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Secure or Seclude:

**U.S. Nuclear Policy and Nuclear States, A Comparison of Inida and
Pakistan**

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Pakistan**

by

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Report

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**U.S. Nuclear Policy and Nuclear States, A Comparison of India and
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by

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2010

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The U.S. has implemented a two-track nuclear policy since the Cold War. The first track is non-proliferation and the second track involves securing all nuclear materials. The two-track nuclear policy has been effective, but at times non-proliferation efforts are contradicted by the US supporting nuclear programs by securing nuclear materials. The current greatest threat to nuclear security is the acquisition of nuclear materials by an extremist or terrorist

organization. Can the US combat the current growing threat of loose nukes with the two-track policy?

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Goals of U.S. Nuclear Policy.....	3
Two-Track Nuclear Policy.....	5
India.....	8
Background.....	8
Is the Current Two-Track Policy Effective in India.....	13
Pakistan.....	16
Background.....	16
Is the Current Two-Track Policy Effective in Pakistan.....	19
Non-Proliferation Policy vs. Securing Nuclear Materials.....	21
Conclusion.....	26
Works Cited.....	28
Vita.....	34

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Introduction

President Barack Obama, in his remarks April 5, 2009 in Prague, Czechoslovakia, said, “In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up.”¹ This statement dramatically focused world attention on the fact that, although the Cold War has ended, a new and dangerous struggle against the threat of nuclear weapons has commenced. In his remarks, President Obama laid out his administration’s nuclear policy. The first goal is to “take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons.” The US will work to reduce nuclear weapons in the world, including its own. The US will maintain an “effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.” This commitment includes stopping nuclear weapons testing and ending the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The second policy is to maintain sufficient international pressure on nation’s considering the initiation of nuclear programs to dissuade them from doing so. President Obama pressed, “Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something.” The third policy is to “ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon” by securing all vulnerable nuclear material throughout the world within four years. The US nuclear policy is focused on nonproliferation above all else. The Obama

¹ U.S. White House. Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President Obama,” Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.

Administration's nuclear policy closely parallels the three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peaceful use nuclear technology.

The effectiveness of the US's current non-proliferation policy is questionable in light of India, Pakistan, and North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons and successfully ignoring pressure from the US in that process. The policy is questioned further since the US has spent over one hundred million dollars since 2001 assisting Pakistan with the security of its nuclear weapons.² Should the United States maintain a strong nonproliferation policy while at the same time funding security mechanisms for States once they become nuclear powers? Can the two policies work together or does assisting with security mechanisms make the non-proliferation policy useless?

² Joby Warrick, "U.S. Has Concerns Over Security of Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons," *The Washington Post*, November 11, 2007; David Sanger and William Broad, "U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms," *The New York Times*, November 17, 2007.

Goals of US Nuclear Policy

It is important to step back and address the goals of US nuclear policy. According to the Council on Foreign Relations' most recent task force report on US nuclear policy, the most important goal is "to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by any state or nonstate actor."³ Clearly the first and most immediate goal should be to ensure no nuclear weapon is detonated anywhere in the world. A single nuclear bomb set off intentionally or unintentionally by an individual or nation has the risk of triggering an irreversible domino effect of response and retaliation.

The second important goal is to prevent "the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to additional states or any nonstate actors." There are two distinct ideas in this goal. Some believe obtaining additional nuclear weapons sets off a chain reaction of escalating responses by other nations. Scott Sagan, Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University agrees with the chain reaction theory arguing, "Every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security."⁴ Other scholars don't believe this to be the case.⁵

³ Council on Foreign Relations Report, Independent Task Force Report No. 62-U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, April 2009.

⁴ Sagan, Scott D., "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security*, Vol. 21 No. 3 (Winter 1996/1997): 54-86.

The third and end goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world altogether. President Obama has stressed this goal since his first speech on nuclear policy, “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

Two-Track US Nuclear Policy

The US employs a two track nuclear policy. The first track is non-proliferation. US non-proliferation policy includes multiple layers of action. The US applies pressure against States to deter them from developing nuclear weapons by agreeing to defend States against nuclear attack from current nuclear States. Western Europe is a good example of this layer of non-proliferation policy at work. The US currently has an estimated 200 tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Western Europe to protect European States against nuclear States.⁶ The weapons are also stationed in Western Europe to deter European States from developing their own nuclear weapon programs. Another tactic of non-proliferation policy involves the use of isolation and sanctions to deter States from initiating or continuing the development of nuclear weapons programs. President Obama has recently voiced the need for a new United Nations sanctions resolution against Iran, “that has bite.”⁷ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has gone so far as to push for “crippling sanctions.”⁸ While non-proliferation is central to US nuclear policy, it has been ineffective without the complete support of all NPT States. The US can sanction a State,

⁶ Robert Burns, “US and Europe rethink role of Cold War alliance,” *The Washington Post*, April 21, 2010.

⁷ David E. Sanger and Peter Baker, “Obama Limits When U.S. Would Use Nuclear Arms,” *The New York Times*, April 5, 2010.

⁸ U.S. Department of State. Office of the Secretary of State. “Remarks at the 2010 AIPAC Policy Conference,” Washington Convention Center, Washington, DC, March 22, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/03/138722.htm>.

but if China supplies the non-NPT State with nuclear materials or information, the non-NPT State isn't deterred.

The second track of US policy nuclear policy is assisting ally States to secure their nuclear weapons in order to protect against theft or accidental detonation. This track did not receive much scrutiny until recently. Assisting nuclear states is controversial, especially if the State is not a signatory to the NPT. Harold M. Agnew, a former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory is a vocal supporter of the US assisting States with nuclear weapons, "Whether it's India Pakistan or China or Iran, the most important thing is that you want to make sure there is no unauthorized use. You want to make sure the guys who have their hands on the weapons can't use them without proper authorization."⁹

The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was the largest gathering of heads of state since the 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization.¹⁰ The focus of the Summit was how to better safeguard nuclear weapon materials and keep them out of the hands of terrorists. Another goal of the summit was to work with other States to deter the development of Iran's nuclear program through further economic sanctions.

To explore whether current US nuclear policy is contradictory and whether a two track approach is effective, we will begin with an examination of the implementation and

⁹ David E. Sanger, "Obama's Worst Pakistan Nightmare," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 11, 2009, pp. 32.

¹⁰ David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, "Leaders Gather for Nuclear Talks as New Threat Is Seen," *The New York Times*, April 11, 2010.

impact of this policy on the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan. The first part will review the history of each country's nuclear program and the effect of US policy in their development decisions. Finally, we will evaluate whether the US can pursue the security track, without emasculating the non-proliferation policy.

India

Background

India's nuclear program began with US assistance under President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Program in the 1950's. Atoms for Peace was an effort to calm fears around the world after the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The US built nuclear reactors in both India and Pakistan with the stated goal, as President Eisenhower put it, to "devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to death, but consecrated to his life."¹¹ The US provided nuclear fuel and allowed Indian scientists to study at US nuclear laboratories.¹²

Although India was active in negotiations of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it refused to join citing the unfairness of members of the UN Security Council (US, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France) to have nuclear weapons and while forbidding them to others. India detonated a nuclear device code named "Smiling

¹¹ The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, "Atoms for Peace," General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City, New York, December 8, 1953, <http://web.archive.org/web/20070524054513/http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atoms.htm>.

¹² U.S. Congressional Research Service, "U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress," RL33016, Paul K. Kerr, February 4, 2010.

Buddha” in 1974.¹³ India called it a “peaceful nuclear explosive.” The test proved to the world that nuclear technology given for peaceful purposes under the Atoms for Peace Program could be used to produce nuclear weapons. In response to the detonation, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed. The NSG is a multi-national body whose purpose is to reduce nuclear proliferation through guidelines for nuclear exports. Forty-six countries including the US are participants.¹⁴ In reaction to India’s test, Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) imposing tough new requirements for US nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon States. The NNPA also required that exports will be terminated if a State detonates a nuclear weapon or attempts to acquire or manufacture a nuclear weapon.¹⁵ The US stopped shipping fuel to India in 1980 under the terms of the NNPA. France, however, supplied fuel to India until similar safeguard requirements were adopted in 1995. India received fuel from China and Russia when France discontinued its assistance. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998 at the Pokhran test range in Rajasthan. India is a member and, currently, a Board Member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Four of India’s seventeen nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.¹⁶

¹³ Gary Milhollin, “Stopping the Indian Bomb,” *The American Journal of International Law*, July 1987, 81 A.J.I.L. 593. See <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/articles/1987/stoppingindianbomb.htm>.

¹⁴ Nuclear Suppliers Group, “History of the NSG,” <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/01-history.htm> (March 15, 2010).

¹⁵ Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub L. no. 95-242, [H.R. 8638], 92 Stat. 120, approved 10 March 1978.

¹⁶ International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Board Approves India-Safeguards Agreement: Agreement Would Widen IAEA Access to Civil Nuclear Facilities,” 1 August, 2008, <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/board010808.html> (March 16, 2010).

In 2005, President George W. Bush announced the creation of a global partnership with India. A joint statement with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pointed out the “significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner.” The US agreed to work with allies to “enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.”¹⁷ Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns testified to the House Committee on International Relations the Bush Administration’s “desire to transform relations with India...founded upon a strategic vision that transcends even today’s most pressing security concerns.”¹⁸ India made civil nuclear cooperation between the US and India the primary concern of the US-Indian strategic relationship. Through this strategic relationship, India transitioned from being a target of US non-proliferation policy to becoming an ally. Prior to this special strategic relationship with the US, in November 1991 India signed an agreement to provide a 10-megawatt research reactor to Tehran.¹⁹ The agreement was soon cancelled due to pressure from the US. But as late as December 2003, India’s Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh stated that India “has and would continue to help Iran in its controversial bid to generate nuclear energy.”²⁰ There are

¹⁷ U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,” July 18, 2005, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html>

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, Statement of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, R. Nicholas Burns, , House Committee on International Relations, Hearing on “The U.S. and India: An Emerging Entente?” September 8, 2005, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa23323.000/hfa23323_of.htm

¹⁹ “Nuclear Facilities,” *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992.

²⁰ “India Denies Nuclear Cooperation with Iran,” *Agence France Presse*, December 13, 2003.

many reports of Indian nuclear scientists passing information to Iran until 2005. Indian officials have protested that the allegations of assistance to Iran only occurred under the IAEA Technical Cooperation program.²¹

The July 18, 2005 agreement restricts India from transferring enrichment and processing technologies to States that do not currently have those technologies and to support international non-proliferation efforts. India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee made clear September 5, 2008 that:

India will not be the source of proliferation of sensitive technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing transfers. We stand for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. We support international efforts to limit the spread of ENR equipment or technologies to states that do not have them.²²

India confirms it intends to support the US non-proliferation nuclear policy, but what are the implications of assisting India?

On October 1, 2008, Congress gave final approval to the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act. This Act

²¹ John Larkin and Jay Solomon, "As Ties Between India and Iran Rise, U.S. Grows Edgy," *Wall Street Journal*, March 24, 2005.

²² Vinay Kumar, "India will not be a source of nuclear proliferation, says Pranab," *The Hindu*, September 6, 2008.

lifts a three-decade moratorium on nuclear trade with India. The pact also provides US assistance to India's civilian nuclear energy program. In addition, the pact allows for IAEA inspectors access to India's civilian nuclear program.²³ Critics of the pact argued it reversed fifty years of US non-proliferation efforts. Charles D. Ferguson, science and technology fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said, "It's an unprecedented deal for India. If you look at the three countries outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty-Israel, India, and Pakistan-this stands to be a unique deal."²⁴ Most critics see the deal as overly benefiting India and, as a Congressional Research Service report put it, "there are no measures in this global partnership to restrain India's nuclear weapons program."

India continues to maintain a no first strike-assured retaliation nuclear posture.²⁵ India's nuclear posture was tested on November 26, 2008 when terrorists from Lashkar-e-Taiba, an organization historically supported by the Pakistani state, attacked Mumbai taking 163 lives. India's response "was restrained; it did not mobilize its military forces to retaliate against either Pakistan or Lashkar camps operating there."²⁶

²³ United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, Pub L. no. 110-369 [H.R. 7081] approved 8 October 2008.

²⁴ Jayshree Bajoria, "The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal," Council on Foreign Relations, November 20, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/> (March 17, 2010).

²⁵ Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, Embassy of India, August 17, 1999, http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html (March 17, 2010).

²⁶ Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace?: Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability," *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), pp.38.

Is the Current Two-Track Policy Effective in India?

India remains a non-NPT State with nuclear weapons. Article I of the NPT states that:

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty understands not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.²⁷

Does this mean US assistance violates Article I of the NPT? Does cooperating with India bestow nuclear weapon state status on India and therefore encourage the Indian nuclear weapons program? More significantly, does US assistance to India discredit the US non-proliferation nuclear policy across the board and damage non-proliferation threats to Iran and North Korea?

First, India has a growing strategic relationship with Iran. India has a strong interest in a proposed \$7.4 billion, 2800-kilometer long gas pipeline between Iran, Pakistan, and India.²⁸ India also has a strong record as a nuclear weapon State that didn't acquiesce to the US non-proliferation policy. Secondly, India is very independent in the area of foreign policy as confirmed by its long-time membership and leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)²⁹. In addition, India has been a vocal opponent to the NPT.

The first track, non-proliferation policy, is ineffective with respect to India. While the US non-proliferation policy might have been modestly successful in slowing down India's nuclear program, it did not stop it. Not only did US non-proliferation policy fail to stop India's nuclear program, the recent United State-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act only validates India's nuclear weapons program. It is contradictory for the US to sign a nuclear pact with India and at the same time make bold threats to States with nuclear weapons or in the early stages of developing nuclear weapons. US non-proliferation policy cannot be taken seriously unless there is global buy-in and no exceptions.

²⁷ U.S. Department of State, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, Ratified by U.S. President November 24, 1969, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/npt1.html>.

²⁸ Sanjay Dutta, "Safe Passage for Iran gas: Pak," *The Times of India*, April 2, 2010.

²⁹ "The Non-Aligned Movement and History," The Non-Aligned Movement, <http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm> (March 17, 2010).

The second track of US nuclear policy, assisting ally States to secure their nuclear weapons, is non-existent with respect to India. While the US is supporting India with fuel, there are no measures involved to secure India's nuclear weapons. The IAEA is only allowed to inspect India's civilian nuclear program and not its military nuclear program. Therefore, US nuclear policy in no way deters or secures India's nuclear weapons.

Pakistan

Since September 11, 2001, Pakistan has been a crucial and necessary ally in the war on terror. The relationship is complicated by the fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons, but is not a signatory to the NPT.

Background

Pakistan's nuclear program, code named Project-726, resulted from the development of India's nuclear program. Project-726 gained urgency after India detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1974.³⁰ Pakistan received technology help from Europe and China. It is unclear when Pakistan first produced a working nuclear explosive device.³¹ A. Q. Khan, widely regarded as the founder of Pakistan's nuclear program, more recently told *The News* that Pakistan had the capability to detonate a nuclear weapon "at the end of 1984."³² Pursuant to the Pressler Amendment, financial and

³⁰ A. Q. Khan, "Kahuta—A History," *The News International*, August 12, 2009.

³¹ U.S. Congressional Research Service, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues," RL34248, Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, February 23, 2010.

³² "Interview with Abdul Qadeer Khan," *The News*, May 30, 1998.

military aid to Pakistan was cut off in 1990 under President George H. W. Bush because certification that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons was not possible.³³

India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 12, 1998 prompting Pakistan to respond with six tests, two weeks later. The US imposed sanctions in response to the tests, but they were lifted after September 11, 2001. Pakistan is estimated to have 60 nuclear weapons, but many contend they have near 100.³⁴ Pakistan's construction of new nuclear reactors signal plans to increase their nuclear arsenal. Pakistani officials insist they are not engaged in an arms race, but that their nuclear arsenal must reach a certain size to serve as a minimum nuclear deterrent.³⁵

Since the United State-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act was signed by President George W. Bush on October 8, 2008, Pakistani officials have grown concerned with the special relationship between the two countries.³⁶ Pakistan's representative on the IAEA worried in 2008 that the pact might cause a nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India.

³³ The Pressler Amendment (August 1985) linked aid and military sales to two certification conditions: (1) that Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid 'will reduce significantly the risk' that Pakistan will possess such a device. For additional information on sanctions legislation, see CRS Report 98-486, *Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan*, by Jeanne J. Grimmett, and CRS Report RS22757, *U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan*, by Richard F. Grimmett.

³⁴ Arms Control Association, "Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance," <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat> (March 18, 2010).

³⁵ Ninan Koshy, "Maximizing Minimum Nuclear Deterrence," *Asia Times*, June 4, 2009.

³⁶ "Pakistan Command Meeting Voices Concern Over Indo-US Nuclear Deal," Pakistan TV, April 12, 2006.

Hit hard by the economic crisis of 2008, Pakistan was forced to reduce its nuclear program by a reported 35%.³⁷ Pakistan's political situation has been turbulent since the military coup in 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf became leader. The tumultuous political situation coupled with active extremist groups brings the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons into question. Between 2001 and 2007, the US secretly gave Pakistan over \$100 million dollars to assist in securing their nuclear weapons.

The aid, buried in secret portions of the federal budget, paid for the training of Pakistani personnel in the United States and the construction of a nuclear training center in Pakistan, a facility that American officials say is nowhere near completion, even though it was supposed to be in operation this year (2007).³⁸

Little is known about precisely what the money was used for, but Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, said the funds were "money well spent."³⁹ Pakistani officials reserved the right to select nuclear security measures paid for by the US.

³⁷ "Pak Nuclear Program Faces 35% Cut," *The News*, May 1, 2009.

³⁸ *New York Times*, November 18, 2007.

³⁹ Ben Arnoldy, "Could Taliban Get Keys To Pakistan's A-Bomb? Experts See The Islamic Fighters As Less Of A Risk Than Radical Insiders Gaining Access To Nuclear Materials," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 15, 2009.

On November 7, 2007, Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte testified to Congress his belief that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are under "effective technical control."⁴⁰ Most recently on January 21, 2010, Secretary of State Robert Gates said the US is "very comfortable with the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons."⁴¹

Is the Current Two Track Policy Effective in Pakistan?

As was the case in India, US non-proliferation policy was ineffective in preventing Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons. Unlike India, Pakistan's political situation is volatile. For example, the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, expressed his concern that a radical regime could take power in Pakistan and by doing so, acquire nuclear weapons.⁴² From the coup in 1999 to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007, there is growing concern about Pakistan's nuclear security and procedures. Also, like India, Pakistan is still a non-NPT State.

The second track of US nuclear policy has been in effect since 2001. It is questionable whether the US has violated the NPT by advising Pakistan and giving over

⁴⁰ House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Democracy, Authoritarianism and Terrorism in Contemporary Pakistan, November 7, 2007.

⁴¹ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "Express TV Interview," January 21, 2010.

⁴² "Al Baradei to Al Hayat," *Dar Al Hayat*, English Edition on-line, January 10, 2008, <http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/01-2008/Article-20080110-639032eb-c0a8-10ed-01ae-81ab2ea588db/story.html> (March 18, 2010).

\$100 million to secure its nuclear weapons. As of 2007, the \$100 million, “amounts to slightly less than one percent of the roughly \$10 billion in known American aid to Pakistan since the Sept. 11 attacks. Most of the money has gone for assistance in counter-terrorism activities against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.”⁴³ Since the US has assisted Pakistan in securing its nuclear weapons, global confidence has gone up. Indian National Security Adviser M.K. Narayan told *The Press Trust of India* that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe and has adequate checks and balances.⁴⁴ With officials from India and the US confident in the current security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the second track of US nuclear policy has been effective.

⁴³ *New York Times*, November 18, 2007.

⁴⁴ “Pak Nukes Safely Guarded, Says Narayanan,” *The Press Trust of India*, December 16, 2007.

Non-Proliferation Policy vs. Securing Nuclear Materials

President Obama acknowledges in the Nuclear Posture Review released April 6, 2010, “To stop the spread of nuclear weapons, prevent nuclear terrorism, and pursue the day when these weapons do not exist, we will work aggressively to advance every element of our comprehensive agenda—to reduce arsenals, to secure vulnerable nuclear materials, and to strengthen the NPT.”⁴⁵ While the Nuclear Posture Review reinforces the goals of US nuclear policy, non-proliferation and securing vulnerable nuclear materials, there is inconsistency in the cases of India and Pakistan.

US non-proliferation policy failed to deter India and Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons. Strict sanctions did little to dissuade India and Pakistan from acquiring the necessary knowledge and materials from other countries, mainly in Europe and China. The second track, assisting in securing nuclear arsenals, is counter-productive to the first track non-proliferation policy. For a non-proliferation policy to succeed, there can be no alternatives or exceptions. Instead of pressuring India and Pakistan with the strict sanctions it is currently pursuing against Iran for allegedly developing nuclear weapons, the US supported and worked closely with India and Pakistan to ensure their nuclear materials are secure. The US demonstrated that it will make exceptions for nuclear States with shared economic interests such as India and for states with which it shares security interests such as Pakistan. However, it will seek to strictly enforce non-

⁴⁵ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by President Barack Obama on the Release of Nuclear Posture Review,” 6 April 2010.

proliferation policies against enemy States. This inconsistency presents a gap in US nuclear policy and undercuts its credibility in this area.

If US policy is to secure the nuclear arsenal of non-NPT States, the policy must apply to all non-NPT States with nuclear weapons. The US accepts India and Pakistan as nuclear States even though they have not signed the NPT, a strict violation of US non-proliferation policy and against the NPT. How can the US expect Iran and North Korea to take sanctions and threats seriously when US non-proliferation policy was reversed for India and Pakistan when it became economically and strategically expedient for the US to do so?

The current two track nuclear policy is a contradiction. While both tracks separately address US nuclear policy goals, together they are in conflict. US non-proliferation policy is vulnerable unless other NPT States implement the same policy. The US sanctioned Pakistan and India for developing nuclear weapons, but European countries and China supplied the required information and resources. Important groundwork has been laid for real global sanctions against Iran as President Obama acknowledged following the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, “the fact that we’ve got Russia and China, as well as the other P5-plus-1 members having a serious discussion around a sanctions regime, following up on a serious sanctions regime that was passed when North Korea flouted its obligations towards the NPT, it’s a sign of the degree to

which international diplomacy is making it more possible for us to isolate those countries that are breaking their international obligations.”⁴⁶ Serious discussion is not enough.

The tension between the two tracks can be slightly alleviated by the US relaxing the strong non-proliferation rhetoric, which has proven to be less than effective, and do all it can to push for securing nuclear materials. Success of US nuclear policy is dependent on the support of Russia and China. US two track policy can't accomplish anything without their full support and assistance. First, the US must appeal to Russia and China's safety needs. The recent Moscow Metro bombings on March 29, 2010 demonstrate all States can be the victim of terrorists. 38 people were killed and over 60 injured in the attacks.⁴⁷ As Russian forces react to the bombings with an offensive in the North Caucasus, the US must reach out to Russia for support. The US must can't separate the recent terrorist attack from issues of nuclear security. The suicide bombings cause many innocent people to die, but if the suicide bombers had possession of a nuclear weapon, a great percentage of population of Moscow would perish. China has not experienced terrorism the same way the US and Russia have, but when terrorism occurs anywhere in the world the world responds with increased security. Following the

⁴⁶ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Conference By The President At The Nuclear Security Summit," Washington Convention Center, Washington, DC, 13 April 2010.

⁴⁷ "Moscow Vows to Avenge Bomb Blasts," *BBC News*, March 29, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8593961.stm> (April 29, 2010).

Moscow Bombings, US transit agencies beefed up security.⁴⁸ The US must convey the severity and seriousness of any terrorist organization obtaining nuclear materials.

The US must also be aware of the economics of what they are asking from Russia and China. For example, China is “Iran’s no. 2 oil customer and Chinese companies are heavily invested in Iranian oil and gas exploration and development.”⁴⁹ China has a great deal invested in Iran, while the US is asking China to impose strict sanctions. The US had major economic needs for the lowering of sanctions on India. By asking China to impose serious sanctions on Iran, the US is asking China to give up enormous investments and the source of 11% of China’s oil. It doesn’t seem likely China will agree to this. The US should work with China to negotiate a Chinese security guarantee with Iran in exchange for them to not develop nuclear weapons and allow IAEA the access it needs. There are dangers with this policy. China’s presence will probably be unwelcome in the Persian Gulf Region. China officially backing Iran has the possibility to either deter Israel from attacking Iran or be the reason for it. Iran quitting its nuclear weapons program and allowing IAEA inspectors will make the world a safer place. The US will need to reaffirm its support for allies in the region and calm their fears. Patrick Seale recently wrote an article for the Tehran Times alleging Israel, India and Pakistan have “escaped censure or sanctions on account of their nuclear activities. Instead, India has recently been granted privileged access to American nuclear fuel and technology, while Pakistan,

⁴⁸ Megan K. Scott, “US transit security beefed up after Moscow blast,” *Associated Press*, March 29, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-03-29/news/20827189_1_transit-systems-transit-agencies-subway (April 2, 2010).

⁴⁹ Robert Haddick, “This Week at War: Could China Disarm Iran?,” *Foreign Policy*, April 16, 2010.

a close American ally in the struggle against the Taliban, has been a recipient of substantial U.S. financial aid. Such preferential treatment has by no means been extended to Iran...⁵⁰ Seale makes valid points for which the US can address with the help and support of Russia and China. The US and Iran have not seen eye to eye since before the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but even so, the hypocrisy of the current two track nuclear policy is a problem. Russia is also a major trading partner with Iran. Trade relations between the two countries have increased to over \$3.7 billion in 2008.⁵¹ Russia will also have a very difficult time agreeing to any sort of sanctions against Iran with trade flourishing between the two countries as it is. Russia must also help foster understanding and an alliance between the US and Iran in order to ensure the US can assist in securing Iran's nuclear materials.

⁵⁰ Patrick Seale, "Hypocrisy of the nuclear game," *Tehran Times*, May 1, 2010.

⁵¹ "Tehran, Moscow talk trade," *Tehran Times*, February 4, 2010.

Conclusion

The US must emphasize security as its top priority. The Obama Administration has done well to ensure the focus of US nuclear policy is on keeping nuclear weapons and material, wherever it may be, secure and out of the hands of terrorists and extremist groups. At the same time, the US must do its all to ensure any sanctions placed on potential nuclear States have the committed backing of all NPT States, especially China and Russia. As in the case of India and Pakistan, sanctions from the US alone are ineffective. The Obama Administration must make certain every State is part of the push to secure nuclear materials. Much like US non-proliferation policy has been ineffective without worldwide support, securing nuclear materials must be a worldwide effort. The US will have difficulty working to secure the nuclear materials in the possession of States like North Korea and Iran. It is imperative that the Obama Administration ask Russia and China to work with Iran to ensure they don't develop nuclear weapons and that their nuclear materials are secure.

In the case of Pakistan, there was evidence of the domino effect in the initiation and escalation of its nuclear weapons program. The South Asia Project Director for the International Crisis Group, Samina Ahmed writes, "From its inception, Pakistan's nuclear policy has been India-centric, revolving around perceptions of threat from and hostility toward India." Once India tested a nuclear weapon, it was imperative for Pakistan to begin a nuclear weapon program. The US needs to be mindful of the impact a single country developing nuclear weapons can have on that country's enemies. The US and

Russia went through an intense arms race during the Cold War which led to the manufacturing of an excessive amount of nuclear weapons. Just as the US and Russia felt they needed to increase production to match the other's stockpile, Pakistan felt they needed to development nuclear weapons in order to survive against India. Iran feels much the same pressure to develop nuclear weapons with a nuclear Israel so close. Iran must feel secure in order to give up nuclear weapon aspirations. Just as the US has given many security guarantees in exchange for a State ending its nuclear weapons program, Russia and China should do the same with Iran.

US nuclear policy has transformed significantly since the development of nuclear weapons, now more than ever it is imperative for US nuclear policy to convert to worldwide policy. The US is still a superpower, but is incapable of securing all nuclear materials and imposing effective sanctions without worldwide support. It is time for Russia and China to step up to the plate.

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