Copyright by Mei Huang 2010 The Thesis Committee for Mei Huang Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: Obedience, Confrontation and Riposte: The Internet and The Traditional Media in Mainland China APPROVED BY SUPERVISING COMMITTEE: Chien-hsin Tsai Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang Supervisor: Obedience, Confrontation and Riposte: The Internet and The Traditional Media in Mainland China by Mei Huang, B.A. Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts The University of Texas at Austin May 2010 For My Country and My People v Acknowledgements My thanks first go to Professor Chien-hsin Tsai, who not only acted as the supervisor, offering me generous support from the last fall to this spring, but also helped me with every step in the hard process, even proofreading. Without his boundless inspirations, disciplines and encouragement, I would not be able to accomplish my thesis like a miracle. Over the last three years, I have greatly benefited from Professor Sung-Sheng Yvonne Chang. She always gave me confidence and understanding in my hardest time, as well as substantial guidance and support. She extremely impressed me, and taught me even more. I want to express my thanks to the Department of Asian Studies at The University of Texas at Austin, which completely supported my studies throughout the three years. I appreciate many colleagues, classmates and friends in China, the United States and other countries, for their sincere concerns, warnings, comments, suggestions, so on and so forth. I especially thank Dr. Arlen Nydam for his crucial contribution to my writing. ? Last but not least, I owe my parents too much since I was born. Although they have never been to Texas, I can feel their love at any time, just like they were by my side. I love them forever, no matter I will be in which corner of the world. May 1st, 2010 vi Abstract Obedience, Confrontation and Riposte: The Internet and The Traditional Media in Mainland China Mei Huang, M.A. The University of Texas at Austin, 2010 Supervisor: Chien-hsin Tsai This thesis discusses the relationship between the two forces—the Internet and the conventional media, and the rules and etiquette that have governed these media from the mid-1990s to present day. I divide the history of interaction between them into three phases, corresponding to different power balances and stances in the field of cultural production. By analyzing three Internet-themed TV talk show episodes, I probe how the Internet has gradually evolved into an active competitor, and how the conventional media have correspondingly changed their stance in response to their thriving counterpart. vii Table of Contents List of Tables ......................................................................................................... ix List of Figures ..........................................................................................................x 1 Introduction...........................................................................................................1 I. The Internet and Internet Culture ..............................................................1 II. Previous Studies .......................................................................................5 III. Three Phases of Internet Development .................................................13 IV. A Micro Field, Approaches and Premises ............................................18 V. Thesis Organization ...............................................................................24 2 From Li Xunhuan To Lu Jinbo ...........................................................................27 I. Behind the Show: His Story and History .................................................27 II. Comparative Approaches and Triple Identity ..........................................31 III. Internet Writing and Hierarchical Significance ......................................35 IV. Show Strategy and Manipulated Identity .............................................39 V. The Ignored Internet: Era of Obedience ................................................46 3 Furong Jiejie is Coming ......................................................................................48 I. Furong's Contextual Implications ............................................................48 II. Internet Star and TV Program ................................................................60 III. Visual Culture in Confrontation ............................................................66 IV. Changed Balance of Power: New Trend ..............................................69 4 When the Internet Encounters Professor.............................................................71 I. New Conditions: Era of Riposte ..............................................................71 II. New Internet and New Hierarchy ...........................................................76 III. Visual Evidence and Proxemics Significance .......................................80 IV. Kuso Subculture and Anti-intellectualism ............................................88 V. Externalized Inner Competition ...............................................................91 viii 5 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................93 Glossary ...............................................................................................................97 Bibliography ..........................................................................................................98? Vita ...................................................................................................................104 ix List of Tables Table 1: Chinese Literary Website Summary .................................................28 Table 2: Major Internet video service providers in Mainland China ..............74 Table 3: Yi’s seating in previous talk show episodes .....................................85 x List of Figures Figure 1: Synchronic triple identity of Li.........................................................35 Figure 2: Distorted triple identity of Li ............................................................46 Figure 3: Frjj's famous picture, 1st ...................................................................49 Figure 4: Frjj's famous picture, 2nd..................................................................49 Figure 5: Frjj in the China Internet Industry Leadership Forum......................51 Figure 6: Frjj's new picture in Xinhuanet .........................................................51 Figure 7: Frjj appeared in the talk show...........................................................62 Figure 8: Frjj showed her signature "S" pose in the talk show ........................64 Figure 9: Yi mocked picking cotton.................................................................81 Figure 10: Yi and the Comedian were seated shoulder to shoulder ...................82 Figure 11: The long distance between Yi and the host ......................................85 Figure 12: A different episode of Special Internet .............................................86 Figure 13: Another episode of Special Internet .................................................86 Figure 14: Edward Hall’s body spacing circle ...................................................88 1 1 INTRODUCTION I. The Internet and Internet Culture As a new medium, the Internet challenges conventional media in Mainland China and struggles with them. In this thesis, I discuss the relationship between the two forces—the Internet and conventional media (such as television, radio, newspapers, magazines),1 and the rules and etiquette that have governed these media from the mid-1990s to present day. These relationships, unwritten rules and etiquette, which I will refer to as “codes”2 of their competition, form the ground of their existence and set the parameters for their competition with one another. By analyzing three Internet-themed TV talk show episodes, I examine three different phases of this competition, probing how the Internet has gradually evolved 1 In this thesis, “traditional media,” “conventional media” and “mainstream media”, all refer to all forms of media that appear in use by the official power before the Internet and have already been taken fully control of the official power. I emphasize television though, though my emphasis is on television. 2 Lessig first describes the term “code” of the Internet, which is comparable to the law in society: the Internet, the software, and the rules are created by various groups such as state organs, individuals, and companies. The code represents the combination and interaction of the software, hardware, and rules and etiquette of the Internet. The structure of the code derives, therefore, from the power struggles between different groups. As Lessig argues: “We can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are fundamental, or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to disappear. [. . .] Code is never found; it is only ever made, and only ever made by us.” See Lessig, Lawrence, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 6. Likewise, in this thesis, I draw this term back from cyberspace to real life, and define the “code” as the law in the media field. 2 into an active competitor in the field of cultural production, and how the conventional media have correspondingly changed their stance in response to their thriving counterpart. Uncontrollability In human history, no new development has reshaped a society in such a thorough and rapid way as the Internet. Indeed, only in 1994 did the mainstream media in the US take any notice of it.3 China’s media response largely mirrored that of the US. In less than two decades, it has become apparent that the Internet not only facilitates communication and the dissemination of information—like conventional media, but also creates a new mode of distribution for existing cultural products.4 However, different from conventional media, the Internet plays a constructive role in the global media network and bridges the virtual world and real world. Its significance goes beyond the range of a mere media outlet. As Kang Liu argues, It trespasses the boundaries of the state-owned, centralized press and the commercially orientated local press, and between the International press and national press. This new press inevitably affects Chinese media structures and 3 See Neil Randall, The Soul of the Internet (International Thomson Computer Press, 1997), 285-7. 4 The ‘Internet film,’ which has become increasingly widespread in the industry, can illustrate this. ‘Internet film’ refers to films produced conventionally but circulated and distributed on the Internet rather than in traditional movie theaters. Internet films are created to serve a variety of ideological and commercial motivations, and the online influence of such films inevitably reaches film fans in the real world. 3 practice and will have profound implications not only on the Chinese media but also on China’s ideological state apparatuses (ISA).5 Liu’s word not only points out the implications of the Internet in the Chinese context, but also indicates how the uncontrollability of this new medium encourages anti-authoritative activity. The Internet became a dynamic force in China’s cultural landscape during the late 1990s. To date, computer-mediated communication (CMC) has eluded control by traditional authorities. In other words, authoritative forces are still trying to rein in the Internet as well as to control conventional media, and continuing to learn from their successes and failures.6 Alternative discourse Besides Liu, Yan Wu also notes the significance of the Internet as a new medium: The “conversation model” and autonomy associated with computer-mediated communication (CMC) provides an alternative “persuasive discourse” which challenges the authoritative discourse and “provides the subject with a language for dialogue” (van Dijk, 2000; Mitra, 2001: 32).7 5 Kang Liu, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), 128. 6 On this point, the popularity of the illegal pornography distribution on the Internet provides the best commentary. Even though the government knows how to take effective measures to ban pornography distribution in real life, it has failed to do so in cyberspace. Since 2008, a series of events relating to the illegal dissemination of online pornography has resulted in changes in lifestyles and values in the Chinese community. For more details, one may search for the most representative and influential examples like those of Edison Chen (??????) and Shoushou (???). 7 Yan Wu, “Blurring boundaries in a 'cyber-greater China': are Internet bulletin boards constructing the public sphere in China?” in ed. Richard Butsch, Media and public spheres (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 210-239. 4 Wu clearly points out that the Internet, as a new high-tech medium, produces an unprecedented conversation model and autonomy, which creates an unprecedented means of information dissemination, circulation and communication, which shelters an alternative discourse that “challenges the authoritative discourse” usually conducted by the state through conventional media such as radio and television. In this way, the Internet provides a safe harbor for information that might be suppressed by authority in the real world.8 The physical difficulty of controlling the flow of information on the Internet points to its key distinguishing features: opposition to authority and an essential anarchy. From the perspective of cultural materialism, these two core identities of Internet culture may be regarded as born of its technological and ideological aspects, and understood as associated in a dynamic dialectical manner. On one hand, as science and technology advance, the Internet in China becomes assimilated to conventional media, and is likely to fall increasingly under the control of conventional authority, though it will remain more uncontrolled than the traditional media. On the other hand, Chinese Internet culture is shaped by “the specific global development of the Net itself, and the larger societal and political development in 8 Here is a universal statement for the overall situation in the whole human society. As everyone knows, ideology and social system in reality determine the development and destination of the Internet; things vary in different regimes, for example, in Mainland China. However, it does not mean this statement must exclude the Chinese case. 5 China,”9 which can be seen as a “constitutive social process” that is “itself material.”10 In other words, Internet culture in China is not merely a determined existence but also a determining dynamic power. As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, it is exercising an increasing influence on culture, the public sphere, and lifestyles. II. Previous Studies With the theory of the “(Repressive) State Apparatus (RSA)” and “Ideological State Apparatus (ISA)”,11 Louis Althusser provides an ideal perspective from which to explore previous studies on the relationship between the Internet and the conventional force. In Althusser’s formulation, the RSA and ISA both function by violence and ideology, but one may find a crucial distinction between them: RSA functions massively and predominantly by repression (including physical repression), while functioning secondarily by ideology (There is no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus.) For example, the Army and the Police also function by 9 Jens Damm, "Internet and the Fragmented Political Community," IIAS Newsletter (March 2003): 10. 10 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 13. 11 Louis Althusser coins the term “Ideological State Apparatus (ISA)”. He redefines Marx’s “State Apparatus” as a “Repressive State Apparatus (RSA)” that contains the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc., which “ ‘functions by violence’—at least ultimately (since repression, e.g. administrative repression, may take non-physical forms).” Accordingly, he defines the ISA as “a certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions [. . .] and function by ideology.” See Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972). 6 ideology both to ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the “values” they propound externally. In the same way, but inversely, it is essential to say that for their part the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic.12 Therefore, in the case of China, governmental regulation and control over the Internet, as well as the practical social function of the Internet that leads to the governmental reaction, should be seen as an illustration of the RSA, while those “symbolic” elements such as regulations in the field of media and culture should be seen as manifestations of the ISA.13 And in fact, previous research can be divided into these two categories: one focusing on the RSA, and the other on the ISA. IIa. RSA-related: Censorship and Practical Function A) Governmental Regulation First, considering the particular Chinese context, researchers have discussed in depth the governmental regulation and control of the Internet, specifically analyzing censorship, Internet filtering, content blocking, and related 12 Ibid. 13 ibid. Althusser lists following institutions as ISA: the religious ISA (the system of the different churches); the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private ‘schools’); the family ISA; the legal ISA; the political ISA (the political system, including the different parties); the trade- union ISA; the communications ISA (press, radio, television, etc.); the cultural ISA (literature, the arts, sports, etc.). 7 issues.14 Their work is usually based on large data sets and multinomial logistic regression analyses. From the perspectives of both technology and administration, they survey the chronology of the governmental regulation, and clearly showcase the obvious attitude changes of the official power towards the developing Internet. Regarding credibility of the Internet as a new medium in information resources and value orientations, Jonathan J. H. Zhu and Zhou He have compared the influence of the Internet and traditional media, and conclude that the Internet is playing an increasingly crucial role in the network of media.15 Also, in order to explore barriers to Internet access in the Chinese media network, Jonathan Zittrain and Ben Edelman attempted to access approximately 200,000 websites and tracked 19,032 websites that were inaccessible from China while remaining accessible from the United States; they conclude that blocking systems are becoming more refined even as they are likely more labor- and technology-intensive to maintain than cruder predecessors.16 Likewise, the Chinese government annually releases an official report 14 See Zittrain, Jonathan and Ben Edelman, “Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China,” IEEE Internet Computing (March/April 2003): 70-77; Weber, Ian and Lu Jia, “Handing over China's Internet to the Corporations,” IIAS Newsletter (March 2003): 9; Tsui, Lokman. "The Taste of Information: State Attempts to Control the Internet," IIAS Newsletter (March 2004): 8. 15 Jonathan J. H. Zhu and Zhou He, "Information Accessibility, User Sophistication, and Source Credibility: The Impact of the Internet on Value Orientations in Mainland China," Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication (January 2002). 16 Jonathan Zittrain and Ben Edelman, "Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China", IEEE Internet Computing (March/April 2003): 70-77. 8 with official data and analysis, in order to showcase the growing impact of the Internet in society.17 The academic research and official reports provide directly perceived evidences of the development of the Internet in Mainland China, and demonstrate an escalating general trend. On the one hand, as technology advances and as society becomes more open, the Internet plays a more and more effective role in the information society. On the other hand, the Internet shapes the cognitive sophistication and everyday lifestyles in the existing world, which has determined its development from the very beginning. B) Civic Reformation This body of research is larger than that on government regulation, as a host of researchers have focused on the aspect of the public sphere and civic reformation, discussing how the Internet continues to undermine the authority of official power and create chances for ordinary people to express their opinions, especially when they disagree with the hegemonic voice.18 17 I also use data from the annual “Chinese Internet Development Report” from 1997 to 2008. See the official website: http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index.htm (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 18 One may ask why I have classified the social function and practical action of the Internet as State Apparatus? One explanation is that the social function and practical action of the Internet essentially leads to more and more restrictive and advanced governmental regulation. This causal relationship prompts my taxonomy. 9 Among these scholars, some attribute the Internet an astounding role in the process of social democratization and globalization, and take an optimistic view of its future potential to overthrow the existing political hierarchies.19 For example, regarding China’s public sphere, Guobin Yang believes that the social uses of the Internet have facilitated public debate and the articulation of problems.20 Specifically, Yang mentions the significance of the Internet to the development of Chinese civic associations, and illustrates the parallel rise of Internet use and social change.21 Other scholars, however, still have reservations about the function of the Internet in the Chinese context.22 As Jens Damm argues, For the time being, however, the Internet has only a limited influence on emerging political discourses in China and has much more importance as a tool for lifestyle communications with a very personalized use.23 19 Besides Liu Kang and Yan Wu quoted above, see Guobin Yang, “How does Chinese Civic Associations Respond to the Internet?” China Quarterly (March 2007): 122-143; Guobin Yang, “The Internet and Civil Society in China: a preliminary assessment,” Journal of Contemporary China (2003): 453–475; Guobin Yang, “The Curious Case of Jia Junpeng: The Power of Symbolic Appropriation in Chinese Cyberspace,” paper presented at New Media and Global Transformations Conference, Columbia University, October 9, 2009; Randulph Cluver, “The Internet in China: A Symposium,” IIAS Newsletter (March 2003): 6; Xu Wu, Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolution, Characteristics, and Implications (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007). 20 Yang, 453-475. 21 Ibid. 22 Chin-Chuan Lee, “The Global and the National of the Chinese Media,” in ed. Chin-Chuan Lee, Chinese Media, Global Contexts (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 1-31; Jens Damm, "Internet and the Fragmented Political Community,” IIAS Newsletter (March 2004): 10. 23 Ibid. 10 Damm analyzes the constitution of Chinese Net users, the Chinese social structure as a consumer-oriented society, and the code of governmental regulation. He concludes, “The Internet may have an important role as a catalyst for the spreading of actual information, but in times of crisis the general usage patterns may change.”24 To a certain extent, this opinion (less popular than its more optimistic counterparts) does represent the reality in Mainland China. When many scholars take an optimistic view of the role of the Internet in China, they usually focus on the ideological difference between China and the West and thus overstate the revolutionary significance of the “persuasive discourse.”25 In their eyes, a “citizen- based democracy”26 has been established in cyberspace, which can be seen as a “virtual public sphere hardly anticipated before.”27 But in fact, ideological difference and Chinese characteristic administration curbs the role of the Internet and limits its influence. As Chin-chuan Lee argues: “under no circumstances will the Party-State relinquish its editorial authority.”28 On the Internet, the newly opened field, official power seems to lose its superiority. However, the virtual world has no significance unless it actively enters the real world 24 Ibid. 25 Wu, 210. 26 Howard Rheingold, “The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier,” http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/index.html (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 27 Wu, 212. 28 Lee, 12. 11 and functions in everyday life like its conventional counterparts.29 In this case, the Internet becomes structured within the hierarchy of real society. In other words, the Internet’s particular identity has made it a target of censorship in Mainland China, restricting its power as an opposition forum. Compared to that of the West, Chinese Internet culture displays far less power and the public sphere in cyberspace functions less effectively and under greater restriction. The Internet in the Chinese context asserts its resistance to control and opposition to authority in a relevant and significant way. IIb. ISA-related: Cyberspace and Cultural Sphere More than RSA-related topics, researchers discuss the Internet and conventional force in the sphere of culture. For example, Yang analyzes the basic elements, dynamics, and political functions of the online Chinese cultural sphere, especially in two kinds of online spaces: non-interactive spaces such as online magazines and newsletters, and interactive spaces such as chatrooms, listservs, 29 Ibid. Online protests and electronic organizing contribute to traditional political communities, despite the fact that “citizens who have no authority, celebrity or expertise to give their opinions” usually launch such efforts. Scholars have researched the issues of e-protesting and e-organizing. Previous studies clearly point out that most e-protesters and e-organizers are ordinary people, but more and more cultural authorities and celebrities are participating in these online activities. Celebrities tend to use these forums to complement the exposure they receive through traditional media, while ordinary citizens use the Internet as a means of exercising the freedom of expression denied them through conventional media. 12 newsgroups and bulletin board systems (BBS).30 Andy Yinan Hu traces Chinese leftism on the Internet, and discusses its historical rationale, characteristics, scope of influence, space for survival, contributions and limitations, and prospective implications.31 Michel Hockx compares Chinese literary journals from the early twentieth century with a Mainland Chinese literary website from the early twenty- first century, and illustrates how literary practice underwent significant changes as a result of major changes in the technological processes involved in the production and distribution of texts.32 Many other scholars have also contributed to the ISA-related discussion of the Internet.33 Previous studies concerned with cultural and communication issues delineate the development of the Internet in China from diverse perspectives and lay the groundwork for future research. However, the limitations of these studies also make it necessary to extend the discussion in this field. For example, other than a big picture 30 Guobin Yang, “The Internet and the Rise of a Transnational Chinese Cultural Sphere," in Media, Culture & Society (2003): 469-490. 31 Andy Yinan Hu, “Swimming Against the Tide: Tracing and Locating Chinese Leftism Online”(Master Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 2006). 32 Michel Hockx, "Links with the Past: Mainland China's Online Literary Communities and their Antecedents," Journal of Contemporary China (Feb. 2004): 105-27. 33 Such as Kang Liu, 127-61; Shih-ding Liu, "Undomesticated Hostilities: The Affective Space of Internet Chat Rooms across the Taiwan Straits," in Positions: East Asian Cultures Critique (Fall 2008): 435-57; Qiang Xiao, "The Internet: A Force to Transform Chinese Society?" in ed. Lional M. Jensen and Timothy B. Weston, China's Transformations: The Stories beyond the Headlines (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 129-143; Guobin Yang, "'A Portrait of Martyr Jiang Qing': The Chinese Cultural Revolution on the Internet," in ed. Ching Kwan Lee and Guobin Yang, Re- envisioning the Chinese Revolution: The Politics and Poetics of Collective Memories in Reform China (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007), 287-316; Youquan Ouyang, Wangluo wenxue lungang(Beijing: Renmin wenxue Press, 2003). 13 of the development of Internet culture, there lacks an ideal taxonomy that divides the development into synchronic phases, which will effectively elaborate different situations and reveal an overall trend from a comparative perspective. In addition, although researchers have touched a host of specific topics (such as Chinese online leftism, Internet literary movement, etc.) and particular technological features (chatrooms, BBSs), the conversation must also embrace up-to-date issues, such like iconoclastic Internet idols, and the Internet’s riposte to the authority in recent days. It is the increasingly growing Internet that calls for continuous research in this field. My thesis also focuses on the ISA-related issues, discussing the code of competition of the Internet culture and conventional force from the perspective of traditional media. I attempt to illustrate how in the field of media, when the Internet medium and conventional medium encounter and interact with each other, the editorial authority held by the authoritative force functions silently and symbolically, and to describe the corresponding stances of the Internet agent. Also, I discuss the way in which, once the Internet seizes the editorial authority in certain cases, the Internet makes its riposte towards the official counterpart in the same way as the official took actions against it but inversely.34 III. Three Phases of Internet Development 34 Chapter 4 discusses this certain situation. 14 I propose dividing the history of interaction between the Internet and conventional media into three phases, corresponding to different power balances and stances in the field of cultural production. As Pierre Bourdieu argues, a field is a structured space with its own laws of functioning, and its own relations of forces independent of those of politics and the economy, except for, obviously, in the cases of economic and politics fields.35 Bourdieu’s views constructively contribute to the understanding of the power struggles between the voices seeking expression through the Internet and official authority in the field of cultural production. Nevertheless, this theoretical structure merely delineates a general situation in the field of cultural production. If the Mainland’s field of media is considered an entity, previous studies evidently show that the general hierarchy, balance of power, and basic stances of different agents have changed little from the mid-1990s to the present. The authoritative power dominates and stays atop the hierarchy of cultural production, while the nascent Internet constituency continues to struggle for capital and to evade suppression. To this extent, Bourdieu’s theory may be less effective in understanding the particular struggles between different agents. How can the different phases of Internet growth be distinguished, and in what ways can the struggle between Internet culture and authoritative power be better explored? 35 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production, ed. and intro. Randal Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 7. 15 In light of these questions, it is necessary to refine Bourdieu’s theory and specify its application in the context of Mainland China. I redefine Bourdieu’s “field” as a macro field of cultural production, where agents of different forces engage in competition. In the macro field, I describe the actual contact of competing forces as a micro field of cultural production, which provides a specific arena for concrete confrontation. Concrete and material competition and struggle among different forces can only be carried out in the micro field. The macro field represents the abstract situation, general trends, balance of power, and hierarchy, while a particular struggle takes place and only takes place in a specific micro field. I refer to this distinction as the macro-micro field (MMF) framework. Micro fields tend to reflect the hierarchy of the macro field; but it is possible for a micro field to differ from its macro counterpart and to represent a different (if not reverse) hierarchy. However, even an exceptional micro field cannot transform the overall rule in the macro field. The concept of MMF plays a crucial role in my taxonomy. According to dissimilarities on the micro level, i.e. different stances and activities of the Internet and conventional forces, I divide the history of the interaction between the Internet and conventional media into three phases.36 36I have two points to clarify for this taxonomy: first, it also corresponds to changes in technological modes of information distribution: Phase I, the Text Era; Phase II, the Text-Image Era; and Phase III, the Text-Image-Video Era. This is coincidentally in conformity with my taxonomy. Second, although I confine my taxonomy within the media sphere, this does not mean it is inapplicable to larger social areas. However, that goes beyond the topic of this thesis and deserves further research. 16 The Era of Obedience: The first phase of the development of Internet culture can be characterized as the Era of Obedience. It refers to the era from the early 1990s to the collapse of the dot-com bubble in the beginning of the 21st century. The emergence of Internet literature and Internet-based writers is a cultural landmark of this era. As Bourdieu sees it, “In the cultural (e.g. literary) field, competition often concerns the authority inherent in recognition, consecration and prestige.”37 At the top of the Chinese “hierarchy”38 is the official voice, i.e. the government-endorsed “Theme”,39 while public opinion is usually manipulated by the official power.40 The official power seizes the editorial authority, i.e. the authority of recognizing or illegalizing agents of forces in the field, while itself remaining in the position of consecration and prestige. The power of the Internet did not obtain official recognition at the very beginning. Virtual space, which had just started to create an implicit public sphere, did not occupy a significant position in the hierarchy. When Internet culture encountered the force of authority, it always chose to restrain itself and obey the authoritative ideology, rather than risk a real confrontation. Therefore, I 37 Bourdieu, 7. 38 In this thesis, I define the hierarchy as a system in the field of cultural production, in which diverse agents of powers are ranked one above the other according to their different priorities, positions, capitals, etc. 39 Translated from a Chinese characteristic term “???”, which refers to the voice or cultural products in any form that corresponds with the official interest. 40 Coincident public opinions are (over) used to support the official decision, but when the public opinions disagree with the official opinion, they are always muffled. 17 define this phase as the Era of Obedience. Generally speaking, authoritative power took a stance of contempt toward its Internet counterpart, and gained a complete triumph. The Era of Confrontation: The Era of Confrontation ran from about 2001 to 2006. It begins with the rise of iconoclastic cultural idols on the Internet, and fades on the eve of kuso subculture’s flourishing in cyberspace.41 In this period, the micro field becomes extremely active as direct contests between mainstream and Internet voices increase. Although authoritative culture continues to dominate the field of cultural production, the Internet as an alternative cultural force gradually develops into a recognized part of the field. The conventional force is forced to abandon its attitude of contempt and willful ignorance, but asserts its right to judge and regulate Internet culture in the hierarchy of cultural production. For its part, the Internet begins explicitly to confront authoritative cultural agents, proclaiming its value and striving for equivalent standing with its mainstream counterpart. This era initiates the real confrontation between the Internet force and conventional force, which has been enhanced and complicated in the next and current era—The Era of Riposte. The Era of Riposte: We are now living in the Era of Internet Riposte, marked by the prominence of kuso culture and an advance beyond the era of 41 Kuso culture is a sort of postmodern subculture, which is prevailing in East Asia. Kuso includes all types of camps and parodies on public celebrities and classic idols. I will discuss it in details in Chapter 4. 18 confrontation, in which the macro hierarchy has been locally overturned in a significant number of micro fields. The establishment of a clearly Internet- dominant pecking order in certain micro cases announces an explicit challenge to authority. Micro scale triumphs indicate the strength of the Internet as a discursive arena, and are reshaping the social discourse in the real world to a certain extent. But, this newfound strength is also drawing the attention of authoritative agents seeking to control the range of expression in new media, which can be seen from recent enhancement of governmental regulation.42 IV. A Model Micro Field, Approaches and Premises Under the macro-micro field distinction, concrete competition among different forces occurs on the micro level, while the macro generally demonstrates the overall balance of power and hierarchy. Therefore, I have selected a model micro field—the Internet-themed TV talk show episode—as a case study to aid in scrutinizing the struggles between Internet and authoritative forces over the three phases. 42 In present day, as the Internet power rapidly grows into a competitive role in the field of cultural production, the government takes more strict actions to curb its development. For example, in the year 2010, the State Council Information Office of PRC set up the 9th bureau, which takes charge of the guidance and regulation over the Internet culture. Relevant information can be found on the official website: http://www.scio.gov.cn/ (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 19 I make my selection based on three motivations. First, I confine my target to the genre of TV programs. Television is the media structure that facilitates the Internet to increasingly generate intersections with conventional media in this vast “network of networks,”43 and creates an age of multi-dimensional media convergence accordingly. Furthermore, amid various forms of media, the huge power of TV legitimizes it as an appropriate object of study. Since its emergence in 1929 as a nascent commercial medium, TV has evolved into today’s most powerful conventional medium. Second, the talk show stands out among types of TV programs, because of its seemingly “live”44 context that creates credibility, a colloquial style that guarantees accessibility, and the effect of seemingly watching real people shortens the distance between the TV audience and the program. According to Gini Graham Scott, TV and radio talk shows have become a powerful new influence on the way we think and behave. [. . .] That’s because talk shows have that incredible potential that comes with the power to attract millions—to do harm or good.45 Granted, Chinese talk shows lack the level of cultural impact of their American counterparts. This is not surprising given the short history of the talk show 43 Randall, xx. 44 Talk shows are usually edited before airing on TV. 45 Gini Graham Scott, Can We Talk? The Power and Influence of Talk Shows (New York and London: Prenum Press, 1997), 1. 20 and the configuration of the TV market in the Chinese context.46 Even so, the three fundamental features named above still guarantee its significance and make it a proper arena to showcase the struggle between Internet culture and authoritative forces. In addition, talk shows indicate inevitable discrepancies and competition among agents of different powers. Two or more parties express differing viewpoints and conduct a competition among cultural forces in the studio. In this sense, the apparent confliction between hosts and guests may ideally represent the inner competition of different forces, which facilitates my discussion the code of competition between the Internet and orthodox. Third, both conventional power and Internet power constitute the two parties of the struggle, which makes the competition possible. On the one hand, Chinese TV is run to promote the agenda of the authoritative power.47 In Mainland China, all conventional media are state-run and severely government-controlled. In most cases,48 TV programming endorses an official stance that is a more authoritative and ideological voice than that heard in most other countries. In other words, the agent of 46 The first TV talk show program in Mainland China is “Son of the East”, which was launched in 1992. See the official website http://www.cctv.com/program/dfsk/01/index.shtml (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 47 See Zhu Ying, Television in Post-reform China: Serial dramas, Confucian leadership and the Global television market (New York: Routledge, 2008). 48 This does not mean every talk show program must take an authoritative stand and promote the official agenda, and the objective talk show (the topic of chapter 4) is an important and rare exception to this trend. 21 authoritative power has been firmly located on the side of the program. On the other hand, the Internet theme of a talk show guarantees the presence of the Internet agent.49 Regarding the above three points, I select three talk shows to conduct case studies, and approach them from a cultural materialist perspective,50 stressing historical context and close textual analysis. As Nicolas Spadaccini and Jenaro Talens argue, If one agrees with the notion that a “fully authoritative text” must have been “socially produced”, then one must also go along with the idea that “the critical standard for what constitutes authoritativeness cannot rest with the author and his intentions alone”.51 The issues raised, be they the participants’ position in society, the balance of cultural power, the hierarchy in field of culture production, or the stances and approaches of agents of different forces, can all be considered cultural activities.This materiality legitimizes the hidden issues as substantial object of studies, which determines the final presentation of the talk show. 49 In the first and second episodes, the guest represents the Internet force, while the program that holds the editorial authority represents the authoritative power. However, in the third episode, the program stands on the side of the Internet culture, while the guest as a representative of official power inversely becomes a target, towards whom the Internets makes its riposte. I will discuss this in detail in following three chapters. 50 According to Jonathan Dillimore, there are four defining characteristics of cultural materialism as a theoretical device: 1) historical context, 2) close text analysis, 3) political commitment and 4) theoretical method. See Jonathan Dillimore, introduction to Political Shakespeare (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1985), 2-17. 51 Nicolas spadaccini and Jenaro Talens, ed. Politics of Editing (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota press, 1991), xii. 22 In addition, my work is premised on two seemingly paradoxical arguments. First, the first talk show selected to represent the Era of Obedience was actually produced during 2008, well into what I have termed the Era of Riposte. In what ways can this talk show still tell about situations in an earlier phase of cultural development, and how can we be sure that it is not a reinterpretation by official power of earlier conditions? Despite these causes for concern, I believe the show in question accurately represents the relationship between Internet culture and the hegemonic cultural power in the earlier phase of cultural conflict, because the stance of the program (the agent of authoritative power) towards the guest (the Internet counterpart), and the balance of power in the studio exactly corresponds with the situation during the Era of Obedience. Furthermore, during the Era of Obedience, cyberspace and the real world had not yet become fully integrated and mutually determined.52 The small number of Internet-connected computers and Internet users meant that the Internet could exert relatively little influence on political conditions, and this discouraged the authoritative cultural power from committing to the struggle for cultural capital in virtual space. The scarcity of interest conflicts decreased the opportunities for direct contact between Internet voices, with consequently little conflict on the micro level. 52 See The First Report on China Internet Development, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index/0E/00/11/index.htm (accessed Apr 24/2010). According to this official report, until Oct. 31, 1997, Internet users in Mainland China numbered no more than 0.6 million, or 0.046% of the total population. 23 Therefore, such opportunities were not afforded to the agents of this cultural force. The invitation to appear on a state-run talk show indicates explicit recognition by the authoritative force, which implicitly requires the kind of growth of Internet culture not seen until later phases of development. My second paradoxical premise is that I consider these talk shows to be reliable texts that deserve close textual analysis, independent of whether they were in fact spontaneous free interchanges or deliberately structured and scripted set pieces. What value can these shows have as documents if they were arranged with an eye to state publicity, ratings, and promoting the views of the hegemonic power? I consider the final edited program as a multilateral text, a relatively autonomous entity intimate with but independent of both producer (the production team) and performer (hosts, guests, audience, etc.). In fact, the relationship between the participants and producer of the show resembles that between the author and editor in Bourdieu’s theory: “[The editor has] the power to impose the dominant definition of the writer and therefore to delimit the population of those entitled to take part in the struggle to define the writer.”53 Likewise, it is the producer of the program that has the power to “impose the dominant definition” of the participants. In the television studio—the micro field—the producer represents the orthodox, or dominant power. No matter how a participant performs in the course of 53 Bourdieu, 42. 24 the show, those parts that conform to the stance of the producer will be kept and aired, while behavior contrary to the producer’s ideals will be cut from the edited version. From the politics of editing, all discussion on the final presentation of the program should be seen as an edited product that does not wholly correspond with the intentions either of the show’s host or of its guest. As for the original intentions of hosts and guests and the gaps between producers and performers, I defer these issues to a discussion of the art and politics of editing which lies beyond the scope of this thesis. My concern lies with the final product, the talk show as seen by the viewing audience. As long as a typical competition between official power and Internet power can be tracked, observed, and analyzed, the criteria of this analysis will be met. V. Thesis Organization In Chapter 2, I focus on the situation in the Era of Obedience. I examine the historical background of talk show guest Li/Lu. As Li Xunhuan, Li/Lu was one of the most prominent Internet writers of the 1990s, and as Lu Jinbo he was also a successful book publisher. I summarize his multi-dimensional identity from both synchronic and diachronic perspectives. I scrutinize the talk show dialogue and delineate how the when contempt of the authoritative power for the nascent Internet has been successfully when into self-examination and self-critique between the identity as Lu Jinbo and the identity as Li Xunhuan. In the Era of Obedience, the 25 agent of Internet force seldom takes a confrontational stance against the editorial authority of the program, but instead cooperates in achieving the program’s goals. Chapter 3 addresses the Era of Confrontation, characterized by the emergence of iconoclastic figures on the Internet. I chronicle the background of Furong Jiejie, known on the Internet as “Frjj,” to contextualize her talk show appearance. Comparing Frjj to Li/Lu in the Era of Obedience, I analyze how this episode showcases a new balance of power, and stress the importance of text-image as the hegemonic mode of information in this era. I then point out the difference between the Chinese and US contexts by comparing Frjj with her American counterpart, William Hung: it is the ideological divergence between the two countries that determines William has roots in the conventional media (television), while Frjj can only originate from the alternative medium (Internet). Also, I examine the Internet’s role in reframing the female position in the social structure. Chapter 4 presents a case that reverses the common pattern in Chinese talk shows in which the agent of authoritative power is located on the side of program. In this case, the host and hostess who represent the program, with the second guest, should be seen as agents of the Internet culture, while the primary guest, Yi Zhongtian, actually becomes a representative of official and classical culture and the target of Internet power’s assault. I analyze how visual evidence such as spatial arrangement externalizes and deepens the confrontation between the two sides. The visual elements used to make a riposte also showcase the ambiguous attitude of the 26 Internet towards its conventional counterpart. As kuso culture in Mainland China is the landmark of the cultural landscape in this era, I discuss it as well in this chapter. With these four chapters, I attempt to delineate a chronology of the interaction between the Internet and conventional media from the mid-1990s to the present day, particularly demonstrating the transformation from one era to the next. My taxonomy provides an effective perspective that clarifies the periodic distinctions of the development of the Internet from a cultural materialistic perspective. It is to be noted that the competition between the two forces can be explored not only from the perspective of RSA, such as the governmental regulation and practical functions of the suppressed Internet, but also from the perspective of culture and communication, which involves more symbolic and implicit functions of different forces. However, the former aspect has been widely noted among researchers, while the cultural and communicative aspect still calls for more study, which may benefit from my discussion in the area of media. 27 2 FROM LI XUNHUAN TO LU JINBO I. Behind the Show: His Story and History The Story of Li/Lu In 2008, i.e. the Era of Riposte, a successful young publisher came into the studio of Watch the East, a talk show program produced by the Shanghai TV Station (one of the most influential provincial TV channels in Mainland China). He was Lu Jinbo, but was also known as Li Xunhuan, the quintessential Internet writer of the late 1990s, i.e. the Era of Obedience. He talked with the program’s hostess about his two lifestyles as Lu and Li. In the mid-1990s, Lu Jinbo quit his job to devote to himself to writing online under the nom de plume of Li Xunhuan.54 Not long after, he moved into crucial positions in IT companies and online writing forums, most notably as the Director of Content for the website www.rongshuxia.com (“Under the Banyan Tree,” the most influential literature website in China at that time). In the early 2000s, he left the 54 “Li Xunhuan” was originally the name of a hero in the novels of martial arts fiction master Gu Long. 28 online writing field and started a career in publishing, swiftly becoming one of the most successful publication planners and publishers in Mainland China.55 Whether as the writer Li, or the dot-com businessman Lu, his life should be seen as a representative model of the Era of Obedience. He surfaced in the first blossoming of Internet culture and became deeply involved in the cutting-edge activity of the time, Internet writing. At that time, hundreds of Chinese-language websites emerged, including a number of literary websites (see Tab. 1). These sites were one of the catalysts for the formation of nascent online communities and promptly generated a host of popular Internet writers such as Annie Baby, Ning Caishen, and, of course, Li Xunhuan. Tab. 1: Chinese Literary Website Summary56 55 For a fuller account of Li Xunhuan/Lu Jinbo, see http://baike.baidu.com/view/1045420.htm (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 56 See Youquan Ouyang, “On the State of Literature in the Times of Internet,” Yinshan Academic Journal (Jan 2003): 8. Website Style Number Comprehensive literature 300 Original literature 241 Internet literature 268 Fiction 486 Poetry 249 Prose 358 Theater 75 Essay 31 TV and film drama 529 Non literature website that contain literature department 3000 29 When the dot-com bubble burst in the early 2000s, the government issued regulations concerning Internet development and information security,57 and the chilling effect of these events shut down many influential forums and pushed Internet writers out of their privileged position within Internet hierarchy and brought about the end of that culture’s first phase of development. Like many of his contemporaries,58 Lu Jinbo left his Internet identity behind to return to conventional media. It is to be noted that the figure Li Xunhuan enjoyed a prominent reputation in the virtual communities of Greater China, but the person Lu Jinbo was only invited to appear on TV long after his years as an Internet writer, i.e. the Era of Riposte. From the Era of Obedience to the Era of Riposte, the Internet has experienced a huge increase and received the official recognition from the authority. As a result, Li Xunhuan who rose to stardom in the Era of Obedience finally appeared on the screen in the Era of Riposte. 57 From 2000 to 2002, the government intensively issued a series of Internet laws and regulations, in order to strengthen the control over the Internet. As for details of these policies, see the official website of Chinese Internet Network Information Center: http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index/0F/index.htm (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 58 It is noticeable that there were few full-time Internet writers in Era of Obedience, and most of them merely wrote part-time on the Internet while still holding another job. In this case, after the dot-com bubble, many top Internet writers just returned to their earlier careers. Of course, some switched to other fields and others went on to make great achievements in new fields. Other than Li Xunhuan, who went back to being “Lu Jinbo,” another prominent Internet writer who transferred to a new field was Xin Yusen, who switched to the field of TV drama scriptwriting and is now one of the most important sit-com drama scriptwriters in Mainland China. 30 Talk Show and the Mode The talk show I study in this chapter revolves around typical clichés of the talk show genre: how to succeed, reasons for career choices, different lifestyles, and self-examination. However, what is interesting here is the way the program reinterprets the original “facts” and demonstrates the “truthfulness” from its own perspective, and how it wields its editorial authority as the orthodox agent and produces an edited and highly selective image of the Internet. But there subsequently emerges a problem: both the Internet agent and orthodox agent contribute to the direction of the talk show and share responsibility for its final form. This would seem to create confusion as to where the motivation of one agent ends, and the other begins. Pierre Bourdieu’s explanation of the literary field is helpful for understanding the problem posed by this talk show. Briefly, Bourdieu argues that The fundamental stake in literary struggles is the monopoly of literary legitimacy, i.e. inter alia, the monopoly of the power to say with authority who are authorized to call themselves writers; or, to put it another way, it is the monopoly of the power to consecrate producers or products.59 From this perspective, I argue that in the micro field of the television studio, the fundamental stake in the struggle is the monopoly of cultural legitimacy, i.e. the monopoly of the power to determine those who are authorized to call themselves 59 Bourdieu, 42. 31 legal. Generally speaking, the orthodox agent and Internet agent should have struggled for cultural legitimacy. Instead, the former agent displays a stance of contempt towards its Internet counterpart, while the latter demonstrates almost obedience to this hegemony. Finally, the orthodox agent seizes the cultural legitimacy and successfully presents a doctored portrait of an illegitimate Internet. In short, the official agent aims to diminish the prestige of discourses propagated by the Internet, but in the first phase of development participants in Internet discourse obey these authorities rather than confronting them directly. In following paragraphs I will discuss the following three questions: First, to what extent and in what ways can a show produced during Era of Riposte illuminate the Era of Obedience? Second, if the stance of the Internet agent in a 2008 talk show mirrors the stance generally taken during the Era of Obedience, what causes such behavior? And third, what specific strategies does the program take to showcase its stance and achieve its ideological goal? II. Comparative Approach and Triple Identity The Internet and Literary Journals In order to answer these questions, I will briefly review the history of Internet literature in Mainland China in the Era of Obedience. This is complicated by the fact that no one has yet published a history of Internet literature. Fortunately, Michel 32 Hockx provides an effective perspective from which to examine Chinese Internet literature.60 He compares the development of literary journals in the early 20th century with the growth of literary websites on the Internet in the 1990s, and concludes that the two share seven common characteristics: 1) Both were born in an era of mixed media; 2) Visual elements play a crucial role in the development of each; 3) Both engendered an intimate contact between authors and readers; 4) Both show concerns about authors’ personal life other than their writing; 5) Both were concerned with social issues; 6) Both facilitated the building of literary communities; and 7) Both were incompatible with the canonical literature. From a cultural materialistic perspective, it is the comparable historic contexts that prompt Hockx to compare the situations in the early 20th century and the 1990s. In the former era, China experienced the most rapid and severe change in every aspect, transforming from a feudalistic and authoritative regime to a modern and chaotic society. Also, two world wars and continuous inner wars brought to China a nationwide confusion and a relatively soft and casual official regulation over culture and literature. All these factors constitute the proper historic context of the popular literature and literary journals. 60 Michel Hockx, "Links with the Past: Mainland China's Online Literary Communities and their Antecedents," Journal of Contemporary China (Feb. 2004): 105-27. 33 Likewise, sea changes and severe social transformation recurred in the latter 1990s when the information revolution and globalization dealt China another huge shock to its culture, technology, and social structure. However, different from the former situation, in the 1990s the government effectively exercised severe regulation over literature and culture across the whole society. It is the relatively uncontrollable Internet that cultivates the chaotic and freer status quo of Internet literature. Triple Identity of Li Xunhuan Based on Hockx’s seven key points of Internet literature, I summarize the triple identity of Li Xunhuan in the Era of Obedience from Hockx’s seven points. First, Hockx’s emphasis on a mixed-media context for Internet journals corresponds closely with the reality of Li Xunhuan, who was a writer as well as a dot-com businessman. The multimedia literature website promotes the nascent dot-com business, while the interaction between the Internet and conventional media further enhances this promotion, and promises the close association between the new medium and new economy. For example, Li Xunhuan was simultaneously a top Internet writer and Director of Content for the website Rongshuxia. Second, the importance of the author’s personal biography touched on in Hockx’s points 3, 4, and 6 indicates that a writer may also simultaneously be a cultural idol. As a cultural figure rather than as a common citizen, Li Xunhuan assumed the status of cultural icon by defining the relationship between Internet 34 writing and the formation of public opinion. In the 1990s, Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) first allowed for the creation of literature websites and public discussion forums on the Internet, and began a process of alteration in social structures that continues today. As Yan Wu argues, “Bulletin boards and other interactive Internet facilities change the relationship between official media agenda- setting and public opinion forming.”61 Wu also argues In the People’s Republic of China, online communities based on Internet bulletin boards are changing the traditional political communities of official meetings, neighborhood or organization study groups, and private elite-dominated salons, and opening political discussion to ordinary Chinese.62 This revolution was not limited to literary Internet writers, but extended to the authors’ postings on public forums and bulletin boards that also play a constructive role in shaping the opinions of ordinary people. These writers in turn became a cultural elite competing with “private elite-dominated salons.” In fact, as mentioned in the talk show, Li Xunhuan began his career as an Internet writer with postings in public forums. Therefore, I conclude that Internet writers possess a triple identity: a dot-com businessman, a cultural idol and a writer (see Fig. 1). Considering that the subject owns all three dimensions at the same time, I define the triple identity as synchronic 61 Wu, 211. 62 Wu, 210. 35 triple identity.63 It is to be noted that this triple identity is a common feature that represents in many famous Internet writers then, and Li Xunhuan is only a typical example. Fig. 1: Synchronic Triple Identity of Li Xunhuan III. Internet Writing and Hierarchical Significance New Features of Internet Writing While it shares many similarities with the popular literature of the early 20th century, Internet literature also demonstrates its own unique features in the new 63 The term “synchronic” is loaned from linguistics, which originally means something concerned, esp. with a language, as it exists at one point in a time. Here I refer to the fact that the subject owns three dimensions of identity in the same era—the Era of Obedience. Indentity   Internet  Writer   Dot-­‐com  Businessman  Cultural  Idol   36 historical context. Many scholars have noted this point in their research, and the main distinguishing characteristics may be summarized as follows. First, the interactive writing style, which is generated and supported by technological advances, blurs the traditional boundaries between the author, editor, critic and the reader, and announces the death of the traditional authorship.64 In online literature forums or bulletin boards, the author initially posts his writing, following which readers may respond with comments. Usually the author will alter his writing according to readers’ opinions and tastes, and sometimes readers even participate in the writing process and co-author the work. Every contributor to the writing has reconstituted the authorship, and the roles of author, reader, critic and editor become transmittable and exchangeable. In a word, unique and certain authorship has been transformed into collective and uncertain authorship; elite discourse has been changed into mass discourse. Briefly, the interactive writing style, and the transformed authorship, both constitute an incompatibility with the canonical pattern of literary production and publication. Second, from the perspective of content, Chinese Internet writing is also distinguished by the disenchantment of literariness, i.e. the depreciation of literariness. Ouyang Zhongquan argues that the accessibility and freedom of the 64 See Zhongquan Ouyang, “On the State of Literature in the Times of Internet,” Yinshan Academic Journal (Jan 2003): 5-9, 21; Ruichun Gao, “Changes on Literature in the Era of Internet,” Journal of Qujin Teachers College (March 2003): 48-50; Jian Wang, “Premise on the Concept of History of Internet Literature,” Journal of Huainan Normal University (Jan 2004): 28-31. 37 Internet disenchant the literariness of writing, and discusses how the reproductivity of the Internet deconstructs the “aura”65 of the canon.66 On the one hand, the canonical status indicates that a work has stood the test of time, which means that texts are typically old before they attain canonicity. Inversely, as above mentioned, Internet literature is distinguished by nothing but an instantaneous and interactive process of writing, posting, reading and criticizing, which differs from the delay that characterizes the production and appreciation of conventional literature. This immediacy not only demarcates conventional literature from Internet literature, but even deprives Internet literature of the possibility of being canonized. Third, borrowing the concept of “invisible writing” from Sihe Chen, I attempt to clarify the historical significance of Internet literature. As Chen argues, “Both invisible writing and publications constitute the entity of the literature of the time, which changes the concept of contemporary literature history.”67 Chen defines the “invisible writing” as literature that cannot be published at the time of its creation68— 65 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations (New York, Schocken Books, 1969), 217-251. Here Ouyang adopted the approach of Benjamin. 66 See Youquan Ouyang, “On the Internet Functions to the Technical Disenchantment of Literariness,”Journal of Jishou University (Jul. 2004): 55-59. 67 Sihe Chen, Chinese Contemporary Literature History (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1999), 12. 68 Ibid. 38 a revolutionary concept in the history of traditional literature,69 but one which loses its efficacy in the context of Internet literature. The characteristic process of Internet writing and reading, i.e. the replacement of publishing by posting, has already minimized the significance of publishing and cannot be explained by the concept of “invisible writing.” Literary history, including Internet literature, thus indicates a brand new conformity of invisible writing and visible writing. Hierarchical Significance Therefore, the three new features of Internet literature, 1) interactive and instantaneous process of production and 2) disenchantment of literariness and 3) conformity of invisible and visible writing, together determine the future of Internet literature. Either regarding its production and consumption, or its inner literariness and historical significance, Internet literature demonstrates a clear incompatibility with traditional literary models, and is thus destined to be “structurally limited and fundamentally flawed”70 in the hierarchy of cultural production. In fact, one may find an explicit illegitimating of Internet literature within the conventional value system. Even though Internet literature had boomed in Mainland China since the 1990s, it was not considered part of the constitution of modern 69 Here the “traditional literature” refers to the literature that is produced and published in the traditional way, which is different from the nascent Internet literature. The concept should be distinguished from “ancient literature” in this thesis. 70 Mark Poster, The Second Media Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 23. 39 Chinese literature until 2009.71 The fresh official recognition just verifies the assumption that the Internet literature had earlier been considered and unofficial within the hierarchy of literature production. Indeed, while it may be possible to argue that the environment for Internet literature has been greatly improved during the Era of Riposte, it is clear that during the Era of Obedience, Internet literature was seen as culturally inferior, and its treatment by the cultural elite represents the suppressed situation of Internet culture in general at that time. IV. Show Strategy and the Manipulated Identity As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, my chosen talk show accurately shows the hierarchy typical of the Era of Obedience: in the struggle between orthodox and Internet agents, the orthodox successfully holds the cultural legitimacy and presents the edited illegitimacy of the Internet. The orthodox takes a contemptuous stance towards the Internet, while the latter obeys the authority rather than confronts it directly. 71 In the 2009 annual meeting of the Chinese Writers Association (the primary official institution in the field of literature), Tie Ning, the chairperson recognized the significance of the Internet writers and indicated that the association will consider accepting Internet writers as new members. However, it has been nearly two decades since Internet writers began to write online, and so far none of them have been considered for membership in the association. See the original report: http://review.jcrb.com/200803/ca695931.htm (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 40 By what strategies does the show exactly demonstrate such a code of struggling? I argue, first, that the program distorts the synchronic triple identity of the guest as an agent of Internet power, and thus successfully eliminates the real figure of the Internet agent, i.e. illegitimates the existence of it. And second, the program splits the diachronic dual identity of the guest, and subsequently transforms the denial into the self-denial, which strengthens the effect of contempt, as well as the effort of 1). In a word, the program achieves its goal primarily by manipulating the identities of the guest. Differentiation of Triple Identity The synchronic triple identity of the guest refers to his simultaneous roles as a writer, dot-com businessman and cultural idol. The synchronic triple identity has been differentiated: each of the three dimensions is retrospectively understated, stressed and eliminated by the editorial authority of the program. In general, the talk show host’s treatment of the guest indicates a contemptuous attitude on the part of the authoritative power and reflects how the Internet displays its self-restraint and obedience as a nascent participant in the field of cultural production. Li, the target of this talk show, has a triple identity as a writer, cultural icon, and dot-com businessman, which the authoritative agents attack separately in the course of the program. By splitting Li’s identity into discrete units, the agents of 41 authority find it easier to degrade the image of the Internet counterpart for which he stands. Downplay the dimension as an Internet Writer. The program intentionally downplays Li’s significance as an Internet writer. Although the show is broken into two segments, one on Li’s activities and the other on Lu’s current business activities, the first part never mentions the popularity, honors, and the significance of Li’s achievement as the best-known Internet writer of the era. By segmenting Li’s identity and demolishing with silence and triviality the most important part of that tripartite structure, that of writer, the program effectively diminishes the stature of Li as an Internet icon and the status of his extant work in the hierarchy of real world discourse. Mock the Cultural Idol. Likewise, the show illegitimates and deconstructs in a mocking way Li Xunhuan’s status as a cultural idol. Considering the flourishing of Internet culture in Li Xunhuan’s times, the ignorance of the authoritative power seems more like a deliberate arrangement than a technological or knowledgeable error. Kang Liu points out that: The state-owned media, of course, no longer have the monopoly in China today. Many independent websites dedicated to social and political debates have sprung up in recent years. Some websites gained popularity in intellectual circles by their controversial standpoints, and some by extensive debates.72 72 Liu, 147. 42 However, the program does not provide any hint or comment on the influence of the public forum in Li’s times, but instead only mentions a funny example of insulting China Men’s Soccer Team, at which the hostess and even the guest himself could not help laughing: Host: In the very beginning, what did you write? Li: I insulted the Chinese Men’s Soccer Team [in an online public forum]…we insulted the coach, the soccer team, the referee, so on and so forth. Since there were so many people devoting attention to this “game,” we needed to find better adjectives and ideas for our insults than other users [both laugh]. At that time I regained the sense of writing.73 It is understandable that in such a public forum people may accomplish greater things than insulting the National Soccer Team, and discuss any number of interesting or sensitive current issues. Li, as an obtrusive author in public forum, was endowed with the identity of a cultural idol and a leader in the trend of Internet culture. I consider the laughable example as a mocking act from the authority toward the activities and efforts of the first generation of authors on the Internet. Indeed, in the Era of Riposte when the Internet power attempts to make a retort to its serious authoritative rival by kuso culture, laughing can be seen as a powerful weapon of the Internet (which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 4). However, under the ideologies of the state-run media monopoly, an amusing instance 73 http://tv.sohu.com/20080703/n257906285.shtml (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 43 is supposed to mock and satirize the target, rather than affirm the value of the struggling target. In this talk show, the conventional media’s stance is very purposive: to dwarf the image of an Internet culture idol, and furthermore, the whole Internet culture represented by the idol, ensuring that it stays in a lower position below the hegemonic power. Stress the Businessman Identity. While Li’s identity as a writer and cultural icon has been downplayed, the dimension of dot-com businessman has been stressed, overflowing into the second segment of the show. The show’s producers, in this second part, were concerned with claiming Lu Jinbo, agent of mainstream culture, as one of their own. The Rongshuxia website, where Li/Lu held a director position, is treated not as a literary phenomenon, but as an object of business interest which came to naught with the bursting of the Internet bubble. However, both guest and hostess laughed at the “mad” assessment of the company’s value and their stock-exchange dreams, but ignored the fact that Li Xunhuan was an important and gifted writer. Considering the deliberate questioning, editing, and misleading emphasis placed on certain aspects of Li’s career, a viewer without previous knowledge of Li will tend to assimilate this false portrait of a dot-com entrepreneur with his current identity as Lu, a successful publisher and an authorized agent of the mainstream discourse. By reducing Li to a businessman who suffered a great loss when the Internet bubble burst, but who prospered in traditional media, the show produces a specious identification of the Internet bubble and nascent Internet literature, and 44 creates the illusion that an Internet economy is less promising and unduly risky. Moreover, this approach also creates an illusion that Internet literature also collapsed. Indeed, it represents an absolute depreciation by the mainstream culture of the newborn Internet literature and reinforces the hierarchy of the field of culture production. Dual Identity and Self-denial To the concept of the differentiation of Li/Lu’s triple identity must be added the notion of diachronic dual identity, which refers to his dissimilarity between the Era of Obedience and the Era of Riposte. It is to be noted that the talk show was produced and aired in the Era of Riposte, when the guest had already said his farewell to Li Xuhuan, appearing on the show as Lu Jinbo. Therefore, in this sense, his identity has been diachronically split into two dimensions: Li/Lu in different phases. In following paragraphs I attempt to clarify how the program has also manipulated this dual identity, in order to achieve its goal of dwarfing the Internet culture agent. In this case, his dual identity as former Internet writer Li Xunhuan and contemporary publisher Lu Jinbo is critical to structuring the micro field of the talk show. It remains to be seen which of these identities should be considered an agent of which power, traditional authority or Internet discourse. The following excerpt helps to clarify his position: 45 Host: What was your attitude when you joined the Rongshuxia website?74 Lu: We thought we would be the Renaissance of Chinese literature. We thought we would replace the Chinese Writer’s Association. [Lu cannot help sneering, and the hostess does as well.] Host: You mean you didn’t even know the fundamental things in the field, but you wanted to devote yourself to it? Lu: En…If you knew you were so bad, you would not try to do it. [Both laugh] Host: At that time, what was your plan or object? Lu: People then hoped to be listed on NASDAQ… [Both laugh] at the wildest time, we estimated the value of Rongshuxia and valued one registered user as one US dollar, and one click at one RMB yuan. In his sense, we were all millionaires… [Both laugh]75 This excerpt clearly demonstrates Lu rejection of his former identity as an Internet writer. The person who sits in the studio is Lu, a successful publisher with vested interests in conventional media, an agent of mainstream power that determines the attitude Lu takes towards his former identity as Li. Lu plays to the hilt the role of an agent for authoritative power, assessing his former self in degrading terms and pouring derision on his past activities with sneers and laughter, assenting to the contempt inherent in the hostess’ commentary. Superficial appearances notwithstanding, both the hostess and Lu Jinbo are acting as agents of the authoritative power, denigrating Lu’s former persona as Li Xunhuan, whose presence is felt only in Lu Jinbo’s degrading narrative concerning himself. He is the target of both hostess and guest. This specific constitution of powers strengthens the contempt expressed by authority, and situates the Internet’s 74 Rongshuxia was a notable literary website of the period in question. Lu/Li held the position of Chief Literature Officer. 75 See footnote 73. 46 discursive power in an absolutely suppressed position. It strengthens the effect of contempt, which is the stance traditional authority takes toward its Internet counterpart. Briefly speaking, regarding the significance and distinctiveness of the three dimensions, the identity as Li should be formed as Fig. 1. However, the aired version of this show presents a distorted view by minimizing certain aspects of triple identity of Li Xunhuan and assimilating it to an almost one-dimensional identity as Fig 2. Fig. 2: Distorted Triple Identity of Li Xunhuan V. Ignored Internet: the Era of Obedience In this chapter I initially review the personal story of the character Li/Lu and the historical context of the Era of Obedience. I particularly discuss the characteristics of Internet literature during this period, analyze the causal multi-dimensional Distorted  Identity   Internet  Writer   Dot-­‐com  Businessman  Cultural  Idol   47 identities of Internet writers, and thus point out their actual dwarfed position as the agent of Internet culture during this era. During the Era of Obedience, the conventional power takes a contemptuous stance towards its Internet counterpart. It chooses to manipulatively produce a distorted figure of the Internet agent, and conduct an attack towards this alternative power. The distortion itself indicates extreme contemptuous stance: it is not even necessary to neutrally legalize the real/actual existence of its Internet counterpart, say nothing of taking an equitable stance towards it. Correspondingly, the agent of Internet during this period, i.e. the identity as Li Xunhuan in this case, merely chooses to stay in the position of being attacked, without any hint of struggling. Rather than a real confrontation between the two powers that encounter in the micro arena of media, the Internet agent displays only obedience. Essentially speaking, it is the huge gap between the Internet and conventional power that leads to the situation. Likewise, as the Internet power grows stronger in following eras, the imbalanced situation is broken up and disappears forever. In the Era of Confrontation and the Era of Riposte, not only does the official power begin to neutrally recognize the actual existence of its developing rival, but the Internet agent itself also starts to take a confrontation or even riposte stance. I will continue the discussion in Chapter 3 and 4. 48 3 FURONG JIEJIE IS COMING Following the Era of Obedience in China is the Era of Confrontation, which is also known as the Text-Image Era. In this era the Internet begins to put aside pure obedience in favor of a more confrontational stance towards its orthodox rivals; technological advances drive this boldness to assert its own cultural significance, for the prevailing mode of information distribution has shifted from the literal text to the multimedia mode of text-image. In this chapter, I discuss how the text-image mode essentially strengthens the Internet power and advances it to a vital position in the hierarchy of cultural production. Faced with a strengthened Internet, the conventional media must rethink their earlier stance of utter contempt toward it, and begin to recognize it as a cultural force. As in Chapter 2, I will analyze a representative case to illustrate the state of relations between Internet and traditional media. I. Furong’s Contextualized Implications The Internet handle Furong Jiejie (Sister Lotus, hereafter referred to as Frjj) is well known to Chinese virtual communities. During late 2004 and 2005, Frjj swiftly became the hottest Internet icon and received unimaginable fame, both good and bad, because of her intensive postings of narcissist articles and photos of overacted 49 feminine poses (Fig 3 & 4). She soon had a cult following, but nobody showed more love to Frjj than Frjj herself, the original founder of what came to be called the “Furong religion.”76 She soon began expanding her influence from virtual space to the real world, and obtained opportunities in conventional media, like TV talk shows, talent shows, music and even film.77 From 2004 to the present day, she has gradually evolved from a notorious target of mockery and parody on the Internet to an influential cultural celebrity in the real world. Fig. 3 & 4: Frjj’s well-known photos on the Internet78 76 Since Frjj becomes a cultural idol on the Internet, there swiftly emerges a term “Religion of Furong”, which gathers up a group of people who are interested in taking about or following Frjj. For more information See http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kw=%DC%BD%C8%D8%BD%CC (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 77 For more details, see Frjj’s personal website www.sfrjj.com (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 78 Her pictures brought her overwhelming negative comments, especially on her style, obesity, and overacted pose. Picture source: Fig 3: http://news.xinhuanet.com/audio/2006- 08/04/content_4919960.htm; Fig. 4: 50 The rise of Frjj is unique, though not entirely unprecedented. As early as late 2003, female journalist and blogger Muzimei posted to her blog frank descriptions of her sexual encounters with various men, which is believed to be a first for China. Muzimei rapidly became a household ne and was swiftly banned by the government. Considering her similar rise to fame, based on sexually provocative pictures and writings, Frjj is usually considered as one of Muzumei’s several imitators. 79 However, only Frjj has managed to remain in the public eye,80 and only Frjj has won positive recognition from mainstream culture (Fig. 5 & 6).81 http://www.ce.cn/cysc/tech/07game/itsh/200706/18/t20070618_11803046.shtml (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 79 Such like Zhuyingqingtong (????)?Xiaotiannv (???)?Liumangyan (???)? Gongxi’er (???)?Tianxianmeimei???mm)?Ximameimei???????Eryueyatou (?? ??), etc. 80 In 2010, Frjj published a series of her photos on the website of Xinhuanet, the online version of the Xinhua News Agency and usually considered as China’s official voice on the Internet. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2010-04/13/c_1230273.htm (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 81 Other than the recognition from Xinhuanet, Frjj was awarded the prize of “Best Personal Website” in the 2009 China Internet Industry Leadership Forum, at which she was also invited to speak. She claimed that she is the most “coquettish” woman in China and gave an impromptu dance. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2010-04/13/c_1230273.htm (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 51 Fig. 5: Frjj attended the China Internet Economy Leadership Forum and was awarded the prize of “Best Personal Website”.82 Fig. 6: Frjj’s newest photo in www.xinhuanet.com, the online version of the official voice Xinhua News Agency.83 82 Ibid. 83 See footnote 80. 52 The show I discuss in this chapter was produced and aired by the Sichuan TV station, a local channel in Southwest China. Although Frjj has received some official recognition, tension remains between her and the orthodox. It is to be noted that she has never appeared on any program produced by the China Central TV Station (CCTV), and her appearances may bring certain risks to local stations.84 Comparative Significance Frjj’s significance can be assessed by comparing her with three other cultural idols: William Hung, Li/Lu, and Mizumei. William Hung: Iconoclastic Idol. By the paradoxical phrase “iconoclastic idol” I refer to someone who rose to celebrity because of his incompatibility with the dominant values in the particular sphere in which fame was achieved—a winner that does not obey the conventions of the field. The major feature of an iconoclastic idol is not the incompatibility itself, but the idol’s self-awareness and conscious embrace of the challenge he poses to orthodox notions. William Hung,85 who rose to fame by way of the TV program “American Idol”, is distinguished as much by his poor audition performance as by his confident 84 For example, a variety show program “Super Emotion” in Shenzhen TV station was banned by the government in 2007, because of its “vulgar taste and negative social effect”: the program invited Frjj to dance on the show. See the report “It is Furong Jiejie’s fault: “Super Emotion” has been banned”, http://ent.163.com/07/0823/09/3MIPB87V00031H2L.html (accessed Apr 24, 2010) 85 William Hung is an outsider musician, who gained fame in early 2004 as a result of his off-key audition for the television series “American Idol.” His singing and dancing led to laughter from the judges, but his positive response (“Um, I already gave my best, and I have no regrets at all”) rapidly 53 self-assessment. Hung differs from Frjj in that his fame began on TV, expanding quickly to the Internet, while Frjj began online and later expanded to TV and other traditional media. But both rose to fame because of the huge gap between their unprofessional art performance and the orthodox value, and the sharp contrast between their objectively bad performances and their high level of self-worth and unusual confidence. This fact renders them commensurable from a cultural perspective. Many westerners argue that Hung, who represents a stereotype of Asian American men as brainy, inartistic nerds, became famous as an object of ridicule and amusement.86 This view focuses on his poor performance, but ignores the gap between the performance and his self-confidence, which in fact sets Hung apart from the crowd of typical unskilled performers. Indeed, it points out the contextualized implication of Hung in the US though, however, is too narrow to the rise of Frjj in the Chinese context. won him fame and a cult following. He began to appear on influential television shows, commercials and films, release albums, and to be featured by newspapers and magazines. 86 See Nathaniel Juel, “Slanted View: William Hung Over”, http://aarising.com/slantedview/njart2.htm (accessed Apr 24, 2010); Deanna Chew, “Asian American Idol: Stereotype or Star?” http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=488ec27f63f81f8613766d6ad03c 5711(accessed Apr 24, 2010); Janet Park, “William Hung’s Success reinforces the Stereotypes of Asians”, http://media.www.thespartandaily.com/media/storage/paper852/news/2004/04/27/Opinioncolumnists/ William.Hungs.Success.Reinforces.Stereotypes.Of.Asians-1498860.shtml(accessed Apr 24, 2010); Eugene Cho, “Asian Stereotypes and Prejudice”, http://eugenecho.wordpress.com/2008/06/13/know- one-asian-know-all-asians(accessed Apr 24, 2010). 54 In contrast to the opinion of the scholars who focus on the Asian male stereotype, Hung’s situation may be better understood as the challenge of the existing orthodox values and customs in the modern society from a postmodern perspective. Hung’s Chinese ethnicity, it should be noted, was not the main reason for his unexpected fame; rather, it was his unwavering self-confidence and clear-sighted willingness to confront orthodox values that made him an iconoclastic idol. Likewise, Frjj rose to fame for both her narcissistic articles and overacted feminine poses, and of course, her objectively mediocre physical appearance that she has never tried to hide. In other words, she challenged the orthodox aesthetics and conventional values in Mainland China and became an iconoclastic idol, begetting, like Hung, a flood of critiques and parodies but also fame and a degree of influence In Mainland China, the Internet’s two main characteristics (resistance to control, and circumvention of authority) determined Frjj’s rise to online fame—but these were unavailable to assist her transition into conventional media. On the one hand, her challenge to orthodox values and aesthetics essentially coincides with the alternative nature of the Internet. On the other hand, under the present censorship, the Internet is really the only medium able to harbor alternative values with any success. Although the Internet is increasingly regulated in China, it nevertheless retains more relative autonomy than any of the conventional media. This point may help explain the difference between the media that Hung and Frjj rise through. Hung first flourishes on TV and then thrives in all conventional 55 media,87 and Internet is only one medium that facilitates his success. Although his fan website plays an important role in his story,88 it functions merely like any other medium but does not lay a groundwork for his success. However, Frjj originates on the Internet, but always encounters barriers in conventional media.89 In this sense, the TV show I scrutinize in this chapter is a rare example of the conventional media being perfectly hospitable to her. Li/Lu: Prowess of Image. Both Li/Lu and Frjj can be seen as quintessential models of the Internet culture in their respective eras, in which the mode of competition of different cultural forces is discernable. However, compared with Li/Lu who is distinguished by online writing, Frjj rises to stardom not only for writing, but more important, for her postings of pictures with overacted feminine poses and clumsy, unprofessional dances. Thus, Frjj’s distinction lies in the mode of text-image, or even to say, the deliberate exploitation of the prowess of image. So, in the new Era of Confrontation, what enables Frjj to rise in this mode, and what is the specific significance of her rise for the Era of Confrontation? I argue that the Internet facilitates the era when visual culture dominates.90 This trend determines the emergence of Internet celebrities in the Era of 87 See footnote 85. 88 See www.williamhung.net (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 89 See footnote 84. 90 As Mirzeoff defines it, “Visual culture is concerned with visual events in which information, meaning, or pleasure is sought by the consumer in an interface of visual technology. By visual technology, I mean any form of apparatus designed to be looked at to natural vision, from oil painting 56 Confrontation, who rise to fame through their visual impact. As Mirzoeff notes, it is the visual crisis that catalyzes postmodernism, which is marked by the visual: The postmodern is the crisis caused by modernism and modern culture confronting the failure of its own strategy of visualizing. In other words, it is the visual crisis of culture that creates postmodernity, not its textuality. The printing culture (e.g. literature) is certainly not going to disappear, the fascination of the visual and its effect that marked modernism has engendered a postmodern culture that is most postmodern when it is visual.91 When the major code of information distribution evolves from the literal text (in the Era of Obedience) into the text-image (in the Era of Confrontation), the visual effect essentially strengthens the Internet force and pushes the authoritative force to change its stance towards the Internet. In other words, it is the visual effect that pushes forward the development of the Internet as a cultural agent from the Era of Obedience to the Era of Confrontation, and alters the mode of competition between the Internet and the authority in the field of media. Indeed, one might argue that the Internet is “most postmodern when it is visual,” or most powerful when it is associated with the prowess of visual culture. The explosive growth of digital photography, combined with continual improvements in the capacity and speed of broadband networks and the ever-increasing processing power of personal computers, make the Internet technologically the best medium for visual culture. This status is reinforced by its decentralized nature, which renders it to television and the Internet.” see Nicolas Mirzoeff, An Introduction to Visual Culture (New York, Routledge, 1999), 3. 91 Mirzoeff, 3. 57 relatively immune to official regulation. To the extent that Internet activity is an alternative discourse to authority, it also represents a crisis of authority. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss the specific implication of Frjj in the context of visual culture. Her photos prompted innumerable mockeries and critiques of her “shamelessness” and physical shortcomings, particularly her obesity. Although she is challenging the orthodox aesthetics and value through both text and image, it is to be noted that the image brings more visual shock and demonstrates more power than does text. In a word, during the Era of Confrontation, visual effect was the Internet celebrity’s most potent weapon, enabling them to take a confrontational stance toward the orthodox. Muzimei: Gendered Struggling and Social Structure Having discussed William Hung and Li/Lu, here I explore the case of Frjj from a gendered perspective by comparing her with her blogging predecessor, Muzimei. Both women were considered contemporary Internet celebrities in the Era of Confrontation. However, Muzimei was suppressed soon after she surfaced in 2003, while Frjj is still ubiquitous today, more than five years after her first appearance. What factors determined these different outcomes? Gendered issues clearly apply to both cases. Muzimei is famous for her frank sex description, and one easily sees sexual elements in her rise to fame. Frjj likewise revels in the sexual, frequently exposing herself online, which contributes to her 58 stardom even though it generates more criticism than praise. Inversely, reviewing the experience of Li/Lu and Hung, it is to be noted that they do not display explicit gender characteristics but only personal characteristics, and the gender does not contribute to their fame. Two main differences exist between Muzimei and Frjj. First, Frjj took full advantage of the power of the text-image. By contrast, Muzimei’s online activity was limited to text unaccompanied by images. Muzimei’s lack of visual effect ensured that she would quickly be eclipsed not only by Frjj, but also by all who circulated explicit videos and images of themselves online. And second, Frjj’s performances challenge not only conventional values and aesthetics, but also (and more unforgivably) the gendered hierarchy. An exhibitionist female will attract more criticism from society than a male. In a sense, she has transgressed the gender boundary by demonstrating the kind of ambition typically reserved for males. It is the norm that a technological revolution precedes a social revolution. The Internet, one of the most important technological advances in human society, has been facilitating socially progressive changes in every aspect of everyday life, and of course this includes the enhancement and improvement of female equal opportunity. As Khan Eng Kuah-Pearce argues in Chinese Women and the Cyberspace, “They [cyberspace] are no longer viewed as masculine space and tool as women have not only embraced but also used the cyberspace to negotiate and reframe themselves 59 within existing social structure.”92 Kuah-Pearce clearly points out that the Internet has become an effective venue through which females can strive for their goals, thereby altering the existing gendered pecking order. The Internet, along with Internet-related utilities, is destined to play a crucial role in the self-reframing of the female in the social structure. However, Kuah-Pearce does not mention the fact that regarding the use of the Internet, females have lagged behind men from the middle 1990s.93 But in what way can the female utilize the Internet to achieve equality with men? Both Muzimei and Frjj provide a credible approach to us, and the visual effect used by Frjj further strengthens her power. Within the existing gendered social hierarchy, the female, as the weaker sex, is supposed to remain passive. In this sense, the Internet provides more room for exposure and exhibitionism to women than to men—that is to say, more possibilities to utilize the visual culture. Gendered elements are associated with and strengthened by visual elements, which relatively weakens the authoritative power that is currently under the control of the male. In this sense, the Internet enables the liberation of women and provides opportunities for their right of expression. 92 Khan Eng Kuah-Pearce, Chinese Women and Cyberspace (Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 11. 93 See the annual Report on China Internet Development from 1997 to 2009. From the beginning, the female netizens are much fewer than the male ones and the situation has not been changed yet. http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index.htm (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 60 Briefly speaking, through drawing three references William Hung, Li/Lu and Muzimei, I summarize three major implications of Frjj: 1) She is an iconoclastic idol, who implies a form of postmodernism. 2) She gains her stardom through the visual culture, which also strengthens the Internet development and moves it forward from the Era of Obedience to the Era of Confrontation. 3) She represents all females who want to redefine themselves in the gendered social structure through the Internet. These three points are pertinent to the following analysis of a talk show featuring Frjj, which illustrates the mode of competition between the Internet and the official authority in the Era of Confrontation. II. TV Program vs. Internet Star The studio of the program “Long men zhen” can be seen as a micro field where agents of the Internet (Frjj) and the authority (the program, and its representative, the host) compete with each other. As one typical of the numerous micro fields in the Era of Confrontation, the mode of competition in this micro field generally conforms to the overall mode (as summarized in Chapter I), and also demonstrates features typical to the talk-show genre. Recognition from the Authority First, Frjj obtained instant recognition from the conventional media, as demonstrated by her appearance on the talk show at the peak of her online stardom, 61 and the fact that the program was aired at a time convenient to the nationwide audience. Compared with the situation in the Era of Obedience, it marks a crucial change of stance for the authority: the nascent Internet power deserves attention and an equal opportunity to talk. The full attention Frjj received contrasts greatly with the lack of attention given to Internet celebrities during the previous era. As mentioned in Chapter 2, when Li/Lu was known as Li Xunhuan, an agent of Internet culture, he was off the TV screen. He appeared on a talk show only after he returned to his role as Lu Jinbo, a successful publisher in real life. Even on the TV talk show, the Li Xunhuan persona became a straw man attacked by both the conventional power (the program) and Lu Jinbo. That program was produced as late as 2008, during the Era of Riposte, when the Internet force had been increasingly growing into a competitive rival of the authority. However, the edited final presentation still accurately demonstrates how during the Age of Obedience the Internet was manipulated and dwarfed, and accordingly had to obey the authority. Also, recognition from the mainstream power appears in other aspects, for example, the questions raised by the program. In Chapter 2, I analyzed how the program deliberately manipulated the multi-dimensional identities of Li/Lu, and how it persuasively raised contemptuous questions and negative topics about the Li persona. Moreover, the Lu persona was even invited to join the editorial authority in disparaging the agent of Internet culture. Inversely, in the Frjj case, during the whole 62 talk, the host did not ask any offensive questions or raise any embarrassing topics. In other words, the program created a proper atmosphere for conversation between equals, rather than display negative preconceptions or prejudice (Fig. 7). Fig. 7: Frjj (in red) appeared in the talk show94 Here is a series of core questions that appeared in the final presentation: Host: 1) Today I see you here, and find you even more beautiful than those pictures on the Internet. What do you think? 2) Could you say hi with your signature pose (it refers to a feminine “S” pose), and show your most beautiful aspect to us? 3) Can you cope with the attention from people? 4) How popular were you at that time? 5) Why do you wear red? Audience: 6) What made you so popular? 7) What do you think of your followers? Do you think they are like you?95 94 A screenshot from the original video (accessed Apr 24, 2010). Clip 1: http://v.ku6.com/show/dj2m08ASJMblgWZL.html Clip 2: http://v.ku6.com/show/K2wnD7bZNR0FmJN-.html. 63 Regardless of whether the host or audience raised the above questions, as long as they finally appeared on the screen, they partly constitute the stance of the program. In other words, this questioning style represents an obvious attitude of the editorial authority: be neutral, open, and even pleasant, offering the Internet celebrity a hospitable environment and letting her expose herself at her own discretion. Confrontational Stance of Frjj Corresponding to the changed stance of the authority, Frjj also demonstrates an obtrusive confrontational attitude, which appears through the conversation between the host and her. In the case of Li/Lu, the program split the guest’s identity into two halves. Lu was designed to conspire with the authority against Li. As a straw man, Li demonstrated a corresponding obedient attitude through an absent presence: the figure of Li only existed in the memory of Lu, while Lu reviewed and criticized Li all the time. Frjj, however, demonstrated a completely different attitude. Not only did she show a obvious confrontational stance towards the orthodox power, but also 95 See footnote 94. 64 demonstrated her opinions that challenge the orthodox values, as seen in her answers to core questions in the show: 1) Today I see you here, and find you even more beautiful than those pictures on the Internet. What do you think? Frjj: You are not the first person who said this. So, I think it is a truth! 2) Could you say hi with your signature pose (it refers to a feminine “S” pose), and show your most beautiful aspect to us? Frjj: Okay! (She made a few “S” poses in the studio and received applause, see Fig. 8) 3) Can you cope with the attention from people? Frjj: People pay attention to me, because they can find something different in my case. At least, they appreciate me. 6) What made you so popular? Frjj: It is my spirit (that made me so popular). Not only pictures. I think our generation lack a spirit of bravely demonstrating you yourself and pursuing your goal.96 Fig. 8: Frjj showed her signature “S” pose in the talk show.97 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 65 These four representative questions and answers clearly showcase her confrontational attitude and the concessive stance of the program. It is a fact that she received a great number of negative comments for her pictures online. However, she selectively overlooked the fact that most comments were actually negative, defended her unorthodox aesthetics, and continued expressing her values and aesthetics that went against public opinion. This last point in particular shows her confrontational attitude. According to Wu, “Bulletin boards entitle users to express themselves on current issues and break down the ‘uniformity in public opinion’ presented by the official media in China.”98 Wu notes how personal opinions may break down the “uniformity of public opinion,” i.e. the de facto authoritative opinion that is orthodox in society. In this sense, when the different personal opinion moves from the Internet to the TV screen, it actually indicates a public confrontational stance to the official media greater than it would have been had it remained only on the Internet. The program conducted the editorial authority, which kept the parts of Frjj’s performance that accorded with the producer’s expectation, while it cut out the parts that did not. In this sense, Frjj’s words in the final presentation of the show indicated the stance of the program. However, before the program’s editing, it is to be noted that Frjj herself also conducted her own self-editing. She reinterpreted her history and cherry-picked positive elements to create a misleading view of the big picture. What 98 Wu, 211. 66 matters is not to what extent her words conform to the “facts,” but what stance she demonstrates through her “truth.” In this sense, the editorial authority in this program actually could be seen as a two-tier editorial authority. III. Visual Culture in Confrontation Physical Appearance and Struggling Mode What stands out in the mode of Frjj’s confrontation in the specific case? One of the most impressive points is her greeting pose in the talk show, which has been considered her signature pose, a silent but frank “S” profile. From the perspective of visual culture, it is more powerful than any oral announcement and deserves further exploration. First, the S pose is a physical appearance. Physical appearance indicates one of the more ambitious modes the Internet uses to engage in real life. In different eras physical appearance plays different roles. In the Era of Obedience, as Rob Kitchin argues, one could preserve one’s anonymity and real life identity as long as one hid one’s physical appearance and disabilities and continued to wear a mask or a different persona.99 Subsequently, when the Internet development enters the Era of Confrontation, a more ambitious mode of information distribution—that of the text- 99 Rob Kitchin, Cyberspace: the World in the Wires (Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 1998), 80. It should be remembered that Kitchin pointed out the situation no earlier than the year 1998, i.e. in the Era of Obedience, when the pure literal text was still the major code of information circulation. 67 image—replaces the purely literal text mode. In other words, physical appearance was no longer a quality hidden behind the Internet persona, but one that in certain cases played a crucial role as an indispensable part of the text-image mode. The emergence of physical appearance is a trend of the virtual community in the Era of Confrontation. In this sense, physical appearance occurs in both virtual space and the real world, functions as a commonly used pass, and bridges cyberspace and offline life. For example, one may not be able to discover the relationship between an Internet fiction and the author’s physical appearance in life, but once a netizen saw Frjj’s photos circulated on the Internet, it was not hard to recognize her in real life. In short, her image conveys a sense of real existence. The transformation from the hidden physical appearance in the Era of Obedience to the obtrusive physical appearance in the Era of Confrontation, indicates the change of the Internet from anonymity to entitlement, from a timid participant in the field of cultural production to an open-handed and competitive rival, essentially speaking, from a detached virtual community to a space that closely relates to the real world. On the one hand, the emergence of physical appearance indicates that the Internet takes a more confident stance towards the conventional force. On the other hand, behind this apparent stance there is concrete enhancement of the Internet’s cultural prestige: the power of visual culture, which of course includes physical appearance, has essentially strengthened the Internet (discussed earlier in this chapter). 68 Women Appearance and (Post) Modernity More than of its importance to physical appearance, the S pose also has great implications from the perspective of curves and (post) modernity. Frjj’s exposure of body curves suggests the subjectivity of the female, which can be seen as part of her effort to redefine the female in the gendered social structure. Although this exposure was accompanied by negative feedback from both officialdom and the general populace, the fact is that Frjj gradually grew into an influential cultural idol in both cyberspace and real life. Many scholars have discussed the relationship between the female physical appearance and modernity. As Shu-mei Shih elaborates, “Gender is one of the ways modernity ineluctably works itself through, and out. Not only is the deployment of women a trope of modernity, but gender constitutes modernity.”100 Furthermore, Chang Hsiao-hung particularly specifies the curves of the female, and argues the connection between the shaping and shaped curve and the subjectivity of the female in the early 20th century.101 Both Shih and Chang point out the relationship between the subjectivity of the female, advanced ethos and the physical appearance of the female. It is to be 100 Shu-mei Shih, "Shanghai Women of 1939: Visuality and the Limits of Feminine Modernity", in ed. Jason C. Kuo, Visual Culture in Shanghai 1850s-1930s (Washington, DC: New Academia, 2007), 240. 101Hsiao-Hung Chang, "Xiandaixing de quxian", Chung-wai Wenxue Literary Month (36:3): 171-200. 69 remembered that both Shih and Chang discuss the situation in early 20th-century China, when modernity as the most advanced ethos challenged the pre-modern society. This situation resonates with that in Frjj’s era, when postmodernity challenged the orthodox in the early 21st century—a challenge externalized by visual culture, specifically the curve of body. Therefore, I would relate the exposure of body curves to postmodernity rather than to modernity. The body curves not only have great postmodern implications as a form of visual culture and thus strengthen the power of the Internet, but also achieve the same goal from a gender perspective. IV. Changed Power and New Trend Frjj is only one of numerous examples in the Era of Confrontation. The prevailing text-image mode and especially the participation of imagery mark the new era. Unlike in the Era of Obedience, during this time, the hegemonic authority has to display full recognition of the budding and promising Internet, facing it more or less as an equal. It has made a concession, or it could even be said, has had to make a concession. Accordingly, the Internet catalyzed by visual culture begins to show a confrontational stance to the orthodox power, and also to take visual effect as one of its most advantageous weapons. Although the overall pecking order in the macro field has not been shaken yet, the above new mode of competition clearly appears in a numer of cases on the micro level, as in the case of Frjj. 70 The popularity of the text-image mode not only leads to the success of Frjj. From a panoramic view, the new mode facilitates the thriving of visual culture, which enhances the power of the Internet and pushes it forward as it evolves from the Era of Obedience to the Era of Confrontation. Moreover, it predicts a trend of visual culture that the Internet culture follows in the later Era of Riposte, to which I now turn in Chapter 4. 71 4 WHEN INTERNET ENCOUNTERS PROFESSOR I. New Conditions: Era of Riposte A Profile of Era of Riposte Following the Era of Confrontation, there comes the present era of the Internet, which can be called the Era of Riposte. As the title indicates, during this phase, although in the big picture the mainstream culture is still dominant, a number of ripostes from the Internet towards the orthodoxy have emerged on the micro level, thanks to the increasingly thriving force of the Internet. In the macro field of cultural production, the riposting force has not yet seized the overall authority. However, in certain micro fields, because of exceptional balances of powers, it is possible that the micro hierarchy be reversed by the riposting Internet power. In this era, it is not a question any longer whether the Internet will choose a confrontational stance against the authority; in the power it gained during the Era of Confrontation has been carried over into this phase and enhanced. Moreover, visual culture that continuously takes effect in this era enhances the kuso subculture, which functions as the most advantageous weapon of the Internet, and in certain cases even makes successful ripostes against orthodoxy. 72 Significance of Video The above mode of competition is indeed not a feature of the last era, but a revolution that follows from it. Contrastingly, from the Era of Obedience to the Era of Confrontation, the mode of competition in the micro field experienced a profound alteration, from a purely obedient stance to the awareness of confrontation. It is not merely a shift in attitude, but has its root in the participation of visual effect and the consequent essential enhancement of the Internet, which changes the balance of power and mode of competition in the micro field. Nevertheless, from Confrontation to Riposte, there is not a radical change in balance of power or stances of the Internet and the agents of orthodoxy. The enhancement of visual culture leads to the thriving kuso subculture, which helps the Internet to continue its confrontation, and, in certain cases, to trump the orthodoxy. The major mode of information distribution in the Era of Riposte is that of text-image-video, which goes beyond the text-image mode that characterized the previous era. Specifically, the addition of video leads to the intensification of visual culture and distinguishes the new era from the last one. As Heidegger argues, This objectifying of whatever is, is accomplished in a setting before, a representing, that aims at bringing each particular being before it in such a way that man who calculates can be sure, and that means be certain, of that being. We first arrive at science as research when and only when truth has been transformed into the certainly of representation.102 102 Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture", in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper Row, 1977), 127. 73 Heidegger indicates the significance of that “truth has been transformed into the certainly of representation”, in other words, the feeling of real existence. Compared with still images that dominate the web in the last era, video, which is more effective at communicating real existence, easily displays visual events one after another and plays the leading role in visual culture. To this extent, not until the video prevails in the era that the “age of world picture” has come. Moreover, considering the interaction of the Internet and conventional forms (e.g. television) in the network of media, the Internet video’s prevalence has more revolutionary implications. The Internet video, as Wes Simpson notes, expands the reach of television broadcasting, and creates for it a new market.103 Simpson, however, argues from the preconception that the Internet as a technologically new medium expands the family of media, and that cyberspace is but a neutral new sphere that all existing forces compete for. As I discussed in the previous three chapters, the Internet is not only a technological innovation with relative uncontrollability, but conveys a distinctive culture that provides an alternative to orthodox discourse. In other words, it is a force ideologically different from any existing force, especially that of conventional media that represent the authoritative voice. In this respect, it is narrow to consider the Internet as only a neutral sphere for competition. 103 See Wes Simpson, IPTV and Internet Video: Expanding the Reach of Television Broadcasting (Burlington: Elsevier, 2009); Wes Simpson, IPTV and Internet Video: New Markets in Television Broadcasting (Washington: National Association of Broadcasters, 2007). 74 The Internet, existing as a new force with distinctive value, actually competes with television. Programs sponsored by the Internet Service Provider (ISP) not only seize part of the market share from television stations, but also break the monopoly of governmental controlled apparatus, and undermine the authority of orthodox media. In fact, the technology-determined uncontrollability and visual reproductivity of the Internet guarantees it as a competitive rival in the world of video, if not a more promising competitor than the conventional television. The video is a most powerful visual form, compared to text or still imagery. Kuso subculture I consider the blossoming of kuso video as a start and a landmark of the Era of Riposte. In late 2005, young amateur video maker Hu Ge posted a short film, A Murder Case Caused by a Bun (a spoof of Chen Kaige’s The Promise) on the Internet, and it vaulted him to stardom. Hu’s maiden work, as well as his subsequent videos, were all well received and launched the genre of spoof video on the Internet. From the technological perspective, this visual event initiated the fashion of video posting on the Internet, which led to the blossom of most major Internet video providers soon after (see Tab. 2). From the cultural perspective, it catalyzed the kuso subculture in Mainland China, which functions as a landmark in the cultural landscape of the Era of Riposte. 75 Website Launch Year Link ?? 2005 www.tudou.com ???? 2005 http://tv.sohu.com 56 2005 www.56.com ?6 2006 www.ku6.com ???? 2006 http://tv.sina.com ?? 2007 www.youku.com Tab. 2: Since 2005, major Internet video service providers emerged in Mainland China.104 So what is kuso? Kuso (?,??), a term rooted in Japanese computer games, has rapidly spread through the whole cultural circle of East Asia.105 Generally speaking, kuso reflects an “internet culture that generally includes all types of camps and parodies”, especially of public celebrities and classic idols. In this sense, it indicates an ethos of challenging the orthodox, i.e., questioning conventional values and satirizing the existing hierarchy. It is still a question whether such questioning or satire can evolve into a practical overthrow of the present authority, and (re) shape the society in its own way. However, the significance of kuso, as a subculture is that it represents an obtrusive attitude, i.e., a grass-roots stance of riposte towards the unifying power. Therefore, the riposting identity of kuso subculture has made a perfect ideological convergence with the alternative identity of the Internet, a convergence that promises great effects. 104 Sources are from the links in the table (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 105 In various East Asian languages it has different forms. For example, it is ?? (e gao) in simplified Chinese and ?? in traditional Chinese, literally meaning "reckless doings". 76 In this sense, it deserves a mentioning that the thriving Internet video provides a proper mean to externalize the kuso subculture. This form is more effective than literal text or still images, thanks to the feeling of real existence and consequent visual shocks it causes. Compared with the concept of the iconoclastic idol described in Chapter 3, the kuso subculture and its inner logic represents a more frank and ambitious attitude toward orthodoxy. The iconoclastic idol provides alternative values and customs that differ from the orthodox, but does not yet attack its mainstream competitor. However, the spirit of kuso is to take a direct stance of riposte towards the powerful authority, which is beyond the spirit of the iconoclastic idol. Both iconoclastic spirit and kuso subculture can be categorized as postmodernist, in light of the crisis of the existing hierarchy they produce. II. “Special Internet” and Special Hierarchy In 2009, a little-known TV talk-show program, “Special Internet,” enjoyed a moment of fame when an unusual confrontation erupted between its hosts and guest Yi Zhongtian, a controversial history professor. His outburst soon touched off a heated discussion on the Internet. However, most of the Internet dialogue emphasized Yi’s personality and the hosts’ interview style, basically ignoring certain elements in the scene that may be more important than the confrontation itself. I analyze the specific balance of powers in this micro field, illustrate particular visual evidences 77 that externalize and heat up the inner competition between the Internet force and the orthodox agent, and explore the sophisticated role kuso subculture plays in this event. The typical mode of competition in the Era of Riposte is well represented by this episode. Different Agents and New Conditions Like the previous two cases, here too the influence of Internet participation, the conventional media used to conducting discourse authoritatively, and the interaction between the two forces constitute the research value of this talk show. Nevertheless, first, I will point out that the guest is not a symbol of the participation of Internet power, like Li/Lu and Frjj in Chapters 2 and 3. On the contrary, the program self-defines as the first talk show program in Mainland China that follows the trend of Internet culture.106 According to Nguyen and Alexander, “unifying media” deliver an authoritative discourse and thus “assemble and sustain nations with real-time 106 As the program’s official website says, the program is produced “in order to tell people’s stories with the Internet, represent the Internet culture, express the Internet emotion and show the positive and happy life on the Internet.” It is clear that the “positive and happy” is a deliberately arbitrary definition of Internet life, which ideologically implies the stance of the mainstream toward the Internet subculture. However, it goes beyond the discussion in this article. Source: www.btv.org/2009/kj-fcwl/fcwl09.htm (accessed Apr 24, 2010) 78 theater.”107 Considering the program is produced and aired by the Beijing TV Station, one of China’s most influential local channels, this self-definition as an Internet-oriented program conveys important ideological implications. On the one hand, it explicitly expresses the desire of conventional unifying media to take the Internet under their control; on the other hand, it also indicates that the Internet has evolved into a competitive rival of conventional media, which forces the latter to concede a part in the field which was previously wholly dominated by conventional power. In short, it is a milestone in the history of the Internet development that a TV program claims its theme as the Internet. While “Special Internet” is still the only Internet-oriented program of its kind on Chinese television, it is a clear signal that suggests the potential of the increasingly thriving Internet power, which has gradually been demonstrated in the Era of Riposte. Competition between the Internet and the orthodox undergoes a sea change. On the macro level, the authoritative power still maintains an advantageous position in the hierarchy, though this is not necessarily true on the micro level. The ensuing imbalance generates power struggles and a diversifying micro hierarchy, for example, the talk show episode in this chapter. Compared to earlier situations, new conditions in the Era of Riposte represent a sea change, and make potentials in the previous eras really come true. The first 107 Nguyen, D.T and Alexander J, “The Coming of Cyberspace time and the End of Polity”, in ed. Shields, R. Cultures of Internet: virtual Spaces, Read Histories, Living bodies (London: Sage, 1996), 99-124. 79 example is Internet literature. During the whole Era of Obedience, Internet literature in Mainland China had always been considered an inferior literature. However, as late as 2008 in the Era of Riposte, it finally received recognition from the official Chinese Writer Association (CWA).108 Second, the iconoclastic idol Frjj in the Era of Confrontation received more negative comments than positive, and was even banned by public authorities. However, even she received official recognition in the late 2009: Frjj was invited to the 2009 China Internet Economy Leadership Forum and awarded the prize of the Best Personal Website.109 In Mainland China, similar examples occur every day, thus ceaselessly altering the pattern of power and competition. The Internet, to a certain extent, has partially seized territories that used to be under the control of those with authoritative power. Power Pattern and Reversed Micro Hierarchy Against this historical backdrop, it is not hard to understand the new power pattern and reversed, or even unconventional hierarchy in the show. First, I attribute the agent of Internet force to the program (represented by the host and hostess), as discussed in the last paragraph. Second, the secondary guest is a comedian also sponsored by the mainstream media, who seems to represent the orthodox force. However, it must be noted that the comedian was invited onto the program to mock 108 See footnote 71. 109 See footnote 81. 80 the primary guest and is thus aligned with the program, standing against the primary guest. So how is the primary guest to be classified? The primary guest, Yi Zhongtian, is in fact an agent of the orthodox power. As a prestigious history professor, Yi became a household name as the host of a television series on the history of China, sponsored by the China Central TV Station (CCTV), which serves as the official voice of the Chinese government and has an audience of billions. Although the Internet has increased his celebrity, his status as cultural icon is undoubtedly rooted in conventional media. The above correspondence differs from the majority of TV talk shows in Mainland China, which used to be seen as quintessential agents of unifying media, conducting a conventional top-down pecking order and an authoritative discourse. This program acts as the agent of Internet culture and takes an advantageous position with the authority to frame the studio confrontation via postproduction editing, placing its rival in a lower position in the power structure. Correspondingly, the guest, who theoretically should have had a status that was secure, actually plays a role of being seen, judged and finally irritated. This conspicuous structure in the micro field, which reverses the hierarchy in the macro field, can be seen as the Internet’s retort towards its authoritative counterpart. III. Visual Evidence and Proxemic Significance. 81 Regarding the specific micro field in this chapter, I intend to discuss how the visual culture continues to facilitate the Internet force to make a riposte to the orthodox, and illustrate how the specific visual evidence (the spatial arrangement) externalizes the inner attitude of the Internet. As a part of the program, the spatial arrangement conveys the stance of the program, i.e., the attitude of the Internet force. It is obvious that the primary guest Yi displayed great cooperation in the first half. With complete calmness, Yi fielded a great number of stilted, even boring lines of questioning that he had already answered on numerous talk shows. When recounting his early life as a farm worker in Xinjiang, he even physically demonstrated picking cotton and picking corn, which enthralled the audience and resulted in the first and last happy climax in the studio (Fig. 9). Fig. 9: Yi Zhongtian mocked picking cotton.110 110 A screenshot from the original video, http://www.56.com/u19/v_NDUxMDIyMDg.html (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 82 In the first half of the show, there is absolutely nothing to foreshadow the confrontation to follow. However, in the middle of the show, the co-guest, an unknown cross-talk performer and comedian, was led onto the stage and seated shoulder to shoulder with Yi (Fig. 10). In retrospect, the entrance and seating of the comedian was a watershed moment that initiated all the confrontations and noncooperation throughout the second half. From then on, Yi ridiculed the host and hostess and even the production team with harsh words, making every topic an oral fight.111 Even until the last minute, when Yi was invited to sing a solo without accompaniment, he maintained his obstreperous manner by mischievously botching a rehearsal. Fig. 10: The comedian was led to sit with Yi shoulder to shoulder.112 111 I quoted a few verbalism of Yi as below: “I refuse to answer stupid question”. “Let’s open a Host Seminar, (since) hosts are all idiots.” “I never ask you ‘why did you raise so silly question?” “You seem not to be able to finish your assignment. It is your boss’s fault who is a fool.” “In this era, how can you be a leader if you are not fool?” 112 See footnote 110. 83 I attempt to demonstrate that the seating arrangement as a visual event not only coincides with Yi’s outburst, but also greatly contributes to his attitude change. What significance can one explore from this visual event? Socio-psychologically, seating abreast implies one party’s identity with the other, or rather, this seating arrangement typically symbolizes recognition of the two parties’ equivalent social positions. In practice, by design or by habit, this seating rule has been widely applied in the spatial arrangement of TV talk-show studios. By using seating arrangement to mitigate disparities between hosts and guests, at least in the studio, this facilitates effective communication through a cozy atmosphere of equals. Similarly, if the only two guests are seated alongside each other, we have every reason to denote it as a latent signifier of the standpoint of the program. My first argument is that the visual arrangement paradoxically conforms to the standpoint of the program and functions in making a riposte towards the orthodox. Based on earlier episodes of “Special Internet,” I draw the conclusion that it is a custom in this program to arrange abreast seating for guests who are equivalent in social roles and public recognition or have very intimate relations. However, Yi’s case is the first where a comedian had been invited to sit shoulder to shoulder with a professor—and not just any comedian, but one famous for mocking the professor’s regional dialect and quirky mannerisms.113 The status gap between the two guests is 113 Even during the talk show, the program screens a clip that the comedian was awarded a prize for his mocking Yi in a ceremony, and asks him to give a live mock show in the studio of the talk show. 84 obvious and of great implications. In this sense, compared with the dozens of previous episodes, this show seems like a violation of the custom of the program. However, I argue that the seating in the Yi episode obeys the custom in a paradoxical way. It signifies a spacious identity of the two: the professor himself and his mocker, and consequently conducts a parody on the professor. In other words, the visual effect has been utilized as a weapon to attack the orthodox, deliberately and publicly. It is not hard for Yi to quickly sense the mockery in the scene. So, it may provide a rational explanation for the show’s otherwise inexplicable turning point. My second argument is that the seating arrangement also demonstrates an ambiguous attitude of the Internet force against its orthodox rival: engage in parody, but keep a respectful distance. The ambivalent attitude is common not only to an agent of a secondary cultural force in the field of cultural production, but also to an agent of a dominant force when it has to face up to an increasingly powerful rival. Yi and the two hosts are not seated shoulder-to-shoulder, but approximately opposite to each other, with a nearly 10 feet distance (Fig. 11). It is untenable to describe this arrangement as intimate at all. For a TV talk-show program, this seating arrangement is absolutely unusual, and it is the first time ever for Yi to sit so far from the host (Tab. 3). Other previous episodes of “Special Internet” show guests seated in patterns that resemble conventional talk-show seating arrangements (Fig.12 & 13). 85 Fig. 11: The long distance between Yi and the host and hostess. From left: the host, hostess, Zhongtian Yi and the Comedian.114 *F2F: face to face. Tab. 3: Yi’s seating in previous talk show episodes.115 114 See footnote 110. 115 Sources are from below links (accessed Apr 24, 2010): 1. http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/-zgo0o1U94Y/ 2. http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/sP064T4q_0g/ 3. http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/QUlyAZ74byM/ 4. http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/zeH7rOXhxPU/ 5. http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/IT4QX7k-Wsg/ 6. http://v.ku6.com/show/9wNj25M8onKVNBck.html 7. http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/t_dqNJLn-5I/ 8. http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/UFmViN3Eqy4/ 9. http://v.ku6.com/show/9dCXN4i3AUpHR6JD.html No Showtime Talk-show Channel Seating 1 03/09/08 Comments on Law Cctv-12 Talent-show model 2 04/13/07 Xiao-cui’s Talk Cctv-10 Abreast, same table 3 07/31/08 Lecture Room Cctv-10 Abreast 4 08/20/06 Face to Face Cctv-1 Knee to knee 5 N/A Talk on Ningxia Ningxia Abreast, same table 6 05/12/06 News Discussion Cctv-1 F2F*, same table 7 08/16/06 Date with Luyu Hunan Abreast, same sofa 8 07/26/06 Interview with Yanglan Shanghai F2F, same table 9 11/09/06 Dialogue Cctv-2 Knee to knee 86 Fig. 12: Another episode of the Special Internet. The program used to arrange intimate guests sitting together.116 Fig. 13: Another episode of the program. 117 116 Source: http://tv.sohu.com/20090708/n265076571.shtml (accessed Apr 24, 2010) 117 Source: http://tv.sohu.com/20090407/n263247854.shtml (accessed Apr 24, 2010).? 87 Edward Hall divides body spacing between people into four types (Fig.14) and argues that the category into which the apparent body spacing falls indicates the inner relationships among people.118 Also, Hall’s theory fits the cultural materialism theories.119 In the Yi episode, the body spacing falls into the far category of social distance and quite close to the public distance. It is proper for interactions among acquaintances, but not fit for the talk show, where there is supposed to be an intimate or even familial atmosphere. However, the dissonance between the distant atmosphere and the personal topics not only creates the initial tension to bring about the oral fights, but also fails to cushion against the confrontation when it really happens.120 118 Edward Hall, The Silent Language (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, 1965). 119 However, if one penetrates the core structure of proxemics—how the estimation of the positioning determines the apparent performance (body spacing)—one may find that it essentially resonates with cultural materialistic ideas. The existent estimation of the positioning of the other and oneself can be considered as the cultural superstructure, which is “itself material,” according to the statements of cultural materialists. Such an “itself material” factor determines the apparent body performing that is actually the externalization of the inner emotion. 120 It can be proved by the later oral fights in the second half of the show. Contrastingly, the statistics in Figure 1 displays that in all previous talk shows where there is not any confrontation or noncooperation, Yi has been seated within personal or even intimate distance to the host(s). 88 Fig. 14: Edward Hall’s body spacing circle.121 IV. Kuso Culture and Anti-intellectualism This part continues the previous discussion on seating arrangement but stresses more the seating’s covert significance. Yes, the deliberate seating in the micro field greatly signals a riposte of the Internet towards the orthodox. However, why does the agent of Internet select such an approach to target its mainstream counterpart? Noticeably, the Internet force makes its retort in its most advantageous 121 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxemics/(accessed Apr 24, 2010) 89 way: kuso subculture, which has converged with the trend of anti-intellectualism in contemporary Mainland China. This talk show episode is an ideal case for kuso culture, because of the dual presentation of kuso culture. The outside tier of kuso, of course, is the disrespectful seating arrangement, which makes a parody of the history professor. However, the inside kuso, which may be not easy to find out, is the approach of kuso that Yi applied in his history research and lecturing. Sponsored by the CCTV and well received by his audience, Yi is distinguished by his humorous mannerism, regional accent and reinterpretation of historic and classic heroes from a modern and soft perspective.122 This style in fact also conforms to the spirit of kuso: take a parody to classic idols. Causally, this professor’s performance received a great amount of critiques from the academia.123 The two tiers of kuso exercises both succeed. As for the outside tier, the program successfully accomplishes the mockery upon the guest, which showcases the strength of the Internet by the means of visual effect. As for the inner tier, the de facto kuso exercise of Yi conveys complex implications. On the one hand, it is the kuso exercise that distinguishes him from most contemporary professors who still hold a conventional attitude towards the classic idol and canon. Yi consequently jumps to 122 See “Verbalism of Yi Zhongtian”, http://baike.baidu.com/view/19398.htm#3 (accessed Apr 24, 2010). 123 At the peak of Yi’s stardom, there are a number of scholars criticizing Yi’s interpretation on history, such as Zhu, Yueyi ed. “The Cultural Eye: Yi Zhongtian is in the Center of Storm,” http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/22226/34912/34914/4745247.html. 90 academic stardom in light of the kuso subculture, which conveys an ethos that accords with the postmodernist inclination in present day, i.e., the crisis of existing hierarchy in modern society. However, on the other hand, once Yi has benefited from the kuso subculture and raised to fame as a distinctive cultural idol, he lost the identity as a challenger of the orthodox, having become a part of the orthodox, and a target of the Internet that makes an alternative discourse to the mainstream. Kuso, or the reinterpretation and re-presentation of classics and authority, signifies a recent anti-intellectualism trend throughout the cyber community in Mainland China. As the Great Britain Encyclopedia’s definition, anti-intellectualism is a hostility towards and mistrust of intellect, intellectuals, and intellectual pursuits, usually expressed as the derision of education, philosophy, literature, art, and science.124 Extremely different from the US,125 there has been a deeply rooted dominant intellectualism trend in Chinese history, largely thanks to Confucian ideology, the civil service and the imperial examination system of the 2,000-year-old feudalistic society. In contemporary Mainland China, this historical trend continues to play an important role in the current ideology. Even though the Party launched a series of 124 http://www.britannica.com/anti-intellectualism (accessed Apr 24, 2010) 125 Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American life See Anti-intellectualism in American life (New York: Knopf, 1966). Hofstadter coins the term “anti-intellectualism”. He self-examines American history and addresses that the trend of anti-intellectualism is deeply rooted in history and can be traced back as early as to 19th century, which helps to bring about the current political phenomenon. 91 anti-intellectualism movements in the first three decades after 1949, the official political effort has little distorted the recognition if not reverence of intellectualism among the masses. Now that intellectualism is a companion of authority, it unavoidably becomes a target of Internet influences that emphasize non-mainstream culture and anti-authority. Furthermore, in the specific context of Mainland China, anti-intellectualism also greatly contributes to Internet culture and stands in opposition to authoritativeness. If the model and classics are the voice of authority in the real world, kuso culture as spread through cyberspace is a sort of Internet voice, which plays a crucial role in the nose-thumbing towards the mainstream culture in the Yi episode. V. Externalized Inner Competition The studio for “Special Internet” is a micro field where the influence of Internet culture seized the editorial authority and consequently made the Internet exceed its mainstream counterpart in the final edited program. The hierarchy in this micro field is contrary to that in the macro field, and the seating arrangement serves as a subtle yet effective coup on the agent of the mainstream force. In addition, as the agent of the mainstream force, Yi undoubtedly competes through his noncooperation, although his struggle does not change the structure in the micro field, and the mainstream still remains lower in the hierarchy and becomes a target of mockery and 92 parody. It is the inner competition of different forces in the field that determines and is externalized by the visual elements. 93 5 CONCLUSION Approaches and Expectations This thesis discusses the mode of competition between the Internet and the orthodox in the past two decades. Concerning the macro-micro relationship, I take a brief view of the macro environment in Mainland China, while focus on particular, concrete competitions on the micro level. Of the two struggling parties in competition, I keep an eye on the changes in stance adopted by the authority, but mainly explore the mode of competition from the perspective of the Internet development. I choose the micro level condition as my object rather than the macro condition, not for my convenience but because of the reality of the cultural landscape of Mainland China. Considering the characteristics of Chinese administration, especially governmental control upon the media, it needs to be noted that the macro situation generally remains constant from the mid-1990s to the present day, i.e., conventional media that conduct an authoritative discourse dominate the macro field of cultural production, while the increasingly thriving Internet attempts to compete for more capital but so far stays in a suppressed position. Contrastingly, situations among micro fields vary, and typically represent the advance of the Internet. Therefore, I select three specific micro fields to make case studies, in order to 94 demonstrate the progress of the competition from one era to the next, as well as the technological and social changes involved. Furthermore, of the two competing forces—the Internet and the authority—I emphasize the former while considering the latter as performing a correspondent role. One reason is that the Internet, as a nascent medium, has been less studied and far less completely theorized than the conventional media, which have been the subject of a huge body of research built up over many decades. In this sense, my discussion specifically on the Internet may contribute to the groundwork in this field. Another reason for my focus on the Internet is that, according to the inner logic in the field of cultural production, it is the development of the Internet that continuously catalyzes the transformation of the authority power, which has been my argument in this thesis. In other words, one may find a causal relationship between the two parties. Therefore, I emphasize the initiative of Internet development and consider the authoritative party as a driven element (but still dominant in the macro environment). However, this does not mean that mine is the only valid approach. To discuss the struggle between the Internet and the mainstream, one may also examine the situation from the macro perspective, or focus on conventional media—such as governmental regulation and propaganda. Considering that a great amount of research has been done in the above two fields, researchers who follow these two ways will definitely benefit from the present study and make valuable achievements. 95 Highlights and Assumptions Rooted in this inherent logic, I categorize the growth of the Internet force into three phases according to the theory of Macro-Micro-Field, which I presented in this thesis for the first time. This taxonomy clarifies the exploration of the cultural landscape, and illustrates characteristics and veins in different phases. However, whether this theory is applicable to other landscapes, e.g. the political landscape, is still a question. In addition, I summarize the taxonomy based on the specific situation in Mainland China, but have not yet tested it in a cross-cultural context. I assume this theory will also effectively demonstrate the situation in different disciplinary landscapes in China, as well as in different cultures and nations, with the results varying in distinctive ways according to particular contextual dissimilarities. This assumption will have to be tested by future research in this field. Throughout my three case studies, I focus on visual culture, and consider it as the catalyst that facilitates the Internet to evolve from the Era of Obedience to the Era of Confrontation, and then to the Era of Riposte. From the perspective of postmodernism, and from the comparative perspective of modernism in the early 20th century, I discuss the contextual significance of visual culture in different eras, particularly as one of the most effective weapons of the Internet. I predict that visual culture will experience more revolutions in future as technology advances, and continue its crucial role in Internet development and even social reform. I will 96 continuously pay attention to the development of visual culture and the Internet, expecting more valuable research in this promising field. Throughout this thesis, I locate the Internet in opposition to the authoritative power, which is to say, to the present orthodoxy. So far this dichotomy works well, but how would it work equally effectively in the future? The Internet and mainstream media are engaged in a yet-unfinished war. We can only imagine, if one day technological advances make the Internet as controllable as conventional media, whether the Internet culture will be incorporated into the mainstream, or still maintain the struggle, but in a different way. It is to be noted that the totality of my previous discussions is based on the premise that the Internet exists and functions as a neo-medium that is less controllable than conventional media. In this sense, the possibility of the Internet’s assimilation by the mainstream may completely invalidate my discussion in this paper. However, these topics go beyond the scope of this paper and merit their own studies in the field of culture and media. 97 Glossary A Case Caused by a Steamed Bun ?????????? Annie Baby ???? China Internet Network Information Center ????????? China Writers Association ?????? Furong Jiejie/Frjj ????? Government-endorsed Theme ??? Gu Long ?? Kuso ?? Li Xunhuan ??? Long Men Zhen ???? Lu Jinbo ??? Muzimei ??? Ning Caishen ??? 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Online Resource (All Accessed Apr 24, 2010): Websites: http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index.htm. http://www.scio.gov.cn/ www.sfrjj.com www.williamhung.net http://www.britannica.com www.btv.org/2009/kj-fcwl/fcwl09.htm www.wikipedia.com 102 Videos: Video clip for Chapter 2: http://tv.sohu.com/20080703/n257906285.shtml Video Clip for Chapter 3: 1) http://v.ku6.com/show/dj2m08ASJMblgWZL.html 2) http://v.ku6.com/show/K2wnD7bZNR0FmJN-.html Video Clip for Chapter 4: http://www.56.com/u19/v_NDUxMDIyMDg.html Online Articles: Chew, Deanna, “Asian American Idol: Stereotype or Star?” http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=488ec27 f63f81f8613766d6ad03c5711. Cho, Eugene. “Asian Stereotypes and Prejudice.” http://eugenecho.wordpress.com/2008/06/13/know-one-asian-know-all- asians1230273.htm. Ge, Hongbin, “Yi Zhongtian Should be Stopped.” http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_473d280c010003up.html. 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Zhu, Yueyi ed. “The Cultural Eye: Yi Zhongtian is in the Center of Storm” http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/22226/34912/34914/4745247.html “Chinese Writers Association will Accept Internet Writers.” http://review.jcrb.com/200803/ca695931.htm. “Furong Jiejie received recognition from the Internet Industry.” http://ent.qq.com/a/20091220/000047.htm. “Furong Jiejie Takes New Photos for Zhang Yimou’s Film.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2010-04/13/c_ . Verbalism of Yi Zhongtian http://baike.baidu.com/view/19398.htm#3. 104 Vita Mei Huang was born in a small town in Hubei, P.R. China. She entered Peking University in 2003, and received her Bachelor of Arts degree from the Department of Chinese Language and Literature in 2007. In Fall 2007, she entered the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin, and studied for a Master of Arts degree in Asian Studies. She worked as a Teaching Assistant in the Department of Asian Studies from 2007 to 2010. ? Email: hmmmeis@mail.utexas.edu This thesis was typed by the author.