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**The Dissertation Committee for Sarah Helen Davies Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:**

**Rome, International Power Relations, and 146 BCE**

**Committee:**

---

Karl Galinsky, Supervisor

---

Adam T. Rabinowitz

---

Jennifer Gates-Foster

---

Steven J. Friesen

---

Arthur M. Eckstein

---

M. Gwyn Morgan

**Rome, International Power Relations, and 146 BCE**

**by**

**Sarah Helen Davies, B.A., M.A.**

**Dissertation**

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy**

**The University of Texas at Austin**

**August 2012**

# **Rome, International Power Relations, and 146 BCE**

Sarah Helen Davies, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2012

Supervisor: Karl Galinsky

Within a single year – 146 BCE – Roman generals had entered the cities of Carthage and Corinth and forever changed the course of Mediterranean history. Although involved in separate conflicts with Rome, these cities and their tragedies became uniquely linked, not only to each other, but also to a perceived trajectory of Rome as an imperial power. Subsequent generations have looked to 146 BCE as an important turning point, and in doing so have attached value-laden interpretations to it as a gauge on Roman imperialism.

This dissertation looks at 146 BCE from a different angle, seeking to understand its significance in terms of its contemporary international context, asking how it first became viewed as a turning point. The analysis utilizes international relations theory of normative systems, focusing on collective perceptions and evolving political conceptions within an interstate cultural environment. Exploring contemporary texts and archaeological clues, it sees the second-century BCE as a period in which the Mediterranean was becoming increasingly globalized, drawn together by universalizing ideals. A framework of “Hellenistic” markers communicated networks of legitimacy, Rome being both participant and game-changer. At the same time, the international

community was rife with disjunctions, which contributed to a disintegration of relations in North Africa, followed by re-eruptions of nationalistic fervor on the Greek mainland. When coupled with wider perceptions, that the *oikoumenē* was becoming progressively interconnected and was moving toward a new juncture in world-history, the stage was set. The legal punishments to be inflicted by the Roman victor were to be viewed on a whole new plane, as reflections of a groundbreaking world-order.

Romans were aware of these implications, made evident in the decisions of Scipio at Carthage, followed by Mummius at Corinth. In a rare and stunning move, both cities were decommissioned as political entities, and their tragedies linked to contemporary visions of cyclical world-history: Carthage burned in reiteration of Troy, and Corinth stripped of cultural Greek heritage. Polybius, uniquely positioned as a commentator on these outcomes, not only captured their ideological ripple effects, but also assured their direction over future generations, as a moment to color Rome as world hegemon.

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## Chapter 1: *Introduction*

*'History' is the name we as human beings give to the horizon of consciousness within which we live.*  
-- Harvey Cox

*And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens, according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time.*  
-- Anaximander (ca. 550 BCE)

### **146 BCE**

This study is ultimately about beginnings and endings, tragedy and triumph, international power, and the construction of history. The story may seem to begin with two parallel acts of annihilation – the destruction of two great cities on opposite shores of the Mediterranean – but in all actuality, it involves many stories underlying the surface currents of historical tradition. Such tradition has, since ancient times, attached special significance to the date of 146 BCE – that is, to the collocated destructions of Carthage and Corinth – by making it a point at which (whether directly or indirectly) to assess Rome as an international, imperialist power. Over the millennia, 146 has thus evolved as a meaning-laden horizon of consciousness, both taken for granted as a moment for demarcating Roman imperialism, and at the same time serving as a mirror held up to the viewers' own perspectives on international politics, on the possibilities and pitfalls, justices and injustices of world order.

Consult almost any modern textbook on the history of ancient Rome, and 146 BCE will be represented as the culmination of mid-Republican imperial expansion.

Modern scholarship surrounding the subject has thus tended to focus on either an analysis of Roman strategic and political motivations for going to war with Carthage in 149 (and to a much lesser extent, with Corinth in 147/6), or on *post eventum* rhetoric and Roman propaganda of imperial justification.<sup>1</sup> As an accepted turning point, then, 146 has often functioned as a transition into discussions of Roman imperialism, the late Republic and new, *internal* challenges experienced by the Roman state.<sup>2</sup>

In this light, modern tradition has continued in a direction first indicated by the ancients themselves. Perhaps most famously among the generations of later ancient authors, Sallust noted that the destructions of Carthage and Corinth, and the elimination of all serious foreign enemies that this moment entailed, signaled the beginning of a decline for the Roman Republic, for “all seas and lands were open, then Fortune began to grow cruel and bring confusion into all our affairs.”<sup>3</sup> In Sallust’s estimation, the absence of serious foreign challenges meant that fear of the enemy (*metus hostilis*) no longer held together Rome’s citizenry in the practice of virtue.<sup>4</sup> Instead, avarice and ambition spread like a plague, splitting the fabric of Roman society into factions, as leisure and wealth took a hold over a once rigorous and just people.<sup>5</sup> Though this “Sallust’s Theorem” may be highly rhetorical, its standards for judgment are revealing, for it assumes that 146 BCE was a crucial moment in which Rome finalized a ‘world’ dominion over all seas and

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<sup>1</sup> See further discussion below – pp. 15ff.

<sup>2</sup> A selection of modern examples illustrating the broad-based assumption of 146 BCE as an historical marker (though with different emphases): Scullard (1980); Badian et al. (1996); Bringmann (2007: 107ff.); Flower (2009: 70-71); Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein (2010: 634); Spielvogel (2010: 93); Woolf (2012: 97-8).

<sup>3</sup> Sall. *Cat.* 10. See discussions in Conley (1981); Wood (1995); and Kapust (2008).

<sup>4</sup> Sall. *Jug.* 41.

<sup>5</sup> Sall. *Cat.* 10-11.

lands. It also assumes that such achievement marked a moral juncture, a beginning of an end for Rome.<sup>6</sup> A generation later, such thinking would be put to work in the ideology of a Republic reborn, crafted under the guidance of Augustus as a renewed and glorious pan-Mediterranean empire – one in which Carthage and Corinth were also to be granted new life as Roman *coloniae*.<sup>7</sup>

However, there is much more going on here, more than the reflections and justifications of *post eventum* rhetoricizing, later taken up by modern thinking. The argument to be presented here is that such *post eventum* traditions, in perceiving 146 as an historical turning point with implications for Rome's status as world power, actually have their roots in the second century BCE. The study thus looks at the contexts and processes by which two otherwise disparate tragedies were, at the time that they occurred, pulled together and shaped into a singular phenomenon – a conceptual marker still in existence today. For in all reality, the pairing between Carthage and Corinth is not an immediately logical one. Carthage, on the one hand, resisted Roman forces to the very end, standing up to a three-year siege; the city had fought two previous, long and momentous wars with Rome; and in the end – as we can tell from current archaeological evidence – suffered severe physical damage.<sup>8</sup> Corinth, on the other hand, was not besieged at all – it was almost immediately captured with no resistance from within the city itself; the city, and the Achaian League of which it was a part, had enjoyed a history

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<sup>6</sup> E.g. Lintott (1972); Levick (1982).

<sup>7</sup> On the re-foundation of Carthage, see Humphrey (1978); Lancel et al. (1980); Wightman (1980); LeGlay (1985); Rives (1990); on Corinth, see Engels (1990: 16ff.); Spawforth (1996); Romano (2003). On Augustus and his ideology of Rome reborn in general, see Syme (1939/2002: 509ff.); Galinsky (1996; 2012); Zanker (1998); Everitt (2006).

<sup>8</sup> For more on the archaeological evidence at Carthage, see below – pp. 318ff.

of relatively amicable dealings with Rome until only the previous year, posing no real serious military threat to Rome; and in 146 – as we can tell from archaeological evidence – Corinth was left virtually untouched, its trauma inflicted in symbolic political and cultural terms.<sup>9</sup> Much more energy, then, must be taken in order to find parallels, and these parallels are tenuous at best: both cities were maritime trading centers, and the two together represented the eastern and western geographic halves of the Mediterranean. In addition, both cities were converted in 146 into *ager publicus* (Roman public lands), and both came to be associated and compared with the fall of Troy.<sup>10</sup> But these last parallels only bring a return to the original question: why, and how, were the captures of Carthage and Corinth in particular (rather than the violent destructions of other cities) connected so closely and granted such importance, as a Roman event of such world-historical, Trojan-war level meaning?

It may perhaps seem that the answer lies in mere historical accident, combined with Roman self-aggrandizement: the fall of Corinth was appended to the tragic drama of Carthage, Rome's great enemy, simply because it occurred in the same campaign year. But a closer look at the evidence suggests something more. The timing may (or may not) have been out of human control – but the conceptual framing and the lasting ideological impressions were not. The present study looks to the second century itself as the source, and argues that the “destructions” of Carthage and Corinth became something extraordinary because they were part of wider changes – political and ideational – taking

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<sup>9</sup> For discussion of the archaeological evidence at Corinth, see below – pp. 316ff.

<sup>10</sup> See below – p. 321 and pp. 336ff.

place at the time. For as we will see, intellectuals and statesmen of the second century were increasingly thinking about their own political and cultural interactions in terms of a progressively cohesive international community, an *oikoumenē*. And in doing so, they saw themselves as part of an historical advancement, moving toward the achievement of a civilized, pan-Hellenic world system, linked via ties of myth-historic kinship and personal/political friendship, and looking to Rome as a potential governor. Such ideas and ideologies involved complex interactions, however, in what Richard White has dubbed a “middle ground” – that is, a negotiated zone of contact (conceptual and/or spatial) formed out of the need and desire to communicate across different cultures and political systems.<sup>11</sup> In some ways, this space – here, existing on an internationally conceived level – can serve to achieve mutual benefits and/or shared goals, but more frequently, and with more creative fission, it results in misapprehension, conflicting agendas, and manipulated translation.

Using literary and epigraphic evidence in particular, this study makes the case that during the second century – the context for 146 – a Mediterranean-wide, Hellenistic, and international-level middle ground was in rapid development, and intellectuals at the time were well aware of the increasingly “globalizing” networks and interrelationships around them. At the same time, power structures and political constructs were in flux, and the interchange between concepts like *polis* and *res publica*, which were mismatched, yet still taken as parallels, led to disjunctions and miscommunication, and eventually (by the

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<sup>11</sup> White (2010) – esp. the preface, which summarizes subsequent uses and critiques of this term, and White’s thoughts on its legacy.

end of the first century BCE), to a re-write of Rome as the *polis* of (world-)empire. Many Greek-speaking intellectuals in the second century were thus striving to understand and interpret Rome's *politeia*, to categorize Rome as a foreign and yet civilized, pan-Hellenic power, as a "mixed" city-state and yet monarchic (or possibly tyrannical) actor abroad.

And at the same time, Romans were also redefining political concepts in this international middle ground, shifting the configurations of third-party diplomacy in accordance with their own beliefs regarding Roman divine/ritual law. Over time, they were also adding increasingly abstract and spatial meaning to the once specific terms of *imperium* and *provincia*, which were gradually evolving from the connotations of "command" and "task/mission," toward "empire" and "province." Evidence suggests that the pieces were there in the second century – in 146 BCE itself, Rome added the territories of Carthage and Corinth to the public lands of the city (as *ager publicus*), and thereby extended Rome's direct possessions beyond Italy and Sicily. In the meantime, an array of contemporary literature suggests that international circles were reacting to and debating over notions that Rome was the latest world empire/Hellenistic kingdom, and their assessments range from eager adulation to somber cynicism and hostile apocalypticism.

The process of pulling these pieces of evidence together requires a theoretical approach – a thread and shape on which to hang them. It is here that the current study turns to modern international relations (IR) theory. Such theory, however, has a multitude of iterations – the Appendix provides an overview of these. The form of IR theory that is espoused here is essentially normative constructivist, with an interest in both "norms" –

that is, patterns of expected and accepted behaviors – and “structuration” – that is, the ideational aspects of envisioning, creating, and legitimizing power structures (on an international level). Such an approach thus allows us to first assemble a general picture of the international community of the second century – the community in which, as will be argued here, 146 was first construed as a significant juncture.

Having reconstructed this international context, we will then use the normative constructivist approach to investigate second-century processes of constructing international-level history. For ultimately, contemporaries of the destructions of Carthage and Corinth took otherwise disparate events and interpreted them on a greater, international and interconnected plane. And as we will see, they did so in accordance with the historiographical and political trends of the time, perceiving world history – predominately a pan-Hellenic one, beginning with the fall of Troy – as running in cycles within a greater series of the rise-and-fall of great kingdoms. This pan-Hellenic history was further shaped and demarcated by key moments of synchronicity (e.g. Himera and the Battle of Salamis, at opposite corners of the Mediterranean). An entire “science” of “synchronography” became popular during the Hellenistic period, and historians focused on identifying and attributing meaning to temporal, political, and even symbolic parallels in people and events – parallels that gave shape to otherwise incomprehensible schemes of Fate. Rome was already being considered the latest in the series of world empires, and students of political philosophy (e.g. Carneades, Panaetius and Agartharcides) were already debating the ethical status of Rome within this position – as bringing a just order

for the benefit of the ruled (*hegemonia*) or bringing a hypocritical order for the benefit of the ruler alone, to the detriment of the ruled (*despoteia*).

146 was fitted into all of these second-century norms, becoming not only a juncture that could be used to assess Rome as a world power, but also one that could mark a synchronism, a tragic marker to suggest the end of one cycle and beginning of the next. And this is where Polybius comes in – as the most influential (but not only) architect of 146's place in historical tradition (especially for moderns).

### **POLYBIUS & 146 BCE**

As an Achaian statesman, Polybius was witness to and participant in the post-146 restructuring of Greece, and he maintained close ties with leading Romans, including Scipio Aemilianus, whom he accompanied during the siege and burning of Carthage. Modern scholarship, while profiting greatly from Polybius' eyewitness perspective, has long recognized the problems of depending so heavily on one interpretative account, inevitably colored by particular personal, political, and cultural biases.<sup>12</sup> This study takes a slightly different turn, at once using Polybius as key evidence of the process by which 146 was constructed as an historical turning point in the second century – in this case, by one individual in particular – and at the same time, contextualizing his account within an international, political and cultural environment. And – as discussed above – it does so

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<sup>12</sup> On source issues and Polybius, cf. Astin (1967: 3; 1989: 3-11); Baronowski (1995); Eckstein (1995: 18-20); Walbank (2002, esp. Ch. 1). On Polybius standing between Greek and Roman perspectives, see Derow (1979); Richardson (1979); Walbank (2002: Ch. 8).

via IR theory, a perspective on international systems and a *longue durée* of history that is analogous to that of Polybius and his second century contemporaries.

It is important to note here that Polybius actually tells his reader his main aim in writing the *Histories*, and elsewhere gives strong hints regarding subsidiary themes fitted within the overall scheme. The goal is to present a *pragmatikē historia* – a history that is utilitarian in the sense that it is intended to function as a guidebook and manual for current and future statesmen.<sup>13</sup> Polybius affirms his strong belief that the events he has been fortunate enough to witness during his lifetime – and to which he can even often claim a “primary source” status – provide the ultimate occasion for developing such a manual.<sup>14</sup> For during his lifetime, Polybius states that the world has experienced something like never before – the rise of a great *archē*, within the rapid span of only fifty-three years. This *archē* has gathered the *oikoumenē* in a newly interconnected manner, in a *symplokē* weaving together like never before the politics of Africa and Asia, Italy, Macedon and Greece.<sup>15</sup> These groundbreaking developments, in Polybius’ estimation, grant him the opportunity to explore exactly *how* great world powers come into being, and to offer instructive examples of both good and bad behavior, to clarify how lesser powers are to deal with such a rising star.

Throughout, the focus is thus on the ethics of leading statesmen, politicians and diplomats of states both great and small – who through unmanaged passions, self-serving naiveté, or moral weakness may catapult their states into decline or disaster, or via their

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<sup>13</sup> See Polyb. 9.2, and below – pp. 127ff.

<sup>14</sup> See Polyb. 1.1-2.

<sup>15</sup> See *idem*, and below – pp. 69, 124ff.

virtue, discipline, and honor may bring it to health, resilience, dignity in defeat, and glory in victory.<sup>16</sup> The weight carried upon the shoulders of these leaders, according to Polybius, is thus a heavy one, for their actions have implications not only for their own hometowns, but also – and in his lifetime even more apparently so – for the grander schemes of world history. For while Polybius does not agree with his contemporaries regarding the value of myth-historic tales and regional, dramaturgic traditions, he does believe in an interconnected, synchronistic world/pan-Hellenic history, and he views this history as cyclical, with the hand of Tyche/Fortuna at key moments turning the wheel.

He also utilizes Aristotelian concepts to explore the growth and decay (*anacyclosis*) of *politeiai*, arguing that the best “constitutions” are those that are mixed/balanced, like the *politeia* of Rome (perceived in an Hellenic frame).<sup>17</sup> Yet no *politeia* is wholly immune from the ravages of time, growth and decay, and these lifespans of all states fit together in the overall cycles of international history. Rome’s meteoric rise to power, then, is first explained as the product of her strong *politeia*, combined with the severe lack of moral fortitude and virtue among Polybius’ fellow Greeks (and leading statesmen in particular). For these reasons, 146 – already in the eyes of others a moment of dramatic synchronism and world-historical significance – was for Polybius, who was a direct participant and witness in its events – something even greater.

When Carthage and Corinth were each captured, Polybius was in the midst of writing the *Histories*, and he makes an immediate turn in his plan for its scope, extending

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<sup>16</sup> See Eckstein (1995).

<sup>17</sup> See discussion below – pp. 155ff.

its span from 167 BCE to 146 as a new endpoint. It is an extension that, as Polybius states, was intended as an instructive assessment of the consequences of a meteoric rise to world *archē*.<sup>18</sup> The period following Rome's defeat of Macedon in 167 – a defeat that heralded Rome's succession in the lineage of great kingdoms – was one loosely characterized by Polybius as one of unrest and disturbance (*tarachē kai kinesis*), in which it is implied that not only the moral fibers of the ruled, but also those of the rulers, were coming unraveled. The events of 146 thus mark a tragedy of all tragedies, and at the same time leave open a number of possibilities for the future. Two cities are undone, and a third stands at a new international juncture. Carthage, by virtue of internal decay and naiveté regarding how Romans approach international law (*deditio* in particular), has fallen, like Troy, in flames, after heroic resistance. Corinth, by contrast, has suffered an even greater (in Polybius' eyes) ruin: having submitted shamefully to demagoguery, the Greeks are left to look at the ruins of their own making. And for Rome, there is an open question: has the international powerhouse become a *hegemon* or a *despotēs*? Is 146 the beginning of a new beginning, or the beginning of an end? These questions – never directly stated outright, but implied via the subtext of second century political philosophy – were to haunt generations to come, Romans (and moderns!) included.

#### **FROM MODERN IR TO ANCIENT HISTORY: OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS**

The current study therefore represents a reappraisal of 146 BCE, from a different set of angles, not only from the testimony of Polybius but also from his normative

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<sup>18</sup> See below – pp. 170ff.

international context, as recoverable via a constructivist IR approach. In order to understand the actions and rhetoric of the second century BCE, and to distinguish contemporary from later contexts, this study thus begins by tackling current modes of thinking regarding foreign policy and international relations (chapter 2). Three axes in the modern debates are analyzed in this light: (1) primitivism (ancient politics as utterly unlike modern) versus modernism (ancient politics analogous to modern); (2) internal-cultural explanations as opposed to external (that is international) and structural; and (3) Roman imperialism as defensive as opposed to offensive in nature. The recent work by Arthur Eckstein, who has re-opened the debate across these axes in light of modern IR theory (specifically, structural Realism), is assessed, with the conclusion that a normative constructivist approach will be preferred here.

From this conclusion, the notion of 146 BCE as a historical turning point can be addressed by assessing the significance of events (and their presentation) at the time, tracing how contemporary judgments and perceptions evolved alongside developments in Roman *imperium* itself. Chapter 3 begins this process by exploring second-century BCE *Zeitgeist*, arguing not only that an interstate community existed, but also that it was self-aware, with a developing rhetoric of pan- and phil-Hellenism and cosmopolitanism, which in turn was building a globalized environment via networks of *syngeneia* and myth-historic kinship, all tied to notions of a *oikoumenē*-wide history. Chapter 4 then looks more closely at the political and legal frameworks within this international system, analyzing linguistic-semantic disjunctions and newly evolving meanings (e.g. *polis* vs. *res publica*, *provincia* vs. *eparcheia*). It introduces Polybius as an individual standing in a

complex middle ground, and it discusses his particular agenda in writing a *pragmatikē historia* with Rome put forward as a unique new world power. Polybius' analysis of Rome's *politeia* in this light thus raises a number of issues, among them his Greco-centric approach and Greek-speaking audience, which could only frame Rome in Hellenic, *polis* terms, but which was confronting experiences with Roman "peculiarities" in the definitions of sovereignty, just warfare, and territorial/treaty arrangements. The disjunctions between Hellenic and Roman frames for these last subjects are analyzed in further depth, for they have direct implications for the outlining of terms in the treaty of Zama between Rome and Carthage in 201 BCE.

The 201 treaty and its terms are in turn of lasting significance, not only for the concomitant parallels and disjunctions between Hellenic and Roman political thought that they reveal, but also, and even more importantly, for the post-war conditions that they establish in North Africa – conditions which ultimately led to conflict between Rome and Carthage in 149. Chapter 5 thus looks in depth at the terms of the 201 treaty, read within their international normative context to determine what each signified, and in terms of conditions in Carthage and North Africa, as reconstructed from archaeological evidence and modern ethnographic comparanda. Taken together, these pieces help clarify the series of territorial disputes that plagued the region in the decades following 201. These disputes are analyzed in this study as emblematic of the cultural misapprehensions taking place in the international arena of the second century – for while Romans and Greek-speakers approached territorial disputes in both analogous and divergent ways, both of these differed from local North African traditions. It was a recipe for disaster that ended

in a mid-century diplomatic crisis and outbreak of war between Rome and Carthage, a crisis for which Polybius again is an important, though complex, source of evidence.

Chapter 6 uses Polybius – and a key passage in which he discusses Greek responses to the Third Punic War – as a means for marking the interconnections between events surrounding Carthage and the greater international, ideological sphere. The chapter thus transitions from North Africa to the Greek world, discussing the revolt of Pseudo-Philip in Macedon and the subsequent outbreak of war with the Achaian League, again not only in terms of their contemporary diplomatic contexts, but also in terms of Polybius’ interpretations and assessments thereof. This brings us to a comparison of the “destructions” wrought upon Carthage and Corinth, and to the great differences that the archaeological evidence reveals between them. This then leads to an analysis of how exactly these two ostensibly disparate events became so closely paired: through a historiographical tradition of pan-Hellenic calamities, of synchronography and the cycles of world empires, and in light of contemporary debates regarding Rome as either *hegemon* or *despotēs*. The enigmatic question raised by Polybius is presented in this context, with the scene of Scipio watching Carthage burn calling forth visions of the fall of Troy, and raising the possibility that Rome as a pan-Hellenic power stands at a new threshold. It is a possibility taken up by subsequent ancient traditions, which are briefly reviewed as the substance of today’s status of 146 as an historical turning point.

And this brings us full-circle, to the need to briefly review previous scholarship surrounding 146 BCE. In the following section, therefore, we summarize this scholarship

- in particular, the debates surrounding the outbreak of war between Rome and Carthage
- as a means of contextualizing the problems and the starting point for the present study.

### **PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP: SUMMARY OF THE DEBATES**

In seeking to reconstruct an account of what happened leading up to 146, modern historians are hampered by the fragmentary nature of books 35-39 in Polybius' *Histories*, which recount events of the period in question. To fill in the substantial gaps, scholars have looked to later writers, such as Livy – though the original text of books 47-52 survives only faintly in later epitomes – as well as Appian, Diodoros, Plutarch, and Pausanias.<sup>19</sup> Each of these authors, writing in different contexts and with different agendas, recombined a certain degree of Polybian material with other available sources within new interpretative frameworks. And each of these constituted yet another evaluation of Rome as victor and as a hegemonic power.

This last issue – of Rome and attendant notions of empire – has perhaps remained the knottiest for modern scholars. For modern conceptions of empire, sovereignty, and diplomacy have themselves affected the reconstruction of source material, and in turn, the way in which the rise of Rome and her conduct in war have been assessed. And in a problematic circularity of analysis, the many centuries of Roman and Greek self-presentation, when blurred into a monolithic model of imperializing behavior and its response, have simply re-asserted many of the assumptions used to analyze them.<sup>20</sup> 146

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<sup>19</sup> Excellent summary of such a process, with references, in Astin (1967: Appendix III).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Marincola (1997); Inglis and Robertson (2006). For a parallel discussion regarding Roman rhetoric, see Connolly (2007: Introduction).

BCE is thus approached with preconceived certainty of its place in the history of Rome as an empire without deeper questioning as to how and why this moment came to contain such moralizing, ethical, and political meaning for both ancients and moderns alike. The problem also begs the question of defining the nature of power, especially imperial or international, in one of its various forms – that is, Rome in the second century BCE – and to understand this form within a trajectory of change.

Modern historians writing about 146 BCE have taken a number of different routes, but each has been governed by underlying judgments regarding Rome as an already established, imperialist power. The year is assumed as a decisive, even culminating, point in an onward march of Roman domination, whether defensive or acquisitive in its initial intent, ultimately aggressive and grasping in its expression. Even in a recent and innovative re-structuring of Republican history, 146 BCE has been interpreted as marking Rome’s “strikingly harsh and imperialistic new foreign policy” in which Carthage and Corinth “were completely razed to the ground,” though “neither posed a credible threat.”<sup>21</sup> On this basis – the so-called *nova sapientia* argument – the tradition of 146 BCE as a historical marker has been broadly espoused, if only because it signals a recognizable crossover from Roman policing of the Mediterranean to forcible imposition of authority. As a result, the vast majority of studies have ultimately focused on the lead-up to war with Carthage, beginning in 149 BCE.

War with the Achaian League and the destruction of Corinth have become secondary subjects, afterthoughts to the major crux that involved Rome’s decision to take

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<sup>21</sup> Flower (2009: 70-71)

up arms against Carthage. And when considered together, the two destructions have been painted with broad strokes, in a manner similar to centuries of ancient authors. Though *post eventum* rhetorical embellishments are to be expected and have been identified, questions as to their origins and significance in the second century and their growth into a historical tradition have largely been passed over.<sup>22</sup> This gap is in part the result of problems with the literary source material, but is more deeply the result of the frame of reference employed, for scholars have certainly not shied away from assembling the jigsaw pieces of Polybius, the epitomes of Livy, and passages from Appian and Zonaras.<sup>23</sup>

The debates regarding 146 BCE have thus been founded upon three basic yet interrelated assumptions: (1) that Rome was imperial; (2) that this statement itself does not require further definition or exploration in this particular context; and (3) that Roman motives can be deduced through the modern logic and rationale of foreign policy. Scholars have thus looked to understand the causes of the Third Punic War as a means for judging Rome as a ruling power, and in preference over the subject of the Achaian War, deemed less significant because it was fought against a minor international state (at least in modern formulation). The causes thus determined fall into four broad categories. The first of these, with a scholarly tradition dating back to Mommsen, is essentially economic, for it emphasizes Carthage's rising position of prosperity and edge as an international

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<sup>22</sup> Purcell (1995) provides an excellent analysis of 146 BCE in Roman political rhetoric, but leaves open the matter of its chronological development.

<sup>23</sup> A good summary, still timely, of these reconstructions can be found in Astin (1967: 270ff.), with references.

trading power, rather than as a military threat.<sup>24</sup> In this formulation, Rome sought proactively to eliminate a challenge to her trade interests, access to resources, and prestige as a Mediterranean center of exchange.

The second category of causal analysis, in some ways growing out of the economic tradition and inspired by the writings of Plutarch and Appian, focuses on Roman fears of Carthage, either rationally or irrationally conceived.<sup>25</sup> The hypothesis combines economically-based fears with military and political considerations, to posit Carthage as the eternal challenger to Rome and thorn in the side of Rome's growing empire. The third category goes another step further and conceives of Roman fears as contextualized by the political situation in neighboring Numidia, with that kingdom on the rise, engaged in continued hostility with Carthage, and governed by an extremely aged king with three designated heirs.<sup>26</sup>

And the final, most recent category, which often offers some recombination of the economic and fear hypotheses, emphasizes the beginning of the Third Punic War as part of a now standard Roman foreign policy. Whether consciously or intuitively mapped out, such policy is considered integral to an overall trend in Roman behavior, towards more direct domination of the Mediterranean world. Scholars diverge over where they see this

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<sup>24</sup> Mommsen (1913: 239); Rostovtzeff (1926: 12, 21); and to some degree, Romanelli (1959: 31f., esp. p. 34); De Sanctis (IV.3.20-24); and Baronowski (1995: 28-29). More recently, and from an archaeological standpoint: Rakob (1984: 10; 1985: 502f.).

<sup>25</sup> With different emphases: Frank (1914: 233f.); Schur (1930: 2163); Gelzer (1931); Adcock (1948: 125); Walsh (1965: 160); Astin (1967: 276; 1978: 284); Cary & Scullard (1975: 148); Albert (1980: 52); Rakob (1984: 10; 1985: 502f.); Huss (1985: 439); Bellen (1985: 32f.); Vogel-Weideman (1989: 79f.); Welwei (1989: 317); Morgan (1990: 41-42, 44); Baronowski (1995: 24-27); Rich (1995/2004: 61-62). For the ancient sources that have inspired the 'fear of Carthage' hypothesis, see Plut. *Cato Mai.* 26.2-3; App. *Lib.* 69.

<sup>26</sup> Again, with different emphases: Kahrstedt (III.615f.); Scullard (1951: 304); Maróti (1983: 224); Huss (1985: 437); Gsell (III. 329f.); Vogel-Weideman (1989: 85).

trend developing. Some identify a decisive change occurring in the wake of the Third Macedonian War and the victory at Pydna.<sup>27</sup> Others observe no substantial change, and consider Rome's behavior at this juncture as quintessentially Roman, and quite typical of her interactions with others, from the beginning of the Republic onward.<sup>28</sup> No matter the emphasis – economic, fear, or domineering foreign policy – scholars across the offensive-defensive divide in the Roman imperialism debate have thus converged on the subject of 146 BCE, almost imperceptibly agreeing that no matter what, at this moment, the Romans truly showed themselves to have been heavy-handed, aggressive, and devious in their international relations.

The end-result of this scholarly discussion is at once satisfying and unsatisfying. It is satisfying in its passing of judgment on a long-past empire, and its conclusions that Roman behavior in this instance remains a cruel lesson in empire-building. But the conclusions are also unsatisfying, because they come no closer to understanding how (not why) Romans came to this point, or to questioning the nature of international power in the second century BCE, how it was defined, how it was changing and challenged, and where Rome and Rome's actions in 146 fitted within these schemes. Ultimately, the process of chasing after causes (in fact inspired by Polybius),<sup>29</sup> and for one war out of two, has produced some illuminating discussions, but has hit a dead end. For it has

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<sup>27</sup> Cf. Heuss (1933: 116-123); Bilz (1935: 30-31); Adcock (1948: 128); Badian (1958: 96, 113-115); De Sanctis (IV.3.20ff.); Hoffmann (1960: 330f.); Walsh (1965: 158-159); Walbank (1965: 2-3, 11); Kienast (1979: 125f.); Maróti (1983: 226f.).

<sup>28</sup> E.g. Harris (1979: 234-246); Bellen (1985: 7f.); Welwei (1989: 320); Baronowski (1995: 30-31).

<sup>29</sup> The tantalizing passage in Polybius is 36.9, where he itemizes the various responses to the Third Punic War among the Greek-speaking communities of the Mediterranean. It remains a cornerstone in modern scholarship of 146 BCE, and will be discussed below – see pp. 286ff.

become all too clear that, as in all wars, a multitude of causal relationships can be identified on both sides, and with no singular or primary explanation. A new frame of reference is thus needed, one that will place the political events surrounding both destructions in their wider, so-called systemic, contexts, and will explore the nature of international power-relations, ideologies, and intellectual *Zeitgeist* at the time, in its historiographical construction of 146 BCE. The next chapter will work to establish the first part of this frame, within the grounds of modern IR theory.

## Chapter 2: *Rome, History, & International Relations Theory*

### INTRODUCTION

The present chapter represents a theoretical exploration of some of the wider issues at hand in tackling a subject with as many layers as 146 BCE. It takes the relationships between modern theoretical interpretation and ancient history as its subject – relationships which from the very beginning pose problems, simply by virtue of setting up two separate and distinct “worlds” (Ancient versus Modern).<sup>30</sup> And the ancient-modern divide is only the first in a series of conceptual dichotomies that have restricted scholarship regarding 146, via assumptions regarding the nature of ancient political interactions in general, and Roman imperialism in particular. As was reviewed in chapter 1, such modern scholarship surrounding 146 BCE has not only been dominated by Romano-centric perspectives, but it has also tended to devolve into debates regarding Roman imperial motivations in going to war and/or subsequently holding up 146 as a rhetorical justification for empire.

This study will discover, however, that such correlations – between 146 as a singular “moment” to be connected with Rome’s position as world power, and assessments thereof – are in essence an inheritance from ancient intellectual traditions, from the second century itself. To reach this point – and to understand exactly *how* such traditions developed, and in what contexts – a theoretical path must be laid out. Here first,

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<sup>30</sup> This is a division that resulted in what Nietzsche called the “untimeliness” of classical studies: “*For I do not know what meaning classical studies would have in our time if not that of working in their untimeliness – that is to say, against our time and thereby on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come.*” Nietzsche, *On the uses and disadvantages of history for life* [1874], as translated and discussed by Morley (2009: 1, and Ch. 1).

then, the relationship, and yet separation, between modern approach (to Rome and empire) and ancient subject (Rome and second-century conceptions of empire) is of fundamental importance. And it is of importance not only for mapping out the assumptions and models of previous scholarship, but also for framing this study's perspective on the study of second century international politics and political thought.

There are three key axes that are involved in modern theoretical debates surrounding ancient politics and Roman imperialism, and they can be arranged (and will be problematized in this chapter) according to the traditional dichotomies: (1) primitivism versus modernism; (2) internal-cultural features versus external-structural ones; and (3) defensivist versus offensivist readings of Rome as an imperial power. In the past few years, Arthur Eckstein has re-opened the debates along these axes, by explicitly reconnecting the disciplines of political science – specifically, international relations (or IR) theory – and classical studies. In two recent publications, Eckstein has taken major steps forward in this much-needed area of research.<sup>31</sup> In the political-theory division between levels of political interaction: individual (or first-level), state (or second-level), and interstate (or third-level), Eckstein has switched the focus of ancient historians from first- and second-level factors to the third, international level and its structures of physical capability – that is, its distributions of material, quantitative power.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. Eckstein (2006; 2008). Eckstein's work has since become a key reference point in general historical surveys on Rome and the Hellenistic world, including Woolf (2012) and Rosenstein (2012).

<sup>32</sup> For more on structural realism, see the Appendix. Structural realists use the term "capability distribution" to talk about the balances and imbalances of power between states in the international arena. In doing so, they focus primarily on power as "physical capability" – that is, in a form that can be measured quantitatively (e.g. access to resources, manpower, military technology, etc.). As such, they view

The current study represents an effort to build from this research, and to pose additional challenges and questions in the investigation of international relations, processes of cultural and political change, and the construction of histories. In order to do so, this chapter in particular will prepare the way, by reviewing and assessing Eckstein's methodology and central conclusions. As a reference-point for Eckstein's position within the overall scope of current IR theory, an Appendix has been provided, which summarizes the multitude of perspectives and emphases that are present in this field. And indeed, the Appendix makes it only too clear that Eckstein's work represents only one of any number of political-theory lines of thinking that can be used to explore the past. As we will see, Eckstein's approach fits into the general category known as realism – a state-centric analysis that finds a “will to power” as the strongest driving force in social interactions, whether derived from human nature (biological realism) or from the lawlessness existing in the international realm (structural realism). However, forms of realism are not the only option: there is the traditional alter-ego to realism – liberalism (also state-centric, but with rationality and law as the forces to prevent utter descent into chaos) – followed by newer re-combinations of realist and liberal ideas, from international political economy, to international society, and the more ideationally driven constructivism.<sup>33</sup>

These last two forms are of special interest in the current study. For they view the international level as a society comparable to those that exist on local, community,

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qualitative factors (e.g. legitimacy, authority, ideology) as secondary in importance. See the overview in Donnelly (2000: esp. 17-8, 60, 84, 99-100, and 123-4), with citations.

<sup>33</sup> See the Appendix for further discussion.

regional, and state levels, possessing its own evolving political culture(s) and degrees of law, governance, frameworks of communication (successful and otherwise), and even ideologies. And as such, these IR theoretical approaches hold great potential for understanding the complexities and ongoing transformations with which a constructed moment of international significance –like 146 BCE – is concerned. For the story of 146 BCE includes Romans, Greeks, Carthaginians, and others in interaction; it comprises political debates, decisions, and responses with respect to two separate conflicts in two separate arenas, which crisscross the lines of domestic and international; and most notably, it involves a wider attributed significance with which a series of events were given value as a singular moment. This study, therefore, takes a fundamentally constructivist approach, and in doing so, it is theoretically focused on norms as the conceptual building blocks, and heterarchy (rather than anarchy) as governing the multiple levels on which international power is constructed.<sup>34</sup> In other words, the more constructivist approach espoused here will allow us to explore multiple cultures (Roman, Greek, etc.) coming into interaction on an interstate level, giving rise to a middle ground of communication (and miscommunication), and in the process, shaping a new, and internationally fielded political culture and set of ideologies – the very substance and backdrop of the events surrounding, and the reactions evaluating, 146 as a moment of meaning.

In the following sections, therefore, we begin with an assessment of Eckstein’s recent contributions, and the ways in which his work challenges modern scholarship to

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<sup>34</sup> See the Appendix.

think about ancient history in terms of international politics as the primary subject. From there, the subject of ancient international politics inevitably turns to the debates surrounding Roman imperialism, configured as they are along the poles mentioned above: from our ways of characterizing Rome and her empire (primitivist versus modernist, and defensivist versus offensivist), to our ways of identifying its sources (internal, Roman-specific culture features versus external, foreign factors). With an eye to the current study's overall perspective, I tend toward the following theoretical conclusions: (1) finding the primitivist-modernist divide restrictive, though preferring the conscious use of modern analogies and modern concepts; (2) viewing “defensive” and “offensive” as relative and subjective categories, but thinking the Romans “offensively defensive” – that is, aggressive and proactive in ways that *they sincerely* believed as necessarily defensive (i.e. it was not just rhetoric); and (3) maintaining a strong focus on the external/international zone of contacts between political cultures as the means for better understanding the changing world of the second century BCE – and 146's place within it.

#### **IR THEORY AS AN APPROACH: ECKSTEIN & REALISM**

Turning to Arthur Eckstein, then: the key contribution here involves an application of contemporary IR theory, in the form referred to as realism, to the study of ancient history.<sup>35</sup> Reviews of Eckstein's recent publications consistently remark on the

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<sup>35</sup> Specifically, Eckstein deals with fifth-century Greece and the Hellenistic Mediterranean of the fourth and third centuries BCE.

significance and potential of his interdisciplinary approach,<sup>36</sup> as well as on the new perspectives it provides for exploring Rome's rise to Mediterranean hegemony. Eckstein's work represents an important step forward in reconnecting modern disciplines, though it deploys only one specific emphasis within a great range of current political theories. That emphasis falls into the category of so-called realism, a "dominant school of thought in the modern study of international relations... [and] a family of closely related (and occasionally competing) theories."<sup>37</sup> However, use of the term "(political) realism" requires careful qualification, since it encompasses several different meanings and has suffered from oversimplification among IR specialists and non-specialists alike.<sup>38</sup>

Eckstein's presentation follows a somewhat customary tendency to use the term realism in order to assume a clear-cut and definitive methodology, in stark opposition to others.<sup>39</sup> In doing so, he reveals his theoretical approach subtly, and to those with prior knowledge of realism's complex history, as actually only one of several forms of realism.<sup>40</sup> In fact, over the century and a half since the coining of the term *Realpolitik*,<sup>41</sup> so many assumed notions, additions, and re-interpretations of realism have emerged that

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<sup>36</sup> Cf. Erskine (2008: 187); Scheidel (2008: 100, 101); Champion (2009: 253, 257); Tröster (2009a: 42, 45).

<sup>37</sup> Eckstein (2006: 6), where Kapstein and Mastanduno (1999: ix-x) are cited for asserting that realism is the dominant "research program" in IR studies. See also Eckstein (2008: 7).

<sup>38</sup> Note that the current study references the use of realism in the study of politics/political philosophy, and not necessarily in art/literature, epistemology, jurisprudence, or metaphysics. Note also that the lower-case spelling is preferred, to avoid the implication that Realism represents a fixed concept. For a good introduction to the broad scope of assumed narratives and associations concerning political realism, see Bell, ed. (2008: 1-6), and p. 13, where he rightly notes that political realism has largely "been a victim of disciplinary amnesia." See also Neufeld (2001: 135); Williams (2005: 10).

<sup>39</sup> For more on these assumptions and opposition to realism, see the Appendix.

<sup>40</sup> On the diversity in forms of self-acclaimed realism, see Cusack and Stoll (1990: Ch. 2); Garnett (1984: 110); Gilpin (1986: 304); Donnelly (2000); Haslam (2002: 249); Coady (2005: 122); and Elman (1996: 26), who refers to realism as a "big tent," with room for a number of different theories." See the summary in the Appendix.

<sup>41</sup> German writer, August Ludwig von Rochau, ca. 1853, first used the term. Cf. Ross (forthcoming).

many self-proclaimed realists may not only disagree, but also even contradict one another.<sup>42</sup> In addition, the multiplicity of claims to a perceived realist foundation itself works in dialectic with a number of other, equally diverse theories (e.g. liberalism, constructivism, international political economy [IPE]), with much recent inter-exchange.<sup>43</sup> For this reason, some of Eckstein's readers may have been led to misinterpret the value of his contribution, either by conflating the diversity of realism with only one of its incarnations, or by expecting that this singular approach can be "proven" against another singular "antiquity" (and *vice versa*).<sup>44</sup> As a result, critics have found Eckstein's use of realism to be "programmatically," "one-sided," or even risking "danger of circularity."<sup>45</sup> Presented with a definitive account of realism as "founded on three fundamental concepts" – international anarchy, self-help regime, and power-balancing<sup>46</sup> – and then asked to consider the universal validity of the formula in light of Rome's emergence as hegemon, many classicists may simply return to the old conclusion that modern political theory restricts the study of ancient history.<sup>47</sup> From this perspective,

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<sup>42</sup> E.g., Bell (2008: 10), on possible contradictions between so-called classical and neo-realist views concerning statehood. For descriptions of these forms of realism, see the Appendix.

<sup>43</sup> Recent scholarship has begun to explore the ways in which these traditionally opposed theories are actually interrelated, and can greatly inform each other's approaches to IR. For this scholarship (as well as an overview of the different IR theories), see the Appendix.

<sup>44</sup> For various evidence and critique of such misinterpretation, see Erskine (2008: 187-188); Champion (2009: 253); Hölkeskamp (2009: 211); Tröster (2009a: 42, 45). Eckstein himself problematically maintains that he can "test the validity of Realist paradigms," not only against their "criticisms" but also in favor of their "claim to universalism" (2006: 9).

<sup>45</sup> The quotes belong to, in order: Hölkeskamp (2009: 211); Tröster (2009a: 42); and Erskine (2008: 187). See also Evans (2009: 29), and Levick (2009: 119): "*It is a question whether the theory illuminates the material, or the material is made to fit the theory.*" The same applies, of course, to traditional historical theses.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Eckstein (2006: 12). In Eckstein (2008: 8-9), the third principle is changed to "prevalence of war."

<sup>47</sup> See the commentary in Morley (2009: 3-6). For an overview of (lessening) disjunctions between ancient historians (esp. of ancient Greece) and political theorists/'scientists', see Ober (2008: 68).

imposition of pre-determining standards only makes realism successful at finding what it looks for, and runs the added risk of confining history to a single mold. However, such rejections miss the deeper potential for advancing further from Eckstein's interdisciplinary outlook.

The form of IR theory deployed by Eckstein is known as “structural” realism, or “Waltzian,” after its developer, Kenneth Waltz (1979), whom Eckstein often cites for supporting evidence.<sup>48</sup> This form of realism is especially useful for moving scholarship beyond Romano-centric (or other culturally-specific) models of analysis. This is because Waltz's original innovation in introducing structural realism was the establishment of a sharp distinction between domestic (state-cultural specific) and international realms.<sup>49</sup> Unlike previous, so-called “biological” realists, who perceived a universal standard – i.e., human nature – affecting both domestic and international spheres, Waltz argued that the international environment was its own entity, characterized primarily by the lack of formal government and enforceable law – a situation he referred to as “anarchic.”<sup>50</sup>

Within the context of such anarchy, Waltz believed that the individual characteristics of states were simply background noise to the larger picture. Instead, he

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<sup>48</sup> Note, however, that Eckstein claims to be an exponent of offensive realism (2006: 6, n. 9), though he does not clearly explain that this was a later development within structural realism and a response to Waltz's model. For detailed discussion, see Snyder (1991: 10-13); Lynn-Jones (1995); Brooks (1997: 445-477); Labs (1997); Jervis (1999: 42-63); Walt (2002); Montgomery (2006: 151). Prominent offensive realists include Mearsheimer (1994/1995: 9-14; 2001: Ch. 2); Labs (1997); Layne (2007). Prominent defensive realists include Jervis (1978); Lynn-Jones (1995); Glaser (1997: 185-188); Glaser and Kaufmann (1998); van Evera (1999).

<sup>49</sup> For an introductory description of Waltz's model and discussion of its place in the history of realism as a discipline, see Donnelly (2000: 16-19, 50-57, 60-63, Ch. 3, 107-121, 198).

<sup>50</sup> Biological realism (also known as “classical,” to distinguish it from structural as “new”) tends to emphasize the role of human nature in problematizing international relations. Cf. Donnelly (2000: 11); Wunderlich (2008: 17). Examples include Niebuhr (1932: 6, 23; 1944: 19); Morgenthau (1946: 202-3; 1948: 4; 1985: 52); Carr (1939/1946: 231).

claimed, states were better viewed as individual “units,” which were “functionally equal” and forced by their environment into complete self-sufficiency. As a result, the only important divergence among states was by “capability distribution” – that is, their relative physical and economic strength.<sup>51</sup> From these hypotheses, Waltz constructed a model that concentrated on warfare occurring as a result of shifting balances and imbalances in capability, from scenarios of one, two, or multiple “great-powers,” known as unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar international systems.<sup>52</sup>

Eckstein has taken an approach parallel to that of Waltz, and has envisioned Rome’s rise to hegemony as part of a power-transition crisis occurring within the old multipolar balance of Alexandrian successor kingdoms. However, international structure – at least in the form of a distribution of military and economic capability<sup>53</sup> – only goes part of the way in explaining the political behaviors and interactions of Romans and contemporaries over time, and especially during this crucial juncture. Whether one conceives of international anarchy or more complex arrangements (see below), significance must also be granted to international-level social frameworks of power and to an underlying political *Zeitgeist* (or to use Richardson’s phrase, “mental wallpaper”).<sup>54</sup> This is because the very conceptions of politics – including definitions of statehood,

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<sup>51</sup> Cf. Waltz (1979: 98-99), who posits that states differ not so much in what they seek as in their relative ability to obtain it.

<sup>52</sup> Note that William Harris published his book on the militarism and aggressiveness of Rome in the same year – 1979 – a book that took the phenomena Waltz saw as a product and characteristic of the international sphere and saw them instead as specific to one state and culture in particular: Rome.

<sup>53</sup> For more on this definition of international structure – a fundamental part of structural realism in IR theory, see the Appendix.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Richardson (2008: 6-7).

*imperium*, and sovereignty – have shifted quite drastically over in time, with new meanings and priorities fitted to various historical contexts.<sup>55</sup>

In addition, while Eckstein’s international-level perspective is a much-needed contribution to the study of ancient history, its exact context in today’s political thought has not been adequately mapped out. For example, the argument that power-transition theory can fully explain Rome’s increased involvement in eastern Mediterranean politics around 200 BCE implies that Rome possessed some pre-existing wide-range policy and vested interest in maintaining balance and/or stability abroad. In many ways, such thinking has driven the foreign policy interpretations of 146 BCE, in judging that Rome made either a necessary or excessive assertion of the *status quo*, of pan-Mediterranean hegemony. However, it has not analyzed the exact nature or context of this hegemony, nor the manner in which such power processes affected the playing-out and representation of events surrounding both destructions, and their evolving collocation in history as an East-West pair. In other words, the question becomes: is it possible to study ancient politics in terms of cultural features specific to the international sphere? This brings us back to the issue of using modern theory to investigate the ancient world, and to the so-called primitivist-modernist debate – a debate that has been mentioned frequently in discussions of Eckstein’s work.

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<sup>55</sup> For more on sovereignty, see Jackson (1993: 50ff.); Spruyt (1994); Donnelly (2000: 141ff.); Gordon (2002); Keating (2004); and discussions in Hay et al. (2006); Davis (2008). On sovereignty and ancient Greece/ Rome, see Finley (1983); Ober (1998); Morgan (2003); Hansen (2006); Connolly (2007). On the transition from medieval Christendom to supposed statehood, see Burckhardt (1878/ 1990); Viroli (1992); Thomson (1994). On modern globalization and the sovereignty debate, see Garrett (1998); Hay (2000). On evolving definitions of *imperium*, see the discussions below, in chapter 4.

## PRIMITIVISM & MODERNISM

Scholars have rightly noted that Eckstein's approach serves as a useful "antidote" to the model introduced by William Harris. In this model, Harris attributed Rome's rise to empire to key cultural-specific features, including an elite ethos of military glory and an economic, coupled with ideological drive for expansion.<sup>56</sup> While such an outlook marked an important stage in post-colonial attitudes towards empire, and largely de-mystified the excusatory tenor of so-called defensive imperialism, its Romano-centric emphasis nevertheless established a restrictive precedent for the study of ancient international relations. Eckstein's use of IR theory thus introduces an alternative to the so-called internalist focus prevalent in subsequent classical studies. In other words, it reverses the trend to look to Roman-specific or Greek-specific features as the sources for interstate phenomena. Instead, it takes a wider focus, viewing Rome's rise to hegemony within the context of changing international power structures.

As an interdisciplinary and internationally based approach, Eckstein's latest work thus represents a major step forward from the isolated and cultural-specific paths taken by previous scholarship. In reversing Harris' perspective, however, Eckstein has been somewhat misconstrued as a direct opponent to the so-called primitivist school, which had earlier obtained associations with the internalist/culturalist approach to Greco-Roman studies.<sup>57</sup> Primitivism, though, has its origins in the debate over ancient economy, and as

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<sup>56</sup> Cf. Hölkeskamp (2009: 213); Tröster (2009a: 44); Champion (2009: 253-254, 257) for references to Eckstein as an alternative to Harris' perspective. For an overview of Harris' arguments, see his own introduction (1979: 2-3).

<sup>57</sup> E.g. Lendon (2002: 376, 384).

such, brings a number of assumptions that should not be confused with either culturalism or with Eckstein's IR theory, structural realism. Primitivism, from Finley onwards, remains rooted in the principle that the Greco-Roman world (and its economy) was neither modern in appearance nor the birthplace of modernity (and its capitalism).<sup>58</sup> It is cultural in the sense that it perceives a Greco-Roman Antiquity as culturally distinct from another society – that of (Eurocentric) Modernity. For this reason, most primitivists warn against using modern concepts and language to explain ancient phenomena, since they believe that such practice falsely imposes one culture's discourse upon another. As such, primitivism is a response to the work of Rostovtzeff – and later so-called modernists – who draw parallels between ancient, especially imperial Roman, and early modern periods, use modern terminology to draw analogies, and view Greece and Rome as precursors of modern development, with differences being only a matter of scale.<sup>59</sup> Where modernism is essentially phenomenological in approach, then, primitivism has fused with a side of culturalism, perceiving ancient economics as embedded within a unique social context.<sup>60</sup>

However, by definition, primitivism focuses on the cultural division between ancient and modern, *not* on cultural divisions within each category. By contrast,

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<sup>58</sup> See Finley (1973), with the following basic arguments regarding Greco-Roman economy: (1) founded on agricultural subsistence; (2) un-'capitalist' motives for re-investment, with landownership the end-goal; (3) cities as centers of consumption rather than production; and (4) merchants and tradesmen held in low regard by society.

<sup>59</sup> See Rostovtzeff (1926), esp. p. 10. Modernists thus characterize the Greco-Roman economy as a world of growing trade, urbanization, agricultural innovation, legal progress, monetization, and material culture made somewhat available to lower classes.

<sup>60</sup> Polanyi (1957) pioneered this emphasis in the study of ancient economics. For a good summary of the primitivist-modernist divide and its relation to the tradition of 'modernity', see Morley (2009), esp. p. 9.

culturalism ultimately requires research into various contexts, both within antiquity and within modernity, and as a result, has undermined much of the primitivist-modernist divide by means of comparative studies.<sup>61</sup> Eckstein, in taking an international-level approach to ancient foreign relations, thus critiques the *Romano-centric* emphasis of previous culturalism,<sup>62</sup> but stands on neither side of the overly simplistic and increasingly restrictive dichotomy between primitivism and modernism. He counteracts the culturalist stance that (ancient) foreign relations spring from individual cultures and their societal views regarding the ends and means of power.<sup>63</sup> He instead grants primacy to the international environment as a structural phenomenon and to its role in constraining and even shaping cultures toward consistent behavior, including militarism and aggression. In doing so, he uses modern terminology to draw phenomenological parallels across time, pointing to recurrent warfare, territorial expansion, and competitive military capability.<sup>64</sup> At the same time, however, he makes frequent reference to the ways in which ancient does not compare to modern, from absence of enforceable international law to primitive diplomacy, communication, and intelligence-gathering – rather than asking whether different, analogous, and functioning forms of all these elements existed.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Bang (2008) is a recent example, arguing that the Roman economy was neither ‘modern’ nor ‘primitive’ in character, but comparable to a ‘tributary empire’ model. For the decline of the primitivist-modernist dichotomy, see Morris et al. (2008: 2).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Hölkeskamp (2009: 213).

<sup>63</sup> Early examples of such a ‘culturalist’ approach to Roman foreign relations include Badian (1958) and Gagé (1959); for a recent example, see Mattern (1999).

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Eckstein (2006: 12-28; 2008: 10-11).

<sup>65</sup> See Eckstein (2006: 53, 258; 2008: 11), and Erskine’s review (2008: 187). On international law: Eckstein (2006: 75; 2008: 127). On diplomacy, communication, and ‘intelligence’: (2006: 58, 76; 2008: 12-13, 22, 184, 242). The possession of nuclear technology is also mentioned – cf. (2008: 316 n.33). Note that Tröster’s review (2009: 43) also jumps to a primitivist-tinged perspective, stating that “...*ancient*

Moving away from the increasingly unproductive debate between primitivism and modernism, Eckstein's work thus provides new challenges for negotiating the relationship between ancient and contemporary history. As mentioned earlier, any vision of the past is inescapably affected by its contemporary context, and as a result, advances in modern theory certainly have a place in the study of ancient history. By the same token, however, this is not to say that the past should be judged against or made to conform to unstated assumptions regarding Modernity.<sup>66</sup> Use of a comparative approach must be circumspect about where the lines of past and present intersect. For example, one of Eckstein's conclusions – that the international politics of the ancient Mediterranean were “more cruel” in their anarchic conditions<sup>67</sup> – is more accurately a statement that they lack parallel institutions of modern diplomacy and constitutional law. Therefore, when assessed by current standards, the ancient international environment becomes a rudimentary and brutish world, comfortably distant from and even reaffirming for present norms. But to make such judgments is to over-simplify the equation, to posit both Antiquity and Modernity as uniform conditions and to consider Modernity as a refined endpoint in human progress.<sup>68</sup> To do so would be to ignore a long and diverse history of re-conceptualization, as not only ancient cultures but also modern ones have formulated different visions of political behavior. For example, over hundreds of years, from Hobbes

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*interstate relations...are certainly marked by a comparatively low degree of institutionalisation and interdependence.”*

<sup>66</sup> See Erskine (2008: 187).

<sup>67</sup> E.g. Eckstein (2008: 11): “historically, some anarchic systems have been harsher and more cruel than others. And it is equally clear that the state-systems that existed in Mediterranean antiquity were especially cruel anarchic systems...”

<sup>68</sup> For more discussion on this subject, see Morley (2009).

to Hume, Marx, and Weber, modern (Eurocentric) political thought has woven a dense web of contrary, compatible, or divergent perceptions of such supposedly stable notions as statehood, sovereignty, the role of law, and warfare.<sup>69</sup>

A more nuanced approach to studying ancient IR, therefore, considers both present and past as containing multiple answers to the issues of human group interaction. Singular manifestations of politics – their scope, content, and forms of power and legitimacy – can then be compared on the basis of their unique manifestations of human social processes.<sup>70</sup> Where they do not line up – for example, in perceptions of statehood – the how and why reveal much more about the past. Ancient cultures derived several different means for circumscribing concepts such as domestic and international spheres, and through their interactions with each other, developed shifting international cultures of conflict, diplomacy, and authority. To this extent, there were – as there are today – multiple cultures operating, both within states – whether defined as tribal groups, leagues, cities, confederations, and/or empires – and within the shifting interstate environment(s) between them.

In studying 146 BCE and the role it came to play in world political history, such a perspective is of key importance. In order to understand the events, their presentation, and the perceptions thereof, we must first delineate how groups at that time, in the second century, defined such notions as statehood/polity, sovereignty, *imperium*, and diplomacy. Only then can we assess the immediate impact of the destructions, and move on to trace

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<sup>69</sup> Scheidel (2008: 102) critiques Eckstein's brief use of the term nation-state (partly in acceptance and partly in criticism of Mommsen) as somewhat misleading, especially when applied to all of Italy in the mid-Republic.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Prokhovnik (2008: 3-4).

how subsequent cultural and political shifts resulted in reinterpretations of these moments.

#### **LEVELS OF ANALYSIS: INTERNAL & EXTERNAL**

As a result, despite moments of judging antiquity by modern standards, Eckstein usefully moves the focus away from individual domestic features and towards an international (or “third”) level and its systemic influences.<sup>71</sup> This shift in focus is roughly analogous to a pendulum-swing between nature and nurture, with explanations based on Roman nature characterizing the Harris perspective, and explanations based on Rome’s international environment (or nurture) characterizing Eckstein’s approach. And as in the nature-nurture dialectic, arguments based *purely* on one or the other obscure the complexity with which the two approaches interrelate. Eckstein’s particular use of Realist IR theory, while useful in pioneering the third-level of analysis and widening the scope for understanding Rome’s rise to hegemony, thus may swing the pendulum too far. By granting causal primacy to the IR environment *over* so-called “unit-attributes” (or characteristics, especially cultural, of individual states), he marginalizes the influences and exchanges occurring in *both* directions across the bounds of domestic and international.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> The term “third level” was introduced by Waltz (1959), who identified three levels of political analysis: (first level) focused on individuals; (second level) focused on domestic affairs; and (third level) focused on systemic factors. See also Waltz (1979); Mearsheimer (1994/1995: 10); Donnelly (2000: 12).

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Eckstein (2006: 93, 185-191; 2008: 15-16). Many reviewers have criticized Eckstein’s minimization of internal features: cf. Erskine (2008: 188); Levick (2008: 139); Hölkeskamp (2009: 213); Tröster (2009a: 43). However, the issue is not so much with making the international level the important area of analysis, as it is with subsequent de-emphasis on the subtle transfers between levels. Eckstein does, however,

Such a move could potentially create a scholarly divide where none need exist. It could confine the culturalist approach to the domestic level, hindering attempts to understand the international environment as another social/cultural sphere. And problematically, it glosses over the processes of change by which state units at once affect and are affected by their environment. In the study of Rome's rise to Mediterranean hegemony, this last is of supreme importance. For it strikes at that most elusive set of paradoxes surrounding Roman identity and *imperium* – its composite nature despite xenophobia, its adaptability despite conservativeness, and its networking of Hellenistic politics into a single web, seemingly one part accidental, one part manipulated, and one part inevitable. Romans, their contemporaries, and every subsequent generation have and continue to rework these paradoxes, as each reconsiders its own stance regarding power and authority, and the nature of empire.

Eckstein too is concerned with the issues and origins of Roman power, but he leaves the gap between internal and external somewhat unexplored in his quest to prove the primacy of the international. By making one set of criteria override all others, the problem of causation is solved only partially. The explanation for Rome's hegemonic success retains its hint of determinism, moving simply from internal character to external environment. Rather than locate empire in exceptional Roman aggression and acquisitiveness, Eckstein finds it in international structure. Context was thus foremost: it not only shaped Rome's character but also set the stage for pan-Mediterranean power.

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acknowledge the interrelations between individual, unit, and international, but subsumes these relations under the primacy of the international level – see Eckstein (2006: 185-186).

From this perspective, Rome was drawn into her position, first by responding to external challenges, pressures, and fears in Italy and the west, and then by hitting upon interests and concerns in the east.<sup>73</sup> These concerns, driven by conditions of violent “self-help,” eventually led Rome to sole authority, as she stepped into the space opened by “structural” conflict in the east.<sup>74</sup>

According to Eckstein, these states had once been “balanced” (albeit shakily) by three “great powers,” a “tripolar” arrangement of Seleucid, Ptolemaic, and Antigonid dynasties.<sup>75</sup> Following deterioration of the Ptolemaic position due to internal disruption, however, in the period from 207 and 188 BCE, the eastern Mediterranean suffered a “power-transition crisis,” as the tripolar structure disintegrated.<sup>76</sup> A new series of conflicts, or “hegemonic wars,” erupted as various states (especially the remaining Antigonid and Seleucid kingdoms) jostled for greater shares of power.<sup>77</sup> Rome, Eckstein argues, was pulled into the mire, in part by apprehension of unrest and possible singular power in the east, in part by alliance obligations, and in part by pre-conditioned

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<sup>73</sup> See discussion in Eckstein (2006: 118-180) and (2008: 121-129, 269, 273-275). This approach in many ways takes a ‘system-level’ approach to add to the earlier work of Erich Gruen (1984).

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Eckstein (2006: 316). Although Eckstein is not the first to reconstruct such a balance-of-power scenario, he is the first to identify such thinking as related to modern IR theoretical analysis.

<sup>75</sup> E.g. Eckstein (2006: 259-260; 2008: 124-126).

<sup>76</sup> The term, power transition was first introduced to mainstream IR theory by Organski and Kugler (1980: esp. 19), who also developed the notion of crossover – that is, a state of heightened danger occurring when declining and rising powers reach near-equal power capability. See also Geller and Singer (1998: 69ff.); Gilpin (1984: esp. 94-95); and Ikenberry and Moon (2007: 42ff.). Copeland (1996: 72, Fig. 1-2) modeled a test-cycle of rising and falling hegemon, though with conclusions contradictory to Waltz.

<sup>77</sup> Eckstein develops this thesis as a major topic in his latest publication (2008); cf. p. 227 for references to earlier work with similar conclusions (esp. Mommsen). Note that the degree of threat posed by the so-called “pact between kings,” in relation to the *military* abilities of Antiochus III and supposed weakness of Egypt, remains debated – cf. Evans (2009: 29).

tendencies toward preclusive expansion.<sup>78</sup> Rome's triumphs over the great powers at the beginning of the second century BCE thus marked a new stage in ancient Mediterranean history: one in which the states of both east and west were overshadowed by a single (that is, unipolar) power.

### **INTERNATIONAL HETERARCHY**

The sort of model just described, in which changing structures of physical power drive interstate politics, is certainly one angle from which to map Rome's rise to hegemony. However, a few problems remain. First is a lingering element of determinism, and second is a reductive perspective on the nature of power and rulership, based utterly on material capability (and to a lesser extent, its image).<sup>79</sup> Such prowess provides "control over the environment,"<sup>80</sup> and as such, is the goal for all states, since "in power lays safety."<sup>81</sup> Eckstein cites the Hobbesian "restless desire of Power after Power [*sic*]", which he sees as an inescapable result of the "great pressure to become and remain stronger than [one's] likely enemies."<sup>82</sup> From these narrow standards, Rome's success is

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<sup>78</sup> See also Gruen (1984).

<sup>79</sup> "Image" is again prescribed in limited terms, referencing the Realist maxim that states can never know each other's capabilities. According to Eckstein, such "opacity" is especially problematic for ancient states, since their communication and intelligence gathering were primitive (cf. 2006: 17, 59, 97). For further discussion of the realist conceptions of "uncertainty principle", "worst-case scenario", see Jervis (1976); Waltz (1979: 171-172); Keohane (1986: 165); Eckstein (2006: 17, and n. 23) [on uncertainty]; and Brooks (1997: 446); van Evera (1998: 12) [on worst-case scenario].

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Eckstein (2006: 224, 234-235).

<sup>81</sup> Eckstein (2006: 19).

<sup>82</sup> Eckstein (2006: 19). The first quote is from Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651/1986: 161). For more on Hobbes and his place in the Realist tradition, see Yurdusev (2006: 306); Donnelly (2000).

ultimately attributed to her greater accumulation of resources and military mobilization.<sup>83</sup>

To explain *how* Rome came to possess such physical superiority, Eckstein uses a comparative approach, placing Roman behavior in the context of other Hellenistic-era states. He concludes that previous scholarship's fixation on Roman aggression is misguided, since Rome was no more belligerent than any of her contemporaries (if not less so at times).<sup>84</sup> All Hellenistic states were equally "conditioned" to violence by the pressures of a "self-help" environment, aggravated by primitive diplomacy and what he considers toothless international law.<sup>85</sup>

In thus countering the internalist model with an international answer, however, Eckstein indirectly raises an issue that has long plagued structural Realism. That is, how can we understand the processes of structural change – as in the rise of Rome – without resorting to comparative analysis between internal features of the states (not to mention individuals) in the international field? According to Waltz, all states are "functionally similar" units in the international arena.<sup>86</sup> But if we are to characterize Rome (or Romans) as either more or less aggressive than contemporary states, we are compelled to

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<sup>83</sup> Cf. Eckstein (2006: 129, 138, 146, 257, 289; 2008: 8-9, 40). Note that at times this argument is supported by biased accounts provided by later Romans (e.g. Livy) – cf. Eckstein (2006: 305).

<sup>84</sup> Eckstein again builds upon the work of Gruen (1984). He adds a system-level emphasis, pointing to instances in which Rome displays reluctance for war, self-restraint, and/or serious anxiety in the face of challenges to security – cf. Eckstein (2006: Ch. 6, esp. p. 224, 227-8, 238). See also Hölkeskamp (2009: 212). On Realism and the so-called "security dilemma," see Herz (1950: 157); Jervis (1978); Snyder (1984); Posen (1993); Glaser (1997); Booth and Wheeler (2008).

<sup>85</sup> For the different perspective taken here, as based on so-called normative IR theory, that a form of international law did exist and function in its contemporary context, see the discussions in chapters 3 and 4.

<sup>86</sup> "Functional similarity" is a term derived from Waltz (1979), which emphasizes the need for each state to be completely self-reliant in order to survive conditions of anarchy. The result of such conditions, according to Waltz, is that states ultimately come to develop almost the same functions as each other (e.g. military, economic, legal). Cf. Waltz (1979: 91, 96, 104, 107, 111, 118); Buzan et al. (1993: Ch. 3); Wendt (1999: 306, 322-323); Donnelly (2000: 82); Eckstein (2006: 14f.). This approach vastly simplifies internal characteristic features, and shared and/or networked functions across states.

ask questions regarding qualitative (not just quantitative) distinctions between political entities: *how* do states evolve different forms and levels of aggression, with what forms of expression, and with what responses (intended and unintended)? Such questions are critical in the process of exploring *how Rome in particular*, out of so many aggressive states, came to accumulate greater physical capability.<sup>87</sup>

At this juncture, then, Eckstein must shift to (internal) “unit attribute theory.” Echoing Mommsen, he focuses on a key attribute (other than excessive belligerence) that explains Roman greatness – that is, “the extraordinary ability of Rome to assimilate and/or integrate non-Romans into a large and relatively unitary state.”<sup>88</sup> Eckstein rightly notes that Rome “evolve[d] a talent for political compromise,” in part through interaction with other relatively “open” Latin polities, and in part through internal settlements between patricians and plebeians.<sup>89</sup> But he goes no further in exploring this evident interplay of internal and external forces, leaving Roman “exceptionalism” a static feature by the end of the third century BCE.<sup>90</sup> Eckstein thus acknowledges some interrelation of internal and external, but chooses a less connective approach. Instead, he favors stressing

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<sup>87</sup> Cf. Scheidel (2008: 102).

<sup>88</sup> Eckstein (2006: 35); cf. Mommsen (1864-1880).

<sup>89</sup> The first quote is from Eckstein (2006: 250). For the “openness” of Latin states, see *ibid.* p. 246, 249; for ‘Conflict of the Orders,’ see p. 250.

<sup>90</sup> See the transition made in Eckstein (2006: 256-7), where he assesses Mommsen’s view of a Roman consolidation in Italy by the end of the third century. Tröster (2009: 44), for example, finds it “regrettable” that Eckstein does not further investigate Rome’s capacity for assimilation and the processes of “state-building” in Italy (to use Tröster’s words). It is important to note that such discussion does not address the degree of non-consolidation – of regionalism, continued local tradition, and forms of interstate diplomatic relations with Rome – to be found across Italy during this period. On this subject, see Jehne et al. (2006); Jehne (2009).

“the previously unacknowledged role of system-level factors, both in the causation of warfare in the ancient Mediterranean and in the rise of Rome to world power.”<sup>91</sup>

The current study hopes to re-adjust what may result in a scholarly divide, by considering international politics as a set of interactions, communications, and miscommunications occurring between unique (though at times converging) cultures and different ways of thinking about statehood, diplomacy, and warfare. From this perspective, the dynamic effects of external environment on internal features and of internal features on external environment together run the patterns of history, with the interest here on Rome’s second- to first century BCE development. Roman supremacy was more than the result of international anarchy plus unique citizen inclusivity. Instead, it was a complex organism, which developed in an international environment better characterized as ‘heterarchic’ – consisting of multiple, intersecting webs of subordination and obligation (neither an absolute rule of law, nor a condition of complete lawlessness and self-sufficiency).<sup>92</sup> As a result, perceived balance among Hellenistic states, whether one, two, or more, was about more than just physical strength – it was also about legitimacy and cultural authority, defined by evolving norms, or socially derived

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<sup>91</sup> Eckstein (2006: 35).

<sup>92</sup> For more on why heterarchy is preferable to anarchy in describing IR, see Donnelly (2000, 2009). See examples along the same vein in Risse (2000); Rosenau (2004: 31-32); Bache and Flinders (2004); Tokoro and Mogi (2007: 135); Leeson (2009). For more on the subject of heterarchy, see McCulloch (1945); Hedlund (1986); Spickard (2004); Ville et al. (2006). On its application to archaeology, see Crumley (1987); Ehrenreich et al. (1995). For more on hegemony as a form of international order, see Doyle (1986: 12, 40, 55-60); Watson (1992: 15-16, 27-28, 122-128); Motyl (2001: 20); Donnelly (2006: 156).

standards, of international behavior.<sup>93</sup> Locked in a feedback loop, physical strength required normative relevance, and the evolution of norms reacted to physical strength.

Rome was indeed able to accumulate military capability through unique adaptability, but the process was a subtle one, without a long-term fixed agenda, and it negotiated variable norms across often-blurred domestic and foreign lines. These dynamics of heterarchic power-relations have important implications for the study of 146 BCE, which has hitherto been interpreted on the basis of particular assumptions of Roman imperialism, both ancient and modern. The modern approaches to Roman imperialism, traditionally framed along the lines of defensivist as opposed to offensivist positions, will be explored next. Doing so will not only clarify a key intersection between modern political theory (specifically, IR theory) and the study of ancient history, but will also delineate the current study's relationship with this intersection and its position regarding the tricky subject of Roman imperialism.<sup>94</sup>

#### **DEFENSIVE & OFFENSIVE IMPERIALISM**

Establishing where distinct cultural practices diverge and intersect across the international sphere not only helps clarify IR behaviors in the past but also separates them from current norms. This is important because scholarship has long sought to rationalize Roman policy according to assumed modern patterns of sovereignty and their

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<sup>93</sup> The term “norms” is used here (and throughout) to refer to socially derived standards of behavior, not as absolute ideals. For more on norms, see the Appendix and below, pp. 54ff. On heterarchy and the concept of power transition, cf. DiCicco and Levy (1999: 685).

<sup>94</sup> For ancient views regarding Roman imperialism as it related to 146 BCE, see below – pp. 322ff. For modern scholarship on 146 BCE, see the summary in chapter 1.

territorial/legal definitions of statehood, and has conceived of Roman imperialism along so-called defensivist, as opposed to offensivist, lines (again, in a simplified dichotomy). Following Mommsen, the dominant view was of defensive imperialism – i.e. that Roman motivations for going to war (and/or “annexing” territory) were based upon rationalized fear (whether well-founded or misconstrued) of neighboring polities.<sup>95</sup> By the late 1970s, however, scholars found it increasingly paradoxical to consider Roman militarism and frequent warfare as purely and simply defensive in nature. A more offensivist approach was taken, with particular impact by Harris, who saw war, desire for glory and spoils, and expansionism all built into Roman culture.<sup>96</sup> Scholars have since been greatly influenced by this tradition, not only for its focus on internal social features, but also its general outlook on Rome as exceptionally acquisitive and domineering. Until recently, critiques of offensive imperialism have only found fault with specific elements, without questioning the deeper assumptions of statehood and international politics. For this reason, debates have only picked at two linked dichotomies, looking for primacy between conscious decision-making and internalized social structure on the one hand, and between annexation and non-annexation as policy on the other.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Mommsen (1864-1880). Exponents of defensive imperialism include Frank (1914), Holleaux (1921), Badian (1958, 1968), Walbank (1963), Errington (1971), and in various forms, Gruen (1984; 2004), Sherwin-White (1984), and Dyson (1985).

<sup>96</sup> Other exponents of offensive imperialism include Finley (1978) and Hopkins (1978: 25-37). More recently, though with greater focus on the imperial period, Susan Mattern (1999) has argued that Roman conceptions of national honor and revenge (plus aristocratic competition) were the principal driving forces behind Roman foreign relations. On the glory of ‘imperial’ expansion and first century BCE attitudes, cf. Brunt (2004) and below, pp. 346ff.

<sup>97</sup> For an overview of these debates, see Harris (1979: 105-107, and Ch.4, esp. 131-133); Rich (1995: 39-50); and Richardson (1986, 2005).

However, in the context of a post-9/11, globalized world, with its revealed networks of interdependency and fissures of incongruity shot across both domestic and international planes, new interpretations have begun to move away from former internalist and mono-causal approaches. Eckstein's work is an important step in this new direction, departing from the tendency to attribute aggression as an absolute within Roman culture (as in offensive imperialism) or as deflected onto other cultures – Samnite, Greek, Punic, Celtic, etc. (as in defensive imperialism). In an introduction to a recent collection on Roman imperialism, co-authored with Craige Champion, Eckstein has explained that the new approach

*shifts away from either the conqueror or the subject, or both, attempting to understand imperialism in a more comprehensive, holistic way by viewing a broader canvas encompassing both the conquering imperialist and the conquered subordinate within a wide and complex interstate system.*<sup>98</sup>

Eckstein uses structural IR theory to understand elements of both defense and offense within the actions taken by Rome, thereby opening the door to a much more nuanced discussion of Roman expansion.<sup>99</sup> In doing so, however, he also shifts the source of aggression from internal culture to external environment. Re-using Veyne's phrase, "imperialism of routine," he delineates warlike behavior as a *system-wide* feature of the ancient Mediterranean, common to all Hellenistic-era polities, and only aggravated by the

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<sup>98</sup> Champion and Eckstein (2004: 4).

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Eckstein (2006: 19): "...stages of expansion, and the motives at each stage, combine elements both of defense and of offense." Elsewhere, Eckstein references an "offense-defense balance" (2006: 69-70), but he distorts its use within the debate between structural realists. For definitions and discussions of these concepts, see Jervis (1978); Lynn-Jones (1995); Glaser (1997: 185-188); Labs (1997: 7-17); Glaser and Kaufmann (1998); van Evera (1999); Montgomery (2006: 154).

failure of tripolar balance in the east.<sup>100</sup> Rome as imperialist aggressor was thus no different from any of her neighbors.<sup>101</sup>

From this angle, Eckstein is successful in rightfully eschewing the offensive-defensive debate as no longer productive.<sup>102</sup> Ironically, however, the set of assumptions he brings to the table have left his conclusions inescapably defensivist in tone.<sup>103</sup> In presenting Roman militarism and expansionism as a symptom of international environment, he has made the end-result – Rome’s empire – an accumulation of protective responses to external challenges.<sup>104</sup> Like defensive imperialism, then, his thesis locates the source of aggression outside of Rome. At the same time, the thesis is more abstract and has a wider scope, situating threat and the origins of violence within general surroundings rather than individual enemies.<sup>105</sup> By prioritizing the interstate system over all other potential sources of aggressive behavior, Eckstein has still only deflected the imperialism debate, without tackling some of its more complex and problematic issues.

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<sup>100</sup> Cf. Eckstein (2008: 237). For the phrase “imperialism of routine”, see Veyne, who first applied it in an internalist fashion: “...l’impérialisme y [à Rome] est devenu la routine d’une oligarchie, qui, comme font toutes les institutions, finit par le pratiquer machinalement, sans même se demander pourquoi.” (1975: 794). This statement is very reminiscent of Polybius’ own comment (6.13.7-9), that for many Greek observers, Rome’s *politeia* appeared entirely oligarchic. See below, pp. 155ff.

<sup>101</sup> See Eckstein (2006: 183-184, and 200): “Roman attitudes were indeed bellicose, and Roman methods of war were certainly violent. But were Roman attitudes here, and Roman methods of war, unusually violent?”; and (2008: 247): “It is also certainly the case that by the third century the Roman State had adopted a habit of command towards the entire outside world... But while we should admit the negative impact...[it] does not differentiate the Roman Republic from any other Classical or Hellenistic state.” Eckstein here cites Derow (1979) as well as Veyne (1975), the former for the phrase – “habit of command.”

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Erskine (2008: 188).

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Scheidel (2008: 101); Champion (2009: 254); Tröster (2009: 44).

<sup>104</sup> Compare Gruen (1984).

<sup>105</sup> In fact, Eckstein never delineates or questions the assumptions of the term imperialism. Instead, he takes “imperialism, meant in the most negative sense,” (2006:5) and Harris’ view of “Rome, the sole imperialist aggressor” (2006: 143), “grinding out in Schumpeteresque fashion the public victories that the aristocracy needed in order to preserve its prestige and authority” (2006: 208)... and moved them to the international level.

Therefore, for the subject of 146 BCE, the problems remain. For as long as scholarship investigates the destructions of Carthage and Corinth in terms of first assuming the two to mark a significant collocation, and then connecting this collocation with Roman imperialism as either defensive or offensive, the results are predetermined. To figure out how and why the collocation originally developed and in what context(s), the approach needs to be changed. For previous scholarship has only converged upon its assessment of Rome's actions as simply aggressive and imperialist (whether caused by internal and cultural or external and structural factors), but has not explored the international level as a potential cultural space in its own right. The dichotomies between defensivist and offensivist perspectives thus deal with purely relative and subjective definitions, and should be discarded. In their place, imperialism is to be explored in terms of the ways in which it was defined, deployed, and responded to at the time – here, in the second century. And these definitions, forms of behavior, etc. were specifically those that took place within the interstate arena as a conceptual form of middle ground. This middle ground – the zone in which different cultures and political conceptions came into contact, conflict, and negotiation – was one with its own developing modes of interaction and communication, affected by and affecting the groups involved (Romans, Greeks, Carthaginians, etc.).

### **BEYOND DICHOTOMIES**

And so, the old divide between defensive and offensive imperialism – at least in their modern forms – fades away (along with primitivism versus modernism, internal-

cultural versus external-structural). And indeed, as Eckstein himself has acknowledged, the “historiography of empire” should reflect the nature of the “interstate world,” which is:

*characterized not by linearity but rather by simultaneity. It is made up of a multiplicity of interacting units, each interacting complexly with others, each pursuing different goals, and all interacting simultaneously and synergistically together.*<sup>106</sup>

Eckstein’s IR-inspired work, however, has focused primarily on third level structural analysis, in order to counteract or even supplant previous internal-culturalism. This approach – though necessary to some extent to move the debate forward – does run the risk of continuing an artificial dualism, heightening a very simplified conception of interior as opposed to exterior limits of statehood. Escaping such dualism – and allowing for political-cultural spaces to exist on a supranational level – is crucial for exploring the relationship between ancient and modern forms of politics, for delineating the cultural context of ancient IR, and for understanding the variable histories of and perspectives on empire.

It is important to note that the interstate system does not exist in a vacuum. It cannot be a space that affects its participants in their aggression toward each other without also being *affected by* its participants, via the modes in which they express or find outlets for their aggression. In this sense, then, the origins of international-level violence are to be tracked along multiple, linked sources – human, societal, and

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<sup>106</sup> Eckstein (2006: 189). Elsewhere, Eckstein even explores internal characteristics, such as Roman religious tradition and moralizing discourse (2006: 193, 216-222, 229). However, he does so only to prove Roman anxiety and/or acclimatization to a particular (anarchic) external environment. In the process, he supports an essentially defensivist view of Roman expansion as “preclusive” and of unexceptional aggression.

environmental – with individuals and states simultaneously influenced by and influencing the web of international relations. In much the same way, the decisions made by individuals and groups (e.g. the Roman Senate) involved a great deal of sub-conscious, emotional, and cultural (both internally and externally derived) influences.<sup>107</sup> The third level is thus a particular reactive and shifting space between large-scale groups. In some ways, it limits or directs second- and first-level behaviors, and influences the cultures within the groups defined as states. At the same time, the very actions taken by individuals and states modify the third level environment, bringing about change to the IR cultural map that may be revolutionary (e.g. Alexander’s conquests), relatively static (e.g. classical-era Greek *poleis*), or gradual yet drastic (e.g. Rome from 250 to 50 BCE).<sup>108</sup> Rome’s “success” was by no means linear or inevitable, and characterizing the evolving “order” established by her *imperium* has been and will continue to be a complex and ideologically loaded subject.

*Post eventum*, the cumulative effect of international actions taken by Romans and by the Roman *res publica* indeed resulted in one of the largest and most longstanding empires in history, and has in turns inspired, appalled, and/or justified particular outlooks on world order and notions of imperialism. The position taken here is that in retrospect, the end-result of empire necessitates some inclusion of offensiveness – that is, outwardly

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<sup>107</sup> The concept of norms incorporates this rational-irrational duality well –see the Appendix, and below, pp. 54ff. Note that both Erskine (2008: 188) and Tröster (2009: 44-45) allude to a weakness in Eckstein’s (structural) realism, in that it makes domestic features a function of *only* external-based system and power capability. See also Ashley (1986); Donnelly (2000).

<sup>108</sup> James (2006: 141) views such changes in general terms as “*a continual oscillation between internationalization and pacification on the one hand, and between violence and the breakdown of international and domestic order on the other hand.*”

aggressive, acquisitive, and domineering behavior – as exceptional to Roman culture. Empires do not occur by accident, nor are they foisted upon an unwilling imperialist by external circumstance, no matter what the excusatory arguments to the contrary. The culture of the state that becomes an empire ultimately contains characteristics that converge to accumulate, support, and validate control over others.<sup>109</sup> This is not to exclude aggressiveness as an international, systemic phenomenon or as a feature of other ancient Mediterranean states – quite the contrary. Nor does this rule out the unusual inclusivity with which the Roman *res publica* granted citizenship. What it does accomplish is a more levelheaded acknowledgment of both offensive and defensive elements in the growth of large-scale physical and ideological power. With this comes a challenge to highlight those shifting gray areas between internal and external group cultures. For it is ultimately along the fluctuating bounds of political conception that states are remade into empires.

The process has long been noted to be complex – e.g.:

*Roman expansion was not a continuous process, maintained at a constant rate. Whether at the level of conscious decision-making or of underlying structures, the determining factors were many and complex and did not all pull in the same direction.*<sup>110</sup>

Nevertheless, historians of the ancient world have never actually looked to the international-domestic interface, to the international sphere as a potential political-cultural middle ground, nor to changing conceptions of statehood and sovereignty as

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<sup>109</sup> On a basic definition of imperialism as “an unequal power relationship between two states in which the dominant state exercises various forms of control, often forcibly, over the weaker state,” see Champion and Eckstein (2004: 3). For more on the Roman conception of *imperium*, see below, pp. 139ff.

<sup>110</sup> Rich (1995: 50).

areas of study. Instead, debates have centered on the assumed criterion, based on modern sovereignty, of territorial “annexation” as indicative of imperialism (or lack thereof).<sup>111</sup> However, in doing so, they have obscured the more relevant, long-term and shifting nature with which Rome was defined as a state, with regards to other states, their conceptions of sovereignty, and to surrounding international convention(s). These definitions moved hand in hand with changing views and forms of empire and imperialism (and have continued to do so, across ancient and modern lines). Notions such as *provincia* and provincial administration were thus part of a long-evolving (and not always linear) process, which redefined Roman preferences, Roman statehood, and intervention in negotiation with others, across multiple adjusted levels of interaction – from *socii* and client-kings, to freed/inviolable, treated, or fully hostile *poleis* and tribes.<sup>112</sup>

The success of Rome, then, lay not only in physical prowess, since such prowess was colored and made possible by an evolved capacity to convince Romans and non-Romans alike, to adaptively recreate other traditions in their own ways, and redefine themselves (to a certain extent) in the process. Beyond mere coercion, the Roman *res publica* was able to offer something truly compelling: a monarchic republic, deploying visions of awe-inspiring ferocity, of tireless if not subjective righteousness, and versions of a new world order (whether for good or for ill). Over time, the Republic thus developed innovative forms of control, and a new alternative to statehood, within which a

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<sup>111</sup> E.g. Badian (1968).

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Evans (2009: 29), who suggests these points in a critique of Eckstein (2008). For more on the notion of *provincia* and sovereignty, see below, pp. 149ff.

variety of polities could be linked and integrated (and only eventually annexed or centralized). By simultaneously crushing defiance, recognizing pre-existing norms, and grafting on new ones, Rome suppressed opposition to the ever-evolving amalgam, and even more so, created converts to its innovative order.

It was thus with particular qualitative features that structural change really took place. Rome existed as an integral part of an international environment, itself a culture with various norms – shared and/or contested – of sovereignty, authority, militarization, and justice.<sup>113</sup> In responding to that environment, Rome achieved a unique balance between internal and external settings, and redefined the nature of statehood itself.<sup>114</sup> It was only in this way that physical prowess could be accumulated, maintained, and legitimized, and any political theory investigating the process of Rome's rise to hegemony must consider it fundamental. Understanding this ongoing relationship between physical and conceptual or ideological aspects of power is also crucial for interpreting the surviving sources, both literary and archaeological. And in an added level of complexity, the story of the second century BCE has become wrapped in the political and social thought of later generations, each with its own set of eliminations, re-appropriations, and re-interpretations of previous events and trends.<sup>115</sup>

A meaningful and nuanced approach to the rise of Rome must therefore recognize multiple layers of historical construction, with physical and conceptual aspects of power. These layers crisscross the ancient/modern divide, as modern interpretations have

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<sup>113</sup> For more on norms and IR theory in this light, see the Appendix, and below, pp. 54ff.

<sup>114</sup> For an explanation of Rome's re-definition of statehood, see the discussion below – pp. 139ff.

<sup>115</sup> See the overview of these later viewpoints below – pp. 345ff.

connected with elements of previous political thought. The very establishment of a defensivist thesis (and by extension, an offensivist response) has been influenced and moderated by Roman imperial rhetoric, especially that of the first century BCE/CE (which first highlighted a split between earlier and ‘late’ periods in the Republic).<sup>116</sup> At the same time, imperialist theses have been guided by even later interpretations of a Roman tradition, by men such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, who perceived distinct lessons regarding fear, virtue, and the role of power in politics.<sup>117</sup> These influences, when paired with nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial and post-colonial experience, have in turn produced specific readings of Polybius, Cicero, Sallust, and Livy, as precursors, foils, and/or lessons to modern thought and practice.

In many ways, then, both ancient and modern narratives return to similar concepts, with various sets of emphasis and multiple conceptions of statehood/sovereignty, political fear and aggression, morality and ethics, and cultural superiority, in constructing histories and their relevant temporal, politicized markers – moments such as 146 BCE.<sup>118</sup> This conclusion brings us to so-called constructivist IR theory, and in particular, the focus on norms as a fundamental unit of contact between individuals and groups attempting to communicate, convince, and overawe on an international level.

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<sup>116</sup> For more, see below, pp. 345ff. In Sallust’s formulation, for example, 146 BCE itself marked the definitive line in periodizing the Republic’s history, becoming the point from which Roman *mores* declined.

<sup>117</sup> On Machiavelli, see Fischer (1996, 1997). On Hobbes, see Ryan (1996); Ahrens Dorf (2000); Yurdusev (2006).

<sup>118</sup> Prokhovnik (2008) develops a useful distinction between a concept – e.g. sovereignty – and its many historical *conceptions*, consisting of varying clusters of semiotic elements. The norms particular to the second century BCE will be discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 4.

## NORMATIVE IR THEORY: A REVIEW OF THE APPROACH

The Appendix describes a wide variety of IR theoretical approaches available for the study of ancient history. The approach taken here, however, begins with elements of realism, as a state (or unit)-based analysis of power processes and the human tendency toward violence. It then incorporates elements from the constructivist critique, in stressing the inter-subjectivity of all human (and hence international) interaction.<sup>119</sup> As such, it re-emphasizes the nature of Power (and its structure) as a *social* process, comprised of *both* material (i.e. military/economic capability) *and* even more interestingly, ideational (i.e. ideological and legitimizing) features. Such an emphasis involves a closer investigation of *how* shared, intersecting, and conflicting identities, interests, and thought (*Zeitgeist*) are created, transformed, and eliminated over time and space. As such, this form of constructivist realism dovetails with so-called normative theory, which examines the frameworks of conceivable and/or acceptable action, and provides a useful tool for assessing events such as the outbreak of war and the practice of violence – in this case, 146 BCE.<sup>120</sup> Within this picture, norms comprise the “grammar” of human societies, inherently defining the interactions within and between groups (including states).<sup>121</sup>

Normative frameworks are not static, however, and again allow us the flexibility to trace how the behaviors of Rome and other groups instituted and challenged change in

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<sup>119</sup> For more (including citations) on the material summarized here, see the Appendix.

<sup>120</sup> In the Appendix, normative theory is characterized as a theme, not a separate approach, because its content and purpose are so closely related to both international society and constructivism, that to draw the lines between them too deeply would only damage their theoretical potential.

<sup>121</sup> On the concept of norms as a “grammar of society”, see Bicchieri (2006).

their international environment, both in the second century BCE and at later points in the interpretation of 146. For at different times and in different contexts, norms develop and transform as “collective understandings of the proper behavior of actors.”<sup>122</sup> Norms may achieve prominence via the isolation and/or heightened visibility of a certain population, as well as through active promotion. In the first instance, particularly powerful, prestigious, and/or rising groups/states/individuals have an edge in determining which norms will become conspicuous. The norm must also have “coherence” with other prevailing norms, a subject that in turn intersects with debates regarding legitimacy, both as a means for setting out criteria for the “right to rule,” and for understanding the beliefs of those subject to rule.<sup>123</sup> As a cluster of *coherent* norms that establish membership and/or consensus within a society (international or otherwise), legitimacy at once reflects the physical capability and evaluative acceptance of authority.<sup>124</sup>

It is important to note, however, that normative theory cannot (and should not) stand alone as an approach to understanding IR. Features once considered part of contentiously defined realism, including elements that are both biological/classical and structural, must remain part of the perspective. For example, the position and role of norms and of social interaction are linked, by feedback loop, to the factors of relative physical capability, uncertainty, and deception in politics, especially in the process of

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<sup>122</sup> Legro (1997: 2).

<sup>123</sup> See the Appendix.

<sup>124</sup> See Wight (1977: 153). On legitimacy as a social consensus, with no element of coercion, see Hurd (1999). For a constructivist realist approach combining consensus *and* coercion (‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of power, respectively), see (among others) Tarrow (1994); McAdam (1996); Linklater (1998); Payne (2001).

normative change (i.e. their rise-and-fall).<sup>125</sup> Some scholars have also begun to draw a distinction between how much/how far an international *society* extends, as opposed to an international *system*, across which rules and institutions are not closely shared.<sup>126</sup> As Raymond has noted:

*Whereas members of a state system observe certain conventions regarding the treatment of envoys, the sanctity of trade agreements, and similar exchanges anchored in reciprocity, those belonging to an international society possess a more elaborate code of conduct.*<sup>127</sup>

This approach helps break down the barriers between IR as either wholly anarchic or fully integrated and socialized (i.e. with strongly related norms). A normative approach instead allows for a back-and-forth in heterarchic forms, including levels of domestic/ international order, their margins, failures, and collapses, and the presence or persistence of interstate warfare during and/or between them. At the system-society interface, types and frequency of interactions (i.e. economic, intellectual, and/or military) can be traced. Such thinking allows us to see how interactions can lead to mutual recognition and to collective acceptance of a particular normative framework. By the same token, it can reveal the reverse, including processes by which states can become excluded or by which an international society itself may collapse back into a more disparate system.

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<sup>125</sup> These factors are often raised as part of a “realist critique” of constructivism/normative theory – cf. Mearsheimer (1994/1995: 367, 369), Jervis (1998: 976), and Copeland (2000a: 200, 202). However, rather than consider realism and constructivism as potentially oppositional, the aim here is to bring the two together – i.e. “constructivist realism.” Cf. Dunne (2008: 274-279), on the need to integrate fundamental realist elements into the debate regarding international society.

<sup>126</sup> The society-system dialectic was first introduced by Bull (1977: 12), but has since been renewed in the constructivist realist discussion – cf. Wight et al. (1991) and James (2006).

<sup>127</sup> Raymond (1997: 207).

The entire process is therefore one occurring across power-relations, on individual, domestic, and international levels, and it provides the new angle of research needed for exploring *how* war with Carthage and the Achaian League and the destruction of their two urban centers were fitted into a contemporary context, for Romans and non-Romans alike. An analysis informed by an understanding of the normative-realist approach to power also opens new doors for discussion of Rome's evolution as an imperial power, both in terms of its legitimization and its level of acceptance. In this instance, the focus is on 146 BCE as an evolving turning point, but in general, the opportunities for the study of any development in ancient history are promising.

To return to the issue of legitimacy: in the trajectory of a contested norm, the need for coherence leads to the final factor in determining its success, its environment. Whereas coherence refers to the norm's harmony with adjacent prevailing norms, environment refers to the structural setting within which the norm is applied – to physical capability (economic and/or military), to the challenges faced by the particular community or set of communities, and to the technological, natural, and/or human resources available. These factors link the environment back to both norm prominence and coherence. For the physical and situational surroundings will have a hand in determining which norms will become especially visible and what individuals will have what voice in promoting certain norms over others. At the same time, pre-existing norms will not only determine which prominent norms will succeed (either to the benefit or detriment of so-called entrepreneurs), but will also serve to define group interest, identify and characterize its challenges, and assign value to particular resources and/or

technologies.<sup>128</sup> This model thus applies well to current developments in the debate over Roman imperialism, which stands somewhere between Harris' Romano-centric thesis of aggressive acquisitiveness, Eckstein's structural thesis of adjustment to systemic warfare, and the Greco-centric, Gruen-inspired thesis of inheriting and adhering to the Hellenistic world. Therefore, in the following chapters, an alternative, normative-inspired approach will be introduced, as a means for re-assessing the events, perceptions, and presentation of 146 BCE in the light of the Rome-as-empire debate.

In their continuing processes of transformation, norms both affect and are affected by the politics of individuals and transnational actors (first-level), the politics within states (second-level), and between states (third-level).<sup>129</sup> The current study will take a multilateral approach, considering the ways in which domestic, international, and transnational factors dynamically affect each other – but it will do so with an eye to investigating the evolution of international-level norms in the developing middle ground between political cultures of the second century. From this perspective, there existed an ongoing and ultimately inescapable tension in the construction of a new international community – one that was eventually to become the Roman “empire” during the first centuries BCE/CE. Within this tension, the outlooks of individuals and of various political groups influenced, intersected, and conflicted with each other, and their actions helped shape the norms of international life. These in turn served to define, socialize, and influence the individuals and groups involved. In terms of interstate conflict, norms also

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<sup>128</sup> In addition, there are often significant lags in time between behavioral and structural changes, meaning that old norms may linger for long periods despite active condemnation and attempts to coerce newer norms.

<sup>129</sup> See the Appendix.

played a number of roles: in defining the key issues between cultures and national identities, in the convergence and contestation of norms as they come into contact with each other, and in defining the ethics of conflict resolution, appropriate forms of diplomacy, arbitration, and even resorts to violence. It is thus with this focus and international-society middle ground in mind that the present study will investigate, in the course of the following chapters, the development of 146 BCE as a moment of historical significance, and as one with continuing connections to the assessment (positive or negative) of Rome as an imperial power.

#### **CONCLUSION: THE ROMAN DILEMMA**

In the course of this chapter, then, we have explored the tangled web of modern theoretical approaches to ancient international politics in general, and to the Roman state as an imperial in particular. Such traditional approaches have steered the assumptions and very focus of previous studies regarding Rome's war with Carthage and war with the Achaian League, followed by Rome's destructions of Carthage and Corinth in 146. Recently, however, the old dichotomies between primitivist and modernist, internal-culturalist and external-structuralist, and defensivist and offensivist stances have begun to break down. And it is at this juncture that Eckstein's contribution, of re-connecting the distant cousins of political (IR) theory and the study of ancient history, has presented an exciting opportunity. Re-entering the debate, the current study builds upon Eckstein's work, using modern terminology and concepts to explore what is essentially a foreign set of cultures. Yet it does so with an eye to the international level as an arena of social

interaction, between individuals and groups with various cultural backgrounds seeking to communicate, accommodate, cajole, or otherwise engage with each other. By virtue of such interactions, the political cultures of Roman, Greek, etc. were to forge a new, international political culture, which in turn affected changes on its members. And – as we will see – this happened in ways that were not always unproblematic and which involved a number of concomitant interpretations that could work at cross-purposes. Furthermore, and uniquely in the second century BCE, there was evolving an additional self-awareness of what today we would call an international community, or “globalized” world. It was all of these factors that in combination were to give what became the constructed moment of 146 BCE its broader, even world-historical meaning.

On one level, this constructivist approach ultimately makes it unnecessary to engage in that eternal imperialism debate: defensive versus offensive. But here – and as we shall see – the associations between 146 BCE, Roman hegemony, and issues of international governance run deeper, all the way back to the second century itself. In recent parlance, the essence of the international governance debate – that is, whether empire can ever truly serve a “good” purpose – has actually been termed the “Roman dilemma” by Harold James. It has been given this name for the European colonial-imperialist rhetoric that looked to Rome as an exemplar, either to emulate or to improve upon – but interestingly, and unbeknownst to James, there was a “Roman dilemma” in the ancient world as well.

In James’ formulation, there are essentially two processes of power in tension with each other – and which find their way into different “sides” in the debate. On the

one hand is the desire for and creation of a “stable, prosperous, and integrated international society,” through inclusivity and peaceful commerce (today often referred to as globalization).<sup>130</sup> And on the other hand is the rivalry, conflict, and dissent created by/within such order, resulting in acts of force, and memories of such force, even within “voluntarily negotiated rules.”<sup>131</sup> Broad-based authority, then, encompasses elements of both “hard” and “soft” power, comprising dual trends, between supposedly benign globalization and high-handed, suppressive imperialism, the roots of its own fragmentation.<sup>132</sup>

And although James does not acknowledge this fact himself, an analogous debate regarding imperial power was indeed taking place within second century BCE intellectual circles. Like today, it explored the problematic nature of empire, as either benign and paternal or tyrannical and oppressive – and as we will see, it played a major role in the contemporary construction of 146 BCE as a momentous juncture.<sup>133</sup> The idea that Rome existed somewhere between a “justice-loving, defensively minded” polity, and a “voraciously bellicose and insatiably grasping” one thus comes closer to the nuances of Roman imperialism – and in particular, as it was discussed at the time.<sup>134</sup> We turn now to those times, and to the normative international context upon which 146 was to become a significant marker of Rome as an imperial – hegemonic or autocratic? – state.

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<sup>130</sup> James (2006: 1).

<sup>131</sup> James (2006: 1).

<sup>132</sup> James (2006: 1). Joseph Nye (1990) first popularized the terms hard and soft power, in order to denote the forceful and ideological dimensions of authority. For an excellent discussion, see Berenskoetter and Williams, eds. (2007).

<sup>133</sup> See discussion below – pp. 331ff.

<sup>134</sup> The quotes are from Champion (2009: 254).

### **Chapter 3: Interstate Norms & the Early Second Century BCE**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

The aim of this and the next chapter is to reconstruct a picture of Mediterranean interstate conditions during the first half of the second century BCE. This objective is crucial for re-contextualizing the events surrounding 146 BCE, and the assessment of these events as a particular moment of change. By developing a view of second-century norms of interstate politics, the current status of 146 as an historical turning point can be returned to its original setting, and re-assessed within broader processes of change occurring at Rome, in the Greek and non-Greek speaking worlds, and at the juncture points between them.

Here in particular, then, the focus is on second-century *Zeitgeist* as an international phenomenon – that is, as a conceptual level upon which intellectuals, statesmen, and diplomats from various states and cultures were thinking about their own interstate politics and its changes.<sup>135</sup> It will be argued that such second-century thinking did indeed conceive of an interstate community and constructed, contested, and even re-defined its parameters via certain modes of diplomatic interaction – in particular, via a rhetoric of pan- and phil-Hellenism and cosmopolitanism, and via networks of *syngeneia* and myth-historic kinship – all tied to notions of a “world” history. These trends provided the wider context for the events of 146 BCE, and the manner in which they attained broader, internationally based significance. To better understand them, we will review the points at which Romans, Greeks, and others (all complex entities in and of themselves)

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<sup>135</sup> Richardson (2008: 6) has used the phrase “mental wallpaper” to refer to such background thinking.

appear to have experienced direct matches in each other's behaviors, as well as when communications misfired, whether due to cultural misunderstanding, unawareness, or egoism (intended or unintended). Later, in the next chapter, we will look further at political and legal frameworks that were being used by this conceptual community, with their own trends toward negotiation, assimilation, manipulation, and misapprehension. For now, however, the focus is on the theoretical construction and development of a middle ground across political cultures.

In order to embark on this investigation, we must first be clear regarding the use of modern terminology vis à vis ancient patterns of thinking, both in the periodization of ancient history – e.g. using the modern term Hellenistic – and in conceiving of world politics – e.g. modern globalization. As mentioned earlier, the conclusion here is that the ancient evidence points to both trends – toward the periodizing of history and in an international, global sense – were actually in place during the second century itself. Intellectuals at the time were engaged in the process of building chronologies while thinking about politics in pan-Hellenic, internationally- and ethically-fielded terms. Old modes of *ethnos* and *polis* and even individual interactions were transforming and forging new interstate networks, which were in turn being mapped onto universalizing, civilizing ideals. And Romans in particular were being positioned, and were positioning themselves, as the key figures for evaluation... as new, re-defined pan-Hellenic hegemon.

## THINKING IN MODERN TERMS: HELLENISTIC GLOBALIZATION

In recent years, scholarship has highlighted the complexities of the period traditionally known as the “Hellenistic” – a period framed by late seventeenth-century historians and in particular by Droysen (in the late nineteenth century) as a temporal entity (extending between Classical and Roman, from Alexander to Actium, etc.) and as a cultural (“Hellenizing”) phenomenon.<sup>136</sup> And it is with the more recently conceived complexities that the term Hellenistic is to be understood here: as a broader label for the multidirectional and increasingly networked exchanges that actually transformed the very meaning of Greek-ness, across a multitude of regions (with various manifestations) in the era after Alexander’s conquests. Such multi-directionality and networks of exchange bring another modern term to the fore – globalization. This concept remains a subject of lively ongoing debate, and some scholars are wary of applying it to the study of the ancient world, yet when reduced to its most simple essence, it is of particular interest to the study of international politics in the age after Alexander.<sup>137</sup> For at its most basic, the term globalization refers to the extension and amplification of relations across pre-existing boundaries – processes that always take place on some level or another, but at key times in history intensify to cross large geographical areas in relatively short periods of time.

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<sup>136</sup> Seventeenth-century origins: cf. Bossuet (1691, I.8). For more on the interrelation of nineteenth-century concepts, see Hingley (2005: Ch. 2); Cartledge (1997); Ogden (2002: ix-x); Erskine (2007: 2-3).

<sup>137</sup> See Vandkilde (2007: 12-13), with references. Vandkilde’s summary is largely followed here, as it best deploys the concept of ‘globalization’ for use in current work in anthropology and archaeology (and by extension, ancient history). For a view of globalization in a positive light, see Legrain (2002); in a negative one - see Petras and Veltmeyer (2001). For recent critiques and re-workings of the term Hellenistic, see Davies (1984: 263); Smith (1988: 2); Green (1990: xv; 1993: 8); Cartledge (1997: 2-5); Ogden (2002: x); Erskine (2007: 3).

This is the globalization we will employ here, to refer to the Hellenistic world as an evolving international system. Not without elements recognizable today as imperializing (for good and/or for ill),<sup>138</sup> the Hellenistic world was one in transit. People, material goods, ideas, and discourses were rapidly intersecting, from different directions and with different momentums, but were ultimately becoming more and more closely linked. Bringing two modern terms together – Hellenistic and globalization – thus allows to think about individuals and groups as “becoming Hellenistic,” forging a middle ground in which to adopt, modify, and reject behaviors and redefine the parameters of internationally-based Hellenism.

#### **HELLENISTIC: ANCIENT CHRONOGRAPHY & GLOBALISM**

In conceiving of the Hellenistic as an historical period, politically based boundaries of chronology remain of lasting value – ancients at the time and in later generations deployed them, and created an approach and framework still used by modern scholars. And rightly so: for a consensus developed early on, among ancient contemporaries, that Alexander’s conquests had forever transformed the (Greek) world and ushered in a new era. Alexander himself had propounded such thinking, and in the Diadochic period, writers such as Hieronymus of Cardia, Nymphis of Heraclea, Arrian of Nicomedia, and Dexippus of Athens all compiled works under titles such as “the things

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<sup>138</sup> See, for example, recent scholarship on the Roman empire and the subject of ‘Romanization,’ using globalization as a model: Sturgeon (2000); Witcher (2000); Hingley (2005); Hitchner (2008).

after Alexander.”<sup>139</sup> The late-fourth/ early-third century BCE orator, Demetrius of Phaleron, reportedly spoke of Alexander’s world empire as lent by Tyche, who had taken her blessings from Persia and would eventually transfer them from the Macedonians.<sup>140</sup> Polybius took this potential scheme for periodizing world history and put forward Rome as the current heir of Tyche’s blessings and of Alexander’s legacy.

And, as we shall see, Polybius was ultimately to posit 146 BCE as the very end of a Greek-Hellenistic and beginning of the Roman era.<sup>141</sup> Romans at the time may or may not have thought differently, but by the Augustan age, their writers were certainly proponents of Rome as current heir in a sequence of grand empires.<sup>142</sup> Within such constructions of ‘universal history,’ Alexander and Augustus – as today – were major figures marking new eras. And like Alexander, Augustus encouraged this literary and ideological trend, placing Roman *imperium* (in the abstract sense) at the culminating point in the cycles of world history. The advent of Augustus was celebrated as the beginning of a new and even greater global age, and the victory over Cleopatra, last of the major Hellenistic dynasts (rather than Antony), was commemorated as the decisive political moment heralding it.<sup>143</sup> As part of this scheme and building upon traditions first established by Polybius (and undoubtedly in the minds of other contemporaries), 146

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<sup>139</sup> Hieronymus of Cardia, *FGrH* 154: “*ta epi Alexandroi prachthenta*”; Nymphis of Heraclea, *FGrH* 432: “*peri Alexandrou kai ton diadochon kai epigonon*”; Arrian of Nicomedia, *FGrH* 156: “*ta meta Alexandron*”; Dexippus of Athens, *FGrH* 100: “*ta meta Alexandron*.”

<sup>140</sup> Demetrius of Phaleron F81 Wehrli, quoted by Polybius, 29.21.

<sup>141</sup> Specifically, he indicates a handing over of archē from Macedon to Rome, followed by a new era culminating in Rome’s defeat of Carthage and Corinth/the Achaian League in 146. For more, see the discussion below in chapter 6.

<sup>142</sup> See below, pp. 322ff.

<sup>143</sup> On Actium and the later death of Cleopatra (conflated) as representing this turning point, see Ogden (2002: xi-xii); Hölscher (1984, 1985); and Quesnay (2009), on Hor. *Odes* 4.5 and the Ludi Quinquennales on the fifteenth anniversary of Actium. See also Aug. *RG* 25.2; Verg. *Aen.* 8.678-700; Lucian *Salt.* 37.

BCE was resurrected and brought full circle, in the Augustan re-foundations of Carthage and Corinth as Roman colonies (see below).

In the meantime, the intellectual milieu of the second century, among Hellenistic rhetoricians, philosophers, and historians, was evolving a distinctly globalized theoretical outlook..<sup>144</sup> Hellenistic intellectuals conceived of such notions as being a ‘world-citizen’ (*kosmopolites*),<sup>145</sup> and of an inhabited world (*oikoumenē*, *orbis terrarum*) whose history was becoming an organic whole (*sōmatoeidē*), and whose events were becoming woven together (*symplekesthai*). These last ideas are given shape in the words of Polybius, near the opening of the *Histories*:

*Previously, the doings of the world had been, so to say, dispersed... but ever since this date [the 140<sup>th</sup> Olympiad, 220-216 BCE], history has been an organic whole (sōmatoeidē), and the affairs of Italy and Libya have been interlinked with (symplekesthai) those of Greece and Asia, all leading up to one end...<sup>146</sup>*

At the same time, such patterns of thought among Hellenistic intellectuals were directly in line with what was happening in the political and international arena, of which many of the same men were an active and integral part. Their interactions contributed to an overall blurring of older boundaries of individual and group identity. On all levels, from horizontal (i.e. between members of equivalent power and status) to vertical (i.e. between members of differing power and status), the interdependencies of local, regional, and

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<sup>144</sup> See Inglis and Robertson (2004), on globalizing Hellenistic historiography/Polybius; Robertson and Inglis (2004: 40-42), on the above, plus Hellenistic philosophy; and Pernot (2005), on Hellenistic globalization in rhetorical styling.

<sup>145</sup> For the Cynic Diogenes characterizing himself as *kosmopolites*, see Goulet-Cazé (2000: 329); see also Konstan (2009); Richter (2011). On the Stoic Zeno’s similar thoughts, cf. Plut. *De fort. Alex.* 329a-b: “*The much admired Republic of Zeno... is aimed at this one main point, that... we should regard all men as our fellow-citizens and local residents (politai), and there should be one way of life and one kosmos...*” See also the section on second-century BCE political philosophies, below – pp. 331ff.

<sup>146</sup> Polyb. 1.3.3-5.

supra-regional élites, associations, *polis*-coalitions, and royal courts were becoming more tightly bound. It is no accident, then, that a contemporary mind such as Polybius used the term *symplokē* (“interweaving”) to describe what today is very recognizable as international, globalized networking.<sup>147</sup>

These intersecting political mechanisms in turn fit into concomitant processes of cultural exchange, with an evolution of a broad range of claims to ‘Hellenism’ across the Mediterranean world. That such a concept as ‘Hellenism’ existed, though with varied manifestations, is evident from a few contemporary testimonies. Forms of the Greek verb, *hellēnizein* (“to Greek-ize”) can be found for example in the books of Maccabees (e.g. 2 Mac. 4.13) and in the Acts of the Apostles (6.1 and 9.29), in reference to Jews who have learned the Greek language, have acquired elements of a ‘Greek’ lifestyle and culture, and are in favor of making diplomatic overtures – alliances, etc. – to Hellenistic hegemony.<sup>148</sup> In the Zenon archive of papyri from third century BCE Egypt, a camel-driver complains of not receiving regular payment, presumably because, as he states, “I am a barbarian,” and, “I do not know how to ‘Greek-ize’ / behave like a Greek (*hellēnizein*).”<sup>149</sup> In each of these instances, individuals of non-Greek descent or religion nevertheless recognized the possibility of becoming more ‘Greek-like,’ or closer to Greek identity, by learning a language and adopting a chosen set of customs (e.g. dress, behavior, style of house, etc.). The same patterns can be seen among leading Romans as well (see below), as they become increasingly involved in Mediterranean interstate

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<sup>147</sup> Cf. Davies (2002); and with broader perspectives, Horden and Purcell (2000); Harris (2005); Malkin (2005); Malkin et al. (2009).

<sup>148</sup> Cf. Ogden (2002); Zacharia (2008a).

<sup>149</sup> *P. Col. Zen.* 66, l. 19, 21; cf. Walbank (1993: 115).

politics during the third and second centuries BCE. The end result was that Hellenism itself was expanding as an international assemblage of political culture, from which individuals and/or groups of various backgrounds could selectively adapt and were doing so with greater frequency.

Such a Hellenic assemblage was not a *de novo* creation of Alexander's age; rather, it had evolved from, and was now expanding, a system of earlier (archaic and classical) definitions of Greek identity.<sup>150</sup> On a fundamental level, these definitions evolved out of what Herodotus had described as comprising *to Hellênikon*: shared bloodline, language, religion, and customs.<sup>151</sup> Within this spectrum of Greekness were subgroups, such as *ethnê* (e.g. Aetolians) and speakers of various dialects (e.g. Dorians and Ionians), which existed on a level above the *poleis* and their manifestations of Hellenism.<sup>152</sup> *Poleis* in turn established webs of interrelationships based on ethnic and linguistic ties, but they also forged cultural and religious links between each other. These links were cemented via mythological-genealogical kinship, or *syngeneia*, an institution that brought together the bloodlines, cults, and customs of *metropolis* and *apoikia*, or of *polis* and *polis*.<sup>153</sup> *Syngeneia* was secured via approved and documented points of shared parentage, whether 'real' – that is, by colonization and generations of intermarriage – or

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<sup>150</sup> Note that these iterations of Hellenic identity were as diverse and in as much flux as those of Romanitas – see, among others, Malkin et al. (2001); Hall (2002); Zacharia (2008a-b); Burstein (2008).

<sup>151</sup> Hdt. 8.144.1-3. Cf. Zacharia (2008b); Burstein (2008). Interestingly enough, as Burstein points out, Herodotus' categories are quite similar to those used by modern sociologists to define ethnicity – i.e. descent, commensality, and cult – cf. Nash (1996: 25).

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Zacharia (2008b: 28-29).

<sup>153</sup> In recent decades, much attention has been paid to this subject, known as 'kinship diplomacy' – cf. Curty (1995, 2005); Will (1995); Jones (1999); Lücke (2000); and in relation to Rome, Elwyn (1993); Erskine (2001); Battistoni (2009).

‘determined,’ after much genealogical digging. The difference between the two, recognizable today, was of no significance to ancient Greeks or their contemporaries. Kinship bonds could also involve mythic-heroic ties of *xenia*, which could establish alignment between cities (*oikeiotes*) or could strengthen other claims to shared parentage. Claims of all types, once recognized by all parties, were taken seriously and had a genuine political impact, far beyond empty rhetoric, and with greater frequency and impact than was true in earlier periods.<sup>154</sup> The Hellenistic era thus witnessed a growth in the number and international political significance of these ties, which were now creating entirely new definitions of Hellenicity (to use Jonathan Hall’s phrase). From the level of the individual *hellēnistēs* (as documented in the Zenon papyri or Acts of the Apostles), to that of the *poleis*, Hellenism was now a process rapidly on the move, connecting groups in a figurative debate over what defined legitimate membership in international society. And as we will see, Romans in the third and especially the second century BCE were very much a part – and played a transformative role – in this system-wide, Hellenistic debate.

### **HELLENISTIC HELLENISM: CIVILIZING IDEALS & EMPIRE**

A common thread in these international processes existed in the growing equation of Greekness with ‘being civilized’ – that is, moving beyond Greek ethnicity and mere mastery of *koinē* Greek, and extending into notions of urbanity, high culture, and refined morality and ethics. As Isocrates stated in his *Panegyricus* (50), the term ‘Hellenes’

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<sup>154</sup> See the next section on kinship diplomacy in the second century BCE, with examples.

would best suggest not a race but an intelligence, to be applied to those sharing culture rather than immediate blood. Later on, Eratosthenes argued that it would perhaps be better to divide mankind into good and bad, rather than use the old and overwrought Greek-barbarian dichotomy.<sup>155</sup> Their words clearly imply that ethnic Greekness was gaining fluidity, not only as part of the momentum behind Macedonian ascendancy and the ‘civilizing mission’ often associated with Alexander’s political rhetoric,<sup>156</sup> but also with gaining speed in the wake of Alexander’s conquests, which opened international networks and juxtaposed very different and distant cultures across a new and ‘Greek’ imperial plane. Within such a context, non-Greeks with the will and the means to obtain Greek *paideia* and assume key Greek customs could gain recognition for their Hellenism among intellectual and diplomatic circles. Terms such as *philhellene* gained broader application for their ability to describe and link together ethnically Greek and non-Greek in behavior that was cultured, moderate, and beneficent to fellow “Greeks,” one’s fellow civilized world-citizens.<sup>157</sup>

For this reason, then, the practice of kinship diplomacy became increasingly popular during the Hellenistic period, for its ability to locate blood relations in addition to bonds of language and culture. By figuring out ties of *syngeneia*, the conceptual sphere of Hellenism could be expanded to include barbaric hinterlands, regions once beyond the

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<sup>155</sup> Eratosthenes F II C in Hugo Berger, 1880.

<sup>156</sup> Cf. Isoc. 5.16.111-116; also Aeschin. 3.132; Plut. *Phoc.* 17.7. See Poddighe (2009); Heckel and Tritle (2011: 101, 255).

<sup>157</sup> Again, *philhellene* has its roots in the classical period – cf. Plato Rep. 5.470c, e. Xenophon (Ages. 7.1) has a revealing description of the concept: “...if it is honorable in one who is a Hellene to be a friend to the Hellenes, what other general has the world seen unwilling to take a city when he thought that it would be sacked, or who looked on victory in a war against Hellenes as a disaster?”

realm of close political and social interaction, but now entering into the networks of civic, ‘civilized’ relations.<sup>158</sup> Strabo provides an anecdote that epitomizes the process well: he describes two Thessalians (themselves once of non-Greek lineage), in Alexander’s (Macedonian) army, setting out to prove that the peoples of Armenia and Media are in fact related to the Thessalians.<sup>159</sup> Through mythic-heroic reconstruction, newly encountered groups could literally be ‘re-entered’ into the *oikoumene*.

The extension and evolution of religious cults also played an important role in these processes, via new pan-Hellenic sanctuaries with internationally recognized festivals and statuses of inviolability (*asylia*).<sup>160</sup> The language commemorating the newly minted festival of *Soteria* at Delphi (279 BCE) summarizes well that the celebration would continuously serve as a

*memorial of the deliverance of the Greeks and of the victory which was achieved over the barbarians [Gauls], who marched against the sanctuary of Apollo, which is common to the Greeks, and who marched against the Greeks...*<sup>161</sup>

Such markers, of mythic-heroic kinship and shared, even syncretized cult, represented an important evolution of the older, Herodotean tradition of *to Hellēnikon*, making it an even more wide-ranging and in some ways elastic concept.

‘Greekness’ in the Hellenistic period was thus a contested label, with quite a lot at stake. Groups once seen as ‘non-Greek,’ and perhaps still by some contemporaries

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<sup>158</sup> See the discussion in Hornblower (2008), with examples of this process occurring in earlier periods as well.

<sup>159</sup> Strabo 11.14.12. Again, this is an updated version of an earlier Greek tradition, of linking newly encountered peoples to Greek civilization via mythological figures – cf. Bickerman (1952).

<sup>160</sup> E.g., the sanctuary of Artemis Leucophryene at Magnesia on the Maeander – cf. *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 557. For documented grants of *asylia*, see Rigsby (1996).

<sup>161</sup> *I. Delphi* 3.3.215, l. 5-8.

deemed ‘non-Greek,’ including *ethnē* such as the Aetolians or Macedonians, could be said to act Greek and would themselves go to lengths to demonstrate their Greekness.<sup>162</sup> Macedonian leadership, for example, could claim Hellenism on the basis of their language,<sup>163</sup> admission to pan-Hellenic cult, and even to mythic-heroic kinship.<sup>164</sup> However, these same Macedonians could be deemed “common enemies of the Greeks” (e.g. Philip II, Perseus),<sup>165</sup> and alternate genealogies could be used to distance them from mainland and Aegean Greeks, at a time when Macedonian kingship came into conflict with these Greek *poleis* as well as with Rome (a state which only encouraged emphasis on Macedon’s non-Greekness).<sup>166</sup>

There was thus a sliding scale of Greekness, which reflected one’s socio-political standing on a local and regional as well as an international level, and which had direct political uses and effects. The scale can be understood as moving in the following direction: on the upper end, from an ethnic Greek acting Greek (i.e. in a civilized fashion), to a non-Greek acting Greek (and even at times achieving admission to Greek identity), and to a barbarian with Greek-like qualities (i.e. potential for becoming more

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<sup>162</sup> Cf. Hornblower (2008: 58), with references. On the complex subject of ancient Macedonian and Greek ethnicity (both consisting of numerous subgroups) and their interrelations, see Engels (2010).

<sup>163</sup> The discovery of a 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE curse tablet at Pella has verified that Macedonian was a form of north-west Greek – cf. Masson (1996); tablet first published in *Bull. ép.* 1994, no. 413. See also Hatzopoulos (1998); Masson (1998).

<sup>164</sup> Dating as far back as the archaic period: Ps. Hesiod, *Cat. of Women* F7 (Merkelbach & West), on eponymous Makedon as son of Zeus and Thyia, daughter of Deucalion; Hellanikos, *FGrH* 4F74, on Makedon as son of Aeolus, brother of Doros and Xythos; Hdt. 9.45, on Alexander I’s claims to Greek descent; Hdt. 5.22, on his admission to the Olympic Games upon proving himself to be of Argive descent; and Isoc. *Phil.* 5.105-7, on Philip II’s lineage from Herakles, and the founder of the Macedonian kingdom, Perdikkas, as coming from Argos.

<sup>165</sup> For Philip II, see Dem. 14.3. For Perseus, see below – p. 95.

<sup>166</sup> On Rome in this context, see below – pp. 78ff. Alternate mythic genealogies, including versions that held eponymous Makedon son of Lycaon, king of Emathia and a Pelasgian, survived into the second century CE – cf. Aelian *N.A.* 10.48; Ps. Apollodoros, *Bibl.* 3.81.

Greek). On the lower end, the spectrum moved from an ethnic Greek, or a non-Greek with claims to Greekness, acting barbaric, to a barbarian being just that, a barbarian, which, as the Greeks saw it, meant acting in a brutal or crude manner. Such a conceptual framework was to have great impact on later conditions in Rome's eastern empire, where, as the second-century CE Hellenized Syrian, Lucian, noted, a man without Greek education could only be a "worker with his hands and a commoner," while one that was educated was "honored and praised... and considered worthy of public office and precedence."<sup>167</sup>

#### **THE WEST: REPUBLICAN ROME, CARTHAGE, & HELLENISM**

In hindsight, we know that Rome would come to inherit much of the Hellenistic system developed in the east, transforming the international language of 'globalized' Hellenism into one of *imperium orbis terrae*.<sup>168</sup> However, there is much more to the equation than mere inheritance and the view often brandished about by Romans themselves, and encapsulated by Horace's sardonic wit: *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artis intulit agresti Latio*.<sup>169</sup> Rome had long been in contact with and affected by multifaceted elements of 'Greek' culture, and during the third and especially the second and first centuries BCE, played an increasingly interactive role in determining the course that international Hellenism would take, both culturally and politically. The manner of Roman rhetoric that developed out of these interactions testifies to this. For the fact that

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<sup>167</sup> Lucian, *The Dream* 9.11.

<sup>168</sup> On this transformation, see, among others, Nicolet (1991); Swain (1996); Clarke (1999).

<sup>169</sup> Hor. *Ep.* 2.1.156-157.

later Roman authors equated the legacy of the Greeks with philosophy and the arts, while associating their own state's contribution with political and military deeds,<sup>170</sup> is telling. For it reflects the trouble faced by earlier, Hellenistic-era generations of Roman intellectuals and statesmen in defining the Roman *res publica* as an internationally civilized and recognized power, culturally adapted (i.e. Hellenized), and yet also adamantly retaining and/or forging a strong place for *Romanitas*.

Romans indeed possessed a longstanding and a complex history of cultural and political interaction with Hellenism, tracing back as far as Bronze Age Mycenaean trade, and extending into the era of the earliest archaic *poleis* developed in the colonies of Magna Graecia and Sicily. Other Italic peoples, who would eventually be brought into the Roman sphere, also conquered and commingled with these Greek communities, prior to and even following Roman domination. Neapolis, for example, on becoming a Roman *municipium* in the first century BCE nevertheless retained its Greek institutions,<sup>171</sup> and Pompeii, an Oscan-Greek city with centuries of Campanian Samnite control, maintained its distinct local flavor after Roman influence reached the town during the First Punic War.<sup>172</sup> Such examples reveal the intricate and numerous points of intersection between groups positioned around Rome, their political affiliations, and their cultural identities. By the fourth century, Heracleides Ponticus could actually think of Rome as a Greek *polis*, and his audiences equated Rome with a civilized, political unit operating (to use the

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<sup>170</sup> E.g. Quint. *Inst. Orat.* 12.2.30: *quantum enim Graeci praeceptis valent, tantum Romani, quod est maius, exemplis...* See also the famed words of Anchises, describing the cosmic 'mission' of the Roman (as opposed to other peoples): Verg. *Aen.* 6.847-853.

<sup>171</sup> Cf. de Martino (1952: 335); and Sherk (1970: 29-32) for inscriptional evidence.

<sup>172</sup> See the overview in Richardson (1988: 3-9).

modern terminology) on the level of international system.<sup>173</sup> That this equation also reflected a lengthy history of interconnectivity with a larger Mediterranean, ‘Greek’ world, that Romans had and were in the process of developing their own brand of Hellenism, was taken for granted.<sup>174</sup> By the second century, Polybius represented Rome using the language of international political philosophy, and analyzed her *politeia* in comparison to and in contrast with contemporary Hellenic constitutions, thereby bringing her into the intellectual tradition of evaluating different ‘Greek’ political systems.<sup>175</sup> That he did so with success, though with a degree of misunderstanding,<sup>176</sup> as he did for states like Sparta, Carthage, or Crete, points to an ongoing process, whereby uniquely Roman conventions were becoming melded onto and transformed by, and yet by the same token were redefining previous traditions of the Hellenistic *polis*-system, across local, regional, and supra-regional networks.<sup>177</sup>

Eratosthenes thus argued that Romans, as well as Carthaginians, both with unique developments on the *polis* model, were wrongly labeled barbarian, because of their admirable systems of government.<sup>178</sup> Centuries later, Strabo voiced the direct opposite of this perspective, lamenting what he called the ‘barbarization’ (i.e. Romanization, or ‘de-

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<sup>173</sup> Plut. *Camillus* 22, quoting Heracleides.

<sup>174</sup> See, for example, the articles in Zanker, ed. (1976).

<sup>175</sup> Polyb. 6; Champion (2004: 99); see also below, – pp. 155ff.

<sup>176</sup> On this subject, see the discussions below in chapter 4.

<sup>177</sup> See discussion in North (1990); note in Mellor (2008: 100). For Polybius’ misunderstandings regarding Sparta, cf. Walbank (1990: 145); for the explanation that these misconceptions were the product of Polybius’ overarching views regarding the subject and purpose of his *Histories*, see id. (1990: 153ff.).

<sup>178</sup> Strabo 1.4.9, quoting Eratosthenes. Aristotle had earlier discussed the ‘mixed’ *politeia* of Carthage, with some admiration – cf. *Pol.* 1272b24-1273b25.

Hellenization') of Magna Graecia.<sup>179</sup> Both statements testify to a lasting belief that the Romans, despite elements of Hellenism, remained fundamentally non-Greek. The same underlying approach was also applied to the Carthaginians. As early as the fifth century, Hamilcar, the Carthaginian general who fought at the Battle of Himera, was said to have had a Syracusan mother and ties of *xenia* with the tyrant of Himera.<sup>180</sup> By the end of the century, a fragmentary decree from Athens records diplomatic exchange between that city and Carthage.<sup>181</sup> And over the following centuries, evidence for Carthaginian-Greek relations of *philia* and *xenia* continued to abound.<sup>182</sup> A Syracusan king was said to have consulted the Delphic oracle via a Carthaginian envoy;<sup>183</sup> while in Boeotia, a Carthaginian, Nobas(?), son of Axioubas, was awarded proxeny;<sup>184</sup> and on Delos and as far away as Istrus on the Black Sea, Carthaginian traders made dedications to Greek sanctuaries and were honored in Greek public inscriptions.<sup>185</sup> The Syracusan-born orator, Lysias, could even make parallels between Artaxerxes II, king of Persia, and Dionysus I, tyrant of Syracuse, as enemies to those involved in the pan-Hellenic struggle against barbarians. In this configuration, the Carthaginians, as the opponents to Dionysius, were the ones being presented – perhaps with added rhetorical flourish – as the champions for

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<sup>179</sup> Strabo 6.1.3

<sup>180</sup> Hdt. 7.165-166.

<sup>181</sup> Meiggs and Lewis (1988: no. 92).

<sup>182</sup> E.g. Polyb. 7.2.4 (on Syracusans Epicydes and Hippocrates, who had served under Hannibal and adopted Carthage as their country, since their family had lived there after their grandfather's exile); Plut. *Dion* 25.12-14 (on Synalus, the Carthaginian commander, having ties with Dion); and *IG* 14.279 (for a late-Hellenistic ivory *tessera hospitalis* found at Lilybaeum, recording *xenia* between Imulch Inibalos Chloron, son of Himilcho, and Lyson, son of Diognetes).

<sup>183</sup> Diod. 19.2.3.

<sup>184</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003: no. 43).

<sup>185</sup> Delian archives: Carthaginian name(s) include Iomilkas; Istrus: early second century BCE *polis* decree inscription cited by Rostovtzeff (1964/1998: 1462, n. 20), who references S. Lambrino, *Dacia iii-iv* (1927-32: pp. 400ff.).

pan-Hellenism.<sup>186</sup> In the widening and progressively interconnected spectrum and negotiation of Mediterranean ‘Hellenism,’ the city of Carthage and its citizens were integral players.<sup>187</sup>

However, and at the same time, the picture of pre-Roman Carthage that survived into later generations of the ancient world was not always positive, especially when authors emphasized or dwelt upon stereotypes of the Carthaginian people as grasping, brutal, or treacherous.<sup>188</sup> These stereotypes – not without their complexities or ambiguities – were in part related to earlier and contemporary views of “Phoenicians,” a group that at times could be characterized as deceitful or greedy, using the regional-ethnic (as well as personal name/idionym) *Phoinix* – an ethnic that was extended to include Carthaginians.<sup>189</sup> Polybius, in his discussion of Rome’s *politeia*, thus refers to “Phoenicians” – meaning Carthaginians – and Africans as naturally inferior to Italians in both bodily strength and personal courage, and in subsequent passages, he reflects stereotypes of “Phoenicians” as innately covetous and tyrannical, as well as

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<sup>186</sup> Lys. 33.5; cf. Diod. 14.109.

<sup>187</sup> See also below, pp. 234ff., for discussion of the second-century BCE urban development of Carthage, which was recognizably Hellenistic in its design.

<sup>188</sup> For a discussion and a range of viewpoints on these subjects, as well as an itemization of later (esp. Roman) stereotypes of *Poeni* – see Dubuisson (1983); Thiel (1994/1954); Barcelò (1994); Franko (1994); Bunnens (1995); Devallet (1996); Krings (1998); Poinssote (2002); Prag (2006); Camous (2007); Syed (2007: 366ff.); and Brizzi (2011).

<sup>189</sup> Greek-speakers used this ascription as early as Homer. The Latin terms, *Poenus*, and by the end of the second century BCE, *Phoenice(s)*, evolved from the Greek, to be used as *genus*-descriptors, alternately ethnic and/or political in nature. *Poeni* could stand in for “Carthaginian” (*Carthaginienses*), but not vice versa, since the latter was used as a *polis* designation only. Over time, the term *Poeni* was used more and more in its wider sense, to refer to peoples – especially in the western Mediterranean (*Phoenices* usually reserved for the east, thus giving rise to modern usage and ambiguity concerning “Phoenician,” “Punic,” and “Carthaginian”) – from areas once settled by Phoenicians and/or once under Carthaginian hegemony. Used as an adverb, the word could reference the language being spoken.

treacherous.<sup>190</sup> By extension, negative stereotyping in Latin sources was usually associated with use of the term *Poeni*.<sup>191</sup> Examples alluding to Romans practicing negative typecasting for this period include references to Carthaginian child sacrifice,<sup>192</sup> to cruelty to the wounded or prisoners of war,<sup>193</sup> and to treachery and bad faith.<sup>194</sup>

Such negative stereotypes were largely the product of two trends: first, the very interconnectedness of Carthage with Greek interstate politics and its normative rhetoric, especially in the west (Sicily and southern Italy); and second, the zeal with which Romans, also part of this international society, came to adopt and encourage such rhetoric, in its anti-Punic manifestations. The roots of this hostile tradition can be found in very standard Greek discourse, anti-barbarian and pan-Hellenic in flavor, which from time to time was deployed by tyrants of Sicilian *poleis* against Carthage. For example, Dionysus I was himself present at Lysias' speech against him (mentioned above), for he was there on a campaign of self-promotion and anti-Carthaginian sloganeering at the Olympic games.<sup>195</sup> His, and later Timoleon's, presentation, of a mission against Carthage

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<sup>190</sup> See Polyb. 6.52.10 (Phoenicians and Africans as inferior to Italians); 9.11.2 (covetousness and "love of dominion"); and 15.4.3 (treachery). Note, however, that Polybius could at other junctures consider Carthaginians civilized in their *politeia* – see below, pp. 161-2.

<sup>191</sup> Note, however, that *Poenus* could also carry neutral or positive connotations. Perhaps the best example of the complex Roman attitudes toward Carthaginians can be seen in Plautus, especially in his treatment of a Carthaginian comedic *senex*, Hanno, in *Poenulus*. References in the *Poenulus* (a title playing off the diminutive ethnic?) to negative stereotypes include 104-113 (crafty, deceitful – *Poenus plane est*), 975-81, 1008, 1121 (mocking Punic dress, implying its effeminacy and lax morality), 1103 (Punic licentiousness), 1022 (associating Punic merchants with assumed thievery). Elsewhere, however, Hanno is not without his redeeming qualities – see the discussion in Franko 1996.

<sup>192</sup> Ennius frag. 221 V<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>193</sup> Ennius frag. 286 V<sup>3</sup>; Cato, *ORF*<sup>4</sup> fr. 197, 191, 193, 195b (describing Carthaginians as a people always capable of every atrocity); and C. Sempronius Tuditanus, annalist and cos. 129 BCE, fr. 5 P<sup>2</sup> = *FRH* 8, fr. 5), referencing tortures inflicted upon Atilius Regulus.

<sup>194</sup> Ennius frag. 274-5 V<sup>3</sup>; Cato, *ORF*<sup>4</sup> fr. 195b., cf. *Orig.* fr. 84 P<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>195</sup> See Isoc. *Ep.* 2 (*ad Dion.*), esp. 7-8, in support of Dionysus' cause. Cf. Prag (2010: 60-63).

as divine *alastōr* (or avenging spirit) for all of Sicily,<sup>196</sup> continued the pan-Hellenic tradition first established by Hieron and Gelon of Syracuse in the fifth century. It was then that Greeks on both ends of the Mediterranean began to celebrate and cross-legitimize their military and political victories, creating parallels between Syracusan successes against Carthage with those of the mainland Greeks against Persia, and viewing both as “rescuing Hellas,” even “all the Greeks,” “from oppressive slavery.”<sup>197</sup> At the same time, accounts circulated that encouraged associations of Carthage with brutal wartime atrocities.<sup>198</sup>

There is thus evidence from the classical period onward for the stereotyping of Carthage as a barbaric ‘other.’ At least by the fourth century BCE, these conceptions showed signs of having developed more intense moralizing rhetoric. Theophrastus, late in the century, was the first (among the surviving accounts) to refer to the purported practice of Carthaginian human (child) sacrifice, in a passage relating to prohibitions placed by Gelon.<sup>199</sup> Evidence going back to the fifth century reveals a tendency in Greek tradition to bring such accusations of human sacrifice – at least on levels deemed barbaric –

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<sup>196</sup> Cf. Aesch. 2.10; *Schol. ad Aesch.* 2.10 (= *FGrH* 566 F29); Val. Max. 1.7 ext. 6. For Timoleon, see Rhodes and Osborne (2003: no. 74) – inscription from Corinth, according to Plutarch, honoring him for bringing back “barbarian spoils,” having “set the Greeks dwelling in Sicily free from the Carthaginians”; Plut. *Tim.* 29.6, see also 39.5; Diod. 16.90.1. There is a possibility that Hannibal was viewed (and perhaps encouraged being viewed) in this mold, as an avenging spirit among the communities of Italy, fulfilling the curse of Elissa-Dido (a subject identified in the fragments of Ennius) – cf. Brizzi (2011).

<sup>197</sup> Pind. *Pyth.* 1.71-80 and Ephor. *ap. Schol. ad Pind. Pyth.* 1.146b = *FGrH* 70 F186. Cf. Hdt. 7.158.1-3, 7.166.1; Arist. *Poet.* 1459a24-27, with a comment on the synchronism, concluding that although it existed, it was of no deeper significance; Polyb. 12.26b on Timaeus = *FGrH* 566 F94; Diod. 11.23-24. Discussion in Prag (2010: 55-59).

<sup>198</sup> Cf. Diod. 13.57-58, 13.59-62, 13.85-86, 13.89-91, 14.46.2; Plut. *Mor.* 799d; Polyb. 3.100.4; Livy 21.57.13-14

<sup>199</sup> Cf. Theophr. *ap. Schol. ad Pind. Pyth.* 2.2.

against foreign peoples and political enemies.<sup>200</sup> Carthaginians were known to incinerate the bodies of infants – whether as immolated offerings of the living or as special funerary rites for the dead remains somewhat debated<sup>201</sup> – but the stinging judgment of barbarism on these grounds continued to be brought against Carthage on into the Roman period.<sup>202</sup>

In general, then, a theme of liberation from tyranny and barbarism was readily available and was employed by all sides in what became a western-Hellenism tradition, never fully separated from the east. For Carthage, the side that won out is evident in what survives in the literary sources – in particular, versions that Rome approved and/or encouraged once the two states became wartime enemies and Rome gained an interest in the allegiance of Greeks across southern Italy and Sicily (Syracuse in particular). The Romans, although they could be and were at times subject themselves to accusations of tyranny and barbarism,<sup>203</sup> thus deployed an international rhetoric of liberation for

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<sup>200</sup> See Rives (1995); Bremmer (2007: 81, n. 2-3).

<sup>201</sup> The debate over whether the urn burials at Carthage's tophet represent child sacrifices or natural perinatal mortality and subsequent cremation rites continues, though the latter theory appears to have gained support from recent study: cf. Schwartz et al. (2010), with evidence of small animal bones in some cases included with those of one or more infants, fitting the range of perinatal mortality; compare Brown (1991), *contra* Stager and Wolff (1984).

<sup>202</sup> Later accounts regarding Carthage include Cleitarchus (third century BCE), *Schol. ad Plat. Rep.* 337a; Diodoros (first century BCE), 20.14.4-7; Plutarch (first to second century CE) *De superst.* 171; and Tertullian (second century CE) *Apol.* 9.2-3. Note the hints of human sacrifice in Roman practice – e.g. the burying alive of two male-female pairs, one Gaul and one Greek, in the Forum Boarium post-Cannae: Livy 22.57; Plut. *Quaes.* 83. See discussions of Greco-Roman elements of human sacrifice in Rives (1995); Futrell (1997, esp. 199ff.); and Bremmer (2007).

<sup>203</sup> Cf. Champion (2000), esp. for discussion of Polybian speeches (and a critique of Timaeus) tinged by references to Romans as *barbaroi*. Elements of apocalyptic-style literature also appear to have developed in the second century (as well as later, during the Mithridatic wars) in the eastern Mediterranean. Possible examples include *P.Hamb.* 129 – the “Hannibal papyrus” – which postured as a letter from Hannibal to Athens, and alluded to the possibility of breaking the “weak lance” of Roman power; and the prophetic warnings of Rome's demise, attributed to Antisthenes the Peripatetic (dated by some scholars to the Antiochene war) – quoted by Phlegon of Tralles, *Mirabilia* III – cf. Gauger (1980); Gruen (1984: 327-8); Ferrary (1988: 238ff.).

‘Greeks’ (i.e. ‘civilized’ communities), decades or more prior to their direct involvements in the east.<sup>204</sup>

One of the most long-standing elements in this rhetoric of freedom was its association with evicting Carthage, originally from Sicily, dating as far back as the classical period. The same sort of language had more recently been deployed in the discourse surrounding Pyrrhus’ intervention, which had revived an emphasis on east-west parallels of Hellenism’s mission against barbarism. Pyrrhus, like all Hellenistic monarchs of any ambition, styled himself as a new Alexander (and by extension, a new Achilles),<sup>205</sup> and likewise assumed the appropriate pan-Hellenic rhetoric, in the process renewing an interest in the east-west parallels of Greek history, and inspiring a new generation of Sicilian kingship (especially in the person of Hieron II).<sup>206</sup> Note, however, the hints of flexibility and broad applicability with which the political discourse of Hellenism became applicable: Hieron II could just as well ally *with* Carthage, to fight against ‘barbaric’ Mamertines, as the Mamertines could be said (in Greek accounts) to seek out allies from fellow ‘barbarians,’ sending envoys of kinship diplomacy to both Rome and Carthage!<sup>207</sup> Likewise, Sicilian tyrants in general could continue to be assigned barbaric reputations, with an historical tradition of wartime atrocity as long as, if not bloodier than that of

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<sup>204</sup> Cf. Prag (2010: 67ff.), *contra* Gruen (1984: 133ff.).

<sup>205</sup> See the discussion in Perret (1942), where the connection is also made to the relevance of the Trojan legend in this pan-Hellenic mythic genealogy. See also below – pp. 123ff.

<sup>206</sup> See Prag (2010: 65-66), with references.

<sup>207</sup> Cf. Polyb. 1. 9-10 (where the Romans are described as *homophyloi* of the Mamertines); Diod. 14.6, 22.13. On the Mamertines and kinship diplomacy, see Elwyn (1993); Battistoni (2010: 113-117).

Carthage.<sup>208</sup> And Romans could later reverse the allegiance of Greeks for Pyrrhus using the same tactics, putting *him* in the role of tyrant rather than liberator.<sup>209</sup>

On a sliding scale of Greekness – i.e. perceived ‘civilization’ – and depending on the context and point-of-view, Romans, Carthaginians, Campanians, and/or inhabitants of Sicily could be either included or excluded, and by the same token, include or exclude others from Hellenism and the international Hellenistic community. That Romans continued to be deemed *barbaroi* is evident from time to time in our sources: Plautus jokes about it, and the topic is still mentioned into the first century BCE-CE.<sup>210</sup> As we will see, our main second century BCE witness, Polybius, presents Romans and Carthaginians alike in this light.<sup>211</sup> Polybius sees both, although non-Greek, even barbarian by blood or origin, as having achieved a level of civilization and *logismos* that was, in his opinion, in the process of, if not already, disintegrating into *tarachē kai kinesis* in the Greek world.<sup>212</sup> In perhaps one of Polybius’ most memorable speeches, the Aetolian ambassador Agelaos addresses the peace conference of Naupactus (217 BCE), presaging a tragic beginning-of-the-end for old Greek pan-Hellenism, to be replaced by a new version from the west:

*It would be best of all if the Greeks never made war on each other, but regarded it as the highest favor in the gift of the gods could they always speak with one heart and voice, and marching arm in arm like men fording a river, repel barbarian*

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<sup>208</sup> E.g. Dionysus I: Diod. 14.111.1-4. Agathocles: Diod. 19.6-8, 19.102, 19.107, 20.54-55; Polyb. 9.23.2.

<sup>209</sup> Livy 31.29.7, 25.28.7, 31.32.8.

<sup>210</sup> Plaut. *Asin.* 11, *Capt.* 492, 884, *Miles* 211, *Most.* 828. In *Trin.* 19, Plautus tells his audience that he has translated Philemo’s Greek play into Latin, a.k.a. “barbarian” – *Philemo scripsit; Plautus vortit barbare*. For later references, see Champion (2000).

<sup>211</sup> See below – pp. 161-2.

<sup>212</sup> On this subject, see below – pp. 252ff.

*invaders and unite in preserving themselves and their cities*<sup>213</sup>... *For if once you wait for these clouds that loom in the west to settle on Greece, I very much fear lest we may all of us find these truces and wars and games at which we now play, so rudely interrupted that we shall be fain to pray to the gods to give us still the power of ... deciding our differences for ourselves.*<sup>214</sup>

As a whole, the international discourse of the period thus reveals a shared pattern of thinking, common to Romans, Greeks, Carthaginians, etc., that the term *barbaros* indicated immorality and uncouth behavior first of all, and ethnicity or citizenship in second place. Roman Hellenism (as with Roman barbarism) was thus possible, as elsewhere in the Hellenistic world, on the basis of acquiring a level of civilization: language, cultural styling, and/or shared cult. But to extend this Roman Hellenism all the way, and to find an example of a Roman individual willingly considering or allowing himself to be called *hellenistes*, seems to have been out of the question. What survive in Latin are the terms *Graeculus* and *semi-graecus*, which are not used as labels of honor.<sup>215</sup> And in both Greek and Latin, various phrases were preferred for associating Romans with Greek acculturation rather than complete Hellenic identity - for example: *Hellēnikēs paideias kai logōn...erastēs*;<sup>216</sup> *phōnēn te kai dialektōn Hellēni*;<sup>217</sup> and *Graecis litteris studuit / eruditus*.<sup>218</sup> These phrases, combined with other accounts of Hellenized Romans,

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<sup>213</sup> Note the strong allusion to the pan-Hellenic ideal of *homonoia*, first expanded as a political philosophy and rhetoric by Alexander – cf. Tarn (1948/2002).

<sup>214</sup> Polyb. 5.104.1-2, 10-11.

<sup>215</sup> *Graeculus*: e.g. Cic. *Sest.* 110, *De Orat.* 1.47, 1.102, 1.221, *Pis.* 70, *Phil.* 13.33, *Red. Sen.* 14; *Juv. Sat.* 3.78. *Semi-graecus*: Suet. *De Gramm.* 1 (used in reference to Livius Andronicus and Ennius).

<sup>216</sup> Said of M. Cl. Marcellus, conqueror of Syracuse: Plut. *Marc.* 1.2.

<sup>217</sup> Plut. *Flam.* 5.5.

<sup>218</sup> The first said of C. Sulpicius Gallus: Cic. *Brut.* 78; the second, of the younger Tiberius Gracchus: Cic. *Brut.* 104.

have been gathered together by modern scholarship under the ancient term, *philhellēn*.<sup>219</sup> As a whole, the subject warrants review, in that it reveals the variety and uniqueness with which Romans of the Hellenistic age (and the second century in particular) adaptively responded to their international cultural milieu, and in the process, played a transformative role in the IR politics of their time.

### **ROMAN PHILHELLENISM: POLITICS OF PRESTIGE**

Roman interactions with Hellenism, political and cultural, reached a significant level during the third and second centuries BCE, especially among leading aristocrats, whose position at home became increasingly linked to events on a wider international stage.<sup>220</sup> Modern scholarship, particularly during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, resurrected an ancient Greek term, *philhellēn*, to craft an overarching concept for understanding and questioning these interactions – namely, ‘philhellenism.’ In doing so, the concept was also imbued with modern nationalistic and imperializing sentiments.<sup>221</sup> For the purposes of the current study, however, none of these associations are intended. Instead, philhellenism is retained as a subject simply as a term for broadly categorizing the intersections, conflicting and concordant, of individual acculturation(s) and multiple political agendas and/or debates occurring in Rome and across the Hellenistic world. It encapsulates what Zagdoun and Michels have both recognized as a phenomenon particular to the age, of an international “politics of prestige” (*Prestigepolitik*) – that is,

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<sup>219</sup> Cf. Hdt. 2.178.1; Plat. *Rep.* 5.470e; App. *Mac.* 11. Romans as *philhellēnes*: Cic. *Att.* 1.15.

<sup>220</sup> On the latter, see Petrocheilos (1974); and Gruen (1984: Ch. 7).

<sup>221</sup> See, for example, Marchand (2003); Miliori (2009).

an implied discourse on the subject of international Hellenism.<sup>222</sup> Such a normative framework in turn became an essential means of IR communication and diplomacy, and leading Romans were as well informed and engaged as any other, adjusting themselves and even the framework itself in their choices of action.

An anecdote from the early third century BCE helps characterize the process and its multiple layers. In 282-1, L. Postumius Megellus supposedly attempted to address a Tarentine assembly using Greek, in order to convey the Roman Senate's demands for reparations from that state. According to surviving accounts, his faulty and stumbling Greek led to a great amount of jeering and rudeness among the crowd, and even to alleged physical insults – some accounts have one individual in particular actually relieving himself on Megellus. In the end, the incident reputedly brought Rome and Tarentum closer to a state of war, which broke out within another year.<sup>223</sup> What from the outside may at first seem like an amusing tale, recounting the somewhat absurd breakdown of relations and dramatic posturing of two states already at odds with each other, beyond the surface reveals an intricate set of interactions full of consequential meaning. Megellus, a three-times former consul (305, 294, and 291 BCE),<sup>224</sup> had been sent to Tarentum in the following context:<sup>225</sup> the Tarentines, purportedly at the instigation of a 'demagogue' of 'obscene lifestyle,' Philocharis, had decried Rome's growing presence and invited aid for cities in the Gulf of Tarentum. They had pointed to an old

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<sup>222</sup> Cf. Zagdoun (1992); Michels (2008).

<sup>223</sup> Cf. Polyb. 1.6.5; Dion. Hal. 19.4.2-5.5; App. *Samn.* 7.3-6; Livy *Per.* 12a; Val. Max. 2.2.5. See Barnes (2005).

<sup>224</sup> Cf. *MRR* p. 189.

<sup>225</sup> Fullest surviving account, referenced here, is App. *Samn.* 7.2ff.

treaty agreement, in which the Romans had allegedly agreed to not sail beyond the Lacinium promontory. In their indignation, the Tarentines had supposedly sunk four Roman consular ships and seized another with its entire crew. In the meantime, they had condemned the nearby city of Thurii of anti-Greek behavior, since the Thurians had accepted a Roman garrison by treaty-agreement. The Tarentines then had taken Thurii by force, ousted the Roman garrison, and sacked the city.

Note the mix of elements in this first part of the dispute, equal parts cultural rhetoric and political action. The Romans (or at least the pro-Roman flavorings in the account) painted the Tarentines in a less-than-civilized light. The Tarentines were said to have been led astray by an immoral mob-leader, and to have taken forceful, even unwarranted action, in confronting a treaty agreement between Thurii and Rome. Tarentine actions had thus been de-legitimized, on multiple levels. The Tarentines, on the other hand, showed themselves to feel threatened, even wronged by the new treaty alignment, which they condemned as non-Greek and in violation of a pre-existing agreement they possessed with Rome. In their turn, they asserted the legality and moral justice for their actions, and responded with their own de-legitimization of the position of Rome and Thurii.

Then came the envoy from Rome. Megellus, a senator of prominent standing, brought a decree from the Senate – in Roman diplomatic terms, he initiated the process of *res repetere*.<sup>226</sup> The demands included the following: if the Tarentines wished to remain friends of the Romans, they must surrender the Roman captives, return Thurian exiles to

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<sup>226</sup> See also below, pp. 268, 278ff.

their homes, restore or pay the value of property seized or destroyed at Thurii, and hand over those Tarentines responsible for the recent criminal behavior (*paranomia*). The Tarentines were thus placed in an international legal bind – they had been formally condemned, and any circumvention of Rome’s demands would bring *iusta causa* for war (as far as Romans were concerned).<sup>227</sup>

That Megellus, however, deployed this standard Roman practice (though similar enough to Hellenistic modes, of airing international grievances to establish legal recourse for war), but in Greek, is interesting. Other examples show that Roman standard practice was to read *senatus consulta* in Latin and then have them translated, so as to maintain the *auctoritas* of the Senate. Whether or not this practice evolved out of Megellus’ embarrassment cannot be determined. But Megellus’ use of Greek not only reveals at least a rudimentary education in the language, but more importantly, Megellus opted to use Greek in order to deflate Tarentine accusations against Rome, and to redirect Tarentine discourse aimed at all prospective allies for Rome in the area. These Tarentine accusations and rhetoric created two nodes for alignment: (1) with Tarentum as pan-Hellenic champion; or (2) with Rome as a non-Greek, tyrant enemy. For the cities of the Gulf, the rhetoric represented a clear threat – align with Rome and become susceptible to the same treatment as Thurii. Megellus’ attempts were thus aimed at directly reversing this rhetoric, in order to present the Tarentines as the barbarous, tyrannical, and essentially non-Greek party.

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<sup>227</sup> For more on this subject, see below – pp. 272ff.

The Tarentines, however, were even more insulted by Megellus' move, for not only was the prominent Roman attempting to claim a pan-Hellenic agenda in the region of their predominance, but he had also listed the unilateral decisions that condemned Tarentum and gave justified grounds for war. The acceptance of such terms was tantamount to admitting the wrongfulness of Tarentum's earlier deeds, founded as they had been on pan-Hellenic rhetoric, and to submitting to Rome as the just party. The Tarentines seethed at the thought, and thus rejected Megellus and his message in a manner that ridiculed and shamed what they saw as hubristic, even unseemly diplomacy. For Megellus' Greek not only conveyed a strong message, but it very well may have contained errors, for we know that leading Romans continued to possess varying levels of bilingualism throughout Roman history, and even on occasion would purposefully introduce awkward idioms into their Greek as a cultural affectation.<sup>228</sup> The end-result was a disaster, both intended and not, as the subsequent war between Rome and Tarentum was as much a crisis created and manipulated by Hellenistic-style communication as it was of interest on both interstate cultural and geopolitical levels.

Therefore, it only makes sense that leading Romans evolved their own voices in Hellenistic international discourse,<sup>229</sup> and developed experience in the modes and manipulations of contemporary diplomacy. For these skills were the very necessary precondition for any individual, and/or the state he represented, to garner any sort of success in an increasingly globalized environment. Only through such means could an

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<sup>228</sup> I.e. in order to highlight their Roman identity and use of Greek as a non-native language. On the range of Roman proficiency in Greek, see Boyancé (1956); and Adams (2003), with examples.

<sup>229</sup> Early compositions, in Greek, of annals of Roman history – e.g. Fabius Pictor, L. Cincius Alimentus, and a generation or so later, C. Acilius and A. Postumius Albinus – can be seen in this vein.

individual and/or state gather and maintain alliances and supportive networks, and establish broader-based legitimacies abroad, both in times of peace and of war. It is for this reason that the list of Roman ‘philhellenes’ grows over the third and into the second century BCE (and beyond). Men such as Aemilius Paullus, his son Scipio Aemilianus, and Tiberius Gracchus the elder no longer made the gaffes (real or simulated) in their use of Greek that had brought insult upon Megellus, and they most certainly knew how to continue and build upon Megellus’ early interaction with Hellenistic international norms.<sup>230</sup>

#### **ROMAN PHILHELLENISM: FLAMININUS**

A key example, often called forward as one of quintessential philhellenism, is T. Quinctius Flamininus (cos. 198 BCE), in his documented fluency in Greek,<sup>231</sup> especially when it comes to his diplomatic correspondence with Chyretiai and his famed Isthmian proclamation. In the former instance, an inscription records the letter written by

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<sup>230</sup> Aemilius Paullus: Livy 45.8.1-7; cf. Val. Max. 5.1.8 (for his fluency in Greek, in addressing Perseus); Livy 45.32.8-11 (on organizing Greek games – better than any Greek! – at Amphipolis); see also Plut. *Aem. Paull.* 6.4-5; Cic. *Rep.* 1.36 (on procuring an early education in Greek – language and culture – for his sons). Scipio Aemilianus: Polyb. 31.23.3-31.25.1, also noting, at 31.24.6ff., that teachers of Greek learning flocked to Rome in the era after Pydna; also on Scipio – cf. Vell. Pat. 1.13.3. Tiberius Gracchus: Cic. *Brutus* 79 (for his refined speech to the Rhodians in the 160s). Other examples include P. Crassus Mucianus (cos. 131 BCE), familiar with five dialects of Greek, and able to address people in Asia Minor in all five – Quint. *Inst. Orat.* 11.2.50; Val. Max. 8.7.6; Q. Catulus – Cic. *De Orat.* 2.28; L. Crassus – Cic. *De Orat.* 2.2; M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina, in whose speeches Cicero (*Brut.* 95ff.) apparently found characteristics of Greek rhetoric; and A. Postumius (cos. 151 BCE), enthusiastic student of Greek language and culture – perhaps exceedingly and grandiloquently so, to judge by Cato the Elder’s and Polybius’ mocking of him (cf. Polyb. 39.1)!

<sup>231</sup> Cf. Plut. *Flam.* 5.5, that Flamininus was a “veritable Greek in sound and dialect.”; also Polyb. 18.1, 18.4-9, 18.36-37; Plut. *Flam.* 6.1-3.

Flamininus and published by the community of Chyretiai.<sup>232</sup> In it, Flamininus' choice of words and sentence structure reveal a deft command of contemporary *koinē* idiom, arranged carefully in balanced phrases, and even containing the occasional regal stylistic flourishes.<sup>233</sup> Flamininus begins with an abbreviated form of a typical diplomatic opener, referencing and establishing a solid record of interstate goodwill, and adjusting the royal 'we' to denote himself and the Roman people:

*Just as in all other matters we have made clear the favorable policy (proairesin) both I and the Roman demos have toward you in general... ” (l. 2-4)*

Now compare the words of Antiochus III, in approving pan-Hellenic games at Magnesia on the Maeander (ca. 205 BCE):

*Since we [=I] have had from the beginning the kindest feeling for your people, because of the goodwill that you have shown on all occasions to us and to our dealings, and since we are anxious to make clear our favorable policy (proairesin) ...<sup>234</sup>*

And in appointing a chief-priest at Daphne (189 BCE):

*since he...has zealously given many great demonstrations of his policy (aireseōs) toward us and our state, and he has spared neither his life nor his property in our interest...<sup>235</sup>*

Also Eumenes II, in accepting personal honors from the Ionian League (167-6 BCE):

*...determining to be zealous and ambitious in what concerned the League, consistent with my father's favorable policy (proairesei), I had made clear on many occasions my attitude...<sup>236</sup>*

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<sup>232</sup> Letter to Chyretiai (197-4 BCE): Sherk (1984: no. 4)= *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 593= *RDGE* 33= *B-D*<sup>2</sup> 36; cf. Livy 31.41.5, 34.48.2.

<sup>233</sup> See Armstrong and Walsh (1986), who argue that Flamininus played a key role in the composition of the letter and the subsequent Isthmian Proclamation.

<sup>234</sup> *RC* 31.16-21.

<sup>235</sup> *RC* 44.1-5.

Flamininus, in this valuable primary document, thus reveals a genuine awareness and subtlety with not only the Greek language, but also with current Hellenistic diplomatic rhetoric. That he possessed such abilities should not be a surprise, or even be viewed as fundamentally groundbreaking.<sup>237</sup> As we have discussed above, Romans had long been exposed to and had partaken in the international language of Hellenism, and the political power to be achieved in claiming pan-Hellenic missions of freedom from barbarism and tyranny.<sup>238</sup> As a result, we see Flamininus engaging with Hellenistic-style diplomatic maneuverings. He carefully selected a less technical term, *enkriseōn* (l. 17), to refer to his personally recorded judgments regarding Chyretiaean property holdings. By not calling such documents formal rulings or decrees in the Greek terminology, Flamininus astutely avoided embarrassing the *tagoi* he had just seen appointed, and left the community to its local autonomy. At the same time, he aimed to prevent future undermining of his settlement by local officials, by making it widely known that written documents were available for reference. It was a masterful move, and one showing familiarity with the contemporary IR system. In rhetorical conception, it parallels what we know of the Isthmian proclamation from historical accounts.<sup>239</sup> Both diplomatic texts opened by asserting Rome's strong record of honorable action and ended with flourished

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<sup>236</sup> *RC* 52.14-17. See also *RC* 36.25-27 (Antiochus III, 204 BCE) and 32.15-20 (Antiochus, son of Antiochus III). Compare with similar language in *RC* 14.11-14 (Ptolemy II, ca. 262-1 BCE), 22.14-17 (Seleucus II, ca. 246 BCE), 45.4-7 (Seleucus IV, 186 BCE).

<sup>237</sup> Compare Walsh (1996), attributing to Flamininus 'discovery' of the use (and usefulness) of a discourse of Greek *eleutheria*.

<sup>238</sup> E.g. earlier Roman claims of Greek liberation from Illyrian piracy, at the Isthmian games of 228 BCE – Polyb. 2.12.4-8.

<sup>239</sup> Isthmian proclamation (196 BCE): Polyb. 18.46.1-15; Liv. 33.32.1-33.8; Val.Max. 4.8.5; Plut. *Phil.* 15.2, *Flam.* 10.3-12.1, *Mor.* 197B; App. *Mac.* 9.4.

gestures of goodwill, returning possessions gained by Rome as the fruits of war.<sup>240</sup> At the same time, both directed a diplomatic slap at the Aetolians: e.g., “not even in such matters as this can persons find any opportunity to slander us who are themselves not accustomed to act by the highest standards of behavior...”<sup>241</sup>

This last was in direct response to and concern over overcoming diplomatic rhetoric circulating in Greek world and most prominently espoused by the Aetolians, who at the time claimed that Romans had merely replaced Macedonians as ‘tyrants’ of Greece.<sup>242</sup> Such rhetoric and the responses to it had significant political impact, and were directly aligned with the international language of Hellenism – that is, the designation of allies as fellow Greeks, sharing favorable policies and goodwill toward other Greek states, and enemies as non-Greeks, barbaric and oppressive in their behavior. For this reason, Polybius’ Aetolian, Agelaos, was the one to voice the ominous warnings of

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<sup>240</sup> Debate regarding the Isthmian proclamation, and Roman interactions with the contemporary Greek conceptions of *eleutheria* and *autonomia*, has a long history and it continues apace – see most recently Dmitriev (2011). Dmitriev contributes a thought-provoking analysis of the longer-term chronological developments in these conceptions, from their application to specific cases in the classical era to more general guarantees in the Diadochic period, before their re-application, in broad, pan-Hellenic fashion, by great powers seeking to win over/dominate *poleis*/Leagues. In this sense, Flamininus represents an example par excellence of Romans engaging with contemporary forms of international political legitimacy. However – and this is not directly addressed in this manner by Dmitriev – the Romans possessed their own definitions of *libertas*, ones that centered upon access to political participation, defined by specific legal and ethical mores. “Freedom” for Romans was not some universal, natural right – it was rather something granted as an honor or reward, or was earned and maintained through proper behavior – see Wallace (2009). It is for this reason that Berlin (1958) distinguished between “positive” and “negative” iterations of Roman announcements of Greek freedom: either granting rights to self-rulership or simply removing an enemy threat to such rulership – both involving alternately a Roman exit strategy or a mode for Roman control.

<sup>241</sup> Letter to Chyretiai, l. 6-8. Compare Livy 34.49.3-7, the Latin text actually naming the Aetolians and stating, *ut omnes scirent utrum Romanis an Aetolis mentiri mos esset, qui male commissam libertatem populo Romano sermonibus distulerint et mutatos pro Macedonibus Romanos dominos. Sed illis nec quid dicerent nec quid facerent umquam pensi fuisse.*

<sup>242</sup> See also accusations alleged for the same time, that Romans were tyrants over Sicily and southern Italy: Livy 31.29 (in the words of a Macedonian speaker); Polyb. 24.13.4 (in the words of Achaian statesman, Philopoemen). Cf. Champion (2000: 434-5, n. 34).

barbarian invasion, enacted by either Carthage or Rome (the eventual victor).<sup>243</sup> Seven years later, an Acarnanian statesman, speaking on behalf of the Macedonians, was said to have denounced the Aetolians, turning the same rhetoric against them, condemning them and scolding the Spartans for their anti-Greek behavior, in either making or even considering an alliance with the Roman barbarian.<sup>244</sup> Not long after (in 207 BCE), another Greek embassy, with representatives from Egypt, Chios, Mytilene, and possibly also Rhodes, accompanied by King Amynder of Athamania, was described as having made further attempts to dissuade the Aetolians from their alliance with Rome. Polybius had an ambassador (possibly belonging to this embassy) speak in the following terms. The prevailing assumptions in his rhetoric underlie the political weight of the Hellenistic discourse of the day:

*You [Aetolians] are fighting for the enslavement and ruin of Greece... you have made a treaty by which you have given up to the barbarians [the Romans] the rest of the Greeks to be exposed to atrocious outrage and violence.*<sup>245</sup>

The Romans were well aware of the power in making such statements and gathering alignments and coalitions around them. They themselves deployed and/or encouraged the deployment of statements that responded in kind, supporting the case first for Macedonian, followed by Aetolian, identity as non-Greek, tyrannical, and even barbarian.<sup>246</sup> Flaminius in his letter and proclamation thus utilized this combination of

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<sup>243</sup> Cf. Polyb. 5.104.

<sup>244</sup> Polyb. 9.37-39, esp. 37.5-6.

<sup>245</sup> Polyb. 11.5.1-2, 6-8. Cf. Walbank (1967: 274-275); Eckstein (2002a); Champion (2004); and Polyb. 11.4.1-6.10. Compare a Macedonian speech, ca. 199 BCE, in the text of Livy (31.29.12-16).

<sup>246</sup> Cf. Polyb. 18.5.7-9, with Philip's response to requests that he evacuate Greece – he asserts that Aetolia is not part of Greece! See also a speech attributed to an anti-Philip Athenian ambassador, actually responding to accusations that the Romans were *barbaroi*: Livy 31.30.4. Compare Roman rhetoric against

political and cultural dialogue, bringing together the advances to be had in collecting allies and friends abroad, achieving conditions favorable for Rome, and furthering his own career, with real ambitions of achieving a level of sophistication and recognition appropriate for a man of international, Hellenistic standing.

### NEGOTIATING PHILHELLENIC RELATIONS

However, despite the deep awareness and informed contact with which Romans and Greeks interacted, the two ‘sides’ did not necessarily achieve (or at all times desire) perfect communication or always see eye-to-eye. As in the example of Megellus and the Tarentines, as often as leading Romans engaged fully with contemporary international language, there also existed elements of misinterpretation, either intended or simply accidental. In the case of Flamininus, his announcement of ‘freedom for the Greeks’ was eagerly celebrated all across the mainland with the full range of typical Hellenistic honors, which lauded him as ‘savior and benefactor,’ and commemorated his ‘excellence and beneficence’ with statues and even games.<sup>247</sup> These honors, however, stayed abroad – such tributes, which could be applied to the divine, not to mention kings, would not have found a favorable welcome back in Rome. In other ways, the philhellenism of

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Perseus, preserved in an epigraphic letter to the Delphic Amphictyony, Sherk (1984: no. 19) = *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 643 = *I.Delphes* 4.75 = *RDGE* 40B = *B-D*<sup>2</sup> 44: “...it was clearly not right at all for him to participate either in the pan-Hellenic sacrifices or games or festal assemblies, since he invited in the barbarians from across the Danube, who for no worthy reason for the enslavement of all Greece had even formerly been aroused ... In addition, he came to such a height of madness that, considering it of great importance, contrary to the oaths, to do away with the freedom given to you through our commanders...he continued to do nothing except what is base...”

<sup>247</sup> Cf. *Plut. Flam.* 16-17; and the selection of inscriptions in Sherk (1984: no. 6): examples from Chalcis (*IG XII* 9.931), Corinth (*SEG XXII* 214), Gytheion (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 592), Eretria (*IG XII* 9.233), Delphi (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 616), Scotussa in Thessaly (*SEG XXIII* 412), and Argos (*SEG XXII* 266 1.13-14). See also Gruen (1984: 167).

leading Romans was a product of its times, and perhaps not quite as conflicted as modern scholarship has sometimes found it.<sup>248</sup> Romans were in the process of positioning their state as a legitimate Hellenistic power, using pan-Hellenic concepts to put common enemies on par with barbarians, to punish unjust action with swift, even brutal response, to arbitrate disputes, rewrite constitutions, and replace monumental statues with their own image (e.g. Paullus at Delphi).<sup>249</sup> Roman generals should not be expected to be any more ‘pro-Greek’ (in the modern sense), or ‘soft on Greeks’ than Philip V or the Seleucids. Instead, Hellenism was part and parcel of a growing international normative framework, in which Romans sought after and negotiated key indicators of “civilized” cultural refinement and political legitimacy, to the best advantage for their allies and opponents at home and abroad.<sup>250</sup>

But over the subsequent decades, leading Romans and the Roman state in general did not in all ways act like a typical Hellenistic hegemon. For example, the Roman Senate repeatedly deferred or delayed judgment when asked to weigh in on interstate disputes, and showed no interest in developing deep commitments to micromanaging the regions that were brought under the shadow of its *archē*.<sup>251</sup> Declarations of freedom and autonomy inferred a new form of hegemony, one that was – in Roman eyes at least – less hands-on for day-to-day business but still keeping the area aligned with Rome and her

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<sup>248</sup> See discussion and conclusions in Gruen (1984: 263ff.).

<sup>249</sup> Cf. Polyb. 30.10.2; Livy 45.27.7; Plut. *Aem. Paull.* 28.2.

<sup>250</sup> Such negotiations explain the well-known examples of *hellenophobia* (e.g. Cato) as maneuvers within Rome’s internal politics, intended to counter the growing power of those with international connections and success abroad.

<sup>251</sup> Cf. Gruen (1984, esp. pp. 129ff., 490ff.); Eckstein (2008: Ch. 9); and discussions below in chapters 5 and 6 (North Africa and the Achaian League in particular as different diplomatic examples of this same general tendency).

broader geopolitics. This meant that Rome stepped back from governing or administering what were considered the minutiae and even quagmires of non-Roman politics. But whereas some Greek states may have misinterpreted, on the basis of prior Hellenistic experience, such disinterest as nonchalance, weakness, or even incompetence, Rome could suddenly awaken and take quite decisive action, as she did in 149-146 BCE. And such resolute reactions took place whenever, in Roman eyes, problems in one region interconnected with those of another, or posed a threat, even a minor one, in the context of an ongoing or looming conflict elsewhere.

Therefore, in the give-and-take between international groups during the third and second centuries, certain norms fell out of place, while others were accepted, and still others modified as powers and cultures adjusted and re-adjusted to each other and their changing international environment. Such multiple patterns of interaction can be seen, for example, in the ways in which Greeks and Romans negotiated the practice of granting Hellenistic-style honors, as perhaps most prominently begun with Flaminius in the 190s. On this, the individual level, Roman generals and magistrates continued to receive grants of *proxenia*, dedications of thanks, statues and other privileges, and in return made their own dedications and offerings at Greek, especially pan-Hellenic, sanctuaries.<sup>252</sup> Such

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<sup>252</sup> Examples abound, on both sides – the following is a cross-section of well-known examples from the period of interest: **Honors for Romans:** cf. *IG IX* 1<sup>2</sup> 17, l. 51 (an early example, ca. 260 BCE – Aetolian proxeny list including the name of L. L. f. Olcaius); *IG XI*. 4,712 (crown offered by Delos to Scipio Africanus); *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 617, *IC II* 3, 5, *IC ii* 23, 13 (proxeny decrees for Scipios); *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 607-608 (equestrian statue and privileges from Delphians to M. Acilius Glabrio, ca. 191 BCE); *ArchEph* (1917) 1-7 = *ISE*, no. 95 (honors from Chyretiae, in thanks for services during the Aetolian War, to Sex. Orfidienus); *ArchEph* (1910) 344-349 (honors from Larisa, for a Quintus son of Titus); *Gonnoi*, II. no. 42 (decree of Gonnoi for C. Flavius Apollonius and C. Flavius Bucco); *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 649 (statue dedicated by the Achaian League at Olympia for Q. Marcius Philippus, ca. 169 BCE); *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 907, l. 3-10 (Athenian proxeny for the same Philippus). See also honors for Flaminius, above. **Dedications by Romans:** cf. Livy 28.45.12 (P. Scipio

exchanged honors were largely reflective of the widely prevalent behaviors practiced by and seen in response to the Hellenistic kings.<sup>253</sup> However, the Roman individuals themselves were not monarchs – and they would have had no desire to make such direct associations (especially back home). As such, these dedications and offerings functioned as extensions of an increasingly visible phenomenon of self-aggrandizement among Hellenistic elites (magistrates, priests, diplomats, etc.) and their families.<sup>254</sup> Leading Romans were thus in the process of pulling together a number of international practices, acting as internationally prominent figures, both high-ranking aristocrats and yet also representatives of a hegemonic state power.

It is for these reasons that, beyond honoring individual Romans, Greeks in the east had a number of misfires in their attempts to find the best way(s) of honoring the Roman state. Whereas a king could be honored both as an individual and as the embodiment of the state, other models had to be found and/or adopted for Rome, the Roman Senate, and its multitude of leading aristocrats. We see this in the well-known

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Africanus sending Carthaginian spoils from Spain to Delphi, ca. 206/5 BCE); *SEG* I 144, *I.Délos* 427. l. 12-13, 428. L.13-14, 439A. l. 81, 442B. l. 85-86, l. 90-91, and l. 102, 1429A. col. I. l. 23, l. 26-28, 1429A. col. II. l. 16, 1441A. l. 106, 1443 l. 94, 1450A l. 67-68, l. 90, 1458. l. 14-15 (dedications by Scipio brothers at Delphi and Delos); *I.Délos* 442B, l. 86, 1429A, col. I, l. 20, 1450A, l. 66 (A. Atilius Serranus, at Delos); 439A, l. 78 and 80, 1429A, col. I, l. 20 and 30 (C. Livius Salinator, at Delos); 442B, l. 104 (L. Aemilius Regillus, at Delos); 442B, l. 100, 1429A, col. I, l. 24-25, 1441A, l. 107, 1450A, l. 67 (Cn. Manlius Vulso, at Delos); 442B, l. 103, 1429A col. I, l. 19, 1441A, l. 104, 1443, l. 92, 1450A, l. 66, 1458, l. 11 (Q. Fabius Labeo, at Delos); 1429A, l. 31-32, 1450A, l. 69 (Q. Marcius Philippus, at Delos); cf. *IC* II 3,5, in which Regillus may have received proxeny honors alongside Scipio, if the restoration of the text is correct. For Romans named in honorific decrees at Delphi during this period, see the list in Daux, *Delphes*, 587-589.

<sup>253</sup> This is a well-known phenomenon – see, for example, Murray (1971); Bringmann (1993); Gruen (1996); Bilde, ed. (1996); Ma (1999; 2005); Strootman (2011).

<sup>254</sup> See Quass (1993); Savalli-Lestrade (1996; 2003), with extensive citations. Cf. also Dmitriev (2005); Rowlandson (2007)

example of King Prusias II of Bithynia. As Polybius tells it,<sup>255</sup> when Roman legates had visited the king in his court, Prusias had entered with his hair shorn and dressed in the garb of a Roman freedman, even referring to himself as a *libertus*. Later, upon personally addressing the Roman Senate, he had prostrated himself on the floor, calling upon the *patres* as “savior gods” (*theoi sōtēres*). Polybius expressed disgust at Prusias’ behavior, which Polybius characterized as disgraceful, unmanly, and servile. There is a small chance that Polybius’ attitude could reflect a Greco-centric cultural attitude against a king of Bithynia – i.e., employ rhetoric denouncing Prusias as less-than-Greek. However, upon further inspection, Polybius reveals on other occasions a strong disapproval for similar behavior, among his mainland Greek contemporaries, including his own father, Lycortas, and the idol of his youth, Philopoemen.<sup>256</sup> As Polybius actually explains, he felt extreme distaste for what he perceived to be a worrying trend of his time – namely, an excessive and shameful obsequiousness on the part of Hellenistic leadership towards the Romans.<sup>257</sup> In Polybius’ opinion, such behavior by the weaker party would only encourage tyrannical behavior in the stronger (i.e. Rome), whereas dignity would encourage restraint. Polybius seems to have been responding to what other evidence confirms: that there was a great outpouring and wide variety of overtures to Rome, especially in the wake of each of Rome’s decisive victories against Hellenistic powers in the east (be it against Macedon or the Seleucids).

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<sup>255</sup> Polyb. 30.18.

<sup>256</sup> Polyb. 24.8.3-5 (Lycortas); 24.13.3-4 (Philopoemen).

<sup>257</sup> Polyb. 24.10.11-13.

Whether or not the Romans felt as Polybius did about such flattery is only hinted at by some of the cultural generalizations Roman authors continued to make against a Greek stereotype over the years (see below). At the same time, however, a number of the subservient gestures did achieve their aim, gaining positive judgment and marginal, if not full concessions from Rome. Romans may have jeered at the servile behavior, but accepted it nonetheless, albeit with particular forms preferred. Prusias, for example, got the leniency he wanted. His wishes may have aligned with Rome's wider goals, but his behavior could have backfired completely. Polybius thought the success was due to Roman pity, and this may have been the hegemonic standard line – of clement rulership. Nevertheless, the Romans did subsequently put a moratorium on senatorial visits from foreign kings. They did not want to be put in the bind, or at least the appearance of one, of having to approve on the basis of servile and flattering behavior alone.

What was also at stake, on a deeper level, and the problem faced by King Prusias, was how a king, or any other party, was supposed to make and nuance the diplomatic gestures of compliance, goodwill, and/or petition. In the case of Prusias, a king responded to what he had heard of Roman rhetoric abroad – i.e. proclamations of and thank-offerings for 'freedom for all the Greeks.' He had then combined this with what he had learned about Roman cultural practice – i.e. the manumission process for Roman slaves. He had ended by bringing the two together and adding his own take on current Hellenistic diplomatic language, which employed the heavily politicized practices of ruler cult and euergetism – hence *theoi sōtēres*. It is important that, although Prusias was diplomatically successful and got what he wanted from Rome, neither the phrase, *theoi*

*sōtēres*, nor the play-acting as *libertus* quite caught on. Roman senators would have balked at being called gods, and it was quite socially improper across the Mediterranean for a king to make himself out to be an ex-slave.

#### **THE EAST & ‘PHILO-ROMANISM’: PANHELLENISM & KINSHIP DIPLOMACY**

Other, more discreet versions of Hellenistic international norms did, however, take root. These comprised two major forms: kinship diplomacy, which involved ties based on mythographic *syngeneia* and *oikeiotēs*, and secondly, various manifestations of ruler-cult. Beginning with kinship diplomacy, the Trojan legend in particular evolved as a central, and centralizing, form deployed on all sides of the Mediterranean. In the east, the cities of Asia Minor and the Troad were especially eager to document their use of this internationally fielded mechanism on stone. Their prominent publication of envoys making petitions to Rome on the basis of, or simply seeking after combinations of *philia*, *syngeneia*, and/or *oikeiotēs* testify to the broad-based value and status that even a unilateral declaration of alignment could bring, economically, territorially, socially, and/or militarily. These pronouncements tended to become more frequent in the years surrounding Rome’s victories over Macedon and Antiochus, and reflect the use of kinship diplomacy to engage with the power of Rome, to communicate intentions and pave a way for future relationships, in defection to or congratulation of the victor.

Even if certain claims to kinship went ignored – we have no definitive evidence in some cases that Rome gave immediate reply, either in the positive or the negative – the fact that cities chose to document these diplomatic missions is itself telling. Not only

does such behavior fit with pre-existing patterns of the third century BCE, thereby fitting Rome into regional politics via international norms, but it also reflects the significance of publicly announced interstate connections. Be they relations of friendship or ancient genealogical ties, whether between shared legendary bloodlines (*syngeneia*) or more distant relations by marriage or *xenia* (*oikeiotēs*), these all created foundations of implied obligation, bonded to the religious/sacred.<sup>258</sup> In the case of *philia*, the relationship, at least initially, involved a mutual agreement to amicable alignment, accompanied in important instances by written clauses and the understanding that each party would provide aid to the other when requested, as possible.<sup>259</sup> Friendship could fade – that is, go un-renewed (and this could be dangerous for the lesser power) – but the blatant default on this or any other diplomatic alignment was the grounds for vengeful retribution, wrought by newly collected earthly enemies, as well as by gods who would guarantee their victory.

For these reasons, a document published on stone in a city sanctuary or public place, testifying to the evidence for friendly links with another state – especially one of rising power – would accomplish a number of goals. It could intimidate local rivals, enhance prestige and rally surrounding communities, stand as possible leverage against powers interested in moving into the region, and influence a new power to be more

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<sup>258</sup> On the distinctions between *philia*, *syngeneia*, and *oikeiotēs*, see discussions in Lévy (1995); Will (1995); Curty (1995: 215ff.; 2005: *passim*); Battistoni (2010: Ch. 3).

<sup>259</sup> Gruen (1984: 54ff.) sees these agreements as mainly informal – however, inscriptional evidence testifies to more hierarchically organized and formalized aspects of interstate *philia*. On such obligations in relation to/comparison with symmachic agreements see Lévy (1995). See also the discussion in Battistoni (2009: 91ff.), who cites the example of an inscription from Alabanda (= *BCH 10* (1886) p. 299-306), which documented three embassies, two to Rome and one to a king, the first seeking a *symmachia* with Rome, but only assured *philian kai oikeiotēta* (ll. 11-13, 15).

lenient in their punishments and/or adjudications. Any new power in turn would have been concerned to utilize such diplomatic means to gain greater regional and international acceptance. Such kinship, friendship, and ultimately pan-Hellenic based norms of interstate interaction shaped Roman decision-making and played a role in the long-term success of Roman actions. And at the same time, the cities of Asia Minor and the Troad were not alone in participating in the international discourse. In many ways, they simply strengthened an already burgeoning set of myths that had earlier found success in Sicily, the west, and with Rome, and which remained valid in the political ideologies of the eastern kingdoms (e.g. Pergamon – see below).<sup>260</sup>

Three relevant examples from the eastern Mediterranean are especially well documented. The first is a decree from Delos, a city that most likely based its kinship with Rome on the foundation myths of Odysseus and/or the Achaians. The decree dates to the early decades of the second century BCE, and records an embassy sent to Rome to renew *oikeiotēs kai philia* between the two states, probably as a means for maintaining Delos' *asylia* status, as a 'free' commercial port and a pan-Hellenic sanctuary.<sup>261</sup> The second is an interesting reference made by Polybius, who stands out for his somewhat

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<sup>260</sup> Examples from Sicily and the west, in relation to Rome, include the Mamertines in 264 BCE, the Segestans from the mid-third century onward, (possibly) Saguntum in 220 BCE, the Capuans in 211 BCE, Centuripe in Sicily, via *syngeneia* with Lanuvium, at some point during the second century – see discussions and citations in Elwyn (1993); Battistoni (2010). There is also some evidence that these myths came to apply on the personal/individual level as well as the international – e.g. the *pinax* of Fabius Pictor, cf. Battistoni (2010: 161-164). Two other inscriptions (though of unclear date) illustrate this practice: (1) an epitaph from Rome, of a wine merchant invoking his Trojan birthplace as matching that of Rome = Zarker (1958: no. 59); and (2) a votive to Zeus Litaos in Asia Minor (Iznik-Nicaea) by a banker with the interesting name of Gaius Hostilius Ascanius = *BCH* 24 (1900), p. 389. Cf. Battistoni (2010: 109-111).

<sup>261</sup> *IG* xi. 4.756; on the date and significance of the inscription, see Elwyn (1993: 274), with citations; also Erskine (1997a); Battistoni (2010: 94-96). On the myths of Odysseus as Roman founder, see Phillips (1953).

dismissive attitude toward contemporary emphases on mythological genealogies in interstate politics and historical treatises (see below).<sup>262</sup> At 22.5.3, for the year 188 BCE, Polybius recounted an apparent confusion in international relations between Rhodes, Lycia, and Rome, with the Rhodians and the Lycian *koinon* each sending envoys to the Roman *decemviri* assigned with the task of organizing the region in the wake of Antiochus' defeat. The Rhodian envoy requested that Lycia be ceded to their control, on the basis of Lycia's alignment with Antiochus during the recent war. The Lycians, however, protested, and pleaded for forgiveness from Rome on the basis of *oikeiotēta*. They apparently feared stringent Roman reprisals, and in their apprehension, had chosen to send two Ilian ambassadors as representatives, no doubt for the strong case these men could make, as themselves *syngenoi* with both parties, for the affinity of Lycia with Rome.<sup>263</sup>

As Polybius framed the account, the Roman *decemviri* apparently gave positive answers to both parties, since the Ilians returned to inform the Lycians that they had found success, while it was announced at Rhodes that Lycia (and Caria) had been granted to their city *en dōreai*. And although Polybius portrayed the episode in a rather jaundiced light, it reveals a number of interesting features about contemporary kinship diplomacy. To begin with, they show the relevance, even centrality, with which such claims were used to accomplish interstate goals. Secondly, they point to familiarity on all sides – Roman, Lycian, Ilian, and Rhodian – to the particular modes that involved establishing

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<sup>262</sup> See below, pp. 130ff.

<sup>263</sup> See Jones (1999: 70-71); Erskine (2001: 176-8); and Battistoni (2009: 87-89; 2010: 165-186), for discussion of the episode, along with later inscriptional evidence of recognized *syngeneia* between Rome and Lycia.

kinship (through the Trojan legend) and/or a history of alignment, and using these as diplomatic tools. And perhaps most importantly, they reveal the Roman fluency in utilizing these tools, keeping promises and goodwill on all sides. The *decemviri* must have agreed to *syngeneia*, via Ilium, and thereby succeeded in enhancing Ilian status (for future use), while refraining from inflicting much harsher penalties on Lycia. At the same time, the Romans were also able to reward Rhodes for her recent service (as a *symmachos* and *philos*), while keeping Rhodes in their debt-friendship (hence Lycia and Caria as a “gift”). Kinship/friendship diplomacy had many wrinkles, and this flexibility offered many choices – and as many pitfalls – for international players. That the Romans in this instance lightly maneuvered around the requests of Rhodes and Lycia, testifies to their awareness of and immersion in the international norms of the day.

A third and final example is especially significant, as it provides a window into the processes of Hellenistic interstate diplomacy, and their blended combinations of personal and interstate, cultural-kinship and political-military elements, as they connected with Rome. It is a decree from Lampsakos, a city that was member of a religious federation centered on the temple of Athena Ilias at Ilion.<sup>264</sup> The decree honored a Lampsakene ambassador, Hegesias, for his service to the city. Its account reveals the great lengths to which a *polis* of diminutive military capability but of more significant religious standing would go to gain at least the added clout and modicum of security from formal recognition by another state, in particular a power to stand up to a Seleucid king. Formal recognition came, as it did across the Hellenistic interstate world, in the form of

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<sup>264</sup> *B-D*<sup>2</sup> no. 35 = Sherk (1984: no. 5); *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 591; *I. Lampsakos* 4.

*philia*, further cemented and assured by approved bonds of *syngeneia*. In order to obtain these valuable interstate associations, Hegesias had first traveled, with a number of other ambassadors, to the Isthmus of Corinth, and had met with Flamininus, around the time of the latter's Isthmian Proclamation. Flamininus had verified Lampsakos' "relationship and kinship" with the Romans (l. 30-31), presumably on the basis of the Trojan legend, but also on what was referred to as Lampsakos' *adelfhia* with Massilia, a long-standing friend and ally of Rome. Lampsakos could apparently strengthen her ties of friendship with Rome via Massilia, with whom Lampsakos shared a *metropolis*, as fellow colonies of Phokis.<sup>265</sup> In addition to acknowledging these links, Flamininus had pledged his own personal friendship, by which he promised to always do what he could to be of benefit to Lampsakos (ll. 31-36).

Hegesias had then met with Flamininus' brother, and commander of the Roman fleet, Lucius, who had granted similar avowals of goodwill (ll. 36-40). From there, Hegesias had sailed all the way to Massilia, perhaps on the advice of one or both of the Flamininus brothers, who may have suggested that what was requested by the Lampsakenes – namely, formal recognition as *syngenoi* and *philoï* of Rome (and ultimately, *adscripti* in the pending peace treaty with Macedon) – would require senatorial approval. In order to gain an audience before the Senate, the Massiliotes, as international kindred and well-received friends of Rome, would make the best intermediaries for introducing the Lampsakene envoys to leading senators and getting

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<sup>265</sup> Cf. Thucy. 1.13.6.

their requests on the agenda set by the urban praetor.<sup>266</sup> According to the Hegesias inscription, the Massiliotes agreed to this role. They first sent a letter, written on behalf of the Lampsakenes to neighboring Gauls (l. 49), who were of the same tribe as in Asia Minor – perhaps a further consolidation of *oikeiotēta* between Lampsakenes, Massiliotes, Gauls, and Rome.<sup>267</sup> The Massiliotes next selected a number of their own ambassadors to accompany Hegesias and help him gain an audience before the Roman Senate. Though we do not know how long it took, the senators apparently complied with Hegesias’ requests, recognizing Rome’s kinship-friendship with Lampsakos, and, according to the inscription, granting permission for Lampsakos to be included as an *adscriptus* in the treaty with Philip (ll. 64-66). The final step was for Hegesias (not a Roman official!) to return to Flamininus with the senatorial letter. Flamininus was then said to have sent letters to “the kings” (possibly Eumenes of Pergamon and Prusias I of Bithynia), informing them of Rome’s relationship with Lampsakos (ll. 75-77).

What is interesting here is that quite typical Hellenistic diplomatic behaviors show signs of adjustment, in negotiation with Rome’s own versions of Hellenistic IR. In particular, certain norms usually deployed between monarchs, as literally relatives, or between middling and lesser states in hierarchies within and/or below the monarchies, are here applied to a new hegemonic power that was neither monarchic nor in any way yet related to the higher levels of dynastic intermarriage. Hegesias and his fellow envoys

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<sup>266</sup> On this as the standard procedure for receiving envoys from Italian communities as well as from abroad, see – including the earliest Greek epigraphic references to the Roman institution of morning salutations, with transliterated terms such as *atrion*, etc. - cf. Eilers (2002, text = C 101, pp. 238-9).

<sup>267</sup> On Gallic tribes – specifically the Aedui – at least by the end of the second century being considered *fratres* of Rome, see Battistoni (2010: 137-147).

must therefore gain a full range of relationships in order to achieve success for their city: from individual statements of friendship from leading Romans (the Flamininus brothers), to pledges of kinship from the magistrates/ assembly at Massilia, to additional international correspondence and support from shared neighbors, the Tolostoagioi, and finally from a letter from the Roman Senate, sent back to the commander, Flamininus. The new – though not completely alien or unrecognizable – modes of international diplomacy afforded by Rome’s arrival thus provided additional channels for Hellenistic states, east and west, to map out more, and ultimately more centralizing, networks of interdependence and political leverage.

#### **PHILO-ROMANISM: RULER CULT REDEFINED**

For states that were not like Lampsakos, and could not rely on mythographic-kinship with Rome or on ties with another city close to Rome, there was an extensive range of additional diplomatic options. Dedications and honors in the mold of Hellenistic ruler-cult were also available, and they became quite prevalent, ranging from statues and cult-places (*iera*), to sacrifices, games, and festivals, which were granted to individual Romans,<sup>268</sup> or to the *Demos* (i.e. *Genius Populi / Populus*) of the Romans.<sup>269</sup> Even more

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<sup>268</sup> Dedications involving individual Romans: e.g. Flamininus – see above, pp. 95ff. The Flaminia festival at Gytheion even continuing into the reign of Tiberius – cf. *SEG IX.923*, ll. 11-12. See also the example of M. Annius, quaestor, honored by Lete in Macedonia with a festival, for saving that city from Gauls (119 BCE)– *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 700.

<sup>269</sup> Dedications involving the *Demos* of the Romans: 50ft statue erected by Rhodes, 160s BCE – Polyb. 31.4; regular sacrifices to the *Demos* and to Roma at Miletos – *Milet I.7* 203 = Sherk 1984: no. 41; crowns to the *Demos* and Senate, at Delos, ca. 170 BCE – *I. Délos* 465; marble altar to Roma in private sanctuary of Egyptian gods on Delos, acknowledging the goodwill of the Senate and *Demos* of the Romans – *I. Délos* 2484; Athenian sacrifices to the *Demos Romaïōn*, early second century – cf. *Hesperia* 40 (1971) 308, no. 9; and two dedications from the Capitoline in Rome, possibly dating to the second century – *ILLRP* 177-178 –

prevalent, especially during the second century, were various types of cult-honors for the divine personification of the Roman state – *Rhōmē*.<sup>270</sup> A figure derived from trends paralleling the development of interstate, mythographic kinship, *Rhōmē* first evolved as a legendary figure, known as early as the fifth century BCE for her links to the arrival of Aeneas and/or Odysseus in Italy.<sup>271</sup> Over the next two centuries, a number of myths, even conflicting versions, developed, as Romans and other groups sought to define this eponymous foundress and her kinship with other founding figures for Rome, in tandem with the varied communities being encountered by Rome as a growing state (e.g. Latins, Etruscans, Greeks, etc.). She was made a male companion of Aeneas (Rhomus), or she was married to Latinus, or to Ascanius, even Aeneas.<sup>272</sup> She was described as a Trojan captive from Argos, with Aeneas' role downplayed, or she was made daughter of Ascanius, of Telemachos, Evander, Italus, or Telephos.<sup>273</sup> By the late third century BCE,

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the first from Laodicea on the Lycus R., and the second from Hierapolis. See also Fears (1978). Evidence for regular cult activity involving the Roman Senate can only be traced to the imperial period. This is most likely due to norms prevalent during the second and first centuries BCE, which, although recognizing power in the Roman Senate, equated that body with a *synkletos* (or, in less formal contexts, a *synedrion*, *gerousia*, or *boulē*), rather than a divinized personification of the state. See the discussion on this subject in Erskine (1997b).

<sup>270</sup> Cf. Mellor (1975).

<sup>271</sup> *Rhōmē* is first attested in Hellanicus' *Chronicles of the Priestesses of Argos*, and according to Dionysius' citation (Dion. Hal. *AR* 1.72), she was among the Aeneadae who followed Odysseus to Italy, and was responsible for instigating the women to burn the Trojan ships upon landing at the Tiber.

<sup>272</sup> Rhomus: Festus 266, citing Cephelon Gergithius, Apollodoros, and Alcimos; marriage to Latinus: Dion. Hal., *AR* 1.72.10 (citing Callias); Plut. *Rom.* 1-2 (later citing "Caltinus" and "Galitas" = Callias?); marriage to Ascanius: Plut. *Rom.* 1-2; marriage to Aeneas: Servius, *ad Aen.* 1.273.48. See Galinsky (1969; 1992); Gabba (1987); Wiseman (1995).

<sup>273</sup> Trojan captive from Argos: Dion. Hal. *AR* 1.72, citing Aristotle; see also Heracleides Lembos (*FGrH* III C 840 F13b; 40d); Festus 269; Solinus 1. Daughter of Ascanius: Plut. *Rom.* 1-2 (citing Agathocles); Solinus, *Coll. rer. mem.* 1.3 (citing Heracleides); Telemachos: Plut. *Rom.* 1-2; Evander: Servius, *ad Aen.* 1.273.51-2; Italus: Plut. *Rom.* 1-2; Telephos: Dion. Hal. *AR* 1.28.8-9; Plut. *Rom.* 1-2.. This last version probably derived from the era of the war against Antiochus, when Pergamon was making strong overtures of kinship diplomacy to Rome – see below, discussion surrounding Lycophron's *Alexandra*, pp. 124ff. See modern scholarship referenced in the footnote above.

her place as a mythic, eponymous foundress had begun to transform into something more wide-ranging and less specifically related to kinship mythography. She came to stand in for the entire state of Rome itself, a goddess to whom any individual or group could give honors and earn a relationship, whether related by *syngeneia* and/or *oikeiotēs* or not.

In her earliest surviving images, Rhōmē sits on a throne, armed, and is crowned by another personification, *Pistis* (Roman *Fides*), both individuals labeled on third century coins from Locri Epizephyrii.<sup>274</sup> Such images are probably related to traditions added to Rhōmē's legends, that she was the first to establish a temple of Fides at Rome, on the Palatine.<sup>275</sup> Both phenomena in turn coincided with Rome's approach to IR during this period, in which Rome was engaging with pan-Hellenist policies in the west, across Magna Graecia and Sicily, against Pyrrhus as well as against Carthage (see above). Parallel, yet ultimately convergent, trends were also taking place with respect to the development of honors granted to the *Demos*, or *Genius Populi* / *Populus* of the Romans. Unlike Rhōmē, the figure of the *Demos* did not originate in kinship mythography or the founding legends of Rome. However, like Rhōmē, he did develop from the fifth into the third centuries BCE, eventually becoming a personified type, who could receive international honors in representation of at least part of Rome as a 'state,' especially abroad.

Such developments were in turn reflective of trends happening across the Hellenistic world, in an evolving international "language" that sought to define and

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<sup>274</sup> Cf. *CIL* X. 16; and Fayer (1975: 275).

<sup>275</sup> Account preserved by Agathocles of Cyzicus = *FGrH* IIIB 472 F5.

embody the shifting normative concepts of statehood, from sheer domination by large monarchic powers, to more regional, networked, and polis-negotiated forms of IR process. Towards the latter half of the third century, and with increasing prominence during the second, other non-monarchic, mid-level powers sought to establish and expand their own international networks, mimicking the modes of Hellenistic kings but adapting these to abstractions of the city as recipients of honors, statues, festivals, and avowals of goodwill. Examples include the Demos of the Athenians, the numerous manifestations of a *Tychē Poleōs*, and the Demos of the Rhodians, the latter also accompanied by the personified goddess of the city, Rhodos.<sup>276</sup>

During the second century, then, pre-existing international practices of both Romans and communities in the east – their ideas long crisscrossed and shared – found easy intersection on this subject of divine honors for the state personified. And like Rhodes, with her cult of Rhodos (and Rhodian Demos), the Romans found the equivalent cult of Rhōmē to be of special value, for the religio-political networks it could establish among foreign individuals and states, as a centralizing means of interstate alignment.<sup>277</sup> Rhōmē began to appear in the sacred binding clauses in treaties, as a deity to whom oaths were sworn, whose statue protected the published inscription of the agreement, and/or to whom penalties would be due.<sup>278</sup> With increasing momentum during the second century,

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<sup>276</sup> See Mellor (1975: 19-20, 23-4), with Fears (1978: 280-281).

<sup>277</sup> Note that Rhodians did not practice the cult of Rhodos, and Romans did not practice the original cult of Rhōmē.

<sup>278</sup> E.g. *OGIS* 762 = Sherk (1984) no. 25, ll. 14-15 (copy of the treaty between Rome and Cibyra to be inscribed on the base of the gold statue of Rhōmē in Cibyra, early second century); *MDAI(A)* 72 (1957) 242-250, no. 65 (fines to be paid to the goddess Rhōmē, for breaking terms of a treaty of *isopoliteia* and *syngeneia* between Samos and Antiochia on Maeander, early second century); and *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 692 (oaths sworn

Rhōmē filled the place of earlier Hellenistic ruler-cults, complete with designated sacred buildings,<sup>279</sup> altars,<sup>280</sup> crowns,<sup>281</sup> statues,<sup>282</sup> festivals (both athletic and dramatic),<sup>283</sup> priesthoods,<sup>284</sup> assimilations/conjoined celebrations with local deities,<sup>285</sup> and even kingly epithets, like Euergetis, Soter, Epiphanes, and Thea.<sup>286</sup> There was no need for Romans to instigate or clash with such practices abroad; these were already the standard of international behavior, already in the process of modification, Mediterranean-wide, molding to fit hegemonic powers led by oligarchs rather than monarchs (cf. Rhodes).

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to Rhōmē, Zeus, and Homonoia in treaty between Aphrodisias, Plarasa, Cibyra, and Tabae, second century). **Note:** these and the following footnotes have been collected here in order to separate the second century / mid-Republican evidence from later, imperial-period evidence for the cult of Roma (as presented together in Mellor, 1975).

<sup>279</sup> E.g. *Milet.* I. 7, no. 203 (Romaion planned at Miletus, ca. 130 BCE); *templum* mentioned by Livy 43.6.5, in relation to the establishment of a Romaia at Alabanda, ca. 170 BCE.

<sup>280</sup> E.g. *I. Délos* 2484 (marble altar to Rhōmē in private sanctuary of Egyptian gods on Delos); *I. Délos* 1779 (altar excavated from room with surviving statue of Rhōmē, dedicated by the Poseidoniasts of Berytus at Delos, late second century).

<sup>281</sup> E.g. Polyb. 30.5.4 (gold crown dedicated by Rhodes to Rhōmē, ca. 167 BCE); *IG XII 3*, 1097 (gold crown dedicated to Rhōmē by Melos, around mid-second century); *I. Délos* 1450A 119 (silver crown to Rhōmē in the Temple of Apollo on Delos, ca. 140 BCE).

<sup>282</sup> E.g. Surviving statue from the collegium of the Poseidoniasts of Berytus at Delos – cf. Mellor (1975: 66, with citations); *OGIS* 762 = Sherk (1984) no. 25, ll. 14–15 (treaty between Rome and Cibyra to be inscribed on the base of the gold statue of Rhōmē in Cibyra, early second century); *IG XII 3*, 1097 (bronze statue of Rhōmē dedicated by Melos, mid-second century); *Olympia* no. 317 (statue of Rhōmē dedicated at Olympia by Elis)

<sup>283</sup> E.g. *Syll.* 611 = *RDGE* 38 (correspondence announcing a Romaia including sacrifices and games at Delphi, ca. 189 BCE); *IGRR IV*.247 (musical competition dedicated to Rhōmē established at Stratonicea by mid-second century); *Milet.* I. 7, no. 203 (regular Romaia established at Miletus, ca. 130 BCE); *I. Magn.* 88 = *Syll.* 1079 (Romaia festival including athletic and dramatic contests established at Magnesia on Maeander by the late second century); reference in Livy 43.6.5, to a regular Romaia established ca. 170 BCE at Alabanda; *I. Délos* 1950, 2596 (Romaia festival established on Delos, ca. 167/6 BCE, with reference to a Romaia of Hekatombaion); *SEG XVI* 486 (tentatively dated to the second century: dedication to Rhōmē with a celebration of the founding of the city at Chios).

<sup>284</sup> E.g. *I Délos* 2596 (priests associated with the cult of Rhōmē on Delos, from ca. 167 BCE); *Milet.* I. 7, no. 203 (priest of Rhōmē at Miletus, ca. 130 BCE).

<sup>285</sup> E.g. *LSAM* no. 26 (early second century cult regulations from Erythrae for the Ionian koinon mention sacrifices to Rhōmē, an Attalid king (Eumenes?), and Antiochus); *OGIS* 441 ll.132-134 (Hecate and Rhōmē at Stratonicea, sometime during the second century); *SNG-DEN* 25 no. 50 (coin from Antiochia showing a Rhōmē of Nikephoros type, with the legend *Rhōmē Antiocheōn*). Conjoined festivals include a Pytheia-Romaia at Megara, a Poseidaia-Romaia at Antigonía, and an Aiakeia-Dionysia-Romaia at Aegina, among others – cf. Mellor (1975: 105ff., with citations).

<sup>286</sup> For a detailed discussion of the various epithets for Rhōmē, see Mellor (1975: 111-119).

Two concepts, however, did evolve along unique paths during this period of transition. The first involved the development of a new phrase, by which Romans were referred to as “common benefactors,” *koinoi euergetai*. This was essentially a universalization of the older, and quite prominent, Hellenistic title of *euergetēs/euergetai*.<sup>287</sup> The all-encompassing nature of this change to *koinoi euergetai* was at its heart a new recognition, and even a celebration of the full realization of pan-Hellenic ideals and rhetoric, brought by Rome to a broader, trans-regional scale. To highlight this shift, the phrases, *pantōn* or *pantōn tōn Hellenōn* were sometimes added to the formula. And unlike previous practice with *euergetēs/euergetai* alone, this expanded formula was not used to directly address or petition Rome. Instead, it was used in mentioning “the Romans” – that is, the Roman state – in the context of interactions with other states.<sup>288</sup>

This tendency reveals an unusual, yet normatively coherent, development, in which Hellenistic states across the Mediterranean began to make abstract a notion of international power during the second century. Such a development moved in tandem with the mapping of new religio-political networks, which not only divinized the abstract international power in multiple forms (e.g. *Demos*, *Rhōmē*, *Rhōmaioi hoi koinoi euergetai*<sup>289</sup>), but also sought to negotiate individual, independent diplomatic ties to it. These trends in turn were an integral and sustaining part of Rome’s evolution and advent as a new version of pan-Hellenic hegemon, the central node in a hierarchic array of relations of *philia*, *symmachia*, *syngeneia*, and *oikeiotēs* across the Mediterranean.

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<sup>287</sup> A comprehensive list of examples and excellent discussion is available in Erskine (1994).

<sup>288</sup> Cf. Erskine (1994: 76ff.).

<sup>289</sup> “Romans as common benefactors” did receive cult honors – see the citations in Erskine (1994: 79ff.).

The second conceptual development related to second-century ‘philo-Romanism’ was a new emphasis that associated the Roman state – however personified – to the notion of a broad arc of world-history. And although adulatory and meant to please, the nature of this emphasis is telling. For it framed Roman power as a new moment, ending one era and beginning another, supported by divine forces (Moirā, Tychē, etc.) in achieving dominion, as never before, over both land and sea. These are the thoughts voiced by contemporaries, and their choice of grounds on which to praise Rome reflect prevalent normative conceptions of their times. Such ‘mental wallpaper’ can be found in what survives, in addition to the work of Polybius, of the literature of the day<sup>290</sup> – in the words of the hymn sung at Chalcis in honor of Flamininus:

πίστιν δὲ Ῥωμαίων σέβομεν,  
τὰν μεγαλευκτοτάταν ὄρκοις φυλάσσειν:  
μέλπετε κοῦραι,  
Ζῆνα μέγαν Ῥώμαν τε Τίτον θ’ ἅμα Ῥωμαίων  
τε πίστιν  
ἰήϊε Παιάν, ὦ Τίτε σῶτερ.

*And the faith of the Romans we revere,  
which we have solemnly vowed to cherish;  
sing, then, ye maidens  
to great Zeus, to Roma, to Titus, and to the Roman faith:  
hail, Paeon Apollo! Hail, Titus, our savior!*<sup>291</sup>

... or in Melinno’s hymn to Rome:

χαίρῃ μοι Ῥώμα, θυγάτηρ Ἄρης,  
χρυσεομίτρα δαίφρων ἄνασσα,  
σεμνὸν ἅ ναίεις ἐπὶ γᾶς Ὀλυμπον  
αἰὲν ἄθροστον.

<sup>290</sup> See the section below – pp. 124ff., on Polybius and Lycophron’s *Alexandra* in this light.

<sup>291</sup> Quoted by Plutarch, *Flam.* 16.4. See Bowra (1957: 23-24).

σοὶ μόνᾳ, πρέσβιστα, δέδωκε Μοῖρα  
κῦδος ἀρρήκτω βασιλῆον ἀρχᾶς,  
ὄφρα κοιρανῆον ἔχοισα κάρτος  
ἀγεμονεύης.

σᾶ δ' ὑπὰ σδεύγλα κρατερῶν λεπάδνων  
στέρνα γαίας καὶ πολίης θαλάσσης  
σφίγγεται – σὺ δ' ἀσφαλῆως κνβερνᾶς  
ἄστεα λαῶν.

πάντα δὲ σφάλλων ὁ μέγιστος αἰὼν  
καὶ μεταπλάσσω βίον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως  
σοὶ μόνᾳ πλησίστιον οὖρον ἀρχᾶς  
οὐ μεταβάλλει.

ἦ γὰρ ἐκ πάντων σὺ μόνᾳ κρατίστους  
ἄνδρας αἰχματὰς μεγάλους λοχεύεις  
εὖστοχον Δάματρος ὅπως ἀνείσα  
καρπὸν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν.

*I welcome you, Roma, daughter of Ares,  
war-loving queen crowned in gold,  
you who live in holy and eternally strong Olympus  
on earth.*

*To you alone, most reverend, Moira (Fate) has given  
royal glory of invulnerable rule,  
so that holding sovereign power  
you may lead.*

*Beneath your yoke of powerful straps  
the chests of the earth and the white sea  
are bound tight; and you safely steer  
the cities of your peoples.*

*While the greatest eternity defeats all  
and reshapes life, sometimes in this way, sometimes in that,  
for you alone a fair wind of rule  
does not change.*

*In truth, you alone of all bear the most powerful  
great spear-carrying men,  
making them spring up like Demeter's plentiful fruits*

*from the land.*<sup>292</sup>

... or in an elegy by Alpheius of Mytilene:

ἤδη γὰρ καὶ πόντος ὑπέξευκται δορὶ Ῥώμης  
καὶ χθῶν - οὐρανὴ δ' οἶμος ἔστ' ἄβατος.

*For not only has the sea already submitted to Roma's spear  
But also has the earth – only the path reaching to heaven is untrodden.*<sup>293</sup>

As a whole, these conceptual developments created a heady mix by the middle of the second century, in which international politics were becoming more strongly globalized and networked, and the power of Rome was made its central axis. This was the context that framed the events surrounding 146 BCE, and by which they would have been triggered, legitimated, and interpreted.

### **ROMAN SYNGENEIA: THE TROJAN LEGEND**

One last piece of the normative map needs to be explored further, and it involves the forms in which Hellenistic kinship diplomacy shaped Rome's advent to international power in particular. Overtures of *syngeneia* that involved Rome's Trojan past in particular became a focus during the early part of the century, as the cities of the Troad began to document their relations with Rome on stone. At the time, these cities were playing a greater role in, and were showing greater concerns about contributing to Rome's interactions with (and eventually counter to) Antiochus. *Poleis* such as Lampsakos, Smyrna, and Alexandria Troas turned to kinship diplomacy as a useful

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<sup>292</sup> Text from Plant (2004: 99-100). The hymn (datable ca. 200-150 BCE – though debated) has been preserved in a quotation by Stobaeus (fifth century CE), in his collection of passages, *peri andreias* (*Eclogues* 3.7.12). See Bowra (1957); Erskine (1997c).

<sup>293</sup> See *Greek Anthology: Garland of Philip* I.11.3528-3531, and *Anth. Pal.* 9.526.3-4.

means for forging diplomatic alignments with Rome against the shadow of the Seleucid king. Such diplomacy was already common to both ends of this very Hellenistic-globalizing equation: the cities of Asia Minor and the Romans alike had long histories of connecting with other states via syncretizing and mythographic processes, identifying and strengthening links to international Hellenism. Again, the mythic-heroic origins of a city did more than construct symbolic demonstrations of cultural identity – they represented and were part of the process of solidifying the religious/sacred foundations for political networks, alliances, and alignments across distances and interstate boundaries.

For Rome, the mythic versions with which the cities of Asia Minor found links during the second century BCE belonged to a set of traditions that had been in development with the communities of Italy and Sicily since at least the late fourth to early third centuries, if not earlier.<sup>294</sup> These legends connected Rome with wider Greek worlds – for both positive and negative political effect – via Aeneas and the Aeneadae, who were then grafted onto other traditions (e.g. Romulus and Remus, Rhea Silvia,

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<sup>294</sup> For an overview, see Galinsky (1969; 1992); Gabba (1987); Wiseman (1995); Battistoni (2010: 15-35). In the fifth century, Hellanicus may have attributed the founding of Rome to Aeneas AND Odysseus, if he was indeed Dionysius' source (at Dion. *Ant. Rom.* 1.72.2 = *FGrH* 1.41). Fifth-century statuettes from Veii, and a mid-fifth century Etruscan scarab (de Luynes collection no. 276, Paris) repeat the scene of a young man carrying an old one, possibly indicating Etruscan origins and/or knowledge of some form of the Aeneas legend. In addition, fifth-century vases, also from Veii, show scenes that could be identified as showing the duel between Aeneas and Turnus. For all of these, see Gabba (1987: catalogue on p. 18).. In the fourth century, Alcimus was said to have attributed Rome's foundation to the great-grandson of Aeneas (*Festus* 362.35ff. L), while Aristotle apparently believed Achaians returning from Troy established the city (Dion. *Ant. Rom.* 1.72.3-4). In the third century, Xenagoras purportedly wrote of Odysseus' sons, Antias, Ardeas, and Rhomaios as the possible founders of Antium, Ardea, and Rome, thereby cutting out Aeneas (Dion. *Ant. Rom.* 1.72.5). Nevertheless, Timaeus, at least from the criticisms he received from Polybius, considered Rome's Trojan origins as a given, even if he was in some way wrong to connect them with the October Horse festival (*FGrH* 3.566 T36). See discussion and additional sources mentioned in Erskine (2001: 23ff.), who notes that our surviving literary sources are heavily affected/influenced by the Augustan age, though with deep Hellenistic origins.

etc.).<sup>295</sup> And they gained force as Rome expanded into Campania and first interacted with Alexander the Molossian – Greeks and Romans alike adapting the long-held colonial tradition of finding links in myth to newly encountered regions.<sup>296</sup> As they did, various groups on both sides accepted some versions, rejected others, and devised new ones of their own, with a particular focus on the ancient heroes of the Trojan-war era, Greek and Trojan figures alike intertwined.<sup>297</sup> Rome's Trojan and/or Achaian roots were thus in direct reflection of her citizens' increasingly eclectic involvements with the wider Hellenistic world.

During the era of the first two Punic wars, as Rome had come into closer contact with and gained hegemony over the communities of Sicily, the links to a Trojan past in particular had gained momentum, on both sides.<sup>298</sup> Evidence for Carthage's role in these processes of international, diplomatic mythography has unfortunately been lost, with only the barest (and decidedly most Romano-centric) traces remaining. At some point prior to the first century BCE, and quite possibly during the third century, the myth of Aeneas as Trojan ancestor, of Rome and of numerous Sicilian and South Italian communities, was connected with the Carthaginian founding legend associated with the goddess/heroine

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<sup>295</sup> Cf. Forte (1972); Galinsky (1969; 1992: 99); Gruen (1992); Erskine (2001); Casali (2010).

<sup>296</sup> As well established by Bickerman (1952).

<sup>297</sup> See Erskine (2001: all, but esp. 7ff.), who astutely deconstructs and nuances the previous modern tendency to oversimplify and assume (based on classical Athenian associations of Trojans with Persians – cf. p. 83ff.), that Trojan identity was directly equated with being non-Greek or barbarian.

<sup>298</sup> Cf. Zambon (2008: 251ff., esp. 260), who rightly sees both Sicilian (especially Segestan) initiative and Roman in this process. It is important to note that evidence points to the existence of some version of a Trojan origin-myth, in BOTH Latium and Sicily, dating as far back as the fifth century. For more discussion, see Erskine (2001: esp. 135-136); and Battistoni (2010: 113-127, 147-165). Battistoni (2010: 117-127) also summarizes the evidence for cultic-mythic developments occurring between Rome and Segesta from the mid-third century BCE onward, centered upon Trojan foundation legends.

Dido-Elissa.<sup>299</sup> In the late third century, Naevius was said to have included Dido and her sister Anna in his *Bellum Punicum*, an epic poem that is known from its surviving fragments to have incorporated the travels of Aeneas.<sup>300</sup> In the context of a duel between Rome and Carthage over the cities of Sicily, the act of connecting the two myths, and placing Aeneas at the site of Carthage prior to reaching Italy, could have served a number of purposes. On the one hand, it could have undermined Carthaginian legitimacy, emphasizing the un-Hellenic nature of Carthage's mythic founder and claiming primacy of kinship among the Aeneadae and their ancestors – i.e. the Romans and Sicilians. Conversely, the Carthaginians – if they even accepted the connection – could have used it to simultaneously reach out to Sicilian communities, advertising a Trojan-connection via *xenia*, while also discrediting the Roman descendants of Aeneas as usurpers and violators of this same guest-friendship.

What is better known, however, is Rome's attention paid during this period, especially within moments of crisis and hardship, to consulting the Sibylline Books and importing foreign deities. Two goddesses in particular stand out among this group, both for their ties to the Trojan origin-myths and for their deeper religio-political significance.

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<sup>299</sup> The oldest surviving reference to Dido-Elissa in connection with Carthage (and the city's founding) actually dates to the early third-century, with Timaeus (*FGrH* i.197). Timaeus also claimed that the name Elissa derived from the Semitic word meaning, "revered one." Later, after the turn of the century, Ennius alluded to Dido as Carthaginian founder (*Annales* 290). Cato the Elder also apparently agreed (at least according to third-century CE Solinus, *Coll. Rer. Mem.* 27.10). By the first century BCE, Varro reputedly connected the Aeneas and Dido myths, though with sister Anna killing herself for love of Aeneas (cited by Servius at *Aen.* 4.682). The fullest surviving non-Vergilian tale of Dido's foundation of Carthage also comes from the first century BCE, with Pompeius Trogus (Philippic History epitomized by Justin, 18.3-5). In this version, Dido's suicide had nothing to do with Aeneas, who goes unmentioned, and was an act to avoid marriage with Libyan King Iarbas.

<sup>300</sup> Servius, in his commentary on the *Aeneid* (4.9), cites Naevius as having included Anna as the sister of Dido.

The first is Venus Erycina, the Greek Aphrodite and Punic Astarte of Mt. Eryx in Sicily.<sup>301</sup> The vowing (by Q. Fabius Maximus) of a temple to her cult in Rome in the wake of the disaster at Trasimene (217 BCE) served a number of intersecting purposes.<sup>302</sup> It created a rallying point for Romans, recalling the place – and its protective deity – where Roman forces had struggled and yet succeeded against the Carthaginians towards the end of the previous, First Punic War.<sup>303</sup> The religious gesture also extended a hand to a key strategic region in Sicily, where only a few years after Trasimene the Romans were again campaigning with a fleet against Carthage. Such overtures were founded upon and strengthened by the bonds of mythological kinship, with both the locals (inhabiting a region once occupied by Elymians) and the Romans together looking to claims of Trojan ancestry, and aligning on a religious and political basis against Carthage.<sup>304</sup> It was most likely during this period that the people of Centuripe first established relations with Rome via the Latin colony (and mythologically significant locale) of Lanuvium as an intermediary. An inscription from later in the century (or possibly early in the first century) testifies to the renewal of this tripartite relationship, which involved guest-

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<sup>301</sup> See Erskine (2001: 198ff.), with sources. For Pyrrhus' earlier use of *syngeneia* rhetoric against the Carthaginians at Mt. Eryx (in this case as a descendent of Heracles, who had defeated eponymous Eryx at this spot), see Zambon (2008: 149-150).

<sup>302</sup> See Livy, 22.9.10, 10.10; 23.30.13-14; Schilling (1954: 242-252); Zucca (1989); Coarelli (1999); and Orlin (2002: 4) – the latter noting that the Romans did not necessarily import the cult of Venus Erycina wholesale, with all its “foreign” elements included. If so, the Romans in this case introduced a foreign goddess, making her entirely Roman. As Ovid later remarked regarding Venus Erycina, “she preferred to be worshipped in the city of her own offspring.” (*Fast.* 4.876).

<sup>303</sup> For the fighting around Mt. Eryx during the First Punic War, see Polyb. 1.55-59.

<sup>304</sup> Cf. Battistoni (2010: 117-129). For more on the interactions between indigenous Elymian, Punic, and Greek elements during the early years of Roman hegemony, see Perkins (2007).

friendship (*xenia*) and the legendary genealogies of affinity (L. *adfinitas* – *oikeiosynē* in the inscription).<sup>305</sup>

About a decade later, during the same war, a second ‘foreign’ goddess was imported – or more fittingly, reintroduced – to Rome: that is, the Idaean Magna Mater.<sup>306</sup> As the goddess of Mt. Ida near Troy, a mountain in part associated with Anchises’ liaison with Aphrodite, Magna Mater again highlighted Rome’s Trojan origins while bolstering ties with Pergamon and the Pergamene kingdom, an important ally at a crucial juncture for Rome. The Mother Goddess was not only a key deity in the cults of western Asia Minor, but also, in her Idaean aspect, was an element in the mythographic politics of King Attalos I (and his successors). For the legitimacies of the Attalids were substantiated, throughout the surrounding region as well as across the Mediterranean world, via pan-Hellenic rhetoric and a pair of founding heroes: the Trojan princeling, Pergamos, and the Arcadian-Heraclid king of Mysia, Telephos.<sup>307</sup> As with Venus Erycina, then, the importation of Magna Mater accomplished a variety of goals. Taking place in 205 BCE, it rallied the hopes and endeavored to allay the fears of the Roman people, as the city prepared to invade North Africa despite Hannibal’s continued presence in Italy. At the same time, it celebrated the conclusion to the First Macedonian War,

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<sup>305</sup> See text, discussion, and citations in Battistoni (2010: 147-165). The phrase, *xenian kai oikeiosynan* occurs at l. 12 in Battistoni’s text. See also Battistoni’s discussion (pp. 161-164) of a related text, possibly also from the second century: the pinax of Fabius Pictor from Taormina (= *SEG* 26, 1123), which references Aeneas, Romulus, and Remus, possibly as a documentation of individual, or ambassadorial *syngeneia*.

<sup>306</sup> Discussion and sources in Erskine (2001: 205ff.). See also Burton (1996); Battistoni (2010: 87-88).

<sup>307</sup> Mother Goddess cults, with various epithets, in Asia Minor: Roller (1999); Erskine (2001: 215-6). On Attalid “culture politics,” which used the myths of Pergamos and Telephos to overcome the stigmas of a new dynasty somewhat shadily established by a eunuch, Philetairos, as well as to forge networks (in typical Hellenistic globalizing fashion) to communities within Asia Minor and abroad, see Gruen (2000); Kosmetatou (2007).

fought with Attalos against Carthage's ally, Philip V. The choice of Idaean Magna Mater thus served both Roman and Attalid ends, and guaranteed a measure of continued goodwill and diplomatic alignment between the two states after the Peace of Phoenike was signed. With Attalos (and Ilion!) included as *adscripti* to the treaty, Rome had established and publicized an alignment. This was the sort of friendship on which Romans could later make claims, and thereby count on Pergamenes to keep an eye out for potential threats coming from the East, for both Roman convenience, and to a certain extent, Pergamene leverage. For at the same time, Attalos achieved Roman recognition of friendship for his kingdom and in reinforcement of his international legitimacy, and he could reference such acknowledgments as bargaining chips with other states against Philip, who remained an adversary in the Aegean. Once again, the very foundations of the bond between Rome and Pergamon, and the religious obligations that gave substance to their international set of diplomatic agreements, were inseparably bound to mythological kinship and shared cult.<sup>308</sup>

### **SYNGENEIA, THE TROJAN LEGEND, & WORLD HISTORY**

Kinship-diplomacy, specifically in the form attached to Trojan origins, could thus extend networks and alliances far across the Mediterranean, in and between both western and eastern ends. Roman power abroad was inherently linked to her ability to participate in the IR field, to communicate diplomatically and ideologically and maintain systems of alliances and alignments on a large geographic scale. The far-reaching implications of

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<sup>308</sup> A similar process is thought to have taken place with the identification of the Samothracian Great Gods with the Roman Penates, possibly in the wake of Perseus' defeat – cf. Battistoni (2009: 91-92).

these ever-interconnecting relations, and Rome's position within them, did not go unnoticed by contemporaries – Polybius observantly described the resulting international situation with the fitting term *symplokē* (“inter-connectedness”). But Polybius was not the only spectator to witness the globalizing process and put his perspective on paper.

Another, perhaps more intricate reflection of the times and its outlook on the international landscape is the poem *Alexandra* of Lycophron (or Pseudo-Lycophron).<sup>309</sup> A strangely enigmatic and even trance-like interweaving of myths, it references a vast array of eponymous heroes, divine ancestries, and deities of natural formations all across geographic and temporal space. The manner in which it bounces around place and time creates an overall impression of an exponentially complex and globalized, essentially pan-Mediterranean world, in which the realms of Europe and Asia, as well as their conflicts, have become inextricably bound.

Arranged as a messenger's speech in a tragic performance, the poem conveys the riddling prophecy of Cassandra/Alexandra. At its most basic level, this prophecy foretells the fall of Troy. Yet in the course of its divinely inspired stream-of-consciousness, the Trojan catastrophe is entangled in a vast array of other tales, telling of woe and conflict across mythic and even historical space. Four key historical allusions are made. First is an otherwise minor event – the assassination of Alexander's illegitimate son with Barsine,

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<sup>309</sup> The name of the attributed author is given as either Lycophron or Pseudo-Lycophron, in accordance with one's position on the poem's date and its manner of composition. The debate has continued since the Byzantine period about whether the known third-century BCE Alexandrine scholar, Lycophron of Chalcis, or some later, second-century BCE author, either using the name Lycophron or adding to a pre-existing text, composed the poem or its addenda. The position favored here aligns with that of Kosmetatou (2000): that the poem as it stands belongs to the second-century, written under the pen name Lycophron, quite possibly for the Attalid court. On the *Alexandra*, see also West (1984), and Fraser (2000).

Heracles, a youth who was briefly king of Pergamon (v. 801-804). Later, in the course of a list of conflicts between Europe and Asia, comes reference to Xerxes and his invasion of Greece (v. 1412-1433). Subsequent to this is a description befitting Alexander the Great (v. 1435-1445), followed by allusion to a wartime alliance and a celebrated peace, the final episode in the prophecy (v. 1446-1450). This pact is said to be between an Alexander, six generations later, and a Trojan descendant, a “unique wrestler” and conqueror honored by his friends.

Such an intriguing selection of historical episodes and its placement within the elaborate context of the poem’s mythic accounts together provide an added glimpse into the ideological thinking of the times. They reveal characteristically Hellenistic developments, in the perception of a ‘world history’ and its workings as a temporal, spatial, and even cultural phenomenon. The Trojan War lies at the very heart of the paradigm, not only connecting friends and foes across traveled space and through the generations, but also continuing numerous age-old rivalries and dichotomies, between East and West, Asia and Europe, Greek and barbarian, hero and villain/monster, mortal and immortal. Mythic and historical conflicts are directly linked, in an interconnected and cyclical progression – what Polybius diagnosed in his contemporary world as the combined processes of *symplokē* and *anacyclosis*.

Polybius, however, went to some lengths to establish himself as an innovator, even informing his readers that he sought to write a new type of history.<sup>310</sup> The form he chose was one that consciously moved away from the myth-historic world of the

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<sup>310</sup> In the preface to the 142<sup>nd</sup> Olympiad, Polyb. 9. 1-2.

*Alexandra* and of the locally or regionally based histories that combined legends, often ancient, with oratorical flourish in their accounts of events. These latter forms of history once proliferated across the Mediterranean. Surviving references to such works include the *Atthis* of Athenian Philochoros, a detailed, year-by-year chronicle of Athenian history from mythical foundations to the third century, a history of Heraclea Pontica written by Nymphis, and a history of western Greek cities by Timaeus of Tauromenium.<sup>311</sup> Roman authors were also engaged in the same practice – works such as Fabius Pictor’s Roman history, from Aeneas and city founding using family histories, and Cato’s *Origines* testify to this. Such histories were works that, like the poetic example provided by the *Alexandra*, were interested in the full range of inter-relations between local place and the wider world, of shrines and settlements, heroic missions, eponymous founders, family genealogies, and ancient blood feuds. Polybius by contrast explicitly states that his work is for only “one class of reader,” and not for “every branch of history,” as with the “genealogical side, (which) appeals to those who are fond of a story, and the account of colonies, the foundation of cities, and their ties of kindred.”<sup>312</sup> These topics were for him already well covered by countless authors, and he thus sought a more refreshing approach to history, one that would be better suited to the here-and-now of his own experience and what he perceived as a changed, and changing, world.

As he characterizes it, Polybius’ goal was to write a *pragmatikē historia*, an account of the actions, the “doings of nations, cities, and kings” for the student of

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<sup>311</sup> Philochoros: *FGrH* 328 T1; Nymphis: Memnon, *FGrH* 434 F6.3; Timaeus: *FGrH* 566 T4.

<sup>312</sup> Polyb. 9. 1.

politics.<sup>313</sup> It is essentially a contemporary history, one that does not look to the distant or mythological past but to the immediate, ongoing present and the cause-and-effect relationship with what directly preceded. In Polybius' words, he intends to focus on "actual events... because there is always some novelty to them that demands new treatment," and he does so with a practical purpose, of providing students of politics "with a method for dealing with any contingency that may arise." In other words, and as he states in other passages, Polybius was writing an *apodeiktikē historia*, a "demonstrative history," intended as a utilitarian guide (*chrēsimon*), not just for the sake of knowledge, but as a manual for current and even future statesmen.<sup>314</sup>

Why Polybius chose to make such an emphasis, and why he so heartily advocated the need for such a new form of history, in turn reflect his deep conviction that his generation was witness to something unique. Words from the very opening of the *Histories* are worth repeating:

*For what gives my work its peculiar quality, and what is most remarkable in the present age, is this. Fortune has guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and has forced them to incline towards one and the same end; a historian should likewise bring before his readers under one synoptic view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose... He indeed who believes that by studying isolated histories he can acquire a fairly just view of history as a whole, is, as it seems to me, much in the case of one, who, after having looked at the dissevered limbs of an animal once alive and beautiful, fancies he has been as good as an eyewitness of the creature itself in all its action and grace.<sup>315</sup>*

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<sup>313</sup> Polyb. 9.2, for this and the following quotations in the same paragraph.

<sup>314</sup> *Apodeiktikē historia*: Polyb. 2.37.3; cf. Walbank (1972: 55-58). For Polybius' repeated emphasis on utility, see 1.4.11; 7.7.8; 9.2.6; 11.19a.1-3; 15.36.3; 31.30.1. Polybius uses the phrase, *oude... autēs heneka tēs epistēmēs*, to describe his history at 3.4.8. On writing a manual for statesmen, see 3.7.5; 6.53.6-54.3-4; 9.9.9-10; 10.21.3-22.4; 11.10.1; 16.28.9; 38.2.

<sup>315</sup> Polyb. 1.4. See Walbank (1974/1985).

Polybius' history thus sought to be a world-history, an organic whole – *sōmatoeidēs*.<sup>316</sup> Following the contemporary theory of historical cycles, he perceived his own times to be at a culminating point, a moment in which global power had moved from the decline of one supremacy to the rise of another.<sup>317</sup> For Polybius, this marked a special moment for study, in which intellectual advances also allowed the historian to make scientific records and analysis of the steps taken by men and the elements of chance that had come together to bring about such momentous change. It is a conscious diagnosis of his times, and an attempt to make changes to current practice among historians and politicians, in preparation for what might come next in the world-historical cycle. There is praise for the previous author, Ephorus, for his attempts at a similarly comprehensive, global view, though dismissal of his inclusion of mythological material, city foundations and ancient genealogies.<sup>318</sup> Polybius seems to view such mythic-histories as relics of a former age, obfuscating contemporary changes, and possibly even detrimental to what he perceives as a new world-order and the skills necessary for a politician in it. In the place of these forms of popular “pseudo”-science (as Polybius would have them), Polybius propounds a form of history that is *pragmatikē* – one that teaches and inspires statesmen via instructive, and even cautionary examples.

At a number of junctures, then, Polybius introduces commentary on the contemporary use of *syngeneia* in interstate relations, dismissing its value and setting it

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<sup>316</sup> Polyb. 1.3.4; cf. 14.12.5.

<sup>317</sup> Polyb. 1.2.

<sup>318</sup> Praise for Ephorus: Polyb. 5.33.2; Ephorus' use of mythology/genealogy: 34.1.3-4 = Strabo 10.465. For similar remarks regarding Timaeus, cf. Polyb. 12.26d.2.

up as a mask for what he sees as real, often personal and/or selfish motivations.<sup>319</sup> He considers mythographic intricacies to be somewhat pedantic,<sup>320</sup> and possibly even associates the quibbling between varied genealogies as contributing to fragmentation between cities and states within the new world unipolarity.<sup>321</sup> From this standpoint, it was the divisions and petty hatreds between, and within, the Greek *poleis* that had caused their demise and could only spell future disaster, as Polybius so passionately (and yet ironically) laments about the fate of his Achaian homeland.<sup>322</sup> And as one of the strongest voices surviving from the period, Polybius has caused modern approaches to think along the same lines, disregarding the inter-related importance of kinship, mythography, and pan-Hellenism (in the manner discussed earlier), in the conduct of international relations and the conception of a world history. In the meantime, modern viewpoints are somewhat blinded to the realities of *how* the mechanisms and language of international politics actually functioned in the third and second centuries. This includes what might seem to later generations as ‘extra’ baggage, but which was an essential part, both positive and negative, in helping and hindering relations between states and their efforts at avoiding or even initiating conflict. As an example – in his account of the Mamertines and events leading up to the First Punic War, Polybius considers kinship between Rome and the

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<sup>319</sup> Cf. Battistoni (2010: 75-76), with references regarding *syngeneia*. For discussion of Polybius’ analysis of political motives (both good and bad), see Eckstein (1995).

<sup>320</sup> Cf. Polyb. 9.1.4.

<sup>321</sup> Cf. Eckstein (2008).

<sup>322</sup> E.g. Polyb. 27.2.10 (on the dissolution of the Boeotian League, because “they rashly and irrationally chose to back Perseus”); 38.1.5 (on disasters for the Greeks caused by their own gross mistakes); 38.1-4 and 16.7 (for an uncharacteristically emotional account of the ‘ruin’ of Achaea in 146 BCE). Polybius uses the phrase *tarachē kai kinēsis* to characterize the troubled and disturbed fragmentation and new networks occurring in the wake of Rome’s advent to unipolarity – cf. 3.4.12; 3.5.1ff., and below – pp. 252ff.

Mamertines as secondary to other factors in Rome's decision to support this group against Carthage.<sup>323</sup> Modern scholarship has tended to do the same.<sup>324</sup> But Polybius' discussion reveals an element of debate behind this decision, in which Rome hesitated to support a group that had twenty years earlier broken *fides* (culturally important, not only to the Romans but to other states abroad). That the Romans followed through nonetheless was not only motivated by aims to leverage against the growing power of Carthage, but was also enacted and legitimated through the mechanism of kinship diplomacy.

In contrast to Polybius, the *Alexandra*, and most certainly the works that Polybius critiques as mythological-genealogical (Ephorus, Timaeus, etc.) construe *anacyclosis* and *syngeneia* as together part of an integrated process. They meld historical and mythical elements in the rise-and-fall history of conflict between East and West, Asia and Europe, going back millennia (as played out in the *Alexandra* at v.1283-1450). As we have seen, and epigraphic evidence continues to show, relations of *syngeneia* and *oikeiotes* were a vital mechanism in Hellenistic IR. And though this was a concept that dated at least as far back as the fifth century BCE, to such authors as Herodotus, it was in the age after Alexander that the world-historical implications of the Trojan legend achieved wider and more universalizing implications.<sup>325</sup>

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<sup>323</sup> Polyb. 1.10.

<sup>324</sup> For a sampling of modern perspectives, see Harris (1979: 182-189); Hoyos (1998: 23ff.); Eckstein (2006: 165); Gargola (2009: 147-148, a summary of events in which kinship goes unmentioned). For growing scholarly attention to kinship diplomacy in relation to these events, see Elwyn (1993: 267ff.); Jones (1999: 124, with an interesting reference to later Roman interpretation of *fabulosa origo* in this case leading to troublesome war); and Battistoni (2009: 75, 87, 96).

<sup>325</sup> See Hdt. 1.1-1.5. On Alexander, the Trojan legend, and an East-West dichotomy, see Flower (2000); Thomas and Conant (2005: 74ff.); Pagden (2008: 38ff.). This subject is currently the focus of an ongoing

## **WORLD HISTORY & ROME IN THE SECOND CENTURY BCE**

Ultimately, the seed of an idea – that the Phoenician abduction of Io and retaliatory abduction of Europa had escalated into a series of reprisals ending in “world war” at Troy – had become a pivotal connecting point. It evolved as a linchpin in third and second century international networks of political alignment and conflict among states and individuals making claims to Hellenic identity, swearing oaths guaranteed by shared religious cult, and accusing their enemies of illegitimacy. After Alexander, greater authority and prestige was to be gained, not only in claiming lineage from the great conqueror himself, but also from a similar combination of Greek and Trojan ancestry. For Alexander had claimed to be a “world king,” greater than any Persian King of Kings, a Greek Heraclid with links to Trojan blood via Neoptolemus, father of Andromache’s children. His pedigree, which combined the mythic aspects of East and West, Europe and Asia, transformed the old fifth century BCE doctrines into an evolving globalizing discourse. It became a theme reflected in the kinship diplomacy of the Hellenistic age, the developing international rhetoric of Rome as a pan-Hellenic power, and in the contemporary literature, from Polybius’ cross-Mediterranean history to the court poetry embodied by the *Alexandra*. In the latter, Alexander the Great was referred to as descendant of Aeacus (son of Zeus and Europa, and also ancestor of Achilles) and of Dardanus (also ancestor of Priam). Combining the bloodlines of conqueror and

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research project entitled, “The Origins of the East-West Antithesis: Before and After Alexander the Great,” and organized by the Zentrum für Altertumswissenschaften, University of Heidelberg.

conquered at Troy, he was pre-figured as a beginning to an end in the conflicts between West and East (v. 1435-1445).

Yet at the same time, the *Alexandra*, in truly globalizing fashion, interconnected the worldwide scale of the Trojan legend and Alexander's conquering mission with both major- and minor-level relations, involving the links between greater and lesser states and individuals, mythic and historical, past and present. For indeed, the Pergamene kingdom, a "middling" power, underwrote its very legitimacy abroad upon an Alexandrine bloodline and a dual Trojan-Greek heritage. And the same East-West ancestry was then attached, in the poem as well as in interstate political relations, to that of Rome, a city with compatible globalizing mythography, origin-legends tracing back to Greek and Trojan bloodlines, and an established history of kinship diplomacy deployed and negotiated with states in the west. Pyrrhus had participated in the same globalizing game, highlighting his own dual Trojan-Greek heritage in pan-Hellenic rhetoric. However, unlike the Attalids of Pergamon, he had used it in opposition to Rome, aiming for support among the cities of Magna Graecia and Sicily.<sup>326</sup>

Kinship diplomacy was thus a complex, adaptable, and increasingly relevant tool in the conduct of international relations and political maneuverings during the second century. The unusual example of the *Alexandra* – neither a public inscription<sup>327</sup> nor an

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<sup>326</sup> Cf. Perret (1942); and Erskine (2001: 159-161), summarizing Pyrrhus' international image as a descendant of Achilles and hero of Trojan lineage (even naming his sons Helenos and Alexander). On the pride of the Epirote royals (including Alexander's mother) in their legendary ancestry: Erskine (2001: 123).

<sup>327</sup> Cf. Curty (1995); Jones (1999). Examples with a political/diplomatic bent include *SEG* 38.1476 (ca. 205 BCE, Kytinion appeals to Xanthus for financial aid, on the basis of shared Dorian kinship); *OGIS* 746 (197 BCE, Xanthus commemorates visit of Antiochus and sanctification of the city to Apollo, Leto, and Artemis, on account of their kinship); Curty no. 9 = *BCH* 14 (1890) no. 11 = *IG* vii.4130 (after 171 BCE,

ancient historian's formal analysis – reveals the manner in which the Trojan legend in particular gained ground for its globalizing potential. The Pergamene kingdom (the most likely court setting for the poem's performance) could celebrate a strengthened position abroad, not only for its Alexandrine legacy and political legitimacy to be found therein, but also for the alliances, formal and otherwise, that such a legacy and position facilitated with Rome.<sup>328</sup> In the *Alexandra*, this last is perhaps the point most clearly driven home: that six generations after Alexander, the perennial East-West conflict would return to peace and glory, in the wake of the victories of a Trojan descendant allied with pan-Hellenic friends (v. 1446-1450). The Trojan descendant is evidently Roman, as highlighted by the position of the associated founding legends of Aeneas, Odysseus as co-founder, and Romulus and Remus (v. 1226-1280), which immediately precede the list of Europe-Asia conflicts ending in the pact at verse 1446. Most scholars agree that the Roman in question can be identified as Flamininus, and his pact as the Roman alliance with the Attalids, ca. 197-4 BCE.<sup>329</sup>

Therefore, evidence from various quarters, from public diplomatic documents, to the poetic production of the *Alexandra*, to the works of contemporary historians, even the objections aired by Polybius against genealogical histories, come together to portray the

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Larissa in Thessaly arbitrates a Boeotian dispute, sending three judges to Acraiphia on the basis of *syngeneia*); Curty no. 5 = Robert, *Documents* pp. 78-90 (second century BCE, from Aigeai in Cilicia, renewing goodwill and *syngeneia*, as outlined with Argos and researched by citizen Pb. Anteius Antiochus); *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 683 = Ager no. 159 = Curty no. 6 (ca. 140/138 BCE, from Olympia recording arbitration of a land dispute, between Messene and the Lacedaimonians, deferred by the Roman Senate to Miletus and decided in favor of Messene, whose case was supported by *syngeneia*).

<sup>328</sup> Note that certain portions of Rome's origin-myth receive unusual emphasis, especially the conflicts between the Aeneadae and the peoples of ancient Macedonia, the heroes Tarchon and Tyrsenos identified as sons of Telephos! Cf. Kosmetatou (2000: 47-48).

<sup>329</sup> Cf. Fraser (2000); Kosmetatou (2000), with citations.

same overall picture of second century BCE *Zeitgeist*. In these modes of thinking, a number of patterns were shared in what was evolving as a more interconnected international language and interstate society. There existed a sense of a world-history, in its inevitably cyclical nature, arriving at a culminating point in their uniquely interdependent and globalizing times. And though terms like ‘interdependence’ and ‘globalization’ did not exist *per se*, analogous intellectual trends were evident, as in the Polybian expressions, *symplokē* and *sōmatoeidēs*, and in the deployment of *syngeneia*, *oikeiotēs*, and other kinship diplomacy terms, in order to forge, strengthen, even compete with various interstate relationships and alignments.

Within these networks, the Trojan War cycle of heroes and legendary travelers, which had been of relevance since the archaic age of colonization, gained special prominence, as states looked to Rome and Rome to others in pan-Hellenistic politics. Ultimately, the ongoing processes of evolution in these international norms coincided with Rome’s development as a pan-Mediterranean power, with Rome driving, encouraging, and manipulating these norms towards centralization. At the same time, however, Rome was also affected by these processes, as they in some cases became possible sources of miscommunication and conflict, and in others became internalized and determined the form and legitimization of international relations.<sup>330</sup>

This was the wider context for events surrounding the devastating defeats of Carthage and Corinth/the Achaian League in 146 BCE. The ways in which these events were legitimated by Rome and perceived by others in the international sphere were

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<sup>330</sup> For more on this subject, see the next chapter.

governed by this context, and later perceptions of 146 BCE as a defining moment in Rome's history as a hegemonic power were first rooted in second century discourse. The contemporary language of international relations was inextricably linked to the widespread belief that there existed a cyclical world history, one that in the present age connected groups even more closely via kinship and via other claims to Hellenic identity across vast distances. In such a world, political and military actions were legitimated and communicated via shared modes of invoking a sort of developing international justice. This normative framework was based upon the ideals of pan-Hellenism, upon recounted histories, traced back to the realm of heroic legend and divine support, of the enmities and close ties between states, and the alignments and fractures that resulted.

Rome was as much a part and a product of this framework as any other state in the system. What enabled Rome to succeed as an international power was in large part a result of her unique participation in this system. At once well versed in international norms and yet also a new player in trans-Mediterranean networks, Romans possessed a unique combination of cultural and legal characteristics that allowed them to engage with contemporary international politics and diplomatic developments, while at the same time transforming these into Roman versions of pan-Hellenism. That contemporaries grasped the momentous nature of Rome's rise, on multiple levels, can be glimpsed in the very different examples of the *Alexandra* and Polybius' *Histories*. With divergent perspectives, both saw the growing importance and presence of Rome as a turning point in the cycles of world history. The first framed it as an endpoint to the primordial battles between Europe and Asia, East-West – the accomplishment of the dream of Alexander.

The second saw it as an exciting opportunity for the student of history and practitioner of politics to analyze the precise events and actions that brought about a new global power in the forever cycling series of empires. For both, and no doubt for others of the time, including Romans, 146 BCE would have had ground-shaking implications, as a dual victory, accomplished by a single power in dramatic fashion, and set as divine retribution, exactingly inflicted for the tragic sins of the wayward from the dream of pan-Hellenism. It was for these reasons, as well as his conviction that he had witnessed a change in the axis of global empires that Polybius chose to extend his work to include 146 BCE, as a means for judging Rome as a new world power. And in doing so, he raises the troubling possibility that as a state at the pinnacle of her success, there is no place for Rome to go but down, to become yet another Troy and the swing of another cycle.

## Chapter 4: *International Legal Constructs & The Treaty of Zama*

### INTRODUCTION

*“The much admired Republic of Zeno ... is aimed at this one main point: that our household arrangements should not be based on cities or parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all men as our fellow-citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law...”*

--Plutarch, *De Alex.* 329A-B<sup>331</sup>

The present chapter investigates the political-legal frameworks that existed within the international system of the second-century *oikoumenē* – a system that was at once moving toward unity (in modern IR terms, unipolarity), and yet at the same time was characterized by a multiplicity of disparate political cultures. As we will see, such political-cultural differences are evident in linguistic-semantic disjunctions – that is, in the deployment of different terms (Greek as opposed to Latin in particular) to refer to seemingly parallel and universalizing terms (e.g. *polis* vs. *res publica*, *imperium* vs. *archē*, *provincia* vs. *eparcheia*). In the resulting international “middle ground,” new fields of meaning thus evolved and in turn crafted a new model for world empire – a culmination, perhaps (though not all would agree at the time)<sup>332</sup> of Zeno’s third-century dream. This model for a pan-Hellenic, *oikoumenē*-wide *archē*, was however – as Zeno would not have expected – set to re-combine Hellenic and Roman norms into a new Hellenistic system.

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<sup>331</sup> = *SVF* 1.262. Greek text: καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυματομένη πολιτεία τοῦ ... Ζήνωνος εἰς ἓν τοῦτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δήμους οἰκώμεν ἰδίους ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίους, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἰς δὲ βίος ἢ καὶ κόσμος, ὡσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ κοινῷ συντρεφομένης...

<sup>332</sup> For more on the debate regarding Rome as a *hegemonia* vs. a *despoteia*, see below – pp. 331ff.

The argument presented here is that such convergent, and yet also at times incompatible, conceptual frameworks provide the context with which to understand diplomatic events surrounding 146. At the same time, they underline the processes by which international intellectuals first construed 146 as having the wider significance that it came to have, as both a marker and a point for assessing Rome in the history of world *archē*. Polybius' account stands as a special example of such construction in progress, while also serving as our primary narrative of events and practices. As such, Polybius provides us with evidence that is colored by individual and cultural biases, which not only reflect contemporary trends (to which he may unwittingly provide evidence) but which may also testify to key cultural misunderstandings. In other words, Polybius is careful to note mistakes made by his fellow Hellenistic statesmen in their interactions with Rome. Polybius uses such junctures as important teaching moments, for, by virtue of his unique position of personal access to and experience with Roman political culture, he finds himself in a position to instruct. In this light, we can mine Polybius' text for clues to the differences between Hellenic and Roman political cultures. At the same time, however, we must realize that Polybius himself is also liable to his own personal and culturally biased mistakes regarding his reading of Roman behavior. In order to bring these to light, we must return Polybius to his international context and see where his interpretations line up with contemporary norms – as evident in epigraphic documents and in other contemporary authors.

And in the end, what is most important in the complex task of navigating Polybius' text is what he himself puts forward as his agenda in writing: the creation of a

*pragmatikē historia*, an instructive set of *exempla* intended to guide current and future statesmen in their approach to dealing with – or even achieving and maintaining – a great world power. Polybius’ attempts to understand and present a comprehensive view of Rome thus manifest a deep-seated belief that such knowledge can provide a crucial means for surviving within, as well as gauging, Rome’s international hegemony – a power that in the eyes of Polybius and his contemporaries could either promise a great world-kingship, the dangerous pitfalls of a world-tyranny, or the turbulent chaos of a hegemon on the decline. All of these possibilities are left to be determined upon the conclusion of the *Histories* at 146.

#### **POLIS & EMPIRE: SHIFTING PERCEPTIONS**

Within the growing level of globalizing discourse and inter-connectivity in second-century international relations, there was an additional, important set of ideational structures. These structures involved an array of cultural thinking that reflected and even shifted the very definition of international political power. And within this array, there seems to have been a gap separating Rome from the Greek-speaking *koinē* of the Hellenistic system. This disjuncture was ultimately based upon a distinctly Roman semantic field of reference, whose Latin terms in turn reflected some different underlining notions of what defined statehood and a state’s relationships with other groups. Such differences, as with all cultural/normative phenomena, are often difficult to detect with precision. And such difficulty is especially apparent when there exists a frequent interaction between groups to blur their edges within a newly evolving “middle

ground” – something that was occurring at increasing rates during the second century. Indeed, in many ways, the language and practice of statehood and international politics among Greeks and Romans (broadly defined) matched or were corollary to each other. As was discussed in the last chapter, both deployed a language of friendship (*philia/amicitia*), of mythic-historic kinship (*syngeneia/consanguinitas*), and philhellenism. And as we will see throughout the present chapter, both groups embraced comparable notions of just warfare (*polemos dikaios/bellum iustum*), predicated upon an airing of grievances and the legal ramifications (in terms of human and divine law) of initiating conflict with due provocation.

As the Hellenistic world entered the second century, such analogies in language and practice helped to accelerate the ‘globalizing’ process, by which international-level interactions became ever more linked. Yet as they did so, these broad similarities also masked some underlying differences that meant that the various parties in an international interaction could often be thinking, assuming, and intending to communicate quite divergent ideas.<sup>333</sup> Such gaps – through which communication could get lost in translation between Greek and Latin (not to mention other linguistic) frames of reference – were in the process of important change during the second century. For as international contacts became ever more linked, various groups tangled with miscommunication, derived new frames of reference or redefined current terms, and learned more about maneuvering their interactions with each other. The end result was an overall shift in the

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<sup>333</sup> This phenomenon falls clearly into White’s sociological concept of a “middle ground” – cf. White (2010).

normative and essentially semantic field with which political interactions were perceived on an international level. And this shift was moving with increasing speed during the second century. At its heart was the very concept of statehood, which, as the Roman state evolved and expanded, stretched the old *polis*-based models of the Hellenistic world and redefined not only Rome's traditional system but also the very fabric of international *archē*.

Among the various Greek-speaking groups around the Hellenistic Mediterranean, the understanding of statehood was ultimately based upon the unit of the *polis*. To follow Aristotle's characterization, this unit could be conceptualized as a *koinōnia politōn politeias* – a collective of citizens involved in the procedures of a community's constitution, a.k.a. its functions toward balanced self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*).<sup>334</sup> In expanding beyond their original bounds, *poleis* of the classical period in turn pioneered a new collective, in which they banded together to form leagues (*koina*), often with some basis in myth-historical *ethnē*.<sup>335</sup> Above the level of *polis* and *koinon*, therefore, there continued to exist – though with increasing prominence and interconnectivity (to use Polybius' term) – a select number of elite international figures, engaged in ambassadorial missions, military campaigns, and civic ('euergetic') service.

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<sup>334</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1274b.39-1275a.1, 1276b.1-2; and Cartledge (1998: definition on p. 40); Dmitriev (2005: 289); Vlassopoulos (2007: 71ff.). See also Sakellariou (1989), on the interactions among modern and ancient definitions of *polis*; and Hansen (2000: 173; 2006), with a greater focus on archaic and classical periods, and on relationships between urban and rural spaces. A good summary of scholarship on the issues of defining the concept of *polis* can be found in Villet (2011).

<sup>335</sup> On the networking of cities and formation of leagues, see Ma (2003); Mackil (2003); Walbank (2010: 20ff.). On the rise of *polis* elites to the level of international standing, see Savalli-Lestrade (2003); Strootman (2011).

Above this level were superimposed even more powerful international individuals – kings. Projected beyond the rank of regular citizenship within individual *poleis* and/or leagues, kings were in some ways pan-Hellenic citizens, operating outside mainstream *politeiai*.<sup>336</sup> As such, they could direct from above the workings of various *koinōniai* that looked to them as hegemon. Kings exercised control via royal overseers, generals, and other officials (who were often among the kings' *Philoï*),<sup>337</sup> as well as via the occasional hand in *polis*-level elections and the activities of city officials, making replacements and direct armed intervention only when trouble and outright insurrection arose.<sup>338</sup> All the same, their power, at its most stable and wide-ranging, relied heavily upon the favor of and positive image among the Greek *poleis* and their leading citizens, both within their regions of hegemony and within those of their rivals.<sup>339</sup> And closely linked to this interdependency was a growth in the intensity of pan-Hellenic discourse, complete with its accompanying concepts of *philia* and *syngeneia*.<sup>340</sup>

Within this international structuration of political thought, Rome was first and foremost perceived, from the outside and according to Greek semantics, as a *polis*. Roman citizens themselves (in all their variety) would not have been unaware of the

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<sup>336</sup> Kings would occasionally reference their city of origin in terms reminiscent of the standard *polis*-citizenship model – e.g. Welles, *RC* 45, ll. 4-5; *RC* 67 (= *OGIS* 331 IV), ll. 5-6; *RC* 71 (= *OGIS* 257), ll. 15-16. However, their public rhetoric more often revolved around pan-Hellenic statements and sentiment, since these provided greater diplomatic opportunities. Note also that Roman terminology tended to insist that monarchs be addressed as “King of \_\_\_(x)\_\_\_ region/tribe/people,” whereas Greek terminology did not – see Ando (1999: 16), with citations.

<sup>337</sup> Cf. Bringmann (1993); Savalli-Lestrade (1996, 1998).

<sup>338</sup> Cf. Dmitriev (2005: 291-296), with citations.

<sup>339</sup> See the precedent-setting example made by Antigonus in 311 BCE – below, pp. 178ff.

<sup>340</sup> On the relationships and interdependencies between *poleis* and Hellenistic kings, see Ma (1999, 2005); O’Neil (2000); Strootman (2011). On *philia*, *syngeneia*, and pan-Hellenic discourse, see the discussions above in chapter 3.

categorization. And over the course of third- and second-century BCE interstate interactions between Rome and the Hellenistic Greek-speaking world, the Roman Republic was mostly treated as a *polis*, distinct and separate from the regions of its *archē*, the areas over which it had hegemony.<sup>341</sup> Polybius uses a number of terms to capture this international power arrangement: e.g. referring to Rome's *dunasteia*, and the Romans as *egkrateis* or *kratountes*. The terms found ready, though at times illusory, analogies in the Roman concepts of *potestas* and *maiestas*, and in certain aspects of Rome's approach to her Italian allies.<sup>342</sup> Yet conceptual change was in the air. For during the second century, there was a building awareness that Rome represented a unique development in the system of international power (as we began to see in the previous chapter). Prior assumptions and the disjunctions between Latin and Greek semantics were being broken wide open by experience. A new Hellenistic order was emerging.

### ***POLIS & RES PUBLICA: DISJUNCTIVE CONCEPTS***

Greek-speaking intellectuals and leading politicians thus faced a number of adjustments during the second century, for they ultimately had to understand the Roman “other” in Greek terms, and as possessing “Greek-like” features, in order to negotiate where they stood by comparison. As such, Rome's position in the Hellenistic world was being framed within prevalent paradigms of interstate “power-over.” At the same time, however, the Roman system represented something new, a combination of the directions

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<sup>341</sup> E.g. Heraclides Ponticus, characterizing Rome as a “Greek city” (quoted in Plut. *Cam.* 22.2). See discussions in Gruen (1984: 316ff.); Ando (1999); Woolf (2001: 313ff.); Millar (2002: Ch. 1).

<sup>342</sup> Cf. Ando (1999; 2011).

in which Hellenistic international politics were already trending – namely, towards a mix of different *politeiai* (kings, *poleis*, leagues, etc.) brought into an organic whole (*somatoeides*). The end result was not only a frequent misreading of the apparent outward analogies between Greek and Roman cultures – analogies that were only compounded by long histories of varied contact and influence. It was also a head-on collision between, and a re-definition and assimilation of the concepts being forcibly translated – e.g. *polis* <-> *urbs*; *politeia* <-> *res publica*; or *archē/dunasteia* <-> *imperium*.

As an expression of statehood, *res publica* was an entity that diverged from former *polis-archē* models.<sup>343</sup> At the heart of the matter stood the differences in perceived bounds of citizenship, made manifest in the linguistic divergence between *populus Romanus* and its Greek equivalent, *dēmos Romaiōn*. The latter (in part via use of the genitive) expressed a particular portion of a group of individuals – a group (i.e., “Romans”) that by tradition was conceived as an *ethnos* and/or *koinon*, in turn connected to a central *polis*.<sup>344</sup> However, the Latin concept articulated a collective that went beyond the Greek lines of *polis*, *koinon*, or *ethnos*. The *populus Romanus* was instead a political cooperative that transcended geographic or ethnic space, in a manner that was analogous to contemporary pan-Hellenism, but was distinguished by its *maiestas* – an invested, sovereign power for which Hellenistic Greeks of the second century had no clear

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<sup>343</sup> Note that even by the Augustan period, Greeks had trouble translating *res publica*: the Greek text of the *Res Gestae* uses four different phrases (1.1: “*ta koina pragmata*”; 1.4: “*ta dēmosia pragmata*”; 2: “*patris*”; and 34.1: “*panta ta pragmata*”) to cover the concept! Cf. Judge (1974: 280-285). “*Ta dēmosia pragmata*” is also used in the Augustan Cyrene Edicts, II.45.

<sup>344</sup> On these intersecting Greek concepts, see Sakellariou (1989, esp. pp. 163ff.); Beck (1997: 188ff.). On the disjunction between *populus Romanus* and *demos Romaiōn*, see Ando (1999: 14-15).

equivalent.<sup>345</sup> As a result, the *res publica*, by virtue of its semantic core, had quite permeable bounds. Built upon collective subscription and constructed out of mutual consent, its political mass could be uniquely expanded by, rather than channeled along, lines of *ethnē* and *poleis*. This was because its membership involved not just citizenship (the Hellenistic world was already discovering the porosities here),<sup>346</sup> but was determined by levels of participation in Roman *ius*. Cicero, a century later, best summarizes the uniquely Roman cooperative that resulted:

*Est igitur ... res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.*

*... therefore, the res publica is the res populi, but a populus is not every crowd of men, gathered for any reason, but a crowd bound by consensual commitment to a particular normative order (ius) and by common interest.*<sup>347</sup>

Therefore, although Greeks could very well comprehend the basic shared notions of citizenship and *polis*, they were not doing so on the same level. And this disjunction had broader implications. Since the Roman *populus* had *maiestas*, it was ultimately the political body that conferred power upon magistrates, who were chosen to bear certain

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<sup>345</sup> This paralleled the manner in which *civitas* in Latin conferred the idea of a “body-politic”... Only by the Augustan period do we find evidence for *maiestas* being translated into Greek (see Ando [1999: 15ff.]) – and although these translations may have existed earlier (second century?), they are far from semantic equivalents: *theiotēs* (“divine-nature/divinity”) and *asebeia* (“profaneness/sacrosanctity”). Also, both of these terms become uniquely and directly associated with the figure of the emperor (“Augustus” as “Sebastos”), and thus correlate with the evolution of Hellenistic ruler-cult toward imperial cult. The earliest evidence of *theiotēs* as a translation of *maiestas* comes from Aphrodisias (imperial cult center?) – cf. Reynolds (1980: 73-74); and of *asebeia* (in the context of an imperial *maiestas* trial) in Philo, *Flaccus* 128.

<sup>346</sup> Namely, in terms of the increasingly overlapped, multiple citizenships via isopolity, sympolity, and proxeny – cf. Reger (2004); Billows (2007b); Burstein (2008)...

<sup>347</sup> *Rep.* 1.39.1. Interestingly enough, Cicero has this definition put into the mouth of Scipio – *Est igitur, inquit Africanus...* See also *Cic. Mur.* 51; *Gell.* 10.20.5. For the subject of an underlying ideology of *consensus* operating within Latin texts, see Ruggiero, *Diz. Epigr.*, s.v. “*consensus*” (p. 605); Instinsky (1940); Nicolet (1979: 332-339); Ando (1999: 14).

allocated authorities (*imperium, potestas, officium*).<sup>348</sup> On an international level, the significance of this relationship, with powers granted from *maiestas populi* to *magistratus*, was that Roman magistrates acting abroad held *imperia*, sacrosanct “rights of command” or “missions” to take military and/or diplomatic action, that extended beyond geographic or political lines of sovereignty from the standpoint of other states.<sup>349</sup> It was for this reason in part that the edges of Rome’s sphere of hegemonic activity had such seemingly blurred boundaries, and that Roman actions overseas could seemingly alternate between completely hands-off and full-on interventionist. The sort of (near-paranoid) reaction this could cause among Hellenistic Greeks in the mid-century is illustrated in a letter written by Attalus II of Pergamon to Attis, priest in Pessinus (ca. 159 BCE):

*... to come to a hasty decision without them [the Romans] seemed to hold great danger. For to us, if successful, it would accrue envy, a taking-away (of success) and hateful suspicion, such as they conceived about my brother (Eumenes), and if unsuccessful, ruin in plain sight: for (in the latter case) they would not turn back toward us, but it would give them pleasure to see (our disaster), because we had set such things in motion without them. But as things are at present, if – may it never happen – we were unsuccessful in anything, after having, with their approval, done each and every thing, we would receive their help and might retrieve a defeat, with the goodwill of the gods. Therefore, I decided in each instance to send to Rome men who would immediately report (to the Romans) those things about which we are in doubt, and, for ourselves, to make preparations...<sup>350</sup>*

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<sup>348</sup> This thinking behind this formulation, by which the powers of a magistrate were conceptually subordinated to the *maiestas* of the *populus*, continued as late as Ulpian: cf. *Dig.* 1.4.1.pr. (“*The wishes of the princeps have the force of law because the populus transfers to him and into him its power of command [imperium] and its powers of jurisdiction [potestas] by that lex regia which is passed concerning the imperium of the princeps.*”). See also Cic. *Leg.* 3.2-5.

<sup>349</sup> The disjunction here – i.e. with regards to respective sovereignties – largely contributed to Hellenistic states often misunderstanding the full import of Roman *deditio*, with quite disastrous consequences – see below – p. 279.

<sup>350</sup> Translated text from *Sherk*, no. 29, ll.12-23 (= *OGIS* 315C VI; *RC* 61)

The *imperia* invested in Roman magistrates – and the lack of direct parallels in the Greek world – also resulted in the misinterpretation that Rome’s Senate was a council (*Boulē*) of kings.<sup>351</sup> And with good reason: into the second century and beyond, individual Roman generals in the East continued to play into this confusion (though they might not have recognized it as confusion). For example, they fulfilled roles analogous to those of Hellenistic kings.<sup>352</sup> Evidence suggests that at the far extreme, it became increasingly necessary for Romans themselves to put some limits upon holders of *imperium*. During the second century, various measures, such as the appointment of *recuperatores*, institution and modification of a *quaestio de repetundis*, and later, a delineation of limits on the exercise of magistrate *imperia* all reveal both the occurrence and recognition of such abuses.<sup>353</sup> Hellenistic Greeks, in turn, began to navigate the

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<sup>351</sup> Cf. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 19.5-7 (where Pyrrhus’ envoy to the Senate purportedly made this characterization); and Polyb. 6.12.9 (where Polybius acknowledges that contemporaries may very well mistake individual Roman magistrates, when viewed in isolation, as kings).

<sup>352</sup> The examples are well known. Among them: Flaminius presiding at the Nemean Games, just like Philip V only a few years earlier (cf. Plut. *Flam.* 12; Polyb. 10.26.1); Paullus placing his own statue on a base intended for use by Perseus at Delphi (cf. Plut. *Aem.* 28.2), and using the Macedonian royal library and hunting grounds (cf. Plut. *Aem.* 28.6; Polyb. 31.29.3-6); the acceptance by Flaminius and other Roman magistrates of divine-like honors (see above, pp. 95ff.); and their use of regal diplomatic language – e.g. *philia*, *eunoia*, etc. (see, among others, Ma [2003]).

<sup>353</sup> Examples include the following: (1) *recuperatores*: 171 BCE – by senatorial decision, panels of five such judges were allocated by the new praetor for each Spanish plaintiff alleging to have had property stolen by previous commanders – the Spanish plaintiffs were also allowed to chose Roman *patroni* to plead their cases (these apparently included figures as illustrious as Cato the Elder and Aemilius Paullus) – cf. Livy 43.2; (2) *quaestio de repetundis*: first instituted in 149 BCE by the lex Calpurnia, revised by Gaius Gracchus in 123/2 BCE, and preserved in part on the Tabula Bembina bronze tablet (ca. 111 BCE) – see Lintott (1981, 1992); *RS* 1, 45-51. In essence, this *quaestio* allowed for former holders of *imperium* to be brought to trial, but only by those claiming to have been wronged seeking recompense. As Jones (1972: 50-51) has noted, this example is an interesting development in Rome’s interaction with non-citizens, within those areas that fell within an *imperium*-holders’ *provincia*, because, “the court of *repetundae* in this early stage of its development has a curious blend of public and private legal procedure”; (3) limits on exercising *imperia*: in a statute dated ca. 100 BCE, preserved in two fragmentary translations into Greek (one from Delphi, the other from Knidos) = *RS* 12 – reference is made to a recent lex Porcia, banning a holder of

difficulties of dealing with multiple ‘kingly’ figures, as juxtaposed with a *maiestas populi Romani*, by adopting such conventions as the title, “Romans, common benefactors,” alongside personifications of the Roman state as *Demos Romaiōn* or *Thea Rhomē*.<sup>354</sup> At the same time, Greeks grappled with the concept of Roman citizenship, which they were gradually coming to realize was something that went beyond their traditional norms of *politeia*.<sup>355</sup> Some of these realizations are reflected in a letter written by Philip V, in which he bitterly ascribed Roman success to the granting of citizenship to “even their slaves when they free them, giving them a share in the offices”<sup>356</sup> – a statement that was at least in part motivated by a desire to propagandize against Rome, yet was also a statement that could only be compelling by referencing current stereotypes.<sup>357</sup>

## BECOMING THE *POLIS* OF EMPIRE

By the late Republic, however, these difficulties with conceptualizing Roman statehood and the Greek world’s position therein show signs of converging upon a new conceptual conclusion – that Rome was the *polis* of empire – that is a worldwide

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*imperium* from marshaling an army, marching, or otherwise traveling beyond the assignments of his *provincia*, unless granted senatorial permission. Later reference to this *lex Porcia* (from Termessus Maior in Pisidia = *RS* 19, col. II, ll. 13-17) also mentions restrictions on holders of *imperium* making military requisitions from an allied state. See Richardson (2008: 37ff.) for discussion of these examples.

<sup>354</sup> “Romans as common benefactors” – see Erskine (1994). See also above – p. 113.

<sup>355</sup> We see this in a lingering tendency among Greek-speakers to conflate the many different Italian groups with “Roman” – see Appian’s account (probably gained from an earlier source), on the first-century BCE Mithridatic massacre of “Romans,” as targeting anyone wearing Roman-style dress – *Mith.* 22.83, 23.91.

<sup>356</sup> *Burstein* no. 65, ll.32-33 (= *IG IX* 2.577; *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 543).

<sup>357</sup> See also Diodorus’ thoughts on Roman citizenship (as opposed to Greek practices), *Ant.Rom.* 2.16-17; and *ibid.* 7.53.5 (in a speech given to Ap. Claudius, though heightening the degree of allegiance usually associated by Greeks between colonies and their *metropoleis*): “*For all the Latins, to whom we [Romans] recently gave equal rights of citizenship, will stand by us, fighting for this polis as if their patria, and the many good cities colonized from here will protect Rome, regarding it as imperative that their metropolis be saved...*”

kingdom – with Greeks (and others) across the *oikoumenē* living in a sort of supra-polis (in Latin terms, a *communis patria*<sup>358</sup>). Such thinking, which achieved further solidification in the Augustan age, was an organic, though by no means inevitable, evolution out of Hellenistic developments in interaction with Rome. The eventual conceptualization of empire thus brought together as parts of a new amalgam the following key ingredients: monarchic *archē* (as embodied by [Thea] Rhōmē<sup>359</sup> and later, the figure of Augustus Sebastos) with Roman civic *maiestas* and *potestas*; the jurisdictional collectivities and shared citizenships of *koina* with those of Roman *civitas* and *Latinum ius*; the modes of kinship and friendship rooted in *metropolis-apoikia* relationships mixed with those rooted in Roman patronage; and a trend toward defining Hellenicity in terms of an international *ethos*, mixed with an increasing tendency among Romans to adaptively implement such Hellenic modes to their own, Roman-specific uses.<sup>360</sup>

The second century was the crucible out of which such a new model for empire first began to coalesce. The progression is made evident in part by the Romans' own use of the terms *provinciae* and *imperium*.<sup>361</sup> These two terms together underwent a series of subtle yet ultimately ground-shifting changes from the second to the first centuries BCE. Evidence shows that, at least from the third century, *provincia* was originally used to designate the 'mission' or task for a magistrate granted *imperium*, or individual military

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<sup>358</sup> Sentiments voiced by Cic. *Leg.* 2.5: "...We consider as our patria both the place where we were born, and that place by which we are adopted. But that [communis] patria must be preeminent in our affections, in which the name of the res publica signifies the common citizenship of us all..."

<sup>359</sup> See above – pp. 110ff.

<sup>360</sup> For Hellenicity as increasingly an "*ethos* not *ethnos*," see Eckstein (2002b: 848).

<sup>361</sup> The following discussion and selection of passages rely on research done by Richardson (2005, 2008).

command, by the *populus Romanus*.<sup>362</sup> Only by extension, and over time with increasing frequency, did *imperium* also gain the sense of *nostrum imperium*, i.e. the command of the Roman people, as then wielded by an individual magistrate.<sup>363</sup> And by the early decades of the first century, *imperium* had also acquired a more universal meaning, one that transferred the general sense of “Roman command” onto a broader plane – that of “world empire,” signifying Rome’s command over the *oikoumenē*.<sup>364</sup>

The connotations of *imperium* were thus to develop significantly from the third to the first centuries BCE, from mere indications of the “command” of an individual, to a more generalizing, “Roman command,” to an abstract and universalizing *imperium*, one that showed signs of claiming control over the whole *oikoumenē*: a “Roman empire,” in a sense that was only strengthened and given more formal definition in the Augustan period.<sup>365</sup> And as the concept of *imperium* transformed, so did that of *provincia*. In a similar trajectory, it evolved from signifying the designated task for a holder of

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<sup>362</sup> See Richardson (2008: Ch. 2); and above – pp. 139ff.

<sup>363</sup> The phrase, *nostro imperio*, is first attested in a speech of Cato the Elder, dated to 167 BCE = *ORF* no. 8.164. A similar use of *imperium* can also be found in Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus’ funeral oration for Scipio Aemilianus (129 BCE), as quoted by Cicero (*Mur.* 75) = *ORF* no. 49.3.

<sup>364</sup> This can be seen specifically in the text of *Rhet. ad Her.*, early 80s BCE (- once thought to have been written by Cicero – see Caplan [1970]). Here, *imperium* continued to retain its general meaning, as *imperium populi Romani* – e.g. *Rhet. ad Her.* 4.13. See also the use of *imperium* to describe a series of dominant Greek *poleis* (each having “command”), at *Rhet. ad Her.* 4.34. At the same time, however, it accrued general meaning: ...*sociis, qui pro nobis pugnare et imperium nostrum nobiscum simul virtute et industria conservare soliti sunt.* (*Rhet. ad Her.* 4.13); followed by a sense of Roman command over the *oikoumenē*: *nedum illi imperium orbis terrae, cui imperio omnes gentes, reges, nationes partim vi, partim voluntate consenserunt, cum aut armis aut liberalitate a populo Romano superati essent, ad se transferre tantulis viribus conarentur* (again in *Rhet. ad Her.* 4.13); and *Quodsi concordiam retinebimus in civitate, imperii magnitudinem solis ortu atque occasu metiemur* (*Rhet. ad Her.* 4.44).

<sup>365</sup> On the development of a defined Roman *imperium* in the Augustan period, see esp. Richardson (2008: Ch. 4)

*imperium*, only sometimes associated with general geographic regions,<sup>366</sup> to, by the Augustan era, referencing specifically defined geographic, and more importantly, administrative units. The process took place as more specific limits (both spatial and in terms of executive powers) were placed upon Roman magistrates acting abroad, as the Roman state gained experience in an accumulating number of *ad hoc* cases. For example, an *imperium*-holder's *provincia* could gain a defined geographical boundary when that magistrate's "mission" happened to focus on an area close to a kingdom whose boundaries were, or had been, expressly recognized in a treaty with Rome. Alternatively, limitations could be placed upon a commander when certain areas were not considered a direct part of his allotted task, or when two commanders held neighboring missions and a line was needed between them.<sup>367</sup>

In turn, by the end of the second century, Greek-speakers had responded to these Roman behaviors, and had rehashed their own, relatively recent, and technical military term in order to translate *provincia: eparcheia*. Earliest attestations of *eparcheia* date to the late third and early second centuries, when Philo, in his manual on siege warfare, used it to indicate a body of troops,<sup>368</sup> and when Eumachus of Naples (cited by Phlegon of Tralles) used it to reference an area – a "sector" of command around the city of Carthage.<sup>369</sup> Polybius also adopted the term, and often in a similar light, to refer to sectors

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<sup>366</sup> Cf. Richardson (1994: 564-571; 2008: 16ff.); Lintott (1993: 22-23), *contra* the old debate regarding Roman "annexation" in the second century – cf. Harris (1979: 131-162).

<sup>367</sup> See Richardson (2008: 27ff.), for detailed discussion of these examples. For his discussion of using Livy to reconstruct such examples, see *ibid.* p. 13ff.

<sup>368</sup> Philo Byz. *Parasc.* 4.6.

<sup>369</sup> *FGrH* 178, F 2 = Phlegon, *Mir.* 18.

controlled by Carthage or Syracuse in Sicily,<sup>370</sup> or to a sector in the immediate vicinity of Rome.<sup>371</sup>

Over time, however, and most likely as it began to be used as the Greek equivalent for *provincia*,<sup>372</sup> *eparcheia* gained increasingly geographical and bounded connotations – and may even have played a role in enhancing the evolution of *provincia* itself in this direction. Such developments can be detected subtly in the occasional passage in Polybius, when he chooses *eparcheia* to reference territories designated to Rome and Carthage in the treaties signed at the end of the First Punic War.<sup>373</sup> *Provincia* and *eparcheia* thus seem to have converged upon a central conception, which entailed a more definitively geographical, yet also predominantly military-based area of control (especially in the wake of recent conflict).

And they continued to do so, as the Roman Senate began to continuously allot key *provinciae*, and as the state inherited entire Hellenistic kingdoms by bequest (e.g. Pergamon in 133 BCE; Cyrene in 96 BCE).<sup>374</sup> The converging shift in meaning between *provincia* and *eparcheia* can also be detected in the Greek text of a letter written to the guild of Dionysian artists by a Roman magistrate (whom most believe was Mummius as

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<sup>370</sup> Polyb. 1.15.10; 1.17.6; 1.38.7; 7.4.2.

<sup>371</sup> Polyb. 2.19.2.

<sup>372</sup> E.g., *eparcheia* occurs in the Greek text of a Roman statute, ca. 100 BCE, preserved in fragments from Delphi and Knidos = *RS* 12. Other parallel uses of *eparcheia*, during the early first century BCE, include: *RDGE* no. 18, ll. 76-7, 114-5 (81 BCE); *RDGE* no. 20, l. G10 (80 BCE); *RDGE* no. 22, l. 29 (78 BCE); and *Epig. Anat. 14* (1989), ll. 32-5, 39-40, 43-4 (citing a law of 75 BCE).

<sup>373</sup> Polyb. 3.27.4; 3.29.10.

<sup>374</sup> On these processes, see Crawford (1990); Richardson (1986; 2008).

commander in 146 BCE).<sup>375</sup> Although the first lines of what survives at the conclusion of this letter are damaged, the phrase “*eparcheia Romaiōn*” is used to preface the granting of certain immunities to the guild, among them being the billeting of troops (*anepistathmeutous*) and tribute/tax payments (*ateleis kai aneisphorous pasēs eisphoras*). Presumably, then, *eparcheia* was here being used to refer to an area of (Roman) control within which such benefits were to be valid, and/or to the powers vested in Mummius that allowed him make such grants. Only a few years later, such combined territorial-military connotations are again evident – this time in an inscription settling a land dispute between the Lacedaimonians and Messenians (and arbitrated by Milesians). The text cites an earlier land-decision made by the consul Mummius when he was “in that *eparcheia*”<sup>376</sup> – i.e. when he was present as military commander within, and, at least for his designated term, over that particular region.

When viewed as a whole, therefore, the evolution of both *imperium* and *provincia* marked a significant change in the perception of Roman power from the third into the first centuries BCE, with Rome morphing into a commanding (though somewhat foreign) hegemon on the international stage. And added to this view was another assessment: that Rome was transforming even further, into the very embodiment of a worldwide *polis*. By the close of the second century, an author of a geographic *Periegesis* (known only by his modern name, Pseudo-Skymnos) could thus compare Rome, the *polis* – by virtue of her

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<sup>375</sup> = *RDGE* no. 44 (l. 2) = *Sherk* no. 37; *IG VII* 2413. See Bertrand (1982) and Kallet-Marx (1995: 43-4, 349-52).

<sup>376</sup> = *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 683, ll. 63-5 = *Ager* no. 159.

power and name – to a star seen and shared by the entire world.<sup>377</sup> And by the end of the first century, Diodorus could present Roman power to the Greek world in an even more unified vision. For he showcased Rome as truly unique in the historical progression of world empires, precisely because her power was not an “empire” or *archē* in the old sense, but was instead a greater *koinonia* into which all other *poleis* and communities were fitted.<sup>378</sup> For Diodorus, Roman *imperium* thus represented a natural culmination of the fundamental Aristotelian tenet: that mankind innately tended to organize into political collectivities. From this intellectual perspective, then, Rome represented the ultimate achievement of at least some version of pan-Hellenic unity, something dreamed of but never fully realized in the earlier Hellenistic age. Polybius voiced these ideals, noting that the ideal *koinon* was in the form of a single *polis*,<sup>379</sup> and in the writing of the *Histories*, setting the express purpose to study the processes of his time, which he believed were bringing all of world history into an organic whole (*somatoeides*) and its events toward a single *telos*.

Out of the interchanges of the second century, then, something new had developed. The Roman (inter-)state system that had evolved by the third century, for the most part in Italy, had in turn become modulated by interaction with Hellenistic norms. And what had eventually developed was a unique amalgam, in which once separate and analogous, yet at times also divergent perspectives had converged. In the war of ideas as

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<sup>377</sup> Ps.-Symnus, ll. 231-234, in Müller, *Geogr. Graec. Min. I*: 205: “... Ῥώμη ἔστιν πόλις / ἔχουσα ἐφάμιλλον τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦνομα, / ἄστρον τι κοινὸν τῆς ὅλης οἰκουμένης...” For more on “Pseudo-Scymnus,” see Bravo (2009).

<sup>378</sup> E.g. Diod. 1.1.3, where he refers to his work within the framework of a “common history of the world, as though of a single *polis*.” This approach is discussed in Ando (1999: 24-25) – see also Sacks (1990).

<sup>379</sup> Words spoken in discussion of his native Achaian League – at Polyb. 2.37.9-11.

much as in the wars of men, Rome was in the process of re-defining “empire,” becoming the *polis* of the *oikoumenē*, her *imperium* a virtual constellation always visible across its sky, and her inhabitants made to negotiate local, regional traditions and communities within a global *koinonia*.<sup>380</sup>

### **POLYBIUS & ROME’S *POLITEIA***

*“But about the Roman politeia, it is neither at all easy to explain the present situation (owing to its complicated character), nor to foretell the future (owing to our ignorance of the peculiar features of public and private life at Rome in the past)...”*  
---Polybius 6.3.3

Despite, and perhaps even further driven by, the difficulties of translating Latin concepts into Greek thought, Polybius pressed on, motivated by a desire to mend the gaps in understanding, to fully grasp and explain Rome as a Hellenized ‘other.’ As is well known, the focus of an entire book (Book 6), at the fulcrum-point of his *Histories* (following the Battle of Cannae), was a discussion of *politeiai*, with an emphasis on characterizing the *politeia* of Rome. It is here that we see Polybius both grappling with the difficulties and responding to contemporary patterns of thought in considering Roman power as a phenomenon that was at once familiar and analogous, alien and innovative with respect to the Hellenistic Greek-speaking world.

For while Rome could be said to be a *polis* with “power over” others, such as other *poleis* or *ethnē*, at the same time, the structures had changed. At the root of these changes was the fact that the Roman state was something other than a typical Greek *polis*

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<sup>380</sup> On this last, see (among others), the contributions in van Dommelen and Terrenato, eds. (2007).

(in its...*politeia*? Greeks had no better word!). In addition, the Roman state encompassed an *archē* that was on a new conceptual level, extending over and above kings, and reaching across eastern and western portions of the Mediterranean, seemingly pulling them together into a singular organism (*somatoeidēs*). Polybius placed his observations of this phenomenon, as well as its potentially awe-inspiring implications, at the very outset of his work, as a main driving force for its whole purpose:

τίς γάρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥάθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιο γνῶναι πῶς καὶ **τίνι γένει πολιτείας** ἐπικρατηθέντα **σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην** οὐχ ὅλοις πενήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν **ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν** ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὐρίσκειται γεγονός... ;

*For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under **what system of polity** the Romans, in less than fifty-three years, have succeeded in subjecting **nearly the whole inhabited world** to their **sole government** — a thing unique in history... ?<sup>381</sup>*

Note how Polybius' use of Greek limits his ability to convey some uniquely Roman features. The best way he can attempt to explain Rome, to interpret and find causes for Roman success, both from his native cultural experience and with a Greek-speaking audience, is on a level of "*politeia*." He must essentially use a Greek-specific concept in his text, a concept for which Latin held no clear or accurate equivalent, in order to explain the uniqueness of the Roman *res publica* and its growth into a world power.<sup>382</sup>

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<sup>381</sup> Polyb. 1.1.5.

<sup>382</sup> As acknowledged by Cicero writing a century later, and evidenced in his use of a great deal of circumlocution to explain the concept of *politeia* in Latin – cf. *Att.* 7.8.4; *Rep.* 1.41; *Leg.* 1.15 – and discussion in Ando (1999).

In many ways, this problematic process exemplified difficulties being faced by Polybius' contemporaries. Yet at the same time, it is of key importance to Polybius as an individual, in his perspectives in writing the *Histories* as a guidebook to statesmen. For in Polybius' estimation, this was the heart of the matter – that Rome's *politeia* was a key factor, not only in her recovery from the disaster at Cannae, but also in her *oikoumenē*-wide success. It was thus within Book 6 that Polybius presented his views on the theories of *anacyclosis* – that is, of a cycle of government-types in the lifespan and final death and/or decay of all *poleis*.<sup>383</sup>

To summarize Polybius' version of the theory: from out of chaos, order first evolves in the form of monarchy, which formalizes into kingship (*basileia*) and degrades into its worst configuration, tyranny. From there, the ousting of a tyrant brings about an aristocracy, which degrades to oligarchy. Oligarchs are then overthrown and replaced by a democracy, which for Polybius disintegrates into the most disastrous type of *politeia*, mob-rule (ochlocracy), only a few ominous steps away from a return to utter chaos and a re-hashing of the entire cycle.<sup>384</sup> In the end, Polybius came to the now archetypal (though perhaps misleadingly translated) “mixed constitution” conclusion, that the optimum system of *polis* was one in which there is united, “all the good and distinctive features of

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<sup>383</sup> On the intersecting subjects of Polybius, types of *politeiai*, and theories of *anacyclosis*, see Walbank (1943); Brink and Walbank (1954); Cole (1964 – esp. for the development of Polybius' own approach to *anacyclosis*); and Podes (1991).

<sup>384</sup> Polyb. 6.5.4-6.9.10

the best *politeiai*, so that none of the principles should grow unduly and be perverted into its allied evil.”<sup>385</sup>

This Polybian theory matters on a number of different levels. Its prominent, even clichéd position – that is, for a modern audience inherently trained in, even distantly influenced by his sort of cultural analysis on the rise of Rome – gets at three main interrelated subjects that are directly relevant to the present study: (1) that Polybius (like his contemporaries) conceived of politics in an “international” frame; (2) that his account testifies to contemporary views of Rome as a state and as an international power; and (3) that his account served a key role in positioning 146 as a significant historical juncture.

To clarify:

1. Polybius explores – though he does not use such terminology – internal-external dynamics. That is, he first examines cultural-specific (e.g. Roman) features (in modern IR-theory terms, “first” and “second” level features), and how they play out and affect change on an international (“third”) level. Then, with a less emphasized and more intrinsic focus, he investigates how international-level relations and power structures affect internal (first and second level) features. Such analyses continue to be deployed and raise debate over internal vs. external factors in the field of IR studies (see above and Appendix). This field in turn has own long history of interaction with Polybius, who is

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<sup>385</sup> Polyb. 6.10.6. Polybius is largely building upon Aristotelian analysis of *politeiai* – see Bates (2003); Biondi (2007) Such ideas are today associated with the phrase, “mixed constitution,” a term that actually coalesced within medieval political thought (with a different connotation from classical or Hellenistic terminologies). It is believed by some to have originated with Sir Thomas Aquinas – for more on this subject, see Blythe (1992); Bates (2003: 102).

often claimed as an important forefather, even as a sort of “proto-Realist.”<sup>386</sup> Reading Polybius from any of the many available modern IR theoretical approaches is thus, at its very core, in the spirit of Polybius’ own work as it was written and intended in the second century.<sup>387</sup> In other words, viewing international relations from the perspective of a “third level” was essentially what Polybius was doing. However – and this is important – modern scholarship does not follow the precepts and viewpoint of Polybius alone in this regard. For Polybius was in step with contemporary, second-century thought on this subject, which perceived the existence of a Hellenistic *oikoumenē* and a cyclical world history.<sup>388</sup> The present study thus aims to pull out some of the third-level evidence available in Polybius’ text, to see how the entity Polybius calls the Roman *politeia* – its first and second levels – interacted, displayed itself, was received, was changed, and in turn brought about change in the international system – with an eye to the presentation and reception of 146. This then leads to the next two subjects:

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<sup>386</sup> For the relationship between Polybius and modern IR- theory – Realism in particular – see Walbank (1990: 87); Podes (1991); Hardt and Negri (2000: Ch. 3.5); Eckstein (2006: 48-9); Little (2006: 66); Champion (2009: 253). Much of this relationship goes back to Machiavelli (often considered the first modern Realist), who was deeply influenced by Polybius – see Fritz (1954: vi, and Ch. 3, esp. p. 51); de Grazia (1989: 94); Donnelly (2000: 173-4); Whelan (2004: 59-62, 92-97); and the discussion from the standpoint of (the history of) Polybius scholarship in Eckstein (1995: 16ff.). See the discussion above in chapter 2, as well as in the Appendix.

<sup>387</sup> See, for example, Polybius’ statements (1.2.7-8): “*In the course of this work, it will become more clearly intelligible by what steps this power [of Rome, immeasurably greater than any which preceded it] was acquired, and it will also be seen how many and how great advantages accrue to the student from the systematic treatment of history.*” -and (1.4.9-11): “*...we can get some idea of a whole from a part, but never knowledge or exact opinion. Special histories therefore contribute very little to the knowledge of the whole and conviction of its truth. It is only indeed by study of the interconnection of all the particulars, their resemblances and differences, that we are enabled at least to make a general survey, and thus derive both benefit and pleasure from history.*”

<sup>388</sup> See discussion below – pp. 322ff.

2. Polybius' views – not only those presented in his analysis of Rome's *politeia* in Book 6, but also those throughout his work – provide valuable, at times circumstantial clues to the prevailing norms and ideologies of his day. In doing so, they offer a means for reconstructing the ways in which Rome as a state, Romans as international figures, and Roman power were perceived on an international, systemic (and through the eyes of Polybius, predominately Hellenic) level. From here we can then build a context within which to read the events surrounding 146 – both in terms of normative behaviors and normative change as well as Roman self-presentation and international-level response. This points to the third, and final subject:
3. It is the view taken here that Polybius played an active role in constructing 146 as a turning-point in the perception of later generations, Roman and Hellenic alike. His decision to modify the original purpose of his *Histories* and extend it to include 146 as a new endpoint speaks volumes to his reaction to events in that year. This decision – and its influence on subsequent generations – will be discussed in more detail later on, but for now, it is important to note that the decision was directly related to Polybius' thinking in positing the analysis of Rome's *politeia* in Book 6. In other words, the political-philosophical views espoused by Polybius, as brought to the fore in Book 6, help inform his reaction to and interpretation of 146 as a significant juncture, a point at which to assess, even critique Rome's position as world hegemon. And at the same time, Polybius' views (as stated in point #2 above) also serve to reflect the international culture of

his time, and thus by extension, to gauge the types of reactions to 146 that could have been felt, at the time, on an international level.

In order to get at these issues, it is thus necessary to review the pertinent highlights of what is otherwise a well-known subject: Polybius' analysis of Rome's *politeia* in Book 6.<sup>389</sup> In this analysis, Polybius points to Rome's uniquely balanced *politeia* – unlike any of its contemporaries – as the fundamental secret to Rome's unparalleled success. As Polybius explains, within the Roman *politeia*, the powers of the singular leading-figure, the best men/nobles, and the *demos* had come to share control of the *polis*, to an unusual extent. Important in this process, in Polybius' estimation, was that the balance had resulted out of a competitive response and recovery by the Roman state and its various constituents to each stage of development, with each moment of crisis and degradation leading to only further growth and improvement.<sup>390</sup> Such a trajectory was contrasted with those of states with comparable *polis*-systems, which had also succeeded for some time in combining the best elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy and forestalling internal decay – namely, Sparta and Carthage.<sup>391</sup> For Polybius, an essential determining factor marking these two states in a level above the less successful but still apart from the truly unique success of Rome was the balanced interplay between internal *politeia*, cultural ethics, and external mastery or rule (*hegemonial/ epikrateial*

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<sup>389</sup> For the range of other studies, see (among others): Walbank (1943); Brink and Walbank (1954); Cole (1964); Derow (1979); Lintott (1999: 16ff.); Millar (2002: 23ff.); Champion (2004).

<sup>390</sup> Cf. Polyb. 6.10.13; 6.18.

<sup>391</sup> Polybius outlines his quite biased reasoning for choosing Sparta and Carthage as comparative examples, rather than Thebes (too short-lived, in his opinion), Athens (too heavily weighted toward its *demos*, which “always more or less resembles a ship without a commander”), Crete (its *koinon* taken as a whole as too morally corrupt and plagued by civil war), or Plato's ideal *Politeia* (too unrealistic) at 6.43-47.

*despoteia*) over others.<sup>392</sup> Therefore, although Sparta possessed an optimal *politeia* and cultural morals attuned to the maintenance of its Lycurgan system, when it came to expansion and international relations, the system was not adequately equipped and ultimately devolved into tyranny under Cleomenes and Nabis.<sup>393</sup> The balance of the Carthaginian *politeia*, on the other hand, was brought down by poorly framed cultural morals and external policy, both of which put no stopgap on individual personal gains and relied too heavily upon a mercenary rather than a citizen military force. In the end, then, the Carthaginian *politeia* at the time of Cannae had, in Polybius' view, already tipped too heavily toward the will of the *demos*, putting it dangerously close to the perils of ochlocracy.<sup>394</sup>

Polybius thus assembled an explanatory model for Rome's rapid rise to hegemony, viewing this rise as the result of a uniquely evolved *politeia*. In his view, the Roman *politeia* had over time and through hardship become adapted to, rather than being brought down by, a policy of conquest. This evolution had taken place because specific social and legislative institutions had been developed that encouraged the pursuit of individual personal honor (e.g. funeral orations) and punished instances of greed (e.g. legislation against bribery).<sup>395</sup> Such a system, according to Polybius, had reached its acme around the time of Cannae, a pivotal moment from which Rome was able to recover with redoubled energy and from which the beginning of an end for Carthage was

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<sup>392</sup> On the latter, see for example Polyb. 6.50 (esp. 6.50.3).

<sup>393</sup> Polyb. 6.48-50. For Polybius' opinion re: Sparta's decline into tyranny, see 2.47.3 (on Cleomenes) and 4.81.12 (on both Cleomenes and Nabis).

<sup>394</sup> See Polyb. 6.51-52 and 6.56.1-5.

<sup>395</sup> Polyb. 6.48-56. Note how this explanatory model parallels certain modern scholarly perspectives on Roman imperialism – cf. above, pp. 15ff.

sealed.<sup>396</sup> The ability to integrate a policy of international conquest while maintaining or even strengthening the balance of powers and morals within the *polis* was therefore a cornerstone in Polybius' political philosophy. But what about international governance, or rule over others after initial conquest – where did these subjects enter into Polybius' model?

To a certain extent, it was a standard assumption, prevalent throughout the Hellenistic world and its intellectual circles, that the exercise of power by one *politeia* over another was quintessentially an implementation of kingship, in a reflection of the *kosmos*' natural order. These notions were reflected by, and even found legitimization within contemporary philosophical doctrines, which asserted that “everywhere god has appointed the superior to rule over inferior,”<sup>397</sup> and that “only the wise man is [a real] king.”<sup>398</sup> As a result, international, imperial actions, from conquest to diplomacy, were modeled upon and supported by the norms of great and noble kingship, mapped out in texts of continuing popularity, such as the *Cyropaedia*, and in numerous newer treatises entitled (or subtitled) *Peri Basileias*, as well as in visual iconography tinged with notes of the divine, in celebrations of grandiose military exploits, and in a discourse of pan-Hellenism and euergetism that all together echoed the legends of Alexander.<sup>399</sup>

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<sup>396</sup> Cf. Polyb. 6.58; 5.7 (on which see below – pp. 173ff.).

<sup>397</sup> Cf. Dio 3.61, 73, etc.

<sup>398</sup> Attributed to Zeno and Chrysippus – cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7.122.

<sup>399</sup> On the overall ideals and assumptions regarding Hellenistic kingship (which despite regional differences shared certain international norms), see Goodenough (1928); Walbank (1985); Bringmann (1993); Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993: 114ff.); Smith (1993); Bilde (1996); Gruen (1996); Ma (2005); Eckstein (2009); Strootman (2011). In general, for the *Cyropaedia*, see Due (1989); Nadon (2001). As for Hellenistic treatises on kingship, the majority are known only by their titles, but from these titles and from the fragmentary citations to their texts, we can tell that they catered to prevailing interests in outlining (and

International power was thus legitimized and de-legitimized in the language of ‘kingly’ ideals, no matter the form that power took – be it Seleucid king or Rhodian *nauarchos*, Achaian *strategos*, Carthaginian suffete, or Roman consul. Rule by those who distinguished themselves as strong, fair, wise, and imposing, all in light of such kingly ideals, thus gained international recognition. It was within this ideological framework that power-over (*archē*) could be validated, within “spear-won” lands gained in the course of justified wars (see below),<sup>400</sup> and across a network of friendships, both with other leading men and in levels of obligation to other states. It was therefore no coincidence that the tradition developed that Scipio Aemilianus quoted from and “always had on hand” a copy of the *Cyropaedia*.<sup>401</sup> Despite all Roman distaste for the institution

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broadcasting claims to “great and noble kingship” – cf. Murray (1971, 2007); Schofield (1999: 743ff.). Examples include (in roughly chronological order, authors in bold): **Aristotle**, “on kingship, in one book” – probably the same work as “*symboleutikos* to Alexander,” and perhaps stemming from Aristotle’s well-known and groundbreaking discussion of kingship in *Pol.* 3 (cf. Cic. Att. 12.40.2, 13.28.2); **Xenocrates**, “Elements of Kingship, to Alexander in Four Books” (Diogenes Laertius (=DL), 4.5, 13, 14); **Anaxarchus**, *On Kingship* (ancient citations gathered by Dorandi, no. 65A-E and 66); **Theophrastus**, *On Kingship*, followed by *On the Education of a King* (cf. *P. Oxy* 1611, ll.42-46; DL, 5.42, 49), and *On Kingship, Addressed to Cassander* (the latter identified in antiquity as a forgery written by **Sosibius**, chief minister of Egypt under Ptolemies III, IV, and V – cf. Athenaeus, iv, p. 144e; also Murray, 2007: 18); **Straton of Lampsakos**, *On Kingship*, in three volumes, and *On the Philosopher King* (DL, 5.58-64); **Epicurus**, *On Kingship* – an apparently satirical attack on the standard trope of companionship between king and philosopher (DL, 10.28; Plut. *Mor.* 1095c); **Cleanthes**, *On Kingship* (DL, 7.175); **Sphaerus**, *On Kingship* (DL, 7.178); **Euphantus of Olynthus**, *On Kingship, For Antigonos Gonatas* (DL, 2.110); **Persaeus of Kition** (courtier of Antigonos and his military governor on Acrocorinth), *On Kingship* (DL 7.36). See also **Aristeas’ Letter to Philocrates**, a letter to the author’s brother during the reign of King Ptolemy Philadelphus, preserved in a number of manuscripts, which encapsulate (among other agendas) many of the Hellenistic ideals of noble kingship in the second century BCE – cf. Murray (1967). Less securely datable to the Hellenistic period are authors grouped together as the so-called **Basileias Group**: Pseudo-Ecphantus, Diotogenes, and Sthenidas. All are cited as having written a *Peri Basileias* – and quotes are provided – by the early fifth-century CE compiler, Stobaeus, in his *Florilegium*. Modern scholars date the Basileias Group anywhere between the third and first centuries BCE or between the second and third centuries CE (notably enough, a period of Hellenistic revival) – cf. Blumenfeld (2004: 189ff.).

<sup>400</sup> Below – pp. 180ff.

<sup>401</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 2.62: “*Itaque semper Africanus Socraticum Xenophontem in manibus habebat, cuius in primis laudabat illud, ‘quod diceret eosdem labores non aequae gravis esse imperatori et militi, quod ipse*

of monarchy, Rome's culture of elite authority had nevertheless assimilated the normative ideals for noble leadership in the Hellenistic world.

And in some ways, this Hellenistic system was already trending toward what could be deemed as mixed-*politeia* interstate structures – with kings, *poleis* (whether primarily democratic, aristocratic, or monarchic), and leagues of *poleis* all forging networks of alignment toward gaining greater exercise of international “monarchy” (i.e. imperial power). Polybius had thought upon and made certain conclusions regarding this context in his *Histories*. The attention he pays to Rome's unique *politeia* in Book 6, when taken with statements regarding Rome elsewhere, provide clues as to these conclusions.<sup>402</sup> On the one hand, Polybius expresses excitement at the potential benefits of Rome becoming a new world power. With its uniquely vibrant *politeia*, Polybius sets up a possible scenario that Rome could offer a new opportunity for unifying the Hellenistic *oikoumenē*, which over the past generations had been fraught with Greek-on-Greek strife. Such views emerge in Polybius' apparent awe at the whirlwind speed with

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*honos laborem leviolem faceret imperatorium.*” – ref. to Xen. *Cyropaed.* 1.6.25; cf. Cic. *Ad Q.Frat.* 1.1.23.

<sup>402</sup> Scholarship on Polybius' views on Rome is quite extensive, in large part because of the central position Polybius himself gives to the “rise of Rome” theme in his work, from the preface onwards, but also because Polybius (at least in what remains of the *Histories*) is at times cryptic in his assessments – some scholars have detected a whole range of Polybian approaches, from slavish adulation to a possible change of heart, to a self-contradictory perspective on Rome. For a selection of this scholarship, see Derow (1979); Richardson (1979); Shimron (1979); Walbank (1963; 1974; 1990: 157ff.; 2002); Gruen (1984: 343ff.); Dubuisson (1990); Eckstein (1995: 194ff.); Champion (2000a; 2000b; 2004: 47ff.); McGing (2010: 157ff.). The view taken here is that Polybius held a naturally complex view of contemporary Rome. As a native-Greek-speaking foreigner who had lived amongst and befriended Romans while in mandated political exile, he at once admired aspects of Roman culture and the great potentials thereof, and felt a measure of foreboding at what could transpire in the future, in the wake of Rome's initial success – for Romans and the Hellenistic *oikoumenē* alike.

which Rome achieved world dominion,<sup>403</sup> in his praises for Rome's *politeia*<sup>404</sup> and/or his close friend Scipio,<sup>405</sup> and in his accumulating hints at a tragic decline within the Greek-speaking world – be it an ignobility of leadership,<sup>406</sup> descent into ochlocracy for a number of *poleis*,<sup>407</sup> or in the sentiments expressed in speeches or in authorial approval for Greek leaders and their policies, placed at important decision-making junctures in the text.<sup>408</sup> Polybius' frustration at the sheer folly of his fellow Greeks (and Rome's contrasting talent for taking the reins at these moments) is perhaps best expressed in the following passage:

*...many decisions of the Romans are now of this kind: availing themselves of the mistakes of others, they effectively increase and build up their own power, at the same time doing a favor and appearing to confer a benefit on the offenders.*<sup>409</sup>

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<sup>403</sup> Polyb. 1.1.5, 6.2.2-3.

<sup>404</sup> Cf. Polyb. 6.18, 6.42, 5.56.

<sup>405</sup> See the extended digression in praise of Scipio's virtues at Polyb. 31.25.2-31.30.

<sup>406</sup> Cf. Polyb. 3.16.4 and 3.19.9 (on Demetrius of Pharus); 5.34.10 and 5.87.3 (on Ptolemy IV); 13.3-5, 15.20-24, 16.1.2, and 25.3.9 (on Philip V); 15.25 and 34 (on Agathocles of Alexandria); 18.55.7-9 (on the Ptolemaic official, Polycrates, and Ptolemy of Megalopolis); 20.8 (on Antiochus III); 21.1 (on the demagogue Molpagoras); 26.14-16 (on Alexander of Issus); 29.8-9 and 29.17-18 (on Eumenes and Perseus); 30.8-9 (on Rhodian statesmen, Deinon and Polyaratus); 33.5 (on Archias, Ptolemaic governor of Cyprus); 36.15 (on Prusias II of Bithynia); 39.7.7 (on Ptolemy VI). For comprehensive statements of disgust with 'Greeks' taken as a whole, see Polyb. 6.56.13-15, 36.17.7, 18.34.7. See also McGing (2010: 149ff.). For an overall view of the period post-Pydna as one of "tumult and commotion" (*tarachē kai kinēsis*), see Polyb. 3.4.12 – and below pp. 252ff.

<sup>407</sup> E.g. Polyb. 4.17ff. (fall of Cynaetha, 220s BCE); 7.10ff. (Messene, 215 BCE); 13.6.2 and 16.13.1-2 (Spartan tyrant Nabis rising to power by winning favor with the *plēthos*); 15.21 (revolution and fall of Cius, 203-2 BCE); 15.25ff. (mob at Alexandria upon the overthrow of Agathocles, 200 BCE); 18.43.8 and 20.6-7 (Boeotians, 190s BCE); 38.11-12 (Achaians at Corinth, 147-6 BCE).

<sup>408</sup> These sentiments are complex, and reveal the mixed reactions that various 'Greeks' surely had toward Roman power. Despite his depictions of this natural complexity, Polybius seems to have reserved special praise for those Greek leaders who (at least in his opinion) strove for maintaining the nobility of Greek autonomy (e.g. Hiero in 263 BCE – cf. Polyb. 1.16, 1.83.3; Aratus in 225/4 BCE – cf. 2.47-53; Aristaenus in 198 BCE – 18.13.8-10, and speech/policy at 24.11-13; Philopoemen in 198 BCE – *ibid.* and 4.31.4; Epirote statesmen Cephalus, 172 BCE – 27.15.10-12) and for unity rather than discord among Greeks (e.g. the famous words given to Agelaus of Naupactus, 217/6 BCE – 5.104: "It would be best of all if the Greeks never made war on each other, but regarded it as the highest favor in the gift of the gods could they speak ever with one heart and voice, and marching arm in arm like men fording a river, repel barbarian invaders and unite in preserving themselves and their cities."). See the discussion in Eckstein (1995: 194ff.).

<sup>409</sup> Polyb. 31.10.7.

Taken as a whole, these clues imply that, for Polybius, Rome was quickly becoming a new “great-king” for the world, and one unlike any other in history. This phenomenon was made possible by Rome’s unique cultural position in the *oikoumenē*, its distinctive *politeia*, and its lack of any individual king to become corrupted (as in Aristotle’s most devastating critique of monarchy and elsewhere in Polybius’ text).<sup>410</sup> As a sort of kingly-*polis*, Rome could thus bring about a natural-order unity to the Mediterranean world – as Polybius implies by the use of such terms for Roman dominion as *somatoeides* and *symplokē*.<sup>411</sup> It was perhaps a utopic vision and an alluring dream (and one that a number of later Romans would jostle to achieve with their own Mediterranean-wide individual leadership – Augustus being the ultimate winner). But the ideals were real, and they were compelling fodder for much of the political ideologies of the day. That such ideals continued to legitimate and muster feverish support into the next century (even beyond) speaks to their potency.<sup>412</sup> They were grand ideas, molded to the principles of pan-Hellenism and *syngeneia*, to visions of the *oikoumenē* coming into its own as a complete empire, and to the optimum leadership of a balanced *politeia* overseeing the whole world, governed by nobility and encapsulating all the widely-varied and interlocking structures of what Alexander had only started.

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<sup>410</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 3.16-17.

<sup>411</sup> For other scholarship on the relationships between Romans and Hellenistic kingship, see (among others) Price (1984); Erskine (1991; 1994); Fishwick (2004); Hekster and Fowler, eds. (2005); Eckstein (2009).

<sup>412</sup> See, for example, the movements stirred by Andrisus and later Mithridates – below – pp. 290ff.

Yet such ideas cut in more than one direction – as much as they could herald Rome as a new pan-Hellenic savior, they could also warn of Rome as a dark cloud of trouble looming in the west.<sup>413</sup> For in following the belief that Rome could fulfill (perhaps too thoroughly) the celebrated, “freedom for the Greeks,” mantra, it stood to reason that Rome could then eliminate all kings in the *oikoumenē*. And this was something that not all Hellenistic Greeks would have applauded or found reassuring. At least two second-century enemies of Rome (albeit kings themselves) voice such thoughts in Polybius’ *Histories* – as a means of rallying popular support.<sup>414</sup> Monarchs and the peoples reliant upon their monarchic system alike felt foreboding at the newly increasing and different form of international “kingship” wielded by Rome. For some, the elimination of independent eastern kings threatened a new, and perhaps more tyrannical overlord. For others, it spelled disruption in the balance of the international system (i.e. the established royal houses and the lines of intermarriage and diplomacy between them). And on the far extreme, some foresaw an immense power vacuum opening, in the instance that Rome as sole international hegemon happened to fail – as some

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<sup>413</sup> For the latter characterization of Rome – see the speech of Lyciscus, Acarnanian envoy, in 217 BCE, as written by Polybius at 9.37.10: “*they [the Aetolians] have, without knowing it, invoked such a cloud from the west as may, perhaps, at first only cast its shadow on Macedonia, but in time will be the cause of great evil to all Greece.*”

<sup>414</sup> (1) Polyb. 21.11.2-11 (Prusias, possibly at the instigation of Antiochus III, fearing that the Romans intended to eliminate all kings in Asia... requiring the Scipios to launch a letter-writing PR campaign); and (2) Polyb. 29.4.9-10 (Perseus using the same fears to court Antiochus IV as a potential ally). See also 1 *Macc.* 8:11-13 (associating Rome’s removal of kings with fear of the city’s very name); and *Orac. Sib.* 3.175-179 (late second century BCE, pronouncing that the power from the west would rule over much of the earth, bring down many, and instill fear in all kings thereafter). Similar sentiments among Rome’s opponents reappear later, in Pompeius Trogus (Justin, 38.6.7 – placed in a speech of Mithridates) and in Sallust (*Jug.* 81.11, in the words of Jugurtha).

contemporary doomsday oracles had it, and as some promised a new pan-Hellenic savior.<sup>415</sup>

These last responses to Rome's developing international power were ones that must have truly affected Polybius. For he strongly believed (and developed as a model in Book 6) that all systems – no matter how well crafted and evolved – eventually degrade from within, as with each type of *politeia* individually.<sup>416</sup> Polybius even stated outright that Rome was not immune from decay, and that despite the possibility that disaster could be forestalled, the final descent would ultimately come, and could in fact be predicted.<sup>417</sup> At certain junctures of the *Histories*, Polybius provides ominous clues of internal weakness at Rome and possible points for failure in the Roman system, especially when it comes to the moral fiber of the nobility and its younger generations.<sup>418</sup> The fact that Rome's old-guard preference for honor over wealth was showing signs of reversal matches similar such descents experienced by other states in Polybius' analysis. All of

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<sup>415</sup> For examples/citations, see below – pp. 293ff.

<sup>416</sup> Polyb. 6.9.12-14.

<sup>417</sup> *Ibid.*, and 6.57.

<sup>418</sup> Cf. Polyb. 8.27 (on the debauchery of M. Livius, commander at Tarentum); 9.10 (criticizing an improper taking of spoils at Syracuse); lengthy discussion at 31.25.2-7 (distinguishing young Scipio Aemilianus from the rest of his generation); 35.3-4 (on the treachery and cowardice of M. Cl. Marcellus); 36.14 (on the ridiculously incompetent magistrates sent to Bithynia). Polybius also notes that C. Flaminius' land-distribution proposal of 232 BCE was a first step in the "moral degradation of the Roman *demos*" (2.21.8). Compare these observations with the ominous warnings Polybius puts in the words of the Roman hero Paullus (29.20.1ff.): "*It is chiefly...at those moments when we ourselves or our country are most successful that we should reflect on the opposite extremity of Fortune; for only thus, and then with difficulty, shall we prove moderate in the season of prosperity. The difference...between foolish and wise men lies in this, that the former are schooled by their own misfortunes and the latter by those of others.*" These sentiments were later echoed in Scipio Aemilianus' reaction to the fall of Carthage – 38.21.1-3; cf. App. *Lib.* 132 (= Polyb. 38.22) – see below, pp. 335ff.

them, Carthage and Corinth included, were the ultimate victims of ochlocracy, itself being the fatal consequence of moral decay among leading politicians.<sup>419</sup>

Polybius thus framed the international situation of the second century with an ongoing and burning question, asking:

*...whether those now living should shun Roman domination or do the reverse, and whether those in the future should consider the Romans' government worthy of praise and emulation, or of blame...*<sup>420</sup>

It remained a recurring debate throughout the *Histories*, and one that never has (or was intended to have) a fully clear-cut answer. At its heart was a double-edged trend: on the one hand, Roman superiority and growth continued to represent an ever-encountered phenomenon in the Greek world. On the other, there hovered the very distinct possibility that Rome could be on the decline, having reached its acme and having lost its capacity to counteract the forces of internal decay that accompany success. As Polybius constructs it – and as many of his contemporaries would have seen it as well – the Hellenistic *oikoumenē* hung in the balance, awaiting that tipping-point at which Rome would have become the greatest power in all of history. At what stage this great success would also become a “tripping”-point for Rome was something that could only truly be told in hindsight (as Polybius acknowledges in his reference to “those in the future”).

For these reasons, then, Polybius poses the all-too-important question at the exact point in the *Histories* where his original plan for the work was extended, to include

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<sup>419</sup> On Carthage: cf. Polyb. 36.7.3-5; on Corinth: cf. 38.11.9-11; 38.12.4-5. See discussions below in chapters 5 and 6.

<sup>420</sup> Polyb. 3.4.7 – a comment made in response to the Senate’s adroit handling of a dispute within the Ptolemaic royal line, 163 BCE.

events from 168, when Rome had achieved (“within fifty-three years”) a dominant status in the Mediterranean *symplokē*, and bring them down to 146 BCE.<sup>421</sup> And as he states, this extension is intended as an opportunity for readers to consider the fact that

*judgments regarding either the conquerors or the conquered ... are by no means final – what is thought to be the greatest success having brought the greatest calamities on many, if they do not make proper use of it, and the most dreadful catastrophes often turning out to the advantage of those who support them bravely ...*<sup>422</sup>

And in his characterization of this latest period – the time following the fifty-three year rise of Rome, Polybius describes the world as suffering from *tarachē kai kinēsis* – a period of revolt, change, and political commotion – and one that provided a unique opportunity for Polybius as observer and author to assess the transformations of both conqueror and conquered in the wake of a newly burgeoning system of international power.<sup>423</sup> That Polybius chose 146 BCE as a new endpoint is telling (and was to have lasting impact – see below). It speaks not only to Polybius’ own personal experience, as a companion to Scipio and witness to the fall of Carthage and as an Achaian statesman involved in post-146 BCE restructuring. It goes further and speaks to the vast ripple effect that the events of 146 BCE had across the Hellenistic Mediterranean system – as connected to the entire *Zeitgeist* of the second century, and as demonstrated by Polybius’ extended account of the variety (and associated emotions) of international-level Greek responses to the fall of Carthage.<sup>424</sup> Each of these were in turn part and parcel of the

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<sup>421</sup> Initial plan of the *Histories*: Polyb. 1.1.5, 1.3, and 3.3. Extension to 146 BCE: 3.4.

<sup>422</sup> Polyb. 3.4.1ff. – and more detailed discussions below.

<sup>423</sup> See Polyb. 3.4, esp. 3.4.5 (for mention of 168-146 BCE as a time of *kinēsis*).

<sup>424</sup> The well-known passage is Polyb. 36.9-10. See also below – pp. 287ff.

*Histories*' central intent and purpose, written as a guidebook of *exempla* (both positive and negative) for contemporary and future statesmen – a guidebook documenting what was viewed with excitement as the crucial and groundbreaking period changing the historical map of world power.<sup>425</sup>

And as such a guidebook for statesmen, the focus of an entire book of the *Histories* (Book 6) on analyzing Rome's *politeia* makes a lot of sense. For in the second century, Rome's *politeia* was the one set to dominate, if not govern, the entire *oikoumenē*. An understanding of that *politeia*'s inner workings, its quirks, strengths, and possible weaknesses was of crucial importance to any Greek statesman – just as an understanding of a Seleucid king and the functioning of his court would have been in earlier days. Polybius thus presents his analysis of Rome's *politeia* for a Greek-speaking audience, and in relation to its (as well as his own) views of *polis* and *archē*. As such, it becomes another means for surviving within, as well as gauging, Rome's international hegemony – a power that for Polybius and his contemporaries could potentially (and depending upon perspective) hold all the glorious promises of a great world-kingship, the dangerous pitfalls of a world-tyranny, or the turbulent chaos of a hegemon on the decline – phenomena that Polybius was to connect closely with 146 as a perceived and constructed historic juncture.<sup>426</sup>

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<sup>425</sup> Cf. (among other passages) Polyb. 1.1-2; 3.4.8; 3.7.4-5; 6.2.3; 12.28 (on the “Odyssean” man as the man for writing history – at once a man of action and experience as well as one of observant intelligence); 23.14.12.

<sup>426</sup> Polybius does present *exempla* of exceptional Greek leaders (not just those reduced to folly) in their negotiation of policy with respect to Rome. Throughout, he reserves the most praise for those who continued to strive for personal and political honor, whether that be in aligning with or aligning against Rome's international powerhouse. See the discussion in Eckstein (1995, esp. Ch. 7).

## TREATY OF ZAMA: THE CONTEXT

*“I learnt by actual experience how fickle Fortune is, and how by a slight turn of the scale either way she brings about changes of the greatest moment, as if she were sporting with little children...”*

--Hannibal, in Polyb. 15.6.8

And so we return to the crucial international arena of the second-century, to a period already recognized by Polybius and others living within it as experiencing significant change. This brings us back to the question of how circumstances and individual responses built, one upon the other, toward the events of 146, events that were then construed (by contemporaries as well as subsequent generations) as a major turning point in world history. In order to answer this set of questions, we have already built a contextual picture of international political norms and normative change, as well as of an increasing international-level awareness of shifting power paradigms. Now we need to look at the details – not only those that point to the justifications, viewpoints, and positions taken by Romans, but also those by Greek-speakers, and – to a more problematic extent – Carthaginians. The view from the Carthaginian perspective, unfortunately, remains more obscure. For although we can reconstruct an international context for Carthaginian diplomacy, our evaluation of Carthaginian-specific cultural and political approaches arrives through a more distant lens, often dominated by Greek and later Latin sources.<sup>427</sup>

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<sup>427</sup> Note: the vast majority of attempts to reconstruct the deeper character of Carthaginian international politics for this period relegate the study to one of two fields: military history (e.g. accounts of battles, army composition, naval ships) or “imperial administration.” The latter relies heavily upon making extrapolations from later, Neo-Punic (as well as Greek and Latin) texts from the first and second centuries CE. This is a valiant effort, but a practice fraught with problems – a “suffete” mentioned in a first-century

Therefore, in analyzing the relations between Rome and Carthage in the second century, there are a number of added complexities. Not only were Latin concepts and semantic fields of reference interacting back-and-forth with the Greek (see above), but also Punic fields of reference were in the mix, coming in contact with and between both ‘sides.’ On this level, Carthage’s international cultural and political relations were even more multifaceted, involving not only a degree of ‘Hellenization’<sup>428</sup> – a set of exchanges analogous to that experienced by Rome – but also one of interaction with Rome. All the same, from the evidence that currently exists – and as we will see played out in events from 201-146 BCE – it appears that Carthage, despite a unique blend of Greek, Phoenician, and North African cultural elements, was quite closely integrated into the Hellenistic system,<sup>429</sup> perhaps even ahead of Rome in the depth of her assimilation with the Hellenistic East.

At the same time, Carthage may have also been ahead of the eastern Greeks when it came to the years of contact, in diplomacy and war, with Rome. However, they still appear to have experienced levels of disjunction comparable to those experienced by Hellenistic Greeks when they interacted with Romans. The Carthaginian approach to hegemony also seems to have developed features more closely analogous to the Hellenistic world than to the Roman system (e.g. in Carthaginian practices of dividing conquered territories into administrative-tributary zones, relying predominately on the

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inscription (e.g. the texts from Dougga) was in an office already accommodated to an official Roman system – to what extent is difficult to tell.

<sup>428</sup> For more on Carthage’s Hellenization, see most recently Tsirkin (2000); Melliti (2006).

<sup>429</sup> See also above, pp. 75ff.

use of mercenary forces, and defining citizenship along tighter, hereditary and honorary-proxeny lines).<sup>430</sup> Indeed, such divergences between Carthage and Rome may in part be highlighted due to the nature of the surviving record, relayed as it is through Greek and Latin filters. Yet the degree to which these divergences were symptomatic of Carthage's specifically Punic as opposed to Hellenistic, or 'Hellenizing' features (or more likely, some combination of the two) remains a possibility (though it cannot be accurately determined). All the same, disjunctions must have existed, and what remains important is that they were viewed on an international stage with its own evolving set of norms – a level upon which we can at least gauge various frames of reference.

Interactions between Rome and Carthage in the second century are therefore to be understood on a number of levels: with both states being considered part of the same international normative framework, and yet at the same time, uniquely positioned as Hellenized 'others,' possessing their own long and distinctive history of interaction. And they are primarily to be understood as occurring in the wake of Zama – both the diplomatic situation surrounding Hannibal's final military defeat and its effects upon the terms of the 201 BCE treaty. For it was this treaty that spelled a new position for Rome in the west and a new relationship for Carthage and Rome, a relationship that was not always defined in the same manner on both sides. Ultimately, it was a combination of these factors – the terms of the 201 treaty, cultural disjunctions, miscommunications, and prejudices, and what was perceived of the evolving international position of Rome that underlined the outbreak of the Third Punic War and its attributed significance.

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<sup>430</sup> See Manfredi (2003).

According to Polybius, on the eve of the battle at Zama, Scipio Africanus the Elder was able to arrange a personal meeting with Hannibal – an encounter between great men of great nations-in-conflict that has captured the imaginations of countless generations since.<sup>431</sup> And although this meeting – if indeed it ever took place – has continued to serve highly dramatic purposes, the political essence of its exchange – whether it actually occurred in the pre-battle personal meeting first staged by Polybius or not – also touched upon a real and key controversy, as well as a taste for international-historical drama at the time. The controversy that lay at the heart of this episode was to have a direct impact on the final treaty of 201 BCE, and by extension, on the return to conflict in 149.

In Polybius' account of the pre-Zama meeting – perhaps passed on in part by his friend Scipio Africanus the Younger's retelling of family legend – Hannibal first noted the extreme vicissitudes of Fortune (excerpted above). This philosophical remark echoes a key motif of tragic reversal and *anacyclosis* that Polybius weaves throughout the *Histories*. And as we have seen, it was a motif that was not only prevalent in contemporary Hellenistic thinking, but was of central importance to Polybius, and his mission to instruct current and future statesmen. Yet this particular use of the motif went beyond mere literary flourish – whether on the part of Polybius alone or through the additional influence of pro-Scipionic accounts. For this musing on the vagaries of Tyche

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<sup>431</sup> Among ancient authors: see Polyb. 15.5.8-9.1; Nepos 23.6.2; Liv. 30.29.4-32.3; Plut. *Flam.* 21.2; Flor. 1.22.58-59; App. *Pun.* 39a-c; Eutrop. 3.22.2; Oros. 4.19.2; Zonar. 9.14b-e. As inspiration for later generations: see Machiavelli, *The Prince* 17, *Discourses* III.17; Thomas Nabbes' play, *Hannibal & Scipio* (1635); print, *Meeting Between Scipio and Hannibal*, by Rubens (early seventeenth cent.); paired busts of Scipio and Hannibal in Napoleon's study at St-Cloud – cf. Emil Ludwig, *Napoléon*. Payot. (1926: 189); parallels with the battle of Tobruk (1941), Rommel vs. Patton.

was also set as the preface for the main substance of Hannibal's diplomatic message: namely, a request for terms of peace. Whether or not this exact exchange took place cannot be independently verified, but what matters about the account given by Polybius is not only the manner in which it was framed but also its normative, international-level ramifications. For the purported request made by Hannibal on the eve of Zama – whether actually made or the product of Roman political rhetoric – referenced a key bone of contention and legal issue which appears to have become a justifying basis for the unusual, even novel terms introduced into the treaty of 201. We will begin with the request itself and the normative framework behind its terms, before looking more closely at this issue and the 201 treaty.

In the meeting with Scipio, Hannibal suggested that Carthage agree to recognize Rome's hegemony over the once-disputed regions of Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and all islands between Italy and Africa, and be restricted from ever again waging war against Rome on account of these areas. On the surface, these were not inordinate or atypical proposals. In fact, the nature of their terms fit with the standards of international diplomacy at the time. As such, Hannibal's proposition represented an attempt, a testing of the waters, towards obtaining at least a temporary truce, and, in the hands of Roman propaganda, could be used to indicate Carthaginian desperation, even predetermined doom. Yet the framing of the terms was conventional, and as with other contemporary agreements, it predicated a cessation of hostilities upon territorial, hegemonic boundaries

and upon restrictions for one or more parties.<sup>432</sup> Such patterns, and their nuances are discussed in the following few sections. Reviewing their examples helps establish the normative context that informed not only Scipio and Hannibal's possible meeting and its issues, but also its repercussions for the 201 treaty and that treaty's role in the diplomatic crisis of 151/0 BCE. The following discussion is thus focused on illustrating the normative backdrop behind the framing of *territorial/hegemonic terms in agreements of peace* (i.e. formal cessation of hostilities):<sup>433</sup>

### **HELLENISTIC PEACE-AGREEMENTS & VAGUELY DEFINED TERRITORIES**

The starting point goes back to the earliest years of the Hellenistic period, to a pair of epigraphic documents that provide invaluable evidence for the development of international peace agreements between Hellenistic monarchs. These documents also shed light on the early formulation of interrelationships between these kings and the *poleis* within their domains, and the conceptions of hegemony itself. The texts come from Skepsis, and record: (1) King Antigonus' proclamation of the 311 BCE peace-agreement between himself, Cassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, and (2) a decree of the *dēmos* of Skepsis regarding this proclamation.<sup>434</sup> The first document elegantly laid out what was in essence a brief stalemate between four of the *diadochoi*, and what was assuredly a

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<sup>432</sup> See discussion below.

<sup>433</sup> Note that the treaties here have been chosen for their predominantly contemporaneous source material that also outlines specific terms to some extent. Other facets related to peace agreements – such as the appeal to or rejection of treaty-terms during disputes, the renewal or disavowal of old treaties, or the relationship between treaties and such concepts as *symmachia* and *philia*... will be discussed as necessary in later sections.

<sup>434</sup> = *B-D*<sup>2</sup> 6, containing English translations of both documents. The Greek texts are available at *RC* 1 (or *OGIS* 5 – cf. *Staatsverträge* 428) for Antigonus' proclamation, and at *OGIS* 6 for the decree of the Skepsis *dēmos*.

shrewd maneuver by Antigonus.<sup>435</sup> In calling at least a brief end to hostilities with Cassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, Antigonus could direct his attention more fully toward Seleucus in Syria. In doing so, he was forced to acknowledge a level of legitimacy for the three other *diadochoi* in their various territorial claims. However, Antigonus' choice of political rhetoric not only served to leverage himself against Cassander in the mainland-Greek sphere and strengthen his own position with respect to the Greek cities of Asia Minor (like Skepsis), but also laid the groundwork for a future re-opening of hostilities, and potentially, in the long run, for negating his rivals' various claims. In the long term, then, such agreements came to act like stalemate truces, but without the specified time frames.

As for the 311 BCE treaty provisions, Diodorus (9.105.1) fills out the picture provided by the Skepsis inscriptions. He relates that the four *diadochoi* agreed to a cessation of hostilities based first on the recognition of Cassander as *strategos* of Europe, until the time when Alexander's young son by Roxanne should come of age. Lysimachus is next acknowledged as holding mastery over (*kyrieuein*) Thrace; Ptolemy over Egypt and the adjacent cities in Libya and Arabia; and lastly, Antigonus is confirmed as having command over (*aphēgesthai*) all of Asia. Note the vaguely defined limits of territory, with each hegemon set to a general region, the details of which are left assumed, or as a separate matter to be fleshed out later. And although this imprecision could simply be the

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<sup>435</sup> For discussion of the 311 peace and the political/military conditions surrounding it, see Welles (1934: 6ff.); Simpson (1954); Ryder (1965: 113-114); Green (1993: 27-28); Bosworth (2005: 241-242); Errington (2008: 33-34).

product of Diodorus' summarizing, it is nevertheless a phenomenon evident in other Hellenistic treaty agreements.<sup>436</sup>

There are a number of factors that come together to explain this trend. The first factor lies in the need to agree on basic terms as a preliminary step, and as the most efficient means for coming to a truce or peace-agreement (as perhaps with Hannibal's offer to Scipio above). Presumably, this process involved some shared understanding that the details of territorial lines were to depend upon existing limits of *polis/league chorai* coming under a hegemon's regional control. Disputes over such lands and the geography of their borders were then to be considered subsequent and subsidiary matters. Such an approach hinged upon the all-encompassing concept of "just-warfare" and its various iterations, which continued to hold immense weight in the conduct of Hellenistic international diplomacy. At the core of this concept were notions that territories had, normatively speaking, rightful owners and hegemons. Such ownership came by acquisition in a justly waged war – i.e. *doriktētos choros*, "spear-won land," gained only during provoked and/or demonstrably justified military action – or by gift or inheritance, but only from a rightful owner.<sup>437</sup>

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<sup>436</sup> See examples listed in the footnotes below.

<sup>437</sup> See the discussions in Chaniotis (2004, 2005). The main source outlining such a definition of *kyrieia* over land comes from a Magnesian arbitration of a land-dispute between Cretan Hierapytna and Itanos, ca. 140-111 BCE (= *Ager* no. 158): "*Men have proprietary rights over land either because they have received the land themselves from their ancestors, or because they have bought it for money, or because they have won it by the spear, or because they have received it from someone of the mightier.*" (l. 133ff.). This definition is corroborated by other cases (discussed by Chaniotis), including the following key examples: (1) Demosthenes 12.21ff. (quoting a letter from Philip II, who claimed Amphipolis on the basis of inheritance, since his ancestor Alexander had occupied the city, and of his own conquests, confirmed by some earlier agreement with Athens); (2) Polyb. 18.51 (196 BCE, Antiochus contesting Rome's request that he evacuate cities once under Philip V, on the basis that a Seleucid victory a century earlier had established his rightful claim to lands that Philip had subsequently "robbed" – *spheterisasthai*); and (3)

Over time, then, peace agreements came to be accompanied by more specific terms dealing with territorial limits, which included criteria for determining boundaries in the wake of the treaty or procedures for handling future territorial disputes.<sup>438</sup> Agreements that did not include such clauses were less likely to last in the long term, acting in a manner similar to stalemate truces. They granted respite to combatants who might have other areas of concern to deal with, or might otherwise need to regroup and re-strengthen their positions. At the same time, they provided fewer constraints, should either combatant wish to resume conflict. This is because clauses in such agreements tended to amount to a “war-nullification,” returning the combatants to circumstances existing prior to the conflict, or simply hitting the pause-button on making further acquisitions.<sup>439</sup> At the furthest end of the spectrum, both parties would agree to rightful possession of only those territories and properties held *prior* to the outbreak of war, in

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*Ager* no. 146 (ca. 150-133 BCE, Pergamene arbitration of a land-dispute between Mytilene and Pitane, with the final decision resting upon Pitane’s original purchase of land being a lawful one, transacted with the legal owner – in this case, it was confirmed that the legal owner had been the son of Seleucus, who had in turn gained the spear-won land by treaty after his victory at Kouropedion).

<sup>438</sup> Examples of such specificity: (1) treaty (of alliance) between the Aitolian and Akarnanian leagues near the end of the Chremonidean War, ca. 263-2 BCE, designating the River Acheloös as a boundary (*Ager* no. 33); (2) treaty between Magnesia-on-the-Maeander and Miletus, ca. 196 BCE (*Burstein* 37), which includes a set of clauses for determining and marking the boundary between them, along the Hybandos River; (3) clauses under negotiation between the Scipio brothers and Antiochus in 190 BCE (Polyb. 21.13.1ff.); (4) arbitration and subsequent treaty-agreement, including clauses mandating arbitration in future disputes, between Temnos and Klazomenai, first half of the second century (*Ager* no. 71).

<sup>439</sup> Examples include: (1) the shrewd maneuver of Agathocles in coming to terms with Carthage, 306 BCE (= *Staatsverträge* no. 437; Diod. 20.79.5; Val. Max. 7.4e1; Just. 22.8.15; Trog. Prol. 22 – cf. *CAH* 7.1.404; *Green* pp. 222-3) – terms included stipulation that Carthage regain all cities formerly subject, and in return to pay in gold the value of 300talents-silver, plus 200,000measures of grain; (2) in some ways, the (abortive) attempt by Pyrrhus to negotiate terms with Rome in 280 BCE (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 18.6-19.5; cf. *Enn. Ann.* 194-6; Cicero, *Brut.* 55, 61 et al.) – Pyrrhus offered to aid in subjugating Italy (= *symmachia*?) and to restore all captives without ransom – the Romans responded that he leave Italy first, then seek friendship and alliance; (3) the swiftly negotiated settlement between Philip V and his allies and the Aetolians and theirs, calling quits to the Social War in 217 BCE (as events in Italy drew Philip’s attention - extended account, with speeches, at Polyb. 5.101.5-105.10) - see esp. Polyb. 5.103.7: “[*Philip asked that the envoys*] propose to the Aetolians to make peace on the condition of both parties retaining what they then possessed...”; cf. Just. 29.2.8-3.8.

addition to the more generic, “pausing” truce-terms, of payment(s) in exchange for territories/properties occupied during the war, and/or an exchange of POWs/deserters. In doing so, these peace agreements were inherently transitory, by virtue of the fact that they did not imply guilt on the part of any combatant – that is, of unjust, unprovoked initiation of conflict – and they provided no framework of imposed penalties or guidelines for future arbitration.

And indeed, over time, this generalized format of peace agreement appears to have served an implicitly temporary purpose,<sup>440</sup> or to have been used as a first-step in the process of at least moving toward negotiating a final peace convention and treaty framework.<sup>441</sup> Vagueness in the terms thus provided a range of diplomatic opportunities – as in diplomacy across the ages – but here there is a discernible set of patterns and a recognizable “language” in development. When deployed in a finalized treaty, the absence, decreased prominence, or even ambiguity of territorial claims could mark a lower level of commitment among one or more parties – and signal as such to the other side. The noncommittal parties could be looking for a momentary pause in the current combat or a chance to regroup and/or look to other concerns, or they could be finding themselves locked in a military/political stalemate from which they perhaps hoped to disentangle themselves at a later date. In the latter case, some of the vagaries of a more

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<sup>440</sup> E.g., the one-year truce between Antiochus and Ptolemy at the end of the Fourth Syrian War, 217 BCE (Polyb. 5.87.1-8, 14.12.3), or the granting of a ten-day armistice to the Aitolians by Glabrio in 191 BCE (Polyb. 20.9.1. ff.).

<sup>441</sup> Examples include: (1) Queen Teuta’s embassy to Rome, making a first-offer for peace, 228 BCE (Polyb. 2.12.3); (2) Philip V’s initiation of peace-negotiations to end the Social War, 217 BCE (Polyb. 5.101.5ff.); (3) Nicaea negotiations between Philip, Flamininus, and their respective allies (Polyb. 18.1.1-10.7); (4) abortive negotiation attempts by the Aetolians, with Roman magistrates Glabrio and Flaccus, 191 BCE (Polyb. 20.9.1ff.).

provisional peace agreement could actually be used as the legal grounds for reinitiating conflict.

As our evidence currently stands, such treaty behavior seems to have been more the *modus operandi* for kings rather than *poleis*. As the level on which kings and leagues as international agents defined their own regional holdings, *poleis* thus held the main responsibility and concern over the details of territorial boundaries, be they geographical markers (especially rivers) or outlying sanctuaries.<sup>442</sup> This is not to say that such issues were beyond the concern of kings. Quite the contrary: kings,<sup>443</sup> and with even more frequency, league councils,<sup>444</sup> showed great interest in intervening in border disputes and

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<sup>442</sup> See the discussion in Ager (1996: 13-17), with examples.

<sup>443</sup> Examples of kingly interventions include: **(1)** Alexander, in 333 BCE, calling for a boundary settlement between (and against) Aspendos, a city that had defied him, and one of its neighbors (Side?) (= *Ager* no. 6); **(2)** Lysimachos, ca. 288-281 BCE, awarding lands to an outlying sanctuary of Samothrace, apparently encroached upon by Thracian neighbors (= *Ager* no. 24); **(3)** a king, usually identified as Lysimachos, ca. 287/6 BCE, granting a people called the Pedieis the rights of *paroikoi*, allowing them to use lands claimed by Priene – most likely in the wake of a peace with Demetrios Poliorketes (= *Ager* no. 25); **(4)** Lysimachos, 283/2 BCE, arbitrating in a centuries-long dispute between Priene and Samos, awarding lands to Samos in what has been interpreted as a magnanimous move calculated toward improving public image in Asia Minor (= *Ager* no. 26; interpretation in Shipley (1987: 181-182)); **(5)** Philip V, late third century, settling a land dispute between two cities within his Macedonian sphere – Gonnoi and Herakleion (= *Ager* no. 54); and **(6)** Ptolemy VI, between 163 and 146 BCE, sending agents to resolve issues of land use and occupation between Troizen and Arsinoë, the latter being the site of a Ptolemaic base. Note, however, that added approval of Athens was required to finalize the arbitration (= *Ager* no. 138).

<sup>444</sup> Examples of league councils intervening in such territorial disputes include: **(1)** the Boiotian League, fourth-third centuries, settling boundaries between league members Koroneia and Lebadeia (= *Ager* no. 16); **(2)** the Boiotian League, third century, in like fashion settling boundaries between league communities Akraipheia and Kopai (= *Ager* no. 17); **(3)** the Aitolian and Akarnanian Leagues, in an alliance agreement, ca. 263/2 BCE, setting out territorial limits as a prerequisite to finalizing that agreement (= *Ager* no. 33); **(4)** the Achaian League, early third century, establishing territorial limits between two unknown states (= *Ager* no. 36); **(5)** the Achaian League, 242/1 BCE and 238/7 BCE, requesting on two occasions that league member Megara arbitrate over disputed boundaries between two other members, Corinth and (newly entering member) Epidauros (= *Ager* no. 38); **(6)** the Achaian League, post-228 BCE, designating a number of league members to arbitrate in a border dispute between other members, Arsinoë and Epidauros (= *Ager* no. 46); **(7)** the Aitolian League, 214/3 BCE, choosing a panel of league judges to settle a boundary dispute between member communities Melitaia and Xynai (= *Ager* no. 55); **(8)** the Aitolian League, 213/2 BCE, designating a panel of three Kalydonian judges to decide upon disputed boundaries, as part of a *sympoliteia* agreement between league members Melitaia and Pereia (= *Ager* no. 56); **(9)** the Achaian League, post-182

legalizing new or re-defined boundaries, especially when disputes could threaten internal strife, or the territories touched upon areas belonging to or courted by rivals. Yet throughout the Hellenistic period, *poleis* remained the essential “unit of measure” for defining territorial limits, which could then be combined to form regional spheres of hegemonic *archē*. Such approaches to territorial holdings were reflected in the various forms of peace agreements, which among kings, tended toward a lesser degree of specificity and left the details of boundary-lines for later occasions – be they future conflicts or occasions for arbitration.

Hannibal’s pre-Zama offer to Scipio was thus a multifaceted one. Given the international normative context outlined above, there are a number of mixed messages that we can suggest were being implied in the surviving account. On the one hand, by making a vague gesture toward territorial possessions, Hannibal, acting in a manner functionally comparable to a Hellenistic king, was proposing a war-nullification, hinting at either a temporary truce or a possible first-step in moving peace negotiations forward (especially since the other usual issues of prisoner/hostage exchange and indemnity payment were not yet raised). And quite possibly Hannibal could have felt some real concerns regarding recent losses in Italy, the loss of Numidian allies, and the continued internal divisions within the domestic politics of his city.

On the other hand, however, Hannibal was also extending an offer to restrict future Carthaginian military action with the clause that Carthage would pledge, “never to

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BCE, involved in the settlement of a land dispute between Megalopolis and Messene, accompanied by the Messenian town of Thouria (= *Ager* no. 116); and (10) the Lycian League, mentioned in relation to an arbitration between member city Araxa and a neighboring community, over land in an area named Soasa (= *Ager* no. 130).

wage war on account of those territories [given up].”<sup>445</sup> This last proposal, in promising not to take future revenge, also implied a certain admission of guilt – i.e., that Carthage had wrongfully entered into conflict with Rome, had suffered setbacks as a result, and would therefore give up claims to occupied territories (according to the conventions of *doriktētos choros*). All the same, such an admission did not quite line up with another part of the offer – namely, that *both* parties return to their pre-war holdings. Was Hannibal then insinuating that the Romans were as much to blame in the outbreak of hostilities, or perhaps simply the latest outbreak? Or does the surviving Polybian account simply reflect a pro-Scipionic perspective, according to which the Carthaginian general is shown to be insincere (*Punica fides*) in his offers for peace or peace negotiations? Or does such a portrayal connect with Polybius’ general assessment of declining leadership sealing the ultimate fate of a city? The diplomatic context is the key to answering these questions.

#### **THE PRE-ZAMA THEATER OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE**

As with many second century events, the dramatic staging of a pre-Zama meeting between Scipio and Hannibal is today filtered through the lens of Polybius, an author with his own complex views on Rome, and despite his unique experiences, not always fully versed in Roman/Latin (not to mention Punic) semantics, writing to and interpreting for a Greek-speaking audience. His subjects here were men from different cultural backgrounds, both from each other, and to a certain extent, from the Greek frame of

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<sup>445</sup> Polyb. 15.5.8.

reference being used to tell their story.<sup>446</sup> Nevertheless, both generals, like Polybius (and his intended audience), moved within the same upper echelon of international-level aristocrats, as reconstructed in the previous chapter. As such – and with Polybius as their Hellenic historian – the participants had a degree of experience in the broad spectrum of international diplomatic language and rhetoric.<sup>447</sup> This discourse of Hellenistic international behavior was their middle ground, providing a shared *lingua franca* (which Polybius has consolidated for us in his own version, but which other intellectuals at the time would have been aware). As a middle ground, however, the international language of Hellenistic diplomacy was also one rife with miscommunication and disputed claims.

In Polybius’ account, Scipio therefore responds to Hannibal’s offer for peace with the following refusal:

ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διαβαίνειν εἰς Λιβύην αὐτὸς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἐκχωρήσας προύτεινας τὰς διαλύσεις ταύτας, οὐκ ἂν οἴομαί σε διαψευσθῆναι τῆς ἐλπίδος... ἡττηθέντων καὶ δεηθέντων τῶν παρὰ σοῦ

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<sup>446</sup> And, if we are to believe Livy (30.30.1), Scipio and Hannibal used interpreters to translate (presumably between Latin and Punic) at their meeting. Whether or not Hannibal spoke any Latin cannot be determined. Dio fr. 54 mentions Hannibal’s proficiency in Punic and “other languages,” but does not further specify. Most likely these “other languages” would have included some Greek – see note below. Livy also provides a brief anecdote (22.13.5-6), in which Hannibal’s attempt to communicate with one of his Italian guides results in a misunderstanding of the place-name ‘Casinum’ for ‘Casilinum,’ due to Hannibal’s pronunciation/accent (*Punicum os*).

<sup>447</sup> See the discussion above in chapter 3. On Scipio, see Astin (1967: esp. App. VI). On Hannibal and Hellenism, we have only vague, anecdotal, and mostly later evidence. Upon his exile, Hannibal traveled and was accepted widely amongst the leading circles of the Hellenistic East (Rhodes, Syria, Bithynia). Nepos, apparently using second-century sources (Silenus and/or Sosylus), tells us that Hannibal was taught Greek by Sosylus the Spartan, wrote a number of books in Greek, including one addressed to the Rhodians on the deeds of Manlius Volso in Asia Minor, and that he at some point traveled with the rhetorician Silenus (*Hann.* 23.13 – cf. Diod. 26.4 for mention of Sosylus’ *History of Hannibal*). Livy (28.46.16) mentions a bilingual Punic-Greek inscription set up by Hannibal on Cape Licinium – see Jaeger (2006) for a discussion of this passage and its possible relationship with a note in Polybius (at 3.33.17-18). Lastly, Cicero (*De Orat.* 2.18) claims that Hannibal spoke Greek, but not well (*non optime Graece*), in the context of Hannibal’s interactions with a Hellenistic court and a lecture on generalship given by the philosopher Phormio (of which Cicero notes Hannibal’s disapproval). Keep in mind, however, that Carthage had a long history of interaction with the Greek-speaking world (esp. in Sicily) – cf. Melliti (2006).

πολιτῶν ἐθέμεθα συνθήκας ἐγγράπτους... ἐπέισθη τὸ συνέδριον τούτοις, ὁ δὲ δῆμος συγκατήνεσε. τυχόντες ὧν ἠξίουσαν ἠθέτησαν ταῦτα Καρχηδόνιοι, παρασπονδήσαντες ἡμᾶς. τί λείπεται ποιεῖν; ... ἢ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν ὑμᾶς διδόναι περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἢ μαχομένους νικᾶν.

*“... if before the Romans had crossed to Africa you had retired from Italy and then proposed them, I think your expectations would not have been disappointed... [Then,] when your countrymen were beaten and begged for peace we framed a treaty in writing... The [Roman] senate agreed and the [Roman] people also gave their consent. The Carthaginians, after their request had been granted, most treacherously violated the peace. What remains to be done? ... Either put yourselves and your country at our mercy or fight and conquer us.”<sup>448</sup>*

For Scipio – as Polybius has it – the crux of the matter rested upon a recent peace agreement between Rome and Carthage, one that had presumably been proffered by Carthage and approved by the Roman Senate and people in the previous year. Scipio accused the Carthaginians of *perfidia*, of breaking the agreement and causing a resumption of hostilities. If this is true, then he was also placing the Carthaginians in the position of the unjust party – in the norms of Hellenistic international warfare, the party waging an unjust, unprovoked war. Any gains made by Carthage from that point on (not to mention territories gained since Saguntum) would thus be contested by Rome (in the near or far future) as *not doriktētos choros*, but rather as territories and properties unlawfully “robbed” from their rightful owners, be they Romans or local citizens or tribes.<sup>449</sup> In Polybius’ account, Scipio was thus claiming the diplomatic upper hand, reserving, in accordance with Roman practice, full legal (and thus divinely sanctioned) permission to continue his pursuit of the current war, up to the point that the unjust party – Carthage – could be forced to full submission rather than negotiated truce. Such

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<sup>448</sup> Polyb. 15.8.4, 7, 9-10, 14.

<sup>449</sup> On this subject, see Chaniotis (2004; 2005).

thinking would only be further vindicated by Scipio's subsequent victory at Zama, and its precepts would play a major role in determining the nature of Rome's 201 treaty with Carthage.

But how had Scipio and Hannibal gotten to this diplomatic point – one at which Polybius has Scipio making such strong claims against Carthage, and at which he has Hannibal only subtly acknowledging Carthaginian guilt, though with an added jab at Roman error? The situation began in the wake of Scipio's siege of Utica in the previous year (203 BCE). The strategic significance of his stranglehold upon this city had sent shockwaves through Carthage, and Polybius describes a number of Carthaginian factions being at odds over what to do next, in a clear Polybian assessment of internal strife bringing trouble upon the city. Ultimately, as Polybius records, the various factions come to a very confused decision, to adopt all measures: attempt to save Utica, send for Hannibal, prepare for a siege of Carthage itself, *and* send Elders to Rome to negotiate peace.<sup>450</sup> Note, however, that the Carthaginians did not send messengers to Scipio regarding peace negotiations, and so for all intents and purposes continued in a state of war, with no truce in place. In the meantime, then, Scipio moved closer to Carthage, occupying Tunis (Tyneta), while the Carthaginian ships made their way to Utica, forcing Scipio to return and set up a naval blockade there.<sup>451</sup>

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<sup>450</sup> Polyb. 14.9.7-10.1.

<sup>451</sup> Polyb. 14.10.2-9. Note that Livy's account of events lines up to this point, with Carthaginians sending ships against a blockade set up by Scipio at Utica, while at the same time sending delegates to Italy – 30.9.

Polybius' text breaks at this juncture, at the end of Book XIV. The account picks back up in Book XV, where mention is made of the Carthaginians having seized Roman transports and supplies, leaving Scipio

*aggrieved... still more... that the Carthaginians had violated the **oaths and solemn pact** and that the war had thus been rekindled from a fresh source.*<sup>452</sup>

However, we do not have direct evidence of this “solemn agreement” or when it was made. Livy provides us with some clues. In his account, fighting continued, but once the Romans succeeded in taking Syphax's Numidian capital of Cirta and Syphax himself – an important Carthaginian ally – captive, the Carthaginians made a more serious suit for peace.<sup>453</sup> Thirty Elders met with Scipio at Tyneta, prostrating themselves before him, and professed themselves “ready to execute any commands which he chose to give,” while blaming the war on Hannibal and his supporters (thereby hoping for some degree of mercy). Scipio responded with the following terms:

*“... surrender of all prisoners, deserters and refugees; the withdrawal of the armies from Italy and Gaul; the abandonment of all action in Spain; the evacuation of all the islands lying between Italy and Africa and the surrender of [the] entire navy with the exception of twenty vessels.... also to provide 500,000 pecks of wheat and 300,000 of barley, [and an] indemnity... [with] three days to consider, ... arrange an armistice, ... and send envoys to the Senate in Rome.”*<sup>454</sup>

The terms were presumably approved, at least on a preliminary basis, for the Carthaginians are next described sending delegates to finalize a truce with Scipio, to last

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<sup>452</sup> Polyb. 15.1.1-2: ὅτι τῶν Καρχηδονίων λαβόντων αἰχμαλώτους τὰς φορηγοὺς νῆας τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ χορηγίας πλήθος ἐξαισίον ὁ Πόπλιος βαρέως μὲν ἔφερον ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ μόνον σφίσι παρηρησθαι τὴν χορηγίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς παρεσκευάσθαι δαψίλειαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἔτι δὲ βαρύτερον ἐπὶ τῷ παραβεβηκέναι **τοὺς ὄρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας** τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ἐγείρεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον.

<sup>453</sup> Livy 30.8-16.

<sup>454</sup> Livy 30.16.

for the interim in which the messengers were traveling to and from Rome. In the meantime, another Carthaginian embassy was already making its way to Rome, accompanied by a number of prisoners and deserters.

This, then, was the “solemn pact” mentioned by Polybius (15.1.2) – a truce arranged between Scipio and the Carthaginians for the duration it took to send the terms of a full peace to Rome and await final approval, amendment, or rejection. This pact was made prior to the incident involving Roman transports and supplies, about which Livy also provides some more detail.<sup>455</sup> Two hundred transports, escorted by a guard of thirty warships, were apparently on their way from Sicily to North Africa when they encountered a storm, which caused a number of them to run aground in close proximity to the city of Carthage. After some debate, the Carthaginians decided to bring in the transports and their supplies, since their Roman crews had presumably abandoned them.

At this point, however, the accounts provided by Polybius and Livy diverge. According to Livy, Scipio next sent messengers to Carthage to protest the seizure of his transports – though no account of their speeches or the Carthaginian responses are given. While making their return, Scipio’s envoys are said to have lost their honorary escort and have been ambushed by Carthaginian warships. In the Livian account, this incident is simply the final icing on the cake, for in the meantime, the envoys from Rome have returned with the message that the Senate and people have already dismissed the earlier offer of terms for peace.<sup>456</sup> The timing of events then allows Livy to insert an anecdote

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<sup>455</sup> See Livy 30.24.

<sup>456</sup> Livy 30.25 – see also 30.23 for the Senate’s rejection.

that clearly contrasts the nobility and *fides* of Scipio with the dishonesty and fickleness of his enemy, as Scipio graciously allows the Carthaginian members of the envoy from Rome safe passage home.<sup>457</sup>

According to Polybius, however, the envoy sent by Scipio to Carthage in order to protest the seizure of transport ships traveled *with* news brought back from Rome, *confirming* a Roman vote for peace. Polybius also provides a sense of the message this combined envoy took with them:

*He [Scipio], therefore, at once appointed...legates...and dispatched them to confer with the Carthaginians about what had occurred [to the transports] and at the same time to inform them that the **Roman people had ratified the treaty: for dispatches had just arrived** for Scipio informing him of this fact... [The legates] reminded the [Carthaginian] assembly that when the **Carthaginian envoys had come to Tunis** to the Romans and presented themselves before the council, they not only saluted the gods and did obeisance to Earth, as is the custom with other men, but that they debased themselves by falling prostrate on the ground and kissing the feet of the members of the council; and that afterwards when they got up again they **accused themselves of having been alone guilty of breaking the original treaty** between the Romans and the Carthaginians. Therefore, they said, they were well justified in any punishment they inflicted on them, but in the name of the common fortune of mankind they had entreated them not to proceed to extremities, but rather let their folly afford a proof of the generosity of the Romans. The general himself, they said, and those what had been present then at the council, when they called this to mind, were amazed and asked themselves **whence the Carthaginians had the assurance now to ignore what they said on that occasion and to venture on breaking this last solemn treaty...***<sup>458</sup>

Note the differences here: in Polybius' version, the Romans had not only approved of the offers and terms for peace, but they also claimed to have shown enlightened magnanimity in their treatment of the Carthaginians (not just Hannibal and his party) as self-avowed wrongdoers in the initial outbreak of war. As a result, Scipio condemns the Carthaginians

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<sup>457</sup> Livy 30.25.

<sup>458</sup> Polyb. 15.1.

for flouting Roman goodwill and acting in a faithless and insincere manner, breaking not only a truce, but also a treaty in the making, already ratified by one party. Polybius continues:

*There were but few among the Carthaginians who approved of adhering to the treaty. The majority both of their leading politicians and of those who took part in the deliberation objected to its harsh conditions, and with difficulty tolerated the bold language of the ambassadors...*<sup>459</sup>

The Roman Senate must have made some amendments to the original terms – ones that displeased the Carthaginians, who then also bristled at the accusations brought by Scipio’s envoys. We have no direct indication, but the Carthaginians could possibly have felt that their own actions, in scuttling the wrecked transports, were not grounds for making them the sole transgressors of the truce. Indeed, the very presence of the Roman transports, in such numbers, such proximity to Carthage, and in the company of thirty warships, might have been taken as a threatening move and as a potential infringement upon the truce. According to Polybius, the Carthaginians, angered by Scipio’s actions, dismissed his envoy without reply, and then hatched a plot to have its escort depart, leaving it prone to surprise attack.<sup>460</sup> It was this attack that then became the immediate cause for a return to a state of war. From a Roman perspective, it provided strong legal grounds upon which to claim a justly waged conflict – grounds upon which Scipio would later so adamantly refuse Hannibal’s offer before Zama (see above).

So why, then, does Livy’s account differ from that of Polybius – would there be some deeper reason for Livy (or some pro-Roman source of his) to have the Senate reject

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<sup>459</sup> Polyb. 15.2.1-2.

<sup>460</sup> Polyb. 15.2-3.

the offer of peace, and have this rejection only reach Scipio after his envoy was allegedly attacked? A third text is available for evidence of the accounts circulating about these events in the second century. It provides an additional perspective in the form of what appears to be an epitome of a Greek historical text. It was written on a papyrus later reused as a Ptolemaic government document (on *verso*), a feature that in turn provides the *terminus ante quem* for the historical text of about 130 BCE.<sup>461</sup> The text has been reconstructed and translated as follows:

[column II]

...]δεναι[...]ταδ[... | ... πε]μψαμενοι τοις | [πρεσβ]ευταις εδωκαν το]υς  
ορκους και ||<sup>5</sup> [ελυσ]αν ηδη την | αιχμα]λωσιαν των | [... ...] ακηκοοτες | [...  
... ]ν[... ...] | [... ευ]πειθεσσει||<sup>10</sup> [ρ... ]τ[ο]υς παροχει[... ...]τας περι των |  
[ορκιων] εξαπεστειλ[αν σ]υν τοις απο | [της Καρ]χηδονος και ||<sup>15</sup> [πα]ρ  
αυτων τους αποισοντας τα ορκια και | ληψομενους παρ αυτων. οι μεν ουν  
απο | Ρωμης κατηραν εις ||<sup>20</sup> την του Σκιπιωνος | πολιν : [οι] δε Φοινικες ως  
ηκον εις την | Καρχηδονα και τα | διωικημενα περι ||<sup>25</sup> της ειρηνης [... ...] |  
(26-30) [... ...] |<sup>31</sup> [... ...]ν[... ...]ωτακ[... ...]

[column III]

θ[... ...] | [... ...] | βε[... ...] ||<sup>35</sup> των[... ...] | εξ[... ...] | προς αυτο]υς  
αθε]τουντε[ς τους ορ]κους απεστειλαν ||<sup>40</sup> φεροντας αντ[ι της] | ειρηνης  
τον πο[λε]μον. τουτο[υ μεν ου]ν αγγελθεντ[ος] | αμφοτεροις [τοις] ||<sup>45</sup>  
στρα[... ...] | μεν[... ...] | δυ[... ...] | χ[... ...] | [... ...]

[column II]

... (?) ... sending (?) to the envoys, they gave (had given?) the oaths and (had) already freed the captive-group of the ..... (They) having heard ..... more amenable(?) (were?) the paroches..., envoys(?) about the oaths they sent out, with the men from Carthage and from themselves, to render the oaths and to take (oaths) from them. They then from Rome therefore sailed to Scipio's city, but the Phoenicians, when they reached Carthage and (announced) the agreements about the peace ..... “

<sup>461</sup> = P. Rylands III.491. See *Staatsverträge* III, pp. 291-295, with Greek text and discussion of the papyrus' date; Hoyos (2001), with the latest Greek text as well as the translation provided here.

[column III]

“ ..... the (?) ... .. (??) sent men (??) to them, repudiating the oaths they sent out men bearing, instead of peace, war. On this therefore being announced to both the generals (?).....

The account begins with oaths and captives, which were indeed part of the negotiations for peace and would have then been offered by the envoys at Rome. Some sort of approval, possibly that of the Roman Senate, comes next, and it results in envoys, Carthaginian and Roman together, being sent to administer final oaths. The envoys sail from Rome to Scipio’s “city” (presumably his camp at Tyneta), and Carthaginian messengers go on to Carthage. Unfortunately, there is no mention of Roman transports – this mention could tentatively be reconstructed in the lacuna between columns II and III, but with no surety whatsoever.<sup>462</sup> Column III then mentions repudiation of the oaths (presumably those being brought from Rome), with men then bearing war instead of peace.

For the most part, this text seems to confirm the broad sequence of events provided by Polybius’ version,<sup>463</sup> in that peace terms were agreed upon (rather than rejected) in Rome, and that these envoys returned to North Africa to administer final oaths before said oaths were repudiated, possibly – but not certainly – in the form of an attack on an envoy. But another, perhaps more unsettling possibility lingers in the *P. Rylands* text. What if the messengers from Scipio to Carthage were Carthaginian (and not Roman), as is seemingly implied in column II (l. 22)? Could it be that there was no

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<sup>462</sup> See Hoyos (2001: 74-5) for a reconstruction along these lines, *contra* Hoffmann (1941: 276).

<sup>463</sup> Note: Hoyos (2001) does not discuss the differences between Polybius and Livy with respect to this document.

devious attack on an envoy, and there was simply a rejection of peace terms, followed by a (therefore wartime) naval engagement?<sup>464</sup>

Quite possibly, the *P. Rylands* text preserves the essence of a more pro-Carthaginian account. And indeed, the Carthaginians, with the same goals of claiming to wage a just war, could have perceived such a sequence of diplomatic events, by which the Romans had made some inflated, even misrepresented allegations. This left Carthage with a number of diplomatic avenues, as perhaps reflected in the many angles of Hannibal's pre-Zama proposal. A segment of the Carthaginian state (be it Hannibal and his followers or another faction) could first be found liable for the mistakes made regarding the seizure of transports, and, if acknowledged, the alleged attack on an envoy. But at the same time, such errors, while admitted, were not to be found commensurate with extreme penalties or a war fought without chance of parlay, for, in the Carthaginian perspective, Rome also played a part in them. The Romans had moved ships (with military supplies?) possibly threatening to Carthage during the truce, and had made antagonizing accusations seemingly calling off all peace negotiations prior to the attack – and whether it was on an envoy or not could then be disputed.

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<sup>464</sup> There are other examples of peace negotiations that reveal such actions would not have been exceptional in interactions between Rome and other Hellenistic states – compare the conference at Phoenice (205 BCE), negotiations at River Aous (198 BCE), Nicaea (198 BCE), negotiations between Glabrio and the Aetolians (191 BCE), and between Scipio and Antiochus (190-189 BCE). The home state (or king) being petitioned for peace – in this case, the Roman SPQ – could reject the offer, or, one or more parties in the field (when dealing with a king this was often the same individual!) could reject the terms upon their amendment or upon new circumstances. Here, if we follow Polybius and the *P. Rylands* text, it appears that not only was Scipio losing his support for the peace terms, but that the Carthaginians did so as well, making the final rejection, as was their legal right within the prevailing norms.

And so Livy's version removes any issue with the envoy/naval attack and places it squarely within the truce-period, prior to the return of the messengers from Rome. In the meantime, it also avoids any discrepancies between the Senate's vote and Scipio's decisions, since Scipio's claims against Carthaginian perfidy are only confirmed by the decree from Rome. And as an added bonus, it provides the opportunity to extol Scipio's virtues as a foil for the behavior of the Carthaginians, as he can then be shown nobly returning the Carthaginian envoys unharmed. The key throughout, then, was to establish the legal, and hence divinely sanctioned, footing for a justly waged war. And whether it was the Carthaginians – as perhaps hinted at in the *P. Rylands* text and in the subtext of Polybius' account – or the Romans, as most strongly evident in Livy, both sides wished to build such an international case. A foundation of justice for one's war would subsequently guarantee not only victory – with victory corroborating one's claims – but would also confer rights of ownership to *doriktētos choros*, in accordance with the prevailing norms of Hellenistic international politics.

#### **THE ZAMA (201) TREATY & ROMAN INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE**

In the pre-Zama meeting, therefore, Hannibal, according to Roman PR accounts, was placed heavily in the position of unjust party, while Rome claimed the right to fight out this latest conflict to a new, and tougher, surrender – *deditio* even. And this is indeed the sort of surrender seen after the battle of Zama, one unique for its time, in that the terms of its peace – as we shall see – contained one clause in particular that had not been applied to a power as internationally significant as Carthage's before.

According to Polybius, in the negotiations following Zama, the Carthaginian ambassadors displayed an excessive, ignoble, and even disingenuous display of emotion. He characterizes the Carthaginians' behavior as "acts exceeding the general custom of exchange among certain men... seem[ing] to be mere hypocrisy for the sake of charlatantry"<sup>465</sup> – behavior typical of those experiencing moral degradation in the downward portions of the cycles in his model of *anacyclosis*.<sup>466</sup> Scipio gives the following response, in a clear reiteration of Rome's justified position:

ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος διὰ βραχέων ἤρξατο λέγειν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὡς ἐκείνων μὲν χάριν οὐδὲν ὀφείλουσι ποιεῖν φιλόανθρωπον, ὁμολογούντων αὐτῶν διότι καὶ **τὸν πόλεμον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπενέγκαιεν Ῥωμαίοις**, παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας ἐξανδραποδισάμενοι τὴν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν, καὶ **πρόην παρασπονδήσαιεν, ἀθετήσαντες τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς ἐγγράπτους ὁμολογίας.**

*Scipio began by stating briefly to them [the Carthaginians] that the Romans were not bound to treat them with leniency for their own sakes, as they confessed that **they had made necessary the war with the Romans from the beginning**, by taking Saguntum contrary to their treaty and enslaving its inhabitants, and that they had quite **recently been guilty of treachery by violating oaths and written agreements.***<sup>467</sup>

Scipio thus stresses the subordinate nature of the Carthaginian position, on the basis of not just one, but two instances of (alleged) guilt: Saguntum and the transgression(s) upon the latest truce and peace agreement. And he ends with a sanctimonious rejection of Hannibal's offer:

οὐ γὰρ εἴ τι πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ δίδοναι σφίσι ἐπιταχθήσεται, τοῦτο δεῖν νομίζειν δεινόν, ἀλλ' εἴ τι συγχωρηθήσεται φιλόανθρωπον, τοῦτο μάλλον

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<sup>465</sup> Polyb. 15.17.1-2: τὰ γὰρ ὑπεραίροντα τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν τῶν παρ' ἐνίοις ἐθισμῶν ... φαίνεται γοητείας χάριν καὶ καθ' ὑπόκρισιν γίνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον ...

<sup>466</sup> See above – pp. 155ff.; and compare below (regarding Corinth) – pp. 294ff.

<sup>467</sup> Polyb. 15.17.3.

ἡγείσθαι παράδοξον, ἐπεὶπερ ἡ τύχη παρελομένη τὸν ἔλεον αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν συγγνώμην διὰ τὴν σφετέραν ἀδικίαν ὑποχειρίους πεποίηκε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς.

*“For you should not regard it as strange if we [Romans] impose sufferings and obligations on you or if we demand sacrifices from you, but rather it should surprise you if we grant you any favors, since Fortune owing to your own misconduct has deprived you of any right to pity or pardon and placed you at the mercy of your enemies[!]”<sup>468</sup>*

As the wrongful party, Carthage should not expect leniency – at all. Any clemency received would speak merely to Roman magnanimity. And although these passages may have been introduced by Polybius to heighten the dramatic effect of the pre-Zama meeting, they do reflect contemporary thought and practice in international politics, especially in regards to framing a justly waged war. Within such norms, it was first and foremost important to establish a claim that the other party had infringed upon a contracted agreement and/or upon one’s territory/property (as determined by legal conquest, inheritance or gift from rightful owner, etc.) or that of one’s ally or allies (as determined by documented *philia*, *symmachia*, etc.).<sup>469</sup>

These claims were broadcast loudly on the international stage – not only in agreements inscribed and displayed prominently in urban and sacred areas and in the airing of arbitral disputes, but also in the works of contemporary historians.<sup>470</sup> It was

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<sup>468</sup> Polyb. 15.17.5-6.

<sup>469</sup> See Chaniotis (2004; 2005); also Karavites (1984); Low (2007); Hunt (2010: Ch. 6).

<sup>470</sup> Epigraphic evidence of this = *IPriene* 37 (cf. Ager no. 26 II, 190s BCE), in which envoys in an international arbitral court reference written histories as evidence in a territorial dispute, naming the authors and summarizing their accounts. In this light, the role of the second century historian was a complex one, as at once political participant and PR rep (sometimes even formally enlisted by a king or city-state), judge, jury, and advocate for a state in its international conduct. Polybius takes the job seriously, especially in regards to the writing of history as a guide for current and future politicians. However, he adamantly rejects what he sees as unadulterated and unsubstantiated bias, reserving the harshest judgment for some of his contemporary historians (e.g. Philinus).

important to do so, because such claims would subsequently become the legal foundation upon which peace agreements were substantiated and internationally accepted. Military victory could verify one's immediate claims to justified war, but was not always a guarantee. In subsequent years, even generations later, arbitral judges or rival states could dismiss or challenge military conquests, if those conquests were deemed as having occurred in the absence of recognized or adequate cause.<sup>471</sup> Therefore, it was of continuing value to make sure one's "just cause" in waging war was first established and then repeatedly emphasized on the world stage; military victory would then serve to finalize the justice of the cause and then allow for a legal, internationally recognized contract of peace.

This process was the one being played out in the events leading up to Zama, and it would take place again in 149-6 BCE. However, while engaging in this process of just-warfare, and while interacting with prevailing international norms, the Romans also – in

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<sup>471</sup> See arbitral evidence regarding territorial disputes: **(1)** *Ager* no. 26 (ca. 283/2 BCE, in a dispute that was to continue until ca. 135 BCE, between Priene and Samos, over areas of the Mykale peninsula. Priene, in its claims (*Ager* no. 26 I, ll. 14-20), cited a history going as far back as the seventh century, to a Cimmerian invasion under Lygdamis, who acknowledged Priene's rightful ownership and "restored" (πάλιν ἀποδιδόναι) conquered lands to Priene three years after the invasion. Priene also referenced an allegedly wrongful seizure by force (μετὰ βίας) of these lands by Samos – an injustice confirmed by a mediation of Bias (*ibid.*, ll. 20-23); **(2)** *Ager* no. 42, ll. 19-27 (ca. 238-221 BCE, between the cities of Nagidos and Arsinoë in Cilicia, the latter founded a few decades earlier, on land conquered by Aetos, commander for Ptolemy II. These lands were still claimed by Nagidos in the dispute, however, on the grounds that they were unjustly taken from "barbarians" illegally occupying them, rather than from Nagidos itself); **(3)** *Ager* no. 146 (ca. 150-133 BCE, Pergamene judges, in arbitrating between Mytilene and Pitane, considered the following criteria for rightful ownership: whether Seleucus, as victor at Kouropedion, was rightful owner, able to bequeath the lands in question to his heir, Antiochus I; and whether a lawful transaction of these lands had thus occurred between Antiochus I and Pitane – see ll. 132-150); **(4)** *Ager* no. 158 I (ca. 140-111 BCE, in which envoys of Hierapytna are recorded as having emphasized, ll. 6-8, that the Hierapytnans had never attacked unannounced or otherwise wronged their adversaries, the citizens of Itanos: Ἰτάνιοι γὰρ ἀδικημάτων μὴ γινομένων ὑ[φ'] ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς, ὑπὸ δὲ ἰ [τῆς τῶν] Κνωσίων [πό]λεως ποτέ, πόλεμον ἀπαράγγελτον ἡμῖν ἐποίησαν ... ἰ ... καὶ ἀδικήματα [ἡμῖν] ἐξετελέσαντο...

both instances – ultimately added their own specific outlooks and practices to the mix. More so than their contemporaries, Romans appear to have felt even more strongly about the significance of military victory and its relationship with just cause. In their patterns of behavior, they reveal an underlying belief that military victory was completely and unambiguously related to the just-cause of a war – at least a war waged by them and in accordance with proper Roman conduct. The belief system underlying the continued practice of fetial law (whether or not such law held associated procedures that had changed over the past century),<sup>472</sup> as well as the very deep-seated connection between Roman religious rite and the conduct of war both meant that for Romans, military victory was the final and definitive proof of the justice of their cause and the rightful performance of a divine verdict.<sup>473</sup>

Such a fundamental belief system played out in a manner that distinguished Roman ethics from contemporary just-warfare systems. And the Roman-specific features can still be detected, making themselves most evident during moments of discord and

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<sup>472</sup> Much scholarly debate continues to surround the subject of Republican-era *ius fetiale* – for the range of viewpoints, see Phillipson (1911, ii.26); McDonald and Walbank (1937); Walbank (1949); Dahlheim (1968: 171-180); Rich (1976); Harris (1979: 166-175); Saulnier (1980); Wiedemann (1986); Rüpke (1990: 97-117); Watson (1993); Ferrary (1995); Giovannini (2000); Bederman (2001: 76-9, 231-41); Santangelo (2008); Ando (2010); and most recently, Zollschan (2011); Rich (2011a and b); and Milano and Zollschan, eds. (forthcoming). For the most part, the problems being tackled by such debate derive from the nature of our source evidence, which comes almost exclusively from later authors (Livy, Cicero, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus in particular). The view taken here is that an old tradition of fetial law continued to be practiced and be of central importance during the second century, when Romans themselves discussed its proper deployment in dealing with states that did not themselves have fetials or practices that directly matched the conventions of fetial law. See also below – p. 278.

<sup>473</sup> See Watson (1993: 27-29) for this connection between *ius fetiale* and the concept of a divinely sanctioned, legal verdict. As noted by Ager (2009: 23ff.), while the Greeks also believed that the gods supported their causes in war, such convictions allowed for the possibility of error, leaving space for practices the Romans would have found humiliating – see discussion below.

misunderstanding between Roman and Hellenic diplomatic conventions, especially when in engaging in certain (but not all) forms of international third-party diplomacy.<sup>474</sup>

On the one hand, Romans clearly integrated with their contemporaries, and recognized that other states could indeed make unjust conquests and thereby lose legal rights to certain possessions. Such states, after all, did not practice fetial law. In acknowledging the possibility of others' injustice(s), Romans thus assimilated well with at least one direction of contemporary third-party diplomatic practice. There are numerous examples of Roman mediation (often in response to invitations to mediate) in international conflicts. In these instances, the Roman Senate would bring two parties together, assigning a third state to arbitrate or adjudicate – that is, provide a legal ruling.<sup>475</sup> More frequently, however, the Senate would serve as a panel of international arbiters, designating powers to special legates or commanders to act on its behalf abroad, making inquiries and conveying judgments.<sup>476</sup>

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<sup>474</sup> See Ferrary (1995) and Ager (2009), who also make this connection between the Roman belief system underlying fetial law and Roman antagonism to at least certain forms of contemporary international third-party diplomacy. Ager furthermore discusses the need to distinguish between forms of third-party diplomacy – e.g. mediation, arbitration/adjudication, good-offices (all in the spirit of current international law classifications) – and she adds to work first done by Eckstein (1988) and Kaščeev (1997) by suggesting another category, of “apologetic deprecation.”

<sup>475</sup> Examples of third-party states designated by the Senate: **(1)** 175-160 BCE, Mylasa was chosen to arbitrate in a dispute between Magnesia and Priene (= *Ager* no. 120); **(2)** ca. 166 BCE, in a dispute between Ambracia and Athamania, Corcyra was delegated to arbitrate via *senatus consultum* (= *Ager* no. 131); **(3)** 156-5 BCE, the Senate decided upon the unjust party (Athens), but designated another state – Sicyon – to decide the sentence for a raid on Oropus (= *Ager* no. 141).

<sup>476</sup> Examples of Senate rulings/designation of magistrates: **(1)** during what modern scholars have called the “settlement of Greece” in 196 BCE, a decemvirate settled a number of territorial disputes – see *Ager* no.s 76, 156 (see also no. 86); **(2)** in disputes between members of the Delphic Amphictyony, ca. 190 BCE = *Ager* no. 88 (documents IIA and B list both the consul and Senate as making the arbitration decision); **(3)** during the “settlement of Asia” in 189-188 BCE = *Ager* no. 97 (arbitration clause included in the Treaty of Apamea), no.s 98-99, 101-102, and 104; **(4)** 175-160 BCE, in the dispute between Magnesia and Priene mentioned above (*Ager* no. 120), the Senate voted a *consultum* authorizing the praetor M. Aemilius to delegate the arbitration to another third-party; **(5)** 156-4 BCE, a series of legations and even a decemvirate

However, there are no clear examples of Romans participating in the category of third-party diplomacy known as “good-offices” – in which the third party (here, Rome) would make an informal approach to bring parties together but would not otherwise take a major role in negotiations.<sup>477</sup> And, there are no known instances whatsoever of Romans participating in the category Ager has called “apologetic deprecation” – in which the third-party (Rome) would apologize for making an offer of intervention, acknowledging the just-cause of the party approached, but nevertheless begging that this party’s anger be diminished against the adversary.<sup>478</sup> Both practices were frequent tools in the trade of contemporary Hellenic diplomatic practice, yet Romans appear to have avoided them when conducting their own international relations.<sup>479</sup>

Such patterns testify to a fundamental Roman belief system in place, according to which all Roman interstate action was self-perceived as fully sanctioned, on a level not on par with some of the flexibilities inherent in contemporary Hellenic diplomatic

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were sent by the Senate to mediate between Attalos II and Prusias II, with threats of war in the air for Prusias (= *Ager* no. 142); (6) ca. 140 BCE, the Senate ruled on a dispute between Melitaia and Narthakion (= *Ager* no. 156). Note: Rome’s interventions in and responses to the conflicts between Carthage and Numidia, as well as between (contested) members of the Achaian League were also in this vein of third-party diplomacy – see discussions below in chapters 5 and 6.

<sup>477</sup> On good-offices, see Ager (2009). Romans instead preferred to make more forceful third-party diplomatic offers. Such offers were closer to acts of mediation, which involved direct participation in the negotiation between parties – cf. the conference at Lysimacheia in 196 BCE, at which Roman envoys essentially mandated an agreement for Antiochus and Ptolemy. Antiochus had his own reply – making what turned out to be an empty promise to submit to an adjudication by Rhodes = *Ager* no. 77. Note that although Antiochus escaped adjudication by virtue of his international power, he did not find a promise to submit to arbitration something shameful – in fact, he found it face-saving. Romans would not have thought otherwise. Their form of such propagandistic offers toward arbitration involved submitting to the Senate! (e.g. Flaminius’ offer to the Aetolians, 192 BCE – *Ager* no. 84). A similar mediation-order occurs later in 168 BCE, with Popilius’ Laenas’ famed “line in the sand” for Antiochus.

<sup>478</sup> On apologetic deprecation, see Ager (2009). Roman behavior in asking parties to submit to diplomatic intervention is actually far from being either apologetic or anger-deprecating – e.g. 200 BCE, a Roman commission demanded that Philip submit to arbitration or face war with Rome (an ultimatum looking very much like *res repetere*) – Polyb. 16.34.3-4.

<sup>479</sup> See extensive discussion in Ager (1996; 2009), with citations.

thought. For on the one hand, Roman magistrates and the Senate as a whole would most certainly intervene abroad – especially upon invitation. Such invitations were received as acknowledgments of and praise for Roman just-practice. And the right was reserved to choose between refusing, postponing, or agreeing to the alleged international injustice or not. Invitations for direct Roman mediation thus confirmed, on an international level, the high moral ground upon which Romans already believed they stood. And in doing so, the door was opened to what modern terminology would call interventionist conduct. In second-century BCE norms, however, these would have been recognized as pan-Hellenizing, honorable friendship/kinship (even noble-kingship) actions, according to which Rome, whether directly or indirectly, in a legal and/or military vein, came to the aid of friends, allies, and other states otherwise believed to be in need. And there were many potential benefits in store for Romans and the state as a whole, in the form of friendship, alliance, and territorial networks of obligation. By contrast, on their very deepest cultural level, Romans would never think of stooping to other contemporary behaviors, to make what for them constituted gestures of international-level inferiority – be it via good-offices (bringing parties together, getting involved, but not having the status or legal standing to decide!) or apologetic deprecation (admitting to be making a wrong step, supporting a presumably unjust party and deprecating the rightful anger of another!).

That such beliefs were in place is only further proved by the patterns of behavior seen when third-party diplomacy went in the other direction, and was aimed at Rome by other states. A direct reversal is evident: what Romans practiced towards others in

interstate intervention, they did not appreciate from others; and what they themselves shunned, they accepted from others. For whereas Romans appear to have been amenable to offers from other states in the form of good-offices or apologetic deprecation,<sup>480</sup> they responded with suspicion, contempt, and even hostility to offers that others mediate or adjudicate in Roman-involved affairs. Depending on the circumstances, and the current strength of position for the “offending” third party as a friend/ally of Rome, the Senate would at some times deflect and at others go as far as threatening war,<sup>481</sup> when propositions of mediation or adjudication were made.<sup>482</sup>

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<sup>480</sup> --Romans accepting good-offices: (1) 212 BCE, during the siege of Syracuse, a number of Sicilian states (allied with Rome) acted as go-betweens in negotiations between Syracuse and Rome – these negotiations, however, eventually failed (see Livy 25.28-9); (2) 205 BCE, the Epirotes helped open negotiations between Rome and Philip, leading to the Peace of Phoenice (see Livy 29.12.8-12); (3) 198 BCE, the Epirotes again facilitated negotiations, leading to the abortive conference between Flaminius and Philip at the River Aous (cf. *Ager* no. 72); (4) 196 BCE, Athenians and Achaians are called upon by Flaminius to witness a *bellum iustum piumque* against Boiotia for acts of violence allegedly done to individual Roman soldiers – the Athenians and Achaians brought about a meeting between Flaminius and the Boiotian League, to discuss the contested indemnity (= *Ager* no. 75). See discussion in *Ager* (2009: 27ff.).

--Romans accepting apologetic deprecation: (1) 190-189 BCE, Athenians and Rhodians “called down the anger” of Rome, leading to a settlement with Aetolia (the Athenian and Rhodian envoys corresponded both with commanders in Greece and before the Senate, but found success only after the battle of Magnesia) (= *Ager* no. 94); (2) 188 BCE, Ilian diplomats spoke before the *decemviri* in Asia Minor, employing kinship diplomacy to “call down” Roman anger against Lycia – the *decemviri* agreed not to punish Lycia for having allied with Antiochus – but they did “gift” Lycia to Rhodes (cf. *Ager* no. 102).

<sup>481</sup> Perhaps the best-known (and most discussed) example of Roman hostility to an offer of mediation occurred at the end of the Third Macedonian War, *vis à vis* Rhodes – see Gruen (1975); Gabrielsen (1993); *Ager* (1991; 2009: 34ff.). Polybius (29.19) tells us that Rhodian envoys were already in Rome when news of the victory at Pydna arrived. He then describes the Rhodians, summoned to appear before the Senate, stating that, “they had come to bring the war to an end; for when the people of Rhodes saw that the war still continued to drag on, and observed that it was unprofitable to all the Greeks and to the Romans themselves owing to its great expense, had decided on this step; but now that war had terminated in the way that the Rhodians had wished, they congratulated the Romans.” Polybius remarks upon the curtness and anger of the Roman response – construing it as a misfortunate turn for the foolish envoys (29.19.2), and as an opportunity taken by Rome to “make an example of” Rhodes (29.19.5-6). Such an interpretation reflects a Hellenic perspective on acceptable third-party diplomatic behavior, whereby Rhodian behavior perhaps displayed unwise self-importance, but was not otherwise insulting to another state’s sense of sovereignty. However, for the Romans, there were added implications to the presence of Rhodian envoys seeking peace, then reacting to Pydna with a denouncement of the war. These details could have been read as an attempted mediation, followed by a quick turn of policy towards anger-deprecation, rather than a full,

On first glance, similar patterns seem to appear in the third-party diplomatic behaviors of Hellenistic kings. There simply are not clear cases of kings submitting to mediation or adjudication in their affairs – though there are cases of engagement with good-offices. Such patterns perhaps make sense in terms of straightforward, capability-defined power politics: Hellenistic kings were simply on a level in the international system that meant they did not have to bow down to the judgment of third parties. In this light, Rome’s earliest engagements with Hellenistic third-party diplomacy – and their outright rejection of mediation – would have seemed even more peculiar to Hellenic contemporaries. Perplexity at Roman behavior would have been even more prevalent during the years when Rome’s standing abroad did not yet rival that of the kings. But even afterward, Roman third-party practices would have only added to the other problems Greek-speakers were having with defining the nature – the *politeia* – of the Roman state (see above).

Going beneath the surface of capability-driven power politics, however, more subtle details can be detected in the third-party behaviors of the kings. Unlike Romans –

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subsidiary, and allied support for the Roman cause. Some senators thus construed Rhodian actions as a form of implicit support for Perseus (Polyb. 29.19.6-8), and even threatened war (Polyb. 30.4) – though others, such as Cato, argued that the Rhodians’ ill-conceived diplomacy did not constitute enough grounds (i.e. harm/injustice to Rome) for war (cf. Gell. 6.3). Livy’s account of the affair of 168-7 BCE amplifies the anti-Rhodian interpretation, and provides a window into Roman-specific evaluations. In Roman understanding, Hellenic third-party mediation, when suggested for their own affairs, was viewed as extremely arrogant and offensive – even suspiciously looking like unfaithful support for the hostile cause.<sup>482</sup> Some of the earliest known instances of such Roman behavior took place when Hellenistic kings approached Rome (e.g. Pyrrhus in 280 BCE – cf. *Ager* no. 27; Ptolemy II in 252 BCE – cf. *Ager* no. 35). These kings seem to have considered Rome, along third-party diplomatic lines, in much the same way they did the Greek *poleis* (e.g. Lysimachus between Priene and Samos in 283/2 BCE – cf. *Ager* no. 26; Philip V between Gonnoi and Herakleion post-218 BCE – cf. *Ager* no. 54; and Ptolemy VI between Arsinoë and Troizen, ca. 163-146 BCE – cf. *Ager* no. 138). Rome’s contemptuous and even hostile responses to monarchic overtures may have thus seemed strange, if not outright arrogant, contributing to the well-known conclusion that Rome was governed by a “*Boulē* of kings.” – see above, p. 147.

whose aversion to mediation in their affairs reflected a unique cultural belief system – kings did occasionally negotiate with both directions of Hellenic diplomatic practice, despite all their physical power. Textual evidence indicates the very infrequent monarchic nod to mediation – for example, in the texts of two treaties made in Crete by Antigonos III, one with Eleutherna and the other with Hierapytna (both ca. 224 BCE).<sup>483</sup> Both treaties included a form of “adjudication clause,” according to which a transgression upon the other terms would be judged by a neutral third party, who would then decide upon and collect any fines due. These clauses were decidedly one-sided, however, since they only applied to transgressions made by Eleutherna and Hierapytna, not Antigonos. All the same, they still put the verdict in the hands of another party. And even if that third party happened to be more biased or obligated toward Antigonos, this was not the same practice as having Antigonos directly delegate (as Romans would have had it).

A similar acknowledgment of adjudication is also evident in Antiochos III’s promise at Lysimacheia (never fulfilled) to submit to the judgment of third-party Rhodes (rather than Rome) in 196 BCE (see above). Hellenic territorial dominions and international law therefore retained certain grey areas, and the kings acknowledged them, if only in nominal terms that minimized the possible damage to their stature. Monarchs were thus said to “return” lands to *poleis*, in the sense of “gifting” them back. And such actions held repercussions beyond paying mere lip service to Greek diplomatic conventions and international goodwill. For as we have seen, cities and arbiters even generations later could rule against a king’s conquests as having rightfully established

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<sup>483</sup> = Ager no.s 47 (*IC* II.xii.20) and 48 (*IC* III.iii.1a).

legal dominion over land, if such conquests were found to have been taken from unlawful owners (see above). Romans simply did not consider such grey areas a viable, even fathomable part of their own international conduct, and they would not even pay lip service to the idea that a third party could intervene in their own affairs.

Unlike their contemporaries, then, Romans could not acknowledge that their acquisitions or foreign engagements were for the legal jurisdiction of others. Romans could not and would not fully participate in all directions and forms of Hellenistic third-party diplomacy. This is not to say that Romans believed that their state-representatives were beyond all reproof. On the contrary: guilt for improper behavior, when such missteps did happen in Roman wars, was placed squarely in the hands of individual commanders. And only the Senate – certainly not anyone outside Rome – could put these commanders on trial. For their crimes were ultimately to be defined as contravening the mission and purpose of the original *imperium*, which retained its essence as divine verdict throughout. And in no cases do the crimes entail an occupation of territories within a commander's *provincia*. Instead, they involved a disgrace to the *res publica*, in the form of shameful surrender and/or fleeing in defeat,<sup>484</sup> or via misappropriation of

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<sup>484</sup> Evidence indicates that indeed, the Roman Senate would only condemn a magistrate for an abuse of *imperium* for a premature, unfavorable, or otherwise embarrassing surrender/defeat in battle – and in quite rare instances, it seems, given the overall number of known *imperatores victi* (Rosenstein, 1990, gives an estimate of some 92 defeated commanders during the Republic). Examples from our period include: (1) P. Cl. Pulcher, cos. 249 BCE, defeated at sea, presumably for ignoring the *auspices*, recalled to Rome and ordered to name a dictator, then put on trial for *perduellio*, eventually given a heavy fine, dying soon thereafter (possibly by suicide?) – cf. Polyb. 1.51-52, Livy *Per.* 19, Cicero, *ND* 2.7, *Div.* 2.71; (2) Cn. Fulvius Flaccus, praetor 212 BCE, whose army fled when defeated by Hannibal – he was prosecuted and exiled – cf. Livy 26.2.7-3.12; (3) M. Cl. Marcellus, procos. 209 BCE, whose army also fled when defeated by Hannibal – he was recalled to Rome to defend his actions before an assembly but was acquitted – cf. Livy 27.12.7-17, 27.20-21; (4) Baebius Tamphilus, praetor 199 BCE, relieved of command after a horrifying loss to the Insubrian Gauls (losing > 6,700 men) – cf. Livy 32.7.5-7; (5) C. Plautius Hypsaesus,

movables/monies from individual *socii* or *amici*.<sup>485</sup> This explains why an icy reception awaited any foreign suggestions (intended or not) that Rome was even possibly involved in less-than-rightful conflicts or, by extension, unlawful territorial possessions. Over the course of the third and second centuries, in their interactions with and at times to the consternation of other states, Romans continued to cling to a deep set of convictions. No matter the occasional individual blunder (or the possible evolutions in fetial law) along the way, Romans remained certain of their *res publica*'s fundamental sanctioning by and adherence to divine justice.

## CONCLUSION

The political and legal frameworks of the second-century international system were thus shot through with linguistic-semantic disjunctions and newly evolving meanings (e.g. *polis* vs. *res publica*, *provincia* vs. *eparcheia*). Greek-speaking intellectuals and politicians who were entering this conceptual “middle ground” in their interactions with Romans, were therefore attempting to define the Roman state in essentially pan-Hellenic terms, identified Rome as a *polis*. At the same time, however,

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praetor 146 BCE, who fled and did not re-engage the enemy after being defeated by Viriathus – Hypsaesus was prosecuted and exiled upon his return – cf. Livy *Per.* 52, App. *Iber.* 64, Diod. 33.2; (6) C. Hostilius Mancinus, cos. during the siege of Numantia, 137 BCE, ordered by the Senate to be delivered, bound and naked, over to the Celtiberians, in repudiation of the treaty of surrender he had made with them – cf. App. *Iber.* 80, 83, Cicero *Rep.* 3.28, *Off.* 3.109 – compare earlier episodes with the commanders at the Caudine Forks, as well as with a previous commander at Numantia (who was acquitted), Q. Pompeius, cos. 141 BCE – cf. App. *Iber.* 78-9, Cicero *Off.* 3.109, *Rep.* 3.28, *Fin.* 2.54. Possibly the Manlius Vulso episode after Cannae, despite Livy's heroic treatment of the story (22.61), fits this pattern, with Vulso being sent back to the Carthaginians as a prisoner, in representation of the Senate's refusal to parlay in defeat. See Rosenstein (1986; 1990). Flaminius' offer to the Aetolians, to go to arbitration via the Senate, also reflects this perceived role of the Senate.

<sup>485</sup> In these instances, ex-magistrates could be condemned for illegal confiscation of properties from Roman *socii* and *amici* (but not *inimici*), and were prosecuted in individual trials, in accordance with recent *de repetundis* legislation. See Richardson (1987).

they were also encountering Romans and the Roman state on the international stage in a manner seemingly analogous to a Hellenistic kingdom. Romans in turn were re-defining some, but certainly not all, of their own concepts, in ways that were moving toward Hellenic ideas, concretizing the notion that Roman commands abroad (e.g. *imperium* and *provincia*) could be conceived in an abstract and geographic sense. The end result was that Rome was increasingly being viewed, by a cross-cultural majority in the international sphere, as the *polis* – or *res publica* – of a monarchic *archē* – an empire.

And as we have seen, Polybius represents a key individual standing in the complex middle ground of these conceptual interactions. Polybius' analysis of Rome's *politeia* thus takes a Greco-centric approach in framing Rome in Hellenic, *polis* terms, and yet Polybius does so with special experience in witnessing Roman practices. We thus gain a window into one among many Greeks confronting Roman "peculiarities" in the definitions of state sovereignty, just warfare, and territorial/treaty arrangements. Such disjunctions, which we have explored in this chapter, held important implications for the outlining of terms in the treaty of Zama, conceived as just punishment for the unjust defeated. The terms, the political-cultural differences that they highlight between Hellenic and Roman frames of reference, and Polybius' agenda in highlighting them as necessary informational tools for his intended audience of current and future statesmen – will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.

## **Chapter 5: *From 201 to 149 BCE – Diplomatic Crisis***

### **INTRODUCTION**

In the previous two chapters, we have established that during the second century BCE, there existed an evolving interstate community that was increasingly connected, or “globalized” via networks of myth-historic kinship and a fluid discourse on “civilized” pan-Hellenism. At the same time, this interstate community shows signs of having become increasingly self-aware, as it progressively looked to contemporary events as fitting within the scope of world history, and Rome/the Romans in particular being negotiated as fulfilling a new world order. We have also explored the fact that this evolving, international “middle ground” was not without its disjunctions and misapprehensions, as different political-cultural frames of references – as most evident in Greek as opposed to Latin terminologies – sought to communicate with, dominate over, and identify analogies between each other. And perhaps most importantly, we have discussed Polybius as a key figure in this international environment, as biased actor, incidental testimony, and historian with an authorial agenda. For Polybius not only provides us with more detailed evidence (both intentionally and inadvertently) as to the convergences and disparities of international political-cultural developments of his time, but he also represents an influential - but not solitary – voice contributing to the contemporaneous construction of 146 as a significant historical juncture.

The present chapter takes these broader contexts and applies them to an analysis of diplomatic events leading up to the outbreak of the Third Punic War in 149 BCE. As

discussed in chapter 1, the tradition in modern scholarship has been to view 146 in light of Roman motivations for going to war with Carthage in 149, either for fear of Carthage and/or Numidia, or with economic motivations of eliminating a competitor or gaining access to Carthage's harbor, or in manifestation of a new, more imperialist approach to foreign policy. Here, however, a different approach is being taken, one that looks beyond the Romano-centric perspective, to the international as well as local North African contexts. Such an approach reveals that modern traditions, in structuring the debate around Roman motivations for war, have been working from an assessment given by Polybius himself – that the Romans had long before decided to go to war with Carthage, but merely sought, and found in 149, a pretext (*prophasis*) to do so.<sup>486</sup>

The contention here, then, is that this last statement reflects an individual opinion and personally held theory regarding causation (*prophasis* vs. *aitia*), though it existed within a historiographical tradition tracing at least as far back as Herodotus. At the same time, it is a contention that this statement manifests a subtle and yet significant disjunction existing between Greek-speaking political-cultural concepts of *polemos dikaios* and Roman *bellum iustum* on the international stage. In other words, it is argued here that the Romans were not so much searching for an excuse for war in 149 as they were sincerely debating whether just cause (in legal/ divinely sanctioned terms) existed, and whether or not a perceived injustice had indeed been inflicted upon the *res publica*. If some or a majority of Romans felt continued or enhanced enmity toward Carthage – as Polybius implies was the truest cause (*aitia*) and as modern traditions have debated – is

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<sup>486</sup> Polyb. 36.2 – see below, pp. 285ff.

largely irrelevant to explaining why the war began when and how it did. What does explain the diplomatic fallout is the wider set of environmental contexts, and the present chapter represents an analysis of these in particular.

We begin with an analysis of the peace treaty of 201 BCE, which first established the conditions that came to a head in 149. The terms of the treaty are read by comparison with contemporary Hellenistic international patterns and Roman legal-diplomatic views. Given such contexts, the 201 treaty takes on some added meanings, becoming more than just a marker for an end of conflict, and serving to outline a new position for the Carthaginian state and limits to its sovereignty in the international system. As with other Hellenistic peace agreements, the nature of the terms – and the degree of their specificity – were seen by international-level politicians as a direct reflection, not only of the defeated party's level of guilt, but also of the certainty with which both parties had agreed to a decisive end of conflict. The implications for Carthage were significant, because Romans, in their unique self-perception of the *res publica* as the ultimate and irreproachable arbiter of justice, essentially repositioned Carthage within a sphere of obligation, and, to a certain extent, within their roster of mandated *socii*. And in doing so, they also removed the legal right for Carthage to engage in her own, independent international diplomacy, instead transferring this key aspect of sovereignty into the hands of the Roman state.

It was the first of two terms from the 201 treaty in particular that established this new position, one which prohibited Carthage from engaging in military conflict at all outside of Africa, and within Africa only with Rome's permission. The second term –

perhaps even more disastrous for the future of Carthage – returned to Massinissa the “ancestral” lands of the Numidians. The implications of both are discussed in detail here. Using archaeological evidence (excavation and survey), post-war conditions are reconstructed for Carthage, Carthage’s immediate hinterland, and in areas disputed between Carthage and Massinissa. These reveal the ways in which Carthage responded to the crisis of defeat and the removal of its independent foreign policy: experiencing a growth in urban population, the city intensified its reliance upon local/regional agricultural production, while remaining linked to international trade networks, these last increasingly dominated by Italian wares. Such evidence debunks the theory that Romans ever actively sought to capture Carthage in order to eliminate economic competition or gain control and access to a new market.<sup>487</sup> Survey evidence, when combined with modern ethnographic comparanda, also reveals the ongoing transformation of the North African hinterland, and helps clarify the series of territorial disputes that plagued the region in the decades following 201.

We analyze these disputes as emblematic of the cultural misapprehensions taking place in the international arena of the second century – for while Romans and Greek-speakers approached territorial disputes in analogous and yet divergent ways, both of these differed from local North African tribal traditions. And as a result, Rome was never able to comprehend – or disentangle – the disputes between Numidians and Carthage over what constituted ancestral land, and in characteristic fashion, avoided making decisive declarations on the matter. Massinissa, in turn, was only too willing to take

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<sup>487</sup> See below – pp. 232ff.

advantage of these misapprehensions, advancing claims to North African lands at moments of international tension abroad, when allegations of Carthaginian misbehavior could also gain some ground with Rome. And Massinissa did so knowing full well that Carthage could not take military action against him, without permission from Rome or without contravening the strictures of the 201 treaty. Overall, it was a recipe for disaster that ended in armed conflict between Numidians under one of Massinissa's sons and Numidians under Carthaginian leadership. The battle took place within the exact year that Carthage's 201-treaty indemnity expired, and yet – at least after debate in the Roman Senate – it was determined to be a breach of the 201 treaty's prohibition against Carthaginian military action without Roman permission.

As we will see, then, there were a number of disjunctions and misapprehensions in play: not only between international Greeks (Polybius to a certain extent included) and Romans over what constituted a just cause for war, but also between Romans, Carthaginians, and Numidians (broadly defined) as to how territorial holdings were to be defined in North Africa and how the 201 treaty terms were to be read over the years. Similar miscommunications are evident in the disintegration of relations between Rome and Carthage from the battle in North Africa – which took place in 152 BCE – and the final outbreak of direct conflict in 149 BCE. The latter was formally signaled by Carthage's refusal of the so-called Censorinus Ultimatum, which ordered the wholesale evacuation and re-location of Carthage to a site further inland. Polybius provides a key discussion of this ultimatum, fitting it – as we can tell from other evidence – into the peculiarly Roman practice of *deditio*. From this testimony it will be concluded that in

Roman eyes at least (though not necessarily in others), a state of war already existed and a *provincia Africa* had already been allotted. In acceding to Roman demands, however – what in Hellenistic practice could lead to a truce or more lasting peace – Carthage inadvertently made a full surrender “into the faith” of Rome. This last – as Polybius clearly states – meant something very different to Romans. It constituted a full admission of guilt – of having inflicted injustice upon the *res publica* – and placed the state in question (Carthage) utterly in Roman hands, at the utmost mercy of Roman command. The consul Censorinus could therefore order that Carthage be un-founded and re-founded elsewhere – it was within his full legal rights. As with an earlier international incident involving misunderstood *deditio* – in which the Roman commander Glabrio had Aetolian statesmen put in chains – *deditio* constituted a literal subservience to Roman *maiestas*.<sup>488</sup>

Polybius’ narrative in this context thus reveals a number of interesting points. First, it testifies to continuing international confusion over certain Roman diplomatic practices – *deditio* standing out among them. Secondly, it indicates Polybius’ strong opinion that a didactic manual – as in his *Histories* – is essential for contemporary statesmen (and for future politicians confronted with a rising foreign power). Polybius thus finds fault with Carthaginian leadership for their naiveté in dealing with Rome, indecisively deciding to stand up to Massinissa and yet by the same token submitting to Roman *deditio* without fearing any consequences. However – and thirdly – Polybius’ narrative reveals an assessment of the Romans as well, as arbiters of a newly minted international *archē*. It is here that important implications for 146’s eventual placement as

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<sup>488</sup> See below – p. 279.

an important historical marker in Polybius' text in particular can be seen developing. For as Polybius had earlier stated, he had planned to extend the *Histories* in order to assess the latest turn in international conditions – toward a period of *tarachē kai kinesis*, both for the rulers and the ruled. The new endpoint for this extension was to be 146 – ostensibly a juncture at which this period of disturbance was to lead to something else. And as we will see, Polybius' discussion of Roman “governance” in North Africa (in Book 31) is not necessarily a positive one, and his presentation of the outbreak of the Third Punic War leaves as many questions regarding Roman “justice” as it does answers (mostly regarding the avoidance of *deditio*!). This chapter thus raises some early signs – to be developed further in the next chapter – regarding 146 as an historical construction that was closely tied to judgments of Roman international power, as either a positive or a negative force in the *oikoumenē*.

## **201 TREATY & POLYBIAN COMMENTARY**

We begin, then, with the nature of the 201 treaty terms, which set the stage for the next half-century. The main surviving historical references to the treaty indicate quite specific terms,<sup>489</sup> and present a dramatized picture of debate and diplomatic communication in the time leading up to the final agreement. Such drama appears to have been heightened (with increasing intensity by authors over time) as a means of

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<sup>489</sup> The major sources are Polybius, Livy, Appian, and Dio, who for the most part agree on the main outline of the treaty: Polyb. 15.17-19; Livy 30.36.9-38.5, see also 42.23.3-4; brief note in Appian *Pun.* 2b, main text at 49a-56a, 59a-b; Dio fr. 57.82; epitomized by Zon. 9.14.i-k. Note: here, for purposes of highlighting the contemporary second-century context, we will focus solely on Polybius, footnoting the later texts where they contain additions/deviations.

highlighting the deep importance of this international contract and its implications for the future of Carthage, as well as serving as a *post eventum* reflection upon Carthage's ultimate fate in 146. It is in this light that Polybius began his description of the post-Zama treaty negotiations with a scornful commentary. He opens by remarking on the Carthaginian envoys' profuse display of emotion in begging Scipio for mercy. And he scathingly concludes that such behavior – rather than inspiring pity for genuine emotions felt in human tragedy – was in reality quite disgusting:<sup>490</sup>

τὰ γὰρ ὑπεραίροντα τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν τῶν παρ' ἐνίοις ἔθισμῶν, ὅταν μὲν **αὐτοπαθῶς** δόξη γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων, ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ὀρώσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι, καὶ συγκινεῖ πῶς ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ὁ ξενισμός: ἐπὰν δὲ φαίνεται **γοητείας χάριν καὶ καθ' ὑπόκρισιν** γίνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, **οὐκ ἔλεον, ἀλλ' ὀργὴν** ἐξεργάζεται **καὶ μῖσος**. ὃ καὶ τότε συνέβη γενέσθαι περὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

*When men give expression to their feelings more violently than is the general custom of habits among some men, if this excess seems to spring **from genuine emotion** due to the magnitude of their calamities, it arouses the pity of those who see and hear it, and its very strangeness touches all our hearts; but when such extravagance seems to be a **mere piece of charlatanry and acting**, it incurs **not pity, but anger and hatred**. Such was the case on the present occasion with regard to the Carthaginian ambassadors.*

Elsewhere – as in the description of King Prusias II at Rome – Polybius also reserved disparaging words for excessive displays of emotion, especially when they involved shameful acts of self-humiliation and ignoble responses to defeat at the hands of a great(er) power.<sup>491</sup> Here, however, in describing the Carthaginian envoys, Polybius went even further, categorizing the behavior as not only excessive and shameful but also

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<sup>490</sup> Polyb. 15.17.1-2.

<sup>491</sup> For the Prusias passage, see Polyb. 30.18 – see also above, pp. 100ff. On Polybius' view on excessively servile and emotion-ridden behavior, see Eckstein (1995, esp. pp. 221ff.), with examples.

as hypocritical and involving *goēteia*, or “witchcraft / illusion.”<sup>492</sup> Such an implication – that Carthaginian behavior also involved an element of con-artistry – adds a sinister twist to the interpretation. Polybius thus not only implies that the Carthaginians degraded themselves by acting in a servile manner, but also hints that they were guilty of doing so with disingenuous intentions. Rather than making a genuine acknowledgment of defeat or conveying a sincere sense of humility, the Carthaginian envoys – in Polybius’ estimation – were manipulating the ideal diplomatic ethos in an underhanded and unseemly way. They were performing in a manner that others with a sense of dignity would not stoop to, simply because they were seeking to be let off the hook, tricking Scipio into making a truce that would be overly lenient, would not be accepted, or would otherwise fall apart in some way (as the pre-Zama truce did).

At first glance, Polybius’ conclusions here seem to have been influenced by his exposure to Roman ideologies, which not only held a strong aversion to dishonorable surrender but also developed a clear rhetoric against the stereotype of *Punica fides*. This last development may at least in part have had its origins in Roman reactions to some of the more foreign (and perhaps in some ways more Hellenic) approaches by Carthaginians to the “grey areas” of international diplomacy.<sup>493</sup> However, while Polybius shows signs of having been influenced by Roman thought, as a native Achaian, he read the shame in the Carthaginian envoys’ behavior on a somewhat different level. He makes sure to note

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<sup>492</sup> Elsewhere, at 4.20.5, Polybius uses *goēteia* in conjunction with *apatē* (“treachery/deceit”), to characterize Ephorus’ more jaded thoughts on the purpose of music in human society.

<sup>493</sup> See above (also on the problems associated with elucidating the unique features of Carthaginian interstate politics) – pp. 75ff.

that the excessive display of emotion could possibly be excused as a cultural oddity for citizens of a not fully Hellenized state. But – as Polybius stresses – this would only be true if it were clear that such behavior sprang from genuine emotion, felt in response to misfortune and in fear of impending doom. And it is here that Polybius finds the most fault with the Carthaginian reaction. In particular – and in line with his aim to present a manual to statesmen – Polybius sets up a negative *exemplum* of Carthaginian leadership and its unmanly insincerity. And in doing so, he also presents a stark contrast between this episode after Zama and that of Roman reactions to Cannae, the latter being presented at a key climax in Polybius’ narrative:<sup>494</sup>

Ῥωμαῖοί γε μὴν τὴν Ἰταλιωτῶν δυναστείαν παραχρῆμα διὰ τὴν ἦτταν ἀπεγνώκεισαν, ἐν μεγάλοις δὲ φόβοις καὶ κινδύνοις ἦσαν περὶ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους... καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπιμετρούσης καὶ συνεπαγωνιζομένης τοῖς γεγονόσι τῆς Τύχης... οὐ μὴν ἢ γε Σύγκλητος οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπε τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἀλλὰ **παρεκάλει μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς**, ἠσφαλίζετο δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ἐβουλεύετο δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐνεστῶτων **ἀνδρωδῶς**. τοῦτο δ’ ἐγένετο φανερόν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα συμβάντων: ὁμολογουμένως γὰρ Ῥωμαίων ἡττηθέντων τότε καὶ παραχωρησάντων τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις **ἀρετῆς**, τῆ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ιδιότητι καὶ τῷ βουλευέσθαι καλῶς οὐ μόνον ἀνεκτήσαντο τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας δυναστείαν, νικήσαντες μετὰ ταῦτα Καρχηδονίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ **τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς** ἐγένοντο μετ’ ὀλίγους χρόνους.

*The Romans on their part owing to this defeat at once abandoned all hope of retaining their supremacy in Italy, and were in the greatest fear about their own safety and that of Rome... It seemed indeed as if Fortune were taking part against them in their struggle with adversity and meant to fill the cup to overflowing... Yet the Senate neglected no means in its power, but **exhorted and encouraged the populace**, strengthened the defenses of the city, and deliberated on the situation **with manly coolness**. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans were now incontestably beaten and their military reputation shattered, yet by the peculiar **virtue** of their constitution and by wise counsel they not only*

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<sup>494</sup> Polyb. 3.118.5-9.

*recovered their supremacy in Italy and afterwards defeated the Carthaginians, but in a few years made themselves **masters of the whole world**.*

The Romans had thus been in an even more desperate situation after Cannae than the Carthaginians after Zama – at least according to Polybius’ formulation. Yet despite Rome’s extreme calamity, Polybius notes a key difference. Rome’s leadership and moral fiber, as generated by the strength and *aretē* of Rome’s *politeia*, meant that the irrational fears of the mob had been quelled and its emotional energies directed calmly toward recovery. Polybius thus pulls together his account to show his readers that the end result for Rome went far beyond recovery from misfortunes sent by Tyche. Instead, the recovery itself had launched into the accomplishment of something truly unprecedented: the achievement of world power in a very short span of time. From near-ruin to global giant, Rome’s meteoric rise was more than just a reversal of Fortune, that favorite catchall of Hellenistic historical drama. It was the triumph of a human *politeia* over the whims of Fortune, and even more than that, a turning of Fortune’s rudder to Rome’s supreme benefit – a phenomenon so compelling that Polybius had made it the central framework for his *Histories*.

Therefore, in the course of the post-Zama episode and its implied contrasts with Rome after Cannae, a key set of Polybian themes and theories are brought to the fore. These all center on Polybius’ belief in a grand, worldwide cycle of history, itself connected to the life cycles of individual *poleis*, and driven not only by the vicissitudes of Tyche but also – and even more importantly – by the strength of a *polis*’ constitution and the moral virtues of its leading politicians. It was with these strong convictions that

Polybius anchored his *Histories*, setting it up as an all-important set of lessons for present and future statesmen. For Polybius identified leading politicians as the cogs running the gears of state in the engine of international history. The *politeia* could help produce stronger, more honorable and morally durable leaders, but it could also decay, and only the most steadfast statesmen could help forestall disaster. Polybius found this the case with powers both great and small, but throughout his *Histories*, he repeatedly emphasized the importance of noble, rational, and resolute leadership in smaller, weaker states.<sup>495</sup> He did so out of personal experience, having witnessed the travails of his native Achaia and having observed firsthand a foreign state's triumph, stepping into the role of new pan-Hellenic power.

Polybius thus saved some of his strongest censure for the Carthaginian diplomats after Zama. And there are a number of reasons why. On the one hand, Polybius believed that their playacting revealed a disturbingly deep internal decay in Carthage's *politeia* and among its leading men. And at the same time, he saw their choice of display as bringing shame to themselves and their *polis* on the international stage. On the other hand, and perhaps even more significantly, this decay and this disgrace were being played out by leaders of one of the greatest challengers, even alternates, to the supremacy of Rome – a state whose *politeia* had in many ways held comparable potential (at least in

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<sup>495</sup> Eckstein (1995) has analyzed this Polybian theme in some detail. To summarize: Polybius frequently uses *exempla* to teach a vitally important task for small-state leaders: to maintain honor and their state's individual autonomies (to the greatest extent possible), for as long as they can, while avoiding the ruin of their city, at the hands of internal mob-rule and/or larger states after separate agendas. See also Baronowski (2011: 124ff.), who sees a development in Polybius' thinking on this subject over time, evolving from slight criticism for misguided military opposition to Rome to strong censure for small-state leaders initiating stupidly disastrous wars against Rome.

Polybius' estimation – cf. 6.51-52). The self-serving and debasing acts of the leading Carthaginians during such a crucial test of Fortune thus garnered Polybius' profound disgust, tinged perhaps even with a degree of sadness.

The contrast between Carthaginian and Roman continues with Scipio's response to the Carthaginian envoys. The brief speech given to Scipio presents the Roman general as a stern, yet fair and rational force of justice, rebuking the Carthaginians and like a judge, proceeding to outline the sentence and dictating the terms for peace.<sup>496</sup> Following the itemization of terms, Polybius provides a brief, yet interesting note on the effect their announcement had on the Carthaginian Gerousia.<sup>497</sup> One of the elders is said to have risen to speak in opposition to the terms, but Hannibal intervened and physically pulled the man down from the podium. This was a clear violation of civil(ized) practice, and the Carthaginian elders are said to have begun to object, but Hannibal continued, and his words appear to have calmed his audience and swayed their opinion.<sup>498</sup> He began by apologizing for his conduct, explaining that he had been raised largely outside the cultural milieu of Carthage, asking that he be forgiven, if only by virtue of the purity of his intentions – those of service to his country. Polybius then has Hannibal urge his fellow citizens to think about the leniency of Scipio's terms, and to accept them, so as to avoid further disaster for their city:<sup>499</sup>

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<sup>496</sup> Scipio's speech (Polyb. 15.17.4-7) is quoted above - pp. 197ff. Note that Appian (*Pun.* 53ff.) includes a similar speech, adding details as to how exactly the Carthaginians broke faith prior to Zama, and making a direct contrast between Scipio's diplomatic behavior and that of the Carthaginians.

<sup>497</sup> Polyb. 15.19.2-7.

<sup>498</sup> Appian, *Pun.* 55, elaborates on this story, portraying the Carthaginian mob as lashing out angrily against the nobles, the latter being led by Hannibal.

<sup>499</sup> Polyb. 15.19.6.

οὓς εἴ τις ὀλίγαις πρότερον ἡμέραις ἤρετο πόσ' ἐλπίζουσι πείσεσθαι τὴν πατρίδα κρατησάντων Ῥωμαίων, οὐδ' ἂν εἰπεῖν οἰοί τ' ἦσαν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν προφαινομένων αὐτοῖς κακῶν.”

*“If you had been asked but a few days ago what you expected your country to suffer in the event of the victory of the Romans, you would not have been able even to give utterance to your fears, so great and excessive were the calamities then in prospect.”*

Once again, we see Polybius using this counterpoint moment to bring out a number of key thematic elements. There is first a hint of the internal decay occurring within Carthage’s *politeia*, made evident via the break in council procedure. Yet at the same time, Polybius seems to set Hannibal’s uncivil behavior as an unfortunately necessary evil, a preventative-measure against the unleashing of selfish, misguided, and ultimately irrational emotion (as occurred in the council halls of his own native Achaia, in 147 and again in 146).<sup>500</sup> And lastly looms a shadow of what Polybius knows will eventually happen, not only to his native land, but also to Carthage – in large part blamed on the folly of leaders much inferior to Hannibal. With this shadow comes an implicit warning to contemporary statesmen, to work to recognize the moment when fighting for the independence and honor of one’s country actually requires submission to a great(er) power.<sup>501</sup> And it is a lesson for future statesmen as well, but more than anything, for the generations yet to come, it is intended by Polybius as a document of Rome’s unprecedented growth. For what he sees as truly remarkable in his own time is the forging of an international, worldwide powerhouse – a process he sees crisscrossing the

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<sup>500</sup> Compare the demagogic stirring up of the Achaian mob against Roman envoys at Polyb. 38.11-12; and Polybius’ criticisms of what he views as the Achaian leaders’ extremely misguided conduct in urging the rejection of Metellus’ peace offer at 38.17. See below – pp. 294ff.

<sup>501</sup> On this theme, see the recent work by Baronowski (2011, esp. 114ff.).

*oikoumenē* like never before, combining the products of Roman *arete*, the folly of Roman enemies, and an admixture of Tyche.

## 201 TREATY: TERMS & SIGNIFICANCE

Polybius provides a full list of Scipio's terms, as they were accepted by Carthage after Hannibal's intervention.<sup>502</sup> The extant text does not include mention of any further debate regarding the treaty and its terms – most likely by making a detailed itemization here, Polybius is recording the treaty as it (at least for the most part) was finally accepted by Rome and sworn before the *decemviri* in Africa.<sup>503</sup> The terms themselves are a revealing range of legal clauses, and all told, they establish a new position for Carthage on the international stage – one that would ultimately lead to the diplomatic crisis that erupted into the Third Punic War.

Polybius divides the terms into the more lenient – reflective of Roman clemency – and the more severe – reflective of Rome's strict justice:

- πόλεις ἔχειν κατὰ Λιβύην ἄς καὶ πρότερον εἶχον ἢ τὸν τελευταῖον πόλεμον ἐξενεγκεῖν Ῥωμαίοις, καὶ χώραν ἣν καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν εἶχον, κτήνη καὶ σώματα καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπαρξιν,
- ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης ἀσινεῖς Καρχηδονίους ὑπάρχειν, ἔθεισι καὶ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις, ἀφρουρήτους ὄντας.
- *Carthage was to **retain all the cities she formerly possessed in Africa before bringing about the last war with Rome, all her former territory, all flocks, herds, slaves, and other property***<sup>504</sup>

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<sup>502</sup> Polyb. 15.19.8.

<sup>503</sup> Doing so leaves Polybius' text without the later drama of debate back in Rome – a topic quite popular among later authors. Livy even adds an earlier discussion occurring in Scipio's camp over whether or not to destroy Carthage – with Scipio seeking to claim a triumph in that year named as his final deciding point (30.36)!

<sup>504</sup> Polyb. 15.18.1. Appian, *Pun.* 54 has a shorter version of this clause.

- *From that day onward, the Carthaginians were to suffer no injury, they were to be governed by their **own laws and customs and to receive no garrison.***<sup>505</sup>

These were the more lenient clauses. The first granted Carthage control over lands and properties as held in Africa before the war, and the second “freed” Carthage, recognizing her as a self-governing and un-garrisoned *polis*. Both terms fit into the normative patterns seen in other Hellenistic treaties – the first being a typical penalty for a defeated state, re-setting the bounds of its legal dominion according to the precepts of just warfare,<sup>506</sup> and the second marking its continued status as a *polis*, to be issued with a number of possible modifiers. The status outlined here by Scipio was indeed on the better end of the scale for Carthage – she would continue to exist as an independent *polis* (i.e. was not de-commissioned as state, and/or was not to be forced into sympolity with another);<sup>507</sup> she was allowed to keep her own constitution, not receiving a new one or a foreign supervising magistrate; and she was to be un-garrisoned (a rather daring addition by Scipio, seeing as Roman troops had not occupied Carthage!).<sup>508</sup> The exact boundaries, however, with which Carthage as *polis* was to be re-defined, were yet to be determined in detail. And the procedure for determining these bounds was to relate to a later clause in

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<sup>505</sup> Polyb. 15.18.2.

<sup>506</sup> See discussion above – pp. 178ff.

<sup>507</sup> E.g. Phthiotic Thebes, sacked by Philip in 217 BCE, population enslaved, and city re-founded as Philippi (Polyb. 5.100.8); Sparta, taken by the Achaians in 188 BCE – its Lycurgan *politeia* abolished (Polyb. 21.32, 22.11); and the treaty bringing Magnesia into Smyrna, most likely by order of Seleucus, ca. 241 BCE (= *B-D*<sup>2</sup> 29 = *Staatsverträge* 492 = *OGIS* 229).

<sup>508</sup> Agreements including the terms αὐτόνομος, “autonomous” and ἀφρούρητος, “un-garrisoned”: e.g. treaty between Lysimacheia and Antiochus, 246 BCE (= *Austin*<sup>2</sup>, no. 171); see also Polyb. 4.25; *Staatsverträge* 442 (= Diod. 20.99.3); *Staatsverträge* 492 (= *B-D*<sup>2</sup> 29) 1.11-12, 65; *Staatsverträge* 536 (212/211 BCE alliance between Rome and Aetolians).

the terms, one that would become a key bone of contention over the next half-century.

After the first two terms, Polybius lists the remaining as punitive:

- πάλιν τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀνοχὰς ἀδικήματα γενόμενα πάντα Καρχηδονίους ἀποκαταστήσαι Ῥωμαίοις,
- τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους καὶ δραπέτας ἐκ παντὸς ἀποδοῦναι τοῦ χρόνου,
- τὰ μακρὰ πλοῖα παραδοῦναι πάντα πλὴν δέκα τριήρων, ὁμοίως καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐλέφαντας.
  
- **Reparation** was to be made to the Romans for all acts of injustice committed by the Carthaginians during the truce.
- **Prisoners of war and deserters** who had fallen into [Carthaginian] hands at any date were to be delivered up.
- They [the Carthaginians] were to **surrender their ships of war with the exception of ten triremes, and all their elephants.**<sup>509</sup>

Clauses for reparations and POW/deserter exchange were common enough features in both truces and more decisive end-of-war agreements.<sup>510</sup> However, disarmament and especially a continued limitation on arms appear to have been less prevalent treaty clauses. As the evidence currently stands, the only other known instance during the third to second centuries can be found later, in Rome's peace terms with Antiochus at Apamea (188 BCE). According to this treaty, Antiochus was to surrender all elephants and not keep/train any more, and surrender all warships, with their rigging and tackle, maintaining no more than ten un-decked vessels in the future, and none with more than thirty oars.<sup>511</sup> Scipio's terms for Carthage may thus

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<sup>509</sup> Polyb. 15.18.3. Livy (30.37) adds the further stipulation that Carthage was not to train any more elephants (compare the Treaty of Apamea – cited below). See also Appian, *Pun.* 54. Livy and Appian both also mention the return of the once controversial naval transports of Scipio (see above – pp. 185ff.) in this context.

<sup>510</sup> E.g. Carthaginian peace agreements in Sicily (see above – pp. 80ff.); truce between Teuta and Epirus, 230-229 BCE (Polyb. 2.6ff.); negotiations at Nicaea, between Flamininus and Philip, 198 BCE (Polyb. 18.1.14); treaty between Magnesia and Miletus, 195 BCE (= *Burstein* 37).

<sup>511</sup> Polyb. 21.42.12-13.

have established if not a new international precedent, then a newly prominent one.<sup>512</sup> And it was a legal precedent that through experience (and most likely the post-war controversies with Carthage in particular) was to gain greater specificity by the time of Apamea. In its restriction on number (and type) of ships in another state's fleet, such a clause most certainly went further than the more common international practice at the time, of placing restrictions on sailing.<sup>513</sup> For such restrictions essentially established key landmarks – usually capes or promontories – to act as boundary markers, marking territorial dominions with respect to sea-going traffic as they would for land troop movement or other travel. By contrast, the Romans were here intervening by implementing a stronger expression of *potestas*, determining the makeup itself of Carthage's fleet, and thereby moving from the simple demarcation of dominion over the seas to a direct policing of another *polis'* international power. This intervention was to be even further strengthened by the next of Scipio's terms:

- πόλεμον μηδενὶ τῶν ἔξω τῆς Λιβύης ἐπιφέρειν καθόλου μηδὲ τῶν ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ χωρὶς τῆς Ῥωμαίων γνῶμης

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<sup>512</sup> It is quite possible that the introduction of these terms may have been the extension of norms already part of prevailing Roman interstate practice – i.e. typical Roman treatment of defeated enemies in Italy. It is a possibility that requires additional research, though it may be difficult to confirm, due to the late nature of our source material for Rome's Italian conquests.

<sup>513</sup> E.g. in the 5<sup>th</sup> century Peace of Callias with Achaemenid Persia; Rome's treaty with Teuta, 228 BCE (Polyb. 2.12.3; see also Appian, *Illyr.* 7; Dio frg. 49) – “[Illyrians were] not to sail beyond Lissus with more than 200 vessels”; Rome's first two treaties with Carthage, 509 BCE (Polyb. 3.22) – “Neither the Romans nor their allies are to sail beyond the Fair Promontory (τοῦ Καλοῦ ἄκρωτηρίου, “*Cap Bon*”), unless driven by stress of weather or the fear of enemies,” and 348 BCE (Polyb. 3.24); also in the Apamea treaty (Polyb. 21.42.14).

- ***They [the Carthaginians] were not to make war at all on any nation outside Africa and on no nation in Africa without consulting Rome***<sup>514</sup>

This is the most significant clause of all, something truly new to the prevailing norms of Hellenistic peace-treaty arrangements,<sup>515</sup> and quite possibly a Roman-specific procedure first developed in interstate politics in Italy. For as it seems to have occurred (whether formally or more informally) with the Italian *socii*, this clause here explicitly prohibited Carthage's independent military action abroad, and required that permission and diplomatic interventions first come from Rome for any action in Africa.<sup>516</sup> In essence, this was a modification and combination of the spirit of two more conventional Hellenistic clauses: one that could outline future arbitral procedure, and one that could establish a defensive bilateral military arrangement (either tilted toward the greater power or not).<sup>517</sup> Together as a modified clause, they placed Carthaginian foreign policy

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<sup>514</sup> Polyb. 15.18.4. Livy (30.37) states this term in the following manner: “*bellum neve in Africa neve extra Africam iniussu populi Romani gererent.*” Appian, *Pun.* 54 provides a strange additional deviation (possibly referring to later accounts claiming that some Carthaginian military units continued to be present and make raids in north Italy in the year or so after the war): “*You shall not recruit mercenaries from the Celts or the Ligurians, nor wage war against Massinissa or any other friend of Rome, nor permit any Carthaginians to serve against them with consent of your people.*” Compare Dio 58 (a compilation of the different variations): “*...they should not hold levies, nor employ mercenaries, nor undertake war against anyone without the consent of the Romans.*”

<sup>515</sup> There are simply no direct comparative examples in the existing body of Hellenistic peace agreements. The relative newness of Rome's approach is also evident in the repeated Greek confusion and misunderstanding regarding *deditio*, with a *maiestas* clause eventually added to Rome's 189 BCE peace-treaty with the Aetolian League – cf. Polyb. 21.29-32; discussion of the different views on this *maiestas* clause in Bauman (1976). See also below – p. 279.

<sup>516</sup> The evidence for such arrangements is mainly circumstantial – we see Italian envoys coming to Rome, asking the Senate to judge in their interstate affairs/disputes and to alleviate problems associated with making required levies to Rome. Nor do we hear of Italian *socii* (outside of mercenaries) engaging in independent military ac In addition, historical records of the actual treaties with the Italian *socii* often come from later authors. See Bispham (2007); Jehne (2009, esp. pp. 153ff.).

<sup>517</sup> Mandatory arbitral clauses, of various kinds: see Ager (1996: 7ff.), esp. Ager no.s 33, 47, 48, and 71. Bilateral military arrangements: e.g., treaty between Lysimacheia and Antiochus, 246 BCE (= *Austin*<sup>2</sup>, no. 171); treaty between Rhodes and Hierapytna, 200 BCE (= *Austin*<sup>1</sup>, no. 95 = *Austin*<sup>2</sup>, no. 113).

squarely in the hands of another state – Rome, and for all intents and purposes, the Roman Senate.

From that point on, Rome was set to make all legal decisions regarding Carthaginian international disputes, and to determine whether or not such disputes, if they should occur in Africa, should warrant a military response from Carthage (and/or Rome). And considering the immediately preceding clause in Scipio's terms, if Carthage were ever to be allowed to take military action in Africa, it would only involve land forces and mercenary/allied aid – the latter especially for naval operations (since Carthage could only have a fleet of ten triremes). These details were all to play an important role in the shape of interstate politics in North Africa from 200-149 BCE. And during this period, Carthage would need to repeatedly send envoys on trips to Rome, not only in order to pay the war indemnity (see below), but also to ensure that the Senate would hear directly about the city's latest interstate affairs – especially when they involved accusations from and territorial disputes with Numidia. In general, this was a time-consuming and most likely quite frustrating process – one that served to continuously highlight and physically manifest Carthage's subsidiary position with respect to Rome. Carthaginian envoys would have to be granted an audience before the Senate,<sup>518</sup> and then return home with messages that, as we will see, most likely involved promises of future investigative action on the part of Rome. Carthage was basically being removed from the international arena

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<sup>518</sup> Compare the account of the Lampsakene mission led by Hegesias, describing the process of obtaining an audience before the Senate (see above – pp. 106ff.). See also the inscription of the Teian ambassadors, recounting their work for a favorable vote from the Senate (ca. 166 BCE): “[by some of our Roman patrons’] exposition of the situation, and by daily morning-calls at their atria, (our envoys) won over their [the opposing Romans’] friendship...” (= *Sherk* no. 26, ll.24-27). And these were the successful envoys...

as an independent actor – and at a time when Roman interests in the international system were turning to an alleged secret pact between Antiochus III and Philip<sup>519</sup> – and this was to have great implications over the next half-century, especially given the next clause in Scipio’s terms:

- οἰκίας καὶ χώραν καὶ πόλεις, καὶ εἴ τι ἕτερόν ἐστι Μασαννάσου τοῦ βασιλέως ἢ τῶν προγόνων ἐντὸς τῶν ἀποδειχθησομένων ὄρων αὐτοῖς πάντα ἀποδοῦναι Μασαννάσῃ
- ***They [the Carthaginians] were to restore to King Massinissa, within the boundaries that should subsequently be assigned, all houses, lands, and cities, and other property that had belonged to him or to his ancestors.***<sup>520</sup>

As we will see, this clause – when considered alongside the restrictions on Carthaginian military action in Africa and requirement for Roman judicial intervention – was to have problematic results. The main issues at hand involved defining which properties and territories had rightfully belonged to Massinissa at some point and which had belonged to his ancestors – a more straightforward process for relations between *poleis*, perhaps, but a tricky and convoluted business for relations between a city, once tributary communities, and nomadic/semi-nomadic tribes with a number of changing allegiances. And it was a situation that Rome would not have actively sought, given the diplomatic stress it ultimately caused (especially at times of international crisis elsewhere – see below). Most likely, Massinissa, as Rome’s victorious ally, pushed for the addition of this clause, and Scipio complied, believing it to be simple re-assignment of dominion

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<sup>519</sup> See Eckstein (2006), and discussion of the “power-transition crisis” above – pp. 38ff.

<sup>520</sup> Polyb. 15.18.5. Livy (30.37) states this term in the following manner: “*Masinissae res redderent foedusque cum eo facerent.*” The *foedus* evidently referred to a future formal settlement of boundaries, as mentioned in Polybius’ text.

in accordance with just-war precepts (see above). It most certainly worked to Massinissa's benefit more than anyone else – and was to be a thorn in Carthage's and Rome's side for years to come.

The remaining clauses represent the standard range of contemporary peace-treaty terms:

- **σιτομετρῆσαι** τε τὴν δύναμιν **τριμήνου καὶ μισθοδοτῆσαι** μέχρι ἂν ἐκ Ῥώμης ἀντιφωνηθῆι τι κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας
- *[The Carthaginians] were to supply the Roman army with **provisions for three months**, and **with pay**, until such time as an answer should be returned from Rome on the subject of the treaty;*<sup>521</sup>
- ἐξενεγκεῖν ἀργυρίου τάλαντα μύρια Καρχηδονίους ἐν ἔτεσι πενήκοντα, φέροντας καθ' ἕκαστον ἑνιαυτὸν Εὐβοϊκὰ τάλαντα διακόσια
- *They were to contribute **ten thousand talents in fifty years**, paying two hundred Euboic talents each year;*<sup>522</sup>
- ὁμήρους δοῦναι πίστεως χάριν ἑκατὸν οὓς ἂν προγράψῃ τῶν νέων ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων, μὴ νεωτέρους τετταρεσκαίδεκα ἐτῶν μηδὲ πρεσβυτέρους τριάκοντα.
- *They were to give as surety a **hundred hostages** chosen by the Roman general from among their young men between the age of fourteen and thirty.*<sup>523</sup>

The most interesting of these clauses is the specification of a fifty-year term for an annual payment of the indemnity. This is a rather long period, especially since other Roman agreements around this time involved ten-year arrangements – and it possibly reflects the large monetary value placed on Carthage's penalty owed to the Roman

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<sup>521</sup> Polyb. 15.18.6.

<sup>522</sup> Polyb. 15.18.7. Appian, *Pun.* 54, says the indemnity was 250 Euboic talents over 50 years (adjusting for value?). For an added detail – that Carthage pay in silver of a particular quality – see Plin. *NH* 33.51 and Gell. 7.5.1.

<sup>523</sup> Polyb. 15.18.8. Appian, *Pun.* 54, gives the number of hostages at 150.

state.<sup>524</sup> Given the other clauses listed by Scipio, it is most likely that this long indemnity period was intended to monitor and maintain Carthage's subsidiary position on a much more permanent basis. In essence, Carthage was being placed on a strict and extended probation for a half-century. During this time, Carthaginian envoys would need to visit Rome on an annual basis, line up with the Italian *socii* and other foreign envoys, pay their dues and update the Senate on their latest interstate politics. Such an annual checkup – at the beginning of the Roman calendar year, upon the accession of the new consuls – again served as a continuing, symbolic reminder of Carthage's new subordinate position. And it was a reminder not only to Romans and Carthaginians, but also to citizens of other nations – that increasingly international gathering of ambassadors traveling to and from Rome to conduct political business. At the end of the fifty years, it is thus only logical that some citizens at Carthage would have been quite eager to find and assert a new, and less chastened diplomatic position for themselves and their city.

### **CARTHAGE AFTER 201**

Carthage was thus de-fanged as an international political player, and she lost territories to a neighboring kingdom that would continue to dispute her position in North Africa. During the half-century after Zama, this political situation led to a number of

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<sup>524</sup> Compare: the treaty at the end of the First Punic War, at 2,200 talents over 10 years, with an additional 1,000 talents immediately (cf. Polyb. 3.27.5); the treaty after Cynoscephalae, at 1,000 talents over 10 years (cf. Polyb. 18.44.7); and the treaty of Apamea, at 10,000 talents over 10 years (cf. *Austin* no. 161). According to Livy (36.4), the Carthaginians offered to pay the full amount of the outstanding indemnity in 191 BCE), but they were turned down – see also Gruen (1984: 293). The Romans were not interested in having an immediate inflow of such a large amount of funds, which could result in divisive debates, jealousies, rivalries, etc. over where to spend it! And it served Roman political purposes to have the Carthaginians required to visit Rome on an annual basis, to check in with the Senate... see below.

changes in the urban topography and economic outlook of the city. The nature of these changes in turn reveals the manner in which Carthage redefined herself after Zama – and provides clues as to the effects on her relationship with Rome.

In physical terms, the urban topography of Carthage experienced a significant building boom in the first half of the second century – the so-called late Punic II period.<sup>525</sup> This was most likely the result of an influx of people – possibly of groups from areas once held by Carthage seeking shelter and opportunity in the mother-city. A whole new section of the city underwent systematic development, on the slopes of the hill known today by the name, “Byrsa.”<sup>526</sup> French excavators dubbed this sector the “Hannibal Quarter”, since Hannibal served as suffete of Carthage at around the time the area was apparently developed (196/5 BCE). The quarter, although dated to the early second century on the basis of stamped Rhodian amphorae<sup>527</sup> found near and below the

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<sup>525</sup> Recent archaeological research and pottery analysis (e.g., the Bir Massouda excavations – see below) have further divided “late Punic” (Hamburg excavations considered from 300-146 BCE) into late Punic I (300-200 BCE), and late Punic II (200-146 BCE). See most recently, Bechtold and Docter (2010: 87).

<sup>526</sup> See Lancel (1978; 1995), and *Byrsa I*, p. 187ff., *Byrsa II*, p. 368ff.; Lancel et al. (1980); Tang (2005). The name “Byrsa” – as has been known for some time (as early as Charles Tissot in 1884: cf. Lancel [1988]; Ladjimi-Sebai [2005]) – was used ambiguously by ancient writers. It was used alternatively to refer to the hill/citadel, or to the overall core of the city (i.e. the area within the city walls, but excluding the orchards/agricultural-garden area of Megara/Megalia = Servius’ “Magalia” – *Aen.* I.368. See Ladjimi-Sebai [2005: 25]). Systematic excavations have only uncovered portions of Byrsa’s slopes – primarily on its southern side, where the SW corner (excavated by Delattre in the late nineteenth century) did not show signs of second-century BCE residential development, but instead showed signs of continued use as a cemetery until 146 BCE: see Lancel (1995: 149).

<sup>527</sup> Note: the chronology of Rhodian amphora-stamps remains a subject of continuing research, with two main chronologies in place: a High Chronology (= “*HC*,” following Grace and Empereur) and a Low (= “*LC*,” following Finkielstejn) – for more, see Finkielstejn (2001). The chronologies are constructed from groups of names/ateliers, divided into relative “periods” (I-VII, from earliest to latest – Finkielstejn’s groupings are used here), which are then assigned to an absolute framework, often on the basis of city destruction events – Carthage and Corinth being among them. The latest work at Corinth, however, has shown that occupation and trade continued there after 146 BCE, and that stratigraphic assumptions regarding “destruction layers/fills” no longer hold water – see James (2010). The chronology of the controversial second-century BCE period IV of Rhodian amphorae nevertheless continues to stand, albeit

floors (ca. 180 BCE),<sup>528</sup> cannot otherwise be connected with Hannibal or his position as chief magistrate – but the name has stuck.

The quarter, as excavated, consists of five *insulae* on the SE corner of Byrsa, organized around three unpaved streets, which were terraced with a number of small stairways. These *insulae* were laid out according to a concerted plan, in standardized plot sizes measured according to the Punic cubit, over an area that had previously served as a metalworking district.<sup>529</sup> The structures are only preserved to the height of their ground floor, since they were later subject to leveling, infilling, and the installation of massive foundation piers for an Augustan-era forum.<sup>530</sup> However, judging from the thickness and

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with less certainty, on the basis of the subsequent period V, which is independently dated by material from Judea - see Finkelstejn (2001, esp. 167-171). The current absence of period V names in the material from Carthage, especially within early Roman colonial construction fills – the site-wide “*RBPS*” (“*Römisch bewegte punische Schichten*”), containing late Punic and any potential interim-period material – could be additional, though tenuous, confirmation of this chronology – see Lancel, *Byrsa I & II*; Finkelstejn (2001: 167). Note the one currently known example of a post-146 BCE Rhodian amphora stamp (from Byrsa) – that of **Herakleitos**, period VIIa = ca. 85 BCE-Augustan (*HC*) / ca. 85-40 BCE (*LC*) – cf. Lancel, *Byrsa II*, p. 174 – possibly left during the Augustan-era re-building process.

<sup>528</sup> The most diagnostic of these stamps – in terms of find-spot – was found in a foundation trench for block B of the *insulae*. It names **Pratophanes** (see Lancel [1978: 310]; *Byrsa I*, p. 255) – a priest of Helios whose tenure is dated to period IIIb, ca. 201-194 BCE (*HC*) / ca. 189-182 BCE (*LC*): cf. *Delos*, 27: 294 and 301 (dating Pratophanes to a few years prior to 180 BCE); Finkelstejn (2001: 192, 196-7). See also Lancel et al. (1980: 20); Tang (2005: 75). Other identifiable Rhodian amphora stamps from Byrsa occur in layers close to the floors (e.g. **Athanodotos**, period IIIId = ca. 187-182 BCE [*HC*] / ca. 175/3-169/7 [*LC*] – cf. Lancel, *Byrsa I*, pp. 215, 217; **Peisistratos** and **Gorgon**, period IVa = ca. 174-156 [*HC*] / ca. 160-153 BCE [*LC*] – cf. Lancel, *Byrsa II*, pp. 19-20; **Sosikles**, also period IVa – cf. Lancel, *Byrsa II*, pp. 136-7; and **Nysios**, period IVb by his association with Pausanias (III) at Delos – cf. Grace, *Délos* XXV.304-5 = ca. 155-146 BCE [*HC*] / ca. 152-146 BCE [*LC*] – cf. Lancel, *Byrsa II*, pp. 136-7); or within the *RBPS* (e.g. **Damothemis**, period IIIa = ca. 205-202 [*HC*] / ca. 234-220 [*LC*] – cf. Lancel, *Byrsa I*, p. 142; **Thestor**, also period IIIa – cf. Lancel, *Byrsa II*, pp. 169-171; **Symmachos**, period IIIId = ca. 187-182 BCE [*HC*] / ca. 175/3-169/7 [*LC*] – cf. Lancel, *Byrsa I*, p. 237; **Aristodamos** (II), period IIIe = ca. 181-175 [*HC*] / ca. 168/6-161 BCE [*LC*] – cf. Lancel, *Byrsa I*, p. 237, *Byrsa II*, p. 209; and **Peisistratos**, period IVa, listed above – cf. Lancel, *Byrsa I*, p. 139).

<sup>529</sup> On standardized plot sizes, see Lancel et al. (1980: 14ff.); Lancel (1995: 162); Tang (2005). This layout – though using Punic dimensions – is comparable to those at Solunto in Sicily and on Delos – see Lancel et al. (1980: 16); Tang (2005: On the presence of a metalworking district in this location prior to the residential development, see Soren et al. (1990: 150); Lancel, *Byrsa II*, pp. 217-260.

<sup>530</sup> See Lancel, *Byrsa I*, p. 132ff.; Gros (1990: 548-551); Ladjimi-Sebaï (2005: 50ff.).

sheer number of support walls, and the amount of flooring material found during excavations, it is generally agreed that these structures were multi-story. The ground-floor rooms appear to have served as street-facing shops (one containing the stone parts of a rotary grain mill),<sup>531</sup> or as internal traffic spaces, moving people through narrow, dead-end corridors that must have led to stairwells for wooden ladders (as at Olynthus and Delos).<sup>532</sup> At their center, each “unit” of ground-floor rooms/corridors surrounded a small, shared portico, dominated by a tiled *impluvium* for the collection, storage, and retrieval of rainwater. Beneath each of the floors of these *impluvia* was a large cistern, apparently for the communal benefit of a number of families inhabiting that “unit.” These cisterns attest to the high density of population that could be supported in this district: in less than 1.2 acres of excavated area, sixteen large-capacity cisterns were discovered, some measuring as large as 20m<sup>3</sup> (= ca. 5,283 gallons).<sup>533</sup> And this residential district evidently continued around some of the other slopes of Byrsa – on perhaps one street to the east (adjacent to the area that continued to serve as a cemetery), and along a possible five to seven more streets that fanned outwards around the hill to the west and north.<sup>534</sup> These were rather tight quarters (even if the upper stories had larger rooms), especially

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<sup>531</sup> See Lancel (1995: 172); *Byrsa II*, pp. 93-103.

<sup>532</sup> Cf. Lancel et al. (1980: 19, n. 30), with references to excavation publications from Olynthus and Delos.

<sup>533</sup> Such a high capacity calls to mind Appian’s famous description of the upper city of Carthage, where the inhabitants made a final defense of their homes against the Romans in 146, fighting hand-to-hand and from the rooftops of buildings that stood as high as six stories (= *Lib.* 128): ...τριῶν δ’ οὐσῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀνόδων ἐς αὐτήν, οἰκίαι πυκναὶ καὶ ἐξώροφοι πανταχόθεν ἦσαν... – “*There were three streets ascending from the agora to this [Byrsa], along which, on either side, were houses built closely together and six stories high...*”

<sup>534</sup> These streets are plausibly reconstructed on the basis of aligned cisterns from the same period and scattered residential finds from rescue excavations around Byrsa: see Lancel, *Byrsa II*, pp. 378-9; Lancel et al. (1980: 230); Lancel (1995: 149, fig. 75).

when compared to the lower residential quarter of town (Quartier Magon – see below). Overall, this new construction on Byrsa appears very much like systematic development intended to accommodate a significant number of new residents (possibly even refugees?).

No matter what, the evidence paints a picture of growing urban population and planned construction to accommodate it in the upper reaches of the city. That this development connected the original, “old town” of the coastal, harbor area of Carthage to a “new town” to the north is hinted at by a truly unique find from the city: a portion of a black limestone stele, inscribed in late Punic script.<sup>535</sup> Unfortunately, its exact find-spot is unclear – it was found ca. 1966 in the vicinity of modern Carthage’s Avenue de la République (near Carthage Station, to the northwest of the circular harbor), apparently in late Roman fill from the fourth century CE. Yet it is the only known legal-municipal document from Punic Carthage, and it references a significant building project, its presiding magistrates, and what were apparently the tradesman-guilds taking part.<sup>536</sup> The project itself involved the opening-up of a major new city street from the south, leading

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<sup>535</sup> Dated on a paleographic basis to the “late third century” – a by no means certain date. However, the text clearly predates Roman-era Neo-Punic: See Dupont-Sommer (1968: 116); Lancel (1995: 142-144).

<sup>536</sup> The text (transl. from the French reading by Dupont-Sommer [1968: 117]) is as follows: “... *this street was opened and constructed, leading to New Gate square, which is in the southern wall(?), by the people of Carthage, in the year of the suffetes Safat and Adonibaal, in the time of the magistracy(?) of Adonibal, son of Esmounhilles(?), son of B(..., and of ... , son of Bodmel)qart, son of Hanno, and their colleagues. Those in charge of the work (were): ‘Abdmelqart, (son of ... , son of ... , in the capacity of [foreman?]); Bodmelqart, son of Baalhanno, son of Bodmelqart, as road engineer; Yehawwielon the brother (of Bodmelqart, as [quarryman]?). (And there worked(?) on it all) the tradesmen, porters, packers(?), from the plain of the town, the weighers of small change(?) and (those) who have neither (silver? nor gold?) and also those who do, the gold-smelters, the craftsmen who make vessels(?), and (those employed) in working the furnaces, and the makers of sandals(?), (all) together. And (if anyone effaces this inscription), our accountants will punish that man with a fine of one thousand (shekels of) silver, over and above (?) measures(?)...*”

to a “New Gate” square. Quite possibly, this could be a commemoration of just one part of the grand construction works that ultimately developed the new district of Byrsa, and then connected it with the older harbor areas. And there is more to add to this picture. Another early second-century project added new residences in the so-called Quartier Magon, to the northeast of Carthage’s two main harbors.<sup>537</sup> This district had for centuries (since the fifth century) been an area of larger, statelier residential *insulae*. The new structures, however, were fitted into a 30m open space that had originally separated the *insulae* from a fortified sea wall (also from the fifth century), which doubled as the city walls in this area.<sup>538</sup>

The evidence thus points to a population boom in Carthage during the first half of the second century. But was this increase a sign of prosperity, as has been generally assumed?<sup>539</sup> For the most part, such assumptions of Carthaginian prosperity have been inspired by ancient tradition: in particular, the legendary tale of Cato and the Carthaginian figs (told by Plutarch and Pliny), and the description of post-war Carthage given by Appian.<sup>540</sup> These ancient authors, however, were writing centuries after the late Punic period, and they lived at a time when Colonia Iulia Carthago was a great trading

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<sup>537</sup> Name given by M. Fantar – cf. Rakob (1991: 252 n. 232).

<sup>538</sup> On these developments – and the Quartier Magon in general – see Rakob (1991; 2002); Lancel (1995: 136, 152-154).

<sup>539</sup> E.g. Soren et al. (1990: 115); Lancel (1995: 404ff.); Tang (2005: 71); Miles (2011: 1948)... These scholars all follow to some degree in the wake of Rostovtzeff’s assessment (1926: 21, n. 15), that Roman landowners helped urge on the war against Carthage in 151-149 BCE, since they were motivated by a desire to remove Carthaginian economic competition.

<sup>540</sup> On Cato and the figs: Plut., *Cato* 27.1; Pliny, *NH* XV.74). Appian’s description = *Libyca* 67: μάλιστα ἡ Καρχηδὼν εἰρηνεύουσα ὁμαλῶς ἐς μέγα δυνάμεως καὶ εὐανδρίας ἦλθεν ἔκ τε πεδίων εὐκαρπίας καὶ θαλάσσης εὐκαιρίας.

city of agricultural produce in the *Roman* empire.<sup>541</sup> And the intervening years had only heightened the drama of Rome's final standoff with Carthage. So were there more trends at work in the Punic city of the second century BCE?

To answer this question, it is necessary to investigate the directions in which Carthage's economy trended during the post-Zama period. Only then can population growth *per se* be connected with a specific form of economic development – whether it be characterized as prosperity or not. Until recently, this was a task that was practically impossible – and even now, only the beginnings of an economic picture can be reconstructed. Much further study on this subject is still required. For now, the main quantifiable evidence comes from pottery, in its capacity to indicate networks of import/export. And there are two key issues with handling this evidence: (1) being able to date sherds in absolute terms with some degree of accuracy; and (2) connecting these site-specific artifacts and their trends with wider Mediterranean data. The most promising recent research has come from excavations in the district of Bir Massouda – a residential area just to the west of Quartier Magon, with occupation layers spanning the entire range of Carthage's history, from archaic through early Roman and even Byzantine.<sup>542</sup> The material uncovered here has not only been systematically excavated (as opposed to Byrsa, which was excavated piecemeal, across the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), but it has also been subjected to statistical analysis (with work still in

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<sup>541</sup> Cf. Fulford (1983).

<sup>542</sup> These excavations comprise two major campaigns, brought together into a single database: (1) the Hamburg DM excavations below the crossroads of Roman Carthage's Decumanus Maximus and Cardo X; (2) the University of Amsterdam excavations of 2000-2001; and (3) the Belgian-Tunisian (co-directed by the University of Ghent and Institut National du Patrimoine) soundings of 2002-2005 – see Bechtold (2010: 1-2), with references (incl. forthcoming works).

progress). According to preliminary publication of the transport amphorae from the site, what is “most striking” about the second-century BCE material (specifically from site 2 of Bir Massouda) is a “low percentage of imported vessels and their limited provenances,” as compared to the percentages of local/regional transport vessels, when compared with relative proportions of import-to-local in preceding periods at Carthage.<sup>543</sup> Only 12% of all transport containers were imported – compared with 20-30% in the previous Middle Punic II period<sup>544</sup> – and they only came from two regions: Campania (Greco-Italic)<sup>545</sup> or Rhodes.<sup>546</sup> The excavators have noted the following:

*There is no doubt that during the final decades of its existence Carthage depended heavily on goods produced in the immediate surroundings of the capital. These were mainly transported in North African amphorae of Ramon’s T-7.4.2.1/3.1 (fig. 10, 33, 37) – the latter type constitutes more than the half of all Late Punic amphorae – and, in smaller quantities, of Ramon’s T-5.2.3.1 (fig. 10, 31) and T-7.7.1.1 (fig. 10, 38). Punic amphorae of these four types constitute nearly 80% of all 2nd century BC amphorae in the present sample.<sup>547</sup>*

From this data, it appears that Carthage perhaps began to look inward after the 201 treaty, turning to the immediate hinterland for goods that had earlier come from

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<sup>543</sup> Bechtold and Docter (2010: 99). See also Bechtold (2010: 60, tab. 27).

<sup>544</sup> See Bechtold and Docter (2010: 99ff., esp. fig. 3); also Bechtold (2010: 59-65, tab. 27, fig. 34). Morel (2004: 16, 20) has also noted a relatively smaller proportion (exact numbers not given) of Greco-Italic amphorae – as compared to the number of local/regional Punic wares – in the Late Punic material from the French excavations on Byrsa. By contrast, Wolff (1986: 147-149), in recording finds from the American excavations at the commercial harbor, noted 30 Greco-Italic amphora sherds, and thought these gave the “impression” of an upturn in Campanian imports. However, in the absence of numbers of local/regional wares for comparison, this impression cannot be confirmed – see Bechtold and Docter (2010: 100, n. 80) and Bechtold (2010: 60, n. 103).

<sup>545</sup> Cf. Bechtold (2010: 60-61, tab. 27, fig. 34.2); Bechtold and Docter (2010: 99-100, fig.s 10.30, 10.36)

<sup>546</sup> Cf. Bechtold (2010: 60-61, tab. 27, fig. 34.3).

<sup>547</sup> Bechtold and Docter (2010: 100). See also Bechtold (2007: 67, n. 264) and (2010: 62, n. 105), where similarly low proportions are cited for deposits recently excavated in the Sidi Bou Saïd quarter of Carthage (= Terrain Boudhina – cf. Maraoui Telmini [2006: 31, 33-4]).

abroad.<sup>548</sup> This is a picture that is at least in part confirmed by an extensive (rather than intensive) survey of this hinterland region, bordered by the Medjerda and Miliana river basins.<sup>549</sup> The preliminary (and as yet only partially published) results from this Carthage Survey suggest a substantial rise in the number of agricultural sites during the late Punic period. And although “sites” were identified by the surveyors on the basis of surface pottery finds alone, the steep rise in site numbers – from nine to fifty from the third century onwards – does seem to indicate some sort of upturn in the level of land occupation and development.<sup>550</sup> Such agricultural intensification also seems to be confirmed by the current data on the export of Late Punic Carthaginian transport vessels. Although more research remains to be done, the evidence (from the western Mediterranean) indicates that from the last quarter of third century onwards, coastal and island sites along the Iberian peninsula imported consistently large numbers of Punic transport vessels, of types identified as Carthaginian.<sup>551</sup> Often, these types have even represented the most numerous class of amphorae uncovered at these various sites, with examples even discovered in the western part of Mauretania.

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<sup>548</sup> Bechtold (2010: 32-33, with additional citations) observes that the Bir Massouda Middle Punic II horizon (= 430-300 BCE) contains amphorae from Punic Sardinia (almost half of all imported transport vessels), followed by examples from Corcyra, Ionian Calabria, and Sicily. Peacock (1986: 106) has also noted that ca. 83% of Middle Punic (ca. 300 BCE) imported amphorae from Carthage’s harbor area came from Spain (proportion to local amphorae unknown).

<sup>549</sup> Greene (1983; 1984; 1986; 1992); Greene and Kehoe (1995); Fentress and Docter (2008: 107ff.); Docter (2009: 182ff.).

<sup>550</sup> See Greene (1986; 1992: 196-197); Fentress and Docter (2008: 108); Docter (2009: 184). A much later Roman legend – recorded by Aurelius Victor in the 4<sup>th</sup> century CE – had it that Hannibal, fearing the effects of idleness on his veterans, set them to a project of mass-planting of olive trees in North Africa (*De Caes.* 37.3).

<sup>551</sup> See Ramon Torres (1995: 291ff.); Bechtold (2010: 62-3, with citations); for the classification of Punic North African amphorae, including types coming from the so-called Carthage-region, see Ramon Torres (1995).

All told, the evidence from the city itself, as well as from the chora and from what is known of Carthaginian exports, seems to point to an intensification of local/regional agricultural production from the Second Punic War period onwards, as Sicily/Sardinia were first disrupted by war and then lost to Rome.<sup>552</sup> And this trend toward North African agricultural production seems to have gained new significance after Zama, as development of the hinterland was increasingly directed toward the city itself, regional transports increasingly being shipped to Carthage for use by the urban population there. And yet despite this turn toward regional self-sufficiency – which makes sense given Carthage’s losses post-Zama – the data from the Iberian peninsula, from shipwrecks, and from Bir Massouda hint at an interesting picture of Carthaginian trade in the final Punic era. On the one hand, Joan Ramon Torres, in her study of Punic amphorae in the western Mediterranean, has noted that there is no detectable change in trade connections between Carthage and the areas of the Iberian peninsula mentioned above.<sup>553</sup> If a break in production and trade occurred because of Carthage’s defeat, it did not last long enough to be noticed in the archaeological record – North African style Punic containers continued to be in use. If this is true (and more work is needed), Carthage was potentially not only supplying her own urban population but those of communities along the Iberian peninsula – a compelling testament to the building picture of intense development in the North African hinterland.

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<sup>552</sup> See also Bechtold (2007).

<sup>553</sup> Ramon Torres (1995: 291).

On the other hand, however, Ramon Torres has also observed that known Mediterranean shipwrecks from this period (200-146 BCE) have simply not yielded a significant number of Punic amphorae.<sup>554</sup> Instead, the ships contained a general international assemblage of Campana A fine wares, Greco-Italic amphorae, and Rhodian transports, followed by Knidian and Koan examples.<sup>555</sup> This phenomenon is interesting, because (as we have seen) the excavations at Bir Massouda have revealed that late Punic imported transport vessels, while less prevalent than local/regional types, were almost exclusively Greco-Italic and Rhodian (rather than north Aegean or Sardinian, as in middle Punic). Presumably, whatever goods these amphorae held, they arrived at Carthage along the same predominant Mediterranean trade routes for the time, in ships much like those found in early second-century wrecks. And despite the relative paucity of imported amphorae at Carthage, Campana A Black Glaze fine wares have nevertheless shown up in massive amounts, sometimes comprising over half the total amount of pottery per context, all across late Punic deposits at Carthage (not just Bir Massouda).<sup>556</sup> A very specific, Punic North African connection with international exchange was occurring here: Carthage was trading with the dominant Greco-Italian system at large, but was selecting fine wares in particular. Foreign transport vessels, and the agricultural

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<sup>554</sup> Were regions of the Iberian peninsula perhaps producing their own imitations of North African Punic amphora shapes? This question requires additional research (comparing fabrics – FACEM.at?)

<sup>555</sup> Ramon Torres (1995: 292).

<sup>556</sup> See Bechtold (2010: 64-5), who notes a comparable occurrence at late Punic Sabratha, in Tripolitania (p. 65, n. 114). In earlier middle Punic periods, Carthage had already developed a taste for Hellenic fine wares and adopted at least portions of Hellenistic symposium practice, but had preferred imported Attic Black Glaze over Italic forms – see Bechtold (2010: 27ff.).

produce they carried (be it wine, olive oil, or grain), were no longer of interest, presumably because of local production.

There are two possible interpretations for this picture of supply and trade – both requiring further study. One is to envision a sort of triangular trade, with Greco-Italic-loaded ships arriving in Carthage, selling their Campana A cargos, and replacing them with Punic transport amphorae bound for the Iberian peninsula.<sup>557</sup> The other is to envision Punic-specific traders (their ships as yet undiscovered as shipwrecks), carrying Punic amphorae and fine wares to the Iberian peninsula, with other, perhaps more perishable Punic items replacing the Campana A on Greco-Italic ships (losing their visibility in known wrecks). As Bechtold and Docter have noted, these are alternatives (not necessarily mutually exclusive), which await further study:

*It is only by looking diachronically at the full amphorae repertoire of Carthage in conjunction with the repertoires of other Mediterranean sites that such wider economical-historical and social questions may be addressed and eventually be answered.*<sup>558</sup>

To make some preliminary conclusions, however: the evidence, as it currently stands, does seem to paint a picture of a changed economic paradigm for Carthage in the wake of the Second Punic War. The city no longer traded for the same inventory of foreign agricultural goods, and now followed new international trends that largely reflected Greco-Italic/Rhodian routes over northern Aegean or Sardinian/Sicilian ones. However, it was selective in doing so, opting only for Italic Campana A – the latest fashion in drink-ware, no matter the politics with Rome. At the same time, imported

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<sup>557</sup> Cf. Bechtold (2010: 65).

<sup>558</sup> Bechtold and Docter (2010: 103).

agricultural goods – which shipwreck evidence suggests arrived on the same ships as Campana A – were not purchased.<sup>559</sup> Carthage supplied the urban population instead with the produce of the immediate hinterland. This hinterland – if the data from the Iberian peninsula has been accurately assessed – must have been very intensively developed, for it not only continued to feed the demands of those foreign communities, but also, for the first time, those of Carthage itself. And as the immediate chora of the city underwent a revolution in the landscape, so did the urban fabric: the population grew to new levels and building project(s) opened up an entire new, and tightly packed, residential district.

Carthage thus showed herself to be adaptable in the face of defeat, able to maintain internal self-sufficiency, yet also able to maintain selective connections with international networks. The city dealt with a loss of territories by concentrating on exploiting her immediate hinterland, and was thereby able to accommodate an influx of urban inhabitants, for whom new residential districts were developed. These measures, however, were a matter of survival – Carthage by no means established herself as a direct economic competitor to Roman interests, or as an alluring gem for the taking, as scholars have sometimes claimed in their assessments of the Third Punic War.<sup>560</sup> In fact, Carthage was a large consumer of Campana A wares, and as such, already provided a lucrative market for Italian merchants – a war would actually work against such interests. And

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<sup>559</sup> See Ramon Torres (1995: 291-2); Bechtold (2010: 65).

<sup>560</sup> Cf. Mommsen (1913: 239); Rostovtzeff (1926: 12, 21); and to some degree, Romanelli (1959: 31f., esp. p. 34); De Sanctis (IV.3.20-24); and Baronowski (1995: 28-29). More recently, and from an archaeological standpoint: Rakob (1984: 10; 1985: 502f.).

Carthage had indeed transformed her chora into an agricultural powerhouse, but had done so with the primary goals of feeding a growing urban population and funding the indemnity to Rome. All the same, the contention here is that one of the most important underlying factors in the outbreak of the Third Punic War was indeed Carthage's intense development of her hinterland. But this was not because Rome viewed such development in any light (or was well informed of it, for that matter). It was because this agricultural development had adverse effects on Carthage's relationships with her neighbors in North Africa. And these relationships were to play out in an escalating series of insoluble conflicts over the next half-century. What brought these conflicts to breaking point and what ultimately brought Roman armies back to North Africa was an incompatible system of international law, put in place to preside over territorial holdings, from a Roman/Hellenistic way of thinking. To understand the crisis that took place mid-century, we thus need to first look at the situation in North Africa after the treaty of Zama.

#### **NORTH AFRICA AFTER 201: THE SOURCES**

As we have seen, Carthage moved in a number of infrastructural directions in the wake of her defeat at Zama and loss of position as an independent international player. On a political level, however, the adjustments to defeat were not so untroubled. According to later sources, Hannibal, suffete in 196 BCE, was forced in 195 to leave Carthage, amid rumors of high political drama.<sup>561</sup> Enemy factions within the city were

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<sup>561</sup> The account of events comes from: Cic. *Sest.* 142; Diod. 28.10.1; Nepos 23.7.6-7; Liv. 33.47.7-49.8; Val. Max. 4.1.6, 5.3e1; Silius 13.878-885; App. *Syr.* 4a; Just. 31.1.7-2.8; Eutrop. 4.3.2; Oros. 4.20.13; Zonar. 9.18i-j.

allegedly aiming for his demise, accusing him of public embezzlement, and, even more gravely, of making overtures to Antiochus, the latest *bête noire* for Rome. Rome apparently became concerned enough to send an investigative envoy, ostensibly to look into disputes between Carthage and Massinissa/the Numidians. Hannibal, suspecting a secondary purpose for the envoy, slipped out of the city, and eventually joined the court of Antiochus, fueling the rumor mill even further. Subsequent tradition even told of a secret spy, Ariston of Tyre, being sent by Hannibal back into Carthage to attempt a coup or test the waters of the city in order to forge an alliance with Antiochus against Rome.<sup>562</sup>

Now while these incidents have become wrapped in generations of later dramatic enhancement, they do contain three key kernels of information – themes – that are relevant to what is otherwise known from contemporary second-century evidence. First is a theme of division and factionalism within Carthage itself – a feature that was to play an important role again in the international crisis mid-century. Second is a theme of international interconnectivity – i.e., a perceived correlation between diplomatic tensions developing in otherwise separate geopolitical regions. Lastly – and perhaps most significantly for the mid-century crisis – is the theme of dispute between Carthage and Massinissa, with Roman envoys being sent to arbitrate in disagreements over territories in North Africa. These are three general pieces of the puzzle, highlighting not only the main issues leading to crisis but also the fundamental concerns of groups (e.g. North African, Roman, Hellenic), who were involved in and were reacting to the events themselves.

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<sup>562</sup> See Nepos 23.8.1-2; Livy 34.60.1-61.16, 39.51.2; App. *Syr.* 7a-8b; Just. 31.3.5-4.3.

It is from this perspective – thinking about diplomatic behaviors and expectations on various sides, international and local/regional – that Polybius (once again, our only contemporary historical source) can be woven into context. For Polybius went much further beyond pure narrative when it came to his treatment of the Third Punic War, largely because of his overall agenda in writing the *Histories* as a manual for statesmen. And at the same time, his assessments – which have strongly influenced subsequent generations (ancient and modern) – were also guided by his own cultural frame of reference, which was not fully in tune with Roman, Punic, or Numidian frames. Yet it was Polybius who first constructed the now classic explanatory paradigm for the Third Punic War: that the Romans had “long ago decided” on war, but had only waited for a suitable “pretext” (*prophasis*) in order to make the final declaration.<sup>563</sup> The assessment was a value-laden one, rooted in some of the deeper ideas that drove Polybius’ work, and centered upon his belief that contemporary Rome had achieved unprecedented world dominion. The extension of the *Histories* to 146 BCE thus reflected Polybius’ individual response to what we will see was a contemporary intellectual phenomenon: that is, of viewing the events of 146 BCE as together marking a significant crescendo point in Rome’s trajectory as a world power.<sup>564</sup> Polybius takes this important juncture and thus

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<sup>563</sup> Polyb. 36.2: *πάλαι δὲ τούτου κεκυρωμένου βεβαίως ἐν ταῖς ἐκάστων γνώμαις καιρὸν ἐζήτουν ἐπιτήδειον καὶ πρόφασιν εὐσχήμονα πρὸς τοὺς ἑκτός.* See the discussion of Polybian *aitia* and *prophasis* in Baronowski (1995).

<sup>564</sup> For more on this contemporary phenomenon, see below – pp. 321ff.

applies it to his didactic mission, deploying it as an opportunity to assess both Roman *archē* and the tragically flawed responses by other polities and politicians to it.<sup>565</sup>

In order to cut through Polybian rhetoric, then, it is first necessary to identify it – i.e., analyze Polybius’ treatment of the post-201 situation in North Africa for the agenda(s) and biases it might contain. From there, clues to the events themselves can be gathered, and this information can be compared to some of the traditions recorded by subsequent authors. These elements can then be aligned with their normative contexts: second-century Greek vs. Roman views on arbitration; Carthaginian, Numidian, and North African approaches to territory; and Roman practices of international law. The end result is a new picture, which pulls together Polybius’ deeply influential views, a broader international context, and the political and cultural interactions taking place in North Africa. Taken together, these pieces will then reveal the complex relationship between Polybius and his contemporary international environment – his account being at once an indirect testimony to trends occurring in diplomatic and ideological norms and at the same time involving a personal evaluation of the world around him, with 146 perceived as an essential turning point within that world’s history.<sup>566</sup>

At the heart of it all were recurring back-and-forth disputes between Carthage and Massinissa/the Numidians, over territories in North Africa. There are some fundamental problems with our ancient sources when it comes to the accounts of these disputes, and for this reason, Polybius becomes our main subject of inquiry. Between Polybius, Livy,

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<sup>565</sup> For more on Polybius’ extension to the *Histories*, see Walbank (1977/1985).

<sup>566</sup> For more, see the discussion below in chapter 6.

and Appian (the main three sources), there is no agreement on a clear chronology of disputes, and in some instances, there even appear to be direct contradictions over the locations of territories and Rome's decisions as arbiter.<sup>567</sup> Prior to the late 150s BCE, Livy describes four major disputes (dated to 193, 182, 174/2, and 157 BCE).<sup>568</sup> Appian's account is usually lined up with the first two – in any case, he does not seem to discuss a third or fourth dispute prior to the late 150s.

What can be taken from these highly muddled accounts are the elements they have in common. Two general regions were disputed: the Lower Syrtis gulf-coast/Emporia region (south of Carthage and west of Leptis Magna), and the Bagradas/Medjerda river valley, or "Great Fields" around Tusca (west/southwest of Carthage in modern Tunisia).<sup>569</sup> Massinissa tends to be the party accused of wrongful occupation – Carthage sends envoys to Rome in order to obtain arbitration and enforcement, and the Numidians send envoys to defend their position. In doing so, both parties appear to have presented Rome with evidence supporting their case, following typical Hellenistic/international procedure. The Roman Senate then either sends or makes some promise to send an embassy to investigate, but in each case either makes no decision, or the ancient sources tell of no definitive conclusion to the dispute. And as noted above, there is a general tendency for these flare-ups to be situated within an international context, and receive notice during times of tension between Rome and

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<sup>567</sup> For more on this subject, see Walsh (1965); Astin (1967: App. III); Desanges (1995).

<sup>568</sup> = Livy 34.62.1-18 (193 BCE); 40.17.1-6 (182 BCE); 42.23.1-24.10 (174/2 BCE); and *Per.* 47b (157 BCE).

<sup>569</sup> "Tusca" mentioned by Appian (*Pun.* 68c) most likely refers to the important *pagus* of Roman Dougga/Thugga – see Poinssot (1958: 9); Walsh (1965: 158).

another state.<sup>570</sup> In this light, either the Numidians were cashing in on an opportunity to play upon concerns that Carthage might join or be wooed by Roman enemies,<sup>571</sup> or the Romans (and later historians) only find notable significance in North African disputes when these disputes presented such potential dangers – or, most likely, some combination of the two.

Polybius' text appears to pull all of this material together, providing a general overview of what must have been an impossibly tangled series of back-and-forth disputes (reflected in the confusion among the sources). Polybius makes only one reference to the conflict over North African territory, placing his overview in the year 162-1 BCE – a year in which none of the other sources mention a dispute. He tells us that after a longstanding peace, Massinissa had attempted to seize Lower Syrtis/Emporia from the Carthaginians, in a number of attacks. According to Polybius – and in stark contrast to the picture portrayed by the other sources – these actions were consistently upheld by decisions of the Senate. Also in stark contrast to the other sources is a distinction between “towns” and “open country” – with the Numidians occupying the latter and the Carthaginians at first holding the former but being ordered to turn them over. The following is Polybius' account:

*In Africa, Massinissa, seeing the numbers of the cities founded on the coast of the Lesser Syrtis and the fertility of the country which they call Emporia, and casting envious eyes on the abundant revenue derived from this district, had tried, not many years before the time I am dealing with, to wrest it from Carthage. He*

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<sup>570</sup> E.g. Antiochus in 193 BCE, the Celtiberians in 182, Perseus in 174/2, and the Ptolemy brothers in 157 BCE. Appian (*Pun.* 68b) even mentions one of the disputes (ca. 182 BCE?) occurred in the context of the Celtiberian Wars, and Livy (41.22.1-3) mentions Numidian allegations that Carthage was sending messengers to Perseus in 174.

<sup>571</sup> This is an interpretation well argued by Walsh (1965: esp. p. 157ff.).

*easily made himself master of the **open country** as he could command it, owing to the Carthaginians, who had always been poor soldiers, having latterly become completely enervated in consequence of the long peace. He could not, however, get hold of the **towns**, since the Carthaginians carefully guarded them. Both parties appealed to the Senate about their differences, and numerous embassies had come from both on the subject, but the **Carthaginians always came off second best at Rome**, not because they had not right on their side, but because the judges were convinced that it was in their own interest to decide against them. Their claim to the country was evidently just; for Massinissa himself not many years previously, while pursuing with an army Aphther (who had rebelled against him), had begged permission from them to pass through this district, thus acknowledging that he had no claim to it. But nevertheless at the end, the Carthaginians were in such straits, owing to the decisions of the Senate at the time I am speaking of, that they not only **lost the country and the towns in it**, but had to pay in addition five hundred talents for the revenue of it since the dispute had originated.<sup>572</sup>*

We will return to the issue of towns vs. open country shortly, but first: why does Polybius discuss the North African territorial disagreements in this year, when no other sources mention a dispute? The view taken here is that the answer can be found in the agenda of Polybius' Book 31 (or at least in what survives of his narrative of the years ca. 165-160 BCE). Polybius deliberately chose to mention North African troubles within what appears to be a synopsis of Mediterranean-wide *tarachē kai kinesis* – that is, of the disrupted and turbulent international *symplokē* of politics post-Pydna. Polybius had first introduced the subject of *tarachē kai kinesis* in Book 3, immediately following his extended introduction and discussion of historical background in Books 1 and 2. In being placed at the beginning of his main historical narrative, from 220 BCE onward, the subject is earmarked as being of key significance. And although Polybius is vague regarding an exact chronology of the “period of disturbance,” he does provide an

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<sup>572</sup> Polyb. 31.21.1-8.

important clue, stating that he has modified his original plan for the *Histories* to include more recent, post-Pydna events – that is, including discussion of interstate conditions after the fifty-three year period of Rome’s rise to power.<sup>573</sup> *Tarachē kai kinesis* is thus used as general shorthand for this period, which appears to have begun in different regions at different points after Rome’s accession to world dominion – North Africa and the Greek world being among their number, and 146 marking their culmination point.<sup>574</sup>

The fragments of Polybius’ text from Book 31 move from arena to arena, but in each, the same impression of *tarachē kai kinesis* is being promoted: that Rome is now in the position of moderating every international issue; that across the Mediterranean, the less-than-honorable are gaining the most success in weaker/weakened states; and that Rome is not necessarily deploying the most admirable behavior in dealing with her new world-wide responsibilities. To summarize, we are presented with the following examples: (1) King Eumenes – Polybius characterizes Roman treatment of him as unfairly harsh;<sup>575</sup> (2) Seleucid prince Demetrius being kept hostage in Rome, being denied his kingdom in favor of a nine-year old boy (Polybius takes this opportunity to remark on Rome’s preference for expediency, *to sympheron*, over justice, *to dikaion*);<sup>576</sup> (3) a renewed alliance with Cappadocia and its new king Ariarathes, who disputes with

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<sup>573</sup> On this subject, see Walbank (1990: 29); Eckstein (1995: 265); McGing (2010: 24).

<sup>574</sup> = Polyb. 3.4, specifically 3.4.12: διὸ καὶ τῆς πραγματείας ταύτης τοῦτ’ ἔσται τελεσιούργημα, τὸ γνῶναι τὴν κατάστασιν παρ’ ἑκάστοις, ποῖα τις ἦν μετὰ τὸ καταγωνισθῆναι τὰ ὅλα καὶ πεσεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐξουσίαν ἕως τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπιγενομένης ταραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως. “So the final end achieved by this work will be, to gain knowledge of what was the condition of each people after all had been crushed and had come under the dominion of Rome, until the disturbed and troubled time that afterwards ensued.” See also the discussions below in chapter 6.

<sup>575</sup> Polyb. 31.6.6.

<sup>576</sup> Polyb. 31.11.11: “For...it was not because Demetrius was not right in what he said that they [the Senate] had decided to keep the young king on the throne, but because it suited their own interest.”

the Galatians – Roman legates judge in his favor, but rebuke his offers of guidance in other eastern affairs; (4) Calynda in Caria being ceded to Rhodes, by approval of the Senate, after Calynda had revolted from Caunus and had simply sought Rhodian aid; and (5) in Egypt, the kingdom being partitioned by Rome between brothers, but Rome renegeing on the original terms, favoring the younger brother, Ptolemy Physcon (a character strongly disliked by Polybius).<sup>577</sup> Polybius at this juncture inserts a comment that summarizes the overall tone of the entire sequence of 165-160 BCE:

πολὺ γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἐστὶ τῶν διαβουλίῳν παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἐν οἷς διὰ τῆς τῶν πέλας ἀγνοίας αὖξουσὶ καὶ κατασκευάζονται τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχὴν πραγματικῶς, ἅμα χαριζόμενοι καὶ δοκοῦντες εὐεργετεῖν τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας.

*For many decisions of the Romans are now of this kind: availing themselves of the mistakes of others, they effectively increase and build up their own power, at the same time doing a favor and appearing to confer a benefit on the offenders.*<sup>578</sup>

This is truly a negative assessment of international standards and international elite morality (with the two running hand-in-hand for Polybius), not only on the side of Rome in the position of Mediterranean arbiter but also on the side of lesser powers, who were seen to be making egregious errors in judgment. In this context, Polybius' extended discursion on the nobility of young Scipio (usually placed after these fragments in reconstructions of the text)<sup>579</sup> gains even further meaning. In Polybius' eyes, his close friend represented something truly special, if not history-making for his time – a nobility

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<sup>577</sup> On the latter, see Eckstein (1995: 104-5), and Polybius' comment at 31.18.14.

<sup>578</sup> Polyb. 31.10.7.

<sup>579</sup> Buttner-Wobst/Loeb, Polyb. 31.22-30.

of character that stood out from the decay of his generation, both at Rome and abroad, and represented a last hope for the future of Roman greatness as a world power.

Polybius thus frames the North African disputes within a highly rhetoricized context, an interpretative framework that was intended to make sense of a broader arc of world history, and one in which Scipio was to become a key player. However, once this agenda is peeled back, there are a number of clues – not only from Polybius but also from the very general picture to be gleaned from Livy and Appian – as to the events themselves. And these involve a clash between political practices – Hellenistic, Roman, Numidian, Punic, and North African – all put in motion by the Zama treaty.

#### **NORTH AFRICA AFTER 201: CLASHES BETWEEN POLITICAL CULTURES**

There were two clauses from the Zama treaty that in particular pushed relations to the brink. These were the clauses that mandated the following to Carthage: (1) to restore to King Massinissa, within boundaries to be assigned, all houses, lands, cities, and other property which had belonged to him or to his ancestors; and (2) to make war on no nation whatsoever outside of Africa – and within Africa, not to do make war without consulting Rome first.<sup>580</sup> Taken together, these terms essentially made Rome the ultimate arbiter of territorial holdings in North Africa, with Carthage unable to independently enforce control over any possessions in the face of foreign challenge.

It was for this reason that embassies from Carthage and the Numidians repeatedly found themselves in Rome over the next half-century, presenting evidence for claims to

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<sup>580</sup> See above, pp. 224ff.

various pieces of territory and making accusations of the other party. They were doing so in accordance with standard contemporary practice of international adjudication – at least on the level of making legal arguments for rightful ownership on the basis of just war and rightful inheritance.<sup>581</sup> However, there was a significant twist to these arbitrations, since the Roman Senate was essentially the treaty-designated panel of judges for *all* such cases involving Carthage. And whereas the Senate did not necessarily make final decisions on the spot, there is no evidence that it re-delegated these cases to another third party (as it often did elsewhere – see above). These were evidently matters of unique import, ones that were perceived as pertaining directly to the Roman state, to be settled by senators/Senate-designated Roman envoys.

On a certain level, then, the territories of Carthage had come under the *maiestas* (though not direct ownership) of the Roman people. That this was the case becomes even clearer by comparison with other contemporary examples of obligatory arbitration. For the standard at the time was to include clauses for future arbitration within isopolity/sympolity agreements,<sup>582</sup> or within federal league constitutions.<sup>583</sup> In other words, such clauses tended to be a feature of contracts that exchanged a degree of legal

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<sup>581</sup> For example: the Numidians at one point were said to have claimed lands because Massinissa's father Gala had retrieved them from Carthage; these lands, according to the Numidian argument, had subsequently been seized wrongfully by Syphax and had thus been illegally gifted to Carthage (Livy 40.17.1-6). In another dispute, Carthage argued that since Massinissa had had to request permission from Carthage to travel with an army through certain lands in pursuit of the Numidian rebel, Aphther, he had acknowledged Carthage's rightful possession of those lands (Polyb. 31.21.1-8). For contemporary comparative examples, see above – pp. 178ff.

<sup>582</sup> E.g., the planned synoikism of Lebedos and Teos by Antigonos I, ca. 303 BCE (= *Ager* no. 13); isopolity between Hierapytna and Priansos, early second century BCE (= *Ager* no. 67). See also *Ager* no. 89 and 108.

<sup>583</sup> See *Ager* (1996: 22ff.); also *Ager* no. 92, the early second-century BCE constitution of the Lesbian League.

sovereignty between *poleis*. And when such obligatory clauses appeared in peace treaties or arbitral decisions, they did not specify a particular arbiter for all future cases – they simply referenced a “designated city” (*ekklētos polis*), which was to be determined by various means once a dispute arose.<sup>584</sup>

But this was not the only unique aspect of the post-war situation in North Africa. For despite the Hellenistic surface of the Zama treaty terms – which treated Carthage as a *polis* and Numidia as a kingdom, both with decisively definable borders – a much more complex system was in play. The notion of “ancestral” lands did not have the same meaning in North Africa as it did for the most part in the wider Hellenistic/Roman worlds. In the latter, territories were primarily conceived in terms of *poleis* as the major units, with each *polis* established by myth-historic genealogy and by just-warfare with rights to a particular *chora*. Within these *polis* units, property ownership was understood at the most basic level as a legal and alienable right, divided among citizens.<sup>585</sup> And even if these boundaries, and those of the greater *polis*, were at times contested, they were nevertheless lines that were definitively mapped to the judicial unit of city-state. In North Africa (specifically in the areas of modern Tunisia and Libya), however, evidence suggests that the Hellenized urban core of Carthage had a different history of interaction with what was otherwise expected to be its *chora*.

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<sup>584</sup> Cf. *Ager* no. 71. Such procedure is outlined clearly in a ca. 185/4 BCE treaty between Herakleia and Miletos: the third party was to be a “free and democratic” state selected by both parties (*Ager* no. 108, l. 84). See also *Ager* no. 120 (II, l. 16). In another, late second-century example, a group of third-party states was to make the selection of *ekklētos polis* for the disputants (*Ager* no. 170 IV, ll. 18-29).

<sup>585</sup> Cf. Sakellariou (1989: 80ff.); Gargola (1995: 25ff.); Rathbone (2003) – with discussion of the definitive (and ritualized) delimitation of Roman public territories, including pastureland. Note: this is a generalized view, intended for comparative purposes only, of Greco-Roman land tenure systems, the nuances of which remain a subject of study in their own right.

Building the beginnings of a picture of this North African context, in the absence of extensive contemporary evidence, requires a combination and distillation of dispersed sources. These sources range from ancient historical references, later Roman/Neo-Punic epigraphic clues, archaeological data (from surveys in particular, and with much further work yet to be done), and modern sociological comparative analysis.<sup>586</sup> Scattered surveys across modern Tunisia and Libya have revealed the following basics as a starting point. From the area around Leptis Magna (coastal Libya), on at least the fringes of the Emporia region mentioned in the ancient sources as a matter of dispute, preliminary survey data suggests a rise in the number of early second-century rural settlements around the port-city.<sup>587</sup> This is a pattern that would roughly parallel the data coming from Carthage's immediate hinterland (see above), and would again point to an intensification of agriculture in both zones. To the north of Leptis, past the Lesser Syrtis bay, survey work in the dryer Sahel coastal region (around Leptiminus) has revealed a contrasting trend. There, the amount of pottery material from the third century BCE through first century CE has been characterized as "extremely small" when compared with later periods.<sup>588</sup> Moving further to the north and west, though, intensive surveys in the transitional zone of the Segermes valley have revealed a scattering of nucleated settlements, with two in particular being developed as fortified centers during the third century BCE.<sup>589</sup>

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<sup>586</sup> See Whittaker (1978); Fentress (2006, esp. pp. 14ff.).

<sup>587</sup> Cifani et al. (2003).

<sup>588</sup> Dore and Schinke (1992: 154). See also Stone (1997: 121; 2004); Stone and Stirling (1998: 307); Quinn (2003: 21-22).

<sup>589</sup> Cf. Quinn (2003: 22-23). Note that like the Sahel region, the Segermes valley experienced even more significant settlement growth during the Roman imperial period (ibid.).

The most interesting evidence, however, relates to the region today known as the Tunisian “Tell”: the area around Tusca/Dougga referred to as the “Great Fields” in the ancient sources.<sup>590</sup> This region, comprised of hilly and fertile lands to the west/southwest of Carthage (and west/northwest of Segermes), has been studied via extensive (rather than intensive) survey work, and only scattered sites have been excavated. Yet all the same, the surveys have revealed that a large number of fortified hilltop sites and so-called “proto-urban” settlements emerged all over this region during the second half of the third and early second centuries BCE.<sup>591</sup> These sites call to mind the “fifty cities” (*poleis*) of the Great Fields mentioned by Appian, the over seventy “towns and forts” (*oppida castellaque*) mentioned by Livy, or even the “multitude of cities” (τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πόλεων) mentioned by Polybius in connection with the disputes between Carthage and the Numidians.<sup>592</sup> From the same period (latter third-early second centuries), the Tell surveys have also recorded an upturn in the number of monumental tomb buildings, and in a wide variety of types. These tombs appeared all across the same region, and always in close vicinity of a proto-urban settlement.<sup>593</sup>

In order to better understand these patterns, later evidence can be used to suggest possible explanations for the cultural processes at work. From epigraphic evidence, we know that the Roman imperial system developed for the province of Africa during the first century CE centered on *pagi* – administrative districts, run by Roman(ized)

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<sup>590</sup> See above – pp. 250-1.

<sup>591</sup> Ferchiou (1990a: esp. 230-231; 1990b; 43-44; 1994).

<sup>592</sup> Cf. Appian *Pun.* 68c; Livy 42.23.2; Polyb. 31.21.1. Ferchiou (1990a: 230) has collected a list of terms used in the Greek and Roman sources that seem to refer to the settlements seen in the Tell surveys. They vary from *polis* to *pyrgos* and *phourion*, to *urbs*, *oppidum*, and *castellum*.

<sup>593</sup> Cf. Ferchiou (1987; 1994); Quinn (2003: 20-21, 23ff.); Fentress (2006: 8ff.).

magistrates, and overseeing regional *civitates* (often gathered into tax-paying units).<sup>594</sup>

From comparative, sociological analysis of modern-era Berber tribes, a number of analogous practices help pull the picture together.<sup>595</sup> As with the patterns suggested by Roman-era *pagi* and survey data, the main unit amongst a number of the modern tribes is that of a village, itself organized along lines of kinship.

The “territories” associated with these independently operating villages are in turn held on an unalienable basis by the village families, among whom a founding or leading family is often revered at a local gravesite.<sup>596</sup> On a periodic basis, male representatives of the village families meet in an assembly (modern *tajma th*), with the elders making all decisions. An assembly-chosen leader serves as chief of the village, and is usually also the head of the dominant family. Villages are then linked together, often on the level of chiefs and elders, into broader alliances, which are not defined in kinship terms but in terms of payment, barter, and histories of obligation. From this level, two to five villages become linked into traditional “tribes” (*taqbilt*). On the village and/or tribal level, these communities then develop their own arrangements with nomadic/semi-nomadic groups, who move their herds along transhumance routes and across village lands.<sup>597</sup> Tribes are

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<sup>594</sup> See Warmington (1954); Jeddou (2008).

<sup>595</sup> See esp. Fentress (2006: 17ff.), whom I follow here; also Whittaker (1978). Although complicated by the use of modern ethnographic information, this reconstruction makes the best use of available data. Until further primary source evidence is available for the rural areas of late Hellenistic North Africa, such a reconstruction is generally accepted – see, for example, Hitchner (1994). For more on this complex subject – and its own colonial-era history – see McDougall (2010).

<sup>596</sup> Cf. Fentress (2006: 17-18).

<sup>597</sup> The term “tribe” is here to be understood in the most general sense possible, as a collection of North African villages. This is at the exclusion of nineteenth-century ethnic or social-evolutionary connotations, but is intended to capture some of the Roman categorization and labeling that later took place – on both, see the discussion in Moore (2011).

brought together into much looser “confederations” ( *’arsh*), which only come together at meetings arranged by the leaders of the most powerful tribal families during times of need, crisis, or conflict.

These modern ethnographic comparanda appear to reflect and flesh out the evidence available from later Roman-assigned terms, which in turn appear to be a continuation of developments from the late Punic/Numidian eras (as indicated by the available archaeological evidence). Such terms include nested *domus-familia-gens-gentes* labels, as used in the second-century CE Tabula Banasitana, which records an imperial honorary grant of Roman citizenship to a local family of the *gentes Zegrensium*.<sup>598</sup> Parallel phenomena are also visible in the various *seniores* and *principes* mentioned in inscriptions from across the early Roman African provinces, as well as in references to *civitates stipendiarii* (e.g. *civitates LXIII pagi Thuscae et Gunzi* = sixty-three villages assessed by Rome and making payment together as a doublet *pagus*).<sup>599</sup>

The networks of village-to-tribal elites thus sat the very foundation of any power structure operating in North Africa, be it tied by obligation and tribute to Carthage (especially during that city’s heyday in the region), or to the rising Numidian kingdom, itself constructed as a sort of greater-chief-of-chiefs arrangement, connected to the wider Hellenistic world... or eventually, to the legal and administrative structures of Rome. As a flexible arrangement, it worked well with these international powers, and succeeded in maintaining a level of cultural continuity over the centuries (if not millennia). Yet it also

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<sup>598</sup> This document, although it comes from Morocco, describes an analogous social hierarchy, lasting into the Roman period. Cf. Oliver (1972); Bénabou (1976: 448); Whittaker (1978: 343); Fentress (2006: 19).

<sup>599</sup> Cf. Fentress (2006: 19), with citations.

resulted in a number of misinterpretations, since North African villages conceived of their own territories and socio-political structures in a manner that differed from Roman approaches. In addition, the externally-determined labels of *civitas*, *pagus*, or *polis*, or false-ethnic epithets attached to “Libyan” or “Numidian” – e.g. “Massyles,” “Muxsi,” “Mauri,” etc. – were terms determined by cultural outsiders that created and solidified fixed units where there had not been ones before.<sup>600</sup>

In the years following 201 BCE, these shifting local-to-regional groups faced additional challenges. Rome had now, from abroad, unwittingly set up what was an overly simplistic dichotomy for North Africa. And this dichotomy dealt with a situation in which Rome only realized and designated two states as being involved: the Numidian kingdom and Carthaginian *polis*. Local-to-regional groups had interacted with both state-structures for a number of generations (with Carthage for longer). Carthage had for some time now relied upon negotiation with, tribute and mercenary forces from, military enforcement over, and actions empowering “tribal elites.” These individuals, identified by the Greek sources as *basileis* or *boëtharchs*,<sup>601</sup> were most likely the heads of tribes and/or confederations seen in modern Berber society. Such interactions had thus not only served to begin the process of solidifying hierarchical structures, but had essentially produced the Numidian kingdom as a gradual bi-product. The latter, upon gaining its own independent status – a status confirmed by Rome – thus manifested a remarkable degree

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<sup>600</sup> See Desanges (1967); Whittaker (1978: 333); Camps (1979); Greene (1986: 139); Mattingly (1992); Moore (2011). In this sense, modern colonialists/nineteenth-century scholars in some ways mirrored the approach taken by our Greco-Roman sources (often deliberately so).

<sup>601</sup> Cf. Polyb. 1.67.1; Appian – e.g. *Pun.* 74.

of multiculturalism, evident in a combination of traditional local-to-regional networks of power, use of Libyan and Punic in inscriptions, engagement with Hellenistic diplomacy, and use of a wide range of monumental tomb types, combining native dolmens with Punic tomb-types, Punic grave goods, and even international Hellenistic-style mausolea.<sup>602</sup>

Therefore, it was not only Carthaginian responses to the Zama treaty – namely, an increased interest in and intensification of agriculture within the North African hinterland – that would have had an effect on local communities. It was also the rise of the Numidian kingdom, which not only enjoyed a new level access to the wider Hellenistic world, but also was apparently interested in developing and intensifying agriculture. Polybius even reserved the following praise for Massinissa (although he did not have much approval for the Numidian peoples):

*His greatest and most godlike success lay in agriculture. Before his time, the whole of Numidia lay fallow, being thought naturally incapable of producing cultivated crops. Unaided, he was the first to demonstrate that it can bear all the crops which any other land produces. To each of his sons separately he allotted an estate of 10,000 plethra bearing all kinds of crops.*<sup>603</sup>

From the early second century onward, then, both Carthage and the Numidian kingdom were interested in transforming the North African landscape, if only in their separate attempts to consolidate political control over the region. The results have since become

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<sup>602</sup> The most famous example is a combination of multiple styles – at Dougga. Also from Dougga: a bilingual Libyan-Punic dedication to Massinissa. See Millar (1968); Khanoussi (2003).

<sup>603</sup> Polyb. 36.16. These are sentiments echoed by Appian (*Lib.* 106), as well as Strabo (17.3.15), who noted that Massinissa converted nomads into citizens and farmers. Polybius' strong distaste for mercenaries – a service the Numidians had served for Carthage – is well known. Cf. Eckstein (1995: 125-127, 175-6). For Polybius' negative comments regarding Numidian trustworthiness, see 14.1.4: *[there is a] natural tendency of the Numidians to grow disgusted with what pleased them, and how lightly they always break their faith to gods and men alike...*

evident in the growth and shift in the character of settlements in regions such as the Tunisian Tell. Socio-economic structures were becoming increasingly solidified, and land was becoming less a zone of labor and bartered usage, and more a commodity in of itself, tied to the production of a certain amount of goods with definable economic value.<sup>604</sup> A certain degree of the traditional, unalienable, and kinship-tied nature of the land seems to have lasted, however.<sup>605</sup> And along with this trend, leading local families in the intensified agricultural zones were now coming into a wealth and power like never before. Such wealth and power – and a whole new need to defend defined tracts of land – helps explain the patterns seen in archaeological survey of areas such as the Tell, with a sudden growth in fortified settlements and physical presence upon the landscape. And as a result, a dynamic, and at times a tense one, between fortified/proto-urban centers and rural territories would have developed – as reflected in the *poleis* vs. countryside split recorded by Polybius. The monumental, wealthy, and even multicultural tombs located alongside the Tell settlements speak even more volumes, for they still serve as strong visual statements, not only highlighting ancestral pasts and traditions, but also boasting of newer networks, connected to the wider Hellenistic world.<sup>606</sup>

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<sup>604</sup> On such changing approaches to land and territory in general, see Gray (2009: esp. p. 23).

<sup>605</sup> ... as evident in Massinissa keeping lands in the family (see above), and in later Roman references to the unique landholding patterns in North Africa. The (second-century CE?) Roman land surveyor, Agennius Urbicus, in his book on land disputes, even noted the following: “*It is not easy for disputes [over land] between communities and private individuals to arise in Italy. But they often occur in the provinces, especially in Africa, where private individuals have estates (saltus) no less extensive than the territory belonging to communities. Indeed, many estates are far bigger than [these] territories. Moreover, private individuals have on their estates a not insubstantial population from the lower orders and villages scattered around their country house, rather like towns...*” – cited in Klingshirn (2012: 30, 32).

<sup>606</sup> Cf. Stone (1997: 95-96).

The landscape and socio-cultural dynamic of the North African countryside was thus in flux, making conditions ripe for tension and conflict, and even raising the stakes for all parties involved. Carthage in particular had a lot to lose by failing to maintain ties of allegiance or rights of taxation to the fruits of the hinterland. As we have seen, the city (its numbers swollen perhaps with individuals displaced by the changes in the hinterland) depended upon locally imported foodstuffs. And yet the city's hands were tied by the terms of the Zama treaty, which not only prevented active, military enforcement of allegiances, but also granted Massinissa "back" all of his "ancestral" lands. The latter clause was where Massinissa had really outwitted his Roman ally. For the notion of ancestral lands in this region was incredibly fuzzy – at least from a third-party perspective: for it was based upon the village unit, and traditionally, was not firmly anchored to any greater political entity. In this sense, the Numidian kingdom had never had – and could not have – boundaries in the sense of a *polis* (or of a Hellenistic kingdom, whose bounds were measured with the *polis* as a fundamental unit). And for the same reasons, both Carthage and the Numidians would have both believed that they had legal international rights to any given parcel of land. And both would have probably been able to bring forward evidence of historical occupation, recognized by the other party and/or by local leadership. Massinissa, however, retained an upper hand, for he was able to keep an army in the field, and he could use it to build and maintain a powerbase of tribal allegiances, leaving Carthage only able to stand back and issue complaints to a foreign third party – the Senate in Rome.<sup>607</sup>

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<sup>607</sup> See, for example, Massinissa's apparent claim (quoted by Livy 34.62) that Carthage only had a rightful

The Romans in the meantime (as well as Greek observers such as Polybius) were largely unaware of and unprepared for these fundamental problems and intercultural disjunctions. It is for this reason that the Roman Senate repeatedly postponed making definitive judgments regarding the disputes between Carthage and the Numidians – and why our Greco-Roman sources are impossibly confused in their accounts of where the disputed territories were located and who gained what lands at what time. If a post-Zama delegation/decemvirate determined territorial bounds via arbitral court(s) – in accordance with the “to be determined” clause of the treaty and in line with Roman practice elsewhere<sup>608</sup> – the results were largely a failure. Rome appears to have found it truly impossible to determine boundaries in recurring conflicts over territory in North Africa, repeatedly making non-decisions. Only in the case described by Polybius was the Senate said to have passed judgment, supporting the claims of Massinissa. And perhaps it did so because it caught Polybius’ eye – not only because it represented a rare moment of decisiveness in this arena, but also because it fit into Polybius’ *tarachē kai kinesis* theme and overall scheme of Book 31 (see above).

The Roman approach, however, was much simpler – it followed in a culturally specific tradition of punishing a defeated foe, on a level commensurate with that foe’s legal injustices to the *res publica* (in this case, the breakdown in relations prior to Zama had sealed Carthage’s fate in losing territories and diplomatic sovereignty). And over the following half-century, the confusion made evident in the sources and the scattering of

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claim to the territory of *Byrsa* (referring to the urban limits, using the cowhide legend), since this land was what had been granted to Phoenician settlers/(Dido) by the Numidians!

<sup>608</sup> E.g. in Greece in 194 BCE (cf. Ager no. 79), and in Asia Minor in 188 BCE (cf. Polyb. 21.42.5).

clues all indicate that rather than setting Machiavellian traps for Carthage, the Romans were in all reality ill acquainted with and unready for the unique conditions in North Africa. They thus responded with their usual attitude of unwillingness to commit to an unclear international matter, especially when it was perceived as not inflicting an injustice or potential harm upon the *res publica*. For this reason, Roman interest was only piqued when Massinissa could make allegations that Carthage was making possible overtures to foreign states hostile to Rome. When such occasions arose, Roman envoys were sent, but the general impression is that they went to check up on Carthage as much as listen to the never-ending tangle of North African territorial claims. The ultimate end product out of these ingredients was to be disaster for Carthage – but not out of any cruel master plan of Rome (as Polybius has often been taken to suggest). For once the fifty-year term of the indemnity – and by implication, the need for Carthage to send envoys to the Senate on an annual, submissive basis – had expired, a faction at Carthage appears to have gained a growing voice and following, fueled by frustrations with the loss of territory to Massinissa and Rome’s repeated indecision. It was a faction that would have urged for reprisals against Massinissa, and a re-assertion of prestige as well as control over lands lost and/or occupied *de facto*. But taking such self-asserting action would only mark a major violation in Roman eyes, and along with it, real, legal grounds for war.

#### **MID-CENTURY DIPLOMATIC CRISIS**

For the most part, the disintegration of relations between Carthage and Numidia and Rome must be reconstructed from later sources – Polybius’ text as it has survived

only provides a window into events once the Roman Senate had made its vote for war. But what is clear is that a crisis had begun to develop around the year 154/153 BCE. From that point on, the sources pay much closer attention to North African disputes, the responding Roman envoys, and perhaps most famously, the war-debate between Cato and Scipio Nasica.

The *Periochae* of Livy mentions the earliest instance of trouble, providing a brief reference to a Roman envoy sent to negotiate between Carthage and Massinissa upon the accession of the new consuls of 154.<sup>609</sup> Unlike all previous references to North African disputes, this one makes note that the Roman envoy returned with a report that they had seen “lots of timber at Carthage.”<sup>610</sup> Whether this additional claim is a product of Roman contemporary or even *post eventum* rhetoric cannot be determined. All the same, it reflects a much closer attention to the details of reports that for decades must have been brought back by Roman envoys returning from Carthage.

For as we have seen, later Roman historical tradition paid the most attention to North African disputes when other international incidents were in limbo – that they made

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<sup>609</sup> Livy, *Per.* 47c.

<sup>610</sup> This issue over timber – along with a later hint (Livy, *Per.* 48g) that Carthage may have had ships (though of what sort is not explained) to be burned as part of a *res repetere* – has led modern scholars to look for archaeological evidence that Carthage was re-outfitting a navy... Carthage did receive a new and state-of-the art harbor system in the late Punic period, built by removing ca. 135,000 m<sup>3</sup> of earth and divided into two connected parts: an inner, circular (naval) harbor, fringed by ship-sheds; and an outer, rectangular (merchant) harbor with dockyards. Cf. Rakob (1984); Hurst and Stager (1978); Vitali et al. (1990: 32-33); Stager (1992). The British excavators of the naval harbor (led by Hurst) believed that they could date construction to the early second century BCE, on the basis of a few finds from below the ship-shed ramps. The American excavators (led by Stager) of the commercial harbor, however, came up with a date of the second-half of the third century (a date confirmed by later British work along the quay). One solution perhaps (cf. van Zeist et al. 2001) is that the late Punic harbor system first dates to the Second Punic War era, when Carthage built and outfitted a very large fleet (the naval sheds could accommodate ca. 200 ships!). Quite possibly, the ship-sheds were then renovated in the early second century – whether prior to or following the outbreak of the Third Punic War cannot be determined at this point.

such interconnections is at least in part a reflection of second-century thinking. In this case, if Roman envoys did bring back reports of additional timber lying around Carthage, it only gained significance in the context of later events. At the very least, Rome's attention was piqued. And it was no coincidence that in the same year, Rome had become engaged in two wars in Spain – Carthage's old stomping grounds. Among the Lusitani, a man aptly named Punicus had led an attack, reportedly killing over 6,000 Romans and even the quaestor, Terentius Varro.<sup>611</sup> Around the same time, conflict with the Celtiberians returned over a reputed breach of treaty by the Arevaci at Segeda.<sup>612</sup> It is a possibility that some Romans would have felt concerned that such events would only encourage Carthage to rise up again, enticed by an opportunity to seize parts of her old dominion (with which she had apparently retained trading contacts). Massinissa – if the timing of his previous diplomacy, as suggested by later historical tradition, is to be trusted – would have been only too eager to build up such concerns. Another embassy was thus sent to Carthage in the following year, in 153 BCE.<sup>613</sup> This time, it was an embassy led by the venerable Cato himself – and this time, the sources have a lot more to report.

Ostensibly, the purpose of the Cato embassy, as with previous examples, was to arbitrate in a territorial dispute between Carthage and the Numidian kingdom. Livy and Appian both allude to claims that Massinissa was occupying Carthaginian land, and Livy

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<sup>611</sup> Appian provides the main account: *Hisp.* 56a-b. See also Livy, *Per.* 47b, 54b; Strabo 3.152e; Flor. 1.33.15; Obseq. 17; Eutrop. 4.16.2.

<sup>612</sup> Again, Appian is the main source: *Hisp.* 44a-b. See also Diod. 31.39.1.

<sup>613</sup> Sources: Livy, *Per.* 48a-b; Plut. *Cato* 26-27; App. *Pun.* 69.

also mentions that armed forces had gathered against Massinissa, under the command of a Numidian leader, Arcobarzanes, son of Syphax.<sup>614</sup> It is possible that this force was acting independently, but the Romans, whose views of North African social and political conditions were less than accurate, nevertheless saw these Numidians as agents for Carthage. Cato's alarmist report apparently concluded that the forces under Arcobarzanes, although outwardly mustered against Massinissa, were in all actuality gathered against Rome. This last statement most likely reflects a hyperbolic rhetorical device used by Cato in one of the speeches he gave upon his return to Rome. The point he was making was that military force coming to the aid (silent or otherwise) of Carthage's cause in North Africa was in all reality an infraction upon the clause that forbade Carthage to engage in independent military action or armament without Roman permission. What Cato might have taken as sneaky behavior was for him on par with a breach of faith. And by extension, the conclusion to be made – and the one driven home by Cato's statement about forces being gathered against Rome – was that it would not take long before Carthage could take the next step. Success against Massinissa would lead to further Carthaginian brashness, and even possible involvement in the Spanish conflicts.

It is at this juncture, then, that the now legendary debate between Cato and Scipio Nasica first began.<sup>615</sup> Like the famed phrase, *Carthago delenda est*, the arguments on both sides have since become wrapped up in generations of later authors attaching their

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<sup>614</sup> Cf. Appian, *Pun.* 69; Livy *Per.* 48a.

<sup>615</sup> For the Cato-Nasica debate, see Livy *Epit.* 49; Zon. 9.26; Ampel. 19.11; discussion and reconstruction from the sources in Astin (1967: 276ff.); cf. De Sanctis, *Storia*, iv.3, p. 23ff.

own rhetoric and interpretations to it. Elements of the modern English slogan put into Latin, *Carthago delenda est*, for example, do not even appear in our sources until the Silver Age resurgence in Latin rhetoric, in Pliny: “*Cato . . . cum clamaret omni senatu Carthaginem delendam...*”<sup>616</sup> And the many other features of the debate – which have spawned a great deal of the modern scholarly theories on Rome’s war “motivations” – are rhetorical red herrings. For despite the fact that each one may indeed have a kernel of truth originating in second-century BCE thinking, each one also has several subsequent layers of added meaning, which stray from the main issue. Debate over “*metus hostilis*” as a motivation may have its roots in Hellenistic balance-of-power political ideologies, but such debate only achieved central significance for late Republican authors, who looked to 146 BCE and the elimination of Carthage as a landmark for the decline of the morals and structures of an idealized “old republic.”<sup>617</sup> Fear of Numidia does not even enter into ancient discourse, and would not be cause for war with Carthage in Roman eyes.<sup>618</sup> And economic motivations were simply not conceived in modern terms.<sup>619</sup> We

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<sup>616</sup> Pliny, *NH* 15.18.74. Pliny is then followed by Florus (I.13.4): “*Cato inexpiabili odio delendam esse Carthaginem, et cum de alio consuleretur, pronuntiabat.*” – as well as Aurelius Victor (*De Vir. Ill.* 47. 8): “*Cato Carthaginem delendam censuit.*” The Greek texts, on the other hand, possibly echoing the now lost account of Polybius, use the phrase: “*Καρχηδόνα μὴ εἶναι*” – cf. Plut. 27.1; App. *Rom.* 10.10.69. In latter passage, Appian also quotes Cato as asserting that Roman liberty would not be secure until Carthage was removed: “*πρὶν ἐξελεῖν Καρχηδόνα.*” This last phrase possibly translates a Latin tradition, present in the text of Cicero, *De Sen.* 6.18 (= our earliest reference to Cato’s speech, without using *delere* or a gerundive): *Karthagini male iam diu cogitanti bellum multo ante denuntio; de qua vereri non ante desinam, quam illam excisam esse cognovero.* See the discussion (and other early imperial Latin texts) in Little (1934).

<sup>617</sup> I.e. “Sallust’s Theorem”: cf. Sallust, *Cat.* 10-11; *Jug.* 41. See discussions in Conley (1981); Wood (1995); and Kapust (2008). For more on previous modern scholarship regarding Roman motives for war, see above – pp. 15ff.

<sup>618</sup> Modern theories along these lines: cf. Kahrstedt (III.615f.); Scullard (1951: 304); Maróti (1983: 224); Huss (1985: 437); Gsell (III. 329f.); Vogel-Weideman (1989: 85). See also above – pp. 15ff.

<sup>619</sup> IPE reading of the Third Punic War: cf. Mommsen (1913: 239); Rostovtzeff (1926: 12, 21); and to some degree, Romanelli (1959: 31f., esp. p. 34); De Sanctis (IV.3.20-24); and Baronowski (1995: 28-29).

have already seen that Italian merchants would not have been an interest group pushing for a war with Carthage – instead, they actually stood to lose from such a war. Instead, Cato referred to wealth in agricultural production (with the famed African fig as a prop) alongside wealth in fighting-age men and in terms of provisions for war. Such observations were intended to confirm his argument – that Carthage was primed and ready to push the envelope; that she had already indirectly violated the terms of the 201 treaty; and that it would not be long before she would be the first to deploy troops against Romans – if not in Africa then in Spain.

All the same, the core of the debate between Scipio and Nasica was ultimately regarding the presence or absence of legal (and divinely sanctioned) *iusta causa*, and this is evident in the less dramatic hints of Nasica’s opposing arguments.<sup>620</sup> At issue was whether or not Carthage’s actions represented a breach of treaty and an injustice inflicted upon the *res publica*.<sup>621</sup> Evidently, the decision made in 152 BCE sided with Nasica – that no *iusta causa* was in place – for the Romans neither levied troops nor issued commands for North Africa for the following year. Instead, we hear of yet another delegation, of *decemviri*, sent to investigate and negotiate further.<sup>622</sup> It returned with Gulussa, son of Massinissa, bringing along allegations that Carthage was raising an army and navy (allegations the Numidians had made earlier over the decades). Cato again spoke out for war, and Nasica urged that Rome issue a disarmament order – one that if

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More recently, and from an archaeological standpoint: Rakob (1984: 10; 1985: 502f.). See also above – pp. 15ff.

<sup>620</sup> Cf. Livy, *Per.* 48a, d, f-g.

<sup>621</sup> Cato himself had used the same arguments – but against the presence of a *iusta causa* – to speak out against declaring war on Rhodes in 167 BCE: cf. Gellius 6.3.16 = Cato, *ORF*, fr. 164.

<sup>622</sup> Cf. Livy, *Per.* 48d.

unheeded would then grant grounds for war.<sup>623</sup> Our sources do not provide us with the details, but subsequent events point to a vote again in Nasica's favor, with another embassy sent to Carthage, with Gulussa in tow (most likely early 150 BCE).<sup>624</sup> By putting together the texts of Appian and Livy's *Periochae*, it would seem that the Carthaginians refused to grant Gulussa entry into the city, thereby putting a halt to negotiations.

From this point, in 150 BCE, relations appear to have completely deteriorated. A faction ("the democratic") among the Carthaginians, led by Carthalo, *boëtharch*, and a man named Hasdrubal, nicknamed "the Samnite," had gained enough support to take action, and they organized a surprise attack on Gulussa.<sup>625</sup> Massinissa retaliated – or possibly was already poised to strike – and set up a siege over the town of Oroscopa (a site unidentified, but most likely located somewhere in the "Great Fields" region around Tusca/Dougga). It is at this juncture that a major set of engagements, even called a "war" between Carthage and Massinissa briefly erupted.<sup>626</sup> And it just so happens that Scipio Aemilianus, who was then serving under Lucullus in the Celtiberian War, showed up in North Africa. Ostensibly, he was there to obtain elephants from Massinissa to aid in the fight in Spain, but there was perhaps no coincidence in his mission. A likely additional

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<sup>623</sup> Livy, *Per.* 48f-g.

<sup>624</sup> Cf. Livy, *Per.* 49a: "...they [the Carthaginians] had refused to receive in their city Massinissa's son Gulussa (who had been with the Roman envoys)..."; and Appian, *Pun.* 70b, referring to Gulussa returning in 150 BCE from an attempted diplomatic entry into Carthage...

<sup>625</sup> The following account (unless otherwise noted) derives from Appian *Pun.* 70-72, since the texts of the other authors at this point are missing. On Carthalo as *boëtharch*, see App. *Pun.* 74.

<sup>626</sup> Polybius (3.5.1) actually lists a war between Carthage and Massinissa as one of a number of explicit examples of growing mid-century *tarachē kai kinesis* across the Mediterranean world. See also above – pp. 252ff.

task could have been to check up on what was an increasingly critical diplomatic situation in North Africa. In addition, the cognomen of Scipio could have been viewed as a potential added resource in achieving some sort of diplomatic progress.

Aemilianus is nevertheless reported to have stood by and witnessed a major battle between Massinissa and forces commanded by Hasdrubal. And according to Appian (echoing Polybius?), he reputedly described the experience of standing on a hill overlooking the battle as a particularly epic one, comparing his birds-eye view to the one enjoyed by the gods at the Trojan War: Jupiter from Mt. Ida and Poseidon from Samothrace.<sup>627</sup> A lofty claim indeed – and perhaps one added by later tradition, which developed a strong symbolic connection between Scipio, who would later stand overlooking Carthage in 146, and the Trojan War, in its position in the broad arc of world history.<sup>628</sup> Ancient readers (of Appian at least) would have relished the foreshadowing.<sup>629</sup>

After the battle, in which Hasdrubal was decisively defeated, the Carthaginians first learned of Scipio's presence. Apparently Scipio had not chosen, or was not able, to make his presence known to the Carthaginians earlier, although he had purportedly met with Massinissa before the battle (a reflection, perhaps, of the deterioration in relations between Rome and Carthage). Hasdrubal contacted Scipio to set up negotiations with Massinissa, but these talks failed. According to Appian, the parties could not agree upon an exchange of "deserters" (possibly those Numidians who had supported Hasdrubal and

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<sup>627</sup> App. *Pun.* 71.

<sup>628</sup> For the "tears of Scipio" motif, its origins in the text of Polybius, see below – pp. 333ff.

<sup>629</sup> At a number of junctures, Appian appears to have used Polybius as his source for the *Punica*, and Polybius was indeed the first to draw this epic-scale parallel between his friend Scipio and the fall of Carthage in 146. So there is a possibility that second-century BCE readers would also have had this opportunity to consider the prophetic occasion in 150.

had likely composed a majority in his army). Scipio then departed, and returned to his post in Spain, with no authority to take further action. Massinissa in the meantime starved out the fortified town of Oroscopa, and as its inhabitants attempted to surrender, he made an ambush, leaving Hasdrubal, utterly crushed, to limp back to Carthage.

In one year, then – 151-150 BCE – the powder keg that North Africa had become had caught a fast spark. This year also happened to be the first in which Carthage was no longer obliged to pay indemnity – in Punic eyes, a tribute – to Rome. Given the recent diplomatic history in North Africa, it is possible to reconstruct the existence of some leaders at Carthage who saw this end in obligation as one freeing their city from the strictures of Roman supervision over their affairs in Africa. After all, Roman adjudication over the past half-century had not resulted in any meaningful solutions. The actions taken by this party, however, not only ended in military disaster, but they also created a situation in which *iusta causa* for war was no longer a matter for debate in Rome. By the end of 150/beginning of 149, a Roman vote for war was passed, Roman troops were levied, and one of the new consuls, Manilius, having been assigned the *provincia* of Africa, summoned Polybius to join him in Lilybaeum and serve as a military adviser.<sup>630</sup> In the meantime, a new faction appears to have gained an upper hand within Carthage, for the city sent two embassies to Rome, one toward the end of 150 and the second in 149, to apologize for the Hasdrubal “war” with Massinissa, and to make an offer of

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<sup>630</sup> See Polyb. 3.5.5; Livy, *Per.* 49a-b, *Epit.Ox.* 49.88-89; Strabo 17.833a; Vell. 1.12.2; Flor. 1.31.3-6; Appian *Pun.* 74a-b, 75a-c, 80b, 86a, 93a... and for Manilius summoning Polybius: Polyb. 36.11.1-12.5.

recompense.<sup>631</sup> According to Polybius, the (second) Carthaginian embassy found, upon their arrival in Rome,

*that war had already been decided on, and that the [Roman] generals had left with their armies and therefore, as the situation left them no choice, they committed Carthage to the faith of Rome.*<sup>632</sup>

At this point, the Romans issued a number of formal demands for Carthage, beginning with the handing-over of three hundred sons from leading families as hostages (in standard practice, as diplomatic guarantee), and followed by a surrender of arms and artillery.<sup>633</sup> Polybius reports that at this juncture, he decided that war had been averted, and he turned back to go home.<sup>634</sup> In doing so, he sets up the final Roman demand as somewhat of a surprise. For in what is now dubbed the “Censorinus Ultimatum,” Manilius’ co-consul, Censorinus, requested that Carthage be fully evacuated and a city be re-founded inland, at a distance of eighty *stades* (= ca. ten Roman miles).<sup>635</sup> On one level, this was a request that paralleled the hard-hitting, and not very frequent, Hellenistic monarchic practice of large-scale *polis* relocation – as in the case of Antigonus forcibly

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<sup>631</sup> 150 BCE: see Diod. 31.1.1, 3.1; Appian *Pun.* 74b-d. 149 BCE: see Polyb. 36.3.1-9; Diod. 32.6.1; Appian *Pun.* 76a; Zonar. 9.26b-c. Around the same time, an envoy from Utica arrived separately, and submitted that city independently into Roman faith – cf. *CIL* 585.79 (Utica mentioned separately as a free, allied community in the *lex agraria* of 111 BCE); Polyb. 36.3.1,4; Livy, *Per.* 49b, *Epit.Ox.* 49.89-90; Appian *Pun.* 75a. Polybius believed that this action affected Roman views of Carthage, which by contrast did not immediately surrender in the same fashion – cf. Polyb. 36.3.4.

<sup>632</sup> Polyb. 36.3.9: ...καταλαβόντες πόλεμον δεδογμένον και τούς στρατηγοούς ώρημζότας μετά τών δυνάμεων, ούκέτι διδόντων βουλήν αύτοίς τών πραγμάτων, έδωκαν τήν έπιτροπήν περι αύτών. On this formal surrender, see also Diod. 32.6.1; Livy, *Per.* 49b-c, *Epit.Ox.* 49.90-91; Appian *Pun.* 76b, 80a; Zonar. 9.26c-d.

<sup>633</sup> See Polyb. 36.4.8-5.9, 11.3, 36.6.1-7; Diod. 32.6.2; Livy, *Per.* 49c; Strabo 17.833a; Flor. 1.31.7; Appian *Pun.* 78a-80c; Oros. 4.22.1-2; Zonar. 9.26d-e.

<sup>634</sup> Polyb. 36.11.

<sup>635</sup> Cf. Diod. 32.6.2-4; Livy, *Per.* 49c, *Epit.Ox.* 49.91-93; Flor. 1.31.8-9; Appian *Pun.* 81a; Oros. 4.22.3; Zonar. 9.26e-f. Diodorus, Livy (*Periochae*), Appian, Orosius, and Zonaras all give the figure for distance that Carthage was to be relocated inland.

disbanding Skepsis, evacuating its inhabitants and bringing them into *synoikismos* with a number of smaller towns to create a new city, Antigonea (later Alexandria) Troas.<sup>636</sup> The Censorinus Ultimatum thus showed Rome acting in a manner characteristic of a Hellenistic monarch – and showed Censorinus’ own personal determination to fulfill his *imperium* and engage Carthage in a *iustum bellum*, decisively, (gloriously,) and with no more negotiation. On an added level, the distance of eighty *stades* was also laden with meaning, since it corresponded with the exact minimum recommended by Plato as a means of avoiding the ethical “contagion of sea-borne communication.”<sup>637</sup> The message was crystal-clear: Carthage had committed its last injustice upon the Roman *res publica*, and there were no further remedies, other than to found Carthage anew, as a moral, Roman-sanctioned *polis* in a Roman *oikoumenē*.

Over the years, scholars have emphasized that Rome showed no signs of backing down, and may even have manipulated or been encouraged by Carthage’s surrender of arms and hostages in 150 BCE.<sup>638</sup> The issuing of escalating demands, ending in the Censorinus Ultimatum, are thus construed as diplomatic hyperbola, only thinly veiling a long-held plan to annihilate the city.<sup>639</sup> In many ways, this interpretation is itself inspired by the text of Polybius, which mentions that the Romans had long decided upon war,

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<sup>636</sup> Cf. Strabo 13.593, 597, 604, 607. See Billows (1990: 215ff.). Compare the synoikism of Teos and Lebedos = *Ager* no. 13 (= *B-D*<sup>2</sup> 7).

<sup>637</sup> Plato *Laws* 4.705a-b.

<sup>638</sup> E.g. Flower (2009: 70-71), in one of the most recent interpretations of 146 BCE, assessed Roman behavior as part of a “strikingly harsh and imperialistic new foreign policy” in which Carthage and Corinth “were completely razed to the ground”, though “neither posed a credible threat to Rome.” Other examples include Adcock (1946); Badian (1958: 125ff.); Hoffmann (1960); Harris (1979); Baronowski (1995: 31).

<sup>639</sup> For Censorinus’ Ultimatum, see Polyb. 36.7.1-5; Diod. 32.6.2-4; Livy *Per.* 49, *Epit.* 49.91-93; Flor. 1.31.8-9; App. *Pun.* 80-93; Oros. 4.22.3; Suda B320; Zon. 9.26. Astin (1967: 274) is one of the few modern scholars to suggest that the ultimatum could have been intended literally.

with only a *prophasis* needed to bring it to fruition.<sup>640</sup> This assessment fits with Polybius' general theory on the causes of wars – a three-part complex of beginning (*archē*) (here, refusal of the ultimatum), pretext (*prophasis*) (here, Carthage's "war" with Massinissa), and deeper motivation (*aitia*) (here, a desire to eliminate Carthage – though we do not have Polybius' text on this).<sup>641</sup>

At the same time, Polybius' comment reflects a Greek perspective on Roman behavior and the disintegration of relations that continued for years, from 154 onward, with an extended *iusta causa* debate (as fought for a number of years between Cato and Nasica) ending in a series of demands (*res repetere*) and a final order for Carthage to literally "un-polis" herself. Contemporary Hellenistic Greeks did not necessarily hold the same view of just warfare as Romans did, and for them, such extended debates and series of demands could result – as Polybius' text testifies – in the opinion that the Romans were simply manipulating *polemos dikaios* precepts to obtain legitimacy, rather than sincerely debating over whether to go to war.<sup>642</sup> For on the one hand, the issuing of demands reflected the well-worn practice of *res repetere*, through which Rome let it be known that injustice had been done to her by another state, and which Rome, in accordance with her unique system based on fetial law,<sup>643</sup> brought an offending state into

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<sup>640</sup> Polyb. 36.2; see also 3.5.5.

<sup>641</sup> Cf. Baronowski (1995).

<sup>642</sup> For more on Roman conceptions of *bellum iustum* see Albert (1980) and list of sources in Ager (2009: 15-16). For a comparison of Roman *bellum iustum* with Greek *polemos dikaios*, see Clavadetscher-Thürlemann (1985: 185ff.). For the existence of a Hellenistic discourse focused on recording the just cause(s) for war, see Chaniotis (2005: 177ff.).

<sup>643</sup> See above (with citations) – pp. 200ff. To reiterate: modern scholarly debate regarding fetial law continues, mostly due to the problems with (and lack of early and mid-Republican) source evidence. The

submission to the *maiestas* of the Roman state. Issuing a series of demands, including disarmament and delivery of hostages, was also an international standard practice, among Greek states and Rome alike.<sup>644</sup> Both disarmament and hostages worked to confirm one state's promise to adhere to, and to hold honest intentions within, an ongoing diplomatic exchange, and assurance against taking armed action. Yet in Hellenistic Greek practices – and this is a crucial difference – such actions were means to a truce or even negotiations for a more permanent peace. For this reason, we hear that the Carthaginians were at first relieved by Rome's acceptance of the hostages and arms – and Polybius even began to make his way back to the Peloponnese. But by contrast, Roman *res repetere* was part and parcel of an injustice already inflicted upon the *res publica* – one that according to the precepts of *iustum bellum* already established a cause for war and a need to seek penalties. In Rome's eye, a state of war was already in existence; in Carthage's, it did not until the Censorinus Ultimatum was more than they were willing to accept.

At the same time, Roman *iusta causa* discourse, in its analogies with contemporary Hellenistic practices, was recognizable as such. And, as we have seen, internationally based intellectuals and politicians were already primed in their thinking to look for a momentous power-showdown for Rome in its increasingly pan-Mediterranean position. Polybius reflects these attitudes, placing his discussion not only within a grander scheme in which Rome was confronted with various crises all across the Mediterranean, and not always handling them with the greatest degree of integrity, but also prefacing his

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view taken here is that an archaic tradition of fetial law continued to be practiced and its underlying ideologies continued to be of central importance during the second century.

<sup>644</sup> Cf. Allen (2006); De Ligt (2008: 358-9), with references.

discussion of the beginning of the Third Punic with a statement on *prophasis* vs. *aitia*. Polybius was nevertheless better informed than perhaps much of the rest of the Greek-speaking world. And while not culturally adhering to Roman concepts of *iustum bellum* and the underlying importance of fetial tradition, he did have something to teach his Greek readers (and intended statesmen audience) regarding Roman *deditio* – namely, that unlike Hellenistic surrender, this practice involved the complete and utter renunciation of sovereignty – metaphoric enslavement to the Roman state.<sup>645</sup>

Polybius' final conclusion, then, is that while Rome might make an at times harsh master, it was the prerogative of the leading men of lesser states to learn how to deal with the behemoth. And in order to do so, they must understand what *deditio* truly entailed (its true “*dunamis*”). Ultimately, then, it was the leaders of Carthage, and the social disintegration of the Carthaginian *politeia* into factionalism and “mob-rule,” that in Polybius' view were at fault. For Polybius argues that the Carthaginians made a foolhardy decision in submitting to Rome's initial demands for *deditio*, irrationally believing that handing over arms and hostages would prevent war. Instead, they had not only weakened their city, but had submitted it to the sovereignty of Rome.<sup>646</sup> And as Polybius states – in a pointed jab at the Cato-Nasica debate already becoming legendary – it was not the dramatic speeches and rhetorical flourishes that made this juncture worthy of his *Histories*. It was the effect this juncture had upon the wider Mediterranean world, for as Polybius quotes Demetrius, a fellow foreign-hostage having spent time in Rome:

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<sup>645</sup> Cf. Polyb. 36.4, referring back to his discussion of *deditio* – and Greek confusion and misunderstanding of it – in the debacle between the consul Glabrio and the Aetolians, 191 BCE (Polyb. 20.9-10).

<sup>646</sup> Polyb. 36.5/9.

πρὸς τοὺς ἑκτός... ἔνστασις γὰρ πολέμου ... δικαία μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦσα καὶ τὰ νικήματα ποιεῖ μείζω καὶ τὰς ἀποτεύξεις ἀσφαλεστέρας, ἀσχήμων δὲ καὶ φαύλη τὸναντίον ἀπεργάζεται.

*when the inception of a war seems just (to foreign nations), it makes victory greater and ill-success less perilous, while if it is thought to be dishonorable and wrong, it has the opposite effect.*<sup>647</sup>

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<sup>647</sup> Polyb. 36.2.(1)/3.

## Chapter 6: *Tragedy, Triumph, & 146 BCE*

### INTRODUCTION

ἀλλ' ὅτε μάλιστα τις κατορθοίη κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον βίον καὶ κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις, τότε μάλιστα παρεκάλει τῆς ἐναντίας τύχης ἔννοιαν λαμβάνειν. καὶ γὰρ οὕτω μὲν ἂν ἐν ταῖς εὐκαιρίαις ἄνθρωπον μέτριον ὄντα φανῆναι.

*“For it is especially in moments of personal or community success that we should reflect upon the opposite extremity of Fortune; only thus – and then only with difficulty – can a man prove moderate in the hour of good fortune.”*

--Polybius 29.20.2-3.

Polybius wrote these words within a pivotal scene in his *Histories*. The Roman general Aemilianus Paullus was presenting the defeated Perseus, former king of Macedon, to his men, in celebration of Rome’s great victory at Pydna. The year was 167 BCE – the year originally projected to act as the endpoint of the *Histories*, as the juncture at which Rome had achieved, after a surprisingly short span of only fifty-three years, world dominion (*archē*).<sup>648</sup> But in the years since, Polybius had experienced additional trends – unsettling ones – which had prompted him to extend his work, as an assessment of this world dominion and the responses by those living under its shadow. The new endpoint was to be 146 BCE – the year in which Roman generals, including Paullus’ son, Scipio Aemilianus, were to triumph over two disparate cities, Carthage and Corinth. And as we will see, this new endpoint was to be presented – by Polybius in particular, yet in response to contemporary intellectual *Zeitgeist* – as the ultimate fulcrum-point in the cycles of world history: a moment of both triumph and tragedy, with the future that it held for Rome as the ruler and other states as the ruled held lightly in the balance.

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<sup>648</sup> See above – pp. 156ff.

The present chapter looks in detail at the collocated triumphs and tragedies surrounding 146 BCE, as these events were pulled together to become a constructed historical moment in the second century. It does so by looking first at a key passage in Polybius (36.9), in which the historian explicitly connects the outbreak of the Third Punic War with the “public opinions” of a wider (international) Hellenic community. As in the previous chapter, we again see in this passage evidence of two major developments. Firstly, it provides evidence of the political-cultural disjunctions inherent in the international system of the second century – with Greek-speaking frames of reference not entirely compatible with or cognizant of Roman ones (especially regarding *deditio*). And at the same time, it reveals Polybius’ own individual agendas regarding the matter, in seeking to provide a practical manual of examples to current (and future) statesmen, and urging this readership to assess not only Roman behaviors as a world leader but also the naivetés, failings, and other blunders of those confronting Rome.

The chapter then transitions to an historical narrative, which reconstructs diplomatic events leading to the outbreak of war between Rome and the Achaian League in 147 BCE – and even more importantly, to Polybius’ moralizing sentiments thereof. The account begins with the surprisingly successful revolt of a “pretender” to the throne of Macedon – Andriscus, or “Pseudo-Philip.” We analyze this revolt in terms of an undercurrent – perhaps not so hidden – of anti-imperialist/anti-Roman texts circulating across the Mediterranean *oikoumenē* during this time. Such texts told of a savior prince who would come from the East to save the world from tyranny and give rise to a new pan-Hellenic order. The legends – not to mention the meteoric success – of Pseudo-Philip

appear to have been closely connected with these anti-imperialist undertones, and it is argued here that Rome first took serious note of these as a result of the revolt. Polybius also testifies to these trends, referring to a madness (δαιμονοβλάβεια) sweeping the Greek world, and attributing it not only to the whims of Tyche – who is so wont to destroy those who were once in a position of glory – but also, and more importantly, to the corrupt machinations and decayed morals of Greek leadership. That this is Polybius' individual assessment becomes even more apparent in the connection he draws between Macedonian madness, surrounding Pseudo-Philip, and Achaian insanity. This insanity, according to Polybius, was stirred up within the passions of the mob by power-hungry demagogues, and was perhaps the strongest example of a decayed polis, at the tail end of its *anacyclosis*.

At the same time – within the overall agenda of the *Histories* as a political manual – the downfall of the Achaian League was held up as a model of exactly what not to do when confronted by an international powerhouse like Rome: that is, to deliberately and rashly seek direct and unwarranted antagonism. For Polybius, then, the death of Corinth exemplified the greatest tragedy within the long history of Greek misfortunes – and by comparison with Carthage, an even *more* momentous disaster. It is at this point that we therefore look to the collocation of the two “destruction” events in 146. For as an analysis of the available archaeological evidence shows, Carthage was subjected to severe physical damage and burning, while Corinth was left almost completely untouched. The fact that Polybius introduces a comparison of the two, and even goes so far as to argue that Corinth's defeat was more traumatic, is revealing. On the one hand, it testifies to the

symbolic value with which Corinth was de-commissioned as a polis, its cultural heritage removed, and its physical remains left as a visible reminder to all other “free” Greeks. And on the other, it points to what other contemporary literary evidence suggests: that Carthage and Corinth were already being discussed within international intellectual circles as a pairing with political/ideological significance.

Within this international context, a number of concomitant historiographical trends were in play. These first involved the perception of a cyclical world history, which could be divided into a series of great world empires, in different formulations involving Assyria, Persia, Macedon, and ending, for the moment in the second century, with Rome. At the same time, they also involved a growing Hellenistic “science” of “synchronography,” as made increasingly popular by authors such as Eratosthenes and Timaeus. An international framework for history was thus a topic of second-century debate, with intellectuals actively interested in the subject of synchronic events linking otherwise separate geo-political regions. The destructions of Carthage and Corinth fit neatly into this trend – and did so with an even greater significance. For they also intersected with contemporary political-philosophical debates regarding the possibility of justice in international *archē*, as some (e.g. Panaetius) claimed that *hegemonia*, or beneficent world governance, was not only an option but was a goal to be sought after, while others (e.g. Agatharcides of Knidos) contended that all imperial power could ever represent was *despoteia*, beneficial to the rulers at the expense of the ruled.

And this brings us back to Polybius – and to the ideas visible in Paullus’ warning regarding the whims of Fortune and the necessity of moderation in triumph. The same

ideas return in a key scene in the *Histories*, discussed below: that is, the climactic vision of Scipio standing before the city of Carthage in flames. It is here that we see all the pieces falling into place and 146 BCE set within a broader scope of world history. For in the account of Scipio's tears and his quote from Homer's *Iliad*, we see a pan-Hellenic hero in the style of Polybius' own pragmatic vision, as well as in contemporary traditions placing the Trojan War at the beginning of history and the fall of Troy as the tragic exemplar for the *urbs capta* motif of human suffering coupled with human renewal. And as Polybius notes, this is the greatest good possible – the chance that a future can rise from ashes, for Romans as rulers, for other powers seeking to replace Rome, and above all, for statesmen who may take the opportunity to learn from Polybius' *pragmatikē historia*.

#### **FROM NORTH AFRICA TO THE GREEK WORLD: CRISIS PANDEMIC**

As discussed above, in the previous chapter, Polybius believed deeply that there were serious lessons to be learned by second-century (and future) statesmen out of studying the experience of Carthage. However, the argument here is that Polybius posited even greater lessons to be learned from the experience of Corinth and the Achaian League. That Polybius connected the two arenas on the international stage – and with farther-reaching significance for his analysis of world history – is evident from what

survives of his text. And this is clear even despite the fragmentary nature of the account for the years 150-146 BCE, from Books 36 and 38 (Book 37 being completely lost).<sup>649</sup>

On the one hand, we have already discussed how Polybius perceived of a *symplokē*, or interconnectedness, increasingly becoming a new feature of a Mediterranean-wide *oikoumenē*. And we have also seen how Polybius' contemporaries would have recognized developments along similar lines, within a pan-Hellenic, civilizing (even myth-historic) discourse. Polybius goes further in this instance, however, making the connections between the Third Punic War and the Greek world even more explicit. Such linkage first becomes evident in a passage that is perhaps one of the most quoted and discussed: a passage that could be aptly subtitled, "Greek responses to Roman actions, 149 BCE."<sup>650</sup> In this passage, Polybius makes a marked transition in his regional-based account (a standard practice throughout his work), here connecting two regions, North Africa and the Greek world, with a digression on the major reactions Greek-speakers had to the outbreak of war in both spheres – Rome against Carthage and against Pseudo-Philip in Macedonia. Regarding the first, he describes four variant opinions, taking the end-result – the destruction of Carthage three years later – as a *fait accompli*. These four groups can be summarized as follows:

1. -those who approved of Roman actions, believing the elimination of a polity perpetually hostile to Rome to be a wise and statesmanlike act;

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<sup>649</sup> On the reconstruction of Books 36 and 38 from fragments (including the Constantinian excerpts, *de legat. gent.*, *de legat. Rom.*, *de virt. et vit.*, and *de sent.*, and Suidas) and loss of Book 37, see Walbank, *Comm.*, III.44-50.

<sup>650</sup> = Polyb. 36.9. For a selection of modern opinions on this passage, see Hoffmann (1960: 311-2); Walbank (1965: 8-11; 1974: 14-7; 2002: 19-20); Musti (1978: 55-6); Harris (1979: 271-2); Gruen (1984: 342-3); Eckstein (1995: 216-7); Baronowski (2011: 90).

2. -those who saw Roman actions as power-hungry and not in line with the ethics by which Rome had earlier won her power. Instead, this group believed that Rome had developed a new, unfair, and even tyrannical turn in policy, according to which enemy states were utterly disbanded upon defeat (as in the creation of four Macedonian republics post-Pydna);
3. -those who countered that Romans were otherwise a civilized people and conducted their wars in civilized manner... But in this particular case, this group believed that Rome had acted with fraud and deceit; and,
4. -those who argued that Rome had acted within her international legal rights, since Carthage had fully surrendered, and in doing so, had admitted to the guilt of breaking the treaty with Rome. Polybius gives a longer explanation of this last group and its opinions – not necessarily because he endorsed this group more than any other.<sup>651</sup> His language does not indicate a choice among the four. Instead, it was more likely that the fourth group required more attention, simply because it was not as prevalent among members of the Greek international community and was more so among Roman ones. For the subject of Roman *deditio* – and the lack of extensive Greek awareness of its true *dunamis* – was something that Polybius had on more than one occasion stressed. And this meant that the international-

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<sup>651</sup> See Harris (1979: 271-2), who believes Polybius supported groups two and four. Walbank – see (2002: 19-20) – stressed that Polybius was writing with Roman eyes watching him, implying that any censure of Roman actions would not have been endorsed. All the same – there are other instances in the *Histories* at which Polybius is not afraid to criticize Rome. Here, he neither clearly endorses nor criticizes Rome, although he has the opportunity to do so. His ambivalence at this point has also been noted by Eckstein (1995: 217).

level argument that Romans were acting within their legal limits was actually in need of greater explanation (ironically) to a Greek audience.

In the end, Polybius leaves the question of his own conclusions open. However, judging from his comments elsewhere in the *Histories*, it is not impossible that he may have believed in a combination of elements from all of the above. By putting all four together, Polybius could have concluded that Rome acted shrewdly in moving toward war, and in general possessed an admirable *politeia* and civil approach to international hegemony. Yet with these factors still in place, the signs of decay were already starting to show within the Roman leading class, and there were now individuals who were increasingly power-hungry. Such men (possibly Censorinus could be implied here?) were individuals who could take advantage of the letter of Roman law to achieve personal, selfish goals of expediency.<sup>652</sup> What was of the greatest importance, though, was that Rome could not ultimately be blamed for the war. For, as Polybius had explained earlier, Censorinus had deployed his full legal right in the wake of a *deditio* (even if the ultimatum came as a surprise). It was the Carthaginians, in their naiveté and foolhardiness (both being signs of their own internal decline), who ultimately became the engineers of the war that brought their destruction. It was a theme, connected to the Polybian concept of pan-Mediterranean *tarachē kai kinesis*, which would play out again

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<sup>652</sup> Compare Polybius' judgments of Roman behavior post-Pydna with his statement regarding monarchic power at 15.24 – that kings begin by treating their subjects like friends and allies, but over time become increasingly tyrannical, gaining immediate advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) yet breaking the standards of noble behavior (τὸ καλόν). Polybius sees this pattern, with preference for expediency rather than honor, within Roman actions toward the Attalids (30.1-3), the Ptolemies (31.10), in North Africa (31.21), toward the Seleucids (32.1-2), and Demetrius (31.2/11). See discussion in Eckstein (1995: 228ff.), above – pp., 154ff., and below – pp. 320ff.

for the Greek world – in Macedon, followed by (most tragically, at least in Polybius’ eyes) the Achaian League.

Polybius therefore connects his discussion of the four types of reaction to the Third Punic War to a progressive series of responses to the brief, yet zealous revolt led by Andriscus in Macedon, 149-8 BCE. This “Pseudo-Philip,” as Polybius calls him, was an elusive and enigmatic figure who exploded quickly onto the international scene, and yet his movement rocked the entire northern Greek mainland of Macedonia, Thrace, and Thessaly. Polybius tells not so much of a division of opinions as of an evolution of Greek (and at least to a certain extent we can assume Roman) diplomatic attitudes.<sup>653</sup> These first thought the whole matter was an utterly ridiculous story being told by a man seemingly “fallen from the skies” (ἀεροπετής), simply treating both Macedon and Rome with (otherwise harmless) disdain. Yet three or four months later, after word had spread that this “Philip” had inflicted military defeat on Macedonian forces, some observers apparently accepted the news, while most thought it a new high-point in absurdity. They were to be surprised, however: a second victory and occupation of all of Macedon ensued, with the Thessalians sending for help to Achaia. At this point, Polybius describes a consensus: something “wonderful and extraordinary” (θαυμαστόν ... καὶ παράδοξον) – the truly impossible – had happened!

Later in Book 36, Polybius returned to the subject, as one that had deeply mystified him. The events following the Thessalian call for aid are unclear, and only survive in fragments from later authors. All told, they mention two Roman armies being

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<sup>653</sup> = Polyb. 36.10. On Andriscus and the revolt of 149-8 BCE, see Helliesen (1968).

sent to deal with the rebellion (the circumstances leading to this “Fourth Macedonian War” otherwise unknown).<sup>654</sup> The first, led, by praetor Publius Iuventius Thalna, was utterly crushed, and apparently lost a legion. The second, led by praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus, succeeded in defeating this “Philip” and taking him back to Rome in chains, thereby ending the insurgency.<sup>655</sup> Polybius finds it necessary to ruminate on the episode as a whole, which he appears to have found intriguing for its lack of rational explanation (in accordance with his otherwise trusty theory of causes).<sup>656</sup> He thus returns to a frequent character in the *Histories*: Tyche. And in doing so, he comes to the conclusion that natural-world phenomena are usually the realm of Tyche and political events usually that of men. Political history can thus search for and find causes by looking to men’s actions and their basis in thoughts, desires, and motivations, and their roots in past actions of others. But in this case, Polybius concedes a rare exception. For in his estimation, Macedon in 149 had been blessed with freedom from tyranny, taxation, and a significant amount of civil strife in the wake of Rome’s reorganization of the region into four republics. Yet, paradoxically, when Pseudo-Philip came out of nowhere and established power for himself on the basis of bloodshed and massacre, the Macedonian people supported him. And even more surprisingly – they did so with even more vigor than they had done for their earlier (and in Polybius’ eyes, much more admirable) kings. They fought for Philip with so much bravery that they even succeeded in inflicting serious

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<sup>654</sup> Cf. Diod. 32.9a1; Livy, *Per.* 50e, *Epit.Ox.* 50.126; Flor. 1.30.4-5; Eutrop. 4.13.1; Oros. 4.22.9; Zonar. 9.23e. Polybius refers in general terms to a Roman defeat – see *infra*.

<sup>655</sup> Diod. 32.9b1, 15.7; Livy, *Per.* 50e, *Epit.Ox.* 52.153; Vell. 1.11.2; Paus. 7.13.1; Euseb., *Chron.* 239d; Obseq. 19; Vict., *Vir.Ill.* 61.1; Eutrop. 4.13.1; Zonar. 9.28f-g.

<sup>656</sup> = Polyb. 36.17.

defeat upon Roman forces. Polybius metaphorically throws up his hands – such events could only be the work of Tyche, like a freak snowstorm or sudden drought...:

διόπερ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαθέσεων δαιμονοβλάβειαν εἶπειε τὸ γεγονός καὶ μῆνιν ἐκ θεῶν ἅπασι Μακεδόσιν ἀπηντήσθαι...

*So that in pronouncing on this and similar phenomena we may well say that the thing was a heaven-sent infatuation, and that all the Macedonians were visited by the wrath of the gods...*<sup>657</sup>

Above all, the Macedonian rebellion of 149-8 BCE was thus an example of the frightening madness of a growing international malady (*tarachē kai kinesis*), and an example like none other. Polybius paid close attention to it not only for its strangeness but also for its place as a backdrop to Achaian affairs, for which the insanity of the citizenry was also to play a key role (the active role of corrupt demagogues nevertheless returning blame back to earth). And, as evident in Polybius' earlier discussion of the revolt, it was to be connected conceptually with the crisis developing for Carthage to the west, as well as to a potential tipping-point for the Mediterranean *symplokē* as a whole.

It has already been established that Polybius – in accordance with contemporary thought – believed in a cycle of history comprised of a rise-and-fall of great powers, with Rome placed at an important recent stage in this cycle. However – the fact that the international community was increasingly attuned to this cycle becoming tied to contemporary political events, specifically in 149 BCE, only becomes clear upon investigation of Polybius' digression at 36.9-10. For deeper currents ran beneath the otherwise inexplicable δαιμονοβλάβεια of the Macedonian rebellion – ones with pan-

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<sup>657</sup> Polyb. 36.17.16.

Hellenic, and not-so-subtle anti-Roman sentiments. These were sentiments that found expression in apocalyptic prophetic texts, and which communicated a belief in, and even fevered anticipation of, a savior-king figure, who would overcome the evil empire and restore a new Hellenic order. Such ideas, on a fundamental level, were not new. Instead, they were part of an anti-imperial set of eastern traditions with a long history. The tradition can be seen directed against the Seleucids in a third-century BCE Zoroastrian scripture, the Bahman Yasht, foretelling of an avenging savior-prince, born under a shooting star and destined to drive foreign tyrants out of Asia.<sup>658</sup> In a similar vein, the Hebrew Book of Daniel from the 160s BCE (directed against Antiochus IV) predicted the downfall of a “last great empire.”<sup>659</sup>

Such texts could be – and were – contemporaneously turned against Rome. Phlegon of Tralles cites Antisthenes of Rhodes (a contemporary of Polybius) as having recorded, following the defeat of Antiochus III at Thermopylai (191 BCE), a disturbingly bizarre text, complete with re-animated corpse and prophetic, disembodied head. It foretold the punishment and annihilation of Rome, at the hands of a “bold-hearted tribe” and a great king from the East, who would recruit a mighty army of many nations.<sup>660</sup> And as time went on, the number of anti-Roman apocalyptic texts grew: texts such as Book III of the Sibylline Oracles, which around the mid-second century BCE, described the

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<sup>658</sup> Bahman Yasht 3.13-15.

<sup>659</sup> Daniel 27. Rome was not the “great empire” in question here, since Rome is mentioned by the same text as the only foreigner to help check the Seleucids – cf. Daniel 11:18, 11:30.

<sup>660</sup> Phlegon of Tralles, *Mirab.* iii – Hansen’s translation (1996: 32-7, 101-112). For an excellent brief summary of this and the other apocalyptic prophecies, see Mayor (2010: 34-5), with discussions of dates/contexts in Gruen (1984: 340-1).

plunder, enslavements, and exactions of retribution to be wrought on Italy;<sup>661</sup> or the “oracle” circulated under the name of a Persian *magus*, Hystaspes, that Rome was to be destroyed by fire and the sword, at the coming of a savior-king from the East, his birth to be proclaimed by a light from heaven.<sup>662</sup>

That such prophecies fell on receptive ears, could inspire large numbers of people and muster significant military strength became only too evident a generation after 149, in the immense success experienced by Mithridates, who deployed the notions of a savior-king in a maelstrom that swept much of the East against Rome.<sup>663</sup> In this context, Polybius’ “heaven-sent infatuation” and description of Pseudo-Philip as “sky-fallen” could be additional hints. Was there possibly a comet-event in 149 BCE that triggered the sudden appearance and widespread acceptance of Andriscus, who then renamed himself as Philip – a Macedonian King Philip resurgent? Seneca does mention *cometes* blazing bright, fiery red, bringing daylight to the night sky, sometime after the death of Demetrius and just before the outbreak of the Achaian War.<sup>664</sup> And later sources do indeed describe the story of the shadowy Andriscus in terms that are myth-heroic, and

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<sup>661</sup> *Orac. Sib.* III.350-355; cf. 652-4; (and written later, in the early first century BCE) IV.145-148.

<sup>662</sup> Quoted by Lactantius, *Inst.* 7.15, 18.

<sup>663</sup> See Mayor (2010). According to later sources (unfortunately, Polybius’ text does not survive at the juncture), there were additional uprisings in Macedon under the leadership of another man (or men) claiming to be a lost son of Perseus – an “Alexander” and an “*aliud Pseudophilippus*” – either the same man or two separate individuals, defeated (according to Zonaras, 9.28.8) closely after Andriscus (147 BCE?), and killed (according to Livy, *Epit.* 53 and Eutropius 4.15) in 143/2 BCE. See Morgan (1969: 430ff.).

<sup>664</sup> Seneca, *Nat. Quaes.* 7.15.1: *Post mortem Demetrii Syriae regis ... paulo ante Achaicum bellum, cometes effulsit non minor sole: primo igneus ac rubicundus orbis fuit clarumque lumen emittens, quanto uinceret noctem; deinde paulatim magnitudo eius districta est et euanuit claritas; nouissime totus intercidit.*

even re-enact the legend of the hero Perseus, namesake of the last Macedonian king, whom Andriscus claimed as father.

These myth-historic accounts sound very much like the sort of stories that would have stirred the great popular backing that Andriscus received – and which so shocked Polybius. Andriscus, as the Perseus (or even Cyrus the Great) of legend, was reportedly of illegitimate, royal birth (son of the Macedonian king Perseus and a concubine), hidden away across the sea, and raised on an island [Crete] by a lowborn couple, in order to escape the dangers of court. He then made a triumphant return and underwent a recognition-scene by means of proofs in the Pergamene court, and underwent a mission to regain his rightful kingdom. And – as Polybius was so scandalized to learn – these epic claims were not to be laughed at. For they tapped into a deep undercurrent, inspiring masses, and even supposedly (if Diodorus is to be believed) gaining the support of leaders in Asia Minor (Pergamene court and Byzantium).<sup>665</sup> It was a lesson to be learned by Rome as well – that such apparently subversive and prodigious claims were to be taken seriously. For the Achaian League, ominously, Polybius saw a madness among citizenry, combined with an absence of good leadership, spreading across the Greek world – and with Rome’s attention at the ready, the mixture spelled disaster.

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<sup>665</sup> According to Diodorus (32.15ff.), Andriscus traveled from Crete, where he had been raised, to Pergamon, where the wife of a certain Athenaeus – a woman named Callippa and a former concubine of King Perseus of Macedon – allegedly confirmed Andriscus’ secret identity. From Pergamon, Diodorus says Andriscus was welcomed as a son of Perseus in Byzantium.

## ACHAIAN LEAGUE DEBACLE

In many ways, then, the end of 149 BCE marked an international stage set for an ideologically significant moment. Cato and Nasica had prominently sparred in a debate over war with Carthage – a debate that had ended with a dispatch of consuls and Censorinus’ controversial ultimatum – at a moment when Rome was still embroiled in conflicts in Spain. In the meantime, the Greek hostages of 167 BCE, of one thousand leading aristocrats (Polybius included), had been released in 150, though their effect on regional politics remains debated – an inheritance from Polybius himself, who identifies civil disturbance as a key factor in the League’s humiliating fate.<sup>666</sup> At the same time nationalistic spirit (Achaian, Spartan, Macedonian, etc.) remained a factor, though it had recently erupted in the sudden, and surprising outburst of success surrounding Pseudo-Philip. Here emerged a leader – a champion for the old Macedonian monarchic system – who tapped into a different, and potentially disturbing vein of pan-Hellenism, one with anti-foreign-imperialist, and even apocalyptic tendencies. And Rome was the foreign imperialist in the picture. As the state now increasingly identified (by Romans and others) as the guarantor of world order, within a tightening international *symplokē*, Rome was being put to a symbolic test.<sup>667</sup> And Polybius, for one, clearly saw this: he extended the scope of his *Histories* with this realization – and the shockwaves of 146 – in mind. For

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<sup>666</sup> For Polybius’ opinions regarding Corinth’s demise in particular – see below, with citations. For debate regarding the return of the Achaian hostages, see Gruen (1984: 518) – noting that a return would lead to internal civic problems – *contra* Larsen (1968), who argues that there would not have been a significant effect – especially since so many hostages had either passed away, been away for too long, or were advanced in years.

<sup>667</sup> As Harris (1979: 243) noted, the Achaian League hardly represented a serious military challenge to Rome – for, as he quipped, “the [Achaian] League could cause the Roman Senate no more anxiety than a wasp on a warm afternoon”!

he, no doubt like a great many of his contemporaries, saw that the nature and future of Rome's interstate position was to be determined by the manner in which the Roman state and its leadership handled the new variety of challenges.<sup>668</sup>

Hints of anti-Roman feeling had from time to time emerged within the Achaian League over the second century – these are perhaps best known from speeches in Polybius' *Histories*, speeches in which Greek politicians dramatically warn against the Roman “shadow from the West.”<sup>669</sup> Yet these speeches largely reflect a particular Polybian goal: to write a guide for statesmen dealing with the rise of a great international power. And as such, their rhetoric and placement reflect Polybius' conviction that the autonomy and honor of small states must be protected above all else, with a great deal of maneuvering with and away from a large power, rather than either purely slavish subservience or foolhardy insolence.<sup>670</sup> Indeed, by looking solely at the actions taken by Achaian leaders over the years, it becomes clear that there was never any distinct anti-Roman vs. pro-Roman set of camps. Instead, sentiments and actions varied, and they reflected local and internal politics as the main motivators. Opposition to Rome (or more

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<sup>668</sup> On this subject in general, see the contributions in Kagan (2010).

<sup>669</sup> See above, pp. 222ff.

<sup>670</sup> Polybius' opinion in this regard has long been a subject of scholarly debate – e.g. Gruen (1984: 331ff.); Walbank (1974; 1990: 166ff.); Eckstein (1995: Ch. 7). As mentioned above (see p. 164), the view taken here is that Polybius took a naturally complex attitude toward the Roman state and toward Roman leaders. Some actions and individuals are criticized, and there are hints that Polybius sees trends toward Roman internal decay. Yet by the same token, some actions and individuals are highly praised, and Polybius establishes the possibility that Rome could be the next great hope for the *oikoumenē*. The decision in some respects is left to the reader – intentionally so. For it is Polybius' view that the statesmen of smaller nations must learn to navigate the tides of Rome – to learn to choose their battles wisely, and as such, be able to assess Roman strengths, weaknesses, and cultural peculiarities.

often, visiting Roman diplomats) was only sparked on the basis of momentary reaction, checkered, and even indirect.<sup>671</sup>

All of these trends continued as the chronic rash of issues within Achaian League politics flared up again in 149-8 BCE. These issues mostly revolved around renewed attempts, by a number of *poleis* – Sparta in particular – at secession from the League. Polybius, however – as we will see – makes sure to highlight the role of internal social issues, with the rise of new demagogues in particular, as leading his beloved League down a path to disaster and shame. And this time, in the wake of Andriscus’ surprisingly successful revolt, Roman eyes – and Roman legions – were turned to the Greek mainland, with a heightened sensitivity and with major conflicts and developments already in progress in the west.

At first, Roman responses to events in the Peloponnese were generally on par with earlier diplomatic approaches. As Gruen has noted, there was almost an exact replay of incidents from forty years earlier.<sup>672</sup> Once again, the Romans showed concern for disruption, secession, and threats of military action within the League, but they did so with a certain degree of remoteness. The argument here, then, is that there was an unwillingness to interfere directly or aggressively in League matters, and the Roman Senate had elsewhere shown itself disinclined to become entangled in or to otherwise micro-manage local/regional affairs, especially when they involved matters of adjudication that did not affect the *res publica* or its conduct in war, and remained a

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<sup>671</sup> This has been firmly established by Gruen (1984: esp. 437ff.).

<sup>672</sup> Gruen (1984: 520ff.).

fundamental domain for Greek *poleis*.<sup>673</sup> Hellenistic Greek cities had long prided and closely guarded such levels of autonomy – and they continued to do so with Rome. But within the Achaian League, the Achaian *strategoí* and, for example, their Spartan opponents, had learned that involving Rome could provide even more diplomatic playing cards, granting opportunities for delay, rhetoric towards international-level legitimacy, and even opportunities for exploiting the gaps between the ephemeral authority of Roman envoys and the ultimate power of the Roman Senate.

With only one clear instance of a consensus to submit to Roman arbitration (in 184/3 BCE) – and this instance leading only to abortive results – the issues of the Achaian League continued to remain just that: issues of the Achaian League.<sup>674</sup> The Roman Senate remained in contact and involvement with the League, but on a peripheral basis, responding to complaints and accusations as they were brought to their attention, and deploying only letters of recommendation and courtesy envoys. There was no treaty of obligation between the two states – at least not on par with the sort of treaty existing between Rome and Carthage.<sup>675</sup> And even if there was some sort of treaty or informal

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<sup>673</sup> For debate on this point, compare Gruen (1984) – who argues against Roman interest in micro-management – and Derow (2003), who sees the Romans actively seeking to assert “suzerainty” over Greece.

<sup>674</sup> In 184/3 BCE, in response to a number of Spartan and Achaian envoys to Rome, the Senate (rather than making its own formal judgment) re-assigned the task, designating a three-man board (consisting of Flamininus, Q. Metellus, and Ap. Claudius Pulcher) to arbitrate. These three purportedly decided upon a recall of Spartans exiled and convicted in 188, a rebuilding of Sparta’s city-walls, an injunction that Sparta remain within the League, and a deferral of all capital cases to judges from outside the League. However, they could not settle on issues of territory, and only the Achaian representatives are mentioned as having signed the agreement. Spartan and Achaian ambassadors again appeared in Rome complaining of each other’s injustices in the following year – evidently, the arbitral agreement had fallen through. See Polyb. 23.4; 23.6.1-3 and 23.9.

<sup>675</sup> There are references to two more formal agreements between Rome and the League. The first was in 198 BCE, towards the end of the Second Macedonian War, for which Polybius uses the term, *symphuchia*

agreement (this remains a matter of debate), there were certainly no terms in it that would allow Rome to directly engage in Achaian policy or procedures.<sup>676</sup> Roman ambassadors only arrived on missions that had been called for by messengers from the Peloponnese. And as such, their missions were not usually intended for formal adjudication, but rather for investigative and/or “good-offices” purposes, meant to bring the disputants together to forge their own solution(s).<sup>677</sup> In the meantime, Greek (including Achaian) leaders consistently followed their own, independent policies, often not shying away from sometimes offending the sensitivities of a visiting Roman envoy, choosing instead to sidestep his recommendations, to re-assert their own pride of place, and yet always making sure to send back the appropriate affirmations of goodwill back to the Roman Senate.<sup>678</sup> Such maneuvering, incidentally, was not only a practice criticized by Polybius

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(18.13.8). He mentions that the League decided to transfer their *symmachia* with Philip for one with Rome – but according to Livy (who uses both *amicitia* and *societas* – cf. 32.21), this vote needed to be confirmed by decree of the Roman Senate – something we do not hear anything more about in the sources. Even if the Senate confirmed some sort of written alliance (whether of friendship or military pact), it would only have lasted for the duration of the war against Philip, and any of its obligations would not have been extended – cf. Lévy (1995). The same applies to a vote made by the League in 192 BCE, approving *philia* with Rome against Antiochus (according to Polyb. 39.3.8 – Livy 35.50 uses the phrase “having the same friends and enemies” clause to refer to this vote).

<sup>676</sup> Note that Badian (1952) believed a formal treaty existed. One example that suggests otherwise is the Roman response to Sparta’s secession from the League in 189/8 BCE. Even though Sparta apparently surrendered herself to Rome (cf. Livy 38.32, even using the term *deditio*), the consul Fulvius merely suggested that Sparta and the League seek counsel from the Senate; the Senate then voted that no change be made in Sparta’s circumstances (a recommendation interpreted in vastly different ways by both parties). The position here (with Gruen [1984] and Dmitriev [2011: 441] – *contra* Harris [1979] and Derow [2003]) is that Rome evidently did not wish to intervene in League affairs, and felt that it was not within the *res publica*’s international legal rights to do so either

<sup>677</sup> On these types of diplomatic missions, see above – pp. 200ff.

<sup>678</sup> E.g. letter from M. Lepidus (cos. 187 BCE), expressing distaste for the League’s massacre at Compasium in 188 (cf. Polyb. 22.3.3); Achaian disregard for Q. Metellus’ demands (186/5 BCE) that a League assembly be called to negotiate troubles with Sparta, since he had no mandate (Polyb. 22.10.4-13); the same disregard for legate Q. Marcius Philippus’ recommendations (183 BCE) that the League consult with Rome before taking military action against Messenian secession (cf. Polyb. 24.9.12-3); followed by requests to the Senate for Roman aid against the Messenians, once this action was already underway

(when it was conducted by leaders Polybius considered disastrously demagogic) – it was also a practice attempted by Polybius himself, in his past career as a prominent Achaian diplomat, and in his writing of the *Histories*. This latter attempt, however, came with a new agenda – namely, to instruct other statesmen in the ways of conducting such maneuvers with honor, integrity, and in the best interests of one’s home state.

Unfortunately, Polybius’ text in large part does not survive for the following events in Greece, for the years 149-146 BCE. Only the barest of outlines will be followed here, tracing events based on what pieces remain of Polybius and from what is otherwise known of contemporary diplomatic practice/precedent.<sup>679</sup> Polybius’ narrative picks up (Book 38) with reference to two successive Roman envoys sent to meet with the Achaians and discuss internal conflict within the League. Our later sources refer to a series of earlier missions, that in their basic elements, clearly followed the same old, decades-long pattern: Sparta (and some other *poleis*) had attempted to secede, sometime in 149-8 BCE – concurrent with the Andriscus revolt – and the League had moved to enforce its membership. Metellus, the praetor then in command in Macedonia, was said to have sent a message – as with earlier letters of rebuke – advising the Achaians to

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(Polyb. 23.9.12); later offers (though very delayed ones) of Achaian aid to Rome in the fight against Perseus, 169 BCE (cf. Polyb. 28.12).

<sup>679</sup> The main continuous account of events in Macedon and Greece for these years comes from Pausanias,. The other key sources are the Epitome of Livy, Justin (epitome of Pompeius Trogus), and Zonaras. Modern scholarship has had a tendency to take these accounts at face value, rather than leave gaps in the story, inserting their details to create a continued historical narrative of the Achaian War. As a counteracting measure, these details will be avoided as much as possible here – they have already been described at length elsewhere – cf. Fuks (1970); Gruen (1976); Bowman (1978); Wiseman (1979: 461ff.); Green (1993: 450ff.).

refrain from military action against Sparta until further consultation with the Senate.<sup>680</sup>

The message was ignored, as others had been in the past, and the Achaians had every right to assume that there was no greater crisis at stake. They moved forward, our later sources tell us, with a vote of war and attack against Sparta.<sup>681</sup> And it was at this juncture (judging by the sequence in later accounts) that the two legates mentioned by Polybius were sent, in succession, to the Peloponnese.

L. Aurelius Orestes was the first – and it was his encounter with the Achaians that was to become, in later tradition, the diplomatic event most memorably and dramatically attached to the outbreak of war with Rome.<sup>682</sup> Orestes apparently made a lot of noise upon his return to Rome, complaining about the rudeness and even physical abuse he received, “barely escaping with his life.” Polybius remarks on the matter, stating that the reports were exaggerated, since the Roman legate and his companions were never in danger, but were instead being targeted consciously by the Achaians.<sup>683</sup> Here, there emerge glimmers of Polybius’ biases: on the one hand, he blames the demagoguery of Achaian leadership in their foolhardy and self-promoting rabble rousing for actually

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<sup>680</sup> Cf. Paus. 7.13.2ff., and compare with Philippus’ earlier, failed attempts to discourage war between the Achaians and Messene in 183 BCE (Polyb. 23.9-24.9).

<sup>681</sup> Paus. 7.13.1-5; Just. 34.1.1-3.

<sup>682</sup> Polybius refers to Orestes’ mission at 38.9.1-2. For the later tradition, see: Cicero, *Leg.Man.*11; Livy, *Per.* 51b, *Epit.Ox.* 51.135-136; Strabo 8.381a; Vell. 1.12.1; Flor. 1.32.3; Paus. 7.14.1-3; Dio fr.72.1-2; Just. 34.1.6-9; Eutrop. 4.14.1.

<sup>683</sup> Polyb. 38.9.1-2: ὅτι παραγενομένων ἐκ Πελοποννήσου τῶν περὶ τὸν Αὐρήλιον πρεσβευτῶν καὶ διασαφούντων τὰ συμβεβηκότα περὶ αὐτούς, ὅτι παρ’ ὀλίγον τοῖς ὅλοις ἐκινδύνευσαν, καὶ λεγόντων μετ’ αὐξήσεως καὶ καινολογίας: οὐ γὰρ ὡς κατὰ περιπέτειαν ἐπ’ αὐτούς ἤκοντος τοῦ δεινοῦ διεσάφουν, ἀλλ’ ὡς κατὰ πρόθεσιν ὠρμηκότων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπὶ τὸ παραδειγματίζειν αὐτούς.

planning to disgrace a Roman legate. On the other, he hints at the less than honorable conduct of Orestes in overreacting, and even misrepresenting events.

Polybius' next statement is even more interesting: that the Senate was vexed – not so much at the alleged violence, but at the underlying effect of the interaction in general, the gesture of disrespect it represented, and the level of civil unrest it indicated.<sup>684</sup> And he notes that this displeasure was more than it had been before, thereby supporting his own case that the whole debacle was one brought about by the sheer lunacy of Achaian leadership in its handling of diplomacy with Rome. In the context of the revolt of Pseudo-Philip to the north, Rome was more likely to take note, especially since the politics of the southern Greek states had long been cross-associated by the Romans with those of Macedon. Roman envoys had made a practice of visiting the southern Greek states in order to gather political and even military support when conflicts with Macedon loomed. And in post-war arrangements – as in 196 BCE – Roman commanders had considered and adjudicated territorial matters for the Peloponnese and Macedon at the same time, as a single diplomatic mission. Therefore, in 148-7, the stirrings of trouble within the League, when accompanied by signs of disrespect for Rome, caught the Senate's eye more than before. For no matter the details, the overall picture was that Rome's hands were full in Carthage and Spain, and that southern Greece could erupt in conflict.

For these reasons, the second envoy sent by the Senate was one of reconciliation, intended to smooth over tensions in the Peloponnese, at least while Metellus was still

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<sup>684</sup> Polyb. 38.9.3: ἡ σύγκλητος ἠγανάκτησεν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ὡς οὐδέποτε...

occupied in Macedon.<sup>685</sup> There was certainly no Roman war-vote, no *res repetere* – instead, the legate, Sextus Iulius Caesar, was provided with instructions to “mildly censure” the League (as earlier in 187).<sup>686</sup> From Polybius’ description, Caesar was told to explain that Orestes had either made an error and/or had been misunderstood in making his earlier announcement to the League.<sup>687</sup> The subject at issue was evidently that the Achaians had interpreted Orestes as ordering a disbandment of the League – something that the Senate now denied as ever being its true intention. Instead, as Polybius states, the Senate now reassured the Achaians that it “did not wish to dissolve the League, but to alarm [them] and to deter them from acting in a presumptuous and hostile manner.”<sup>688</sup>

Stripping away Polybius’ interpretation that the Senate had been deceptively seeking to scold or cow the wayward Achaians into good behavior (which fits with his less positive views on more recent Roman approaches to international governance), there is a core of diplomatic meaning. For the Senate had earlier made a very similar statement regarding the departure of some cities from the League, in the context of the complete failure of their attempted three-man commission to adjudicate disputes, in 183 BCE.<sup>689</sup> At that juncture, the Senate had responded, first to Spartan envoys bringing renewed

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<sup>685</sup> Cf. Polyb. 38.9.3-8. The year, based on reconstructions from the ancient sources, was 147 BCE. Orestes’ mission was either in 148, or – and scholars generally agree – earlier in 147, when Metellus was wrapping up his work of pacifying Macedon. The timing of this work is based upon a final victory over Andriscus toward the end of 148, determined by the beginning date of the “Macedonian Era” and confirmed by Livy and Obsequens. If Zonaras is to be believed, there was even a second uprising by an “Alexander” after the capture of Andriscus, sometime in 147 BCE. See Morgan (1969); Gruen (1984: 432-5). On the Macedonian Era, see Tod (1918/9; 1953); Theodossiou and Mantarakis (2006: 353); Vanderspoel (2010: 252).

<sup>686</sup> Polyb. 38.9.4: “μετρίως ἐπιτιμήσαντας.” For the parallel with 187 BCE, see above – p. 298.

<sup>687</sup> Polybius’ description of Caesar’s mission is at 38.9.9-11.11.

<sup>688</sup> Polyb. 38.9.6: “οὐ διασπάσαι βουλομένη τὸ ἔθνος, ἀλλὰ πτοῆσαι καὶ καταπλήξασθαι [βουλομένη] τὴν αὐθάδειαν καὶ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν.”

<sup>689</sup> See above – pp. 298/300.

complaints that it had done all it could for the city; and then to Achaian envoys bringing protests against secessionist movements that it did not care if Sparta, Corinth, or Argos left the League.<sup>690</sup> In other words, the Senate, in sending Orestes, had wished to wash its hands of the perennial Achaian problems as it had in 183. And as the political body forever plagued with complaints and disputes back and forth between members of the League, the Senate (if it ever were to become an approved third-party arbiter) could indeed make the judicial decision that some cities – especially some of the newer members – should leave the League peacefully. Of course no Achaian *strategos* alive would ever agree to such a decision. And so the very suggestion that cities secede – however Orestes phrased it – would have brought strong reactions and an easy political leverage point for such as Critolaus.

Achaian leadership had always been one of competing interests and at times, bitter rivalries. In 147-6, Polybius depicts the rivalry in a dichotomous manner, as separating the populist Critolaus (followed by his successor as *strategos*, Diaeus) and a “wiser” minority, the latter sending an envoy to apologize for Orestes’ treatment, meeting with Caesar on the road, and joining him in an attempt to call a summit in Tenea for negotiations.<sup>691</sup> All the same, Caesar ultimately returned to Rome with bad news. Polybius sets up the situation as one molded by the rabble-rousing Critolaus, who is portrayed as sabotaging an opportunity for peace by simply not showing up, announcing that the issues would be discussed at the next meeting of the League assembly in another

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<sup>690</sup> Response to the Spartans: Polyb. 23.9.11; and to the Achaians: 23.9.13.

<sup>691</sup> Polyb. 38.10.

six months.<sup>692</sup> The same lack of regard for a Roman representative's call to meet, followed by independent action taken against Sparta, had happened before.<sup>693</sup> And in those instances, no further action other than diplomatic missives had come from the Roman Senate. Rather than itching for a direct war against Rome – or even worse, madly seeking the self-destruction of his own state (as Polybius bitterly asserts) – Critolaus was simply following a standard, pride-in-autonomy and popular, nationalist procedure as his predecessors. What was different this time was that Roman diplomatic perspective on the region had shifted, by virtue of events in Macedonia. Of this last shift, Critolaus may have been caught unaware.

After Caesar's return, and upon follow-up news coming in waves from Metellus, toward the end of 147, the Senate ultimately decided upon a *bellum Achaicum*, since one of the consuls for the following year, Lucius Mummius, was assigned to Achaia. Unfortunately, none of our surviving sources give us the details of the decision, especially from the angle of the Roman Senate. Some clues, however, remain. Polybius does reveal that while Caesar made his way back to Rome, Metellus, upon hearing what had happened to the missions of Orestes and Caesar, sent four legates to the Peloponnese. Metellus in the meantime remained in the north, evidently policing post-war Macedon

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<sup>692</sup> Polyb. 38.11.

<sup>693</sup> E.g., disregard for Q. Metellus' demands (186/5 BCE) that a League assembly be called to negotiate troubles with Sparta, since he had no mandate (Polyb. 22.10.4-13); the same disregard for legate Q. Marcius Philippus' recommendations (183 BCE) that the League consult with Rome before taking military action against Messenian secession (cf. Polyb. 24.9.12-3). See also above – p. 298/300. Note that while the Senate had sent Orestes and later Caesar explicitly to the Achaian League as their main diplomatic mission, the other, earlier examples involved messengers stopping by on their way to another diplomatic task, or letters and/or recommendations coming from Roman commanders, their communiqués with the League only indirectly mandated by the Senate.

and working on preliminary judicial arrangements there. The legates arrived at a meeting of the League assembly in Corinth – presumably the one that Critolaus had earlier mentioned to Caesar. According to Polybius, Metellus’ legates spoke in the same conciliatory tones, urging the Achaians to refrain from hostile action and to seek diplomatic negotiation.<sup>694</sup> But these words had been heard before – and they had never led to negative repercussions. And so Polybius describes the quiet voices of the elders pressing for peace as being drowned out by the ravings of Critolaus and his followers. The demagogue managed to whip the crowd of “workmen and lowly types” (πλήθος ἐργαστηριακῶν καὶ βαναύσων ἀνθρώπων) into a frenzy, their noise and near stampede driving the legates out of the meeting, their anger turned against the elders as suspected pro-Roman traitors.<sup>695</sup> The mob-chaos – whose rabidness, according to Polybius, was at its worst in Corinth<sup>696</sup> – led to a formal vote for war on Sparta (again, as had happened before in the past).<sup>697</sup> Yet in addition, the assembly voted to grant absolute wartime power to the *strategia*<sup>698</sup> – a measure perhaps put forward to forestall the work of potential “traitors” (who also happened to be Critolaus’ political opponents), but also a vote of confidence selecting Critolaus as new Achaian champion.

Polybius was utterly disgusted. His attitude is evident simply in the colorful adjectives he finds to describe the *melée* – even though he was in North Africa at the time. Resentfully, he closes his account of Peloponnesian events for the year (147) with a

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<sup>694</sup> Polyb. 38.12.1-3.

<sup>695</sup> Polyb. 38.12.4-13.5.

<sup>696</sup> Polyb. 38.12.5.

<sup>697</sup> Polyb. 38.13.6.

<sup>698</sup> Polyb. 38.13.7.

dark accusation. Critolaus had one more trick up his sleeve. For the newly minted “dictator” was apparently intending to send Achaian troops against the Romans, not just the Spartans.<sup>699</sup> And as Critolaus was plotting, the four Roman legates had apparently stationed themselves in waiting: one at Sparta, one at Naupactus, and two at Athens to await the arrival of Metellus.<sup>700</sup> In these last statements, Polybius has left us with blame resting squarely on the shoulders of Critolaus, and hints of what was to become the beginning of war with Rome. For this time, as Achaian troops gathered to enforce the membership of the League (as it had in the past), a Roman presence this time stayed in the Peloponnese, presumably at some point later being joined by the commander Metellus himself. Achaian forces may or may not have sought out these Romans – Polybius certainly seems to believe they did – and they may or may not have even known where the legates had gone after leaving Corinth.

Yet no matter what, direct violence must have ultimately come to involve Roman officers/troops, leading to an immediate state of war. And it is perhaps for this reason that no extended, senatorial war-debate became part of the historical tradition of the Achaian War, as it so prominently did for the Third Punic War, which had been more a matter of international law than of direct aggression against Roman troops. In the end, then, Mummius obtained a *provincia* to settle what was evidently a straightforward injustice to the *res publica*: outright defiance and attacks that had somehow involved a Roman troop-presence. Who attacked whom cannot be determined from the sources – though Roman

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<sup>699</sup> Polyb. 38.13.8.

<sup>700</sup> Polyb. 38.13.9.

ethics would suggest that the legates and/or Metellus would have simply waited for the slightest aggression from the Achaians before fully deploying. In this sense, the Achaians would have simply marched into a war with Rome.

### COLLOCATED DESTRUCTIONS

After a suspenseful ending to his account of 147 BCE, Polybius' text for the following year is lost, leaving only the scattered narratives of later sources. From these, there is reference first to an Achaian campaign (most likely over the winter) against Heracleia, another city seeking to withdraw from the League.<sup>701</sup> This is followed by reports of military engagements between Metellus and various Greek troops, beginning with Achaians under Critolaus,<sup>702</sup> followed by Arcadians attempting to reinforce Critolaus,<sup>703</sup> and ending with occupation of a number of Peloponnesian cities.<sup>704</sup> Pausanias' account is somewhat anti-Metellus in its tone, portraying the commander as aggressively seeking out the Greek forces, slaughtering them and burning down sanctuaries,<sup>705</sup> and as such, it could reflect a pro-Mummius Roman tradition in what must have been sharp competition between the commanders over credit for victory (and access to a triumph) over Achaia.<sup>706</sup>

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<sup>701</sup> Paus. 7.15.2-3, 15.9-10; Zonar. 9.31b.

<sup>702</sup> = battle at Scarpheia in Locris: cf. Livy, *Per.* 52a; Vell. 1.11.2; Flor. 1.32.3-4; Paus. 7.15.4, 15.8-9; Vict. *Vir.Ill.* 60.2, 61.2; Oros. 5.3.2-3; Zonar. 9.31b-c.

<sup>703</sup> = battle at Chaeronea: cf. Paus. 7.15.5-6, 15.8; Vict. *Vir.Ill.* 61.2; Oros. 5.3.3.

<sup>704</sup> = Thebes and Megara: cf. Polyb. 38.16.10; Livy, *Per.* 52a; Paus. 7.15.9-10.

<sup>705</sup> Cf. Paus. 7.15.4-6, 15.10.

<sup>706</sup> Similar competition also seems to have taken place between Mancinus and Scipio over Carthage – Mancinus claiming to be the first to enter the city in 147 (cf. Livy, *Per.* 51a; Flor. 1.31.10-12), even supposedly having his supporters give public lectures in Rome, using maps to showcase the attack (cf. Pliny, *H.N.* 35.23); Scipio in the meantime claiming that Mancinus actually needed saving from disaster

According to a later citation (in Orosius 5.3), Polybius only mentioned one battle prior to Mummius' arrival in Greece – the one between Critolaus and Metellus at Scarpheia, which resulted in Critolaus' death. At this juncture, Polybius also apparently drew another parallel between events in North Africa and those in Achaia, noting that at the time, he was still with Scipio at Carthage. At the beginning of the campaign season of 146, Scipio was preparing his final assault on the city, having at the end of the previous year succeeded in taking the outer quay of Carthage's harbors and having captured Nopheris, the major town on the outskirts, connecting Carthage to its supply route to the hinterland.<sup>707</sup> To a great extent, then, as both Scipio and Mummius prepared for the campaigns of 146, both would have anticipated being on the verge of a potential great victory and triumph, for themselves and for Rome.<sup>708</sup>

Polybius' narrative of Achaian events resumes with Diaeus replacing the deceased Critolaus as *strategos*, mustering the Achaian forces, collecting emergency funds (including even women's jewelry), and resorting to the emancipation of slaves in order to have the greatest number regroup and gather at Corinth.<sup>709</sup> In the meantime, Polybius describes panic and civil chaos spreading like wildfire across all the cities of the Peloponnese, as citizens fled their homes, evacuated urban areas, began informing against

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upon entering the city, with retreat from what amounted to a raid into "Megalia" = Megara becoming necessary (cf. App. *Pun.* 113a-114d; Zonar. 9.29b-e).

<sup>707</sup> Capture of the outer quay at Carthage: Polyb. 38.19.1; App. *Pun.* 124a-125b; occupation of Nopheris: Livy, *Per.* 51a; App. *Pun.* 126a-e; Zonar. 9.30b-c. Appian describes the significance of Nopheris – a site for which the exact location is not yet known.

<sup>708</sup> Note: whether or not Scipio and Mummius knew of each other's campaigns while they were in the field cannot be known with certainty – the sources simply do not provide clues on this. What is clear is that the two "destructions" – Carthage, followed by Corinth – were immediately paired, as a contrasting duo, when news of the Roman victories spread across the Mediterranean. See below...

<sup>709</sup> Polyb. 38.15.1-11.

their own friends, accusing them of treason and support of Rome, while others committed suicide or turned themselves in, hoping for mercy and usually not receiving it.<sup>710</sup> This was Thucydidean-style *stasis* at its very worst – a literal implosion of the Peloponnese. Envoys, led by a certain Andronidas, at this point were said to have returned from negotiating a preliminary settlement with Metellus – what the terms were is not disclosed. Polybius simply describes the frenzied insanity with which Diaeus and his party accused Andronidas and his fellow envoys of treason, arresting, torturing, and then executing them.<sup>711</sup> Polybius bitterly quotes a proverb that he says was on the lips of all at the time of this horrible travesty: “Had we not perished so soon, we would never have been saved.”<sup>712</sup> By some twisted design, Tyche had found the only way out for the unsalvageable League – to have it defeated as quickly as possible so as to avoid further suffering at the hands of such utter internal collapse and its concomitant madness.<sup>713</sup>

And indeed, in a fragment placed at the introduction to Book 38, Polybius discusses the tragedy of Greece in 146 in comparison to that of Carthage, as well as in terms of the whole history of major (Hellenic) tragic events, from the invasion of Xerxes to Alexander’s destruction of Thebes and Chalcis.<sup>714</sup> He does so in terms of *ἀτυχία* versus *σύμπτωμα*: the former defined as utter “disaster,” involving hardship combined

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<sup>710</sup> Polyb. 38.16.1-10.

<sup>711</sup> Polyb. 38.17.1-18.6.

<sup>712</sup> Polyb. 38.18.12: “ἅπαντες δὲ τότε τὴν παροιμίαν ταύτην διὰ στόματος ἔσχον, ὡς ‘εἰ μὴ ταχέως ἀπωλόμεθα, οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθημεν.’”

<sup>713</sup> Polyb. 38.18.7-11.

<sup>714</sup> Polyb. 38.1.1-2.14.

with shame, and the latter as “calamity,” involving hardship but with the honor of the victim intact. He thus observes that,

δοκούντος γοῦν μεγίστου πάθους γεγονέναι τοῦ περὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐκ ἔλαττον ἂν τις ἠγήσασαιτο, κατὰ δέ τι μείζον τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τότε συμβάν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τόπον ἔσχατον ἀπολογίας γε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιγινόμενους περὶ σφῶν ἀπέλειπον, οὗτοι δ' οὐδ' ἀφορμὴν εὐλογον ἔδοσαν τοῖς βουλομένοις σφίσι βοηθεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμαρτημένων. καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἅμα ταῖς περιπετείαις ἄρδην ἀφανισθέντες ἀνεπαίσθητοι τῶν σφετέρων εἰς τὸ μέλλον ἐγένοντο **συμπτομάτων**, οἱ δ' Ἕλληνας ἐφορῶντες τὰς αὐτῶν **ἀτυχίας** παισὶ παίδων παραδόσιμον ἐποίησαν τὴν ἀκληρίαν.

*The ruin of Carthage is indeed considered to have been the greatest of sufferings, but when we come to think of it, the fate of Greece was no less terrible, and in some ways, even more so. For the Carthaginians at least left to posterity some ground, however slight, for defending their cause, but the Greeks gave no plausible pretext to anyone who wished to support them and acquit them of error. And again, the Carthaginians, having been utterly exterminated by the **calamities** which overtook them, were for the future insensible of their sufferings, but the Greeks, continuing to witness their **disaster**, handed on from father to son the memory of their misfortune.<sup>715</sup>*

Polybius then recounts a series of calamities in Greek history, none of which amount to the degree of shame – and thus, utter disaster – encountered by the Achaian League:<sup>716</sup>

1. Xerxes' invasion: the Greek world suffered greatly, and Athens did in particular, but in the process, won pan-Hellenic glory and authority like never before;
2. the Peloponnesian wars: Athens was defeated and forced to tear down her walls, but shame came to Sparta, the victor, which made such oppressive use of the victory;

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<sup>715</sup> Polyb. 38.1.4-6.

<sup>716</sup> Polyb. 38.2.1-3.7.

3. the Theban war: Sparta was defeated, yet maintained a modicum of respect by giving up her wider hegemony and withdrawing to her ancestral lands (Polybius' anti-Spartan bias is very evident here!);
4. Alexander's destruction of Thebes: Thebes was greatly pitied as a result of the cruelty that Alexander showed the city. Here, there is at first a seeming parallel with Carthage. Yet Polybius goes on to explain that the Thebans were soon able to return and restore their city to life; and,
5. the "fetters" of Greece – Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth: three cities were forced to submit to Macedonian garrisons, but all the same, they continued honorably to strive for full autonomy, eventually winning it back.

Carthage, then, was fitted into this pan-Hellenic historical scheme as a city suffering the ultimate calamity – an ill-starred fate, brought about by a combination of poor decision-making, a certain degree of internal decay, and naiveté regarding Roman diplomatic practice (as Polybius had outlined earlier).<sup>717</sup> Yet, there is an indication that there was also a tragically redeeming quality to Carthage's catastrophe (at least from a third-party perspective) – a sense that total annihilation was somehow better than being left pathetically looking at the broken pieces. And why Polybius comes to this conclusion – besides his own citizenship, of course, as an Achaian (more on his opinions regarding Corinth, below) – can perhaps be clarified by the surviving account of the final "last-stand" of Carthage.

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<sup>717</sup> See above – pp. 156ff.

Appian, whose narrative of the Third Punic War tends to match Polybius' at points where the latter survives, tells the story.<sup>718</sup> And it is one of the most dramatic scenes of urban warfare – and horribly graphic depictions of a citizenry fighting to the very last for their city, after three years of siege: from the struggle over the harbors and agora in the lower town, to the weeklong street-by-street battle over Byrsa, in the new residential district of high-rise *insulae*. Romans and civilians were described fighting hand-to-hand, across rooftops – and as the buildings started to burn and be torn down – the living and the dead and the rubble were swept up together into pits to clear the way for the Roman army. And at the top of the citadel was the Temple of Asclepius (Punic Eshmoun), where the suffete Hasdrubal hid with his family. Here, at least part of Polybius' account survives, as one final testament to the stark contrast between the extreme bravery of the Carthaginian people (and hence their lack of shame in the annals of history, according to Polybius' paradigm), and the tragic disappointment of their ineffectual leadership (the main cause of Carthage's end, in Polybius' opinion).

Later sources amplify the drama of these last moments – Hasdrubal's pathetic begging, his wife's scorn, and her epic/heroic-style suicide alongside their two children on a fiery pyre – Hasdrubal also killed as the blaze consumed the temple.<sup>719</sup> What remains in Polybius, however, is a note on the whims and vicissitudes of Tyche, references to an earlier, abortive attempt by Hasdrubal to negotiate a last-minute peace agreement with Scipio, and a description of Hasdrubal's proud, noble wife seeking death

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<sup>718</sup> App. *Pun.* 127-130.

<sup>719</sup> Diod. 32.23.1, 24.1; Livy, *Per.* 51c, *Epit.Ox.* 51.139-142; Strabo 17.832d; Val.Max. 3.2e8; Flor. 1.31.16-17; App. *Pun.* 130b-132c; Oros. 4.23.4; Zonar. 9.30d-e.

rather than dishonor and capture in defeat.<sup>720</sup> Here was an account of a city's tragic death worthy of Greek theater, ending in an all-consumptive inferno reminiscent of an offering to the gods – the goddess Tyche in particular, who now ushered in an undisputed age for Rome.

By contrast, the death of Corinth was for Polybius the ultimate fiasco – the example par excellence of the sort of self-inflicted destructions of *politeiai* that had swept the entire Greek mainland, including the “Peloponnesians, Boeotians, Phocians, Euboeans, Locrians, some of the cities on the Ionian Gulf, and finally the Macedonians.”<sup>721</sup> And what made events so reprehensible and pitiful at Corinth was that the Achaians there had not even attempted to make a heroic last-stand. Mummius, upon arriving in Greece, had dismissed Metellus, and then defeated the rag-tag Achaian forces on the Isthmus.<sup>722</sup> From later sources, we then learn that the Achaians had fled, without regrouping at Corinth and thus leaving the Achaian center abandoned. Mummius waited a few days, wondering whether he would receive any opposition, and when he did not, he simply marched into Corinth, in a very anti-climactic manner, without a real siege or fight for the city. The victory hardly ended in an epic maelstrom.

Yet Polybius goes to some effort to emphasize that this second Roman conquest was more lamentable than the first, possibly because Corinth was being discussed in international circles as a contrast to the grand-scale ruin of Carthage – for which a widely

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<sup>720</sup> Polyb. 38.20.1-22.3.

<sup>721</sup> Polyb. 38.3.8.

<sup>722</sup> Polyb. 39.8.6; Livy, *Per.* 52a; Flor. 1.32.5; Paus. 7.16.3; Just. 34.1.2-5; Vict. *Vir.Ill.* 60.2; Oros. 5.3.3; Zonar. 9.31d-e. On Diaeus' suicide after this battle, see Livy, *Epit.Ox.* 51.145-146; Paus. 7.16.4-6; Vict. *Vir.Ill.* 60.2; Zonar. 9.31e.

discussed war-debate had also been circulated three years earlier. In addition, many Greeks in Polybius' readership would have had, and felt, a very real connection to the political and cultural undoing of Corinth.<sup>723</sup> Polybius' statement, then, adds up: what was the worst factor in the Achaian disaster was that future generations were left with a continued memento of their past errors, of what they themselves had done to fragment the Peloponnese.

That this was the situation has only become clearer as more archaeological evidence has come to light at Corinth. For to summarize: the "sack" of Corinth simply does not show up in the same physical terms that contemporary authors (Polybius included) would have us think (see below). This reality reveals the degree to which the destruction of Corinth was enhanced by ancient contemporary modes of thinking in terms of synchronicity in world history and an *urbs capta* motif in historiography (more on this below). Polybius thus built upon a scheme already in place, arguing that Corinth was not simply a lesser "part II" to Carthage's fiery death, but was a tragedy of even *greater* significance. Such a tragedy – even more than the one at Carthage – was, in Polybius' formulation, a starker lesson in shame, which revealed a showcase of everything *not* to do when faced by a greater international power like that of Rome,

Archaeologists at Corinth, influenced by such heightened traditions of 146, thus worked on the original assumption that the city had been burned and destroyed. The expected destruction layers – which had shown up in massive amounts, even several

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<sup>723</sup> On the post-war re-organization of Greece – a subject of debate that requires further study – see Bernhardt (1977).

meters thick, at Carthage – were few and far between. And more recently, re-analysis of the Hellenistic pottery from Corinth has shown that many of these supposed destruction layers are actually fills dumped down wells during the Augustan-era cleanup and re-foundation of the city: they contain pottery from before and after the fall of Corinth, and include Roman material, from the second and first centuries BCE.<sup>724</sup> Over the years, excavations have also confirmed that the site was still inhabited in the later second and first centuries BCE, and that a local pottery industry continued, although public buildings fell into disrepair.<sup>725</sup> The only signs of physical damage that could even possibly be connected to Mummius' capture of the city are debris layers in two buildings – in a hall

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<sup>724</sup> = fills in South Stoa wells – see Broneer, *Corinth* I.iv, 100-159; Edwards, *Corinth* VII.iii; James (2010; forthcoming); Sanders (forthcoming).

<sup>725</sup> For an overview of the evidence, including pottery deposits from the so-called “interim period” (i.e., between Mummius' occupation and the Roman colonial re-foundation), see Wiseman (1979, 494-496); Gebhard & Dickie (2003: 266-270); Millis (2006). Excavations of the Panayia field, to the southeast of the South Stoa, have revealed signs of continued occupation and local pottery industry – see James (2010; forthcoming). For more on a continued local and regional (Sikyonian) pottery, see Williams and Russell (1981: 42-43); Pemberton, *Corinth* XVIII.i, 4. For a brief discussion of the prevalence of amphorae from Knidos at interim Corinth, see Gebhard and Dickie (2003: 267). For evidence of pottery and wine imported from Italy, see Williams and Russell (1981: 34-7). A large Latin inscription cut into the base of a 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE monument, also indicates a Roman presence – cf. Gebhard and Dickie (2003: 272-7). Gebhard and Dickie make the case that the Latin text was translated from a Greek original. It commemorates, in elegiac verse, the transport of a Roman fleet across the Isthmus by a Marcus Antonius (most likely the praetor of 102 BCE) = *Corinth* VIII.ii, no. 1; *Corinth* VIII.i, no. 31; *CIL* 122662; *ILLRP* 342. Wheel-ruts that pre-date the colonial re-foundation crisscross the area once used as the Hellenistic racetrack, just to the north of the South Stoa in the area that later became the Roman-era forum – cf. Weinberg, *Corinth* I.v, 4-5; Gebhard and Dickie (2003: 270). A smattering of small, poorly constructed buildings, some using reused blocks, has been discovered around this former public area – cf. Wiseman (1979: 494); Gebhard and Dickie (2003: 269-270); Millis (2006). In the Asklepieion, wheel-ruts have also been found running across the Lerna court and up the Asklepieion ramp, into which a water tank was installed – cf. Roebuck, *Corinth* XIV, 82-84. The Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore has an interim-period deposit, but is not diagnostically votive – cf. *Corinth* XVIII.i, 4; XVIII.iii, 434; Gebhard and Dickie (2003: 266, 269). No interim period votive deposits have been found in the sanctuary of Aphrodite on Acrocorinth, and the Archaic Temple appears to have fallen out of use – cf. Gebhard and Dickie (2003: 269). An interim-period building was constructed over the Sacred Spring – cf. Williams and Fisher (1971: 22, 45); Williams (1978: 22, n. 31). The Hellenistic theater, prior to the Augustan period, appears to have fallen into disuse, losing its roof and superstructure, possibly to spoliation for building stone – cf. *Corinth* II, 135. For signs of a possible Corinthian diaspora, with individuals using the Corinthian ethnic on late second and first century BCE grave monuments in Athens, Egypt, and on Delos, see Millis (forthcoming) – cited by James (forthcoming).

identified as the *Strategeion*,<sup>726</sup> and in the North Stoa, which had presumably contained a military store of sling bullets and large stone catapult balls<sup>727</sup> – and the removal of the South Stoa monuments.<sup>728</sup>

Excavations at Carthage, by contrast, have revealed some frightening signs of the horrors that took place there in 146 – especially on Byrsa. There, in a layer some 2-3 meters thick, the residential district was covered in a destruction layer consisting of burned domestic items (pottery, figurines, cookware) and bones (both animal and human), mixed with rubble.<sup>729</sup> Even more disturbing was a discovery made in the southwest corner of the hill. There, late nineteenth-century excavations came across an unlined burial pit, covering earlier Punic tombs and filled with several hundred skeletons, carefully aligned and stacked, about four to five skulls deep in two end-to-end rows.<sup>730</sup> In two other locations, there are thinner burn-layers: in the ruined remains of a small, Late Punic house on the lower southern slopes of Byrsa, which had held a large number of transport amphora;<sup>731</sup> and in the military harbor, prior to its reconstruction in the Roman period.<sup>732</sup> And across the entire city, all sites that had been occupied during the Late Punic period – from Byrsa to Quartier Magon and Bir Massouda – were covered in a

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<sup>726</sup> As the so-called “Columned Hall” to the west of the South Stoa has been identified, on the basis of two inscribed marble counting tables/abaci found at the site, reading ΔΙΟΣ ΒΟΥΛΕΟΣ ΔΑΜΟΣΙΑ ΚΟ/PINΘΙΩΝ and ΣΤΡΑΤΑ[ΓΙΟΝ]: cf. Williams (1978: 56).

<sup>727</sup> Scranton, *Corinth* I.iii, 175.

<sup>728</sup> Broneer, *Corinth* I.iv, 100.

<sup>729</sup> Cf. *Byrsa I-II* – esp. II, pp. 15-18, with an overview of the area’s stratigraphy.

<sup>730</sup> This “fosse commune” was excavated by Delattre in 1890, and it does not conform to any other example of Punic burial. See Delattre (1891; 1893: 114-118; 1896: 77-80); Lancel (1988: 85-6) – and *Byrsa I*, p. 21, no.s 20-22; Soren et al. (1990).

<sup>731</sup> = Tunisian rescue excavations, Rue Astarté: *Cedac* 3, p. 29; Chelbi 1984, *BAC 17B*, p. 21-33.

<sup>732</sup> Hurst (1979: 27-8).

substantial layer that has been dubbed the “*RBPS*” (“*Römisch bewegte punische Schichten*”).<sup>733</sup> As a recognizable layer from site to site, it represents a massive project of cleanup and re-leveling completed during the Augustan period – in some ways, a “re-destruction” prior to colonial re-foundation of the city. For the *RBPS*, dated by the presence of the occasional Augustan-period amphora handle, contains a dense mix of Late Punic domestic material (coarse and fine wares, amphorae, figurines, beads, bones, etc.) dumped and spread out to create a new level for the Roman city.<sup>734</sup>

As at Corinth, then, a major part of re-founding Carthage consisted of a cleanup operation, mostly of material not otherwise indicative of violent disturbance. At Carthage, however, the sheer amount of material gathered was on a much larger scale – a testament to widespread violence, which if nothing else left so much domestic material available for terrace-works and leveling. And although no work has yet been done to study whether any of the *RBPS* contains interim period material (for the moment, none has been identified), the strongest impression is that Carthage, unlike Corinth, experienced extensive destruction and abandonment.<sup>735</sup>

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<sup>733</sup> See also above – p. 233.

<sup>734</sup> Rue Ibn Chabaât excavations (adjacent to Quartier Magon), where an unburied skeleton – a possible casualty of war – was also found: *Cedac 1*, p. 6; Rakob (1990: 41) and 1997, *Cedac 16-7*, p. 15 and 53; Bir Massouda: Bechtold (2010). On Byrsa, the original destruction layer was covered by sequential layers of mixed sand and gravel, followed by the *RBPS*, as part of an immense re-terracing of the hill: cf. *Byrsa II*, p.15-18.

<sup>735</sup> Note: in the Salamambo area, to the west of the commercial harbor, two Late Punic sites do not show signs of re-occupation until the late Roman period! = a home excavated to the south of Salamambo, overlain by a Byzantine level (*Cedac 3*, p. 17); and “Carton’s Chapel,” a Punic-era sanctuary near the Salamambo rail-station, followed by a late Roman cemetery (*Cedac 8*, p. 13; Carton, 1929. “Un sanctuaire punique découverte à Carthage”).

As discussed by Polybius, then, the “destruction” wrought at Corinth was of a different nature than at Carthage, traumatic in another sense. At Corinth, the wounds were political and ideological, with less of the physical force inflicted at Carthage. According to later sources, Mummius, in the wake of his victory, called an assembly of the Achaian League and announced all of its cities to be free – with the marked exception of Corinth, whose current inhabitants were to be sold in slavery, whose walls and public monuments were to be demolished, and whose control over the pan-Hellenic Isthmian Games were to be transferred to the Sicyonians.<sup>736</sup> In this context, Polybius’ discussion of his involvement in post-war arrangements in Greece gains added meaning. He rather proudly records his key role in saving and restoring statues of Philopoemen to cities across the Peloponnese.<sup>737</sup> It was thus the civic and cultural heritage that was at stake in Corinth in particular, as a showcase to the rest of the Greek world, over and above the physical toll. It is for this reason, then, that the only archaeological evidence for “destruction” at Corinth involves the carting away of public statues and the abandonment of former civic buildings. And indeed, later historical tradition tells of “Corinthiaka” – a flooding of the art-market and of Italy in particular with Corinthian bronze statuary and fine vases.<sup>738</sup> Polybius apparently even told of Roman soldiers playing cards over up-

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<sup>736</sup> Cf. Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 1.2.5; 2.51; Paus. 2.2.2. This proclamation of Greek freedom was clearly intended as a parallel with that of Flamininus. Note that Mummius received “thanksgiving” honors from a number of Peloponnesian cities, again in a manner comparable with Flamininus (as well as Paullus) – see below – pp. 96ff.

<sup>737</sup> Given this account, it is perhaps interesting to note that excavators at Corinth discovered a “trophy” statue-base set up in the vicinity of the *Strategeion*, around the time it was destroyed? – cf. Williams (1978: 56-8).

<sup>738</sup> Livy, *Per.* 52a-b, Strabo 8.381b, Plin. *H.N.* 34.7, Flor. 1.32.6-7, Vict. *Vir.Ill.* 60.3; Oros. 5.3.6-7.

ended great-master paintings set up as tables<sup>739</sup> – a different, yet still meaningful violence done to the city, now cheapened and stripped of its cultural heritage – a key feature in the pride of place for Hellenistic *poleis* on an international level.

To go along with this, Corinth's very status as a *polis* was removed, leaving it at most to exist as a mere village, its lands becoming *ager publicus* – the public property of Rome.<sup>740</sup> In this latter, and significant punishment upon the defeated, there is a strong and deliberate parallel being made, evidently by order and decree of the Senate, between Corinth and Carthage, since Carthage too was decommissioned as a city and made into *ager publicus*.<sup>741</sup> Here, then, was a meaningful new precedent in Roman imperial expansion, beyond Italy and Sicily at least – one that was being extended into territories that had not been former holdings of another state (as Sicily had once been to Carthage), or the private estates of a king (as in the lands of King Hiero of Syracuse), but fully autonomous, long-standing *poleis* of the Hellenistic international system.<sup>742</sup> It was a

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<sup>739</sup> Polyb. 39.2 – fragment as cited by Strabo VIII.6.28.

<sup>740</sup> Cf. Lex Agraria of 111 BCE = *CIL* I.585. One clause in particular indicates that Carthage was no longer considered a *polis* at this time: “*extraque eum agrum locum ubi oppodum Char[tago] fuit.*” This issue then raises the question of a curse being laid on Carthage (and later, Corinth). There is no contemporary evidence to support this. However, it is not out of the question that Scipio would have engaged in some sort of formal, ritual process to “un-found” the city, if it was to cease to exist and to subsequently become *ager publicus*. The late Roman author Macrobius records just such a formula, indicating that it was spoken both at Carthage and at Corinth – cf. *Sat.* 3.9.10-11. An imperial inscription found at Carthage does claim to be a copy of Scipio's original dedication of the site (*consecratio*) to Lord Ba'al – see *CRAI* 1966. For other Roman-period descriptions of Carthage's *consecratio*, see Cicero, *Leg.Agr.* 1.5, 2.51; and App. *Lib.* 135. For the act of plowing as a reversal of the Roman act of city foundation, see Modestinus *Dig.* 7.4.21; and Pliny, *HN* 26.19. Florus adds an odd detail, stating that a trumpet was played at the destruction (1.33.5) – though this could simply be a confusion between ritual and military signaling.

<sup>741</sup> Lex Agraria of 111 BCE, *CIL* I.585; see also Cicero, *Leg.Agr.* 1.5, 2.51 (land for sale in Rullus' land-list, 64-3 BCE); cf. Lintott (1992).

<sup>742</sup> On *ager publicus* in Sicily (Syracuse in particular), see Eckstein (1987: 164-5), *contra* Holm (1898), who argues that all of Syracuse – not just the Hieronic estates – became *ager publicus*. See also Frank (1927); Pritchard (1975), with further discussion.

significant move indeed, and one that would have driven home a much more permanent presence for Roman hegemony, and like never before, on a pan-Mediterranean level.

## 146 BCE & HISTORY: CYCLES OF WORLD EMPIRE

After 146, Polybius thus chose to extend his monumental *Histories* to a second endpoint – a point at which the entire Hellenistic *oikoumenē* had been pulled in a new direction. It was not so much a question of Rome as dominant power, however – this had already been established with some degree of international recognition after Pydna (Polybius’ original endpoint).<sup>743</sup> It was much more a question of *how* Rome was to be characterized as world hegemon, with what outlook – and how lesser states were to respond.<sup>744</sup> And in a pairing of rousing finality – the very sort of imperial moment that had been awaited (with mixed feelings and expectations, certainly), the events of 146 presented a juncture for debate. The end of Polybius’ *Histories*, then, brought a unique hinging-point. For it was at once a product of contemporary *Zeitgeist*, a conscious

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<sup>743</sup> Cf. Polyb. 1.1.5-6, 1.3.1, also 6.2.3 (“53 years” for Rome to subject the *oikoumenē*; starting from the 140<sup>th</sup> Olympiad, 220 BCE), 3.1ff. (starting points of the *Histories* proper – excluding introductory historical overviews in Books 1 and 2 – are set as the Social War, Hannibalic War, and the war for Coele-Syria, in the 140<sup>th</sup> Olympiad; endpoint to be in the “destruction of the Macedonian monarchy,” with an intervening space of 53yrs = 220 – 167 BCE). In the meantime, in the wake of Pydna, other forms of Hellenic literature, from the laudatory and myth-historic to the apocalyptic, had also shifted their focus to Rome as imperial *archē* – see above, pp. 108ff.

<sup>744</sup> This is clear from Polybius’ explanation of the extension (3.4.1ff.): *Now if from their success or failure alone we could form an adequate judgment of how far states and individuals are worthy of praise or blame, I could here lay down my pen, bringing my narrative and this whole work to a close with the last-mentioned events [= destruction of the Macedonian monarchy], as was my original intention. For the period of fifty-three years finished here, and the growth and advance of Roman power was now complete... But since judgments regarding either the conquerors or the conquered based purely on performance are by no means final – what is thought to be the greatest success having brought the greatest calamities on many, if they do not make proper use of it, and the most dreadful catastrophes often turning out to the advantage of those who support them bravely – I must append to the history of the above period an account of the subsequent policy of the conquerors and their method of universal rule, as well as of the various opinions and appreciations of their rulers entertained by the subjects...*

looking-back to a *longue durée* of world history, and a creation of an entirely new reference position with which to consider the future. As a conclusion to this study, therefore, we will consider the fulcrum-point of 146. On the one hand, we will do so in terms of ancient historiographical thought, regarding synchronisms, universal world history and its imperial cycles, and the fall of cities (with Troy as the paradigm). On the other, we will do so with an eye to how second-century principles affected future perspectives, together enshrining 146 as a moment with which to draw a line, to interpret Rome as an imperial power and to posit possible beginnings for its change.

As was discussed earlier, the contemporary second-century BCE international community was already primed to experience a major set of events on a pan-Mediterranean level. Since Pydna, a wider international discourse had gained momentum – one that viewed Rome as a new power in the *oikoumenē*, and as a state with a unique position *vis à vis* Hellenism. At the same time, such Hellenism itself was finding new definitions and was increasingly becoming involved in an interlinking of diverse political and cultural arenas (characterized by Polybius as a *symplokē*).<sup>745</sup> In such a self-conscious age, long-standing historiographical traditions – especially those involving the nature of “universal” history and its chronology – gained added meaning and scope. Greek historians had long held an interest in synchronicity and the linking of events across time and geographic/political space – sometimes over great distances, and tracing back to the realms of mythic and legendary pasts. Doing so allowed these authors to bring together an otherwise incomprehensible mix of local histories and regional calendars – and

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<sup>745</sup> See above – pp. 65ff.

thereby build interpretative frameworks for a broader scale and set of destinies across an expanding Hellenic world.<sup>746</sup>

The synchronistic tradition can be detected as early as Herodotus, for whom there existed a neat and compelling symmetry between pan-Hellenic battles fought against barbarian threats, on land and on sea: Salamis and Himera, Thermopylai and Artemision, Plataiai and Mykale.<sup>747</sup> The tradition continued and was made into a Hellenistic science by the late third century BCE. Eratosthenes, in an approach analogous to his system for measuring the circumference of the earth, devised a framework for measuring world history – one that became a standard for later historians and even today continues to anchor ancient events to modern BCE/CE. In his *Chronographiae*, Eratosthenes used Olympiads to align across various Hellenic systems (archonships, kingships, vastly different calendric systems), pulling together the whole trajectory of the Greek *oikoumenē*, from the fall of Troy to the death of Alexander.<sup>748</sup>

It was just this sort of systematic “synchronography” (to coin a phrase) that Timaeus applied to his history of Sicily and the western Mediterranean – a history that, despite Polybius’ abuses, had been motivated by an ambitious and telling, if not groundbreaking vision. For it represents the earliest known attempt to integrate the histories of the western and eastern Greeks with those of Rome and Carthage, utilizing the then latest systems of historical timekeeping (from Olympiads to Argive priestesses,

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<sup>746</sup> For much more detail – and an excellent discussion – on synchronism, the construction of Greek histories, and the integration of Rome into these systems, see Feeney (2008).

<sup>747</sup> Salamis and Himera (Hdt. 7.166); Thermopylai and Artemision (Hdt. 8.15); Plataiai and Mykale (Hdt. 9.90, 100ff.).

<sup>748</sup> Cf. *FGrH* F241; Fraser (1971); Feeney (2008: 19).

archons to kings and ephors). The fragments that remain of Timaeus' work provide a window into the diverse links meticulously plotted, each one with underlying, symbolic significance: Euripides' birth coinciding with Salamis – his death with the accession of Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse;<sup>749</sup> Alexander's birth and the burning down of the Artemision at Ephesus;<sup>750</sup> the founding of Carthage and Rome in the same year;<sup>751</sup> or the capture of the cult-statue of Apollo at Alexander's sack of Tyre, seventy-three years to the day and hour on which the statue was first taken by the Carthaginians from Gela.<sup>752</sup>

Polybius might have blasted Timaeus' work, in a large digression in Book 12, for its factual inaccuracies, biases, and illogical claims, but he makes no direct discussion (positive or negative) of Timaeus' approach to synchronography, and in this, there are a number of important contemporary trends being made evident.<sup>753</sup> To begin with, Polybius felt it necessary to address and challenge Timaeus' history – it was apparently influential (and indeed, it inspired the later synchronographic work of first-century BCE Roman authors Varro, Nepos, and Atticus).<sup>754</sup> At the same time, Timaeus' work appears to have

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<sup>749</sup> *FGrH* 566 F105.

<sup>750</sup> *FGrH* 566 F150.

<sup>751</sup> *FGrH* 566 F60.

<sup>752</sup> *FGrH* 566 F106. For modern scholarship on Timaeus, see Brown (1958); Walbank, *Comm.* II. 347-8; Meister (1989-1990); Pearson (1975; 1987); Feeney (2008).

<sup>753</sup> Cf. Polyb. 12.3-16 – esp. 12.4: “... *Timaeus, while making a great parade of accuracy, is, in my opinion, wont to be very short of the truth. So far is he from accurate investigation of the truth by questioning others that not even about matters he has even with his own eyes and places he has actually visited does he tell us anything trustworthy...*”

and 12.7: “*Timaeus frequently makes false statements. He appears to me not to be in general uninformed... but his judgment to be darkened by prejudice; and when he once sets himself to blame or to praise anyone he forgets everything and departs very widely from his duty as a historian...*”

and 12.12: “*We should indeed reprove and ridicule the frenzy of those authors who dream dreams and write like men possessed. But those who indulge freely p341themselves in this kind of foolery should, far from accusing others, be only too glad if they escape blame themselves. Such is the case with Timaeus.*”

<sup>754</sup> See Feeney (2008: 18ff.).

fed into the same *Zeitgeist* as Polybius' *Histories*, which itself was driven by some of the same basic concepts: i.e., that political events and relationships across wider distances of the *oikoumenē* were becoming ever more interlinked, and that the *archē* of that world was being pulled to the west. And as it did so, both historians were reacting to Rome's wars with Carthage (at first over Sicily – Timaeus' regional home) as determining which power would look to the east, the processes involved being somehow connected to the ever-rotating wheel of Fate (Tyche).<sup>755</sup> Polybius also included his fair share of synchronicities, with Carthage and Corinth in 146 providing the revised ending to his entire work, and with a strongly Eratosthenian time marker setting his general introduction, with an overview of history prior to 220 BCE.<sup>756</sup> At heart, then, both Timaeus and Polybius were ultimately interested in linked destinies, between Rome, Carthage, and the Greek east. Their respective emphases on Tyche and their interpretations of causal linkages (not to mention their cultural biases), however, set them apart. And for this reason, Polybius makes it clear that his history, as a continuation of (and to a certain extent, antidote for) Timaeus' treatment, was to be distinguished as an inherently *political* work – one to be read as an instructive guide to current and future statesmen regarding their practice. For Tyche had her grand designs, but the final determining factor of achievement in the face of these greater forces, of maintaining honor and survival for the state – whether in success or defeat – ultimately rested in the

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<sup>755</sup> On Timaeus and these concepts, see Feeney (2008: 47-8). On Polybius and these concepts, see above – pp. 289ff.

<sup>756</sup> = Polyb. 1.6.1-2, where he synchronizes the Spartan peace of Antalcidas with Persia, Dionysius' siege of Rhegium, and the Gallic sack of Rome.

hands and moral conduct of statesmen (not the random accidents and eerie coincidences of the sensational as in Timaeus and his like).<sup>757</sup>

From this perspective, then, Polybius sought to engage with and re-direct contemporary responses to 146, away from some of the popular tendencies toward myth-heroic dramatization and more along a path guiding history to a political-scientific purpose. In doing so, he also interacted with related theories regarding the rise-and-fall of kingdoms and empires – the greater phenomena Polybius saw played out in Rome’s rise to international *archē* and as fueled by *anacyclosis*, the cyclical growth and decay of all *politeiai*, great and small alike. 146 was thus a scheme of individual cities – Rome, Carthage, and Corinth, each on separate trajectories of political evolution, growth, decay, and fall – to be fitted into a framework of world history and that history’s greatest imperial powers. This is evident in Polybius’ review of the broader picture of Greek history, from Xerxes’ invasion onward, held up as a comparison to the tragedy of the Greeks in 146.<sup>758</sup> And it is also evident in his recounting of “Demetrius’ maxim” – a pondering by Perseus on the reversals of Fortune, placed at what was originally planned as the ending of the *Histories*, and what eventually served as a mirror to Scipio’s remarks at Carthage.<sup>759</sup>

Contemporary audiences would have recognized and immediately attached significance to these references to the cycles of imperial world history. For alongside the tradition of synchronism, Greek historiography also had deep roots in the practice of

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<sup>757</sup> See Eckstein (1995).

<sup>758</sup> = Polyb. 38.2-3 – see discussion above, pp. 310ff.

<sup>759</sup> See discussion below – pp. 333ff.

dividing the past into a particular set of great kingdoms/empires, following one upon the other across millennia. From the mythic-prehistoric Ages of Hesiod, there developed a conception of three successive eastern kingdoms (Assyrian, Median, then Persian) coming into fateful contact with the Greek world – a destiny that would make the Greeks (and the Macedonians) the fourth heirs to global power. The beginnings of the sequence can be first detected in Herodotus,<sup>760</sup> and appear about a century later in the *Persica* of Ctesias.<sup>761</sup> And in the wake of Alexander’s conquests, the *topos* developed further, becoming a favorite among prophetic texts, which restlessly told of a more glorious kingdom yet to come, and in doing so, presumably gave voice to the discontent felt in an era of many monarchies, constant wars, and (for some, oppressive) power wielded from afar. The pattern could vary,<sup>762</sup> but they all tapped into a now accepted view of cyclical world history, and an equal anticipation of something greater: either a realization of Alexander’s pan-Hellenic dream, or a return to local/regional freedom.<sup>763</sup>

Such historiographical traditions eventually combined and solidified as they came into contact with the growing power of Rome and with Roman intellectuals thinking on the subject. The end result was a more clearly defined four-plus-one sequence, with Rome all too readily becoming the anticipated and prophesied fifth kingdom. The process

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<sup>760</sup> Hdt. 1.95-130: overviewing the history of the great kingdoms of the Assyrians, followed by the Medes, and followed by the Persians, whose failed invasion of Greece lies at the heart of Herodotus’ inquiry.

<sup>761</sup> Cited by Diod. 2.1-34; cf. 2.21.8 = Assyrians to Medes; and 2.34.6 = Medes to Persians.

<sup>762</sup> For a good overview of the tradition, see Mendels (1981), responding to (and tempering) the discussion by Swain (1940). The examples include *Daniel* 2; 7; 8 (mentioning four great kingdoms to be replaced by a more glorious fifth); the Third Sibylline Oracle (vv. 157-160), which lists more than four kingdoms in succession: Egypt, Persia, Media, Aethiopia, Assyria and Babylonia, Macedonia, Egypt and Rome; cf. also the Testament of Naphtali.

<sup>763</sup> For the latter, see the testimony of Agatharcides of Knidos – below, p. 331.

was in motion during the second century – and as we have seen, Rome was clearly being discussed as the latest great world power, for good and for ill. Unfortunately, however, there is no evidence currently surviving of the paradigm’s development within mainstream, pro-Roman historical texts of the time. There is, however, the ominous testimony of the Third Sibylline Oracle, which is usually dated to the 140s BCE.<sup>764</sup> Its text shifts the prophecy away from the point of heralding Rome, and instead adds steps to the sequence, foretelling of Rome’s demise. By the first century BCE, the pro-Roman texts come to the fore. Castor of Rhodes, in his *Chronica*, began his world history with King Ninus of Assyria (linked via synchronism to King Aegialeus of Sicyon) and ended with Pompey’s conquests in the East.<sup>765</sup> And a generation later, Dionysius of Halicarnassus presented the four-plus-one paradigm, fully formed, providing a sequence of world kingdoms from Assyria to Media, Persia to Macedonia, and ending with Rome.<sup>766</sup> From that point on, the scheme becomes fully ingrained into Roman tradition – from Varro<sup>767</sup> to Pompeius Trogus,<sup>768</sup> to Velleius,<sup>769</sup> and only requiring tangential

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<sup>764</sup> On the date, see Gruen (1984: p. 340), with citations.

<sup>765</sup> Cf. Feeney (2008: 63ff.), who also notes the influence Castor had on later Roman authors, including Nepos, Atticus, and Varro. Castor, also engaging in synchronography, reportedly ended Book 1 of the *Chronica* in the year 754 BCE, a year prior to Rome’s founding and the year in which the life archonship at Athens had ended and the powers of the Spartan kings had been curbed – a prophetic symbolism of Greek decline and Roman future...

<sup>766</sup> Cf. Dion. *A.R.* 1.2-3. The Fourth Sibylline Oracle contains the same paradigm, though its date is debated (usually placed ca. 80 CE, with earlier Hellenistic roots).

<sup>767</sup> Varro is cited by Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* 18.2, as making connections across time and space – e.g. between Ninus of Assyria and Sicyon. Augustine later (21) mentions a chronology (though not explicitly naming Varro), which traced history from the Assyrians to Medes, and was synchronized with Amulius, grandfather of Romulus and Remus.

<sup>768</sup> Epitomized in Justin. Book 1, which lists Assyrians, Medes, followed by Persians. Bks 2ff. then recounts a history of Greece/Macedonia, and ends, with Bks. 18ff., on Rome. See also 30.4.4: *As all men were alarmed at this prodigy [EQs at Thera and Rhodes, 198 BCE], the soothsayers predicted that the rising power of the Romans would swallow up the ancient empire of the Greeks and Macedonians.*

reference by the times of Tacitus,<sup>770</sup> Appian,<sup>771</sup> and Aelius Aristides.<sup>772</sup>

No matter the details of the progression of world kingdoms concept, it was clearly a theme in the intellectual mindset of the Mediterranean in 146. For this was a point for historical synchronism, ready to be placed somewhere in the map of imperial histories. Just where, however, was a matter of great debate. Polybius hints at this in his digression on the Greek world's varied responses to the Third Punic War (see above). The insertion of the debate, however, was not only a commentary on the wider, international ripple effect the war caused, or a weighing-in by Polybius on the widespread misunderstandings of Roman diplomatic practice. It was also a very real document of the types of political-philosophical thought and discussions that were on the tips of tongues at the time. For on the one hand – and as we have seen – Hellenistic international power had for some time been legitimized in the language of great and noble kingship, with treatises published on the proper functions and necessary virtues of kings, as shepherds to their flocks, wise and awe-inspiring, terrifying in righteousness, and yet also fair and beneficent to their

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<sup>769</sup> = Vell. Pat. 1.6.1-2, from Aemilius Sura, in a gloss inserted into the text of Vell. Pat. 1.6.6: *Aemilius Sura de annis populi Romani: Assyrii principes omnium gentium rerum potiti sunt, deinde Medi, postea Persae, deinde Macedones; exinde duobus regibus Philippo et Antiocho, qui a Macedonibus oriundi erant, haud multo post Carthaginem subactam deuictis summa imperii ad populum Romanum pervenit. Inter hoc tempus et initium regis Nini Assyriorum, qui princeps rerum potitus, inter- sunt anni MDCCCXCV.* The date of Aemilius Sura is unfortunately a matter up for debate – some believe he dates to the second century BCE (which would fill a gap in evidence), but this cannot be confirmed.

<sup>770</sup> Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.8-9 (history of Judea).

<sup>771</sup> Appian, *Praef.* 6-11 – esp. 9.

<sup>772</sup> Aelius Aristides, *Panath.* 234, where he quickly recaps the four-plus-one sequence without names, revealing its common-knowledge acceptance: *Again, history records five empires, and may their number not increase. In the time of the oldest of these, the Assyrian, occurred the first deeds of the city's history, and the anecdotes about the gods fall in this period. In the time of the second occurred the rise of the city. The third she completely defeated. In the fourth, she [Roma] alone held out and came off best of all. In the time of the empire now established, which is in all respects the best and greatest, she holds the place of honor in the whole Hellenic world, and has so fared that one could not wish for her the old circumstances instead of the present.* See Swain (1940); Mendels (1981).

subjects, as the gods were to the *kosmos*.<sup>773</sup> In this context, then, both Scipio and Mummius were primed to be seen as “kingly” figures on the international stage (though certainly not back home in Rome!). Polybius alludes to this in his description of Scipio at Carthage, as a “great and perfect man – a man, in short, worthy to be remembered.”<sup>774</sup> And a series of inscriptions honoring Mummius testify to the continuation of a Hellenistic-style practice, hailing the general (in a manner parallel to honors earlier granted to eastern kings, as well as to Flamininus in 196-4 BCE, Paullus in 168-7) for his excellence and benevolence towards individual cities and other Greeks in general.<sup>775</sup>

And it was important that both men projected such great-king images on an international level – they had both just unmade an independent *polis*. That such action needed confirmation as being just and fair, rather than oppressive and tyrannical, connected with a matter of great political-philosophical debate – a debate sensationalized by Carneades in his ambassadorial visit to Rome about a decade earlier (155 BCE). The details of Carneades’ controversial speeches while in Rome have unfortunately not survived - there only remain a general summary given by Lactantius and a dialogue in Cicero’s *Republic* that stands only in indirect relation, as a composite of multiple

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<sup>773</sup> Cf. Goodenough (1928); Murray (1971, 2007); Walbank (1985); Bringmann (1993); Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993: 114ff.); Smith (1993); Bilde (1996); Gruen (1996); Schofield (1999: 743ff.); Ma (2005); Eckstein (2009); Strootman (2011). See also above - pp. 95ff.

<sup>774</sup> Polyb. 38.21.3: ἀνδρός ἐστι μέγαλου καὶ τελείου καὶ συλλήβδην ἀξίου μνήμης.

<sup>775</sup> E.g. *Burstein* 78 (= *I. Olympia* 319; *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 676): “*The city of the Eleians (honors) Lucius Mummius, son of Lucius, consul of the Romans, for his excellence and the benevolence which he continues to have for it and the other Greeks.*” On Flamininus and international Hellenism in this context, see above – pp. 95ff. For comparison between Mummius’ and Flamininus’ declarations of Greek freedom, see above.

philosophies.<sup>776</sup> But the essence of Carneades' arguments fit right into what is otherwise known about Hellenistic political theory regarding international power. He reportedly gave two lectures on justice, on the first day presenting arguments in favor of the concept, and on the second, negating them all. And according to Lactantius, he did so "in the manner of a rhetorical exercise," using sophistic argumentation (e.g. *reductio ad absurdum*) to undermine the very notion that true justice could exist. In doing so, he was entering – with devastating results – a debate that had first been brought to the fore by Plato, followed by Aristotle, who had together outlined an existence of natural/true justice, in relation to a civil (and in Aristotle's discussion), imperial form of justice.<sup>777</sup>

To summarize this philosophical background: Plato had originally framed his inquiry by introducing a "challenge" of Thrasymachus (*Rep.* 343c-344c), that justice was merely a social construct introduced by the strong to have the weak serve the their interests. The rest of Plato's *Republic* was thus built as a response defending the existence of true justice, viewing it as manifest in the hierarchy of the state, which in turn reflected the hierarchy of mind/soul over body. Such an order, if properly constructed, thus served the best interests of all, strong and weak alike. (Polybius was clearly influenced by this premise in his theory of *anacyclosis* and the cycles in the health of

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<sup>776</sup> = Lact. *Div. inst.* 5.14.3-5 and *Epit.* 50.8: *When he [Carneades] was sent by Athens as an ambassador to Rome, he discoursed at length on justice in the hearing of Galba and Cato the Censor, the foremost orators of the time. On the next day, he overturned his own discourse on the opposite side, and subverted justice, which he had praised on the previous day, not with the seriousness of a philosopher, whose opinion should be firm and stable, but in the manner of a rhetorical exercise in which argument is given, pro and contra... With the object of refuting Aristotle and Plato, supporters of justice, Carneades in his first discourse assembled all the arguments in favor of justice, in order that he might overturn them, as he did... not because he thought justice ought to be disparaged, but to show that its defenders had no certain or firm arguments about it.* (transl. by Long and Sedley (1987: no. 68M). For the passage in Cicero, see *Rep.* 3.8-29. See the summary and discussion in Baronowski (2011: 17ff.).

<sup>777</sup> For the following summarization, see in particular Brown (2011) and Baronowski (2011: 18-19).

*politeiai*). Aristotle built upon these ideas and laid the groundwork for Hellenistic political philosophy, by taking the interrelationship between natural and civil justice and applying it to international governance. He defended imperial power, dividing it into two main forms. The first was *despoteia*, which was paralleled with slavery on an individual level. Aristotle argued (in a continuation of Plato's hierarchic order) that such subordination was just for as long as master and slave were each suited to their stations. And although such hierarchy was of benefit to the governed, it was aimed primarily at the interests of the rulers. The second form was *hegemonia*, which was paralleled with the rule of father over family. Such governance – unlike *despoteia* – benefited both, but was ultimately aimed at the interests of the ruled.<sup>778</sup>

Carneades' lectures seem to have entered the fray at this juncture – and considering the normative rhetoric regarding just kingship that was prevalent at the time, rocked all convention involving the justification of empire, and Roman power in particular. For by undermining the very concepts of natural and/or civil justice, Carneades would have by extension (if not explicitly) disconnected international empire, whether as *hegemonia* or *despoteia*, from benefit to the ruled, leaving the eye-opening conclusion that Roman international power could not ever be said to be just. And this very sort of argument was already being voiced by other intellectuals of the day. Agatharcides of Knidos, for example – the author of *On the Erythraean Sea*, written during reign of Ptolemy VI (180-145 BCE) – made it abundantly clear that he saw the expansionism of empire (Hellenistic kingdoms and Rome equally guilty) as

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<sup>778</sup> Cf. Baronowski (2011: 19 – extensive primary and secondary sources cited at n. 4).

fundamentally unjust. For such practices, in his view, undermined natural law, corrupting native populations and their traditional, and happier (even if they were considered “less advanced”) ways of life. *Hegemonia* was an illusion, and *despoteia* held no benefit to the ruled, for it was for them wicked and inexpedient to its core.<sup>779</sup>

By contrast, however – and in support and justification of Rome – stood the responses of men such as Panaetius (a known personal friend to Scipio). These responses saw the Romans as common benefactors (*koinoi euergetai* – as they had begun to be eulogized in inscriptions in the East).<sup>780</sup> Rome’s power was a necessary and beneficial world *hegemonia* – a natural order that was for the service of those being ruled. The argument appears, in echoed form, in Cicero’s dialogue in the *Republic*, put into the speech of Laelius: Rome provided a system of international order in which the wicked were prevented from doing evil and those incapable of exercising their own autonomy were afforded civil justice – and by extension, those that were capable, were left free.<sup>781</sup> Here, then, was the heart of the debate (ostensibly over the Third Punic War) that Polybius describes at 36.9.<sup>782</sup> And here was where 146 served an added significance – for some, marking confirmation of Roman *despoteia*, as being against the good of the ruled, and for others (the Romans in particular), marking confirmation of Roman *hegemonia*, the rule of the best, which eliminated the unjust (Carthage in breaking international law) and those who failed to adequately rule themselves (Corinth/the Achaian League).

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<sup>779</sup> See Fraser (1972: I.173-4, 515-7, 539-553); Ferrary (1988: 232-6); Burstein (1989); Verdin (1990); Clarke (1999: 62-3); Baronowski (2011: 22-4, 26-7, 53-4).

<sup>780</sup> See above – p. 113.

<sup>781</sup> See Baronowski (2011: 21-22), with citations.

<sup>782</sup> See discussion above, pp. 284ff.

As for Polybius' views on the matter, we have already seen the ambivalence with which he weighed in on the debate at 36.9. However, his treatment of Scipio's final victory over Carthage – although tantalizingly fragmentary – provides some clues, as well as additional indications of the ways in which the debate over Roman international power intersected with contemporary thought regarding history, tragedy, and the fall of great cities. And the clues suggest that Polybius perhaps considered Rome – and Scipio in particular – as in this world-historical moment at least, embodying a just *hegemonia*. The juncture is the famed “tears of Scipio” scene, which has survived in three main versions, beginning with Polybius. All three are repeated here, for comparison:

1. Polybius (38.21.1-3):

καὶ ... χ ... ς ἐπεισαγαγο ... δε ... σδ ... αυ ... της ... ἐπειμιαν ... τι ... παρ ... καὶ δι ...  
 νι ... τὸ δίκαιον εὐ ... ρων φησιν ὁ πολυβίος ἐγὼν ὅτι καὶ τιν(ο) ... ραν ἐπι ... ἀν  
 ... **τούτου καλλιον** ... οὐτ ... καὶ **τοῦτ' εἴρηται παρὰ [τῷ ποιητῆ:]** καὶ  
 ἐπιστρέψας ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ λαβόμενός μου τῆς δεξιᾶς 'ὦ Πολύβιε,' ἔφη 'καλὸν  
 μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐγὼ δέδια καὶ προορῶμαι μὴ ποτέ τις ἄλλος τοῦτο τὸ  
 παράγγελμα δώσει περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πατρίδος.' ταύτης δὲ δύναμιν  
 πραγματικωτέραν καὶ νουνεχεστέραν οὐ ῥάδιον εἶπεῖν: τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς  
 μεγίστοις κατορθώμασι καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν συμφοραῖς ἔνοιαν λαμβάνειν  
 τῶν οἰκείων πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας περιστάσεως καὶ καθόλου  
 πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιτυχίαις τὴν τῆς τύχης ἐπισφάλειαν ἀνδρός ἐστὶ  
 μεγάλου καὶ τελείου καὶ συλλήβδην ἀξίου μνήμης.

*... the just ... says Polybius ... what is more glorious than this... and this he  
 proclaimed, by/quoting the poet... and turning round to me at once and  
 grasping my hand Scipio said, "A glorious moment, Polybius; but I have a dread  
 foreboding that some day the same doom will be pronounced on my own  
 country." It would be difficult to mention an utterance more statesmanlike and  
 more profound. For at the moment of our greatest triumph, and of disaster to  
 our enemies, to reflect on our own situation and on the possible reversal of  
 circumstances, and generally to bear in mind at the season of success the  
 mutability of Fortune, is like a great and perfect man, a man in short worthy to  
 be remembered.*

2. Diodorus (32.24):

ὅτι τῆς Καθηδόνας ἐμπρησθείσης καὶ τῆς φλογὸς ἅπασαν τὴν πόλιν καταπληκτικῶς λυμαινομένης, ὁ Σκιπίων ἀπροσποιητῶς **ἐδάκρυεν**. **ἐρωτηθεὶς** δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Πολυβίου τοῦ ἐπιστάτου τίνος ἔνεκα τοῦτο πάσχει εἶπε, “Διότι τῆς κατὰ τὴν τύχην μεταβολῆς ἔννοιαν λαμβάνω: ἔσσεσθαι γὰρ ἴσως ποτέ τινα καιρὸν **ἐν ᾧ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάθος ὑπάρξει κατὰ τὴν Ῥώμην**.” καὶ τούτους τοὺς στίχους παρὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ **προηγέκατο**, “ἔσσεται ἡμαρ ὅταν ποτ’ ὀλώλη Ἴλιος ἱρὴ καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς.”

*When Carthage had been put to the torch and the flames were doing their awful work of devastation throughout the whole city, Scipio **wept** unabashedly. **Asked** by Polybius, his mentor, why he was thus affected, he said: "Because I am reflecting on the fickleness of Fortune. Some day, perhaps, the time will come when a **similar fate shall overtake Rome**." **And he cited** these lines from the poet, Homer: "The day will come when sacred Ilium shall perish / And Priam and his people shall be slain."*

3. Appian (*Pun.* 132):

ὁ δὲ Σκιπίων πόλιν ὀρώων ... τότε ἄρδην τελευτῶσαν ἐς πανωλεθρίαν ἐσχάτην, λέγεται μὲν **δακρῦσαι** καὶ φανερὸς γενέσθαι κλαίων ὑπὲρ πολεμίων ... εἴτε ἐκὼν εἴτε προφυγόντος αὐτὸν **τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους**, “ἔσσεται ἡμαρ ὅταν ποτ’ ὀλώλη Ἴλιος ἱρὴ καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς εὐμμελίω Πριάμοιο.” **Πολυβίου δ’ αὐτοῦ ἐρομένου** ... ὅ τι βούλοιο ὁ λόγος, φασὶν οὐ φυλαξάμενον ὀνομάσαι **τὴν πατρίδα** σαφῶς, ὑπὲρ ἧς ἄρα, ἐς τάνθρωπεια ἀφορῶν, ἐδεδίει.

*Scipio, when he looked upon the city ... as it was utterly perishing and in the last throes of its complete destruction, is said to have shed **tears** and wept openly for his enemies. After being wrapped in thought for long... **he said**: "A day will come when sacred Troy shall perish / And Priam and his people shall be slain." And when **Polybius ... asked him** what he meant by the words, they say that without any attempt at concealment he named **his own country**, for which he feared when he reflected on the fate of all things human. Polybius actually heard him and recalls it in his history.*

In the surviving portion of Polybius' text, no tears are specifically mentioned – though there is a possibility that they belonged to the mutilated section just prior to Polybius' question to Scipio (τούτου καλλιον... "What is more glorious than this?").

The question was raised as the two men stood watching the ruin of Carthage, and, if Büttner-Wobst's restoration (made by comparison with Diodorus) is correct – τοῦτ' εἴρηται παρὰ [τῷ ποιητῆ:] – it possibly involved a reference to Homer, a reference that both Diodorus and Appian appended in full, quoted directly from Hektor's departing speech to Andromache in the *Iliad*,<sup>783</sup> as a pronouncement of Troy's inevitable end.<sup>784</sup> Clearly, for Polybius – even if there were no tears – this was a moment of great emotion, as indicated by Scipio's taking of Polybius' hand and by Polybius' effusive praise for the nobility of Scipio's character. And at the same time, there were connections also being made to Homer, and to a poetic/tragic tradition of the *Ilioupersis* motif – if not stated outright, then strongly implied by virtue of the setting and context of the scene. Such a reference would have made a decisive connection between 146 and the entire scope of Hellenic history, which synchronographers traced back to the fall of Troy, and mapped onto a framework of the rise-and-fall of great powers.<sup>785</sup>

That Polybius presents such an emotionally charged, *Ilioupersis*-type scene, at this point in 146, is – at least by outward appearances – somewhat exceptional for the historian. For elsewhere, he shows little patience for the mixing of “mythic” and

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<sup>783</sup> = *Iliad* 6.448ff.

<sup>784</sup> Note that with the reconstruction suggested here, the basic order of events shifts between authors: (1) Polybius: weeping (possibly), question, quotation of Homer, foreboding for Rome; (2) Diodorus: weeping, question, foreboding for Rome, quotation; (3) Appian: tears, quotation, question, foreboding for Rome. Compare with Astin (1967: Appendix IV), who does not recognize a difference between Polybius and Diodorus.

<sup>785</sup> Apollodorus of Athens, in his *Chronica* (dedicated to King Attalos II Philadelphus, possibly 144/3 BCE?) may have done just this, with the work's four books (written in iambic verse) beginning with the Fall of Troy, stopping half-way through with the death of Alexander, and concluding with Apollodorus' own time... 146 BCE? – cf. *FGrH* 239ff.; and Pfeiffer (1968: 253ff.).

“pragmatic” history,<sup>786</sup> and in one digression, criticizes the gaucheness of writers who confuse the tasks of tragic poets (= “to thrill and to charm”) and of political historians (= “to instruct and convince”). Phylarchus in particular garners disapproval, for his overwrought and sensationalized accounts of disasters, including the destruction of cities (such as Mantinea).<sup>787</sup> That Polybius finds it necessary to address this issue testifies to the very prevalence of a dramatically framed “*urbs capta*” *topos* in contemporary historiography.<sup>788</sup> Just this sort of embellished and theatrical report is apparent in the poetic writings of Polystratos about the destruction of Corinth: the deed is monumentalized as revenge inflicted by the descendants of Aeneas upon the Achaians who had sacked Troy and burned the house of Priam. The scene is one of the bones of the Achaians being dumped unceremoniously into a pile, to be left un-mourned and robbed of their funerals:

*Lucius has smote the great Achaian Acrocorinth, the Star of Hellas /  
And the twin shores of the Isthmus. /  
One heap of stones covers the bones of those felled by the spear; /*

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<sup>786</sup> See above – pp. 323ff.

<sup>787</sup> Polyb. 2.56: *In general Phylarchus through his whole work makes many random and careless statements... he tells us that the Mantineans, when they surrendered, were exposed to terrible sufferings and that such were the misfortunes that overtook this, the most ancient and greatest city in Arcadia, as to impress deeply and move to tears all the Greeks. In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers he treats us to a picture of clinging women with their hair disheveled and their breasts bare, or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery... A historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals, but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace. For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates...* – see also 29.12.

<sup>788</sup> See Paul (1982); Rossi (2002).

*And the sons of Aeneas left un-mourned by funeral rites the Achaians who burnt the house of Priam.*<sup>789</sup>

The fact, then, that Polybius – despite his opposition to such extravagant accounts – proceeded nevertheless to include a moving scene at the fall of Carthage reveals that something truly significant was at work here. Polybius signals for his readers an event of singular impact – a moment of philosophic *eupatheia*, with Scipio representing a real and true (not exaggerated or fabricated) heroic *exemplum*, a victor who displays a wondrous magnanimity of spirit.<sup>790</sup> In Polybius’ estimation, what was most admirable about Scipio was his ability to recognize, in that moment of triumph, a lining of humility – a realization that his own city was at the same time getting closer to its own inevitable demise. Here, therefore, was the meaning for tears – if Polybius included them. For

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<sup>789</sup> Cf. *Anth. Graec.* 7.297 (trans. W.R. Paton, 1919). Compare this with the later epigram by the Augustan-era Antipater of Thessalonica: “*I, Rhodope, and my mother Boisca, neither died of sickness nor fell by the enemy’s sword, / But we ourselves, when fierce Ares burnt the city of Corinth, our fatherland, chose a brave death. / My mother slew me with the slaughtering knife, / Nor did she, sorrowful woman, spare her own life. / But tied the noose around her own neck, for to die in freedom was better than slavery.*” = *Anth. Graec.* 7.493 (trans. W.R. Paton, 1919).

<sup>790</sup> Compare this with Polybius’ scene of Scipio at Carthago Nova, where the Roman hero sheds tears in realization of the past horrors experienced by the women of the town, when it was under Carthaginian dominion – 10.18.7/13. Aristotle/Stoics on *eupatheia* – see Konstan (2007: esp. ch. 4). *Note:* A later tradition developed out of Polybius’ presentation of Scipio as a Roman hero par excellence. It centered upon Scipio’s redistribution of the spoils of Carthage – a subject discussed at length by Cicero (2 *Verr.* 4). Cicero describes the communities in Sicily as being directly involved in the recognition and restitution of property that had been taken from them by Carthage. These properties apparently included significant cult-statues, like that of Artemis of Segesta, Hermes of Tyndaris, and Apollo of Acragas. Cicero holds high praise for the *mansuetudo* exhibited by Scipio in accomplishing these returns. Scipio would have indeed served a number of political goals in this mode of distributing the spoils of war: he would have avoided the criticisms launched against men like Marcellus and Mummius, for bringing excessive luxury and corruptive wealth, and he would have made a strong statement of contrast between Rome as hegemon and Carthage in its past. The latter is evident in Cicero’s description of the ecstatic joy among the Sicilians in welcoming back their cult statues – it is a direct foil between the old regime and the generosity and fairness of the new one. As Cicero says, the rededication of the statues was a *testimonium societatis*, monuments of Scipio’s *aequitas* and *humanitas*. See also Eutrop. *Brev.* 4.12.2: *spolia ibi inventa quae variarum civitatum excidiis Carthago collegerat et ornamenta urbium civitatibus Siciliae Italiae Africae reddidit quae sua recognoscebat...*; as well as an inscription honoring Scipio’s generosity, found at Marruvium, which had possibly suffered depredations in the Second Punic War (*CIL* 1<sup>2</sup>.625, Hadrianic restoration of original text?).

Scipio appears like a figure of legend, but in the form of a living, breathing, and real statesman. As a Roman, he is made an emblem for the best of both the Greek and the Trojan heroes, being at once like Achilles before Priam, in the shedding of empathetic tears for the defeated,<sup>791</sup> and like Hektor before Andromache, in a heroic fight for his home city, at least symbolically (since in Polybius' formulation, Scipio represents a last bastion against the moral decay of Rome's younger generation).<sup>792</sup> As such, the scene of Scipio at Carthage stands as a climactic example of *eupatheia*, as the triumphant victor weeps in pity of the defeated, and yet also in the realization that he/his city too will crumble, and that by virtue of his success, it has come that much closer to a final end.<sup>793</sup> And the moment mirrored other such epiphanies, when the wheel of Tyche could be seen actually turning before mortal eyes: Antiochus, when faced by the captured and humiliated rebel-leader, Achaeus, in 213 BCE;<sup>794</sup> or Perseus, defeated in 168/7 BCE – the originally projected conclusion to Polybius' *Histories* – reciting to Aemilius Paullus (Scipio's father) the maxim of Demetrius of Phaleron:

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<sup>791</sup> *Iliad* 24.507ff.

<sup>792</sup> *Iliad* 6.448ff. – the passage quoted in the text of Diodorus and Appian, and presumably referenced indirectly by Polybius (by referring to a saying of “the poet” with regard to the inevitable fall of one's own city) – see above, pp. 334-5. For Polybius' opinion that Scipio stood out within his generation as a model of virtue, see Polyb. 10.2ff., and 31.24ff.

<sup>793</sup> Interestingly enough, there is no evidence of a comparable “tears of Mummius” episode at Corinth – this perhaps reflective of the deep shame associated with the collapse of the Achaian League which Polybius discusses at length – see above. There is, however, a substantial later tradition regarding Mummius and the taking of spoils, with some sources emphasizing the general's magnanimity in not taking spoils for himself (Livy *Per.* 52; Strabo 8.6.23; Dio fr. 76; *Vir. Ill.* 60.3), and others serving up biting commentary on his lack of cultural refinement and ignorance of the deeper value of Corinthian artworks (Vell. 1.13.3-5; cf. Cic. *Verr.* 21.55; *Off.* 2.76; Strabo 8.6.23) – see discussion in Yarrow (2006). Such a tradition – linked to the ideological destruction that was brought upon Corinth – re-engages with the by-then long-standing negotiation between Roman and Hellenic cultures – see discussions above in chapter 3. According to Pausanias (5.24), Mummius was remembered as the first Roman to make a formal dedication (as victor over Greece?) in a Greek sanctuary. As such, the sacker of Corinth was presented in a pan-Hellenic fashion, as a benefactor vindicating the true freedom of Greece.

<sup>794</sup> Polyb. 8.20.9.

...Demetrius, in his treatise on Fortune, wishing to give men a striking instance of her mutability, asks them to remember the times when Alexander overthrew the Persian empire, and speaks as follows: 'For if you consider not countless years or many generations, but merely these last fifty years, you will read in them the cruelty of Fortune. I ask you, do you think that fifty years ago either the Persians and the Persian king or the Macedonians and the king of Macedon, if some god had foretold the future to them, would ever have believed that at the time when we live, the very name of the Persians would have perished utterly – the Persians who were masters of almost the whole world – and that the Macedonians, whose name was formerly almost unknown, would now be the lords of it all? But nevertheless this Fortune, who never compacts with life, who always defeats our reckoning by some novel stroke; she who ever demonstrates her power by foiling our expectations, now also, as it seems to me, makes it clear to all men, by endowing the Macedonians with the whole wealth of Persia, that she has but lent them these blessings until she decides to deal differently with them.' And this now happened in the time of Perseus...<sup>795</sup>

In conclusion, then – and as Hartog<sup>796</sup> has also recently noted – Polybius, in making Tyche the driving force behind the events of his pragmatic world history, has created the truest tragedy of all, both specific to the lives and decisions of individuals, and universal to the scope of world history and its inevitable cycles. And we can see Polybius constructing a progression moving from east to west, via such momentous occasions in which individuals actually recognize the wheels of Fate turning, and (quite possibly in each case) shed tears, overcome by the scale of it all. This progression first moves from the tears of a victor – Antiochus, the Macedonian successor to Alexander's line in the East – to the tears of one defeated – Perseus, king of Macedon, before his conqueror, the Roman Aemilius Paullus. It then moves back to a victor – Paullus' own

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<sup>795</sup> Polyb. 29.21.1-7. Polybius' text is broken after this point, and we do not know whether Paullus shed tears at this point. Later tradition – Livy 45.4.2-3 – does have Paullus weep. For other examples of this *topos*, see Antigonus weeping over the defeat of Pyrrhus – Plut. *Pyrrh.* 34.4; Caesar over Pompey (Plut. *Caes.* 48; *Pomp.* 80; Dio 42.8.1-3; Lucan 9.1010-1108; Eutropius 6.21.3; Orosius 6.15.29); and Octavian over Antony (Plut. *Ant.* 78)..

<sup>796</sup> Cf. Hartog (2010), considering Polybius with respect to (and as a rebuttal against) Aristotelian definitions, of history as specific and tragedy as universal.

son, Scipio, standing over the burning city of Carthage, once Rome's greatest rival for power in the West. In which direction the pendulum should swing next – to a defeated Roman, perhaps? – is left as an unknown, for only future generations to know.

## AFTERMATH

In framing his *Histories*, Polybius posed a number of crucial questions for his readers, both present and future. Among these questions was the following:

τοῖς μὲν νῦν οὖσιν πότερα φευκτὴν ἢ τούναντίον αἰρετὴν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν, τοῖς δ' ἐπιγενομένοις πότερον ἐπαινετὴν καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἢ ψεκτὴν γεγονέναι νομιστέον τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν.

*[should] those now living shun Roman domination or do the reverse, and [should] those in the future consider the Romans' government worthy of praise and emulation, or of blame[?]797*

At its heart was a dual phenomenon: Roman superiority continued onwards, and yet there existed the distinct possibility that Rome could be on the decline. For Polybius and his contemporaries, the *oikoumenē* thus hung in the balance, awaiting that tipping-point at which Rome would become the greatest power in all of history. At what juncture such success would also become the “tripping”-point was something to be looked-out for by “those in the future.” For Polybius leaves us at an equivocal endpoint.

On the one hand, the *tarachē kai kinesis* of his day is characterized as the results of both Rome being a poor international ruler and of lesser states not taking the opportunity to thrive. Polybius hints at this sentiment – though he does so in reference to Carthage as a former hegemon (rather than Rome as a current one):

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<sup>797</sup> Polyb. 3.4.7 – see above, p. 169.

ἐπειδὴν δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων τυχόντες κακῶς ποιῶσι καὶ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχωσι τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, εἰκότως ἅμα ταῖς τῶν προεστώτων μεταβολαῖς συµμεταπίπτουσι καὶ τῶν ὑποταττομένων αἱ προαιρέσεις. ὃ καὶ τότε συνέβη τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

*When, having attained their desire, men begin to act wickedly and to treat their subjects tyrannically, it is only natural that with the change in character of the rulers, the attitude of the ruled should change as well – as actually happened now to the Carthaginians.*<sup>798</sup>

Across the board, then, the greatest historical tragedy for Polybius, in looking at his times, is the pandemic self-destruction enacted by so many small states across the Mediterranean, in response to Rome’s possible (though never explicitly stated) failings as a world leader. And at the same time, the narrative serves as an implicit warning to Romans, lest they hasten their eventual fate like the Carthaginians had done.<sup>799</sup> But this is not to say that the *Histories* is an account without hope. In the act of writing, Polybius intended to make a change, potentially on both ends of the spectrum: ideally informing leading men of all states, and thereby allowing Rome to step more fully and responsibly into the role of world hegemon, and enabling lesser states to recover, rebound, and achieve nobility and status once again (if not more). The dual destructions of Carthage and Corinth in 146 thus stand as a world-changing cue: to Rome that it be mindful of potential decay and cultivate leaders like Scipio, who could continue to chart an honorable, hegemonic course; and to lesser states to simply get their act together.

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<sup>798</sup> Polyb. 10.36.7. This passage is symbolically placed by Polybius in the wake of Scipio Africanus’ successful siege of Qart Hadasht (“Carthage”) in Spain – a city renamed “Carthago Nova” by Scipio after its capture in 209 BCE.

<sup>799</sup> See the latest discussion in Baronowski (2011: Ch. 9).

At the same time, Polybius provides ominous warnings along the way, suggesting that Rome as an international *archē* could be on the edge of tyranny, moving from *hegemonia* to *despoteia* and worse.<sup>800</sup> At 3.4.5, he notes that those who achieve great success often do not make proper use of it, while at 15.24, he remarks upon the evils of great power, once attained (in a passage following Philip's destruction of Thasos, 202 BCE – a timing that would have surely caught a synchronographer's eye). At 9.10, upon the Roman sack of Syracuse, Polybius discusses the internal decay that can result for a victor who develops a taste for luxury and expensive treasures (a clear mirroring of Cato's rhetoric at the time).<sup>801</sup> It is indeed an ominous parallel with the capture of Corinth, and this time, it followed upon the heels of a high point for Rome: Scipio's triumph at Carthage. Taken together, there is perhaps a hint here, that Rome could be putting herself on the road to decline. And – as we have seen – there were those in the international community who would not only have formed such an interpretation, but

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<sup>800</sup> See also Shimron (1979).

<sup>801</sup> Polyb. 3.4.5: “*what is thought to be the greatest success [brings] the greatest calamities on many, if they do not make proper use of it, and the most dreadful catastrophes often turn[s] out to the advantage of those who support them bravely.*”

15.24: “*Perhaps it may be said of all kings that at the beginnings of their reigns they talk of freedom as of a gift they offer to all and style all those who are thus loyal adherents their friends and allies, but as soon as they have established their authority they at once begin to treat those who placed trust in them not as allies but as servants. Therefore they are disappointed of any credit for noble conduct, though as a rule they do not miss their immediate interest...*”

9.10: “*... when opportunities become ever more frequent, and the victor collects around him all the treasures of other peoples, and these treasures may be almost said to invite those who were robbed of them to come and inspect them, things are twice as bad. For now spectators no longer pity their neighbors, but themselves, as they recall their own calamities. And hence not only envy, but also a sort of passionate hatred for the favorites of fortune flares up, for the memories awakened of their own disaster move them to abhor the authors of it. There were indeed perhaps good reasons for appropriating all the gold and silver: for it was impossible for them to aim at a world empire without weakening the resources of other peoples and strengthening their own. But it was possible for them to leave everything which did not contribute to such strength, together with the envy attached to its possession, in its original place, and to add to the glory of their native city by adorning it not with paintings and reliefs but with dignity and magnanimity...*”

would have also welcomed it gleefully. These were individuals who subscribed to the opinions and/or arguments of intellectuals such as Agatharcides or Carneades, or to the apocalyptic prophecies foretelling Rome's doom, from *I Maccabees* to the Sibylline Oracles – the sort of texts that continued in popularity and served as explosive fuel for Mithridates' later defiance of Rome.

Over the following decades, then, second-century notions of cyclical history and moral decline thus fed into what was to become the discourse typical of the first century, as conceptions of *imperium* and *provinciae* gathered more abstract, territorial, and administrative associations.<sup>802</sup> Intellectuals looked to the *topoi* of imperial power, foreign influence, and moral decline and used them in their battles against each other. The Gracchan period in particular appears to have been transitional, shaping the concept of *metus hostilis* later espoused by Sallust. In the turmoil of 133 BCE and rivalry between Scipio Aemilianus and Tiberius Gracchus, notions that the elimination of Carthage had indeed given rise to ambitious demagogues and would-be tyrants surely became more prevalent. Scipio defended his name by transferring blame to Gracchus' annexation of Pergamon, as bringing the evils of Greek luxury and effeminacy too close to the city.<sup>803</sup> And about a decade later, following Gaius Gracchus' failed attempt to establish a colony at Carthage, political opposition fomented and encouraged beliefs that a curse existed on the site – a subject that captured the imaginations of later Romans and moderns alike.<sup>804</sup>

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<sup>802</sup> On this evolution, see Richardson (2008).

<sup>803</sup> See Astin (1967); Lintott (1972).

<sup>804</sup> Cf. Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 1.5; Pliny *HN* 26.19; App. *Pun.* 135-136; Macrob. *Sat.* 3.9.10-11. On the modern myth of the lands being biblically 'sown with salt,' see Ridley (1986).

By the first half of the first-century BCE, the destructions of Carthage and Corinth had achieved legendary status.<sup>805</sup> For Cicero (who blamed Sulla for the moral decline of his day), Scipio and Mummius represented shining exemplars of the ‘former’ Roman virtues, of *fides*, *mansuetudo*, *aequitas*, and *humanitas*.<sup>806</sup> Like his contemporary, Sallust, Cicero also amplified the notion of Carthage as “rival to empire” (*aemula imperii*),<sup>807</sup> presenting the pair of Carthage and Corinth as *insignia et infulae imperii*.<sup>808</sup> The two are also described as “eyes of the maritime face,”<sup>809</sup> a rare pair capable of sustaining “the burden and reputation of world-empire.”<sup>810</sup> Cicero also breathed new life into earlier Hellenistic themes of tragic reversal, romanticizing the elegiac gloom and emptiness of once-great cities.<sup>811</sup> The imagery of tragic ruins at Corinth was even adapted to the genre of consolation-letter by Servius Sulpicius, in an example written to Cicero.<sup>812</sup> In the same period, Diodoros, perhaps echoing Servius, noted that travelers passing by Corinth’s ruined prosperity could not refrain from shedding a tear, even long after the destruction. With even greater emotion, he declared that the horror of Corinth’s demise was made all the worse, in that it left Greeks behind to look at the remains.<sup>813</sup>

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<sup>805</sup> For a general discussion of the evolved ‘rhetoric of destruction,’ see Purcell (1995).

<sup>806</sup> E.g. Cic. 2 *Verr.* 4; *Pro Mur.* 58, 66; *De Off.* 1.108; *Vir.ill.* 60.3; *De Orat.* 2.154; *Verr.* 2.2.86.

<sup>807</sup> Sallust *Cat.* 10.1; see also Strabo 17.3.5 (832); Velleius 1.12.5-6; Appian 51. The topic is taken up by later authors – cf. Livy, *Per.* 52; Strabo 8.23; Dio fr.76 (regarding Mummius).

<sup>808</sup> Cic. *Leg.Agr.* 1.5-6.

<sup>809</sup> Cic. *ND* 3.91.

<sup>810</sup> Cic. *Leg.Agr.* 2.87.

<sup>811</sup> Cic. *Leg.Agr.* 1.2.5; 2.51; 2.87: *Corinthi vestigium vix relictum est*; cf. Appian *Pun.* 135-6; also Plut. *Mar.* 40, on the imagery of Gaius Marius “amid the ruins of Carthage.”

<sup>812</sup> Cic. *Fam.* 4.5.4

<sup>813</sup> Diod. 32. 27, and 32.36-37, respectively.

It was in the Augustan age, however, that the greatest transformations in 146 BCE's legacy took place, as all of Rome's various power-networks were channeled in the direction of one man. The Mediterranean international system was conceptually framed, by authors and intellectuals, into a singular *imperium Romanum*, and for the first time, the term referred to a collective, territorial entity.<sup>814</sup> Geographical, administrative *provinciae* were linked to Rome via newly founded colonies across the Mediterranean, including Carthage and Corinth. Just over a hundred years (a *saeculum*) after 146 BCE, the tragedies and politically charged rhetoric associated with the pair was re-forged as part of the rebirth of Rome itself. It was at this point that 146 BCE truly crystallized as a temporal boundary.<sup>815</sup> Exultant in Rome's newly re-conceptualized *imperium*, Vergil's *Aeneid* in particular connected world history to the saga of Rome, from the fall of Troy to the foundations of Carthage and Rome, to the fall of Carthage, and to the rebirth of both under a new golden age.<sup>816</sup> Other writers of the period further amplified the scale and grandeur of 146 BCE: Strabo, for example, doubled the circuit-length of Carthage's walls to equate them with legendary Babylon.<sup>817</sup> Most importantly, however, intellectuals delved into world chronology and determined new synchronisms. Corinth had been destroyed in its 952<sup>nd</sup> year, while Carthage had been destroyed in its 672<sup>nd</sup> year, or its

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<sup>814</sup> Richardson (2008), with special reference to the *Res Gestae* in chapter 4.

<sup>815</sup> Cf. Diod. 32.37; Plutarch *Caes.* 57; Dio 43.50.3-5; Paus. 7.16.7-8; cf. Strabo 17.3.1.

<sup>816</sup> E.g. *Aen.* 6.836ff. (Anchises' revelation of Rome's future, including both Mummius and Scipio in the procession of heroes); building of Carthage in Book 1, followed by Aeneas' tale of the burning of Troy in Bk. 2; Dido's curse of hatred, of her (Carthaginian) people upon those of (Roman) Aeneas, in Bk. 4.

<sup>817</sup> Strabo 17.3.14 (to a length of 365 *stades*!); compare Livy *Per.* 51; Appian *Iber.* 15.98; and Dio's description of Corinth's epic scale (fr. 72).

seventh *saeculum*, an age now surpassed by Rome in her celebration of the *ludi saeculares* in 17 BCE.<sup>818</sup>

These notices of age upon destruction made key connections with a theory popular during the Augustan era, of a succession of five world empires, from Assyria to Media, to Persia, Macedon, and ending in Rome. The concept was rooted in second-century BCE ideas, but it had become a leading principle for Augustan historians. Pompeius Trogus' *Philippic Histories* was completely framed by it, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus opened his *Roman Antiquities* with it, adding that Carthage and Rome, as rivals for the west, had been founded in the same year.<sup>819</sup> Velleius also structured his *History* around the principle, beginning with the fall of Assyria, and closing book I of II with Roman ascendancy in 146 BCE.<sup>820</sup> And Livy, perhaps more subtly, placed the theory in the rhetorically prophetic words of Antiochus, noting that the ordained rise of Rome would involve the fall of the eastern kingdoms.<sup>821</sup> Less subtle, however, was Livy's use of 146 BCE as the endpoint for his first fifty books, which had begun with Aeneas' landing in Italy.

Polybius would have appreciated this continued tradition for 146 – though perhaps with criticisms along the way of historical inaccuracies. For the legendary status and symbolic significance of 146 remained distantly linked to his interpretation of history and of imperial power in general, of Rome's position with respect to these, and of the

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<sup>818</sup> Vell. 1.12.5-6; Livy *Per.* 51.

<sup>819</sup> Dion. Hal. 1.2-4.1, 1.74.1 = FGH 566F60 (38yrs before the First Olympiad = 814 BCE). Cf. Kramer (2005); Purcell (1995).

<sup>820</sup> Vell. 1.6.6, 1.12-13, and 2.1ff.; Kramer (2005).

<sup>821</sup> Livy 37.25.5-7 (cf. Polyb. 21.11.1-2).

elusive mystery that 146 presented as a potential tipping point. And so, we conclude with the final words of the *Histories*, as quoted by the Constantinian excerpts, *De Sententiae* (39.8.6-7):

τὰς κοινὰς τῆς οἰκουμένης πράξεις ... ἐξ ὧν τὸ κάλλιστον ἔφαμεν, ἅμα δ' ὠφελιμώτατον περιγενέσθαι τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι: τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ γνῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὐρίσκεται γεγονός.

*... students, by this treatment [of the shared history of the whole world], will attain the best and most salutary result, which is to know how and by what system of polity the whole world was subjected to the single rule of Rome — an event without any parallel in the past.*

Thanks to Polybius, 146 BCE has become forever tied to a very human drive to consider a particular form of history that is universal rather than merely specific, its interpretation always left for redefinition and reapplication, in a striving to make sense of the intersections of the political, from individual to international, across the millennia.

## Appendix

### INTRODUCTION

The following sections are included as a general introduction to the various “schools of thought” that have developed – and continue to evolve – within the wider discipline of international relations (IR) theory. They are intended to serve as a reference point for the IR approach taken in this study, which is best categorized as a normative constructivist analysis. The major schools of thought are traditionally divided into the following groups, which then have their own range of sub-groups: Realism vs. Idealism / Liberalism (as the old oppositional dichotomy); Neorealism and Neoliberalism; International Political Economy (IPE); and Postmodernist International Society (IS) and (Normative) Constructivism.

### REALISM & IDEALISM

*The prescriptions directly derived from a single image [of IR] are incomplete because they are based upon partial analyses. The partial quality of each image sets up a tension that drives one to the inclusion of others... One is led to search for the inclusive nexus of causes.*

-- Kenneth Waltz<sup>822</sup>

For Kenneth Waltz in 1959, the study and practice of international politics was a seemingly limitless and exponentially diverse field, in need of an explanatory theory that could pull together a complete, overarching, and multifaceted picture. Twenty years later, he proposed such a nexus, known (and still influential) today as structural realism.<sup>823</sup> In

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<sup>822</sup> Waltz (1959: 229-230).

<sup>823</sup> See Waltz (1979). Note that Eckstein (2006, 2008) is deeply influenced by Waltzian realism – see above, pp. 28ff.

the thirty years since, however, this theory has grown into simply another image, not an inclusive nexus. For it has become increasingly apparent that no single or monolithic form of scientific (that is, completely objective) theory can adequately encapsulate *all* of international politics, across time or space.<sup>824</sup> Instead, with greater openness, scholars and practitioners are looking to the possibility of multiple nexuses, which may pull together the various images of IR in different ways, at different times and with different meaning. Such eclecticism not only recognizes the (in some cases, long-standing) contributions of various schools of thought, but also explicitly explores their intersecting histories, their overlapping and conflicting perspectives, and seeks to negotiate and/or recombine them in order to raise new questions and solve new problems. The current study embraces such an eclectic approach, to both the study of IR and the study of ancient civilization. Beginning with IR theory, then, we will first map out the sub-disciplines of the field using standard definitions, before breaking these down and laying the groundwork for a more eclectic form of political realism, employed in the current study of 146 BCE.

Within the discipline of international relations theory, five major sub-disciplines or approaches have evolved over the past few centuries. They are generally known as: (1) realism; (2) liberalism; (3) international political economy (IPE); (4) international society (or the English School); and (5) constructivism. Within each of these categories, there exists a particular history of development, a range of manifestations, and even internal

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<sup>824</sup> In fact, scholars (though not yet a majority) are breaking theoretical rank and seeking to “*explore the interfaces between, and build bridges across, problematics and analyses originally constructed within seemingly incommensurable research traditions.*” The quote is from Katzenstein and Sil (2008: 110), citing the following examples of growing eclecticism: Berstein et al. (2000); Makinda (2000); Sil and Doherty (2000); Dow (2004); Zürn and Checkel (2005).

debate(s) regarding the position and future course of the sub-discipline. As a result, sets of theories have developed within each sub-discipline, which communicate and even intersect with each other. For example, as we will see, the neorealist and neoliberalist approaches both represent a “positivist” and empirical turn, and despite different emphases regarding competition and cooperation, both look to *structure* as fundamental in IR. It is at such intersections that contemporary eclecticism can make theoretical and methodological headway, as it recombines once alienated, though in essence corresponding perspectives. This in turn is an evolving process, and in many ways began with the formation of the last three sub-disciplines listed above (IPE, international society, and constructivism). Each of these has developed in the wake of and now crisscrosses a once standard dichotomy between realism ‘vs.’ liberalism, as the original traditions in IR theory.

The typical assumption, persistent today, that realism and liberalism are stark alternatives is due largely to the disciplinary foundations of IR and the way in which early realists and idealists became framed as mutually exclusive positions.<sup>825</sup> The *formal* creation of IR as a distinct academic subject, with its own university departments and/or programs began in the wake of World War I, in which the labels of realist and idealist became increasingly charged with divisive and highly politicized meaning.<sup>826</sup> The standard synopsis of interwar IR theory characterizes the period as essentially idealist,

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<sup>825</sup> Cf. Bell, ed. (2008: 12), who notes that, “we are often presented with highly distorted accounts of disciplinary history,” and earlier (on the same page) that, “There is no antithesis between realism and liberalism *per se*.”

<sup>826</sup> Cf. Jackson and Sørensen (2007: 31ff.); Sharp (2007: 261, 263, 268). Schmidt (1998) and Ashworth (2006) are both excellent reviews of the complexities and confusions in the evolution of interwar realism and idealism.

and posits that the subsequent events precipitating WWII largely discredited idealist principles in favor of realism.<sup>827</sup> However, such a summary is the product of decades of rhetorical oversimplification, often traced back to E.H. Carr's (often misunderstood) critique of the interwar period.<sup>828</sup> Theorists and practitioners split, roughly along conservative and liberal lines, in their approach to the new League of Nations,<sup>829</sup> between those who continued to adhere in some fashion to state-centric and power-balancing politics, and those who were concerned with achieving an integrated (i.e. capitalist democratic) international community and set of organizations/ institutions.<sup>830</sup> After 1931, in response to the rise of fascism and mistakes of the West, the debate became ever more polarized as idealists were criticized for busying themselves with "paper safeguards,"<sup>831</sup> while realists were accused of using the League to continue an outmoded world order.<sup>832</sup> In the years since, the divided disciplines have assumed key points of departure, which, although extremely generalized (if not superficial), serve as the guideposts for

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<sup>827</sup> See Morgenthau (1946); Herz (1950); Kennan (1951); Thompson (1960); and more recently, Guzzini (1998: 5-6); Donnelly (2000: 28); S. Whitworth in Reus-Smit and Snidal, eds. (2008: 397); Bell, ed. (2008: 12).

<sup>828</sup> See Jones (1998: 3). Though completed in 1939, Carr's book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, was not published until 1946. Until the 1930s, realism and idealism were not very common or technical labels in IR scholarship, and were used quite inconsistently. For example, Brailsford (1923: 4) used them to refute both supporters of pre-war diplomacy (as realists) and those who thought the Great War an opportunity for a new world order (as idealists). Only a year later, the same author used the terms realist and idealist to describe methods of thought both necessary for good policymaking – cf. Brailsford (1924: 9). On the changing connotations of realism and idealism, see Ashworth (2006).

<sup>829</sup> Cf. Schmidt (1998: 440-445); Bluntschli (1880, 1921); Lieber (1885); Treitschke (1970 reprint); Willoughby (1918); Ellis (1920); Laski (1921); Krabbe (1922); Coker (1924); Merriam (1924); Garner (1925: 18); Dickinson (1926); Burgess (1933); Follett (1934). For more on evolving notions of sovereignty, see MacCormick (1995); Kukathas (2008); Prokhovnik (2008).

<sup>830</sup> Ironically, many affirmed liberals increasingly lost faith in the League of Nations, which they saw as perpetuating pre-war type diplomacy – see Ashworth (2006: 307). For more on the so-called democratic peace thesis – both in support and in critique – see Doyle (1983); Fukuyama (1991); Layne (1994); Levy (1989); Owen (1994); Waltz (2000: 6-13); Eckstein (2006: 72); Sharp (2007: 265ff.).

<sup>831</sup> Brailsford (1933)

<sup>832</sup> Carr (1939/1946: 5).

understanding the history and current shape of debate. And as in the ancient historians' debate over Roman imperialism, once dichotomized between defensivists and offensivists, the various IR schools of thought must first be unpacked before a more nuanced modern IR theory can grant a new, and more productive analysis of 146 BCE as a moment in ancient international relations. The goal is also to introduce classicists to the wide range of approaches being developed in current IR theory, an area of study that informs and questions the manner in which political processes take place, and requires experts in ancient history to add their voice to the mass of available source material. The main schools of thought in IR can thus be summarized as follows:<sup>833</sup>

#### **REALISM & NEOREALISM**

1. From the broadest perspective, realism is associated with a pessimistic view of human nature. According to this view, human reason is limited, often tragically so, when combined with egoism and pride. Mankind is also thought to be driven by an *animus dominandi*, a “will to power,” by which individuals and groups enjoy taking advantage over and avoiding the “domination of others.” Such human nature realism is often referred to as biological or classical, the latter term used to extend the realist tradition back to pre-modern roots.<sup>834</sup>

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<sup>833</sup> Good introductions can also be found in Elias and Sutch (2007); Jackson and Sørensen, eds. (2007).

<sup>834</sup> Biological realists expressing these views: Niebuhr (1932: xx, 6, 23; 1944: 19); Carr (1939/1946: 231); Morgenthau (1946: 192-193, 202-203; 1948: 4). Though not a biological realist, Waltz does make similar assumptions regarding human behavior – cf. (1979: 175). Contemporary realism is making a return to the emotional/irrational elements discussed by biological realists – cf. Ross (forthcoming).

2. At their heart, realist theories emphasize that international relations are about power politics, with power being the means and the end in survival. As a result, competition and conflict are persistent, even inevitable features of political history.<sup>835</sup>
3. Connected to the conception of power politics is state centrism – that is, the notion that national security and state survival are of primary importance. Theorists with traditional views on the state as sovereign are proponents of this feature of realism. They perceive the state as the primary political institution worth protecting, for it alone can guarantee citizen safety and prosperity. Among structural (or neo)-realists, state-centrism has been translated to an emphasis on “great powers” as leaders in the international arena, if only by virtue of their greater capability distribution, responsible for directing international politics (including its organizations and institutions).<sup>836</sup>
4. State-centrism then links with an overall realist skepticism regarding the notion of progress, especially in international politics, when compared to the domestic sphere. For structuralists (especially in the US), this concept has been enshrined as international anarchy, the belief that lasting, centralized government, although for some perhaps desirable, is in fact impossible and even antithetical to interstate

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<sup>835</sup> A *small* section of examples: Schumann (1941: 9); Morgenthau (1948: 17); Schwarzenberger (1951: 147); Waltz (1979: 186); Gilpin (1986: 305); Mastanduno (1997: 88); Wohlforth (1999: 10-18); Guzzini (2000: 55); Mearsheimer (2001: 55); Schmidt (2005: 529).

<sup>836</sup> Some examples of realist state-centrism: Morgenthau (1954: 4-10); Waltz (1979: 73, 81-82, 97, 118); Jervis (1989: 38-40); Stein (1991: 431-451); Snyder (1997: 20-33); Schweller and Priess (1997: 15-23); Mearsheimer (2001: 34-36). Keohane (1986: 164-5) actually defined the realist core as containing three assumptions: state-centrism, rationality, and power.

relations. For this reason, some theorists promote realism as more objective and of transcendent validity, since the fundamentals of human nature and anarchic international environment remain constant across time and space.<sup>837</sup>

### **LIBERALISM (IDEALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM)**

1. In the simplistic dichotomy between realism and liberalism, the latter group presents a generally positive view of human nature and faith in human reason, especially regarding the application of rational principles to international affairs. Such optimism corresponds with a belief in civil and economic progress, modernization, and globalization as improving the scope and need for international cooperation. An important feature of liberal debate thus focuses on the *directions* of progress – how much, of what sort, with what limits, for whom, etc.<sup>838</sup>
2. In contrast with traditional, especially biological or classical realism, liberalism also posits that while individuals are somewhat self-interested and competitive, it is more important to note the shared nature of their interests. These commonalities allow human beings to seek mutual, even long-term benefits and engage in collaborative social action, on both domestic and international levels.<sup>839</sup>
3. Like realism, liberalism is strongly rooted in state-centrism. However, unlike realism, the liberal paradigm of state sovereignty is more Lockean than

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<sup>837</sup> E.g. Swarzenberger (1951); Waltz (1979: 66); Glaser (1997: 171); Elman and Elman (1997: 9); Cronin (1999); Copeland (2000b: Ch. 8); Mearsheimer (2001); Eckstein (2006).

<sup>838</sup> Cf. Pollard (1971: 9-13).

<sup>839</sup> See overview in Jackson and Sørensen, eds. (2007: 98ff.).

Hobbesian, with states guaranteeing liberty and happiness as *constitutional* entities (*Rechtsstaaten*), rather than as concentrations and instruments of force or power (*Machtsstaaten*).<sup>840</sup>

4. Lastly, while some liberals acknowledge that international anarchy is a problem, all agree that progress, human rationality, shared interest, and constitutional statehood can make war and conflict avoidable. Despite debate over the magnitude of the obstacles,<sup>841</sup> liberals believe that *Rechtsstaaten* – especially democratic, capitalist republics<sup>842</sup> – can come to tolerate and even respect each other, giving way to agreed-upon legal configurations of international law and even government.<sup>843</sup> In a methodological turn that parallels the development of structural neorealism, neoliberals have taken a more behavioralist or scientific approach to quantifying and tracking the development of international institutions and interdependence. They have and in many ways continue to emphasize the processes by which functional, transnational activities (e.g. trade), formal international organizations (e.g. WTO, EU, OECD), and less formal regimes forge multiple, beneficial links of mutual advantage, long-term cooperation, and

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<sup>840</sup> On the Hobbesian view of sovereignty (in contrast with Locke), see McClelland (1996: 193ff.); Ahrendorf (2000); Yurdusev (2006).

<sup>841</sup> Cf. Smith (1992: 204).

<sup>842</sup> On processes of democratization and the democratic peace thesis, see Lake (1992); Schweller (1992); Sørensen (1992); Russett (1993); Thompson (1996); Lipson (2003). For a recent critique, see Rosato (2003).

<sup>843</sup> The eighteenth-century philosophic roots of such arguments can be found in Jeremy Bentham (who coined the phrase, international law) and Immanuel Kant (who posited that republics could ultimately establish “perpetual peace”).

shared information and/or values.<sup>844</sup> In contrast to the realist position, international institutions are not so much governed by great powers with the highest capability distribution, but are the expression of complex multilateral ties of economic and political interdependence.<sup>845</sup>

Such basic oppositions between realism and liberalism represent decades of disciplinary entrenchment. Over the decades, however, such division has become less and less useful. Overly schematic on the surface, the dichotomy is actually riddled with shared tradition and complementary visions. In the resulting maze, it has become almost impossible to pin down what is political realism and what is political idealism/liberalism (the latter being the more preferred term today). Both contain paradigms that give primary force to domestic factors, and others that emphasize international ones.<sup>846</sup> Both emphasize power to some extent and contain multiple forms of defining that power. Both include theorists who try to quantify political relations, using economic, geographical, manpower, technological and other indexes.<sup>847</sup> And both include theorists with a broad spectrum of views regarding sovereignty, the role and position of the state, of law, and of intervention and/or the use of force.

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<sup>844</sup> Examples include Haas (1958); Keohane and Nye, eds. (1975, 1977); Deutsch et al. (1957); Young (1986, 1989); Keohane (1989); Rosecrance (1986, 1995, 1999); and recently, Moravcsik (2008).

<sup>845</sup> For “multilevel governance” and a recent survey of the debates regarding neoliberal institutionalism, see Stein (2008a, and b, respectively).

<sup>846</sup> Some examples... Realists with a domestic emphasis: Morgenthau (1946), Katzenstein (1978), Snyder (1991); with an international one: Hoffman (1965); Waltz (1979); Mearsheimer (2001). Liberals with a domestic emphasis: Doyle (1983), Schweller (1992), Sørensen (1992); with an international one: Rittberger (1993), Adler and Barnett (1996).

<sup>847</sup> These are primarily the neorealists and neoliberals. See Bearce and Fisher (2003) for a more recent (and cross-disciplinary) approach to quantifying interdependence and conflict.

The result, then, has been a whole set of new approaches, such as IPE, international socialism, and constructivism. These approaches, though at times presented as alternatives to realism and/or liberalism, are in essence a response to the need for more complex analyses of divergent problems. Known as post-positive and critical theories, they reflect a (post-modern) world in which simple dichotomies, such as East-West, primitive-modern, and domestic-international have lost much of their original force.<sup>848</sup> New approaches thus aim to reveal the multiple facets of such linked issues as state partition, disintegration, and reconstruction, transnational terrorism, ethnic/religious conflict, international intervention, and global economy. A simple set of law-like principles is no longer adequate and is even dangerously one-sided in such a context. As a result, theorists have turned to methodologies that rest on the “proposition that people conceive, construct, and constitute the worlds in which they live, including the international world, which is an entirely human arrangement.”<sup>849</sup> Their various emphases are described in the sections below.

### **INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (IPE)**

IPE was one of the earliest forms of critical theory, and it developed as an offshoot of so-called neo-Marxism, focusing on the use of economic power to exploit,

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<sup>848</sup> The term “Frankfurt School” is sometimes used as a label for critical theory, since it was developed by a group of German scholars in the US. They argued that social laws are not permanent in world politics or economics, but are constructions of time and place, forever biased morally, politically, and ideologically. See Horkheimer (1972); Habermas (1972); and more recently, Honneth (2004).

<sup>849</sup> Jackson and Sørensen, eds. (2007: 292); Smith et al. (1996).

oppress, and even impoverish the post-colonial “Third World.”<sup>850</sup> In many ways, it dovetails neatly with the economic interpretations of the Third Punic War.<sup>851</sup> Beginning in the early 1970s, the concept of dependence was used to evoke and condemn the apparently conscious underdevelopment of poorer nations by wealthy capitalist ones.<sup>852</sup>

Both liberal and realist IR scholars adopted elements of this critique, and over the years have forged a unique sub-field highlighting the relationships between economics and international politics. The labels liberal and realist remain however, and somewhat superficially frame some of the debates. Liberal IPE is generally associated with the tradition of Adam Smith, and posits that human prosperity can be achieved, through free-market global expansion of capitalism.<sup>853</sup> By contrast, realist IPE is traced back to the nineteenth-century German economist, Friedrich List, and the belief that economic activity should be put in the service of building a strong state and supporting national interest.<sup>854</sup> On an international level, then, realist IPE is associated with the labels of mercantilism and economic nationalism, for its stance that the smooth operation of a free market ultimately depends upon the presence of a strong international political power or hegemon.<sup>855</sup> However, this simplistic divide often goes unrecognized outside the US, and some scholars have begun to claim that IPE itself should be approached as an adjacent,

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<sup>850</sup> For a good review of Marxism, its relationship with IR theory, and the development of IPE as a sub-discipline, see Teschke (2008: 163-187). In general, see Jackson and Sørensen, eds. (2007: 50-52).

<sup>851</sup> See the introduction - above, pp. 15ff.

<sup>852</sup> Cf. Frank (1967); Wallerstein (1974, 1983).

<sup>853</sup> E.g. Friedman (1962). See Smith (1776/1976).

<sup>854</sup> Cf. Ravenhill (2008).

<sup>855</sup> E.g. Gilpin (1987).

rather than subordinate, field to IR theory.<sup>856</sup> For the purposes of the current study, the confusions and occasional narrow focus of IPE will be avoided. Instead, economic relations will be recognized as inherent to the processes of power, but will not be the primary angle of focus.

### **TOWARDS AN ECLECTIC APPROACH: INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IR THEORY**

In order to cross the artificial divide between realism and liberalism, and meet the need for a more multivalent approach in addressing the complexities of IR, a variety of new alternatives have been developed over the past few decades. Among these is the so-called International Society approach, or English School, known for its origins within UK universities.<sup>857</sup> From the Cold War era onward, international society (IS) theorists have derived a different form of IR theory from behavioralist or scientific forms found in the US, which often heightened the (neo)-liberal-realist divide.<sup>858</sup>

Instead, IS differs in two key ways. First, it rejects deductive analysis seeking law-like paradigms, and favors a more holistic approach based on human understanding, norms, and history. Second, it rejects making any firm distinction between strictly realist and liberal views (both important elements in the present study).<sup>859</sup> IS does acknowledge that realism, both classical and structural, represents an important perspective in recognizing the self-interested and competitive elements in human nature, the continued

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<sup>856</sup> See the recent overview in Ravenhill (2008).

<sup>857</sup> Cf. Jones (1981). -- Finnemore; Epp; Reus-Smidt; Wendt.

<sup>858</sup> Leading scholars of the English School, 1950s-1980s: C. Manning, H. Bull, A. Watson, and J. Vincent. From the 1990s onward: B. Buzan, A. Hurrell, R. Jackson, E. Keene, A. Linklater, R. Little, J. Mayall, H. Suganami, and N. Wheeler. Cf. Dunne (2008: 267).

<sup>859</sup> Cf. Sterling-Folker (2002). See also Jackson and Sørensen, eds. (2007: 46-50) for a general overview.

importance of states (however defined), and the significance of such problems as international hierarchy (or lack thereof), power, security, and survival. At the same time, it critiques some elements of traditional realism, and in doing so, represents a promising new angle for debate.<sup>860</sup> It questions the potentially one-sided focus of arguing *against* liberalism, and instead posits that the complete picture of IR should address the multiple features of human nature, including those that lead to cooperation, and the elements of order in the “jungle” of IR.<sup>861</sup> Rather than pure anarchy (as posited by structural neorealism), the English School suggests that international politics occur within a societal/group context. Bull and Watson summarize well, characterizing such international society as:

*a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.*<sup>862</sup>

International society scholars also recognize the role played by transnational actors – that is, individuals and (more marginally) IGOs and NGOs.<sup>863</sup> In essence, they graft traditionally liberal concepts, such as progressive international law and institutional/economic cooperation, with key realist notions of national interest and power capability. They also emphasize the character of international politics as a *historical*

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<sup>860</sup> Cf. Jackson and Sørensen (2007: 89).

<sup>861</sup> The term “anarchical society” was first popularized by Hedley Bull (1977) to describe a system of independent states sharing common interests and values, rules and institutions in dealing with each other. This concept combines realist claims of international anarchy with a liberal emphasis on shared concerns and organizations.

<sup>862</sup> Bull and Watson (1984: 1).

<sup>863</sup> IGO = “intergovernmental organization”; NGO = “non-governmental organization.”

dialogue, with an ongoing dialectic between political thought and action, ideology, and constructions of the past.<sup>864</sup> In doing so, IS scholarship represents a fruitful perspective that crosses disciplinary bounds, and allows for consideration of ancient politics within changing processes of human political interaction across time and space.

### **POST-MODERNISM & CONSTRUCTIVISM**

Another key development in IR studies has been influenced by so-called post-modernism, a trend in thought arising out of the rejection of French existentialism in the late 1940s and 50s, but only entering political theory in the 1980s.<sup>865</sup> Like other critical theorists (examples in IR include IPE and international society), post-modernists are keen to point out the “conceptual prisons” constructed by scholarship. In particular, they focus on notions of modernity and progress – whether based on liberal, Kantian enlightenment or realist, Waltzian science – as intellectual illusions, inescapably subjective in conception. As a result, one of post-modernism’s most important contributions is to re-highlight the inter-relations of power and knowledge in human social interaction. As Steve Smith has aptly noted,

*All power requires knowledge and all knowledge relies on and reinforces existing power relations. Thus there is no such thing as ‘truth’, existing outside of power. To paraphrase Foucault, how can history have a truth if truth has a history? Truth is not something external to social settings, but is instead part of them.*<sup>866</sup>

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<sup>864</sup> Martin Wight, a leading proponent of the IS approach, has noted that IR scholarship itself represents a dialogue between three political philosophies, resurrected/redefined across history – realism (Machiavelli), rationalism (Grotius), and revolutionism (Kant) – cf. Wight et al. (1991).

<sup>865</sup> A leading example of post-modern theory applied to IR can be found in Ashley (1996: 240-253). For an overview, see Jackson and Sørensen, eds. (2007: 294-296).

<sup>866</sup> Smith (1997: 181).

Rather than envisioning absolute truths, then, post-modernism is skeptical, and posits that neither a single theory nor set of universally moral institutions can be fashioned to “fit,” i.e. be just and fair in the eyes of all humankind (and certainly not for all time). When taken to extremes, post-modernism can tend toward nihilism, but in its more moderate forms, it has served as the driving force for one of the most promising recent trends in IR theory, known as constructivism.<sup>867</sup>

Nicholas Onuf first introduced constructivism to IR, coining the term to capture the essence of inter-subjectivity in all human (and hence international) interaction.<sup>868</sup> The underlying thesis is that individuals and groups “construct” their reality, by relating different values and conceptions to the more objective elements of physicality and shared insight (i.e. concept) around them. In its more moderate form,<sup>869</sup> constructivism joins international society theory in bridging the realist-liberal divide. It does so by re-emphasizing the nature of power as a *social* process, which in turn involves elements that are *both* material (i.e. of military/economic capability) *and* “ideational” (i.e. ideological and legitimizing).<sup>870</sup> In reconnecting physical and conceptual forms of power,

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<sup>867</sup> Cf. Hopf (1998, 2002). On the more critical side, of (“de-”)constructivism (essentially placing ideas *over* physical power), examples include Der Derian (1987); Tickner (1992); Walker (1993); George (1994); Campbell (1998); and Linklater (1998). On the more moderate, “conventional” side (placing ideas and power in co-relation), examples include Katzenstein (1996); Reus-Smidt (1997); Adler and Barnett (1998); Ruggie (1998a); Checkel (1998); Wendt (1999); and Finnemore (2003).

<sup>868</sup> Cf. Onuf (1989). Good introductions to the history of constructivism include Barnett (2005); Reus-Smidt (2005); and Jackson and Sørensen, eds. (2007: 53, 164-176).

<sup>869</sup> Critical constructivists tend to oversimplify the distinction between constructivism and realism on these very grounds, rejecting realism as essentially materialist – cf. Hurd (2008a: 300-301). However, this is a damaging misrepresentation, since the realist tradition includes much discussion of ideational factors, especially in its classical/biological form. On the convergence of realism and constructivism, see Barkin (2003) and Jackson, ed. (2004).

<sup>870</sup> For more on the ideational focus of constructivism, see Wendt (1992: 394; 1995); Finnemore (1996, 2003); and Weldes (1999) (the latter two discussing the historical formations of national interest). See also

constructivism has derived much inspiration from the sociological notion of “structuration,” which is used to analyze the relationships between structures and actors.<sup>871</sup> According to the principle of structuration, “structures” – the rules and conditions guiding social action – do not predetermine an actor’s behavior in a straightforward or mechanical manner. Instead, structures are inter-subjective, and despite their constraints on actors, they can be transformed. In acting and/or thinking on structures in various and/or new ways, actors can subtly or drastically shift the nature of their constraints.

A central example is the structure of sovereignty, a significant organizing force in political relations across history, but of vastly different conception. As forms and perceptions of state as corporate entity have changed, so have the definitions of sovereignty, in placing authority, rights, and obligations over or within citizens, territory, and law.<sup>872</sup> Structuration thus allows for the study of historical change – that gray area once avoided by disciplinary battles for supremacy – and paves the way for a closer investigation of *how* shared, intersecting, and conflicting identities, interests, and thought (*Zeitgeist*) are created, transformed, and eliminated over time and space. For this reason, some scholars have joyfully used the label “emancipatory” to describe constructivism’s potential to liberate current political thought from at least some of the outmoded

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Tannenwald (2005: 15), who divides the ideational into four main types: (1) ideologies (shared belief systems); (2) normative beliefs (principles of right and wrong); (3) cause-effect beliefs (guidelines for means-end strategies); and (4) policy prescriptions (programmatic ideas regarding policy issues).

<sup>871</sup> Cf. Jackson and Sørensen, eds. (2007: 163), and Giddens (1984), who first used the term structuration. For more on how constructivism’s approach to power can serve as a useful additive to structural realism, see Barkin (2003).

<sup>872</sup> Cf. Biersteker and Weber (1996); Prokhovnik (2008).

strictures of Westphalian statehood and its concomitant IR theory.<sup>873</sup> Such theory – really a perspective rather than a set of paradigms – offers more dynamic possibilities for future study, whether into security as an issue on multiple levels (not just national), into interest as defined in intersecting, even contradictory ways, or into the inter-relations of political philosophy, action, and historical interpretation.

### **NORMATIVE IR THEORY**

At this juncture, constructivism dovetails with another theme among the alternatives to the divide between realism and liberalism: normative theory.<sup>874</sup> Echoing much of the scholarship in international society and constructivism, normative theory is not so much post-positive – that is, transcending behavioralism and social science – as it is “pre-positive.” In many ways, it returns to the humanistic and holistic approaches of classical realism (and classical liberalism), in that it looks to the inseparability of human rational and irrational features.<sup>875</sup> It is at once modern *and* pre-modern, being part of a long history of political thought that has re-evaluated and responded to the texts of ancient Greece, Rome, the medieval period, and onward. In its modern sense, normative

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<sup>873</sup> See Booth (1991), who first developed so-called emancipatory theory. See also Linklater (1989). For an overview, see Jackson and Sørensen, eds. (2007: 90-92). Please note that constructivists remain divided, between those who perceive neorealist anarchy as fundamental (e.g. Cronin (1999)), and those who take a “post-anarchy” view (i.e. including elements of international/transnational authority) (e.g. Ruggie (1998a, b); Barnett and Finnemore (2004: Ch. 1); Hurd (2008b)). The current study advocates a balanced approach, characterizing all politics as inherently heterarchic.

<sup>874</sup> I characterize normative theory as a theme, because its content and purpose are so closely related to both international society and constructivism, that to draw the lines between them too deeply would only damage their theoretical potential.

<sup>875</sup> Cf. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). The term classical here refers to the post-war era of realism, including scholars such as Morgenthau, Carr, and Niebuhr. Recent work has also resurrected the topic of human emotion, as at once rational *and* irrational, and as a main driving force in political interaction and power relations – cf. Ross (forthcoming).

theory is quite similar in usage to the Greek word, *nomos* (“custom”), especially in its inclusion of a contextual moral dimension in IR, and in its wider questioning of meaning and interpretation in the issues of international order, war and peace, justice and injustice, diplomacy and intervention.<sup>876</sup> “Norms” represent standards of behavior in a web of expectations, sometimes shared, sometimes conflicting, and enforced both formally and informally.<sup>877</sup> Many positivist/structural IR scholars draw a distinction between their own empirical theories and normative ones, characterizing the latter as exclusively prescriptive. This oversimplification has translated into a general equation of norms with non-existent ideals (as opposed to “facts”). However, most normative theorists do not agree with this definition, and for the present study, the meaning of norms will be closer to the ancient Greek term *nomos* – encompassing social conventions that are at once about facts (i.e. formal and informal rules and practice) *and* about values.<sup>878</sup> And because political interactions are constrained by “limited rationality” – that is, a degree of uncertainty in interpretation, and emotional response in decision-making – normative theory offers a crucial tool for understanding frameworks of conceivable and/or

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<sup>876</sup> Leading normative IR theorists include Nardin (1983); Brown (1992); Frost (1996); Jackson (2000). See also Brown, Nardin, and Rengger (2002).

<sup>877</sup> For definitions of norms in IR, see Jepperson (1991); Thomson (1993); Axelrod (1986); Florini (1996); Jepperson et al. (1996: 54); Katzenstein (1996); Raymond (1997); March and Olsen (1998); Ruggie (1998a, 1998b). Some scholars also use the term “rule systems,” defined as the “steering mechanisms through which authority is exercised...” Rule systems have “spheres of authority” (SOAs), through a range of formal (i.e., consitutional/legal) and informal (i.e. repeated practice) means. Cf. Rosenau (2004: 31-32).

<sup>878</sup> Note that normative theorists rightly point out that even positivist/empirical theories are themselves inevitably based on values/evaluative assumptions. Cf. Jaskson and Sørensen, eds. (2007: 297-299).

acceptable action, and for assessing events such as the outbreak of war and the practice of violence – in this case, 146 BCE.<sup>879</sup>

Normative frameworks are not static, however. At different times and in different contexts norms develop and transform as “collective understandings of the proper behavior of actors.”<sup>880</sup> As such, they include elements of *prescription*, characterizing certain behavior as proper, and of *description*, achieving “collective understandings” through regular patterns of behavior and/or communication between actors.<sup>881</sup> At their most concrete, then, norms can become formalized as institutions and as manifestations of international order.

In order to understand how and why certain norms develop instead of others, scholars have turned to evolutionary theory.<sup>882</sup> Norms are thus classed as “memes,” the cultural equivalent of genes as the basic unit of transferred, encoded data.<sup>883</sup> Certain traits and/or types of behavior are thus selected according to the environment (international/ domestic/ transnational), with advantage for the norm itself (i.e. its survival and growth).<sup>884</sup> The evolutionary model of norm development thus allows for complexity, both in the expression of norm variation and in the transfer of essentially *acquired*

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<sup>879</sup> Cf. Finnemore (1996); Rosenau (2004).

<sup>880</sup> Legro (1997: 2).

<sup>881</sup> Some scholars employ a distinction between behavioral and “deontic” to describe the active and conceptual expressions of norms (cf. Raymond 1997: 218-219, with citations), but this is perhaps too limiting.

<sup>882</sup> The evolutionary theory applied is not Darwinian in the sense of late 19<sup>th</sup>-early 20<sup>th</sup> century emphases on “fitness” as embedded superiority. Instead, it takes a contextual approach, envisioning fitness in terms of advantage for a specific environment (in both time and space). See Florini (1996) for more on developing evolutionary normative theory.

<sup>883</sup> Dawkins (1989: Ch. 11) first coined the term “meme” to describe this cultural type of replicator, or item that copies, transmits, and expresses (coded) information.

<sup>884</sup> Selection is thus not directly tied to human survival, although if the norm were lethal to all hosts, it would obviously not last.

characteristics. When presented by a number of different norms, then, a population may be “polymorphic” – that is, some actors may follow one norm and others follow another – or an individual may pursue a “mixed” strategy. What determines a norm’s success is its relevance to the social environment(s) at hand, its acceptability and applicability, and eventually, its popularity across a growing number of existing communities. As a cultural phenomenon, the development and shift in norms represents a set of processes that may be gradual or sudden, coerced or organic, and at once rationally and emotively produced.<sup>885</sup> Therefore, while norms serve as the building blocks of group identities, shared practices, and cultural/ethical values, they are remote from a group’s genetic evolution.<sup>886</sup> Norms may operate on another plane of reproductive success or failure, but these events are not completely detached from the success or failure of the population(s) practicing and modifying them. Perhaps for this reason traditional realists have had so much trouble assigning motivational assumption to international politics, and have ended with the rather unenlightening syllogism that all state interest is ultimately about survival.<sup>887</sup> They have been asking the wrong question, and looking in the wrong direction for their answers, as human survival and the evolution of norms are uniquely linked and are both contextually, historically based. The same problems, and the same possible solution, exist for the study of Roman imperialism *vis-à-vis* 146 BCE.

In the development and transfer of norms, three factors in particular are said to determine the spread of a new (i.e. “contested”) norm: (1) prominence; (2) coherence;

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<sup>885</sup> As Douglas (1986) notes, human actors do not consciously assess every action and choice that they make, and even when they do, may be unconsciously following normative habits.

<sup>886</sup> Cf. Gellner (1992: 14).

<sup>887</sup> Cf. Donnelly (2000: 52-56).

and (3) environment.<sup>888</sup> Prominence is a relational phenomenon, through which a norm first emerges to gain notice and a foothold over other, pre-existing norms.<sup>889</sup> Norms may achieve prominence via the isolation and/or heightened visibility of a certain population, as well as through active promotion. In the first instance, particularly powerful, prestigious, and/or rising groups/states have an edge in determining which norms will become conspicuous. In the second, key individuals and/or groups (known in normative theory as “entrepreneurs”) endorse new norms, and play an important role in “framing” them.<sup>890</sup> Entrepreneurs use a frame to “fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems.”<sup>891</sup> However, power, influence, and promotion are not enough for a norm to thrive. The norm must also have “coherence” – that is, it must interact well or fit with an environment of other prevailing norms.<sup>892</sup>

This last attribute – also known as “resonance” – describes the relative strength of a norm that possesses greater compatibility with and reinforcement from its surrounding norms.<sup>893</sup> Discussion of normative coherence in turn intersects with Weberian debates regarding legitimacy, both as a means for setting out criteria for the “right to rule,” and

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<sup>888</sup> Cf. Florini (1996: 374-377). For a recent application of this model, see Fisher (2006-2007).

<sup>889</sup> For “norm emergence” and the stages of norm influence, see Sunstein (1997).

<sup>890</sup> E.g. Nadelmann (1990). Entrepreneurs may be single actors, but are often networks or groups – see Keck and Sikkink (1998). See also Snow et al. (1986), who use the term “frame alignment processes” to describe the development of prominence.

<sup>891</sup> Barnett (1997: 25). See also Payne (2001: 39). For more on the rational/ strategic aspect of norm promotion, see Axelrod (1986); Bernheim (1994); Fearon and Laitin (2003).

<sup>892</sup> Cf. Florini (1996); Thomas (2005: 27-28, 31); Fisher (2006-2007: 742).

<sup>893</sup> For the term resonance, see Lumsdaine (1993); Keck and Sikkink (1998).

for understanding the beliefs of those subject to rule.<sup>894</sup> As a cluster of *coherent* norms that establish membership and/or consensus within a society (international or otherwise), legitimacy at once reflects the physical capability and evaluative acceptance of authority.<sup>895</sup> Any new norm of legitimacy (as with any other new norm) must therefore fit into the pre-existing web of shared understandings of what constitutes acceptable behavior for the context at hand.<sup>896</sup>

A wide variety of mechanisms and forms of social praise and censure drive a norm's decline or its emulation and growth.<sup>897</sup> Once a norm or set of norms reaches broad acceptance (in what is known as a "norm cascade"), it becomes "internalized" as a new social/cultural standard, either informally or formally delimited.<sup>898</sup> In their continuing processes of transformation, norms both affect and are affected by the politics of individuals and transnational actors (first level), the politics within states (second level), and between states (third level).<sup>899</sup> All actors – state and otherwise – are thus concerned simultaneously with shifting their behavior to match the rules (formally and informally

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<sup>894</sup> For overviews of legitimacy and political theory, see Barker (1990); Beetham (1991). On the Weberian tradition and legitimacy, see Clark (2003: 79-80). On legitimacy and norms, see Franck (1990).

<sup>895</sup> See Wight (1977: 153). On legitimacy as a social consensus, with no element of coercion, see Hurd (1999). For a constructivist realist approach combining consensus *and* coercion ('soft' and 'hard' forms of power, respectively), see (among others) Tarrow (1994); McAdam (1996); Linklater (1998); Payne (2001).

<sup>896</sup> On norms and this so-called "logic of appropriateness" (including explicitly inappropriate action framing some new norms), see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); March and Olsen (1998).

<sup>897</sup> Cf. Scott (1971); Ullman-Margalit (1977); Opp (1982); Axelrod (1986); Florini (1996); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902). On the importance of identity, esteem, and competition in IR, see Feldman and Stenner (1997); Rubin and Hewstone (1998); Brewer (2001); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse (2003).

<sup>898</sup> For more on the three-stage "life-cycle" of norm influence (emergence, cascade, and internalization), see Nadelmann (1990); Sunstein (1997); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). For another example, see the proposed "spiral model" of Risse et al. (1999), who explore the ways in which compliance is achieved out of repression and internalization.

<sup>899</sup> See Cortell and Davis (1996); Tarrow (2001).

defined), and in reconstructing the rules to condone their behavior.<sup>900</sup> On the dynamics between domestic and international norms in particular, there are some differences in emphasis. Some scholars study the role of domestic norms in shaping international ones, and others study the reverse.<sup>901</sup> However, making too much of a primary focus on one or the other misses the degree to which norms can converge among a large number of highly varied states, or to which domestic and international concerns interrelate in directing the course of foreign “policy.” From this angle, the ethics of international behavior, of law and statecraft, and of the decisions of states-people and governing institutions can be addressed from multiple angles.<sup>902</sup> And in an important connection with (social) constructivism, such normative theory recognizes that the actions of states and states-people help shape the norms of international life, which in turn serve to define, socialize, and influence them.<sup>903</sup> In a feedback loop, then, institutions, states, and individuals are redefined and re-constrained by the actions taken by themselves and others, and by the evaluations these receive (i.e. legitimizing or not).

Turning to conflict (especially international), norms play a number of roles: in defining the tension between cultures and national identities, in the convergence and contestation of norms as they come into contact with each other, and in defining the

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<sup>900</sup> Cf. Thomas (2001); Hurd (2007).

<sup>901</sup> Emphasis on the role of domestic norms: Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Cortell and Davis (2000: 66); Hooghe (2005). On international norms, see Florini (1996: 366).

<sup>902</sup> E.g. Nardin (1983); Jackson (2000).

<sup>903</sup> For the constructivist origins of this proposition, see Onuf (1989: Ch. 1); Wendt and Duval (1989: 51-73); Wendt (1992, 1994); Klein (1994: Ch. 1-2); Cortell and Davis (1996); Finnemore (1996: Ch. 1); Katzenstein (1996: 1-32); Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996: 33-75); Adler (1997: 338-340); Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997: 158-167); Reus-Smit (1997); Hopf (1998: 172-173); Ruggie (1998a: Ch. 1).

ethics of conflict resolution, identifying appropriate forms of diplomacy, arbitration, and even resorts to violence.<sup>904</sup> Conventionally, however, the concept of normative “ethics” playing an expansive role in international politics has been considered problematic in the least, and antithetical at the most. For the liberal/neoliberal tradition, it represents a positive goal to be achieved, in mimicry of domestic social order (usually defined according to the democratic peace thesis). For the realist/neorealist tradition, such “ethical” behaviors and rule-systems may range anywhere from pure sham performance to wholly self-serving leverage for those with the greatest physical capability.

Such a dichotomous approach, though, between absolute morality and interest, misses the more complex extent to which norms underlie the forms taken by physical prowess and evaluations of “right” and “wrong” (with both positive and negative outcomes). The location of power and the processes of politics remain contextualized, conceived in social judgments of morality as much as in quantifiable ways. For this reason, the perception, for example, of the good in dying for one’s country involves an evaluation that is at once moral *and* based on collective self-interest (enforced or not). In other words, a particular set of socialized norms has evolved to define a state as worth an individual’s life, in terms that are at once emotionally and rationally framed. Making simplistic assumptions regarding pure “self-interest” as opposed to or even governing “ethics” is to deny the central role of changing group dynamics, and of the human ability for self-sacrifice in the belief that something is right. The need to assure oneself and

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<sup>904</sup> Cf. Raymond (1980); Sullivan and Siverson (1981); Brecher and James (1986); Snyder (1997); Raymond (1997); Guidry et al. (2001); Tarrow (2001).

others of such truth, both inside and outside the group, drives the manner in which any structure of power, be it coercive or collaborative, gains and changes shape.

Therefore, as suggested by social constructivist theories, power is best viewed as a process, the quintessence of politics as a particular form of human social activity creating and communicating systems of relative order, both quantitative/physical and qualitative/conceptual.<sup>905</sup> Integral to this process are norms, as a “grammar” of human societies, inherently defining the interactions within and between groups (including states).<sup>906</sup> In setting formal and informal “linguistics,” including contextualized ethical judgments, norms not only color the cooperative aspects of human behavior but also the violent and destructive ones.<sup>907</sup> In the case of the latter, it is as much a form of organized human social interaction, with its own evolving sets of norms.

More is going on, and needs to be considered carefully, in how people think and talk about the use of force in IR, and how they strive and even succeed in legitimizing it, in ways that to outsiders or opponents seem incongruous with the devastation inflicted. The perceptions and avowals of “acceptable” instances and people involved in intra- and inter-group use of force thus not only reflect the morals and values of a particular society,

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<sup>905</sup> Power is thus defined here as a relational, complex phenomenon, involving social interaction (complete with norms, identity, and culture), the potentials and effects of physical capability, and elements of opposition and collaboration. Weber (1921-1922/ 1976: 28) compresses these elements well in his definition of *Macht*: “the opportunity to have one’s will prevail within a social relationship, also against resistance, no matter what this opportunity is based on.” See also Weber (1919/ 1999: 7); Morgenthau (1960: 5); and Deutsch (1967: 232).

<sup>906</sup> On the concept of norms as a “grammar of society,” see Bicchieri (2006).

<sup>907</sup> These last behaviors, however, are least associated with norms by positivist scholars (both neo-realist and neo-liberal), whose rationalist/materialist approaches have artificially separated morality (as an absolute) from considerations of power – cf. Thomas (2001: 2ff.).

but also the structures, practices, and expressions of its power as a political entity.<sup>908</sup> In return, by setting and modifying socialized parameters, norms largely anticipate the who, what, and how of relative “success.”<sup>909</sup> The key, therefore, is to understand norms as both the products and sources of power in politics, be they within or across the perceived bounds of statehood.

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<sup>908</sup> See, among others, Finnemore (1996) and Price (1997). The term “war convention,” which derives from Walzer (1977: 44), is sometimes used to refer to the effects of ethical understanding on the use of force (on the third-level in particular). For examples dealing with modern history, see Bailey (1972); Howard (1979); Reisman (1991); Arend and Beck (1993); Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman (1994). Among classical scholarship, the focus is more on international law as a (predominantly classical) Greek conception, see, among others: Adcock (1948); Bierzanek (1960); Mosley (1973) Karavites (1982); Missiou-Ladi (1987); Tenekides (1993); Nakategawa (1994); Bederman (2001); Piccirilli (2002); Butkevych (2003); Chaniotis (2004); Low (2007). On relation of Greek laws to Rome: Ager (1996); Bauman (1996); Amelotti (2002); Phillipson (2001); Martini (2002); and Giovannini (2007).

<sup>909</sup> As noted by Osiander (1994: 11), physical and conceptual norms set the political “game”: i.e., who shall play, what the board will look like, and what moves are acceptable.

## Abbreviations

<i>ArchEph</i> <i>Austin</i> <sup>1</sup> / <i>Austin</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>Archaiologike ephemeris.</i> <i>The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources.</i> M.M. Austin. 1 <sup>st</sup> edition (1988); 2 <sup>nd</sup> edition (2006).
<i>BAC</i> <i>B-D</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>Biblioteca di Antichità Ciproite.</i> Roma, 1971-. <i>The Hellenistic Period: Historical Sources in Translation.</i> 2 <sup>nd</sup> ed. R.S. Bagnall and P. Derow, 2004.
<i>BCH</i> <i>Burstein</i>	<i>Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.</i> <i>The Hellenistic Age from the Battle of Ipsos to the Death of Kleopatra VII.</i> S.M. Burstein., 1985.
<i>Byrsa I</i>	<i>Byrsa I : rapports préliminaires des fouilles (1974-1976), sous la direction de Serge Lancel.</i> J.-M. Carrie et al. (eds.). EFR, 1979.
<i>Byrsa II</i>	<i>Byrsa II : rapports préliminaires des fouilles (1977-1978), niveaux et vestiges puniques, sous la direction de Serge Lancel.</i> S. Lancel et al. (eds.). EFR, 1982.
<i>Byrsa III</i>	<i>Byrsa III : rapport sur les campagnes de fouilles de 1977 a 1980, la basilique orientale et ses abords.</i> Pierre Gros. EFR, 1985.
<i>Cedac</i>	<i>Cedac (Centre d'Études et de Documentation Archéologique de la Conservation de Carthage) Carthage Bulletin.</i> 1978-.
<i>Corinth I-XX</i>	<i>Corinth Volumes.</i> ASCSA. 1929-2003. Available online at: <a href="http://www.ascsa.edu.gr/index.php/publications/browse-by-series/corinth">http://www.ascsa.edu.gr/index.php/publications/browse-by-series/corinth</a>
<i>Curty</i> <i>CAH</i> <i>CRAI</i>	<i>Les parentés légendaires entre cités grecques.</i> Olivier Curty, 1995. <i>Cambridge Ancient History.</i> Vol. 1-21, 1971-2005. <i>Comptes rendus des séances - Académie des inscriptions &amp; belles-lettres.</i>
<i>Délos</i>	<i>Exploration Archéologique de Délos.</i> Fasc. I-XXX. V. Grace et al., 1970.
<i>Dorandi</i>	“Anaxarchi Democritei Fragmenta,” in <i>Atti e Memorie dell'Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere 'La Colombaria'</i> 59. T. Dorandi, 1994, pp. 9-59.
<i>FGrH</i> <i>FIRA</i>	<i>Fragmente der griechischen Historiker.</i> F. Jacoby, 1923-. <i>Fontes Iuris Romani Antejustiniani, I-III.</i> 1941-3.
<i>Fornara</i>	<i>Archaic times to the end of the Peloponnesian War.</i> C. Fornara, 1983.
<i>Gonnoi</i>	<i>Gonnoi. I: La cité et son histoire. II: Les inscriptions.</i> B. Helly, 1973.
<i>Green</i>	<i>From Alexander to Actium: The Hellenistic Age.</i> Peter Green, 1990/3.

<i>IC</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Creticae, I-IV.</i> M. Guarducci, 1935-50.
<i>I.Délos</i>	<i>Inscriptions de Délos.</i> 1926-.
<i>I.Delphi</i>	<i>Fouilles de Delphes, III: Épigraphie.</i> G. Colin, 1909-.
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae.</i> 1903-.
<i>IGRR</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes.</i> ed. Cagnat.
<i>I. Lampsakos</i>	<i>Die Inschriften von Lampsakos.</i> P. Frisch, 1978.
<i>ILLRP</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae.</i> ed. Degrassi.
<i>I. Magn.</i>	<i>Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Mäander.</i> ed. Kern, 1900.
<i>ISE</i>	<i>Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche III.</i> F. Canali de Rossi, 2001-.
<i>LSAM</i>	<i>Lois Sacrées de l'Asie Mineure.</i> ed. Sokolowski, 1955.
<i>Milet</i>	<i>Milet. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahre 1899.</i> 1906-.
<i>Müller</i>	<i>Geographi Graeci Minores.</i> Karl Müller, 1855.
<i>OGIS</i>	<i>Orientalis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae.</i> W. Dittenberger, 1903-5.
<i>Olympia</i>	<i>Olympia V. Die Inschriften.</i> Ed. Dittenberger-Purgold, 1896.
<i>ORF</i>	<i>Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta.</i> Heinrich Meyer, 1832.
<i>P.Hamb.</i>	<i>Griechische Papyrusurkunden der Hamburger Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek.</i> I-IV, 1911-1998.
<i>P.Oxy</i>	<i>The Oxyrhynchus Papyri.</i> Vols. I-LXXV. Egypt Exploration Society in Graeco-Roman Memoirs, London.
<i>Ramon</i>	<i>Las Ánforas Fenicio-Púnicas del Mediterráneo Central y Occidental.</i> J.Ramon Torres, 1995.
<i>RC</i>	<i>Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period.</i> C.B. Welles, 1934.
<i>RDGE</i>	<i>Roman Documents from the Greek East.</i> ed. R.K. Sherk, 1969.
<i>RE</i>	<i>Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumwissenschaft.</i> Pauly-Wissowa.
<i>REG</i>	<i>Revue des Études Grecques.</i>
<i>Robert, Documents</i>	<i>Documents d'Asie Mineure.</i> Louis Robert, 1987.
<i>Roman Statutes</i>	<i>Roman Statutes (BICS Suppl. 64).</i> ed. M.H. Crawford, 1996.
<i>RRAM</i>	<i>Roman Rule in Asia Minor.</i> D. Magie, 1950.
<i>RS</i>	<i>Roman Statutes.</i> M.H. Crawford, 1996.
<i>Ruggiero, Diz. Epigr.</i>	<i>Dizionario epigrafico di antichità romane.</i> Ettore de Ruggiero, 1895.
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum.</i> 1923-.
<i>SNG-DEN</i>	<i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum – Denmark.</i>
<i>Staatsverträge</i>	<i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums.</i> H.H. Schmitt, 1969.
<i>SVF</i>	<i>Stoicorum veterum fragmenta.</i> H. von Arnim. Leipzig, 1903-5.
<i>Syll.<sup>3</sup></i>	<i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum<sup>3</sup>.</i> ed. W. Dittenberger, 1915-1924.
<i>Walbank, Comm.</i>	<i>A Historical Commentary on Polybius.</i> I-III. F.W. Walbank, 1957-1974.
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik.</i>

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