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**Russia's Role in the Middle East:
Russian Weapons Sales to the Syrian Arab Republic
1950-2010**

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by

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents Natalia Poltoratskaya and Vladimir Poltoratsky. Without their help I would never have been able to finish this degree.
Thank you.

Abstract

Russia's Role in the Middle East: Russian Weapons Sales to the Syrian Arab Republic 1950-2010

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2010

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In this paper I look at the evolving role of Russia in the Middle East, analyzing transfers of Russian military equipment to its main ally in the region, the Syrian Arab Republic. By using Syria as a case study, I provide insight as to the evolution of Russia's Middle Eastern policy, examine the motivations that play a role in Moscow's decision-making process and the discuss the changes that have taken place in the Middle East military landscape. My research illustrates that Russia is a prestige seeking state that is motivated my domestic issues. Furthermore, sixty years of arms transfers indicate that Russia has never sold game-changing weapons to Syria as this would be counterproductive to Moscow's main goal in the region: the brokering of a new Middle East peace deal.

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Introduction

In this paper I will look at the evolving role of Russia¹ in the Middle East, analyzing transfers of Russian military equipment to its main ally in the region, the Syrian Arab Republic. By using Syria as a case study in the region, I will provide insight as to the evolution of Russia's Middle Eastern policy and examine the motivations that play a role in Moscow's decision-making process.

Most of the theorists focusing on the foreign policy of the USSR after World War II, saw the Soviet policies as primarily driven by ideological differences with West. This difference was quite pronounced in the literature about Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, with Moscow's support for the socialist and communist parties that were sprouting up in various Middle Eastern countries, such as Iraq and Syria. Thus when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Moscow's role in the Middle East was thought to have been exhausted. Faced by a new system of government, Moscow was further crippled by the economic crisis of 1998, with the crash of the rubel, and so was clearly unable to keep its own house in order, thus the idea of influence abroad was farfetched. However with the election of Putin in 2000, Russian foreign policy began to shift and take form.

Russia is in fact still an important player in world politics and transatlantic security, particularly with regard to United States interests in the international arena. Due to the large natural gas reserves located in Russia and the fact that it

¹ Due to the time span covered by this thesis, 1950-2010, I will use the term Moscow as synonymous to both the USSR and the Russian government.

supplies 30% on Europe's energy needs, Russia plays an important role in the European economy². Russia's geographic position also lends it to be an ally for the Americans with regards to the 2001 war in Afghanistan. In 2009, Russia granted the US fly over rights for fighter jets heading to Afghanistan, but has not been allowed to get further involved in the area.³

Russia's relationship with Iran is also an important issue for a number of Western actors. While it has been rocky in the past, first due to Iran's relationship with America during the time of the Shah and then due to the anti-Communist stance of the Khomeini regime following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Russia is now one of Iran's closest allies. This relationship has been recently hampered due to President's Medvedev's veto of the sale of the S-300 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), yet Russia remains close with Iran and has the potential to act as a mediator between Iran and the West on Iran's nuclear program.

Military arms sales are of particular interest because not only is Russia now the fifth largest arms supplier in the world⁴ but it is also estimated that Russian military sales will increase by 12% in 2010⁵. Thus the Russian military establishment is going to be a major player worldwide and it is important to see how it is used by Moscow, paying particular attention not only to the quantities of

² Erlar, Gernot and Myers, Joanne J. "European energy security and the role of Russia." *The Carnegie Council*. 5 February 2007. Available at: <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5416.html>. [Last accessed on: 25 October 2010.]

³ Sims, Dimitri K. "An Uncertain Reset." *Foreign Affairs*. July 17, 2009.

⁴ SIPRI, "The SIPRI Top 100 Arms Producing Companies, 2008," c2010.

⁵ RIA Novosti, Moscow April 21, 2010.

weapons sold but also to the types of weaponry that are being sold. In my analysis, I will examine sales of large military technology, such as aircraft, naval technology and missiles as a gauge of interest in the area. I chose to use transfers of large military equipment as my independent variable because unlike small arms, such as AK-47s and other rifles, large military equipment is feasible to track. Due to the policies of the Cold War, the USSR supplied its allies, such as China, with small arms manufacturing facilities as a way of propping up the regimes. Additionally there were a number of factories built in the various Soviet republics, which has allowed these nations to continue production of Soviet arms after the disintegration of the USSR. This combined with the large weapons stockpiles left behind when the Soviet Union fell, makes it difficult to track the origin of small arms sales and distinguish between ones manufactured and sold by the Russians and those manufactured and sold by other actors.

Starting from the mid-1950, the USSR began to sell weapons to the Syrian Arab Republic as a way of securing it as an ally in the Middle East. Despite some analysts' dismissal of the role of Syria due to its stagnant economy and bloated military forces, Syria is still an important player in Middle Eastern politics, particularly with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Syria has a number of times acted as a "spoiler"⁶ in the negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but has also started independent negotiations with Israel in 2008 with

⁶ See Rubinstein, 220; Sharp, Congressional Research service, April, 26, 2010.

the aim of regaining the Golan Heights, an important strategic military area and also a abundant source of water⁷. These negotiations stalled following Israel's armed offensive in the Gaza strip in 2009, but were significant as this was the first time since 2000 that both parties met to discuss the possibility of a peace treaty. With the restart of the peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians earlier in 2010, the American government has acknowledged the pivotal role the Syrian government plays in Middle Eastern negotiations and secretary Clinton has encouraged the restart of the negotiations between Israel and Syria as a major help to the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Additionally the Syrian government is also a significant player in Lebanese politics due to the historical role of the Syria government played in Lebanon after the bombing of the American embassy in Beirut in 1983. While Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, Syria continued to have dealings with the militia group turned political party: Hezbollah.

The primary concern of this work is to look at Russian military hardware sales as an assessment of Russian influence and power in the Middle East. I focus on these sales because both the Soviet Union and its successor state Russia, have used arms sales as an instrument of foreign policy⁸. Some scholars would dispute

⁷ "Regions and territories: The Golan Heights." BBC News. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/3393813.stm. [Last accessed: 25 October 2010.]

⁸ Efrat, 1991; Taylor, 1980; Roberts, 1983.

that this is no longer the case in contemporary Russia due to the privatization of weapons companies after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, if one would look closely at the ownership of Russian arms exporters they would see that Russian companies are closely connected to the government either through overt stock ownership or through more obscure personal relationships⁹.

I will also discuss the motivations behind these transaction between Moscow and Damascus and what insight this analysis can give on Russian foreign policy. Another aspect of the study is the outcome of these sales, in terms of the power balance in the Middle East and what predictions can be made about the future of Russian policy and behavior vis-à-vis the Middle East.

I seek to address these issues in three sections. Firstly, I examine the literature dealing with Soviet and Syrian military cooperation between the years of 1950 and 2010. Many of the works written about this period focus largely on the anti-Western ideology of the USSR and look at how the Cold War conflict played out between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East. I argue that the policy of the Soviet Union at the time, to use military sales as an instrument of foreign policy, has survived the USSR. While Moscow has started to implement other methods to exert influence, it still remains a card that is used and can give insight into Moscow's true international ambitions.

⁹ Simes, Dimitri K. and Saunders, Paul J. "The Kremlin Begg to Differ." *The National Interest*. Nov-Dec 2009. Can be accessed at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-kremlin-begs-to-differ-3280> ; last accessed 10/21/10.

Secondly, I examine the literature dealing with Russian foreign policy. Looking at the importance of domestic issues, particularly prestige, for Moscow, in both the Soviet and Russian period, shed light on the reasons that the Russian government has continued to have dealings with Syria, while it has cut out other strategic regional partners, such as Iran.

Then I proceed to give a background on Russian and Syrian non-military relations and the circumstances that have led the two countries to develop military cooperation. This is followed by a discussion of the arms trade between Syria and Russia over the period of 1950 to 2010. As a comparison of Moscow's interest in the Middle East, I look at arms transactions between Egypt and the USSR. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database allows me to examine the types and amounts of transfers for most of the time period covered by this paper. The last year of the study, 2010, is not covered by the SIPRI database and so I rely on several Western News agencies to supplement my findings. I then test the hypothesis developed in the previous section, summarize my findings and discuss how Russian military trade has effected the power balance in the Middle East.

Chapter 1: Literature Review and Hypothesis

Most of the literature dealing with Moscow's role in the Middle East relies heavily on the anti-Western ideology of the Soviet Union during the time of the Cold War. In the specific discussion about the sales of weapons, a number of authors, such as Taylor, Mott, Glassman and Roberts treat weapon sales of the Soviet Union as an extension of foreign policy. Roberts goes on to describe the types of weaponry sold concentrating on the fact that Moscow had no intention of selling modern weapon to the Syrian government but was forced to do so in order to maintain its credibility as an arms supplier. Roberts argues that the USSR supplied more modern and more accurate weaponry to the Syrian government in order to compensate for the lack of proper training. In order to emphasize the fact that it was poor training as opposed to faulty equipment, which was responsible for the poor showing of the Syrian troops in the Yom Kippur War, Moscow insisted on manning the SA-5 air-defense (AD) system with their own troops until 1985, three years after the original sale¹⁰. Roberts concludes that the Soviet Union did not really achieve any significant policy goals as of 1983, and speculates that it is unlikely that the USSR will succeed in winning friends and influencing people with military sales. Instead of being able to use the weapon sales as a lever of influence against Syria, the Soviet Union became a victim of its own game. Hafez al-Assad knew that the Soviet Union could not afford to lose Syria as an ally in the Middle East and so he

¹⁰ See Appendix B.

was able to use the USSR's ideological crutch as a way of exerting reverse influence against the Soviet Union.

Like Glassman and Roberts, Kreutz argues that the Soviet Union was forced to support Syria with military sales during the 1980s if it was going to maintain relevance in the Middle East, despite Damascus' lack of desire to cooperate with Moscow on certain policy concerns. During the 1990s, Syrian-Russian relations hit a low point and Syria began looking for new allies to replace the USSR/Russia as the main arms supplier, and refusing to repay old debts for arms sales to Moscow, however these efforts did not bare fruit seeing as Syria's military is 90% Soviet stock and the introduction of equipment from new supplier would cause a compatibility issue. Much like Bourtman, Kreutz discusses Israel's growing influence in the Kremlin and that in recent years with Moscow reporting that it "only intends to sell Syria defensive weapons and spare parts to weapon systems that were supplied to Syria by the former Soviet Union"¹¹. In looking at the determinants of Russian foreign policy and its military sales to Syria, Kreutz, argues that Moscow has rekindled its links with Damascus as a way of "reentering the Middle Eastern political and diplomatic arena and laying a genuine role in the Arab-Israeli Process"¹². The same sentiment is present in Anatoliy Tsuganok's article, published in 2006, a year prior to Kreutz's book, stating that "in the opinion of many

¹¹ Kreutz, 2007.

¹² Kruetz, 2007.

experts, Syria will be responsible for restarting the dialogue with Israel, which has been at a standstill for many years.¹³”

Another focus of Soviet defense policy brought up in the literature was the issue of geographical security. In his article “Soviet Strategic Interests in the Middle East,” Alvin Rubinstein argues that the most important need that drives Soviet policy makers is the need to secure the borders to the south, which includes keeping friendly to the Soviet Union regimes in power. Like Goodman, he stresses the USSR’s need for military privileges in the Mediterranean region, at the expense of American influence in the area. While he does mention Moscow’s desire to be part of the Middle East peace process, in his opinion the goal is counter-productive, as he does not see prestige and legitimization as something that the USSR should concern itself with¹⁴. He feels that the United States was already doing a sufficient job and the presence of another superpower would just hamper the process.

Goodman states that the USSR wanted “Syria to act as spoiler in the Arab-Israeli confrontation” to prevent a peace deal from coming though¹⁵. Thus the author does not even entertain the idea that one of the goals of the Soviet Union in the region is to broker a peace deal and thus secure the prestige and legitimacy that comes with it. According to Goodman, the driving factor behind the Soviet Union’s decisions in the region was access to military facilities in the Mediterranean, the Red

¹³ Tsuganok, 2006

¹⁴ Rubinstein, 220

¹⁵ Goodman, 87.

Sea and the Indian Ocean¹⁶. By providing Syria with military assistance, Moscow in turn gained two ports on the Mediterranean, Latakia and Tartus, allowing them to expand their sphere of influence and fulfill that ever pressing need for a warm water port.

Moving into the post-Soviet period of Moscow's Middle Eastern relations, there are few authors that deal with Russian relations with that region. In his article, "Putin and Russia's Middle Eastern Policy" published in the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Ilya Bourtman looks at the new direction of Russia's Middle Eastern policy, analyzing the role of Israel and its influence on Russian policy in the region. According to him, Putin's main initiative has been to maintain parallel relations with both Israel and other Middle Eastern nations, such as Syria, the Palestinian Authority and Iran. Bourtman argues that due to greater trade with Israel, which amounts close to \$1.5 billion in direct trade and over a billion in energy deals, Israel has been successful in using its economic influence to pressure Moscow into canceling several arms deals to both Syria and the Palestinian Authority. A particular success for the Israeli government occurred in 2005 when they succeeded in convincing Russia to modify the 200 SA-18 Grouse portable SAMs, so that they would be mounted on vehicles, helicopters and ships instead of portable launchers. This modification makes the missiles easier to track and thus helped assuage Israeli fears that they would be transferred to Hezbollah without their

¹⁶ Goodman, 89

knowledge. However, Bourttman also states that Israel is increasingly depended on Russia for its energy supplies and holds far fewer cards than Russia due to this factor. Additionally, Bourttman is unable to explain Israel's lack to success in preventing Russia from dealing with Iran, who poses a bigger security threat than Syria. He suggests that this may be the result of a pro-Syrian lobby in the Kremlin, which has survived since the days of the Soviet Union with Arabists like Yevgeny Primakov¹⁷; however that still does not explain why Moscow continues to deal with Iran (a non-Arab state) on such warm terms.

Russia's special relationship with Iran can be explained through the way in which Muslims perceive Russia's stance toward Islamic peoples, particularly when viewed through the lens of Russia's Chechnya problem. Recently no party in the Middle East has spoken out against Russia's treatment of the Chechnya province, but there has been a history of tensions on the subject in their dealings with Iran. As part of Ayatollah Khomeini's pan-Islamic policy, the Ayatollah called for the liberation of the Muslim populations of the Soviet Union from beneath the thumb of the atheist government. While that rhetoric has disappeared with the Soviet Union, Moscow realizes that they need to keep Russia's image positive in that area of the world so that public opinion remains in favor of Russia.

In the literature focusing on the determinants of Moscow's Middle Eastern policy, the bulk of it talks about the role of anti-Western ideology. This emphasis on

¹⁷ Yevgeny Primakov is a Russian politician and diplomat. Before he started his political career, He served as Middle East correspondent first for the State Committee for Television and Radio (1956-1960) and then for Pravda (1960-1970).

ideology was primarily the staple of literature written during the time of the Soviet Union. While this argument was rarely applied to the Middle East after the disintegration of the USSR, since that is usually viewed as the arena of the Cold War, the argument of Russia's anti-Western ideology has resurfaced with regards to Russian foreign policy after the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000. Furthermore when scholars discuss the presidency of Medvedev, in contrast to that of Putin, they frame it in a pro-Western light. This point is emphasized in discussions of Russia's signing of sanctions against Iran, Medvedev's veto of the sale of the S-300 missile defense system to Tehran¹⁸, and the new \$400 million military deal with Israel to develop drone technology in Russia. These moves may seem to be part of a new pro-Western direction for Russian foreign policy however, Russia still has continued to work with Iran on the Bushehr nuclear facility and has gone ahead with the Yakhot anti-ship missile, the most sophisticated missiles in its class, despite objections from the West.

Another argument that has been raised as an explanation for Russian military sales in the Middle East is Russian domestic economic and defense policies. Looking at the economic aspect, the sale of military equipment both provides revenue and allows Russia to get rid of dated equipment making room for new technologies. After the fall of the Soviet Union, exports kept the Russian military

¹⁸ "Iran protests Russian Missile Cancellation." United Press International (UPI). 28 September 2010. Available at: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/09/28/Iran-protests-Russian-missile-cancellation/UPI-53401285703715/. [Last accessed: 25 October 2010]

manufacturing establishment afloat during the 1990s and still remain a large portion of what money gets spent on, as opposed to research and development¹⁹. However the financial argument does not make sense if one looks at the 2005 meeting between Bashar al-Asad and President Putin in Moscow. While the two countries did conclude a new military agreement, President Putin also forgave 73% of Syrian Cold War debts, amounting to roughly \$58 billion²⁰. Furthermore, in September 2010, President Medvedev announced that he was vetoing the sale of the S-300 missile defense system to Iran, citing UN Resolution 1929²¹ the driving force behind the decision. However not only did the veto cover the S-300 missiles, but it also extended to all other military deals with Iran, which makes it clear that there were no economic motivations as military trade with Iran amounts to about \$11-13 billion²². This veto has resulted with the Russians having to repay the \$166.8 million that Iran has already paid for the missiles.

National defense has always been a paramount concern for Russia throughout its history and it is not difficult to understand if one looks a map of Russia. Russia is a huge country that covers eleven time zones with almost no natural boundaries, except for the Arctic in the north. During the time of the Soviet

¹⁹ Oliker, 48.

²⁰ Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. "The Russian-Syrian Connection: thwarting democracy in the Middle East and the greater OSCE region: hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe," 18.

²¹ Resolution 1929 was passed on June 9, 2010 by the UN General assembly calling for the ban of sales of military hardware to Iran.

²² Kucera, Joshua. "Russia's cagey moves toward Iran and the US." Sept. 27, 2010. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62024>. Last accessed on: Oct. 23, 2010.

Union, the Russian Federation had a nice buffer zone consisting of Soviet Republics if someone chose to invade, but even during the times of the Soviet Union the issue of the “soft underbelly” always weighed heavily on Moscow’s conscience²³. Now, not only have the former Soviet provinces gained independence, but also their boarder security has not improved much with independence. This is further complicated by Russia’s shrinking population and military reforms, which in turn decreases the number of conscripted soldiers that are available to guard Russian boarders²⁴. Recently, there has been a push to both modernize the Russian army as well as change it from a largely conscripted force to a professional officer corps. This concern that Russia plays a role in Moscow’s new military cooperation with Israel. Security concerns are exacerbated by Chechen demands for independence and the armed conflict that has ensued due to Russia’s continued refusal to meet their demands.

But the primary factor in the crafting of Russian foreign policy is the issue of prestige. This phenomenon was quite often tied to Moscow’s anti-Western ideology during the time of the USSR. This issue is visible in Cynthia Robert’s discussion of Soviet pride with regards to the poor showing of Soviet weapons against US technology during the Yom Kippur War between the Arab nations and Israel. Rubinstein also mentions Moscow’s goals for prestige, however he dismisses them

²³ Glassman, 1975.

²⁴ Oliker, et al., 148.

quickly placing emphasis on the fact that the United States is sufficient in order to shepherd the Israelis and the Palestinians into a workable peace treaty.

Like ideology, the argument of prestige has resurface with the presidency of Vladimir Putin. While this quest for prestige appears to have been abandoned by President Medvedev, who wants to focus on restarting Russia's internal economy and national defense, this is in fact not the case. The most important thing that needs to be understood when dealing with Russian politics, is that foreign policy is determined by domestic necessities²⁵. This is necessary to look at the opinion of the Russian public and ascertain what the term prestige and Great Power mean to them²⁶.

In her article, "Naslediye imperii v obshestvennom soznaniyi Rossiyan," Tihonova deals with the self-awareness of the Russian public and how much importance the people ascribe to the term Great Power²⁷. Through extensive surveys conducted over a number of years she found that the Russian people do not want to return to the bi-polar world of the Cold War but instead favor a multi-polar system in which the Russian Federation is one of the major players. Furthermore her findings illustrate the fact that the Russian people linked the idea of greatness in

²⁵ Olikier, et. al., 89.

²⁶ I use the term Great power as a translation for the Russian: Великая Держава (Velikaya Derzhava)

²⁷ Tihonova's article in translations titled: "The inheritance of the empire in the collective conceptualization of the Russian people."

the international arena to a higher standard of living for Russian citizens as well as overall economic growth and prosperity²⁸

However the issue of prestige is more complex in that it is one of the issues that also has foreign determinants. It is not only sufficient for Russian citizens to consider Moscow to be working in their interests but Russia's prestige in the international arena is also determined by outside actors, in this particular case, other nation states and their perceptions of Russia.

In Noymann's article entitled, "Rossiyskoye stremleniye k velikoderzhaviyu: kak Rossiya dobilas' priznaniya Evropu,"²⁹ he argues that neither economic prosperity nor military supremacy is sufficient when it comes to the designating of a state as a Great Power. He goes on to discuss Russian history stating that despite the fact that Russia had all the makings of a Great Power as early as the 15th century but it was not recognized as such until its victory over Sweden in 1721³⁰. Nevertheless, even after this point, the European powers had reservations about Russia's qualifications for Great Power status, due to its divergence from the European model of government. He applies this argument to modern day Russia and Putin's position as stated in his 2001 New Year's annual address. He goes on to say that in today's contemporary inter-connected world, military strength is no

²⁸ Tihonova, p.114.

²⁹ Noymann's title in translation: "Russian aspirations toward Great Power status: how Russia was accepted by Europe."

³⁰ Noymann p.176

longer sufficient in order to garner respect of nations³¹. What is required to achieve the recognition of peers as a Great Power is a similarity in styles of governance.

Overall the literature focuses on the way in which Soviet, and then Russian, policy in the Middle East interacts with Israel and the United States regional interests. Authors like Glassman, Mott and Roberts see Moscow's policy to be ideologically driven and Soviet support of Syria is an expression of the anti-Israel/anti-West stance of the USSR. Bourtman's article takes a slightly different approach, stating that now that the ideological aspect of Moscow's foreign policy is gone, the Middle East is no longer an area of interest to Russia. In the foreign policy literature, the focus is on domestic issues that drive foreign policy and the importance of prestige for Russia.

I hypothesize that Russia is and always has been a prestige seeking state. I argue that during the time of the Soviet Union, this prestige-seeking behavior was incorporated into the ideological motivations of the Soviet Union. While the purpose of government policies were meant to subvert the interests of the United States, they were also meant to promote Soviet interests and importance. I use this prestige-seeking behavior to explain the reasons, which motivated the sale of military technology to Egypt and Syria as a means of reassuring them that the USSR was a strong and capable ally who would support that Arab governments in their struggle against Israel and was very interested in resolving the Palestinian question.

³¹ Noymann p.176

However the ideological bent of the Soviet policies proved to be counterproductive by limiting the actors with whom the USSR could deal.

With the end of the Cold War, Moscow has lost its Great Power status and is now seeking to regain its standing in the international arena. However it has become obvious to Russia that military supremacy is no longer enough in order to be considered a Great Power. Now in order to achieve this status, a country needs to be a leader as part of international bodies that proposes and implements policy and while Russia is part of both the UN Security Council and the G-8, it has a reputation for achieving its goals through veto power as opposed through proposing legislation. Furthermore, in order to be considered a Great Power there needs to be some consideration given to international opinion since in no one considers Russia a Great Power but Russia itself, that does not go far in achieving Russia's aims. And while Russia is now more open to Western opinions, it will only agree to implement a policy that is in line with its domestic interests. To this day, Russia uses military sales to foreign nations, such as Syria, to garner respect and influence.

In the next section, I will test this hypothesis by looking at the types and amounts of military hardware sold by the USSR and later Russia to the Syrian Arab Republic.

Chapter 2: Evidence and Analysis

In this chapter, I will give a brief history of Russian and Soviet relations with Syria and Egypt and move on to discuss the military cooperation between the three nations. In order to provide perspective on the Soviet interest in Syria, I will first discuss Russian-Egyptian arms sales from the 1950 to 2010 and a similar description of military trade between Syrian and the USSR will follow. I will then compare the way in which the Soviet Union dealt with both of the Middle Eastern nations and summarize my findings addressing the Soviet Union's main objective in the Middle East. I argue that the USSR's goal was to gain the ability to use these sales as leverage in the Arab nations in order to bring them to the negotiating table with Israel and bring about a solution to Israeli-Palestinian issue and gain the international prestige that would come in doing so.

Russian and Soviet relations with Syria and Egypt

Russian interest in the Middle East, particularly Syria, predates the creation of the modern nation states, which came into being after the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. Originally Russian interests in Syria came about due to a large number of Russian pilgrims traveling through the area on their way to Palestine. En route they stopped at several holy sights in this region and this led to

the establishment of the Imperial [Russian] Orthodox Society in Damascus. Despite the fact that the Society's main objective was to see to the welfare of Russian pilgrims, most of its efforts were put into establishing schools in Syria and thus solidifying Russian ties with the region.

After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Union, there was a break in Russian-Syrian relations, but Moscow moved to reestablish them in 1944, two years before the country achieved independence from the French mandate. The interest of the Soviet Union in Syria was a response to several factors. The primary point of interest was the partial success of the Syrian Socialist Party (the Ba'ath Party) and the strength of the Syrian Communist Party, which was closely followed by the issue of growing Western influence in other Middle Eastern nations, particularly US support of Israel³². Syria's anti-Israeli stance also appealed to the Soviet Union as it was viewed as an extension of anti-Western sentiment and brought the two countries closer together³³. Another attractive factor about Syria was its large size and strategic position in the Middle East, bordering Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan.³⁴

Before Hafez al-Assad came to power in November 1970, there were no specific policy goals espoused by the Syrian government. This lack of policy can be easily understood through the numerous coups that took place in Syria after its

³² Freedman,19.

³³ Mott, 2001; Glassman, 1975.

³⁴ Prior to the creation of Israel in 1948, Syria bordered the Palestinian Mandate.

independence. This “political merry-go-round” made it easy for the Soviet Union to gain a foothold as Syria’s ally³⁵. However this emphasis on revolutionary rhetoric that the USSR found so appealing did not last. However, despite Syria’s attractive strategic qualities, it was not the USSR’s first choice for an alliance in the region.

The more attractive ally for Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East was Egypt. Due to its position straddling the Suez Canal, Egypt would be an invaluable for the Russian military. The Suez Canal would allow the Soviet navy access to the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the south Pacific greatly increasing the USSR’s sphere of influence. Despite the relative weakness of the Egyptian communist party the significant strategic benefits of having Egypt as an ally propelled Soviet cooperation with Egypt. The USSR’s wanted to keep up relations with Egypt, but there was a break between the two countries in 1961 due to increased repression of the Egyptian communist movement by President Gamal Abdel Nasser. However following a change in the Soviet Union leadership, there was a reapproachment between the two nations in 1964. Following Nasser’s death in September 1970, relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly. In 1972, President Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet advisers from Egypt and even though this did not completely end Soviet-Egyptian relations, it moved Egypt further away from the USSR. In 1976, Egypt canceled the Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Treaty and in 1979, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel and was firmly placed in the Western camp.

³⁵ Howard,150.

Since the USSR recognized it would not be able to leverage its arms sales against Egypt, as Sadat was on good terms with the West, the Soviet Union saw no need to provide Egypt with additional shipments. Furthermore, the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was already signed and therefore the USSR could not achieve its main goal of brokering a peace deal between the two nations. Thus the Soviet Union turned to Syria who was more isolated than Egypt allowing the Soviet Union to act as the sole powerful ally and exert influence over Syrian foreign policy. Also Syria had no peace treaty with Israel, which would allow the USSR to fulfill its main objective for Soviet Middle Eastern policy.

The Soviet Union's role, as chief arms supplier was an integral part of Soviet-Middle Eastern foreign policy. "Not merely designed as a method for excluding Western influence from the Middle East, Soviet military aid and logistical support of President Assad's (Alawai) military power base is additionally recognized as an essential ingredient in maintaining a sympathetic 'progressive' regime in power"³⁶. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was not Hafez al-Assad's number one fan, Moscow was still afraid that if the Assad regime was not properly buttressed, it would be overthrown by an anti-Soviet group and the USSR would lose its foothold in the area. This fear combined with the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, left Syria to act as the USSR's sole influential ally in the region, and between 1971 and 1980, Soviet economic and technical assistance to Syria tripled.

³⁶ Taylor, 1980.

Arms Sales between the USSR and Egypt

The first arms orders were placed in response to the Gaza Raid conducted by Israel on February 28, 1955, which left 38 Egyptian soldiers and 8 Israeli troops dead³⁷. Also known as *Operation Black Arrow*, the raid was meant to bypass the Egyptian forces stationed in Gaza and target the water tower and railroad station but the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) stumbled onto Egyptian troops. While Nasser resisted pressure from the Egyptian army to stage a counterattack, he did accept a massive shipment of Soviet technology³⁸. Among the technology that was provided to him were 100 MiG-17/ Fresco planes, which had corrected some of the problems that the MiG-15 experienced at higher altitudes³⁹.

Following the 1956 conflict with Israel, the Egyptian government acquired a large arsenal of Soviet technology, including fire control radar, Il-28 bomber aircraft, and eight submarines. The Egyptian air force was updated with 80 MiG-19 Farmer fighter jets in 1958-1959. The trade registers continue in this tone, emphasizing large military hardware, such as aircraft, naval ships and submarines until 1970. Starting in 1970, a shift can be seen in the technology that the Soviet Union was willing to sell the Egyptian government. The equipment delivered that year consisted primarily of defensive technology, including 100 reconnaissance aerial

³⁷ Howard, 141; Oren, 25.

³⁸ Ibid; see Appendix C.

³⁹ "MiG-17 Fresco." [GlobalSecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-17.htm). Available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-17.htm>. [last accessed: 12 Aug 2010.]

vehicles. From that point onward in the Soviet-Egyptian the focus shifts to air-to-air missiles and the acquisition of new radar systems that the Egyptians severely needed. The plains that Egypt does receive are actually an older model than was previously shipped⁴⁰. The last transactions that occurred between the Soviet Union and Egypt happened in 1974, at which point there was no further trade until 1994 when the Russian Federation sold Egypt another air search radar system and a handful of anti-tank missiles. Then starting in 1999, Egypt received two new SAM systems followed by the sale of portable SAMs in order to modernize the old ZSU-23 anti aircraft gun⁴¹.

Arms Sales between Syria and the USSR/Russia

As with the trade with Egypt, the first shipment of arms occurred in 1955 with 20 Yak-11 trainer aircraft. This shipment was followed by 25 MiG-15s delivered between 1955 and 1956. The MiG-15 was a state of the art aircraft that was primarily designed for dogfights, although it had maneuvering problems at high altitudes. This shipment of fighter jets was supplemented by a shipment of transport aircraft and helicopters in 1958. Looking at the sales, during those five years, it becomes obvious that they were all offensive in nature and meant to

⁴⁰ In 1967 Egypt received MiG-19 but in 1971 Russia ships them MiG-17s instead.

⁴¹“ZSU-23-4 *Shilka* 23mm Antiaircraft Gun.” [GlobalSecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/zsu-23-4.htm). Available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/zsu-23-4.htm>. [last accessed 10 October 2010.]

provide the Syrian army with the ability to engage the Israeli forces on the battlefield.

Throughout the early 1960s of the arms trade, there are a few bombers shipped and some anti-ship missiles, but it is not until 1967 when the USSR begins to supply large quantities of weaponry. There are 500 mobile rocket launchers ordered by the Syrian in 1967, which were delivered between 1967 and 1969. This weaponry is supplemented by a S-75 Dvina SAM system, as a way to counter Israeli airpower. This missile defense system was exceptionally important for Syria due to Syria's loss of the Golan Heights to Israel in the 1967 Six Day War. The loss of this strategic position, resulted in Syria's need to compensate by getting more military technology to balance out Israel's military superiority and protect its air space.

Leading up to the Yom Kippur War of 1973, there were more deliveries of fighter jets including forty Su-7B fighter ground attack aircraft, 10 MiG-17s, and 25 MiG-21 PFMs. These shipments were followed by further sales of offensive aircraft, bolstered by the 2K12 Kvadrat SAM system, which was procured by Syria in 1973. Following the losses in the Yom Kippur War, the USSR replaced much of Syria's lost hardware. There were 50 new MiG-21 PFMs and another 86 MiG-21MFs, the first third generation aircraft in the Russian arsenal, delivered in 1974⁴². This pattern of supplying Syria with offensive weaponry continues through the 1970s.

⁴² "MiG-21 Fishbed." [GlobalSecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-21.htm). Available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-21.htm>.

In 1982, the USSR supplied the Syrian army with everything it could desire including 50 new MiG-23 MLDs and 15 MiG-25 PDs, which despite its outdated radar was a very impressive aircraft⁴³. Following the 1982 War in Lebanon, the USSR continued to resupply Syria's stores with various types of missiles, including surface-to-surface, anti-tank and anti-ship, but mostly focusing on air-to-air ones. In 1986, Syria once again updated its aircrafts through a shipment of 48 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters, a mere six years after they appeared in the Soviet air force⁴⁴. The MiG-29 had a much improved radar system over the MiG-25 and the two fins gave it greater stability in the air, making it comparable to some Western aircraft of the time⁴⁵.

As is to be expected the relationship between Moscow and Damascus changed with the fall of the Soviet Union. Starting in 1992 until the meeting between Putin and Assad in 2005, the technology that was supplied by Russia consisted primarily of spare parts and SAMs that were modified at the behest of Israel and the United States⁴⁶. After the 2005 meeting in Moscow, the Russian government agreed to provide Syria with a new mobile air-defense (AD) system but has yet to complete making deliveries and the new MiG 31M/Foxbat-B modernized fighter aircraft which were ordered in 2007, had yet to be delivered three years

⁴³ "MiG-25 Foxbat." [GlobalSecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-25.htm) Available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-25.htm>.

⁴⁴ "MiG-29 Fulcrum." [Global Security.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-29.htm). Available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-29.htm>.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ See Appendix B.

later. Tsuganok's article sheds some light on this development in that he points out toward the end of his article that while Moscow and Syria have reached a new stage in their relationship. Moscow is worried that Syria will place unnecessary roadblocks on the road to mutual friendship by not fulfilling its part of the bargain and seeking to diversify its military arsenal⁴⁷.

Comparison of Syria and Egypt

Upon examination of the military trade history concerning the arms transfers between the Soviet Union/Russian to Syria and Egypt from 1950 to 2009, several interesting patterns emerge⁴⁸. The first arms transfers from the Soviet Union took place in 1955 to both nations and both Syria and Egypt were provided with modern weaponry however there were some differences in the relations between Soviet-Syrian and Soviet-Egyptian relations. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Egypt was definitely the favored partner for the Soviet Union. Prior to the mid-1970s when Syria received more modern technology, such instances were the result of breaks in Soviet-Egyptian relations. This pattern can be seen in the transfers for 1961 and 1964. Once Egypt had negotiated a disarmament with Israel with the help of the

⁴⁷ Tsuganok, 2006; Podtserob, 2008.

⁴⁸ Unfortunately the SIPRI database did not have data from 1994-1997, to my analysis will assume that no new equipment was sold during the span of those four years.

United States in 1974, the USSR backed off and had no choice but to increase its support of Syria⁴⁹.

Despite the fact that Hafez al-Assad did not cooperate with Soviet policy regarding a number of issues, such as the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Middle Eastern politics or want to take part in a talks with Israel, the USSR continued to deal with him⁵⁰. The USSR knew that its perceived control over Syrian politics was the only way that either the US or Israel would allow the USSR to take part in a bilateral conference dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian issue, thus the Soviets had no choice but to continue their support of Syria. Due to the its ideological stance, the USSR was very limited in whom it could deal. This lack of success on the diplomatic arena was complicated by the lack of Arab victories on the battlefield. In order to not lose face and reassure the international community that the Soviet military hardware was comparable to US technology, the Soviet Union continued to supply Syria with increased quantities of modern arms.

Once the Soviet Union fell, Russia no longer had the monetary ability to supply the Syrian government with massive amounts of equipment and prestige was moved to the back of Moscow's agenda. Syria's refusal to repay Soviet debts and its desire to diversify its military holdings led to a halt in Russian-Syrian relations until Bashar al-Assad's visit to Russia in 2005. By that point in time, the Russian economy had recovered from earlier problems and President Putin was ready to reaffirm

⁴⁹ Cleaveland, 377.

⁵⁰ Norton, 267.

Russia's role in the international arena. In order to restart the relationship with Damascus, he forgave 73% of Syria's Cold War debts and two years later the two countries concluded a new military contract to provide Syria with MiG-31s and a shipment of Yakhot anti-ship missiles. While there has been some controversy surrounding both sales, in early 2010, the Russian government announced that they would go ahead with the sale of the Yakhot missiles in spite of concerns voiced by the Israeli government that the missiles would fall into the hands of Hezbollah. Due to their low flying altitude and speed, they are virtually undetectable by radar, making them difficult to intercept⁵¹. Russia's pursuit of Syria as a partner in the Middle East is a result of the belief that Syria is still central to the prospect of peace in the Middle East and this alliance is a way for Russia to be part of possible bilateral talks in the future.

⁵¹ "Rossiyskii yakhotu v Sirii, ili o chom zabuvaet Izrael' i Seshea." [Russian Yakhots in Syria, or what Israel and the USA are forgetting about.] Pravda.ru. 21 September 2010. Available at: <http://www.pravda.ru/world/asia/middleeast/21-09-2010/1050400-yahont-0/>. [last accessed: 27 September 2010.]

Chapter 3: Conclusions and Analysis

As has been illustrated in the previous chapter, Moscow still has a vested interest in Syria and has continued to this day to use arms transactions as an extension of foreign policy. In this chapter I briefly review my findings from the previous chapter and then I will address how these arms sales have impacted the balance of power in the Middle East.

Summary: Evidence and Analysis

Moscow has a long history of involvement in the Middle East and this paper examines one of the ways in which Moscow's foreign policy has affected this area of the world. In my research I found Moscow's weapons sales to the Middle East to be motivated by prestige seeking behavior.

Throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s, the Soviet government continued to supply both Egypt and Syria with weaponry, however Egypt was most definitely the preferred partner. While the lack of policy goals for the Syrian government throughout the 1950s and 1960s made it easy for the USSR to gain influence through weapon's sales, the political turnover was so rapid that there was essentially no need to sell a great amount of weapons to gain the necessary outcome of an ally. Influence in Egypt meant getting access to the Suez Canal and would allow Soviet ships to pass through the canal and gain access to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, extending the USSR's influence into the Gulf region and the south

Pacific. However President Sadat chose to move the Egyptian government away from the Soviet Union and the relationship deteriorated throughout the 1970s and finally came to complete halt in 1974, when Egypt signed a disarmament pact with Israel. At that point the USSR could no longer pursue its objective to negotiate a peace deal between the two nations, and so arms shipments ceased.

The Syrian government was provided weapons until the fall of the Soviet Union at which point Moscow was no longer in a financial position to continue its aid. At that point in time, Russia's economic situation took precedence over the need to gain international prestige. However as part of President Putin's agenda, military transfers restarted in 2005 after a meeting with President Bashar al-Assad. These arms sales are supported by the widespread opinion in Russia that Syria is an essential player in the Middle East peace process.

Also due to the fact that the main goal for Russian policy in the Middle East is to achieve a peace treaty between Israel and Syria, Moscow has been very careful to not sell Syria any game-changing weaponry. This is evident in several recent transactions between Syria and Russia. The 200 Igla portable SAMs that were delivered in 2006, were modified for use on vehicles, helicopters and ships at the behest of Israel, making them easier to track. Furthermore, the four MiG 31M/Foxhound-B fighter aircraft that were ordered as part of the same military agreement in 2007 have yet to be delivered⁵². The modernized aircraft would come

⁵² Two of the Foxhound-B aircraft were meant for spare parts for the other aircraft; there is also some discrepancy over the number of Foxhound-B plains that were ordered. The SIPRI database has

with 5th generation aircraft, which would be a significant upgrade from the MiG-29 fighters that were delivered to Syria between 1987 and 1988⁵³. Additionally Russia has also refused to provide Syria with the S-300 missiles defense system and instead supplied Damascus with the Pantsyr-S1, which is an older outdated model⁵⁴.

Further Implications of Research

After the Soviet Union fell in 1991, it took Moscow about a decade to recover from the crisis of losing its empire and reform its policy in a post-Cold War world. The loss of the Soviet empire was accompanied by a loss of prestige in the international community and the loss of Great Power status, something that Russia has been in the process of regaining for the past twenty years. During the years immediately following the fall of the USSR, the loss of prestige was associated with a divergence from the “civilized” Western world but President Putin corrected this direction in Russian political thinking in 2001 when he emphasized Russia’s role throughout history as a Great Power⁵⁵. Since then, Russia has been steadily rebuilding its role as an arms supplier and using those arms to regain the trust of past allies. Syria however is not the only country to whom Russia sells military hardware. One of the largest recipients of Russian military technology is India, a fast growing economy.

the number at four (two of which are for spare parts) but several news articles have the number to be as high as eight.

⁵³ Some MiG-29UB trainer aircraft were included in that order.

⁵⁴ Podtserob, 2009.

⁵⁵ Noyman, 179.

Additionally during the past year, the Russian navy has spent a lot of effort to expand arms trade with the Gulf States, attending two military exhibitions in 2010. In spite of the recent economic crisis, the Gulf states still have large amounts of money to spend on defense technologies and the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) looking to increase spending on military technology by 20% in 2010⁵⁶. While it is obvious that Russian sales to Syria are an attempt to gain access into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, one wonders what is motivating Moscow's desire to break into the Gulf arms market. Is it solely the result of economics? Or is this motivated by a desire to gain prestige in another area of the Middle East?

Russia's relationship with Iran is also very controversial. For most of 2009, Russia has insisted that it would go ahead with the sale of the S-300 AD system, a highly sophisticated missile defense system that is intended for the protection of high value targets. There were several delays to the delivery of the missiles but Moscow seemed to hold firm in the face of criticism from the United States and Israel. In September 2010, though President Medvedev announced the cancellation of the sale despite the fact that Iran had already put forth a portion of the money for the technology⁵⁷.

⁵⁶ "GCC arms race? An issue of safety and stability?" The Peninsula (Qatar). 6 October 2010. Available at: <http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/q/55-khalid-al-jaber/128219-gcc-arms-race-an-issue-of-safety-and-stability.html>. [last accessed: 10 October 2010].

⁵⁷ "Iranian legislator wants Russia to be sued over missile contract." *CNN International*. 11 October 2010. Available at: <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/10/11/iran.russia.missiles/>. [last accessed: 11 October 2010]

Despite Tehran's displeasure with Moscow's decision to provide military technology, there is continued cooperation between the two countries on the Bushehr nuclear facility, which, much like the missile sale, is being criticized by the West. I would argue that this move on Russia's behalf is a way of inserting itself into another internationally important issue to raise its credibility as a leader. But Russia has a long road ahead of it if it wants to regain Iran's trust enough to act as a go-between for Tehran and the West.

Appendix A

Acronyms

AD	Air Defense
APC	Armored personnel carrier
ASW	Anti-submarine warfare
AV	Armored vehicle
BVRAAM	Beyond visual range air-to-air missile
FAC(M)	Forward Air Control (military)
FAC(T)	Forward air control (tank)
FGA	Fighter ground attack
HE	High-explosive
IFV	Infantry fighting vehicle
MRL	Mobile rocket launcher
SAM	Surface-to-air missile
SRAAM	Short-range air-to-air missile
SSM	Surface-to-surface missile
UAV	Unmanned airborne vehicle

Appendix B: Transfers of aircraft, naval technology and missiles from USSR/Russia to Syria from 1950-2009

Year	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Yr of order	Yr of delivery	No. produced	Comments
2009	36	96K9 Pantsyr-S1	Mobile AD system	2006	2008-09	18	part of \$400-730 m. deal; no. could be as high as 50
	850	9M311/SA-19 Grison	SAM	2006	2008-09	350	part of \$400 m. deal; for Pantsyr AD system
		9K40 Buk/SA-17	SAM system	2007			
		9M317/SA-17 Grizzly	SAM	2007			
	2	MiG 31M/Foxhound-B	fighter aircraft	2007			Modernized before delivery; possibly reconnaissance version; 2 more for spare parts; status uncertain
2008	SAME AS 2009						
2007	SAME AS 2009						
2006	200	Igla/SA-18 Grouse	Portable SAM	2005	2006	200	For use on vehicles/hicopters/ships instead of portable launchers after Israeli and US pressure
2005	1500	9M 119/AT-11 Sniper	Anti-tank missile	1998	2000-05	1500	For modernized T-72 tank
	500	9M 131/AT-13 Saxhorn	Anti-tank missile	1998	2000-05	500	
2004	SAME AS 2005						
2003	SAME AS 2005						
2002	SAME AS 2005						
2001	SAME AS 2005						
2000	SAME AS 2005						
1999	SAME AS 2005						
1998	1000	9M 133 Komet/ AT-14	Anti-tank missile	1998	1998-99	1000	
1994-97	NO DATA						

1993	149	V-46	Diesal engine (AV)	1991	1992-93	139	for 149 T-72 M1 tanks
1992		SAME AS 1993					
1991		SAME AS 1993					
1990	20	Su-24MK/Fencer D	bomber aircraft	1988	1990	20	possibly more ordered than delivered
	2	Ka-27PL/ Helix-A	ASW helicopter	1988	1990	2	Ka-28 version
1989	2300	BMP-1	IFV	1977	1977-89	2300	
	1250	T-72	tank	1978	1979-89	1250	
	2000	9M 111/AT4 Spigot	Anti-tank missile	1980	1981-89	2000	incl. for BRDM-2 tank destroyer
	1500	Strela-3/SA-14 Gremlin	Portable SAM	1985	1987-89	1500	
1988	43	9K33 Osa/SA-8	mobile SAM system	1982	1982-88	43	
	1500	9M33/SA-18 Gecko	SAM	1982	1982-88	1500	incl. replacing missiles used in Lebanon in 1982 against Israel
	36	BM-22/9P140 Uragan	MRL	1986	1987-88	36	
	48	MiG-29/Fulcrum-A	fighter aircraft	1986	1987-88	48	incl. some MiG-29UB version
	200	R-27/AA-10 Alamo	BVRAAM	1986	1987-88	200	for MiG-29 jets
	1000	R-60/AA-8 Aphid	SRAAM	1986	1987-88	1000	for MiG-23MF/BN & MiG29
	50	9M79/SS-21 Scarab	SSM	1987	1988	50	
	100	BMP-2	IFV	1987	1987-88	100	
	6	OTR-21/SS-21	SSM launcher	1987	1988	6	
1987	36	P-35/SS-C1 Sepal	Coast defense missiles	1986	1987	36	
	6	SS-C-1 Sepal	Coast defense system	1986	1987	6	
1986	550	Strela-1/SA-9 Gaskin	SAM	1978	1980-87	550	
	99	AI-25/DV-2	Turbofan	1979	1980-86	99	for combat aircraft
	290	2S1 122mm	self-propelled gun	1981	1982-86	290	no. delivered could be more than 400
	4	9K37 Gang/SA-11	SAM system	1983	1986	4	
	400	9M38/SA-11 Gadfly	SAM	1983	1986	400	
	6	4K40/SS-C-3 CDS	Coast defense system	1984	1985-86	6	
	60	9K35 ZREB-BD/SA-13	Mobile SAM System	1984	1985-86	60	
	400	9M113/AT-5 Spandrel	Anti-tank missiles	1984	1984-87	400	
	96	P-15M/SS-N 2CStyx	Anti-ship missiles	1984	1985-86	1500	

1985	50	Mi-24D/Mi-25/Hind-D	Combat helicopter	1979	1980-85	50	
	250	R-40/AA-6 Acrid	BVRAAM	1979	1980-85	250	for MiG-25 Combat aircraft
	60	Su-22/Fitter-H/J/K	FGA aircraft	1979	1979-85	60	Incl. some Su-22 combat aircraft
	2000	9M111/AT-4 Spigot	anti-tank missiles	1980	1981-89	2000	incl. for BRDM-2 tank destroyer
	290	2S1 122mm	Self-propelled gun	1981	1982-85	290	No. could be up to 400
	55	S3 152mm	Self-propelled gun	1981	1982-85	55	
	43	9K33 OSA/SA-8	Mobile SAM system	1982	1982-88	43	
	1500	9M33/SA-8 Gecko	SAM	1982	1982-88	1500	Incl. replacing missiles used in Lebanon 1982 against Israel
	4	Big Back	Air search radar	1982	1982-85	4	for use with 8 SA-5c SAM system
	50	MiG-23ML/Flogger-G	Fighter aircraft	1982	1983-85	50	MiG-23MLD version
	1250	R-13S/AA-25 Atoll	SRAAM	1982	1982-85	1250	for various combat aircraft
	400	R-23R/T/AA-7 Apex	BVRAAM	1982	1982-85	400	for MiG-23MF/MLD combat aircraft
	8	S-200 Angara/SA-5	SAM system	1982	1982-85	8	delivered in reaction to Israeli success in attacks on Syrian forces in Lebanon; manned by Soviet troops until 1985
	96	S-200/SA-5 Gammon	SAM	1982	1982-85	96	
	6	140mm RL	Naval MRL	1983	1984-85	6	on 3 ex-Soviet Navy Polnocny B Type landing ships
	15	MiG-25PD/Foxbat-E	fighter aircraft	1983	1984-85	15	
	6	4K40/SS-C-3 CDS	Coast defense system	1984	1985-86	6	
60	9K35 Zreb-BD/SA-13	Mobile SAM system	1984	1985-86	60		
400	9M113/AT-5 Spandrel	Anti-tank missiles	1984	1984-87	400		

	2	Mi-14PL/Haze-A	ASW helicopter	1984	1984-85	20	possibly incl. coms Mi-14PS SAR version
	96	P-15M/SS-N-2C Styx	Anti-ship missiles	1984	1985-86	96	P-20 (SS-C-3) version for coast defense system
	1500	Strela-1/SA-13 Gopher	SAM	1984	1985-86	1500	
1984	4	Long Track	Air search radar	1982	1983-84	4	
	4	Osa/Type-205	FAC(M)	1982	1982-84	4	Osa-2 version
	32	P-15M/SS-N-2C Styx	Anti-ship missiles	1982	1982-84	32	for Osa-2 Class FAC
	2	PRV-9/Thin Skin	Height-finding radar	1982	198-84	2	
1983	15000	Strela-2/SA-7 Grail	Portable SAM	1969	1970-83	15000	Incl. some SA-N-5 naval version
	25	Mi-8T/Hip-C	Helicopter	1978	1979-83	25	
	5	VR-3 REIS	UAV	1980	1981-83	5	
	10	MiG-25RB/Foxbat-B	Reconnaissance aircraft	1981	1982-83	8	Incl. 2 MiG-25PU/RU version
	50	9M79/SS-21 Scarab	SSM	1982	1983	50	
	45	MiG23ML/Flogger-G	Fighter aircraft	1982	1982-83	45	Probably incl. some MiG-23UB
	6	OTR-21/SS-21 Scarab	SSM launcher	1982	1983	6	
1982	350	5V27/SA-3B Goa	SAM	1981	1982	350	
	20	Mi-2/Hoplite	Helicopter	1981	1981-82	20	
	10	S-125M/SA-3B	SAM system	1981	1981-82	10	
	4	Osa/Type-205	FAC(M)	1982	1982-84	4	Osa-2 version
	32	P-15M/SS-N-2C Styx	Anti-ship missiles	1982	1982-84	32	
1981	20	9K33 Osa/SA-8	Mobile SAM system	1977	1979-81	20	
	650	R-13S/AA-25 Atoll	SRAAM	1977	1977-81	650	for MiG-23BN, Su-20 and MiG21 MF combat aircraft
	30	2K12 Kvadrat/SA-6A	SAM system	1978	1978-81	30	
	1800	3M9/SA-6 Gainful	SAM	1978	1978-81	1800	
	600	9M33/SA-8 Gecko	SAM	1978	1979-81	600	
	45	MiG-23BN/Flogger-H	FGA aircraft	1978	1979-81	45	
	550	Strela-1/SA-9 Gaskin	SAM	1978	1980-87	550	
	150	BM-21 Grad 122mm	MRL	1979	1980-82	150	
	250	R-40/AA-6Acrid	BVRAAM	1979	1980-85	250	for MiG-25
	60	Su-22/Fitter-H/J/K	FGA aircraft	1979	1979-85	60	Incl. some Su-22U/UM version
	2000	9M111/AT-4 Spigot	Anti-tank missiles	1980	1981-89	2000	Incl. for BRDM-2 tank destroyer

	8	M-240 240mm	Mortar	1980	1981	8	
	5	VR-3 REIS	UAV	1980	1981-83	5	
1980	4	An-26/curl	Transport aircraft	1977	1979-80	4	
	50	Mi-24D/Mi-25/Hind-D	Combat helicopter	1979	1980-85	50	
	20	MiG-25P/Foxbat-A	fighter aircraft	1979	1979-80	20	incl. MiG-25PU version
1979	6	Osa/Type-205	FAC(M)	1977	1978-79	6	Osa-2 version
	48	P-15M/SS-N-2C Styx	Anti-ship missiles	1977	1978-79	48	For Osa-2 Class FAC
1978	10000	9M14M/AT-3 Sagger	Anti-tank missiles	1968	1969-78	10000	Incl. for BRDM-2 Saffer tank destroyer
	400	ZSU-23-4 Shilka	SPAAG	1972	1972-78	400	
	2300	BMP-1	IFV	1977	1977-89	2300	
	650	R-13S/AA-2S Atoll	SRAAM	1977	1977-81	650	for MiG-23BN, Su-20 and MiG-21MF combat aircraft
	6	Luna-M/FROG-7	SSM launcher	1978	1978	6	
1977	30	MiG-21MF/Fishbed-J	fighter aircraft	1975	1977	30	
1976	NO NEW SHIPMENTS OF MISSILES OR AIRCRAFT OR NAVAL TECHNOLOGY						
1975	1000	BRDM-2	Reconnaissance AV	1968	1969-75	1000	
	400	BTR-50	APC	1973	1973-75	400	
	500	BTR-60PB	APC	1973	1973-75	500	
	225	R-23R/T/AA-7 Apex	BVRAAM	1973	1974-75	225	for MiG-23MF combat aircraft
	12	Top Bow	Fire control radar	1973	1974-75	12	For use with 50SM-4-1 130mm guns
	4	9K31/SA-9 Gaskin	Mobil SAM system	1974	1975	4	
	52	MiG-23MS/Flogger-E	fighter aircraft	1974	1974-75	52	
	2	Petya-2	Corvette	1974	1975	2	Petya-3 version
	312	R-12R/AA-2C Atoll-C	SRAAM	1974	1974-75	208	for MiG-23MF combat aircraft
	60	Strela-1/SA-9 Gaskin	SAM	1974	1975	60	
1974	1100	5V27/SA-3B Goa	SAM	1972	1972-74	1100	
	30	S-125M/SA-3B	SAM system	1972	1972-74	30	
	30	Su-20/Fitter-C/F	FGA aircraft	1972	1973-74	30	
	200	3M11/AT-2a Swatter	Anti-tank missiles	1973	1973-74	200	
	2000	3M9/SA-6 Gainful	SAM	1973	1973-74	2000	Incl. replacement for missiles used in 1973 October War

	18	9P117/SS-1 Scud TEL	SSM launcher	1973	1974	18	
	2	An-24/Coke	Transport aircraft	1973	1974	2	
	9	Ka-25/Hormone-A	ASW helicopter	1973	1974	9	
	86	MiG-21MF/Fishbed-J	fighter aircraft	1973	1973-74	86	delivered to replace losses of 1973 October War
	50	MiG-21PFM/Fishbed-F	fighter aircraft	1973	1974	50	delivered to replace losses of 1973 October War
	1	P-4	FAC(T)	1973	1974	1	
	840	R-12R/AA-2C Atoll-C	SRAAM	1973	1973-74	840	for MiG-21MF combat aircraft
	72	R-17/SS-1c Scud-B	SSM	1973	1973-74	72	No. delivered could be over 200
	3	Komat/Type-183	FAC(M)	1974	1974	3	
	12	P-15/SS-N-2A Styx	Anti-ship missiles	1974	1974	12	For Komar Class FAC; status uncertain
1973	250	ZSU-57-2	SPAAG	1966	1967-73	250	
	200	BM-21 Grad 122mm	MRL	1972	1972-73	200	
	6	Luna-M/FROG-7	SSM launcher	1972	1973	6	
	10	Mi-6T/Hook-A	Helicopter	1972	1972-73	10	
	20	2K12 Kvadrat/SA-6A	SAM system	1973	1973	20	
	6	Luna-M/FROG-7	SSM launcher	1973	1973	6	
	15	Mi-8T/Hip-C	Helicopter	1973	1973	15	
	25	Su-7B/Fitter-A	FGA aircraft	1973	1973	25	possibly incl. some Su-7U trainer version
1972	1200	R-13S/AA-1 Atoll	SRAAM	1967	1967-72	300	
	200	BRDM-2	tank destroyer (M)	1968	1969-72	200	
	1000	BRDM-2	Reconnaissance AV	1968	1969-75	1000	
	30	Mi-8T/ip-C	Helicopter	1969	1971-72	30	
	10	MiG-17/Fresco	fighter aircraft	1969	1972	10	
	25	MiG-21 PFM/Fishbed-F	fighter aircraft	1970	1972	25	
	110	5V27/SA-3B Goa	SAM	1972	1972-74	1100	
1971	135	MiG-21F/Fishbed-C	fighter aircraft	1967	1967-71	135	Incl some 25 MiG-21U trainer version

	40	Su-7B/Fitter-A	FGA aircraft	1967	1968-71	40	Incl. some Su-7U trainer version
	300	BTR-152	APC	1968	1969-71	300	
	100	BRDM-1	Reconnaissance AV	1970	1970-71	100	
	150	BTR-60PB	APC	1970	1970-71	150	
	2	Mi-4A/Hound-A	Helicopter	1970	1971	2	
1970	12	Luna/FROG	SSM launcher	1967	1969-70	12	
	200	BM-14 140mm	MRL	1967	1967-69	200	Ex-Soviet
	100	BM-21 Grad 122mm	MRL	1967	1968-69	100	
1969	300	BM-24 240mm	MRL	1967	1967-69	300	probably ex-Soviet
	40	S-75 Dvina/SA-2	SAM system	1967	1967-69	40	
	960	SA-2/Guideline	SAM	1967	1967-69	960	for SA-2 SAM systems
1968	6	An-12/Cub	Transport aircraft	1967	1968	6	Ex-Soviet
	50	MiG-17/Fresco	Fighter aircraft	1967	1967-68	50	Ex-Soviet
	250	BTR-152	APC	1966	1967	250	Ex-Soviet
1967	150	BTR-50	APC	1966	1966-67	150	
	20	Mi-4A/Hound-A	Helicopter	1967	1967	20	
	6	Komar/Type-183	FAC(M)	1962	1963-66	6	Ex-Soviet
	500	9M69/AT-1 Snapper	Anti-tank missiles	1965	1966	500	
1966	8	Osa/Type-205	FAC(M)	1965	1966	8	Possibly ex-Soviet (but maximum only a few years old); Osa-1 version
	76	P-15/SS-N-2A Styx	Anti-ship missiles	1965	1966	76	For Osa-1 and Komar Class FAC
1965	7	I1-28/Beagle	bomber aircraft	1964	1965	7	Ex-Soviet
1964	SAME AS 1965						
1963	24	P-15/SS-N-2A Styx	Anti-ship missiles	1962	1963	24	For Komar FAC
1962	SAME AS 1963						
1961	16	P-4	FAC(T)	1956	1957-61	16	Ex-Soviet
1960	80	SU 100	Tank destroyer (g)	1958	1959-60	80	Ex-Soviet
1959	SAME AS 1960						
1958	10	Mi-4A/Hound-A	Helicopter	1957	1958	10	
	8	I1-14/Crate	Transport aircraft	1956	1957	8	
1957	7	Mi-1/Hare	Light helicopter	1956	1957	7	
	60	MiG-17/Fresco	fighter aircraft	1956	1957	60	
	20	Yak-18A/Max	Trainer aircraft	1957	1957	20	

1956	25	MiG-15/Fagot	fighter aircraft	1955	1955-56	25	From Czechoslovakian production line
	6	MiG-15UTI/Midget	Trainer aircraft	1955	1955-56	6	Probably from Czechoslovakian production line
1955	20	Yak-11/Moose	Trainer aircraft	1955	1955	20	Possibly from Czechoslovakian production line
1954	NO ARMS SHIPMENTS						
1953	NO ARMS SHIPMENTS						
1952	NO ARMS SHIPMENTS						
1951	NO ARMS SHIPMENTS						
1950	NO ARMS SHIPMENTS						

Appendix C: Transfers of aircraft, naval technology, and missiles from USSR/Russia to Egypt from 1970-2009

Year	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Yr of order	Yr of delivery	No. produced	Comments
2009	600	Igla/SA-18 Grouse	Portable SAM	2007	2009	100	For modernization of ZSU-23 SPAAG to ZSU-23-4M4
2008	SAME AS 2009						
2007	SAME AS 2009						
2006	20	S-125 Pechora-2	SAM system	2006	2006	20	Egyptian S-125 (SA-3) SAMs rebuilt to Pechora M2 version
	20	S-125 Pechora-2M	SAM system	1999	2002-06	10	Egyptian S-125 (SA-3) SAMs rebuilt to Pechora M2 version
2005	SAME AS 2006						
2004	SAME AS 2006						
2003	SAME AS 2006						
2002	SAME AS 2006						
2001	NO REPORTED SALES						
2000	NO REPORTED SALES						
1999	27	Mi-8/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	1997	1997-99	27	
1998	SAME AS 1999						
1997	SAME AS 1999						
1996	NO REPORTED SALES						
1995	580	9M113/AT-5 Spandrel	Anti-tank missiles	1991	1992-95	580	
1994	1	P-12/Spoon Rest	Air search radar	1992	1994	1	
1993	SAME AS 1995						
1992	SAME AS 1995						
1991	NO REPORTED SALES						
1990	NO REPORTED SALES						
1989	NO REPORTED SALES						
1988	NO REPORTED SALES						
1987	NO REPORTED SALES						
1986	NO REPORTED SALES						
1985	NO REPORTED SALES						
1984	NO REPORTED SALES						
1983	NO REPORTED SALES						
1982	NO REPORTED SALES						

1981	NO REPORTED SALES						
1980	NO REPORTED SALES						
1979	NO REPORTED SALES						
1978	NO REPORTED SALES						
1977	NO REPORTED SALES						
1976	NO REPORTED SALES						
1975	NO REPORTED SALES						
1974	120	R-13R/AA-2C Atoll-C	SRAAM	1973	1974	120	for MiG-23BN combat aircraft
	20	MiG 23BN/Flogger-H	FGA aircraft	1973	1974	20	incl. 4 MiG-23U
	250	BMP-1	IFV	1971	1973-74		
	10000	Strela-2/SA-7 Grail	Portable SAM	1968	1969-74	10000	Incl. some SA-N-5 naval version
1973	1	PRV-9/Thin Skin	Height-finding radar	1973	1973	1	for 1 regiment of 6 SA-6 SAM systems
	1	P-12 Spoon Rest	Air search radar	1973	1973	1	for 1 regiment of 6 SA-6 SAM systems
	30	MiG-19 Farmer	fighter aircraft	1973	1973	20	ex-Soviet
	6	Long Track	Air search radar	1973	1973	6	for 6 SA-6 SAM systems
	250	3M9/SA-9 Gainful	SAM	1973	1973	250	
	6	2K12 Kvadrat/SA- 6A	SAM system	1973	1973	6	
	150	MiG21MF/Fishbed J	Fighter aircraft	1971	1972-73	150	incl. some MiG- 21UM trainer version
	36	R-17/SS-1c Scud-B	SSM	1970	1971-73	36	
	650	BTR-60BP APC	APC	1969	1970-73	650	
	9	9P117/SS-1 Scud TEL	SSM launcher	1970	1971- 1973	9	
	200	ZSU-23-4 Shilka	SPAAG	1967	1967-73	200	
1972	3000	9M14M/AT-3 Sagger	Anti-tank missiles	1966	1967- 1973	3000	
	1	PRV-9/Thin Skin	Height-finding radar	1972	1972	1	for 1 regiment of 6 SA-6 SAM systems
	1	P-12 Spoon Rest	Air search radar	1972	1972	1	for 1 regiment of 6 SA-6 SAM systems
	6	Long Track	Air search radar	1972	1972	6	for 6 SA-6 SAM systems
	250	3M9/SA-9 Gainful	SAM	1972	1972	250	

6	2K12 Kvadrat/SA-6A	SAM system	1972	1972	6	
4	SO-1	Patrol craft	1971	1971-72	4	ex-Soviet
1	PRV-9/Thin Skin	Height-finding radar	1971	1972	1	for 1 regiment of 6 SA-6 SAM systems
1	P-12/Spoon Rest	Air search radar	1971	1972	1	for 1 regiment of 6 SA-6 SAM systems
6	Long Track	Air search radar	1971	1972	6	for 6 SA-6 SAM systems
250	3M9/SA-9 Gainful	SAM	1971	1972	250	
6	2K12 Kvadrat/SA-6A	SAM system	1971	1972	6	
25	Tu-16/Badger	Bomber aircraft	1970	1971-72	25	ex-Soviet; modernizaed to Badger-G version before delivery
20	Su-20/Fitter-C/F	FGA aircraft	1970	1972	20	
45	S-125M/SA-3B	SAM system	1970	1971-72	45	
10	PRV-11/Side Net	Height-finding radar	1970	1971-72	10	
10	P-15/Flat Face-A	Air search radar	1970	1971-72	10	
10	P-12/Spoon Rest	Air search radar	1970	1971-72	10	for use with SA-3 SAM systems
100	MiG-17/Fresco	Fighter aircraft	1970	1971	35	ex-Soviet; number could be as high as 165
50	AS-5 KELT	anti-ship missiles	1970	1970-72	50	for Tu-16 combat aircraft
1600	5V-27/SA-3B Goa	SAM	1970	1971-72	1600	
750	SA-2 Guidline	SAM	1968	1970-72	750	for SA-2SAM systems
20	S-75 Dvina/SA-2	SAM system	1968	1969-70	20	
12	Luna-M/FROG-7	SSM launcher	1968	1971-72	12	
140	Su-7B/Fitter-A	FGA aircraft	1967	1967-72	140	
2640	R-13S/AA-2 Atoll	SRAAM	1967	1967-72	2640	for MiG-21MF, Su-7B and Su-20 combat aircraft

	100	BM-21 Grand 122mm	MRL	1967	1968-72	100	
1971	80	Mi-8T/Hip-C	Helicopter	1969	1970-71	80	
	11	Mi-6T/Hook-A	Helicopter	1969	1971	11	
1970	20	PRA-11/Side Net	height-finding radar	1968	1969-70	20	
	20	P-15/Flat Face-A	Air search radar	1968	1969-70	20	
	20	P-12/Spoon Rest	Air search radar	1968	1969-70	20	for use with SA-2 SAM systems
	100	BRDM-2	Reconnaissance AV	1968	1969-70	100	
	16	P-6	FAC(T)	1965	1966-70	16	ex-Soviet
1969	10	P-14/Tall King	Air search radar	1967	1969	10	
	200	BRDM-1	Reconnaissance AV	1967	1968-69	200	ex-Soviet
	6	Romeo/Type-633	Submarine	1966	1966-69	6	ex-Soviet
1968	100	MiG21F/Fishbed-C	fighter aircraft	1967	1967-68	100	
	11	An-12/Cub	transport aircraft	1967	1967-68	11	
	7	Shershen	FAC(T)	1966	1967-68	7	
	104	P-15/SS-N-2A Styx	anti-ship missiles	1966	1966-68	104	for Osa-1 Class FAC
	500	3M11/AT-2a Swatter	Anti-tank missiles	1965	1966-68	500	
1967	2	Skory	Destroyer	1967	1967	2	ex-Soviet
	50	MiG-19 Farmer	fighter aircraft	1967	1967	50	ex-Soviet
	60	Su-7B/Fitter-A	FGA aircraft	1965	1967	60	
	18	PRV-11/Side Net	Height-finding radar	1965	1966-67	18	
	18	P-15/Flat Face-A	Air search radar	1965	1966-67	18	for use with SA-2 SAM systems
	18	P-12/Spoon Rest	Air search radar	1965	1966-67	18	for use with SA-2 SAM systems
	12	Luna/FROG	SSM launcher	1965	1967	12	
	18	S-75 Dvina/SA-2	SAM system	1962	1963-67	18	
	1338	R-13S/AA-2 Atoll	SRAAM	1962	1962-67	1338	For MiG-21 and Su-7 combat aircraft

	163	MiG-21F/Fishbed-C	Fighter aircraft	1962	1962-67	163	Acquired in response to Israeli acquisition of Mirage-3 combat aircraft
	8	SO-1	Patrol craft	1961	1962-67	8	ex-Soviet
	32	P-15/SS-N-2A Styx	anti-ship missiles	1961	1962-67	32	For Komar Class FAC
	8	Komar/Type-183	FAC(M)	1961	1962-67	8	ex-Soviet
1966	13	Osa/Type-205	FAC(M)	1965	1966	12	Possibly ex-Soviet (but maximum only a few years old); Osa-1 version
	600	BTR-152	APC	1961	1962-66	600	ex-Soviet
1965	4	SMB-1	Landing craft	1964	1965	4	ex-Soviet
	8	Mi-6T/Hook-A	Helicopter	1964	1965	8	
	30	BM-24 240mm	MRL	1963	1964-65	30	Probably ex-Soviet
	432	SA-2 Guidline	SAM	1962	1963-65	432	
	15	An-12/Cub	transport aircraft	1962	1963-65	15	
	500	9M69/AT-1 Snapper	Anti-tank missiles	1962	1963-65	500	
1964	4	SS-C-2 CDS	Coast Defense System	1963	1963-64	4	
	30	BM-14 140mm	MRL	1962	1963-64	30	ex-Soviet
	48	KS-1/AS-1 Kennel	anti-ship missiles	1963	1963-64	48	S-2 (SS-C-2b Samblet) coast defense version
	63	Top Bow	Fire control radar	1960	1961-64	63	For use with SM-4-1 130mm guns
1963	50	SON-9/Fire Can	Fire control radar	1960	1960-63	50	For use with S-60 57mm AA guns
	50	SON-9/Fire Can	Fire control radar	1960	1960-63	50	For use with 300 KS-19 100mm AA guns
1962	1	Whiskey/ Type-613	Submarine	1962	1962	1	ex-Soviet
	2	Skory	Destroyer	1962	1962	2	ex-Soviet
	100	ZSU-57-2	SPAAG	1960	1961-62	100	

	25	Tu-16/Badger	Bomber aircraft	1960	1961-62	25	ex-Soviet; no. delivered could be up to 30
1961	40	Mi-4A/Hound-A	Helicopter	1956	1956-61	40	
1960	40	BM-13 132mm	MRL	1959	1960	40	ex-Soviet
	18	P-6	FAC(T)	1955	1956-60	18	
1959	80	MiG-19 Farmer	fighter aircraft	1958	1958-59	80	
1958	7	Whiskey/ Type-613	Submarine	1957	1957-58	7	ex-Soviet
	50	SU-100	Tank destroyer (G)	1957	1957-58	50	Probably from Czechoslovakian line
	10	I1-14/Crate	transport aircraft	1957	1958	10	
1957	40	Yak-18A/Max	trainer aircraft	1956	1956-57	40	
	1	MV	Submarine	1956	1957	1	ex-Soviet
	10	Mi-1/Hare	Light helicopter	1956	1956-57	10	SM-1 version from Polish production line
	12	I1-28/Beagle	Bomber aircraft	1956	1957	12	Probably from Czechoslovakian line
	100	MiG-17/Fresco	fighter aircraft	1955	1956-57	100	From Polish production line
1956	35	Yak-11/Moose	trainer aircraft	1955	1956	35	No. could be up to 62; from Czechoslovakian production line
	70	SON-9/Fire Can	Fire control radar	1955	1955-56	70	For use with KS-18 85mm AA guns; status uncertain
	2	Skory	Destroyer	1955	1956	2	ex-Soviet
	2	P-20 Token	Air search radar	1955	1956	2	
	2	P-10/Knife Rest	Air search radar	1955	1956	2	
	2	MiG-15/Fagot	fighter aircraft	1955	1956	2	ex-Soviet
	86	MiG-15bis/Fagot	fighter aircraft	1955	1955-56	86	From Czechoslovakian production line
	39	I1-28/Beagle	Bomber aircraft	1955	1955-56	39	B-228 version from Czechoslovakian production line

	20	I1-14/Crate	trainer aircraft	1955	1955-56	20	
	100	SU-100	Tank destroyer (G)	1954	1955-56	100	Probably from Czechoslovakian line
1955	NO REPORTED SALES						
1954	NO REPORTED SALES						
1953	NO REPORTED SALES						
1952	NO REPORTED SALES						
1951	NO REPORTED SALES						
1950	NO REPORTED SALES						

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