to perform a distributed reading of nineteenth-century Hellenism as an enfigurative tradition with a distinct historical poetics capable of change, an opportunity all the more welcome in that the subject of the next and final chapter of the dissertation, Oscar Wilde, explicitly broke with Reynoldsian enfigurative tradition in promulgating his own theory of evolutionary aesthetics.

BIBLICAL AND CLASSICAL IN *STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE*

In the system of 'genetic logic' I outline in the previous chapter, Reynoldsian aesthetic theory assumes that a person's outward appearance has a transcendent social importance directly related to their inner character, and that viewing 'Grand Style' art and mimicking other members of the Reynoldsian assemblage can 'ennoble' someone and give them access to personhood. Most visible in the description of the "magic circle" of looking relations surrounding the *Greek Slave*, the infectious cognitivism of Reynoldsian aesthetic theory is a product of Baumgarten's monist psychology of aesthetics, and while Reynolds' application of this theory to a group exceeds the one-to-one transmissiveness of Winckelmann's aesthetics, the assumption that outer appearance reveals the 'inner man' is

[104] In *Dandies and Desert Saints: Styles of Victorian Masculinity* (1995) James Eli Adams notes "the increasingly acute Victorian unease with strangers - an anxiety vividly registered in etiquette books, in novelistic treatments of blackmail, in paranoid preoccupations with secret societies, and (most broadly) in a devaluation of the public sphere" (13-14). For a comprehensive picture of the role of etiquette and self-fashioning in the nineteenth century, see Linda Young's *Middle-Class Culture in the Nineteenth Century* (2003), which offers a comparative history of behavioral norms in The United States, Britain, and Australia from the 1780s to the *fin de siècle*.

clearly visible in Knox's and in the other nineteenth-century physiognomic images I discuss in Chapter three. These images, depicting ethnic assemblages through lone male figures, offer a visual basis for the social logic that codes women as Other to men and men as Other to Man. In this view, nineteenth-century scientific racialism in Britain is little more than the application of genetic logic to ethnicity, ethnicity being understood as an innate psychosomatic quality as totalizing in its implications for sociality as is gender. Where Knox's racialism was geopolitically nihilistic, though, tending toward blankness rather than whiteness, Reynolds believes 'Grand Style' art can weaponize his nationalist aesthetic psychology via Biblical and Classical subject matter. This sets up a connective disjunction in the *Discourses* that is also visible in *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, where the outward tension between Biblical and Classical is mapped onto the inward disjunction between the two enfigurative traditions, their synthesis depicted as simultaneously impossible and impose-able. While this connective disjunction is already visible in Reynolds' comments on the proper subjects of history painting being "the great events of Greek and Roman fable and history" and "the capital subjects of Scripture history" (40), it is also visible in the collocation of Christian and classical themes in "Euphrasia: A Tale," Moulton-Barrett's preface to *The Seraphim*, Barrett-Browning's later comments on the *Greek Slave* in "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" and in the historical narrative literally attached to the base of the pedestal on which the *Greek Slave* rested.

If we are opposing saintly and satanic in *Strange Case*, obviously the satanic role is Hyde's. At one point in the narrative he is described as "troglodytic" and "dwarfish"

(25), which qualities would seem to make him a good example of Reynoldsian genetic logic, and this also forms a useful example of how historical poetics can illuminate reception patterns across time. The saintly/satanic dichotomy characterizing Jekyll and Hyde, signifying a more general duality in creation, was the commonplace reading of *Strange Case* in contemporary sermons as it is now the commonplace reading in the titles of scientific papers.[105] A misrecognition of Hyde as the dark Other to Jekyll's supposed perfection is certainly his function in the traditional reading of the Jekyll/Hyde commonplace both then and now, but the text does not participate as fully in Reynoldsian genetic logic as is often assumed. For example, when the lawyer-protagonist of *Strange Case*, Gabriel John Utterson, asks for a description of Hyde in order to identify him, he is told that Hyde is "not easy to describe" despite there being "something wrong with his appearance; something displeasing, something downright detestable" (37). Before narrating events I will discuss at length below, Utterson's conversational companion, Richard Enfield, continues:

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[105] *Strange Case* was widely used as an inspiration for sermons soon after publication; a few examples chosen at random demonstrate the novel's ubiquity. The *Leamington Spa Courier* of November 24th, 1888 describes a sermon delivered by the Reverend Dr. Nicholson, on man's dual nature and on Jekyll's choice to become Hyde, which Nicholson called "the enswining of a nature" (n.p.). By 1893 the story was so familiar that a congregation in Menomonie, Wisconsin could hear a sermon in which no summary is offered, because "[T]he tale is so familiar it hardly needs retelling" (13), and in the same year a book of sermons published for use by English Unitarians contains a sermon, "The Higher and Lower Self," which uses the novel as one of many exempla of the 'war in the members,' calling "Mr. Stevenson's little book" a "parable" and "striking commentary" on the lectionary text. This parabular treatment of the supposed central theme of *Strange Case* is now most often found in the titles of scientific articles: "The Jekyll and Hyde Function of Caspases" (2009) and "The Inflammatory Macrophage: a story of Jekyll and Hyde" (2003) are just two examples of many, and both turn on a simplistic understanding of *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* surprisingly similar to that found in the sermons. This similarity might reward further attention.

> He must be deformed somewhere; he gives a strong feeling of deformity, although I can't specify the point. He's an extraordinary looking man, and yet I really can name nothing out of the way. No, sir; I can make no hand of it; I can't describe him. And it's not for want of memory; for I declare I can see him this moment. (37-8)

Enfield's description, useless in ekphrastic terms and troublesome from a Reynoldsian point of view, nevertheless expresses a precise affective sense of Hyde's appearance and proximity as a "strong feeling of deformity" felt in the body of the person looking at him. Enfield's inability to describe Hyde offers a useful example of how invocation and enfiguration are experienced on a phenomenological level, perhaps one that precedes the semiotic. Enfield is unable to describe Hyde's body in words, intensifying the reader's sense of Hyde's otherworldly status, but Enfield can describe the affective impact of Hyde's body on his own, the "strong feeling of deformity" Hyde "gives" Enfield marking Hyde as "extraordinary" – as literally exceeding the somatic norm of a late-Victorian London street in his invocatory, scopological effect on others. Hyde is the deformed, anti-Reynoldsian Other both to Enfield and to Jekyll, as the novel's title indicates so economically with the interplay between "Dr." and "Mr.", and thus he is indescribable, a verbal "nothing"; crucially, he is also "nothing out of the way." Hyde 'breaks' binary genetic logic, but as I will show, so does Jekyll.

We first meet Dr. Henry Jekyll after a dinner given at his home, where he is described as "a large, well-made, smooth-faced man of fifty, with something of a slyish cast perhaps, but every mark of capacity and kindness" (45) who, as Utterson tells him that he has been investigating Hyde, grows "pale to the lips" and gains "a certain blackness

about his eyes" (46). We next see Jekyll when Utterson visits him after Hyde murders Sir Danvers Carew, to inquire as to Hyde's whereabouts. This time Jekyll is described as "looking deadly sick" and having a "feverish manner" (52). After the passage of time suggests Hyde's permanent absence Jekyll's appearance changes again, his face seeming "to open and brighten, as if with an inner consciousness of service" (55), but as Jekyll's months of good behavior begin to pall on him and end in Hyde's unbidden return, Jekyll is described as having "an infinite sadness of mien" (58) while resting, which changes into "an expression of such abject terror and despair" (59) as he feels a transformation into Hyde approaching. Thus we see that transformative corporeality characterizes both men; in addition to the obvious fact of Jekyll's transformation into Hyde, the crucial hinge on which the novel's plot swings, Hyde is both "deformed" and "nothing out of the way," while Jekyll tranforms from being "large," "smooth-faced," and "well made"– all appellations as applicable to a statue as to a person – to being both pale and black, even at the beginning of the story. If he is a *felix aestheticus* of his own appearance, Jekyll finds his medium exceedingly resistant; if his supposedly 'correct' personhood places him in the position of an Apollo in the Victorian hierarchy of racialist 'types,' the faces of the other gods are shining through a little too clearly in his own.

Reception of *Strange Case* has, as I note above, struggled with the novel's anti-dualism; frequent film and stage adaptations have emphasized a fervid, Manichean reading of the book but, as *Strange Case* regained popularity in the 1960s after decades of critical

neglect, it also garnered more searching critical attention.[106] This is not to say that *Strange Case* criticism remained in the intellectual doldrums from 1886 to the 1960s; for example, in *The Victorian Age in Literature* (1913) G.K Chesterton calls it a "double triumph:"

> It is also characteristic of him (and of the revolt from Victorian respectability in general) that his most blood-and-thunder sensational tale is also that which contains his most intimate and bitter truth. *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* is a double triumph; it has the outside excitement that belongs to Conan Doyle with the inside excitement that belongs to Henry James. Alas, it is equally characteristic of the Victorian time that while nearly every Englishman has enjoyed the anecdote, hardly one Englishman has seen the joke—I mean the point. You will find twenty allusions to Jekyll and Hyde in a day's newspaper reading. You will also find that all such allusions suppose the two personalities to be equal, neither caring for the other. Or more roughly, they think the book means that man can be cloven into two creatures, good and evil. The whole stab of the story is that man *can't*: because while evil does not care for good, good must care for evil. Or, in other words, man cannot escape from God, because good is the God in man; and insists on omniscience. This point, which is good psychology and also good theology and also good art, has missed its main intention merely because it was also good story-telling. (226)

Others are not so laudatory, and the next fifty years of scholarly attention do little to shift the dualist reading. Even in 1966 Joseph Egan, in "The Relationship of Theme and Art in *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*," is still adjudicating Chesterton's major argument about the novel, which is that it is the *indivisibility* of the internal multiplicity natural to humanity, rather than the divisibility of good and evil, that is the 'point' of the

[106] King (1997) counts "at least 88 film and television adaptations" of *Strange Case* and notes that "[S]ince 1908, there has not been a period of longer than five years without a version of the story, and multiple versions in the same year are not uncommon" (9-10). In the introduction to *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde After One Hundred Years* (1988), Veeder and Hirsch offer an excellent, if brief *précis* of Stevenson criticism generally, and *Strange Case* criticism specifically.

text. Masao Miyoshi further advances the novel's return to critical favor in "Dr. Jekyll and the Emergence of Mr. Hyde" (1966). Arguing explicitly against a simplistic reading of the novel as concerned with "the dual-personality theme," Miyoshi instead suggests that *Strange Case* is inhabited by a group of men with distinct characteristics: they are "all unmarried, barren of ideas, emotionally stifled, joyless… in a wasteland, but a wasteland hidden by the secure and relatively comfortable respectability of its inhabitants" (472). Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, Miyoshi describes the gradual metamorphosis of the Jekyll/Hyde relationship from one of control to one of unbidden impulse, argues for the thematic importance of the double, and emphasizes what he sees as a historical shift during the nineteenth century, from textual celebrations of the achievement of a stable personal identity to "a species of resigned acceptance of ambiguity" (480).

Irving Saposnik continues this trend away from simplistic readings by explicitly attacking them, continuing to stress the text's complexity. The first sentences of his "The Anatomy of *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*" (1971) make this clear:

> No work of Stevenson's has been so popular or so harmed by its popularity as (to give it its full name) *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886). As pulpit oratory, as starring vehicle on stage and screen, as colloquial metaphor for the good-evil antithesis that lurks in all men, it has become the victim of its own success, allowing subsequent generations to take the translation for the original, to see Jekyll or Hyde where one should see Jekyll-Hyde. (715)

As I do, Saposnik wishes to focus critical attention on the historicity of the text. He argues that Victorian sensibilities necessitated an increasingly rigid "existential charade" and that the setting, themes, characters, and action of the plot make clear how deeply invested

Stevenson was in exposing this charade to criticism (717). Historicism will prove to be a dominant method for textual exegesis from this point, and echoing Miyoshi's basic argument that the novel is worth critical attention and rewards it well, Saposnik begins the first decade of sustained, careful attention to *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*. Irving Massey, in "The Third Self: *Dracula*, *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, and Mérimée's "Lokis"" (1975) argues that Hyde's leading characteristic, and the motivation of his depredations, is singularity and the loss of duality available to Jekyll. He makes the valuable point that Hyde lacks something Jekyll possesses and deserves sympathy both within and without the world of the story: "Jekyll can become Hyde, but who can Hyde become… it is not because the evil in Jekyll has overcome the good that Hyde can no longer return to the form of Jekyll; it is because all progress or descent towards unity is a one-way process, and the realization of a singleness is something that once learned cannot be forgotten" (59). While somewhat elliptically put, Massey's point – that Hyde is symbolic of the despair induced by a lack or repudiation of subjective multiplicity, and of the concomitant loss of intrapersonal choice and interpersonal connection – will be useful here.

In addition to Jekyll and Hyde's symbolic complexity, which repeatedly confounds the simplistic dualism of the Manichean reading of the novel, the corporeal excess of *Strange Case*'s titular characters also makes *Strange Case* useful in analyzing how invocations of corporeal normativity work over the course of the nineteenth century. The ways *Strange Case* subtly questions the terms by which habitus is understood in the novel extend, as I note above, from Hyde's un-remark-able appearance to Jekyll's supposedly

‘correct’ personhood, which I will argue puts Jekyll in the position of an Apollo in the hierarchical genetic logic characteristic of Victorian racialism. I have repeatedly drawn attention to the importance of Apollo, particularly in the first and third chapters of this dissertation: Winckelmann’s description of the transcendent beauty and muscular austerity of the *Apollo Belvedere* offered an archetypical vision of ideal masculinity that was widely influential, and as I show in the comparison of Camper’s, Lavater’s, Knox’s, Nott & Gliddon’s and Haeckel’s racialist imagery in Chapter three, Apollo was frequently depicted in 18th- and nineteenth-century physiognomic treatises as a stand-in for human perfection.[107] In *Strange Case* this enfigurative tradition is given a critical narrative addendum. Despite his desire to embody the social ideal of human perfection, the Apollo figure in *Strange Case*, Henry Jekyll, is changeable and strangely uninteresting, his companion Hyde more active and his old friend Utterson more intelligent, and of course Jekyll’s ultimately unwilling search for ‘perfection’ leads to his death. As I will discuss below, this ‘perfection’ consists of an active accession to the most stringent social expectations, while freedom from social expectations is associated with “down-going men” and their loss of membership in the Reynoldsian assemblage from the first pages of the text (2).

[107] Nietszche is another nineteenth-century source for Apollo’s importance, of course, and one that has clear critical utility in reading *Strange Case*. Hustis (2009), for example, reads *Strange Case* against Nietzsche’s *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future* (1886) and convincingly argues that Stevenson’s novella is a cautionary tale describing the negative effects of Jekyll’s ‘will to power.’ While Nietzschean masculinity and Nietszchean Hellenism would both be interesting ways to approach *Strange Case*, I have tried to restrict the scope of this chapter, however reluctantly, and have not included any discussion of Nietzsche’s Apollonian/Dionysian dichotomy.

Perhaps unexpectedly, considering my nomination of Hyde as the indescribable companion to the un-ideal Jekyll, Hyde's first appearance and the novel's first citation of nineteenth-century British Hellenism occur simultaneously. The setting is "about three o'clock of a black winter morning" in "a part of town where there is literally nothing to see but lamps," and there two figures have converged at a street corner: "a little man… stumping along eastward at a good walk" and "a girl of maybe eight or ten" (35), running for a doctor and headed in the opposite direction. Instead of skirting her as she runs past, the little man tramples the child "like some damned Juggernaut"[108] and leaves her screaming in pain on the sidewalk (35). The witness to this episode, Richard Enfield, runs after him and brings him "back to where there was already quite a group about the screaming child," the scene of confrontation unfolding from there (ibid).

> The people who had turned out were the girl's own family; and pretty soon, the doctor, for whom she had been sent, put in his appearance. Well, the child was not much the worse, more frightened, according to the Sawbones; and there you might have supposed would be an end to it. But there was one curious circumstance. I had taken a loathing to my gentleman at first sight. So had the child's family, which was only natural. But the doctor's case was what struck me. He was the usual cut and dry apothecary, of no particular age and colour, with a strong Edinburgh accent and about as emotional as a bagpipe. Well, sir, he was like the rest of us; every time he looked at my prisoner, I saw that Sawbones turn sick and white with desire to kill him. I knew what was in his mind, just as he knew what was in mine; and killing being out of the question, we did the next best. We told the man we could and would make such a scandal out of this as should make his name stink from

[108] It is worth noting that 'Juggernaut' is an Anglicization of the Sanskrit *Jagganatha* (odia:ଜଗନ୍ନାଥ), one of the avatars of Vishnu. In activating a potent geopolitical "intentional history" this descriptive analogy strengthens the underlying sense of Hyde as unworldly, inhuman, demonic, and immensely powerful. Since *Jagganatha* also refers to the immense cart on which the deity is carried in public during religious ceremonies, sometimes crushing unwary spectators, the analogy is particularly apt.

> one end of London to the other. If he had any friends or any credit, we undertook that he should lose them. And all the time, as we were pitching it in red hot, we were keeping the women off him as best we could for they were as wild as harpies. I never saw a circle of such hateful faces; and there was the man in the middle, with a kind of black sneering coolness – frightened too, I could see that – but carrying it off, sir, really like Satan. (35)

The 'man in the middle' being Hyde, the limitations of his freedom from social expectations are certainly clear here. Hyde is unfree from them because he has been seen doing something which is 'unfit' to his position. Precisely in the moment that two "professional men" treat him as one of their own, he becomes a "down-going" man trapped between "women… as wild as harpies" and gentlemanly men who can threaten his 'name' and his 'credit,' no longer able to remain in the liminal social space he has marked out for himself. The shared cost of Reynoldsian uniformity is Hyde's imbrication in normative sociality, and the cost is high in social, economic and emotional terms: where Hyde is forced to pay £100 to keep his reputation, Enfield and the 'Sawbones' force themselves and the "harpies" not to kill Hyde, despite their heartfelt desire to do so.

In this scene these harpies seem to be presented in what would have been their better-known classical role, as vehicles of divine retribution for Hyde's *hamartia*, the wrongful act which reveals his inner imperfection.[109] The harpies can also be read as

[109] *Hamartia*, from Greek *hamartanein*, 'to err.' Hamartia is often called a character's 'tragic flaw' and associated with Greek drama, and especially with the downfall of the heroic protagonist in classical Greek Tragedy. Here Hyde is no tragic hero, though, and his *hamartia* resembles that of King Phineus, who disobeys the Gods and thus calls down the harpies' punishment upon himself in the myth of Jason and the Argonauts. In this sense Hyde's characterological fault-line falls somewhere between hubris and hamartia. It is important to note that, like Hyde, harpies in classical myth come in more than one form; they appear in Homer and in Virgil in very different aspects, as well as in Hesiod. In the next section of the chapter I will elaborate on my reading of the harpies as they would have been understood in the period.

symbols of threatening female power here, recalling the Billingsgate woman of the Bull print as possible symbols of inappropriate cross-class and cross-gender conflict, while Enfield and the Sawbones are presented as members of the Reynoldsian assemblage in good standing, resolving the situation in keeping with the social order they enfigure through their controlled habitus. Citations of genetic logic abound: we are told that Hyde is "perfectly cool" as he is brought back to the group, "but gave one look, so ugly that it brought the sweat out on (Enfield) like running." Hyde has a "black, sneering coolness" about him, and it is not just Hyde who "puts in his appearance" in the harpy scene. Much as Jekyll transforms into Hyde by the action of a drug, the Scotch doctor "of no particular age or color" who is "as emotional as a bagpipe" turns "sick and white" at the sight of Hyde. He is filled with a murderous desire the Sawbones can also see in Enfield, and in the "circle of such hateful faces" Hyde's appearance has created, he remains "the man in the middle," his "black, sneering coolness" masking a fright written on his face despite his "carrying it off, sir, really like Satan."

In addition to marking the connective disjunction between biblical and classical through the narrative contraposition of Satan and Harpies in this passage, there is also something reminiscent of the *Greek Slave* in Stevenson's interplay of blackness and whiteness on the faces of Hyde and the doctor. My reading of this scene certainly supports Massey's comment on Hyde's "progress or descent towards unity" being at least momentarily "a one-way process," and Enfield and the Sawbones seem to hope that in Hyde's case, as Massey writes, "the realization of a singleness is something that once

learned cannot be forgotten" (1975: 59). I would add this to his point: in *Strange Case*, the harpy scene serves the same function as the *Greek Slave*, focusing readerly attention on the performative challenge of maintaining the outward sign of individual membership in the *ethnos* that is Winckelmann's mixture of serenity and austerity, and like the Great Exhibition, the novel uses connective disjunction between nations to do so. This is because, in addition to depicting the characters as themselves, this passage also presents the reader with a Reynoldsian assemblage that combines Enfield's elite English gentlemanliness with the Sawbones' Scottish professionalism and the Harpies' non-elite English femininity, and does so in order to regulate the sociopolitical relations between different parts of the British body politic. Hyde's "descent towards unity" becomes an emblematic instance of the Reynoldsian assemblage's proper functioning in this scene: the ideological boundaries regulating social behavior in the harpy scene create out of the "circle of such hateful faces" a similar kind of 'magic circle' to that we saw around the *Greek Slave* in the last chapter, and the circle's function is much the same. It proffers an opportunity to 'ennoble' Hyde while Enfield, Sawbones, and harpies perform their own 'chastened' personhood in the face of temptation. There is also something reminiscent of the *Punch* cartoon in the interplay of masculine subjects in the harpy scene, especially in Enfield and the Sawbones' imposition of Reynoldsian obligations onto Hyde.

The other explicit instance of the novel's participation in the enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-century British Hellenism is not so consonant with Reynoldsian theory, as I will describe. This instance occurs a few chapters after the harpy scene, as the lawyer

Utterson 'seeks Hyde' in the hopes of protecting his old friend, Jekyll. In seeking information about this shadowy figure Utterson relies on both professional and friendly bonds which, we find out, have long since broken:

> After a little rambling talk, the lawyer led up to the subject which so disagreeably preoccupied his mind.
>
> 'I suppose, Lanyon,' said he, 'you and I must be the two oldest friends that Henry Jekyll has?'
>
> 'I wish the friends were younger,' chuckled Dr. Lanyon. 'But I suppose we are. And what of that? I see little of him now.'
>
> 'Indeed?' said Utterson. 'I thought you had a bond of common interest.'
>
> 'We had,' was the reply. 'But it is more than ten years since Henry Jekyll became too fanciful for me. He began to go wrong, wrong in mind; and though of course I continue to take an interest in him for old sake's sake as they say, I see and have seen devilish little of the man. Such unscientific balderdash,' added the doctor, flushing suddenly purple, 'would have estranged Damon and Pythias.' (40)

While Utterson takes this outburst in stride, returning to his home to consider the situation as we will see below, the harpy scene and the Lanyon interview mark a point of tension between two competing worldviews much as Lanyon's changing countenance, his face "flushing suddenly purple," marks a point of tension between himself and his ex-friend Jekyll. If we read the harpy scene and the Lanyon interview in tandem, the classical allusions, the language of "devilish little" and the "bond of common interest" certainly remind us of the connective disjunction inherent to Reynoldsian theory. Lanyon has seen "devilish little" of Jekyll because their "bond of common interest" has been broken by Jekyll's "unscientific balderdash" – his desire to play God – and Jekyll's ejection from Lanyon's circle of friendship and even of professional acquaintance can be read as Jekyll's

self-ejection from the Reynoldsian homosocial assemblage. This self-ejection from British Greekness is so complete it has even "'estranged Damon and Pythias,'" Lanyon's and Utterson's conversation putting Jekyll in the same position Hyde occupied in the harpy scene, the 'man in the middle' whose fate is decided by others. Lanyon's change in countenance, his "flushing suddenly purple" further ties the two scenes together by mapping the Sawbones' shifting habitus onto Lanyon's.

Reading both scenes simultaneously also helps to relate *Strange Case* to some of the issues discussed previously in this dissertation: for one thing, the peripheral-yet-supplementary role of women in Reynoldsian theory is nicely demonstrated by the peripheral, but significant role of the harpies in the harpy scene, their righteous anger recalling the Billingsgate woman of the Bull print. This double role further demonstrates how Reynoldsian aesthetics imposes a forced equipoise between opposed states onto women, their commonplace depiction as being surrounded by men and their retention of some strategic ability to interact with the Reynoldsian assemblage from its periphery well expressed in the harpy scene. The total absence of women in the Damon and Pythias scene, as in the source myth, also recalls earlier discussions: Winckelmann's and Goethe's image of classical Greece, and the masculine, homosocial world of collecting and connoisseurship that preceded Reynolds' creation of a national school. Lanyon's comment on Jekyll's having gone "wrong in mind" in the Damon and Pythias scene are reminiscent of Byron's comments on Elgin's 'classical taste,' and beside their connection to this dissertation, it is interesting that these allusions also encompass the primary thematic elements at work in

Strange Case. Both passages depict "down-going men" and place them within Massey's movement towards subjective unity: a surveillative masculine homosociality that seeks to retard their downward progress through repeated comparison with an absent ideal. Where the harpy scene locates Jekyll/Hyde's current habitus in a public urban space and characterizes it as an infectious, chimerical ambiguity, the Damon and Pythias scene locates Jekyll/Hyde's habitus in time: a past wherein Hyde's absence allowed Utterson, Jekyll, and Lanyon to enjoy a Reynoldsian "bond of common interest."

Just as both scenes locate their characters in space and time, I have tried in this section of the chapter to so locate the novel and its reception. I have argued against a commonplace misreading of the novel as an autogenetic battle-myth, which is still the shorthand popular meaning of the phrase 'Jekyll and Hyde.' Also, in this section I have taken 'biblical' and 'classical' as shorthand for a number of other approaches to *Strange Case* that attention to Reynoldsian aesthetic theory may be useful in extending. Clearly Stevenson's novel is 'about' ambiguity and the desire to escape it; this means that the commonplace misrecognition of Jekyll as an Apollo-figure that I have noted in the literature on *Strange Case* and in the titles of scientific articles is part of the "verse-thinking" Prins' historical poetics is supposed to help the critic access. The distribution among examples of "verse-thinking" here is very wide, and may or may not increase the utility of the poetics historicized through this critical praxis, but it does offer a very diverse context in which to locate the significance of *Strange Case*. In the next section of the

chapter I will widen the distribution of "verse-thinking" as it relates to *Strange Case* even further, by tracking the journalistic meaning of harpy allusions from the 1790s to the 1880s.

HARPIES AND "VERSE-THINKING" IN *STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE*

If *Strange Case*'s dialectic between Christian and Classical demonstrates the novel's connection to social questions related to British Greekness, and the last section of the chapter was engaged in adumbrating a focused reception history of the novel to show how rich the critical archive connected to *Strange Case* has grown in the 20th century, here I will treat reception differently. In this section I will use the harpy scene as an opportunity to analyze how classical Greek allusions were used throughout the nineteenth century, from the late 1700s to the 1880s. This is useful for a number of reasons. As I have already shown in previous chapters, classical allusions are a common feature of middle- and upper-class British journalistic discourse in the nineteenth century. This is especially true of the female-authored 'alternative musea' I discuss in Chapter two, but I have noted that there is some question whether working-class readers were exposed to British Greekness through the same means. Consequently, one purpose of a 'distributed' analysis of the historical poetics of the nineteenth-century harpy is this: a brief and non-exhaustive survey of harpy allusions in the popular press from the 1790s to the 1880s will allow me to return to the question of working-class classicism as I demonstrate what archive the image of the harpy would have had for readers of Stevenson's novel in 1886, and this will assist me in making a theoretical argument about the "making present" of "verse-thinking in the moment" through the harpy that I will return to in the final section of this chapter. Another purpose of a 'distributed'

analysis of the historical poetics of the nineteenth-century harpy is that it offers another opportunity to comment on the mechanics of enfiguration as a cognitive operation, something I will return to in the final chapter of this dissertation. Harpies are especially apt symbols of enfiguration because the reference remains somewhat current, unlike the Damon and Pythias reference I will discuss in the next section; the mythical creatures, half-bird and half-woman, who in Hesiod are beautiful daughters of the wind but in the story of Jason and the Argonauts are monsters who snatch the food from blind King Phineus' mouth, are also apt symbols to read *Strange Case* through. There is even a third, comparative purpose here: after a discussion of the relatively stable symbolic significance of the harpy in nineteenth-century British press accounts, in the next section of the chapter I will note how much less stable the story of Damon and Pythias is.

In nineteenth-century Britain, the tale of the Harpies' punishment of Phineus – the gods gave him the gift of prophecy which he misused, and so Phineus was banished to an island where harpies took his food before he could eat it, from which vexing situation Jason and the Argonauts rescued him – was told in contemporary storybooks meant for children, as well as reference works such as Keightley's *The Mythology of Ancient Greece and Italy* (1831) and Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology* (1844-49). Even where the emphasis is mostly on Virgil's story of the Trojan feast and Aeneas' fearful reaction to Caelano's prophecy, as in Bulfinch's *The Age of Fable, or Beauties of*

Mythology ([1855] 1883), the description of the Harpies themselves are highly similar.[110] Harpy references can be tracked to the early years of the century with ease: in Letter XIX (1819) of the *Lady's Monthly Museum* "New System of Mythology," 'Clermont' describes harpies as having "the bodies of birds, with the faces of virgins, and claws instead of hands, with which they rapaciously seized everything they could," (39) while Lempriére describes them in 1812, in his much-read *Classical Dictionary* (8th edition) as "winged monsters, who had the face of a woman, the body of a vulture, and had their hands and feet armed with sharp claws," who "emitted an infectious smell, and spoiled whatever they touched by their filth and excrements" (Y3). Lempriére's dictionary was of course a product of the previous century, first published in 1788, and he is writing within the traditional 18th century understanding of the Harpies that was then carried forward into the nineteenth. Edmund Burke, in his *Letter to a Noble Lord* (1796) uses the figure of the harpy as a symbol of chaotic filth in his discussion of the French Revolution:

> The revolution harpies of France, sprung from night and hell, or from that chaotic anarchy, which generates equivocally "all monstrous, all

[110] Bulfinch's *The Age of Fable* ties the story of Jason and the Argonauts chronologically to that of Aeneas and the Trojan founding of Rome; in the version of events presented there, the Harpies are first set to punish Phineas by Jupiter (*Mythology* generally uses Roman names, even in retelling Greek myth) and when they are driven off by Jason and the Argonauts, they take refuge on the island on which Aeneas and the Trojans find them. In both stories the harpies are inhuman hybrids, half-woman and half-bird; in the story of Aeneas and the Trojans as retold by Bulfinch, the harpies are treated as fearful and "odious" (316) but not as evil, their gift of prophecy guiding Aeneas to the future site of Rome. Following Turner's (1989) argument that Greek myth was of particular characterological importance to the Victorians, I will deal with Harpies as originally Greek (which they are), and since their later Roman depiction is so similar, I will not make especial effort to delineate some difference between their reception as either Greek- or Roman-identified entities. This seems appropriate because Bulfinch is both American and appears in mid-century, and because Harpy references are so similar across my sources, even when their meaning is not. While it may be more exact to call the figure of the harpy 'classical' rather than Greek, Bulfinch's version of the story nicely demonstrates that, even in focusing on a Roman account, a Greek foundation is always present.

> prodigious things," cuckoo-like, adulterously lay their eggs, and brood over, and hatch them in the nest of every neighboring state. These obscene harpies, who deck themselves, in I know not what divine attributes, but who in reality are foul and ravenous birds of prey (both mothers and daughters) flutter over our heads, and souse down upon our tables, and leave nothing unrent, unrifled, unravaged, or unpolluted with the slime of their filthy offal. (16)

This invective-laden use of the harpy allusion is not exceptional in any way except, perhaps, in degree. The archives of *The Spectator* are a reliable source for similar quotations, linked to Burke through their Whig politics.

On the 11th of December, 1833, for instance, we see a discussion of coal-taxes in which "taxgatherers, monopolists, corporationists, and one set of harpies and another" are blamed for the high price of 'sea-coal,' while in the preceding March there is a passing reference to the "brother and sister harpies" (actually servants) of the American inn and their unwonted expectation of tips from travelers. There are also numerous references to harpies, *pace* Burke, in collocation with the Irish. One example from October 1836 serves well: in a discussion of O'Connell's Parliamentary declaration of the necessity to end the forced tithing of Catholic subjects in Ireland titled "Symptoms of Tory Alarm Lest the Whig-Radical Union Should be Restored on a New Basis," the unnamed author describes "the vile and atrocious harpies who now prey upon [England's] glory, her welfare, and her peace" both through the expansion of suffrage and through support for the Irish refusal to pay tithes. This is one of many articles on the same subject and using similar language,

seemingly meant to solidify a sense of the parties so described as Other in a specific sense that links economics and subjectivity: as greedy, unreasonable, and powerful.[111]

We see a mention of harpies in another, similar connection, also in *The Spectator*, in October of 1830. The article describes the foundation of a Sailor's Home in London, the purpose of which was to "furnish for seamen occasionally resident in London, a clean, comfortable barracks, where they can hang their hammocks without molestation and without danger of robbery" and which it is hoped will afford them protection from the "crowd of harpies that beset them on their coming ashore" (6). While the gendered implications of this usage are unclear – *The Spectator* applied the same language to Oxford tradesmen preying on undergraduates[112] – it is possible that the harpies here referred-to would have included female sex workers. Certainly other sources emphasize the gendered aspects inescapable in any discussion of the term 'harpy': in "A London Conversazione," published in 1853 in *Eliza Cook's Journal*, Thackeray uses the term to apply to 'Lady Barbara MacBeth,' "that haggard and painted old harpy" (191). Along with the repetitive description of grasping, undeserving non-entities as harpies in *The Spectator* this allows us to form an idea of the historical poetics of the term. Simply put, to describe someone as a

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[111] 'Harpy' appears frequently (at least 39 instances from 1830 to 1900) in the pages of *The Spectator*, and forms a potentially valuable object of inquiry for an examination of the historical poetics of nineteenth-century economic personhood. Since my analysis shows that it is a recurring facet of *The Spectator*'s 'vocabulary,' sustained attention to the journal's harpy references may suggest something of the ways it constituted a microcosmic Reynoldsian assemblage through citation of a specific corporeal imaginary. *The Spectator* is particularly useful here due to its excellent open-access archives; see http://archive.spectator.co.uk/.

[112] see "University Men and Tradesmen" (15 January 1848)

harpy in early and mid-nineteenth-century Britain was an insult meant to emphasize the misfit pretensions of the undeserving. Either a woman or a man, or a group of either, could have the term applied to them; to call someone a harpy was a generalized term of abuse and seems not to have expressed the obvious misogyny one might expect. It is instead a way of referring to (and Othering) someone whose economic personhood is such that they are ejected from a Reynoldsian assemblage, the outlines of which are then delineated in opposition to the rejected party's.

This would seem to suggest that Hyde is more a harpy than the "women… wild as harpies" are, the asexual application of the harpy analogy in the popular press producing this surprising result of an applied, distributed praxis of historical poetics. There is an additional surprise: if nineteenth-century harpy allusions do not have the sexual character one might expect, nor do they have the class connotations my previous examples may have implied; the term was used by radicals and Chartists with the same appellative force as it was by their political opponents. In an 1819 letter to the editor of *The Medusa*, an anonymous author who signs her- or himself as 'a fellow of the swinish multitude' describes noblemen variously as 'reptiles,' 'maggots,' and 'spungers,' the reference to harpies appearing in this lively display of invective:

> Sir,
>
> For the intention you have expressed of publishing "A List of SPLENDID PAUPERS," you deserve the thanks of every well wisher to the happiness of mankind. The number of sharks and blood-suckers that you lately exhibited, will be appreciated as it ought, by all who are smarting under the pressure of the iron hand of taxation, levied by harpies for the support of the voluptuary and the pander; the locust

> glutting on the industrious gleanings of a miserably starving population; the slothful sinicurist (sic) that fattens on the sweat of the mechanic, the tradesman, and the laboring classes of the community; the cringing tool of a corrupt ministry that contemptuously calls the melancholy complaint of dreadful privation, the murmurings of *"ignorant impatience."* (149-50)

The class politics of this paean are echoed in an 1833 issue of *The Man, A Rational Advocate,* an anonymous author writing on resistance to house- and window-taxes referring to "the harpies of government" (61), and these class poetics survive the Kennington Common debacle and the diminishment of organized anti-government activism after 1848. Indeed, the 1880s see the harpy resurface somewhat in the radical press: in *The Commonweal* of January 1886, E. Belfort Bax refers to a "nice little plot" by "the capitalist harpies of Europe" to carry out "direct industrial exploitation" of Morocco (3), while in 1888 the same author, in the same publication, renews his criticism of the economic exploitation of Morocco by European industrial powers, calling them "the European band of harpies" (1). Clearly not the words of elite speakers, these authors do not show any compunction in referring to their betters as harpies; one final example will fill in our sense of the literal poetics of harpy allusions in the 1880s, when Stevenson wrote *Strange Case*.

In the pages of *The Radical* for April 16, 1881, among notices of meetings of the Manhood Suffrage League, the St. Pancras Workmen's Club and the Democratic League of Great Britain and Ireland we find a poem by John Critchley Prince entitled "The Poor Man's Appeal," whose opening stanza mixes a solid understanding of the Sophoclean version of the encounter between the harpies and the Argonauts with a Promethean twist:

> Look down upon the people, gracious God,
> The suffering millions need Thy special care;
> For cruel laws are made to curse the sod
> Which Thou hast made so fertile and so fair;
> Laws which, like harpies on our vitals fed,
> Snatch from our lips the life-sustaining bread. (7)

It is interesting that Prince's post-Romantic radicalism echoes conservative descriptions of harpies as grasping, monstrous creatures who take what is not theirs. The importance of these and many other retellings is their presumed accessibility to readers, their clear evidential value in demonstrating the status of the harpy reference as a rhetorical commonplace in the nineteenth century, and their utility in tying that reference to an important discourse of economic personhood. From Burke's 1796 reference to "the revolution harpies of France" to Prince's 1881 reference to "Law which, like harpies on our vitals fed,/ Snatch from our lips the life-sustaining bread," harpies are symbols of Otherness even as they are also symbols of official order, the connective disjunction between the two roles the source of the enfiguration's rhetorical force. That this disjunction is emblematized by the harpy's very body, its outer habitus a sign both of its inner identity and its social role, further underlines the enfiguration's rhetorical force by allying it with traditional physiognomic assumptions and with Reynoldsian genetic logic.

This distributed approach to the historical poetics of the harpy reference in *Strange Case* suggests that my initial reading of the harpy scene was insufficient. I argued that the harpies in *Strange Case* are presented as vehicles of divine retribution for Hyde's *hamartia*, and that they can be read as symbols of threatening female power and inappropriate cross-class conflict. While these still seem like useful critical remarks, I now also read Hyde as

the outer sign of Jekyll's *hamartia*, and as a harpy in terms of his liminal economic personhood, while the largely asexual coding of the harpy in popular sources suggests that two other men, Enfield and the Sawbones, are also harpies in serving as the vehicles of divine retribution for Hyde's *hamartia* in the harpy scene. What is still missing is a sense of how nineteenth-century readers might have read the harpies, and why Stevenson chose the reference. It is worth remembering that harpies appear in Shakespeare (in *The Tempest*, in *Much Ado About Nothing*, and in *Pericles*) and in Milton, in Coleridge and in many Victorian poets. Stevenson would probably have been on safe ground in assuming that most readers would have been familiar with the literary or the journalistic aspect of the harpy archive, and would have understood harpies as symbols of order and of order contravened, which describes the doubled women of the harpy scene very exactly. They are described as "natural' in the harpy scene, particularly their anger at Hyde, their familial bonds the "natural" order Hyde has contravened, but they are also described as "wild." If we recall that the term "harpy" was most often levied against people making untoward economic demands in the nineteenth century, either (as in the case of the *Spectator*'s reporting on Irish refusal to pay tithes) by refusing to fulfill a contract to pay debt or (as in the 'harpies of Europe' examples) through rapacity, we can see that the term divides an 'us' from a 'them' and does so according to behavioral criteria directly tied to economic activity. In fact, it might be more exact to say that the term *is* the criteria, the behavior to which it is attached functioning to separate groups and individuals according to economic morality.

The term separates by class as well, in the sense of class as propriety. The Thackeray example is typical in this regard, the inference flowing from the nomination of Lady Barbara MacBeth as "that haggard and painted old harpy" being that her appearance is inappropriate. Indeed, the term appears in a passage bemoaning the difficulty of moving through a crowd at a London *conversazione* and describes the impossibility of not stepping on Lady MacBeth's lace flounces as being part and parcel of the pretense, inanity, and hypocrisy of the entire proceedings. This is typical Thackeray, his sense of having been born into a fallen world moving him to biting wit at the social customs of his day, and what he means by calling Lady MacBeth a 'haggard and painted old harpy' is that she is overdressed both for the occasion and for her age, to which he adds a strong sense of her insincerity through description of her context. She is, in other words, not what she wishes to appear to be, and the wish Thackeray condemns as utterly as he does the appearance.

This transversality of meaning is echoed in nearly every use of the term. The harpy body, uncannily both human and animal, both beautiful and ugly, is transposed onto the inner life of those so described and thus we can understand that the immediate, economic sense of the term when applied to the Irish landowner refusing to tithe, or the lawyer charging for services that only create further demand for said services, or the government, or the women in Stevenson's novel, is supported by the existential sense of the term as applying to those who *seem* or *ought* to be one thing but are demonstrably two. In this case, the appearance of the term 'harpy,' despite being applied to unnamed female characters whose role in the narrative is exceedingly minor, signals something much more important

about the thematic content of the book. This adds to the anti-dualist critical consensus I have already noted a more specifically social message: it may be that Stevenson uses the harpy reference in this passage because he envisions economics as a field for moral action, people's financial choices mirroring their spiritual inclinations, as seen in his letters.[113] Thus in some sense it is Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde who are the real harpies, first because Jekyll is no Apollo despite the outward appearance of rigid propriety, and because Hyde is both human and monstrous, his presence pestilential and overwhelming. Second, both are harpies because Jekyll has and maintains the claim to economic personhood based on propriety and property that enables Hyde to act out his violent, grasping desires. If Hyde-as-harpy blights whatever he touches, he needs Jekyll's wings in order to fly.

This may help us to see the reasoning behind Stevenson's use of the reference, particularly in a work that was itself popular in every sense of the word. In referring to harpies Stevenson is simultaneously activating an elite archive closely connected to the somatic and aesthetic norms of British Greekness, and a popular archive that repeatedly narrates the breakdown of those norms. In allowing two members of the Reynoldsian assemblage to rescue Hyde from the "women as wild as harpies" Stevenson may even be retelling the Argonaut story as a sexual drama taking place on contemporary London

[113] There are too many examples of Stevenson's tense relationship to his own economic circumstances, and to a discourse of economic morality, to explore here. The example most often seen in *Strange Case* criticism is his use of the term "whore" in multiple letters to his friend Edmund Gosse, referring to popular, professional writers. In his "The Sedulous Ape: Atavism, Professionalism, and Stevenson's "Jekyll and Hyde"" (1995), Stephen Arata extends Massey's reading of Hyde's "descent towards unity" as an imposition of gentlemanliness, and in the second half of his article he gives an excellent account of Stevenson's attitude towards writerly professionalism.

streets. Harpies symbolize the antithesis of Reynoldsian central form, and the allusion was so familiar from both journalistic and canonical literary citation that a single word places Stevenson in a long and easily recognized tradition in British letters. As he does in Enfield's first description of Hyde, through Enfield's inability to narrate his cognitive impression of the other man, in the harpy scene Stevenson wants to impress upon his readers a sense of the social situation in which Hyde finds himself that is at once perfectly clear and psychologically meaningful. The sense one gets is that the 'magic circle' of the harpy scene is a social situation driven by unseen forces with their own, divergent histories, and using Prins' recursive model of historical poetics in the context of the novel's continuing popularity further supports such a reading.

STRANGE CASE OF DAMON & PYTHIAS: ENFIGURATIVE TENSION, EROTIC RESOLUTION

The first thing to note about the allusion to the legend of Damon and Pythias in *Strange Case* is that, unlike the Harpy reference, the reference to Damon and Pythias is as important within the world of the novel as it is without. Where Stevenson's harpy reference points outward and displays its importance to the novel most clearly after a sustained critical investigation, the narrative of Damon and Pythias and the narrative of Jekyll and Hyde are more obviously related. As we have already seen, in the Lanyon interview two old and familiar friends discuss a third man who is now estranged from one but not the other, and the clear implication of the scene is that masculine friendship is thematically important. This reading of *Strange Case*, while it needs no support, is nonetheless strengthened by an attention to the text surrounding the interview. Preceding his entrance

into Lanyon's dining room Utterson is welcomed into the house itself, "subjected to no stage of delay" by a "solemn butler" who "knew and welcomed him," in implicit contrast to the doctor's patients (39). Upon entering the dining-room Lanyon welcomes his friend with both hands, the reader told that "these two were old friends, old mates both at school and college, both thorough respecters of themselves and each other, and, what does not always follow, men who thoroughly enjoyed each other's company" (39). This repetitive presentation of the degree to which Utterson is welcomed into Lanyon's home, as well as the felt comfort of that welcome, strongly emphasizes the same aspect of Utterson's character emphasized in his introduction to the reader – that he exists in a web of masculine friendship – and increases the significance of Lanyon's and Jekyll's disunion.[114]

As I have noted, after his conversation with Lanyon, Utterson goes home to ponder the situation over a restless night. He re-imagines the harpy scene, moving from Enfield's tale of the little girl's being trampled to an imagined domestic scene in which Hyde visits Jekyll in his bed, and the repetition of the harpy scene is here very different, Hyde and the little girl the only moving figures:

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[114] Though I am not performing a friendship studies analysis of *Strange Case*, being focused on narrating their importance to an enfigurative 'break' in the reception of their story that occurs in the late nineteenth century and relates to my ongoing discussion of Reynoldsian sociality, the novel cries out for such an analysis, examples of which I have not been able to find. Friendship is certainly as central to masculinity as it is to Stevenson's novel: as Migliaccio (2010) notes, "when men interact with friends, they are "doing masculinity" (227). The novel's being structurally and thematically linked to the fortunes of Henry Jekyll's homosocial web of friendship suggests that further attention to relational patterns of this kind would be richly rewarded. My hope is that the research presented in this section might act as a springboard to such a discussion, and that a theory of Reynoldsian homosociality may help to relate this supposed 'break' in the enfigurative tradition of the Damon and Pythias narrative to nineteenth-century masculine friendship in new ways.

> … as [Utterson] lay and tossed in the gross darkness of the night and the curtained room, Mr. Enfield's tale went by before his mind in a scroll of lighted pictures. He would be aware of the great field of lamps of a nocturnal city; then of the figure of a man walking swiftly; then of a child running from the doctor's; and then these met, and that human Juggernaut trod the child down and passed on regardless of her screams. (40)

Slight differences between the two versions – the girl is now a "child" and is coming from, rather than going to the doctor's – are dwarfed by the absence of almost the entire substance of the harpy scene. Here Hyde is no longer constrained by his masculine cohort, no longer threatened by the harpy-women, no longer made to pay. Instead Hyde comes from without, solitary, and heads toward his preordained meeting with the "child," but instead of that encounter trapping Hyde in Pater's "network of law" as in the first harpy scene, or enveloping him in warm welcome as in Utterson's visit to Lanyon, Hyde tramples on. While the passage retains the possibility of sociality through the encounter between Hyde and another person, it does so in order to more fully indicate the monstrous asociality of Hyde, just as in the Lanyon interview the previous condition of warm friendship between Utterson, Lanyon, and Jekyll makes Lanyon's and Jekyll's break more significant.

Still tossing in his bed after his visit to Lanyon, Utterson shifts into a meditation on the necessity of seeing Hyde's face I will discuss below. Here it is sufficient to emphasize how important individual habitus is in the Damon and Pythias passage, Lanyon's sudden purple flush the outward physical sign of his emotional reaction to Jekyll's "unscientific balderdash" and an effective instance of foreshadowing, Lanyon's later death due to the shock of witnessing Hyde's transformation into Jekyll. From this we can see that the

Damon and Pythias passage plays a structurally important part in the narrative, both in terms of its relation to the retelling of the harpy passage and to the conclusory chapter in which Lanyon recounts his final encounter with Jekyll's 'transcendental medicine.' Even as it inaugurates Utterson's search for Hyde, the Lanyon interview relates that search back to a time of perfect friendship between Utterson, Lanyon, and Jekyll, and forward to the deaths of Lanyon, Jekyll, and Hyde.

If the connection between sociality and death in the Lanyon interview is unclear, it may be useful to review the story of Damon and Pythias as it would have been known in the period. Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology* (1844-49) offers a representative account:

> **Damon**, a Pythagorean, and friend of Pythias or Phintias, who was a member of the same sect. When the latter was condemned to die for a plot against Dionysius I of Syracuse, he asked leave of the tyrant to depart for the purpose of arranging his domestic affairs, promising to find a friend who would be pledge for his appearance at the time appointed for his punishment. To the surprise of Dionysius, Damon unhesitatingly offered himself to be put to death instead of his friend, should he fail to return. Phintias arrived just in time to redeem Damon, and Dionysius was so struck with this instance of firm friendship on both sides, that he pardoned the criminal, and entreated to be admitted as a third into their bond of brotherhood. (936)

In the story of Damon and Pythias as in *Strange Case*, masculine friendship is a precondition to life, and its breakdown or loss brings death. While Damon and Pythias convert their would-be executioner through their striking demonstration of the bonds of amity, Jekyll's break with Lanyon kills them both and leaves Utterson alone, the only member of the trio to survive to the conclusion of the book. The passage of time is

emphasized in the interview, too, Lanyon's response to Utterson's description of himself and Jekyll as old friends being the mock-tragic "I wish the friends were younger" (40).

The legend of Damon and Pythias had considerable cultural currency in the nineteenth century. As in the case of the harpies, this is most clearly seen through a return to the publications of the time. Schiller's 1799 ballad *Die Bürgschaft* ('The Hostage'), set to music by Schubert in 1815 and translated into English in 1842 for *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, and John Banim's 1821 staging of the legend at Covent Garden both contributed to its familiarity, and "Making a Night of It," in Dickens' *Sketches by Boz* (1836), relies on such a readerly familiarity.[115] While Smith and Lempriére give similar accounts, Keightley does not mention the legend, nor does 'Clermont' include the pair in his "New System of Mythology." *The Spectator* also disappoints, the first reference to Damon and Pythias being in an 1869 letter to the editor calling, aptly enough, for more attention to "a field… hardly yet claimed by science," and one 1888 reference ironically relating the love of the Parnellite faction in the House of Commons for England to that of Damon for Pythias completes the tally. Further examples are too numerous to offer here, but as the examples from Dickens, Schiller, and Banim demonstrate, where we no longer recall the story of Damon and Pythias there is frequent nineteenth-century allusion to the story in both elite and popular discourse. Damon and Pythias also appear in boys' papers, in religious texts, in Trollope's novels *The Three Clerks* (1857), *Small House at Allington*

[115] In "Making a Night of It," Damon and Pythias are both the first three words and the thematic touchstone of the story, which follows two young clerks as they become drunk, go to a working-class theatre in London, and become so obstreperous that they are ejected.

(1864), and *The Claverings* (1866), and the pair appear in Tennyson's only prose work, *The Promise of May* (1882). The important point to note about the nineteenth-century allusions to Damon and Pythias I have so far mentioned is that they tend to take a contextual approach identical to Stevenson's, simply deploying the two friends as symbolic of the *ne plus ultra* of masculine comradery. While it is true that sermons sometimes take the story as emblematic of more general virtues like fidelity or honor, the core significance of the story is its close connection to an important nineteenth-century preoccupation that has animated this dissertation from the first chapter: the high status and identitarian purpose of masculine homosocial intimacy. There is the high value placed on masculine friendship, perhaps best exemplified in the novel by the relationships between Utterson, Jekyll and Lanyon at public school and then at university, but there is also a sharp internal contradiction in the Victorian conception of homosocial intimacy that maps onto chronological changes in the reception of the Damon and Pythias story and in the friendship status of the three men.

As I note above, we know that Jekyll, Utterson and Lanyon have been intimate friends from their youths, and this is why the Damon and Pythias reference can be said to occupy a structurally important place in the novel. The prehistory of this relationship is even replayed in Stevenson's narrative during the period in which Jekyll has abandoned his transformations into Hyde from fear of arrest:

> Now that that evil influence had been withdrawn, a new life began for Dr. Jekyll. He came out of his seclusion, renewed relations with his friends, became once more their familiar guest and entertainer; and

> whilst he had always been known for charities, he was now no less distinguished for religion. He was busy, he was much in the open air, he did good; his face seemed to open and brighten, as if with an inward consciousness of service; and for more than two months, the doctor was at peace.
>
> On the 8th of January Utterson had dined at the doctor's with a small party; Lanyon had been there; and the face of the host had looked from one to the other as in the old days when the trio were inseparable friends. On the 12th, and again on the 14th, the door was shut against the lawyer. "The doctor was confined to the house," Poole said, "and saw no one." On the 15th, he tried again, and was again refused; and having now been used for the last two months to see his friend almost daily, he found this return of solitude to weigh upon his spirits. (54-5)

Here Hyde is the influence that determines whether or not Jekyll engages in masculine friendship. When he is 'absent' Jekyll enters the web of social relations, renews and even improves his reputation, his habitus changes and his inner demons are momentarily pacified. When Jekyll engages in his experimentation with transcendental medicine, however, Hyde returns, and Jekyll goes with him. While Jekyll's transformation into Hyde is an oddly distancing kind of intimacy, the presumed friendship between them is understood by the novel's other character as a perverse sociality that leads Jekyll not into open brightness, but into darkness and obscurity.

In *Strange Case* Lanyon's Damon and Pythias reference is a negative one, after all, and by emphasizing the death of friendship rather than its continuance, the reference locates the reader at a strange, even an estranged point in the arc of the traditional Damon and Pythias narrative. In *Strange Case* the connective disjunction between friendship and estrangement is mapped onto the perverse 'intimacy' of Jekyll/Hyde that so concerns Utterson, an intimacy which has replaced the Reynoldsian "bond" between Jekyll, Utterson

and Lanyon; by locating most of the homosocial relations depicted in the novel *between* the 'tick' and 'tock' of Pythias' narrative departure-and-return and *after* the 'tick' and 'tock' of Utterson's, Lanyon's and Jekyll's "bond," *Strange Case* locates readerly attention at an uncomfortably indeterminate point. Via this this semiotic and phenomenologically-undetermined (overdetermined?) poetics of masculine sociality, the novel subtly undercuts the suggestion that men can maintain acceptable social relationships with each other by remaining within the bounds of narrative tradition, of the Reynoldsian assemblage, and of their own bodies. After all, this tradition has always been poised on a knife-edge between Winckelmann's 'temperament' and his 'friendships,' on one hand, and Reynolds' surveillative polity emerging from a 'central form' of ideal humanity on the other, and this equipoise activates a number of other important issues.

Jekyll's dalliance outside the magic circle of Lanyon's scientism is as damning in the eyes of his former professional colleague as his dalliance outside the bounds of his own body is to Enfield, the Sawbones, and the harpies when he masquerades as Hyde. Both instances are linked to a "youthful gaiety"[116] that Utterson suspects Jekyll is being blackmailed for, the details of which 'gaiety' are never specified. Nevertheless, the novel

[116] Jekyll comes closest to revealing the truth in his final confession to Utterson. Writing in a letter to be opened after his death or disappearance that he began the chemical experiments which resulted in his transformation into Hyde due to "a certain impatient gaiety of disposition, such as has made the happiness of many, but such as I found it hard to reconcile with my imperious desire to hold my head high," Jekyll adds that he thus felt himself forced to "conceal his pleasures" and thus found himself "committed to a profound duplicity of life" (104). He refers to having "laid aside restraint and plunged in shame" (105) and complains of the "perennial war among my members" (106) as if he himself is both Other and Reynoldsian assemblage, but the specific contents of this 'gaiety' that is also a plunge into shame remains unclear.

repeatedly associates this past 'gaiety' with Hyde's and Jekyll's relationship: the reader knows that Hyde has a key and enters Jekyll's house through a back door to get money from him following the harpy scene, first causing Enfield to suspect forgery and then blackmail, and the sense that there is something deeply perverse here is strengthened when Utterson imagines the harpy scene and Hyde's bedroom visit to Jekyll as he tosses in bed after his meeting with Lanyon. As Utterson dozes he imagines the second, harpy-less harpy scene discussed above "in a scroll of lighted pictures,"

> Or else he would see a room in a rich house, where his friend lay asleep, dreaming and smiling at his dreams; and then the door of that room would be opened, the curtains of the bed plucked apart, the sleeper recalled and lo! there would stand by his side a figure to whom power was given, and even at that dead hour, he must rise and do its bidding. (40)

Here the man whose Reynoldsian *bona fides* are imposed from without in the first harpy scene is enfigured as an intrusive Pythias to Jekyll's Damon. It is fitting that the remainder of the chapter is taken up with Utterson's bid to see Hyde's face and thus to know the contents of his spirit - which in mythopoetic terms amounts to Utterson's bid to insert himself in Jekyll/Hyde's relationship as Dionysius did in Damon/Pythias'. When Utterson does finally meet Hyde, Utterson describes him in a way reminiscent of the most vicious polygenist racialism: "the man seems hardly human," having "[S]omething troglodytic" about him, and Utterson asks himself if this 'something' is "the mere radiance of a foul soul that thus transpires through, and transfigures, its clay continent" before deciding instead that he has seen "Satan's signature upon a face" (43).

This last being another excellent example of the connective disjunction between Christian and classical themes in *Strange Case* should not distract from the fact that the passage I have quoted above, along with Jekyll and Hyde's uncertain relationship throughout much of the novel, Hyde's invocatory habitus, Utterson's knowledge of Jekyll's youthful gaiety and Utterson's fear that Jekyll is being blackmailed have all been taken to indicate a possibly homosexual relationship between Jekyll and Hyde. Nabokov is among the first to do so in print; he says that the "all-male pattern" of the novel "may suggest by a twist of thought that Jekyll's secret adventures were homosexual practices so common in London behind the Victorian veil" (194).[117] Like Nabokov's, such readings are often quite general, focusing on class or on genre: in *Sexual Anarchy* (1990) Elaine Showalter reads Hyde as an example of "upper-middle-class eroticization of working-class men" (111) and the novel as "a fable of fin-de-siécle homosexual panic" (107). Jack Halberstam adds to this in *Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the Teleology of Monsters* (1995), arguing that Stevenson uses the Gothic mode through which Halberstam reads "the cross-dressing Gothic-homo performances of Jekyll, Hyde, and Dorian Gray" to reveal not just homosexual panic, but "the ideological stakes of a bourgeois realism" (62). This has everything to do with Stevenson's anxieties about genre, class, and professionalism, as Stephen Arata points out in his discussion of Stevenson's class identity and his disinterest

[117] Nabokov may or may not have uttered this exact phrase, but it is attributed to him in the *Lectures on Literature* (1980) put together from the notes he used for his Cornell lectures from 1948-58; while the essay on Jekyll and Hyde may be most familiar to readers from its being republished in the Signet Classics edition of *Strange Case* (and in many others), I have used the pagination from *Lectures on Literature*.

in joining Besant's Society of Authors after Besant's 1884 lecture "The Art of Fiction," which laid out 'rules' for writers that Henry James and Stevenson each objected to in essay form (1995: 233-259). In this latter reading Halberstam echoes Nabokov and, more recently, Stephen Heath (1986), who also reads *Strange Case* in terms of Stevenson's "closeness to his age" (102); for Heath, Hyde is sexual pathology in human form, *Strange Case* is a sexological text, and Stevenson's novel is adjudicating whether sexual pathology is environmental or inherent. Here again *Strange Case* is transposing questions usually related to race in the nineteenth century onto sexual behavior, but it is anticipating questions quickly becoming important to the new sexology of Krafft-Ebing, Havelock Ellis, and J.A. Symonds.[118]

Other readings are much more specific. Martin Danahay (2013) reads an increasing "emphasis on the appetites of the male body" (23) and its increased visibility in the late nineteenth century, understood in terms of sexual desire, in the bagginess of Hyde's

[118] While there is insufficient scope to explore this point fully, excerpts from sexological writing in the period demonstrate its force. In *A Problem in Modern Ethics* (1896), Symonds describes homosocial patterns of sexuality "on the steppes of Asia… in the bivouacs of Keltish warriors… upon the sands of Arabia" and elsewhere around the world in the course of an argument that something so ubiquitous (and thus not an effect of environment) should not be criminalized in Britain (2). Ellis' *Sex in Relation to Society* (1910) takes up the question of how environmental factors influence sexuality as well, but Krafft-Ebing makes it foundational to his *Psychopathia Sexualis* (from 1886). In his first chapter Krafft-Ebing assumes that sexual activity is degrading if taken part in for a purpose other than procreation, and he then offers a tour of the world in support of this theory. It is a developmental theory, so Krafft-Ebing places savages at the very lowest stage of development, where "sexual intercourse is done openly, and man and woman are not ashamed of their nakedness" (2), and notes that it is "an anthropological fact that modesty can be traced to much earlier stages in the development of northern races" (2-3). The implicit corollary that sexual development can be tied to outer appearance, but only tenuously to environment, is apposite to my reading of *Strange Case* because Hyde's appearance is what forms the environment around him, whereas he has an increasingly tenuous connection to the environment from which he comes: Jekyll.

clothing in his final encounter with Lanyon;[119] Danahay also argues that the perversity of the relationship between Jekyll and Hyde can be found not in Jekyll sleeping *with* Hyde, but *as* Hyde in Hyde's Soho apartment. Jennifer Beauvais (2009), writing on fallen women and fallen men in Victorian fiction, sees "Foucault's description of the nineteenth-century homosexual" as a visually uncanny physiognomic type, Stevenson anticipating Foucault in depicting Enfield's inability to describe Hyde's appearance (184), and to return to Showalter's reading, at one point she assigns Jekyll's left hand, which she argues is associated with Hyde, an alternative association with homosexuality (115). Obviously, whether tied to specific or general comments on the novel, sexuality remains an important question in *Strange Case* criticism. For closely-related reasons, *Strange Case* is also an important moment in the enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-century British Hellenism as it relates to the Damon and Pythias allusion and to Pater's "Winckelmann."

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[119] Queer postcolonial theorist and literary critic Neville Hoad, in "Arrested development or the queerness of savages: resisting evolutionary narratives of difference" (2000), makes connections between evolutionary figurations of race, sexuality, and appearance that are useful here. Hoad argues that modern, western theories of male homosexuality cannot be understood absent "the imperial and neo-imperial contexts of such theoretical productions" (133), and that one of these contexts is the study of non-western peoples as lower forms of what Krafft-Ebing called the "northern races." Krafft-Ebing supplies the logical link between sexuality, race, and environment, but what Hoad points out that relates to appearance is startling. Darwin's notion that males of a species are "always more modified and thus more evolutionarily advanced" (137) than the female is in this period displaced in reverse onto male 'savages,' who were thought to be more highly-ornamented than their female counterparts and thus closer to animals than their colonial observers. That many colonial observers, at least British ones, would have been inculcated in British Greekness and would thus have shared Reynolds' horror of 'meretricious ornament' suggests a reasoning behind what otherwise seems a profound logical leap. This is an extension of Hoad's earlier interest in the aesthetics of Darwinian evolutionism as expressed in his *Wild(e) Men and Savages: The Homosexual and the Primitive in Darwin, Wilde and Freud* (1998).

The Labouchére amendment to the Criminal Law Amendment Bill of 1885, outlawing private homosexual acts between men, had very recently passed when *Strange Case* was published in 1886. This may or may not have dashed Paterian hopes for a "more liberal mode of life" (184), but the recent passage of the Labouchére amendment did make it highly likely that readers could have associated Jekyll's youthful 'gaiety,' Hyde's suspected blackmail of Jekyll, and Utterson's plan to blackmail Hyde with 'the Blackmailer's charter,' as the Labouchére amendment was commonly known.[120] Elaine Showalter, and Wayne Koestenbaum (1988) before her, made this connection as *Strange Case* was returning to critical favor, and the way Stevenson uses the Damon and Pythias reference only strengthens this supposition.

This assertion that Stevenson is knowing in his allusion to Damon and Pythias is believable for at least two reasons, the first being historiographical. The assumption of a widely agreed-upon silence in nineteenth-century Britain on the topic of men who had sex with men has been a common feature of Victorianist scholarship and thus of Stevenson criticism throughout the latter half of the 20th century. Many critics who perform a 'gay'

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[120] Section 11, known as the Labouchére amendment after its author and principal proponent, Henry Labouchére, and also known as 'the Blackmailer's charter' for its obvious utility in providing the impetus to acts of extortion, is only a small part of the 1885 Act which ostensibly was meant to provide women and girls legal protection against various forms of exploitation. Section 11 outlawed private sexual behavior between men and thus began the legal definition of 'the homosexual' and of homosexual behavior, according to some scholars; Foucault has famously stated that modern homosexuality was first defined during the latter half of the nineteenth century in an 1870 German article by Carl Westphal (see *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, 1980: 42-44). It is probably best not to assume a perfect analogy between late Victorian 'homosexual' behavior and homosexuality as it has been defined in Northern Atlantic countries since the late 1980s, especially since even during this short time the social status and social meaning of homosexuality in men (especially able, bourgeois, white, cis-gendered metropolitan men) has changed drastically.

reading of Jekyll/Hyde's perverse intimacy deal with the question of readerly knowledge much as Koestenbaum does. In the first sentences of "The Shadow on the Bed: Dr. Jekyll, Mr. Hyde, and the Labouchére Amendment" he says "[T]hat Jekyll and Hyde turn out to be not two men mysteriously involved with each other, but actually one and the same man, protects Stevenson from having to describe a homosexual relationship; the novel's first readers, unaware that Jekyll and Hyde were one person, might have thought initially that it was a novel not about two men in one body, but about two bodies in one bed" (35). However, an emerging body of scholarship demonstrates that men who had sex with men were a well-known feature of London life throughout the nineteenth century, frequent and often detailed journalistic accounts of court cases describing the circumstances of "unnatural assault" and naming the public locations in which such events took place, as well as the men involved, which turns Koestenbaum's "might" into a "probably would."

In his *Before Wilde: Sex Between Men in Britain's Age of Reform* (2009) Charles Upchurch demonstrates exactly how widely-available such information was in the years between 1820 and 1870, and shows that such accounts were particularly detailed, and court cases particularly prolonged, when the men involved were not of the same class or when private as well as public sex acts were part of the prosecutorial purview. Upchurch notes that for the 1,083 criminal trials for sex between men in London and Middlesex between 1820 and 1870, 891 reports were printed in two major London papers, the *Weekly Dispatch* and the *Times*. Especially in the case of the *Times*, Upchurch reads this as part of the paper's editorial responsibility for its readers' proper participation in the *demos* (141). He notes

that "[T]he *Times* explained its reporting on cases involving sex between men in part on the grounds that these cases came regularly before the courts, and therefore potential jurymen needed to be informed about the relevant laws and practices" (133) and writes that, in addition to this function, newspaper reports of such cases portrayed urban public spaces as closely surveilled by police and thus served multiple statist purposes. Not only did such stories serve as a warning to men intending to express sexual interest in other men in public, but they also served as a warning to the potential objects of that interest: "[M]en were expected to know enough from newspaper accounts to avoid Hyde Park at night, and on the witness stand they were usually not allowed to claim ignorance of its reputation as a site for sexual encounters between men," Upchurch writes (152). In this way newspaper reporters, and their reports, became part of the surveillative machinery of the Reynoldsian state and of the historical poetics of *Strange Case.* The courts, the police and the popular press were in this conception of nineteenth-century British society all reliant on a social scopo-logic of visibility – men who could be seen to have sex with other men were and had long been criminalized – that had become tied to a new sexual ideo-logic of performative self-control – men who could not be seen to have sex with other men could now also be criminalized – in the Reynoldsian assemblage's bid to separate the homo-social from the homo-sexual and thus to resolve the tension within British Greekness that had existed since before it existed, in Winckelmann's theories of aesthetic subjectivity.[121]

[121] This has obvious connections to Eve Kosofksy Sedgwick's work, with which I have been in intermittent dialogue throughout this dissertation. I will elaborate on those connections in the next chapter section.

In addition to the Labouchére amendment's connection to the blackmail theme in *Strange Case*, and the likelihood of readers' familiarity with journalistic accounts of men who had sex with men, another reason the 'gay reading' of Jekyll's and Hyde's relationship would have been fairly easy to perform for a first-time reader of *Strange Case* in 1886 has to do with an unusual 'break' in the enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-century British Hellenism. Richard Kaye, a queer theorist whose research focuses on the Victorian *fin-de-siécle* and transatlantic modernism, links the availability of a gay reading of *Strange Case* to precisely this cause: a shift in the significance of the Damon and Pythias legend in the mid-1880s. *Marriage Below Zero* is an 1889 novel written by Alfred J. Cohen, and Kaye argues that, like *Strange Case*, Cohen's *Marriage Below Zero* uses the tension between the traditional significance of the Damon and Pythias story and the new availability of a sexualized reading of that story as a source of narrative energy that supports the traditional melodramatic troubled-marriage plot and enlarges its scope to include same-sex desire. Though there is no marriage plot in *Strange Case*, the two texts present a sort of mirror-image of each other: in *Zero* the protagonist is a woman who discovers the fact of her husband's homosexual relationship with another man, where in *Strange Case* there are no female protagonists, and the reader is left trying to discover the emotional truth of Jekyll's and Hyde's relationship until the end of the novel, where it remains somewhat ambiguous. In *Zero* the heroine's discovery is strongly foreshadowed in her introduction to her future husband and his friend, Captain Jack Dillington, at a ball the heroine doesn't want to attend:

> "Arthur Ravener and Captain Jack Dillington," pursued Letty, disdaining to notice my petulance, "are known in society as Damon and Pythias. They are inseparable. Such a case of friendship I have never seen. I half expected they would be at your mother's party, but I presume they were not invited. I have never met one without the other. They always enter a ball-room together and leave together. Of course they can't dance with each other, but I'm sure they regret that fact. They are together between the dances, conversing with as much zest as if they had not met for a month. Girls don't like them because they talk downright, painful sense. Men seem to despise them. You might appreciate them, however," with a smile. 31

If only four years after the publication of *Strange Case* as clear a link between Damon and Pythias and two men who "regret" that "they can't dance with each other" can be drawn in a novel that Kaye states was explicitly written to discuss 'the homosexual problem' and reviewed as such, this representative similarity suggests that the Greek legend's treatment of close relations between men had in the 1880s regained the homoerotic subtext of Winckelmann's "temperament," and that British Greekness remained beset by the question of homoeroticism between men.

This link between figures from Greek antiquity and male homoeroticism was certainly not a phenomenon restricted to the 1880s: in his *Nineteenth-Century Writings on Homosexuality: A Sourcebook* (1999), Chris White writes that allusions to Damon and Pythias in nineteenth-century Britain did not come to reference homosexual desire through gradual processes of discursive change, but instead were explicitly claimed by advocates for what we would now call gay rights, who like Pater and so many others saw in nineteenth-century British Hellenism a powerful rhetorical resource. Reminiscent of Winckelmann's description of Greece and of Goethe's description of Winckelmann, in

texts like William Cory's "Desiderato" (1858), J.A. Symonds' *A Problem in Greek Ethics* (1873), the poetry of Edward Cracroft Lefroy (1855-1891), especially *Echoes from Theocritus* (1885), and in Pater's "Winckelmann," White writes that

> The link is made between the ancient and the modern, with the modern being articulated through the history and stories of the ancient. Ancient Greek culture offers a model in which relationships between men are not only a given, but are an intrinsic part of the organization of society, its laws, education, military prowess and literature, where women are not citizens, where no reference need be made to the female. The valid binary is not between heterosexual and homosexual, but between good and bad homosexual relationships. Relationships between men are normal. Exemplary relationships between men can save a society from barbarous enemies. The same pairings of famous lovers are cited again and again as evidence of how beneficial and healthy homosexual relationships can be: Pythias and Damon, Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades, Heracles and Hylas. They are all proof of purity and innocence in a culture which is young, which has not yet been corrupted by age. The modern is old, decayed, declining, while the ancient is young, vigorous and physically robust… the youthful ancients are capable of selfless devotion and sacrifice for the greater good, in contrast to the mercantile, grimy world whose people think only of their own good, their own pleasures. Such a framework requires the male body to be central to the good these relationships bring. It is always a young, muscular, athletic body containing a mind on higher things, representing a masculinity which is militaristic but never macho. (119)

In other words, such texts enfigure men in exemplary homosexual relationships as the new Reynoldsian assemblage: heroes who will save the nation from degeneration through proper "devotion and sacrifice," much as Pater's "Winckelmann" enfigures the modern artist as a person who will 'save' our experience of the world through the representation of a "more liberal mode of life" to a viewer (184). It is interesting to note that this is the opposite of what happens in *Strange Case*, where Jekyll's 'gaiety' in youth and his

"unscientific balderdash" in adulthood condemns Jekyll/Hyde first to ignominy and then to death. Instead of depicting Jekyll's transformation as a scientific achievement or as a new 'central form' of Hellenist Reynoldsian masculinity, *Strange Case* depicts a worst-case scenario of what happens when one tries to escape 'penetration' by Pater's "network of law," the magnetic impetus borne by the "central forces of the world" repelling Jekyll/Hyde from each other and from sociality rather than attracting them to some higher existence. In this reading, it is fitting that Lanyon dies as a result of seeing Hyde transform into Jekyll, and this also helps to contextualize Enfield's indescribable description of Hyde. That Stevenson could have known he was making an allusion that had sexual overtones when he describes Jekyll as half of a Damon/Pythias friendship seems quite possible, and when Stevenson depicts him in bed, another man entering his chamber, plucking apart his bedclothes and compelling him to "rise and do (his) bidding," this possibility is increased.

Thus *Strange Case* first presents the reader with an example of the proper functioning of the Reynoldsian assemblage in the harpy scene, while in the Damon and Pythias scene this normative bond is located in the past. Utterson's dream-vision then unites Hyde, the unfit man who in this reiteration of the harpy scene goes unpunished, and Jekyll, the escapee from the Reynoldsian assemblage, in a scene whose sexual undertones are fairly overt. In narrating the breakdown of Jekyll/Hyde's personhood in this way, *Strange Case* effectively narrates the failure of the Reynoldsian assemblage to repress its own origin in Winckelmann's erotic interest in men's bodies, which in the novel ushers in a post-Reynoldsian sociality in which late-Victorian scientific advances, the surveillative

anonymity of urban sociality, and the latent, queer content of Winckelmann's Hellenism have combined to mark the passing of an age. That this failure is catastrophic to the functioning of the Reynoldsian "bond" between "professional men" is abundantly clear. As I note above, Lanyon dies of shock after witnessing Hyde's transformation into Jekyll, Jekyll/Hyde finally kills himself to avoid an interview with Utterson, and in the course of his efforts to protect his friend Jekyll, Utterson plans to commit blackmail and instead manages to abet murder, before finding the body of his friend and the record of Jekyll's self-experiments in the book's final scene. In presenting the Reynoldsian ideal as both imposition and pose, *Strange Case* undercuts the ideal's connective power while emphasizing its internal disjunction, and Stevenson's novel never replaces the ideal with another, never presents the reader with a systematic theory of post-Reynoldsian personhood. Instead Jekyll/Hyde's selfhood becomes duplicitous in being bifurcated, Jekyll's past imposition of austere habitus on himself as much a pose as Hyde's calm demeanour in the harpy scene, and the message of the novel is that internal disjunction is coterminous with social existence: neither Utterson, Lanyon, Jekyll/Hyde nor the reader survive the events of the novel unchanged. That this is presented in a negative light suggests that *Strange Case* is finally rather conservative in its valuation of social change, but the novel nevertheless presents a new genetic logic, the details of which would be worked out by another late-Victorian writer, Oscar Wilde. He will be the subject of the last chapter of this dissertation.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH HELLENISM AND THE *STRANGE CASE* FOR HISTORICAL POETICS

Before moving to Wilde, though, it is necessary to bring my discussion of historical poetics to some kind of conclusion. This discussion has stretched over four chapters and began in the introduction as a task I set myself: to apply Prins' recursive model of historical poetics to examples of nineteenth-century British Hellenism, combining Prins' 'distributed' approach with Jarvis' author-centered version of textual poetics, hopefully resulting in a granular, constrained, faithful reading of a text. My first application of this praxis was to Shelley's "We are all Greeks," and even in *Strange Case* we can still hear Shelleyan echoes. Jekyll's pretensions to Apollo-like grandeur and thus to British Greekness show that he wants to appear part of the Shelleyan 'we,' but his inner Hyde demonstrates that Jekyll is very far from being 'all Greek.' The novel's Greek allusions make the same case: in the harpy scene nearly everyone is a harpy *because* none are 'all Greek,' and the Damon and Pythias allusion further complicates matters by suggesting that Jekyll and Hyde, like the version of Damon and Pythias we see in *Marriage Below Zero*, may in fact be *too* Greek. In other words, *Strange Case* recasts Shelley's declarative "We are all Greeks" as a question: are we all Greeks? Are we Greeks *all* Greek? Is it possible to be *too* Greek? This is important to the discussion of the explanatory utility of historical poetics, considered as a method and a methodology. Using distributed historical poetics we can combine Shelley's "We are all Greeks" with Lanyon's reference to his lost relationship with Jekyll, and our knowledge of the many textual accounts of same-sex desire between men. This produces a genealogy of masculine, sexualized British Greekness that, if we then

extend the genealogy backwards in time to Winckelmann, suggests that nineteenth-century British Hellenism was always-already 'about' men's sexuality as it related to their masculinity and it was always-already uncomfortably unsure of what that relation was. In some sense, a 'distributed' approach to historical poetics thus suggests something literary critics already know: that texts have a life of their own, their intertextual bonds so unexpectedly various and the permutations of their combination so impossibly infinite that a great deal can be said about them without exhausting their significance. The distance between Shelley's confident Orientalism and Jekyll's bifurcated Greekness, built on opposition that is too-obviously incomplete, offers a good example of two seemingly-unrelated texts' complicated historical poetics but possibly little more.

Jarvis' approach, on the other hand, attends to Stevenson's intent. Difficult to augur in most cases, in Stevenson's it can be seen in his letters and in the essays he wrote related to writing and to *Strange Case*, through attention to Stevenson's anxiety about his own professionalism and his strong opinions on Besant's call for a Society of Authors. Arata, Heath, and Halberstam all attend to Stevenson's intent in their readings of *Strange Case*, and their criticism has informed my own: if Stevenson was as aware of the liminality of his novel, and as self-aware of his own 'achieved' liminality as a writer as these critics demonstrate he was, then I am that much more confident in ascribing to him the sly, subversive use of ambiguity and slippage that my reading of his use of Greek allusion rests upon. This was also an important feature of my reading of Moulton-Barrett's *Seraphim*, where attention to the poetics of writerly identity Moulton-Barrett uses in her preface again

ties sexual identity to British Greekness, and combining a distributed approach in my reading of Pater's "Winckelmann" with an attention to his historical poetics of authorship allows me to argue that Pater's hopes were not just for the general increase of nineteenth-century British Hellenism. Pater says, after all, that "our culture" is "filled with the classical spirit," but if Pater's reworked Shelleyan Greekness is another example of how sexuality, sex/gender, and sociality were intertwined through Reynoldsian aesthetic theory in a Laocoönic social form of the group with some paradoxical characteristics, this may point to a problem with my praxis of historical poetics.

The problem is this: poetics are *always* historical, and history is always narrated with some admixture of poetic license. A recursive model of historical poetics bifurcates and binds the two, but I would suggest that the loop in this loop-model cordons off yet another 'magic circle' in which enfigurations endure over very long periods of time, and stretch across immense spaces. Through various means I have tried to show as much over the last four chapters, and I have also shown that the enduring quality of enfigurations means that they are always self-contradictory. Enfigurations of nineteenth-century British Hellenism as 'Man' are both ideal, marmoreal in their perfection, and as internally disjunct as are enfigurations of 'Woman.' Ethnogenetic attempts to monumentalize British Greekness are no more successful than are autogenetic attempts to infiltrate British Greekness through 'alternative musea.' A nihilistic racial history of the world and a hopeful, sexual history of Europe can both partake of the same archive, and this confounds the attempt to 'fix' meaning or finally delineate the static outlines of an enfiguration

through a praxis of historical poetics. Victoria can fix the meaning of the crowds on the opening day of the Great Exhibition as "the crowd most enthusiastic and perfect order kept," but I have already shown that this order was not sustained for long. The *Greek Slave* is another excellent example: it is an identitarian technology, it is immensely famous and copies a famous work of classical art, but it functions as an identitarian technology in an encounter with an audience member that is always doubled, the 'member' at war with itself, imagining the original viewer's experience and the sculptor's intent while also having their own intense experience. Even in ekphrastic accounts of the *Greek Slave*, the number of enfigurations activated in this cognitive operation are multiplied by the number of subjects taking part, and my investigation of the historical poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism begins to take on a diffractive quality that may preclude critical utility.

This begs two questions. One is whether we have discovered that Sedgwick's homosocial/homosexual distinction actually names an enfiguration, marked by connective disjunction, that describes the nearly-indissoluble links between two possible identity positions with a clarity that makes the naming useful. I think it does, and I think this also answers Butler's closely related question about whether we can confidently delineate the process by which "heterosexuality and homosexuality are defined through one another" (2004: 139). This argument seems to me to turn upon the different theories of time we are working with. Sedgwick's contention that there was a "sudden, radical condensation of sexual categories" (1990: 9) around the time of the Wilde trials is a clock-time argument that relies on chronological linearity and assumes some measure of historical

progressivism, while my suggestion that the homosexual/homosocial distinction is an enfiguration assumes the cognitive primacy of repetitive, Kermodean narrative time over chronological linearity. By noting that this distinction between homosociality and what I call 'sexual homosociality' in Chapter one has to be continually re-made, I hope to have escaped the pull of linear time, but Upchurch's research showing that sex between men was a common subject of journalistic speech links the two temporal frames very well. In continually reminding Londoners that sex between men occurred and was legally considered a social ill, newspapers were also reminding Londoners that sex between men was not an acceptable form of intimacy. Goethe is doing something similar in his comments on Winckelmann's 'temperament,' though in a much more subtle and ambiguous way, and there are numerous examples of this tensive relationship between acceptable and unacceptable forms of masculine intimacy in every chapter of this dissertation.

However tensive it is in specific moments, my point is that the relationship endures. Homosociality (like all other forms of sociality) has a sexual aspect because it is engaged-in by sexual subjects, and thus the two terms name two aspects of one thing, not two separate things that accidentally overlap on occasion. This, however, brings up the other question: how *useful* is such a theory? If sociality is always-already sexual and we demarcate particular forms of sexual sociality (or social sexuality) through enfiguration, then 'the homosexual' and 'the heterosexual' are also enfigurations. This means that we can only track the course of the enfigurative tradition as it *seems* to change in response to events, while in fact it simply persists, only showing us another of its many faces from time

to time. I have tried to track the course of enfigurative tradition in nineteenth-century British Hellenism over the course of four chapters, but the signs I have tracked have all been very highly located within a specific time and place, and within a specific facet of that time and place. The process is not the same elsewhere, or elsewhen, and this suggests that there is a radical contingency necessarily activated in using enfiguration theory that may be either a feature or a bug. This question – whether enfiguration theory, bolstered by a historical-poetics methodology, is finally of any use to the literary critic – will be a question I will try to answer again in the final chapter.

Conclusion: Oscar Wilde and the Imposition of Enfiguration

By convention sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color; but in reality atoms and the void.

Democritus

In the last chapter I demonstrated how some of the most important and complicated aspects of the historical poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism are made visible through the two allusions to 'things Greek' in Stevenson's *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886). I also suggested that an understanding of the text's emplacement in the historical poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism adds value to a critical reading of the novel, by focusing critical attention both on the recursive relationship between writerly questions of intent and technique in *Strange Case*, and on readerly questions of reception. Noting the intertextual poetics of the novel's social context strongly implies that the novel would have been read through that context and was written to be read so, and that the way masculine homosociality was represented generally, particularly in the harpy scene and the Lanyon interview, indicated as much. I also pointed out that pressing critical problems remain, even with a methodology that applies both quantitative and qualitative constraints to theorizing, because the recursive model of historical poetics I have been using orders enfigurative patterns without fixing them as static entities, and without allowing for their full explication. This lack of fixity has everything to do with the cognitive aspects of enfigurations as I understand them, which I will make an effort to explain in the last section of this chapter. In short, I will argue that ideological interpellation becomes an

aspect of individual embodiment through a repetitive, cognitive operation of self- and other-enfiguration, and that the effect on the individual is akin to that of mapping a preferred socioemotional orientation over one's own phenomenological experience. Questions remain: whose preference is at work? What are the effects of preference in a given enfigurative tradition?

To answer these questions I will ask whether the 'New Hellenism' Wilde envisions in "The Soul of Man Under Socialism" (1891) is actually new, and whether his 'genitive'[122] model of artistic praxis breaks with Reynoldsian tradition, as he implicitly claims in his "What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?" (1883).[123] To answer these questions I will discuss Wilde's 1895 trials for gross indecency, especially the literary-critical aspects of the trials, which are a remarkably important part of any search for the meaning of Wilde's aesthetic, artistic, activist 'pose.' Through attention to a journalistic discourse of Wilde-as-social-threat I will show that competing enfigurations of masculinity

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[122] I am using the term 'genitive' in this case to emphasize my feeling that Wilde's theory of the role of art is imbricated in the evolutionary intellectual tradition so important during the late nineteenth century in Britain, but also to begin to approach questions of ownership that are important in this chapter, as in the dissertation as a whole, in a new way. The 'genitive' case in Greek and Latin indicates possession, and I will argue that Wilde sought both to 'possess' his own artistic praxis in a way that was deeply meaningful to him and to give back possession of their own 'souls' to his contemporaries through that artistic praxis. However, I also want to include other shades of meaning: 'genitive' can refer to genital organs and 'genitive' and 'genesis' are closely-related philologically, a relation that I have tried to foreshadow through my discussion of auto-and ethnogenesis. 'Genetic' readings of literary texts attend very carefully to their origins, as I have mentioned before in this dissertation, and I have also mentioned that in this dissertation I am interested in how narratives that originate enfigurative traditions remain powerful and significant over time, and how these narratives function at the origins of individual semiotic and phenomenological relations to the world. The relation between the grammatical, biological, and literary-critical valences of this terminological cluster will become clearer, and my use of the terms more obviously apt, through the course of my analysis of Wilde's aesthetic theories.

[123] "What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?" is sometimes simply entitled "Lecture to Art Students," but in the source I am using (*Essays,* 1916) the title is given as above.

and thus of the Reynoldsian assemblage were at work in Wilde's trials and in their description in the London papers, explaining *why* Wilde took part in the trials, which he instigated by suing the Marquess of Queensberry for libel. I will argue that Wilde attempted to envision a new Reynoldsian assemblage during his trials and that he might even have been momentarily successful, but I will also argue that in the end, the conservative social conventions associated with the enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-century British Hellenism won out.

OSCAR WILDE, THE GENITIVE ARTIST, AND THE "NEW HELLENISM"

In the previous chapter I claimed that a 'break' in the enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-century British Hellenism attended the change in meaning of allusions to 'Damon and Pythias' and laid bare the latent eroticism of Winckelmannian homosociality. I posited that *Strange Case* thus presents the reader with a new genetic logic, the details of which would be worked out by Oscar Wilde. This is not so much a new idea as an extension of previous critical arguments; what I call a 'new genetic logic' in this chapter was in the last chapter an attack on the formal conventions and ideological stakes of bourgeois realism for Halberstam, for Saposnik the cracks in an increasingly rigid "existential charade" (717), and for Masao Miyoshi "a species of resigned acceptance of ambiguity" following a previous historico-textual pattern celebrating subjective unity and stability. As I will note, other Wilde critics also recognize that he represents a new phase in nineteenth-century aesthetic theory. In the historical framework of this dissertation, Wilde's new genetic logic appears as a renewed Reynoldsianism that Wilde applies to changing social circumstances.

That a 'new' genetic logic would appear in the late nineteenth century is apt, historically speaking; after Darwin's 1859 publication of the *Origin of Species* and his 1871 *Descent of Man*, human imbrication in processes of natural selection and thus in the animal kingdom was an inescapable possibility, even in the absence of widespread agreement, and the effects of this new position in creation were momentous.[124] Questions about evolutionism and species transformation over time were important long before Knox's *Races of Men* was republished in 1862, probably to capitalize on the popularity of *Origin of Species*, and questions around the heritability of traits were widespread, their import central to the common understanding of evolutionary change. If acquired characteristics like muscular development or artistic taste could be inherited, as Lamarck, Spencer, and even Darwin believed possible, then adaptation could take place over short periods of time and could be easily guided.[125] Though the possibility of the inheritance of acquired characteristics was

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[124] Harriet Ritvo's *The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age* (1987) remains an important foundational text that makes this point extremely well. Working in a similar vein but on the other side of the Atlantic, Boggs (2013) is an excellent and theoretically up-to-date source, and as Boggs updates Ritvo, Brown 2015 similarly updates Stephen Jay Gould's *The Mismeasure of Man* (1981) with a useful characterization of Darwin's influence. Brown states that "Darwin opened up an infinite variety of possibilities by making the process of adaptation depend on *chance* rather than authority," noting that "the greatest number" of these possibilities "appear to be both emancipatory and oppressive" (112, emphasis original). In response to Brown I would argue that Wilde's 'new genetic logic' was aimed at re-asserting the role of politico-social authority in the process of adaptation, as was Galton's; this is why I occasionally describe Wilde's new genetic logic as 'eugenic,' a term coined by Galton – because the word (from Greek *eu*, 'good or well' and *genos* 'race or kin') describes both Galton's *and* Wilde's program of genetic control, which both men held would solve social problems through a more equitable arrangement of labor relations. See Galton's *English Men of Science* (1874), where he calls for increased state funding of science and decreased state funding of religion, and for a scientific clerisy to be put in control of the state, for a clear description of Galton's basic assumptions about the role of science in society.

[125] The inheritance of acquired characteristics (IAC) is a logical assumption about genetic inheritance that has been held by numerous people throughout history, and frequently disproven. As Lawson & Thompson (1988) note in an article on science education, "virtually all naïve students, regardless of reasoning ability will tend to adopt a theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics" (734), and nineteenth-century

experimentally disproven by the German evolutionary biologist August Weissman (1834-1914) and announced in his 1883 lecture "*Über die Vererbung*" ("On inheritance") delivered at the Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg, 'Weissmanism' remained one of many theories of inheritance during Wilde's lifetime. That Wilde was interested in such questions is obvious from his Oxford Notebooks, where he discusses evolution, scientific advance and the relationship between art and science extensively[126], and in his aesthetic

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thinkers were not unaware of IAC's explanatory utility. Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck were well-known advocates of IAC, though Lamarck's advocacy of IAC is more limited and cautious than is usually assumed (see Burckhardt 2013), and Charles Darwin's theory of Pangenesis is a materialist explanation of IAC that Darwin and his cousin, Francis Galton, sacrificed many rabbits in failing to prove. Schwartz (2009) gives an excellent account of Darwin's and Galton's failed experiments on pangenesis, and narrates the post-Darwinian fortunes of IAC with care in his *In Pursuit of the Gene: From Darwin to DNA*. Gould ([1981] 1996) writes that Galton had a "strong belief in the inheritance of nearly everything he could measure" (108), including a person's moral character, and it seems fair to posit that artistic taste was considered heritable since it had been ranked and measured throughout the century – recall Hemans' ranking of the two men, one of whom has 'classical taste,' in *Modern Greece*.

[126] Indeed, too extensively to be quoted here at a representative length. On page 7 of his commonplace book (all page numbers are as given in Helfand and Smith 1989) Wilde writes

> human nature• there can be no knowledge of human nature without knowledge of the Laws of Mind, (Psychology) nor of the Laws of Mind without knowledge of the Laws of Life (Biology)•
>
> The science of society now rests on the science of life: sociology on Biology• the state as Plato saw is "man writ large": now in spite of his imperfect psychology, and ignorance of biology Plato saw the real analogy between the individual and the social organism•

Clearly Wilde is reading scientific works at this time, though his mind is full of Plato, and his comments on the interpenetration of sociology and biology in the 1870s and early 1880s, when his college notebooks date from, are slightly chilling in light of Galton's still-nascent eugenic project. They also seem to suggest an interest in evolutionary theories. On page 51 of his notebook kept at Oxford Wilde strengthens this supposition, writing that "Comparative anatomy shows us that, physically, man is but the last term of a long series which leads from the highest mammal to the almost formless speck of living protoplasm which lies on the shallow boundary between animal and vegetable life" and adds, "so does comparative psychology or the anatomy of the mind." The analogical method Wilde relies on throughout the notebooks show that he was an original thinker, and sought intertextual and intellectual patterns that he could then consider as a through-line between widely disparate works; many of his comments show that he saw analogies between Greek art and science, but this selection from page 144 of his commonplace book is representative:

> <u>Science and Hellenism</u>
>
> Goethe owed his sublime cheerfulness to his scientific training – For us who do not "walk delicately in sunlit air", or "garlanded with white-poplar run races in the prime of spring

theory he suggests that the role of the artist is in some sense evolutionary, in that artists acquire and then share not only a vision of the world, but a set of possibly heritable skills that allow them to refine their own senses and those of their audience.

This 'genetic,' evolutionary version of the artist, nascent in the notebooks, is fully visible in Wilde's "What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?," delivered to the students of the Royal Academy of Art on June 30th, 1883, as is Wilde's self-conscious post-Reynoldsianism. Standing in the same relation to the students of the Royal Academy as Reynolds himself stood a century earlier, though he fails to mention Reynolds by name, Wilde begins his assault on the basis of Reynoldsian orthodoxy by stating that "[I]n the lecture it is my privilege to deliver before you tonight I do not desire to give you any abstract definition of beauty at all," adding that "[N]othing, indeed, is more dangerous to the young artist than any conception of ideal beauty… [Y]ou must find it in life and re-create it in art" (521). Wilde adds to this when he states that his purpose is not to promulgate a theory of art or to promote a national school thereof, but to "investigate how we can

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> when the plane tree whispers to the pine" the Greek attitude can only be gained by a recognition of the scientific basis of Life–
> Life came naturally to the Greeks as a very beautiful thing, we "whom the hungry generations tread down" barely can attain to the gladness that was their immediate heritage

In these selections I have only indicated the richness of what I cannot include here, but in their commentary on the texts Helfand and Smith do an admirable job of clarifying what I have only gestured to. As I will argue below, Wilde's analogical method marks his speech and his theoretical writings, particularly via his nimble use of language, and it is imperative that we retain a sense of his thinking as a dialogue between Helenism, scientific theory, and the emerging disciplines of sociology and psychology in his comments on 'soul' in "The Critic as Artist" and "The Soul of Man Under Socialism." Particularly in his comments on the connections between comparative psychology and comparative anatomy Wilde seems to be stating a materialistic view of some kind of continuity stretching across millennia, and in his comments on "the Greek attitude" Wilde suggests that this continuity is an internal, animating "gladness."

create art" (ibid). Indeed, Wilde relegates the idea of an English school of art to the dustbin of history with a *bon mot*, noting that "such an expression as English Art is a meaningless expression," adding that he "might as well talk of English mathematics" (522). Because "all good work looks perfectly modern," whether it be a Velasquez portrait or a piece of Greek sculpture, and because art is universal rather than national, Wilde states that there is little point in mastering the dates and names of artists and national schools "unless," he warns his auditors, "you are seeking the ostentatious oblivion of an art professorship" (ibid). In Wilde's opinion, this course of action will lead to a merely archaeological understanding of art, when in fact "all you should learn about art is how to know a good picture when you see it, and a bad picture when you see it" (ibid). Thus Wilde manages to contradict himself at least twice within the first few minutes of his lecture, first by proffering Velasquez portraits and Greek Sculpture to support his argument against knowing the names and works of individual artists and the different national schools, and second by following his stated intention of not theorizing about art by suggesting that he will teach his audience how to adjudicate artistic value.

Here Wilde displays his debt to Reynolds very clearly, his rhetorical use of connective disjunction allowing Wilde to retain a focus on Reynolds' pedagogical goal, which is to teach students of the Royal Academy to recognize artistic excellence, while jettisoning Reynolds' requirement of "essential uniformity."[127] That this requires the

[127] While Wilde is certainly not a traditional Reynoldsian figure, he evidently identifies with Reynolds as an artist. This can be seen in "The Philosophy of Dress" (1885), when Wilde compares art and fashion in

dubious attitude towards nationalism Wilde evinces in his comments on the possibility of a national school of art is clear from Wilde's opening words, but Wilde's attack on the nationalist purpose of the Royal Academy is also an attack on a number of other orthodoxies. For Wilde, the true artist is never a conformist; in arguing that art is universal and that there are no national schools, Wilde also argues that there has never been an 'artistic' or an 'inartistic' age. He reminds his listeners that even in ancient Greece, Phidias died in prison for the crime of having represented Pericles on the shield of Athena Parthenos, and that the Athenians, "when they had the greatest poets and the greatest artists of the antique world, when the Parthenon rose in loveliness at the bidding of a Phidias, and the philosopher spake of wisdom in the shadow of the painted portico, and tragedy swept in the perfection of pageant and pathos across the marble of the stage… raised the cry of immorality against art… against every great poet and thinker of their day" (525-6). In a prescient aside, Wilde adds that the students can even see the proof of this for themselves:

> In the room of the Parthenon marbles, in the British Museum, you will see a marble shield on the wall. On it there are two figures; one of a man whose face is half hidden, the other of a man with the godlike lineaments of Pericles. For having done this, for having introduced into a bas relief, taken from Greek sacred history, the image of the great statesman who was ruling Athens at the time, Phidias was flung into prison and there, in the common gaol of Athens, died, the supreme artist of the old world. (525)

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the same language Reynolds uses to compare ephemeral taste and lasting value, but the most obvious example appears in "The Relation of Dress to Art" (1885). He begins that essay with a thumbnail portrait of Reynolds' artistic vision: "'How can you possibly paint these ugly three-cornered hats?' asked a reckless art critic once of Sir Joshua Reynolds. 'I see light and shade in them,' answered the artist" (187).

Just as Wilde retained only what he needed of Reynolds' system, here he undercuts Winckelmann's and Pater's encomiums on Greek artistic freedom. He also throws Pater's theory of history and Winckelmann's theory of climatological determinism into question, enunciating an unusually critical comment on Periclean Athens that also contradicts Pater's historical vision of Periclean Athens' harmony between *heiterkeit* and *allgemeinheit*. In "What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?" Wilde also references Ruskin's arguments that the artist requires beautiful surroundings to create beautiful art only to refute them, too, questioning the very meaning of the words 'beauty' and 'ugliness' and suggesting that the beauty expressed by a work of art is wholly an effect of the valuation of their subject by the artist.

Adjuring his listeners not to "wait for life to be picturesque" but instead to create conditions of picturesqueness out of the materials furnished by nature, and by their own ability to see those materials differently, Wilde states that "[T]o paint what you see is a good rule in art, but to see what is worth painting is better" (531). The advice is not simply to burnish their technique, either, because Wilde states that while signs of effort remain visible, the work is unfinished. For Wilde, "the object of art" – "to stir the most divine and remote of the chords which make music in our soul" – is only served when art "annihilates" its materials and appears in its ideal state, divorced from its individual origins and effortful creation (532). This reformist vision of artistic production, however contradictory or synthetic, does in fact inform his listeners of Wilde's idea of how the artist is to create art: by viewing Baumgarten's 'art of beautiful thinking,' the *ars pulchre cogitandi*, as an end

in itself. This 'new' art of beautiful thinking is also the source of artistic inspiration, the effort of *perfectio* being the primary medium in which the artist works, his actual artistic expression an outgrowth thereof. Wilde tells his listeners to attend to the process of their own envisioning and to avoid a reliance on received aesthetic wisdom, again breaking with Reynolds, but to do so as the genesis of a new Reynoldsian assemblage.[128]

This is Wilde's post-Reynoldsian synthesis, his reconstructed genetic logic replacing Reynolds' Platonic, pre-nominative essences with an improvisatory aesthetics focused on the process of art rather than its products, the genitive act of artistic creation of higher importance than the artifact it creates. In this system, Wilde's genitive artist is an evolutionary craftsman whose acquired aesthetic sense can help viewers acquire a sense of what it is to "see what is worth painting" via his art, which important social task is nevertheless fraught with danger. The non-conforming artist is also a kind of autogenetic mutation, acting on the ethnogenetic assemblage while retaining some difference and distance therefrom, and the dangerous position of the artist in relation to the assemblage is strangely similar to that of Jekyll/Hyde in relation to their cohort of "professional men." Like Jekyll, the Wildean artist relegates the Reynoldsian assemblage to his personal past in order to break new ground, and like Hyde, he is a "man in the middle," endangered by his non-conformity and by his proximity to the norm, his effect on others a visual means

[128] In *Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception* (2016), Bence Nanay makes a similar argument. For Nanay, aesthetics and philosophy of perception are always-already tightly intertwined, and her book links Baumgarten and Wilde as I am doing here.

of slipping into the viewer's mind and "bidding them to rise." Indeed, much as P.B. Shelley and J.S. Mill share a logic in their comments on British Greekness, there is even a shared 'battle myth' in Wilde's and in *Strange Case*'s intentional history of social evolution that is as much psychological as it is aesthetic. Both Wilde and *Strange Case* envision the condition of humanity, or at least of masculine creativity, to be characterized by an intense autogenetic effort towards self-perfection, the effort ultimately thwarted by societal expectations, which effort toward self-perfection was in the scientific moment of the mid-1880s readily understandable as having material, corporeal effects through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. This has not been properly appreciated as an integral part of Wilde's thinking.

As Julia Prewitt Brown writes in *Cosmopolitan Criticism: Oscar Wilde's Philosophy of Art* (1997), "the high esteem in which Wilde was held as a thinker by W.K. Wimsatt and Lionel Trilling, and more recently by Harold Bloom, has not led to the appreciation of Wilde's critical writing that one might have expected" (xv), and this is no less true in "What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?" than it is for the rest of his critical corpus. Brown sees Wilde's cosmopolitanism as prefiguring that of Adorno and Benjamin, and reasons that Wilde's neglect is due to a materialist criticism's discomfort with "the manifestly idealist bent of Wilde's thought" (xv), but I would argue that in fact it is Wilde's evolutionary materialism, his eugenic program for biologically-driven social change, that discomfits modern critics. Michael Helfand and Phillip Smith take this view of Wilde in "Anarchy and Culture: The Evolutionary Turn of Cultural

Criticism in the Work of Oscar Wilde" (1978), contrasting Wilde's evolutionism with that of Matthew Arnold, and they argue that Wilde's "cultural criticism… demonstrates a more logical application of ethnological and evolutionary theory to methods of cultural improvement" than does Arnold's (199).[129] Wilde-as-Darwinist is certainly not a difficult portrait to paint; as Helfand and Smith note, Wilde "relied upon science as the soundest guide to methods of social improvement… and turned to the author of *The Origin of Species* for the scientific foundation of his cultural criticism," the authors quoting proof of this view from Wilde's essay "The Critic as Artist," collected in *Intentions* ([1891] 2007):

> Aesthetics are higher than ethics. They belong to a more spiritual sphere. To discern the beauty of a thing is the finest point to which we can arrive. Even a colour-sense is more important, in the development of the individual, than a sense of right and wrong. Aesthetics, in fact, are to Ethics in the sphere of conscious civilization, what, in the sphere of the external world, sexual is to natural selection. Ethics, like natural selection, make life possible. Aesthetics, like sexual selection, make life lovely and wonderful, fill it with new forms, and give it progress, and variety and change. And when we reach the true culture that is our aim, we attain to that perfection of which the saints have dreamed, the perfection of those to whom sin is impossible, not because they make the renunciations of the ascetic, but because they can do everything they wish without hurt to the soul, and can wish for nothing that can do the soul harm, the soul being an entity so divine that it is able to transform into elements of a richer experience, or a finer susceptibility, or a newer mode of thought, acts or passions that with the common would be commonplace, or with the uneducated ignoble, or with the shameful vile. *Collected Works* (204-5)

[129] Helfand and Smith make the same point in their edition of Wilde's Oxford Notebooks, which they published in 1989. In fact, the essay from which I am quoting is reprinted there. The recognition of Wilde's evolutionism and the importance of this aspect of his thought to his artistic output has taken many years to manifest itself, but there are signs it has done so: Ferguson (2009) echoes my reading of "The Critic as Artist" and Wainwright (2011) locates expressions of Wildean evolutionism in *Picture of Dorian Gray*, while Sumpter (2016) looks for Wildean evolutionary theory in "The True Function of Criticism," the version of "The Critic as Artist" published previous to the essay's collection in *Intentions*.

While I agree with Helfand and Smith that this passage clearly shows Wilde's reliance on evolutionary theory, this passage may also explain Brown's image of Wilde as an idealist.

Wilde's notion of 'soul' is clearly an odd one, if we accept that he is describing an aesthetics-driven eugenic program in the passage quoted above. Where 'soul' would normally refer to something definitionally spiritual and non-material, here 'soul' is something like an individual's genetic code, but also recalls faculty psychology in being what Wilde would call during his trials "a sense of beauty, which is the highest sense that I think human beings are capable of."[130] Like the souls which have "attained to that perfection of which the saints have dreamed," Wilde's conception of aesthetics as sexual selection creates "progress, variety and change" that is both external, occurring in one's cultural context, and internal, because aesthetics "belong to a more spiritual sphere" even than ethics. This is already unusual, but Wilde progresses even further than this: much as epigenetics treats certain aspects of our genetic code today, Wilde holds in "The Critic as

[130] I am uncomfortably aware of the dangers of anachronism here. While the term 'eugenic' was coined in 1883 by Francis Galton, the term 'genetic' actually pre-dates it; in its most basic meaning, "of or relating to origin or development" (*Oxford English Dictionary* 2017) the Latinate term was in English use by 1750. It remains in use as a literary term, a 'genetic' study of a text a common book studies critical technique, of which technique Marian Eide's *Ethical Joyce* (2002) is a good recent example. In its biological usage, 'of or relating to common evolutionary origin or ancestry,' the term is in English use by 1860 and Darwin uses the term in the 6th edition of his *Origin of Species* in 1872. Indeed, it is logical to suppose that the current biological usage of 'genetic' was common by 1883, since Galton relies on that meaning in coining 'eugenic.' However, there was no recognition of the existence of a genetic code or use of the term 'gene' as referring to a discrete entity until 1909. In suggesting that Wilde's 'soul' is "something like an individual's genetic code" I am not suggesting that Wildean aesthetics form a precursor to Watson, Crick, Franklin and Wilkin's discovery of DNA in 1953, but I am suggesting that Wilde is knowingly participating in a scientific conversation about the heritability of acquired characteristics. As a result of this I have tried to avoid using the term 'genetic,' preferring 'eugenic' or 'evolutionary' since these are terms that would have been more comprehensible in the period. However, Wilde's thinking seemingly presages some aspects of genetic theory as it was promulgated after his death, and this has not been sufficiently noted as one of Wilde's intellectual contributions to his age.

Artist" that the 'soul' is material and can be done material harm or good through purposive outside influence - it is inborn, but it can be cultivated.[131] His eugenic project will protect the souls of "those to whom sin is impossible" by involving them in a practice of Wildean genitive aesthetics, because the acquired artistic ability to capture and communicate the deeper meaning of phenomenal appearances is a characteristic that can inspire and then be introjected by another in Wilde's theoretical system. Wilde locates the genitive artist's role in the audience's relation to the artist-as-medium in "What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?", and sees the looking relations pertaining thereto much as Lacan understands the mirror stage: as an opportunity to build and then to maintain a special kind of social self-awareness. In "The Critic as Artist" Wilde goes further, discussing the artist's social role in terms of the outcome of the looking relations which will pertain between his work and an audience that is generalized into a diffuse notion of the body politic. If the artist-as-medium engages in genetic labor to potentiate his autogenetic effect on the *ethné*-as-audience, the work of art then becomes an evolutionary link between artist and audience through a mixture of the inheritance of acquired characteristics and an aesthetic version of Darwinian sexual selection. Wilde's post-Reynoldsian theory of artistic looking relations replaces the looking relations pertaining to 'Grand Style' works of art with a genitive scene of ennoblement that effectively reverses the 'chastening' effect of works like the *Greek*

[131] Epigenetics studies genetic change acquired over the course of a lifetime, and there have been some indications that epigenetic change is in some cases heritable, though questions remain. As has been true since Francis Galton coined the phrase, the relationship between "Nature and Nurture" remains complex and inadequately understood.

Slave. This reversal results in a kind of post-Reynoldsian ennoblement that retells in augmented form the 'intentional history' foreseen for Elgin's Marbles by Parliament in 1816. Where the Marbles were intended to ennoble the working classes and engender an English School of art, the Wildean artist's intent is to embody that ennobling effect and to spread it through corporeal means – the artist-as-medium – while also creating works of art that themselves plant the seed of ennoblement in viewers. Careful attention to this idea helps to explain Wilde's unexpectedly fervent advocacy of Dress Reform and widens the scope of Wilde's reformed Reynoldsian assemblage.

This attentional shift explains Wilde's advocacy of Dress Reform because, while Wilde's theory of the artist-as-medium is primarily aimed at men, his work on Dress Reform deals exclusively with women. Women's dress had been a contentious topic throughout the long nineteenth century, as Reynolds' comments on the destructive and unhealthful effects of the "straight-lacing of the English ladies" in his Seventh Discourse show (199). In *Dress Culture in Late Victorian Women's Fiction: Literacy, Textiles, and Activism* (2009), Christine Bayles Kortsch writes that corsets were particularly divisive late in the century:

> This lowly piece of underwear ignited a furor of debate that burned steadily throughout the nineteenth century, reaching its zenith in the 1880s and 1890s. For New Woman novelists entering the fray, the corset could signify just about anything, making the reactions it provoked particularly resonant – and volatile. Since the early Victorian period, dress reformers and doctors had blamed tight-lacing – lacing a corset to extremely small dimensions – for a variety of female maladies, including neurasthenia and consumption. Corsetry was also vilified for its mental and moral risks… people worried that lacing too tightly made

> women vain and trivial. It turned them into slaves to fashion, willing to deform their bodies into a silhouette characterized as unnatural, unhealthy, or, even worse, uncivilized. (56)

The effects of tight-lacing on women being so similar to the effects of exposure to an ennobled artist and his art in their supposed ineluctability, the connection between Wildean aesthetics and Dress Reform quickly becomes more obvious. This relation becomes especially visible if we consider how tight-lacing's physical effects were assumed to be entrained with psychological changes whose sociocultural effects were diametrically opposed to those of Grand Style art. Wilde's contribution to the debate came primarily in the form of his lecture 'On Dress,' in three essays couched as replies to letters received by the *Pall Mall Gazette* in response to that lecture, "Woman's Dress" (October 14th, 1884), "More Radical Ideas Upon Dress Reform" (November 11th, 1884), "The Relation of Dress to Art" (February 28th, 1885) and in a recently-rediscovered essay published in the *New-York Tribune* on April nineteenth, 1885, "The Philosophy of Dress," though he also touches on dress in other lectures and essays. His position informed by his spouse Constance's passion for the subject, a passion shared by a group of other writers for *The Woman's World*, the magazine Wilde edited from 1887-1890, Wilde argued that dress is an opportunity for women to translate the lessons of Wildean genitive aesthetics into the actions of daily life.[132]

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132 For more on Constance Wilde's influence on her husband's attitudes towards dress reform see Clayton 2008, and for an overview of Wilde's tenure as editor of *The Woman's World* see Green 1997. Fish (1913) offers a contemporary's view of Wilde's editorship of *The Woman's World*, and Youngkin (2013) reads Wilde's editorial voice at *The Woman's World* as an extension of his aestheticism that nevertheless had to be modified to accommodate an increased realism associated with the journal and its readers. Youngkin's point is that the editorship was as formative for Wilde as it was for the journal.

As he states in "The Philosophy of Dress," "I hold that the very first canon of art is that Beauty is always organic, and comes from within, and not from without, comes from the perfection of its own being and not from any added prettiness… consequently the beauty of a dress depends entirely and absolutely on the loveliness it shields, and on the freedom and motion that it does not impede" (9). As a good post-Reynoldsian, Wilde suggests that dress be rationalized so that changing, momentary fashion is vanquished, the true and unchanging 'principles of Dress' placed in its stead. In another passage from "The Philosophy of Dress," Wilde lays out these principles of Dress:

> … what I mean by a well-made dress is a simple dress that hangs from the shoulders, that takes its shape from the figure and its folds from the movements of the girl who wears it, and what I mean by a badly made dress is an elaborate structure of heterogeneous materials, which having been first cut to pieces with the shears, and then sewn together by the machine, are ultimately so covered with frills and bows and flounces as to become execrable to look at, expensive to pay for, and absolutely useless to wear. (9)

A Reynoldsian simplicity is clearly of the utmost importance here.[133] Wilde suggests that all clothing should be suspended from the shoulders in consonance with anatomy, noting with horror the necessity of creating "a regular artificial ledge" around the waist in order

[133] The continuity of anti-ornamentalism in nineteenth-century British Hellenism is interesting, and its totalizing reach is on display here. From Reynolds to Wilde we see a highly similar horror of 'meretricious ornament' that is retained by the Modernists and becomes an important aesthetic touchstone for a number of artistic movements in the 20th century. This suggests that the genealogy of 'modernism' may stretch back to Reynolds, or even Winckelmann, and if we consider Winckelmann's ideal (male) beauty and his theoretical approach to the male body as an aesthetic touchstone, we may even have some confidence in calling that genealogy 'queer.' Certainly nineteenth-century British Hellenism has an influence on modernism in this reading.

to suspend long, heavy skirts therefrom, and that clothing should generally take the body's form and proportions as its own (ibid). Thus may Fashion be avoided, and Art attained:

> Fashion rests upon folly. Art rests upon law. Fashion is ephemeral. Art is eternal. Indeed what is a fashion really? A fashion is merely a form of ugliness so absolutely unbearable that we have to alter it every six months! It is quite clear that were it beautiful and rational we would not alter anything that combined those two rare qualities. And wherever dress has been so, it has remained unchanged in law and principle for many hundred years. (9)

Considering Wilde's education and his particular knowledge of classical Greece, the comment on "beautiful and rational" dress having "remained unchanged… for many hundred years" is a clear signal that Wilde has a specific form of clothing in mind.

If in 'Woman's Dress' (October 14th, 1884) Wilde suggests "some adaptation of the trouser of the Turkish lady" and speaks positively of the principle, if not the execution of the divided skirt (171-2), while in the other essays he refers to forms of clothing we have entirely forgotten – doublets, farthingales and vertrugadins – in general he follows Reynolds very closely here in taking us back to classical Greece for his ideal garment. As he states in "Woman's Dress," "from a continuation of the Greek principles of beauty with the German principles of health will come… the costume of the future," the costume of the future in fact coming from the ancient past (173).[134] These 'Greek principles' – that clothing beautify the body beneath – come from Wilde's assumption that the Greeks were

[134] The "German principles of health" Wilde refers to here are likely the strictures of Dr. Gustav Jaeger, a Stuttgart professor of physiology whose book, *Health Culture* (1887), Wilde references in his "Philosophy of Dress." Among other things Dr. Jaeger's argument has to do with clothing material, and Wilde refers to his theories on "the sanitary value of different textures and colors" of wool as important aspects of the combination of art and science in creating the "costume of the future" (9).

best acquainted with the appreciation of the human body in its naked form, which assumption he shared with Winckelmann, and thus that their clothing best expressed that appreciation; Wilde is stating plainly enough that he would have us all wear clothing in the style of ancient Greece, and it is worth returning to Reynolds for a moment to see exactly how closely the student apes the master here. The passage below comes from Reynolds' Seventh Discourse (Dec. 10th, 1776):

> It is in dress as in things of greater consequence. Fashions originate from those only who have the high and powerful advantages of rank, birth, and fortune. Many of the ornaments of art, those at least for which no reason can be given, are transmitted to us, are adopted, and acquire their consequence from the company in which we have been used to see them. As Greece and Rome are the fountains from whence have flowed all kinds of excellence, to that veneration which they have a right to claim for the pleasure and knowledge which they have afforded us we voluntarily add our approbation of every ornament and every custom that belonged to them, even to the fashion of their dress. For it may be observed that, not satisfied with them in their own place, we make no difficulty of dressing statues of modern heroes or senators in the fashion of the Roman armor or peaceful robe; we go so far as hardly to bear a statue in any other drapery.
>
> The figures of the great men of those nations have come down to us in sculpture. In sculpture remain almost all the excellent specimens of ancient art. We have so far associated personal dignity to the persons thus represented, and the truth of art to their manner of representation, that it is not in our power any longer to separate them. (199-200)

While Wilde's Hellenist classicism causes him to substitute Grecian for Roman dress, and Wilde assigns that dress a transcendent quality absent in Reynolds' account, it is noteworthy that both men recognize the necessity of applying their aesthetic theories not just to art, but to clothing.

I have assigned Reynolds the more conservative position in this dissertation relative to Wilde, but in some ways, this is incorrect. Wilde's assessment of Greek Dress is not based on custom as Reynolds' is, but on Law, and Wilde is finally much more authoritative in his materialism than Reynolds is in his idealism. The language of 'eternal law' versus 'ephemeral folly' certainly takes us back to Reynolds' horror of meretricious sensuality and deforming ornament, but for Wilde, the relation of Dress to Art is a relation of closer resemblance than it is for Reynolds, the simplicity of a dress's line and decoration and the beautiful movement of the dress as it is worn exactly analogous to the contingent perfection expressed by the genitive artist in contemplation of the phenomenal world. In this sense Wilde is much more rule-bound than Reynolds, who views all clothing as more or less ephemeral and thus lacking in inherent value. Making Wilde the more normative of the two in this specific instance, it is nevertheless revealing that Wilde's examples of dress all apply to women, while Reynolds' are mostly applicable to men. Wilde's reformed Law of Dress rejects the painful and deforming foundational garments of late nineteenth-century women's fashion and the expensive, wasteful use of fabric, and in doing so it would seem to reform other ares of womens' lives, conferring on women the privilege of personal comfort and conferring on their servants a great deal more freedom from laundry.

Wilde's central dress-form would also seem to offer the prospect of increased financial independence, and the possibility of corporeal freedom, along with the power to act on others and to guide social evolution while retaining reproductive autonomy, thus making both Wilde's activist reformism and his social consciousness quite clear. In other

words, and as Wilde humorously notes in "The Philosophy of Dress," the transcript of an American lecture published in the *New-York Tribune*, women's sartorial liberation will precede and cause social change. In fact, despite Congress, the impending shift has already begun:

> But I know that, irrespective of Congress, the women of America can carry any reform they like. And I feel certain that they will not continue much longer to encourage a style of dress which is founded on the idea that the human figure is deformed and requires the devices of the milliner to be made presentable. For have they not the most delicate and dainty hands and feet in the world? Have they not complexions like ivory stained with a rose-leaf? Are they not always in office in their own country, and do they not spread havoc through Europe?
>
> *Appello, non ad Caesarem, sed ad Caesaris uxorem*. (9)

Wilde's flattery aside, the final Latin tag expresses a great deal of his convictions around Dress Reform. By 'appealing not to Caesar, but to Caesar's wife' Wilde takes the idea that women must be beyond reproach to be considered equal to men and turns it on its head. He implies that by appealing to Caesar's wife he is in fact appealing to the person of higher repute and thus of greater social influence, and while he uses humor to make the point, it is one he took seriously.

This is what is of primary interest in discussing Wilde's attitude towards both Dress and Art, at least from the point of view of Wilde's later reputation and in relation to his trials: the high seriousness of his purpose. He takes a Reynoldsian line in allowing that art can in fact influence its observer's 'soul' but, instead of wishing to enact a nationalist uniformitarianism through that influence, Wilde sees the opportunity to expand the social vision of 'central form' far beyond the lone masculine I, even including the feminine Other.

This is not Wilde the decadent but Wilde the social reformer, more aware than was Reynolds of the violence and isolation inherent to a Procrustean program of art-driven social reform. This is partly why I call his aesthetics 'genitive,' because they are interested in the possession of the self by the self and not by society, and because they are explicitly aimed at the genesis of a new social order. His awareness of the price of conformity made Wilde unwilling to theorize an aesthetic Leviathan in the shape of Grand Style art, but he remained stolidly Victorian in his intellectualized, rationalist, Hellenist vision of the power of art and of Artistic Dress to reform the life of the mind, the heart, the 'soul' and the nation through auto- and ethnogenetic means. This is of a piece with his editorship of *The Woman's World* and with his notebooks, in which Helfand and Smith see a Victorian humanist wrestling with the major thinkers of his day, and it allows us to envision a Wilde that is less egoistic and more socially aware than the caricature of the decadent aesthete he himself helped to create. He also uses Hellenism to imagine women as self-sufficient subjects, certainly to a greater extent than we saw in Winckelmann, Goethe, or Reynolds, and even more so than Mary Shelley's vision of female cultural curatorship in "Euphrasia: A Tale of Greece." Seeing Wilde as a proponent of women's liberation, whether from uncomfortable clothing or from suffocating social strictures, is a vision of Wilde that should be more widely held.

Another vision of Wilde the social reformer, and even the socialist, is visible in Wilde's famous essay, "The Soul of Man Under Socialism" (1891). As the title indicates, it is not as egalitarian in its sexual politics as were Wilde's lectures and essays on Dress

Reform, and in fact it recalls the social landscape of *Strange Case* and of Pater's "Winckelmann" in more than one way. The incessant references to men and men's actions and beliefs in "Soul of Man" recall the near-total focus on "professional men" in Stevenson's novel, and the terms through which individual imbrication in sociality is understood in the two texts are basically identical. Where *Strange Case* depicts Jekyll/Hyde as an individualist at "perennial war" with his assemblage and "among his members" (106), as Jekyll puts it in his final confession, finally unwilling to accede to social pressure and thus brought low, Wilde believes that "scarcely anyone at all escapes" the social pressures that characterize modern life, and that only Socialism will "relieve us of that sordid necessity of living for others which, in the present condition of things, presses so hardly upon almost everyone" (3). This is a sad presaging of his trials, which I will discuss below, and the "necessity of living for others" here carries strong echoes of Pater's "network of Law" that forms the "tragic situation in which certain groups of noble men and women work out for themselves a supreme *Dénouement*" (232). Where a Darwin, a Keats, a Byron or a Shelley may have used his riches and immense creative powers to "realize the perfection of what was in him," enriching himself and the world, Wilde notes that "[T]he majority of people spoil their lives in an unhealthy and exaggerated altruism" wrung from them by the paired forces of ideology and circumstance (ibid). They are "surrounded by hideous poverty, by hideous ugliness, by hideous starvation," compelled to address the surface conditions of life and not their cause: private property (ibid).

The world of 'credit' and reputation we saw in *Strange Case* is in "The Soul of Man Under Socialism" not a setting but a plot, the professionalism of the Uttersons and Lanyons only a more genteel version of the servitude of the poor, their lives as painful as Jekyll/Hyde's death. In "Soul of Man," the kind of charity Utterson shows towards "down-going men" in *Strange Case* is recast as slavery, chaining both rich and poor to an unjust system in which a man's property is his imposed identity and his dutiful burden. In place of *Strange Case*'s nihilistic *dénouement*, however, Wilde envisions an alternative, but one with its own Jekyll/Hyde character: Socialism. Under socialism the immorality and unfairness of the capitalist system will disappear, and the vicissitudes of climate that reared their heads in 1816 and in 1848 will follow. As Wilde writes, "[T]he security of society will not depend, as it does now, on the state of the weather," allowing "[E]ach member of the society" to "share in the general prosperity and happiness of the society" and engendering true individualism by "restoring society to its proper condition of a thoroughly healthy organism," while also giving "Life its proper basis and its proper environment" (5-6). If this socialism is 'Authoritarian,' though, "if, in a word, we are to have industrial Tyrannies," then instead of a second Golden Age we will be in Hell: as Wilde writes, in that case "the last state of Man will be worse than the first" (6).

This doubled aspect of socialism recalls Riquelme's (2000) comments on the relation between *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1890) and Paterian aestheticism. Riquelme argues that Wilde's novel "proceeds against the background of Pater's aesthetic writings" and "provides in narrative form a dark, revealing double for Pater's aestheticism that

emerges from a potential for dark doubling and reversal within aestheticism itself" (2000: 609). I agree, but I would add that *Dorian Gray* is only the most obvious text in which this occurs. In "Soul of Man," it is socialism that is doubled: it is "industrial tyranny" and it is also art's last, best hope. In this way Wilde takes on Pater's historical model and also injects it with a fair amount of gloom, but this begs a question: is Pater's account so rosy? Pater describes a characteristically 'modern' experience of being trapped within webs of signification and 'Law' that form him, and as I note in the third chapter, Pater says that to meet their need for a "sense of freedom" modern artists must recognize that we all now live within that "network of law," which Pater reads as forming a tragic narrative in which perhaps only a noble ending is now possible. That Wilde understands socialism as both a tragedy – industrial tyranny – and as something else suggests that Wilde's thought is as closely tied to Pater's as Riquelme states it is, but not as a dark double; Pater looks forward to a "supreme *Dénouement*," we will see that Wilde's doubled socialism causes him to look towards a new form of individualism, and both acknowledge aestheticism's 'dark side' more readily than Riquelme admits.

Wilde's 'doubled' socialism is also reminiscent of *Strange Case* in its contrast between ideal and deformed, as well as in its somewhat dubious picture of social possibility, and there is another connection to Stevenson's novel in Wilde's comments on the current state of affairs. Discontent, he writes, is natural in a society driven by profit and property, and "the man who would not be discontented with such surroundings and with such a low mode of life would be a brute" (8). Much as *Strange Case* depicts Jekyll/Hyde

in constant friction with their surroundings, Wilde adds that disobedience is "man's original virtue," a means of progress and a "healthy protest," and it is "almost incredible" to Wilde that "a man whose life is marred and made hideous by such laws can possibly acquiesce in their continuance" (8-9). Because he believes that "it is only in voluntary associations that man is fine" (12), neither Reynoldsian normativity, capitalism, nor authoritarian socialism represent true social progress. Instead Wilde proposes a system of capital-I Individualism he believes is already latent in 'mankind,' but has been suffocated to varying degrees by the burden of private property. Wilde's comments on the effects of private property on subjectivity also recall his comments on the fate of the artist in ""What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?", and he notes that even the great artists like Shelley and Byron have had "[H]alf their strength… wasted in friction" with the societies that wished to make them live more for others than themselves, while he asserts that real Individualism is peacefully confident in its purpose (15-16).

Like private property, democracy has been "found out," Wilde writes (23). The "bludgeoning of the people by the people for the people" defeats the goals of Individualism as surely as does tyranny, and finally authority of any kind becomes antithetical to self-fashioning because "by bribing people to conform," authority "produces a very gross kind of over-fed barbarism amongst us" that includes all forms of punishment, of censorship, of starvation and of crime (24). In place of authority, Wilde proposes a government of voluntary association resembling a labor union, and envisions a social landscape in which machines do the work it is impossible for humans to do with real joy. At this point Wilde's

scholarly classicism interjects itself unexpectedly in his comment that "[T]he Greeks were quite right" to assume "that civilization requires slaves," and he states unequivocally that "on the slavery of the machine, the future of the world depends" (28). The world also depends on Art; "Art is Individualism, and Individualism is a disturbing and a disintegrating force" (ibid). Art's "immense value" lies in avoiding "the reduction of man to the level of a machine," even under present, imperfect conditions (ibid). Wilde continues in this vein for many pages; his opinion of the public's effect on the artist is the same as in "What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?", but where in that setting he was concise, in "Soul of Man" he is expansive. The public stands in judgment over Art and jeers at the artist's attempt to authorize himself; in preferring the journalism of scandal and impertinence to the joys of Art the public exercises its authority over the private lives and private thoughts of all to the betterment of none. The arts which have fared best have least caught public attention, poetry first among them, and drama has progressed beyond the level of a "second-rate booth" only because of "a few individual artists refusing to accept the popular want of taste as their standard, and refusing to regard Art as a mere matter of supply and demand" (43-4).

The public have also "clung with really pathetic tenacity to… the direct traditions of the Great Exhibition of international vulgarity" as Wilde calls it, "traditions that were so appalling that the houses in which people lived were only fit for blind people to live in" (48). Nevertheless the general level of taste has risen, because "the craftsmen of things so appreciated the pleasure of making what was beautiful, and woke to such a vivid

consciousness of the hideousness and vulgarity of what the public had previously wanted, that they simply starved the public out" (49). In this odd and ultimately disingenuous fashion Wilde answers the obvious question his opposition of Socialist Individualism to "Industrial Tyranny" first begged: how is society to be shaped so that Individualism may flourish, when "all authority is equally bad" (51)? The answer is simply that "[T]he conditions will be done away with, and human nature will change" (54), but ultimately Wilde's answer in "Soul of Man" is unsatisfying, perhaps because he has already arrived at a better answer elsewhere.

> Man will develop Individualism out of himself. Man is now so developing Individualism. To ask whether Individualism is practical is like asking whether Evolution is practical. Evolution is the law of life, and there is no evolution except towards Individualism. Where this tendency is not expressed, it is a case of artificially-arrested growth, or of disease, or of death. (55)

This unexpected comparison of transcendent subjectivity and human evolution in "Soul of Man" is not so confounding in light of Wilde's "What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?", "The Critic as Artist" and the genitive aesthetic theory I and a growing number of other scholars have discerned there. Wilde's deeply psychological assumption that evolution is progressive and tends towards the development of Individualism clearly shows Wilde's post-Reynoldsian conviction that there is material evolutionary change involved in any increase of public taste. In a moment of enthusiasm at the end of his essay Wilde says that this "new Individualism" will be "perfect harmony," it will be "what the Greeks sought for" and finally he says that it will be "complete, and through it each man

will attain to his perfection," his final conclusion now pregnant with clear and specific meaning: "[T]he new Individualism is the new Hellenism" (62).

Wilde scholar Gregory Mackie points out that "Soul of Man" is remarkable for more than this odd conclusion. "Soul of Man" was published as a book during Wilde's lifetime, the only one of his critical essays to appear on its own until after 1901, and it was published five days after Wilde's sentencing to two years' hard labor after his 1895 trials, which will be the subject of the next section of this chapter. Mackie sees in the essay's vision of individualism a queer anti-normativism whose predecessors include J. S. Mill's concept of individuality as eccentricity in *On Liberty* (1859), and Mackie traces the anti-philistinism in "Soul of Man" to the strong, negative, and highly public reception of *Dorian Gray* in 1890. By "separating equality from sameness" Wilde manages to "imagine a socialist polity," but Mackie also sees anxiety about the linkage between private and public acts in "Soul of Man" – an anxiety that has the effect of elevating "sexual privacy" to the level of "an ethical principle" in an essay written 4 years before Wilde's trials (n.p.). Mackie reads this elevation of sexual privacy to an ethical principle, alongside the publication history of the 1895 edition of "Soul of Man," as proof of the publisher Arthur Humphrey's political support of Wilde during his trials. I will demonstrate in the next section of the chapter that this gesture may have been lost in the maelstrom of moral panic that engendered a number of savage journalistic enfigurations of Wilde-as-deviant during and after his trials, but it is worth remembering him otherwise as we move into the next section of the chapter and the final chapter of Wilde's life as a successful genitive artist.

Wilde's social activism was part of his public persona from his early days as a lecturer, through his short-lived career as editor of the *Woman's World*, and on to his salad days as a successful dramatist, and even as those days were ending in a painful public humiliation, Wilde still had friends who valued him for his social vision rather than his social attainments.

In this section of the chapter I have tried to show that in Wilde as in *Strange Case*, the genitive artist will set us free. Where that freedom is negative in *Strange Case*, represented as actual and social death, in Wilde it is "what the Greeks sought for," the "New Hellenism" coming into being as "each man attains his perfection" through a reformed Baumgartenian self-fashioning that can usher in a new era and a new *ethnos*. The difference between the two is one of orientation; where in *Strange Case* the Individual faces away from the Reynoldsian assemblage in his Knoxian, predestined hurry towards oblivion, Wilde's Individual seeks out intercourse with the Reynoldsian assemblage and in doing so imbues it with new Paterian life, post-Reynoldsian sociality accommodating both the Jekyll-Hydean loner and the Wildean aesthete within an interpenetrating network of law worn as lightly as a Jaeger woolen dress of the future. Despite an impending system of machinic slavery, Wilde's hopes for social change are clearly aroused in "Soul of Man," but when Wilde puts his theories to the ultimate test in 1895, he finds that the Reynoldsian assemblage will not do his bidding. As with Jekyll's "war between my members," Wilde's courtroom fight on behalf of 'The New Hellenism' ends in pain and darkness.

THE WILDE TRIALS: GENITIVE ARTIST V. REYNOLDSIAN ASSEMBLAGE

In this section I will argue that in his trials, we see Wilde attempting to enact his genitive aesthetic theories in exactly the scene he imagined twelve years earlier, in his lecture to the students of the Royal Academy: as an artist on trial for immorality. I will focus initially on the most 'textual' aspects of the trial before leaving the Old Bailey and turning to the newspapers. While I will not perform an extensive analysis of journalistic sources like those that punctuated the last chapter, I will use two examples that frequently star in the critical literature on the Wilde trials to comment on how Wilde was enfigured then, and on the deeper meaning of that enfigurative imposition. I will ask whether the ways we see 'Wilde' are similar to the ways we see ourselves and each other, and if so, what the social effects of this effort might be. Perhaps it is because the first of Wilde's three trials began with a lengthy exercise in literary criticism that the trials have found such a central place in literary-critical approaches to Wilde. Certainly they have been a part of his mythos since the trials concluded, and deservedly so, and I will argue that the trials proffer an opportunity to engage with enfigurative traditions that remain deeply meaningful to contemporary societies, which opportunity has been too-often squandered.

The literary-critical interest of the trials is made obvious by the fact that Edward Carson, the defending counsel who cross-examined Wilde during much of the first of Wilde's three trials and who was also a schoolfellow of his from Trinity College, Dublin, spent a full day and a half – the majority of the two-and-a-half-day proceeding – examining the author's attitude towards various literary works of art, some his own and some not. The

stated purpose was to understand Wilde's reception of various works in order to understand his view of life and thus to plumb his moral compass. In terms of Jarvis' writerly historical poetics these remarks are valuable, inasmuch as that method seeks to know what a writer thinks as the writer works, but I will treat a specific interchange as a metonym for the whole. On the first morning Wilde was asked about Alfred, Lord Douglas' two poems published in a newly-founded Oxford undergraduate magazine, *The Chameleon*, that had circulated the only issue it would ever publish in December 1894, and about a story which accompanied "Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young" in the journal, "The Priest and the Acolyte." This story of an out, pederastic relationship between a young village priest and his 14 year-old acolyte, which ends in their suicide, was written by the journal's editor, John Francis Bloxam (1873-1928). "The Priest and the Acolyte" argues strongly for the exemplary nature of the couple's love for each other and equally strongly against their social censure upon discovery, and mixes religious and erotic imagery very freely. Both in order to create a sense of guilt by association and because he was assumed to have been the guarantor of publication for the nascent journal, Wilde was repeatedly asked both to paraphrase and to critique the poems and the editor's story. Finally he was induced to say that "The Priest and the Acolyte" was "highly improper" (Holland 2003: 68)[135] but strenuously avoided calling it 'blasphemous:'

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[135] For recorded speech during the libel trial I am using Merlin Holland's *The Real Trial of Oscar Wilde* (2003), which is taken from a longhand manuscript displayed for the first time at the British Museum in 2000. As the title indicates, the book purports to give a more or less unedited transcript of the libel trial for the first time, but Moran (2008) sounds a healthy note of caution on this point. Noting that each of the records of the Wilde trials he discusses, Hyde ([1948] 1962), two film versions of the trials from 1960, and

Carson: Did you think the story blasphemous?

Wilde: I thought the end, the account of the death, violated every artistic canon of beauty.

C: That is not what I asked.

W: That is the only answer I can give you.

C: Did you think it blasphemous?

W: How do you mean? I thought it wrong, utterly. Let me say so.

C: Did you think it blasphemous, sir?

W: Yes.

C: I want to see what position you pose in.

W: Now, that is not the way to talk to me - 'to pose as'. I am not posing as anything.

C: Yes, I beg your pardon. I want to see exactly what is the position you take up in reference to this line of publication, and I want to know, sir, did you consider that the story was blasphemous?

W: The emotion produced in my mind when I read the story–

C: Will you answer 'yes' or 'no'?

W: I will answer the question – was that of dislike and disgust.

C: I have a great deal to ask you. Will you answer 'yes' or 'no'. You are a gentleman who understands a question perfectly. Did you or did you not consider that story of 'The Priest and the Acolyte' a blasphemous production?

W: I did not consider the story a blasphemous production.

C: Very well; I am satisfied with that.

Holland (2003) make similar truth claims but diverge in their records of the trials, Moran suggests that claims to total veracity be treated with caution. In his introduction Holland notes that he has "made minor editorial interventions" (xl), which supports Moran's argument. Salamensky (2002) offers a dense discussion of the same issue, but focuses instead on Moisés Kaufman's *Gross Indecency: The Three Trials of Oscar Wilde* (1998) and argues that Kaufman's caution in regard to veracity has made the play less successful as a drama – a point Wilde would have appreciated. Arguing that the trial transcripts themselves should be read as literature, Wan (2011) reads the trials through an emerging sub-discipline of 'law and literature' and places them among Wilde's theoretical essays on art, including "The Critic as Artist." Below I use Hyde ([1948] 1962) for reported speech during subsequent trials, as Holland (2003) only contains the edited transcripts from the libel trial.

> W: I thought it was disgusting.
>
> **C**: When the priest in the story administers poison to the boy, does he use the words of the Sacrament of the Church of England?
>
> **W**: That I entirely forgot. You cannot cross-examine me. I dare say he does. I think it is horrible. The word blasphemous is not my word. I think it is horrible and disgusting.
>
> **C**: It isn't blasphemous?
>
> **W**: It is not the word I use myself, it is a word of yours. (70-71)

This last phrase, and the substantial roles language and ownership played throughout the trials, make this exchange even more interesting.

While he agrees to the characterization of "The Priest and the Acolyte" as blasphemous early in the interchange, before amending his opinion to "horrible and disgusting," 'blasphemy' is indeed not a Wildean word, while 'posing' has an outsized significance here for two reasons. The prosecutorial term, 'blasphemy,' both assumes that language functions according to known, static rules constituting unproblematic social facts and that representation can and should work to extend hegemonic control over ideologically unsound thought. As we have seen in "What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?", for instance in Wilde's advice that the artist paint "not things as they are but things as they seem to be, not things as they are but things as they are not," Wilde uses language very differently, in paradoxical, seemingly flippant, dexterous ways in order to force his listener to think differently, and that *is* Wilde's ideology. To speak of 'blasphemy' would be to jettison his own aesthetic theory and accede to Carson's and the court's, and Wilde's aesthetic 'pose' will not allow this, perhaps because it would break the 'magic circle' he is attempting to construct around himself through his testimony.

Instead Wilde states that Bloxom's story "violated every artistic canon of beauty," which to Wilde is equivalent to blasphemy in that such a violation shows contempt for what Wilde holds most sacred. In accordance with his own understanding of the 'artistic canons of beauty,' Wilde's 'pose' is meant to be expressive of social, moral, and aesthetic meaning, much as that of the *Greek Slave* was, and his answers to the prosecution are part of this 'pose.' However, the status of this word is not wholly his to define, as Carson reminds him by asking "to see what position you pose in." The Marquess of Queensberry has also used the word 'pose' in accusing Wilde of sodomy, as the court well knew, and thus where Wilde uses the word to refer to a practice of truth-telling on his part, Carson and the court define 'posing' as perversity, Wilde's 'pose' of innocence a lie.



Fig. 1: The Marquess of Queensberry's calling card with the inscription "For Oscar Wilde posing somdomite" (sic), which was exhibit A in the Queensberry libel trial, having been left by the Marquess with the hall porter at the Albemarle Club, where Wilde was dining.

Queer studies scholar Moe Meyer (1994), writing about the poetics of camp, suggests that 'posing' in the senses under discussion here has everything to do with what he calls an 'archaeology of camp.' Originating in a French system of gestural acting called Delsartre, Meyer argues that when 'camp' is first found in a slang dictionary in 1909 it is already associated with a homosexual identity it helped to fix as visible and unitary; he assigns Wilde a major role in resurrecting dandyism after his American tour in 1882, with Wilde's major innovation the addition of same-sex desire signified in the dandiacal 'pose' through postural 'camp.' This addition, Meyer writes, allowed Wilde to exceed the act-based ascription of sodomy and create a homosexual identity:

> Beginning in 1886, one can trace the development of Wilde's efforts to formulate (at least on paper) a strategy capable of constructing a sign of identity by objectifying homoerotic desire and situating it on the surfaces of the body of the sexual partner conceived as an art object. Constructing a sign by fixing, stabilizing, and giving permanence to desire was a necessary first step in order to prepare for the appropriation of the sign that would render him as a living work of art while simultaneously bestowing a homosexual identity. The way in which this was accomplished was through a concept of "posing" … By setting up the partner as posed object and himself as subject, Wilde was attempting to establish a sign whose appropriation would play out both the desiring and the desired on the surfaces of his own body, thus freeing him from the relational sodomitical identity capable of expressing homoeroticism only. (82)

Meyer's argument is closely related to the argument queer theorist and cultural historian Alan Sinfield makes in *The Wilde Century: Effeminacy, Oscar Wilde and the Queer Moment* (1994), in which Sinfield argues that before the Wilde trials, male effeminacy was read as an excess of heterosexual desire and of "cross-sexual attachment" (27). Where

Meyer reads Wilde's 'pose' as purposive, the implication in Sinfield's work is that Wilde just *was* effeminate, and that this accident of habitus inaugurated what Sinfield calls "the Wilde century." Sinfield's point about effeminacy is important, and I fully agree that modern assumptions about effeminacy and its links with male homosexuality are exactly that – modern assumptions. However, in light of Wilde's interest in Dress Reform, his aesthetic theory of the genitive artist and his thoroughgoing interest in his own self-presentation, my own reading of Wilde's habitus is more in line with Meyer's assessment of Wilde's practice of 'posing,' Meyer expressing the aesthetic *and* the sociosexual stakes of the courtroom ascription of a "position you pose as" onto Wilde very clearly. Furthermore, Meyer's vocabulary is drawn from semiotics and his comments on "constructing a sign of identity… and situating it on the surfaces of the body of the sexual partner conceived as an art object" link back to my interest in the utility of a semiotic phenomenology of masculinity to investigate the historical poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism. Meyer's point is that Wilde's performative masculinity assumes a social audience and the potential for social change; Meyer is right to understand Wilde's larger project as identitarian, and this informs my reading of the trial transcripts.[136] The

[136] The specter of Judith Butler's concept of performativity is important here in ways that there is insufficient scope to explore. I will make some effort to begin to do so in the concluding section of this chapter, but it should be understood that performance, performativity and Butler's concept of gender inform this project in ways its author is only neginning to understand. As Butler points out in her 1990 *Gender Trouble*, if gender is "a stylized repetition of acts . . . which are internally discontinuous" then "the appearance of substance is precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief" (191-192). The extent to which Wilde or his "mundane social audience" believed in his pose is debatable, but I would argue that his decision to put his pose on trial indicates that he felt it would withstand the pressure better than it (or he?) did.

identitarian Wilde is visible at least from "What Makes an Artist? And What Does an Artist Make?", and the individualism of "Soul of Man" makes Wilde's interest in questions of social identity clear enough, but in the trials he makes this interest a practical program through his own testimony.

Literary scholar and novelist Dennis Denisoff (1999) adds to Meyer's point about the importance of posing at Wilde's trial, noting that Queensberry was also posing: as a concerned father rather than an angry homophobe, and as someone motivated by national concerns, as I will discuss below. Queensberry's 'pose' is particularly interesting because it complicates the assumption that 'camp' or queerness was necessarily the only pose in the courtroom, and this fits well with my argument that enfiguration involves an immanent mimicry. If one's own phenomenological experience of the world must be translated through a semiotic schema not of one's own making in order for experience to become perception, and if interpellation into an ideology of ideal embodiment is thus the essence of enfiguration in the context under discussion, then it should come as no surprise that both Wilde and Queensberry were posing. We are all posing, all of the time, and to some degree we are aware of and able to be strategic in our posturing. This is the basic argument Erving Goffman makes in *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life* (1956), which Butler and others extend in the 1990s, and its importance lies in the possibility that sustained attention to Wilde's pose may help us to understand why he chose to become a player on that particular stage.

In *The Real Trial of Oscar Wilde* (2003) Oscar Wilde's grandson, Merlin Holland, asks why Wilde took part in this trial, which Wilde instigated; Holland writes that "[I]f I could ask my grandfather a single question, it would have to be, 'Why on earth did you do it?'", Holland writes that "one answer would hold the key to so much in his life that is not satisfactorily explained" (xxxiv). Wary of Holland's assessment of the explanatory power of an answer to this "single question" about such a complex figure, I will nevertheless suggest a possible answer. While he wants to prosecute the Marquess of Queensberry for libel, Wilde also wants to adjudicate his aesthetic theory in its logical artistic setting, aligning himself with Phidias as he fights on behalf of the 'New Hellenism.' He wants to recreate that Hellenism in his own society but most importantly, he wants to exemplify that Hellenism himself, through the performative 'pose' he strikes in court. But consider the task Wilde is set by Carson and the Court – to adjudicate the aesthetic value of a work of art – and consider how he is supposed to perform this task: by rehearsing the events represented in the work of art. He does not, perhaps cannot do this, which inability seems to imply an unattractive amorality, but in fact the cross-examination quoted above is a portrait of two men at cross purposes. Carson adjudicates the worth of an artistic production according to whether or not its message is ennobling to the 'ordinary' person, betraying his debt to the most normative aspects of 'Grand Style' aesthetics, while Wilde adjudicates the worth of an artistic production in terms of whether or not its presentation and content engenders evolution in the 'soul' of one receptive to it. Carson relies on the centrality of the normate individual's experience of art, while to Wilde this is the rankest philistinism.

All this is clearly still at issue in the following hours of the trial, where Carson presses Wilde on his opinion on Art, and on the opinions expressed in *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1890). Wilde is asked specifically whether the novel's epigram expresses his opinions on art:

> There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book.
> Books are well written, or badly written.

Wilde says that it does, and in answer to Carson's suggestion that even an immoral book would be 'good' if it were well written he agrees, saying that such a book would indeed be good "if a book is well written, that is if a work of art is beautiful, the impression that it produces is a sense of beauty, which is the highest sense that I think human beings are capable of," adding that were the book badly written, it would only "produce a sense of disgust" (Holland 2003: 80). Carson continues, reading passages aloud and asking Wilde if he feels the sentiments expressed in them are proper or improper and whether an average reader would find them so, especially in terms of their masculine speakers and addressees; Wilde answers that he has no control over the reception of his work by other readers, that he thinks it unlikely that books can influence readers toward good or evil, and that whatever vices readers detect in *Dorian Gray* are probably their own.

As the libel trial wears on its literary aspects become less pronounced, and when the courtroom drama leaves the realm of art and enters the world of actions, Wilde's fate is sealed. Letters from Wilde to various young men are produced and read to the court, and eventually the young men themselves, with the exception of Lord Alfred Douglas, are

called to testify. There is a strong suggestion of blackmail, but Wilde claims even here the protection of Art's "fiery finger," arguing that the papers the young men tried to sell back to Wilde were aesthetic objects rather than documents proving sexual intimacy, but this is a dead letter. A parade of semi-employed youths and staff working in hotels at which Wilde regularly stayed testify to fecal matter left on bedsheets, men kissing each other in public and in bed together, a restaurant meal during which Wilde and another young man repeatedly pass a preserved cherry back and forth between their mouths, and gifts of money and luxury items. The questions of fact, in which there is little to no interpretive latitude, cause Wilde to take refuge in inartistic denials. Soon enough the prosecution sees that their case is impossible and withdraws their charge of libel, vindicating the Marquess of Queensberry and strongly suggesting Wilde's inability to prove the falsehood of Queensberry's accusation of sodomy. Once he is trapped within the court's rhetorical scheme Wilde is not only unable to escape the prison-house of language but, after another set of trials, receives a sentence of two years' hard labor.

The libel trial concluded, Wilde is at liberty for a short period, during which he could possibly have left England for the Continent. He remains, however, and Wilde is arrested and accused of sodomy and gross indecency under Section 11 of the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act, the same 'Labouchére amendment' I suggested might have been on readers' minds in my discussion of Jekyll and Hyde's perverse intimacy. The eyewitnesses and physical evidence from the libel trial supply the impetus for arrest, prosecution, and finally conviction, and the only, momentary stay in the process comes when the jury in

Wilde's second trial is unable to reach a verdict. This is also Wilde's last opportunity to negotiate his own rhetorical emplacement, which he does in a famous speech that may have necessitated the third and final trial. Characteristic of this oddly literary series of trials, it comes during another inquisition into Wilde's opinion of a work of art, this time Douglas' poem "Two Loves." While "The Love That Dare Not Speak its Name" speech is usually quoted out of context, for my purposes it is more apposite to include additional contextual matter from Hyde's trial transcript:

> **G (Charles F. Gill, prosecutor for the Crown)**-- During 1893 and 1894 you were a great deal in the company of Lord Alfred Douglas?
>
> **Wilde**-- Oh, yes.
>
> **G**-- Did he read ('In Praise of Shame,' a poem previously discussed) to you?
>
> **W**-- Yes.
>
> **G**-- You can perhaps understand that such verses as these would not be acceptable to the reader with an ordinary balanced mind?
>
> **W**-- I am not prepared to say. It appears to me to be a question of taste, temperament, and individuality. I should say that one man's poetry was another man's poison!
>
> **G**-- I daresay! The next poem is one described as "Two Loves." It contains these lines:
>
> "'Sweet youth,
> Tell me why, sad and sighing, dost thou rove
> These pleasant realms? I pray thee tell me sooth,
> What is thy name?' He said, 'My name is Love,'
> Then straight the first did turn himself to me,
> And cried, 'He lieth, for his name is Shame.
> But I am Love, and I was wont to be
> Alone in this fair garden, till he came
> Unasked by night; I am true Love, I fill
> The hearts of boy and girl with mutual flame.'

Then sighing said the other, 'Have thy will,
I am the Love that dare not speak its name'."

G--Was that poem explained to you?

W--I think that is clear.

G--There is no question as to what it means?

W--Most certainly not.

G--Is it not clear that the love described relates to natural love and unnatural love?

W--No.

G--What is the "Love that dare not speak its name"?

W--"The Love that dare not speak its name" in this century is such a great affection of an elder for a younger man as there was between David and Jonathan, such as Plato made the very basis of his philosophy, and such as you find in the sonnets of Michelangelo and Shakespeare. It is that deep, spiritual affection that is as pure as it is perfect. It dictates and pervades great works of art like those of Shakespeare and Michelangelo, and those two letters of mine, such as they are. It is in this century misunderstood, so much misunderstood that it may be described as the "Love that dare not speak its name," and on account of it I am placed where I am now. It is beautiful, it is fine, it is the noblest form of affection. There is nothing unnatural about it. It is intellectual, and it repeatedly exists between an elder and a younger man, when the elder man has intellect, and the younger man has all the joy, hope and glamour of life before him. That it should be so the world does not understand. The world mocks at it and sometimes puts one in the pillory for it. (Loud applause, mingled with some hisses.)

Mr. Justice Charles, presiding judge--If there is the slightest manifestation of feeling I shall have the Court cleared. There must be complete silence preserved.

G--Then there is no reason why it should be called "Shame"?

W--Ah, that, you will see, is the mockery of the other love, love which is jealous of friendship and says to it, "You should not interfere."

Here we can see a number of interesting auto- and ethnogenetic negotiations taking place, having to do at once with competing definitions of British Greekness, as well as with

Wilde's emplacement in the court's Reynoldsian assemblage. In fact, "The Love That Dare Not Speak its Name" speech combines most of the themes I have discussed in this dissertation, from its reliance on biblical and classical allusions and on a traditional vision of masculine homosociality to its aesthetic and philosophical warrants. This is particularly true if we read the speech in context.

Wilde's assumption of individualism's definitional aesthetic function is certainly visible in his comment that the interpretation of literature is a matter of "taste, temperament, and individuality," and while "individuality" recalls Wilde's social theory as seen in "Soul of Man," especially in the word 'temperament' we also find echoes of Goethe's praise of Winckelmann's 'temperament,' which, like Wilde, Winckelmann exercised in the company of young men. That Wilde is asked to adjudicate literature by taking on the *weltanschauung* of "the reader with an ordinarily balanced mind" recalls the psychology of Reynolds' 'central form' in a repetition of Carson's questions about blasphemy, and the contrast between 'natural' and 'unnatural' love Wilde refuses to draw is another such repetition. In the "The Love That Dare Not Speak its Name" speech itself we see further proof of the late-century importance of White's 'youthful ancient' in Wilde's genealogy of exemplary homosexual relationships, as in his comments on the artworks those relationships have "pervaded and dictated," and here we also see hints of Paterian sexual history as we see Wilde in constant negotiation with Reynoldsian theory. Wilde cites Biblical, classical, and Renaissance exempla as warrants for his argument much as Reynolds did in the *Discourses*, and in doing so he rewrites Pater's cyclic sexual history

as a continuous undercurrent of creative energy that has driven the course of European culture. In Wilde's nomination of "the love that dare not speak its name" as "the noblest affection" we see another repetition of the Reynoldsian language of ennoblement, and in his total focus on men we see another, but it is worth asking what Wilde's intent is here.

On one level the intent is obvious. Wilde wants to convince the court that 'affection' between men, which he also calls 'friendship,' is both noble and natural. This is the gay-rights reading of the speech, and its very obviousness has made it the most lasting interpretation, and I have already shown that I believe that Wilde's genitive aesthetics tended towards this result. Judging from the applause and the hung jury it is even possible that Wilde was successful in convincing his auditors that pederasty is "the noblest of affections," but Wilde also has other goals. In inserting himself in his own 'intentional history' of European aesthetics Wilde is using every rhetorical strategy he can think of. He is both scholarly enthusiast and upper-class connoisseur, reminding the court of his status both as an artist and as a man of comparative privilege, claiming the latitude to act unconventionally that was associated with both identities throughout the nineteenth century, while also using a modified version of the Shelleyan "We are all Greeks" to imply that he and his listeners share the same 'temperament' through their shared imbrication in British Greekness. In translating 'affection' into 'friendship' Wilde knowingly softens the more invocatory aspects of his Hellenism while retaining an implicit classical frame – Artistotelian *philia* (which itself is not automatically opposed to *eros* in the sense of

sexualized intimacy – Aristotle gives "young lovers" as an example of *philia*[137]) – and in shifting from the intimation that "the world" simply lacks understanding to the more negative accusation of "mockery," Wilde is making it harder for his listeners to identify with the prosecution and easier to identify with him.

In his artistic courtroom 'pose' he also means to signify more than he says, as I have argued. While unlike the *Greek Slave* Wilde is not silent, Wilde does wish to use the specific looking relations pertaining in the space of the courtroom to train his auditors' attention on the operation of State power on his body, on his own use of his body, and on the self-understanding he has of his identity as it is related to his corporeal *potentia*. The court is actively trying not only to *see* "the position" Wilde "poses in" but to change it, imposing the bigoted socioemotional and representational enfiguration of sex between men as deviance onto Wilde. Wilde fights back through his speech, the implication being that in mocking at and pillorying Wilde, the British State is in conflict with British Greekness just as "some Eastern Barbarian" was in the American Section of the Great Exhibition. Wilde, the local representative of Aristotelian *philia* and Platonic *paederastia*, the latest in a long line of gentlemanly connoisseurs with the nation's interests at heart, seeks to install himself as a temporary enfiguration of British Greekness' 'central form' and thus to convince the court to join him and Lord Alfred in an exemplary erotic homosociality, as Dionysius did Damon and Pythias.[138]

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[137] see Hughes 2001:168 n1
[138] see Chapter four, page 30

However well Wilde's famous speech worked on its hearers, the outcome is already known: Wilde was convicted of the charges against him at his third and final trial and incarcerated for two years' hard labor. This outcome meant that in the immediate aftermath of the trials his identity was fixed, the court effectively defining him not as a genitive artistic savior of the British body politic, but as an auto- and ethnogenetic outlaw. In this the court was given ready assistance by the press. As I note above, there is no scope to survey the outpouring of press coverage that resulted when a story that would have been covered in any case as a service to the public, as Upchurch has shown, also included a celebrated and controversial public intellectual, but two representative texts will show the general tone and thrust of coverage.[139] W.E. Henley, the editor of the *National Observer*, wrote in a leading article on April 6th, 1895 (one day after the conclusion of the libel trial) that

> There is not a man or a woman in the English-speaking world possessed of the treasure of a wholesome mind who is not under a deep debt of gratitude to the Marquess of Queensberry for destroying the High Priest of the Decadents. The obscene imposter, whose prominence has been a social outrage ever since he transferred from Trinity Dublin to Oxford his vices, his follies, and his vanities, has been exposed, and that thoroughly at last. But to the exposure there must be legal and social sequels. There must be another trial at the Old Bailey, or a coroner's inquest– the latter for choice; of the Decadents, of their hideous conception of the meaning of Art, of their worse than Eleusinian mysteries, there must be an absolute end.

[139] Arguing that "[H]is advocates and opponents in the French press drew on diverse philosophical, legal, and social traditions in formulating their reactions to the Wilde trials," Erber 1996 offers an interesting account of the French (primarily Parisian) journalistic response to the Wilde trials; Foldy (1997) remains the best account of British journalistic reaction to the Wilde trials.

Henley's comments on Wilde's "worse than Eleusinian mysteries" recalls Wilde's comments on "the other love" and my own on the continuing tension between "friendship" and "central form" in nineteenth-century British Hellenism, and show that Wilde, like Winckelmann, was a figure whose significance is complex and multiple. In an article entitled "Over-Toleration," the *St. James Gazette* of May 27th also commented on Wilde's final conviction, though without the suggestion that Wilde kill himself. The article states that "while tolerance is one of the distinctive virtues of the modern world," the 'New Tolerance' has overstepped its mark, this "too-liberal" ideology making "everything an open question"; even though the "perverted criminal" Wilde has been given his "heavy but well-deserved sentence," the anonymous author here states that British society is left with a "little sting of self-reproach" at having allowed its traditional liberalism to overstep its proper bounds. Nevertheless there is hope: "[T]he painful and scandalous exposure of these weeks may do something to bring back a dash of wholesome bigotry into our art, our literature, our society, our view of things in general," this 'wholesome bigotry' reviving "the intolerance without which a nation goes into collapse."

It is well to be cautious of one-note responses to complex events, however. Michael Foldy, historian of late-Victorian society and author of *The Trials of Oscar Wilde: Deviance, Morality, and Late-Victorian Society* (1997) argues that "[F]rom a historical perspective, the Wilde trials should be seen as one in a long line of (mostly) sex-related scandals involving important persons" in the 1880s and 1890s whose importance to newspapers had everything to do with boosting circulation (50). As I noted in the previous

chapter, this is only a partial account; London newspapers had long covered court cases related to sex between men, and the Wilde trials have to be placed in that context as they do in Foldy's genealogy of celebrity scandal. Foldy also shows that mine is a partial account by demonstrating that a newspaper's attitude towards the Wilde trials was closely tied to its readership; where *The Echo* told its middle-class readership that "the best thing for everybody now is to forget all about Oscar Wilde, his perpetual posings, his aesthetical teachings, and his theatrical productions… let him go into silence, and be heard of no more" (11 April 1895, quoted in Foldy 1997: 52), the *Illustrated Police News*, which Foldy asserts was aimed "(theoretically) at an uneducated working-class readership" (ibid) did the opposite. Taking Wilde's own experience as their focus, the writer for the *Illustrated Police News* instead described the trial as "the most gruesome tragedy in the world" and laments that "a man whom a month ago thousands would have been glad to have known, a man who was fawned and cringed to and lionized by many, today stands without a friend in the world" (4 May 1895, quoted in Foldy 1997: 52). However useful this cautionary note about readership, and the examples of sympathetic coverage, it remains true that as Foldy writes, "public support for Wilde was virtually non-existent" (59).

Where the *St. James Gazette* argues the courts have saved the nation from 'over-toleration,' the *National Observer* thanks the Marquess of Queensberry on behalf of the entire "English-speaking world," but both tend toward the same point. In enfiguring Wilde as "the High Priest of the Decadents," as an "obscene impostor" whose claims to genitive artistic personhood have constituted "a social outrage" endangering the *ethnos*, and in

comparing the "perverted criminal" with a person "possessed of the treasure of a wholesome mind," the newspaper accounts I have quoted from enfigure Wilde as a deformed Hydean degenerate and any tolerance of him as a momentary fashion, the ephemerality of his ennoblement proof of its anti-Reynoldsian effects. The terms by which this enfiguration is formed are themselves revealing: the John Bullian paradigm of "wholesome bigotry" is also the proper British Greekness of one opposed to Wilde's "worse than Eleusinian mysteries," and Wilde's nomination as an emblem of obscene imposture is both a negative enfiguration of his invocative courtroom 'pose' and an argument against his very existence. If this seems overblown, it should be recalled that the purpose of the libel trial Wilde initiated against the Marquess of Queensberry was explicitly social-definitional: in arguing that the Marquess of Queensberry's calling card constituted libel, Wilde was arguing against the Marquess' enfiguration of him as a deviant. The famous calling card through which this enfiguration was formed read "To Oscar Wilde, posing somdomite," and in seeking to define Wilde, it drew him into a disastrous act of self-definition afterward answered in kind by the press.

Indeed, during the course of the libel trial, the calling card left with the porter at the Albemarle shifts from being defined as a scurrilous attack on a British gentleman's good reputation to being defined as an act of civic patriotism. Since the Libel Act of 1843, a successful defense against an accusation of libel required not only that those accused of libel prove the truth of their assertion, but also that they prove that their assertion was published to the public benefit. This combination of truth and public benefit is precisely

what Wilde's prosecution was unable to disprove. Indeed, multiple figures explicitly placed the subsequent trials in this context, starting with Queensberry, who said to Wilde after the conclusion of the libel trial, "If the country allows you to leave, all the better for the country," adding that "if you take my son (Alfred, Lord Douglas) with you, I will follow you wherever you go and shoot you" (Hyde 1962: 149). As I note above, the importance of a 'pose' is not just Wilde's: Queensberry goes from being a Hydean figure whose actions endanger a gentleman's good name to a Jekyll whose exposure of Hyde allows him re-entry into the 'magic circle' of his own Reynoldsian assemblage, the aristocracy, while Wilde's social evolution is reversed. Where the Marquess of Queensberry is owed a debt of gratitude, Wilde is owed an "absolute end," the "social outrage" of over-toleration ending too in a "dash of wholesome bigotry" inflicted and celebrated by the twinned harpies of the press and the judiciary. Like the Cochranite in the *Punch* cartoon, Wilde's meaning is fixed, his previous imposture and sudden downfall proof of his degeneracy, but unlike that figure, both identity *and* punishment were imposed on Wilde.

Finally, his art's "fiery finger" could not save Wilde, and he came to form another example of "the serfdom of this world," like Euphrasia and Constantine a funerary monument to the dangers of a frontal assault on the somatic norms of British Greekness. He was replaced by the opposing term in the Gehrkean oppositionality[140] I have shown has so often been inherent to British Greekness' 'battle myth' of existence, Wilde's judicially-

[140] See Chapter three, page 40

imposed Otherness conferring on the state "the treasure of a wholesome mind," despite Wilde's supposed Otherness being almost totally divorced from Wilde's actual character or identity. Instead both Marquess and martyr are enfigured wholly in relation to Wilde's erotic choices and the Marquess of Queensberry's opposition thereto, and the contraposition of Lord Alfred Douglas' father and his male lover, with Wilde in the middle, finally place all three in a mythic account of phenomenal existence that is an exaggerated, dramatized version of the felt experience of enfigurative reality. In this as in every example I have shown of enfiguration throughout this dissertation, the 'truth' of such enfigurative assertions is an absent presence, contained between the *tick* and *tock* of narrative possibility but never explained thereby, much like the contents of Jekyll's youthful 'gaiety.' And, much as Jekyll's attempt to impose a ceasefire on the "perennial war among my members" by becoming Hyde finally destroys him, the British state's attempt to control the foremost member of the post-Reynoldsian assemblage forces Wilde to attempt a courtroom redefinition of 'Grand Style' aesthetics before "the other love" who says "you should not interfere" claims victory, and Wilde is ejected from the garden.

CONCLUSION: THE NECESSITY TO GO ON SPEAKING

Winckelmann's enthusiastic movement from rural Prussian poverty to Italian antiquarianism and Wilde's transferal of "his vices, his follies, and his vanities" from Ireland to England are physical changes in location, but their meaning in each case inheres elsewhere: in the bodies and the bodily capacities, both sexual and intellectual, of the men who make the journey both as they describe them, and as they are described afterwards by

others. In Hemans' *Modern Greece* and in the parliamentary report on the Parthenon Marbles, this quality is not simply inherent to what Eliot and Schopenhauer called the objective correlative thereof – the masculine speaker's body, bodily capacities, or the masculine assemblage's patrimony – but occurs in the process of its assignation by an onlooker. The looking relations pertaining between multiple figures create an enfiguration that is entrained in historical poetics, Hyde the other-within serving in stead of the state in *Strange Case*, and Wilde the other-without seeking to speak on the state's behalf during his trials.

That these examples are largely drawn from men's artistic creativity is apposite and purposeful, though throughout this dissertation I have tried to include women's voices both as artists and as critics. I note in the second chapter how women used alternative musea to gain entrance to the temple of Greek mythopoetics, and how Hemans and Shelley promote romantic Hellenism with as much fervor as their male counterparts, but there are problems. This project, reclamatory of some women's social experience though it is, nevertheless locates women's position in the Reynoldsian assemblage as being one of equipoise between endangerment at the hands of men and ennoblement at the hands of men. I think that fact best explains why the final image of the second chapter was of an anonymous woman, identified only by her relationship to men, her body contained between men in a snow-bound carriage as though the narrative 'tick' and 'tock' of her entire existence were masculine, just as Euphrasia's is despite the female authorship of her tale. In the third chapter I noted that the *Greek Slave* was powerful over men, just as Victoria was powerful

over her nation, but even there the powerful woman is represented as such while remaining in a subordinate relation to a male figure, whether he is Prince Albert or "some Eastern Barbarian," while in the previous chapter as in this one, we have seen women only as they are seen by men. My favorite woman remains the Billingsgate figure from the Bull print, her angry immodesty marking the most direct intervention in nineteenth-century British Hellenism prior to Wilde's, but most of the women authors I have discussed in this dissertation resemble the women of Moulton-Barret's *Seraphim*, contained within a masculinist imaginary whose female author locates her right to write between "man's ideal," Aeschylus' *Prometheus*, and "God's divine."

Like the distance between these masculine enfigurations, the distance between Bull's wife and the Billingsgate woman brings up the final questions this dissertation will explore by way of a conclusion. There is a distinct historical poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism and it is masculine, homosocial, highly normative, and while it accommodates sexual homosociality from its origins to its final flowering at the Wilde trials, it does so through exceedingly disjunct means. The poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism are focused on accomplishing Haraway's 'God-Trick' through constant reification of what Puwar calls "the maleness of the state," and the difficulty of this poetic program, as well as its partial success, can be seen in Wilde's comments on the shield of Athena Parthenos. In the image of "two figures; one of a man whose face is half hidden, the other of a man with the godlike lineaments of Pericles" we see not only the intense desire for homosocial intimacy but the cost: the man "whose face is half hidden," Phidias,

dies for depicting "the godlike lineaments" of another man in the wrong social setting. This recalls Byron's comments on Elgin's 'classical taste' and Haydon's and Keats' surveillance of "two common looking decent men," and ties together the normative ethnogenetic purpose of Reynoldsian scopo-sociality with the frequent expressions of Islamophobia, misogyny, and moral panic in response to men's sexual homosociality we have seen repeatedly in this dissertation. Accomplishing the 'God-trick' while seeking to naturalize the "maleness of the state" requires an underlying supplementary relation between "the godlike lineaments" of whichever emblem of the Reynoldsian assemblage is currently visible and whichever Other is most proximate, the non-Person "whose face is half hidden" bearing the cost of the hegemon's Periclean ennoblement.

That this image also refers back to the Parthenon Marbles is especially apposite, because they are an incredibly important part of the historical poetics of nineteenth-century British Hellenism, which I have shown supplied the underlying logic for a number of attempts to monumentalize British Greekness. After their parliamentary purchase, the 'Elgin' Marbles symbolized the British victory over Napoleon that ensured Britain's nineteenth-century global dominance while also enabling Britain to claim a historiographic tradition that explained that dominance, and this remarkably material instance of cultural appropriation helps to explain why both ethno- and autogenetic personhood rely on patterns of appropriation and imposition that remain powerful today. The connective disjunction between I and Other is overcome in the moment the I takes the Other's eyes to see with, directing the Other's gaze inward while controlling the Other's outward appearance

through the force of repetitive representation, which I have called enfiguration. The journalistic accounts of Wilde's trial do this most clearly where they council suicide, but describing Wilde as the "high priest of the Decadents" does much the same thing, though less poisonously. The opposite is also true; the connective disjunction between I and Other is also overcome when the Other accedes to the I's vision of sociality and takes on the supplemental relation to the I and internalizes it. One lesson from *Strange Case* is appropriate here, in that Stevenson's novel confronts us with one of the uncomfortable truths constantly elided in the enfigurative tradition of nineteenth-century British Hellenism: internalized oppressions will out, like a natural disaster shattering the order on which Reynoldsian scopo-sociality depends, and this is another aspect of nineteenth-century British Hellenism that, while not distinctly its own, is nonetheless characteristic: a cycle of breakage and repair.

I would argue that none of the seeming 'breaks' in enfigurative tradition I have narrated here – the 'ennobling' potential of the Parthenon marbles, the educative potential of women's alternative musea, Powers' *Greek Slave*, Browning's "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave," Pater's classical spirit, Stevenson's reference to Damon and Pythias, the Wilde trials – ever actually escape the historical-poetic loop set up by nineteenth century British Hellenism's foundational text, Reynolds' *Discourses*. They recombine elements or emphasize aspects of an enfigurative tradition, sometimes opposing earlier enfigurations as stand-ins for the enfigurative tradition itself as "Euphrasia," *Modern Greece*, and "Hiram Powers' Greek Slave" do, but these never seem to undermine the concept of central

form. As this project has demonstrated, the masculine somatic norm is exceedingly difficult to shake. Both Puwar and Haraway know this, and perhaps they can offer a solution to the problem I have so carefully documented. Haraway's vision of a "menagerie" of posthuman "configurations" offers some possibilities, not being focused on either the human or the masculine, but what I think is of greatest utility about this particular image is not its posthuman configuration, but the fact of the 'menagerie.'

I have tried to show in previous chapters that the solitude of the masculine somatic norm is the ur-enfiguration of Enlightenment subjectivity – we see it in Baumgarten's subject, Byron's hero, Winckelmann's scholar, Wilde's genitive artist, Pater's aesthete and Knox's scientist – and this helps to explain both why *Strange Case* remains so psychologically available to readers, and why Wilde's trials were a series of exercises in homophobic literary criticism. But we have already seen a break here, too, in the Reynoldsian assemblage, which suggests that even groups of men retain fealty to Man, and in mixed groups like the magic circle around the *Greek Slave*, Man can even be transposed onto groups of women, making them "hover together as if to seek protection from the power of their own sex's beauty" (26). Instead the solitude of the masculine somatic norm must be replaced by an assemblage whose fealty is not to a central, unachievable somatic form but to communitarian forms of *behavior*, like the *namaz* Puwar describes listening to in Trafalgar Square in 2001. We must relinquish being and rely instead on doing, and learn to live in process rather than live for (and learn to be) products. To get away from the surface, as *Strange Case* and Wilde have taught us, you need to attend not to how things

look, but how they feel; our societies' and our own socioemotional patternings of proprioceptive inputs need to focus not on boundaries and exclusions but on already-existing interpenetrations, and to celebrate them.

To do so requires that we work towards a heightened, reflexive awareness of how enfigurative traditions drive the imposition of socioemotional scripts onto proprioception. Adrienne Rich's "Notes Towards a Politics of Location" (1984) offers helpful advice here that takes me back to my intellectual roots in second-wave antihumanist feminism:

> The absolute necessity to raise these questions in the world: where, when, and under what conditions have women acted and been acted on, as women? Wherever people are struggling against subjection, the specific subjection of women, through our location in a female body, from now on has to be addressed. The necessity to go on speaking of it, refusing to let the discussion go on as before, speaking where silence has been advised and enforced, not just about our subjections, but about our active presence and practice as women. We believed (I go on believing) that the liberation of women is a wedge driven into all other radical thought, can open out the structures of resistance, unbind the imagination, connect what's been dangerously disconnected. Let us pay attention now, we said, to women: let men and women make a conscious act of attention when women speak; let us insist on kinds of processes which allow more women to speak; let us get back to earth - not as paradigm for "women," but as place of location. (10)

As Rich says with characteristic eloquence, there is a "necessity to go on speaking… where silence has been advised and enforced," and much of this project has been concerned with a better understanding of *how* this advisement and enforcement has and continues to take place. I think that is, finally, the purpose of a theory of enfiguration. I fully agree with Rich that "the liberation of women is a wedge driven into all other radical thought" and I can only hope that she is right that a sustained attention to how women have been kept from that liberation, how that liberation has been defined away as something pertaining not even

to men but to Man himself, the lonely hegemon, will foster change. I agree too that earth is our location, and not a symbolic stand-in for the supplementary non-identities required by hegemonic masculine enfigurations of Man. Taking earth as our place of location, our shared stage on which we play out a drama whose script we could write ourselves but seldom do, re-centers the here-and-now as our primary object of inquiry. Taking our shared imbrication in an anthropocenic tragedy unfolding on an ecological level is only the first and most necessary order of business in that re-centering operation and, as I hope to have shown in the preceding pages, sometimes we will have to look back to our past in order to see the way forward.

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