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**Un-detering Fences,
Why is Gaza Still Attacking?!**

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Abstract

Un-deterring Fences, Why Gaza is Still Attacking?!

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Many contemporary states and historic political entities walled their borders stressing the idea that these barriers would protect their homelands from external threats and thus, achieve security. Although this security argument has prevailed, the political science literature fails to offer a systematic empirical examination of the relationship between barriers and cross-border threats. This research attempts to bridge this gap by answering the question: What are the actual security outcomes of physical barriers on borders? And thus, under what conditions do barriers succeed/fail to achieve security? This paper posits that, in some cases, building barriers on borders to stop non-state actors' attacks escalate conflict. It demonstrates that when militants have supply institutions, they will manage to increase their attacks and shift to new tactics despite the barrier. It also studies the Israeli Gaza Strip Fence and offers an analysis based on patterns of the relationships between features of the barrier and the Gaza attacks. these patterns are derived from a quantitative dataset built by the researcher and are also supplemented by qualitative data about the case.

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INTRODUCTION

On the night of December 12th 2004 and in a well-planned attack, Hamas and Fatah Hawks militants detonated a 1,500kg bomb in an 800-meters tunnel under an Israeli military base near the Egypt-Gaza borders. As a cover for the operation, mortars and Qassam rockets showered the area to distract the soldiers' attention. Two Palestinian militants appeared from the tunnel and opened fire at the soldiers stationed in the location. A second explosion was heard in the same base right after the end of the operation (Macintyre, 2004; Barzak, 2004; O'Loughin, 2004: 8). This attack in of itself may not be of a great significance; however, it represents both the continuation of attacks from Gaza and an amalgamation of attack tactics Gaza militants have adopted in the past decade.

Ten years prior to this attack, Israel was subjected to a wave of suicide bombings from different Palestinian areas in general and from the Gaza Strip in particular. Feeling in the midst of a tough situation, and sensing the urge and need for having to do something about it, the Israeli government launched a project to build a hi-tech and militarized fence on the borders with the Gaza Strip. The then Israeli Prime Minister, Yitshak Rabin stressed that this fence will stop Palestinian attacks inside Israel (Gold, 1995:7; Borger, 2007). Knowing that the Gaza barrier is not the only Israeli separation project and that Israel is not the only state that has launched such projects, the question remains, what are the actual security outcomes of physical barriers on border? Do these

constructions actually stop attacks from the other side? Why? What explains the continuity of attacks at least in some cases as that of the Gaza Strip?

This paper employs a single case study, the Gaza Israeli fence as a plausibility probe to determine the theory's validity and applicability¹. Gaza is not the only Palestinian zone involved in a conflict with Israel. Nevertheless, in the past five years, it has attracted more political, public and media attention due to its intense involvement in the conflict. I selected this case for two main reasons. First, Gaza is an extreme (most likely) case, because it has one of the strictest Israeli border controls and the most institutionalized militant groups. It presents high values the independent variable (barriers as intensified forms of border policing) and the intervening variable (militants institutions that provide war knowledge and material supplies), as well as the dependent variable (militants number of attacks and tactical shifts). A probe into the dynamics relating barriers on borders to militants' institutions and escalation of conflict should thus offer clear, discernable results (on the logic of using an extreme case, see George & Bannett, 2005: 120-3; for an example on similar studies see Van Evera, 1984; Atzili, 2006).

Second, the Gaza Israeli barrier had been built and completed more than fifteen years ago, which offers sufficient time to examine it and its effect. Thus, the Israeli conflict with the Palestinians in the Gaza area is multifaceted in the sense that it offers many observation points although it is a single case. Because this study is an initial

¹ I use "Gaza" to refer to the Palestinian Gaza Strip in general, a sandy strip on the Mediterranean that stretches for 62 sq. km. It falls to the north-west of the Negev and is bordered by Israel from all sides except in the South, by Egypt (The World Factbook, 2011). The biggest city is Gaza city but other population centers in the area are Beit Hanun, Beit Lahya, Jabalya, Deir Balah, Khan Yunis, and Rafah. "Plausibility probes" are "preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted." (See George & Bannett, 2005: 75-6).

probe, into a newly identified causal mechanism, however, and because it involves only one case, the ability to generalize from its findings should not be exaggerated.

I seek to answer the above detailed questions in three main sections. The first part of this paper defines barriers on borders and discusses the evolving debate on their viability in achieving state security. This discussion revolves mainly around two main ideas on the mechanisms through which barriers achieve security and their failure to do so. Based on this debate, I develop new specific hypotheses about why in some cases militants sustain and may increase their attacks despite the barriers. I supplement these hypotheses from works on terrorist groups goals and institutions. I argue that in some cases, when militants have the will and the resources to attack, barriers will cause increase rather than decrease in violence.

In the second section, I turn to the specifics the Gaza barrier case as a preliminary probe of the plausibility of the paper's theory. The time period covered in this study is twenty years, from 1990 to 2010. I begin with a background on the case to provide the context and to examine specific patterns in attacks emanating from Gaza as well as development on the physical dimensions of the Israeli Gaza barrier. In this section, I also explore the development of Gaza's smuggling networks that became the militants' source of supplies and developed into institutions over time. Subsequently, I collect and present data on the Gaza attacks and variation in the Israeli policing dimensions of the Gaza fence. Reports from world newspapers available on LexisNexis, militant groups' websites, and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website enabled me to count attacks and their type. In turn, barrier dimensions data are collected from international

newspapers available on LexisNexis, the OCHA and Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ) websites.

Finally, in the last section, I use the theory and evidence developed and provided in this paper to draw tentative conclusions about the effect of barriers on borders on attacks. The paper also concludes with suggestions for future research.

Chapter 1: Literature Review and Hypotheses

Walls and fences are commonly seen as constructions to protect a property and preserve privacy. If one travels various continents, and visits different countries with varying cultures and customs, s/he will still see fences and walls of different forms and types that are meant to serve the same aforementioned functions. In this regard, many cite the well-known poet, Robert Frost's in his "Mending Wall," in which he contends that good walls make good neighbors (1915). Political science has recently started to discuss walls and fences as a political phenomenon by mostly stressing their positive effect on the security of the state.

Barriers are state-made obstacles, such as walls, fences, ditches and sand piles that create closure systems, which aim at controlling crossings to prevent undesirable cross-border movement (Rosière, 2009: 1). States and empires that built barriers assumed they protect their homeland by make it easy for them to defend (Jervis, 1978: 194), and deter external threats. Barriers are not merely walls or fences; they are systems of surveillance technologies, towers and weapons of different kinds. These systems may extend beyond the border into a web of control mechanisms on one or both sides of the borders. This chapter seeks to further elucidate the relationship between physical barriers on borders and security in the form of non-state actors' cross border attacks.

BARRIERS AND SECURITY

States are not the first political entities to build barriers on their borders. Empires also, launched such constructions long before nationalism and the creation of the nation state. Just to mention a few examples, the Chinese built their known walls on their

northern frontiers to stop raids by the Mongols (Sterling, 2009:106), and the Greeks built Athens' long Walls to eliminate the area's vulnerability vis-à-vis Sparta (Ibid: 13). Recently, after the end of the Cold War, a diverse set of political, military, economic and social challenges have elevated the state's sense of vulnerability in many different regions. These challenges include illegal immigration, narcotics, and terrorism. Motivated by a need to stop these threats, an increasing number of states resorted to fencing and walling their borders and the phenomenon have become a strikingly widespread practice (Sterling, 2009: 2; Rosière, 2009: 7).

To illustrate contemporary cases, less than two decades ago Spain has built a fence around its enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla to stop illegal immigration and drug trafficking, Israel is building a barrier in the West Bank to stop Palestinian attacks and Greece is considering a barrier on the borders with Turkey to stop flows of illegal immigration (Walterfield, 2011; Andreas, 2000). What is interesting about all those barriers is despite the variation in time and place; in all of the above-mentioned cases as well as others, different political entities, whether states or empires, predicted that their barrier policies would stop external threats.

Despite the presence of fencing and walling for a long time in history and their proliferation today, so far, the scholarly literature had devoted little attention to theories regarding the role of physical barriers in cross-border security. The earliest work that discusses physical barriers however, is that of Robert Jervis (1978: 194) who posits that barriers, though he was referring to natural barriers, offer better chances for the states to punish attacks, and lower the efficiency of attackers. As will be detailed below, this logic became the corner stone for more recent works on the phenomenon.

Cross-border Violence and Barriers

With the surge in terrorist attacks in the past decade and the development of a deterrence literature studying non-state actors², and building on the conventional understanding of barriers proposed by Jervis, new contributions appeared in the political science literature. Most of these contributions argue that barriers reduce the frequency and intensity of non-state violence either by making it easy to punish attacks or by denying militants' access to their targets (Kaufman, 1996; Makovsky, 2004; Pape, 2003; Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 438). On the one hand, deterrence by punishment scholars base their arguments on Jervis' assertions that barriers deter infiltrations first, by punishing those who try to cross the borders, and second, by increasing the costs of infiltrations as more logistics are required to infiltrate a border when there is a barrier (1978: 194; Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 437). According to this view, perpetrators will be dissuaded from crossing the borders when barriers are built because they know they will be punished (Frey & Luechinger, 2003: 238-9).

On the other hand, the deterrence by denial framework also takes off from ideas developed by Jervis when he said that barriers facilitate control, and lower the efficiency of infiltrators by making their progress slower and giving the defenders more time to prepare (Jervis: 1978: 194). These works demonstrate that the defender (i.e. the state who builds the barrier) denies the attackers (the none-state actor) the achievement of their objectives by denying him access to his target. Many proponents of this view contend that continuous barriers in this regard have the best prospects for reducing the frequency

² Non-state actors, militants, militant groups and insurgents are used interchangeably in this paper. They include militant groups that carry out attacks against a state. Other works may refer to these same groups as terrorist in nature. I refrain from doing so based on the preference to avoid value-laden expressions and use a more neutral terms.

and intensity of non-state attacks (Kaufman, 1996, 1998; Makovsky, 2004; Pape, 2003; Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 438).

Despite their contribution, these scholars have not yet significantly advanced an understanding of barriers as systems of defenses. Most of these works perceive barriers in the context of the defense-offense debate and posit that all else being equal, when offense has a greater military advantage, war is most likely to occur. By contrast, the greater the edge of defense, the more stable the international system is. In the minds of the states that build them, barriers are seen as defensive structures. As unmovable constructions, walls and fences may be presented as the most defensive systems, a commonly used argument used by politicians who launch such projects (Sterling, 2009: 3). Accordingly, barriers are expected to increase the edge of defense and thus enhance stability.

One has to recall however, that this defense-offense idea itself has been subjected to lengthy debates between its proponents and opponents. One of the points taken against the defense-offense literature is who determines what is offensive and what is defensive and how one system could be seen defensive by one state but offensive by another (see for example Van Evera, 1984). Additionally, the above view is based their argument on a logic based inter-states interaction and cannot be extended to state-non-state relations without a deeper exploration. Unlike states, non-states actors seem to be in a constant war and if they cannot use their known attack tactics, they have always an incentive to adopt new tactics (Horowitz, 2010: 36) no matter whether the defense or the offense has the advantage.

Very few efforts challenged the above arguments. Some countering arguments are based on the idea that non-state actors are not static and can adapt to the new environment created by the barrier. First, Peter Andreas asserts that barrier do not stop infiltrations as infiltrators, including violent ones, may bribe border officials, shift their

border-crossing routes and methods, change the nature of their activities and morph their organizational structure (2000: 9-15). In addition, the adoption of new military and information technologies by infiltrators undermines the usefulness of barriers as security tools (Trottier, 2007: 109). This is because the globalization of communication, finance and transportation has benefited not only states, but also non-state actors (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008: 7). From this perspective, when barriers are built, non-state actors can be innovative and find alternative methods to cross the borders or even change their tactics to sustain their activities. Second, Geroge Gavrilis draw the attention to the fact that barriers may involve land-grabs that would motivate more attacks (2004: 8), a matter that would escalate violence when there is an ongoing conflict rather than stop attacks or at least reduce their frequency (de Figueiredo & Weingast, 2001: 28; Gavrilis, 2004: 8; Bock, 2002).

Thus, the perception of barriers from the defense-offence perspective is overtly simplistic, knowing that militants on the other side of a barrier may have technologies and innovations to enable them to attack despite a state's defensive system represented by the barrier, an idea posited by Andreas. Additionally, when walls and fences are built on a contested or a foreign territory, they may be tactically defensive but strategically offensive and could be seen differently by parties involved, also a warning proposed by Gavrilis. In other words, understanding barriers' security outcomes is very context specific (Sterling, 2009: 3). In their turn, critics of barriers as security policies, including Andreas and Gavrilis, still fall short of providing a thorough analysis of the security effects of barriers on non-states' cross border attacks and of offering detailed empirical studies-an omission this paper aims to address.

MILITANTS' NETWORKS AND INSTITUTIONS

In the terrorism literature, some scholars have explored the militants' motivations, innovations and tactical shifts. To attack, militants need to have the will, the knowledge and the material resources. Usually, non-state actors are motivated by a long-term fundamental goal, such as ending an occupation, independence and territorial control, as well as short-term instrumental and operational goals that pave the way to the long-term ones, as in bombings, rocketing and tunneling (Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 431, Kydd & Walter, 2006, Bloom, 2004). Militants see the latter attacks as small steps towards their larger goal, and as a result are willing to take extremely high risks and are often willing to suffer severe damages (Hewitt, 1984; Poe, 1988, Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 431). In a sense, long-term goals make non-state actors willing to attack to inflict some harm on the target state even if this harm is merely psychological and emotional. For the theory developed here and building on this literature, having the will to attack is a given for the studied non-state actors. In a sense, these militants have at least one persisting fundamental goal that is not fulfilled and this in turn motivates them to continue to attack.

At the resources level, violent non-state actors are known to have limited resources, limited capabilities, and limited reach. Thus, for those militants to continue to perpetrate attacks against the target state/s, they need resources including weapons, raw materials, funding and training. Some scholars have focused on this dimension by studying linkages among militant groups. These works established that militant non-state actors have networks of relationships through which military capabilities and attack tactics get directly diffused among armed groups in different areas. Different militant groups send their members to pick up certain attack tactics from their innovators to conduct their own attacks (Horowitz, 2010: 34; Desouza & Hensgen, 2007: 598). When linkages are present, we expect to see militant groups introducing new attack tactics.

As far as tactical shifts are concerned, some argue that deterrent state policies limit militants' resources or affect the relative costliness of different kinds of attacks (Enders & Sandler, 2002). When these policies impose restrictions on resources, militants look for alternative resources. Put differently, states' counter-terrorism policies affect the cost of certain attacks but militants in turn, may switch to new tactics. In the context of the study at hand, barriers impose restrictions on militants' sources. Nevertheless, motivated to attacks still, armed groups will look for alternative methods to access needed resources. To get these resources, militants cooperate with recognized, albeit criminal, institutions in a way that contribute to their successes (Desouza & Hensgen, 2007: 593, 598 & 600), and the militants in turn contribute to the further institutionalization of these criminal institutions. These institutions provide linkages with militant groups abroad through which they access military materials and skills. Without the availability of supplies of materials and the know-how needed for the execution of attacks under difference circumstances, militants' attacks may decline after the construction of a barrier.

These institutions begin as smuggling networks that are usually dubbed criminal by states and as a result take a clandestine nature. They date back to long time ago in the history of border areas particularly whenever a state vigorously carried out law-enforcement campaigns against illegal trafficking (Andreas & Nadelman, 2006: 4-5). When militants use the existing smuggling networks to perpetrate attacks, politics gets mixed with economic factors of the existing networks as cooperation become mutually beneficial for militants on the one hand and illegal economic entrepreneurs on the other. This is because these networks provide militants with needed material and know-how resources. In the meanwhile, militants' use of these networks opens doors for economically rewarding exchanges. In these cases, illegal economic and violent webs

intertwine (Ibid, 2006: 197). As will be demonstrated below, the cooperation between militants and illegal economic entrepreneurs will strengthen the existing illegal networks to have them take the shape similar to that of institutions in the legal world.

Thus, linkages provided through criminal networks that enable militant groups to exchange skills and know-how help militants to continue to attack and even introduce new attack tactics despite the barrier built by the target state. As a result, militants have networks through which they directly learn from other more experienced groups. These linkages help militant non-state actors determine what attack tactic they can adopt. Exchange of knowledge among militant groups facilitated by militants' institutions introduces new attack tactics by non-state actors.

CONCLUSION AND HYPOTHESES

This chapter has examined the ways in which current political science literature has explained barriers and their relationship to cross border attacks. It also shed light on some ideas developed with in the terrorism literature concerning militants' motivations to attack, militants' tactics and institutions. Based on these contributions, I establish a connection among all of the above literatures in the context of construction of barriers. Below are three hypotheses regarding the role of barriers on borders in promoting use and even strength of militants' institutions and violence in general.

Hypothesis 1: barriers on borders can perpetuate and strengthen militants' supply institutions.

Hypothesis 2: militants' supply institutions can create conditions that enable militants to continue attacking despite the barrier and even increase the frequency of their attacks.

Hypothesis 3: barriers on borders may, accompanied by the existence of militants' supply institutions, cause introduction of and shifts to new tactics.

This paper demonstrates that in some areas, barriers are built can perpetuate and strengthen militants' supply institutions. This is because once the borders are sealed off, motivated militant groups turn for alternative solutions to access military knowledge and materials that would enable sustain their attacks and even adopt new attack tactic that could be executed despite the barrier. I define militants' supply institutions as networks that establish connections and linkages between militant groups in one area to the external world as well as other militants in other countries through which they exchange materials and knowledge. Micheal Horowitz (2010) has already referred to the importance of these inter-group linkages as a key factor to the introduction of new tactics by non-state actors. These supply institutions start as smuggling networks that may initially exist for criminal and other reasons. When sources are blocked for militants as a result of a barrier built by a state, militants resort to these institutions for supplies. These institutions help militants to cope, survive and sustain their activities despite difficult circumstances (Andreas, 2008: 18). Barriers on borders, nevertheless, do not necessarily create these militants' institutions but they can definitely make the existing ones more institutionalized.

Overtime, with the rise in demand on using these networks, they gain features of what is known as institutions in the legal world (see for example Gavrilis, 2008: 1523; Tilly, 1990; Anderson, 1996: 1). For instance, these networks may develop to become staffed with people, such as service and goods providers as well as consumers embedded

in networks of selling, buying, and transferring knowledge and materials. Interaction within these networks becomes more regularized by setting specific fees for certain goods and services, and providing rules for any exchange. At a more advanced phase, even networks owners may have to pay taxes to a higher authority to sustain their business in another attempt to regulate the striving interaction.

Thus this paper posits that, in some cases, building barriers on borders to stop militants' attacks may escalate conflict. However, two main conditions account for this negative effect. First, though not sufficient in of itself, militants must have the will to attack the target state. It has been established in the literature that non-state actors are usually motivated by a long-term fundamental goal, as well as short-term instrumental and operational goals that pave the way to the long-term ones, as in bombings, rocketing and tunneling (Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 431, Kydd & Walter, 2006, Bloom, 2004). The persistence of their long-term goal keeps non-state actors' continuously motivated to attack despite all obstacles and deterrence policies even if they are not necessarily gaining much from one specific attack. The mere psychological and emotional harm an attack may cause may be considered a success in of itself even if it does not cause any physical damage.

Nevertheless, a second condition is necessary to continue to perpetrate attacks and to determine what attacks tactic could be adopted; militants need resources to be able to implement attacks against their target state. They need weapons, raw materials, funding and training, which could be provided through their supply institutions (Desouza & Hensgen, 2007: 598 & 600). These institutions provide linkages with external sources

and other militant groups to share materials and skills. Without supplies of materials and the know-how needed for the execution of attacks under different circumstances, militants' attacks may decline.

Thus this paper does not deny the fact that barriers as a deterrent state policy, some label them as anti-terrorism policies do affect non-state actors' attacks. However, this effect neither is necessarily direct and nor leading to the stopping the threat and attacks. Yet, when militants have the will and resources to attack, the effect of barriers on non-state cross-border attacks usually falls under changes in the nature of these attacks but not necessarily the number. Each deterrent policy can influence a non-state actor's choice of operations by either affecting their resources or the relative costliness of different kinds of attacks (Enders & Sandler, 2002). Militants adopt certain tactics not others depending on what materials and skills they have and what tactics can survive the new reality created by the barrier. Once institutions and networks are available to fulfill this purpose, militants resort to these networks to continue their attacks and will be able to shift to new tactics if old ones are not successful anymore. Cooperation among militant groups and the recognized illegal institutions contribute to the former's ability to attack (Desouza & Hensgen, 2007: 593).

Like many other state counter-terrorism policies, the problem with barriers is that they address specific attacks but ignore the will that drives those attacks. When militants with a drive to attack find themselves fenced off and unable to sustain the attacks known to them due to the obstacles created by the barrier, they try to use their supply institutions in search for new tactics, new raw materials and new knowledge. If militants manage to

find such supplies, the end result under these conditions is the continuation of attacks despite the barrier. Furthermore, if militants get access to new military skills and materials through, they may introduce attack tactics they never used before. In both cases, rather than decrease in attacks, militants may even intensify their attacks.

To summarize, barriers do not stop attacks; rather motivated resourceful militants may increase their attacks after the construction of the barrier. However, the barrier may cause militants to introduce new tactics and shift to certain attacks tactics. Militants motivated to attack will look for new resources once they are fenced off. If those militants find supply institutions, these institutions get more institutionalized when militants start using them. Once militants find these supply institutions, they will manage to shift to new tactics that are possible to implement despite the barrier. They will be even able to increase the frequency of their attacks with the abundance of resources.

The three hypotheses developed above will be tested in the next chapter by examining the ways in which the Israeli Gaza barrier has caused an increase in the number of militant attacks and led the militants to shift to new tactics. It also explores what specific aspects of barriers do affect the number and type of militants' attacks.

Chapter 2: Evidence and Analysis

The Gaza case illustrates the mechanism through which building barriers on borders can lead to an increase in attacks. After offering a brief review of Gaza's relevant history, I describe how the Israeli Gaza barrier perpetuated and indirectly strengthened militants' supply institutions. I then show how these institutions triggered mechanisms to perpetuate the conflict with Israel by escalation of violence through increasing the number of attacks and providing supplies for new attack tactics.

To demonstrate how the Gaza barrier has affected the militants' attacks by introduction of new tactics and shifting to certain attack tactics, I supplement the empirical evidence with descriptive statistics on both Gaza attacks and changes in relevant dimensions of the barrier between 1990 and 2010. These descriptives also disintegrate the Israeli Gaza barrier into several dimensions and tries to establish correlations between each of these dimensions and the Gaza attacks. They are based on a dataset I have created in 2010-11 covering all Gaza attack tactics and all physical dimensions of the Israeli barrier around the area.³

BACKGROUND

In 1993 Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, indicating a new era after thirty-six years of direct Israeli military occupation of the Gaza Strip. Internal administrative issues were transferred for the Palestinian Authority headed by the late

³ Attacks data include the number of suicide bombings, rocket attacks, tunnel attacks and roadside and settlement attacks collected from world newspapers available on LexisNexis (English), militant groups websites (Arabic), and Israeli Foreign ministry website (English). Barrier dimensions data are collected from international newspapers available on LexisNexis, OCHA website and Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem. Barrier dimensions are length, continuity, material, location, buffer zone, distance from the Green Line, Palestinian Land taken to build the barrier and buffer zones in sq. km, number of surveillance and weapons technologies reported to be used on the barrier, 24/7 and mobile policing, number of checkpoints and barriers to movement inside Gaza and number of Israeli settlements and Palestinian land under settlement control.

Yasser Arafat (Efrat, 2006: 42). By mid-1995 Israel withdrew its forces from the Gaza Strip and took locations on its borders. It generally maintained control the borders and coordinated crossings with the newly established Palestinian security apparatus. About a year before signing the agreement, Israel deported members of military groups to Southern Lebanon. In the midst of their exile, Southern Lebanese and particularly the well-known Hezbollah who operated from the area welcomed those deported. Many terrorism scholars trace the beginnings of linkages between Palestinian armed groups, particularly Hamas, and Hezbollah to that time (Horowitz, 2010: 37).

The effect of the establishment of the Hamas-Hezbollah link could be seen in the Israeli streets. In 1993, as the peace process was being discussed between the Israeli and Palestinian representatives, militants, particularly PIJ and Hamas, launched their first suicide bombing originating from the Gaza Strip. Some works in the literature see this attack as well as other attacks by the same militant groups as objections to the peace process and an attempt to spoil the agreement (see Kydd & Walter, 2002). Others like Pape argued that foreign occupation and religious differences between the terrorist group and the perceived occupying state drive suicide bombing (Pape, 2005). In parallel to those suicide attacks, Gazans also carried out settlement and roadside attacks against Israelis. Nevertheless, the latter attacks attracted much less attention and media coverage. No matter what those attacks and no matter what really motivated them, Israel was convinced that something has to be done to stop them.

MOTIVATIONS AND TACTICS OF GAZA MILITANTS

Gaza militants including the armed wings of Hamas, Fatah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), believe that they have a larger goal of self-determination,

independence and ending the Israeli occupation. These groups' militants and political leaders recurrently and consistently articulated this goal (see of example, Hamas, 2007). Moreover, the former Hamas spokesperson, Abdel Aziz Rantisi recurrently stressed that, "There can be no talk of stopping martyrdom operations as long as we continue to be under Israeli occupation and aggression (Potter, 2002: A13) while Fatah's Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades indicated that it would suspend its attacks against Israel under the condition that the latter quit all occupied territories (Ibid: A13). Thus, to these militants, attacking in the form of suicide-terrorism, rocketing, tunnel operations and settlement and roadside attacks are merely steps serving their fundamental goal of ending the Israeli occupation.

The persistence of this key goal always gave them the motivation to attack Israel but they have to make a choice about what they can do in order to achieve this goal based on the resources and skills they have. The Palestinian militants in Gaza see the development of their attacks tactics as well as introducing new ones a natural development as they are at conflict and are attempting defend themselves. In addition, they see development of their attack tactics in the context of "the need is the mother of inventions." Hamas for example, contends that after having Israeli tightly closing the Gaza strip particularly after the outbreak of the Aqsa Intifada in late 2000, militants lost many of their military raw materials and arsenals. As a result, they resorted to alternative methods to fight. Rantisi said in this context, "we are in a struggle against a superior enemy, with its advanced military technology. Consequently, we try to develop our weapons to be able to encounter this enemy as much as we could" (The Qualitative Development, 2003). In 2006, Muhammad Dayf, the then Commander in chief of Hamas' military wing in Gaza emphasized the same idea when he described Gaza militant

operations as advancing from bombings, suicide bombings to finally reach tunneling, which he considers a qualitative development (Al-Jazeera Airs, 2006).

In the first intifada, militants attacked by throwing stones, then by ambushing Israeli forces, then by suicide bombing, then by launching rockets and finally by tunnel-operations. Rockets at the beginning targeted Israeli settlements inside the Gaza Strip, then Israeli towns outside of Gaza. Rockets themselves then witnessed technical improvement in range and accuracy. The Hamas website posits that every time Israel tightens its grip by intensifying its punishment policies and policing strategies, its fighters consistently look for alternatives to continue attacking. Rocket attacks, Hamas admits, were an innovation that caused by the Israeli tight fence around the strip. Additionally, with the Israeli fence and closure, Hamas and other militant groups resorted to smuggling weapons and military materials through the tunnels under the borders with Egypt (The Qualitative Development, 2003).

In other words, the will to attack also motivates militants to develop their own attack tactics based on their available resources. This will has been always persistent for the Gaza militants and as result the first condition to attack is present in the case at hand.

THE GAZA ATTACKS VS. THE ISRAELI BARRIER

In response to a wave of suicide bombings, as well as roadside attacks in early 1990s by Hamas and PIJ, Israel launched a fence project along its perceived borders with Gaza (Bronner, 1995: 1). The Israeli fence completely encircled the area, had a 300m buffer zone and used surveillance cameras and touch sensors and electric wires. Generally, the number of Gaza attacks went down from 1995-2000 after the construction of the barrier. About five years after the construction of the fence, the Palestinian Aqsa Intifada broke out in late 2000 and Israel was showered with waves of attacks including

suicide bombings and settlement and roadside attacks from Gaza in addition to new tactics illustrated by rockets, tunnel operations. This time, these attacks were launched not only by Hamas and PIJ, but also by Fatah, PRC and PFLP. In 2005, Israel further intensified its barrier technologies, extended its buffer zone and ended any Israeli existence inside the Gaza Strip. Right after, we see a continuation of attacks from Gaza but this time with a tactical shift to mostly rocket attacks (for details on attacks, see figure 1 below).




Figure 1: Attack Tactics vs. the Barrier.

In early 2000s, Israel extended the buffer zone to 1km and added new technologies including continuous videotaping and 24/7 surveillance equipments. In the meanwhile, Israel expanded the Gaza land under the control of settlements and increased

the number of roadblocks and checkpoints within the territory to control movement even more. Militants at this point in time found themselves in a rising conflict with Israel but the Israeli barrier this time imposed many obstacles on accessing military resources. Motivated by their persisting will to attack, and seeing an opportunity in using the smuggling tunnels to get military materials and training, they started to intensively use these networks to import needed military materials and skills.

With the flowing supplies from the tunnels mixed with their own past experience in settlement and roadside attacks as well as suicide bombings, Gaza militants continued to attacks Israel and introduced tactics they never used before; rockets and tunnel attacks borrowed from Hezbollah (Rabinovich, 2007: A13).

Late 2005, Israel had unilaterally withdrawn from the strip and intensified its barrier policing by even adding more technologies, such as aerial surveillance, ground sensors, and distantly controlled weapons. It also expanded the buffer zone between 2 and 9km. After this development, we rarely see any suicide bombings emanating from Gaza and most of the attack from the area are rocket attacks. This was explained by both militants and experts as being a result of increasing difficulties to cross the borders to carry suicide attacks inside Israel and the evacuation of Israeli settlements inside the Strip, which decreased the Israeli targets accessible to militants (Qassim, 2009).

Before moving to the quantitative data, it is important to establish the link that provided Gaza militants with military resources and thus they could attack Israel despite the barrier, introduce new tactics and later shift to certain attack tactics. This link is presented in the Gaza tunnels.

GAZA TUNNELS

Gaza tunnels are traced back to 1982 when Israel fortified its frontier after peace with Egypt. They appeared when the Israeli-Egyptian borders separated relatives from Rafah as families started digging at the closest points on both sides (Smith, 2006: 1). Over time, the tunnels that were motivated by reconnecting families were used to smuggle people and illegal commodities. Profit became a factor that enhanced the sustainability of the tunnels as Gaza underground traffic prospered but mainly maintained an economic nature.

Over time, as Israeli tightened its closures and control over its borders with Gaza; these tunnels became the Gaza lifeline and the militants' main source for weapons and military materials. In the next few paragraphs, I detail the steps through which the Gaza barrier has contributed to strengthening militants' networks and how that in turned caused the continuation, increase and innovations in Gaza attacks.

Evolution of Tunnels into Institutions

The Gaza tunnels went through three developmental phases proceeding towards institutionalization. As mentioned above, from the outset, these tunnels were first built for social reasons with separated families breaching the borders in order to reconnect with relatives on the other side. The digging started at the closest points on both sides of the borders usually by prominent Rafah clans, such as the Al Sha'ir, Breaka and Zorob families (Toolis, 2007: 18). Immediately, these families realized the economic revenues they could garner by smuggling goods back and forth into their tunnels and this is when people, and commodities, such as hash, cigarettes and cars-spare parts were carried back and forth in Gaza's tunnels in the 1980s. Weapons were indeed among the smuggled materials particularly during conflict escalations, such as in the first Palestinian Intifada in the late 1980s, but arms smuggling was never very active until early 2000s (Ibid: 18).

The second phase started in late 2000 with the outbreak of the Aqsa Intifada. In this phase, tunnels took a more political form when they have become the main source of weapons, military raw materials and training needed by the Gaza militant groups to launch attacks. As mentioned above, Israel increased the technologies it used on its Gaza barrier, extended its buffer zone, upped the number of deployed personnel and thus crossing into Israel became more difficult for Gaza militants. With a persisting will to attack Israel and with the increasingly rising tension, militants headed to the southern borders of Gaza with an already active illegal trafficking.

Through those tunnels, and relaying on relations that were already established directly with Hezbollah in early 1990s and indirectly with Iran, tunnels not only offered those militants access to military materials, they also transported Gaza militants outside of Gaza to get military training and got military trainers from abroad into Gaza (Israeli Army notes Shifts, 2003). In the chart presented above, the effect of tunnels on Gaza tactics is evident in the introduction of new attacks tactics, such as tunnel operations and rocketing, which were tactics borrowed from Hezbollah in early 2000s (Abdel Hameed, 2009; Gedalyahu, 2010; Qassim, 2009; Israel Says Iran, 2004; The Qualitative, 2003).

Since 2000, rocket parts for instance, were regularly taken through the tunnels and assembled inside Gaza by munitions experts (Mazzetti, 2009: 12). A rocket-maker in Gaza says that he gets the needed materials through the tunnels to make his rockets to sell them to different militant groups, such as PIJ and PFLP. He adds that each rocket costs the militant groups \$300 and that he makes at least a couple a month (Murphy, 2008: 6). After getting the needed training from Hezbollah, tunnels were also used to

attack Israeli military bases just outside of the borders with the Gaza Strip. Although these operations are few in number, they are very unique in nature because they require extensive preparations and planning. Preparations for instance include collecting intelligence about the target, digging the tunnels and planning for implementation. Furthermore, in almost all tunnel operations militants used other tactics in the same operation, i.e. suicide bombing and rocketing, which increased the efficiency of these attacks and distracted the Israelis soldiers. In most of those operations, more than one militants groups was involved in the execution.

From the perspective of the smugglers, they had high economic incentives to transport weapons in their tunnel networks despite the high risks of being arrested or even killed. For instance, a Kalashnikov that cost \$500 in Egypt would cost as much as \$2,500 in the Gaza Strip. Consequently, tunnel digging became a very lucrative business in the border areas and the profits were usually divided among partners; tunnel owners, builders, gatekeepers and smugglers. Tunnel gangs started to charge premiums of up to %150 on their cargoes. From the perspective the average people, tunnels provide employment for 20,000 construction workers who previously worked inside Israel in the past (Toolis, 2007: 18; Bongiorno, 2007; Chulov, 2008: 14; Jansenfinds, 2008: 12; Martin, 2008: 41; Freeman, 2009: 32). Many today work as diggers, drivers and haulers (Lifeline, 2009).

The third phase started in late 2005 as Israel evacuated its settlements, added new technologies on its Gaza barrier and extended its buffer zone. After that, an increase in the numbers of weapons smuggled into Gaza through the tunnels has been noted including imported Katyusha rockets, AK47s, better known as Kalashnikov, RPG rockets,

explosives, and ammunitions (Martin, 2008: 41; Bongiorno, 2007; Mazzetti, 2009: 12). Moreover, the number of tunnels mushroomed and became longer, more developed and better equipped compared to older one.

Institutionalization of Gaza tunnels reached its peak at this phase after the Hamas take over Gaza in Mid-2007 as the owners of hundreds of tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border registered with the Hamas authorities, signed pledges to pay tunnel workers' compensation and hooked up the tunnels to the local electricity network (Lamb, 2008: 70). Hamas also started imposing taxes on the underground flows, and provided protection for the diggers and tunnel businesses in general (Witte, 2008: A01). The exchange has also become more regularized with set prices. For example, having a person smuggled across costs about \$1,250, a sack of items about \$250, about \$23 for a Kalashnikov, 18 cents a bullet, and about \$10 for a pack of cigarettes. This in when the incentive for sustaining the tunnels networks was a combination of politics and profit (Toolis, 2007: 18; Smith, 2006: 1; Martin, 2008: 41). Tunnel organization at this phase can be also illustrated in having some specialized in transporting certain commodities; for instance, in 2008, ten tunnels have thick hosepipes to carry diesel, which is collected in large plastic vats and distributed to clients (Jansenfinds, 2008: 12).

To summarize, Gaza's tunnels evolved from being merely illegal smuggling networks to fully-fledged institutions. At the beginning these tunnels were used for social and economic reasons to develop into military use as a result of lack of resources. With the intense involvement of militants in tunnel activities, these networks developed over the past years to become institutions supplying goods and services and offering job

opportunities. They also were protected by militants and were supplied with services like electricity in exchange for paying taxes to the militants in charge.

THE QUANTITATIVE DATA

Below I detail the effect of the barrier on Gaza attacks. The charts cover changes in both variables over time. Unfortunately, it is impossible to quantitatively represent the Gaza tunnels in these charts due to lack on information and ambiguity of the topic. However the qualitative data provided in the previous section should fill in this gap. The quantitative data presented here has two main goals. First, it demonstrates whether the Israeli barrier has affected the frequency and type of attacks from Gaza. Second, it shows what specific dimensions of the barrier had an effect on number of attacks as well as attack tactics. example:




Figure 2: Attack Frequency vs. the Barrier.

Having a general look at the development of Gaza attacks over time after the construction of the Israeli barrier reveals a counter-intuitive picture for those who support the idea of barriers being successful deterrent strategies. The chart above indicates that after the construction of the barrier (mid-1995), attacks went down to almost zero between 1995 and late 2000. Yet late 2000, with the outbreak of the Aqsa Intifada, the attacks started increasing to peak up in the second half of 2004. They then declined in mid-2000s. In the second half of 2000s, attacks have three major spikes in late 2006, late 2007 and late 2008-early 2009. Attacks sunk into three big declines after each attack peak. Knowing that the Gaza barrier was always there during this period of time, this means that there are other variables affecting the frequency of Gaza attacks other than the mere construction of the barrier. It would be interesting to see what was going during these four peaks.

Exploring qualitatively what was going on during this fluctuation of attacks reveals that at all four points in time, there was a major Israeli military operation launched in the Strip. In 2004, Israel carried out several ground operations but mainly in Rafah, where many Palestinian houses were leveled to track cross-border tunnels (Israeli Army Completes, 2004). Also later in the same year, Israel launched a series of ground operations in the north of the strip to fight rockets (110 Palestinians, 2004: 22). In second half of 2006, Israel launched one of its biggest military operations in Gaza after militants kidnapped an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit in later 2006 (Israel Steps up, 2006: 23). In late 2007, Israel executes a big incursion into the Gaza Strip accompanied by tank and air-born attacks (Fisher, 2007: A22).

As for the declines, late 2005 had witnessed the Israeli unilateral disengagement and evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip (Israel completes Gaza, 2005). Hamas and other militants describe this Israeli move as a victory. For example, Fawzi Barhoum, a Hamas spokesman said in the context of the disengagement, "This is the victory of Hamas against the occupation" (Bengali, 2009). In mid-2008, Israel offered a cease-fire deal between Israel and Hamas (Katz & Keinon, 2008: 1). By end of June, both Israel and the Gaza militants, particularly Hamas, started a six-months truce (Walker, 2008). Right after the Israeli operation "Cast Lead" both Israel and Hamas announced a cease-fire that may explain the decline in attacks after January 2009. Later in the same year, Hamas announced that it informed the Palestinian factions with military wings that it will "deal with the individual acts" of firing rockets at Israel but it will turn a blind eye to any resistance action against Israeli forces if they enter Gaza (Sabbah, 2009).

Knowing that the Gaza attacks employed several tactics; it would be interesting to disintegrate attack tactics to see if the construction of the barrier is correlated with introduction of new tactics and/or any tactical shifts. Gaza attacks fall under four main categories, Suicide bombings, settlements and roadside attacks, rockets and tunnel operations. The chart below indicates that the construction of the barrier also falls behind explaining the dynamics of the Gaza attacks. In the early 1990s and before the construction of the barrier, Gaza militants employed suicide bombing and settlement and roadside attacks. In the second half of the 1990s, and after the construction of the barrier, militants continued to use the same tactics. From 2001-2005, militants combined their old tactics with new ones to intensively use of four tactics: suicide bombings, tunnel attacks, rocket attacks and settlement and roadside attacks. More than ten years after building the

Gaza barriers, militants shifted to mostly launching rocket attacks. This means neither introduction of new attacks tactics (tunnels and rocket attacks) in early 2000s nor the tactical shift in Gaza attacks after 2005 cannot be explained by the mere construction of the Gaza barrier. example:




Figure 3: Attack Tactics vs. the Barrier.

Thus, the data illustrated in the two charts above show that the barriers stop attacks argument has no empirical support from the Gaza case. On the contrary, this case demonstrates a fluctuation in the number of attacks after the construction of the barrier that is better explained by Israeli military operations and truces. Additionally, the relatively long time lag between the construction of the barrier on the one hand and the introduction of new attack tactics and having a tactical shift on the other indicates that

there must something else other than building the barrier that can explain the nature of militants attacks. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind as detailed in the previous section, when militants introduced new tactics was the same time they started using tunnel networks for military reasons and this may account for the introduction of these tactics.

Specific Barrier Dimensions vs. Attacks

Technology vs. Attacks

Knowing that the Israeli Gaza barrier has changed over time, it would be interesting to look deeper into the barrier dimensions that varied to see if these variations can account for the increase and decrease in the number of attacks, introduction of new tactics and/or tactical shifts in attacks. This is because there might be certain dimensions of the barrier that have caused any of the dynamic changes in Gaza attacks. From the dataset I created, I select here the barrier dimensions that vary over time because constants cannot explain a variable; frequency of Gaza attacks and attack tactical shifts. The constant dimensions of the barrier include: height of the barrier (mostly 3 meters), material (mostly a fence), continuity (completely encircling Gaza), thickness (specific attacker chased and punished deep inside Gaza and/or Israe), length (62.7km), location (on the Green Line), and distance from the Green Line (0). On the other hand, number of smart surveillance and military technologies used on the barrier, number of settlements, number of checkpoints, Palestinian land attached to the barrier in square km, the deepest point buffer zone went into the Palestinian areas in meters-km, Palestinian land under settlements jurisdictions, 24/7 and mobile policing are dimensions that have varied over

time and may thus affect the rise and decline in the frequency of the Gaza attacks and/or the tactical shifts.




Figure 4: Attack Frequency vs. Barrier Technology.

The above chart presents the relationship between the frequencies of Gaza attacks and number of smart technologies used on the barrier by Israel. It reveals that the two times Israel increased its technologies were followed by first, a short decline in the number of attacks and then, a gradual increase in attacks. This is an indication that barrier technologies do affect the number attacks however, as militants adapt to these new technologies, they can increase the number of attacks afterwards. However, examining other points in time when attacks decrease indicates that technologies cannot explain the decrease in the number of attacks around mid-2008 and 2009 for example. So, though

when first employed technologies may initially affect the number of attacks, we cannot claim that technologies are the cause behind all declines in attacks. To look at a different level of the interaction, it would be interesting to examine if technology has an effect on the nature of attacks.




Figure 5: Attack Tactics vs. Barrier Technologies.

Having a quick look at the chart above reveals that increase in barrier technology has variant effects on in attack tactics. The first addition to the technologies came around mid-2001 with continuous videotaping and day & night observation posts equipped with technologies that cover a range of 6km. Rockets were introduced before increasing the technologies. Nevertheless, these technologies were immediately followed by the introduction of another tactic; tunnel operations. Thus, the barrier technologies of 2001

are not responsible for the introduction of rockets as a tactic but can explain employing tunnel operations.

From the same chart, we can tell that a tactical shift happened in the end of 2005, just after Israel added more technologies on its barrier. This tactical shift is presented in having rockets the main attack tactic. Israel added automated and remotely-controlled machine guns, ground sensors, and drones, and rocket radars. After this addition, we rarely see suicide attacks, which were one of the main tactics used before 2005. This could be because with the new technologies, it has become very difficult to have militants go to Israeli locations without being detected and punished. Thus, from the evidence provided above, technologies may cause the introduction of new tactics as well as the shift to certain tactics.

Barrier Land and Attacks

Barrier land related dimensions are also interesting to look at. They are three, first, Palestinian land taken by Israel and attached to the barrier system in square km. It is usually land taken from Gazans to become part of the buffer zone. The second land dimension is the deepest point the buffer zone goes into Gaza. Finally, we have the Palestinian land under settlement use and jurisdiction.

As for the frequency of attacks vis-à-vis expansion of settlements (see chart below), attacks were already increasing before Israel expanded its settlement land. Yet, as the settlement expanded in mid-2002, we see the increase in attack becomes sharper towards the end of 2002 and the first half of 2003. Thus, expansion of settlements accelerated the increase in the number of attacks. Later, when Israel gave up all the

settlements land in 2005, we see a sharp decline in the Gaza attacks. So, settlement land may provide an explanation in the increase and decrease in the frequency of attacks.




Figure 6: Attack Frequency vs. Barrier Land.

As for the Palestinian land taken by Israel to become part of its barrier system, the first increase in this land around mid-2001 was immediately followed by a slight increase in the number of Gaza attacks. What is more interesting is the post 2005 phase as the increase in Gaza attacks consistently followed increase in the Palestinian land taken for the barrier. This happens twice in late 2005 and early 2007. Consequently, we can say the expansion of the Palestinian land taken for the barrier may result in an increase in Gaza attacks.

Finally, concerning the deepest point the buffer zone went into the Palestinian areas, the first increase came in 2001 during which attacks were through a minor decline. We cannot say this decline resulted from the buffer zone as both appear to happen at the same time. Nevertheless, after Israeli widened its barrier buffer zone around mid-2001, the number of attacks increased. The second extension of the buffer zone is in late 2004. At this point, attacks were already increasing and continued to increase after the expansion of the buffer zone. Thus, the deepest point of the buffer zone does not seem to consistently explain the increase and decrease in attacks.

So, in general land variables are relevant to the frequency of Gaza attacks. The more land Palestinians lose, the higher the number of attacks and when Israel gave Palestinians land back, attacks declined. Settlement expansion and increase of barrier land however, better explain the frequency of attacks than the deepest point the buffer zone goes.

Barrier Policing Dimensions vs. Attacks

As for the effect of policing on the number of attacks, illustrated in the chart below, the addition of 24/7 and mobile policing in mid-2001 was followed by a gradual rise in attacks but it is unclear if they are actually the cause of this increase. This is because later, the number of attacks rose and declined without any noted changes in policing the barrier.




Figure 7: Attack Frequency vs. 24/7 & Mobile Policing.

When examining the effect of policing dimensions on attack tactics, presented in the chart below, we find that right after these the addition of 24/7 and mobile policing on the Gaza barrier, Gazan militants introduced tunnel attacks. Tactical shift to rockets occurred after 2005 but not necessarily due to having mobile and 24/7 policing because no changes happened on the latter. Thus, we can say, policing dimension may cause the introduction of new tactics but not necessarily the shift to specific ones. Thus, barrier-policing dimensions may cause the introduction of new tactics but does not affect the number of attacks.




Figure 8: Attack Tactics vs. 24/7 & Mobile Policing.

Internal Control Dimensions vs. Attacks

Regarding the effect of checkpoints, roadblocks and other barriers to movement inside Gaza the chart below indicates that the increase in the number of checkpoints between 2001 and 2005 was accompanied by an increase in the Gaza attacks. Yet, a closer look at the chart reveals the following: every increase in the number of Israeli checkpoints in the Gaza strip in the early 2000s was followed by an increase in the number of Gaza attacks. However, the picture is flipped in mid-2004 as the number of attacks peaked before Israel increased its roadblocks, checkpoints and other internal barriers. At this point the increase in the number of attacks could be a cause for the

increase in the number of Israeli checkpoints inside the strip. Nevertheless, the sudden dismantlement of Israeli checkpoints in the context of the Israeli Gaza disengagement in late 2005 was immediately followed by a decline in Gaza attacks. Thus, the number of checkpoints does seem to have an effect on the number of Gaza attacks.




Figure 9: Attack Frequency vs. Checkpoints & Roadblocks.

Concerning the effect of checkpoints on tactical shifts, disappearance of checkpoints inside Gaza was followed by a shift from a combination of suicide bombings, rockets, tunnel attacks and roadside and settlement attacks to mostly rocket attacks. It is also worth noting that increase in the number of checkpoints was associated with an increase in settlement and roadside attacks between 2001 and 2005. Between 2001 and 2003, every increase in the number of checkpoints was associated with an increase in rocket attacks. But it is not clear which one caused the other because they

happened at the same time until late 2003 when we see increase in rocket attacks preceding the increase in checkpoints. Thus, rocket attacks may be the cause behind the increase in checkpoints at least during that time.




Figure 10: Attack tactics vs. checkpoints & Roadblocks.

From the above data, we can generally conclude that the construction of the barrier in 1994 did not stop attacks. Early 2000s seem to be a turning point since attacks in general increased. Looking beyond the images provided by those charts, 2000 is indeed the time the Aqsa Intifada started but it is also the time tunnels started to be intensively used by militants as well. Right after the beginning of the Intifada, new attack tactics were introduced, tunnel attacks and rocket attacks. Both the skills and

materials needed for those tactics were lacking for the Gaza militants until they employed the tunnels to import rockets, military raw materials and skills.

Additionally, some dimensions of the barrier seem to be potential causes for increase and decrease in attacks as well as shifts to new tactics. Barrier technologies, especially automated & remote-controlled machine guns, ground sensors, and drones could be behind shift to rocket attacks after 2005. However, the land related dimensions seem to offer a strong potential causal variable. Expansion of land taken from the Palestinians is associated with increase in attacks and vice-versa. Finally 24/7 and mobile policing could be the cause behind introducing tunnel attacks.

However, neither the continuity of attacks nor shifts to new tactics would have been possible without the availability of supplies. Without the Gaza militants' tunnels networks the picture would have been definitely so different.

Chapter 3: Conclusions and Future Research

With barriers becoming a common phenomenon in our contemporary world due to the threat imposed by non-state actors, studying the attacks by Gaza militants described above, reveals that the mere construction of the barrier can explain nothing about the frequency of attacks, the introduction of new tactics or tactical shifts. Although the Gaza barrier completely encircled the Gaza Strip since the day of its construction, attacks generally continued. This proves that the argument that barriers fail to deter attacks by denial or even by punishment. At least, it is safe to say that barriers are context specific.

This paper offered a new theory and explored an empirical study of the effect of one of the most intensively policed barrier's effect on militants' attacks. In this chapter, I briefly review the theoretical claims and the evidence presented in the above chapters. Then, I address some of the implications of these findings in Gaza as well as in other cases of barriers.

SUMMARY: ARGUMENT AND EVIDENCE

The paper is motivated by the spreading phenomenon of building barriers in borders by many states in our world today. The main argument adopted by both politicians who build these barriers as well as many political scientists is that barriers will facilitate defense and this will keep their proper safe and secure. My hypotheses attempt to explain the outcomes of physical barriers on borders and challenge this common perception about barriers. To do so, I relied on some arguments that countered the above

detailed common wisdom about barriers and borrowed from the existing literature on violent groups' motivations, tactical shift, cooperation with criminal networks and institutions. In the first hypothesis I expect barriers to cause already existing criminal networks to develop into militant institutions. In other words, one of the unintended consequences of the Gaza barrier is the fact that it pushed militants to develop tunnels-networks into institutions. As provided in the second and third hypotheses, these networks/institutions provide militants with military materials and skills that help them to continue to attack and even increase the number of their attacks despite the barrier. At another level, these supply institutions also provide militants with necessary resources to introduce and shift to new tactics.

My examination of the Gaza case from early 1990s through 2010 supports the idea that militants' institutions were key in playing an intermediary role in the interaction between the Gaza militants attacks and Israeli border policing tactics on Gaza barriers. It also indicates that one cannot generalize about the outcomes of barriers. However, the study of the Gaza case here also reveals that some aspects of the Gaza barrier did indeed have an effect on militant's number of attacks, introduction of new tactics and tactical shifts. From the quantitative evidence provided, certain dimensions of the barrier forced the Gaza militants to explore what resources their institutions can provide and based on that either somehow continue to use the same old tactics if the barrier allows them to do so, introduce tactics of new nature or switch tactics. Thus, in a sense, these dimensions of the barrier affect when the tactical shifts happen. But supplies provided by the militants' institutions define what tactics militants can use/introduce given the restrictions imposed by the barrier.

While the construction of the barrier cannot explain the frequency of attacks, introduction of new tactics or tactical shifts, some dimensions of the barrier that varied

over time have indeed affected the Gaza attacks tactics. First, barrier technology initially causes a decrease in the number of attacks. However, this effect diminishes with time as militants adapt to the new technologies. Technologies also are behind the introduction of certain tactics as well as tactical shifts. As for the land variables, the more land Palestinians lose, especially settlement and barrier lands, the higher the number of attacks and vice versa. In turn, the nature of barrier policing may cause the introduction of new tactics but does not affect the number of attacks. The internal control variables illustrated in the number of checkpoints and other barriers to movement give mixed evidence on its relationship. Sometimes the increase in the number of checkpoints was followed by an increase in the number of attacks but in some others the rise in the number of attacks could be the reason behind the increased number of checkpoints. However, dismantling checkpoints in Gaza could be one of the reasons behind militant's shift to rockets. Thus the land variable is the only barrier-dimension that directly affects the number of attacks. All other dimensions usually affect attack tactics or give unclear or a diminishing effect on the frequency of attacks.

The latter findings further support the idea that security outcomes of barriers are context specific. The qualitative section of this paper dealing with Gaza tunnels indicates that Gaza militants continued to attack because they have a persisting will and constant supplies of materials and skills. In other contexts probably barriers would cause a stop in attacks all together if these barriers provide solutions to the concerned militants' motivations or if those militants are not resourceful enough. At the level of the barrier itself, the quantitative evidence provided in this paper indicates that it is a fallacy to claim that barriers (fail to) achieve security. Even one barrier may vary along different dimensions over time and some of those dimensions affect attacks, others don't.

GAZA IN CONTEXT

Due to problems with generalizing from this single case study, a carefully designed study that compares the Gaza case with other cases, past or present, is needed to confirm the conclusions presented here. However, the link I try to withdraw between the Gaza barrier, the tunnels networks and attacks does help in understanding the increased intensity of attacks from the area as well as the shift to new tactics. It also reveals that certain aspects of the barrier may have an effect on the particularly on the nature of attacks.

Thus, to get a fuller picture about the relationship between barriers and their specific dimensions and militants attacks as well as the effect of non-state actors institutions. Cases of barriers can be compared in different contexts in the Middle East and around the world. Comparisons can be conducted with cases where barriers were built in the context of illegal immigration and drug trafficking as well. These comparisons may offer a more general understanding of barriers and their effect on non-state actors institutions as well as the frequency of their attacks/infiltrations and tactics. Variation could be in the physical features on the barriers, such as in the technologies, the land variables, the policing dimensions, the materials barriers are made of, their height etc. For non-state actors, their institutions and resources may vary and as a result the number of their attacks will also vary as well as their tactics.

Even within the Palestinian context, Israel is building a barrier around the West Bank. This barrier varies from that of Gaza at many different levels. For instance, unlike the Gaza barrier, the West bank Barrier is still an unfinished project and is subject to so much controversy. It is a much more extensive project but none of its sections entirely encircles the Palestinian areas, except in the case of Qalqilya. The cement sections of the barrier are much longer than those of the Gaza barrier. Yet, attacks from the area in

general declined especially in the last three years or so. Tunnel attacks were not used at all and very few rockets were launched from the West Bank on Israel and Israeli settlements. Most if not all the attacks from the West Bank today take the form of settlements and roadside bombings.

The paradox is unlike the Gaza fence, the West bank barrier does not fully encircle the Palestinian areas but the expanding Israeli settlements and restricted roads perform the role of a barrier. However, the West Bank is a lot more proximate to the Israeli centers and settlements but attacks in the area take a different form from those of Gaza. Knowing that the West Bank lacks networks to parallel Gaza's tunnels is one of the significant differences between the two areas; it would be very informative to compare the Gaza case to the West Bank.

In the Middle East, a less known barrier is that between Syria and Turkey. Hatay, also known as Alexandretta, used to be part of the Syrian territory but France ceded the area to Turkey in 1939, hoping to coax the Turks away from Nazi Germany. However, Syrian maps still show the region as part of Syria and as result Turkey fenced the borders. Later in the 1980s, Turkey also mined about 500 miles of the borders in the late 1980s because of infiltration of Kurdish insurgents. While the mines were removed in 2004, it would be interesting to look at the effect of this barrier on the PKK's (Kurdistan Workers' Party) attacks in Turkey (US, Israel, 2004; Turkey Gets, 2008). It would be also informative to compare this case to the cases of Gaza and the West Bank.

Another interesting case is the fences built around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Spain fenced off its enclaves Ceuta and Melilla to stop illegal migrant and drug trafficking from Morocco to Europe (Saddiki, 2010). The Spanish authorities supplied their fences with advanced surveillance technologies in an attempt to stop infiltrations. The Spanish civil guards, the police and the army cooperate in chasing

infiltrators deep into the Spanish territories and in many cases infiltrators are actually arrested (Andreas, 2000: 127-32). The borders however are still known of active illegal crossings. In many instances infiltrators bribe the border-guards; hide their commodities in legal cargos or swim around the fence (Oliver, 2007:14). Although emphasis in this case is on stopping illegal crossings, comparing it to the Palestinian cases for example may provide many theoretical and empirical insights.

The above-mentioned cases, give different examples of barriers with various materials, technologies, buffer zones etc. non-state actors crossing the borders also employ different tactics. Attempting at testing the hypotheses about the interaction between barriers, non-state actors' institutions and attacks/infiltrations in other contexts will deliver many theoretical, empirical and policy implications.

Knowing that a decision by a policy-maker to fence off an area affects the life of many people, it has become imperative to question the vitality of these constructions. In many of the above mentioned cases, barriers not only separated people from each other but also some also separated families on different sides of the perceived borders. Barriers at another level indeed limit the resources for militants but they also do so for average people, as they will have decreased access to land, jobs and natural resources.

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