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EVALUATING LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM:

What could political theory offer in accommodating diversity?

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**EVALUATING LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM:
What could political theory offer in accommodating diversity?**

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Report

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Abstract

Liberal multiculturalism, at least in the lines of some of its advocates, is vulnerable to serious critiques. This paper lists all major critiques directed to liberal multiculturalism without necessarily agreeing with all. Yet, this is not a sufficient reason to drop it from the intellectual agenda. In contrast, it still stands as the most promising theory to solve the problems stemming from cultural diversity. The position taken in this report sees liberal multiculturalism insufficient in accommodating all the interests of all the parties involved (e.g., different minority groups, political positions, theoretical approaches). Yet, a flexible and contextual formulation of liberal multiculturalism is able to accommodate the broadest range of demands involved in the debate without any serious damage to the core liberal premises such as respecting freedom of choice and basic human rights. What is achieved with such a formulation is not an entirely consistent philosophical truth project, but a relatively flexible guide to solve public policy issues in the face of cultural diversity.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction: Multiculturalism as an Empirical Fact.....	1
II. Approaches to Multiculturalism.....	4
Libertarianism.....	4
Liberalism.....	7
a. Liberal proceduralism.....	12
b. Comprehensive/Substantial liberalism.....	14
c. Cosmopolitan liberalism.....	18
Civic republicanism.....	19
Communitarianism.....	21
Multiculturalism.....	26
III. Multiculturalism and Its Challenges.....	30
IV. Conclusion.....	46
Bibliography.....	48
Vita.....	53

EVALUATING LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM:

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I. Introduction: Multiculturalism as an Empirical Fact

The contemporary globalization process since the end of the Cold War is called ‘glocalization’ by some. The assimilationist market forces of globalization have faced stronger local identities and identity-related challenges in this process. As a matter of fact, group consciousness of numerous cultural communities is increasingly becoming more visible and bringing the salience of identity-related issues to the core of public policy discussions.

This process has numerous motives attached to it. Most obviously, increasing human mobility is leading to the creation of new ethnic (religious and/or linguistic) minorities. Yet, already existing communities also mobilize and make stronger demands than before. While technological improvements enable these groups to mobilize and campaign more effectively, there is also a shift in approaching these groups in the academia and politics. If the Cold War was the era of ideologies, the post-Cold War era is the era of cultures. The bipolar left-right ideological spectrum has been enriched for the last three decades by newly arising questions. Neglected issues such as cultural demands have gained salience in the social sciences and local politics almost around the entire globe. The question of today is the accommodation of cultural diversity without (or with minimal) damage to the political integrity of the state.

This review aims at presenting an intellectual map of discussions of rights related to culture and identity regarding minority groups. The review goes through a brief

discussion of various theoretical approaches, namely libertarianism, liberalism, civic republicanism, communitarianism, and multiculturalism. While all these theories share some claims with each other, multiculturalism is the most eclectic one. Apart from the complexity in positing it as a separate school of thought, multiculturalism is also crucial to study, because it directly addresses the problem of cultural diversity more than any other approach. Therefore, multiculturalism will be paid more attention in this review. Yet, the critiques of multiculturalism will naturally take us back to the other approaches' stance on multiculturalism. Hence, the classification and discussion of these approaches should not be taken to mean that they are viewed in a mechanical way as clearly distinct, internally homogenous and complete theories.

This paper lists all major critiques directed to liberal multiculturalism without necessarily agreeing with all. Hence, I also evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to and critiques of liberal multiculturalism. Liberal multiculturalism, at least in the lines of some of its advocates, is vulnerable to serious critiques. Yet, this is not a sufficient reason to drop it from the intellectual agenda. In contrast, it still stands as the most promising theory to solve the problems stemming from cultural diversity. The position taken in this report sees liberal multiculturalism insufficient in accommodating all the interests of all the parties involved (e.g., different minority groups, political positions, theoretical approaches). Yet, a flexible and contextual formulation of liberal multiculturalism is able to accommodate the broadest range of demands involved in the debate without any serious damage to the core liberal premises such as respecting freedom of choice and basic human rights. What is achieved

with such a formulation is not an entirely consistent philosophical truth project, but a relatively flexible guide to solve public policy issues in the face of cultural diversity.

II. Approaches to Multiculturalism

Libertarianism

One way to deal with the demands of cultural groups is to ‘free’ them. This is basically an ‘anything goes’ approach. Accordingly, cultural demands, as any other demand, should be tolerated following John Stuart Mill’s ‘harm principle’ as the only legitimate limit for freedom. A significant representative of this school, Kukathas eliminates the ‘comprehensive’ claims of Mill’s broader philosophy and defends procedural minimalism as a libertarian political structure. For Kukathas, the goal of this approach is ‘avoidance’ rather than ‘achievement’. Accordingly, difference should not be suppressed, nor should it be elevated (Kukathas, 2003: 246).

The first characteristic of this approach is avoiding assigning any value to any collectivity. Cultural communities are tolerated only because individual members have a right to associate with other willing individuals. Secondly, libertarianism regarding multiculturalism -as in all other issues- pursues the maximization of (individual and negative) freedoms.

Kukathas presumes a shared human nature whose cultural identity is fluid and not primordial. What makes humans distinctive is the pursuit of their individual conscience. Conscience guides people by providing a deep moral sense and letting them pursue different ‘right’ paths of life. The respect for human conscience requires absence of interference with these paths, namely diversity. Thus, the importance of diversity has only an instrumental value. It is not a desired end, but just an ineradicable fact of life and ‘the source of the problem’.

Freedom of conscience necessarily requires and, in practice, means freedom of association to let people pursue their own particular ends. The two corollaries of this principle are freedom of dissociation and mutual toleration. While the former enables individuals to exit from their communities when they wish so, the latter enables people to pursue their own ends freely within particular communities. However, what toleration requires in response to cultural diversity is only benign neglect, little more than indifference.

Cultures do not have independent value for their members, and neither the political community nor local communities are objects of intrinsic value. This formulation challenges both the arguments for social unity/stability and multiculturalism. The free society for Kukathas is “not a hierarchy of superior and subordinate authorities but an archipelago of competing and overlapping jurisdictions” (Kukathas, 2003: 4, 75). This assumption rests on the existence of multiple authorities and roots the legitimacy of authority in the consent of individuals.

Kukathas challenges the social unity theses by pointing out the lack of a single moral standpoint for all. The only role of the political community is to provide order and peace, in other words, to manage diversity rather than eliminating it. “Authority cannot be found on justice when justice is at issue” (Kukathas, 2003: 264). Kukathas also challenges multiculturalists by defending a uniform set of libertarian rules. He does not support any kind of recognition, because cultural survival is not a right in itself (Kukathas, 2003: 252). Group practices are tolerated so long as they do not harm other communities and/or deny the right to exit for their own members. Since only individuals have rights, there remains no categorical distinction between immigrant groups and minority nations,

and minorities and the majority. Some cultures might disappear or change dramatically, but this is so because every individual choice has an opportunity cost.

Yet, some of Kukathas' arguments beg for further clarification. First, Kukathas skips over some deep disagreements by pointing out *modus vivendi* solutions. Accordingly, the camps in culturally divided societies can and should find a non-principled solution for disagreement over problems such as selecting national symbols and deciding on the question of secession. In fact, the lack of an agreed on principled solution is not part of the solution, but of the problem. It could even trigger inter-communal conflicts to leave these questions to a non-principled realm of negotiation. Second, Kukathas undervalues some serious difficulties. For instance, he expects too much from the idea of the 'right to exit', but this is not a realistic expectation. Even though members are not directly punished by respective cultural communities for exiting, numerous indirect barriers make a genuine exit difficult, if not impossible. Third, Kukathas simply calls agreement on some issues unattainable. For him, it is not possible to draw the limits of toleration clearly. For instance, he is very vague on the limits of parental rights over the lives of children. Fourth, Kukathas neglects some important facets of freedom of association. While he addresses the question of the 'right to exit', he overlooks related terms such as the 'right to enter' to and the 'right to stay' in cultural communities. The questions of whether communities could expel their members under certain circumstances and under what conditions individuals can be prevented from joining associations are not addressed by Kukathas. Overall, Kukathas presents a highly consistent libertarian theory relying on freedom of association by rejecting both legal

paternalism and legal moralism, but he fails in addressing the further public policy implications of his theory.

Liberalism

The liberal way to treat cultural diversity is very eclectic and includes various ‘sub-liberalisms’. Both opposing and overlapping conclusions could be reached in discussing these sub-categories from the thinnest versions of liberal proceduralism to the thickest versions of comprehensive liberalism. The undisputed core of liberalism is individualism in relation to other core values of equality and liberty. Yet, these abstract ideals find different expressions within liberalism.

Rawls (1993: xviii) states the problem of political liberalism as building “a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines”. Hence, political liberalism aims at solving the fundamental political questions with a reasonable public basis of justification. Rawls’ political liberalism has a threefold claim: The *overlapping consensus* of reasonable comprehensive doctrines determines *political justice* which regulates the *basic structure* of the society (Rawls, 1993: 44). This is an improvement over Rawls’ earlier work, *A Theory of Justice* (1971).

Rawls presents a twofold account of justice in his earlier book: (1) First, all citizens must be recognized as equal and free, so that equal basic liberties are guaranteed. (2) Second, social and economic inequalities are permissible only with two conditions: (a) offices and positions must be open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b) inequalities must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged

members of society (the difference principle). Rawls reaches this conclusion with a thought experiment: original position under the veil of ignorance. *Theory* stops at this point and *Political Liberalism* takes over where *Theory* stopped to deal with the problem of consensus in profoundly divided societies.

Rawls acknowledges that *Theory* was not divorced fully from a ‘comprehensive’ point of view. *Political Liberalism*, on the other hand, claims to be based on a ‘political’ theory. Rawls does not simply follow the Enlightenment project of defending ‘truth’ against superstition. His focus is much more practical: the question of building and maintaining a political society. For this project, Rawls follows a political (reasonable) path rather than a comprehensive (truth-project) one. Therefore, Rawls avoids dealing with deep metaphysical questions on the nature of truth or being.

The term ‘overlapping consensus’ indicates that individuals with different comprehensive doctrines can reach an agreement on the basic structure of the society. Hence, ‘reasonable disagreement’ over comprehensive doctrines is compatible with common, shared political principles. The idea of ‘reasonableness’ is crucial here. *Political Liberalism* refers to its political conception of justice as reasonable rather than true. Reasonability indicates seeking a fair engagement with others on the basis of reciprocity or the terms of cooperation which can be adopted by others. Reasonable individuals are willing to cooperate with others on a mutually respectful basis.¹ In addition to willingness to agree to fair terms of cooperation, reasonable people are also willing to recognize the ‘burdens of judgment’. Burdens of judgment, or the sources of reasonable disagreement, set limits on what can be reasonably justified to others (Rawls,

¹ Therefore, ‘reasonability’ is distinct from ‘rationality’ which “applies to a single, unified agent (either an individual or corporate person) with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly its own” (Rawls, 1993: 50).

1993: 61). This concept takes us to another concept: ‘reflective equilibrium’ which is achieved when the involved parties can no longer reject intuitions stated in reasonable ways. The exercise of power based on the overlapping consensus as described above, and therefore acceptable to the ‘common human reason’, is legitimate or just² for Rawls.

Rawls’s original position under the veil of ignorance is seen as too abstract by communitarian scholars and the individual in the original position is often called ‘unencumbered self’. Although Rawls attempts to face these challenges by stressing devotions and attachments of individuals in his later work, he still bases his theory “apart from, or without reference to, any such wider background” (Rawls, 1993: 12). Thus, Rawls undervalues the constituted character of the self with his ‘freestanding’ view of justice. The problem with Rawls’s thought experiment is that reasoning under the veil of ignorance may be either (a) impossible or (b) irrelevant. (a) It may be impossible, because we may not be rational and reasonable without being taught how to be so; and (b) it might be irrelevant, because what people think under the veil of ignorance may not be relevant to what they think under the veil of ‘faith,’ ‘custom,’ or ‘paradigm’. There is no way to make people think that their decisions in a hypothetical situation are more relevant and valid than their current ‘informed’ situation.

Another contested conceptualization in *Political Liberalism* is the idea of society. Rawls (1993: 18) conceives society “as a fair system of cooperation over time between generations”. Accordingly, the society is neither a community nor an association. Society differs from the former in two ways: society (a) is viewed as a complete and closed social system; and (b) has “no final ends and aims in the way that persons or associations do”.

² Justice and legitimacy are not the same though for Rawls. Legitimate procedures for Rawls can produce unjust outcomes.

Society is not a community either, because it is not governed by a shared comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine (Rawls, 1993: 40-41). This conceptualization faces critiques from civic republican and communitarian circles for undervaluing the importance of society. According to these critiques, a society bound only by democracy and toleration is vulnerable to dissolution. Rawls, in his reply to these critiques, acknowledges the importance of virtues and willingness to take part in public life in a healthy political society. Therefore, political liberalism is not fundamentally opposed to civic republicanism as Rawls understands it. However, Rawls (1993: 205) opposes civic humanism which sees individuals as inherently social and/or political animals “whose essential nature is most fully realized in a democratic society in which there is widespread and vigorous participation in political life”.

Another problem with Rawls’s political liberalism is related to diversity. Can political liberalism incorporate diverse secular or faith groups holding numerous comprehensive doctrines? The answer is to some extent. Rawls (1993: 197) acknowledges that there is “no social world that does not exclude some ways of life that realize in special ways certain fundamental values”. Here, the first problem is the question of the limits of reasonability or how and where to draw the line of what is reasonable.

Whether Rawls’s ‘limited’ substantive account of political liberalism is compatible with deep diversity is a serious problem. Rawls attempts to solve this problem by limiting the political sphere and leaving moral questions to the private realm. He also hopes to reach to an overlapping consensus among diverse groups within this limited realm. Since there will still be disagreement on certain political matters, there are three

things to be done: (1) honoring as far as we can “the claims of those who wish to withdraw from the modern world in accordance with the injunction of their religions” (Rawls, 1993: 200); (2) accepting the authority of churches/religious institutions over their members provided that the ‘right of exit’ is recognized (Rawls, 1993: 221); and (3) imposing limits on permissible ways of life (Rawls, 1993: 174, 209).

All three, but particularly the last policy is very problematical. Rawls’s two claims are not easy to be adopted by certain groups: (1) limited, but still substantive account of political justice draws the line of reasonableness; and (2) comprehensive doctrines that cannot support such a democratic society are not reasonable. As a result, the individuals believing in ‘unreasonable’ comprehensive doctrines will be punished by the political society. Since they do not share the liberal premises of the account, this punishment will naturally look arbitrary, if not tyrannical, to them. At this point, Rawls has two hopes, not solutions: ‘unreasonable’ groups (1) can adopt moderate/reasonable views; and (2) will stay in the minority in numerical terms. For the former (1), Rawls (1993: 461) refers to recent studies on the ‘reasonable’ side of Islam. However, this is just a hope, more accurately, a weak hope given the increasing strength of ‘unreasonable’ fundamentalist streams parallel to moderate streams of this religion. Rawls’s second hope is that ‘unreasonable’ groups are “in the minority, and are likely to remain so”, and “do not significantly affect the moral quality of public life and the basis of social concord” (Rawls, 1993: 148). This might have been a realistic hope for the early 1990’s, but today, the empirical data shows that those groups are spreading in the liberal societies of the West.

a. Liberal proceduralism:

Since liberalism is not a unitary bloc, but a very broad set of approaches, a particular form of it, liberal proceduralism should be discussed in a more detailed way. The core feature of proceduralism is its thin approach to ‘truth’. Accordingly, there is no ‘true’ or ‘just’ ideal for how to deal with cultural diversity. ‘Pure procedural justice’ implies that “what is just is specified by the outcome of the procedure, whatever it may be. There is no prior and already given criterion against which the outcome is to be checked” (Rawls 1993: 73). This strand of liberalism accepts only one rule: a formal method (Gregg, 2002).

As an example of liberal proceduralism, Gregg’s (2003) thin politics rests on ‘thin normativity’ which is composed of three attributes. Its first feature is particularity. Thin normativity enables several thick communities to negotiate on certain matters. Hence, Gregg keeps the aims of his solution framework for problems related to minorities away from far-reaching conclusions such as a deep moral ideal believed to solve all social problems. Its second feature is rationality. Here, Gregg differs from the long-standing liberal belief in reason as comprehensive truth. Gregg focuses on rationality rather than pure reason. His emphasis on rationality is far from a faith in truth which can only be discovered by the right conduct of reason. Rather, thin normativity relies on an understanding of rationality which lays out no more than a criterion for the acceptability of arguments. The third feature of thin normativity is fragmentation. Gregg acknowledges the empirical state of social inequality, and sees this fact as inevitable particularly in democracies as well as other regimes. We cannot remove all social inequalities, nor should we attempt to. Fragmentation has always been an empirical fact and will remain

so even more strongly given the increasingly more dynamic mixing of different populations and awakening consciousness of different identity groups.

Despite framing his theory based on an ‘unusual’ communitarian ground (‘communitarianism among strangers’) (Gregg, 2003: 54), Gregg’s proceduralism is also relevant for the discussion of liberal proceduralism. His proceduralism, by definition, seeks fairness in the process, not in the outcome. The procedure mainly relies on the idea of reciprocity where all the participants are subject to the same rules. Another tenet of Gregg’s approach is pragmatism. The underlying idea behind Gregg’s pragmatism is, following Kuhn’s epistemology, that all judgments are fallible (Gregg, 2003: 2). Hence, the aim is not finding truth or ‘correctness’, but ‘competence’ (Gregg, 2003: 120). Correctness would assume a general standard of truth, whereas the problem is not to choose the most correct ideal for diverse groups, but to provide accommodation between them.

Despite being thinner than other liberalisms, proceduralism is not ‘perfectly’ thin. First, as a version of liberalism, proceduralism takes individuals ideally as free and equal. This claim is not fully divorced from a comprehensive claim of truth. As Gregg (2002: 744) acknowledges, “no proceduralism can operate without introducing into itself at least a few, specific substantive norms. First, a commitment to proceduralism is not normatively neutral because proceduralism is itself a norm that entails an obligation to recognize and abide by procedural outcomes”. Therefore, the main question on the ‘right’ way to treat people still rests on the assumption of individual rights which needs more than proceduralism for justification.

b. Comprehensive/Substantial liberalism:

Apart from thin, procedural forms of liberalism, Barry (2001) presents a substantial form of liberalism. Barry makes a defense of liberal ideas on equality and state neutrality together with an attack on multiculturalist critiques and ideas on liberal hegemony, cultural rights, and cultural relativism. Barry also makes a defense of integration of diverse groups into the mainstream society on civic grounds.

Barry's primary emphasis is on the liberal idea of equality, in other words, egalitarian liberalism. For Barry, disadvantage must be defined as the lack of resources and opportunities on universal grounds rather than cultural referents. The remedy for unfair disadvantage should address particularly disadvantaged individuals. Affirmative action and similar applications can be justified only if they address those individuals. Group membership cannot be a criterion to identify who is disadvantaged. Barry acknowledges the difficulty in finding out who is disadvantaged and refers to (following Patterson) parental income as one of the least flawed measures of it. "Members of minority cultures may, indeed, suffer from a paucity of resources or opportunities, but the case for culture-based special rights does not depend on its being so" (Barry, 2001:13).

For Barry (2001: 20), multiculturalist scholars overlook the fact that "religious or cultural difference may be a marker of group identity without being the reason for the members of the group to suffer physical abuse or discrimination". Yet, Barry is mistaken in following this straightforward logic. Regarding affirmative action, past injustices still have an impact on present distribution of resources and public images of groups, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The Black community in the US, for example, is the primary beneficiary of affirmative action programs. Although there are (relatively few)

rich, well-educated, even politically powerful African-Americans, their public image as a group still consists of ‘vicious’ stereotypes such as ‘dangerous’, ‘criminal’, ‘lazy’, ‘untrustable’, etc. These public images are also buttressed by some empirical facts. One of each three adult male African-Americans in the US has spent some time in the jail. In turn, these images affect recruitment and promotion decisions regarding Black people. These stereotypes turn out to be a kind of ideological hegemony in a Gramscian sense. Even the members of the Black community might follow the hidden racism of various stereotypes and develop more positive attitudes toward lighter-skinned Blacks than darker-skinned ones.³ This self-fulfilling mechanism can only be destroyed by an overall improvement in the Black community’s socio-economic conditions. I still agree with Barry’s concerns with ‘quota’ system-based affirmative action programs. Yet, differently from Barry, I think these quota systems should be reformulated to be responsive to within-group differences. In other words, if we assign a 20 percent Black quota in a public university, we should be careful not to pick up this 20 percent from the upper 20 percent of the overall Black community.

Another primary focus of Barry is ‘neutrality’ which is related to his liberal idea of ‘equality’. Barry defends the idea that the state should not prefer some groups or comprehensive cultural ideas over others. For Barry, liberalism aims at ‘universalism’ and is not just one of those cultural views. Barry follows Rawls to some extent in that “a sign of our having achieved a just answer is that it is one that can be endorsed as fair by each person, whatever his or her personal characteristics, endowments and commitments

³ Various studies demonstrate the positive relationship between light skin tone and socio-economic status among the African-American population (see: Edwards, 1973; Hughes & Hertel, 1990; Keith & Herring, 1973). A similar relationship is shown between skin tone and perceived physical attractiveness by others within the group (see: Okazawa-Rey et al., 1987; Russell, Wilson, & Hall, 1992), and between skin tone and self-esteem in terms of attractiveness (Robinson & Ward, 1995).

may be” (Barry, 2001: 69). Yet, similar to Rawls’s view, this is a false presumption on two grounds: first, we do not have access to an unencumbered life. What we think of as ‘neutral’ principles are actually the cultural constructions of centuries. The supremacy of universal equality and freedom over other particularist, parochial, and/or patrimonial values is a liberal ‘invention’, not a discovery of the very nature of the things. Second, let’s assume that we have access to the ‘original position’ and we see people as really ‘neutral’ or liberal in the original position. What does this imply for contemporary choices and life styles? The neutrality of people behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ does not have a binding force anymore, because people prefer their commitments over their ‘original’ neutrality.

Finally, Barry makes an overwhelming attack on the illiberal ways of life and multiculturalist suggestions in defense of these ways. “If a liberal is not somebody who believes that liberalism is true (with or without inverted commas), what is a liberal?” (Barry, 2001: 132). For Barry, liberalism is not freedom for all, toleration for all, moral relativism, anarchist thinking, or nihilism. “The liberal position is clear. Nobody, anywhere in the world, should be denied liberal protections against injustice and oppression” (Barry, 2001: 138). Neither group rights, nor parental rights give enough reason to deny liberal protection to adult group members or children. Otherwise, public tolerance would be ‘a formula for creating a lot of private hells’ (Barry, 2001: 143). For Barry, if a culture depends on oppression, assault, or any other illiberal practice for its survival, then it will have to either change or disappear in a liberal society. Hence, Barry does not recognize ‘culture as such’ as a right same as Kukathas and advises liberal dominance over illiberal cultures in contrast to Kukathas’s laissez faire solution.

For Barry, if people have to lose an employment opportunity due to their restrictive cultural commitments, then it is not the liberal regulations, but their commitment which puts them at a disadvantage. Barry goes one step further, and extends his argument on ‘religious commitments’ to language. “[T]hose who do not learn the language of public life cannot reasonably complain if they are disadvantaged in dealing with the law and the bureaucracy and are marginalized politically” (Barry, 2001: 106).

Barry is right to some extent, but not completely. For instance, it makes sense, let’s say, for a firefighting or police department to require its employees to wear a standard costume,⁴ but it does not make much sense if they provide those employees, let’s say, only pork products as their meals. In the latter case, Jewish and Muslim (as well as vegetarian) employees would be discriminated against unfairly. Hence, some general regulations might be fair whereas some others are not. This depends on the context rather than a single universal formula defended by Barry. One of the most obvious faults of Barry’s reasoning is to compare an Englishwoman working in Pakistan and a Pakistani working in England. “An Englishwoman who chose to work in Pakistan would be expected to conform to local sensibilities in the way of dress. Why should not those who want a job in the mainstream economy leave the customs of Pakistan behind in Pakistan” (Barry, 2001: 58). The reason why Barry compares Pakistan with a liberal democratic society is unclear. Pakistan is obviously not a liberal society and cannot guide us in deciding the proper regulations in England or any other self-claimed liberal society. Beyond dress codes, Pakistan might also punish an Englishwoman for drinking alcohol in

⁴ In fact, even though not as clear as the latter case (meal menus), the costume regulations might vary and incorporate as well, let’s say Jewish skullcaps, Muslim headscarfs, or Sikh turbans. A practical solution would be to make these head clothings in proper colors and/or with proper materials (especially for firefighters and military personnel) regulated by the department.

public and obviously this does not legitimize punishing a Pakistani, let's say, for wearing a headscarf in public in England. Also, many Pakistanis living in England have citizenship. Hence, it is not fair to refer them as Pakistani and distinguish from the 'Englishman'.

Barry develops a civic solution to the problems generated by multiculturalism. He sees identity as 'additive' and believes that individuals can step beyond their particular identities. The political community for Barry is not just 'a community of communities', it demands an attachment to the country (Barry, 2001: 77). Yet, given Barry's emphasis on the assimilation of linguist and religion groups into the mainstream society, his understanding of 'civicness' is beyond a political attachment and requires a transformation of individual identity rather than purely adding to it.

c. Cosmopolitan liberalism:

A last strand of liberalism could be called cosmopolitan liberalism. As in the case of libertarianism, cosmopolitanism is also often associated with various liberal scholars. Yet, not all liberals, in fact a minority of them, pursue the cosmopolitan ideal. For scholars like Martha Nussbaum, the cosmopolitan argument takes humanity as a whole into account, not separate states or communities. The realm of the moral imagination and political engagement is drawn to encompass the entire globe. One of the far-reaching policy implications of this ideal is the opening of national borders (Carens, 1995: 229) which have traditionally been seen as the determinants of not only legality, but also morality. The moral implication of cosmopolitanism is having a certain reflexive distance from one's own national or local culture (Turner, 2002: 57). Hence, Turner's idea of self-

reflexivity broadens the scope of Rawls's 'reflective equilibrium' from a particular liberal society to the entire globe. Despite being worthy in its moral aspirations, cosmopolitanism, for the moment, seems far from having a firm base of support in the public except for a very limited number of activists. Apart from its current lack of popularity, cosmopolitanism also faces an enduring problem in generating a bond of solidarity and a common moral vision between people from different cultures.

Civic republicanism

A third way of accommodating diversity is civic republicanism. Dating back to the Aristotelian understanding of human beings as political animals, the civic tradition pays great attention to the political virtues fulfilled in polities. From Lipset to Dahl, Sartori, Almond, and Verba, and to 'liberal' political theorists such as Rawls, Habermas, and Barry, the role of citizens with civic characters has been emphasized heavily by many scholars. Yet, differently from the liberal tradition discussed above, the civic tradition takes the political community as its central concern. Individuals are seen as citizens or members of political communities with certain duties and obligations toward each other and the state. "To want republican liberty, you have to want republican equality; to realize republican liberty, you have to realize republican community" (Pettit, 1999: 126). The political community, as the main unit of politics, has an interest on its own, or 'the common good' and a common or 'general' will in the Rousseauian sense. Hence, the primary virtue of the citizen is "to further the public good over his or her own private ends" (Philip, 2000: 173).

Republicans, in contrast to libertarians, do not see the state as ‘a community of communities’, but as the overarching community. Similarly, multiculturalists are also criticized by scholars from this tradition. Accordingly, multiculturalist thinkers see nothing wrong with people having their primary attachments to particular, even parochial, communities rather than the broader political community (Barry, 2001: 89). Since individual citizens have their own opinions on the ‘good’ of the community, republican thinkers see public deliberation as the main instrument for determining and serving to the common good. They see citizenship as a dimension of civil society and public opinion formation (Habermas 1995). Two necessary counterparts of deliberation are a willingness to engage in politics (Spinner, 1994: 55) and appreciating “the value of the clashes of rhetoric that occur in public councils” (Viroli, 2002: 54-55).

Despite its emphasis on the political community over particular local and/or cultural communities, the civic tradition claims to be compatible with cultural diversity. Patten (2000: 204) does not see strong attachments to particular identities and identity groups as necessarily fragmenting, “if they are accompanied by an attachment to the whole as a context in which difference flourishes”. Habermas (1995: 270) also defends his ‘communicative pluralism’ as “open for and sensitive to the influx of issues, value orientations, contributions, and programs originating from...informal environments”. Pettit also (1999: 124) clarifies this stance and sees satisfying some demands of cultural communities as a necessary requirement of a republican ‘non-domination’ ideal.

Despite its merits, civic republicanism seems to be too demanding by reducing individual identity into a uni-dimensional citizenship. In practice, the language of rights is also often undervalued in contrast to the language of obligations. In sum, the civic

tradition seems to fail in balancing political integrity and social diversity at the cost of the latter. Yet, it is a fact that any given political society needs some commitment from its members whether on civic or ethnic grounds. The civic choice still stands as the more inclusive and tolerant one of the two, but a mixing of the two is more likely given the historical record.

Communitarianism

A fourth way of treating diversity is communitarianism. The primary difference between liberals and communitarians is on the constitution of the self. Whereas liberal scholars such as Rawls could imagine an ‘unencumbered’ self, this depicts a ‘selfless’ self for communitarians. From Taylor to Macintyre, so-called communitarian scholars emphasize the socially formed nature of identity. The constituted –not chosen- nature of identity also implies its persistence. This claim regarding human nature leads to two communitarian conclusions: (a) denial of recognition to culturally constituted identity is a primary source of oppression (Taylor, 1992); and (b) the moral scope of individuals is determined by their local cultures, therefore, justice should be sought within these local cultures based on ‘internal principles’ (Walzer, 1983).

A prominent, so-called, communitarian scholar, Taylor (1992), basically claims that (a) recognition of identity is a vital human need, (b) individual identity has intrinsic ties to the broader cultural setting in which it has flourished, (c) denial of recognition to cultures is a form of oppression, and (d) recognition is a social good which needs to be provided for each culture. Taylor’s starting point is identity, particularly individualized identity. He defines the concept as the “one that is particular to me, and that I discover in

myself'. This ideal arises along with "being true to myself and my own particular way" (Taylor, 1992: 28). Taylor connects individualized identity -as being authentic, original, or having a unique voice- to culture. This is because identity is not (re)produced in a monological way by just turning to our inner depth. Rather, it is defined in a dialogical way -in dialogue with others sharing our cultural setting. Hence, our individual 'uniqueness' is tied to the 'uniqueness' of our own culture which gives us the potential to form our identity. Following Herder, Taylor (1992: 32) argues that "[w]e become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression". Hence, identity becomes an intrinsic part of human dignity and could be reproduced only through a common engagement with other co-members speaking the same 'language'. This form of 'common enjoyment' makes recognition an essential human need. Once we accept that all human beings have equal dignity in modern democratic societies, the necessarily following claim is the respect and recognition of their individualized and cultural particularity. "The politics of difference grows organically out of the politics of universal dignity" (Taylor, 1992: 39). The denial of recognizing culture seems as a form of oppression on this ground. For Taylor, non-recognition or misrecognition hurts human dignity by "imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being" (Taylor, 1992: 25).

In a nutshell, Taylor brings communitarianism closer to liberalism, or to some substantial forms of it. However, this is not an easy endeavor and Taylor is susceptible to certain critiques. First, Taylor's universal fundamental principle, respecting each individual's autonomy, seems to rely more on an intuition rather than a philosophic

account. Men and women, for Taylor, distinguish right and wrong based on a fundamental intuition as a result of a deep engagement within their inwardness which is also shaped by the surrounding and constituting culture. Morality turns out to be a 'voice within' (Taylor, 1992: 28) in this account. This individualized intuition has also a reflection on the collective level. A related problem here is the 'thin' line between Taylor's 'inwardness' and the subjectivism of postmodern theories which are harshly criticized by Taylor. Taylor needs to give a fuller account of the difference between the 'collective goods' within cultures and subjectivism of postmodernism or mere conventionalism.

Walzer's *Spheres of Justice* has also been read widely in academic circles as an alternative to liberal accounts of justice. Walzer, in a nutshell, argues that justice requires/means the autonomous distribution of social goods in accordance with complex equality. Complex equality aims to comply with need, desert, and/or free exchange in different spheres of life from economy to politics. The book has two broad underlying claims: (1) there are distinguishable communities with shared social meanings, and (2) the social meanings shared by community members generate justice. The former claim is an empirical one while the latter is philosophical. Yet both arguments are vulnerable to certain critiques.

Walzer's communitarianism appears most fully in his rejection of universalism, or the belief in a single overarching philosophical truth. Since Walzer refutes a single foundation such as 'utility' or 'rights', to some extent, for his political theory, he can be counted as an anti-foundationalist thinker. While being anti-foundationalist, his theory is not groundless. He grounds his theory of justice on history and culture of particular

communities. Since history and culture vary in different particular societies, the substance of justice also varies. Thus, he argues for 'grounded' or rooted justice as opposed to abstract philosophy. As opposed to thinkers from Plato to many contemporary liberals, Walzer rejects the idea of 'truth out there'. We do not need to go out of our caves to access the truth. By contrast, the only truth we can acquire is already in the 'cave' or the 'polis'. Any further claim to seek the universal truth would be either a hollow or just another misnamed local endeavor.

Walzer argues for 'internal reasons' in grounding justice/complex equality. Internal reasons go one step back from the question of how to distribute the goods and delve into the social meanings of goods. "[T]he conception and creation precede and control the distribution" (Walzer, 1983: 6). Hence, shared conceptions over the meaning of goods tell us the 'purpose' of those goods. In return, the criterion which determines how to distribute each social good is determined in a just way when the means of distribution matches the purpose. Thus, Walzer revises Aristotle's natural 'telos' and grounds justice within a communitarian 'telos'.

In a just society, these separate social goods must have their own autonomous spheres without being violated by a dominant good from another sphere. "No social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of x" (Walzer, 1983: 20).

Walzer's theory of justice is not convincing enough on two grounds, one empirical, the other philosophical. Regarding the empirical test, Walzer, first, needs to define the community in his mind. He should make a choice among three particularist options for his appropriate setting of justice to be consistent: (a) political community (e.g.,

USA, Turkey), (b) cultural community *within* political communities (e.g., Turks living in Turkey, Kurds living in Turkey, Turks living in Greece), or (c) cultural communities *across* political communities (e.g., Turks living in Turkey and Greece, Armenians living in Turkey and Armenia). However, Walzer goes for all three choices on an arbitrary basis. Second, Walzer needs to explain the reasoning behind his choice for a particular group by showing the commonality in the chosen group. This empirical side is important, because for Walzer, “[t]here cannot be a just society until there is a society” (Walzer, 1983: 313). However, even though Walzer can fulfill these two steps (choosing between overlapping communities and putting forward the reason behind this choice) successfully, the project is still incomplete. Even if there is an agreed on community with a shared moral world distinct from all others, this community’s shared moral world might still be vulnerable to criticisms of outsiders, let’s say, for violating basic human rights.

What remains is a philosophical justification of the ‘shared’ moral worlds of respective communities. The idea that ‘internal reasons’ of respective communities and justice are mutually supportive (or the same) is difficult to defend. The obvious question is what if internal reasons, themselves, produce domination? Walzer seems quite confident in his answer. Even nepotism and patronage -two concepts with conventionally bad connotations- are not necessarily unjust for Walzer, but might well be necessary if their social meanings dictate so (Walzer, 1983: 148, 163). However, on this ground, Walzer’s following statement loses its substance: “justice is better than tyranny; but whether one just society is better than another, I have no way of saying” (Walzer, 1983: 312). What distinguishes justice from tyranny? Walzer’s answer is twofold: (a) Differentiation of the spheres, and (b) the realization of social meanings about the social

goods in each sphere. The conceptions such as “tyranny within autonomous spheres” and “tyranny stemming from social meanings” are self-defeating conceptions according to Walzer’s premises. Yet, are they?

Walzer must be aware of this gap in his theory. Perhaps, that is why he turns to abstract philosophy at the cost of consistency. He limits and controls the value of ‘internal reasons’ with human rights. For Walzer, two human rights -life and liberty- are particularly important, because they are the “two most basic and widely recognized rights of human beings” (Walzer, 1983: xv). Yes, they are widely recognized, but still not universally. There are societies which subordinate life and liberty to some ‘internal reasons’. Obviously, we cannot criticize these extremely ‘illiberal’ societies based on their internal reasons, but based on human rights as a product of abstract philosophy only.

Overall, Walzer deals with very hard questions such as (a) are there distinguishable societies with distinctive and shared ‘internal reasons’?; and (b) can internal reasons generate justice? Walzer’s answer for both is yes. Although there are some inconsistent and missing points in his theory, Walzer still manages to apply communitarianism not only as a negative political theory (a plain critique of liberalism), but also as a positive political theory (an original account of justice).

Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism in the second sense –not as the empirical fact of cultural diversity, but as a theoretical approach to cultural diversity- deserves greater attention than the previously discussed approaches for two reasons. First, it directly addresses the question of cultural pluralism, Second, it is very eclectic and uses insights of the

theoretical approaches discussed so far, as well as criticizing them. Therefore, both overlapping and conflicting ideas from scholars associated with these theoretical approaches will be discussed in this part.

Multiculturalism, for most of its defenders, simply refers to the doctrine that cultural diversity is valuable in itself (Raquejo, 1999: 261) and should be recognized as a permanent and valuable part of political societies (Tempelman, 1999: 17). As a part of multiculturalism, multicultural citizenship can be defined as the framework of policies supporting multicultural arrangements within national institutions by integrating diversity into citizenship. Therefore, rights are not only provided for individuals, but also for cultural groups beyond tolerance (Shafir, 1998: 19).

Numerous, if not all, multiculturalist thinkers argue for group-specific rights. This feature posits cultural group rights beyond universal and egalitarian human rights. Based on a liberal defense of minority rights, Kymlicka (1995: 52) states that individual freedom is tied to membership in national groups, and group-specific rights can promote equality between the minority and the majority. Tamir (1993: 42-43) sees these group-specific rights as part of both individual and communal rights, because they consist both of the right of individuals to choose their national identity and their right to adhere to the national culture of their choice. The inclusion and participation of every citizen in social and political institutions sometimes require the articulation of special rights that attend to group differences (Young, 1995: 176). '[D]ifferentiated citizenship,' for Young, is "the best way to realize the inclusion and participation of everyone in full citizenship" (Young, 1995: 177).

Differentiated rights gain importance especially in cases where group difference can only be accommodated when the members have certain group-specific rights. Kymlicka (1995: 30-38) describes three types of special rights for distinct identity groups: polyethnic, special representation, and self-government rights. Polyethnic rights enable a person to freely express her particularity. Special group representation rights make it less likely that a national or ethnic minority will be ignored on the decisions made on a country-wide basis. Finally, self-government rights include devolving powers into smaller political units, so that a national minority cannot be outvoted by the majority on decisions that are of particular importance to their culture, such as the issues of education, immigration, and resource development.

In a nutshell, multiculturalism takes cultural communities as its center rather than the global scope (humanity as a whole), the political community, or atomized individuals; because it believes that individual life is constituted, supported, flourish, and/or reaches genuine freedom in respective cultures. Hence, its primary interest is same with communitarians, with the difference that multiculturalism focuses on the current members of a cultural group rather than an intergenerational cultural tradition. Multiculturalism respects cultural communities beyond mere toleration and recognizes 'cultural rights'. Theorists from the multiculturalist camp defend group rights or differentiated rights for particular, especially, minority groups. Yet, this approach faces serious challenges. The rest of this paper aims at discussing the following questions and criticisms directed to some, if not all, multiculturalist thinkers:

- a. Multiculturalism relies on a primordialist understanding of culture with its false assumptions of the fixity, uni-dimensionality, and internal homogeneity of cultures.

- b. Multiculturalism perceives 'culture' more narrowly than it should. Hence, it excludes other secular and/or non-ethnic 'cultural' communities such as women, gays, atheists, and so on.
- c. Multiculturalism is far from a full comprehension of the role of 'culture'.
- d. Some forms of multiculturalism leads to a hierarchy of groups by undervaluing the role of immigrant groups in contrast to settled groups and ethnic groups in contrast to national minorities.
- e. Multiculturalism leads to the 'ghettoization' of cultural communities and gives way to disintegration, possibly through ethnic conflicts.
- f. By primarily focusing on inequality between communities, multiculturalism neglects the problem of inequality between individuals.
- g. Multiculturalism empowers elites within cultural communities.
- h. By focusing on group rights, multiculturalism tolerates the oppression of individuals. Hence, it is not liberal enough.
- i. By focusing on a 'thin' liberal moral core, multiculturalism oppresses illiberal groups. Hence, it is too much liberal.

III. Multiculturalism and Its Challenges

- a. *Multiculturalism relies on a primordialist understanding of culture with its false assumptions over the fixity, uni-dimensionality, and internal homogeneity of cultures.*

...recent history suggests that to some extent national identities must be taken as givens.

The character of a national identity can change dramatically... But the identity itself – the sense of being a distinct national culture – is much more stable (Kymlicka, 1995: 184).

...whenever and however a national identity is forged, once established, it becomes immensely difficult, if not impossible (short of total genocide) to eradicate (Kymlicka, 1995: 185).

Multiculturalist scholars are often criticized for ‘naturalizing’ and ‘essentializing’ culture (e.g., by Barry, 2001: 11) in accordance with primordialist assumptions. Primordialist assumptions assume ethnic groups are fixed in time, clearly distinguished from other groups, uni-dimensional, and internally homogenous. Going back to one of the most influential originators of the term, cultures do not live only in people’s minds, but are ‘embodied in public symbols’ (Geertz, 1973). The public character of culture gives it a structural feature in the sense of existing prior to human agency and exogenously shaping human action. To the extent that culture is a ‘mindset’ (Elkins and Simeon, 1979: 128), context (Geertz, 1973: 14; Kymlicka, 1995, 105), features of society or a social group (UNESCO, 2002), ‘attached to the collective identity’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 18), or ‘a system of meaning and significance’ (Parekh, 2000: 143), it operates on an aggregate/macro level, and it is exogenously given, so it is a structural variable.

The problem of studies on multiculturalism in particular, and ethnic politics and/or culture in general is that multidimensionality, fluidity, and internal heterogeneity of cultures are, even though acknowledged in the initial assumptions of respective authors, usually not carried through core arguments, perhaps due to measurement and aggregation problems at different levels of analysis. Even the liberal arguments defending cultures from the stand point of individuals often take distinct, exclusive cultural groups as granted as the primary units of their studies. In particular, as Chandra (2001: 10) points out, Kymlicka repeats this broad pattern of mistake by equating ‘groups’ with ‘cultures’.

b. Multiculturalism perceives ‘culture’ narrower than it should. Hence, it excludes other secular and/or non-ethnic ‘cultural’ communities such as women, gays, atheists, and so on.

Scholars such as Barry (2001) and Kukathas (2003) rightfully criticize multiculturalists for discriminating against non-religious and/or non-ethnic groups. Sure, this critique does not target multiculturalist thinkers (such as Young) who do not make such a distinction. For instance, Okin (1998) and Shachar (2000) point out the potential tensions between multiculturalism and women’s rights. Accordingly, the singular understanding of identity among multiculturalist scholars “is blind to the particular vulnerability” of “traditionally subordinated categories such as women” (Shachar, 2000: 69).

Multiculturalist scholars pay special attention to the demands of faith groups whereas they neglect the demands of people sharing non-faith cultures. Examples are numerous. The motorcycle helmet issue of the Sikh and the Amish people’s neglect of

some traffic regulations are among the first that come to mind. Accordingly, some faith groups' members are left free to follow or not to follow some particular state regulations which they find contrary to their beliefs. From particular dress codes to the denial of certain public services, faith groups demand autonomy to or not to participate in and/or follow state regulations. Yet, the rights given to faith groups are often denied to secular groups. Accordingly, a vegetarian person's demands for a particular diet in public-owned places such as hospitals, prisons and schools seem, at least to some, less legitimate and understandable than Hindu, Muslim, or Jewish people's demands for certain diets. The same is true for dress codes. Can we tolerate a naturist person's demand to wear 'not enough' as much as we can tolerate a veiled Muslim woman's demand to wear 'more than enough'? This and similar questions beg for further attention than often given to. The distinction, if there is, seems to lay on the importance of a particular culture in the eyes of its followers. In that respect, all traditionally subordinated groups from women to gays should deserve more attention than they have been paid so far.

c. Multiculturalism is far from a full comprehension of the role of 'culture'.

Multiculturalism, in some respects, undervalues the role of culture. This critique, first, came from another defender of so-called cultural rights. Taylor (1992) thinks that many liberal multiculturalists do not give a full account of the importance of culture. Accordingly, Kymlicka's reasoning is valid for existing members of cultures who are "trapped within a culture under pressure," but "it doesn't justify measures designed to ensure survival through indefinite future generation. For the populations concerned, however, that is [goal of survival] what is at stake" (Taylor, 1992: 41).

Although the whole multiculturalist literature is grounded on the idea that ‘culture matters’ to a great extent for individuals, numerous ‘unconventional’ cultures are often subordinated to the mainstream liberal culture. In Stanley Fish’s (1997) terms, this sort of ‘boutique multiculturalism’ hardly means more than appreciating and/or tolerating an Indian cuisine restaurant in the town or a parade of an African community with their colorful costumes. Kukathas (1992b: 122) also points out the same problem in Kymlicka’s reducing culture to colorful dresses and rituals. If the central claim of liberal multiculturalism is to support the choice or autonomy of cultural groups, multiculturalists contradict with their own presumptions by denying freedom to choose for people who want to be parts of illiberal cultures (Kukathas, 1992b: 123). Hence, if a dominant liberal culture lays the core of ‘so-called’ multiculturalism, it is hard to distinguish multiculturalism from a liberal culture.

d. Some forms of multiculturalism lead to a hierarchy of groups by undervaluing the role of immigrant groups in contrast to settled groups and ethnic groups in contrast to national minorities.

Immigrants are neglected, or discriminated against, in some formulations of multiculturalism. According to Kymlicka (1995: 14), immigrant groups differ from national minorities in that they do not occupy homelands, do participate in the public institutions of the dominant culture(s) and speak the dominant language(s). On the other hand, national minorities are “previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures” which were sometime in the past incorporated into a larger state. They “wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and demand

various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies” (Kymlicka, 1995: 10-11). Hence, the two minority groups differ in that while the former wishes to integrate into to the mainstream society on an equitable basis, the latter wishes to keep its distinctness.

Kymlicka’s distinction creates a hierarchy between already settled national minorities and immigrant groups. For instance, self-government rights, for Kymlicka, should be granted only to the former groups. Kymlicka’s reasoning behind this ‘discrimination’ rests on the voluntary character of immigration. Yet, as Barry (2001: 218) suggests, some immigrant groups such as African-Americans did not migrate voluntarily on the first instance. Yet, my critique runs counter to Barry’s to some extent. Barry argues that the children of national minorities, as well as immigrants, equally deserve the same rights: children from both groups “need to be prepared linguistically and academically to compete for jobs in the mainstream economy.” I go one step further than Barry and deny the possibility of ‘voluntary immigration’ altogether in many cases. The conditions generating the need for migration -due to a range of necessities from political pressure to economic needs- significantly limit people’s choices. In many occasions, migration becomes the only way of survival. We can possibly see a choice between losing access to culture and losing physical survival, but this is obviously not a fair choice. Immigrants would presumably ‘choose’ losing their access to culture rather than losing their physical survival, because the latter cannot be chosen on its own without the latter.

While Barry has a fundamental disagreement with Kymlicka on the role of culture in human life, Kymlicka is vulnerable to more serious critiques on his own theoretical

grounds. Kymlicka basically contradicts his own premises. There is no consistent way of rejecting full cultural autonomy (the right for cultural survival) for immigrant groups if we genuinely believe that cultures are essential to individual autonomy given the fact that migration is rarely voluntary.

e. Multiculturalism leads to the 'ghettoization' of cultural communities and gives way to disintegration, possibly through ethnic conflicts.

One of the most serious critiques of liberal multiculturalism stems from the fear of social and/or political disintegration of the broader political society. One estimated outcome of group recognition and differentiated group rights is the loss of a common, shared public life. Accordingly, the broader society under multiculturalist policies will be split between distinctly separated, competing, parochial, inward-oriented cultural groups (Miller, 1995). Therefore, increased opportunities of intra-communal communication and solidarity could be achieved at the cost of inter-community relations. The mechanisms for this divisive process are numerous.

First, legal recognition and group-differentiated rights could reduce the multiple dimensions of ethnic identity to one. It could lead to the removal of cross-cutting cleavages in a given society. Recognition and political support might create incentives for ethnic entrepreneurship. Cultural communities under the control of ethnic entrepreneurs can produce clientalistic linkages between individual members and their ascribed ethnic community. Hence, the given incentives for individuals lead them to be grouped under this or that cultural community to gain from patronage linkages. On the other hand, politicians are soon forced (by the very nature of ethnic politics) to outbidding strategies.

In turn, outbidding elite strategies and the available demand for these politics will push ethnic groups to take more extremist and centrifugal positions. In that respect, Schnapper's question deserves attention (2002: 7): "How do we avoid crystallizing rigid particularist identities if we recognize them in political and legal terms and, as a consequence, how can the public recognition of difference escape a process of endless cultural demands which could eventually lead to social fragmentation?". Cultural communities soon find themselves in competition with each other to gain political and economic support from the political center. Hence, each community is likely to find itself in an interlocked system of competition which leads to a security dilemma in a similar fashion to the states operating in the international scale. Saideman, et.al. (2002: 106) traces the reasons behind ethnic conflict to the problem of security dilemma: "the search for security motivates groups in divided societies to seek to control the state or secede if the state's neutrality cannot be assured".

The risks for countries which follow multiculturalist policies vary. First, it may be not feasible to have multiculturalist policies in terms of governance (Miller, 1995: 140). Homogeneity becomes necessary to some extent, whether in the national or local level, especially on language matters. Hence, what we conventionally see as multiculturalist countries are, in fact, an assembly of numerous uni-cultural sub-state regions. For instance, in Switzerland, only four cantons are linguistically mixed out of twenty six. The others have a sole official language, and newcomers from other language regions have to adapt, in particular, for schooling. A German-speaking family moving from Zurich to Lausanne, for example, must send their children to a French-speaking school (Steiner, 2001: 140). This situation leads to the emergence of closed linguist regions with minimal

interaction with each other. “Within Switzerland, interactions across language borders have become less frequent”, Steiner (2001: 145-146) continues by warning us on that “the risk is not that Switzerland will suddenly break apart, but that the language groups will more and more drift apart”.

The outcome of emerging closed groups is likely to be ‘ghettoization’, “to withdraw behind the boundaries of its own group, its own group identity, with no need to acknowledge a larger common culture. Citizenship would then be reduced to an aggregate of sub-national ghettos (Beiner, 1995: 10). Claiming that individual rights are insufficient to deal with cultural demands, for Glazer (1994: 238), also means that “whether we want to or not- we will permanently section the society into ethnic groups by law”. Some may argue that the group rights are temporary, and once equality between groups is achieved, all groups will integrate into a common civic life. Yet, for thinkers like Glazer (1994: 238), even temporary solutions lead to permanent splits within the broader society, because “where benefits once given cannot be withdrawn”.

Ethnic identities are thought to be the hardest cases for some in terms of coexistence (Miller, 1995: 121). Many political scientists find evidence for the difficulty of sustaining a stable regime in culturally plural societies.⁵ Ethnic nationalisms “pose a threat to any state which does not have a common ethnicity or a shared culture” (Kellas, 1991: 53). Groups link their fate to each other and see their gains and losses on relative, rather than absolute, grounds. Elections in many multiethnic societies function as a sort of census of ethnic groups. “For minority groups, losing an election is a matter of not simply losing office but of losing the means for protecting the survival of the group”

⁵ See: Barry, 2001; Beiner, 1995; Dahl, 1971; Kellas, 1991; Miller, 1995; Offe, 1998; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Schnapper, 2002.

(Sisk, 1996: 31). In many occasions, one identity group's members make the absence or isolation of another one the benchmarks of their well-being or else they demand the full assimilation of others to their own identity (Offe, 1998: 120).

The threat posed by ethnic groups and other cultural communities to political integrity is real and requires attention. Yet, it is not a helpless situation. In accordance with constructivist insights, a full comprehension of cultural identity as dynamic and multi-dimensional is the first step for achieving such a remedy. As Hooker (2009) states, increasing mobilization and consciousness of minority groups could be channeled into 'nested' and 'overlapping' solidarities which are not inherently in tension with the solidarity of the broader political society. Cross-cutting cleavages -whether through electoral engineering (Horowitz, 1985) or civil society (Varshney, 2001)- could also create interethnic cooperation and socialization. Yet, the argument for the existence of remedies to the divisive effects of cultural diversity does not claim a natural outgrowth of cross-cutting cleavages from multiculturalist policies. This is a process which should be designed carefully and by facing the possible risks which can be posed by ethnic entrepreneurs.

f. By primarily focusing on inequality between communities, multiculturalism neglects the problem of inequality between individuals.

Both Barry and Kukathas criticize multiculturalists for defending policies which lead to the unequal treatment of individuals. Barry's critique stems from an egalitarian liberal approach. For Barry (2001: 12-13), the term disadvantage should be defined on universal grounds "as the lack of things (resources and opportunities) whose possession would generally be agreed to be advantageous". Hence, policies such as affirmative

action should aim anyone who lacks resources and opportunities regardless of their cultural affiliation. Yet, the “politics of multiculturalism undermines a politics of redistribution” (Barry, 2001: 8). Religious or cultural affiliations, for Barry (2001: 20), “may be a marker of group identity without being the reason for the members of the group to suffer physical abuse or discrimination”. Barry’s logic is simple: the politics of redistribution should be aimed at the poor, defined by context, regardless of their skin color, mother tongue, or faith.

Kukathas also positions liberalism on universalist, individualist, and egalitarian grounds. For instance, Aboriginals in Australia on average are less better off than ‘white’ Australians. Yet, some Aboriginals have higher socio-economic status than some white Australians. Then, any kind of redistribution policy should privilege poor white Australians and Aboriginals rather than rich white Australians and Aboriginals (Kukathas, 1992: 123). Although both Barry and Kukathas are right on the possible risks of multiculturalist policies in escalating socio-economic inequality, they both deny the negative effect of ethnic and racial stereotypes on minority group members. As I discussed in my response to Barry, minority group members do not simply suffer from low socio-economic status, but also from the negative stereotypes attached to them.

g. Multiculturalism empowers elites within cultural communities.

A related sub-theme of the inequality between individuals within cultural communities is the critique of elitism led by multiculturalist policies. Various scholars trace the origins of ethnic conflicts to ethnic entrepreneurship and outbidding policies pursued by these entrepreneurs (Laitin, 2007; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). Barry (2001:

21) also joins to this camp by stating that the ‘politics of difference’ manufactures conflict by rewarding groups which can most effectively mobilize and ethnic “political entrepreneurs who can exploit its potential for their own ends by mobilizing a constituency around a set of sectional demands”.

From the historical ‘millet system’ model to the contemporary consociational politics, multiculturalist policies really did privilege elites. This is inevitable given an organizational-positional definition of political elites: those who are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements (Higley and Burton, 2006: 8). Institutional recognition and political and/or economic support for minority groups often lead to the emergence of an elite group which claims to represent the overall community within respective cultural groups. Once created, this elite group is likely to work for the further solidarity within the minority group and for the distinctness of the minority group from the rest of the society. Among others, outbidding policies of ethnic entrepreneurs is a likely outcome of ethnic politics with repercussions on increasingly extremist politics.⁶

Yet, multiplying and cross-cutting diversity can mitigate, if not prevent, the effect of organizational-structural elitism in accordance with Madison’s view on factions in the tenth book of the Federalist. This Madisonian view of pushing forward diversity has resonance today too. Chandra (2005: 235) rightfully suggests that institutionally encouraged ethnic parties can sustain a democratic system: “outbidding can be reversed by replacing the unidimensional ethnic identities assumed by the outbidding models with multidimensional ones”.

⁶ For the outbidding policies, see: Horowitz, 1985; Reilly, 2000/01: 156; Rabushka and Shepsle, 2009; Saideman, et.al., 2002: 108.

h. By focusing on group rights, multiculturalism tolerates the oppression of individuals. Hence, it is not liberal enough.

According to Barry (2001: 327), “the accommodation of ‘deep diversity’ among groups thus goes along with the suppression of diversity within groups”. It can also lead to the justification of human rights violations. Female genital mutilation, burqa wearing by parental force, home schooling, arranged marriages, refusal of medical operation are all examples of possible human rights violations on children, if not adults. As Okin (1998) points out, certain communitarian and multiculturalist claims are particularly in tension with women’s rights as equal beings to men.

Liberal multiculturalist practices could harm members’ rights in two ways: self-indoctrination and lack of real exit opportunities. Especially home schooling and similar demands by certain minority groups aim at isolating children from the ‘indoctrination’ of the mainstream society. For instance, some religious groups in the US argue for the teachings of ‘intelligent design’ as an alternative explanation to evolutionary theory. The implication is that the secular wording of the national curriculum limits parents’ control over their children’s moral education. On the one hand, this claim deserves attention for the reason that illiberal groups are treated as subordinate to the liberal ones in liberal democratic societies’ curriculums. Hence, the claim that a liberal curriculum treats liberal and illiberal communities unequally is right. However, communitarian and multiculturalist solutions to this discrimination are not satisfactory either.

Any liberal society values ‘questioning’ individual members who can compare and contrast different worldviews and choose among them. Yet, practices such as home

schooling or 'religious' curriculums abandon this goal to a great extent through a mechanism of self-indoctrination. Each group can (re-)produce what we call morals and even science in an education system fragmented between secular and religious curriculums and public and home schooling. As a matter of fact, this fragmentation would also bring about the distortion of 'science' in a country where children will grow up by believing in 'religious' curriculums which reveal 'the big lies' of evolutionary science.

Apart from distorting scientific knowledge, fragmented education systems might also easily lead to sub-state exclusive nationalisms between different linguistic and/or religious groups. Hence, any national education ministry has to make a decision on the content of a common curriculum. It might reasonably be argued that the content of national curriculum should be 'thin' or parents should have freedom not to send their children to public schools after a certain age. Yet, a common, primary education for each (future) citizen is inevitable in any democratic country.

The second issue regarding the oppression of individual members under multicultural policies is the lack of a genuine possibility of the right to exit. While liberal multiculturalists such as Kymlicka oppose the illiberal practices of minority groups, other multiculturalists like Parekh, communitarians like Walzer and libertarian scholars like Kukathas find these practices permissible given the right to exit of individual members. Hence, this critique is aimed at this latter group of scholars. It is known even by these scholars as well that the right to exit is not a final solution, but only tempers the probability and extent of injustice (Kukathas, 1992a: 678).

Individual members are forbidden to exit their communities in certain groups. For instance, converting from Islam to other beliefs is a fatal crime in certain countries and this rule is adopted (but currently cannot be legally applied) by some diaspora groups in the West. Although such an immense violation of human rights would be rejected by all scholars discussed in this book, this agreement is lost in less clear cases. If we imagine an illiberal community which oppresses its individual members, but gives them the right to exit, first, we should figure out the real possibility of ‘exit’ for individual members. If the ‘right to exit’ implies losing employment, respect, personal connections, and similar social goods for members, then this right means very little.

- i. *By focusing on a ‘thin’ liberal moral core, multiculturalism oppresses illiberal groups. Hence, it is too much liberal.*

Multiculturalists like Parekh blame liberals for absolutizing liberalism. For Parekh (2000: 109), “the good life can be lived in several different ways, some better than others in certain respects but none is the best”. Yet, not all multiculturalists agree on that. For Kymlicka, principles of individual freedom are the core of liberalism. Accordingly, “liberals can only endorse minority rights in so far as they are consistent with respect for freedom or autonomy of individuals” (Kymlicka, 1995: 75). Freedom within the minority group and equality between the minority and majority groups determine the limits of multiculturalism for Kymlicka (1995: 152).

It is a fact that each political regime needs some boundaries of the permissible ways of life. Some acts might be criminal in some regimes, whereas permissible or even supported in some others. Liberal multiculturalist regimes also need legitimate

boundaries for permissible codes of behavior whether they are affiliated with cultures or not. In the US context, *Reynold vs. United States* (1878) and *Commonwealth vs. Twitchell* (1993) are two examples of drawing the boundaries of permissible actions in the case of religious exemptions. The former case prosecuted George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, for committing bigamy. The latter occurred much more recently regarding the prosecution of Christian Science Church member parents. The parents refused medical treatment for their child, Robyn Twitchell, other than Christian Science treatment and caused the death of their child from an easily treatable illness. The examples could be multiplied in and outside the United States. The point is liberal societies, as any other society, could and should limit the permissible ways of life. Polygamy, inhumane animal slaughter, refusing medical treatment for dependents, and similar activities which violate basic human (and animal) rights as adopted by liberalism has no place in a given liberal society.

The institutional choice for individual rights in liberal societies could be seen and, in fact, is tyrannical over illiberal communities. A liberal state should protect its citizens from torture and other basic human rights violations. But sure, illiberal practices accept gradation too. In that respect, polygamy is a lighter violation of human rights than manslaughter. Similarly, parental discretion on home-schooling after public elementary education could also be seen a lighter violation, if it is, than polygamy. Hence, liberal multiculturalist regimes should and do, to some extent, define some core rights for each individual citizen; and only after this core set of rights, the accommodation of diversity could become possible. Within that thin core of rights, liberal multiculturalism needs to rest on a liberal hegemony which does not negotiate any dispute but imposes its own

'truth'. As admitted by almost any scholar belonging to different approaches, a fully pragmatist and content-free politics is not possible and desirable.

IV. Conclusion

This paper started with the evaluation of different approaches to the problem of diversity in modern political societies: namely, libertarianism, liberalism, civic republicanism, communitarianism, and liberal multiculturalism. These categories are only ideal types -in the Weberian sense- which simplify the reality and make it easier to comprehend, but at the cost of over-simplification and, perhaps, the distortion of reality. Hence, the suggested categorization in this paper does not suggest distinct, internally homogenous schools of thought. It is possible to imagine a scholar who adopts a liberal position on a public policy matter whereas adopting a communitarian position on another. Moreover, as is demonstrated in the discussion of sub-liberalisms (e.g., proceduralism, cosmopolitanism, comprehensive/substantial and civic forms of liberalism), these approaches are far from a unitary outlook. Other schools of thought such as libertarianism and liberal multiculturalism could also be seen as sub-liberalisms. Hence, these approaches are more or less overlapping on some issues while being exclusive on others.

The discussion of the liberal multiculturalist school is the main part of this paper. I listed and discussed certain critiques posed to liberal multiculturalist scholars. Despite the numerous critiques discussed in this paper, liberal multiculturalism still stands as the most promising approach to the problems related to cultural diversity. Since it aims at integrating two so-called opposing camps (liberalism and culturalism), liberal multiculturalism might easily lead to inconsistent public policies. Yet, this might be a strength rather than a weakness for liberal multiculturalism. The complex problems of contemporary cultural diversity require a contextual interpretation of cultural demands. The balance between the units (individuals, cultural communities, and the political

community/the state) is a delicate one. Some policies naturally privilege some of these units over others. Yet, it is impossible to agree on a single, overarching principle to follow in every issue.

Liberal multiculturalism often privileges individuals over communities and the state. The latter two are important to the extent that they make the lives of individual members better. Yet, this relationship is a complex one and requires some compromise on the extent of individual and communal autonomous spheres. A correct formulation of liberal multiculturalism should specify a limited core of basic human rights and discuss the broader issues on a case by case basis in a responsive way to the demands of each group involved in the discussion.

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