The Dissertation Committee for Zekiye Ayca Arkilic Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

Between the Homeland and Host States: Turkey's Diaspora Policies and Immigrant Political Participation in France and Germany

Committee:

Gary P. Freeman, Supervisor

Terri E. Givens, Co-Supervisor

Robert G. Moser

Raúl L. Madrid

Sultan Tepe

Between the Homeland and Host States: Turkey's Diaspora Policies and Immigrant Political Participation in France and Germany

by

Zekiye Ayca Arkilic, B.A.; M. European.Studies.; M.A.; M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

August, 2016

Dedication

Bu doktora tezini canım aileme ithaf ediyorum.

Acknowledgements

dinners, concerts, and long walks in London and Oxford. I would like to extend my thanks to Yasir Suleiman of the Cambridge Center for Islamic Studies for allowing me to present my research to a group of young scholars and for inviting me to contribute to an edited volume. Parts of my concluding chapter are based on a book chapter published in this edited volume.

I am also indebted to many colleagues and friends, who gave me useful insights and perspectives. In particular, I thank Adam, Bill, Chang, Danilo, Emma, Hüseyin, Hyobin, Jessica, John, Kai-Ping, Kyle, Luke, Matt, Ömer, Pete, Rachel, Randy, Rodolfo, Ryan, Sophia, and Victoria. My *hermana* Mine never hesitated to be there whenever I needed her. My friends outside of graduate school, Beliz, Elif, Emine, and Miray, also deserve special mention.

I feel the deepest gratitude of all to my wonderful family. Being born into such a loving family is the best luck of my life. I particularly thank my parents Ayşe and Necati for always being by my side. I thank my siblings Tunca, Günça, and Güven for making me feel so strong and supported in life. Our funny phone, Facebook, and Whatsapp conversations almost always make me start my day with a good laugh. I also would like to extend my thanks to Ada, Derin, Erhan, Muharrem, Irmak, and Rıfat for joining our family and for making our life more fulfilling. Finally, I thank Felix for being the best partner I could ever ask for. His compassion, patience, and love never cease to amaze me. I look forward to many more years of joy and adventure together.

Between the Homeland and Host States: Turkey's Diaspora Policies and Immigrant Political Participation in France and Germany

Zekiye Ayca Arkilic, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2016

Supervisor: Gary P. Freeman

Co-Supervisor: Terri E. Givens

Abstract: This dissertation analyzes why sending states develop specific diaspora outreach policies and how those policies affect the political participation of immigrant organization leaders in host countries. I theorize and empirically test the propositions that diaspora outreach policies are a growing and significant preoccupation of sending states and that they play a pivotal role in motivating immigrant leaders to participate in host state politics. I argue that sending states influence immigrant political participation through the "diaspora empowerment" mechanism, which reshapes immigrant organizations leaders' identification and capabilities. More specifically, sending states instill a sense of self-efficacy, collective identity, and group consciousness in the leaders of immigrant organizations and provide them with technical, financial, and legal support. I test my hypotheses through an extensive analysis of Turkey's relations with expatriate umbrella organizations operating in France and Germany, two countries that are the

leading recipients of Turkish immigrants in Western Europe. My analysis shows that origin states may apply a multi-tiered diaspora policy based on the size and the loyalty of immigrant organizations. This differential treatment affects the frequency and form of immigrant political activism oriented toward host states. I conclude that the leaders of immigrant organizations are more likely to be receptive to the sending state's diaspora policies if they hold strong grievances toward their host state. Greater grievances lead to greater receptivity because they encourage immigrant leaders to identify with the sending state rather than the host state. My findings draw from secondary literature, content analysis of organizational and governmental reports, semi-structured in-depth interviews, participant observation, and survey research.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter One: Introduction

In February 2008, 200,000 Turks gathered in Cologne to hear Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan speak.[1] "The Turkish people are people of friendship and tolerance," he said. "Wherever they go, they bring only love and joy (…) Turkey is proud of you!" (*Der Spiegel*, February 11, 2008). Three years later, at another rally in Germany, he added: "You are my fellow citizens, you are my people, and you are my friends. You are my brothers and sisters. You are part of Germany, but you are also part of our great Turkey (…) Integrate yourselves into the German society but do not assimilate (…) Assimilation is a crime against humanity (…) No one has the right to deprive us of our culture and our identity" (*Der Spiegel*, February 28, 2011).

These words reflect Turkey's growing interest in its expatriates since the early 2000s. Turkey is among the world's top ten emigration countries (World Bank Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2011, 20). Large-scale Turkish emigration to Western Europe started in the early 1960s as a result of short-term labor recruitment agreements signed between the Turkish and various European governments. The first agreement was with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961. It was followed by similar agreements with Austria (1964), Belgium (1964), the Netherlands (1964), France (1965), Sweden (1967), Switzerland (1971), Denmark (1973), and Norway (1981) (İçduygu 2009). Even though

---

[1] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan served as Turkey's Prime Minister between 2003 and 2014.

the economic downturn of the 1970s caused by the 1973 oil crisis brought the demand for Turkish workers to a halt in Europe, most of the guest workers had already obtained residency permits by then (Akgündüz 2008). The introduction of lenient family reunification and asylum policies once again increased the inflow of Turkish immigrants to European countries, this time spearheaded by spouses and dependents (Martin 1991). By the mid-1980s, policy-makers in Turkey and Europe came to realize that Turks were no longer temporary guests (Messina 2007).

Today, the Turkish community living abroad amounts to 5.3 million, of whom approximately 4.6 million live in Western European countries, 300,000 in North America, 200,000 in the Middle East, and 150,000 in Australia (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). As Table 1.1 shows, it is estimated that out of France's 4.7 million Muslims, some 440,000 are of Turkish descent. Of Germany's 4.8 million Muslims, the Turkish population numbers around 3 million.

Table 1.1: Turkish Population in Western Europe

Country	Turkish Population
Germany	3,000,000
France	440,000
Netherlands	390,000
Belgium	250,000
Austria	205,000
United Kingdom	200,000
Switzerland	120,000
Denmark	60,000
Sweden	60,000
Norway	16,000
Finland	10,000
Total	**4,651,000**

Source: Erdoğan (2013a)

Given the significance of Turkey as a sending country of largely Muslim immigrants to Europe, and the fact that Turks are a very large presence in Germany and France, this study will focus on Turkey and its diasporas in Germany and France. Despite the large numbers of their citizens living in Western Europe, the Turkish government has for years either ignored the members of the diaspora or viewed them with suspicion.

Over the last two decades however, Ankara's relationship with its diaspora community has entered a new stage, as evidenced by the promotion of a more inclusive discourse addressing Turks abroad and a series of initiatives to extend the government's sway over its diaspora. Since the early 2000s, Turkish officials have begun to pay regular visits to European capitals to appeal to Turkish nationals. Moreover, Turkey has increased the size and the budget of the existing state institutions playing a key role in the area of diaspora affairs, introduced external voting, and extended the provision of a wide

range of social security benefits to the Turkish population abroad. Turkey's diaspora policy-making has gained momentum after the formation of the Presidency for Turks and Relative Communities (*T.C. Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı*, YTATB), an over-arching diaspora institution established in 2010. In the last few years, Ankara has created other institutions geared toward the construction and administration of a more ambitious diaspora policy, such as the Yunus Emre Foundation and the Office of Public Diplomacy.

The questions I seek to answer with respect to the Turkish government's policy toward its nationals living abroad are: what accounts for the relative neglect, even contempt, with which the government in Ankara treated its expatriates in the immediate aftermath of World War II and what accounts for its turnabout in the last decade? I answer these questions by focusing on the goals and incentives of sending states to develop diaspora policies and the reverberations of those policies for the political engagement of immigrant organizations in their host countries.

My approach incorporates each of the important aspects of the analytical problem. The principal dependent variable in this study is organizations formed by immigrants in the host society. More specifically, I am interested in the rate and form of the political participation of those groups. The independent variables are (1) the diaspora policy of the sending state, (2) the policies of the host state, and (3) the characteristics of the diaspora groups. I draw on an extensive analysis of Turkey's relations with expatriate umbrella

organizations operating in the two countries that are the leading recipients of Turkish immigrants, France and Germany. I theorize and empirically test the propositions that diaspora outreach policies are a growing and significant preoccupation of sending states and that they are a primary factor in discouraging or motivating immigrant organizations to participate in host state politics. Furthermore, they have the ability to shape diaspora political life in directions beneficial to the sending state. With respect to host states, I show that the grievances of the leaders of immigrant organizations toward their host states augment their receptivity to diaspora policies. Greater grievances lead to greater receptivity.

Next, I present my core argument in detail. I then define the main concepts used in this study, explain the operationalization of my variables, and present my research design. I conclude by providing an overview of the dissertation.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

Immigrant political participation in destination countries has become the subject of considerable interest recently, motivated in substantial measure by the growing size of immigrant communities and concern about failures of integration in light of terrorist attacks launched in Europe by Muslims settled in European cities.

Broadly speaking, this phenomenon has been explored from three theoretical perspectives, none of which is very well developed. The first is individual- and group-

based accounts that focus on specific characteristics of immigrants, including class, immigration history, socio-economic status, ethno-cultural factors, and social capital[2] (Castles 1986; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Tillie and Slijper 2007). The institutionalist school, on the other hand, asks how host countries' citizenship and integration regimes, church-state relations, and forms of government create opportunities or obstacles for immigrants to engage in political participation (Brubaker 1992; Ireland 1994; Thränhardt 2000; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Fetzer and Soper 2005). A third approach suggests that immigrant groups' psychological frustrations and collective perceptions of their status in their host country's ethno-racial context determine the degree of political mobilization (Olzak 1992; Esser 1999; Yalaz 2014, 2015).

These accounts have their uses but fall short of explaining *why*, *how*, and *when* some immigrant organizations participate in host country politics at higher levels than other immigrant organizations. Or they cannot explain why the same ethnic groups are active in one country but inactive in another.

As many emigration states have gradually developed more interest in their expatriates since the 1980s, the literature has turned to the transnational ties of immigrants to their homelands (Bauböck 2003). Objecting to the presumption of a clear dichotomy between origin and destination states, scholars have explored how states

---

[2] An OECD report (2015, 103) defines social capital as networks, shared norms, and relationships that facilitate co-operation within or among groups. Social capital can take many forms, including bonds that link family, close friends, and people who share ethnicity or culture; bridges that link distant friends, colleagues, and associates; and linkages that link people or groups with those at the upper or lower level on the social ladder. According to this definition, immigrant organizations with more networks are expected to be more successful in political integration.

respond to the transnational activities of immigrants. They have looked at how immigrants' political and economic participation in their home country, such as memberships in hometown associations or involvement in homeland-oriented conflicts, may affect their political integration in destination countries (Freeman and Ögelman 1998; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Portes et al. 2007; Morales and Morariu 2011). Another strand of the literature has addressed how and why states form and implement diaspora policies to cultivate closer ties with their diaspora groups (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Smith 2003; Brand 2006; Ragazzi 2014).

Despite their merits, these accounts either treat the origin country merely as a proxy that mediates the effects of other factors pertinent to the host country and immigrant population or fail to identify how diaspora policies influence immigrant political participation. I aim to fill this gap in the literature by studying Turkey's shift from a passive to pro-active set of diaspora policies and its consequences for the political mobilization of Turkish umbrella organizations in France and Germany.

Turkey's efforts aimed at the Turkish population abroad have accelerated with the Justice and Development Party's (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* AKP) rise to power in 2002. I suggest that domestic factors have played the most significant role in shaping Turkey's diaspora agenda. I examine the domestic dimension both as an independent factor and also in relation to transnational and international factors (Délano 2011). More specifically, I show how the configuration of a new economic and political elite has

changed the ways in which Turkey interacts with its transnational diaspora, and defines and perceives its international position vis-à-vis European countries.

Since remittances make up only 0.1 percent of Turkey's GDP (World Bank 2016), Turkey's current diaspora agenda is not driven by economic motives. Moreover, today Turkish immigrants are largely skilled workers and university students rather than low-skilled workers and political dissidents (Köser-Akçapar 2009). Therefore, Turkey is no longer interested in controlling subversive political dissidence.

Turkey's current emigration agenda is driven mainly by political and symbolic goals. Politically, Turkish officials have developed a keen interest in advancing the "social capital upgrading" of Turkish citizens. The incumbent government has begun to view Turkish expatriates as a key lobby group that would mobilize support for Turkey's EU bid (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Bilgili and Siegel 2011, 2013), promote Turkey's image abroad as a powerful country, and take action against host state policies that are considered to be harmful to the homeland's interests, such as the recognition of the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 as genocide.[3] Additionally, Turkey's diaspora outreach policies have aimed at consolidating the AKP's political presence by attracting absentee votes. Symbolically, Turkey's outreach efforts have sought to extend the state's legitimacy and "soft power" beyond its borders (Aydın 2014; Öktem 2014).

---

[3] The Turkish state rejects the referral of the mass killings of Armenians as genocide. While Turkish officials acknowledge that scores of Armenians had been killed in 1915, they argue that an equal number of Ottoman Turks had also been killed amidst the brutal conditions of World War I and that the killings did not intend to massacre the entire Armenian population. The Turkish state addresses the Armenian killings as "the so-called genocide," "the 1915 events," or the "Armenian problem."

I argue that Turkey's shift from a passive to pro-active diaspora policy has triggered the political participation of Turkish immigrant organizations in France and Germany. Drawing on the social psychology and social movements literature, I argue that the ways in which sending states engage with their expatriates play a key role in determining immigrant groups' political participation in host countries. Sending states influence immigrant political participation by reshaping immigrants' *identification* and *capabilities*.

More specifically, I argue that Turkish policy-makers have initiated a process of "identity work" with the propagation of a new diaspora discourse that extols Turkish expatriates as hard-working, competent, and harmonious people. Turkey's positive and inclusive discourse (Collyer 2013) has restructured Turkish immigrant organization leaders' previously marginalized identities and boosted their perceptions of self-worth, self-efficacy, and collective efficacy. Turkish bureaucrats have also instilled feelings of collective identity among immigrant organizations by appealing to common values and goals, and by emphasizing immigrant organizations' similarities. Moreover, they have encouraged organization leaders to collaborate and form alliances with each other, and to promote Turkey's interests, culture, history, and language. By creating a common identity and ambition for its diaspora, the Turkish government has strengthened Turkish Muslim leaders' collective affirmation, which in turn has paved the way for their collective political action.

While collective identity is necessary for collective action, it is not sufficient. In other words, successful political mobilizations also require strategic leadership. Accordingly, Turkish policy-makers have strived to improve immigrant organization leaders' mobilization capacity by providing technical, financial, and legal support to them. Leadership and brainstorming seminars, funding programs, capacity-development workshops, and legal training have played a key role in increasing the visibility, credibility, and political presence of Turkish immigrant organizations in their host countries.

I also contend that Turkey has applied *multi-tiered* diaspora policies toward its diaspora by favoring certain immigrant organizations over others. Turkey has differentiated its diaspora policies based on the size and the loyalty of organizations within the broader diaspora. A larger diaspora group can be more visible and assertive in terms of political action, and therefore, would serve the interests of the homeland more effectively. Turkey has also established closer relationships with immigrant organizations that are ideologically proximate. This is because these groups would be more likely to serve as advocates of the Turkish government. The Turkish government has favored conservative-nationalist and Sunni Islamic immigrant organizations over Alevi and secular immigrant organizations. This differential treatment explains conservative Turkish organizations' unexpected political mobilization toward their host state, and non-religious Turkish organizations' continuing political apathy. Turkish officials have also

provided more support to conservative Turkish organizations in Germany due to their larger size and visibility in their host country. Consequently, Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany have participated in host state politics at higher rates than their counterparts in France.

This study also emphasizes that immigrants are not passive receivers of homeland policies.   In order for diaspora policies to be effective, immigrants should be willing to embrace these policies.   Immigrant leaders' grievances toward their host states enhance their receptivity to the homeland's diaspora outreach policies. If leaders feel more aggrieved in their host state, they become more receptive to the homeland's diaspora policies.   Put differently, if immigrant groups are frequently exposed to prejudices and maltreatment that cause low self-esteem or self-respect, they more easily convert their self-identities into a collective identity and self-interests into collective interests, and become more willing to respond to their country of origin's outreach policies. Conservative Turkish organizations in Germany have responded to Turkey's outreach efforts more enthusiastically than those in France because Turkish Muslim leaders feel more excluded in Germany.

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION

Diasporas and Diaspora Policies

I define *diaspora* as temporary or permanent extra-territorial groups that interact with their origin states (Gamlen 2008, 4). Hence, members of a diaspora community are

dispersed beyond the territory of origin yet retain ties to the country of origin (Berking 2000, 53 *cited* in Aydın 2016, 170). I define the Turkish diaspora as immigrants and their descendants who originate from Turkey regardless of their cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious background.

Diaspora policies refer to origin states' activities and discourse aimed at reaching out and engaging with their nationals abroad at the individual and collective level through symbolic nation-building, institution-building, and provision of a set of rights and obligations (Gamlen 2006, 9). *Emigration policies*, on the other hand, refer to all policies that spur or hinder the extra-territorial movement of populations—such as agreements on seasonal work, return policies, retention schemes, and exit restrictions (Weinar 2014, 5). In this study, I focus on diaspora policies and confine my analysis to state actors, such as ministries, embassies, consulates, political parties, and local authorities.

To measure Turkey's shift from a passive to pro-active diaspora policy since the early 2000s, I have gathered the following evidence: 1) the increase in the number of Turkish diplomatic missions established in Europe (2002–2014), 2) the increase in the number of religious personnel sent to Europe (1974–2015), 3) the increase in the number of religious personnel sent to France and Germany (1983–2014), 4) the expansion of the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, Diyanet) (2002–2014), 5) the amount of financial assistance the YTATB provided to Turkish immigrant organizations in France and Germany (2010–2015), 6) the programmatic distribution of

financial assistance provided to Turkish immigrant organizations in France and Germany (2010–2015), 7) the number of immigrant organization projects supported by the YTATB (2010–2015), 8) the number of Yunus Emre Cultural Centers set up in Europe (2007–2015), and 9) the number of political rallies held in France and Germany since the mid-2000s.

Immigrant Political Participation

As a theoretical and political concept, immigrant integration is often defined as processes that take place after an immigrant has moved to a new country (Givens and Mohanty 2014, 2). *Integration* differs from *assimilation* in the sense that an assimilated immigrant opts for total immersion in the host culture at the expense of her ethnic culture, while an integrated immigrant retains her ethnic culture yet still establishes a close relationship with the host culture (Lesthaeghe 2000).

Defining integration as a two-way process (Tambiah 2000, 168) helps one to account for the action-reaction mechanism between the state institutions and immigrant that is based on mutual negotiation rather than a top-down process imposed by the host state. While this definition is important, this study shows that policies of countries of origin also matter for immigrant integration. Hence, integration should be conceptualized as a "three-way process" (Unterreiner and Weinar 2014, 4).

13

Integration can take place at two levels. On one level, it can occur through interactions between state institutions and individuals with an immigration background. On another level, it can occur through interactions between state institutions and immigrant organizations (Amelina and Faist 2008, 94). Integration has three key dimensions: political, socio-economic, and cultural (Penninx 2005).

Political integration can take two forms: formal and informal. Formal political integration includes legal status, citizenship, and formal participation in the political process, which primarily refers to voting and holding elected office. A group of scholars have argued that political integration should not be reduced to electoral participation. According to them, immigrants' ability to use a repertoire of political actions that allows them to shape decision-making should also be considered indicative of political integration (Morales 2011). This second category, civic or informal dimension of political integration, concerns repertoires of political action outside traditional political channels (DeSipio 2011; Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013). This type of civic engagement does not necessitate citizenship status and is usually conducted collectively (Ekman and Amnå 2009).

This study examines both the formal and informal dimensions of immigrant political participation. Although the distinction between formal and informal political participation is analytically useful, in reality, these dimensions of political integration often overlap (Gsir 2014, 3). In this study, political activism also refers to a process of

"normalization" or development of better relations with host state authorities rather than political violence or segregation. The term "political participation" will be used interchangeably with other terms, including political activism, political engagement, political mobilization, and politicization.

To measure Turkish immigrant organizations' political activism in France and Germany since the mid-2000s, I have gathered the following evidence: 1) Turkish expatriates' naturalization rates in France and Germany (1990–2011), 2) Turkish expatriates' electoral registration and voter turnout rates in France and Germany (2007–2015), 3) Turkish expatriates' political representation at the local, regional, and national levels in France and Germany (2008–2015), 4) the number of political demonstrations, protests, campaigns, and boycotts organized by Turkish immigrant organizations in France and Germany (2004–2015), 5) the number of special-purpose organizations and coalitions established by Turkish immigrant organizations in France and Germany (2007–2015), and 6) Turkish immigrant organizations' involvement in host state institutions and programs (2003–2015).

Immigrant Organizations

This study's analytical focus is on immigrant umbrella organizations for manifold reasons. Many scholars place immigrant organizations at the core of their definitions of transnationalism (Amelina and Faist 1998; Portes 2003). As the *de facto* representatives

of immigrants in Europe, immigrant umbrella organizations constitute the most important claims-making [4] actors in Europe (Yükleyen 2012; Carol and Koopmans 2013). Moreover, umbrella organizations are not passive receivers of state-imposed institutional opportunities or policies, but co-constructors of integration debates (Kastoryano 2002; Schrover and Vermeulen 2005; Sezgin 2008; Yurdakul 2009). In the aftermath of 9/11, Muslim organizations have particularly become important actors in Europe (Tietze 2008; Rosenow-Williams 2012).

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data for this study was collected during extensive fieldwork in Turkey, France, and Germany, where I spent a total of 11 months between February 2013 and January 2014. This project uses a case-study research design for the purposes of theory-building and theory-testing. Tests conducted with case studies are often strong because the predictions tested are unique. Moreover, they can better explain the causal process (George and Bennett 2005).

The causal arguments in this study rely on inferences from the *congruence procedure* and *process-tracing* method, which are the strongest test methods in case studies (Van Evera 1997). These methods are suitable to evaluate the relative impact of the homeland versus other factors on immigrant political participation as they help

---

[4] Koopmans (2002, 2) defines "claims-making" as "the expression of a political opinion by some form of physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.), and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGOs, individuals, anonymous actors, etc).

researchers to extract all of the observable implications of a theory, explore antecedent conditions, and rule out intervening variables.

Using the congruence method, I will assign values to Turkey's diaspora policies and the political participation of immigrant organizations, and measure the congruence between expectation and observation. My theory posits a relationship between variance in my independent variables and variance in my dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005, 181). The process-tracing method requires observation of the historical chain of events and shows whether a causal relationship exists between Turkey's diaspora policies and the political participation trends of Turkish immigrant organizations in France and Germany. Evidence that a given stimulus led to a given response can be sought in the sequence and structure of Turkey's diaspora policies and Turkish immigrant organizations' political actions, and in the testimony of actors explaining why they acted as they did (Van Evera 1997). Since different theories would produce different expectations about events, each theory can be tested on the basis of detailed observations within each case. The detailed unfolding of events over time permits me to assess why Turkish immigrant organizations have become politically active in certain periods. Moreover, tracing the causal processes of how Turkey's diaspora policies have propelled immigrant political participation enables me to address the problem of endogeneity as well as equifinality.[5]

---

[5] Endogeneity refers to the difficulty in separating causes and effects. Does the independent variable cause the dependent variable or is it vice versa? Equifinality refers to the problem that a given outcome can be reached in multiple ways (George and Bennett 1997).

Scholars have noted that making causal inferences when one selects on the dependent variable can be a problem in comparative analysis. Barbara Geddes has suggested that choosing randomly from the universe of cases—where immigrant political participation varies widely—can overcome selection bias. However, she has also noted that, "in practice, identifying the universe of cases that meet the structural criteria is probably an impossible task" (Geddes 1990, 144). This study aims to balance the need for variance on the dependent variable with the need to study a few cases in detail (Givens 2005, 8).

Case Selection

I focus on Turkey because Turks form the largest third-country immigrant group in Europe (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). Another reason why Turkey constitutes an excellent case for this research agenda is that despite its position as a key immigrant-sending country, existing research on Turkish immigrants and their descendants has mostly concentrated on the economic, social, and political impact of Turkish emigration on the homeland and host states (Völker 1975; Abadan-Unat 1976; Martin 1991). Since Turkey is a latecomer in the arena of diaspora affairs, the Turkish state's discourse, policies, and institutions directed toward Turkish nationals abroad have been the topic of relatively few policy reports and articles (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b; Nell 2008; Mügge 2010; Bilgili and Siegel 2011, 2013; Ünver 2013; Aydın 2014, 2016;

Desiderio and Weinar 2014; Öktem 2014). However welcome these projects are, they tend to be limited to straightforward description or fail to delineate the complex interactions between immigrant organizations, the homeland, and host states.

France and Germany are the most popular emigration destinations for Turkish citizens. The cases of France and Germany are similar in many ways yet possess a few important institutional differences. France and Germany are both representative democracies with highly developed, capitalist economies as well as influential EU members. They also have similar immigration trends: They not only host the largest Muslim populations in Europe, but they are also the most popular emigration destinations for Turkish citizens. However, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, these countries have different citizenship and immigrant integration models, church-state relations, and forms of government.

By choosing two cases that present wide institutional variation, I can control for the explanatory power of institutional factors, and therefore, illustrate the sending country effects more clearly. These two cases are also ideal for controlling for group-related and grievance-based factors because the Turkish community and the Turkish umbrella organizations present in both countries display an overall resemblance.

To gain a complete understanding of immigrant political participation, one also has to examine the local institutional context as a potential variable. A comparison of four cities in Germany and France will help me understand whether the sizes of the cities,

the share of immigrants in the population, and the local policies determine different patterns of immigrant political participation. Paris and Strasbourg in France, and Berlin and Cologne in Germany have been selected as the main sites for research. This is because these cities host the largest Turkish populations in France and Germany. Moreover, the headquarters of Turkish immigrant umbrella organizations and host states' governmental and diplomatic centers are located in these cities. By showing that conservative Turkish immigrant organizations in two countries and four cities have become politically active around the same time, I isolate both national and local independent variables. By demonstrating that Turkish immigrant organizations that operate in a less favorable institutional context have become more politically engaged, I am also able to control and account for such institutional factors.

I examine the largest and most important Turkish immigrant umbrella organizations operating in France and Germany (for a list of examined organizations, see Table 4.2 and Table 5.2). Throughout the study, the term "Turkish" will be used to refer to people who were born in Turkey or have at least one Turkish parent regardless of their ethnic or religious background. This research excludes Kurdish immigrant organizations operating in Europe because Kurds do not self-identify as Turks. Selecting a combination of Sunni Islamic, Alevi, secular, and conservative-nationalist organizations operating in both countries enables me to delve into *why* the homeland engages with immigrant

organizations differently in different host countries, and *how* the variation in the homeland's diaspora engagement affects the degree of immigrant political participation.

Archival Research

This research draws on a careful analysis of secondary literature, governmental and organizational reports, national censuses, and press releases to trace the wider process of political transformation in Turkey and conservative Turkish immigrant organizations' increasing political participation. The archival research conducted for this study involved studying official government documents, including Turkish law and legal decrees and constitutional reforms relevant to Turks living abroad, parliamentary minutes, and statements by public officials. Using these materials, I trace the changing patterns and discourse in the Turkish state's attitude toward Turkish immigrants in general. This research also consists of the examination of organizational press releases and magazines. Moreover, news sources in Turkish, English, French, and German, such as *Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Today's Zaman, Foreign Affairs, New York Times, Washington Times, Libération, Le Figaro, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, Deutsche Welle*, and *Tagesspiegel* are carefully reviewed. The analysis of the content of printed materials, media reports, and French and German national censuses enabled me to observe the shift in Turkey's diaspora policies, immigrant organizations' political activities and discourses, and host country policies concerning immigrant political participation.

21

Interviews

This research's primary findings rely on semi-structured in-depth interviews. To track the evolution of Turkey's diaspora engagement policies between the 1960s to the present day and the Turkish state's changing relations with immigrant communities and host countries, I carried out interviews in Ankara with Turkish officials from the Diyanet, the Ministry for EU Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the YTATB, the Yunus Emre Foundation, and the Office of Public Diplomacy.

To gain a deeper understanding of organizations' political activism, perceptions, interpretations, practices, goals, and discourses as well as their links to the home and host governments, interviews were conducted in France and Germany with the chairs, spokespersons, and executive board members of the largest and most active Turkish immigrant umbrella organizations. Moreover, I conducted interviews with French and German politicians of Turkish origin, and Turkish diplomats from the Turkish Embassy and Consulate in Paris and Berlin.

Finally, I carried out interviews with French and German policy-makers from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the French Ministry of the Interior; the French Council for the Muslim Faith (*Conseil Français du Culte Musulman*, CFCM); the French High Council for Integration (*Haut Conseil à l'Integration*, HCI); the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the German Federal Ministry of the Interior; the German

22

Federal Agency for Civic Education; the German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, DIK); the Berlin Senate for Integration and Migration; the German Ministry of Labor, Integration, and Social Affairs in North Rhine-Westphalia; and French and German municipalities and their immigration and integration offices. These interviews are important to discern European leaders' perceptions of Turkey and Turkish immigrants, and how home and host state policies clash and/or converge with respect to the integration of Turkish immigrants in Europe.

THE PLAN OF THE STUDY

I proceed as follows. In Chapter Two, I demonstrate that existing approaches downplay the causal role of diaspora engagement policies for immigrant political participation. After this discussion, I present the main thrust of my theory and discuss its causal mechanisms in depth.

Chapter Three provides an overview of the evolution of Turkey's diaspora engagement policies from the 1960s to the present day.

Chapters Four and Five delve into Turkish immigrant organizations' history and political participation in France and Germany. These chapters also examine the French and German integration policies and detail Turkey's diaspora outreach activities in France and Germany.

Chapter Six unravels the causal mechanisms that link diaspora engagement policies to immigrant political participation. I revisit the empirical implications of the

conventional approaches and demonstrate why a new theoretical account is needed to explain immigrant political participation. This chapter presents original data to support my arguments.

Chapter Seven summarizes my main findings. It then discusses the broader theoretical implications and generalizability of my theory, and explores how my conclusions might inform analyses of the more recent immigrant crisis in Europe.

Chapter Two: Theory

The dramatic increase of international immigration in recent years, especially in light of the growing threat of immigrant participation in terrorist acts, has provoked increased interest in the integration process of immigrants settling in Europe (Vertovec 1999; Faist 2000). My research reflects this evolving interest by examining the political activity of immigrant organizations formed in the destination states. Group mobilization is not the only way to assess the outcomes of integration but is certainly central to the process. I show that there is a strong tendency for analysts to gloss over sending states' diaspora policies that also shape the political engagement of immigrants.

In contrast to existing approaches, I develop a new theory that places the sending state at the center of the analysis. I argue that the homeland's engagement with immigrant organizations empowers organization leaders, which in turn initiates their political mobilization.

In this chapter, I review the predominant theoretical perspectives on immigrant political integration and demonstrate that they do not account for the levels of immigrant participation in France and Germany. I proceed to evaluate the still sparse literature on how and why origin states develop diaspora engagement policies. I explain why a diaspora empowerment theory provides a needed corrective to the shortcomings of this literature. In the third section of the chapter, I flesh out my theory's main arguments and

causal mechanisms. I conclude with a discussion of the empirical implications of my theory, which I will test in subsequent chapters.

THE LIMITS OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Individual- and Group-Related Factors

A well-developed branch of scholarship in immigration studies uses individual-level factors to explain immigrant political participation. These factors include immigrants' identification with the host state (Martiniello 2005); their income, education, mode of immigration, length of stay in destination countries (Verba and Nie 1972; Bevelander and Veenman 2006), and gender (Bass and Casper 2001).

Studies that highlight individual-level factors share common faults. They downplay the role that institutions play in shaping individual-level variables and ethnic group definitions and delineations (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005). Moreover, with a few exceptions (Bird et al. 2011; Maxwell 2012; Givens and Maxwell 2012), this U.S.-based literature has failed to provide a systematic cross-national perspective (DeSipio 1996; Simpson-Bueker 2005; Ramakrishnan 2005). The neglect of comparative perspectives in European cases limits the usefulness of this literature to the Turkish emigrant experience.

Others argue that group-related factors determine immigrants' political behavior. Some scholars in this literature suggest that a common class-consciousness that develops through trade union activities and labor parties triggers collective action among

26

immigrant groups (Castles and Kosack 1973; Miles 1982). Others have investigated the impact of social capital (Jones-Correa 1998; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Tillie and Slijper 2007).

Research in the ethno-cultural approach also points to the importance of identity for immigrants' political mobilization. It emphasizes cultural differences between origin and destination countries, the legacy of colonialism or continuing colonial relations, and the regime type of the sending country (Miller 1981; Dronkers and Vink 2012). For example, one study found that Turkish, Italian, and (former) Yugoslavian immigrants mobilized at different rates in Germany due to their cultural differences (Ögelman 2000). In a similar manner, Mügge (2010) argued that differences in Turkish and Senegalese immigrant groups' political participation in the Netherlands stem from differences in their sending countries' "ideologies of nationhood." A number of scholars suggest that religion is a critical variable affecting immigrant integration especially given the large presence of Muslims among immigrant populations (Heitmeyer et al. 1997; Huntington 2005; Leiken 2005; Klausen 2005). This focus on religion has become one of the most common approaches in the scholarship on Muslim immigrant populations in Europe.

These literatures leave a great deal of space for additional research. The relevance of common class identity has decreased since the initial stages of labor immigration in Europe. The advent of family reunification and the rise of immigrant businesses in the 1980s rendered class-related arguments obsolete. As Koopmans and Statham note (2000),

class-based interpretations are deterministic and tend to explain immigrant organizational activities as a condition of processes of industrial modernization rather than as an effect of the political environment. As for ethno-cultural characteristics in Europe, the majority of immigrants are Muslim, and they come from developing countries that are similar to each other and culturally very different from European societies. Yet despite their religious similarities, Muslim immigrants from different sending states do not participate in politics at similar rates (Thränhardt 2000; Maxwell 2012). More importantly, even Muslim immigrants originating from the same country do not integrate at similar rates (Engelen 2006). Put differently, group-based approaches can account for cross-group variations in a single institutional setting; however, they cannot explain cross-national variations in the behavior of a distinct ethno-cultural immigrant group (Yalaz 2014).

Turks in France and Germany come from the same origin country and share similar ethno-cultural characteristics. Why is political participation higher among conservative Turkish umbrella organizations in Germany than in France? Other group-related factors, such as group size and social capital, cannot account for this difference. First, the unit of analysis in this study is the immigrant organization. Even though the population of the Turkish community is larger in Germany, the organizational characteristics of conservative Turkish umbrella associations in France and Germany are similar. Second, conservative organizations operating in France are closely connected to organizations operating in Germany through transnational networks. These organizations

28

are headquartered in Germany and their human and financial resources are available to other branches operating across Europe (Schiffauer 2014). Moreover, studies showed that large numbers do not guarantee successful political mobilization (Schönwalder 2013). Surprisingly, conservative Turkish organizations in France have managed to engage in large-scale political action despite their limited political resources. This variation in political mobilization creates a puzzle that the group-based literature on immigrant mobilization cannot answer.

Institutional Factors

An alternative school of thought argues that institutional factors determine political participation. Relying on the "political opportunity structure" framework borrowed from the social movements literature (McAdam et al. 1996), this approach claims that the institutional opportunities and constraints within host states determine immigrants' local, national, and transnational political activities.

Ireland (1994), for instance, has shown that foreign workers in similar industrial sectors in different host countries follow divergent participatory trajectories. Others (Thränhardt 2000; Odmalm 2005) agree that different models of integration and citizenship give rise to different sets of opportunities for immigrants to participate in the political sphere. These scholars suggest that citizenship policy is an important determinant of immigrant political activity because access to naturalization allows foreign nationals to cast votes and to stand for election (Messina 2007). Host country

29

citizenship also increases immigrants' participation in non-electoral forms of political participation (Just and Anderson 2012).

Scholars contend that the French and German models of citizenship create different opportunities and obstacles for immigrants. In his seminal work, Brubaker (1992) divided citizenship regimes into two categories: *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) and *jus soli* (right of soil). *Jus sanguinis* regimes, including Germany, base citizenship on an ascriptive, ethno-cultural community of descent and common cultural traditions. In contrast, *jus soli* regimes, including France are based on a civic community defined by adherence to common political values and institutions, and residence in the state territory. Brubaker argued that the persistently higher naturalization rates in France than in Germany are explained by this difference in historical traditions of citizenship. Other scholars concur with Brubaker (Castles and Miller 1993; Kleger and D'Amato 1995; Safran 1997) that Germany's ethnic or exclusive citizenship regime creates institutional and cultural barriers that hinder immigrants' access to the political system. For scholars in this tradition, France's assimilationist or republican model of citizenship, provides easier access to the political system for immigrants.

A group of scholars have gone beyond ethnic-civic notions of citizenship to draw attention to cultural dimensions of citizenship (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005). They expect immigrants to be more politically active if they benefit from other institutional opportunities, including equal opportunity and anti-discrimination

legislation, state subvention and consultation of immigrant organizations, and the availability of cultural group rights within education and the media. Given that France maintains a strict color-blind approach to race and ethnicity, some scholars deem the French regime more suitable for immigrant political participation (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011). Morales and Giugni (2011) claim that discursive opportunity structures in receiving countries, such as the openness of public authorities and formal institutions, and prevailing discourses on immigration and immigrants also affect immigrant political participation.

The German system of naturalization has changed in recent years. The Nationality Act that went into effect in 2000 reformed the old citizenship law (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*) by replacing *jus sanguinis* with *jus soli* (Howard 2008). Many observers have argued that despite this groundbreaking reform, France continues to provide a more favorable institutional context for immigrant political participation. They point to the fact that the implementation of the 2000 citizenship reform has not led to a higher naturalization rate among immigrants due to obstacles in attaining dual citizenship. Moreover, the German citizenship regime is still replete with "material and symbolic barriers," as evidenced by onerous naturalization tests and prevailing distrust against Muslims (Green 2004; Howard 2009; Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012).

Not all scholars of immigration argue that France is more welcoming to immigrants than Germany. Taking church-state relations into consideration, some have

concluded that France has been less accommodating to the religious needs of Muslims compared to Germany due to the French regime's clear-cut separation of religion and the state (Fetzer and Soper 2005).   In a similar vein, the German Basic Law establishes a formal separation between church and state. Yet at the same time, the constitution allows the German state to cooperate with Christian and Jewish organizations in the areas of religious education and social welfare services. My research found that Turkish Muslim leaders believe that Germany has been less accommodating to their religious needs than France. In these leaders' view, France's *laïc* system keeps an equal distance from all religious groups, whereas Germany's secular system favors Christian and Jewish organizations over Muslim organizations (Arkilic 2015).

Yet another group of scholars have argued that local institutional factors are more important than national-level factors. They have ascribed importance to such features, such as local policies, local electoral systems, and relations between local authorities and local groups in providing channels of political mobilization to immigrants. This approach emphasizes that immigration and integration politics takes place at multiple levels of government (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006).

Scholars of local institutions suggest that unitary and federal systems yield different outcomes for immigrant integration (Penninx et al. 2004). This is because national models of integration are reinterpreted, renegotiated, and restructured at the local level (Garbaye 2005; Hinze 2013). However, researchers disagree as to the impact of

each   system.   While   some contend that federal systems, such as Germany, allow for more

concentration of power for immigrants (Ireland 1994), others suggest that these systems

pose certain challenges to immigrant integration (Joppke and Seidle 2012). In respect to

France and Germany, a study found that national policy has always been a stronger

determining factor than local efforts in France. Despite different constellations of

political actors in French and German cities, immigration policy-making did not differ

much at the local level and was characterized by exclusionary policies (Mahnig 2004,

32).

In general, the institutional approach, like any other, has several limitations. First,

the majority of studies that look at the effects of citizenship policies are single-country

cases (cf. Jones-Correa 1998; Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012) or generated

mixed findings (Bevelander and Veenman 2006). Moreover, many criticize the literatures

on modes of citizenship and on modes of church-state relations for using static variables

that cannot explain or predict the complex empirical reality of different countries that

evolves   over   time (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Freeman 2004; Joppke and Torpey

2013). For example, even in centralized systems, such as France, policies can be

implemented in a more flexible and lenient manner at the local level in some areas. This

creates room for different modes of cooperation with Muslim immigrant organizations

(Arkilic 2015). Scholars who study institutions in Europe also are subject to criticism that

they poorly define and subjectively select indicators to prove rather than to test their

theories (Bowen 2007; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). Moreover, this literature portrays immigrants as passive receivers of institutional policies, which is not the case in reality (Kastoryano 2002; Amelina and Faist 2008; Yurdakul 2009). In addition, the institutional literature neglects the importance of factors related to immigrant groups and their transnational connections, and global human right norms and regimes (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Pero and Solomos 2010). Institutional typologies have not been able to explain differences among immigrant groups within the same country or similarities among individual immigrants or immigrant groups across countries (Maxwell 2012).

The institutional context, especially the political opportunity structures in host countries, affects the availability of formal and informal channels of political participation to immigrants. Yet, they cannot explain why immigrant groups take action in certain contexts and not others. As my subsequent chapters will show, if the institutional context in Germany is replete with legal and symbolic barriers, how have Turkish organizations in Germany become more politically engaged compared with their counterparts in France? If government forms or local policies determine immigrant political participation, how have conservative Turkish immigrant organizations operating under unitary and federal systems and in different cities all mobilized around the same time?

The Role of Perceived Group Status

A third explanation shifts from the individual and group to focus instead on perceptions of group status (Gurr 1970; Miller et al. 1981; Olzak 1992; Dawson 1995; Yalaz 2014). This body of literature distinguishes between "group consciousness," which denotes "in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about one's group's social standing," and "group identification," which refers to "a psychological sense of belonging or attachment to a social group" (McClain et al. 2009, 476). While group identification does not always trigger political mobilization, group consciousness is a necessary condition for political mobilization.

As my hypotheses will detail below, immigrant organizations' grievances toward their host states form part of my theory. I suggest that collective grievances compound immigrants' receptivity to diaspora outreach policies. Immigrant organization leaders that feel more excluded in their host states are more receptive to the homeland's diaspora policies. Yet, despite its merits, this approach suffers from several weaknesses. First and foremost, it cannot clarify the timing of political mobilization because the level of grievances usually remains high and constant among subaltern groups (Scott 2000; Goodwin 2001).

Turks in France and Germany have long perceived that they hold a disadvantaged position in their host country's inter-ethnic context, but they became politically active only recently. As the largest Muslim immigrant group in Germany, the Turkish

community has always been the object of xenophobic attacks and the center of concerns about integration. Brutal arson attacks organized by neo-Nazi groups murdered eight Turks in Mölln in 1992 and in Solingen in 1993. The NSU attacks targeting Turkish immigrants (commonly dubbed the "*döner* murders" in the German media) started in 2000. As will be discussed extensively in Chapter Five, the contentious German Nationality Act came into force in the same year and eight German states (*Länder*) banned wearing headscarves in public schools in 2003. Moreover, some of the Turkish Islamic organizations have been placed under state surveillance in the wake of the "Islamization" of immigration after 9/11 (Rosenow-Williams 2012). Despite these highly provocative events, conservative Turkish organizations did not organize *any* political demonstration until the mid-2000s. In fact, these organizations' leaders voiced their first political claims regarding dual citizenship only after 2010 and held their largest collective political action in 2013.

In a similar vein, a focus on grievances cannot explain why conservative Turkish organizations in France have engaged in political action since the mid-2000s. Many Turks in France see themselves enjoying a better position in their host country's inter-ethnic context compared to other immigrants. While observers can point to specific events as sources of potential grievances, such as the outbreak of the headscarf controversy (*l'affaire du foulard*) in the mid-1990s and the recognition of the mass killing of Armenians as genocide in the French Parliament in 2001, Turkish conservative

organizations in France have not engaged in political activism since the mid-2000s. Given that Turks' grievances date back to the 1960s and are chronic, some other factor must activate political action in these countries.

Moreover, host countries' legal and symbolic barriers apply to all members of the Turkish community. If the collective perception of group status in a host country's ethno-racial hierarchical context determines immigrant political mobilization, then every Turkish immigrant organization should be expected to participate in host country politics at equal rates. Yet, as discussed earlier, conservative-nationalist and Sunni Islamic Turkish immigrant organizations have become more politically engaged than Alevi and secular Turkish immigrant organizations despite the fact that all members of the Turkish community are subject to the same host state policies.

TURNING TO SENDING STATES: TRANSNATIONALISM AND DIASPORA POLICIES

A common weakness of the above-mentioned accounts is that they overlook the role of the sending state in shaping immigrant integration. Nonetheless, the transnationalism and diaspora policies literature have shifted our focus to sending states.

Transnationalism

The classical assimilation theory assumes that once immigrants settle in their new societies they typically go through a process of assimilation or cultural adjustment that includes weakening ties to their countries of origin (Alba and Nee 1997; Heitmeyer et al.

37

1997). In this perspective, ties to the homeland are seen as a hindrance to integration because these bonds reinforce "competing loyalties" and create "parallel societies" (Esser 2001). This literature thus views home and host countries as two distinct localities, in which interaction with one party undermines ties with the other (Huntington 2004).

The transnationalism literature that developed starting in the 1990s offers a multi-faceted and refined analysis of immigrants' links to their origin countries. This approach has found that contrary to the claims of assimilation theory, transnational practices do not prevent integration; they can even foster it (Levitt 2001; Portes 2001; Morawska 2003; Perrin and Martiniello 2010).

As Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b, 16) has rightly formulated, political identity and activities are shaped by home and host state factors. However, these studies are mainly concerned with how origin states respond to the transnational activities of immigrants or how immigrants' political activities towards their countries of origin affect immigrant integration.

Diaspora Policies

In recent years, researchers have realized that relations between sending states and their diaspora communities should attract more scholarly attention, and that the orientation of sending states toward immigrants is as important as host states' relations with their immigrants. Scholars have described and categorized sending countries and their policies (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001, 2003a; Levitt and de la Dehasa 2003; Levitt and

Glick Schiller 2004; Brand 2006; Gamlen 2006; Ragazzi 2014), and examined domestic, transnational, and international factors that lead states to engage with their émigré population (González Gutiérrez 1999; Smith 2003; Iskander 2006; Délano and Gamlen 2014). Studies on Albania (Koinova 2013), Australia (Fullilove and Flutter 2004), Britain (Hampshire 2013), China (Nyiri 2001; Xiang 2016), Greece (Demetriou 2003), Hungary (Waterbury 2010), India (Varadarajan 2010; Naujoks 2013), Korea (Mylonas 2013), Mexico (Martínez-Saldaña 2003; Délano 2011; Lafleur 2013), New Zealand (Gamlen 2007) and the Middle Eastern and North African countries (Brand 2006; de Haas 2006) have expanded our horizons in this burgeoning area of research. Researchers have found that states develop different strategies to engage with their populations abroad. These strategies can range from policies that create a set of corresponding state institutions, such as surveillance institutions, state-owned transnational immigrant organizations or government offices at the ministerial level to strategies that extend rights to or extract obligations from expatriate communities (Gamlen 2006, 2008).

Economic incentives, such as the desire to tap into the remittances, economic investments, and human capital of emigrants may encourage states to develop closer relations with their diaspora (Gillespie and Andriasova 2008; Agunias and Newland 2012). In other words, sending states may seek to mobilize their immigrants for the purpose of poverty alleviation or the advancement of development projects in the homeland (Iskander 2008; Naujoks 2013).

Counter-intuitively, others argue that there is no clear relationship between state interests and diaspora engagement (Collyer and Vathi 2007). They suggest that the overall trend toward democratization and liberal global norms has produced more inclusive citizenship regimes and rights (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010). Through the symbolic incorporation of immigrants into positive narratives of popular sovereignty and stories of "peoplehood," states reach out to their citizens abroad to strengthen national legitimacy, and to produce a state-centric "transnational national society," some scholars argue (Brand 2006; Gamlen 2006; Collyer 2013). States reinforce immigrants' feeling of belonging and their attachment to their homeland and create a "homogenous" national diaspora through the inclusion of immigrants within the national population (Lainer-Vos 2010). This norms-based account of diaspora politics contends that the dispersion of global norms of cosmopolitanism and good governance induces cooperation between countries of origin and countries of settlement for the sake of the global greater good (Gamlen 2008). Such multilateral cooperation requires the development of common rules and practices regarding international immigration.[6]

While this literature expands our understanding of the role played by sending states in interacting with their expatriates, it remains a top-down approach that purports to explain why sending states develop policies and strategies aimed at their diaspora, but does not explicate how sending state policies are perceived by and affect the diaspora.

---

[6] Some scholars have argued that these steps are "all talk and no action" because very few meetings result in formal agreements (Délano 2011, 8).

This approach thus views immigrants as passive receivers of sending state policies, and does not identify the effects diaspora engagement policies have on immigrants' political participation.

NEW APPROACHES TO IMMIGRANT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

An emergent literature explores the connection between states' changing diaspora policies and immigrant political participation. Simpson-Bueker (2005) proposed that "a source country effect" explains two types of political incorporation among immigrants: citizenship acquisition and voting turnout. She suggested that the country of origin matters as much for how it interacts with other key characteristics, such as education and income. Others have researched the implications of external voting and dual citizenship for political participation of immigrants in their countries of residence (Lafleur 2012; Vink 2013). These works have concluded that the origin country serves only as a proxy that mediates the effects of other factors. Three recent studies speculate that sending states' increasing engagement with their diaspora communities may positively affect immigrant political integration into host countries (Délano 2010; Yalaz 2011; Bilgili and Siegel 2013). The INTERACT project is another recent endeavour developed to understand the impact of origin countries on immigrants' political participation (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013; Desiderio and Weinar 2014). Gsir's INTERACT (2014) report deserves special mention as it focuses on the diaspora empowerment mechanism.

These novel approaches are without doubt an important contribution to the immigrant integration literature. However, they either do not give due attention to the country of origin in determining immigrant integration or they remain highly theoretical and abstract, and marshal little or no empirical evidence to support their conclusions. For example, the INTERACT project concluded that immigrants' civic participation is not determined by the emigration state because "integration, above all, is a host country issue" (Gsir 2014, 11). In addition, like other studies (Yalaz 2011), this project did not empirically test its hypotheses and failed to detail how the diaspora empowerment mechanism works. Table 2.1 summarizes the existing approaches in the literature and identifies their weaknesses.

Table 2.1. Different Approaches to Immigrant Political Participation

Approach	Variables	Weaknesses
Individual- and Group-Related Factors	• Mode of immigration • Class identity • Religious factors • Ethno-cultural factors • Social capital	• Overly deterministic • Fails to explain cross-national and within-group variations in the behavior of a distinct ethno-cultural group • Fails to explain why immigrant groups with similar characteristics mobilize at different rates
Institutional Factors	• Citizenship regimes • Church-state relations • Form of government (federal vs. unitary) • Discursive opportunity structures	• Static • Views immigrants as passive actors • Fails to explain simultaneous mobilization of a distinct ethno-cultural group in different contexts • Fails to explain different mobilizations within the same institutional context
The Role of Perceived Group Status	• Psychological frustrations, grievances, and perceptions of collective status in the host country's ethno-racial hierarchical context	• Fails to explain the timing of political mobilization • Fails to explain why different groups subject to similar exclusionary policies mobilize at different rates
Transnationalism	• Immigrants' transnational activities	• Fails to show the impact of diaspora outreach policies on mobilization
Diaspora Policies and Other New Approaches	• State policies aimed at the diaspora	• Views immigrants as passive actors • Fails to show the impact of diaspora outreach policies on mobilization • Remains highly abstract • Provides little/no empirical evidence

A THEORY OF DIASPORA EMPOWERMENT

In contrast to previous theories that treat the sending country solely as an intervening variable, my theory places it at the heart of the analysis. My main argument is that the ways in which sending states engage with their diasporas play a pivotal role in determining immigrant groups' political participation in host countries. This is achieved through the "*diaspora empowerment*" mechanism, which reshapes immigrants' *identification* and *capabilities*. Identification is one's perception of individual and/or collective characteristics. Put differently, it is the definition of "the self" as an individual identity and/or a member of a group. Capabilities refer to symbolic and material resources or power.

I argue that diaspora engagement policies increase immigrant political participation by changing immigrant leaders' identification. They do so by instilling a sense of self-efficacy, collective identity, and group consciousness in immigrant organization leaders. The homeland government also improves immigrant organizations' organizational capabilities by providing them with technical, financial, and legal support.

In what follows I develop the logic of my theory by unpacking the two causal mechanisms by which the sending state's engagement with the diaspora directly influences the political mobilization patterns of immigrant organizations. I will also explain how the two mechanisms relate to each other in shaping the degree and type of mobilization that occurs. I then will discuss why the homeland develops *multi-tiered*

44

engagement policies, and how the host state context augments immigrants' receptivity to homeland policies.

The Causal Link Between Diaspora Engagement Policies and Immigrant Political Participation

Social psychologists argue that an individual strives to preserve not only a positive sense of personal identity but also a positive sense of social identity. Social identity is defined as "a part of an individual's self-concept, which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel 1981, 255). Other social psychologists have coined the terms "collective self-esteem" (Crocker and Luhtanen 1990) and "collective efficacy" to address members' perceptions of their group's identity and capabilities (Bandura 1995).

Building on the distinction between personal identity and social identity, the social movement literature has pointed out that possessing a collective identity is an important precondition of collective action for groups (Melucci 1989, 1996). Proponents of this school have defined collective identity as "an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution" (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 285). Moreover, they have suggested that a collective identity is formed when members of a group have positive feelings for each other and share the same status, ideologies and goals (Gamson 1991). This literature depicts collective

identities as interactive processes that are reconstructed and renegotiated by the repeated activation of relationships that link individuals to groups (Melucci 1995, 44).

To provoke collective identities within their groups, some leaders seek to redefine common identities that had been stigmatized by others (Johnston et al. 1994; Jasper 1997). To achieve this, leaders often use "identity work" to "create, present, and sustain personal identities that are congruent with and supportive of the self-concept" (Snow and Anderson 1987, 1348). Identity work is thus regarded as a significant means of empowerment and a way to challenge hegemonic identities and stigmas because it converts understated member identities into salient ones (Johnston et al. 1994; Schwalbe and Mason-Shrock 1996; Snow and McAdam 2000). Identity work can be conducted individually or collectively. Yet at the end of this process, each member's self-identity and a group's definition of an identity match, thereby fostering collective identity (Jasper 1997).

Scholars have argued that to strengthen collective identity, elites may transform the needs and interests of their followers from self-interest to collective interest by virtue of their appeals to collective values and goals, and the use of symbolic, inspirational, and emotion-arousing activities (House et al. 1991; Shamir et al. 1993). This elite-directed process works to strengthen the collective identity of the group. Elites can maximize the intrinsic value of group efforts and goals by linking them to valued aspects of members' self-concepts and by harnessing the motivational forces of self-efficacy and collective

efficacy (Gecas 2000, 103). These efforts increase members' commitment to their group, and therefore, affect the likelihood of successful collective action (Tajfel et al. 1971; Hogg and Abrams 1990).

I build on this research and hypothesize that sending states' diaspora policies precipitate immigrant political mobilization in two key ways. First, sending state policy-makers initiate a process of "identity work" with the propagation of a new diaspora agenda. As the homeland adopts a state discourse that extols immigrants as hard-working, competent, and harmonious people who contribute to the development of both their homeland and host states, immigrant organization leaders' and members' perceptions of themselves and their group improve. The homeland's positive and inclusive discourse restructures immigrants' previously marginalized identities and boosts their perceptions of self-worth. The origin state's increasing engagement with the diaspora also empowers immigrants by reminding them that the homeland is ready to support its nationals abroad if they encounter discrimination and maltreatment in their host states. These messages render immigrants more self-confident. Together these efforts create a stronger sense of self-efficacy.

A new diaspora agenda usually comes with elite appeals to common identity, values, and goals. Sending states can instill feelings of collective identity by bringing immigrant organizations together for various activities and meetings, drawing attention to their similarities, encouraging them to collaborate and form alliances with each other, and

promoting the homeland interests, culture, history, and language. The transformation of the image of certain immigrant organizations from one of stigmatization into one of normalization also helps organizations overcome past tensions and engage themselves in inter-organizational collaboration. By creating a common identity and purpose for the diaspora, sending states strengthen immigrants' collective identity and group consciousness. This in turn brings about collective political action.

The social movements literature argues that motivation is necessary but not sufficient for involvement in collective action. Groups must also develop sufficient organizational capacity to translate motivation into action (McAdam and Schaffer-Boudet 2012). Following Weber's (1947) notion of charismatic leadership, others (Ganz 2000) have drawn attention to the importance of strategic leadership in shaping mobilization outcomes. Building on these arguments, I suggest that the second mechanism through which sending states precipitate immigrant political mobilization is the provision of technical, financial, and legal support to immigrant organization leaders.

I hypothesize that technical, financial, and legal support granted to immigrant leaders creates a bridge for knowledge transfer between the homeland and immigrant organizations. Sending states rejuvenate the organizational capacity of immigrant organizations by offering capacity-development and know-how programs for Turkish Muslim leaders. These programs may concentrate on different thematic areas, including anti- discrimination, active citizenship, equal participation, academic and professional

development, and legal guidance. To strengthen immigrant organizations' abilities to achieve common goals in their host countries, homeland institutions may provide leadership seminars, workshops, and brainstorming sessions. I expect that these initiatives would resonate well with immigrant groups that feel aggrieved in their host states.

The homeland's projection of collective identity combined with the provision of technical, financial, and legal support empowers immigrant organization leaders by increasing their visibility and clout in their host countries. A strong support emanating from the homeland changes these groups' interactions with host state authorities, thereby helping them to gain more power, respect, and credibility in their host states. In light of this elaboration, I arrive at the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The sending state's engagement with its diaspora empowers immigrants by reshaping their identities and mobilization capabilities. Empowered immigrants participate in host state politics.

Both collective identity and organizational capacity are necessary mechanisms for political mobilization. Collective identity cannot trigger political action without organizational capacity. Organizational capacity by itself would not be adequate for political mobilization if organizations do not act together with a strong collective identity. These two mechanisms are not independent of each other; instead, they interact and might be mutually reinforcing. In other words, increases in collective identity may

increase the organizational capabilities of immigrant organization leaders because coordinated and self-confident elites mobilize more easily (identification → capabilities). On the other hand, elites with a higher organizational capacity may have a higher level of collective action (capabilities → identification). Therefore, the sending state's rapprochement with immigrants can create a multiplier effect by reshaping both the identification and organizational capabilities of immigrant organizations.

Multi-Tiered Diaspora Policies and Their Consequences

The existing literature typically assumes that states develop homogeneous policies in approaching their diaspora communities. While a few scholars have suggested that states may implement differentiated policies targeting different diaspora groups (Schmitter Heisler 1985; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Green and Weil 2007; Collyer 2013; Naujoks 2013), they have not theorized why this might be the case. A recent study that focuses on within-state variation in emigration policies rather than diaspora policies suggests that states develop different emigration policies depending on the perceived utility of emigrant communities' staying abroad versus the utility of their potential return (Tsourapas 2015).

I suggest that states implement *multi-tiered* diaspora policies even when immigrants are *not* expected to return to the homeland or do *not* serve as the "agents of development" for the sending country. I hypothesize that sending states develop

differential diaspora policies because certain immigrant organizations have a higher political potential as a lobby group within their host countries. I argue that the diaspora group's utility to the sending state is determined by two factors: the size and the loyalty of the organization. Given that a large diaspora group would be more visible and assertive in terms of political action, the homeland would prefer to invest in a larger diaspora rather than a smaller one. Over time, a large diaspora in the host state may act as a small extension of the origin state inside foreign territories.

The home state's favorable relations with the diaspora also depend on the political tendencies and loyalty of the diaspora group. This is because members of the diaspora do not necessarily act in ways loyal to the current leadership of the origin country. Hence, while the homeland would prefer a large diaspora to advance its political interests abroad, this is not a sufficient condition by itself for the sending state to support the diaspora. The homeland would also prefer a loyal diaspora community that will use its resources in support of the homeland's interests. Therefore, I expect the homeland to engage most with immigrant organizations that are large and loyal, and to engage least with immigrant organizations that are small and disloyal. This takes me to the following hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 2a: Sending states develop differentiated diaspora policies toward immigrant organizations. This policy variation is determined by the size and the loyalty of the immigrant organization.*

I further hypothesize that immigrant organizations that receive more support from the homeland would be more politically active. Immigrant organizations favored by the homeland would develop a stronger collective identity and organizational capacity. Their deeper exposure to symbolic and material perks provided by the sending state empowers them, and therefore, sparks their political participation. This line of reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2b: Immigrant organizations that receive more support from the sending state have a higher level of political participation.

The implementation of differential diaspora policies can be clearly seen in the Turkish case. Since the early days of its new diaspora agenda, Turkey has favored conservative-nationalist and Sunni Islamic immigrant umbrella organizations in France and Germany, including the DİTİB, Millî Görüş, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, the Turkish Federation, and the ATİB over Alevi and secular immigrant organizations. This is because conservative Turkish organizations have more followers, and are ideologically closer to the incumbent AKP government compared with other Turkish immigrant organizations. Their close relationship with the homeland has allowed conservative organizations in both France and Germany to engage in political activism since the mid-2000s. In contrast, Alevi and secular organizations have participated in host

state policies sporadically because they have received little or no support.[7] Furthermore, Turkish officials have channelled more technical, financial, and legal support to conservative organizations in Germany due to the Turkish community's larger size and visibility in Germany. The German Turkish population constitutes an important lobby bloc and a large constituency for Turkish elections. The Turkish government targets the conservative elements of the German Turkish population as a vital source of political support abroad. Consequently, Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany have mobilized at higher rates compared with their counterparts in France.

The Host State Dimension

It would not be realistic to expect immigrants to form a homogeneous lobbying group in the interests of the home state (Délano 2011). Nor would it be accurate to exclude the host state dimension from the picture or to portray immigrant organizations as passive receivers of policies. The social movements literature demonstrates that high self-efficacy coupled with low trust in the political system creates not only resentment but also provokes efforts at political change (Gecas 1989, 2000; Snow and Oliver 1995). I argue that in order for diaspora policies to be effective, immigrants should be willing to embrace these policies. Immigrants' grievances toward their host states condition how willing immigrants are to receive the homeland's support.

---

[7] Alevi and secular organizations in both France and Germany are traditionally more politically active compared to Turkish Islamic organizations. However, their political activities and claims are aimed at their homeland rather than host states. In other words, these organizations rarely engage in political action that targets French and German policy-makers.

Collier (2013, 43) argues that immigrant groups' integration into their host society is determined by two factors: the size of the immigrant group and their cultural distance from the host society. He suggests that the larger the size of the diaspora is, the slower its rate of absorption into the mainstream society becomes. As the size of the diaspora increases, immigrants prefer more strongly to interact with members of their group rather than with the majority of the population. This is because an easier interaction with kin groups, as is possible in a large diaspora, leads new immigrants to avoid contact with natives, and hence retards immigrants' integration into the society. The second factor is related to the cultural distance between the diaspora and host society. If there is a wider cultural distance between immigrants and the majority society, immigrants' rate of absorption becomes slower (Collier 2013, 88). In consequence, culturally distant groups experience more difficulty integrating into their host society than groups with cultures that are more similar to the majority culture in the host state. A large, unassimilated diaspora can pose serious economic, political, and social threats to the host state. Given that the risks of the diaspora increase with its size and cultural distance, the host state would prefer an immigrant community that is smaller in size and more similar in culture.

If immigrant groups become exposed to predicaments that cause low self-esteem or self-respect, they more easily convert their self-identities into a collective identity and self-interests into collective interests. Moreover, they become more willing to accept technical, financial, and legal support from the homeland with the goal of fighting against

54

discrimination and becoming active citizens in their host states. In other words, the host state context compounds the impact of the homeland's policies on immigrant organizations. This allows me to formulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: An immigrant organization's grievances toward its host state condition the organization's receptivity to diaspora policies. Greater grievances lead to greater receptivity.

As mentioned previously, conservative-nationalist and Sunni Islamic Turkish organizations' political mobilization in both France and Germany started around the same time. Yet Turkish organization leaders in Germany feel more excluded compared with their counterparts in France because they attract more negative attention due to the larger size of the Turkish community in Germany. Consequently, these leaders have embraced Turkey's diaspora policies more enthusiastically.

CONCLUSION

Existing theories of immigrant political participation omit the role played by sending states. Traditional accounts that focus on individual- and group-related variables cannot explain why, how, and when specific immigrant groups participate in host country politics at higher levels compared to other immigrant groups. I try to fill this gap in our knowledge by theorizing and empirically testing the connection between the sending state's diaspora outreach policies and immigrant political participation in host states. I

55

unpack the causal mechanisms that link diaspora engagement policies to immigrants' politicization.

Based on the Turkish case, I argue that an origin country's support for the diaspora spurs immigrant organization leaders to participate in host state politics by instilling a sense of self-efficacy, collective identity, and group consciousness in them, and by improving their organizational capacities. Finally, I argue that Turkey's diaspora policies would have been ineffective if immigrants did not welcome and respond to them. I suggest that immigrants' grievances toward their host states condition their receptivity to the homeland's diaspora outreach policies. If immigrants feel excluded in their countries of settlement, they become highly willing to accept the support of the homeland. Conservative organizations in Germany have responded to Turkey's outreach efforts more enthusiastically than those in France because Turkish Muslim leaders feel more excluded in Germany than in France.

Having identified what I consider to be drawbacks of the existing literature and laid out my approach, in the next chapter I will detail why and how Turkey has become more engaged with its diaspora since the early 2000s.

Chapter Three: Explaining the Evolution of Turkey's Diaspora Engagement Policies from the 1960s to the 2000s

This chapter's main goal is to explain why Turkey adopted a pro-active diaspora agenda since the 2000s as compared with earlier passive policies. Immigrant remittances are no longer the driving force behind Turkey's diaspora policies. The expansion of trade relations with Turkish entrepreneurs abroad remains an important goal for Turkish bureaucrats. Yet since the 2000s, Turkey's diaspora agenda has been mainly shaped by political and symbolic incentives. I suggest that domestic factors have played the most significant role in shaping Turkey's diaspora agenda. I examine the domestic dimension both as an independent factor and also in relation to transnational and international factors (Délano 2011). More specifically, I show that the AKP's ascension to power in 2002 has transformed the way Turkey perceives its nationals abroad and interacts with host states.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first section covers the period from the 1960s to 1990s and delves into the gradual yet limited change in Turkey's diaspora policies during this time. The second section investigates the dramatic steps the Turkish state has taken to strengthen its ties with its diaspora since the early 2000s. The third section reveals the specific domestic, transnational, and international factors that have provoked a shift to a highly engaged diaspora agenda.

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES BETWEEN THE 1960S AND 1990S

Motives

Until the 2000s Turkish emigration was motivated mainly by economic incentives. Starting from the 1960s, the provision of low-skilled guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) was regarded as a win-win situation for Turkey and Western Europe. This labor exchange aided the recovering but labor-short economies of post-war Europe and served as a temporary solution to Turkey's unemployment problems. In addition, Turkey hoped to attract workers' remittances and benefit from their skills and experiences upon their return to the homeland (Sayarı 1986).

Immigrant remittances greatly benefited the Turkish economy for decades. For example, remittances sent by Turkish workers in 1964 amounted to $45 million. This number rose to $1.4 billion in 1974. The oil crisis of 1974 led to a sharp decline in remittances in the mid-1970s. However, Turkey's economic liberalization and Western European countries' promotion of "return immigration" programs revitalized the flow of remittances to Turkey in the 1980s. Remittances, which reached $2 billion in 1980, served as an important source of revenue during the 1980s, thereby contributing to the country's economic development (Penninx 1982; Abadan-Unat 2002; Bettin et al. 2012).

In the 1980s, Turkey offered immigrants a variety of favorable interest rates as well as investment and development benefits (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). These policies were meant to stimulate a steady flow of remittances and were largely successful. Turkish

officials also developed a program called "Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals" to encourage expatriates to transfer their skills to the domestic economy (Bilgili and Siegel 2011).

Yet by the mid-1990s, remittances fell dramatically and plummeted even further during the 2000s. While remittances made up around 2.7 percent of Turkey's GDP throughout the 1980s, this figure dropped to 1.9 percent in the 1990s. Between 2000 and 2012, remittances as a share of the Turkish economy declined further to 0.3 percent, and by 2013, they made up only 0.1 percent (World Bank 2016).

The decline of remittances in the post-1998 era responded to changes in Turkish government polices and developments pertaining to the Turkish communities of Western Europe. Corruption and mismanagement of remittances by Turkish authorities and the 1994 and 2001 financial crises discouraged the expatriates from sending money back to Turkey. Other factors were increases in the acquisition of permanent residency in the host country, diminishing attachment to the homeland, the increasing naturalization rate of Turkish immigrants following the 1999 German Nationality Act (which came into force in 2000), and second- and third-generation immigrants' improving socio-economic conditions. Moreover, between 1999 and 2002, the EU's transition to the Euro as the common currency negatively affected Turkish immigrants' purchasing power and savings (Bettin et al. 2012; Elitok 2013; İçduygu 2009).

Today there is no policy to promote the flow of remittances to Turkey, and it is unlikely that such a policy will emerge in the future (İçduygu 2006). The following graphs illustrate the rate of remittances over time. Figure 3.1 shows the amount of remittances sent to Turkey between 1974 and 2009 and Figure 3.2 documents dwindling personal remittances received between 1974 and 2012 in relation to Turkey's GDP.

Figure 3.1: Remittances to Turkey, 1974–2009 (in USD)

Source: Bettin et al. (2012, 135)

Figure 3.2: Personal Remittances Received, 1974–2012 (% of Turkey's GDP)

Source: World Bank (2016)

Over the course of the mid-1980s and 1990s, the political situation became chaotic in Turkey. Consequently, Turkish officials became more concerned with containing and co-opting dissident group activities and exerting influence on immigrant organizations than with promoting remittances. In the 1970s, the main cleavage shaping the Turkish diaspora was a political one between the right and left. By the 1980s and 1990s, a plethora of other dividing lines between seculars and conservatives, Turkish nationalists and Kurdish nationalists, and Sunnis and Alevis replaced the left versus right cleavage (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b; Ögelman 2003). The 1980 military coup that ended the conflict between the right- and left-wing camps was followed by the escalation of the civil war between Turkey and Kurdish rebels. The spiralling domestic violence targeting Alevis increased the number of asylum appeals from Turks to European countries (Sökefeld 2008). The emigration of ethnic and religious minorities and political dissidents to Europe created a very heterogeneous Turkish diaspora.

Government policy also shifted towards the diaspora in this period. The military government characterized immigrant organizations as "pro-state" and "anti-state" groups. The government saw secular immigrant organizations as "allies" because they imported the Turkish state's nationalist and secular discourse to the transnational space. On the other hand, officials saw Alevi, Kurdish, and leftist groups as "enemies" (Şenay 2013) and placed them under constant state surveillance. Since there was a clear distinction between "official" Islam, represented by the Diyanet and its branches in Europe, and

61

"parallel" or "dissident" Islam, represented by groups that are not officially recognized, controlled, or endorsed by the state, the government also regarded Islamic organizations other than the Diyanet-linked DİTİB as enemies (Akgönül 2005). Turkey also encouraged the establishment of coordinating committees composed of quasi-umbrella organizations affiliated with the nationalist state ideology (Mügge 2012). These state-led organizations promoted Turkish national interests abroad and strived to thwart opposition groups.

As the Turkish diaspora in Western Europe entered its second-generation, its members faced strict host-state citizenship policies and increasing xenophobia. Turkish officials, therefore, also became worried about the threat of waning ties between young Turks abroad and their homeland and by the assimilation of Turks into European societies. Turkey's diaspora policy around this time included policies for the successful integration of Turks into their new destinations. However, the Turkish definition of integration was narrow, including only social integration and the protection of cultural rights. In the 1980s, Turkey began to send religious personnel to European countries through the Diyanet. Turkey also sent Turkish language teachers through the Ministry of Education (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b, 108). These policies revealed Turkey's intention to retain ties with the Turkish community abroad.

State Discourse

The way Turkish bureaucrats view and refer to Turkish immigrants changed dramatically after immigrants shifted from temporary to permanent settlement. In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkish bureaucrats tended to view Turkish emigrants as uncivilized, low-skilled "villagers" (*köylü*) or "remittance machines" (*döviz makinesi*). Yet by the 1990s, Turkish officials had begun to see Turkish expatriates as promoters of Turkey's interests abroad.

An examination of official documents demonstrates this shift in perception. Overseas Turks were referred to as "workers abroad" (*yurtdışı işçileri*) in parliamentary proceedings in the 1960s and 1970s. Parliamentarians believed that Turkish workers would be short-term temporary residents in Europe. Consequently, they abstained from using the word "immigrant' (*göçmen*) in official documents in that period. Parliamentary discussions of the 1960s and 1970s were restricted to a small number of topics, including remittances and the co-optation of dissidents (Artan 2009).

The parliamentary proceedings of the 1980s addressed Turks abroad as "immigrant workers" for the first time. They also used the words "expatriates" (*gurbetçiler*)[8] and "Turkish citizens abroad" (*yurtdışı Türkler*) (Aksel 2014). Remittances remained a significant topic of formal discussion throughout the 1980s. Concerns over dissident groups, the threat of radical Islam, and the protection of the cultural identity of

---

[8] This term has a derogatory undertone, dismissing Turkish immigrants as uneducated, low-skilled people.

younger generations constituted the other main themes that were raised in the sessions (Artan 2009).

In the 1990s, Turks in Europe were cited as "Euro-Turks" (*Avrupa Türkleri*) in official documents (Kaya and Kentel 2005). The education of Turkish children in Europe and the perpetuation of cultural ties between immigrants were some of the important topics that dominated the parliament discussions (Artan 2009). It was around this time that parliamentarians began to emphasize the economic and political contributions of Turks abroad to the homeland, especially as "goodwill ambassadors." However, Turkey was a weak state at the time and its effectiveness was limited. In the words of an immigrant organization leader:

> Ankara wants us to be like the Armenians in the United States, but Turkey is very poor at this. They say: "Go and settle and lobby for us" (…) But they forget another point: You have to take care of your people if you want their support, and Turkey never did this. People here are faced with a lot of (…) state discrimination (…) Even when they go to the consular departments (…) And this creates an atmosphere where Turkey can't say: "So I did this for you and now you do something for me" (*quoted* in Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b, 116).

Institutions

Until the 2000s, Turkey's communication with its diaspora had been facilitated through three government offices operating at the ministerial level: 1) the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 2) the Office of the Prime Minister, and 3) the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.[9]

At the sub-ministerial level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Directorate for Consular Affairs is the main government body that oversees relations with expatriates. The institution's official goals are enumerated as contributing to the bilateral relations between Turkey and other countries, helping Turkish citizens in their adaptation to the country in which they live, and safeguarding the rights and benefits of Turkish citizens abroad (Law 6004). Since 1986, in cooperation with the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also promotes Turkish culture, language and art abroad and contributes to bilateral relations between Turkey and foreign countries through its Turkish Cultural Centers (*Türk Kültür Merkezleri*).

Tied to the Office of the Prime Minister, the Diyanet,[10] which was established in 1924 following the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, has served as another important arm of Turkey's diaspora affairs. Founded to bring all religious activity under state control, the Diyanet sent its first *imams* to Europe in the 1980s.[11] The main duties of the Diyanet are to train religious personnel, provide religious education, enlighten the public about Islam, and administer sacred places of worship.

---

[9] I exclude the Turkish Coordination and Cooperation Agency (*Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı*, TİKA) from my analysis because the organization's main focus is on kin and relative communities rather than Turks abroad.

[10] The introduction of secularism (*laiklik*) in 1928 constituted a milestone for state-religion relations in modern Turkey. As a reflection of modern Turkey's secular state ideology, Turkish constitutions do not recognize or promote any official religion. However, the creation of the Diyanet as the main state institution responsible for the administration of religion in the society demonstrates that Turkey's secularism is different from the French *laïcité*: Turkish secularism is not about the separation of church and state. It is about "the subjugation and integration of religion into the state bureaucracy" (Zürcher 2004, 233).

[11] Personal interview with DİTİB secretary-general, November 27, 2013, Cologne.

The Promotion Fund (*Tanıtma Fonu Kurulu Başbakanlık Merkez Teşkilatı*) is another sub-unit connected to the Office of the Prime Minister. It was established in 1985 to disseminate Turkey's culture, language, history, and art to the world and to shape international public opinion in accordance with Turkey's interests.[12] The Advisory Board for Turkish Citizens Abroad (*Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu*) is another unit that has been operating under the auspices of the Office of the Prime Minister. It was founded in 1998 with the participation of ministers, party representatives, and immigrant organization leaders to facilitate dialogue between Turks living abroad and the state, tackle legal problems encountered by Turkish immigrants, and aid their integration.[13]

The Ministry of Labor and Social Security is responsible for enhancing and protecting the rights and benefits of Turkish citizens working abroad (Law 3146). Its Directorate General for Issues Related to Workers Abroad[14] was established in 1972 as the first attempt of the Turkish state to coordinate matters related to Turkish workers abroad. This organization assists Turkish immigrants in their country of destination and upon their return to Turkey through consulting services (İçduygu 2008; Artan 2009). The office also coordinates social security agreements signed with foreign governments (Kaya 2008).

---

[12] More information is available at: http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr

[13] The Turkish Parliament proceeding, Session 20, Volume 3, March 24, 1998.

[14] Its name has been changed to the Directorate General for Services on Foreign Relations and Workers Abroad in 2003.

Political and Social Concessions

The shift in the 1980s in the Turkish government's view of the Turkish community abroad is evident in the landmark amendment in Turkish citizenship law in 1981. Changing the 1964 Turkish Citizenship Law,[15] it permitted dual citizenship for Turkish nationals (Ünver 2013). Under the new law, Turkish nationals became eligible to apply for and acquire the citizenship of another country after receiving a permission document from the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (İçduygu 2008). Likewise, the 1982 Constitution became the first constitution to highlight the need to maintain relations with Turkish immigrants. Article 62 of the Constitution noted that:

> [T]he state shall take the necessary measures to ensure family unity, the education of the children, the cultural needs, and the social security of Turkish nationals working abroad; to safeguard their ties with the home country; and to facilitate their return to the homeland.

In the 1980s, the Turkish government took additional steps to establish relations with its diaspora. These included the introduction of paid military service (*bedelli askerlik*) after the adoption of Law No. 2299 and the curtailment of the duration of mandatory military service for Turkish men residing abroad (Freeman and Ögelman 1998, 783). In addition, after 1987 Turks living abroad for more than six months could vote in general elections and referenda using polling stations set up at Turkey's external

---

[15] Constitutionally, Turkish citizenship relies on territory (*jus soli*). However, the 1934 Law on Settlement (Law 2510) grants persons of Turkish descent and culture the right to enter the country for the purpose of permanent settlement and the right to Turkish citizenship. Turkish citizenship can also be acquired through marriage, residence, birth, and intention to settle permanently (Hecker 2006).

borders or in Turkey.[16] However, take up of this opportunity was limited (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b, 111).

In the early 1990s, a handful of Turkish parliamentarians set up special commissions and published reports on the conditions of Turks abroad (Kadirbeyoğlu 2007). Following these initiatives, citizenship law was amended to create a "privileged non-citizen status" under the Pink Card (*Pembe Kart*) program. Holders of a Pink Card who renounced Turkish citizenship to take the citizenship of their country of settlement retained all Turkish citizenship rights except for voting and running for seats in local and national elections. In this period, Turkish policy-makers also revised the Turkish Party Law to allow political parties to establish party branches abroad. The effects of this reform were mostly symbolic, as no political party opened an overseas office until the 2000s (Mügge 2012). In addition, Turkey's state-run television and radio began daily broadcasts in Europe.

While some ministries opened sub-units to assist immigrants in the 1990s, the establishment of an overarching institution to centralize and coordinate relevant diaspora institutions and policies was still a distant goal. Moreover, the parliamentary reports and special commissions of the time did not prove effective. They were typically put forward as ephemeral proposals by individual politicians and lacked clear-set goals or strategies.

---

[16] Election Law, Article 94/E, 2008; Law no. 3270, dated 03/28/1986; Official Gazette and Law no. 3377, dated 05/23/1987.

Most did not include immigrants in the process.[17] The diplomatic services, likewise, fell short in aiding the Turkish community abroad. Their top-down attitude, cumbersome and costly services, and inability to take action against the rise of racist attacks targeting Turks in Europe alienated the diaspora (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b).

Turkey's unambitious diaspora policy in the 1980s and 1990s could be explained by a combination of economic and political factors. In the 1980s, globalization converted state-led economies to open-market economies. Turkey was no exception to this transformation. Following a transitional period of military rule between 1980 and 1983, neoliberal reforms undertaken by Turgut Özal created a clear break from the import-substitution policies of previous decades (Öniş 1991, 2004). As a consequence of this "shock-therapy market transition," the state eliminated its direct control on trade, shifted the public sector from manufacturing into infrastructural sectors, and opened its economy to international markets and foreign investors (Cooper 2002).

Turkish politics also changed dramatically in the 1980s. While Turkey advocated for parliamentary democracy since the mid-1950s, it lacked an institutionalized democracy until 1980. In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, Turkey reestablished its parliamentary multi-party democracy under the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP). The restoration of democracy, coupled with the above-discussed process of

---

[17] Personal interview with YTATB director, July 24, 2013, Ankara.

economic liberalization, brought about an initial change in the state's attitude toward its diaspora.

Nevertheless, this growing interest did not result in a serious policy change because the government lacked both economic and political coherence to engage with the diaspora more assertively. Turkey's market liberalization continued throughout the 1990s. However, the Turkish economy was vulnerable to external monetary and fiscal shocks. High inflation and severe economic crises crippled the economy in the 1990s and scuttled the ambitious economic reforms (İlhan 2009). In addition, Turkey's escalating war with the Kurdistan Workers' Party in the 1990s posed a heavy financial burden on the country. The series of fragmented coalition governments that dominated the political arena since the 1960s, and the lack of a united, powerful elite further weakened Turkey's political stability.[18] As one top official from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs put it during an interview, Turkey's economic and political context created the main obstacle that prevented Turkey from reaching out to its nationals abroad at that time.[19]

Turkey failed to engineer a well-articulated diaspora agenda in this period in part because Turks in Europe were mainly embroiled in the homeland's problems, and did not participate in the economic, social, and political life of their host countries (Ögelman 2003, 178–180). In addition, the military intervention of 1980 not only fragmented the

---

[18] With the exception of the Republican People's Party (1947–1950), the Democrat Party (1951–1960), the Justice Party (1969–1971; 1979-1980), and the Motherland Party (1987–1991), coalition governments ruled Turkey until the 2000s.

[19] Personal interview with an official from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research, August 1, 2013, Ankara.

Turkish party system but also created rifts within the Turkish diaspora in Europe (Argun 2003). The export of domestic conflicts to Europe delayed Turkish immigrants' integration into host societies. While the transition from temporary to permanent settlement began in the 1980s, it took time for this transformation to mature and bear fruit. Neither could Ankara contribute to the social mobility of Turks abroad due to the country's lack of economic and political resources. Accordingly, it was not until the late 1990s that Turkish expatriates gained economic, political, and social clout in their host states, and Turkish officials had the resources to coordinate with its diaspora.

Turkey's inability to craft a coherent diaspora policy until the 2000s was also a result of Turkey's position at the weaker end of the asymmetric relationship with European countries (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Even though Turkey had hinted at its aspiration to join the European Union (EU) since the early 1960s and even applied for full membership in 1987, Turkey–EU relations showed no progress until the late 1990s due to Turkey's economic and political weakness (Müftüler-Bac 2005, 17). Ankara acknowledged the diaspora's potential as a player in bilateral and multilateral relations with EU member states. However, Turkey's emigration policy-making remained limited and ineffective. This passive policy would change soon.

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES SINCE THE 2000S

Motives

Over the last two decades, Turkey has embarked on a new diaspora engagement strategy based on a nuanced understanding of and increasing rapprochement with the diaspora. Emigration policies in the past focused on immigrant remittances. Since the 2000s, Turkey's emigration agenda is mainly driven by political and symbolic goals.

Turkish officials have realized in recent years that an integrated and enfranchised diaspora armed with the rights and prerogatives of citizenship would be beneficial for both immigrants and the homeland. To this end, Turkish officials have developed a keen interest in advancing the "social capital upgrading" of Turkish citizens by improving the diaspora's quality of life and changing the image of Turks as backward people. Official capacity development programs have urged the Turkish community to participate in European elections, obtain dual citizenship, and learn the language of their host country.

Turkish politicians also view Turks abroad as a foreign policy lobby for Ankara. Turkey has increasingly sought to build its leverage and legitimize its presence in Europe through its diaspora population. The government has therefore actively mobilized Turks abroad to support Turkey's national interests. First and foremost, Turkey conceives the émigré population as a key lobby group to advance Turkey's EU bid (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Bilgili and Siegel 2011, 2013). The government also encouraged Turkish expatriates to protest against host state policies that they consider harmful to the interests

of the homeland, such as the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Moreover, Turkey's diaspora outreach policies have aimed at consolidating the political power of ruling political parties in Turkey.

The Turkish government has also changed how it treats its diaspora rhetorically. Since the 2000s, Turkey has included emigrants into positive narratives of popular sovereignty and stories of "peoplehood" (Collyer 2013). Turkey's diaspora outreach policies seek to evoke loyalty and a sense of obligation among Turks abroad and to extend the state's legitimacy beyond its borders. This pattern of changing relations with the diaspora reflects Turkey's self-perception as an emerging power. Turkey's "symbolic nation-building" policies and transnational exercise of home-state power entail both the extraction of obligations and extension of rights to non-resident Turks. By granting political and social concessions, Turkey aims to show that it is a country competent enough to safeguard its expatriates abroad, and that it is ready to embrace diaspora members as part of its nation. Such "transnationalization of citizenship" (Lee 2004) has granted "thin membership" (Smith 2003) to the Turkish diaspora, and exerted "thin sovereignty" over them in return (Gamlen 2006, 10).

Key Changes

Turkey's new diaspora agenda is marked by three changes: 1) the promotion of a more inclusive state discourse toward Turks abroad, 2) the institutionalization of diaspora affairs through the establishment of new diaspora institutions and the expansion of the existing ones, and 3) the provision of social and political concessions to diaspora members.

An Inclusive State Discourse

In the last few years, Turkey has deliberately reframed the position of Turkish immigrants in its state discourse and called for a change in the definition of the diaspora. The messages conveyed during mass rallies organized by Turkish officials in Europe reflect this. A common theme in these rallies is Turkey's rise as a new economic and political leader in the region that has a growing capacity to protect Turkish expatriates. Through these rallies, Turkish politicians disseminate the message that the current government, unlike its predecessors, is capable of caring and advocating for its citizens abroad.

In these rallies, Turkish politicians also extoll overseas Turks as qualified, hard-working, influential people who are "equal citizens" of Turkey and representatives of the country in Europe (Erdoğan *quoted* in *Der Spiegel*, February 11, 2008). They draw attention to the input of expatriates to Turkey's economic growth and praise their

74

lobbying power overseas. In 2004, Mustafa Baş, a parliamentarian from the incumbent

AKP suggested that:

> Today Turkey not only has workers but also academics, students, and businesspeople [abroad]. On top of that, Turkey has a great lobbying power abroad (…) A great state is a state, which benefits from these people, organizes them, directs them, knowing that they are a potential power.[20]

In a more recent rally that took place in Germany on May 10, 2015, Erdoğan

conveyed a similar message: "[F]or us you [Turks abroad] are not guest workers, you are

our strength in foreign countries (…) The ballot box is your weapon."[21] In the same rally,

Erdoğan indicated that German Turks' votes shape Turkey's future and that "the creation

of a new Turkey will start in Germany." An organization leader I interviewed also

reported that Erdoğan referred to him and other Turkish immigrant organization leaders

as "raiders" (*akıncılar*) in a diaspora meeting held in Germany.[22]

Since the early 2000s, parliamentary proceedings have opted for the term

"diaspora" to refer to the Turkish émigré population. This is a surprising change given

that previously the concept "diaspora" had a negative connotation in Turkey. The term

had initially been used to refer to former non-Muslim ethnic groups of the Ottoman

Empire, such as Armenians, Greeks, and Jews who emigrated to Europe and the

Americas in the 19th century. Yet today Turkish officials suggest that anyone who

---

[20] The Turkish Parliament proceeding, Session 98, Volume 52, Meeting 2, June 8, 2004 (*cited* in Artan 2009, 192).

[21] This speech is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apt--qsn0wk

[22] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (IGMG) vice secretary-general, November 22, 2013, Cologne.

emigrated from Anatolia regardless of religious or ethnic background should be considered a part of the Turkish diaspora (Davutoğlu 2013 *cited* in Öktem 2014, 22).

The Institutionalization of Diaspora Politics

The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (YTATB)

The creation of the YTATB as an institution designed mainly for the purposes of diaspora engagement served as a catalyst for Turkey's diaspora affairs. The YTATB came into existence in 2010 (Law No. 5978).[23] Tied to the Office of the Prime Minister, it provides assistance to three groups: 1) Turks living abroad, 2) kin and relative communities residing in neighboring countries, and 3) international students studying in Turkey.[24]

The institution is composed of seven sub-departments.[25] The Citizens Abroad and the Public Relations and Communication departments are the two most fundamental sub-units tasked with setting diaspora engagement strategies and coordinating with immigrant organizations. In addition to its headquarter in Ankara, the institution has two other coordination branches in Izmir and Edirne. As the institution's first director Kemal Yurtnaç spelled it out during an interview, its main objective is to work with Turkish

---

[23] Two prior initiatives paved the way for the creation of this institution. First in 2003, Turkish parliamentarians with an immigration background set up a commission in the Turkish Parliament to deal with the problems of the Turkish diaspora. Four years later, a second parliamentary report concerning the Turkish diaspora took the first concrete step toward the creation of a single state institution at the ministerial level to streamline the existing diaspora policies (Kirişçi 2008).

[24] This dissertation's main focus is on Turkey's state policies aimed at Turks living abroad. Hence, policies and activities targeting kin and relative communities, and international students will not be discussed.

[25] These departments are: Citizens Abroad, Cultural and Social Relations, Public Relations and Communication, Foreign Students, Strategic Planning, Legal Advisory, and Human Resources and Support.

citizens abroad to help them overcome their problems, assist their integration into European societies, and remind them of their social and cultural ties to the homeland. The organization provides capacity development training to representatives of Turkish immigrant organizations in a variety of areas, including anti-discrimination, active citizenship and equal participation, justice, bilingual education, academic and professional development, family and social security, and the preservation of native culture.[26]

In another interview, Yurtnaç emphasized that the organization "aims to transform Turkish people living abroad from being a mere 'crowd of Turkish people' into a diaspora, that is, an organized force capable of defending its rights, while working at the same time to influence policy in the countries where they live in" (Yurtnaç *quoted* in *Today's Zaman*, April 30, 2013). The YTATB has an advisory board that consists of a maximum of 70 elected Turkish-origin individuals living in different parts of the world. The board members are elected for a four-year period during which they make recommendations to the Turkish government on various issues concerning the Turkish diaspora.[27]

As the following figures (Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4) illustrate, the YTATB has been providing generous financial assistance to Turkish civil society organizations

---

[26] Personal interview with YTATB director, July 24 2013, Ankara.

[27] "Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulunun Çalışma Usul ve Esasları Hakkında Yönetmelik," available at: http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/27795_0.html

operating abroad, foreign students residing in Turkey, and kin and relative communities.[28] These figures have shown such a rapid growth in financial assistance and supported projects as the institution has become stable over time. Yet, as the subsequent chapters will detail, this financial assistance has mostly been allocated to conservative-nationalist and Sunni Islamic organizations. In contrast, as interviews with Alevi and secular organizations revealed, the YTATB has not provided funding to non-religious organizations.

Figure 3.3: Financial Assistance Provided by the YTATB, 2011–2015 (in USD)

Source: Author's compilation based on the activity reports (2011–2015) of the YTATB (Currency from TL to USD converted by the author)

---

[28] In 2015, kin and relative communities received 45 percent of the total financial aid provided by the YTATB, whereas Turkish civil society organizations operating abroad received 34 percent of the budget. The rest (21 percent) was provided to foreign students studying in Turkey (YTATB Activity Report 2015).

Figure 3.4: Number of Projects Supported by the YTATB, 2011–2015

Source: Author's compilation based on the activity reports (2011–2015) of the YTATB

Since its establishment, the YTATB has worked closely with other state bureaus, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the Ministry for EU Affairs. Other government offices view the creation of the YTATB as a positive development. As Turkey's Ambassador to Germany indicated:

> The YTATB and the existing institutions, such as the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs don't vie with each other for power but rather complement and improve each other's services (…) For instance, Turkish consulates in Germany mainly provide services in the areas of citizenship, marriage, and conscription. The YTATB, on the other hand, offers additional budget and expertise in different realms and enriches our social services.[29]

The Yunus Emre Foundation

The promotion of Turkish identity, culture, history, and language is another key objective of Turkey's new diaspora framework. The Yunus Emre Foundation, named

---

[29] Personal interview with Turkey's Ambassador to Germany, November 7, 2013, Berlin.

after a Turkish poet and Sufi mystic of the 13th century, was built in 2007 in Ankara with this motivation in mind, and operates as the cultural pillar of Turkey's new diaspora policy. The institution coordinates cultural and public relations activities previously performed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture.[30]

According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2009 and 2014, "foreign policy is not carried out solely with diplomacy but also with cultural networks (…) The Yunus Emre Foundation's main goal is to popularize and disseminate Turkish language and cultural heritage to the world" (Yunus Emre Bulletin November 2010, 10). Over time, the institution has inaugurated Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centers (*Yunus Emre Türk Kültür Merkezleri*) in 36 countries across the world and 8 countries in Europe (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centers in Europe

Country	City	Country	City
1.UK	London	**5. Belgium**	Brussels
2. Poland	Warsaw	**6. Netherlands**	Amsterdam
3. France	Paris	**7. Romania**	Bucharest and Constanta
4. Hungary	Budapest	**8. Germany**	Berlin

Source: Office of Public Diplomacy (2016)

Since 2011, the institution also administers the Turkology Project, which teaches Turkish culture and language at 53 universities in 36 countries in the world. The state has

---

[30] Personal interview with an official from the Yunus Emre Foundation, July 31, 2013, Ankara.

extended its support to the program by sending 1,618 teachers and 112 lecturers to assist the instruction of Turkish language and culture abroad. The number of countries where Turkish courses are offered at public schools exceeded 80 in 2015 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). Yunus Emre Cultural Centers also provide financial assistance to Turkish immigrant organization projects focusing on the promotion of Turkish language and culture.

Institution leaders believe that there is increasing demand for Turkish language and culture due to Turkey's rise as an economic and political power.[31] My interviews with officials from the Yunus Emre Cultural Center in Paris also revealed that they feel proud of Turkey's economic and intellectual opening to the world.[32] During the foundation's inauguration ceremony, Erdoğan asserted that:

> Turkey is witnessing a new era, a breakthrough. This institution [the Yunus Emre Foundation] will play a key role in introducing the "new Turkey" to other countries, and will be an important center in the promotion of our language and culture (…) Turkey doesn't deserve to be associated with economic crises, terrorist attacks, and assassinations. The Yunus Emre Foundation will be the best answer to those who try to present Turkey as a conflict-ridden, weak country. Turkey has been a melting pot for different cultures and traditions for centuries, and carries the legacy of an empire that spawned an unmatched civilization. Turkish language does not belong only to Turks living in Turkey. Our language, cuisine, music, and architecture belong to a wider geography, spanning from Yemen to Vienna (…) Erecting this legacy is an important responsibility for us (…) The Yunus Emre Foundation is an essential instrument of this mission, and will serve as our window to the world (Yunus Emre Bulletin September 2009, 4).

---

[31] Personal interview with an official from the Yunus Emre Foundation, July 31, 2013, Ankara.

[32] Personal interview with the director of the Yunus Emre Cultural Center in Paris, March 5, 2013, Paris.

Turkish officials' neo-Ottoman discourse and the location of Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centers show how these centers aim to strengthen Turkey's linkage to its ancestral lands, and perpetuate "the common history and heritage" rhetoric the government now uses. The former President Abdullah Gül added that these centers serve as the most important instrument for the promotion of Turkish culture during Turkey's EU accession process (Yunus Emre Bulletin February 2011, 18).

In sum, new diaspora institutions, such as the YTATB and the Yunus Emre Foundation have reemphasized Turkey's role as an emerging great power and a modernizing agent, and spread the idea that the Turkish diaspora contributes to the rise of Turkey internationally (Kaya and Tecmen 2011, 17).

The Office of Public Diplomacy

The Office of Public Diplomacy was established in 2010 under the Office of the Prime Minister. The institution's *raison d'être* is to increase the visibility and effectiveness of Turkey in the international arena by telling the story of "new Turkey" to a wide audience across the globe.[33] Another official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that together with other diaspora institutions, the Office of Public Diplomacy aims to corroborate Turkey's image as a powerful country and refresh ties with the diaspora.[34]

---

[33] Personal interview with the director of the Office of Public Diplomacy, August 1, 2013, Ankara.

[34] Personal interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Studies, August 1, 2013, Ankara.

The institution's first director, İbrahim Kalın links the establishment of the Office to Turkey's rise as a "soft power" since the early 2000s. He suggests that Turkey's historical and cultural depth, democratization efforts, increasing international legitimacy, and economic development qualify it as a soft power in international politics, and this status creates opportunities for new spheres of influence. The Turkish diaspora constitutes an important part of this mission. According to Kalın (2011, 19), Turks' perceptions of Turkey have changed in parallel to Turkey's transformation. Today Turkish citizens no longer see themselves as "a problematic and small footnote in the Euro-centric historical narrative," and they desire to see Turkey as an active agent creating its own history.

The Empowerment of Existing Institutions

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In addition to the establishment of new diaspora institutions, the organizational capacity, quality, and budget of the existing diaspora institutions have expanded significantly since the early 2000s. As Figure 3.5 presents, since 2002, Turkey has increased the number of its diplomatic missions around the world to expand its influence in foreign policy.

Figure 3.5: Total Number of Diplomatic Missions Around the World, 2002–2014

As Figure 3.6 shows, Europe hosts the highest number of Turkish missions. Over the last two decades, Turkey has strengthened its presence in the continent by opening more missions.

Figure 3.6: Regional Distributions of Turkish Missions Abroad, 2002–2014

Since 2001, the Turkish government has diversified and ramped up the quality of consular services. One of the most concrete examples of this change was the distribution

of two circulars by Abdullah Gül (who was serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time) to Turkish embassies and consulates in Europe to induce cooperation with Millî Görüş (*Radikal*, April 10, 2003). As a diplomat from the Turkish Consulate in Berlin explained, in the past bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been reluctant to form close relations with conservative immigrant organizations. However, "this negative stance has finally disappeared, and the gap between the state and the public has diminished."[35] Turkey's Ambassador to Germany confirmed that Turkish diplomats' relations with Turkish expatriates have changed: "When I first assumed this position, I requested that my personnel treat Turkish citizens better (…) A 'good governance' revolution has begun in Turkey."[36]

The Diyanet

The Diyanet has undergone major changes since 2003. It has increased religion's public presence and introduced ambitious measures to increase staff capabilities and to broaden its services (Gibbon 2009, 19, 22). It has also adopted a more positive and inclusive stance toward conservative organizations. Today, the institution recognizes and embraces currents of "parallel" Islam and strives to incorporate them under its roof. As an official from the Diyanet pointed out, since the 2000s there has been a process of rapprochement among Islamic organizations and the Turkish government. This attitude

---

[35] Personal interview with a diplomat from the Turkish Consulate in Berlin, December 3, 2013, Berlin.

[36] Personal interview with Turkey's Ambassador to Germany, November 7, 2013, Berlin.

change is evidenced by the Diyanet's willingness to send religious personnel to other Islamic organizations.[37]

Another striking change is the expansion in the Diyanet's budget and the number of religious personnel hired. Table 3.2 documents that the Diyanet's budget has increased tremendously since 2002. The largest increases have been made during the last few years. The Diyanet's budget is larger than all the existing ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Defense. This table also details the Diyanet's incremental budget in relation to Turkey's overall budget.

Table 3.2: The Budget of the Diyanet, 2002–2014

Budget Year	Overall Budget (in USD)	The Diyanet's Budget (in USD)	The Diyanet's Budget as Percentage of Overall Budget (%)
2002	33,094,646,702	186,620,177	0.6
2003	49,655,967,483	259,825,242	0.5
2004	50,819,106,862	329,499,946	0.6
2005	52,650,965,723	379,729,444	0.7
2006	57,397,737,910	441,281,115	0.8
2007	72,543,143,473	552,654,163	0.8
2008	78,915,013,202	674,077,632	0.9
2009	93,126,543,785	827,839,810	0.9
2010	101,750,346,662	894,037,650	0.9
2011	113,047,721,128	1,072,289,992	0.9
2012	130,031,053,547	1,312,583,554	1.0
2013	149,795,762,155	1,153,258,471	1.0
2014	161,933,493,327	1,836,002,632	1.1

Source: Bruce (2015, 119) (Currency from TL to USD converted by the author)

---

[37] Personal interview with an official from the Diyanet's Strategic Development Office, July 24, 2013, Ankara.

The number of religious personnel sent abroad has also increased considerably since the early 2000s. The Diyanet does not provide direct funding to mosques. However, it has sent both short-term and long-term religious personnel to other countries since the 1980s. Figure 3.7 demonstrates that the number of religious personnel serving abroad has increased over the years.

Figure 3.7: The Number of Diyanet Religious Personnel Serving Abroad, 1974–2015

Source: The blue points correspond to the number provided by Çakır and Bozan (2005), the red squares reflect the numbers provided by the media and parliamentary reports, and the green points refer to the projected numbers announced in the Diyanet's 2012–2016 Strategic Report (Bruce 2015, 397)

Political and Social Concessions

While the majority of countries in the world have introduced out-of-state voting (Collyer and Vathi 2007; Faist and Kivisto 2007; Lafleur 2013), non-resident Turkish

citizens lacked this right until 2012 when Turks were given the right to cast votes by regular ballot at polling booths in their countries of residence.

The election held in 2014 to elect the 12th President of Turkey became the first election that permitted external voting.[38] However, among 2,798,726 registered voters living abroad, only 530,116 overseas voters cast their ballot (Supreme Electoral Council 2014).[39] In other words, the participation rate was only 18.94 percent. Why was turnout so low? Ballot boxes were placed in big cities, mail ballots were not accepted, and Turkish officials did not explain voting procedures well. Table 3.3 presents the 2014 presidential election results for the three competing candidates: the AKP's leader Erdoğan, the People's Democratic Party's (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP) Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtaş, and the Republican People's Party's (*Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi*, CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party's (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) joint candidate Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu:

---

[38] All citizens over the age of 18 that are registered on the overseas electoral roll at diplomatic missions or population registration offices are eligible to vote in Turkish national elections.

[39] Available at: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/HaberDosya/2014CB-Kesin-GumrukYurdisi-Grafik.pdf?_afrLoop=22656611625189210.

Table 3.3: The 2014 Presidential Election Results (Nationwide and Overseas Votes)

Person	Nationwide votes	%	Overseas votes	%	Customs votes	%	Total votes	%
Erdoğan	20,670,826	51.65	143,873	62.30	185,444	62.73	21,000,143	51.79
Ihsanoğlu	15,434,167	38.57	64,483	27.92	89,070	30.13	15,587,720	38.44
Demirtaş	3,914,359	9.78	22,582	9.78	21,107	7.14	3,958,048	9.76
Invalid/ Blank Votes	734,140	-	1,857	-	1,719	-	737,716	-
Total	**40,019,352**	**100**	**230,938**	**100**	**297,340**	**100**	**41,283,627**	**100**
Registered Voters/ Turnout	52,894,115	77.05	2,798,726	8.32	-	-	55,692,841	74.13

Source: Supreme Electoral Council (2014)

The June 2015 parliamentary elections addressed some of the logistical problems. Turks abroad were able to cast their votes during a longer period of time, and more polling stations were set up. These elections introduced two major changes that benefited the Turkish diaspora. Citizens abroad were included in political parties' election platforms for the first time. In addition, emigrant candidates were placed in the electable ranks on party ranks, which would allow them to serve as deputies in the Turkish Parliament (Mencütek and Yılmaz 2015, 1).

The external votes had a major impact on the 2015 elections' results. Due to the above-mentioned improvements, the turnout rate increased to 37 percent, with a total of 1,056,078 citizens casting votes at polling stations and customs gates all around the world. Furthermore, five deputies from emigrant backgrounds were elected to the

Parliament (Mencütek and Yılmaz 2015, 6–9). The outcome of the elections was once again satisfying for the AKP, as the party remained the most popular party abroad, receiving 50.37 percent of the overseas votes. The HDP (21.43 percent), the CHP (15.93 percent), and the MHP (9.09 percent) shared the remaining overseas votes (Supreme Electoral Council 2015a).

The June parliamentary elections were repeated in November 2015 because the four parties in the Parliament failed to secure a parliamentary vote of confidence. This time the overseas voter turnout reached 45 percent with 1,298,325 votes, and the AKP increased its share to 55.28 percent of the total overseas vote. Table 3.4 lists the election results, and Figure 3.8 shows the increase in the overseas turnout rate since the 1980s.

Table 3.4: The November 2015 Parliamentary Elections Results (Overseas Votes)

Party	Vote Share
AKP	55.28%
HDP	18.85%
CHP	16.89%
(MHP	2.06%
Other	6.92%

Source: Supreme Electoral Council (2015b)

90

Figure 3.8: Overseas Voter Turnout in the Turkish Elections, 1987–2015

Source: YTATB's *Artı 90* Magazine (2015, 11)

In addition to political concessions, Turkey has granted further social rights to expatriate Turks. Some European countries, including Germany, Austria, and Denmark require foreigners to renounce their original nationalities if they wish to gain citizenship. This policy used to create legal problems for Turks abroad upon their return to Turkey. In order to remedy this situation and legalize their status, Turkey introduced the Blue Card (*Mavi Kart*) program in 2004, which grants expatriate Turks who renounced their Turkish nationality to obtain the citizenship of their country of residence the right to possess land, live, work, and inherit in Turkey. This program replaced the Pink Card program and

91

provides a more comprehensive and systematic framework.[40] As the head of the

Directorate General for Services on Foreign Relations and Workers Abroad at the

Ministry for Labor and Social Security explained to me, another law (Law No. 3201) was

passed in 2008 to entitle Turks who have renounced their citizenship to receive invalidity,

old age, and survivor's pensions.[41] These policies have encouraged Turkish immigrants

to apply for dual citizenship in their countries of settlement. Turkey's most recent

concession targeting Turks abroad came in January 2016. A bill allowed Turkish citizens

living abroad for more than three years to pay only 1000 euros (rather than 6000 euros) to

be exempt from mandatory military service (*Sabah*, January 14, 2016). Table 3.5

summarizes Turkey's policy change in diaspora affairs throughout the years:

---

[40]Another amendment came in 2012 (Law No. 6304) to improve the administration of the Blue Card program and to extend the right to apply for a Blue Card to the descendants of former Turkish nationals who obtained Turkish citizenship by birth (Pusch and Splitt 2013, 148).

[41] Personal interview with Faruk Küçük, the head of the Directorate General for Services on Foreign Relations and Workers Abroad at the Ministry for Labor and Social Security, July 25, 2013, Ankara.

Table 3.5: Turkey's Diaspora Policy Change, 1960–2015

Time Period	Motive	Discourse	Concessions
1960–1980s	Economic	Negative	• Investment, development, and consultancy benefits
1980s–1990s	Economic & Political	Negative/ Neutral	• Dual citizenship • Transfer of religious personnel and Turkish language teachers to Europe • Military service benefits
1990s–2000s	Economic & Political	Neutral/ Positive	• Pink Card Establishment of political party branches in Europe • Radio and television broadcasting in Europe
2000s–Present	Political & Symbolic	Positive	• New diaspora institutions • External voting • Blue Card program • Welfare benefits • Discounted military service • Civil society empowerment

FROM A PASSIVE TO PRO-ACTIVE DIASPORA POLICY: A MULTI-FACETED ANALYSIS

Although many of the changes I have described had minor effects, it is undeniable that taken together they amount to a sea change in attitude. What brought this about? The many causes can be grouped into two categories.

Domestic Factors

Turkey's shift from a passive to active diaspora engagement policy coincided with the AKP's rise to power in 2002. Over the last two decades, the AKP's economic and political reforms, Europeanization process, neo-Ottoman foreign policy agenda, and promotion of a new identity based on Sunni-Muslim nationalism (White 2014) transformed diaspora relations. The new elite based its conception of a new Turkey on the Ottoman imperial dream of becoming "bigger" and "better" (Yavuz 2006, 7). This vision requires reinforcing social ties among people who share the same dreams (Göle 1997). Accordingly, strengthening ties with Turks abroad and kin and relative communities has become a state priority.

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the modern Turkish state was established in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a secular and nationalist military officer, who came from a Western-oriented elite tradition. This modern ruling elite was very different from the conservative sultans of the Ottoman Empire for whom Islam had played a significant role in politics and the society (Heper

94

2001; Heper and Sayarı 2012). According to some scholars, Kemalist reformers' efforts went far beyond modernizing the state apparatus as the country changed from a multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to a secular republican nation-state, and attempted to penetrate into the lifestyles, manners, and daily customs of the people (Göle 1997, 83). The abolition of the Caliphate, the Arabic alphabet, Islamic education, the Arabic call to prayer (*ezan*), and the wearing of the Islamic veil in the public space struck conservatives as the monopolization of governmental and societal power by the newer modernist elites (Karpat 1973). From 1923 to the 1980s, a secular military and bureaucratic elite and Istanbul-based businessmen dominated Turkish economy and politics. Over time, the gap between the modernist elite and the conservative majority grew (Taşpınar 2007, 118 *cited in* Yılmaz 2009).

In 1983, power was transferred to Turgut Özal, a civilian leader, who went on to rule the country first as prime minister (1983–1989) and then as president (1989–1993). Özal's political reign was characterized by its "synthesis of liberal economic rationality with social unity based on religious-moral values" (Heper 2002, 143). He left his mark on the Turkish economy by empowering the formerly marginalized pious business elite.

While a Muslim bourgeoisie gained economic power with Turkey's neoliberal opening in the 1980s, this new class began to gain political power during the reign of the pro-Islamist parties in the 1990s (Yavuz 2006). Political Islam infiltrated the mainstream

politics through the emanation of the Millî Görüş (Nationalist Vision) ideology.[42] This ideology was first endorsed by the National Order Party (*Millî Nizam Partisi*) in 1970 (banned by the Constitutional Court in 1971 due to intended Islamist agenda) and the National Salvation Party (*Millî Selamet Partisi*) (founded in 1972 and banned in 1980). Both of these parties were founded by Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011) who was a devout engineer-turned-politician trained in Germany, and combined Islamic and national rhetoric (Çakır 2001). After the dissolution of his parties, Erbakan lived in Switzerland for a while before returning to Turkey to establish another Islamic party, the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi,* RP), which came into being in 1983. In 1995, the RP became the first pro-Islamic political party to win significant votes in parliamentary elections with 21.4 percent of the total vote (Supreme Electoral Council 1995). This electoral victory allowed it to form a coalition government with the center-right True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*). Erbakan, who espoused the brotherhood of *ummah*, the creation of an Islamic government and society, and an anti-Western position in foreign policy, became Turkey's first overtly Islamic prime minister.

On February 28, 1997, the military-dominated Nationalist Security Council, the self-appointed guardian of secular Turkey, organized a meeting to discuss threats posed by religious groups to Turkey's secular regime. As a result of this meeting, which was the beginning of the "February 28 process," the Erbakan government was forced to resign.

---

[42] In the 1950s, the Democrat Party rose to power as the first party with a religious undertone, however the 1960 military coup disbanded the Party due to its Islamist policies, including the abolishment of the ban over Arabic prayer.

The RP was closed down for violating Turkish secularism by using religion for political goals.[43] In subsequent months, the top echelons of the military promoted the boycott of religious companies and put key figures, including the then mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on trial (Akyol 2012).

Until the 2000s, the Turkish businesses and political elite had failed to form stable relations with the Turkish diaspora. The largest Istanbul-based business organization, the Turkish Industry and Business Association (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği*, TÜSİAD), whose firms employ 50 percent of the work force in Turkey, opened its first branch in Europe in 2003.[44] The inability of the Istanbul-based political elite and business conglomerates to reach out to Turks abroad was partly due to Turkey's unstable economic and political atmosphere and partly due to the wide cultural gap between the secular ruling elite and Turkish immigrants, the overwhelming majority of whom were conservative, low-income, and low-educated people from the Anatolian provinces.

The AKP, whose cadre arose from the Millî Görüş movement's reformist wing,[45] was established in 2001 and came to power in 2002. It opened a new chapter in Turkish politics by winning 34.3 percent of the total vote, and becoming the first party in eleven years to win an outright parliamentary majority (Supreme Electoral Council 2012). The party's leader Erdoğan's unpleasant experience with the "February 28 process" and the

---

[43] The military first warned the party by posting a memorandum on its website. Hence, this warning is seen as Turkey's "post-modern coup."

[44] Please see: http://tusiad.org/en/tusiad/representative-offices/item/8825-tusiad-berlin-office

[45] Traditionalists remained loyal to Erbakan as well as to the Felicity Party.

RP's failure to attract the support of the devout bourgeoisie led him to distance his party from the preceding Islamist parties of the 1990s and to promote a new party identity premised on democratic, liberal, pluralistic values, and an open-market policy.[46]

Between 2002 and 2011 the Turkish economy thrived, with an average growth rate of 7.5 percent annually, making it one of the fastest-growing economies in the world in that period. This unprecedented prosperity enabled Turkey to provide generous financial assistance to Turks abroad. The AKP's aggressive export-oriented policy increased Turkey's exports from \$36 billion in 2002 to \$132 billion only six years later (Kösebalaban 2011, 148). A strict privatization program enabled Turkey to lower its inflation and attract unprecedented foreign direct investment. During this period, the average per capita income rose from \$2,800 in 2001 to \$10,000 in 2011. Turkey's unemployment rate, inflation rate, and budget deficit were all at record lows by 2012 (Taşpınar 2012).[47] As Anatolia-based businesses have gained more prominence in the economy and opened up to the global market, they have encouraged the government to form stronger relations with the Turkish diaspora and the EU.

In addition to serving as the vanguard of economic liberalization, the AKP's commitment to bringing the country closer to the EU led the government to pass an array

---

[46] The February 28 process, which was initiated to restructure Turkey's political landscape along Kemalist lines, unintentionally paved the way for the rise of the AKP (Cizre and Çınar 2003). This process forced the conservative elite to become active participants of globalization and to support Turkey's Europeanization process. The conservative elite came to realize that Turkey's globalization and democratization process is a means for their empowerment and emancipation from repressive policies (Kösebalaban 2011, 147).

[47] As will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five, Turkey's economic growth and democratization process have lost momentum in the last few years. Economically, the country's low production, political uncertainty, and dependence on external liquidity led to a recession of GDP growth from 9.4 percent in 2004 to 3.98 percent in 2015 (World Bank 2015).

of constitutional and judicial reforms in the mid-2000s. Among all the democratic reforms, the AKP's inclusion of "pluralism" into the state discourse (Turam 2007; Tambar 2014) has had the most salient impact on Turkey's diaspora agenda. The launch of the Alevi Initiative (*Alevi Açılımı*) and the Kurdish Initiative (*Kürt Açılımı*) in the mid-2000s became the first comprehensive state initiatives aimed at responding to Alevis and Kurds' identity-based demands. These initiatives have had important repercussions for Turkey's changing relations with the diaspora because the Kurdish and Alevi groups make up a significant proportion of the Turkish population abroad.[48] Hence, the AKP's democratization reforms[49] have increased the political incorporation of formerly excluded diaspora groups (Alevi, Kurdish, and Islamic organizations) into the public debate. As a state official put it:

> Since the early 2000s, Turkey's economic and democratic progress has been shaping the way the government views its citizens abroad. The previous governments did not respond to Alevis, Kurds, or different Islamic voices when they expressed their demands and concerns. The Turkish state has transformed itself into a responsive and accountable authority that not only listens to its people but also takes action in that direction. The redefinition of the term diaspora in an inclusive manner reflects this metamorphosis. As Turkey has gained self-confidence as a global actor, the state has empowered every segment of the Turkish community in the homeland and abroad regardless of their religious or ethnic differences. Today, an Alevi citizen feels as proud as a Sunni citizen for carrying a Turkish passport. Kurds are as willing as Turks to serve as a lobby group for Turkey. Our government acknowledges these groups' differences, views them as an asset, and treats every member of the Turkish community as an equal citizen.[50]

---

[48] Alevis are an estimated 10-15 percent of the Turkish immigrant community in Europe (Yükleyen 2012, 45). There are more than one million Kurds in Western Europe (Başer 2014, 5).

[49] As will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five, the AKP's democratization reforms have stalled in recent years.

[50] Personal interview with the director of the Office of Public Diplomacy, August 1, 2013, Ankara.

Transnational Factors

Turkey's changing attitude toward its diaspora was also a consequence of developments at the transnational level. The growing economic, social, and political visibility and clout of Turkish immigrants in their host countries since the late 1990s led Turkey to reconsider its interests toward its diaspora.

The shift from temporary to permanent settlement began in the 1980s. Family reunification, the establishment of local associations, and the ownership of houses and businesses consolidated a permanent Turkish community. However, most immigrants, due to their strong transnational engagement in Turkish politics, failed to develop strong ties with host state authorities (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). Moreover, most positions within immigrant organizations were still occupied by the first-generation. A study conducted in 1996 with Turkish immigrant organization leaders in Germany revealed that 29 of 31 leaders interviewed had been born in Turkey. According to another survey carried out during that period, 86.6 percent of German Turks said they read newspapers in their native language (Ögelman 2003, 178–180 *cited* in Arkilic 2016).

Turkish businesses in Europe have thrived over the last two decades. Turkish companies have gradually diversified and become active in fields other than the food and service sectors. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015), there are 140,000 businesses established by Turkish businessmen in Europe as of 2015. These enterprises provide jobs for 640,000 employees, and their total annual revenue exceeds

$70 billion (*cited* in Arkilic 2016). A report published by the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations noted that by 2023, there will be 200,000 Turkish entrepreneurs in Europe, providing jobs for more than one million people (YTATB's *Artı 90* Magazine 2012).

Politically, the Turkish community has acquired a stronger position in Europe through its increased naturalization rates. A report published by the German Statistics Institute specified that among all immigrant groups, Turks become German citizens in the greatest numbers (*Statistisches Bundesamt* 2013). As the following table (Table 3.6) shows, over the course of the 1990s, the naturalization rate of German Turks increased from 0.1 percent in 1990 to 4 percent in 2000. The naturalization rate of Turks in France showed a similar trend. It increased from 0.6 percent in 1990 to 5.9 percent in 2000:

Table 3.6: Naturalization Rates of Turks in France and Germany, 1990–2005

	Naturalization rate, all foreign-born					Naturalization rate, Turkish-born			
	1990	1995	2000	2005		1990	1995	2000	2005
Germany	0.4	1.0	2.5	1.6		0.1	1.6	4.01	1.9
France	1.7	-	4.6	4.3		0.6	-	5.9	5.1

Sources: Ersanilli and Koopmans (2010, 777)

This increase in naturalization rates allowed Turks in Europe to participate in local and federal politics in greater numbers. While Turks in Europe have played an active role in local politics for some time, they became important players in national politics only recently. This trend is particularly evident in Germany.

In 2002, Ekin Deligöz became the first German Turk to enter the *Bundestag*. This was followed by the election of other German Turks as parliamentarians in subsequent years. In 2009, Aydan Özoğuz became the first person of Turkish descent to serve as a minister (Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Integration) in Germany. In the 2013 German federal elections, the number of *Bundestag* deputies of Turkish origin rose from five to eleven (Arkilic 2013, 2016).

German Turks even formed a political party in the 2000s. The Alliance for Innovation and Justice (*Bündnis für Innovation und Gerechtigkeit*, BIG) Party, a local political movement established by German Turks in Cologne in the early 2000s, achieved visibility on the German political scene in the mid-2000s. As its chairman explained to me, the party's first major success came in 2009 when it secured two seats in the city of Bonn's local council. The party won 17,000 votes in the 2013 federal elections, becoming the first immigrant political party to compete in national elections.[51]

According to the Euro-Turks Barometer Survey (Erdoğan 2013a), 57 percent of Turks in Europe have been living in Europe for more than 21 years. Of the total population of Turks in Europe, 91 percent were either born in European countries or have been living in Europe for more than 11 years. Almost half of the people of Turkish origin living in Europe (2.5 million) have citizenship of their country of settlement. Of these, 51 percent have only Turkish citizenship, 21 percent are only citizens of their country of

---

[51] Personal interview with BIG chairman, November 26, 2013, Cologne (*cited* in Arkilic 2016).

residence, and 27 percent have dual citizenship. This survey has also found that 82.5 percent of Euro-Turks believe that they are highly integrated into the society in which they live and 60 percent of them see themselves as people with multiple identities. For instance, in Germany, 77.4 percent of people of Turkish background are determined to stay in Germany permanently. Yet Euro-Turks still define themselves primarily as Turkish-Muslim (34 percent) rather than German/French (1 percent) or European (2 percent). These numbers hint at Turkish expatriates' dual identity: They are European citizens, but they also retain strong ties with their ancestral homeland. Their attachment to Turkey does not necessarily hinder their integration into their new countries (Arkilic 2016).

The changing demographic profile and upward mobility of Turkish expatriates led to the moderation of traditional immigrant organizations. Since the late 1990s, as the new ranks within these organizations have been filled up with second- and third-generation Turkish immigrants born and raised in European countries, a process of "post-Islamism" or "Europeanization" has begun within the Turkish Islamic organizational field (Schiffauer 2010; Yükleyen 2012). This paradigm shift has allowed Islamic organizations to diversify their activities to include non-religious projects (Arkilic 2016).

In recent years, the Diyanet "has repositioned itself from an insular institution to an expansive one and moved from being a domestic institution into a global actor" (Tepe 2016, 176). As an official from the Diyanet explained to me, since the early 2000s, the

Diyanet has become more invested in non-religious issue areas, such as legal matters, the empowerment of Turkish immigrants, and the preservation of native language and cultural identity.[52] The director of the Diyanet's Turks Abroad Office elaborated on this change:

> In light of domestic changes taking place in Turkey since the early 2000s, and the changing needs and demands of new generation Turks in Europe, the Diyanet has set new goals, including deeper involvement with Turkish immigrants, a new education and cultural policy agenda, and a stronger focus on the promotion of Turkish identity and language in Europe. Since then, the Diyanet has opened new offices. Thanks to Turkey's economic growth, now we have sufficient resources to embark upon new projects, such as the establishment of bilingual kindergartens and schools. We have also established theology institutes and programs in France and Germany to train bilingual religious personnel who will form better relations with younger generation Turks. Today, everyone knows that Turkish immigrants will not return to Turkey. Therefore, we are doing our best to serve the needs of second-, third-, and fourth-generation Turks.[53]

Even though conservative organizations' localization process had begun much earlier, as the following chapters will explain in detail, Turkey's engagement with them has activated their political engagement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Diyanet, the YTATB, and the Yunus Emre Foundation have contributed to these organizations' empowerment process by providing generous moral, financial, legal, and technical assistance to them.

To improve, coordinate, and administer Turkish civil society organizations' lobbying activities in Europe, the AKP established the Union of European Turkish

---

[52] Personal interview with an official from the Diyanet's Foreign Affairs Office, July 26, 2013, Ankara.

[53] Personal interview with the director of the Diyanet's Turks Abroad Office, July 26, 2013, Ankara.

Democrats (*Avrupalı Türk Demokratlar Birliği*, UETD) in 2004 as an overarching lobbying organization based in Germany. Today the organization has ten branches in other European countries. According to its secretary-general, the UETD reflects Turkey's rise in the international arena. Its main goals are to contribute to Euro-Turks' deeper social and political integration into European societies and to lobby for Turkey's EU membership.[54]

International Factors

Turkey's diaspora agenda has also been influenced by international developments. The nature of the relationship between the homeland and host countries varies over time, as does the homeland's perception of the possibilities and limits of action within this power structure (Délano 2011, 14–18). Turkey's diaspora policies between the 1960s and 1990s were characterized by the asymmetry of power between Turkey and the EU. Over the last two decades, following Turkey's recognition as a candidate for full EU membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the beginning of full accession negotiations with the EU in 2005, and the development of a neo-Ottoman foreign policy, Turkey's perception of its capabilities in the context of its relations with the Turkish diaspora and host states has changed significantly.

Starting from the second half of the 1990s, the EU has served as a key external actor for fomenting political change in Turkey. The 1999 Helsinki Summit officially

---

[54] Personal interview with UETD secretary-general, November 27, 2013, Cologne.

recognized Turkey as a candidate for full membership to the EU, and this recognition constituted a milestone in Turkey–EU relations. After the Helsinki Summit, Turkey enjoyed a more balanced set of conditions and incentives. The AKP has implemented a series of economic and political reforms between 2002 and 2005 in preparation for EU membership. The 2005 Luxembourg Summit of the EU started full accession negotiations with Turkey, and the first accession chapter was opened that year. During an interview, a Turkish official commented that this was the beginning of a period when Turkey has begun to attain a stronger negotiation position vis-à-vis the EU.[55]

The initiation of EU accession negotiations with Turkey overlapped with the advent of a "neo-Ottoman" foreign policy on the part of the AKP. Turkey's then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu has argued that Turkey is destined to reassume a historic and critical role in the world due to its Ottoman legacy (2008). In this line of thought, he argued that Turkey is not a "regional" or "peripheral" power, which merely follows the order of superpower allies, but a "central superpower" with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one category:

> [T]here is a clear need to pursue a proactive diplomacy with the aim of strengthening prosperity, stability and security in a neighborhood, which spans the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Caspian basin, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, from the Gulf to North Africa, not void of tension but also abundant with unfulfilled potential. With stronger political will on the part of the countries of the region and coordinated encouragement by the international community, I am convinced that poverty and conflict can be replaced in time with prosperity and cooperation (…) Turkey enjoys multiple

---

[55] Personal interview with the director of the Office of Public Diplomacy, August 1, 2013, Ankara.

regional identities and thus has the capability as well as the responsibility to follow an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy. The unique combination of our history and geography brings with it a sense of responsibility. To contribute actively towards conflict resolution and international peace and security in all these areas is a call of duty arising from the depths of a multidimensional history for Turkey (Davutoğlu 2009, 12).

This neo-Ottoman ideal was also visible in a speech that Erdoğan gave following the 2011 parliamentary elections, in which he depicted the electoral triumph of the AKP as an accomplishment for all Muslims around the world. In his words: "Today both Istanbul and Sarajevo won, both Ankara and Damascus, both Diyarbakır and Ramallah, as well as Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank of Jordan, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip won" (*quoted* in *Hürriyet*, June 13, 2011). Turkey's new neo-Ottoman foreign policy encourages economic and political rapprochement with the diaspora and kin communities and emphasizes the contribution of Turkish immigrants to Turkey's neo-Ottoman ideals (Davutoğlu 2001).

The spiraling global crisis that hit Europe in 2005, and the eruption of the Eurozone crisis in 2010 further changed Turkey's perceptions of its power in opposition to the EU powers. As Europe's economic problems have become more obvious and Turkish economy has fared well, Turkish officials have begun to depict Europe as a conflict-ridden region with stagnant economies and comatose labor markets.[56] While Europe was coping with financial stress, Turkey has paid off its remaining debt to the

---

[56] Personal interview with an official from the Ministry for EU Affairs, July 25, 2013, Ankara.

IMF and witnessed a dramatic increase in foreign investment (*Foreign Affairs*, January 2014).

Amidst these developments, Turkey has reoriented itself as a powerful country in the region. The Minister of Economy's words reflect this change: "Turkey is no longer a weak country that asks for outside financial help, takes orders [from the EU], and whose agenda is consequently shaped by other countries. Turkey is now a country whose success serves as a model for others" (*Today's Zaman*, November 18, 2011). During my interviews, Turkish officials have noted that: "[I]n the past, Turkish officials' meetings with European bureaucrats would start by responding to criticisms directed at Turkey. Today, *we* raise questions and criticize the EU."[57]

In a recent rally that took place in Germany on May 24, 2014, Erdoğan emphasized that "[f]or decades, our [Turkish] identity, values, and beliefs have been insulted (…) Today's Turkey is not that old Turkey."[58] The incumbent party listed EU membership as a top goal for 2023 yet maintained the argument that Turkey should be seen as a powerful country and "an equal partner" that should set the agenda together with European countries rather than serving as the EU's pawn. The party's roadmap for 2023 reiterates that, despite unfair obstacles put before Turkey, the Copenhagen Criteria should be redefined as "Ankara Criteria," and Turkey should move forward to achieve this goal. In line with Turkey's neo-Ottoman foreign policy, the manifesto added that:

---

[57] Personal interview with the director of the Office of Public Diplomacy, August 1, 2013, Ankara.

[58] Erdoğan's speech is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FLv8MKrFXw

"the country's pro-active foreign policy, global activism, and critical role in the Balkans, Caucasia, Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East will continue to shape global politics" (AKP 2023 Political Vision).

CONCLUSION

Over the last two decades, Turkey has woven a new diaspora engagement strategy based on the promotion of a more positive narrative toward Turkish citizens abroad, the establishment of new diaspora institutions, and a series of political and social privileges extended to the diaspora. This chapter argued that while until the 2000s the Turkish state's diaspora policies were driven mainly by economic incentives, Turkey's current diaspora agenda is mainly shaped by political and symbolic goals. Politically, Turkish officials have strived to improve the Turkish diaspora's quality of life and change the negative image of Turks and Turkey abroad. Turkey has also sought to increase its leverage in Europe through its diaspora population, and actively mobilized Turks abroad in favor of Turkey's national interests. In addition, Turkey's diaspora outreach policies have aimed at consolidating the political power of the ruling party in Turkey. Symbolically, Turkey's diaspora outreach policies have sought to extend the state's soreveignty and "soft power" beyond its borders.

This chapter also showed that Turkey's diaspora policies are a result of the amalgamation of domestic, transnational, and international factors. They are strongly influenced by the characteristics of the domestic regime and the interests of incumbent

governments, the social capital of the diaspora, and Turkey's bilateral and multilateral relations with European countries as well as policy-makers' perception of their limits and capabilities. This chapter particularly pointed to the role of domestic factors in shaping Turkey's diaspora agenda. It argued that the AKP's rise to power in 2002 has changed the ways in which Turkey interacts with its transnational diaspora and defines and perceives its international position vis-à-vis European countries.

Chapter Four: Political Participation of Turkish Immigrant Organizations in France

A careful examination of immigrants' naturalization rates, electoral participation, and political representation in elected bodies reveals that immigrants have a higher general rate of political participation in France than in Germany. At the organizational level, French immigrants are also more vocal in making collective claims and participate in extra-institutional protests more frequently compared to immigrants in Germany. Paradoxically, these observations do not hold for Turkish immigrants in France. Compared to Maghrebis and Sub-Saharan Africans, Turks in France have the lowest rate of naturalization, electoral participation, and political representation in elected bodies. Until very recently, Turkish immigrant organizations were also largely absent from the political life of France. Contrary to the visibility of non-Turkish immigrant organizations in political debates, Turkish Muslim leaders in France did not display interest in French politics. They were not present in the *Beurs* marches. Nor did they participate in the *sans-papiers*, headscarf, and *banlieue* protests in the 1990s and 2000s. The recognition of the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 as genocide by the French Parliament in 2001 and the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments after 9/11 did not trigger any political action either.

This pattern of political behavior shifted in recent decades. From the mid-2000s onward, the political apathy of Turkish Muslim leaders in France has transformed into

active citizenship. The number of Turkish people running for office increased dramatically. The leaders of conservative immigrant organizations took unprecedented interest in electoral participation and began to cooperate with French authorities in the CFCM. They also launched large-scale political demonstrations aimed at the French state for the first time.

This chapter shows that existing approaches cannot account for conservative Turkish immigrant organizations' recent political engagement in France. Group-related accounts cannot provide a satisfactory answer because French Turks are still the least socio-culturally and politically integrated immigrant group in France. Turkish Muslim leaders in France have managed to engage in collective political action despite their limited resources.

The institutional account cannot explain why conservative Turkish organizations have become politically mobilized in France only recently either. An examination of France's citizenship policies, church-state relations, and specific policies targeting Muslims shows that France has not undertaken any groundbreaking institutional change with respect to its immigrants over the last two decades. In fact, France's immigration and integration policies have become increasingly restrictive throughout the 1990s and 2000s. A decline in the naturalization rate of French Turks reflects this trend.

According to a grievance-oriented theory, immigrant organization leaders who see themselves as holding a disadvantaged position in their host country's inter-ethnic

context are inclined to become politically mobilized in order to improve their perceived disadvantaged position compared to other groups. Yet even though Turkish Muslims in France experience discrimination in daily life at similar rates with Maghrebi and Sub-Saharan African immigrants, they report less discrimination than other immigrant groups. Hence, this approach also falls short.

I argue that Turkey's engagement with its diaspora in France is the main reason for the sudden increase in political activism. Turkey's intervention into the lives of its diaspora in France is a deliberate strategy to attract expatriate votes and to increase the lobbying potential of French Turks. Several homeland-related factors have spurred immigrant activism in France, including the growing involvement of Turkish diplomatic personnel in immigrant organizational life in France, government-sponsored political rallies held in large French cities, and the large numbers of religious personnel sent by the Diyanet. The channeling of financial assistance and organizational support to conservative immigrant organizations by the YTATB was also an important factor. The frequency and intensity of French Turks' collective action increased particularly after the establishment of the YTATB in 2010.

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the history of ethnic immigration in France. It then details the history of Turkish immigration in France. In the subsequent section I scrutinize France's citizenship policies, church-state relations, and specific policies targeting Muslims. Next, I analyze Turks' political presence in France. The last

section of the chapter unravels Turkey's recent involvement in the Turkish organizational field in France.

THE HISTORY OF ETHNIC IMMIGRATION IN FRANCE

Since the mid-19th century, demographic and economic concerns lead France to open its doors to immigrants. However, immigration has never been central to France's national identity (Wihtol de Wenden 2014, 135). Until 1980, France's *laissez-faire* approach to immigration resulted in spontaneous and clandestine policies and the failure to address the socioeconomic problems plaguing immigrants (Freeman 1979). Since 1980, an astonishing amount of legislation passed on immigrants' entrance and settlement following the shift of power between right- and left-wing governments. These governments differed in their approaches to immigration yet frequent rotation of governments prevented them from developing a long-term consistent policy. France's immigration and integration policies have become increasingly restrictive over the last two decades.

The 1889 Nationality Law France laid the legal foundations for nationality on the basis of the principle of soil (*jus soli*) rather than blood (*jus sanguinis*). During the early decades of immigration, France pursued policies to turn immigrant workers from Germany, Belgium, Italy, North Africa, Poland, and Asian colonies into French citizens (Hollifield 2004, 184).

The first significant immigration from its Muslim colonies took place during World War I to supplement military personnel (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 63). In the aftermath of World War I, France sought to replace the losses due to war long-term population decline via immigration. Most were from Italy, Eastern Europe, and Russia. The General Immigration Society founded by employers shaped immigration policy in this period. A 1927 law on naturalization allowed aliens residing in France for three years to become citizens (Schain 2008). Yet economic recession in this decade soon brought the influx of immigrants to a halt and spawned xenophobic sentiments (Wihtol de Wenden 2014, 136).

The thirty years between 1945 and 1974 witnessed the expansion of French economy and a series of attempts to create an inclusionary immigration policy. The Ordinance of 1945 (*Ordonnance*) set the tone for immigration and naturalization policy and rejected the idea of cherry picking immigrants on the basis of ethnicity and natural origins. It prioritized economic and demographic needs instead (Hollifield 2004, 185–186).

During the 1950s and 1960s, the new reluctance of Italians to come to France led to the recruitment of nonwhite immigrants and the entry of people without legal documents (*sans-papiers*) into labor force (Freeman 1979). Afro-Caribbean and Maghrebis became the main nonwhite immigrant groups settling in metropolitan France.

Their emigration to France expanded in response to rapid population growth, increasing unemployment, and the decolonization process (Giubilaro 1997; Maxwell 2012, 35).

The protests, marches, and factory closings that occurred in May–June 1968 prompted a radical change in French immigration policy. The government's reaction to the involvement of immigrants in the protests was harsh. France unilaterally restricted the number of Algerians who could enter the country. This swift change was one of the first manifestations of the government's recognition of the potential danger of a large, disenfranchised, and unassimilated Maghrebi population (Freeman 1979, 86; Cesari 1994). In July 1974, administrative *circulaires* suspended labor and family immigration (Wihtol de Wenden 2014, 136).

The 1980 Bonnet Law tightened entry requirements and facilitated the expulsion of undocumented immigrants. In 1981, the first government of the left since the thirties rose to power with the election of François Mitterrand to presidency (1981–1995). Immigration policies moved towards a liberalizing "grand bargain" (Martin 1991). Abrogating the Bonnet law, the government granted conditional amnesty to undocumented immigrants and residency and work permits to all immigrants (Weil 1995, 2008). Foreign associations had long been long prohibited without prior approval.[59] This was abolished in 1981. After this change, a plethora of immigrant organizations were

---

[59] Foreign associations fell under the *décret loi* of the Executive of 12 April 1939 at that time, which aimed stop Nazi propaganda in France (Basdevant-Gaudemet 2004, 60).

established with religious, cultural, charitable, and educational goals (Wihtol de Wenden 1995).

Immigration became more politicized with the victory of the far-right National Front (*Front National*, FN) in the 1984 municipal elections. This was the first time since 1945 that an extremist party on the right gained national popularity. Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, the FN garnered approximately 10 to 15 percent of the popular vote in regional, national, and European elections. Moreover, a one-time use of proportional representation in the 1986 legislative elections allowed the FN to send 35 deputies to the National Assembly that year (Bleich 2003, 147–148). In 1986, France amended the existing immigration law in effect since 1984.[60] The Pasqua Law restricted access to resident cards and facilitated the deportation of illegal residents who were deemed dangerous to the unity and peace of French society. In 1989, the Joxe Law eased the conditions of the Pasqua Law yet maintained tough entry requirements (Schain 2008, 41).

French immigration policy shifted toward an approach that focused on law and order and national security in the 1990s. The second Pasqua Law in 1994 facilitated expulsions, restricted undocumented immigrants' claims to social benefits, and revoked suspected marriages of convenience. Most importantly, it restricted the *jus soli* rights of children born in France by replacing automatic naturalization at the age of 18 with

---

[60] Before the amendment, an alien was eligible for permanent resident status by marriage to a French citizen (Law of July 17, 1984). The Pasqua Law required one year of marriage and revoked marriage of convenience. Moreover, the law specified that aliens convicted of a felony or misdemeanor should not be granted residency status (Schain 2008).

bureaucratic hurdles and partially limiting the application of double *jus soli*, whereby a French-born child of at least one French-born noncitizen parent automatically receives French citizenship (Howard 2009, 150–152). In 1994, the Méhaignerie Law required immigrant children born in France to request citizenship at age 16–21 and set extensive residency requirements for Maghrebis claiming citizenship. In 1997, the Débre Law expanded the power of the police, increased residency requirements for the naturalization of the spouses and children of legal immigrants, and hardened policies on family visits to resident immigrants.

The left came back to power in 1997 and once again promised a liberalized immigration policy. The Chevènement law, passed in 1998, reestablished the principle of *jus soli*. In the same year, an expert committee convened under the leadership of political scientist Patrick Weil, argued that the Pasqua Laws were detrimental to the French economy. Weil's recommendations served as the basis for a 1998 nationality law that facilitated the admission procedure for professionals, restored double *jus soli*, resimplified the process for automatic *jus soli* at the age of 18, and facilitated spousal naturalization (Howard 2009; Hamilton et al. 2014).

Nevertheless, a new conservative government led by Nicholas Sarkozy tightened immigration policy once again in the early 2000s.[61] The first Sarkozy Law in 2003 sought to curb illegal immigration, facilitated expulsion, and required that a couple have been

---

[61] "Chronologie: histoire de l'immigration en dates," available at: http://www.vie-publique.fr/politiques-publiques/politique-immigration/chronologie-immigration/

married for at least two years to apply for naturalization. Moreover, France introduced tighter controls on immigration to respond to the 2005 *banlieue* riots (*Le Figaro*, October 10, 2015). In 2006, the second Sarkozy Law introduced new laws on marriage and decreased the number of visas available (Schain 2008, 41). Restrictions on family reunification and undocumented immigration prevailed. The 2007 Hortefeux Law stipulated that immigrants must pass an evaluation of language competence and knowledge of the Republic in order to qualify for family reunification and announced a strict policy of repatriations. The 2011 Besson Law introduced even more restrictive criteria for family reunification and prohibited foreign students from staying in France upon completion of their studies (Wihtol de Wenden 2014, 137).

Even though the 2012 victory of the Socialist François Hollande indicated a less restrictive immigration policy (*Le Monde*, December 15, 2014), his term brought about no significant changes in immigration policy. Hollande has advocated for an open-door policy in the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis. His promise to welcome 30,000 refugees to France in the next two years is a concrete example of this policy change (*Washington Times*, November 18, 2015). Yet non-citizen foreign residents still lack the right to vote in local elections[62] and curbing illegal immigration is still a priority in French immigration policy.

---

[62] In France and Germany, non-citizen foreign residents cannot participate in local elections even when they pay their taxes and reside in their host country for a long time. Only EU citizens are allowed to vote in their town or city's municipal elections and the European Parliament's elections.

Figure 4.1 shows the growth of France's foreign population between 1961 and 2012. Table 4.1 breaks down immigrant groups based on their country of origin (this list does not include naturalized immigrants).

Figure 4.1: France's Foreign Population, 1961–2012

Source: INSEE (2016)

Table 4.1: Main Foreigner Groups in France, 1982–2012 (in 1000)

Country	1982	1990	1999	2009	2012
Spain	327	216	162	128	244
Italy	340	253	202	174	292
Portugal	767	650	554	493	598
Algeria	805	614	478	468	747
Morocco	442	573	504	440	692
Tunisia	191	206	114	144	251
Turkey	**122**	**198**	**208**	**222**	**248**

Source: INSEE population censuses (1982–2012)

THE HISTORY OF TURKISH IMMIGRATION IN FRANCE

Unlike immigrants from Africa and South Asia, Turkish immigrants do not share colonial ties with any European state. Large-scale Turkish emigration to France started in

1965 following a bilateral agreement signed between the Turkish and French governments. Labor shortages and the demographic challenges of the post-war era were the rationale for importing labor (Abadan-Unat 2002). The first major flow of Turkish immigrants to France took place in the 1970s when French companies systematically invited Turkish immigrants to France (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 28). Turkish emigration continued over the course of the 1970s in the form of legal family reunifications and illegal entry (Manço 2012). A massive wave of Turkish immigration occurred in the 1980s due to Turkey's political instability. Turks mainly settled in Paris, Rhône-Alpes, Alsace-Lorraine, and Bretagne (Petek-Şalom 1998; Hüküm et al. 2007). Dissident groups and religious Turkish organizations, which had long been repressed in Turkey, found openings in the free political atmosphere of France and expanded (Akgönül 2009, 44).

In earlier periods of immigration, Turks established small organizations to meet their daily needs, to assist newcomers, and to socialize. The first type of organizations focused on labor, student concerns, and community charity.[63] Turkish immigrants also had religious needs that could not be met without special effort. In early years of Turkish immigration, small measures were taken, converting hotel rooms, garages, and warehouses into small prayer rooms (*masjids*) (Amiraux 2001). These early organizations were rudimentary, informal, and loosely organized (Kepel 1991).[64] This was in part due

---

[63] For example, the Association of Solidarity with Turkish Workers (ASTU) was established in Strasbourg in 1974 to struggle against the maltreatment of immigrants in workplaces and to foster solidarity. Interview with the chairman of the ASTU, November 11, 2014, available at: http://www.zamanfransa.com/article/astu-40-yilini-gocmenlik-konulu-seminerle-kutladi-15159.html

[64] Personal interview with ELELE chairwoman, February 20, 2013, Paris.

to immigrants' economic difficulties and in part due to institutional obstacles, such as the obligation to receive prior authorization to establish associations of any sort.

From the 1970s onwards, political factions within Turkey found expression in transnational movements and led to the creation of leftist, conservative nationalist, Sunni, and Alevi organizations. These homeland-oriented political groups were mainly headquartered in Germany; however, they established transnational branches in France (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b).

Conservative-nationalists linked to the MHP in Turkey, opened the first political umbrella organization founded by Turks in France in 1978. For years, this organization remained aloof from other conservative organizations and had their *imams* sent from nationalist support networks in Turkey. In France, this organization united its branches under the name the Turkish Federation in 1995. The Turkish Federation's chairwoman informed me that the organization convenes 50 organizations under its roof today.[65]

The 1970s also saw the incorporation of *masjids* into well-organized networks. Since the Diyanet-linked religious organizations did not arrive in France until the 1980s, alternative religious currents dominated the Turkish Islamic field during the first two decades of Turkish immigration (Akgönül 2006). After the 1971 military coup in Turkey, leaders from the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers sought refuge in Europe. This organization became the first Turkish immigrant organization to inaugurate formal

---

[65] Personal interview with Turkish Federation chairwoman, March 1, 2013, Paris.

mosques in Europe. Its first mosque in France opened its doors in 1979 (Lemmen 2000; Caymaz 2002). Today the organization has several regional centers across France. Since its inception, it has remained a close-knit community that provides space for daily religious practices in its mosques and Islamic education in its boarding schools.[66]

The Islamic Community Millî Görüş (*Communauté Islamique Millî Görüş,* CIMG) is another organization representative of the "dissident Islam" that emerged from the religious networks founded in the 1970s. Millî Görüş originated in Turkey in 1970 as a political Islamist movement aiming to change Turkish political and public life through democratic means (Yükleyen 2012, 22). The movement gained prominence in Europe from the late 1970s. It developed the first mosque organization in France in 1979.[67] Millî Görüş's main goal is to increase religion's role in the public sphere and to promote Muslim identity in Europe.[68]

The Council for Justice, Equality, and Peace (*Conseil pour la Justice, l'Egalité et la Paix,* COJEP) was originally established in 1985 as the youth wing of Millî Görüş. In 2000, the organization separated from Millî Görüş. Since then, the organization has established close links with the AKP government and serves as a lobby group with its 25

---

[66] The organization's members practice Islamic mysticism related to the Sufi Naqshibandiyya order and follow the teachings of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan Efendi (1888–1959) (Jonker 2000).

[67] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) chairman, May 17, 2013, Paris.

[68] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) chairman, May 17, 2013, Paris.

branches located in various regions in France. The COJEP is also active in Germany and Belgium.[69]

The 1980s marked the beginning of a period when Turkish officials felt the need to organize Turks in Europe under the patronage of "official Islam" and to isolate Turkish immigrants from alternative political and religious currents they deemed threatening (Den Exter 1990 *cited* in Yükleyen 2012). According to the Diyanet, other religious organizations posed a threat to Turkey with their politicized *imams*. Turkey aimed to establish an official religious organization in opposition to these established organizations. To this end, Turkey first created the position of foreign religious service counsellor in 1978 through the Turkish embassies abroad. It then formed the Diyanet-linked Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*, DİTİB) in France in 1986 as an overarching organization to provide basic religious service to the Turkish community abroad.[70] As an institution with organic ties to the Turkish state (DİTİB presidents serve as officials in Turkish embassies),[71] the DİTİB's main goals were to embrace all Turkish Muslims, to restore their loyalty to the Turkish state, and to place religion under state control. Today the DİTİB is the largest Turkish

---

[69] Personal interview with COJEP chairman, March 16, 2013, Strasbourg.

[70] The Diyanet did not build any branch in France and Germany in the 1970s, however it sent temporary religious personnel for the month of Ramadan together with the Turkish Ministry of Labor (Gözaydın 2009).

[71] DİTİB presidents serve as the counselor for religious services at the Turkish embassies abroad. They hold a diplomatic status and receive their salary from the Diyanet. Hence, DİTİB presidents have both religious and administrative duties (Bruce 2015).

religious umbrella organization in Europe and is frequented by around 70 percent of Turkish Muslims, most of whom are first-generation immigrants.[72]

The French Act of 1981 deepened the politicization of existing Turkish immigrant organizations and led to a mushrooming number of political Turkish immigrant organizations in addition to the religious organizations. As its chairman noted, in 1980, Turkish refugees linked to the left-wing Revolutionary Path movement in Turkey created a political new organization called the Assembly of Citizens Originating from Turkey (*l'Assemblée Citoyenne des Originaires de Turquie*, l'ACORT). L'ACORT strives to combat discrimination and to promote immigrants' equal participation in daily life.[73]

In the 1980s, Alevis also formed associations in France. The first Alevi cultural centers in France were established in Strasbourg and Metz (Koşulu 2013). Like other Turkish organizations, Alevi organizations were small and mainly occupied with homeland problems in this decade. The Federation of Alevi Unions in France (*La Fédération de l'Union Des Alévis en France*, FUAF), the largest Alevi umbrella organization, was founded in Strasbourg in 1998. It has other branches in major French cities. FUAF leaders advocate for the recognition of Alevi identity and faith in Turkey and France.[74] Table 4.2 lists the most active homeland-originated Turkish umbrella organizations in France.

---

[72] Personal interview with DİTİB chairman, May 23, 2013, Paris.

[73] Personal interview with l'ACORT chairman, December 12, 2013, Paris.

[74] Personal interview with a FUAF official, December 9, 2013, Paris.

Despite their institutionalization, Turkish immigrant organizations in France consistently failed to constitute a social group and engage in political action oriented toward their host state until recently.

Table 4.2: Homeland-Originated Turkish Organizations in France

Organization	Est. Date	Focus
The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers	1979	Religion • Daily religious practices and Islamic education
Millî Görüş (CIMG) * COJEP was originally established in 1985 as the youth wing of Millî Görüş	1979	Religion • Muslim public identity
L'ACORT	1980	Secularism • Immigrant rights and anti-discrimination •
DİTİB	1986	Religion • Loyalty to Turkey
Turkish Federation	1995 *First conservative-nationalist organization founded in 1978	Religion and nationalism • Turkish and Muslim identity
FUAF	1998	Ethnic identity • Alevism

French Citizenship Policies

France has the most liberal citizenship policy in Europe (Howard 2009). Until recently, the only conditions for full citizenship were the length of residence and language competency. Both conditions are easy to achieve because most of France's post-World War II non-European immigrants came from former French colonies. Moreover, France's citizenship regime rests on the *jus soli* principle (Weil 2008).

In the first half of the 19th century, most people born on French soil to foreign parents were not accepted as French citizens. Only a child born to a French father either in France or abroad was granted automatic French citizenship. This principle of *jus sanguinis* dominated French nationality legislation between 1803 and 1889 (Sahlins 2004). The 1889 law abolished this restriction by establishing the first version of double *jus soli*, which endowed third-generation immigrants with automatic citizenship if born in France (Howard 2009, 150; Bertossi 2010, 2). While minor modifications took place over time, the 1889 law forms the legal cornerstone of contemporary French nationality law.

The tremendous casualties of World War I led France to implement a lenient naturalization policy in the interwar era. French women were allowed to retain their citizenship even if they married foreigners and even to transfer it to their children. In this period, the residency requirement for naturalization dropped from ten to three years. In

127

addition, following World War I, France has allowed dual citizenship (Bertossi 2010, 2–8).[75]

Following World War II, France implemented a selective approach to citizenship by favoring immigrant groups, such as Europeans, who were deemed easier to integrate than Maghrebis or Turks (Weil 1995). This changed somewhat with the Law of 1961, which modified the conditions under which former colonial subjects were granted citizenship by abolishing good health and legal residence requirements. After the 1963 Evian Accords, France granted Algerians automatic naturalization if they lived in France for five years and were over 18 years of age. France equalized nationality rights for men and women in 1973 and gave automatic citizenship to French-born children of parents who were born in former colonies (Weil and Spire 2006 *cited* in Howard 2009, 151). Since 1973, French nationals living abroad are allowed to pass their nationality through an infinite number of generations as long as the French descendant registers with a French authority. Foreign spouses are entitled to citizenship after two or three years of marriage (Bertossi 2010, 2–6).

In the 1980s, the FN proposed a more restrictive naturalization policy based on immigrants' assumed assimilation capacity. This law did not pass. However, to appease the opposition, the prime minister convened a commission and held public hearings about the law. The commission's final report concluded that the core identity and values of

---

[75] Yet only since 1973, both men and women can retain their French citizenship if they acquire foreign citizenship. In some extreme cases, such as betrayal to the state, the French citizenship of dual citizens may be revoked (Bertossi 2010).

France should be redefined in order to cope with a new kind of ethno-cultural and religious diversity. This report spearheaded the transition from a universal republican understanding of integration toward a culturally-dependent approach based on explicit racial framings. Other official reports published in the 1990s perpetuated this exclusionary rhetoric and singled out Maghrebis and Turks as immigrant groups with deep-seated cultural and religious traits that are at odds with the core values of the French society (Bertossi 2012, 432–433). As discussed above, in the mid-1990s, the Pasqua, Méhaignerie, and Débre Laws imposed restrictions to the automatic *jus soli* principle and spousal naturalization. The 1998 nationality law reversed the restrictive reforms.

Today, French citizenship is granted at birth if one of the child's parents is French regardless of the country of birth. Citizenship is also granted if the child is born in France and has one parent also born in France. A person born in France whose parents are neither French nor born in France will automatically become French at the age of 18 if the person resides in France and does not decline citizenship. Immigrants (foreign residents of France born in a foreign country) may apply for naturalization, which requires five years of residence. If immigrants come from a former colony or a francophone country, they only have to be resident in France at the time of the application (Bertossi 2010, 1).

The center-right victory in the elections of 2002 led to the introduction of several new restrictions on citizenship and the politicization of immigration and integration

129

(Bertossi and Hajjat 2013). Despite these developments, the fundamental characteristics of the 1998 law on citizenship remain unchanged. Figure 4.2 shows foreigners' naturalization trends in France since 1995.

Figure 4.2: Naturalization of Foreigners in France, 1995–2014

Source: INSEE (2014)[76]

Church-State Relations

France's state policies toward religion have historically been shaped by an ideological battle between proponents of *laïcité de combat* (combative secularism) and *laïcité plurelle* (pluralistic secularism). Combative secularism aims to separate religion from the public sphere, whereas pluralistic secularism allows the public visibility of religion (Kuru 2009, 106). The principle of combative *laïcité* is the dominant ideology in

---

[76] Foreigners' naturalization trends in France could also be viewed at: http://www.jeune-nation.com/societe/demandes-dasile-cartes-de-sejour-regularisation-naturalisation-la-politique-de-remplacement-du-peuple-francais-en-chiffre.html

France and determines state policy on the accommodation of religious practices and groups.

The first two articles of the 9 December 1905 Law on the Separation between Church and State constitute the legal basis of French *laïcité.* According to Article I of the 1905 Law, the Republic guarantees the freedom of conscience. The free practice of religions is subject only to the restrictions set out in the interests of public policy. Article II stipulates that the state should not recognize nor subsidize or corroborate any religion (*cultes*). However, expenses related to chaplaincy services and those designed to guarantee the free exercise of religions in public establishments, including schools, nursing homes, and prisons, may be covered by specified state budgets.

What makes the French system unique in Europe is that the 1905 Law ended state protection for Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism that had been recognized, protected, and funded by the state previously. In other words, no religion is recognized by the French state and all religions and beliefs stand on an equal legal footing. The separation was specifically directed at the Catholic Church due to the 1801 Concordat[77] (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 69).

---

[77] The 1801 Concordat was signed between Napoleon Bonaparte and the Pope Pius VII. The Condordat granted the French state the right to nominate bishops and created a system of "recognized religion" (*cultes reconnus*) in which Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism were all equal, with Catholicism being the first among equals. The ministers of the recognized religions became salaried state employees. The Alsace-Moselle region is subject to the Concordat rather than the 1905 Law because this region was under the German authority in 1905. In Alsace-Moselle, ministers of the recognized religions are salaried state employees, and Christian churches and Jewish subsidiaries receive public subsidies. The state also finances the construction of places of worship that belong to the recognized religions (Baubérot 2004).

Religions are organized in the form of associations in France. In other words, religious groups are entitled to form religious associations. The definition and operation of these associations are subject to sections 18 and 19 of the 1905 Law. These associations can have no other purpose than as religious organizations and are not allowed to receive subsidies from public funds. They can benefit from tax exemptions when they receive donations if the state explicitly acknowledges their status as religious associations and grants them full legal capacity during the receipt of donations (Basdevant-Gaudemet 2004, 61–62). While Muslim organizations are subject to the 1905 Law, they rarely become religious associations under this law and operate under the 1901 Act instead (Laurence and Vaisse 2006, 85–86).

The law of associations is defined by the Law of 1 July 1901, which ensures that the right to form associations is a fundamental public right. According to this Law, any association that has legal status can be formed freely and should be disbanded only if it endangers public policy. In theory these associations are only allowed to receive hand-delivered gifts with no tax benefits for the donor. Yet under certain conditions, associations formed under the 1901 Law can be categorized as "public utility associations" and receive major tax benefits. Moreover, they can request subsidies from public authorities. In other words, although the state provides no direct funding to religious organizations from the public budget, religious associations may receive indirect financial assistance (Basdevant-Gaudemet 2004, 59–60). In other words, even

though the constitution demands a strict separation of church and state in France, in reality, the rules are at times relaxed in a way that provides benefits to Muslim organizations (Arkilic 2015).

The Incorporation of Islam and Muslim Immigrants in France

The Headscarf Issue

As the Muslim population in France grew over time, religious issues, including the allocation of Muslim cemetery spaces, the accreditation of *imams*, the construction of mosques, ritual slaughter, and the demand for Islamic education challenged prevailing understandings of French secularism. The Islamic headscarf controversy became the most contentious issue with respect to the accommodation of Muslim religious rights in France.

In 1989, the director of a public high school in Creil (near Paris) expelled three Muslim schoolgirls because they wore headscarfs (*hijab*). When the school administrators and parents of the girls could not reach a mutually suitable solution, the Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin, took the case to the Council of the State. The Council ruled that teachers wearing a headscarf would be a violation of the principle of *laïcité*; however, for students, it was permissible in accordance with the "freedom of conscience" (Joppke 2009, 38). This ruling did not resolve the headscarf controversy, which once again came to the forefront in 2003 when President Jacques Chirac set up a

commission to study the application of the *laïcité* principle. The Stasi Commission's report laid the grounds for a 2004 law on secularism and conspicuous religious symbols at school that prohibited the wearing of the headscarf in addition to the Christian and Jewish religious symbols and dress (Bowen 2006). A new law came into effect in 2011 following a report written by André Gerin, a member of the National Assembly, that prohibited the wearing of full-face veils (*voile intégral*), such as a burqa and a *niqab* in public (Bowen and Rohe 2014).

Muslim Representative Bodies

There are more than 1500 Muslim organizations in France. Given that there is no central authority governing Islam and that French Muslims come from many cultural backgrounds, Muslim immigrants are divided and have not established a unified national political organization to represent their interests (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 10). Three umbrella organizations represent the majority of Muslims in France. Specific currents of Islam and specific national-origin communities dominate each organization: the Algerian-dominated Great Mosque of Paris, the Egypt-linked Union of Islamic Organization, and the Moroccan-dominated National Federation of Muslims in France (Basdevant-Gaudemet 2004, 63). Turkish Muslims are not a part of these organizations and have established their own associations, as noted above.

The French state established the CFCM in May 2003 as a representative body that would facilitate dialogue between French Muslims and state authorities regarding the

regulation of Islamic worship and public ritual practices, the allocation of Muslim cemetery spaces, the training and accreditation of *imam*s, halal certification, and the construction of mosques (Godard and Taussig 2007). The CFCM's participants are elected by mosque organizations based on the size of their prayer rooms. If a mosque organization's prayer room occupies more space, it secures more seats in the CFCM. The French state is not a party to the CFCM, only fulfilling an observatory role. It only appoints the president and the vice-president of the CFCM.[78]

The CFCM is limited to representing Islam—not Muslims themselves—in state institutions. As an official from the CFCM explained to me, the CFCM does not speak for the Muslim population but rather gives voice only to observant Muslims. Moreover, since its proposals and decisions are not binding, most Muslim organizations do not take the CFCM seriously.[79]

Currently, three main organizations are represented in the CFCM: The Coordination Committee of Turkish Muslims of France (*Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France*, CCMTF)—an organization linked to Turkey's DİTİB[80]; the Great Mosque of Paris; and the pro-Moroccan Rally of French Muslims. Thus, the CFCM represents religious Turkish Muslims to an extent.

---

[78] Personal interview with a CFCM official, May 25, 2013, Paris.

[79] Personal interview with a CFCM official, May 25, 2013, Paris.

[80] The DİTİB is represented under a different name in the CFCM. DİTİB officials established the CCMTF in 2001 to show that the DİTİB is an independent organization with no organic ties to Turkey (Personal interview with the former CCMTF representative in the CFCM, March 4, 2013, Paris).

Islamic Education

Education is the hallmark institution of French *laïcité*. In keeping up with the 1905 Law, the national curriculum does not teach religion as a formal subject in primary education. However, primary schools are allowed to close one day a week with the exception of Sunday to permit parents to register their children in religious education organized by non-state entities. In addition, chaplains are free to teach religion in secondary schools outside the school timetable. Yet this guideline does not benefit French Muslims because no Islamic chaplaincy operates in secondary schools (Basdevant-Gaudemet and Frégosi 2004).[81]

Although religion is not taught within the public school system, France provides significant funding for private religious schools that are under contract with the state.[82] Muslims seeking public funding must prove that their school has been functioning for at least five years, their teachers are qualified to provide good education, the size of student body is relatively large, and the school facilities are hygienic.[83]

Core teacher teaching in France includes little instruction about religious teaching, which is not surprising given *laïcité*. Teachers in training are able to take elective courses on religious topics. Some French universities have endeavored to improve teacher education by including courses on teaching about religion. The European

---

[81] The Alsace-Moselle region is exempt from these restrictions.

[82] There are three types of schools in France: public schools, Catholic schools subsidized by the state, and privately funded schools (Berglund 2015, 41).

[83] "France's first private Muslim school tops the ranks," available at: http://www.france24.com/en/20130329-france-first-private-muslim-school-tops-ranks-averroes

Institute of Religious Sciences was founded in 2002 to organize training programs about teaching religious studies for national education personnel. Nevertheless, adequate training programs for teachers who will teach in religious schools are still lacking in France (Berglund 2015).

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF TURKS IN FRANCE

Individual Level Political Participation

Researchers usually measure immigrants' and their descendants' political participation through naturalization rates, electoral participation, and political representation in elected offices. As mentioned previously, France's assimilationist model is more inclusive and has provided a more fertile ground for immigrant political participation at the individual level than Germany's exclusionary model. Scholars have found that immigrant-origin people have higher naturalization rates in France than in Germany (Janoski 2010). Immigrants in France also have higher local/national electorate shares vis-à-vis their proportion in the national population, higher electoral participation rates, and higher numbers of immigrant-origin representatives at the local level than immigrants in Germany. Concerning political representation in elected offices, while immigrant political representation at the national level is slightly higher in Germany,[84]

---

[84] Scholars have proposed several reasons to explain why immigrants are not represented well in French national politics. One factor is the color-blind ideology of the Republic (Alba and Foner 2009). France's party structure and election system is also viewed as another potential reason. Michon (2011), for example, argued that two-round election system with single member district prevents the entry of minority candidates to the political system.

immigrant political representation at local and regional levels is higher in France (Yalaz 2014).[85]

Paradoxically, these observations do not hold for Turkish immigrants in France. Turks have generally lower levels of integration levels compared to other immigrant groups in France (Tribalat 1995). French Turks have the lowest naturalization rates among third-country immigrant groups, including Maghrebis, Sub-Saharan Africans, Cambodians and Vietnamese. According to the 1999 census, only 15 percent of Turkish immigrants born in Turkey had French citizenship compared to 40 percent of Tunisians, 36 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans, and 27 percent of Algerians. The 2008 census documented that 29 percent of Turkish immigrants obtained French citizenship compared to 48 percent of Tunisians, 43 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans, and 42 percent of Algerians. French Turks' naturalization rates have been declining in recent years (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Naturalization Rates of Turks in France, 2003–2011 (per 100,000 Turkish citizens)

Country	2003-2005	2006-2008	2009-2011
France	520	460	329

Sources: Yalaz (2014, 173)

---

[85] The first Muslim cabinet member in France was Azouz Begag, who served as Equal Opportunities Minister under the Dominique de Villepin cabinet in 2005. Three politicians of Muslim background (Rachida Dati, Rama Yade, and Fadela Amar) received extensive national media coverage when they served as ministers in President Sarkozy's cabinet.

Turkish-origin people also have the lowest rate of electoral registration among all immigrant groups in France. According to the Trajectories and Origins Survey (2008),[86] 73 percent of Turks in France are registered to cast ballots in elections. This compares to a rate of 83 percent for Maghrebis. Voter turnout for Turkish nationals in both local and national elections (74 percent and 81 percent, respectively) is also lower than that of Maghrebis. Table 4.4 compares and contrasts voter registration and turnout rates for Turks, Maghrebis, and the native French population in the 2007 presidential and 2008 municipal elections.

Table 4.4: Voter Registration and Turnout Rates of Immigrant Groups in France

Group	Electoral Registration Rate (%)	Voter Turnout Rate (2007) (%)	Voter Turnout Rate (2008) (%)
Turks	73	81	74
Maghrebis	81	84	76.5
Natives	89.5	89.5	81

Source: Trajectories and Origins Survey (2008)

The Trajectories and Origins Survey (2008) also found that only 36 percent of Turkish immigrants and 41 percent of their children were interested in French politics. In contrast, 50 percent of Maghrebi immigrants and their children were interested in French politics. Turks in France also have the highest level of interest in homeland politics (41 percent) among all immigrant groups.

---

[86] This survey was conducted in 2008: http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page=sources/ope-enq-trajectoires-2008-teo.htm. For its main findings, please see Beauchemin et al. (2010).

In addition, Turks in France have a lower level of political presence in elected bodies than other immigrant groups in France. For example, no Turkish-origin MP has served in the French Parliament. Slightly over 5 percent of regional councilors and 9 percent of municipal councilors serving in France's ten largest cities have an immigrant background (Michon 2011). However, only four Turks were elected to local councils in 36,000 municipalities until 2008, and only one Turkish-origin politician sat on France's regional councils that have a total of 1,722 seats to this date.[87] It is evident French Turks are still underrepresented in elected bodies compared to other immigrant communities.

In sum, French Turks have the lowest naturalization, electoral registration, and voter turnout rates among all immigrant groups in France. In addition, they are poorly represented in elected bodies. This discussion indicates that Turkish Muslim leaders' recent political activism in France is surprising given their limited political participation at the individual level.

Group Level Political Participation

France has also provided a more favorable structure for immigrant political participation at the group level than Germany. Despite its statist integration model in which no intermediary institution between the state and its immigrants is recognized (Soysal 1994; Kastoryano 1995), scholars (Koopmans et al. 2005) found that host country

---

[87] Personal interviews with: 1) a Turkish-origin municipality councilor, May 10, 2013, Paris; Personal interview with a Turkish-origin municipality councilor who also serves as a DİTİB official, May 28, 2013, Strasbourg.

related extra-institutional protests are more common in France (46 percent) than in Germany (29 percent). This study also revealed that French immigrants are more vocal about their collective claims and they raise more integration-related claims than immigrants in Germany.[88] In addition, anti-racist and pro-immigrant groups are also more visible in public debates in France than in Germany. Yet Turkish immigrant organizations were largely absent from the political life of France until recently.

While the immigrant organizations founded in the 1970s expressed concerns regarding the improvement of work and living conditions, the new wave of immigrant political activism in the 1980s mainly focused on the economic and social segregation of immigrants and racism that immigrants face. In this period, protests erupted among second-generation Maghrebis. In 1983, hundreds of thousands of young Maghrebis marched from Marseille to Paris (*Marche des Beurs*)[89] to demand equal citizenship rights and anti-discriminatory measures (Bonnafous 1988). The *Marche des Beurs* created influential immigrant movements: SOS Racism, the Movement against Racism and for Friendship of Peoples, and France-Plus. Between 1983 and 1985, France witnessed three mass demonstrations organized by Maghrebi immigrant organizations: The March Against Racism and for Equal Rights, Convergence 84, and the March for Civil Rights (Poinsot 1993). Maghrebi organizations also fostered immigrants' presence in local

---

[88] Previous scholarship that compares immigrants' claims-making in France and Germany also highlights other cross-national divergences in how Muslim immigrants represent themselves with regard to their host states. Immigrants in France use religious references and identify themselves in broader categories ("immigrant"), whereas immigrants in Germany use ethnic/national references ("Turk," "Kurd," and "Arab") (Kastoryano 2002).

[89] "*Beur*" is a term used to refer to second-generation Maghrebis in France.

politics by initiating voter registration campaigns and lobbying political parties to include immigrant-origin politicians in their cadres (Hargreaves 1991, 1995). Maghrebis and Sub-Saharan Africans organized other mass protests throughout the 1990s and 2000s. They expressed their grievances during the *sans-papiers* movement in 1996, protests against the headscarf ban in 2004, and the *banlieue* riots in 2005.

Until the 2000s, Turks in France abstained from forming political alliances among themselves or with non-Turkish immigrant groups. Turkish organizations were not present in the *Beurs* marches. Nor did they participate in the *sans-papiers*,[90] headscarf, and *banlieue* protests in the 1990s and 2000s. The recognition of the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 as genocide by the French Parliament in 2001 did not trigger any political action either. French Turks' disinterest in host country politics was puzzling given that all Muslim immigrant groups face similar challenges.

The organization l'ACORT was the only exception to this pattern. In the 1980s and 1990s, l'ACORT's members organized with non-Turkish immigrant groups to combat the institutional hurdles stymieing immigrants' socioeconomic and political integration in French society. As the chairman of l'ACORT explained to me, in 1983, the organization co-founded the Council of Immigrant Associations in France (*Conseil des Associations d'immigrés en France*, CAIF) with non-Turkish immigrant organizations.

---

[90] Occupations of buildings, hunger strikes, and demonstrations organized by Maghrebi illegal immigrants took place as early as 1972 and escalated in the 1980s and 1990s. In February 1980, seventeen Turks employed illegally in textile industries in Paris began a hunger strike, claiming legal employment and better working conditions. Yet apart from the political participation of these individual workers in the protests, no Turkish immigrant organization participated in the *sans-papier* movement at a larger scale (Freedman, 2008, 82).

The CAIF's main goal was to mobilize Muslim immigrants around the issues of family reunification, residence and work permits, and anti-discrimination. L'ACORT held marches and organized meetings with Maghrebi, Portuguese, and Spanish organizations to lobby for these causes. L'ACORT later co-established other federations, such as the Immigration Forum with non-Turkish immigrant groups. In 1993, l'ACORT leaders participated in a hunger strike with other organization leaders in order to protest the legislation that banned non-citizen foreign residents from participating in local elections.[91]

Yet while l'ACORT collaborated with non-Turkish organizations, it rarely worked with other Turkish organizations. The only attempt to collaborate with other Turkish organizations came in 1991. That year l'ACORT formed the French Council of Turkish Immigrant Associations (*Conseil Français des Associations d'Immigrés de Turquie*, CFAIT) with 15 other Turkish immigrant organizations, including Millî Görüş, some Kurdish, and some other left-wing organizations. However, this council disbanded a few years later. According to the l'ACORT chairman, who also served as the president of the CFAIT, Turks failed to work together at that time because they did not agree about their basic interests. He pointed out that conservative Turkish organizations showed no interest in non-religious activities, and that Alevi, secular, and left-wing organizations' claims revolved around identity-related issues tied to Turkey rather than the broader host

---

[91] Personal interview with l'ACORT chairman, December 12, 2013, Paris.

143

state-related concerns common among immigrants. In other words, internal divisions pitted Turkish organizations against each other.[92]

I asked my other interviewees why Turks have maintained a low public profile in the French political arena compared to other immigrant groups. Another argument is that Maghrebis' and Sub-Saharan Africans' colonial ties with France familiarized them with the French language and political processes and, hence, improved their integration prospects. In contrast, Turkish immigrants are less likely to speak French and understand the French political system initially.[93]

Other Turkish immigrant leaders advanced a different argument for the comparatively lower levels of Turkish political participation in France. According to one immigrant leader, there was a common perception among Turks in France, particularly prior to the 2000s, that restrictive immigration and integration legislation targeted Maghrebis because "they were the real trouble-makers and they deserved harsh treatment."[94] Turks thus distinguished themselves from other Muslim groups and viewed themselves as superior to other Muslim immigrants. According to Turkish Islamic organization leaders who follow this line of thought, the issue of Islam and immigration has never been a Turkish problem in France because neither Turkish immigrants nor French policymakers thought of Turks when they thought of Muslim immigrants.

---

[92] Personal interview with l'ACORT chairman, December 12, 2013, Paris.

[93] Personal interview with a Turkish-origin municipality councilor, May 10, 2013, Paris.

[94] Personal interview with l'ACORT chairman, December 12, 2013, Paris.

France's first encounter with Islam was with Maghrebis, and the large size of the Maghrebi community put this immigrant group under the spotlight. Both Turks and French policy-makers blamed immigrants from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa whenever Muslim immigrants were cast under negative light.[95] Thus, French Turks have enjoyed a privileged "invisibility" in the eyes of French policy-makers.

Another respondent argued that French Turks showed no interest in the *banlieue* protests because they do not hold the colonial resentments that agitate Maghrebis. Turks have always situated themselves in a separate and superior category compared to Arabs and Africans due to their distinct ethnic, cultural, and historical characteristics, including the Ottoman Empire's glorious history, lack of colonial subordination to Western powers, and the modern Turkish Republic's democratic regime.[96]

Studies confirm that Turks perceive that they are less subject to discrimination than Maghrebis and Sub-Saharan Africans in France (Brouard and Tiberj 2011). While 31 percent of Turkish-origin immigrants reported that they perceive discrimination based on their ethno-racial origins, the rate of perceived discrimination is 38 percent for Maghrebis and 48 percent in Sub-Saharan Africans (Brinbaum et al. 2012 *cited* in Yalaz 2014). Paradoxically, the Trajectories and Origins Survey (2008) found that Turks in France experience discrimination at similar rates with North Africans in reality. This means that an argument focusing on the lack of collective identity and organizational

---

[95] Personal interview with an official from the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, June 1, 2013, Paris.

[96] Personal interview with l'ACORT chairman, December 12, 2013, Paris.

capacity in the Turkish organizational field is more likely to explain Turkish leaders' absence from French politics. As will be discussed further in Chapter Six, the French government's disinterest in Turkish Muslims was another factor impeding Turkish Muslims' absence from French politics.

In the mid-2000s, the political apathy of Turkish immigrant organizations has begun to vanish. However, only Sunni Islamic and conservative-nationalists have organized collective political action directed at French officials. The first large-scale political event that instigated political action among conservative organizations was France's aggressive opposition to Turkey's EU membership. As one of the immigrant organization leaders put it in an interview, France's stance served as a wake-up call for Turks. It provoked a dramatic increase in the number of Turkish people running for office in France.[97] According to a report published by the Turkish embassy in Paris, 200 Turkish-origin French citizens ran for municipal assembly and vice mayor seats in the 2008 local elections. Of them, 107 were elected as councilors (*Hürriyet*, March 22, 2014). Given that in the 2001 local elections only four Turks were elected to local councils, this was an unexpected political development. This mobilization was a result of Turkey's shift from the weaker end of the asymmetric relationship with the EU to a stronger end and its lobbying activities for the EU bid.

---

[97] Personal interview with l'ACORT chairman, December 12, 2013, Paris.

Another groundbreaking development that shook the Turkish immigrant organizational field took place in 2011. The French Senate passed a bill that made it a crime to deny the 1915 mass killings of Armenians committed by Ottoman Turks. The French Parliament had recognized the killings as genocide officially in 2001. The new bill changed the existing laws that did not criminalize using terms other than genocide to refer to the killings and instead mandated a 450,000-euro fine and a year in jail for genocide deniers (*Le Monde*, January 23, 2012). According to the HUGO France survey (Erdoğan 2012), 96.83 percent of French Turks followed the developments related to this bill closely.[98] The same survey found that only 3 percent of French Turks believed that the mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turks should be recognized as "genocide" and only 6.94 percent of them argued that the Turkish state owes Armenians an apology.

Due to the sensitivity of the topic for Turks with strong ties to the homeland, leaders of conservative Turkish umbrella organizations, including the DİTİB, Millî Görüş, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, and the Turkish Federation, formed a coordination council to organize rallies across France against the proposed bill. In contrast, non-religious organizations, such as l'ACORT and the FUAF did not become a party to this initiative. The coordination council organized the first and largest collective demonstration of immigrant Turks that targeted French authorities and policy. In January 2012, 35,000 Turks gathered at the Denfert Rochereau plaza in Paris with banners

---

[98] According to the same survey, more than 60 percent of French Turks followed the Turkish media to learn the latest developments.

reading "No to the Shame Law" (*Sabah*, January 21, 2012). Such political commitment and cooperation among conservative organizations was previously unheard-of.

As one of the organizers of this event asserted in an interview, this rally was an extension of the Turkish state's efforts to block the influence of Armenian lobby groups in France.[99] As such, it provides evidence of how the Turkish state's national interests in this matter have encouraged activism among the conservative Turkish immigrant population in Europe.

The COJEP, an immigrant organization known for its close ties to both Millî Görüş and the AKP, has also organized electoral campaigns in different regions of France since 2002. In 2012, the COJEP led a mass political campaign to mobilize the Turkish population for the national and local elections in France. The "Now or Never" (*Ya Şimdi Ya Hiç*) campaign started in Strasbourg and it quickly spread to 35 French cities. In campaign meetings, the COJEP's leadership encouraged Turkish immigrants to become members of political parties and to run for office in local administrations. In an interview conducted shortly after the launch of the campaign, the COJEP's chairman emphasized that, "in the 1960s and 1970s, we [French Turks] had to establish mosque associations to protect our national and religious identity. Today, organized political action is the only way."[100] The "Now or Never" political campaign was soon embraced by other

---

[99] Personal interview with the chairman of the Anatolian Cultural Center, February 25, 2013, Paris.

[100] Interview with COJEP chairman, April 20, 2012. Available at: http://www.haberler.com/fransa-da-yasayan-turklere-sandik-cagrisi-3554013-haberi/

conservative organizations, such as the DİTİB and the Turkish Federation. These organizations broadcasted a collective video that invited French Turks to cast vote and to run for office in elections.[101] This campaign turned into a larger electoral campaign for the 2014 local elections, this time with the participation of Millî Görüş. Contributing organizations distributed posters and booklets to assist Turks in obtaining electoral cards. At the end of this campaign, eight Turks ran for mayor (a position superior to local councilor or vice mayor) in municipal elections for the first time (*Hürriyet*, March 22, 2014). As its chairman explained to me, the COJEP has also organized other electoral campaigns recently, including the "Do Something Now!" (*Şimdi Bir Şey Yap!*), and the "Time is Up!" (*Vakit Yakın)* campaigns to encourage French Turks' participation in local politics.[102]

Another indicator of Turkish Muslims' burgeoning politicization is an increasing interest among Turkish Sunni Islamic organizations in the French state's mediation efforts with the Muslim community. In the early years of the CFCM, Turkish Islamic organizations showed reluctance to engage in communication with the French state. This posture has changed in recent years. Particularly after 2007, the DİTİB, Millî Görüş, and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers have sent their representatives to the CFCM meetings and begun to cooperate with Maghrebi organizations. For example, Millî Görüş

---

[101] This video can be watched at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SyYmDu0ydyQ

[102] Personal interview with COJEP chairman, March 16, 2013, Strasbourg.

formed an alliance with Moroccan organizations to gain more seats during the CFCM elections (Çitak 2010).

As Chapter Six will discuss in detail, conservative Turkish organizations' recent political mobilization is evidence of the impact of Turkey's new policy framework at the grassroots level. Turkey's diaspora engagement policies have instilled a sense of self-efficacy, collective identity, and group consciousness in Turkish Muslim leaders and improved their organizational capacity. The next section will unravel Turkey's rapprochement with conservative Turkish immigrant organizations in France since the early 2000s.

TURKEY'S DIASPORA OUTREACH ACTIVITIES IN FRANCE

Official Correspondence and Mass Rallies

An important dimension of the Turkish state's new diaspora agenda is the active involvement of Turkish diplomatic personnel in the organizational life in France. The relative frequency of Turkish visits to immigrant organizations in recent years is a remarkable change. As discussed extensively in Chapter Three, one of the defining characteristics of the pre-AKP era was the distance between consulate officials and Islamic organizations in Europe. While previous diplomatic circles opted for a separation between Turkish bureaucrats and alternative religious currents, the AKP administration endeavored to bridge the gap between diplomats and the conservative elements of the

Turkish diaspora. This process started with a 2003 memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that asked the Turkish embassies and consulates in Europe to buttress Millî Görüş's networks (*Radikal*, April 10, 2003). Accordingly, Turkish diplomats have begun to attend Millî Görüş's and other Islamic organizations' Ramadan dinners, pay visits to their offices, and invite them to official ceremonies held at the Turkish consulates and embassies. Turkish diplomatic officials have also begun to pay more attention to Turkish immigrant organizations' lobbying potential.

According to a DİTİB official serving in Strasbourg, in 2005, the Turkish Consulate in Paris asked the representatives of the leading Turkish immigrant organizations in France to create a joint platform to discuss important issues pertaining to the Turkish community. The Consulate also asked the Turkish Cultural Centers to establish an umbrella organization named the Union of Turkish Cultural Associations in France. This request stemmed from the AKP's understanding of the role of Turkish immigrants in Europe.[103] In the words of Tahsin Burcuoğlu, who served as Turkey's ambassador in Paris between 2010 and 2014, "Turkish immigrant organizations in France should work collectively for the sake of national unity and interests. Any step taken by Turkish immigrants toward this direction would be key to our [Turkey's] success." Echoing Burcuoğlu's remarks, Turkish Consul General Uğur Arıner has suggested that Turkish immigrant organizations should unite under common goals and take action

---

[103] Personal interview with a DİTİB official, May 28, 2013, Strasbourg.

whenever national interests are at stake. According to these diplomats, the Turkish state should create federations and confederations to give direction to immigrant organizations' activities abroad.[104]

The Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) was created by the AKP in 2004 for similar purposes. In 2013, the then-Vice Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ paid personal visits to Turkish immigrant organizations in Paris, Lyon, and Strasbourg, and inaugurated the "Anatolia Festival" (*Festival d'Anatolie*) in Paris. This festival was organized by the UETD. The UETD listed its goals as to "promote Turkey and eliminate prejudices against Turkish citizens in France, and to boost Turkey's trade relations with France together with Turkish civil society organizations."[105]

Mass rallies in Europe that are sponsored by Turkish state leaders and organized by the UETD provide another important instrument for the Turkish state's diaspora engagement policy. Starting from 2010, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has come together with French Turks in stadium rallies to encourage their political participation in France. In a rally held in the Zenith stadium in Paris in 2010, Erdoğan urged Turkish immigrants to participate in French politics more:

> Please know that you are never alone there [in France]. Your happiness is our happiness. Your sorrow is our sorrow (…) France grants you [Turkish nationals] dual citizenship but there isn't enough interest in obtaining French citizenship. Why? Becoming a French citizen would not make you less Turkish. Pursue your

---

[104] Please see: "Fransa Türk Kültür Dernekleri Kuruluyor," available at: http://www.hodrimeydan.net/anasayfa/anasayfa-uest/155-fransa-tuerk-kueltuer-dernekleri-federasyonu-kuruluyo.html

[105] "Festivalimiz" and "Biz Kimiz?," available at: http://www.festivaldanatolie.com/#

legal rights in France. Why don't we see our Ahmet, Mehmet, Hasan, Ayşe, Fatma in French or European Parliament? You must take this step. If you don't, others [other diaspora groups] will take advantage of this. Unite, act together, fight together, be strong, be assertive. I am requesting this from you as your Prime Minister. If you take these steps, you will contribute immensely to your country [Turkey] (*CNN Türk*, April 7, 2010).

These political rallies have become more frequent in recent years. In a more recent rally staged in Lyon, Erdoğan pleaded:

There are 620,000 Turks in France. Why don't you submit an application to become a French citizen? I am shouting out to my fellow citizens who have not obtained French citizenship yet. Apply for dual citizenship. Don't postpone this important task. Know your legal rights in France. You are our ambassadors in France (…) Never feel desperate. Your country [Turkey] is a powerful country and it will continue to grow. We will always fight back when they [enemies] attack us. Be proud of your identity, language, and religion. Don't forget to apply for French citizenship (…) France needs people like you. But never assimilate and never let your children assimilate (*Hürriyet*, June 21, 2014)."

Erdoğan's call for French Turks to gain citizenship but not to assimilate is evidence to the argument that the AKP sees Turks in France as a lobby for Turkey's interests in Europe. As will be discussed further in Chapter Six, these rallies have essentially targeted conservative Turks.

In some of his rallies, such as the one organized in Strasbourg in October 2015 that attracted 12,000 supporters (*EU Observer*, October 5, 2015), Erdoğan praised bilateral relations between Turkey and France and thanked France for building positive relations with the Turkish community. In others, he criticized France's policies

concerning the Armenian issue and called the French government to increase its efforts to welcome Turkey into the EU.

These rallies also extolled the AKP's policies and achievements in the homeland in order to attract diaspora votes.[106] In France, 317,997 French Turks are eligible to vote for Turkish elections. For the November 2015 Turkish general elections, 45 percent of French Turks cast their ballot. The AKP received 58.4 percent of the votes (see Figure 4.3). Given that each rally attracts hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens, there is no doubt that these messages influence Turkish citizens' voting behavior.

Figure 4.3: The November 2015 Turkish Parliamentary Election Results (France)

Source: Supreme Electoral Council (2015c)

---

[106] Erdoğan's Strasbourg speech is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1X4_JeCD9no

Activities of the Diyanet

The Diyanet is a key player in Turkey's new diaspora policy. In the past, the Diyanet's long-term personnel stayed in Germany for a maximum period of four years. This increased to five years in 2002. A 2003 Turkish cabinet decision (BKK 2003/5753) defined the Diyanet personnel's primary role as "to publicize, spread, and protect Turkish culture abroad, and to preserve the cultural ties of Turkish citizens abroad to their homeland." The Diyanet's president at that time also argued that the staff serving abroad should be responsible for shaping European attitudes about Turks and for promoting Turkey's accession to the EU (Gibbon 2009, 18). Growing efforts on the part of Turkey can also be seen in the increasing number of religious personnel sent by the Diyanet to France, particularly since 2002 (see Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4: Diyanet Religious Personnel in France, 1983–2014

Source: Bruce (2015, 412)

Since the 2000s, the DİTİB's religious personnel meet regularly with Turkish diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara and submit activity reports to them. DİTİB religious personnel in Europe regularly organize meetings among themselves and with leaders from other Turkish organizations as well. Turkish officials, including representatives of the AKP and the Diyanet, pay frequent visits to DİTİB mosques and events when in Europe. Between 2007 and 2010, not a month went by without at least one visit by a representative of the Turkish state to a DİTİB mosque or event (Bruce 2015, 426). This frequency points to the magnitude of organizational support provided by the Turkish state to DİTİB's mosque associations abroad and to the DİTİB's efforts to monitor other associations.

Turkey has extended its support to the Turkish Muslim community in France also by engaging in negotiations with French policy-makers to increase the religious personnel quotas imposed by the French state in order to open up new religious service attaché positions in France (Bruce 2015, 406–437). More importantly, Turkey helped the DİTİB set up the International Theology Program (*Uluslararası İlahiyat Programı*) as well as a theology institute in Strasbourg. The International Islamic Theology Program was inaugurated in 2006. Administered by the Turkish Council for Higher Education and funded by the Turkish Diyanet Foundation (*Türk Diyanet Vakfı*), this program enables French citizens who have completed their high school education in France to obtain a Bachelor's degree in Theology from Turkish universities and to serve as religious

personnel or teachers in their host countries upon successful completion of the program. The program has attracted hundreds of students from all over Europe. France sends the second largest number of students to this program after Germany.[107] According to a Diyanet publication (2014), the International Theology Program works to train competent people who are knowledgeable about Islamic theology; aware of the social, cultural, religious, and psychological needs of Turkish people in Europe; and able to guide the process of integration. Students accepted to this program will serve in European countries and must hold citizenship in their host country. This program has increased and will continue to increase Turkey's visibility within the Islamic field in Europe.

Turkey's Diyanet, with organizational support from French authorities, also established the Strasbourg Theology Institute in 2011. Students who successfully complete this program receive a Bachelor's degree from Istanbul University's Faculty of Theology. As the DİTİB's religious attaché in Strasbourg pointed out in an interview, this program's main goal is to train religious personnel who are fluent in both Turkish and French and familiar with both cultures. Trained personnel will serve in DİTİB mosques upon graduation. The Strasbourg Theology Institute had 55 students at the time of this research, all of Turkish descent. This is the most comprehensive theological training project for a Muslim organization in France.[108] The Strasbourg Theology Institute came into existence as a result of a "declaration of intent" signed bilaterally by Turkey and

---

[107] Personal interview with the director of the Diyanet's Turks Abroad Office, July 26, 2013, Ankara.

[108] Personal interview with the DİTİB's religious attaché, May 28, 2013, Strasbourg.

157

France. Yet it is funded by the Turkish state. In addition, the DİTİB in France has the final say in the design of the curriculum and the appointment of teachers.[109]

The establishment and administration of the International Theology program and the Strasbourg Theology Institute is a sign of Turkey's growing presence in Europe. As a Turkish official noted, the DİTİB plans to open more theology institutes, kindergartens, and private high schools in other parts of France.[110]

Activities of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities

Since the establishment of the YTATB in 2010, Turkey has been able to reach out to conservative Turkish immigrant organizations more efficiently. The activities conducted by the YTATB in France focus on two issue areas: youth empowerment and civil society empowerment.

Youth Empowerment

The Turkish Citizens Abroad Scholarship Program is a key component of Turkey's diaspora youth empowerment project. These scholarships are provided to Turkish citizens living in 18 European countries as well as in the United States, Australia, and Canada to support their undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral studies. In France, Turkish citizens who pass competitive interviews become qualified to receive monthly

---

[109] Personal interview with the DİTİB's religious attaché, May 28, 2013, Strasbourg.

[110] Personal interview with the CCMTF (DİTİB) representative in the CFCM, December 12, 2013, Paris.

stipends of €500 for their undergraduate studies, €750 for their doctoral studies, and €1,000 for their postdoctoral training (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 32).

The Youth Bridges Program is another project aimed at third- and fourth-generation Turkish citizens living abroad. According to the YTATB's activity report on France (2015, 34), the program's goal is "to refresh and strengthen young Turks' ties to their homeland and ancestors, to remind them that Turkey is always within their reach, and to reconcile them with their own history and culture." Turkey cooperates with Turkish immigrant organizations operating in France to connect with young French Turks and to bring them to Turkey on short trips. As of 2015, six "Youth Bridges" programs have been organized in France, which enabled 235 young Turks to visit several cities in Turkey.

The Young Leaders Program assists young French Turks to gain work experience in Turkish government offices, companies, and civil society organizations as trainees. The focus of the program is on professional development of young generation Turks living abroad. To this end, the YTATB organizes seminars and workshops on active citizenship and professionalism both in Turkey and France. One good example is the leadership seminars delivered by the directors of the Yunus Emre Foundation and the YTATB to young French Turks. In the last three years, 15 people attended these workshops (YTATB France Activity Report 2015, 35).

Civil Society Empowerment

The YTATB is also involved in several active citizenship projects. The first is the Election Information Campaign. The purpose of this initiative is to inform Turkish immigrants of their electoral rights in Turkey and in France. This project is advertised through brochures and posters, social media announcements, and regular meetings with immigrant organization leaders. For example, 6,880 posters and 110,300 booklets were circulated to encourage French Turks' participation in the 2015 Turkish general elections (YTATB France Activity Report 2015, 41).

The YTATB also holds public awareness campaigns concerning the Armenian problem. In 2015, the YTATB published a book titled "A Centennial Issue: New Approaches in the Democratization Process (1915–2015)." Given that 2015 marked the centennial commemoration of the mass killings of Armenians, the publication of this book in six different languages, including French, German, and English, was critical in the promotion of Turkey's official position regarding the issue.

The empowerment of immigrant Turkish immigrant organizations lies at the heart of Turkey's diaspora agenda. The YTATB has organized numerous brainstorming workshops in France to encourage organization leaders' participation in French society and politics. In these workshops, Turkish leaders exchange views to diagnose their common problems they face in France. In addition to brainstorming workshops, the YTATB holds civil society empowerment trainings. According to Turkish officials,

Turkish immigrant organizations in Europe play a key role in reinvigorating Turkish citizens' ties to Turkey, helping them to become active citizens, and teaching them how to pursue their legal rights in their countries of residence. In light of these goals, the YTATB has launched more than six training programs across France. For example, 41 Turkish Muslim leaders participated in the training held in Strasbourg in March 2014. In this meeting, civil society leaders learned how to write project applications and how to submit them to French and European authorities. In 2014 and 2015, the YTATB held two larger meetings that brought Turkish organizational representatives together with the leaders of the UETD and the ATİB. Turkish officials' brainstorming and empowerment trainings have mainly targeted conservative-nationalist and Sunni Islamic Turkish organizations and aimed to expand their lobbying potential.

Between 2011 and 2014, Turkish civil society organizations operating in France submitted 70 project applications to the YTATB. Of these, the YTATB provided financial assistance to 25 projects. The total amount of financial aid equalled to $666,019. This money is given to organizations so that they could "conduct more effective and professional activities" and "make significant contributions to 'societal development,' 'public opinion,' and 'active citizenship' in France." Sixty percent of this funding was devoted to lobbying, educational, and capacity development (seminars, workshops, publications) activities (YTATB France Activity Report 2015, 56–57). Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 break down the YTATB's financial aid into years and themes.

Figure 4.5: The YTATB's Financial Aid to Turkish Civil Society Organizations in France, 2012–2014 (in USD)

Source: YTATB France Activity Report (2015, 56) (Currency from TL to USD converted by the author)

Figure 4.6: Thematic Distribution of the YTATB's Project Support

Source: YTATB France Activity Report (2015, 57)

Active citizenship is also facilitated through the International Justice Program that has been held in France since 2012. The program aims to educate Turkish citizens living in France about their legal rights. It does so by training Turkish jurists. Seven seminars

have been staged in which 39 Turkish jurists received training. In September 2015, an additional seminar was organized in Ankara, which attracted 32 Turkish jurists from 9 countries, including France. The YTATB also engages in outreach to ordinary Turkish immigrants in Europe. For example, it published a booklet detailing France's legal system to help French Turks "become cognizant of their legal rights in their host state and to defend themselves when necessary."

The Anti-Discrimination Project has also been launched to help Turkish organizations operating in European countries to combat racism. This project aims to give up to $69,854 to organizations that are committed to conduct relevant activities. This program complements the Active Citizenship and Equal Participation Program targeting Turkish immigrant organizations operating in Europe. The Active Citizenship and Equal Participation Program's budget is $32,397 (YTATB France Activity Report 2015, 10–13, 38).

Turkish outreach also concerns commercial issues. For example, under the Association of All Industrialists and Businessmen (*Tüm Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*, TÜMSİAD)—a conservative new-generation business organization with close ties to the AKP—Turkey has held 35 professionalization and entrepreneurship workshops in 7 different French cities for 1,400 Turkish businessmen (YTATB France Activity Report 2015, 59, 63).

France's liberal citizenship policy and color-blind republican model has provided a more fertile ground for immigrant political participation at the individual and group level with the notable exception of Turks. For decades, French Turks were absent from the political life of France.

This changed with the organization of collective mobilizations against France's opposition to Turkey's EU membership and the initiation of electoral campaigns aimed at encouraging French Turks' participation in local and national elections starting from 2008. Turkish Muslim leaders also began to cooperate with French authorities and Maghrebi organizations to deepen Muslims' political influence in France. In addition, conservative Turkish organizations established a coordination council that organized the largest collective demonstration of immigrant Turks in 2012 that targeted the French Senate's Armenian "genocide" bill. French Turks' political mobilization has increased particularly after the formation of the YTATB.

This chapter showed that existing approaches fail to explain Turkish Muslim leaders' unprecedented political engagement since the mid-2000s. Group-related accounts that focus on socio-economic factors, group size, and social capital are not helpful because conservative Turkish organizations in France have engaged in political activism despite their small size and limited resources. Moreover, Turks have the lowest naturalization, electoral registration and voter turnout rates among all immigrant groups

164

in France. In recent years, no major change has taken place with respect to French Turks' group-related characteristics. Turks are still the least integrated immigrant group in France.

The institutionalist account also falls short because French immigration and integration policies have been predominantly restrictive throughout the 1990s and 2000s. A decline in French Turks' naturalization rates since the 2000s proves that France's integration regime has shown no improvement over the last two decades. In addition, if France's institutional setting was the main factor explaining immigrant activism, all Turkish immigrant groups should have become politically mobilized. The same policies and institutions apply to all members of the Turkish community in France. However, activism by Turkish organizations is new and is concentrated within conservative Muslim organizations.

A grievance-oriented theory cannot explain Turkish Muslim leaders' recent political activism in France either because even though Turks experience discrimination in daily life at similar rates with Maghrebi and Sub-Saharan African immigrants, their perceived level of discrimination is lower than that of other immigrant groups.

I argue that the sudden awakening of conservative-nationalist and Sunni Islamic immigrant organizations was a direct response to Turkey's redirection of its diaspora policy towards the promotion of homeland interests through the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Diyanet, the YTATB, and the UETD. The timing of the changes in

policy emanating from Ankara and the diaspora groups in France was not a coincidence. The connection between Turkey's diaspora outreach policies and conservative organizations' political activism comes into clear view when we contrast Turkish Muslims' silence during the *Beurs* marches, the *sans-papier* movement, the politicization of the headscarf issue, Maghrebis' electoral campaigns, and the *banlieue* riots in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s with their new activism.

Turkish conservative organizations have engaged in political mobilization targeting their host state only when their homeland's national interests were at stake. New efforts by the Turkish state have caused Turkish Islamic organizations in Europe to act in concord with Turkish interest abroad. French Turks' recent political activities are directly linked to homeland interests, including Turkey's EU membership, the Armenian issue, and the preservation of Turkish interests within the CFCM.

Turkey's political interests were challenged by French policy-makers long before (i.e. the recognition of the Armenian "genocide" by the French Parliament in 2001). Yet, these confrontations did not spark any protests among Turkish organizations. The Turkish state did not encourage activism among Turkish immigrants in the past. It was only after the development of a robust diaspora framework in Turkey and the channeling of financial and organizational support to the diaspora that Turks in France began to organize politically vis-à-vis the French government.

Chapter Five: Political Participation of Turkish Immigrant Organizations in Germany

Like their counterparts in France, Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany were largely absent from the political life of Germany until recently. These leaders finally entered German politics in earnest in the mid-2000s. Sunni Islamic and conservative-nationalist organizations came together to take collective political action against the securitization of immigration and integration in Germany and the recognition of the 1915 mass killings of Ottoman Armenians as "genocide" by the *Bundestag*, and to promote Turkey's EU bid.

German Turks' recent political activism cannot be explained by group-related factors. Turks in Germany still constitute the least integrated immigrant community in Germany. They have lower levels of education, employment, and social interaction with natives than any other immigrant group in the country. German Turks have gained stronger political representation in elected bodies since the late 1980s. Yet these trends have only affected select subgroups of Turks in Germany. The majority of Turkish MPs elected to the *Bundestag* are secular and Alevi Turks without links to conservative organizations. Hence, non-religious Turkish politicians' growing political clout does not explain the unprecedented political activism of conservative Turkish Muslims.

Institutional factors also fail to explain the political mobilization of conservative immigrant organizations in Germany. A careful examination of Germany's citizenship policies, church-state relations, and specific policies targeting Muslims shows that the German political system is still replete with material and symbolic barriers to immigrants' participation, even after the passage of the 2000 Nationality Act. Declining naturalization rates of German Turks and the growing visibility of anti-immigrant movements since the 2000s reflect these barriers. In addition, German public opinion towards immigrants continues to be negative.

A grievance-based theory is not explanatory either because Turks in Germany have long perceived a disadvantaged position in their host country's inter-ethnic context. Turkish Muslims in Germany neither raised their voices during the horrendous Neo-Nazi arson attacks that killed scores of Turks in Mölln and Solingen in the early 1990s nor during the contentious Nationality Act debates in the late 1990s. Conservative Turkish Muslim organizations have not become politicized even over the course of the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment after 9/11, a series of xenophobic murders plotted by the NSU, and the headscarf ban in 2003. In fact, these organizations' leaders voiced their first political claims regarding dual citizenship only after 2010 and held their largest collective political action as late as 2013.

I suggest that Turkey's recent diaspora outreach activities in Germany have instigated a new sense of active citizenship among Turkish Muslim leaders. The growing

presence of Turkish diplomats and Diyanet personnel in Turkish immigrants'
organizational life in Germany built greater organizational capacity among conservative
organizations. The flow of financial assistance and organizational support from the
YTATB to conservative organizations in Germany and the Turkish government-
sponsored political rallies held in large German cities also reinforced organization
leaders' collective identity and mobilization skills. The frequency and intensity of
political campaigns organized by Turkish Muslim leaders have increased particularly
after the establishment of the YTATB in 2010.

Turkey's engagement with the Turkish community in Germany follows deliberate
policy goals to increase the lobbying potential of German Turks in favor of the Turkish
government and to canvass expatriate votes. With its large population, it is in the interest
of the Turkish government if the Turkish community conducts lobbying activities in
Germany. In addition, the 1.4 million German Turks who are eligible to cast their ballots
in Turkish elections serve as a resource for domestic politics in Turkey. The AKP
government channels resources to conservative Turkish organizations in Germany
because these organizations are ideologically closer to the incumbent government and
thus are more inclined to support the AKP abroad and in the Turkish elections than
secular groups.

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the history of ethnic immigration in
Germany. It then details the history of Turkish immigration in Germany. In the

subsequent section I examine Germany's citizenship policies, church-state relations, and specific policies targeting Muslims. Next, I analyze Turks' political presence in Germany. Finally, I look at Turkey's recent involvement in the Turkish organizational field in Germany.

THE HISTORY OF ETHNIC IMMIGRATION IN GERMANY

Germany has attracted agricultural seasonal workers since the second half of the 19th century in the wake of industrialization. However, fewer workers settled than people emigrated from Germany (Vogel and Kovacheva 2014, 145). This pattern changed drastically after World War II with the return of ethnic Germans from former German settlements in the East (*Aussiedler*). Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the immigrant population in Germany multiplied. Germany recruited workers, and new immigration policies incorporated asylum seekers and civil-war refugees into the German community. Yet official rhetoric lagged behind concrete patterns of immigration. The term *kein Einwanderungsland* (not a country of immigration) characterized Germany's relationship with immigrants in these decades. Over the years, even though Germany has shown "an all-too-clear will and an all-too-clear capacity" (Brubaker 1994, 229) to protect itself from unwanted immigration, it has remained one of the most popular destinations for immigrants in Europe. The 2000 Nationality Act represented a significant change in German immigration and integration policies. However, this reform liberalized

170

the system only partially. The German citizenship regime is still exclusionary, as evidenced by foreigners' low naturalization rates in Germany.

After World War II, Germany split into two states: the Western Federal Republic of Germany and the Eastern German Democratic Republic. In the post-war era, there were four major sources of emigration to West Germany. The first was the ethnic German emigration from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The second source of post-war emigration was the recruitment of guest workers. In later years, the family members of guest workers, and asylum seekers became the other major sources of post-war emigration (Geddes 2003, 80).

Article 116 of the 1949 federal constitution (Basic Law, *Grundgesetz*) granted automatic citizenship to people possessing "German nationality or who as a refugee or as an expellee of German descent or as their spouse or descendant has found residence in the territory of the German Reich in its borders of 31 December 1937." Hence, the *Aussiedler* were seen as a part of the German nation even if they were geographically distant (Geddes 2003, 80). The emigration of ethnic Germans rose dramatically following the collapse of the Iron Curtain.[111] This demographic change led politicians from both the left and the right to promote stricter immigration policies. A new law (*Ausländergesetz*) enacted in 1990 aimed to encourage the return of foreign nationals (Vogel and Kovacheva 2014, 148).

---

[111]For more information on inflows of *Aussiedler* by country of origin (1950—2005), please see: http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/Germany.1509.0.html?&L=1

Guest workers came to Germany in response to labor needs. Unlike France, Germany did not tend to attract workers from its former colonies because German decolonization occurred earlier in the century (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 99). The acceptance of ethnic German immigrants between 1945 and 1955 contributed to the growth of the German economy, yet labor shortages remained (Messina 2007, 125). The first guest worker agreement was signed with Italy in 1955. Decisions regarding recruitment were made in the corporatist context of the German Federal Ministry of Labor and included representatives of employers and trade unions (Geddes 2003, 81). Germany signed other guest worker agreements with Spain (1960), Greece (1960), and Turkey (1961). According to the rotation principle, guest workers were ostensibly required to return to their country of origin after no more than several years of residence in Germany. However, tens of thousands of workers stayed in Germany upon the expiration of their work visas (Messina 2007, 125).

After the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the end of movement from East Germany to West Germany put a strain on economic growth. Guest worker programs in West Germany expanded. In an attempt to attract more foreign labor, additional agreements were signed with Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), Morocco (1963 and 1966), and Yugoslavia (1968) (Geddes 2003, 81). The period between 1960 and 1968, dubbed "a period of uncontrolled expansion" in immigration, thus witnessed a dramatic increase

of immigrants in Germany. The majority of guest workers were of Turkish origin in this period (Özcan 2004).

The recruitment of guest workers halted in 1973 due to economic recession caused by the oil crisis (Klopp 2002). However, three important legal changes prevented the end of the recruitment period for immigrant workers in the 1970s and 1980s. New legislation that came into force in 1973 limited the state's powers of deportation. In 1978, the automatic renewal of residence permits was allowed. More importantly, in 1981, Germany allowed family reunification, albeit with an eight-year residence qualification for the spouse and a one-year wait outside Germany for the partner (Joppke 1999). The 1980s also witnessed the growth of second-generation immigrants in Germany. Existing immigrant communities had children on German soil. However, Germany's *jus sanguinis* policy did not grant citizenship to German-born children of immigrants. These children were treated as foreigners (Esser and Korte 1985).

The increase in the number of immigrants entering Germany created tensions in society. Unsealed confidential British documents revealed that during British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to Bonn, the reunited Germany's first Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982–1998) said that "over the next four next years, it would be necessary to reduce the number of Turks by 50 percent (…) and that it was impossible for Germany to assimilate Turks in their present numbers." According to Kohl, immigrant groups such as Italians, Portuguese, Eastern Europeans, and even Southeastern Asians did not pose

problems for Germany. Yet, in his view, Turks came from a very different culture and did not integrate well due to forced marriages, illegal employment, and language incompetency. Public sentiment was even more hostile to immigrants. A 1982 survey found that 58 percent of Germans wanted to reduce the number of foreigners in the country (*Der Spiegel*, August 1, 2013). This hostility to immigration resulted in the denial of the family reunion of immigrant children over the age of fifteen and the passing of a new law to encourage immigrants to return to their country of origin in 1983 (Wilpert 2013). Yet this measure did not prevent the growth of the immigrant population.

Asylum seekers further swelled the ranks the immigrant population. By the end of the 1980s, civil wars across Europe and the Balkans led to a number of people seeking asylum in Germany. Article 16 (2) of the German constitution granted all persons prosecuted for political reasons the right to asylum in Germany. The Turkish military coup of 1980, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the war-ridden economy of Yugoslavian countries all precipitated the increase in the number of asylum applications in this period. The Turkish and Yugoslavian immigrant communities grew through a process of chain immigration (Thränhardt 1999). The number of asylum seekers surged after 1977, and Germany faced an asylum policy crisis as well as a small spike in electoral support for anti-immigrant groups and political parties in the late 1980s (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 104). It was against the backdrop of this political climate that the anti-immigrant Republican Party (*Die Republikaner*, REP) gained an unexpected electoral victory in the

Berlin municipal elections of 1989 and the German elections to the European parliament. In 1991, anti-asylum seeker protests shook multiple German cities, including Rostock, Hoyerswerda, and Mannheim. To assuage the public's increasing anti-immigrant sentiments, Article 16 was amended in 1993 to restrict the constitutional right to asylum (Messina 2007, 128).

By the late 1990s, the immigration issue became further politicized in the context of new immigration reform. Job losses and social welfare cuts triggered mass public protests in this period. Most Germans blamed the center-right coalition government of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU)/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (*Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*, CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (*Freie Demokratische Partei*, FDP) for the high unemployment rate and social tension of the 1990s. A coalition formed by the Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD) and the Green Party (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*) in 1998 was seen as beacon of hope in the country. Once it assumed power, the SPD–Green coalition drafted the German Nationality Act. The Act came into effect in 2000 and replaced *jus sanguinis* with *jus soli* (Howard 2009). More importantly, in 2004, Germany acknowledged for the first time that it is a country of immigration (Martin 2014). Following the 2005 federal elections, Angela Merkel was appointed as the new Chancellor of Germany.

In 2005, a new immigration law modified the terminology and the structure of the legal framework to adopt a more open immigration policy. The law included some integration measures, such as the introduction of privileged labor access and the provision of a residence permit of unlimited duration for high-skilled foreign graduates of German universities (Messina 2007, 132). In contrast, family reunification regulations have remained the same, with the exception of the 2007 regulation, which specified that spouses who wish to join their partners in Germany must attain basic German language skills (Vogel and Kovacheva 2014, 149). Despite these remarkable new laws, the implementation of immigration policy did not change drastically. Anti-immigrant sentiment remained a part of mainstream German politics. For example, Chancellor Merkel's statement in a 2010 meeting that Germany's attempts to create a multicultural society have "utterly failed" stirred a public anti-immigration debate (*Deutsche Welle*, October 17, 2010).

Europe now faces the toughest refugee crisis since World War II. This crisis, which began in 2012, transformed questions of immigration in Europe in general and Germany in particular. In 2013 alone, 1.23 million people moved to Germany, a rate the country has not witnessed since 1993 (*Euractiv*, March 4, 2015). In 2015, Germany admitted more than one million refugees. The vast majority of refugees came from Syria and Iraq. The tension over the refugee crisis and Merkel's "open-door policy" emboldened extreme right-wing anti-immigrant groups, such as the Patriotic Europeans

Against the Islamization of the West (*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*, Pegida) and the Alternative for Germany Party (*Alternative für Deutschland*, AfD). It also prompted a general public backlash.

Figure 5.1 shows the growth of Germany's foreign population since the 1960s. Table 5.1 breaks down foreigner groups based on their country of origin (as of 2015).

Figure 5.1: Germany's Foreign Population, 1961–2015

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2015a)

Table 5.1: Main Foreigner Groups in Germany (as of 31 December 2015)

Citizenship	Total
Poland	740,962
Italy	596,127
Romania	452,718
Greece	339,931
Croatia	297,895
Bulgaria	226,926
EU-candidate countries	1,987,701
Turkey	1,506,113
EEA-states/ Switzerland	48,070
Rest of Europe	782,478
Russian Federation	230,994
Kosovo	208,613
Bosnia and Herzegovina	167,975
Africa	429,048

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2015b)

THE HISTORY OF TURKISH IMMIGRATION IN GERMANY

In the mid-1950s, Germany had admitted its first Turkish immigrant workers in small numbers through private initiatives. These workers mostly worked at shipbuilding plants (Yurdakul 2009). In the 1960s, Turkish workers were mostly recruited by the agricultural and construction sectors (Castles and Kosack 1973).

During the first few years of Turkish emigration to Germany, the majority of workers were semi-skilled, often literate, men aged between 20 and 39 from urban areas. In this period, workers from rural Anatolia constituted only 17.2 percent of the Turkish population in Germany. However, starting in the second half of the 1960s, low-skilled workers from rural Anatolia became the main emigrant group from Turkey as the heavy-industry sectors in Europe demanded unskilled labor (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 17). This

demographic change had a long-lasting impact on the social, religious, and political composition of the Turkish community in Germany (Yurdakul 2009, 31).

Like France, Germany experienced economic recession in 1973 caused by the oil shock. In response, Germany halted labor recruitment from abroad. Despite this policy shift, the Turkish population in Germany grew throughout the 1970s. The 1973 family reunification law allowed dependents of Turkish workers to reunite with their spouses, which increased the immigrant population. Moreover, this period witnessed the suppression of Alevis, Kurds, and other political dissidents in Turkey, which provoked a surge in asylum applications from Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b).

During the first three decades of the Turkish immigration in Germany, Turkish workers were isolated from much of German society. Since Germany had no integration efforts at that time, the majority of Turks in Germany lacked language skills. Turkish workers lived collectively in immigrant settlements and dormitories called *Heime* and socialized in isolated mosques, with minimal contact with the locals (Abadan-Unat 2002). In Germany, officials referred to Turks as "guest workers" (*Gastarbeiter*), "foreigners" (*Ausländer*), and "residents" (*Mitbürger*) rather than "immigrants" to highlight their temporary status (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 18).

Turkish immigrant organizational life in Germany was marked by class-based claims in the 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1970s and 1980s, it became focused on ethnic and religious claims (Ögelman 2000; Yurdakul 2009). The first types of organizations

founded by German Turks were small labor unions, student organizations, and local solidarity organizations (Zırh 2008, 115).

Islam was effectively seen as a "guest religion" that Germany had no legal obligation to accommodate. In consequence, Germany was not prepared to meet the religious needs of its growing Turkish population. Turkey's Diyanet was not sufficiently organized to address the religious concerns of Turkish Muslims either. In the DİTİB's absence, Turkish Muslims in Germany set up temporary prayer rooms and backyard mosques, which later evolved into religious associations.

The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (V*erband der Islamischen Kulturzentren*, VIKZ) was the first religious Turkish umbrella organization founded in Germany.[112] It was established in 1973 and became a federation in 1983. The organization is headquartered in Cologne and has branches in other German cities.[113]

The second Turkish Islamic organization established in Germany was Millî Görüş. Millî Görüş was a dispersed, informal network in the 1970s. It opened its first mosque in Germany in 1976 (Yükleyen 2012, 60). In 1980, the Islamic Federation in Berlin (*Islamische Föderation in Berlin*, IFB), an Islamic organization known for its close ties to Millî Görüş, was founded in Berlin. Another Berlin-based religious umbrella organization named the Turkish Community of Berlin (*Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*, TGB) was founded in 1983. Today the TGB is the largest Turkish religious umbrella

---

[112] The organization's original name was "Islamic Cultural Centers." It took its current name in 1980.

[113] "Organization," available at: http://www.vikz.de/index.php/organisation.html

organization in Berlin[114] and is tied to Millî Görüş. Millî Görüş leaders established the Organizations of the National Vision in Europe (*Avrupa Millî Görüş Teşkilatları*) in Kerpen (near Cologne). In 1995, the organization obtained its current name: the Islamic Community Millî Görüş (*Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş*, IGMG) (Amelina and Faist 2008). Millî Görüş has fifteen regional centers today in Germany that consist of mosque, youth, and women's associations.[115] Millî Görüş' activities in other parts of Europe are directed from its headquarter in Kerpen (near Cologne).

After 9/11, Millî Görüş launched a reform process in response to the increasing suspicion of Islamic groups in Germany. To this end, it distanced itself from the Millî Görüş movement in Turkey and embraced a new discourse that emphasizes the transnational reference to the global *ummah* (Schiffauer 2004 *cited* in Amelina and Faist 2008, 26). Despite this change, Millî Görüş is the only Turkish Islamic organization included in the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution's (*Verfassungsschutz*) blacklist. The organization's direct link to Islamist parties in Turkey, and its religious activities and discourse are still seen as a threat to Germany's democratic and secular regime. According to a Millî Görüş official, German officials are aware of the positive changes taking place inside Millî Görüş. Yet they still turn a blind eye to them.[116]

---

[114] "Who Are We?," available at: http://www.tgb-berlin.de/

[115] "The Organizational Structure," available at: http://www.igmg.org/gemeinschaft/wir-ueber-uns/organisationsstruktur.html

[116] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (IGMG) secretary-general, November 19, 2013, Cologne.

The DİTİB entered the religious field in Germany after the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers and Millî Görüş. The DİTİB was officially established in Cologne in 1984 with 230 member associations, although it had sent temporary *imams* to Germany during the month of Ramadan in earlier years. When the DİTİB opened its first branch in Germany, it had a limited appeal. The DİTİB required that only religious personnel approved by Ankara could serve the Turkish community abroad. Furthermore, Turkey paid the salaries of religious personnel sent abroad. This was because of Turkey's intention to prevent the development of "heretic" religious organizations in Europe, such as the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers and Millî Görüş (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 103). However, these organizations had far more appeal to the Turkish community in Germany than the DİTİB initially. Today, the DİTİB serves as the largest umbrella organization in Europe and has several regional centers in Germany.

In the 1980s, conservative-nationalists founded their own organizations. In 1987, conservative-nationalist associations organized under the Turkish-Islamic Union in Europe (*Avrupa Türk İslam Birliği*, ATİB) in Nieder Olm/Mainz. The Alevi mobilization in Germany also picked up steam in the 1980s. In 1986, Alevis established cultural organizations in several cities, including Mainz, Frankfurt, Dortmund, Cologne, Hamburg, and Berlin. In 1989, Alevis in Germany published a declaration that defined the Alevi identity different than Sunni Islam and called for the recognition of Alevi rights in Turkey and Europe. This declaration precipitated the establishment of the Federation

of Alevi Unions in Germany (*Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland*, AABF) the same year (Sökefeld and Schwalgin 2000, 15). With over 100,000 members, the AABF is the largest Alevi umbrella organization in Germany.[117]

In 1995, the secular-oriented Turkish Community in Germany (*Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland*, TGD) was founded in Hamburg as a federation operating at the national level. The TGD is linked to the secular Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg (*Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg*, TBB), an umbrella organization founded in Berlin in 1991. Table 5.2 lists the most active homeland-originated Turkish umbrella organizations in Germany.

---

[117] For more information, see "About Us" at: http://alevi.com/TR/hakkimizda/genel-tanitim/

Table 5.2: Homeland-Originated Turkish Organizations in Germany

Organization	Est. Date	Focus
The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers	1973	Religion • Daily religious practices and Islamic education
Millî Görüş (IGMG) * IFB and TGB are linked to Millî Görüş	1976	Religion • Muslim public identity
DİTİB	1984	Religion • Loyalty to Turkey
ATİB	1987	Religion and nationalism • Muslim and Turkish identity
AABF	1989	Ethnic identity • Alevism
TGD *TBB is linked to the TGD	1995	Secularism • Immigrant rights and anti-discrimination

STATE POLICIES AND ISLAM IN GERMANY

German Citizenship Policies

Prior to the 1800s, the requirements for German citizenship contained a small territorial component. Yet, even in that era, the rule of descent was the dominant element defining citizenship in the areas that would become Germany. Germany's ethnic conception of citizenship informed the 1913 citizenship law (Brubaker 1992).

When it first set citizenship policies in 1949, West Germany based its nationality law on the 1913 Nationality Act (Hailbronner 2010). This Act remains the basic legal framework for German citizenship law. Through the end of the Cold War, Germany maintained its 1913 citizenship law and defined its citizenry "as a community of descent, restrictive toward non-Germans yet remarkably expansive toward ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union" (Brubaker 1992, 14). After the Cold War, several revisions amended the 1913 law, most notable the ones in 1990 and 1993. These revisions did result in an increase in immigrants' naturalization rates. Accordingly, foreigner's naturalization rates increased over the course of the 1990s, and they reached their peak in 1999. Yet these improvements did not change the underlying notion of ethnic citizenship (Howard 2012, 44).

Against the backdrop of heated discussions on immigration and German identity, the SPD/Green coalition's victory in 1998 opened a window of opportunity for a substantial immigration reform. The Nationality Act that came into effect in 2000 reformed the old citizenship law by introducing three main sets of changes. First, the new law reduced the residency requirement for citizenship from fifteen years to eight years. Second, it replaced *jus sanguinis* with *jus soli* stipulating that children whose parents are foreigners would acquire automatic German citizenship if born in Germany and if at least one of the parents has lived in Germany for eight years or has held an unlimited residential permit for three years. Finally, the law introduced the option model

(*Optionsmodell*). That is, at the age of 23, children obtaining German citizenship through the *jus soli* model would decide   which citizenship they prefer to hold. If they fail to choose one nationality, their German nationality would be rescinded (Howard 2008).

Although the 2000 citizenship reform overhauled German nationalization law, it did not increase immigrants' naturalization rates for several reasons. First, Germany still does not allow dual citizenship. Second, the preconditions for naturalization remain grueling compared to most European countries' naturalization requirements. The application process for German citizenship may last as long as three to four years and costs 225 Euros. The 2000 citizenship reform actually made this process more onerous, which helps to explain the decrease in naturalization rates. Before the citizenship reform, the application fee was much lower and there was no need to pass a language and civic test to become a citizen (Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012). In addition, the German version of the *jus soli* does not include a provision for double *jus soli* like in France, whereby the third-generation children of second-generation immigrants would automatically receive citizenship regardless of their residency permit condition. Due to this restriction, 60 percent of the children born in Germany since the implementation of the 2000 Nationality Act could not obtain German citizenship (Howard 2008, 53).

Germany's nationality law was widened in 2014, following a grand coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. According to this new law, children of foreign parents living in Germany no longer have to choose between their

current citizenship and German citizenship before they turn 23. Yet to obtain dual citizenship, children of foreign parents must have been raised in Germany and, by the age of 21, they must have lived in Germany for at least eight years and have attended a German school for at least six years. These amendments are still viewed as discriminatory by immigration activists because not everyone meets the preconditions and the legislation does not automatically apply retroactively (*Deutsche Welle*, December 19, 2014). In other words, the law only applies to young immigrants and does not cover those born abroad even if they have spent decades living in Germany (*Deutsche Welle*, April 8, 2014). Hence, despite improvements, the German citizenship regime remains exclusionary compared to France's citizenship regime, as evidenced by foreigners' declining naturalization since 2000 (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2: Naturalization of Foreigners in Germany, 1994–2014

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2014a, 2015c)

Church-State Relations

Germany is a secular state and does not have a state religion. The German Basic Law establishes a formal separation between church and state. The German arrangement had its origins in the political tension between Catholic and Protestant churches that arose following the Protestant Reformation. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which brought the Thirty Years' War to an end, established the "religion of the ruler is the religion of the state" principle. This principle led to the division of German territories among Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist princes as well as to the establishment of a strong connection between church and state. In the aftermath of World War I, Articles 136 and 137 of the Weimar Constitution (1919–1933) adopted the principle of church-state separation, declaring that "civil and political duties shall be neither dependent on nor restricted by the exercise of religious freedom" and that "there shall be no state church." Yet the Weimar Constitution also introduced the status of corporation under public law (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*), which extended certain subsidies and privileges to the Catholic and Evangelist churches. In the post-World War II period, Article 140 of the new constitution maintained these religious clauses from the Weimar Constitution. Therefore, the religious communities operating at the time of the enactment of the 1949 Basic Law, including Evangelical, Catholic, and Jewish communities, automatically received the status of corporation under public law (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 105–107).

Other religious communities that meet certain criteria can apply for the status of corporation under public law following Article 140 of the 1949 Constitution. Jurisdiction for this issue area lies within the authority of *Länder*. However, some centralized requirements exist. In particular, the religious community must have been in existence for thirty years, possess a large number of members, and show loyalty to the German state (Rohe 2008).

In recent years, attaining this status has become easier (Joppke and Torpey 2013). However, to this date, Germany has not granted the status of corporation under public law to any mainstream Muslim organization. German authorities have argued that Muslim groups do not qualify for this status because they either have insufficient members or they do not meet the permanency requirement. Turkish Muslim representatives in Germany find this treatment discriminatory. They note that they have enough followers and that most Muslim organizations in Germany have been active for more than thirty years (Rosenow-Williams 2012).

Some Turkish Sunni Islamic and Alevi organizations are recognized as religious communities (*Religionsgemeinschaft*) and can provide Islamic education in public schools. Associations recognized as a religious community enjoy limited benefits, such as the right to provide religious education in public schools. The status of corporation under public law, on the other hand, enables religious organizations to enjoy public rights to the same extent as Christian and Jewish communities. For example, a public law corporation

189

is entitled to levy church taxes (*Kirchensteuer*) that amount to 8 to 10 percent of what is owed to the federal government in income taxes (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 107). Public corporations can also administer businesses autonomously, decide upon the composition of their religious instruction, open religious places, and send a representative to public institutions and broadcast-councils (Loobuyck et al. 2013).

The Incorporation of Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Germany

The Headscarf Issue

Apart from France, Germany is the only other European country that bans the Islamic headscarf. The headscarf became a heated issue in Germany in 1998 when Fereshta Ludin, a Muslim German of Afghani background, was forced to quit her job as a teacher in Baden-Württemberg because of her headscarf. The Court of Baden-Württemberg found that Ms. Ludin's headscarf interfered with the religious freedom of her students (Özcan 2003).

In 2003, the Constitutional Court called for each state parliament to pass laws on the status of the headscarf in public schools (Boucher 2008, 220). Eight of Germany's 16 states (Baden Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Saarland, Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Berlin) banned wearing headscarves in public schools. Five of these states (Baden Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Saarland, and North Rhine-

Westphalia) made a distinction among religions and did not ban wearing Christian symbols and clothing (Chahrokh 2009).

Thus, the German law differed from the French law concerning headscarves in two important ways. First, in Germany, the headscarf ban only applied to teachers under the logic that they are representatives of the state. In contrast, the French law also applies to students. Second, unlike the French law that applies to all religious symbols, the German law targeted Islam specifically and made explicit exemptions for Christian symbols (Joppke 2009, 53).

This legal situation changed in September 2015 when the German Federal Constitutional Court struck down its 2003 ban on the Islamic headscarf for teachers. The Constitutional Court ruled that the ban violates religious freedom protected by Article 4 of the Basic Law. While previously teachers were only allowed to wear the headscarf if they were religious education teachers, the new ruling meant that teachers in all subjects now are allowed the wear the headscarf so long as they do not put social harmony in danger. This court decision did not lead to major constitutional changes in Germany because it did not require the eight *Länder* that had banned headscarves to lift their ban. Among these states, only Lower Saxony voluntarily followed the court ruling and rescinded its ban (*Deutsche Welle*, September 7, 2015).

Muslim Representative Bodies

Germany developed a clientelistic/paternalistic relationship with its (Muslim) immigrant groups. As Soysal (1994, 39) argued, the public sphere in Germany is profoundly centralized and bureaucratic. German trade unions, church groups, and legal experts represent immigrants. However, these organizations are top-down and do not allow the growth of autonomous representation for immigrants. This hierarchy has been counterproductive to immigrants' political participation. Moreover, as noted above, even though Muslims constitute the third largest religious group, after Catholics and Protestants, no Muslim organization is recognized as a corporation under public law in Germany. This lack of legal status inhibits Muslim representation under the corporatist system and has created resentments.

Muslim organizations work to represent German Muslims despite these legal hurdles. Apart from the major Turkish Muslim organizations, two larger Islamic umbrella organizations represent Germany's Muslims and negotiate specific issues pertaining to Islam and Muslims in Germany: the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (*Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, IRD) and the Central Council of the Muslims in Germany (*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland*, ZMD). The IRD was established in 1986 as an umbrella organization to convene Islamic organizations under one roof. Since the IRD's biggest member is Millî Görüş, the organization is regarded by Germany as the sister organization of Millî Görüş. As the chairman of the organization

explained to me, the IRD is also home to religious organizations from different ethnicities, including Albanians, Arabs, and Bosnians.[118] The ZMD was founded in 1994 as an Islamic federation based in Cologne. The spokeswoman of the organization reported that unlike the IRD, the ZMD does not have substantial Turkish membership.[119] The ethnic divisions inside these organizations have made decision-making difficult. These divisions obstructed the formation of a representative body that can make claims on behalf of all Muslims (Yükleyen 2012, 160).

On 26 September 2006, the Federal Ministry of the Interior launched the German Islam Conference (DIK) as the first serious attempt at institutionalized dialogue among federal, state, and local governments and Muslims in Germany. As the Federal Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble noted (2006), the DIK intended to show that Muslims are a genuine part of German society and should be recognized as political partners.[120] Four plenary DIK meetings took place between 2006 and 2009. These meetings focused on four policy areas: (1) the German societal system and value consensus, (2) the German constitution, (3) the private sector, and (4) security (*Bundesministerium des Innern* 2008). In this period, Germany also initiated the National Integration Summit to discuss immigrants' social and political problems.

---

[118] Personal interview with IRD chairman, November 18, 2013, Cologne.

[119] Personal interview with ZMD secretary-general, November 29, 2013, Cologne.

[120] Schäuble's speech can be accessed at: http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/EN/DIK/UeberDIK/Hintergrund/hintergrund-node.html

In 2009, Germany's new Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziére initiated the second DIK process, which focused on new topics, such as the promotion of institutionalized cooperation and pro-integration projects; gender equality; and the prevention of extremism, radicalization, and social polarization (*Bundesministerium des Innern* 2016). While the IRD was excluded from the first DIK round due to its ties to Millî Görüş, it was included in the second (2009–2014) and third rounds (2014–2016).

At the current third round of the DIK, German Muslims are represented by the DİTİB, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, the AABF, the TGD, the IRD (and hence Millî Görüş), and the ZMD. In addition, influential individuals not affiliated with any immigrant organizations, and some Bosnian, Ahmadiyya, and Moroccan organizations are invited to the DIK (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz* 2016).

Like the CFCM, the DIK's recommendations are not binding. Yet there are major differences between the CFCM and the DIK. First, the DIK includes individuals and female voices. Moreover, German officials select the participating organizations. Another key difference between the DIK and the CFCM is the DIK's much more extensive focus on security and terrorism issues and its "hands-on" approach. Due to its security-oriented rhetoric in its meetings and publications, and Germany's direct involvement in the process, Turkish Muslims view the DIK as a less inclusive platform compared to the CFCM (Arkilic 2015).

Islamic Education

Religious education in Germany falls under the jurisdiction of federal states. According to Article 7 of the German Constitution, officially recognized religious societies can develop curricula and offer religious courses. Muslim organizations were not allowed to offer religious courses in public schools until the 1990s (Rosenow-Williams 2012).

In the late 1990s, the IFB, which is the local branch of the IRD, became the first Sunni Islamic organization to win the right to provide Islamic religious classes. The IFB obtained the right to provide Islamic education after a grueling legal battle that lasted two decades. The IFB was authorized to provide Islamic education in public schools without being recognized as a public law corporation because Berlin has a more flexible legislation than other federal states. Despite this accomplishment, IFB officials reported to me that they have turbulent relations with German officials because they are still viewed with suspicion.[121] Islamic religious education has been offered in other federal states since 2012, including Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, and North Rhein-Westphalia. These states have recognized the DİTİB and the AABF as religious bodies through state contracts (*Staatsvertrag*). Yet this status is not by any means as extensive and privileged as the status of corporation under public law.[122]

---

[121] Personal interview with IFB spokesperson, November 15, 2013, Berlin.

[122] Personal interview with IFB spokesperson, November 15, 2013, Berlin.

The German constitution permits the establishment of private faith-based schools. However, the state is not required to provide financial support for these schools. By custom, only organizations that are recognized as public law corporations can apply to open their own private schools with financial support. This rule has naturally restricted Islamic schools' activities (Yükleyen 2012, 161). While there have been serious improvements in recent years in the provision of Islamic religious education in Germany, Muslims still face many obstacles in religious education compared to other religious groups.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF TURKS IN GERMANY

Individual Level Political Participation

Long-term social exclusion reduces immigrants' political participation (Koopmans and Statham 2003). Turkish immigrants in Germany tend to have lower levels of education, lower rates of employment, and interact less socially with natives compared to other immigrant groups. According to a 2009 report published by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, on a sliding scale of 1 (poorly integrated) to 8 (well integrated), Turkish immigrants came last among immigrant groups in Germany, with a score of 2.4. The report found that 45 percent of Turks have failed to complete their high school education and 93 percent have married a Turkish spouse. The unemployment rate among Turks is also the highest among immigrant groups.

Immigrants from former Yugoslavia and Africa (3.2), the Middle East (4.4), and Asia (4.6) all fared better than Turks with respect to integration. Immigrants from other EU countries constituted the most integrated immigrant group in Germany with a score of 5.5 (*Deutsche Welle*, January 26, 2009). As Table 5.3 illustrates, German Turks' naturalization rates have been declining since the 2000 Nationality Act. This table also shows that German Turks naturalize at lower rates than French Turks (see Table 4.3 in Chapter Four for French Turks' naturalization rates).

Table 5.3: Naturalization Rates of Turks in Germany, 2003–2011 (per 100,000 Turkish citizens)

Country	2003-2005	2006-2008	2009-2011
Germany	245	168	161

Source: Yalaz (2014, 173)

Several factors explain why German Turks naturalize at lower rates since 2000. First, as mentioned before, German Turks do not enjoy dual citizenship rights unlike French Turks (Gerdes et al. 2007). Prior to the 2000 citizenship reform, many German Turks still managed to gain dual citizenship by exploiting a legal loophole. They did so by first abandoning their Turkish citizenship and then acquiring German citizenship. They then reapplied for Turkish citizenship (Hailbronner 2010). The 2000 reforms closed this loophole, and the reacquisition of a second citizenship has become more difficult.

Naturalization rates are in decline since 2000 also because many Turkish immigrants are reluctant to give up their current citizenship. Turks tend to think that if

they renounce their Turkish citizenship, they will have to waive their inheritance, burial, and property rights in Turkey. Some Turks also believe that choosing German citizenship over Turkish citizenship is equivalent to a betrayal to their homeland (Howard 2008, 56–57).

My interviews with the leaders of Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany revealed that Turkish Muslim leaders have become less interested in naturalization in recent years in large part because they find the option model unfair. These leaders are highly critical of this model because of its asymmetric consequences for different immigrant groups. Turks acquiring German citizenship must give up their original citizenship (see Table 5.4). Yet immigrants from the former Soviet Union, children of parents from the United States, ethnic Germans, and European citizens are exempt from this ban on dual citizenship. Moreover, several non-European countries (Algeria, Morocco, Iran, and Syria, and Latin American countries, to name a few) do not allow their citizens to give up their citizenship. Hence, citizens of these countries also can hold dual citizenship. In fact, almost half of all naturalized citizens in Germany hold dual citizenship (Miera 2009). Some scholars have argued that exemptions of certain nationalities from the dual citizenship ban signals the continuation of the *jus sanguinis* principle and unequal treatment toward Turks (Green 2000). Turkish community leaders would agree with this critique.

Table 5.4: Naturalizations by Country of Former Citizenship Retained (as of 2014)

Citizenship	Total	Former citizenship retained	Former citizenship retained (%)
Europe	64,391	32,974	51.2
EU	26,541	26,000	90
Poland	5,932	5,928	99.9
Romania	2,566	2,515	98
Russian Federation	2,744	666	24.3
Serbia	2,223	805	36.2
Turkey	**22,463**	**3,830**	**17.1**
Ukraine	3,142	664	21.1
Africa	11,169	6,333	56.7
Morocco	2,689	2,682	99.7
America	4,645	3,737	80.5
Asia	26,525	14,987	56.5
Iraq	3,172	2,493	78.6
Iran	2,546	2,546	100
Australia and Oceania	125	112	89.6
Total	**108,420**	**58,146**	**53.6**

Source: Statistiches Bundesamt (2014b)

Germany's exclusionary politics and discriminatory practices in daily life provide another reason for why Turks are naturalizing at lower rates (Howard 2008, 56–57). In particular, the climate of political distrust against Muslims makes it hard for Turkish Muslim immigrants to participate in politics. According to a 2009 survey, the majority of Germans (62 percent) reported that immigrants are not well integrated into Germany. Turkish immigrants are consistently perceived as the group that is culturally most different than natives (Abalı 2009).

Studies have found that Turks experience discrimination at higher rates than other immigrant groups in Germany (Diehl and Blohm 2003). The European Union Minorities

and Discrimination Survey (EU MIDIS) (2008) revealed that Turkish Muslims also perceive discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin at higher levels than other immigrants. More recent studies (Erdoğan 2011) found that, 69 percent of Turks believe that there is discrimination against Muslims in Germany, and only 2 percent of them think that the German state does not support or protect xenophobic movements. According to 87 percent of German Turks, Germany supports Neo-Nazi movements at moderate and/or high levels. 77 percent of German Turks expect more xenophobic attacks targeting Turks in the future and 60 percent of them think that German policy-makers are not willing to prevent such attacks. These statistics point to the low levels of trust Turks in Germany have for German authorities.

A survey conducted by the Center for Turkish Studies and Integration Research (ZfTI) found that Turkish-origin people have the highest intention to vote in state elections (83.6 percent) after native Germans (86.2 percent) (Berger et al. 2002). A recent survey conducted by Erdoğan (2013b) found that 70 percent of German Turks participated in the 2013 federal elections.

Turks are also better represented in elected bodies than other immigrant groups. Several Turkish-origin politicians have been elected to the *Bundestag*. In 1994, Leyla Onur from the SPD and Cem Özdemir from the Green Party became the first Turkish-origin MPs in the *Bundestag* (*Deutsche Welle*, October 24, 2011). Cem Özdemir, who held a parliamentary seat until 2002, became the first Muslim to be elected as chairman

of a major political party (the Greens) in 2008 (he was reelected in 2010). In the 2013 federal elections, the number of *Bundestag* members of Turkish origin rose from five to eleven (*Hürriyet*, September 24, 2013). In the same year, Aydan Özoğuz of the SPD became the Federal Minister of Immigration and Integration. All of these Turkish-origin politicians are Alevi and/or secular Turks. Hence, their political success does not explain the unprecedented political activism of conservative Turkish Muslims. Moreover, although Turks are now better represented in their host countries politics and society with an increasing number of politicians of Turkish descent, there is still a very large group of unemployed Turks who lead a dependent and isolated life in their "ethnic islands" in German ghettos (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 58).

In 2013, 60 percent of all 1860 immigrant-origin MPs serving in state parliaments were of Turkish origin. Moreover, 38 percent of all 190 local councilors of non-German origin who held a seat in local parliaments in Germany's medium and large cities elected between 2006 and 2011, and 40 percent of non-German origin MPs serving in local councils in 2013 were of Turkish descent (Schönwälder et al. 2011 *cited* in Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014; Schönwälder et al. 2013). Yet, given the Turkish population's large size in Germany, their political presence at the federal, regional, and local levels is still marginal.

Turks also have the highest level of interest in homeland politics among all immigrant communities in Germany (Yalaz 2014, 175). The Euro-Turks Barometer

Survey (Erdoğan 2013a) reported that while 74 percent of Turks feel attached to the Turkish culture, only 2 percent feel attached to their host country's culture, and 19 percent feel attached to both Turkish and host country culture. The same survey found that 50 percent of Turks follow the Turkish media.

This discussion shows that despite their success in elected bodies compared to other immigrant groups, German Turks are still the least integrated immigrant group in Germany. They also naturalize at lower rates compared with French Turks and are highly interested in homeland politics. Hence, Turkish Muslim leaders' recent politicization in Germany is surprising given their limited political participation at the individual level.

Group Level Political Participation

While Turkish-run immigrant organizations have been active since the 1960s, they had minimal political presence in Germany before the mid-2000s. Anti-immigrant violence that took place in Germany in the 1990s in theory could have provoked political activism among Turkish immigrants. Arson attacks organized by Neo-Nazi groups in Mölln in 1992 and in Solingen in 1993 killed members of several Turkish families. Yet, while a handful of Turkish and German individuals protested the incidents, these racist attacks did not trigger large-scale demonstrations by Turkish immigrant organizations. In fact, more German individuals condemned the incidents than Turks (*New York Times*, June 4, 1993). In addition, Turkish immigrants were only marginally involved in the

202

political debates of the 1990s concerning immigrant rights in Germany. For example, Turkish immigrant organizations were very passive during the drafting of the contentious German Nationality Act.[123] Given the salience of the issue for the Turkish community, Turkish immigrant organizations' disinterest in the citizenship reform process was surprising (Boucher 2008, 216).

Similar to the situation in France, a paralyzing disharmony within the Turkish community prevented Turkish immigrant organizations from participating in German politics in the past. Two examples are telling. In 1978, several Turkish Muslim organizations, including Millî Görüş and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers formed a temporary alliance to apply for the provision of Islamic education in North Rhein-Westphalia. Yet Muslim organizations could not agree on the curriculum, which, eventually, led to the failure of the project. A second telling event happened in 1988. That year, the DİTİB, Millî Görüş, and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers came together with other influential local Muslim organizations to lobby for Islamic education. Yet within five years, the organization collapsed completely (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014, 174–177). As Yurdakul and Yükleyen (2009, 222–224) argued, the *de facto* dominance of the DİTİB in the Turkish organizational landscape was one of the factors that fragmented the organizational landscape. Other organizations needed to work with

---

[123] Of all the Turkish immigrant organizations, only two smaller organizations—the TBB and Immigrün—showed interest in the proposed reforms (Boucher 2008, 216).

the DİTİB to create unity among Turkish organization, but the interests of the DİTİB contrasted with those of many groups of Turks in Germany.

The institutionalization of hierarchical relations between the German government and immigrant organizations further suppressed political organization among German Turks. Turkish immigrant organizations had very limited independent representation at parliamentary committee meetings. They, for example, were not even invited to the 1999 Hearing of Experts during the citizenship reform process (Boucher 2008, 217). Germany's paternalistic approach towards Turks coupled with Turkish organizations' internal problems shattered Turks' collective identity, self-confidence, and organizational capacity, and therefore, hindered their collective political engagement at the time. As Chapter Six will discuss in detail, the establishment of the DIK in 2006 did not improve Germany's relations with Turkish civil society leaders.

Despite these hurdles, Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany became politically active from the 2000s onward. These organizations' political activism has focused on issues, including the legal status of Islam, dual citizenship, the preservation of the Turkish language, and Turkey's bid for EU membership. Turkish Muslim leaders also oppose discrimination against Turks and Muslims, the securitization of immigration and integration, and the recognition of the Armenian "genocide."

An early sign of conservative Turkish organizations' changing political behavior came in 2004 when representatives of conservative Turkish organizations entered the

headscarf debate by organizing a march in Berlin under the slogan "my headscarf is 100 percent cotton and 0 percent terror" (*Taggesspiegel*, January 19, 2004). Following this march, Turkish Muslim leaders held public forums and public hearings in state parliaments, issued press statements, and conducted lobbying activities to oppose the headscarf ban. Even though only a few years had passed between the Nationality Act debate (1999) and the headscarf debate (2004), Turkish immigrant organizations' claims-making in the headscarf debate was substantially higher than their claims-making in the Nationality Act debate (Boucher 2008, 221–222).

The establishment of the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (*Koordinationsrat der Muslime in* Deutschland, KRM) also followed from Turkish organizations' burgeoning political activism.[124] In 2007, the DİTİB, the IRD, the ZMD, and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers joined forces to establish an umbrella organization. This organization would speak with one voice when negotiating with policy-makers on important issues affecting Muslims, such as the right to provide Islamic religious education. In 2012, a special contract gave Turkish Muslim organizations the right to provide Islamic education classes even though they do not hold the status of corporation under public law (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014, 179). These classes were the first of their kind in Germany. The establishment of the KRM and the subsequent

---

[124] Other Islamic councils (*Schura*) have been established in Hamburg and Lower Saxony since the early 2000s. These councils are not restricted to Turkish Islamic organizations and include other Muslim organizations from different ethnicities. In Lower Saxony, the Schura came together with the Turkish DİTİB to develop a curriculum for Islamic education to be offered in public schools as of 2013. Like the KRM, the Schura acts as a "quasi-recognized" Muslim body that engages in negotiations with German authorities (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014, 180).

rights extended to these organizations were a remarkable achievement for the Turkish Muslim community.[125]

In order to get further recognition, in 2011, the DİTİB initiated the "Muslim Community Registry" campaign to count and register the members of the Turkish Muslim community in Germany. Since immigrant organizations must have a large number of followers to be given the status of corporation under public law, the Muslim Registry Campaign's main goal was to prove that the Turkish Muslim population in Germany is populous enough to be eligible for this status.[126]

Turkish Muslims political activity surrounding citizenship also changed in the 2000s. While Turkish Muslim organizations had mostly ignored the citizenship debate in the late 1990s, some Turkish organizations began to voice political claims regarding dual citizenship after 2010. In March 2012, the Millî Görüş-linked TGB initiated a signature campaign that called for the government to grant dual citizenship to Turks. Soon after, other conservative organizations, such as Millî Görüş and the DİTİB, joined the campaign. Using the slogan "Dual Citizenship for Everyone" (*Herkese Çifte Vatandaşlık*), these organizations managed to collect 40,000 signatures in Berlin, which were later submitted to German party leaders (*Hürriyet*, December 19, 2012). Millî

---

[125] Yet Muslim leaders criticize the contracts due to their paternalistic nature. German experts have the authority to decide which organization is eligible for cooperation. German bureaucrats also regularly monitor Islamic religious course curricula prepared by KRM representatives. According to one of the KRM's representative, German experts select interlocutors in a top-down and biased manner and make a distinction between "good Muslims" and "bad Muslims." Moreover, while the original agreement sought to reach 350,000 Muslim pupils, due to technical problems, only 50,000 pupils have benefited from these classes in North Rhein-Westphalia (Personal interview with IRD chairman, November 18, 2013, Cologne).

[126] For more information on the campaign, please visit: http://www.ditib.de/gemeinderegister/

206

Görüş, the DİTİB, and the ATİB launched another signature campaign in August 2012, titled "Do not Meddle with Our Language!" (*Türkçemize Karışma!*) in Hessen. The campaign advocated for the instruction of Turkish language as an optional language course in public schools. The campaign organizers collected 2,541 signatures, which were then submitted to the Federal Ministry of Education (*Hürriyet*, August 26, 2012).

The largest collective political action led by conservative Turkish organizations in Germany came right before the September 2013 federal elections. Millî Görüş, the DİTİB, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, the ATİB, and the TGB initiated a nation-wide political campaign titled "Go to the Ballot Box!" (*Sandığa Git!*).[127] This campaign called for Turkish voters to have a say in Germany's politics by casting a ballot in the German elections. It was the first major effort by immigrant organizations to boost electoral participation among Turks in Germany. The leaders of the participating organizations attempted to mobilize the Turkish electorate by launching a media campaign, distributing booklets, and organizing seminars and workshops on how to become an active citizen. These organizations not only worked to increase voting, they also organized a manifesto of political demands. Turkish Muslim leaders demanded the preservation of Turkish language and the promotion of bilingualism, stronger opposition against discrimination and anti-Islamophobia, the abolition of the German language test required for immigrants' family reunification, and the abolition of the option model for

---

[127] The TGD participated in this campaign later.

207

Turkish nationals. They also requested the extension of the status of corporation under public law to Turkish Islamic organizations, the promotion of multiculturalism, the acceleration of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU, and the fair implementation of bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and the EU. This manifesto was then submitted to German MPs, party leaders, and journalists.[128]

In recent years, conservative Turkish immigrant organizations have publically objected to the securitization of immigration and integration in Germany. For example, DİTİB officials boycotted the second National Integration Summit in 2007 due to the tightening of immigration and family reunification policy.[129] Other conservative Turkish organizations have also boycotted the DIK at various points and suspended their collaboration with the Federal Ministry of the Interior due to Millî Görüş's exclusion from the DIK (Arkilic 2015). These organizations are no longer willing to let German authorities' prejudicial treatment of Millî Görüş continue without protest.

Anti-discrimination is another important action area for conservative Turkish organizations. In January 2015, Millî Görüş and the ATİB delivered a press release that took a strong stand against the Pegida movement, which had organized xenophobic marches and demonstrations. Millî Görüş and the ATİB criticized populist German politicians and the media for encouraging anti-immigrant groups (*Cihan*, December 30, 2014). These organizations also staged a demonstration in Cologne to condemn racism

---

[128] These claims can be seen at: http://www.sandigagit.com/index.html

[129] Personal interview with DİTİB secretary-general, November 27, 2013, Cologne.

and hatred against Muslims following the press release. The Cologne demonstration showed the popular support for organizations among Turks in Germany.

Finally, conservative Turkish organizations have worked to defend Turkey's national interests concerning the Armenian issue. In April 2015, Millî Görüş, the DİTİB, the UETD, the TGB, and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers held a press conference to take political action against a recent German parliamentary motion that labeled the 1915 mass killings of Ottoman Armenians as "genocide" (*BBC*, April 23, 2015). Following this press statement, on 25 April 2015, these organizations launched the "Peace and Friendship March Against Genocide Allegations" (*Soykırım İftiralarına Karşı Dostluk ve Barış Buluşması*) demonstration in Cologne (Süslü 2015).

Alevi and secular organizations are largely absent from the Turkish community's new political activism. The only exception to this pattern is the secular-oriented TGD's submission of the Equal Rights Law resolution[130] to the *Bundestag* in 2013. As the organization's former chairman explained to me in an interview, this campaign was supported by conservative Turkish organizations. Yet he noted that conservative organizations and secular organizations rarely come together to organize political campaigns.[131]

---

[130] This campaign raised seven demands: the extension of dual citizenship to Turks, the removal of language requirements for family reunification, Turkey's accession to the EU, the recognition of foreign diplomas, support for vocational training, the promotion of Turkish language, and the improvement of work conditions for Turkish nationals

[131] Personal interview with TGD chairman, September 13, 2013, Berlin.

Chapter Six will show that Turkey's recent engagement in Germany fed political activism among Turkish Muslims. Turkey's diaspora outreach policies have lessened the polarization within conservative umbrella organizations and improved their organizational capacity. The next section will trace Turkey's relations with conservative Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany since the early 2000s.

TURKEY'S OUTREACH ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY

Official Correspondence and Mass Rallies

In recent years, Turkish diplomatic personnel in Germany have become increasingly involved in the organizational life of Turks in Germany. As mentioned before, one of the most concrete indicators of this policy change was the publication of a circular by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2003 that mandated Turkish bureaucrats serving in Europe to support and collaborate with Millî Görüş and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, which were previously seen as harmful to the secular Turkish state. This mandate shook the *de facto* dominance of the DİTİB. In the same year, a Turkish parliamentary commission issued a comprehensive report on Turkish organizations in Europe that detailed the state of the organizational landscape and the main challenges Turkish Muslims faced regardless of their organizational affiliation (Baş et al. 2003).

The 2003 memorandum and parliamentary report thawed the ice between Turkish diplomats and Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany. The creation of the UETD by the

AKP in 2004 as an overarching organization to coordinate the lobbying activities of Turkish immigrant organizations in Europe has also initiated a process of rapprochement among conservative Turkish organizations. Since the early 2000s, representatives of the DİTİB, Millî Görüş, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, the ATİB, and the UETD's chairman in France have come together on many occasions. Turkish bureaucrats' increasing visits to these organizations also reflect Turkey's increasing interest in its diaspora. For example, in 2014 and 2015, the director of the YTATB came together with Turkish citizens in Heidelberg, Mannheim, Cologne, Witten, and Dortmund. Turkey's Vice Prime Ministers accompanied him in some of these visits. During these official trips, Turkish bureaucrats visited several Turkish mosques that were attacked by Neo-Nazi groups, including the Mevlana Mosque in Berlin and the Yunus Emre Mosque in Mannheim to show that "Turkish Muslims living in Germany are not alone" (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 40).

Another effective way to reach out to the Turkish diaspora in Germany is massive rallies. These rallies served as an important component of Turkey's new diaspora engagement policy. In the first event of its kind, 20,000 Turks gathered in a stadium in Cologne in 2008 to hear Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan speak. This speech was controversial because few politicians had given live speeches in Germany since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Public rallies are not common in modern Germany for understandable historical reasons. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's speech delivered in 1989 at the fall of the Berlin Wall attracted only 10,000 people. During the most recent parliamentary election campaigns, only a few thousand people came to listen to Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel's speeches (*Der Spiegel*, February 11, 2008). In contrast, Erdoğan's rally was massive.

The rally was not a part of Erdoğan's official visit to Germany but was organized by the UETD as a private event. Erdoğan started his speech by condemning the German government's negligence during the investigation of the NSU attacks targeting Turkish families. He also raised his concerns regarding Germany's reluctance to support Turkey's EU accession. Erdoğan went on to list the measures his government took to investigate xenophobic crimes aimed at Turks. Turkey's President concluded his speech by enumerating the AKP's other accomplishments.

In this speech, Erdoğan also urged German Turks to make greater efforts to integrate. He stated that Turks should: "Take advantage of Germany's educational institutions. It is a disadvantage that you don't speak the language of the country [Germany]." Yet he warned that Turks should not forget their culture, religion, and language while integrating. The majority of the participants of this rally were followers of Turkish Islamic organizations. Most participants traveled to Cologne from Berlin, Duisburg, Munich, Hamburg, and Bremen to see him. Following Erdoğan's speech,

participants were asked to sing the Turkish anthem followed by the German anthem (*Deutsche Welle*, February 11, 2008).

Three years later, the UETD organized another private rally in Düsseldorf. Some 10,000 Turks came from all over Germany to see Erdoğan speak again. In his speech, he urged Merkel to drop her opposition against Turkey's accession to the EU. He repeated the point that German language is the key to integration: "I want you and your children to learn German. You must study and obtain a Master's degree. I want you to become doctors, professors, and politicians in Germany." He also repeated his warning to Turks against assimilation: "Integrate yourselves into German society, but do not assimilate. No one has the right to deprive us of our culture and our identity," he said (*Der Spiegel*, February 28, 2011). At this rally, Erdoğan once again lauded the AKP's specific accomplishments in diaspora affairs, such as the introduction of the Blue Card program.

In the following years, Erdoğan organized several other diaspora rallies in Germany. In February 2014, 7,000 Turkish gathered in Berlin. In May 2014, 20,000 Turks gathered in Cologne. The Berlin and Cologne rallies were supported by the UETD like the previous rallies. These visits continued to spark controversy in Germany, leading Chancellor Merkel to ask Erdoğan to "act with a sense and responsibility" (*Financial Times*, May 19, 2014).

Erdoğan organized more rallies in Germany than any other European country. Two factors prompted this behavior. First, German Turks form a stronger lobby group

than other parts of the Turkish diaspora due to their large population base. Erdoğan's government desired that this lobby group advocate for Turkey's interests in Europe. Second, Turks living in Germany are a vital voter base in Turkish domestic elections. With 1.4 million German Turks eligible to vote for the Turkish elections (47 percent of Turkish voters abroad), Germany is the fourth largest constituency after Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir (Mencütek and Yılmaz 2015, 5). For the November 2015 Turkish general elections, 41 percent of German Turks cast their ballot. The AKP received 59.7 percent of the votes (see Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3: The November 2015 Turkish Parliamentary Election Results (Germany)

Source: Supreme Electoral Council (2015d)

In sum, Erdoğan used rallies in Germany as he did in France to revitalize relations with the EU, refresh ties with the Turkish diaspora, drum up expatriate votes, and tap into German Turks' lobbying potential.

Activities of the Diyanet

The Diyanet's largest body of overseas personnel resides in Germany. In the past, the Diyanet's long-term personnel stayed in Germany for a maximum period of four years. This increased to five years in 2002. The number of long-term Diyanet personnel serving in Germany has also climbed rapidly since 2002 (see Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4: Diyanet Religious Personnel in Germany, 1983–2014

Source: Bruce (2015, 412)

The Diyanet has also begun to collaborate with the Goethe Institute in Turkey to familiarize its *imams* with German language and culture before the start of their tenure in Germany. To this end, 50-60 Diyanet *imams* now take "integration" courses at the Goethe Institute each year (Bruce 2015).

Over the last two decades, the Diyanet's religious counselors and attachés have also met more frequently with Turkish bureaucrats from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and the Turkish Parliament. Almost every month, high-ranking Turkish officials pay multiple visits to DİTİB mosques and events abroad. These visits are consistent. Between 2007 and 2010, representatives of the Turkish government paid at least one visit each month to a DİTİB mosque or event. Recent years have brought increasing dialogue between the Diyanet and other religious organizations as well (Bruce 2015, 426–427).

The Diyanet's activities in Germany expanded when it endowed two Islamic theology professorships at the Goethe University in Frankfurt in 2004. Professors teaching at this university are sent from Turkey and students enrolled in this program visit Turkey during the academic year to attend lectures taught by Turkish theology professors in Istanbul (Gibbon 2009, 23). This program is part of an educational trend. Islamic centers also were established in Münster, Osnabrück, Paderborn, Tübingen, Hamburg, and Erlangen-Nürnberg in recent years to train academics in Islamic theology. However, unlike the theology institute in France, the Diyanet (and hence the Turkish state) has a very limited role in the administration and funding of these Islamic centers. Instead, the entire funding for these programs comes from Germany (*Deutsche Welle*, January 16, 2013).

While Turkey's involvement in these theology institutes in Germany is minimal, it offers an alternative program. In 2006, the Diyanet initiated the International Theology Program to provide young German Turks religious education at Turkish universities. This program allows students residing in Germany to be trained in Turkish theology institutes

216

and to return to Germany to serve as theology professors and *imams*. This program is under full control of Turkey and is fully funded by the Diyanet.[132]

Activities of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (YTATB)

The YTATB's activities in Germany focus on two key issue areas: youth empowerment and civil society empowerment.

Youth Empowerment

The Turkish Citizens Abroad Scholarship Program is a key component of Turkey's diaspora youth empowerment project. This program provides generous scholarships to Turkish students living in Germany to support their undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral studies. To date, 20 young German Turks have benefited from this program. Students who pass competitive interviews receive monthly stipends of €500 for their undergraduate studies, €750 for their doctoral studies, and €1000 for their postdoctoral training (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 32).

The Youth Bridges Program is another project that targets third- and fourth-generation Turkish citizens living in Europe. This project aims to bring a total of 1,500 young people to various Turkish cities to "solidify their ties to Turkey, enable them to learn their native culture through first-hand experience, and introduce them to Turkey's

---

[132] Yet, while DİTİB authorities want these students to be appointed to German public schools to teach Islamic religious courses upon completion of this program, Germany gives priority to students graduating from its own theology institutes (Personal interview with DİTİB secretary-general, November 27, 2013, Cologne).

historical and cultural assets" (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 73). Students visiting Turkey through this program also meet Turkish policy-makers.

The Young Leaders Program has similar goals. It assists young German Turks to obtain work experience in Turkish government offices, companies, and civil society organizations. The primary goals of this program are listed as: "to increase the social, economic and political participation of new-generation Euro-Turks and to urge them to become active citizens in both Turkey and their host states." To date, 40 young German Turks have participated in the Young Leaders Program (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 34). The majority of participants in all of these programs are conservative.

Ankara has also mobilized its diplomatic efforts to retrieve Turkish children placed in foster care in Germany in recent years (*Hürriyet*, October 24, 2013). The Youth Bureaus and Turkish Families Project is a new project designed to encourage Turkish families living in Germany to adopt Turkish children. In Berlin alone, Turkish officials held 29 seminars and circulated 10,000 booklets on the subject matter (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 59).

Turkey pays special attention to the preservation of Turkish language and the promotion of bilingual education. Two new projects, namely the Bilingual Education Project and the Preservation of the Turkish Language Project were initiated in 2012 and 2013, respectively to teach Turkish to German-born children "on the basis of multiculturalism and universal Islamic values" (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015,

62). Turkey has also established education centers since 2012 that work to help Turkish children succeed in public schools in Germany. More than eight education centers were set up in Duisburg, Ludwigshafen, Dortmund, Cologne, Hannover, Duisburg, Dusseldorf, and Mulheim an der Ruhr to help Turkish high-school students score better on tests. The Turkish government launched two additional projects in Bremen and Lower Saxony for college students. In addition, the Successful Education Project gives seminars to at least 1000 Turkish families each year about how to "raise self-confident children who know their rights and can fight for them" (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 65–66).

Civil Society Empowerment

Active citizenship is the most important issue area for the YTATB. The institution launched the Civil Society Workshops as a flagship activity. These workshops serve to empower the leaders of immigrant organizations and to facilitate their participation in Germany's economic and political life.

Brainstorming workshops held in both Germany and Turkey act as an important venue to foster civic engagement among German Turks. For example, more than 40 Turkish organization leaders participated in a capacity-development meeting held in Berlin in 2014. The same year, the AKP's lobby organization UETD organized a larger meeting for Turkish Muslim leaders in Istanbul. During this three-day event, immigrant organization leaders attended seminars led by 60 UETD leaders who taught capacity building and empowerment strategies. The ATİB held a similar brainstorming meeting in

219

February 2015 in Istanbul for conservative Turkish organizations operating in Germany (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 46–48).

Between 2011 and 2014, Turkish civil society organizations operating in Germany submitted 296 project applications to the YTATB. The YTATB provided financial assistance to 113 projects (38 percent). The total amount of financial aid allocated to civil society organizations equalled to $3,354,533. According to the YTATB's 2015 Germany activity report, the institution gave this financial assistance to organizations for them to "conduct more effective and professional activities, and make significant contributions to 'societal development,' 'public opinion,' and 'active citizenship'." Seventy-eight percent of this assistance went to support lobbying, educational, and capacity development (seminars, workshops, publications) activities (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 56–57). Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 break down the YTATB's financial aid into years and themes.

Figure 5.5: The YTATB's Financial Aid to Turkish Civil Society Organizations in Germany, 2011–2014 (in USD)

Source: YTATB Germany Activity Report (2015, 56) (Currency from TL to USD converted by the author)

Figure 5.6: Thematic Distribution of the YTATB's Project Support

Source: YTATB Germany Activity Report (2015, 57)

The Turkish government has also launched the International Justice Program and the Fight Against Discrimination Project to promote the active citizenship of Turkish Muslim leaders. The International Justice Program aims to educate Turkish citizens living

221

in Germany about their legal rights. To date, the program organized seven "justice seminars" in Germany in which 400 Turkish jurists received training. The Fight Against Discrimination Project serves a similar purpose. In the wake of an increase in anti-Muslim sentiments among the public in Germany, this project aims to equip Turkish Muslim leaders with necessary tools to combat discrimination and to publish reports that document the extent of discrimination Turks in Germany face (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 49, 71).

The YTATB has also launched public awareness campaigns to boost German Turks' participation in elections. The YTATB launched the Election Information Campaign to inform German Turks of their electoral rights in Turkey and in Germany. Turkish officials advertise this project using brochures and posters, social media announcements, and during regular meetings with immigrant organization leaders. The Election Information Campaign circulated 13,150 posters and 215,750 booklets to encourage German Turks' participation in the 2015 Turkish general elections. A related project was held in Hamburg in 2015 to encourage the political participation of 90,000 Turkish residents in local councils (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 39, 70).

In addition, the YTATB strives to improve organizations' lobbying capacity surrounding the Armenian issue. In 2015, the YTATB published a book titled "A Centennial Issue: New Approaches in the Democratization Process (1915–2015)." The publication of this book was an attempt to "enlighten the Turkish and German society

regarding the Armenian issue in the most accurate manner" (YTATB Germany Activity Report 2015, 50). The book was distributed to German universities, public libraries, and civil society organizations.

CONCLUSION

This chapter showed that Turkish conservative-nationalist and Sunni Islamic organizations in Germany, like their counterparts in France, have engaged in political activism only after 2000. This recent advent of German Turks' political activism cannot be explained by overall changes in their social capital. Turks continued to be the least integrated immigrant community in Germany throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Compared to other immigrant groups, such as former Yugoslavians and Maghrebis, Turks still have lower levels of education, employment, and social interaction with natives. Turkish politicians in Germany have gained visibility in political parties and the *Bundestag* starting from the late 1980s. Yet these politicians tend to be secular Turks, not the religious Turks who dominate immigrant activism. Moreover, despite their impressive levels of political participation, Turks have the lowest levels of interest in German politics and highest levels of interest in homeland politics among immigrant communities in Germany. Therefore, we still need a better explanation as to why Turkish Muslim leaders waited until the mid-2000s to engage in political activism.

This chapter also discussed the shortcomings of the literature that attributed casual importance to institutional factors. Despite the 2000 citizenship reform, the

institutional structure of Germany still provides an unfavorable context for Turkish Muslim leaders' political participation. Moreover, anti-immigrant sentiment remains a part of mainstream German politics, as evidenced by public opinion polls and the rise of anti-immigrant movements, such as Pegida and the AfD. Conservative Turkish immigrant organization leaders in Germany have managed to mobilize politically despite their declining naturalization rates and the climate of political distrust against them.

While studies have found that Turks experience discrimination at higher rates than other immigrant groups in Germany, a grievance-oriented theory, likewise, cannot explain why conservative Turkish organizations in Germany have engaged in collective activism only recently. This is because Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany have long understood their ethnic group to occupy a disadvantaged position in their host country's inter-ethnic context. However, this perception did not translate into political participation until recently. Conservative Turkish organizations did not launch large-scale political actions until the establishment of a diaspora institution in Turkey.

I demonstrated in this chapter that conservative Turkish organizations' shift from political apathy to active citizenship occurred due in large part to Turkey's recent diaspora outreach activities in Germany. The growing interaction between Turkish bureaucrats and immigrant organization leaders, the increased frequency of Turkish government-sponsored political rallies held in large German cities, the growing number of the Diyanet personnel sent to Germany, and the flow of financial assistance and

organizational support from the YTATB to conservative immigrant organizations have all paved the way for immigrant activism in Germany.

Compared to France, Turkey has channeled even more support to its diaspora in Germany due to the Turkish population's larger size and visibility in Germany. The German Turkish population constitutes an important lobby bloc and a large constituency for Turkish elections. The Turkish government also targets the conservative elements of the German Turkish population as a vital source of political support abroad. As a result, Turkish conservative-nationalist and Sunni Islamic organizations have become pioneers of Turkish immigrant political activism in Germany.

Chapter Six: Linking Diaspora Engagement Policies to Immigrant Political Participation

As discussed in the previous two chapters, despite the long history of Turkish immigration in France and Germany, conservative Turkish organizations were absent from their host countries' political life for decades.[133] Yet starting from the mid-2000s, these organizations' leaders have engaged in unprecedented political activism in both countries. In addition, while Turkish Muslim leaders in these countries became politically mobilized around the same time, politicization is higher among conservative Turkish organizations in Germany than in France.

This chapter explores further these trends in political mobilization. It revisits the empirical implications of the conventional approaches to immigrant mobilization as possible explanations for the changing patterns of Turkish political engagement. In the first part of the chapter I show that existing approaches fail to explain conservative Turkish immigrant organization leaders' cross-national differences in their political activism. This discussion shows that a new theory is required to shed light on Turkish Muslim leaders' different rate of politicization in France and Germany.

---

[133] Parts of this chapter are based on a previously published article of mine. Please cite this article as follows: Arkilic, Z. Ayca. 2015. "The Limits of European Islam: Turkish Islamic Umbrella Organizations and their Relations with Host Countries–France and Germany." *Journal of Muslim and Minority Affairs* 35 (1): 17–41.

The second part of the chapter details the "diaspora empowerment mechanism" that lies at the heart of my theory. Based on interviews conducted with immigrant organization leaders, I show that Turkey's support has instilled a sense of self-efficacy, collective identity, and group consciousness in supported organization leaders and enhanced their organizational capacities. These interviews reveal that Turkey has favored conservative organizations over non-conservative ones in its diaspora policy. I also demonstrate empirically that the Turkish state has directed greater resources to conservative Turkish organizations in Germany than in France. To gauge the higher level of support provided to Germany, this chapter tracks the number of political rallies that took place in France and Germany as well as the number religious personnel sent to each country. The degree of financial support provided by the YTATB to conservative organizations in Germany and France and the number of Turkish Muslim leaders from each country that serves in the YTATB's advisory board also confirm that conservative organizations in Germany have benefitted more from the homeland's backing. This variation in Turkey's outreach policies has affected the degree of immigrant political activism and rendered organizations in Germany more politically active than those in France.

The last part of the chapter complicates this top-down mobilization story. It examines the impact of local grievances toward host states on Turkish immigrant leaders' receptivity to Turkey's diaspora outreach policies. It demonstrates that diaspora

populations with stronger grievances against host states are more likely to respond to efforts of their homeland government to organize them politically. Since Turkish Muslim leaders feel more aggrieved in Germany than in France, they have become more receptive to Turkey's diaspora policies. Interviews conducted with German and French authorities and Turkish Muslim leaders show that German Turks do not enjoy public rights to the same extent as Christians and Jews. Nor are they seen as a trustworthy group in Germany. Conservative Turkish organizations in Germany also do not receive any subsidy for their activities and have limited representation in the DIK unlike their counterparts in France. Due to the lack of support from their host state, Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany view Turkey's outreach activities necessary for their viability and empowerment.

REVISITING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Group-Related Factors

Group-related factors, such as socio-economic standing cannot explain why Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany have become more politicized than their counterparts in France. According to the Euro-Turks survey conducted by Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel (2005), Turks in Germany have lower socio-economic status than Turks in France. A more recent study also found that German Turks are less socio-culturally integrated than French Turks (Ersanilli 2010). Unemployment is a more serious

concern for German Turks. In comparison to 7 percent of French Turks, 22 percent of German Turks are unemployed. Moreover, as Figure 6.1 shows, 21 percent of German Turks earn less than 1000 Euros per month as opposed to 15 percent of French Turks. In addition, 41 percent of German Turks belong to the lower-middle class compared with 52 percent of French Turks. The percentage of Turks who receive steady income is also somewhat lower in Germany: 32 percent of German Turks have regular income as opposed to 36 percent of French Turks.

German Turks also perceive their socio-economic status to be more negative than that of French Turks. 37 percent of German Turks reported that their socio-economic status is worse today compared to ten years ago as opposed to 12 percent of French Turks. The number of university graduates and post-graduate students is also lower among German Turks than French Turks (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 59–67).

Figure 6.1: French and German Turks' Monthly Income (in €)

Source: Kaya and Kentel (2005, 59)

Ethno-cultural factors also fail to provide an adequate explanation for the recent shifts in Turkish organizational activism in France and Germany. The ethno-cultural approach expects similar political behavior from immigrant groups originating from the same homeland. Turks in Germany and France are ethno-culturally similar: They share the same religion, language, and ethnic cleavages. There are Alevi, Sunni Islamic, conservative-nationalist, and secular organizations in both countries, often operating under the same names. Since Turks in France and Germany possess identical ethno-cultural characteristics, we need a better explanation as to why political participation is higher among conservative organizations in Germany than those in France. This explanation must also account for why non-conservative Turkish immigrant groups have maintained their political apathy unlike conservative organizations.

230

Little differs in the history of Turkish immigration to France and Germany. As noted previously, the length of stay in these destination countries and mode of immigration are very similar for Turkish immigrants to both countries. Turks came to France and Germany in 1961 and 1965, respectively. In both France and Germany, large-scale immigration began with guest-worker programs and grew following the introduction of lenient family reunification policies and the influx of political dissidents and asylum seekers. Hence, these factors cannot explain cross-national divergence in political participation trends of Turks.

One can argue that group size or social capital could explain why conservative Turkish organizations in Germany have become more politicized. Turkish immigrants in Germany outnumber those in France, and therefore, they are more visible in Germany's social and political life. Yet this explanation is also unsatisfactory. While the size of the Turkish population in France and in Germany differs, the organizational traits of conservative Turkish immigrant umbrella organizations operating in these countries are similar. Moreover, studies show that large numbers do not guarantee successful political mobilization. For example, despite their large size, ethnic Germans have little political presence in Germany (Schönwalder 2013). In contrast, Armenians and Jews are politically active and influential despite their small size (Yalaz 2014). Put differently, large immigrant communities that lack political consciousness and collective identity may not participate in their host countries' political life.

Tiberj and Simon's (2012) study also found that Turks and Maghrebis have similar membership rates in immigrant organizations. This means that organizational membership cannot explain French Turks' traditionally lower levels of political activism. Despite having similar rates of organizational membership, Maghrebis have been more politically active than Turks since the 1980s. Hence, variations in the size of the Turkish community cannot explain the timing of and the differences in the degree of Turkish political activism in France and Germany.

Variations in the level of social capital among Turkish organizations in France and in Germany may help to explain the lower levels of mobilization in France, but cannot explain the overall trend towards greater activism. Turkish immigrant organizations in France are less institutionalized and united, and are underrepresented at the national level compared with their counterparts in Germany. Yet despite their limited political resources, they have managed to engage in large-scale political action. The post-2000 shift towards political activism among conservative Turkish organizations happened in both Germany and France.

In addition, conservative Turkish organizations in France and Germany are connected to each other through transnational networks. These networks mean that conservative French Turks can take advantage of the higher levels of social capital among German Turks. Since Germany is the political center of Turkish organizations, decisions taken in Germany affect leaders in France. Due to this transnational linkage,

French Turks enjoy access to organizational resources beyond those immediately available to them in their host country (Yalaz 2014, 258–260).

Institutional Factors

The institutional context within host countries does not explain Turkish immigrants' recent political mobilization. Despite the significant differences in these host countries' legal and political characteristics, conservative Turkish immigrant organizations in both France and Germany have mobilized around the same time. Scholars have also suggested that Germany's exclusionist integration regime provides fewer opportunities for immigrant political participation than the assimilationist French model. This observation renders the higher political politicization of Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany a curious case.

German Turks naturalize and turnout to vote at lower rates in their host country than French Turks. According to the Euro-Turks survey, 59 percent of German Turks have or plan to apply for German citizenship as opposed to 74 percent of French Turks (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 79). A more recent study reported that 40 percent of German Turks are naturalized as opposed to 46 percent of French Turks (Yalaz 2014, 173). Table 6.1 shows that the naturalization rates of Turkish immigrants in France have traditionally been higher than those in Germany. Moreover, according to the HUGO France survey (Erdoğan 2012), 83 percent of French citizens of Turkish origin have both French and

Turkish citizenship. The HUGO Germany survey (Erdoğan 2011) found that only 15.9

percent of German citizens of Turkish origin have both German and Turkish citizenship.

Table 6.1: Naturalization Rates of Turks in France and Germany, 2003–2011 (per 100,000 Turkish citizens)

Country	2003–2005	2006–2008	2009–2011
France	520	460	329
Germany	245	168	161

Sources: Yalaz (2014, 173)

Turks in Germany are also less interested in local elections and more interested in

Turkish elections compared with Turks in France. For example, only 70 percent of

German Turks participated in the 2013 *Bundestag* elections (Erdoğan 2013b). On the

other hand, 81 percent of French Turks cast a ballot in the 2007 presidential elections

(Erdoğan 2012). The 2005 Euro-Turks Survey revealed that 58 percent of German Turks

follow Turkish politics as opposed to 50 percent of French Turks (see Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2: French and German Turks' Interest in Homeland Politics

Source: Kaya and Kentel (2005, 72)

The 2005 Euro-Turks Survey also revealed that since their settlement in host countries, 25 percent of German Turks have participated in Turkish elections as opposed to 8 percent of French Turks (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 72–73). In contrast, in the most recent Turkish elections, Turks in France and Germany had a very similar participation rate. For the June 2015 Turkish general elections, 35 percent of German Turks and 37 percent of French Turks cast a ballot. For the November 2015 Turkish general elections, 41 percent of German Turks and 45 percent of French Turks cast a ballot. The AKP became the leading party in France and Germany in both elections. The party received 53.6 percent and 59.7 percent of Turkish votes in Germany in June and November, respectively. It received 50.6 percent and 58.4 percent of Turkish votes in France in June and November, respectively (Supreme Electoral Council 2015). The similar turnouts

among Turks in France and Germany in these past elections stem in part from the concerted efforts of the Turkish government to rally conservative Turks in Europe.

The Role of Perceived Group Status

Another account focuses on immigrants' grievances toward their host states to explain why Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany have organized collective political action at higher rates than their counterparts in France (Yalaz 2014, 263).

Existing studies and surveys found that French Turks perceive that they are less subject to discrimination than Maghrebis and Sub-Saharan Africans even though they experience discrimination at similar rates with other immigrant groups (Trajectories and Origins Survey 2008; Brouard and Tiberj 2011). In contrast, studies conducted in Germany showed that German Turks perceive discrimination at higher levels than other immigrant groups in Germany (Diehl and Blohm 2003; EU MIDIS 2008).

Public opinion polls support the argument that German citizens generally have a more negative attitude toward Muslims and immigrants than French citizens. According to a Eurobarometer survey (June 1991), 56 percent of the French and 58 percent of Western Germans thought that there were too many immigrants in their country in 1991. The 2003 National Identity Survey found that 25 percent of the French population said the number of immigrants living in their country should be reduced a little and 41 percent said it should be reduced a lot. In contrast, 27 percent of the German population said the number of immigrants living in their country should be reduced a little and 44 percent

said it should be reduced a lot (Simon and Sikich 2007). The 2014 Global Attitudes Survey revealed that 32 percent of Germans and 44 percent of the French believe that immigrants want to adopt European customs and way of life, and 51 percent of Germans and 36 percent of the French blame immigrants for crime. The same survey found that Germans are more skeptical of Muslims too: 27 percent of the French and 33 percent of Germans have an unfavorable view of Muslims (Pew Research Center 2014). A survey conducted by the University of Münster had previously demonstrated that Germans are much less tolerant of Muslims than their Western European neighbors (Pollack 2010).

As I will detail below, my interviews with Turkish immigrant organization leaders in France and Germany confirm that Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany feel more aggrieved toward Germany than toward France. While this variable affects Turkish immigrants' political engagement in host state politics, it does not determine it. Turks in France and Germany have long perceived a disadvantaged position in their host country's inter-ethnic context. Yet their chronic grievances did not translate into political mobilization until the creation of an assertive diaspora engagement policy by Turkey.

TURKEY'S ASYMMETRIC DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICY

Favoring Conservative Organizations over Secular Ones

Since 2002, Turkey has approached diaspora groups that are larger in size and ideologically closer to the government more strongly than other groups. Turkey's diaspora support, therefore, is mainly aimed at conservative Turkish organizations, including the DİTİB, Millî Görüş, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, the Turkish Federation, and the ATİB. Having received the highest amount of financial and organizational support from Turkey, these organizations have become the most politically active Turkish organizations in France and Germany within the last decade. On the other hand, non-religious organizations, such as l'ACORT, the FUAF, the TGD, and the AABF have engaged in collective political action sporadically because they have received little or no homeland support.

According to l'ACORT's chairman, Turkey's diaspora agenda is asymmetric:

In the early 2000s, we wanted to initiate a political campaign to promote Turkey's EU membership. We had meetings with the Turkish Embassy and Consulate in Paris: However, they did not give us any opportunity. Instead, they let other organizations work on a different campaign, which was directly controlled by Turkish officials. Turkey does not support organizations like ours, which is ideologically different. It is true that the Turkish government has been providing resources to empower Turkish immigrant organizations here. Yet, only like-minded organizations are supported. We do not receive any financial or organizational support for our activities. The YTATB does not invite us to its events.[134]

---

[134] Personal interview with l'ACORT chairman, December 12, 2013, Paris.

In his view, supported organizations' recent political actions are heavily influenced by

Turkey's political agenda:

> Since the early 2000s, Turkish immigrant organizations' activism has gained momentum in France. However, most of the politically active organizations, such as the DİTİB, Millî Görüş, and the COJEP are supporters of the AKP. Turkey is actively trying to organize these organizations for its own interests. To this end, Turkish officials have established the UETD and have been trying to create another all-encompassing lobby organization called the Council of Turkish Associations. Turkey has sent a lot of money to the favored organizations (…) But these organizations do not have an established worldview.[135]

Secular-leaning organization leaders operating in Germany have similar worries.

The former chairman of the TGD emphasized that Turkey's recent diaspora outreach

efforts are constructive as today most nation-states, not just Turkey, endeavor to reach

out to their nationals living abroad. However, in this leader's opinion, Turkey promotes a

lop-sided diaspora agenda by favoring Islamic organizations and by staying away from

organizations that differ ideologically from the Turkish government. This leader served in

the YTATB's advisory board in the past. He reported that Turkish immigrant

organization leaders play a minor role in this board because Turkish bureaucrats

generally do not take the elected leaders' opinions and suggestions into consideration.

Decisions on important issues, this leader argued, are imposed on Turkish immigrant

organizations through the UETD. In his view, the Turkish government should promote a

---

[135] Personal interview with l'ACORT chairman, December 12, 2013, Paris.

more inclusive approach that embraces different segments of the Turkish community and should cooperate with host states.[136]

The YTATB is also structured to maximize the influence of religious organizations. Although the YTATB's advisory board also includes Turkish-origin French and German academics and businesspeople with no links to immigrant organizations (in total, 6 individuals from France and 18 individuals from Germany serve in the board), the majority of board members are affiliated with conservative organizations. The TGD is the only non-religious organization represented in the YTATB's advisory board. As Table 6.2 illustrates, four organization leaders from France and nine from Germany are elected by the YTATB for this position.

Table 6.2: YTATB Advisory Board Members from France and Germany

France	Germany
Bilal Dinç (COJEP)	Abdulhafız Karadağ (MÜSİAD)
Emine Bozkurt (Turkish Federation)	Ayten Kılıçarslan (DİTİB)
Fatih Sarıkır (Millî Görüş)	Bahattin Kaya (TGD)
Şaban Kiper (DİTİB)	Bekir Yılmaz (TGB)
	Erdinç Altuntaş (DİTİB)
	Fazıl Arslan (UETD)
	Mustafa Yeneroğlu (Millî Görüş)
	Oğuz Üçüncü (Millî Görüş)
	Yakup Tufan (ATİB)

Source: YTATB[137]

---

[136] Personal interview with TGD chairman, September 13, 2013, Berlin.

[137] The full list is available at: http://www.ytb.gov.tr/Files/Document/Yurtdisi-Vatandaslar-Danisma-Kurulu-Uyeleri.pdf

The TGD participated in various political campaigns organized by conservative Turkish organizations, such as the "Go to the Ballot Box!" electoral campaign and initiated the Equal Rights Law campaign, which was later supported by Turkish Muslim leaders. Yet despite the TGD's history of collaborations with religious organizations, the TGD leader noted that conservative organizations mostly organize their political campaigns without the input of secular organizations and that their political actions are predominantly driven by Turkey's political life.[138]

The TGD's vice chairwoman also agreed that since the AKP's rise to power in 2002, Turkey has distanced itself from non-religious organizations:

> Things have changed in recent years. Before the 2000s, Turkish ministers used to visit our office when in Germany. Now Turkish bureaucrats ignore us. We are invited to official meetings in Ankara. However, we feel as if we are a minority in these meetings. Participants from religious organizations outnumber us (…) Our relations with the Turkish government have worsened after the Gezi Park protests.[139] In a press conference, we condemned human rights violations committed by the AKP during the Gezi Park events. Following our press conference, a Turkish MP canceled his visit to our organization. The UETD also suspended its visits to our organization once it saw our political stance.[140]

This leader also criticized Turkey's new diaspora agenda for its religious and nationalistic focus and its manipulative nature:

> In Germany, Turkish organizations' activities are mainly religious and nationalistic. This has to do with Turkey's new diaspora policy as well as with Germany's exclusionist policies. I used to find some activities of the YTATB

---

[138] Personal interview with TGD chairman, September 13, 2013, Berlin.

[139] A wave of civil unrest shook Turkey when the AKP initiated a neoliberal project of urban transformation of the Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul. Environmental concerns took a backseat when thousands of protestors gathered in various Turkish cities to raise their voices against the government's increasing authoritarianism and encroachment on Turkey's secularism (Tuğal 2013).

[140] Personal interview with TGD vice chairwoman, October 29, 2013, Berlin.

constructive. But then I saw that this institution's main goal is to shape and steer the Turkish diaspora by sending money (…) Turkey provides funding to religious organizations' activities through the UETD.[141]

Alevi organizations in France and Germany are even more critical of Turkey's new state policies. Despite the AKP's Europeanization reforms and the development of the Alevi Initiative in Turkey in the mid-2000s, Alevi leaders in France are concerned by the rise of political Islam in Turkey and the intensification of the Sunni-Alevi divide under the AKP regime. In the words of the chairman of the FUAF:

> Alevis feel even more suppressed under the AKP government than they did in the past (…) We are worried about the AKP government's and Erdoğan's assimilation and "othering" policy and their goal of raising a vindictive and religious generation. Erdoğan's hate speech assaults Alevis.[142]

During my interviews with them, prominent leaders of the Alevi community in Germany revealed that the majority of the participants in almost all of the Alevi Initiative meetings in Ankara were of non-Alevi origin. According to the chairman of the AABF, the AKP's intention through the Alevi Initiative was not to meet Alevis' demands but rather to assimilate Alevis and to balkanize the Alevi movement by empowering some Alevi organizations that are closer to the government, and by weakening the FUAF and the AABF.[143]

---

[141] Personal interview with TGD vice chairwoman, October 29, 2013, Berlin.

[142] Interview with FUAF chairman, available at:
http://www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1085:klckaya-biz-aleviler-cesur-olmak-zorundayz&catid=1:son-haberler

[143] Personal interview with AABF chairman, November 26, 2013, Cologne.

On paper, the YTATB offers financial support to immigrant organizations on a project-by-project basis, and this support is available to all Turkish organizations. In practice, the institution marginalizes Alevi organizations. Alevi leaders in France and Germany criticize the YTATB for turning a blind eye to the needs of the Alevi community. As one Alevi leader reported, Alevi leaders are often invited to the diaspora empowerment meetings and workshops organized in Ankara, but these invitations are hollow. Many Alevis stopped attending these gatherings because, like the TGD's representatives, they feel left out if they attend.[144] The chairman of the AABF confirmed that the FUAF and the AABF do not receive any financial or moral support from the Turkish state. He also resents that the Turkish Embassy and Consulate in Berlin invite conservative Turkish organizations to their receptions but not secular Alevi organizations. Turkey's new diaspora agenda is half-baked and biased for these reasons, he argued. Surprisingly, the AABF chairman asserted that not receiving any support from the Turkish state is actually a positive thing for his organization because Alevi leaders do not want to be associated with the "brutal and assimilationist Turkish state."[145]

The Gezi Park protests that broke out in Istanbul in May 2013 caused relations between Turkey and the Alevi diaspora in Europe to deteriorate. The protests ultimately resulted in the deaths of seven people, six of whom were of Alevi origin. Violence aimed at Alevis has caused outrage among the Alevi diaspora and has provoked the FUAF and

---

[144] Personal interview with a representative from the FUAF, December 9, 2013, Paris.

[145] Personal interview with AABF chairman, November 26, 2013, Cologne.

the AABF to organize large-scale anti-government demonstrations in various French and German cities.

The situation is very different for conservative Turkish organizations. These organizations not only have established close relations with Turkish officials but also have received generous financial, legal, and technical support from Turkey since the early 2000s. In addition, many conservative leaders have established political connections with the Turkish government through their roles as board members in the YTATB's advisory board and their election to the Turkish Parliament as MPs from the AKP.

Due to its symbiotic ties to the Turkish state, the DİTİB branches in France and Germany receive the highest level of financial and organizational support from the Turkish government. As discussed in Chapter Four, Turkey has extended its support to the DİTİB in France by helping it set up the International Theology Program as well as a theology faculty in Strasbourg in 2006 and 2011, respectively. These projects are fully sponsored by Turkey.[146] As the DİTİB's former chairman in France spelled out, the DİTİB also partners with the YTATB for its various projects and regularly attends the YTATB's official meetings.[147] DİTİB officials also serve in the YTATB's advisory board. The fact that the DİTİB's representative in the CFCM served as the UETD's chairman in France until 2013 also points to close ties between the DİTİB and the AKP.

---

[146] Personal interview with the DİTİB's religious attaché, May 28, 2013, Strasbourg.

[147] Personal interview with DİTİB chairman, May 23, 2013, Paris.

While Turkey does not sponsor any theology institutes or Islamic centers in Germany, it funds the DİTİB's International Theology Program.[148]

Millî Görüş is another religious organization that has forged a close relationship with Turkey over the last two decades. A Millî Görüş leader in Paris characterized his organization as a major recipient of Turkish support. He stated that Millî Görüş receives the second highest amount of support after the DİTİB.[149] An important source of homeland support comes in the form of religious personnel. Since the early 2000s, the Diyanet has been sending religious personnel to Millî Görüş. Millî Görüş spokesperson's in France concluded that: "The old Diyanet and the new Diyanet are completely different. The old Diyanet used to exclude us (…) Today we work together with the Diyanet."[150] In addition to religious personnel support, Turkish officials have begun to send teachers to Millî Görüş's religious boarding schools in France and to visit Millî Görüş offices and mosques in France. This is a drastic change given hostility and prejudices Turkish bureaucrats held for his organization in the past, the organization's chairman indicated.[151]

The head of Millî Görüş's women's unit in Paris shared a striking anecdote that reveals the difference between Turkish diplomats' approach to Millî Görüş in the past and today:

---

[148] Personal interview with DİTİB secretary-general, November 27, 2013, Cologne.

[149] Personal interview with a Millî Görüş (CIMG) board member, May 8, 2013, Paris.

[150] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) spokesperson and representative in the CFCM, March 19, 2013, Paris.

[151] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) chairman, May 17, 2013, Paris.

When years ago my husband and I wanted to marry at the Turkish Consulate in Lyon, Turkish officials working there forced me to take off my headscarf to authorize our marriage (…) Today Turkey's mentality is completely different. Our current government does not exert any pressure on us.[152]

The YTATB also provides financial and organizational support to Millî Görüş in France. In particular, it funds educational projects. As its spokesperson pointed out, the YTATB sponsors the organization's youth camps that take place in Turkey every summer. Millî Görüş officials also attend the YTATB's capacity development meetings in Ankara and serve in the institution's advisory board.[153] The COJEP, which was established as the youth wing of Millî Görüş in France, also receives subsidies from the YTATB as well as from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and the Yunus Emre Cultural Centers for its civic and political activities.[154]

Millî Görüş leaders in Germany, likewise, have established strong relations with Turkey since 2002. For example, in recent years, two former Millî Görüş leaders have joined the AKP ranks to pursue political careers. Oğuz Üçüncü, who had served as Millî Görüş's secretary-general since 2002, left his post in 2014 to join the UETD.[155] Üçüncü is also a member of the YTATB's advisory board. Mustafa Yeneroğlu, who was Millî

[152] Personal interview with the head of Millî Görüş's (CIMG) women's unit, May 17, 2013, Paris.

[153] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) spokesperson and representative in the CFCM, March 19, 2013, Paris.

[154] Personal interview with COJEP chairman, March 16, 2013, Strasbourg.

[155] "UETD Meeting," available at: http://uetd.info/20130216_UetdKongresi/20130216_UetdKongresi.pdf

Görüş's vice secretary-general between 2011 and 2014, became an MP from the AKP in 2015.[156]

I interviewed these activist-turned-politicians in Cologne in November 2013. During my interviews with them, these leaders pointed out that, like Millî Görüş in France, Millî Görüş in Germany receives religious personnel support from the Diyanet and financial support from the YTATB. Turkey focuses its support for Millî Görüş in Germany primarily on projects that seek to improve second- and third-generation Turks' educational records and cultural connection to Turkey.[157] While both Üçüncü and Yeneroğlu think that Turkey's new diaspora policy has some drawbacks, such as its top-down nature, they praised it for its significant contribution to the empowerment of Turkish Muslim leaders in Europe.

Another organization that has received support from Turkey in recent years is the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers. The Diyanet has sent religious personnel to this organization since the early 2000s. The organizational chairman in France is pleased by Turkey's shift from a passive to pro-active diaspora policy. He said that:

> In the past, Turkish officials were unapproachable. They would never sit down and drink tea with us. Now Turkish MPs and ministers come here and listen to our problems. For example, last year [in 2012], the Diyanet's vice president paid a personal visit to me and asked me what my needs are. Likewise, the YTATB's director wanted to meet with us over breakfast. This is very gratifying.[158]

---

[156] "Biography," available at: http://www.mustafayeneroglu.com/ozgecmis/

[157] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (IGMG) secretary-general, November 19, 2013, Cologne; Personal interview with Millî Görüş (IGMG) vice secretary-general, November 22, 2013, Cologne.

[158] Personal interview with the chairman of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, June 1, 2013, Paris.

The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers leaders in Germany have gone through a similar process of détente with Turkey in the last decade. The organization's chairman in Berlin commented that: "Before the 2000s, whenever we went to the Turkish Consulate in Berlin, we were treated very badly. This maltreatment changed with the AKP government." In this leader's view, the YTATB provides more support to the DİTİB than to any other organization. He understood Turkey's new diaspora initiatives, such as the introduction of external voting and the provision of financial support to immigrant organizations as remarkable achievements. This leader believes that the AKP's diaspora policy is overall fair and inclusive.[159] The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers' secretary-general in Cologne added that he finds some homeland activities, such as the preservation of religious and cultural values particularly important.[160]

Conservative nationalist organizations, such as the Turkish Federation and the ATİB, have had similar experiences with the Turkish state in recent years. The chairwoman of the Turkish Federation confirmed that the homeland has reinforced its relations with conservative organizations since the AKP's rise to power. This leader suggested that the DİTİB and Millî Görüş have received more support from Turkey than other organizations, including hers, and criticized Turkey's new diaspora policy for its manipulative nature. Nevertheless, she reported that she has good relations with the

---

[159] Personal interview with the chairman of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ), September 30, 2013, Berlin.

[160] Personal interview with the secretary-general of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ), November 27, 2013, Cologne.

YTATB. For example, she regularly attends diaspora meetings held in Turkey and France. Recently she was also elected to the YTATB's advisory board.[161]

The ATİB mostly undertakes activities related to promoting Turkish language and culture. Turkey's diaspora institutions endorse ATİB activities in this field. The organization's chairman indicated that the ATİB has teamed up with the YTATB and the Yunus Emre Cultural Centers to organize symposiums to promote the preservation of Turkish language among younger generations of Turks in Western Europe. The Turkish Language Convention in Europe is one such event and was organized with the help of Turkey.[162] Tellingly, the ATİB recently became the second Turkish organization after the DİTİB to receive religious personnel support directly from the Diyanet.[163]

Favoring Conservative Organizations in Germany over the Ones in France

While Turkey's diaspora support is mainly aimed at conservative Turkish organizations in France and Germany, conservative organizations in Germany receive more technical, financial, and legal support.

As Table 6.3 shows, President Erdoğan has organized more rallies in Germany than in France. Two factors prompted this behavior. First, Erdoğan wanted to take advantage of the fact that German Turks form a stronger lobby group than French Turks due to their large population base. In addition, Erdoğan focused on Germany because

---

[161] Personal interview with Turkish Federation chairwoman, March 1, 2013, Paris.

[162] Personal interview with ATİB chairman, November 18, 2013, Cologne.

[163] Personal interview with the CCMTF (DİTİB) representative in the CFCM, December 12, 2013, Paris.

Turks living in Germany are now a key voter block in Turkish domestic elections. Germany is the fourth largest regional constituency after Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.

Table 6.3: Turkish Political Rallies Held in France and Germany

France	Germany
April 7, 2010: Paris June 21, 2014: Lyon October, 4 2015: Strasbourg	February 11, 2008: Cologne February 27, 2011: Düsseldorf July 7, 2013: Düsseldorf February 4, 2014: Berlin May 24, 2014: Cologne May 10, 2015: Karlsruhe

Source: Various newspapers listed in Chapters Four and Five.

Other empirical indicators show Turkey's closer relationship with conservative organizations in Germany, such as the number of religious personnel serving in France and Germany. This indicator is particularly salient because it indicates the Turkish state's willingness to provide resources with a religious focus. Figure 6.3 shows that Germany has traditionally received more religious personnel from the Diyanet since the 1980s. Yet, since the early 2000s, the gap between the number of religious personnel sent to France and Germany has widened.

Figure 6.3: Diyanet Religious Personnel in France and Germany, 1983–2014

Source: Bruce (2015, 412)

Another indicator of Turkey's increasingly favorable relations with conservative organizations in Germany is the amount of project support extended to organizations in France and Germany by the YTATB. Since the creation of the YTATB in 2010, conservative organizations in Germany have taken the lion's share of this support (see Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4: The YTATB's Financial Aid to Turkish Civil Society Organizations in France and Germany, 2012–2014 (in USD)

Source: YTATB France and Germany Activity Reports (2015) (Currency from TL to USD converted by the author)

251

The YTATB provides organizations with support that is allocated for specific projects or thematic concerns. The YTATB provides considerably more support for lobbying activities in Germany than in France. This distribution of project support demonstrates that Turkey intends to strengthen German Turks' lobbying activities by providing more financial support to them in this thematic area (see Figure 6.5).

Figure 6.5: The Amount of Lobbying Support Provided to Turkish Civil Society Organizations in France and Germany (in USD)

Source: YTATB France and Germany Activity Reports (2015) (Currency from TL to USD converted by the author)

This favoritism of Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany extends to institutional representation. In fact, Turkish Muslim leaders from Germany have greater levels of representation in the YTATB's advisory board than leaders from France. As Table 6.2 showed, the board's members include four conservative organization leaders from France and eight from Germany.[164]

---

[164] This list is available at: http://www.ytb.gov.tr/Files/Document/Yurtdisi-Vatandaslar-Danisma-Kurulu-Uyeleri.pdf

THE EMPOWERMENT MECHANISM: IDENTITY WORK AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT

Conservative Turkish organizations receive ample support from the homeland and the ones in Germany are buttressed even more. But how does this support translate into political mobilization? Diaspora outreach activities foster Turkish leaders' collective identity and self-confidence, and rejuvenate their organizational capacity.

According to the DİTİB's head of women's unit in France, Turkey's policy change has had direct consequences for the Turkish community in France: "It feels good to be under the auspices of Turkey (…) Our people are no longer reluctant to obtain French citizenship. Erdoğan's words gave us courage." [165] Another DİTİB leader in Strasbourg agreed. He noted:

> Before the 2000s, Turks were an introverted and fragmented community. This had to do with Turkey's poor economic and political standing at the time. As Turkey has become stronger, we have become empowered too. Even the way French policy-makers look at us has changed recently. We owe this to the AKP government (…) Now Turkish officials get together with civil society leaders. They tell us: "You are not alone." Our government looks after us. In return, our position here becomes stronger (…) Fifteen years ago, organizational leaders here were antagonistic toward each other. Today we communicate and work with each other. Seven to eight years ago, with the encouragement of the Turkish Consulate in France, we even established a common platform with other Turkish organizations to find solutions to our problems.[166]

A DİTİB leader, who also serves as a member in the YTATB's advisory board as well as a councilor in the Paris municipality, elaborated on the impact of the financial,

---

[165] Personal interview with the head of the DİTİB's women's unit, May 14, 2013, Paris.

[166] Personal interview with a DİTİB official, May 28, 2013, Strasbourg.

legal, and technical support emanating from Turkey on the empowerment of Turkish

Muslim leaders in France:

> Turks in France are representatives of Turkey. If Turkey invests in our capacity and skills, both sides [the Turkish state and the Turkish community in France] win (…) The YTATB was established with this goal in mind. It aims to boost our resources and give us direction. It teaches us how to write projects, how to prepare press speeches, how to communicate with French politicians, and how to take action together despite our differences.[167]

According to the DİTİB's secretary-general in Germany, Turkish Muslim

organizations' rapprochement and formation of a collective identity is a new and positive

development. Particularly after the mid-2000s, the organizations in Germany have

become more vocal about their claims and taken action for the provision of Islamic

education in public schools and the prevention of xenophobic attacks, he suggested.[168]

Other DİTİB representatives in Germany also see Turkish Muslim leaders' empowerment

as a consequence of Turkey's backing. According to the DİTİB's religious attaché in

Berlin: "Economic and political changes in Turkey have had tremendous repercussions

for us. Finally, we can proudly declare that we are Turkish citizens. Our self-esteem has

increased."[169] Another leader emphasized that:

> Erdoğan's rally messages are very supportive and constructive. They unite us. In the past, we used to bow our head [*başımız eğikti*]. We were weak. His messages give us power but they irritate German politicians (…) Erdoğan's harsh criticism

---

[167] Personal interview with a Turkish-origin municipality councilor who also serves as a DİTİB official, May 28, 2013, Strasbourg.

[168] Personal interview with DİTİB secretary-general, November 27, 2013, Cologne.

[169] Personal interview with the DİTİB's religious attaché, October 28, 2013, Berlin.

of Germany's foster care policy[170] was very important. His firm stance in this matter gave us group consciousness. After his remarks, Turkish organizations began to act collectively to prevent the adoption of Turkish children by German families (…) Another important development is the YTATB's support. We submit project proposals to them [YTATB officials] and they help us.[171]

Millî Görüş leaders in France and Germany, likewise, feel empowered in recent years. According to the organization's chairman in Paris, Turkey's policies have had a positive impact on Turkish Muslims' group pride: "We recline upon Turkey, we are not alone anymore [*sırtımızı dayayacak yer var, artık yalnız değiliz*]." The chairman of the Millî Görüş-linked COJEP underscored the confidence-boosting effect of Turkish diaspora policies on civil society leaders in France:

> French politicians now approach us very differently. All the politicians I talk to these days refer to Turkey's increasing power. All of them want to visit Turkey. We feel more self-confident recently (…) Turkish ministers and vice presidents come to this office to visit me. They want us to apply for dual citizenship, participate in French politics, and preserve Turkish culture and values. Not long ago, Turkish politicians were ignoring us completely. This attitude has changed with the AKP. New institutions, such as the YTATB and the Yunus Emre Cultural Centers provide us with both moral and financial support. This gives us the opportunity to act in unison.[172]

Millî Görüş's chairman in Paris is also satisfied with the capacity-building activities held for Turkish civil society organizations: "In diaspora meetings and capacity-development seminars in Ankara, we discuss how we can reinforce our position

---

[170] As discussed in Chapter Three, Erdoğan accused Germany of illegally taking children of Turkish origin from their families and placing them into foster care.

[171] Personal interview with a DİTİB official, October 9, 2013, Berlin.

[172] Personal interview with COJEP chairman, March 16, 2013, Strasbourg.

in Europe," he noted.[173] The organization's spokesperson in France added that, in these

meetings, YTATB officials have urged Millî Görüş to form a joint political platform with

other Turkish Islamic organizations to speak with one voice while defending Turkish

interests in France.[174] Following this advice, the COJEP has begun to work closely with

the DİTİB in the Strasbourg Theology Institute.[175] Other Millî Görüş officials confirmed

that conservative Turkish organizations no longer see each other as enemies: "We now

protect our rights together," one leader from the organization's Paris branch declared.[176]

> Millî Görüş's head of the Berlin branch made an almost identical comment:

> Sociopolitical developments in Turkey directly influence the organizational landscape here. The state and the public have coalesced in the last decade [*devlet ve millet kaynaşması son on senede oldu*]. We receive both moral and financial assistance [from Turkey] (…) We are not alone anymore [*artık yalnız değiliz*] (…) We have become much more interested in activities and projects related to political participation and begun to take collective action. For example, we organized a large-scale election campaign with other Turkish organizations, including the DİTİB, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, and the ATİB for the September 2013 federal elections. We showed local authorities that we are a powerful group.[177]

Another official surprisingly concluded that Millî Görüş might even be disbanded in the

future for the sake of common ideals.[178]

---

[173] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) chairman, May 17, 2013, Paris.

[174] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) spokesperson and representative in the CFCM, March 19, 2013, Paris.

[175] Personal interview with COJEP chairman, March 16, 2013, Strasbourg.

[176] Personal interview with a Millî Görüş (CIMG) official, May 8, 2013, Paris.

[177] Personal interview with the head of Millî Görüş's (IGMG) Berlin office, September 10, 2013, Berlin.

[178] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (IGMG) vice secretary-general, November 22, 2013, Cologne.

Millî Görüş's (former) secretary-general Oğuz Üçüncü also attributes religious Turkish organizations' recent reconciliation process to the AKP's electoral victory in 2002:

> Prior to the AKP's rise to power, the Diyanet's then representative in Paris told Nicholas Sarkozy that France should recognize the DİTİB as the only legitimate organization representing Turks in France. He threatened Sarkozy that if France treats Millî Görüş the same way as it treats the DİTİB, DİTİB officials will freeze their relations with French authorities (…) As you see, in the past, even if we wanted to work together with other organizations, this was not possible (…) The AKP is not taking any sides. It says: "We are in favor of brotherhood." They are promoting our cooperation in the field.[179]

Leaders from the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers in France and Germany concurred with other organizational leaders that Turkey's new diaspora policy has paved the way for a process of rapprochement among Turkish Muslim leaders and improved their capacity to mobilize. The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers has begun to work closely with the DİTİB for the CFCM elections. According to the organization's chairman in France, in addition to its collaboration with the DİTİB, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers has allied with Millî Görüş to build a joint mosque in Montferney, France. He specified in an interview that:

> As Turkey has become stronger and more assertive in the last decade, French politicians have begun to take us [Turkish immigrant organizations] more seriously. Our image here has become more positive. A strong homeland empowers us. One example is the smooth establishment of the Strasbourg Theology Institute. Thanks to Turkey's leverage, France created no problems for the Turkish Muslim community in this project (…) Turkish ministers and MPs urge us to integrate into French society and to become active citizens in French

---

[179] Personal interview Millî Görüş (IGMG) secretary-general, November 19, 2013, Cologne.

politics (…) They want to bring us together under an all-encompassing umbrella organization.[180]

In a similar vein, the organization's head of the Berlin branch linked conservative immigrant organizations' rapprochement process to recent political changes taking place in Turkey: "Before the 2000s, Turkish Muslim leaders from different organizations did not even say hi to each other. Now we co-organize *iftar* dinners during the Ramadan month. We hold political campaigns together, we lobby together (…) I am proud of my homeland."[181] The organization's secretary-general in Cologne suggested that Turkey's outreach to organizations in Germany has even affected Germany's relations with the Turkish Muslim community. In his view, once the Turkish government "adopted" the Turkish community in Germany, Chancellor Merkel began to form closer relations with Turkish immigrant organizations. "We no longer feel vulnerable [*kendimizi eskisi gibi sahipsiz hissetmiyoruz*]," this leader concluded graciously.[182]

While conservative-nationalist organizations, such as the Turkish Federation in France and the ATİB in Germany, have received less support from Turkey compared with Sunni Islamic organizations, the organizational capacities of these organizations have improved in parallel with Turkey's diaspora engagement activities. So has the strength of their leaders' feelings of solidarity. For example, the chairwoman of the

---

[180] Personal interview with the chairman of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, June 1, 2013, Paris.

[181] Personal interview with the head of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers' (VIKZ) Berlin branch, October 30, 2013, Berlin.

[182] Personal interview with the secretary-general of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ), November 27, 2013, Cologne.

Turkish Federation in France was one of the organizers of the largest political demonstration held by Turks in France in 2012. Together with other conservative Turkish organization leaders in France, she gathered 35,000 Turks in Paris to protest the penalization of the denial of the Armenian "genocide." As she noted, this demonstration was co-organized with other organizations in order to speak with one voice in France. Thus, it served the AKP's policy vision that sees Euro-Turks as a lobby group that promotes Turkish interests abroad. This leader also reported that in diaspora meetings held in Ankara, Turkish bureaucrats tell Turkish immigrant leaders that they plan to galvanize them into action by streamlining individual lobbying activities of organizations.[183]

Like the Turkish Federation in France, the ATİB has cooperated with the DİTİB, Millî Görüş, and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers on many occasions. The organization's chairman believes that the YTATB's financial and organizational support to Turkish civil society organizations in Europe plays a key role in their empowerment. "Our name was in European diplomats' black list in the 1980s and 1990s. But now we are treated with respect (…) Turkey has changed a lot since 2002. Today it is much more self-confident. So are we," he boasted. [184] Another official from this organization argued that:

---

[183] Personal interview with Turkish Federation chairwoman, March 1, 2013, Paris.

[184] Personal interview with ATİB chairman, November 18, 2013, Cologne.

There was a vacuum in the organizational field until the 2000s. We were in a cocoon. But then the AKP looked out for us [*AKP bize sahip çıktı*]. We left our cocoon (…) Our mosques represent the Turkish state. We are a big, influential lobby group. It does not matter if Turkey joins the EU. We [the Turkish diaspora] are already in the EU.[185]

THE IMPACT OF THE HOST STATE ON THE RECEPTIVITY OF TURKEY'S OUTREACH POLICIES

In order for diaspora policies to be effective, immigrants must be willing to embrace these policies. As will be detailed below, Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany feel more aggrieved compared with their counterparts in France. These leaders reported to me that their attachment to Turkey has grown in recent years as a response to Germany's discriminatory policies.

Although French and German national leaders view the DİTİB as a respected dialogue partner, DİTİB officials have experienced more hurdles in Germany. Several examples illuminate how this discrepancy in DİTİB's relations with German and French officials works.

France and Germany view the DİTİB's organic ties to the Turkish state differently. DİTİB presidents have both religious and administrative duties. While the dual status of DİTİB officials has not created any problems for France, Germany has long asked DİTİB leaders to prioritize their religious responsibilities over diplomatic duties. Yet DİTİB leaders believe that they need to practice their administrative skills to run such an influential and massive organization. They also find it unjust that Germany tolerates

---

[185] Personal interview with an ATİB official, October 30, 2013, Berlin.

the dual responsibility exercised by leaders of large Christian and Jewish organizations (Arkilic 2015).[186]

Another example that highlights the challenges DİTİB leaders encounter in Germany concerns the extent of the DİTİB's involvement in the Islamic theology institutes built in France and Germany. The DİTİB in France established the Strasbourg Theology Institute in 2011 with funding from Turkey. Moreover, the DİTİB has the final say in the design of the curriculum and the appointment of teachers. According to the DİTİB's religious attaché in Strasbourg, this project benefits France because the country needs religious personnel who are fluent in both French and Turkish and it has a lot to learn from Turkey's experience with Islamic education. In the future, the DİTİB also plans to open high schools in Strasbourg.[187] The French state has been supportive of the DİTİB's involvement in religious affairs despite its reputation for promoting secular education.

In contrast, the DİTİB has had a very limited role in the establishment and funding of the theology centers built in Germany. Unlike the Strasbourg Theology Institute, funding for these centers comes from Germany. German officials also designate the curricula and the appointment of teachers (*Deutsche Welle*, January 16, 2013). The DİTİB has initiated its own International Theology Program in 2006 to provide young German Turks religious education at Turkish universities. However, as the DİTİB's

---

[186] Personal interview with DİTİB secretary-general, November 27, 2013, Cologne.

[187] Personal interview with the DİTİB's religious attaché, May 28, 2013, Strasbourg.

secretary-general in Germany asserted, Germany is reluctant to appoint this program's graduates as teachers of religious education in public schools even though there is a need for teachers who can speak both Turkish and German. According to this leader, German policy-makers think that graduates of their own theology centers would make better candidates for these positions.[188]

Another example that reflects the DİTİB's positive relations with French policy-makers in the area of Islamic service is the number of Turkish religious personnel serving in France. Under an agreement signed between the DİTİB and France, 151 religious personnel from the DİTİB are eligible to work in France. This is the highest quota allocated to a Muslim organization in France. Even though the Algerian population is larger than the Turkish population, Algeria sends only 100 religious personnel to France. DİTİB officials cite this as an indication of how respected the DİTİB is in the eyes of French authorities[189] (Arkilic 2015). Moreover, the DİTİB in France was the only Muslim organization invited to the *Istichara* (Consultation) process in the 1990s, which served as the basis of the CFCM. Currently, the DİTİB-linked CCMTF[190] has six representatives in the CFCM. The CCMTF will also serve as the CFCM's vice president from 2015 to 2017, and president from 2017 to 2019.[191]

---

[188] Personal interview with DİTİB secretary-general, November 27, 2013, Cologne.

[189] Personal interview with DİTİB chairman, May 23, 2013, Paris.

[190] As discussed in Chapter Four, the DİTİB is represented under a different name in the CFCM. This is because DİTİB officials want to show that the DİTİB is an independent organization with no organic ties to Turkey.

[191] Personal interview with an official from the CFCM, May 25, 2013.

The DİTİB in Germany, on the other hand, has a limited role in the establishment and the administration of the DIK. In addition, it has grappled with serious recognition problems as no Turkish Muslim organization has the status of corporation under public law in Germany. Moreover, during the first DIK round, German officials revoked the DİTİB's participation in the summit. These officials rejected the DİTİB for its centralized administration and its close ties to Turkey. DİTİB officials criticized this treatment.[192] Another tension between the DİTİB and Germany took place when DİTİB leaders overtly collaborated with the AKP to help the party attract expatriate votes during the 2015 Turkish elections (*Cihan*, October 21, 2015).

DİTİB leaders' perceptions of the CFCM and the DIK, therefore, vary. According to a DİTİB representative, the CFCM is far from being perfect. It has several problems, including the limited role played by young and female Muslim leaders in the decision-making processes and the CFCM's small budget. Yet he still views the creation of the CFCM as a very positive development for Turkish Muslim leaders. DİTİB officials see themselves holding a good position inside the CFCM. In their view, the small population of Turks in France puts them in an advantaged position vis-à-vis other Muslim groups: "We feel free in the CFCM. Nobody meddles with our business. Unlike Turks in

---

[192] In order to decentralize and weaken its ties to Turkey, the DİTİB reconstituted itself in the form of 15 regional associations in Germany.

Germany we are a minority here [in France]. We do whatever we want and never attract attention," a DİTİB leader asserted.[193]

The situation is not as rosy for the DİTİB in Germany. A DİTİB official argued that German officials do not want Turkish Muslim organizations to act together in the DIK. Instead, they prefer to communicate with each Muslim organization individually. In his view, DİTİB leaders view the DIK negatively also because they want to exclude Millî Görüş from the DIK working groups.[194]

Germany's exclusionist policies toward Muslims create resentments among DİTİB officials and make them appreciate Turkey's financial and organizational support even more. According to the DİTİB's spokesperson in Germany, Turkey's financial support to the DİTİB is necessary because the DİTİB does not receive any financial assistance from German authorities:

> Turkish Muslims face economic hardship in Germany because they do not receive state subsidies or tax revenues. Every year tax revenue given to Christian churches equals to 10 billion Euros. Other Christian organizations, such as CARITAS and DIAKONIE, receive 50 billion Euros. Under these circumstances, I find it unsurprising that the DİTİB relies on Turkey's financial assistance.[195]

---

[193] Personal interview with CCMTF (DİTİB) representative in the CFCM, December 12, 2013, Paris.
[194] Personal interview with DİTİB secretary-general, November 27, 2013, Cologne.
[195] Personal interview with DİTİB secretary-general, November 27, 2013, Cologne.

"German politics is very rigid and static. Even though we request financial assistance from them [German authorities], we do not get anything. They only provide subsidies to non-religious organizations. I don't trust German politicians," another official added.[196]

A DİTİB official working at the Şehitlik Mosque in Berlin agreed that the combination of Germany's maltreatment of Muslims and Turkey's generous support to Turkish organizations has paved the way for Turks' recent process of political mobilization:

> Germany sees Islam as an enemy. After 9/11, even mosques became a part of the securitization of Islam debate. In the last decade, mosques awakened. They realized that time has come for collective political action. But they [German officials] don't want us to act together. They keep saying to us: "Do not speak with Millî Görüş. It is an extremist organization" (…) Mosque organizations were very weak in the past because we don't receive any support from [German] authorities for our projects. There is no funding. All of our funds come from Turkey.[197]

Millî Görüş's leadership also has better relations with the French state than with the German state. According to Millî Görüş's chairman in Paris, religious personnel working in Millî Görüş mosques come to France for three years. However, they typically do not return to Turkey upon expiration of their work permits. French officials tolerate this situation due to their need for religious personnel. Millî Görüş's personnel in France also face less bureaucratic hurdles while obtaining and renewing their passports and visas

---

[196] Personal interview with a DİTİB official, October 9, 2013, Berlin.

[197] Personal interview with a DİTİB official, October 9, 2013, Berlin.

compared with their counterparts in Germany.[198] Millî Görüş's spokesperson in France agreed:

> Germany implements a very strict inspection of passports when Turkish *imams* enter the country. In general, *imams* who come to Europe on temporary contracts are middle-aged men retired from the Diyanet. These *imams* hold a green passport granted to public servants. *Imams* mostly encounter problems while entering Germany and renewing their passports. Yet *imams* working in France are subject to favorable conditions (…) Millî Görüş personnel in Germany grapple with more hurdles also because they don't enjoy dual citizenship rights.[199]

The chairman of Millî Görüş in Paris also explained that French municipalities allow the purchase of large lands and buildings by Millî Görüş leaders, which are often converted into mosques. Only in two years, Millî Görüş purchased three buildings in Paris that will be used as mosques. This leader also noted that as long as they comply with the French law, organizational leaders are allowed to open education centers.[200]

In France, several Millî Görüş mosques provide educational services. Millî Görüş also plans to open primary, middle, and high schools in Paris, Strasbourg and Lyon in the future. These schools will be eligible for state subsidy if they provide successful education for at least five years. Millî Görüş also receives financial support from some French municipalities for its cultural and sporting projects.[201] French politicians extend their support to the Millî Görüş-linked COJEP as well. As the COJEP's chairman indicated, French authorities have granted the COJEP funding for some of its

---

[198] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) chairman, May 17, 2013, Paris.

[199] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) spokesperson and representative in the CFCM, March 19, 2013, Paris.

[200] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) chairman, May 17, 2013, Paris.

[201] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) chairman, May 17, 2013, Paris.

campaigns.[202] Millî Görüş officials are also satisfied with the way the CFCM functions. They praised the CFCM for granting official recognition to them, for being a more democratic institution than the DIK, [203] and for letting Muslim leaders converse with each other in an official platform.[204]

This is not the case in Germany. Turkish Muslim leaders argue that while France keeps an equal distance from all religious groups, Germany favors non-Muslim religious groups over Muslim groups. According to the former vice secretary-general of Millî Görüş, even though the French constitution is more exclusionary than Germany's, France has a participatory political culture in reality. To the contrary, Germany fails to embrace pluralism despite its liberal constitution (Arkilic 2015).

This leader explained that Germany's treatment of Turkish Muslims is not as favorable as France's because Muslim organizations lack official recognition in Germany. Since 2012, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, and North Rhein-Westphalia have recognized the DİTİB and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers as religious bodies through state contracts. Yet this leader criticized these contracts for their superficial recognition. In his view, Muslim organizations should be entitled to these rights by their mere existence. These contracts also do not provide any financial benefits to Muslim organizations. He argued that Germany should grant the status of corporation

---

[202] Personal interview with COJEP chairman, March 16, 2013, Strasbourg.

[203] Personal interview with the head of Millî Görüş's (CIMG) women's unit, May 17, 2013, Paris.

[204] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (CIMG) spokesperson and representative in the CFCM, March 19, 2013, Paris.

under public law to Turkish organizations. This status provides not only material perks, such as church taxes, but also symbolic ones, including prestige and credibility.[205]

In addition, the leaders of Millî Görüş criticized German officials for placing them under state surveillance due to their alleged extremist political and religious agenda. "There are 30,000 Muslim individuals in the Federal Office's blacklist. Except for 1,500 of them, the rest are linked to Millî Görüş. If they remove us from the blacklist, what will be the purpose of the institution? They need to keep us on the list to justify their existence," the organization's former vice secretary-general complained.[206] Due to this stigma, Millî Görüş in Germany does not receive any support for its cultural and sporting activities from municipalities unlike Millî Görüş in France. More importantly, while Millî Görüş has a permanent seat in the CFCM, it is not a permanent member of the DIK. In fact, it was excluded from the first DIK round due to its negative image in the eyes of German officials.[207]

According to a Millî Görüş leader, particularly after 9/11, debates surrounding Muslims have often been cast in terms of security in Germany. In his view, there is "latent" racism in Germany, as evidenced by the success of xenophobic politicians and movements, such as Thilo Sarrazin, Heinz Buschkowsky, and the AfD. According to him, the politicization and securitization of DIK meetings have increased in recent years

---

[205] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (IGMG) vice secretary-general, November 22, 2013, Cologne.

[206] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (IGMG) vice secretary-general, November 22, 2013, Cologne.

[207] Millî Görüş was represented by the IRD during the second and third DIK rounds.

and a new state discourse that calls for immigrants' assimilation into the "core culture" (*leitkultur*) has emerged. This leader argued that: "They [German politicians] refer to us as an extremist organization and warn other Turkish organizations not to collaborate with us. Their intention is to pit us against each other so that they can 'divide-and-rule'."[208] Other Millî Görüş officials agreed that the DIK's main goal is to balkanize the Turkish community.[209]

These grievances enable Turkey's diaspora outreach policies to become more effective in Germany. As the chairman of the IRD—Millî Görüş's representative in the KRM—suggested, Turkey's support to religious organizations is vital because Turkish Muslims do not receive any benefits from Germany. This leader asserted that: "Germany should not be bothered by Turkey's engagement with us because we do not receive anything from Germany."[210] The organization's head of the Berlin branch argued that Turkish Muslim leaders' attachment to Turkey has grown as a response to Germany's discriminatory policies. In his view, Turks' grievances toward Germany have also triggered a process rapprochement among Turkish Muslim organizations: "We now use our power against the common enemy [Germany]. In the future, we will be more efficient in our struggle."[211]

---

[208] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (IGMG) secretary-general, November 19, 2013, Cologne.

[209] Personal interview with Millî Görüş (IGMG) Berlin representative, December 6, 2013, Berlin.

[210] Personal interview with IRD chairman, November 18, 2013, Cologne.

[211] Personal interview with the head of Millî Görüş's (IGMG) Berlin office, September 10, 2013, Berlin.

The situation in France contrasts with that in Germany for other organizations as well. The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers' leaders are satisfied with the way they are treated by French authorities. The organization owns 12 boarding schools in France. French municipalities do not create problems for organization leaders while purchasing or requesting authorization for buildings. Moreover, some local authorities provide subsidies and space for their activities. In comparing the conditions in France to those in Germany, one Union of Islamic Cultural Centers leader in France pointed out that:

> Less than 5 percent of our associations are authorized to build boarding schools in Germany. In France, we have 40 associations and 12 of them have boarding schools. The regulations are even stricter in North Rhein-Westphalia, where the Turkish population is dense. Recently we built a new mosque with a boarding school in Nancy, France. This school has 6 floors and our mosque can host 815 people. All the prominent local politicians were present in our inauguration ceremony. Our other mosques in Nantes, Rouen, and Lyon also obtained boarding school authorization very easily. French officials trust us when we explain them who we are and what we do. Here in Pantin [in Paris], we are in the process of enlarging our mosque. Our new mosque will host 910 people and 19 students will stay permanently in its boarding school.[212]

While the organization's leaders in Cologne reported that they collaborate with German officials for vocational training, education, and sporting projects, this is not the case in much of Germany.[213] Union of Islamic Cultural Centers leaders in Berlin are very critical of the Berlin municipality's approach to Turkish Muslims. This is because their

---

[212] Personal interview with the chairman of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, June 1, 2013, Paris.

[213] Personal interview with the secretary-general of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ), November 27, 2013, Cologne.

branches face bureaucratic challenges when buying new buildings or renewing authorizations.[214]

The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers in France has also had a positive experience with the CFCM. The organization's leaders are included in the CFCM through their partnership with the DİTİB. According to the chairman of the organization's Paris branch, the CFCM has had important accomplishments, such as enabling Muslim leaders to reach a decision on important issues collectively.[215]

In contrast, leaders from the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers in Berlin think that the DIK exists primarily for enforcement against Muslims. These leaders suspended their relations with the DIK several times because of the DIK's highly centralized approach that marginalizes Muslims. These leaders complained that DIK leaders' definition of integration is very different from theirs: "The German definition of integration is to drink beer and to eat pork. We cannot accept this."[216]

Like other Turkish Muslim leaders, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers leaders are also critical of Germany's reluctance to grant them the status of corporation under public law. This organization has the right to provide Islamic education in certain *Länder*, such as North Rhein-Westphalia. Yet, its officials had to struggle for years to obtain this

---

[214] Personal interview the chairman of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers' (VIKZ) Berlin office, October 30, 2013, Berlin.

[215] Personal interview with the chairman of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, June 1, 2013, Paris.

[216] Personal interview with an official from the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers' (VIKZ) Berlin office, October 30, 2013, Berlin.

basic right. Moreover, they had to adjust themselves to different regulations in each *Länder*.[217]

According to one leader from the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, the lack of dual citizenship rights for Turkish citizens, the stigmatization of Muslims as a dangerous group in Germany—specifically Germany's rigid distinction between "good Muslims" and "bad Muslims"—and the top-down administration of the theology centers established by Germany all drive discontent among the Turkish population. The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers had to suspend its cooperation with the Federal Ministry of the Interior for the Security Partnership Initiative Program in 2012 due to the Initiative's emphasis on security rather than intercultural dialogue. The organization also clashed with the University of Münster's theology institute when the director of the university questioned the legal status of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers before appointing it as a monitoring member of the institute. The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers' leaders in Germany complained that Turks always become the target of anti-immigrant rhetoric due to their large size and visibility (Arkilic 2015).

Germany's hostile setting has mobilized Union of Islamic Cultural Centers leaders more easily too. These leaders have come together to work towards the preservation of Turkish culture and identity in particular. Therefore, these leaders

---

[217] Personal interview with the secretary-general of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ), November 27, 2013, Cologne.

appreciate Turkey's diaspora activities in this area. According to a representative from the Berlin branch:

> German politicians want to assimilate us. Our kids can't speak Turkish in public schools. If they do, they get penalized. The German state gives Turkish children to German foster families. This way they make our children forget their Turkish and Muslim roots. We must prevent this. Otherwise our younger generations will lose their identity (…) We [Turkish organizations] are now united under common goals—goals that are linked to Turkey and to the Turkish identity. But German politicians don't like it when we come together.[218]

The conservative-nationalist organizations of the Turkish diaspora also have a less favorable relationship with German authorities than with French authorities. The Turkish Federation in France does not receive any subsidy from French officials for its projects. However, the chairwoman of the organization thinks that French Turks have a good image in France. In her opinion, this is because most Turks have obtained French citizenship and participate in French politics actively. The Turkish Federation regularly comes together with French political parties, bureaucrats, and civil society organizations.[219]

In contrast, ATİB leaders feel highly aggrieved in Germany. The chairman of the organization argued that in 50 years, Turks have not resolved any of their major problems. They still cannot enjoy public rights to the same extent as Christians and Jews, they are not seen as a trustworthy group by German society and policy-makers, and they still lack dual citizenship. The ATİB does not receive any funding from German

---

[218] Personal interview with an *imam* from the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ), October 30, 2013, Berlin.
[219] Personal interview with Turkish Federation chairwoman, March 1, 2013, Paris.

authorities either. The organization's chairman agreed that the large size of the Turkish population creates serious problems for German Turks, which are not felt by French Turks: "We suffer from severe discrimination and depreciation here [in Germany] (…) German society excludes us, that's why young Muslims succumb to extremism," he cried out. In criticizing the DIK, he suggested that Germany's real purpose in creating the institution was to create "Islam *of* Germany" rather than "Islam *in* Germany." This chairman also views the state contracts that allow Muslim organizations the right to provide Islamic education as a strategic move to control and dominate the Muslim community:

> The state contract introduced in Hamburg asks Muslim organizations to make certain changes to their organizational structure to be eligible for the right to provide Islamic education. Non-Muslim religious organizations are not subject to such conditions. This is a double standard (…) We don't want Turkish children to study Islam in German. Our children are forgetting their roots and becoming German. This is our major concern.[220]

According to this leader, even though Turks have never done anything wrong in Germany, they are still treated with suspicion. Yet he argued that Turkey's recent engagement with its diaspora has changed the way they are perceived in Germany. This statement corroborates the argument that if immigrants are exposed to maltreatment that tends to cause low self-esteem or self-respect, they embrace the homeland's endorsement more enthusiastically. The ATİB's chairman praised Turkey's diaspora outreach

---

[220] Personal interview with ATİB chairman, November 18, 2013, Cologne.

274

activities for promoting Turkish language and culture, for empowering civil society leaders, and more importantly, for "giving their pride back to them."[221]

My interviews with French and German policy-makers show that Turkish Muslims have a less positive image in Germany than in France. An official from the French Ministry of the Interior's *Bureau Central des Cultes* admitted that France indeed has more amicable relations with its Turkish Muslim population than does Germany. This official complained that French officials gave too much leeway to Turkey during the establishment of the Strasbourg Theology Institute. In his view, this theology institute is the extension of Turkey's soft power: "So far, Turkey has spent 12 million Euros for this project and bought 5 buildings. This is a political and cultural project as much as a religious one but we [French officials] do not see this." In comparing France and Germany's handling of the theology institutes, he said:

> When I speak with French politicians, they say that the AKP comes from an Islamic background but it is a secular party. This is why they didn't oppose the funding of the Strasbourg Theology Institute by Turkey. The mayor in Strasbourg even helped them [Turkish officials] complete this project. He never asked himself what this project is about and what kind of consequences it will have for France. He never thought that this is indeed a political project steered from Turkey (…) This project has come to fruition as the consequence of a collaborative act between France and Turkey. Yet it is the foreign country that says: "This is the type of Islam we want to develop in France" (…) Why does France allow this? This is because the law permits this. The law says: "You cannot intervene in religious organizations" (…) This is the liberty of religions. This is why we never intervene, and this is why it's easier for foreign states to step in (…) In Germany, the situation is different. They say it's not possible to

---

[221] Personal interview with ATİB chairman, November 18, 2013, Cologne.

open an institution directed from Ankara. German officials want to exert control. They don't want to give the discretion to the Diyanet. It is quite a problem for them.[222]

He went on to emphasize that the broader political climate in France is more supportive of Turkish Muslim organizations in general:

If you compare the Turkish case in France and Germany, there is a big difference. Umbrella organizations are formed easily in France. We don't evaluate the question of immigration from the perspective of Islam. Never. We don't want radicalists, we don't want political Islam, but we don't care about the rest. This is *laïcité*. This is why it's easier for Turks to form an umbrella organization in France than in Germany (…) For example, Germany doesn't want to come together with Millî Görüş. The organization is seen as a threat there, but not here.[223]

He elaborated that the problem is not "Turkish Islam" but "Maghrebi Islam" in France because Turkish Muslims are regarded as a less religious and less extremist group than Maghrebis. In his view, this is because the first wave of Turkish immigrants who came to France were secular and educated people. They left a good impression. Another reason why Turks do not attract much attention in France is that the size of the Turkish community is much smaller than that of other Muslim groups. This bureaucrat concluded that: "French policy-makers are not very concerned about Turks' conventional and traditional lifestyle and close connection to their homeland because Turks have a positive image here." However, he warned that France is not taking the issue seriously: "Foreign

---

[222] Personal interview with an official from the French Ministry of the Interior, March 11, 2013, Paris.

[223] Personal interview with an official from the French Ministry of the Interior, March 11, 2013, Paris.

governments, such as Turkey and Morocco have a much stronger influence in France than ten years ago."[224]

Another official from the French Ministry of the Interior is not as cautious as her colleague. Even though the French state has a statist and holistic approach to integration, municipalities develop specialized programs and projects for neighborhoods populated heavily by Turks. This bureaucrat informed me that Turks are very interested in these municipalities' pro-integration programs. One such program was initiated in 70 different regions in 2008 to provide basic education to female parents. "Turkish women have become the major participant group in the pilot program. This observation refutes the argument that Turks are against integration," she suggested. This bureaucrat also has positive views about the Strasbourg Theology Institute. She thinks that this project will play an important role in enhancing the co-existence of French Muslims and natives, and in helping French authorities form healthier relations with the Muslim population in the country. "Some say that Muslim immigrants lie at the root of every problem in France. I don't agree with this statement," she concluded.[225] My discussion with three officials from the High Council for Integration supported the observation that Turks have a better image in France compared to Maghrebis.[226]

---

[224] Personal interview with an official from the French Ministry of the Interior, March 11, 2013, Paris.

[225] Personal interview with an official from the French Ministry of the Interior, June 5, 2013, Paris.

[226] Personal interview with three High Council for Integration officials, May 22, 2013, Paris.

German policy-makers approach Turkish Muslim organizations with suspicion. An official from the Federal Ministry of the Interior, who is also one of the conveners of the DIK, argued that Germany is ready to cooperate with Turkish Muslim organizations but these organizations might not be capable of cooperating with the German state in the same ways that Christians and Jews do. For him, the DİTİB's close ties to Turkey, Millî Görüş's political and religious agenda, and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers' relatively limited role in the organizational landscape call into question these organizations' ability to serve as a dialogue partner for the federal state. This policy-maker was also concerned with the recent political developments in Turkey:

> The Diyanet has over 700 *imams* in Germany. Sending religious personnel is the most efficient way to influence [the Turkish diaspora]. However, there is a big mental gap between *imams* sent from Turkey and young Turks living here [in Germany]. This is a major source of contention between Turkey and Germany (…) Turkish politicians also want to include Millî Görüş in the process. Bekir Bozdağ [Turkey's former Deputy Prime Minister] is pressuring the DİTİB not to cooperate with Germany unless Millî Görüş is invited to the DIK.[227]

Another German official from the Federal Agency for Civic Education, a state agency connected to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, is more critical of Germany's approach to Muslims. According to him:

> Despite the new citizenship law, the dual citizenship problem is not resolved. The NSU affair complicated the situation even more. The discourse on Muslims remains the same in Germany. There is an Islamic stamp on every issue (…) We [German policy-makers] shouldn't deprive people of their [Muslim] identity. We have to be patient and open. We shouldn't set our agenda in a top-down way.[228]

---

[227] Personal interview with an official from the Federal Ministry of the Interior, November 7, 2013, Berlin.

[228] Personal interview with the program manager of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, October 25, 2013, Berlin.

Another official from the Federal Ministry of Labor, Integration, and Social Affairs in North Rhein-Westphalia agreed with this statement. He praised the groundbreaking policy changes Germany has undertaken within the last decade. However, he still thinks that the rise of Islamophobic sentiments, as evidenced by the NSU murders; Germany's reluctance to grant Turks dual citizenship; and other symbolic barriers ingrained in German society, pose challenges to Turkish Muslims in daily life. This official described the negative atmosphere surrounding Turkish Muslims as follows:

> The idea that Turks don't want to integrate is a part of our discourse since the 1990s. I don't know if this has gone worse. There is always this prejudice that Turks don't want to integrate and that they are different (…) German society won't give Turkish immigrants the feeling that they are really accepted. Our economic situation is better than France's, the legal situation is okay, access to citizenship is there but there is something missing besides these hard indicators (…) A process of legal opening is in progress, but it hasn't affected the attitudes and behaviors of average Germans yet.[229]

In his view, Germany's paternalistic treatment of immigrant organizations also harms relations with immigrant organizations:

> Germany is a decentralized state with a centralized society. By centralized, what I mean is that we have these mass civil organizations like churches and unions. They are so powerful that it's hard for smaller organizations to make themselves understood. This is the case not only for immigrant but also for women's and gay organizations (…) Welfare agencies say: "We will speak for you, we know what your interests are, and let us do the job." This has taken away the edge from immigrant organizations. This could be one reason why aren't very visible. This may also have to do with the old ethnic understanding of the German nationality. This is terrible. On the other hand, the tendency is going toward integration.

---

[229] Personal interview with an official from the Ministry of Labor, Integration, and Social Affairs in North Rhein-Westphalia, November 20, 2013, Düsseldorf.

When I speak with people with an immigrant background, I see that they are becoming more vocal. But emotional belonging is still missing.[230]

When asked why he thinks that Turkish immigrant organization leaders in Germany have gotten closer to their homeland recently, he answered that: "Erdoğan's rally speeches differ a lot from German politicians' speeches. He is much more emotional. I think people need that emotional communication. In Germany, politicians are just politicians, they talk very German."[231] His statements regarding the issue of official recognition are also striking:

> What we have here is that people pay church taxes, which are collected by the state, and then the state takes the church taxes and gives them to non-Muslim organizations. This takes place only in Germany and Austria. Then we also have Catholic and Protestant religious classes taught in public schools. This is hard to understand for France (…) Muslim organizations' leaders now demand the same thing because they are German citizens. In many states, the largest religious group is Muslims. Now they demand that they be treated the same way that Catholics and Protestants are treated, and they are right. You can't argue against this claim without discriminating.[232]

Yet this leader also draws attention to problems originating from conservative Turkish organizations themselves. He, for example, indicated that his Ministry's relations with conservative Turkish organizations are weaker than its relations with secular organizations. This is because the majority of conservative organizations are not

---

[230] Personal interview with an official from the Ministry of Labor, Integration, and Social Affairs in North Rhein-Westphalia, November 20, 2013, Düsseldorf.

[231] Personal interview with an official from the Ministry of Labor, Integration, and Social Affairs in North Rhein-Westphalia, November 20, 2013, Düsseldorf.

[232] Personal interview with an official from the Ministry of Labor, Integration, and Social Affairs in North Rhein-Westphalia, November 20, 2013, Düsseldorf.

equipped enough to engage in dialogue with German authorities and to gain recognition at the state and national level. In his view, the KRM does not function efficiently either: "Sometimes you talk to this [Turkish] representative. You meet again four months later and there is someone else. And you start all over again. This has to change. We need a reliable partner to discuss the provision of religious education."

Local German politicians do not have close relations with conservative Turkish organizations either. The press officer for the Berlin Commissioner for Immigration and Integration said that:

> In Ramadan, we get invitations for *iftar* dinners. Otherwise we are not in touch with Muslim organizations (…) We have a new system now. Immigrant organizations can ask for money but they need to justify why they need the money. We cannot give any money to the DİTİB because we have certain rules and they [DİTİB leaders] do not respect our rules. They need to be open. They need to show for what purposes they spend the money.[233]

An immigration officer working in Berlin's Turkish-populated Neukölln district pointed out that his office touches base with the DİTİB regularly but it is hard to communicate with it overall:

> They [DİTİB leaders in Berlin] first call the DİTİB office in Cologne. Then they ask Ankara and the Diyanet. By that time, we are already in the next subject (…) They also send *imams* who can't speak German for two years. It is not easy to work together if you can'r speak with them (…) What is Mr. Erdoğan doing with 800 mosques in Germany and 700 *imams* sent from Turkey who can't speak German? What is the impact? (…) Our relations with Millî Görüş will also remain bad as long as this organization is included in the black list of the Federal Office. Since 9/11, debates are all about security. We can't have discussions with them

---

[233] Personal interview with the press officer for the Berlin Commissioner for Immigration and Integration, September 12, 2013, Berlin.

[Millî Görüş], we never invite them to events, we never give money for their projects (…) Conservative-religious groups are not integrating, but other groups do.[234]

CONCLUSION

Chapters Four and Five showed that despite their long history in France and Germany, conservative Turkish organizations in France and Germany have engaged in political activism only since the mid-2000s and those in Germany have participated in host state politics at higher rates. This chapter first showed that the existing accounts do not provide a satisfactory explanation to conservative Turkish immigrant organization leaders' cross-national differences in their political activism.

Turkish Muslim leaders' higher level of politicization in Germany cannot be explained by socio-economic factors because German Turks have a lower socio-economic status than French Turks. German and French Turks' different political behavior cannot be explained by ethno-cultural factors either because this approach expects similar political behavior from immigrant groups originating from the same homeland.

The institutionalist approach also falls short in accounting for the higher level of politicization among Turks in Germany because Germany's exclusionist regime is less

---

[234] Personal interview with an immigration officer from the Neukölln municipality, September 19, 2013, Berlin.

conducive to political participation. German Turks' lower rates of naturalization and electoral participation reflect the institutional hurdles entrenched in the German system.

Another approach focuses on the level of French and German Turks' grievances to explain why they participate in politics at different rates. Immigrant organizations' grievances toward their host states form part of my theory: Collective grievances condition Turkish Muslim leaders' receptivity to Turkey's diaspora outreach policies. However, this theory does not explain why Turks in France and Germany have engaged in political activism only recently because both groups' grievances are chronic.

This chapter then fleshed out the causal mechanisms of my diaspora empowerment theory. In doing so, it showed that Turkey has favored conservative organizations over non-conservative ones in its diaspora policy. Turkey's diaspora policies have empowered Turkish Muslim leaders by changing their identification and by improving their mobilization capacities. Since Turkey has transferred more financial and organizational support to conservative organizations in Germany, organizations operating in this country have become more empowered.

To map the asymmetrical level of support Turkey has provided to conservative organizations in France and Germany, this chapter examined several key indicators, including the number of political rallies that took place in France and Germany, the number religious personnel sent to each country, the degree of financial support provided

by the YTATB to organizations in France and Germany, and the number of Turkish Muslim leaders from each country that serves in the YTATB's advisory board.

The last section of the chapter elaborated on the impact of grievances held by Turkish Muslim leaders toward their host states on their reaction to Turkey's outreach efforts. Turks feel more aggrieved in Germany compared with Turks in France because they attract more negative attention due to their larger size. The high degree of stigmatization Turks have faced in Germany has led organization leaders to embrace Turkey's inclusive policies focusing on anti-discrimination and active citizenship more enthusiastically. Against the backdrop of the hostile political atmosphere surrounding them in Germany and the generous empowerment efforts emanating from Turkey, Turkish leaders in Germany have more easily translated their self-identities into a collective identity and self-interests into collective interests, and therefore, become more politically engaged.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This dissertation shows that the policies of sending states toward diaspora populations influence how these diasporas mobilize abroad.[235] Most scholars of immigration treat sending countries as fairly unimportant for immigrant integration. In contrast, I view sending countries as vital players that shape immigrants' political integration. I demonstrate that sending states' engagement with their diasporas activates immigrant political participation in host countries in two ways. First, diaspora engagement policies render immigrant organization leaders more self-confident and alleviate leaders' collective action problems. These policies also strengthen immigrant organization leaders by providing them with technical, financial, and legal support. I call this effect the "diaspora empowerment" mechanism.

While this study's main contribution is to theorize and empirically test the connection between diaspora outreach policies and immigrant political participation, I acknowledge that the characteristics of the diaspora groups and host states' polices also matter. In particular, I demonstrate that sending states may favor certain diaspora groups over others based on the size and the loyalty of the diaspora group. This differential treatment affects the degree of immigrant political activism in host states. In addition,

---

[235] Parts of this chapter are based on a previously published book chapter of mine. Please cite this book chapter as follows: Arkilic, Z. Ayca. 2016. "Cooperation, Emulation, Rapprochement: The Changing Dynamics of the Turkish Islamic Organizational Landscape in Europe." In *Muslims in the UK and Europe II*, edited by Yasir Suleiman and Paul Anderson, 77–90. Cambridge: Cambridge Center for Islamic Studies Press.

immigrant leaders' grievances toward host states condition their receptivity to the homeland's diaspora policies. Greater grievances lead to greater receptivity.

The Turkish diaspora in France and Germany provides a strong case in which to test my hypotheses. Turks comprise the largest third-country immigrant group in Europe and France and Germany constitute the most popular emigration destinations for Turks. Yet Turks did not mobilize through immigrant organizations in large numbers until very recently. I show that the recent surge in mobilization among Turkish immigrant organization in Europe stems from the deliberate efforts of policy-makers in Turkey to mobilize these groups.

But why did Turkey form an assertive diaspora agenda only recently? As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the development of an active diaspora engagement policy started with the AKP's rise to power in 2002. Over the last two decades, the party's economic and political reforms, Europeanization process, neo-Ottoman foreign policy, and promotion of a new identity based on Sunni-Muslim nationalism have transformed Turkey's relations with its diaspora as well as with host states.

While past Turkish policy-makers focused on securing immigrant remittances and other financial concerns, Turkey's new diaspora agenda is mainly shaped by political and symbolic incentives. Since the early 2000s, Turkey has sought to actively mobilize Turks abroad in favor of Turkey's national interests in key issue areas. These efforts include lobbying for Turkey's EU membership and mobilizations against the recognition of the

Armenian "genocide." In addition, Turkey's diaspora outreach policies have aimed at consolidating the incumbent AKP's political strength by attracting expatriate votes. Symbolically, Turkey's diaspora outreach policies have sought to extend the state's legitimacy and "soft power" beyond its borders.

As shown in Chapters Four, Five, and Six, conservative Turkish organizations have become pioneers of political activism in both France and Germany since the mid-2000s in response to Turkey's outreach efforts. Turkish officials have favored them over other diaspora groups due to their larger size and ideological proximity. In other words, political mobilization among Turkish Muslim leaders followed the timing and wishes of the Turkish government. Differences in political mobilization between French and German Turkish populations also mirror the Turkish diaspora policy. Turkish bureaucrats have provided more support to conservative organizations in Germany than in France. This differential treatment is due to the larger size and clout of the Turkish community in Germany. Consequently, conservative organizations in Germany have become more politically engaged. I also demonstrate that Turkish Muslim leaders in Germany have responded to Turkey's diaspora policies more enthusiastically because they feel more aggrieved compared with their counterparts in France. The securitization of Muslim identity and the lack of dual citizenship rights for Turks in Germany have created a vacuum filled by the Turkish government.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

My theory informs two broader theoretical debates in political science and closely related disciplines: 1) state-centered theories and 2) Islam in Europe.

Bringing the State Back In

Emigration is a phenomenon that simultaneously fortifies and subverts territorial understandings of state sovereignty and borders (Brand 2006; Collyer 2013). Its impact is felt in terms of both de-territorializing and re-territorializing (Basch et al. 1994; Glick Schiller et al. 1995). A school in the literature contends that globalization has led to the loss of control of borders and states in a way that has started to render sovereignty and even citizenship redundant by creating a "post-national citizenship" (Soysal 1994; Sassen 1996). This approach argues that state sovereignty has declined in an era characterized by the growth of international networks that go beyond national borders and cultures.

I argue that these claims about the decline of states are exaggerated. I point to the relevance of the state. Like others before me, I provide empirical support for the argument that the national state is alive in an age of globalization (Hollifield 1998, 2008). States are of particular importance for Muslim communities in Western Europe. For example, a recent study (Laurence 2012, 6) stressed that between 1990 and 2010, European governments sought to shape European Islam by "a dual movement of expanding religious liberty and increasing control exerted over religion." European states

288

have converged and started to cooperate on a broad range of issues concerning their Muslim communities, this scholar argued.

In this study, I demonstrate that sending states are also vitally important for Muslim immigrant communities in Europe. My findings reflect the continuing supremacy of the nation-state despite the ascendance of the global market and transnational forces. I argue that scholars must study state policy to understand immigration. But unlike most other researchers, I focus on sending states and reassess the ability of receiving states to shape immigrant integration vis-à-vis sending states. My research demonstrates that the scholarship on the decline of state power over immigrant communities has simply focused on the wrong states. The diaspora policies of sending states matter at least as much as the immigrant policies of receiving states for immigrant mobilization.[236]

The existing literature has consistently underappreciated the ability of sending states to influence diasporas. Scholars have assumed that origin states develop one-tiered diaspora policies toward nationals abroad or have suggested that economic interests determine diaspora policies (Eckstein 2013). My research reveals that sending states do not reach out equally to all groups within their diasporas. I show, instead, that sending states can launch sophisticated and effective diaspora engagement policies that work to achieve concrete political aims.

---

[236] I acknowledge that economic, social, and political developments taking place in host states may also affect the homeland. Yet my study focuses on the impact of sending state policies on host states since this is an understudied interaction.

Researchers have not sufficiently theorized the political incentives that underlie different diaspora policies. Some studies have drawn attention to the existence of multi-tiered emigration policies, which depend upon emigrant communities' perceived utility of staying abroad versus the utility of being back at home (Tsourapas 2015). In comparison, I argue that states implement multi-tiered diaspora policies even when immigrants provide *little* or *no* remittances and are *not* expected to return to the homeland. I emphasize that specific diaspora policies have specific implications for immigrants' political participation.

Islam in Europe

Scholars of European Islam have offered different insights on how Islamic diversity should be conceptualized. The essentialist approach to the study of religion suggests that Islam is the new "other" of the Western world, a religion incompatible with Western values of freedom, liberty, and democracy (Fukuyama 1989; Huntington 1993; Kedourie 1994). These authors treat Islam as a static religion that cannot adjust to European societies. They ignore the dynamism in Islam and the ways Muslims reconstruct their identities and activities in their daily lives.

Contextualist (Eickelman 1982; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996) and post-structuralist (Asad 1993; Barth 2002; Yükleyen 2012) accounts, on the other hand, focus on change and adaptability in Islam. These scholars depict Islam as a social phenomenon

290

that is interpreted and practiced differently by its followers depending on social context. They argue that a process of negotiation exists between the universal practices of Islam and the particular circumstances of Muslims. Islamist movements and religious politics take place in the present, and shape and are shaped by the contexts in which they unfold (Bayat 2007; Bowen 2009). Yükleyen's (2012) ethnographic study of Turkish Muslim organizations in Europe shows that there is no single form of assimilated and privatized "European Islam" but rather multiple interpretations and practices of Islamic communities. According to Yükleyen, Turkish Muslims reconstruct Islam in response to European alienation or acceptance toward Muslims.

My work builds on the contextualist approach toward Islam in Europe. Turkish Muslim leaders' unprecedented shift from political apathy to active citizenship in France and Germany accompanied a new growth in religious organizing. The Turkish state encouraged this transformation. Turkish Muslim leaders in France and Germany also responded to policies in each state that alienated or offered acceptance to Muslims. Hence, I underscore that Turkish immigrants respond to political developments in their origin and settlement countries.

More importantly, I argue that Turkish Muslims' loyalty to their country of origin does not hinder their integration into host states. At first glance, conservative Turkish organizations' grievance-oriented political activism might seem problematic for host countries. Yet this is a positive development for both host states and immigrant groups in

291

reality because political participation is an indicator of integration. Muslims leaders'
political participation through legal channels creates a democratic, transparent, and
interactive platform between Muslim organizations and host states, allowing Muslims to
become more visible in the public sphere. Given that the anti-immigrant discourse in
Germany revolves around the claim that Muslims segregate themselves and live in
"parallel societies," the shift of Muslim leaders from political apathy to active citizenship
will increase Muslims' trustworthiness. Muslim leaders' political activism will also
encourage host states to be more responsive and accountable to Muslims' claims.

My study is the first to provide an analytical account of Turkey's changing
diaspora agenda and its implications for Turkish Muslim leaders. In investigating Turkish
immigrant organizations' both formal and informal political participation, it also goes
beyond the top-down state-level analyses that have dominated the immigration literature.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REFUGEE CRISIS

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the escalation of political
conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, millions of refugees have fled to Turkey and EU
member states. Germany has accepted the largest number of refugees in Europe, followed
by France. From 2011 to 2014, Germany accepted 467,510 refugees, and France accepted
75,750 (Eurostat 2015). Germany registered 964,574 new asylum seekers in 2015.
Syrians topped the figures, with about one in three applications coming from Syria

(*Guardian*, December 7, 2015). France received 80,075 asylum requests in 2015, mainly from Sudan, Syria, and Kosovo (OFPRA 2015). These statistics illustrate that Europe now faces the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II. This crisis has serious repercussions for Europe's established and new immigrant groups. My findings inform analyses of the recent refugee crisis in Europe in three ways.

First, my research emphasizes that the process of integrating immigrants into a society takes a long time. A few months ago, Germany's Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizierè argued that Arab immigrants are expected to encounter more integration problems compared to Turks due to their distinct cultural and historical background (*Hürriyet*, May 10, 2016). This statement makes it clear that Germany has to show more effort to integrate its new immigrant community.

Turks came to France and Germany in the 1960s as guest workers. To this date, they are still the least integrated immigrant community in these countries. Since the 1990s, Turkish immigrants in Germany have begun to establish a foothold in the media, politics, academia, and business. Despite these gains in integration, Turkish Muslim leaders' political engagement in Germany started only in the mid-2000s. My interviews with Turkish-origin civil society leaders and German policy-makers revealed the extent to which an exclusionary approach and negative sentiments toward immigrants still prevail despite recent reforms of citizenship laws.

German politicians acknowledge that they need to learn from the past mistakes in the treatment of Turkish guest workers. For example, Chancellor Merkel stated in a meeting held in September 2015 that: "Many of them [newcomers] will become new citizens of our country. We should learn from the experiences of the 1960s (…), and make integration the top priority from the start" (*Hürriyet*, June 25, 2016). Germany's Minister of State for Europe Michael Roth made a similar argument, yet he added that German Turks' contribution to Germany's integration efforts would also be vital:

> [The] integration of migrants became a major topic in German politics only recently. We learned from our missed chances. This is why I would warmly recommend to our Turkish friends that they put integration on the political agenda earlier than Germany did, and I welcome the initial signs that indicate this is happening. Thinking about the current situation, there are so many Germans of Turkish descent helping and supporting refugees who come to seek shelter in Germany. It is so good to be able to count on them, and they are an integral part of our civil society (*Hürriyet*, June 25, 2016).

Turkish immigrants' assistance to refugees is certainly important. According to a report published by the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research, 30 percent of the volunteers who have assisted refugees across the country have an immigrant background (Karakayalı and Kleist 2015). A number of Turkish immigrant organization leaders have already developed pro-integration projects to help refugees adjust to their new country. According to the TGD's chairman, Turkish immigrants play a key role in helping refugees to transition into German life. He noted that the German government wants to integrate refugees but they do not show enough empathy. Turkish

immigrants are better at empathizing with the refugee population. The TGD's integration services mainly target Syrian women and children. The organization's volunteers get together with refugees to teach them the German language and customs. They play games with refugee children to help them overcome their traumatic experiences. This leader argued that: "Turks had an isolated life when they first came to Germany. Their interaction with natives was minimal. It took a long time for them to feel 'normal.' We don't want Syrians to go through the same hardships (*Milliyet*, March 13, 2016). Turkish Islamic organizations, such as the DİTİB and Millî Görüş have also founded support networks for refugees. These networks provide services ranging from *iftar* dinners organized for refugees to the donation of basic emergency supplies to meet destitute families' water, food, sanitation, and clothing needs.[237]

Second, I argue that cooperation between home and host governments is crucial for immigrants' integration. Turkey and the EU countries have begun to work together in the refugee crisis. A deal signed in March 2016 between Turkey and the EU on the relocation of Syrian refugees is a big step towards the alleviation of the crisis. Under this pact, Ankara will take back refugees, who reach Greece illegally. For every refugee returned, another refugee will be sent to Europe, with numbers capped at 72,000. In return for its alliance with the EU, Turkey will receive 3 billion Euros and be exempt from visa restrictions (*Guardian*, April 4, 2016). However, this deal faced a major

---

[237] See, for example: http://www.milligorusportal.com/showthread.php?t=32896

setback recently because Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs (and one of the architects of the deal) Ahmet Davutoğlu resigned and the EU set new obstacles for Turks' visa-free travel.

While this deal still has potential to improve relations between Turkey and the EU countries, the current deadlock should not be surprising. My study shows that Turkey only collaborates weakly with France and Germany on issues concerning Turkish immigrants. Turkish officials have slammed France and Germany over their maltreatment of Turkish immigrants, reluctance to support Turkey's EU bid, and bills recognizing the Armenian "genocide." Moreover, Erdoğan's mass diaspora rallies in European cities sparked controversy and went against local norms. European leaders, especially German leaders, urged Erdoğan to act with a sense of responsibility after these rallies. The tension between Turkish and European governments bodes ill for immigrants' integration prospects. Turks in Europe increasingly question their dual identities. Hence, Turkey should engage in a healthier dialogue with host states to improve both Turkish immigrants' and newcomers' integration into Europe.

I make a third major point of relevance to the current refugee crisis. I suggest that host states should be wary of polarization among different diaspora groups. My research shows that the gap between secular and religious Turkish immigrant organizations has grown in response to Turkey's asymmetrical diaspora policies. The growing number of refugees in Germany may cause a similar tension between old and new immigrant

296

groups. While some Turkish immigrant organizations aid Syrian refugees, not every immigrant-origin German is happy about the influx of refugees into Germany. According to a 2009 YouGov survey, 40 percent of Germans with an immigrant background argued that Berlin should accept fewer refugees. Nearly a quarter said Germany should halt the admission of refugees completely (*cited* in *Die Welt*, November 29, 2015).

Three realities explain this position. First, Germany's swift measures to integrate the newest wave of arrivals, such as free language classes, special university enrollment programs, and initiatives to create job opportunities for refugees do not apply to established immigrants. This differential treatment might create resentment among Turks, who had to struggle for these rights and services for decades. Second, the arrival of a new immigrant group means that competition for economic opportunities will increase. Turks, Arabs, and Africans still live on the margins of society in Germany. Many reside in ghettos, where refugees are sent. The flow of refugees will lead to fierce competition for housing and jobs in these areas (*Foreign Policy*, March 8, 2016). Finally, the increasing number of refugees is likely to escalate anti-Muslim sentiments. Anti-immigrant violence in Germany is already on the rise since 2011, and populist right-wing groups do not distinguish between old and new Muslim immigrant groups. Islamic organizations reported an increase in hateful phone calls and e-mails recently. Muslim leaders complained that receiving vicious emails has become a daily occurrence (*Süddeutsche*

Zeitung, January 11, 2016). Hence, established Muslims worry that the influx of refugees will harm them.

This analysis shows that immigrant integration requires serious efforts from immigrants, origin states, and host states.

GENERALIZABILITY OF MY FINDINGS

The analytical framework introduced in this dissertation has the potential to be applied to other cases. Since the 1980s, many states across the world have developed initiatives to reach out to their populations abroad. Over half of all United Nations member states now have some type of formal governmental institution dedicated to their expatriate population (Gamlen et al. 2013).

Mexico is one such country that has renewed its ties to its diaspora in recent years. Mexico's diaspora policies have undergone a process of transformation particularly after 2000. Like the Erdoğan government (2000–present), the Vicente Fox government (2000–2006) promoted a positive and inclusive discourse toward the Mexican diaspora, expanded the scope of the country's consular services, and established new diaspora institutions. More specifically, Fox made the Mexican diaspora in the United States a domestic priority by creating the Presidential Office for Mexicans in 2000, which became the Institute of Mexicans Abroad in 2003. His government also

provided instruments for the empowerment of Mexican immigrant organizations in the United States (Délano 2009, 778).

A recent study (Délano 2010, 240) suggested that Mexico's diaspora outreach efforts "enhance and promote integration into the United States by providing a bridge between immigrants and United States institutions and services." It argued that Mexico's programs in the field of health, education, and leadership development have positive consequences for immigrants' integration in the United States. This research has not looked into the impact of Mexico's diaspora engagement policies on the political participation of Mexican immigrant organizations in the United States. Nor has it mapped the causal mechanisms linking Mexico's diaspora engagement policies to immigrant integration. However, its claims provide evidence of the generalizability of my diaspora empowerment theory.

Another study (Unterreiner 2015) investigated the impact of China and India's emigration and diaspora policies on the integration of Chinese and Indian immigrant groups in the United Kingdom. China and India began to establish stronger relations with their nationals abroad in the early 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Although these countries do not permit dual citizenship, they consider foreign nationals of ethnic Chinese or Indian background as part of their diaspora. The external voting rights for the Chinese diaspora is limited. Overseas Indians holding an Indian passport are allowed to vote in Indian elections. Moreover, both countries have taken measures, such as university

quotas, investment advantages, and simplified entry procedures to reinforce immigrants' sense of belonging to their origin countries. These policies also allow China and India to benefit from the Chinese and Indian diasporas' economic and political resources. This study concluded that China and India's emigration and diaspora policies and British integration policies have affected Chinese and Indian immigrants' access to citizenship, education, and labor market integration in the United Kingdom. While this study's dependent variable is not political mobilization in host states, it shows that origin states' diaspora policies and host states' integration policies have a direct impact on immigrant integration.

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Future research should test to what extent my findings can travel to other Muslim groups in Europe, such as the Moroccan diaspora. Morocco has three million immigrants in Western Europe (de Haas 2014). Prior to the 2000s, the Moroccan government's main motivation was to contain the political activities of Moroccan immigrants in Europe and to prevent their assimilation into their host countries. In recent years, the Moroccan government has begun to emphasize the successful integration of the Moroccan diaspora. Morocco continues to encourage the diaspora to stay in contact with Morocco. These goals have culminated in the establishment of the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad in 2007. The main goals of this institution are to preserve the moral and material

interests of the Moroccan diaspora, to contribute to the activities of immigrant organizations, to deepen Moroccan immigrants' allegiance to their homeland, and to consolidate the political regime (Bilgili and Weyel 2012). These goals are akin to Turkey's post-2000 diaspora agenda.

Morocco has also undergone significant political changes recently. Mohammed VI's ascension to the throne in 1999 and the 2011 constitutional reform that proclaimed Islam as the country's official religion have strengthened ties between Islam and the Moroccan national identity. Like the conservative AKP government, the Moroccan government now works to forward forms of belonging and commitment based not only on nationality but also on Islamic identity. On one hand, Morocco tries to facilitate Moroccan immigrants' civic participation in host states. On the other hand, it promotes the preservation of Moroccan national identity, culture, and native language. Like Turkey, Morocco now educates and sends religious personnel to Europe and has established a religious presence in its diaspora community (Contreras and Martinez 2015, 113).

Given the resemblance between the Turkish and the Moroccan diaspora policy agendas, future research could examine whether Turkey and Morocco's diaspora engagement policies have similar outcomes. Have Morocco's diaspora engagement policies prompted political mobilization among organizations in the Moroccan diaspora? One could also analyze whether Morocco has applied a multi-tiered diaspora policy

toward religious immigrant groups over non-religious ones, and whether this differential treatment has affected the intensity of political participation among diaspora groups.

More specifically, it would be interesting to compare the Turkish and Moroccan communities of Belgium. Belgium became a magnet for Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the 1960s when the Belgian government invited guest workers from Turkey and Morocco to take jobs in factories and mines. Today, Turks and Moroccans account for the vast majority of Belgium's Muslim population. Yet, as the 2016 Molenbeek terrorist attacks showed, while extremism is high among the Moroccan community, Turks do not tolerate extremist views and actions. Compared to European Turks, the European Moroccan community is far more divided and resistant to authority. Moreover, Moroccans feel discrimination more acutely and suffer more from an identity crisis in their host countries (Higgins 2016). This is certainly the case in Belgium. Given this contrast, one could examine the effects of Turkey's and Morocco's diaspora outreach efforts on Turkish and Moroccan immigrants' political attitudes and behaviors in Belgium.

Another promising avenue for future research is to study the impact of diaspora engagement policies on the membership of immigrant organizations. The views of leaders in organizations views do not always overlap with those of members. It is important to examine whether diaspora outreach policies reach ordinary immigrants. Future research should explore the dynamics that drive membership in immigrant

organizations and whether these dynamics influence the effectiveness of sending countries' diaspora engagement policies. As a 2006 study on mosque associations in Berlin demonstrated, 50 percent of the Turkish Muslim population are not members or followers of any umbrella organization (Spielhaus and Färber 2006, 15). Another report published by the DIK revealed that only one in five Muslims is a member of a religious organization (Haug et al. 2009). Hence, it would be important to see to what extent the views of Turkish Muslim leaders reflect the views of the membership of immigrant organizations and the views of the broader Turkish Muslim community. It would also be interesting to study to what extent immigrant organization leaders' mobilization and empowerment process has had a trickle-down effect.

Appendix A: List of Abbreviations

AABF: Federation of Alevi Unions in Germany (*Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland*)

AfD: Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*)

AKP: Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*)

ANAP: Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*)

ASTU: Association of Solidarity with Turkish Workers (*Türkiyeli İşçilerle Dayanışma Derneği*)

ATİB: Turkish-Islamic Union in Europe (*Avrupa Türk İslam Birliği*)

BIG: Alliance for Innovation and Justice (*Bündnis für Innovation und Gerechtigkeit*)

CAIF: Council of Immigrant Associations in France (*Conseil des Associations d'Immigrés en France*)

CCMTF: Coordination Committee of Turkish Muslims of France (*Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France*)

CDU: Christian Democratic Union of Germany (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*)

CFAIT: French Council of Turkish Immigrant Associations (*Conseil Français des Associations d'Immigrés de Turquie*)

CFCM: French Council for the Muslim Faith (*Conseil Français du Culte Musulman*)

CHP: Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)

CIMG: Islamic Community Millî Görüş (*Communauté Islamique Millî Görüş*)

COJEP: Council for Justice, Equality, and Peace (*Conseil pour la Justice, l'Egalité et la Paix*)

CORIF: Council of Reflection on Islam in France (*Conseil de Réflexion sur l'Islam en France*)

CSU: Christian Social Union in Bavaria (*Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*)

DIK: German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*)

DİTİB: Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*)

Diyanet: Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*)

FDP: Free Democratic Party (*Freie Demokratische Partei*)

FN: National Front (*Front National*)

FNMF: National Federation of French Muslims (*Féderation Nationale des Musulmanes de France*)

FUAF: Federation of Alevi Unions in France (*La Fédération de l'Union Des Alévis en France*)

HCI: High Council for Integration (*Haut Conseil à l'Integration*)

HDP: People's Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*)

IFB: Islamic Federation in Berlin (*Islamische Föderation in Berlin*)

IGMG: Islamic Community Millî Görüş (*Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş*)

IRD: Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (*Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*)

KRM: Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (*Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland*)

| L'ACORT: | Assembly of Citizens Originating from Turkey (*l'Assemblée Citoyenne des Originaires de Turquie*) |

L'ACORT: Assembly of Citizens Originating from Turkey (*l'Assemblée Citoyenne des Originaires de Turquie*)

MHP: Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*)

MÜSİAD: Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*)

NSU: National Socialist Underground (*Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund*)

Pegida: Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*)

REP: Republican Party (*Die Republikaner*)

RMF: Rally of French Muslims (*Rassemblement des Musulmans de France*)

SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*)

TBB: Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg (*Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg*)

TGB: Berlin Turkish Community (*Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*)

TGD: Turkish Community in Germany (*Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland*)

TÜMSİAD: Association of All Industrialists and Businessmen (*Tüm Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*)

TÜSİAD: Turkish Industry and Business Association (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği*)

UETD: Union of European Turkish Democrats (*Avrupalı Türk Demokratlar Birliği*)

UOIF: Union of Islamic Organizations of France (*Union des Organisations Islamiques de France*)

VIKZ: Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (*Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren*)

YTATB: Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (*T.C. Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı*)

ZMD: Central Council of Muslims in Germany (*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland*)

Appendix B: List of Interviews

Number	Organization Name	Abbr.	Interviewee	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
1	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	Chairman	May 23, 2013	Paris, France
2	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	DİTİB Representative in the CFCM	March 4, 2013	Paris, France
3	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	Head of Women's Unit	May 14, 2013	Paris, France
4	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	Secretary	May 23, 2013	Paris, France
5	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	Religious Attaché	May 28, 2013	Strasbourg, France
6	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	Board Member	May 28, 2013	Strasbourg, France
7	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	DİTİB Board Member, Municipal Councilor, and YTATB Advisory Board Member	May 28, 2013	Strasbourg, France
8	Millî Görüş	CIMG	CIMG Spokesperson, CIMG Representative in the CFCM, and YTATB Advisory Board Member	March 19, 2013	Paris, France
9	Millî Görüş	CIMG	Board Member	May 8, 2013	Paris, France

10	Millî Görüş	CIMG	Board Member	May 9, 2013	Paris, France
11	Millî Görüş	CIMG	Board Member	May 15, 2013	Paris, France
12	Millî Görüş	CIMG	Chairman	May 17, 2013	Paris, France
13	Millî Görüş	CIMG	Head of Women's Unit	May 17, 2013	Paris, France
14	Union of Islamic Cultural Centers		Chairman	June 1, 2013	Paris, France
15	Turkish Federation		Chairwoman and YTATB Advisory Board Member	March 1, 2013	Paris, France
16	Assembly of Citizens Originating from Turkey	L'ACORT	Chairman	December 12, 2013	Paris, France
17	Council for Justice, Equality, and Peace	COJEP	Chairman	March 16, 2013	Paris, France
18	Union of European Turkish Democrats	UETD	Chairman	March 27, 2013	Paris, France
19	Migration and Culture of Turkey	ELELE	Chairwoman	February 20, 2013	Paris, France
20	Anatolian Cultural Center		Chairman	February 25, 2013	Paris, France
21	Plateforme de Paris		Chairman	February 19, 2013	Paris, France
22	Federation of Franco-Turkish Entrepreneurs	FEDIF	Chairman	March 21, 2013	Paris, France
23	Federation of Franco-Turkish Entrepreneurs	FEDIF	Board Member	March 14, 2013	Paris, France
24	Federation of Alevi Unions in France	FUAF	Board Member	December 9, 2013	Paris, France
25	Waterlily Institute		Board Member	February 19, 2013	Paris, France
26	Bosphore		Chairwoman	March 5, 2013	Paris, France
27	Yunus Emre Cultural Center		Chairman	March 5, 2013	Paris, France

28	Association of All Industrialists and Businessmen	TÜMSİAD	Chairman	May 29, 2013	Strasbourg, France
29	MEDEST		Chairman	May 30, 2013	Strasbourg, France
30	Zaman France		Editor	February 28, 2013	Paris, France
31	Turkish Consulate in Paris		Consul General	March 11, 2013	Paris, France
32	Turkish Embassy in Paris		Diplomat	March 12, 2013	Paris, France
33	French Ministry of the Interior		Official	March 11, 2013	Paris, France
24	Paris Municipality		Local Councilor	May 10, 2013	Paris, France
25	French High Council for Integration	HCI	Official	May 22, 2013	Paris, France
26	French High Council for Integration	HCI	Official	May 22, 2013	Paris, France
27	French High Council for Integration	HCI	Official	May 22, 2013	Paris, France
28	French Council for the Muslim Faith	CFCM	Official	May 25, 2013	Paris, France
29	French Ministry of the Interior		Official	June 5, 2013	Paris, France
30	Cumhuriyet		Correspondent	February 21, 2013	Paris, France
31	NTV		Correspondent	May 27, 2013	Strasbourg, France
32	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	Secretary-General	November 27, 2013	Cologne, Germany
32	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	Religious Attaché	October 28, 2013	Berlin, Germany
33	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	Official	October 9, 2013	Berlin, Germany
34	The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs	DİTİB	Official	October 9, 2013	Berlin, Germany

35	Millî Görüş	IGMG	Board Member	September 10, 2013	Berlin, Germany
36	Millî Görüş	IGMG	Board Member	December 6, 2013	Berlin, Germany
37	Millî Görüş	IGMG	Secretary-General and YTATB Advisory Board Member	November 19, 2013	Cologne, Germany
38	Millî Görüş	IGMG	Vice Secretary-General and YTATB Advisory Board Member	November 22, 2013	Cologne, Germany
39	Union of Islamic Cultural Centers	VIKZ	Board Member	October 30, 2013	Berlin, Germany
40	Union of Islamic Cultural Centers	VIKZ	Board Member	October 30, 2013	Berlin, Germany
41	Union of Islamic Cultural Centers	VIKZ	Chairman	November 27, 2013	Cologne, Germany
42	Turkish-Islamic Union in Europe	ATİB	Chairman	November 27, 2013	Cologne, Germany
43	Berlin Alperen Turkish Association		Chairman	November 30, 2013	Berlin, Germany
44	Turkish Community in Germany	TGD	Chairman	September 13, 2013	Berlin, Germany
45	Turkish Community in Germany	TGD	Vice Chairwoman	October 29, 2013	Berlin, Germany
46	Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg	TBB	Spokesperson	September 6, 2013	Berlin, Germany
47	Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg	TBB	Spokesperson	November 6, 2013	Berlin, Germany
48	Berlin Turkish Community	TGB	Chairman and YTATB Advisory Board Member	September 17, 2013	Berlin, Germany
49	Federation of Alevi Unions in Germany	AABF	Spokesperson	October 23, 2013	Berlin, Germany

50	Federation of Alevi Unions in Germany	AABF	Chairman	November 26, 2013	Cologne, Germany
51	Union of European Turkish Democrats	UETD	Secretary-General	November 27, 2013	Cologne, Germany
52	Union of European Turkish Democrats	UETD	Head of Youth Unit	November 27, 2013	Cologne, Germany
53	LAGA		Chairman	November 20, 2013	Düsseldorf, Germany
54	Islamic Federation in Berlin	IFB	Former Board Member	November 15, 2013	Berlin, Germany
55	Islamic Federation in Berlin	IFB	Secretary-General	November 15, 2013	Berlin, Germany
56	Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany	Islamrat	Chairman	November 18, 2013	Cologne, Germany
56	Central Council of the Muslims in Germany	ZMD	Chairwoman	November 29, 2013	Cologne, Germany
57	Turkish Consulate in Berlin		Consul General	December 3, 2013	Berlin, Germany
58	Turkish Embassy in Berlin		Ambassador	November 7, 2013	Berlin, Germany
59	Alliance for Innovation and Justice Party	BIG	Head of Berlin Unit	October 22, 2013	Berlin, Germany
60	Alliance for Innovation and Justice Party	BIG	Chairman	November 26, 2013	Cologne, Germany
61	Berlin Haci Bektashi Veli Association		Chairman	November 1, 2013	Berlin, Germany
62	Sivasli Canlar Association		Board Member	October 14, 2013	Berlin, Germany
63	Berlin Commission for Immigration and Integration		Press Officer	September 12, 2013	Berlin, Germany
64	Neukölln Municipality		Immigration Officer	March 19, 2013	Berlin, Germany
65	Neukölln Municipality		Immigration Officer	October 7, 2013	Berlin, Germany
66	Christian Democratic Union of Germany	CDU	Spokesperson	October 16, 2013	Berlin, Germany
67	Federal Agency for Civic Education		Program Manager	October 25, 2013	Berlin, Germany

68	German Federal Ministry of the Interior		Official	November 7, 2013	Berlin, Germany
69	Schöneberg-Tempelhof Municipality		Immigration Officer	November 13, 2013	Berlin, Germany
70	Stiftung Mercator		Expert	November 14, 2013	Berlin, Germany
71	German Federal Ministry of Labor, Integration, and Social Affairs in North Rhein-Westphalia		Official	November 20, 2013	Düsseldorf, Germany
72	Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration	SVR	Expert	November 11, 2013	Berlin, Germany
73	Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration	SVR	Expert	December 2, 2013	Berlin, Germany
74	Presidency of Religious Affairs	Diyanet	Official	July 24, 2013	Ankara, Turkey
75	Presidency of Religious Affairs	Diyanet	Official	July 26, 2013	Ankara, Turkey
76	Presidency of Religious Affairs	Diyanet	Official	July 26, 2013	Ankara, Turkey
77	Ministry of Foreign Affairs		Official	August 1, 2013	Ankara, Turkey
78	Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities	YTATB	Director	July 24, 2013	Ankara, Turkey
79	Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities	YTATB	Expert	July 29, 2013	Ankara, Turkey
80	Ministry for EU Affairs		Deputy Undersecretary	July 25, 2013	Ankara, Turkey
81	Ministry for Labor and Social Security		Official	July 25, 2013	Ankara, Turkey
82	Yunus Emre Foundation		Official	July 31, 2013	Ankara, Turkey

83	Office of Public Diplomacy		Director	August 1, 2013	Ankara, Turkey
84	Pir Sultan Abdal Association		Board Member	July 31, 2013	Ankara, Turkey

Appendix C: Sample Interview Questions

Questions for Immigrant Organization Leaders

1. When was your organization established? What was its original structure, and how has it evolved over time?

2. How many branches and members does your organization have?

3. What are your organization's main services and activities?

4. What claims does your organization make towards the host state? How have these claims evolved over time?

5. What claims does your organization make towards the home state? How have these claims evolved over time?

6. How would you characterize your organization's relationship with previous Turkish governments? How would you characterize your organization's relationship with the current Turkish government?

7. What do you think about Turkey's policies toward its diaspora? Do you think Turkey's increasing engagement with its nationals abroad is a negative or positive development for immigrant integration? What impact has Turkey's policy change in diaspora affairs had on you and your organization?

8. Has your organization established closer relations with Turkey in recent years? If yes, how and why?

9. Have you been receiving any sort of support from Turkish institutions? If yes, from which institutions, since when, and for which activities and projects?

10. Do Turkish officials visit your organization? Do you attend meetings or events organizations organized by Turkish officials?

11. Have you noticed any changes in the Turkish organizational field in France/Germany in recent years? If yes, what are they, and what factors have triggered these changes?

12. How would you characterize your organization's relations with other Turkish and non-Turkish immigrant organizations? Do you co-organize any activities or events with them?

13. What do you think about your country of settlement? Do you feel integrated?

14. How would you characterize your organization's relationship with previous French/German governments? How would you describe your organization's relationship with the current government?

15. How do you view French/German integration policies?

16. Could you compare French and German integration policies? Which country do you think is a better place for immigrants?

17. Does your organization receive any support from French/German institutions? If yes, from which institutions, since when, and for which activities and projects?

18. Do you primarily identify yourself as Turkish, as French/German, or as a person with a dual identity?

19. What do you think about Turkey's relations with France/Germany?

20. Do you think Turkey should join the EU?

21. Do you think it is important that Turks are integrated into their host societies? Do you take any specific measures or organize any activities to encourage French/German Turks' integration?

22. Could you inform me about the political activities your organization has undertaken since the early 2000s? What are your organization's motivations and goals?

Questions for French/German Officials

23. What types of activities and policies does your government/institution develop regarding immigrants? What are some of the measures you have taken to encourage immigrants' integration into France/Germany?

24. Could you provide a brief overview of your government's/institution's current integration policies and explain how they differ from past policies?

25. Could you inform me about your government/institution's relations with Turks? What is the nature and frequency of your interaction with Turkish immigrant organizations?

26. In what ways do Turkish immigrant organizations differ from each other? Which organizations have better relations with your government/institution?

27. How do you view Turks' integration into your country? In what ways are Turks similar to and/or different from other immigrant groups in your country? Does your government/institution develop different policies for each immigrant community?

28. What role do you think countries of origin play in shaping immigrants' integration and organizational life in France/Germany? Has your government/institution established relationships with immigrants' origin governments? If so, do these relationships differ based on the policies of these governments? Do you see the activities of specific countries of origin as a threat to immigrant integration?

29. How would you characterize your government's/institution's relationship with Turkey? Do you collaborate with Turkish officials in the area of immigrant integration?

30. How do you view Turkey's recent diaspora engagement policy?

Questions for Turkish Officials

31. How have Turkey's relations with its diaspora changed over time?

32. What factors have motivated Turkey to cultivate closer ties with its diaspora in recent years?

33. How have your institution's relations with the Turkish community/Turkish immigrant organizations in Europe changed over time?

34. How does your institution view Turkish immigrant organizations? In what ways are Turkish immigrant organizations similar to and/or different from each other? Which Turkish immigrant organizations have better relations with the Turkish government/your institution?

35. Does your institution provide any support to Turkish immigrant organizations? If yes, to which organizations, since when, and for which activities and projects?

36. How do you view French/German integration policies?

37. How would you characterize your institution's relationship with European host states? Do you collaborate with them in the area of immigrant integration?

References

Abadan-Unat, Nermin. 1976. *Turkish Workers in Europe, 1960–1975*. Leiden: Brill.

_____. 2002. *Bitmeyen Göç: Konuk İşçilikten Ulus-Ötesi Yurttaşlığa*. Istanbul: Bilgi University.

Abalı, Oya. 2009. "German Public Opinion on Immigration and Integration." Migration Policy Institute Report. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/migration-public-opinion-and-politics

Abrams, Dominic, and Michael A. Hogg. 1990. "Social motivation, self-esteem, and social identity." In *Social identity theory: Constructive and critical advances*, edited by Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, 28–47. New York: Springer Verlag.

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP). 2023 Policy Vision. https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/2023-political-vision

Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveig, and Katheeln Newland. 2012. "Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development." Migration Policy Institute Handbook.

Akgönül, Samim. 2005. *Religions de Turquie, Religions des Turcs: Nouveaux acteurs dans l'Europe élargie*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

_____. 2006. "Millî Görüş: Institution religieuse minoritaie et nouvement politique transnational." In *Islamismes d'Occident, les voies de la renaissance*, edited by Amghar Samir, 63–89. Paris: Lignes de Repères.

_____. 2009. "Turks in France: Religion, Identity, and Europeanness." In *Turks in Europe: Culture, Identity, Integration*, edited by Talip Küçükcan and Veyis Güngör, 35–65. Amsterdam: Türkevi Research Center.

Akgündüz, Ahmet. 2008. *Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960–1974: A Multidisciplinary Analysis*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Aksel, Damla B. 2014. "Kins, Distant Workers, Diasporas: Constructing Turkey's Transnational Members Abroad." *Turkish Studies* 15 (2): 195–219.

Akyol, Mustafa. "Recalling Turkey's Post-Modern Coup." *Hürriyet*. February 29.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/recalling-turkeys-post-modern-coup-
.aspx?pageID=449&nID=14884&NewsCatID=411

Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 1997. "Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration." *International Migration Review* 31 (4): 826–874.

Alba, Richard, and Nancy Foner. 2009. "Entering the Precincts of Power: Do National Differences Matter for Immigrant Minority Representation?" In *Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*, edited by Jennifer Hochschild and John Mollenkopf, 277–294. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Alexander, George, and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Amelina, Anna, and Thomas Faist. 2008. "Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany: Between Integration Pressure and Transnational Linkages." *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 24 (2): 91–120.

Amiraux, Valérie. 2001. *Acteurs de l'Islam entre Allemagne et Turquie: Parcours militants et expériences religieuses*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Argun, Betigül. 2003. *Turkey in Germany*. *The Transnational Sphere of Deutschkei*. London: Routledge.

Arkilic, Z. Ayca. 2013. "An Immigrant Party in the German Elections." *Hürriyet*. December 7.
http://web.hurriyetdailynews.com/an-immigrant-party-in-the-german-
elections.aspx?pageID=238&nID=59157&NewsCatID=396

_____. 2015. "The Limits of European Islam: Turkish Islamic Umbrella Organizations and their Relations with Host Countries–France and Germany." *Journal of Muslim and Minority Affairs* 35 (1): 17–41.

_____. 2016. "Cooperation, Emulation, Rapprochement: The Changing Dynamics of the Turkish Islamic Organizational Landscape in Europe." In *Muslims in the UK and Europe II*, edited by Yasir Suleiman and Paul Anderson, 77–90. Cambridge: Cambridge Center for Islamic Studies Press.

Artan, Zeynep Selen. 2009. "From Village Turks to Euro Turks: The Turkish State's Perceptions of Turkish Migrants in Europe." Master's Thesis. Bosphorus University, Istanbul.

Asad, Talal. 1993. *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Aydın, Yaşar. 2014. "The New Turkish Diaspora Policy." Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper.
https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2014_RP10_adn.pdf

_____. 2016. "Turkish Diaspora Policy: Transnationalism or Long-Distance Nationalism?" In *Turkish Migration Policy*, edited by İbrahim Sirkeci and Barbara Pusch, 169–181. London: Transnational Press.

Bandura, Albert. 1995. "Exercise of personal and collective efficacy in changing societies." In *Self-efficacy in Changing Societies*, edited by Albert Bandura, 1–45. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Barth, Fredrik. 2002. "An Anthropology of Knowledge." *Current Anthropology* 43 (1): 1–18.

Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton-Blanc. 1994. *Nations unbound: Transnational projects and the deterritorialized nation-state*. New York: Gordon and Breach.

Basdevant-Gaudemet, Brigitte. 2004. "Islam in France." In *The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe*, edited by Roberta Aluffi and Giovanna Zincone, 59–83. Leuven: Peeters.

Basdevant-Gaudemet, Brigitte, and Franck Frégosi. 2004. "L'Islam en France." In *Islam and the European* Union, edited by Richard Potz and Wolfgang Wieshaider, 143–180. Leuven: Peeters.

Bass, Loretta, and Lynne Casper. 2001. "Difference in the registration and voting between native-born and naturalized American citizens." *Population Research and Policy Review* 20: 483–511.

Baş, Mustafa, Ali Rıza Gülçiçek, and Eyüp Fatsa. 2003. "Komisyon Raporu." Dönem 22, Yasama Yılı 2. TBMM.
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem22/yil01/ss335.pdf

Başer, Bahar. 2014. "Diaspora Politics and Germany's Kurdish Question." University of Kent Diasporas and Security CARC Working Papers.
https://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/carc/diasporas-and-securitisation/working-papers.html

Baubérot, Jean. 2004. *Laïcité 1905–2005, entre passion et raison*. Paris: Le Seuil.

Bauböck, Rainer. 2003. "Towards a political theory of migrant transnationalism." *International Migration Review* 37 (3): 700–723.

Bayat, Asef. 2007. *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

BBC. 2015. "Armenian killings were genocide - German president." April 23.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32437633

Beauchemin, Cris, Christelle Hamel, and Patrick Simon. 2010. "Trajectoires et Origines: Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France." INED Documents de Travail 168.
https://www.ined.fr/fichier/s_rubrique/19558/dt168_teo.fr.pdf

Berger, Maria, Christian Galonska, and Ruud Koopmans. 2002. "Not a Zero-Sum Game: Ethnic Communities and Political Integration of Migrants in Berlin." ECPR Political Participation of Immigrants and Their Descendants in Post-War Europe Workshop. March 22–27, Turin.

Berglund, Jenny. 2015. "Publicly Funded Islamic Education in Europe and the United States." Brookings Institute Analysis Paper.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/04/islamic-education-berglund/final-web-pdf.pdf

Berking, Helmuth. 2000. "Homes Away from Home: Zum Spannungsverhältnis von Diaspora und Nationalstaat." *Berliner Journal für Soziologie* 1: 49–60.

Bertossi, Christophe. 2010. "Country Report: France." European University Institute EUDO Citizenship Observatory Report.
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19613/France.pdf?sequence=1

Bertossi, Christophe, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. 2012. "National Models of Immigrant Integration: The Costs of Comparative Research." *Comparative European Politics* 10 (3): 237–247.

Bertossi, Christophe, and Abdellali Hajjat. 2013. "Country Report: France." European University Institute EUDO Citizenship Observatory Report. http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/France.pdf

Bettin, Giulia, Seçil Paçacı Elitok, and Thomas Straubhaar. 2012. "Causes and Consequences of the Downturn in Financial Remittances to Turkey: A Descriptive Approach." In *Turkey, Migration, and the EU: Potentials, Challenges, and Opportunities*, edited by Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar, 133–166. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press.

Bevelander, Pieter, and Justus Veenman. 2006. "Naturalisation and Socioeconomic Integration: The Case of the Netherlands." IZA Discussion Paper No. 2153. http://repec.iza.org/dp2153.pdf

Bilgili Özge, and Melissa Siegel. 2011. "Understanding the Changing Role of the Turkish Diaspora." Maastricht University UNU-MERIT Working Paper. http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/wppdf/2011/wp2011-039.pdf

_____. 2013. "From Economic to Political Engagement: Analysing the Changing Role of the Turkish Diaspora." In *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*, edited by Michael Collyer, 277–301. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bilgili Özge, and Silja Weyel. 2012. "Diaspora Engagement in Morocco: Understanding the Implications of a Changing Perspective on Capacity and Practices." Maastricht University UNU-MERIT Migration Policy Brief. http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu/ISacademie/docs/PB10.pdf

Bird, Karen, Thomas Saalfeld, and Andreas K. Wüst. 2011. *The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies*. London: Routledge.

Bleich, Erik. 2003. *Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bonnafous, Simone. 1988. "La presse française et les 'événements immigrés' de 1974 à 1984." *L'Homme et la société* 87 (1): 53–62.

Boucher, Anna. 2008. "The Political Participation of Berlin's Turkish Migrants in the Dual Citizenship and Headscarf Debates: A Multilevel Comparison." In *Migration and Activism in Europe since 1945*, edited by Wendy Pojmann, 209–233. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bowen, John R. 2007. *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves? Islam, the State, and Public Space*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_____. 2009. *Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bowen, John R., and Mathias Rohe. 2014. "Judicial Framings of Muslims and Islam in France and Germany." In *European States and Their Muslim Citizens: The Impact of Institutions on Perceptions and Boundaries*, edited by John R. Bowen, Christophe Bertossi, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Mona Lena Krook, 135–164. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brand, Laurie. 2006. *Citizens Abroad: State and Emigration in the Middle East and North Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brinbaum, Yael, Mirna Safi, and Patrick Simon. 2012. "Les discriminations en France: entre perception et expérience". INED Documents de Travail 183. https://www.ined.fr/fr/publications/document-travail/discriminations-france-perception-experience/

Brouard, Sylvain, and Vincent Tiberj. 2011. *As French as Everyone? A Survey of French Citizens of Maghrebin, African, and Turkish Origin*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 1994. "Commentary: Are Immigration Control Effects Really Failing?" In *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bruce, Benjamin. 2015. "Governing Islam Abroad: The Turkish and Moroccan Muslim Fields in France and Germany." Doctoral Dissertation. Sciences Po-Paris.

Bundesministerium des Innern. 2008. "German Islam Conference Interim Résumé by the Working Groups and the Roundtable." Paper for the 3rd Plenary Session of the German Islam Conference. March 13, Berlin.
http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DIK/EN/Downloads/Plenum/DIK-drittes-Plenum-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

_____. 2016. "Society and Constitution: German Islam Conference."
http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Topics/Society-Constitution/German-Islam-Conference/german-islam-conference_node.htm

Carol, Sarah, and Ruud Koopmans. 2013. "Dynamics of Contestation over Islamic Religious Rights in Western Europe." *Ethnicities* 13 (2): 165–190.

Castles, Stephen. 1986. "The Guest Worker in Western Europe- An Obituary." *International Migration Review* 20 (4): 761–778.

Castles, Stephen, and Godula Kosack. 1973. *Immigrant workers and class structure in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. 1993. *The Age of Migration*. New York: Guilford Press.

Caymaz, Birol. 2002. *Les mouvements islamiques turcs à Paris*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Cesari, Jocelyn. 1994. "De l'immigré au minoritaire: les Maghrébins de France." *Revue européenne des migrations internationalies* 10 (1): 109–126.

Chahrock, Haleh. 2009. "Discrimination in the Name of Neutrality: Headscarf Bans for Teachers and Civil Servants in Germany." Human Rights Watch Report.
https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/02/26/discrimination-name-neutrality/headscarf-bans-teachers-and-civil-servants-germany#_ftnref84

Cihan. 2014. "German-Turkish NGOs condemn growing Islamophobia in Germany." December 30.
https://www.cihan.com.tr/en/german-turkish-ngos-condemn-growing-islamophobia-in-germany-1637736.htm?

_____. 2015. "DİTİB'in siyasallaşması Almanya'da tanınmasını engelleyebilir."
October 21.
https://www.cihan.com.tr/tr/ditibin-siyasallasmasi-almanyada-resmen-taninmasini-
engelleyebilir-1946085.htm

Cizre, Ümit, and Menderes Çınar. 2003. "Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light
of the February 28 Process." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 102 (2): 309–332.

CNN Türk. 2010. "Fransa'daki Türklere anayasa değişikliğini anlattı." April 7.
http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/dunya/04/07/fransadaki.turklere.anayasa.degisikligini.anla
tti/571245.0/

Collier, Paul. 2013. *Exodus: How Migration is Changing Our World*. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

Collyer, Michael. 2013. "Introduction: Locating and Narrating Emigration Nations." In
Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement, edited by Michael
Collyer, 1–24. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

_____. 2013. "Afterword: States of Emigration." In *Emigration Nations: Policies and
Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*, edited by Michael Collyer, 327–333. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.

Collyer, Michael, and Zana Vathi. 2007. "Patterns of Extra-territorial Voting." Sussex
Center for Migration Research Working Paper T22.
http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/working_papers/WP-T22.pdf

Contreras, Ana I. Planet, and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi Martinez. 2015. "Religion
and Migration in Morocco: Governability and Diaspora." *New Diversities* 19 (1): 111–
127.

Cooper, Malcolm. 2002. "The Legacy of Ataturk: Turkish Political Structures and Policy-
Making." *International Affairs* 78 (1): 115–128.

Crocker, Jennifer, and Riia Luhtanen. 1990. "Collective self-esteem and ingroup bias."
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58 (1): 60–67.

Çakır, Ruşen. 2001. *Ayet ve Slogan*. Istanbul: Metis.

Çakır, Ruşen, and İrfan Bozan. 2005. *Sivil, Şeffaf ve Demokratik bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Mümkün mü?* Istanbul: TESEV.

Çitak, Zana. 2010. "Between 'Turkish Islam' and 'French Islam': The Role of the Diyanet in the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36 (4): 619–634.

Dawson, Michael C. 1995. *Behind the mule: Race and class in African-American politics*. Princeton University Press.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2011. *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*. Istanbul: Küre.

_____. 2008. "Turkey's Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007." *Insight Turkey* 10 (1): 77–96.

_____. 2009. "Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8 (3): 11–17.

De Haas, Hein. 2006. "Between Courting and Controlling: The Moroccan State and 'Its' Emigrants." University of Oxford Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) Seminar Series Working Paper No. 54. https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/media/WP-2007-054-deHass_Morrocan_Emigrants.pdf

_____. 2014. "Morocco: Setting the Stage for Becoming a Migration Transition Country?" Migration Policy Institute Country Report. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/morocco-setting-stage-becoming-migration-transition-country

Délano, Alexandra. 2009. "From Limited to Active Engagement: Mexico's Emigration Policies from a Foreign Policy Perspective (2000–2006)." *International Migration Review* 43 (4): 764–814.

_____. 2010. "Immigrant Integration vs. Transnational Ties? The Role of the Sending State." *Social Research* 77 (1): 237–268.

_____. 2011. *Mexico and Its Diaspora in the United States: Policies of Emigration since 1848*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Délano, Alexandra, and Alan Gamlen. 2014. Comparing and Theorizing State-Diaspora Relations. *Political Geography* 41: 43–53.

Der Spiegel. 2008. "Cologne's Turkish Spectacle: Erdogan's One-Man Show." February 11.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cologne-s-turkish-spectacle-erdogan-s-one-man-show-a-534519.html

_____. 2011. "Erdogan Urges Turks Not to Assimilate." February 28.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/erdogan-urges-turks-not-to-assimilate-you-are-part-of-germany-but-also-part-of-our-great-turkey-a-748070.html

_____. 2013. "Secret Thatcher Notes: Kohl Wanted Half of Turks Out of Germany." August 1.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/secret-minutes-chancellor-kohl-wanted-half-of-turks-out-of-germany-a-914376.html

Desiderio, Maria Vincenza, and Agnieszka Weinar. 2014. "Supporting immigrant integration in Europe? Developing the governance for diaspora engagement." Migration Policy Institute Report.
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigrant-integration-europe-developing-governance-diaspora-engagement

DeSipio, Luis. 1996. "Making citizens or good citizens? Naturalization as a predictor of organizational and electoral behavior among Latino immigrants." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 18 (2): 194–213.

_____. 2011. "Immigrant Incorporation in an Era of Weak Civic Institutions: Immigrant Civic and Political Participation in the United States." *American Behavioral Scientist* 55 (9): 1189–1213.

Deutsche Islam Konferenz. 2016. "Overview: The DIK 2014-2016."
http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/EN/DIK/ArbeitDIK/DIK2014ueberblick/dik-2014-ueberblick-node.html;jsessionid=0E30AB5CBA0BBFE0148A7C15D26A16B0.1_cid286

Deutsche Welle. 2008. "Erdoğan'ın Köln Çıkarması." February 11.
http://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fan%C4%B1n-k%C3%B6ln-%C3%A7%C4%B1karmas%C4%B1/a-3119307

_____. 2009. "Study Shows Turkish Immigrants Least Integrated in Germany." January 26.
http://www.dw.com/en/study-shows-turkish-immigrants-least-integrated-in-germany/a-3975683

_____. 2010. "Chancellor Merkel says German multiculturalism has 'utterly failed.'" October 17.
http://www.dw.com/en/chancellor-merkel-says-german-multiculturalism-has-utterly-failed/a-6118859

_____. 2011. "Alman Siyasetinde Türk Kökenliler." October 24.
http://www.dw.com/tr/alman-siyasetinde-t%C3%BCrk-k%C3%B6kenliler/a-15481848

_____. 2013. "Islamic Success Story at German Universities." January 16.
http://www.dw.com/en/islamic-success-story-at-german-universities/a-16526690

_____. 2014. "Germany to grant children of immigrants dual citizenship." April 8.
http://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-grant-children-of-immigrants-dual-citizenship/a-17551448

_____. 2014. "Dual citizenship law takes place in Germany." December 19.
http://www.dw.com/en/dual-citizenship-law-takes-effect-in-germany/a-18143002

_____. 2015. "German state lifts headscarf ban for public school teachers." September 7.
http://www.dw.com/en/german-state-lifts-headscarf-ban-for-public-school-teachers/a-18699223

Die Welt. 2015. "Migranten wollen weniger Flüchtlinge in Deutschland." November 29.
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article149391575/Migranten-wollen-weniger-Fluechtlinge-in-Deutschland.html

Diehl, Claudia, and Michael Blohm. 2003. "Rights or Identity? Naturalization Process among 'Labor Migrants' in Germany." *International Migration Review* 37 (1): 133–162.

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. 2012. Stratejik Plan (Strategic Report), 2012–2016.
http://www.sp.gov.tr/upload/xSPStratejikPlan/files/qbwUy+diyanet_stratejik_plan.pdf

_____. 2014. "Uluslararası İlahiyat Programı Tanıtım Kılavuzu." Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı.

Dronkers, Jaap, and Maarten Vink. 2012. "Explaining Access to Citizenship in Europe: How Citizenship Policies affect Naturalisation Rates." *European Union Politics* 13: 390–412.

Eckstein, Susan. 2013. "Immigrants from Developing Countries: An Overview of Their Homeland Impacts." In *How Immigrants Impact Their Homelands*, edited by Susan Eckstein and Adil Najam, 1–30. Raleigh: Duke University Press.

Eickelman, Dale F. 1982. "The study of Islam in Local Contexts." *Contributions to Asian Studie*s 17: 1–16.

Eickelman, Dale F., and James Piscatori. 1996. *Muslim Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ekman, Joakim, and Amnå, Erik. (2009). "Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards A New Typology." Youth and Society Working Paper.

Elitok, Seçil Paçacı. 2013. "Remittance Flows between Germany and Turkey: A Reverse Trend?" Istanbul Policy Center Policy Brief. http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Remittance-Flows-Between-Germany-and-Turkey-A-Reverse-Trend_WEB.pdf

Engelen, Ewald. 2006. "Towards an Explanation of the Performance Differences of Turks in the Netherlands and Germany: The Case for a Comparative Economy of Integration." *Journal of Economics and Social Geography* 97 (1): 69–79.

Erdoğan, Murat. 2011. "Almanya'da Irkçı Neo-Nazi Cinayetler: Türklerin Görüş ve Duyguları Araştırması." Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center. http://fs.hacettepe.edu.tr/hugo/dosyalar/HUGOSEKPOLIrkciNeo.pdf

_____. 2012. "Fransa'daki Türkiye Kökenlilerin Güncel Konulardaki Görüş ve Düşüncelerinin Araştırması." Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center. http://fs.hacettepe.edu.tr/hugo/dosyalar/duyuru_190412.pdf

_____. 2013a. "Euro-Turks Barometre." Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center. http://fs.hacettepe.edu.tr/hugo/dosyalar/ETB_rapor.pdf

_____. 2013b. "Türkiye Kökenli Alman Vatandaşların Almanya Federal Meclisi Seçimlerinde Siyasal Davranışları." Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center. http://fs.hacettepe.edu.tr/hugo/dosyalar/HUGOBundestag2013140114.pdf

Ersanilli, Evelyn. 2010. "Comparing integration: Host culture adaption and ethnic retention among Turkish immigrants and their descendants in France, Germany and the Netherlands." Doctoral Dissertation. University of Amsterdam.

Ersanilli, Evelyn, and Ruud Koopmans. 2010. 'Rewarding Integration? Citizenship Regulations and the Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants in the Netherlands, France, and Germany." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36 (5): 773–791.

_____. 2011. "Do Immigrant Policies Matter? A three-country comparison among Turkish immigrants." *West European Politics* 34 (2): 208–234.

Esser, Hartmut. 1999. "Die Situationslogik ethnischer Konflikte." *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 28 (4): 245–262.

Esser, Hartmut, and Hermann Korte. 1985. "Federal Republic of Germany." In *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Analysis*, edited by Thomas Hammar, 165–216. New York: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2001. *Integration und ethnische Schihtung. Gutachten im Auftrag der Unabhängigen Komission "Zuwanderung."* Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung.

EU Observer. 2015. "Erdoğan harangues EU at Strasbourg rally." October 5. https://euobserver.com/justice/130544

Euractiv. 2015. "Merkel freezes Germany's debate over new immigration law." March 4. http://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/merkel-freezes-germany-s-debate-over-new-immigration-law/

Eurobarometer. 1991. "Public Opinion in the European Community." June 1991. No. 35. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb35/eb35_en.pdf

European Union Minorities and Discrimination (EU MIDIS) Survey. 2008. http://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2011/eu-midis-european-union-minorities-and-discrimination-survey

Eurostat. 2015. "Asylum and first time asylum applicants – annual aggregate data (rounded)."
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps001 91&plugin=1

Faist, Thomas. 2000. *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*. Oxford: Oxford University.

Faist, Thomas, and Peter Kivisto. 2007. *Dual Citizenship in Global Perspective: From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Favell, Adrian. 1998. *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fennema, Meindert, and Jean Tillie. 1999. "Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam. Civic communities and ethnic networks." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25 (4): 703–726.

Fetzer, Joel S., and Christopher J. Soper. 2005. *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Financial Times. 2014. "German politicians attack Erdogan plan for pre-election rally in Cologne." May 19.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c1ff024a-df64-11e3-86a4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz44i7XLDJe

Foreign Affairs. 2014. "Six Markets to Watch." January.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2013-12-06/six-markets-watch-turkey

Foreign Policy. 2016. "In Germany Immigrants Bristle at a New Generation." March 8.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/08/germans-older-immigrant-communities-dont-like-the-new-kids-in-town-refugees-syrians-iraqis-turks/

Freedman, Jane. 2008. "The French 'Sans-Papiers' Movement: An unfinished Struggle." In *Migration and Activism in Europe since 1945*, edited by Wendy Pojmann, 81–96. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Freeman, Gary P. 1979. *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945–1975.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_____. 2004. "Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies." *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 945–969.

Freeman, Gary P., and Nedim Ögelman. 1998. "Homeland Citizenship Policies and The Status of Third Country Nationals in the European Union." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 24 (4): 769–788.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16: 3–18.

Fullilove, Michael, and Chloe Flutter. 2004. *Diaspora: The World Wide Web of Australians.* Double Bay: Lowy Institute for International Policy.

Gamlen, Alan. 2006. "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What Are They, and What Kind of States Use Them?" University of Oxford Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) Working Paper 32. https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2006/wp-2006-032-gamlen_diaspora_engagement_policies/

_____. 2007. "Making Hay While the Sun Shines: Envisioning New Zealand's State-Diaspora Relations." *Policy Quarterly* 3 (4): 12–21.

_____. 2008. "The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination." *Political Geography* 27 (8): 840–856.

Gamlen, Alan, Michael Cummings, Paul M. Vaaler, and Laura Rossouw. 2013. "Explaining the Rise of Diaspora Institutions." University of Oxford International Migration Institute Working Paper No. 78. https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/wp/wp-78-13.pdf

Gamson, William, A. 1991. "Commitment and Agency in Social Movements." *Sociology Forum* 6: 27–50.

Ganz, Marshall. 2000. "Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959-1966." *American Journal of Sociology* 105: 1003–1062.

Garbaye, Romain, 2005. *Getting Into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and French Cities*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gecas, Viktor. 1989. "The Social Psychology of Self-Efficacy." *Annual Review of Sociology* 15: 291–316.

_____. 2000. "Value identities, self-motives, and social movements." In *Self, Identity, and Social Movements*, edited by Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens, and Robert W. White, 93–109. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Geddes, Barbara. 1990. "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics." *Political Analysis* 2 (1): 131–150.

Geddes, Andrew. 2003. *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. London: Sage.

Gerdes, Jürgen, Thomas Faist, and Beate Rieple. 2007. "We Are All Republican Now: The Politics of Dual Citizenship in Germany." In *Dual Citizenship in Europe: From Nationhood to Social Integration*, edited by Thomas Faist, 45–77. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Gibbon, James. 2009. "Religion, Immigration, and the Turkish Government in Germany: Reexamining the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB). Paper Presented at the "Living Islam in Europe: Muslim Traditions in European Contexts" Conference. May 7–9, Berlin.
http://jamesgibbon.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/James_Gibbon_Living_Islam_Paper.pdf

Gillespie, Kate, and Anna Andriasova. 2008. "Supporting Business Development: The Experience of Armenia." In *Diasporas and Development: Exploring the Potential*, edited by Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, 113–131. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Giubilaro, Donatella. 1997. *Migration from the Maghreb and Migration Pressures: Current Situation and Future Prospects*. Geneva: International Labor Organization.

Givens, Terri E. 2005. *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Givens, Terri E., and Rahsaan Maxwell, eds. 2012. *Immigrant Politics: Race and Representation in Western Europe*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Givens, Terri E., and Pete Mohanty. 2014. "The Politics of Immigrant Integration: Public Opinion and Party Politics." Paper Presented at the International Conference of Europeanists. June 25–27, Amsterdam.

Glick Schiller, Nina, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton-Blanc. 1995. "From immigrant to transmigrant: Theorizing transnational migration." *Anthropology Quarterly* 68: 48–63.

Godard, Bernard, and Sylvie Taussig. 2007. *Les musulmans en France: Courants, institutions, communautés: Un état des lieux*. Paris: Hachette.

Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Göle, Nilüfer. 1997. "The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity." In *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, edited by Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, 69–81. Washington: University of Washington Press.

Gözaydın, İştar. 2009. *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*. Istanbul: İletişim.

Green, Simon. 2000. "Beyond Ethnoculturalism? German Citizenship in the New Millenium." *German Politics* 9 (3): 105–124.

_____. 2004. *The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Green, Nancy, and François Weil, eds. 2007. *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Gsir, Sonia. 2014. "Civic Participation and Integration: A Country of Origin Perspective." European University Institute INTERACT Report. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31244/INTERACT-RR-2014_03.pdf?sequence=1

Guardian. 2015. "Germany on course to accept one million refugees in 2015." December 7. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/08/germany-on-course-to-accept-one-million-refugees-in-2015

335

_____. 2016. "EU-Turkey deal begins as Syrian refugees arrive in Germany and Finland." April 4.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/04/eu-turkey-deal-syrian-refugees-germany-istanbul-hanover

Guarnizo, Luis E., Alejandro Portes, and William Haller. 2003. "Assimilation and transnationalism: Determinants of transnational political action among contemporary migrants." *American Journal of Sociology* 108 (6): 1211–1248.

Gurr, Ted. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*? New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Gutiérrez, Carlos González. 1999. "Fostering Identities: Mexico's Relations with Its Diaspora." *Journal of American History* 86 (2): 545–567.

Hailbronner, Kay. 2010. "Country Report: Germany." EUDO Citizenship Observatory Report.
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19614/Germany.pdf?sequence=1

Hamilton, Kimberly, Patrick Simon, and Clara Veniard. 2014. "The Challenge of French Diversity." Migration Policy Institute Country Profile.
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/challenge-french-diversity

Hampshire, James. 2013. "An Emigrant Nation without an Emigrant Policy: The Curious Case of Britain." In *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*, edited by Michael Collyer, 302–326. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hargreaves, Alec G. 1991. "The Political Mobilization of the North African Immigrant Community in France." *Journal or Ethnic and Racial Studies* 14 (3): 350–367.

_____. 1995. *Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*. London: Routledge.

Haug, Sonia, Stephania Müssig, and Anja Stichs. 2009. *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland*. Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Integration und Flüchtlunge.

Hecker, Pierre. 2006. "Turkey." Focus Migration Country Profile No.5. Hamburg Institute for International Economics.

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm, Joachim Müller, and Hemlut Schröder. 1997. *Verlockender Fundamentalismus: Türkische Jugendliche in Deutschland*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Heper, Metin. 2001. "Turkey: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 1 (3): 1–19.

_____. 2002. "The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey." In *Political Parties in Turkey*, edited by Metin Heper and Barry Rubin, 138–146. London: Routledge.

Heper, Metin, and Sabri Sayarı, eds. 2012. *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.

Hero, Rodney E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2005. "Introduction." In *Politics of Democratic Inclusion*, edited by Rodney E. Hero and Christina Wolbrecht, 1–14. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Higgins, Andrew. 2016. "A Close Look at Brussels Offers a More Nuanced View of Radicalization." *New York Times*. April 19. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/world/europe/more-than-islam-origin-is-a-marker-for-terror-among-brussels-immigrants.html?_r=0

Hinze, Annika. 2013. *Turkish Berlin: Integration Policy and Urban Space*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

Hollifield, James. 1998. "Migration, Trade and the Nation-State: The Myth of Globalization." *Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs* 3 (2): 595–636.

_____. 2004. "French Republicanism and the Limits of Immigration Control." In *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield, 183–215. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

_____. 2008. "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We 'Bring the State Back In.'" In *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, edited by Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield. London: Routledge.

House, Robert J., William D. Spangler, and James Woycke. 1991. "Personality and charisma in the US Presidency: A psychological theory of elite effectiveness." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 3: 364–396.

Howard, Marc Morjé. 2008. "The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law." *German Politics* 17 (1): 41–62.

_____. 2009. *The politics of citizenship in Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2012. "Germany's Citizenship Policy in Comparative Perspective." *German Politics and Society* 30 (1): 39–51.

Huntington, Samuel. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations." *Foreign Affairs* 73 (3): 22–28.

_____. 2005. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Hüküm, Uğur, Gaye Petek, and Defne Gürsoy. 2007. *Turcs en France*. Paris: Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule.

Hürriyet. 2011. "Başbakandan üçüncü balkon konuşması." June 13. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ gundem/18015912.asp

_____. 2012. "Türkçe için 2.541 imza." August 26. http://avrupa.hurriyet.com.tr/haberler/gundem/1273655/turkce-icinimza

_____. 2012. "Çifte vatandaşlık için imza kampanyası hızlandı." December 19. http://avrupa.hurriyet.com.tr/haberler/gundem/1347501/cifte-vatandaslik-icin-sonbin-imza

_____. 2013. "Eleven Turks Enter German Parliament." September 24. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eleven-turks-enter-german-parliament-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=55013

_____. 2013. "Turkish children face unjust practices in Europe." October 24. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-children-face-unjust-practices-in-europe-report.aspx?PageID=238&NID=56729&NewsCatID=351

_____. 2014. "Yerel seçimlerde 130 Türk aday var." March 22. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yerel-secimlerde-130-turk-aday-var-26061465

_____. 2014. "Başbakan Erdoğan Fransa'daki Türklere seslendi." June 21. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/basbakan-erdogan-fransadaki-turklere-seslendi-26657828

_____. 2016. "Alman İçişleri Bakanı Atatürk Hayranı Çıktı." May 10. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/alman-icisleri-bakani-ataturk-hayrani-cikti-40101593

_____. 2016. "Germany urges Turkey to focus on integrating Syrian refugees." June 25. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/germany-urges-turkey-to-focus-on-integrating-syrian-refugees.aspx?pageID=238&nID=96639&NewsCatID=351

Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE). "Population Censuses, 1982–2012." http://www.insee.fr/en/bases-de-donnees/default.asp?page=recensements.htm

_____. 2014. "Acquisitions de la nationalité française en 2014." http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=NATTEF02161

_____. 2016. "Étrangers- Immigrés." http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/theme.asp?theme=2&sous_theme=5

Ireland, Patrick. 1994. *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Iskander, Natasha. 2006. "Innovating Government: Migration, Development and the State in Morocco and Mexico, 1963–2005." Doctoral Dissertation. MIT.

_____. 2008. "Diaspora Networks for Creating National Infrastructure: Rural Morocco, 1985-2005." In *Diasporas and Development: Exploring the Potential*, edited by Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, 163–183. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

İçduygu Ahmet. 2006. "International Migrant Remittances in Turkey." European University Institute CARIM Research Report No. 7. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/11687/CARIM_ASN_2006_07.pdf?sequence=1

_____. 2008. "Circular Migration and Turkey: An Overview of the Past and Present – Some Demo-Economic Implications." European University Institute CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes 10. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/8331/CARIM_AS%26N_2008_10.pdf?sequence=1

_____. 2009. "International Migration and Human Development in Turkey." United Nations Development Program Human Development Research Paper No. 52.

İlhan, Ebru. 2009. "Turkey's Interest Group Politics Revisited: The Role of Associations of Conservative Muslim Businessmen in Transforming the Turkish State and Policy-making Tradition." King's College London Doctoral Discussion Papers.

Janoski, Thomas. 2010. *The Ironies of Citizenship: Naturalization and Integration in Industrialized Countries*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jasper, James M. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Johnston Hank, Enrique Laraña, Joseph R. Gusfield. 1994. "Identities, grievances, and the new social movements." In *New Social Movements: From Ideology into Identity*, edited by Hank Johnston, Enrique Laraña, Joseph R. Gusfield, 3–35. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Jones-Correa, Michael. 1998. *Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Jonker, Gerdien. 2000. *Eine Wellenlange zu Gott: der "Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren" in Europa*. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Joppke, Christian. 1999. *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 2009. *Veil: Mirror of Identity*. Cambridge: Polity.

Joppke, Christian, and Ewa Morawska. 2003. *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Joppke, Christian, and Leslie F. Seidle, eds. 2012. *Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Joppke, Christian, and John Torpey. 2013. *Legal Integration of Islam: A Transatlantic Comparison*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Just, Aida, and Christopher Anderson. 2012. "Immigrants, Citizenship, and Political Action in Europe." *British Journal of Political Science* 42 (3): 481–509.

Kadirbeyoğlu, Zeynep. 2007. "National Transnationalism: Dual Citizenship in Turkey." In *Dual Citizenship in Europe: From Nationhood to Social Integration*, edited by Thomas Faist, 127–147. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Kalın, İbrahim. 2011. "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey." *Journal of International Affairs* 16 (3): 5–25. BIM Report.

Karakayalı Serhat, and Olaf J. Kleist. 2015. "Strukturen und Motive der ehrenamtlichen Flüchtlingsarbeit (EFA) in Deutschland." Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research (BMI) Report. Humboldt University of Berlin. http://www.fluechtlingshilfe-htk.de/uploads/infos/49.pdf

Karpat, Kemal. 1973. *Social Change and Politics in Turkey*. Leiden: Brill.

Kastoryano, Riva. 1995. "Etre Turc en Allemagne." In *Enjeux de l'immigration turque en Europe: les Turcs en France et en Europe*, edited by Alain Jund, Paul Dumont, and Stéphane de Tapia, 103–122. Paris: L'Harmattan.

_____. 2002. *Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kaya, İbrahim. 2008. "Circular Migration and Turkey: A Legal Perspective." European University Institute CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes 37. http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/8355

Kaya, Ayhan, and Ferhat Kentel. 2005. *Euro-Türkler: Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği Arasında Köprü mü, Engel mi?* Istanbul: Bilgi University.

Kaya, Ayhan, and Ayşe Tecmen. 2011. "The Role of Common Cultural Heritage in External Promotion of Modern Turkey: Yunus Emre Cultural Centers." Istanbul Bilgi University European Institute Working Paper No. 4.

Kedourie, Ellie. 1994. *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*. London: Routledge.

Kepel, Gilles. 2001. *Les banlieues de l'Islam. Naissance d'une religion en France*. Paris: Le Seuil.

Kirişci, Kemal. 2008. "Three Way Approach to Meeting the Challenges of Migrant Incorporation in the European Union: Reflections from a Turkish Perspective." European University Institute CARIM Research Report 2008/3.

Klausen, Jytte. 2005. *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kleger, Heinz, and Gianni D'Amato. 1995. "Staatsbürgerschaft und Einbürgerung - oder: Wer ist ein Bürger? Ein Vergleich zwischen Deutschland, Frankreich und der Schweiz." *Journal für Sozialforschung* 35 (3): 259–281.

Klopp, Brett. 2002. *German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship*. Westport: Praeger.

Koinova, Maria. 2013. "Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism for Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9 (4): 433–453.

Koopmans, Ruud. 2002. Codebook for the analysis of political mobilization and communication in European public spheres. http://europub.wzb.eu/Data/Codebooks%20questionnaires/D2-1-claims-codebook.pdf

Koopmans, Ruud and Paul Statham. 2000. *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 2003. "How National Citizenship Shapes Transnationalism: Migrant and Minority Claimsmaking in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands." In *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*, edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, 195–238. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Koopmans, Ruuds, Paul Statham, Marco Giugny, and Florence Passy. 2005. *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Koşulu, Deniz. 2013. "The Alevi quest in Europe through the redefinition of the Alevi movement: Recognition and participation, a case study of the FUAF in France." In *Muslim Political Participation in Europe*, edited by Jørgen Nielsen, 255–276. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Kösebalaban, Hasan. 2011. *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalization, and Globalization*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Köser-Akçapar, Sebnem. 2009. "Turkish Associations in the United States: Towards Building a Transnational Identity." *Turkish Studies* 10 (2): 165–193.

Kuru, Ahmet T. 2009. *Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lahav, Gallya, and Virginie Guiraudon. 2006. "Actors and venues in immigration control: Closing the gap between political demands and policy outcomes." *West European Politics* 29 (2): 201–223.

Lainer-Vos, Dan. 2010. "Diaspora-Homeland Relations as a Framework to Examine Nation-Building Processes." *Sociology Compass* 4 (10): 894–908.

Lafleur, Jean-Michael. 2012. *Transnational Politics and the State: The External Voting Rights of Diasporas*. London: Routledge.

_____. 2013. "Regime Change in Mexico and the Transformation of State-Diaspora Relations. In *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*, edited by Michael Collyer, 153–174. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Laurence, Jonathan. 2012. *The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims: The State's Role in Minority Integration*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Laurence, Jonathan, and Justin Vaisse. 2006. *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Le Figaro. 2015. "En 2005 trois semaines d'émeutes urbaines." October 10. http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/10/25/01016-20151025ARTFIG00142-des-emeutes-urbaines-sans-precedent.php

Le Monde. 2012. "Le Parlement adopte la loi sur le génocide arménien." January 23. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2012/01/23/lle-parlement-adopte-la-loi-sur-le-genocide-armenien_1633536_3214.html

_____. 2014. "Immigration: la contre-offensive de Hollande." December 15. http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2014/12/15/immigration-la-contre-offensive-de-hollande_4540644_823448.html

Lee, Chulwoo. 2004. "The Transnationalization of Citizenship and the Logic of the Nation-State." Paper Presented at the AsianPacific Sociological Association Sixth Conference on Asia-Pacific Societies in Globalization. September 18–19, Seoul.

Leiken, Robert. 2005. "Europe's Angry Muslims." *Foreign Policy* (July/August Issue).

Lemmen, Thomas. 2000. *Islamische Organisationen in Deutschland*. Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Lesthaeghe, Ron J. 2000. *Communities and Generations: Turkish and Moroccan Populations in Belgium*. Brussels: VUB University Press.

Lewis, Bernard. 1990. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." *The Atlantic Monthly* 266 (3): 47–60.

Levitt, Peggy. 2001 "Transnational Migration: Taking Stock and Future Directions." *Global Networks* 1 (3), 195–216.

Levitt, Peggy, and Rafael de la Dehesa. 2003. "Transnational Migration and the Redefinitions of the State: Variations and Explanations." Harvard Weatherhead Center for International Relations Research Paper. http://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/transnational-migration-and-redefinition-state-variations-and-explanations

Levitt, Peggy, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2004. "Conceptualizing simultaneity: a transnational social field perspective on society." *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 1002–1039.

Loobuyck, Patrick, Jonathan Debeer, and Petra Meier. 2013. "Church-State Regime and Their Impact on the Institutionalization of Islamic Organizations in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 33 91): 61–76.

Madeleine, Demetriou. 2003. "Priming the Diaspora: Cyprus and the Overseas Greek Cypriots." In *International Migration and Sending countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, edited by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, 185–208. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mahnig, Hans. 2004. 'The Politics of Minority-Majority Relations: How Immigrant Policies Developed in Paris, Berlin, and Zurich." In *Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics, and Integration Policies*, edited by Rinus Penninx, Karen Krall, Marco Martiniello, and Steven Vertovec, 17–39. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Manço, Ural. 2012. "La dimension démographique et les caractéristiques sociales et économiques de l'émigration turque en Europe." *Anatoli* 3: 121–130.

Martin, Philip, L. 1991. *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe*. Geneva: International Labour Office.

_____. 2014. "Germany." In *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield, 224–251. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Martínez-Saldaña, Jesús. 2003. "Los Olividados Become Heroes: The Evolution of Mexico's Policies Towards Citizens Abroad." In *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, edited by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, 33–56. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Martiniello, Marco. 2005. "Political Participation, Mobilisation, and Representation of Immigrants and their Offspring in Europe." Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations 1 (5). http://dspace.mah.se/bitstream/handle/2043/1495/WB_1-05.pdf;jsessionid=09F38E65920655AB29AC8AE303647E56?sequence=1

Maxwell, Rahsaan. 2012. *Ethnic Minority Migrants in Britain and France: Integration Trade-Offs*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. 1996. "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes: Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, 1–22. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Doug, and Hilary Schaffer-Boudet. 2012. P*utting Social Movements in Their Place: Explaining Opposition to Energy in the United States, 2000–2005*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McClain, Paula, Jessica Johnson Carew, Eugene Walton, and Candis Watts. 2009. "Group membership, group identity, and group consciousness: Measures of racial identity in American politics?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 471–485.

Melucci, Alberto. 1989. *Nomads of the Present*. London: Hutchinson Radius.

_____. 1995. "The process of collective identity." *Social Movements and Culture* 4: 41–63.

_____. 1996. *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mencütek, Zeynep, and Seyma Akyol Yılmaz. 2015. "Turkey's Experience with Voting from Abroad in the 2014 and 2015 Elections." Rethink Institute Paper. Washington D.C. http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/turkeys-experience-with-voting-from-abroad-in-the-2014-and-2015-elections/

Messina, Anthony L. 2007. *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Michon, Laura. 2011. "Immigrants in French Politics." Heinrich Böll Stiftung Analysis Article.
https://heimatkunde.boell.de/node/14865

Miera, Frauke. 2009. "Political Representation of Migrants in Germany." EMILIE Project Research Paper.
https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/political-participation-of-migrants-in-germany

Miles, Robert. 1982. *Racism and Migrant Labour*. London: Routledge.

Miller, Mark. 1981. *Foreign Workers in Western Europe: An Emerging Political Force*. New York: Praeger.

Miller, Arthur H., Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk. 1981. "Group Consciousness and Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (3): 494–511.

Milliyet. 2016. "Almanya'da Suriyelileri Türkler Entegre Ediyor." March 13. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/almanya-da-suriyelileri-turkler/dunya/detay/2209141/default.htm

Morales, Laura. 2011. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Migrants' Political Inclusion." In *Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe: Making Multicultural Democracy Work*?, edited by Laura Morales and Marco Giugni, 19–42. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Morales, Laura, and Marco Giugni. 2011. "Political Opportunities, Social Capital, and the Political Inclusion of Immigrants in European Cities." In *Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe*, edited by Laura Morales and Marco Giugni, 133–176. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Morales, Laura, and Miruna Morariu. 2011. "Is 'Home' a Distraction? The Role of Migrants' Transnational Practices in Their Political Integration into Receiving-Country Politics." In *Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe*, edited by Laura Morales and Marco Giugni, 140–171. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Morawska, Ewa. 2003. "Immigrant Transnationalism and Assimilation: A Variety of Combinations and the Analytic Strategy It Suggests." In *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship*, edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Müftüler-Bac, Meltem. 2005. "Turkey's Political Reforms: The Impact of the European Union." *Southeast European Politics and Societies* 10 (1): 16–30.

Mügge, Lisa. 2010. *Beyond Dutch borders: transnational politics among colonial migrants, guest workers and the second generation*. Amsterdam: IMISCOE Amsterdam University Press.

_____. 2012. "Managing transnationalism: Continuity and change in Turkish state policy." *International Migration* 50 (1): 20–38.

Mylonas, Harris. 2013. "The Politics of Diaspora Management in the Republic of Korea." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief 81: 1–12.

Naujoks, Daniel. 2013. *Migration, Citizenship, and Development: Diasporic Membership Policies and Overseas Indians in the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nell, Lisa. 2008. "The Shadow of Homeland Politics: Understanding the Evolution of the Turkish Radical Left in the Netherlands." *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 24 (2): 121–145.

New York Times. 1993. "Thousands of Germans Rally for the Slain Turks." June 4. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/04/world/thousands-of-germans-rally-for-the-slain-turks.html

Nyiri, Pal. 2001. "Expatriating is Patriotic? The Discourse on 'New Migrants' in the People's Republic of China and Identity Construction among Recent Migrants from the PRC." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 (1): 635–653.

Odmalm, Pontus. 2005. *Migration Policies and Political Participation: Inclusion or Intrusion in Western Europe?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Office of Public Diplomacy. 2016. "Facts on Rising Turkey."
http://kdk.gov.tr//en/verilerle-yukselen-turkiye/

Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People (OFPRA). 2015.
https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/fr/l-ofpra/actualites/publication-du-rapport-d-activite-0

Olzak, Susan. 1992. *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2015. "OECD
Insights: Human Capital."
https://www.oecd.org/insights/37966934.pdf

Ögelman, Nedim. 2000. "Directing Discontent: Turkish-Origin Associations in
Germany." Doctoral Dissertation. University of Texas at Austin.

_____. 2003. "Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics
among Germany's Turks." *International Migration Review* 37 (1): 163–193.

Öktem, Kerem. 2014. "Turkey's New Diaspora Policy: The Challenge of Inclusivity,
Outreach, and Capacity." Istanbul Policy Center Research Paper.
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/14627_Kerem%C3%96ktenWEB.18.08.pdf

Öniş, Ziya. "The Evolution of Privatization in Turkey: The Institutional Context of
Public-Enterprise Reform." *Journal of Middle East Studies* 23 (2): 163–176.

_____. 2004. "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-liberalism in
Critical Perspective." *Middle Eastern Studies* 40 (4): 113–134.

Özcan, Veysel. 2003. "Germany's High Court Allows Teacher to Wear Muslim
Headscarf." Migration Policy Institute Analysis.
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/germanys-high-court-allows-teacher-wear-
muslim-headscarf

_____. 2004. "Germany: Immigration in Transition." Migration Policy Institute Country
Profile.
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/germany-immigration-transition

Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2001. "The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices." Paper Presented at the Conference on Transnational Migration: Comparative Perspectives. June 30–July 1, Princeton. http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/WPTC-01-22%20Ostergaard.doc.pdf

_____. 2003a. "Turkey and the 'Euro-Turks': Overseas Nationals as an Ambiguous Asset." In *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, edited by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, 77–99. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

_____. 2003b. *Transnational Politics*. *Turks and Kurds in Germany*. Routledge, London and New York.

Penninx, Rinus. 1982. "A Critical Review of Theory and Practice: The Case of Turkey." *International Migration Review* 16 (4): 781–818.

_____. 2005. "Integration of migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimensions." In *The New Demographic Regime: Population Challenges and Policy Response*s, edited by Miroslav Macura, Alphonse L. MacDonald, and Werner Haug, 137–152. New York: United Nations.

Penninx, Rinus, Karen Kraal, Marco Martiniello, and Steven Vertovec, eds. 2004. *Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics, and Integration Policies*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Pero, Davide, and John Solomos. 2010. "Introduction: Immigrant Politics and Mobilization: Exclusion, Engagements, Incorporation." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33 (1): 1–18.

Perrin, Nathalie, and Martiniello, Marco. 2010. "Beyond the Core Conflict: New Minorities, New Confrontations and New Policies." Final Report of the Work Package 5 of the Research Project International Civil Society Forum on Conflicts. https://issuu.com/infocon/docs/infocon_deliverable_5/1

Petek-Şalom, Gaye. 1998. "Les ressortissants turcs en France et l'évolution de leur projet migratoire." *Revue Hommes et migrations* 1212, 14–24.

Peucker, Mario, and Shahram Akbarzadeh. 2014. *Muslim Active Citizenship in the West*. London: Routledge.

Pew Research Center. 2014. Global Attitudes Survey.
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/12/chapter-4-views-of-roma-muslims-jews/

Poinsot, Marie. 1993. "Competition for Political Legitimacy at Local and National Levels among Young North Africans in France." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 20 (1): 79–92.

Pollack, Detlef. 2010. Survey on Religious Plurality in Europe. University of Münster.
https://www.uni-muenster.de/imperia/md/content/religion_und_politik/aktuelles/2010/12_2010/pm_en_zur_pressekonferenz_02.12.2010.pdf

Polletta, Francesca, and James M. Jasper. 2001. "Collective Identity and Social Movements." *Annual. Rev. Sociol.* 27: 283–305.

Portes, Alejandro. 2001. "Introduction: The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism." *Global Networks* 1 (3).

_____. 2003. "Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism." *International Migration Review* 37: 874–885.

Portes, Alejandro, Cristina Escobar, and Alexandria Walton Radford. 2007. "Immigrant Transnational Organizations and Development: A Comparative Study." *International Migration Review* 41 (1): 242–281.

Pusch, Barbara, and Julia Splitt. 2013. "Binding the Almanci to the Homeland." *Perceptions* 18 (3): 129–166.

Radikal. 2003. "Gül: Millî Görüş genelgesi normal." April 10.
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=72669

Ragazzi, Francesco. 2014. "A Comparative Analysis of Diaspora Policies." *Political Geography* 41, 74–89.

Ramakrishnan, Karthick. 2005. *Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing Demographics and Political Participation*. Stanford University Press: Stanford.

Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2015. "Turkish Citizens Living Abroad."
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa

Rhodes, Sybil, and Arus Harutyunyan. 2010. "Extending Citizenship to Emigrants: Democratic Contestation and a New Global Norm." *International Political Science Review* 31 (4): 470–493.

Rohe, Mathias. 2008. "Islamic Norms in Germany and Europe." In *Islam and Muslims in Germany*, edited by Ala Al-Hamarneh and Jörn Thielman, 49–81. Leiden: Brill.

Rosenow-Williams, Kerstin. 2012. *Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam. New Developments in the 21ˢᵗ Century*. Leiden: Brill.

Sabah. 2012. "Turks stage mega march in Paris." January 21.
http://www.dailysabah.com/world/2012/01/21/turks-stage-mega-march-in-paris

_____. 2016. "Dövizli askerlik ücretini düşüren tasarı kabul edildi." January 14.
http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/01/14/bedelli-ucretini-dusuren-tasari-kabul-edildi

Safran, William. 1997. "Citizenship and nationality in democratic systems: Approaches to defining and acquiring membership in the political community." *International Political Science Review* 18: 313–335.

Sahlins, Peter. 2004. *Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sassen, Saskia. 1996. *Losing control: sovereignty in an age of globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Sayarı, Sabri. 1986. "Migration policies of sending countries: Perspectives on the Turkish experience." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 485, 87–97.

Schain, Martin. 2008. *The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain, and the United States: A Comparative Study*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schiffauer, Werner. 2004. "Die Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs - ein Lehrstück zum verwickelten Zusammenhang von Migration, Religion und sozialer Integration." In *Migrationsreport 2004. Fakten, Analysen, Perspektiven*, edited by Klaus J. Bade, Michael Bommes, and Rainer Münz.

_____. 2010. *Nach dem Islamismus: Die Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş: Eine Ethnografie*. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.

_____. 2014. "The Milli Gorus Community in Germany." In *Islamic Movements of Europe*, edited by Frank Peter and Rafael Ortega. London: I.B. Tauris.

Schmitter Heisler, Barbara. 1985. "Sending Countries and the Politics of Emigration and Destination." *International Migration Review* 19: 469–484.

Schönwalder, Karen. 2013. "Immigrant Representation in Germany's Regional States: The Puzzle of Uneven Dynamics." *West European Politics* 36 (3): 634–651.

Schönwalder, Karen, and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos. 2012. "A Bridge or Barrier to Incorporation? Germany's 1999 Citizenship Reform in Critical Perspective." *German Politics and Society* 30 (1): 52–70.

Schönwalder, Karen, Cihan Sinanoglu, Alex Street, and Daniel Völkert. 2013. "Germany's New Parliament: Tiny Steps Toward Better Immigrant Representation." Political Studies Association Research Paper. https://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/germany%E2%80%99s-new-parliament-tiny-steps-towards-better-immigrant-representation

Schrover, Marlou, and Floris Vermeulen. 2005. "Immigrant Organisations." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31 (5): 823–832.

Schwalbe, Michael L., and Douglas Mason-Shrock. 1996. "Identity Work as Group Process." *Advances in Group Processes* 13: 113–147.

Scott, James. 2000. *Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sezgin, Zeynep. 2008. "Turkish Migrants' Organizations: Promoting Tolerance Toward the Diversity of Turkish Migrants in Germany." *International Journal of Sociology* 38 (2): 78–95.

Shamir, Boas, Robert J. House, and Michael B. Arthur. 1993. "The motivational effects of charismatic leadership: A self-concept based theory." *Organizational Science* 4: 577–594.

Simon, Rita J., and Keri W. Sikich. 2007. "Public Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration Policies across Seven Nations." *International Migration Review* 41 (4): 959–962.

Simpson-Bueker, Catherine. 2005. "Political incorporation among immigrants from ten areas of origin: The persistence of source country effects." *International Migration Review* 39(1): 103–140.

Smith, Robert, C. 2003. "Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State, and the Extra-territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics." *International Migration Review* 37 (3): 297–343.

Snow, David A., and Leon Anderson. 1987. "Identity Work Among the Homeless: The Verbal Construction and Avowal of Personal Identities." *American Journal of Sociology* 92 (6): 1336–1371.

Snow, David A., and Pamela E. Oliver. 1995. "Social Movements and Collective Behavior." In *Sociological Perspectives in Social Psychology*, edited by Karen Cook, Gary Fine, and James House, 571–590. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Snow, David A., and Doug McAdam. 2000. "Identity work processes in the context of social movements: Clarifying the identity/movement nexus." In *Self, identity and social movements*, edited by Sheldon Stryker, Timothy Owens, and Robert W. White, 41–67. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Soysal, Yasemin. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Memberships in Europe*. Chicago: Chicago Press.

Sökefeld, Martin. 2008. *Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in Transnational Space*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Spielhaus, Riem, and Alexa Färber, eds. 2006. *Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Berlin*. Berlin: Der Beauftragte des Senats für Integration und Migration.

Statistisches Bundesamt. 2013. "Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit." https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegratio n/Einbuergerungen2010210137004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

_____. 2014a. "Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit." https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegratio n/Einbuergerungen2010210147004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

_____. 2014b. "Naturalization."
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/MigrationIntegration/N
aturalisations/Tables/NaturalisationsCountryFormerCitizenshipRetainedRetained.html

_____. 2015a. "Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit."
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegratio
n/AuslaendBevoelkerung2010200157004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

_____. 2015b. "Ausländische Bevölkerung."
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegrati
%20n/AuslaendBevoelkerung.html

_____. 2015c. "Einbürgerung von Ausländern in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland von
1981 bis 2015."
http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/159084/umfrage/einbuergerung-von-
auslaendern/

Supreme Electoral Council. 1995. December 1995 Parliamentary Elections (Nationwide).
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Secme
nIslemleri/Secimler/1983-2007-MVSecimleri/Turkiye.pdf

_____. 2002. November 2002 Elections (Nationwide).
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Secme
nIslemleri/Secimler/1983-2007-MVSecimleri/Turkiye.pdf

_____. 2014. August 2014 Presidential Election Results (Nationwide and Overseas).
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Haber
Dosya/2014CB-Kesin-416_d_Genel.pdf

_____. 2015a. June 2015 Parliamentary Election Results (Nationwide and Overseas).
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Secme
nIslemleri/Secimler/2015MV/D.pdf

_____. 2015b. November 2015 Parliamentary Election Results (Nationwide and
Overseas).
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Secme
nIslemleri/Secimler/2015MVES/96-D.pdf

_____. 2015c. June 2015 Parliamentary Election Results (France).
http://secim.haberler.com/7-haziran-2015-secimi/fransa-secim-sonuclari/

_____. 2015d. June 2015 Parliamentary Election Results (Germany).
http://secim.haberler.com/7-haziran-2015-secimi/almanya-secim-sonuclari/

_____. 2015e. November 2015 Parliamentary Election Results (France).
http://secim.haberler.com/2015/fransa-secim-sonuclari/

_____. 2015f. November 2015 Parliamentary Election Results (Germany).
http://secim.haberler.com/2015/almanya-secim-sonuclari/

Süddeutsche Zeitung. 2016. "Zentralrat der Muslime klagt über 'neue Dimension des
Hasses'." January 11.
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/uebergriffe-in-koeln-zentralrat-der-muslime-klagt-
ueber-neue-dimension-des-hasses-1.2812772

Süslü, Ufuk. 2015. "Ermeni yalanına Berlin'den yanıt." April 21.
http://www.igman.tv/ermeni-yalanina-berlinden-yanit/#.V56gmpMrL_R

Şenay, Banu. 2013. *Beyond Turkey's Borders: Long-distance Kemalism, State Politics,
and the Turkish Diaspora*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Taggesspiegel. 2004. "100 Prozent Baumwolle, 0 Prozent Terror." January 19.
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/100-prozent-baumwolle-0-prozent-terror/482804.html

Tajfel, Henri, 1981. *Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology*.
New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, Henri, M. G. Billig, R.P. Bundy, and Claude Flament. 1971. "Social
Categorization and Intergroup Behavior." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 1 (2):
149–178.

Tambar, Kabir. 2014. *The Reckonings of Pluralism: Political Belonging and The
Demands of History in Turkey*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Tambiah, Stanley J. 2000. "Transnational Movements, Diaspora, and Multiple
Modernities." *Daedalus* 129 (1): 163–194.

Taşpınar, Ömer. 2007. "The Old Turks' Revolt: When Radical Secularism Endangers
Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 86 (6).

_____. 2012. "Turkey: The New Model?" Brookings Institute Research Paper. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar

Tepe, Sultan. 2016. "Contesting political theologies of Islam and democracy in Turkey." *Journal of Religious and Political Practice* 2 (2): 175–192.

Thränhardt, Dietrich. 1999. "Germany's Immigration Policies and Politics." In *Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies*, edited by Grete Brochmann and Tomas Hammar, 29–57. Oxford: Berg.

_____. 2000. "Conflict, consensus, and policy outcomes: immigration and integration in Germany and the Netherlands." In *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics*, edited by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, 162–186. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tiberj, Vincent, and Patrick Simon. 2012. "La fabrique du citoyen. Origines et rapport au politique en France." INED Documents de Travail 168. https://www.ined.fr/fr/publications/document-travail/fabrique-citoyen-origines-rapport-politique-france/

Tietze, Nikola. 2008. "Muslims' Collective Self-Description as Reflected in the Institutional Recognition of Islam: The Islamic Charta of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany and Case Law in German Courts." In *Islam and Muslims in Germany*, edited by Ala Al-Hamarneh and Jörn Thielman, 215–239. Leiden: Brill.

Tillie, Jean, and Boris Slijper. 2007. "Immigrant Political Integration and Ethnic Civic Communities in Amsterdam." In *Identities, Allegiances, and Affiliations*, edited by Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro, and Danilo Petravonic, 206–225. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Today's Zaman. 2013. "Turkey works to transform overseas Turks into diaspora." April 30. http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=314090

Tribalat, Michèle. 1995. *Faire France: Une enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants*. Paris: La Découverte.

Tsourapas, Gerasimos. 2015. "Why States Develop Multi-Tier Emigrant Policies? Evidence from Egypt." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (13): 2192–2214.

Tuğal, Cihan. 2013. "Occupy Gezi: The Limits of Turkey's Neoliberal Success." *Jadaliyya*. June 4.
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12009/occupy-gezi_the-limits-of-turkey's-neoliberal-succ

Turam, Berna. 2007. *Between Islam and the State*. California: Stanford University Press.

Unterreiner, Anne. 2015. "Corridor Report on the United Kingdom: The Immigration, Emigration, and Diaspora Policies' Effects on Integration: Chinese and Indian Migrants in the UK." European University Institute INTERACT Report.
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34683/INTERACT-RR-2015%20-%2005.pdf?sequence=1

Unterreiner, Anne, and Agnieszka Weinar. 2014. "The Conceptual Framework of the INTERACT Project." European University Institute INTERACT Report.
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29566/INTERACT-2014%20-%2001.pdf?sequence=1

Ünver, Can. 2013. "Changing Diaspora Politics of Turkey and Public Diplomacy." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 12 (1): 181–189.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Varadarajan, Vatha. 2010. *The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Vertovec, Steven. 1999. "Minority associations, networks and public policies: re-assessing relationships." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25 (1): 21–42.

_____, ed. 2013. "International Migration Review: Special Issue on 'Transnational Migration'" (Guest Editors, Josh De Wind, Peggy Levitt and Steven Vertovec) 37 (3).

Vink, Maarten Peter. 2013. "Immigrant Integration and Access to Citizenship in the European Union: The Role of Origin Countries". INTERACT Research Report 5.
http://interactproject.eu/docs/publications/Research%20Report/INTERACT-RR-2013-02.pdf.

Vogel, Dita, and Vesela Kovacheva. 2014. "Germany." In *European Immigration: A Sourcebook*, edited by Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas, 147–161. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Völker, Gottfried. 1975. "Labor Migration? Aid to the Western Economy." In *Manpower Mobility Across Cultural Boundaries*, edited by Ronald Krane, 7–46. Leiden: Brill.

Washington Times. 2015. "Francois Hollande: 30,000 Syrian refugees 'will be welcomed' in France despite the attacks." November 18. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/18/hollande-30000-syrian-refugees-will-be-welcomed-fr/

Waterbury, Myra. 2010. *Between State and Nation: Diaspora Policies and Kin-State Nationalism in Hungary*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Weber, Max. 1947. *The theory of social and economic organization*. New York: Free Press.

Weil, Patrick. 1995. *La France et ses étrangers. L'aventure d'une politique de l'immigration de 1938 a nos jours*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

_____. 2008. *How To Be French? Nationality in the Making since 1789*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Weil, Patrick, and Alexis Spire. 2006. "France." In *Acquisition and Loss of Nationality*, edited by Rainer Bauböck, Eva Ersbøll, Kees Groenendijk, and Harald Waldruch, 187–212. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Weinar, Agnieszka. 2014. "Emigration Policies in Contemporary Europe." European University Institute CARIM-East Research Report. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31208/CARIM-East%20RR-2014_01.pdf?sequence=1

White, Jenny. 2014. *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine. 1995. "Generational change and political participation in French suburbs." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 21 (1): 69–78.

_____. 2014. "France." In *European Immigration: A Sourcebook*, edited by Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas, 135–147. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Wilpert, Czarina. 2013. "Identity Issues in the History of the Postwar Migration from Turkey to Germany." *German Politics and Society* 31 (2): 108–131.

World Bank. 2011. "Migration and Remittances Factbook." Second Edition. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf

_____. 2015. "GDP Growth (Annual %)." http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG

_____. 2016. "Remittance Inflows to GDP for Turkey," retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDOI11TRA156NWDB.

Xiang, Biao. 2016. "Emigration Trends and Policies in China: Movement of the Wealthy and Highly Skilled." Migration Policy Institute Transatlantic Council on Migration Report. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/emigration-trends-and-policies-china-movement-wealthy-and-highly-skilled

Yalaz, Evren. 2011. "Homeland Politics and the Political Integration of Turkish Groups in Germany and France." Koç University Migration Research Center Proposal. http://mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/sites/mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/files/Evren%20Yalaz.pdf

_____. 2014. "Immigrant Political Incorporation: Institutions, Groups, and Inter-Ethnic Context." Doctoral Dissertation. Rutgers University.

_____. 2015. "Immigrant Political Activism, Political Opportunities, Group Resources, and Inter-Ethnic Context." Harvard Transnational Studies Initiative Working Paper. http://seminars.wcfia.harvard.edu/files/tsi/files/1-yalaz_2015_tsiworkingpaper.pdf

Yavuz, Hakan. 2006. "Introduction." In *The Emergence of a New Turkey*, edited by Hakan Yavuz, 1–23. Utah: University of Utah.

Yılmaz, Kamil. 2009. "The Emergence and Rise of Conservative Elite in Turkey." *Insight Turkey* 11 (2): 113–136.

Yunus Emre Bulletin. 2009. September. http://www.yee.org.tr/tr/bultenler

_____. 2010. November. http://www.yee.org.tr/tr/bultenler

_____. 2011. February. http://www.yee.org.tr/tr/bultenler

Yurdakul, Gökçe. 2009. *From Guest Workers into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.

Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı (YTATB). 2011. Faaliyet Raporu (Activity Report).
https://www.ytb.gov.tr/ytbadmin/assets/uploads/files/2011_Faaliyet_raporu.pdf

_____. 2012. Faaliyet Raporu (Activity Report).
https://www.ytb.gov.tr/ytbadmin/assets/uploads/files/2012-faaliyet-raporu.pdf

_____. 2013. Faaliyet Raporu (Activity Report).
https://www.ytb.gov.tr/ytbadmin/assets/uploads/files/2013_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf

_____. 2014. Faaliyet Raporu (Activity Report).
http://www.ytb.gov.tr/documents/ytb/files/yayinlar/faaliyet_raporlari/2014%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.pdf

_____. 2015. Faaliyet Raporu (Activity Report).
https://www.ytb.gov.tr/ytbadmin/assets/uploads/files/2015%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.pdf

_____. 2015. "Media."
https://www.ytb.gov.tr/medya_kutuphane.php

_____. 2015. Fransa Faaliyet Raporu (France Activity Report).
https://ytb.gov.tr/ytbadmin/assets/uploads/files/FRANSA.pdf

_____. 2015. Almanya Faaliyet Raporu (Germany Activity Report).
https://ytb.gov.tr/ytbadmin/assets/uploads/files/ALMANYA.pdf

Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı (YTATB) *Artı 90* Magazine. 2012. January. No 1.
 https://issuu.com/ytat/docs/arti90dergisi-ocak-2012

_____. 2015. October-November-December Issue. No. 12.
https://www.ytb.gov.tr/ytbadmin/assets/uploads/files/%2B90.pdf

Yükleyen, Ahmet. 2012. *Localizing Islam in Europe*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Yükleyen, Ahmet, and Gökçe Yurdakul. 2009. "Islam, Conflict, and Integration: Turkish Religious Associations in Germany." *Turkish Studies* 11 (1): 217–231.

Zapata-Barrero, Ricard, Lorenzo Gabrielli, Elena Sánchez-Montijano, and Thibaut Jaulin. 2013. "The political participation of immigrants in host states: An interpretative framework from the perspective of origin countries and societies." European University Institute INTERACT Report. http://interact-project.eu/docs/publications/Research%20Report/INTERACT-RR-2013-07.pdf

Zırh, Besim Can. 2008. "Euro-Alevis: From *Gastarbeiter* to Transnational Community." In *The Making of World Society: Perspectives from Transnational Research*, edited by Remus Gabriel Anghel, Eva Gerharz, Gilberto Rescher, and Monika Salzbrunn, 103–133. London: Transaction.

Zürcher, Erik Jan. 2004. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris.