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**SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA
IN POST-TA'IF LEBANON**

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**SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA
IN POST-TA'IF LEBANON**

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA IN POST-TA'IF LEBANON

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The tiny nation-state of Lebanon has been marred by political instability and violence over the past 35 years. Most scholars blame the consociational structure of the bureaucratic system as the main culprit for the precarious state of the republic. It is an understatement to say that the delicate power-sharing balance divided between the Christian and Muslim sects has been one of the most detrimental elements to government stability and socioeconomic development. Underneath these sectarian affiliations, however, lie numerous patronage systems all vying for power and control over the Lebanese system. These systems not only act to support their Lebanese sectarian leader, but many have reached across the border and found the open hands of foreign powers. The actions of these foreign entities have also constituted a divisive role in undermining the unification of the nation into a cohesive and functioning state, particularly during the post-civil war time period. The end of the 15 year civil war through the passage of the National Reconciliation Accord heralded in a sense of promise for a future free of war and political mismanagement through the abolition of the consociational system. This promise, however, has yet to be fulfilled. This thesis is an examination into the role and impact of Syrian and Saudi Arabian patronage ties in the Lebanese system. By looking at the states through the actions of their clients we can come to a better understanding of both why and how the goals of Ta'if have yet to be achieved and potentially come to understand the needs facing Lebanon's future.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The modern Republic of Lebanon is a tiny nation state nestled along the Mediterranean coast and serves as the gateway from the Middle East to Europe. Established as a Parliamentary Republic in the 1920s under the French Mandate, the government combines the traditional practices from the Middle East with Western style democracy into what is known as a 'consociational,' or 'sectarian,' system. That is, representation within the government is divided based upon specific groups or sects of people such as, in the case of Lebanon, religion. This bureaucratic structure has largely failed to function effectively, given the prolonged civil upheaval and governmental instability that has plagued the country over the past 35 years. Once seen as a beacon of democracy and modernization in a sea of authoritarianism and conservatism, “Lebanon has become a term for a pathology of fragmentation and destruction.”¹

Much research has been devoted to uncovering the reasons and potential solutions for Lebanon's unrest. Though there are numerous casual mechanisms for the precarious nature of Lebanese politics, one particular aspect of its history seems significant to any investigation: external influences. Not only must the internal Lebanese political parties attempt to overcome the sectarian barriers consecrated in the constitution, but they also must attempt to reconcile the divided support for external polities. For as long as the

1 Augustus Richard Norton. “Lebanon After Taif: Is the Civil War Over?” *The Middle East Journal*. 45: 3. (1991): 457- 473. Accessed 16 Oct. 2010. < <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328316>>

country has suffered from war and unrest, it has also been the playground for numerous regimes to conduct proxy wars or further their own political agenda, further dividing the country into pro and anti-segments.

Lebanon is a pluralistic society, or one made up of many different groups rather than one prominent ethnic, religious or social group. Traditional theories of pluralism have thought of groups, "... as instruments, representing individuals rather than replacing them in the political process, thereby *enhancing* chances for individual-centered democracy in a world of increasingly complex socio-political interaction."² This meant that individuals were able to act through groups in order to fulfill their political agenda, rather than fight to assert themselves as a single person onto the political scene. Rainer Einfeld, however, offers a critique of the traditional theory of pluralism that is beneficial in thinking of how pluralism operates in the Lebanese context. Instead of groups enhancing the ability of individuals to actively participate in politics, Einfeld sees groups as actually detrimental to individual-centered democracy.³ They are not instruments for the people to enter into the political process but barriers. Rather, groups skew

...the political process, eventually fatally flawing it in favor of powerful minorities. Non-committed or indoctrinated citizens caught in a web of hierarchical organizations: That is often the less than satisfactory (from a democratic theory perspective) reality.⁴

This is certainly the case in Lebanon, where membership in a group⁵ is not merely optional but necessary for one to participate in the political process and even conduct

2 Rainer Einfeld. "Introduction," in *Pluralism: Developments in the Theory and Practice of Democracy*. ed. Rainer Einfeld, 11-20, (Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006), 11.

3 Ibid, 2006, 11.

4 Ibid, 2006, 11.

5 In Lebanon, membership must be to a religious group, or Sect.

many basic functions of life.⁶ Instead of individuals exerting their power onto the system, they must support a specific group who then exerts its agenda on the government.

Furthermore, choice as to which group or party one wants to join in Lebanon is always limited by religious affiliations and often times by familial heritage. It is not always a matter of merely being a Christian Maronite, for instance, but the questions of from which village or neighborhood as well as whom they politically support equally cause problems. The violence and political turmoil that has existed throughout Lebanese history is not merely limited to sect on sect, but is also intra-sectarian and often even intra-familial.

The pluralistic nature of Lebanese society and politics is not a new or modern phenomenon but a narrative that has been developing for centuries. Numerous empires, including the Phoenicians, Assyrians, Romans, and Crusaders have occupied Lebanon, leaving both physical and cultural traces of their presence across the country. This has created a space in which diversity thrives and has been co-opted as a slogan for Lebanese uniqueness. Yet, despite the consistently changing powers in the Middle East, the people of Lebanon share a very similar, if not the same, genealogy with its surrounding neighbors. The Christian Maronites, who have made up the modern elites, of Lebanon originally fled from Syria into the Lebanese mountains which were also home to Druze and Shi'i communities.⁷ During the 16th and 17th centuries the Druze communities were

6 One example of this is the lack of civil marriages in Lebanon. In order to marry, one must belong to a religious group.

7 Hilal Khashan. *Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind*, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc, 1992), 4.

the major power players, under the leadership of Fakr ad-Din II.⁸ Though he was later ousted by the Ottomans in 1633 for becoming too independent and subsequently executed in 1635, he is considered by many to be the first Lebanese leader.⁹ Later, "... in the seventh century, the Lebanese coast became the home of the Sunni Muslim majority, with Melchite Christians as a sizable minority."¹⁰ During the Ottoman Empire the area now known as Lebanon, or the region surrounding Mount Lebanon, was once a small piece of the larger entity, *Bilad al-Sham*. This state was eventually disassembled into numerous states (Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Syria) at the hands of Western power and the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.¹¹ Two more religious groups were added prior to the dissolution of *Bilad al-Sham*, with the conversion of some citizens to Protestant Christianity as well as the influx of Armenian immigrants to the area.¹² Lebanon now consists of 18 recognized sects, the three most powerful of which are the Christian Maronites, Sunni Muslims and Shi'ite Muslims. Ironically, while this diversity is touted as the soul of Lebanon it has also been the greatest ally in the dismantling of stability.

When Lebanon was created as a separate state from Syria in 1926, it enshrined these various religious sects or confessions into the government itself in a form that would be later known as consociationalism, or confessionalism.¹³ Consociationalism "...

8 Michael Johnson. *All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon*. (NY: St. Martin's Press, 2001), 73.

9 Ibid, 2001, 86.

10 Ibid, 1992, 7.

11 Nizah Ayubi. *Over-stating the Arab State*. (NY: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 114.

12 Ibid, 1992, 8.

13 In the case of Lebanon, it is also referred to as sectarianism, due to the fact that the divisions within the government are based on religious sects.

is an empirical theory that aims to show how stable democratic government can be forged through power sharing between political elites representing competing groups.”¹⁴ The theory is usually credited to Arend Lijphart, whose definition remains fundamental to any discussion of consociationalism. He defines consociationalism along four main characteristics: (1) a government made up of a 'grand coalition' of leaders from all sects in the society, (2) mutual veto power, (3) proportionality between political representation, and (4) “... a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs.”¹⁵ It is theorized that each of these elements must work together in order to have a functioning government and society. Of course, as is the problem with most theories, consociationalism is an idealization of government structure which is not always practiced in actual application. In Lebanon, the consociational system is often blamed for the failings of society on the basis that it separates rather than unifies the nation:

The foundation of coexistence in modern Lebanon, therefore, depends on a notion that religious communities must be represented as political communities. Diversity makes Lebanon possible; it also immediately and effectively impedes any sense of a secular Lebanese citizenship.¹⁶

Therefore consociationalism is both the glue that binds Lebanon together and the obstacle to the realization of a singular Lebanese identity that supersedes sectarian divisions.

Despite the breakdown of the Lebanese state into a civil war in 1975, Lijphart still contends that consociationalism was and remains a viable system for the Lebanese

14 Ian O' Flynn. *Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 16.

15 Arend Lijphart. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 25.

16 Ussama Makdisi. “Understanding Sectarianism” in *The War on Lebanon: A Reader*. Edited by Nubar Hovsepian. 20-27 (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008), 24

state.¹⁷ He looks to the post-independence period as evidence for this. That era is often referred to as Lebanon's 'golden age,' when "... Lebanon's outward-looking economy managed to institutionalize an economic order which sustained a strong currency, mobilized domestic private capital, attracted foreign investment, and promoted a growing variety of service exports."¹⁸ But, this 'golden era' most effected the elite Christian population and urban city dwellers rather than Lebanon as a whole. He also asserts that the government was effective at quelling numerous civil upheavals, including a minor civil war in 1958.¹⁹ In reality, this first glimpse of instability came around the time that those members of disenfranchised sects or who lived in the countryside, particularly Shi'is, became aware of their status and began to politicize, making it an early warning for the problems that would continue to plague the country. In this way, the 'golden age' seems less like true gold than an age of ignorance among most of the citizens.

Lijphart continues that consociational in Lebanon has not succeeded because of time constraints, as consociational regimes are best at achieving long term stability rather than short term.

In the short run, an adversarial system may be a great deal more decisive and effective in a plural society than a consociational democracy. But the price that probably has to be paid for this favorable result is the increasing antagonism and suspicion of those segments that have been denied participation in the government and that, rightly or not, feel unjustly treated.²⁰

17 Ljiphart, 1977, 164.

18 Samir Khalaf, 2007, 155

19 Ibid, 1977, 150.

20 Ibid, 1977, 51.

Perhaps this brings into question exactly how much time differentiates *short-term* and *long-term* application²¹ in our modern era. The social experiment of organizing into nation-states is a new enterprise in the history of the world and politics,²² which itself begs the question of the *long-term* capabilities of nation states at all. But it seems that, at the very least, one can argue that periods of short-term stability actualized in Lebanon while overall stability has remained unattainable. Lijphart's model also fails in Lebanon when considering the lack of a 'quick-and-easy transition to another system of democracy when things turned sour. He argues that when "... weakness are felt to be increasingly onerous and particularly when they are regarded as less and less necessary because a society has become less plural, it is not difficult to move from a consociational to a more competitive democratic regime."²³ History has shown (as I will discuss in the following section), that there was no transition to another system of government but, instead, a complete breakdown of any functioning system. The inability to move forwards towards meaningful reforms or, indeed any at all, according to Rainer Eisfeld, is one of the principle problems of pluralism itself.²⁴ Eventually the civil war was resolved at the hands of foreign governments rather than the Lebanese themselves. In fact, mediation of internal affairs by outside entities is a theme in Lebanese history, calling into question the ability of Lebanon to implement meaningful transitions of its own volition.

21 See page 5.

22 See Ernest Gellner. *Nations and Nationalism*. 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006)
E.J. Hobsbawm. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities*. Revised Edition. (NY: Verso, 2006).

23 Ibid, 1977, 52.

24 Eisfeld, 2006, 11.

In juxtaposition to Lijphart, Ian O'Flynn argues that the consociational model of government actually failed in Lebanon. He points to the fact “... that the four key institutional characteristics alone could not account for political stability in societies marked by deep social and political divisions.”²⁵ Like all theories, the institutional characteristics are an at best scenario, whose practical application is often more difficult and flawed. He also brings up the valid point that the 30 years of prosperity in Lebanon should not and does not negate the civil war. Roger Owens, likewise, asserts that the relative successes of the Lebanese system during the post independence period were likely the result of having a party system, with the parliament located at the center,²⁶ rather than the successful implement of an effective parliamentary system. Parties, however, have typically been and still are weak in Lebanon, with familial and sectarian relations really the ruling powers. He does not, however, see the parliamentary system as a harbinger of confessional cohabitation, but instead a system that successfully co-opted elements of the Ottoman system that shared the popular support of the elites,²⁷ meaning that it was likely destined for failure through the process of modernization and the changing of elites. Many modern political scientists and academics seem to align with this thought, arguing that Lebanon must cast off its consociational cloak if it ever hopes to free itself from political, economic and social stagnation. “... in the culture of sectarianism the articulation of a broad, national, and secular citizenship will always be

25 Ian O'Flynn, 2006, 23.

26 Roger Owen. *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. 3rd Ed. (NY: Routledge, 2006), 149.

27 Ibid, 1992, 150.

sacrificed on the altar of narrow communal interests.”²⁸ The horrors that the former 'Switzerland of the Middle East' has suffered seems to outweigh any early successes it had through this system.

Perhaps the question, then, is not whether or not consociationalism is a viable choice for Lebanon but, rather, *why* it has not been an effective system in this country. Obviously, there were many factors that led to and propelled the Lebanese civil war, but the most prominent after the start of violence was the presence of numerous foreign entities and the alliances made between various sects of society with these groups. This tradition harkens as far back in Lebanese history to Fakr ad-Din II, who “... entered into an alliance with the Italian Medici dynasty...”²⁹ This practice continued, being more of a nuisance to Lebanese politics the further into the future the state progressed. “Threatened and marginalized groups, victims of internal socioeconomic disparities or political neglect, sought external protection and patronage.”³⁰ While some foreign powers came in as solicited agents, many did not. They all, however, “... almost always served to polarize the factions and deepen sources of hostility.”³¹ Some of these players may have physically left the country at the close of the war, but that does not mean that they also stopped meddling diplomatically. Everyone from neighboring Arab states, Israel, international organizations (such as the United Nations), major global powers (United States and Russia) and even Iran have played an integral role in Lebanese history. In

28 “Understanding Sectarianism,” 2008, 27.

29 “All Honourable Men...,” 2001, 74.

30 Roger Owen, 2007, ix

31 Roger Owen, 2007, x.

some cases, such as Syria and Israel, military presence or violence has sporadically occurred in the post-war period. Even Lijphart himself suggests that these players had an impact on the system in Lebanon.³² These factors have undoubtedly changed the way Lebanon deals with the international community but have also altered the way Lebanese have come to deal with themselves. Politics in Lebanon is never merely a 'pro group x' or 'anti group x' system. Instead these affiliations often come with underlying implications about one's stance on international alliances between Lebanon and another polity, with the Syrian Arab Republic and, more recently, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the forefront of these matters during the post-war period.

The post civil war, or what I will refer to as the Post-Ta'if³³, era has been characterized by false senses of stability and unimpressive political progress. "... the country remains mired in political inertia and suffers from a seeming inability to institute deeply needed reforms in its political structure and governing arrangement."³⁴ Avaigail Eisenberg suggests that this may be caused by the facts that groups in plural societies only function when they are porous, allowing members the option of exiting the group if and when they see fit.³⁵ The civil war, however, made this porosity impossible and it seems as if the post civil war period was fraught with memories of sectarian violence.

32 Lijphart, 1977, 154.

33 Ta'if is in reference to the city of Ta'if, Saudi Arabia where the Charter of the Lebanese National Reconciliation or what is commonly known as the 'Ta'if Accord.'

34 Imad Harb. "Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects." *United States Institute of Peace* (March 2006).

35 Avaigail Eisenberg. "Pluralism and the Politics of Diversity," in *Pluralism: Developments in the Theory and Practice of Democracy*. Ed. Rainer Eisfeld, 59- 80, (Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006), 77.

While this may be part of the reason for Lebanon's lackluster performance, it is certainly not the only reason. Exploring foreign intervention, particularly that of Syria and Saudi Arabia, in Lebanon during the post Ta'if era may shed light on some of the reasons why Lebanon has yet to achieve true stability and, more importantly, renegotiated their governmental system as per the goal of the Ta'if Accords.

These two states have been the power brokers that support and maintain the two most powerful blocs in the Lebanese system, with Syria behind many of the “opposition” groups, such as Hizbullah and Saudi Arabia behind the Sunni leader Rafiq Hariri and, after his assassination, Sa'ad Hariri. Often times these two powers were seen to be in competing roles, attempting to implement their agenda onto Lebanon:

Hariri's liberal economic vision, which required political stability and moderation, would clash directly with Syria's determination to maintain a strong grip over Lebanon that was aided by the loyal presidency of Emile Lahoud, who considered Lebanon's historical pluralism and dynamism anathema to his pro-Syrian authoritarian tendencies.³⁶

However, the relationship between these two powers has not always been antagonistic. There have been many occasions where the two diplomatic powers worked together or even supported the same political strategies for the country. For instance, “Syria control of the pro-Iranian Hizbullah was valued by the Saudis as a means of limiting Tehran's regional influence.”³⁷ Ergo, it is overly simplifying complex regional affairs to suggest that the two states were at odds over their interests in Lebanon.

36 Talal Nizameddin. “The Political Economy of Lebanon Under Rafiq Hariri: An Interpretation.” *Middle East Journal* 60.1 (Winter 2006): 95-114, 95-6. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 22 Feb 2011 <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330218>>

37 *Ibid*, 2006. 103.

Instead, it is important to look at the local figures or groups directly supported by the state in order to better understand how these regional influences played out in the Lebanon itself. Though Syria and Saudi Arabia were not in direct confrontation, their support aided the formation of strong opposition sentiments among Lebanese politicians and elites, which has characterized the Post-Ta'if era. As Wadi D. Haddad states, "... to define the conflict as regional or international submerges the real and great differences within Lebanon that have quite on their own generated a substantial violence, death and destruction."³⁸ Although Haddad wrote this in relation to the civil war, it still rings true today. "... confessional and sectarian identities in Lebanon are hardening. The logic of this situation leads to a fractured polity in which different parties seek external alliances to bolster their internal agendas."³⁹ By understanding the greater influences behind the decision making processes will serve to uncover some of the flaws in the Lebanese system and, hopefully, shed light how Lebanon can both avoid regressing back under Syrian Rule and move towards greater political autonomy as well as financial autonomy from Saudi Arabia.

38 Wadi D. Haddad. *Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors*. (Washington D.C.: Praeger, 1985), 3.

39 Ibid, 1985, 10.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND TO TA'IF

As previously stated, Lebanon was originally only a small portion of the Greater Syrian entity. It did not gain status as a separate nation until after the outbreak of the First World War, when France had become a *major* player in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). France was hoping to expand the sphere of influence that it had long since established, particularly with the passage of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was a secret agreement between the United Kingdom and France that established what areas in the MENA these two countries would control. While Britain was largely focused around Egypt and the Suez Canal, France wanted control of the Levant and even parts of Turkey. In 1920, Greater Lebanon (or *Le Grand Liban*) was created, not only incorporating the area around Mount Lebanon, but also “... four Syrian *cazas*, or districts... including the Beqa' valley in the east, Tripoli and its hinterland in the north, Tyre, Sidon and the Jabal 'Amil in the south, as well as the thriving merchant port city of Beirut...”⁴⁰ By controlling the newly created Lebanon and Greater Syria, France confirmed its control over the Mediterranean and Damascus, a historically important seat of power, allowing it to exert its dominance across the Middle East and North Africa.

However, the fact that Lebanon was carved out of Greater Syria by an occupying power led many to claim Lebanon as a 'fake-state,' which was made up of disputed

⁴⁰ Patrick Seale, “Foreword,” *Post-Colonial Syrian and Lebanon: The Decline of Arab Nationalism and the Triumph of the State*, Youssef Chaitani, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), XII

territories. “Such dissension was furthered by the way in which Grand Liban was perceived by both local and foreign interest groups controlling the new state; by the policies carried out by these groups; and by the reaction they precipitated among those who were excluded from the political process.”⁴¹ Indeed, many of the citizens of this new Lebanese state even questioned its validity. Most Sunni Muslims wanted to reunite with the Muslim majority in Syria. However, even some Christians felt Syria to be their proper homeland and an opportunity to create a nationalistic state based upon lingual and culture ties, rather than religion. The differences between Lebanese and Syrians were certainly fomented by the French, who attempted to divide

... a numerically weak but socially and culturally more advanced Christian minority (Lebanon), with 'an unquenchable thirst' for European knowledge and values, against a large community of fanatical, narrow-minded, and intellectually underdeveloped Muslims (Syria) bent on obstructing progress in all areas of life.⁴²

This ultimately pitted the two nations and their citizens against each other based upon either their rejection of French legitimacy in the region or their toleration of the colonial power.

It is important to note that one of the reasons why France was successful in creating this nationalistic ideal in Lebanese population was the precedent for certain Lebanese factions to connect themselves to a distant past and their pluralistic nature. The deep historical roots of the area now known as Lebanon is a source of pride for its inhabitants, who value the various architectural ruins and influences scattered across the

41 Ragid el-Solh. *Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation*. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 1-2.

42 Youssef Chaitani. *Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon: The Decline of Arab Nationalism and the Triumph of the State*. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 8.

state. Their connection to the Phoenicians, one of the oldest civilizations in the world, remains one of the greatest points of admiration. The Phoenicians were a sea-faring, Semitic people whose society flourished along the Mediterranean from around 1200 BC until 334 AD,⁴³ who are credited with inventing the first alphabet system for languages. The idea that modern Lebanese descended from the Phoenicians not only marks them as unique from the rest of the Middle East, but also establishes the idea that the Lebanese deserve their own nation state. “Some of the modern ultra-Phoenicians claimed that the Phoenician era never ceased to exist and today's Lebanese area as Phoenician as their ancient ancestors.”⁴⁴ Of course, much evidence points to the fact that notions of Lebanese as an individual identity did not materialize until the mid-1800s and did not receive a significant amount of support until after the formation of Greater Lebanon.⁴⁵

Ussama Makdisi, however, links the idea of Christian favoritism to their Muslim counterparts to the rise of European colonization in the Middle East and its domination over the Ottoman Empire. “Although the empire was not formally colonized by European power, colonial ideologies were very much in place, legitimizing the use of overwhelming force ... to force the Ottomans to comply with European pressure.”⁴⁶ In fact, French influence in Lebanon began as early as 1535, when “... Francis I and Sulaiman II signed an agreement in which the French gained important concessions

43 Asher Kaufman. *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon*. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 3.

44 Ibid, 2004, 5.

45 Ibid, 2004, 5.

46 Ussama Makdisi. *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 3.

entitling them (among other things) to attend to the religious and cultural interests of the Maronite of Mount Lebanon.”⁴⁷ The juxtaposition of growing European power and prestige to the Ottomans established “... an amply stock of racial and cultural stereotypes clearly demarcated the Ottoman as inferior, pre-modern, and corrupt...”⁴⁸ This attitude was fomented throughout the decline of the empire and into the period of European Colonialism. The nurturing of these attitudes throughout the 19th century gave support to the idea of Lebanese as distinctly Christian.

By the dawn of complete French domination, many of the Lebanese, Christian elite had already co-opted French culture and language into their lives. This fusion of cultures gave the Christians and thereby many Lebanese the feeling of solidarity with the occupying power. This attitude drew a stark contrast to how many Syrians felt towards the French. As early as 1925, Syrian Nationalists and Druze led an unsuccessful revolt against French forces in an attempt to rid their country of foreign control. The difference in attitude towards the French is still obvious today, as French culture and language remains highly present in every day Lebanese life while it has dwindled among most of the population (although it is still fairly strong among the Christians) in Syria.

France continued to retain ultimate control over both the Lebanese and Syrian states throughout the 1920s and 1930s. On 8 June 1941, the Free French forces announced independence for both Syria and Lebanon. However, this proclamation meant little, as French forces continued to oversee and control the governments in Syria and

47 Ibid, 1992, 7-8.

48 Ibid, 2000,

Lebanon. It did mean, however, that French authority in the region was weakening and true independence was not far off. When Lebanon was finally declared independent from French forces in 1943, the ruling powers structured a confessionally based system of power.⁴⁹ In the case of Lebanon this is based on “... the National Pact, a gentlemen's agreement between the country's Maronite Christian President Bishara al-Khuri and his Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Riyadh al-Solh... [where] religious communities were allocated specific political posts.”⁵⁰ These men decided that the President would always be a Christian Maronite, whereas the Prime Minister would be a Sunni Muslim and the

49 Imad Harb. “Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects.” *United States Institute of Peace*. (March 2006).

50 Harb, 2006.

Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim. This power sharing formula was also spread throughout the Parliament, allotting a ratio of 6 Christians for every 5 Muslims. It was purported that these figures reflected the official census of 1932.⁵¹ Rania Maktabi notes, this Census "... provided the demographic as well as the political cement that molded and legitimized the principle of power-sharing under Christian dominance..."⁵² The Christian Maronites were shown to be the single largest population, with just fewer than 50,000 more than the next largest group, the Sunni Muslims. The census itself was called into question over the validity of the numbers. But, in reality, the census figure provided a

51 See the Appendix for the original Arabic version.

52 Rania Maktabi. "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited: Who are the Lebanese?" in *The British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 26.2 (Nov. 1992): 219-241, 222. *JSTOR*. Accessed 25 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/195924>>

Table 1 English Translation of the 1932 Census

	Residents			Emigrants			
				Before August 30, 1924		After August 30, 1924	
				Pays taxes	Does not pay	Pays taxes	Does not pay
Residents	793,396	Sunni	178,100	2,653	9,840	1,089	3,623
Emigrants	254,987	Shi'i	155,035	2,977	4,543	1,770	2,220
Foreigners	61,297	Druze	53,334	2,067	3,205	1,183	2,295
Total	1,109,680	Maronite	227,800	31,697	58,457	11,434	21,809
		Greek Catholic	46,709	7,190	16,544	1,855	4,038
		Greek Orthodox	77,312	12,547	31,521	3,922	9,041
		Protestant	6,869	607	1,575	174	575
		Armenian Orthodox	26,102	1	60	191	1,718
		Armenian Catholic	5,890	9	50	20	375
		Syriac Orthodox	2,723	6	34	3	54
		Syriac Catholic	2,803	9	196	6	101
		Jews	3,588	6	214	7	188
		Chaldean Orthodox	190	0	0	0	0
		Chaldean Catholic	548	0	6	0	19
		Miscellaneous	6,393	212	758	59	234
		Total	793,396	59,981	127,003	21,713	46,290
		Thereof		Males	Females	Males	Females
		Before August 1924	186,984	44,749	15,232	72,447	54,556
		Pays fees and does not pay before 30 August 1924		16,578	5,135	26,246	20,044
		After August 1924	68,003	Pays fees and does not pay after 30 August 1924			
		Total	254,987				

Source: *al-jarida a-rasmiyya, Official Gazette*, 2718 (5 October 1932).

basic framework for the National Pact, "... but the main factor underlying the covenant was the financial and political clout each sect and constituency could marshal."⁵³

This Census is the only official one ever taken in Lebanon and remained the basis for the divisions in the government until the Ta'if agreement in 1989. This creates obvious problems as it completely ignores the changing demographics of Lebanon. Although attempts at reconfiguring the population have been made (one notably by the Hariri Foundation at the urging of Saudi Arabia), none have been official. Most scholars and Lebanese citizens suggest that Muslims are now the majority, primarily due to the growth

53 Ibid, 1992, 220.

rates and the movement of many Christians to new countries.⁵⁴ Dividing a government based on a decade old census was problematic enough in the 1940s, but the pact that determined this arrangement is even more so. The agreement itself was bilateral, between two of the larger parties thus excluding the majority of the various sects in Lebanon. The Shi'is specifically "... were grossly neglected by the Lebanese state and poorly represented in it,"⁵⁵ a fact that was to create numerous problems later in history. Furthermore, it was *unwritten* agreement that the Lebanese have continued to abide by despite its obvious biases. This staunch loyalty to an arguably illegitimate pact is merely one of the many problems of the way in which the consociational paradigm functions in Lebanon.

Lebanese independence also came with the assistance of British forces, who mediated the National Covenant between Lebanese and French forces. This Covenant called for independence from France if Christians and Muslims alike would agree to work together in the formation of a united nation. The pact stated that, while Lebanon was an Arab country, it was also unique in its identity. "In other words, despite its Arabism, Lebanon should not cut off its cultural and spiritual ties with the West."⁵⁶ In actual practice, Lebanon merely did away with the physical presence of Western powers, but continued to have an open economic relationship with Europe. "Soon after the

54 Muhammad Faour. "The Demography of Lebanon: A Reappraisal." *Middle Eastern Studies* 27: 4 (Oct. 1991), 638.

55 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch. *Syria and Iran: Middle power in a penetrated regional system*. (New York: Routledge, 1997), 117.

56 Samir Khalaf. *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 285.

withdrawal of French and British troops in 1946, Lebanon's power-bloc began to establish the economic and political foundations of a Merchant Republic, based on free trade, Laissez-Faire and external orientation,⁵⁷ or Western style economics. This is in complete contrast to Syria's trajectory as a protectionist government, which preferred import substitution.⁵⁸ This forced Syria to rely on Lebanon as the gateway to the West and the international economic community, turning their ports and banking into a kind of proxy economic zone.

In reference to their governmental structures, Lebanon attempted to form a democratic state, with power-sharing amongst the various confessions of the population. Syrian political development was markedly "... synonymous with Arab nationalism, so much to that even conservative Syrian politicians became the champions of Arab unity and radical change."⁵⁹ This, unfortunately, also made for a climate of instability and constant change that eventually led to a takeover by the Baath party in 1963. Then, in 1970, there was a military coup headed by Hafez al-Asad, who then founded a strong armed regime who ordered their citizens into submission through a strong police force, both uniformed and secret.

Relations between the two states during this post-independence period were characterized by tension and often distrust.

57 Carolyn Gates. "Laissez-Faire, Outward-Oriented and Regional Economic Disintegration: A Case Study of the Dissolution of the Syro-Lebanese Customs Union." in *State and Society in Syria and Lebanon*. ed. Youssef M. Choueiri, 74- 83, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1993), 75.

58 Ibid, 1993, 75.

59 Youssef M. Choueiri. "Introduction." in *State and Society in Syria and Lebanon*. ed. Youssef M. Choueiri, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1993), xvi.

From 1947 and until March 1950, the defining feature of Syro-Lebanese bilateral relations was temporary solutions dictated by ephemeral political and regional considerations. Never were long-term points of contention seriously addressed. Rather, they accumulated, unresolved, particularly as each state began to develop and retain distinct interests.⁶⁰

Much of this was caused, in part to the different economic and diplomatic paths each country was seeking. The attempt at creating a bilateral economic customs union was merely one factor that not only showcased the differences in their styles of governance; but also exacerbated tensions.⁶¹ This customs union was eventually dissolved, taking along with it most trade and financial transactions between the two neighboring states.⁶² Continually, cultural attitudes developed quite differently in the two nations, with Lebanon turning into a playground of sorts for vacationers seeking an 'open' and 'western' atmosphere whereas Syria remained more isolated and closed off.

Many scholars view this post-independence, pre-civil war, time period in Lebanon as a great golden age. Richards and Waterbury argue that,

despite the lack of separation of “church” and state, somehow the system seemed to work. The press was free, debate open and vigorous, and elections held on a regular basis (although not without tampering), and Lebanon served as a small island of political refuge and free enterprise for the rest of the region.⁶³

However, that is not to say that the country didn't experience its fair share of upheaval. As early as 1958 there was a brief civil war predominantly fought between two groups, the Lebanese Nationalists and the Arabists. Ragid el-Solh cites a number of reasons for the eventual demise of peace into conflict, including the 1957 elections which excluded

60 Chaitani, 2007, 163.

61 Gates, 1993, 76.

62 Ibid, 1993, 79.

63 Alan Richards and John Waterbury. *A Political Economy of the Middle East 3rd Edition*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 317.

many Lebanese Nationalists from the assembly, as well as Lebanese endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁶⁴ However, it was President Chamoun's refusal to side with Arabists, rather than Britain, over Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal that appears to have caused the most controversy.⁶⁵ This event marks a major shift in Lebanese politics. Prior to 1958, the National Pact was largely supported and maintained by Lebanese politicians. Afterward, however, "... the National Pact was maintained as an arrangement between two parties: on the one hand, the Lebanese nationalists, represented by and large by the Lebanese president and, on the other hand, an Arab regional power acting as a representative and custodian of the Lebanese Arab nationalists."⁶⁶

The banking sector then experienced upheaval during the 1960s after the collapse of the Palestinian owned Intra Bank in 1966⁶⁷. Though Intra was the only bank that collapsed, it signified the weaknesses in the Lebanese banking system, as it "... was only the tallest tree in a forest of overextended and mismanaged banks."⁶⁸ Following this brief banking crisis, the government implemented a number of safe guards, such as the Code of Money and Credit of 1963,⁶⁹ allowing the economy to re-stabilize. However, this time

64 Ragid el-Solh. *Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation*. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 315.

65 Ibid, 2004, 315.

66 Ibid, 2004. 316.

67 Clement Henry Moore. "Prisoner's Financial Dilemma: A Consociational Future for Lebanon?" in *The American Political Science Review* 81.1 (March.1987): 201-218, 205. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 22 Feb 2011. <<http://www.jstor.org.stable/1960785>>

68 Ibid, 1987, 205.

69 Ibid, 1987, 205.

period shows the earliest cracks in the Lebanese financial and political system, showing that the new state was less stable than originally thought.

Furthermore, the continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian diaspora across the Middle East further complicated the situation in Lebanon. Although there had been numerous Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon since the 1948 war, the situation was rapidly becoming more complicated and dangerous. “After the Arab defeat in the 1967 war and the concentrated efforts of the PLO to build its own base in Lebanon, the dilemma became more pronounced.”⁷⁰ This caused a schism among Lebanese attitudes into that of solidarity with the Palestinians and their plight, versus fear that their presence was a potential for war and destruction. The war between Jordan and the Palestinians in 1970 and 1971 ended in the eviction of the PLO from Jordan and dispersing many Palestinians into neighboring countries, especially Lebanon. From 1971-1973, the PLO and many Palestinian commandos continued to rebuilding and expand their presence and influence in Lebanon, eventually leading to full scale conflict in 1973. This conflict, however, seems only to have served as a precursor for the major destruction that was to come.

Most historians agree that the 13 April 1975 Beirut skirmishes between Palestinian forces and Christian militias in both the Ayn al-Rummaneh district and against a Palestinian bus were the first strikes in the Lebanese Civil War. The beginning of the civil war was largely a battle between Palestinians and their 'Leftist' allies versus

70 Wadi D. Haddad, 1985, 41.

Lebanese forces, predominantly comprised of Christians. Fighting quickly spread throughout Beirut, prompting Syria to task "... its Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam to resolve the situation, which marked the operational beginning of the Syrian initiative."⁷¹ Diplomatic solutions failed to establish any sort of lasting peace efforts so, in June 1976, Syrian military forces entered Lebanon⁷² "... with the proclaimed aim of preventing the Palestinian leftist coalition from scoring a military victory, which would have led to partitioning of the country, foreign intervention, and negative consequences for the Palestinian and Arab cause."⁷³ Following what Wadi D. Haddad refers to as the 'Syrian Initiative,' there was a push by the Arab League and its members to stop the hostilities, primarily with the creation of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). This was supposed to be a militarily deterrent force comprised of "... representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Kuwait..."⁷⁴ In reality, Syria was the most represented of these nations, making the ADF less of a regional entity than a Syrian one. The ADF ultimately failed in its mission as the conflict continued and escalated over the next decade.

By the 1980s the conflict had both turned into a true civil war, amongst the various sectarian groups and a proxy war for outside powers. This shift became most notable with the emergence of Shi'i dominated groups, such as Amal and later Hizbullah. The Shi'i population had notoriously been on the outskirts of Lebanese, especially Beirut, society. "They were initially the least politicized Lebanese community until

71 Wadi D. Haddad, 1985, 47.

72 This also signaled the beginning of Syrian military troops in Lebanon, a presence that would last nearly 30 years until the Cedar Revolution of 2005.

73 Wadi D. Haddad, 1985, 55.

74 Ibid, 1985, 57.

urbanization raised consciousness of their inferior position and made them available for political mobilization.”⁷⁵ Amal has roots back into the early 1970s when the, “... charismatic cleric, Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, began to challenge the leftist parties for the loyalty of Shiite youth.”⁷⁶ The military wing of Amal was eventually established at the beginning of the civil war, in 1975. Lara Deeb cites numerous events between 1978 and 1982 as the catalysts that thrust the Shi'i groups into action. These include Amal leader Musa al-Sadr's disappearance in 1978 in Libya and the Islamic Revolution in Iran.⁷⁷

However, the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in 1982 was likely the most influential event on the Shi'ites. This move intended to push back the PLO, but wound up killing and injuring tens of thousands of Lebanese, and displacing 450,000.⁷⁸ After Lebanon entered into a security agreement with Israel in December 1982, Syria “... rallied its Shi'a and Druze allies in Lebanon to defeat Gemayel, who was backed by Maronite militias, the Multinational Forces, the strongest battalions in the Lebanese Army and the firepower of US destroyers anchored off the Lebanese coast.”⁷⁹ It was after the events of 1982 that numerous members of Amal left the party and many young Shi'is formed into smaller militias that would even create Hizbullah and its military wing, known as the 'Islamic Resistance.’⁸⁰ This military wing was to later play a pinnacle role in

75 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, 1997, 117.

76 Lara Deeb. “Hizbullah and its Civilian Constituencies in Lebanon.” in *The War on Lebanon: A Reader*. Ed. Nubar Hovespian, 58-74. (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008), 59.

77 Ibid, 2008, 60.

78 Ibid, 2008, 60.

79 Bassel Salloukh. “Syria and Lebanon: A Brotherhood Transformed.” *Middle East Report* 236 (Fall 2005) 12-21. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 16 Oct 2010 <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042457>> 4.

80 Lara Deeb, 2008, 60.

the civil war, especially where US involvement was concerned. Though it still remains a point of some debate, Hizbullah is generally considered to have been responsible for the bombing of the US Marine Corps Barracks and US embassy in Beirut in 1983. The group did not officially announce their existence until 1985, in an “Open Letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World.”⁸¹ At this point in time Hizbullah functioned as an opposition group, working on the outside of the government spectrum. Following the end of the civil war, however, Hizbullah would increase its political actions from within the system, eventually having elected members in the Lebanese parliament.

The end of the civil war was marred by General Michel Aoun's war for liberation against Syria, whose forces were still occupying the country. Despite the calls for an end to the violence by the Arab league and others, Aoun continued with support from both Iraq and France.⁸² “Fighting between the militia and Aoun's troops, combined with attacks by the Syrian army, and undermined the status of the Christian community, leaving it only a marginal role in the emerging new order.”⁸³ This is especially obvious when taking into consideration that, during this resistance, the end of the war was being overseen by Syria, along with Saudi Arabia.

The official end of the war came with the passage of the Ta'if Agreement, or Charter of the Lebanese National Reconciliation, was passed in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia on 22 October 1989.

81 Ibid, 2008, 61.

82 Georges Corm. “A Cedar Ready to Fall.” *The War on Lebanon: A Reader*. Ed. Nubar Hovsepian. 50- 57. (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008), 51.

83 Ibid, 2008, 51.

With the Americans largely preoccupied with winning allies for the First Gulf War, the regional external powers - chiefly the Syrians and the Saudis - acted as the godfathers of the accord's constitutionally mandated legislative Christian-Muslim parity and the stipulated reduction of the powers of the presidency. The new terms still did not correspond to demographic realities, but all major political forces came to accept them at least tacitly, if only at the behest of their outside patrons (including, eventually, Iran).⁸⁴

In regards to Lebanese political affairs, this agreement was a seemingly halfhearted attempt at implementing real change. The primary function was, of course, ending the protracted and bloody civil war. It also made minor changes to the make-up of the Lebanese system. It called for equality between the Muslims and Christians, proportionality between the sects and between the districts.⁸⁵ The document continues by calling for an increase in the number of chairs in the chamber to 108, to be divided equally, a 50/50 split, between Muslims and Christians,⁸⁶ an alteration to the originally arrangement of 6/5. Possibly the most important demand of the accords which has yet to be realized is the goal of abolishing sectarianism. In Title VI, the 'Final and Transitory Provisions,' of the revised Constitution calls for “the first Chamber of Deputies which is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians shall take the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of political confessionism according to a transitional plan.”⁸⁷ It sets out the goal of abolishing sectarianism to the extent that any jobs or positions will become available to all sects and not limited to a particular

84 Farha, 2008.

85 Said, Salman. *Lubnan wa-al-Ta'if: atharuh, rudud al-fi'l h*. (Bayrut: Dar Azal: Wakalat al-Matbu'at al-Lubnaniyah, 1990), 235

86 Ibid, 1990, 235.

87 Charles G. Gedeon. “The Lebanese Constitution.” in *Who's Who in Lebanon*. (Beirut: Publitec Publications, 2006), 413.

religion.⁸⁸ There was, however, no realistic time line for the changes for be implemented, rather it says that they shall be made “... in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation.”⁸⁹ Of course, the Ta'if Accord also provided no concrete time period or method for the abolition of sectarianism but more the idea of the goal.

On the regional scale, the passage of the Ta'if Agreement allowed external powers to tighten their grip over the tiny country: “... Lebanon emerged from its civil war to embrace not global capitalism, but external patrons whose support would sustain the critical banking sector and the domestic political elite heavily dependent on it.”⁹⁰ Ta'if had “... consecrated Syria's role as the external balancer of power among the different Lebanese communities, an objective Damascus had pursued for many decades...”⁹¹ It outlines Syria's claim as an ally and the dominant protector of the Lebanese Republic. The Accords also enshrined Syria's role not only to interfere in Lebanese affairs but also that their presence is needed in order to preserve some sense of order within Lebanon. This document essentially gave Syria a green light to have their way with Lebanon.

Furthermore, Syria was still battling both Aoun's forces and attempting to restrict Hizbullah's power in the country during this time. “... the Iranian alliance allowed Syria to balance and mediate between the two wings of the Shi'a movement, which it had itself

88 Said, 1990, 239.

89 “The Lebanese Constitution,” 2006, 414.

90 Clement Henry Moore and Robert Springborg. *Globalization and Politics of Development*. 2nd Edition. (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 296.

91 Bassel Salloukh, “Syria and Lebanon: A Brotherhood Transformed.” *Middle East Report* 236 (Fall 2005): 14- 21. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 16 Oct. 2010 <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042457>>

helped to divide, making both beholden to it.”⁹² Syria also used this alliance with Iran and the Shi'is to pressure the newly influential Saudi Arabia. While the accords were in progress, Iran was amassing scores of anti-Aoun groups in Tehran, from Druze leader Walid Jumblatt to Hizbullah and Amal members.⁹³ The threat of this force, which Syria helped control, “... was also a Syrian way to warning Saudi Arabia and the Arab League that the alternative to Syrian pacification could be a far more alarming Islamic revolution and, arguably, frightened them into a Taif settlement which was far more acceptable to Syria than previous such proposals.”⁹⁴ The accord placed a great deal of tension on the Syria-Iran alliance, because of the level of control Syria was now allowed in Lebanon as well as its need to control the Shi'i militias⁹⁵, it bolstered Syria's role in the regional and thus international scene. The United States was now forced to work with Syria in reestablishing a Lebanese state and recognize the fact that any Israeli peace agreement in the Middle East would have to involve Syria.

The Ta'if Accords also established Saudi Arabia as a new and highly influential power in Lebanon. Unlike Syria, Saudi Arabia does not share the same deep rooted communal and familial ties with Lebanon and therefore does not assert itself to be a great 'blood brother.' Therefore, Saudi Arabia's relationship to Lebanon is not explicitly spelled out in the accords nor, in fact, is Saudi Arabia mentioned at all other than it being the

92 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, 1997, 134.

93 Ibid, 1997, 135.

94 Ibid, 1997, 135.

95 Ibid, 1997, 135.

location of the negotiations.⁹⁶ Its role is implicitly implied by its role as a mediator in the accords as well as the simple fact that they were signed in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, then, spent most of the reconstruction period influencing Lebanon through economic and financial means rather than physical presence in the country. This situation may have been a factor of the reconstruction period coinciding with the First Gulf War, which Saudi Arabia was inevitably and more immediately preoccupied with due to both proximity and its ties with the United States.

Despite their historical differences, both of these states invoke a traditional power structure from the MENA in order to fulfill their desired goals in Lebanon: Patronage. This practice has been rampant in the Middle East generally and in Lebanon particularly for centuries. “In Mamluk and Ottoman times these networks were managed by the 'notables (a'yan) who acted as intermediaries between al-khassa (the 'special ones; the ruler and his entourage; the elite), and al-'amma (the 'public'; the commoners or the plebs).”⁹⁷ In Lebanon, “the pervasiveness of this system... is easily traced to feudal times, wherein the overlord allowed peasants and their families the use of land in exchange for unquestioned loyalty.”⁹⁸ It then translated into the political system where a political leader would become the *zaim*, or main power broker.⁹⁹ “... clientilistic groupings bring together people of very different status and power. The patron is the power wielder, and his clients need his protection. In turn they render him a number of services that enhance

96 Salam Said, 1990, 235.

97 Nazih H. Ayubi, 1995, 165.

98 “Zuama Clientilism,” 1987.

99 Ibid, 1987.

his power and hence his ability to act as their protector.”¹⁰⁰ This practiced flourished, with numerous patron-client networks popped up, the patrons themselves competing for the utmost political power. This phenomenon is most often depicted as being triangular in shape, as the further down the patronage line one moves, the more people there are around them to compete with. Patronage-client relations, however, are almost never as neat and organized as a basic pyramid. Instead, they are often multiple pyramids coming down from the top, main source. Moreover, these pyramids do not necessarily exist independent of each other but in the same times and places. It is theoretically possible for one individual to be involved in multiple patronage ties, each representing a different *wasta*, or connection, to a different resource, be they political, economic or social. In that sense, they exist more on a three dimensional plane, with ties moving in all directions, not merely vertically.

In Lebanon, these patronage pyramids are most often found within the boundaries of a particular religious sect. Due to the consecration of religious affiliation into the Lebanese political society, these patron-client relations then became an essential part of political participation. Even non-active members of political parties and regular lay-people are swept up into these systems as they must rely on their sect and thus their particular patronage scheme for basic needs, such as protection. This fact becomes abundantly clear when analyzing the power, or lack thereof, in the Lebanese army. During the civil war, the Lebanese army was replaced by a number of warring militias

100 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, 3rd Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008),327.

and played a minor role in the war itself. Even today, despite the increase in size of the Lebanese military, it remains at the whims of the consociational state. As such, most soldiers can be seen directing traffic through the Beirut streets or sitting around at random traffic posts. Clientelism in Lebanon does not abandon sectarianism but further entrenches it. This patronage system does not remain within the borders of the country, however. In fact, most patrons have the backing of, at least, one foreign power that, in turn, may be pitted against each other in their struggle to assert themselves into the Lebanese political scene.

Michael Johnson originally argued that it is Clientelism itself which started the civil war in 1975, due to the exclusion of Palestinian refugees from gaining citizenship, let alone garnering an entrance into a patron system, and the migrant Shi'i communities from voting in the city.¹⁰¹ “Both groups were susceptible to radical politics and came to be seen as a threat to the Lebanese political system...”¹⁰² He later revised his original ideas, stating that they largely oversimplify the situation that had occurred in Lebanon.¹⁰³ While it was an oversimplification of an incredibly complicated issue, he does hit on some important ideas. Nazih H. Ayubi demonstrates that “... clientilist networks themselves could become destabilising, as local leaders would mobilise their respective constituencies against each other or against the government.”¹⁰⁴ The patronage paradigm becomes even more precarious when the lower and disenfranchised are either excluded

101 Michael Johnson, 2001, 6.

102 Ibid, 2001, 6.

103 Ibid, 2001, 7.

104 Ayubi, 1995, 165.

from the system or are incorporated very rare.¹⁰⁵ The Palestinian communities are quite obviously victims of these exclusionary practices,¹⁰⁶ as they are even barred from having citizenship or access to many professional careers in the state. However, of the officially recognized and legal citizens of the state, the Shi'i community was the most marginalized of the larger sects in Lebanon. They had not been powerful players in the formative years of the state, to the point that they were not even present at the National Pact, which laid out the hierarchy of religious groups in relation to political power.

This situation continued until the civil war when Shi'is seem to have structured their own patron-client networks through the formation of groups such as Amal and then Hizbullah, who then turned outwards, towards Syria and Iran for the financial and political backing necessary to become a viable opposition to the establishment. Similarly, as the Shi'i population grew in power and numbers, Sunnis began to feel the dwindling of their power. This gradual decline met an abrupt halt with the entrance of businessman Rafiq al-Hariri onto the political scene, first in the 1980s, but then again with much more success in the 1990s. He had both the individual financial wealth as well as monetary and political backing by the Saudi regime. Christians, meanwhile, have and continue to align themselves wherever preferred or necessary for the political climate at hand: "It is the only major confession that is split between the March 1th and March 8th

105 Ibid, 1995, 165.

106 The Palestinian situation has been and still is critical to the situation in Lebanon. They are still excluded from citizenship and the political process itself. Instead, their needs and demands are often co-opted by other groups, particularly Hizbullah, who pursue political goals that are said to be in the interest of the Palestinians. As such, I will not focus on this group in particular but the ways in which Lebanese political groups use them as a method for attaining their own goals.

blocs. General Aoun, whose party holds the largest number of Christian seats in Parliament, is considered by many to be the community's de facto leader.”¹⁰⁷ Aoun, who has traditionally been the staunchest opponent to Syria, recently changed his affiliations with an unprecedented move to align with Hizbullah, a group seen as being highly pro-Syrian. His move, however, demonstrates the bipolar system, with two main camps of power. Through there exists smaller circles of power outside these groups, any hope at impacting the government system must be done through the acquiescence of one of these two powers.

107 Mona Yacoubian. “Lebanon's Unstable Equilibrium.” *United States Institute of Peace*. (Nov. 2009), 4.

CHAPTER III

PATRONAGE OUTSIDE LEBANON

Before discussing the ways in which Saudi Arabia and Syria utilize patronage systems to influence Lebanon, it is also important to establish how these networks operate within the states themselves. Unlike in Lebanon where there are numerous, independent and significant network all vying for power, in both Syria and Saudi Arabia there exists one main, omnipresent system of patronage where the patrons are the leaders themselves, the president and the king (respectively). Power emanates from the highest position of power, down through the government apparatus. To use Richards and Waterbury's description of the patron as a 'broker,' it is easy to see how these leaders can and do dole out things like public goods, protection and, most importantly, access to the bureaucratic apparatus.¹⁰⁸ Unlike democratic forms of government, where people can be said to be included horizontally into the system, "... patronage and clientelism are practices that integrate the individual vertically into social life on the basis of conformity, of accepting the legitimacy of the status quo and becoming trained to its rules of conduct."¹⁰⁹ Access to political power and often the greatest wealth come through inclusion into these systems. In this sense, it seems that they have created similar systems where the networks are omnipresent and force citizens to either access them or remain disenfranchised from any sort of governmental power.

108 Ibid, 2008, 329.

109 Ayubi, 1995, 167.

It appears that the patronage pyramids in both Syria and Saudi Arabia are characterized by a tight-knit group of cronies directly around the main power broker. While these cronies ultimately serve the power broker, be it the president or the king, but they then take charge of organizing and ensuring the preservation of the system. “The members of these groups help each other along in their careers, for it is likely that at any particular time some will be doing better than others and can promote the interests of the less fortunate.”¹¹⁰ Continually, these groups often come from the same regional area, family or perhaps religion group.¹¹¹ In the case of Syria, these cronies come primarily from the same religious group, the 'Alawites, as the al-Asad family and other minority groups, particularly Christians. In Saudi Arabia, however, these originally began “... from some of the sons of Abd al-Aziz, members of related families like the Jilqis and the al-Shakhs, and a few tribal leaders and senior clergy.”¹¹² After Abd al-Aziz's death and some reshuffling of leadership, power was consolidated amongst the royal family. Prominent business families were adopted to this system only after the power was firmly fixed in the hands of the royals. In both systems however, these groups of cronies then appear to gathered clients under themselves. While they have control over their clients, using them to satisfy their own needs, they do so in a way that ensures the continuation of power of their own patron.

110 Richards and Waterbury, 2008, 327.

111 Ibid, 2008, 327.

112 Roger Owens, 2006, 49.

SYRIA

In Syria, the patron-client system funnels mostly through the higher ranking military positions, the security forces and the government apparatus itself. This is largely due to the background of former President of Syria, Hafez al-Asad. Al-Asad was originally a military man, having served in the air force, who overthrew a fellow Alawi for the office of President¹¹³ and immediately placed clients into strategic governmental positions around the country. He then surrounded himself with those who were most loyal and valuable to the continuation of his power.

For more than thirty years the Syrian state has been controlled at its apex, in descending order of importance, by the family, clan, tribe, and minority religious sect of the president. Commands of the vital military and security organs are virtually exclusively Alawi preserves, while another religious minority that tends to be favored by the regime, the Christians, provides a disproportionate number of domestic intelligence officers.¹¹⁴

Continually, Syria's ruling elite also contain a noticeable Sunni component as two of Hafez al-Asad's closest cronies were Sunnis such as Mustafa Tlas and 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam.¹¹⁵ Part of the success in the persistence of the al-Asad regime comes from the way in which the patron-client relations are structured, through a "... military-sectarian power configuration."¹¹⁶ Syria is considered to be a 'bunker praetorian state,' most of whom are characterized by a minority ruling class, who often use coercion as a means of controlling the population.¹¹⁷ In other words, they prefer to use sticks to keep dissidence down rather than carrots. The al-Asad family's regime is no different and has been known

113 Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg, 2010, 140.

114 Ibid, 2010, 140.

115 Salwa Ismail, "Changing Social Structure, Shifting Alliances and Authoritarianism in Syria." *Demystifying Syria*. Ed. Fred Lawson (London: Saqi, 2009): 13- 28, 14

116 Ibid, 2009, 15.

117 Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg, 2010, 113.

to use force to quell rebellion or dissent. In 1982, for instance, the regime under the rule of Hafez al-Asad squashed a rebellion building in Hama by the Muslim Brotherhood, killing around 20,000 citizens.¹¹⁸ The regime was also so heavy handed as to extend its control over any items that can aid in the production and spread of information. For instance, “All typewriters had to be registered with the government and a sample of their typeface provided until the early 1990s, fax machines were prohibited until the latter part of that decade, and the Internet only became available in the country just before the death of strongman Hafez al-Assad in 2000.”¹¹⁹ In the 2000s, new media websites, such as facebook and youtube, have been outright banned from usage.¹²⁰

The real threat of violence against Syrian citizens by the government appears to have given the regime a false sense of security. Despite the strength of their police and military forces, the country suffers from a lackluster economy and is largely excluded from integration into the international community. The outward appearance of Syria is as a heavy handed and thus strong state. In reality, however, it is a weak state whose bureaucratic functions are supported by the military, police force, and the patronage binds within those organizations. Eyal Zisser argues that one of the reasons why this regime may have lasted so long was due to the fact that “... the Syrian regime formed by Asad

118 Ibid, 2010, 140.

119 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack. “The Arab Economies in a Changing World.” (DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), 278.

120 Only recently, in 2011, did the government begin allowing access to twitter, facebook, youtube, etc in response to increasing demands for freedom. It has yet to be determined if the government will continue allow such access. Furthermore, Hafez's son and current president, Bashar al-Assad, has been proving his similarities to his father, with a reported 500 people already killed in the 2011 uprisings in Syria.

was more firmly rooted in the reality of the country than its predecessors had been.”¹²¹

The cronies of his inner circle were made up of citizens who had either been on the fringes of society or who had been repressed.¹²² Unfortunately, these individuals remained in power throughout most of al-Asads reign, until the 1990s and the severe changes that occurred within the international and regional environment, particularly with the fall of the Soviet Russia.

After Hafez al-Asad died in 2000, his second eldest son Bashar came into power.¹²³ His ascension to power was undoubtedly preplanned, beginning years prior to his fathers death. In 1994, after the death of his older brother Basil, Bashar entered the military and quickly rose through the ranks. By 1997, he was already a lieutenant-colonel and was promoted to a full colonel only two years later.¹²⁴ Merely one day after the death of his father, he became the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.¹²⁵ This meant the continuation of al-Asad rule over the military and security forces and the guarantee of continued loyalty to the regime. During this time, the young al-Asad had also set his sights on ridding the regime of any obstacles to his power. This largely centered on the forced removal of Hafez's powerful cronies from power, including the General Intelligence Chief General Muhammad Bashir al-Najjar, Vice President Rifaat al-Asad

121 Eyal Zisser. *Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the First Years in Power*. (NY: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 9.

122 Ibid, 2007, 9.

123 The eldest al-Asad son, Basil, was originally groomed as Hafezs successor to the presidency until his untimely death in a car accident in 1994.

124 David W. Lesch. *The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria*. (New Haven: Yale University Press: 2005), 75.

125 Ibid, 2005, 75.

and Prime Minister Mahmud Zubi.¹²⁶ “... Bashar had replaced most of his fathers aging compatriots with his contemporaries well before he was reelected president in 2007 with more than 97 percent of the vote.”¹²⁷ It is also reported that Hafez al-Asads two most important Sunni allies, Mustafa Tlas and Abd al-Halim Khaddam¹²⁸ aided in securing the support of the secret police, or Mukhabarat, and key military figures for Bashar and, in turn, continuing that line of patronage.¹²⁹

When Bashar first took power, there was a great deal of optimism both in Syria and worldwide for the future of the nation. Unlike his father, Bashar was seen as a more liberal politician, having lived and studied in Britain and being married a British woman of Syrian descent, Asma al-Asad. Yet, “... the regime has yielded little on demands for reform: there has been some cautious economic liberalization, but dissent is still being suppressed, and corruption has, according to all available accounts, increased tremendously.”¹³⁰ This is part of the reason why Volker Perthes describes Bashar as a modernizer, not a reformer: “... he gave Syria a more modern face and made some things work more efficiently, but he also made sure that the basic system... remained intact.”¹³¹ Even more distressing for the Syrian regime was the mishandling of foreign affairs by the green president. This breakdown was emphasized by the Syria Accountability and

126 Ibid, 2005, 76.

127 Clement Henry Moore and Robert Springborg, 2010, 141.

128 See previous page.

129 David W. Lesch, 2005, 79.

130 Volker Perthes. “The Syrian Solution.” *Foreign Affairs* 85.6 (Nov.- Dec. 2006): 33-40, 34. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 22 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032141>>

131 Volker Perthes. “Is Assad Capable of Reform?” in *The New York Times*. 30 March 2011. Accessed 1 April 2011. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/opinion/31iht-edperthes31.html>>

Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 by the United States, which listed Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism and thus imposed a number of sanctions on the country.¹³²

“The immediate outcome was a collapse of Syrian-American relations, a further isolation of Syria in the region and in the world's affairs, and the expulsion of Syrian forces from Lebanon in April 2005 under heavy international but also Lebanese pressure.”¹³³ The US led war in Iraq also spelled trouble for Syria in terms of regional affairs. The al-Asad regime had already been under scrutiny from the US and its allies and its role in the war only served to further deter any friendship.

According to American sources, documents were seized in this action which bore witness, albeit not always direct, to Syrian connections to terrorist activities in Iraq. For example, it transpired that some of the anti-American terrorists had come from Syrian, that former Iraqi Ba'th leaders were in Syria coordinating the struggle against the U.S. and, finally, that Syria allowed or at least ignored the establishment of training camps for terrorists.

The Iraq war has, in general, had an overwhelming impact on regional alliances in the Middle East, as many countries now see alliances being formed around sectarian alliances. There are noticeable relationships between the Sunni run states, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, versus the Shi'i (Iran) or, in the case of Syria, minority run enterprises. Since the dawn of this new era in the Middle East, Syria has continued to dwindle in regional political importance and strategy and thus has become more isolated, with Iran as its only real ally.

Patronage ties, however, seem to be ever present in the system. Under Bashar, “... the government has removed barriers to private sector entry for most industries, as well

132 U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Relations. 2003. *Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003*. 108th Cong. 1st sess., 18 Oct. 2003.

133 Eyal Zisser, 2007, Viii.

as schools, universities and banks, and it is reforming formal institutions, including labor laws, the public educational system, and social protection programs.”¹³⁴ Although this seems like an attempt by the government to quell the spread of clientilism and patronage, the results depict otherwise. “Findings from the 2003 Unemployment Survey indicate that over 80% of unemployed were 15-29-year-olds were interested in public sector jobs and 60% sought jobs exclusively in the public sector.”¹³⁵ Though “... life time earnings for young public sector workers exceed those for private sector workers among all groups (with the exception of men with a primary education or below),”¹³⁶ access to the bureaucratic apparatus seems as likely of a reason for continuing preference for the public sector. Falling under the emanating patronage within the government means security from police agencies and the ability to network oneself to a better life. The sentiment among youth to prefer public sector jobs may be an indicator of the resilience of these ties in the current atmosphere.

Though Syria has not necessarily been considered a strong government, it has been one that has been resilient and triumphant in the complete suppression of any opposition. Yet, as of early 2011, it has been facing severe and spreading protests that are increasing coming under international and regional scrutiny due to the use of violence against citizens. Though it is impossible to determine future outcomes, it seems unlikely that Bashar's regime will emerge unscathed or unchanged into the new era of Middle

134 Nader Kabbani. “Why Young Syrians Prefer Public Sector Jobs,” *Middle East Youth Initiative* 2 (2009), 1.

135 Ibid, 2.

136 “Missed by the Boom, Hurt by the Bust.” *Middle East Initiative* (2009), 12.

Eastern politics. The government has already be reshuffled underneath him and, as of April 2011, the Emergency Law that has been in place since 1962 has been overturned, only to have more rules but in its place.

SAUDI ARABIA

In Saudi Arabia, however, the patronage is closely related to the ruling family. Whereas Syria saw the passing of power between the al-Asad family who unofficially function as a ruling family, the Saud family is the legitimate and official source of power in Saudi Arabia and familial support is not merely expected, but completely necessary. The first state based on Saudi-Wahhabi doctrine formed during the 18th century, centered on trade routes between Riyadh and Ha'il.¹³⁷ "It has been run since the 1920s by and largely for the sprawling royal family, all of whom are descendants of the founding patriarch, King 'Abd al'Aziz Al Saud, and who now number in the thousands."¹³⁸ King 'Abd al'Aziz al Saud, known as Ibn Saud, is known to have been a very religious man, "... who was quoted as saying: 'Two things are essential to our state and our people... religious and the rights inherited from our fathers.'"¹³⁹ His father, of course, was from a dynasty (the House of Saud) which had controlled the Arabian Peninsula for over two centuries and had used religion both as a rallying point for unification and as the basis for

137 Nazih N. Ayubi, 1995, 127.

138 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, 2008, 315.

139 Joesph Nevo. "Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia." *Middle Eastern Studies* 34.3 (July 1998): 34-53, 36. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 22 Feb 2011.
<<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283951>>

their political legitimacy.¹⁴⁰ When it came time for Ibn Saud to unify those living in the Arabian Peninsula into one modern nation state, the third version of Saudi Arabia, they did so on the basis of the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.¹⁴¹ One way that the Saud family was able to ensure their power was by “... including the age-old practice of tribal alliance-through-marriage to expand the 'social base' of the ruling clique. They also turned several nomadic groups into military forces under their command.”¹⁴² The patronage structure was eventually introduced into the system to ensure the continuation of the family.

At the summit of the patronage pyramid there was the core network of the main Saudi 'clan class' that controlled all the strategic functions, ministries and provinces (e.g. Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Petroleum, etc.). The descending pyramid structure then extended into a status network of patron-client relationships, while towards the bottom much of the 'productive base' acquired a certain 'externality' to the whole system, being assigned mainly foreigners and members of out-groups.¹⁴³

Also, the fervor with which Ibn Saud implemented religion into politics is a practice that substantiated his power and has been continued by all following rulers, who have been members of the Saud family. By keeping religion centralized in the political scene, they have ensured their continued success as rulers and, for the most part, loyalty among the population.

Patronage really gained momentum in Saudi Arabia after the 1950s, when the state as we currently know it was galvanized “... through the decisions of a few Saudi

140 Ibid, 1998, 36.

141 Wahhabism was created in the 1700s by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who “... called for the reinstatement of exactly the same religious, social and political customs that had been practised by the prophet Muhammad and his followers, namely adherence to the Quran and the *sunna* as the only sources for religious conduct...” Joseph Nevo, 1998, 36-7.

142 Nazih N. Ayubi, 1995, 128-9.

143 Ibid, 1995, 132.

royals.”¹⁴⁴ These royals, however, established “... specially tailored patronage, with leading Saudi princes being provided top government positions and specific allocations of oil exports, with lesser ones being given stipends, titles to public land, and preferred access to government contracts.”¹⁴⁵ For instance, even today, “... members of the royal family, if not the king himself, direct the Ministry of Defense, command key units in the armed forces and review all promotions in the officers' corps.”¹⁴⁶ These princes and royal family members then made connections with a number of prominent business and merchant families, creating a web of patronage around the country.

This pattern is reproduced on a smaller scale within state agencies, on the “micro-level” of individual organizational units and bureaucrats. Bureaucrats in large parts of the oversized state apparatus tend to be de facto distributive clients of the state, with job entitlements that sap individual motivation. This results in a penchant for referring matters upwards while giving superiors little control over the day-to-day behavior of low-level administrators.

Any bureaucrat who is co-opted into this system does so through merit based patronage ties.¹⁴⁷ This upward motion serves to condense and reinforce the upper levels of Saudi political society, particularly into the hands of the top patron, the King.

During this time Saudi Arabia was also building its role in the international arena, “... thanks largely to the enormous oil wealth it could use (with US approval) to buy friends and influences...”¹⁴⁸ Saudi Arabia's relationship with the United States played a specific strategic importance as the Kingdom became one pillar “... to bolster

144 Steffen Hertog. “Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia.” (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 10.

145 Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg, 2010, 227.

146 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, 2008, 346.

147 Ibid, 2008, 315.

148 Zachary Lockman. *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 160.

conservative and pro-US governments and political forces,”¹⁴⁹ as per the 'Nixon Doctrine' of 1969. The Kingdom's wealth and political importance again skyrocketed with the oil boom of the 1970s and early 80s. According to Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg this developmental strategy classifies Saudi Arabia as a rentier developmental monarchy¹⁵⁰, or one that sells internal resources to external sources. In the case of Saudi Arabia this internal resource is oil, with Saudi ARAMCO as the leading company. This is not to say, however, that the Kingdom has not met its fair share of scrutiny from the West. Even as early as the 1990s, Saudi Arabia was under examination by the United States “... to put on a more liberal face.”¹⁵¹ Which the King eventually did, in a superficial way, through the establishment of the Consultative Council, which is made up of non-elected members who are undoubtedly favored by the royal family.

However, the Saudi strategy of governance and development has itself developed numerous issues, including the ability of the Kingdom to retain control over the bureaucrats and bureaucratic apparatuses and ever-growing royal family beneath it. In 2009, for instance, King Abdullah effectively reworked many of the major players in various ministries; including firing a number of conservative leaders and creating a new job of deputy education minister for woman's affairs to which Noura al-Faiz was appointed.¹⁵² Saudi Arabia faces numerous other governance challenges, including the

149 Ibid, 2004, 162.

150 Ibid, 2010, 229.

151 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, 2008, 314.

152 Clement Henry Moore and Robert Springborg. 2010, 233; BBC News, “Major reshuffle in Saudi Arabia,” *BBC*, 2009, Accessed 21 February 2011, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/ft/-/2/hi/middle_east/789021.stm

ability to mediate between its conservatism, its support for and by the West, and its regional role. However, it has weathered the tumultuous sea of revolutions and protests relatively well. The country had outlawed protest demonstrations, but made good on their threats to quell any movements through threat, or in some cases, actual force. It appears, however, that the Kingdoms success thus far in squashing most dissent was with money, as “... the Saudi approach is based more on the carrot of patronage than on the stick of repression.”¹⁵³ In February, the King implemented a benefits package for unemployment, education and housing subsidies worth around \$37 billion.¹⁵⁴

153 Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg, 2010, 229.

154 Ian Black, “Saudi Arabian security forces quell 'day of rage' protests, *Guardian UK*, 11 March 2011, Accessed 11 March 2011. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/11/saudi-arabia-police-quell-protests>>

CHAPTER IV

PATRON RELATIONS IN LEBANON

SYRIA

In looking at the post civil-war era, Syria appears to have had near complete control over the Lebanese state in a number of ways, at least until 2005 when Syria was unceremoniously evicted from the country and whose power has continued to wane due to both regional and international pressure. However, the effectiveness of Syria's role in postwar Lebanese politics is divided between the Hafez era and a noticeable decline after Bashar rose to power. Hafez al-Asad first used Syrian influence on Lebanon as a way to meet his country's developing needs. Politically, he bolstered Syria's regional power as well as its strength internationally, particularly in relation to any US or Israeli peace process.¹⁵⁵ It was similarly used to garner "... a secure source of much-needed rents to finance the regime's neo-patrimonial networks and offset pressure for economic reform."¹⁵⁶ To illustrate the importance of Lebanon to Hafez, it is reported that he actually passed away while speaking with the Lebanese president.¹⁵⁷ During his reign, Lebanon functioned as it was an independence sphere in a larger Syrian entity. His son's political relationship with Lebanon, however, has been marred numerous times over, causing a loosening in the Syria grip over Lebanon.

155 Bassel F. Salloukh. "Demystifying Syrian Foreign Policy under Bashar al-Asad." *Demystifying Syria*. Fred. H Lawson. (London: Saqi, 2009): 159- 179, 159

156 Ibid, 2009, 166.

157 Zisser, 2007, 183.

The foundation for this control was set down in the Ta'if Accord itself, which recognized the fraternal binds between the two nations and the necessity of Syrian assistance to rebuild and spread Lebanese hegemony.¹⁵⁸ There is, for instance, an entire section of the document that addresses the relationship between Syria and Lebanon, stating that the two nations share a special relationship because of their kinship, history, and shared brotherly interests.¹⁵⁹ The document continues by outlining the necessity of achieving and preserving security within each state in order to maintain good relations between the states and ensure a peaceful future for both.¹⁶⁰ This relationship was later reaffirmed through the 'Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination.' Approved in "... May 1991 [it] further strengthened the links between the two countries through joint councils that would elaborate and oversee implementation of policies regulating economic, political, and military affairs."¹⁶¹ These two documents provided leverage for Syria to continue their involvement in Lebanese affairs and acted as a deterrent to other forces looking for inroads to the country.

Some of the most obvious and important points of Syrian involvement are related to the filling of higher elected offices by pro-Syrian officials. This method was seen as early on as the first post civil war elections. "The election of a new president [Rene Muawwad] and the re-election of Husayn al-Husayni as speaker of the Lebanese

158 Salman Said, 1990, 342

159 وتقوم بينه وبين سوريا علاقات مميزة تستمد قوتها من جذور القربى والتاريخ والمصالح الاخوية المشتركة
Salman Said, 1990, 243.

160 Ibid, 1990, 243.

161 Judith Harik. "Syrian Foreign Policy and State/Resistance Dynamics in Lebanon." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 20.3 (July- Sept. 1997): 249-65, 251.

parliament bestow constitutional legitimacy on the Syrian role in Lebanon.”¹⁶² Muawwad was a pro-Syrian supporter, who appears to have been specifically chosen to run by the Syrian regime.¹⁶³ The Syrians ensured that the top offices would have a pro-Syrian stance and that they would be an integral part of the political rebuilding process.

Although it is questionable how much Hafez himself played in these negotiations given his declining health, it was certainly done by his cronies with his acquiesce. Even before his son Bashar took power in 2000, however, relations between Syria and Lebanon were becoming strained. Irritation at the continued presence of Syrian military forces in the country began to spread. Then, in 2000, “... an order issued by the Lebanese Minister of Education... possibly under pressure by Damascus, easing the entrance requirements of Syrian students applying to Lebanese Universities.”¹⁶⁴ Later in the same year the Lebanese government also decided to reduce the customs on agricultural imports from Syria, which was highly detrimental to Lebanese farmers.¹⁶⁵ Feelings of unrest were slowly building throughout the country, coming to a head as soon as Bashar gained power. Some of these demonstrations were even backed by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who was later forced to retract some of his anti-Syrian tendencies¹⁶⁶ The mere fact that Jumblatt was either forced or coerced into changing his attitude towards Syria showcases the extent to which Lebanon still rested in Syria hands.

162 Asad Abukhalil, “Syria and the Shiites: Al-Asad's Policy in Lebanon.” *Third World Quarterly* 12.2 (Apr. 1990): 1-20, 17. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 22 Feb 2011.
<<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992256>>

163 Ibid, 1990, 16.

164 Zisser, 2007, 186.

165 Ibid, 2007, 186.

166 Ibid, 2007, 187.

Unlike his father, Bashar seems to have taken a more direct and open approach to dealing with Lebanon. In 2002, Bashar actually visited Beirut, the first time a Syrian president had done so in over 25 years.¹⁶⁷ After meetings with President Emile Lahoud, the two collectively released a statement, which outlined various ways in which the Syrian and Lebanese governments would strengthen their relationship.¹⁶⁸ This was the first move in what would turn out to be a disastrous play by the Syrian government. Later, in 2004, Syria helped to extend the term of pro-Syrian President, Emile Lahoud beyond the constitutional limit, using “... heavy-handed methods Syrian security agents and their Lebanese allies used to force an amendment through the country's parliament.”¹⁶⁹ This action was poorly regarded among Lebanese citizens and the international community alike as it involved actual alterations to the Lebanese constitution at the obvious will of an external patron.

In response to this Syrian action the UN passed Resolution 1559, calling for all foreign troops to leave Lebanon, including Syria. During this time many individuals who opposed Syrian rule in Lebanon accused Syria of helping to increase the national debt, to 185% of the GDP, or about \$34 billion, partially due to “... the deliberate channeling of funds to benefit groups and individuals loyal to Syria, as well as directly to Syria itself.”¹⁷⁰ The 'Lahoud era' marked the beginning of the end of Syria's direct reign over

167 Charles G. Gedeon. “Visit of President Assad to Lebanon.” In *Who's Who in Lebanon: A Biographical Dictionary*. (Beirut: Publitec Publications, 2006), 402.

168 This included the easing of trade, the price of Syrian gas sold in Lebanon, a joint dam on Nahr al-Kabir among other things. Ibid, 2006, 402.

169 Talal Nizameddin, 2006, 96.

170 Talal Nizameddin, 2011, 97.

Lebanon, as numerous citizens were becoming irritated with the depths of Syria meddling permeating their government. This sentiment came to its head in 2005, after the assassination of the popular figure Rafiq Hariri and the subsequent Cedar Revolution which evicted Syrian military presence out of the country. Though this 'revolution' was successful in ridding the country of the Syrian military, but the al-Asad regime certainly maintained a level of influence over Lebanese through other, less obvious, means.

Indirect Syrian influence and intervention in Lebanon is most often connected to the Shi'i group Hizbullah. According to Michael Johnson, Hizbullah "... had been founded with the encouragement of Iranian 'revolutionary-guards who were allowed by Syria to operate in Baalbeck and the Bekaa valley in the early 1980s."¹⁷¹ This effort was supposedly coordinated by "Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the Iranian ambassador to Damascus in the 1980s."¹⁷² Physical Iranian support, particularly weapons of the newly formed group was only possible with the consent of Syria, "... since shipments must pass through Syrian ports and cross the Syrian border to reach the Bikaa Valley, where Damascus troops [were] heavily concentrated."¹⁷³ Syria's connection to Iran is what originally provided the country influence over Hizbullah, since Syria had been closely aligned with Amal with whom early Hizbullah supporters had become disenchanted with.¹⁷⁴ In fact, "... Hizbollah would, until the 1990s, prove more an obstacle than an aid to Syrian

171 Michael Johnson, 2001, 165.

172 Anoushiravan Ehteshai and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, 1997, 129.

173 Judith Harik, 1996, 254.

174 Ibid, 1997, 129.

ambitions in Lebanon.”¹⁷⁵ The first real sign that Syria was gaining control over Hezbollah came in 1989, with the passage of the Damascus agreement. Cosponsored with Iran, this document acted as a sort of peace settlement between Hezbollah and Amal, giving Syria a sense of control over both groups.¹⁷⁶

Since 1967, Syria has been at odds with Israel over the piece of territory known as the Golan Heights in addition to a smaller space known as the Shebaa Farms. While the Golan Heights is considered to be Syrian territory occupied by Israel, both Lebanon and Syria argues that Shebaa Farms is actually Lebanese land despite UN and Israeli claims that it is in the Golan, making it Syrian.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, opposition to Israel is a sentiment shared between the two groups albeit for different reasons. For Hezbollah, resistance to Israel is a reaction more to their occupation of Lebanese territory than it is for their treatment towards Palestinians. In Syria, however, opposition to Israel is a path to accumulate greater regional support as well as assert itself as a powerful asset in the Middle East; turning itself into a necessary player in any peace agreement or treaty in the Middle East. It also sees Lebanon as a barrier between Israel and itself, afraid that it could penetrate “... its soft underbelly by extending its influence inside the small neighboring state of Lebanon.”¹⁷⁸ As such, Syria has often gone out of its way in order to ensure its involvement in any Israel- Lebanese situation. The Israeli “Graphs of Wrath”

175 Ibid, 1997, 129.

176 Ibid, 1997, 134.

177 Lara Deeb, 2008, 62.

178 Judith Harik. 1997, 250.

campaign during the 1990s showed the extent to which Syria interjected itself into the situation.

The difference between the two sentiments and goals for Israel brings up an important aspect in the Syria-Hizbullah relationship. Many individuals in the media, particularly in the West, attempt to paint Hizbullah as an arm of Syria. However, the two may be more loosely connected than that of traditional clientelist systems or what many assume. Rather, it appears that Syrian funding and support goes to the top leaders in Hizbullah who then form a more traditional styled patronage pyramid through their party's ranks. These ties are more independent, allowing the groups to have differences. "Syria sought to both restrain Hizbollahs taking of hostages and use it to demonstrate to Washington that an end to such anti-Westernism depended on Syrian-sponsored pacification in Lebanon and acknowledgment of Syria's interests." In this way, Syria has merely used Hizbullah as one tool in their quest to control Lebanese affairs. If there was ever a time that the ties between the two groups were stronger, with Syria having total domination over the organization, it has certainly been waning as Hizbullah has grown stronger and more independent. "... while the party keeps good relations with the Syrian government, Syria does not control or dictate Hizballah decisions or actions."¹⁷⁹ Bashar al-Asad himself made this claim in an interview in 2001, stating,

... we keep explaining that we do not direct or control Hizballah activity, and make no decisions whatsoever in these matters. It is Hizballah that makes this type of decision¹⁸⁰, which also means that we have no responsibility for any activity it carries out. Hizballah is a

179 Lara Deeb, 2008, 66.

180 This is in reference to armed resistance against Israel.

Lebanese resistance organization, although we stand by it politically and morally, and in any event it is not in need of material assistance from us.¹⁸¹

Hizbullah may continue to rely on Syria for political support and some financial backing, but it seems as if it could continue independently if either of these were taken away.

Many individuals, notably the United States military and some bureaucrats, remember Hizbullah predominately as a violent opposition group who used force as a means to implement their agenda. This idea tends to negate the numerous political and military changes that have occurred within Hizbullah since the end of the civil war. Unlike the early years, Hizbullah has moved from being merely an opposition group to an elected and very powerful part of the Lebanese government. "... Hizbullah has in fact built alliances with other parties, secular and non-Shiite, in order to get a larger representation in the government. When it put up candidates in the last parliamentary elections, some of those on its electoral list were Christians."¹⁸²

Syrian intervention in Lebanon does not stop at utilizing Hizbullah as the only patronage system or means into the country. In fact, only emphasizing the Hizbullah-Syria connection, or the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah connection for that matter, seems to discredit the complexity of these foreign relations and the extent to which Syria had infiltrated Lebanese affairs. Instead, Syria was able to assert itself into the Lebanese political arena without necessarily needing to utilize a patronage system. One interesting way in which Syria has, intentionally or not, altered Lebanese affairs was through a string

181 Eyal Zisser, 2007, 160.

182 Assaf Kfoury. "Meeting Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah." *The War on Lebanon: A Reader*. Ed. Nubar Hovsepian. (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008): 75-85, 82.

of assassinations against anti-Syrian journalists and politicians between 2004 and 2008. The first of attempt in a notable rash of assassination attempts was against Marwan Hamadi, "... an opposition politician who had voted against Lahoud's extension."¹⁸³ Though the attempt was unsuccessful, it certainly sent a strong warning to Hariri, which was quickly followed up on in February 2005 when Rafiq Hariri was assassinated in a massive car bombing.¹⁸⁴ The impact of his assassination on Lebanese affairs and Lebanese-Syria relations cannot be understated. As I will explore in my next section, Hariri had established himself as the most powerful politician in the post-Ta'if era. Prior to death, Hariri had become more critical of Syria's role in Lebanon, particularly the extension of Lahoud's presidential term.

In 2005, in particular was a deadly year with the assassination of numerous anti-Syrian figures, including journalists Samir Kassir and Gebran Tueni as well as communist politician George Hawi. In the following two years, numerous anti-Syrian parliament members including Pierre Amine Gemayel, Walid Eido, and Antoine Ghanem were assassinated as well. It is an over-extension to deem that the plethora of assassinations on anti-Syrian politicians in Lebanon were directed by Damascus itself, as it is too difficult to determine the actual inner workings of these events. However, it certainly seems that Syria has played an important role in allowing these assassinations. As stated by an unnamed State Department official, "... Syria has, by negligence or

183 Lesch, 2005, 129.

184 Ibid, 2005, 126.

design, allowed Lebanon to become destabilized.”¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, whether these assassinations were directly undertaken or even ordered by Damascus they illustrate the power of the Syria patronage ties in Lebanon. Though not all victims of assassination in Lebanon were anti-Syrian in the political stance, a noticeable majority of them were against the continued Syrian presence and control over Lebanon. It seems unlikely that it is merely a coincidence that these individuals all fell victim to assassination attempts. Rather, they depict the strength of Syrian military and security ties that they funnel well through the Lebanese state.

Despite the early successes in Syria's bid for Lebanese domination, things certainly changed in 2000, with the changing of the Syrian presidency from Hafez al-Asad to his son Bashar. “The Syrian Ba'th regime inherited by Bashar al-Asad from his father was a personality-based regime revolving around the figure of Hafez al-Asad, its founder and long-time leader.”¹⁸⁶ This personality cult caused many, including Volker Perthes, to argue against the possibility that Bashar could first attain power, let alone hold onto it.¹⁸⁷ Eva Bellin similarly mentions that this moment of change in the presidency could have led to a completely overhaul of Syrian politics. “... the ruling dictator's old age, illness, and death might have created an opportunity for political opening if the leaders of the coercive apparatus had no closed ranks behind the old system and persuaded the dictator's son that the country's best interest lay in continuing the

185 Ibid, 2005, 128.

186 Eyal Zisser, 2007, 47.

187 Volker Perthes. *The Political Economy of Syria under Asad*. (NY: I.B. Tauris, 1995).

regime.”¹⁸⁸ This action both illustrates the patron-client relationship that penetrated the Syrian system but also the willingness and actual need for the clients to keep the status quo. The election of an individual outside the patronage system could have completely altered the established system, opening up the opportunity for new clients to insert themselves or old clients to climb the ladder.

Despite Bashar being seen as a failure in terms of foreign policy decisions, he did utilize the access to Lebanon in a few noteworthy ways. Lebanon has always had a large and resilient banking system. Under Hafez al-Asad, however, the privatization of banks was disallowed. Bashar al-Asad, however, passed Law 28 in 2001, allowing the privatization of banks but limited foreign ownership of any bank to 49%.¹⁸⁹ The country later approved an increase in foreign ownership from 49% to 60% in 2010.¹⁹⁰ This, of course, has meant a growing number of foreign banks in Syria, many of which were Lebanese owned. As of November 2010, six Lebanese owned banks are open for business in Syria, with movements to open more.¹⁹¹ This is a smart move on the part of al-Asad, especially in light of the United States sanctions against Syria, one of is against the Commercial Bank of Syria.

This action bars U.S. banks and their overseas subsidiaries from maintaining a correspondent account with the CBS; it also requires banks to conduct due diligence that

188 Eva Bellin. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East; Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective.” in *Comparative Politics* 36.2 (Jan. 2004): 139-157, 150. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 12 Feb 2011. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150140>>

189 “Private Banks Establishment in Syria (Law No.28/2001) <http://www.banquecentrale.gov.sy/eg-laws/law28-eg.htm>

190 Tamara Qiblawi, “Salameh Urges Further Bank Expansion in Syria and Turkey,” *The Daily Star*, 2 Nov. 2010, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=3&article_id=121028#axzz17RtcutfB>

191 Ibid, 2010.

ensures the CBS is not circumventing sanctions through its business dealings with them.¹⁹²

Lebanese banks, then, are Syria's best and most efficient way of putting their country on the international scene.

SAUDI ARABIA

Unlike the multifaceted aspects of Syrian intervention, the newly established patronage line is primarily funneled from the King through one main source, Rafiq Hariri and his family. Unlike most traditional patronage alliances, especially the Lebanese zuama style, Rafiq Hariri's leadership and wealth was not inherited through familial ties, but instead earned through careful and calculated networking. He was born in Sidon in 1944 to what is often described as a modest Sunni family¹⁹³. Though he spent his childhood studying in Sidon, he moved to Beirut for college, attending the Beirut Arab University and majoring in commerce¹⁹⁴. His real break came after moving to Saudi Arabia and gaining employment with the French construction company Oger. One of his first tasks was the construction of a \$150 million Intercontinental Hotel in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, which he finished 8 months ahead of schedule.¹⁹⁵ His speedy work placed him in the good graces of the King, eventually making him a valued and favored client of the Kingdom, so much so that he was granted Saudi citizenship in 1978. Rafiq eventually

192 "U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions Against Syria." *US Department of State*. Accessed 1 April 2011. <<http://damascus.usembassy.gov/sanctions-syr.html>>

193 Charles G. Gedeon. "Hariri." in *Who's Who in Lebanon: Biographical Dictionary*. (Beirut: Publitec Publications, 2006), 154.

194 Ibid, 2006, 154.

195 Matthew Swibel. "Heir Time." *Forbes*. 14 April 2003. Accessed 22 Feb 2011. <<http://www.forbes.com/global/2003/0414/028.html>>

took over Oger, making Oger International. It is worth noting that this company has been under Sa'ad Hariri's wing since 1992, which Rafiq was elected Prime Minister of Lebanon. Today, Oger's board remains under the direction of no less than 5 Hariri family members.¹⁹⁶

In 1979, Hariri established the Hariri Foundation, a non-profit that, according to his the Website, "... helped educate more than 33,000 Lebanese students in the best universities in Lebanon, the U.S., the U.K., France and Canada. The Hariri Foundation provides also health, social and cultural services to the need in Lebanon as well as to promote cultural issues and childrens welfare."¹⁹⁷ Through this foundation he made early in roads onto the Lebanese scene, donating \$12 million to aid in the reconstruction of Beirut, though these efforts were thwarted by 9 more years of civil war. The image of the philanthropist and selfless man is one that the Hariri camp still continues to paint of their great leader: "Mr. Hariri is a philanthropist, a self-made man who built his businesses single-handedly on the basis of his reputation as an honest, credible and trustworthy partner in all his endeavors."¹⁹⁸ Of course, Hariri was also a business tycoon, making sure to expand his actual business interests as soon as he returned to the Lebanese scene in the 1990s. He quickly bought up a number of businesses, including the newspaper *The Daily*

196 "Key Executives." *Saudi Oger*. Accessed 22 Feb 2011.
<http://www.saudioger.com/overview_key.html>

197 "Biography." *Rafiq Hariri: The Official Website*. Accessed 22 Feb 2011
<<http://rhariri.com/general.aspx?pagecontent=biography>>

198 "Biography: Mr. Rafic Hariri."

Star and founding the TV station *Future TV* in 1993,¹⁹⁹ home to the popular “Superstar” TV show.

There was a general sense of optimism in 1992, when Rafiq Hariri became the Prime Minister of the newly elected Lebanese cabinet. He was seen as a great savior by many, willing to invest his own personal wealth into the reconstruction of the state. “International and local confidence in him was demonstrated by an increase in the value of the Lebanese pound when he took office, and declines when he threatened to resign in December 1994 and May 1995.”²⁰⁰ Hariri's power continued to grow, so much so that in the elections in 1996 established him “... as the most powerful za'im in Beirut, eclipsing the traditional political elite.”²⁰¹ Of course, as with all Lebanese elections, the country was rife with rumors over corruption, rigged elections, and vote buying.²⁰² Rafiq remained in his office until 1998 but regained the office from 2000 until his resignation in 2004.

Not everyone was enthralled with the notion of Hariri as Lebanon's great savior.²⁰³ “Some of Lebanon's liberal elite find the notion offensive. Mr. Hariri, they say, is a nouveau riche who is buying the nation for himself while giving away its democracy and

199 “About Future TV.” *Future Television*. Accessed 22 Feb 2011.
<<http://www.futuretvnetwork.com/Default.aspx?page=aboutus>>

200 “All Honourable Men,” 2001, 235.

201 Ibid, 2001, 238.

202 Ibid, 2001, 238.

203 Somewhat ironically, one of the most outspoken critics of the Hariri agenda has come from another Saudi source, Prince Walid Ibn Talal. Born of Saudi father and a Lebanese mother, he carries both a Saudi Arabian and a Lebanese passport. He blamed Hariri for not only mismanaging public funds and plunging the country into further debt but had no strong economic reform plan to begin rectifying the situation.

independence.”²⁰⁴ It is undeniable that Hariri was more interested in reconstructing a Lebanon meant for the elites and foreign tourists than it was for the Lebanese people. In his first cabinet, Hariri introduced the Horizons 2000 plan, which called for \$14 billion in government expenditures for massive reconstruction projects.²⁰⁵ Though it is true that the country, as a whole, needed a complete reconstruction of infrastructure, this plan did not successfully address the needs as a respective whole. Accusations flew that Hariri was “... turning the country into an outpost on the Mediterranean for oil-rich Gulf states.”²⁰⁶ This sentiment is blatantly obvious in the reconstruction of the Beirut Central District, or BCD.

Located in the heart of Beirut, the BCD had been a no-man’s land throughout the civil war. The reconstruction of the center was viewed as potential way to unify the country and bring together the Lebanese people after 15 years of violence. However, the area became something of a personal project for Hariri, who used the French construction company SOIDERE to dictate the reconstruction of the project. There is a general impression among numerous Lebanese that this area is really a tourist center for foreigners, particularly wealthy Gulfis to vacation. Quite obviously stores like Alexander McQueen, Dior and Giorgio Armani are well out of the financial reaches of most citizens in an economy with an overwhelming debt and a lack of jobs.

204 John Andrews. “Changing the Game.” *The Economist* 338.7954 (1996): 10- 12, 11.

205 Sami Baroudi. “Economic Conflict in Postwar Lebanon: State-Labor Relationsbetween 1992 and 1997.” *Middle East Journal* 52.4 (Autumn 1998): 531- 550, 536. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 16 March 2011. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329252>>

206 Nadim Shehadi. “Capitulate or Escalate.” *The World Today* 62.10 (Oct. 2006): 9-11, 10. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 22 Feb 2010. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40477658>>

After his assassination Rafiq's son, Sa'ad Hariri, has taken the reins as top Saudi-patron in Lebanon. This hereditary succession is often typical of patronage systems, especially in the Lebanese *zuama* clientelist system. "The position of *zaim* is frequently hereditary, and politics is often treated like a family business."²⁰⁷ As previously stated, Sa'ad had already taken over the reins of Saudi Oger in 1992 and, as of 2010, was ranked #536 on Forbes magazine's list of billionaires, with a net worth of \$1.9 billion and growing.²⁰⁸ He also making good on following in his fathers political footsteps by being elected Prime Minister of Lebanon in 2009, though there were also widespread accusations of gerrymandering and utilizing votes from Lebanon's large diaspora community. Sa'ad, however, has had a harder time integrating into the political scene than his father, already being ousted from power by Hizbullah in late 2010.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, it has proved impossible for Hariri to change the public opinion of him as a friend of Saudi Arabia and, as such, the United States. Though it is often popular for *Western* media to connection Hizbullah to Syria, it is highly popular amongst *Arab* media to point out Hariri's connection with his external financier. This ultimately aids in the dwindling of public confidence in him as a strong and independent political figure.

Though it is obvious that Saudi Arabian money and financial backing was the bread and butter of Sa'ad Hariri's financial success, another Saudi backed entity appears

207 "Lebanon: *Zuama* Clientilism," 1987.

208 "#536 Saad Hariri." *Forbes*. 10 March 2010. Accessed 22 Feb 2011.
<http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/10/billionaires-2010_Saad-Hariri_4R2O.html>

209 It is also necessary to mention the importance of the Saudi and American governments. Though the USA has often had its hands buried deep into regional affairs, it is allied with Saudi Arabia for both political leverage as well as economic, particularly, oil benefits.

to have funded a great deal of reconstruction during the post-war era. Headquartered in Jeddah, the Islamic Development Bank (ISDB or ISD) was one established at the hands of the Conference of Islamic States in 1974.²¹⁰ It is an international bank, with 56 member states from the Conference of Islamic States. However, Saudi Arabia appears to be the largest financier of the bank and, as such, likely one of the most dominant voices in the decisions of the bank. According to the bank's website, Saudi Arabia holds over 368,500 shares in the bank, 26.57% of the capital and subscribes over 3.5 billion Islamic Dinars to the bank.²¹¹ This is more than twice the amount of the next largest donor, Libya, who was 147,824 shares, 10.66% of the capital and subscribes just short of 1.48 billion dinars to the bank.²¹² Not to mention that the first and still current President and Chairman of the Board of Executive Directors, Dr. Ahmad Mohamed Ali Al-Madani, is a Saudi Arabian native who was born and raised in Almadinah Almunawarah.²¹³ According to Aiddata.org²¹⁴, the ISDB was a consistent contributor to the rebuilding of the Lebanese state after the civil war.

210 Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg, 2010, 243.

211 Islamic Development Bank, Accessed 4 April 2011, <<http://www.isdb.org/irj/portal/anonymous>>

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.

214 This website uses reports from both donors and recipients to gather data. Therefore, it relies completely on the willingness of the states and companies to truthfully disclose information. Unlike the ISDB and Saudi Arabia, Syria has no data available in regards to Lebanon. This does not mean that the country did not donate money but that it is not transparent in its reporting.

Table 2 Pie Chart of Saudi Financial Aid to Lebanon after 1990





Table 3 Pie Chart of ISDB Financial Aid to Lebanon after 1990



Interestingly enough, both the ISDB and the Rafiq Hariri Foundation won the King Faisal International Award in 2005 under the category of Service to Islam. Dr.

Ahmed Mohamed Ali, the then and current president of the ISDB, received the award for “his endeavors to strengthen economic ties between Islamic countries coupled with his strong support of research and training in the field of Islamic economics...”²¹⁵ Whereas the Hariri Foundation was touted for its excellence in education, involvement in the preservation of Islamic architecture as well as its support and constructed of social and health care institutes after the Lebanese Civil War.²¹⁶

215 King Faisal Foundation, Accessed 15 March 2011,
<<http://www.kff.com/EN01/KFIP/1425H2005G/KFIPWinners1STI1425H2005G.html>>

216 Ibid, <<http://www.kff.com/EN01/KFIP/1425H2005G/KFIPWinners1STI1425H2005G.html>>

CHAPTER V

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Though the Ta'if Accords were intended to bring peace to Lebanon and usher in a new era, the political and economic atmosphere has been plagued by continued instability and an overwhelming debt. The most important and monumental aspect of the Accords was the call for an end to sectarian and clientelist politics. Most scholars tend to argue that Lebanon will not function as a unified nation state or move beyond the political stalemates that have characterized its past unless it abandons the sectarian and consociational make up. At the same time, however, most scholars see that consociationalism has hardened since the end of the civil war. "In general, parties have failed to promote national integration and were not able to establish mechanisms for cooperation- except on Election Day through the formation of temporary election alliances."²¹⁷ Farid el Khazen sees the penchant for partisan politics as increasing in the post-war period. "... the margin for freedom and tolerance is no doubt narrower than that of the prewar period and... that margin has been shrinking and the political system has gradually acquired features of an authoritarian state."²¹⁸ Likewise, Hilal Khashan's book *Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind* explores the loyalty to sectarianism with university aged individuals. In regards to clientelism, Khashan found that "... many

217 Farid el Khazen. "Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Search of Partisans." *Middle East Journal* 57.4 (Autumn 2003): 605- 624, 606. *JSTOR*. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 22 Feb, 2011. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329942>>

218 Ibid, 2003, 613.

democratically and universally oriented, as well as efficacious and compromising students appear to behave according to the patron-client exchange basis.”²¹⁹ Though the study was only reflective of the youth generation, Khashan suggests that sentiments among the general population are actually more extreme, making the prospect of decommissioning the confessions in Lebanon bleak.

Lebanese citizens may not have been prepared to cast aside their sectarian identity and enter into an alliance with the same groups who had, more than likely, been involved in the murder of deaths of the family neighbors, friends and neighbors, foreign intervention exasperated these divisions. Foreign powers, particularly Syria and Saudi Arabia, all too quickly and eagerly propped up two powerful, disparate and often antagonistic groups as the two main forces in Lebanese politics. These two camps, the pro-Syrian Hizbullah centered alliance and the pro-Saudi/pro-Western Hariri center group dominated politics in the post-Ta'if period. They simultaneously tugged the country into two vastly different directions that, instead of providing the stability necessary to unify the state, served to further entrench individuals into their divisions.

The Cedar Revolution provides a powerful image of the perseverance of sectarian ties and political divisions well into the 21st century. This event is often depicted as a great turning point in Lebanese affairs, when the country united against a great foreign oppressor. In reality, however, it was far from being such an orchestrated act, instead

219 Hilal Khashan, 1992, 147.

uniting only some Christians, Sunnis and Druzes together.²²⁰ This “revolution” reflects the split between the two main political affiliations and thus the patronage systems that back them. “Washington blamed Damascus and worked closely with both France and Saudi Arabia to ratchet up diplomatic and economic pressure on the Syrian regime in order to hold it responsible before an international investigation and court of law.”²²¹ The polarization between the pro-Hariri camps, who protested his assassination and the believed puppet-master Syria, versus the pro-Syria and pro-Hizbullah camps, who protested the revolution mimics the severe split between the two main political groups that dictate the course of politics.

The effects of this moment in Lebanese history are still being felt today. In response to Hariri’s assassination in 2005 and the Cedar Revolution, the United Nations formed a special tribunal²²² to research and uncover the party or parties behind the killing. Though his assassination originally sparked an outcry against Syria, resulting in their eviction from the country, recent rumors assert that the UN will indict Hizbullah members for the assassination on the former Prime Minister. Prior to the release of these documents, all of the Hizbullah ministers serving in the government stepped down, effectively forcing the government to shut down on January 12th. This caused both the Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and the Saudi Arabian King Abdullah to visit Lebanon in hopes of finding a solution to the growing problem. As of March 2011, Najib Mikati, a pro-Syria leaning politician whose appointment was supported by Hizbullah, took over as

220 Talal Nizameddin, 2006, 97.

221 Farid el Khazen, 2003, 128.

222 المحكمة الدولية الخاصة بلبنان

Prime Minister but a full government has yet to be created. The recent events at the end of 2010 and into 2011 depict the depths to which Lebanese politics are still entrenched in the old-guard ways and have failed to move closer to a mutual understanding years later. The fact that both Syrian and Saudi Arabian officials were quick to visit Lebanon in hopes of finding a viable solution to the Lebanese political problem likewise shows the continuation of external control and influence on Lebanese politics.

There is, however, an ever-growing movement to end sectarianism among the growing youth population. Calls for true democratization are ringing out in the streets of Beirut and beyond. Truthfully, it does seem as if the moment for Lebanon to construct an effective framework for sectarianism has passed. It may have operated to some successful degree during the 1950s and 1960s and, although Lebanon still has a government that has not dissolved into total chaos since the end of the civil war, it certainly has not been effective in implementing reforms to stabilize the economy and the country. Furthermore, “the demographic, economic, political and social conditions of each one of the sects is in constant change...”²²³ This increasing abolition movement may only succeed, however, if the underlying patronage lines to foreign powers are severed. Even if Lebanon officially does away with the consociationalism, it is likely that these patron-client relations will continue to support the old guard ways.

In fact, internal parties may become stronger if they are able to flip the patron-client structure in relation to their foreign patrons. Traditionally clients are thought of as

223 Sofia Saadeh, 2007, 120.

being the underling to their great patron, forced to act on the whim of the leader.

However, if groups choose to emasculate themselves, and assert their power above that of their patron, it may be possible for them to better conduct internal affairs. This sort of relationship is easily visible through the Hizbullah-Syria connection. Though Syria has often held a great deal of influence over Hizbullah, the group has more often than not tried to follow its own agenda even if it meant infringing upon the demands of Syria. This obstinacy has aided in the image of Hizbullah as the great warrior against both Israel and government corruption. The Hariris, however, have always been seen as being under the thumb of both the Saudi and American regimes. The inability for Sa'ad Hariri to recast himself as a politician free from foreign influence has served to discredit his strength as a political leader.

Continually, the recent wave of protests that have swept across the Middle East highlight the necessity for these internal clients to liberate themselves from their external patrons. As of March 2011, both Tunisia and Egypt²²⁴ have successfully overturned their governments, though the course of their political reconstruction is yet unknown. Both of these regimes had been considered to be relatively strong and able to withstand some social upheaval. The fact that protesters were able to oust President Mubarak, a man who had been in complete control over his state, from power within 18 days seriously calls into question the durability and persistence of all regimes in modern times. These protests

224 Both of these states are considered Bully Praetorian states, or ones whose "... rule rests almost exclusively on the institutional power of the military/security/party apparatus, but because these elites are not drawn from a clearly identified social formation, they are at least not unrepresentative of their relatively homogenous political communities."
Clement Henry Moore and Robert Springborg, 2010, 162.

and revolutionary movements have quickly spread from North Africa into the heart of the Middle East, with almost all regimes facing the threat of civil disobedience. The changing futures of these states could make a huge impact upon Lebanese politics. If Bashar's regime in Syria loses its hold over the country, it is very possible that its power and role in Lebanon would change. On the contrary, the robustness of the House of Saud could mean the continuation of Saudi goals in Lebanon.

APPENDIX

Table 4 Rania Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited: Who Are the Lebanese?" in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 26.2 (Nov. 1999): 219-241, 223. JSTOR. Univ. of Texas. Accessed 25 Feb 2011. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/195924>>

LEBANESE CENSUS OF 1932

السيرة الرسمية
العدد ٤٧١٨ تاريخ ١٠ / ١٩٣٢
قائمة ٥

خلاصة نتيجة الإحصاء
لسكان الجمهورية اللبنانية
التي جرى في سنة ١٩٣٢ وفقاً لقرار لجنة الإحصاء العليا

مهاجرون				مقيمون	
بعد ٣٠ آب سنة ١٩٢٤		قبل ٣٠ آب سنة ١٩٢٤			
لا يدفع	يدفع رسوم	لا يدفع	يدفع رسوم		
٣٦٢٣	١٠٨٦	٩٨١٠	٢٦٥٣	سني ١٧٨١٠٠	مقيمون ٧٩٣٣٦٦
٢٢٢٠	١٧٧٠	٤٥٤٣	٢٩٧٧	شبيسي ١٥٥٠٣٥	مهاجرون ٢٥٤٩٨٧
٢٢٩٥	١١٨٣	٣٢٠٥	٢٠٦٧	درزي ٥٣٣٣٤	اجانب ٦١٢٩٧
٢١٨٠٩	١١٤٣٤	٥٨٤٥٧	٣١٦٦٧	ماروني ٢٢٧٨٠٠	١١٠٩٩٨٠
٤٠٣٨	١٨٥٥	١٦٥٤٤	٧١٩٠	روم كاثوليك ٤٦٧٠٩	
٩٠٤١	٣٩٢٢	٣١٥٢١	١٢٥٤٧	روم ارتوذكس ٧٧٣١٢	
٥٧٥	١٧٤	١٥٧٥	١٠٧	بروتستانت ٦٨٩٩	
١٧١٨	١٤١	٦٠	١	ارمن ارتوذكس ٢٦١٠٢	
٣٧٥	٢٠	٥٠	٩	لومين كاثوليك ٥٨٩٠	
٥٤	٣	٣٤	٦	سريان ارتوذكس ٢٧٢٣	
١٠١	٦	١٩٦	٩	سريان كاثوليك ٢٨٠٣	
١٨٨	٧	٢١٤	٦	مروني ٣٥٨٨	
.	.	.	.	كلدان ارتوذكس ١٩٠	
١٩	.	٦	.	كلدان كاثوليك ٥٤٨	
٢٣٤	٥٩	٧٥٨	٢١٢	متفرقة ٦٣٦٣	
٤٦٢٩٠	٢١٧١٣	١٢٧٠٠٣	٥٩٩٨١	٧٩٣٣٦٦	
اناث	ذكور	اناث	ذكور	يسكون	
٥٤٥٥٦	٧٢٤٤٧	١٥٢٣٢	٤٤٧٤٩		
١٩٢٤	اب	قبل ٣٠	يدفع رسوم ولا يدفع قبل ٣٠	١٨٩٩٨٤	قبل اب سنة ١٩٢٤
٢٠٠٤٤	٢٦٢٤٦	٥١٣٥	١٦٥٧٨		

*Table 3 Saudi Aid Contributions to Lebanon:
1993-2008*

Year	Purpose	Amount USD
1993	Access Roads to Beirut and Main Crossings	\$18,132,880.00
1993	University of Lebanon Rehabilitation	\$14,932,960.00
1994	Maintenance of Government Buildings	\$5,866,300.00
1994	Completion of South Trans-Costal Highway	\$25,865,050.00
1994	Beirut General Hospital	\$25,065,100.00
1994	Completion of North Trans Costal Highway	\$16,532,300.00
1995	Three Hospitals for Primary Care	\$7,999,500.00
1996	Rehabilitation of Infrastructure for emigrants housing	\$4,799,160.00
1997	Rehabilitation of teachers' colleges	\$1,999,650.00
1997	Medical Equipment, Beirut Government Hospital	\$26,310,000.00
1997	Construction of Government Schools	\$4,799,160.00
1998	Miscellaneous Projects	\$100,000,000.00
1998	Establishment of three primary care hospitals	\$1,599,600.00
2002	Drinking Water Network at Al Maniah City	\$8,000,700.00
2003	Construction of Twelve Government Schools	\$7,000,612.50
2003	Al-Matn Highway	\$12,001,050.00
2005	Roads at Akar Area	\$15,000,750.00
2005	Main roads in Al-Khroub	\$11,000,550.00
2006	Albetroun-Tnwryin Road	\$7,009,353.75
2008	Construction of College Buildings at LU at Tripoli	\$15,000,018.75
	Total Saudi Contribution:	\$328,914,695.00 ²²⁵
Yearly Totals:		
1993		\$33,065,840.00
1994		\$73,328,750.00
1995		\$7,999,500.00
1996		\$4,799,160.00
1997		\$31,109,160.00
1998		\$101,599,600.00
2002		\$8,000,700.00
2003		\$19,001,662.50
2005		\$26,001,300.00
2006		\$7,009,353.75
2008		\$15,000,018.75
Contributions by Use:		
	Roads and Highways	\$105,541,933.75

²²⁵ Based on data collected from aiddata.org

Education (Universities, Schools etc)	\$43,732,401.25
Hospitals/ Health Care Facilities:	\$60,974,200.00
Utilities	\$18,666,160.00
Miscellaneous	\$100,000,000.00

*Table 5 Islamic Development Bank (ISDB) Aid Contributions to Lebanon:
1990-2007*

Year	Purpose	Amount (USD)
1990	Construction, Repairing and Equipping 3 Charitable Hospitals	\$1,106,000.00
1990	Crude Oil	\$10,000,000.00
1990	Engineering Design for Al Shariah College Beirut	\$264,000.00
1990	Construction of Secondary School Tripoli	\$282,000.00
1990	Construction of charitable complex for students	\$288,000.00
1991	Vocational School, Kharoub Region	\$280,000.00
1991	Crude Oil	\$12,000,000.00
1991	Beirut Government Hospital	\$10,000,000.00
1992	Beit Al-Zakah Hospital, Tripoli	\$270,000.00
1992	Telecommunications	\$3,950,000.00
1992	Tareek Al-Jadid Secondary School, Beirut	\$2,000,000.00
1992	Telecommunications	\$8,540,000.00
1993	Computers Center for Dar Al Fatwa	\$70,000.00
1993	Reconstruction of Schools in Southern Lebanon	\$1,000,000.00
1993	Reconstruction of Electricity Networks for Akkar Region	\$7,020,000.00
1994	Al Makassed General Hospital	\$10,000,000.00
1995	220KV Transmission Line Project	\$20,000,000.00
1995	Engineering College in the Lebanese University	\$11,000,000.00
1995	Engineering College in the Lebanese University	\$7,000,000.00
1996	Vocational and Technical Education	\$7,800,000.00
1996	Vocational and Technical Education	\$22,200,000.00
1996	2nd Emergency Aid for Reconstruction of Schools	\$1,000,000.00
2000	Taibah Water Treatment and Pumping Plant	\$12,160,000.00
2000	Scientific Education	\$9,500,000.00
2000	Refined Petroleum Products	\$15,000,000.00
2000	Refined Petroleum Products	\$25,000,000.00
2000	Reconstruction of Schools in Southern Lebanon	\$4,340,000.00
2000	Al Ghadeer Wastewater Collection and Treatment	\$22,440,000.00
2001	Lebanese University New Campus Project	\$27,000,000.00

2001	Lebanese University New Campus	\$15,000,000.00
2001	Al-Mahabba Islamic Charity Association Orphans Complex	\$180,000.00
2002	Petroleum Products	\$25,000,000.00
2002	Gas Oil	\$20,000,000.00
2002	Fuel Oil	\$4,000,000.00
2002	Medical Equipment, Beirut Government University Hospital	\$37,300,000.00
2002	Medical Equipment	\$8,300,000.00
2002	Import of Fuel, Govt of Lebanon through CDR	\$24,000,000.00
2002	Government of Lebanon	\$24,000,000.00
2002	Telephone Cables	\$13,000,000.00
2002	Telephone Cables II	\$4,270,000.00
2003	Bacharre Road Project	\$7,000,000.00
2003	Purchase of Assets from UIF & Specific Deposits	\$3,000,000.00
2003	Quarantina Slaughterhouse Project: Govt of Lebanon	\$14,600,000.00
2003	Southern Costal Highway Project	\$32,390,000.00
2003	Southwestern Beirut Infrastructure	\$37,510,000.00
2003	Construction/Reconstruction of Akkar Roads	\$9,350,000.00
2004	Reconstruction of Sour-Naquoura Road	\$12,200,000.00
2005	Petroleum Products	\$100,000,000.00
2005	Jabal Amel Water Supply	\$14,573,000.00
2005	Tripoli Infrastructure	\$43,210,000.00
2006	Eight Schools in Bekaa	\$8,900,000.00
2006	Lebanese University, Tripoli Campus	\$42,000,000.00
2006	Gross Import Trade Financing Operations	\$12,000,000.00
2007	Gross Import Trade Financing Operations	\$7,000,000.00
2007	Study/Design of the Greater Beirut Water Supply Scheme	\$4,500,000.00
	Total ISDB Contributions:	\$774,793,000.00 ²²⁶

Yearly Total:

1990	\$11,940,000.00
1991	\$22,280,000.00
1992	\$14,760,000.00
1993	\$8,090,000.00
1994	\$10,000,000.00
1995	\$38,000,000.00
1996	\$31,000,000.00
2000	\$88,440,000.00
2001	\$42,180,000.00
2002	\$159,870,000.00
2003	\$103,850,000.00
2004	\$12,200,000.00
2005	\$157,783,000.00
2006	\$62,900,000.00

²²⁶ Based on data collected from aiddata.org

2007

\$11,500,000.00

Contributions by Use:	
Roads and Highways	\$60,940,000.00
Education (Universities, Schools etc)	\$159,924,000.00
Hospitals/ Health Care Facilities:	\$66,976,000.00
Utilities	\$191,173,000.00
Miscellaneous	\$60,780,000.00
Gas/Patroleum	\$235,000,000.00

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