The report committee for David Lynn Bernard

certifies that this is the approved version of the following report

On Semantic Reference and Discerning

Referential Intentions

APPROVED BY

SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

Supervisor: _____

David Sosa

_____

Ray Buchanan

On Semantic Reference and Discerning

Referential Intentions

by

David Lynn Bernard, B.A., J.D.

Report

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To all who have shared philosophy with me—teachers, students, and peers.

On Semantic Reference and Discerning

Referential Intentions

by

David Lynn Bernard, M.A.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2010

SUPERVISOR: David Sosa

In S*peaker's Reference and* S*emantic Reference*, Saul Kripke posited two kinds of reference involved in every use of a designator—a *semantic* reference, to the object picked out by the meaning of the words used—and a *speaker* reference, to the object to which the speaker aimed to call attention by deploying the designator. Kripke tentatively defined the notion of the *speaker's referent* as the object that (i) the speaker wishes to call attention to, on a given occasion, and (ii) that he believes fulfills the conditions for being the description's *semantic referent*. Although offered as a definition, this account is best interpreted as a tentative statement of the normal success conditions of speaker reference. As such, it raises the question of how special a role semantic reference plays in successful speaker reference. This report addresses that question by evaluating Kripke's tentative account in the light of an extended series of examples in which definite descriptions are used to speaker refer to objects other than the objects to which the descriptions uniquely semantically refer. The report concludes that words' semantic characteristics are only one of several forms of evidence that audiences regularly rely on to discern what object a speaker intends to call attention to by a particular act of reference.

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1. Introduction

In *Reference and Definite Descriptions*, Keith Donnellan distinguished "attributive" and "referential" uses of definite descriptions.[1] When a speaker deploys "the so-and-so" *attributively*, he means simply to "state[] something about whomever or whatever is the so-and-so."[2] When he deploys "the so-and-so" *referentially*, the speaker uses the description to pick out the object he means to state something about, regardless of whether that object actually is the so-and-so, i.e., regardless of whether it satisfies the Russellian conditions for being the semantic referent of "the so-and-so."[3] Donnellan offered examples showing that even when that object is not, in fact, the so-and-so, the speaker can nonetheless "use[] the description to enable his audience to pick out [the object] and state[] something about that person or thing."[4] Donnellan's paper was taken by some as suggesting that Russellian accounts of the semantics of definite descriptions could be faulted for failing to accommodate the attributive–referential distinction.[5]

In S*peaker's Reference and* S*emantic Reference*, Saul Kripke set out to demonstrate that we should not expect Russellian semantics to account for the phenomenon Donnellan pointed out.[6] Kripke suggests that the attributive–referential distinction is an instance of Grice's distinction between "what *the speaker's words meant*, on a given occasion, and what *he meant*,

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[1] Keith Donnellan, *Reference and Definite Descriptions*, 75 PHIL. REV. 281, 285 (1966) [hereinafter "D [page number(s)]"].

[2] D 285; see also D 291.

[3] D 281.

[4] D 285.

[5] For sustained discussion of what contentions regarding the significance of his distinction can and cannot be fairly attributed to Donnellan on the basis of his remarks in *Reference and Definite Descriptions*, see Rod Bertolet, *The S*emantic *S*ignificance of Donnellan's Distinction, 37 PHIL. STUDIES 281, 281–82 (1980).

[6] Saul Kripke, *Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference*, *in* Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr. & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (U. Minn. Press, 1977) (hereinafter "K [page number(s)]").

in saying these words, on that occasion."[7] We should not, he argued, expect a semantic theory to account for descriptions' various "'uses,' in some pragmatic sense . . . ."[8] Kripke emphasized that the distinction between attributive and referential use "exists and is of fundamental importance . . . ."[9] Or rather, there is a fundamentally important feature *every* reference that the distinction brings into relief: speaker meaning.[10] The *semantic* meanings of the speaker's words, Kripke explains, are "given by the conventions of [the] language,"[11] whereas the *speaker's* meaning "derives from various further special intentions of speaker, together with various general principles, applicable to all human languages regardless of their special conventions. (Cf. Grice's 'conversational maxims.')"[12] Kripke posited two kinds of reference corresponding to the two kinds of meaning. A definite description, if sufficiently detailed, has a unique *semantic* referent, the object that actually fits the description. And every use of the description has a *speaker's* referent, the object that the speaker uses the description to call attention to. Donnellan's attributive–referential distinction is important because it shows that these objects need not be the same. Attributive use, Kripke explained, occurs when the speaker means whatever object is the semantic referent also to be his speaker's referent. When the speaker means to refer to a particular object regardless of whether it is the semantic referent, one has an instance of referential use.

Kripke offered a tentative account of the notion of the speaker's referent: "that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator."[13] This account sufficed for Kripke's purpose in *Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference*. But Kripke acknowledged that it would need refinement to accommodate some of Donnellan's more atypical examples of referential use.[14]

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[7] K 394.

[8] K 383, 392–96.

[9] K 386.

[10] Or so I interpret the relevant portions of *Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference*, K 394-97.

[11] K 395 .

[12] K 395.

[13] K 396.

[14] K 422 n.22.

If Kripke's explanation of the attributive–referential distinction is correct, then the notion of speaker reference is indispensable for understanding how it is conveyed what a speaker is referring to with any use of a singular term, including terms that lack a unique semantic referent.[15] The notion of speaker's reference being so important, it would be worthwhile to refine Kripke's tentative account. In this report, I consider how to refine his account in light of several examples designed to stimulate our intuitions regarding what must be true of an object before a speaker will attempt to speaker refer to it using a particular description. I conclude that an object's relation to a description's semantic referent is just one of many types of evidence from which speakers expect their audiences to discern what object the speaker has used a description to speaker refer to. The semantic characteristics of the words used play no special role beyond being a particularly important form of such evidence. Moreover, it often happens that the evidentiary contribution the words' semantics make does not involve directing the audience to an object that is (or is among) the words' semantic referent(s).

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[15] *See* Rod Bertolet, S*peaker Reference*, 52 PHIL. STUDIES 199, 199–200 (1987) (hereinafter Bertolet 1987 at [page no.]); Stephen Schiffer, *Indexicals and the Theory of Reference*, 49 SYNTHESE 43, 43 (1981) (hereinafter "Schiffer 1981 at [page number(s)]").

2.   Preliminary Matters

Stated in terms of definite descriptions, Kripke's tentative account is that the speaker's referent of a definite description is the object that:

(i) the speaker wishes to talk about with a given use of a definite description; *and*

(ii) the speaker believes fulfills the conditions for being the description's semantic referent.[16]

The focus of this report is on refining (ii). However, some clarification is needed regarding the purpose of the account as well as the notion of "that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion . . ." Many philosophers of language regard speaker reference, or reference *simpliciter*, as being nothing more than a linguistic effort to realize an intention to "talk about," "refer to," or "direct attention to," an object.[17] *Defining* speaker reference is a matter of examining the nature of that intention, a task that has been undertaken by many theorists.[18] The intention, really a compound of related intentions, is subject to the following analysis, drawn from papers by Stephen Schiffer and Rod Bertolet.[19]

Consider a speaker ("S"); an audience ("H"), an utterance ("U"); a definite description ("D"), a set of circumstances ("C"); and an object ("O"):

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[16] K 396.

[17] Bertolet 1987 at 202–06; Schiffer 1981 at 65–76.

[18] *E.g.* Schiffer 1981 at 65–76; Bertolet 1987 at 202–06; Jack W. Meiland, TALKING ABOUT PARTICULARS, (New York, Humanities Press, 1970), at 20.

[19] Schiffer 1981 at 65–76; Bertolet 1987 at 201. I emphasize that the analysis offered here is merely *drawn* from Schiffer's and Bertolet's accounts. I have made several simplifications and substitutions in order for the analysis to suit my purposes here. Many theorists would take issue with the following as a statement of *sufficient* conditions for an act of reference. It suffices for my purposes here if the following analysis, with some added bells and whistles and extended beyond descriptions, turns out to be just about right as a statement of the necessary conditions for a speech act to constitute an act of reference.

(R_DD) S refers to O, by D, in C, iff:

> (1) in C, S brings about U;
>
> (2) D occurs in U;
>
> (3) in C, S intends that: by S uttering D in C, H's attention will be directed to O;
>
> (4) in C, S intends that: in C, H will recognize that S intends that: by S uttering D in C, H's attention will be directed to O;
>
> (5) in C, S intends that: in C, S's intention in (2) will be realized at least in part on the basis of H's recognition described in (4).

Some abbreviations and stipulations:

> "S A-intends O" abbreviates "in C, S intends that: by S uttering D in C, H's attention will be directed to O."
>
> "S RC-intends O" abbreviates "in C, S intends that: in C, H will recognize that S A-intends O."
>
> "S B-intends O" abbreviates "in C, S intends that: in C, S's A-intention will be realized at least in part on the basis of H's recognition that S A-intends O."
>
> "S R-intends O" abbreviates "S A-intends O; S RC-intends O; and S B-intends O."
>
> A description's "SR conditions" are the conditions an object must satisfy in order to be, or be among, the description's semantic referent(s).
>
> "SR^D" abbreviates "the SR conditions of description D."
>
> "Referential intentions" denotes the three intentions involved when S R-intends O.

I have stated the definition in terms of a definite description, and in the following I (nearly) exclusively consider only definite descriptions. This is in no way to indicate that I do not think that speaker reference is an ubiquitous phenomenon. Speaker reference can be accomplished by a very broad category of singular terms, as well as by non-linguistic utterances and gestures. For reasons that will become clear,[20] the implications of my discussion apply as much to references accomplished by those means as to references involving definite descriptions.

I will assume that it is not necessary for one's referential intentions to be realized to accomplish an act of referring *simpliciter*. That is, if one has deployed a singular term in an effort to realize those intentions, then one has speaker referred to the object of those intentions,

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[20] See infra pages 11–17.

even if they are frustrated.[21]   This point is terminological, and makes no difference to the substance of my discussion below. Nothing seems to be at stake other than whether *R-intending* alone or *R-intending plus realization* is denoted by the English lexeme REFER.[22]   I favor the former, but I do not eschew talk of efforts to "accomplish" or "convey" reference, or of the "success" or "failure" of a reference. Such language should be taken as concerning efforts to realize a speaker's R-intentions, and whether or not those efforts were successful.

Insofar as Kripke's tentative account is viewed as an effort to define what constitutes an act of speaker reference, it is not particularly interesting. (i) is circular and unenlightening, and (ii) is unnecessary.[23]   Recall that Kripke's aim in S*peaker's Reference and S*emantic *Reference* was to clarify the semantic significance of the kind of examples with which Donnellan illustrated the attributive–referential distinction: examples in which reference succeeds in spite of the speaker referent not being the semantic referent of the term deployed. The remarkable feature of those examples the *success* of the reference, not the occurrence of it. Kripke's tentative account, I propose, is most charitably taken as a preliminary effort at explaining how a term's semantic referent is normally and regularly involved in cases when a speaker can reasonably expect that his R-intentions will be realized by deploying a particular description. With (ii), Kripke tentatively suggests that the semantic characteristics of the words comprising the description pay a very special role in indicating the object the speaker wishes to call attention to. The object of this report is to evaluate that suggestion.

Restating Kripke's tentative account with the above observations in mind, we get:

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[21] This seems to be the orthodox view, though there is not a consensus. Bertolet 1987 at 200, 200 n.4. The orthodox view is exhibited in Bertolet 1987 at 200; Jack W. Meiland, TALKING ABOUT PARTICULARS (New York, Humanities Press, 1970), at 120; Alfred McKay, *Mr. Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty on Referring*, 77 PHIL. REV. 197 (1978). A. P. Martinich dissents in A. P. Martinich, *Referring*, 40 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 157, 161–62 (1979).

[22] *R-intending plus a reasonable expectation of realization* is another possible candidate.

[23] Or, if one thinks that reference must be conveyed in order for it to have occurred, (ii) is woefully insufficient.

Account 1:

Consider a speaker ("S"); an audience ("H"), an utterance ("U"); a definite description ("D"), a set of circumstances ("C"); an object ("O"); and the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be D's *semantic* referent ("SR^D").

Given that, in C:

    (1.0)   S brings about U;

    (2.0)   D occurs in U; *and*

    (3.0)   S R-intends O by D.

S can reasonably expect to realize his R-intentions with respect to O iff:

    (4.0)   S believes that O fulfills SR^D.

3.   Refining the Account

3.1

Testing the account will require examples of references that the speaker could reasonably expect to accomplish his R-intentions. Each example I use involves a definite description with a unique semantic referent.   The description at issue in each example is underlined.   The underlining does not indicate an emphatic volume or arch tone. I begin with an example of the kind Donnellan relied on to illustrate referential uses in which the speaker's referent is not the semantic referent: [24]

Husband–Lover 1

—suppose, at a party, our speaker and his companion can see a female friend across the room. She is standing with a man whom the speaker believes is her husband. The speaker notices that the man is being nice to the woman, and then the speaker has the following exchange with his companion:

Speaker: "Our new friend's husband is being kind to her."

Companion: "Yes, he seems to be."

In fact, the man our speaker observed with the woman is not her husband. He is her lover, and her actual husband is quite cruel to her.

Taking the lover as O, "our new friend's husband" as D, and our speaker as S, it is quite plausible that (1.0)–(3.0) are true—that the speaker R-intends the lover by D. And we intuitively get that the speaker's R-intentions will be realized in this case. That is to say, his companion will recognize his intention to call attention to the lover by "our new friend's husband," and this will, in part, bring about the companion's attention being directed to the lover. Account 1 accommodates this intuition. Considering the lover as O, (4.0) is true by the not implausible stipulation that the speaker believes the lover is the woman's husband.

Donnellan also called attention to cases of referential use in which the speaker does *not* believe that the object he R-intends fits the description. An example of that kind:

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[24] Kripke gave the example that follows, with different details. K 385. Kripke's version is a modification of an example he credits to Leonard Linsky. K 385.

Husband–Lover 2

—suppose the facts of *Husband–Lover 1*, except that the speaker does *not* believe that the man he and his companion can see being kind the woman is her husband. The speaker's poorly sighted companion, however, *does* believe the man is her husband. Not wanting to disabuse his companion of this mistake, our speaker accommodates it:

> Companion: "Why is it that the women in our social circle end up with such unkind men?"
>
> Speaker: "Do they? You must admit <u>our new friend's husband</u> is being kind to her."
>
> Companion: "So it seems. Perhaps I am wrong."

As in *Husband–Lover 1*, the man with the woman is not her husband, but her lover.

Husband–Lover 2 requires revising Account 1. (4.0) has been rendered false by stipulation, but the intuition that the speaker's reference succeeds survives. Donnellan offered a different example to illustrate this kind of case:

Usurper 1

—"Suppose the throne is occupied by a man I firmly believe to be not the King, but a usurper. Imagine also that his followers as firmly believe that he is the King. Suppose I wish to see this man. I might say to his minions, 'Is <u>the King</u> in his countinghouse?' I succeed in referring to the man I wish to refer to without myself believing that he fits the description."[25]

Usurper 1 seems to be another case in which (4.0) is false of an object with respect to which the speaker could reasonably expect his R-intentions to be realized. A modified account that allows for *Husband–Lover 2* and *Usurper 1*:

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[25] D 290–91 (underlining added).

Account 2:

Consider a speaker ("S"); an audience ("H"), an utterance ("U"); a definite description ("D"), a set of circumstances ("C"); an object ("O"); and the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be D's *semantic* referent ("SR^D").

Given that, in C:

    (1.0) S brings about U;

    (2.0) D occurs in U; *and*

    (3.0) S R-intends O by D.

S can reasonably expect to realize his R-intentions with respect to O iff:

    (4.0) S believes that O fulfills SR^D; *or*

    (4.1) H believes that O fulfills SR^D.

Account 2 is threatened by cases Donnellan illustrated with a variant of his usurper example:

Usurper 2

—"[i]t is not even necessary, moreover, to suppose that [the usurper's] followers believe him to be the King. If they are cynical about the whole thing, know he is not the King, I may still succeed in referring to the man I wish to refer to [when I ask, 'Is the King in his counting house?']."[26]

Now, it might be objected that *Usurper 1* and *Usurper 2* are not actually cases in which the speaker does not believe that the object he R-intends is not the semantic referent of "the King."   Recall that the *semantic* meaning "the King" is "given by the conventions of [the] language . . . ."[27]   Those conventions would be unsettled and eventually revised by sustained enforcement of the courtiers' demand that people refer to the usurper as "the King."   To avoid this objection, let us stipulate for the usurper examples that the courtiers are averse to hearing the usurper called "the usurper," but they do not demand he be called "the King."   Moreover, members of the castle's permanent staff (to which the speaker belongs) continue to regard the King as "the King."   And the staff regularly have conversations outside of the courtiers' hearing in which they use the terms "the usurper" and "the King" accordingly.   The courtiers know this, but there is little they can do about it.   The upshot is that there have not been sufficient pressures,

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[26] D 291.

[27] K 395.

incidents, or announcements for the semantics of "the King" to be unsettled. This stipulation threatens the plausibility of *Usurper 1* and *Usurper 2*. Assuming the *Usurper 1* courtiers don't believe that the usurper and the King are the same person, the speaker could not be certain that they would understand his use of "the King" to refer to the usurper. The courtiers believe the usurper is the semantic referent of "The King," but, if they are aware that the pre-coup semantics still prevail among the castle staff, then the speaker could not be confident that they would understand him to be referring to the usurper by "the King."   The *Usurper 1* courtiers will likely respond: "No. The man you call 'the King' is in exile." Success would be even less likely in *Usurper 2*, in which the courtiers might well reply: "Don't be silly. The King is in exile. Our man is in charge now."

Something more is needed for it to be plausible that the *Usurper 1* and *Usurper 2* speaker would reasonably expect to realize his R-intentions by referring to the usurper as "the King." In the husband-lover examples, the sight of the lover being kind to the woman makes it plausible that the speaker's R-intentions would be realized by calling the lover "our new friend's husband." The usurper examples can be amended to introduce a like perceptual salience:

> *Additional Stipulations for the Usurper Examples*
>
> —It is dusk. Our speaker is approaching the castle courtyard through an arched gateway opposite the large, squat countinghouse, where it has become the usurper's habit to wile away the evenings. A group of the usurper's courtiers are huddled in the arched gateway, conversing in low tones. Candlelight is visible in the countinghouse's second floor windows, and one can just make out the sounds of jingling coins and a male voice loudly (and badly) singing the kingdom's national anthem.
>
> The singing is interrupted by a cough and a clearing of the throat. The speaker wants to ask a question about the usurper, but he fears that the courtiers will react unpleasantly if uses "the usurper." Wishing to ask a simple question without incurring suspicion or abuse, our speaker asks the courtiers:
>
> > "Will <u>the King</u> want a hot drink for his throat?"

With these amendments, *Usurper 1* can join *Husband–Lover 2* as a counter example to Account 1, and *Usurper 2* is now a counter example to Account 2. Neither (4.0) or (4.1) hold in *Usurper 2*. Yet the U*surper 2* speaker can reasonably expect that his R-intentions regarding the usurper will be realized. In *Usurper 2* and *Husband–Lover 2*, a reasonable expectation that his R-intentions will be realized does not *depend* on the speaker using a description that doesn't semantically refer to the object of those intentions. "The usurper" or "our new friend's lover"

would have worked fine. The speaker eschews those descriptions for reasons collateral to realizing his R-intentions.[28] Other features of the examples explain why "the King" and "our new friend's husband" are available alternatives. Focusing on *Usurper 2*, the noise coming from the countinghouse seems to prompt the speaker's question, and it gives whoever is inside perceptual salience as a person who might need a hot drink for his throat. That being the case, it would not seem likely to the courtiers that the speaker is asking about the habits of the actual king, who is far away.[29] That rules out the King, but there are others, not in exile, who satisfy the SR conditions of "the King" no better or worse than the usurper, and who might be responsible for the noises emitted from the countinghouse (the steward, perhaps, or the jester). The speaker's R-intentions are realized because the usurper is the only person (in the vicinity) who relates to the actual king in such a way that it would not be bizarre for someone to refer to him using "the King." The usurper relates to the King by *purporting to be the King*, e.g. he orders the King's subjects around, wears the King's vestments, dickers around in his countinghouse, etc.

That relationship is crucial to realization of the speaker's R-intentions, which he could not count on if the courtiers didn't think the usurper was either the King's usurper or the King himself. Suppose—*Usurper 2.1*—that while they acknowledge that he has taken the King's role, the courtiers don't regard this as an act of either rightful succession or illegal usurpation. They think the usurper has done no more than what his duty required when the King's mental problems rendered him unable to rule and forced him to seek treatment abroad. Perhaps the courtiers refer to the usurper as "the Regent." In that case, "the King" would work, but only because the courtiers could well impute any number of beliefs to the speaker under which the speaker regards the usurper as being, or purporting to be, the King. They might suppose the speaker is not sophisticated enough to distinguish between a king and an officer who acts in his place but does not claim his throne. Or he might not distinguish between a regent and an

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[28] To borrow terms from Rod Bertolet, while using "the usurper" or "our new friend's lover" might accomplish the speakers' *expression-specific* goals (that is, their R-intentions), using those descriptions could trigger developments that would frustrate their *conversational* goals (getting a straightforward answer out of the courtiers, making light conversation without upsetting the companion). *See* Bertolet 1987 at 209–10.

[29] Notice how different things would be different if the speaker had made an unpleasant face and said "the King didn't used to sing the anthem while counting money."

usurper. The courtiers might suppose that the speaker thinks their boss is merely biding his time before overtly claiming a right to the throne, so the speaker is cheekily implying that the usurper regards himself as the King by calling him "the King." The reference can succeed only if the courtiers believe that the speaker regards the usurper as relating to the semantic referent of "the King" in such a way that sets the usurper apart from others who are not ruled out by the perceptual context.   Another example on this point—*Usurper 2.2*—there is a neighboring kingdom, called "Desdemonia." Desdemonia also has a king, but there is no reason to think that he is anywhere near the castle where our speaker and the courtiers have their exchange. If the speaker were to ask the usurper's courtiers "is the King of <u>Desdemonia</u> in the countinghouse," he could not reasonably expect his audience to recognize that he A-intends the usurper, because the courtiers have no reason to suppose that the speaker regards the usurper as relating to the King of Desdemonia in the requisite way. The noise from the countinghouse would quite plausibly lead the courtiers to expect the speaker to ask about the usurper, but the semantics of "the King of Desdemonia" lead them to rule that possibility out. The answering courtier might well furrow his brow, cock his head, and say: "The King of *Desdemonia*? Um, no. I expect he's somewhere in Desdemonia, where he belongs."

The importance of the relationship between the usurper and the King to the realization of the *Usurper 2* speaker's R-intentions suggests that the disjunct needed to accommodate *Usurper 2* should require that, by using D, he will *not* lead his hearers to rule out O as the object the speaker A-intends by D.

> (4.2): immediately prior to U, H believe that O relates to the object that fulfills SR^D in such a way that when S deploys D, S *may* A-intend O by D.

We might require the audience to believe that his hearers expect the speaker A-intends O, by D, *whenever* the speaker uses D.   But another example—*Archduke 1*, indicates that requirement would be too strong.

Archduke 1

—the circumstances are as in *Usurper 2*, with the following amendments: Suppose the real king, now in exile, is the King not only of the Kingdom the usurper has taken over, but also of neighboring Trufenia. The usurper has wrongfully occupied the throne of our speaker's country, but another fellow, the Archduke of Trufenia, has usurped that country's throne. The usurper and the Archduke make inconsistent political claims; each purports to be the King of both the country he controls and the country controlled

by the other. But they have been forced to temporally join forces against mutual enemies, and they have abated their own dispute, though they have not abandoned their incompatible claims.

The Archduke has been visiting the usurper's castle. There is no convention of referring to the usurper or the Archduke as "the King." Each man's courtiers get testy with people who speak of their boss as if he is an usurper. However, for the duration of the visit, both groups would permit a member of the castle's beleaguered staff to refer to one or another of them as "the King," even though that implies that the other is an usurper.

It is just before dawn of day the Archduke is scheduled to depart. Our speaker hurries into the courtyard. There is light and singing coming from the countinghouse. He approaches the courtiers and says:

> "Will <u>the King</u> come out of the countinghouse to bid <u>the King</u> farewell before he departs for home?"

The proposed requirement is not satisfied in this case, because both usurper and Archduke have the same relation to the actual king such that one could use "the King" to realize R-intentions with respect to either of them. It is nonetheless plausible that the courtiers will recognize that by his first use of "the King" the speaker A-intends the usurper, and that by his second use the speaker A-intends the Archduke, and that the speaker's other R-intentions will be realized for both references accordingly. Given the Archduke's scheduled departure and the substance of his utterance, the correct interpretation of the speaker's referential intentions is also the best explanation of why he said what he did. So, the speaker need not believe that his hearers expect that *whenever* he uses the description, his use of that description *must* rule out other possible candidates for the object he A-intends. In *Archduke 1*, the perceptual context and the hearers' beliefs about the unique semantic referent (the King) rules him out as the object the speaker A-intends. But the description's semantics still serve to narrow the field to the usurper and the Archduke, and the hearers can isolate the speaker's referent for each use of "the King" using their understanding of the context and the meaning of the rest of the utterance. The process would go in just about exactly the same way, I think, if "the King" were semantically ambiguous among the King, the usurper, and the Archduke.

Our full account, with (4.2) added:

Account 3:

Consider a speaker ("S"); an audience ("H"), an utterance ("U"); a definite description ("D"), a set of circumstances ("C"); an object ("O"); and the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be D's *semantic* referent ("SR^D").

Given that, in C:

(1.0) S brings about U;

(2.0) D occurs in U; *and*

(3.0) S R-intends O by D.

S can reasonably expect to realize his R-intentions with respect to O iff:

(4.0) S believes that O fulfills SR^D; *or*

(4.1) H believes that O fulfills SR^D; *or*

(4.2) immediately prior to U, H believe that O relates to the object that fulfills SR^D in such a way that when S deploys D, S *may* A-intend O by D.

Another example shows that this account is too permissive:

Archduke 2

—suppose the facts of *Archduke 1*, but changed as follows: it is just before dawn of day the Archduke is scheduled to make his early morning departure. Our speaker is walking along the path between the usurper's keep and the guesthouse where the Archduke is quartered. There is no light or noise coming from either building.

Both the Archduke and the usurper must be up well before the hour the Archduke is scheduled to leave. Some courtiers, a few some from each ruler's retinue, are huddled together on the path, conversing in low tones. Desiring to know whether the usurper is awake, our speaker says to them:

"The time of departure soon approaches. Is the King not yet awake?"

The speaker cannot reasonably expect that his R-intentions would be realized, because his audience could take "the King" to refer to either the usurper or the Archduke. There is no feature of the situation—like the usurper's unique status as the guy who purports to be the King in *Usurper 2*, or the Archduke's unique status as the person departing in *Archduke 1*—that will indicate which of them the speaker A-intends. This is a problem for Account 3, because, taking either the usurper or the Archduke as O, (4.2) is satisfied in *Archduke 2*. There must be some additional circumstance that would lead to the speaker's R-intentions being realized with respect to the usurper rather than the Archduke.

That circumstance could be some perceptual circumstance making one or the other more salient as the likely object of the speaker's A-intention. Change our pre-dawn scene—*Archduke 2.1*—so that the windows of the guest house, where the Archduke is quartered, are lit, and a man can be heard leading his household in morning calisthenics, as the Archduke is known to do. The Archduke being evidently up and about, the courtiers would get that the speaker's use of "the King" refers to the usurper. The semantics of "the King" (and the fact that the King himself is in exile) narrows the possibilities to Archduke and usurper, and the Archduke's perceptual obtrusiveness and the meaning of the speaker's question give the *usurper* salience as the probable object of the speaker's A-intention. Notice, though, that the perceptual circumstances do not work alone. The significance of the noise from the guesthouse as evidence of the speaker's A-intentions depends on the substance of his question (he is asking whether someone is awake). The *Husband-Lover* examples also show this. If that speaker did not comment that the woman's husband was *being kind*, it would not be clear that he A-intended the man who can be seen being kind to her. The significance of the perceptual circumstances depends no less on the audience's beliefs about the possible referents. An example illustrates this dependence:

Archduke 2.2

—suppose the facts of *Archduke 2*, amended as follows: The guesthouse is dark and quiet, but the windows of the usurper's keep are lit, and a lot of shouting can be heard within. It is common knowledge among the speaker and the courtiers of both rulers that the Archduke's unwavering routine is to wake soon after midnight and spend the pre-dawn hours doing yoga in his bedchamber. The speaker and the same courtiers now gathered on the path were up late last night making arrangements for the today's departure ceremony, and they overheard the usurper and his mother have one of their terrible fights. After the fight, they observed the usurper withdraw to the keep with a jug of wine.

The speaker worries that the commotion in the keep is caused by the butler's desperate efforts to rouse the usurper. He says to the courtiers:

"The time of departure soon approaches. Is <u>the King</u> still not yet awake?"

By changing the audience's beliefs about the objects to which the speaker might be referring, the significance of the perceptual circumstances is reversed.

In *Usurper 2*, *Archduke 1*, *Archduke 2.1*, and *Archduke 2.2*, the semantics of the description narrow the field of possible referents down to those who either are or specially relate to the semantic referent, and a like narrowing would also be effected by a semantically

ambiguous description. A concatenation of the substance of the utterance, the perceptual context, and the audience's beliefs about the remaining objects thus gives one of them salience as the likely object of the speaker's A-intention.

With those observations in mind, let us revise the account:

Account 4:

Consider a speaker ("S"); an audience ("H"), an utterance ("U"); a definite description ("D"), a set of circumstances ("C"); an object ("O"); and the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be D's *semantic* referent ("SR^D").

Given that, in C:

    (1.0)   S brings about U;

    (2.0)   D occurs in U; *and*

    (3.0)   S R-intends O by D.

S can reasonably expect to realize his R-intentions with respect to O iff:

    (4.0)   S believes that O fulfills SR^D; *or*

    (4.1)   H believes that O fulfills SR^D; *or*

    (4.2)* immediately prior to U, H believe that

        (4.2*-i) O is one among the group of objects that relate to the object that fulfills SR^D such that S *may* A-intend O; *and*

        (4.2*-ii) either,

            (ii-a.) O is the only member of that group, or

            (ii-b.) O is the most salient member of that group as the object S is likely to A-intend, given the perceptual context, the substance of U, and the facts about O and the other members of that group.

3.2

At this point, let us see if we can't economize the account. We can collapse (4.1) into (4.2)* if it turns out that the audience believing that O fulfills SR^D is really just one reason why they might believe O is one among a group of objects that relate to D's semantic referent such that S may A-intend O by D. To test this, we should think of a case in which (4.1) is satisfied, but (4.2)* is not. Let us start with a case in which (4.2)* is false because the second conjunct fails:

Archduke 2.3

—suppose the facts of *Archduke 2.2*, except that the group of courtiers on the path all come from the usurper's retinue. The usurper's courtiers believe that the usurper is the rightful king. However, they know this claim is controversial, and they are sensitive to the fact that overt assertions that the usurper is the King could provoke the populace and threaten his hold on power. Accordingly, the courtiers carefully eschew referring to the usurper as "the King," and they do not demand that others do so. They do insist, however, that he not be referred to as an "usurper."

As in *Archduke 2.2,* it is just before dawn of the day the Archduke is scheduled to make his early morning departure, which the usurper must attend. The guesthouse is dark and quiet, whereas the lights of the usurper's keep are lit, and there is a commotion within. The usurper's courtiers are *not* aware of the Archduke's unwavering morning yoga routine, and the previous night they did *not* observe the usurper's row with his mother, nor his subsequent withdrawal to the keep with his jug of wine. The speaker wishes to ask whether the usurper is yet awake.

Suppose the speaker says to the courtiers: "The time of departure soon approaches. Is the King still not yet awake?" Taking the usurper as O, (4.1) is satisfied; the courtiers believe the usurper fulfills the SR conditions of "the King." (4.2*-i) is satisfied; the courtiers will allow that the speaker *may* A-intend the usurper by "the King." But (4.2*-ii) is false. (ii-a) fails because the semantics of the "the King" leave both the usurper and the Archduke as possible A-intended objects. (ii-b) fails because, for all the courtiers know, the noises from the keep give strong indication that the usurper is up and about, and this makes the Archduke the more salient possible object of the speaker's A-intention. The very circumstances that make (4.2*) false would render unreasonable any expectation that the *Archduke 2.3* speaker's R-intentions would be realized. It is just as likely that his audience will understand him to referring to the Archduke as to the usurper.

So, for the *Archduke 2.3* speaker to reasonably expect to be understood, he must give, or there must be, some further indication that he means to call attention to the usurper by the term he uses to refer to him. That indication could take a number of forms. The speaker could choose a definite description with semantics that would rule out the Archduke: "…is *our* king still not yet awake?" He could use a physical signal, perhaps by looking or pointing at the keep. He could supply the courtiers with facts that would attune them to the significance of the noise from the keep: "Is the King not yet awake? He was up late fighting with his mother and brooding over a jug of wine." He could change his utterance to convey his views about the significance of the circumstances, without indicating their grounds: "All this shouting; have they not yet managed to

rouse the King?" Or he might more precisely convey the purpose of his question: "Is the King not yet awake; I fear there will not be enough time to prepare him to bid his visitor farewell." Any one of these adjustments, and likely many others, would make (4.2*-ii) true. And without some such adjustment, conditions satisfying (4.1) will not yield a reasonable expectation that the speaker's R-intentions will be realized. Earlier examples (e.g. *Usurper 2*) show that (4.2*) is sufficient even if (4.1) is false. So it seems we can eliminate (4.1):

Account 5:

Consider a speaker ("S"); an audience ("H"), an utterance ("U"); a definite description ("D"), a set of circumstances ("C"); an object ("O"); and the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be D's *semantic* referent ("SR^D").

Given that, in C:

    (1.0)   S brings about U;

    (2.0)   D occurs in U;

    (3.0)   S R-intends O by D.

S can reasonably expect to realize his R-intentions with respect to O iff:

    (4.0)   S believes that O fulfills SR^D; *or*

    (4.2)* immediately prior to U, H believe that

        (4.2*-i) O is one among a group of objects that relate to the object that fulfills SR^D such that S *may* A-intend O; *and*

        (4.2*-ii) either,

            (ii-a.) O is the only member of that group, or

            (ii-b.) O is the most salient member of that group as the object S is likely to A-intend, given the perceptual context, the substance of U, and the facts about O and the other members of that group.

With my next example, I aim to test whether (4.0) can be collapsed into (4.2)*. First, we should note that, as a sufficient condition, (4.0) is vulnerable to counter examples: there will not be a reasonable expectation of success in many instances in which S believes that O fulfills SR^D, but S knows full well that his audience does not believe that, or in instances in which the audience believes that O fulfills SR^D, but does not believe that the speaker shares that beleif. It seems likely that the speaker believing that the R-intended object fulfills the SR conditions of the description is just incidental to the circumstances that make the conjuncts of (4.2)* true.

We can begin to test this hypothesis by considering a case in which (4.0) is satisfied—the speaker believes that O fulfills the SR conditions of D, but the first conjunct of (4.2)* is not

satisfied—the audience does not expect, immediately prior to U, that O is among the objects that S may intend by D.

Usurper 3

Suppose the facts of *Usurper 1*—the speaker believes that the man who rules the land and claims to be the rightful king is in fact an usurper, and the usurper's courtiers believe that the usurper fulfills the SR conditions of "the King." Suppose that the previous king recently died, and the usurper is the previous king's brother. Unknown to the courtiers, the usurper murdered the previous King, and it is this fact alone that defeats the usurper's otherwise rightful claim to the throne. That is, were it not for his being the murderer of the late king, he would in fact fulfill the SR conditions of "the King." A distant cousin from a long forgotten branch of the family is the true successor. He resides in a different country and has no idea that he has inherited the throne of our speaker's country.

The usurper has pinned the regicide on a member of his retinue, the hapless Oric, who now languishes in the dungeon. But our speaker knows the usurper is the real murderer. Our speaker finds the usurper's courtiers in the castle courtyard at dusk, across from the countinghouse. The upstairs windows are lit, but no noise can heard from whoever is within. Our speaker has no interest in revealing the usurper's crime, but simply wants to confirm that he is in the countinghouse.

Suppose the speaker asked "Is the late king's murderer in the countinghouse?" (4.0) would be satisfied. But the first conjunct of (4.2)* would not be. The courtiers do not expect that the speaker, deploying "the late king's murderer," may wish to talk about the usurper. If the speaker were to refer to the usurper as "the King," instead, then (4.0) would not be satisfied, but (4.2)* would be. Now, is it is more plausible that the speaker, R-intending the usurper, would deploy "the late King's murder," a definite description that conforms to *his* beliefs about the usurper, or "the King," which conforms to *how the courtiers expect him to talk* about the usurper? It seems plain that the speaker would use the latter. If he said "is the late King's murderer in the countinghouse," the courtiers would respond with something like "why no; Oric is locked in the dungeon." To get across that he A-intends the usurper, the speaker would use "the King," or some other description that he believes the courtiers expect he may use to refer to the usurper. That is, he would deploy a description such that the first conjunct of (4.2)* is true, regardless of whether (4.0) is false for that description. *Usurper 2* showed that if the R-intended object does not fulfill the SR conditions of a description, it may nonetheless do the job if the audience expects the speaker may use it when talking about that object. *Usurper 3* shows that when the R-intended object *does* fulfill the SR conditions of the description, the description can't be

expected to work if it will cause the audience to rule out the R-intended object as the object of the speaker's A-intention.

But it would be too quick to change our definition at this point. What, one might ask, if the speaker *were* interested in revealing the usurper's crime?[30] If, say, the usurper could be heard singing in the countinghouse—would asking "is <u>the late king's murderer</u> carousing in the countinghouse again?" not accomplish the speaker's R-intentions, as well as reveal to the courtiers that the speaker thinks the usurper murdered the late king? Consider another example:

Valet 1

—Suppose, as in *Usurper 3*, that the usurper murdered his predecessor to attain the throne. And the only defect to his claim to the throne is that he is the murderer. Ignorant of his crime, the usurper's courtiers believe that he is the King. And they believe that Oric committed the crime. Our speaker, however, knows the horrible truth, and plans to denounce the usurper when he holds court this morning.

Unbeknownst to our speaker, the usurper has learned of the plan to denounce him and has plotted his escape. Hours before sunrise, the usurper summoned his ever faithful valet, who by extraordinary coincidence is the spitting image of the usurper. Claiming to have a severe headache, the usurper instructed the valet to impersonate him at court the next morning. The usurper then sent the valet back to bed, disguised himself as a peasant, stole out of the keep, and fled on his fastest steed.

The courtiers and our speaker have gathered in the throne room, waiting for the usurper to arrive and hold court. The valet, dressed in the royal vestments, enters the throne room and sits on the throne. Following the usual morning ceremony, the herald gently places the crown on the valet's head. Deciding that the time is right, the speaker stands and says:

"Gentlemen, <u>the late king's murderer</u> is wearing the crown right now!"

The courtiers stare in horror at the astonished valet.

(4.0) is true; the speaker (falsely) believes that the valet satisfies the SR conditions of "the late king's murderer." (4.2*-i) is false; the audience does not expect that the speaker, using "the late king's murderer," may refer to the man wearing the crown. (4.2*-ii) is false; the predicate ("…wears the crown at this moment") and the perceptual context give the valet overwhelming salience as the person whom the speaker A-intends by "the late king's murderer." But that does not occur until after the utterance, not immediately before, as (4.2*-ii) requires.

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[30] This possibility, and the substance of the next example (*Valet 1*), were suggested by David Sosa.

Valet 1 shows that (4.2*) cannot accommodate cases in which the speaker can successfully use a description in a manner that defies the audience's expectations about how he will use that description. The non-semantic evidence of the speaker's A-intentions can so strongly point an object (which may or may not be the semantic referent), that the audience will understand the speaker even if they must revise robust views about the beliefs that could attributed to him regarding the description's extension.

Valet 1 suggests we should fashion (4.2*-ii) into an independent condition that can be satisfied immediately before or after the utterance:

Account 6:

Consider a speaker ("S"); an audience ("H"), an utterance ("U"); a definite description ("D"), a set of circumstances ("C"); an object ("O"); and the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be D's *semantic* referent ("SR^D").

Given that, in C:

> (1.0) S brings about U;
>
> (2.0) D occurs in U; *and*
>
> (3.0) S R-intends O by D.

S can reasonably expect to realize his R-intentions with respect to O iff:

> (4.0) S believes that O fulfills SR^D; *or*
>
> (4.2) H believe that O relates to the object that fulfills SR^D in such a way that when S deploys D, S *may* A-intend O, by D; *or*
>
> (4.3) either,
>
> > (4.3-i.) O is the only member of the group of objects that H believe relates to the object that fulfills SR^D in such a way that when S deploys D, S *may* A-intend O, by D; or
> >
> > (4.3-ii.) O is the most salient member of that group as the object S is likely to A-intend, given the perceptual context, the substance of U, and the facts about O and the other members of that group.

Is (4.3) doing *all* the work? We can dispense with (4.0). In *Husband-Lover 2*, the hearer is cued in that the speaker A-intends the lover by the sight of the lover being kind to their upset female friend, combined with the fact that the speaker says of his referent that he is kind to her. Suppose—*Husband-Lover 3*—that neither the hearer nor the speaker believe that the lover is her husband, but the speaker says "her husband" just to avoid embarrassing her in case the remark is overheard. The speaker can still reasonably expect his R-intentions to be realized. Indeed, if we change the circumstances to strengthen the connection between the substance of the utterance

and the shared perceptual cues, then it becomes implausible that the hearer would take the speaker to A-intend anyone other than the lover, even though neither hearer nor speaker believes that he is her husband. Suppose—*Husband-Lover 3.1*—that the speaker's female friend is visibly upset, but her lover's kind remarks make her break a smile and laugh a little through her tears. The speaker says "Our new friend is upset; she is very lucky that <u>her husband</u> is being kind and sensitive enough to make her laugh at such a time." Under these circumstances it seems the speaker will manage to convey whom he is talking about whatever description is used, and regardless of his or his audience's beliefs about whether his intended referent is that description's semantic referent. Suppose—*Husband-Lover 3.1*—the speaker used "the table," to refer to the lover. His companion would likely *still* understand that he is making the observation that the lover is kind to their mutual friend, though he would wonder why the speaker referred to the lover as "the table." (He might reply "Yes. That's true. Now, did I miss something? Why are you calling him "the table?"") As long as the companion's views about the perceptual circumstances, the substance of the utterance, and the background facts about the lover combine to create a sufficiently strong cue that the speaker A-intends the lover, there are no circumstances in which a reasonable expectation that the speaker's R-intentions will be realized requires that (4.0) be satisfied, or that the audience think it is satisfied.

A variant on the Valet 1 example shows that (4.3) is not similarly dispensable:

Valet 2

—the events of *Valet 1* have just occurred. The valet leaps from the throne and pushes past the speaker. As he pushes past him, the valet says—audibly only to the speaker— "We'll get you for this." The speaker realizes at that moment that the man wearing the crown is the valet, because he lacks the usurper's characteristically nasal voice. The valet shoves his way through the confused courtiers and pushes open the throne room's heavy wooden doors. He flees down the long antechamber, where several men-at-arms stand at rigid attention while he runs past. They are accustomed to similar antics from the usurper, and the speaker's announcement in the throne room was not audible to them. Our speaker, knowing that the usurper will never be brought to justice if the valet is not interrogated, shouts:

"Guards, <u>the late king's murderer</u> is escaping! Bar his way!"

(4.3) is true in *Valet 2*, but (4.0) is false. The speaker—now aware that it is the valet impersonating the usurper—does *not* believe that the guy running down the corridor fulfills the

SR conditions of "the late king's murderer."[31] (4.2) is also false; it is quite a surprise to the men-at-arms that the speaker deploys "the late king's murderer" to refer to the valet. What makes it reasonable for the speaker to expect that the "the late king's murderer" will accomplish his R-intentions with respect to the valet is that the timing, tone, and the substance of his utterance will convey that he A-intends a person who is now escaping by means that the men-at-arms can obstruct by some immediate physical action. The perception of the valet running down the corridor gives him an overwhelming salience as that person.

What if (4.3) were false?   That is, what if the men-at-arms' beliefs about the description "the late king's murder" and their understanding of the rest of the utterance did not combine in such away as to give salience to the valet? Could the speaker reasonably expect that using "the late king's murderer" would accomplish his R-intentions and prompt the men-at-arms to arrest the valet? I think he could not. Another example:

Valet 2.1

—suppose that when valet burst through the throne room doors and went running down the long antechamber, the herald was hard on his heels, dagger raised, shrieking with righteous fury. Two men-at-arms train their crossbows on the herald, but they pause, not knowing whether this is serious or one of the usurpers' games. The speaker, knowing the valet cannot reveal the usurper's destination if he is stabbed to death by the enraged herald, shouts "Shoot men! Or the late king's murderer will kill again!"

Considering the *valet* as O, (4.3) is false in this example—the speaker does not believe that the substance of his utterance will combine with the men-at-arms' perceptual circumstances to give the valet salience as the object he A-intends by "the late king's murderer." Taking the *herald* as O, (4.3) is true; the soldiers see the herald chasing the valet, whom the soldiers believe is the King. The speaker's use of "the late king's murderer" will convey that the speaker A-intends the herald because the men-at-arms are concerned that the herald is about to stab the valet, whom the soldiers believe is the present king. (4.0) can be eliminated.

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[31] Notice that (4.1) is also false in *Valet 2*. The men-at-arms do not believe that the guy running down the corridor fulfills SR conditions of "the late king's murderer." Inducing that belief is part of the purpose of the speaker's utterance.

3.3

Account 7:

Consider a speaker ("S"); an audience ("H"), an utterance ("U"); a definite description ("D"), a set of circumstances ("C"); an object ("O"); and the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be D's *semantic* referent ("SR^D").

Given that, in C:

(1.0)   S brings about U;

(2.0)   D occurs in U; *and*

(3.0)   S R-intends O by D.

S can reasonably expect to realize his R-intentions with respect to O iff:

(4.2)   immediately prior to U, H believe that O relates to the object that fulfills SR^D in such a way that when S deploys D, S *may* A-intend O, by D; or

(4.3)   either,

(4.3-i.)   O is the only member of the group of objects that H believe relates to the object that fulfills SR^D in such a way that when S deploys D, S *may* A-intend O, by D; or

(4.3-ii.)   O is the most salient member of that group as the object S is likely to A-intend, given the perceptual context, the substance of U, and the facts about O and the other members of that group.

(4.2) cannot be dismissed as easily as (4.0). Suppose that the speaker had said to the men-at-arms "Shoot men! Or the queen-mother will kill again!" It is not clear what they would do, but the speaker certainly couldn't reasonably expect them to understand him to have A-intended the herald by "the queen-mother." It seems that in some cases the perceptual circumstances and the substance of the utterance do not make the A-intended object *so* salient that the speaker can use *just any* description and expect that is A-intention will be recognized. (*Husband-Lover 2*, *Usurper 2*, *Usurper 3*, and *Archduke 2* are also examples of such cases.) Sometimes the hearers' perceptual-cum-substance expectations point only weakly to that object, and the speaker must use a description that his hearers already expect he may use to refer to it. Sometimes the perceptual-cum-substance expectations point strongly to another object, so the speaker must use a description with semantics that will rule that object out. It seems that either both (4.2) and (4.3) must be true, or the circumstances that generate the hearers' post-utterance belief involved in (4.3) must be so strong that the hearers will discern the object the speaker wishes to A-intend regardless of the description used.

We should also note, at this point, that the role that the substance of U has played in all of these examples could be played by the substance of prior utterances in the conversation. Let us designate all of that "the substantive conversational context." The next version of the account:

Account 8:

Consider a speaker ("S"); an audience ("H"), an utterance ("U"); a definite description ("D"), a set of circumstances ("C"); an object ("O"); and the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be D's *semantic* referent ("SR^D").

Given that, in C:

   (1.0)   S brings about U;

   (2.0)   D occurs in U; *and*

   (3.0)   S R-intends O by D.

S can reasonably expect to realize his R-intentions with respect to O iff:

   (4.2)* immediately prior to U, H believe that

        (4.2*-i) O is one among a group of objects that relate to the object that fulfills
                   SR^D such that S *may* A-intend O; *and*

        (4.2*-ii) either,

                (ii-a.)   O is the only member of that group, or

                (ii-b.)   O is the most salient member of that group as the object S is
                           likely to A-intend, given the perceptual context, the substance of
                           U, and the facts about O and the other members of that group

           ; *or*

   (4.4) immediately *after* U, H will believe that O is the object to which S *must have* A-
           intended, given the perceptual context, the substantive conversational context, the
           facts about O and other objects the speaker might have A-intended.

Some interaction of the perceptual circumstances, D's semantics, the substantive conversational context, the audience's beliefs about O, and other objects the speaker might A-intend must conspire either to make (4.2)* or (4.4) true. When the conjuncts of (4.2)* are true, and O is D's semantic referent, one has a straightforward case of referential use in which the object with respect to which the speaker can reasonably expect his R-intentions to be realized is the same as the description's unique semantic referent. When those contextual features combine to point to an object other than the semantic referent, but the speaker nonetheless A-intends to talk about the semantic referent, the speaker can make the use attributive by using some special

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signal to convey that his audience will most easily recognize his A-intention by giving controlling weight to the description's semantics.

Now, it seems clear, without adducing more examples, that we could add to the list of contextual features that control whether (4.4) or (ii-b) of the second conjunct of (4.2*-ii) hold. An exhaustive list would include any circumstance that can be evidence of what a speaker wanted to achieve with the utterance. Let us call such circumstances "referential evidence." The conventions of the speaker's idiolect that determine the semantic characteristics of his words are simply one sort of referential evidence. That sort of referential evidence usually interacts with other sorts to evince speakers' A-intentions. And in many such interactions the contribution of the semantic evidence is *not* to point to the semantic referent, i.e., the object it would indicate if it were considered alone. My final account:

Account 9:

Consider a speaker ("S"); an audience ("H"), an utterance ("U"); a definite description ("D"), a set of circumstances ("C"); an object ("O"); and the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be D's *semantic* referent ("SR^D").

Given that, in C:

(1.0)   S brings about U;

(2.0)   D occurs in U; *and*

(3.0)   S R-intends O by D.

S can reasonably expect to realize his R-intentions with respect to O iff:

(4.n)   Given all of the referential evidence available to H, H should conclude that the best explanation of S's utterance is that S A-intends O by D.

4. Conclusion

I have no exhaustive list of the sort of circumstances that can make (4.n) true, but refining Kripke's tentative account has shown how various and complex referential evidence can be. Our intuitive sense of what a speaker uses a description to call attention to seems to arise from a somewhat complex interaction among items of referential evidence that could be roughly divisible into two sorts. What one might call "use evidence" consists of the conventions of the language and the speaker's own past uses of the description involved and related words. Use evidence consists of the speaker's doxastic profile—the beliefs his hearers attribute to him—as well as the conventions of his idiolect. Use evidence gives special salience to certain objects as possible objects of the A-intention the speaker hopes to realize by deploying a description. Specifically, use evidence tends to favor objects that are either (1) identical to the description's semantic referent, or (2) related to the semantic referent in ways that are akin to identity—like perceived identity, purported identity, possible identity, alleged identity, or supposed identity.

Circumstances more local to the utterance give rise to what one might call "context evidence." These local circumstances include what the audience knows about the speaker's assertions, assumptions, and attitudes regarding the various possible objects the speaker might A-intend by a particular use of a description. Context evidence also includes the substantive conversational context, an important part of which is often the substance of the remainder of the utterance containing the description. There is also the perceptual context in which the utterance is made. That is typically the conversants' immediate physical surroundings, though the substantive conversational context could orient the audience to a remote perceptual context.[32] Like use evidence, context evidence gives special salience certain objects as possible objects of the speaker's A-intention. Context evidence tends to favor those objects that have already appeared in the conversation or that have perceptual features indicating they would be fitting referents in light of the substance of the conversation, particularly of the utterance containing the description.

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[32] That perceptual context could be any set of perceptual experiences with which the conversants are mutually acquainted, like a shared memory, a mutual hallucination, or a familiar painting, television show, or piece of music.

Use evidence and context evidence concatenate to evince the object of the speaker's A-intentions. In many cases, the best explanation of the speaker's utterance is over determined, and evidence of either sort would have been sufficient to recognize the A-intended object. In other cases, both sorts are necessary. When use evidence and context evidence clash, the A-intended object can still be quite easy to recognize if it is so strongly favored by one type of evidence as to overwhelm the other sorts. Speakers can preempt such conflict by using special devices to aid the audience. Words that signal attributive use, for instance, signal to the audience that the conventions of how the speaker's words are generally used should be given controlling weight. There are many such devices. Some simply contribute new referential evidence, e.g. timing one's remark, or looking in a particular direction. Some give controlling weight to a particular form of evidence, e.g. words or gestures that invite focus on one's perceptual context. Some both introduce evidence and convey that that evidence should control, e.g. a deliberate pointing gesture closely timed with the use of the description.

This suggests that semantic reference is not so much a separate species of reference as it is the results that are obtained when form of referential evidence—the conventions of the language—is considered in isolation. Like other forms of evidence, semantic evidence can be privileged by special signals from the speaker. But usually it is not. Few references are attempted with terms that uniquely semantically refer, and even when such terms are used, some help is usually required from other types of evidence for the speaker's A-intention to be clear. Audiences rarely rely on semantic referential evidence without seeking confirmation from other forms of referential evidence. Also, other forms of evidence often and easily change the implications of the semantics of the description used such that the semantic evidence is crucial to discerning that the speaker A-intends quite a different object than would be indicated by the description's semantics considered alone.

I do not underestimate the importance of semantic evidence in discerning speakers' A-intentions. The conventions governing the use of the term used to refer to something is extremely useful and important evidence of the speaker's A-intention. Moreover, that term's semantics are not the only point at which the language's conventions supply evidence of the speaker's A-intention. The semantics of the other words used in the conversation are a major part of the substantive conversational context. However, the utility of the referring term's semantics usually accrues only in combination with other (semantic and non-semantic)

referential evidence. And it is not unusual that the term's semantic evidence, when considered along with the other evidence, points to an object that is not the term's semantic referent.

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VITA

David Lynn Bernard grew up in southern Oregon. He attended Vassar College, where he majored in philosophy, receiving his B.A. in May of 2002. He received his J.D. from the University of Texas at Austin in December of 2008. He is currently a law clerk for a federal district judge in Laredo, Texas. When he finishes clerking, he will likely practice law.

Address: 901A Castle Heights Drive

Laredo, Texas 78041

This report was typed by the author.