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**On Emotional Intentionality as a Conative State**

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**On Emotional Intentionality as a Conative state**

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**Report**

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## **Abstract**

### **On Emotional Intentionality as a Conative State**

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When we consider the active involvement of a subject of an emotional state, we have to say that intentionality of emotional states is conative rather than cognitive. Emotion is much closer to desire or a conative state than a belief or perception. Since a conative state is successful when it is carried out, a conative intentional state is more related to action toward others and events rather than passive perception. So it is important to examine the relation between emotion and action to see emotion as an active response. In the first, second and third chapter of my thesis, I will argue that since perception is too passive to be emotions, it is wrong to insist that emotions are a kind of perception. In the fourth chapter, I will show that it is impossible to have emotions without self-involvement. In the fifth chapter, I will discuss the relation between emotions and action through the cases of brain damaged patients and the Confucianist theory of emotion.

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## **Introduction**

The derivation of the word “emotion” has two parts: “e” for external and “motion” for movement. As the etymology of “emotion” implies, a subject’s active role is indispensable to emotional responses. Emotions are an action through which a subject expresses her concern or interest.

Although some movements look the same externally, they can have different origins. For example, my arm might rise because of a muscular spasm, or I might raise my arm to drive my car. In the first case, there is no room for a subject’s role since I cannot say that I move my arm. That is, there is no self-involvement to move my arm. We call the movement resulting from a muscular spasm and excluding a subject’s active role a passive movement. On the contrary, my arm’s movement to drive my car is impossible without self-involvement. My arm’s movement to drive my car is called an active action.

If this distinction between active actions and passive behaviors is reasonable, emotional responses are much more similar to active actions rather than passive behaviors. Traditionally, movement involving intentionality has been considered active. The subject’s role has something to do with a subject’s intentionality. In the same vein, emotional responses can be active and spontaneous. Emotional responses are active and spontaneous in the sense that an emotional response happens because of processes within a subject’s intentional states rather than being caused by things outside them. The aim of my thesis is to show that emotional responses are spontaneous actions in virtue of the intentionality that emotional states have.

There are two questions that must be answered in order to uphold the theory that emotions are active responses. The first question is whether or not an emotional state is intentional. The second question, since some kinds of intentionality can be neither compatible with emotional states nor active actions, is which kind of intentional state is required to make emotional responses active.

The first question can be answered through the debate between feeling theory and cognitivism about emotions. Feeling theorists, for example James, defined emotions as physiological changes resulting from perception of exciting events. As a result, feeling theorists have been accused of neglecting intentionality of emotions. On the other hand, cognitivists have asserted that intentionality is indispensable to emotions.

Most philosophers do not accept feeling theory. Without intentionality, we can neither explain how to identify one emotion from another emotion nor how to distinguish the physiological changes resulting from drinking too much coffee versus those from anger. Although most philosophers and psychologists consent to the intentionality of emotions, it is a very contentious issue as to which kind of intentionality is necessary for emotional states. Cognitivism can also be classified into two different groups. One is the strong cognitivism and the other the weak one. The strong cognitivists, for example Lyon, Solomon (1976) and Gordon etc., have used higher-order cognitive states, like evaluative belief or judgment, to explain emotional intentionality.<sup>1</sup> But since higher-order

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<sup>1</sup> Higher-order cognitive states can be understood neurologically or epistemologically. Neurologically speaking, higher-order cerebral cortices are mainly involved in higher-order cognitive states like belief. “They [higher-order cerebral cortices] contain centers that put together information from the **senses** with **thoughts and memories**.” (Angus Gellatly and Oscar Zarate, 2003) Higher-order cognitive states can also be explained in terms of epistemology. In epistemology, higher-order cognitive states are relatively defined. If an organism has higher-order cognitive states, it has a more discriminative representation system that codes information than those that have relatively lower-order cognitive states. For example, suppose there are two different types of neural states responsible for two different types of response: the first produces the same response to all acids while the second results in the same response to all acids except hydrochloric acid (HCl). The latter organism has more differentiating manner in which information of acids is represented or coded. The representation system of the latter is higher-order cognitive states than

cognitive states require propositional or conceptual content, higher-level cognition cannot be compatible with the emotions evident in infants or animals.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the weak cognitivists have tried to explain emotional intentionality through non-conceptual and unconscious cognitive states such as seeing-as (Nussbaum) or judgments of the body (Solomon) to avoid problems regarding infants' and animals' emotions.

Meanwhile, some feeling theorists (I call them neo-feeling theorists), for example Prinz, assert that if the reliable causal relation theory of mental representation is plausible, James's theory can be compatible with the intentionality of emotion since James considered a causal relation between perception of an event and the resulting physiological changes. In line with James, neo-feeling theorist like Prinz and Goldie, assert that the physiological changes are a kind of perception of exciting events.

There are huge differences between the weak cognitivists and neo-feeling theorists even though both of them have begun to focus on the importance of bodily feeling related to emotional intentionality. First of all, there is a difference between the concept of bodily changes between neo-feeling theorists and weak cognitivists. Neo-feeling theorists only consider physiological changes when explaining feeling while weak cognitivists contend that there is a mind and body synthesis that goes beyond purely physiological changes.

The second difference concerns the direction of emotional intentionality. Neo-feeling theorists assert that emotional intentionality is a kind of perception explained in terms of causal relations. The intentionality of perception has "mind-to-world direction of

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the one of the former since its representative content is more discriminating. (Fred Dretske, 1980) One of bases for discriminating information is concept or language. Thus mental representative content categorized with concepts or language can be higher a cognitive state than one without concept or language.

<sup>2</sup> R. Solomon holds that the content of higher-cognitive states related to emotions do not have to be propositional while J. Deigh asserts that propositional and conceptual content is necessary for higher-cognitive content related to emotions.

fit”, which has to fit into the world to be successful, rather than “world-to-mind direction of fit”, which has to be fulfilled or carried out to be successful.

The object of an intentional state that has “mind-to-world direction of fit” is determined by the cause that results in the intentional state. Thus the object is given to a subject rather than formed by her. For example, when I have the belief that there is a red apple on my desk, the object of the belief related intentional state is a red apple which causes my belief. Like perceptual belief, if the content of emotion were determined by a causal relation, it would be impossible for the object of emotion to be different from the cause of emotion. However, it is not unusual for the object of emotion is different from the cause of the emotional state. I was very happy, when I saw an apple on my desk since the apple reminded me of my daughter who loves to eat all kinds apple. Even though an apple caused my happiness, the object of my happiness is not the apple, but my daughter. Emotional content is evaluative. The object of emotional states is formed by a subject since evaluative content requires “being valued by a subject.” If emotions were a kind of perception of events whose intentionality is explained by a causal relation, there would be no room for a subject’s role in the emotional content and thus emotional responses would be passive rather than active or spontaneous.

It is very important to defeat the neo-feeling theorists’ claim that emotional content is a kind of perception whose intentionality is explained in terms of a causal relation, in order to prove that emotional responses are active. In my thesis, first of all, I will argue that it is impossible for a subject to have an emotional response without self-involvement. I will show that without a subject’s active role, an emotional response is impossible through several thought experiments and elucidation of implications of brain damages patients’ cases that neuroscientists provide. On scrutiny of debates between feeling theory and cognitivism, I will argue that the most appropriate theory of emotional

intentionality needs to incorporate an explanation of conative intentionality to encompass a subject's involvement.

The role of a subject is crucial to form the object of conative intentional state such as desires, which has "world-to-mind direction of fit". The object of desire, is neither true nor false, but can be carried out or fulfilled by a subject. When we consider the active involvement of a subject of an emotional state, we have to say that intentionality of emotional states has "world-to-mind direction of fit" rather than the other. Emotion is much closer to desire or a conative state than a belief or perception. Since a conative state is successful when it is carried out, the intentional state having world-to-mind direction of fit is more related to action toward others and events rather than passive perception. So it is also important to examine the relation between emotion and action to see emotion as an active response. I will also discuss the relation between emotions and action through the cases of brain damaged patients and the Confucianist theory of emotion.

## **Chapter 1. An Examination of Cognitivism.**

One morning, on the way to school, I was angry at a driver who suddenly thrust his car into my lane without any signal. How could I know whether or not I was angry? I felt bodily changes such as muscle tension, palpitation and so on, which I usually experience when I am angry. In order for a subject to be in emotional state, it seems necessary for a subject to experience physiological changes.

But the experience of bodily changes is not sufficient to explain emotional states, since we cannot differentiate emotional states by means of our physiological experiences. Palpitation and muscle tension can occur not due to my anger but my drinking too much coffee. In addition, what is the difference between bodily changes of guilt and the ones of shame? Tears cannot be the unique mark of sadness since tears of joy are not rare. Our emotional states are too finely discriminated to be equal to the feeling of physiological changes.

If feelings are not enough to individuate emotions, what can do it? Traditionally, philosophers have thought that the problem of the differentiation of mental states is the same as the problem of the content of mental states. The content of mental states has a different name: intentional state or aboutness. Emotional states are about an object or thought about the object beyond the bodily changes. My anger is directed toward the impudent driver.

Where does the intentionality of emotional states originate and what kind of form does it take? Cognitivists usually assert that emotional intentionality has something to do with relatively higher-level cognitive states, for example a judgment or belief regarding evaluative content. Through my anger, I judge or believe that his driving is ill-mannered

and is very threatening to my safety. Robert Solomon (1976) argues that an emotion is an evaluative judgment, a judgment about one's situation and about one's self or about all other people (p.186). William Lyons (1980) also holds that an emotion is based on knowledge or belief about the properties of the object of the emotion (138). Robert Gordon (1987) says that 'S fears that P' entails that S *believes* that there is a possibility that P (70).<sup>3</sup>

There are two kinds of counter arguments against cognitivism. The first is that emotional state cannot be reduced to belief or judgment. The second is that belief and judgment are not necessary to explain the intentionality of emotions. The first problem is not so serious a problem for cognitivism, but the second one can be problematic.

The first common counter argument is that the account of belief or judgments cannot exhaust the explanation of emotions. Emotions are different from mere belief or judgment. For example, suppose one reads an article about a notorious dictator of an African nation. Although one thinks that the dictator abuses his power, one can remain calm without any anger. Intentional states related to evaluative judgments are not equal to emotional states.

If you look closely at cognitivists' arguments, however, they include bodily changes as one of components of emotional states. Lyons (1980) suggests that cognitive states, like evaluative judgments, are necessary for emotional condition and an "abnormal physiological response" is another necessary condition for emotions. Solomon (1976) claims that an emotion is a relatively "*intense*," "*urgent*," "*hasty*" or "*emergent*"

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<sup>3</sup> Cognitivists are a motley crew. They do not agree with each other about the status or role of cognitive states in emotions. According to Lyons, evaluative belief causes an "abnormal physiological response." There is a causal relation between belief and emotional response. Gordon claims that cognitive states are one of the constituents of emotion. Solomon, however, thinks that an emotion is a judgment. Thus, cognitive states, like belief, thought, knowledge do neither cause nor constitute emotions. An emotion, Solomon holds, is equivalent to a cognitive state itself. Emotions as judgments are a kind of cognitive state, which is different from other cognitive states like belief, thought, perception or knowledge.

evaluative judgment. By using modifiers that usually are used to depict feeling, it seems that Solomon also considers a feeling of bodily change as one of features of emotional states. Hence, it is plausible to say that according to cognitivists, emotions have at least two characteristic features: an experience of physiological change and belief or judgment as an intentional state.

The second problem is a more serious challenge to cognitivists than the first. The second problem results from the fact that cognitivists count on higher-level epistemological states, like belief or evaluative judgment, in order to explain intentional content. Many philosophers have believed that those epistemological states require a concept or propositional contents. Thus cognitivism implies that emotional content has to be conceptual or propositional.

What kind of concept is needed to individuate emotional states? Anthony Kenny (1963) suggests “formal objects” (187-94). Each emotion has its own proper formal object. For example, sadness is related to loss. Fear implies ‘danger’. ‘Formal object’ is a kind of concept, with which a subject apprehends exciting objects. For example, since one thinks that a lion is dangerous, she is scared of a lion. She apprehends a lion with the concept of danger and attributes the formal object, danger, to lion. Kenny’s argument implies that an agent who is in emotional states should be competent to have concepts like formal objects.

Gordon pushes further. He holds that the content of emotion is propositional content. Gordon asserts that the intentional content of emotions should be propositional content. Gordon states, “all fear are fears *that* something is the case” (67, my emphasis) Propositional content is grammatically a “complete thought.” Thus propositional content demands a subject to have higher-level cognitive ability.

Conceptual content and propositional content are convenient ways to individuate emotional content. However, the claim that the intentional content of emotions is conceptual content or propositional content faces a problem since there are basic emotions that human beings and other animals share with each other. This difficulty, which is developed by John Deigh, can be summarized as follows.

- 1) According to cognitivism of emotions, intentionality of emotions can be captured by belief or evaluative judgment.
- 2) The content of a belief or evaluative judgment is a form of propositional content or conceptual content.
- 3) Propositional thought presupposes linguistic capacities.
- 4) Basic emotions are the ones that both adult human beings and beasts or infants share.
- 5) Beasts and infants do not have linguistic capacities.
- 6) Thus, the intentionality of the basic emotions is not related to linguistic capacities.
- 7) Thus, the intentionality of basic emotions cannot be reduced to belief or evaluative judgment that has a form of propositional content or conceptual content. (Deigh, 2004, 9-27).

Deigh argues that if animals have emotions, propositional or conceptual content is not necessary for emotions. However Deigh (1994) states that cognitivists can be divided into two different types: “one that entails a concept of thought broad enough to apply to all states of mind with objective content and another that entails the narrower concept whose application corresponds to that of the grammarians’ ‘complete thought’ and the

logicians' 'proposition'" (827). I think that if cognitivists can be divided into two different groups, one of the cognitivists's groups can have an answer for Deigh's counter argument regarding animals' emotions.

We may call the former weak cognitivism and the latter strong cognitivism. The weak cognitivist holds that there is no reason to think that the second premise of Deigh's argument is true. Nussbaum (2000) and Solomon (2004) claim that an evaluative content of emotional states can be non-propositional or non-conceptual content.<sup>4</sup> To explain non-conceptual content, cognitivists introduce new terminologies like "seeing-as" or "the judgment of body." The new terminologies can be understood in two different ways. First, seeing-as and the judgment of body are non-conceptual even though they are still a kind of higher level cognition like belief or judgment. Or, second they are not any longer belief or judgment, but they are still a kind of cognition even though they happen at different or low cognitive level.

First, I will examine whether it is plausible that the new concepts, seeing-as or judgment of body, involve a kind of higher-level cognition or not. Lazarus's experiment that R. B. Zajonc and J. Robinson (2004) cite supports the idea that emotions do not need any higher-level cognition. In the experiment, ten meaningless words are given to subjects. Five out of the ten words are given to subjects with an electric shock. After subjects are conditioned in this way, these meaningless words are presented to the same

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<sup>4</sup> Solomon (2003) insists that the debate regarding the content of basic emotion is related to consciousness and reflection rather than the propositional or conceptual content problem. He explains, "In the sense of consciousness as articulate and self-conscious reflection, an emotion can become conscious only if one has (at the minimum) a language with which to "label" it and articulates its constituent judgments."(181) According to his explanation, the difference between an adult human being's emotions and animal's emotions is not related to the question of whether or not the emotional states include conceptual content, since all kinds of belief and judgment, including one of an animal and an adult's, do not have to be articulated with labels. Rather, the difference is about whether or not the subject, who is in the emotional, is able to reflect its emotion state with labels like words. The labels like words are needed only if a subject needs to reflect consciously what she believes or judges. Thus a dog can have a belief or judgment like an adult, but a dog cannot reflect on what it believes.

subjects. But at this time, the word is seen to subjects too fast for them to recognize words and without any shock. Even though the subjects are not able to identify the word, their skin shows much higher galvanic response to the word associated with a shock. Robinson nicely summarizes the result of the experiment: “the subject did not know which ‘word’ had appeared to them, but their skin did. We can infer that the subjects feared or disliked certain ‘words’ even though they did not know what they were.” (33) This experiment weighs in favor of the claim that even though higher-level cognition is not always at work, subjects respond to word.

However some people may think that Lazarus’ experiments are not persuasive enough for theorists to give up the role of higher-level cognition in emotions since it is possible that higher-order cerebral cortices work unconsciously to detect stimuli even though the stimuli is presented too briefly for the subjects to be aware of it.

But the argument that higher-order cognitions work unconsciously is not strong enough to insist that a higher-level cognition is necessary for someone to be in emotional state since there are so many examples to show that higher-order cognitions are necessary to have emotions.

Damasio (2003) cites neurological research to prove the claim that higher-order cognitions are not necessary. Sophie Schwartz and Patrik Vuilleumier (2001) studied patients with unilateral neglect and visual extinction, who have right hemisphere cerebral cortices damage. Patients with such damage ignore events occurring on the left side of space because of damage to mechanisms of spatial attention in the right hemisphere. Patients may even fail to eat the food on the left side of their plate or bump into obstacles on their left side. If stimuli are given at the left side, there is no way that higher-level cerebral cortices of patients’ right hemisphere can detect the stimuli consciously or unconsciously because of their brain damage. However, the patients

detected emotional stimuli (spiders) on the left side much more often than neutral pictures (flowers). Those stimuli “break through the barrier of blindness” and induce physiological changes.

Since higher-order cerebral cortices are involved in higher-order cognition like perception, knowledge, belief, or judgment, unilateral neglect patients cannot employ higher-level cerebral cortices related to higher-order cognition when they detect emotional stimuli. If it is possible to detect emotional stimuli without using higher-level cerebral cortices, what should we conclude?

The human brain can be divided into several different parts whose functions are distinct. While higher-order cerebral cortices are involved in higher-order cognition, the main function of the amygdala is triggering bodily changes following emotional stimuli. According to Antonio Damasio (2003), Paul Whalen shows that the amygdala is able to induce an emotional bodily change without higher-order cerebral cortices. Whalen scanned brains to see what brain activity would be like when emotional stimuli are too fast for normal people to know what they are seeing. In the experiment, the amygdala became active even though subjects could not know what they were seeing and the higher-order cerebral cortices were not active (60). Normally, emotional stimuli that are captured by the higher-order cerebral cortices are sent to the amygdala to trigger bodily changes. This common order of emotional response is not necessary since the amygdala can directly capture emotional stimuli bypassing the higher-order cerebral cortices.

The result of these experiments implies that higher-order cerebral cortices are not necessary for emotional response. This suggests that cold thought, like belief, knowledge and judgment involving higher-level cortices, is not necessary for emotional response. The above experiments clearly demonstrate that the amygdala, whose role is essential in

the process of emotional bodily change, detects emotional stimuli without higher-level cognitions.

The intentionality of a belief or a judgment, which higher-order cerebral cortices are involved in, cannot exhaust the intentionality of emotions. But the feelings of bodily changes that are triggered by the amygdala are also intentional enough for an emotional state to be about something. Thus, there is hope to save cognitivism, if cognitivists accept that instead of higher-order cognition like belief or judgment, a feeling of physiological changes contributes emotional content. Many traditional cognitivists assign the role of differentiation of emotional states only to higher cognition and ignore the role of physiological changes for the intentionality of emotional content. But since the amygdala, which is involved in the physiological response, can detect and process information flowing from stimuli, it should be an acceptable claim for cognitivists that the physiological change plays a role in the content of emotion.

However, even though most cognitivists accept the intentionality of feeling, there are many difficult questions that cognitivists need to answer: 1) What kind of intentionality does feelings of the physiological changes assign to emotions? 2) How can physiological changes have intentionality? In following chapters, I will examine several suggested answers for the above questions and discuss about problems which those answers have.

## Chapter 2. Jessie Prinz's Embodied Emotions

Before cognitivists began to pay attention to the intentionality of feeling of physiological states, feeling theorists asserted that the intentionality of an emotional state can be captured by feelings of bodily changes. William James (1884) asserted that emotions are a bodily feeling aroused by the perception of an exciting fact. Although James did not think that perception is one of components that comprises the definition of emotion, he acknowledged a causal chain from an exciting object to perception of the object and then from perception to an aroused feeling.

In virtue of the causal relation, James's theory can be compatible with the reliable causal relation theory of mental representation. According to the reliable causal relation theory, Dretske (1981) suggests, mental states refer to something owing to a reliable causal relation between the mental state and its cause. For example, there is a reliable causal relation between smoke and fire. By virtue of the causal relation, smoke can carry information about the fire. In other words, owing to the causal relation, smoke represents fire. Information delivered by the causal relation can be "the natural sense of meaning." Likewise, a mental state is reliably caused by something. Thus a mental state, through the causal relation, has a function to represent the reliable cause. For example, there is a reliable causal relation between my-red-visual experience and the wavelength of light reflected from an object. It is by virtue of the reliable causal relation that my visual perception represents the wavelength of light reflected from the object.

Noticing that James's feeling theory of emotions and Dretske's meaning theory fit well together, Jessie Prinz (2004) asserts that emotional intentionality can be explained

by the reliable causal relation theory of mental representation. Let me summarize Prinz's explanation.

Dretske's mental representation theory tallies with the intentionality of emotions James's explanation implies. My experience of changes in my retina can carry information about color due to a reliable causal relation with the wavelength of light. Likewise, my experience of feeling of bodily changes can carry information about an exciting event if the feeling of bodily change has a reliable causal relation with it. By virtue of the causal relation, those bodily feelings represent their causes – exciting events.

If this explanation were plausible, it would be possible for emotions to be intentional without any higher-level belief or judgment. Thus it is worthwhile to look over Dretske's theory. It seems that when I perceive the color red, it is not required for me to rely on my belief or other higher-order cognition to explain the content of my perception. If Dretske's theory of mental representation corresponds with the content of emotional states, we can explain the intentionality of emotional states through the bodily changes, without depending on higher-order cognition.

Nevertheless, there is a big problem in using Dretske's theory to explain emotional content. Dretske's theory mainly talks about the content of perception. Emotions have a different kind of intentionality than perception, however. As Nussbaum (2001) states, emotions are not like being given a snapshot of the object. Rather emotions require looking at the object through one's own window (28). Perception is like a given snapshot whose representation is determined by a causal law excluding my spontaneous response. A subject's own way to see the world or her response to it plays a role in determining emotional contents. Thus the intentionality of emotion is that it has a "world-to-mind direction of fit" rather than "mind-to-world direction of fit." Emotional content is

conative rather than cognitive.<sup>5</sup> In other words, the object of emotions is formed by a subject rather than given to her.

Due to the different intentionality direction, the object of intentionality of emotions, unlike that of perception, can be separated from the cause. For example, when I smell the soup that my mother often has made for me, in a restaurant the smelling can cause my longing for my mother, but the object of my longing is not the soup but my mother.

As the above example shows, a subject's active response as a cause of emotions is very important to determine emotional content. Thus it is an important question: what does a subject attribute to the object of emotions? Many philosophers and psychologists agree with each other about the answer to the question. Most scholars acknowledge that evaluative or appraisal content is attributed to the emotional content although evaluative or appraisal contents have a very broad spectrum from mere preference to moral judgment.

It is a thorny problem for Prinz that the theory of emotional content cannot explain the evaluative property since Prinz wants to explain the intentionality of emotions through the reliable causal relation and considers emotions to be perceptions of their cause. It is common sense that evaluative content requires "being valued by a subject." But there is no room for a subject's role in the automatic causal process.

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<sup>5</sup> "World-to-mind direction of fit" and "Mind-to-world direction of fit" is meant to sum up the contrast between the conative orientation and cognition. We will or desire what does not yet exist, and deem ourselves successful if the world is brought into line with the mind's plan (Ronald de Sausa, 2003). When the world fits to my mind, my desire is successful. The intentionality of the conative state, like desire and intention, has "world-to-mind direction of fit." On the other hand, "mind-to-world direction of fit" is the expression of the direction of cognitive states like perception or belief. My perceptual or belief states have to conform to the world in order for these states to be successful. That is, when we perceive something, we consider ourselves successful only if our mind fits the world. Unlike conative states, the intentionality of cognitive states has "mind-to-world direction of fit"

Prinz bravely challenges the assumption of regarding evaluative properties as subjective ones. Prinz (2004) claims, “A response-dependent property, P, is one that would not exist without being represented as P by a human experience, judgment or other mental state...I do not think that emotions represent response-dependent properties in this strict sense.” (61) If Prinz can prove that an appraisal property belongs to environments and the reliable causal representation theory is true, emotion-related physiological changes caused by an object can represent an appraisal property without a subject’s evaluation. Thus in Prinz’s argument, it is very crucial to prove that appraisals are not subjective or response-dependent properties but objective, belonging to the environment. To justify his argument, Prinz gives us an example. For example, “radiation would be dangerous even if we did not know that it is.” Thus, without “being valued” as a danger, radiation is still a danger.

Prinz defines, “danger is the property in virtue of which these highly desperate eliciting conditions have come to perturb our bodies.” According to Prinz, danger, which is the formal object of fear, can make a subject scared without being valued by the subject. His argument has several problems. Before examining Prinz’s theory, let me summarize his claim. His position can be summarized as follows.

- 1) [Premise 1] A response-dependent property is one that would not exist without an agent’s mental operation such as experience, judgment, or other mental states.
- 2) [Premise 2] Emotional states are about formal objects such as loss, danger.
- 3) [Premise 3] a mental state represents an object by a reliable causal relation between the mental state and the object

[Premise 4] Like danger, formal objects exist without an agent’s mental operation.

- 4) By Premise 1 and Premise 4, formal objects are not response-dependent properties.
- 5) Thus excluding a subject's evaluation, formal objects can cause her emotional response.
- 6) By the premise 3, a subject's bodily changes that are caused by objective formal objects can represent formal objects without any subject's response such as evaluation or judgment.

As this summary shows, Prinz's argument counts heavily on the fourth premise. Many people doubt whether or not the fourth premise is true. In fact, the issue of whether or not the value property, like a formal object, is objective is very controversial. There might be persuasive arguments to justify the claim that evaluative properties are not subjective but objective. Thus some people might think that Prinz's argument is plausible if it is proved that the formal objects are objective properties. But even though it is right that evaluative properties are not assigned by a subject, one of these properties belongs to an objects or a state of affairs, Prinz's argument has a lethal problem. Even though the value is not response-dependent, the emotional response to the property requires the subject to evaluate it.

Here is an interesting experiment to support my argument. Robert Hinde's experiments, which Damasio (2003) cites, show that "the monkey's innate fear of snakes requires an exposure not just to a snake but to the mother's expression of fear of the snake."(47) Even though confronting a snake is an extremely desperate situation, a snake cannot automatically cause agitation in a baby monkey's body. After the monkey's learning how to evaluate appropriately the situation through its mother, a monkey can be scared by a snake.

The objective formal object cannot automatically cause a subject's bodily changes without the subject's involvement or mental operation. The conclusion (6) does not follow from the premise (4). Here is another argument.

Suppose that Jane and I read "Cinderella." After reading, both of us would agree that Cinderella's step mother is very malicious. Nonetheless, it is possible that I would be angry at her step mother but Jane is not upset at all in spite of our agreement. Where is the big difference? I empathized with Cinderella but Jane did not. If emotional responses were the same as perception, Jane and I should show the same emotional response: since Jane and I perceive the same property of malice. Putting myself in Cinderella's shoes, I could identify the situation as something with which I am concerned. As soon as I put myself in Cinderella's shoes, Cinderella's miserable plight becomes my interest and I am concerned with the situation seriously. In a result, I react to her situation with my anger. It is not until I engage in the situation and appraise the situation regarding my interest that I have an emotional response. As this argument shows, emotional response requires an agent to involve herself and only, an object seen through her own eyes is able to induce an emotional response, regardless of whether or not evaluative properties are response-dependant.

Damasio (1994) demonstrates through the cases of several patients who suffered from the damage of frontal lobe of brain that perceiving or seeing an evaluative situation is different from an emotional response to the situation(46-51). Damasio presented moral dilemmas and financial questions to one of his patients, Elliot. He shows that he shares ethical judgment principles with us. His answers to solve the financial problems are very reasonable. Patients, who have frontal lobe damage including Elliot, however, remain serene and indifferent to emotionally very evocative pictures. Such patients cannot show any strong emotional reaction, positive or negative. When we see the evocative pictures,

we feel what we are seeing with our eyes. Elliot and other such patients lost the ability to feel negatively or positively.

Due to his injury, Elliot cannot feel negatively or positively. As a result, he lost his ability to evaluate the situation **regarding himself**. Damasio summarizes “Elliot’s predicament as to know but not to feel.” Without the positive or negative feeling, an agent cannot decide what he has to do to cope with the situation to increase his well-being. If the consequence of my reaction could not bother me at all through positive feeling or negative feeling, it would not matter whether or not I have done morally good thing and whether or not I have done a positive thing to my well-being.<sup>6</sup> The disassociation between seeing and feeling shows that perceiving an evocative situation is different from feeling it. To see something is not enough to feel it. That is, an emotionally evocative picture cannot automatically cause emotional responses. Emotional responses require a subject’s involvement. Thus emotional responses are not automatic reflective reactions.

As the above several examples show, recognizing an emotionally evocative situation is not enough to cause a subject’s emotional response. A subject’s involvement through her positive or negative evaluation is necessary for her to form an emotional response to an object. Hence the emotional physiological change is a spontaneous action on a subject’s own initiative rather than an automatic causal result like sneezing.

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<sup>6</sup> The result of disassociation between seeing and feeling can be very catastrophic. Unlike his reasoning or judgment, Elliot’s real life performance is “a catalogue of violations” of the principles that he and we share. After his injury, his investment leads him to bankruptcy. In addition, he is very obscene and repulsive to other people and does not show any sympathy to anybody, including his family members.

### **Chapter .3 Goldie's Feeling Toward and Bodily feeling**

Unlike Prinz, Peter Goldie (2004) pays attention to the importance of a subject's point of view or perspective, discussing the intentionality of the feeling of emotions. Goldie thinks that the emotional feeling is different from merely feeling of bodily change such as a toothache, since the former is about the world beyond body's limitation while the latter is not. There are two kinds of feeling related to emotional intentionality. One is 'bodily feelings' and the other one is 'feeling toward.'

'Bodily feelings' provide two different kind of intentionality. Using Goldie's terminology, the first one is introspective knowledge and the second one is extraspective knowledge. The introspective knowledge is about our body's physiological change. When you are scared, you would experience palpitations, muscle tension, blushing and the like. These physiological changes refer to your body condition. Bodily feelings yield introspective knowledge about what happens to in your body. But 'bodily feelings' provide not only introspective knowledge but also extraspective knowledge. Extraspective knowledge is a prima facie reason to make us look further around the environment, which might bring on further physiological change. Likewise, emotional bodily feelings help us turn our attention into the outside world and this can cause further emotional feeling. Emotional feelings reveal to us that "there is something in the environment that has the emotion-proper property." (94)

Bodily feelings, however, are not enough to tell me what my emotion is about. Bodily feelings of my muscle tension and palpitation make me aware of that there is something scary nearby, but they cannot tell me that this is about a snake. Goldie asserts

“When an emotion is directed toward its object, then this is a sort of *feeling toward* the object.”(96) ‘Feeling toward’ tells a subject what causes her feeling.

In addition, Goldie holds that there is epistemic difference between propositional statements and feelings about our experience. He explains, “... our everyday thought and talk of feelings is personal partly in order to contrast the personal perspective with the impersonal perspective of the sciences. The two sorts of perspective, and *the two ways of thinking and talking*, are in different businesses, deploying different kinds – call them respectively phenomenal and theoretical concept (my emphasis).”(95) For example, if we talk about sadness in terms of phenomenal concepts, we talk about what is like to be sad. On the other hand, if we talk about being sad in terms of impersonal theoretical concepts, we understand sadness by the causal relation or the role of emotional states such as survival value.

Goldie’s distinction between two kinds of knowledge about our experience depends on Frank Jackson’s thought experiment about color vision. Jackson’s argument tries to show that the knowledge of the impersonal view is so different from the first person knowledge and that the former and the latter cannot be interchangeable. His thought experiment is as follows.

Mary has been locked up in black and white room since she was born. So Mary had never seen a color before she walked out from the room. She, however, read the book about color and learns about all optical knowledge and neuroscience knowledge regarding the perception of colors. As soon as Mary walks out from the colorless room, she was astounded by the experience of the colorful world. It is not until she walks out of the room that she does know what it is like to see color. The first person knowledge cannot be reduced or explained in terms of the impersonal knowledge.

Like knowledge of color vision, Goldie (2002) maintains that there are two different kinds of emotional knowledge. For example, danger can be understood in these two different ways. A computer knows the danger of a bomb through the description of the dangerous situation. But the computer cannot feel the dangerous situation while we can feel the danger from the first person point of view: we are afraid of a bomb. Our fear is one of the ways to know a dangerous situation. A computer, incapable of the same feeling as we have, can figure out and respond to a dangerous situation only by theoretical concepts such as its causal relation, whereas normal human beings know danger not only by its causal relation but also by what it is like to be in a dangerous situation.

Although I agree with Goldie's argument in that there are two ways to understand emotional states, I suspect that the role emotional feeling that Goldie explains is too limited to comprehend an essential role of emotional feeling. Like Prinz, Goldie thinks that emotions are a kind of perception. For Goldie, the emotional feelings are only one of the ways to perceive emotional stimuli rather than a subject's response to them. Thus the intentionality of emotion, according to him, is "mind-to-world direction of fit" rather than "world-to-mind direction of fit." My thought experiment, similar to Jackson's, will show what the difference between emotional feeling and perception of a red thing is.

Like Mary, we can imagine Smith, who has been confined in the safest place and has never exposed to a dangerous situation since he was born. When Smith walks out from the securest place and faces a snake, what is his response? He can be very calm and not scared at all. As I mentioned before, monkeys who have never seen their mother frightened by snakes do not fear snakes. The baby monkey's example implies that to be emotionally excited, an agent learns how to respond or how to evaluate the emotional stimuli. The example implies also that emotional responses are not automatic results of

stimuli – unlike color perception. A red thing can automatically give an experience to Mary even though she does not know how to feel it. However it is questionable whether or not a snake can automatically cause Smith’s experience. Emotional feeling requires a subject’s conative reaction.

As long as Mary is not color-blind, when Mary walked out from the black and white room, she realized what she does not know. When she gets out of the black and white room, she has an experience of what it is like to see colors since the color perception is an automatic result of optical causes. However Smith may fear a snake or may not. It depends on what he takes as danger. The existence of a snake is not sufficient to frighten an agent since the intentionality of emotion is about how to cope with stimuli rather than a causal result of stimuli.

So far, I have examined two answers for the questions: what kind of intentionality do feelings of the physiological changes assign to emotions? And how is it possible that physiological changes contribute intentionality to emotion? Two answers, Prinz’s and Goldie’s, suggest that the intentionality in feelings of physiological changes is perceptual. In addition, both answers heavily depend on the reliable causal relation theory of mental representation. As a result, the problem that these two answers have is that they exclude self-involvement or any active aspect of emotional intentionality. In the next chapter, through examining Damasio’s theory, I will argue that the intentionality of emotion is conative rather than perceptual and that bodily feeling of emotion represents not the world but a subject’s evaluation of the world.

## **Chapter 4. Damasio's theory**

Damasio (2003) makes a clear distinction between the object of visual perception and the object of feeling. In the case of vision, the external object generates a physical and neurological change of the retina, which is the main organ of vision. The retina receives stimuli from the outside world and delivers a signal of its physiological changes to the brain. The neurological changes of brain and retina correlate with the external world. In other words, it is the external world that the visual perception represents or refers to.

It is not wrong but imprecise to say that the feeling of physiological changes is about the external world, however. What feelings refer to is not directly the external world itself. Feelings are directly about the inside body state, which is a response to an external object, while visual perception is about the external events and objects. For example, in front of a dog, my body is shaken due to my dog-phobia. The process of visual perception forms the image of a dog in my brain map. My feeling perceives my shaken body that results from the image of a dog. In other words, my feeling is about myself shaken because of a dog. Thus, unlike general perception through vision or hearing, emotional feeling is about the organism's response to outside world as well as the outside world.

Perception passively receives information flowing from the object outside the body owing to a causal relation between perception and an object. However, what emotional feelings detect is not passive information but an interaction of an organism with the object. Damasio (2003) suggests that a normal neurological process is able to

support the argument that emotional feelings are an active perception about a subject's response to outside objects. To summarize the process, Damasio offers the following figure (90).




Figure 1. A diagram of the main stages for the triggering and execution of emotion

Feeling is an interactive complex emerging within a casual network. Feeling is not just sensory association or perception of the outside world. Emotional feelings emerge after raw information interacts with the subject's memory and the disposition of bodily change and so on. So emotional feeling is not just the image of the outside world, but the image or perception of the subject's response to the image of an exciting event.

It is important to notice that the feeling is not only about bodily changes but also indirectly about the object. What induces the images of feeling are not only changes in the 'internal milieu' but also the image of an object even though the image of the object is an indirect cause of feeling. The feeling is about an image of an object associated with a subject's changes in internal milieu. The image of feelings is about an interaction between the object and the organism. The brain "creates a nonverbal account of the events that are taking place in the varied brain regions activated as a consequence of the object-organism interaction"(Damasio (1995), 170). Feeling is not just about bodily changes, but also about the world. But the world that feelings represent is mixed with a subject's response.

The main function of higher-order cerebral cortices is to perceive an object and an image of the object by associating varied information flowing through organs. The image of the object induces bodily change. After inducing bodily change, the image of the object is associated with the image of bodily change and these conjoined images are associated with feelings in higher-order cerebral cortices. The image of objects changes, after the image of an object is associated with feelings. The brain can modify or change the image of object through feelings. The fox in Aesop's fables, Sartre quoted, alters the desirable grape into very sour grape through its emotions. Feelings are not a passive perception but an agent's active interpretation and interaction with its objects.

Based upon the above explanation, we can reach the provisional conclusion that emotional feelings are intentional. Through emotional feeling, a subject evaluates objects in point of view of herself. Thus, what the image of feeling represents is the interaction between organism and objects rather than just objects or a state of body. The image combined with feelings is colored with an agent's point of view and bias. As a result,

feelings can change images about the fact in the external world. That's why many people would say that if you fall in love, the world looks different. In virtue of bias, we drive our attention to an object the images of the object are salient to us.

## Chapter 5. Emotion and Action: “Knowing How” and Confucianism

Interacting with perceptual images, emotional feelings make another very important contribution to our rational cognition. The examples of Damasio’s patients demonstrate how important the contribution of feelings is. Elliot, who cannot feel negatively or positively because of his frontal lobe injury, hardly concentrates on one item steadily, and he fails to organize things in order of importance. As a result, he lost his job. His intelligence is totally intact, including perception, reasoning, linguistic ability and memory. Furthermore, he showed that his ability is better than average for solving a given problem related to a moral dilemma or financial crisis. Even though his knowledge and intelligence is unscathed, his mind is full of ‘cold blood’. He is always too calm and dispassionate.

As his tragic example shows, without emotion, which involves bodily feeling and agitation, we cannot choose the appropriate cause even though we have tons of knowledge. Cold blood hinders our using knowledge in practical life. Why is emotion necessary to choose an appropriate measure? In our real life, we are confronted with vast information and stimuli. Thus, options are too overwhelming for us promptly to focus on the important ones. In order to we direct our action to cope with a situation, we need to weigh the importance of matters.

Damasio states, citing Ronald De Sousa (1987), that feelings of bodily changes<sup>7</sup> help us focus on what are important among incessantly flowing stimuli. The bodily

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<sup>7</sup>In this context, Damasio uses “feeling” to refer to emotion. Even though sometimes Damasio uses “feelings” to refer mere physiological changes,, he emphasizes that feelings occur at the cerebral level, within sensory association and higher order cerebral cortices after he suggest the above figure. Since the

feeling image can selectively give the enhancement to images of the causative objects. The patient who had an injury of the frontal lobe lost the means to make any one of the images salient. So Elliot could not organize his working.

There are two ways for emotion related feelings to make factual knowledge salient. First, emotional feelings determine preferences among factual images by providing negative or positive value. Second, emotional feelings assign the degree of inclination. Emotional feeling drives or energizes our attention and working memory for us to keep focusing on important things for our well-being. By controlling the degree of preference, feelings fortify or weaken our attention.

In our mind, there is a vast amount of stored factual knowledge. In order to efficiently retrieve and use the stored knowledge, we categorize the knowledge and rank the groups of knowledge relative to the degree of inclination. To sort groups of knowledge, we need criteria. It is emotion related feeling that functions as criteria. Damasio (1994) explains how feelings play a role as bias for factual knowledge.

One possibility is that when different somatic markers [feelings] are juxtaposed to different combinations of images, they modify the way the brain handles them, and thus operate as a bias. The bias might allocate attentional enhancement differently to each component, the consequence being the automated assigning of varied degrees of attention to varied content, which translates into an uneven landscape. (Damasio, 1994, p.199)

The stored knowledge combined with bodily feeling is efficient enough for us to take a step immediately and strongly when we are in a situation to need an intensive and prompt measure. In most situations provoking emotional responses, we do not have enough time to look this way and that to choose the most pertinent action. The stronger

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main role of higher order cerebral cortices produce images, he implies that feelings can have an image about something combined with personal concern or interest when feelings occur at the higher cerebral level,

feeling is combined with our external world image, the less we waste time reacting in a situation.

The reaction combined with strong feeling is so immediate that it looks like almost reflective reaction like sneezing. But our emotional reaction is a kind of ‘knowing how’ knowledge rather than ‘knowing that.’ Solomon (2004) calls emotions ‘judgment of body’, which resemble a kind of kinesthetic knowledge. Unlike ‘knowing that’, ‘knowing how’ is not composed of propositional knowledge and thus does not have to be articulated or conceptual. For example, for me to know how to drive a car does not imply that I can describe the process of driving with exact concepts. By repetitive practice, driving *appears to* be the same action as an automatic behavior that lacks any mental operation. However, driving is a totally different action from any other reflexive behaviors. Even though I do not reflect the knowledge of how to drive when I drive, so it looks like an automatic behavior, my driving is not the same kind of behavior as a spasm. Likewise, even though we do not contemplate our proper emotional response with accurate terminologies for a long time in front of a roaring lion, my emotional state is a mental state closer to ‘knowing how’ rather than sneezing. This prompt reaction is possible in virtue of the feeling functioning to energize attention and to drive immediate action.

Interestingly, Confucian thought on emotion is very similar to this account of emotion as ‘know-how.’ The basic concern of Confucianism is how people act properly to others in everyday life. The emotions in the context of Confucianism are not so different from its basic concern. In order to understand Confucian thought about emotions, first of all, we need to understand “*Li*” and “*Jen*.” “*Li*” is “rite,” or “right conduct.” In other words, “*Li*” is the ability to act appropriately toward one’s fellow human beings in a respectful and dignified way (Bockover, 1995). “*Li*” as ritual would no

longer be proper if it is performed without any goodness. So “*Li*” needs the proper and good spirit. This proper spirit is “*Jen*.” “*Jen*” is “goodness”, “nobility”, “benevolence” and “humaneness.” Even though the explanation of “*Jen*” sounds like very private and spiritual concept, “*Jen*” is “outer-directed.” The goodness (*Jen*) must be established and expressed in acting toward others. Thus “*Li*” and “*Jen*” cannot be understood separately within Confucian’s teaching

When “*Li*” is performed properly with “*Jen*”, “*Li*” becomes “*Wu-Wei*.” In Confucianism, “*Wu-Wei*” is a kind of habitual and effortless ritual action. At the beginning, we need to lots of dedication to be fluent to speak a language, ride a bike or swim. After lots of practice, our performance can be delivered effortlessly. Like those activity, to act properly (“*Li*”) we need lots of practice and dedication. But if our practices are good enough, we can perform proper action effortlessly. Like kinesthetic knowledge, “*Wu-Wei*” is a kind of “know-how” knowledge. “*Li*” and “*Wu-Wei*” are knowledge of how to act properly in a social situation. According to Confucianism, “*Jen*.” Is a kind of emotion (or disposition), which is expressed through “*Li*”<sup>8</sup> Thus the right emotions are like action or proper know-how knowledge which are set up and expressed in how we live and act toward other people. When “*Li*” becomes “*Wu-Wei*,” we can perform proper action effortlessly or immediately, like a kind of kinesthetic knowledge.

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<sup>8</sup> If “*Jen*” and “*Li*”, which is proper action with humane goodness, can govern our positive emotional action, “*Yu*” has something to do with our negative emotion. “*Yu*” refer to troubled response to a troubling situation. The concept of “*Yu*”, like “*Jen*”, is not private psychological state. They are all established through interaction with others and a kind of knowledge about how to act.

## **Chapter 6. Conclusion and remaining question to be answered**

One of my aims for this thesis is to show that it is necessary to explain the conative aspect of the emotional intentionality when we explicate a subject's active involvement. A subject transforms images of an object by means of emotional feelings, through which the subject involves herself in the situation. Thus the perceptual image of outside world plus feeling refers to the organism's negative or positive attitude to objects inducing the perceptual image of objects. Furthermore, feelings control the degree of an organism's inclination. The degree of bias has the same role as the tone of color. By virtue of the tone of a color, we can see subtle difference of colors. Likewise, the feeling differentiates delicately the factual images relative to the degree of inclination. Owing to the fine differences, subjects rank or categorize factual images in accordance with the degree of significance to the organism's well-being. That is, the object of emotions is an image formed by a subject. The intentionality of emotions has a conative or active aspect different from any other perceptual images. A subject transforms images of objects by means of feelings. Feeling is not only about a factual image of an object, but also an interaction between a subject and an object.

Hence what is at stake is not only whether or not feeling is intentional and cognitive, but also whether or not feeling is a spontaneous or active response rather than an automatic response. Emotional theory has to be able to explain that the intentionality of feeling is a 'world-to-mind direction of fit.' Emotional feeling is conative rather than cognitive.

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