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**Russia's Federal Security Service in the Twenty-first Century:
Terrorism, the Political Manipulation of Domestic Intelligence, and the
Dramatic Expansion of the FSB**

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**Russia's Federal Security Service in the Twenty-first Century:
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by

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The objective of this research was to analyze the evolution of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) during the twenty-first century, using historical institutionalism as a framework. Three critical junctures were President Putin's election in 2000, the Nord-Ost Terrorist Crisis in 2002, and the Beslan Terrorist Crisis in 2004; theories dealing with insecurity, the psychological effects of terrorism, and domestic intelligence were also incorporated. This study found that the expansion of the FSB has provided it with greater potential for carrying out its functions as a domestic intelligence service as well as abusing authority and assisting the state in regime consolidation. Consolidation, in the intelligence community and state, was made possible by legitimate terrorist crises and the perception of threats, which were manipulated by Vladimir Putin's administration. Public support for consolidation, favoring security over freedom, was mobilized around Putin's war against terrorism and perceived foreign "threats" within a political system devoid of effective checks against the executive.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Federal Security Service (FSB) is a powerful and multi-role security service in the Russian Federation. The main successor to the Soviet KGB, the FSB inherited the former KGB headquarters at the Dzerzhinskii Square, Lubyanka Street, in Moscow, along with its predecessor's infamous reputation (Staar and Tacosa 45). The FSB has proven to be one of the most capable of Soviet intelligence's heirs as well as one of the most powerful and extensive of Russia's present security services. The FSB is composed of both a central apparatus and regional directorates; the FSB operates over seventy regional offices, which are broken down into smaller district and city-level departments, all following a militaristic command structure that fundamentally begins with the headquarters in Moscow (Bukharin 139). The service's vast apparatus, significant manpower, and far-reaching authority correspond with its wide range of activities. Although technically considered a domestic intelligence service, it possesses characteristics and capabilities traditionally associated with both a domestic security service and foreign intelligence agency.

Originally, activities associated with foreign intelligence were supposed to be limited to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff (GRU); the FSB would function primarily in "domestic areas" such as counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and fighting organized crime. Since the FSB's creation in 1995, though, as a result of various federal laws and

presidential decrees, the FSB has acquired the resources, capabilities, and legislative authority to engage in a range of intelligence practices and external operations as well.

The FSB's primary activities include: counterintelligence, counterterrorism, economic security, intelligence collection abroad, protection of state secrets and technologies, internal and external surveillance, combating corruption, and fighting organized crime, illegal trafficking, and nuclear theft (Knight "Internal Security" 312). The FSB also is permitted specifically to investigate criminal or political offenses, operate detention centers and interrogation facilities, deploy agents under cover, recruit informants, wiretap and monitor communications, as well as enter citizens' residences, and following a 2009 decree, open mail and monitor all postal activities (Staar and Tacosa 44-45; Elder 1).

The FSB wields significant political influence and has proven to be an indispensable political instrument of the state, perhaps even more institutionalized into the Russian government and in control of more power institutions than even the Soviets allowed the KGB—a state within a state; unlike its predecessor though, the FSB is not shy about its operations and frequently reminds the public of its activities (Waller 334). When examining the expansion of FSB authority, and the placement of former KGB-FSB personnel throughout high positions of the government bureaucracy and corporate management, it is clear that unprecedented FSB influence has spread throughout the public and private spheres (Anderson 1). The most profound manifestation of FSB influence in politics has been Vladimir Putin. Putin, a veteran of the KGB's Foreign Service and former director of the FSB, has served two terms in the Russian presidency

and now is prime minister. The FSB began its new era of prosperity under Putin: the most significant institutional changes to the FSB and expansion of its authority have been made over the last eight years during the Putin administration.

In Russia, large-scale terrorist attacks and other perceived security threats, such as “foreign agents” and “extremists”, provided Putin with the opportunity to significantly increase the authority of the FSB and ignore, if not undercut, civil liberties for alleged needs of national security through a highly nationalistic, aggressive policy agenda. This expansion subsequently has allowed the FSB to widen its scope operationally and exercise, if not abuse, its authority. Putin, therefore, provided the FSB an operational *carte blanche*, manipulating the service’s role in domestic intelligence and utilizing certain security functions, mainly its ability to identify, monitor, and report “threats” to the regime; potentially silence or eliminate these “threats”; and assist in political consolidation.

With an imbalanced Russian political system devoid of effective checks against the presidency and the security services, the FSB was used not only for national security, but to further Putin’s illiberal policies against the media, political competition, and any other supposed “threats” to the state. This legacy, spanning both national security and internal Russian politics, most notably as a coercive instrument for state control, provides the basis for understanding the role of the FSB in the twenty-first century.

Research Objective

The objective of this research is to analyze the evolution of Russia’s FSB during the twenty-first century. This thesis focuses on the FSB’s function in national security, as

a central part of the intelligence community, as well as its potential for monitoring and influencing parts of society in achieving regime conformity. The hypothesis of the study is as follows: *Under a political framework devoid of effective checks against the executive and security services, the vast expansion of the FSB was an attempt to meet legitimate security challenges, while manipulating post-9/11 terrorist attacks and the perception of threats to increase the authority of this security institution at the expense of civil liberties and further Putin's agenda of regime consolidation.*

The process of institutional change in the FSB and expansion of its authority under Putin, coinciding with a period of eroding democratic institutions, may be characterized by the following premises: (1) the arrival of Vladimir Putin, a former KGB member and FSB director, as president created a new institutional cohesiveness between the executive and the FSB that was absent during Yeltsin's administration; (2) because the FSB is fundamentally a domestic intelligence service, it shares the two usages inherent with this kind of organization, state protection and state control, the latter which makes it potentially dangerous to democratic institutions and civil liberties; (3) the FSB's expansion began as a response to legitimate post-9/11 security challenges facing Russia but was also assisted by the perception of threats, which the FSB manipulated to drive its own expansion and the Putin administration exaggerated to push for a hard-line security agenda; (4) though the FSB faced many security challenges during Putin's administration, the expansion of the FSB, intelligence reorganizations, and broadening of Russian laws related to security have in principle made the service more capable of protecting society, but also increased the potential for abuse of authority; and (5)

disregard of democratic institutions and civil liberties by the FSB, public support for the administration's hard-line security agenda, and ultimately Putin's political consolidation of the Russian state depended on the emergence of legitimate security crises following 9/11, Nord-Ost and Beslan, which were manipulated under a political framework lacking legitimate intelligence oversight and effective political checks.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

Historical Institutionalism

The primary theoretical framework used in this study is historical institutionalism, emphasizing the importance of critical junctures. Historical institutionalism in general examines the structure or characteristics of an organization's operating rules over a given period of time (Barany 5-7). Institutional development, how an organization changes, is seen as path dependent. Longer periods of institutional stability can be interrupted or broken up by brief phases of flux called critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen 341). Critical junctures are defined formally as "relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest...choices during the critical juncture trigger a path-dependent process that constrains future choices" (Capoccia and Kelemen 348). With these choices the possibility for dramatic institutional change is increased, and the new trajectory of the altered organization becomes more difficult to alter in the future (Capoccia and Kelemen 342).

In a study by Capoccia and Kelemen, it is suggested that *institutional analysis* in particular provides one of the most effective means of studying change, through critical junctures, in the field of politics. In institutional analysis, critical junctures are depicted as situations in which the structural (organizational, economic, cultural, and others) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period of time (Capoccia and Kelemen 343). The juncture must be short relative to the overall

institutional period being examined; the longer the duration of the juncture though, the longer the possibility for dramatic change to be made by an actor. Two main consequences follow: the range of choices is expanded, and the institutional decisions made by actors are more significant and difficult to alter (Capoccia and Kelemen 343). Capoccia and Kelemen's definition of critical junctures is vital in selecting the appropriate criteria for choosing those moments or phases that constitute a critical juncture.

The focus of this study is that security crises and perceived security threats were manipulated during Putin's presidency to reform the intelligence community, expand the FSB, and inevitably consolidate the regime in Russia; these perceived threats inevitably were expanded to include any political critic or organization opposed to the regime. Primary critical junctures include: Putin's presidential appointment and his overwhelming election as president in 2000; the Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis of 2002 or 'Nord-Ost'; and the Beslan School Terrorist Crisis of 2004. All three junctures affected the entire regime, and Russia was altered on a national level. The first juncture, Putin's election, also specifically affected the interaction between two organizations—the Russian executive and FSB. Putin's election brought a strong, political actor to the presidency, with an agenda focusing on hard-line security policy and political consolidation, and a power base, *siloviki*, formed out of several political groups, including the FSB.

As Mahoney explains, “critical junctures are moments of relative structural indeterminism when willful actors shape outcomes in a voluntaristic fashion than normal

circumstances permit” (Capoccia and Kelemen 349). Quite literally, the first juncture provided the necessary actor to allow for the shaping of institutions that would occur as a result of future junctures: Putin was the right person, at the right place, at the right time. It is hard to imagine that Russian politics in the 21st century would have been the same without Vladimir Putin.

All junctures are relatively short in duration, Putin’s election being a singular moment and the crises lasting no more than a few days. All three junctures therefore coincide with the condition that the duration of a juncture must be brief relative to the duration of the trajectory that it initiates, in this case spanning Putin’s presidency of eight years (Capoccia and Kelemen 348). The choices of the right political actor, Putin, resulting from the Nord-Ost and Beslan crises created a path-dependency for the FSB that was codified into Russian law, expanding the service’s authority and influence and limiting future changes that go against its “institutional preferences.” So fixed was the FSB’s trajectory that the new Russian president Dmitri Medvedev removed the FSB’s director to try and disrupt the service’s path and create a situation more favorable to his position as president, concerned that the FSB would be less responsive to his leadership because of its strong political influence and Nikolai Patrushev’s loyalty to Putin.

It also is important to mention that both terrorist crises had profound effects on Russian politics and society, and therefore may be characterized by causing widespread systematic shock to the political and social status quo. This study supports the various claims in the literature regarding the effects of terrorism, threat perception, and insecurity on politics and society; these profound psychological and sociological effects in Russia

allowed for the broader political consolidation of the state. Specifically to this study, though, they also provided Putin with the opportunity, in the form of public and political support, to expand the FSB in such a way that would have never been possible without these traumatic events.

Terrorism and Insecurity Shaping Politics and Society

There is a wide variety of literature addressing various psychological and sociological factors that seeks to explain how and why certain crises, the perception of threats, and insecurity can have profound effects on a society and government policy. Two studies in particular are Daniel Beland's "Insecurity and Politics: A Framework" and Nehemia Friedland and Ariel Merari's "The Psychological Impact of Terrorism: A Double-Edged Sword."

Beland's study addresses points of contention in moral panic theory and provides an alternative view of how elites can construct and frame collective insecurity to meet certain political ends. Beland focuses on collective insecurity, the translation of personal concerns and fears into political issues and subsequently placing them into policy through lobbying to elected officials. Collective insecurity is a social construction, and each threat possesses certain characteristics, a "threat infrastructure", around which elites can manipulate, construct policy, or frame in such a way that benefits their political agenda. The characteristics (structure) of threats that he identifies include frequency, distance, visibility, and source.

The structure or characteristics of each threat determines how and to what ends an elite can frame and mobilize a society around the threat. Political elites enter a threat into

the policy agenda if it is determined that the public recognizes the threat as a major concern in society—an elite may take credit for successes in meeting this threat or blame a predecessor, or even a political rival, who did not support certain policies as an explanation for an administration’s failures or other politically disadvantageous situations.

Furthermore, as mentioned, how an elite frames a threat, taking credit or placing blame, will fundamentally be limited to the threat’s characteristics: “violent, spectacular, episodic threats, like terrorism, are more likely to simulate sweeping legislative changes than a low-profile environmental hazard” (Beland 331). Terrorism becomes an especially unique source of insecurity in that its inherent characteristics are highly visible and originate from human organizations and actors, not uncontrollable natural forces; terrorism can many times also be close in proximity, “touching” a large group of society, and frequent, depending on the organization, security environment, and so on. Elites can “proactively” increase public attention more easily toward highly visible and devastating terrorist crises such as Nord-Ost and Beslan and use the insecurity produced from these events to further a political agenda. Other research has shown that public reaction to terrorism tends to favor more hard-line aggressive counterterrorist stances, and the response of states can favor authoritarian policies or at least those that favor security or freedom.

A study by Friedland and Merari, surveying Israeli citizens following terrorist attacks, demonstrated a hardening of social sentiment toward terrorists and increased public support for aggressive counterterrorist policies. Random acts of violence

perpetrated against a society will cause fear and anxiety; the amount of fear and anxiety experienced by a society though, in regards to terrorism, is usually disproportionately higher than the actual reality of the threat and the terrorists' capabilities. Friedland and Merari found that the majority of their respondents, following terrorist incidents, overwhelmingly favored hard-line counterterrorist measures and retaliation against the perpetrators (595). The participants surveyed rejected concessions and dismissed political solutions in favor of counterterrorist actions. While this study is based on Israel's experience with terrorism, a study on terrorism and public opinion in Russia seemed to find similar "hardening" results (Polikanov), which will be comparatively addressed later.

These factors further explain within the context of this study's last two critical junctures, terrorist crises, why these junctures created a period of flux and altered institutional paths. This suggests that simply saying that a juncture occurred and created the opportunity for change is not enough, details matter; each juncture is unique and contextual: a juncture's specific characteristics will affect institutions in different ways and may allow for varying outcomes in a different political environment. Therefore, it is significant that two junctures were terrorist attacks, as the psychological effects of terrorism and its "threat structure" provided a template for actors' choices. The characteristics of Nord-Ost and Beslan, as critical junctures, determined how and to what degree the Putin regime could alter certain institutions' path dependency, in this case focusing on the expansion of the FSB.

Chapter 3

Methodology

The methodology used for this study is based on an analysis of primary and secondary sources from scholarly journals, books, and other materials related to: Russian security and intelligence operations; the restructuring and consolidation of the Russian intelligence services under Putin; the role of the FSB in Russian security and intelligence; security services' role in political systems and the development, or erosion, of democratic political institutions; the effect of crises and security threats on society and political decision making; and the erosion of liberties and democratic institutions by the FSB under Putin.

This study is based entirely on open source material, information, and data, despite the fact that the subject itself, a foreign security service, is of the utmost secretive and closed nature. The materials collected, translated, and analyzed are some of the most thorough on the FSB; Russian government laws, decrees, and documents provided direct access to ratified state security policies. That being said, though, this study does not suggest that all findings or analyses are entirely complete or comprehensive; it is impossible to be certain when discussing any intelligence service, even in the most democratic states. This study has attempted to be detailed and current given the available literature and data describing the structure, inner workings, operations, cadre, and resources of Russia's FSB.

A large portion of this study's materials came from government documents, particularly federal laws and presidential decrees, while many finer points about the FSB

were gathered and translated from Andrei Soldatov's web project. Mr. Soldatov's extensive work with *Novaya Gazeta* and his project Agentura.ru have brought him unprecedented expertise, knowledge, and information about the Russian intelligence community. In addition, Russian newspapers were helpful in locating recent developments of FSB operations and organizational changes, particularly *Novaya Gazeta*, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, *Kommersant*, *RIA Novosti*, and *BBC Russia*. *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* also provided unparalleled research capabilities and easy access to many Russian newspaper sources.

While limited in open source material, the FSB website provided useful information regarding recruitment and personnel. Although Russia's recent record with democracy has been weak, its government websites, even in regard to the security services, seem to be quite accurate, thorough, and reliable sources. All Russian federal laws and presidential decrees regarding the FSB and its role within intelligence community were accessed and downloaded from the Russian President's Kremlin website.

Reports and other documents by scholars and a variety of international renowned think tanks were examined, but the most thorough was the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC) at the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom. Scholars at the CSRC, such as Russian intelligence specialist Gordon Bennett, who wrote *The Federal Security Service, FPS & FAPSI – RIP*, and *Vladimir Putin & Russia's Special Services*, provided outstanding, open source scholarship about the FSB and other Russian intelligence services. Other notable scholars and their works that were central to this project included:

Richard Staar and Corliss A. Tacosa, “Russia’s Security Services”; Adam Dolnik and Keith M. Fitzgerald, *Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists*; Mikhail Tsypkin, “Reforming Intelligence: Russia’s Failure”; and Pavel K. Baev, “Instrumentalizing Counterterrorism for Regime Consolidation in Putin’s Russia.”

It also is important to mention that much of the inspiration for writing this thesis derived from two books in particular: *Spies without Cloaks*, by Amy Knight, and *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*, by Christopher Andrew. It seemed fitting to at last provide a detailed and current analysis of the KGB’s most famous successor now nearly a decade into the twenty-first century.

Research Implications

The Russian security services have undergone significant consolidating transformations under President Putin, increasingly resembling their KGB predecessor (Bacon and Renz 25). The FSB in particular has been generously aided by these restructurings and legal changes. These “reforms” have provided the FSB with not only more authority within the state, but also increased resources, capacity, and support for operations at home and throughout the CIS. Indeed many FSB operations are intended to ensure the national security of Russia, and for the most part, it is likely that these changes have improved the service’s effectiveness. A benefit of having a career intelligence officer as president was that Putin possessed firsthand experience in the field of intelligence, having served in the KGB and as director of the FSB. Putin undoubtedly understood the inner workings of this institution and knew what kind of maneuverings,

changes, and improvements could make it both more effective and efficient, organizationally and operationally.

Other activities though conducted by the FSB under Putin's administration have been characterized by an abuse of their authority at the expense of civil liberties, with the intention of consolidating political power, eliminating political competition, and silencing the media through censorship. All of these coercive activities are rooted in the broader, blatant disregard for civil liberties and human rights that has become an unfortunate cornerstone of FSB operational practice and is at present loosely codified in Russian law. These practices are continually reinforced by the organization's *chekist* culture, an unfortunate byproduct of the KGB that has remained despite the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such strengthening of the state and FSB has been timely given the both legitimate and fabricated threats of terrorism, foreign espionage, economic instability, and social unrest that exist in twenty-first century Russia, also coinciding with the other profoundly illiberal characteristics that have become all too commonplace in Putin's Russia. The dichotomy of developments in Russia under Putin has thus been split between security and stability on one hand and increased abuse of authority and illiberalization on the other, both within the political arena as well as the intelligence community. It should not necessarily be a zero-sum game, exchanging security for freedom, but in Russia it has been; Russia has struggled to find a balance between security needs and successful democratization. While Russia's military has been in decline, the FSB has emerged as the primary *coercive* element of the state: "the sword and the shield of Putin's Russia", but whose "sword and shield" are they—the Russian political elites or the Russian people?

To understand the FSB is to understand the capabilities and shortcomings of Russian intelligence, as well as the potential for cooperation and partnership in mutual areas of security concern and bilateral interest that may exist between the United States and Russia. The FSB plays a central role in nonproliferation and counterterrorism, which are two critical security concerns of the United States. Furthermore, understanding the transformation of Russia's domestic security service also opens a window to appreciating the complexities and dynamics of contemporary Russian politics under Vladimir Putin, the social and political "fallout" resulting from security crises, and the broader negative effects that domestic intelligence services can pose on democracies, particularly in states undergoing some kind of post-authoritarian transition where democratic institutions have not yet matured.

Outline of the Thesis

This thesis examines the evolution of Russia's FSB, focusing on its roles in national security and its central position in the Russian intelligence community. The FSB's role in political consolidation and increased authoritarianism, as a coercive instrument of state power, is also addressed.

The first chapter in the Results, on the FSB's beginnings, discusses the development and transformation of the FSB from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, until the end of Boris Yeltsin's presidential administration in 1999. This chapter demonstrates how the FSB changed during some of Russia's most tumultuous years throughout the 1990s, which corresponded understandably with chaotic experiences by the intelligence community – the dismembering of the KGB, the founding of the FSK,

and the FSB's inception in 1995 – and continued disorganized developments under Yeltsin. Altering of FSB leadership, structure, and salary; the FSB's role in counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations during the First Chechen War; and its struggle against corruption, organized crime, and increasingly powerful Russian oligarchs are also examined. The chapter closes with two developments: (1) the Russian Apartment Bombings in 1999, which caused wide-spread social panic, provided a basis for the Second Chechen war, and subsequently led to the expansion of the security services and (2) the first critical juncture: Putin's appointment as president and subsequent overwhelmingly popular election in 2000. Putin's political rise, beginning as director of the FSB, then prime minister, and finally election as president are examined in the chapter. This juncture culminates with an examination of the personal dynamics between Putin and the FSB, particularly his background in the KGB and FSB and relationship with Nikolai Patrushev.

The next chapter, on the FSB in the twenty-first century, discusses the evolution of the FSB under Vladimir Putin's presidential administration with the most dramatic periods of expansion based on addressing the "threat" of terrorism. It examines the nature of threat perception and fundamentally how domestic intelligence services such as the FSB can undermine constitutionality and civil liberties, the inherent characteristics of a domestic intelligence service, and specifically how these organizations can be problematic to democratization. As mentioned, the perception of threats by the state, and therefore the FSB, came to include virtually all critics of the Putin administration. The situation was made worse in Russia because of a lack of legitimate oversight institutions

over the executive and security services and the toleration, if not support, for illiberal activities by the Russian executive. It further suggests that both the FSB and Russian government exaggerated the threat level in Russia, propagating “phantom threats” at times to further personal and organizational interests in the FSB and political agenda of Putin’s administration, respectively.

This chapter then discusses the early developments in the FSB and Russian security legislation that occurred even before the first of the major crisis. While Putin’s personal relationship with the FSB set a precedent for development, terrorist crises inevitably provided the opportunity for substantial organizational and jurisdictional expansion of the FSB. The second critical juncture, Nord Ost, is then summarized briefly and focuses on demonstrating how the crisis was used by Putin to propose significant reforms to the security services—namely the intelligence reforms of 2003. The third critical juncture, the Beslan School Crisis, is summarized and analyzed in regard to Putin’s additional legislative and structural changes to the FSB in 2004 and 2006, as well as significant curtailing of Russian civil rights and liberties; following Beslan, some of Putin’s most authoritarian political and legislative practices were enacted, essentially approving the FSB’s practices and providing the service a *carte blanche* in the name of fighting terrorism and extremism. The service’s expansion and development are compared and contrasted, and its broader role in Russian security up to 2008 when Dmitri Medvedev was elected president is also examined.

The Conclusion, following a summary of the findings, is dedicated to the issue of FSB expansion, coinciding with the consolidation of politics in Russia. It examines how

the perception of threats and the threat of terrorism can bring about authoritarian politics and regime consolidation; the psychological and sociological literature on threat perception, the effects of terrorist attacks, and counterterrorism as a regime consolidation mechanism are discussed, using Pavel K. Baev's work, "Instrumentalizing Counterterrorism for Regime Consolidation in Putin's Russia," as a basis.

Putin manipulated these crises and the public perception of threats to further an authoritarian agenda, relying on "power ministries" such as the FSB: elimination of political competition, media censorship, dismissal of foreign NGOs, erosion of remaining democratic institutions within the government, and other violations of civil liberties through the passing of new laws that created *de jure* approval of illiberal FSB practices. An extended rally around the flag effect in Russian society, embracing Putin's "cult of personality" during a period of increased nationalism, xenophobia, and threat anxiety from the security crises, assisted Putin's policies by widening the period of institutional flux and increasing his window for change in the FSB and Russia. When discussing the FSB and Russia's long history of brutal security services, whether KGB, NKVD, or Cheka, it is impossible not to mention their legacy, past and present, with undermining human rights and under Putin being used as a paradoxical instrument of socio-political coercion as well as national security.

The last portion is a basic dossier of the FSB: a present-day overview of the Russian FSB. It provides a recent structural overview of the FSB in the twenty-first century and then describes its organization: services, directorates, departments, and support units. This chapter examines the FSB financially: its budget, officer salaries, and

increases in pay and resources under Putin. Transitioning from financing, recruitment, and personnel are addressed, focusing on aspects such as requirements for new officers, total manpower, and degree of institutional professionalism. Finally, the operations, objectives, and institutional mission of the FSB are also briefly reviewed.

Chapter 4

End of an Empire: Collapse of the KGB and FSB Under Yeltsin

As part of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Soviet KGB was splintered into a series of different security services, intelligence agencies, and government organizations. The FSB was not created officially until 1995, five years after the dissolution of the KGB (Federal'nyj zakon ot 3 aprelya 1995 g. N 40-FZ). The FSB was based on the framework of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), one of many post-Soviet security organs and part of a line of KGB successors that emerged following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Yeltsin's main motivation underlying disbanding the KGB was for political purposes: ensuring that the new system of Russian intelligence would be composed of smaller, competing agencies unable to effectively check the power of the executive and coordinate a coup, like under Gorbachev. Although the KGB would take on a new form, and the intelligence community would undergo a series of reshufflings throughout the 1990s, inevitably the KGB survived the post-Soviet transition, carrying its *chekist* culture and many intelligence officers into the new regime; instead of a single all-encompassing security organ, there were now five primary intelligence agencies (Knight "Internal Security" 312; Mereu 1-2). Many scholars, such as Amy Knight and Michael Waller, have agreed that in the end, the majority of changes seem more superficial than anything as most KGB personnel and institutions remained, even if with different names, positions, and part of "new", perhaps less prestigious, organizations.

By October 1991, the USSR State Council had eliminated the KGB, and by December, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin had fully succeeded in simultaneously dismantling the once powerful Soviet KGB and transferring it to the Russian Federation (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 8). With the security organs under his control, Yeltsin now hoped to preserve them both for the security demands of the weak Russian state as well as his own political needs. In retrospect, it is clear that from the beginning of his administration, Yeltsin had hoped to employ the security services to help solidify control over the new regime, as long as they remained under thumb of the executive (Knight “The Enduring Legacy” 1). Yeltsin either missed or intentionally passed over the legitimate period for security reform that immediately followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite whatever his initial goals may have seemed regarding reforming the security services, “uprooting the Chekists was never a priority in post-Soviet Russia...the government of Boris Yeltsin preserved Chekist structures and co-opted them, relying on them as a core component of Yeltsin’s personnel political machine” (Waller 338).

By January 1992, after a series of decrees, the former KGB had been restructured and renamed into a series of successor institutions. The earliest of the Russian Federation’s successor services, directly related to the FSB, was the Ministry of Security. The Ministry of Security was created amidst a series of presidential decrees and parliamentary disputes over its constitutionality in 1991-1992, shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Security was an extremely powerful

organization, having acquired its authority and resources from the merger of several leading KGB directorates.

Following a second coup attempt between October 3 and 4, 1993, Yeltsin disbanded the Ministry of Security, which had not enthusiastically supported him during the crisis, and created the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) (Knight “The Enduring Legacy” 1). The decree dissolving the Ministry of Security and creating the FSK was met by mixed feelings at Lubkyanka (Knight *Spies* 86). Many security officers only found out about the reorganization from news reports (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 11). Worsening their contempt, all intelligence officers were required to undergo a “recertification” process to be rehired by the new service, which essentially translated into staff cuts (Knight *Spies* 86). There also were talks about limiting the new agency to strictly “counterintelligence” work, greatly reducing its authority and prestige, and redistributing its other responsibilities to other agencies—the FSK’s economic responsibilities, for example, would be transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) (Knight *Spies* 86). Nikolai Golushko, Director of the Ministry of Security and a lifelong *chekist*, resigned along with many other senior officers. He was replaced by his deputy, Sergei Stepashin, to head the FSK.

According to Article 3 of the FSK’s statute, “the Russian FSK is subordinate directly to the president. There was no mention whatsoever of the parliament or judiciary” (Knight *Spies* 87). The FSK was able to conduct counterintelligence work, foreign espionage in collaboration with the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and signals intelligence in union with the Federal Agency of Government Communication

and Information (FAPSI) (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 12). It also was charged with monitoring political and economic conditions in Russia and combating terrorism, illegal arms trading, and organized crime. At a conference in April 1994, the director warned that the threat from foreign spies had increased considerably, threatening economic development in Russia, and “that the FSK could not be effective in protecting society from crime if it had to deal with procedural laws protecting the individual” (Knight *Spies* 92). Director Stepashin and Yuri Baturin continued to call for additional strengthening of the service, which had already grown to over 100,000 personnel (Knight “The Enduring Legacy” 4).

The FSK existed a little over a year. The institutional transformation of the FSK to the FSB was driven mainly by two dominant factors: the conflict in Chechnya and growing concerns over crime and corruption. Stepashin identified the increase in crime, war in Chechnya, and threat of terrorism as an opportunity to expand the authority of his security service and increasingly employed illiberal methods (eavesdropping, surveillance, interrogation) in countering so-called threats to the state (Knight “The Enduring Legacy” 5).

Since the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, ethnic issues had steadily increased in Russia, and Chechnya, the most unstable ethnic republic, sought independence. Dzhokar Dudaev, who had won the presidential election in Chechnya, immediately called for the republic’s independence, an act declared illegal by Yeltsin (Murphy 12-13). Violent demonstrations and attacks began to erupt in 1993. In July 1994, Chechen insurgents seized hostages at Mineralnye Vody airport (Knight *Spies* 106). Shortly after

the incident, Stepashin announced that stabilizing the situation in Chechnya had become a top FSK priority. The FSK began organizing subversive operations to undermine the new Chechen leadership: opposition forces, however, were unable to regain control over the provincial government, and special military teams failed to hunt down and “neutralize” Dudaev (Knight *Spies* 106).

Chechnya increasingly became an FSK nightmare as Chechens refined their methods in unconventional warfare and kidnapping. FSK efforts failed repeatedly, and as one Russian paper wrote, “the latest on-goings in Grozny cannot be assessed other than as a dismal failure of the Russian Counterintelligence Service” (Knight *Spies* 106). On December 11, 1994, unable to solve the crisis in Chechnya via the security services, Russia sent troops into Chechnya, officially beginning the First Chechen War. Following only two years of fighting, 35,000 people were killed by late 1996 (Knight “Internal Security” 313). The infamous connection between human rights abuses and the security services in Russia, once carried out by the Soviet KGB, would reemerge in Chechnya, perpetrated by the FSK against Russian citizens of Chechen or other Caucasian ethnicity. Chechnya would prove to be a destabilizing factor during Yeltsin’s administration; the conflict was a primary factor in hampering the creation of legitimate, democratic institutions, and it eroded any serious attempts to establish rule of law in Russia (Knight “Internal Security” 313).

Though Chechnya was a serious concern, an equally pressing domestic issue was corruption and rising crime. In 1994, Yeltsin passed the decree on “Urgent Measures to Implement the Program to Step-Up the Fight against Crime”, significantly increasing the

efficiency of security organs as well as providing better equipment and resources (Knight *Spies* 93). The decree also enabled the security services much broader authority in conducting searches.

In January 1994, a report determined that 70-80% of private enterprises were either involved with the mafia or paid tribute to these organizations (Knight *Spies* 94). Unlike organized crime in most countries, in Russia it was not limited to drugs, gambling, and smuggling but had spread to all aspects of the economy. Criminal organizations used racketeering, kidnapping, blackmail, and murder to intimidate the Russian public (Knight *Spies* 95). In 1994, the number of committed crimes was 30% higher than in the prior year; Russia was averaging 84 murders a day; there were approximately 5,700 gangs with 100,000 members in Russia; and terrorist bombings had increased from 50 in 1991 to 350 by the end of 1993 (Knight *Spies* 93).

In addition to organized crime and terrorism, the FSK's serious errors and frighteningly apathetic protection of Russian nuclear secrets and technology brought it enormous criticism from the West (Knight "Is the Old KGB" 65). Stealing of nuclear weaponry, fissile materials, and state technological secrets had become a serious problem since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Between 1992 and 1994, German security services claimed to have caught over 100 individuals involved with trafficking nuclear materials or technology outside of the former Soviet Union (Knight "Is the Old KGB" 65). The FSK refused Western intervention or aid and suggested that it was an attempt for external powers to acquire control over Russia's nuclear arsenal. German authorities claimed instead that the Russian security services were merely trying to redirect attention away

from their own failures by making a political statement out of the issue. According to German intelligence sources, Russian counterintelligence officers were being bribed to ignore attempted hijackings or paid to even assist in the acquiring of these materials themselves (Knight “Is the Old KGB” 65).

As a direct result of pressures from Chechnya, growing organized crime, and other threats to international security, FSK Director Sergei Stepashin successfully convinced President Yeltsin that the FSK needed to be restructured and strengthened to effectively perform its security functions. On April 3, 1995, President Yeltsin signed the law *On the Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation*, transforming the FSK into the FSB and expanding its role and jurisdictional boundaries. On June 23, 1995, there was an additional decree, *On Immediate Measures to be Implemented to the Federal Law On the Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation*.

By 1995, the Russian security organs had undergone four years of change, some superficial and others extensively redistributing personnel and institutional resources. At the outset of the creation of the Russian Federal Security Service in the spring of 1995, the Russian intelligence community was composed of the security organs in Table 1, each directly related to a KGB predecessor.

The FSB would staff roughly 78,000 employees and be divided by the new law into chief directorates, directorates, services, and departments, which also specified in great detail the *modus operandi* of the FSB (Mukhin 40). As part of the new law on the

Table 1. Federal Security Service and Related KGB Predecessor

Soviet KGB
Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence)
Third Chief Directorate (military counterintelligence)
Fourth Chief Directorate (transportation security)
Directorate for Protecting the Constitution (anti-terrorism and ethnic unrest)
Sixth Chief Directorate (economic crime and corruption)
Seventh Chief Directorate (surveillance)

Adapted from Knight *Spies* 35.

FSB, Stepashin was promoted to the rank of army general. It was the first time a security director had been held this rank since the dissolution of the KGB in 1991 (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 16).

The service's most important functions have continued to include fighting organized crime, combating corruption, and conducting counterterrorism and counterintelligence (Staar and Tacosa 45). The last two, counterintelligence and counterterrorism, are widely regarded as its two most important priorities. In addition to these functions, the law "legalized such practices as the following clandestine techniques: operating prisons; deploying agents under cover to other government agencies; recruiting, protecting, and paying informants; and collecting intelligence in other former Soviet republics while basically kept free from legislative oversight" (Staar and Tacosa 44). On August 12, 1995, a new law titled *On Operational-Search Activities* permitted FSB agents to enter private residences, conduct surveillance, and tap phones, all without warrants, so as long as the service informs the prosecutor-general's office within 24 hours, a rule that is unlikely to be practiced by the FSB (Staar and Tacosa 45). The department specifically responsible for various kinds of surveillance activities, including physically "tailing" marked targets by foot or vehicle, is the Operational-Search

Directorate of the FSB (OPU) (Federal'nyj zakon ot 12 avgusta 1995 g. N 144-FZ; “Operativno-poiskovoe upravlenie FSB” 1).

In May 1995, Stepashin, recognizing that the conflict in Chechnya would not be resolved quickly, made a long term investment in the region and created a separate department for the FSB to operate in Chechnya. The FSB Chechen Directorate was one of the largest territorial divisions of the service, and a sizable special forces detachment was assigned there to assist in combating insurgents; the FSB deploys special operation units in at least 11 different Russian cities (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 16, 19). This move by Stepashin reflected how quickly the need for countering terrorism was in Russia. He boasted regularly of the FSB’s effectiveness against terrorism: “how well trained and equipped their men were at dealing with counterterrorist missions” (Knight *Spies* 234). Despite Stepashin’s rhetoric, in reality the security organs in Chechnya were poorly coordinated and unprepared, as institutional competitiveness drove them apart and lack of adequate resources left them ill-equipped.

In June 1995, Shamil Basayev led 162 heavily armed Chechen soldiers into Russian territory on *Operation Jihad*, during which they seized several buildings in the town of Budyonnovsk, including a hospital with 2,500 hostages (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 45). Security service troops from both the MVD and FSB, notably Alfa and Vypel Groups, assaulted the position twice but were unable to retake the building and rescue the hostages by force. A peace delegation, headed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, negotiated the release of the hostages in exchange for the terrorists’ passage back to Chechnya and the beginning of peace talks involving the war (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 47).

It was a rare example of Russia using short term agreements to successfully end a confrontation with terrorists. Still, 150 Russians would die as a result of the incident. Special force units Alfa and Vypel would both be officially returned to the FSB in August in an effort to strengthen the service's counterterrorist capabilities (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 18).

Stepashin, who in the end proved quite dispensable, was held responsible for the Buddenovsk affair and fired by Yeltsin on June 30, 1995 (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 3; Waller *Security Services* 8). It was a reminder that "the chief of security and counterintelligence was always in the 'hot seat', particularly under a president like Yeltsin, who drew this agency into unsavory battles with opponents and gave it a carte blanche in risky domestic operations" (Knight *Spies* 236).

On July 24, 1995, Yeltsin appointed Colonel General Mikhail Barsukov, the director of the Main Protection Directorate (GUO), as the new director of the FSB (Knight *Spies* 237). Barsukov had served in the KGB but was more of a military man by training than an intelligence officer. Barsukov's deputy Viktor Zorin, though, who headed the FSB's Antiterrorist Directorate, was a valuable asset having led the KGB's Seventh Directorate on surveillance during the Soviet era (Knight *Spies* 237). In addition to Zorin, the elite spetsnaz Alfa and Vypel units were returned to the FSB. Both Zorin and the additional spetsnaz units should have spelled a legitimate strengthening of the FSB's counterterrorism capabilities; they would not prove any more effective. A decree with the aim of strengthening personnel through improving recruit selection and retention of experienced officers, titled *On Additional Measures to Strengthen Personnel in the*

Organs of the Federal Security Service, was passed in September 1995 (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii 6 sentyabrya 1995 goda N 901).

Six months following Buddenovsk, in January 1996, the new FSB Director faced another hostage crisis in Dagestan when Salman Rudayev attacked an airbase at Kizlar with 250 Chechen troops and then kidnapped another 2,500 hostages within the city (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 49). Offering a false peace negotiation, the Russians assaulted the terrorist convey traveling to Pervomayskoye, Dagestan, forcing them to create a new defensive position outside of the town. Director Barsukov issued the terrorists an ultimatum; this time Russia was determined to punish the terrorists at all costs (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 50). Following several assault attempts, Rudayev, having received significant casualties, was successfully reinforced and retreated shortly before the Russians began indiscriminately blanketing the area with artillery (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 50). The shift in objectives at Kizlar, punishing terrorists versus rescuing hostages, would play an important role in redirecting Russian counterterrorism strategy in the near future; Barsukov's operation to solve the crisis was ultimately unsuccessful. "Numerous units were badly coordinated, had inadequate maps and communication equipment...and a large group of kidnapers, including Raduyev, escaped...in spite of his evident incompetence, Barsukov survived six more months" (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 17).

Zorin and the FSB anti-terrorism efforts had not demonstrated much improvement or increased effectiveness despite the additions successfully lobbied by Barsukov earlier. Barsukov's other contribution to the institutional development of the FSB, in addition to

adding the new counterterrorism forces, was the transfer of additional communication equipment and increasing FSB authority to conduct more extensive surveillance operations with FAPSI (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 17).

A year after the attack at Kizlar, the FSB's counterterrorism capabilities were under legitimate scrutiny and criticism, as they again were unable to apprehend another group of terrorists who were responsible for bombing the Moscow metro underground in June and July of 1996 (Knight "Is the Old KGB" 64). Additionally, in 1996, 39 Russian citizens were arrested and charged with espionage, and the following year another 30 foreign agents were expelled from the Russia. In particular, the FSB ordered the expulsion of nine members of Britain's foreign service and American businessman Richard Dann Oppfelt, all of whom the FSB claimed were engaging in espionage (Williams 1).

Organized crime and corruption had also increased significantly during 1996. Amy Knight attributes the spike in illegal enterprise and corruption to two primary factors: the flaws in the Russian legal system, which was unable to effectively function with and regulate a market economy, and the involvement of leading government officials, who were protected politically by Yeltsin, in illegal activities and enterprises ("Is the Old KGB" 65). Given the severity of the problems of crime and terrorism, it is not surprising that the FSB struggled during much of the 1990s, constantly complaining to critics that they merely lacked the necessary resources and support to address such immense problems. Yeltsin though wanted results, especially before the upcoming election.

On June 20, 1996, Barsukov was fired and almost immediately following his removal, Yeltsin promoted Nikolay Kovalev to acting director of the FSB. Kovalev, a career *chekist* and completely nonpolitical, had served in the KGB Fifth Directorate as well as in Afghanistan and also had led successfully an operation against the Italian mafia's counterfeiting and smuggling activities in 1994; both his experience and lack of political ambitions made Kovalev a sound choice (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 20).

The first major change under Kovalev was the creation of the FSB's Long Term Programs Directorate, charged with making forecasts regarding Russia's security situation and developing the latest modern intelligence methods to combat espionage and crime (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 21). Director Kovalev made it clear that according to FSB reports, foreign intelligence services had intensified and expanded their operations in Russia (Knight "Is the Old KGB" 66). Industrial espionage and stealing of Russian state technological and military secrets were the most significant targeted by foreign services.

Kovalev announced that 28 Russian citizens had been caught assisting foreign intelligence services, 67 espionage operations thwarted, and over 200 foreign agents uncovered, 11 of whom were expelled from Russia (Knight "Is the Old KGB" 66). One of the most notable cases involved Platon Obukhov, a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was arrested for allegedly working with agents of the British Secret Intelligence Service MI-6. FSB officials claimed to have uncovered Obukhov's activities, monitored his contacts, and used information collected from surveillance to expose

British agents in the embassy in Moscow; nine “employees” of the British embassy were expelled from Russia and declared *personae non gratae* (Knight “Is the Old KGB” 67).

To strengthen the FSB’s counterintelligence operations under Kovalev while simultaneously restricting the capabilities of foreign agents and citizens, Yeltsin also passed a law in 1996 *Controlling Developers and Users of Special Means Intended for Covert Information Gathering*, which granted the FSB the authority to coordinate all eavesdropping within Russia (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 24;). Yeltsin made it clear that the FSB should specifically increase its activities on economic security. To meet these goals, the FSB acquired the Economic Counterintelligence Directorate. The new directorate was to investigate corruption, conduct surveillance on foreign businesses in Russia, monitor contact between Russian defense contractors and foreigners, and prevent “strategically important” Russian corporations from falling into foreign ownership (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 21).

On May 22, 1997, President Yeltsin passed a decree *On the Structure of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation*, restructuring the FSB. It was the first significant restructuring since the service’s creation. The decree abolished the position of first deputy director and changed the structure from 14 directorates to 5 departments and 6 directorates. It eliminated all vacant posts in the FSB and caused several generals to retire. The FSB was instructed to continue restricting the recruitment of civilian “volunteers” and maintain its institutional secrecy. The service’s staff was cut by 20% and then 40% in 1997-1998 (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 22).

The decree failed to address FSB salaries, though, 50% higher in the SVR and 150% in the FSO: a colonel in the FSB received 2,200 rubles compensation a month and a lieutenant only 1,500, making it nearly impossible to compete with the salaries of private enterprise and increasing the temptation for agents to outsource their skills (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 22).

Despite these financial shortcomings and discrepancies in pay, in a statement supported by Kovalev, the head of the FSB Counterintelligence Directorate Valeriy Pechenkin said that in 1997, the FSB was still successful in filling its ranks. He noted that young people joining were highly motivated, committed, and deeply patriotic, and that the FSB academy graduated 600 students in 1997 (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 38).

Although Pechenkin was remaining optimistic, Director Kovalev suggested during a speech at the 1997 FSB Academy graduation that activities of foreign intelligence services operating in Russia were at levels comparable to WWII and that the FSB was struggling to thwart the increased activities. Typically western states had been considered to be among the most dangerous security threats to Russia, but “in the post-Cold War changes Moscow discovered that for political, economic, military, and religious reasons, it had become target of smaller and poorer countries” espionage activities, particularly from the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 33, 35). From 1996-97 reports, the FSB claimed to have identified Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Jordan, Tanzania, Pakistan, Iran, China, and Saudi

Arabia as operating regular intelligence activities within Russia (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 35).

The crime rate and influence of criminal organizations began to increase exponentially: “according to Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs, by 1997 organized criminals owned or controlled about 40% of Russia's private businesses, 60% of state enterprises, and 50% to 85% of banks. Illegal drug traffic, the most recent manifestation of Russia's organized crime pandemic, is currently valued at between \$4 billion and \$7 billion per year... [and] in St. Petersburg...200 deaths have been labeled contract killings since 1997” (Members of the Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia).

The FSB had proven to be a “victim of its own success in the Soviet period.” When the Soviet Union collapsed, the FSB lost the KGB’s vast funding and pool for recruitment (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 19). The KGB never faced an ethnic conflict as serious as Chechnya or fought against organized crime, simply because there was none in the Soviet Union. Consequently, threats related to ethnic conflict, terrorism, and corrupt oligarchs continually challenged the FSB to readjust and refine its methods.

On July 6, 1998, Yeltsin signed another decree, *On Approval of the Statute on the Federal Security Service and Its Structure*, that again called for restructuring within the FSB. The new structuring created two new sub-directorates within the Counterintelligence Department: counterintelligence operations and a new directorate on Information and Computer Security. The Directorate of Economic Counterintelligence became a separate, stronger department within the FSB, and Military Counterintelligence received more autonomy (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 27). The decree also

reshuffled several leadership positions such as adding an additional first deputy director to help coordinate the service's activities. Kovalev would be removed from his position on July 25, 1998, the same day Russia passed the law, *On the Fight against Terrorism*, explicitly discussing the challenges, responsibilities, and authority of the state, in particular security organs such as the FSB, in combating terrorists and terrorist activities. By the end of 1998, the FSB structure appeared as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Structure of the Federal Security Service in 1998

Structure
1 st Department: Counterintelligence
2 nd Department: Antiterrorism
4 th Department: Economy Security
5 th Department: Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategic Planning
6 th Department: Organizational and Personnel
7 th Department: Operational and Support Services
3 rd Directorate: Military Counterintelligence
8 th Directorate: Constitutional Security
9 th Directorate: Internal Security
Investigations Directorate
Treaties and Legal Affairs Directorate
Computer and Information Security Directorate
Department 10 (sub-department): Military Mobilization

From Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 28; Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii 6 Iyulya 1998 goda N 806

Following Kovalev, the FSB was placed again under the leadership of another career intelligence officer, Vladimir Putin. Putin was appointed Director of the FSB in September 1998 and served in the position until April 1999. Many of the reforms that occurred during Yeltsin's administration had already taken place before Putin's arrival at Lubyanka. The organizational changes during Putin's tenure were mostly internal restructurings and not the kind of major institutional reforms that would take place during his own presidency. Putin was already a proponent of organizational reform in the

security services though saying in an interview that several departments and subunits of the FSB could be merged or reorganized to streamline the organization (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 37).

In April 1998, two directorates of the FSB's Economic Security Department were divided and reorganized, and many of their officers dismissed (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 37). In August 1999, Yeltsin merged the department for combating terrorism with the Constitutional Security Directorate, creating the Department for the Protection of the Constitutional Order and the Fight against Terrorism (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 38). A few months later, in October 1999, Putin created a new department responsible for monitoring and guarding nuclear weapons systems. On March 27, 1999, Minisvyazi issued the decree, *On the Approval of General Technical Requirements Placed on the System of Technical Means to Ensure the Functions of Operational-Search Activities on Networks (Service Providers) of Documented Telecommunications*, which set up the security services' new SORM system: a system designed to allow security services, namely the FSB, to be able to monitor internet activity and intercept internet-based or other forms of electronic communications between two or more "users" (Ministerstvo Rossijskoj Federacii po svyazi i informatizacii Prikaz N 47 ot 27.03.1999 g).

The FSB was also facing serious financial shortcomings and a rapid erosion of its *esprit de corps*, both of which had been increasing over the last decade but were particularly damaged by the 1998 Russian Financial Crisis. Putin reported to Yeltsin that the security service received vastly inadequate funding and that his best personnel were

leaving the FSB. The FSB director requested that the Duma increase the FSB salaries by no less than 25% by the end of 1999, as an incentive for personnel retention (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 38). Putin ordered a series of staff cuts and internal reshufflings, downsizing the FSB, to help ease the service's financial burden. These purges also forced out older "Soviet" *chekists* while promoting and supporting more junior officers loyal to the Russian Federation and Yeltsin (Szaszdi 101). Yeltsin was impressed with Putin's management of the FSB, particularly the recent reorganizations that amounted to the forced retirement of over 40 Lieutenant-Generals, Major-Generals, and directorate chiefs by the end of March. On August 9, 1999, Putin was appointed Prime Minister by Yeltsin and replaced as Director of the FSB by Lieutenant-General Nikolai Patrushev on August 17.

Also in August of that year, Shamil Basaev and Amir Khattab moved troops across the border into Dagestan, with the goal of establishing an Islamic Trans-Caucasian state. Russia responded first by immediately deploying forces from the MVD and the FSB in Dagestan and neighboring Chechnya (Kramer 212). These forces were able, albeit with difficulty, to repel the Chechen fighters from Dagestan.

On September 4, 1999, a bomb exploded at an apartment building in Buynaksk, killing 84 residents. The following week, on September 8 and 14, several apartment complexes in Moscow also were bombed, killing 228 residents. The final incident occurred on September 16, when a car-bomb killed 18 apartment residents in Volgodonsk (Szaszdi 107).

Skeptics claim that the bombings were orchestrated by the FSB on behalf of the Russian government in order to create a basis for the invasion of Chechnya. A Turkish journalist produced a video testimony by a captured GRU officer, who made claims implicating the FSB and GRU to be behind the September bombings; it is unclear whether the officer's testimony came as a result of coercion and torture from his captors or if the video was staged (Szaszdi 311). In another suspicious incident that occurred after the bombings, Novaya Gazeta reported that the FSB had covertly hid explosives at a storage facility. Two soldiers guarding the compound allegedly discovered an explosive compound hexogen stored in containers labeled as sugar, and upon reporting the incident to superiors, were reprimanded by FSB officers for exposing state secrets and warned by the agents to forget about the affair (Szaszdi 314). The FSB even publically admitted planting a supposedly fake bomb in an apartment in Ryazan as part of a training exercise (Knight "The Enduring Legacy" 11).

The FSB and Russian Prosecutor General conducted a swift investigation into the bombings, with pressure from the government to resolve the case, and concluded that they were legitimate acts of terrorism against Russia carried out by the Chechens. It is impossible given the available evidence, most of which comes from witnesses' testimonies and questionable sources, to accurately and positively identify the party guilty of carrying out the September bombings in Russia. It will likely remain an issue of controversy with accusers pointing blame at either the Russian government or Chechen terrorists as culprits in the matter.

Regardless of who actually perpetrated the bombings, the Russian government laid all of the blame on Chechnya, using the political momentum from the bombings as a basis for conducting a second military campaign in Chechnya (Szaszdi 314). In September Putin ordered the Russian army and internal security forces to reassert control over Chechnya (Kramer 12). The Second Chechen War began in October 1999, as Russian forces en masse crossed the border into Chechnya.

The war and the 1998 financial crisis played a tremendous role in allowing Putin to move into a position of power. United Russia, the political party that supported Putin and a tough stance in Chechnya, received 23 percent of the parliamentary votes in the December elections (Knight “The Enduring Legacy” 11). Yeltsin resigned from the presidency on December 31, 1999, and Putin, as Prime Minister, became acting president. Putin was then formally elected into office on March 26, 2000, winning the presidential election as the Russian incumbent candidate.

Putin’s election as president of the Russian Federation serves as the first of three critical junctures that allowed for the dramatic expansion of the FSB. The unique relationship between the security services and Russian society, the historical legacy of the Soviet *cheka* and its successors, and Putin’s sweeping public support provided a unique opportunity for the KGB’s successor, which it had not experienced since Yuri Andropov was Premier of the Soviet Union—one of its own occupied the highest political office. This momentous event also provides at least one factor to explain why and how the FSB was able to be expanded and has operated increasingly repressive during Putin’s

administration, providing national security while simultaneously operating at the expense of those it claims to protect, the Russian public.

Russia has had a fascinating and complicated historical relationship with its security services. The Russian experience with intelligence has taken particularly interesting twists since the collapse of the Soviet Union; as Gordon Bennett writes, “there are not many countries in which a person once employed by its highly controversial security and intelligence service...[could] run for president in a democratic election, win it, and remain a highly popular leader” (*The Federal Security Service* 4). Putin’s background in the intelligence community, having served in the KGB from 1975 to 1991, actually helped him gain public support and remain an exceptionally popular leader, despite Russia’s increasing authoritarianism under his guidance. Putin’s election as president in many ways was a culmination of events that represented the growing influence of the intelligence community in Russian politics and society.

The Russian intelligence community had its origins in the Soviet *cheka* and its successor agencies; organizations that carried out massive repression while simultaneously garnered a reputation as being part of the elite of the global intelligence community played a pivotal role in the Soviet Union’s defense (Tsyarkin 73). The KGB, despite all of its authoritarian activities, like the Soviet state, carries with it a nostalgia and desire by certain Russians to return to a position of prosperity and global power. These feelings, in many ways a part of Russia’s political culture, were heightened by Putin’s nationalistic rhetoric, the conflict in Chechnya, and the state’s recovery from near economic collapse in 1998 (Waller 352).

Furthermore, there was almost a complete absence of any legitimate reforms of the intelligence community under Yeltsin's administration. Yeltsin failed to establish legitimate oversight institutions, as he knew it would interfere with his absolute control of the security apparatus. The president's decision not to purge the Russian Federation of this *chekist* culture and provide legitimate oversight, but rather employ many of its highly intelligent members in bureaucratic positions, exacerbated the situation and strengthened this social group's influence.

The FSB consequently maintained its *chekist* culture, revering a legacy that was built upon Soviet repression and excessive power, while Yeltsin tried to unsuccessfully balance democratic and market reforms with a powerful, singularly controlled, security apparatus (Waller 351). Yeltsin's only means of checking their influence and controlling security organs such as the FSB was to constantly reorganize them and reshuffle personnel, creating institutional weakness and worsening Russia's ability to legitimately provide security (Waller 351-352). The scenario inevitably became a self-fulfilling prophecy: Russians, yearning for stability and security, were willing to turn to former intelligence officers like Putin and support the strengthening of the security services to provide security at the expense of civil liberties.

Putin's election as president created a unique institutional cohesiveness between the Russian presidency and FSB. For the first time since Andropov, the highest political position of the Russian state was held by a *chekist* and the former director of the FSB. The FSB was headed by a close friend of Putin, Nikolai Patrushev. Patrushev joined the Leningrad KGB in 1974, serving there along with Putin until he was eventually sent to

head the KGB in Karelia; Patrushev was reunited with his old friend in 1998, when Putin asked him to join Yeltsin's administration and recommended him to head the FSB (Bennett *The Federal Security Service* 8). Putin and Patrushev's relationship would play an important role in shaping the FSB, given their trust in one another and their mutual view of the FSB's role in Russia as the security service most central for ensuring security, stability, and order. Both men possess the same world view and embrace the KGB's ideology, which would shape the policies and practices of Putin's administration.

Chapter 5

The FSB in the Twenty-first Century: Vladimir Putin's Administration and Beyond

Momentarily ignoring Putin's political aspirations for regime consolidation, Russia would still need a capable security service to address legitimate security threats facing the Russian state in the twenty-first century: terrorism, corruption, organized crime, and foreign intelligence activities, among others. Although by the beginning of the century, the FSB had retained its position as the most capable of Russia's security services, it was still in desperate need of modernization, a restoration of its *esprit de corp*, and additional resources to fulfill its extensive role in national security. The FSB's institutional path in the twenty-first century may be characterized by three distinct features that emerged during Putin's administration: (1) the dismantling and transferring of other security organs and the addition of resources, personnel, and funding to modernize and strengthen the FSB; (2) passing laws that allow for more operational flexibility and broader authority of the FSB and consequently the possibility for more excessive abuses of authority; and (3) the changes that affected the FSB, particularly legislative, coinciding many times with the government's objective of consolidating the political system and controlling certain aspects of Russian society.

These dramatic changes would not have been possible without consistent acts of terrorism being committed in Russia, including two immense hostage crises, and the absence an effective system of checks and balances in Russian politics. The inability of the system to check or punish the executive or security services allowed for abuses of authority and a widening gap in Russian politics between what the law says and what an

organization such as the FSB actually does. The irony here is that despite a widening gap between law and the practice of security services such as the FSB, under Putin, Russia has been trying to catch up legally with these organizations' practices, not by using the constitution and judiciary to check them, but rather by legally consenting to their methods and actions by passing vague and interpretable legislation.

The Nature of Domestic Intelligence and FSB's Identification of "Threats"

Kate Martin suggests that the inherent interests, or what this study calls "institutional preferences", of a domestic security service can differ from the interests of democratic institutions: domestic intelligence, the collection of intelligence and performing active security measures within a state, can pose a danger to civil liberties and democratic governance.

Because domestic intelligence, like any kind of intelligence, requires operating secretly and covertly, it is difficult to constrain the organization to the same kinds of political checks despite that this type of oversight may be a necessary component of successful democratic governance and a means of ensuring constitutionality (Martin 8). Unlike a foreign intelligence service, operating outside of the state, a domestic intelligence service operates within the borders of the state and conducts investigations ideally with the interest of preventing terrorism, protecting state secrets, and countering foreign espionage. When a foreign intelligence service is acting "illegally", it typically is violating the laws of another country; when a domestic intelligence service violates civil liberties and national law, it is violating its own state's laws and harming its own society.

The same domestic service employed to protect the state at home can also abuse its power or be used as an instrument of coercion and control (Martin 8-11).

Even in well established democracies, the inherent problems domestic intelligence services face, for example, countering terrorism, is quite apparent—in a democracy, a security service’s objective should be to investigate and prevent terrorist attacks but without violating civil liberties and unjustly targeting members of the population who may share similar religious or ethnic ties to identified terrorists. It would be easier though, and tempting, for a service to merely target and arrest members of that social group regardless of whether they have any intention of committing a terrorist act or direct association to a terrorist group, other than their ethnic, religious, or political identity. Security services may even scapegoat members of social or ethnicity groups as an excuse to validate their institution’s importance to broader society, while eliminating potential political competition or critics on behalf of the state, blatantly disregarding civil liberties under the pretext of counterterrorism and public good (Martin 11).

Human rights groups, such as Memorial and Civil Assistance, have cited instances of Russian security services such as the FSB specifically targeting Muslims on fabricated charges, many times claiming their association with radical Islamic groups; according to these advocate groups, in some instances Russian domestic intelligence services have even used torture to extract confessions from innocent Muslims (Bigg 1). These abusive practices have been especially common in Russia’s republics located in the North Caucasus or neighboring areas, which are home to ethnic non-Russians and large Muslim populations.

These ethno-religious minority groups, as well as journalists and outspoken opposition politicians, complain that they routinely have been unjustly harassed, interrogated, or arrested by FSB agents; in some instances, minorities and critics have learned of a colleague's disappearance or death at the hands of the security services (Tsyarkin 80). Toleration of these practices by the Kremlin is most unnerving.

This same logic that applies to counterterrorism can be used to explain any security service's abuse of authority in "combating" virtually any kind of security threat by potentially unconstitutional practices. Furthermore, this same technique of investigating and arresting based on description or perceived association, not necessarily evidence, is particularly relevant in a state such as Russia, where the law allows for flexible interpretation of who may be labeled an "extremist" or arrested on charges of "espionage" and intelligence oversight is essentially nonexistent.

Regarding the vagueness and interpretability of security law in Russia, espionage, for example, is defined in Article 276 of the Russian Criminal Code as: "the passing on, as well as collection, theft, or possession of information constituting state secrets, in order to transfer to a foreign state, foreign organization or their representatives, as well as transferring or picking up other information by orders of a foreign intelligence service for use in harming the external security of the Russian Federation"; the law though does not explicitly define what constitutes a "foreign organization" or "representative", or on what basis authorities determine the intent of "harming" state security through "picking up other information" (Federal'nyj zakon ot 25 iyulya 2002 goda N 114-FZ; Tsyarkin 72-74; Ugolovnyj kodeks "Stat'ya 276. Shpionazh").

The virtual absence of intelligence oversight furthermore complicates the vagueness of security legislation and allows for illiberal intelligence practices to continue unchecked. The lack of oversight of the FSB is at the heart of Russia's political problems involving the security apparatus; it allows for a domestic intelligence service to abuse its authority, violating civil liberties and undermining the potential for sustained democratization. In Russia's "super-presidential" system, the executive branch is the sole form of legitimate and effective intelligence oversight (Tsypkin 79). The FSB is required by law to report its activities only to the president of Russia.

Legislative oversight is limited, only introduced by law in 2005; the Duma's intelligence committee is headed almost exclusively by former KGB members or current FSB and SVR "security experts" and is restricted essentially to approving new laws and decrees involving Russian security and the intelligence community (Tsypkin 79).

As far as judicial oversight, the prosecutor-general is also charged in principle with monitoring government agencies; the prosecutor-general's oversight, however, is extremely limited. The prosecutor-general is forbidden from investigating the "organization, tactics, methods, and means of work of the FSB", limiting this body's role to basically accepting or rejecting cases brought forth by the FSB, which have been quite numerous in the heightened "threat" environment of Putin's Russia (Tsypkin 79).

The FSB as an organization also creates an exaggerated scenario regarding the potential use of a domestic intelligence service; as it is the successor organization of the Soviet KGB, it has embraced the *chekist* ideology and incorporated the KGB's traditions into its organizational culture. The FSB, like the KGB, is torn between its own power

ambitions and obsessive national “protection.” It has no reservations for violating civil liberties and traumatizing certain members of society to protect its idea of “Russia” and what it means to be “Russian.”

The FSB’s institutional preferences, therefore, as a domestic intelligence service have been biased by an illiberal organizational culture that reveres its power over society, is familiar with abuse of authority, and has historically been ignorant of democratic processes. While the FSB’s culture and routine abuse of authority makes it an extreme case, as Kate Martin acknowledges, there is virtually no domestic intelligence service, including Britain’s MI-5 or the United States’ FBI, which is “untainted by scandal, political spying, and dirty tricks, activities that threaten not only individual rights, but the proper functioning of democratic government” (8).

As introduced earlier, this study suggests that the expansion of the FSB was a response to both legitimate security threats in the twenty-first century and the desire of the Putin administration to consolidate Russia’s political system. Putin’s objective realistically was thus twofold: using his background in intelligence and professional relationships to strengthen the FSB to ensure state security as well as provide him with a reliable and loyal instrument to check domestic political competition and control certain social activities viewed as threatening or unfavorable to his policies. Both of Putin’s objectives therefore coincided with the two aforementioned potential usages of a domestic intelligence service: state protection and state control.

The government’s primary platform for these security initiatives with the FSB and consolidation of Russian politics were based on the war against terrorism. This hard-line

“counterterrorism platform” became a central part of Putin’s public popularity and political support as Russia seemed to be facing increasing threats of terrorists from the North Caucasus and other international terrorist networks. The terrorist crises at Nord-Ost and Beslan demonstrate the severity of Russia’s terrorist threats. Terrorism, however, is not the only threat identified by the FSB; foreign espionage and extremist activities are other threats that the service routinely reports in large numbers and frequently uses as a basis for arrests. The issue is not that there is an absence of these legitimate threats in Russia but rather that the FSB exaggerates the security situation, propagating more threats than actually exist, and identifies false threats, ranging from average citizens to vocal critics of Putin’s regime.

Despite the reality that the security environment in Russia, and the rest of the international community, has changed considerably since the Cold War’s end, the FSB continues to cite staggering claims of foreign agents or informants operating within the borders of Russia, in what some authors such as Michael Flynn have coined a “spy mania”—arresting anyone from Russian scientific researchers allegedly for collaborating with foreign agents and expelling foreign businessmen on charges of industrial espionage to generate broad public support and perhaps seek individual advancement. Compiling data from reports on *agentura.ru*, between 2001 and 2008, the FSB claimed to have suppressed the activities of 188 foreign career intelligence officers and 446 collaborating agents, both foreign nationals and Russian citizens (“Otchet FSB” za 2001, 2003-2008). This is interesting considering that Russia’s former Cold War counterpart, the United States, has had only two highly publicized security breaches in recent memory, Aldrich

Ames of the CIA in 1994 and former special agent of the FBI Robert Hansen in 2001 (Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States Department of Justice).

The FSB also has been criticized for abusing its authority to investigate, interrogate, and arrest individuals and groups marked as “extremist” or “treasonous” such as political opposition leaders, journalists, and NGO members. Journalists have been in particular scrutinized and harassed by security service officials on account of extremist activities or violating state secrets; in some cases, these critics have even disappeared or have been killed under questionable circumstances connected to the FSB, typically involving sensitive material on the war in Chechnya, Putin’s authoritarian policies, or “whistle-blowing” on the FSB’s abusive practices.

As the Committee to Protect Journalists writes, “the FSB has consistently played a central role in Russia’s most egregious press freedom violations” (J. Cooper 2). Some of examples published by the committee include: Andrei Soldatov, *Novaya Gazeta*, claims he was interrogated four times in 2002 alone for an article he wrote about the FSB’s corrupt practices; in 2003, the FSB intercepted a truck carrying over 4,000 copies of Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko’s book, *The FSB Blows Up Russia*, being shipped to Moscow, raided the publisher’s office, and interrogated the editor-in-chief; a television reporter from Georgia, Nana Lezhava, was arrested, drugged, and interrogated for having “illegally” crossed the border to investigate the Beslan terrorist attacks in 2004; in 2006, radio station Ekho Mskvy received 15 threatening letters from the FSB and state prosecutors warning it to cease making “extremist statements,” which under the law it can be arrested for by the FSB; in 2007, 50 armed men, identified as FSB by their

clothing, vehicles, and weapons, raided the house of Zurab Tsechoyev, a human rights activist in Ingushetia investigating abuses by the security services, who was subsequently interrogated, beaten, and threatened to be killed by the men if he did not quite his job; the three high profile murders of journalists in Russia, the deaths of Anna Politkovskaya, Igor Domnikov, and Yuri Shchekochikhin, all journalists with *Navaya Gazeta* and profound critics of the Putin's government, had done major investigative work into the FSB's illiberal practices (Committee to Protect Journalists "Attacks 2004" 3; Committee to Protect Journalists "Attacks 2007" 1-5; Committee to Protect Journalists "Attacks 2008"; A. Cooper 1-3; Lupis 2; Soldatov "Anatomy" 2).

Putin has repeatedly told the FSB that their priorities include protecting Russians against ideological extremism and ethnic discrimination, despite the fact that he has amended Russian law to provide the FSB a virtual *carte blanche* in deciding what those terms mean (Federal'nyj zakon ot 25 iyulya 2002 goda N 114-FZ; Press Service of RFCP Central Committee 1). While to an extent it is likely that the FSB operates with a certain degree of autonomy, it is also plausible, given the relationship between the executive and security services, that the FSB has not been merely unleashed but rather maintains close contact and communications with the presidency regarding its activities; this is especially probable when considering the personal relationship between Putin and Patrushev. Although it is unlikely that Putin orders specific operations or investigations against the media and critics, he is certainly aware, if not encouraging, of the FSB's abusive and illiberal techniques. Putin has manipulated the practice of domestic intelligence, using the FSB by instructing it in a broad sense to maintain social order and regime conformity,

therefore targeting critics of the regime and political opponents, who are in turn identified as “threats” to the state and subsequently placed under surveillance, interrogated, harassed, or even kidnapped by the security service.

The FSB tends to identify all of these threats in reports, interviews, newspaper articles, or on the internet, taking advantage of virtually any opportunity to claim that these security concerns are becomingly increasingly problematic if it were not for the service’s successful activities; without access to classified security figures though, it is almost impossible to verify or refute whether the service has adequate evidence to support its claims and criminal cases.

One explanation is that the FSB has used propaganda in the media to proactively remind Russian society of its role and perhaps create a myth among critics that the FSB’s operations are more extensive and highly active against opponents than they are in reality. Although the FSB has been expanded greatly and encouraged to infiltrate Russian society, it would be unrealistic to believe that the service can monitor all citizens’ activities and communications at all times. The FSB may be constructing “phantom threats” to strengthen its position within the intelligence community and from a psychological standpoint, constantly remind Russian citizens of its value, importance, and potentially exaggerated presence.

The primary origin of the FSB’s threat identification is its organizational cultural; Putin’s political usage of the FSB has been important in recent developments, but the service’s illiberal practices and organizational “suspicions” are an inherently rooted in its KGB heritage. The most salient characteristic that the FSB inherited from the KGB has

been its predecessor's culture, *chekism*: an organizational ideology formed in the Soviet security services that shapes and defines the practices and beliefs of all FSB personnel. In an interview in the *Economist*, Sergei Grigoryants explains that the “[FSB] security chiefs believe ‘that they are the only ones who have the real picture and understanding of the world.’ At the center of this picture is an exaggerated sense of the enemy, which justifies their very existence: without enemies, what are they for?” (“The making of a neo-KGB state” 25). The greatest threat has always been the “West”, and anyone within Russia, journalists, NGOs, or liberal politicians, are seen as affiliated with the West and therefore part of the threat.

This *chekist* ideology, rooted in social suspicion and control, has been codified into legislation, such as in the Federal Laws *On Countering Extremist Activities* and *On Combating Terrorism*, giving services such as the FSB almost unlimited authority to pursue and uproot these internal and external “perceived threats”. *Chekism* has played a central role in defining the practices and attitudes of all FSB members, whether security elites or field agents; it is the same ideology and worldview seen in the policies and rhetoric of Russia's former president and former KGB officer, Putin, who has even ominously remarked: “there are no former agents” (Mereu 1).

Irina Borogan's article in the newspaper *Version* supports this theory that the FSB's threat identification is exaggerated and biased, mainly as a result of its *chekist* culture. These *chekist* practices are particularly visible when examining FSB charges of espionage or violation of state secrets; FSB agents have become accustomed to harassing average Russia citizens to create this “myth” of foreign espionage, engaging in

intelligence practices that many times place individual advancement above legitimacy, evidence, and even ensuring actual security. These practices also coincide with the Soviet Union's broader cultural phenomenon of social suspicion and denunciation.

Every organization has its own institutional incentives, one of which is an accepted expectation or goal for receiving advancement. Borogran demonstrates how counterintelligence officers' personal ambitions for promotion, following the FSB's institutional incentive for catching spies, has caused a massive abuse in authority as officers target virtually any potential suspect, erect a case, and even fabricate charges for personal success.

In each case, the involved FSB officers, according to Borogan, have received promotions and moved on to higher posts in the FSB; other scholars agree, particularly examining the FSB's tendency to prey on average Russian citizens such as scientists. Nikolai Govorusko writes: "one measure of FSB officers efficiency – and a basis for bonuses and promotions – is the number of cases they uncover and resolve...scientists are attractive targets: they are involved in frequently impenetrable research, and, generally, lack friends in high places" (2). Although such activities are officially linked to the Counterintelligence Service of the FSB, the primary actor in identifying and arresting potential spies, it is likely many different departments and directorates in the service also take advantage of Russia's "spy mania" and thrive upon the FSB's practice of "counterintelligence" ("Sluzhba kontrazvedki FSB").

The "Soviet-esque" practice of counterintelligence in Russia, the very system that the FSB employs, is problematic in that it encourages the service to forecast foreign

espionage activity levels. Even if FSB agents are not seeking individual advancement, this places pressure on counterintelligence (CI) agents to locate and arrest spies who may not exist by drawing conclusions about Russia's security situation first and producing the evidence second. CI agents begin by assessing foreign visits to sensitive sites, studying biographical information, schedules, and surveillance data on suspected foreign operatives; they attempt to determine foreign recruitment initiatives and redirect foreign agents away from sensitive and valuable objectives towards unimportant targets and average Russian citizens, who are then thoroughly investigated, if not held accountable themselves on espionage charges. The FSB ultimately seeks to compromise, disrupt, or arrest foreign operatives, preventing the potentially most "active" first, by engaging in defensive counterintelligence measures such as counter-recruitment or the use of disinformation and diversion (Bukharin 140-141). Inevitably, though, because FSB leadership is basing its intelligence activity reports on these forecasted analyses and vague information, constantly lobbying Moscow for increased spending and authority, the practice of counterintelligence runs the risk of serving as a post-communist "quota" system for catching both real and imaginary state threats.

In summary, the FSB has its own institutional incentives, as do its agents on a personal level, which historically have always been based on the pursuit and expulsion of foreign agents, both real and imaginary. Today, the FSB has added "extremists" and "terrorists" to this list of prioritized threats; the service has taken advantage of Russia's security situation and the flexibility, vagueness, and inconsistency in Russian security legislation to monitor people, investigate suspects, and make arrests. Journalists, political

opponents, and critics of both the regime and FSB's practices have received the most abuse, frequently becoming victims of unsubstantiated accusations and arrests on a variety of charges.

Aside from the highly visible acts of terrorism perpetrated by recognized terrorist organizations, many times it is difficult to differentiate between the legitimate "threats" identified and reported by the FSB, as well as the individuals arrested on these charges, and the fabricated or "phantom" threats. The question remains whether the FSB, Russia's primary domestic intelligence service, in addressing security challenges actually represents the legitimate threat level in its reports and spends time safeguarding Russian society, as opposed to abusing it. To what extent is the FSB on an organizational level, with an institutional agenda of recruiting new officers, lobbying for resources, and pushing for new legislation, as well as on a personal level, relying on outdated institutional incentives for promotion and encouraging this "spy mania"? Are the threats identified by the FSB and the majority of its activities directed against legitimate security targets or against political opposition, foreign organizations, and regime critics? How extensively has the FSB's *chekist* culture, as well as Putin's policy of manipulating domestic intelligence practices to help consolidate the regime, affected the service's ability to successfully carry out legitimate operations against determined and capable opponents like Chechen terrorists or British foreign intelligence?

Given the limited information available on these questions, hidden in Russian government archives, this study provides two broad conclusions regarding FSB threat identification: 1) the FSB recognizes that it will be prioritized by politicians and the

public as long as Russia feels it is being threatened and in need of a stronger security apparatus; and 2) Putin recognizes that this organization's potential for engaging in illiberal and socially repressive activities, clearly can assist in his domestic political agenda. In regards to the FSB's practices, it likely conducts operations both against legitimate threats and "phantom" enemies, the latter being for personal advancement or assisting in regime consolidation. Both, once again, return the discussion to Kate Martin's fundamental usages of domestic intelligence services, but emphasize the FSB's usage in social control and regime conformity because there is limited evidence to suggest otherwise: that its primary concern is the security of the Russian people and not the interest of state elites. The Russian government provides only partial information to verify the FSB's security reports, while the press and human rights organizations have provided detailed accounts of FSB abuses, corruption, and illiberal practices.

The FSB has been able to strengthen its own position by exaggerating the threat level in Russia, while contributing to the same social anxieties that Putin has relied on to consolidate political power. The FSB and Vladimir Putin have created a collaborative, political relationship between the Russian executive and a domestic intelligence service. And while the FSB has thrived upon reporting and arresting an increasing number of so-called spies, traitors, and extremists, glorifying its own image, Russia remains an extraordinary corrupt state, home to internal conflict and rampant criminality ("The making of a neo-KGB state").

FSB Expansion: The Intersection of Terrorism, Security Needs, and Organizational Interests

The FSB's structure, resources, legal basis, and jurisdiction had not changed profoundly since the final year of Yeltsin's administration in 1999. On February 7, 2000, Putin issued the decree *On Approval of the Statute on the Directorates (Departments) of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Other Forces, Military Formations, and Organs (Security Organs in Military Forces)*, which strengthened the activities of the Department of Military Counterintelligence, part of the Counterintelligence Service of the FSB, which is Russia's military counterintelligence. The decree reorganized the position of agents in the armed forces and the MVD and reiterated the FSB's role in conducting counterintelligence and intelligence, countering terrorism, and protecting military secrets, emphasizing the importance of infiltrating and establishing "contacts" in the military or other ministries. The decree specifically emphasized the importance of the FSB in securing Russia's weapons of mass destruction as well as combating weapon and drug trafficking, corruption, and criminality that may be associated with the armed forces ("Departament voennoj kontrrazvedki FSB (DVKR)"; Ukaz Prezidenta RF No.318 February 7, 2000).

While this may have strengthened the FSB's position in the military, it also likely exacerbated the poor relationship between the two institutions by demonstrating the Kremlin's favor towards the FSB and lack of trust in the armed forces. There has historically been great distrust between the KGB, as well as its successors, and the armed forces because of their different organizational cultures, the FSB's manipulation of

military personnel, and the prevailing view that the FSB, like the KGB, exists in the armed forces simply to monitor soldiers' "loyalty" to the state (Szaszdi 281-82). The lack of communication between the FSB and other security or defense bodies has been especially problematic in managing the situation in Chechnya.

The FSB's proposal to implement a security and monitoring program into telecommunication providers began in 1999, but was not extensively developed until Putin entered office in 2000. Originally, the SORM program began as an order passed by the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Communications and Information, now the Ministry of Communications and Mass Information, on March 27, 1999, *On Approval of the General Technical Requirements for the System of Technical Means of Ensuring the Functions of Operational-Intelligence Activities on the Networks (Services) of Documented Telecommunications*. The program legally built on the legislation *On Operational-Search Activities* that permitted the FSB to conduct surveillance, tap phones, and intercept personal communications, among other activities; however, SORM specifically was addressing the explosive advances and prevalence of the internet and advanced telecommunication technologies, which the FSB believed provided anyone from the average Russian citizen to foreign spies and criminal organizations opportunities to penetrate Russian security and gain access to state secrets and other classified information (Goskomsvyaz Order No. 47).

The need to secure Russia's government secrets and communications paralleled the service's interests to hone monitoring what was going on within Russia. The first major initiative to combat these concerns came in two forms: *The Information Security*

Doctrine of the Russian Federation, passed on September 9, 2000, and a new order by the Ministry of Communications and Mass Information of the Russian Federation *On the Rules for Implementing the System of Technical Means Ensuring Operational-Search Measures on Networks of Telephone, Mobile, and Wireless Communication and Personal Paging of General Use*.

The new information security doctrine defines vaguely information security and cyber threats to the Russian Federation. Both documents should allow the security services such as the FSB more flexibility when investigating and arresting on the basis of surveillance activities. The doctrine emphasizes the role of the state in protecting its own information and places the need of state mass media above private and foreign correspondences (Bennett *Vladimir Putin* 21; Doktrina informacionnoj bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii).

The original SORM was adopted in 1999, and the new model, SORM-2, from a technical standpoint was an improved system, allowing the FSB to more effectively monitor internet communications and filter information (Bennett *Vladimir Putin* 21; Petrovskii 88-89). This system was proposed by the FSB, along with another program called SDSS, to allow the FSB to monitor electronic communications on other cell phones, land-line telephones, and other wireless communications; wiretapping, an important tool of the FSB, even has its own dedicated department, the FSB's Directorate of Operational-Technical Measures (Prikaz Minsvyazi RF ot 25 iyulya 2000 g. N 130; "Upravlenie operativno-tekhnicheskikh merotriyatii"). All of the systems required that the private service providers install the software and equipment at their own expense.

Eventually, the FSB lost a surprising court case regarding the SORM-2 and SDSS programs, which declared forcing companies to install them was unconstitutional (Petrovskii 88-89). Under subsequently approved legislation, the FSB must seek a court order if they wish to install the systems on phone lines, internet providers, or mobile phone companies. The SORM, operational-search, and other monitoring legislations would be amended several times though, and the new decrees passed over the next eight years would inevitably justify legally the FSB's preferred scope of activities. As with most FSB practices, the law is merely a formal recognition of practices that the service would likely carry out regardless.

The FSB would undergo minor organizational changes following a decree passed on June 17, 2000, *On Amendments to the Presidential Decree of 6 July 1998 N806 "On Approval of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation and Its Structure and Regulation"* that addressed the FSB's structure and leadership. Putin assured Patrushev that the changes to FSB leadership would be minor; the president understood that major reshufflings under Yeltsin had resulted in resignations and institutional weakness. While Putin wanted personnel leading Lubyanka he could trust, such as Nikolai Patrushev, he did not want to disrupt the FSB while it healed from its mismanagement during the 1990s; a former FSB director, Putin knew that Yeltsin's constant reshuffling and cuts had weakened the service's professionalism and caused the retirement or departure of many qualified officers. Under the decree, the FSB was allowed one first deputy, one deputy state secretary, and six deputy directors, each who headed a department. The decree also

established regional security councils that were headed by members of the security services (Ukaz prezidenta 17 Iyuniya 2000 N 1109).

By 2001, the situation in Chechnya had deteriorated into an insurgency movement. The command of Russian forces in Chechnya had been transferred from the Russian Ministry of Defense to the FSB in January 2001, signifying an end to the military campaign and the official beginning of a counterinsurgency operation (Kramer 12). The FSB's new responsibilities in the North Caucasus and worsening security environment in the region called for a reexamination of priorities on the part of Lubyanka. While Russian intelligence leadership had long regarded intelligence and counterintelligence as the priorities of the KGB, and subsequently the Russian intelligence services, some had begrudgingly begun to recognize the significance of new internal security threats, which although less glamorous, had emerged as the most serious challenges following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

FSB officers desired nostalgically to be pursuing western spies from the CIA or MI-6 such as at the height of the Cold War, but organized crime, corruption, and trafficking of illegal narcotics had reached critical levels and shifted their priorities. As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and violence in the North Caucasus, in January 2002, FSB director Nikolai Patrushev officially announced the FSB's recognition of terrorism as the most serious threat to Russia in the twenty-first century. He stated that the FSB would increase its activities in counterterrorism, primarily carried out by the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order and the Fight against Terrorism (SZKSiBT), where the FSB's spetsnaz units Alpha and Vypel are stationed,

to address this growing security challenge (Bennett *Vladimir Putin* 15; “Sluzhba po zashhite konstitucionnogo stroya i bor’be s terrorizmom FSB”).

A new law passed on July 25, 2002, *On Countering Extremist Activities*, redefines extremism, extremist activities, and who qualifies as an extremist in accordance with Russian law. This law has been met with criticism particularly because of its vague wording and the wide degree of interpretation that it allows the secret services in determining whether a person or group may be considered extremist and arrested on these legal grounds (Babich 1). The law includes public and religious associations, media organizations, and individuals planning, organizing, preparing, or implementing a variety of acts including: change of the constitutional order; undermining Russian security; seizing power or regime change; creating armed groups or terrorist organizations; inciting racial, ethnic or religious strife; humiliating national dignity; rioting; or spreading propaganda (Federal’nyj zakon ot 25 iyulya 2002 goda N 114-FZ).

Although Patrushev had identified terrorism as a major threat, it is difficult to assess how prepared and capable the FSB’s counterterrorist methods were at the beginning of the 21st century, evident in the numerous terrorist incidents that would plague Russia over the next several years; a terrorist attack at a theater in Moscow would prove to be Russia’s first, large-scale, hostage crisis and challenge the effectiveness of the FSB in adapting to Russia’s 21st century security environment.

The hostage crisis at the Dubrovka Theater from October 23 to 26, 2002, provided the first of two terrorist rooted critical junctures that allowed for dramatic institutional change of this security service and validated the FSB director’s concerns about terrorism

in Russia. *Nord-Ost* began a process of dramatic transformation within the Russian intelligence community and Russian security law. Though the FSB would benefit greatly from these events as an organization, controversial operational performances, questionable institutional professionalism, and claims of excessive abuse of authority would still plague the service.

On October 23, 2002, over 800 men and women were attending a performance of the musical *Nord-Ost* at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, located approximately 6 km southeast of the Kremlin (Holliman 285). At 9:15 pm, 40 armed Chechen terrorists, both men and women, entered the theater and took over 900 people hostage (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 80; Holiman 285).

The Chechen terrorists had placed explosives around the building, totaling the equivalent of 110 pounds of TNT (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 80). They adopted a suicidal posture and threatened to detonate the explosives, killing everyone in the building, if the FSB attempted to assault the theater. The terrorists also refused to negotiate their unconditional demands: the immediate withdrawal of all Russian troops from Chechnya.

Members of the FSB and police arrived and sealed off the building and adjacent streets, and the FSB established its operational headquarters in the nearby Veterans Hospital. The operation was officially under the command of FSB Deputy Director Vladimir Pronichev, although leading members of other major security services and various other government representatives also were there (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 80; Holiman 285). The FSB's elite Alpha unit and other units of the FSB's Special Operations Center, who had arrived within the hour, had already begun practicing

different assault scenarios at a another building with similar structure and design as the Dubrovka Theater. A 57-hour standoff ensued between the Chechens and Russian authorities (Holiman 285). The situation gradually deteriorated as the Russians were unsuccessful in their negotiation attempts, despite being given nearly four days to find a nonviolent resolution to the situation and obtain the hostages' release.

On Saturday, October 26, 2002, the final day of the terrorists' ultimatum, Russian spetsnaz began to redeploy around the theater in three different assault teams as well as positioning snipers and support personnel in adjacent buildings. The spetsnaz forces released a chemical agent into the theater's ventilation system in hopes of incapacitating the terrorists. The gas is believed to have been related to opioid fentanyl, a potentially lethal chemical (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 70). Approximately 20 minutes after releasing the gas, spetsnaz soldiers began opening fire on visible terrorists while the three assault teams simultaneously stormed into the theater, beginning at the theater entrances and basement. The basement team was the first to arrive in the auditorium and once they had neutralized the terrorists in the room, began evacuating hostages. Shortly after, the other teams fought their way to the auditorium and assisted in relocating the hostages. The hostage crisis ended with the theater securely in Russian control by 7:20 a.m. on October 26 (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 70; Holiman 287-88).

The initial success of the spetsnaz forces' tactically efficient assault was short lived as hostages began dying: medical responders had not been notified about the chemical until the first hostages died, and the government had not brought enough of the antidote, naloxone, to treat all of the hostages (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 71; Holiman 288).

In the end, 41 Chechen terrorists had been killed and 129 hostages had died, 126 from the effects of the chemical agent (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 71). Despite these casualties, because the terrorists had been eliminated, the theater returned to Russian control, and many of the hostages rescued, the Russian government in the immediate aftermath called the security services' counterterrorist operation at Nord-Ost a success.

It is possible that the attack was part of a response by the Chechens following the death of Shamil Basayev's close colleague and warlord, Omar Ibin al Khattab, a Jordanian Islamic militant who arrived in Chechnya with a few dozen mujahedin during the First Chechen War (Russell 186). Khattab was killed on April 25, 2002, allegedly from a letter that had been poisoned by the FSB ("Obituary: Chechen Rebel Khattab" 1). It is possible given the several months that the Chechen "black widows" and Riyadus-Salikhin Suicide Battalion would have had to plan the attack that the crisis was a direct response to the loss of Khattab, not necessarily changes in the overall environment in Chechnya.

Regardless of the Russian government's stance on the crisis, the Russian security services, particularly the FSB, failed on multiple levels leading up to and during the Nord-Ost terrorist attacks; the crisis demonstrated inadequacies in the FSB and the seriousness, resolve, and capabilities of Chechen terrorists. The FSB's intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism units had failed to identify and prevent the Nord-Ost terrorists prior to the incident.

The Chechens had been operating inside of Russia, in Moscow, to collect their own intelligence and prepare for the operation three months in advance. During this time,

it was later determined that the Chechen commando team had specifically been living and working undercover in Moscow as construction workers, studying the theater and surrounding area. They took the opportunity to attend the Nord-Ost performance to gain a thorough understanding of their objective and sneak explosives and weapons into the theater when possible. The rest of the team met in Moscow shortly before the operation, traveling by car or train to avoid the mandatory FSB database screening that all passengers received when flying from the North Caucasus to any “internal” Russian city (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 73-74). The Chechens had assembled a highly professional, well trained, suicidal commando team, equipped with assault rifles, pistols, grenades, and the additional explosives for the theater and hostages. The sophistication and cost of the operation, an estimated \$60,000, far exceeded the expectations of the FSB (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 73). While security measures had been in place, such as at Russian airports and border crossings, it had become evident that the current tactics, resources, and personnel of the FSB were not prepared to effectively counter this new threat.

Therefore, in spite of the government’s official public statement, it is likely that FSB leadership and President Putin recognized these legitimate security concerns and reacted accordingly, strengthening Russia’s security intuitions. While Putin clearly understood the importance of a strong, reliable, and loyal security service in achieving his political agenda, it is far too cynical to believe that he began the process of FSB expansion with the singular focus of assisting future regime consolidation. A great deal of Putin’s support was based on his hard-line security agenda, constructed around the war in Chechnya and countering terrorism. While it is possible that his political agenda also

favored a state of constant conflict in the North Caucasus and maintaining collective insecurity in Russia, Putin also realistically could not allow the situation to spiral out of control; it would be impossible for any leader to maintain public support around a platform constructed on security and stability if their regime was consistently unable to provide either.

The combination of significant casualties, attack being carried out in Russia's capital, and inability of the FSB to prevent the crisis under its current framework provided the government with the impetus and support for dramatic reforms in the intelligence community. Many of these post-Nord-Ost reforms would be directed at strengthening and expanding the FSB. The Nord-Ost Crisis of 2002, therefore, serves as the second critical juncture of this study and provided the political actors, in this case President Putin, with the possibility of reshaping the trajectory of this security institution, as well as Russian law and politics. Between the Russian press framing Nord-Ost as Russia's '9/11', a consensus among both military and political leadership correlating the terrorist attack with the need for redefining Russian security doctrine, and growing public anxieties over terrorism, it is clear that Putin's administration possessed the political support and public backing for making significant institutional changes. New security policies, antiterrorist legislation, and reforming the security services all became part of a sweeping initiative by the government to address these legitimate concerns; the reforms also corresponded conveniently with the Putin administration's desire to consolidate the political apparatus and situate loyal, reliable, and ideologically similar members from the security apparatus into key positions of the government bureaucracy.

Three days after the Nord-Ost Crisis, President Putin instructed his security ministers to write a revised draft of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation or NSC (de Haas 10; Safranchuk 1; Weir 1). Russia's National Security Concept outlines a comprehensive national security policy as determined by Russia's leading military and political figures. Some of its provisions related to the FSB include strengthening law enforcement bodies, primarily units that counter organized crime and terrorism; strengthening the system of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; taking measures to detect, prevent, and suppress foreign espionage in Russia (Kontsiptsiya 4-5, 8). The revisions addressed specifically the issue of terrorism and role of the Russian military and security services in assessing and preventing terrorist threats. The new concept identified internal threats as the most serious to Russian security, deemphasized large-scale warfare, and called for reevaluating the role of the nuclear forces (de Haas 10; Safranchuk 1-2; Weir 1).

Several months after 'Nord-Ost', in March 2003, the Russian intelligence community underwent a dramatic period of institutional reorganization. On March 11, Putin issued the decree, *On Measures for Improvement of the State Administration in the Area of the Security of the Russian Federation*, which called for the dismantling of the Federal Border Guard Service (FPS), the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), and the Federal Tax Police Service (FSNP). It was by far the most extensive institutional change within the Russian security apparatus since the KGB had been dissolved (Bacon and Renz 26; Bennett *FPS* 1; Paukov 1-4; Ukaz Prezidenta RF No.308 11 Marta 2003). According to open sources, the

FSB structure at the end of 2002, prior to the reforms of March 11, 2003, appeared as indicated in Table 3.

Table 3. Structure of the Federal Security Service in 2002

Structure
1 st Department: Counterintelligence Department
2 nd Department: Department for the Fight against Terrorism
4 th Department: Economic Security Department
5 th Department: Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategic Planning Department
6 th Department: Department of Organizational-Personnel Work
10 th Department: Military-mobilization Department
3 rd Directorate: Military Counterintelligence Directorate
8 th Directorate: Constitutional Security Directorate
9 th Directorate: Internal Security Directorate
Administrative Directorate
Contractual and Legal Directorate
Inspectorate Directorate

From Kolpakigi and Ceryakov 532

As a result of the 2003 reforms, the FSB received the entire Federal Border Guard Service, which was to be headed by First Deputy Director Vladimir Pronichev, who previously directed the FSB's counterterrorism operations (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 11 Marta 2003 g. N 324). The FSB also received a sizable part of FAPSI, the second largest portion of the agency, other than what the Federal Protective Service (FSO) received. The FSB inherited half of FAPSI's 3rd Main Directorate or electronic intelligence within the borders of Russia (GURRSS), which became the Center for Communications Security of the FSB (TsBS); the 2nd Main Directorate of FAPSI or communications security, decryption, and cryptography (GUBS), which became the Center for Signals Intelligence of the FSB (TsRRSS); and FAPSI's intelligence troops and research institutions (Khinshtein 1-3; "Centr bezopasnosti svyazi FSB"; "Tretij glavk FAPSI Glavnoe upravlenie radioelektronnoj razvedki sredstv svyazi (GURRSS)").

Prior to the intelligence reforms of 2003, the Federal Border Guard Service was an independent security service of the Russian Federation charged with the protection and securing of Russia's national borders. The service not only guards and monitors Russia's borders but also conducts intelligence operations and investigations in and along Russia's territorial borders, much in the same way as the Department of Homeland Security in the United States (Soldatov and Borogan "The Mutation"). Despite the massive loss of territory resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia currently occupies the largest national border in the world and is neighbored by 16 different foreign states (Bennett *Federal Border* 1). Nearly half of all Soviet border districts, along with their security posts, staff facilities, and other fixed installations, now reside external to Russia in states of the CIS.

As of May 2001, two years prior to its merger with the FSB, the Federal Border Guard Service had planned to cut its staff to 180,000 personnel as part of a 5-year personnel reduction plan, and according to recent sources, the FSB's border guards service would be cut by an additional 10,000 troops. Despite the cutbacks in manpower, because the border guards are part of the FSB, their resources and operational authority have increased dramatically. The border guards of the FSB should be much more effective than their predecessors in securing Russia's borders (Bennett *Federal Border* 13-14; Soldatov "Voiska" 1-3).

The Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information was a powerful and expensive Russian intelligence agency responsible primarily for signals intelligence, electronic intelligence, crypto-analysis, and intelligence on non-

communication signal or electronic emissions (Bennett *The Federal Agency* 1). Its most fundamental objective was to intercept and decipher the communications of other states or strategically important parties, whether by employing mathematical models or collecting electromagnetic and acoustic leakage (Bennett *The Federal Agency* 1-2). The Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information also served as the information warfare agency of the Russian Federation. The Agency provided reports to the Russian president and operated both within and outside of the borders of Russia, establishing SIGINT posts in friendly or neutral states in exchange for generous financial compensation, most notably the Lourdes Center in Cuba (Bennett *The Federal Agency* 21; Soldatov “Na strazhe mira” 1). Unlike the Federal Border Guard Service, FAPSI was divided among the FSB, Foreign Intelligence Service, and Federal Protection Service.

The FSB is authorized to carry out a wide range of activities. The transferring of the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information’s domestic role was another logical transfer of equipment and resources to a critically important agency whose multiple roles were already stretched and demonstrated why FAPSI’s expensive existence was all the more unnecessary. Even before the reforms of March 11, the FSB, not FAPSI, was the primary organization for monitoring communications, conducting surveillance, encrypting communications and performing cryptanalysis, and certifying private business ventures in telecommunications and computing; “the FSB’s function as a gatherer of information about activities in all spheres of Russia’s political life is crucial to the Kremlin” and makes the addition of FAPSI’s organs a particularly important move by an administration seeking to consolidate the political establishment (Pallin 13). The

addition of the border guards' service tripled the FSB's manpower, increasing it by an additional 180,000 employees, and provided the additional funding of the Federal Border Guard Service to the FSB's budget, which Julian Cooper estimated to have been 25,066 million rubles in 2003 (Bacon and Renz 26; J. Cooper 108). This transfer assisted with the FSB's primary roles of counterterrorism and counterintelligence, allowing the service to monitor more directly and coordinate the security of Russia's borders: ensuring foreign agents, terrorists, and illegal traffickers were unable to penetrate into Russia and the unauthorized sales of state secrets, nuclear material, and dual-use technologies were not allowed to exit Russia.

Analyzing the results of the 2003 intelligence reforms, the FSB was definitely the most successful beneficiary. Having received Russia's entire border service and some of its most powerful electronic intelligence organs likely strengthened several of the many roles that the FSB is expected to fulfill and in principle, corrected inefficiencies within the Russian intelligence community. Consolidating the security and intelligence services was a logical budgetary decision and should help resolve some of the communication problems and overlapping authority that plagued the services throughout the 1990s and early twenty-first century.

The fragmentation of the intelligence community into 13 different entities had been disastrous, as the FSB was too resourcefully lean, interfered with politically, and forced to compete with other services; these inefficiencies proved particularly costly in Chechnya and at Nord-Ost. The changes of 2003 streamlined the intelligence community, particularly its command structure and consolidating agencies whose roles overlapped

(Bacon and Renz 26-27). It also marked a significant expansion of the FSB, extending its distance above other security bodies within the Russian intelligence hierarchy to a position that the Putin administration believes it should be to effectively meet current threats.

In response to the Nord-Ost terrorist attacks and concerns over future incidents, a new anti-terrorism decree, *On Additional Measures to Combat Terrorism in the North Caucasus of Russia*, was also passed on June 30, 2003. The most significant part of the decree was that it transferred responsibilities in Chechnya from the FSB to the MVD (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 30 iyunya 2003 g. N 715). This did not mean that the FSB would no longer function in Chechnya but rather would not be in command of the overall counterinsurgency. The FSB would serve a supporting role, but one of significant salience, conducting more covert counterterrorism or intelligence operations on the ground in Chechnya as opposed to the direct day-to-day “peacekeeping” in the region that would be left to the MVD. The FSB has exercised a particularly strong presence with its elite spetsnaz forces in Chechnya’s southern mountainous regions (Kramer 9-10).

The MVD would oversee Chechnya at the federal level and manage the Regional Operations Staff (ROSH) for the North Caucasus, which conflicted with the operations of the FSB’s Chechnya Regional Office and service’s duties at the national level (Soldatov and Borogan “Terrorism” 3-4). The situation became exceptionally confusing as the FSB and MVD’s jurisdictions had become overlapping and unclear; neither the new laws nor Federal Antiterrorism Commission clarified whose authority took precedence or how the

agencies should be coordinating and sharing information (Soldatov and Borogan “Terrorism” 3-4). The transfer of leadership in Chechnya threatened to undermine the “streamlining” reorganizations of 2003 that were supposed to resolve inefficiencies and coordination in the intelligence community.

Issues of the Federal Security Service, a decree passed on August 11, 2003, made changes to the FSB’s structure and discussed the various roles and operational parameters of the FSB in Russian security. It was a legislative continuation of the intelligence reorganization decree from March, specifically related to the authority, responsibilities, and organization of the FSB. The decree describes the main tasks of the FSB and includes among other responsibilities: identifying, preventing, and combating foreign intelligence; combating crime, corruption, and smuggling of weapons and narcotics; defending against terrorist and extremist activities; conducting intelligence collection; protecting Russia’s borders; encrypting and decrypting communications; protecting Russia’s economic interests; conducting surveillance; and protecting state secrets, strategic sites, and technologies (Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 11 avgusta 2003 g. N 960). The decree outlined the FSB’s leadership and structure as follows: the FSB is allowed two deputy directors, a first deputy director in charge of the border guard service of the FSB, a deputy director-state secretary, another deputy director, six deputy directors who are the heads of the six main FSB departments, and a deputy director in charge of the Inspectorate Directorate of the FSB (Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 11 avgusta 2003 g. N 960).

Another decree, also titled *Issues of the Federal Security Service*, passed on July 11, 2004, and made additional organizational and legislative changes to the FSB. The

decree's objective was to improve the effectiveness of the FSB and gave Nikolai Patrushev three months to outline a proposal (Volkov and Zaitsev 1). Putin and the FSB's leadership used the opportunity to target specifically the service's structure, beginning by reorganizing the FSB's directorates into independent subunits called "services", eliminating the previous system of organization. Each service would then be divided into separate departments and directorates to deal with a more specific security function. For example, based on the decree the Department for Military Counterintelligence was consolidated into the new Counterintelligence Service of the FSB; two departments, the Department for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, created in 1998 to deal with social threats such as "internal sedition", and the Department for the Fight against Terrorism, were merged into a single service called the Service for the Fight against Terrorism and the Protection of the Constitutional Order ("Sistema politicheskogo syska v Rossii"; "Sluzhba po zashhite konstitucionnogo stroya i bor'be s terrorizmom FS"; Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 11 Iyulya 2004 g. N 870. According to the decree, the FSB leadership may consist of one first deputy director, one first deputy and head of the Border Guard Service of the FSB, and two deputy directors. Not including directorates and departments, the FSB is composed of the services within its structure listed in Table 4.

In wake of the 2003 reforms, which reorganized the entire intelligence community, FSB officers had hoped that the new legislation would bring even more radical enlargement of the FSB. There had been rumors about the Kremlin's intention on

resurrecting the Ministry of Security, which would merge the Federal Protective Service and Foreign Intelligence Service into the FSB; this would not be the case though

Table 4. Structure of the Federal Security Service in 2004

Structure
(1 st) Counterintelligence Service
(2 nd) Service for Protection of the Constitutional Order and the Fight against Terrorism
(3 rd) Border Guard Service
(4 th) Economic Security Service
(5 th) Operational Information and International Communications Service
(6 th) Service of Organizational Personnel Work
(7 th) Oversight Service
(8 th) Scientific and Technical Service
(9 th) Activity Support Service

From “Struktura FSB: Central'nyj apparat”

with the July 11 decree (Sas, Skrobot, Latukhina, and Rodin 4). It would appear that Lubyanka, which thus far had been generously rewarded by the Putin administration, was getting greedy, showing immediate disappointment in the decree. They cited their position on the matter saying that such a radical reorganization would allow for a singular “fist” to attack Russia’s enemies, eliminate “redundant” security institutions, and lower the costs of maintaining the security services (Sas, Skrobot, Latukhina, and Rodin 4). Regardless of the service’s position, expressed discontent, and how awful the acts of terrorism, this kind of reform would never occur.

Sources in the Putin administration noted that despite unparalleled financial, structural, and legislative strengthening that the FSB had received over the last four years, and given the state’s tolerance of the service’s constitutionally questionable methods, in a society already gripped with collective insecurity, the FSB still fell short in

two critical areas expected of a world-class security service: professionalism and its ability to excel during crisis (Volkov and Zaitsev 1).

The critics were justified; even though the FSB was proving capable at conducting routine counterintelligence operations and monitoring “political extremists”, the service had failed repeatedly in preventing terrorism. Large-scale acts of terrorism and hostage crises, such as Budyennovsk, Kizlar, and Nord-Ost, had been particularly problematic for the FSB to resolve without massive casualties. These critical moments, when Russia needed the FSB to perform at its best, became a rallying cry for increasingly hard-line counterterrorist measures and expansion of the security institutions at the expense of civil liberties. The most dramatic of these terrorist attacks, particularly in its ability to shape national and international sentiment towards terrorism in Russia, occurred in the fall of 2004 in Beslan, North Ossetia.

On the morning of September 1, 2004, a group of terrorists arrived at the No.1 School in Beslan and took between 1,150-1,200 people hostage (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 109-118; Plater-Zyberk 1-3, 7). The crisis at Beslan would last three days, ending in a chaotic and brutal engagement between security forces and the terrorists on September 3rd. From the moment they arrived in Beslan, the terrorists were highly organized—splitting up the hostages into different classrooms until they finished rigging the building with 127 explosives devices, setting up their defense positions, and then relocating them to a central location, the gymnasium, which had been wired with explosives (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 109-118; Plater-Zyberk 1-2). Seven terrorists took turns guarding the gym, while the others were dispersed throughout the corridors, classrooms, and cafeteria, with

the leaders in the library and teachers' office; the terrorists positioned snipers around the building, mounted eight surveillance cameras, and in addition to being well armed, had brought gas masks (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 109-118; Plater-Zyberk 1-2).

Over an hour after the situation began, soldiers and police arrived on the scene. The President of North Ossetia, Alexander Dzasokhov set up the one of two command centers at the neighboring Technical School No. 8, and FSB deputy directors Vladimir Pronichev and Vladimir Anisimov set up the other when they arrived (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 109-118; Plater-Zyberk 1-3). Initial attempt by the FSB were futile, as the terrorists insisted from the beginning that they would only speak with select individuals or high ranking members of the state. Their official demands, received during the afternoon of the second day and relayed to the government forces by Ruslan Aushev, a former Afghan war general, were highly unlikely: the Russian military must withdraw from Chechnya at once and Russia must recognize Chechnya's independence (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 109-118; Plater-Zyberk 1-3).

It is not entirely clear what went wrong after the first two and a half days of negotiating, but on the third and final day of the Beslan crisis, a massive shootout occurred between the Russians and terrorists amidst a chaotic series of events. At approximately 1:00 pm, the terrorists announced they would remove the bodies of dead civilians who had been killed two days earlier, but as a vehicle approached to collect the dead, shots were fired and several explosions seen from within the school (Haraszi 3). A violent shootout ensued between the government forces and the terrorists, as hostages desperately fled from the school amidst the firefight. Whatever started the shootout is

unclear, but when the engagement had ended and authorities collected the casualties the following morning, the results were horrific: 338 hostages were reported killed, of which 186 were children, along with 30 terrorists and 10 members of the FSB's Special Forces Center (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 109-118; Forester 1; Plater-Zyberk 5-7).

Understanding what went wrong at Beslan is markedly different from what had taken place at Nord-Ost. The Beslan Crisis is entirely a question of which account appears most accurate, each providing differing chronologies of events and placing blame on different parties. However, in regards to the FSB, the most specific criticism revolves around differing claims of what kinds of force and weaponry the service authorized to be used during the engagement. By some accounts, which the FSB and government officials deny, the FSB's elite special forces teams used T-72 tanks and armed personnel carriers for cover as they approached the school, and then ordered the armor to fire on the building (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 109-118; Forester 3-4). There are conflicting testimonies of who ordered the armor to open fire and whether the school still contained hostages at the time (Bransten 1).

Assessing the FSB's performance, it clear once again that the situation as a whole was quite disorganized. The FSB's command center, coordinating both the special force Alpha and Vypel units and regional FSB personnel, was only one of six different command groups coordinating between roughly seven government organizations including the Russian military (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 132; Forester 6; Gidathubli 4705-6). Each group had its own command, doctrine, and specific objectives. There was minimal communication and coordination among the government forces, which left the

most capable of the forces, the FSB's spetsnaz units, essentially tactically isolated within the mob of other troops, policemen, and armed civilians. The FSB, or at least another government body, should have been given authority to coordinate the situation, but this was never realized; clearly interagency communications and some sort of operational hierarchy would have to be established to rectify these problems in the future (de Haas 11-13, Soldatov and Borogan "Terrorism" 6).

Furthermore, similar to Nord-Ost, the primary emphasis of criticism toward the FSB should not be that it struggled to bring about a flawless outcome of the terrorist crisis once it had started, but rather that it should have taken measures to ensure that the incident never occurred to begin with. Resolving hostage crises, particularly in which the terrorists have adopted a suicidal posture, poses a serious challenge to all modern, security services. The concern is that the FSB's ability to identify legitimate threats has become limited and its intelligence practices have become stagnant and ill-equipped, as result of an outdated organizational culture and incentive system, and are now unable or unwilling to face serious institutional security reform.

Effective counterterrorism goes hand-in-hand with effective intelligence collection. The FSB possess the personnel and authority to conduct intelligence operations and bears the burden of counterterrorism. While this creates a wide breadth of responsibilities, such authority puts it in a unique position, particularly the ability to independently accomplish a variety of essential intelligence functions. Unlike the MVD or FSO, the FSB presumably does not need to rely on agencies like SVR or GRU for

information and therefore can also navigate coordination and communication problems that potentially plague intelligence communities.

The Almaty Agreement eliminates the possibility of CIS states conducting intelligence against one another via foreign intelligence agencies such as the SVR. The FSB, defined as a domestic intelligence service, is abstained from this agreement and should possess a strong intelligence presence in places like Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Tsyarkin 75). The FSB has a service within its apparatus dedicated strictly to intelligence collection, analysis, and security briefing, the Operational Information and International Communications Service, specifically coordinated and carried out by the service's Directorate for Coordination of Operational Information and the Department of Operational Information, respectively ("Departament operativnoj informacii (DOI) FSB"; "Sluzhba operativnoj informacii i mezhdunarodnyx svyazej"; Soldatov and Borogan "Chto znaet podpolkovnik" 2).

Stronger measures to increase protection of the Russian public through intelligence and counterterrorist efforts by the FSB may deter aggressive and complicated hostage seizures or at the least allow for more precise and coordinated understanding of potential or immanent threats. Above all else, Beslan demonstrated complacency in the strategic thinking of the FSB as an entire organization. The crisis showed that the service had not incorporated the lessons of the Chechen War, the terrorist attacks of the 1990s, or Nord-Ost into a process of "institutional learning" and institutional creativity, which would have likely allowed for better preventive measures and a greater likelihood of

identifying the links between the various parties in Chechnya's terrorist network (Forester 2).

The inability of the FSB to grow and develop internally, despite external support and expansion, raise questions about the service's possibly declining professionalism and efficacy. Professionalism and *esprit de corp* are important organizational characteristics of an intelligence service, as the agency can only accomplish tasks within the limitations of its own personnel; agents' skills, education, and commitment though are in practice always more critical for operating effectively than having an ideology that is consistent with the organization. This is one area in particular where the FSB may be struggling: even under Putin's increased Russian nationalism and patriotism, it possible that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, intelligence candidates, who may be highly patriotic and driven, are also less qualified intellectually, educationally, and professionally than their predecessor's employees – agents in the KGB. Still a victim of its own success in the KGB, it is possible that the FSB continues to find difficulty in competing with the incentives of private industry and has sacrificed professionalism in exchange for filling, it not overflowing, its ranks: “where we once had one Chekist for every 428 Soviet citizens, we now have one for every 297 citizens in Russia” (Albats 23).

Issues like professionalism, as well as organizational loyalty to the service and Russia, are supposed to be dealt with by the Oversight Service of the FSB, particularly the Directorate of Internal Security, which has existed in various forms dating back to the KGB. Ironically, the directorate itself though came under scrutiny for corruption charges when its former heads Sergei Shishin and Vladimir Anisimov were forced to resign for

their association in the “Three Whales” scandal, which consisted of smuggling furniture goods and laundering large amounts of money (“Kontrol'naya sluzhba FSB”; “Upravlenie sobstvennoj bezopasnosti FSB”; Yasmann 1-2).

Contrastingly, Vladimir Putin insists that professionalism is not a concern in the modern FSB. In one instance, the former president specifically praised the service’s counterintelligence activities for expelling four British diplomats on charges of espionage and closing a nongovernmental organization on account of its funding affiliations (Radio Free Europe “Putin” 1).

The Beslan siege created the last major initiative for expansion of the FSB and consolidation of Russia’s security doctrine, and therefore serves as the final and perhaps most important critical juncture, as it carried the momentum of Putin’s counterterrorist campaign into a second term and allowed for four more years of benefits on part of the FSB. Beslan thus far has also been the last large-scale terrorist crisis in Russia and had a profound effect on Russian society, considered to be comparable to a “Russian 9/11.” Table 5 outlines notable terrorist incidents and their outcomes, publicized in the media, that occurred between 1999 and the end of Vladimir Putin’s administration in 2008. It is important to note that the frequency of terrorist incidents decreased by the end of 2004.

In a study by Polikanov, examining Russian public opinion on terrorism, a similar hardening was found in Russia as in Israel (Friedland and Merari). The salience of terrorism in the public mind and support for more aggressive measures increased significantly following the Beslan crisis. While only 15 percent of respondents attributed terrorism as one of Russia’s major problems prior to Beslan, 45 percent identified

Table 5. Terrorist Attacks in Russia (Reported in the Media): 1999-2008

Date	Incident	Casualties
August-September 1999	Bombings at apartments in Moscow, Bunaksk and Volgodonsk	200+ killed (civilians)
October 23-26, 2002	Chechen terrorists seize Dubrovka Theater Moscow and take 900 hostages	129 killed (civilians)
July 5, 2003	Two female terrorists bomb rock music concert not far from Moscow	15 killed (civilians)
August 1, 2003	Terrorist bombs military hospital at Mozdok	50 killed (mostly soldiers)
December 5, 2003	Passenger train in Stavropol Krai is bombed	46 killed, 160 injured (civilians)
December 9, 2003	Terrorist bombs location near Red Square in Moscow	5 killed, 13+ injured (civilians)
February 6, 2004	Terrorist bombs Moscow Metro near Avtovodskaya station	40 killed, 100+ injured (civilians)
June 22, 2004	Insurgents attack government offices and seize MVD headquarters in Ingushetia	92 killed (mostly MVD)
August 24, 2004	Two Russian planes are blown up in flight; FSB investigation claims terrorist bombing	90+ killed (civilians)
August 31, 2004	Female terrorist bombs Moscow Metro near Rizhskaya station	10 killed (civilians)
September 1-3, 2004	Chechen terrorists seize No.1 School in Beslan and take over 1,200 hostages	338 killed (civilians; 150+ children)
October 13, 2005	Over 100 insurgents attack government positions in Nalchik	24 killed (civilians and police)
August 21, 2006	Moscow suburban market is bombed	10 killed (civilians)
August 13, 2007	Explosion hits and derails Nevksy Express; FSB investigation claims terrorist bombing	60 injured (civilians)

From Radio Free Europe "Timeline" 1-2; Times Online, 1-2.

terrorism as a major concern that fall; the Center for Russian Public Opinion Research found that terrorism's salience in public awareness increased from 50 to 70 percent from 2003 to 2004 (Polikanov 46-47). An overwhelming majority, 85 percent, linked insurgent groups in Chechnya to international terrorist organizations.

Regarding the security service's activities and favoring authoritarian policies over civil liberties, the study also found a hardening relationship: 63 percent favored increased cooperation within the intelligence community and possibility of consolidation under a singular agency; 84 percent favored stricter laws against terrorism including the death penalty; 82 percent favored the security service's locating and eliminating terrorists beyond Russia's borders; 58 percent favored increasing spending on security and defense; 58 and 44 percent favored restricting immigration and censoring the mass media, respectively (Polikanov 50-54).

The findings of Polikanov's study and the literature on terrorism's psychological effects by Friedland and Merari demonstrate how terrorism and counterterrorism have entered the public discourse and occupy a top priority in Russian society, at least up to 2005. This suggests the public's strong negative sentiment to terrorism and support for a strong counterterrorism agenda: consolidation of the intelligence community, stricter laws, elimination of terrorists abroad, and in the broadest sense, favoring security over freedom, all which were part of Putin's agenda.

Beslan, like Nord-Ost, resulted in an expansion of the security apparatus and law, a predictable response by the Putin administration made possible by the crisis's traumatic events. The government promised dramatic funding increases, a new counterterrorism system, and new legal parameters around which the FSB may operate. Putin's administration announced its intent to allocate 6 billion rubles to the security services by the end of 2004, and as part of the new national security initiative, spend an additional 27% on security and defense for the 2005 fiscal year, including an additional 398.7

billion rubles for the security services (Plater-Zyberk 8). Legally the FSB would be given even more flexibility in monitoring, investigating, and arresting suspected terrorists or extremists.

A week following the hostage crisis at Beslan, Putin signed a decree, *On Immediate Measures to Improve the Fight against Terrorism*, passed on September 13, 2004. The decree ordered the leadership of the Russian intelligence community and several ministries, including the defense, justice, and internal affairs, to develop a new system for preventing and combating terrorist attack in Russia, and resolving the unstable situation in the North Caucasus. The decree focused specifically on improving the ability of government bodies to communicate with one another and respond as an effective, coordinated, and collective preplanned crisis system that would address a variety of issues from terrorist hostage taking, to WMD attack, to technological accident or disaster (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 13 sentyabrya 2004 g. N 1167). Security organs such as the FSB were expected to develop a means of keeping the public informed about possible threats and how to better protect themselves and warning them during an actual crisis.

An additional law to strengthen the security organs in countering terrorism was passed two years later, on February 15, 2006, which significantly expanded the authority of the FSB over the other power ministries involving terrorism. The decree, *On Measures to Counter Terrorism*, redefined the role of security bodies such as the FSB in both preventing and countering terrorist attacks. The decree emphasized the role of the FSB in

each of its eleven positions and authorized increasing the FSB's central apparatus by 300 personnel, the equivalent of a new department (Akhundov, Farizova, and Khamrayev 1).

The decree also created a new oversight committee to more effectively outline and plan new methods for preventing terrorist attacks as well as coordinate the actions of agencies such as the FSB and its counterparts in the MVD, FSO, or GRU: the National Anti-terrorism Committee of the Russian Federation (Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 15 fevralya 2006 goda N 116). The director of the FSB would act as the chairman of the NAK, which also would be set up into territorial bodies headed by the regional directors of the FSB to supervise and perform counterterrorist activities at a local level (Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 15 fevralya 2006 goda N 116).

Although in the past, such as with Nord-Ost and Beslan, there had been confusion over leadership and command during a crisis situation, the new legislation clearly eliminates any confusion, placing the sole authority and responsibility into the hands of the regional directors of the FSB and director of the FSB himself (Akhundov, Farizova, and Khamrayev 1; Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 15 fevralya 2006 goda N 116). These individuals would coordinate the operations on the ground during a crisis and have the authority to declare a state of martial-law, or what is referred to as a "counterterrorist regime", during a "state of emergency." These terms were given essentially no criteria and therefore were left open to the interpretation of the director of the FSB, the Chairman of the NAK (Kolesnichenko and Krasilova 2; Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 15 fevralya 2006 goda N 116). The FSB's Operational-Coordination Directorate for the North Caucasus was also dismantled; it has been the source of extensive criticism by journalists and

human rights activists who claimed the directorate had been operating completely unrestrained, supposedly torturing, beating, and even murdering of civilians in regions like Chechnya on a routine basis.

Several other decrees, in June, July, and December 2006, made additional amendments to previous laws regarding FSB structure, leadership organization, and the service's authority, and embraced a new European anti-terrorism initiative as an excuse to aggressively deploy Russian intelligence outside of the state's borders. The FSB used the Council of Europe's Convention on Terrorism as an opportunity to push for new legislation regarding their authority. While the rulings of the convention were ratified on April 20, 2006, the FSB was significantly rewarded in the amending of the legislation that followed.

On July, 27 2006, the decree was signed *On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Russia connected with the adoption of the Federal Law "On Ratification of the Council of Europe's Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism" and the Federal Law "On Combating Terrorism."* The decree amended two federal laws, redefining the role of the security services in combating terrorism, and was supposed to follow the counterterrorist model outlined by the Council of Europe; Russia would make some significant changes to this model agreed on several weeks earlier. The law described the role of the FSB as conducting counterintelligence and intelligence collection, combating organized crime, and preventing extremist and terrorist acts (Federal'nyj zakon Rossijskoj Federacii ot 27 iyulya 2006 g. N 153-FZ). In addition to expanding the legal definition of terrorist and extremist activities, leaving it interpretable to essentially any act causing

some kind of damage to the state, the most notable change was that the decree gave specific permission to the FSB to coercively operate outside of the borders of Russia. The FSB, according to the law, was given permission to collect intelligence on, hunt down, and eliminate terrorists by deadly force outside of Russia (Federal'nyj zakon Rossijskoj Federacii ot 27 iyulya 2006 g. N 153-FZ). Using Special Forces units and counterterrorist teams, the FSB was ordered to employ whatever means necessary to destroy terrorists in the North Caucasus but also to fight international terrorists around the world.

Within the clan-like structure of the Russian intelligence community, the legislation could lead to internal conflicts between the FSB and the SVR or GRU who may feel threatened as organizations by the FSB's growing presence abroad (Saradzhyan 1). While recent rivalries have emerged between the FSB and other domestic services, in particular a bitter conflict with the Federal Narcotics Agency, there is no evidence to suggest that the FSB has overzealously abused this legislation and interfered with the spheres of the SVR or GRU in external intelligence (Matthews and Nemtsova 1; Saradzhyan 1-2).

The first publicized statement involving the FSB's new legislative authority to eliminate terrorists abroad was made by President Putin in June 2006. The president ordered Russia's secret services to locate and eliminate members of a group called the Mujahedin Shura Council, an organization believed to be affiliated with Al Qaeda, responsible for kidnapping and executing five employees of the Russian embassy (Mite 1-2; Myers 1-2). FSB director Nikolai Patrushev announced that the service would use all of its resources and capabilities to carry out the operation against the Iraqi perpetrators.

Some experts such as Alexander Goltz believe that the operation is unrealistic and exceeds the capacity of the modern Russian intelligence community (Mite 1-2). Other analysts, like James Nixey, suggest that although the FSB's claim is complicated to fulfill, it is not impossible given that Russia has highly trained security services, which historically have had successful human intelligence operatives (Mite 1-2).

FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev announced that in 2006, the FSB had helped to prevent 300 terrorist acts and killed over 100 militants, including Shamil Basayev, and carried out 119 operations in the North Caucasus alone (Nikolsky 2). It is not clear whether there has been a decrease in the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks in Russia or as the FSB claims, that the service is successfully preventing a much larger percentage of attacks. These security "improvements" also may or may not be directly related to the expansion and strengthening of the FSB. After all, it is not the responsibility of the FSB to solve the social, economic, and political roots of terrorism; it is possible to argue that perhaps an increased standard of living in Russia, for example, may have alleviated certain social problems or that Basayev's death crippled the coordination ability of terrorist forces in the North Caucasus.

As of 2009, though, there have not been claims made by the FSB of successfully locating and liquidating any of the terrorist perpetrators in Iraq. Apart from general reports of the FSB operating abroad, it is difficult to determine how successful the FSB's external operations have actually been aided following the July 27 legislation. Regarding the geographical presence of the FSB's external counterterrorism efforts since 2006, the service likely operates in various capacities throughout the CIS and parts of Europe. The

FSB is most likely though to maintain a significant number of “anti-terrorism” forces and increase its influence in Central Asian states like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where recognized terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have existed in the past, as well as in the Caucasus, particularly Georgia and Azerbaijan (Trifonov 1-3).

In addition to the legislative additions involving FSB operations abroad, the president also promised FSB officers an additional pay increase of 25% and an additional 27% for the FSB’s 2006-2007 budget; FSB officer pay has steadily increased during Putin’s administration, with a captain or major receiving between 18,000-25,000 rubles a month, twice as much as an officer of equivalent rank in the MVD (British Broadcasting Corporation “Putin” 2; Nikolsky 2). Salary and funding increases such as this may have aided the FSB in its recruitment efforts and strengthened the service’s ability to replenish its ranks with more professionals and college graduates, having struggled to compete with private industry for well educated and skilled applicants in the past.

The expansion of the FSB’s role abroad and additional funding in 2006 would be one of the last major organizational, legislative, budgetary initiatives of the Putin administration that involved expanding the FSB. Putin had only a year and a half of the presidency remaining and turned his attention to grooming a successor. On March 3, 2008, Dmitri Mevedev was elected president of Russia, having won by an overwhelming majority, and the following week the Russian parliament appointed Vladimir Putin as Russia’s Prime Minister (Chivers 1; Finn 1).

By presidential decree *On Director of the Federal Security Service*, on May 12, 2008, Alexander Bortnikov was appointed director of the FSB by the new Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev. Nikolai Patrushev, the former director of the FSB and close colleague of Putin, was transferred to serve as the secretary of Russia's Security Council, a position that some analysts regard as a demotion from the post of FSB director (Novoprudsky 4). Bortnikov previously headed the FSB's economic counterintelligence service, which may suggest Medvedev's desire to strengthen economic security and address the issue of corruption more seriously than his predecessor, Vladimir Putin (Saradzhyan 1).

It is difficult to assess how the relationship between the Kremlin and the FSB has changed now that Dmitri Medvedev is president. Medvedev recently asked the Duma in January of 2009 to revise a FSB backed bill that expands the criminal codes' definition of espionage and treason, following wide-spread public criticism of the bill, which the president admitted defined the legal concepts "too broadly" (Schwartz 1). This being said, with Vladimir Putin still holding political office as prime minister and popular public support, given that the threat of terrorism following Beslan is never too far from the minds of Russian citizens, and the prevailing impression that the "moderate" Medvedev is essentially a political puppet, it is likely that the FSB's position within the competing clans of the Russian security services will not change greatly.

A recent study in 2007 found that 42 percent of Russians felt that the security service's played an important role in Russia and that their power is proportionate with this role (Coalson 2). It is therefore likely given the popularity of Putin and the general

public's "toleration" of FSB authority that the service will remain at the pinnacle of its post-Soviet power, despite international, and limited domestic, criticisms of its illiberal activities and the questionably unconstitutional degree of its expansion that occurred under Putin's presidency.

Chapter 6

Conclusion: The Kremlin's Agenda of Regime Consolidation and the FSB

Fundamentally, this study is an examination of a modern security service in twenty-first century Russia, examining how and why it expanded and was strengthened during the better part of the last decade. The reason why this organization has been able to expand and continue along a path marked by constant rewarding and strengthening by the state draws on the literature of historical institutionalism: notably critical moments, two of which were major crises, altering the path trajectory of this security institution. This trajectory was constantly renewed by both continual “threats”, some fabricated by the security services and Russian government, and the favorable leadership of Vladimir Putin, who shared a unique, personal relationship with the FSB. These factors allowed the FSB to develop politically and become more socially entrenched. The actual institutional path of the FSB has finally merged with its preferred institutional path, which the organization has always embraced since the collapse of the Soviet Union—a return of prestige, influence, and power.

The transformation of the FSB though is part of a larger development that has deeply affected Russian politics and society. The same crises, propagation of threats, and nationalistic politics that enabled this security service to be expanded allowed for a dramatic consolidation of the political system and adoption of increasingly authoritarian politics, some of which were carried out by the FSB.

Pavel K. Baev's work “Instrumentalizing Counterterrorism for Regime Consolidation in Putin's Russia” constructs an analysis of how the war against terrorism

provided Putin with a basis for consolidating Russia's political apparatus, solidifying his *siloviki*, and moving Russia further away from democracy for the promise of stability and security. This study supports Baev's assertion that the war against terrorism, while partially based on legitimate security threats, was exaggerated and manipulated by Putin to further political ambitions.

Baev has argued, and rightfully so, that inevitably Putin's counterterrorist campaign, much like the war in Chechnya, are part of a broader political agenda constructed on the premise that Putin's regime model is the most effective at solving Russia's problems, most notably security concerns (Baev 338). These "perceived threats" are not limited to terrorism and include foreign agents and extremists as well; terrorism and the collective insecurity it provided offered Putin the most visibly stimulating and traumatizing means of mobilizing public support. The FSB through propagating tales of foreign agents, extremists, and other threats has contributed to Putin's counterterrorist campaign and transformed it, in a broader sense, into a political strategy constructed around even broader social insecurities and nationalism.

Putin has used a power arrangement built on his *siloviki* to centralize political power around the presidency and away from regional elites and oligarchs and to institutionalize the security services into politics by placing members of the intelligence community, particularly the FSB, into political positions and therefore creating a loyal, reliable, and ideologically similar "uniformed bureaucracy." He also has used the war against terror as a mechanism for creating public support by manipulating real and

imaginary threats, the perception of threats, and stories of the successful FSB's covert operations (Baev 340-343).

The fear of terrorism as well as other “threats” has provided the Putin administration with excellent tools for propaganda in the media and mobilizing Russian society around nationalist ideas. Putin's administration, along with the FSB, has exaggerated the threat level in Russia, and in doing so, the former president and the security service have used the media to suffocate “unpatriotic ideas” about the regime's fight against terrorism, extremist groups, and meddling Western influences. This includes essentially anyone criticizing the erosion of democratic institutions that have been exchanged for security and stability under his administration; these “unpatriotic” groups or individuals, mostly journalists and liberal politicians, have subsequently been suppressed by the FSB (Baev 343).

It is true that domestic intelligence, security services, and internal police forces all can have a detrimental effect on democratization and democratic institutions, even in established democracies. The conservative culture of the FSB, *chekism*, as well as its organizational incentives, has exacerbated the situation in Russia though, which lacks a system of effective intelligence oversight to check the influence of this particular institution. The problem therefore is not just legal; oversight and institution building play a significant role, but Russia has refused, or been unable, to cleanse itself from one of the most repressive symbols of the Soviet era. In tolerating this kind of organization, the undeniable successor to the KGB, they have allowed an extremely entrenched, illiberal security institution to reassert itself in the new, post-communist regime.

It is too naïve to assume that the FSB was expanded simply to meet the legitimate security needs of Russia in the twenty-first century, but also perhaps too cynical to suggest that Putin only expanded and entrenched this security service for his own political ambitions—it is most likely a combination of these perspectives, which were smoothly molded into an efficient political strategy by a rather capable and pragmatic politician, Vladimir Putin, who has proven to be quite savvy.

The FSB has been expanded dramatically under Putin’s administration and has found itself occupying a top position both within the hierarchy of the Russian intelligence community and within the internal politics of the regime. It is likely due to instability in the North Caucasus and other international threats, whether terrorist or otherwise, real or imaginary, and the rigidity of the FSB’s institutional path, that this security service will remain in a favorable and highly influential position of power in Russia for the foreseeable future.

Appendix

Dossier: The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation

Name: Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (*Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federatsiya*)

Location: Lubyanka Square, Moscow, Russian Federation

Created: April 3, 1995 (Federal Law)

Emblem: “The Sword and the Shield” (Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 13 nojabrja N 1513)



Structure

The FSB’s structure has remained relatively consistent since the organizational reforms and legislative changes of 2004 and 2005. According to evidence collected and translated from *agentura.ru*, including several points that needed to be verified by additional sources, the Russia Federal Security Service likely resembles the structure in Table 6.

Table 6. Structure of the Russia Federal Security Service

Structure
Leadership – Director Alexander Bortnikov
First Deputy Director
First Deputy Director and Chief of the FSB’s Border Guard Service
Deputy Director
Deputy Director and State Secretary
Deputy Director
Deputy Director
(1 st) Counterintelligence Service
(2 nd) Service for Protection of the Constitutional Order and the Fight against Terrorism
(3 rd) Border Guard Service
(4 th) Economic Security Service
(5 th) Operational Information and International Communications Service
(6 th) Service of Organizational Personnel Work
(7 th) Oversight Service
(8 th) Scientific and Technical Service
(9 th) Activity Support Service
Subdivisions, Directorates, and Departments Subordinate to FSB Headquarters:
Investigative Directorate
Administrative Directorate
Contractual and Legal Directorate
Directorate of Scientific and Technical Support
Communications Security Center (TsBS)
Center of Intelligence of Radio-electronic Means of Communication/SIGINT (TsRRSS)
Special Service for Ciphering
Center for Licensing, Certification, and Protection of State Secrets
Center for Special Equipment
Center for Operational-Border Research
Operational-Reconnaissance (Surveillance) Directorate (OPU)
Directorate of Assistance Programs
Public Relations Center
Registration and Archives Directorate
Radio-counterintelligence Directorate (Directorate R)
Directorate of Aviation
Directorate of Special Communications
Military-Medical Directorate
Military-Construction Directorate
Provost Service
Watch Officer Service
Tenth Department (Military Mobilization)
FSB Academy

From “Dossier”; Decree No.633 06/23/1995; Kolpakigi and Ceryakov 532

Recruitment, Training, Manpower, and Finances

There are different explanations to how the FSB recruits new members and replenishes its ranks. According to some sources, the FSB seems to reach out and contact Russian men who excel in math and science but are looking for an alternative means to military service. A recent decree created a program that allows Russian youth meeting certain needs of the FSB to forgo military service by working with the FSB (FSB “Nauchno-texnicheskaya”). Other sources, including the account of former President Vladimir Putin, suggest that the FSB, like its KGB predecessor, does not officially allow Russian citizens to “apply” or “volunteer” to the service; they claim that if the FSB is interested in a candidate who meets the service’s requirements, then he is notified and given an offer to attend the FSB Academy (Bennett *The Federal Security* 38; Staar and Tacosa 46). This same explanation also suggests that the service prioritizes its selection of men to those whose relatives served in either the KGB or FSB, like during the Soviet period.

To enter the FSB, candidates must be citizens of the Russian Federation who have met the necessary professional qualifications, age, education, and health requirements to carry out their duties and are willing to work in any region of Russia (FSB “Dlya”). They also must pass the necessary physical and psychological profiles of both the military and the FSB. The candidates must be cleared by the government as being eligible to access state secrets and intelligence related information. A higher education degree is preferred, but full secondary or secondary vocational degrees that meet the specific needs of the FSB are also acceptable (FSB “Dlya”). Professional competency and experience are

determined during an interview, which similar to the medical and psychological tests, must be scheduled by the candidates on their own. The physical fitness level of a candidate must fall within the guidelines indicated in Tables 7 and 8 (FSB “Normativnye”):

Table 7. Physical Fitness Requirements for Men

Pull-ups (minimum)		Cross-country skiing 5 km (maximum score)		Running 100 m (maximum score)		Running 1 km (maximum score)	Running 3 km (maximum score)
A	B	A	B	A	B	A-B	A-B
10	9	28.00	29.00	14.40	14.60	4.25	12.35

A, younger than 35 years of age; B, older than 35 years of age

Table 8. Physical Fitness Requirements for Women

Running 100m (maximum score)	Running 1 km (maximum score)		Cross-country skiing 5 km (maximum score)	
A-B	A	B	A	B
17.9	4.50	5.30	41.0	45.0

A, younger than 30 years of age; B, older than 30 years of age

A candidate must submit a variety of materials as part of the application process. These include: a statement of interest in working with the FSB; identity documents (passport, identity card, and others); copies of documentation proving professional experience; education transcripts; certificates of marriage and dependents (if applicable); signed military service contract and conscription certificate or military ID; a brief autobiography; a copy of relatives’ death certificate (if applicable); photos; proof of citizenship; birth certificate; financial records (personnel accounts, residence and

property, income and assets); and a letter of recommendation by a member of the Federal Security Service (FSB “Osnovaniya”).

Individuals can be easily disqualified for service in the FSB if they fail to meet any of the requirements, which typically include: criminal record or failure to serve a court ruling, withdrawal from conscription, foreign citizenship, failure to provide accurate information (false personal data or financial records), failed medical or psychological testing, personal exposure that could threaten state security, inability to handle or access state secrets, and the absence of vacant positions fitting the candidate’s background (FSB “Osnovaniya”).

Candidates are notified within 15 days if they are members of the military and up to a month if civilians. The individual’s application and information is verified, including a background check. They also are tested to determine their ability to handle access to state secrets. The entire process of verifying and approving candidates is rather long and can take up to three months total before recruits are given the official decision and invited to attend the academy (FSB “Osnovaniya”).

The FSB Academy is located at Building #70, Michurinskii Prospekt, Moscow (“Akademiya federal'noj s'uzhby bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii” 1). When candidates arrive at the academy, they are given the option of studying and training in a several fields that include: Counterintelligence; Language and Special Departments; Information Security (computing machinery, complexes, systems, and networks, computer security); Applied Mathematics (cryptography, applied mathematics and computer science); and Special Equipment (telecommunication system information security, radio-

electronic/signal intelligence systems) (“Akademiya federal'noj s'uzhby bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii” 1; Bennett *The Federal Security* 38). The academy hopes to train students to successfully work in positions such as investigators, lawyers, field operatives, interpreters, cryptographers, information security experts, and telecommunications security experts (Bennett *The Federal Security* 38). Presumably, the field training of agents is also quite extensive and rigorous, and likely follows a mixed military and intelligence training regime.

Two of the most secretly guarded data sets of the Russian intelligence community are the manpower and budget of the FSB. Because the complete figures are considered a state secret, this makes estimates difficult to predict. What is clear though is that the FSB has dramatically increased its manpower, with the addition of the Federal Border Guards Service in 2003 and other expansionary measures, and has likely been generously rewarded financially thanks to the Putin administration and Russian economy’s recent success over the last few years.

The FSB headquarters and regional staff were approximately 1,500 and 75,000 personnel in 1998. This number increased to 4,000 and 92,000 respectively by 2000 (Mukhin 41-42). It is likely that this number has remained receptively constant, except for possibly a slight increase, excluding the addition of the border guards. The border guards numbered between 200,000 and 182,000 by 2006 (Bennett *FPS* 4). This places the FSB’s total manpower at roughly 278,000 personnel.

The service’s budget is also difficult to calculate. According to Ivan Safranchuk, the only available recent budget information that the government releases shows roughly

1% of the total budget of the Russian security services (Soldatov 1-2). This means that 99% is unaccounted for in the state's financial report because it considered "classified spending." According to Safranchuk's analysis, in 2006, the FSB, FSO, and SVR received 3 million rubles in declassified spending, 1.3 million that was allocated to the FSB. The total budget though for the security services was reported at over 91 billion rubles (Soldatov 1-2). It is logical to assume that the FSB received a sizable portion of this figure as well as the spending for Russia's border defenses, but it is impossible, by his estimation, to be certain. A study of power ministry spending by Julian Cooper reported that the government spending for the security services, FSB, FSO, and SVR, was 135,293 million rubles in 2008 and 152,683 million rubles in 2009; the border service received 65,540 million rubles and 80,046 million rubles each year, respectively (Cooper 111).

This still does not even begin to provide an accurate picture of how many resources the FSB is receiving and how the service has specifically benefited from Russia's recent economic success. As Safranchuk explained, because the information is classified, it is impossible to tell for certain the FSB's total budget with open sources. The only conclusion that can be drawn from either financial report, and the data on personnel, is that Russia is spending a substantial amount of money on defense and the security services, and the FSB's manpower and resources have undoubtedly grown substantially, particularly since the intelligence reforms of 2003 and 2004.

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